Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A02-1711-MF-2614 | March 29, 2019 Page 1 of 19

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Duran L. Keller

Keller Law

Lafayette, Indiana

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE

Thomas F. Little

Power, Little, Little, & Little Law 

Firm

Frankfort, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

James R. Cadwallader, IV,

Appellant-Petitioner,

v.

James R. Cadwallader, III,

Appellee-Respondent.

March 29, 2019

Court of Appeals Case No.

79A02-1711-MF-2614

Appeal from the Tippecanoe 

Circuit Court

The Honorable Thomas H. Busch, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

79C01-1410-MF-199

Pyle, Judge.
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Statement of the Case

[1] This case involves an action to enforce a promissory note (“the Note”) and a

mortgage (“the Mortgage”) executed by James R. Cadwallader IV (“Son”) in 

favor of his father, James R. Cadwallader III (“Father”). Son signed the Note 

in which he agreed to repay Father the $130,000.00 that Father had loaned him, 

and Son mortgaged his property at issue (“the Mortgaged Property”) to Father 

to secure payment of the note. Son failed to make any payments on the note, 

and Father filed a complaint to foreclosure on the mortgage. Following a 

bench trial, the trial court entered an order of foreclosure and judgment in favor 

of Father. The crux of Son’s argument on appeal is that the trial court erred by 

entering the order of foreclosure in favor of Father. Concluding that there was 

no error, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

[2] We affirm. 

Issue

Son raises multiple issues, which we consolidate and restate as: 

Whether the trial court erred by entering an order of foreclosure in 

favor of Father. 
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Facts1

[3] In July 2007, Son, who lived in Indiana, purchased the Mortgaged Property, 

which was located at 2409 U.S. 231 in Lafayette. Son initially used the 

Mortgaged Property for his own business, which was a used car lot and car 

repair shop. Son later rented the property out to a tenant to use as a car lot.

[4] In August 2007, Son sought to purchase a property from a sheriff’s sale (“the 

Tax Sale Property”), which was located at 119 State Road 25 West in 

Lafayette. Son’s mother, grandmother, and aunt collectively loaned $72,000.00 

to Son to purchase this property.2 The money obtained from Son’s mother, 

grandmother, and aunt were secured by a promissory note. Father, who lived 

in Pennsylvania, contributed $130,000.00 to the purchase of the Tax Sale 

Property. Father loaned the money to Son and expected that Son would pay 

him back. On August 7, 2007, Son and Father purchased the Tax Sale Property

for approximately $202,000.00. Both Son’s and Father’s names were listed on 

the deed to the Tax Sale Property. They considered the purchase of this 

 

1 We remind Son’s counsel that an Appellant’s statement of facts “shall be in a narrative form and shall not 

be a witness by witness summary of the testimony.” Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(6)(c). Additionally, we note 

that Son reproduced a copy of the bench trial transcript and included it in his Appellant’s Appendix. Aside 

from this reproduction being “a waste of paper and unnecessarily bloating the record on appeal,” see Steve 

Silveus Ins., Inc. v. Goshert, 873 N.E.2d 165, 172 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), it also violates Appellate Rule 50(F), 

which explicitly instructs that “parties should not reproduce any portion of the Transcript in the Appendix” 

because the Transcript is transmitted to our Court pursuant to Appellate Rule 12(B).

2

Son’s mother and grandmother each loaned Son $11,000.00, and his aunt loaned him $50,000.00.
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property as a partnership venture. They did not create a formal business entity,

nor did they have a written contract defining the partnership relationship. 

[5] Thereafter, in July 2008, Father and Son obtained a mortgage on the Tax Sale 

Property from Lafayette Bank and Trust (“the Bank”) for $220,000.00. Son

then paid back his mother, grandmother, and aunt the money that they had 

loaned him. Father and Son agreed that Son would find a tenant to rent the 

Tax Sale Property, that Son would manage the property, and that the mortgage 

to the Bank would be paid from the rental income. Son got a tenant3for the

Tax Sale Property, and he paid the mortgage with funds from the rental. 

[6] In November 2009, Son and Father went to an attorney, asking him to draft a 

note and mortgage on the Mortgaged Property with Father as the lender and 

Son as the borrower. On December 10, 2009, Son signed the Note and 

Mortgage, which provided as follows:

 

3 The tenant used the Tax Sale Property as a used car lot. 
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(Ex. Vol. at 7-8, 10). Thus, pursuant to the Note, Son agreed to pay Father 

$130,000.00 for a loan of the same amount, and he secured it by granting 

Father a mortgage on the Mortgaged Property. The parties recorded the 

Mortgage with the county recorder.

