IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA

No. 13–1756

Filed January 30, 2015

SIOUX PHARM, INC. and SIOUX BIOCHEMICAL, INC.,

Appellees,

vs.

SUMMIT NUTRITIONALS INTERNATIONAL, INC.,

Appellant.

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Sioux County, Duane E. 

Hoffmeyer, Judge.

Defendant appeals order denying motion to dismiss for lack of 

personal jurisdiction. AFFIRMED. 

Daniel J. Fischer, Brian J. Koenig, and J. Daniel Weidner of Koley 

Jessen, P.C., L.L.O., Omaha, Nebraska, for appellant. 

Anthony L. Osborn and Jeana L. Goosmann of Goosmann Law 

Firm, PLC, Sioux City, for appellees. 
2

WATERMAN, Justice.

This appeal provides our first opportunity to address when

statements on a website support personal jurisdiction and the impact of 

recent United States Supreme Court precedent on the showing required 

for general jurisdiction. Specifically, we must decide whether a 

nonresident corporation’s inaccurate statement on its passive website—

that it had a manufacturing facility in Sioux Center, Iowa—subjected it 

to personal jurisdiction in Iowa in a lawsuit by an Iowa plaintiff alleging 

unfair competition. The district court denied the nonresident 

defendant’s motion to dismiss, ruling that general jurisdiction was 

established simply because its website held this defendant out as having 

an Iowa manufacturing facility. The Sioux Center facility actually is 

owned and operated by a separate Iowa defendant that supplies the 

product to the nonresident defendant. We allowed the nonresident 

defendant’s interlocutory appeal of the jurisdictional ruling. 

For the reasons explained below, we hold the district court erred 

by exercising general jurisdiction over Summit based solely on the 

inaccurate statement on its passive website. Recent precedent requires 

proof the nonresident defendant is “essentially at home in the forum

State” to establish general jurisdiction. See Goodyear Dunlop Tires 

Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. ___, ___, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2851, 180 

L. Ed. 2d 796, 803 (2011). That proof is lacking here. Nevertheless, we 

hold the totality of the nonresident’s contacts with Iowa, including its

website statement, Iowa supply contract, and its sale of the product to 

the plaintiff in Iowa were sufficient to subject it to specific jurisdiction 

here on claims related to those contacts. We therefore affirm the order 

denying its motion to dismiss on this alternative ground. 
3

I. Background Facts and Proceedings. 

Plaintiff Sioux Pharm, Inc.1 is an Iowa corporation that

manufactures chondroitin sulfate, a supplement for joint health usually 

mixed with glucosamine to help lessen the effects of osteoarthritis. Eagle 

Laboratories, Inc. (Eagle Labs) is an Iowa corporation and a competitor of 

Sioux Pharm. Eagle Labs sells and ships chondroitin sulfate monthly to 

Summit Nutritionals International, Inc. (Summit), a New Jersey

corporation with its principal place of business in Branchburg, 

New Jersey. Summit packages and resells the chondroitin sulfate. 

At the time this lawsuit was filed, Summit’s website erroneously 

claimed that Summit had a manufacturing facility in Sioux Center, Iowa. 

The website read, “Manufacturing Facility, Summit Nutritionals 

International, Inc.,” and for contact information listed a Sioux Center, 

Iowa, physical address and an email address. In fact, the Sioux Center

facility at that physical address has always been owned and operated by 

Eagle Labs. Summit admits it listed the facility on its website to inform 

its customers as to the Iowa source of Summit’s chondroitin sulfate, 

which is derived from bovine organs. 

Summit actually has no Iowa office, agent, or employees. It has 

never been registered to do business in Iowa, and neither owns nor 

leases any real or personal property in Iowa. Summit has no Iowa bank 

accounts and has never been a party in litigation in Iowa before this 

case. Summit has never specifically directed advertising at Iowa markets

or sold its product to anyone in Iowa except for a sample purchased by 

Sioux Pharm to test for purposes of this lawsuit. Summit purchases its

1Plaintiff Sioux Biochemical, Inc. is a sister corporation to Sioux Pharm, Inc. We 

will refer to the entities together as Sioux Pharm. 

 
4

chondroitin sulfate from Eagle Labs under an annual contract to supply

Summit’s requirements through monthly shipments. Summit’s president 

traveled to Iowa once to inspect Eagle Labs’ facility, but he flew in and 

out of an airport in South Dakota and only spent a few hours in Iowa. 

No other employee of Summit has ever visited Iowa on its behalf. 

Sioux Pharm filed suit against Eagle Labs and its principals, Dana 

Summers, Robert Den Hoed, and John Ymker on March 8, 2012. The 

initial pleading alleged claims for the misappropriation of trade secrets,

which are the subject of a separate, pending interlocutory appeal. See 

Sioux Pharm, Inc. v. Eagle Labs, Inc., No. 13–1756 (Iowa filed 

September 27, 2013). Sioux Pharm’s second amended petition, the 

operative pleading here, was filed April 23, 2013. That pleading added 

claims of unfair competition, intentional interference with contractual 

relationships, and civil conspiracy and named Summit and Federal 

Laboratories Corporation (Federal Labs), a New York corporation, as 

additional defendants. Sioux Pharm specifically alleged Summit, Federal 

Labs, and Eagle Labs conspired to distribute adulterated and diluted 

chondroitin sulfate while misrepresenting its purity, in violation of 

§ 1125(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1141n (2012). On June 

7, the district court, pursuant to Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.914, 

granted Summit’s motion to bifurcate the trade-secret claims from the 

unfair-competition claims. 

