UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 

JAMES E. AKINS, et aI., ) 

) 

Plaintiffs, ) 

) 

v. ) Civil Case Nos. 92-1864, 00-1478, 

) 03-2431 (RJL) 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, ) 

) 

Defendant. ) 

MEMORANDU~NION (September £, 2010) 

This consolidated matter is before the Court on the parties' cross-motions for 

summary judgment, seeking review of the Federal Election Commission's dismissal of 

multiple administrative complaints. The Court has carefully considered the parties' 

filings, relevant law, and the entire record herein. For the reasons set forth below, the 

plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED and the defendant's Cross-Motion 

for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. 

BACKGROUND 

A. The Parties 

Richard Curtiss, Paul Findley, Andrew Killgore, and Orin Parker (collectively, 

"plaintiffs") are former ambassadors, congressmen, or government officials. I They are 

politically active people who seek to influence policymakers and the public on U.S. policy 

Three plaintiffs, James E. Akins, Robert 1. Hanks, and George Ball, have died since this 

litigation was first commenced. Their deaths, however, do not affect the legal issues pending in 

this case. 

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in the Middle East. The plaintiffs hold many views contrary to those of the American 

Israel Public Affairs Committee ("AIPAC"). See 1st Am. CompI. ~ 10, Akins v. FEe, No. 

92-1864 ("Akins F'); 2d Am., 1st Supp. Compl. ~ 10, Akins v. FEe, No. 00-1478 ("Akins 

IF'); CompI. ~ 8, Akins v. FEe, No. 03-2431 ("Akins IIF'). 

AIPAC is an incorporated, tax-exempt organization with over 50,000 supporters 

and a budget of about $10 million (as of 1989). It lobbies Congress and the Executive 

Branch for military and economic aid to Israel with the stated purpose to encourage close 

relations between the United States and Israel. AIPAC was the respondent in the 

underlying administrative matters before the Federal Election Commission, but it is not a 

party in the district court cases.2 See 1st Am. CompI. ~ 12, Akins I; 2d Am., 1st Supp. 

CompI. ~ 12, Akins 11; CompI. ~ 10, Akins III; Pl.'s S. Mat'l Facts ~~ 1-2. 

The defendant is the Federal Election Commission (the "FEC" or the 

"Commission"), an independent agency of the U.S. Government. The FEC has sole 

jurisdiction to civilly enforce the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, as amended, 2 

U.S.C. § 431 et seq. (the "FECA" or the "Act"). 2 U.S.C. § 437c(b )(1). 

B. The Federal Election Campaign Act 

The FECA's purposes are "to limit spending in federal election campaigns and to 

eliminate the actual or perceived pernicious influence over candidates for elective office 

2 AlP AC was granted leave to file briefs as amicus curiae in Akins I and Akins II for prior 

motions. AlP AC did not seek leave to file for the currently pending cross-motions for summary 

judgment. 

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that wealthy individuals or corporations could achieve by financing the 'political 

warchests' of those candidates." Orloski v. FEC, 795 F.2d 156, 163 (D.C. Cir. 1986) 

(citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25-26 (1976)). To accomplish its goals, "[t]he Act 

imposes limits upon the amounts that individuals, corporations, 'political committees' 

(including political action committees), and political parties can contribute to a candidate 

for federal political office." FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 14 (1998) ("Akins Supreme 

Court Opinion") (citing 2 U.S.C. §§ 441a(a)-(b), 441b). 

Under the Act, all "political committees" are required to register with the 

Commission and make periodic reports of receipts and disbursements. 2 U.S.C. §§ 433, 

434. A "political committee" is defined as "any committee, club, association, or other 

group of persons which receives contributions aggregating in excess of $1 ,000 during a 

calendar year or which makes expenditures aggregating in excess of $1 ,000 during a 

calendar year." 2 U.S.C. § 431(4)(A). Generally speaking, an "expenditure" is "any 

purchase, payment, distribution, loan, advance, deposit, or gift of money or anything of 

value, made by any person for the purpose of influencing any election for Federal office." 

2 U.S.c. § 431(9)(A). 

The Act exempts from the definition of the term "expenditure" "any 

communications by any membership organization ... to its members ... if such 

membership organization ... is not organized primarily for the purpose of influencing the 

nomination for election, or election, of any individual to Federal office." 2 U.S.C. 

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§ 431(9)(B)(iii). Simply put, membership communications by a membership organization 

that is not organized primarily for the purpose of influencing federal elections are not 

"expenditures" that count toward the $1,000 limit beyond which the organization can be 

classified as a "political committee." However, "the costs incurred by a membership 

organization ... directly attributable to a communication expressly advocating the 

election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate (other than a communication primarily 

devoted to subjects other than the express advocacy of the election or defeat ofa clearly 

identified candidate)[] shall, if such costs exceed $2,000 for any election, be reported to 

the Commission." Id. Membership organizations that trigger the reporting requirement 

must file disclosure reports in accordance with 2 U.S.C. § 434(a)(4)(A)(i) and (ii). 