[7] In the summer of 2011, the tenant on the Tax Sale Property left, and Son was 

unable to find another tenant. Son got behind in the mortgage payments to the 
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Bank. In September 2011, the Bank filed a complaint for foreclosure on the 

mortgage for the Tax Sale Property. The Tax Sale Property was sold sometime 

thereafter in a private sale.4 Father paid the remaining deficiency to the Bank, 

and the foreclosure proceeding on the Tax Sale Property was dismissed in 2013. 

[8] In December 2011, Son failed to make an annual payment on the Note for the 

Mortgaged Property. He also failed to make an annual payment in December 

2012. Around that same time, Father and Son had a falling out and, thereafter, 

they had “[m]inimal” communication. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 143). In 2013, Father 

went to Lafayette to see Son, but Son would not talk to him. Son again failed 

to make an annual payment on the Note for the Mortgaged Property in 

December 2013. 

[9] In October 2014, Father filed a complaint to foreclose on the Note and the 

Mortgage on the Mortgaged Property.

5

 Father alleged that Son had defaulted 

on the Note and Mortgage on the Mortgaged Property by failing to make any 

payments as required. Father sought a judgment ordering the sheriff to sell the 

Mortgaged Property to obtain the “outstanding unpaid principal balance” plus 

interest and expenses, and he sought “all other relief just and proper in the 

premises.” (App. Vol. 2 at 19). 

 

4 The parties could not recall the date the Tax Sale Property was sold. 

5

Father later filed two amended complaints. 
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[10] On July 27, 2017, the trial court held a bench trial. Father and Son both 

testified and submitted exhibits. Father contended that the Note and Mortgage 

were an enforceable contract to repay Father $130,000.00 and that Son had 

signed these documents but failed to make the required payments as set out in 

the Note. Father testified that he and Son had the Note and Mortgage drawn 

up to secure his $130,000.00 loan to Son and to help protect Son from any 

potential lawsuits against the Mortgaged Property. 

[11] Son acknowledged that he had signed the Note and Mortgage, but he claimed 

that they were a “sham.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 129). Son’s main defense was that the 

Note and Mortgage were “never intended to be enforced.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 129). 

Son also argued that the Note and Mortgage were not valid because there was 

no consideration. In the alternative, Son argued that, even if the Note and 

Mortgage were valid, Father had failed to provide Son with notice of 

acceleration as set forth in the Note. The trial court noted that Son’s argument

about the lack of notice of acceleration was somewhat contrary to his main 

assertion that the Note and Mortgage were never meant to be enforced. The 

trial court pointed out that the remedy for that argument would be to enforce 

the Note and Mortgage and for Son to bring his mortgage payments up to date.

[12] Son also argued that Father was not entitled to any payment from Son because 

they had been involved in a partnership for the Tax Sale Property. Son 

suggested that Father’s $130,000.00 was a loss that he would have to sustain as 

part of the partnership that had ended with the sale of the Tax Sale Property. 

When cross-examining Father, Son’s counsel extensively questioned Father to 
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establish that Father and Son had purchased the Tax Sale Property as a 

partnership venture. Son also testified that he and Father had a partnership for 

the Tax Sale Property only, and he acknowledged that the partnership had 

ended with the sale of the Tax Sale Property. The trial court noted that the 

partnership issue and the winding up of the partnership had not been raised in 

the pleadings but had been raised during the trial, and it noted that the evidence 

showed there was no longer an active partnership because the Tax Sale 

Property had been sold. At the end of the trial, Son’s counsel requested to 

make a closing argument about the existence of a partnership. However, the 

trial court instructed the parties to submit proposed findings and conclusions 

that included a discussion of the partnership. 

[13] A few days after the trial, Son sought and was granted permission to 

supplement the record with three exhibits.6 Thereafter, the parties submitted 

their proposed findings and conclusions, which included argument on 

partnership.

7

 In addition to the order of foreclosure, Father requested that the 

 

6 The three exhibits consisted of copies of three checks issued by Son and cashed by the respective payees. 

The first check, dated July 31, 2008, was issued to Father for the amount of $99,999.00. The second check, 

dated July 17, 2008, was issued to Son’s grandmother in the amount of $5,000.00. The third check, dated 

July 17, 2008, was issued to Son’s grandmother in the amount of $6,000.00.

