NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION

File Name: 24a0218n.06

Nos. 23-5116/5273

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

MICHAEL A. BYRD (23-5116); JE’VON BYRD

(23-5273),

Defendants-Appellants.

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

ON APPEAL FROM THE 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT 

COURT FOR THE EASTERN 

DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY

OPINION

Before:BOGGS, McKEAGUE, and LARSEN, Circuit Judges.

BOGGS, Circuit Judge. Defendants-Appellants Michael A. Byrd and his nephew, Je’Von 

Byrd, are drug traffickers. They appeal, together, challenging (1) the attribution of fentanyl to 

Michael Byrd, (2) the sentence enhancement of Michael Byrd for possession of a firearm, (3) the 

sentence enhancement of Michael Byrd for maintaining a premises for the purpose of 

manufacturing or distributing controlled substances, (4) the sentence enhancement of Michael 

Byrd for his leadership in the drug-trafficking operation, and (5) the holding that reasonable 

suspicion supported the stop of a Ford Explorer that Je’Von Byrd was riding in at the time of a 

drug bust.

I. BACKGROUND

Michael Byrd was indicted for conspiracy to distribute 100 grams or more of 

fluorofentanyl, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, possession with intent to distribute 100 grams or 
Nos. 23-5116/5273, United States v. Byrd, et al.

more of fluorofentanyl, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841, and possession with intent to distribute 10 

grams or more of fluorofentanyl, also in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841. Byrd pleaded guilty to each 

count, and there was no plea agreement.

In March 2021, law enforcement responded to a narcotics overdose at a house in Lexington, 

Kentucky. At the scene, a “remaining occupant of the residence agreed to cooperate with police 

and became a cooperating individual (CI).” The CI provided the name of “Bird,” which 

investigators “determined to be Michael A. Byrd.”

Using this CI, investigators set up a narcotic deal. Michael Byrd’s cell phone was called, 

and he answered, advising the CI that he would call back. Later, Michael Byrd contacted the CI 

and advised him “to meet him at the Horseman[’s] Lane residence.” Investigators then began 

surveillance of 1100 Horseman’s Lane, Apartment #42, in Lexington, Kentucky.

In April 2021, while conducting surveillance on Apartment #42, investigators observed 

that a dark-colored sedan had arrived. A “drug runner” for Michael Byrd named “John John” got 

out of the sedan and entered the apartment. Investigators saw John John pull a “wad of money 

from his right pant pocket” before transferring “an unknown white substance from one bag to 

another bag.”

The CI received a phone call from Michael Byrd that he was five minutes away. The CI 

informed investigators that Michael Byrd was likely driving a blue 2017 Ford Explorer. After some 

time, a blue 2017 Ford Explorer and a small sedan pulled up to Apartment #42 together.

Investigators observed the driver of the Explorer, identified as Wesley Reed, walking towards 

Apartment #42, and the passenger, identified as Je’Von Byrd, reaching towards his waist. At that 

point, investigators told Je’Von Byrd to raise his hands.
Nos. 23-5116/5273, United States v. Byrd, et al.

Investigators opened the door of the Explorer and immediately observed a handgun, which 

was later determined to be loaded. Investigators then patted down Je’Von Byrd and located a 

vacuum-sealed bag of what appeared to be fentanyl. A search of the vehicle recovered two more 

vacuum-sealed bags of what appeared to be fentanyl and multiple ownership documents with the 

name Michael Byrd.

Je’Von Byrd “took ownership of the drugs found on his person.” Michael Byrd was a 

passenger in the other car that arrived at Apartment #42 at the same time as the Explorer—the 

small sedan. No narcotics were found on Michael Byrd. Michael Byrd was detained while a search 

warrant was prepared for Apartment #42.

Je’Von Byrd’s person contained 924.4 grams of fluorofentanyl. The two bags in the vehicle 

contained 3.01 kilograms and 690.10 grams of fluorofentanyl.

Before leaving the scene, the officers knocked on the door at Apartment #42 and Savanna 

Asberry, Michael Byrd’s romantic partner, answered. According to Asberry, she was alone in the 

apartment even though investigators had watched John John “enter [it] and not exit.” Considering 

the circumstances, police conducted a protective sweep of the apartment. Police observed an “open 

safe with numerous pill bottles covered in a white powdery substance believed to be fentanyl” and 

an open back window. “Three additional firearms, suspected narcotics and drug paraphernalia, 

including, but not limited to, a hydraulic press, baggies, operational digital scales, cutting agents, 

and a blender” were also found. The suspected narcotics were later identified as 65.138 grams of 

fentanyl, 0.223 grams of cocaine, and 5.155 grams of fluorofentanyl and fentanyl.