C. Procedural History 

1. MUR2804 

This case has had a long and complicated history. On January 12, 1989, plaintiffs 

filed their first administrative complaint with the FEC, designated Matter Under Review 

("MUR") 2804, alleging, inter alia, that AlP AC was a political committee as defined by 

the Act and was thus required to make certain disclosures regarding its financial 

activities. First Certified Administrative Record ("F.A.R.") 4, 12-19 (refiled Oct. 14, 

2005); Second Certified Administrative Record ("S.A.R.") 341 (filed June 6, 2004) 

(describing procedural history). Plaintiffs also claimed that AIPAC had made illegal 

corporate campaign expenditures in violation of2 U.S.C. § 441b. F.A.R.4, 12-19; 

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S.A.R. 341. AIPAC claimed that its communications to its members fell within the 

membership organization exception and, therefore, that it did not have to register as a 

political committee or disclose its financial activities to the FEC. F .A.R. 1460-1549; 

S.A.R. 341. 

On June 16, 1992, the Commission voted 6-0 to find no probable cause to believe 

AlP AC was a political committee-and thus AlP AC was not subject to the registration 

and disclosure rules applicable to political committees-because AIPAC's "major 

purpose" was not to influence federal elections. F .A.R. 3771-72, 3871-72; S.A.R. 341-

42. However, the Commission voted 4-2 to find probable cause that AlP AC had violated 

2 U.S.C. § 441 b by making corporate contributions, which consisted largely of electionrelated coordinated expenditures for communications to individuals who were not, under 

the Commission's view at the time, "members" of AIPAC. 3 F.A.R. 3771-72, 3871-72; 

S.A.R.341. The FEC thought that the question of whether the individuals receiving this 

material were "members" was a "close question" and noted that it expected to undertake a 

regulatory proceeding in the near future to clarify the membership criteria. F .A.R. 3860-

68, 3925-26. Ultimately, the Commission voted 6-0 to exercise its prosecutorial 

discretion to take no further action and dismiss the complaint. F.A.R. 3925-26; S.A.R. 

341-42. 

The FEC found that, under the regulations then in force, the Executive Committee of 

AlP AC qualified as "members" of the organization and that communications to them were 

"membership communications." F.A.R. 3862,3867. 

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2. Akins I, No. 92-1864 

Plaintiffs filed suit in our Court in 1992, challenging the FEC's detennination that 

AIPAC was not a "political committee." S.A.R. 342 (describing Akins I). They did not, 

however, seek review of the membership organization issue. Id. A former member of 

our Court granted summary judgment for the FEC in 1994, agreeing with the "major 

purpose" test employed by the FEC to detennine whether AlP AC qualified as a political 

committee. Akins I, No. 92-1864, slip op. at 15-16 (D.D.C. Mar. 30,1994). Plaintiffs 

appealed, and a divided panel of our Court of Appeals affirmed. See Akins v. FEC, 66 

F.3d 348 (D.C. Cir. 1995) ("Akins Panel Opinion"). Upon rehearing en bane, our Circuit 

Court reversed, finding that the "major purpose" test was inapplicable in cases such as 

this one that did not involve independent expenditures. See Akins v. FEC, 101 F.3d 731 

(D.C. Cir. 1996) (en bane) ("Akins En Bane Opinion"). Unfortunately, this appellate 

odyssey had only just begun! 

The Supreme Court granted certiorari on the question whether an organization that 

otherwise satisfies the Act's definition of a political committee nonetheless falls outside 

of that definition because "its major purpose is not the nomination or election of 

candidates." Akins Supreme Court Opinion, 524 U.S. at 26 (internal quotation marks 

omitted).4 Rather than addressing this issue, however, the Supreme Court noted that the 

Commission had proposed new rules defining "membership organization" and vacated 

4 The Supreme Court also granted certiorari on the question of standing and found that the 

plaintiffs did have standing to bring suit in this case. Akins Supreme Court Opinion, 524 U.S. at 

26. 

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our Circuit's en banc decision and remanded the case to the FEC to determine whether, 

under the new membership rules promulgated by the FEC, the communications at issue 

constituted membership communications and, therefore, fell outside the scope of 

expenditures that could qualify AIPAC as a "political committee." Id. at 28-29. The 

Court stated that "[i]f ... the FEC decides that AIPAC's activities fall within the 

'membership communications' exception, the matter will become moot." Id. at 29. 