7

Father contends that Son did not file proposed findings and conclusions and filed a motion to strike the 

inclusion of Son’s proposed findings and conclusion in his Appellant’s Appendix. The chronological case 

summary (“CCS”) contains an entry, dated October 2, 2017, that indicates that Son filed an “Objection to 

Plaintiff, Father’s [P]roposed [F]indings [o]f Fact and Conclusions of Law.” (App. Vol. 2 at 11). In response 

to Father’s motion to strike, Son provided documentation to show that he had filed and the trial court had

accepted his proposed findings and conclusions on October 2, 2017. By an order, issued on the same date as 

this memorandum decision, we deny Father’s motion to strike. 
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trial court find that the winding up of the partnership had been completed and 

that the partnership was terminated. 

[14] The trial court entered judgment in favor of Father and ordered foreclosure on 

the mortgage of the Mortgaged Property. The trial court explicitly rejected 

Son’s defenses regarding lack of consideration and notice of acceleration. The 

trial court concluded that “the consideration for the Note and Mortgage was a 

clarification of the parties’ financial obligations to each other[.]” (App. Vol. 2 

at 15). The trial court ruled that Father would be allowed to list the Mortgaged 

Property at a sheriff’s sale “to collect the $130,000.00 principal owing on the 

Note” and explained that any funds above the $130,000.00 collected at the 

foreclosure sale would be distributed to Son. (App. Vol. 2 at 16). The trial 

court also determined that “[t]he winding up of the partnership between 

[Father] and [Son] [wa]s complete” and ordered that the “partnership is 

terminated.” (App. Vol. 2 at 16). Son now appeals.

Decision

[15] Son overarching argument is that the trial court erred by entering the order of 

foreclosure on the Mortgaged Property in favor of Father. Son asserts that: (1) 

the Mortgage was not supported by consideration; (2) Father failed to provide 

him with notice of acceleration; and (3) the trial court erred by making a 
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determination regarding the winding up and termination of the partnership on 

the Tax Sale Property.

8

 

[16] Before we address Son’s arguments, we note that the trial court entered written 

findings and conclusions pursuant to Trial Rule 52 and that, under such 

circumstances, our standard of review is well-settled:

We must first determine whether the evidence supports the 

findings of fact and then whether the findings support the 

judgment. We will not reverse the trial court’s findings and 

judgment unless they are clearly erroneous. Findings of fact are 

clearly erroneous when the record lacks any facts or reasonable 

inferences from the evidence to support them. The judgment is 

clearly erroneous when it is unsupported by the findings of fact 

and conclusions entered on the findings. In making these 

determinations, we will neither reweigh the evidence nor judge 

witness credibility, considering only the evidence favorable to the 

judgment and all reasonable inferences therefrom.

While we defer substantially to findings of fact, we do not do so 

for conclusions of law. We apply a de novo standard of review to 

conclusions of law and owe no deference to the trial court’s 

determination of such questions.

 

8

Son also argues that the trial court erred by denying his Trial Rule 41(B) motion for involuntary dismissal. 

Following Father’s presentation of evidence, Son moved for “directed verdict[,]” arguing that the Note and 

Mortgage were “never intended to be enforced” and that there was no consideration for them. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 

92, 93). The trial court denied Son’ motion. On appeal, Son makes only a general assertion that the trial 

court erred by denying his motion. Because Son makes no cogent argument showing how the trial court’s 

denial of his Trial Rule 41(B) motion was erroneous, we conclude that he has waived appellate review of the 

argument. See Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a). 
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Gates v. Houston, 897 N.E.2d 532, 534-35 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (citation 

omitted). Where, as here, the trial court sua sponte entered findings and 

conclusions, we will apply a general judgment standard of review for any issue 

not covered by the findings, and we will affirm the judgment on any legal 

theory supported by the evidence. Jackson v. Luellen Farms, Inc., 877 N.E.2d 

848, 853 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). “[U]nless the evidence viewed in a light most 

favorable to the trial court leads uncontrovertibly to a conclusion opposite to 

the one reached, we will not reverse the determination of the trial court.” 

Hansford v. Maplewood Station Bus. Park, 621 N.E.2d 347, 350 (Ind. Ct. App. 

1993) (internal citations omitted), reh’g denied.

[17] We now turn to Son’s first argument. Son asserts that there was no 

consideration to support the Mortgage and that the trial court’s conclusion that 

consideration existed was clearly erroneous. He argues that the trial court’s 

conclusion disregarded the law that “[p]ast acts cannot be used for future 

consideration[.]” (Son’s Br. 14).

