CLONING HUMAN BEINGS

The Science of Animal Cloning

Commissioned Paper

by Janet Rossant, Ph.D.

Samuel Lunenfield Research Institute-Mount Sinai Hospital

B-1

CONTENTS

What Is Cloning? B-3

The Scientific Question: Does Differentiation Involve Irreversible

Changes in Genetic Content? B-4

The Stability of the Differentiated State: Our Understanding Today B-6

Nuclear Transfer in Mammals: The Early Experiments B-7

Reprogramming in the Oocyte Environment B-8

Nuclear Transfer in Mammals: The Current State of Play B-9

And Then Came Dolly B-10

Why Pursue Animal Cloning Research? B-12

1. Making Clones for Research Purposes B-12

2. Propagating Desirable Stocks B-13

3. Improved Generation and Propagation of Transgenic Livestock B-13

4. Generating Targeted Gene Alterations B-14

How Can We Use Information from Nuclear Transfer Experiments

for Human Benefit? B-17

Ethical Concerns B-17

References B-18

B-3

WHAT IS CLONING?

The word “clone” is used in many different contexts in biological research, but in simple terms it

means a set of genetically identical individuals. Scientists talk about cloning DNA— the process of

making and propagating a set of identical copies of a particular piece of genetic material, or about

cloning cells— taking a single cell in culture and allowing it to multiply into a cell line. These

techniques are some of the basic tools of the trade of modern biomedical research and are not

currently a source of much public concern. But when we talk about cloning whole animals,

especially mammals, the public rightly wants to know what is going on and why.

Genetically identical copies of whole organisms— clones— are commonplace in the plant

breeding world. Many valuable horticultural or agricultural strains are maintained solely by

vegetative propagation from an original plant, and never by sexual reproduction. This reflects the

ease with which it is possible to regenerate a complete plant from a small cutting. The ability to

propagate a valuable animal strain in the same way would revolutionize the agricultural business.

However, in the animal kingdom, development is much less flexible than in plants. Many simpler

invertebrate species have the ability to regenerate a whole organism from a small piece, although

this is not necessarily their usual mode of reproduction. Vertebrates have lost this ability entirely,

although regeneration of missing limbs, organs, or tissues can occur to varying degrees.

Although an adult vertebrate cannot make another adult, natural cloning does occur, in a

limited way, with the formation of identical twins. These arise in humans and other mammals by

chance separation of a single embryo into halves at an early stage of development. The resulting

offspring will be genetically identical, deriving from one zygote— the result of the fusion of one

egg and one sperm. A clone of two is not very remarkable, but it is a clone nonetheless.

Experimental separation of cells from the early embryos of several mammalian species has shown

that it is possible in some cases to get larger clones from one egg (Figure 1). In mice, only

separated two-cell blastomeres are capable of generating entire mice (Rossant 1976), but in some

domestic species, like sheep, it is possible to get separated eight-cell blastomeres to develop into

viable offspring (Willadsen 1981).

At best, efficiency of this technique is never 100 percent, so the number of clones is small.

However, the experiments are scientifically important, because they demonstrate that the cells of

the early embryo are totipotent; that is, they retain the full potential to form an entire animal. As

development proceeds, cells begin to differentiate into specialized cell types and can no longer

revert back to the beginning of development (Figure 1). If this stability of the differentiated state

could be reverted in some way, then producing animals from later differentiated cells or even adult

cells would become feasible. Nuclear transfer experiments, first performed in amphibians in the

1960s, demonstrated how this could be done.
B-4

Figure 1: Preimplantation development in mammals

THE SCIENTIFIC QUESTION: DOES DIFFERENTIATION INVOLVE

IRREVERSIBLE CHANGES IN GENETIC CONTENT?

The information for all the proteins produced in all the specialized cell types of the body is

encoded in the DNA of the zygote and must be passed on intact into the next generation via the

germ cells that form the eggs and sperm. However, there is no absolute requirement that the

somatic cells— those cells not destined to give rise to the germ cells— retain the full genetic

content in an unmodified form. A differentiated cell like a neuron must keep a set of

neural-specific genes active and silence those genes specifically required to make muscle, liver,

and other tissues. How does it do this? Is it an active process, in which genes are still present but

repressed in some way, or is the DNA for the inactive genes lost or irreversibly inactivated in

some way? In the early 1960s our understanding of the mechanisms of gene regulation was still

rudimentary and this general question was extremely important.

Elegant experiments in Xenopus laevis by John Gurdon, following earlier experiments in

Rana temporaria by Briggs and King (1952), provided strong evidence that the genetic content of

differentiated somatic cells is essentially unchanged from that of the early embryo. Nuclei from

donor differentiated cells were injected into recipient eggs from which the nucleus, containing the

DNA, had been inactivated (Figure 2). If the donor nucleus could direct normal development of

the recipient egg, this would strongly suggest that differentiation cannot involve permanent
B-5

Figure 2: Nuclear transfer in amphibians

changes in the genetic material. The first series of experiments used intestinal epithelial cells from

swimming tadpoles (Gurdon 1962), and adult frogs were produced, albeit at a very low efficiency.

The intestinal cells used were highly specialized brush-border gut cells, but were not derived from

the final adult frog and so might not be terminally differentiated. Gurdon and colleagues (1975)

performed another carefully controlled series of experiments in which they used nuclei from adult

skin cells for transfer. Over 99 percent of the cultured cells expressed keratin, a differentiated

marker of skin cells, and 4 percent of the nuclei transferred eventually gave rise to fully developed

tadpoles. These experiments provided the strongest evidence to date that the nuclei of terminal

differentiated cells could be reactivated by the cytoplasm of the egg and redirect normal

development.

However, no viable adult frog was ever produced from an adult differentiated nucleus and

there was a strong decline in the rate of recovery of feeding tadpoles with progressive age of

nuclei transferred. This left open the theoretical possibility that complete reactivation of the adult
B-6

nucleus was prevented by some kind of irreversible change in the genetic material, and that there

was, indeed, a progressive decline in nuclear potential with age. However, careful analysis at the

time suggested that the major reason for developmental failure of transplant embryos was

chromosomal abnormalities acquired as a consequence of the process of nuclear transplantation

itself. The cell cycle of adult cells is much slower than the rapid pace of cell division in the early

frog embryo. Expecting a transplanted nucleus to reprogram its gene expression, replicate its

DNA, and enter normal embryonic cell cycles within an hour of nuclear transfer is unrealistic. The

remarkable thing is that some nuclei manage to do so, rather than that so many do not.

The general conclusion from the amphibian nuclear transfer experiments of Gurdon and

others was that the differentiated state did not involve major irreversible changes in the DNA.

This conclusion was reached in the 1960s and early 1970s and has not been challenged in the

intervening years (Gurdon 1974).

THE STABILITY OF THE DIFFERENTIATED STATE:

OUR UNDERSTANDING TODAY

As our understanding of the regulation of gene expression has grown, we have learned that most

patterns of differentiated gene expression are maintained by active control mechanisms (Blau

1992), in which combinations of regulatory proteins bind to control sequences adjacent to genes

and turn them on or off. The particular differentiated state of a cell depends on its particular

combination of regulatory proteins. This is not the only mechanism of gene control. There are

some cases in which actual rearrangements and deletions of DNA occur, as in the expression of

the immunoglobulin and T-cell receptor genes in lymphocytes. Heritable modification of the DNA

by methylation can also affect gene expression. However, the overwhelming evidence suggests

that given the right environment, it should be possible to activate or inactivate almost any gene in

a cell.

This environment need not be the cytoplasm of the egg. Cell fusion experiments, in which

different cell types are fused into one multinucleate cell called a heterokaryon, have demonstrated

that extensive reprogramming of differentiated nuclei can occur. For example, when muscle cells

are fused with non-muscle cells of various sorts, muscle-specific genes are activated in the

non-muscle cells (Blau et al. 1985). Similarly, globin genes can be activated in many cell types

after fusion with erythroid cells (Baron and Maniati 1986). These and other kinds of experiments

have led to the isolation of specific protein factors that regulate cell differentiation, such as the

myogenic factors that regulate the formation of the muscle cell lineages (Weintraub 1993).

All of this information has shown that the stability of the differentiated state is not absolute

and, therefore, it should be theoretically possible to reprogram adult cells to reinitiate earlier

programs of differentiation. Nuclear transfer experiments pointed the way and molecular biology

is continuing to define the components of the regulation of cellular differentiation.

NUCLEAR TRANSFER IN MAMMALS: THE EARLY EXPERIMENTS
B-7

Following success in nuclear transfer experiments in frogs, there were some attempts in the 1970s

to repeat the experiments in mice, the mammal of choice for experimental manipulation. It was

known that early development occurs at a considerably slower rate in mammals than in

amphibians, giving hope that reprogramming of the donor nucleus would occur more efficiently.

In mice it takes about a day from fertilization to the first cleavage, giving ample time, it was

thought, for the reprogramming of gene expression and adjustment of the cell cycle. This proved

not to be the case. Early experiments showed that nuclei of adult cells fused with fertilized eggs

did not undergo nuclear swelling or nuclear division (Graham 1969).

A careful series of experiments by McGrath and Solter in the mid 1980s showed that

nuclei could be successfully exchanged between zygotes, with 90 percent reaching the blastocyst

stage and beyond (McGrath and Solter 1984). Nuclei from 2-cell embryos could direct

development to the blastocyst stage, but nuclei from later cleavage stages could not successfully

recapitulate development after nuclear transfer. In fact, in mice, nuclei show less totipotency than

whole cells— many experiments have shown that blastomeres from as late as the early blastocyst

stage are still totipotent when combined with other embryonic cells (Rossant and Pedersen, 1986).

This means that the failure of nuclear reprogramming has to be the result of something other than

irreversible changes to the genetic material of the cells. In 1986, Willadsen showed that, unlike the

situation in mice, enucleated unfertilized eggs from sheep could be fused with 8-cell stage

blastomeres and viable offspring produced (Willadsen 1986).

Most recent experiments have used nuclear transfer into enucleated unfertilized oocytes, a

procedure that prolongs the period of possible reprogramming before the donor nucleus has to

undergo the first cleavage division. Oocytes arrested at metaphase II of meiosis, prior to

fertilization, are enucleated by aspiration of the metaphase chromosomes into a fine glass

micropipette (Figure 3). The nuclear donor cell is introduced under the egg membrane, or zona

pellucida, and fused to the enucleated oocyte. The major technical advance in the last few years

has been the use of electrofusion for both fusion of cells and activation of the oocyte. When the

enucleated oocyte and the nuclear donor cell are subject to short electrical pulses in culture,

membrane breakage and fusion occurs between the two cells and the electrical pulse also begins

the processes of egg activation that would normally be triggered by fertilization. Using this

approach, viable offspring have been obtained after nuclear transfer from 8-cell blastomeres in the

mouse (Cheong et al. 1993) and from later stages of development in several other species, as will

be discussed below.
B-8

Figure 3: Nuclear transfer in mammals

REPROGRAMMING IN THE OOCYTE ENVIRONMENT

There has been some study of the events that occur once an embryonic nucleus is exposed to the

oocyte cytoplasm, and some, but not all, of the parameters that affect success of nuclear transfer

are known (Fulka et al. 1996). Oocytes used for fusion are arrested in metaphase II of meiosis and

only proceed to complete division, with extrusion of the second polar body, after fertilization or

activation by some artificial signal, such as electrical current. In this arrested state, levels of

maturation-promoting factor (MPF) are high. This cell-cycle regulatory complex promotes

mitosis. When transplanted nuclei are introduced into the high MPF-containing oocyte

environment, they usually undergo DNA replication, nuclear envelope breakdown, and premature

chromosome condensation. Activation of the oocyte causes a decline in MPF activity and the

nuclear envelope is reformed around the donor nucleus. The nucleus now takes on the appearance

of the pronucleus of the egg, which is large and swollen. It is assumed that this process begins the

reprogramming of the transferred nucleus, by exposing the chromatin to the oocyte cytoplasm and

beginning the exchange of donor nuclear proteins for oocyte-derived proteins (Prather and First

1990).
B-9

Whether exposure to MPF and/or nuclear swelling is an absolute prerequisite for later

development seems to be still unclear. Experiments in a number of species have shown that when

nuclei are fused with oocytes that have been activated some hours prior to fusion, no DNA

replication, chromosome condensation, or nuclear swelling occurs, but normal development can

occur (Campbell et al. 1993, Campbell et al. 1994, Stice et al. 1994). Prefusion of blastomere and

enucleated oocyte, with activation being induced after a few hours in culture, has also been

attempted with success (Campbell et al. 1996). In all cases, the numbers of surviving progeny are

too small to determine whether the differences in the success rates of the various treatments are

statistically significant.

What is clear, however, is that the cell cycle stage of the donor nucleus does affect

success. In rabbits, cows, sheep, and mice (Campbell et al. 1993, Cheong et al. 1993, Collas et al.

1992), experiments have shown that nuclei from cells in the early phases of the cell cycle do better

than cells in S-phase or beyond. In the first phase of the cell cycle, G1, cells are diploid and

relatively quiescent. They then enter a period of DNA replication, called S-phase, followed by

another rest phase, called G2, where they have twice the diploid amount of DNA in preparation

for mitosis. Because DNA replication is induced after nuclear transfer in the usual protocol, where

fusion and activation are simultaneous, any nucleus that has more than the diploid DNA value

upon transfer will end up with too much DNA, which will likely result in chromosome anomalies.

Thus, the need to transfer G1 nuclei is paramount if chromosome damage is to be avoided. It

seems likely that the failure to use carefully synchronized donor nuclei underlies some of the

difficulties that have been reported in achieving successful nuclear transfer development in

different species.

NUCLEAR TRANSFER IN MAMMALS: THE CURRENT STATE

OF PLAY

Over the past ten years or so, there have been several reports of successful nuclear transfer

experiments in mammals, nearly all of them using cells taken directly from early embryos.

Surveying the literature on embryonic nuclear transfer, we find that the oldest embryonic nucleus

that can successfully support development differs among species. In mice, no nucleus older than

the 8-cell stage has been used successfully (Cheong et al. 1993). Four-cell blastomere nuclei have

been successfully used in pigs (Prather et al. 1989), while in rabbits, 32- to 64-cell morulae can be

used as nuclear donors (Yang et al. 1992). In cows and sheep, inner cell mass (ICM) cells from

the 120-cell blastocyst stage have been used successfully (Collas and Barnes 1994, Smith and

Wilmut 1989). Indeed, in both cows and sheep, cell lines have been made from ICMs and nuclei

from these cells have been able to reprogram development after nuclear transfer. In the first

experiments of this sort by Sims and First (1994), bovine ICM cells were grown in low-density

cell suspensions for up to 28 days and then used as nuclear donors, without any attempt at

synchronization of the cell cycle of the donor cells. Of those successfully fused, 24 percent

developed to the blastocyst stage, and 4 out of 34 (12 percent) blastocysts transferred to recipient

cows developed into normal calves. This success rate compares favorably with those using earlier
B-10

blastomeres, and suggests that it might be possible to achieve nuclear transfer success from

permanent cell lines established from early embryos.

Wilmut and colleagues established permanent epithelial cell lines from sheep embryos and

used these as nuclear donors after as many as 13 passages in culture (Campbell et al. 1996). In an

attempt to avoid the problems of nuclear transfer of non-G1 nuclei into activated oocytes, they

subjected their donor cell line to serum starvation prior to nuclear transfer. Under these

conditions, where the cells are starved of essential nutrients, the cells exit the cell cycle and enter

the so-called G0 state. Fusion of G0 nuclei to oocyte cytoplasm means that all nuclei can be

activated to reenter the cell cycle together and problems of cell cycle asynchrony between donor

and host are avoided. It was also suggested that the G0 state might actually be beneficial in terms

of increasing the capacity of the nucleus to be reprogrammed by the oocyte cytoplasm. However,

there is currently no direct evidence to support this, nor to conclude that nuclei synchronized in

G0 are any better than nuclei synchronized in G1. Approximately 14 percent of fusions resulted in

development of blastocysts, and 4 out of 34 (12 percent) embryos transferred developed into live

lambs. The success rate in sheep and bovine experiments was almost identical, and suggested that

long-term passage of early embryo cells need not inhibit their ability to be reprogrammed by the

oocyte environment. Would the same be true of adult cells?

AND THEN CAME DOLLY

All of this background work led up to the famous Dolly, the first mammal to develop from the

nucleus of an adult somatic cell (Wilmut et al. 1997). Wilmut and colleagues took fetal fibroblast

cells and cells derived from the mammary gland of an adult sheep and applied the same approach

of synchronizing cells in G0 prior to nuclear transfer. They reported successful production of live

offspring from both cell types. Twenty-nine out of 247 (12 percent) of successful fusions between

adult mammary gland nuclei and enucleated oocytes developed to the blastocyst stage, and 1 out

of 29 (3 percent) blastocysts transferred developed into a live lamb— Dolly. This experiment was,

in fact, the first time any adult animal had been derived from nuclear transfer of an adult nucleus,

since the frog experiments generated only swimming tadpoles. However, the amount of new

information about the stability of the differentiated state derived from this experiment was small,

since no attempt was made to use only fully differentiated cells expressing specialized mammary

gland proteins for the transfer, as was done for the skin cell experiments in frogs. The successful

nuclear transfer animal could have derived from a less-differentiated, stem-cell-like cell in the

population. The excitement generated by Dolly was more related to the realization that there may

be no theoretical barrier to nuclear transfer into the oocyte from any cell of the body in any

mammalian species. Hence, the science fiction scenario of copying or “cloning” an adult mammal,

including humans, became science fact.

Several important questions remain unanswered about how feasible cloning from adult

cells really will be, especially since only one successful adult nuclear transfer animal has been

produced to date.
B-11

1. Are there true species differences in the ability to achieve successful nuclear transfer?

We have seen that the published data suggest that nuclear transfer in mice is much less

successful than in larger domestic animals. Part of this difference may reflect the intensity

of research in this area in the last ten years, where agricultural interests have meant that

more nuclear transfer work has been performed in domestic animals than in mice. But part

of it may be real and reflect another critical component for the successful reprogramming

of the donor nucleus— namely, the time between nuclear transfer and the activation of the

embryonic genome. In order for a differentiated nucleus to redirect development in the

environment of the egg, its particular constellation of regulatory proteins must be replaced

by those of the egg in time for the embryo to be able to use the genome of the donor

nucleus to transcribe the genes it needs for normal development. In mammals, unlike many

other species, the early embryo rapidly needs to use the embryonic genome and cannot

survive on the proteins and messenger RNA inherited from the mother in the egg. The

time at which embryonic gene activation occurs varies among species— the late 2-cell

stage in mice (Schultz 1993), the 4- to 8-cell stage in humans (Braude et al. 1988) and the

8- to 16-cell stage in sheep. The later onset of embryonic gene transcription in sheep

provides an additional round or two of cell divisions in which nuclear reprogramming can

occur, unlike the rapid genome activation in the mouse. Donor nuclei do turn on some of

the 2-cell stage-specific genes after nuclear transfer in the mouse, but protein synthesis

patterns are not identical between nuclear transfer and normal embryos (Latham et al.

1994). Further cross-species comparisons are needed to assess the importance of this

difference in the time of genome activation for the success of nuclear transfer experiments.

2. Will imprinting affect the ability of nuclei from later stages to reprogram

development? In mammals, the phenomenon of genomic imprinting means that the

paternally and maternally inherited genomes are not equivalent (Solter 1988). Some

heritable imprint is established on the chromosomes during gametogenesis, such that

certain genes are expressed from only one of either the maternally or paternally inherited

copies later in development. Imprinting explains why parthenogenetic embryos, with only

maternally inherited genes, and androgenetic embryos, with only paternally inherited

genes, fail to complete development (Fundele and Surani 1994). Nuclei transferred from a

diploid organism, whether from the embryo or the adult, should contain both maternal and

paternal copies of the genome and so not suffer the problems of parthenogenesis.

However, an adult nucleus, if it is to be successful in reprogramming development, should

retain intact the chromosomal imprints that normally determine whether maternal or

paternal gene copies will be active. The successful generation of an adult sheep from an

adult cell nucleus suggests that the imprint can be stable, but it is possible that some

instability of the imprint, particularly in cells in culture, could limit the efficiency of nuclear

transfer from adult cells. It is interesting that nuclear transfer embryos produced from

established bovine embryonic cell lines died in mid-gestation, with specific deficiencies in

placental development (Stice et al. 1996). Placental development has been found to be

particularly sensitive to imprinting effects in mice (Moore and Haig 1991).
B-12

3. Will processes of cellular aging affect the ability of adult nuclei to program

development? As somatic cells divide, they progressively age and there is normally a

defined number of cell divisions that they can undergo before senescence. Part of this

aging process involves the progressive shortening of the ends of the chromosomes, the

telomeres. Germ cells and cancer cells evade this chromosome aging by possessing a

telomerase activity that can keep telomeres full length (Chiu and Harley 1997). It seems

likely that returning an adult mammalian nucleus to the oocyte will expose it to sufficient

telomerase activity to reset telomere length, since oocytes have been found to be potent

sources of telomerase activity (Mantell and Greider 1994).

4. Will the mutation load accumulated by adult cells affect nuclear transfer efficiency

and predispose to cancer and other diseases? As cells divide and organisms age,

mistakes and alterations in the DNA will inevitably occur and will accumulate with age. If

these mistakes occur in germ cells, a heritable mutation occurs, but mutations in somatic

cells are not necessarily harmless. Sporadic somatic mutations in a variety of genes can

predispose a cell to become tumorigenic. Transfer of a nucleus from a somatic cell

carrying such a mutation into an egg would transform a sporadic somatic mutation into a

germline-equivalent mutation in all cells of the body, with presumably severe

consequences on the likelihood of that mutation leading to malignant transformation. The

risks of such events occurring following nuclear transfer is difficult to estimate.

WHY PURSUE ANIMAL CLONING RESEARCH?

The continued pursuit of nuclear transfer as a means of producing genetically identical copies of

embryonic or adult organisms largely has been driven by technological needs rather than by the

pursuit of basic knowledge of cellular differentiation. The goals are:

1. to generate groups of genetically identical individuals for research purposes,

2. to rapidly propagate “elite” animal stocks,

3. to improve the efficiency of generation and propagation of transgenic livestock, and

4. to generate targeted genetic alterations in domestic animals.

1. Making Clones for Research Purposes

Inbred strains of mice have been a major mainstay of biological research for years. These mice

have been bred by brother-sister mating for many generations until they are essentially all

genetically identical and homozygous (i.e., they carry two identical copies of all genes).

Experimental analysis is then simplified, because variations in response to experimental treatment

due to variations in genetic background can be eliminated. Clearly, generating homozygous inbred

lines in larger animals with long generation times and small numbers of offspring is not readily

achieved. The concept of generating small groups of identical animals by nuclear transfer has been

proposed as an alternative strategy and apparently underlies the recent report from Oregon on

successful nuclear transfer from early embryonic nuclei in monkeys. Repeated cycles of nuclear
B-13

transfer can expand the number of individuals derived from one donor nucleus, a trick first used in

Xenopus experiments. Thus, the first nuclear transfer embryo is allowed to divide to early

blastomere stages, and then those cells are used as donor nuclei for another series of transfers.

This process can be carried on indefinitely, in theory, although practice suggests that fusion rates

decline with each cycle of transfers. One experiment in cows, for example, produced a clone of 54

early embryos from nuclear transfer of a single blastomere nucleus from one parent embryo after

three cycles of transfer (Stice and Keefer 1993). Viable calves were produced from all three

cycles.

This approach is likely to be limited in its usefulness as a research tool, however. It must

be remembered that a clone of animals derived from nuclear transfer from one individual is

self-limited. Cloned animals do not breed true unless they are derived from an inbred stock, and

each clone will differ genetically from a clone derived from another individual. Thus each member

of a clone has to be made by the difficult procedure of nuclear transfer, and generation of large

enough clones to be useful as experimental groups is likely to be prohibitively expensive in most

animals.

2. Propagating Desirable Stocks

In animal breeding strategies, rapid spread of desirable traits within stocks of domestic animals is

of obvious commercial importance. Artificial insemination and embryo transfer can increase the

effective reproductive output of individual elite male and female animals, respectively, and are

widely used in the livestock business. Nuclear transfer cloning, especially from adult nuclei, could

provide an additional means of increasing the average “genetic merit” of a given generation of

animals. The ability to make identical copies of adult prize cows, sheep, and pigs is a feature

unique to nuclear transfer technologies and may well be used in livestock production if the

efficiencies of adult nuclear transfer can be improved. The net effect of multiplying genetically

favorable individuals by cloning will be to reduce the overall genetic diversity in a given livestock

line, with possible adverse long-term consequences. Efforts will have to be made to ensure

maintenance of a pool of genetic diversity for the future.

3. Improved Generation and Propagation of Transgenic Livestock

There is considerable interest in being able to genetically alter farm animals by introduction and

expression of foreign DNA sequences in their genome. So-called transgenic animals were first

made in mice by microinjection of DNA into the pronucleus of the egg. In a proportion of cases,

the injected DNA integrates into a host chromosome and is then passed into all cells of the mouse

and into the next generation as though it were a host gene. With the right DNA sequences

attached, the foreign gene can be expressed and function in the transgenic environment. This

ability to add genes to the genome has been a major research tool for understanding gene

regulation and for making mouse models of certain human diseases. It has also been applied to

other species, including livestock species. Proposed applications of this technology to livestock

improvement include the possible introduction of growth-enhancing genes, genes that affect milk
B-14

quality or wool fibers, and disease-resistance genes (Ward and Nancarrow 1995). Progress has

been slow. Initial results of attempting to manipulate meat production by overexpression of

growth hormone in pigs led to undesirable side effects (Pursel et al. 1989). In light of the likely

resistance of consumers to genetically manipulated meat, it seems probable that the use of

transgenesis for livestock improvement will be limited.

The major activity in livestock transgenesis is focused on pharmaceutical and medical

applications. The milk of livestock animals— sheep, goats, and cows— can be modified to contain

large amounts of pharmaceutically important proteins by expression of human genes under the

control of mammary gland-specific sequences (Houdebine 1994). In sheep, greater than 50

percent of the proteins in milk can be the product of a human transgene (Colman 1996). Even the

milk of transgenic mice can yield milligram quantities of recombinant proteins. Since many such

proteins are pharmaceutically active at very low concentrations, it is estimated that production of

human drugs from transgenic animals could be a multimillion-dollar industry in the coming years.

Regulatory approval for drugs prepared from milk is not yet in place.

The other major area of commercial interest is the use of transgenic animals for human

organ transplantation. Pig organs in many cases are similar enough to human organs to be

potentially useful in organ transplants if problems of rejection of the so-called xenograft could be

overcome. Prevention of acute phase rejection of the xenografts has already been achieved by

expression of human complement regulatory proteins in transgenic pigs. Further transgenic

manipulation may lead to improved graft survival. Several companies are exploring the possibility

of pig organ transplants despite possible risks of cross-species transfer of pathogenic viruses and

the likely public resistance to xenografts.

How does nuclear transfer come into all this transgenic animal work? Transgenesis by

zygote injection is inefficient. Not all injected eggs will develop into transgenic animals, and then

not all transgenic animals will express the transgene in the desired manner. Characterizing a

transgenic line of livestock is a slow and expensive business. Nuclear transfer would speed up the

expansion of a successful transgenic line, but, perhaps more important, it would allow more

efficient generation of transgenic animals in the first place. Foreign DNA could be introduced into

cell lines in culture, and cells containing the transgene in the right configuration could be grown

up and used as a source of nuclei for transfer, ensuring that all offspring are transgenic.

4. Generating Targeted Gene Alterations

The most powerful technology for genetic manipulation in mammals— gene targeting— was

developed in mice, and depends on the ability of mammalian DNA, when added to cells in culture,

to recombine homologously with identical DNA sequences in the genome and replace them. Thus,

mutations or other desired alterations can be introduced into the genome in a directed and

controlled manner and their effects studied (Capecchi 1989). This technology would have been of

limited use, however, without some means of taking those changes generated in culture and

reintroducing them into animals. In mice, this can be achieved by the use of embryonic stem (ES)
B-15

Figure 4: Generation of germline chimeras from embryonic stem

cells

cells. These are cell lines derived from the ICM of the blastocyst, which can be cultured

indefinitely in the undifferentiated state but which retain the potential to form all cells of the

animal, including the germ cells, when returned to the environment of the early embryo (Figure 4).

These “chimeric” animals can then be bred to transmit the ES genotype into the germ line. Thus,

any genetic alteration made in the ES cells in culture can be introduced back into mice (Robertson

1986).

The combination of homologous recombination and ES cell technology has been

responsible for the explosion of knock out mice, in which specific genes have been deleted from

the genome. These mice enhance understanding of normal gene function and allow generation of

accurate models of human genetic disease. Gene targeting approaches can also be used to ensure

correct tissue-specific expression of foreign transgenes and to misexpress genes in inappropriate

tissues. If applied to domestic animals, this technology could increase the efficiency of transgene

expression by targeting transgenes to appropriate regions of the genome for expression. It could

also be used to mutate endogenous genes so as to influence animal health and productivity or to
B-16

Figure 5: Aggregation of ES cells with tetraploid embryos generates entirely ES-derived mice

help prevent rejection of xenografts. However, to date, there are no fully validated ES cell lines in

domestic animals. Nuclear transfer from non-pluripotent cell lines, as reported by Wilmut et al.

1997, provides a possible alternative to the ES cell route for introduction of targeted gene

alterations into the germ line.

At this point it is unclear whether homologous recombination can occur efficiently in the

kinds of cell lines used for sheep nuclear transfer. Experiments in mice have indicated that the ES

cell environment is particularly conducive to homologous recombination, and efficiencies of

targeted mutation tend to be much lower in non-ES lines. Attempts to generate ES cells from

other species are continuing— primate (Thomson et al. 1995), rat (Iannaccone et al. 1994), and

pig (Wheeler 1994) lines have been reported, and this may still be the best route to achieve precise

gene alterations in domestic animals.

Apart from the fact that ES lines do not exist, the other argument for using nuclear

transfer to introduce germ-line genetic alterations in farm animals is that it avoids one generation

of breeding from chimeras, an important factor in farm animals with long generation times and

small litter size. In fact, ES cells can also be used directly to generate cloned animals carrying the

gene alteration of interest without the intermediate chimeric step. Clonal ES cell lines have been

shown to be capable of forming entire mice when combined with developmentally compromised

host embryos (Figure 5) (Nagy et al. 1993). Although this procedure is not yet very efficient, it

illustrates the remarkable properties of these cells and suggests that similar approaches could be

applied in other species.
B-17

HOW CAN WE USE INFORMATION FROM NUCLEAR TRANSFER

EXPERIMENTS FOR HUMAN BENEFIT?

The biotechnology applications of nuclear transfer cloning in mammals are clear, but the

underlying science does offer some opportunities for further understanding of the reversibility of

the differentiation process. The demonstration that in mammals as in frogs, the nucleus of an adult

cell can be reprogrammed by the environment of the early embryo, provides further impetus to

studies on how to reactivate embryonic programs of development in adult cells— with exciting

prospects for regeneration and repair of diseased or damaged human tissues and organs.

Information on the mechanisms of reprogramming of the adult nucleus in the egg cytoplasm may

provide clues as to how to reprogram adult differentiated cells directly without the need for

oocyte fusion.

It may not be necessary to reprogram terminally differentiated cells, but rather to stimulate

proliferation and differentiation of the quiescent stem cells, which are known to exist in many

adult tissues— including the nervous system (Gage et al. 1995). Experiments in this area are likely

to focus more on the conditions required for direct stimulation of the stem cells in specific tissues

than on the actual use of nuclear transfer to activate novel developmental programs. These

approaches to cellular repair using adult stem cells will be greatly aided by an understanding of

how stem cells are established during embryogenesis. ES cells provide an interesting model for

such studies, since they represent the precursors of all cell lineages in the body. They can be

stimulated to differentiate in vitro into precursors of the hematopoietic, endothelial, neuronal, and

muscle cell lineages, among others (Weiss and Orkin 1995), and they thus provide a potential

source of stem cells for regeneration of all tissues of the body.

Once we have learned more about how to control the differentiation of mouse ES cells, one could

envisage the generation of human ES-type cells as essentially endless sources of stem cells for

tissue regeneration. Such cell lines could be generated from “spare” in vitro fertilized embryos or

from fetal germ cells, as has proved possible in mice (Matsui et al. 1992). One could even

envisage using nuclear transfer from an adult cell to generate an early embryo and therefore an ES

line for each individual human, which would be ideally tissue-matched for later transplant

purposes. This seems a rather expensive and far-fetched scenario; a more likely scenario would

involve the generation of a few widely used and well-characterized human ES cell lines that had

been genetically altered to prevent graft rejection in all possible recipients.

ETHICAL CONCERNS

As we move into the realms of direct human embryo manipulation, the ethical implications of this

research become more apparent. It is outside the scope of this paper to discuss the various

scenarios in which human nuclear transfer might be considered. Work with embryonic stem cells

and genetic manipulation of early embryos in different species (including nuclear transfer) is

already providing unparalleled insights into fundamental biological processes and promises to

provide great practical benefit in terms of improved livestock, improved means of producing
B-18

pharmaceutical proteins, and prospects for regeneration and repair of human tissues. Great care

should be taken in crafting any ethical or legal guidelines on human cloning to avoid inhibiting

legitimate research in animals or humans that has the potential to provide immense benefits for the

future.

References

Baron, M.H., T. Maniatis, Rapid reprogramming of globin gene expression in transient

heterokaryons, Cell, 46:591-602, 1986.

Blau, H.M., Differentiation requires continuous active control, Annu Rev Biochem, 61:1213-

1230, 1992.

Blau, H.M., G.K. Pavlath, E.C. Hardeman, C.P. Chiu, L. Silberstein, S.G. Webster, S.C. Miller,

C. Webster, Plasticity of the differentiated state, Science, 230:758-766, 1985.

Braude, P., V. Bolton, S. Moore, Human gene expression first occurs between the four- and

eight-cell stages of preimplantation development, Nature, 332:459-461, 1988.

Briggs, R., T.J. King, Transplantation of living nuclei from blastula cells into enucleated frogs’

eggs, Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A, 38:455-463, 1952.

Campbell, K.H., P. Loi, P. Cappai, I. Wilmut, Improved development to blastocyst of ovine

nuclear transfer embryos reconstructed during the presumptive S-phase of enucleated activated

oocytes, Biol Reprod, 50:1385-1393, 1994.

Campbell, K.H., J. McWhir, W.A. Ritchie, I. Wilmut, Sheep cloned by nuclear transfer from a

cultured cell line, Nature, 380:64-66, 1996.

Campbell, K.H., W.A. Ritchie, I. Wilmut, Nuclear-cytoplasmic interactions during the first cell

cycle of nuclear transfer reconstructed bovine embryos: Implications for deoxyribonucleic acid

replication and development, Biol Reprod, 49:933-942, 1993.

Capecchi, M.R., The new mouse genetics: Altering the genome by gene targeting, Trends Genet,

5:70-76, 1989.

Cheong, H.T., Y. Takahashi, H. Kanagawa, Birth of mice after transplantation of early

cell-cycle-stage embryonic nuclei into enucleated oocytes, Biol Reprod, 48:958-963, 1993.

Chiu, C.P., C.B. Harley, Replicative senescence and cell immortality: The role of telomeres and

telomerase, Proc Soc Exp Biol Med, 214:99-106, 1997.
B-19

Collas, P., J.J. Balise, J.M. Robl, Influence of cell cycle stage of the donor nucleus on

development of nuclear transplant rabbit embryos, Biol Reprod, 46:492-500, 1992.

Collas, P., F.L. Barnes, Nuclear transplantation by microinjection of inner cell mass and granulosa

cell nuclei, Mol Reprod Dev, 38:264-267, 1994.

Colman, A., Production of proteins in the milk of transgenic livestock: Problems, solutions, and

successes, Am J Clin Nutr, 63:639S-645S, 1996.

Fulka, J., Jr., N.L. First, R.M. Moor, Nuclear transplantation in mammals: Remodeling of

transplanted nuclei under the influence of maturation promoting factor, Bioessays, 18:835-840,

1996.

Fundele, R.H., M.A. Surani, Experimental embryological analysis of genetic imprinting in mouse

development, Dev Genet, 15:515-522, 1994.

Gage, F.H., J. Ray, L.J. Fisher, Isolation, characterization, and use of stem cells from the CNS,

Annu Rev Neurosci,18:159-192, 1995.

Graham, C. F., The fusion of cells with one- and two-cell mouse embryos, Wistar Inst Symp

Monogr, 9:19-35, 1969.

Gurdon, J.B., The Control of Gene Expression in Animal Development, Oxford: Clarendon Press,

1974.

Gurdon, J.B., The developmental capacity of nuclei taken from intestinal epithelium cells of

feeding tadpoles, J Embryol Exp Morphol, 10:622-640, 1962.

Gurdon, J.B., R.A. Laskey, O.R. Reeves, The developmental capacity of nuclei transplanted from

keratinized skin cells of adult frogs, J Embryol Exp Morphol, 34:93-112, 1975.

Houdebine, L.M., Production of pharmaceutical proteins from transgenic animals, J Biotechnol,

34:269-287, 1994.

Iannaccone, P.M., G.U. Taborn, R.I. Garton, M.D. Caplice, D.R. Brenin, Pluripotent embryonic

stem cells from the rat are capable of producing chimeras, Dev Biol, 163:288-292, 1994.

Latham, K.E., J.I. Garrels, D. Solter, Alterations in protein synthesis following transplantation of

mouse 8-cell stage nuclei to enucleated 1-cell embryos, Dev Biol, 163:341-350, 1994.

Mantell, L.L., C.W. Greider, Telomerase activity in germline and embryonic cells of Xenopus,

EMBO J, 13:3211-3217, 1994.
B-20

Matsui, Y., K. Zsebo, B.L.M. Hogan, Derivation of pluripotential embryonic stem cells from

murine primordial germ cells in culture, Cell, 70:841-847, 1992.

McGrath, J., D. Solter, Inability of mouse blastomere nuclei transferred to enucleated zygotes to

support development in vitro, Science, 226:1317-1319, 1984.

Moore, T., D. Haig, Genomic imprinting in mammalian development: A parental tug-of-war,

Trends Genet, 7:45-49, 1991.

Nagy, A., J. Rossant, R. Nagy, W. Abramow-Newerley, J.C. Roder, Derivation of completely cell

culture-derived mice from early passage embryonic stem cells, Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A,

90:8424-8428, 1993.

Prather, R.S., N.L. First, Cloning embryos by nuclear transfer, J Reprod Fertil Suppl, 41:125-

134, 1990.

Prather, R.S., M.M. Sims, N.L. First, Nuclear transplantation in early pig embryos, Biol Reprod,

41:414-418, 1989.

Pursel, V.G., C.A. Pinkert, K.F. Miller, D.J. Bolt, R.G. Campbell, R.D. Palmiter, R.L. Brinster,

and R.E. Hammer, Genetic engineering of livestock, Science, 244:1281-1288, 1989.

Robertson, E.J., Pluripotential stem cell lines as a route into the mouse germ line, Trends Genet,

2:9-13, 1986.

Rossant, J., Postimplantation development of blastomeres isolated from 4- and 8-cell eggs, J

Embryol Exp Morph, 36:283-290, 1976.

Rossant, J., R.A. Pedersen, Experimental Approaches to Mammalian Embryonic Development,

Cambridge: University Press, 1986.

Schultz, R.M., Regulation of zygotic gene activation in the mouse, BioEssays, 15:531-538, 1993.

Sims, M., N.L. First, Production of calves by transfer of nuclei from cultured inner cell mass cells,

Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A, 91:6143-6147, 1994.

Smith, L.C., I. Wilmut, Influence of nuclear and cytoplasmic activity on the development in vivo

of sheep embryos after nuclear transplantation, Biol Reprod, 40:1027-1035, 1989.

Solter, D., Differential imprinting and expression of maternal and paternal genomes, Annu Rev

Genet, 22:127-146, 1988.
B-21

Stice, S.L., C.L. Keefer, Multiple generational bovine embryo cloning, Biol Reprod, 48:715-719,

1993.

Stice, S.L., C.L. Keefer, L. Matthews, Bovine nuclear transfer embryos: Oocyte activation prior

to blastomere fusion, Mol Reprod Dev, 38:61-68, 1994.

Stice, S.L., N.S. Strelchenko, C.L. Keefer, L. Matthews, Pluripotent bovine embryonic cell lines

direct embryonic development following nuclear transfer, Biol Reprod, 54:100-110, 1996.

Thomson, J.A., J. Kalishman, T.G. Golos, M. Durning, C.P. Harris, R.A. Becker, and J.P Hearn,

Isolation of a primate embryonic stem cell line, Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A, 92:7844-7848, 1995.

Ward, K.A., C.D. Nancarrow, The commercial and agricultural applications of animal

transgenesis, Mol Biotechnol, 4:167-178, 1995.

Weintraub, H., The MyoD family and myogenesis: Redundancy, networks, and thresholds, Cell,

75:1241-1244, 1993.

Weiss, M.J., S.H. Orkin, In vitro differentiation of murine embryonic stem cells: New approaches

to old problems, J Clin Invest, 97:591-595, 1995.

Wheeler, M.B., Development and validation of swine embryonic stem cells: A review, Reprod

Fertil Dev, 6:563-568, 1994.

Willadsen, S.M., Nuclear transplantation in sheep embryos, Nature, 320:63-65, 1986.

Willadsen, S.M., The development capacity of blastomeres from 4- and 8-cell sheep embryos,

J Embryol Exp Morphol, 65:165-172, 1981.

Wilmut, I., A.E. Schnieke, J. McWhir, A.J. Kind, K.H. Campbell, Viable offspring derived from

fetal and adult mammalian cells, Nature, 385:810-813, 1997.

Yang, X., S. Jiang, A. Kovacs, R.H. Foote, Nuclear totipotency of cultured rabbit morulae to

support full-term development following nuclear transfer, Biol Reprod, 47:636-643, 1992.
CLONING HUMAN BEINGS

Views of Scientific Societies and Professional Associations on Human Nuclear

Transfer Cloning Research

Commissioned Paper

by Elisa Eiseman, Ph.D.

RAND Corporation

C-1

CONTENTS

Preface C-3

Summary C-4

Acknowledgments C-6

List of Abbreviations C-6

Introduction C-6

Strategy for Soliciting Input from Societies on Human Nuclear Transfer Cloning C-8

Society Responses to Questions about the Uses of Nuclear Transfer Cloning C-9

Table 1: Respondents to the NBAC’s Request for Input on the Issue

of Nuclear Transfer Cloning C-10

Table 2: Summary of Scientific Societies’ and Professional Associations’

Views on the Issue of Human Nuclear Transfer Cloning C-12

Specific Comments on Questions 1 and 2 C-13

Specific Comments on Questions 3 and 4 C-14

Specific Comments on Questions 5 and 6 C-15

General Comments about Human Nuclear Transfer Cloning C-17

Definition of Cloning C-17

Knowledge Gained and Potential Uses C-18

Potential Risks and Scientific Constraints C-18

Restrictions, Regulations, or Legislation C-19

Ethical and Religious Issues C-21

Additional Comments C-23

Conclusion C-24

Appendix: Alphabetical Listing of Scientific Societies and Professional

Associations C-26

References C-32

Notes C-32

C-3

PREFACE

In response to the news of the cloning of Dolly, a Scottish mountain sheep, President Clinton

asked the National Bioethics Advisory Commission (NBAC) to report to him on the legal and

ethical issues that cloning raises in regard to its potential use in human beings. To obtain the views

of the scientific community, the NBAC asked a number of scientific societies and professional

associations for their opinions on the use of nuclear transfer cloning using embryonic or adult

human donor nuclei for three general areas of research: (1) basic developmental biology

conducted in vitro on embryos up to day 14; (2) in vitro cell differentiation to generate specific

human cell types for potential cell based therapies; and (3) the generation of cloned offspring for

the treatment of infertility or related reproductive reasons.

This report summarizes the responses of the scientific organizations to the NBAC

questions about human nuclear transfer research, as well as their general comments about the

risks and benefits, possible restrictions, and the ethical and religious issues connected with human

cloning research. It was prepared by RAND’s Critical Technologies Institute (CTI) in response to

a request from the Ad-hoc Cloning Science Working Group of the NBAC, and is intended for

inclusion in the NBAC’s report to the President on legal and ethical issues involved in the cloning

of human beings. The author is an American Association for the Advancement of Science Fellow

at CTI.

CTI was created in 1991 by an act of Congress. It is a federally funded research and

development center operated by RAND. CTI’s mission is to:

Help improve public policy by conducting objective, independent research and analysis to

support the Office of Science and Technology Policy in the Executive Office of the

President of the United States.

Help decisionmakers understand the likely consequences of their decisions and choose

among alternative policies.

Improve understanding in both the public and private sectors of the ways in which

technological efforts can better serve national objectives.

CTI research focuses on problems of science and technology policy that involve or affect multiple

Executive Branch agencies, different branches of the U.S. government, or interaction between the

U.S. government and states, other nations, or the private sector.
C-4

Inquiries regarding this document or CTI may be directed to:

Bruce Don, Director, Critical Technologies Institute

RAND

1333 H St., N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20005

Phone: (202) 296-5000

Web: http://www.rand.org.cti

Email: cti@rand.org

SUMMARY

The cloning of Dolly, a Scottish mountain sheep, has brought into sharp focus the possibility of

cloning human beings along with all its inherent moral, ethical and legal implications. On February

24, 1997, President Clinton asked the National Bioethics Advisory Commission (NBAC) to

deliver a report to him within 90 days on the legal and ethical issues involved in the cloning of

human beings and “possible federal actions to prevent its abuse.” On March 4, 1997, President

Clinton imposed a ban on the use of federal money for cloning human beings and asked for a

voluntary moratorium by researchers working with private money until he receives the report

from the NBAC.

As an aid to its deliberations, the NBAC requested that a number of scientific societies and

professional associations provide their views about the use of nuclear transfer cloning, using either

embryonic or adult human donor nuclei, for three general areas of research: (1) basic

developmental biology conducted in vitro on embryos up to day 14; (2) in vitro cell differentiation

to generate specific human cell types for potential cell-based therapies; and (3) the generation of

cloned offspring for the treatment of infertility or related reproductive reasons. Thirty-two

societies and associations responded to the Commission’s request, providing comments not only 1

on the science of human nuclear transfer cloning, but on the associated risks and benefits, and

ethical and policy issues as well.

The societies and associations made a clear distinction between the use of human nuclear

transfer cloning for the purposes of research and for the cloning of an entire human being. The

majority of respondents did not support cloning to produce a new individual. Although the

societies and associations were asked to comment on the use of either embryonic or adult donor

nuclei, the majority of respondents made no distinction between these two sources of donor

nuclei.

The majority of societies and associations stated that research on basic developmental

biology or new cell-based therapies should be allowed to proceed freely with proper peer review

to ensure that established scientific and ethical principles are not violated. The overwhelming view

was that the potential benefits of cell-based therapies far outweighed the risks of the research, and

that the many possible contributions to science and medicine warranted this type of research.

Prohibition or excessive regulation of this technology could limit our knowledge of the genetic
C-5

basis of diseases, such as certain birth defects, inherited disorders, and cancer, and impede the

development of new therapies with the potential to help many people.

In contrast to their views on the use of nuclear transfer cloning for basic developmental

biology and cell-based therapies, the majority of the societies and associations agreed that the

generation of cloned offspring should be prohibited entirely at this time. Most of the objections

centered on (1) ethical issues of personal and social well being, such as family relationships,

identity, individuality, psychological impact, and expectations of sameness; and (2) scientific

issues such as the low efficiency of nuclear transfer cloning and the high likelihood of abnormal

offspring. The concerns of several respondents were nicely captured in statements made by the

American Medical Association (AMA). The AMA, founded on the principle that physicians

practice medicine within set standards of professional conduct and are bound by a code of ethics,

stated, “Cloning as an approach to medical infertility has ethical hazards in the areas of

confidentiality, consent, and discrimination. This and risks to personal and social well being would

prevent professional endorsement at the present time.” The AMA also stated, “Cloning as an

approach to terminal illness or population enhancement is not acceptable medical practice.”

Finally, the AMA indicated that even if animal cloning technology ever met standards sufficient to

permit clinical trials, it would still be necessary to establish that cloning offered an equal or better

approach than existing therapy.

Several respondents were concerned that an ambiguous definition of “cloning” might

interfere with valuable medical research. To avoid inadvertently prohibiting important genetic

research, they argued that there needs to be a clear distinction between human cloning to produce

a new human being, and cloning as a tool in biomedical research that in and of itself would not

result in a new human being. Although most respondents indicated that cloning to produce a new

human being was practically and morally unacceptable, they did not advocate legislation to

prohibit research in this area. Instead, a voluntary moratorium was proposed. Because the

prospect of cloning an entire human being is so preliminary at this stage, a voluntary moratorium

would allow additional time to consider the scientific, ethical, social, and legal bases of such

research. In contrast, most of the societies and associations indicated that there should be no new

restrictions on nuclear transfer cloning for biomedical research beyond those already in place for

similar types of research, which include (1) the obligation of researchers and physicians to observe

self-restraint consistent with scientific, medical, and ethical codes of conduct; (2) oversight by the

scientific community through such means as peer review and Institutional Review Boards; and (3)

federal oversight, such as by a national bioethics authority, or regulation by the federal policy for

the protection of human research subjects. Several respondents also stated that nuclear transfer

cloning experiments should first be perfected in animal models, after which confirmatory

experiments with human cells could be performed to address species variations.

It was notable that none of the societies or associations called for the enactment of federal

or state legislation banning either the cloning of an entire human being, or cloning research to

study basic developmental biology or to develop cell-based therapies. Several respondents

specifically indicated that they opposed such legislation due to concerns that overly broad
C-6

regulations may inhibit or deter critical biomedical research. Many medicines, diagnostics, and

vaccines to treat diseases such as heart attacks, cancer, diabetes, hemophilia, and hepatitis were

developed with knowledge gained from the cloning of genes and cells. In addition, a legislative

ban would have a force of permanence that may not be presently scientifically or ethically

justified. The difference between a moratorium and legislation is that a moratorium can either be

lifted in the future or made permanent when more information is available to assess the feasibility,

desirability, and public acceptability of the cloning of human beings.

This summary of opinions came from a subset of the scientific and medical communities.

However, it is by no means a complete account of all the scientific societies and professional

associations that may have opinions on this complex issue. A more thorough investigation of the

issues may provide many more important points of view and information critical to a decision on

the allowability of human nuclear transfer cloning research.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The author would like to thank the scientific societies and professional associations for their

timely and informative response to the NBAC’s request for input on the issue of human nuclear

transfer cloning. The guidance, input, and review by Carol Greider, David Cox, Steven Holtzman,

and Diane Scott-Jones from the NBAC Ad-hoc Cloning Science Working Group were invaluable

for the preparation of this document. The author would also like to thank Rachel Levinson from

the Office of Science and Technology Policy for the opportunity to work with the NBAC on this

project. She would also like to thank the NBAC Staff— Henrietta Hyatt-Knorr, Patricia Norris,

and Robin Dorsey— for their help in soliciting and compiling the society and association

responses. The author is also very grateful to her colleagues at RAND— Richard A. Rettig,

Katherine Webb, and David Adamson— for their quick and thorough review of this document.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CTI Critical Technologies Institute

FDA Food and Drug Administration

IRB Institutional Review Board

NBAC National Bioethics Advisory Commission

NIH National Institutes of Health

RAC Recombinant DNA Advisory Committee

Ref # Reference number

INTRODUCTION

The first and only mammal to be cloned from an adult cell, the sheep named Dolly has brought

into sharp focus the possibility of cloning human beings along with all its inherent moral, ethical,

and legal implications. On February 24, 1997, President Clinton asked the National Bioethics

Advisory Commission (NBAC) to deliver a report to him within 90 days on the legal and ethical
C-7

issues involved in the cloning of human beings and “possible federal actions to prevent its abuse.”

On March 4, 1997, President Clinton imposed a ban on the use of federal money for cloning

human beings and asked for a voluntary moratorium by researchers working with private money

until he receives the report from the NBAC.

The nuclear transfer technique that was used to clone Dolly from the udder of an adult

sheep is not new technology. This technology has been used since the early 1960s to answer the

question of whether the genetic material of differentiated cells from adult animals is irreversibly

modified. Nuclear transfer experiments, first performed in amphibians in the 1960s, in mice in the

1970s, in sheep in the 1980s, and in monkeys in the 1990s have provided evidence that fully

differentiated somatic cells retain all the genetic material of the early embryo, and that

differentiation is almost entirely achieved by reversible changes in gene expression (Rossant 1997,

Wilmut et al. 1997).

The nuclear transfer technology that produced Dolly is not new to Ian Wilmut and his

group in Scotland, either. They have been studying the control of cell development for over ten

years, and just last year published a report of the first mammal to be cloned from an established

cell line (Campbell et al. 1996). Their major contributions to this area of research are (1) the

complete genetic material from an adult mammalian cell has been used in the development of a

new individual for the first time; and (2) donor cells, induced to exit the growth phase and become

quiescent before being used for nuclear transfer, are more susceptible to reprogramming by the

recipient egg cell and result in the normal development and birth of cloned offspring (Campbell et

al. 1996, Wilmut et al. 1997).

In order to fully evaluate the issues that nuclear transfer cloning raises, the NBAC

requested input from a wide cross-section of the scientific community. Various scientific societies

and professional associations (hereafter “societies”) were asked for their views on the use of

nuclear transfer cloning, using embryonic or adult human donor nuclei, for three general areas of

research: (1) basic developmental biology conducted in vitro on embryos up to day 14; (2) in vitro

cell differentiation to generate specific human cell types for potential cell-based therapies; and (3)

the generation of cloned offspring for the treatment of infertility or related reproductive reasons.

This report summarizes the responses of the scientific organizations to the NBAC

questions about human nuclear transfer research, and describes their general comments about the

risks and benefits, possible restrictions, and the ethical and religious issues connected with human

cloning research. The strategy for soliciting input from the societies on human nuclear transfer is

also presented.

STRATEGY FOR SOLICITING INPUT FROM SOCIETIES

ON HUMAN NUCLEAR TRANSFER CLONING

In an effort to form recommendations that best represent the scientific community, the NBAC

sought input from scientific societies and professional associations on the human nuclear transfer
C-8

cloning issue. Because of time constraints, it was not possible to mount a systematic survey of the

members of the societies. Instead, the NBAC requested help from society and association leaders

to obtain an informal assessment of the views held by their members, with the knowledge that the

responses may only reflect the views of the leadership, or may even be the personal opinion of the

respondent. The societies were asked to provide feedback regarding the appropriateness of

pursuing six types of research (Questions 1–6):

1. Nuclear transfer cloning using adult human donor nuclei for basic developmental

biological research on early embryos up to 14 days post fertilization, but not for ultimate

implantation, gestation, and birth.

2. Nuclear transfer cloning using embryonic human donor nuclei for basic developmental

biological research using early embryos up to 14 days post fertilization, but not for

ultimate implantation, gestation, and birth.

3. Nuclear transfer cloning using adult human donor nuclei for research purposes on in vitro

cell-differentiation to generate specific human cell types for potential cell-based therapies.

4. Nuclear transfer cloning using embryonic human donor nuclei for research purposes on in

vitro cell-differentiation to generate specific human cell types for potential cell-based

therapies.

5. Nuclear transfer cloning using embryonic human nuclei for research toward generating

cloned offspring in the treatment of infertility or related reproductive reasons.

6. Nuclear transfer cloning using adult human nuclei for research toward generating cloned

offspring in the treatment of infertility or related reproductive reasons.

The societies and associations were asked to indicate whether each kind of research

should be (1) prohibited entirely, (2) allowed in some limited circumstances, or (3) allowed freely.

They were also asked for the reasoning behind their answers, what types of limited circumstances

they envisioned, and their views on why nuclear transfer cloning experiments using either

embryonic or adult donor cells should be allowed or prohibited.

SOCIETY RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ABOUT THE USES

OF NUCLEAR TRANSFER CLONING

Thirty-two societies responded to the NBAC’s request. Table 1 lists the societies that responded, 2

the corresponding reference number (Ref #) used in this report, and notes whether the response

provided was in an official or personal capacity. In addition, four societies stated that they could

not respond in the time allotted. Twenty-five of the 32 responses presented the official views of

the society, while 7 represented the personal views of the respondent. Some of the societies that

responded in an official capacity qualified their responses: eight stated that their responses
C-9

represented the leadership and not necessarily that of the entire membership; one submitted the

consensus view of the society’s Public Policy Committee; and one gave an impression of the

views of the society’s members. Six respondents provided general comments about their views on

cloning, but did not directly address the six research areas (Questions 1–6) defined by the NBAC.

Seven societies had no official position on human cloning or on the six proposed research areas.

Nineteen respondents specifically addressed Questions 1–6.

Table 2 summarizes the responses of the scientific societies and professional associations

on the six areas of human nuclear transfer research described in Questions 1–6. It is interesting to

note that even though the societies were asked to comment on the use of either embryonic or

adult donor nuclei, the majority of respondents did not differentiate between these two sources of

donor nuclei. Three respondents specifically stated that they drew no distinction between the use

of adult or embryonic nuclei, when used for in vitro purposes, on the assumption that such use be

subject to usual ethical approval constraints (13, 32, 34).

Of the 19 respondents commenting on Questions 1–6, four represented the personal views

of the respondent, and 15 represented the official views of the society. The majority of

respondents stated that nuclear transfer cloning should be allowed freely for in vitro research on

basic developmental biology (Questions 1 and 2) or for the in vitro generation of specific cell

types for potential cell-based therapies (Questions 3 and 4). In contrast, the majority of

respondents stated that the use of nuclear transfer cloning for the generation of cloned offspring in

the treatment of infertility or related reproductive reasons (Questions 5 and 6) should be

prohibited entirely.

A few respondents recommended that nuclear transfer cloning should be allowed only in

some limited circumstances for in vitro research (Questions 1–4) or for generating cloned

offspring (Questions 5 and 6). The types of limitations cited included the requirements that

nuclear transfer cloning experiments be conducted under strict regulations and safeguards, and

first be perfected in animal models. Although the majority of societies distinguished the cloning of

human beings from the use of cloning for the purposes of research, three respondents stated that

all research with nuclear transfer cloning, including creating entire human beings, should be

allowed freely (10, 15, 24). In contrast, two respondents stated that all research with nuclear

transfer cloning, including research not intended for implantation, gestation, and birth, should be

prohibited entirely by enforcing a moratorium (12, 21).
C-10

Table 1. Respondents to the NBAC’s Request for Input on the Issue of Nuclear Transfer Cloning

Society/Association Ref # Official/Personal Comments

Norman Abeles 1 personal

Department of Psychology

Michigan State University

American Association for the 2 official

Advancement of Science (AAAS)

American Association of 3 official

Colleges of Pharmacy

American Association of State 4 official

Colleges and Universities

American Board of Medical Genetics 5 official

American College of Medical Genetics 6 official leaders

American College of Obstetricians 7 n/a could not respond in time

& Gynecologists

American Federation for Clinical 8 n/a could not respond in time

Research

American Medical Association 9 official

American Psychological Association 10 official leaders

American Psychological Association 10a official

Norman, Abeles, President

American Public Health Association 11 n/a could not respond in time

American Society for Cell Biology 12 official consensus

American Society for Human Genetics 13 official

American Society for Reproductive 14 official leaders

Medicne

American Society of Parasitologists 15 official leaders

Association of American Universities 16 official

O. W. Barnett 17 personal

North Carolina State University,

College of Agriculture and Life

Sciences

Biotechnology Industry Organization 18 official

(BIO)

Council of Scientific Society Presidents 19 official

Entomological Society of America 20 personal

Federation of American Societies 21 personal colleagues

for Experimental Biology (FASEB)
C-11

Table 1. Respondents to the NBAC’s Request for Input on the Issue of Nuclear Transfer Cloning (cont.)

Society/Association Ref # Official/Personal Comments

Genetics Society of America 22 official Board of Directors

Tony E. Hugli, Ph.D. 23 personal

Scripps Research Institute

Brian W. J. Mahy, Ph.D. 24 personal

National Center for Infectious

Diseases, Centers for Disease

Control and Prevention

National Academy of Sciences 25 personal

National Advisory Board on 26 official leaders

Ethics in Reproduction (NABER)

National Health Lawyers Association 27 official

Pharmaceutical Research & 28 official

Manufacturers of America (PHARMA)

Public Responsibility in Medicine 29 official impression

and Research (PRIM&R/ARENA)

Society for Assisted Reproductive 30 official leaders

Technology

Society for Clinical Trials 31 official impression

Society for Developmental Biology 32 official leaders

Society for Neuroscience 33 official

Society of Integrative and 34 official

Comparative Biology

Society of Research Administrators 35 official

Society of Research in Child 36 n/a could not respond in time

Development

Key

n/a = not applicable

no position = respondent has no official position on the issue

Board of Directors = circulated to the Board of Directors

colleagues = prevailing opinions of colleagues at recent professional meetings

consensus = consensus view of Society=s Public Policy Committee

impression = represents responders impression of the views of Society members

leaders = view of society/association leadership and not necessarily entire membership
C-12

Table 2. Summary of Scientific Societies’ and Professional Associations’ Views on the Issue of Human Nuclear

Transfer Cloning

Response of Scientific Societies/Professional

Associations (number responding)

Questions entirely circumstances freely Position

Prohibited some limited Allowed No

Allowed in

(1) Nuclear transfer cloning using adult human donor

nuclei for basic developmental biological research on

early embryos up to 14 days post fertilization, but not

for ultimate implantation, gestation, and birth.

3 2 14 7

(2) Nuclear transfer cloning using embryonic human

donor nuclei for basic developmental biological

research using early embryos up to 14 days post

fertilization, but not for ultimate implantation,

gestation, and birth.

3 2 14 7

(3) Nuclear transfer cloning using adult human donor

nuclei for research purposes on in vitro cell

differentiation to generate specific human cell types

for potential cell-based therapies.

2 5 12 7

(4) Nuclear transfer cloning using embryonic human

donor nuclei for research purposes on in vitro cell

differentiation to generate specific human cell types

for potential cell based therapies.

3 5 11 7

(5) Nuclear transfer cloning embryonic human nuclei

for research toward generating cloned offspring in the

treatment of infertility or related reproductive reasons.

13 1 4 8

(6) Nuclear transfer cloning using adult human nuclei 14 1 3 8

for research toward generating cloned offspring in the

treatment of infertility or related reproductive reasons.

* 4/19 responses to questions 1–6 were personal views

* 5 additional societies officially replied

* 15/19 responses to questions 1–6 were official views but did not directly answer questions 1–6

* all responses of no position were official views
C-13

Specific Comments on Questions 1 and 2

Question 1: Nuclear transfer cloning using adult human nuclei for basic developmental

biological research on early embryos up to 14 days post fertilization, but not for ultimate

implantation, gestation, and birth.

Question 2: Nuclear transfer cloning using embryonic human nuclei for basic developmental

biological research on early embryos up to 14 days post fertilization, but not for ultimate

implantation, gestation, and birth.

The majority of respondents stated that using either embryonic or adult human donor

nuclei for nuclear transfer cloning for in vitro research to study basic developmental biology

should be allowed freely (6, 9, 10, 13, 14, 15, 18, 19, 24, 25, 26, 28, 31, 34). Several respondents

indicated that this research should be allowed to proceed since it is promising, may prove

extremely beneficial to medicine, does no harm, and is intended to benefit people (13, 14, 19, 26,

31, 34). This type of research may be necessary for understanding the scientific basis of cellular

differentiation (10). It may also provide new and needed information about the morphology,

biochemical and biophysical properties, genetic expression, and similar biological characteristics

of pre-gastrulation-stage human embryos (14). Such research could also help improve the

understanding of the origin of certain birth defects, increase the knowledge about cancer and

metastasis, and explore ways to circumvent disease and inherited disorders of defects (14). The

needed advancement within this important field of biological science warrants the use of

early-stage embryos (14). It was pointed out that the NBAC’s questions raise ethical issues

surrounding research on embryos, whether or not they will be implanted (18). It was also noted

that the Human Embryo Research Panel in 1994 addressed this issue and declared that early

developmental research on embryos was acceptable for federal funding until the primitive streak

appeared on the embryo, at approximately 14 days (18, 28). Therefore, NIH has already

concluded that basic developmental research on embryos that will not be implanted is acceptable.

Those who replied that in vitro research using human nuclear transfer cloning to study

basic developmental biology should be allowed only in limited circumstances thought that this

research should only be conducted under strict regulations and safeguards (30, 32). Another

respondent indicated that most of the basic research in this area should take place in experimental

animals, but that some limited confirmatory experiments will have to take place with human cells,

since species differences may occur (32).

Three respondents thought that in vitro research using human nuclear transfer cloning to

study basic developmental biology should be prohibited entirely (12, 20, 21). One respondent

holds a “pro-life world view” and believes that any scientific research with human embryonic

tissues is immoral and unethical since it involves the ultimate death of a potentially completely

unique human being (20). The other respondents called for a moratorium on all six areas of

human nuclear transfer research described in Questions 1–6 to allow time for appropriate

consideration of the technology’s scientific and ethical implications (12, 21).
C-14

Specific Comments on Questions 3 and 4

Question 3: Nuclear transfer cloning using adult human nuclei for research purposes on in vitro

cell differentiation to generate specific human cell types for potential cell-based therapies.

Question 4: Nuclear transfer cloning using embryonic human nuclei for research purposes on in

vitro cell-differentiation to generate specific human cell types for potential cell-based therapies.

The majority of respondents stated that using either embryonic or adult human donor

nuclei for nuclear transfer cloning research for the purpose of developing potential cell-based

therapies should be allowed freely (9, 10, 15, 18, 19, 24, 25, 26, 28, 32, 34). One respondent

indicated that the use of adult donor nuclei should be allowed freely (Question 3), while the use of

embryonic donor nuclei should only be allowed in limited circumstances (Question 4) (14).

Several respondents indicated that research for the purpose of developing potential

cell-based therapies should be allowed freely, since this research holds therapeutic promise, does

no harm, the payoffs far outweigh the risks, and is intended to benefit people (10, 14, 19, 26, 34).

In addition, nuclear transfer cloning of adult or embryonic nuclei to generate specific human cell

types for potential cell-based therapies is a technology fundamental to developing new, more

effective medicines (28, 34). Prohibition or excessive regulation of this technology could

profoundly limit our knowledge of the genetic bases of disease and significantly impede or

preclude the development of new, breakthrough drugs with the potential to help many people

(28). This area of research holds the most future potential when combined with other approaches

to cell-based therapies, such as promoting the growth of stem cells from adult tissues and

generating embryonic stem cell lines (28, 32). It may also circumvent the current problems of

graft rejection and scarcity of donor material (32). An example of the utility of this type of

research is the possibility to develop healthy nervous system tissue and brain cells for

transplantation in degenerative diseases such as Alzheimer’s disease (30). It was suggested that

guidelines for research using human cells in the development of cellular and tissue-based products

could be coordinated with the new regulations being developed by the Food and Drug

Administration (FDA), which are dependent on the origin of the cellular material as well as the

intended use (18).

Some respondents thought that research using either embryonic or adult human donor

nuclei for the purpose of developing potential cell-based therapies should be allowed in limited

circumstances (6, 13, 30, 31). One reason for granting limited approval was that the cell-based

therapies were not specified, and while some might be acceptable, others would not (31). In

addition, it was suggested that there should be strict supervision with guidelines on appropriate

consent by couples donating embryos (30), and that the processes and controls currently used in

human gene therapy may be appropriate starting points for evaluating such experiments (6).

Two respondents indicated that there should be more limitations on the use of embryonic

donor nuclei than on adult donor nuclei for research aimed at developing potential cell-based
C-15

therapies (14, 20). The view of one respondent was that the use of adult tissue for this type of

research does not involve the ultimate death of a potentially complete, unique human being (20).

Since the goal of this type of research is to better understand a variety of health and

developmentally related subjects, the use of adult human donor nuclei was allowable with

limitations, but the use of embryonic human donor nuclei should be prohibited entirely (20). The

other respondent indicated that the use of adult donor nuclei for the development of cell-based

therapies should be allowed freely, but research using embryonic donor nuclei could not exceed

the 14-day stage of development (14). It was felt that the potential therapeutic benefits of

directing cell differentiation warrant the use of early-stage embryos that are not grown beyond the

14-day limit; however, research exceeding the 14-day stage would be problematic (13, 14). In

addition, before this research takes place with human cells, animal models should be used to

determine whether it is feasible, possible, and/or beneficial (14, 30).

Two of the respondents indicated that research using adult human donor nuclei for the

purpose of developing potential cell-based therapies should be prohibited entirely (12, 21), while

three respondents stated that the use of embryonic human donor nuclei should be prohibited for

this type of research (12, 20, 21). One respondent held a “pro-life world view” and believed that

any scientific research with human embryonic tissues is immoral and unethical since it involves the

ultimate death of a potentially completely unique human being (20). The other respondents called

for a moratorium on all six areas of human nuclear transfer research described in Questions 1–6 to

allow time for appropriate consideration of the technology’s scientific and ethical implications

(12, 21).

Specific Comments on Questions 5 and 6

Question 5: Nuclear transfer cloning using embryonic human nuclei for research purposes

towards generating cloned offspring in the treatment of infertility or related reproductive

reasons.

Question 6: Nuclear transfer cloning using adult human nuclei for research purposes towards

generating cloned offspring in the treatment of infertility or related reproductive reasons.

The majority of respondents stated that using either embryonic or adult human donor

nuclei for nuclear transfer cloning research toward generating cloned offspring in the treatment of

infertility or related reproductive reasons should be prohibited entirely (6, 9, 12, 13, 14, 18, 20,

21, 26, 30, 31, 32, 34). One respondent indicated that using embryonic donor nuclei should be

allowed in limited circumstances, but the use of adult donor nuclei should be prohibited entirely

because there is no therapeutic benefit in cloning an existing or previously existing person (14).

The reasons given for entirely prohibiting research aimed at generating cloned offspring in

the treatment of infertility or related reproductive reasons were similar for the use of either

embryonic or adult human donor nuclei. The objections to this type of research included the

observation that it would be years before the scientific data existed to determine if such
C-16

experiments were even feasible (6, 25). It was also pointed out that the efficiency of nuclear

transfer is so low and the chance of abnormal offspring so high that experimentation of this sort in

humans is currently unthinkable (13, 18, 19, 25, 32). It was suggested that an imposed

moratorium would allow time for the appropriate consideration of the technology’s scientific and

ethical implications (12, 13, 18).

The concerns of several of the societies were nicely captured by one respondent: “Cloning

as an approach to medical infertility has ethical hazards in the areas of confidentiality, consent,

and discrimination. This and risks to personal and social well-being would prevent professional

endorsement at the present time” (9). The respondent also stated, “Cloning as an approach to

terminal illness or population enhancement is not acceptable medical practice” (9). Finally, the

respondent indicated that even if animal cloning technology ever met sufficient standards that

clinical trials might be permissible, it would still be necessary to establish that cloning offered an

equal or better approach than existing therapy (9).

Most of the objections to the generation of cloned offspring centered on ethical issues.

Further discussion and consideration of the ethics of generating cloned offspring would be

desirable due to the potential implications for society in general (31, 34). It was asserted that “the

deliberate generation of human clones impinges on the dignity and integrity of the human as an

individual,” and even though the therapeutic objectives of such studies might be to help infertile

couples, it would be achieved at great cost to the offspring (32). “Humans cherish their

uniqueness and an attempt to deliberately clone another human being involves an inescapable

element of coercion, since the perpetrator has chosen to transcend the normal means of

reproduction in order to produce a genetic copy of himself” (32). Although most of the

respondents indicated that research in this area was practically and/or morally unacceptable, they

were reluctant to advocate legislative prohibition of research in this area. Instead, a voluntary

moratorium was proposed on such research (12, 13, 18, 21, 32).

A few respondents stated that nuclear transfer cloning using embryonic (10, 15, 19, 24) or

adult (10, 15, 24) human donor nuclei for research toward generating cloned offspring in the

treatment of infertility or for related reproductive reasons should be allowed freely. It was felt that

the payoff far outweighed the risks and that this research did no harm and was intended to benefit

people (19).

One respondent stated that nuclear transfer cloning using embryonic human donor nuclei

for research toward generating cloned offspring in the treatment of infertility or related

reproductive reasons should be allowed with limitations (14). The use of embryonic nuclear

transfer technology might be a viable option for an infertile couple as long as all other types of

treatment had been exhausted (14). For example, age-related infertility may be treated by

transferring the nuclei of a couple’s early embryo, produced in vitro, into a younger woman’s

enucleated egg to overcome problems encountered by older women (e.g., the outer layer of an

older woman’s egg, the zona pellucida, can be tough and not allow for cell division to occur

freely; the cytoplasm and mitochondria of an older woman’s oocyte are more likely to be
C-17

dysfunctional; and an older woman is more likely to produce a small number of embryos

appropriate for transfer, and through nuclear transfer cloning, the number of embryos for transfer

could be increased, thereby improving the likelihood of successful implantation and delivery) (14).

However, if this type of infertility treatment were allowed, careful limits would need to be set as

to the number of nuclei that can be used from the early embryo and the timing of the transfer of

cloned embryos (14). In addition, if any resulting cloned embryos are cryopreserved, they should

only be used in the event of a prior unsuccessful pregnancy attempt (14).

Another respondent stated that because nuclear transfer cloning using adult human donor

nuclei for research toward generating cloned offspring raises both scientific and emotional issues

of concern, it should be allowed with limitations (19). Specifically, it would be necessary to

perform animal experiments before any human experiments were done since it is not known if

clones of adult cells will produce harmed offspring (19). In addition, there are several emotional

issues connected with this technology, including religious and other beliefs that married sex

should produce all offspring, and the fear that creating a clone will diminish the donor in some

fashion (19). The respondent stated that this research should be not be subject to legislation, but

to oversight by the leaders of the relevant parts of the scientific community, perhaps as formal as

the Recombinant DNA Advisory Committee (RAC), but certainly with a sunset for such an

oversight (19).

GENERAL COMMENTS ABOUT HUMAN NUCLEAR

TRANSFER CLONING

The general comments made by the scientific societies and professional associations fall into six

categories: (1) definition of cloning; (2) knowledge gained and potential uses; (3) potential risks

and scientific constraints; (4) restrictions, regulations, or legislation; (5) ethical and religious

issues; and (6) general comments.

Definition of Cloning

To avoid inadvertently prohibiting important genetic research, there needs to be a clear distinction

between human cloning to produce a new human being and cloning as tool in biomedical research

that in and of itself would not result in a new human being (9, 12, 13, 18, 22, 25, 28, 30).

According to these respondents, it would be unfortunate if an ambiguous definition of “cloning”

interfered with valuable medical research.

“Cloning” is the copying of biological material to produce identical genetic copies from a

single entity, such as genes, cells, or organisms. Scientists use the word “cloning” in many

different ways. The term “human cloning” is routinely used to describe accepted and approved

research such as (1) “clones” of human genes placed into various cell types to study their

function; (2) human genes “cloned” into bacteria to produce proteins for therapeutic purposes

(e.g., the production of Factor VIII to treat hemophilia, and the production of interferon- for the

treatment of cancer); and (3) “cloning” of human cells for the study of cancer or genetic diseases.
C-18

These types of cloning are integral tools in biotechnology, and have been used to produce

breakthrough medicines, diagnostics, and vaccines to treat heart attacks, cancer, kidney disease,

diabetes, hepatitis, multiple sclerosis, cystic fibrosis, and other diseases (18).

Knowledge Gained and Potential Uses

Human nuclear transfer research could possibly revolutionize and certainly advance our

understanding of basic developmental biology by (1) addressing how cells become different from

each other during the development of an organism from egg to adult (32); (2) confirming that the

genetic material of adult cells is intact and potentially “totipotent” (i.e., totally capable of

recreating an adult organism) (32); and (3) advancing our knowledge of fundamental processes

such as how genes control human development and how an oocyte can reprogram the adult

nucleus (12, 18, 32). A full understanding of how the oocyte can reprogram the adult nucleus

holds great hope for research of cell-based therapies for human genetic and degenerative diseases,

and for developing novel strategies for the repair and regeneration of human tissues (32). In the

decades ahead, these fundamental insights will provide the basis for even greater biomedical

advances in the service of humanity (18).

Any decision to clone or permit cloning of humans has enormous potential for impacting

our basic understanding about human development, capabilities, relationships, and rights (10a). In

addition, human nuclear transfer research may provide new insights into reproductive biology,

create improved animal models for human disease, and generate farm animals for the production

of rare and currently expensive protein therapeutics (12).

Potential Risks and Scientific Constraints

Human nuclear transfer cloning using either embryonic or adult human donor nuclei to produce a

new human being poses several potential risks, which were cited as reasons to limit or prohibit

this activity. The most commonly stated risk was that the efficiency of nuclear transfer is so low

and the chance of abnormal offspring so high that experimentation of this sort in humans is

premature and, therefore, currently unthinkable (13, 18, 19, 23, 25, 32).

Several respondents agreed that nuclear transfer cloning experiments must be perfected

first in animal models, and that it would be inappropriate to “waste” human tissues, cells, and even

embryos in attempts to perfect techniques that could first be perfected in other species (6, 13, 14,

18, 19, 23, 25, 32). It was also suggested that it may be possible to adequately investigate,

advance, and perfect the technology— as it may apply to man— using non-human primates, which

should not prevent, inhibit, or delay the research in cloning technology (13, 23). Risks associated

with the technology that might be tolerated in the case of farm animals would never be tolerated

were the technology to be applied to human beings (18).