3. MUR2804R 

On March 21, 2000, under its newly revised membership regulations, the FEC first 

found that members of AlP AC met the definition of "members" in the new regulations, a 

finding that is undisputed. F.A.R. Supp. 3980 (filed Oct. 2, 2000)5; S.A.R. 343; see 11 

C.F.R. § 114.1(e)(2) (2000). The FEC then voted 6-0 to find that AIPAC was a 

"membership organization" under the new regulations. F .A.R. Supp. 3979-82, 3986; 

S.A.R.343. Among other requirements, the regulation specifies that a membership 

organization "[i]s not organized primarily for the purpose of influencing the nomination 

for election, or election, of any individual to Federal office." 11 C.F.R. § 114.1(e)(1)(vi) 

(2000).6 The Commission concluded that the facts that had originally led it to conclude 

This Supplement to the First Certified Administrative Record constitutes the 

administrative record for MUR 2804R. 6 The new regulations defined a "membership organization" as an organization that: 

(i) Is composed of members, some or all of whom are vested with the power and 

authority to operate or administer the organization, pursuant to the 

organization's articles, bylaws, constitution or other formal organizational 

documents; 

(ii) Expressly states the qualifications and requirements for membership in its 

articles, bylaws, constitution or other formal organizational documents; 

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that election activity was not AIPAC's "major purpose" were enough to establish a 

fortiori that AIPAC was not organized "primarily" for that purpose. F.A.R. Supp. 3982. 

This is the only requirement under the regulations defining "membership organizations" 

that is contested by the plaintiffs in the instant action. The FEC concluded that AlP AC' s 

disbursements for election-related communications were exempt from the definition of 

"expenditures" because they were made to AIPAC's "members." F.A.R. Supp. 3982-83. 

The FEC found that "the issue of AIPAC's political committee status during the period 

covered by the complaint in MUR 2804 has, as anticipated by the U.S. Supreme Court, 

become effectively moot." F.A.R. Supp. 3983. Accordingly, the Commission adhered to 

its earlier determination that there was no probable cause to believe that AlP AC violated 

2 U.S.C. §§ 433 and 434. F.A.R. Supp. 3986. 

4. Akins II, No. 00-1478 

In 2000, plaintiffs again filed suit in our Court, now seeking review of the FEC's 

determination that AIPAC was a membership organization. Akins IL No. 00-1478 

(D.D.C. filed nunc pro tunc to May 19,2000). Akins II was consolidated for all purposes 

with Akins 1. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. Plaintiffs made two 

(iii) Makes its articles, bylaws, constitution, or other formal organizational 

documents available to its members upon request; 

(iv) Expressly solicits persons to become members; 

(v) Expressly acknowledges the acceptance of membership, such as by sending 

a membership card or including the member's name on a membership 

newsletter list; and 

(vi) Is not organized primarily for the purpose of influencing the nominationfor 

election, or election, of any individual to Federal office. 

11 C.F.R. § 114.1(e)(1) (2000) (emphasis added). 

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arguments: (1) that the FEC erred in determining that AIPAC was a membership 

organization and that its communications were to members and (2) that AIPAC's 

communications expressly advocated the election of clearly identified candidates and cost 

more than $2,000 per election and thus had to be reported pursuant to the Act. The FEC 

responded that it had never been presented with the plaintiffs' second argument. On May 

20, 2002, the plaintiffs filed a new administrative complaint before the Commission, 

designated MUR 5272, making the express advocacy argument. S.A.R. 15-24. The 

consolidated case in the District Court was stayed by a now deceased member of our 

Court pending the resolution ofMUR 5272. Order Staying Proceedings, Akins II, No. 00-

1478 (D.D.C. Aug. 15,2003). 

5. MUR5272 

In MUR 5272, plaintiffs argued that even if the membership communication 

exemption applies, AlP AC is required to report its membership communications in excess 

of $2,000 under 2 U.S.C. § 431(9)(B)(iii) because they are "communication[s] expressly 

advocating the election or defeat of ... clearly identified candidate [ s]." S.A.R. 15-24. 

On November 13,2003, the FEC dismissed the complaint as a matter of prose cut oria I 

discretion, noting that in the complaint for MUR 5272, the plaintiffs did not cite any 

specific instances of communications containing express advocacy. S.A.R. 344-45. The 

Commission reviewed the material from the earlier MUR and the information submitted 

by AIPAC in its response to MUR 5272 and concluded that although there may have been 

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"isolated instances" when AIPAC's communications extended from issue advocacy to 

express advocacy, there was no indication that the costs associated with these 

communications exceeded the $2,000 threshold or that these communications continued 

after 1990. S.A.R. 345. The Commission reasoned that any further investigation would 

be frustrated by problems of proof and the expiration of the applicable statute of 

limitations and concluded that it would not be an appropriate use of the FEC's limited 

resources. Id. 

