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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO 

CINCINNATI DIVISION 

) 

NATIONAL REPUBLICAN SENATORIAL ) 

COMMITTEE, et al., ) 

) Civ. No. 22-639 (DRC) 

Plaintiffs, ) 

) 

v. ) REPLY IN SUPPORT OF 

) MOTION TO DISMISS OR 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, et al., ) TRANSFER 

) 

Defendants. ) 

) 

DEFENDANT FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION’S REPLY 

IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS FOR IMPROPER VENUE 

OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, TRANSFER 

Plaintiffs oppose the Motion to Dismiss for Improper Venue or, in the Alternative, 

Transfer (Docket No. 10) (“Motion” or “Mot.”) filed by defendants Federal Election 

Commission (“FEC” or “Commission”) and its six Commissioners, but plaintiffs fail to show 

that they have chosen the proper venue for this facial challenge to limits on coordinated spending 

by national party committees who are, like the Commission, based in the District of Columbia. 

See Plaintiffs’ Mem. in Opp. to the FEC’s Motion (Docket No. 11) (“Response” or “Resp.”). It 

is true that because plaintiffs National Republican Senatorial Committee (“NRSC”) and National 

Republican Congressional Committee (“NRCC”) support candidates campaigning nationwide in 

each two-year federal election cycle, such as plaintiffs Senator Vance and former Representative 

Chabot, the challenged statute has at least some connection to nearly every federal judicial 

district in the country, including this one. Yet that does not grant plaintiffs the right to bring 

their challenge in whatever district they prefer. The venue requirement is designed to assure that 

lawsuits are filed in appropriately convenient courts for the matters raised and for the parties 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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involved. Plaintiffs distort the Commission’s positions on key elements of this analysis, but they 

do not deny that all plaintiffs with standing, all defendants, and nearly all participating attorneys 

in this case conduct business within about one mile of one another in the nation’s capital. At the 

same time, plaintiffs fail to distinguish this District from the scores of others in which federal 

elections are regularly held, apart from the choice by the real parties in interest to include two 

individual plaintiffs, one of whom lacks standing. The District of Columbia is thus the 

“appropriate district court” for this action under 52 U.S.C. § 30110, the review provision that 

plaintiffs have chosen to invoke, and in any event the relevant factors weigh heavily in favor of a 

discretionary transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). This Court should therefore dismiss this matter 

or transfer it to the District Court for the District of Columbia, for the benefit of all parties and 

potential witnesses, and in the interests of justice. 

I. THIS CASE SHOULD BE DISMISSED BECAUSE “THE APPROPRIATE 

DISTRICT COURT” UNDER THE JUDICIAL REVIEW PROVISION 

PLAINTIFFS HAVE INVOKED IS THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 

Plaintiffs here have chosen to seek review under 52 U.S.C. § 30110, a special provision 

establishing procedures for limited classes of plaintiffs to bring constitutional challenges to the 

Federal Election Campaign Act (“FECA”). In its Motion, the Commission explained that section 

30110 requires that such actions be brought “in the appropriate district court of the United 

States[,]” and that this entails an independent determination as to which district is “the 

appropriate” one for this challenge to a longstanding statute impacting elections nationwide. 

(Mot. at 7.) The Commission further explained that such a determination is appropriate given 

the well-established role of district courts in section 30110 proceedings, which involves ensuring 

jurisdiction, developing a record sufficient for appellate review, and determining whether the 

constitutional challenges are frivolous, before potentially certifying questions to the en banc 

court of appeals. (Id.) The general federal venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1391, specifically provides 

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for provisions like section 30110 to govern venue in particular situations identified by Congress, 

in its statement that it applies “except as otherwise provided by law.” (See id. at 8 n.2.) 

In response, plaintiffs argue that “the phrase ‘the appropriate district court’ incorporates 

rather than invalidates otherwise applicable venue rules.” (Resp. at 3.) Of course, as discussed 

in more detail below, the Commission has only argued that section 30110 is an example of 

Congress “otherwise provid[ing]” for venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1391; nothing has been 

“invalidated.” But in any event, plaintiffs identify no case interpreting section 30110 for venue 

purposes, and defendants are aware of none. Indeed, constitutional challenges to FECA pursuant 

to section 30110 are relatively rare, and past cases do not seem to have required courts to 

confront the kind of difficult venue claims that plaintiffs have made here. (See Mot. at 8 n.2.) 

