No. 85-592 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1986 

IN THE FATTER OF THE MALE CHILD 

BORN JULY 15, 1985 TO L. C.; 

IN RE THE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS 

OF L.A.C. AND D.S.C. 

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Sixth Judicial District, 

In and for the County of Park, 

The Honorable Thomas Olson, Judge presiding. 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

For Appellant: 

Yardley & Yardley; Jack Yardl-ey, Livingston, Montana 

For Respondent: 

Lineberger & Davis; Peter S. Lineberger, Bozeman, 

Montana 

Submitted on Briefs: Feb. 26, 1986 

Decided: May 15, 1986 

Clerk 
Mr. Chief Justice J. A. Turnage delivered the Opinion of the 

Court. 

The birth mother, L.A.C., appeals the District Court's 

order which determined, overall, not to interfere with the 

child's adoption in Idaho. Although we sympathize with 

L.A.C.'s natural maternal feelings, the outcome of this 

appeal is dictated by legal procedure. We affirm. 

The primary issue for us to consider here concerns the 

jurisdiction of Montana district courts over a Montana born 

child who has been transferred and adopted in Idaho. If the 

Montana district courts had lost jurisdiction, then the 

adoption of the child in Idaho was legal, and this Court has 

no jurisdiction to interfere. 

Montana and Idaho have adopted the Interstate Compact 

on Placement of Children. Section 41-4-101, MCA; Section 

16-2101, I.C.A. The states have also adopted versions of the 

Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act. Section 40-7-101 et 

seq., MCA; Section 32-1101 et seq., I.C.A. Both the Compact 

and the Uniform Act have the goal of preventing jurisdictional tug-of-wars over children by the member states. This case 

presents a contingency not anticipated by the statutes, but 

which can be solved by application of the statutes with a 

recognition of their broader principles and goals. 

L.A.C. was an expectant mother residing in Park County, 

Montana. She had recently been divorced from her husband for 

a second time and doubted her ability and desire to raise the 

child. Two months prior to the birth of her child, she 

contacted AID Adoption Agency, Inc. (AID) of Idaho for assistance in placing the child in a proper home for adoption. 

AID provided counselling to L.A.C. and assisted her in selecting a suitable family to raise her child. L.A.C. 
expressed her desire that the child be transferred to the 

prospective parents in Idaho immediately after birth. In 

compliance with L.A.C.'s wishes, AID set out to expedite the 

process of a legal transfer of the child to Idaho. Papers 

were drawn a.nd administrative agencies contacted. The child 

was born, and two days later L.A.C. signed. forms relinquishing her parental rights and consenting to adoption. The 

relinquishment form states as follows: 

CONSENT FOR RELINQUISHMENT 

OF PARENTAL RIGHTS 

I, [L.A.C], of Clyde Park, Montana, 

declare that I am the natural mother of 

the unamed [sic] male child who was born 

at the Livingston Memorial Hospital in 

Park County, Montana on July 1.5, 1985. 

Believing it to be in the best interests 

of said child, I do hereby freely, 

voluntarily and irrevocably release and 

relinquish forever al-1 of my parental 

rights, privileges and claim to said 

child including the right to inheritance 

and agree that from the date of execution of this document, my interests 

shall be terminated and said child shall 

to all legal interests and purposes be 

relinquished to the custody of Aid 

Adoption Agency, Inc., a private adoption agency licensed in Montana and 

Idaho. 

I further state that I understand tha.t 

this relinquishment will be submitted by 

Aid Adoption Agency, Inc., for the 

purpose of obtaining an order to terminate my right to the said minor child 

and for the purpose of transferring 

custody to the above-referenced agency 

for placement with adoptive parents. I 

hereby waive notice to any proceeding 

necessary to effect the termination of 

my parental rights. 

DATED this 11th day of July, 1985. 

/s/ [L.A.C.] 

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before this 17th 

day of July 1985. 

s/s June Miller 
Notary Public for the State of Montana 

R.esiding at Wilsall, Montana. My commission expires: 10-16-85 

AID sent copies of the relinquishment documents and 

notice of placement for adoption to the appropriate authorities in Idaho. Three days after the child's birth, an AID 

representative took the child to the adoptive family in 

Idaho, as had been agreed. Three days later, L.A.C. notified 

the AID representative that she had changed her mind and did 

not want to give the child up for adoption. L.A.C. filed a 

petition to revoke her consent to the adoption and obtained 

an ex parte temporary restraining order from the Park County 

District Court, prohibiting adoptive placement of the child 

and ordering that he be returned to Montana. By this time, 

however, Idaho had approved the child's placement for adoption, and the child was legally placed with the adoptive 

family. Also at this time, AID filed its petition in the 

Park County District Court for an order of termination of 

parental rights. Montana's Department of Social and Rehabilitation Services and the AID representative attempted to 

arrange for the child to be brought back to Montana, but the 

adoptive parents would not agree to that. Instead, the 

adoptive parents initiated adoption proceedings in Idaho and 

obtained a temporary restraining order from the Idaho district court, prohibiting removal of the child. from their 

custody until the outcome of the adoption proceedings. A 

final adoption order was entered in Idaho. 

