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i 

65–111 2011

[H.A.S.C. No. 112–11] 

HEARING 

ON

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT 

FOR FISCAL YEAR 2012 

AND

OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED 

PROGRAMS 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

FULL COMMITTEE HEARING 

ON

BUDGET REQUEST FROM THE 

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY 

HEARING HELD 

MARCH 2, 2011 
(II) 

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, California, Chairman 

ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland 

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas 

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina 

W. TODD AKIN, Missouri 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

JEFF MILLER, Florida 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio 

JOHN KLINE, Minnesota 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

ROB WITTMAN, Virginia 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

JOHN C. FLEMING, M.D., Louisiana 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado 

TOM ROONEY, Florida 

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania 

SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia 

CHRIS GIBSON, New York 

VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri 

JOE HECK, Nevada 

BOBBY SCHILLING, Illinois 

JON RUNYAN, New Jersey 

AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia 

TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas 

STEVEN PALAZZO, Mississippi 

ALLEN B. WEST, Florida 

MARTHA ROBY, Alabama 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

TODD YOUNG, Indiana 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

SILVESTRE REYES, Texas 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina 

ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania 

ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey 

SUSAN A. DAVIS, California 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

DAVE LOEBSACK, Iowa 

GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona 

NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts 

CHELLIE PINGREE, Maine 

LARRY KISSELL, North Carolina 

MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico 

BILL OWENS, New York 

JOHN R. GARAMENDI, California 

MARK S. CRITZ, Pennsylvania 

TIM RYAN, Ohio 

C.A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland 

HANK JOHNSON, Georgia 

KATHY CASTOR, Florida 

BETTY SUTTON, Ohio 

COLLEEN HANABUSA, Hawaii 

ROBERT L. SIMMONS II, Staff Director 

JOHN WASON, Professional Staff Member 

DOUG BUSH, Professional Staff Member 

MEGAN HOWARD, Staff Assistant 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2011 

Page 

HEARING: 

Wednesday, March 2, 2011, Fiscal Year 2012 National Defense Authorization 

Budget Request from the Department of the Army .......................................... 1 

APPENDIX: 

Wednesday, March 2, 2011 ..................................................................................... 47 

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 2, 2011 

FISCAL YEAR 2012 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BUDGET 

REQUEST FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck,’’ a Representative from California, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services .................................................................. 1 

Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Ranking Member, 

Committee on Armed Services ............................................................................ 3 

WITNESSES 

Casey, GEN George W., Jr., USA, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army .............................. 9 

McHugh, Hon. John, Secretary of the Army ......................................................... 5 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

McHugh, Hon. John, joint with GEN George W. Casey, Jr. ......................... 55 

McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck’’ .................................................................... 51 

Smith, Hon. Adam ............................................................................................ 53 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

Mr. Smith .......................................................................................................... 117 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Akin ............................................................................................................ 124 

Mr. Bartlett ....................................................................................................... 122 

Mr. Brooks ......................................................................................................... 137 

Mr. Coffman ...................................................................................................... 131 

Mr. Conaway ..................................................................................................... 130 

Mrs. Hartzler .................................................................................................... 133 

Mr. Loebsack ..................................................................................................... 123 

Mr. McKeon ....................................................................................................... 121 

Mr. Owens ......................................................................................................... 124 

Mr. Rigell .......................................................................................................... 133 

Mrs. Roby .......................................................................................................... 137 

Mr. Runyan ....................................................................................................... 134 
Page

IV 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING—Continued 

Mr. Ruppersberger ........................................................................................... 126 

Mr. Shuster ....................................................................................................... 129 

Mr. Smith .......................................................................................................... 122 

Mr. Turner ........................................................................................................ 127 

Mr. West ............................................................................................................ 136 

Mr. Wilson ......................................................................................................... 125 
(1) 

FISCAL YEAR 2012 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BUDGET REQUEST FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF 

THE ARMY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC, Wednesday, March 2, 2011. 

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:04 a.m. in room 2118, 

Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck’’ McKeon 

(chairman of the committee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, 

A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

The CHAIRMAN. Committee come to order. Good morning. Thank 

you for joining us as we consider the fiscal year 2012 budget request for the Department of the Army. Secretary McHugh, General 

Casey, thank you both for being here. As I have said before, we are 

very fortunate to have both of you serving our country. 

Secretary McHugh, once again you find yourself in the hot seat. 

Nine-term member of Congress and this committee’s former ranking member. I am sure glad you moved over there. General Casey 

said, ‘‘Me too.’’ So that is—— 

Secretary MCHUGH. Mr. McKeon, not more than I. 

The CHAIRMAN. I don’t know—oh. 

Secretary MCHUGH. I guess I should say I am glad as well. So 

it is all worked out fine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Without a doubt, whether a member of this committee or as the 21st Secretary of the Army, you are a staunch advocate for soldiers and their families. We on the Armed Services 

Committee are very proud of you and of your achievements and the 

things that you are doing there and we thank you for your public 

service. 

General Casey, you are also no stranger to this committee. I 

want to take a moment to mention that this will be your last Army 

posture hearing. Thirtieth vice chief of staff, commander multinational force Iraq, 36th chief of staff, over 40 years of selfless military service to this Nation. Pretty good for a guy that wasn’t going 

to go into the Service. 

I know you still have much that you want to accomplish in your 

time as Army chief of staff, but I thank you and your wife, Sheila, 

for your service to our country, for the leadership that you have 

provided for our Army and for all of the soldiers that have served 

under you during those 40 years and the ones that you served 

under. Great tradition. Thank you very much. 

General CASEY. Thank you, Chairman. 
2 

The CHAIRMAN. I would like to mention that the ranking member 

and I recently had the pleasure to visit with soldiers at Fort Lewis 

in Mr. Smith’s District and the National Training Center in my 

district along with several members of our committee. While at the 

NTC [National Training Center], we were able to observe the 3rd 

Brigade, 25th Infantry Division as they trained for their upcoming 

deployment to Afghanistan. 

I want to mention that one of the things that I have been very 

concerned about is IEDs [Improvised Explosive Devices] and I 

thought we just weren’t doing enough no matter what we are 

doing, but I was very impressed both there and at Fort Lewis 

where we observed the 3rd and 4th Stryker Brigade Combat Teams 

for the 2nd Infantry Division. Excellent training they were getting 

to prepare them for IEDs and the things that are being done to 

interdict the—get rid of the financier or get rid of the builder or 

all the things that are being done by other—the Marines, also. 

We went to the Mountain Warfare Center in the Sierras and saw 

them and it was a great visit, but the soldiers that we saw training 

were getting excellent training and I am sure it will save lives as 

they arrive in Afghanistan. It is on trips like these and similar 

trips to Iraq and Afghanistan that we are reminded why hearings 

such as this one are so important because you just don’t go to war 

with the Army you have. You go to war with an Army who was 

resourced, hopefully properly, with personnel and equipment provided by the United States Congress, by the United States people. 

As our former chairman, the great Ike Skelton used to say, ‘‘The 

buck stops here,’’ and I am sure he wasn’t talking about me. To 

that end, I remain concerned about the reduction of an additional 

$78 billion from the Department’s funding top line including the 

$13 billion cut in 2012 ultimately leading to a zero-percent real 

growth within 3 years. The Army’s share of the Department’s efficiency savings is $29 billion including $2.7 billion in the 2012 budget request. 

We are told that the Army has been allowed to reinvest all of the 

$2.7 billion. However, when you compare the Army’s base budget 

and the supplemental budget request from 2011 to 2012, this budget request is almost $30 billion less. 

I understand that the primary reason for the reduction is based 

on the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq by this year by the end 

of December. Clearly, there was a need to move overseas contingency operations funding into the base budget, but we need assurances that the Army was able to migrate everything they needed 

from the supplemental into the base, particularly as it relates to 

taking care of soldiers and the reset of equipment. 

Likewise, as Congress must learn more about the proposed end 

strength reductions for the Army, the Army has borne the brunt 

of two wars for the past decade and hasn’t reached its objectives 

for Active Component dwell time of one-to-three. In fact, the proposed end strength reductions appear to force the Army to settle 

for only a one-to-two dwell time. I would like to know why. 

In short, I cannot in good conscience ask the Army to do more 

with less. Again, I thank both of you for your service to our country 

and for being here today. Ranking Member Smith. 
3 

[The prepared statement of Mr. McKeon can be found in the Appendix on page 51.] 

STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM 

WASHINGTON, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED 

SERVICES 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I too want to echo your 

comments in support of—and thanks for—our two men testifying 

today. Secretary McHugh, it is a great honor serving with you on 

this committee for a long time. It is great to have you over there. 

You certainly understand this committee and you understand the 

Pentagon as well. You are in the perfect position. You have been 

great to work with as Secretary of the Army and as a member of 

the committee, and it is a real asset for our country to have you 

there. It is great to see you back here today. 

And General Casey, congratulations on a great, great term of 

service to your country. It has been great working with you. I know 

you will miss these hearings more than anything, but we appreciate your hard work on behalf of the Army and yes, I say that facetiously, but appreciate the work you do in presenting this. And 

it has been a great relationship, I believe, between this committee 

and yourself. You have always done a great job of reaching out to 

individual members, making sure that we are informed and, you 

know, giving us a chance to understand the issues that are so important. 

So you will be missed and we appreciate your great service to 

your country. And also as I said, your work with this committee 

specifically has been outstanding and I have appreciated it as I 

know other members have as well. And as we go forward into this 

posture hearing, there are a lot of transitions coming. As the chairman mentioned, there is talk about what the future of force structure should be as drawdowns continue in Iraq and hopefully at 

some point begin to happen in Afghanistan. 

What does that mean for the Army? But I want to assure you 

and all those listening to this committee—focusing on the fact that 

your Army is in the fight and protecting those who are in the fight 

is our top priority. We still have, you know, 50,000 troops overall 

in Iraq and in Afghanistan we still have 100,000 and they are, in 

many cases, in the midst of a very, very difficult fight and this 

committee’s top priority is to make sure that they are equipped and 

have the support that they need to prosecute that fight to the best 

of their ability. 

Now, the chairman mentioned what is, you know, our top priority and that is IEDs. That still causes the most casualties over 

there and I do want to also compliment both of you for the work 

you have done, you know? Every Army base that I have been to, 

you know, they take you to the IED training and they are everyday 

learning directly from what is happening over there taking it back, 

training the soldiers so that they will be best prepared when they 

get over there to deal with that threat. It is a constantly evolving 

threat, but you are evolving with it in a way that has unquestionably saved lives of our soldiers. 

And we appreciate that work and this committee—well, again, 

anything we can do to help in that area we want to do. We know 
4 

how important it is. And then the major challenge going forward 

is the transition as we get back, as we begin to draw down. What 

does that mean for the size of the force? I think the chairman asks 

the appropriate questions. What is the mission set that is going to 

be asked of our soldiers and is the force the proper size to meet 

that? How do we get back into a more regular training mission for 

all the threats that come at us instead of just sort of responding 

as quickly as we have to the immediate threats? 

Now, what should that look like? It is not easy to tell. How do 

we get the dwell times back up so we can deal with some of the 

stress on the force that I know, General Casey, you have talked 

about a great deal. Those are questions we need to answer and we 

look forward to hearing from you today on how we should go about 

meeting those threats. 

In particular, we are also focused on PTSD [Post Traumatic 

Stress Disorder] and traumatic brain injury, some of the things 

that have more long-term impacts. How are we preparing to do 

that? And I will say that when I was down at Fort Hood a few 

weeks ago, I was very impressed with the overall preparation for 

how you deal with the stresses and strains on the force. I think you 

are making a great deal of progress on that and we look forward 

to being as supportive as we possibly can. 

And lastly is the modernization of the force. I know we had some 

significant struggles with the future combat systems which I believe we are pulling our way out of and I thank both of you for your 

leadership on that. We do need to update, modernize and better 

equip our infantry brigades. Now, the core of that is the network. 

How do we make sure that the soldiers get the information when 

they need it? How can we give them total situational awareness? 

You have to have the proper network to do that. I think we have 

learned a lot of hard lessons in the acquisition process about how 

to do that better, how to acquire equipment in the future, hopefully 

in a more cost-effective manner that gets there more quickly. 

But I believe we are making progress on that. I thank both of 

you. I also thank General Crowley, whom I have worked with very 

closely on some of these issues, for making that progress. 

I look forward to continuing to support that effort because unquestionably, you know, information warfare places a great deal 

more challenges on all of our services, but on the Army in particular to make sure they have the best equipment when they need 

it. You can’t go through a 2-year—the normal acquisition process 

in some cases to make sure you have that equipment because by 

the time you get to the end of it, it is already 2 or 3 years out of 

date. 

So we have learned some good lessons there. I think we are making progress. And again, I look forward to working with you and 

this committee as always stands ready to support you in any way 

that we can. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the Appendix on page 53.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. The Honorable John McHugh, Secretary of the Army, and General George W. Casey, Chief of Staff 

of the U.S. Army. Mr. Secretary. 
5 

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN MCHUGH, SECRETARY OF THE 

ARMY 

Secretary MCHUGH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Smith, and distinguished members of—from a somewhat prejudiced view what I believe is certainly the leading committee in the United States House of Representatives. It is great 

to be back here, although I enjoyed the view sitting up there looking down here better. It is terrific to see so many not old, but longstanding friends and colleagues and to see so many new members 

here who have stepped forward to serve on this great committee, 

and I commend them for that action and look forward to working 

with them as well. 

I should note—on a sad comment. It pains all of us. I know that 

Congresswoman Gabby Giffords is not with us here today. I have 

to tell you from my experience working with her, she was one of 

the most determined and capable legislators in the House, but really a tireless champion for the men and women who wore the uniform of this Nation. 

And, in fact, she was one of the first members of Congress to call 

me after I had been confirmed into this post and she offered her 

congratulations, but she just happened to take the opportunity to 

talk about the great men and women of Fort Huachuca, which is 

in her district, of course. 

And I remember thinking very clearly that that is Gabby, always 

taking the opportunity to look out for soldiers and their families 

and certainly everyone in the Army family joins me in wishing her 

a speedy recovery and we look forward to seeing her back in her 

rightful place on this distinguished committee. And our thoughts 

and prayers go out as well to those innocent victims of that tragic 

day, and may they quickly find peace and comfort in the days 

ahead. 

If I may, Mr. Chairman, I would like to join with you in recognizing this great soldier on my left. As you mentioned, this is the 

last time—at least he hopes it is the last time that he will appear 

before this committee as the chief of staff of our great Army. It is 

a career that has spanned four distinguished decades and he has 

held numerous positions at every level, but one thing has remained 

constant through all of those positions. He has done the right thing 

for our soldiers and their families and he has had a tireless determination to serve our Nation. 

And I can tell you that over the last nearly 18 months, George 

and I have not only operated as partners, but I think we have become close friends in spite of the fact that he is a Boston Red Sox 

fan. So I do look forward to working with another exceptional leader, the presidential nominee, General Marty Dempsey, should the 

Senate so concur, but the Army, this Nation, and I will truly miss 

George and Sheila. They are great Americans. 

I want to thank—— 

General CASEY. I thought you were going to propose. I get constructive credit for the hearing. 

Secretary MCHUGH. No, I wasn’t, but nice try. I want to thank 

each of you for your steadfast support of our 1.1 million soldiers, 

279,000 civilians and their families. With the leadership and great 

support of this Congress and particularly this committee, America’s 
6 

Army continues to be at the forefront of combat counterinsurgency, 

counterterrorism and security assistance operations in nearly 80 

countries around the world. 

In Iraq, our soldiers and civilians began one of the largest and 

most complex logistical operations in our Nation’s history. As we 

continue to draw down our forces to meet the December 31, 2011, 

deadline, we have already closed or transferred over 80 percent of 

the bases that we maintained to the Iraqi authorities. We have reduced the number of U.S. personnel by over 75,000 and we have 

redeployed some 26,000 vehicles back to other operations. 

Having recently visited Iraq for my 16th time just last January, 

I can validate firsthand the true enormity of the retrograde operations and the exceptionally high morale of the forces remaining as 

they continue to advise, assist, and train Iraqis to support that 

still-burgeoning democracy. 

Simultaneous with the drawdown operations, the Army has 

surged an additional 30,000 soldiers to Afghanistan to defeat the 

Al Qaeda terrorist network and the Taliban insurgency. This surge 

enabled our soldiers and our Afghan partners to seize multiple 

sanctuaries in the traditional insurgent heartland of Southern Afghanistan. 

Additionally, during this past year, our forces have trained some 

109,000 Afghan National Army soldiers as well as 41,000 Afghan 

National Police, yet overseas contingency operations are only one 

part of the Army’s diverse requirements. Our soldiers and civilians 

from all Army Components remain committed to protecting our 

homeland not only from the threat of enemies who would harm us, 

but also from the ravages of natural and manmade disasters. 

From National Guard soldiers assisting with drug enforcement 

and border security to the Army Corps of Engineers responding to 

the catastrophic oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico, America’s Army has 

been there to support local, State and Federal partners in saving, 

protecting and caring for our citizens. 

Clearly, over the last year America’s Army has seen extraordinary success in one of the most dynamic, dangerous and complex 

operational environments in our Nation’s history, and yet our challenges have not been reserved solely for combat or the protection 

of disaster relief. 

For just as our soldiers and civilians conducted multiple operations here and around the world, the Army simultaneously continued its far-reaching efforts to modernize equipment, transform 

units and complete the unprecedented consolidations required 

under the round of base closure and realignment. 

As the Army continues to fight global terrorists and regional insurgents, we must be ever mindful of the future and future enemies such as—threats and hostile state actors that we may well 

face. It is vital, therefore, that we have a modernization program, 

one that provides our soldiers with a full array of equipment necessary to maintain a decisive advantage over the enemies we are 

fighting today and to also ensure that we can deter and defeat tomorrow’s threats at a price that we can afford. 

Our fiscal year 2012 budget request is critical to achieving this 

goal by supporting the extraordinary strides being made in the 

Army state-of-the-art network tactical wheel vehicle and combat 
7 

vehicle modernization programs. Regarding the network, we are requesting $974 million in procurement and $298 million in research 

and development for the Warfighter Information Network–Tactical, 

WIN–T, which will become the cornerstone of our battlefield communication systems as the distinguished ranking member had 

mentioned. 

This budget request also contains $2.1 billion in procurement for 

joint and combat communication systems including the Joint Tactical Radio System better known as JTRS. As we look to modernize 

our wheeled and combat vehicle fleets, we are asking for $1.5 billion for Tactical Wheeled Vehicle modernization and $1.04 billion 

in support of the Army’s combat vehicle modernization strategy including $884 million for the Ground Combat Vehicle and $156 million for the modernization of the Stryker, Bradley and Abrams programs. 

Along with advances and equipment, the Army is seeking new 

methods to use and secure our scarce energy resources. Clearly, future operations will depend on our ability to reduce dependency, increase efficiency and use more renewable or alternative sources of 

energy. We have made great strides in this area and we intend to 

do more. 

The Army has established a senior energy council, appointed a 

senior energy executive, created an energy security office and 

adopted a comprehensive strategy for energy security. Based on 

this strategy, we are developing more efficient generators and 

power distribution platforms factoring in fuel cost as a part of 

equipment modernizations in developing a net-zero approach to holistically address our installation’s energy, water and waste needs. 

In May 2010, the chief and I commissioned an unprecedented 

blue ribbon panel review of the Army’s acquisition systems from 

cradle to grave. We are currently reviewing the panel’s insightful 

report and we will use it as a guide over the next 2 years to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the Army acquisition process, but we didn’t stop there. 

To ensure that we purchased the right equipment to meet the 

needs of our soldiers, we instituted a series of capability portfolio 

reviews to examine all existing Army requirements and terminate 

programs that we judged to be redundant, didn’t work or which are 

just too expensive. 

These broad-based reviews have already helped us to identify key 

gaps and unnecessary redundancies while promoting good stewardship of our Nation’s resources. We remain committed to using every 

effort to obtain the right systems, supplies and services at the right 

time and at the most cost-effective streamlined manner. Our soldiers and the taxpayers deserve no less. We look forward to working closely with this committee as we continue to implement these 

sweeping challenges. 

Throughout it all, at its heart, the Army is people. Although our 

soldiers and civilians are better trained, led and equipped and 

more capable than ever before, our forces are clearly stretched and 

our personnel are strained from a decade of war. This is evidenced 

by yet another year of discouraging rates of suicide and high-risk 

behavior, not only among members of the regular Army, but the 

Reserve Components as well. 
8 

In response and in the direct supervision of our Vice Chief of 

Staff, General Pete Chiarelli, the Army completed an unprecedented 15-month study to better understand suicide and related actions amongst our soldiers. In July, we published the first-ever 

health-promotion, risk-reduction, and suicide-prevention report. 

Very, very candid assessment designed to assist our leaders in recognizing and reducing high-risk behavior as well as the stigma associated with behavioral health care. 

The lessons from this holistic review have been infused into 

every level of command and incorporated throughout our efforts to 

strengthen the resiliency of our soldiers’ families and civilians. 

Moreover, our fiscal year 2012 budget requests $1.7 billion to 

fund vital soldier and family programs to provide the full range of 

essential services to include Army campaigns for health promotion, 

risk reduction and suicide prevention, sexual harassment and assault response and prevention, and comprehensive soldier fitness. 

In addition, this funding supports family services including morale welfare and recreation programs, the youth services and 

childcare. Survivor outreach services and education and employment opportunities for family members are funded in this manner 

as well. Caring for our personnel and their families goes beyond 

mental, physical and emotional health. We are also committed to 

protecting their safety both at home and abroad from internal and 

external threats. 

As part of our continuing efforts to learn and adopt and adapt 

from the Fort Hood shooting, the Army has instituted a number of 

key programs to enhance awareness reporting prevention and response to such threats. Finally, I would be remiss if I didn’t mention the devastating impact of the continuing resolution on each of 

the programs that I have mentioned as well as dozens of others. 

From modernization to MILCON [Military Construction] to family services and base operation support, the lack of a fiscal year 

2011 budget is adversely affecting critical needs and projects that 

support our soldiers and their families, not to mention delaying 

long-term requirements of the Department writ large. 

Let me close by mentioning my deep appreciation and admiration 

for all those who wear the Army uniform as well as the great civilians who work day in and day out to support them. Daily, I am 

reminded that these heroes make enormous sacrifices in defense of 

the Nation, sacrifices that simply can’t be measured accurately. 

Moreover, I know that each of you as members of this great committee play a key role in the success of that Army. Your efforts and 

your support ensure that our soldiers, civilians and Army families 

receive their critical resources and authorities they need. We cannot do it without you. 

So from the bottom of my heart, thank you. I deeply appreciate 

the opportunity to be with you here today and I look forward to the 

rest of the hearing. With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

[The joint prepared statement of Secretary McHugh and General 

Casey can be found in the Appendix on page 55.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. General. 
9 

STATEMENT OF GEN GEORGE W. CASEY, JR., USA, CHIEF OF 

STAFF, U.S. ARMY 

General CASEY. Thank you, Chairman, Congressman Smith, 

members of the committee. I am trying to keep a straight face, but 

being here for the last time is not all it is cut out to be. I will just 

tell you that. But it is a great opportunity for me to talk to you 

about the progress that we have made in the Army over the last 

decade. 