Given the apparent lack of precedent, the Court is free to interpret section 30110 in light of the 

structure of FECA, the constitutional claims at issue, and the parties to this proceeding, and in 

doing so it will “break new ground” either way. (Resp. at 4.) 

Plaintiffs next suggest that “adopting the FEC’s construction of § 30110 would produce a 

hopelessly indeterminate venue provision,” but in fact the term “appropriate district court” is 

readily definable with reference to section 30110 and FECA as a whole. In United States v. 

Texas, 601 F.3d 354, 365 (5th Cir. 2010), the Fifth Circuit was required to consider whether the 

court below properly exercised jurisdiction over claims pursuant to the Equal Educational 

Opportunities Act (“EEOA”), which provided that “[t]he appropriate district court of the United 

States shall have and exercise jurisdiction of proceedings instituted under section 1706 of this 

title.” (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1708). Pursuant to that provision, the court of appeals found that the 

lower court had “failed to adequately address whether it constituted an ‘appropriate district 

court’ pursuant to Section 1708.” Id. After conceding that “Congress did not define ‘appropriate 

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district court’ in the statute, and there is little legislative history or judicial precedent on the 

issue[,]” the court of appeals nonetheless proceeded to interpret the language in light of the 

overall statutory scheme and the claims at issue in the matter before it. Id. The court of appeals 

“conclude[d] that ‘an appropriate district court’ is normally the district court in which a local 

school district, as a party to the action, is located[,]” and that the presence of additional school 

districts should cause the court to “reconsider whether it constitutes an ‘appropriate district 

court’ . . . or if the case should, instead, be handled in a forum that constitutes a proper venue for 

such additional parties.” Id. Just as the Texas court had no difficulty in determining that the 

physical location of defendant school districts was the correct barometer of what was 

“appropriate” in that EEOA case, here the locations of every major national party committee and 

the federal agency entrusted with enforcement of the challenged statute are the relevant 

considerations to give effect to the text of section 30110. 

Indeed, plaintiffs effectively concede that the phrase “appropriate district court” is a 

workable standard when they proceed to argue that this Court is the “appropriate district court” 

under the Commission’s theory. (Resp. at 7.) Plaintiffs further propose that the analysis the 

Court should undertake should be similar to “the multi-factor transfer analysis under 28 U.S.C. § 

1404(a)[.]” (Id.) Borrowing from that test is reasonable because section 1404(a) provides a 

familiar set of standards to determine the “appropriate district court” in specific situations. This 

reading is also consistent with the structure and purpose of section 30110, which provides for 

constitutional challenges to nationally applicable election laws. Because of the politically 

charged nature and wide-reaching impact of such cases, it is appropriate that Congress departed 

from the general venue statute, which provides plaintiffs with more control over the litigating 

forum, in favor of a separate test that mandates “consideration of all the relevant factors” to 

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ensure that such cases are decided fairly and efficiently. (Resp. at 7 (citing Michigan v. EPA, 

576 U.S. 743, 752 (2015)).) 

Finally, plaintiffs claim that the Commission is “seeking to suggest that two statutes 

cannot be harmonized” and “the FEC therefore bears the heavy burden of showing a clearly 

expressed congressional intention that such a result should follow[,]” (id. at 5 (citation omitted)), 

but that is simply wrong. What the moving papers actually posited was merely that section 

30110 is an exception to the general venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1391, as provided for in the 

statute itself. In two separate locations section 1391 provides that it will give way in the face of 

venue provisions that govern specific contexts. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) (“except as otherwise 

provided by law”); id. § 1391(a) (same). 28 U.S.C. § 1391 and 52 U.S.C. § 30110 are thus in 

perfect harmony, and where the provisions do not conflict, the Commission bears no “heavy 

burden.” 