Even if this technology is perfected in animals, there will eventually be a need for human

experiments (6, 32). The human species will provide more than a few surprises, and techniques
C-19

that work wonderfully in animals may fail dismally in human experiments (6, 32). Since the

embryology of each species is different and very little basic research in human embryology has

been performed, much more preliminary data is necessary before appropriate scientific protocols

could be developed (18). Even after all of the procedures were verified and optimized, there is a

high probability that many human eggs, as well as surrogate mothers, would be necessary to

establish this technique as a reliable method of developing new human beings (18). Therefore, the

use of nuclear transfer technology for the generation of entire human beings is neither feasible nor

ethically acceptable at this time (6, 13, 18, 23, 25, 32).

Restrictions, Regulations, or Legislation

The types of restrictions proposed for the cloning of an entire human being included oversight by

leaders of the scientific community, such as an Institutional Review Board (IRB), federal

oversight by a national bioethics authority, and a voluntary moratorium. However, none of the

societies or associations called for federal or state legislation banning the cloning of an entire

human being. As for cloning research using human donor nuclei to study basic developmental

biology or to develop cell-based therapies, most of the societies indicated that there should be no

new restrictions on nuclear transfer cloning for biomedical research beyond those already in place

for similar types of research, which include (1) the obligation of researchers and physicians to

observe self-restraint because of scientific, medical, and ethical codes of conduct; (2) oversight by

the scientific community, such as through peer review and by IRBs; and (3) federal oversight,

such as by a national bioethics authority, or regulation by the federal policy for the protection of

human research subjects. There were also a few proposals for a voluntary moratorium. Again, no

one called for legislation banning cloning research. Although most of the respondents drew no

distinction between the use of adult or embryonic human donor nuclei, one thought that there

should be more restrictions with adult nuclei than with embryonic ones (15).

One statement seemed to capture the general feelings of most of the respondents on the

issue of restrictions, regulations, and legislation:

“Ian Wilmut’s group has clarified what a number of scientific questions should be

[about embryology, development, biology and developmental genetics], and that

is a very great service. It would be a shame if those questions, and others, were

not to be addressed because of restrictions (6).”

Self-Restraint. The scientific and medical communities subscribe to ethical codes of conduct (9,

18). Physicians have an obligation to “do no harm” to patients under the Hippocratic oath (18).

Furthermore, the medical profession has taken care to uphold standards, articulated in the

Helsinki Declaration and the Belmont Report, that are “consistent with medical obligations to

patients and the public’s health” (9). In addition, universities and companies have ethical codes of

conduct for their employees (18). Scientists and physicians could jeopardize their professional

standings and careers by performing ethically questionable research (18).
C-20

Oversight. Several societies and associations stipulated a need for oversight, guidelines, and strict

research protocols of the highest standards when dealing with this unique field of human subjects

research (1, 10, 12, 13, 14, 18, 19, 29). The importance of informed consent was also emphasized

(1, 13, 30). However, it was clear that all the respondents calling for restrictions agreed that this

area of research should not be subject to legislation. A suggestion was made for oversight by the

leaders of the relevant parts of the scientific community, perhaps as formal as the RAC, but with a

sunset provision for such oversight of some minimum necessary number of years (19).

Alternatively, it was suggested that all human cloning research should obtain approval of an IRB,

which could ensure that subjects are not abused, and research results are not a danger to the

community (14, 29). Another suggestion was that the NBAC could become, or could appoint, a

standing body to monitor and periodically report on the progress of research in this field as well as

other innovative advances in reproductive biology (12, 18). Finally, it was proposed that the

highest level of national oversight would be achieved if federal funding of human cloning research

were allowed (14).

Voluntary Moratorium. Several societies and associations supported the President’s call for a

voluntary moratorium on the cloning of human beings until the NBAC reviewed the scientific,

legal, and ethical implications of the recent scientific advances brought to light by the birth of

Dolly (2, 6, 12, 18, 22, 28). Furthermore, three respondents proposed a continuation of this

voluntary moratorium on the cloning of an entire human being beyond the 90-day review period

(13, 18, 32). One recommendation was that the moratorium on research on implanted embryos

derived by nuclear transfer last for three years to permit time for the consideration of the

scientific, ethical, social, and legal bases for such research (13). At the end of the three-year

period, all research subjected to the moratorium should again be reconsidered by the NBAC or

another responsible agency (13). Two respondents called for a moratorium on all human cloning

research until there has been enough time to allow for appropriate consideration of the scientific

and ethical implications of the technology (12, 21). One suggestion for enforcing the moratorium

was to have the NBAC appoint an international panel of eminent scientists to reinforce the call for

a moratorium and to develop global research guidelines relating to nuclear transfer cloning (12).

The advantage of a moratorium over legislation is that it can either be lifted in the future or made

permanent, when more information is available to assess the feasibility, desirability, and public

acceptability of these procedures (32).

Legislation. At least ten bills dealing with the cloning of a human being have been filed at the state

level and at least three at the federal level (18). Representative Ehlers has two bills before

Congress, H.R. 922 and H.R. 923, that refer simply to “human cloning” (22). Poor

communication between scientists and legislators may produce an ambiguous definition of what is

to be prohibited, which could result in interference with valuable life-saving and life-enhancing

medical research or even practice (22). The point was made that the enactment of any state law

on the subject of human cloning should be opposed because issues raised by the cloning of entire

human beings should be addressed nationally and comprehensively, not on a state-by-state basis

(18). A continuation of the moratorium on cloning human beings may obviate the need for any

state or federal legislative action (18).
C-21

There is a fear that hastily drafted rules or legislation could inadvertently result in a much

broader ban on research than intended or needed to address the ethical concerns (12, 18, 22, 29,

32). Overly broad legislation may inhibit or deter critical biomedical research that uses the cloning

of genes and cells to develop future drugs for many currently incurable diseases and conditions

(18). Hasty responses to profound developments or new capabilities do not always promote

sound policy (29). Instead, guidelines about the use of highly controversial technologies should

only follow deep and lengthy dialogue among stakeholders and advisors (29).

An example cited of policy adopted in the absence of thorough exploration of the issues is

the federal ban on fetal research and the accompanying state regulations that followed (29).

Massachusetts expanded the federal ban on fetal research to include neonatal research. As a

result, truly critical information on normal values and measurements in neonates was not

obtainable in Massachusetts. As a result, neonatologists left to work elsewhere and the care of

sick neonates declined. An example of an appropriate, measured response to new technology was

the development of guidelines for performing recombinant DNA technology, which resulted in a

useful, reasonable, and effective national policy for regulating such research (29). Relocation of

research is a common response to overly rigid controls (29). Although relocation to other

academic centers has local implications, relocation of banned research to the “underground” or to

foreign countries where no ethical guidelines may be observed may be a dangerous and tragic

result of superficial consideration of the implications of such measures (29).

Ethical and Religious Issues

Several respondents made remarks about the potential impact of nuclear transfer cloning using

adult donor nuclei to generate new individuals on issues of personal and social well-being such as

family relationships, identity and individuality, religious beliefs, and expectations of sameness (6,

9, 10, 18, 19, 30). Some of respondents made very poignant remarks about these issues, which

are reflected in the following comments from various society and association responses.

Family Relationships. Some respondents thought that nuclear transfer cloning using adult donor

nuclei to generate an entire human being would have negative impacts on family relationships,

while others believed that it would not. Some of the comments follow.

“These new prospects [of cloning human beings from the genetic material of an

adult cell] challenge some of the most fundamental concepts we hold about

ourselves as social and spiritual beings. These concepts include what it means to

be a parent, a brother or sister, a family” (18).

“Unprecedented relational circumstances would or could arise. For instance, birth

cousins may be genetic siblings, and marital prohibitions might be called into

question” (9).
C-22

“An additional argument against cloning is its supposed destruction of the family

unit. This argument has been made with every new development in the area of

reproductive medicine. I do not believe cloning will have any negative impact on

the concept of family” (30).

Identity and Individuality. It was also pointed out that is not just people’s genetic background,

but their unique experiences, that play an essential role in determining who they are (10, 18, 30).

Therefore, predictions of armies of identical individuals are not realistic (10). Other responses

included the following.

“We are quite familiar with identical twins in our everyday lives. We know, for

example, that such twins have very distinct personalities despite sharing the same

genetic makeup.... While we may encounter identical twins of the same age today,

we have never experienced identical twins substantially different in age; indeed,

perhaps alive during entirely different periods in history” (18).

“One can make the argument that cloned children may be psychologically harmed

by their lack of individual identity. However, this does not appear to be the case

with identical twins and triplets” (30).

Religious Beliefs. Citizens of all religious and moral persuasions must be allowed to contribute to

the discussion of cloning entire human beings (6). Three major ethics systems under which society

functions— which could be used to determine how society would deal with the issue of human

nuclear transfer cloning— are (1) the greatest good for the greatest number; (2) sets of rules (e.g.,

thou shalt not commit murder); and (3) golden rules (do unto others [Jesus] or do not unto others

[Hillel]) (19). It would be inappropriate for scientists to assert that one system of ethics is better

than another for this issue (19).

Expectations of Sameness. Cloning of an existing or previously existing person may be attractive

as an approach to overcome terminal illness, a way to replace a deceased loved one, or simply for

reasons of vanity. However, this implies that the resulting child will be identical, in all ways, to the

person being cloned. In addition, there may be preconceived notions about the child’s character,

level of intelligence, and talents.

“The possibility of having one’s life over again, or having the life of a dying child

over again might be attractive to people facing death and dying. However, this

reasoning does not withstand examination.... Because the cloned individual

is— because of the different environment in which he or she creates his or her life

story— not the same person; then the dying individual does indeed still die and a

‘second chance’ is not achieved. Cloning, therefore, does not appear to be a

reasonable medical approach to terminal illness” (9).
C-23

“The idea that cloning will lead to creation of cloned children for reasons of pure

vanity needs to be viewed from the perspective of the reasons why children are

created by any method. There is a wide spectrum of motivations for wanting a

child. Sometimes it is for pure vanity even when non-cloning (natural) methods

are used. Banning reproductive use of cloning will not assure that children are

produced for the right reasons. And dictating the “proper reasons” for producing

a child is not an activity a government ought to be involved in” (30).

“In our everyday lives we may decide to procreate a child and wait in wonder and

awe to see the unique individual he or she will turn out to be. We do not, on the

other hand, have experience creating a child where part of that decision may

include an evaluation of the life, health, character, and accomplishments of an

adult from whom we will take the genetic material that will become the child’s

entire genetic makeup” (18).

Additional Comments

“Research has always had a history of upsetting the status quo and by its very nature will always

be a provocative change agent. Biotechnology now saves lives and makes for a better future.

Heart transplants and gene therapy were shocking in their time; they have both become routine. In

vitro fertilization, now an industry, was considered adultery only two decades ago. Our society

adjusts after it has time to learn and understand the benefits [of new technologies]” (19). This

remark reflects the general attitude of several of the respondents. The public reaction to the

cloning of Dolly parallels the fears evoked during the early days of recombinant DNA research,

plant transformation, organ transplantation, in vitro fertilization, and protocols involving genetics

and gene therapy (6, 17, 19, 23, 29). Once fear was replaced by a body of evidence that

demonstrated the concerns for safety were greatly exaggerated, a rational policy was developed

(6, 17, 23).

Several respondents expressed their concern that 90 days is not enough time to make this

type of critical decision, and that by forcing this decision to be made in such a short time frame,

there may be a rush to judgment and unanticipated issues may be overlooked (6, 13, 19, 21, 22,

23, 25, 30). It was clear that the many of the respondents felt that this matter deserves a much less

rushed and more thorough study and review (6, 13, 19, 21, 22, 23, 25, 30).

Correspondingly, the need to educate and inform the public, legislators, and the scientific

and medical communities was thought to be vital to the understanding of these very complex

issues (2, 6, 17, 19, 23, 28, 29). A place to start would be to establish a basic understanding of the

special language, technologies, and issues that typify molecular biology, cell biology, and cloning

protocols (29). As the public and scientists learn more about what types of cloning experiments

are proposed, they will be more accepting of the technology and will become aware of the good

that can result and not so afraid of the potential negative side (17).
C-24

The need for a rational, well-informed, national debate was also identified (6, 22, 23).

“After the public and legislators have been better informed, and have had time to digest the

implications and debate the issues pertaining to human cloning, a more enlightened policy should

emerge for regulating future human experimentation” (23).

Some respondents commented that the guiding principle in the NBAC’s recommendations

should be the optimization of human health within moral bounds (12). Human research should be

allowed freely in all circumstances that offer the promise of increased knowledge and/or potential

therapeutic benefits, providing that the research does not place the subjects at a risk that

outweighs the potential benefits or violate established ethical principles, that the research is

properly reviewed prior to initiation, and that appropriate informed consent is obtained (13).

CONCLUSION

Thirty-two scientific societies and professional associations responded to the NBAC’s request for

their views on the use of nuclear transfer cloning using embryonic or adult donor nuclei for three

general areas of research: (1) basic developmental biology conducted in vitro on embryos up to

day 14; (2) in vitro cell differentiation to generate specific human cell types for potential

cell-based therapies; and (3) the generation of cloned offspring for the treatment of infertility or

related reproductive reasons.

The majority of societies agreed that research aimed at gaining knowledge in basic

developmental biology or developing new cell-based therapies (areas 1 and 2 described above)

should be allowed to proceed freely. It was their view that the benefits of these types of research

far outweighed the risks, and the many possible contributions to science and medicine warranted

this type of research.

In contrast, the majority of societies agreed that the generation of cloned human

offspring, even if only used for the treatment of infertility or related reproductive reasons, should

be prohibited entirely at this time. Most of the objections centered on the ethical issues of personal

and social well-being. Other objections focused on scientific issues, such as the low efficiency of

nuclear transfer cloning and the high likelihood of abnormal offspring.

The general comments made by the responding scientific organizations focused on five

main issues:

1. the need for a clear definition of cloning to avoid inadvertently prohibiting important

genetic research

2. the knowledge that was gained and potential uses of this technology

3. the potential risks and scientific constraints of this technology
C-25

4. the need for certain restrictions and regulations in the form of either self-regulation by the

scientific community itself, national oversight, or voluntary moratorium, but not in the

form of legislation

5. the ethical and religious issues that are brought to light by the potential to clone an

existing or previously existing person.

This report summarizes the views of a cross-section of the scientific and medical

communities. However, it is by no means a complete account of all the scientific societies and

professional associations that may have important input into this complex issue. A more extensive

investigation may provide other points of view and information critical to a decision on the

allowability of human nuclear transfer cloning research.
C-26

APPENDIX: ALPHABETICAL LISTING OF SCIENTIFIC SOCIETIES

AND PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATIONS

1. Norman Abeles

Department of Psychology

Michigan State University

East Lansing, MI 48824-1117

Phone: (517) 355-9564

Fax: (517) 353-5437

2. American Association for the Advancement of Science

1200 New York Avenue, NW

Washington, DC 20005

Phone: (202) 326-6600

Fax: (202) 289-4950

3. American Association of Colleges of Pharmacy

1426 Prince St.

Alexandria, VA 22314

Phone: (703) 739-2330 (ext. 127)

Fax: (703) 836-8982

4. American Association of State Colleges and Universities

One Dupont Circle

Washington, DC 20036

Phone: (202) 293-7070

Fax: (202) 296-5819

5. American Board of Medical Genetics

9650 Rockville Pike

Bethesda, MD 20814

Phone: (301) 571-1825

Fax: (301) 571-1895

6. American College of Medical Genetics

9650 Rockville Pike

Bethesda, MD 20814

Phone: (301) 571-1825

Fax: (301) 530-7079
C-27

7. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists

409 12th Street, SW

Washington, DC 2024-2188

Phone: (202) 638-5577

Fax: (202) 484-5107

8. American Federation for Clinical Research

311 Massachusetts Ave., NW

Washington, DC 20002

Phone: (202) 543-7450

Fax: (202) 543-5327

9. American Medical Association

1101 Vermont Ave, NW

Washington, DC 20005

Phone: (202) 789-7413

Fax: (202) 789-4581

10. American Psychological Association

750 First Street, NE

Washington, DC 20002-4242

Phone: (202) 336-6080

Fax: (202) 336-6069

11. American Public Health Association

1015 15th St., NW

Washington, DC 20005

Phone: (202) 789-5600

Fax: (202) 789-5661

12. American Society for Cell Biology

9650 Rockville Pike

Bethesda, MD 20814

Phone: (301) 530-7153

Fax: (301) 530-7139

13. American Society for Human Genetics

9650 Rockville Pike

Bethesda, MD 20814

Phone: (301) 571-1825

Fax: (301) 530-7079
C-28

14. American Society for Reproductive Medicine

Department of Obstetricians and Gynecologists

Emory University School of Medicine

1209 Montgomery Highway

Birmingham, AL 35216-2809

Phone: (205) 978-5000

Fax: (205) 978-5005

15. American Society of Parasitologists

Department of Biology

University of Iowa

Iowa City, IA 52242

Phone: (319) 335-1061

Fax: (319) 335-1069

16. Association of American Universities

1200 New York Avenue, NW

Suite 550

Washington, D.C. 20005

Phone: (202) 408-7500

Fax: (202) 408-8184

17. O.W. Barnett

North Carolina State University

College of Agriculture and Life Sciences

Box 7616

Raleigh, NC 27695-7616

Fax: (919) 515-7716

18. Biotechnology Industry Organization (BIO)

1625 K Street, N.W., Suite 1100

Washington, D.C. 20006

Phone: (202) 857-0244

Fax: (202) 857-0237

19. Council of Scientific Society Presidents

1155 16th Street, NW

Washington, DC 20036

Phone: (202) 872-4452

Fax: (202) 872-4079
C-29

20. Entomological Society of America

9301 Annapolis Road

Lanham, MD 20706-3115

Phone: (301) 731-4535

Fax: (301) 731-4538

21. Federation of American Societies for Experimental Biology

9650 Rockville Pike

Bethesda, MD 20814

Phone: (301) 571-0657

Fax: (301) 571-0686

22. Genetics Society of America

9650 Rockville Pike

Bethesda, MD 20814

Phone: (301) 571-1825

Fax: (301) 530-7079

23. Tony E. Hugli

The Scripps Research Institute

10550 North Torrey Pines Road

La Jolla, CA 92037

Phone: (619) 784-8158

Fax: (619) 784-8307

24. Brian W. J. Mahy

Division of Viral and Rickettsial Diseases

National Center for Infectious Diseases

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)

Atlanta, GA 30333

Phone: (404) 639-3574

Fax: (404) 639-3163

25. National Academy of Sciences

2101 Constitution Avenue, NW

Washington, DC 20418

Phone: (202) 334-2446

Fax: (202) 334-2153
C-30

26. National Advisory Board on Ethics in Reproduction (NABER)

409 12th Street, SW

Washington, DC 20024-2118

Phone: (202) 863-4997

Fax: (202) 554-0453

27. National Health Lawyers Association

1620 Eye Street, NW

Washington, DC

Phone: (202) 833-1100

Fax: (202) 833-1105

28. Pharmaceutical Research & Manufacturers of America

1100 15th Street, NW

Washington, DC 20005

Phone: (202) 835-3420

Fax: (202) 835-3429

29. Public Responsibility in Medicine and Research

132 Boylston Street

Boston, MA 02116

Phone: (617) 423-4112

Fax: (617) 423-1185

30. Society for Assisted Reproductive Technology

Physician Pavilion West

6569 Charles Street, Suite 406

Baltimore, Maryland 21204

Fax: (410) 828-3067

31. Society for Clinical Trials

600 Wyndhurst Avenue

Baltimore, MD 21210

Phone: (410) 433-4722

Fax: (410) 435-8631

32. Society for Developmental Biology

9650 Rockville Pike

Bethesda, MD 20814-3998

Phone: (301) 571-0647

Fax: (301) 571-5704
C-31

33. Society for Neuroscience

11 Dupont Circle, NW, #500

Washington, DC 20036

Phone: (202) 462-6688

34. Society of Integrative and Comparative Biology

401 N. Michigan Avenue

Chicago, IL 60611-4267

Phone: (312) 527-6697 or (800) 955-1236

Fax: (312) 245-1085

35. Society of Research Administrators

1200 18th Street, NW, #300

Washington, DC 20036-2401

Phone: (202) 857-1141

Fax: (202) 223-4579

36. Society of Research in Child Development

University of Michigan

300 N. Ingalls Building, 10th Floor

Ann Arbor, MI 48109-0406

Phone: (313) 998-6578

Fax: (313) 998-6569
C-32

References

Campbell, K.H.S., J. McWhir, W.A. Ritchie, and I. Wilmut, Sheep cloned by nuclear transfer

from a cultured cell line, Nature, 380:64-66, 1996.

Rossant, J. The Science of Animal Cloning, paper prepared for the National Bioethics Advisory

Commission, 1997.

Wilmut, I., A.E. Schnieke, J. McWhir, A.J. Kind, K.H.S. Campbell. Viable offspring derived from

fetal and adult mammalian cells, Nature, 385:380-385, 1997.

Notes

This was an informal request, not a formal survey. Most of the societies and associations did not 1

have time to poll their members in a systematic manner. Therefore, most of the views that were

expressed by the societies and associations were not necessarily representative of their entire

membership.

The statements in this document are the views of the societies and associations that responded to 2

the NBAC’s request, and are not those of the author, RAND Critical Technologies Institute, or

the NBAC.
CLONING HUMAN BEINGS

Religious Perspectives on Human Cloning

Commissioned Paper

by Courtney S. Campbell, Ph.D.

Oregon State University

D-1

CONTENTS

Introduction D-3

Religion and Human Cloning: An Historical Overview D-3

Themes in Theological Bioethics D-6

Casuistical Analysis D-6

Family and Procreation D-6

Reproductive Technologies D-7

Research and Therapy D-8

Genetic Interventions D-10

Normative Analysis D-10

Personhood and the Image of God D-10

Procreation and Parenthood D-13

Science and Technology D-14

Playing God D-15

Human Destiny and Eschatology D-17

Communities of Moral Discourse D-18

Religious Traditions D-20

African-American Churches D-21

Buddhism D-23

Hinduism D-25

Islam D-27

Judaism D-29

Native American D-31

Orthodox Christianity D-32

Protestant Christianity: Conservative Evangelical D-34

Protestant Christianity: Mainline D-36

Roman Catholic Christianity D-38

Appendix A: Annotated Bibliography D-40

Appendix B: Bibliography

Endnotes: Sections 1 and 2 D-49

References: Section 3 D-51

General Sources D-56

D-3

INTRODUCTION

In response to the cloning of a sheep in Scotland, President Clinton requested that the National

Bioethics Advisory Commission (NBAC) investigate and make recommendations on the

prospects of human cloning by May 26, 1997. Citing matters of morality and spirituality, the

President, on March 4, 1997, imposed a temporary moratorium on federal funding of human

cloning research. This paper was prepared for NBAC to assist in its deliberations and policy

recommendations.

The research methods used in preparation of this report included: (1) a comprehensive

review of literature in theological biomedical ethics on human cloning since the mid-1960s;

(2) attendance at and review of the testimony of religious thinkers submitted at public hearings

before NBAC on March 13 and 14, 1997; (3) solicitation and review of ecclesiastical statements

on genetic engineering and human cloning; (4) an ongoing Nexus search to identify religious

thinkers with perspectives on human cloning discussed in print media; (5) personal or telephone

interviews with many of these thinkers. A bibliography of these sources is provided in appendices

A and B.

The report generated from this research is organized into five sections: (1) a brief

historical overview of religious thought on the ethics of human cloning; (2) a discussion of

selected themes among theological bioethicists that recur frequently in ethical evaluations of

human cloning. These themes are derived primarily from the scholarly literature of the western

faith traditions; (3) a summary of approaches to the theology, ethics, and policy of human cloning

from ten major faith traditions; (4) an appendix containing an annotated bibliography of religious

literature on human cloning in biomedical ethics; (5) an appendix containing a bibliography of

materials used in preparation of this report.

The author wishes to extend appreciation to NBAC for the invitation to prepare this

report; to Dr. James Childress, NBAC, for procedural and substantive suggestions; to Dr. Joan

Woolfrey, Oregon State University, for compilation of research materials; to librarians at the

National Reference Center for Bioethics Literature, Georgetown University, and at The Hastings

Center for research assistance; to many religious thinkers who provided time for interviews and

provided research materials; and to Lois Summers for assistance in manuscript preparation.

RELIGION AND HUMAN CLONING: AN HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

It is possible to identify four overlapping time frames in which theologians and religious thinkers

have engaged the scientific prospects and ethics of human cloning. The first phase of

consideration occurred in the mid-1960s. This early discussion was shaped by a context of

expanded choices and control of reproduction (for example, availability of the birth control pill),

the prospects of alternative, technologically assisted reproduction (for example, in vitro

fertilization, or IVF), and advocacy by prominent biologists and geneticists of cloning “preferred”
D-4

genotypes to avoid overloading the human gene pool with deleterious genes and thereby placing

the survival of the human species at risk.

Prominent theologians engaged in these initial discussions of genetic manipulation and

human cloning included Charles Curran, Bernard Häring, Richard McCormick, and Karl Rahner

within Roman Catholicism and Protestants Joseph Fletcher and Paul Ramsey. The latter two

staked out diametrically opposed positions and envisioned a world of human cloning that is

remarkably prescient given the state of current discussion.

Fletcher advocated expansion of human freedom (autonomy) and control over human

reproduction. He portrayed human cloning as one among a variety of present and prospective

reproductive options that could be ethically justified under circumstances of overriding societal

benefit. Indeed, for Fletcher, human cloning was a preferable method of reproduction relative to

the “genetic roulette” of sexual reproduction: Laboratory reproduction was “radically human”

because it was deliberate, designed, chosen, and willed [9–12].

By contrast, Paul Ramsey portrayed cloning as a “borderline,” or moral boundary, for

medicine and society that could be crossed only at risk of compromise to humanity and to

procreation. He identified three “horizontal” (person-person) and two “vertical” (person-God)

border-crossings of cloning: (1) Clonal reproduction would require dictated or managed breeding

to serve the scientific ends of a controlled gene pool. (2) Cloning would involve non-therapeutic

experimentation on the unborn. (3) Cloning would assault the meaning of parenthood by

transforming “procreation” into “reproduction” and by severing the unitive and the procreative

ends of human sexual expression. Theologically, cloning represented (4) the sins of pride or hubris

and (5) of self-creation in which human beings aspire to become a man-God [27, 28]. The legacy

of Ramsey has been especially noticeable in post-Dolly theological reflection [36].

A second distinctive era began in 1978, which was notable for two events, the birth of the

first IVF baby, Louise Brown, and the publication of David Rorvik’s In His Image, an account

alleging the creation of the first human clone [30]. While Christian theologians concentrated on

the ethical issues raised by IVF, Jewish scholars such as Seymour Siegel and Fred Rosner directed

attention to human cloning and were neither as supportive as Fletcher nor as indicting as Ramsey.

They instead expressed a need for more extensive discussion of the topic within the Jewish

community.

This period also witnessed the beginning of formal ecclesiastical involvement with

questions of genetic manipulation. In 1977, the United Church of Christ produced a study booklet

on “Genetic Manipulation” that appears to be the earliest reference among Protestant

denominational literature to human cloning [19]. It provided a general overview of the science

and ethics of human cloning, while stopping short of rendering any specific theological verdict.

Protestant-organized bodies, such as the World Council of Churches (1975, 1982, 1989) and the

National Council of Churches of Christ (1980, 1983, 1986), as well as some individual

denominations, issued resolutions or position statements giving cautious endorsement to genetic
D-5

interventions for therapeutic purposes. In addition, concerns expressed in 1979 by Jewish,

Protestant, and Roman Catholic leaders about genetic engineering led President Jimmy Carter to

request an examination of the scientific, ethical, and social issues of gene splicing by the

President’s Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and

Behavioral Research.

The blastomere separation of human embryos at George Washington University in 1993

initiated a third era of religious discussion. The Roman Catholic tradition expressed vigorous

opposition, with a Vatican editorial denouncing the research as “intrinsically perverse.” Catholic

moral theologians invoked norms of individuality, dignity, and wholeness to assess the ethics of

the study [20, 21, 24, 32]. Conservative Protestant scholars held the research contravened basic

notions of personhood, such as freedom, the sanctity of life, and the image of God. Other

Protestant scholars recognized potential medical benefits from the research and advocated

regulation rather than prohibition.

The fourth and most recent stage of religious discussion has come in the wake of the

successful cloning of “Dolly” by Scottish researchers. Roman Catholic and conservative

Protestant discussion has reiterated past opposition and warnings. Writing in the Christian

Century, for example, Protestant theologian Allen Verhey has drawn on the arguments against

human cloning initially voiced by Paul Ramsey and concluded that an account of the good life in a

family is “inhospitable” to cloning [36, 38].

However, some Protestant thinkers, reflecting on the meaning of human partnership with

ongoing divine creative activity, have expressed qualified support for cloning research and human

cloning. Jewish and Islamic thinkers have encouraged continuing laboratory research on animal

and human cloning, while expressing deep moral reservations about transfer of a cloned human

embryo to a womb for purposes of gestation and birth. The testimony presented to NBAC in

public hearings on March 13 and 14, 1997, provides the most considered statements of

theological examination in this renewed discussion of the ethics of cloning research and its

implications for human cloning.

Several conclusions can be drawn from this brief historical overview:

There is a sustained theological engagement with the issue of cloning that

anticipates and illuminates much contemporary discussion.

There is no monolithic religious perspective on human cloning. Theological and

ecclesiastical positions exhibit the pluralism characteristic of American religiosity.

Despite changes in scientific research and technical capability, the values that

underlie religious concerns about human cloning have displayed durability and

staying power and have informed public consciousness and debate.
D-6

The religious discussion no longer is limited to professional theologians. It has

expanded to encompass other professionals, including scientists, and other faith

traditions, as well as education of religious adherents. Religious traditions have

gradually aspired to be informed communities of moral discourse on issues of

reproductive and genetic technologies.

THEMES IN THEOLOGICAL BIOETHICS

Theological discourse about human cloning has adopted either of two methods (and often both)

of practical reasoning [2]. A first approach relies on a form of moral casuistry: It examines the

extent to which human cloning is relevantly continuous with already “familiar” ethical contexts

and issues. For example, a theological discussion may draw attention to the occurrence of

“natural” clones, i.e., identical twins, and proceed to inquire in what respects laboratory-created

clones are morally or theologically similar to or different from this already accepted social context

for raising children. Casuistical argumentation presupposes the validity of the formal principle of

justice (treat similar cases similarly); the central question in an ethical assessment will be the

interpretation of human cloning as similar or dissimilar to certain social structures or medical

practices already valued or criticized by society and the faith tradition. Lacking direct revelation

on human cloning in sacred texts, casuistical and analogical reasoning has been a characteristic

part of religious argumentation. The significant point is that conclusions about human cloning are

influenced in large measure by the framing ethical context.

A second, and often complementary, mode of practical reasoning involves application of

the moral and anthropological norms of the faith tradition to generate an ethical assessment of

human cloning. For example, perhaps the most common norm of western theological

anthropology invoked in the discussion of human cloning is that human beings are created in the

“image of God” (imago Dei). This concept, which is very rich in ethical content, is then applied

by methods of religious reasoning to provide a perspective or conclusion on human cloning in

general, or the theological and moral status of any given clone (the status, for example, of a clone

as an ensouled entity with full claims as a person).

This section will examine the principal theological themes in the western faith traditions

that emerge in both the casuistical and normative modes of practical reasoning and analysis. It will

begin with the casuistical approach, which seeks to identify the ethical contexts deemed relevantly

similar to human cloning so as to warrant methods of analogical reasoning.

Casuistical Analysis

Family and Procreation

The family has been invoked as the prime social institution, and in some traditions, a

divinely ordained institution for the bearing and nurturing of children. Within Roman Catholic

moral teaching, procreation and education of offspring is a principle of natural law. Paul
D-7

Ramsey’s opposition to human cloning stemmed in part from a view that Christians perform their

primary responsibility to future generations through procreation and care for children. Jewish and

Islamic law each impose fundamental duties and responsibilities through spousal, parenting, and

familial relationships and through intergenerational ties.

The question of human cloning is thus theologically approached not from the secular

standpoint of personal rights and individual autonomy, but rather from a framing context of

familial relationships and responsibilities that society already values. The casuistical concern is the

extent to which this relational and moral context can accommodate such cloning possibilities as a

“replacement” child, laboratory twinning in place of natural twinning, or children with a genetic

grandfather but no genetic father.

Core moral criteria for faith traditions in addressing these prospects include the impact of

human cloning on the integrity of the family, the nature of parenthood, the role of marital

sexuality and procreation, and the identity of a child. As noted above, in the wake of the recent

cloning of “Dolly,” Allen Verhey has appealed to the concept of a “good life in a family” to reject

the prospects of human cloning. Verhey maintains that the primary justifications for human

cloning— appeals to the principle of freedom and the principle of utility— are necessary but

insufficient guidelines for the moral life of a family. In particular, Verhey focuses his critique on

the potential disruption of the parent-child relationship: Human cloning risks transforming

children into “products” of technological achievement rather than “gifts” created in love [36].

The stability of family is not a sufficient moral perspective by which to evaluate human

cloning, but it is a necessary consideration within a religious framework. Islamic thought, for

example, affirms that, since the family is intrinsic to a well-functioning society, cloning procedures

that separate the spiritual and moral relations of spouses, and those of parents and children, may

undermine the foundation for human community in general [31]. It is not a compelling

counterargument to contend that social realities of familial life and relationships do not match

theological idealism, for the moral and policy question in part is whether society should

deliberately support alternative modes of reproduction outside marital love and procreation.

Reproductive Technologies

A second casuistical context that shapes religious responses to human cloning is the

increasing acceptability and availability of various forms of reproductive technology. The

widespread use of such procedures indicates that even if conjugal relations are a preferred setting

for human procreation, it can be ethically acceptable to have recourse to methods of donor

insemination or in vitro fertilization within or outside of a marital relationship. Joseph Fletcher

argued that human cloning should be viewed as simply another option in a spectrum of asexual

reproduction tailored to an expanding menu of human reproductive rights and choice. Given that

society has already accepted donor insemination, egg donations, in vitro fertilization, contract

pregnancy, embryo transfers, and so forth, the question must be asked whether and how cloning is

unique or distinctive from these other practices.
D-8

This question is relevant even if, as in the case of the Roman Catholic tradition, none of

the above practices is considered morally licit. In her testimony to NBAC, Prof. Lisa Cahill

suggested a radical discontinuity between current reproductive technologies and cloning, using

the language of “genuine revolution” to refer to human cloning [1]. The revolutionary impact of

human cloning needs explication, however, to warrant drawing a moral and policy line between

current reproductive technologies and prospective cloning. By contrast, Rabbi Elliot Dorff and

Rabbi Moshe Tendler assimilated cloning within current medical practices, suggesting that human

cloning was morally “easier” for the Jewish tradition than donor insemination or egg donation,

because it would not raise issues of consanguineous relationships or “non-therapeutic”

reproductive techniques [6, 34]. Prof. Abdulaziz Sachedina’s identification of a consensus in

Islamic scholarship on therapeutic uses of cloning also presumes an important continuity between

human cloning and such procedures as in vitro fertilization [31].

The question of the moral uniqueness of cloning inevitably imposes itself on religious

traditions. Theologian Roger L. Shinn has put the religious dilemma this way: “I know of no way

of drawing a line and saying: thus far, scientific direction and control are beneficial; beyond this

line they become destructive manipulation” [33]. Absent a complete prohibition on reproductive

technology, any moral or policy line-drawing will seem arbitrary unless a distinctive feature of

human cloning can be identified.

Nonetheless, there are reasons why faith traditions would resist treating human cloning as

continuous with reproductive technologies for policy purposes. The latter is unregulated and

relies on good-faith compliance with professionally developed guidelines for ethical practice.

There is, however, no current mechanism of public oversight or accountability. Secondly, the

political language of reproductive technology is that of “choice” and “rights,” whereas religious

traditions more commonly invoke an ethic of “duty” or “responsibility” in the context of

procreation and parenting.

Research and Therapy

A third moral context invoked by theological bioethics concerns a distinction between

non-therapeutic and therapeutic research. A principal objection to human cloning articulated by

Ramsey, and reiterated by many subsequent theologians, is that human cloning will inevitably

involve non-therapeutic research on the unborn without valid consent. The current inefficiency of

mammalian cloning technology (the production of Dolly was the only technical success in a

research project involving 278 sheep embryos) has suggested to religious thinkers that cloning of

human embryos for research or for transfer and gestation will result in morally significant loss of

potential human life. This is of particular concern for the Roman Catholic tradition, given its

teaching that the preimplantation human embryo is entitled to full moral respect and dignity. In

arguing against blastomere separation, for example, Richard McCormick claims that less than full

respect for the human pre-embryo as potential human life will lead to diminished respect for all

pre-nascent life [20]. While Protestant theologians such as Ronald Cole-Turner see no theological
D-9

difference between a cloned and an uncloned human embryo, they express substantial reservations

about the likelihood of embryo loss due to technical inefficiency [3].

A second research issue, presented to NBAC by Prof. Gilbert Meilaender [22], is that

progress in biomedical research is an “option,” not an obligation for society to pursue. This

echoes positions formulated by Ramsey and philosopher Hans Jonas; such a claim in part is rooted

in a view that non-infliction of harm (non-maleficence) has moral priority over promotion of

benefits (beneficence) in human subjects research. On such an account, claims that human cloning

research possesses therapeutic intent will be inadequate, for some faith traditions will understand

the certain loss of life of human embryos as a real harm and not merely a symbolic or speculative

harm. Thus, researchers will be required to make a case not only that their research may produce

benefits (such as the development of medicinal products), and not only that these benefits will

outweigh the harms, but that serious efforts have been undertaken to minimize the harms. The

moral burden of proof on researchers will be even heavier for proposals to engage in research on

human cloning with the objective of transfer of a clone for gestation and birth.

Jewish and Islamic traditions are more favorably disposed to cloning research with

therapeutic objectives, such as alleviation of infertility. Jewish law does not attribute full moral

status to the human embryo, while Islamic scholarship is divided on the timing of ensoulment.

Thus, the loss of human embryonic life through cloning research does not carry the same status of

“harm.” Moreover, Jewish law permits almost any action (except for breaches of three

commandments) to be performed for the purpose of saving life. In the case of cloning research,

this may encompass new methods to remedy or avoid serious genetic disease, but would preclude

research directed at reproducing a clone solely for organ harvesting.

On the question of human cloning research, the western religious traditions place the

burden of proof on the side of biomedical research. Research may be permitted, but is not

required, and the prospect of therapy must meet a standard of probability of specific benefit and

assurance of minimization of harm, not a standard of possibility of speculative benefit, and

dismissal of symbolic harm. Additional questions must be addressed regarding the justification of

research on the preimplantation embryo and the distribution of the benefits and harms of cloning

research; the latter concern has been forcefully expressed by minority religious communities (see

section 3). If biomedical science were unable to meet the burden of moral proof, which is rooted

in the basic principles of respect, beneficence, and justice, the proposed pharmacological and

medical benefits of cloning research may have to be forgone, and it would be extremely difficult to

justify support for research to transfer a human clone into a womb for birth.

Genetic Interventions

The prospect of human cloning as therapeutic research suggests a final moral context:

Cloning research may be viewed as relevantly similar to other forms of genetic interventions

already in place in medicine. This casuistical context not only provides justification for cloning

research, but also important procedural and substantive limitations. Unlike reproductive
D-10

technology, for example, gene therapy is subject to stringent public regulation and oversight.

There is moreover a general consensus that some defensible lines can be drawn with respect to

genetic interventions, such as between somatic cell and germ-line therapy and between therapy

and enhancement. Restrictions on human cloning research might then follow a model of

prohibition on germ-line interventions, as recommended to NBAC by Rabbi Tendler [34]. A third

limit is that benefits be directed toward individuals rather than society. That is, rather than using

cloning procedures for the general improvement of the human species, as proposed by Fletcher

and other early religious and scientific proponents, an ethical and regulatory model that followed

the social precedent of accepted genetic manipulations would focus on therapeutic manipulations

for an individual.

It is difficult, however, to subsume human cloning entirely under the moral casuistry of

genetic therapy. Genetic screening for abnormalities may be performed on the early embryo

through diagnosis of undifferentiated cells, but this cannot be considered therapeutic research on

the embryo. Germ-line interventions affect the genetic characteristics of a person of a future

generation. They do not directly determine whether that person will exist, as cloning of a person

would.

Normative Analysis

Religious traditions and communities have articulated a variety of ethical norms to address the

wide range of practical issues and problems that persons encounter in moral life. These norms

may be derived from sacred writings and their interpretation, ongoing historical reflection within a

religious tradition, and personal experience, among other sources, and can be applied to the wide

array of moral choices persons confront from the beginnings to the endings of life. This section

presents certain theological norms, themes, and values that may be applied through practical

reasoning to the question of human cloning within religious communities, and that supplement the

analogical and casuistical methods delineated above.

Personhood and the Image of God

It has been argued that the most significant issue forced upon society by genetic science is

an understanding of normative humanity [15]. The same question is encountered in theological

discourse on human cloning. Lutheran theologian Philip Hefner argues that cloning is a

“revelation of the human situation.... In cloning, we are, in fact, addressing ourselves, and it is

about ourselves that we have the greatest questions” [17].

The question of personhood (and human distinctiveness) is commonly described and explained in

the western faith traditions with reference to the theological theme of the image of God (imago

Dei). Normative humanity is theologically rooted in the creation of human beings in the image of

God (Genesis 1:27-28). Interpretations of the moral meaning of the imago Dei depend in part on

prior convictions about the nature of God and those characteristics of God human beings are
D-11

believed to image. Nevertheless, it is possible to identify several implications of significance to the

questions of human cloning:

Human beings are bestowed with the gift of freedom and moral agency. Moral agency is

inherent in the human self and creates logical and correlative moral responsibilities. The

logical correlation encompasses respect for the equal freedom and agency of other

persons. The moral correlation of personal freedom is personal responsibility for actions

before one’s conscience, others, and ultimately before God.

Human beings are created in God’s image, but they are not God. They are finite and

fallible, with limited capacities to predict and direct the course of actions they initiate, or

to assess accurately the outcomes of these actions.

A fundamental equality is inherent in the human person. This equality transcends

differentiation between persons made on the basis of gender, race, class, ethnicity, etc.

Human beings are relational and social creatures. They are created in and for relationship

with God, for community with other persons, and with creation.

The image of God is reflected in human diversity, involving but not limited to gender

diversity. The differentiation of the sexes provides a divine warrant for procreation and the

sacredness of sexuality.

Human beings are embodied selves. The person is revealed and experienced through the

body and not merely as an intellectual or spiritual essence, or a disembodied mind or will.

Human beings bear the image of God through the exercise of their creative capacities and

potential. This includes creative ways of exercising “dominion” over the natural world.

Each of these features of the imago Dei helps explain and define religious responses to

cloning. Religious concerns about the disruption or confusion of relationships, diminished

diversity, the primacy of procreation, and the significance of the body can be rooted in this

theological concept. Moreover, reproductive technology and genetic interventions that culminate

in cloning may be interpreted as a responsible exercise of human (and divine) creativity.

The divine commands given to humanity subsequent to their creation in God’s image are

also invoked in religious discourse on human cloning. Human beings are obligated to multiply

through the earth. This provides a warrant not only for sexual love and procreation as good, but

also, on some theological perspectives, for an intrinsic connection between the “unitive” and

“procreative” purposes of sexuality.

How human dominion over nature should be carried out can be interpreted in at least three

ways of significance for cloning. One notion is an ethic of stewardship in which human beings are
D-12

entrusted with administrative responsibility for creation. Human stewardship involves caring for

and cultivating creation after the manner of a gardener. The stewardship ethic accepts the

givenness of nature as a good to be maintained and preserved.

A second model, particularly significant in Jewish and Islamic discourse, suggests a

“partnership” of human beings with God in caring for and improving upon creation. “...as

participants in the act of creating with God, human beings can actively engage in furthering the

overall well-being of humanity by intervening in the works of nature, including the early stages of

embryonic development, to improve human health” [31]. The natural world in this view is

inherently malleable, and can be shaped in several different forms in service of divine and human

goals. This model holds the potential for seeing cloning research, and perhaps some forms of

human cloning, as using human creative potential for good.

A third understanding is that of human beings as “created co-creators.” This claim

recognizes that human beings are created beings, dependent on God, and finite and fallible in their

existence. Simultaneously, human beings assume a role of co-creator to envision and implement

knowledge for the betterment of humanity and the world. Human beings are called to “play

human” [26] through their freedom and responsibility in creating an essentially open human

future. Reproductive and genetic technology, as well as human cloning, can be one particular

expression of responsible created co-creatorship.

Finally, although creation is “good” and human beings are “very good,” over the course of

history, humans have displayed an irremediable propensity to use their divinely authorized

dominion for unauthorized domination, to violate their covenant of partnership with God, and to

create after their own image rather than the divine image. The person created in the image of God

is nonetheless marked by sin. All human activities are pervasively imperfect. The prospect that

humans can and do choose evil rather than good means caution is a moral necessity [14].

However, human imperfection is not necessarily a warrant for halting technological advances

[17], although it should inform a posture of modesty regarding human aspirations.

This analysis contends that issues of human cloning inevitably beg the question about the

nature of the person, and within the western religious traditions, the fundamental concept of

theological anthropology put forward to describe and explain human personhood and

distinctiveness is the image of God. The question is unavoidable even if the religious content is

not shared.

Procreation and Parenthood

In the initial phase of theological assessments of cloning, Paul Ramsey argued that the

covenant of marriage included the goods of sexual love and procreation. These were divinely

ordained and intrinsically related: Human beings had no permission to sever what God had joined

together. On this basis, Ramsey, Bernard Häring, Richard McCormick, and other theologians

objected to cloning as part of a panoply of envisioned forms of reproductive technology. Their
D-13

arguments claimed that such technologies separate the unitive and procreative ends of human

sexuality and transform “procreation” (which implicitly places humans in a role of co-creator) into

“reproduction.” The most authoritative statement of this position was issued by the Vatican in

1987 in its Instruction on Respect for Human Life (Donum Vitae), which contained a prohibition

on human cloning either as a scientific outcome or technical proposal: “Attempts or hypotheses

for obtaining a human being without any connection with sexuality through ‘twin fission,’ cloning,

or parthenogenesis are to be considered contrary to the moral law, since they are in opposition to

the dignity both of human procreation and of the conjugal union” [5].

Protestant scholars have offered a similar critique through appeals to fundamental

theological tenets that distinguish between “begetting” (procreating) and “making” (reproducing).

The Nicene Creed of early Christianity affirmed that Jesus, as the authentic image of God and the

normative exemplar of personhood, is “begotten, not made” of God. The theological

interpretation of “begetting” emphasizes likeness, identity, equality, and of the parent’s very

being. By contrast, “making” refers to unlikeness, alienation, subordination, and of the parent’s

will as a project.

Oliver O’Donovan, an Anglican theologian, has drawn out the implications of this

distinction for human cloning. O’Donovan portrays human cloning as the culmination of scientific

or technical “making” in human reproduction: “...the development of cloning techniques...will be a

demonstration, if it occurs, that mankind does have the awesome technical power to exchange the

humanity which God has given him for something else, to treat natural humanity itself as a raw

material for constructing a form of life that is not natural humanity but is an artificial development

out of humanity” [25]. Thus, the use of scientific capacity comes at the cost of an artificial,

diminished humanity. This ruptures the fundamental relational ties of likeness, identity, and

equality.

This distinction further illuminates two meanings of “making” embedded in the title of

Ramsey’s Fabricated Man. A child born through cloning is designed and manufactured as a

product, rather than welcomed as a gift. Moreover, the process is itself unauthentic, or

“fabricated,” with respect to what it means to be human.

The question is whether this position literally throws the baby out with the technology,

either through current forms of reproductive technology or proposed methods of cloning. If no

distinction is permitted between unitive and procreative sexuality, or between begetting and

making, then it becomes difficult to justify contraception or technically assisted conception. Rev.

Moraczewski has argued that, within the Roman Catholic context, the threshold of moral

acceptability was violated with the birth of the first test-tube baby in 1978 [24], while from a

conservative Protestant perspective, Prof. Meilaender offered a modified form of this view in his

remarks before the NBAC, commenting that he “would have got off the train” of reproductive

technology long before it arrived at the cloning station [22]. Put another way, if, as is the case

with most Christian denominations, there is qualified acceptance of DI, IVF, etc., drawing a line
D-14

against cloning is likely to appear arbitrary with respect to the theological values underlying

procreation and parenthood.

Science and Technology

Media reports have portrayed a classical confrontation between science and religion over

the prospects of human cloning. This is misleading, insofar as not all arguments against cloning

are religious, and not all religious arguments oppose cloning. Indeed, the issues instead offer the

possibility for substantive and sustained dialogue between leading scientists and theologians.

Probing the intersections of ethics, science, and theology can offer mutual enrichment: Scientists

are informed as to how research in genetics and biology inevitably broaches theological questions,

while theologians are critically challenged as to whether and how to accommodate religious

convictions to new scientific knowledge [14].

The quest for scientific knowledge per se is not considered theologically threatening.

Islamic scholars, for example, emphasize that all scientific discovery is ultimately a revelation of

the divinely ordained creation. Scientific knowledge is thereby a symbol or sign of God’s creation

[16]. This perspective is embedded in the comments of the respected Shi’ite jurist (Sheikh

Fadlallah) that recent cloning discoveries occurred “because God allowed it” [8], and those of

Prof. Sachedina that cloning may be a divinely given opportunity for human moral training and

maturity [31]. Similar assessments of the legitimacy of scientific inquiry appear in Catholic and

Protestant traditions. Invoking a Calvinist claim that the world is a theater of God’s glory, one

ecclesiastical statement indicates that “in the sciences, the human does indeed receive glimpses of

God’s theater” [29].

These prospects for dialogue and theoretical convergence can dissipate when examining

specific scientific applications. Scientific descriptions of the world do not supply theological or

normative prescriptions for acting in the world. The faith traditions have insisted that two

principal issues— who controls technological developments, and the ends or purposes of

technology— are ethical rather than technical questions. This can support a sharp distinction

between endorsement of the scientific quest for knowledge and critique of applications of

scientific discoveries in the social, political, and clinical worlds. This theological critique may

assume several forms in the context of cloning:

The reduction of nature, animals, the human pre-embryo, or persons to merely an object

for scientific manipulation. The concern behind objectification is a loss or diminished sense

of awe and wonder at the mystery and meaning of life. Awe is a foundational religious

sentiment. It has also been described by Einstein as the source of true science [7]. The loss

of awe and wonder then can reflect a deformed scientific and religious sensibility.

Moreover, theological concern has been raised about the difficulty of de-limiting

diminished awe to the laboratory setting. Cloning may be perceived to assault the dignity

of those involved in the process of human cloning as much as it does the person who

results from cloning [23].
D-15

Theological criticism has also been directed toward the “technological imperative.” Two

variations of this imperative have been invoked: “If we have the technical capacity to

clone, we should pursue this research”; “If we have the technical capacity, we will

inevitably pursue this research.” The theological sentiment expressed in both cases is a

concern about loss of control, about either the ethical debate or about the scientific

pursuit. It may in addition reflect theological suspicion not of science, but of scientists,

particularly if research is conducted without adequate public monitoring and

accountability. In the Protestant traditions particularly, this suspicion is supported or

reinforced by a general claim about the impact of human sin from which scientists as

persons are not immune. This concern can be met to some extent by establishing

appropriate procedural review.

The theological context of cloning also elicits disputes over the relationship of knowledge

and power. Joseph Fletcher used the language of “rational control” to warrant cloning, but

this in essence meant harnessing the power of the modern sciences to transform nature and

human nature. On more direct theological grounds, the Jewish tradition supports

technological and medical interventions in response to the divine mandate to master the

earth in service to humanity.

Other theologians have challenged Fletcher’s unbridled optimism about beneficial

applications of scientific knowledge by focusing on the ways that power can be a form of

oppression rather than liberation. The comments of Anglican scholar C.S. Lewis have been

reiterated by contemporary theologians in the context of both genetics and cloning: “If any one

age really attains, by eugenics and scientific education, the power to make its descendants what it

pleases, all men who live after it are the patients of that power. . . . Each new power won by man

is a power over man as well” [18]. This claim does not suggest society has the luxury of choice

between use or abuse of cloning. Rather, the abuse is itself embedded in and expressed by the use.

Playing God

Much of the preceding analysis reflects theological ambivalence and criticism about

biomedicine that is often expressed in the slogan of “playing God.” This slogan is invoked as a

moral stop sign to scientific research and medical practice on the basis of some or all of the

following attributes:

Human beings should not probe the secrets or mysteries of life. Continued scientific

pursuit to reveal these secrets can create a “God of the gaps” theology, in which “God” is

reduced to a symbol that simply fills in for those questions modern science has not yet

answered [37].

Human beings do not have the knowledge, especially knowledge of outcomes, attributed

to divine omniscience.
D-16

Human beings do not have the power to control the outcomes of actions or processes that

is a mark of divine omnipotence.

Human beings have no authority to make decisions regarding the beginnings or endings of

life, which is reserved to divine sovereignty.

Human beings are fallible and display a propensity to evaluate actions according to

self-interest rather than by the self-giving quality of divine love.

In these respects, the appeal to “playing God” serves to remind human beings of their

finitude and fallibility. By not recognizing personal limits and human constraints on scientific

aspirations, persons enact the Promethean presumption of pride or hubris. In the initial theological

discussions of human cloning, Ramsey summarized his objections by stating: “Men ought not to

play God before they learn to be men, and after they have learned to be men, they will not play

God” [27, p. 138].

Even within the theological communities, however, the prohibition against playing God

may be disputed or not viewed as a sufficient sanction against cloning. Allen Verhey has argued

that the prohibition is simply too indiscriminate in its judgments to be of ethical use, and neglects

moral invitations to play God, particularly in the realm of genetics [37]. Protestant scholar Ted

Peters agrees with Ramsey that human beings are not called to play God, but argues that this does

not by itself define what is necessary for us to be human. Hence, we are responsible for using our

creativity and freedom (features of the imago Dei) to forge a destiny more consonant with human

dignity and beneficence. In “playing human,” according to Peters, there is no theological reason to

leave human nature unchanged, nor any theological principle that is necessarily violated by human

cloning [26].

Arguments against cloning that invoke the language of “playing God” are not always

theological, and they are seldom sound or sufficient. The slogan is often presented as the

conclusion of an argument whose premises are either unexamined or unidentified. At the very

least, the theological and moral concern behind the prohibition needs explication. The language of

“playing God” cannot by itself carry the full weight of an ethical or policy prohibition on human

cloning.

Human Destiny and Eschatology

Theological views of medicine and medical interventions grounded in themes of creation,

such as those identified above, may tend to be more conservative with respect to reproductive or

genetic technologies, not to mention cloning, because of the divine evaluation of creation and

persons as imago Dei, as “good.” The role of medicine is then conceived to be to restore

disordered biological organisms to their initial goodness. By contrast, theological positions that

focus on human destiny rather than human nature, on “eschatology” in theological language rather
D-17

than “creation,” tend to be much more supportive of an array of reproductive and genetic

interventions as means for improvement or enhancement of the human condition.

The question of human destiny has been an underlying theme of the cloning debate from

its inception. Scientific proponents such as Muller and Lederberg affirmed a pessimism about the

survival of the species due to genetic overload. Cloning represented a prospective intervention to

avoid this “genetic apocalypse” and promised a future of unlimited possibility. Paul Ramsey’s

theology of cloning likewise assumed an apocalyptic prognosis of human destiny, though very

different in content: “Religious people have never denied, indeed they affirm, that God means to

kill us all in the end, and in the end he is going to succeed” [27, p. 136]. However, the end of

species survival did not, for Ramsey, justify the means of cloning. Survival is meaningful only if

values of human dignity and freedom are respected.

The use of cloning to save the endangered species of human beings is no longer part of the

debate, although cloning techniques have received some support to rescue endangered animal

species or even endangered indigenous cultures. However, the general question of the extent to

which human beings are shapers and creators of their personal and collective futures continues to

be important. Discourse on destiny can be especially important in a liberal pluralistic society that

is agnostic about the substantive telos of human life and society.

Some theologians in the cloning debate therefore tend to stress an openness to human

nature, rooted in a creative imago Dei and a dynamic view of history, rather than a more rigid and

static formulation of human nature and destiny. The theological and ethical interpretation of

cloning then turns on the nature of human responsibility in the face of uncertain (and perhaps

unforeseen) consequences.

Some Jewish thinkers affirm that the divine mandate of mastery empowers human beings

with responsibility for shaping a malleable world using innovation and discovery. Responsibility

for deleterious outcomes from human self-creativity falls not to humans but to God. The Jewish

tradition affirms an optimism in the face of uncertainty about unanticipated consequences rooted

in divine control and care; indeed, to be overly cautious to the point of moral paralysis may invite

trouble. As one Orthodox rabbi has expressed it: “Human beings do the best that they can. If our

best cost/benefit analysis says go ahead, we go ahead. ‘G-d protects the simple’ is a Talmudic

principle that allows us to assume that when we do our best, G-d will take care of what we could

not foresee or anticipate. If things do not work out, the theological question is G-d’s to answer;

not ours” [13, p. 132]. On this view, cloning may express moral responsibility insofar as it is

directed to the service of God and humanity.

What is clear within Jewish thought is the critical importance of moral education of

progeny who will live in the generations to come. One form of immortality discussed in biblical

and rabbinic sources comes through the influence of parents (and others) on their children. The

transmission of knowledge, skills, and the teaching and emulation of moral dispositions is an

ongoing obligation that binds the generations together. Rabbi Tendler has emphasized the
D-18

importance of moral education as the best form of human control over cloning technology: “Are

we good enough to handle this good technology? Of course we are, if we can set limits on it. And

when we can train a generation of children not to murder or steal, we can prepare them not to use

this technology to the detriment of mankind” [35].

An Islamic interpretation also assumes a malleability to the human self that allows for

creative shaping of destiny. Islamic tradition describes two forms of creative processes. Bari

refers to creation out of nothing and is reserved to the domain of God. Khaliq concerns creation

from material already in existence, and the human mind is empowered by Allah to participate in

khaliq as a co-creator [16, 31]. The ethics of cloning is then addressed by a distinction between

theoretical research in science and practical application in society.

The Protestant Christian variation may emphasize the idea of creatio continua— divine

creative activity is an ongoing process— coupled with the theme that persons are co-creators

called to participate with God in shaping a better future. Indeed, destiny is so open and indefinite

that the Christian may be a “co-explorer” with God in revealing new and unlimited possibilities

through innovative technology [4]. This perspective on human destiny offers qualified support to

human cloning, insofar as it is technically feasible and publicly supported.

Lest these theological accounts of human destiny seem to bless and anoint scientific

progress, they are balanced within each of these traditions by recurring warnings, often in

narrative form, about not crossing certain lines. The archetypal figure is that of Prometheus in

Greek mythology; each theological tradition has its own Promethean analogue. The theological

caveat is that creative initiative may be a form of rebellion of the created against the creator. The

consequences of such rebellion are catastrophic havoc and perhaps destruction of the human

creator, or of that which has been created. This lesson is as fundamental to religious narrative and

mythology as it is to modern science fiction. The hard questions for theologies of human destiny

are identifying what lines may not be crossed, where they are located, and whether human cloning

is one such line.

Communities of Moral Discourse

In the March NBAC hearings, members of the commission repeatedly challenged the

religious thinkers to explicate the relevance of their testimony for purposes of formulating public

policy in a pluralistic society. This section discusses some substantive and procedural approaches

discussed by theologians and religious writers with respect to policy on human cloning.

It is first important to recognize that religion in American culture already embodies

pluralism (see Section Three for further illustrations). The religious perspectives on cloning are

diverse in conclusion, modes of reasoning, and fundamental premises. There is no monolithic

“religious” view on cloning (or most ethical issues in biomedicine). However, this has not been

seen as an impassible barrier by the faith traditions; discourse across religious traditions on many
D-19

contested ethical issues in biomedicine is common and expanding, and this can provide important

models for public discourse between persons who share the common bond of citizenship.

It follows from this observation that religious discourse on the ethics and policy of cloning

should not be marginalized because it may invoke values or assumptions that are not part of a

social consensus or appeal to premises that are not generally shared. While public policy must

invoke publicly accessible reasons to support its conclusions, it is not evident that scientific,

professional, philosophical, economic, or legal reasons considered or proposed as grounds for

policy are themselves independent of assumptions about the human good. Prof. Meilaender’s

testimony to NBAC emphasized that it is an “illusion” to understand any constructive policy

recommendation as free of value presuppositions [22]. Those presuppositions themselves may not

meet the standard of publicly “accessible,” “shared,” or “persuasive” reasons. Thus, religious

values or reasons should not necessarily be held to a higher standard of public relevance than

other forms of reasons.

Religious communities have a self-understanding as “communities of moral discourse.”

That is, they are a locus for moral and policy education for believers (and often nonbelievers) who

are also citizens, and this education often addresses very contested issues in the society. Given

general public ambivalence about biotechnology— and in particular trepidations about cloning

research, its processes, and its products— religious communities can be critical venues for

informing and eliciting public values on human cloning.

The traditions of religious reflection see in the question of human cloning an invitation to

sustained and substantive public discourse about the common good. It would be a missed

opportunity were public policy to default to an ethics of autonomy, the politics of procedure, or

the crafting of compromise among special, vested interest groups. The principle of autonomy or

self-determination is a necessary principle for the moral life of persons and the life of the polis. It

needs to be supplemented, however, and situated within a richer moral context of human

interdependency and solidarity, care for the vulnerable, and restraint on private interest.

As all the religious thinkers before NBAC testified, the prospect of human cloning strikes

at very deep issues of human identity and community. Policy recommendations should not

presume consensus on the meaning of human personhood. Instead, the policy process should seek

to identify points of common ground and determine if conflicts of positions are rooted in disputes

over scientific facts, or over philosophical or theological values. Factual disparities can

presumably be resolved through the provision of more complete or reliable information. Value

pluralism may not be beyond resolution. Some important values may not be absolute, core, or

“bottom-line” values, but rather are presumptive values that can give way in the face of

conflicting, weightier values, one of which may be the capacity to sustain public discourse in the

face of reasoned disagreement. The policy process must be as cognizant of the fundamental

questions asked by religious traditions as of the fundamental values invoked by these traditions in

support of certain conclusions.
D-20

This is but a specific exemplification of a theme common in the testimony before NBAC of

the religious thinkers, namely, that procedural models beg substantive ethical (and theological)

questions. A policy of regulatory control and/or voluntary adoption of professional guidelines,

e.g., would be necessary but still insufficient. It is also critical to examine the character, integrity,

and virtues embodied by persons permitted to control the cloning process. This can be

supplemented by the proposal of Rabbi Tendler of a curricular requirement for the teaching of the

ethics of professional and scientific integrity to medical students and research scientists [34].

Rabbi Dorff, meanwhile, encouraged reliance on current regulatory mechanisms, such as

institutional review boards and institutional animal care and use committees, regarding the

protection of human and animal subjects [6]. The human capacity to use technology with justice

and beneficence in the service of the common good makes public discourse on cloning possible,

while the capacity to abuse cloning technology for self-interested purposes makes public oversight

and accountability necessary.

RELIGIOUS TRADITIONS

This section contains more specific information on the views of distinctive religious traditions

regarding ethical questions in human cloning research. With very few exceptions, the religious

traditions discussed here have yet to develop specific theological or denominational positions on

the moral or public policy aspects of human cloning. The theological literature examined and the

religious thinkers interviewed for this section characteristically employ analogical reasoning in

discussing cloning, invoking values or historical experience used to support positions on issues

deemed relevantly similar to human cloning.

In considering the implications of these religious positions for public policy on human

cloning, it may be useful to adopt the metaphor of a traffic semaphore. Under this metaphor,

traditions may be analyzed and compared under several possibilities with respect to society’s

assessment of the process of cloning research and the product of cloning a human being:

“Red” indicates a full stop to research and/or cloning. The policy analogue is a permanent

moratorium or prohibition.

“Flashing red” indicates the need to stop to evaluate risks before proceeding. The policy

analogue is a temporary moratorium until important scientific and social questions are

addressed.

“Amber” indicates the need to proceed with caution and care, slowing the pace of or

stopping research as necessary. The policy analogue is a regulatory model coupled with

the adoption of guidelines by relevant professional bodies.

“Green” indicates permission for cloning research and/or cloning on the assumption that

other stakeholders in human cloning will conform to norms of professional and social
D-21

responsibility. The policy analogue is the adoption of guidelines by relevant professional

bodies.

Given the diversity of American religiosity, an inherent risk of the following analysis is

oversimplification for the sake of generalizations. The discussion nonetheless should indicate

important questions raised by religious communities and thinkers about science, technology, and

human cloning.

African American Churches

Faith traditions in the African American religious community comprise approximately 11% of

religious adherents in the United States. The African American churches, stemming from

Methodist and Baptist traditions, locate themselves within the “black Christian tradition.” This

tradition is united by commitment to a fundamental principle of human equality before God,

often phrased as “the parenthood of God and the kinship of all peoples.” The principle offers a

theological basis for criticism of racism and sexism and necessitates social reform through

non-violent measures and religious witness.

Social Context. The black Christian tradition understands the history of research abuses of

African Americans at the hands of medicine, such as the Tuskegee experiments, as a violation of

the fundamental principle of human equality. Moreover, due to ongoing racism in society and

medicine, it maintains the prospects for further exploitation of African Americans through cloning

research are substantial. “The history of scientific abuse and medical neglect carries with it a

legacy that is permanently imprinted upon...the collective consciousness” of African Americans

(Secundy).

Given this history of past abuses, society should assume a posture of greater vigilance for

minority communities. Preston N. Williams, a participant in the 1970s discussion of cloning,

argues both that public oversight is necessary with respect to cloning, and that it also must be

“race conscious,” lest the African American community experience further marginalization within

biomedical science and society (Williams). This requires emendations to current codes of research

ethics and institutional review policies, insofar as they do not address race relations and issues of

power in the research setting. Present procedures of informed consent are not deemed morally

sufficient for cloning research.

Accountability and Education. While technology is not morally objectionable per se, applications

of technology within this social context can be morally indefensible. Of particular concern are

entrepreneurial efforts in biomedicine that are motivated by private interest and supported by

concerns for commercial profit and/or racism. At a minimum, strong regulations that build in

public accountability must be developed by legislative bodies to protect vulnerable patients and

families from coerced choices or economic inducements. In addition, the scientific research

community should voluntarily adopt strict protocols and monitoring. Communal distrust of

scientific and research institutions and suspicion of commercial endeavors also entails a more
D-22

comprehensive policy approach than oversight and accountability. Some African American writers

stress that policymakers must learn a fundamental lesson from the community’s distrust of organ

procurement methods, and implement a major informational and educational campaign with

respect to genetic, reproductive, and cloning technologies. While it is often difficult to enforce

regulations or prohibitions, the lessons of the civil rights movement provide some confidence in an

approach to human cloning that complements public accountability with public education.

Embryo Research and Therapy. African American churches affirm, along with elements of

historical Christianity, that human life begins at conception. The use of human embryos for

medical research is problematic, since it involves experimentation on living human embryos rather

than embryonic material. In addition, the tradition is concerned about the procedures required for

creating embryos and those used in discarding embryos. A minimal criterion of moral acceptability

is therapeutic intent: Cloning of human cells, for example, should not be allowed to benefit any

individual racial or ethnic group “outside of the context of a clearly identified, morally defensible,

medically justifiable” condition that would benefit from such technology (Robinson).

Fairness. The tradition also raises questions about fairness and social priorities in resource

allocation. The history of medical progress has often meant that African Americans assume the

heaviest burdens and receive the least benefit for participation. Moreover, scientific energies and

public monies used to support cloning could divert attention from diseases specific to the African

American community or from poor health indices, such as high premature birth or infant mortality

rates. The principle of human equality is violated when a new area of research investigation is

opened up, while many within the African American community do not have access to basic health

care.

African American churches do not have any objections to the use of reproductive

technologies per se as a means of bringing children into the world. However, the churches’

principle of equality is invoked to criticize selective access to reproductive technologies,

particularly to the exclusion of African Americans. Rev. Geoffrey Ellis, president of the NAACP

Interdenominational Coalition, contends that those with the technical capacity to clone “certainly

will make more people like them. This certainly rules out more people like me” (Ellis). If financial

resources dictate access to human cloning services, members of the black Christian tradition may

experience further social marginalization. Human cloning may therefore perpetuate social

stratification rather than affirm human equality.

Cloning Research: Flashing Red

Human Cloning: Red

Buddhism

The Buddhist Churches in America claim approximately 100,000 adherents. There are, in

addition, numerous non-affiliated Buddhist temples, monasteries, and organizations. There is as

yet no systematic consideration of cloning by Buddhist scholars, nor is there is any formal
D-23

teaching authority. This manifests the Buddha’s warning to his followers that speculation about

metaphysical issues was futile because the human problems of birth, old age, death, and sorrow

remain regardless. However, basic Buddhist teachings present an ethic of responsibility,

centered on the values of non-injury and the relief of suffering of sentient beings, compassion,

the “no-self,” the moral authority of intuition, and reincarnation. These values offer some

elements of a Buddhist response to reproductive and genetic technologies, including cloning.

Buddhist teachings indicate that the Buddha (560-477 BCE) provided a four-fold decision-making

method for his followers should they encounter unanticipated questions. The four steps involve

recourse to (1) original Buddhist texts; (2) derivation of rules in “consonance” with the original

texts; (3) the views of respected teachers; (4) the exercise of personal judgement, discretion, and

opinion. Buddhist scholars have cited this method as a resource for Buddhists in addressing the

issues of cloning, with a particular emphasis on the authoritative nature of personal intuition and

opinion (Nakasone). By its nature, then, there is a notable diversity of views by Buddhists on

cloning, rather than a Buddhist view.

Procreation and Reproduction. Buddhist scholars generally agree that the process by which

children are born into the world makes no difference. “Individuals can begin their lives in many

ways,” including but not limited to human sexual generation. Cloning is thereby understood as an

alternative method of generating new human life, in principle continuous with other methods

(Keown). One Buddhist ethicist has supported use of reproductive technology, so long as it

benefits the couple who wish to have a child and does not bring pain or suffering. However, some

Buddhist scholars find in human cloning an impoverished approach to procreation. It marks a

diminished creativity and diversity, analogous to the difference between the creativity, initiative,

and investment that is required for an original painting and the mechanistic process required to

reproduce the painting (Nolan).

Human Status and Enlightenment. The status of human being is critical within Buddhist

thought, because it is the only ontological condition by which an entity can achieve

“enlightenment” and liberation from a world marked by suffering. Buddhist scholars throughout

history have reiterated that, due to karma, the chances of being born as a human being are rare

and remote. Human life is a precious opportunity to escape from perpetual rebirth

(karma-samsara) by following the teachings (dharma) of the Buddha.

In this respect, any form of human reproduction, sexual or asexual, that allows for the

birth of a human being may be especially valuable. Buddhist tradition contains stories of

“spontaneous generation.” Buddhist scholar Damien Keown states that cloning, if it “is ever

perfected in human beings, would show only that there are a variety of ways in which life can be

generated. It would not cast doubt on whether the host from which the clone was taken, or the

clone itself, were ontological individuals” (Keown, 90).

Some forms of Buddhism may endorse cloning because of the chance human life gives to

achieve enlightenment. The Dalai Lama, the exiled leader of Tibetan Buddhism, was questioned
D-24

about his attitude towards the following hypothetical scenario: “[What] if at some future

time...you could make by genetic engineering, with proteins and amino acids, or by engineering

with chips and copper wires, an organism that had all of our good qualities and none of our bad

ones,...?” The Dalai Lama indicated he would welcome such a technological development,

because it would facilitate the process of rebirth and liberation.

Moral Development and Spiritual Priorities. Buddhist understandings that change is the nature

of reality suggest that, in considering technological developments, the central questions concern

how persons can accommodate change and how they can use change to expand their

self-understanding and their understanding of humanity. Cloning may be an occasion for

self-knowledge, which is a central feature to the experience of enlightenment. Nonetheless, the

end of enlightenment as an end in itself may not, for some Buddhists, justify the use of any means

of reproduction.

A different position on cloning can be supported by claims and stories in Buddhist texts. It

is important in Buddhism for children to express generosity to their parents, especially the mother,

for the risks of birth and nurture they assume in bringing a child into the world. Human cloning

offers a way of reproduction that, if efficient, would diminish risk, and thus diminish the

generosity and gratitude of the child.

Moreover, while cloning may preserve genetic identity, it cannot assist in what for

Buddhists is most critical— the cultivation of spiritual identity. The problem of distorted priorities

is illustrated in a famous narrative, the “Parable of the Mustard Seed.” In the parable, a distraught

woman sought out the Buddha, requesting that he restore life to her dead child. The Buddha

indicated that a cure was simple: The woman needed to prepare tea from five or six grains of

mustard seed. The Buddha stipulated, however, that the grains needed to come from a house not

visited by death. The woman was unable to obtain a single grain, thus learning about the universal

truth of death. This narrative supports Buddhist concerns with cloning research or human cloning

due to the attention focused on bodily, material life to the neglect of cultivating discovery or the

inner life of a person. This misguided priority is reflected in the statement of Gen Kelsang Tubpa,

a Buddhist monk: “Cloning is just another example of man’s belief that by manipulating the

external environment he will create happiness for himself and freedom from suffering.”

Some Buddhist scholars have raised objections to applications of cloning, particularly

commercial or social agendas that may support cloning for reasons contrary to the interest of the

clone. These agendas may include pressures on scientists for continual progress and discovery or

for commercial gain from pharmaceuticals or organ harvesting. In this respect, there would be

greater suspicion within Buddhism about private-sponsored cloning research without public

oversight.

Sentience and Cloning Research. While cloning might be permissible under some understandings

of Buddhism, the scientific research necessary to build up to cloning encounters difficulties. Part

of the “Noble Eightfold Path” promulgated by the Buddha prohibits infliction of violence or harm
D-25

on sentient beings. This would seem to permit research on human pre-embryos, but the primacy

Buddhism places on birth as a human being as a necessary condition of enlightenment can restrict

such research. Buddhism does hold that a new being comes into existence shortly after

fertilization. Moreover, especially where the research process is very inefficient and causes loss of

life, both embryo research and animal research would be especially problematic. Any Buddhist

account would ask of cloning research or human cloning: “How does this serve all sentient

beings?”

Cloning Research: Flashing Red

Human Cloning: Amber

Hinduism

“Hinduism” is a western term for a family of philosophies and religious practices that have their

origins in the Aryan period of Indian history and the Vedic scriptures (1200 BCE). There is no

formal teaching authority for the world’s one billion Hindus (Hindu population in the United

States is estimated at two million). However, classical texts and commentary have offered four

principal values: Dharma (virtue, morality); Artha (wealth, power); Kama (aesthetics,

sexuality); Moksa (liberation) to guide Hindu life. Liberation from the cycles of rebirth is the

ultimate goal within Hinduism, while Dharma regulates the pursuit of Artha and Kama. Using

these values, scholars of Hinduism and Hindu practitioners have begun to initiate ethical

discourse on a wide array of social practices in India and North America, including those of

cloning.

The most current and summational statement of Hindu thought on human cloning has been

developed by the editors of Hinduism Today, an international journal published in ten languages,

and was formulated in response to an inquiry regarding the preparation of this report. Entitled

“For the President, Mr. Bill Clinton,” the statement of 1 April 1997 reads in part:

“Hindu leaders applaud President Clinton’s call for a spiritual view on the human cloning

predicament, noting that it shows his deep understanding of complex issues which cannot be

resolved by science or politics alone. Hindu swamis appeal to the U.S. President, and indeed to all

heads of state who will face this issue, for laws to restrain cloning of humans and emphatically

urge him to engage spiritually minded people to guide and control the process. Good people are

the best promise of a good outcome. It is our wish to inform the President that Hinduism neither

condones nor condemns the march of science. If done with divine intent and consciousness, it may

benefit; if done in the service of selfishness, greed, and power, it may bring severe negative karmic

consequences. The simple rule is this: Cause no injury to others and let dharma— the law of good

conduct and harmony with the universe and its many forces and creatures— be the guide for all

such explorations” (Hinduism Today).

Self. Classical Hinduism does not accept distinctions found in western thought between God,

human beings, and other creatures, or between the supernatural, human nature, and nature.
D-26

Rather, the self (atman) is part of the creative force (Brahman) and life energy residing in all

creation. Hinduism affirms a oneness of self with divinity rather than separation. A person cannot

“play God,” because in an ultimate sense the self is God. Hindu texts describe the atman as pure

spirit. It is “eternal, free from disease, free from old age, deathless, free from decay; it cannot be

pierced, cut or agitated” (Lipner). Two concepts of relevance for issues of cloning may be

inferred from this religious anthropology. First, if the real self or true consciousness is radically

distinct from the body, it is beyond the reach of material science and hence cannot be harmed by

genetic manipulations or cloning. A second correlative principle is that scientific processes and

methods (though not their practical application) manifest the workings of divine consciousness.