I would echo the Secretary’s comments on Congresswoman Giffords and add my wishes for her speedy recovery and her return 

to this chamber. And if you would indulge me, Mr. Chairman, I 

would like to introduce some guests here today who represent the 

men and women of this great Army. First of all, if you just would 

stand up there, if you would, Ruth. Ruth Stoneseifer. Ruth’s son, 

Christopher, was killed in a helicopter crash along the AfghanPakistan border in 2001 and Ruth has committed herself since to 

helping other surviving spouses. 

She has recently completed a tour as the director of the Gold 

Star Mother’s Foundation for the last year. So thank you very 

much, Ruth. Sitting next to her is First Sergeant Damien Anderson. He is first sergeant from the old guard, but he has recently 

completed a 10-day master resilience trainer course at the University of Pennsylvania and master resilience trainers are part of our 

key program to give our soldiers, civilians and family members the 

skills they need to deal with the coming challenges of the next decade. So thank you very much, First Sergeant. 

And lastly, Sergeant Joe Duasante. In 2007, Sergeant Duasante 

was severely wounded and lost his right leg. He has been working 

actually here in our legislative liaison office while he has been completing the 2-year recovery. The good news is he has completed 

that recovery and will leave this summer to go to our airborne 

school as a member of the cadre down at Fort Benning, Georgia. 

So thank you very much. 

Now, if I may, Mr. Chairman, for the past 4 years, you have 

heard me say that the Army was out of balance, that we were so 

weighed down by our current commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan that we couldn’t do the things that we knew we needed to do 

to sustain this all-volunteer force for the long haul and to prepare 

to do other things. Today, thanks in large measure to the sustained 

support from this committee, I can tell you that we have made 

great progress toward the goals that we set for ourselves in 2007 

and as an Army, we are starting to breathe again. 

We are emerging from a decade of war and transformation with 

a well-equipped, combat-seasoned total force that, while still 

stretched by the demands and lingering effects of a decade at war, 

is able to begin preparing for the challenges of the second decade 

of the 21st Century. And let me just quickly update you on some 

of that progress. First, we have completed both the permanent end 

strength increase that was directed by President Bush in 2007 and 

the temporary end strength increase of 22,000 authorized by Secretary Gates in 2009. 

This allowed us to meet the plus-up in Afghanistan before we departed Iraq without having to increase deployed time for our soldiers. I know there is a concern about the condition-based reduc-
10 

tions planned for our end strengths that were announced by Secretary Gates a few weeks ago, but I can tell you that I believe that 

if the drawdowns in Iraq and Afghanistan go as planned, that it 

is prudent to begin planning to reduce the size of the Army in 2015 

and we need to do that to facilitate sustaining a balanced force, one 

that is both the right size to meet our national security strategy 

at an appropriate deployment tempo, but that is also well trained, 

well equipped and well supported. 

In a time of war, we just can’t afford anything less. Second, our 

growth plus the drawdown in Iraq enabled us to significantly improve dwell, and by dwell I mean the time at home between deployments. This is a critical component of sustaining an all-volunteer 

force in a protracted conflict. For the better part of 5 years, we 

were returning soldiers to combat after only 1 year at home and 

we knew that wasn’t sustainable and had been working to bring 

dwell to 2 years at home as quickly as possible. 

I will tell you that beginning the 1st of October this year, given 

what we know about the projected demands, our Active units who 

deploy after the 1st of October will deploy with an expectation of 

having 2 years at home when they return. Our Guard and Reserve 

units will deploy with an expectation of having 4 years at home 

when they return. We have worked very hard to get to this point 

and it is a significant accomplishment because all of our studies 

tell us that it takes 24 to 36 months to recover from a 1-year combat deployment. It just does. We are human beings. 

And turning faster than that accelerates the cumulative effects. 

I would tell you that we will continue to work toward our long-term 

goal of 3 years at home between combat deployments. Third, this 

year we will also complete the largest organizational transformation of the Army since World War II. We will finish the modular conversion of all but a handful of our 300 brigades and finish 

rebalancing soldiers out of Cold War skills into skills that are more 

relevant and more necessary today. That is to the tune of about 

150,000 to 160,000 soldiers. 

Taken together, it is a fundamentally different Army than it was 

on September 11, 2001, and we had a great Army then, but today, 

we are a much more versatile and experienced force. Fourth, to enhance this versatility, we have developed a fundamentally different 

way of building readiness in providing trained and ready forces to 

combatant commanders, and I think you have heard about it, but 

we call it the Army Force Generation Model. 

It is an output readiness model that fully integrates the Guard 

and Reserve, that brings the kind of predictability we need to sustain our all-volunteer force, and that allows us to build the readiness we need to both meet current demands and to hedge against 

unexpected contingencies. ARFORGEN [Army Force Generation] is 

also a more effective and more efficient way of building the readiness we need when we need it. 

So if you add all of these things up, accelerated growth, increased 

dwell, transformation and the ARFORGEN readiness model, together they begin to allow us to restore some strategic flexibility, 

the capability to provide trained and ready forces to all combatant 

commanders for operations across the spectrum of conflict. 
11 

So after a decade of very hard work, we have a force that is the 

right size, that is organized in versatile modular formations on a 

predictable rotational cycle, and that has sufficient time at home 

to begin training for the full range of missions and to recover from 

a decade at war. This would not have been possible without your 

support and the support of the American people. So thank you. 

Now, this fiscal year 2012 budget marks a transition point in 

which we can begin shifting our focus from restoring balance to 

sustaining the balance that we together have so painstakingly restored to this force. Sustaining that balance is critically important 

because this war is not over by any stretch of the imagination. The 

fiscal year 2012 budget that we are presenting today enables us to 

maintain our combat edge, to reset and reconstitute our force, to 

continue to deal with the impacts of a decade at war, and to build 

the resilience into this force for the second decade. 

I would like to say a few words about each of those, but in short, 

this budget enables us to sustain the balance that we have restored 

to this great Army. First, maintaining our combat edge. It is important that we maintain the edge that we have honed over a decade 

at war and we will do that through continuous adaptation, affordable modernization, tough, demanding training for the full range of 

missions, and by sustaining the gains that we have made in our 

Reserve Components. 

Last week, Secretary Gates said that, ‘‘We were an institution 

transformed by war.’’ He is absolutely right and I talked about that 

transformation a few minutes ago, but I believe that we are in a 

period of continuous and fundamental change driven by rapid technological advances and adaptive enemies. Critical to our ability to 

maintain our edge will be an affordable modernization strategy 

that provides the equipment that gives our soldiers a decisive advantage over any enemy that they face. 

This budget lays out such a plan and I would like just to highlight two key areas and reinforce what the Secretary said. No matter where our soldiers are operating, they need to know where they 

are, they need to know where their buddies are, they need to know 

where the enemy is and when they shoot at the enemy, they need 

to strike them with precision. They will also need protected mobility. 

This budget contains funding that will begin the fielding of some 

key elements of the network that will enable our soldiers in any— 

enable our soldiers in any environment and these include the Joint 

Tactical Radio System and the Warfighter Information Network. It 

also includes funding for a new ground combat vehicle that provides protection against IEDs, that has the capacity to carry a 

nine-man squad and is capable of operating across the spectrum of 

operations, and we also hope that it can be developed in 7 years. 

Maintaining our combat edge also requires training for the full 

spectrum of operations. This training is conducted both at home 

stations and at our combat training centers, and it will be critical 

to ensuring that we sustain our combat experience and restore the 

ability to rapidly deploy for the full range of missions. It will require moving operations and maintenance dollars from OCO [Overseas Contingency Operations] to the base over the next several 

years. 
12 

It will also be important to consolidate the gains that we made 

in our Reserve Components. Think about it. Half of our guardsmen 

and reservists are combat veterans. Half of the general officers in 

the Guard and Reserve are combat veterans. I have never seen a 

relationship between the Active and Reserve Component forces better than it is now, and we are working together to establish an effective paradigm that allows us to leverage our substantial investments and the substantial experience of the Reserve Components. 

Second point, reconstituting the force. I see two elements to this. 

One is the continuous reset of forces returning from Afghanistan 

and Iraq. We have got over 110,000 soldiers there today and they 

and their replacements and their equipment will need to be reset 

over time. Reset isn’t a one-time shot. It is a process that is necessary for every returning unit, and it will require sustained funding for 2 to 3 years after we are out of Iraq and Afghanistan to ensure that we reconstitute the force fully and restore readiness into 

our next to deploy forces. We haven’t had that ability in 5 or 6 

years, and so it is important that we restore that readiness. 

The third critical element for us is building resilience into the 

force for the long haul. We have been at war for almost a decade. 

The cumulative effects are still with us and they are going to be 

with us for a while. Think about it. 

More than 4,000 soldiers killed, leaving more than 20,000 family 

members. 

Over 29,000 soldiers wounded, 8,000 of them significantly enough 

to require long-term care. 

Over 100,000 soldiers diagnosed with traumatic brain injury. 

Fortunately, greater than 90 percent are moderate or mild. 

Forty thousand soldiers diagnosed with post-traumatic stress, 

and over 30,000 soldiers processed through our warrior transition 

units. 

This budget contains funding for programs like the Comprehensive Soldier Fitness, health promotion, risk reduction, suicide prevention, the Army Family Covenant, survivor outreach services and 

sexual assault prevention that will allow us to continue to build resilience into this force for the second decade. We remain, as I know 

you do, committed to the well-being of our soldiers, families and civilians. 

So in conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I would like to leave the committee with two thoughts as I complete over 40 years of service to 

this great country. First, we are at a key transition point here as 

we move from a decade of war and transformation to a decade of 

sustaining a force at war in a period of declining resources. Together, we have built a great Army, but it is an Army still 

stretched and recovering from the last decade of war and it continues to prosecute a war in two theaters. 

It took us a decade to get where we are today and we recognize 

that the country is in a difficult fiscal position, and we have and 

will continue to work hard to use the resources that you provide 

us as effectively and as efficiently as possible, but we are at war 

and this war is not over. So we need to proceed with caution because the last thing any of us want to do is to create a hollow Army 

while we are fighting a war. 
13 

And second, Mr. Chairman, is to thank the members of this committee for your enduring support of our Army. You have visited our 

troops and their families at home and at war, you have helped us 

bury our dead and you have seen firsthand through all this change, 

hardship and demands of war. What has remained constant is the 

courage, the selfless service and the sacrifice of our soldiers, our 

families and Army civilians. 

I couldn’t be more proud to have worn this uniform for the past 

40 years and to have served alongside the men and women of this 

great Army. I am humbled and particularly proud to have led them 

in this last decade. It has been the greatest honor of my career. So 

thank you very much and I look forward to taking your questions. 

[The joint prepared statement of General Casey and Secretary 

McHugh can be found in the Appendix on page 55.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. General Casey, just a couple of things about the end strength. I would like to understand the 

relationship between the current requirement for BCTs [Brigade 

Combat Teams] and the cut to the end strength of 27,000 soldiers. 

Did the Army propose the cut or was it imposed on the Army? If 

it was the result of an in-depth Army analysis, I would like to hear 

when that analysis took place and what the results were. If the 

analysis has not yet taken place, does the Army have assurances 

that the Department of Defense will restore the funding required 

that the analysis suggests a lesser reduction is appropriate? 

General CASEY. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. First of all, we did not 

propose the cuts. They were given to us by—from the Department 

of Defense. We were informed of them before they were announced, 

but we did not participate in the development. But last July, I 

went to the Secretary of Defense and I laid out for him what I 

thought the Army needed to do in the next 5 years and the majority of that was in the next 3 years to get this force back and to 

reset it and reconstitute it. 

And I told them that to do that, I needed to hold the end 

strength of the Army and the access of the Guard and Reserve constant through fiscal year 2014. And he basically supported me in 

that with this decision. Now, as I said in my testimony, I see this 

end strength reduction as conditions-based and the Secretary established those conditions. If the assumptions don’t hold, then I am 

sure the Secretary and my successor will feel very comfortable coming back to the Secretary and saying, ‘‘This won’t work.’’ 

But I think it is important as we look at this to remember that 

we need a balanced Army coming out the other end and if we hold 

the end strength too high, we run the risk of having a big hollow 

force like the Army I came into. So it is going to take some good 

analysis and some good interaction between the committee and us 

as we go forward so that we come out of this with the right size 

Army that can meet demands at an appropriate tempo and is also 

well equipped, well trained and well maintained. John, you 

want—— 

Secretary MCHUGH. If I may, Mr. Chairman, first of all, I associate myself with the comments of the chief. While we didn’t participate, certainly from my perspective, we were given ample opportunity to come in and to talk to both the programmers and the Secretary as to the way ahead and from my perspective, as I look at 
14 

the direction we are on a path to take, both with respect to a total 

drawdown in Iraq at the end of this calendar year and the way forward that the President has laid down in his responsibilities as the 

Commander in Chief. Beginning to withdraw out of Afghanistan in 

numbers yet to be determined beginning in 2014, this is a supportable position and the budget that underpins it is appropriately 

arrayed, particularly as the chief said with respect to ensuring that 

we have an end strike number that is supported robustly by the 

kinds of training equipment and support programs that are necessary to keep it from being hollow, something that some of the 

older amongst us in this room had gone through before in our oversight role and something we very much want to resist, and both 

the Secretary of Defense and the President are ever mindful of 

that. 

The old adage, ‘‘Man plans, God laughs’’ is always true. I remember in my role early on, in listening to four administrations come 

to this committee and lay out their 5-year programs, I told them 

I just pray to God that someday before I die I am allowed to live 

in an out-year. I mean, as the President has said and as the Secretary endorsed in his comments at West Point just last week, we 

are perfect in our record of prediction. We have always been wrong. 

So the Secretary, the Administration and I assure you, Mr. 

Chairman, I recognize that we have to be ever vigilant as to the 

changing realities and demand on the force, but as we look ahead 

to 2015 and 2016, this is very supportable and I think a very justifiable position. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. I know we are all concerned that—and as you both stated, no one can see really over the 

horizon. We have to put our best guesses and as you said, unfortunately, many times we are wrong, but the—our job, I think, all of 

us working together is to make sure that we are not wrong at the 

detriment to the Nation. 

And I know I have been around long enough to remember how 

we cut back after World War II and after Korea and after Vietnam 

and I just want to make sure that we don’t put ourselves in a position that we—as Reagan said, we don’t—he never saw us get into 

war that we were—because we were overprepared and that is a 

fine line, I think, between a hollowed-out Army and one that is 

lean and mean and ready to go and sufficient in size to handle all 

of those eventualities that may hit us. 

You mentioned, both of you, the CR [Continuing Resolution], and 

I know we all have strong concerns there and I think all of the 

committee here is unanimous in understanding and supporting the 

prospect of getting an appropriation bill finished up. And I have 

talked to the appropriators and they have assured me that they are 

ready to go. They have got the bill done. I don’t know how much 

of it has been coordinated yet at this point with the Senate. I know 

they have been working on it. 

I was hopeful that we would be able to tie it in to this CR that 

is being voted on this week, but apparently there wasn’t time to 

get it all done, but maybe, hopefully, it could be done at the end 

of this 2-week extension that we are voting on this week because 

everybody—you have all expressed to all the services, the Secretary 

has expressed it, industry, everybody understands that if we don’t 
15 

get this done, stupid things are going to happen and it is going to 

end up costing us more money. 

So we are unanimous in desire. It is just whether we are going 

to be able to pull it together and make it happen and I feel fairly 

confident that we will. The rest of the spending will probably just 

roll into one big omnibus bill to carry through September 30th, but 

defense will be, hopefully, separated out and should be able to 

move us forward. Ranking Member Smith. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I share the chairman’s concerns about the CR and the hope that we get there. I am 

a little less optimistic about the ultimate outcome and I think the 

members of this committee in particular should bear close scrutiny 

on that process and be as supportive as possible of getting us a defense appropriations bill once we get through this whole process. 

There are still a lot of differences between the House and the Senate to resolve to get there. 

And if we don’t get there, one of the consequences is the impact 

that it has on—certainly on the Army, on the entire DOD [Department of Defense]. So getting a defense appropriations bill, you 

know, getting a process that gets us to September 30th is critically 

important to what everybody on this committee does and I hope we 

all work hard in the next couple of weeks to try and make sure 

that we get that done. 

I thank you gentlemen both for your kind words about Congresswoman Giffords. One of the things that her staff has been doing, 

if you are interested to know, she and her staff continue to be incredibly strong advocates for Fort Huachuca in particular and the 

military in particular and they work closely with my staff to make 

sure that while she is recovering, her questions and concerns about 

the military and about her district in particular get addressed. 

So I have a couple of questions from her staff that have been 

sent to me and then a couple of my own. Fort Huachuca is a critical part of the Army. I have been down there to visit myself. Going 

back at the end of this month, as a matter of fact. It is where the 

Intelligence Center of Excellence is which provides, you know, 

great support for all the Intel operations and the training for our 

Intel officers. It is also where the Army’s Network Enterprise Technology Command, or NETCOM is, and that is the focus of my first 

question. 

How are you and the Army doing a better job of protecting our 

networks? Obviously, in the light of the whole WikiLeaks thing, 

there have been heightened concerns, but even before that we were 

aware of the challenges of protecting the Army’s network and also 

protecting the entire DOD network because they all come in together. And one of the things I have discovered is I visit military 

bases and there are a lot of Army bases that have a piece of that 

responsibility and it’s never been clear to me who is ultimately responsible for network security. It is a multilayered thing, but having ultimate responsibility is a good place to start. 

How are you pulling that together? What is your overall plan for 

the Army’s network security? 

Secretary MCHUGH. I would just start and anything the chief 

wants to add, obviously, you mentioned WikiLeaks, Mr. Smith. You 

are absolutely right. That was a real lesson learned from—for us 
16 

and, in fact, for DOD writ large. We have really had a parallel effort at OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense] and DOD level. 

Their intelligence folks have taken a hard look at the processes and 

the procedures as to network protection. They have ordered a host 

of reforms and new measures including the tighter restrictions on 

readable media, et cetera, et cetera, that have already been implemented. 

And while I can’t put a quantified number to it, I think we have 

already come a long way in ensuring that our network security systems particularly for the kinds of things that happen with respect 

to WikiLeaks does not happen again. Beyond that, at the Army 

level, we are coordinating, of course, with OSD, but are—we have 

stood up our cyber which in concert with Cyber Command. General 

Keith Alexander will be the combatant—is the combatant commander working together to ensure that we are installing the kinds 

of network protections across the Army, across the services in general are taken up. 

The Secretary also directed me, asked me to go in and to take 

a hard look at what happened in WikiLeaks, not just what happened at that particular SCIF [Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility], but the processes by which we train, the processes 

by which we maintain security both at home, but, of course, in theater as well. 

Mr. SMITH. Just a basic question, if I could on that, Mr. Secretary. 

Secretary MCHUGH. Certainly. 

Mr. SMITH. You know, one of the big concerns that was raised 

was the fact that this material was able to be downloaded and 

there were no alarm bells that went off. This was clearly protected. 

Maybe just—could you—why? Why was there not a situation where 

this was downloaded and it didn’t, you know, raise an alarm? 

Secretary MCHUGH. Well, the study is still ongoing, but I think 

there were a couple of reasons. One, the controls on the SCIF were 

not up to standards. 

Mr. SMITH. So it was the Army’s policy that that should have 

happened? It just didn’t? It wasn’t a—— 

Secretary MCHUGH [continuing]. We don’t have room for improvement because I—— 

Mr. SMITH. Okay. 

Secretary MCHUGH [continuing]. I think it is going to come back 

that we do and, in fact, I am going to meet with General Caslan, 

and he is the officer who is the commander of our schoolhouse out 

at Fort Leavenworth, to pull together a team to look at that. I 

think we probably have a situation where we need to tighten up 

both our training and our standards, but it seems likely to me that 

where procedures did exist, where they were perhaps not as sufficient as we would like, they probably were not upheld as well as 

they should have been. 

Mr. SMITH. And just one other specific question on that. You 

mentioned the Cyber Command. I think that is a great step. I am 

a big fan of General Alexander’s. Could not have a better person 

in that position. So you are confident now that in terms of who is 

ultimately responsible for network security, that even in the Army 

that will filter up directly through the Cyber Command, the Army 
17 

has a representative there and that representative is going to be 

the person who every day wakes up going, ‘‘It is my responsibility 

to make sure the network is protected’’? 

Secretary MCHUGH. That is the purpose of those two commands 

and I share your great admiration for General Alexander. His experience at NSA [National Security Agency] and now carried into 

Cyber Command, I think, will give us the kind of one-source authority that is necessary to make sure all the Services are pulling 

the oar in the same direction. 

Mr. SMITH. Okay. If I could move on to one other, the other 

areas—as you know, Congresswoman Giffords is very interested in 

energy security alternatives and efficiencies dealing with the energy challenges. There is a great quote in your written testimony, 

‘‘The Army’s logistical tail of the operational energy pipeline is a 

handicap that must be overcome through technological advances.’’ 

A fancy way of saying getting energy to the troops is always a 

major challenge. 

There have been examples. The Marine Corps has a forward-operating base that has used solar to dramatically reduce the amount 

of fuel that they have to use, which has dramatically reduced the 

number of convoys that need to run that fuel in and out, always 

at risk when you are running a convoy. So it has definitely been 

saving lives and definitely saving energy. 

Two questions about that. I also know that you have set up a 

sort of a tech center at Bagram—which has a long complicated 

name that I won’t get into, but basically it is, you know, the problem solver. If you have a technological problem anywhere, you 

know, across the Army, the tech center is the place to go. Energy 

obviously is going to be one of those technological challenges. 

How is the Army meeting those operational challenges in trying 

to reduce its dependency on energy and more deal with the challenges that were laid out there? 

General CASEY. Well, we just call it—I just call it—the technology village of Bagram—it is—than the longer term, but as you 

have stated very correctly, Congressman, that is the place where 

we bring in and fuse together the various elements of energy efficiency and energy consumption reduction that we think is so very 

important. It is a big cost saver. There is no question about it. But 

frankly, at least from my perspective, we look at this as a matter 

of soldier safety. 

Convoying in fuel supplies is a very dangerous job and we would 

like to see that reduced as greatly as possible. We have already deployed some of the lessons learned in places like Fort Huachuca 

and places like Fort Irwin, the national training center, with respect to fuel cells, with respect to water purification systems. We 

are putting into the field higher efficiency generators. I would add 

as well that we have put a mark on the wall that we expect in the 

years ahead will reduce our energy consumption at FOBs [forward 

operating bases] through high-efficiency batteries, et cetera, et 

cetera, by 30 to 60 percent. 

So the Marines and us and the Army are working hard to reduce 

that as a cost saver, but as I said, it is a saver of lives and we are 

very devoted and dedicated to that objective. 
18 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. I won’t ask for a comment on this. I just 

want to make a statement for the record. One of the big problems 

we have within the Department of Defense is the contractor issue 

which you remember from when you were here the, you know, excessive reliance on the amount of costs. We have contractor supervisors and contractors in some instances which, you know, drives 

up costs as well. 

That is something this committee is going to be taking a close 

look at as we try to find efficiencies. I would be curious to get, for 

the record, an answer of sorts if you will—both of your take, not 

right now, but if you could submit something on how are we addressing that problem. How can we save money in the contractor 

world because, you know, that is something that many members of 

this committee are interested in. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 117.] 