In sum, plaintiffs have not chosen “the appropriate district court” for this action under 

section 30110, and the action should be dismissed. 

II. THE COURT SHOULD ALTERNATIVELY EXERCISE ITS DISCRETION TO 

TRANSFER THIS MATTER TO THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 

A. Plaintiffs’ Choice of Forum is Entitled to Little, If Any, Deference Because 

this District Lacks a Substantial or Unique Connection to This Controversy 

If this case is not dismissed, it should be transferred to the District of Columbia in accord 

with the balancing test required by 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). (See Mot. at 9-14.) It is true that, as 

between two potential forums with clear connections to the claims at issue that present similar 

burdens on the parties and potential witnesses, a plaintiff’s choice of forum should ordinarily be 

afforded “considerable weight[.]” (Resp. at 8 (citing Doe S.W. v. Lorain-Elyria Motel, Inc., Civ. 

No. 19-1194, 2020 WL 1244192, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 16, 2020)).) But plaintiffs’ choice of 

forum here is entitled to little deference where “the vast majority of operative facts giving rise to 

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the lawsuit took place outside of Ohio.”1 U.S. ex rel. Kairos Scientia, Inc. v. Zinsser Co., Civ. 

No. 10-383, 2011 WL 127852, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 14, 2011)); (see Mot. at 12-13.) 

Plaintiffs’ attempts to establish a connection to this District rely entirely on the inclusion 

of the two individual plaintiffs and the efforts of plaintiffs to influence election outcomes 

through expenditures in this District. (Resp. at 8-10.) However, that is insufficient. Plaintiffs’ 

focus ignores the larger context of the parties, claims, and facts at issue in this proceeding, and it 

again fails to distinguish this District from the dozens of others where the NRSC, NRCC, and 

other national political committees regularly support their candidates. Because this litigation has 

only an incidental relationship to this District, plaintiffs’ choice of forum is entitled to little 

deference. 

First, plaintiffs’ effort to connect the case to this District ignores the true “operative facts 

giving rise to the lawsuit[.]” Kairos Scientia, 2011 WL 127852, at *2. As plaintiffs’ complaint 

attests, the statute they challenge places “limitations on how much money party committees can 

spend on such so-called ‘coordinated party expenditures’ to support their general election 

nominees[.]” (Compl. ¶ 2.) The Supreme Court has upheld this statute against a constitutional 

challenge as a “measure to address the ‘corrosive effects’ of money in politics, . . . concluding 

that the government has a sufficiently important interest in preventing ‘corruption (and its 

appearance),’ . . . to justify campaign finance restrictions.” (Id. ¶ 79 (quoting FEC v. Colo. 

Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431, 456, 462 (2001).) Plaintiffs seek nation-wide 

In their Response plaintiffs paint a distorted picture of the Commission’s arguments, 

suggesting that the Commission alleged that this District “has no connection with the matter in 

controversy” and that plaintiffs included Senator Vance and Congressman Chabot in their 

complaint “at random[.]” (Resp. at 8.) These are clear overstatements, as the cited portions of 

the Commission’s Motion show. (See Mot. at 4, 13.) 

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relief and evidence of the danger of corruption throughout the country will be necessary as the 

vitality of the Colorado Republican holding is considered in this facial challenge. 

Plaintiffs’ attempt to draw an analogy between the challenged statute and a libel claim, 

for purposes of venue, is thus misconceived. (See Resp. at 9-10.) That analogy is strained at its 

outset, given that this case is a facial constitutional challenge to a federal law governing federal 

elections, as opposed to a tort claim under state law. (Id.) Plaintiffs’ cited authority makes no 

mention of the federal Constitution, leaving unsupported their assertion that “venue for a First 

Amendment claim is proper in the forum where the burdened speech would occur.” (Id. (citing 

Klauder & Nunno Enterprises, Inc. v. Hereford Assocs., Inc., 723 F. Supp. 336, 344 (E.D. Pa. 