In April 2022, approximately one year later, an officer on routine patrol observed a vehicle, 

registered to Michael Byrd, illegally blocking a sidewalk. Later, a police officer observed Michael 

Byrd standing outside the vehicle. When approached, Michael Byrd ran, threw his jacket off his 
Nos. 23-5116/5273, United States v. Byrd, et al.

body, and was observed reaching his hand into his pants, pulling out something, and throwing it 

over a fence. Michael Byrd was then taken into custody, where a search of the jacket yielded 

$3,530 and a cell phone. In the area where he threw something was a bag of suspected fentanyl 

that had “broken or burst” and the suspected fentanyl was spread over the ground. It was later 

identified as 84.6 grams of fentanyl.

Michael Byrd continued to use Asberry to coordinate his drug-trafficking operation. In 

May 2022, Asberry went to Louisville to pick up narcotics. While driving back to Lexington, she 

and Michael Byrd spoke on the phone during a routine traffic stop in which Michael Byrd asked 

her if she “locked the shit in the thing” to which she advised that she had “everything” in the car.

The car contained a Glock pistol, and “13.87 grams of cocaine, 60.605 grams of fentanyl, and 

56.062 grams of methamphetamine.”

The lease agreement for Apartment #42 was signed by Michael Byrd. Photographs from 

his cell phone depicted him with large amounts of U.S. currency. They also depicted suspected 

narcotics and several individuals with firearms. Michael Byrd maintained that he resided 

elsewhere—365 Woodview Drive in Lexington, Kentucky—although his name was on the lease 

of Apartment #42.

In June 2022, based on all the above information, a grand jury ultimately indicted Je’Von 

Byrd, Michael Byrd, and Savanna Asberry. The Byrds pleaded guilty to the drug crimes. The 

district court sentenced Michael Byrd to 420 months of imprisonment, followed by ten years of 

supervised release and sentenced Je’Von Byrd to 120 months of imprisonment followed by 10 

years of supervised release. These appeals followed.
Nos. 23-5116/5273, United States v. Byrd, et al.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Fluorofentanyl in Explorer

A district court’s factual calculation of the drug quantity attributable to a defendant is 

reviewed for clear error. United States v. Olsen, 537 F.3d 660, 663 (6th Cir. 2008). A “finding is 

‘clearly erroneous’ when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire 

evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” United 

States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 384, 395 (1948). The Sentencing Guidelines instruct 

sentencing courts to calculate a defendant’s base offense level from the total quantity of drugs 

attributable to him. United States v. Thompson, 588 F. App’x 449, 452 (6th Cir. 2014). A drug 

quantity need only be established by a preponderance of the evidence, and an estimate will suffice. 

United States v. Anderson, 526 F.3d 319, 326 (6th Cir. 2008). The testimony of a co-conspirator 

may be sufficient to support the quantity of drugs attributable to another co-conspirator. United 

States v. Swanberg, 370 F.3d 622, 625 (6th Cir. 2004). 

Law enforcement seized two bags, containing 3.01 kilograms and 690.10 grams of 

fluorofentanyl, from the back seat of the Explorer. The 3.01 kilograms seized was in a backpack. 

The Explorer had a temporary tag registered to Michael Byrd, the Explorer was registered to 

Michael Byrd, and business cards of Michael Byrd were inside the vehicle. Je’Von Byrd’s pants 

contained a separate 924.4 grams of fluorofentanyl. The presentence report attributed the 3.01 

kilograms of fluorofentanyl to only Michael Byrd. Michael Byrd objected, and the district court 

overruled the objection. 

The district court correctly attributed the 3.01 kilograms of fluorofentanyl in a backpack in 

the back seat to Michael Byrd. As stated by the district court, Michael Byrd “had picked up the 

drugs with [fluoro]fentanyl that were found in the backpack.” When the two vehicles arrived at 
Nos. 23-5116/5273, United States v. Byrd, et al.

1100 Horseman’s Lane Apartment #42, it was a coordinated drug sale between Michael Byrd and 

the CI where he was “obviously overseeing the operations.” Considering the evidence presented, 

the district court concluded that Michael Byrd “in fact was responsible and had picked up all of 

those drugs.”