Creation by Cloning. Values embedded in Hindu narrative tradition may offer the community

analogues to human cloning. Hindu creation narratives are replete with references to the creation

of a person, a deity, or social groups through cells of skin or drops of blood. However, in a classic

narrative, the Ramayana, only demonic persons (asuras) come from divine blood. This suggests

to some Hindu spiritual leaders that society has little control over ensuring only good outcomes of

cloning.

Cloning Research. The animating spirit is present from fertilization in classical Hindu thought.

Biological development does not shape moral development, however, for the embryo is given the

status of person throughout pregnancy. Hindu thought is thus concerned with moral attitudes

toward research on the pre-embryo; in particular, such concerns would focus on exploitation of

the vulnerable, and whether the underlying dispositions could be limited to the research setting or

would influence how human beings treat each other and treat animals.

The Dharma gives great authority to ahimsa, or the non-injury of sentient beings. This

inclusive scope of beings within the moral community renders much contemporary animal

research without justification. Animal research for the benefits of animals can be justified, but it is

more difficult to justify when such research is conducted solely to advance human interests.

Human Cloning. Some Hindu scholars may permit human cloning under very circumscribed or

exceptional circumstances. The primacy of generational continuity, especially the establishment of

father-son lineage, is underscored in the Mahabharata (an Indian epic analogous to the Odyssey).

The continuation of generational lineage may take place through several different methods of

having a son as offspring, including a “son by artifice, a son who comes by himself, ...[and] the

son of unknown seed.” The epic also indicates that when a lineage is threatened by extinction, a

different law— appaddharma— applies and permits production of offspring through relationships

outside of marriage (Desai, 246, 247). Other scholars maintain that the four values of Hinduism

would support human cloning when it is conducive to material or spiritual well-being, such as to

alleviate infertility or for saving life through providing compatible bone marrow (Sharma).

Life Priorities. Within any Hindu discussion of cloning, there is concern that scientific attention

on cloning will divert attention from the true purpose of life, which is to become conscious of and

actualize one’s self in union with the divine. Sri Easwaran has suggested that the question we
D-27

need to ask in light of significant scientific discoveries such as the splitting of atoms or of cloning

is: “Will this help me in my search for realizing God, who is enshrined in the depths of my

consciousness?”

Other Hindu spiritual leaders have posed the same question about what cloning reveals

about human priorities: “Will [cloning] help us to draw nearer to God if we have such bodies?

Will the soul’s evolution toward the goal of spiritual liberation be advanced one millimeter?...Will

mankind’s inner consciousness be enhanced?” (Hinduism Today).P

The cultivation of spiritual self-awareness, rather than manipulation of the external

environment, or one’s biological self, which is no less an external organic environment, is the

overriding concern of the Hindu tradition. While Hindu thought would not recognize any

ontological distinction between the in-dwelling spirit of naturally born persons and of cloned

persons, the latter is likely to experience discrimination because of embedded social bias. Human

cloning thereby suggests that the wrong questions about life’s meaning and about social priorities

are being asked.

Cloning Research: Flashing Red

Human Cloning: Flashing Red

Islam

Islam (“submission”) is the youngest of the Abrahamic family of religions (Judaism,

Christianity, Islam). Islam presents continuity with Judaism and Christianity— Abraham and

Jesus are “prophets” in Islamic tradition— as well as distinctiveness, which stems from the

revelation of the Qur’an to the Prophet Muhammad (610 CE). The two main sub-traditions of

Islam are Sunni (about 80%) and Shi’ite (about 20%). Within the United States, the Muslim

population is estimated to comprise between three and six million persons.

Islam does not recognize a separation of religion, ethics, law, and politics; rather, Islamic law

or Shari’a regulates belief, worship, the family, and personal and social morality. Islamic

scholars have recently begun to apply the tradition’s authoritative sources— Qur’anic teachings,

stories attributed to the Prophet (hadith), and Shari’a— to developments in modern biomedicine.

Science and Technology. The pursuit of knowledge, including scientific inquiry, receives a divine

warrant in Islamic thought. Indeed, the Islamic Code of Medical Ethics portrays the pursuit of

knowledge as worship of God. Scientific discoveries do not threaten God as much as they reveal

the intricacies of God’s creation and will to humanity. Scientific research and investigation in most

circumstances should not be curbed, and human interventions in nature are permissible to promote

health.

However, Islam does not view technology as morally neutral. Instead, Islam believes

careful consideration must be given to potential abuse. Islamic traditions thereby express
D-28

significant moral concern regarding the potential for discrimination in a sinful world, especially

stemming from political and economic systems that do not give primacy to the promotion of

human dignity. Islamic discussions of human cloning have also emphasized the possibilities for evil

present in the commodification of knowledge and of persons through motivations of profit.

Therapeutic Research. The Qur’an describes persons who reject God and follow Satan as

persons who “will change God’s creation” (4:119). This has led leading Sunni authorities in Saudi

Arabia and Egypt to condemn cloning as “the work of the devil” and advocate punishment for

scientific researchers. However, Islamic jurists in general have not interpreted this Qur’anic

passage to preclude forms of genetic intervention, such as somatic cell therapy, provided that such

interventions are done for therapeutic purposes and are life-promoting in intent. The question

Islam poses to proposals for human cloning is this: In what sense can such research legitimately be

described as therapeutic?

Schools of Islamic thought have not provided a consensus on the moral status of the

human embryo. Some traditions affirm that ensoulment occurs at fertilization, whereas other

traditions indicate ensoulment occurs at the end of the fourth month (120 days) following

fertilization. Within these latter traditions, it becomes possible to argue for research on the human

pre-embryo for purposes of human health. Moreover, if the embryo is not accorded personhood,

then destruction of the embryo is permissible.

Relationships. While Islam warrants biomedical research and clinical application for therapeutic

purposes, issues of the integrity of relationships have raised questions about the legitimacy of

reproductive technologies. The tradition gives special attention to preserving spousal, procreative,

and parenting relationships because of designated role-responsibilities within the Shari’a. Use of

third-party gametes for reproduction violates precepts concerning legitimacy, lineage, and

inheritance. Transformed relationships can confuse relationships and their correlative

responsibilities. These values, and objections to third-party assisted reproduction, would extend to

cloning of human beings. Nonetheless, use of cloning research as an aid to fertility within the

bounds of marriage would likely be substantially supported by Islamic scholars and traditions

(Sachedina).

The Shari’a also places moral priority on refraining from harm over the production of

benefits. The formation of public policy on a medical technology then must place the burden of

proof on those who advocate technological innovation to establish clear benefits and to weigh

immediate and prospective long-term harms.

Cloning Research: Amber

Human Cloning: Flashing Red

Judaism
D-29

Judaism is the oldest of the western monotheistic faith traditions. Its primary source of authority

is the Torah, the revealed will of God in the Hebrew Bible, and rabbinic commentaries on the

Torah contained in the Talmud and Mishnah. Within the United States, there are four main

Jewish traditions— Conservative, Orthodox, Reform, and Reconstructionist— that collectively

claim approximately 3% of the U.S. religious population. Jewish scholars have drawn on their

authoritative sources and casuistical reasoning to make substantial contributions to biomedical

ethics since its inception. Indeed, discussion of human cloning by Jewish scholars begins to

appear in the late 1970s.

The Divine Mandate and the Self. Human beings have a command and challenge from God to

use their rational, imaginative, and exploratory capacities for the benefit and health of humanity.

Judaism affirms that human beings have inherent worth as creatures created in the image of God,

and the Talmud understands human beings as partners with God in the ongoing act of creation. In

their unique role, persons receive a divine mandate for stewardship and mastery, which

encompasses a very strong emphasis on use of medical knowledge and skills to promote health,

cure, and heal.

Nonetheless, the divine mandate of mastery generates moral ambivalence in the tradition

with respect to cloning. Cloning is troubling because of the prospect that the mandate to master

nature will be transformed into mastery over humans. The Jewish understanding of the self entails

that persons are more than their genotypes. Rabbi Jakobovits has highlighted the transcendent

character of the person within Jewish thought: “...man, as the delicately balanced fusion of body,

mind, and soul, can never be the mere product of laboratory conditions and scientific ingenuity.”

Jewish perspectives on cloning are also profoundly influenced by the eugenics programs carried

out on European Jewry under Nazi Germany.

An Ethic of Responsibility. Judaism is committed to an ethic of responsibility or duty, rather than

an ethic of rights. The overriding duty (with three exceptions), derived from the Torah and

rabbinic commentary, is the preservation of human life. Given this presumptive duty, it is possible

to support cloning when it is presented as a therapeutic remedy for a genetic disease or condition,

such as infertility, that besets an individual or couple. However, many proposals for human

cloning do not meet these conditions of underlying disease, therapy, and individual benefit.

One exception to the command to preserve life, the prohibition of idolatry, is relevant to

an assessment of cloning. Human cloning raises a danger of self-idolization. Through sexual

intercourse and the raising of children, human beings are confronted with the inescapable

“otherness” of persons. This otherness enables the development of humility and the authenticity of

“I-Thou” relationships. These characteristics curb human hubris and self-idolization (Dorff).

The ethic of responsibility is also expressed in Jewish norms of parenthood and the

responsibilities of lineage. The more the processes by which one becomes a parent— conjugal

relations, conferral of genetic identity, fetal gestation in a mother’s womb, birth, and raising a

child— are separated from the actual creation of life, reservations and objections in Jewish thought
D-30

increase. In the context of human cloning (or other reproductive technologies), the ethic of

responsibility would be diminished because of changed roles (father, mother, child) and

relationships (spousal, parental, filial). It would be unclear who has responsibilities to whom

between and among the generations. According to Rabbi Tendler, “we do not live well with

generational inversion” that might be induced by cloning.

Status of a Clone. One source invoked by some Jewish scholars to inform community reflection

are the “Golem” narratives in Jewish mysticism. The Golem narratives describe the creation of

artificial, human-like life by a mystic; the Golem is subsequently destroyed without occasioning

regret, because, lacking the capacity to speak, it is not considered to have human status. The

narratives are deemed to present parallels to human cloning insofar as they implicitly address the

status of human life without direct human parentage. However, were a human clone to be actually

produced from biomedical research, there is rabbinic consensus that the clone would have human

status, and the imperative to protect life would require protection and care for the clone.

Cloning Research. Jewish scholars are wary of a public policy prohibiting cloning research,

which would violate the command of mastery, interfere with valuable scientific research, and

compromise public oversight and accountability. It is considered important to pursue scientific

research that precedes cloning for transfer because of its potential benefits. Since Jewish law does

not grant full moral status to the human embryo, cloning research conducted on the early human

embryo can be warranted; however, a high incidence of embryo deaths, attributable to the

inefficiency of research, would violate the maxim of do no harm.

Human Cloning. The prospects of human cloning elicit ambivalence but seldom explicit

condemnation in Jewish scholarship; the ambivalence is expressed in a Talmudic maxim that, at

some point, human beings must ask whether they are prepared to forgo the honey from a bee in

order to avoid the sting (Tendler). Jewish scholars support extensive consideration by the Jewish

community of the ethical and social issues pertaining to human cloning. Rabbinic discussion does

express fundamental concerns about the potential commodification of human life through cloning.

Insofar as cloning, coupled with capitalistic motivations, transforms the person into a product or

fungible commodity, it would violate the sacred character of human life.

Cloning Research: Amber

Human Cloning: Amber

Native American

It is worth recalling that the source of philosophical critique in Huxley’s Brave New World was

Native American culture. Native Americans do not partition religion from other life domains;

rather, religion is a “way of life.” Good health requires living in conformity with the ways of life

Native Americans received at the time of creation. The whole of creation is good within Native

American narratives and all creation is animated, interrelated, and responsible for harmonious

interaction to sustain the order of life in the world.
D-31

Within this world view, Native Americans give primacy to the good of the whole, or the group,

rather than to alleged needs of individuals. Individual actions must be placed within a holistic

perspective; as with a pebble that causes a ripple effect in an entire body of water, so there are

no isolated actions that do not have repercussions on the greater whole (Cordova).

Life Balance. Illness is a result of disorder or imbalance between persons, or between persons

and nature, or within a person. The aim of traditional healing practices is to restore balance and

order to the person. Ritual, ceremony, and language are no less important to maintaining or

restoring health. A study of the Navajo found that thought and language were potent forces for

the shaping of reality, for better or ill. Native culture would express substantial concerns with how

biomedical technology shapes our language (for example, AIH, AID, GIFT, IVF, and SET to

describe ART) and thus transforms reality in a manner out of harmony with the given ways of life.

Cloning Research. Animal cloning, and the potential for human cloning, risks substantial

disruption of the created order and balance. Animal research erodes the reverence and kinship

between humans and other created beings. Cloning research on human embryos symbolizes the

western, non-Native pursuit of technical solutions to what are ultimately metaphysical problems;

moreover, these technological skills are not accompanied by necessary practical wisdom about the

ways of life. Sakim, a traditional elder from the Muskogee tribe observes of cloning: “We are

becoming more like Creator with every day that goes by. However, it is only our abilities that are

growing that way. We are not blessed with nor in any manner fraught with the judgment of

Creator. That is the fundamental problem.”

Resource Priorities. Fertility drugs, other methods of reproductive technology, and cloning can

disrupt the balance of communal co-existence. This communal balance relies on an acceptance

that human beings and groups exist in a bounded space that may not be expanded. The human

species as a whole has nonetheless expanded beyond its given bounds through overpopulation;

cloning simply will perpetuate a problem of human growth and increasing scarcity of those

resources needed to live a decent human existence. In this context, “the application of the

knowledge to clone a human being is unjustified” (Cordova). In particular, a focus on scientific

technology such as cloning will divert needed attention and resources away from basic care for

Native Americans, whose life expectancy is the shortest of any demographic group. The needs of

a few cannot be prior to the good of the whole.

While interrelationship is cherished, it is not mutually exclusive with personal identity. A

Sioux creation narrative reflects the importance of individuality as a necessary condition for

diversity and interrelationship: “The reason Wakan Tanka [Creator] does not make two birds, or

animals, or human beings exactly alike is because each is placed here by Wakan Tanka to be an

independent individuality and to rely upon itself” (Deloria, 89). The values of balance with the

patterns and ways of life, individuality, diversity, and interdependent relationships can be

compromised by motivations for cloning.
D-32

Indigenous Cultures. What support that does exist among Native American cultures for human

cloning may pertain to the preservation of endangered indigenous peoples. The Rev. Abraham A.

Akaka, a Native American Hawaiian pastor, has commented: “For aboriginal people of our planet

who see themselves as a dwindling and endangered species, cloning of the best of their race will

be a blessing— a viable avenue for preserving and perpetuating their unique identities and

individualities upon lands they revere as Father and Mother” (Akaka). This qualified support for

human cloning is consistent with the Native emphasis of maintaining the balance of the ways of

life given to peoples at creation. It does not, however, warrant individualist desires for cloning

that have little bearing on the perpetuation of a species or culture.

Cloning Research: Flashing Red

Human Cloning: Flashing Red

Orthodox Christianity

In the United States, the tradition of Orthodox Christianity is institutionalized in two prominent

denominational bodies, the Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of America and the Orthodox Church

in America. About 3% of the U.S. religious population is affiliated with these denominations.

The Bible and the wisdom of the tradition provide grounds for the ecclesiastical teaching content

of Orthodox Christianity. Theologians within both denominations, as well as the Orthodox

Church in America itself, have addressed the subject of cloning.

The Image of God. The concept of the person within Orthodox tradition is rooted in the imago

Dei, with the ultimate purpose of life to realize theosis, or God-likeness, in union and communion

with others. The image of God influences judgments about reproductive technologies and cloning.

Reproductive technologies used outside the context of marriage may be viewed as attempts to

recreate human beings in man’s image and preferred characteristics, rather than God’s image. One

theologian, while acknowledging the tremendous promise that cloning holds out for agricultural

development, indicates that it must be condemned “as grotesque genetic manipulation when

practiced on human beings.”

The image of God is also invoked as the central theological claim in a public statement on

cloning, issued on 11 March 1997, by the Orthodox Church in America. The Orthodox Church

believes cloning use will inevitably be abused, through such examples as “the commercialization of

‘prime’ DNA, production of children for the purpose of providing ‘spare parts,’ and movement

toward creation of a ‘superior’ class of human beings.” The statement concludes with an emphatic

request that “a government ban be imposed on all forms of experimentation to produce human

clones and that government funding for such activity be denied.” This does not preclude public

support and funding for animal cloning to produce therapeutic medical products. The call for a

prohibition is addressed directly to publicly funded research, whether animal or human embryonic,

that is developed for the purpose of human cloning.
D-33

The imago Dei requires that human beings be treated with dignity and respect. These

values underlie not only treatment of the person, but the method by which the person comes into

existence. Cloning creates human beings for human rather than divine purposes and thereby is a

form of disrespect. Since on Orthodox understanding, the person is an embodied soul,

experimentation on the body, including cloning, would necessarily enter the realm of the soul and

the spiritual essence of the self. Cloning cannot be reduced to a scientific procedure on a

biological organism.

Sacramental Relationships. A central concern within the Orthodox tradition is the sacramental

(revelations of the sacred in human experience) dimensions of marriage, procreation, and the

rearing of children. The holiness of marriage and the family is the proper context for procreation

and nurture of a child. It is not permissible in Orthodox teaching to introduce the gametic or

gestational contributions of third parties in human reproduction. Cloning in particular is deemed

to depersonalize the human being; the prospect of manufacturing children transforms a sacred

mystery into a sterile technological achievement. While a clone would be considered a person with

a soul, based on its capacities for intelligence, self-determination, self-consciousness, and

interpersonal and spiritual relationships, Orthodox theologians believe that a cloned human being

would be valued only for extrinsic purposes, as an object for the use and exploitation of others.

Cloning Research. Orthodox theologians extend the dignity and respect owed to the person to

the human embryo. This does not depend on a claim about ensoulment, but rather exhibits human

finitude and fallibility: “We must treat the developing embryo with dignity and respect, because

we do not know when it becomes a person” (Demopulos). Moreover, the inefficiency of current

cloning techniques, if applied to human embryos, would constitute a tragedy of loss of potential

human life. Such positions necessarily preclude cloning research on the embryo.

Cloning Research: Red

Human Cloning: Red

Protestant Christianity: Conservative Evangelical

The diversity of Protestantism is illustrated by the different views of Joseph Fletcher (Episcopal)

and Paul Ramsey (Methodist) on human cloning. This report will try to illuminate some of the

diversity, while avoiding oversimplification, by distinguishing between conservative evangelical

and mainline Protestantism.

The conservative evangelical denominations considered in this report account for some 15% of

the American religious population. This includes the largest Protestant body, the Southern

Baptist Convention (SBC), which claims over 16 million adherents. The Christian Life

Commission of the SBC issued a resolution against human cloning on 6 March 1997. While

evangelical theologians and denominations do not speak as one voice, they are united in relying

heavily on the Bible as the principal authority for spiritual and moral life. Protestant

evangelicals began to take a serious interest in biomedical ethics following the Roe v. Wade
D-34

decision legalizing abortion in 1973, and their writings continue to focus on ethical questions at

the beginning and ending of life. However, partly as a response to the influence of secular,

philosophical models in medicine, evangelical ethicists have begun to address all the major

questions of biomedical ethics.

The Sanctity of Life. Given evangelical emphasis on the sanctity of human life, it is not surprising

that J. Kerby Anderson, perhaps the first evangelical author to address human cloning, set it

within the context of the right-to-life controversy. Anderson argued that the sanctity of life is

violated by cloning in two different ways. First, cloning research would inevitably result in loss of

embryonic life. Secondly, although Anderson believes a clone would have a soul, he holds that

societal disregard for the sanctity of human life would lead to a redefinition of humanity. In that

way, society could treat the clone as a repository for spare organs and tissues.

More recent evangelical commentary has reiterated concern about the diminished

personhood or humanity of the clone without invoking the sanctity of human life value. The

framing context has instead been a critique of the kind of society that makes cloning a valued

cultural project, namely, a society that arbitrarily projects certain traits as preferable, particularly

those traits having to do with bodily appearance.

Parenthood. Evangelical discourse affirms the intrinsic connection between marriage and

parenthood delineated in the Genesis creation story. Human cloning is theologically misguided

because it breaks this connection so completely. In so doing, cloning no less ruptures critical

connections between parent and child. Gilbert Meilaender argues that a marital context of giving

and receiving in love is the ideal context for procreation and nurture of a child. This relational

context is emphatically severed in human cloning, which “aims directly at the heart of the mystery

that is the child.” Thus, the idea of a child as a “gift” is effaced as the child becomes both a project

and a projection of the self.

Oliver O’Donovan’s argument to root the sanctity of parenthood within the Christian liturgical

tradition has been especially influential in evangelical scholarship. O’Donovan contrasts the

“begetting” of procreation with scientific “making” in human reproduction; the latter is

exemplified by human cloning. Cloning diminishes humanity to “raw material” out of which an

artifice can be designed and constructed in our image.

Southern Baptist scholars portray human cloning as distinctive and discontinuous from

previous methods of human procreation; indeed, it is represented as a “radical break with the

human past, and with the established patterns of human life.” The distinctiveness of cloning is

manifested in what R. Albert Mohler, Jr. refers to as “consumer eugenics” in which “direct genetic

customization” of the human embryo is performed. Moreover, the secular principles of

procreative liberty and autonomy that support cloning assault the integrity and social necessity of

the family and of marital love: “The possibility of human cloning allows for the final emancipation

of human reproduction from the marital relationship. Indeed, cloning would allow for the

emancipation of human reproduction from any relationship” (Mohler, Jr.).
D-35

The Image of God. Evangelical authors directly connect issues of diminished humanity and

relationality embedded in human cloning with a violation of the imago Dei. One author, drawing

on neo-orthodox theologian Karl Barth, delineates the imago Dei in terms of freedom for

self-determination, equality, relationality, mutual respect, and solidarity. Scientific inquiry that

issues in a research project to clone human beings violates individual freedom by subordinating

self-determination to scientific predetermination. The imago Dei is substantively compromised in

a clone because of diminished solidarity and the potential deprivation of equality and relationality.

Human cloning risks devaluing the person by suggesting genetics is the essence of personhood, or

by valuing the clone because of its replication of valued characteristics of another person. In

evangelical understandings, society could grant the clone only derivative value, not inherent value.

Religious thinkers within the Southern Baptist Convention also invoke the imago Dei as a

bar against human cloning. As bearers of this image, human beings gain insight into

self-understanding and human uniqueness and receive a distinctive status relative to the rest of

creation. This sacred uniqueness is compromised by efforts at human cloning. On 6 March 1997,

the Christian Life Commission of the Southern Baptist Convention issued a resolution entitled

“Against Human Cloning” that supported the decision of President Clinton to prohibit federal

funding for human cloning research and requested “that the Congress of the United States make

human cloning unlawful.” The resolution also called on “all nations of the world to make efforts

to prevent the cloning of any human being.”

Evangelical ethicists contend that cloning can contradict human creativity and innovation

embedded in the image of God, rather than express it (as claimed by some mainline Protestant

theologians). Instead of reflecting an openness to the future, cloning in fact involves a replication

of the past. Thus, it should not be interpreted as creative but rather as “reactionary biological

conservatism” (Jones). Cloning perpetuates the past and thereby belies our unwillingness to

accept contingency and the unknown.

Cloning Research. Research on the human pre-embryo is assessed as “immoral” because of the

ascription of personhood with full moral status to the conceptus. Echoing Ramsey’s concern,

evangelical authors describe cloning as an immoral experiment on a person without his or her

consent. Moreover, cloning procedures are likely to ensue in embryonic death due to

abnormalities in the embryo or practical difficulties in transferring the embryo to a host womb.

Cloning Research: Red

Human Cloning: Red

Protestant Christianity: Mainline

The religious witness of mainline Protestantism focuses on questions of peace and social justice

rather than the right to life. The seven principal denominations designated as “mainline”

Protestant (American Baptist, Christian Church [Disciples of Christ], Episcopal, Evangelical
D-36

Lutheran, United Methodist, Presbyterian, United Church of Christ) claim approximately 17%

of the U.S. religious population.

These denominations have been very active in developing ecclesiastical position statements and

convening working groups to address theological and ethical issues in biomedicine. Moreover,

ecclesiastical leaders and theologians have been prominent in bringing such issues to the

consideration of more global bodies, such as the National Council of Churches in Christ and the

World Council of Churches. However, the primacy of freedom of conscience in Protestantism

means that theologians engaged in biomedical ethics may not agree with the views of

denominational bodies or their theological peers. This summary will reflect this theological

diversity rather than resolve it.

Creative Freedom. An important question within mainline Protestant thought is whether there are

any adequate precedents to guide ethical reflection for the advent of reproductive and genetic

technologies, or what one scholar has described as the “new genesis.” A first position affirms that

we are free to engage in exploratory ethics because human destiny lies in the future rather than

being determined by the past. Theological ethics begins by God giving human beings a future to

shape and create in partnership with God. Genetic and reproductive technologies express the

creative dimensions of the imago Dei insofar as they promote human dignity and welfare. Within

this understanding, no theological principle stands as a bar to human cloning.

The Christian vocation of freedom warrants the pursuit of scientific freedom. However,

freedom is not unlimited but is to be used to fulfill divine purposes. Moreover, freedom has a

correlative obligation of accountability. Thus, regulation of research is justified especially given

the current imprecision of the technology and the consequent loss of animal or human embryonic

life. While researchers should ensure respect for the pre-embryo, and adopt procedures to

minimize discarded embryos, the efficacy of such research is ultimately an issue of scientific

procedure rather than of theological principle.

Even though sin will manifest itself in an ongoing disparity between a designed future and

its reality, Christians are given permission to “sin bravely” in the pursuit of progress. Thus, if

further research on human cloning can establish a reasonable expectation of benefits, and ensure

human dignity, then both research and eventually human cloning seem warranted. The prospects

of private, entrepreneurial interests establishing various cloning services could, however,

culminate in diminished dignity.

Research Criteria. A second position distinguishes between the ethics of cloning research and the

ethics of cloning human beings for purposes of transfer and birth. Research on cloned embryos

can be justifiable, using the precedent of current standards for the regulation and protection of

human and animal subjects. However, cloning of humans involves creation after our image rather

than God’s and can lead to power over humans rather than enhanced choices. Moreover, this

position criticizes the appeal to “human” dignity as a warrant for cloning as too global and

impersonal. Decision makers should instead focus on the interests of children, that is, on those

persons living in the future created for them. At a minimum, society should engage in a sustained
D-37

and substantive debate on the possible benefits and the likely harms of human cloning, with a

burden of proof imposed on the research community to establish a compelling case for the

beneficial and therapeutic uses of the technology.

Research Moratorium. Public discourse is necessary but insufficient: A third position supports

implementing a long-term moratorium on cloning research until the scientific, ethical, and social

issues have been fully debated. Without a moratorium, it is entirely likely that new research

discoveries could outpace discussion and thereby change the issues under debate. Both issues of

cloning research on pre-embryos and cloning human beings should be subjected to ethical and

theological scrutiny as well as tests of political and legal feasibility. Christians bring to this social

discussion an emphasis on human creative possibility, to be sure, but also a “hermeneutics of

suspicion” (Nelson) that stresses human fallibility, misplaced self-confidence, and the risks of

arrogance.

Prohibitions. A fourth position places cloning within the context of positive eugenics and offers a

critique of both research process and product based on the ethical precedents and prohibitions

established with respect to genetic enhancements. In particular, cloning raises issues about the

substantive characteristics desired in a person, the control of enormous powers of manipulation by

a very small circle of experts, and whether human life will assume instrumental rather than

inherent value.

Cloning Research: Green/Amber

Human Cloning: Amber

Roman Catholic Christianity

The Roman Catholic Church is the largest denomination in the U.S., with approximately 40% of

the religious population and over 20% of the general population. The religious and moral

authority for Roman Catholicism is grounded in the witness of God and Jesus Christ in the

Bible, as interpreted through the teaching office (magisterium) of the Church. In the United

States, Roman Catholic teaching is coordinated by the National Conference of Catholic Bishops

(NCCB). Roman Catholic theologians, though not always in agreement with magisterial

teaching, have been among the most influential contributors in biomedical ethics, and have

addressed the possibility of human cloning since the 1960s.

Magisterial Teaching. Donum Vitae, an encyclical issued in 1987 by the Congregation for the

Doctrine of the Faith condemned cloning (blastomere separation) as a violation of the dignity of

the human embryo and of the intrinsic goods of human sexuality: “...attempts or hypotheses for

obtaining a human being without any connection with sexuality through ‘twin fission,’ cloning, or

parthenogenesis are to be considered contrary to the moral law, since they are in opposition to the

dignity both of human procreation and of the conjugal union.” While some traditions have

addressed the possible abuses of cloning technology, Roman Catholic teaching maintains that the

use of cloning techniques with respect to human beings is itself contrary to human dignity.
D-38

Scientific research on cloning since Donum Vitae has issued in ecclesiastical condemnation

and a request to governments to enact legislation to prohibit non-therapeutic research on human

embryos and cloning of human beings. In the wake of the cloning of “Dolly,” a Vatican statement

reiterated the basic teaching of Donum Vitae: “A person has the right to be born in a human way.

It is to be strongly hoped that states...will immediately pass a law that bans the application of

cloning on humans and that in the face of pressures, [states] have the force to make no

concessions.”

National Conference of Catholic Bishops. In the United States, the NCCB released a statement

in March 1997 rejecting human cloning on several grounds, including an appeal to the rights of

children to have real parents and not to be manufactured as copies. Moreover, research involving

the cloning of human embryos is deemed unethical due to its risks and nontherapeutic objectives.

The NCCB also issued support for the testimony of John Cardinal O’Connor before the New

York State Senate (13 March 1997). Cardinal O’Connor criticized cloning as contrary to human

parenthood and human wisdom. Human cloning violates the norms of procreation and parenthood

through a process that removes “the humanism from human parents and the human child.” A

serious survey of the state of our degraded external environment reveals that human beings lack

the wisdom to experiment with the internal human environment. O’Connor emphasizes in

particular questions of technical inefficiency and issues of the character and qualifications of those

who would direct the research and process of cloning, concluding that these are not matters to be

left to technical specialists. O’Connor also observes that cloning falls beyond the parameters of

the vocation of medicine: “The act of human cloning itself cures no pathology. Thus, we are not

doctoring the patient but doctoring the race.” While Roman Catholicism encourages scientific

development in the service of the person and human dignity, proposals for research “that are

hostile to human parenthood, unknown in deleterious consequences, and cure no disease...are not

medicine and are not welcome.”

Theologians: Cloning Research. While many Roman Catholic theologians have addressed the

subject of human cloning, Richard A. McCormick, S.J., has provided the most constant Catholic

commentary on cloning. His themes will be used as illustrative of the central concerns of

theologians within the tradition. McCormick has invoked the themes of sanctity, wholeness, and

individuality in criticizing cloning research on human pre-embryos. Cloning is not merely a

question of scientific technique, but also involves matters of the public interest. McCormick is

concerned that such research will erode respect for the human pre-embryo and pre-nascent life,

and diminish the wonder of human diversity and uniqueness.

Parenthood. McCormick has also argued that human cloning is contrary to the meaning of

marriage and the family. The purpose of marriage includes the binding of the unitive and

procreative purposes of sexuality. Reproductive technologies, including cloning, suggest that

embodiment is extrinsic rather than intrinsic to personhood. Such procedures depersonalize the

family, “debodify” marital love, and violate the sacramental covenant of marriage. Moreover,

natural law encompasses duties for both procreation and education of offspring; parental nurture
D-39

is required to enable a child to develop morally and spiritually and to assume interpersonal

commitments.

Roman Catholic theologians have emphasized the sins of pride and self-interest, and the

human conditions of finitude and fallibility, in assessing the prospects of human cloning. However,

avoiding pride should not mean falling into the sin of sloth. Human beings have a divine

responsibility for dominion that can be expanded through justified scientific research.

Cloning Research: Red

Human Cloning: Red
D-40

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A: ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY

RELIGION and CLONING

J. Kerby Anderson, Genetic Engineering, Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan Publishing House,

1982.

The fundamental issue of cloning is the sanctity of life, because the potential for loss of life and

genetic abnormality is very high. While clones would be creations in God’s image and have souls,

the major question is whether their humanity would be redefined. Because of societal disregard

for the sanctity of life, clones will likely be used for spare parts and be abused.

John Breck, “Genetic Engineering: Setting the Limits,” in Health and Faith: Medical,

Psychological, and Religious Dimensions, John T. Chirban (ed.), Washington, DC:

University Press of America, 1991, 51–55.

Breck contends that cloning technology holds out tremendous promise for agriculture, but that

the Orthodox Church must condemn it as a grotesque manipulation were it to be practiced on

human beings.

R. Geoffrey Brown, “Clones, Chimeras, and the Image of God: Lessons from Barthian

Bioethics,” in Bioethics and the Future of Medicine: A Christian Appraisal, John F.

Kilner, Nigel M. de S. Cameron, David Schiedermayer (eds.), Grand Rapids, MI:

William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1995, 238–249.

The principles of the image of God give a decisive command to the person for prohibition of

“creative (non-therapeutic) genetic predetermination of a human being” through cloning or

chimeras on the grounds that human freedom is denied, respect for life is disregarded, and the

relational self is violated. Human freedom for self-determination is theologically subject to the

image and sovereignty of God. Scientific freedom that results in a project of human cloning

“would be blatant disregard for individual freedom,” because it subordinates self-determination to

scientific determination. Moreover, a clone lacking the characteristics of freedom, which in turn

diminishes equality, relationality, and fellow humanity, would be compromised as a person in the

image of God.

Ronald Cole-Turner, “Dolly Theology,” unpublished manuscript.

Cole-Turner recommends a temporary and voluntary ban on all human cloning, which should last

well into the next decade in order to allow full public discussion. The role of the church is to

prevent trivial and misguided uses of cloning through careful and open consideration of proposed

reasons.

Cole-Turner does not see a theologically or morally significant difference between a cloned and an

uncloned embryo, but this should be an item for public discussion. Cole-Turner distinguishes

selfish, sinister, exploitative, and possessive uses for desiring to reproduce through cloning an
D-41

embryo. He cannot, however, imagine any “loving” reasons; non-loving reasons will devalue the

identity of the child.

Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Instruction on Respect for Human Life in Its

Origin and on the Dignity of Procreation, Vatican City, 22 February 1987.

The Instruction prohibits human cloning, both as a scientific outcome and as a scientific proposal:

“Attempts or hypotheses for obtaining a human being without any connection with sexuality

through ‘twin fission,’ cloning, or parthenogenesis are to be considered contrary to the moral law,

since they are in opposition to the dignity both of human procreation and of the conjugal union.”

The prohibition is based in the twin and intrinsically linked meanings of sexual intercourse,

procreative and unitive sexuality. The violation of the moral law incurred through a cloning

hypothesis concerns the usurpation of God’s domain by a scientific ideology devoted to mastery

of human destiny.

Charles E. Curran, “Moral Theology and Genetics,” Crosscurrents 20 (Winter 1970):

64–82.

While finding himself in agreement with most of Paul Ramsey’s conclusions on genetic

engineering, including cloning, Curran believes Ramsey presents a “closed” or static concept of

human nature and that he neglects the expanded dominion over human existence that modern

science has bequeathed to us. Thus, Ramsey risks the danger of sloth. However, Curran’s critique

of proposals for human cloning appeals more to human propensities for pride. The Christian

understanding of human nature as limited and sinful means the decisions required for clonal

reproduction, such as the selection of ideal types, either could not be made because of incomplete

information, or would be made arbitrarily.

Richard Doerflinger, “Remarks in Response to News Reports on the Cloning of Mammals,”

National Conference of Catholic Bishops, 25 February 1997.

Speaking on behalf of the NCCB, Doerflinger maintains that Catholic teaching rejects the cloning

of human beings because it is not a worthy way to bring a human being into the world. Children

have rights to have real parents and not to be manufactured as products. Research on human

embryos for cloning purposes is unethical because it violates informed consent and poses risks in

non-therapeutic experimentation.

Nancy J. Duff, “Clone with Caution,” The Washington Post, 2 March 1997, C1, 5.

Duff presents several reasons against cloning from a theological perspective. These include: (1)

Cloning represents an insidious form of pride, insofar as we may seek to create a more perfect

humanity, or a humanity created after our own image. Power to clone human beings means power

over human beings; (2) Human beings are not their own creators, but cloning raises the prospect

of humanity acting as its own destroyer; (3) Human cloning may challenge traditional forms of

human procreation; (4) There is a potential risk of harm to the identity of the cloned child; (5) The

presumed ownership and manipulation of animal life necessary for human cloning may violate the

theological claim of dominion.
D-42

The Church is called to “forge a responsible path for this new technology.” Duff opposes actual

cloning of humans, but believes research on cloning may be encouraged if science will proceed

cautiously, openly, and with a willingness to be subject to regulations for the protection of the

public good.

Sri Eknath Easwaran, “Brave New World,” Blue Mountain: A Journal for Spiritual Living

(March 1997).

From within Hindu spirituality, Easwaran believes we must ask of cloning technology: “Will this

help me in my search for realizing God, who is enshrined in the depths of my consciousness?”

Kenneth D. Eberhard, “Genetics and Human Survival,” Linacre Quarterly 40:3 (August

1973), 167–181.

Cloning reduces humankind to a material and scientific object to such an extent that the humanity

of all is placed under attack. It could not be justifiable to have a cloned child unless human beings

were considered merely as material objects. A world of scientific reductionism is not a world the

Christian wishes to live in.

John S. Feinberg, Paul D. Feinberg, Ethics for a Brave New World, Wheaton, IL: Crossway

Books, 1993.

The authors view cloning as impractical and immoral. It is impractical, because research

procedures are likely to cause embryo death due to abnormality or failure to transfer to a host

womb successfully. It is immoral because a person is present at conception. Cloning therefore

involves an immoral experiment on a person without his or her consent.

Joseph Fletcher, Humanhood: Essays in Biomedical Ethics, Buffalo, NY: Prometheus

Books, 1979; The Ethics of Genetic Control, Garden City, NY: Anchor, 1974; “New

Beginnings in Life: A Theologian’s Response,” in The New Genetics and the Future

of Man, Michael Hamilton (ed.), Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing,

1972, 78–89.

Fletcher argued the “real moral question” is not whether or not to engage in cloning, but when

and why. His own reply is that “There is no ethical objection to cloning when it is morally (that is,

humanely) employed.”

Fletcher portrays cloning as one among many methods of “reproduction,” useful under

appropriate circumstances: “It can alternate with sexual reproduction as need suggests, in one

generation or another.” Indeed, according to the criteria of humanness, “laboratory reproduction

is radically human” because it is rational and deliberate. Human beings should exercise the same

kind of reproductive choice and control over themselves that they do over non-humans: “What

men can do by cloning with their plants and animals they could and sometimes should do for

themselves.”

Among moral or humane uses of cloning technology are (1) to provide “clonants” (instructively,

Fletcher never uses the language of “person”) with sources of immunologically compatible
D-43

life-saving organs; (b) perpetuation of the “finest genotypes” in our species; (c) cloning a child’s

sex to avoid a genetic-linked disease or to insure family survival; (d) selective reproduction of

individuals (e.g., top scientists) for social vocations that require specific characteristics; (e)

reparation of a diminished gene pool; or (f) safeguarding those (e.g., soldiers) who assume risks

or dangerous roles on behalf of the society.

Bernard Häring, Ethics of Manipulation: Issues in Medicine, Behavior Control, and

Genetics, New York: Seabury Press, 1975.

Haring raises specific objections to human cloning: (1) it would disrupt human procreative

responsibilities: “The total severance of the unitive and procreative purposes of sexuality would

have profound repercussions on all human relationships”; (2) a clone may have a compromised

sense of identity, belonging, and continuity, which would make it difficult to achieve a willingness

to accept interpersonal responsibility and commitment; (3) widespread cloning would undermine

the stability of marriage and family.

Maher Hathout, “Cloning: Who Will Set the Limits?” The Minaret 19:3 (March 1997), 8.

Hathout argues that the Qur’an and Islam encourage scientific inquiry: Scientific knowledge

becomes a symbol or sign of God’s creation. Cloning research imitates creation by manipulation

of elements created by God (khaliq), but does not change creation (bari).

The larger question within Islam concerns the application of research. Human beings do have

responsibility before God for how they apply research findings. Human dignity must be protected

from abuse. Thus, application must be complemented with ethical and sociological studies on

possible harm to humans. Moreover, the commodification of knowledge, when it is traded,

bought, and sold, is a “violation of the divine principles of serving God and his creation.” A

similar judgment would be made of uses of cloning for purposes of political and cultural

superiority.

Philip Hefner, “Cloning as Quintessential Human Act,” forthcoming in Insights, June 1997.

Hefner believes the significance of cloning lies in its revelation to us of fundamental realities:

Human beings are created co-creators; we are thoroughly natural creatures; and cloned humans

are natural persons.

Theologically, Hefner contends that life is God’s gift; that humans are to be good stewards of

God’s gifts; humans are free and accountable to God; and that human experience is inevitably

sinful. Policies on cloning should reflect these realities, allowing considerable time for public

discussion, attending to the complex sets of values, and accounting for our fallible judgments.

D. Gareth Jones, Brave New People: Ethical Issues at the Commencement of Life, Grand

Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing, 1985.

Jones argues that cloning is unacceptable to Christians. Creativity and change are intrinsic to

human life and reflect our likeness of God, who is creative and innovative. Cloning by contrast
D-44

involves a replication of the past, and therefore, is a form of “reactionary biological

conservatism.”

The value of clones lies in their replication of characteristics of other persons; clones are valued

for others, rather than for themselves. Thus, they are creatures in “our” likeness, rather than

God’s. Jones fears that human cloning will result in a lost humanness. In addition, Jones believes

that society is incapable of addressing the ethical issues raised by implementation of cloning.

Damien Keown, Buddhism and Bioethics, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995.

In a short discussion of asexual reproduction, Keown contends that human cloning will merely

illustrate the variety of ways that life can be generated, consistent with teaching in Buddhist texts.

The Buddhist narrative tradition relates stories of “spontaneous generation” in which sages and

supernatural beings have power to “materialize a human form for themselves at will.” On

Keown’s view, both the clone and the host are ontological individuals entitled to full respect.

Andrew Kimbrell, The Human Body Shop: The Engineering and Marketing of Life, New

York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1993.

Kimbrell recommends a “complete ban on the cloning of human beings.” This policy is based on

an appeal to the “sacred image of the human form,” suggesting conceptions of embodiment and

the image of God.

C.S. Lewis, The Abolition of Man, New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1973.

The consequences of designing our descendants would be less freedom: “If any one age really

attains, by eugenics and scientific education, the power to make its descendants what it pleases, all

men who live after that are patients of that power.”

Richard A. McCormick, S.J., How Brave a New World: Dilemmas in Bioethics, Garden

City, NY: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1981.

McCormick argues that Fletcher distorts the notion of humanness by equating “rational control”

with “good” in discussions of asexual reproduction. The criteria of deliberation and rationality tell

us only that a person is acting, not that the person is acting humanly. McCormick then offers his

own view that reproductive procedures such as IVF and cloning are “inimical to marriage and the

family.” There is no justification for such steps “unless a value the equivalent of survival demands

it.”

McCormick finds himself in agreement with Ramsey (and Leon Kass) on the issue of whether

such procedures depersonalize and dehumanize the family and its members. First, they suggest

that embodiment is extrinsic rather than intrinsic to personhood. Moreover, laboratory control of

reproduction undermines the biological and moral bonds of the family.
D-45

Richard A. McCormick, S.J., “Should We Clone Humans,” The Christian Century

November 17–24, 1993, 1148–1149; “Blastomere Separation: Some Concerns,”

Hastings Center Report 24:2 (1994), 14–16.

McCormick argues in his original article, and in a subsequent rejoinder to John Robertson, that

cloning is capable of imposing irreparable harm to “our cherished sense of the sanctity, wholeness,

and individuality of human life.” The status of the human preembryo used in human cloning

research at George Washington University is of substantial public importance because it reflects

basic attitudes toward human life. McCormick is concerned that support for autonomous choices

regarding preferential breeding will be detached from social contexts of eugenics. We will reduce

the totality to a part and begin to value a person in terms of the particular trait he or she was

programmed to have. Finally, cloning may “shatter our wonder at human diversity and

individuality.”

C. Ben Mitchell, as cited in “Cloning of Embryos Stirs Ethical Concerns,” The Christian

Century November 10, 1993, 1117.

Responding to the George Washington University experiment, ethicist Ben Mitchell of the

Christian Life Commission of the Southern Baptist Convention argues, “It is difficult to see how

this technology could be used without devaluing the sanctity of human life. Human beings are

more than the sum of genetic parts.”

Oliver O’Donovan, Begotten or Made?, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984.

Using the Nicene Creed as a point of departure, O’Donovan contrasts the theological use of

“begotten” with “making.” Begetting generates that which is like ourselves (in the way the Son

was like the Father), while making produces that which is unlike ourselves. Cloning represents the

culmination of scientific making in human reproduction. The use of scientific capacity comes at

the cost of natural humanity: “Cloning techniques demonstrate that mankind does have the

awesome technical power to exchange the humanity which God has given him for something else,

to treat natural humanity itself as a raw material for constructing a form of life that is not natural

humanity but is an artificial development out of humanity.”

Orthodox Church in America, “Statement on Recent Developments in Cloning

Technology,” 11 March 1997.

This denominational statement holds that the prospect of human cloning raises the prospect of an

ominous slippery slope, in which use of cloning will inevitably lead to abuse. “Prime” DNA will be

commercialized, children will be produced for their spare parts, and there will be movement to

create a superior race of human beings.

The statement concludes by emphatically requesting that a government ban be imposed on all

forms of experimentation to produce human clones and that government funding for such activity

be denied.
D-46

Paul Ramsey, Fabricated Man: The Ethics of Genetic Control, New Haven: Yale University

Press, 1970, especially pp. 60–103, “Shall We Clone A Man?”; “Moral and Religious

Implications of Genetic Control,” in Genetics and the Future of Man, John D.

Roslansky (ed.), New York: Appleton-Century-Croffs, 1966, 107–169.

Ramsey portrayed clonal reproduction as a “borderline” for medicine and society. Cloning seeks

to modify the genetic conditions of life in the service of non-patients— the human species or

control of evolution— and thus risks changing medicine’s vocation of service to life and to real

patients.

As part of a general critique of asexual reproduction, Ramsey identified three

“horizontal” (person-person) and two “vertical” (person-God) violations of cloning

on moral norms: (1) Clonal reproduction would inevitably require “coercive” or

“dictated breeding” in order to ensure a controlled gene pool. (2) Scientific

optimism for eugenic improvement of the species would neglect injustices and

“mishaps” perpetrated on individuals. (3) Cloning represents an assault on human

parenthood. Cloning technology alienate the person from his or her embodied

personhood through a technical, non-relational, and dehumanized process. The

two vertical violations of hubris and playing God explicitly invoke a theological

anthropology. With the death of God in secular culture, human beings who enact

their self-modifying freedom assume the role of man-God. (92).

Fred Rosner, Modern Medicine and Jewish Ethics, New York: Yeshiva University Press,

1986.

Rosner suggests three questions are involved in Jewish discussion of cloning: (1) Are we

encroaching on the domain of the Creator? (2) Are we allowed to tamper with our essence in

creating an “artificial” human? (3) Do we have permission to alter humanhood and humanity?

Such issues deserve “extensive consideration” within the Jewish community.

Thomas A. Shannon, “Cloning, Uniqueness, and Individuality,” Louvain Studies 19 (1994),

283–306.

Shannon examines the implications of cloning for genetic uniqueness and individuality in the wake

of the George Washington University studies. Drawing on the scholastic theologian John Duns

Scotus, Shannon argues for a difference between genetic uniqueness, i.e., the genome which

constitutes a common nature for the human species, and individuality, which begins through

cellular division and continues through the life experiences of a person. Persons may then be

genetically but not individually interchangeable. Shannon holds that the pre-embryo is not morally

mistreated through the technical process of cloning, but individuals will be, because they are

valued for reasons other than their inherent worth and dignity.
D-47

Seymour Siegel, “Genetic Engineering: Some Reflections,” address to the Rabbinical

Assembly Convention, New York, 1978, as cited in Martin Ebon, The Cloning of

Man: A Brave New Hope or Horror, New York: Signet Books, 1978.

Siegel addressed the prospects of cloning in the future. He argued that we cannot play God, but

that humankind is challenged by God to use its reason, its imagination, and its daring in an effort

to improve the health and welfare of the human species.

Charles Stinson, “Theology and the Baron Frankenstein: Cloning and Beyond,” The

Christian Century 89 (January 19, 1972), 60–63.

In opposition to Ramsey, Stinson envisions “socially regulated cloning of individuals deemed

especially valuable to the community” within the next century. He offers a “key theological

concept for the future”: The spiritual significance of life lies in the ongoing content of human life,

not its origin, whether natural or artificial.

Stinson contends that clones would have a “soul”— insofar as they would be capable of personal,

ethical, aesthetic, and religious experience. So long as a clone is raised in a loving familial

environment, Stinson believes there is little question about the genuineness of the humanity of a

clone.

Allen D. Verhey, “Cloning: Revisiting an Old Debate,” Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal

4:3 (September 1994), 227–234; “Theology after Dolly,” The Christian Century,

March 19–26, 1997, 285–286.

Verhey contrasts the views of Joseph Fletcher and Paul Ramsey on five major themes:

1) Freedom: Fletcher understood freedom to be a sufficient principle of morality, while Ramsey

held it to be insufficient and limited by our embodied and social nature.

2) Good and Evil: Fletcher assessed “good” in terms of the maximization of happiness. Ramsey

believed that happiness was not sufficient to account for the good life in a family, and that we

must be concerned with how happiness is distributed.

3) Embodiment: Fletcher located the person in our capacity for rational choice and control.

Ramsey emphasized our embodied selfhood, including sexuality as intrinsic to self.

4) Nature: Fletcher followed in the Baconian tradition of celebrating technology and human

mastery over nature. Ramsey recognized that technology is also the power of some people over

other people.

5) Parenthood: Fletcher emphasized the social parent, while Ramsey argued for the significance

of biological parenting. We are called to see children as gifts, not products.
D-48

World Council of Churches, Faith and Science in an Unjust World, Geneva: World Council

of Churches, 1979.

A working group of the World Council of Churches examining ethics and the biological sciences

believed cloning raised ethical objections similar to those of positive eugenics— namely, that there

is no societal, let alone global, consensus on “superior” human qualities, and that cloning

technology places enormous powers of manipulation in the hands of a few experts, who require

control by other experts.
D-49

APPENDIX B: BIBLIOGRAPHY

Endnotes: Sections 1 and 2

[1] Cahill, L.S., Cloning: Religious-Based Perspectives, Testimony before the National Bioethics

Advisory Commission, March 13, 1997.

[2] Childress, J.F., Practical Reasoning in Bioethics, Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press,

1997.

[3] Cole-Turner, R., Dolly Theology, Unpublished manuscript.

[4] ——— , Is genetic engineering co-creation?, Theology Today, 44:338-349, 1987.

[5] Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Instruction on respect for human life in its origin

and on the dignity of procreation, Origins, 16(40):698-711, 1987.

[6] Dorff, R.E.N., Human Cloning: A Jewish Perspective, Testimony before the National

Bioethics Advisory Commission, March 14, 1997.

[7] Einstein, A., Strange is our situation here upon Earth, in The World Treasury of Modern

Religious Thought, J. Pelikan (ed.), Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1990, 202-205.

[8] Fadlallah, M.H., as cited in Cloning should be punishable by death or amputation: Saudi cleric,

Agence France Presse, March 13, 1997.

[9] Fletcher, J., Humanhood: Essays in Biomedical Ethics, Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books,

1979.

[10] ——— , The Ethics of Genetic Control, Garden City, NY: Anchor Press, 1974.

[11] ——— , New beginnings in human life: A theologian’s response, in The New Genetics and

the Future of Man, M. Hamilton (ed.), Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing

Company, 1972, 78-89.

[12] ——— , Ethical aspects of genetic controls, N Engl J Med, 285(14):776-783, 1971.

[13] Freundel, R.B., Judaism, in On the New Frontiers of Genetics and Religion, J.R. Nelson

(ed.), Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1994, 120-136; Personal

communication, March 6, 1997.

[14] Gustafson, J.M., Where theologians and geneticists meet, dialog, 33(1):7-16, 1994.
D-50

[15] ——— , Genetic therapy: Ethical and religious reflections, J Contemp Health Law Policy,

8(Spring):183-206, 1992.

[16] Hathout, M., Cloning: Who will set the limits?, The Minaret, 19(3):8, 1997.

[17] Hefner, P., Cloning as quintessential human act, Insights, June 1997.

[18] Lewis, C.S., The Abolition of Man, New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1973, 70,

71.

[19] Lynn, B., Genetic Manipulation, New York: Office for Church in Society, United Church of

Christ, 1977.

[20] McCormick, R.A., Should we clone humans?, The Christian Century, Nov. 17-24, 1993,

1148-1149.

[21] ——— , Blastomere separation: Some concerns, Hastings Center Report, 24(2):14-16, 1994.

[22] Meilaender, G.C., Testimony before the National Bioethics Advisory Commission, March

13, 1997.

[23] Moraczewski, A.S., Cloning and the Church, Testimony before the National Bioethics

Advisory Commission, March 13, 1997.

[24] ——— , On human cloning, Ethics and Medics, 19(6):3-4, 1994.

[25] O’Donovan, O., Begotten or Made?, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984, 16.

[26] Peters, T., Playing God? Genetic Discrimination and Human Freedom, New York:

Routledge, 1997; Personal communication, March 13, 16, 1997.

[27] Ramsey, P., Fabricated Man: The Ethics of Genetic Control, New Haven, CT: Yale

University Press, 1970.

[28] ——— , Moral and religious implications of genetic control, in Genetics and the Future of

Man, J.D. Roslansky (ed.), New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1966, 107-169.

[29] Reformed Church in America, Genetic engineering, in Minutes of General Synod, New

York: Office of Social Witness and Worship, 1988, 61-74.

[30] Rorvik, D.M., In His Image: The Cloning of a Man, Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott Company,

1978.
D-51

[31] Sachedina, A., Islamic Perspectives on Cloning, Testimony before the National Bioethics

Advisory Commission, March 14, 1997.

[32] Shannon, T.A., Cloning, uniqueness, and individuality, Louvain Studies, 19:283-306, 1994.

[33] Shinn, R.L., Forced Options: Social Decisions for the 21st Century, San Francisco: Harper

& Row Publishers, 1982, 142.

[34] Tendler, R.M., Testimony before the National Bioethics Advisory Commission, March 14,

1997.

[35] ——— , as quoted in A.R. Melnick, Cloning a difficult issue for churches, Pittsburgh

Post-Gazette, March 1, 1997, A-1.

[36] Verhey, A.D., Theology after Dolly, The Christian Century, March 19-26, 1997, 285-286.

[37] ——— , Playing God and invoking a perspective, J Med Philos 20:347-364, 1995.

[38] ——— , Cloning: Revisiting an old debate, Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal, 4(3):227-

234, 1994.

References: Section 3

Akaka, A.K., Cloning: A Native American Hawaiian Comment, Personal letter, April 5, 1997.

Anderson, J.K., Genetic Engineering, Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan Publishing House, 1982.

Antes, P., Medicine and the living tradition of Islam, in Healing and Restoring: Health and

Medicine in the World’s Religious Traditions, L.E. Sullivan (ed.), New York: Macmillan

Publishing Company, 1989, 173-202.

Athar, S. (ed.), Islamic Perspectives in Medicine, Indianapolis, IN: American Trust Publications,

1993.

Avery, C., Native American medicine: Traditional healing, JAMA, 265(17):2271, 2273, 1991.

Berg, S., Begotten, not made?, Star Tribune (Minneapolis), April 26, 1997, 7B.

Breck, J., Genetic Engineering: Setting the limits, in Health and Faith: Medical, Psychological

and Religious Dimensions, J.T. Chirban (ed.), Washington, DC: University Press of America,

1991, 51-55.
D-52

Brown, R.G., Clones, chimeras, and the image of God: Lessons from Barthian ethics, in Bioethics

and the Future of Medicine: A Christian Appraisal, J.F. Kilner, N.M.deS. Cameron, D.L.

Scheidermayer (eds.), Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1995, 238-249.

Cahill, L.S., Cloning: Religion-Based Perspectives, Testimony before the National Bioethics

Advisory Commission, March 13, 1997.

Carrese, J.A., L.A. Rhodes, Western bioethics on the Navajo reservation: Benefit or harm?, in

Bioethics: An Introduction to the History, Methods, and Practice, N.S. Jecker, A.R. Jonsen, R.A.

Pearlman (eds.), Sudbury, MA: Jones and Bartlett Publishers, 1997, 383-391.

Christian Life Commission, Southern Baptist Convention, Against Human Cloning,

March 6, 1997.

Cohen, C.B., The moral hazards of human cloning, Episcopalian Life, June 1997, 24.

Cole-Turner, R., The New Genesis: Theology and the Genetic Revolution, Louisville, KY:

Westminster/John Knox Press, 1993.

Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Instruction on Respect for Human Life in Its Origin

and on the Dignity of Procreation, 1987.

Cordova, V.F., Clones, Test Tubes, and Human Litters: A Native American Perspective, Personal

statement, March 25, 1997.

Curran, C., Moral theology and genetics, CrossCurrents, 20(Winter):64-82, 1970.

Deloria, V. Jr., God Is Red: A Native View of Religion, Golden, CO: Fulcrum Publishing, 1994.

Demopulos, D., Personal statement, March 20, 1997.

Desai, P.N., Medical ethics in India, J Med Phil, 13(3):231-256, 1988.

——— , Hinduism and bioethics in India: A tradition in transition, in Theological Developments

in Bioethics: 1988-1990, B.A. Lustig (ed.), Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic

Publishers, 1991, 41-60.

Dorff, R.E.N., Human Cloning: A Jewish Perspective, Testimony before the National Bioethics

Advisory Commission, March 14, 1997.

——— , Testimony before the National Bioethics Advisory Commission, March 13, 1997.

——— , Personal correspondence, March 5, 1997.
D-53

Duff, N.J., Clone with caution, The Washington Post, March 2, 1997, C1.

Easwaran, S.E., Brave new world, Blue Mountain: A Journal for Spiritual Living, May 1997, 11.

——— , Personal correspondence, March 16, 1997.

Ellis, R.G., as cited in L. Scanlon, Cloning technology spawns moral dilemma, words of caution,

[Louisville] Courier-Journal, April 7, 1997.

Fadlallah, M.H., as cited in Cloning should be punishable by death or amputation: Saudi cleric,

Agence France Presse, March 13, 1997.

Feinberg, J.S., P.D. Feinberg, Ethics for a Brave New World, Wheaton, IL: Crossway Books,

1993.

Flack, H.E., E.D. Pellegrino (eds.), African American Perspectives on Biomedical Ethics,

Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 1992.

For the president, Mr. Bill Clinton, Hinduism Today, April 1, 1997.

Freundel, R.B., Personal communication, March 6, 1997.

——— , Judaism, in On the New Frontiers of Genetics and Religion, J.R. Nelson (ed.), Grand

Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1994, 120-136.

Gbadegasin, S., Personal communication, March 18, 1997.

Harakas, S.S., Questions about cloning, Hellenic Chronicle, 14(April 3):4, 1997.

——— , Personal correspondence, March 18, 23, 1997.

——— , Eastern Orthodox bioethics, in Theological Developments in Bioethics: 1990-1992, B.A.

Lustig (ed.), Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1993, 117-132.

Häring, B., Ethics of Manipulation: Issues in Medicine, Behavior Control, and Genetics, New

York: The Seabury Press, 1975.

Hathout, H., Islamic concepts and bioethics, in Theological Developments in Bioethics: 1988-

1990, B.A. Lustig (ed.), Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991, 103-

118.
D-54

Hathout, H., B.A. Lustig, Bioethical developments in Islam, in Theological Developments in

Bioethics: 1990-1992, B.A. Lustig (ed.), Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic

Publishers, 1993, 133-148.

Hathout, M., Cloning: Who will set the limits?, The Minaret, 19(3):8, 1997.

Hefner, P., Cloning as quintessential human act, in Philosophy of Biology, M. Ruse (ed.),

Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 1998, 352-358.

Hultkrantz, A., Health, religion, and medicine in Native North American traditions, in Healing

and Restoring: Health and Medicine in the World’s Religious Traditions, L.E. Sullivan (ed.),

New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1989, 327-358.

Jakobovits, R.I., Some letters on Jewish medical ethics, J Med Philos, 8:217-224, 1983.

John Paul II, The ethics of genetic manipulation, in Medical Ethics: Sources of Catholic

Teaching, 2nd ed., K.D. O’Rourke, P. Boyle (eds.), Washington, DC: Georgetown University

Press, 1993, 132-133.

Jones, D.G., Brave New People: Ethical Issues at the Commencement of Life, Grand Rapids, MI:

Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1985.

Keown, D., Personal communication, April 4, 1997.

——— , Buddhism and Bioethics, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995.

King, P., Personal communication, March 18, 1997.

Lipner, J.J., The classical Hindu view on abortion and the moral status of the unborn, in Hindu

Ethics: Purity, Abortion, and Euthanasia, H.G. Coward, J.J. Lipner, K.K. Young (eds.), Albany,

NY: SUNY Press, 1989, pp. 41-70.

Lopez, D., Personal communication, Mar. 18, 1997.

McCormick, R.A., Should we clone humans?, The Christian Century, Nov. 17-24, 1993, 1148-

1149.

——— , How Brave a New World?: Dilemmas in Bioethics, Garden City, NY: Doubleday &

Company, Inc., 1981.

Meilaender, G.C., Testimony before the National Bioethics Advisory Commission, March 13,

1997.
D-55

Mitchell, C.B., as cited in Cloning of embryo stirs ethical concerns, in The Christian Century,

November 10, 1993, 1117.

Mohler, R.A., Jr., The Brave New World of Cloning: A Christian Worldview Perspective,

Unpublished manuscript, March 1997.

Moraczewski, A., Cloning and the Church, Testimony before National Bioethics Advisory

Commission, March 13, 1997.

Murphy, N., Personal communication, March 10, 1997.

Murray, R.F., Personal communication, March 18, 1997.

Nakasone, R.Y., Ethics of Enlightenment, Fremont, CA: Dharma Cloud Publishers, 1990.

——— , Personal communication, March 28, 1997.

National Conference of Catholic Bishops, Secretariat for Pro-Life Activities, Remarks in

Response to News Reports on the Cloning of Mammals, February 25, 1997.

Nolan, K., Personal communication, March 22, 1997.

——— , Buddhism, Zen, and bioethics, in Theological Developments in Bioethics: 1990-1992,

B.A. Lustig (ed.), Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1993, 185-216.

O’Connor, John Cardinal, Testimony at the New York State Senate Committee of Investigation,

Hearings on Cloning, March 13, 1997.

O’Donovan, O., Begotten or Made? Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984.

Orthodox Church in America, Statement on Recent Developments in Cloning Technology, March

11, 1997.

ibn Saleh al-Othimin, M., as cited in Cloning should be punishable by death or amputation: Saudi

cleric, Agence France Presse, March 13, 1997.

Palaniswami (ed.), Hinduism Today, Personal communication, March 21, 1997.

Paris, P.J., The Social Teaching of the Black Churches, Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1985.

Peters, T., Playing God? Genetic Determinism and Human Freedom. New York: Routledge,

1997.
D-56

——— , Personal communication, March 13, 1997.

Rahner, K., Theological Investigations, vol. 9, G. Harrison (trans), New York: The Seabury

Press, 1972, 205-252.

Robinson, K.S., Personal letter, March 21, 1997.

Rosner, F., Modern Medicine and Jewish Ethics, New York: Yeshiva University Press, 1986, pp.

173-183.

Sachedina, A., Islamic Perspectives on Cloning, Testimony before the National Bioethics

Advisory Commission, March 14, 1997.

——— , Personal correspondence, March 21, 1997.

Sakim, as cited in J. Weiss, Religions aren’t unanimous on cloning, Dallas Morning News, March

1, 1997, 1G.

Secundy, M.G., Personal letter, March 27, 1997.

Sharma, A., Personal letter, March 20, 1997.

Shinn, R.L., Personal communication, March 14, 1997.

Tendler, R.M., Testimony before the National Bioethics Advisory Commission, March 14, 1997.

——— , as cited in L. David, Cloning of sheep revives ancient cultural fears, The Columbus

Dispatch, March 16, 1997, 7B.

Tubpa, G.K., as cited in S. Dobee, Cloning poses challenge to religious leaders, Copely News

Service, February 27, 1997.

Wassil, N.F., as cited in Egypt top Muslim cleric says cloning satanic, Reuters North American

Wire, March 16, 1997.

Williams, P.N., Personal communication, April 7, 1997.

General Sources

Ames, D.A., C.B. Gracey, Good Genes? Emerging Values for Science, Religion, and Society,

Cincinnati: Forward Movement Publications, 1984.
D-57

Blake, D.A., Ethics of biotechnology: Medical biotechnology for the nineties, The Catholic

World, Sept./Oct. 1991, pp. 234-237.

Bouma, H. III, et al., Christian Faith, Health, and Medical Practice, Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B.

Eerdmans Publishing, 1989.

Brody, B., Current religious perspectives on the new reproductive techniques, in Beyond Baby M:

Ethical Issues in New Reproductive Technologies, D.M. Bartels, et al. (eds.), Clifton, NJ: Human

Press, 1990, 45-64.

Carney, T.P., Instant Evolution, Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1980.

Carrese, J.A., L.A. Rhodes, Western bioethics on the Navajo reservation: Benefit or harm?

JAMA, 274(10):826-829, 1995.

Church of the Nazarene, Current moral and social issues: Genetic engineering and gene therapy,

Manual 1993-1997, Kansas City, MO: Nazarene Publishing House, 1993.

Cole-Turner, R., The New Genesis: Theology and the Genetic Revolution, Louisville, KY:

Westminster/John Knox Press, 1993.

——— , Religion and the human genome, Journal of Religion and Health, 31(2 Summer):161-

173, 1992.

——— , Is genetic engineering co-creation?, Theology Today, 44:338-349, 1987.

——— , Genes, Religion and Society: The Developing Views of the Churches, Unpublished

manuscript.

Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Instruction on Respect for Human Life in Its Origin

and on the Dignity of Procreation, 1987.

Coughlan, M.J., The Vatican, the Law, and the Human Embryo, Iowa City: University of Iowa

Press, 1990.

Cranor, C.F. (ed.), Are Genes Us? The Social Consequences of the New Genetics, New

Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1994.

Duster, T., Backdoor to Eugenics, New York: Routledge, 1990.

Dyson, A., J. Harris (eds.), Ethics and Biotechnology, New York: Routledge, 1994.

Eberhard, K.E., Genetics and human survival, Linacre Quarterly, 40(3, August):167-181, 1973.
D-58

Ebon, M., Bring on the clones, Human Behavior, 8(February), 38-41, 1979.

Einstein, A., Strange is our situation here upon Earth, in The World Treasury of Modern

Religious Thought, J. Pelikan (ed.), Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1990, 202-205.

Eisenberg, L., The outcome as cause: Predestination and human cloning, J Med Philos, 1(4):318-

331, 1976.

Ellison, C.W., Modifying Man: Implications and Ethics, Washington, DC: University Press of

America, 1978.

Esbjornson, R. (ed.), The Manipulation of Life, San Francisco: Harper & Row Publishers, 1984.

Flack, H.E., E.D. Pellegrino, African-American Perspective on Biomedical Ethics, Washington,

DC: Georgetown University Press, 1992.

Fletcher, J., Humanhood: Essays in Biomedical Ethics, Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books, 1979.

——— , The Ethics of Genetic Control, Garden City, NY: Anchor Press, 1974.

——— , New beginnings in human life: A theologian’s response, in The New Genetics and the

Future of Man, M. Hamilton (ed.), Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company,

1972, 78-89.

——— , Ethical aspects of genetic controls, N Eng J Med, 285(14):776-783, 1971.

Freundel, R.B., Judaism, in J.R. Nelson, On the New Frontiers of Genetics and Religion, Grand

Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1994, 120-136.

General Conference of Seventh-day Adventists, Health Department, Christian Principles of

Genetic Interventions, Silver Spring, MD, June 13, 1995.

——— , Genetic engineering and the study of its implications, Journal of the General Convention

of the Episcopal Church 1985, New York: General Convention, 1986, 179.

Guidelines in the area of genetic engineering, Journal of the General Convention of the Episcopal

Church 1991, New York: General Convention, 1992.

Gustafson, J.M., Where theologians and geneticists meet, dialog, 33(1):7-16, 1994.

——— , Genetic therapy: Ethical and religious reflections, J Contemp Health Law Policy,

8(Spring):183-206, 1992.
D-59

——— , Basic ethical issues in the biomedical fields, Soundings, 53:151-180, 1990.

Hamilton, M., New life for old: Genetic decisions, The Christian Century, 86:741-744, 1969.

——— (ed.), The New Genetics and the Future of Man, Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans

Publishing, 1972.

Häring, B., Medical Ethics, Notre Dame, IN: Fides Publishers, 1973.

Hathout, M., Cloning: Who will set the limits, The Minaret, 19(3):8, 1997.

Hefner, P., Cloning as quintessential human act, Insights, June 1997.

Heyd, D., Genethics: Moral Issues in the Creation of People, Berkeley, CA: University of

California Press, 1992.

Hirschorn, K., On re-doing man, Commonwealth, 88(May 17):257-261, 1968.

Hughes, J.J., D. Keown, Buddhism and medical ethics: A bibliographic introduction, Journal of

Buddhist Ethics, 2:105-124, 1995.

Human cloning and Catholic teaching, The Medical-Moral Newsletter, 31(1):1-2, 1994.

Hyde, M.E., L.E. Hyde, Cloning and the New Genetics, Hillside, NJ: Enslow Publishers, Inc.,

1984.

Jacob, W. (ed.), American Reformed Response, New York: Center Conference of American

Rabbis, 1983.

Jakobovits, R.I., Jewish Medical Ethics, New York: Bloch Publishing Co., 1975.

Jones, D.G., Brave New People: Ethical Issues at the Commencement of Life, Grand Rapids, MI:

Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1985.

Kahn, C., Can we achieve immortality?: The ethics of cloning and other life-extension

technologies, Free Inquiry, Spring 1989, 14-18.

Kilner, J.F., N.M.deS. Cameron, D.L. Scheidermeyer (eds.), Bioethics and the Future: A

Christian Appraisal, Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1995.

Kuhn, H.B., Prospect of carbon-copy humans, Christianity Today, 15:639-642, 1971.
D-60

Lammers, S., A. Verhey (eds.), On Moral Medicine: Theological Perspectives in Medical Ethics,

Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1987.

Land, R.D., L.A. Moore (eds.), Life at Risk: The Crises in Medical Ethics, Nashville, TN:

Broadman & Holman Publishers, 1995.

Langone, J., Human Engineering: Marvel or Menace?, Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1978.

Lauritzen, P., Pursuing Parenthood: Ethical Issues in Assisted Reproduction, Bloomington, IN:

Indiana University Press, 1993.

LeBar, M., The pros and cons of human cloning, Thought, 59(234):319-333, 1984.

Lewis, C.S., The Abolition of Man, New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1973, 70, 71.

Linzey, A., Animal Theology, Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1994.

——— , Human and animal slavery, in The Bio-Revolution: Cornucopia or Pandora’s Box, P.

Wheale, R. McNally (eds.), Winchester, MA: Pluto Press, 1990, 175-188.

Lipkin, M. Jr., P.J. Rowley (eds.), Genetic Responsibility: On Choosing Our Children’s Genes,

New York: Plenum Press, 1974.

Lustig, B.A. (ed.), Theological Developments in Bioethics, 1990-1992, vol. 3, Dordrecht, The

Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1993.

——— , Theological Developments in Bioethics, 1988-1990, vol. 1, Dordrecht, The Netherlands:

Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991.

Lynn, B., Genetic Manipulation, New York: Office for Church in Society, United Church of

Christ, 1977.

Mackenzie, D., A new crusade for science?: Morality in science, New Scientist,

13(November):49, 1993.

Mangum, J.M., The New Faith-Science Debate, Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1989.

McCormick, R.A., Blastomere separation: Some concerns, Hastings Center Report, 24(2):14-16,

1994.

——— , Should we clone humans?, The Christian Century, November 17-24, 1993, 1148-1149.

——— , Health and Medicine in the Catholic Tradition, New York: Crossroad Publishing, 1984.
D-61

——— , How Brave a New World? Dilemmas in Bioethics, Garden City, NY: Doubleday &

Company, Inc., 1981.

——— , Reproductive technology: Ethical issues, in Encyclopedia of Bioethics, W.T. Reich (ed.),

New York: Free Press, 1978, 1454-1464.

Meier, R.L., Jewish Values in Bioethics, New York: Human Sciences Press, 1986.

Melton, J.G. (ed.), Encyclopedia of American Religions, 4th ed., Detroit: Gale Research, 1993.

Meyer, J.R., Cloning human embryos: Why artificial human procreation is immoral, Linacre

Quarterly, 62(2):22-29, 1995.

Mitchell, C.B., Genetic engineering: Bane or blessing?, Nashville, TN: Christian Life Commission

of the Southern Baptist Convention, 1994.

——— , Was Jesus an embryo?: The ethics of human embryo research and the Brave New World,

Nashville, TN: Christian Life Commission of the Southern Baptist Convention, 1994.

National Council of Churches in Christ, Genetic Science for Human Benefit, New York: National

Council of Churches, 1986.

——— , Genetic Engineering: Social and Ethical Consequences, New York: National Council of

Churches, 1983.

——— , Human Life and the New Genetics, New York: National Council of Churches, 1980.

Nelson, J.R., The role of religions in the analysis of the ethical issues of gene therapy, Human

Gene Therapy, 1:43-48, 1990.

——— , Human Life: A Biblical Perspective for Bioethics, Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1984.

——— , Genetic science: A menacing marvel, The Christian Century, July 6-13, 1983, pp. 636-

638.

——— , Science and Our Troubled Conscience, Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1980.

——— , (ed.), On the New Frontiers of Genetics and Religion, Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B.

Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1994.

Niebuhr, G., Suddenly, religious ethicists face a quandary on cloning, New York Times, March 1,

1997, 1, 10.
D-62

O’Donovan, O., Begotten or Made?, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984.

Peters, T., Playing God? Genetic Discrimination and Human Freedom, New York:Routledge,

1997.

——— , ‘Playing God’ and germline intervention, J Med Philos, 20:365-386, 1995.

Peters, T.F., R.J. Russell, The Human Genome Project: What questions does it raise for theology

and ethics? Midwest Medical Ethics, 8(1 Summer):12-17, 1992.

Playing God, Hinduism Today, June 1997, 22-25.

Rahman, F., Health and Medicine in the Islamic Tradition: Change and Identity, New York:

Crossroad Publishing, 1989.

Rahner, K., Theological Investigations, vol. 9, G. Harrison (trans.), New York: Crossroad, 1972.

Ramsey, P., Fabricated Man: The Ethics of Genetic Control, New Haven, CT: Yale University

Press, 1970.

——— , Moral and religious implications of genetic control, in Genetics and the Future of Man,

J.D. Roslansky (ed.), New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1966, 107-169.

Ratanakul, P., Bioethics in Thailand: The struggle for Buddhist solutions, J Med Philos,

13(3):301-312, 1988.

Reformed Church in America, Genetic engineering, in Minutes of General Synod, New York:

Office of Social Witness and Worship, 1988, 61-74.

Reiss, M.J., R. Straughan, Improving Nature?: The Science and Ethics of Genetic Engineering,

Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996.

Roberts, M.A., Human cloning: A case of no harm done?, J Med Philos, 21(October):537-554,

1996.

Rorvik, D., In His Image: The Cloning of a Man, Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott Company, 1978.

Roslansky, J.D. (ed.), Genetics and the Future of Man, New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts,

1966.

Rosner, F., J.D. Bleich (eds.), Jewish Bioethics, New York: Sanhedrin Press, 1979.
D-63

Shannon, T.A., Testimony before Senate Hearing on Human Cloning, Commonwealth of

Massachusetts, March 10, 1997.

——— , Made in Whose Image?: Genetic Engineering and Christian Ethics, Atlantic Highlands,

NJ: Humanities Press, 1997.

——— , Cloning, uniqueness, and individuality, Louvain Studies, 19:283-306, 1994.

Shinn, R.L., The New Genetics: Challenges for Science, Faith, and Politics, Wakefield, RI:

Moyer Bell, 1996.

——— , Forced Options: Social Decisions for the 21st Century, San Francisco: Harper & Row

Publishers, 1982, 142.

——— , Perilous progress in genetics, Social Research, 40(1):83-103, 1974.

Shinn, R.L., P. Albrecht (eds.), Faith and Science in an Unjust World, Philadelphia: Fortress

Press, 1980.

Simmons, P.D., Birth and Death: Bioethical Decision-making, Philadelphia: The Westminster

Press, 1983.

Steinfels, P., Beliefs, New York Times, March 8, 1997, 15.

Stinson, C., Theology and the Baron Frankenstein: Cloning and beyond, The Christian Century,

January 19, 1972, 60-63.

Studdard, A., The lone clone, Man and Medicine, 3(2):109-117, 1978.

United Church of Christ, General Synod 17, A Pronouncement on the Church and Genetic

Engineering, Cleveland: United Church of Christ, 1989.

United Methodist Church, New developments in genetic science, The Book of Resolutions of the

United Methodist Church, Nashville, TN: United Methodist Publishing House, 1992, 325-340.