1989) (“Since there are clearly no federal constitutional questions joined here . . .”).) Moreover, 

even assuming arguendo that a libel action represented a useful analogy, the place of publication 

is not decisive. In Hereford Associates the court conducted a general “weight of contacts” test in 

which it considered the residences of each of the parties, the presence of witnesses in 

Pennsylvania, and the initial drafting of the defamatory statements in Pennsylvania before 

determining that venue in that state was proper. 723 F. Supp. at 342. In this case, to the extent 

such factors apply, they weigh decisively in favor of the District of Columbia as the most 

convenient venue. See infra pp. 9-14. 

In light of the national scope and purposes of the challenged statute limiting coordination 

between national political committees and their candidates, plaintiffs’ heavy reliance on the 

placement of campaign ads in Ohio is insufficient. The fact that Senator Vance’s campaign 

committee “communicat[es] with Ohio voters” in Ohio (Resp. at 9) is of limited importance in a 

case that implicates the anti-corruptive purpose and national application of restrictions on the 

activities of national party committees. Indeed, the campaign committees of Senator Vance and 

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former Congressman Chabot are not parties to this case, and the spending of those committees is 

a minor component of the case. Nor do plaintiffs allege that this District has a unique connection 

to the fundraising efforts undertaken by the national party committees or even by Senator Vance, 

and those activities are critical to the government’s interest in foreclosing quid pro quo 

corruption that is at the heart of this case. Supra pp. 6-7. 

With regards to the NRSC and NRCC, plaintiffs do not contest that they operate from the 

District of Columbia, and plaintiffs fail to show that their operations in this District are of 

sufficient dimension to make such operations the principal operative facts. Plaintiffs refer 

broadly to their “overriding aim . . . to influence political campaigns in . . . Senate races and 

House races in Ohio and other hotly contested States,” conceding their national scope. (Resp. at 

9.) However, the location where the “operative facts giving rise to the lawsuit took place” 

Kairos Scientia, 2011 WL 127852, at *2, is predominantly the District of Columbia and then 

secondarily a multiplicity of states throughout the country, not merely Ohio. Indeed, the sole 

substantive evidence offered by plaintiffs to connect these national committees with Ohio in fact 

demonstrates the centrality of the District of Columbia to this litigation. Plaintiffs note that “the 

NRSC targeted this forum in 2022 with coordinated advertising specific to Ohio’s U.S. senate 

race,” but they cite to an NRSC press release that lists its place of publication as “Washington, 

D.C.” (Resp. at 10 (citing ICYMI NEW AD// JD Vance’s Ohio Story, NRSC.org Press Release 

(Aug. 3, 2022), https://bit.ly/3DcpMuf).) 

Second, even if it were correct that venue “is proper in the forum where the burdened 

speech would occur” (Resp. at 9-10), plaintiffs again fail to contend with the fact that such 

campaign activity occurs in nearly every federal judicial district on a biannual basis, and 

plaintiffs do not allege that the activity taking place in Ohio is unique for purposes of venue. 

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The statute plaintiffs challenge impacts all states, parties and candidates, and on a national basis. 

Plaintiffs do not allege that Senator Vance or any other persons in this District suffer unique 

harm. Nor do they allege that either the NRSC or NRCC have a relationship with this District 

distinct from any other in which they support candidates. While a plaintiff’s choice of forum is 

generally entitled to deference, such deference need not apply where “the vast majority of 

operative facts giving rise to the lawsuit took place outside of Ohio,” Kairos Scientia, 2011 WL 

127852, at *2, and that is the case here. 

B. The District of Columbia Is Plainly a More Convenient Forum 

Plaintiffs do not seriously dispute that the District of Columbia is the most convenient 

forum for resolving this action, as reflected in an analysis of the private and public-interest 

factors courts weigh to evaluate a request for transfer. As the Commission explained (Mot. at 

10), private interests include the convenience of potential witnesses, “the relative ease of access 

to sources of proof, availability of compulsory process for attendance of unwilling [witnesses], 

the cost of obtaining attendance of willing witnesses . . . and all other practical problems that 

make trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive.” Robinson v. Chertoff, Civ. No. 06-329, 

2007 WL 708616, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 2, 2007) (citation omitted). Public-interest concerns 

include “systemic integrity and fairness,” Moses v. Bus. Card Express, Inc., 929 F.2d 1131, 1137 

(6th Cir. 1991) (citations omitted), as well as “docket congestion, the burden of trial to a 

jurisdiction with no relation to the cause of action, . . . and the familiarity of the court with the 

controlling law.” Robinson, 2007 WL 708616, at *2. 