Je’Von Byrd’s testimony supports this. Before arriving at Apartment #42, Michael Byrd 

“picked [him] up” and stopped at a retirement home where Michael Byrd “went in there with a 

camo backpack” and came out and handed Je’Von Byrd the 924.4 grams of fluorofentanyl that 

ended up in Je’Von Byrd’s pants. Additionally, all the fluorofentanyl seized was “consistently 

wrapped,” indicating that it was from the “same source.” Michael Byrd’s name is a constant in this 

case, including the drugs seized in the backpack—they were obtained by Michael Byrd, found in 

a vehicle registered to Michael Byrd, brought to a drug deal coordinated by Michael Byrd that was 

outside a stash-house apartment that was leased to Michael Byrd. Therefore, the district court’s 

factually-supported conclusions were not clearly erroneous.

B. Possession of a Firearm

U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1) provides that a defendant convicted of a drug offense is subject to 

a two-level sentence enhancement if “a dangerous weapon (including a firearm) was possessed.” 

For the sentence enhancement to apply, the government must show, by a preponderance of the 

evidence, that (1) the defendant actually or constructively possessed the weapon, and (2) such 

possession was during the commission of the offense. U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1); United States v. 

Greeno, 679 F.3d 510, 514 (6th Cir. 2012), abrogated on other grounds by N.Y. State Rifle & 

Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022); United States v. Faison, 339 F.3d 518, 520 (6th Cir. 

2003). The enhancement reflects the danger of violence when drug traffickers possess weapons, 

and the enhancement should be applied if the weapon was present “unless it is clearly improbable 
Nos. 23-5116/5273, United States v. Byrd, et al.

that the weapon was connected to the offense.” U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1); see § 2D1.1 cmt. 11(A). 

Once the government meets its burden, a rebuttable presumption arises that the weapon was 

connected to the offense and the burden shifts to the defendant to show that it is clearly improbable. 

United States v. Hill, 79 F.3d 1477, 1485 (6th Cir. 1996).

The presentence report included a U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1) enhancement, which Michael 

Byrd objected to. Over Michael Byrd’s objection, the district court stated that “there’s sufficient 

evidence to connect the firearms that were in [the] residence to Michael Byrd.” The district court 

noted that it was “clear that [Michael Byrd] had control over the premises . . . the drugs, as well 

as the firearms, and it [was] foreseeable based upon his knowledge.” Moreover, “his own 

statements do indicate that that he possessed the firearms.” The district court properly attributed 

the firearms located inside 1100 Horseman’s Lane, Apartment #42, and properly applied the twolevel Guidelines sentence enhancement to Michael Byrd.

Inside 1100 Horseman’s Lane, Apartment #42, was “an AR-style rifle fully loaded” and 

“in the closet, a .40 caliber pistol, as well as a 12-gauge shotgun.” The firearms were found in a 

bedroom that also contained “numerous types and quantities of narcotics,” a safe “coated in” 

residue, and baggies. Michael Byrd told law enforcement that “everything inside belonged to him,” 

indicating that he possessed the firearms.

Other evidence links Michael Byrd to the firearms: his statement to Savanna Asberry, “in 

which he was not startled when she indicated she had a gun” on her supports his knowledge of 

firearms; he was photographed with firearms, including one photograph of him holding “what 

appears to be a pistol in [his] right front pants pocket” and another in which Michael Byrd is 

holding cash with “several firearms” in the frame, including the AR-style firearm seized from 1100 
Nos. 23-5116/5273, United States v. Byrd, et al.

Horseman’s Lane, Apartment #42. Although the district court acknowledged that the photographs 

are “not conclusive,” they do indicate a connection. 

This court reviews the district court’s factual determinations related to this enhancement 

for clear error. United States v. West, 962 F.3d 183, 187 (6th Cir. 2020). In this case, the firearms 

were found within the Explorer and the stash house—both registered to and leased by Michael 

Byrd. He was a self-proclaimed drug trafficker, who admitted that everything inside the apartment 

belonged to him. The district court did not err in imposing this enhancement on Michael Byrd. 

Also, it is not clearly improbable that the weapon was connected to the offense. Regardless 

of whether the firearm was on him or whether he was photographed with the firearm, the district 

court was correct in ruling that, considering the circumstances, there was no question “he’s 

responsible.” Even if there are “two permissible views of the evidence,” a district court’s “choice 

between them cannot be clearly erroneous.” Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574 

(1985).