After that time, the Montana District Court, with a new 

judge presiding, held. a hearing on L.A.C.'s petition to 

revoke her consent to adoption and relinquishment of parental 

rights. AID presented testimony and evidence at the hearing. 

The court held that L.A.C. was not a "sending agency" under 
the Interstate Compact on Placement of Children, § 41-4-101, 

MCA, and, because of that it set a.side the Montana court's 

prior restraining order. It also held that AID was not in 

violation of any court order, that L.A.C. 's parental rights 

were terminated, and that it was in the child's best interests to remain with the adoptive parents in Idaho. 

L.A.C. sought a writ of supervisory control from this 

Court, which was denied. She now appeals. 

This opinion will first consider the effect of L.A.C.'s 

relinquishment of parental rights on the District Court's 

jurisdiction. L.A.C.'s contention that she is a "sending 

agency" under the Interstate Compact will be discussed as a 

sub-issue to the District Court jurisdiction issue. We will 

then consider L.A.C1s challenges to the adoption proceedings 

in Idaho. The opinion will conclude with a discussion of 

this Court's jurisdiction. We make no conclusion as to our 

jurisdiction if L.A.C.'s arguments had been correct. 

L.A.C.'s conduct over a period of two months were 

directed at giving her child up for adoption to a family of 

her choice in Idaho. Towards this end she engaged the services of AID. She voluntarily signed and executed a form 

relinquishing her parental rights to AID. This relinquishment had legal consequences that determine the case. 

The effect of L.A.C.'s execution of the relinquishment 

form can be found in §$ 40-6-135 (1) and (7), MCA. Subsection 

(1) provides how a natural mother can relinquish her parental 

rights: 

(1) Any parent or guardian who proposes 

to relinquish custody of a child for 

purposes of placing the child for adoption may do so by executing a relinquishment by which all parental rights 

to the child are voluntarily relin- 
quished to an agency of the state of 

Montana or a licensed adoption agency. 

Thus, L.A.C.'s parental rights were relinquished when she 

executed the form. No additional procedure was required for 

the relinquishment. When L.A.C. relinquished her parental 

rights to AID, AID became a "sendling agency" as defined by 

the Interstate Compact. Section 41-4-101, Art. 11, MCA. As 

a sending agency, AID had the power to place the child for 

adoption in Idaho. See 5 41-4-101, Art. V, MCA. Consequently, the only standing L.A.C. then had in the Montana courts 

was to seek a revocation of the relinquishment. 

Subsection (7) provides the! only method by which a 

voluntarily executed relinquishment can be revoked: 

(7) Upon petition of a person who 

executed a relinquishment - and of the 

agency of the State of Montana or licensed adoption agency to which the 

child was relinquished, the court with 

which the relinquishment was filed may 

grant a hearing to consider whether the 

relinquishment should be revoked. A 

relinquishment may -- not be revoked -- if thz 

child has been placed for adoption. . . . (Emphasis added.) 

Thus, subsection (7) requires both the adoption agency and 

relinquishing parent to petition the court before the relinquishment can be revoked. 

We interpreted substantia.11~ similar statutory precursors to the provisions just quoted in In Re Adoption of 

B.G.B. (1979), 183 Mont. 347, 353,, 599 P.2d 375, 379, where 

we stated: 

Clearly, a construction of this section 

[ (1) I along with subsec:tion (7) of the 

same statute requires a determination 

that a strong public policy interest 

exists surrounding the finality of 

parental releases, and one who voluntarily signs a parental release cannot 

willy-nilly revoke that release. 
We held that the procedure contained in subsection (7) is 

required when there is no issue of voluntariness of the 

parental release. B.G.B., 599 P.2d at 379. There is no 

issue of voluntariness here. Therefore, L.A.C. could only 

petition the District Court to revoke the relinquishment with 

AID as a co-petitioner. Section 40-6-135(7), MCA. Because 

AID was not a co-petitioner, the District Court was without 

authority to revoke the relinquishment. Moreover, by the 

statute the relinquishment became irrevocable when the child 

was placed for adoption in Idaho. We hold that once the 

child was placed for adoption in Idaho, and the relinquishment became irrevocable, Montana lost jurisdiction. 

L.A.C. argues that she was the "sending agency," and 

that, under the Interstate Compact she had jurisdiction to 

effect return of the child. See S 41-4-101, Art. V, MCA. 