Plaintiffs largely ignore these factors, with the sole exception of docket congestion, as 

discussed infra. That may be because virtually every factor weighs in favor of transfer. Every 

party to this case that has standing, all Commission attorneys, and six of the eight attorneys 

signing plaintiffs’ Response regularly conduct business in the District of Columbia. The Federal 

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Election Commission is a 22-minute walk from the federal courthouse.2 The NRSC is a 16-

minute walk.3 The NRCC is a 20-minute walk.4 The offices of Senator Vance are an 11-minute 

walk.5 Jones Day’s Washington, D.C. office is a 7-minute walk.6 Potential witnesses include 

NRSC and NRCC staff, as well as Members of Congress, all of whom work within a 20-minute 

walk to the federal courthouse.7 Therefore, this location will be convenient for parties, counsel, 

and potential witnesses; will facilitate in-person oral arguments; will avoid unnecessary flights 

and accommodation expenses; and in general will “make trial of a case easy, expeditious and 

inexpensive.” Robinson, 2007 WL 708616, at *2. Plaintiffs do emphasize that Senator Vance’s 

campaign “conducts the substantial part of its operations from Cincinnati” (Resp. at 13; see id. at 

9-10), but it is the Senator, not his campaign, that joined this lawsuit, and in any event the 

Senator is not up for reelection until 2028. Plaintiffs do not claim that former representative 

Chabot would be unduly burdened by a transfer. Nor have plaintiffs identified “any present or 

former campaign staff” in Ohio who would need to serve as witnesses in this case. (Resp. at 13.) 

Plaintiffs suggest that there is no meaningful burden to litigating 500 miles from the locus 

of this case by virtue of the “less-than-two-hour flight from Washington to Cincinnati[,]” the 

2 GOOGLE MAPS, Walking Directions from FEC to D.C. Federal Courthouse (last accessed 

Feb. 13, 2023), https://goo.gl/maps/9ACCtWc7Snwjt6oj8. See Ryan v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 

Civ. No. 14-356, 2015 WL 1962173, at *1 n.1 (E.D. Tenn. Apr. 30, 2015) (“The Court may take 

judicial notice of Google Maps to determine distances and locations.”) (citations omitted).

3 GOOGLE MAPS, Walking Directions from NRSC to D.C. Federal Courthouse (last 

accessed Feb. 13, 2023), https://goo.gl/maps/TghDi1ysB5Gz9pZ59.

4 GOOGLE MAPS, Walking Directions from NRCC to D.C. Federal Courthouse (last 

accessed Feb. 13, 2023), https://goo.gl/maps/GKXop3cc6PKoVLYf8.

5 GOOGLE MAPS, Walking Directions from Dirksen Senate Office Building to D.C. Federal 

Courthouse (last accessed Feb. 13, 2023), https://goo.gl/maps/gJdVEe4p8CF8WRda6.

6 GOOGLE MAPS, Walking Directions from D.C. Office of Jones Day to D.C. Federal 

Courthouse (last accessed Feb. 13, 2023), https://goo.gl/maps/V1Ythmv37tvM36uU6.

7 GOOGLE MAPS, Walking Directions from United States Capitol to D.C. Federal 

Courthouse (last accessed Feb. 13, 2023), https://goo.gl/maps/oFQ2MdmnJEmNHzzu5. 

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virtual “submission of affidavits and declarations,” and other “technological means.” (Resp. at 

12-13.) But it is ultimately for the courts to assess the value of in-person hearings and 

arguments. And it is not in the interest of “fairness” to unnecessarily compel a federal agency to 

spend limited attorney time and public resources on interstate travel for such appearances. 

Moses, 929 F.2d at 1137. The fact remains that that burden would not be present if the case were 

litigated in the District of Columbia. 