C. Maintaining Premises

Guidelines section 2D1.1(b)(12) provides for a two-level enhancement “[i]f the defendant 

maintained a premises for the purpose of manufacturing or distributing a controlled substance.” 

Any defendant convicted of a federal drug crime who maintained a premises for the purposes of 

manufacturing or distributing a controlled substance is subject to the enhancement, and the 

enhancement applies to anyone who “(1) knowingly (2) opens or maintains any place (3) for the 

purpose of manufacturing or distributing a controlled substance.” U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(12); United 

States v. Johnson, 737 F.3d 444, 447 (6th Cir. 2013). The drug trade “need not be the sole purpose” 

for maintaining the place; it need only amount to a “primary or principal use[]” as opposed to an 

“incidental or collateral use[].” U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(12) cmt. 17.
Nos. 23-5116/5273, United States v. Byrd, et al.

The presentence report applied the § 2D1.1(b)(12) enhancement, Michael Byrd objected, 

and the district court overruled and applied the enhancement. Although we “ha[ve] not settled on 

the proper standard of review for assessing such enhancements,” the district court’s application 

was proper in this case. United States v. Bell, 766 F.3d 634, 636 (6th Cir. 2014); see also United 

States v. Terry, 83 F.4th 1030, 1041 (6th Cir. 2023).

Michael Byrd maintained 1100 Horseman’s Lane, Apartment #42, for the purpose of 

manufacturing or distributing controlled substances, more commonly known as a stash house. 

There was a bed, a closet, articles of clothing, and other items in the apartment; there were also 

needles, a blow-up mattress, marijuana, a hydraulic press, scales, baggies, cutting agents, a blender 

with white residue, and evidence of a surveillance system.

Michael Byrd also maintained a separate primary residence, and leased 1100 Horseman’s 

Lane, Apartment #42, a few months before this incident. The apartment was sparsely furnished, 

had clothing in bags, with little hanging in the closet, and little, if any, food. A bedroom upstairs 

contained a firearm, two more firearms in the closet, “numerous types and quantities of narcotics,” 

a safe “coated in” residue, and baggies. Michael Byrd clearly maintained this apartment for the 

purpose of manufacturing or distributing controlled substances. The evidence supports the 

enhancement, and the district court’s application of the enhancement was proper in Michael Byrd’s 

case.

D. Leadership Enhancement

An offense level is increased by two if the defendant is found to be an “organizer, leader,

manager, or supervisor in any criminal activity” that involved fewer than five participants and was 

not otherwise extensive. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(c). In determining whether a defendant is an organizer, 

leader, manager, or supervisor in any criminal activity, the court should consider 
Nos. 23-5116/5273, United States v. Byrd, et al.

the exercise of decision making authority, the nature of participation in the 

commission of the offense, the recruitment of accomplices, the claimed right to a 

larger share of the fruits of the crime, the degree of participation in planning or 

organizing the offense, the nature and scope of the illegal activity, and the degree 

of control and authority exercised over others. 

U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 cmt 4.

Generally, a “defendant must have exerted control over at least one individual within a 

criminal organization for the enhancement of § 3B1.1 to be warranted.” United States v. GortDiDonato, 109 F.3d 318, 321 (6th Cir. 1997). “Merely playing an essential role in the offense is 

not equivalent to exercising managerial control over other participants.” United States v. Minter, 

80 F.4th 753, 758 (6th Cir. 2023) (quoting United States v. Vandenberg, 201 F.3d 805, 811 (6th 

Cir. 2000)). The government bears the burden of proving that the enhancement applies by a 

preponderance of the evidence. United States v. Martinez, 181 F.3d 794, 797 (6th Cir. 1999). We 

review the decision to impose a leadership enhancement under § 3B1.1 deferentially because it 

raises a fact-intensive question. United States v. Washington, 715 F.3d 975, 983 (6th Cir. 2013). 

The presentence report applied the § 3B1.1(c) enhancement, Michael Byrd objected, and 

the district court overruled, finding that there is “more than sufficient evidence to establish clearly” 

that the enhancement applies. We agree.

Michael Byrd was the organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor of this criminal activity. 

First, “it [is] apparent” from looking at the photographs of him “holding large sums of currency” 

that he was “making a significant profit from his actions.” Sentencing Tr., R.184 at PageID 846-

47 (finding “evidence of significant profit from large scale drug activities by this defendant” to be 

relevant); see United States v. Vazquez, 560 F.3d 461, 473 (6th Cir. 2009) (finding that whether 

the defendant “received a larger share of the profits” was a relevant factor); Minter, 80 F.4th at 

758 (same).
Nos. 23-5116/5273, United States v. Byrd, et al.