Vaux, K. (ed.), Who Shall Live?: Medicine, Technology, Ethics, Philadelphia: Fortress Press,

1970.

Verhey, A.D., Cloning: Revisiting an old debate, Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal, 4(3):227-

234, 1994.

Weir, R.F. (ed.), Genes and Human Self-Knowledge, Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 1994.
D-64

Wheale, P., R. McNally, Genetic Engineering: Catastrophe or Utopia?, New York: St. Martin’s

Press, 1988.

Williams, P.N. (ed.), Ethical Issues in Biology and Medicine, Cambridge, MA: Schenkman

Publishing Company, 1973.

Woodward, K.L., Today the sheep..., Newsweek, March 10, 1997, 60.

World Council of Churches, Biotechnology: Challenge to the Churches, Geneva: World Council

of Churches, 1989.

——— , Manipulating Life: Ethical Issues in Genetic Engineering, Geneva, World Council of

Churches, 1982.
CLONING HUMAN BEINGS

An Assessment of the Ethical Issues Pro and Con

Commissioned Paper

by Dan W. Brock, Ph.D.

Brown University

E-1

CONTENTS

Introduction E-3

Moral Arguments in Support of Human Cloning E-4

A. Is There a Moral Right to Use Human Cloning? E-4

B. What Individual or Social Benefits Might Human Cloning Produce? E-7

Moral Arguments Against Human Cloning E-11

A. Would the Use of Human Cloning Violate Important Moral Rights? E-11

B. What Individual or Social Harms Might Human Cloning Produce? E-14

Conclusion E-20

References E-21

E-3

INTRODUCTION

The world of science and the public at large were both shocked and fascinated by the

announcement in the journal Nature by Ian Wilmut and his colleagues that they had successfully

cloned a sheep from a single cell of an adult sheep (Wilmut 1997). Scientists were in part

surprised, because many had believed that after the very early stage of embryo development at

which differentiation of cell function begins to take place, it would not be possible to achieve

cloning of an adult mammal by nuclear transfer. In this process, the nucleus from the cell of an

adult mammal is inserted into an ennucleated ovum, and the resulting embryo develops following

the complete genetic code of the mammal from which the inserted nucleus was obtained. But

some scientists and much of the public were troubled or apparently even horrified at the prospect

that if adult mammals such as sheep could be cloned, then cloning of adult humans by the same

process would likely be possible as well. Of course, the process is far from perfected even with

sheep— it took 276 failures by Wilmut and his colleagues to produce Dolly, their one success.

Whether the process can be successfully replicated in other mammals, much less in humans, is not

now known. But those who were horrified at the prospect of human cloning were not assuaged by

the fact that the science with humans is not yet there, for it looked to them now perilously close.

The response of most scientific and political leaders to the prospect of human cloning,

indeed of Dr. Wilmut as well, was of immediate and strong condemnation. In the United States,

President Clinton immediately banned federal financing of human cloning research and asked

privately funded scientists to halt such work until the newly formed National Bioethics Advisory

Commission could review the “troubling” ethical and legal implications. The Director-General of

the World Health Organization (WHO) characterized human cloning as “ethically unacceptable as

it would violate some of the basic principles which govern medically assisted reproduction. These

include respect for the dignity of the human being and the protection of the security of human

genetic material” (WHO 1997). Around the world similar immediate condemnation was heard, as

human cloning was called a violation of human rights and human dignity. Even before Wilmut’s

announcement, human cloning had been made illegal in nearly all countries in Europe and had

been condemned by the Council of Europe (Council of Europe 1986).

A few more cautious voices were heard, both suggesting some possible benefits from the

use of human cloning in limited circumstances and questioning its too quick prohibition, but they

were a clear minority. In the popular media, nightmare scenarios of laboratory mistakes resulting

in monsters, the cloning of armies of Hitlers, the exploitative use of cloning for totalitarian ends as

in Huxley’s Brave New World, and the murderous replicas of the film Blade Runner, all fed the

public controversy and uneasiness. A striking feature of these early responses was that their

strength and intensity seemed to far outrun the arguments and reasons offered in support of

them— they seemed often to be “gut level” emotional reactions rather than considered reflections

on the issues. Such reactions should not be simply dismissed, both because they may point us to

important considerations otherwise missed and not easily articulated, and because they often have

a major impact on public policy. But the formation of public policy should not ignore the moral

reasons and arguments that bear on the practice of human cloning— these must be articulated in
E-4

order to understand and inform people’s more immediate emotional responses. This paper is an

effort to articulate, and to evaluate critically, the main moral considerations and arguments for and

against human cloning. Though many people’s religious beliefs inform their views on human

cloning, and it is often difficult to separate religious from secular positions, I shall restrict myself

to arguments and reasons that can be given a clear secular formulation and will ignore explicitly

religious positions and arguments pro or con. I shall also be concerned principally with cloning by

nuclear transfer, which permits cloning of an adult, not cloning by embryo splitting, although

some of the issues apply to both (Cohen and Tomkin 1994).

I begin by noting that on each side of the issue there are two distinct kinds of moral

arguments brought forward. On the one hand, some opponents claim that human cloning would

violate fundamental moral or human rights, while some proponents argue that its prohibition

would violate such rights. On the other hand, both opponents and proponents also cite the likely

harms and benefits, both to individuals and to society, of the practice. While moral and even

human rights need not be understood as absolute, that is, as morally requiring people to respect

them no matter how great the costs or bad consequences of doing so, they do place moral

restrictions on permissible actions that appeal to a mere balance of benefits over harms. For

example, the rights of human subjects in research must be respected even if the result is that some

potentially beneficial research is made more difficult or cannot be done, and the right of free

expression prohibits the silencing of unpopular or even abhorrent views; in Ronald Dworkin’s

striking formulation, rights trump utility (Dworkin 1978). I shall take up both the moral rights

implicated in human cloning, as well as its more likely significant benefits and harms, because

none of the rights as applied to human cloning is sufficiently uncontroversial and strong to settle

decisively the morality of the practice one way or the other. But because of their strong moral

force, the assessment of the moral rights putatively at stake is especially important. A further

complexity here is that it is sometimes controversial whether a particular consideration is merely a

matter of benefits and harms, or is instead a matter of moral or human rights. I shall begin with

the arguments in support of permitting human cloning, although with no implication that it is the

stronger or weaker position.

Moral Arguments in Support of Human Cloning

A. Is There a Moral Right to Use Human Cloning?

What moral right might protect at least some access to the use of human cloning? Some

commentators have argued that a commitment to individual liberty, as defended by J. S. Mill,

requires that individuals be left free to use human cloning if they so choose and if their doing so

does not cause significant harms to others, but liberty is too broad in scope to be an

uncontroversial moral right (Mill 1859; Rhodes 1995). Human cloning is a means of reproduction

(in the most literal sense), and so the most plausible moral right at stake in its use is a right to

reproductive freedom or procreative liberty (Robertson 1994a; Brock 1994). Reproductive

freedom includes not only the familiar right to choose not to reproduce, for example by means of

contraception or abortion, but also the right to reproduce. The right to reproductive freedom is
E-5

properly understood to include as well the use of various artificial reproductive technologies, such

as in vitro fertilization (IVF), oocyte donation, and so forth. The reproductive right relevant to

human cloning is a negative right, that is, a right to use assisted reproductive technologies without

interference by the government or others when made available by a willing provider. The choice

of an assisted means of reproduction, such as surrogacy, can be defended as included within

reproductive freedom, even when it is not the only means for individuals to reproduce, just as the

choice among different means of preventing conception is protected by reproductive freedom.

However, the case for permitting the use of a particular means of reproduction is strongest when

that means is necessary for particular individuals to be able to procreate at all. Sometimes human

cloning could be the only means for individuals to procreate while retaining a biological tie to the

child created, but in other cases different means of procreating would also be possible.

It could be argued that human cloning is not covered by the right to reproductive freedom,

because whereas current assisted reproductive technologies and practices covered by that right

are remedies for inabilities to reproduce sexually, human cloning is an entirely new means of

reproduction; indeed, its critics see it as more a means of manufacturing humans than of

reproduction. Human cloning is a different means of reproduction than sexual reproduction, but it

is a means that can serve individuals’ interest in reproducing. If it is not covered by the moral right

to reproductive freedom, I believe that must be not because it is a new means of reproducing, but

instead because it has other objectionable moral features, such as eroding human dignity or

uniqueness. We shall evaluate these other ethical objections to it below.

When individuals have alternative means of procreating, human cloning typically would be

chosen because it replicates a particular individual’s genome. The reproductive interest in

question then is not simply reproduction itself, but a more specific interest in choosing what kind

of children to have. The right to reproductive freedom is usually understood to cover at least

some choice about the kind of children one will have; for example, genetic testing of an embryo or

fetus for genetic disease or abnormality, together with abortion of an affected embryo or fetus, are

now used to avoid having a child with that disease or abnormality. Genetic testing of prospective

parents before conception to determine the risk of transmitting a genetic disease is also intended

to avoid having children with particular diseases. Prospective parents’ moral interest in

self-determination, which is one of the grounds of a moral right to reproductive freedom, includes

the choice about whether to have a child with a condition that is likely to place severe burdens on

them and cause severe burdens to the child itself.

The more a reproductive choice is not simply the determination of oneself and one’s own

life but the determination of the nature of another, as in the case of human cloning, the more

moral weight the interests of that other person, that is, the cloned child, should have in decisions

that determine its nature (Annas 1994). But even then parents are typically taken properly to have

substantial, but not unlimited, discretion in shaping the persons their children will become, for

example, through education and other childrearing decisions. Even if not part of reproductive

freedom, the right to raise one’s children as one sees fit, within limits mostly determined by the

interests of the children, is also a right to determine within limits what kinds of persons one’s
E-6

children will become. This right includes not just preventing certain diseases or harms to children,

but selecting and shaping desirable features and traits in one’s children. The use of human cloning

is one way to exercise that right.

It’s worth pointing out that current public and legal policy permits prospective parents to

conceive, or to carry a conception to term, when there is a significant risk, or even certainty, that

the child will suffer from a serious genetic disease. Even when others think the risk or presence of

genetic disease makes it morally wrong to conceive, or to carry a fetus to term, the parents’ right

to reproductive freedom permits them to do so. Most possible harms to a cloned child that I shall

consider below are less serious than the genetic harms with which parents can now permit their

offspring to be conceived or born.

I conclude that there is good reason to accept that a right to reproductive freedom

presumptively includes both a right to select the means of reproduction, as well as a right to

determine what kind of children to have, by use of human cloning. However, the particular

reproductive interest of determining what kind of children to have is less weighty than other

reproductive interests and choices whose impact falls more directly and exclusively on the parents

rather than the child. Accepting a moral right to reproductive freedom that includes the use of

human cloning does not settle the moral issue about human cloning, however, since there may be

other moral rights in conflict with this right, or serious enough harms from human cloning to

override the right to use it; this right can be thought of as establishing a serious moral

presumption supporting access to human cloning.

There is a different moral right which might be thought to be at stake in the dispute about

human cloning— the right to freedom of scientific inquiry and research in the acquisition of

knowledge. If there is such a right, it would presumably be violated by a legal prohibition of

research on human cloning, although the government could still permissibly decide not to spend

public funds to support such research. Leaving aside for the moment human subject ethical

concerns, research on human cloning might provide valuable scientific medical knowledge beyond

simply knowledge about how to carry out human cloning. Whether or not there is a moral right to

freedom of scientific inquiry— for example, as part of a right to free expression— prohibiting and

stopping scientific research and inquiry is a serious matter and precedent which should only be

undertaken when necessary to prevent grave violations of human rights or to protect fundamental

interests. But even for opponents of human cloning, the fundamental moral issue is not acquiring

the knowledge that would make it possible, but using that knowledge to do human cloning. Since

it is possible to prohibit human cloning itself, without prohibiting all research on it, it is not

necessary to limit the freedom of scientific inquiry in order to prevent human cloning from taking

place. But this means as well that a right to freedom of scientific inquiry could only protect

research on human cloning, not its use. For this reason, I believe the fundamental moral right

which provides presumptive moral support for permitting the use of human cloning is the right to

reproductive freedom, not the right to freedom of scientific inquiry. My discussion in what

follows will principally concern the moral issues in the use of human cloning, not those restricted

to research on it.
E-7

B. What Individual or Social Benefits Might Human Cloning Produce?

Largely Individual Benefits

The literature on human cloning by nuclear transfer, as well as the literature on embryo splitting

where it is relevant to the nuclear transfer case, contains a few examples of circumstances in

which individuals might have good reasons to want to use human cloning. However, a survey of

that literature strongly suggests that human cloning is not the unique answer to any great or

pressing human need and that its benefits would at most be limited. What are the principal benefits

of human cloning that might give persons good reasons to want to use it?

1. Human cloning would be a new means to relieve the infertility some persons now

experience. Human cloning would allow women who have no ova or men who have no sperm to

produce an offspring that is biologically related to them (Eisenberg 1976; Robertson 1994b and

1997; LaBar 1984). Embryos might also be cloned, either by nuclear transfer or embryo splitting,

in order to increase the number of embryos for implantation and improve the chances of

successful conception (NABER 1994). While the moral right to reproductive freedom creates a

presumption that individuals should be free to choose the means of reproduction that best serves

their interests and desires, the benefits from human cloning to relieve infertility are greater the

more persons there are who cannot overcome their infertility by any other means acceptable to

them. I do not know of data on this point, but they should be possible to obtain or gather from

national associations concerned with infertility.

It is not enough to point to the large number of children throughout the world possibly

available for adoption as a solution to infertility, unless we are prepared to discount as illegitimate

the strong desire many persons, fertile and infertile, have for the experience of pregnancy and for

having and raising a child biologically related to them. While not important to all infertile (or

fertile) individuals, it is important to many and is respected and met through other forms of

assisted reproduction that maintain a biological connection when that is possible; there seems no

good reason to refuse to respect and respond to it when human cloning would be the best or only

means of overcoming an individual’s infertility.

2. Human cloning would enable couples in which one party risks transmitting a serious

hereditary disease, a serious risk of disease, or an otherwise harmful condition to an

offspring, to reproduce without doing so (Robertson 1994b). Of course, by using donor sperm

or egg donation, such hereditary risks can generally be avoided now without the use of human

cloning. These procedures may be unacceptable to some couples, however, or at least considered

less desirable than human cloning, because they introduce a third party’s genes into reproduction,

instead of giving the couple’s offspring only the genes of one of them. Thus, in some cases human

cloning would be a means of preventing genetically transmitted harms to offspring. Here, too,

there are not data on the likely number of persons who would wish to use human cloning for this

purpose instead of either using other available means of avoiding the risk of genetic transmission

of the harmful condition or accepting the risk of transmitting the harmful condition.
E-8

3. Human cloning a later twin would enable a person to obtain needed organs or tissues for

transplantation (Robertson 1994b, 1997; Kahn 1989; Harris 1992). Human cloning would solve

the problem of finding a transplant donor who is an acceptable organ or tissue match and would

eliminate, or drastically reduce, the risk of transplant rejection by the host. The availability of

human cloning for this purpose would amount to a form of insurance policy to enable treatment of

certain kinds of medical needs. Of course, sometimes the medical need would be too urgent to

permit waiting for the cloning, gestation, and development of the later twin necessary before

tissues or organs for transplant could be obtained. In other cases, the need for an organ, such as a

heart or a liver, that the later twin would need to maintain life would preclude cloning and then

taking the organ from an even later twin.

Such a practice has been criticized on the ground that it treats the later twin not as a

person valued and loved for his or her own sake, as an end in itself in Kantian terms, but simply as

a means for benefiting another. This criticism assumes, however, that only this one motive would

determine the relation of the person to his or her later twin. The well-known case some years ago

in California of the Ayala family, who conceived in the hopes of obtaining a source for a bone

marrow transplant for their teenage daughter suffering from leukemia, illustrates the mistake in

this assumption. They argued that whether or not the child they conceived turned out to be a

possible donor for their daughter, they would value and love the child for itself, and treat it as

they would treat any other member of their family. That one reason it was wanted was as a means

to saving their daughter’s life did not preclude its also being loved and valued for its own sake; in

Kantian terms, it was treated as a possible means to saving their daughter, but not solely as a

means, which is what the Kantian view proscribes.

Indeed, when people have children, whether by sexual means or with the aid of assisted

reproductive technologies, their motives and reasons for doing so are typically many and complex,

and include reasons less laudable than obtaining life-saving medical treatment, such as having a

companion like a doll to play with, enabling one to live on one’s own, qualifying for public or

government benefit programs, and so forth. While these other motives for having children

sometimes may not bode well for the child’s upbringing and future, public policy does not assess

prospective parents’ motives and reasons for procreating as a condition of their doing so.

One commentator has proposed human cloning for obtaining even life-saving organs

(Kahn 1989). After cell differentiation, some of the brain cells of the embryo or fetus would be

removed so that it could then be grown as a brain-dead body for spare parts for its earlier twin.

This body clone would be like an anencephalic newborn or presentient fetus, neither of whom

arguably can be harmed, because of their lack of capacity for consciousness. Most people would

likely find this practice appalling and immoral, in part because here the cloned later twin’s

capacity for conscious life is destroyed solely as a means for the benefit of another. Yet if one

pushes what is already science fiction quite a bit further in the direction of science fantasy, and

imagines the ability to clone and grow in an artificial environment only the particular life-saving

organ a person needed for transplantation, then it is far from clear that it would be morally

impermissible to do so.
E-9

4. Human cloning would enable individuals to clone someone who had special meaning to

them, such as a child who had died (Robertson 1994b). There is no denying that if human

cloning were available, some individuals would want to use it in order to clone someone who had

special meaning to them, such as a child who had died, but that desire usually would be based on a

deep confusion. Cloning such a child would not replace the child the parents had loved and lost,

but rather would create a new and different child with the same genes. The child they loved and

lost was a unique individual who had been shaped by his or her environment and choices, not just

his or her genes, and more important, who had experienced a particular relationship with them.

Even if the later cloned child could have not only the same genes but also be subjected to the

same environment, which of course is in fact impossible, it would remain a different child than the

one they had loved and lost, because it would share a different history with them (Thomas 1974).

Cloning the lost child might help the parents accept and move on from their loss, but another

already existing sibling or another new child who was not a clone might do this equally well;

indeed, it might do so better, since the appearance of the cloned later twin would be a constant

reminder of the child they had lost. Nevertheless, if human cloning enabled some individuals to

clone a person who had special meaning to them and doing so gave them deep satisfaction, that

would be a benefit to them even if their reasons for wanting to do so, and the satisfaction they in

turn received, were based on confusion.

Largely Social Benefits

5. Human cloning would enable the duplication of individuals of great talent, genius,

character, or other exemplary qualities. The first four reasons for human cloning considered

above looked to benefits to specific individuals, usually parents, from being able to reproduce by

means of human cloning. This fifth reason looks to benefits to the broader society from being able

to replicate extraordinary individuals— a Mozart, Einstein, Gandhi, or Schweitzer (Lederburg

1966; McKinnell 1979). Much of the appeal of this reason, like much thinking both in support of

and in opposition to human cloning, rests on a confused and mistaken assumption of genetic

determinism, that is, that one’s genes fully determine what one will become, do, and accomplish.

What made Mozart, Einstein, Gandhi, and Schweitzer the extraordinary individuals they were was

the confluence of their particular genetic endowments with the environments in which they were

raised and lived and the particular historical moments they in different ways seized. Cloning them

would produce individuals with the same genetic inheritances (nuclear transfer does not even

produce 100% genetic identity, although for the sake of exploring the moral issues, I have

followed the common assumption that it does). But neither by cloning, nor by any other means,

would it be possible to replicate their environments or the historical contexts in which they lived

and their greatness flourished. We do not know, either in general or with any particular individual,

the degree or specific respects in which their greatness depended on their “nature” or their

“nurture,” but we do know in all cases that it depended on an interaction of them both. Thus,

human cloning could never replicate the extraordinary accomplishments for which we admire

individuals like Mozart, Einstein, Gandhi, and Schweitzer.
E-10

If we make a rough distinction between the extraordinary capabilities of a Mozart or an

Einstein and how they used those capabilities in the particular environments and historical settings

in which they lived, it would also be a mistake to assume that human cloning could at least

replicate their extraordinary capabilities, if not the accomplishments they achieved with them.

Their capabilities, too, were the product of their inherited genes and their environments, not of

their genes alone, and so it would be a mistake to think that cloning them would produce

individuals with the same capabilities, even if they would exercise those capabilities at different

times and in different ways. In the case of Gandhi and Schweitzer, whose extraordinary greatness

lies more in their moral character and commitments, we understand even less well the extent to

which their moral character and greatness was produced by their genes.

None of this is to deny that Mozart’s and Einstein’s extraordinary musical and intellectual

capabilities, nor even Gandhi’s and Schweitzer’s extraordinary moral greatness, were produced in

part by their unique genetic inheritances. Cloning them might well produce individuals with

exceptional capacities, but we simply do not know how close their clones would be in capacities

or accomplishments to the great individuals from whom they were cloned. Even so, the hope for

exceptional, even if less and different, accomplishment from cloning such extraordinary

individuals might be a reasonable ground for doing so.

I have used examples above of individuals whose greatness is widely appreciated and

largely uncontroversial, but if we move away from such cases, we encounter the problem of

whose standards of greatness would be used to select individuals to be cloned for the benefit of

society or humankind at large. This problem inevitably connects with the important issue of who

would control access to and use of the technology of human cloning, since those who control its

use would be in a position to impose their standards of exceptional individuals to be cloned. This

issue is especially worrisome if particular groups or segments of society, or if government,

controlled the technology, for we would then risk its use for the benefit of those groups, segments

of society, or governments under the cover of benefiting society or even humankind at large.

6. Human cloning and research on human cloning might make possible important advances

in scientific knowledge, for example about human development (Walters 1982; Smith 1983).

While important potential advances in scientific or medical knowledge from human cloning or

human cloning research have frequently been cited in some media responses to Dolly’s cloning,

there are at least three reasons why these possible benefits are highly uncertain. First, there is

always considerable uncertainty about the nature and importance of the new scientific or medical

knowledge to which a dramatic new technology like human cloning will lead; the road to that new

knowledge is never mapped in advance and takes many unexpected turns. Second, we also do not

know what new knowledge from human cloning or human cloning research could also be gained

by other methods and research that do not have the problematic moral features of human cloning

to which its opponents object. Third, what human cloning research would be compatible with

ethical and legal requirements for the use of human subjects in research is complex, controversial,

and largely unexplored. For example, in what contexts and from whom would it be necessary, and

how would it be possible, to secure the informed consent of parties involved in human cloning?
E-11

No human cloning should ever take place without the consent of the cloned and the woman

receiving a cloned embryo, if they are different. But we could never obtain the consent of the later

twin to being cloned, so research on human cloning that produces a cloned individual might be

barred by ethical and legal regulations for the use of human subjects in research (Ramsey 1970).

Moreover, creating human clones solely for the purpose of research would be to use them solely

for the benefit of others without the clones’ consent, and therefore unethical. Of course, once

human cloning was established to be safe and effective, then new scientific knowledge might be

obtained from its use for legitimate, non-research reasons. How human subjects regulations would

apply to research on human cloning needs much more exploration than I can give it here in order

to help clarify how significant and likely the potential gains are in scientific and medical

knowledge from human cloning research and human cloning.

Although there is considerable uncertainty concerning most of the possible individual and

social benefits of human cloning that I have discussed above, and although no doubt it may have

other benefits or uses that we cannot yet envisage, I believe it is reasonable to conclude that

human cloning at this time does not seem to promise great benefits or uniquely to meet great

human needs. Nevertheless, a case can be made that scientific freedom supports permitting

research on human cloning to go forward and that freedom to use human cloning is protected by

the important moral right to reproductive freedom. We must therefore assess what moral rights

might be violated, or harms produced, by research on or use of human cloning.

Moral Arguments Against Human Cloning

A. Would the Use of Human Cloning Violate Important Moral Rights?

Many of the immediate condemnations of any possible human cloning following Wilmut’s cloning

of an adult sheep claimed that it would violate moral or human rights, but it was usually not

specified precisely, or often even at all, what the rights were that would be violated. I shall

consider two possible candidates for such a right: a right to have a unique identity and a right to

ignorance about one’s future or to an “open future.” The former right is cited by many

commentators, but I believe even if any such a right exists, it is not violated by human cloning.

The latter right has only been explicitly defended to my knowledge by two commentators, and in

the context of human cloning, only by Hans Jonas; it supports a more promising, even if in my

view ultimately unsuccessful, argument that human cloning would violate an important moral or

human right.

Is there a moral or human right to a unique identity, and if so, would it be violated by

human cloning? For human cloning to violate a right to a unique identity, the relevant sense of

identity would have to be genetic identity, that, is a right to a unique unrepeated genome. This

would be violated by human cloning, but is there any such right? It might be thought there could

not be such a right, because it would be violated in all cases of identical twins, yet no one claims

in such cases that the moral or human rights of each of the twins have been violated. Even the use

of fertility drugs, which increases the probability of having twins, is not intended to produce
E-12

twins. However, this consideration is not conclusive (Kass 1985; NABER 1994). It is commonly

held that only deliberate human actions can violate others’ rights, but outcomes that would

constitute a rights violation if those outcomes if done by human action are not a rights violation if

those outcomes result from natural causes. For example, if Arthur deliberately strikes Barry on

the head so hard as to cause his death, Arthur violates Barry’s right not to be killed. But if

lightening strikes Cheryl, causing her death, then we would not say that her right not to be killed

has been violated. The case of twins does not show there could not be a right to a unique genetic

identity.

What is the sense of identity that might plausibly be each person has a right to have

uniquely, which constitutes the special uniqueness of each individual (Macklin 1994; Chadwick

1982)? Even with the same genes, two individuals, for example homozygous twins, are

numerically distinct and not identical, so what is intended must be the various properties and

characteristics that make each individual qualitatively unique and different than others. Does

having the same genome as another person undermine that unique qualitative identity? Only in the

crudest genetic determinism, a genetic determinism according to which an individual’s genes

completely and decisively determine everything about the individual, all his or her other

non-genetic features and properties, together with the entire history or biography that will

constitute his or her life. But there is no reason whatever to believe in that kind of genetic

determinism, and I do not think that anyone does. Even with the same genes, as we know from

the cases of genetically identical twins, while there may be many important similarities in the

twins’ psychological and personal characteristics, differences in these develop over time together

with differences in their life histories, personal relationships, and life choices. This is true of

identical twins raised together, and the differences are still greater in the cases of identical twins

raised apart; sharing an identical genome does not prevent twins from each developing a distinct

and unique personal identity of their own.

We need not pursue what the basis or argument in support of a moral or human right to a

unique identity might be— such a right is not found among typical accounts and enumerations of

moral or human rights— because even if we grant that there is such a right, sharing a genome with

another individual as a result of human cloning would not violate it. The idea of the uniqueness, or

unique identity, of each person historically predates the development of modern genetics and the

knowledge that except in the case of homozygous twins, each individual has a unique genome. A

unique genome thus could not be the grounds of this long-standing belief in the unique human

identity of each person.

I turn now to whether human cloning would violate what Hans Jonas called “a right to

ignorance,” or what Joel Feinberg called “a right to an open future” (Jonas 1974; Feinberg 1980).

Jonas argued that human cloning in which there is a substantial time gap between the beginning of

the lives of the earlier and later twins is fundamentally different from the simultaneous beginning

of the lives of homozygous twins that occur in nature. Although contemporaneous twins begin

their lives with the same genetic inheritance, they also begin their lives or biographies at the same

time, and so in ignorance of what the other who shares the same genome will by his or her choices
E-13

make of his or her life. To whatever extent one’s genome determines one’s future, each begins

ignorant of what that determination will be and so remains as free to choose a future, to construct

a particular future from among open alternatives, as are individuals who do not have a twin.

Ignorance of the effect of one’s genome on one’s future is necessary for the spontaneous, free,

and authentic construction of a life and self.

A later twin created by human cloning, Jonas argues, knows, or at least believes he or she

knows, too much about himself or herself. For there is already in the world another person, one’s

earlier twin, who from the same genetic starting point has made the life choices that are still in the

later twin’s future. It will seem that one’s life has already been lived and played out by another,

that one’s fate is already determined, and so the later twin will lose the spontaneity of

authentically creating and becoming his or her own self. One will lose the sense of human

possibility in freely creating one’s own future. It is tyrannical, Jonas claims, for the earlier twin to

try to determine another’s fate in this way. And even if it is a mistake to believe the crude genetic

determinism according to which one’s genes determine one’s fate, what is important for one’s

experience of freedom and ability to create a life for oneself is whether one thinks one’s future is

open and undetermined, and so still to be determined by one’s own choices.

One might try to interpret Jonas’ objection so as not to assume either genetic determinism,

or a belief in it. A later twin might grant that he is not determined to follow in his earlier twin’s

footsteps, but that nevertheless the earlier twin’s life would always haunt him, standing as an

undue influence on his life, and shaping it in ways to which others’ lives are not vulnerable. But

the force of the objection still seems to rest on a false assumption that having the same genome as

his earlier twin unduly restricts his freedom to choose a different life than the earlier twin chose. A

family environment also importantly shapes children’s development. But there is no force to the

claim of a younger sibling that the existence of an older sibling raised in that same family is an

undue influence on his freedom to make a life for himself in that environment. Indeed, the younger

twin or sibling might benefit by being able to learn from the older twin’s or sibling’s mistakes.

In a different context, and without applying it to human cloning, Joel Feinberg has argued

for a child’s right to an open future. This requires that others raising a child not close off future

possibilities that the child would otherwise have, thereby eliminating a reasonable range of

opportunities from which the child may choose autonomously to construct his or her own life.

One way this right to an open future would be violated is to deny even a basic education to a

child. Another way might be to create him as a later twin, so that he will believe his future has

already been set for him by the choices made and the life lived by his earlier twin.

A central difficulty in evaluating the implications for human cloning of a right either to

ignorance or to an open future, is whether the right is violated merely because the later twin may

be likely to believe that his future is already determined, even if that belief is clearly false and

supported only by the crudest genetic determinism. I believe that if the twin’s future in reality

remains open and his to freely choose, then someone acting in a way that unintentionally leads him

to believe that his future is closed and determined has not violated his right to ignorance or to an
E-14

open future. Likewise, suppose I drive down the twin’s street in my new car, which is just like his.

I know that when he sees me, he is likely to believe that I have stolen his car, and therefore will

abandon his driving plans for the day. I have not violated his property right to his car, even though

he may feel the same loss of opportunity to drive that day as if I had in fact stolen his car. In each

case, he is mistaken that his open future or car has been taken from him, and so no right of his has

been violated. If we know that the twin will believe that his open future has been taken from him

as a result of being cloned, even though in reality it has not, then we know that cloning will cause

him psychological distress, but not that it will violate his right. Thus, I believe Jonas’ right to

ignorance, and our employment of Feinberg’s analogous right of a child to an open future, turns

out not to be violated by human cloning, though they do point to psychological harms that a later

twin may be likely to experience and that I will address below.

The upshot of our consideration of a moral or human right either to a unique identity or to

ignorance and an open future is that neither would be violated by human cloning. Perhaps there

are other possible rights that would make good the charge that human cloning is a violation of

moral or human rights, but I am unsure what they might be. I turn now to consideration of the

harms that human cloning might produce.

B. What Individual or Social Harms Might Human Cloning Produce?

There are many possible individual or social harms that have been posited by one or another

commentator, and I shall only try to cover the more plausible and significant of them.

Largely Individual Harms

1. Human cloning would produce psychological distress and harm in the later twin.

This is perhaps the most serious individual harm that opponents of human cloning foresee, and we

have just seen that even if human cloning is no violation of rights, it may nevertheless cause

psychological distress or harm. No doubt knowing the path in life taken by one’s earlier twin may

in many cases have several bad psychological effects (Callahan 1993; LaBar 1984; Macklin 1994;

McCormick 1993; Studdard 1978; Rainer 1978; Verhey 1994). The later twin may feel, even if

mistakenly, that his or her fate has already been substantially laid out, and so have difficulty freely

and spontaneously taking responsibility for and making his or her own fate and life. The later

twin’s experience or sense of autonomy and freedom may be substantially diminished, even if in

actual fact they are diminished much less than it seems to him or her. Together with this might be

a diminished sense of one’s own uniqueness and individuality, even if once again these are in fact

diminished little or not at all by having an earlier twin with the same genome. If the later twin is

the clone of a particularly exemplary individual, perhaps with some special capabilities and

accomplishments, he or she may experience excessive pressure to reach the very high standards of

ability and accomplishment of the earlier twin (Rainer 1978). All of these psychological effects

may take a heavy toll on the later twin and be serious burdens under which he or she would live.
E-15

One commentator has also cited special psychological harms to the first, or first few,

human clones from the great publicity that would attend their creation (LaBar 1984). While public

interest in the first clones would no doubt be enormous, medical confidentiality should protect

their identity. Even if their identity became public knowledge, this would be a temporary effect

only on the first few clones. The experience of Louise Brown, the first child conceived by IVF,

suggests this publicity could be managed to limit its harmful effects.

While psychological harms of these kinds from human cloning are certainly possible, and

perhaps even likely, they remain at this point only speculative, since we have no experience with

human cloning and the creation of earlier and later twins. With naturally occurring identical twins,

while they sometimes struggle to achieve their own identities (a struggle shared by many people

without a twin), there is typically a very strong emotional bond between the twins, and such twins

are, if anything, generally psychologically stronger and better adjusted than non-twins (Robertson

1994b). Scenarios are even possible in which being a later twin confers a psychological benefit.

For example, having been deliberately cloned with specific genes might make the later twin feel

especially wanted for the kind of person he or she is. Nevertheless, if experience with human

cloning confirmed that serious and unavoidable psychological harms typically occurred to the later

twin, that would be a serious moral reason to avoid the practice.

In the discussion above of potential psychological harms to later twins, I have been

assuming that one later twin is cloned from an already existing adult individual. Cloning by means

of embryo splitting, as carried out and reported by Hall and colleagues at George Washington

University in 1993, has limits on the number of genetically identical twins that can be cloned (Hall

1993). Nuclear transfer, however, has no limits to the number of genetically identical individuals

who might be cloned. Intuitively, many of the psychological burdens and harms noted above seem

more likely and serious for a clone who is only one of many identical later twins from one original

source, so that the clone might run into another identical twin around every street corner. This

prospect could be a good reason to place sharp limits on the number of twins that could be cloned

from any one source.

There is one argument that has been used by several commentators to undermine the

apparent significance of potential psychological harms to a later twin (Chadwick 1982; Robertson

1994b, 1997; Macklin 1994). The point derives from a general problem, called the non-identity

problem, posed by the philosopher Derek Parfit and not originally directed to human cloning

(Parfit 1984). Here is the argument. Even if all the psychological burdens and pressures from

human cloning discussed above could not be avoided for any later twin, they are not harms to the

twin, and so not reasons not to clone the twin. That is because the only way for the twin to avoid

the harms is never to be cloned or to exist at all. But no one claims that these burdens and

stresses, hard though they might be, are so bad as to make the twin’s life, all things considered,

not worth living— that is, to be worse than no life at all. So the later twin is not harmed by being

given a life with these burdens and stresses, since the alternative of never existing at all is arguably

worse— he or she loses a worthwhile life— but certainly not better for the twin. And if the later

twin is not harmed by having been created with these unavoidable burdens and stresses, then how
E-16

could he or she be wronged by having been created with them? And if the later twin is not

wronged, then why is any wrong being done by human cloning? This argument has considerable

potential import, for if it is sound, it will undermine the apparent moral importance of any bad

consequence of human cloning to the later twin that is not so serious as to make the twin’s life, all

things considered, not worth living.

Parfit originally posed the non-identity problem, but he does not accept the above

argument as sound. Instead, he believes that if one could have a different child without these

psychological burdens (for example, by using a different method of reproduction which did not

result in a later twin), there is as strong a moral reason to do so as there would be not to cause

similar burdens to an already existing child; I have defended this position regarding the general

case of genetically transmitted handicaps or disabilities (Brock 1995). The theoretical

philosophical problem is to formulate the moral principle that implies this conclusion and that also

has acceptable implications in other cases involving bringing people into existence, such as issues

about population policy. The issues are too detailed and complex to pursue here, and the

non-identity problem remains controversial and not fully resolved. Suffice it to say that what is

necessary is a principle that permits comparison of the later twin with these psychological burdens

and a different person who could have been created instead by a different method and so without

such burdens. Choosing to create the later twin with serious psychological burdens instead of a

different person who would be free of them, without a weighty overriding reason for choosing the

former, would be morally irresponsible or wrong, even if doing so does not harm or wrong the

later twin who could only exist with the burdens. At the least, the argument for disregarding the

psychological burdens to the later twin, because he or she could not exist without them, is

controversial, and in my view mistaken; unavoidable psychological burdens to later twins are

reasons against human cloning. Such psychological harms, as I shall continue to call them, do

remain speculative, but they should not be disregarded because of the non-identity problem.

2. Human cloning procedures would carry unacceptable risks to the clone.

One version of this objection to human cloning concerns the research necessary to perfect the

procedure. The other version concerns the later risks from its use. Wilmut’s group had 276

failures before their success with Dolly, indicating that the procedure is far from perfected, even

with sheep. Further research on the procedure with animals is clearly necessary before it would be

ethical to use the procedure on humans. But even assuming that cloning’s safety and effectiveness

is established with animals, research would need to be done to establish its safety and

effectiveness for humans. Could this research be ethically done (Pollack 1993)? There would be

little or no risk to the donor of the cell nucleus to be transferred, and his or her informed consent

could and must always be obtained. There might be greater risks for the woman to whom a cloned

embryo is transferred, but these should be comparable to those associated with IVF procedures.

The woman’s informed consent, too, could and must be obtained.

What of the risks to the cloned embryo itself? Judging by the experience of Wilmut’s

group in their work on cloning a sheep, the principal risk to the embryos cloned was their failure
E-17

successfully to implant, grow, and develop. Comparable risks to cloned human embryos would

apparently be their death or destruction long before most people or the law consider them to be

persons with moral or legal protections of life. Moreover, artificial reproductive technologies now

in use, such as IVF, have a known risk that some embryos will be destroyed or will not

successfully implant and will die. It is premature to make a confident assessment of what the risks

to human subjects would be of establishing the safety and effectiveness of human cloning

procedures, but there are no unavoidable risks apparent at this time that would make the

necessary research clearly ethically impermissible.

Could human cloning procedures meet ethical standards of safety and efficacy? Risks to an

ovum donor (if any), a nucleus donor, and a woman who receives the embryo for implantation

would likely be ethically acceptable with the informed consent of the involved parties. But what of

the risks to the human clone if the procedure in some way goes wrong, or unanticipated harms

come to the clone? For example, Harold Varmus, director of the National Institutes of Health, has

raised the concern that a cell many years old from which a person is cloned could have

accumulated genetic mutations during its years in another adult that could give the resulting clone

a predisposition to cancer or other diseases of aging (Weiss 1997). Moreover, it is impossible to

obtain the informed consent of the clone to his or her own creation, but, of course, no one else is

able to give informed consent for their creation, either.

I believe it is too soon to say whether unavoidable risks to the clone would make human

cloning unethical. At a minimum, further research on cloning animals, as well as research to better

define the potential risks to humans, is needed. For the reasons given above, we should not set

aside risks to the clone on the grounds that the clone would not be harmed by them, since its only

alternative is not to exist at all; I have suggested that is a bad argument. But we should not insist

on a standard that requires risks to be lower than those we accept in sexual reproduction, or in

other forms of assisted reproduction. It is not possible now to know when, if ever, human cloning

will satisfy an appropriate standard limiting risks to the clone.

Largely Social Harms

3. Human cloning would lessen the worth of individuals and diminish respect for human

life.

Unelaborated claims to this effect were common in the media after the announcement of the

cloning of Dolly. Ruth Macklin has explored and criticized the claim that human cloning would

diminish the value we place on, and our respect for, human life, because it would lead to persons

being viewed as replaceable (Macklin 1994). As argued above, only in a confused and indefensible

notion of human identity is a person’s identity determined solely by his or her genes. Instead,

individuals’ identities are determined by the interaction of their genes over time with their

environments, including the choices the individuals make and the important relations they form

with other persons. This means in turn that no individual could be fully replaced by a later clone

possessing the same genes. Ordinary people recognize this clearly. For example, parents of a
E-18

12-year-old child dying of a fatal disease would consider it insensitive and ludicrous if someone

told them they should not grieve for their coming loss because it is possible to replace him by

cloning him; it is their child who is dying, whom they love and value, and that child and his

importance to them could never be replaced by a cloned later twin. Even if they would also come

to love and value a later twin as much as their child who is dying, that would be to love and value

that different child who could never replace the child they lost. Ordinary people are typically quite

clear about the importance of the relations they have to distinct, historically situated individuals

with whom over time they have shared experiences and their lives, and whose loss to them would

therefore be irreplaceable.

A different version of this worry is that human cloning would result in persons’ worth or

value seeming diminished because we would now see humans as able to be manufactured or

“handmade.” This demystification of the creation of human life would reduce our appreciation and

awe of it and of its natural creation. It would be a mistake, however, to conclude that a human

being created by human cloning is of less value or is less worthy of respect than one created by

sexual reproduction. It is the nature of a being, not how it is created, that is the source of its value

and makes it worthy of respect. Moreover, for many people, gaining a scientific understanding of

the extraordinary complexity of human reproduction and development increases, instead of

decreases, their awe of the process and its product.

A more subtle route by which the value we place on each individual human life might be

diminished could come from the use of human cloning with the aim of creating a child with a

particular genome, either the genome of another individual especially meaningful to those doing

the cloning or an individual with exceptional talents, abilities, and accomplishments. The child

might then be valued only for his or her genome, or at least for his or her genome’s expected

phenotypic expression, and no longer be recognized as having the intrinsic equal moral value of all

persons, simply as persons. For the moral value and respect due all persons to be seen as resting

only on the instrumental value of individuals, or of individuals’ particular qualities, to others

would be to fundamentally change the moral status accorded to persons. Everyone would lose

their moral standing as full and equal members of the moral community, replaced by the different

instrumental value each of us has to others.

Such a change in the equal moral value and worth accorded to persons should be avoided

at all costs, but it is far from clear that such a change would take place from permitting human

cloning. Parents, for example, are quite capable of distinguishing their children’s intrinsic value,

just as individual persons, from their instrumental value based on their particular qualities or

properties. The equal moral value and respect due all persons just as persons is not incompatible

with the different instrumental value of people’s particular qualities or properties. Einstein and an

untalented physics graduate student have vastly different value as scientists, but share and are

entitled to equal moral value and respect as persons. It would be a mistake and a confusion to

conflate the two kinds of value and respect. Making a large number of clones from one original

person might be more likely to foster this mistake and confusion in the public. If so, that would be

a further reason to limit the number of clones that could be made from one individual.
E-19

4. Human cloning would divert resources from other more important social and medical

needs (LaBar 1984; Callahan 1993).

As we saw in considering the reasons for, and potential benefits from, human cloning, in only a

limited number of uses would it uniquely meet important human needs. There is little doubt that in

the United States, and certainly elsewhere, there are more pressing unmet human needs, both

medical or health needs and other social or individual needs. This is a reason for not using public

funds to support human cloning, at least if the funds actually are redirected to more important

ends and needs. It is not a reason, however, either to prohibit other private individuals or

institutions from using their own resources for research on human cloning or for human cloning

itself, or to prohibit human cloning or research on human cloning.

The other important point about resource use is that it is not now clear how expensive

human cloning would ultimately be, for example, in comparison with other means of relieving

infertility. The procedure itself is not scientifically or technologically extremely complex and might

prove not to require a significant commitment of resources.

5. Human cloning might be used by commercial interests for financial gain.

Both opponents and proponents of human cloning agree that cloned embryos should not be able

to be bought and sold. In a science fiction frame of mind, one can imagine commercial interests

offering genetically certified and guaranteed embryos for sale, perhaps offering a catalogue of

different embryos cloned from individuals with a variety of talents, capacities, and other desirable

properties. This would be a fundamental violation of the equal moral respect and dignity owed to

all persons, treating them instead as objects to be differentially valued, bought, and sold in the

marketplace. Even if embryos are not yet persons at the time they would be purchased or sold,

they would be valued, bought, and sold for the persons they will become. The moral consensus

against any commercial market in embryos, cloned or otherwise, should be enforced by law,

whatever public policy ultimately is created to address human cloning. It has been argued that the

law may already forbid markets in embryos on grounds that they would violate the thirteenth

amendment prohibiting slavery and involuntary servitude (Turner 1981).

6. Human cloning might be used by governments or other groups for immoral and

exploitative purposes.

In Brave New World, Aldous Huxley imagined cloning individuals who have been engineered with

limited abilities and conditioned to do, and to be happy doing, the menial work that society

needed done (Huxley 1932). Selection and control in the creation of people was exercised not in

the interests of the persons created, but in the interests of the society and at the expense of the

persons created. Any use of human cloning for such purposes would exploit the clones solely as

means for the benefit of others, and would violate the equal moral respect and dignity they are

owed as full moral persons. If human cloning is permitted to go forward, it should be with

regulations that would clearly prohibit such immoral exploitation.
E-20

Fiction contains even more disturbing and bizarre uses of human cloning, such as

Mengele’s creation of many clones of Hitler in Ira Levin’s The Boys from Brazil (1996), Woody

Allen’s science fiction cinematic spoof Sleeper, in which a dictator’s only remaining part, his nose,

must be destroyed to keep it from being cloned, and the contemporary science fiction film Blade

Runner (Levin 1976). Nightmare scenarios like Huxley’s or Levin’s may be quite improbable, but

their impact should not be underestimated on public concern with technologies like human

cloning. Regulation of human cloning must assure the public that even such farfetched abuses will

not take place.

7. Human cloning used on a very widespread basis would have a disastrous effect on the

human gene pool by reducing genetic diversity and our capacity to adapt to new conditions

(Eisenberg 1976).

This is not a realistic concern since human cloning would not be used on a wide enough scale,

substantially replacing sexual reproduction, to have the feared effect on the gene pool. The vast

majority of humans seem quite satisfied with sexual means of reproduction; if anything, from the

standpoint of worldwide population, we could do with a bit less enthusiasm for it. Programs of

eugenicists like Herman Mueller earlier in the century to impregnate thousands of women with the

sperm of exceptional men, as well as the more recent establishment of sperm banks of Nobel

laureates, have met with little or no public interest or success (Adams 1990). People prefer sexual

means of reproduction, and they prefer to keep their own biological ties to their offspring.

CONCLUSION

Human cloning has until now received little serious and careful ethical attention, because it was

typically dismissed as science fiction, and it stirs deep, but difficult to articulate, uneasiness and

even revulsion in many people. Any ethical assessment of human cloning at this point must be

tentative and provisional. Fortunately, the science and technology of human cloning are not yet in

hand, and so a public and professional debate is possible without the need for a hasty, precipitate

policy response.

The ethical pros and cons of human cloning, as I see them at this time, are sufficiently

balanced and uncertain that there is not an ethically decisive case either for or against permitting it

or doing it. Access to human cloning can plausibly be brought within a moral right to reproductive

freedom, but the circumstances in which its use would have significant benefits appear at this time

to be few and infrequent. It is not a central component of a moral right to reproductive freedom,

and it serves no major or pressing individual or social needs. On the other hand, contrary to the

pronouncements of many of its opponents, human cloning seems not to be a violation of moral or

human rights. But it does risk some significant individual or social harms, although most are based

on common public confusions about genetic determinism, human identity, and the effects of

human cloning. Because most moral reasons against doing human cloning remain speculative, they

seem insufficient to warrant at this time a complete legal prohibition of either research on or later

use of human cloning. Legitimate moral concerns about the use and effects of human cloning,
E-21

however, underline the need for careful public oversight of research on its development, together

with a wider public debate and review before cloning is used on human beings.*

* I want to acknowledge with gratitude the invaluable help of my research assistant, Insoo

Hyun, on this paper. He not only made it possible to complete the paper on the NBAC’s tight

schedule, but also improved it with a number of insightful substantive suggestions.

References

Adams, M., ed., The Well-Born Science, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990.

Annas, G.J., Regulatory models for human embryo cloning: The free market, Professional

guidelines, and government restrictions. Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal, 4(3):235-249, 1994.

Brock, D.W., The non-identity problem and genetic harm, Bioethics, 9:269-275, 1995.

——— , Reproductive freedom: Its nature, bases and limits, in Health Care Ethics: Critical

Issues for Health Professionals, D. Thomasma, J. Monagle (eds.), Gaithersburg, MD: Aspen

Publishers, 1994.

Callahan, D., Perspective on cloning: A threat to individual uniqueness, Los Angeles Times,

November 12, 1993, B7.

Chadwick, R.F., Cloning. Philosophy, 57:201-209, 1982.

Cohen, J., G. Tomkin, The science fiction, and reality of embryo cloning. Kennedy Institute of

Ethics Journal, 4:193-204, 1994.

Council of Europe, Recommendation 1046 (1986) on the Use of Human Embryos and Fetuses

for Diagnostic, Therapeutic, Scientific, Industrial and Commercial Purposes, 1986.

Dworkin, R., Taking Rights Seriously, London: Duckworth, 1978.

Eisenberg, L., The outcome as cause: Predestination and human cloning. J Med Philos, 1:318-

331, 1976.

Feinberg, J., The child’s right to an open future, in Whose Child? Children’s Rights, Parental

Authority, and State Power, W. Aiken, H. LaFollette (eds.), Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield,

1980.

Fletcher, J., The Ethics of Genetic Control: Ending Reproductive Roulette, Garden City, NY:

Anchor Books, 1974.
E-22

Hall, J.L., et al., Experimental Cloning of Human Polypoid Embryos Using an Artificial Zona

Pellucida, Abstract 0-001, American Fertility Society jointly with the Canadian Fertility and

Andrology Society, Abstracts of the Scientific Oral and Poster Sessions, Program Supplement,

1993, S1.

Harris, J., Wonderwoman and Superman: The Ethics of Biotechnology, Oxford: Oxford

University Press, 1992.

Huxley, A., Brave New World, London: Chalto and Winders, 1932.

Jonas, H., Philosophical Essays: From Ancient Creed to Technological Man, Englewood Cliffs,

NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1974.

Kahn, C., Can we achieve immortality?, Free Inquiry, 9:14-18, 1989.

Kass, L., Toward a More Natural Science, New York: The Free Press, 1985.

Kolata, G., The hot debate about cloning human embryo, New York Times, October 26, 1993, 1A.

LaBar, M., The pros and cons of human cloning, Thought, 57:318-333, 1984.

Lederberg, J., Experimental genetics and human evolution, The American Naturalist, 100:519-

531, 1966.

Levin, I., Boys from Brazil, New York: Random House, 1976.

Macklin, R., Splitting embryos on the slippery slope: Ethics and public policy, Kennedy Institute

of Ethics Journal, 4:209-226, 1994.

McCormick, R., Should we clone humans?, Christian Century, 1148-1149, 1993.

——— , Notes on Moral Theology: 1965 Through 1980, Washington, DC: University Press of

America, 1981.

McKinnell, R., Cloning: A Biologist Reports, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1979.

Mill, J.S., On Liberty, Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill Publishing, 1859.

NABER (National Advisory Board on Ethics in Reproduction), Report on human cloning

through embryo splitting: An amber light, Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal, 4:251-282, 1994.

Parfit, D., Reasons and Persons, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984.
E-23

Pollack, R., Beyond cloning, New York Times, Nov. 17, 1993, A27.

Rainer, J.D. Commentary, Man and Medicine: The Journal of Values and Ethics in Health Care,

3:115-117, 1978.

Ramsey, P., Fabricated Man: The Ethics of Genetic Control, New Haven, CT: Yale University

Press, 1970.

Rhodes, R., Clones, harms, and rights, Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics, 4:285-290,

1995.

Robertson, J.A., A Ban on Cloning and Cloning Research Is Unjustified, Testimony before the

National Bioethics Advisory Commission, March 1997.

——— , Children of Choice: Freedom and the New Reproductive Technologies, Princeton, NJ:

Princeton University Press, 1994a.

——— , The question of human cloning, Hastings Center Report, 24:6-14, 1994b.

Smith, G.P., Intimations of immortality: Clones, cyrons and the law, University of New South

Wales Law Journal, 6:119-132, 1983.

Studdard, A. The lone clone, Man and Medicine: The Journal of Values and Ethics in Health

Care, 3:109-114, 1978.

Thomas, L., Notes of a biology watcher: On cloning a human being, N Engl J Med, 291:1296-

1297, 1974.

Turner, P.O., Love’s labor lost: Legal and ethical implications in artificial human procreation,

University of Detriot Journal of Urban Law, 58:459-487, 1981.

Verhey, A.D., Cloning: Revisiting an old debate, Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal, 4:227-234,

1994.

Walters, W.A.W., Cloning, ectogenesis, and hybrids: Things to come?, In Test-Tube Babies,

W.A.W. Walters, P. Singer (eds.), Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1982.

Watt, H., What moral status has a human clone?, Bulletin of Medical Ethics, 93:2, 1993.

Weiss, R., Cloning suddenly has government’s attention, International Herald Tribune, March 7,

1997, 2, 1997.
E-24

WHO (World Health Organization), WHO Director General Condemns Human Cloning, Geneva,

Switzerland: World Health Organization Press Office, March 11, 1997.

Wilmut, I., et al., Viable offspring derived from fetal and adult mammalian cells. Nature, 385:810-

813, 1997.

Wilmut, I., et al., Sheep cloned by nuclear transfer from a cultured cell line. Nature, 380:64-66,

1996a.

Wilmut, I., et al., Implications of cloning. Nature, 380:383, 1996b.
CLONING HUMAN BEINGS

The Current and Future Legal Status of Cloning

Commissioned Paper

by Lori B. Andrews, J.D.

Chicago-Kent College of Law

F-1

CONTENTS

Preface F-3

Executive Summary F-4

A. Potential State Restrictions on Cloning F-4

B. Constitutional Concerns F-5

1. Reach of the Commerce Clause F-5

2. Right to Scientific Inquiry F-6

3. Right to Make Reproductive Decisions F-6

C. Parenthood Issues F-7

The Goals of Cloning Research F-8

A. How Is Cloning Performed? F-8

B. What Are the Uses for Cloning Technology in Animals? F-9

C. What Are the Proposed Uses for Cloning Research in Humans? F-10

1. Disease Research and Treatment F-10

2. Reproductive Technology F-11

3. Organ and Tissue Reserve F-12

The Potential Impacts of Cloning F-13

A. Problems in Application to Humans F-13

B. Potential Psychological Impacts of Cloning Whole Individuals F-15

C. Potential Social Impacts of Cloning F-16

Existing Laws that Could Restrict Cloning F-18

A. State Statutes Governing Research on Embryos F-18

B. The Reach of Laws Governing In Vitro Fertilization and Assisted

 Reproductive Technology F-22

Proposed Federal and State Statutes Regarding Cloning F-23

A. Federal Action F-24

B. Alabama F-24

C. California F-25

D. Florida F-25

E. Illinois F-25

F. Maryland F-25

G. Missouri F-26

H. New Jersey F-26

I. New York F-26

J. Oregon F-27

K. South Carolina F-27

L. West Virginia F-27

The Federal Role in Regulating Cloning F-27

Is There a Right of Scientific Inquiry? F-36

The Right to Make Reproductive Decisions F-37
F-2

Constitutional Limits to Cloning F-40

A. Thirteenth Amendment Concerns F-40

B. Nobility Clause F-40

Who Is the Parent in Cloning? F-41

Human Research Implications F-50

Potential Tort Claims Based on Cloning F-53

Policy Options F-54

Acknowledgments F-55

Appendix A: Potential Parental Configurations in Human Cloning F-56

Endnotes F-58
F-3

PREFACE

“Perhaps in recognition of the surrealistic circumstances they should have spelled it

D-A-L-I, instead of D-O-L-L-Y.”

1

This response is quite representative of how most people reacted to the news that a team of

Scottish scientists succeeded in cloning a mammal. On July 5, 1996, a sheep named Dolly was

born in Scotland, the result of the transfer of the nucleus of an adult mammary tissue cell to the

enucleated egg cell of an unrelated sheep, and gestation in a third, surrogate mother sheep.2

Although for the past ten years scientists have routinely cloned sheep and cows from embryo

cells, this was the first cloning experiment which has succeeded using the nucleus of an adult 3

cell.4

Shortly after the report of the sheep cloning was published, President Clinton instituted a

ban on federal funding for human cloning. This moratorium provides the opportunity for an 5

analysis of the potential risks and benefits of human cloning, the current legal status of cloning,

and the potential constitutional challenges that might be raised if new legislation is put into place

to restrict cloning.

With the recent success in cloning an adult mammal, it is reasonable to start thinking about

the feasibility and impact of human cloning. Many reproductive and genetic procedures, such as

artificial insemination by donor, embryo transfer, in vitro fertilization, and preimplantation

screening of embryos, were applied first in animals and then in humans. Animal husbandry is a

precursor to clinical reality for humans, with the time of technology transfer to humans ever

decreasing. If W. Bruce Currie, biologist at Cornell University, is correct, “[c]loning humans from

adults’ tissues is likely to be achievable any time from one to ten years from now,” an estimate 6

which was repeated by the journal Nature, which published the article about Dolly. Immediately

after Dr. Wilmut announced to the world how Dolly was “conceived,” Dr. Harold Varmus, the

director of the National Institutes of Health, testified before a House subcommittee that the

technology involved was “fairly simple.” Currie estimates that at least ten fertilization clinics in 7

the United States have the technology which will allow such a feat; he did not, however, name

these ten clinics.8

The executive summary briefly surveys the current and future legal status of cloning; the

rest of this document develops this analysis. The paper then addresses the potential uses that

could be made of cloning. The procedures to be used and their purposes are relevant to an

analysis of whether human cloning falls within the reach of existing law. Discussion of the

potential impact of cloning, which is relevant in determining the need for a legal policy and

whether such a policy can be justified as a proper exercise of governmental power, is followed by

that of the impact of existing laws on cloning, particularly state bans on embryo research. The

next sections describe proposed federal and state laws regarding cloning; analyze whether federal

legislation restricting or banning cloning can be challenged as not justified by the federal spending

power or the federal power to regulate interstate commerce; analyze whether a ban on human
F-4

cloning might be subject to attack as violating scientists’ alleged First Amendment right to

scientific inquiry; and assess whether a ban on human cloning of complete individuals would

violate an individual’s or couple’s constitutional right to privacy or liberty to make reproductive

decisions. The paper then examines constitutional concerns, such as the Thirteenth Amendment

prohibition on slavery and the nobility clause, that could restrict certain forms of cloning; analyzes

who would be considered to be the legal parent(s) of the resulting child if an individual were

cloned; addresses the human research constraints applicable to a child created through cloning;

and addresses potential tort claims based on cloning. The final section addresses policy options in

this area.

Throughout this paper, two types of cloning research are addressed. The first is research

at the genetic, cellular, and tissue level which is not intended to create a cloned individual. Most

of the scientists addressing human cloning research focus on this first type of research. The

second type is research which is intended to create an individual. The latter type of research might

be considered by some to be too remote and speculative to be worthy of serious policy analysis at

this time. However, given the fact that much of the public and media discussion has focused on

the cloning of whole individuals, a legal policy analysis would be deficient if it did not analyze

whether existing and proposed laws would cover the cloning of whole individuals as well.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This section— the executive summary— summarizes the analysis with respect to the most

important legal issues that have been raised: Do existing laws ban the procedure? If human

cloning were regulated or banned, could that policy be challenged as unconstitutional? If the

cloning of a whole individual were allowed, who would be the legal parents?9

A. Potential State Restrictions on Cloning

Ten states have laws regulating research and/or experimentation on conceptuses, embryos,

fetuses, or unborn children that use broad enough language to include early stage conceptuses.10

However, several arguments could be made to suggest that most of the statutes should be

construed narrowly so as not to apply to cloning. First, an argument can be made that since the

experimental procedure is being done on an egg, not an embryo, fetus, or unborn child, the laws

should not apply. By the time the embryo is created, the experimental procedure is completed.

Second, two of the ten states define the object of protection— the conceptus (Minnesota) or

unborn child (Pennsylvania)— as the product of fertilization. If transfer of nucleic material is not

considered fertilization, these laws would not apply. Third, the laws of at least eight of the states

banning embryo research are sufficiently general that they might be struck down as

unconstitutionally vague.11

Two statutes have provisions that are particularly likely to be applied to cloning. In New

Hampshire, a preembryo may not be allowed to develop beyond 14 days post-fertilization, so 12

cloning research may be permissible within the first 14 days of development. However, “no
F-5

preembryo that has been donated for use in research shall be transferred to a uterine cavity.”

13

Thus, if a renucleated oocyte is considered to be a preembryo, it would be impermissible in New

Hampshire to implant the resulting conceptus to create a child.

In Louisiana, the statute applies to an “in vitro fertilized human ovum . . . composed of

one or more living human cells and human genetic material so unified and organized that it will

develop in utero into an unborn child.” An entity meeting the definition cannot be cultured and 14

farmed solely for research purposes, which would prohibit cloning research to study gene 15

function, cellular development, and so forth. Another provision specifically states that such an

entity may be used “solely for the support and contribution of the complete development of

human in utero implantation.” This creates the anomalous result that researchers could clone a 16

whole individual in Louisiana, but could not do research ex utero on cloned cells.

B. Constitutional Concerns

If the federal government chooses to regulate or even ban cloning, that action might be challenged

on a number of constitutional grounds— as not being justified under the commerce clause, as

violating scientists’ First Amendment freedom of inquiry, or as violating a couple’s or individual’s

constitutional right of privacy or liberty to make reproductive decisions.

1. Reach of the Commerce Clause

Congress has the power to regulate interstate commerce, but states maintain the power to

regulate intrastate activities that have little impact on interstate commerce. In 1995, the U.S.

Supreme Court held, for the first time in almost 60 years, that Congress had adopted legislation

that exceeded its authority under the commerce clause. The facts at issue in that case, however, 17

are distinguishable from the case of cloning. In that case, Congress had banned the possession of a

firearm within 1000 feet of a schoolyard. The U.S. Supreme Court held that the law was not a

proper exercise of federal power because the activity at issue did not affect interstate commerce,

interfered with a traditional state activity (education), and had already been addressed by state

laws in most states. There is much more leeway for the federal government to regulate cloning. 18

It is likely that some of the equipment or materials used in the cloning procedure will have moved

in interstate commerce, some of the individuals seeking cloning services will have traveled 19

interstate to obtain those services, some funding will have come from out of state, some of the 20 21

personnel may have been hired from out of state, and some of the researchers may attend related 22

conferences and classes out of state. Moreover, if the federal government were to adopt a law 23

on cloning, Congress could address the commerce clause concerns in the legislative history, which

it failed to do in connection with the firearm ban at issue in Lopez. Congress’ power to regulate

cloning under the commerce clause would include a power to ban it.24
F-6

2. Right to Scientific Inquiry

Certain commentators have speculated that there might be a right of scientific inquiry protected by

the First Amendment right to free speech. If the First Amendment protects a marketplace of ideas,

it seems likely it would protect the generation of information that would be included in that

marketplace. The U.S. Supreme Court has not directly addressed the right of scientific inquiry,

but a lower federal court has suggested in dicta that scholars have a “right . . . to do research and

advance the state of man’s knowledge.” Other federal courts, however, have refused to 25

recognize a First Amendment right of scientific inquiry. And even if the First Amendment were 26

found to be applicable to scientific inquiry, there is widespread agreement that the method of

research could be regulated to prevent harms.

3. Right to Make Reproductive Decisions

The right to make decisions about whether to bear children is constitutionally protected under the

constitutional right to privacy and the constitutional right to liberty. The U.S. Supreme Court 27 28

in 1992 reaffirmed the “recognized protection accorded to liberty relating to intimate

relationships, the family, and decisions about whether to bear and beget a child.” Early decisions 29

protected married couples’ right to privacy to make procreative decisions, but later decisions

focused on the individual’s rights. The U.S. Supreme Court, in Eisenstadt v. Baird, stated, “[i]f 30

the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free

from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the

decision whether to bear or beget a child.”

31

A federal district court has indicated that the right to make procreative decisions

encompasses the right of an infertile couple to undergo medically assisted reproduction, including

in vitro fertilization and the use of a donated embryo. Some legal analysts have suggested that 32

the constitutional right to make reproductive decisions free from unnecessary governmental

intrusion covers the decision of a couple to undergo cloning. However, other legal analysts have 33

noted that the unprecedented step of creating a child with only one genetic progenitor would be

such a fundamental change in the way humans “reproduce” that it would not be constitutionally

protected.34

Even if a restriction on cloning were found to infringe upon an individual’s or a couple’s

right to make reproductive decisions, the government could justify the restriction if it had a

compelling state interest and the restriction furthered that interest in the least restrictive manner

possible. The potential physical and psychological risks of cloning an entire individual are 35

sufficiently compelling to justify banning the procedure. Moreover, certain uses of cloning— such

as creation of a clone as a source of spare organs— would likely be banned by the Thirteenth

Amendment prohibition of slavery and involuntary servitude.

The use of cloned cells and tissue for research purposes other than the creation of a child

would not be protected by the constitutional rights of privacy and liberty that protect reproductive
F-7

decisions. Consequently, a governmental regulation or ban of such research would not have to

have such stringent justification. It would be constitutional so long as it was rationally related to

an important governmental purpose. Under such an analysis, a court could uphold restrictions that

require that sufficient animal research be done in advance. Moreover, it would be permissible to

require the scientists proposing the research to have “the burden of proving that the research is

vital, cannot be conducted any other way, and is unlikely to produce harm to society.”

36

C. Parenthood Issues

Current state laws addressing parentage, including paternity acts, surrogacy statutes, and egg

donation statutes, are not broad enough to address the multitude of parentage issues raised by the

process of cloning through nuclear transfer. The process of cloning will result in a child having

genetic material from as many as four individuals: the person from whom the cell nucleus was

derived, that individual’s biological parents, and the woman contributing the enucleated egg cell

which contains a small fraction of DNA in the mitochondria. In addition, if the egg with the 37

transferred nucleic material is implanted in a surrogate gestational mother, the child will have two

other potential parents— the gestator and, if she is married, her husband. The latter will have

rights (even though he has no biological connection to the child) based on the common law

presumption that if a woman gives birth within marriage, her husband is the child’s legal father, or

in some states, based on specific statutes holding that the surrogate and her husband are the legal

parents of a child she has gestated, regardless of their genetic contribution. There may also be 38

intended rearing parents unrelated to the individual who is cloned; this may occur when the cloned

individual is deceased, a celebrity, or a favorite relative.

Various contributors in the cloning arrangements will have legal rights and responsibilities

with respect to the resulting child. Since the clone is a twin to the cloned individual, the latter’s

parents could be recognized as legal parents. They certainly would be identified as the parents

under DNA paternity testing. Yet, given that they will likely have not made the decision to create

offspring (in fact, they may be dead at the time their own offspring is cloned), it seems unfair to

designate them as the legal parents. It is also not in keeping with a perspective that considers

preconception intent as a relevant factor for determining parenthood in the context of assisted

reproduction.

In many states, the woman who gives birth is considered to be the legal mother and her

husband the legal father of any resulting child. Under statutes in Arizona and Utah, this holds true

even when the surrogate is gestating an embryo with no genetic relationship to her. Only in

Florida, New Hampshire, North Dakota, and Virginia do court-approved gestational surrogacy

arrangements result in the intended parents— not the surrogate— being viewed as the legal

parents. However, these four states have leeway for denial of parenthood to people who clone.

The laws allow only married individuals to contract with gestational surrogates (thus not applying

to the unmarried individual who clones himself or herself). Virginia also allows judges the leeway

to deny gestational surrogacy based on psychological examination of the intended parents. Some

would argue that the desire to clone oneself is evidence of psychological disturbance.
F-8

The person who clones himself or herself could try to establish paternity (or maternity)

under the state paternity statute. If such individuals are denied use of the provisions allowing

“mothers” and “fathers” (because they do not seem to fit traditional conceptions of that role), they

might be able nonetheless to go forward under the provisions in at least 13 states that allow

“interested persons” to bring a paternity action. Such an action could be challenged by one of 39

the other rights holders, though, such as the cloned individual’s parents or the gestational

surrogate.

The state laws for blood testing to prove paternity may or may not be useful to the

individual who wishes to prove he or she is the “parent” of his or her clone. The laws provide for

a wide range of such tests— from HLA typing to DNA tests. If one of the less precise tests were

used, the individual whose nucleic material was used might have a match that makes it appear that

he or she is the “parent” and might be declared the legal parent on those grounds. However, if

DNA testing were used, the nucleus provider would clearly have the pattern closer to that of a

twin (a nearly 100% match) rather than a parent (50% match). It is not clear what a judge would

make of such information. The legal standard for paternity is often a particular probability of

being a parent. For example, in Mississippi, the blood test must show that there is a statistical

probability of paternity of 98% or greater. So, the judge’s ideas about paternity and parenthood,

rather than the DNA test, would be determinative of whether the nucleus provider was declared

the parent of the clone. The nucleus donor’s claim to the rights and responsibilities of parenthood

would be bolstered under doctrines and cases that give weight to preconception intent in

recognizing legal parenthood.40

If a couple creates a child who is the clone of a loved one or an unrelated individual

chosen for that person’s valued traits, parenting rights would also be dispersed across individuals.

If the wife carried the clone to term, the couple would be protected by legal presumptions

assigning parenthood to the birth mother and her husband. If paternity testing were done,

however, the parents of the cloned individual (and maybe the cloned individual himself or herself)

might be able to assert rights to the child.

THE GOALS OF CLONING RESEARCH

A. How Is Cloning Performed?

“Cloning” is the manipulation of a cell from an animal or human in such a way that it grows into a

copy of that animal with identical nucleic DNA. The clone will not be 100% genetically similar 41

because it will have mitochondrial DNA from the egg donor. In the case of Dolly, an adult 42

mammary cell which contains a copy of every gene needed to make the lamb was extracted and

then starved of its nutrients in order for the cell to enter a quiescent state. This cell was then 43

fused with an enucleated egg cell— one in which the nucleus has been extracted— and an electric

current was run through the fused cell, activating the dormant cell and causing it to begin to

divide. These divided cells were then implanted into a surrogate mother and carried to term.44
F-9

B. What Are the Uses for Cloning Technology in Animals?

Dolly was not cloned primarily for scientific purposes, but rather for commercial ones. Dr. Wilmut

and the Roslin Institute had created a means for sheep to be engineered to express pharmaceutical

products in their breast milk. The company that funded the research, PPL Therapeutics, P.L.C. of

Edinburgh, applied for a patent on the technique. Dr. Wimut’s goal in creating Dolly was to find a

method to produce “consistent” transgenic animals. Dr. Wilmut has stated that his idea is to 45

create one transgenically beneficial animal, for whatever scientific or commercial purposes, and

then to clone that animal until a small herd is achieved, where reproduction of the animal would 46

be continued by alternative methods to avoid the problem of “species suicide.” Cloning animals is

seen as beneficial both to the pharmaceutical industry and to agriculture.

This notion of consistent animals is of particular importance to the pharmaceutical

industry, where clones may prove to be the most beneficial. Dr. Wilmut has stated that medically 47

useful transgenic sheep and cows would be created, and those animals could then be cloned, thus

creating walking biomedical factories. The greatest area of promise in pharmacology seems to be 48

in the area of genetically manipulating animals whose milk will contain useful proteins, such as

blood-clotting amino acids to be used in treating hemophilia. Dr. Wilmut states that the Roslin 49

Institute “is confident that it will be possible within two or three years to produce farm animals

that will produce in their milk proteins to treat human diseases.”

50

In addition, cloning may provide another method of reproducing cattle and sheep.51

Increasing the cattle and sheep population could lead to an increase in the world’s food supply by

producing more milk from smaller herds. For example, cows could produce 30,000 to 40,000

pounds of milk per year as opposed to the average 13,000 pounds per year they now produce.52

With herd sizes reduced, land which is currently used for cattle and sheep grazing could be

devoted to raising grain and other crops.53

Another proposed benefit of cloning is the proliferation of champion breeding stock.

Champion bulls, dogs, horses, and sheep would all serve to produce either more food and wool or

greater contributions to human entertainment. The proposition of cloning existing adults seems 54

advantageous over embryo cloning— twinning— because in twinning, one is not absolutely certain

of the sort of animal— or human— the twinned embryos will become. Accordingly, with this new

nuclear transplantation technique, it is possible to clone only the “best” existing animals, or those

with the most desirable traits. Once the desired animal is created, it is theoretically possible to

make as many copies as desired.55

C. What Are the Proposed Uses for Cloning Research in Humans?

Many proposed uses of cloning technology in humans have been offered, ranging from the

scientifically interesting through the medically useful to the bizarre. Cloning technology may be

useful in understanding the mechanisms of disease and in developing treatments; in creating organ

and tissue reserves; in creating children for individuals and couples; and in immortalizing oneself,
F-10

loved ones, or important individuals. It is likely that one or more of these will be attempted. “In

science, the one rule is that what can be done will be done,” said Rabbi Moses Tendler, professor

of medical ethics at Yeshiva University.56

1. Disease Research and Treatment

Dr. Wilmut has stated that his objective in creating Dolly was merely to “build a better glass of

milk.” However, the implications of his research might possibly benefit humans in additional 57

ways. Cloning research technology could help increase understanding of how genes turn on and

off and why cells divide, leading to potential treatments for genetic diseases, cancer, and

neurological traumas. It could also help researchers to understand, and potentially reverse, the

aging process.

Cloning research might lead to greater understanding of the intricacies of the cellular life

cycle, potentially allowing control and manipulation of this cycle. Cloning research, specifically 58

nuclear transplantation, promises scientists the opportunity to learn how to “starve” mature,

differentiated cells and reactivate their DNA, thus causing differentiated cells’ genes to revert to

their most primitive state. By redirecting cells to act as they do in their embryological state, 59

scientists can learn how to direct, or grow, these cells in the manner they wish, ultimately leading

to control of the development of normal and abnormal cells. Thus, cloning technology may lead 60

scientists to discover why cancerous cells mutate, revert to an embryonic stage, and then

uncontrollably divide. Such technology might also allow researchers to go one step further and 61

take differentiated cells from anywhere in a patient’s body and redirect the cells into other sorts of

cells, such as brain cells to treat Parkinson’s disease or lung cells to treat cystic fibrosis.62

Cloning research might possibly lead to enhanced understanding of how genes operate and how

they can be manipulated to cure and prevent diseases. Neuroscience may also benefit from 63

cloning techniques by enhancing understanding of why spinal cord tissue, brain tissue, and heart

muscle do not regenerate after injury.64

Many of the questions that cloning research would address could also be addressed in

other ways, however, so it is not known whether human cloning is necessary to provide these

benefits. One researcher has speculated, for example, that cloning research will have only a 65

“modest role” in the field of developmental biology.66

2. Reproductive Technology

Cloning research may lead to greater insights into the mechanisms of human reproduction— for

example, by enhancing understanding of the high rate of spontaneous abortions in natural

situations. Such research could lead to infertility treatments. 67

Beyond scientific research in cloned tissue, the cloning of complete individuals raises the

potential for individuals to create children. Numerous forms of noncoital reproduction have
F-11

developed over the past two decades, including in vitro fertilization, egg donation, embryo

donation, and surrogate motherhood. Some of the individuals who currently provide assisted

reproductive services envision a role for cloning as well.

If both members of a couple are infertile, they may wish to clone one or the other of

themselves. If one member of the couple has a genetic disorder that the couple does not wish to 68

pass on to a child, the unaffected member of the couple could be cloned. In addition, if both

husband and wife are carriers of a debilitating recessive genetic disease and are unwilling to run

the 25% risk of bearing a child with the disorder, they may seek to clone one or the other of

them. This may be the only way in which the couple will be willing to have a child that will carry 69

on their genetic line. In the future, these couples might also wish to avail themselves of gene

therapy on the resulting embryos, which is not currently possible, to eliminate undesirable

hereditary genetic traits in their cloned children. This combination of techniques would be similar 70

to the ones that led ultimately to the creation of Dolly.

Charles Strom, director of genetics and the DNA laboratory at Illinois Masonic Medical

Center, argues that the high rate of embryo death that has occurred in animal cloning should not

dissuade people from considering cloning as a legitimate reproductive technique. Strom points 71

out that all new reproductive technologies have been marred by high failure rates, and that it is

just a matter of time before cloning could be as economically efficient as any other form of

artificial reproduction.72

Even people who could reproduce coitally may desire to clone for a variety of reasons.

People may want to clone themselves, deceased or living loved ones, or individuals with favored

traits. A wealthy childless individual may wish to clone himself or herself to have an heir or to

continue to control a family business. Parents who are unable to have another child may want to

clone their dying child. This is not unlike the current situation in which a couple whose daughter 73

died is making arrangements to have her cryopreserved in vitro embryo implanted in a surrogate

mother in an attempt to recreate the daughter.74

Additionally, a person with favored traits could be cloned. Respected world figures and

celebrities such as Mother Teresa, Michael Jordan, and Michelle Pfeiffer have been suggested as

candidates for cloning. Less well-known individuals could also be cloned for specific traits. For

example, people with a high pain threshold or resistance to radiation could be cloned. People 75

who can perform a particular job well, such as soldiers, might be cloned. One biologist 76

suggested cloning legless men for the low gravitational field and cramped quarters of a space

ship.77

Others worry that immortalizing people will lead to an inherently discriminatory practice

of selecting only the “best” to be immortalized. For many people, the notion of cloning superior 78

or important historical figures is simply too closely related to the practice of eugenics. Also, some

believe that no one should be deciding which humans are worthy of cloning. Would it be the 79

scientists themselves, or should government officials decide? Arthur Caplan, director of the 80
F-12

Center for Bioethics at the University of Pennsylvania, stated that history has taught us frightening

lessons “from Nazi Germany to Bosnia, of the evils humans can do when they set values on one

another according to biological or inherited traits.”