Plaintiffs also fault the Commission for not submitting “affidavits averring to the 

disruption traveling to Ohio would create in their personal and professional lives,” but that 

argument missed the mark. (Resp. at 12 (quoting Mesa Indus., Inc. v. Charter Indus. Supply, 

Inc., Civ. No. 22-0160, 2022 WL 3082031, at *14 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 3, 2022).) The passage 

plaintiffs quote from the Mesa case referred to that court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over 

the defendants, not venue. As the Mesa court noted, assessing personal jurisdiction under 

Federal Rule12(b)(2) in fact requires the court to evaluate evidence submitted by the parties. 

Mesa, 2022 WL 3082031, at *3. Plaintiffs cite no case, and the Commission is aware of none, 

holding that such submissions are required for a section 1404(a) analysis. In any case, here both 

the benefits of litigating in D.C. and the inconvenience of litigating in Ohio are self-evident. 

Plaintiffs’ primary argument that the District of Columbia will be an inconvenient forum 

is their contention that “current docket congestion threatens a slower resolution of this case than 

in this Court” (Resp. at 11), but this too is unavailing. Plaintiffs’ argument relies on speculation 

and selective anecdotal evidence, completely failing to assess this District’s own docket. 

Plaintiffs note that as of November 2022 there were about 950 criminal cases pending in the 

District of Columbia, and that in the opinion of one judge this has created a “massive traffic 

jam[.]” (Id. (citations omitted).) However, plaintiffs make no attempt to assess the impact of 

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these cases on the District of Columbia’s civil docket, nor do they avail themselves of publicly 

available information to compare that docket to the docket of this District. A more rigorous 

analysis shows that there is no basis to believe docket congestion supports plaintiffs’ claims. 

Statistics compiled by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts present a far more 

complete and meaningful picture, and they show considerably greater docket congestion in this 

District. Statistics for the 12-month period ending September 30, 2022 (the most recent 

available) show that, in a comparison between this District and the District of Columbia, there 

were 5,687 vs. 3,864 total filings and 20,507 vs. 4,656 pending cases, respectively.

8 Moreover, 

there are thirteen district judges in active service in the District of Columbia9 and only eight in 

this District.10 With a much higher number of filings and less than two thirds the number of 

active judges, the data indicates that cases in this District took an average of 12.6 months to be 

resolved compared to 5.6 months in the District of Columbia.11 While these statistics are over 

four months old, the relative gap between this District and the District of Columbia has persisted 

for the last six years, making it highly unlikely this trend has meaningfully changed in the last 

8 Statistics and Reports, Table C-1—U.S. District Courts–Civil Judicial Business 

(September 30, 2022), Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, 

https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics/table/c-1/judicial-business/2022/09/30. 9 District Judges, United States District Court, District of Columbia (last accessed Feb. 13, 

2023), https://www.dcd.uscourts.gov/district-judges. 10 Judges Biographical Sketch, United States District Court, Southern District of Ohio (last 

accessed Feb. 13, 2023), https://www.ohsd.uscourts.gov/judges-biographical-sketch.

11 Statistics and Reports, Table C-5—U.S. District Courts–Civil Judicial Business 

(September 30, 2022), Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, 

https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics/table/c-5/judicial-business/2022/09/30. Both Districts have 

obviously had levels of judges in active service that fluctuated to some extent over that period 

depending on the numbers of retirements and the pace of ensuing confirmations as the table 

reflects, but the fundamental dynamics of a significantly higher workload in this District per 

judgeship and resulting slower pace of disposition has remained constant. 

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few months.12 In any case, contrary to plaintiffs’ claims, the available data does not indicate that 

this District’s docket is less congested or that this case will proceed more quickly here. 