Next, Michael Byrd, while in jail, gave Savanna Asberry directions about “continuing 

distribution activities.” He “direct[ed] her activities” and “clearly was giving her directions as to 

what to do in the case” including “how to continue to distribute, to whom to distribute, how much, 

and prices.” Asberry was “dealing on [Michael Byrd’s] behalf.” Michael Byrd’s exertion of control 

over his girlfriend, even from jail, in operating his drug-trafficking operation is enough to 

independently qualify Michael Byrd for the § 3B1.1(c) enhancement. 

Lastly, Michael Byrd was “supervising his nephew” Je’Von Byrd for his drug-trafficking 

operation. Je’Von Byrd stated that Michael Byrd gave him a brick of fentanyl to distribute and that 

he had never sold drugs before. Je’Von Byrd explained that Michael Byrd was “going to teach” 

him how to sell the brick of fentanyl that was given to him, and that Michael Byrd “would just 

guide [Je’Von Byrd] through” the process. The district court credited Je’Von Byrd’s testimony 

and imposed the § 3B1.1(c) enhancement. Considering the evidence, the § 3B.1(c) enhancement

was justified. 

E. Reasonable Suspicion

A stop without reasonable suspicion of criminal activity is unconstitutional. Terry v. Ohio, 

392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968). To determine whether there was a sufficient degree of suspicion to justify 

a Terry stop, we consider the totality of the circumstances, including the officer’s own observations 

as well as information received from fellow officers, dispatch, and police reports. United States v. 

Sheckles, 996 F.3d 330, 342-43 (6th Cir. 2021); United States v. Campbell, 549 F.3d 364, 371 (6th 

Cir. 2008). This involves “commonsense judgments and inferences about human behavior” as well 

as an officer’s experience about human behavior. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 125 (2000); 

United States. v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002). The detaining officers “must have a 
Nos. 23-5116/5273, United States v. Byrd, et al.

particularized . . . basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.” United 

States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 (1981). 

Reasonable suspicion is not a “finely-tuned standard[]” but an “elusive concept.” Ornelas 

v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696 (1996); Cortez, 499 U.S. at 417. Reviewing courts should not 

engage in a “divide-and-conquer analysis” but consider factors as a whole. Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 

274. The degree of suspicion “is obviously less demanding than . . . probable cause.” United States 

v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989). Probable cause itself is “not a high bar” and only requires a 

“substantial chance of criminal activity.” District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 49 (2018)

(citations omitted).

1. Relevant Facts

In March 2021, officers responded to a narcotics overdose. At the scene, Detective Todd 

Hart contacted an individual at the residence who agreed to be a CI. The CI informed Detective 

Hart that his supply of narcotics came from a man known as “Bird.” The CI went on to describe 

two vehicles. One of them, the blue Ford Explorer, was ordinarily used by Byrd. The other vehicle 

was used by Byrd’s “romantic partner and the mother of his children.” The CI reported, correctly, 

that this woman was white, blond-haired, and named Savanna. The CI even provided, correctly, 

the license-plate numbers for the vehicles and specifically described Michael Byrd’s primary 

residence as “a white house on the right as you enter the court with a large tree in front of it” as 

well as the exact address—365 Woodview Drive in Lexington, Kentucky. Even Michael Byrd 

could not recall his exact street address. Detective Hart began to surveil that area. 

Detective Hart located the residence at the address provided by the CI and found the two 

vehicles specifically described by the CI in the driveway. Detective Hart then identified Michael 

Byrd as the registered name attached to the vehicles’ license plates, and two people who matched 
Nos. 23-5116/5273, United States v. Byrd, et al.

the descriptions provided by the informant— “Bird” and his partner and co-defendant Savanna 

Asberry—and saw them entering and exiting the residence with children’s car seats. The CI 

identified a driver’s license photograph of Michael Byrd as his supplier and used Michael Byrd’s 

phone number to arrange a controlled purchase of a very large quantity of fentanyl. 

Michael Byrd agreed to meet the CI at Apartment #42 at an agreed-upon date and time. 