81

3. Organ and Tissue Reserve

Human cloning research might provide insights that could be valuable in the field of organ

transplantation. National Institutes of Health director Dr. Harold Varmus stated that possibly one

area of cloning research might provide methods of growing skin, which could then be used in

grafting for burn victims and patients with skin-destroying diseases. He explained that nuclear 82

transplantation cloning technology, by enhancing an “understanding of how genes are turned off

and on and how we can make different kinds of cell types, not whole human beings, but different

kinds of human tissues for transplantation and for treatment of disease, offers tremendous

prospects.”

83

Beyond basic scientific research and the development of a technology to create organs in

vitro, it has been suggested that clones could be created to donate non-essential organs like

kidneys and blood. John Fletcher, former bioethicist from the National Institutes of Health, 84

stated that “[i]t is hard to argue against the idea of a family’s loving a child so much that it will

happily raise another, identical child so that one of its kidneys or a bit of its marrow might allow

the first to live. . . . The reasons for opposing this are not easy to argue.” More generally, John 85

Robertson advocates cloning a “backup supply of embryos from which tissue or organs could be

obtained if a tragedy befell a first child.”

86

It has been suggested that a person suffering from leukemia could be cloned, the resulting

fetus’s marrow could be extracted in utero, and then the cloned fetus could be aborted in utero,

thus avoiding some of the fears that clones would be treated as second-class citizens. Jeffrey 87

Kluger argues that cloned organ banking is the ultimate realism of the Maoist Chinese belief that

individuals are “uberorganistic,” or a collection of multicellular parts to be die-cast as needed.88

Cloning a person for an organ reserve would be futile if the resulting individual had the same

diseased organ, however. But situations may arise in which an organ transplant may be needed as

the result of injury or nongenetic illness.

Ursula Goodenough, a cell biologist from Washington University, raised an additional

application of cloning— to allow reproduction without men. If females cloned themselves, men 89

would be “superfluous” in reproduction, leading to a world where men may eventually be phased

out entirely— the ultimate “feminist utopia.” From the beginning of Wilmut’s announcement of 90

Dolly, commentators have discussed the implications of “virgin birth,” or of a woman giving birth

to her twin. Ann Northrop, a columnist for the New York gay newspaper LGNY, says that 91

nuclear transplantation is enticing to gays and lesbians because it offers them a means of

reproduction and “has the potential of giving women complete control over reproduction.”

92

“This is sort of the final nail in men’s coffins. Men are going to have a very hard time justifying
F-13

their existence on this planet, I think. Maybe women may not let men reproduce,” said

Northrop.93

Also, Clone Rights United Front, a group of gay activists based in New York, have been

demonstrating against the proposed New York legislation which would ban nuclear

transplantation research and human cloning. They oppose such a ban because they see human

cloning as a significant means of legitimizing “same-sex reproduction.” Randolfe Wicker 94

founded the Clone Rights United Front in order to pressure legislators not to ban human cloning

research, because he sees nuclear transplantation cloning as an inalienable reproductive right.95

Wicker stated, “We’re fighting for research, and we’re defending people’s reproductive rights. . . .

I realize my clone would be my identical twin, and my identical twin has a right to be born.”

96

THE POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF CLONING

A. Problems in Application to Humans

There is widespread consensus that human cloning research should not be undertaken at this time.

Before such a step is undertaken, further animal research is necessary. Princeton University

biologist Dr. Shirley Tilghman has indicated that it is a long-term project to determine the risks in

animals.97

There are many concerns about the potential danger of treatments based on cloning

techniques and risks of cloning whole individuals. The high rate of laboratory deaths may suggest

that cloning in fact damages the DNA of a cell, and scientists urge that Dolly should be closely

monitored for abnormal genetic anomalies which did not kill her as a fetus but may have

long-term harmful effects. Dr. Wilmut warns that when thinking of applying nuclear 98

transplantation as a means of human reproduction, one “shouldn’t underestimate the difficulties of

this [nuclear transplantation] research.”

99

It is unclear whether the animal research could be successfully generalized to humans. For

example, all of the initial frog cloning experiments succeeded only to the point of the amphibian’s

tadpole stage. In addition, some of the tadpoles were grossly malformed. Thus, there is fear 100 101

that initial trials in human nuclear transplantation would also meet with disastrous results. Drs. 102

Wilmut and Varmus, testifying before Congress, specifically raised the concern that animalcloning technology is not scientifically ready to be applied to human cloning research, even if it

were permitted, because there are technical questions which can be answered only by continued

animal research. Dr. Wilmut is specifically concerned with the ethical issue which would be 103

raised by any “defective births” which may be likely to occur if nuclear transplantation is

attempted with humans.104

In addition, if all the genes in the adult DNA are not properly reactivated, there might be a

problem at a later developmental stage in the resulting clone. Some differentiated cells 105
F-14

rearrange a subset of their genes. For example, immune cells rearrange some of their genes to

make surface molecules. That rearrangement could cause a problem for the resulting clone. 106

Moreover, human cloning research may not lead readily to treatments. In sheep embryos,

the genes from the donor cell do not turn on until the egg has divided three or four times. In

humans, by contrast, the genes turn on after two divisions. Although the difference may seem

insignificant, Colin Stewart, from the National Cancer Institute, warns that the problem may lie in

the fact that this rapid “turn-on time” may make it impossible to act quickly enough to catch the

disease where its cancerous cells could be effectively and adequately quashed. Additionally, for 107

cancers which appear to be inheritable, such as the BRCA-1 mutation, there is no reason to

assume that the cells will not mutate into other cancers or that the manipulation of the cancerous

cells by these techniques will not further irritate the cells and worsen the original condition.108

Also, because scientists do not fully understand the cellular aging process, scientists do

not know what “age” or “genetic clock” Dolly inherited. On a cellular level, is she now a 109

normal seven-month-old lamb, or is she six years old (the age of the mammary donor cell)?110

Colin Stewart believes that Dolly’s cells most likely are set to the genetic clock of the nucleus

donor, and therefore are comparable to those of her six-year-old progenitor. One commentator 111

stated that if the hypotheses of a cellular, self-regulating genetic clock are correct, clones would

be cellularly programmed to have much shorter life spans than the “original,” which would

seriously undermine many of the benefits which have been set forth in support of cloning— mostly

agricultural justifications— and would psychologically lead people to view cloned animals and

humans as short-lived, disposable copies. This concern for premature aging has lead Dr. 112

Sherman Elias, geneticist and obstetrician at the Baylor College of Medicine, to call for further

animal testing of nuclear transplantation as a safeguard against subjecting human clones to

premature aging and the potential harms associated with aged cells.113

The hidden mutations that may be passed on by using an adult cell raise concerns as well.

“[Mutations are] a problem with every cell, and you don’t even know where to check for them,”

writes Ralph Brinster of the University of Pennsylvania. “If a brain cell is infected with a mutant 114

skin cell, you would not know because it would not affect the way the cell develops because it is

inactive. If you chose the wrong cell, then mutations would become apparent.”

115

Moreover, even if cloning were successful, it could lead to physical harm to the individual

created, such as when the latter individual is subjected to physically invasive procedures to supply

organs for transplants. Father Richard McCormick has said that to use a clone as a bank of

potential organs and blood for donation is wrong; and one writer, Kenneth L. Woodward, called

the practice an “inherently evil, morally unjustifiable intrusion into the human life.” Many feel 116

that the manner in which a clone comes into existence should not affect the dignity or the rights

the clone is granted. Therefore, notes Leon Kass, the clone should be treated as other humans are,

and the notion of setting up a reserve of organs would be akin to slavery.117
F-15

B. Potential Psychological Impacts of Cloning Whole Individuals

There are concerns about the psychological impacts of cloning, both on the person whose DNA is

used to create the clone and the resulting offspring. Psychologists worry that the mental health of

the original may suffer from seeing himself or herself cloned. Many originals may feel that a clone

would give them a second chance at life or an opportunity to change their own fate. However, 118

it could be too psychologically confusing and distressing for the originals to see themselves as

children if they are not pleased about aging. Similarly, if the original sees the clone as a chance to

correct fate, then the pressure placed on the clone would harm both the original and the clone.119

Mixing parental and twin roles could be psychologically harmful to the parent and the

clone. “For the clonant to have as his parent the foreknower and creator of every one of his

genetic predispositions might well make child adjustment exponentially more difficult,” argues

Francis Pizzulli.120

Thomas Murray worries about the self-identity of the clone when the clone finds out how

he or she was conceived: “[H]uman beings tend to insist on finding meanings in relationships that

it’s not clear animals do.” Murray points out that an animal probably does not care about its 121

conception, while a human does. It is often observed that adopted children feel a psychological

compulsion to find their biological parents, for a number of reasons, including simple curiosity

about their “genetic roots.” Therefore, it is likely that human clones would experience the same

compulsion to find the “original” from whom they were created. Just as “illegitimate children”

historically were psychologically harmed and socially discriminated against, the children created

by cloning might have problems, particularly where the replicant is ethically or religiously opposed

to nuclear transplantation cloning. Similarly, in situations where a clone is created without the

consent of the original, the potential rejection and hostility which the original may feel toward his

or her cloned twin would be undeniably harmful to the clone’s psyche.

Cloning could undermine human dignity by threatening the replicant’s sense of self and

sense of autonomy. Cloning represents the potential for “[a]buses of the power to control another

person’s destiny— both psychological and physical— of an unprecedented order. . . .” Pizzulli 122

points out that legal discussions of whether the replicant is the property of the cloned individual,

the same person as the cloned individual, or a resource for organs all show how easily the

replicant’s own autonomy can be swept aside.123

Unlike a naturally occurring twin, the replicant “is deliberately infused with a

predetermined genetic identity.” He is “saddled with a genotype that has already lived.”

124 125

Pizzulli notes that “a clonant’s genetic identity not only deprives him of a unique genotype but

also has a detrimental impact upon his ability to experience a unique ‘social environment’ (i.e.,

physical and psychological stimuli that interact with his genotype subsequent to conception).”

126

Cloning, notes Pizzulli, “raises issues that go to the very nature of the individuality which is

implicit in any legal order.” He points out, “[a]rguably a person cloned from a departed loved 127

one has less chance of being loved solely for his own intrinsic worth.”

128
F-16

Another problem is that the clone has lost the ability to control disclosure of intimate

personal information. This may threaten the individual’s self-image. Studies of people’s

129 130

responses to genetic testing information show that learning genetic information about oneself

(whether it is positive or negative information) can harm one’s self-image. The replicant 131

individual may be made to feel that he or she is less of a free agent. Laurence Tribe argues that if

one’s genetic makeup is subject to prior determination, “one’s ability to conceive of oneself as a

free and rational being entitled to resist various social claims may gradually weaken and might

finally disappear altogether.” Under such an analysis, it does not matter whether or not genetics 132

actually determines a person’s characteristics. Having a predetermined genetic makeup can be

limiting if the person rearing the replicant, and/or the replicant, believes in genetic determinism.133

C. Potential Social Impacts of Cloning

Concerns have also been raised about the overall social impact of allowing people to create

children through cloning. A general argument is made against cloning on the grounds that it is

unnatural, but what is natural is historically bound and changes as technology becomes available.

Contraception changed the natural assumption of the link between sex and procreation. Artificial

insemination and in vitro fertilization further changed this assumption by showing that it was

possible to procreate without sex. Joshua Lederberg argues that artificial reproduction is only as

bizarre and new as sexual reproduction was at an earlier stage in evolution. In addition, Joseph 134

Fletcher has argued that the “natural” should not be privileged. He states:

[L]aboratory reproduction is radically human compared to conception by . . .

heterosexual intercourse. It is willed, chosen, proposed and controlled, and surely

these are among the traits that distinguish Homo sapiens from others in the animal

genus. . . . Coital reproduction is, therefore, less human than laboratory

reproduction . . . with our separation of baby making from lovemaking both

become more human because they are matters of choice, and not chance. This is

. . . essentially the case for planned parenthood. I cannot see how either humanity

or morality are served by genetic roulette.135

Even though labeling cloning as unnatural may not provide an appropriate policy reason to

ban it, the social impacts of such a departure from the usual means of creating children must be

factored into the policy analysis. There is concern that cloning will interfere with evolution.

Because cloning promotes genetic uniformity, cloning increases the danger that a disease might

arise in the future to which the resulting clones have no resistance. George Johnson, professor 136

of biology at Washington University, an evolutionist, opposes cloning because “genetic variation

is the chief defense our species has against an uncertain future. If we strip ourselves of it, even

partially, is to endanger our species.” What has allowed the human species to survive is genetic 137

adaptation, and producing genetically identical humans would therefore be threatening to the

species. Also, it is not clear yet whether all or a high proportion of children created through 138

nuclear transplantation will be sterile, which may affect the potential for humans to procreate in

the traditional manner. However, some commentators argue that if human cloning is restricted 139
F-17

to only very rare cases, then the evolution of the human species should not be stunted nor the

human gene pool disturbed any more than the gene pool is currently affected by naturally

occurring identical twins.140

Philippe Stroot, a spokesperson for World Health Organization, condemned human

cloning as “ethically unacceptable” because it threatens human evolution not only by destroying 141

genetic diversity, but also by posing risks of transmitting diseases from the original to the clone,

and, if transgenic manipulation is allowed, by transmitting diseases from animal species to

humans. Stroot stated that there are always concerns associated with medical technologies 142

which involve the introduction of interspecies cells into one another, and that the potential for

harm created by transgenic animals and humans must be closely monitored. Future generations 143

may be harmed if cloning is used extensively, since they would be limited only to the narrow range

of acceptable genotypes left after a particular generation has instituted a cloning program.144

There are also concerns about the changes that cloning could bring to the institution of the

family. Boston College theologian Lisa Sowhill Cahill is concerned with the commodification of

human beings and their genes and the manipulation of human genetics to achieve more socially

desirable children. Allen Verhey, a Protestant ethicist at Hope College in Holland, Michigan, 145

warns that cloning would desensitize society into regarding all children, particularly cloned

children, as “products.”

146

A wide range of opponents— from Pope John Paul to Senator Connie Mack to health 147

law expert George Annas to Dr. Wilmut — feel that nuclear transplantation cheapens not only 148

the life of the clone but that of all humanity. Opponents envision a world where clones are 149

“cannibalized for spare parts,” or are made solely for medical purposes, asked to donate their 150

organs, and are then forever treated “like second class citizens.”

151

Cloning may also have negative impacts on legal concepts. Pizzulli points out that

“(a) privacy and autonomy might be severely attenuated in one known by himself or others to

have a predetermined genetic identity; and (b) irrespective of personal and/or public knowledge of

one’s clonal origins, the technology of cloning might have macro-effects upon society by eroding

the concept of individuality which is at the core of our notions of privacy and autonomy.” In 152

addition to weakening an individual’s sense of free will, cloning would “weaken the social

constructs and political institutions that serve to foster the exercise of individual autonomy and to

inhibit the coercive manipulation of individuals.”

153

There have been religious arguments against cloning as well. Within the week after Dolly’s

story became public, the Vatican called for a global ban on cloning. According to the Pontiff, 154

the creation of life outside of marriage goes against God’s plan. Additionally, according to the

Pontiff, out of respect for animals, all cloning of animals should be abandoned as well.155
F-18

EXISTING LAWS THAT COULD RESTRICT CLONING

Are there existing state laws that would ban human cloning as either a scientific research

technique to study cells and tissue or as a new means to create whole persons? The only existing

legal regulation that speaks directly to cloning is the federal ban on cloning using federal funds.

Proposed laws on the subject are under consideration, but until they are passed, the analysis of 156

whether a particular state restricts cloning requires scrutiny of statutes which were adopted for

other purposes. In addition to the statutory precedents, criminal and tort law precedents in many

states create an obligation on the part of scientists and clinicians to exercise due care when they

undertake research or innovative therapy with respect to embryos and fetuses. Moreover, 157

constitutional principles must be considered in determining whether the application of such

precedents to cloning is appropriate.158

A. State Statutes Governing Research on Embryos

There are ten states which have laws regulating research and/or experimentation on embryos,

preembryos, fetuses, conceptuses, or unborn children which arguably may apply to cloning

research. The difficulty in discerning whether any of the states’ regulations could reach cloning 159

is primarily definitional. Each statute approaches the prohibited activities in a slightly different

way, and thus a close analysis is necessary to determine whether cloning is within a particular

statute’s reach. Among the questions to be addressed are whether the cloning technique fits the

definition of “research” or “experimentation”; whether the entity being researched upon fits the

definition of Alive” and, depending on the state, “preembryo,” “embryo,” “fetus,” “conceptus,” or

“unborn child”; and whether nucleic transfer can be considered to involve “fertilization.”

Eight of the states prohibit some form of research on some product of conception,

referred to in the statutes as a conceptus, embryo, fetus, or unborn child. An argument 160 161 162 163

could be made that the experimentation is being done on an egg, not the product of conception,

and thus these statutes should not apply. By the time the egg is renucleated, the experiment or

research (which is prohibited) has already been completed. Since the statutes would not apply

until after the cloning procedure is completed, it could be argued that the most protection these

statutes supply would be protection from experimentation after the renucleation; it would not

prevent the cloning itself.

The statutes are ambiguous. On the one hand, it could be argued that the statutes should

not cover cloning, particularly since it was not within the original contemplation of the laws’

drafters. On the other hand, it could be argued that the spirit of the legislation is to protect the

beginning of human life and so the statutes would apply.164

The analysis is further complicated in states that define the term conceptus or unborn child

as the product of “fertilization.” Whether Minnesota’s and Pennsylvania’s statutes would apply to

cloning turns on whether the term “fertilization” includes cloning. Minnesota’s statute bans

research on a “living conceptus,” created in utero or ex utero, “from fertilization through 265
F-19

days thereafter.” Since fertilization is not defined, a court might turn to a dictionary definition: 165

“the process of union of two germ cells whereby the somatic chromosome number is restored and

the development of a new individual is initiated . . . .” Cloning is not the union of two germ 166

cells, but this process does restore the somatic chromosome number, and the development of a

new individual is initiated. The two most important elements of fertilization are satisfied, and the

third merely explains the only way previously known to accomplish the first two. Thus

fertilization could be interpreted to include cloning. The 265-day period of coverage in the

Minnesota statute potentially creates a loophole, though. If an embryo is created through cloning,

it could be argued that if it is cryopreserved for 265 days after “fertilization,” it could be

experimented upon thereafter.

Pennsylvania prohibits nontherapeutic experimentation and nontherapeutic medical

procedures on an “unborn child,” which is defined as being an organism of the species of homo 167

sapiens from fertilization to live birth. Fertilization, in turn, is defined as the fusion of a human 168

spermatozoa with a human ovum. Like Minnesota, then, the reach of the statute would depend in

part on whether the definition of fertilization was stretched to cover nucleic transfer.

Pennsylvania’s law is open to an additional challenge. The statute’s use of the term “unborn child”

might allow for an argument that it should not be interpreted to cover cloning research which is

not intended to lead to birth.

A further complication is presented by the fact that six of the statutes apply to “live”

fetuses only. Two of the statutes— Florida and Maine — do not define “live” but it is likely 169 170 171

that a court would determine that the product of cloning research was live.

In the other four states that provide protection for “live fetuses,” a fetus is defined as

being “live” at that time when “in the best medical judgment of a physician, it shows evidence of

life as determined by the same medical standards as are used in determining evidence of life in a

spontaneously aborted fetus at approximately the same stage of gestational development.”

172

Whether these statutes would apply to the new cloning technique is a medical determination. If

they are to apply, Massachusetts, North Dakota, and Rhode Island would prohibit all research or

experimentation, while Michigan would prohibit only non-therapeutic research and 173

experimentation.174

Some of the states that ban research and/or experimentation on fetuses have exceptions if

the activity is necessary to preserve the life or health of the fetus. An argument could be made 175

that these statutes might create an exception for cloning whole individuals, because without the

very procedure the statute would regulate, the fetus would not be alive to preserve. John

Robertson argues that, in cloning, “the intent there is actually to benefit that child by bringing it

into being so if one views it somehow as experimentation on the expected child I would think it

should be classified as experimentation for its benefit and thus would fall within recognized

exceptions when experimentation can occur.” However, a court would be unlikely to find such 176

an argument persuasive; a court is likely to hold that the procedure needs to be therapeutic to an

already existing fetus.
F-20

Two statutes have provisions that are particularly likely to be applied to cloning. The New

Hampshire law does not allow a preembryo to develop ex utero past 14 days after fertilization,

which would appear to allow cellular-level and genetic-level cloning research during that period.

However, New Hampshire’s statute prevents a “preembryo” that has been used for research from

being transferred to a uterine cavity. The statute’s concern is clearly to prevent the birth of a 177

researched-upon individual. New Hampshire’s statute would completely ban cloning research that

leads to a birth (until such time as there is an artificial womb perfected, since the statute only 178

prohibits implantation into a uterine cavity).

Louisiana has the most far-reaching statute. Louisiana’s statute protects an “in vitro

fertilized human ovum . . . composed of one or more living human cells and human genetic

material so unified and organized that it will develop in utero into an unborn child.” Although 179

the same arguments as above may be made about the definition of fertilization, they seem

unnecessary because the definition of “in vitro fertilized ovum” is broad enough to include any

human cells destined to become children. Accepting this interpretation, the entire statute applies

to cloning. A renucleated oocyte is certainly one human cell and human genetic material,

presumably alive, and so unified that it will develop into an unborn child. The Louisiana statute

would bestow various rights upon the clone. Under the Louisiana statute, the resulting in vitro

fertilized ovum can be used only for support and contribution of the complete development of

human in utero implantation; it cannot be cultured or farmed solely for research, is deemed a 180 181

juridical person, must be given an identity, can sue and be sued, has a right to 182 183 184

confidentiality, is a biological human being which is not property, may not be destroyed, 185 186 187

and is owed a high duty of care; and all disputes regarding the in vitro fertilized human ovum 188

shall be resolved in the best interest of the in vitro fertilized human ovum.189

The Louisiana statute specifies the relation of the resulting embryo to other persons and

the duties owed by others to it. An in vitro embryo is not property. If parents reveal their 190

identities, their rights as parents of the fertilized ovum are preserved; otherwise, the physician or a

court-appointed curator is its guardian. The gamete donors owe the in vitro embryo a “high 191

duty of care and prudent administration.” The donors may renounce their rights generally, in 192

which case the embryo is placed for “adoptive implantationy,” or in favor of a couple willing and

able to accept the embryo. Neither couple may pay or receive compensation to renounce 193

parental rights. Disputes involving the embryo are to be determined in the embryo’s best 194

interests.195

The physician who caused the in vitro fertilization is directly responsible for the embryo’s

safekeeping in vitro. The physician, hospital, and clinic are not strictly liable for any screening, 196

collection, conservation, preparation, transfer, or cryopreservation procedure undertaken in good

faith. This immunity, however, appears to only apply to actions brought on behalf of an in vitro

embryo as a juridical person.197

The Louisiana statuteq would severely limit or prevent some of the uses that have been suggested

for cloning, such as cloning for body parts, and would settle the question of whether a clone is a
F-21

separate person or an extension of the original. It creates an anomalous situation, however, where

research would be prohibited on cloned cells but there would be no specific ban on cloning a

whole individual. The latter activity would seem to be permissible under the provision saying that

an in vitro fertilized ovum may be used “solely for the support and contribution of the complete

development of human in utero implantation.”

198

The states vary in the type of penalties they impose for violation of the fetal research laws.

In some states, violation of the fetal research law is considered to be unprofessional conduct,199

creating the potential for a physician/researcher who violates the law to lose his or her license to

practice medicine. In other jurisdictions, the violation of such laws can subject the researcher to a

fine and imprisonment.200

The Massachusetts statute creates an elaborate regulatory mechanism providing for public

and private actions to enforce the law. When a proposal for research on fetuses is approved, the

written approval by the Institutional Review Board must be filed with the local District

Attorney. The approval is open for public inspection. If the District Attorney believes that the 201

proposed procedure is prohibited, he or she shall file a complaint, giving notice to the

Commissioner of Public Health, who in turn gives notice to all licensed medical schools and other

institutions in the state that may be affected by a judgment in the case. The statute authorizes a 202

broad class of people or institutions potentially affected by the judgment to intervene in the

case. The trial on the merits must be without a jury, and any judgment must be published in 203 204

newspapers and sent to licensed hospitals and medical schools. There is also a procedure for 205

researchers to bring a declaratory judgment action to determine whether a proposed procedure

violates the provisions of the statute.206

In addition to questions of statutory interpretation, the state laws that have general bans

on embryo research or experimentation may be challenged as unconstitutional for being

impermissibly vague. Such laws have already been struck down in three states on those grounds.

In Lifchez v. Hartigan, the ban on experimentation on embryos was unconstitutionally vague

because it failed to define the terms “experimentation” and Atherapeutic.” The court pointed 207

out that there are multiple meanings of the term “experimentation.” It could mean pure 208

research, with no direct benefit to the subject. It could mean a procedure that is not sufficiently

tested so that the outcome is predictable, or that departs from present-day practice. It could mean

a procedure performed by a practitioner or clinic for the first time. Or it could mean routine

treatment on a new patient. Since the statute did not define the term, it violated researchers’ and

clinicians’ due process rights under the Fifth Amendment since it forced them to guess whether

their conduct was unlawful.209

A similar result was reached by a federal appellate court assessing the constitutionality of a

Louisiana law prohibiting nontherapeutic experimentation on fetuses in Margaret S. v.

Edwards. The appeals court declared the law unconstitutional because the term 210

“experimentation” was so vague it did not give researchers adequate notice about what type of

conduct was banned. The court said that the term “experimentation” was impermissibly 211
F-22

vague since physicians do not and cannot distinguish clearly between medical experimentation 212

and medical tests. The court noted that “even medical treatment can be reasonably described as 213

both a test and an experiment.” This is the case, for example, “whenever the results of the 214

treatment are observed, recorded, and introduced into the data base that one or more physicians

use in seeking better therapeutic methods.”

215

A third case struck down as vague the Utah statute that provided that “live unborn

children may not be used for experimentation, but when advisable, in the best medical judgment of

the physician, may be tested for genetic defects.” The Tenth Circuit held that “[b]ecause there 216

are several competing and equally viable definitions, the term ‘experimentation’ does not place

health care providers on adequate notice of the legality of their conduct.” A petition for 217

certiorari was filed in the U.S. Supreme Court in this case on March 18, 1997.

It should be noted, however, that the vagueness claim could be avoided if the state or

federal government ban included more explicit language. For example, the proposed federal

cloning ban, S. 368, would not be unconstitutionally vague. It prohibits “the replication of a

human individual by the taking of a cell with genetic material and the cultivation of the cell

through the egg, embryo, fetal and newborn stages into a new human individual.”

218

B. The Reach of Laws Governing In Vitro Fertilization

and Assisted Reproductive Technology

Cloning procedures for reproductive purposes would be subject to the Fertility Clinic Success

Rate and Certification Act of 1992, which regulates assisted reproductive technology 219

programs— defined as “all treatments or procedures which include the handling of human oocytes

or embryos,” and embryo laboratories— defined as facilities in which “human oocytes are 220

subject to assisted reproductive technology treatment or procedures based on manipulation of

oocytes or embryos which are subject to implantation.” The Act requires assisted reproductive 221

technology programs to report their pregnancy success rates to the Secretary of Health and

Human Services for publication in an annual consumer guide. In addition, the Act requires 222 223

that assisted reproductive technology programs identify the embryo laboratories that they rely on

for lab work for publication in the consumer guide. Finally, the Act requires the Secretary of 224 225

Health and Human Services to develop a model program for the inspection and certification of

embryo labs to be implemented by the states.226

If cloning is considered to be a form of fertilization, questions arise regarding whether

state laws setting standards for who may perform in vitro fertilization will cover the practice.

There are fewer state laws specifically addressing the conduct of in vitro fertilization than

addressing the conduct of fetal research. Although the impetus behind the in vitro fertilization

laws was, for the most part, the regulation of the clinical practice of in vitro fertilization, the

provisions are sometimes broad enough to regulate cloning researchers. Certain laws governing

reporting, the qualifications of personnel, and so forth, will be applicable to researchers. A New

Hampshire law requires counseling in advance of in vitro fertilization and limits the procedure to
F-23

participants over age 21 (which, if applied to cloning could prohibit the use of DNA from a 227

minor child). Pennsylvania has a reporting requirement which mandates that anyone performing in

vitro fertilization file quarterly reports with the Department of Health describing such facts as the

number of embryos destroyed and discarded and the number of women in whom embryos are

implanted. Louisiana’s law requires that in vitro fertilization shall only be undertaken by 228

practitioners and facilities meeting the standards of the American College of Obstetricians and

Gynecologists (ACOG) and the American Fertility Society (AFS) (currently the American Society

for Reproductive Medicine). Some states have statutes dealing with insurance reimbursement of 229

in vitro fertilization for infertility. A few of those states mandate that, to be reimbursed, the in

vitro fertilization procedure must be performed in facilities that meet the ACOG and AFS

standards. The insurance-related provisions are unlikely to be applicable to cloning, since 230

cloning will be denied coverage as being too experimental.

PROPOSED FEDERAL AND STATE STATUTES

REGARDING CLONING

The announcement of Dr. Ian Wilmut’s experiment led to the immediate introduction of federal

and state bills to ban the practice of human cloning. Most do not suffer from the problem of

unconstitutional vagueness, since the particular activity they ban— cloning— is explicitly

described. However, it is described in different ways in the various bills, which could lead to

definitional problems similar to those encountered in the fetal research laws as new variations of

the technology are developed that may not exactly fit into the current cloning definition.

Federal legislation has been introduced, and bills have been proposed in at least 11 states

(Alabama, California, Florida, Illinois, Maryland, Missouri, New York, New Jersey, Oregon,

South Carolina, and West Virginia). The federal bill and two states’ bills ban the use of

governmental funds for cloning an entire individual. The other nine states’ bills ban cloning of 231

an entire individual, no matter what the funding source. Only a few states’ bills conceivably apply

to cloning research not intended to create an entire individual. One bans research using cloned

cells or tissue. In addition, two other statutes might unintentionally ban such research. The 232

South Carolina statute defines cloning as the creation of a human being and then bans the steps

leading to it. It prohibits cloning by extracting the nucleus from any unfertilized egg and infusing

into it DNA from any other cell. Such a provision may restrict cellular research using cloning 233

techniques because it might be difficult for a scientist to convincingly prove that he or she was not

doing it to create an individual. West Virginia bans creation of a human “organism” through

cloning, which might be interpreted to ban creation of tissue or an organ through cloning

techniques.

Moreover, some of the statutes have loopholes since they only ban the creation of a

“genetically identical” individual. Since a donated egg is used to create the clone, the resulting 234

individual will have some mitochondrial DNA that is not identical to that of the original individual.

Thus, an argument could be made that the law would not apply because it does not create a

“genetically identical” individual.
F-24

A. Federal Action

At the federal level, Senator Christopher Bond of Missouri introduced S. 368, a bill to ban the use

of federal funds for research with respect to the cloning of a human individual. His bill defines

cloning as “the replication of a human individual by the taking of a cell with genetic material and

the cultivation of the cell through the egg, embryo, fetal, and newborn stages into a new human

individual.” Thus, Senator Bond’s bill would not prohibit federal funding of cloning research 235

that did not result in a live birth. Researchers could clone human cells and allow the resulting

entity to proceed through cell divisions to determine what influenced the turning on and off of

certain genes. They apparently could also undertake cloning research to create human organs for

transplant in the laboratory, so long as no new humans are born.

In addition, Representative Vernon Ehlers, on March 5, 1997, introduced H.R. 922 and

923. H.R. 922 provides that “[n]one of the funds made available in any Federal law may be

expended to conduct or support any project of research that involves the use of a human somatic

cell for the process of producing a human clone.” H.R. 923 provides that “it shall be unlawful for

any human person to use a human somatic cell for the process of producing a human clone.” The

latter bill has a civil penalty of $5,000, which, given the overall cost of cloning and the incentive

to undertake the procedure for scientific and personal reasons, would probably not be enough to

deter someone from cloning a person.

B. Alabama

State Senator John Amari of Alabama introduced S.B. 511, which prohibits the cloning of human

beings. Again, the definition of cloning is broad: “reproducing a being of like genetic 236

constitution from a single somatic cell by repeated cell division.” Amari also introduced Senate 237

Joint Resolution 58 requesting the U.S. Congress to prohibit cloning and urging other countries

to prohibit the practice. The preamble of the joint resolution gave several reasons for the

prohibition.

“The creation of a human being is sacred and every person has the right to be born as the

result of human reproduction.”

“The cloning of human beings could irreparably harm the dignity of human life and show

an appalling lack of respect for human life.”

“The cloning of human beings could result in dangerous experiments with unfathomable

consequences.”

C. California

A bill was introduced in California by State Senator Johnston amending the human

experimentation law to ban the cloning of a human being. In addition, California State Senator 238
F-25

Dave Kelley introduced a Senate Joint Resolution requesting the President and Congress “to act 239

immediately and swiftly to ban, outlaw, and take all necessary means to prevent the cloning of

human beings.” The resolution points out that cloning human beings raises serious moral, ethical,

legal, and other questions and that other countries ban cloning. The resolution also indicates that

State Senator Kelley plans to introduce a bill banning cloning in California in the next legislative

session.

D. Florida

Florida State Representative Villalobos introduced a bill to make it unlawful “to clone or attempt

to clone the DNA of any human being.” This law would not just limit the cloning of a whole 240

human being, or research involving nuclear transfer, but would restrict much existing scientific

research in which cells are “cloned” or replicated through techniques that involve cell division.

E. Illinois

An Illinois bill, introduced by House Member Carolyn Krause, defines cloning as “the intentional

manipulation of a human egg cell to make it genetically identical to another human being, living or

dead.” The bill prohibits both human cloning and the use of public funds or property for human 241

cloning. It has an exception for in vitro fertilization, use of fertility-enhancing drugs, and certain 242

other medical procedures that are not intended to create a genetically identical being.243

F. Maryland

In Maryland, State Representative Valderrama introduced a House Joint Resolution to ban state

funding of cloning or cloning research that would “replicate a human being.” The resolution 244

preamble asserts:

The principles of industrial production and design, such as quality control, predictability,

profitability, and efficiency, should never be allowed to apply to the production of humans.

Social, ethical, and moral values should not be sacrificed in favor of the dubious potential

benefits of scientific experimentation in human cloning.

Cloning would tend to devalue human life or dehumanize mankind.

The resolution also points out that in a recently published poll, 90% of respondents favored

prohibiting cloning by law.

G. Missouri

Representative Edwards-Pavia of Missouri introduced a bill forbidding the use of state funds for

“the replication of a human person taking a cell with genetic material and cultivating such cell
F-26

through the egg, embryo, fetal and newborn stages of development into a new human being.” In 245

addition to the limitations of coverage (it would not apply to cloning with private funds), it is

ambiguous since it does not define “replication.” It might be considered unconstitutionally vague

since so many forms of reproduction (including coital) start with one cell (in most instances, the

fertilized egg) and proceed through those stages of development.

H. New Jersey

The New Jersey bill, introduced by Assemblywoman Gell and Assemblyman Doria, takes an

interesting approach and includes cloning within a broader bill regulating genetics. The bill makes

it criminal to knowingly engage or assist, directly or indirectly, in the cloning of a human being,

which is defined as “the replication of a human individual by cultivating a cell with genetic

material through the egg, embryo, fetal and newborn stages into a new human individual.” (This 246

again would create a problem with the definition of replication). The New Jersey bill also includes

a number of provisions that would prevent an individual from being cloned without his or her

consent. These provisions provide that, except in limited circumstances, an individual’s DNA

sample which has been used shall be destroyed upon the individual’s request and an individual’s

247

DNA sample used in research shall be destroyed upon completion of the project or withdrawal of

the individual, unless the individual directs otherwise.248

I. New York

New York State Senator John Marchi has introduced a bill, S.B. 2877, to criminalize human 249

cloning and conspiracy to clone. Cloning is defined as “the growing or creation of a human being

from a single cell or cells of a genetically identical human being through asexual reproduction.”

250

The substantive provision prohibits cloning “by extracting the nucleus from any unfertilized

human egg and infusing into such egg deoxyribonucleic acid from any other cell; or cloning a

human being by any other measure or method.” The bill also provides that “[a] person is guilty 251

of conspiring to clone when, the intentional conduct would result in the cloning of a human being,

such person agrees with one or more persons to engage in or cause the cloning of a human

being.” The Commissioner of Public Health or a departmental representative can enter into any 252

workplace at a reasonable hour if there is reason to believe cloning is being conducted. A 253

parallel bill was introduced in the New York Assembly by Member of the Assembly Connelly.254

Yet both bills may be problematic because of the language about a “genetically identical”

individual.

J. Oregon

The Oregon proposal, sponsored by State Senator Lim, makes it “unlawful for any person to

create a clone from a cell derived from a human being, including a fetus, embryo, or other product

of conception.” The bill defines a clone as “an individual grown from a single somatic cell of its 255

parent and genetically identical to the parent.”

256
F-27

K. South Carolina

State Representative Mason of South Carolina has introduced a bill that bans cloning and

conspiracy to clone. The definition of cloning, though, has the same problem as the one in New

York. Cloning is defined as “the growing or creation of a human being from a single cell or cells

of a genetically identical human being through asexual reproduction.”

257

L. West Virginia

The West Virginia bill, introduced by State Senator Bailey, makes it “unlawful to use recombinant

deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) or recombinant ribonucleic acid (RNA) research and cell fusion, or

other such genetic engineering technology, to engage in the manipulation or alteration of a human

organism’s genetic material to produce another human organism from that genetic material, more

commonly referred to as cloning.” The use of the term human organism, however, might be

interpreted to include the creation of human tissue or organs, not just the creation of a whole

individual.258

THE FEDERAL ROLE IN REGULATING CLONING

Because both President Clinton and various members of Congress have expressed concerns about

human cloning of individuals— as have a majority of members of the public— federal action is

being considered to ban the practice. Such an action would raise important questions of

federalism and might be challenged as exceeding the federal government’s authority. However, a

close analysis of U.S. Supreme Court cases regarding federal powers provides justification for

federal action in this area.

The states have traditionally regulated issues related to health care. For example,

physicians and hospitals are licensed and regulated by state boards of medical examiners. Thus, at

first glance, it would seem that cloning would be more appropriately regulated at the state level.

However, despite this tradition of decentralization, the federal government may justify regulation

of human cloning by linking such regulation to its spending power and/or its power to regulate 259

interstate commerce.260

The federal government currently regulates a variety of medical and scientific activities

which are linked to government funding. In conjunction with its provision of Medicare funds, the

federal government has required physicians to abide by certain regulations, such as by prohibiting

certain forms of fraud and abuse. Similarly, as a condition of receiving federal funds for 261

scientific research, scientists must comply with federal regulations governing research.262

Consequently, a federal ban on human cloning research with federal funds, as the President has

currently promulgated, would be a permissible exercise of federal power. However, regulation 263

based on the spending power is insufficient to regulate research in the private sector, conducted

with non-governmental funds. To be permissible, federal regulation of private research must be

justified under the commerce clause.
F-28

The U.S. Constitution provides that Congress has the authority “to regulate commerce . . .

among the several States. . . . Court cases have held that the federal government has the power 264

to regulate economic activities that substantially affect interstate commerce. When Congress 265

regulates medical and scientific activities pursuant to its commerce clause power, it often includes

a jurisdictional element— a provision in the statute which indicates that it applies only to activities

involving interstate commerce. One example is the National Organ Transplant Act, which

provides, in part, that “[i]t shall be unlawful for any person to knowingly acquire, receive, or

otherwise transfer any human organ for valuable consideration for use in human transplantation if

the transfer affects interstate commerce.” Even the proposed Human Research Subject 266

Protections Act of 1997 contains a jurisdictional element in its definition of research facility: “any

public or private entity, agency . . . or person that uses human subjects in research involving

interstate commerce.”

267

Until recently, the Supreme Court endorsed a broad construction of the commerce clause.

However, in 1995, for the first time in close to 60 years, the Supreme Court held that Congress 268

had passed a law that exceeded its authority under the commerce clause. In U.S. v. Lopez, the 269

Supreme Court held that the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, prohibiting the possession of a

firearm “at a place that the individual knows or has reason to believe, is a school zone,” neither 270

“regulate[d] commercial activity nor containe[d] a requirement that possession be connected in

any way to interstate commerce.” Consequently, the law was struck down as exceeding the 271

federal power to regulate.

Commerce clause case law concerns the basic principle that the Constitution creates a

Federal Government of enumerated powers. As James Madison wrote, “[t]he powers delegated 272

by the proposed Constitution to the federal government are few and defined. Those which are to

remain in the State governments are numerous and indefinite.” Federalism is central to our form 273

of government. As the U.S. Supreme Court has pointed out, “[a] healthy balance of power

between the States and the Federal Government will reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse from

either front.” The nature of Congress’ commerce power was first defined in Gibbons v. 274

Ogden. The commerce power “is the power to regulate; that is, to prescribe the rule by which 275

commerce is to be governed. This power, like all others vested in Congress, is complete in itself,

may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations other than are prescribed

in the Constitution.”

276

In the “watershed” case NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., the Court sustained 277 278

the directive of the National Labor Relations Board, issued pursuant to the National Labor

Relations Act of 1935, that the defendant steel company desist from discriminating against

employees on the basis of union membership and in other respects interfering with attempts to

organize the company’s employees. The Court held that intrastate activities that “have such a

close and substantial relation to interstate commerce that their control is essential or appropriate

to protect their commerce from burden and obstructions” are within Congress’ power to

regulate. Subsequent decisions, recognizing the great changes that had occurred in the way 279

business was carried on, indicate that Congress did not have to show that each transaction it
F-29

regulates has a substantial impact on commerce: “[w]here a general regulatory statute bears a

substantial relation to commerce, the de minimis character of the individual instances arising

under that statute is of no consequence.”

280

For example, in U.S. v. Darby, the Court upheld the Fair Labor Standards Act stating: 281

The power of Congress over interstate commerce is not confined to the regulation

of commerce among the states. It extends to those activities intrastate which so

affect interstate commerce or the exercise of the power of Congress over it as to

make regulation of them appropriate means to the attainment of a legitimate end,

the exercise of the granted power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce.282

Under this approach, intrastate activities were reached in Hodel v. Virginia Surface

Mining & Reclamation Assn., Perez v. U.S., Katzenbach v. McClung, and Heart of Atlanta 283 284 285

Hotel, Inc. v. U.S. At issue in those cases were the regulation of intrastate coal mining, 286

intrastate extortionate credit transactions, restaurants utilizing substantial interstate supplies, and

inns and hotels.

In some instances, the federal government was found to have power to regulate because of

supplies which moved in interstate commerce. In other instances, the key was that customers 287

came from out of state. The Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of the Civil Rights

Act of 1964 as applied to hotels of seemingly “purely local character.” In holding that “the 288 289 290

power of Congress to promote interstate commerce also includes the power to regulate the

incidents thereof, including local activities . . . which might have a substantial effect upon . . .

commerce,” the Court reasoned that racial discrimination would burden interstate travel. 291 292

In light of the contours of the federal commerce power as outlined by case law, the Lopez

court affirmed three broad categories of legislation authorized by the commerce clause: (1)

statutes regulating the use of the channels of interstate commerce; (2) laws governing “the

instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce, even though

the threat may come only from intrastate activities”; and (3) statutes regulating activities “that

substantially affect interstate commerce.”

293

In holding that “possession of a gun in a local school zone is in no sense an economic

activity that might, through repetition elsewhere, substantially affect any sort of interstate

commerce,” the Court relied on a number of factors. First, the majority opinion repeatedly 294

noted that the Gun-Free School Zones Act did not regulate any “commercial transaction or

economic activity.” In Lopez, “neither the actors nor their conduct have a commercial character 295

and neither the purpose nor the design of the statute have an evident commercial nexus.”

296

Rather, the Gun-Free School Zones Act was “a criminal statute that by its terms had nothing to

do with ‘commerce’ or any sort of economic enterprise.”

297
F-30

Second, the Gun-Free School Zones Act contained “no jurisdictional element which would

ensure, through case-by-case inquiry, that the firearm possession in question affects interstate

commerce.” Professor Deborah Merritt suggests that a jurisdictional element would have 298

signaled that Congress was aware of its limits under the Commerce Clause and took those limits

seriously. The jurisdictional clause would have slightly narrowed the scope of federal 299

prosecutions, making the federal interest more apparent. By failing to include a jurisdictional 300

element, “Congress almost dared the Court to find the statute unconstitutional.”

301

Third, the Court was influenced by the lack of express findings or legislative history. In

fact, the Government conceded that “neither the statute nor its legislative history contains express

congressional findings regarding the effects upon interstate commerce of gun possession in a

school zone.” Although congressional findings or a legislative history are not prerequisites to 302

sustaining a statute under the commerce clause, the majority noted that such findings or history

would have enabled them “to evaluate the legislative judgment that the activity in question

substantially affected interstate commerce, even though no such substantial effect was visible to

the naked eye. . . .” The Court wanted either Congress or the Solicitor General’s office to 303

articulate a rationale for the exercise of congressional power at issue.304

Fourth, the statute’s link to education, an area traditionally regulated by the States, was 305

also significant. The Government argued that “the presence of guns in school poses a substantial

threat to the education process by threatening the learning environment. A handicapped

educational process, in turn, will result in a less productive citizenry. That, in turn, would have an

adverse effect on the Nation’s economic well-being.” The Court was troubled by this argument, 306

which was based on a tenuous link between the presence of guns in schools and the Nation’s

economy. Acceptance of such an argument would imply that Congress could regulate almost all

aspects of education.

Fifth, the statute’s focus on gun possession also affected the Court’s decision. The statute

at issue was broadly drawn. As a result, it included some forms of gun possession that posed little,

if any threat to school children. A hypothetical situation posed by the Fifth Circuit which would 307

fall under the prohibitions of the statute involved carrying an unloaded shotgun “in an unlocked

pickup truck gun rack, while driving on a country road that at one turn happens to come within

950 feet of the boundary of the grounds of a one-room church kindergarten located on the other

side of a river, even during the summer when the kindergarten is not in session.”

308

Furthermore, gun possession on school premises lacked the “aura of national urgency”

309

present in earlier cases endorsing a broad construction of the commerce clause. Most states had 310

already outlawed the possession of guns on school premises, and there were no findings, nor did

the Government argue, that state and local officials were unable to enforce those laws.

Finally, the Lopez Court might have believed that in response to the Government’s

arguments, it simply had to set some limit to Congress’ authority. The Government argued that

violent acts affect the national economy by raising insurance rates; violent crimes affect the
F-31

economy by discouraging interstate travel; and guns disrupt education, reducing workforce skills

and ultimately diminishing productivity. In considering these arguments, the Court pointed out 311

that if it were to accept them, it would be “hard pressed to posit any activity by an individual that

Congress is without power to regulate.” Under the “costs of crime” reasoning, “Congress could 312

regulate not only all violent crime, but all activities that might lead to violent crime, regardless of

how tenuously they relate to interstate commerce.” Under the “national productivity”

313

reasoning, “Congress could regulate any activity that it found was related to the economic

productivity of individual citizens: family law (including marriage, divorce, and child custody), for

example.” Under these arguments, it would be “difficult to perceive any limitation on federal 314

power.”

315

Although Lopez reminds us that Congressional authority to regulate under the commerce

power is limited, commentators suggest that the unique combination of factors at play in that case

will readily distinguish it from future challenges. Nonetheless, it does raise a number of factors to

be considered in determining whether Congress’ commerce power extends to the regulation of

cloning.

The first question is whether cloning is, in fact, commerce. Medicine initially was viewed

as an altruistic, non-commercial endeavor. Hospitals were charitable institutions for the poor and

were exempt from various rules that governed businesses. For example, tort suits against hospitals

were prohibited on the ground of charitable immunity. In recent years, hospitals have taken on 316

more of the characteristics of business, characterized by revenues and expenditures in the millions

of dollars. The characterization of hospitals as businesses has justified the extension of such 317

federal regulatory schemes as the Fair Labor Standards Act, the National Labor Relations 318

Act, and the Sherman Act to hospitals. Each of those acts specifically state that they apply 319 320

only to interstate commerce. Cases upholding the application of these regulatory schemes to 321

hospitals reason that the purchase of medicine and supplies from out-of-state sources and

reimbursement from out-of-state insurance companies and the federal government are sufficient to

establish a substantial effect on interstate commerce.322

Providers challenging the federal regulation of cloning may argue that they provide their

services for purely altruistic purposes— creation of organs, reproductive options— rather than

economic gain. What if cloning were provided without charge? Sperm is provided without charge

at the Repository for Germinal Choice in Escondido, California (the Nobel Prize Sperm Bank)

due to the owner’s interest in attempting to upgrade the intelligence of the next generation. A

similar entity could be established to allow people to raise clones of talented individuals.

Nevertheless, an organization does not have to be a commercial enterprise to affect interstate

commerce.323

What if it were alleged that cloning did not have a substantial impact on interstate

commerce? Such an argument has already been made in the medical setting, when individual

dentists challenged the application of Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act to their

practices as unconstitutional under the commerce clause. Title III prohibits discrimination on 324
F-32

the “basis of disability . . . by any person who owns, leases, . . . or operates a place of public

accommodation.” Private entities are considered public accommodations “if the operation of 325

such entities affect commerce.” In Abbott v. Bragdon, the defendant argued that because the 326 327

practice of dental medicine occurs purely intrastate, it did not substantially affect commerce and

thus was beyond Congress’ regulatory authority under the commerce clause. The court found 328

that

if the Defendant’s purchase of supplies and equipment from out of state, receipt of

payments from out of state insurers and credit card companies, and attendance of

classes and conferences out of state by themselves do not substantially affect

interstate commerce . . . those commercial activities taken together with the

activities of other dentists similarly situated, have an effect on interstate commerce

substantial to fall within the reach of congressional authority under the Commerce

Clause.329

The court concluded that an “economic enterprise that trades in interstate commerce, even

one centered on filling cavities,” is sufficiently tied to commercial activity. In fact today “[t]here 330

is little doubt that health care providers are subject to the congressional commerce authority and,

therefore, the Congress can opt to impose regulatory controls or federal policy conditions on the

activities of those providers. . . .”

331

The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act,332

which regulates drugs and medical devices, also provides a precedent for considering cloning to

involve interstate commerce. The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act prohibits:

(a) The introduction or delivery for introduction into interstate commerce of any food, drug,

device, or cosmetic that is adulterated or misbranded.

(b) The adulteration or misbranding of any food, drug, device, or cosmetic in interstate

commerce.

(c) The receipt in interstate commerce of any food, drug, device, or cosmetic that is

adulterated or misbranded, and the delivery or proffered delivery thereof for pay or

otherwise.333

Although “it is well settled that Congress has the power, under the commerce clause of

the Federal Constitution, to condemn the interstate transportation” of drugs and devices that 334

violate the Act, manufacturers continue to challenge this authority, and the power of the FDA is 335

continually upheld. This is because it can generally be shown that some part of the drug or

device— an ingredient, a container, or a package— has passed in interstate commerce. Along those

lines, U.S. v. 39 Cases, held that a drug manufactured in one state for distribution in the same 336

state was subject to the provisions of the Act because component ingredients were shipped in

interstate commerce to the manufacturer. The court reasoned that “it would be a strained
F-33

interpretation to say that each ‘drug’ component falls within the jurisdiction of the Act, being

shipped in interstate commerce, but, when compounded together to form another ‘drug,’ the

finished product is not being held for sale after shipment in interstate commerce.” To so 337

interpret the Act would create a loophole at the expense of public protection.338

In 1980, Congress passed a law regulating the interstate sale, barter, or exchange of

blood, blood components, or blood derivatives, unless “such . . . blood, blood component or

derivative . . . has been propagated or manufactured and prepared at an establishment holding an

unsuspended and unrevoked license issued by the Secretary [of Health and Human Services] to

propagate or manufacture, and prepare such . . . blood, blood component or derivative. . . .”

339

The regulation of the biological components involved in cloning would be a logical expansion of

this power. In fact, if the cloning was done with DNA from blood, it would have to comply 340

with this law.

If an entity that undertook cloning claimed that it operated exclusively intrastate, using

supplies, equipment, and personnel from the state, it might claim to be exempt from the reach of

federal law. This is similar to the claim of researchers in California working under the California

AIDS Vaccine Research and Development Grant Program, which provides funds to the private 341

sector for the development of an AIDS vaccine “until the Federal Food and Drug Administration

(FDA) approves the clinical testing of an AIDS vaccine on humans.” In establishing this 342

program, the California legislature permitted AIDS vaccines to be tested in the state without

being subject to FDA requirements. Under the program, the vaccine is manufactured by a

California company for use in California on California residents. Despite this justification, it is not

likely that the regulation of an AIDS vaccine and its clinical trial would be viewed by courts as an

intrastate activity and therefore beyond Congress’ reach. Rather, the federal government has

probably not decided to step in and regulate the program under the federal Food and Drug Act

because, as one commentator suggests, that opposition to the program would be “akin to political

suicide.” Given the pervasive and immediate threat AIDS poses to the public health of our 343

nation, no politician would “want to appear to be standing in the way of people receiving

experimental treatments, even if unproven and unsafe.”

344

Cloning research and services do not evoke the same policy justifications as does access to

an AIDS vaccine. Although cloning research could provide bone marrow, organs, and even

children to infertile couples, those concerns are not as pervasive as is the threat of AIDS.

Furthermore, there are alternatives to cloning for obtaining organs and for treating infertility.

Post-Lopez cases challenging the constitutionality of the Freedom of Access to Clinic

Entrances Act (FACE) may provide guidance in determining whether federal regulation of 345

human cloning would survive similar constitutional challenges. FACE prohibits the physical

obstruction, injury, or interference “with any person because that person is or has been . . .

obtaining or providing reproductive services;” the physical obstruction, injury, or interference 346

“with any person lawfully exercising or seeking to exercise the First Amendment right of religious

freedom at a place of worship;” and the intentional destruction of a reproductive health services 347
F-34

facility or a place of worship. Congress derived its authority to enact FACE from its authority 348

to regulate activities that substantially affect interstate commerce. Cases sustaining the 349

constitutionality of the Act under the commerce clause hold that unlike the Gun-Free School

Zones Act at issue in Lopez, FACE regulates commercial activity— the provision of reproductive

health services. Furthermore, such cases hold that the provision of reproductive health services 350

substantially affects interstate commerce based on the following congressional findings: (1)

reproductive health facilities acquire equipment, medicine, medical supplies, surgical instruments

and other necessary medical products from other states; (2) “individuals travel interstate to 351

obtain and provide reproductive services;” (3) “obstruction of facilities decreases the overall 352

availability of reproductive health services nationwide;” and (4) “obstruction of facilities is a 353

nationwide problem that is beyond the control of individual states.” Because FACE regulates a 354

commercial activity that substantially affects interstate commerce, as supported by congressional

findings, it is a legitimate exercise of Congress’ commerce power.

Congressional findings similarly justify the enactment of the Fertility Clinic Success Rate

and Certification Act of 1992, which requires that assisted reproductive technology programs 355

report their pregnancy success rates to the Secretary of Health and Human Services for

publication in an annual consumer guide and that the Secretary develop a model program for the

certification of embryo laboratories to be implemented by the states. This legislation arose in

response to the absence of regulation in “one of the fastest growing areas of health care.” The 356

drafters sought to protect “vulnerable” couples from a field “ripe for exploitation.” In addition, 357

the legislative history points out that the government had to “step in” because the regulation of

clinics could not be left to voluntary guidelines created by professional societies such as the

American Society for Reproductive Medicine, since those clinics causing the most problems were

unlikely to comply with voluntary programs. The Fertility Clinic Success Rate and Certification

Act does not adopt substantive provisions directly regulating clinics, but rather calls for the

secretary to develop model guidelines for states to adopt, if they desire. This form of 358

implementation suggests that Congress contemplated commerce clause concerns in the direct

regulation of in vitro fertilization (IVF) laboratories.

However, under case law addressing the constitutionality of FACE, it is likely that

Congress could directly regulate those facilities that provide cloning as a reproductive service.

First, the provision of reproductive health services is a commercial activity. The test that will be 359

used to determine whether Congress has the authority to regulate cloning performed with private

funds is “whether a rational basis existed for concluding that [the] regulated activity sufficiently

affected interstate commerce.” Second, cloning facilities are likely to substantially affect 360

interstate commerce in some of the same ways that the facilities at issue in the FACE cases do.

For example, cloning facilities are likely to acquire equipment, medicine, medical supplies,

surgical instruments, and other necessary medical products from other states. U.S. v. Dinwiddie

points out that the commerce clause allows regulation of a health care facility if its patients are “in

interstate commerce.” It is likely that some of the patients coming to cloning clinics will travel 361

interstate. By one estimate, there are 10 clinics in the United States that may be able to provide
F-35

these services, and, consequently, people in other states would have to cross state lines to 362

obtain the services.

Having out-of-state employees and purchasing out-of-state equipment also makes a

business subject to the commerce clause. In addition, cloning providers will share information 363

and research findings in a national arena, requiring attendance at national classes and conferences.

Under Abbott, traveling to and attendance at national conferences may be sufficient to satisfy the

“substantially affects” requirement. Furthermore, those human beings who result from cloning 364

will have the right to travel. Finally, cloning is an issue of national concern. Like IVF, cloning is

“ripe for exploitation” (often with the same potential consumers— infertile couples). The legal,

physical, psychological, and sociological issues implicated by cloning are even less familiar to the

public than those raised by IVF.

The activity of cloning is further distinguishable from the activities at issue in Lopez

because it does not affect an area where there is a history of state regulation and where states

have regulated extensively. Unlike lower school education, which is provided at a local level,

cloning would generally be provided by a limited number of facilities around the country that draw

personnel and patients from a national market. In addition, few states have regulated the conduct

of human research. Such research has primarily been funded and regulated at the federal level. 365

In Lopez, 40 states had already acted to ban the possession of guns near schoolyards. With 366

respect to cloning, states do not yet have a legal scheme in place to deal with the issue. In fact, 367

state legislatures have introduced bills calling on the federal government to address the issue.368

Cloning research which does not create full human beings may not “substantially affect”

interstate commerce in the same way as reproductive cloning. However, the research facilities are

likely to participate in an interstate market of supplies, scientists, and information, and thus be

within the reach of federal law.

If a federal law were adopted, it would be important to provide a sufficient legislative

history to indicate how cloning would affect interstate commerce, to establish why cloning is of

national importance, and to document state legislative actions specifically asking for the federal

government to intervene in this area.

IS THERE A RIGHT OF SCIENTIFIC INQUIRY?

If Congress (or a state) were to adopt a ban on human cloning, questions would arise as to its

constitutionality. Specifically, a question would arise regarding whether scientists have a

constitutional right of inquiry that could serve as the basis of a constitutional challenge to such a

restriction.

There is no doubt that scientific inquiry has been an enduring American value. The framers

of the Constitution discussed the sacred nature of scientific inquiry. The Constitution 369

established a system of patents to promote scientific invention. Historically, scientific theories 370
F-36

have been protected because of the great social import the United States places on the “sanctity of

knowledge and the value of intellectual freedom.”

371

In fact, Senator Tom Harkin has defended cloning research by explicitly stating that

scientists have the right to research and that there are not “any appropriate limits to human

knowledge. None, whatsoever. . . . To my friends Senator Bond and President Clinton who are

saying ‘Stop, we can’t play God,’ I say ‘Fine. Take your ranks alongside Pope Paul V who in

1616 tried to stop Galileo.’” Senator Harkin argues that any government ban or limitation on 372

human cloning research is essentially an “attempt to limit human knowledge [which is] demeaning

to human nature.” Harkin also stated that human cloning “is right and proper . . . [because] it 373

holds untold benefits for humankind in the future.”

374

Although there is no specifically enumerated right to research in the U.S. Constitution,

certain commentators argue that support for such a right could be derived from the Fourteenth

Amendment right to personal liberty and the First Amendment right to free speech. This right 375 376

to research consists of the freedom to pursue knowledge. The strongest claims have been made 377

for a First Amendment right of scientific inquiry. The U.S. Supreme Court in Branzburg v. Hayes

specifically analogized the information function performed by academic researchers to that

performed by the press. If the First Amendment protects a marketplace of ideas, it seems likely 378

that it would protect the generation of information that will be included in the marketplace. The

U.S. Supreme Court has protected the precursors to speech in a variety of settings, such as 379

extending First Amendment protection to the financing of speech and the gathering of news 380 381

as necessary precursors to speech itself.

There is extensive discussion in dicta of a right of inquiry. The Supreme Court stated in

Meyer v. Nebraska that the right to liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment 382

encompassed freedom to “acquire useful knowledge . . . and generally to enjoy those privileges

long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.” A 383

federal district court similarly suggested that scholars have a “right . . . to do research and

advance the state of man’s knowledge.” But what does that “right” consist of? It is clear that 384

the right of scientific inquiry protects access to existing information. For example, that federal

court opined in dicta that obscenity laws could not be applied to prohibit the Kinsey Institute

from studying obscene materials. However, other court cases specifically reject the idea that a 385

fundamental right of scientific inquiry exists. These cases are relevant because they held that 386

there is no fundamental right of medical researchers to conduct medical research on fetuses.

Even if scientific inquiry were found to be protected by the Constitution, certain

restrictions would be permissible. Regulation would not be permissible if it were solely

undertaken to restrict the generation of new knowledge. However, the government could regulate

to protect against compelling harms (such as the psychological, physical, and social risks of

cloning of whole individuals), so long as the regulation is no more restrictive on speech than is

necessary to further that interest.
F-37

The freedom to pursue knowledge is distinguishable from the right to choose the method

for achieving that knowledge, since the method itself may permissibly be regulated. Although 387

the government may not prohibit research in an attempt to prevent the development of new

knowledge, it may restrict or prohibit the means used by researchers which intrude on interests in

which the state has a legitimate concern.388

Therefore, both the federal government and the states may regulate the researcher’s

methods in order to protect the rights of research subjects and community safety. Research may 389

be restricted, for example, to protect the subject’s right to autonomy and welfare by requiring

informed, free, and competent consent. This is in keeping with other permissible restrictions 390

under the First Amendment. In cases where “speech” and “nonspeech” elements are inextricably

bound up in the conduct, “a sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the

nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms.” Thus, 391

where the government can prove that restrictions on cloning and cloning technology are

sufficiently important to the general well-being of individuals or society, such restrictions are

likely to be upheld as legitimate, constitutional governmental actions, even if scientists were held

to have a First Amendment right of scientific inquiry.392

THE RIGHT TO MAKE REPRODUCTIVE DECISIONS

The right to make decisions about whether or not to bear children is constitutionally

protected under the constitutional right to privacy and the constitutional right to liberty. The 393 394

U.S. Supreme Court in 1992 reaffirmed the “recognized protection accorded to liberty relating to

intimate relationships, the family, and decisions about whether to bear and beget a child.”

395

Early decisions protected married couples’ right to privacy to make procreative decisions,

but later decisions focused on individuals’ rights as well. The U.S. Supreme Court, in Eisenstadt

v. Baird, stated, “[i]f the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual,

396

married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so

fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.”

397

A federal district court has indicated that the right to make procreative decisions

encompasses the right of an infertile couple to undergo medically-assisted reproduction, including

in vitro fertilization and the use of a donated embryo. Lifchez v. Hartigan held that a ban on 398 399

research on conceptuses was unconstitutional because it impermissibly infringed upon a woman’s

fundamental right to privacy. Although the Illinois statute banning embryo and fetal research at

issue in the case permitted in vitro fertilization, it did not allow embryo donation, embryo

freezing, or experimental prenatal diagnostic procedures. The court stated:

It takes no great leap of logic to see that within the cluster of constitutionally

protected choices that includes the right to have access to contraceptives, there

must be included within that cluster the right to submit to a medical procedure that

may bring about, rather than prevent, pregnancy. Chorionic villi sampling is

similarly protected. The cluster of constitutional choices that includes the right to
F-38

abort a fetus within the first trimester must also include the right to submit to a

procedure designed to give information about that fetus which can then lead to a

decision to abort.400

Some commentators argue that the Constitution similarly protects the right to create a

child through cloning. As Pizzulli points out, “[i]n comparison with the parent who contributes

half of the sexually reproduced child’s genetic formula, the clonist is conferred with more than the

requisite degree of biological parenthood, since he is the sole genetic parent.”

401

John Robertson argues that cloning is not qualitatively different from the practice of

medically assisted reproduction and genetic selection that is currently occurring. Consequently, 402

he argues that “cloning . . . would appear to fall within the fundamental freedom of married

couples, including infertile married couples to have biologically related offspring.” Similarly, 403

June Coleman argues that the right to make reproductive decisions includes the right to decide in

what manner to reproduce, including reproduction through, or made possible by, embryo

cryopreservation and twinning. This argument could also be applied to nuclear transplantation 404

by saying that a ban on cloning as a method of reproduction is tantamount to the state denying

one’s right to reproductive freedom.

In contrast, George Annas argues that cloning does not fall within the constitutional

protection of reproductive decisions. “Cloning is replication, not reproduction, and represents a

difference in kind, not in degree in the way humans continue the species.” He explains that 405

“[t]his change in kind in the fundamental way in which humans can ‘reproduce’ represents such a

challenge to human dignity and the potential devaluation of human life (even comparing the

‘original’ to the ‘copy’ in terms of which is to be more valued) that even the search for an analogy

has come up empty handed.”

406

If a constitutional right to clone was recognized, any legislation which would infringe

unduly upon this fundamental right would be subject to a “strict standard” of judicial review.407

Legislation prohibiting the ability to clone or prohibiting research would have to further a

compelling interest in the least restrictive manner possible in order to survive this standard of

review.408

The potential physical and psychological risks of cloning an entire individual are 409

sufficiently compelling to justify banning the procedure. The notion of replicating existing humans

seems to fundamentally conflict with our legal system, which emphatically protects individuality

and uniqueness. Banning procreation through nuclear transplantation is justifiable in light of the 410

sanctity of the individual and personal privacy notions that are found in different constitutional

amendments and protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.411

One could argue that a ban on cloning would “preserve the uniqueness of man’s

personality and thus safeguard the islands of privacy which surround individuality.” These 412

privacy rights are implicated through a clone’s right to “retain and control the disclosure of
F-39

personal information— foreknowledge of the clonant’s genetic predispositions.” Catherine 413

Valerio Barrad argues that courts should recognize a privacy interest in one’s DNA because

science is increasingly able to decipher and gather personal information from one’s genetic

code. The fear that potential employers and health insurers may use private genetic information 414

discriminatorily is not only a breach of privacy of the original DNA possessor, but any clone

“made” from that individual. Even in cases where the donor waives his privacy rights and 415

releases genetic information about himself, the privacy rights of the clone are necessarily

implicated due to the fact that the clone possesses the exact same genetic code. Thus, the legal 416

system would have to devise strategies to deal with the privacy issues of donors and clones. In 417

particular, laws would need to be created to effectively deal with situations where either the

original’s or the clone’s genetic information is released without the prior consent of the other

individual sharing that genetic code. This argument also evokes the Fifth Amendment’s protection

of a “person’s ability to regulate the disclosure of information about himself.”

418

The government could also assert a compelling interest in protecting against social harms.

For example, the government could assert an interest in preserving evolution and forbid cloning

because it could lessen diversity in society. The government may also assert an interest in 419

diversity as a cultural good independent of its value for evolution.420

The use of cloned cells and tissue for research purposes other than the creation of a child

would not be protected by the constitutional rights of privacy and liberty that protect reproductive

decisions. Consequently, a governmental regulation or ban of such research would not have to

have such stringent justification. It would be constitutional so long as it was rationally related to

an important governmental purpose.

CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS TO CLONING

While a First Amendment right of scientific inquiry or a constitutional liberty or privacy argument

might be seen as protecting cloning, other constitutional provisions may limit the use of cloning.

A. Thirteenth Amendment Concerns

Cloning a whole individual whose genetic constitution is known in advance may create a form of

“genetic bondage” that runs afoul of the U.S. Constitution’s Thirteenth Amendment prohibition 421

on slavery. To the extent that a cloned individual would be limited in his or her freedom based 422

on expectations about his or her genetic makeup, being a clone can be seen as creating a badge of

slavery. A clone’s autonomy might be limited where his or her genetic traits and predispositions

are already known. Intentionally producing people whose genetic predispositions are known 423

undermines the theory of free will, and courts have held that infringement on free will and civil

liberty may be prohibited by the Thirteenth Amendment. Bans or restrictions on cloning would 424

be justifiable where the government could prove that cloning is inconsistent with the notion of

free will, and that such an erosion of the free will would result in grave societal harms.425
F-40

Laurence Tribe has noted that cloning “will profoundly affect what it means to be a human

being and will do so in ways that matter whether or not particular ‘abuses’ ever take place.”

426

Francis Pizzulli points out that a ban on cloning individuals would likely be constitutional since it

is not based on a religious rationale but on “the valid secular purpose of safeguarding a normative

view of human identity,” resting upon the personal privacy and individual autonomy values of the

Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments. “Implicit in the prohibition of clonal humans is the 427

rationale that certain types of humans ought not to exist, either because they have inalienable

rights to nonexistence or because their presence would erode important social values.”

428

Additionally, the creation of persons to be used as “spare” parts for transplantation would

not only be socially repugnant, but be violative of the clone’s Thirteenth Amendment rights 429

against involuntary servitude. The clone’s right to bodily integrity and personal property rights 430

are also violated by the notion of spare organ-part banking.431

B. Nobility Clause

The United States was formed with a rejection of British values that certain special privileges

should attach based on one’s blood lines. To that end, the U.S. Constitution, art. I, § 9, cl. 8

states, “No title of nobility shall be granted by the United States.” State constitutions, too, have

such provisions. The Alabama constitution provides, “No title of nobility, or hereditary

distinction, privilege, honor, or emolument, shall ever be granted or conferred in this State.” An

1872 Alabama case interpreted this provision in the following way:

To confer a title of nobility, is to nominate to an order of persons to whom

privileges are granted at the expense of the rest of the people. It is not necessarily

hereditary, and the objection to it arises more from the privileges supposed to be

attached, than to the otherwise empty title or order. These components are

forbidden separately in the terms “privilege,” “honor,” and “emolument,” as they

are collectively in the term “title of nobility.” The prohibition is not affected by any

consideration paid or rendered for the grant. Its purpose is to preserve the equality

of the citizens in respect to their public and private rights.432

In an innovative legal analysis, Francis Pizzulli suggests that the values underlying the

nobility clause could render unconstitutional a positive eugenics program. If certain individuals 433

are given the right by the government to clone based on their genetic makeup (such as top

scientists, political leaders, musicians, or athletes), it might be viewed as creating a class of

nobility. At the very least, letting only certain individuals have access to cloning due to their 434

purported genetic distinction would violate the idea of “equality of citizens in respect to their . . .

private rights.”

435

Even if the nobility provisions of the federal and state constitutions do not directly

apply, they signal an important set of values against creating a supposed hereditary elite which 436

can be used as a public policy argument against cloning whole individuals. However, the nobility
This section was prepared by Nanette R. Elster, J.D., M.P.H. *

F-41

provisions would not serve as a bar to cloning cells, tissue or organs in vitro unless, of course,

only individuals of a particular genetic background were allowed to clone a spare organ for

themselves.

WHO IS THE PARENT IN CLONING?*

Traditionally, “family” referred to the nuclear family— a household consisting of a husband, a

wife, and their children. That traditional view of family, though, is continually being challenged.

Divorce, homosexuality, and single parenthood create family structures far different from the

traditional concept of family. Additionally, the use of assisted reproductive technologies, including

the use of gamete or embryo donors as well as surrogates has lead to familial configurations not

contemplated just a few decades ago.

Are these recent family structures and methods of family building any less valuable than

the traditional nuclear family created through coital reproduction? The question has not been fully

answered— in part, because the answer requires society to consider what values “family”

represents and what it means to be a parent. Using the nuclear family as a model, the law has very

clearly defined rights and obligations based on one’s status as a parent.

Parents have the right to custody of their child, to discipline the child, and to make

decisions about education, medical treatment, and religious upbringing. Parents

assign a child a name. They have a right to the child’s earnings and services. They

decide where the child will live. Parents have a right to information gathered by

others about the child and may exclude others from that information. They may

speak for the child and may assert or waive the child’s rights. Parents have the

right to determine who may visit the child and to place the child in another’s care.

. . . Parents must care for their child, support him financially, see to his education,

and provide him proper medical care.437

These rights and obligations, though, become less clear when the roles of mother and

father are not as obvious as when a couple produces a child through coital reproduction. Methods

of collaborative reproduction necessitate reconsidering what it means to be a parent. Is

parenthood defined by biology, genetics, intention, or rearing? These types of questions will need

to be answered when sorting out the rights and responsibilities of the potential parents if an

individual is cloned.

Current state laws addressing parentage, including paternity acts, surrogacy statutes, and

egg donation statutes, are not broad enough to address the multitude of parentage issues raised by

the process of cloning through nuclear transfer. The process of cloning will result in a child’s

having genetic material from as many as four individuals: the person from whom the cell nucleus
F-42

was derived, that individual’s biological parents, and the woman contributing the enucleated egg

cell which contains a small fraction of DNA in the mitochondria. In addition, if the egg with the

transferred nucleic material is implanted in a surrogate gestational mother, the child will have two

other potential parents— the gestator and, if she is married, her husband. The latter will have

rights— even though he has no biological connection to the child— based on the common law

presumption that if a woman gives birth within marriage, her husband is the child’s legal father, or

in some states, specific statutes that provide the surrogate and her husband are the legal parents of

a child she has gestated regardless of their genetic contribution. There may also be intended 438

rearing parents unrelated to the individual who is cloned, such as when the cloned individual is

deceased, a celebrity, or a favorite relative.

With so many contributors— biologic, genetic, and social— determining who shall assume

the parental rights and obligations of the resulting child is very difficult not only from a legal

standpoint but also from scientific, psychological, and sociological perspectives. In the cloning

scenario, it is unclear which of the contributors is responsible for raising and supporting the

resulting child. If parenthood is not clarified, there may be situations in which either the state will

bear the responsibility or the child will be caught in a legally complicated, protracted custody

battle.439

In attempting to determine the parentage of a clone it is going to be necessary to not only

consider states’ paternity laws, but also any state laws that address parentage in the context of

egg donation and surrogacy. There are two types of surrogacy— traditional and gestational.

Traditional surrogacy involves a woman agreeing to be inseminated with sperm from the intended

father (or a donor), carrying the resulting child to term, and relinquishing all parental rights to the

child to the intended father and his wife if he is married. In that situation, the surrogate is

providing the egg (which includes mitochondrial DNA and nucleic DNA) and is gestating the

fetus. Gestational surrogacy typically involves a woman agreeing to carry an embryo created

through in vitro fertilization of the egg and sperm of the intended parents or a donated egg and/or

sperm and relinquishing the child to the intended parents. The distinction between the two forms

of surrogacy is that with gestational surrogacy, the woman who carries the child to term

contributes no genetic material. Currently, at least 34 states have laws addressing artificial

insemination by donor, but only 5 states have laws dealing specifically with parentage in egg 440

donation. While 22 states have laws addressing surrogacy, only 8 of those address 441 442

parentage.443

Whether and how these laws might apply to cloning is a complex matter. Under the

artificial insemination laws, if a man provides sperm for artificial insemination of a consenting

woman and her consenting husband, that couple and not the sperm donor are the legal parents.444

Because statutes specifically use the term “sperm” or “semen,” they arguably do not influence the

situation in which a man provides DNA rather than sperm.

The egg donation laws are more likely to be applicable, even though the egg being used in

cloning has only mitochondrial DNA, not nucleic DNA. In the five states having egg donation
F-43

legislation, the donor is not considered to be the mother of the resulting child. Four of the states’

statutes specifically assert that the donor has no parental rights or obligations with respect to the

resulting child. The Texas statute likely results in the same outcome, but it addresses the issue 445

of legal parentage only from the perspective of the intended parents. It reads, in part:

If a husband consents to provide sperm to fertilize a donor oocyte by in vitro

fertilization or other assisted reproductive techniques and the wife consents to

have a donor oocyte that has been fertilized with her husband’s sperm, pursuant to

his consent, placed in her uterus, a resulting child is the child of both of them.446

The language of this statute is significant in the cloning context, because unlike the other

four states’ laws on egg donation, the Texas statute does not state that the donor relinquishes all

parental rights. This law stresses that the intended parents would only be the legal parents if the

donated egg is fertilized with the husband’s sperm. So, this would not be broad enough to rule

out the donor of the enucleated egg as a potential parent in the cloning scenario. The law leaves

unanswered the question of the donor’s rights and obligations if the egg is not fertilized with the

recipient’s husband’s sperm as would be the case with cloning. One might argue that if a donated

egg is enucleated and a nucleus transferred to it, the egg donor may have not only parental rights

to a resulting child but also parental obligations such as support.