Mr. SMITH. So you can do that for the record if you had a quick 

comment. I had one other question I wanted to ask you. 

Secretary MCHUGH. I do. I have a quick comment and—— 

Mr. SMITH. Right. 

Secretary MCHUGH [continuing]. And I am glad you brought it 

up because this is, in our opinion, a place where we can save a lot 

of taxpayer dollars through common sense and a tighter rein. As 

I mentioned in my opening comments, we commissioned a blue ribbon panel. They have come back with, I think, some very exciting 

recommendations as to how we can tighten that up. I have asked 

both the Deputy Under Secretary of the Army and the acquisition 

executive to look at that, to come back to the chief and I with recommendations. 

The other thing, just in closing, one of the bigger problems we 

have had in theater is we didn’t have enough CORs, contracting officer’s representatives. In fact, in 2007, we just had 200. Now, I am 

proud to say we have grown that COR body to 3,558 and that gives 

us an on-the-ground eyeball on the kinds of contract situations 

where we have not been as efficient as we should and we would 

not run as tight of a ship as we could and we are getting better, 

but clearly, we look forward to working with you and doing an even 

better job, sir. 

Mr. SMITH. Yes, we will certainly take a closer look at that report 

and I look forward to work with you on that. The final question I 

have builds off of Secretary Gates’ speech at West Point. He called 

into question the size of the Army’s heavy mechanized forces given 

the threats he foresees in the future. It is the most quotable line 

from the speech being, you know, you have to be insane to go into 

a war like we went into Iraq and Afghanistan anytime again in the 

future. 

Now, some people have misunderstood that as a criticism of the 

existing fights that we are in, but I think it is looking forward to 

say, what are our needs? And I think your initial requests in the 

budget this year, you know, focus on helicopters, network communications, lighter, faster dealing with the asymmetric threats, but 

at the same time, you know, there is the beginning of the R&D [Research and Development] process for a new ground combat vehicle 
19 

which is ultimately, if we are lucky, going to cost $40 billion and 

that is a very high mechanized thing. 

When you look out in the future in terms of how you meet the 

challenges with all the budget constraints that we have and how 

we have to choose between risks, I guess my one difference from 

some on the committee is I don’t think it is the job of this committee or your job to eliminate all risk. We can’t do that. We have 

to sort of manage the threats. We have to do triage, try to contain 

the threats and be most logical about what is coming. I think Secretary Gates is spot-on in what he said at West Point. So, you 

know, how does that blend in with continuing to build a heavier 

mechanized force with things like the ground combat vehicle, General? 

General CASEY. Yes, I am glad you asked that because I don’t see 

the ground combat vehicle as a heavy mechanized vehicle. It may 

wind up being heavy because it requires a certain weight to protect 

soldiers from the blast, but we are purposely designing it as a fullspectrum vehicle, one that can be used in any environment that we 

go into and it is not specifically designed to fight mobile armored 

warfare which is what the tanks and Bradleys are very well designed to do. 

This is the first vehicle that has been designed from the ground 

up to operate in an IED environment and we believe that IEDs are 

going to be part of any future environment that we are going to 

have to operate in. So I don’t see it as a heavy combat vehicle. 

Mr. SMITH. Okay. 

General CASEY. I see it as a full-spectrum vehicle that will protect our soldiers and connect them to the network. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, gentlemen, both very much. Thank you, 

Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mr. Bartlett. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much both of you for your service. Secretary McHugh, I continue to be concerned that we spend 

billions of dollars on weapon systems only to change the underlying 

requirement and terminate the program. While termination may be 

appropriate in certain instances, we must examine how these requirements get validated in the first place. 

The Secretary of Defense coined a new phrase when he referred 

to programs as having exquisite requirements, yet these requirements were approved at the individual service level and validated 

by the joint community. I read with interest a recent article which 

stated that you had commissioned an acquisition reform study last 

May. According to the article, the study group concluded that cancelled Army programs had eaten up between $3 billion and $4 billion a year since 2004 and that, ‘‘The Army lacks a credible quantitative model and process for determining realistic achievable requirements for modernization and recapitalization given reduced 

budgets.’’ 

I understand that a copy of this study was recently delivered to 

our committee. Can you share any of your observations from this 

study or follow-on actions? Do all of the weapons programs that are 

funded in this budget have valid requirements, or in 3 to 4 years 

will they be labeled exquisite? 
20 

Secretary MCHUGH. Well, I think the Secretary has been very 

clear in his perspective as to what he is looking for out of the services and fielding a new platform. And as you mentioned, Congressman Bartlett, he feels, and I couldn’t agree more, that the objective 

of single service exquisite is 100 percent, meaning the requirements can no longer be the standard by which we feel platforms 

and that we have to be more realistic. 

And I would certainly tip my hat to the chief. One of the first 

things he started talking to me about when I walked into the Pentagon as the new service secretary was the fact that our requirements process simply does not reflect reality, that it just ends up 

being an add-on every little bell and whistle that you can think of 

and the result, as you mentioned was found in the acquisition 

study, has lost billions of dollars and through cancelled programs, 

a vast majority of which since 2004, of course, we are through the 

future combat system cancellation. 

I would like to think we have learned that lesson. I wouldn’t 

come here today and tell you we can’t do better because we can, 

but to use for an example the ground combat vehicle, when that 

RFP [Request for Proposal] was first put out on the street, it had 

over 900 exquisite requirements embedded in it. We had at least 

the good sense to pull back from that to cancel that RFP, to revalidate the requirements and they were reduced to less than 200 and 

the RFP was refielded. 

I think that beyond common sense though, we have to have systems changes, and the report by Lou Wagner and Gil Decker that 

you had mentioned is going to be, at least in large measure, our 

blueprint. I don’t want to prejudice our acquisition executive or our 

Deputy Under Secretary because I just tasked them last week to 

look at that and to analyze it, but I have reviewed this report very 

carefully. 

I think it lays out in large measure a very common sense approach on both requirements and how we can be better acquirers 

of future platforms, and I look forward to working with the other 

executives in the Army to make sure that that happens. But I 

would like to hear the chief’s comments if that meets with your approval. 

General CASEY. Now, Congressman, as I said in my opening 

statement, you know, we are committed to using the resources you 

give us as effectively and as efficiently as possible. And as we look 

at what is happening with the budgets, there is no way that we can 

operate an acquisition system that doesn’t very efficiently acquire 

the systems that give us the most value and we are absolutely committed to doing that. 

Our track record, as you know better than I, has not been good 

at this. And what the report found—one of the things the report 

found was that our requirements and acquisition core competencies 

have atrophied over the last couple of decades and we have got to 

build those back. And it is going to take us a little time, but we 

are absolutely committed to doing it. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you. I think all of us want the very best 

equipment for our people and I think the challenge is to be able 

to develop a more open architecture so that the system can continue to be improved as it is in use. To have everything on the 
21 

front end just makes it prohibitively expensive and too long of a development time. Thank you very much and I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mr. Reyes. 

Mr. REYES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you both. Good to 

see you here this morning. And General Casey, I want to congratulate you and thank you for your 40 years of service including your 

wonderful wife, Sheila. Thank you both for serving our Nation. 

I would like to follow up on the ranking member’s question regarding Secretary Gates’ speech at West Point. In that speech, he 

was questioning the Army’s heavy mechanized forces, while at the 

same time saying that he—that the Army should not be a constabulary peacekeeping force that can only do counterinsurgency, 

which I found curious because I think historically there has never 

been a closer working relationship between our military and our intelligence forces as we have taken on the challenge of Iraq and Afghanistan. 

And as we prepare to face the future challenges of not so much 

nations, although they will always be on our radar scope, but these 

groups—these radicalized groups that work everywhere from the 

Middle East to the Horn of Africa and other places, to me the Secretary’s comments send a very mixed message and I was curious 

to know—what is your view of the Army’s role in future combats? 

How does the Army strike the right balance between the different types of warfare that it may face including in partnership 

with the intelligence community? And as you and I have talked 

about before, you know, the answer isn’t that we have to be prepared to do everything because that makes it, you know—if everything is a priority, then nothing is a priority. 

So do you feel like you have had enough guidance from the civilian DOD leaders to make the kinds of choices the Army needs to 

make in the structure of the forces? And if not, your successor is 

going to have to work with this. How do you think that will take 

place? What will that look like and what kind of specific guidance 

will your successor need to be able to carry out what I think is a 

kind of conflicting priority? 

General CASEY. Thank you, Congressman. You know, lots of different reporting on the Secretary’s speech and what I found is if 

you sat down and read the speech, you had a different view than 

you usually got from the press reports of the speech. But what I 

saw the Secretary doing was telling us to start thinking about the 

future beyond Iraq and Afghanistan and I think that is the right 

thing to do and we had been doing that already. 

You have heard me talk about we are at war. It is a long-term 

ideological struggle and that the trends out there in the global environment are more likely to exacerbate that struggle than they 

are to ameliorate it. And when I put all that together, I see us as 

a country in an error of what I call persistent conflict, protracted 

confrontation and not necessarily at the level we have been at in 

Iraq and Afghanistan, but at some levels and I would say for a decade or so. 

And we don’t have a choice. You know, I fought these folks in 

Iraq. They have a 100-year view and they are out to attack our way 

of life and establish their own. So, you know, we have to be very 

careful with that. As we looked at this, the two elements of this— 
22 

the future strategic environment—that are most pronounced to us 

are uncertainty and complexity, and Secretary Gates hit it exactly 

right. Our record is perfect. He never accurately predicted the future. 

So it seems to us that we—versatility needs to be the primary 

operating principle for our Army. That is the—we need a versatile 

Army for the future that can do a range of things because we just 

don’t know which end of the spectrum we are going to be operating 

at. And as we look at that, we say then, okay. Well, we need a 

versatile mix of forces: Heavy, light, special operating, Stryker, 

aviation brigades and all of the supporting—all the supporting 

forces. 

And we had been working for the last 6 months going back and 

look at—looking at every type of force and the design of every unit 

to take the lessons that we have learned in the last decade at war 

and say have we got this right. And, you know, even though since 

2003, we have stood down 40 percent of our heavy brigade combat 

teams. We have stood down almost 70 percent of artillery units and 

we have stood down about 60 percent of the heavy sustainment 

units that supported those forces. 

I mean, that is pretty significant, but we are also asking ourselves the question, was it enough? And so we are wrapping up the 

study here in the next few weeks and I think my successor will be 

well postured to take a look and figure out what this Army needs 

to look like 2015 and beyond and I think that is important. And 

I think that is where Secretary Gates is trying to push us. 

Mr. REYES. Thank you very much. Mr. Thornberry. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you, Chairman. Gentlemen, thanks for 

being here. I want to talk about a different part of the Secretary’s 

speech last week. It caught my attention primarily because this is 

something I have been interested in and concerned about for some 

time. He said that the third and greatest challenge facing the 

Army, and frankly, my main worry is how can the Army break up 

the institutional concrete, its bureaucratic rigidity in its assignment and promotion process? 

And I am sure you both know that he went on to talk about a 

more merit-based, more individualized approach to officer evaluations, citing General Chiarelli’s proposal that evaluations include 

input from peers as well as subordinates rather than just superiors. He talked about maybe instead of moving people around every 

2 or 3 years, we ought to have people apply for job openings like 

in the competitive system that a number of big organizations use, 

and essentially quoted Nagl and Yingling about how the Army will 

become more adaptive only when being adaptive offers the surest 

path to promotion. 

And so I think that really gets at the heart of not just budgets, 

but the culture of the Army and my question is, number one, do 

you think he is right? That is the number one concern that we 

ought to have for the Army. And if you do think he is right, what 

are we doing about it? 

Secretary MCHUGH. Well, I would never say the Secretary of Defense is necessarily wrong and I would not hear either of—not just 

because he is the Secretary of Defense, but more to the point because I think he is right. When you are at war, it is tough to say 
23 

what is the number one challenge, but the Secretary’s comments 

were directed, I believe, over time. This is a critical aspect of how 

the Army is structured and how it maintains itself that we have 

to address. 

One of the first things I did when I walked in the building was 

to begin to look at and rewrite the memorandum of instructions. 

These are the qualities that are listed in the paper’s instructions 

to the promotion boards what we are looking for, the kinds of 

things that the Secretary mentioned, creativity, trying to get our 

promotion boards not to think about lifting up officers simply because they checked the boxes that they had checked on their OERs 

[Officer Evaluation Reports] when they were promoted. 

And that is a cultural change that is a challenge, but I think we 

can begin to see it. I would argue that the selection of the next 

chief of staff, Marty Dempsey, should the Senate confirm him, is 

a great example of promoting someone who thinks outside the box 

and it will serve as a great example not just because it will help 

us to create the means by which we can achieve those kinds of new 

paradigms, but also because it sends the right message as to what 

kinds of officers ultimately succeed. 

At the end of the day, we have to look at this very carefully and 

I think the Secretary has set the stage in an exciting way that will 

allow us to think in new ways about what we value in an officer. 

I think one of the equally big challenges we face, and the Secretary 

mentioned this in his speech, is that as we take today’s field grade 

officers, these majors and others who are given so much autonomy, 

so much authority in theater and bring them back into—and put 

them into what often times is a—garrison environment, how do we 

keep them from losing interest? 

And there is a variety of things we have to work very hard to 

ensure that this Army forged through 10 years of war so well 

equipped with creativity and intelligence and flexibility is not lost 

in a garrison environment. And we are looking at that everyday in 

the schoolhouses and I won’t tell you we have the answers yet, but 

I think the Secretary has posed a critical issue for us to take up 

and to hopefully deal with effectively or we are going to lose the 

greatest Army, I think, the world has ever seen. 

General CASEY. If I could just speak back on that, I agree that 

we need to make some significant advances in our personnel system. They have been up to their eyeballs just trying to man these 

units and get them into the fight properly manned, but we have 

some significant changes we need to make in our promotion and assignments policy. No question. 

I don’t think that is a number one concern. It is certainly not my 

number one concern. What the Secretary just mentioned about retaining this generation of young combat season leaders who understand the environment that we are operating in, that is my number 

one concern and combating this, slipping back into a garrison 

mindset that a lot of the old folks can’t wait to get back to, you 

know, the good old days and we have been talking about this since 

last summer when I had all the two- and three-star commanders 

and their sergeants majors in for a training and leader development conference. 
24 

And I warned them about this because I saw it myself as a division commander in Europe. We brought units back from Kosovo. 

We would have a sergeant that we would let lead a patrol into the 

downtown Gnjilane in the middle of the night and we wouldn’t let 

him turn in a deadline report when he got back. And that is our 

bias and that is my number one concern and we can’t let that happen. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Ms. Sanchez. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, gentlemen, 

again, for being before us today. There are so many questions that 

I would really like to have with you. I was speaking earlier to our 

former colleague about how we protect the industrial base or how 

we get back to making things in America and how we use the military for that transformation, how we really get out of Iraq and Afghanistan. So many questions, but unfortunately, I really need to 

come back to an issue that, Mr. Secretary, you and I worked on, 

on this committee because it is still bothering me and it is still out 

there and we just had a—last week a lawsuit filed with respect to 

sexual assault in the military. 

And because really nobody else brings it up, I am going to do 

that. You know, one of the things that I remember you said, Mr. 

Secretary, so firmly when we were working on trying to change and 

we did the UCMJ [Uniform Code of Military Justice] with respect 

to sexual assault was a comment you made when you were the 

chairman of the Personnel Subcommittee and you said, ‘‘It has 

been 15 years and we have had 18 reports given to Congress from 

the Pentagon about sexual assault.’’ 

And we are sort of—a lot of things haven’t changed. I know that 

they have changed in the way that you are trying to implement, 

but the fact of the matter is I get calls every single day about are 

military women being assaulted by our military men. And they get 

drummed out and the guys get to stay in. I mean, this is their 

main complaint. 

So the task force in the 2009 December report for sexual assault 

in the military recommended that the secretaries of the military 

departments ensure that all commanders and senior enlisted leaders be actively involved in sexual assault prevention and response 

training and awareness programs. 

I would like to ask you, Secretary McHugh, what steps have you 

taken to engage General Casey right next to you on the subject of 

sexual assault in the service? 

Secretary MCHUGH. I want to make sure I understand your questions, Ms. Sanchez. What actions have I taken in respect to the 

issue or working with the chief? 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Working with the chief. What is it from the top? 

How can you help us change this? I mean, I really don’t want to 

get another report that says the same thing again. So I would like 

to know how actively—how do you think we can change that? Now, 

you are on the other side, you know, having to deal with this. 

Secretary MCHUGH. Right. Fair point. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. How do we do this? 

Secretary MCHUGH. I view this problem very seriously and I 

really view it from two different perspectives. The first is a cultural 

one that I can’t imagine anything more contrary to the basic core 
25 

values of being a member of the United States Army than sexually 

assaulting, abusing a fellow soldier be it male or female under any 

circumstances. 

And what we have tried to do through the formation of the 

SHRP, Sexual Harassment Response Program, is to put into place 

the mechanism by which we can begin to change the perspective 

and the understanding particularly of our younger soldiers, but all 

through the cadre as to how volatile this is to Army core values. 

The main component of that SHRP effort is an initiative called, ‘‘I 

am strong; intervene, act and motivate’’ where we have placed in 

the schoolhouses at all levels of military education, the fact that 

this is unacceptable, what the responsibility of every soldier is and 

looking out for, protecting, reporting and participating and getting 

this better under control. 

Obviously, as we saw last week, we have quite a long way to go. 

I mentioned it to you in our discussions earlier. One of the more 

recent initiatives was to produce two training films that I brought 

here to this House and previewed for a number of members who 

were able to drop by and take a look at it. My impression was they 

felt it was very effective. We give this now to—as part of our training aid. So all of our NCOs [Non-Commissioned Officers], those soldiers that are with our troops, our younger troops particularly that 

learn and look up to those soldiers, and we are going to continue 

that effort. 

The other is to ensure that we have the resources and the personnel available to get out there and to make a difference. When 

this program began, it was funded at about $10 million. It has been 

a 500-percent increase and with those monies, we have hired 10 experts to go out and to train our trainers. They are experts in everything from sexual assaults to investigations to counseling to 

forensics to laboratory work. We have hired 15 investigators in addition to our base cadre to go out and to ensure that when a sexual 

assault occurs, we have the expertise to fully investigate. 

We have hired prosecutors. We have hired 35 additional lab technicians. The Army is the central lab for investigating all cases of 

sexual assault and most importantly, we have placed into the 

Judge Advocate General Schools a specialist in sexual assault and 

we have 38 different programs through the JAG [Judge Advocate 

General] schools to ensure that every JAG officer coming out and 

ultimately going to every post, camp and station that we have 

Army forces on understands the nuances of investigating and prosecuting sexual assault. 

So we are trying to take a holistic approach. Obviously one case 

is too many. I do think we are making good progress. I meet quarterly with the SHRP representatives and the chief and we take a 

full briefing and try to ensure that we understand exactly the outcome of those programs, but this is something that troubles us very 

deeply. 

And as I started out, I will close with something that is totally 

contrary to our core values. Thank you. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. I know my time is up. I will have some questions 

for the record to ask the general on that also. Thank you, Mr. 

Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mr. Jones. 
26 

General CASEY. If I could just add just briefly to that because 

that, I think, is important, Congresswoman. It is a leadership 

issue. Prevention of sexual assault is a leadership issue and it is 

something that we from the top down have to force all the way 

down through our ranks. 

Secretary Gerin and I started a program in 2008 designed to 

change the culture of the Army because as we assessed the programs we put in place in 2004, they were all focused on response 

and not prevention and we recognized that until we changed the 

culture, we weren’t going to be successful in the program and that 

is what this program that the Secretary mentioned is designed to 

do. 

At the end of this month, we have our annual conference and the 

Secretary and I are going to put the goal at zero sexual assaults. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mr. Jones. 

Mr. JONES. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much and Secretary 

McHugh, it is good to see you as always and General Casey. I join 

my colleagues here in thanking you for your years of service to our 

Nation. 

I want to go back. Last week we had Secretary Gates testifying 

and I might have misunderstood, but it seemed that he was saying 

that, you know, before a significant drawdown, much must happen 

in Afghanistan and probably we are looking more at 2016 before 

there is a substantial—excuse me—drawdown. After I read his 

comments that he made in West Point, General Casey, I have a 

very dear friend—I gave him my word I wouldn’t use his name in 

a hearing on the floor—that you would know very well. And I hate 

playing that game, but you would. But I gave him my word. 

I emailed him about Secretary Gates’ comments about the large 

number of troops in the Middle East, Africa, wherever it might be 

and this will lead to my question. I am going to read you just a 

sentence that he emailed me back. He said, ‘‘I have mixed feelings 

about the comments made by Secretary Gates. I think he is spoton regarding the commitment of a large number of forces to conflicts in either Asia or the Middle East, but must qualify this statement with the thought that if the conflict is in a vital, national interest, we must never be afraid to take action to protect those interests.’’ 

This general who is retired agrees with me and the American 

people that Afghanistan is really not in our national interest. It 

might have been 10 years ago, but it is 10 years later. My comment 

to you based on what I thought I heard from Secretary Gates—can 

you share with this committee what do you view as a realistic 

timeline for withdrawing the troops from Afghanistan? 

Before I—you answer, would you please—we had been hearing 

for 10 years from different leaders of our military that it is going 

to be critical to be able to train the Afghans to do the police work. 

It is going to be critical to train the Afghanistan people to be the 

soldiers. And, you know, not you, sir, not Secretary McHugh, but 

I have been hearing that for 10 years and I think 10 years later 

they ought to be trained. And here we go again with the Secretary 

of Defense indicating that the significant drawdown might not happen until 2014 and yet, the President of the United States, I know 
27 

he meant what he said at the time, was saying a significant drawdown could happen beginning in July of 2011. 

The American people want to know what is the end point of this 

strategy? What can they see that would say to the American people 

we have victory? So if you would share with me, if no one else 

cares, what you see as the timeline that we can significantly start 

bringing down our troops in Afghanistan. 

General CASEY. Okay. Congressman, you are asking the wrong 

guy to make comments on policy. 

Mr. JONES. Well, I am just asking your opinion because soon you 

will be a retired hero of this country. So if you can in the short period of time—— 

General CASEY. Then I can make all the—then I can make all 

the comments on policy that I want. 

Mr. JONES [continuing]. Call you back then, I don’t know, but we 

don’t ever get a straight answer. And I am not talking about you 

here, but we don’t ever seem to get the straight answer about what 

we are trying to accomplish in Afghanistan. What can we say to 

the American people that are spending billions of dollars breaking 

our soldiers’ backs and legs and killing them? What can we say to 

them that looks like we can declare victory? 

General CASEY. Okay. If I might just go back to your friend’s 

comments there about not putting forces on the ground, I mean, 

one of the things that I have learned in 40 years is never say 

never. 

Mr. JONES. I understand. 

General CASEY. And especially in an environment as unpredictable as we are operating in. And so I would just take you back to 

the comments I made. We have to have a versatile mix of forces 

that can do a range of things and we ought not seal off or put off 

any options. I can tell you your—now to your question about when. 