6. Akins III, No. 03-2431 

Undaunted, plaintiffs filed a third suit in our Court, seeking review of the FEC's 

decision to dismiss MUR 5272. Akins III, No. 03-2431 (D.D.C. filed Nov. 25, 2003). On 

October 25,2007, following the death of the presiding District Judge, all three related 

cases were reassigned to this Court by our Calendar Committee. Akins III was 

consolidated with Akins I and Akins II. The parties then filed the currently pending crossmotions for summary judgment in 2009. 

DISCUSSION 

A. Standard of Review 

The standard to be applied in reviewing a decision by the FEC not to prosecute is 

whether the FEC has acted "contrary to law." Orloski, 795 F.2d at 161 (citing 2 U.S.c. 

§ 437g(a)(8)(C)). "The FEC's decision is 'contrary to law' if(l) the FEC dismissed the 

complaint as a result of an impermissible interpretation of the Act or (2) if the FEC's 

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dismissal of the complaint, under a permissible interpretation of the statute, was arbitrary 

or capricious, or an abuse of discretion." Id. (internal citation omitted). In determining 

whether the Commission's action was contrary to law, a reviewing court is "not to 

interpret the statute as it [thinks] best but rather the narrower inquiry into whether the 

Commission's construction was 'sufficiently reasonable' to be accepted by a reviewing 

court." FEC v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454 U.S. 27, 39 (1981) 

("DSCC'). "To satisfy this standard it is not necessary for a court to find that the 

agency's construction was the only reasonable one or even the reading the court would 

have reached" on its own. Id. The arbitrary, capricious, or abuse of discretion standard is 

"an extremely deferential standard which requires affirmance if a rational basis for the 

agency's decision is shown." Orloski, 795 F.2d at 167 (internal quotation marks and 

citation omitted). 

B. Analysis 

1. Waiver 

The Commission first argues that the plaintiffs waived their challenge to the 

Commission's determination that AIPAC was a membership organization. This claim is 

based on the fact that the plaintiffs did not seek review of the Commission's finding in 

MUR 2804 that AIPAC did not violate 2 U.S.C. § 441b through its communications to 

members of its Executive Committee, who did qualify as "members" of AlP AC under the 

regulations in force at that time. The FEC asserts that the only question on remand was 

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whether additional individuals, outside of the executive board, qualified as "members," 

since the "organized primarily for the purpose of influencing" federal elections language 

was already in the statute during MUR 2804. In response, the plaintiffs draw a distinction 

between the Commission's 1992 determination that the Executive Committee was not 

"organized primarily" for the purpose of influencing elections and the currently pending 

issue of whether the entire 50,000 "membership organization" is "organized primarily" 

for that purpose. I agree. 

The Supreme Court's remand required the FEC to revisit whether AIPAC was 

organized primarily for the purpose of influencing federal elections. As described above, 

the Court granted certiorari on the issue of the definition of "political committee," but the 

Court then chose not to address that issue and instead directed the Commission to 

reconsider the issue of AIPAC's membership organization status under the newly revised 

regulations. See Akins Supreme Court Opinion, 524 U.S. at 29.7 It would be ridiculous to 

say that the Supreme Court ordered the FEC to issue a new determination under a new set 

of rules, but barred any judicial review of that determination. In fact, the Supreme Court 

specifically contemplated judicial review. See id. (noting that the FEC's remand 

determination would either moot the political committee issue or allow the "lower courts, 

in reconsidering the respondents' arguments" to evaluate the communicative context of 

7 To that end, when the en bane D.C. Circuit issued its vacate and remand order following 

the Supreme Court's decision, Judge Silberman wrote separately to note certain unusual 

circumstances of the case. See Akins v. FEe, 146 F.3d 1049 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (per curiam) 

(Silberman, J., writing separately). 

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the case). Thus, there was no waiver. 8 

2. "Organized Primarily" 

The FEC found that AlP AC was not "organized primarily for the purpose of 

influencing" elections, within the meaning of2 U.S.C. § 431(9)(8)(iii) based on the 

FEC's finding in MUR 2804 that "[t]he evidence shows that AIPAC is primarily ... a 

lobbying organization." F.A.R. 3772; see F.A.R. Supp. 3982. The plaintiffs argue that in 

making this determination, the FEC erred by failing to consider whether AIPAC's 

lobbying efforts were primarily based on campaign-related activities and communications 

that influence elections. In other words, the plaintiffs argue that AlP AC should not be 

considered a "membership organization" by virtue of the "organized primarily" clause of 

§ 431(9)(8)(iii) because AIPAC is primarily organized for the purpose oflobbying that is 

primarily focused on influencing elections. Plaintiffs assert that the FEC's opposing view 

is contrary to law because it is at odds with the purpose of the Act. Plaintiffs also argue 

that the FEC failed to consider whether AIPAC's lobbying is primarily quid pro quo 

lobbying, i.e., demands that members of Congress vote for legislation and appropriations 

favored by AIPAC in return for AIPAC's support, which plaintiffs assert is prohibited 

under the Act. 