The surrogate mother laws also figure into the analysis. Although eight states do have

statutory presumptions regarding parentage determinations in surrogacy, the states differ over

whether the surrogate and her husband are presumed to be the parents or whether the biological

father and his wife are presumed to be the parents. Laws in Arizona, North Dakota, and Utah

presume that the surrogate and her husband are the legal parents of the child, whereas laws in

Arkansas, Florida, Nevada, New Hampshire, and Virginia presume that the genetic father and his

wife are the legal parents of the child. Of the eight states, only Arkansas’ and Nevada’s statutes

do not apply to both traditional and gestational surrogacy. The Arkansas statute only covers

traditional surrogacy. Because the presumption under the Arkansas statute is that the intended

father and his wife are the child’s parents, it is likely that the same presumption would apply to

gestational surrogacy where both of the intended parents would have a genetic link to the child,

but the issue of parentage when donor gametes are used is not certain. The Nevada statute,

though, only applies to gestational surrogacy, leaving the determination of parentage in a

contested, traditional surrogacy arrangement unresolved.

Florida and New Hampshire impose specific age requirements concerning who can

participate in surrogacy arrangements. In Florida, all participants must be 18 or older, and in 447

New Hampshire, all participants must be 21 or older. North Dakota defines both a gestational 448

carrier and a surrogate as “adult woman,” which presumably imposes an age requirement at 449

least for the surrogate.

Another restriction found in the surrogacy statutes which may be even more limiting to

cloning than an age requirement is a requirement that the intended parents be married. If marriage
F-44

is a requirement and the statute does apply to cloning situations, single individuals interested in

cloning themselves would not be able to use the mechanisms of the statute to assert parental

rights as an intended parent. Florida, Nevada, New Hampshire, and Virginia specifically define

intended parents as being married. In addition, North Dakota uses the terms husband and wife 450

rather than intended mother and intended father, which implies that participants need to be

married in order for the statute to apply. Other requirements which may limit applicability to

cloning include the requirements of the Virginia statute that all participants must undergo a home

study and must all meet applicable standards of fitness for adoptive parents.451

Three states have additional restrictions regarding recognition and approval of surrogacy

contracts which may further limit their applicability to instances of cloning especially by a single

male. In Florida, it must be determined by a licensed physician that “[t]he commissioning mother

cannot physically gestate a pregnancy to term; . . . gestation will cause a risk of harm to the

physical health of the commissioning mother; or . . . will cause a risk of harm to the health to the

fetus.” Both New Hampshire’s and Virginia’s statutes have similar requirements that the 452

intended mother be unable to carry the child without risk to herself or the fetus. Virginia’s

453

statute differs slightly from New Hampshire’s and Florida’s in that it also takes into account risks

to the psychological health of the mother or fetus. For a surrogacy contract to be approved in

Virginia, the intended mother must be “infertile . . . unable to bear a child or . . . unable to do so

without unreasonable risk to the unborn child or to the physical or mental health of the intended

mother or child.”

454

In states that do not have laws addressing a specific reproductive technology, it is

necessary to turn to a state’s parentage act which may not clearly resolve the question of who is

the child’s legal mother. In California, for example, the parentage act would find that both the

woman who gestates a child and the woman who contributes her genetic material are the child’s

legal mothers. One section of the act provides that “(a) Between a child and the natural mother,

[the parent and child relationship] may be established by proof of her having given birth to the

child, . . .” suggesting that the gestator is the mother. Another section, though, allows for the 455

use of a blood test to establish maternity, based on a genetic relationship suggesting that the 456

woman who provided her genetic material is the mother.

The California Supreme Court was confronted with resolving this conundrum in Johnson

v. Calvert, a gestational surrogacy case in which the surrogate asserted her parental rights to 457

the child. The court resolved the case by looking to the parties’ intent, which had been

memorialized in a contract. The agreement clearly indicated that the intent of all the parties was

for the man and woman whose sperm and egg formed the embryo to be the legal parents of the

child. Based on this clearly expressed intent, the court found that the mother of the child was the

woman who had contributed her genetic material. If a written contract had not expressed the

parties’ intent, the outcome of this case may have been different, as California does not have a

statutory presumption of parentage in the context of surrogacy. The result may also have differed

if donor eggs had been used rather than the eggs of the intended mother. The court would have
F-45

had to decide whether gestation, genetic contribution, or intent is determinative of the legal status

of motherhood. This is precisely the type of decision that may be necessary if cloning does occur.

The court in Johnson gave significant weight to intent, which may indicate a willingness to

consider preconception intent in other settings. One legal scholar, Marjorie Schultz, argues that

“because parenting involves long-term and multi-faceted commitment, personal intention seems a

desirable basis for selecting between two biological claimants who are arguably equally

situated.” Shultz points out, “[a]s in other arenas of policy, private ordering need not be 458

absolute; particular regulatory constraints on private ordering might be adopted.”

459

Some states have essentially codified the recognition of intent in collaborative

reproduction. The surrogacy law in Virginia, for example, provides an elaborate scheme for

ultimately recognizing parental intent. The law provides for judicial approval of surrogacy

contracts. The law specifies that in order to be judicially approved, specific issues must be

addressed in the contracts. Additional requirements for approval include that all parties must have

counseling, the surrogate must be married and have had at least one pregnancy and live birth, and

at least one of the intended parents is expected to be the child’s genetic parent. The statute 460

clearly lays out what is necessary for a court to approve a surrogacy arrangement and legally

recognize the intent of the parties.

The state parentage acts, which were cited in Johnson v. Calvert, create additional issues

with respect to cloning. Every state has a specific statute setting forth presumptions about

paternity. Under these legitimacy statutes, a husband of a woman who bears a child during

marriage or within a certain number of days after termination, separation, or dissolution of the

marriage is presumed to be the father and has legal responsibilities for the child.

The statutes, however, present problems with respect to cloning. First, some states allow

exceptions to the presumption of paternity if the husband is sterile. In those states, an infertile

husband who wants to be considered the legal father of a clone born to his wife (either using his

or her DNA) may not be able to assert paternity under the statute.

Moreover, the statutes create a problem for people wanting to establish parenthood to a

clone gestated by a surrogate. Even when the statutory presumption of the surrogate’s husband’s

paternity is rebuttable, the statutes governing paternity do not always provide a mechanism for the

biological father to assert his paternity. The genesis of the paternity statutes was to allow a

woman to assert that a particular man was the father of her child and to allow her to bring a legal

proceeding to compel that man provide child support. To that end, all the statutes allow a mother,

expectant mother, or representative of the mother to initiate a paternity action. Some additionally

allow the child or a guardian, conservator, or child’s best friend or representative to initiate such

an action. Some statutes also allow certain public officials, such as state public welfare officials 461

or housing officials, to bring a paternity action (for example, in cases where the state will have to

make welfare payments on the child’s behalf if a father is not identified to support the child).
F-46

Far fewer states have a specific provision for a man wanting to be recognized as the legal

father to establish his paternity. While over 19 states specifically provide such a mechanism, in

some states a man asserting fatherhood can do so only if there is no presumed father. In those

states, the man providing the DNA for the clone may be able to bring a paternity action when an

unmarried surrogate bears his child, but not when a married surrogate does so. However, the man

providing the sperm may also be able to initiate a paternity action under a provision providing

simply for actions by the “father,” which is common in at least nine states.462

In at least 13 states, there is also a provision for “interested parties” to bring a paternity

action, and three states have a provision to allow a relative to bring a paternity action.463

Arguably, the father could bring a paternity action as an interested party or relative.

However, if there is a provision allowing the “presumed” or “alleged” father to bring a

paternity action, the man providing the DNA probably will not be able to use that provision to

bring a paternity action if the surrogate changes her mind. He is not the presumed father (if the

statute provides that a woman’s husband is the presumed father). He is not the “alleged” father

either (since the surrogate is not alleging he is the father).

In establishing paternity, states differ in the type of proof they statutorily specify as

admissible. In at least 45 states, blood tests can be used. In the District of Columbia, for 464

example, “[a] conclusive presumption of paternity shall be created upon a genetic test result and

an affidavit from a laboratory . . . that indicates a 99% probability that the putative father is the

father of the child and the Division shall enter a judgment finding the parentage of the child.”

465

Similarly, a Tennessee statute provides that “[a]n individual is conclusively presumed to be the

father of a child if blood, genetic, or DNA tests show that the statistical probability of paternity is

99% or greater.” In contrast, some states find there is a rebuttable presumption of paternity 466

even if a 99% probability has been shown under certain circumstances. In Michigan, for example,

“[i]f 2 or more persons are determined to have a probability of paternity of 99% or higher,

paternity shall be presumed for the person with the higher probability.” In Mississippi, there is a 467

rebuttable presumption “affecting the burden of proof, of paternity, if the court finds that a

probability of paternity, as calculated by the experts qualified as examiners of genetic tests, is

ninety-eight percent (98%) or greater. This presumption may only be rebutted by a preponderance

of the evidence.”

468

Some tests used to establish paternity are so general (for example, those tests based on

blood type), that a man contributing his nucleic material to create a clone may be found to have a

98 or 99% probability of being the child’s father. Other types of tests are so specific, however,

that they would identify a nucleic donor as a twin rather than as a father of the child. Thus, it is

unclear whether an individual seeking to be considered the parent of a child created with his DNA

would be able to use current legal mechanisms to do so.

There is no uniformity among the states concerning the laws governing sperm donation,

egg donation, or surrogacy; and there continues to be some uncertainty in assigning parentage in
F-47

disputed arrangements. The applicability of these laws to cloning will present even more

confusion. Cloning through nuclear transfer presents at least 13 possible parental configurations

ranging from as few as 3 possible legal parents to as many as 10.

Surrogacy, egg donation, and sperm donation statutes attempt to address the question of

parentage when reproduction occurs with the assistance of individuals other than or in addition to

the man and woman seeking to have a child. Cloning, though, unlike collaborative, non-coital

reproduction, or even traditional sexual reproduction, may be accomplished with as few as one

participant. One woman could transfer nucleic material from one of her cells to her own

enucleated egg cell and have the resulting “embryo” transferred to her uterus for gestation. Yet,

even in this scenario, parentage issues are raised with which existing laws are ill equipped to deal.

For example, if this woman sought child support, her own father and mother may have a legal

obligation to support the child because existing paternity testing would find them to be the child’s

genetic parents. Yet, the woman, too, would be presumed to be the child’s mother based on the

common law presumption that the woman who gives birth is the legal mother. It is unlikely that 469

in this scenario her maternity would be challenged; however, if it were, the parentage

determination would be complicated. In addition to the legal confusion raised by even this most

simplistic cloning scenario raises, there are equally baffling psychological and sociological issues

raised by the issue of a woman giving birth to her identical twin.470

In another possible cloning scenario, cloning may more closely approximate family

building in the traditional sense, where a man and woman contribute genetic material to form an

embryo which the woman carries to term, than currently accepted and practiced forms of

collaborative reproduction. For example, consider a husband and a wife who have chosen to have

a child, but the wife has a genetic disease she does not want to pass on to her offspring. To avoid

the possibility of passing on this disease, the couple decides to transfer nucleic material from one

of the husband’s cells to the wife’s enucleated egg cell and then transfer the resulting embryo to

the wife’s uterus. Unlike egg donation or traditional surrogacy, which would accomplish the

couple’s goal of not passing on the wife’s genetic disease to their offspring, cloning allows the

couple to reproduce using its own genetic material without the contribution of a third party. In

terms of genetics, the husband’s parents will also be the resulting child’s parents and, in fact, the

husband will be the child’s twin. If a highly specific paternity test were to be performed, the

husband could have a nearly 100% genetic match with the child. This may be indicative that he is

not the child’s father, “since no two people, aside from identical twins, have the same genetic

composition.” He may have the intent to be the child’s father, and if the child is born during the 471

marriage, he will be presumed to be the child’s legal father; but if his status is challenged, a

paternity test could reveal that he is the child’s identical twin and this may rebut the presumption.

In some states, “[e]ven if the presumption of paternity has been successfully overcome, a

party may be stopped from questioning paternity under certain circumstances . . . includ[ing]

situations where the parties involved have, by their conduct, accepted the man as the father of the

child in question.” This is yet another way in which the law currently recognizes intent in the 472

parenting context. This illustrates that in this cloning situation closely akin to traditional family
F-48

building, it is possible that the husband and wife choosing to create a child through cloning will be

recognized as the child’s legal parents, so long as neither of them challenges the other’s status.

If a couple creates a child who is the clone of a loved one or an unrelated individual

chosen for his or her valued traits, parenting rights would also be dispersed across individuals. If

the wife carried the clone to term, the couple would be protected by legal presumptions assigning

parenthood to the birth mother and her husband. If paternity testing were done, however, the 473

parents of the cloned individual (and maybe the cloned individual himself or herself) would be able

to assert rights to the child.

Even a cloning arrangement which closely resembles traditional reproduction, as between

a husband and wife, presents confounding questions not resolvable under existing law. The

examples discussed are the simplest potential parental configurations possible in human cloning,

yet they raise very profound issues. Existing laws may not effectuate the desired outcome of

cloning arrangements and could leave unanswered many questions, including who can make

childrearing decisions, who must support the child, who has a right to the child’s earnings, and

from whom can the child inherit. This confusion about family roles and relationships and the

uncertainty of current law to address these issues may present serious psychological, sociological

and legal risks for all parties involved in a cloning arrangement.

The matters become even more complicated when a man decides to clone himself by

having his DNA fused with a donor egg and gestated by a surrogate. His parents might be viewed

as the legal parents of the resulting child. In most states, the egg donor could assert a parental

right. In addition, the surrogate generally would have a claim to the child. This would occur either

under existing paternity statutes that indicate that the woman who gives birth to the child is the

legal mother or, as in Arizona and Utah, where a gestational surrogate and her husband are

considered to be the legal parents. Only in Florida, New Hampshire, North Dakota, and Virginia

would an “intended” parent (in this case the man cloning himself) possibly have a superior claim

to that of the surrogate. But these statutes would not help the man if he were not married.

There are two other likely scenarios in which a surrogate would participate in the cloning

situation. One scenario would involve an infertile couple who wants to have a genetically 474

related child. The wife, having had a hysterectomy, cannot carry a child but can still produce eggs.

Her husband is sterile, so they decide to fuse her egg cells with his nucleic material and have the

resulting embryo gestated by a surrogate. In the second scenario, the wife has had a hysterectomy

and oophorectomy, and so the gestator also contributes the egg cell, which is fused with the

husband’s nucleus.

The first situation resembles gestational surrogacy since the surrogate is contributing no

genetic material. As such, the laws in Florida, New Hampshire, North Dakota, and Virginia would

likely recognize the intended parents as the child’s legal parents. However, the law of North 475

Dakota relies on the parentage act to determine paternity and maternity in gestational surrogacy,

and under such analysis the probability of parentage must be 95% or higher. Although, using a 476
F-49

DNA test, there would be greater than a 95% “match” with the intended father, courts might view

the test results as indicating twinning, not parenthood. And because the intended mother is only

contributing mitochondrial DNA, she would not be a greater than 95% match. The statutes in

Arizona and Utah would provide that the surrogate and her husband are the child’s legal parents.

Based on a 1994 Arizona Court of Appeals decision, though, this presumption of

maternity under the Arizona law is rebuttable. In Soos v. Superior Court of the State of

Arizona, a married couple entered into a gestational surrogacy contract. During the pregnancy 477

the wife filed for dissolution of the marriage and requested shared custody of the unborn children.

The husband asserted that he was the biological father under the existing statute and the surrogate

was the legal mother; as such, he asserted that the wife had no standing to request custody. When

the triplets were born, the husband was named as the father and took custody. The wife

subsequently challenged the constitutionality of the applicable statute. The court found the statute

unconstitutional and held that “[b]y affording the Father a procedure for proving paternity, but

not affording the Mother any means by which to prove maternity, the State has denied her equal

protection of the laws.” Therefore, in Arizona, although there is a presumption of maternity in 478

favor of the surrogate, this presumption is rebuttable.

In the second scenario, which resembles traditional surrogacy because the egg of the

gestator is utilized, Arizona, North Dakota, and Utah have statutes that would recognize the

surrogate and her husband, if she is married, as the child’s legal parents. Arkansas statute would

be inapplicable because it specifically refers to the surrogate as having been artificially

inseminated. It would seem unlikely that the term “inseminated” would include the process of

nuclear transfer. Similarly, the law of New Hampshire, which requires one of the intended parents

to be a gamete provider, gamete being defined as ovum or spermatozoa, would also be 479

inapplicable. The laws of Florida and Virginia would both find that the intended parents are the

child’s legal parents.

The examples discussed reflect the difficulty of applying existing law to this new and

unprecedented technology. Other assisted reproductive technologies were also not amenable to

existing law; therefore, over time, statutes addressing the unique issues raised by such practices

have been and continue to be enacted. However, as is seen by the dearth of surrogacy and egg

donation statutes, the law does not keep pace with the technological developments. And given the

widespread opposition to cloning complete individuals, it will be unlikely that legislators will rush

to develop paternity, maternity, or “clonerity” statutes for this new realm which may be

considered to be a tacit acceptance of the procedure.

HUMAN RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS

If cloning of an entire individual does occur, there will be extensive scientific and public curiosity

about the resulting individual. Consequently, the procedure may be performed as part of a

research protocol that would involve observational, psychological, and medical testing on the

resulting individual to assess whether physical and psychological development are affected by the
F-50

process of cloning. If the resulting individual is a competent adult, he or she would have a clear

right to refuse to participate in any follow-up research and would be protected by the federal

regulations governing human research, if the research is federally funded, as well as various state

laws governing human research, no matter what the source of funding. When the resulting 480

individual is a minor child, however, questions arise regarding what types of research are

permissible and who may consent to the child’s participation in research.481

The previous section discussed the necessity of determining legal parentage of a child born

through cloning in order to assess the rights and obligations of all contributors with respect to the

child. One reason that parentage must be determined at the outset of a cloning arrangement is to

determine who has the responsibility for consenting to medical treatment for the embryo, fetus,

and child. Included within that responsibility is the right to consent to medical research involving

the child.

The medical and psychological effects of cloning on embryos, fetuses, and resulting

children are unknown; therefore, observation and medical testing on the embryo, fetus, and child

would likely be necessary to make an assessment of these effects. There will likewise be interest in

the psychological implications of taking nucleic material from one child in order to create another

child or children. This situation may be similar to the situation in which parents consent to

transplantation of an organ from one child to the child’s sick sibling, which has been found to be

legally permissible.482

In general, “competent individuals should not be used in research without their informed

and voluntary consent.” In fact, the first principle of the Nuremberg Code states that “The 483

voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely necessary.” Similarly, the Federal

Regulations provide that “[n]o investigator may involve a human being as a subject in research

covered by this policy unless the investigator has obtained the legally effective informed consent

of the subject or the subject’s legally authorized representative.” In addition, the section which 484

pertains specifically to research on children requires that the parents or guardians and the child

“assent.”

485

The requirement of parental consent will be difficult to satisfy if the child is a clone. Who

is responsible and authorized to consent for the child? Which contributor(s) has the child’s best

interests in mind? Are there ever situations in which research on children should not be done

despite parents’ authorization? “As a general rule parents, as the natural guardians of their

children, have the authority, and even the duty, to consent to medical care on behalf of their

children,” according to Leonard Glantz. One reason that parents have this authority is that 486

“parents are best able to determine what is in their child’s best interest. . . .”

487

In addition, parents are liable for the support of their children, and this could increase

greatly in the event of a physician’s error. However, this may not always be appropriate. The 488 489

parents themselves may not comprehend the purpose or nature of an experiment. Or they may be

unduly coerced to participate in research by the researchers and clinicians who helped create the
F-51

child, especially in the context of cloning, where this is the only way for the couple to have a

genetically related child. Parents’ feelings of responsibility to a first child may influence their

decision to allow experimentation on a clone, particularly in order to have a “reserve” of organs

or bone marrow available if the child should become ill. In some cases, parents may be induced 490

to consent to their children’s participation by undue incentives. In a California case, a 491 492

member of a university Institutional Review Board (IRB) disapproved of a research protocol

which permitted parents to consent to their children’s participation in nontherapeutic research. He

resigned from the IRB and brought a legal action to bar the use of normal, healthy infants as

controls in an asthma research project. Apparently, the children were to be injected with drugs

and the parents were to receive $300 per year for their children’s participation. The case alleged

that it would be child abuse for parents to consent to nontherapeutic research on their infants. A

trial judge denied the motion for a preliminary injunction, and the case was not pursued any

further. It is not inconceivable that incentives such as this may be used to convince parents to 493

consent to their children born through cloning to be the subjects of research. Additionally, parents

may be provided with various incentives to consent to cloning of an existing child.

There are limits to what parents can volunteer their children for. The Supreme Court

stated in Prince v. Massachusetts, that “[p]arents may be free to become martyrs themselves, 494

but it does not follow that they are free in identical circumstances to make martyrs of their

children before they reach the age of full and legal discretion when they can make that choice for

themselves.”

495

Past a certain age, a mature child should be allowed to decide whether or not he or she

wants to assume the risks of an unknown therapy. For example, a child of 12 with a potentially 496

terminal illness such as leukemia may be more capable than the parents of deciding whether or not

to participate in an experimental research program. Additionally, a child of 12 may be able to 497

decide whether or not he or she wishes to be cloned in order to have an available bone marrow

donor. It is the child’s identity which could be compromised. Moreover, there is a question of

whether the child whose DNA is used would have parental obligations toward the clone at some

time in the future.

Some commentators suggest that where children are capable of assessing information and

comprehending the nature and consequences of acting as a research subject, they should be

allowed to consent or withhold consent independent of their parents. However, the states which 498

provide statutorily for the participation of minors in research require the co-consent or sole

consent of the parent or guardian. Additionally, the federal regulations also outline 499

requirements for permission by parents and assent by the child, where appropriate.500

Some commentators argue that children should never be used as research subjects in

nontherapeutic experiments because of the problems involved in obtaining informed consent 501

and the possibility that the child’s parents or the researcher could be subject to criminal liability

for child abuse. Others argue that experiments with children are absolutely essential as results 502

cannot be obtained by other methods or means of study. They would permit such research 503
F-52

where there is an institutional review board review and approval, parental authorization, and the

informed consent of the minor when he or she is capable.504

The research that may be performed on children born through cloning may be considered

to be nontherapeutic research as there is no direct benefit to the child who is the clone. The child

would be a research subject in order to observe how the cloning process may affect physical,

mental, and psychological development. Some of these analyses could be done without any

physically invasive procedures, while others would require intervention.

Under the federal research regulations, research on children involving only minimal risk is

allowed so long as the IRB finds that adequate provisions are in place for soliciting the child’s

assent and permission of the child’s parents or guardian. Assent is defined as the child’s

505

affirmative agreement to participate and does not include failure to object. Both the child’s

506

assent and the parent’s or guardian’s permission are required under all circumstances. If the

research involves greater than minimal risk, but may potentially benefit the child, the IRB must

additionally determine that the risk is justified by the anticipated benefit to the child and that the

anticipated benefit is at least as favorable to the child as available alternatives. Research that 507

involves greater than minimal risk, and no direct benefit, but is likely to provide knowledge about

the subject’s disorder is permitted if the IRB determines that the risk is only slightly more than

minimal and the procedure is reasonably similar to the established treatment. Where the 508

research is directed toward the alleviation or prevention of a serious children’s illness, but is not

otherwise approvable, it nevertheless may be conducted if the Secretary of Health and Human

Services (after consultation with a panel of experts and the opportunity for public review and 509

comment) determines that the research will be conducted in accordance with sound ethical

principles.510

The statutes of at least two states contain provisions regarding the use of children as

experimental subjects. Virginia requires the informed consent of the child’s guardian in addition 511

to the child’s consent where the child is capable of giving such consent. New York requires 512

consent of the child’s parents or guardians with the approval of an IRB.513

Cloning research presents a unique type of research on children because presumably

healthy children will be observed and experimented upon to determine how the cloning procedure

affected them. It is likely that the testing of such children will be extensive. Even those aspects of

the research that do not require physical interventions (such as observation and questionnaires)

might be harmful to the child by emphasizing his or her dissimilarity to other children. Forcing a

clone child to become a research subject, even with his or her parents’ consent, might be

stigmatizing and emotionally disturbing to the child.

POTENTIAL TORT CLAIMS BASED ON CLONING

If an entire individual is created by cloning, that individual might be able to bring wrongful life

actions against the individual who caused him or her to be brought into being or the scientists
F-53

and/or physicians who served as facilitators. Wrongful life cases have succeeded in a few

jurisdictions. The claim in such cases is that a child would rather not have been born than have 514

been born with a particular disability. Cases to date have found breaches of duties to the child’s

parents. For example, in Curlender v. Bio-Sciences, the parents were erroneously told by a

genetic testing laboratory that the father did not carry the gene for Tay-Sachs when he did,

leading to the creation of a child with Tay-Sachs, who successfully sued the laboratory for

wrongful life. The court in that case said in dicta that the child would also have had a cause of 515

action against her parents for not aborting her. Under that logic, parents are seen as having a duty

to future offspring not to give birth to a child with serious disabilities. Some commentators argue

similarly that choosing to give birth to a child with a serious disability should be analogized to the

parent maiming a child through child abuse.516

Some commentators argue that clones would have actions in tort against their creators for

“wrongful life” because of their lack of “uniqueness” and invasion of their privacy. Recently, 517

John Robertson argued that because nuclear transplantation cloning denies clones their right to

personal privacy and alleged constitutional right to unique genes, it is likely that many would be

so psychologically harmed that they would prefer to not have been born at all. Another 518

commentator responded to this concern by arguing that if the legal system allowed clones to bring

wrongful life suits, these suits would further undermine notions of human autonomy by

reinforcing the idea that humans are machines which are controlled merely by their genes.519

Replicants whose claimed harm is that their autonomy has been limited— by having a

predetermined genotype, by having the value of their talents devalued, by the overcreation of

clones of their genotype— would be unlikely to show that they have been so seriously limited so

as to be considered to be a wrongful life.

The analysis is more complex when a sterile individual clones himself or herself to have a

genetically related child. The child created with the limitation of sterility might be able to claim

that that disability is significant enough to be considered to be a wrongful life. Similarly, it might

be argued that replicants have been wronged by being denied their uniqueness and by having their

future options limited by genetic predetermination. However, it is unlikely that such a claim would

give rise to an action for wrongful life, since courts that do recognize such claims limit them to

situations in which the child is seriously disabled. A boy who was born “illegitimate” was not

allowed to sue his father for wrongful life. And a court speculated that, with respect to 520

deafness, “it seems quite unlikely that a jury would ever conclude that life with such a condition is

worse than not being born at all.”

521

The replicant of a cloned individual might also have a cause of action based on tort or

property grounds for the creation of too many genetically identical versions which diminish his or

her right to distinctiveness. Pizzulli explains the issue in the following way:

While a given genotype may have been proved to be eminently successful, his

duplicate may be relatively unfit because he is a duplicate. That is, there is little

place for a duplicate genotype in a society which places a premium on uniqueness
F-54

and individuality. A duplicate genotype is therefore relatively lacking in fitness,

with respect to the posited social/moral environment and is therefore relatively

lacking in social worth.522

POLICY OPTIONS

This paper was prepared to aid the National Bioethics Advisory Commission in assessing the

range of legal options that are possible in the regulation of human cloning. An analysis of existing

laws found that there are few statutes that would apply to human cloning. A few states’

restrictions on embryo research may apply to cloning, and a federal law would require that 523

clinics offering human cloning as a form of assisted reproductive technology would have to

identify themselves and report success rates to the Secretary of Health and Human Services.524

There is clearly a need for policies addressing human cloning.

In May 1971, Dr. James Watson, the Nobel Prize winner for co-discovering the structure

of DNA, authored a seminal article for Atlantic Monthly called “Moving Toward the Clonal

Man.” He explained how cloning could be done and he tried to alert ethicists and scientists that

the realization of human cloning was “a matter far too important to be left solely in the hands of

the scientific and medical communities. President Clinton has assigned the task of making 525

recommendations about cloning to the National Bioethics Advisory Commission, with the

admonition that “any discovery that touches upon human creation is not simply a matter of

scientific inquiry, it is a matter of morality and spirituality as well.”

526

This paper has addressed the potential barriers that may have blocked federal attempts to

regulate human cloning, such as constitutional challenges based on the commerce clause,

scientists’ First Amendment right of inquiry, or individuals’ or couples’ privacy or liberty rights to

make reproductive decisions. In each case, it has been shown that human cloning could

permissibly be restricted.

Thus, the National Bioethics Advisory Commission does not face undue restrictions in the

range of recommendations it could consider. It would be constitutionally permissible to enact a

federal ban on creating individuals through human cloning. There is widespread public support for

such a ban. Already such prohibitions have been proposed in Congress and 11 states. No

legislator has proposed a bill to permit the process.

It would also be permissible to enact restrictions on scientific research on cloned tissue,

cells, or organs. Such research is not constitutionally protected as part of reproductive decision

making, so governmental regulation or ban of such research would not have to have stringent

justifications. Regulation of human cloning research would be constitutional so long as it was

rationally related to an important governmental purpose. Under such an analysis, a court could

uphold restrictions that require that sufficient animal research is done in advance. Moreover, it

would be permissible to require the scientists proposing the research to have “the burden of
F-55

proving that the research is vital, cannot be conducted any other way, and is unlikely to produce

harm to society.”

527

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This paper would not have been possible without the generous and creative aid of a talented

group of lawyers and law students— Nanette Elster, Stephanie Grubenhoff, Michelle Hibbert,

Laura Hutchinson, Julie Ann Sklaver, and Sheri Tarr.
F-56

APPENDIX A: POTENTIAL PARENTAL CONFIGURATIONS

IN HUMAN CLONING

By Nanette R. Elster, J.D., M.P.H.

CONTRIBUTORS POTENTIAL PARENTS

I Intended Mother’s Egg 1. Intended Mother

Intended Mother’s Nucleus 2. Intended Mother’s Mother

Intended Mother as Carrier 3. Intended Mother’s Father

[4. Intended Mother’s Husband]

II Donor’s Egg 1. Egg Donor

Intended Mother’s Nucleus 2. Intended Mother

Intended Mother as Carrier 3. Intended Mother’s Mother

4. Intended Mother’s Father

[5. Intended Mother’s Husband]

III Donor’s Egg 1. Egg Donor

Intended Father’s Nucleus 2. Intended Father

Intended Mother as Carrier 3. Intended Father’s Mother

4. Intended Father’s Father

5. Intended Mother

IV Intended Mother’s Egg 1. Intended Mother

Intended Father’s Nucleus 2. Intended Father

Gestational Carrier 3. Intended Father’s Mother

4. Intended Father’s Father

5. Gestational Carrier

[6. Gestational Carrier’s Husband]

V Donor’s Egg 1. Egg Donor

Intended Mother’s or Intended Father’s Nucleus 2. Intended Mother or Intended Father

Gestational Carrier 3. Intended Mother’s or Intended Father’s Mother

4. Intended Mother’s or Intended Father’s Father

5. Intended Mother’s or Intended Father’s Spouse

6. Gestational Carrier

[7. Gestational Carrier’s Husband]

VI Intended Mother’s Egg 1. Intended Mother

Intended Father’s Nucleus 2. Intended Father

Intended Mother as Carrier 3. Intended Father’s Mother

4. Intended Father’s Father

VII Donor’s Egg 1. Egg Donor/Carrier

Intended Mother’s or Intended Father’s Nucleus [2. Carrier’s Husband]

Donor as Carrier 3. Intended Mother or Intended Father

4. Intended Mother’s or Intended Father’s Mother

5. Intended Mother’s or Intended Father’s Father

[6. Intended Mother’s or Intended Father’s Spouse]
F-57

APPENDIX A: POTENTIAL PARENTAL CONFIGURATIONS

IN HUMAN CLONING (continued)

VIII Donor A’s Egg 1. Egg Donor

Donor B’s Nucleus 2. Nucleus Donor

Intendend Mother as Carrier 3. Nucleus Donor’s Mother

4. Nucleus Donor’s Father

5. Intended Mother

[6. Intended Father]

IX Donor A’s Egg 1. Egg Donor

Donor B’s Nucleus 2. Nucleus Donor

Gestational Carrier 3. Nucleus Donor’s Mother

4. Nucleus Donor’s Father

5. Gestational Carrier

[6. Gestational Carrier’s Husband]

7. Intendend Mother

[8. Intended Father]

X Donor A’s Egg 1. Donor A

Donor A’s Nucleus 2. Donor A’s Mother

Gestational Carrier 3. Donor A’s FAther

4. Gestational Carrier

[5. Gestational Carrier’s Husband]

[6. Intended Mother]

[7. Intended Father]

XI Donor A’s Egg 1. Donor A

Donor B’s Nucleus 2. Donor B

(Donor born thru egg and sperm donation) 3. Donor B’s egg donor

Gestational Carrier 4. Donor B’s sperm donor

5. Donor B’s Legal Mother

6. Donor B’s Legal Father

7. Gestational Carrier

[8. Gestational Carrier’s Husband]

[9. Intended Mother]

[10. Intended Father]

XII Intended Mother’s Egg 1. Intended Mother

Dodnor Nucleus (from the child of the Intended 2. Nucleus Donor

Mother and the Intended Father) 3. Intended Father

Intended Mother as Carrier

XIII Intended Mother’s Egg 1. Intended Mother

Donor’s Nucleus 2. Nucleus Donor

Donor as Carrier 3. Nucleus Donor’s Mother

4. Nucleus Donor’s Father

[5. Nucleus Donor’s Spouse]
F-58

Endnotes

1. All Things Considered, Cloning roundtable, R. Seigel, L. Wertheimer (hosts), D.

Rosenberg, R. Portilo, T. Peters, L. Kass (guests), February 24, 1997 (transcript on file

with author).

2. M. Specter, A new creation: The path to cloning— A special report, The New York Times,

March 3, 1997, p. A1.

3. In 1993, embryologists at George Washington University split human embryos, making

twins and triplets. See K. Sawyer, Researchers clone human embryo cells; Work is small

step in aiding infertile, The Washington Post, October 25, 1993, A4. These embryos were

not implanted into a woman for gestation. This procedure is distinguishable from cloning

by nuclear transfer.

4. S. Begley, Little lamb, who made thee?, Newsweek, March 10, 1997, 53-57. See also I.

Wilmut, A.E. Schnieke, J. McWhir, A.J. Kind, and K.H.S. Campbell, Viable offspring

derived from fetal and adult mammalian cells, Nature, 385:810-813, 1997.

5. Transcript of Clinton’s remarks on cloning, U.S. Newswire, March 4, 1997.

6. Begley, supra note 4.

7. National brief— Washington D.C.: NIH director plays down cloning effect, Los Angeles

Times, February 27, 1997, A9.

8. Begley, supra note 4.

9. Although these are the most pressing legal issues raised, the rest of this paper goes beyond

these issues to address other legal concerns, such as the human subjects’ concerns

regarding research on a clone, the application of the nobility clause of federal and state

laws to cloning, and the liability issues associated with cloning whole individuals.

10. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 390.001(6) (West 1993); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9:121 et seq. (West

1991); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 22, § 1593 (West 1992); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 112, §

12J (West 1996); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 333.2685 et seq. (West Supp. 1997); Minn.

Stat. Ann. § 145.421 (West 1989); N.D. Cent. Code § 14-02.2-01 (1991); N.H. Rev. Stat.

Ann. § 168-B:15 (Supp. 1996); Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3216 (West Supp. 1996); R.I. Gen. Laws

§ 11-54-1 (1994).

11. Three other states’ fetal research bans— those of Illinois, Louisiana, and Utah— have

already been struck down on those grounds.
F-59

12. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 168-B:15(1) (Supp. 1996).

13. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 168-B:15(2) (Supp. 1996).

14. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9:121 (West 1991).

15. Id., § 9:122.

16. Id.

17. U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 115 S.Ct. 1624 (1995).

18. Over 40 states have laws outlawing firearms on or near school grounds. U.S. v. Lopez, 115

S.Ct. 1624, 1641 (1995) (Kennedy and O’Connor, JJ., concurring).

19. See, e.g., Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298 (1969); Perez v. U.S., 402 U.S. 146 (1971); U.S. v.

62 Packages, 48 F.Supp. 878 (W.D. Wisc. 1943); U.S. v. Undetermined Number of

Unlabeled Cases, 21 F.3d 1026 (10th Cir. 1994).

20. U.S. v. Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d 913 (8th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 613 (1996); U.S. v.

Wilson, 73 F.3d 675 (7th Cir. 1995); Heart of Atlanta Motel v. U.S. 379 U.S. 241 (1964).

21. Abbott v. Bragdon, 912 F.Supp. 580 (D. Me. 1995), aff’d, F.3d, 1997 WL 85096 (1st Cir.

1997).

22. U.S. v. Wilson, 73 F.3d 675 (7th Cir. 1995).

23. Abbott v. Bragdon, supra note 21.

24. Lottery Case, 188 U.S. 321 (1903) (the power to regulate under the interstate commerce

clause includes the power to prohibit).

25. Henley v. Wise, 303 F.Supp. 62 (N.D. Ind. 1969).

26. Margaret S. v. Edwards, 488 F.Supp. 181, 220-221 (E.D. La. 1990). See also Margaret S.

v. Treen, 597 F.Supp. 636 (E.D. La. 1984), aff’d sub. nom. Margaret S. v. Edwards, 794

F.2d 994 (5th Cir. 1986); Wynn v. Scott, 449 F.Supp. 1302 (1978), aff’d, sub. nom., Wynn

v. Carey, 599 F.2d 193 (7th Cir. 1979).

27. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 379 (1965); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S.

438 (1972).

28. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 112 S.Ct. 2791 (1992).
F-60

29. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 112 S.Ct. 2791, 2810 (1992).

30. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).

31. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).

32. Lifchez v. Hartigan, 735 F.Supp. 1361 (N.D. Ill.), aff’d without opinion, sub nom.,

Scholberg v. Lifchez, 914 F.2d 260 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1069 (1991).

33. J. Robertson, Statement to the National Bioethics Advisory Commission, March 14, 1997,

83.

34. G. Annas, Testimony on Scientific Discoveries and Cloning: Challenges for Public Policy,

before the Subcommittee on Public Health and Safety, Committee on Labor and Human

Resources, United States Senate, March 12, 1997, 4.

35. See the discussion of risks, infra in Part II.

36. These standards were suggested by George Annas in Senate testimony. George Annas,

testimony on Scientific Discoveries and Cloning: Challenges for Public Policy, before the

Subcommittee on Labor and Human Resources, United States Senate, March 12, 1997.

37. Approximately .01 percent of our DNA is encoded outside the nucleus or mitochondrial

DNA. S. Tilghman, Statement to the National Bioethics Advisory Commission, March 13,

1997, 170-171. The clone will have mitochondria from the egg. It may also have

mitochondria from the cell that was used to provide the nucleic DNA. Id. 171. For more

information about mitochondrial DNA, see J.M. Shoffner, Maternal inheritance and the

evaluation of oxidative phosphorylation, Lancet, 348:1283-1288, 1996.

38. See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 25-218 (1996).

39. L.B. Andrews, Alternative reproduction, in S.B. Schatkin (ed.), Disputed Paternity

Proceedings, vol. 2, New York: Matthew Bender, 1990, § 30.02, 30-11.

40. M.M. Shultz, Reproductive technology and intent-based parenthood: An opportunity for

gender neutrality, 1990 Wisc. L. Rev. 297 (1990); Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal.

1993) (en banc), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 206 (1993) and cert. dismissed 114 S.Ct. 374

(1993).

41. Begley, supra note 4.

42. Tilghman, supra note 37, 172.
F-61

43. T.H. Maugh II, Brave new world, Los Angeles Times, February 27, 1997, B2.

44. See id.; see also P.N. Spotts, R. Marquand, A lamb ignites a debate on the ethics of

cloning, The Christian Science Monitor, February 26, 1997, 3; see also F.C. Pizzulli, Note,

Asexual reproduction and genetic engineering: A constitutional assessment of the

technology of cloning, 47 S. Cal. L. Rev. 476, 483 (1974).

45. Begley, supra note 4, 55.

46. Testimony of Ian Wilmut, Federal Document Clearing House Congressional Testimony,

March 12, 1997.

47. Cloning of sheep has remarkable implications, Copley News Service, February 24, 1997.

48. L. Reibstein, G. Beals, A cloned chop, anyone?, Newsweek, March 10, 1997, 58.

49. S. Stolberg, Sheep clone researcher calls for caution science, Los Angeles Times, March 1,

1997, A18.

50. See G. Kolata, Scientists urge senators not to rush to ban human cloning, The New York

Times, March 13, 1997, B11 (testimony of Ian Wilmut before the Senate hearings on

cloning, March 12, 1997).

51. Begley, supra note 4.

52. Id.

53. J.M. Nash, The age of cloning, Time, March 10, 1997, 62-65.

54. Id.

55. P. Kendall, W. Neikirk, Cloning breakthrough a large step on much larger road, Chicago

Tribune, February 25, 1997, 1. See also, Maugh, supra note 43.

56. J. Gross, Thinking twice about cloning, The New York Times, February 27, 1997, B1.

57. Begley, supra note 4.

58. Kolata, supra note 50; see also Don’t rush anti-cloning laws, Los Angeles Times, March

13, 1997 (Governor Pete Wilson commenting that he would not consider a bill banning

cloning human research if it would hinder “important” biotechnology research designed to

fight cancer, AIDS, and other diseases).
F-62

59. Kolata, supra note 50; see also Pizzulli, supra note 44.

60. Kolata, supra note 50.

61. Begley, supra note 4.

62. Kolata, supra note 50.

63. Maugh, supra note 43; see also Stolberg, supra note 49.

64. C. Krauthammer, A special report on cloning, Time, March 10, 1997, 60; see also

Stolberg, supra note 49.

65. Id.

66. Tilghman, supra note 37, 169.

67. Kendall, supra note 55.

68. H. Wray, J.L. Sheler, T. Watson, The World after cloning, U.S. News and World Report,

March 10, 1997, 59.

69. J. Katz, Experimentation with Human Beings, New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1972,

977.

70. Maugh, supra note 43; see also, J. Laurence, Regulations are relatively liberal, The Times,

February 26, 1997.

71. Stolberg, supra note 49.

72. Id.

73. W. Gaylin, We have the awful knowledge to make exact copies of human beings, New York

Times Magazine, 56(March 5):48, 1972.

74. Kolata, Medicine’s troubling bonus: Surplus of human embryos, New York Times, March

16, 1997, 1; Fox on Trends (Fox Television), March 19, 1997.

75. J.B.S. Haldane, Biological possibilities for the human species in the next thousand years, in

Man and His Future, G. Wolstenholme (ed.), 1963, 337, cited in Pizzulli, supra note 44,

490 n. 66.

76. Fletcher, Ethical aspects of genetic controls, N Eng J Med, 285:776, 779, 1971.
F-63

77. Haldane, supra note 75, 354-355, cited in Pizzulli, supra note 44, 520.

78. J. Kluger, Will we follow the sheep?, Time, March 10, 1997, 67.

79. Gross, supra note 56 (comments by Father Richard McCormick).

80. All Things Considered, supra note 1 (comments of Leon Kass).

81. Id. (equating the decision of who to immortalize as not dissimilar to the activities in Nazi

Germany and the historical legal racism that inflicted our country); see also S. Schmickle,

Cloning debate full of mystery and wonder, Star Tribune, March 2, 1997, 14.

82. See NIH director plays down cloning effect, Los Angeles Times, February 27, 1997, A9.

83. Id.

84. Kluger, supra note 78.

85. Id.

86. Robertson Statement, supra note 33, 86.

87. Krauthammer, supra note 64.

88. Kluger, supra note 78.

89. Nash, supra note 53.

90. C.P. Gilman, Herland, New York: Pantheon Books, 1979.

91. Nash, supra note 53.

92. A. Manning, Pressing a ‘right’ to clone humans, some gays foresee reproduction option,

USA Today, March 6, 1997, D1.

93. L. Schilinger, Postcard from New York, The Independent (London), March 16, 1997, 2

(discussion of the Clone Rights United Front demonstrations in New York to dissuade

New York legislators from passing a bill that would make human cloning research a

felony).

94. Manning, supra note 92.

95. Id.; see also Schilinger, supra note 93.
F-64

96. Schilinger, supra note 93.

97. Tilghman, supra note 37, 173.

98. See Nash, supra note 53; see also Spotts and Marquand, supra note 44.

99. See Stolberg, supra note 49 (Ian Wilmut warning against prematurely banning all cloning

research; from testimony before the Senate hearings on cloning research, March 12, 1997).

100. The law and medicine, The Economist, March 1, 1997, U.S. ed., 59; see also Pizzulli,

supra note 44, 484 (citing Briggs and King, Transplantation of living nuclei from blastula

cells into eucleated frogs’ eggs, Proc Nat Aca Sci, U S A, 38:455, 1952).

101. Pizzulli, supra note 44, 484, 487.

102. Id., 487.

103. P. Recer, Sheep cloner says cloning people would be inhumane, Associated Press, March

12, 1997 (reported testimony of Dr. Ian Wilmut and of Dr. Harold Varmus before the

Senate, March 12, 1997, regarding the banning of human cloning research).

104. Id. (comments of Dr. Ian Wilmut, testifying that as of yet he does not know of “any reason

why we would want to copy a person. I personally have still not heard of a potential use of

this technique to produce a new person that I would find ethical or acceptable.”).

105. Tilghman statement, supra note 37, 146.

106. Id., 147.

107. Recer, supra note 103.

108. Nash, supra note 53.

109. Recer, supra note 103.

110. Id.; see also Nash, supra note 53.

111. See Recer, supra note 103; see also J. Laurence, and M. Hornsby, Warning on human

clones, The Times, February 23, 1997; see also, Whatever next?, The Economist, March 1,

1997, 79 (discussing the problems associated of having mitochondria of egg interact with

donor cell).
F-65

112. Hello Dolly, The Economist, March 1, 1997, 17 (discussion of the pros and cons of aging

research which could result from nuclear transplantation cloning); cf. T. Monmaney,

Prospect of human cloning gives birth to volatile issues, Los Angeles Times, March 2,

1997, A2 (comments of Dr. Elias).

113. Monmaney, supra note 112.

114. Nash, supra note 53.

115. Id. See also Tilghman, supra note 37, 145 (discussing the problem of mutations).

116. Gross, supra note 56; see also K.L. Woodward, Today the sheep. . ., Newsweek, March 10,

1997, 60.

117. All Things Considered, supra note 1; see also J. Coleman, Playing God or playing scientist:

A constitutional analysis of laws banning embryological procedures, 27 Pac. L.J. 1331,

1351 (total ban on embryological procedures violates the Constitution); see also Pizzulli,

supra note 44, 489 (cloning “subhumans” solely for organs would lead society to view

clones as “manufactured arrangements of cells” whose civil liberties would be infringed).

118. Krauthammer, supra note 64, 61.

119. R. Wright, Can souls be xeroxed?, Time, March 10, 1997, 73; see also Krauthammer,

supra note 64.

120. Pizzulli, supra note 44, 510 (citation omitted).

121. Talk of the Nation, February 24, 1997 (transcript on file with author).

122. Pizzulli, supra note 44, 497.

123. Id., 492.

124. Id., 509.

125. Id., 509 (citation omitted).

126. Id., 509 (citation omitted).

127. Id., 499 (citation omitted).

128. Id., 503 n.140.
F-66

129. Id., 512.

130. Id., 514. Pizzulli points out that a person’s self-image may be at odds with an “objective”

description of himself or herself (id.), and that overestimation of abilities might spur one to

achieve goals otherwise thought unattainable (id., 515).

131. For a review of the studies, see L.B. Andrews, Prenatal screening and the culture of

motherhood, 47 Hastings L.J. 967 (1996).

132. L. Tribe, Technology assessment and the fourth discontinuity: The limits of instrumental

rationality, 46 S. Cal. L. Rev. 617, 648 (1973).

133. There is much evidence of the widespread belief in genetic determinism. See, e.g., D.

Nelkin, S. Lindee, The DNA Mystique: The Gene as Cultural Icon, New York: W.H.

Freeman & Company, 1995.

134. Pizzulli, supra note 44, 499 (citation omitted). Such an argument, however, ignores the

role of having a culture of thinking; reflective individuals who can react to and are

influenced by such a change.

135. Fletcher, Ethical aspects of genetic controls, New Eng J Med, 285:776, 781, 1971.

136. G.B. Johnson, What rights should a cloned human have? St. Louis Post-Dispatch, March

20, 1997, B7.

137. Id.

138. Genesis the sequel, Newsday, March 9, 1997, G1.

139. Id.

140. Bader, M., Threats from cloning shouldn’t be overstated, Portland Oregonian, March 9,

1997, A8 (arguing that as long “[a]s the human gene pool is intact, humans will be able to

adapt to the extent that is within their overall makeup to do so.”).

141. Who agrees cloning has research benefits, The Times-Picayune, March 12, 1997, A8 (the

World Health Organization has condemned human cloning as “ethically unacceptable,” but

warns that other cloning research could be medically beneficial and therefore should

continue.).

142. Id.

143. Id.
F-67

144. Pizzulli, supra note 44, 529.

145. Gross, supra note 56.

146. Id.

147. Vatican calls for a global ban on cloning, Reuters North American Wire, February 26, 1997.

148. Kolata, supra note 50.

149. Kluger, supra note 78.

150. Amer, M.S., Comment: Breaking the mold: Human embryo cloning and its implications for

a right to individuality, 4 UCLA L. Rev. 1659, 1666 (1996) (citing Elmer-Dewitt, P.,

Cloning: Where do we draw the line?, Time, November 8, 1993, 65).

151. Id.

152. Pizzulli, supra note 44, 498.

153. Pizzulli, supra note 44, 524-25.

154. Vatican calls for a global ban on cloning, Reuters North American Wire, February 26,

1997.

155. Id.

156. There are currently bills introduced in Alabama, California, Florida, Illinois, Maryland

Missouri, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, South Carolina, West Virginia and in the U.S.

Congress. See S.B. 511 (Ala. 1997); S.B. 1344 (Cal. 1997); H.B. 1237 (Fla. 1997); H.B.

1829 (Ill. 1997); H.B. 2235 (Ill. 1997); H.J.R. 28 (Md. 1997); H.B. 824 (Mo. 1997); A.B.

2849 (N.J. 1997); A.B. 5383 (N.Y. 1997); S.B. 2877 (N.Y. 1997); S.B. 1017 (Ore. 1997);

H.B. 3617 (S.C. 1997); S.B. 410 (W. Va. 1997); S. 368, 105th Cong., 1st Session (1997);

H.R. 922, 105th Cong., 1st Session (1997); H.R. 923, 105th Cong., 1st Session (1997).

157. For a discussion of these precedents, see Andrews, L.B., The legal status of the embryo,

32 Loy. L. Rev. 357 (1986).

158. See Parts VII and VIII, infra.

159. Fla. Stat. Ann. ’390.001(6) (West 1993); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. ’9:121 et seq. (West 1991);

Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 22, ’1593 (West 1992); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 112, ’12J

(West 1996); Mich. Comp. Laws. Ann. ’333.2685 et seq. (West Supp. 1997); Minn. Stat.
F-68

Ann. ’145.421 (West 1989); N.D. Cent. Code ’14-02.2-01 (1991); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann.

168-B:15 (Supp. 1996); 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. ’3216 (West Supp. 1996); R.I. Gen. Laws

§ 11-54-1 (1994).

160. Minn. Stat. Ann. § 145.421 (West 1989).

161. Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 333.2685 (West Supp. 1997).

162. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 390.001(6) (West 1993); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 22, § 1593 (West

1992); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 112, § 12J (West 1996); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §

333.2685 et seq. (West Supp. 1997); N.D. Cent. Code § 14-02.2-01 (1991); R.I. Gen.

Laws

§ 11-54-1 (1994).

163. 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3216 (West Supp. 1996).

164. Also note that few of the states which have research/experiment statutes are among the

group (small but growing fast) of states which have introduced legislation to ban cloning.

This situation lends itself to argument from both sides as well. On one hand, these states

may assume that their current statute would cover cloning and a new statute would be

duplicative. On the other hand, the lack of legislative action may indicate satisfaction with

unregulated cloning.

165. Minn. Stat. Ann. § 145.421 (West 1989).

166. Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, Unabridged, Springfield, MA: Merriam

Webster, Inc., 1986.

167. 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3216 (West Supp. 1996).

168. 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3203 (West Supp. 1996).

169. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 390.001(6) (West 1993); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 22, § 1593 (West

1992); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 112, § 12J (West 1996); Mich. Comp. Laws. Ann. §

333.2685 et seq. (West Supp. 1997); N.D. Cent. Code § 14-02.2-01 (1991); R.I. Gen.

Laws

§ 11-54-1 (1994).

170. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 390.001 (West 1993).

171. Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 22, § 1593 (West 1992).
F-69

172. Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 112, § 12J(a)(I) (West 1996); Mich. Comp. Laws. Ann.

§ 333.2687 (West Supp. 1997) (the Michigan statute protects “embryo, fetus, or neonate,”

but the definition of the group is the same: “best medical judgment of a physician.”); N.D.

Cent. Code § 14-02.2-01(4) (1991); R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-54-1(c) (1994).

173. Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 112, § 12J(a)(I) (West 1996); N.D. Cent. Code

§ 14-02.2-01(1), (3) (1991); R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-54-1(c) (1994).

174. Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 333.2685 et seq. (West Supp. 1997).

175. See Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 112 § 12J(a)(I) (West 1996) (creating exception to

preserve the life or health of the fetus or mother); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 333.2685(1)

(West Supp. 1997) (creating exception for therapeutic procedures); Minn. Stat. Ann. §

145.422 (West 1989) (creating exception to preserve the life or health of the fetus or

mother and for “experimentation which verifiable scientific evidence has shown to be

harmless to conceptus”); 18 Pa. Const. Stat. § 3216 (West Supp. 1996) (allowing

therapeutic procedures); R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-54-1 (1994) (creating exception to preserve

the life or health of the fetus or mother).

176. Robertson Statement, supra note 33, 94.

177. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. 168-B:15 (Supp. 1996).

178. Zorn, E., ‘Brave new world’ awaits debaters of abortion rights, Chicago Tribune, March

9, 1997, B1.

179. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9:121 (West 1991).

180. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9:122 (West 1991).

181. Id.

182. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9:123 (West 1991).

183. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9:124 (West 1991).

184. Id.

185. Id.

186. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9:126 (West 1991).

187. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9:129 (West 1991).
F-70

188. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9:130 (West 1991).

189. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9:131 (West 1991).

190. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9:126 (West 1991).

191. Id.

192. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9:130 (West 1991).

193. Id.

194. Id.

195. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9:131 (West 1991).

196. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9:127 (West 1991).

197. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9:132 (West 1991).

198. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9:122 (West 1991).

199. See, e.g., Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 2254 (West Supp. 1997).

200. See, e.g., N.M. Stat. Ann. § 24-9A-6 (1994) (providing for imprisonment for up to one

year or the payment of a fine up to $1,000 or both).

201. Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 112, § 12J(a)(VI) (West 1996). An Institutional Review

Board’s reasonable, well-documented written approval provides a complete defense to

criminal prosecution of the researcher. Id.

202. Mass. Gen. Laws. Ann. ch. 112 § 12J(b)(I).

203. Mass. Gen. Laws. Ann. ch. 112 § 12J(b)(III).

204. Mass. Gen. Laws. Ann. ch. 112 § 12J(b)(VI).

205. Mass. Gen. Laws. Ann. ch. 112 § 12J(b)(VII).

206. Mass. Gen. Laws. Ann. ch. 112 § 12J(b)(VIII).

207. 735 F.Supp. 1361, 1364 (N.D. Ill. 1990), aff’d without opinion, sub nom., Scholberg v.

Lifchez, 914 F.2d 260 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1068 (1991).
F-71

208. Id., 1364-65.

209. Id., 1364.

210. 794 F.2d 994 (5th Cir. 1986).

211. Id., 999.

212. Id.

213. Id. A concurring judge found this analysis to be contrived and opined that the provision

was not unconstitutionally vague. Id., 1000 (Williams, J., concurring). Instead, he

suggested that the prohibition was unconstitutional because “under the guise of police

regulation the state has actually undertaken to discourage constitutionally privileged

induced abortions.” (Id., 1002, citing Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians

and Gynecologists, 106 S.Ct. 2169, 2178 (1986)). The concurring judge pointed out that

the state had “failed to establish that tissue derived from an induced abortion presents a

greater threat to public health or other public concerns than the tissue of human corpses

[upon which experimentation is allowed].” Id. Moreover, the state had not shown a

rational justification for prohibiting experimentation on fetal tissue from an induced

abortion, rather than a spontaneous one. Id.

214. Margaret S. v. Edwards, 794 F.2d 994, 999 (5th Cir. 1986).

215. Id.

216. Utah Code Ann. § 76-7.3-310.

217. Jane L. v. Bangerter, 61 F.3d 1493 (10th Cir. 1995).

218. S. 368, 105th Congress, 1st session, § 1(B) (1997).

219. 42 U.S.C.A. § 263a-1 et seq. (Supp. 1996).

220. 42 U.S.C.A. § 263a-7(1) (Supp. 1996).

221. 42 U.S.C.A. § 263a-1(b) (Supp. 1996).

222. Id.

223. 42 U.S.C.A. § 263a-5 (Supp. 1996).

224. 42 U.S.C.A. § 263a-1(a)(2) (Supp. 1996).
F-72

225. 42 U.S.C.A. § 263a-5 (Supp. 1996).

226. 42 U.S.C.A. § 263a-2 (Supp. 1996).

227. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 168-B:13 (Supp. 1993)

228. 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 3213(e) (1983).

229. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9:128 (West 1991).

230. See, e.g., Ark. Code Ann. § 23-86-118(d) (1992); Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 432:1-604(6)

(1994); 215 ILCS 5/356m(b)(1)(c) (1993); Md. Ann. Code art. 48a §§ 477EE(6) and

470W (1994).

231. 1997 Mo. H.B. 824 (introduced March 6, 1997); Md. H.J.R. 28 (introduced March 20,

1997).

232. Fla. H.B. 1237 (introduced March 7, 1997).

233. South Carolina H.B. 3617 § 16-17-745(B) (introduced March 11, 1997). A similar

provision exists in New York Assembly Bill 5383 (introduced March 4, 1997).

234. 1997 N.Y.S.B. 2877 (introduced February 26, 1977); 1997 N.Y.A.B. 5383 (introduced

March 4, 1997); 1997 Ill. H.B. 2235 § 5 (introduced March 10, 1997).

235. S. 368, 105th Congress, 1st session, § 1 (B) (1997).

236. The bill was introduced on March 4, 1997.

237. S.B. 511 § 1. Anyone who “intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly” clones a human being

is guilty of a Class B felony. Id., § 2.

238. Cal. S.B. 1344 (introduced March 11, 1997).

239. This was introduced on March 4, 1997.

240. Fla. H.B. 1237 (introduced March 7, 1997).

241. 1997 Ill. H.B. 2235 § 5 (introduced March 10, 1997).

242. Id., § 10.

243. Id., § 5.
F-73

244. Md. H.J.R. 28 (introduced March 20, 1997).

245. Mo. H.B. 824 (introduced March 6, 1997).

246. N.J.A.B. 2849 § 1 (introduced March 24, 1997).

247. Id., § 2(b).

248. Id., § 2(c).

249. S.B. 2877 (introduced on February 26, 1997).

250. Id., § 4825.

251. Id., § 4826. Such actions are a Class D felony. Id., penal law § 125.70.

252. Id., Penal Law § 105.18. This is a Class B felony. Id.

253. Id., § 4827.

254. 1997 N.Y.A.B. 5383 (introduced March 4, 1997).

255. Ore. S.B. 1017 § 1 (introduced March 19, 1997).

256. Id., § 2.

257. S.C.H.B. 3617 § 16-17-45(A).

258. W.Va. S.B. 410 (introduced March 21, 1997).

259. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.

260. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.

261. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395nn(b)(2)(B) (1995).

262. 45 C.F.R. § 46.201 et seq. (1996).

263. Transcript of Clinton remarks on cloning, U.S. Newswire, March 4, 1997.

264. U.S. Const., art. I, § 8 cl. 3.

265. U.S. v. Lopez, 115 S.Ct. 1624, 1630 (1995).
F-74

266. 42 U.S.C.A. § 274e (1991).

267. Human Research Subject Protections Act of 1997, S. 193 § 3(9) (1997).

268. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (holding provisions of the Bituminous

Coal Act of 1935 regarding minimum wages, wage agreements, and collective bargaining

unconstitutional on the basis that mining constituted “production,” which is an

“antecedent” of, not a part of, “commerce”).

269. U.S. v. Lopez, 115 S.Ct. 1624 (1995).

270. 18 U.S.C. § 922 (q)(1)(A). The term “school zone” is defined as “in, or on the grounds of,

a public, parochial or private school” or “within a distance of 1,000 feet from the grounds

of a public, parochial or private school.” 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(25).

271. Lopez, 115 S.Ct., 1626.

272. U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8.

273. Lopez, 115 S.Ct., 1626 (citing The Federalist No. 45, pp. 292-293 [C. Rossiter ed. 1961)].

274. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991).

275. 9 Wheat. 1, 189-90 (1924).

276. Id., 196.

277. Lopez, 115 S.Ct., 1628.

278. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).

279. Id., 37.

280. Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 197 n. 27 (1968).

281. 312 U.S. 100 (1941).

282. U.S. v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 118 (1941).

283. 452 U.S. 264 (1981).

284. 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
F-75

285. 379 U.S. 294 (1965).

286. 379 U.S. 241 (1964).

287. For example, in Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 302 (1969), the U.S. Supreme Court held that an

Arkansas amusement facility isolated on a country road nonetheless affects interstate

commerce because a substantial portion of the food served at the snack bar (Id., 1701)

moved in interstate commerce as well as the “sources of amusement” which included

paddle boats leased from an Oklahoma company and a juke box which was manufactured

out of state and played records manufactured out of state (Id., 1702).

288. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000a (1994).

289. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. U.S., 379 U.S. 261 (1964).

290. Id., 358.

291. Id.

292. Id., 355-358.

293. Lopez 115 S.Ct., 1629-1630. In affirming regulation of activities that “substantially affect”

interstate commerce, the Lopez court established that consistency with prior case law

required a test that analyzed whether the regulated activity “substantially affects” interstate

commerce as opposed to whether it “affects” interstate commerce.

294. Lopez 115 S.Ct., 1634.

295. Id., 1625, 1630-1641.

296. Id., 1640 (Kennedy, J., concurring).

297. Id., 1630-1631.

298. Id., 1631.

299. Merritt, D.J., Commerce!, 94 Mich. L. Rev. 674, 696 (1995).

300. Id., 696.

301. Id.

302. Lopez, 115 S.Ct., 1631.
F-76

303. Id., 1632.

304. Merritt, supra note 299, 689 n. 65.

305. Lopez, 115 S.Ct., 640-641 (Kennedy, J., concurring).

306. Id., 1632.

307. Merritt, supra note 299, 701.

308. Id., 693 n. 74 (citing U.S. v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342, 1366 (5th Cir. 1993), aff’d., 115 S.Ct.

1624 (1995)).

309. Merritt, supra note 299, 703.

310. See for example, NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (responding

to severe worker dissatisfaction and a series of violent strikes) and Perez v. U.S., 402 U.S.

146 (1971) (responding to the perception that organized crime was too far flung for state

law to handle).

311. Lopez, 115 S.Ct., 1632.

312. Id.

313. Id.

314. Id.

315. Id.

316. This changed in 1957 in the landmark case, Bing v. Thunig, 163 N.Y.S. 2d 3, 143 N.E. 2d

3 (N.Y. 1957).

317. Wing, K.R., A.M. Silton, Constitutional authority for extending federal control over the

delivery of health care, 57 N.C. L. Rev. 1423, 1470 (1979).

318. 29 U.S.C.A. § 203(S)(1)(B) (Supp. 1997) (establishing minimum wage and working

condition requirements for certain defined employers engaged in interstate commerce).

319. 29 U.S.C.A. § 152(14) (Supp. 1997) (imposing collective bargaining requirements on

employers engaged in interstate commerce).

320. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1 et seq. (1973).
F-77

321. 29 U.S.C.A. § 203(b) (1978) (FLSA); 29 U.S.C.A. § 152(b) (1973) (NLRA); 15 U.S.C.A.

§ 12 (Supp. 1996) (Sherman Act).

322. Hospital Building Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hospital, 425 U.S. 738 (1976) (holding that

hospital had sufficient nexus with interstate commerce to invoke federal jurisdiction of

Sherman Act). See also Summit Health, Ltd. v. Pinhas, 111 S.Ct. 366 (1991) (holding that

jurisdictional elements of the Sherman Act were satisfied because ophthalmological

services affect interstate commerce; because physicians and hospitals serve nonresident

patients, they receive Medicare payments, and peer review proceedings routinely

distributed across state lines affect doctors’ employment opportunities throughout the

Nation).

323. National Organization of Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249, 114 S.Ct. 798, 803-

806, 127 L.Ed.2d 99 (1994); Wilson v. U.S., 73 F.3d 675 (7th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 117

S.Ct. 47 (1996).

324. Abbott v. Bragdon, 912 F.Supp. 580 (D. Me. 1995), aff’d., 107 F.3d 934, 1997 WL 85096

(1st Cir. 1997); U.S. v. Morvant, 898 F.Supp. 1157 (E.D. La. 1995).

325. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12182(a) (1995).

326. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12181(7) (1995).

327. 912 F.Supp. 580 (D. Me. 1995), aff’d., — — F.3d — — , 1997 WL 85096 (1st Cir. 1997).

328. Abbott v. Bragdon, 912 F. Supp. 580, 593 (D. Me. 1995), aff’d., —— F.3d — — , 1997

WL 85096 (1st Cir. 1997).

329. Id.

330. Id., 594.

331. Wing and Silton, supra note 317, 1471.

332. 21 U.S.C.A. § 321 et seq. (1972).

333. 21 U.S.C.A. § 331 (1972).

334. U.S. v. 62 Packages, 48 F.Supp. 878 (W.D. Wisc. 1943).

335. See, e.g., M-D-D-I Reports, “The Gray Sheet” (March 17, 1997) (referring to lawsuit

challenging FDA’s policy on PET radiopharmaceuticals).
F-78

336. 192 F.Supp. 51 (E.D. Mich. 1961). See also U.S. v. Undetermined Number of Unlabeled

Cases, 21 F.3d 1026 (10th Cir. 1994) (holding that urine and saliva specimen containers

used in HIV-testing are subject to FDA regulation).

337. 39 Cases, 192 F.Supp., 52.

338. Id.

339. 42 U.S.C.A. § 262(a) (Supp. 1997).

340. The proposed Human Tissues Safety Act of 1996, S. 2195, would bring within FDA

regulation “human tissue,” which is defined as “a collection of similar human cells which is

intended for use in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of a disease or

condition in a human or for reproduction.” If the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act were

amended to include the regulation of human tissue, it is likely that embryos that result from

cloning would fall within the proposed definition of “human tissue.”

341. Cal. Health & Safety Code § 121200 (1996).

342. Id.

343. Rivas, M.S., The California AIDS initiative and the Food and Drug Administration:

Working at odds with each other?, 46 Food Drug Cosm. Law J. 107, 125 (1991).

344. Id.

345. 18 U.S.C.A. § 248 (1994).

346. 18 U.S.C.A. § 248(a)(1)(1994).

347. 18 U.S.C.A. § 248(a)(2)(1994).

348. 18 U.S.C.A. § 248(a)(3)(1994).

349. U.S. v. Wilson, 73 F.3d 675, 680 (7th Cir. 1995).

350. Cheffer v. Reno, 55 F.3d 1517, 1520 (11th Cir. 1995).

351. Id., 1520; Wilson 73 F.3d, 681.

352. Cheffer, 55 F.3d, 1520; Wilson, 73 F.3d, 681 (holding unique scarcity of certain

reproductive health services necessitates substantial interstate travel).
F-79

353. Cheffer, 55 F.3d, 1520; Wilson, 73 F.3d, 682.

354. Cheffer, 55 F.3d, 1520; Wilson, 73 F.3d, 680-682.

355. 42 U.S.C.A. § 263a (Supp. 1996).

356. 138 Cong. Rec. H5349-01 (1992).

357. Id.

358. 42 U.S.C.A. § 263a-2(b) (Supp. 1996).

359. Cheffer, 55 F.3d, 1520.

360. Lopez, 115 S.Ct. 1629 (1995).

361. U.S. v. Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d 913, 919 (8th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 613 (1996).

The court noted that “[s]ubstantial numbers of women travel across state lines to obtain

reproductive-health services.” Id. (citation omitted).

362. This estimate is from Dr. W. Bruce Currie, biologist at Cornell University. Begley, supra

note 4.

363. U.S. v. Robertson, 514 U.S. 669 (1995).

364. A legislative assistant in Senator Glenn’s office suggested that the national exchange of

research results justifies Congress’ authority under the commerce clause to regulate the use

of human subjects in all research, including those projects that do not receive federal

funding. See proposed Human Research Subject Protections Act of 1997, S. 193.

365. See Andrews, L., Medical Genetics: A Legal Frontier, Chicago: American Bar

Foundation, 1987, chapter 3.

366. Lopez, 115 S.Ct., 1641 (Kennedy, J., concurring).

367. Some states have proposed laws, however. See, e.g., N.Y. S.B. 2877 (February 26, 1997);

Al. S.B. 511 (March 4, 1997).

368. California S.J.R. (March 4, 1997).

369. Francione, G.L., Experimentation and the marketplace theory of the First Amendment, 136

U. Pa. L. Rev. 428-429 (1987).
F-80

370. One of the powers of the legislative branch under the patents and copyrights clause of the

U.S. Constitution is [t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for

limited times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and

Discoveries. U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, cl. 8.

371. Coleman, supra note 117, 1386-1387.

372. Stolberg, supra note 49.

373. Sen. Tom Harkin, D-Iowa, today said that he is investigating President Clinton’s authority

to ban federal spending for human cloning research, Congress Daily, March 12, 1997.

374. Recer, supra note 103 (testimony of Senator Tom Harkin before the Senate hearings on

cloning research on March 12, 1997).

375. Robertson, J., The scientist’s right to research: A constitutional analysis, 51 S. Cal. L. Rev.

1203-1279, 1213 (1977). Robertson argues that the right to participate as a research

subject is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment’s right to privacy as recognized in Roe

v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). This right arises from an individual’s privacy interest in

autonomous decision-making concerning the use of his or her body in an experiment

designed to further medical knowledge or to be of personal benefit. Id.

376. Id., 1212. Coleman argues that “[v]arious Supreme Court decisions, read together, seem to

acknowledge a freedom to conduct research which is anchored in the freedom of speech.”

Coleman, supra note 117 (citations omitted). See also Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476,

484 (1957) (noting that the Continental Congress cited scientific advancement as a reason

for protecting freedom of the press); see also Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234,

250 (1957) (noting that “[t]eachers and students must always remain free to inquire, to

study and to evaluate, to gain new maturity and understanding; otherwise our civilization

will stagnate and die.”).

377. Robertson, supra note 375, 1204.

378. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 705 (1972).

379. Coleman, supra note 117, 1338.

380. Buckley v. Valeo, 435 U.S. 765 (1978).

381. Branzburg, 408 U.S., 681-682.

382. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
F-81

383. Id., 399.

384. Henley v. Wise, 303 F.Supp. 62 (N.D. Ind. 1969).

385. Id., 67.

386. Margaret S. I, 488 F.Supp. 181, 220-221 (E.D. La. 1980). See also Margaret S. v. Treen,

597 F.Supp. 636 (E.D. La. 1984), aff’d sub. nom Margaret S. v. Edwards, 794 F.2d 994

(5th Cir. 1986); Wynn v. Scott, 449 F.Supp. 1302, 1322 (N.D. Ill. 1978), aff’d sub nom.,

Wynn v. Carey, 599 F.2d 193 (7th Cir. 1979).

387. Robertson, supra note 375, 1212.

388. Id., 1253.

389. Id., 1254.

390. Id., 1256.

391. U.S. v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-377 (1968).

392. Id.

393. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 379 (1965); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S.

438 (1972).

394. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 112 S.Ct. 2791 (1992).

395. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 112 S.Ct. 2791, 2810 (1992).

396. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).

397. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).

398. Lifchez v. Hartigan, 735 F.Supp. 1361 (N.D. Ill.), aff’d without opinion, sub nom.,

Scholberg v. Lifchez, 914 F.2d 260 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 787 (1991).

399. 735 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Ill. 1990), aff’d without opinion, sub nom., Scholberg v. Lifchez,

914 F.2d 260 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1068 (1991).

400. Id., 1377 (citations omitted). The court also held that the statute was impermissibly vague

because of its failure to define “experiment” or “therapeutic.” Id., 1376.
F-82

401. Pizzulli, supra note 44, 550.

402. Robertson statement, supra note 33, 83. This seems to be a reversal of Robertson’s earlier

position that cloning “may deviate too far from prevailing conception of what is valuable

about reproduction to count as a protected reproductive experience. At some point

attempts to control the entire genome of a new person pass beyond the central experiences

of identity and meaning that make reproduction a valued experience.” Robertson, J.,

Children of Choice: Freedom and the New Reproductive Technologies, Princeton, NJ:

Princeton University Press, 1994, 169.

403. Id.

404. Coleman, supra note 117.

405. Annas, G.J., Human cloning, ABA Journal, May 1997.

406. Annas, G., Scientific Discoveries and Cloning: Challenges for Public Policy, testimony

before the Subcommittee on Public Health and Safety, Committee on Labor and Human

Resources, United States Senate, March 12, 1977, 4.

407. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S.

438 (1972); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Planned Parenthood of Southern

Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).

408. See Lifchez v. Hartigan, 735 F.Supp. 1361 (N.D. Ill.), aff’d without opinion, sub nom.

Scholberg v. Lifchez, 914 F.2d 260 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1068 (1991).

409. See the discussion of risks, supra in Part II.

410. Mauro, T., Sheep clone prompts U.S. panel review, USA Today, February 25, 1997, A1.

411. Pizzulli, supra note 44, 502

412. Id., 512.

413. Id.; see also, Amer, supra note 150.

414. Valerio Barrad, C.M., Comment, Genetic information and property theory, 87 Nw. U. L.

Rev. 1037, 1050 (1993).

415. Id.

416. Id.
F-83

417. See Amer, supra note 150, 1669 n. 50; see also A wolf in sheep’s cloning? Fantasies

abound about what cloning animals means to the human race, The Edmonton Journal,

March 2, 1997.

418. See Amer, supra note 150.

419. Pizzulli, supra note 44, 557. “[L]arge-scale cloning of a limited number of genotypes

would decrease the adaptive potential of man.” Id., 560.

420. Id., 559.

421. This useful term was introduced by Francis Pizzulli, supra note 44, 481.

422. Under the Thirteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, “[n]either slavery nor

involuntary servitude, except as punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been

duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their

jurisdiction.” U.S. Const. Amend. 13, § 1.

423. Pizzulli, supra note 44, 515.

424. Id., 517-522.

425. Id.

426. Tribe, supra note 132, 649.

427. Pizzulli, supra note 44, 583.

428. Id., 493.

429. Kluger, supra note 78, 70 (Varmus commenting that human cloning is repugnant to the

American public).

430. Pizzulli, supra note 44, 525-527.

431. Id.

432. Horst, Mayor, & Co., et al. v. Moses, 48 Ala. 129, writ dismissed, 82 U.S. 389 (1872).

433. Pizzulli, supra note 44, 581.

434. Pizzulli poses a counter argument— “That granting a talented person the right to clone on

the basis of his genetic constitution is based on a claim of personal merit, and that it does
F-84

not necessarily follow that he is being accorded preferential treatment on the basis of his

ancestry.” Id., 580 n. 503.

435. Id. If legislatures were to enact laws regarding who could be cloned, this would also likely

run afoul of state constitutional provisions prohibiting special legislation.

436. Lest it be thought that an argument based the nobility clause is far-fetched, it should be

noted that the nobility clause has been revitalized by recent scholarship applying it to issues

of affirmative action and political activity. See, e.g., Lobsenz, J.E., Bakke, Lochner, and

law school: The nobility clause versus a republican form of medicine, 32 Me. L. Rev. 1

(1980) and Eisgruber, C.L., Political limits and the powers of government, 44 UCLA L.

Rev. 1297 (1994).

437. King, A.E., Solomon revisited: Assigning parenthood in the context of collaborative

reproduction, 5 UCLA Women’s L.J. 329 (1995).

438. See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 76-7-204 (1995).

439. See, e.g., In re Baby M., 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988).

440. See, Andrews, L.B., N.R. Elster, Legal issues in fertility management, in Infertility in the

Male, 3rd ed., L.I. Lipshultz, S.S. Howards (eds.), St. Louis: Mosby Year Book, 1997,

476-484, 477.

441. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 742.14 (West Supp. 1997); N.D. Cent. Code § 14-18-04 (Michie 1991);

Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 10 § 555 (West Supp. 1997); Texas Family Code § 151.102 (1996);

Va. Code Ann. § 20-158 (Michie 1995).

442. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 25-218 (1991); Ark. Code Ann. § 9-10-201 (Michie 1993); D.C.

Code Ann. § 16-401 et seq. (Supp. 1996); Fla. Stat. Ann. §§ 63.212, 742.15 (West 1985

and Supp. 1997); Ind. Code Ann. § 31-8-2-1 (West Supp. 1996); Iowa Code Ann.

§ 710.11 (West 1993); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 199.590 (Michie 1995); La. Rev. Stat. Ann.