I can tell you from my experience in Iraq and I was—I am sure 

I have come to this committee and sat before this committee and 

said we can’t credibly hand off security in these countries until the 

local security forces can maintain domestic order and keep the terrorists out. 

Otherwise, our long-term mission wouldn’t be successful. We 

would just have to do it again. And one of the things I worry about 

as I look at the environment is safe havens. Countries or parts of 

countries where the local government can’t or won’t deny their 

country to terrorists. And this global extremist network has tried 

to attack us on our soil three times in the last year and they are 

not going to stop and they are not going to quit. 

So for us to have the ability to go in and stop that, or better yet 

have the local security forces at a level that can prevent that, I 

think is the only way we are going to protect ourselves over the 

long haul. 

Mr. JONES. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Andrews. 

Mr. ANDREWS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General, thank you 

and your family for the sacrifices you made for our country and the 

honor for which you serve. And Mr. Secretary, we are so proud of 

you and the dignity and quality of your work at the Department 

of the Army. Thank you for what you are doing as well. 
28 

I looked at the budget request for fiscal year 2012 as compared 

to the request for fiscal year 2011. I wish I could say it compared 

to the budget for fiscal year 2011. We are trying. And I see that 

there is about a $29.5 billion reduction for fiscal year 2012 compared to the request for fiscal year 2011. I also see that $23 billion 

of that $29 billion approximately is from the O&M [Operations and 

Maintenance] and procurement account. 

To what extent is that drawdown, that reduction attributable to 

the drawdown in Iraq? Either of you. 

Secretary MCHUGH. The theater operation differences between 

2011 and 2012 are in large measure the cause of those drawdowns. 

There are a number of subfactors. For example, a rather noticeable 

cut in Warrior Transition Units that comes from OPA, Other Procurement Army, where we had a number of military construction 

projects under way to serve in the WTU [Warrior Transition Units] 

inventory. The IT [Information Technology] purchases have been 

made and we no longer need that level of expenditure. 

But clearly as we draw out of Iraq, as the expenses associated 

with personnel while deployed, 42 cents of every dollar we spend 

is personnel-related on the infrastructure that had been supported. 

We are down to 73 bases or posts in Iraq, more than 400 have been 

turned back to the Iraqis or just closed up, we no longer have to 

support. So a large measure of that is theater-driven. 

Mr. ANDREWS. Mr. Secretary, could you tell us what the size of 

the force assumptions are for the fiscal year 2012 number? Size of 

the force in Iraq assumptions? In other words, what are they based 

on? 

Secretary MCHUGH. The assumption is as we are now at 500,000 

and the planning assumption in our operational assumption is we 

will be out of Iraq in entirety by the end of this calendar year. 

Mr. ANDREWS. So am I correct that the present size of the force 

is a little bit in excess of 40,000 Army; is that correct? 

Secretary MCHUGH. Fifty thousand roughly. We have six advise—— 

Mr. ANDREWS. Fifty—— 

Secretary MCHUGH [continuing]. And assist brigades and an advise and assist task force. 

Mr. ANDREWS. And the assumption is at the end of fiscal year 

2012 or the end of calendar 2011? 

Secretary MCHUGH. Calendar 2011. 

Mr. ANDREWS. At the end of calendar 2011, it is down to zero? 

Secretary MCHUGH. Yes, sir. 

Mr. ANDREWS. Okay. I also wanted to ask about the reports in 

today’s newspaper about a step-up of fitness standards. What 

was—I applaud that. It sounds like it makes an awful a lot of 

sense. If either of you could tell us, what was the cause of that decision? 

General CASEY. It is just—it is something that we have been 

working for a long time and the last test was 30 years old and we 

have been working at this for a while. 

Mr. ANDREWS. Right. 

General CASEY. And it—finally, we got to the point where we had 

some concrete ideas and put it in their package and now, we are 
29 

going to pilot it at several installations. But it is designed to test 

this—the things that we see ourselves using. 

Mr. ANDREWS. I don’t expect you to have a specific number, but 

do you know an intelligent estimate of what percentage of those 

who attempt to enlist are obese or significantly overweight? 

Secretary MCHUGH. Seventy-five percent of the age knowledgeable population of this country are either—through weight, social 

background, criminal background or intelligence levels—unavailable for being accessed in the United States Army. And of that 75 

percent, a very substantial number is because of obesity problems. 

Mr. ANDREWS. So I assume if we could do a better job in the civilian world with diet, nutrition and exercise that the number of 

men and women eligible to serve would expand pretty significantly? 

Secretary MCHUGH. I think that is a fair assumption, sir. 

Mr. ANDREWS. And I see that you did a great job at 100 percent 

of your recruiting goals for this year which is extraordinary given 

the circumstances. How much easier would it be to hit those recruiting goals if we had more people who were physically eligible 

to serve? 

Secretary MCHUGH. I think our recruiting command and its 

cadre would be delighted, but they, do a great job and it is not just 

numbers. The quality of our recruits is outstanding. Over 98 percent are high school grads that—— 

Mr. ANDREWS. Sure is. 

Secretary MCHUGH [continuing]. Far in excess of the population 

averages in this country and their intelligence levels are really unequaled in our Army’s history—— 

Mr. ANDREWS. We agree and please thank them all and we thank 

you. I yield back. Thank you very much. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Next will be Mr. Forbes and at the 

conclusion of his questions, we will take a 5-minute break for the 

committee. Mr. Forbes. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And Mr. Secretary and 

General, you know the enormous respect you have at this committee. Mr. Secretary, you have sat on this side. So you know our 

needs. And General, I don’t know of any individual in the military 

who spends more time to talk with members and find out their concerns than you do. 

So I have two questions for you. One is that it seems like over 

and over when we have people coming in to testify to us today we 

are hearing them say we are trying to give you a defense strategy 

that is driven by physical realities. When we hear that, it seems 

like we are saying there is this tension between what our defense 

needs are and what our budgetary wants are. 

The first question I would have is do you have any recommendations for us as members of this committee about how we can be assured that we are getting the true defensive needs of the country 

that are not distorted by budgetary wants? That is one. And the 

second one, it seems like we are needing to use modeling and simulation a lot today for training, also for our testing and for 

jointness. 

How important do you see modeling and simulation in the Army 

and what kind of future do you see for modeling and simulation? 
30 

Secretary MCHUGH. I think many of us have been through the 

times, as I mentioned earlier, where we had a very significant mismatch between what the National Defense Policy was and what the 

services were fielding. 

And from my experience, I think we all intuitively knew it, but 

didn’t press it. I sat through my first drawing up from the DOD 

side of the Quadrennial Defense Review and as I understand it, 

this was a landmark QDR [Quadrennial Defense Review] and that 

it really did for the first time make an effort to purposely match 

available resources against the formulation of that defense policy. 

And I wish I were a better attuned to the QDR both as a process 

and a document when I was a member of this committee and I 

think every member would find that helpful because it exposes the 

validity of what the National Defense Policy is and ultimately the 

resourcing of the individual services or the gaps that exist that you 

can discern from those. 

So my humble suggestion was, you know, read the QDR, be familiar with the process and you can learn from it. I would say with 

respect to the 2012 budget, because I am mindful of the very circumstances that you spoke about, Congressman Forbes, that I look 

at this budget as really driven by policy, driven by what we expect 

the threat to be particularly in the out years. 

I mentioned we can never get it right, but as we look at the 

drawdown in Iraq that we have already drawn down to just under 

50,000 troops, as we look at what the President has said with respect to the drawdown as anticipated in Afghanistan, particularly 

beginning in 2015 and as the Secretary of Defense and the chief 

worked out in their conversations, this budget fields an Army. 

Again, critically important that it isn’t just sufficient numbers, 

but it is robust in the equipment that is available to the training 

and program support initiatives for their families that we all know 

is so important in this volunteer force, but at all times, this committee plays a critical role to make sure that the services are getting it right and we don’t just look to you, we need you to keep a 

close watch and vigilance and that is why, in my opinion, this is 

such a great committee. Simulation is absolutely essential. 

We do a great job in trying to give soldiers real role experiences. 

If you go out to the chairman’s district of the National Training 

Center, a little place called Medina Wasl, the replication of IEDs 

in a firefight in a simulated village either Iraq or Afghanistan is 

chilling, but clearly simulations are computer driven and are some 

of the best ways we can ensure that our soldiers are acclimated to 

what they are going to see and what they are going to experience 

once they get into theater. 

And I see it, as robotics and such get better and better, I see it 

as an increasingly important part of our training lay-down. 

General CASEY. Congressman, I would just say that we are at 

war and I can’t imagine that you would ever have anyone wearing 

this uniform sitting in this position not coming to you and telling 

you what the men and women of the United States Army needed 

to successfully prosecute that war and recover from it. And that 

really was the theme of my opening testimony that we have to be 

very, very careful here as fiscal pressures cause us to make deci-
31 

sions about the size, the structure, the equipment, the training for 

your future Army. 

We have been at war for a decade. It took us a decade to get 

where we are today and we can unhinge that in a couple of years. 

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will now stand in recess for 5 

minutes and reconvene at 10 minutes to 12:00. Thank you. 

[Recess.] 

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will be in order. Mrs. Davis. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And to General Casey, I 

think that we are all grateful for your service to the country as our 

troops are and their families and I want to thank you very much 

for always being available as well. And, Mr. Secretary, good to see 

you as well. I wanted to follow up just very briefly on the issue that 

my colleague, Congresswoman Sanchez, raised because we do meet 

with victims quite frequently actually and I think the one message 

that I would relay from them is that until the perpetrators are held 

accountable and not promoted, nothing is going to change. 

All the education in the world is not going to make a difference. 

So it is the law enforcement piece that is really critical here and 

I think we need to continue to work on that. And I know you have 

been working on it. Thank you. 

The other issue that I wanted to raise that a number of colleagues have mentioned is really the contracting issue and I don’t 

know whether you happened to see the C.Q. [Congressional Quarterly] article in the middle of this month and we are very aware 

of these issues ongoing, but it feels as if, in addition to the Army 

Acquisition Review that is going on, the fact that we have hired a 

number more corps men to deal with the procurement that there 

is also a real cultural issue there in the way that contracts are led. 

And I wanted to ask you, General, because the Secretary spoke 

to this. I mean, you see a lot of this. I can’t imagine that this is 

not so frustrating from time to time because this is all about the 

troops. It is about their equipment. It is about the way that we 

train and a lot of the contracts that we know go on forever and 

don’t have the kind of oversight that they should. How is this going 

to be different? How do we change business as usual? 

General CASEY. Congresswoman, I come at this from two perspectives. One is the actual skills required to develop and monitor 

contracting, and you may recall back in 2007 the Army chartered 

what we called the Gansler Commission. Jack Gansler went out 

and we told him the same thing that we basically told Lou Wagner 

and Gil Decker about the acquisition, go out and give us a soupto-nuts look at how we are doing contracting and tell us what we 

need to do to fix it. 

He came back and gave us a blueprint and when we looked at 

it, it is getting the right leadership, you know? We have promoted 

15 acquisition and contracting colonels to generals in the time that 

I have been here and that is putting people in the right rank in 

leadership positions that have the knowledge to deal with these 

things. 

We also have set up a contracting command and seven expeditionary contacting brigades to provide the oversight. You might remember the charts where we started off with a couple of hundred 
32 

million dollars worth of contracts in Kuwait and it went to $5 billion and didn’t increase the people monitoring the contract. 

Mrs. DAVIS. I think partly what I am asking though are solesource contracts. Now, maybe it is hard to generalize that. Is that 

a good idea? Is it a bad idea of data rights? Do you think those 

issues are going to be changed and what would you change? 

General CASEY. Some of those—yes. Well, some of those issues 

are really a case-by-case basis and there is not a cookie cutter way 

to say yes or no on any one of those. The other thing on contracting 

is how we actually develop the requirements—to go out and buy 

something for the troops and that is what the second study looked 

at. 

And it comes down to you have got to have the right people with 

the right skills and that takes time to build them. And so I think 

we are going in the right direction. I think it is going to take us 

some time to get where we want to be. 

Secretary MCHUGH. May I say just a couple of things about sole 

source? As the chief said, there are circumstances where you have 

no choice and in those circumstances are obviously an operational 

necessity, but they are few and far between or they should be. And 

I think your point is well taken that you don’t have to look in the 

far past—the too distant past to see where sole-source contracts 

may have been let as a matter of convenience, not as a matter of 

responsibility. 

Probably the most prevalent example of areas where the Army 

and others have been criticized is—are in the LOGCAP’d [Logistics 

Civil Augmentation Program] contracts, those service support contracts and principally in Iraq that over time in the past were solesourced. We have changed that. They are now—let. We have three, 

in fact, LOGCAP at the operators in LOGCAP IV. We had the issue 

recently of so-called ANC, Alaska Native Corporation, contracts 

where under the federal guidelines an Alaska Native Corporation 

duly constituted is eligible for a sole-source contract. That was the 

topic of some discussion in recent newspaper articles. 

We have put out directives that if we indeed use those kinds of 

contracts, they have to be absolutely justifiable. We don’t want to 

diminish our support of the small business and minority objectives—— 

Mrs. DAVIS. Exactly. 

Secretary MCHUGH [continuing]. And this Administration is very 

supportive of those, but I think we have got to be wise taxpayer 

stewards, and sole-sourcing is something that we can do a better 

job of. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mrs. DAVIS. I will submit questions for the record. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mr. Wilson. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And General Casey, Secretary McHugh, thank you very much for your visits to Fort Jackson which I am very grateful to represent in South Carolina. To 

me, it is a classic case of where new recruits are trained, military 

opportunity is provided and our military service where young people can achieve to their highest potential. And so I appreciate your 

service. 
33 

In my perspective, my dad served in the 14th Army Air Corps, 

Fighting Tigers, World War II. I was grateful, General, to serve actually beginning with you at Indiantown Gap Military Reservation, 

Pennsylvania, several years ago. Like, 1943. And so I served 31 

years in Guard and Reserve, but most grateful I have got three 

sons currently in your command serving with the Army National 

Guard, one son served for you in Iraq, another has served in Egypt 

and the third guy will be commissioned May 12th. 

With that background, I want to thank you. This committee has 

been bipartisan and I sent a letter with Congresswoman Davis and, 

General, you responded and I appreciate this. Our concern was 

dwell time, one that the goal is still one to three and I am still 

hopeful too that boots on the ground that we can work for 1 year 

to 9 months. 

But my concern is about the drawdown and the impact of a 

27,000 drawdown. I am concerned obviously for the morale of the 

troops, for the families, their concerns and expectations of a career 

that could be in jeopardy. I am also concerned that we may have 

an unintended message to our enemy that we are not understanding the threat to our country. 

And so as to the impact, General, what do you see as to what 

study and what will be considered for a drawdown? 

General CASEY. Thank you, Congressman. As I have—we have 

worked our way through this. I mean, there was a reason I picked 

the end of 2014 to hold our end strength in excess to the Guard 

and Reserve and that the reason was that got us through one full 

cycle at 1 year out, 2 years back and I felt that that was important 

to get that for the troops. 

As we talked about earlier, you know, we have not yet begun to 

figure out how this drawdown will occur. I mentioned that we have 

had some ongoing work for about 6 months here looking at our 

force structure, figuring out what we need more of, what we need 

less of, those kinds of things and that work will come together, I 

would think, over the next 90 days to 180 days. 

And so I think we are in a much better position to talk about 

that a little bit later. But I would assure you and the committee 

that we will work very closely with the committee and we want to 

make sure because we are at war. We have an appropriate end 

strength that both meets the demand and does it at a sustainable 

tempo. I can’t imagine knowingly bringing to this committee an 

end strength that wouldn’t give us at least one-to-two and we want 

to get to one-to-three and be able to surge to one-to-two. That has 

got to be the new benchmark. We can’t go back to one-to-one after 

a decade at war. 

Mr. WILSON. And that would just be what we would—I know I 

would support. So I thank you for your commitment. Additionally, 

General, all the joint chiefs signed a letter supporting changes in 

the military health care plan and these changes affect the military, 

but they also go beyond that and affect our local hospitals such as 

Fort Drum, New York; Fort Huachuca in Arizona. 

How will these hospitals be affected? I am going to ask the Secretary that. 

Secretary MCHUGH. If I may, in my old district, you mentioned 

one of the hospitals. When that special program was set up, the 
34 

original intention, as I recall, was to ensure that these hospitals 

had the opportunity to adapt to the needs of the military community and the assistance dollars were intended to provide that bridging opportunity. 

If I could use the hospital outside of Fort Drum, New York and 

Carthage, New York, as an example, at the time their OB/GYN operations were probably not at a level that would allow them to take 

advantage and participate particularly in live birth deliveries for 

the—population and we would hope the monies provided gave them 

that chance to upgrade their infrastructure. 

From my perspective, it was never intended to be an unending 

program and, in fact, it has been maintained now for a sufficient 

amount of time that the Department of Defense made the judgment 

that indeed we could withdraw that support and that the bridging 

should have been completed by now. I can’t speak to the condition 

of each and every hospital, but I think from a programmatic level, 

it was a reasonable planning and budgetary assumption. 

I just want to point out when we are talking about the very modest increases to the TRICARE payments, they do not affect Active 

military. No Active military member nor their families would be affected by the very modest increases in the TRICARE enrollment increases which are $2.50 a month for an individual and $5 for a 

family. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mr. Kissell. 

Mr. KISSELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, thank 

you for being here. Good to see you again. And General Casey, we 

also wish you the best and if you could, pass on to your wife also 

our thanks for her service. I know you and I were at a meeting last 

spring. We were both there in service of our spouses who were in 

service of our military families and especially our military children 

in the light of education. 

Our concern here, my concern is for the whole of the military, the 

whole of the Army and the Reserve Component. I am going to zero 

in a little bit towards Fort Bragg, the center of the universe, and 

General Mulholland and Special Forces. I am sure there is one or 

two people here that might be familiar with Robin Sage and the 

exercise that our special forces go through and they have trained 

to go into the field and they tell us it is the best training they get 

to actually be working and encounter insurgency and I have had 

the privilege because Robin Sage is mostly my district. 

I have had the privilege of being a character actor there three 

times. I have met the Pine Lynn government official who will work 

with the insurgency and has been a great opportunity. But if you 

could, tell us a little bit about the Special Forces. I know Admiral 

Olson was talking about the special ops, they are starting to feel 

a little bit of the strain. What are our Special Forces doing, where 

are we heading, and what are our plans for Special Forces? 

General CASEY. We have been adding a Special Forces battalion 

a year here for the last several years and I think we finish up next 

year and it will be a total of five more Special Forces battalions 

that we have added to the force. 

And I talked to General Mulholland frequently and he has done 

a wonderful job of putting us in a position to better support them. 
35 

I know you have heard a lot about—talk about enablers for Special 

Forces. We have worked out a system where they can request 

enablers from us through the normal force generation process that 

I described earlier and that is helping them out quite a bit. 

I think one of the other things that we are looking at here, and 

I have discussed this with both General Mulholland and Admiral 

Olson is that—we are looking because of our experience of—with 

conventional forces working with other militaries that we have 

gained in the last 5 or 6 years. We are actually going to be in a 

position here next year to start taking some of the training requirements to ease the burden on the Special Forces. 

And so that active conventional mix can go—active special mix 

can go the other way and actually we can wind up supporting 

them. And I am—the other thing that we are doing is for Special 

Forces aviation, building them some additional CH–47 [Boeing Chinook helicopter] battalions so that they increase their aviation capabilities. 

Mr. KISSELL. Thank you, sir. And I would just like to quickly reiterate what my colleague, Mrs. Davis, said about the concerns 

about some of the—and that you all have talked about and working 

on that some of the procurement—down to some of the smaller levels of contracts. I am not talking about the big systems and the big 

monies, but just some of the things that people have that are better 

ideas, better cost. It just seems like the bureaucracy that there is 

such a comfort level of the people within the programs that they 

don’t want to be bothered with having to consider something else. 

And we get a lot of folks that we feel that have good ideas that 

just get frustrated with the process. We appreciate you all working 

on this and I will actually be sending a couple of questions in for 

the record. And thank you for your service and thank you for your 

time and I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. Mr. Turner. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General, thank you for 

being here. Mr. Secretary, good to see you again. I appreciate you 

being here and I for one do miss you on the committee. So for all 

those who are happy that you are in that position, we certainly appreciate all the accomplishments that you had while you served on 

this committee. 

General, you had made the point, you know, that we are a country at war and this is a Congress that is burdened by the issues 

of how we address this mounting debt and the deficits that our 

country is facing, but I think, you know, we know being a country 

at war that our greatest concern is, how do we ensure that the Department of Defense receives what it needs at the same time that 

we look for efficiencies? 

And one of the concerns that I have as we look to this year’s of 

reductions or cost-cutting in the Department of Defense is the issue 

of end strength reductions, both those that I looked at, at the Marine Corps and the Army. And in your opening statement, you 

made reference to the issues of dwell time ratios. We know that the 

Marine Corps and the Army neither have met the goal of one-tothree dwell time ratios. 

According to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs’ testimony to the 

committee on February 16th, the Army will not even achieve a one- 
36 

to-two dwell ratio until sometime in 2012. You made similar statements of the goals of achieving it, but they are still just goals and 

we have grave concerns as we look to what reductions and resources you might have as to whether or not that is accomplishable. 

And then so if you would comment on that, I would greatly appreciate it. And then, Mr. Secretary and General Casey, I am also 

interested in your thoughts on the issues of the HMMWV [HighMobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle] reprogramming. I think 

people are really concerned as to what extent there has been true 

and accurate analysis of both the ability to field the type of vehicles 

that are needed and to look at what the effects are going to be of 

the account reprogramming and we would appreciate it if you 

would comment on that, and I probably have a follow-up question 

to the HMMWV comments. 

Secretary MCHUGH. If I may, I will start with HMMWVs and 

then if the chief would take over on end strength. The issue of how 

carefully did considered this is a well studied one, and I can assure 

you this is based on sound analysis. I directed early on in my tenure as the Secretary that the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, General Pete Chiarelli, and the Under Secretary of the Army, Joe 

Westphal, began what we are calling capability portfolio reviews. 

Everything the Army does is compressed into a portfolio whether 

it be our wheeled vehicles, our combat fighting fleet, et cetera, et 

cetera. 

And when that panel took a look at HMMWVs, they discovered 

something very, very interesting. Not only have we met our requirement, we in fact had exceeded it and we had come to the point 

where we always knew someday it would be that our acquisition 

objective had been achieved. 

There are a couple of reasons that snuck up on us, I think, in 

large measure because the HMMWVs were not being used to the 

extent we thought they would be in theater. They were lasting 

longer and we weren’t having to transition out through wear as 

many as, I think, in the first instance were programmed. The other 

thing is the commanders were concerned about their survivability 

in an IED environment. So that too added to the fact that we had 

more on-hand much, much sooner than we had originally planned. 

So that analysis led us to the conclusion that the monies that 

were scheduled in 2010 to procure more HMMWVs could be better 

spent in other ways. And we worked with the Secretary of Defense 

and Comptroller Hale to ensure that the proposed reprogramming 

we put forward would utilize the monies should Congress approve 

that reprogramming to meet the immediate threat that our soldiers 

are facing in theater, counter IEDs, ISR [Intelligence, Surveillance, 

and Reconnaissance], things that are necessary to save lives. 