The Commission also argues that even if the plaintiffs have not waived their claim, any 

post-remand claims are barred because the plaintiffs did not present any arguments to the 

Commission when the matter was remanded by the Supreme Court. Not so. The plaintiffs had 

no duty to present their arguments to the FEC on remand and, further, they were not permitted to 

do so under the regulations. See 11 C.F.R. § 111.22. Thus, for similar reasons to finding no 

waiver, I find no bar on the plaintiffs' arguments, particularly in light of the fact that the 

Commission does not cite a single FEC case to support its position that such a bar exists. 

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The FEC responds that its conclusion that AlP AC was primarily a lobbying 

organization was firmly rooted in the record before the FEC and included an extensive 

review of AIPAC's by-laws, its history, and its organizational structure and activities. 

The Commission argues that the plaintiffs' suggestion that AlP AC was involved in quid 

pro quo lobbying is squarely addressed under criminal bribery statutes, rather than under 

the FECA. Furthermore, the FEC asserts that Explanation and Justification issued with 

the new membership regulations indicate that the requirement not to be organized 

primarily for the purpose of influencing federal elections was intended to prevent 

individuals from establishing sham membership organizations to circumvent the Act's 

contribution and expenditure limits. Such a sham, according to the Commission, is 

clearly not in issue here, given AIPAC's primary focus on lobbying, which it has actively 

conducted for more than forty years. The FEC argues that plaintiffs have provided no 

support for bootstrapping the primacy of AIPAC's lobbying efforts into federal election 

activity by arguing that its lobbying is primarily based on campaign-related activities. 

According to the Commission, the proper forum for such an argument eliding the 

distinction between lobbying and electioneering is Congress, not the Courts. For the 

following reasons, I agree with the FEC. 

As an initial matter, the Commission's interpretation of the Act's "organized 

primarily" language regarding membership organizations is to be given deference. See 

Chevron, US.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. De! Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984) ("[I]fthe 

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statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court 

is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute."); 

see also DSCC, 454 U.S. at 37 (stating the Commission "is precisely the type of agency to 

which deference should presumptively be afforded"). As the FEC explained in the 

Explanation and Justification issued with the new membership regulations, the 

membership communications exception "addresses [the] concern that an organization not 

be used as a conduit by a candidate or other outside entity seeking to influence unlawfully 

a Federal election." Definition of "Member" of a Membership Organization, 64 Fed. 

Reg. 41266, 41269 (July 30, 1999). To that end, "[s]ince the purpose of the Act's 

'membership communications' exception is to allow bona fide membership organizations 

to engage in political communications with their members, these rules are intended to 

prevent individuals from establishing 'sham' membership organizations in an effort to 

circumvent the Act's contribution and expenditure limits." Id. This interpretation of the 

membership communications exemption language is "sufficiently reasonable" as to be 

accepted by this Court and entirely consistent with the purpose of the Act. See DSCC, 

454 U.S. at 39; see also Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26 (stating that the Act's primary interest is 

"to limit the actuality and appearance of corruption resulting from large individual 

financial contributions"). 

Plaintiffs arguments that the Commission's interpretation does not go far enough 

to effectuate the purposes of the Act provides no basis for this Court to expand it. While 

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the dividing line between lobbying and electioneering may be, at times, hard to draw, and 

lobbying efforts may be, at times, linked to influencing elections, nothing in the Act 

indicates that the Commission acted contrary to law by refusing to equate lobbying in 

general-and AIPAC's lobbying in particular-with efforts to influence federal elections. 

Rather, the FEC's determination that the membership communications exception be 

construed as an effort to prevent "sham" membership organizations from circumventing 

the campaign finance rules is completely consistent with the FECA's purpose. "'[N]o 

legislation pursues its purposes at all costs .... [I]t frustrates rather than effectuates 

legislative intent simplistically to assume that whatever furthers the statute's primary 

objective must be the law.'" Albany Eng 'g Corp. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm 'n, 

548 F.3d 1071, 1076 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (quoting Rodriguez v. United States, 480 U.S. 522, 

525-26 (1987) (emphasis in original). Stated simply, such an approach makes sense in 

this case, especially given the deference due to the Commission in interpreting and 

enforcing the Act. Accordingly, the Commission did not act contrary to law by 

maintaining a distinction between an organization primarily devoted to lobbying and one 

organized primarily to influence elections. 