Both Summit and Federal Labs moved to dismiss for lack of 

personal jurisdiction. Both nonresident defendants filed affidavits 

attesting to their lack of contacts with Iowa. Sioux Pharm filed 

resistances and argued as to Summit that its website statement along 

with its contract with Eagle Labs and site visit there were sufficient to 

subject it to general jurisdiction or, alternatively, specific jurisdiction.
5

The district court granted Federal Labs’ motion, determining that 

Sioux Pharm “failed to present a prima facie case” sufficient to justify 

personal jurisdiction on a conspiracy theory and that Federal Labs lacks 

contacts with Iowa sufficient for general jurisdiction. However, the

district court denied Summit’s motion, stating:

Although Summit presents this Court with many facts 

to establish that it has no systematic or continuous ties to 

the State of Iowa, this Court does not find those facts to be 

persuasive. Although Summit may not have an office or real 

property in Iowa, it holds itself out as having both. 

Summit’s website clearly states that it has a manufacturing 

facility in Sioux Center, Iowa. . . . Regardless of Summit’s 

intent when posting that information, and regardless of what 

ties Summit has to the manufacturing facility, by asserting 

that it has continuous and systematic ties with Iowa, 

Summit has availed itself [of] Iowa Courts. 

The district court did not reach the specific jurisdiction theory. The 

district court also granted motions for partial summary judgment,

dismissing the civil conspiracy claims against all defendants, including 

Summit, by finding “[t]here has been no evidence presented to show a 

meeting of the minds” or an overt act required to establish liability for 

civil conspiracy. 

We granted Summit’s application for interlocutory appeal and 

retained the appeal to determine if that defendant is subject to personal 

jurisdiction in Iowa. 

II. Standard of Review. 

“We review a district court’s decision on a motion to dismiss for 

lack of personal jurisdiction for correction of errors at law.” Shams v. 

Hassan, 829 N.W.2d 848, 853 (Iowa 2013); see also Iowa R. App. P. 

6.907. We are not bound by the court’s conclusions of law or application 

of legal principles. Shams, 829 N.W.2d at 853. The district court’s 
6

factual findings are binding on appeal if supported by substantial 

evidence. Id. 

“ ‘ “[W]e accept as true the allegations of the petition and the 

contents of uncontroverted affidavits.” ’ ” Id. (quoting Addison Ins. Co. v. 

Knight, Hoppe, Kurnik & Knight, L.L.C., 734 N.W.2d 473, 476 (Iowa 

2007)). “After the plaintiff makes a prima facie case showing that 

personal jurisdiction is appropriate, the burden shifts to the defendant to 

rebut that showing.” Id.

We may affirm the district court on an alternative ground that is 

supported by the record and urged by the prevailing party in district 

court and on appeal. Hawkeye Foodserv. Distrib., Inc. v. Iowa Educators 

Corp., 812 N.W.2d 600, 609 (Iowa 2012). 

III. Analysis. 

We must decide whether the Due Process Clause of the United 

States Constitution permits the exercise of personal jurisdiction over 

Summit. This case requires us to determine the jurisdictional effect of 

an erroneous statement on defendant’s passive website that it has a 

manufacturing facility in Iowa. We conclude the district court erred in 

ruling that Summit was subject to general jurisdiction in Iowa based on 

that website statement alone. We further conclude that the totality of 

Summit’s contacts with Iowa falls short of establishing general 

jurisdiction under Goodyear. 564 U.S. at ___, 131 S. Ct. at 2851, 180 

L. Ed. 2d at 803. But, we affirm the jurisdictional ruling on the

alternative ground, supported by the record and urged by Sioux Pharm

in district court and on appeal, that Summit is subject to specific 

jurisdiction here. 

We begin by reviewing well-established principles of personal 

jurisdiction. A state’s power to exercise personal jurisdiction over a 
7

nonresident defendant is limited by both the state’s jurisdictional rules

and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Ostrem 

v. Prideco Secure Loan Fund, LP, 841 N.W.2d 882, 891 (Iowa 2014). 

Iowa’s jurisdictional rule authorizes the widest exercise of personal 

jurisdiction allowed by the Due Process Clause. Id. (citing Iowa R. Civ. P. 

1.306, which states that “every corporation, individual, personal 

representative, partnership or association that shall have the necessary 

minimum contact with the state of Iowa shall be subject to the 

jurisdiction of the courts of this state”). Therefore, we will focus on the 

constitutional requirements for personal jurisdiction. 

“The touchstone of the due-process analysis remains whether the 

defendant has sufficient ‘minimum contacts with [the forum state] such 

that the maintenance of the suit does not offend “ ‘traditional notions of 

fair play and substantial justice.” ’ ” Id. (quoting Viasys., Inc. v. EBM–

Papst St. Georgen GmbH & Co., KG, 646 F. 3d 589, 594 (8th Cir. 2011)). 

“Fairness is the crux of the minimum-contacts analysis.” Shams, 829 

N.W.2d at 854. The defendant must have sufficient contacts to 

“ ‘reasonably anticipate being haled into court’ in the forum state.” 

Ostrem, 841 N.W.2d at 891–92 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. 

Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297, 100 S. Ct. 559, 567, 62 L. Ed. 2d 490, 501 

(1980)). Therefore, “it is essential in each case that there be some act by 

which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of 

conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits 

and protections of its laws.” Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 

462, 475, 105 S. Ct. 2174, 2183, 85 L. Ed. 2d 528, 542 (1985) (citation 

and internal quotation marks omitted). The purposeful-availment 

requirement prevents defendants from being forced to defend themselves 

in a jurisdiction “as a result of ‘random,’ ‘fortuitous,’ or ‘attenuated’
8

contacts.” Id. It also prevents defendants from being haled into court by 

the unilateral actions of plaintiffs. Id. 

There are two forms of personal jurisdiction, general jurisdiction 

and specific jurisdiction. Shams, 829 N.W.2d at 855. General 

jurisdiction “ ‘refers to the power of a state to adjudicate any cause of 

action involving a particular defendant, regardless of where the cause of 

action arose.’ ” Ostrem, 841 N.W.2d at 892 (quoting Sondergard v. Miles, 

Inc., 985 F.2d 1389, 1392 (8th Cir. 1993)). General jurisdiction allows 

suits on claims unrelated to the defendant’s contacts with the forum and

exists if the defendant’s “ ‘affiliations with the State are so “continuous 

and systematic” as to render [the defendant] essentially at home in the 

forum State.’ ” Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. ___, ___, 134 S. Ct. 746, 

754, 187 L. Ed. 2d 624, 633–34 (2014) (quoting Goodyear, 564 U.S. at

___, 131 S. Ct. at 2851, 180 L. Ed. 2d at 803). “For an individual, the 

paradigm forum for the exercise of general jurisdiction is the individual’s 

domicile; for a corporation, it is an equivalent place, one in which the 

corporation is fairly regarded as at home.” Goodyear, 564 U.S. at ___,

131 S. Ct. at 2853–54, 180 L. Ed. 2d at 806 (emphasis added). 

By contrast, specific jurisdiction “ ‘refers to jurisdiction over causes 

of action arising from or related to a defendant’s actions within the forum 

state.’ ” Ostrem, 841 N.W.2d at 892 (quoting Sondergard, 985 F.2d at 

1392). Specific personal jurisdiction has two requirements: 

“Where a forum seeks to assert specific jurisdiction over an 

out-of-state defendant who has not consented to suit there, 

[due process] is satisfied if the defendant has ‘purposefully 

directed’ his activities at residents of the forum and the 

litigation results from alleged injuries that ‘arise out of or 

relate to’ those activities.” 

Capital Promotions, L.L.C. v. Don King Prods., Inc., 756 N.W.2d 828, 834 

(Iowa 2008) (alteration in original) (quoting Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 
9

472, 105 S. Ct. at 2182, 85 L. Ed. 2d at 540–41). “A single contact with 

the forum state can be sufficient to satisfy due process concerns when 

the plaintiff’s claim arises out of the contact.” Shams, 829 N.W.2d at 

855. Physical presence in the forum is not essential, but the court must 

investigate the nature and quality of the contacts between the defendant 

and the forum. See Addison Ins. Co., 734 N.W.2d at 478.

With these principles in mind, we examine whether Summit’s 

contacts with Iowa give rise to either general or specific personal 

jurisdiction. Sioux Pharm relies on three grounds to establish personal 

jurisdiction over Summit in Iowa: (1) the erroneous statement on 

Summit’s website that it has a manufacturing facility in Iowa, (2) 

Summit’s supply contract purchasing its chondroitin sulfate from Eagle 

Labs, and (3) the brief Iowa visit and inspection of Eagle Labs by 

Summit’s president.2 Sioux Pharm argues these grounds support both 

general and specific jurisdiction over Summit. We begin with the website 

statement that the district court concluded subjected Summit to general

jurisdiction here. We then examine whether the totality of Summit’s 

2Summit also sold one sample of its product in Iowa to Sioux Pharm, which 

used the sample to test for the purposes of this lawsuit. Summit has made no other 

sales in Iowa, nor has it specifically directed any advertising at Iowa markets. Sioux 

Pharm’s appellate brief does not argue the lone Iowa sale supports its position, but at 

oral argument, its counsel urged us to consider that sale as “a factor” establishing 

personal jurisdiction over Summit. Some federal district courts have noted plaintiffs 

cannot create personal jurisdiction over a defendant seller merely by purchasing the 

defendant’s product in the forum state. See, e.g., Mor-Dall Enters., Inc. v. Dark Horse 

Distillery, LLC, 16 F. Supp. 3d 874, 880 (W.D. Mich. 2014) (“ ‘[A] plaintiff may not 

manufacture jurisdiction by engaging in a sale merely to confer jurisdiction in a 

particular forum.’ ”) (quoting Dawson v. Pepin, No. 1:99-CV-316, 2001 WL 822346, at *4 

(W.D. Mich. Mar. 29, 2001)); Foreign Candy Co. v. Tropical Paradise, Inc., 950 

F. Supp. 2d 1017, 1032–33 & n.5 (N.D. Iowa 2013) (holding a single sale to plaintiff’s 

representative through a third-party retailer is insufficient to subject defendant to 

personal jurisdiction in trademark action); Krepps v. Reiner, 588 F. Supp. 2d 471, 479 

(S.D.N.Y. 2008) (“[P]laintiffs are not permitted to ‘manufacture’ personal jurisdiction 

over defendants by orchestrating an in-state web-based purchase of their goods.”), aff’d,

377 F. App’x 65 (2d Cir. 2010). 

 
10

contacts with Iowa support general jurisdiction. Finally, we examine 

whether specific jurisdiction over Summit has been established. 

A. General Jurisdiction Based on Summit’s Website. The 

district court ruled that Summit is subject to general jurisdiction in Iowa

because its website held the corporation out as having an Iowa 

manufacturing facility, regardless of whether that representation was 

true. The manufacturing facility is in fact owned and operated by a 

separate corporation, codefendant Eagle Labs. We hold that website 

statement is insufficient to subject Summit to general jurisdiction in 

Iowa under the recent United States Supreme Court decisions requiring 

a showing that the defendant’s “ ‘affiliations with the State are so 

“continuous and systematic” as to render [it] essentially at home in the 

forum State.’ ” Daimler AG, 571 U.S. at ___, 134 S. Ct. at 754, 187 

L. Ed. 2d at 633 (quoting Goodyear, 564 U.S. at ___, 131 S. Ct. at 2851, 

180 L. Ed. 2d at 803). It is undisputed that Summit is a New Jersey

corporation with its principal place of business in New Jersey. 

Sioux Pharm contends that personal jurisdiction over Summit is 

established by waiver or estoppel based on Summit’s website 

representation it has an Iowa manufacturing facility. We acknowledge 

there are circumstances under which personal jurisdiction may be 

established by waiver, consent, or estoppel. See, e.g., Ins. Corp. of Ir., 

Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinea, 456 U.S. 694, 704, 102 S. Ct.

2099, 2105, 72 L. Ed. 2d 492, 502 (1982) (“[T]he requirement of personal 

jurisdiction may be intentionally waived, or for various reasons a 

defendant may be estopped from raising the issue.”). Personal 

jurisdiction can be waived in several ways. A party could submit to the 

jurisdiction of the court by appearance. Id. at 703, 102 S. Ct. at 2105,
11

72 L. Ed. 2d at 502.3 Moreover, parties may agree contractually to 

submit to jurisdiction and venue in a given court, which operates as a 

waiver. See id. at 703–04, 102 S. Ct. at 2105, 72 L. Ed. 2d at 502; EFCO 

Corp. v. Norman Highway Constructors, Inc., 606 N.W.2d 297, 299 (Iowa 

2000) (noting that contractual choice-of-forum clauses have “long been 

recognized under Iowa law”). Further, the United States Supreme Court 

has recognized “constructive consent to the personal jurisdiction of the 

state court in the voluntary use of certain state procedures.” Ins. Corp. 

of Ir., 456 U.S. at 704, 102 S. Ct. at 2105, 72 L. Ed. 2d at 502 (upholding 

jurisdiction as discovery sanction). But, Summit has not waived its 

objection to jurisdiction in such a manner or otherwise consented to 

jurisdiction here. See Cent. Life Assurance Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 

466 N.W.2d 257, 261 (Iowa 1991) (describing waiver as the voluntary 

relinquishment of a known right). Summit’s representation that it has a 

manufacturing facility in Iowa, even if true, does not render Summit at

home in this state for purposes of general jurisdiction. See Goodyear, 

564 U.S. at ___, 131 S. Ct at 2853–54, 180 L. Ed. 2d at 806 (equating athome status with domicile). 

Nor does the record support a finding of jurisdiction by estoppel

based on the website statement. Sioux Pharm bears the burden to prove 

equitable estoppel by a clear and convincing preponderance of the 

evidence. See Christy v. Miulli, 692 N.W.2d 694, 702 (Iowa 2005). 

Sioux Pharm must prove the following elements:

“(1) The defendant has made a false representation or has 

concealed material facts; (2) the plaintiff lacks knowledge of 

the true facts; (3) the defendant intended the plaintiff to act 

3Iowa abolished the special appearance in 1987. Antolik v. McMahon, 744 

N.W.2d 82, 83 (Iowa 2007). Defendants may now preserve a defense of lack of personal 

jurisdiction by pleading it in the answer to the petition. Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.421(1). 

 
12

upon such representations; and (4) the plaintiff did in fact 

rely upon such representations to his prejudice.” 

Id. (quoting Meier v. Alfa-Laval, Inc., 454 N.W.2d 576, 578–79 (1990)).

Because Sioux Pharm did not rely on Summit’s website statement, it 

cannot prove equitable estoppel to establish personal jurisdiction. 

Sioux Pharm relies on Turpin v. Mori Seiki Co., a case involving the 

exercise of specific jurisdiction. 56 F. Supp. 2d 121, 124 (D. Mass. 

1999). There, the federal district court ruled that a Japanese 

manufacturer of an engine lathe was subject to personal jurisdiction in 

Massachusetts in a product-liability action. Id. at 124, 127–28. The 

plaintiff’s employer had acquired the lathe made and sold by the 

Japanese defendant. Id. at 123–24. The plaintiff was injured when he 

was dragged into the lathe. Id. at 124. The workplace accident occurred 

in Massachusetts. Id. The lathe had been sold to plaintiff’s employer 

through intermediaries, and the Japanese defendant moved to dismiss 

for lack of personal jurisdiction. See id. Plaintiff submitted evidence that 

the defendant’s brochures represented it “has an overseas office in 

Boston.” Id. at 127. In response, the defendant “contend[ed] that it does 

not actually have an overseas office in Boston and that whenever it made 

such a representation, it was merely designating an authorized dealer or 

the office of its wholly-owned subsidiary as an overseas office.” Id. The 

district court concluded:

The defendant can explain the facts, but it can’t change 

them. Whether MS Ltd. was designating its own facility or 

the facility of an intermediary or subsidiary, the fact remains 

that it was explicitly holding itself out to the public as ready, 

willing and able to do business in Boston. It is difficult to 

imagine a more intentional or deliberate effort to “serve the 

market in the forum” of the Commonwealth. 

Id. 
13

The Turpin court relied in part on defendant’s representations 

about the Boston office and on the fact the Massachusetts plaintiff was 

injured in the forum using defendant’s product there. See id. at 127–28. 

Turpin is distinguishable for that reason. Here, Summit’s website merely 

identified an Iowa facility as the source of its raw product it repackaged 

and sold elsewhere. By contrast, in Turpin, the office in Boston was 

admittedly open for the purpose of selling that defendant’s products in 

the forum state. See id. at 127. And most importantly, the productliability claims arose in the forum when plaintiff was hurt using 

defendant’s product in that state. As the court said:

The Commonwealth has a significant interest in 

obtaining jurisdiction over a defendant who causes tortious 

injury within its borders and in providing its citizens with a 

convenient forum in which to assert their claims. 

Massachusetts also has a strong policy interest in protecting 

its citizens from injuries caused by defective products, 

regardless of where those products were originally 

manufactured. 

Id. at 127 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, Turpin

is a specific jurisdiction decision. We do not see Turpin as persuasive 

authority for general jurisdiction. 

There are policy reasons against basing general jurisdiction solely 

on Internet activity. 

The fact that many companies have established virtual 

beachheads on the Internet and the fact that the Internet is 

now accessible from almost any point on the globe have 

created complex, new considerations in counting minimum 

contacts for purposes of determining personal jurisdiction. 

Butler v. Beer Across Am., 83 F. Supp. 2d 1261, 1267–68 (N.D. Ala. 

2000). Given the economic importance of the Internet, courts should 

consider the ripple effects before subjecting nonresidents to general

jurisdiction based solely on information posted on defendants’ websites.
14

See David C. Tunick, Passive Internet Websites and Personal Jurisdiction, 

28 Okla. City U.L. Rev. 739, 750–51 (2003) (“Would an Internet company 

stop doing business on the Internet . . . if the company knew that 

personal jurisdiction could attach in a distant forum even if no products 

were sold?”). Summit denies it intended to consent to jurisdiction in 

Iowa and contends that it placed the statement on its website merely to 

inform customers as to the Iowa source of its chondroitin sulfate. 

Commentators have expressed the concern that vague or expansive views 

of personal jurisdiction may subject new business owners to litigation in 

distant states through innocent misstatements on websites. 

“[B]ecause the Internet is bringing unsophisticated and 

poorly capitalized people into new situations where they are 

more likely than ever to make innocent mistakes and be 

sued for them, due process guarantees should be more 

robust in this new environment than they have been in more 

traditional commercial settings.” Individual Web designers 

and bloggers can, and will, make mistakes concerning the 

content of their Web sites and electronic communications. 

With a vague standard for personal jurisdiction, suits for 

defamation, copyright infringement, and trademark 

infringement, as well as suits for relief in connection with 

other content-related claims, will be filed against these 

"unsophisticated and undercapitalized" designers. 

Mark D. Standridge, Passive Voice: The Unclear Standards for 

Establishing Personal Jurisdiction in New Mexico via the World Wide Web, 

35 N.M. L. Rev. 679, 697 (2005) (footnotes omitted). We share this 

concern. 

Courts have relied on two tests to evaluate personal jurisdiction 

based on website activity, the Calder effects test and the Zippo slidingscale approach. See, e.g., Johnson v. Arden, 614 F.3d 785, 796 (8th Cir. 

2010) (citing Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789–90, 104 S. Ct. 1482, 

1487, 79 L. Ed. 2d 804, 812 (1984), and Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, 

Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa. 1997)). We conclude both tests 
15

may be used to determine the jurisdictional import of websites. Although 

Calder, a libel case, predated the growth of the public Internet, it

established a useful framework to evaluate whether website 

communications give rise to specific jurisdiction in tort cases. Under the 

Calder effects test, “foreseeable effects from an intentional tort can 

occasionally support jurisdiction” when the primary effect of the tort is 

felt within the forum. Shams, 829 N.W.2d at 856. “[W]e look at the 

location of the tortious activities and the ‘focal point’ of the alleged tort.” 

Id. 

The Zippo approach recognizes a sliding scale from passive to 

interactive websites and is widely followed. See Thomas A. Dickerson

et al., Personal Jurisdiction and the Marketing of Goods and Services on 

the Internet, 41 Hofstra L. Rev. 31, 41–42 & n.29 (Fall 2012) (surveying

caselaw holding passive websites insufficient to support personal 

jurisdiction). The Zippo sliding-scale approach works as follows: 

[T]he likelihood that personal jurisdiction can be 

constitutionally exercised is directly proportionate to the 

nature and quality of commercial activity that an entity 

conducts over the Internet. This sliding scale is consistent 

with well developed personal jurisdiction principles. At one 

end of the spectrum are situations where a defendant clearly 

does business over the Internet. If the defendant enters into 

contracts with residents of a foreign jurisdiction that involve 

the knowing and repeated transmission of computer files 

over the Internet, personal jurisdiction is proper. At the 

opposite end are situations where a defendant has simply 

posted information on an Internet Web site which is 

accessible to users in foreign jurisdictions. A passive Web 

site that does little more than make information available to 

those who are interested in it is not grounds for the exercise 

[of] personal jurisdiction. The middle ground is occupied by 

interactive Web sites where a user can exchange information 

with the host computer. In these cases, the exercise of 

jurisdiction is determined by examining the level of 

interactivity and commercial nature of the exchange of 

information that occurs on the Web site. 

Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1124 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
16

The Zippo sliding-scale approach is used to evaluate specific 

jurisdiction, but also can be considered along with other contacts in a 

general jurisdiction analysis, as the United States Court of Appeals for 

the Eighth Circuit has noted:

[I]n a general jurisdiction case, . . . we consider the “nature 

and quality of the contacts” as well as the “quantity of the 

contacts.” This is precisely why the Zippo test alone is 

insufficient for the general jurisdiction setting. 

. . . As a result, we will first apply the Zippo [quality] 

test and then also look at the quantity of those contacts with 

[forum] residents. 

Lakin v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 348 F.3d 704, 712 (8th Cir. 2003) (quoting 

Bell Paper Box, Inc. v. U.S. Kids, Inc., 22 F.3d 816, 819 (8th Cir. 1994)). If 

sufficient contacts are found, the court must still subject the defendant’s 

activities to the traditional test of “fair play and substantial justice,” 

including the burden on the defendant, the interest of the forum state, 

and plaintiff’s interest in relief. Id. at 713. 

The erroneous statement on Summit’s website does not establish

general jurisdiction. The Calder effects test is used to analyze specific 

jurisdiction and is inapplicable to the analysis of general jurisdiction. 

Nor is the Zippo sliding-scale approach met here for general jurisdiction 

purposes. Summit’s website merely gave the address of the facility where 

Summit acquires its chondroitin sulfate. Summit’s website is not 

interactive and falls on the passive end of Zippo’s sliding-scale approach. 

Moreover, there is no evidence anyone in Iowa accessed Summit’s 

website before this litigation. See Johnson, 614 F.3d at 797–98 (holding 

defendant’s interactive website did not support personal jurisdiction 

without evidence defendant transacted business with forum residents

through the website or that its website was “uniquely or expressly aimed” 

at the forum state). We conclude the district court erred in ruling 
17

Summit’s website statement alone subjected Summit to general 

jurisdiction in Iowa. 

B. General Jurisdiction Based on the Totality of Summit’s 

Contacts with Iowa. Sioux Pharm argues in the alternative that general

jurisdiction exists based on Summit’s long-standing contract to purchase 

chondroitin sulfate from Eagle Labs and the Iowa site visit by Summit’s 

president. Sioux Pharm relies on Iowa Code section 617.3(2) (2011), 

which states:

If a foreign corporation makes a contract with a resident of 

Iowa to be performed in whole or in part by either party in 

Iowa, or if such foreign corporation commits a tort in whole 

or in part in Iowa against a resident of Iowa, such acts shall 

be deemed to be doing business in Iowa by such foreign 

corporation for the purpose of service of process . . . . 

Therefore, Sioux Pharm argues, Summit’s contract with Eagle Labs 

represents continuous and systematic business contacts with Iowa and 

subjects Summit to general personal jurisdiction. 

As noted above, general personal jurisdiction requires that the 

defendant’s contacts “are sufficiently substantial or continuous and 

systematic.” Bankers Trust Co. v. Fidata Trust Co. NY, 452 N.W.2d 411, 

415 (Iowa 1990). The corporation must be “essentially at home in the 

forum State.” Goodyear, 564 U.S. at ___, 131 S. Ct. at 2851, 180 

L. Ed. 2d at 803 (holding tire manufacturer was not subject to general 

jurisdiction in North Carolina on claims arising from bus accident in 

France); see also Daimler AG, 571 U.S. at ___, 134 S. Ct. at 751, 187 

L. Ed. 2d at 633 (holding German parent corporation was not subject to 

general jurisdiction in California on tort claims arising from Argentinian 

subsidiary’s conduct aiding government security forces who kidnapped 

dissidents in so-called “Dirty War”). In Helicopteros Nacionales de 

Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, the United States Supreme Court concluded a 
18

nonresident purchaser was not subject to general jurisdiction in Texas

on claims arising out of a helicopter accident in Peru. 466 U.S. 408, 

409–10, 416, 418, 104 S. Ct. 1868, 1870, 1873–74, 80 L. Ed. 2d 404, 

408–09, 412–14 (1984) (holding that general jurisdiction did not exist 

when the Colombian defendant negotiated a contract in Texas, accepted 

checks from Texas, and sent employees to purchase helicopters and 

attend training sessions in Texas). Similarly, in Bankers Trust, we 

determined that personal jurisdiction over Fidata was lacking even

though it sent its employees to Iowa to train Bankers Trust employees on 

multiple occasions and did business with Bankers Trust annually. 452 

N.W.2d at 416. In these cases, general personal jurisdiction was lacking

over the nonresident despite multiple in-person visits to the forum and 

ongoing contracts with the resident plaintiff. 

We rejected a similar jurisdictional argument based on Iowa Code 

section 617.3 in Rath Packing Co. v. Intercont’l Meat Traders, Inc., holding 

no personal jurisdiction existed over a nonresident purchaser despite its

contract with an Iowa seller. 181 N.W.2d 184, 186–87 (Iowa 1970). In 

Rath Packing Co., we found it significant that the nonresident defendant 

was a purchaser rather than a seller. Id. at 188. We concluded an outof-state purchaser does not purposefully avail itself of the privilege of 

conducting business in Iowa the same way a seller does. Id. “The state 

also has an interest in protecting its citizens from damages sustained 

from a product brought into the state which is not present when a 

resident seller seeks to collect for a product shipped out of state.” Id. at 

189. “ ‘[A] contract alone cannot automatically establish sufficient 

contacts.’ ” Ross v. First Sav. Bank of Arlington, 675 N.W.2d 812, 816 

(Iowa 2004) (quoting Hager v. Doubletree, 440 N.W.2d 603, 607 (Iowa 
19

1989)). Rather, the defendant must “purposely avail[] itself of the 

benefits of dealing with Iowa residents.” Id. at 819. 

We conclude the totality of Summit’s contacts with Iowa falls short 

of establishing that it is “essentially at home in the forum State.” 

Goodyear, 564 U.S. at ___, 131 S. Ct. at 2851, 180 L. Ed. 2d at 803.

Accordingly, the district court erred in ruling that Summit was subject to 

general jurisdiction in Iowa. 

C. Specific Jurisdiction Based on Summit’s Alleged Unfair 

Competition.4 We now turn to Sioux Pharm’s alternative argument 

raised in district court and on appeal that Summit’s Iowa contacts are 

sufficient to establish specific jurisdiction in this lawsuit, alleging unfair 

competition. Specific jurisdiction may be based on “ ‘single or occasional

acts . . . with respect to suits relating to that in-state activity.’ ” Daimler 

AG, 571 U.S. at ___, 134 S. Ct. at 754, 187 L. Ed. 2d at 633 (quoting Int’l 

Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 318, 66 S. Ct. 154, 159, 90 L. Ed. 

95, 103 (1945)). Thus, we have upheld the exercise of specific 

jurisdiction over a nonresident corporation based on a single, harassing 

phone call to an Iowan in a lawsuit alleging that phone call violated our 

consumer credit code. Norton v. Local Loan, 251 N.W.2d 520, 522 (Iowa 

4In district court, Sioux Pharm argued that the court could exercise personal 

jurisdiction on a theory of civil conspiracy to impute Eagle Labs’ Iowa contacts to 

Summit. See Remmes v. Int’l Flavors & Fragrances, Inc., 389 F. Supp. 2d 1080, 1093–

95 (N.D. Iowa 2005) (noting split in authorities and predicting our court “would 

recognize civil conspiracy as a basis to support the exercise of in personam 

jurisdiction”). But see Brown v. Kerkhoff, 504 F. Supp. 2d 464, 518 (S.D. Iowa 2007) 

(surveying authorities to reject civil liability as a basis for establishing personal 

jurisdiction). We have never decided whether to adopt a civil conspiracy theory of 

personal jurisdiction and do not reach that question today because the district court 

dismissed the civil conspiracy claims against all defendants, including Summit, based 

on lack of evidence of an overt act or agreement to conspire. Sioux Pharm did not 

cross-appeal the ruling dismissing the conspiracy claims and does not argue in this 

appeal that Eagle Labs’ Iowa contacts may be imputed to Summit under a civil 

conspiracy theory of personal jurisdiction. 

 
20

1977). More recently, in Shams, we held specific jurisdiction could be 

asserted over a nonresident who by mail misappropriated money from an 

Iowa bank account set up to benefit children, two of whom lived here, 

even though the defendant lacked any other contacts with this state. 

829 N.W.2d at 859–60. 

Two criteria must be met to subject a nonresident defendant to 

specific jurisdiction: (1) the defendant must purposefully direct its 

activities at residents of the forum, and (2) the litigation results from 

alleged injuries that “arise out of or relate to” those activities. Id. at 856 

(internal quotation marks omitted). “If sufficient minimum contacts 

exist, the court must then determine whether the assertion of personal 

jurisdiction would comport with fair play and substantial justice.” Id. at 

857 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

We conclude the unfair-competition claims Sioux Pharm alleges 

against Summit are related to Summit’s Iowa contacts, and those 

contacts in their totality are sufficient to subject it to specific jurisdiction

here. Sioux Pharm alleges Summit competes unfairly in the sale of 

chondroitin sulfate by distributing diluted product that is mislabeled as 

at least ninety percent pure, in violation of § 1125(a) of the Lanham Act, 

as well as Iowa common law. The source of Summit’s raw product is 

codefendant Eagle Labs in Sioux Center, shipped monthly from Iowa to 

Summit under their long-standing supply contract. For its own 

competitive marketing purposes, Summit touted the Iowa source of its 

product on its website, listing the Sioux Center manufacturing facility as 

its own. Summit’s website statement, by holding itself out as operating 

its own Iowa manufacturing facility, supports specific jurisdiction 

notwithstanding that Eagle Labs actually owns the Iowa location. See

Turpin, 56 F. Supp. 2d at 127 (holding that a brochure claiming Boston 
21

office supported finding of specific jurisdiction even though another 

entity operated that office). Summit falsely touted Iowa roots to enhance 

its sales. Subjecting Summit to Iowa jurisdiction comports with fair play 

and substantial justice. As the district court concluded, “Any party that 

claims to operate within a forum state should expect to be haled into 

court there, whether or not the claims are true.” 

Summit sold one shipment of the product to Sioux Pharm in Iowa. 

Although that sale was arranged by Sioux Pharm, it shows Summit’s 

willingness to sell the allegedly mislabeled product anywhere, including 

in this forum. Courts have noted that a single sale in the forum may be 

sufficient to establish specific jurisdiction over the seller in a Lanham Act 

case. See Chloé v. Queen Bee of Beverly Hills, LLC, 616 F.3d 158, 170 

(2d Cir. 2010) (surveying caselaw and noting defendant’s “single act of 

shipping a counterfeit Chloé bag might well be sufficient, by itself, to 

subject him to the jurisdiction of a New York court”); Furminator, Inc. v. 

Wahba, No. 4:10CV01941AGF, 2011 WL 3847390, at *5–6 (E.D. Mo. 

Aug. 29, 2011) (finding specific jurisdiction over defendants based on 

their sale of counterfeit goods over eBay.com and Amazon.com to the

forum state plaintiff who owned the trademark). The United States Court 

of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Chloé held the defendant was subject 

to specific jurisdiction based on his sale to an employee of the plaintiff’s 

law firm as well as at least fifty additional sales to other New Yorkers.

Chloé, 616 F.3d at 165–67. Like the Second Circuit, we regard Summit’s 

sale to Sioux Pharm in Iowa as a factor supporting specific jurisdiction. 

We need not and do not decide whether a single sale to the plaintiff by 

itself could support specific jurisdiction in an unfair-competition action. 

Sioux Pharm alleges intentional tort claims against Summit. 

Under the Calder effects test, we may consider the effects on Sioux 
22

Pharm in Iowa of Summit’s sales in other states. See Shams, 829 

N.W.2d at 856. The Calder effects test applies if 

(1) the defendant’s acts were intentional; (2) those actions 

were uniquely or expressly aimed at the forum state; and (3) 

the brunt of the harm was suffered in the forum state, and 

the defendant knew the harm was likely to be suffered there. 

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). We apply the Calder effects test 

narrowly “as an additional factor to consider when evaluating a 

defendant’s relevant contacts with the forum state.” Johnson, 614 F.3d 

at 796–97. “[A]bsent additional contacts, mere effects in the forum state 

are insufficient to confer personal jurisdiction.” Id. at 797. The 

foreseeability of causing injury in the forum alone is not enough to 

establish jurisdiction, but it is a relevant factor. Shams, 829 N.W.2d at 

855–56. 

The record shows Sioux Pharm and Eagle Labs are the only 

domestic producers of chrondroitin sulfate. Thus, it is reasonable to 

infer Summit was aware its allegedly unfair competition would harm 

Sioux Pharm in Iowa. See CollegeSource, Inc. v AcademyOne, Inc., 653 

F.3d 1066, 1078 (9th Cir. 2011) (rejecting as “implausible” defendant’s 

claim it was unaware plaintiff’s principle place of business was in the 

forum state because they “were direct competitors in a relatively small 

industry”). 

Summit’s allegedly unfair competition harmed the Iowa plaintiff, 

Sioux Pharm, in this state under the Calder effects test. See id. at 1079 

(“We have repeatedly held that a corporation incurs economic loss, for 

jurisdictional purposes, in the forum of its principal place of business.”); 

Dakota Indus., Inc. v. Dakota Sportswear, Inc., 946 F.2d 1384, 1388–89 

(8th Cir. 1991) (holding economic injury in trademark-infringement case 

was suffered in forum state where plaintiff had its principal place of 
23

business and offending product was sold); Mor-Dall Enters., Inc. v. Dark 

Horse Distillery, LLC, 16 F. Supp. 3d 874, 881–82 (W.D. Mich. 2014) 

(noting Lanham Act violations cause economic harm to the plaintiff in its 

home state).

Iowa has an interest in providing a forum for an “ ‘effective means 

of redress for its residents.’ ” Ostrem, 841 N.W.2d at 903 (quoting McGee 

v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223, 78 S. Ct. 199, 201, 2 L. Ed. 2d 

223, 226 (1957)); see also Shams, 829 N.W.2d at 860 (“Iowa’s interest in 

adjudicating a dispute concerning a tort that [oc]curred within its 

borders and [plaintiff’s] interest in obtaining convenient relief outweigh 

any inconvenience to [defendant].”).

We hold the totality of Summit’s contacts with Iowa, considered in 

light of the Calder effects test, are sufficient to establish specific 

jurisdiction here. We therefore affirm the order denying Summit’s motion 

to dismiss. 

IV. Disposition.

For the foregoing reasons, we hold Summit is not subject to

general jurisdiction in Iowa, but specific jurisdiction has been 

established over Summit in this unfair-competition action. We therefore

affirm on that alternative ground the district court’s ruling denying 

Summit’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. We remand 

the case to allow Sioux Pharm’s claims against Summit to proceed. 

AFFIRMED. 

All justices concur except Hecht, J., who takes no part.