So it is a very careful calculation. We feel it is well founded in 

the data and obviously a change of this nature causes concern 

amongst some quarters. We understand that and we are willing to 

do whatever we can—— 

Mr. TURNER. Before, if I could—— 

General CASEY. Sure. 

Mr. TURNER [continuing]. Before my time completely runs out, 

but I appreciate your answer, and your explanation, you know, the 
37 

two concerns obviously in that switch you are taking a capital expenditure and shifting it to what is an operational expense. The 

other issue is the concern that the JLTV [Joint Light Tactical Vehicle] program may be delayed and what—a result if that program 

is delayed? Will you be able to meet all of your requirements? 

Secretary MCHUGH. The question—your second question is we 

will. We have a recap program for the existing HMMWV that is 

being damaged right now frankly by the continuing C.R. We have 

had to lay off 200—on that recap program, but we feel we can buy 

a zero-miles-based, zero-hour-based recapped HMMWV for 

$100,000 versus $165,000 for an equal new. So we feel confident 

and we are going to require platforms with our reprogramming, as 

I said, counter IED and such, in the same fashion we are going to 

require HMMWV platforms. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Ms. Hanabusa. 

Ms. HANABUSA. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman—my colleagues who liked you, thanks, General Casey, for his 40-plus years 

of service and to say that I have read a lot about you and I think 

we are losing someone with amazing foresight as to what we need 

to do. 

Having said that, my questions are for the Secretary. Mr. Secretary, in looking at the budget, it is very evident that the base 

budget for the 2012 request is about $144 plus, almost $145 billion, 

and there is this interesting category—of course, the overseas contingency operations, the OCO, which then amounts to almost 50 

percent of the $144 billion. For your total addition together, you 

would have about $216 billion. 

I was really interested in the OCO category because my understanding from the power briefings is that that category is really 

one that is sort of tied to Iraq and Afghanistan and as we begin 

to draw down, I assume that that budget was also being looked 

upon as being drawn down. Now, how would that then impact what 

you need to do with your sustainability efforts for the Army in the 

future? 

Secretary MCHUGH. Well, indeed the OCO budgets that used to 

be called supplemental budgets are designed to support theater operations. That is how historically Congress has funded wars, and 

it provides us an opportunity to fund, as you noted, a base budget 

this year just over $140 billion to sustain those things that we 

would buy whether we were at war or not, and at the same time 

to ensure we are doing the right things by the warfighters. 

Indeed, as you noted, Congresswoman, OCO budgets do come down when theater operations and demands decrease. The $71 billion in this year’s Army OCO request is down from about $120 billion in years past and we expect that that will continue as operations diminish. 

We will need in terms of our long-term sustainment, as the chief 

had mentioned earlier, 2 to 3 years of reset monies, those dollars 

that in large measure, in fact, totally contained in OCO right now 

to bring back the major pieces of equipment to put them through 

the recap program to bring them back to standards for 2 to 3 years 

after we are no longer engaged in a name contingency. 

So we need those reset monies as they are contained in OCO 

right now to transition with Congress’ support into the base so we 
38 

can do over the next 2 or 3 years after cessation of hostilities the 

reset program that we need. 

Ms. HANABUSA. I noticed that also part of the OCO budget is an increase of $9 billion for research and development and about $2.1 

billion for procurement. I happen to be a great advocate of research 

and development and I was wondering, why is it in the OCO budget? Was there something unique about this research and development and the procurement that puts it in the OCO budget versus 

something that can be facilitated in the base budget? 

Secretary MCHUGH. I don’t recall that exact line, but clearly if 

you look for example historically at joint IED defeat programs, the 

RTD&E [Research, Development, Test & Evaluation] had been in 

the OCO. I would note that we are purposely—and I think at the 

behest in urging of the Congress and this committee—moving those 

funds for IED defeat and providing a line in the base budget for 

that, but a generic response to your question be any time we are 

developing something such as an MRAP [Mine Resistant Ambush 

Protected vehicle] or something that is field-unique, it would not be 

unusual to have at least a portion of the research development 

monies in the OCO itself because that is a primarily war-driven 

process and cost. 

Ms. HANABUSA. Let me ask you about one of the—probably the 

most disturbing parts of the testimony regarding General 

Chiarelli’s report on the suicide. Now, how much of the reset or 

how much of this dwell time should—is going to cost—it is going 

to have a cost—and how much of that should we really have in the 

base budget if it isn’t already in the base budget? It seems to be 

something that is so result of the OCO operations. 

So what do we want to ensure into the future that we have those 

kinds of costs written into your base? 

Secretary MCHUGH. Well, we pay a soldier whether that soldier 

is back and reset and going through—in his or her home base or 

if they are forward-deployed. When they are forward-deployed, 

there are certain wartime pays and bonuses that are available, but 

the cost when you are in CONUS [the continental United States] 

and garrison are calculated as part of our personnel expenses, as 

I mentioned earlier, about 42 cents of every dollar we spend are 

personnel-driven and it is something that we will have to build into 

our budget development process and we do that routinely. 

Ms. HANABUSA. Thank you. 

General CASEY. If I could, we are already putting some of those 

costs in the base. I mean, we have about $280 million in the base 

for psychiatric care and services and another $85 million for research in post-traumatic stress and mild traumatic brain injury. 

That is already in the base. 

Ms. HANABUSA. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mr. Franks. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. And General 

Casey, may I just add my name to the list of all those who have 

lauded your noble service to humanity and just to the cause of 

human freedom. I know that there is no way to express the kind 

of service that you have done. I mean, a lot of us talk about freedom up here and people like yourselves carry it on your back everywhere you go and I appreciate it so much. 
39 

And Mr. Secretary, obviously it is wonderful to see you back 

again. You know, I don’t know if it is harder on that side of the 

lectern or not. It sounds like it might be. So my question is to both 

of you. DOD has recently decided to stop funding for the Medium 

Extended Air Defense System, or the MEADS system, and yet they 

have decided to complete the design and development phase of the 

program which requires an additional $804 million across fiscal 

2012 and 2013. 

And as you know, the MEADS program is intended to replace the 

aging Patriot and Hawk missile system that has been developed in 

cooporation with, of course, Italy and Germany. Admiral Mullen 

testified in a hearing before the Senate in 2007 that, ‘‘In view of 

the threats we face today and will face in the future, I believe the 

United States should deploy components of the ballistic missile defense system as soon as they become available, even as we improve 

their operational effectiveness.’’ 

Now, significant amounts of time and research and development 

and testing have already gone into the MEADS system and at a 

time when the need for layered ballistic defense system is drastically increasing, I guess my question is kind of three-fold. First, 

does it make sense to end the program that will meet this need so 

near to its completion? And, secondly, if the program is terminated 

what course of action is the Army taking to replace the intended 

mission of the MEAD system and what kind of timeframe are we 

working on? 

And finally, do we have a cost comparison between seeing the 

MEAD system go through the—to production and implementation 

and the alternative to replacing the Patriot and Hawk missile systems? That is a long set of questions, but it is—— 

Secretary MCHUGH. I will do my best to try to get through at 

least most of those. This was not an easy decision and it wasn’t a 

hasty decision. As I am sure you are aware, Congressman, the 

MEADS program has been under way for a decade. The Army has 

invested over $2 billion and that is only the partial cost of the program. Frankly, it was underperforming. You mentioned it was close 

to completion. We are not so sure that is true. 

The decision to stick with the D&D [Design and Development] 

through the end of, I believe, 2014—the technology was one to provide our German and Italian partners an equal opportunity to harvest technology out of that. If there is any available information 

and gain out of this program, it is the technology package. We intend to put that on the shelf and to utilize it in trying to develop 

a program that can deliver the capability the MEADS was designed 

to deliver and do it in a more timely and affordable way. 

In the interim, it is our intent to do upgrades to the pack three 

that you mentioned to—and other layered defenses that OSD has 

validated to us are available to meet the near-term needs. We just 

felt it was more good money after bad, but we remain committed 

to a system that is—that provides that kind of protection against 

the threat that is just not going to go away. 

Mr. FRANKS. General, I might ask you to elaborate, too. I mean, 

as far as the cost comparison to any replacement that may occur, 

you are saying to me, it sounds like, that you think that the PAC– 

3 [Patriot Advanced Capability–3] and some of the other systems 
40 

can be upgraded to be able to meet that need; is that—was that 

what I was hearing? 

Secretary MCHUGH. I said there is a bridge. 

Mr. FRANKS. Okay. Where would the bridge go? 

Secretary MCHUGH. Well, the bridge goes to the next system. We 

are not abandoning the project that—and one of the reasons for 

harvesting the technology is as the threat becomes more prevalent, 

we can take the technology off the shelf and develop a system that 

meets the threat when it appears. Right now, it is prospective. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, I guess I am—you know, I am hearing a little 

conflict here that the threat or the need is increasing, but you 

are—if I heard you right, Mr. Secretary, you are saying that the 

need right now is more prospective? Now, maybe I misunderstood. 

Secretary MCHUGH. Well, what I am suggesting—and I defer to 

your expertise on missile defense, Mr. Franks. I have followed your 

lead on voting many times and I appreciate the insight and the understanding you bring to that. 

Mr. FRANKS. You should keep that a secret, if you can. 

Secretary MCHUGH. No, there are not many of us here. Perhaps 

they will hold it—— 

Mr. FRANKS. Nobody will know. You are safe. 

Secretary MCHUGH. Yes. Yes. 

But we felt there was a—use of money particularly with this program that was non-performing and we really did not see light at 

the end of the tunnel to invest the funds more wisely in an immediate threat that we know is out there that we feel and has as, 

again, I mentioned, validated by OSD and DOD that can be met 

by our PAC–3 upgrade programs, Aegis System and other available 

technologies. 

Clearly, we need to ensure in the future as this threat that 

MEADS was intended to confront matures to have a response to it 

and that is why we are harvesting the technology to begin to develop a new program that will meet what we feel is a maturing 

threat somewhere down the road, it is not a threat right now that 

we believe we are indefensible against. 

Mr. FRANKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mr. Hunter. 

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary and General, thank you. Let me beat this horse from a different side. It is 

going to cost about $800 million to finish MEADS to proof of concept. That is 800-and-something-million dollars. The request to 

bring it this next fiscal year 2012 is around $400 million, roughly 

half. 

If you are not doing it for any particular purpose that meets a 

standing threat, then why put the money there at all? My question 

is actually for General Casey. Do you have any other thing you 

would like to put to almost half a billion dollars into in fiscal year 

2012 or—— 

General CASEY. As you both know, I mean, this is a very complex 

program. It is a development program with other countries that 

have interest in it. There are cancellation fees and things that had 

to be taken into consideration. And the Department has worked all 

of those issues and come to the conclusion that this is the best way 

to proceed with the program. 
41 

Mr. HUNTER. By spending almost a billion dollars on something 

we are not going to produce? 

General CASEY. But that will allow us to meet our obligations to 

these other countries. 

Mr. HUNTER. So we are doing it for these other nations’ interest? 

Secretary MCHUGH. If I may, the $800 million proof of concept 

that you mentioned we are not convinced is viable. The history of 

this program has been one as it has been related to me were milestones that were set out and determined were rarely reached in the 

timeframe in which they were defined and proof of concept may 

well be yet another one of those. The investment of the $400 million was the—as the chief said, a decision as to how do we most 

wisely terminate this program. 

If we withdrew this year, there are substantial withdrawal fees 

that the United States would have to bear and pay into the program that would not make it a wise decision. 

Mr. HUNTER. Would you call it a bad deal then from the very beginning kind of? I mean, to—— 

Secretary MCHUGH. Well, I think the—I wasn’t there at the time, 

Congressman Hunter. Obviously anytime you—anytime you spend 

over $2 billion and dedicated a decade and you have little to show 

for it beyond the technology package was why the Department decided to spend the $400 million. It is probably not what you would 

want to design your procurement programs to be, but I think in the 

beginning you had three key allies—the Germans, the Italians, the 

Americans—working together to try to cooperatively do something 

that maybe they wouldn’t have taken up jointly and for a variety 

of reasons that I don’t pretend to totally understand. It has been 

a non-performing program. 

Mr. HUNTER. Okay. Next question, something totally different 

having to do with Reserves, National Guard, Army drawdowns as 

we exit Iraq and hopefully victoriously leave Afghanistan in the 

next decade or so. How are we going to make sure this time that 

we don’t let our National Guard and Reserves fall into disrepair especially National Guard which are your shooters? 

General CASEY. Yes. 

Mr. HUNTER. I mean, it is just a huge burden—I wouldn’t call 

it a burden. I would call it a privilege that they have had to serve 

as main frontline soldiers especially in Afghanistan and Iraq. How 

are we going to make sure that they don’t fall into the same slump 

that they sink to every time we exit a war? 

General CASEY. That is a great question because they have been 

full participants in this war. I mean, the Guard itself has over 600 

killed, 5,000 wounded and I just talked to all of the tags a couple 

of days ago and we talked about exactly this. 

We all believe that we do not want the Guard and Reserve to go 

back to being just a Strategic Reserve. We have invested $28 billion just in Guard equipment in the last 5 years. We have to figure 

out how to leverage that investment and we commissioned a study, 

the Secretary and I, oh, about a year ago now where we asked a 

former Chief of Staff of the Army, a former Chief of the Army 

Guard and former Chief of the Army Reserve to go back and tell 

us what should be the role of the Guard and Reserve in an area 

of persistent conflict when repeated deployments are the norm. 
42 

And they came back and gave us some great insights and one of 

the most important insights that they gave us was that we are 

going to have some forces that are going to deploy and those forces 

will be resourced and to do what they need to do and be well 

trained and equipped so they meet the needs of that deployment. 

And we have designed the Army since the early 1970s not to be 

able to go to war without the Guard and Reserve. 

And I think you know our force structure is very heavily weighted with Guard and Reserve filling the combat supported combat 

service for functions. And so there is one level. They are going to 

get funded. They are going to go. 

Now, the question then becomes, okay, how much readiness do 

you build in the next decade to deploy forces and we need a model 

that allows us to sustain their combat edge that they have built 

over the last decade, but then also only to build the readiness we 

need when we need it and we are actively working on that model 

with the Guard and Reserve, but we are absolutely committed that 

we don’t want the Guard and Reserve to go back to being just a 

Strategic Reserve. 

Mr. HUNTER. Great. And please let me know how we can help. 

Mr. Walls and myself are the co-chairs of the National Guard Reserve Caucus now and any way that we can help you with that or 

work with you on that, we would be happy to. Thank you. Thank 

you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mr. Coffman. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Secretary McHugh. 

And especially General Casey, seeing that you are going to retire 

soon, thank you so much for your 4 decades of service to the United 

States Army. 

First of all, Secretary McHugh, I share with you the condolences 

to the families that were killed in the Fort Hood shooting that happened last year—I am sorry, on November 5, 2009—and the report 

of Major Hasan is—I believe it is still restricted and it is merely 

an analysis of his personnel record with no references to the incident itself. And if it is still restricted, I would ask you to make that 

available to the American people. I think they have a right to know 

and I don’t see anything relevant to national security nor relevant 

to the case that is in this report. 

It is, in fact, embarrassing to the United States Army to have 

missed so many, I think, cues as to the radicalization of Major 

Hasan and I believe that corrective action is being taken in that 

regard. I certainly hope that it is. Secretary. 

Secretary MCHUGH. The release of information is really controlled by the interpretation placed on it by the legal authorities as 

to the possible effect it might have at this time with respect to public release with the prosecution for the crimes allegedly committed 

by Nidal Hasan. That was a decision made by the Office of General 

Counsel, DOD and others, and at such time that I would assume 

that those circumstances no longer exist, release of appropriate redacted information I feel comfortable will occur. I just can’t tell you 

when the lawyers—— 

Mr. COFFMAN. I thank you, Mr. Secretary. I just want to say that 

that is an abuse of the authority of the chief legal counsel of the 
43 

Department of Defense to have made that decision, which I believe 

is a political decision, and really has nothing to do with the case. 

Let me go to a question concerning our—I believe we have four 

brigade combat teams still in Europe and General Casey, I think 

I was—you were second lieutenant when I was a private in the 

United States Army. And during the Cold War, you and I know it 

is pretty damn cold being on that border of Czechoslovakia—rotating on that border during that period of time in the early 1970s, 

but we still have four brigade combat teams and the Cold War has 

long since been over with. 

And I know in the Quadrennial Defense Review, they supported 

keeping those troops there, but in a recent GAO [Government Accountability Office] study, it said that GAO concludes keeping two 

brigades in Germany costs $390 million more per year than basing 

them in the United States. And so I would really ask you to take 

a look at whether or not we ought to redeploy some of those forces 

back to the United States. Do you have a response to that? 

General CASEY. I think you—you know, Congressman, this is 

something the Department of Defense has been working on for a 

while and I think they are getting relatively close to making a decision on what, if any, of those forces would return. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Very well. Thank you. You know, my final question, for Secretary McHugh or General Casey, the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle program has been subject to cost overruns, milestone 

delays, ambiguous capability requirements, you know? I think that 

right now the projected base unit cost of the JLTV is $300 to 

$4,000—$300,000 to $400,000 per copy. And you know and I know 

historically these costs will rise over time. What is the future of 

this program and how will the army manage cost increases? What 

is the long-term ground vehicle strategy for the Army regarding 

HMMWVs, MRAPs and JLTVs? 

Secretary MCHUGH. A good question there. The Army is still 

committed and we are still working with the Marine Corps on the 

development of the JLTV. Your observations about cost overruns is 

accurate and it in large measure goes back to what we had discussed earlier in this hearing with respect to unrealistic requirements. I think they have reconfigured that. 

We do expect a lot of the JLTV. It shares several hundred requirements with the MATVs, with the—MRAPs that we think are 

performing so magnificently, but it has its own unique aspects as 

well. We are trying our best to control that and we look forward 

to its fielding. It will be ultimately the replacement for the 

HMMWV with far more survivability with off-road capability that 

the HMMWV does not have and we see it as part of our future 

fleet. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mr. Gibson. 

Mr. GIBSON. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the witnesses 

being here today. I have learned a great deal and I want to thank 

you for your leadership. I also want to express my support and admiration for those you lead. I think it was particularly noteworthy 

that you brought these fine non-commissioned officers here to remind us to keep it real as we are going through this here today. 

Thank you for your service. And we remember the families too and 
44 

I thought it was very touching that you brought one of our Gold 

Star family leaders here today. We will always remember. 

You know, I also want to appreciate the work that went into preparing the budget. This is really a different time over the last decade. We are doing more with less and we are all committed. I think 

everybody on this committee and beyond is committed to protecting 

our cherished way of life, but we also know that the deficit is a 

threat to our way of life. 

So towards that end, the judgment that you showed to deal with 

the declining President’s budget numbers is appreciated. You know, 

my question has to do with the future of the Armed Forces and 

here today the Army and looking forward to 2014, 2015 and beyond 

at a time when we have accomplished our objectives in Iraq and 

Afghanistan and we think about the force that we are going to 

need. 

I affiliate to some degree with the—he would—any future Secretary of Defense would be crazy if he gave a recommendation that 

we send a land army or send our Army to the land forces in Asia 

or to Africa, you know, I think to the degree that we avoid a decade-long counterinsurgency effort is something we ought to be trying to do. 

I think there are better ways to neutralize the Al Qaeda threat, 

but having said that, so much of the international order is really 

based on deterrence and to have demonstrated capability to put together a con-op where the Nation has the ability from joint forcible 

entry to campaigning to sustaining and post-hostilities, I think, 

will go a long way to keeping peace, particularly when you think 

about the instability in the world and the potential interests of nations that may want to take advantage of certain circumstances. 

So looking out in 2014 and 2015 and beyond, General, how do 

you assess our ability to conduct these kind of operations? Where 

do you think the risk is not only inside your formations and your 

institutions, but along the joint force for the country to be able to 

do this, and are you convinced that in the fight that we have, war 

gaming, exercises and other means to come to understanding in situational awareness on where our weakness and vulnerabilities are? 

Thanks. 

General CASEY. Well, this kind of goes back to the discussion we 

were having earlier about what are we going to need and what 

kind of Army we are going to need in 2015, 2016. And as I mentioned, the two dominant characteristics of the future environment 

are uncertainty and complexity. And frankly, I believe that the 

Army we will have at the beginning of 2015 will be an Army that 

is versatile, that is combat-seasoned, that is well-equipped and 

ready to deal with a wide range of challenges. 

The issue will be should we draw it down and if we draw it 

down, can we do that without damaging our capability to operate 

across the spectrum of conflict, to put together the types of operations that you mentioned? Because I think that is what we are 

going to need. We don’t know what we are going to be doing in 3 

to 5 years from now. 

I mean, Secretary Gates says our track record is perfect and I 

firmly believe that we will be doing something in 3 to 5 years that 

none of us are thinking about today. I don’t know what that is. 
45 

Mr. GIBSON. Are you convinced that in the FYDP [Future Years 

Defense Program] you have got the war gaming, the modeling, the 

simulation, the exercises to show that we have this capability? 

And, for example, to put a finer point on a couple of these things, 

are you convinced we have got enough C–17s [Boeing Globemaster 

military transport aircraft], vessels that we have got the command 

and control in the like that we are going to be able to put this together? 

General CASEY. No, I appreciate what you are saying there and 

there are studies and models that do the kinds of things you are 

saying, but what I found in my 4 years here is they are still largely 

weighted toward a conventional military operation and we have 

been working with others over time to build models that actually 

reflect the kinds of operations that we are going to be doing—we 

think are hybrid-type operations. They are not—there will be a mix 

of conventional irregular criminal terrorists, all arrayed against us 

asymmetrically, but we don’t have good models for those to your 

point. 

Mr. GIBSON. Well, thank you very much for that testimony, and 

I think to the degree that we demonstrate competency on that, I 

think it will reinforce what our diplomats are doing for us and we 

will be a strong Nation. And I think we can protect our cherished 

way of life in a manner that is consistent for a republic and not 

an empire. I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. I see no further members 

of the committee to ask questions. I thank you for your time here 

today. Thank you again for your service. I look forward to working 

with you as we move through the budget process and this committee will stand adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:43 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

A P P E N D I X 

MARCH 2, 2011 

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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING 

THE HEARING 

MARCH 2, 2011 

(117) 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. SMITH 

Secretary MCHUGH and General CASEY. The Army has initiated several efforts to 

improve contracting practices and save taxpayer resources. In April 2009, we formally established solicitation and contract review boards and oversight thresholds 

to improve visibility and performance of our contracts across the entire Army. We 

have also strengthened the Headquarters, Department of the Army Procurement 

Management Review program to ensure the Army is effectively managing its resources. In addition, the Army continues to implement strategic sourcing initiatives 

to achieve the benefit of cost efficiencies by consolidating procurements where it 

makes good business sense. In November 2010, we appointed a Deputy Assistant 

Secretary of the Army (Services) to place greater emphasis on the requirements generation, oversight, and management of service contracts, which account for a large 

share of DOD spending. As part of the DOD effort to achieve savings of $100 billion 

over the next five years, the Army has been a full partner in identifying cost savings 

of approximately $29 billion. Through comprehensive capability portfolio reviews, 

the Army has proposed savings by terminating or reducing weapons systems with 

declining relevance or unnecessary redundancy. Lastly, the Army is utilizing Section 

852 funding to hire new Acquisition personnel, with the majority being contracting 

interns. The Army has hired over 1300 Acquisition personnel under Section 852 authority. [See page 18.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

MARCH 2, 2011 

(121) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MCKEON 

Mr. MCKEON. With regard to end strength, what I would like to understand is 

the relationship between the current requirement for 45 Active Brigade Combat 

Teams and the cut to end strength of 27,000 between 2015 and 2016. 

a. If this end strength reduction happens, what will be the impact on the total 

number of BCTs and what kind of mix of BCTs can we expect (Heavy, Light, and 

Stryker)? 

b. From a force structure perspective, how do you budget in 2012, 2013 and 2014, 

for an anticipated end strength reduction in 2015/2016? 

c. You have previously stated that it took ten years to grow and equip the force 

to current levels, have equipping funds already been reduced in the 2012–2014 timeframe that assumes that this reduction will take place? 

d. From a total force structure perspective, how do you plan and program funds 

in the 2012–2014 timeframe if the plan assumes that this troop reduction will take 

place in 2015/2016? 

e. What is the ‘‘knee in the curve’’ for making a decision to reverse this reduction 

and still not have a negative impact on the ability to train and equip? 