Furthermore, the Commission's decision under its interpretation of the Act not to 

prosecute AIPAC was neither arbitrary or capricious, nor an abuse of discretion. In 1992, 

the FEC concluded in MUR 2804 that AlP AC was not a "political committee" because 

the nomination or election of candidates was not AIPAC's "major purpose"; 

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AIPAC's campaign related activities, while likely to have crossed the $1,000 

threshold, constitute only a small portion of its overall activities and does not 

appear to be its major purpose. The evidence shows that AlP AC is primarily 

and fundamentally a lobbying organization interested in U.S.-Israel relations 

and in legislation affecting Israel. Its campaign-related activities and 

communications are undertaken as an adjunct to, and in support of, its 

lobbying efforts. 

F.A.R.3772. In 2000, the FEC stated in MUR 2804R that the facts that had led it to 

conclude that election activity was not AIPAC's "major purpose" were enough to 

establish a fortiori that AIPAC was not organized "primarily" for that purpose: 

Another requirement of membership organizations set out at new 11 C.F .R. 

§ 114.[1](e)(l) is that a potential membership organization "not be organized 

primarily for the purpose of influencing" federal elections. This was the 

conclusion reached in MUR 2804 with regard to AlP AC, with the result that 

the Commission found no probable cause to believe that the organization had 

violated 2 U.S.C. §§ 433 and 434. 

F.A.R. Supp. 3982. Although such reasoning is susceptible to the accusation of 

conflating two different tests-the "major purpose" test that the Commission used for 

political committees and the "organized primarily" test for membership 

organizations-such a result is also logically unavoidable. After all, if influencing 

federal elections is not a major purpose of AlP AC, then AlP AC cannot be organized 

primarily to influence federal elections. 9 

9 The plaintiffs also argue that the FEC should be required to clarify what it means by 

"major purpose" and to state whether an organization can have more than one "major purpose." 

The FEC responds that this argument is irrelevant because the General Counsel's report 

originally dismissing the plaintiffs' complaint stated that "AIPAC's political activities did not 

rise to such a level as to make them a major purpose of the organization." Def.' s Reply 7 

(quoting F .A.R. 3672) (emphasis added). I agree with the FEC that even if an organization could 

be organized primarily for more than one "major purpose," it would be inconsequential in this 

situation because the Commission has already determined that AlP AC did not have even "a" 

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The Commission's decision in MUR 2804 that formed the basis of its decision in 

MUR 2804R resulted from an extensive investigation and development of a substantial 

administrative record documenting AIPAC's political interests, finances, and campaignrelated activities. AlP AC was incorporated in 1963 as a non-profit organization with the 

"sole function," as a registered domestic lobby, to encourage close U.S.-Israel relations 

and to provide services to its own members. F .A.R. 1469. Based on a careful review of 

the administrative record and the parties' arguments, I find no evidence that AlP AC' s 

focus on lobbying for more than forty years has been a sham perpetrated to circumvent 

the Act's contribution and expenditure limits. Accordingly, I find that the Commission 

had a rational basis to conclude that AlP AC was not "organized primarily" for the 

purpose of influencing federal elections. Therefore, the Commission's decision not to 

prosecute AIPAC was not an act contrary to the law. 

3. Communications "by" Candidates 

Plaintiffs next argue that the FEC improperly failed to consider whether AlP AC' s 

communications should be disentitled to the membership communications exemption 

because they solicit campaign contributions for and are coordinated with candidates and 

therefore are communications "by" the candidates. Essentially, plaintiffs argue that 

communications by AlP AC to its members were in such close coordination with 

candidates that they create an appearance, and danger, of quid pro quo corruption. I 

major purpose to influence elections. Thus, remand for clarification on this point is unnecessary. 

The Court also notes that the FEC's General Counsel indicated that election-related activities 

were a "small portion" of AIPAC's activities overall. See F.A.R. 3772. 

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disagree. If the communications were in fact "by" the candidates, any disclosure 

obligation would then fall on the candidate. Indeed, coordination with candidates is 

explicitly provided for within the statutory exemption for membership communications, 

see 11 C.F.R. § 114.3(a), and the Supreme Court and our Circuit adjudicated this case 

based upon the assumption that AIPAC's communications to its supporters had been 

coordinated with candidates. As such, the plaintiffs are, in essence, asking this Court to 

invalidate the regulation: a request that is neither procedurally possible nor legally 

sustainable. How so? 

The Commission's regulations state that communications to members are within 

the statutory exemption for membership communications even if they "involve electionrelated coordination with candidates." 11 C.F.R. § 114.3(a)(l). Plaintiffs have failed to 

advance any legal basis for why the FEC should not be afforded deference in its 

construction of the Act. Moreover, the Supreme Court and our Circuit Court assumed 

that there had been coordination with the candidates. See Akins Supreme Court Opinion, 

524 U.S. at 28; Akins En Bane Opinion, 101 F.3d at 744 ("There is no contention that 

AIPAC's disbursements were independent expenditures."). There would have been no 

reason for the Supreme Court to remand the case to the Commission if coordination had 

been enough, alone, to disqualify AIPAC's reliance on this exemption. Accordingly, I 

find that the FEC did not improperly fail to consider whether AIPAC's communications 

were in fact communications "by" the candidates. 