§ 9:2713 (West 1991); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 722.851 et seq. (West 1993); Neb. Rev.

Stat. § 25-21-200 (1989); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 126.045 (Michie Supp. 1995); N.H. Rev. Stat.

Ann. § 168-B:16 (1994); N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 121 et seq. (McKinney Supp. 1997); N.D.

Cent. Code § 14-18-05 (1991); Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-102146 (1996); Utah Code Ann.

§ 76-7-204 (1995); Va. Code Ann. § 20-160 (Michie 1995); Wash. Rev. Code Ann.

§ 26.26.210 et seq. (West Supp. 19976); W. Va. Code § 48-4-16 (1996); Wisc. Stat. Ann.

§ 69.14(h) (West 1990); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-1-410(d) (1997).

443. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 25-218 (1991); Ark. Code Ann. § 9-10-201 (Michie 1993); Fla.

Stat. Ann. § 742.16 (West Supp. 1997); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 126.045 (Michie 1995);
F-85

N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 168-B:16 (1994); N.D. Cent. Code § 14-18-05 (1991); Utah Code

Ann. § 76-7-204 (1995); Va. Code Ann. § 20-158(D) (Michie 1995).

444. See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. § 45a-774 (1994); 750 ILCS 40/3 (1996) and Wash. Rev. Code

§ 26.26.050 (1996).

445. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 742.14 (West Supp. 1997); N.D. Cent. Code § 14-18-04(1) (1991); Okla.

Stat. Ann. tit. 10 § 555 (West Supp. 1997); Va. Code Ann. § 20-156 (Michie 1995).

446. Texas Fam. Code Ann. § 151.102(a) (West 1996).

447. Fla. Stat. § 742.15 (West Supp. 1997).

448. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 168-B:17(I) (1994).

449. N.D. Cent. Code § 14-18-01 (1991).

450. N.D. Cent. Code § 14-18-03 (1991).

451. Va. Code Ann. § 20-169 (Michie 1995).

452. Fla. Stat. § 742.15(2) (West Supp. 1997).

453. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 168-B:17 (1995); Va. Code Ann. § 20-160 (Michie 1995).

454. Va. Code Ann. § 20-160 (Michie 1995) (emphasis added).

455. Cal. Fam. Code § 7610 (1994).

456. See, Cal. Fam. Code §§ 7550, 7650 (1994).

457. 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 494 (1993).

458. Shultz, supra note 40, 332. Another legal commentator, also espousing an intent-based

allocation of parenthood, articulates the value of such a private ordering approach to

assigning roles in collaborative reproduction. She explains that:

The benefits of private ordering in general, and in the context of

collaborative reproduction in particular are many. Privatization of familial

relationships advantages all members of the family; it protects the best

interests of the child and furthers the adults’ autonomy. Allocation of

parental status by prebirth agreement clarifies adult-child relationships

from the beginning of the child’s life. It enables intending parents to
F-86

exercise parental authority and receive legal recognition of their functional

status throughout the course of the child’s life. It provides certainty to the

child and structure to the family. Moreover, it ensures that relationships

within families of consent have been thought out and planned, through

negotiation and compromise.

King, supra note 437.

459. Shultz, supra note 40, 370.

460. Va. Code Ann. § 20-160 (1996).

461. See discussion of specific states’ approaches in Andrews, L.B., Alternative reproduction,

in Disputed Paternity Proceedings, vol. 2, S.B. Schatkin (ed.), New York: Matthew

Bender, 1990, § 30.02, 30-11.

462. Id., 30-11.

463. Id.

464. Id., 30-12.

465. D.C. Code § 16-2343.1(e) (1996).

466. Tenn. Code Ann. § 24-7-112 (1996).

467. Mich. Stat. Ann. § 25.496 (1996).

468. Miss. Code Ann. § 93-9-27 (1996).

469. See, e.g., Schiff, A.R., Solomonic decisions in egg donation: Unscrambling the legal

conundrum of legal maternity, 80 Iowa L. Rev. 265, 267 (1995) (opining that the

presumption would establish legal parenthood for a woman who gave birth using a donated

egg in the context or currently used forms of collaborative reproduction).

470. These issues are discussed supra in Section IIIB.

471. Schatkin, S.B. (ed.), Disputed Paternity Proceedings, 4th ed., vol. 1, New York: Matthew

Bender, 1990.

472. Faust, H., Challenging the paternity of children born during wedlock: An analysis of

Pennsylvania law regarding the effects of the doctrines of presumption of legitimacy and
F-87

paternity by estoppel on the admissibility of blood tests to determine paternity, 100 Dick.

L. Rev. 963, 964 (1996).

473. See, e.g., Cal. Fam. Code § 7610.

474. A third but unlikely scenario is possible which would occur when the egg cell of the

intended mother is fused with the nucleic material of the gestator.

475. The law in Nevada is not applicable, though, because it specifically states that the egg and

sperm must be from the intended parents, but in this scenario, there is no sperm

contributed by the intended father.

476. A blood test could reveal that the intended father is the twin brother of the child. “In the

analysis of a typical paternity case, exhibiting approximately 40 bands in the two DNA

fingerprints of the child, there will be approximately 17 maternal specific bands, 17 paternal

specific bands, and 6 to 8 bands shared between the mother and alleged father and/or the

mother, child and alleged father.” Schatkin, supra note 473, 118-131 (footnote omitted).

477. 897 P.2d 1356 (1994).

478. Id., 1361.

479. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 168-B:1 (1996).

480. See Andrews, L.B., Medical Genetics: A Legal Frontier, 1987, chapter 3.

481. For a discussion of the use of children as research subjects, see Glantz, L., The law of

human experimentation with children, in Children as Research Subjects: Science, Ethics,

and Law, M.A. Grodin, L.H. Glantz (eds.), New York: Oxford University Press, 1994,

122; Grodin, M.A., J.J. Alpert, Children as participants in research, Pediatric Clinics of

North America, vol. 35, Philadelphia: W.B. Saunders Co., 1980, 1389-1401, 1390; Levine,

R., Children as research subjects, in Children and Health Care, Kopelman, Moskop (eds.), 

Norwell, MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1989; Levine, R., Ethics and Regulation of

Clinical Research, Baltimore: Urban and Schwartzenberg, 1981, 156.

482. See, e.g., Hart v. Brown, 289 A.2d 386 (1972).

483. Brock, D.W., Ethical issues in exposing children to risks in research, in Children as

Research Subjects: Science, Ethics and Law, M.A. Grodin, L.H. Glantz (eds.), New York:

Oxford University Press, 1994, 81.

484. 45 C.F.R. § 46.116 (1996) (emphasis added).
F-88

485. 45 C.F.R. § 46.408 (1996).

486. Glantz, supra note 483, 104.

487. Id.

488. Andrews, L., Medical Genetics: A Legal Frontier, Chicago: American Bar Foundation,

1987, 44-45.

489. Rozovsky, F.A., Consent to Treatment: A Practical Guide, Boston: Little, Brown & Co.,

1984, 540.

490. The difficulties with this, including its possible violation of the Thirteenth Amendment, are

discussed in this paper supra, Part IX.

491. Andrews, supra note 490, 45.

492. Nielsen v. Board of Regents, Civ. No. 665-049 (Super. Ct. San Francisco, Cal. filed

August 23, 1973).

493. Andrews, supra note 490, 45.

494. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).

495. Id., 170.

496. Rozovsky, supra note 491, 540.

497. Id.

498. Id., 541.

499. N.Y. Pub. Laws. Ann. § 2442 (McKinney’s 1996); Va. Code Ann. § 32.1-162.18 (1996

Supp.).

500. 45 C.F.R. § 46.408 (1996).

501. Levine, supra note 483, 157.

502. Woody, Legal and ethical concepts involved in informed consent to human research, 18

Cal. W. L. Rev. 50, 63-64, 72 (1981).
F-89

503. Christoffel, T., Health and the Law: A Handbook for Health Professionals, New York:

Free Press, 1982, 293.

504. Id.

505. 45 C.F.R. § 46.404; § 46.408 (1986).

506. 45 C.F.R. § 46.402(b) (1986).

507. 45 C.F.R. § 46.405 (1986).

508. 45 C.F.R. § 46.406 (1986).

509. 45 C.F.R. § 46.407(b) (experts from disciplines such as science, medicine, education, law,

or ethics).

510. 45 C.F.R. § 46.407(b)(2)(ii) (1986).

511. Supra note 501 (N.Y. and Virginia).

512. Va. Code Ann. § 32.1-162.18 (1996 Supp.).

513. N.Y. Public Health Law § 2442 (McKinney 1985).

514. For a general discussion of such claims, see Andrews, L.B., Torts and the double helix:

Legal and ethical issues raised by the Human Genome Project, 29 Houston L. Rev. 149,

155-157 (1992). It should also be noted that at least seven states (Indiana, Minnesota,

Missouri, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, and Utah) have adopted statutes to

prohibit an individual from bringing a wrongful life suit. Id., 160 n. 54.

515. Curlender v. Bio-Science Lab., 165 Cal. Rptr. 477 (Ct. App. 1980).

516. Shaw, M., Conditional prospective rights of the fetus, 5 J. L. Med. 63, 99 (1984).

517. Id., 537l; see also Brodie, I., Clinton acts swiftly to avert abuse of breakthrough, The

Times, February 26, 1997 (citing that the clone would have an action for wrongful life

based on its denial of uniqueness).

518. Robertson, J., Genetic selection of offspring characteristics, 76 B.U. L. Rev. 421, 437

(1996).

519. Pizzulli, supra note 44, 541.
F-90

520. Zepeda v. Zepeda, 190 N.E.2d 849, 859 (Ill. App. Ct. 1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 945

(1964).

521. Turpin v. Sortini, 643 P.2d 954, 962-963 (Cal. 1982).

522. Pizzulli, supra note 44, 543 n. 320.

523. See in particular the discussion of the Louisiana and New Hampshire laws in Part IV,

supra.

524. 42 U.S.C.A. § 263a-1 et seq. (Supp. 1996).

525. Safire, W., Clonalities, The New York Times, February 27, 1997, A23.

526. Transcript of President Clinton’s remarks on cloning, U.S. Newswire, March 4, 1997.

527. These standards were suggested by George Annas in Senate testimony. Annas, G.,

Scientific Discoveries and Cloning: Challenges for Public Policy Testimony, before the

Subcommittee on Labor and Human Resources, United States Senate, March 12, 1997, 8.
CLONING HUMAN BEINGS

Cloning: An International Comparative Overview

Commissioned Paper

by Bartha Maria Knoppers, J.D.

University of Montreal

G-1

CONTENTS

Introduction G-3

International Positions G-3

National Positions G-6

1. Research on Embryos G-6

2. Embryo Twinning G-7

3. “Dolly” Technique G-7

4. Bills, Policy Positions, and Ethical Guidelines G-7

5. Government Actions G-8

Conclusions G-8

References G-9

G-3

INTRODUCTION

The cloning of the sheep called Dolly involved a different technique than that used in embryo

twinning or splitting. In “Dolly,” a quiescent adult mammary cell was placed in the unfertilized

ovum of a sheep whose nucleus had been removed. This was followed by the transfer of the

subsequent embryo into a surrogate mother sheep, its normal division as an embryo, and then by

the birth of a sheep genetically identical to the donor (except for the mitochondrial DNA which

came from the ovum donor). (Nature, 1997, vol. 385, February 27, 810-1)

Two months earlier (December 15-18, 1996) in Strasbourg, France, at the Third

Symposium on Bioethics of the Council of Europe on Medically-Assisted Procreation and the

Protection of the Human Embryo, the renowned biologist Dr. Anne McLaren of the United

Kingdom had stated in her report on “Research on Embryos in Vitro: The Various Types of

Research” that “[a]reas of research that are widely regarded as ethically unacceptable and often

prohibited by law include the following: . . . 3) cloning by nuclear substitution” (CDBI/SPK(96)

(22), p. 6). At the same meeting, J. Egozcue, the Spanish expert, in his report on “Research in

Human Conceptuses” reiterated that “[o]ther lines of research are forbidden or even penalized,

although in some cases they may correspond to extremely useful models for the study of some

special situations, that do not carry with them any danger, menace or unethical load. Among them

are cloning, parthenogenesis, the production of chimeras, interspecies fertilization (with the

exemption of the human-hamster system), any modification of the genome (or of the

non-pathological genome, as in the Spanish law) and germ-cell therapy” (CIBD/SPK (96) (5), p.

7).

The scope of this international, comparative study on “human” cloning covers the last

decade (1986–96) of laws, bills, and official policy statements on the legal and ethical issues with

regard to research in human genetics and new reproductive technologies. While it includes

international, regional (Europe), and national coverage of these issues, it excludes the 1–5 6–12 13–37

United States and animal cloning and does not cover legislation on human tissues generally.

International and regional positions will be treated in a first part (I) followed by the division of the

different national positions covering 13 countries into five categories in the second part (II):

(1) legal prohibitions on research on gametes and/or embryos; (2) legal prohibitions on embryo

twinning; (3) legal prohibitions specific to the cloning technique used in the creation of “Dolly”;

(4) recommendations on cloning as found in bills, policy statements, or ethical guidelines; and

finally, (5) recent government actions in relation to “Dolly.”

INTERNATIONAL POSITIONS

Recently, two international ethics committees, one governmental (UNESCO) and the 1

other nongovernmental (HUGO), were deliberately created for the study of the ethical, legal, and 2

social issues surrounding human genetics. Neither has an explicit statement on cloning. The

UNESCO International Bioethics Committee has as its mandate “the preparation of an

international instrument on the protection of the human genome” (1993).
G-4

The preamble of UNESCO’s proposed Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and

the Protection of Human Rights recalls the universal principles of human rights as found in the

international instruments and recognizes that: “research on the human genome and the resulting

applications open up vast prospects for progress in improving the health of individuals and of

humankind as a whole, but emphasiz[es] that such research should fully respect human dignity and

individual rights, as well as the prohibition of all forms of discrimination based on genetic

characteristics.” In particular, article 4 foresees the need for scientific research, but such research

should have therapeutic aims. It provides that: “[r]esearch, which is necessary to the progress of

knowledge, is part of the freedom of thought. Its applications, especially in biology and genetics,

should relieve suffering and improve the health of individuals and the well being of humankind as

a whole” and that “[b]enefits from advances in biology and genetics should be made available to

all, with due regard to the dignity and rights of each individual.” Moreover, article 5 maintains

that: “[n]o research applications should be allowed to prevail over the respect for human dignity

and human rights, in particular in the fields of biology and genetics.” These provisions taken

together would disallow any form of genetic research such as cloning when interpreted by a

signatory country to run afoul of their purpose and scope.

A universal declaration, when adopted, is an international statement of principles that

eventually may become part of customary law and so have force of law, but ab initio serves a

hortatory function and is meant to guide nations in their domestic legislation. Absence of specific

provisions on cloning, however, does not mean that the positions taken (which must by reason of

their origin and vocation be general in nature) are without normative value and impact. They

apply therefore to the legitimacy of cloning as a research endeavor.

The International Ethics Committee of HUGO in its Statement on the Principled Conduct

of Genetic Research was also concerned with research under the Human Genome Project and

Human Genome Diversity Project generally, and not with any particular form of research.

However, the Statement in its background principles refers to the “acceptance and upholding of

human dignity and freedom.” The deliberate creation of a clone could well fall within the purview

of concerns enumerated therein, including the possible “reduction of human beings to their DNA

sequences and attribution of social and other human problems to genetic causes” referred to in its

preamble.

While easily dismissed as too broad and vague, these international approaches which are

necessarily the result of compromise may, as we shall see, prove to be more inclusive than the

narrow, scientific definitions often found under national legislation.

Turning to the Council of Europe and then to the European Union, November 26, 1996

saw the adoption by the Council of Europe (40 countries) of the Convention for the Protection of

Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with Regard to the Application of Biology and

Medicine: Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine. Upon signature, this Convention is 6

binding upon member states. Again, even though there is a chapter on the “Human genome”

(Chapter 4), no mention is made of cloning. Article 2 of the Convention, however, states:
G-5

“Parties to this Convention shall protect the dignity and identity of all human

beings and guarantee everyone, without discrimination, respect for their integrity

and other rights and fundamental freedoms with regard to the application of

biology and medicine.” Moreover, like the proposed UNESCO Declaration,

“[s]cientific research in the field of biology and medicine shall be carried out freely,

subject to the provisions of this Convention and the other legal provisions ensuring

the protection of the human being” (article 15).

It is also important to note that earlier recommendations of the Council of Europe either

covered medical research and reproductive technologies in general or were “subject specific,” that

is, covered cloning. Beginning with the latter, that is medical research with human beings, in

1990, the Council stated in its preamble to Medical Research on Human Beings that “medical 8

research should never be carried out contrary to human dignity.” It also maintained that such

research “should take into account ethical principles” and that “[a]ny medical research which is

unplanned, or contrary to any of the preceding principles, or in any other way contrary to the

ethics or law, or not in accordance with scientific methods in its design and cannot answer the

questions posed should be prohibited or, if it has already begun, stopped or revised, even if it

poses no risk to the person(s) undergoing the research” (article 16).

Prior to the adoption of the 1996 Council of Europe Convention, a 1989

Recommendation on the Use of Human Embryos and Fetuses in Scientific Research provided 10

that “[t]he removal of cells (author’s emphasis), tissues, or embryonic or fetal organs, or of the

placenta or the membranes, if live, for investigations other than of a diagnostic character and for

preventive or therapeutic purposes shall be prohibited” (Appendix D.9). The general tenor of this

text, covering the fetus and the embryo however, would lead one to conclude that it was

“embryonic cells” that were envisaged (see explanatory paragraphs 3 to 7). This may be because

an earlier “cloning-specific” recommendation of 1986, Use of Human Embryos and Fetuses for

Diagnostic, Therapeutic, Scientific, Industrial and Commercial Purposes, which defined 12

cloning as “the creation of identical human beings by cloning or any other method, whether for

race selection purposes or not” (section 14(A)(iv)), without further explanation, had already

recommended to governments of its member states that such a technique be forbidden.

Another “cloning-specific” recommendation by the Council of Europe can be found in an

1989 information document entitled Principles in the Field of Human Artificial Procreation.

11

This information document was originally to be a recommendation but was not adopted by the

Council of Ministers, since two member states disapproved of assisted conception techniques. It

would have prohibited “[t]he use of techniques of artificial procreation to create identical human

beings by cloning or by any other method . . .” (principle 20). Then in 1994, the Parliamentary

Assembly of the Council of Europe in its recommendation on the protection of patentability of

material of human origin asked that “techniques for cloning” be prohibited (article 13iii(b)).7

Turning now to the resolutions of the European Parliament of the European Union, the

first Resolution on the Ethical and Legal Problems of Genetic Engineering was adopted in 9
G-6

1989. It maintained that “[t]he European Parliament as regards clones, considers that the only

possible response to the possibility of producing human by cloning and to experiments with a view

to the cloning of humans must be to make them a criminal offence” (article 41).

Finally, three statements of international non-governmental organizations bear mention

here. The first is that of the International Law Association in its 1988 Resolution on Reproductive

Technologies and the Protection of the Human Person. The position of the association was that 5

“[c]onsidering the dignity inherent in all human beings, . . . any research or manipulation of human

genetic material shall be for therapeutic purposes and shall be subject to the approval and control

of an ethics committee” (article 1) (author’s emphasis). Penal sanctions were asked for. Similarly,

the 93rd Inter-Parliamentary Conference of 1995, in its wish to promote “universal principles and

rights,” mentioned “the inviolability of the human body and the intangibility of the genetic heritage

of the human species.” Finally, the 1996 Charter on Sexual and Reproductive Rights of the 4

International Planned Parenthood Federation also mentions the right to human dignity and access 3

to “safe” and “acceptable” reproduction technologies (article 103) without further definition.

At the international level, then, there is no doubt that respect for human dignity and

respect for the intangibility of the human body, its constituent parts, reproductive tissues, and

even down to the cell(s) are irreparably linked. While the need for, and value of, research

involving humans are reaffirmed, both the proposed UNESCO Declaration and the European

Convention would limit such research in the “genetic arena” to therapeutic interventions. These

two overarching instruments implicitly refute human cloning. This is underscored not only by the

more specific prohibitions on cloning, as found in the recommendations and resolutions just

examined, but by national positions.

NATIONAL POSITIONS

Before turning to the specific positions found in the thirteen countries under study, it is important

to emphasize that like the international instruments just examined, the objectives of these national

positions are largely similar. Indeed, the stated object of the majority is to protect the dignity of all

persons in relation to uses of human genetic materials. Cloning is seen as 17,20,28,33,34,35

“diminish[ing] the value of human individuality” and as “violat[ing] basic norms of respect for 18,34

human life” and the “integrity of the human species.”

19 24

(1) Research on Embryos

Some countries with legislation on new reproductive technologies restrict such techniques to the

use of “viable cells” in order to achieve pregnancy” (Austria, France) and “to avoid the 16,23

transmission to a child of a particularly serious disease” (France, Spain). Four countries 23,31

prohibit experimentation with fertilized eggs (Norway) or with human embryos (France), or 28 23

experiments which have as their purpose “developing methods for achieving potentially hereditary

genetic effects” (Sweden), that is, to “develop certain characteristics” (Switzerland). It is 32 33

interesting to note, however, that while research with fertilized ova and with embryos are
G-7

explicitly mentioned, no country has prohibited by specific mention in law research on unfertilized

gametes, and so, at first glance, the “Dolly” technique might not be prohibited. Yet, as just

mentioned, if research on fertilized ova or embryos generally, or the legitimate applications of the

techniques of medically assisted procreation which involve the prior obtaining of ova and sperm

are themselves severely constrained to the therapeutic purposes mentioned above, cloning could

well be understood to be excluded from the ambit of licit practice.

(2) Embryo Twinning

Often countries with an explicit prohibition on human cloning cover embryo splitting or twinning,

but not the “Dolly” technique. An example of this is the 1995 Infertility Treatment Act of the state

of Victoria in Australia. It bans cloning as well as the attempt to clone with penal sanctions, but 14

defines cloning as “to form, outside the human body, a human embryo that is genetically identical

to another embryo or person” (article 3). Similarly, the 1990 German Embryo Protection Law25

also prohibits “artificially caus[ing] a human embryo to develop with the same genetic information

as another embryo, fetus, living person or deceased person” (article 6(1) (again with penal

sanctions). Depending on how the phrase “causes a human embryo to develop” is interpreted, this

definition may or may not cover “Dolly.” Paradoxically, the 1990 Human Fertilization and

Embryology Act of the United Kingdom, which proscribes “replacing a nucleus of a cell of an 37

embryo with a nucleus taken from a cell of any embryo, person or subsequent development of an

embryo” (article 3(3)(d)) (emphasis added) may also not be inclusive. The 1995 Code of Practice

of the Human Fertilization and Embryo Authority repeats this definition in its list of activities that

are prohibited by law. It adds that it “will not license research projects involving embryo splitting

with the intention of increasing the number of embryos for transfer” (article 10.5).

Irrespective of whether such precise scientific definitions include the Dolly technique, it is

clear that in these countries the intent was to prohibit human cloning. The potential limits of the

precise legal provisions, however, point to the danger of using scientific definitions in a legislative

text.

(3) “Dolly” Technique

Two countries have legislation that simply prohibits research on the creation or production of

“genetically identical human beings” (Denmark, Spain) without further definition. Such 21,22,30

legislation is sufficiently broad to be inclusive of both embryo twinning and the “Dolly” technique

by concentrating on “the result” rather than the technique itself.

(4) Bills, Policy Positions, and Ethical Guidelines

Of the thirteen countries under study, only Canada and Switzerland currently have bills on 17 34

reproductive technologies. The Canadian bill would make it a criminal offense to “manipulate an

ovum, zygote or embryo for the purpose of producing a zygote or embryo that contains the same

genetic information as a living or deceased human being, or, zygote, embryo or fetus” (article
G-8

4(1)(a)). This bill, which would inter alia cover the “Dolly” technique, has passed first reading

and is broader in its scope than the report of the Canadian Royal Commission on New

Reproductive Technologies, which had recommended “the prohibition of human zygote/embryo 14

research related to cloning” (rec. #184). In Switzerland, the current federal bill on medically

assisted procreation proposes criminal sanctions for “the artificial creation of genetically identical

beings” (article 2(n)) (author’s translation) and again would be inclusive in scope. 34

Other countries have either study papers prohibiting the “production of genetically

identical individuals,” or describing the creation of genetically identical preembryos 29

(twinning) and recommending its prohibition, or codes of ethics in the same vein. Examples 27,35 36

of the latter are found in Australia, where the 1996 National Health and Medical Research

Council ethical guidelines considered as ethically unacceptable “experimentation with the intent 13

to produce two or more genetically identical individuals” (guideline 11.3). These guidelines apply

in the states where there is no relevant legislation (guideline 6.1). This recent statement follows a

1982 position that also considered as ethically unacceptable “[c]loning experiments designed to 15

produce from human tissues viable or potentially viable offspring that are multiple and genetically

identical” (no 8). Another example is in Canada, where parallel to the bill before Parliament just

described, three research councils are preparing a Code of Conduct for Research Involving

Humans that would simply state that “cloning of human beings [is] ethically unacceptable”

20

(article 16.10). It is interesting to note that while a 1993 Norwegian report recommended to 29

Parliament the prohibition of the “production of genetically identical individuals” (p. 33), the 1994

Norwegian law on the medical use of biotechnology simply prohibits “research on fertilized 28

eggs” (article 3-1).

Government Actions

On March 4, 1997, the Italian Ministry of Health established a three-month moratorium on

cloning research in humans and animals. On June 26, 1996, the President and Chancellor of the 26

Swiss Confederation, in a message on both a new popular initiative on new reproductive 35

technologies and the recently proposed federal bill, reiterated his country’s position against the 34

“artificial creation of genetically identical beings.”

CONCLUSIONS

Either indirectly or directly, all of the international and national sources have focused their

attention on the issue of cloning. Some limited themselves to broader statements of the principles

of human rights in the need to preserve human dignity and integrity; others circumscribed the

goals, scope, and type of medical research involving human beings and the new reproductive

technologies; while other more direct prohibitions on cloning either addressed embryo twinning

techniques or simply mentioned the prohibition on the creation of identical human beings and

thus, in the latter case directly covered the Dolly technique. The latter approach, which proscribes

the goal rather than the technique, avoids the pitfalls and confusion of ambiguous or too precise

legislation.
G-9

Irrespective of the route chosen, the gambit of approaches symbolizes the difficulties

inherent in legislating with regard to scientific advances, especially in a prospective fashion. The

criminal law is a vehicle that sanctions behaviors that are considered morally reprehensible in a

given society. “Crimes,” however, require definition for the sake of certainty, and so techniques

that we can only “imagine” may in their very description escape sanction. Human rights legislation

seeks to guarantee and promote the well-being of persons and humanity but its actualization in the

scientific context is difficult. Ethical guidelines fulfill both a principled and self-regulatory function

but are often without sanction. Depending on the technology under scrutiny and jurisdictional

issues, different legal tools and approaches are available. The problem lies in our limited

understanding of present and future scientific advances. “Dolly” is but another lesson in humility.

References

All references are complete to March 30, 1997. The author wishes to thank Kyriakoula

Hatjikiriakos, LL.B, CRDP, Université de Montréal, for her invaluable assistance.

International

1. Third Session of UNESCO’s International Bioethics Committee (IBC) (Paris, September

27-29, 1995), (1996) 47 (1) IDHL 107.

2. HUGO statement on the principled conduct of genetics research, May 1996, Genome

Digest at 2.

3. International Planned Parenthood Federation, Charter on Sexual and Reproductive

Rights, (1996) 47 (4) IDHL 546.

4. Resolution on Bioethics and Its Implications Worldwide for Human Rights Protection,

adopted by the 93rd Inter-Parliamentary Conference on 1 April 1995, (1995) 46 (3) IDHL

401.

5. Resolution on Reproductive Technologies and the Protection of the Human Person,

adopted at the 63rd Conference of the International Law Association (Warsaw, August

21-27, 1988), (1990) 41 (4) IDHL 723.

Europe

6. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with

Regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine: Convention on Human Rights and

Biomedicine, Directorate of Legal Affairs, Strasbourg, November 1996, DIR/JUR (96)

14.
G-10

7. Recommendation 1240 (1994) on the Protection of Patentability of Material of Human

Origin, adopted by the Parliamentary Assembly on April 14, 1994, (1994) 45 (4) IDHL

565.

8. Recommendation No. R (90) 3 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States

Concerning Medical Research on Human Beings, adopted by the Committee of Ministers

on February 6, 1990, at the 443rd meeting of Ministers’ Deputies, (1990) 41 (3) IDHL

461.

9. “Resolution on the Ethical and Legal Problems of Genetic Engineering,” March 16, 1989,

April 1990 Bull. Med. 57, 8, a. 41.

10. Recommendation 1100 (1989) on the Use of the Human Embryos and Foetuses in

Scientific Research, in text adopted, Parliamentary Assembly, 40th Session, Party III, a.

D. 9. in Appendix.

11. Principles in the field of Human Artificial Procreation, contained in an information

document entitled Human Artificial Procreation, published by the Council of Europe in

1989, (1989) 40 (4) IDHL 907.

12. Recommendation 1046 (1986) on the Use of Human Embryos and Foetuses for

Diagnosis, Therapeutic, Scientific, Industrial and Commercial Purposes, in text adopted,

Parliamentary Assembly, 38th Session, Party II, a. 14 A. iv.

National

Australia

13. National Health and Medical Research Council, Ethical Guidelines on Assisted

Reproductive Technology, Commonwealth Department of Health and Family Services,

1996.

14. Victoria: Infertility Treatment Act 1995 (assented to June 27, 1995), No. 63/1995, a. 3 et

47.

15. National Health and Medical Research Council, Statement on Human Experimentation

and Supplementary Notes (Supplementary Note 4: In Vitro Fertilization and Embryo

Transfer, October 1982); Supplementary Note 5: The Human Fetus and the Use of

Human Fetal Tissue, October 1983, Rec. 2, No. 8.
G-11

Austria

16. Federal law of 1992 (Serial No. 275) Regulating Medically Assisted Procreation (The

Reproductive Medicine Law), and Amending the General Civil Code, The Marriage Law,

and the Rules of Jurisdiction, (1993) 44 (2) IDHL 247.

Canada

17. Bill C-47, An Act respecting Human Reproductive Technologies and Commercial

Transactions Relating to Human Reproduction, 2nd Sess., 35th Parliament, 45 Elizabeth

II, 1996, a. 4 (1) a) et 8.

18. Voluntary Moratorium on New Reproductive and Genetic Technologies, pronounced by

the Minister of Health, at the National Press Theatre, Ottawa, ON, July 27, 1995,

Government of Canada.

19. Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies, Proceed with Care, Final Report,

Ottawa: Minister of Government Services Canada, 1993, vol. 1 & 2, rec. # 184.

20. Draft, Code of Conduct for Research Involving Humans, Prepared by the Tri-Council

Working Group: The Medical Research Council of Canada, The Natural Sciences and

Engineering Research Council of Canada, The Social Sciences and Humanities Research

Council of Canada, Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1996, a. 16.10.

Denmark

21. Law No. 503 of 24 June 1992 on the Scientific Ethics Committee System and the

Examination of Biomedical Research Projects, (1992) 43 (4) IDHL 758, a. 15 (1).

22. Law No. 353 of 3 June 1987 on the Establishment of an Ethical Council and the

Regulation of certain Forms of Biomedical Research, (1988) 39 (1) IDHL 95, a. 11 (1).

France

23. Law No. 94-654 of 29 July 1994 on the Donation and Use of Elements and Products of

the Human Body, Medically Assisted Procreation, and Prenatal Diagnosis, (1994) 45 (4)

IDHL 473, Art. L. 152-2, L. 152-14, 152.8 et 152.18.

24. Law No. 94-653 of 29 July 1994 on Respect for the Human Body, (1994) 45 (4) IDHL

498, a. 16-4.

25. Law of 13 December 1990 for the Protection of Embryos (the Embryo Protection Law),

(1991) 42 (1) IDHL 60, a. 6.
G-12

Italy

26. Decree (March 4, 1997) by the Italian Ministry of Health establishing a three-month

moratorium for all kinds of cloning experimentation in humans and animals, personal

communication with Stefano Rodota, March 7, 1997.

Netherlands

27. Committee of the Health Council of the Netherlands, Heredity: Science and Society, (The

Hague, 1989, 57-58.

Norway

28. Law No. 56 of 5 August 1994 on the Medical Use of Biotechnology, (1995) 46 (1) IDHL

51, a. 3(1).

29. Ministry of Health And Social Affairs, Biotechnology Related to Human Beings,

Parliamentary Report No. 25 (1992-93) to the Storting on Biotechnology related to

Human Beings, Oslo, 1993, Report no. 25, 1992-1993, 33.

Spain

30. Law No. 35/1988 of 22 November 1988 on Assisted Procedures, (1989) 40 (1) IDHL 82,

a. 20 (2) (B) (k) et (l).

31. Law No. 42/1988 of 28 December 1988 on the Donation and Use of Human Embryos and

Fetuses or their Cells, Tissues, or Organs, (1991) 42 (1) IDHL 64. (v. a. 2 (e) et 8 (2) a

contrario).

Sweden

32. Law No. 115 of 14 March 1991 Concerning Measures for the Purposes of Research or

Treatment in Connection with Fertilized Human Oocytes, (1993) 44 (1) IDHL 58.

Switzerland

33. Genetics and Assisted Procreation, Amendment of Federal Constitution, Dated 13 of

August 1992, (1992) 43 (4) IDHL 745.

34. Projet de loi fédérale sur la procréation médicalement assistée (LPMA), 1996, a. 2m and

36.
G-13

35. Message relatif à l’initiative populaire pour la protection de l’être humain contre les

techniques de reproduction artificielle (Initiative pour une procréation respectant la

dignité humaine, PPD) et à la loi fédérale sur la procréation médicalement assistée

(LPMA), du 26 juin 1996, au nom du Conseil fédéral suisse: Le président de la

Confédération, Delamuraz; Le chancelier de la Confédération, Couchepin, 96.058, 45, 82,

87.

36. Rapport au Département de l’intérieur et au Département fédéral de justice et police,

Commission d’experts pour la génétique humaine et la médecine de la reproduction,

Berne, 19 août 1988.

United Kingdom

37. Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act (1990) (U.K.), 1990, c. 37, in Morgan, D., 

R.G. Lee, Blackstone’s Guide to the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990

Abortion & Embryo Research, the New Law, London: Blackstone Press Limited, 1991,

a. 3 (3) (d) and 41 (b).
CLONING HUMAN BEINGS

Do Research Moratoria Work?

Commissioned Paper

by Robert Mullan Cook-Deegan, M.D.

H-1

CONTENTS

Preface H-3

Framework of This Paper H-4

What Is a Moratorium? H-4

Congressional Moratoria on Fetal Research H-6

Moratoria on Recombinant DNA Research H-10

Cloning Rat Insulin and Growth Hormone in pBR322 at UCSF H-12

Recombinant DNA Experiments without a Memorandum of

Agreement between Harvard and NIH H-13

Introduction of Recombinant DNA into Thalassemic Patients in Israel

and Italy H-14

Review of Somatic Cell Gene Therapy Protocols H-15

Moratoria on Germ Line Gene Therapy H-16

Lessons from Oversight of Fetal Research, Recombinant DNA Research,

and Human Gene Therapy H-19

Some Personal Observations H-22

Appendix A: The UCSF Case H-26

Appendix B: The Cline Case H-29

Appendix C: Excerpt from University of California v. Eli Lilly and Co. H-32

A Note on Sources H-42

References H-46

H-3

PREFACE

On Constitution Avenue in the nation’s capital, just inside from Einstein’s statue, the workings of

democracy looked a lot like bedlam. Protesters sang, “We shall not be cloned” to the tune of “We

Shall Overcome.” “A banner quoting Adolph Hitler ‘We will create the perfect race,’ was

unfurled and tauntingly waved in the faces of the scientists until one biologist, in a fit of pique,

ripped it apart.” It was March 7, 1977, at the National Academy of Sciences (NAS), and the 1

subject at hand was governance of recombinant DNA research. Two bills had been introduced in

Congress to regulate such research, and fourteen more would follow in the next few years;

legislation was deemed inevitable, and the debate was about what it would say not whether it

would pass. The city council of Cambridge, Massachusetts, had just a few weeks earlier rescinded

a moratorium on recombinant DNA research after a rancorous debate; several other local

governments had passed similar ordinances imposing local moratoria. Cambridge Mayor Alfred

Vellucci was in Washington to complain about not having been invited to the NAS symposium

and to ask who would control recombinant DNA research.

Unknown to those at the symposium, another ruckus was stirring across the continent. At

the University of California, San Francisco (UCSF), Axel Ullrich and his colleagues had learned

earlier that week, on March 1, that they had inadvertently violated the National Institute of Health

(NIH) guidelines for recombinant DNA research. Ullrich had cloned the rat insulin gene in a

vector that had been provisionally “approved” by NIH’s Recombinant DNA Advisory Committee

(RAC) in mid-January but had not yet been “certified” by the NIH director. Peter Seeburg,

another UCSF postdoctoral researcher, had also cloned rat growth hormone using the same

uncertified vector. On March 19, Ullrich destroyed the bacteria containing the cloned insulin gene,

following the recommendation of his lab chief (and department chair) William Rutter, who had

discussed the matter with NIH Deputy Director DeWitt Stetten, Jr. Ullrich then cloned the insulin

gene again using another, technically inferior and less safe, vector after it was certified for use on

April 18. The cloning of the insulin gene, the first mammalian gene so captured, was announced at

a triumphal May 23 press conference by UCSF laboratory directors William Rutter and Howard

Goodman. Rutter and Goodman did not mention, and reporters did not yet know to ask, about

the inadvertent breach of NIH guidelines.

Genetic technology was racing ahead, and government was struggling to keep up. The

chaotic spring of 1977 marked the first cloning of a mammalian gene and the launch of a

congressional debate that lasted several years. It was a confusing period of political turbulence,

buffeting those who did recombinant DNA research, the Members of Congress and executive

branch officials who funded and oversaw such research, and those who feared the consequences

of its unfettered pursuit. In the end, the nation stumbled into a process for reviewing recombinant

DNA research that enabled scientific progress but also ensured public scrutiny and set technical

limits. The policy history of recombinant DNA research, including human gene therapy and

congressional efforts to constrain fetal research, illustrate how the United States Government has

contended with controversial emerging biomedical technologies. This paper recounts some
H-4

historical precedents and draws lessons from those experiences, as background for the National

Bioethics Advisory Commission’s (NBAC’s) deliberations about human cloning.

FRAMEWORK OF THIS PAPER

A brief introductory section focuses on a definition of “moratorium” that pertains to the accounts

that follow. The historical summaries begin with fetal research, because this was the first subject

of a federal bioethics commission and because it involves many legislative moratoria through both

authorization and appropriations statutes, as well as de facto moratoria in the executive branch.

Fetal research also highlights the importance of regulations governing human subjects in research.

Recombinant DNA research never became the subject of statutory constraint, but concern about

biohazards from such research did lead to NIH guidelines and a new process to monitor

compliance with them, separate from but parallel to human subjects review. As concern about the

biohazards diminished in the early 1980s, a new controversy erupted over the deliberate

introduction of DNA into humans to treat disease, or human gene therapy. General concern

about human gene transfer, sharply exacerbated by a highly publicized premature human

experiment, led to an extension of RAC review into clinical protocols. More than two hundred

gene therapy protocols have been approved worldwide, but these have been confined to

introduction of genes into cells that do not produce sperm and eggs, so changes are not inherited.

The United States, the United Kingdom, and Germany exemplify three alternative approaches to

proscribing introduction of DNA into sperm cells, egg cells, their precursors, or early embryos,

leading to inherited changes through germ line gene therapy.

The discussion of historical background is followed by a summary of policy lessons that

emerge from the cases. The main body of the paper is confined to factual accounts and limited

interpretations, but does not contain recommendations. I have added a brief final section with my

own observations. This section can easily be removed without jettisoning the earlier background

material.

WHAT IS A MORATORIUM?

The Oxford English Dictionary lists only one definition of “moratorium,” “a legal authorization to

a debtor to postpone payment for a certain time.” The word is used much more broadly now to 2

include a pause in the action, but it is not clear it should be stretched so far as some decisions

covered later in this paper. In some cases, the meaning is appropriate— a suspension of activity

pending further analysis or other action; in others it is clear that “moratorium” refers to “a ban I

don’t want to call a ban,” with a deliberately disingenuous implication of transience. Some of the

rhetoric surrounding human cloning falls into each category. Some of the cases below are true

moratoria, the classic example being the period during which scientists refrained from doing

recombinant DNA experiments while guidelines for safe practices were being devised.

In other cases, “moratorium” is not the word that has been used at all, but the case fits

into analysis here because the factual similarity merits treatment. Fetal research has been the
H-5

subject of moratoria, and partial bans. Germ line gene therapy is banned in several countries, but it

is nonetheless relevant for discussion here because in several ways it is the closest historical

parallel. The congressional language about embryo and fetal research has been temporary because

of the nature of NIH authorization and appropriation, not by intent, which has clearly been a

permanent ban on federal funding of controversial experiments, with full knowledge that the same

research would go on under private auspices.

The closest analogy to human cloning may well be germ line gene therapy— deliberate

changes in human DNA intended to be inherited. This is because it is quite difficult to imagine an

urgent clinical reason to clone a human now, much as scenarios for germ line gene therapy were

difficult to concoct a decade ago. The motivation for a ban or moratorium seems to be some

combination of preserving social values, fear of loss of social control, or harm to the products of

the technology (people born from germ line gene therapy or human cloning). And finally, the

technological risks appear to be mainly social and moral rather than technical, in contrast to the

concern about biohazard to researchers and the public if recombinant DNA were to create

uncontrollable replicating pathogens.

The prospect of inherited genetic intervention predates the Watson-Crick discovery that

Mendel’s inherited elements— genes— are stretches of DNA. A decade ago, the consensus was

that no one could do germ line genetic interventions safely and reliably. Transgenic animals

existed, but the methods were inapplicable to humans because there was a constant risk of

malformed animals and the probability of effecting a desired genetic change was low (and so it

remains, although much improved). Opinion split about the prudence of banning germ line gene

therapy. On one hand, there seemed little to be lost by banning it, with some prospect of public

assurance as a benefit. On the other hand, some voices pointed out that if the technology evolved

sufficiently, one might imagine clinical scenarios, however rare, where it could be useful. Policy

on deliberate germ line intervention now varies from barely permissive to explicitly proscriptive.

In the United States, “the RAC will not at present entertain proposals for germ line alternations”

[emphasis added]. This felicitous turn of phrase, a relic of NBAC member James Childress from a 3

previous role, says the door is closed but RAC might open it in response to an appropriate knock.

This was a deliberate decision, as an outright ban was urged by the Council for Responsible

Genetics (CRG) in 1985, and the RAC subcommittee elected to stick with its language. German

law, by contrast, says that such intervention is a criminal act, period. In the United Kingdom, a 4

licensing authority oversees embryo research, but it precludes licenses to genetically alter germ

line cells.

The proposed germ line intervention discussed below commends RAC’s prescience. For

ten years, RAC has had a de facto ban on germ line gene therapy, but last year a concrete,

clinically defensible proposal was proposed, and if it proves technically feasible, a protocol might

come forward. In this clinical scenario, the harm of germ line therapy is speculative and vague,

and most of the risks and consequences long debated do not pertain, yet the potential benefits are

straightforward. RAC could simply choose to review the protocol if need be, after announcing a

change in policy. In Germany, the parliament must alter a statute before such a move is possible.
H-6

Such a proposal comes forward, and indeed the National Advisory Board on Ethics and

Reproduction has reliable information that a pregnancy to avoid maternal mitochondrial disease is

underway, although not in a setting that uses federal research dollars. In Germany, a couple

wanting to use this technique to have a genetically related healthy child would be blocked in

exercising their choice by a German law that does not appear to protect any present or future

individual from a particular harm. Whether this state involvement is appropriate turns on one’s

political philosophy, but it is unlikely to comport well with American values.

This recent offshoot of the germ line gene therapy debate exemplifies how language

intended to constrain a technology can have unintended side effects. The language used to impose

constraints matters a great deal, and yet it is quite difficult to foresee uses of emerging technology

with sufficient precision to craft that language. Constraints on human cloning will face this same

dilemma. As an alternative to precise legal definitions of what is proscribed, a review process for a

broad spectrum of activities can leave judgments of risk and benefit to case-by-case analysis.

CONGRESSIONAL MORATORIA ON FETAL RESEARCH

Research on the Fetus was the first report of the first federal bioethics commission, the National

Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research. This 5

report was due four months after the Commission got started. Congress in 1974, much like

President Clinton in 1997, wanted careful deliberation, but wanted it now. Section 213 of Public

Law 93-348, the same statute that created the National Commission, also imposed the first

legislative moratorium on fetal research, barring research “on a living fetus before or after the

inducted abortion of such fetus unless such research is done for the purpose of assuring the

survival of such fetus” until the National Commission had made its recommendations to the

Secretary of Health Education and Welfare (which would today be the Secretary of Health and

Human Services). The moratorium stemmed from Scandinavian research involving tissue taken

from fetuses after induced abortions, followed by revelations that NIH was supporting some fetal

research. Outrage greeted press accounts of the research, leading to street demonstrations in

Washington. Among those organizing the protests was Eunice Kennedy Shriver, whose brother,

Senator Edward Kennedy, was championing the legislation to establish the National Commission.

The National Commission inventoried ongoing fetal research. As the commission

countenanced actual research efforts, hard-edged ideology gave way to a search for common

ground and criteria that might be used to mark its boundaries. Michael Yesley, executive director,

later noted:

“Fetal research appeared at the outset to be a topic on which the disputants were

so far apart that the National Commission would be unable to make

recommendations that were satisfactory to all or most of the concerned parties. . . .

Many who had expressed outrage at the reports of research involving severed fetal

heads anticipated that the National Commission would produce a whitewash of

science, while many scientists feared that the National Commission would
H-7

overreact to the public outcry by unjustifiably terminating some areas of valuable

research. Instead, the National Commission made recommendations that enabled

most fetal research to continue, yet imposed conditions to assure that such

research would be ethically acceptable.”

6

The Commission adopted the principle that fetuses intended for abortion be treated

equally to those intended for birth, leading to recommendations that only research intended to

benefit the fetus or posing “minimal” risk be permitted. The National Commission issued another

seven reports and ceased to exist in 1978. Most of its recommendations, including those

governing fetal research, were incorporated into federal regulations, which became Title 45, Part

46 of the Code of Federal Regulations (45 CFR 46). 45 CFR 46 is the section of U.S.

administrative law that governs human subjects in research. The fetal research recommendations

of the National Commission, for example, were incorporated into subparts 208 and 209 of 45

CFR 46. Under 45 CFR 46, institutions that conduct federally funded research involving human

subjects sign an “assurance” document with the Office of Protection from Research Risks

(OPRR). OPRR is part of NIH, but serves all parts of the federal government for this purpose.

The National Commission made many recommendations for fetal research and about

vulnerable populations. The Commission recognized, however, that any firm and fast rules would

prove inadequate, so it also recommended that a review body be established to consider waivers

to enable research on in vitro fertilization, research that posed more than “minimal risks” for

children and fetuses, or otherwise deviated from the standards laid out in the regulations. The

National Commission intended to leave the door open for meritorious research in exceptional

cases, in subpart 204 mandating “one or more Ethical Advisory Boards” to review research

protocols falling outside the other parts of the regulation. These boards became singular in

implementation— as the Ethics Advisory Board (EAB)— which was chartered in 1976 and 1979,7

and operated from 1977 through 1980. The EAB issued reports recommending exemptions from

the Freedom of Information Act for some records retained by the Centers for Disease Control and

NIH and on fetoscopy (which entailed more than minimal risk and so required special EAB

approval). The EAB also made recommendations about in vitro fertilization and embryo 8–11

transfer, finding some research acceptable and recommending a change in the regulations to

accommodate it, but these were never accepted by the Secretary of the Department of Health,

Education, and Welfare (which became the Department of Health and Human Services with the

creation of a Department of Education under President Carter). The EAB’s modifications to the 9

regulations were not proposed as formal regulations. Instead, section 205 of the regulations

continued to prohibit funding of human in vitro fertilization unless reviewed by the EAB, which

later that year ceased to exist.

The National Commission also recommended establishment of a successor deliberative

body, another national bioethics commission but with a broader mandate than human subject

protections. Public Law 95-622 established the President’s Commission for the Study of Ethical

Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research (President’s Commission). This
H-8

large and unwieldy title accurately described the President’s Commission’s broader mandate. One

consequence of creating the President’s Commission was the demise of the EAB.

The EAB did issue reports and also review protocols, but the diversion of the EAB’s

budget to sustain the President’s Commission allowed only the deliberative function to continue.

Loss of the EAB removed the only avenue for national review for in vitro fertilization or review

of any protocols requiring waiver of 45 CFR 46 provisions. This, in effect, imposed a moratorium

on fetal research posing more than minimal risk, unless expected to enhance the health of the

particular fetus.

With the demise of the EAB, the source of the moratorium on any research falling outside

45 CFR 46 was no longer legislative, but caused by the executive branch’s failure to establish a

review body stipulated in its own regulations. The language of the regulations also introduced a

legal lacuna, which was ambiguous but never tested. In vitro fertilization (IVF) was prohibited,

but other experimentation on human embryos was not, because the fetal research provisions

applied to a fetus, defined as “the product of conception from time of implantation” (subpart

203). Conceivably, an embryo created without federal funds could be the subject of research

before implantation, and an argument could have been made for use of federal funds in such

research.

The regulations applied (and still apply) to institutions that receive federal funds for

research involving human subjects. Research on in vitro fertilization nonetheless continued, at

private research centers funded by clinical fees, donations, and other nonfederal sources. The

congressional Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) observed in 1988 that “the effect of this

moratorium on federal funding of IVF research has been to eliminate the most direct line of

authority by which the Federal Government can influence the development of embryo research

and infertility treatment to as to avoid unacceptable practices or inappropriate uses.” Failure to

fund such research led to inability to control it or even monitor it.

The President’s Commission operated from 1980 to 1983. Fetal research was not the

theme of any of its 11 reports, although it did point to the problematic nature of a de facto

moratorium on certain kinds of research. Even as the President’s Commission went out of

business in 1983, a debate about replacing it commenced. Representative Albert Gore introduced

a bill to create a successor body to review developments in “human genetic engineering.” A long

and circuitous legislative journey ultimately led to creation of the Biomedical Ethics Advisory

Committee in Public Law 99-158. This was a to be a small congressional analytical agency

modeled on OTA, governed by a congressional Biomedical Ethics Board. That body operated for

eight months, but was never able to get to its mandated tasks, which included a review of the

“minimal risk” criterion for fetal research. The same 1985 law imposed a legislative moratorium

on research “on a nonviable living human fetus ex utero or a living fetus ex utero” unless the

research was intended to enhance its prospects of survival or posed “no added risk of suffering,

injury, or death to the fetus.” It stipulated that the standard for evaluating risk be no different for
H-9

research on fetuses intended for abortion than for those intended for birth (the National

Commission principle, originally proposed by LeRoy Walters).

The legislative moratorium was repeated in the 1988 NIH authorization. A different, but

related topic was also the subject of a special NIH review. Preliminary experiments using fetal

tissue transplanted into adults to treat Parkinson’s disease provoked a controversy in 1988 and

1989. In response to an NIH request to fund such research, Assistant Secretary of Health Robert

Windom imposed a funding moratorium until NIH received the report of an ad hoc panel to

address 10 questions that he posed. The most contentious of the questions dealt with connections

between fetal tissue research and elective abortion. The panel issued a short report containing

recommendations that were then accepted by the Advisory Committee to the Director of NIH.

The Secretary of DHHS, however, rejected the use of tissue from elective abortions, in a tale

recounted by James Childress. Since he is an NBAC member, NBAC has direct access to much 12

more intimate knowledge of the proceedings, and there is little virtue in recounting it here.

The fetal tissue transplantation controversy and a House hearing convened by

Representative Weiss, drawing on OTA’s 1988 infertility report, almost led DHHS Secretary Otis

Bowen to charter a new EAB. He intended to do so but left office just before signing the charter.

(As an aside, this EAB was chartered to combine the deliberative and protocol review functions,

which may have doomed it even if it had come into being.) The 1985 legislative moratorium on

fetal research remained until early in the Clinton Administration.

Newly elected President Bill Clinton urged Congress to lift the legislative ban on fetal

research in January 1993 (Federal Register, vol. 58, p. 7468), and the relevant provisions were

indeed removed from that year’s NIH reauthorization, Public Law 103-43. NIH’s first moves

were cautious, however, in part because of a breaking controversy. Plans to assemble a panel for

advice took shape in September 1993. In October, press accounts of research involving the

“cloning” of a human embryo at George Washington University caused a public stir. NIH

contemplated reentry onto this treacherous turf with understandable trepidation. In early 1994,

NIH established a Human Embryo Research Panel to advise it about how to use its restored

funding authority.

That panel’s experience was reminiscent of the fetal tissue transplantation panel five years

before. Recommendations were forwarded to the Advisory Committee to the Director of NIH,

which recommended their adoption to NIH Director Harold Varmus. Within hours, however,

President Clinton stepped forth to reject one recommendation of the NIH panel, saying, “I do not

believe that federal funds should be used to support the creation of human embryos for research

purposes, and I have directed that NIH not allocate any resources for such research,” in the same

statement that first announced his intention to create NBAC (Presidential statement, December 2,

1994). The President was silent on the panel’s many other recommendations. The panel

recommended that a group inside NIH review compliance with the guidelines. The Human

Embryo Research Panel’s deliberations are chronicled by R. Alta Charo as “The Hunting of the

Snark.” She is an NBAC member, and so further review here is unnecessary. 13
H-10

The President’s venture into the ethics of fetal research does not end the story. The

Republican landslide in the 1994 congressional elections brought with it renewed interest in

legislative constraints on fetal research. NIH was up for reauthorization in 1996, but the bills

proved controversial, and fetal research provisions were among the sources of controversy. The

NIH authorization was not a sufficiently high legislative priority, and NIH can operate for most

purposes under a standing authorization, so no reauthorization bill was passed. A legislative

moratorium on fetal research was restored, however, via language in the NIH appropriation for

both fiscal years 1996 and 1997. These appropriation provisions were extremely controversial,

involving floor debate that invoked allusions to Nazi atrocities (by proponents of the ban) and the

Flat Earth Society (by opponents). The fetal research funding bans were in and out of House and

Senate appropriation bills at different stages, but the final version included the Dickey-Wicker

amendment proscribing embryo and fetal research, which survived a July 1996 attempt to excise

it, and was passed in the final funding resolution in September. That language precludes use of

NIH funds for “the creation of a human embryo or embryos for research purposes; or research in

which a human embryo or embryos are destroyed, discarded, or knowingly subjected to risk of

injury or death greater than that allowed for research on fetuses” [in 45 CFR 46].14

In sum, a legislative moratorium imposed to allow the National Commission to report on

fetal research gave way to criteria for fetal research in human subjects regulations, with a “safety

valve” CEAB review of protocols that posed greater risks or involved in vitro fertilization. The

EAB operated for three years, but its recommendations were never approved by the Secretary.

The EAB was allowed to die in 1980, creating an executive branch ban on in vitro fertilization

and fetal research outside the criteria specified in 45 CFR 46. (This was often called a de facto

moratorium, but it was a ban). In 1985, a legislative moratorium was reimposed, pending

comment from a congressional bioethics committee, via NIH reauthorization. The congressional

committee was defunded in 1989 without having issued a report, and the moratorium became a

ban until 1993, when Congress lifted the ban. During 1994, NIH accepted funding proposals for

review while its Embryo Research Panel met. In 1995, a legislative ban was reimposed, this time

not in the NIH authorization statute, but through the appropriations process. Whether the

appropriations language will be included with 1998 appropriations is not yet clear, and NIH

reauthorization may also be considered this year in Congress, although controversial features such

as fetal research could preclude passage or even serious committee action.

MORATORIA ON RECOMBINANT DNA RESEARCH

When biomedical researchers think of research moratoria, they are apt to think first of the

recombinant DNA story of the mid-1970s. It began with an experiment that Stanford molecular

biologist Paul Berg proposed in 1970 to Janet Mertz as a graduate student research project. It

would have entailed splicing together a monkey virus, SV40, and a bacterial virus (phage) and

inserting the new construct into bacteria. Mertz discussed the experiment at a course she took in

June 1971 at Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory on Long Island, one of the birthplaces of molecular

biology. Her classmates and instructors, especially Robert Pollack, were worried that this might

enable the bacteria to copy and transmit potentially harmful genes. Pollack called Berg to dissuade
H-11

him from the experiment. Worry about the hazards of working on tumor viruses were the subject

of a January 1973 meeting chaired by Berg at Asilomar, but recombinant DNA was not the focus

there. Berg and Mertz’s gene-splicing experiment was dropped, but concern was rekindled with

the advent of gene-splicing experiments in bacteria a few years later— as the recombinant DNA

era dawned in 1973 with the work of Herbert Boyer of UCSF and Stanley Cohen of Stanford

(they first conceived their collaboration in a cafe on Waikiki in November 1972). (This paragraph

and the following account derived from several sources. )

15–20

A Gordon Conference in June 1973 was the first nationally conspicuous event in the

recombinant DNA debate, initiating a public discussion through a letter to the President of the

National Academy of Sciences, Philip Handler, and David Hogness, President of the Institute of

Medicine. The letter was drafted by the conference co-chairs, Maxine Singer of the National

Cancer Institute and Dieter Soll of Yale, and circulated to the conferees in July before being sent

to Washington. It urged formation of a committee to formulate guidelines for the safe conduct of

recombinant DNA experiments. Handler referred the Singer-Soll letter to the newly formed

Assembly of Life Sciences of the National Research Council (the operating arm of the Academy).

The Singer-Soll letter was subsequently published in Science that September, greatly expanding 21

the audience for the debate about recombinant DNA. The notion of potential biohazard from gene

splicing was new to many in that audience, but not to Singer, as she was a friend of Paul Berg’s.

They had worried together over his proposed SV40-phage splicing idea in 1970. When the

Academy asked her advice, she suggested that Berg chair the proposed committee, and he was

contacted.

The resulting committee met in April 1974 at MIT, and included four past or future

Nobelists in addition to Berg (a Nobelist six years later) and three other scientists. The committee

reported in July. They recommended a moratorium on certain experiments until their hazards

could be better assessed, that NIH establish a committee to craft guidelines and review proposals,

and that an international meeting be convened to discuss potential biohazards. This set the 22, 23

stage for the famous Asilomar conference of February 1975.

Whereas the first Asilomar conference dealt with biohazards of viral research but did not

address recombinant DNA, the second and far more famous Asilomar conference focused on

biohazards of recombinant DNA specifically. The conference was again organized by a committee

chaired by Paul Berg. The second Asilomar conference brought together biologists, mainly

molecular biologists, with a smattering of lawyers and reporters. The Berg committee invited 150

participants, 60 from outside the United States; 16 were reporters who agreed not to file reports

until after the meeting was over. When the conference ended on February 27, 1975, it was 18

immediately followed by a press conference, and the reporters who had attended were free to start

filing their stories. A final report from the Asilomar conference was submitted in late April, was

formally reviewed by independent sources, approved on May 20, and rushed into print in the June

5 issue of Science and that month’s Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. The 24, 25

day the Asilomar conference ended, the NIH’s Recombinant DNA Advisory Committee (RAC)

met in Bethesda, Maryland, adopting the draft statement of the Asilomar conference as its interim
H-12

rules for federally funded research. The RAC had been born and began to walk, if only on shaky

legs.

The voluntary moratorium, largely conceived and imposed by the molecular biology

community on itself, thus was supplanted by a federally sanctioned set of guidelines and a

prospective group review process. No violations of the voluntary phase of the recombinant DNA

moratorium are known to have occurred. There were two known violations of the RAC

guidelines for federally funded research, plus one alleged infraction at Harvard that was widely

publicized but turned out to be a bureaucratic snarl rather than a real infraction. These cases shed

light on different aspects of research moratoria.

The first two cases were about laboratory experiments that either actually took place

outside the guidelines (University of California, San Francisco) or without proper NIH

authorization documents on file (Harvard). The third case, involving University of California, Los

Angeles (UCLA) physician Martin J. Cline, entailed introduction of recombinant DNA into two

thalassemic patients, one in Israel and one in Italy. Of these, only Cline’s actions were found to be

deliberate violations of recombinant DNA guidelines, and even here, the violations of human

subject protections were much more significant than infraction of the recombinant DNA

guidelines. The Cline debacle set the stage for RAC’s prospective review of human gene therapy

protocols.

Cloning Rat Insulin and Growth Hormone in pBR322 at UCSF

Two genes, for rat insulin and rat growth hormone, were cloned using the plasmid pBR322 before

it was certified by the NIH director. These experiments took place in January through March

1977, following a January RAC meeting at which pBR322 was provisionally “approved” pending

further data. This was an action of the RAC, but the guidelines called for “certification” by the

NIH director before a cloning vector could actually be used. Alex Ullrich cloned insulin and Peter

Seeburg’s growth hormone. Most of the attention, both scientifically and in the investigations of

infractions in late 1977, focused on the insulin gene.

Axel Ullrich, a German postdoctoral researcher who had been in the United States only six

months, apparently did not understand that approval was not the same as certification when he

started his experiments. The information was relayed by phone, first from Miami (after the RAC

meeting) to a postdoc in the Boyer laboratory, and then again from that laboratory to Ullrich.

Even formal certification decisions were often communicated by phone, not only at UCSF but at

most universities, because of the intense scientific competition (necessitating very fast

communication) and also because the NIH Office of Recombinant DNA Activities was, by its own

admission, “desperately understaffed.” The fact that two different people at UCSF took the 26

same action suggests both that the competitive urge to use state-of-the-art methods was shared,

and that neither Ullrich nor Seeburg was alone in his misunderstanding of the rules. The

infractions took place at UCSF mainly because that is where the pBR322 vector was created and

one of the places where gene cloning methods were most advanced.
H-13

By the time Ullrich confirmed that he had succeeded in cloning insulin, on March 2, 1977,

he had known since a laboratory meeting on February 4 that pBR322 was not certified for use. At

a March 1 meeting in Utah, William Garland of NIH confirmed to laboratory director Howard

Goodman that pBR322 was not certified for use. After a conversation between William Rutter

and NIH Deputy Director DeWit Stetten, Ullrich destroyed bacteria containing the pBR322

vectors that included the insulin gene inserts–the first mammalian gene ever cloned. In the 1, 27, 28

end, the experiments that broke the guidelines were technically safer than the ones that

experiments using other cloning vectors. The vector designers turned out to be right about its

safety, although that was not confirmed by empirical data until May 1977. The vector pBR322

was certified for use in cloning experiments on July 7, 1977.

The violations came to light on September 30, 1977, when Science reporter Nicholas

Wade ran a story. This led to wide media coverage for several months, and Senate hearings that 29

November. Investigations at UCSF and NIH resulted in “no further action” being taken. Further 30

information about the infractions came to light in a federal patent case decided against the

University of California last December. New facts and documents were uncovered through legal 31

discovery proceedings, court testimony, and expert analysis of data in the June 1977 Science

paper and the related U.S. Patent 4,652,525. That case remains under appeal in the Court of

Appeals, Federal Circuit. It was argued orally on January 6, 1997 (docket number 96-1175), and

a decision is pending. Several relevant facts and interpretations remain in dispute.

Most of the disputed facts have little bearing on NBAC’s interest about whether

infractions of research moratoria take place. None of the parties to this litigation dispute that the

infraction took place and was initially inadvertent; the disputes center on what took place when

knowledge of the infraction became known. The final outcome of this case may, however,

influence judgments of what happens when infractions do occur. The continuing dispute is not

about whether an infraction occurred (it did), whether it was initially inadvertent (it was), or

whether it posed a real risk to safety (it did not). Instead, this case shows how new regulatory or

legal constraints imposed on research can complicate scientific discovery, influence scientific

competition, and may even bear on patent rights— in this case, whether the patent on the first

cloned mammalian gene is judged valid. The December 1995 decision of the judge explicitly calls

into question findings from the UCSF and NIH investigations of late 1977, statements in the

November 1977 Senate hearing, and completeness of the patent disclosure (see appendix C). The

federal judge’s decision hinges on facts that the NIH and UCSF investigations failed to bring to

light, and thus implicitly raises doubts about the adequacy of previous investigations. Relevant

sections of the judge’s decision are reprinted as Appendix A.

Recombinant DNA Experiments without a Memorandum of Agreement

between Harvard and NIH

Another guidelines infraction was alleged soon after the UCSF case was reported in Science.

Charles Thomas at Harvard Medical School was one of the early users of recombinant DNA

methods. He sat on the NIH committee that developed the guidelines. He believed the dangers of
H-14

recombinant DNA were “imaginary” or “totally conjectural,” and made no secret of this. A 32, 33

Freedom of Information Act inquiry from the Environmental Defense Fund discovered that no

formal “memorandum of agreement” covering his experiments was on file at NIH. His 34

outspokenness no doubt made him a juicy target. The revelations were covered in the scientific

press, then spilled over into the mainstream media and became the subject of a Senate hearing.

Investigations at both Harvard and NIH ultimately concluded that “at no time were Dr.

Thomas’ [sic] laboratory practices out of compliance with the applicable guidelines or conducted

in a manner that would constitute a hazard.” Dr. Thomas admitted that he “misspoke” to the

Harvard biosafety committee. He claimed that NIH grants were being held up pending approval of

his laboratory at the next-to-highest physical containment specifications (ventilation was

insufficient, and it was never so certified, but in the meantime, Dr. Thomas departed Harvard for

the Scripps Clinic and Research Foundation). Dr. Thomas’ strategy was a transparent attempt to

pressure the Harvard biosafety committee to approve his laboratory by leading it to believe their

approval process was holding his research grant hostage. This manipulation, while unethical, did

not bear directly on the allegations of violating the recombinant DNA guidelines, and says little

about respect for the moratorium. Researchers in his laboratory were interviewed, and none

asserted that he ever failed to abide by the NIH guidelines, whatever he thought about their merit.

He publicly chafed at the rules, but all agreed that he played by them.

Dr. Thomas had many documents on file at both Harvard and NIH, including an

agreement that was not forwarded to NIH a month before the case came to light. In the end, this

was not an infraction of the guidelines but a bureaucratic tangle, and responsibility was shared

among NIH, Harvard, and Dr. Thomas. Dr. Thomas’s grants to do recombinant DNA research

(not all work) were put on hold for five months while the investigations were underway. When

those investigations were complete, the recommendation was to allow Dr. Thomas to resume

recombinant DNA research using NIH funds. In the end, Dr. Thomas was vindicated. From the 35

documentary record, it appears he endured research constraints while under investigation and

suffered bad publicity for being obstreperous and Machiavellian, but he neither violated the

guidelines nor broke the earlier voluntary moratorium.

Introduction of Recombinant DNA into Thalassemic Patients in Israel and Italy

In July of 1980, UCLA physician Martin J. Cline inserted recombinant DNA into two patients

with the blood disease thalassemia, one in Israel and one in Italy. In doing so, he violated the U.S.

recombinant DNA guidelines (which covered any experiments using molecules created with

federal research dollars) and human subjects regulations (which cover research by investigators at

institutions with a signed human subjects agreement, regardless of whether the work is federally

funded or not and whether or not it takes place in the United States). As a consequence, Dr. Cline

resigned as chair of his department, had several grants terminated early, and for three years had to

submit the report of the investigation to those reviewing any proposals he made to do

recombinant DNA, to do research involving human subjects, or to request NIH funding.36, 37
H-15

REVIEW OF SOMATIC CELL GENE THERAPY PROTOCOLS

The most significant aspect of the Cline case was its violation of human subjects regulations, but

its main impact was on how gene therapy entered the world, under the framework of the

recombinant DNA guidelines. A month before Dr. Cline did his experiments abroad, the general

secretaries of the three major U.S. religious denominations (Protestant, Roman Catholic, and

Jewish) wrote to President Jimmy Carter. Their letter opened, “We are rapidly moving into a 38

new era of fundamental danger triggered by the rapid growth of genetic engineering” and went on

to note, “Those who would play God will be tempted as never before.” From a group of august

theologians, that statement carried some weight. The clerics then turned to public policy and

process, “We believe, after careful investigation, that no government agency or committee is

currently exercising adequate oversight or control, nor addressing the fundamental ethical

questions in a major way.” Among other things, they were concerned about the 1980 Supreme

Court decision allowing patenting of a bacterium, the famous Diamond v. Chakrabarty case.

As the President’s Commission was beginning to operate, Alexander Capron, Executive

Director, got wind of the letter. The President’s Science Advisor, Frank Press, turned the letter

over to the Commission. The letter became one origin of its report Splicing Life. The 39

Commission addressed public fears and pointed to the distinction between somatic cell therapy

(which would affect only the person treated) and germ line treatment (which could be inherited).

It discussed reconfiguring or augmenting RAC, with appointment of a Genetic Engineering

Commission to “deal solely with this field” and also the possibility of a successor bioethics

commission (the President’s Commission was slated to go out of existence several months

hence). The report was released, became the subject of a House hearing before Representative 39

Gore (at which Dr. Cline presented a defense of his work), and led ultimately to the creation of 40

the Biomedical Ethics Advisory Committee, and thence NBAC, through a long and complicated

lineage.

The President’s Commission report was commended to the RAC, which in 1984 set up a

Working Group on Human Gene Therapy chaired by LeRoy Walters of Georgetown University’s

Kennedy Institute of Ethics. That Working Group was reconstituted as a RAC subcommittee,

which went on to produce the first document laying down guidelines for RAC’s review of gene

therapy protocols, the “points to consider” document that raised over one hundred questions in

seven main areas. This document survives as Appendix M to the recombinant DNA guidelines, 41

having been modified several times, but not fundamentally changed. With diminishing duties 3

other than gene therapy, the subcommittee was merged into the full RAC in 1991. As of 41

December 1996, RAC had considered 149 protocols. Last year, NIH Director Harold Varmus 42

proposed to dismantle the RAC, leaving review of gene therapy protocols to the Food and Drug

Administration (FDA).

FDA does review gene therapy and somatic cell alterations, and Varmus observed that 43

protocol review by NIH was redundant and that public purposes could be served by hosting

national conferences to promote dialog. Dr. Varmus’s proposal met opposition, and RAC will be
H-16

retained in smaller form, reducing membership from 25 to 15. RAC will be responsible for

“(1) Identifying novel human gene transfer experiments deserving of public discussion...

(2) Identifying novel ethical issues relevant to specific human applications of gene transfer and

recommending appropriate modifications to the Points to Consider... (3) Identifying novel

scientific and safety issues... (4) Publicly reviewing human gene transfer clinical trial data... [and]

(5) Identifying broad scientific and ethical/social issues... for Gene Therapy Policy Conference

topics” (Office of Recombinant DNA Activities, 1997 #15; Office of Recombinant DNA

Activities, 1997 #94).

MORATORIA ON GERM LINE GENE THERAPY

The President’s Commission set the tone for much of the subsequent debate about gene therapy.

Its distinction between germ line and somatic cell therapy guided the policy discussion, most

notably in the form of Council of Europe Recommendation 934, citing a right to inherit a genome

that “has not been tampered with,” but also open to therapeutic interventions (with the suggestion

that a list might be drawn up of conditions possibly warranting gene therapy). Second thoughts 44

about the moral and clinical significance of the somatic-germ line distinction began to appear with

the 1990 Declaration of Inuyama, the statement resulting from an international meeting. It noted

that germ line alteration would be “technically much more difficult than that of somatic cells and is

not at present in prospect. However, such therapy might be the only means to treat certain

conditions, and therefore continued discussion of both its technical and its ethical aspects is

essential. Before germ-cell therapy is undertaken, its safety must be very well established, for

changes would affect the descendants of patients.”

45, 46

The final clause about safety was added not only to note multigenerational impact, but

following discussion of a serious problem faced by germ line therapy but not somatic

therapies— the fact that any inserted genes would have to go through all of embryonic and fetal

development without triggering a developmental mishap. This was a high hurdle indeed, since no

animal models of human development can fully simulate the timing of intricate gene regulation,

and controlled expression of many genes not expressed in adults. The thinking at Inuyama was

that debate about germ line gene therapy would become serious with progress toward technology

for extremely specific replacement of mutated genes with their exact non-mutated counterparts,

leaving the genes in the same chromosomal site and subject to the same local regulatory effects. If

such a technique were developed— and it would surely be developed first in other

organisms— then it would quite likely be safe throughout development (and virtually no other

technique would be). At that point, some clinical scenarios would become sufficiently safe to

make possible application in some rare situations.

Walters and Palmer devote a chapter to possible scenarios for germ line intervention.

Their book also includes a survey of targeted genetic alterations in other organisms, by molecular

biologist Mario Capecchi of the University of Utah, because it is the key enabling technology

necessary before human germ line changes make sense. One such scenario discussed in Inuyama 47

involved two parents with recessive disorders wishing to have a child without the disorder.
H-17

Another was to address diseases requiring genetic change in many different organs whose cells do

not divide in adults (such as muscle, heart, and nerve cells), requiring modification before organs

differentiate during embryonic development (Wivel 1993, 95).

All nations that have explicitly addressed germ line gene therapy have opted to constrain

it. In the United States, the “will not entertain proposals” language of RAC prevails. As noted

before, Germany, Denmark and some other nations have made germ line alterations in humans a

criminal act. In the United Kingdom, the experiments are subject to a licensing authority that was

created by law. The licensing authority has discretion, but only within statutory parameters. The

legislative language has caused some problems in the case of a mother who desired fertilization

using the sperm of her husband, whose sperm was obtained and frozen after he was comatose and

could not give written consent for its use. The artful solution in this case has been to export the

sperm to another European Union country, where the fertilization and insemination can take

place.

The proscriptions on germ line intervention were largely academic but edged toward more

concrete form in 1995, when Donald Rubinstein and colleagues proposed “a nine step protocol at

the germ-line level for the curative treatment of a genetic disorder.” The protocol was 48

unexpected because it focused on mitochondrial disease, thus framing germ line intervention in a

new way.

Mitochondria are small membrane-enclosed organelles inside most cells in the body. They

contain several dozen genes, some of which cause diseases when mutated. Mitochondria are not

inherited with the other chromosomes, but reside in the mother’s egg at time of fertilization, and

so inheritance is exclusively maternal. All children of an affected woman are at high risk, although

expression can be variable, depending on the severity of the mutation, on whether all

mitochondria are mutated or there is a mix of mitochondrial gene types, and on modulation by

other genes.

The proposed protocol would fertilize the egg of an affected woman with her husband’s

sperm, thus making the nuclear genes the usual 50-50 mix of mother’s and father’s genes. The

nucleus of the mother’s egg would be removed, however, and placed into the enucleated egg of

another woman before fertilization. This would replace the mother’s cytoplasm, containing the

mutated mitochondria, with the donor woman’s just before fertilization. Like other children, the

resulting child would retain the nuclear genome of the mother and father but all mitochondria

would derive from eggs of the donor woman.

The child’s cells would be genetically altered, but not in the way most writers addressing

germ line intervention have assumed. This protocol entails manipulation of an egg and not an

embryo, but depending on details of language, the technique might or might not be covered by

proscriptions intended to thwart embryo research and in vitro fertilization. The technique certainly

causes inherited changes in subsequent generations, and in that sense is a germ line manipulation.

It does not entail recombinant DNA, however, and so would not be subject to RAC review unless
H-18

voluntarily submitted to it. It would be subject to Institutional Review Board (IRB) review if

conducted at an institution that receives federal funding for research under an agreement with the

OPRR, and is thus governed by the U.S. human subject protection regulations. (The reported

pregnancy under way using this technique, or a similar one, was apparently undertaken by a

private institution. I have no direct information about it, even about whether it is taking place in

the United States, nor is the case publicly known). This technique is very likely a criminal act

under the German law, which addresses genetic alterations, and also perhaps a Danish law, which

addresses manipulations of all or part of an embryo (although since the nuclear transplant takes

place before fertilization, it might be exempt). Because it would alter the genetics of an embryo, it

appears to be outside the range of experiments that can be licensed in the United Kingdom.

The couple’s intent might not be a cure for future generations, but only to rid their

genetically related child of consequences from the mother’s mitochondrial mutation. If male, the

child would not pass his mitochondria on. But any female child would pass the mitochondria

inherited from the donor woman’s enucleated egg. The technique deliberately induces maternally

inherited changes intended to avoid mitochondrial genetic defects, and would be transmitted via

germ line (egg) cells. It is, in this sense, germ line gene therapy and would be proscribed by most

formulations of bans on germ line manipulation. It is not, however, gene splicing of the kind that

was debated and intended to be stopped by those bans. It is hard to argue that the mitochondrial

genetic changes carry the moral risk that lies beneath the germ line gene therapy debate, and the

case for state intervention seems weak. Yet it is easy to construct reasonable scenarios in which a

woman might well want to avoid mitochondrial disease while retaining the benefits of having

genetically related children.

If the technique were proven safe in animal experiments (and the developmental safety

considerations about mitochondrial inheritance are considerably less worrisome than nuclear

genes, so considerations raised earlier do not pertain), then this scenario could present a case

lesson in the dangers of premature bans. The desire of a woman (and man) to have a healthy

genetically related child could be pitted against existing germ line legal constraints. It is not

entirely clear what harm the constraints would be preventing in this scenario, and hard to

construct much public benefit, but the damage to the couple’s reproductive liberty is quite clear.