Secretary MCHUGH and General CASEY. a. No decisions have been made as to 

what types of units or what installations will be impacted by the Secretary of Defense’s announcement. There are currently 73 Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) in the 

Army, 45 in the Active Component (AC) and 28 in the Army National Guard 

(ARNG). There are 24 Heavy Brigade Combat Teams (17 AC/7ARNG), 40 Infantry 

Brigade Combat Teams (20 AC/20 ARNG), and 9 Stryker Brigade Combat Teams 

(8 AC/1 ARNG). 

b. Specific direction from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) is to reduce 

end strength by 27,000, including about 5,000 officers and about 22,000 enlisted personnel. Reductions are expected to be phased in with approximately half of the 

27,000 reduction occurring in FY15 and the other half no later than the second 

quarter of FY16. The Army is considering reducing accessions and implementing a 

myriad of voluntary and involuntary separation authorities to achieve the Secretary 

of Defense’s direction. 

c/d. We are conducting deliberate analyses now to determine which capabilities 

should be reduced and how the drawdown plan will proceed. Adjustments to the 

Army’s program will be captured in our Program Objective Memorandum (POM) 

14–18 submission. 

e. Three assumptions must be achieved if the Army is to draw down its end 

strength as directed by OSD. The Army assumes that the drawdown in Iraq will 

continue and that it will be completed by 31 December 2011. The Army also assumes that forces in Afghanistan will be drawn down in accordance with current 

administration policy. Finally, while we cannot predict when and where crises may 

occur, we do expect that in an era of persistent conflict Army forces could be required for a variety of missions but at nothing approaching the levels seen in recent 

years. If these assumptions hold true, we believe the Army is capable of supporting 

Combatant Command requirements within an end strength of 520,400. 

Mr. MCKEON. The Secretary of Defense said at our hearing that the force structure reductions he announced in January will be ‘‘conditions based.’’ a. Please give 

us your definition of what ‘‘conditions based’’ means? Is it AFG specifically? b. What 

assumptions must we make about our force presence after 2014 in AFG to implement the cut? How does this relate to your recent comments that you believe the 

Army will continue to have over 50K deployed after Iraq/AFG? c. Is the end strength 

decision reversible? d. If the decision is indeed conditions based, how will the Army 

ensure we have the force structure to support a higher end strength in case conditions do not allow for such reductions? 

General CASEY. The term ‘‘conditions based’’ refers to global demand for land 

forces and does not refer to any one region specifically. The Army makes assumptions about future demand in order to inform its planning efforts, and while we cannot predict demand with absolute certainty, we are confident that it will not reach 

the levels seen in recent years. We assume that the drawdown in Iraq will continue 

and that it will be completed by 31 December, 2011 and we assume that forces in 
122 

Afghanistan will be drawn down in accordance with the current Administration’s 

policy. The Army is conducting deliberate analysis, and will develop a phased plan 

with opportunities to reverse course if assumptions prove incorrect. We will continue 

to ensure that force requirements are sourced with trained and ready units through 

a disciplined Global Force Management process. 

Mr. MCKEON. Secretary Gates recently spoke at West Point and said that he envisages a future ground force that will be smaller, pack less heavy firepower and 

will not engage in large-scale counter-insurgency wars like those in Iraq or Afghanistan. a. Do you believe that in the next ten years the Army will increasingly be 

asked to focus more on short-duration counterterrorism strikes and disaster relief? 

b. What size force do you believe will be required? c. In past, we have downsized 

after the war was over. But this budget puts us in unchartered waters. Does this 

concern you? 

General CASEY. Due to the complexity and dynamic nature of the strategic environment, it is impossible to predict with certainty exactly the types of conflicts in 

which the United States may become involved. The Army must maintain the capability to operate effectively across the full spectrum of conflict, with a continued emphasis on partner building and engagement activities to prevent conflicts from occurring or escalating. The Army is conducting deliberate analysis to determine the 

optimal force mix within authorized end strength, and will take into account the 

current fiscally constrained environment. The Army will continue to ensure the accomplishment of its assigned missions, improve operational readiness to meet future 

demands, and care for the well-being of its Soldiers and their Families. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SMITH 

Mr. SMITH. The Committee understands that the USMC LAV program has experienced significant benefits associated with Side and Wheel-well Armor Kits added to 

the USMC fleet of LAV’s. These kits were developed by Armatec and installed at 

the Barstow and Albany USMC Depots. Further, the Committee understands that 

several allied countries are incorporating, into their LAV fleets, additional technologies developed by this company such as Mine Blast floor and Underbelly Protection Kits, Roof Mounted Blast Attenuating Seats, Armored Self-sealing Fuel Tanks 

and RPG Protection Kits. The Committee believes that these technologies could improve Stryker vehicle and occupant survivability while not compromising mobility. 

a. Could these kits be adapted for use on the Stryker vehicle? Has the Army 

worked with the USMC or ally countries to determine if these LAV armor solutions 

provide better protection than current Stryker armor solutions? If not, why not? 

b. If the Army has worked in coordination with the USMC LAV program and or 

ally countries to evaluate if any of these technologies could be incorporated into the 

Stryker vehicles during reset, provide the HASC with a summary of your findings. 

c. If the USMC and allied countries have armor solutions that provide better protection for their war fighters shouldn’t the Army develop a prototype to test these 

technologies? 

Secretary MCHUGH. a. Yes, the kits could be adapted for use on Stryker. However, 

while vehicles may appear largely common, specific kits may not be easily applied 

to the other vehicles without significant redesign. Since the Stryker vehicles have 

a greater base vehicle protection against small arms than the USMC LAVs and the 

Canadian LAV IIIs, the armor technologies optimized for their vehicle systems may 

not be optimized or as weight efficient on the Strykers. 

b/c. Since 2002, the Army has participated and conducted technical exchanges 

with the USMC, Canada, New Zealand, and Australia under the Light Armor Vehicle User Nation Group that included meetings conducted annually in London and 

Ontario. In addition, the Army has conducted bi-lateral exchanges with the Canadian Project Manager Organization-Light Armored Vehicle III Office under a Data 

Exchange Agreement on the Light Armor Ground Combat Vehicles. Exchanges have 

included technical approaches to enhance the force protection and survivability of 

our respective ground vehicle systems. It should be noted that vehicle weight, configuration, and capacity play a significant role in the applicability of specific kits to 

other vehicle systems. We will coordinate with the HASC staff to provide a summary of our findings. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BARTLETT 

Mr. BARTLETT. We understand that the U.S. Army has developed a three-phase 

strategy to upgrade M4 carbines with incremental improvements—ambidextrous fire 

control, bolt and bolt carrier, forward rail assemblies, and an upgraded operating 
123 

system—over the next few years. Given the importance of these weapons on the battlefield, this improvement process is essential to ensuring our Soldiers’ operational 

readiness and military capability in places like Afghanistan and elsewhere. But as 

we’ve witnessed with Secretary Gates’ Efficiency Initiatives and the on-going debate 

about trimming programs and getting our spending under control, this upgrade 

process needs to occur in a cost-effective manner. Procurement decisions must emphasize efficiency and effectiveness. And they need to recognize that competition is 

an essential component in achieving the best value—as highlighted so often by 

Under Secretary of Defense Ash Carter. It is in that context that I ask you gentlemen about the Army’s strategy for upgrading the M4. It appears that by choosing 

to approve only incremental upgrades that rely on one company’s product, you have 

foreclosed the possibility of a smarter way to do business. So my questions are 

threefold: 

1. How aware are you of commercial off-the-shelf options in the M4 carbine upgrade area? Have you considered that there may be readily-available COTS solutions? 

2. We understand that the Army is fielding incremental weapon improvements to 

the M4 in Phase I and Phase II of the upgrade strategy, but why is there no definitive budget or timeline for Phase III when COTS solutions will finally be evaluated? 

If there is a plan for Phase III, can you tell us how much is budgeted and when 

the Army will test those COTS solutions? 

3. The Army recently released a draft RFP for a new individual carbine. That 

competition will take at least two years to down select to three potential vendors, 

for a competition that could ultimately cost $1B. At the end of that competition, the 

Chief of Staff of Army will decide between a new carbine and an upgrade. Does it 

make sense to spend 10’s of millions to run an individual carbine competition only 

to turn around and potentially decide only an upgrade is required? Why won’t the 

Army take the more cost effective option today and test commercially available kits 

(and individual carbines) to start by determining the best, most cost effective weapon, then developing a strategy to procure it? 

Secretary MCHUGH and General CASEY. 1. The Army has conducted several market surveys and is aware of the Commercial Off the Shelf (COTS) components and 

weapons that could offer a substitute to the upgraded M4A1 carbine. We are pursuing a Small Arms dual approach to upgrade our current weapons while we simultaneously challenge industry through a Full and Open Competition for the next generation Individual Carbine (IC). The current M4A1 will be in the Army’s inventory 

for a number of years, even if a new weapon is selected through the IC Competition. 

We owe our Soldiers the best weapons we can provide and this dual approach will 

accomplish that. 

2. There is currently no definitive Phase III within the M4 Product Improvement 

Program. Incorporation of a COTS solution for specific weapon components is 

planned for Phase II. 

3. The Army selects its systems through an extensive requirements based test and 

evaluation process. The pending IC competition and testing is estimated to cost 

$21.8M. The Army developed a dual path strategy that would maximize the ability 

to upgrade the M4 by assessing available industry capability, while simultaneously 

developing a new requirement and conducting a full and open COTS competition for 

a new IC. The planned Business Case Analysis at the conclusion of the COTS competition will support the Army’s decision to determine the most prudent path forward for the Carbine program. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LOEBSACK 

Mr. LOEBSACK. How much funding for psychological health and suicide prevention 

in the 2012 budget will be specifically targeted to the National Guard and Reserve? 

Secretary MCHUGH. The Army Reserve’s FY12 budget for psychological health is 

$529K and Suicide Prevention is $3.8M. 

Mr. LOEBSACK. Does the Army have a detailed plan to address the mental health 

needs of the Reserve Components? Will that plan specifically address the unique 

needs and circumstances of the Guard and Reserve? 

Secretary MCHUGH. The Army has embarked on a holistic approach in addressing 

the mental health needs of the Total Force through the Comprehensive Behavioral 

Health System of Care (CBHSOC). However, challenges remain in providing care 

for Reserve Component Soldiers as they matriculate in and out of ‘‘beneficiary’’ status based on mobilization activities. Planning efforts to improve the CBHSOC include identifying those challenges that are unique to the Reserve Component. 
124 

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. AKIN 

Mr. AKIN. In recent weeks, we have heard the Secretary of Defense and you General speak to the need to modernize the tank into the future. Specifically, in the 

Army’s budget material provided to this committee, the Army notes that the Abrams 

tank has ‘‘virtually reached its upper limits for space, weight and power.’’ However, 

there is less than $10 million in the FY 2012 budget request for research and development for Abrams Tank Modernization. This represents close to a $100 million reduction from previous budgets. In light of this significant research funding reduction, does the Army still support Abrams modernization? 

Secretary MCHUGH and General CASEY. Yes. The Army is committed to the modernization of the Abrams. The $9.7M of Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDTE) funds requested in the FY12 President’s Budget is sufficient for 

Abrams modernization because the Army anticipates that the majority of the 

$107.5M in FY11 RDTE funds will carry over to FY12, thereby providing sufficient 

funding to execute all anticipated FY12 RDTE efforts. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. OWENS 

Mr. OWENS. MCEB–Joint Staff memo calls for ‘‘accelerating commercial JTRS solutions to the field’’ and setting standards to create a competitive environment. 

What actions is the Army taking to create a competitive environment for tactical 

radio market? 

Secretary MCHUGH. The Army is taking the following actions to create a competitive environment for the tactical radio market: 

The Army is working to incentivize industry to invest and also direct internal corporate efforts toward developing products that can be made available off-the-shelf 

to meet Service capability needs. 

The JTRS Enterprise Business Model enables companies outside the Programs of 

Record to invest/develop tactical radios according to technical standards determined 

by JTRS, and then compete to sell those radios to the Services. 

Each JTRS Program Office, Airborne Maritime/Fixed, Ground Mobile Radio, and 

Handheld, Manpack, Small Form Fit is intended to have a Full and Open Competition for Full Rate Production. 

The Army remains committed to ensuring that all capable radio vendors are given 

a fair and open opportunity to compete for the Department of Defense’s tactical 

radio communication needs. 

Mr. OWENS. The President’s budget request for family programs is $200 million 

more than FY11, $8.3 billion in all. You yourself have been a particularly strong 

champion for Army family programs. Last year before our Committee you noted that 

if we wish to maintain our vibrant, all-volunteer force, ‘‘soldiers and their families 

must be our top priority.’’ Does this funding increase give your Department the latitude it needs to meet the commitments laid out by the President earlier this year, 

especially as they pertain to rural or underserved areas? 

Secretary MCHUGH. The Army is committed to providing the best possible Family 

Programs and services for Soldiers and Families. We have resourced FY12 Family 

Programs to provide Soldiers and Families with a quality of life commensurate with 

their level of service and sacrifice to the Nation. Army Family Programs serve Active and Reserve Component Soldiers and Families whether they reside on or near 

an installation, or are geographically dispersed. Because of their incredible sacrifices, the Army has committed to provide a full range of services to support readiness and retention and enhance resiliency. 

Soldiers and Families appreciate the wide variety of available programs and services. To better serve them, the Army recently conducted a Holistic Review of Army 

Family Covenant programs and identified opportunities to rebalance resources to 

improve customer access to available programs and services. Our efforts will ensure 

a balanced portfolio of services that are fiscally sustainable to strengthen Soldier 

and Family programs for the long term. 

Mr. OWENS. It is my understanding that the Army is providing our sniper teams 

with the XM2010, which is the upgraded M24 sniper rifle, with increased range and 

lethality. The success of this program has been well covered in the press. I note that 

the President’s Budget proposes $2M for the XM2010 in FY2012 and $2M in each 

of the following three years. It would seem to make sense to buy the XM2010 now, 

when the need by our sniper teams is the greatest, rather than spreading the procurement over four years. Is the $2M amount sufficient to meet the immediate 

needs of the Army? If not, should we accelerate the purchase of the rifles to meet 

the need? 
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Secretary MCHUGH. The President’s Budget requested $2M per year for sniper 

modifications beginning in FY12. This funding was not intended for conversion of 

any M24s to XM2010. Rather, it enables a number of improvements to the other 

weapons in the Army Sniper Rifle Portfolio: the M107 (.50 Caliber) and the M110 

(7.62) Sniper Rifles. Planned improvements include: Lightening the M110 and procuring Sniper Weapon Tripods, Sniper Weapon Quick Fire Sights, Sniper Weapon 

Collimators and Sniper Mirage Mitigating Devices. The Army has sufficient funding 

programmed to meet the current requirement for the XM2010, and is considering 

additional procurements. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WILSON 

Mr. WILSON. I am interested in the Army’s effort to compete Contractor Logistics 

Sustainment and Support (CLSS) contract for Route Clearance Vehicles (RCV) and 

the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) family of vehicles which has been 

carried out by a single provider since 2003. It is concerning to learn the MRAP 

CLSS acquisition schedule is currently in its fourth delay with a new proposed date 

of April 8, 2011, for the release of a draft Request for Proposal (RFP). Can you tell 

me whether the Army is on schedule to release a draft RFP on April 8 and a final 

RFP on June 7? What do you intend to do to ensure the current schedule is not 

delayed for a fifth time? 

Secretary MCHUGH. Yes, the Army is on track to release the draft RFP in April 

2011. The final RFP is still planned for release in June 2011. There are many aspects of conducting a competitive acquisition, including documentation and peer reviews to ensure the RFP is fair to all competitors. It is imperative that the solicitation is properly scoped and the evaluation factors accurately reflect the criterion for 

best value during the initial planning stages of a source selection. The MRAP team 

continues to work towards a competitive procurement while maintaining key support to deployed forces. I have asked the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics and Technology) to continue to monitor this competitive source selection. 

Mr. WILSON. We appreciate your commitment to providing our soldiers with improved small arms at both close combat range and long distance shots in the mountains of Afghanistan. 

a. I understand that the Army is conducting a competition that could determine 

the successor to the M–4. Please describe the competition and how the Army will 

determine whether to retain the M–4 or begin replacing it with the new carbine? 

b. What do you see as the future for the M–4 in the next year or two? 

General CASEY. a. The Individual Carbine (IC) program is being conducted as a 

full and open competition to ensure that the Soldier receives the best overall weapon 

at the best value to the Government. Full and open competition will permit the 

Army to exploit commercially available advances in small arms capabilities. On 31 

January 2011 the Army released the initial draft ‘‘Request for Proposal’’ (RFP) to 

solicit input from industry. Industry was afforded approximately 60 days to review 

the initial draft and submit questions to Program Manager Soldier Weapons 

(PMSW). 

PMSW will host an IC Industry Day on 30 March 2011 in which 35 weapons manufacturers are expected to attend. A panel of acquisitions experts and program managers addressed questions previously submitted by industry as well as questions 

submitted that day. 

The Army expects to release the final RFP at the end of May/beginning of June 

2011 and will give industry 90 (ninety) days to submit their single weapon design 

that best meets the Army requirement. 

The IC Competition is a formal source selection and is expected to last two years, 

although the time frames will vary based upon the number of entrants received and 

qualified for each phase of the competition. The M4A1 will be tested alongside each 

of the competing designs in order to establish a baseline data set for performance 

comparison. 

The Individual Carbine competition has three distinct phases: 

Phase I consists of weapons inspections, non firing characteristics, facility capability, and cost/price. The most highly qualified candidate system will proceed to the 

next phase. 

Phase II: IC candidates will be evaluated against a number of factors, including 

accuracy, reliability/durability, fielding, facility capability, and operational and 

supportability impacts, management, price, government purpose rights, and past 

performance. Three candidate systems will enter the final ‘‘down select’’ phase. 
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Down select Phase: The vendors of the three most highly rated candidate systems 

will be awarded contracts to produce limited number of test articles. The down select phase will include ‘‘user in the loop’’ testing where Soldiers will put the weapons through their paces in a Limited User Evaluation. 

At the end of the competition a formal business case analysis (BCA) will be conducted to consider the performance, life-cycle cost, and terms and conditions (government purpose rights) of the selected system as compared to the current carbine. 

Based on the BCA, we will determine if it is in the best interest of the Army to 

procure the winning carbine, and if so, what the ultimate fielding plan would be. 

b. The future of the M4 is to continue with our Product Improvement Program 

(PIP) as part of the Army’s ‘‘Dual Path Strategy.’’ The M4 PIP includes upgrading 

M4s to M4A1s by adding heavy barrels, full automatic trigger mechanisms and ambidextrous controls. Additionally, the Army plans to solicit industry for upgrades to 

specific components to further improve overall system performance. The combatproven M4/M4A1 Carbine will remain in service for years to come. A competitive 

M4/M4A1 carbine solicitation will be published later this FY to complete the Army’s 

requirements for new M4A1 Carbines and to procure M4/M4A1 Carbines for other 

services and foreign military sales. 

Mr. WILSON. Did the Army conduct an Analysis of Alternatives prior to initiating 

the new carbine competition? If so, will you provide the Committee a copy of the 

analysis? 

General CASEY. The Army waived an Analysis of Alternatives (AOA). We determined that an AOA would not produce relevant information in support of the program since the Key Performance Parameters and Key Systems Attributes were 

baselined on the current M4 Carbine capability as directed by the Army Requirements Oversight Council (AROC). Instead the Army will conduct a Business Case 

Analysis using actual data collected during the test and evaluation of the Individual 

Carbine candidate at the conclusion of the Commercial-off-the-Shelf competition to 

determine the most prudent path forward. 

Mr. WILSON. How will the Army guarantee it does not simply award the contract 

to the lowest bidder, but focuses rather on a combination of quality, cost (life-cycle 

included), and manufacturing capability? 

General CASEY. The Secretary of the Army has directed that all actions be taken 

that allow the Army to conduct a best value, full and open competition for an Individual Carbine. We will evaluate a number of source selection factors, including, 

price, technical performance, past performance, and manufacturing capability. The 

evaluation criteria and the relative weighting of the criteria will be contained in the 

final Request for Proposals. When the technical evaluation is complete, the procurement team will conduct price evaluations against the Independent Government Cost 

Estimate and past performance evaluations. 

Mr. WILSON. Is the infantry carbine competition fully funded in the proposed 

FY12 budget? 

a. Is the M–4 Product Improvement Program (PIP) fully funded in the proposed 

FY12 budget? 

b. Is the Continuing Resolution for FY2011 having any effect on the PIP or carbine competition? 

General CASEY. a. Yes, the Individual Carbine (IC) competition is fully funded in 

FY12. The M4 PIP is not fully funded in the proposed FY12 Budget. 

b. The Continuing Resolution (CR) has not yet begun to affect the M4 PIP or the 

IC Competition at this time but an extended CR could delay both programs three 

to six months. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. RUPPERSBERGER 

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. As you are aware the Air National Guard wing in my District is transitioning from C–130s to the new C–27J Spartan, specifically to address 

the Army’s Direct Support Mission. The Army is spending significant operations and 

maintenance funding on resupply missions using CH–47s. Once deployed, the C–27J 

will relieve the strain on the Army CH–47 fleet and reduce the amount of contracted 

airlift missions required in-theater. Can these missions be better performed using 

more C–27s rather than CH–47s and contractor supported lift? 

Secretary MCHUGH. We are anticipating that the C–27J will ease the burden on 

Army CH–47 helicopters and contracted airlift missions. We are working closely 

with the U.S. Air Force so that the operational commanders’ requirements for delivery of equipment, supplies, and personnel are met. Until the C–27J assumes this 

mission, and until the supported commanders gain sufficient experience with this 
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aircraft, the Air Force will support with C–130 Hercules aircraft, and the Army will 

continue to augment with CH–47 and contracted airlift missions. 

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Regarding the strategy for upgrading the M4. What is your 

strategy to use commercial off-the-shelf options in the M4 carbine upgrade area? Are 

there readily-available COTS solutions? Could you outline the budget plan and 

timeline for each phase of the upgrade strategy? 