Law-enforcement units went to the location with the CI in anticipation of the exchange and of 

intercepting Michael Byrd. On arrival to the scene, the officers observed a man, “John John,” a 

drug courier for Michael Byrd, enter Apartment #42 and remain inside. The investigators 

maintained contact with Michael Byrd through the CI, and Byrd indicated that he was five minutes 

away from the location. Within fifteen minutes, the blue Ford Explorer and a smaller gray sedan 

parked in front of the driveway at Apartment #42. The Explorer matched the description and 

license plate number provided by the CI. It was at this point that law-enforcement units prepared 

to contact the suspects and intercept any narcotics within the vehicles. 

Multiple units approached the vehicles. Detective Elizabeth Thomas secured the driver of 

the Explorer while Detective Brandon Hazelwood approached the side of the vehicle and saw an 

individual, later identified as Je’Von Byrd, sitting in the front passenger seat. Detective Hazelwood 

testified that he believed Je’Von Byrd was reaching for a weapon and repeated instructions to 

Je’Von Byrd to keep his hands visible and to not reach for anything. Detective Thomas then came 

around to and opened the passenger door. Detective Thomas saw that Je’Von Byrd’s pocket was 

plainly visible and contained a handgun. Je’Von Byrd admitted that it was a handgun. Detective 

Thomas then did a weapon pat-down to ensure that Je’Von Byrd did not have any additional 

firearms. She felt a long, rectangular object inside in his jeans and immediately suspected that it 
Nos. 23-5116/5273, United States v. Byrd, et al.

was a brick of narcotics. Detective Thomas enlisted Detective Ross Collins to search Je’Von 

Byrd’s person and Collins quickly located the brick of narcotics.

Officers then searched the Explorer and suspected they would find drugs within the vehicle.

The officers located about three kilograms of suspected fentanyl in a backpack in the rear 

passenger seat. The officers then obtained and executed a search warrant for Apartment #42 and 

located additional drugs and other evidence of drug trafficking inside.

Je’Von Byrd sought suppression of all evidence seized by police from his person and the 

car in which he was a passenger on the date of his arrest, and the magistrate judge recommended 

denial. Je’Von Byrd objected, and the district court overruled the objection and denied the 

suppression.

2. Motion to Suppress

When reviewing an order denying a motion to suppress, we review the district court’s legal 

determinations de novo but will not set aside the district court’s factual findings unless they are 

clearly erroneous. United States v. Shank, 543 F.3d 309, 312 (6th Cir. 2008). Whether an officer 

had reasonable suspicion under the circumstances is a mixed question of law and fact that we 

review de novo. United States v. Bell, 555 F.3d 535, 539 (6th Cir. 2009). We may affirm the district 

court’s decision to deny the motion to dismiss for any reason supported by the record. United 

States v. Pasquarille, 20 F.3d 682, 685 (6th Cir. 1994). 

There was overwhelming reasonable suspicion that warranted the stop of the Explorer, and 

the district court did not err in denying the motion to suppress. As the district court held, reasonable 

suspicion “clearly” existed and reasonable suspicion, according to the magistrate judge, “readily,” 

“abundant[ly],” and “unequivocally existed.” Michael Byrd was not unknown to law 

enforcement—the CI had identified him, his cars, and his home, and the CI arranged a controlled 
Nos. 23-5116/5273, United States v. Byrd, et al.

purchase and his ultimate take-down. Detective Hart’s methodical and investigatory steps all 

corroborated the key details of the CI’s information, including his name, his residence, the license 

plates of his two vehicles as well as their makes and models, and his description, his partner and 

co-defendant’s description, and the fact that they had young children. 

Most importantly, the CI gave accurate predictions of Michael Byrd and his associate’s 

actions on the date at issue, which corroborated his reliability at the time of the stop. Law 

enforcement monitored the residence after the CI identified it, and the CI cooperated with law 

enforcement to communicate with Michael Byrd and set up a drug transaction. The CI correctly 

predicted that Michael Byrd would pull up to the driveway of the correctly identified residence to 

conduct the drug transaction at the agreed-upon date and time. see Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 

325, 332 (noting that “future actions by third parties ordinarily [are] not easily predicted” before 

concluding that the informant’s tip was sufficiently reliable because it accurately predicted that the 

target would drive to a particular location in a particular vehicle at a particular time). 

In sum, more than sufficient suspicion existed to warrant the stop of the Explorer, and the 

district court’s factual findings of this case considering the evidence are not clearly erroneous. The 

district court’s denial of Je’Von Byrd’s motion to suppress was appropriate given the 

circumstances of this case.

AFFIRMED.