In the United States, RAC could simply remove the “will not entertain at present”

language in its guidelines by administrative fiat after announcing publicly its intention to do so, or

it might choose to construe the protocol as a gene therapy protocol to cure a specific child that

has the inadvertent effect of causing changes that female offspring would transmit to their

progeny. Most scenarios for use of the technique, however, would not even require RAC review

at all, unless the mitochondrial or nuclear genes were altered using recombinant methods. RAC

might nonetheless accept such a protocol for review, and judge its safety and technical prospects

for success. In the United Kingdom, the licensing authority could also possibly consider the case,

subject to interpretation of its statute. In Germany, respecting the couple’s reproductive choice

would entail a criminal act. Changing the law would require a public process and considerable

delay. It would also put a private family decision on public display, and potentially threaten the
H-19

personal privacy of the couple if names and other details came to light. Altering national statutes

to accommodate reasonable clinical investigations, in any event, seems an awkward route to

sensible public policy.

LESSONS FROM OVERSIGHT OF FETAL RESEARCH,

RECOMBINANT DNA RESEARCH, AND HUMAN GENE THERAPY

The legislative and bureaucratic history of fetal research is all well and good, but what has it

meant to research? Has it led to a real moratorium?

The various legislative bans on federal funding were never expected to block all scientific

research on in vitro fertilization. If the intention were to ban all human cloning, then this

moratorium on federal funding is not the appropriate model. Private sector activity was

anticipated and understood by lawmakers to be going on. In many respects, the situation now is

much as OTA reported it a decade ago. The federal moratorium has shifted in vitro fertilization

and related research to private centers that do not receive federal funds for research on human

subjects, and so can conduct work outside 45 CFR 46. Thus most of the work takes place outside

the research mainstream. With the possible exception of some research undertaken by Mark

Hughes that overlapped with activities funded by the National Center for Human Genome

Research last year, however, the federal moratorium appears to have held. (The Hughes case may

or may constitute an infraction. Federal funding for Dr. Hughes was cut off when this came to

light, but the nature, extent, or even existence of work that was federally funded and fell afoul of

federal guidelines has not been publicly disclosed. A congressional inquiry has been initiated).

For most of the past 23 years, a ban has remained in place for federally funded in vitro

fertilization and fetal research of more than minimal risk. This ban has been punctuated by two

periods when proposals were considered for federal funding— 1978–1980, when the EAB existed

to review proposals (including some fetoscopy studies that were approved), and 1994-1995, when

NIH assembled a panel to consider what criteria should guide funding for fetal research. The

boundaries of the moratorium have shifted slightly with the shift from NIH authorization statute

to executive branch back to NIH authorization to ban removal to new bans imposed by annual

appropriations. Fetal research has proven irresolvable within Congress, and has provoked

repeated fights. With a shift to the appropriations committees, such fights can now be expected to

take place every year, meaning more or less continually.

The various moratoria on fetal research were initially imposed by Congress, and

subsequent moratoria were either due to actions of Congress or decisions not to act by

Secretaries of Health and Human Services (in several cases over the years, usually to spare the

President from precipitating controversies that policy change would entail). The various bans

were imposed because of ethical concerns, not biohazard danger to patients, or lack of informed

consent. The dangers were not palpable to the investigators whose freedom of inquiry was

constrained. The risks were to unborn fetuses, and for early embryonic research in particular, the

moral standing of the “research subject” was a matter of moral belief, often grounded in theology.
H-20

Yet biomedical researchers are by occupation empirical sorts, intellectually contentious and

skeptical of assertion not grounded in experiment. Fetal research moratoria have been fought over

by factions in Congress and among political appointees in DHHS, and recently joined by the

President himself. The terms of the debate have not been framed as risks that might be empirically

assessed, as was possible with recombinant DNA. The debate on fetal research has been largely

derived from the savage and divisive policy debates over abortion.

Congress has not been able to resolve the controversy, but instead has been itself poisoned

by it. With the shift of the moratorium to appropriations language in 1995, the rancorous debate

can now affect funding for all of DHHS and the Departments of Labor and Education, bundled

with NIH in the same appropriations bill. The shift to appropriations was made because

disagreement blocked NIH authorization. NIH has a standing permanent authorization that lessens

the need for reauthorization. The funding bills must pass each year, however, one way or another.

With authorization blocked, the fetal research battle shifted to the appropriations process. In the

past two years, the fetal research provision has been one major reason that a

Labor-HHS-Education Appropriations Act has not been passed as a separate law, but instead has

been lumped with other incomplete funding bills as the new fiscal year threatens to dawn. With

linkage to the appropriations process that must go forward every year, and always faces a

daunting schedule, fetal research funding could escalate from a nasty intermittent sting to a hardy

perennial controversy.

Fetal research bans and the recombinant DNA moratorium followed by guidelines were

research constraints that originated from different sources for different reasons. Both sets of

constraints, however, were respected for the most part. In the case of recombinant DNA, this was

at first because of genuine concern about biohazard, soon followed by an understanding that a

breach of the guidelines could undermine public faith and threaten the research effort. The

guidelines were followed not only for federally funded work but on a voluntary basis by those

doing research with private funds. While this paper summarized a few infractions and alleged

infractions of the recombinant DNA guidelines, the main story here is the remarkable success in

creating guidelines that adapted to new knowledge and were for the most part respected

throughout the scientific community.

In the case of fetal research, the federal ban has not extended to the privately funded

research sector. Many in the research community do not regard the federal ban on in vitro

fertilization research and fetal research as prudent, but the ban has held out of respect for the legal

line-drawing by Congress and surely also some fear of the impact that violating the ban might

have on other research. Because of contending moral values, however, this ban is a constant

source of conflict.

Respect for constraints on research involving human subjects, in contrast, runs strong and

deep. Respect for persons involved in research is fundamentally different from the speculative

risks of biohazard attending a new technology or the moral values embedded in a fetal research

ban. The human subject regulations derive from principles well understood even before the
H-21

Nuremberg Code. The human subject regulations are an accepted fact of modern research. The 49

relevant U.S. regulations, 45 CFR 46, are just two decades old, but two generations of

investigators now regard them as a matter of course that ultimately strengthen research. Many

conceivable experiments that could produce interesting data simply are not done. Moral

boundaries are respected; they may be porous, but they are constantly patrolled by Institutional

Review Boards. The Advisory Committee on Human Radiation Experiments discovered that the

IRB system is far from perfect and some unethical experiments still proceed (Advisory Committee

on Human Radiation Experiments 1995, 97)— and this is one reason for NBAC’s existence, to

continue an unfinished agenda of human subject protections. There can be little doubt, however,

that norms of clinical research have changed over the past few decades.

LeRoy Walters, in responding to a previous draft of this paper, noted that the RAC

process could take on even the world’s best known experts in an emerging and highly

conspicuous field, in part because of its process and stature. Success may have depended on

several features of the RAC process (Walters 1997, 98):

open public meetings,

involvement of nationally recognized experts,

expertise spanning biology, medicine, law, ethics, public policy, and consumer advocacy,

appointment of experts familiar with the field but not direct competitors,

use of expert ad hoc consultants when needed,

rotation of membership,

regular and accurate coverage by the public media, and

frequent revision of the “points to consider” document.

One lesson from the Cline case is that when the potential rewards are exceedingly large,

human subject protections are all the more important, because scientific priority and fame are

powerfully seductive. The Cline case tested the IRB and recombinant DNA review processes. The

punishment meted out was swift and fair. Cline remained a scientist, but was stripped of his

chairmanship, lost several grants, and found getting grants much harder than before his infraction.

The main damage was to his reputation and ability to do science. Few molecular biologists would

fail to recognize Martin Cline’s name even after more than a decade and a half. His censure was

meaningful to the scientific community. If indeed Dr. Cline’s actions were driven by a desire to

enhance his reputation, then the penalty that mainly damaged that reputation was appropriate and

proportionate.
H-22

SOME PERSONAL OBSERVATIONS

A proposed moratorium on human cloning would share with fetal research a grounding in public

outrage over what is much more a moral than a technical or public health concern. The purpose of

a human cloning moratorium would be to prevent a moral wrong rather than to save lives or

forestall biohazard. Arguments for a human cloning moratorium also hinge on theological and

moral beliefs, as abortion and thus fetal research positions often do. The moral standing of the

resulting human beings, however, is not in question, and so, unlike the debate about fetal and

embryonic research, disagreement about personhood should not be as central, and theological

tenets may be less likely to confront deep social divisions. This might diminish the passions, and it

may also reduce pressure to impose a moratorium in the first place. Unlike fetal research,

however, the object of a moratorium might well be to block any human cloning, not just the use

of taxpayers’ money in its pursuit.

If the object of the effort is to stop all cloning, not just experiments funded by the federal

government, then in vitro fertilization and fetal research are poor models. Since it is currently

difficult to foresee any compelling reasons to go ahead with human cloning, then the main intent

of a moratorium might be to thwart an egocentric billionaire. If in some currently unimagined

scenario, some benefit could be postulated, then the IRB system, if supplemented by a mechanism

for review and debate at the national level, might well be up to the task, addressing the policy

concern with only the need to strengthen national review of the existing human subject

protections. If that is the problem being solved, then a moratorium on federal funding similar to

the one on fetal research would be useless.

The UCSF story paradoxically suggests that a moratorium can matter a great deal, not just

because it changed scientists’ behavior, but also because it distorted the rules of scientific

competition in surprising ways, and planted a seed of discord that is now a factor in patent rights

still being decided by federal courts two decades later.

There are limits to the respect scientists will accord a research constraint if they believe

strongly in the potential knowledge to be gained. If the recombinant DNA guidelines had been

more burdensome, less flexible, or (worse) scientifically suspect, the walls would likely have been

breached more than the two times we know about (once deliberately, once inadvertently).

Although biohazard was initially perceived to be real, with time the risks appeared more and more

speculative while the power of the technology became more apparent. And the rewards were

sweet. The races to clone mammalian genes were high stakes. It was one thing to hold position

for a few laps under the caution flag, quite another to put a permanent governor on the engine.

If Martin Cline had only violated the recombinant DNA guidelines, his violations would have

seemed far less significant. In fact, his case is telling in three regards. First, the recombinant DNA

portion of the infraction said more about truth-telling— how Dr. Cline dealt with his collaborators

and the people he was “treating”— than it did about the validity of the recombinant DNA

guidelines. They were intended to prevent biohazard, but in this case they may have mainly
H-23

contributed to weakening an already questionable experiment. When the initial guidelines were

extended into the clinical realm, before the Human Gene Therapy Working Group began to

grapple with the specific issues in gene therapy 1983, the guidelines were poorly suited for clinical

experiments. Second, the bureaucratic decision to exempt the experiment from review was

perverse because it removed scrutiny while weakening the likelihood of clinical benefit, which was

already extremely low. Third, and most on point when contemplating rules governing human

cloning, the Cline case revealed the pathologies of multiple parallel reviews.

Dr. Cline’s experiments were either safe and likely to work or not, and the most important

considerations were those that an IRB should review, not whether recombinant DNA was

involved or not. Yet the local UCLA IRB encountered serious difficulty in reviewing the protocol,

in part because it was an experiment with national, even worldwide implications, but review was

local. When RAC shifted to reviewing human gene therapy, it in effect became a national IRB for

such experiments. This was highly beneficial for the science and for the protection of the human

subjects involved, for several reasons. Human gene therapy has always been “hot,” and those who

do it are local stars because they attract money, prestige, and publicity. It can be difficult for local

IRBs to contend with the local star, but when review moves to the national level, NIH can bring

in the nation’s best minds without worrying as much about local impact. The procedures generally

get more thorough technical review at a higher level of expertise. The RAC process is open and

visible because unlike FDA review it is public. And it is credible and accountable because the

deliberations are covered by the media, especially when major decisions are made or when

controversies come to light. It is good for the science because the right information is gathered to

comply with the “points to consider” document, which was itself drafted and revised following an

open process.

These positive aspects of gene therapy review highlight the consequences of not having an

EAB to perform the same functions for other kinds of research. Gene therapy demonstrates that a

national IRB can function, despite the fact that RAC was technically operating under recombinant

DNA guidelines rather than human subject regulations. Yet this came to be only because the

trivial and marginally relevant fact that recombinant DNA was involved in gene therapy. That fact

enabled a national committee to construct a document that addresses the same points IRBs should

be concerned about.

If NIH had clicked its heels twice, it could have had a review process for difficult research

issues all along. The successful national review model grew out of recombinant DNA, but if

history were logical, it should have grown out of the human subjects’ protections. In the past

decade, NIH has careened from crisis to crisis about embryo and fetal research, research involving

the cognitively and emotionally impaired, and fetal tissue research. FDA has been excoriated over

its handling of RU486, use of placebos in drug trials for schizophrenia, and insufficient regard for

AIDS patients and cancer patients to get access to clinical trials. Yet the nation has in its handling

of gene therapy a credible model for a transparent and accountable system of national review. The

lesson for NIH is the need for the ability to convene national-level IRBs to review particularly

vexing research areas. The lesson for FDA is to make its rulemaking and deliberations more open.
H-24

The lesson for human cloning may be that it is just one of many possible issues to arise in

doing research that involves people or people-to-be. Creating another ad hoc committee or new

process may well create the kinds of bureaucratic difficulties, with ambiguously overlapping

jurisdictions that appeared in the Cline case.

All three efforts to impose research moratoria must confront an uncomfortable fact: they

work well in general but may be violated by isolated individuals.

As a final personal opinion, the temptation to blend functions of national deliberation and

analysis with review of complex research protocols that raise difficult issues should be resisted.

The gene therapy review process under RAC served well by first posing the right questions about

clinical protocols and then reviewing protocols. On a few occasions, RAC has also attempted to

mediate a national debate, but with no success comparable to the National or President’s

Commissions. The Ethics Advisory Board also issued some reports, as well as serving to review

protocols, but these reports did not have nearly the impact of the National and President’s

Commissions. The National and President’s Commissions, the radiation experiments committee,

and now NBAC are spared the review of specific protocols, so they can commission papers,

discuss options, and concentrate staff effort on gathering information, writing reports, and the

business of policy analysis.

The Ethics Advisory Board did a bit of both deliberating and protocol review. It was

arguably closer to success in protocol review than effecting change through its reports. The

Ethical, Legal and Social Implications Working Group of the NIH and DOE was successful in

helping launch a research program, but had minimal success in its policy forays— with scant

publication and no systematic information gathering, report writing, document review, or other

features associated with credible policy analysis. The Ethics Advisory Board, as laid out in the

1988 proposed charter, would have mixed analysis with the traffic cop role. So would the EAB

functions laid out by the 1993 NIH reauthorization. We have examples of successful public policy

deliberation about topics in bioethics, and relatively successful review processes for protocol

review for human subjects protections and for gene therapy; but models for doing both are not

promising.

NBAC’s engagement with the human cloning question demonstrates the virtues of having

a deliberative commission in place. NBAC was there to catch the ball. The key missing element

seems to be national protocol review. The local infrastructure for human subjects review already

exists in the form of IRBs, but the national superstructure of an EAB does not. If concerns about

human cloning justify further action, the most pressing need may be to formulate guidelines or

terms of a moratorium or ban, and then to review protocols if benefits are plausibly in prospect.

This is just what the gene therapy working group did fourteen years ago. In that case, the fear was

that without such guidelines, the technology would rush ahead. In the case of human cloning,

there seems no pressing clinical or other practical need for the technology but rather a need for

reassurance that whatever progress occurs in genetics and cloning technology, there is a credible

process for assessing its technical merit and social impact before experiments are tried.
H-25
H-26

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A: THE UCSF CASE

The UCSF infractions of recombinant DNA guidelines were caused by confusion over regulatory

permission to insert mammalian genes into the recombinant plasmid pBR322, named for Francisco

“Paco” Bolivar of Mexico and native Californian Raymond Rodriguez. Bolivar and Rodriguez

were postdoctoral researchers working in Herbert Boyer’s laboratory who designed a circular

DNA molecule (plasmid) that dramatically simplified gene cloning. It contained genes to enable

selection of bacteria containing it, with a gene conferring penicillin resistance and another gene for

tetracycline resistance whose disruption by insertion of a foreign DNA would cause bacteria to

stop growing but not to die. It also had splice sites for a variety of DNA-cutting enzymes.

Many of the cloning vectors still used today are direct descendants of this cleverly craf-ted

plasmid. It was easier to use than other vectors available at the time, and Bolivar and Rodriguez

also reasoned that it would be less liable to pass from bacterium to bacterium, reducing the risk of

proliferating outside deliberate control. But it was also new, and the RAC review process meant

formal certification, with review by the committee and formal certification by the NIH director.

Confirmation of the plasmid’s safety awaited data produced by Stanley Falkow and Jorge Gros at

the University of Washington. The data showed pBR322 plasmids in weakened bacterial strains to

be “the safest plasmid-host systems currently available.” Those data were not available until May 50

1977, and the vector was not certified until July 7.30

The competition to clone mammalian genes was intense. Gene jockeys were not so named

just because of alliteration. Molecular genetics was characterized by long hours, and as a

marathon neared the finish line— the cloning or sequencing of a gene, for example— work went on

around the clock. The insulin race was particularly competitive, with a UCSF group contending

with Walter Gilbert’s Harvard crew, another group at the City of Hope Hospital, and who knew

who else? The urge to use the technique most likely to work best and fastest was strong. This

day-by-day, hour-by-hour competition was a stark contrast with the quarterly RAC meetings.

Boyer attended a Miami Winter Symposium in January 1977, and the RAC was scheduled

to meet afterward. Boyer had sent a letter requesting approval of pBR322 in December 1976. The

RAC met January 15-17. It provisionally approved pBR322, but RAC wanted more data before

certification by the NIH director. Boyer phoned from Miami to Rodriguez in the UCSF lab with

the news. Rodriguez phoned Ullrich. Ullrich proceeded to begin the multi-step cloning procedure,

starting from some isolated DNA thought to contain rat insulin genes. By the end of February, he

thought he had the gene. Howard Goodman then attended a conference in Park City, Utah, where

RAC’s executive secretary, William Gartland, unambiguously stated that pBR322 was not

certified for use. Goodman then knew for sure the experiments had violated the recombinant

DNA guidelines.

Just days before the Washington NAS meeting that began this paper, Ullrich confirmed he had

cloned the insulin gene by examining DNA sequence data from one pBR322 clone. After an
H-27

internal debate among UCSF collaborators, Ullrich destroyed bacteria containing the pBR322

vector with its insulin-gene inserts on March 19. He cloned insulin in another vector, pMB9, 1, 27

after that vector was certified in April. That cloning effort was announced in May 1977 and

published in Science that June.51

These parts of the story are not contested. Appendix C, the federal district court’s

decision, includes information about what happened after it became apparent an infraction had

occurred. The contested findings cover a few points relevant to this paper— what was done with

any DNA derived from the insulin-containing pBR322 constructs (as opposed to the destroyed

bacterial clones), the chronology of events, the accuracy and completeness of various statements

about these events, and the disposition of patent rights.

Had the violations come to light in the spring of 1977, the legislative outcome might have

been different. Congress was considering bills to impose more stringent and permanent constraints

on recombinant DNA research. NIH director Fredrickson was doing all he could to keep review

flexible and locate it at research institutions to the degree possible. The Washington clamor was at

a perilous juncture. From Fredrickson’s perspective, if the scientists didn’t like RAC, they should

try what Congress had in mind. News of the UCSF violation at this critical juncture might have

scuttled the strategy and led to legislation with more central and less flexible review.

Analysts offer several different reasons for the loss of momentum for legislation. First,

RAC began to operate and its initially technical membership was broadened to include

nonscientists. At the same time, scientific consensus began to grow that the dangers of inadvertent

biohazard (as opposed to deliberate biological warfare engineering) were quite low. Gene

exchange that took place in nature even without recombinant DNA was demonstrated. And the

first successes in gene cloning, including the insulin and growth hormone genes, were

announced. Those successes shifted some attention from possible risks to obvious benefits. 18, 52

Finally, the scientific community mounted a spirited lobbying effort against legislative action,

spearheaded by Harlyn Halvorson, a former president of the American Society of Microbiology.19

Had the UCSF events become widely known as they occurred or soon after, they could

well have undermined the RAC process even as it was just getting started. Or they might not have

undermined confidence, if it were clear that the infraction was obviously inadvertent. Faith in

scientific self-regulation was arguably the most important factor attenuating calls for legislation

and stringent regulation— but this case might have played out as an example that scientists could

not be trusted, or that the processes worked to surface and remedy even minor infractions. The

impact of public disclosure of the inadvertent infraction might well have turned on how it was

handled at least as much as what had actually occurred. An open and transparent process is

generally more credible than a secret and opaque one. One thing is clear, however. In retrospect,

heavy-handed regulation or inflexible statutory restrictions on recombinant DNA research would

have been a serious error, as recombinant DNA research has proven enormously useful

scientifically as well as and socially valuable. The putative biohazards have not proven substantial.

The lesson here is not that the recombinant DNA guidelines did not work, only that they
H-28

influenced the conduct of science and that procedures for communicating them, investigating

infractions, and enforcing compliance were incomplete.
H-29

APPENDIX B: THE CLINE CASE

This account of the Martin Cline case is mainly based on Larry Thompson’s book Correcting the

Code, as supplemented by NIH case files and old OTA files. 53 54

On July 10, 1980, Dr. Martin J. Cline infused 700 million blood cells treated with

recombinant DNA into Ora Morduch, a 21-year-old Iraqi Kurdish Jew and patient activist living

in Israel. The experiments took place at Hadassah University Hospital. The treatment was

repeated the next day. Each treatment involved taking blood cells, incubating them with calcium

phosphate in the presence of the DNA, radiating Ms. Morduch’s bone marrow with 300 rads to

kill native cells, and reinfusing the treated cells. On July 15 and 16, at the University Polyclinic in

Naples, Italy, Dr. Cline administered a similar treatment to Maria Addolorata, a 16-year-old from

Torino, except that a smaller body surface and lower dose of radiation were used (200 rads). The

next day, the University of California, Los Angeles, IRB rejected Dr. Cline’s proposed clinical

protocol.

The IRB action culminated a 14-month struggle. In May 1979, Dr. Cline and his UCLA

collaborators submitted a clinical protocol to the UCLA IRB proposing gene therapy for sickle

cell disease and other hemoglobin disorders. This was based on a mouse experiment in which cells

treated with recombinant DNA (by incubating them with DNA precipitated in calcium phosphate

and rendered porous by electrical currents) were inserted into mice whose bone marrow had been

entirely killed by radiation. The mice were also treated with the cell poison methotrexate that

killed cells unless they had taken up the recombinant DNA— containing the globin gene linked to

one that conferred resistance to methotrexate. Under this strong selection, the mice expressed low

levels of the globin gene transiently.

Dr. Cline was chairman of the department of hematology at UCLA. The department had a

history of several confrontations with UCLA’s IRB. Moreover, the protocol was initially subject

to both IRB review and the local Institutional Biosafety Committee, which oversaw compliance

with recombinant DNA guidelines. The committees initially deferred to one another. Cline and

collaborators decided to avoid the biosafety committee, and thus the recombinant DNA

guidelines, by fragmenting the DNA before insertion into patients, so it would not longer be

“recombined” in a vector. This modification, while avoiding a bureaucratic impediment, was

arguably both more dangerous and less likely to provide benefit because chromosomes tend to

incorporate such DNA fragments as large redundant arrays. Since one concern was gene

regulation, and such tandem arrays are even less subject to control than single copies, this element

could have introduced a new risk of unregulated gene expression. At the least, this needed testing.

This protocol as proposed for human patients was never tested in animals, nor was the experiment

without full-body radiation and without methotrexate selection, although these were essential

features of the human experiments.

The IRB initially requested external expert review of the protocol, but Dr. Cline resisted,

wishing to keep his ideas secret from scientific competitors. The back-and-forth led Dr. Cline to
H-30

propose the IRB seek advice from an expert panel. The four external consultants who reviewed

the experiment were picked after Dr. Cline was allowed to reject direct competitors. All four

consultants judged the experiment as premature.

In the experiments he conducted in Israel and Italy, Dr. Cline decided to go ahead and use

recombinant DNA instead of cutting it into fragments as promised. He lacked facilities to

fragment it, and did not personally know how to do it as proposed in the UCLA protocol. His

promises not to use recombinant DNA had proved important in the review process at Hadassah

University Hospital, and he had also told both patients no recombinant DNA would be inserted.

This feature was again bureaucratically significant, but technically unsound.

Rumors about gene therapy having been tried in Israel percolated among research

hematologists between July and October 1980. An NIH scientist also interested in gene therapy,

W. French Anderson, heard about the rumors. He talked to the resident bioethicist at NIH’s

Clinical Center, John C. Fletcher, who decided to call Dr. Cline. He caught up with him by phone

at a Montreal hotel. Fletcher told Cline about the rumors that Cline had attempted gene therapy in

Israel, and he should come tell the facts to NIH officials if he had done so. At the end of an

equivocal conversation, Cline denied having done such experiments. On September 8, Charles 53

McCarthy, director of NIH’s office for overseeing human experimentation, wrote a letter to

UCLA Chancellor Charles E. Young asking whether Dr. Cline had performed gene therapy

experiments. In October, Los Angeles Times reporter Paul Jacobs broke the story on the front

page, having checked with sources in Italy and Israel and with scientists who had been part of the

rumor mill.

This began a series of investigations at UCLA and NIH, which culminated in May 1981,

noting the first-ever documented transgression of the human subjects guidelines and also a

violation of the recombinant DNA guidelines. Dr. Cline had by then resigned as department chair.

The NIH reviewed his ongoing grants, terminated several, and required that future applications

for clinical research, recombinant DNA research, and NIH funding should include the NIH

committee’s report on the investigation.36

Several factors cast doubt on Dr. Cline’s own account of why he did the experiments: (1) he went

abroad to do the experiments after being rebuffed at UCLA, (2) he did them knowing that in all

likelihood the protocols would be rejected by the UCLA IRB, (3) he lied about using recombinant

DNA to his collaborators and to the patients (setting aside the technically sound judgment that it

was more likely to work), (4) he lied to John Fletcher about having done the experiments at all,

and (5) he tried to convince his UCLA collaborators to keep mum about using recombinant DNA

when the story broke.

Dr. Cline’s contention that he acted with the best interests of the patients foremost in mind

is undermined by his failure to tell either patient what he was really doing, his failure to produce

evidence in advance about the possible harms that could come from overexpression of beta globin
H-31

in cells, the extremely incomplete animal model and human in vitro data, and his characterization

of the trials as phase I.

Phase I trials are intended to test the safety and toxicity of drugs, usually by escalating

dosages until side effects emerge in healthy patients. Testing for safety and toxicity in seriously ill

patients is nonsensical, as their generally fragile health makes it impossible to know whether ill

effects are due to the drug or the severe underlying disease. The Israeli case bears out this point:

soon after the experiment took place, Ora Morduch entered the hospital in arrhythmic crisis and

could have died. This was much more likely to be caused by excess iron in her heart muscle cells

than Dr. Cline’s treatments. But who could know? The Cline experiments taught nothing about

the toxicity of the methods, and could never have been expected to do so.

The proper framework for the experiments is “compassionate use,” referring to innovative

therapy for patients with no better alternatives, and so even a small potential benefit can be

acceptable. In this framework, the decisive factors are the unavailability of alternative treatments

and the plausibility, even if small, of clinical benefit. The Cline experiments fail on both counts.

Iron chelation therapy in conjunction with blood transfusion was being tested as Dr. Cline did his

experiments. Indeed both patients eventually got and greatly benefited from those treatments,

both surviving for more than a decade. Gene insertion was exotic and unlikely to work compared

to chelation therapy.

Regarding the potential clinical benefit of inserting genes, the situation was at least as bad.

First, exposing both legs to 300 rads of radiation (Israel) or 200 rads (Italy) could harm the

patient and certainly could not help, except to “make room” for the infused cells, but this part of

the protocol had never been tested. Second, credible evidence would have required either closely

similar experimental data from animals or tissue culture evidence of gene expression using the

same procedures on human cells. Yet even strong selection in the mouse experiments (total body

radiation to kill all marrow cells followed by methotrexate selection) led to only low gene

expression for a short time. Dr. Cline’s clinical experiments in Israel and Italy involved a much

smaller proportionate influx of cells and no selection. And although his Italian collaborator did

indeed test gene expression in vitro, Dr. Cline did his experiments in patients before those results

were known.
H-32

APPENDIX C: EXCERPT FROM UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

V. ELI LILLY AND CO.

Source: U.S. Patent Quarterly 2d, Book 39, from “A. The ‘525 Patent” on pp. 1248–1254.

Some background information concerning research involving recombinant DNA must precede

discussion of this issue. In the early 1970’s when experiments in the area of recombinant DNA

were first contemplated many people, including some scientists, were concerned that such

experiments might pose medical threats to humans. Tr. at 1295. The National Academy of

Sciences eventually “called for a broad moratorium on all recombinant experiments until they

could be . . . better reviewed by the scientific community.” Id. At a subsequent review of

recombinant DNA research in 1975, it was suggested that experiments in that area might proceed

if suitable guidelines were promulgated to govern the research. See Lilly Ex. 3547 at HG2

580773.

Consequently, the Recombinant DNA Molecule Program Advisory Committee, previously

established by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare’s National Institutes of Health

(NIH), held its first meeting to develop safety guidelines. Id. Those guidelines were issued by the

NIH on June 23, 1976, and published in the Federal Register on July 7, 1976. Tr. at 1296, 1298;

Lilly Ex. 3731 at 000004; Lilly Ex. 3547. “The NIH Guidelines establish [ed] carefully controlled

conditions for the conduct of experiments involving the production of [recombinant DNA]

molecules and their insertion into organisms such as bacteria.” Lilly Ex. 3547 at HG2 580773. For

example, the regulations classified types of biological containments (i.e., plasmids) and specified

which ones could be used in certain recombinant DNA experiments. The regulations also

governed the type of physical containment facilities (i.e., laboratories) in which scientists could

conduct particular types of experiments. The safety guidelines mandated that no plasmid could be

considered to fall within an approved classification until it had been certified by the NIH

Recombinant DNA Advisory Committee. Tr. at 1301.

The guidelines also stipulated that any institution receiving NIH funds was to appoint a

principal investigator. Under the guidelines, the principal investigator had certain responsibilities,

including “supervising the safety performance of the staff to ensure that the required safety

practices and techniques [were] employed” and “investigating and reporting in writing to the NIH

Office of Recombinant DNA Activities and the institutional biohazards committee (or biosafety

committee) any problems pertaining to operation and implementation of biological and physical

containment safety practices and procedures, or equipment or facility failure.” Lilly Ex. 3547 at

HG2 580791. The guidelines governed the conduct of all NIH supported research in the area of

recombinant DNA. The research UC was conducting on rat insulin the research that formed the

basis of the ‘525 patent was NIH-supported. Consequently, UC was to operate within the

strictures of the safety guidelines.

By January of 1977, the NIH only had certified the plasmids denominated pSC101 and

pCR1 for experiments with mammalian DNA. Tr. at 1301. According to Rutter, UC scientists
H-33

delayed their recombinant DNA research, awaiting the NIH green light on use of a more advanced

vector either pMB9 or pBR322. Tr. at 127. Rutter said UC representatives preferred to use

pBR322. Id. Reportedly, that vector would be the most effective cloning agent. Id. On April 18,

1977, the NIH certified plasmid pMB9 as safe. Lilly Ex. 3554A at 177. On July 7, 1977, the NIH

certified plasmid pBR322. Id.

Lilly contends that UC researchers knowingly used a plasmid not yet certified for use

PBR322 in conducting its rat insulin experiments. Moreover, Lilly argues that UC researchers

misrepresented the origins of their rat insulin data to the public, the NIH, the United States Senate

and the PTO in order to conceal their misuse of plasmid pBR322. According to Lilly, the UC

researchers’ misuse of the plasmid and misrepresentations of the origins of their data are material

to patentability of the ‘525 patent, and the misrepresentations of their data were intended to

mislead the PTO. Thus, Lilly argues, a finding of unenforceability based on inequitable conduct is

appropriate.

Clearly, UC’s scientists used pBR322 in their research before the NIH had certified that

plasmid for use. In January of 1977, working in Goodman’s laboratory at the University, Ullrich

began using pBR322 in his recombinant DNA experiments. Ullrich testified that he began using

the plasmid after a colleague informed him by telephone that the NIH had approved pBR322 for

use. Tr. at 79798; Lilly Ex. 3420 at HG 002878. The record indicates that prior to his use of

pBR322, Ullrich informed Rutter that he had heard pBR322 was approved and that he intended to

proceed with his experiments. Dr. Rutter concurred with Dr. Ullrich’s plan, without further

verification of the status of pBR322. Lilly Ex. 3420 at HG 002870.

Subsequently, during a February 4, 1977, meeting, certain UC researchers including

Ullrich and Shine learned that although approval of pBR322 had been recommended, the NIH

director’s requisite certification of the plasmid as safe had not yet issued. Lilly Ex. 3420 at HG

00287172. Ullrich averred that he earlier had not been aware of the distinction between approval

and certification. Tr. at 800. Thus, UC’s premature use of pBR322 through February 4, 1977,

was a violation of the NIH guidelines, but it was not necessarily an intentional violation.

The record, however, illustrates that UC researchers did not halt their use of pBR322

and/or the fruits of previous experiments with that vector after learning that pBR322 had not been

certified. In fact, UC agrees that the experiments continued until at least March 3, 1977. Lilly Ex.

3420 at HG 002871. In its report to the Office of Recombinant DNA Activities (ORDA)

concerning UC’s premature use of pBR322, UC’s biosafety committee stated:

At this [February 4] gathering, the investigators in Dr. Goodman’s laboratory (including

Drs. Ullrich and Shine) reportedly learned for the first time that there was some confusion about

the status of pBR322 . . . However, the initial cloning experiments with pBR322 and insulin

cDNA had been completed, and clones had been obtained. After February 4, no new clones were

constructed, but those already obtained were grown up and examined for the presence of

recombinant DNA.
H-34

There is no satisfactory explanation as to why the investigators in Dr. Goodman’s laboratory

continued experiments with these recombinant plasmids after February 4.

Lilly Ex. 3420 at HG 002872. Moreover, when questioned at trial, Ullrich did not deny

use of pBR322 after learning that it had not been certified. Tr. at 824. We find that the record

clearly supports Lilly’s contention that UC knowingly violated NIH safety guidelines when its

researchers continued to use pBR322 in recombinant DNA experiments even after learning that

the plasmid had not yet been certified for use.

Additionally, neither Rutter nor Goodman officially reported the unauthorized use of

pBR322 to the NIH after the time they became aware of the prohibited use. Rather, Rutter

testified that he had an informal telephone conversation with Dr. DeWitt Stetten, NIH deputy

director for science, and that he and Stetten ultimately decided against a formal disclosure of the

incident. Tr. at 12930. In fact, Rutter testified that the conversation between Stetten and himself

“was carried out in a deliberate way to convey the fact, but not to create a need to disclose . . .

[t]o make a formal disclosure . . . There was no formal disclosure.” Tr. at 246. Rutter also

testified that during the conversation, Stetten and Rutter decided that the pBR322 clones would

be destroyed. Id. at 131. This conversation reportedly occurred sometime between March 1619,

1977. Lilly Ex. 3420 at HG 002873.

Furthermore, neither Rutter nor Goodman informed UC’s own biosafety committee of the

misuse of pBR322. Rather, Dr. David Martin, then chairman of UC’s biosafety committee, “heard

rumors” of the incident through a technician in Rutter’s lab sometime in May, 1977. Tr. at 227;

Lilly Ex. 3420 at HG 002874. Martin then discussed the matter with Rutter and Goodman. Id. At

a June 3, 1977, biosafety committee meeting, Martin reported the UC scientists’ use of pBR322.

However, an examination of the minutes of that meeting indicates that the committee was not

informed fully of the events that had occurred. As UC stated in its committee report to the NIH,

[t]he failure of the Biosafety Committee to notify the NIH of the pBR322 incident was primarily a

consequence of the fact that the Committee itself was unaware of the details and import of the

event. On the basis of the information the Committee had at that time, it was not aware that a

violation had occurred. Lilly Ex. 3420 at HG 002874.

Thus, it is obvious that UC representatives did not formally report UC’s researchers’

violation of the guidelines to the NIH, nor did they provide a detailed explanation of the incident

to UC’s biosafety committee at its June 3, 1977, meeting. Events occurring later, however,

brought the incident to the surface.

On September 9, 1977, Nicholas Wade, a Science reporter, called Dr. William Gartland

(Gartland), director of ORDA, asking questions about UC’s alleged use of an uncertified plasmid.

Lilly Ex. 3731 at 000095. Wade stated that he was writing an article about the pBR322 incident

an article that subsequently was published in the September 30, 1977, issue of the publication. Id.

at 83, 87. Gartland apparently first learned of UC’s inappropriate use of the plasmid during

Wade’s telephone call to him. Id. at 83.
H-35

On October 11, 1977, Gartland wrote Dr. James Cleaver, chairman of UC’s biosafety

committee, asking for an accounting of the incident. Lilly Ex. 3731 at 00008889. Cleaver

responded on October 25, 1977, including in his response a memorandum authored by Goodman

and Rutter detailing, as they recollected, the events surrounding the pBR322 incident. Lilly Ex.

3731 at 000090, 000092. In the memorandum, Goodman and Rutter stated that the decision was

made to destroy the pBR322 clones. No date was affixed to this decision. Id. However, in the

biosafety committee’s January 20, 1978, report to the NIH in which the committee answered NIH

questions about UC’s misuse of pBR322 Rutter and Goodman said that Ullrich, the UC scientist

actually working with the plasmid, told them that he disposed of the pBR322 clones on March 19,

1977. Lilly Ex. 3420 at HG 002873.

It is clear from the record that Ullrich did not destroy all the material associated with

pBR322. He saved the purified DNA associated with the use of pBR322 plasmids, and Goodman

and Rutter were aware that he did. In registered letters that Rutter and Goodman testified to

having exchanged during the events in issue, they admitted that they chose to A [k]eep the cloned

DNA since the experiments had already been performed . . . We believed that further sequencing

of the DNA clones was acceptable since the hypothetical danger, if any, is not with the DNA

itself.” Lilly Ex. 3361 at HG 00069192; Lilly Ex. 3363 at WR 1072021; see also tr. at 231234,

11491153. Goodman’s letter to Rutter was sent March 25, 1977; Rutter’s letter to Goodman was

sent March 22, 1977. These “smoking gun” letters could have had no purpose but to keep either

of the writers from attributing the misuse to the other.

At trial, Rutter and Goodman testified that although the letters reflect that they chose to

retain the cloned DNAs, they actually chose a different course of action. They contended that they

destroyed all the cloned DNAs. Tr. at 302, 1111. When asked why he and Goodman did not

amend their letters to reflect a different decision, Rutter responded:

Because acqtually we acted on the advice of DeWitt Stetten and destroyed the clones. It was

unnecessary to adapt this guideline. We had carried out the activities which we had decided,

namely, to destroy the clones for pBR322. Tr. at 302.

We believe the registered letters are reflective of Rutter and Goodman’s contemporaneous

level of concern over the pBR322 incident. We are far from convinced that the two would go so

far as to mail identical registered letters to one another admitting to having taken a course of

action that flew in the face of NIH regulations and, subsequently, upon abandoning that course of

action, permit those letters to stand uncorrected in their respective files. Moreover, the earlier of

these registered letters was dated March 22, 1977. Rutter’s telephone conversation with Stetten

was, at the latest, on March 19, 1977. Thus, the letters were exchanged after Rutter and

Goodman had time to contemplate and decide their course of action and after the time Ullrich

allegedly destroyed the tainted materials. In light of the persuasive nature of the registered letters

and other evidence of record, we find Rutter and Goodman’s trial testimony regarding the letters

not credible.
H-36

In addition, Ullrich’s trial testimony indicates that Goodman and Rutter did not decide to

abandon use of the pBR322 DNA clones after they learned of pBR322’s uncertified status. After

Ullrich’s recollection was refreshed by an examination of one of the registered letters, the

following dialogue transpired:

Q. Does that refresh your recollection that you were, in fact, instructed by Drs. Goodman and

Rutter to continue to work with the DNA even after you learned it was not certified?

A. I wouldn’t use the word “instructed.”

Q. Would you turn to Defendant’s Exhibit

THE COURT: Wait just a minute. What word would you use?

THE WITNESS: It was probably the result of a discussion and an agreement among more than

Drs. Howard Goodman and Rutter.

Tr. at 829.

We find by clear and convincing evidence that UC representatives continued to use at least

the fruits of the uncertified plasmid in sequencing experiments well beyond the time they learned

that such use was inappropriate. The Court believes such use is tantamount to use of the plasmid

itself. Next, we must determine whether UC researchers misrepresented the origins of the rat

insulin data data on which the ‘525 patent is based.

On May 9, 1977, Rutter submitted to the journal Science a manuscript in which UC

researchers described the isolation of four pieces of rat insulin DNA. Lilly Ex. 3391; Lilly Ex.

3380. The pieces of DNA isolated and sequenced were denominated in the Science article as

pAU1, pAU2, pAU3 and pAU4. The researchers stated in their manuscript describing their rat

insulin work that they had used the bacterial plasmid pMB9 in their research efforts. Notably,

pMB9 was not certified for use by the NIH until April 18, 1977.

Lilly contends that although UC researchers asserted that the work leading to the Science

manuscript and, ultimately the ‘525 patent was done with plasmid pMB9, yet actually the work

was done with the uncertified vector pBR322. Lilly argues that the DNA pieces described in the

Science article really are those DNA clones obtained by UC’s unauthorized use of pBR322. An

examination of the evidence and trial testimony leads us to conclude that Lilly’s position is well

supported. We explain.

Ullrich maintained a laboratory notebook regarding his research activities and in that

notebook he described his work with pBR322. See Lilly Ex. 3340. In his notebook, Ullrich

specified which of the DNA clones showed a positive result from a hybridization experiment

involving microorganisms transformed by the uncertified pBR322 plasmids containing rat islet
H-37

cDNA. Id. at HG 000445; tr. at 83437. Ullrich labelled each of the clones for identification

purposes. Tr. at 83537. Significant to this discussion are the clones he labelled 113, 39 and 310.

Reference to these same clone numbers, i.e., 113, 39 and 310, was found on certain pages

contained in a folder designated “INSULIN expt” from Howard Goodman’s files. See Lilly Ex.

3354 at HG 002075. Ullrich admitted that the numbers 113, 39 and 310 “match with the numbers

that we had seen before on the hybridization experiment.” Ullrich further testified that several of

the pages found in this folder contained his handwriting. Tr. at 84041. He also agreed that the

page in this folder entitled “Summary of Insulin Clones” includes a diagram that describes where

the pieces of DNA from pBR322 started and stopped. Tr. at 841.

At trial, Gilbert, in his expert testimony, relied on Ullrich’s lab notes, the insulin

experiment folder from Goodman’s files, and a handwritten manuscript draft describing an

experiment conducted in the plasmid pBR322. See Lilly Ex. 3365. Gilbert compared the sequence

data from the unauthorized pBR322 research work with the sequence data reported in the Science

article and concluded that the pieces of DNA reported in the article were derived from pBR322

research. Tr. at 1308, 131033. He stated that clone pAU1 listed in the Science article contained

the same starting and stopping points as pBR322 clone 113; pAU2, the same as pBR322 clone

39; and pAU3, the same as pBR322 clone 310. Id. Moreover, Gilbert testified that pAU4

identified in the Science article corresponds to other sequence data reported in the pBR322

research. Tr. at 132122.

Gilbert was asked whether a second experiment, conducted in the same way as that with

pBR322, likely would result in the isolation of clones having the same structure. Tr. at 1332.

Gilbert answered that a researcher might isolate another clone having the same structure as that

identified as 39. Tr. at 1333 34. However, he added that the same was not true of clones 113, 310

or that identified as pAU4 in the Science paper. Id. In these fragments, one would have expected

variations in other experiments. Id. Even Ullrich declared it highly unlikely that the sequence

reported in pAU4 would be duplicated by random chance. Tr. at 87374. UC expert Richards

concurred with Ullrich’s observation. Tr. at 206.

The Court finds Gilbert eminently qualified and credible. Significantly, we find that the

evidence supporting his interpretation of the sequence of events is clear and convincing. Hence,

we find that the duplications in the structure of pBR322derived clones and the structure of clones

reported in the Science manuscript and the original ‘525 patent application are not products of

random chance. Rather, we find that UC researchers used data derived from the pBR322

experiments in the aforementioned publications.

The Court also believes that comment on Rutter’s testimony before the Senate

subcommittee in November of 1977 is in order. After comparing the evidence of record against

that testimony, we find that Rutter was not candid with members of the subcommittee. For

example, Rutter testified that the experiments with the uncertified plasmid were not spurred by
H-38

commercial interests. Lilly Ex. 3554A at 219. Rutter also averred that none of the work in the

plasmid had any relationship to Genentech, Inc. (Genentech).

Certain evidence of record counters Rutter’s averments. The evidence indicates that UC

representatives began collaboration discussions with both Genentech and Lilly shortly after

learning that rat insulin DNA had been isolated in the uncertified pBR322. For example, on March

9, 1977 eight days after learning of UC’s misuse of the plasmid and seven days after learning that

an insulin clone actually had been obtained from pBR322 work Goodman contacted Lilly. Lilly

Ex. 3400 at WR 10052. In his notes recording that conversation, Goodman wrote: “Have rat

clone. Q. How? A. Don’t want to say too much now, but can prove it.” Lilly Ex. 3343A.

Goodman met with Lilly personnel on March 14, 1977. Lilly Ex. 3349. In his notes of that

meeting, Goodman wrote that he discussed a plasmid but that when someone asked him what

plasmid, he answered, “Can’t say.” Id. at HG 001462. Additionally, Goodman’s notes reflect that

he told those present that what he wanted in exchange for what he had to offer included “money

for lab” and “consulting.” Id. at HG 001465.

Other evidence indicates that Goodman also approached Genentech during the same time

period. On March 12, 1977, he met with Genentech representatives; Goodman’s handwritten

notes of that meeting indicate that Genentech offered Goodman “money for salaries, supplies,

equipment, shares (common) . . . [and] consulting for me.” Lilly Ex. 3347 at HG 001355. The

record illustrates that Goodman called Genentech representative Ron Swanson at home the

following day. Lilly Ex. 3348 at HG 001357. Goodman’s notes of that telephone conversation

state that Goodman “[h]inted [at] we were bringing something very valuable to the co & should

be compensated for difference in kind between ‘idea’ & ‘having [it].” Id. at HG 001357.

Subsequently, other handwritten notes by Goodman illustrate that on March 15, 1977, he again

called Genentech and reported the following: “Problem that in Boyer plasmid. Lay low. Not

approved. Can’t apply for patent yet.” Lilly Ex. 3351 at HG 001364.

Significantly, although at trial Goodman could not recall when Rutter became involved in

the Genentech negotiations, he did not dispute that Rutter did become involved. In fact, in

Goodman’s deposition of May 18, 1993, he testified that while Rutter was not present at the first

of the Genentech negotiation meetings that he could recollect, Rutter was involved in all

subsequent meetings. Tr. at 123738. Hence, contrary to Rutter’s statements to the Senate

subcommittee, we find that continued use of the fruits of the pBR322 research was driven by

commercial interests and we find that those commercial interests were tied closely to Genentech.

UC asserts that even if the Court determines that the sequence data in issue did stem from

work done in the uncertified plasmid pBR322, Lilly still cannot succeed in its inequitable conduct

charge. Specifically, UC argues that Lilly cannot prove by clear and convincing evidence not only

that UC’s act was material to the prosecution of the ‘525 patent, but also that UC representatives

committed the act with an intent to deceive the PTO examiner.
H-39

In General Electro Music Corp. v. Samick Music Corp., 19 F.3d 1405 [ 30 USPQ2d 1149

] (Fed. Cir. 1994), the patent applicant, Samick, sought expedited examination of its application

because, Samick alleged, the claimed design was being infringed. Id. at 1406. In order to obtain

expedited examination, Samick had to file a “petition to make special.” Id.

At the time Samick filed its petition, the MPEP [Manual of Patent Examining Procedure]

required that an applicant support a petition to make special with an oath or declaration alleging

facts showing, among other things, “that he or she had made or caused to be made a careful and

thorough search of the prior art or has a good knowledge of the pertinent prior art.” Id. (quoting

MPEP Section 708.02, II(5)). In light of this requirement, Samick, through its attorney, submitted

a declaration stating that a prior art search had been conducted.

However, a jury determined that, contrary to Samick’s attorney’s declaration, Samick had

not conducted a prior art search and, thus, that Samick intentionally had made a material false

statement to the PTO. Id. at 1407. The Court entered judgment against Samick based on

inequitable conduct rendering its patent unenforceable. Id. at 1408. The Federal Circuit affirmed.

Id.

We believe the decision in Samick illustrates that the Federal Circuit’s application of the

concept of inequitable conduct is not limited to situations in which the patent applicant

intentionally misleads the PTO in the context of prior art. Rather, inequitable conduct may be

found in a variety of circumstances in which the patent applicant has abandoned his duty of

candor, good faith and honesty to the PTO.

We already have determined that certain of the data found in the ‘525 patent was the

result of an experiment conducted in the uncertified pBR322 plasmid. Moreover, in its

prosecution of the ‘525 patent, UC failed to report its use of that vector to the PTO examiner but

rather reported use of pMB9 for the data in issue. In light of these findings, the Court must

determine whether UC’s misrepresentation to the PTO was material to the patentability of the

‘525 patent.

After considering the facts and the law, we find that there is a substantial likelihood that a

reasonable examiner would have considered UC’s unauthorized use of pBR322 important in his

patentability determination. UC, as an institution that accepted funding from the NIH, was

obligated to follow the guidelines issued by that agency; UC was aware of its obligation. Even

after UC representatives admittedly learned of their premature use of the subject plasmid, they,

nonetheless, continued, at the very least, to use the sequence data they secured from their tainted

research. A reasonable examiner easily could have determined that without use of the

unauthorized plasmid and the data therefrom, UC’s application for the ‘525 patent would not

have acquired its May 27, 1977, file date. Indeed, it is impossible to determine whether UC would

have been the first to make patent application had its representatives followed the rules to which

its competitors were bound.
H-40

The Court also must consider the issue of intent, though the issue need not detain us long.

First, we consider UC’s forbidden use of pBR322 long past its recognition of the uncertified

status of that plasmid. Second, we reiterate our determination that UC representatives

incorporated pBR322 data into the ‘525 patent application an incorporation that was not

accompanied by candor or honesty in UC’s prosecution of the ‘525 patent application.

Considering the admissions contained in the exchange of letters between Rutter and Goodman,

we find no room for doubt that UC’s failure to reveal its unauthorized use of pBR322 was

intentional. Moreover, the Court finds that such intentional failure necessarily was meant to

deceive or mislead the PTO examiner. UC was aware of its violation of the NIH safety guidelines

and apparently was concerned that the PTO would endorse neither its experimental use of

uncertified pBR322 nor its use of the results of that experiment in the ‘525 patent application.

The United States Supreme Court has stated that

. . . a patent is an exception to the general rule against monopolies and to the right

to access to a free and open market. The far-reaching social and economic

consequences of a patent, therefore, give the public a paramount interest in seeing

that patent monopolies spring from backgrounds free from fraud or other

inequitable conduct and that such monopolies are kept within their legitimate

scope.

Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Maintenance Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 816

[ 65 USPQ 133 ] (1945). We are persuaded that endorsement of UC’s conduct by enforcing the

‘525 patent would counter the public’s interest. Hence, we hold that the ‘525 patent is

unenforceable based on UC’s inequitable conduct.

These regulations, however, did not pacify everyone. Public debate in Cambridge,

Massachusetts about the safety of recombinant DNA research led to a determination that such

research was banned from “the City of Cambridge until the citizens of Cambridge and the city

council had convinced themselves that it was safe for the research to continue.” Tr. at 1299. A

citizens committee was appointed to investigate the matter and, in early 1977, the ban was lifted.

Tr. at 12991300.

Rutter and Goodman were coprincipal investigators for the research in issue in the instant

case. Lilly. Ex. 3420 at HG 002873. Rutter was then chairman of the Department of Biochemistry

and Biophysics at the University of California. Tr. at 106; Lilly Ex. 3554A at 200. Goodman was

then a professor in the Department of Biochemistry at the University. Tr. at 1106. During some of

the time in which the subject research was being conducted, Goodman was out of the country on

sabbatical leave. His absence, however, is not relevant to this discussion.

An institutional biohazard committee was established in each institution that received NIH

funding. According to the guidelines, such a committee was responsible for, inter alia, certifying,
H-41

and recertifying annually, to NIH that the facilities, procedures, practices, training, and expertise

of involved personnel had been reviewed and approved. Lilly Ex. 3547 at HG2 580781.

Hearings before qa subcommittee of the United States Senate were held in November of 1977 to

examine the potential need for federal regulation governing all recombinant DNA research,

including research not funded by the NIH. Lilly Ex. 3554A. At the hearings, Rutter testified about

the pBR322 incident. Id. at 20024. Rutter told the subcommittee, inter alia, that the application

for the ‘525 patent was not based on PBR322 research, id. at 21718, and that there were no

commercial interests motivating UC to use the uncertified plasmid. Id. at 219.

The record suggests that Goodman actually became aware of the uncertified status of

pBR322 on March 1, 1977. Lilly Ex. 3400 at WR 10052. Reportedly, on March 4, 1977,

Goodman informed Rutter of the matter. Id.

The way in which ORDA became aware of the pBR322 incident is discussed infra at 7374.

In identical letters Rutter and Goodman exchanged with each other in March of 1977,

discussed infra, they state that on March 5, 1977, Ullrich destroyed the “plasmid containing cells

and kept only the purified DNA from the clones. . . .” Lilly Ex. 3361 at HG 000691; Lilly Ex.

3363 at WR 10720.

Gilbert also relied on Goodman’s notes of a March 14, 1977, meeting with Lilly. Tr. at

131516; Lilly Ex. 3349. At this meeting, Goodman had drawn on the board a plasmid labeled in

the same fashion as one in Goodman’s insulin experiment folder. Lilly Ex. 3349 at HG 001462. In

the experiment folder, the drawing appears under the title, “clone 113.” Lilly Ex. 3354 at HG

002081. The Goodman Lilly meeting was on March 14, 1977. Hence, Gilbert concluded that the

sequence listed in Goodman’s insulin experiment had to exist before that date. Because Rutter

testified that UC experiments with plasmid pCR1 were ineffective, tr. at 137, and because pMB9

was not even certified for use until April 18, 1977, the sequence described in Goodman’s insulin

experiment folder, and later drawn on the board at the Lilly meeting, had to be a pBR322

sequence. Tr. at 1328.

At trial, Lilly introduced certain drafts of research manuscripts found in UC’s files. Lilly

contends that although these manuscripts purport to arise from research conducted with certified

plasmids, yet the data contained therein illustrate that the manuscripts actually were based on

work done with the uncertified vector pBR322.

We agree with Lilly that the record illustrates that the data contained in these manuscripts

originated in pBR322 research work. However, we already have found that the research work

reported in the Science article and, ultimately, in the ‘525 patent, is based, at least in part, on

work done in the uncertified plasmid. Thus, while the common threads in these manuscripts (e.g.,

identical sequencing errors, identical typographical errors) strengthen Lilly’s argument that the
H-42

manuscripts all rely upon pBR322 research work, a detailed explanation of those documents and

their corresponding features is unnecessary for purposes of this decision.

Genentech, a corporation located in California, is involved in other of the six cases

consolidated in this Court for pretrial proceedings by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation.

See, supra at 12.

At trial, Goodman verified that the notes were in his handwriting. Tr. at 1219.

Evidence of record convinces us that Goodman was referring to pBR322 when he named

the “Boyer plasmid.” Ullrich testified that scientists in Herb Boyer’s laboratory developed

pBR322. Tr. at 79798. Moreover, other testimony reveals that the only plasmid with which UC

researchers had achieved success by March of 1977 was the uncertified pBR322. Specifically,

Rutter averred that UC was unsuccessful in its attempts to clone in plasmid pCR1. Tr. at 137.

Furthermore, Rutter stated that UC researchers did not begin using vector pMB9 until after it was

approved by the NIH. Tr. at 136. That approval was not received until April of 1977.

Consequently, Goodman’s midMarch 1977 reference to “Boyer plasmid” must mean pBR322.

It also is interesting to note that by agreement with UC the inventors are entitled to 50

percent of the net profits derived from any royalties or fees received from patent rights.

Lilly contends that UC’s inequitable conduct in procurement of the ‘525 patent should

render the ‘740 patent unenforceable as well. However, we believe UC acted inequitably in the

prosecution of the ‘740 patent itself, as discussed infra. Therefore, we need not consider whether

UC’s conduct associated with the ‘525 patent should hinder its ability to enforce another patent in

suit.

A NOTE ON SOURCES

This paper was written on short notice, over two successive weekends, in order to meet NBAC’s

pressing deadlines. I have relied heavily on others’ accounts of many of the events, and I am

indebted to them. John C. Fletcher (University of Virginia) kindly shared copies of public NIH

files bearing on the Cline case, and Rebecca Lawson (Office of Recombinant DNA Activities, 54

NIH) quickly found and copied files on the UCSF and Harvard recombinant DNA guideline

cases. Laura Bishop of the National Reference Center for Bioethics Literature did several 30, 55

literature searches on very short notice and emailed the results. Susan Poland from the Kennedy

Institute of Ethics at Georgetown University took a late Friday road trip to secure the federal

court documents. These generous gestures were immensely helpful in reconstructing the events. I

have e-mailed and called many of the principals to ask for corrections to or comments on

published accounts and the public record.

With more time, more primary sources could have been reviewed and cited. The accounts

are accurate to the extent required here, I believe, because several scholars and policy analysts
H-43

have worked hard to construct accounts, and those involved in the debates concur that the

accounts are generally accurate. The facts of the UCSF insulin-cloning incident were subject to a

formal federal trial, but some findings remain under appeal. For NBAC’s deliberations about the

merits of moratoria, however, further detail may not be necessary.

The main source for the UCSF cloning story was Stephen Hall’s beautifully written and

lively book Invisible Frontiers: The Race to Synthesize a Human Gene, although some of the 1

facts did not come out until the University of California-Eli Lilly litigation in 1995 (see

appendix— and footnote 31). Letters from William Rutter and his attorney Rachel Krevans of

Morrison & Foerster and from Kirke Hasson (on behalf of Howard Goodman) helped separate the

agreed from the contested facts in the UCSF cloning incidents. The broader history of the

recombinant DNA debate is recounted by Bernard Talbot, Sheldon Krimsky, John Lear, and 20 17 16

Judith Swazey, et al. Many relevant background documents were collected for the Recombinant 19

DNA Technical Bulletin maintained by NIH. James Watson and John Tooze selected many of the

seminal documents for The DNA Story. And finally, Donald Fredrickson has reviewed part of 15

this history in previous articles, and is working on a book. OTA’s 1981 report, Impacts of 18, 56

Applied Genetics, includes an excellent brief history of the recombinant DNA controversy and the

early origins of commercial biotechnology, although, surprisingly, it does not mention the 52

guideline infractions. The first Federal Register guidelines notice also has an expansive and

detailed history of events leading up to them.57

For background on review of gene therapy, several sources were particularly useful.

LeRoy Walters chaired numerous relevant oversight groups for over a decade— the 1984 OTA

workshop panel, the Human Gene Therapy Working Group, the Human Gene Therapy

Subcommittee, and the Recombinant DNA Advisory Committee. He and coauthor Judy Palmer

devoted the better part of a chapter in their recent book to the history of how human gene therapy

has been reviewed at NIH and the Food and Drug Administration, and that is the best place to

start for a chronology. Scope Note 24, by Mary Carrington Coutts, summarizes the salient 41

literature up to 1991. Eve Nichols’s book for the Institute of Medicine and a 1984 OTA report 58

review the process before the first real protocols appeared. And Splicing Life, the report by 59, 60

the President’s Commission, was the first major public policy statement and remains among the

most significant. The recent changes in gene therapy review, with NIH’s RAC only reviewing 39

protocols that raise novel issues are stated in official government notices. No discussion of 3, 61

gene therapy is complete without noting the sober December 1995 report that urged more

attention to scientific foundations and less to hype.62

The best and most detailed account of the Cline case is contained in chapters six and seven

of Larry Thompson’s book Correcting the Code, which was guided by interviews with Cline, his 53

collaborators abroad, the patients and their families, and numerous NIH officials. His account

goes well beyond the NIH case file. The early events in human gene therapy are 36, 37, 54, 63

summarized well by John Fletcher. The human gene therapy account in this paper is partly based 64

on files collected for the 1984 report Human Gene Therapy, but much more detailed accounts 60
H-44

have been published since. A compendious volume on gene therapy was written by Chicago

Tribune reporters Jeff Lyon and Peter Gorner.65

The tortuous history of fetal research and embryo research is reviewed most concisely and

effectively by Constance Pechura, and summarized through early 1994 by the Institute of 66

Medicine. Alta Charo analyzes the results of NIH’s Human Embryo Research Panel, and how 67 13

its findings were rejected by President Clinton. The closely parallel experience of the Human Fetal

Tissue Transplantation Research Panel is reviewed by Childress, and the de facto moratorium on 12

fetal research due to the absence of an Ethics Advisory Board in DHHS is documented by OTA.68

The earlier history of fetal research is summarized well by Dorothy Lehrman in a report for the

Association of American Medical Colleges, and touched on by a 1989 Institute of Medicine 69

report.70

The role of bioethics commissions has generated its own small literature. Michael Yesley

comments on the National Commission from his perspective as its executive director. The 6

President’s Commission was the subject of a symposium a year after it closed its doors, and 71

many articles have been written about it. The most useful recent synthetic literature comes from a

1995 Institute of Medicine report that contains pertinent background papers, including especially

useful ones by Dan Brock and Bradford Gray. Background on federal, state, and international 72 73

bioethics commissions is collected in the 1993 OTA report which contributed directly to the 7

establishment of NBAC. It includes the legislative language creating the National and President’s

Commissions and the Biomedical Ethics Board and Advisory Committee, as well as the 1976 and

1979 EAB charters. The point about the separate functions of public deliberation and consensus

building versus protocol review and guideline preparation are covered in greater detail, as 74, 75

well as difficulties in steering a research program and attempting policy deliberation in the same

group.76

A 1996 report, Understanding Risk, is highly commended for thinking about how to

incorporate risk assessment into public policy.77

The following is a record of direct contacts through May 3, 1997.

Phone or face-to-face conversations:

Charles Weiner, MIT, 25 March

Bernard Talbott, NCRR, 25 March

William Gartland, NIDR, 25 March

Judith Swazey, Acadia Institute, 24 March

LeRoy Walters, 24 March

Rebecca Lawson, ORDA, 25 March

John Fletcher, 21 March

Larry Thompson, 2 April

Stephen Hall, New York Times, 3 April

Walter Gilbert, Harvard University, 3 April
H-45

Amy Hamilton, Eli Lilly & Co., 9 April

[confidential source, Genentech, 3 April]

Letters:

Kirke Hasson, Pillsbury, Madison & Sutro LLP, 29 April

William Rutter, Chiron Corporation, 30 April

Rachel Krevans, Morrison & Foerster, 30 April

E-mail from:

Axel Ullrich, Max Planck Institute for Biochemistry, Martinsried, Germany, 21 March

Donald S. Fredrickson, National Institutes of Health, 21 March

Barbara Culliton, Editor, Nature Medicine, 24 March

Charles Weiner, MIT, 24 March

Larry Thompson, FDA, 25 March

John Fletcher, University of Virginia, 20 March

Laura Bishop, NCRBL (who did literature searches at the National Reference Center for

Bioethics Literature, Georgetown University), 26 March

LeRoy Walters, 7 April

Peter Seeburg, Center of Molecular Biology (ZMBH), University of Heidelberg, 11 April

E-mailed to:

Martin Cline, UCLA, 20 March
H-46

References

1. Hall, S.S., Invisible Frontiers: The Race to Synthesize a Human Gene, New York:

Atlantic Monthly Books, 1987.

2. The Compact Edition of the Oxford English Dictionary, Oxford, UK: Oxford University

Press, 1971.

3. Office of Recombinant DNA Activities, Appendix M: The Points to Consider in the

Design and Submission of Protocols for the Transfer of Recombinant DNA Molecules

into the Genome of One or More Human Subjects, Bethesda, MD: National Institutes of

Health, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 1997.

4. German Embryo Protection Act, Gesetz zum Schutz von Embryonen, October 24, 1990,

Hum Reprod, 6:605-606, 1991.

5. National Commission, Research on the Fetus: Report and Recommendations,

Washington, DC: National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of

Biomedical and Behavioral Research, Department of Health Education and Welfare, 1975.

6. Yesley, M.S. The use of an advisory commission, Southern California Law Review,

51(September):1451-1469, 1978.

7. U.S. Congress, Biomedical Ethics in U.S. Public Policy, Washington, DC: Office of

Technology Assessment, 1993.

8. Ethics Advisory Board, The Request of the Centers for Disease Control for a Limited

Exemption from the Freedom of Information Act, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of

Health and Human Services, 1980.

9. Ethics Advisory Board, Report and Conclusions: HEW Support of Research Involving

Human In Vitro Fertilization and Embryo Transfer, Washington, DC: U.S. Department

of Health, Education and Welfare, 1979.

10. Ethics Advisory Board, Report and Recommendations: Research Involving Fetoscopy,

Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, 1979.

11. Ethics Advisory Board, The Request of the National Institutes of Health for a Limited

Exemption from the Freedom of Information Act, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of

Health and Human Services, 1980.
H-47

12. Childress, J.F., Deliberations of the Human Fetal Tissue Transplantation Research Panel,

in Biomedical Politics, K.E. Hanna (ed.), Washington, DC: National Academy Press,

1991, 215-240.

13. Charo, R.A., The hunting of the snark: The moral status of embryos, right-to-lifers, and

third world women, Stanford Review of Law and Policy, 6(2):11-37, 1996.

14. U.S. Congress. This language appears in HR 2127, appropriations for FY1996, section

510, and HR 3755, section 512, appropriations for FY 1997. They govern appropriations

under Public Law 104-91, as noted in HR 2880, section 128, 1996.

15. Watson, J.D., J. Tooze, The DNA Story, San Francisco: W.H. Freeman, 1981.

16. Lear, J., Recombinant DNA: The Untold Story, New York: Crown, 1978.

17. Krimsky, S., Genetic Alchemy: The Social History of the Recombinant DNA Controversy,

Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1982.

18. Fredrickson, D.F., Asilomar and recombinant DNA: The end of the beginning, in

Biomedical Politics, K.E. Hanna (ed.), Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1991,

258-292.

19. Swazey, J.P., J.R. Sorenson, C.B. Wong, Risks and benefits, rights and responsibilities: A

history of the recombinant DNA research controversy, Southern California Law Review,

51(September):1019-1078, 1978.

20. Talbot, B., Introduction to recombinant DNA research, development and evolution of

NIH Guidelines, and proposed legislation, University of Toledo Law Review,

12(Summer):804-814, 1981.

21. Singer, M., D. Soll, Guidelines for hybrid DNA molecules, Science, 181(September

21):1114, 1973.

22. Berg, P., D. Baltimore, H.W. Boyer, et al., Potential biohazards of recombinant DNA

molecules, Proc Nat Acad Sci U S A, 71(July):2593-2594, 1974.

23. Berg, P., D. Baltimore, H.W. Boyer, et al., Potential biohazards of recombinant DNA

molecules, Science, 185(July 26):3034, 1974.

24. Berg, P., D. Baltimore, S. Brenner, R.O. Roblin, M. Singer, Summary statement of the

asilomar conference on recombinant DNA molecules, Proc Nat Acad Sci U S A,

72(June):1981-1984, 1975.
H-48

25. Berg, P., D. Baltimore, S. Brenner, R.O. Roblin, M. Singer, Summary statement of the

Asilomar Conference on Recombinant DNA Molecules, Science, 72(June 6):991, 1975.

26. Stetten, D., Letter to David Martin of University of California, San Francisco, Deputy

Director, NIH, 1977.

27. Goodman, H.M., W.J. Rutter, Memo to Dr. James Cleaver, chairman, Biosafety

Committee, University of California, San Francisco, Department of Biochemistry and

Biophysics, UCSF, 1977.

28. Cleaver, J.E., Letter to William J. Gartland, Director, Office of Recombinant DNA

Activities, NIH, and committee report in response to NIH questions communicated by Dr.

W.J. Gartland to Dr. J.E. Cleaver on December 1, 1977, Chair, Biosafety Committee,

University of California, San Francisco, 1978.

29. Wade, N., Recombinant DNA: NIH rules broken in insulin gene project, Science,

197(September 30):1342-1345, 1977.

30. Office of Recombinant DNA Activities, Case file on William Rutter, University of

California, San Francisco. National Institutes of Health, 1978.

31. University of California v. Eli Lilly and Co., MDL Docket No. 912, No IP-92-0224-CD/G, decided December 11, 1995, U.S. Patent Quarterly, 39 USPQ2d(July):1225-1258,

1976, esp. 1248-1254. (“The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit rendered its

decision in this case on July 22, 1997. Please refer to Docket 96-1175 for the decision.”)

32. Thomas, C.A., The fanciful future of gene transfer experiments: Genetic interaction and

gene transfer, Brookhaven, NY: Brookhaven Symposia in Biology, No. 29, 1977,

348-358.

33. Thomas, C.A., Letter to Dorothea S. Miller, Grants Administrator, NIH, 1977.

34. Dach, L., Letter and Freedom of Information Act request, Environmental Defense Fund,

1977.

35. Minutes of meeting, Executive Recombinant DNA Committee, NIH, 1978.

36. Talbot, B., Memorandum for the record on Background and Committee

Recommendations regarding the Report of NIH Ad Hoc Committee on the UCLA Report

Concerning Certain Research Activities of Dr. Martin J. Cline, Executive Secretary, NIH

Ad Hoc Committee of the UCLA Report Concerning Certain Research Activities of Dr.

Martin J. Cline, 1981.
H-49

37. Fredrickson, D.S., Statement of the Director, NIH, Accompanying the Release of the

Report Concerning Martin J. Cline, M.D., Office of the Director, NIH, 1981.

38. Randall, C., B. Mandelbaum, T. Kelly, Letter to President Jimmy Carter from General

Secretaries of the National Council of Churches, the Synagogue Council of America, and

the United States Catholic Conference, reprinted in the President’s Commission report,

Splicing Life, 1980, 95-96.

39. Splicing Life: The Social and Ethical Issues of Genetic Engineering with Human Beings,

Washington, DC: President’s Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine

and Biomedical and Behavioral Research, 1982.

40. Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight, Committee on Science and Technology,

U.S. House of Representatives, Human Genetic Engineering, Washington, DC, 1982.

41. Walters, L., J.G. Palmer. The Ethics of Human Gene Therapy, New York: Oxford

University Press, 1997.

42. Anonymous, Human gene marker/therapy clinical protocols, Hum Gene Therapy, 8(March

20):629-654, 1997.

43. Kessler, D.A., Regulation of somatic-cell therapy and gene therapy by the Food and Drug

Administration, N Engl J Med, 329(October 14):1169-1173, 1993.

44. Council of Europe, Recommendation 934 (1982) on Genetic Engineering, Strasbourg,

Germany: Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, 1982.

45. Council for International Organizations of Medical Sciences, The Declaration of Inuyama

and Reports of the Working Groups, Hum Gene Therapy, 2(Summer):123-129, 1991.

46. Bankowski, Z., A.M. Capron (eds.), Genetics, Ethics, and Human Values: Human

Genome Mapping, Genetic Screening, and Gene Therapy, Proceedings of the XXIV

CIOMS Conference, Tokyo and Inuyama City, Geneva: Council for International

Organizations of Medical Sciences, 1990.

47. Capecchi, M.R., Appendix E: Background information on homologous recombination, in

L. Walters, J.G. Palmer (eds.), The Ethics of Human Gene Therapy, New York: Oxford

University Press, 1997, 186-196.

48. Rubinstein, D.S., D.C. Thomasma, E.A. Schon, M.J. Zinaman, Germ-line therapy to cure

mitochondrial disease: Protocol and ethics of in vitro ovum nuclear transplantation, Camb

Q Healthc Ethics, 4:316-339, 1995.
H-50

49. Macklin, R., Universality of the Nuremberg Code, in The Nazi Doctors and the

Nuremberg Code, G.J. Annas, M.A. Grodin (eds.), New York: Oxford University Press,

1992, 240-257.

50. Falkow, S., J.H. Grosa. Letter to A.E. Adelberg, Department of Human Genetics, Yale

University, University of Washington, 1977.

51. Ullrich, A., J. Shine, J. Chirgwin, et al. Rat insulin genes: Construction of plasmids

containing the coding sequences, Science, 196(June 17):1313-1319, 1977.

52. Office of Technology Assessment, U.S. Congress, Impacts of Applied Genetics:

Micro-Organisms, Plants, and Animals, Washington, DC: 1981.

53. Thompson, L., Correcting the Code: Inventing the Genetic Cure for the Human Body,

New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994.

54. Office of Recombinant DNA Activities, Risks OoPfR, Case file on Martin Cline, National

Institutes of Health, 1981.

55. Office of Recombinant DNA Activities, Case file on Charles Thomas, Harvard University,

National Institutes of Health, 1978.

56. Fredrickson, D.S., A history of the recombinant DNA guidelines in the United States,

Recomb DNA Tech Bull, 2(July):87-90, 1979.

57. Fredrickson, D.S., Part II: Department of Health, Education and Welfare, National

Institutes of Health, Recombinant DNA Guidelines, Fed Regist, 41(July 7):27902-27943,

1976.

58. Coutts, M.C., Scope Note 24: Human Gene Therapy, Washington, DC: National

Reference Center for Bioethics Literature, Georgetown University, 1991.

59. Nichols, E.K., Human Gene Therapy, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988.

60. Office of Technology Assessment, U.S. Congress, Human Gene Therapy— Background

Paper, Washington, DC:1984.

61. Office of Recombinant DNA Activities, Notice of Proposed Actions Under the NIH

Guidelines for Research Involving Recombinant DNA Molecules, Bethesda, MD:

National Institutes of Health, 1997.

62. Orkin, S.H., A.G. Motulsky. Report and Recommendations of the Panel to Assess the

NIH Investment in Research on Gene Therapy, Bethesda, MD: National Institutes of

Health, 1995.
H-51

63. Krause, R.M., B. Talbot, Report of the NIH Ad Hoc Committee on the UCLA Report,

1981. (Chairman, NIH Ad Hoc Committee on the UCLA Report (RMK) and Executive

Secretary (BT). Other committee members: Susan Gottesman, Harry Keiser, Mortimer

Lipsett, Charles McCarthy, and Richard, Riseberg (Counsel).)

64. Fletcher, J.C.,.Moral problems and ethical issues in prospective human gene therapy,

Virginia Law Review, 69:515-546, 1983.

65. Lyon, J., P. Gorner, Altered Fates: Gene Therapy and the Retooling of Human Life, New

York: W.W. Norton, 1995.

66. Pechura, C.M., Fetal and embryo research: A changing scientific, political, and ethical

landscape, in The Ethics of Research Involving Human Subjects, H.Y. Vanderpool (ed.),

Frederick, MD: University Publishing Group, 1997, 371-400.

67. Institute of Medicine, Fetal Research and Applications: A Conference Summary,

Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1994.

68. Office of Technology Assessment, U.S. Congress, Infertility: Medical and Social

Choices, Washington, DC:1988.

69. Lehrman, D., Summary: Fetal Research and Fetal Tissue Research, Washington, DC:

Association of American Medical Colleges, 1988.

70. Institute of Medicine, Medically Assisted Conception: An Agenda for Research,

Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1989.

71. Weisbard, A.J., J.D. Arras, J. Katz, et al., Symposium: Commissioning morality: A

critique of the President’s Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and

Biomedical and Behavioral Research, Cardozo Law Review, 6(Winter):223-355, 1984.

(This is a collection of several different articles by these authors.)

72. Brock, D.W., Public moral discourse, in Society’s Choices: Social and Ethical Decision

Making in Biomedicine, R.E. Bulger, E.M. Bobby, H.V. Fineberg (eds.), Washington,

DC: National Academy Press, 1995, 215-240.

73. Gray, B.H., Bioethics commissions: What can we learn from past successes and failures?,

in Society’s Choices: Social and Ethical Decision Making in Biomedicine, R.E. Bulger,

E.M. Bobby, H.V. Fineberg (eds.), Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1994,

261-306.

74. Hanna, K.E., R.M. Cook-Deegan, R.Y. Nishimi. Finding a forum for bioethics in U.S.

public policy, Politics and the Life Sciences, 12(August):205-219, 1993.
H-52

75. Hanna, K., R.M. Cook-Deegan, R.Y. Nishimi, Bioethics and public policy: Still seeking a

forum, Politics and the Life Sciences, 13(February):102-105, 1994.

76. Hanna, K.E., The ethical, legal, and social implications program of the national center for

human genome research: A missed opportunity?, in Society’s Choices: Social and Ethical

Decision Making in Biomedicine, R.E. Bulger, E.M. Bobby, H.V. Fineberg (eds.),

Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1995, 432-457.

77. National Research Council, Understanding Risk: Informing Decisions in a Democratic

Society, Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1996.