Secretary MCHUGH. Upgrading the M4 consists of two phases. Phase I is underway and does not involve a Commercial-off-the-Shelf (COTS)/Non-Developmental 

Item solution. Phase I converts M4 Carbines to M4A1 carbines through new production and modification work orders. Delivery of the M4A1’s from the current production contract begins in mid-FY11 and is currently funded. The Army Acquisition Objective quantities will be met through an acquisition competition and new production contract award to the existing Technical Data Package. The competition and 

funding required to support the Army’s conversion of all fielded M4 Series carbines 

to the M4A1 is currently programmed for FY13–17. 

During Phase II the Army will review potential COTS solutions to improve specific weapon components. Phase II production incorporating these improvements is 

subject to approval prior to proceeding. An engineering study to support the Army’s 

decision for Phase II is funded and currently underway with testing scheduled to 

begin towards the end of FY11. 

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Because of the 2005 BRAC, as well as standing up of 

CYBERCOM there is significant growth at Fort George G. Meade. Could you please 

provide me a status update and timeline on the replacement of displaced BRAC facilities as well as the impact to the MWR Fund at Meade if these facilities are not 

replaced? 

Secretary MCHUGH. I have asked my staff to develop a legislative solution for the 

authorization and appropriation of limited funding to enable the replacement of a 

portion of displaced Soldier assets in FY 13. If the assets are not replaced (in addition to negative impact on community services) the MWR Fund will lose an important source of non-appropriated income, estimated at $200K per year, which is used 

to support other MWR programs on Fort Meade. 

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Regarding the modernization of the US Army’s ground vehicle fleet, please explain the obstacles to further reducing the Army’s (and U.S. Marine Corps) ground vehicle program budget expenditures by re-using the relevant 

portions of the mission systems software and architecture from current investments 

in the AH–64 Apache helicopter program. 

Secretary MCHUGH. The Army continuously seeks to improve its ground vehicle 

fleet by cross-leveling relevant technology to include system software and architecture from other programs whenever possible. Typically, obstacles preventing crossleveling of technology between programs include the lack of data rights, commonality between architectures, and the willingness of defense contractors for different platforms to collaborate. There are specific obstacles to re-using AH–64 software systems. For one, the systems used in aviation tend to be more complex and 

costly. Additionally, the cost of incorporating aviation systems into a truck fleet that 

currently exceeds 250,000 (and for which there is no system software requirement) 

would be cost prohibitive. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TURNER 

Mr. TURNER. In today’s austere budget environment, can the Army afford to procure the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) at a base unit cost of $300–400,000 and 

a total unit cost of $700–800,000? I understand the Army plans to procure about 

50,000 JLTVs. 

a. Will the additional capability provided by the JLTV over the HMMWV merit 

the significant difference in cost? 

b. When were JLTVs originally supposed to go into production? 

c. When are they expected to go into production now? 

d. Does the Army still plan to procure 50,000 JLTVs? 

e. How long is it anticipated that the Army and Marine Corps will use recapitalized vehicles before replacing them with JLTVs? 

f. How much will the recapitalized unarmored HMMWVs cost per unit, per year, 

until the JLTV goes into production? 

Secretary MCHUGH and General CASEY. a. Yes, the Army can afford the JLTV. 

The total unit cost of $700K-$800K for JLTV is not accurate. The Army has established a cost target of $350K per-vehicle and budgeted an additional $60K for vehicle armor kits for a total program target cost of $410K per vehicle. At this target 
128 

cost, the Army can afford its strategy to replace roughly one-third of the Light Tactical Vehicle (LTV) fleet with JLTVs. 

The JLTV is the next generation LTV and is being designed to provide the necessary leap in protection, performance, and payload to fill the capability gap between High Multi-Purpose Mobility Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) and the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) Family of Vehicles. In addition to providing 

greater mobility than the current Up Armored HMMWV (UAH) and MRAPs, the 

JLTV will provide the following: (1) increased payload with armor installed (3,500 

to 5,100 pounds), (2) greater underbody protection than UAH (equal to the MRAP– 

All Terrain Vehicle threshold), (3) on-board/exportable power, (4) the advanced ‘‘Victory’’ architecture for its Command, Control, Communications and Computers and 

Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance systems, (5) increased reliability, and 

(6) increased fuel efficiency. 

b. As of the Army’s Program Objective Memorandum 12–16, the production of 

JLTV was scheduled to begin in FY14. 

c. As a result of the requirement changes captured from lessons learned in the 

JLTV Technology Demonstration (TD) phase and operational lessons learned in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Engineering and Manufacturing Development phase has 

been extended, moving the start of production to FY16. 

d. The Army continues to refine the quantity requirement for JLTV. However, 

based on operational requirements and the Total Obligation Authority for the Tactical Wheeled Vehicle (TWV) fleet, the Army’s strategy is to replace roughly onethird of the LTV fleet with JLTVs over a 20 year period. The total number of 

HMWMVs to be replaced is projected to be approximately 40–46K after completion 

of the 15 percent reduction of the TWV fleet directed in the Army TWV Strategy. 

e. The Army will not replace all of its recapitalized HMMWVs with JLTVs. The 

Army will first replace legacy vehicles that have not been recapitalized, and then 

will begin to replace recapitalized vehicles approximately eight years into JLTV production. At that point the Army will replace unarmored HMMWVs that will have 

accrued roughly 20 years of service life since their recapitalization. 

f. The Army is still developing its HMMWV recapitalization strategy and has not 

made decisions about the recapitalization mix between unarmored and armored 

HMMWVs in the period FY13–15 before JLTV enters production. 

Mr. TURNER. With MEADS no longer planned as the replacement for Patriot in 

the 2017 timeframe, what actions and investments are required by the Army, and 

when, to operate and sustain the legacy Patriot system beyond 2017? Are any of 

these funded in the FY12 request? Does the Army see a need to improve or upgrade 

Patriot’s capabilities? If so, what is the estimated cost of such improvements or upgrades as compared to the cost to complete MEADS development and production? 

Secretary MCHUGH and General CASEY. The Army is taking numerous actions 

and making multiple investments to operate and sustain Patriot in light of the decision not to continue the Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS). These actions include upgrades to the Patriot system to meet the evolving threat, improving 

both system performance and mean time between failures, extending the recapitalization program and accelerating Patriot integration into the Army Integrated Air 

and Missile Defense System of Systems architecture. 

In the President’s Budget 2012, the Army requested funding in support of this effort primarily for the Patriot improvement and sustainment efforts. Additionally, 

the Army will integrate the Missile Segment Enhancement (MSE) missile with the 

Patriot system to continue the capability evolution of Patriot’s interceptor and expand the size of Patriot’s engagement envelope. Additionally, the Army will procure 

Electronic Launcher Enhanced System (‘‘ELES’’ launcher upgrades) to provide Combatant Commanders with additional Patriot Advanced Capability–3 and MSE hitto-kill launch capability. In total, these efforts will keep Patriot relevant and ready 

well into the future. 

The Army conducted a comprehensive analysis of cost to complete development, 

complete production, and operate and sustain MEADS compared to the cost to upgrade and sustain Patriot. The assessment concluded that, between FY12 and FY30, 

proceeding with Patriot is approximately one-third the cost of continuing MEADS. 

This difference is in large part attributable to the high cost of producing a full new 

force of MEADS equipment, versus upgrading and sustaining existing equipment to 

meet emerging threats. 

Mr. TURNER. During your testimony you were confident that the Army would 

meet the 1 to 2 dwell time ratio. When will the Army meet that ratio? Will the 

Army continue to meet that ratio given the proposed end strength reductions? Will 

the Army be able to meet the 1 to 3 dwell time ratio before the proposed Afghani-
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stan reductions in 2014? What concerns do you have about the Army’s ability to 

meet and maintain the 1 to 2 dwell time ratio? The 1 to 3 dwell time ratio? 

General CASEY. Based on the Joint Staff projections of demand for forces, which 

includes reductions in both Iraq and Afghanistan, we believe we will reach our goal 

of 1-to-2 in late 2012. The strength reductions in FY15 and FY16 also assume that 

the demand for forces will decrease enough to allow us to maintain at least the 1- 

to-2 ratio with the smaller force. However, it is unlikely that we will be able to 

achieve a 1-to-3 ratio under proposed Afghanistan reductions in FY14. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SHUSTER 

Mr. SHUSTER. The Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS) is a NATOmanaged, cooperative development program that was conceived in the mid-1990’s to 

develop a ground-based air and terminal ballistic missile defense capability that 

would replace existing Patriot systems. On February 11, the Secretary of Defense 

made a decision not to proceed to procurement of the MEADS system. Instead, the 

Department plans to continue development though 2013 within the funding limits 

set forth under a 2005 Memorandum of Understanding (a $4B cap on total design 

and development costs). According to DOD, this would allow them to implement a 

‘‘proof of concept’’ effort and avoid termination costs. However, under this scenario, 

the Department is still required to spend $804M. This raises the question of whether it is feasible in the current fiscal and threat environment to continue investing 

in MEADS. The Patriot system is currently fielded by the U.S. and 11 partner nations. It has been continuously upgraded and modernized over the years, much of 

it financed through FMS, resulting in a ‘‘Configuration 3+’’ system that already 

meets most of the envisioned requirements for MEADS. The OSD Memo clearly lists 

Department’s inability to afford to procure MEADS and make required Patriot upgrades as rationale for terminating the procurement of MEADS. Patriot modernization should be accelerated in light of the Department’s MEADS decision. I applaud 

you for your decision not to proceed to procurement of the MEADS missile defense 

system. As noted in the DOD memo, the program is substantially over budget and 

behind schedule. The Department made a decision to complete the design and development phase of the program, which will require an additional $804 million across 

FY12 and FY13. $406.6 million of this is included in the FY12 budget request. 

a. If the MEADS program ends at the design and development phase and there 

are no plans to continue into production and fielding, why are we even continuing 

to fund design and development? 

b. Why should the committee authorize the FY12 budget request of $406.6 million 

for MEADS? What is the pay-off? 

c. Will DOD go back to the drawing board and try to find a way to ring out some 

additional savings out of this $800M for MEADS? 

d. The DOD memo indicates that it will be necessary to allocate funds for Patriot 

upgrades. At a minimum, will DOD work to reallocate funds for Design and Development for upgrades to the Patriot system? 

Secretary MCHUGH. a. The continued funding of the Proof of Concept is intended 

to complete prototypes of radar, battle manager, and launcher end items; demonstrate integration of the Missile Segment Enhancement interceptor; and complete 

ground testing and conduct two intercept flight tests. Information gained from the 

Proof of Concept will be used to inform future program decisions, and some MEADS 

technology developed in the Proof of Concept approach may be applicable to future 

U.S. systems. The MEADS partners will also take delivery of equipment and other 

hardware residuals from this contracted effort, as well as all information (including 

deliverable technical data) that the contractor is obligated to provide under the contract. Germany and Italy stated in discussions with the Under Secretary of Defense 

(Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics) that they would like to proceed to completion of the Proof of Concept. Completing the Proof of Concept will enable our 

MEADS partners to field coalition missile defense capability. Our MEADS partner’s 

burden-sharing investment in MEADS will reduce future demands for U.S. investment to protect coalition forces in this ‘‘high-demand, low-density’’ force protection 

area. Additionally, the continuation and completion of the Design and Development 

will avoid the more costly termination cost required under the agreements in the 

Memorandum of Agreement. 

b. The $406.6M in FY12 funds the Proof of Concept effort to reduce risk and invest in Technology Development rather than absorb the termination costs. The Proof 

of Concept will mature MEADS Major End Items and complete some system-level 

integration and testing within the existing Design and Development (D&D) Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) cost constraints. This will be executed using re-
130 

maining funds that would otherwise pay termination costs with no further benefit 

to the three MEADS partners. Collective work under the Proof of Concept offers 

pay-off benefits for all three MEADS partners, builds partner capacity in Air and 

Missile Defense, and positions Italy and Germany for possible future development, 

production, and fielding. We envision that the Proof of Concept development efforts 

will focus on completion of as many D&D tasks as possible within the funding limitations of the current D&D MOU, concluding with two flight tests of the MEADS 

system in late 2012 and mid 2013, and completion of all D&D MOU efforts by mid2014. 

c. Potential Proof of Concept revisions to the D&D prime contract are currently 

in negotiations with the Partners. The NATO MEADS Management Agency 

(NAMEADSMA) will develop and negotiate a contract amendment consistent with 

the Proof of Concept scope envisioned by the MEADS partners. 

d. The Army is taking numerous actions and making multiple investments to operate, sustain and upgrade Patriot, in light of the decision to pursue the Proof of 

Concept approach and the decreased future funding requirement for MEADS. It 

should be noted, however, that the $804M for the MEADS Proof of Concept funding 

remains separate and does not directly sustain or upgrade Patriot. 

Mr. SHUSTER. The Memo accompanying your recent decision not to proceed to procurement of MEADS, you specifically highlighted the Army’s inability to afford to 

procure MEADS and make required Patriot upgrades as rationale for the decision. 

I agree wholeheartedly with that assessment and commend you on your decision. 

It is vital that we continue to upgrade the Patriot system, which can provide added 

capability much sooner and at a fraction of the cost. With MEADS no longer 

planned as the replacement for Patriot in the 2017 timeframe, what actions and investments are required by the Army, and when, to operate and sustain the legacy 

Patriot system beyond 2017? Are any of these funded in the FY12 request? Does 

the Army see a need to improve or upgrade Patriot’s capabilities? If so, what is the 

estimated cost of such improvements or upgrades as compared to the cost to complete MEADS development and production? 

Secretary MCHUGH. The Army is taking numerous actions and making multiple 

investments to operate and sustain Patriot in light of the decision not to continue 

the Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS). These actions include upgrades to the Patriot system to meet the evolving threat, improving both system 

performance and mean time between failures, extending the recapitalization program and accelerating Patriot integration into the Army Integrated Air and Missile 

Defense System of Systems architecture. 

In the President’s Budget 2012, we requested funding in support of this effort primarily for Patriot improvement and sustainment efforts. Additionally, the Army will 

integrate the Missile Segment Enhancement (MSE) missile with the Patriot system 

to continue the capability evolution of Patriot’s interceptor and expand the size of 

Patriot’s engagement envelope. We will also procure the Electronic Launcher Enhanced System (‘‘ELES’’ launcher upgrades) to provide Combatant Commanders 

with additional Patriot Advanced Capability–3 and MSE hit-to-kill launch capability. In total, these efforts will keep Patriot relevant and ready well into the future. 

The Army conducted a comprehensive analysis of cost to complete development, 

complete production, and operate and sustain MEADS compared to the cost to upgrade and sustain Patriot. The assessment concluded that, between FY12 and FY30, 

proceeding with Patriot is approximately one-third the cost of continuing MEADS. 

This difference is in large part attributable to the high cost of producing a full new 

force of MEADS equipment, versus upgrading and sustaining existing equipment to 

meet emerging threats. 

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. CONAWAY 

Mr. CONAWAY. I am pleased to read from your statement your thoughts on the 

importance of fiscal stewardship in the U.S. Army. Like you, I strongly support 

training leaders and managers to make better resource-informed decisions. I am 

happy to learn that in addition to better training and professional development, the 

Army has fielded the General Fund Enterprise Business System to more than 

11,000 users at 14 installations. Along with the better training, this system is vital 

to ensuring Army is able to reach full auditability of its financial statements sooner 

rather than later. Investment from the Army leadership is important in accomplishing the full audit readiness goal. Like I have said in every budget posture hearing during this Congress and many previous Congresses, I cannot stress enough to 

you that making audit readiness a priority for the U.S. Army is a necessity. Would 
131 

you please provide for the Committee your thoughts on the Army’s audit program 

to date and how you see it moving forward? 

Secretary MCHUGH. The Army has a solid, achievable, and resourced plan to be 

fully auditable by 2017. The Army’s plan is synchronized with the overall DOD Financial Improvement and Audit Readiness (FIAR) Plan and provides detailed milestones and organizations responsible for ensuring the milestones are met. 

Our plan provides necessary training to Army personnel to ensure these personnel 

understand how to manage the Army’s financial resources in a manner that is 

transparent and auditable. The plan stresses the importance of establishing and 

maintaining a compliant control environment that will meet or exceed audit standards. To meet the objective of establishing an effective internal control environment, 

we are implementing the General Fund Enterprise Business System (GFEBS), evaluating existing internal controls, and implementing corrective actions where controls do not meet standards. Moreover, we are training personnel to maintain and 

operate within the required, disciplined control environment. 

Additionally, our audit readiness plan includes a series of four successive financial 

statement audits, conducted by an independent public accounting firm (IPA) in 

FY11 through FY14. The IPA audits will validate the efficacy of our control environment, training and GFEBS implementation. The audits will disclose underperforming areas and recommend corrective actions. The cumulative effect of training, 

controls, GFEBS fielding and independent audit testing will enable an audit ready 

environment by FY17. 

In executing this audit readiness plan, the Army has achieved several significant 

accomplishments. First, as of 30 Sep 2010, the Army asserted the audit readiness 

of the Appropriations Received line on the General Fund Statement of Budgetary 

Resources, which totaled $231.9 billion in FY10. OUSD(C) has validated this assertion package and on 27 Apr 2011 an independent public accounting firm began an 

audit of this line item. In addition, the Army asserted, as of 31 Mar 2011, the existence and completeness of eight aviation programs, which includes more than 2,400 

mission critical assets. OUSD(C) and DOD IG are currently validating this assertion 

package and DOD IG will begin an audit of this assertion in in the fourth quarter 

of FY11. Finally, the Army is in the process of beginning the first of several interim 

audit readiness examinations of the funds distribution and budget execution processes at sites where GFEBS was first implemented, known as GFEBS 

Wave 1 installations. OUSD(C) and DOD IG are currently validating this assertion package and OUSD(C) is progressing through the procurement process to contract an IPA to begin this examination in June 2011. 

By achieving these important milestones, the Army has demonstrated that its 

audit readiness plan will result in the appropriate outcomes, as defined by Congress 

and USD(C). These milestones are critical first steps in confirming the effectiveness 

of the Army’s plan and gaining the necessary momentum to enable future audit 

readiness success across the Army. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. COFFMAN 

Mr. COFFMAN. General, various ground vehicle programs are currently being developed by the U.S. Army. Additionally, modernization efforts are also underway for 

some ground vehicle platforms, including the Bradley Fighting Vehicle, the Abrams 

Main Battle Tank, and the Stryker. How will the Army ultimately reconcile the existing ground vehicles, updated/modernized ground vehicles, and ground vehicles 

currently being developed into a comprehensive and cohesive ground vehicle strategy? Please specifically address the future of Abrams Main Battle Tank, Bradley 

Fighting Vehicle, Ground Combat Vehicle, MRAP/MATV, Stryker, Joint Light Tactical Vehicle, and the HMMWV. 

General CASEY. The Army’s Combat Vehicle Modernization Strategy represents a 

holistic approach to the development of the Ground Combat Vehicle, replacement of 

the M113 Family of Vehicles and the incremental modernization of the Bradley, 

Abrams, Paladin, and Stryker. Modernization imperatives across the fleet include 

improved protection, mobility and sustainment, mitigation of existing Size, Weight 

and Power (SWaP) shortfalls and Network integration. In addition, the Army has 

developed and published a comprehensive Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Strategy aimed 

at providing an affordable plan to achieve and sustain the capabilities that the 

Army will need through FY25. 

The Ground Combat Vehicle will replace the Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle 

(IFV) and will be the cornerstone of modernization for the Combat Vehicle fleet. The 

four imperatives of the Ground Combat Vehicle are: 1) MRAP like protection, 2) a 

nine man squad carrying capacity, 3) full spectrum operations capability, and 4) de-
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velopment in seven years. The Ground Combat Vehicle will be built with capacity 

to grow in weight and power requirements through modernization as future technologies mature. 

The Army is considering options for the modernization of the M1A2SEP v2 tank 

and is currently evaluating technology alternatives. The application of new technologies will be synchronized with the next recapitalization opportunity for the oldest tanks in the fleet. 

Bradley modernization will address buy-back of SWaP for Non-IFV Bradley 

variants (Cavalry, Fire Support and Engineer) to improve protection, mobility and 

integrate the emerging network. 

M113 replacement will initially focus on Heavy Brigade Combat Teams (HBCT) 

using a material solution that provides necessary protection, mobility, and interoperability to operate in the Ground Combat Vehicle-equipped formation. 

Stryker Modernization includes buy-back of SWaP and will leverage the development effort of the Double V Hull. Additionally, the Army will consider engine and 

drive train upgrades to improve mobility and enable network integration. 

The Army plans to retain and use most of its MRAP/M–ATV fleet for the next 

15 years and potentially beyond. A small number of MRAPs that are uneconomical 

to maintain and/or upgrade will be divested once they are no longer required for 

wartime service. The majority will be maintained by the Army, some as organic unit 

equipment and some in augmentation sets to be used when required. As requirements in Iraq and Afghanistan decline, MRAPs will be reset to eliminate maintenance deficiencies; when feasible and affordable, safety and automotive upgrades 

will also be applied. 

The Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) is the Army’s next generation Light Tactical Vehicle (LTV) and is being designed to provide the necessary capability in protection, performance and payload to fill the capability gap remaining between the 

HMMWV and MRAPs. The JLTV program is scheduled to enter the Engineering 

and Manufacturing Design phase of development in FY12 and begin Low Rate Production in FY16. The Army plans to replace approximately one-third of the 

HMMWVs in its LTV fleet over a period of 20 years. 

The HMMWV is the Army’s current LTV and will continue to serve in the force 

for the foreseeable future. The Army TWV Strategy calls for an approximately 15% 

reduction in its Tactical Wheeled Vehicle fleet, which will result in an LTV fleet size 

of roughly 120,000 vehicles. HMMWVs will continue to make-up two-thirds of this 

fleet after the Army’s planned procurement of JLTV. HMMWVs will continue to be 

used for operational deployments as the mission and threat situation allows and will 

serve prominently in the Homeland Defense and Disaster Relief mission roles. The 

Army will continue to recapitalize its HMWMV fleet to extend its service life and 

is conducting research for a Competitive HMWMV Recap program to potentially increase HMMWV protection to near-MRAP levels. 

Mr. COFFMAN. General, how important are initiatives such as the Yellow Ribbon 

program at the state level in reintegrating National Guard soldiers when they return from combat operations? 

General CASEY. At the state level, the Yellow Ribbon Reintegration Program has 

proven to be an invaluable resource and tool for our Warriors and Families. Programs like the Yellow Ribbon program are an integral part of our efforts to build 

resilient Families and Army Strong Soldiers who can endure the mobilizations, separations, and sacrifices we ask of them as part of their selfless service. We continue 

to work to provide Soldiers and Families, their employers and local communities 

some stability and predictability. This allows them to pursue both their military and 

civilian careers. Participating in Yellow Ribbon events provide attendees with information and services, opportunities for referral and proactive outreach from our commands and our communities. Our events rely on the support and involvement of 

command staffs, employers, community partners and a host of volunteers. The goal 

is to build skills in each Family member and Soldier to assure they are prepared 

and able to cope with the difficulties of extended separation and deployment. We 

help Families network together, connect with each other and keep the Families connected with their unit/command and Family Programs’ Office/staff during the deployment of their Soldiers. We concentrate on assisting Families and Soldiers to 

help with reuniting, reconnecting and reintegrating them into a ‘‘new normal.’’ Lastly, we attend to both the Family members’ and Soldiers’ physical, behavioral and 

mental health needs. We utilize trained professional speakers and briefers from federal agencies and local, state, and national agencies, to come to units or regional 

venues to educate and assist attendees with knowledge, skills and practical, handson participation to meet the goals stated above. 
133 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. RIGELL 

Mr. RIGELL. I would like to commend the Army on their quick and appropriate 

response to addressing the increased threat of Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) 

and other heat hazards facing our soldiers in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). 