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4. Adequacy of Investigation 

Plaintiffs next argue that the Commission improperly failed to adequately 

investigate whether AIPAC's non-communication expenditures in past elections make it a 

political committee. I disagree. 

The FEC has broad discretionary power in determining whether to investigate a 

claim, and how, and whether to pursue civil enforcement under the Act. Plaintiffs' 

speculation based on twenty-year-old evidence about what may have turned up in further 

investigation falls far short of proving an abuse of discretion. The Commission's 

investigation, pursuant to the Supreme Court's remand instructions, was properly ended 

after the Commission determined that AIPAC's activities fell within the membership 

communications exemption. Indeed, the prosecutorial discretion given to the 

Commission is entitled to great deference as to the manner in which it conducts 

investigations and its decisions to dismiss complaints, provided it supplies reasonable 

grounds. See Democratic Cong. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 831 F .2d 1131, 1134 (D.C. 

Cir. 1987); Common Cause v. FEC, 655 F. Supp. 619, 623 (D.D.C. 1986), rev'd on other 

grounds, 842 F.2d 436 (D.C. Cir. 1988). Here, the FEC's investigation of AIPAC in 

MUR 2804 and MUR 2804R produced an exhaustive administrative record totaling 

almost 4000 pages in twelve volumes, which was summarized in three lengthy General 

Counsel's Reports. See F.A.R. 3671-3778,3842-69; F.A.R. Supp. 3964-85. Moreover, 

due to the lengthy history of this case, many courts have already reviewed the adequacy of 

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the FEC's investigation. To date, none have found the FEC's work inadequate. lo As 

such, plaintiffs argument that further investigation is likely to find evidence of "similar 

activities now" is purely speculative and inconsistent with the heavy burden it has to 

establish an abuse of discretion. 

First, plaintiffs' argument depends on "similar activities" both existing and, unlike 

in the past, rising to a significant level. Plaintiffs's simple disagreement with the results 

of the FEC's earlier investigation, however, is not enough to warrant further action. See 

Common Cause, 655 F. Supp. at 623; see also FECv. Rose, 806 F.2d 1081,1091 (D.C. 

Cir. 1986) ("It is not for the judiciary to run roughshod over agency procedures or sit as a 

board of superintend [ e ]nce directing where limited agency resources will be devoted. "). 

Absent evidence that the Commission's investigation was so inadequate as to constitute 

an abuse of discretion, it is not this Court's place to direct the Commission how to expend 

its resources, and it is certainly not the plaintiffs'. Indeed, the Supreme Court itself 

merely directed the Commission to consider whether AlP AC was a political committee 

only if the Commission decided that AIPAC's spending did not qualify as membership 

communications. See Akins Supreme Court Opinion, 524 U.S. at 29 ("If ... the FEC 

decides that AIPAC's activities fall within the 'membership communications' exception, 

10 Although the D.C. Circuit noted that the investigation may have been insufficient, that 

comment was directed to the FEC's investigation into whether AlP AC' s contributions were a 

major purpose of the organization. That determination is not at issue on remand, and the D.C. 

Circuit's comment was dicta in a footnote in an opinion that was later vacated. See Akins En 

Bane Opinion, 101 F.3d at 744 n.13. In contrast, the District Court and the original panel of the 

D.C. Circuit found that the FEC had conducted an extensive investigation. See Akins Panel 

Opinion, 66 F.3d at 355; Akins I, No. 92-1864, slip op. at 17. 

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the matter will become moot.'"). The political committee question has thus become moot. 

5. Express Advocacy 

Finally, the plaintiffs argue that the FEC improperly failed to find that AIPAC's 

past membership communications constituted "express advocacy," thereby warranting an 

investigation into AIPAC's current membership communications. Specifically, plaintiffs 

contend that the combination of (1) communications from AlP AC urging its members to 

choose candidates to support, either financially or by working in their campaigns, and (2) 

Campaign Update reports deeming candidates who received the highest ratings on issues 

relevant to AIPAC as deserving of support triggers the "express advocacy" exception of 

2 U.S.c. § 431(9)(B)(iii). Moreover, plaintiffs assert that the FEC erroneously limited its 

assessment of which communications crossed the $2,000 threshold to certain isolated 

incidents, rather than considering the costs involved in creating the above combination as 

well as AlP AC' s routine, widespread membership communications. 1 1 As to each of their 

arguments, I disagree. 