[18] We recognize that “[a]s a general rule, past consideration that imposed no 

obligation when it was furnished will not support a subsequent promise.” 6 

Ind. Law Encyc. Contracts § 19. See also Jackson, 877 N.E.2d at 858 (explaining 

that “[p]ast consideration can generally not support a new obligation or 

promise”); Brown v. Addington, 114 Ind.App. 404, 408, 52 N.E.2d 640, 641 

(1944) (“If a person has been benefited in the past by some act or forbearance 

for which he incurred no legal liability and afterwards, whether from good 

feeling or interested motives, he makes a promise to the person by whose act or 
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forbearance he has benefited, and that promise is made on no other 

consideration than the past benefit, it is gratuitous and cannot be enforced.”).

[19] However, in regard to consideration for a mortgage, we have explained as 

follows:

A mortgage must be supported by consideration to be 

enforceable. Any consideration which will sustain a promise to 

pay will suffice. It is not necessary that the obligee actually give 

anything of value to the obligor, and sufficient consideration will 

be found if it is shown that the mortgagee suffered any damage, 

inconvenience, detriment or loss, or that he extended any 

forebearance in reliance upon the mortgage. Consideration exists 

if it is shown that any right, profit, benefit accrued to the 

mortgagor, or that responsibility was suffered or undertaken by 

another. A pre-existing debt or liability is sufficient consideration to 

support a mortgage given as security, and there need not be a new 

consideration at the time of making the mortgage.

Huntingburg Prod. Credit Ass’n v. Griese, 456 N.E.2d 448, 451-52 (Ind. Ct. App. 

1983) (emphasis added and internal citations omitted).

[20] Son’s challenge to the trial court’s determination on consideration is premised 

on his assertion that he never personally owed Father the $130,000.00. Son 

contends that Father paid the $130,000.00 to the partnership for the Tax Sale 

Property and that Father was to get repaid that amount only if there were rental 

proceeds of the Tax Sale Property and not by him individually. At trial, 

however, the trial court heard and saw the evidence and the witnesses’ 

testimony, including Father’s testimony that the $130,000.00 was a loan that 

Son was expected to repay. Additionally, Son signed the Note, in which he
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stated that he had received a “loan” for $130,000.00 and promised to pay it 

back. (Father’s Ex. 3). Because the evidence supports a finding that the 

$130,000.00 was a pre-existing debt, we conclude that there was sufficient 

consideration to support the Mortgage. See Huntingburg Prod. Credit Ass’n, 456 

N.E.2d at 451 (explaining that “[a] pre-existing debt or liability is sufficient 

consideration to support a mortgage given as security, and there need not be a 

new consideration at the time of making the mortgage); see also Jackson, 877 

N.E.2d at 853 (explaining that our Court will affirm the judgment on any legal 

theory supported by the evidence). 

[21] Next, we address Son’s argument that the trial court should not have enforced 

the Note and Mortgage because Father failed to provide him with notice of 

acceleration as set out in paragraph 6(C) of the Note. When Son raised this 

argument as a defense at trial, the trial court noted that this argument about the 

lack of notice of acceleration was somewhat contrary to his main assertion that 

the Note and Mortgage were never meant to be enforced. In its findings and 

conclusions, the trial court rejected the notice of acceleration defense, noting 

that Son had “disclaimed the validity of the Note and Mortgage.” (App. Vol. 2 

at 15).

[22] To determine whether Father was required to give a notice of acceleration, we 

must look to the language of the relevant agreements executed by the parties. 

See Otto v. Park Garden Associates, 612 N.E.2d 135, 138 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993), 

reh’g denied, trans. denied. When construing contracts, we will read them as a 

whole and will construe the language therein so as not to render any words, 
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phrases, or terms ineffective or meaningless. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Riddell 

Nat. Bank, 984 N.E.2d 655, 658 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied. 

Additionally, unambiguous provisions will be given their plain and ordinary 

meaning and will be conclusive upon the parties and upon the courts. Id. at 

567.

[23] Here, Son signed the Note and Mortgage on the same day, December 10, 2009, 

and promised to pay Father $130,000.00 for a loan of the same amount. 

Paragraph 6(B) of the Note provided that Son would be “in default” if he “d[id] 

not pay the full amount of each annual payment on the date it [wa]s due[.]” 