The Interstate Compact defines "sending agency": 

(2) "sending agency" means a party 

state, officer or employee thereof; a 

subdivision of a party state or officer 

or employee thereof; a court of a party 

state; a person, corporation, association, charitable agency, or other entity 

which sends, brings, or causes to be 

sent or brought any child to another 

party state; 

Section 41-4-101 (2), Art. 11, MCA. L.A.C. relinquished her 

parental rights to AID who then effectuated the transfer of 

the child to Idaho. We find that AID was the sending agency. 

L.A.C. asks us to interpret the above-quoted definition 

to include a parent who initiates an adoption by relinquishing her rights to an adoption agency. Such an interpretation 

would mean that no state or private licensed adoption agency 

would ever be able to act with assurance that its conduct was 

final. We will not interpret the definition so broadly. 
L.A.C. also argues that the child was not properly 

placed for adoption in Idaho, because AID did not have approval of Idaho prior to the transfer as required by Article 

111 of the Interstate Compact. As such, she believes she can 

still revoke her relinquishment of parental rights. This 

argument fails for two 'reasons: (1) L.A.C. would still 

require AID as a co-petitioner before the District Court 

could revoke the relinquishment; and (2) Idaho's notification 

and approval procedures are matters to be worked out between 

AID and Idaho. L.A.C. has no standing to attack the adoption 

process in Idaho because she relinquished her parental rights 

to AID. Under Article V of the Compact, AID then had the 

power to effect the transfer of the child to Idaho. We note 

that the only reason, the transfer occurred before the formal 

notice and approval of Idaho was because of L.A.Cr s request 

for expediency. 

Finally, L.A.C. argues that Montana still has jurisdiction because AID did not obtain a Montana District Court 

order terminating L.A.C.'s parental rights prior to placing 

the child in Idaho. She refers us to S 40-8-103(10), MCA, 

which defines "placement for adoption" as "the transfer of 

physical custody of a child with respect to whom parental 

rights have been terminated and who is otherwise legally free 

for adoption to a person who intends to adopt the child." 

From this she argues that because AID had not secured the 

termination order, the "placement" in Idaho was improper, and 

AID, therefore, has "unclean hands." We disagree. 

First, we note that by 5 40-6-135(5) it was mandatory 

upon the District Court to issue an order terminating parental rights when the relinquishment was filed. AID, therefore, had no reason not to assume that the order of 
termination was forthcoming. Me further note that the definition relied upon by L.A.C. does not require a judicial 

termination order. Rather, the definition only requires that 

parental rights have been terminated. The relinquishment 

form specifically states that L.A.C.'s parental rights were 

terminated when the form was executed. We hold that L.A.C.'s 

parental rights were terminated when she executed the form 

relinquishing her parental rights. 

L.A.C. points to A.R.M. § 46-5.440 (6) which states: 

Agencies must secure a court order 

terminating the parental rights of the 

birth parents and legal authority to 

place the child for adoption prior to 

adoptive placements. 

AID had authority to place the child in Idaho under Article V 

of the Compact. However, L.A.C. claims that since AID had 

not secured the court order terminating parental rights, the 

placement was illegal. 

Whether or not AID obtained a termination order in 

Montana is irrelevant to the child's adoption in Idaho. The 

Idaho Code does not require a judicial termination of parental rights prior to adoption. Rather, the adoption decree 

automatically results in a termination of parental rights. 

Section 16-1509, I.C.A. In Idaho only the consent of the 

natural parents is required in its adoption proceedings. 

See, ~5 16-1504 and -1509, I.C.A. The Idaho district court 

was presented with the natural parents' properly executed 

consents to adoption and relinquishments of parental rights. 

Once the adoption decree was entered, L.A.C.'s parental 

rights were judicially terminated by operation of 5 16-1509, 

I.C.A. We can see nothing illegal or improper about the 

child's adoption in Idaho. 
We will now consider this Court's authority to 

interfere with the Idaho district court's adoption decree. 

Section 40-7-114, MCA, provides in part: 

The courts of this state shall recognize 

and enforce an initial or modification 

decree of a court of another state which 

has assumed jurisdiction under statutory 

provisions substantially in accordance 

with this chapter . . . 

Idaho had jurisdiction over the adoption proceedings under a 

statute substantially similar to § 40-4-211, MCA. See 

5 32-1103, I.C.A. Therefore, by S 40-7-114, MCA, we must 

recognize the Idaho adoption decree and have no jurisdiction 

to interfere. We note that a similar decision is mandated by 

the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution and Montana statutes. See U. S. Const. , Art. IV, § 1, 

and 5 26-3-203, MCA. 

Because this Court has no jurisdiction to interfere 

with the child's adoption, we need not consider appellant's 

challenge to the District Court's finding that the child's 

best interests would be served by remaining with its adoptive 

parents. We will comment, however, that the finding is 

supported by substantial evidence. 

The District Court is affirmed in its order terminating 

parental rights and its recognition of the child's legal 

adoption in Idaho. 

Chief Justice 
We concur: