IN THE

TENTH COURT OF APPEALS

No. 10-14-00013-CR

MITCHELL DEAN COCHRAN,

Appellant

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,

Appellee

From the 54th District Court

McLennan County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2012-20-C2

MEMORANDUM OPINION

In two issues, appellant, Mitchell Dean Cochran, challenges his convictions for 

five counts of sexual assault of a child and two counts of indecency with a child by 

contact. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 21.11, 22.011 (West 2011). Specifically, Cochran 

asserts that the trial court erred by: (1) preventing him from presenting impeachment 

evidence; and (2) denying him the right to properly cross-examine two witnesses. We 

affirm.
Cochran v. State Page 2

I. BACKGROUND

Cochran was charged by indictment with five counts of sexual assault of a child 

and two counts of indecency with a child by contact. At the conclusion of the evidence, 

the jury found Cochran guilty on all counts and sentenced Cochran to twelve years’ 

confinement in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice on 

each count. The trial court stacked two of the sentences and ordered that the remaining 

sentences run concurrently.1 The trial court also certified Cochran’s right of appeal, and 

this appeal followed.

II. IMPEACHMENT EVIDENCE

In his first issue, Cochran contends that the trial court erred in not admitting 

impeachment evidence—statements allegedly contained in a CPS report.

A. Standard of Review

We review a trial court’s admission or exclusion of evidence for an abuse of 

discretion. Martinez v. State, 327 S.W.3d 727, 736 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). A trial court 

abuses its discretion if it acts arbitrarily or unreasonably, without reference to any 

guiding rules or principles. Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 380 (Tex. Crim. App. 

1990). When considering a trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence, we will 

 

1 The judgments for each of the convicted offenses reflect that the sentences were to run 

concurrently; however, both the case information sheet contained in the Clerk’s Record and the trial 

court’s statements in open court indicate that two of the sentences were ordered to run consecutively 

with the remaining sentences to run concurrently. See Ex parte Madding, 70 S.W.3d 131, 135 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 2002) (“A trial court’s pronouncement of sentence is oral, while the judgment, including the 

sentence assessed, is merely the written declaration and embodiment of that oral pronouncement. When 

the oral pronouncement of sentence and written judgment vary, the oral pronouncement controls.” 

(internal citations omitted)); Taylor v. State, 131 S.W.3d 497, 500 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004); see also Robinson v. 

State, Nos. 10-13-00304-CR & 10-13-00305-CR, 2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 6631, at **4-5 (Tex. App.—Waco June 

19, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication).
Cochran v. State Page 3

not reverse the trial court’s ruling unless it falls outside the “zone of reasonable 

disagreement.” Id. at 391; see Manning v. State, 114 S.W.3d 922, 926 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2003).

B. Discussion

On appeal, Cochran complains that the trial court erroneously prevented him 

from impeaching the victim in this case with statements she allegedly made to a CPS 

caseworker. Cochran asserts that the statements contained in the CPS report were 

central to his theory to undermine the credibility of the victim. It appears that Cochran 

wished to impeach the victim about her prior drug use and her sneaking boys in the 

house that put her at odds with her parents. 

Under Texas Rules of Evidence 104(a), whether or not to admit evidence 

at trial is a preliminary question to be decided by the court. A bedrock 

condition of admissibility of evidence in any legal contest is its relevance 

to an issue in the case—that is to say, its tendency to make a fact of 

consequence to determination of the action more or less probable. 

Evidence has no relevance if it is not authentically what its proponent 

claims it to be. . . . In performing its Rule 104 gate-keeping function, the 

trial court itself need not be persuaded that the proffered evidence is 

authentic. The preliminary question for the trial court to decide is simply 

whether the proponent of the evidence has supplied facts that are 

sufficient to support a reasonable jury determination that the evidence he 

has proffered is authentic.

Tienda v. State, 358 S.W.3d 633, 637-38 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (internal citations & 

footnotes omitted). In other words, the trial court does not abuse its discretion if it finds 

that a reasonable juror could not reasonably find that the evidence has been 

authenticated. See Druery v. State, 225 S.W.3d 491, 502 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (“Indeed, 

the requirement of authentication or identification as a condition precedent to 
Cochran v. State Page 4

admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in 

question is what the proponent claims.” (internal citations & quotations omitted)).