(Father’s Ex. 3). The Note further provided as follows:

6. BORROWER’S FAILURE TO PAY AS REQUIRED

* * * * *

(C) Notice of Default

If I am in default, the Note Holder may send me a written 

notice telling me that if I do not pay the overdue amount by a 

certain date, the Note Holder may require me to pay immediately 

the full amount of principal which has not been paid and all 

interest that I owe on that amount. That date must be at least 30 

days after the date on which the notice is delivered or mailed to 

me.

* * * * *

9. WAIVERS

I . . . waive the rights of presentment and notice of 

dishonor. “Presentment” means the right to require the Note 

Holder to demand payment of amounts due. “Notice of 
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dishonor” means the right to require the Note Holder to give 

notice to other person that amounts due have not been paid.

(Father’s Ex. 3) (emphasis added). The Mortgage, signed the same day as the 

Note, provides, in relevant part, as follows:

This mortgage is given to secure the performance of the 

provisions hereof and the payment of a certain Promissory Note 

dated December 10, 2009, in the principal amount of One 

Hundred Thirty Thousand and 00/100 Dollars ($130,000.00). 

The full debit if not paid earlier, shall be due and payable on 

December 10, 2020.

The mortgagor expressly agree[s] to pay the sum of money above 

without relief from valuation or appraisement laws; and upon the 

failure to pay said note, or any part thereof, at maturity, or the 

interest thereon, or any part thereof, when due, . . . thence said 

note is to be due and collectible, and this mortgage may be 

foreclosed accordingly.

(Father’s Ex. 4) (emphasis added). 

[24] The language used in paragraph 6(C) of the Note provides that, upon default by 

Son, Father “may” send Son a written notice telling him to pay the overdue 

amount. The use of the language “may” is permissive and not mandatory. See

Stump v. St. Joseph Cty. Treasurer, 33 N.E.3d 360, 365 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). The 

note also has a provision in which Son waived his right of presentment, thereby 

waiving his right to have Father demand payment. Additionally, the Mortgage 

provides that the “note is due and collectible” and the “mortgage may be 

foreclosed” upon Son’s failure to pay “any part” of the Note when due. 

(Father’s Ex. 4). Base on the clear language in these documents, Father was 
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not required to give Son notice of acceleration. See, e.g., Otto, 612 N.E.2d at 139 

(Ind. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that the language of the note and mortgage, 

including a waiver of presentment, showed that the mortgagee did not have an 

obligation to give a notice of acceleration to the mortgagor). Because the 

evidence viewed in a light most favorable to the trial court does not lead 

uncontrovertibly to a conclusion opposite to the one reached, we affirm the trial 

court’s judgment for foreclosure in favor of Father. See Hansford, 621 N.E.2d at 

350 (explaining that “unless the evidence viewed in a light most favorable to the 

trial court leads uncontrovertibly to a conclusion opposite to the one reached, 

we will not reverse the determination of the trial court”).

[25] Lastly, we turn to Son’s argument that the trial court erred by making a 

determination regarding the winding up and termination of the partnership on 

the Tax Sale Property. He contends that the partnership issue “was not 

properly before the [trial] [c]ourt” because Father did not seek a dissolution of 

the partnership issue in his complaint. (Son’s Br. 22). Son does not argue that 

the substance of the trial court’s determination is erroneous, nor does he 

contend that the partnership is still intact. Instead, he focuses on the procedural 

nature of notice pleading and asserts that the trial court should have refrained 

from making any determination regarding the partnership issue because “the 

partnership was not properly at issue[.]” (Son’s Br. 25). We will not address 

Son’s argument because he invited any alleged error. Under the doctrine of 

invited error, “‘a party may not take advantage of an error that []he commits, 

invites, or which is the natural consequence of h[is] own neglect or 
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misconduct.’” Witte v. Mundy ex rel. Mundy, 820 N.E.2d 128, 133 (Ind. 2005)

(quoting Evans v. Evans, 766 N.E.2d 1240, 1245 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). As noted 

in the facts above, Son raised the partnership issue during trial and precipitated 

the trial court’s determination on the issue. Because Son created the situation 

of which he now complains, he cannot now argue that the trial court’s 

determination was procedurally erroneous. See id. at 134.9

[26] Affirmed.

Vaidik, C.J., and Barnes, Sr. J., concur. 

 

9 Moreover, under the Uniform Partnership Act, a trial court may dissolve a partnership by decree when “[a] 

partner . . . otherwise acts in matters relating to the partnership business so that it is not reasonably 

practicable to carry on the business in partnership with that partner” or when “[o]ther circumstances render a 

dissolution equitable.” IND. CODE §§ 23-4-1-32(1)(d) and (f).