Notably, policies put in place to ensure that flame resistance is integrated into a 

soldier’s uniform have helped to greatly mitigate the number of soldiers suffering 

life altering or ending burn injuries. 

a. To this end, it is my understanding that currently, only aviators and combat 

vehicle crewmen receive the Fire Resistant Environmental Ensemble (FREE) that 

protects soldiers from heat and burn threats, and provides critical warmth and mission readiness capabilities. Could you please clarify if this is correct? 

b. Please also comment if the Army has a plan to provide this or a similar flame 

resistant cold weather clothing systems to all soldiers deployed in OEF. 

General CASEY. a. Only aviators and combat vehicle crewmen are issued the 

FREE System, however, all Soldiers deploying in support of OEF are issued Flame 

Resistant (FR) Uniforms to include gloves, light-weight performance hood, FR boots, 

and FR Army combat shirts. Depending on the Military Occupational Specialty 

(MOS) and mission, all deploying Soldiers are fielded either the Flame Resistant 

Army Combat Uniform (FR ACU), the Army Aircrew Combat Uniform (A2CU), or 

the Improved Combat Vehicle Crewman (ICVC) uniform). All Soldiers are protected 

in their operating environments. 

b. Yes, the Army has a plan to provide similar flame resistant cold weather clothing system to all Soldiers deployed in OEF. The Army is currently pursuing efforts 

to integrate FR capabilities into the outer layers of the Extended Cold Weather 

Clothing System (ECWCS) seven-layer system. The improvement is currently in research and development (R&D) and, when available, will be issued to all deploying 

Soldiers. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MRS. HARTZLER 

Mrs. HARTZLER. With the proposed repeal of the DADT policy, what changes to 

facilities are you contemplating to address the privacy and concerns of service members? 

General CASEY. We are not contemplating any changes to facilities. This is supported by the Comprehensive Review Working Group (CRWG) recommendation that 

no ‘‘new construction or modifications to facilities beyond low-cost, unit-funded adaptations’’ to improve privacy was required to address the concerns of Soldiers. Although not related to the implementation of the repeal of DADT, the DOD Unified 

Facilities Criteria requires all new, unaccompanied, permanent housing be designed 

to afford Soldiers private bedrooms and a bathroom shared by not more than one 

person, which will provide greater privacy. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Will chaplains of all faiths be required to conduct diversity training programs that promote homosexual conduct as equivalent to heterosexual conduct, or will there be a right to refuse such responsibilities in educational programs? 

General CASEY. Chaplains will continue to have freedom to practice their religion 

according to the tenets of their faith. In the context of their religious ministry, chaplains are not required to take actions that are inconsistent with their religious beliefs (e.g., altering the content of sermons or religious counseling, sharing a pulpit 

with other chaplains or modifying forms of prayer or worship). 

Chaplains of all faiths care for all Soldiers and facilitate the free exercise of religion for all personnel, regardless of religious affiliation of either the chaplain or the 

individual. 

Chaplains minister to Soldiers and provide advice to commanders on matters of 

religion, morals, ethics and morale in accordance with (and without compromising) 

the tenets or requirements of their faith. Chaplains faced with an issue contrary to 

their individual faith may refer the Soldier to other appropriate counsel. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. If chaplains do have a right to refuse such responsibilities, will 

they suffer career penalties for exercising it? 

General CASEY. Implementation of the repeal of DADT will require no change in 

chaplains’ responsibilities or flexibility in serving Soldiers. Chaplains of all faiths 

care for all Soldiers and facilitate the free exercise of religion for all, regardless of 

religious affiliation of either the chaplain or the individual; hence, chaplains will 

incur no career penalties for practicing the tenets of their faith 

Mrs. HARTZLER. What costs do you anticipate it costing to make these changes? 

General CASEY. No funds will be separately requested for construction of facilities 

as a result of the Don’t Ask Don’t Tell Repeal Act. 
134 

Mrs. HARTZLER. What is the estimated number of man-hours that will be needed 

to implement each phase of the three-tier training program? 

General CASEY. Current analysis indicates that Tier 1 education sessions are taking an average of 1.5 hours to complete; Tier 2 education sessions require an average of 2.5 hours, and Tier 3 education sessions are taking about an hour. Using the 

most recent reporting numbers from the force: 66,093 Soldiers completed Tier 1 

training; 44,894 completed Tier 2; and 1,019,013 completed Tier 3. We estimate Tier 

1 man-hours at 99,140; Tier 2 man-hours at 112,235; Tier 3 man-hours at 1,019,013 

with a grand total of 1,230,388 man hours to date. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. What is the estimated number of military commanders likely to 

suffer career-ending consequences for disagreement with the repeal of the DADT 

law and policies? 

General CASEY. The Army has no such estimate and has no way of knowing. Commanders are expected to emphasize Soldiers’ fundamental professional obligations 

and the oath to support and defend the Constitution that is at the core of their military service. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Given what is known about the normal human desire for privacy 

in sexual matters, why would policies requiring the constant cohabitation of mixed 

sexual orientation groups not undermine morale, disciple, and readiness, recruiting, 

and retention? 

General CASEY. Service in the military makes it necessary at times for Soldiers 

to accept living and working conditions characterized by little or no privacy. The 

Army will not establish facilities, quarters, berthing or practices based on sexual 

orientation. Commanders retain the authority to address individual cohabitation 

concerns on a case-by-case basis regardless of the sexual orientation of the affected 

Soldiers. 

The Army Guiding Principles for Implementation of the Repeal of DADT include: 

standards of conduct will apply to every Soldier; all Soldiers must treat each other 

with dignity and respect; our role as professional Soldiers is emphasized; and good 

order and discipline will be maintained at all times. The clear message is that respecting each other’s rights within a closed space is critical to maintaining good 

order and discipline. Standards of conduct apply equally to all Soldiers and inappropriate conduct should be corrected appropriately. If a Soldier has a concern with a 

billeting or work arrangement for any reason, he or she should address those concerns appropriately within the chain of command. Commanders may use discretion 

in personnel assignments to berthing, housing and other facilities to maintain morale, good order and discipline based on Army policies and space available. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. How would these changes improve the All-Volunteer Force? 

General CASEY. It is currently too early to determine its effects as the policy has 

not gone into effect. We have a training strategy/plan that should allow the transition to the new policy with minimal disruption. The policy as currently crafted, 

which is limited in scope (in that gays/lesbians are not a special class), should have 

a neutral impact during the training/transition period. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. RUNYAN 

Mr. RUNYAN. Could you please give your assessments of the impact of proposed 

DOD and Army efficiencies on Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst? 

Secretary MCHUGH and General CASEY. It is too early in the process for an assessment regarding DOD and Army efficiencies at the Joint Base McGuire Dix 

Lakehurst (JBMDL). JBMDL reached Final Operational Capability (FOC) on 1 Oct 

2009 with the Air Force as the lead. Projected efficiencies associated with Joint Basing will not be realized until two to five years after achieving FOC. 

Mr. RUNYAN. As BRAC 2005 winds down, what is your assessment on whether 

Joint Basing is producing the operational benefits and cost efficiencies that were expected more than five years ago? Is the Army transferring funds to the Air Force, 

Navy, and Marine Corps to pay for valid Army Military Construction requirements 

at Joint Bases? How about the reverse—has the Army received any MILCON fund 

transfers from other Services? 

Secretary MCHUGH and General CASEY. Although we do not have enough data to 

conclude that Joint Bases are achieving the expected benefits and efficiencies, early 

indications show that some operational benefits are being realized. Joint Base Commanders are using ingenuity to optimize the delivery of installation support. The 

Army has transferred funds to the Service lead for valid Army Military Construction 

requirements. 

Mr. RUNYAN. Are you confident that the budget cuts contained in the FY12 request will not force the Reserve Components to go back to the pre-September 11th 
135 

days of a hollow, ‘‘Strategic Reserve’’ force? What metrics or leading indicators will 

you be monitoring to ensure that the Reserve Components remain a viable, operational force that is fully part of the Total Army?’’ 

Secretary MCHUGH and General CASEY. The steady, consistent, and recurring demand for Reserve capabilities during almost a decade of war required us to integrate our Reserve forces into our operational expeditionary Army. Congressional 

support for Overseas Contingency Operations resources enabled us to address incremental funding challenges. Most of the incremental costs were a result of needing 

additional man days (above the statutory 39 per year) to achieve higher readiness 

levels. During POM 12–16, the Army validated Operational Reserve training requirements in the base program for the first time. The majority of our Reserve Component units are still funded at the ‘‘Strategic Reserve’’ level in the FY12 Base 

Budget but have achieved higher levels of readiness using OCO funding. As part 

of the POM 13–17 build, the Army tasked the Reserve Chiefs to assess how much 

of the Operational Reserve requirements they can fund within existing resources. 

We have not yet determined which Army programs will be decreased or eliminated 

to fund the Reserve Components above the current ‘‘Strategic Reserve’’ levels, but 

we expect to make those decisions as part of the FY13 budget submission. We are 

working closely with OSD to determine what the future requirements will be for our 

Reserve Component and how to best achieve affordable access for the full range of 

assignments. 

Mr. RUNYAN. How does the Army plan to integrate the Russian Mi–17 into the 

Army operational and logistical system? Have you established a separate program 

office? 

Secretary MCHUGH and General CASEY. There are no plans to integrate the Mi– 

17 into the Army Operational and Logistical System. The Army was designated as 

the lead Service for the Mi–17 and other Non-Standard Rotary-Wing Aircraft in an 

Acquisition Decision Memorandum (ADM) dated 19 January 2010. The lead Service 

responsibilities outlined in the ADM include procurement, training, and sustaining 

of Non-Standard Rotary Wing Aircraft for partner nations in support of Department 

of Defense’s (DOD’s) enduring Security Force Assistance (SFA) requirements. In 

order to facilitate lead Service responsibilities, the Army established a Project Management Office to support DOD’s global Non-Standard Rotary Wing SFA programs. 

As identified in the Quadrennial Defense Review, building partner nation vertical 

lift capabilities through SFA programs will likely continue into the future. Building 

a partner Nation’s sustainment is a key capability and the primary method of building a Non-Standard Rotary Wing sustainment capability is through Contractor Logistics Support (CLS). The Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, G–4, has identified CLS as the most cost effective and dependable means to sustain low density, 

high demand, critical components and repair parts that require airworthiness certification. 

Mr. RUNYAN. Will the logistical support for the Mi–17 aircraft be integrated into 

the normal Army aviation logistics system? 

Secretary MCHUGH and General CASEY. Logistics support for the Mi–17 will not 

be integrated into the normal Army aviation logistics system. The logistics and 

sustainment support for each partner nation or customer will be accomplished 

through a Contractor Logistics Support (CLS) Contract executed through the NonStandard Rotary Wing Program Manager’s Office with approved sources of supply. 

Each partner Nation/customer will determine the level of CLS required to support 

their Nation’s sustainment strategy. The Department of Defense’s assigned Security 

Force Assistance Team helps them develop their logistics and sustainment strategy 

through detailed capability and requirements analysis. 

Mr. RUNYAN. Why was the Mi–17 program changed from NAVAIR to the Army? 

Secretary MCHUGH and General CASEY. The Mi–17 program was not changed 

from NAVAIR to the Army. The NAVAIR was directed to procure 21 Mi–17 helicopters for Afghanistan in 2009, but was not assigned as a project office nor as the 

lead Service. This procurement was prior to the establishment of the Non-Standard 

Rotary Wing Aviation Program Management Office (NSRWA PMO) and a decision 

was made not to move the NAVAIR procurement to the Army after the NSRWA 

PMO was created. The Department of Defense did not want to impact the Mi–17 

procurement. The NAVAIR procurement strategy was to procure commercial Mi–17 

helicopters and modify them for military use. However, based on diplomatic communications between the U.S. Ambassador to Russia and the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs in 2010, it was determined that the NAVAIR procurement approach 

would not be feasible. Russian Federation Law requires that all military end use 

helicopters be procured through Rosoboronexport, a state owned organization responsible for the export of all military end use items from the Russian Federation. 

Based on this information, the Defense Acquisition Executive signed an Acquisition 
136 

Decision Memorandum directing NAVAIR to cancel its procurement and directing 

the Army to begin a new procurement for military Mi–17 helicopters for the Afghan 

Ministry of Defense in accordance with Russian Federation law. 

Mr. RUNYAN. Is the Mi–17 program a government to government program with 

the Russian government? 

Secretary MCHUGH and General CASEY. The current Mi–17 procurement effort for 

21 helicopters and airworthiness assurances are being conducted between the U.S. 

Army’s Non-Standard Rotary Wing Aviation Program Management Office (NSWRA 

PMO) and the Russian Federation’s Federal Service for Military and Technical Cooperation. In addition, the NSWRA PMO is negotiating a contract with 

Rosoboronexport for the procurement of 21 military use Mi–17s for Afghanistan. 

This contract will include the procurement of 21 Mi–17’s, with an option for 12 additional Mi–17’s, critical Mi–17 spare parts and engineering services. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WEST 

Mr. WEST. The recent developments across North Africa, the Middle East, the Korean Peninsula, and in the SOUTHCOM AOR have one common geographical aspect—the littorals. Is the Army looking ahead and considering how they can be deployed into the littorals using force projection and forcible entry from the seas? I 

specifically would like to know about training, equipment modernization, and joint 

coordination exercises. 

Secretary MCHUGH and General CASEY. Typically, the Army plays a limited role 

during forcible entry operations from the seas into the littorals. The Army maintains capabilities in general purpose forces to conduct forcible entry by air borne 

and air assault operations and these forces could support forcible entry operations 

in littorals. Seldom would airborne operations need to originate from ships. By exception, air assault operations could be executed from ships, but this capability is 

not expected of general purpose forces and requires qualification of pilots and compatible helicopters and ammunition. Army aviation units do not routinely train for 

over-water/shipboard operations until assigned that mission. For aviation units with 

assigned over-water/ship-board requirements (like some supporting Korea and U.S. 

Southern Command), the Army provides qualification training and equipment. 

Army aviation simulators include littoral training scenarios. 

The Army has organized, equipped, and trained units to support force projection 

from the seas, to include specific units that supported port opening, water purification/storage/distribution, and logistics-over-the-shore operations. Critical capabilities for logistics-over-the-shore operations include command and control; cargo documentation; Soldier ‘‘stevedores’’ to operate onboard cranes and to discharge equipment from strategic ships; waterborne transportation of personnel, cargo, and equipment to include the operation of small tugs, large tugs, vessels, floating cranes, 

‘‘water taxi’’ service, floating platforms and causeways. Army training ensures these 

units are technically and tactically ready for employment when needed by combatant commanders. U.S. Transportation Command joint logistics-over-the-shore exercises provide an important training venue where these Army units can operate doctrinally in littorals as part of an interdependent joint team. There is a joint logisticsover-the-shore exercise in Morocco with U.S. Africa Command during the April-May 

timeframe and a joint logistics-over-the-shore exercise in Korea with U.S. Pacific 

Command in the Mar-Jun timeframe. The Army is also exploring with U.S. Transportation Command opportunities to integrate air borne forcible entry capabilities 

into a theater entry exercise. 

Mr. WEST. Myself and a number of my colleagues are concerned about so-called 

invisible wounds, such as Traumatic Brain Injury. What can you tell me about the 

Department of the Army’s efforts with Hyperbaric Oxygen Therapy (HBOT) and 

Cognitive Stimulation? 

Secretary MCHUGH and General CASEY. The Army is evaluating the use of 

hyperbaric oxygen for the treatment of persistent mild TBI symptoms. There is a 

multi-center study underway that will evaluate Active Duty military men and nonpregnant Active Duty military women who are residing in the United States. The 

military personnel in the study have been deployed one or more times and have 

been diagnosed with at least one mild brain injury with persistent symptoms. The 

study is being conducted at Fort Gordon, Fort Carson, Camp Lejeune and Camp 

Pendleton with research staff assistance from the Denver VA Medical Center and 

Salt Lake City LDS Hospital. It is important to note, however, that the use of 

hyperbaric oxygen to treat traumatic brain injury (TBI) is currently not approved 

by the Food and Drug Administration. Some civilian medical practitioners are using 
137 

it as treatment for patients with brain damage from stroke, sports injury and trauma including chronic symptoms from mild traumatic brain injury. 

The Army is providing Cognitive Rehabilitation Therapy (CRT) to a large number 

of Soldiers with TBI and the Department of Defense (DOD) is actively studying its 

effectiveness. CRT interventions for Service members are available at DOD Military 

Treatment Facilities, through the Supplemental Health Care Program, and through 

VA programs. CRT is a not a single therapy as the name suggests, but a collection 

of individual treatment strategies, such as cognitive stimulation, that are designed 

to improve problems with memory, attention, perception, learning, planning and 

judgment brought about by a traumatic injury to the brain. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MRS. ROBY 

Mrs. ROBY. During the testimony, it was stated ‘‘As we continue to build dwell 

and increase the time Soldiers have at home, more units will conduct full spectrum 

training rotations at the Combat Training Centers.’’ To be fair to Soldiers and Families, can the dwell time ratio be modified to reflect time not spent at home station 

so that it better represents the amount of time that the Soldier is able to be at their 

home station? 

Secretary MCHUGH. The current dwell time ratio was designed to account for significant, high-stress events that could have physical and psychological impacts on 

individual Soldiers. While time away from home station and family for any event 

can be stressful, routine training events are not likely to have the same impact on 

individuals as combat deployments. 

Mrs. ROBY. In light of the Army budget allowing for $1.5 billion in adding 71 UH– 

60M/HH–60M Black Hawk helicopters, $1.4 billion to procure 32 new and 15 remanufactured CH–47F Chinook helicopters, and $1.04 billion to modernize the AH– 

64 Apache helicopter: What are the fielding plans for another UH–60M simulator 

and another Transportable Black Hawk Operations Simulator (TBOS) system for 

Fort Rucker, AL? Additionally, what impact will modernization of the UH–60 (Black 

Hawk), CH–47 (Chinook), and AH–64 (Apache) helicopters have on the USAACE’s 

ability to meet their mission goals in regards to training, maintenance, and facilities? 

General CASEY. The United States Army Aviation Center of Excellence (USAACE) 

is slated to receive its third Transportable Black Hawk Operations Simulator 

(TBOS) by the end of FY11. The third TBOS will be operational no later than 1 

OCT 11 in order to support the FY12 training requirement. USAACE will receive 

three UH–60M simulators by midyear 2013. To date, USAACE has received 10 CH– 

47Fs and will receive 4 additional CH–47Fs in 3rd and 4th quarter FY11. Every 

time we receive a CH–47F, we are required to turn in a legacy CH–47D to the remanufacture line. Currently, USAACE has 28 UH–60Ms on hand and is scheduled 

to receive 6 additional this year with an end state of 34 on hand for FY11. Due to 

the large training demand for the UH–60A/L, USAACE has not been required to 

turn in any legacy UH–60s to the remanufacture line. The first arrival of AH–64D 

Block III helicopters is tentatively scheduled for FY14. USAACE will be required 

to turn in legacy AH–64Ds on a one for one basis with the Block III’s. The fielding 

of modernized aircraft will not impact USAACE’s mission goals in regards to training, maintenance, and facilities. Coordination has been conducted with Headquarters Training and Doctrine Command and all USAACE elements to insure 

timely integration of new aircraft to mitigate any training issues. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BROOKS 

Mr. BROOKS. During the March 2, 2011, hearing you discussed the MEADS (Medium Extended Air Defense System) program with Rep. Franks and Rep. Hunter. 

a. You mentioned that MEADS was ‘‘underperforming’’. Can you explain in what 

ways the systems is underperforming? 

b. You also mentioned that MEADS was not close to completion. What was the 

original schedule for completion? How far behind is the program? 

c. Is the additional $804 million over the next two years intended to wind down 

the program or complete the program? 

d. How will ending the program affect our German and Italian partners in their 

development of MEADS? What inputs have you had from Germany and Italy on 

MEADS? 

Secretary MCHUGH. a. The MEADS’ underperformance has been in the areas of 

cost and schedule, with additional concerns on oversight, program management, and 
138 

systems engineering. The Proof of Concept was designed to markedly reduce the 

risk of the remaining Design and Development work. It should be noted that since 

the MEADS independent review in 2008, there have been improvements in oversight, program management, and systems engineering in the MEADS program, although cost and schedule growth continue. By choosing to not pursue development 

of the full MEADS system, and to refocus the program as a Proof of Concept, the 

higher-risk integration and testing efforts included in the full scope program have 

been removed, resulting in substantially lower cost and schedule risk. 

b. The original Design and Development program schedule was established as a 

110 month effort, which is approximately 71 percent complete. The effort was originally to be completed in October 2013. However, in 2010, the Partners and the 

NATO MEADS Management Agency (NAMEADSMA) determined that an additional 

30 month effort was required to recover from delays in the program and to add Partner desired capabilities. These changes would have extended the total program effort to 140 months, with completion in March 2016. 

c. The $804M will wind down the program. 

d. Completing the Proof of Concept will enable our MEADS partners to field coalition missile defense capability. We believe that our collective work under the Proof 

of Concept offers significant benefits for all three MEADS partners, builds partner 

capacity in Air and Missile Defense, and will position Italy and Germany to continue future development, production, and fielding. Our MEADS partners have informed us that they intend to field MEADS capability in some form. 

Mr. BROOKS. If we are to end MEADS and harvest technology from the program 

in the future for other missile defense systems: Which technologies are you expecting harvest? What other systems do you expect to use the harvested technology? Are 

you expecting to use the MEADS 360 degree radar in the Patriot system? What are 

the expected costs of the integration of MEADS technology into legacy and future 

missile defense systems? 

Secretary MCHUGH. The technology benefits are likely to be at the subsystem 

level, which makes it unfeasible to estimate the costs at this time. Some of the more 

attractive technologies from the U.S. perspective are contained in radar developments for the 360 degree surveillance radar. As part of the Proof of Concept approach, the U.S. expects to receive technical data packages providing detailed technology information. The U.S. will evaluate the potential incorporation of the 

MEADS technology in existing or future systems over the next several years as that 

data becomes available. 

Mr. BROOKS. Can you provide the committee with the cost comparison between 

fully completing the MEADS program and harvesting the technology for legacy and 

future systems? 

Secretary MCHUGH. The cost comparison for completing the U.S. share of the 

MEADS design and development is approximately $2.8B in FY12–17, while the 

Proof of Concept will cost approximately $804M in FY12 through FY13, and may 

lead to harvesting technology. This does not include procurement costs for a full 

force of MEADS major end items, which would require additional funds beginning 

in FY13 and extending through FY30. 

Æ