Plaintiffs disagree with authority from this District suggesting that the District of 

Columbia would be a particularly suitable court for a discretionary transfer of a constitutional 

challenge to a federal campaign finance provision with potential nation-wide effect, (see Mot. at 

12-13; Resp. at 13-15), and note the obvious point that all district courts are charged with 

potentially supervising constitutional challenges with nation-wide effect, (Resp. at 14.) But the 

cases on which plaintiffs rely for the proposition that there are no differences between federal 

courts related to federal “governing law” are all out of Circuit. (See Id. (citing SEC v. Comm. on 

Ways & Means of the U.S. House of Representatives, 161 F. Supp. 3d 199, 229 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) 

and Lewis v. Grote Indus., Inc., 841 F. Supp. 2d 1049, 1055 (N.D. Ill. 2012)).) Courts in this 

District have specifically noted the appropriateness of making transfers due to other jurisdictions 

having greater “familiarity” with “the controlling law,” Robinson, 2007 WL 708616, at *2, and 

recognized the District of Columbia as “an obvious choice” for wide-ranging constitutional 

challenges against federal agencies, Dearth v. Gonzales, Civ. No. 06-1012, 2007 WL 1100426, 

at *4 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 10, 2007) (internal quotation omitted). The other factors addressed here 

are more than sufficient to establish the sensibility of a transfer, but it would not constitute error 

for the Court in its discretion to also consider the unique aspects of the logical transferee court. 

Statistics and Reports, Table N/A—U.S. District Courts–Combined Civil and Criminal 

Federal Court Management Statistics, Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts (June 30, 2022) 

https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics/table/na/federal-court-management-statistics/2022/06/30-2 

(select “Download Data Table (PDF)” and compare “Ohio Southern,” PDF page 43, with 

“District of Columbia,” PDF page 2, with respect to “12-Month Periods Ending” for each of 

2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021, and 2022). 

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Finally, plaintiffs do not controvert that bringing their broad challenge in this Division 

with a smaller number of judges in active service is the sort of filing that has raised judgeshopping concerns. See Alex Botoman, Divisional Judge-Shopping, 49 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. 

Rev. 297, 326-27, 329-30 (2018) (noting that “it is especially important to ensure that judge 

assignments are made with the highest degree of impartiality” in “cases with multiple potential 

plaintiffs or cases challenging the validity of generally applicable laws or regulations”). And a 

recognition of the District of Columbia as a better venue for this case given all the relevant 

factors would not prevent groups of plaintiffs with more substantial ties to other districts from 

litigating 52 U.S.C. § 30110 cases outside the nation’s capital. (See Resp. at 14-15 (citing 

previous cases brought in part by a state-specific nonprofit association and a state political party 

and one brought exclusively by a Senate candidate).) 

In sum, a comprehensive comparison of the relative “docket congestion” in the District of 

Columbia versus this District paints precisely the opposite picture that plaintiffs suggest. 

Combined with the fact that the District of Columbia is plainly the most convenient forum for all 

parties with standing, nearly all counsel, and all likely factual witnesses, the balancing test 

required by § 1404(a) in this case is extremely lopsided. For the convenience of the parties and 

potential witnesses and in the interest of justice, this Court should exercise its discretion to 

transfer this proceeding. 

CONCLUSION 

For all the foregoing reasons, the Court should dismiss plaintiff’s complaint for improper 

venue or, in the alternative, transfer this matter to the District Court for the District of Columbia. 

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Respectfully submitted, 

Lisa J. Stevenson (D.C. Bar No. 457628) 

Acting General Counsel 

lstevenson@fec.gov 

Kevin Deeley (Mass. Bar No. 644486) 

Associate General Counsel 

kdeeley@fec.gov 

Christopher H. Bell (D.C. Bar No. 1643526) 

Attorney 

chbell@fec.gov 

/s/ Harry J. Summers 

Harry J. Summers (Cal. Bar No. 147929) 

(Trial Attorney) 

Assistant General Counsel 

hsummers@fec.gov 

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION 

1050 First Street, N.E. 

Washington, D.C. 20463 

(202) 694-1650 

February 13, 2023 

15 
 

 

 

 

 

Case: 1:22-cv-00639-DRC Doc #: 15 Filed: 02/13/23 Page: 16 of 16 PAGEID #: 144 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I hereby certify that on February 13, 2023, I served the foregoing pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 5(b)(2)(E) on counsel of record, as a registered ECF user, through the Court’s ECF system. 

/s/ Harry J. Summers 

Harry J. Summers (Cal. Bar No. 147929) 

Assistant General Counsel 

hsummers@fec.gov