Supreme Court precedent indicates that for a communication to constitute "express 

advocacy," it must "in express terms advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified 

candidate for federal office" by using words "such as 'vote for,' 'elect,' 'support,' 'cast 

your ballot for,' 'Smith for Congress,' 'vote against,' 'defeat,' 'reject.'" Buckley, 424 

U.S. at 44 & n.52. In Federal Election Commission v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 

11 Plaintiffs also argue that the FEC's assertion that their allegations were barred by the 

applicable statute of limitations was contrary to law and, regardless, there is no reason to believe 

AIPAC has not continued its election-related membership communications to the present day. 

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the Court found that a publication that "urges voters to vote for 'pro-life' candidates" and 

"identifies and provides photographs of specific candidates fitting that description" 

constituted express advocacy, even though "this message is marginally less direct than 

'Vote for Smith. '" 479 U.S. 238, 249 (1986) ("MCFL"). In contrast, in Federal Election 

Commission v. Christian Coalition, the District Court found that a communication 

including both a scorecard with candidates' voting records and a cover letter explaining 

that the scorecard '''will give America's Christian voters the facts they need to distinguish 

between GOOD and MISGUIDED Congressmen'" was not express advocacy. 52 F. 

Supp. 2d 45,64-65 (D.D.C. 1999) (quoting cover letter). The District Court in Christian 

Coalition also found that explicit directives such as "stand together," "get organized," and 

"start now," all for the purpose of "making our voices heard in the elections" fell short of 

express advocacy. Id. at 64. 

Here, the plaintiffs argue that the combination of communications urging AIPAC 

members to support unidentified candidates with "Campaign Update" reports that include 

information identifying which candidates rate best on issues relevant to AlP AC are, in 

effect, express advocacy. Fiddlesticks! Putting aside the substantial problem of proof as 

to whether any individual AlP AC members actually received both of these 

communications within a close enough period of time to even suggest they should be read 

together, and the novel legal question of whether two communications can even be 

combined in this manner to constitute express advocacy, this proposed combination falls 

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far short of the "pointed exhortations to vote for particular persons" that is required for 

express advocacy. MCFL, 479 U.S. at 249. Communications from AIPAC that state, 

"We urge you to choose candidates to support and we urge you to support them 

financially or by working in their campaigns," stand in sharp contrast to the newsletter at 

issue in MCFL, which urged its members to "vote pro-life" and then, in the same 

document, identified by name and picture the candidates who were "pro-life." See id. at 

249. The Campaign Update reports that plaintiffs rely on as identifying particular 

candidates for AIPAC members to support consisted primarily of voting records and 

electoral prospects of candidates, similar to the scorecards found in Christian Coalition. 

See F.A.R. 3700; see, e.g., S.A.R. 123-24 (describing Lawton Chiles' voting record and 

re-election prospects); see also 2 U.S.C. § 431 (9)(B)(iii) (carving out communications 

"primarily devoted to subjects other than ... express advocacy" from the express 

advocacy exception to membership communications). Urging organization members to 

become politically active in general, or even to lobby incumbents on certain issues, is not 

express advocacy. See Christian Coalition, 52 F. Supp. 2d at 64. The general categories 

of communications plaintiffs attempt to bundle together fall closer to the line drawn in 

Christian Coalition than those in MCFL. Not surprisingly, plaintiffs failed in both their 

administrative complaint and in their pleadings before this Court to identify a single 

specific instance of express advocacy.12 See S.A.R. 345. Therefore, the Court finds no 

12 Plaintiffs' remaining arguments regarding MUR 5272 are premised on the first one and 

thus also fail. The Commission did not erroneously limit its consideration of costs by refusing to 

consider the costs in creating the above-described combination of communications or the cost of 

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abuse of discretion with respect to the plaintiffs' express advocacy allegations. 

CONCLUSION 

This never ending legal saga has spanned almost twenty years, multiple 

administrative complaints, and the careers of numerous Judges and Justices. To say the 

least, the time to complete the judicial review of these FEC decisions is long overdue. 

While time will tell what role, if any, this Opinion will have played in this interminable 

legal drama, I certainly trust that I will be the last District Judge that has to wrestle with 

this seemingly inexhaustible Hydra. 

In the meantime, for all of the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES the plaintiffs' 

Motion for Summary Judgment, GRANTS the defendant's Cross-Motion for Summary 

Judgment, and DISMISSES the action in its entirety. An order consistent with this 

decision accompanies this Memorandum Opinion. 

United States District Judge 

AIPAC's membership communications in general. See 2 U.S.C. § 431 (9)(B)(iii) (requiring 

spending be "directly attributable to a communication expressly advocating the election or defeat 

of a clearly identified candidate" (emphasis added)). Finally, the Commission acted within its 

prosecutorial discretion in considering the lack of evidence supporting the plaintiffs' position. 

See Common Cause, 655 F. Supp. at 623. Regardless, because the plaintiffs' combination 

approach to express advocacy is fatally flawed, any further investigation into similar present-day 

communications would have been pointless. 

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