At trial, the victim, the victim’s brother, the victim’s mother, and the 

investigating police officer all testified that the statements attributed to them in the CPS 

report were never made by them and, thus, were untrue. Specifically, the investigating 

officer testified that the CPS caseworker inaccurately attributed statements to him “so I 

question anything that she (the caseworker) puts in there, quite frankly.” Moreover, 

Veronica Terrell, an investigative supervisor for CPS, testified that the employment of 

the CPS caseworker who wrote the report in this case had been terminated because of 

“[c]oncerns with falsification of documentation.” Terrell discovered that the CPS 

caseworker alleged “she had interviewed certain people and they had told her certain 

things, but that the people would say, no, I hadn’t told them—told her that.” 

Accordingly, Terrell testified that the CPS caseworker did not do reliable work. 

Additionally, the record reflects that the CPS caseworker who drafted the report did not 

testify, and the victim testified that she neither reviewed nor signed the purported CPS 

report.

 Based on the foregoing, we cannot say that Cochran, the proponent of the 

impeachment evidence, satisfied his burden of demonstrating that the purported CPS 

report was authentic. See TEX. R. EVID. 104(a); see also Tienda, 358 S.W.3d at 637-38; 

Druery, 225 S.W.3d at 502. Therefore, because nothing in the record authenticates the 

purported statements contained in the CPS report, none of the statements were 

admissible to impeach the victim’s testimony. See TEX. R. EVID. 104(a); see also Tienda, 
Cochran v. State Page 5

358 S.W.3d at 637-38; Druery, 225 S.W.3d at 502. Accordingly, we cannot say that, in 

performing its Rule 104 gate-keeping function, the trial court abused its discretion in 

excluding the complained-of evidence for impeachment purposes. See Martinez, 327 

S.W.3d at 736; Manning, 114 S.W.3d at 926; Montgomery, 810 S.W.2d at 380. We overrule 

Cochran’s first issue. 

III. CROSS-EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES

In his second issue, Cochran argues that the trial court erred in limiting his right 

to cross-examine Lois Helmick and Mitchell Dean Cochran II regarding the victim 

allegedly sneaking boys into the house without permission. However, Cochran’s brief 

does not have a specific section addressing his second issue. Instead, Cochran’s 

argument section melds his two issues together to the extent that it appears that his 

second issue is dependent on the resolution of his first issue—an issue that we have 

already overruled. Nevertheless, Cochran makes the following statements, without 

citation to authority, that appear to be the extent of his second issue:

Appellant was prevented from going into prior bad acts of the victim 

when the appellant’s son was on the stand. Appellant also was denied the 

ability to prove up the victim[‘]s drug use and that her having had boys in 

the house causes her parents to be mad at her and argue with each other 

about this behavior. The judge refused the same questions of Lois 

Helmick, a defense witness, to be asked in front of the jury. This was also 

preserved by an offer of proof. 

Based on our review of Cochran’s brief and the record, we cannot say that 

Cochran has successfully demonstrated that the trial court erred in limiting crossexamination of the complained-of topic in this issue. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i); see also 

Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 678, 106 S. Ct. 1431, 1434-35, 89 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1986) 
Cochran v. State Page 6

(noting that the right of cross-examination is not unlimited and that the trial court 

retains wide latitude to impose reasonable limits on cross-examination); Irby v. State, 

327 S.W.3d 138, 145 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (“Nonetheless, the trial judge retains wide 

latitude to impose reasonable limits on such cross-examination . . . .”). As such, we 

overrule Cochran’s second issue.

IV. CONCLUSION

Having overruled both of Cochran’s issues on appeal, we affirm the judgments 

of the trial court.

AL SCOGGINS

Justice

Before Chief Justice Gray,

Justice Davis, and

Justice Scoggins

(Chief Justice Gray concurring with a note)*

Affirmed

Opinion delivered and filed April 16, 2015

Do not publish

[CR25]

*(Chief Justice Gray concurs in the Court’s judgment of affirmance without a separate 

opinion.)