[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 14–15567

Non-Argument Calendar

________________________

D.C. Docket No. 5:13–cv–00310–CLS

RISMED ONCOLOGY SYSTEMS, INC.,

 Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

DANIEL ESGARDO RANGEL BARON, et al.,

 Defendants-Appellees.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Alabama

________________________

(July 17, 2015)

Before JORDAN, JULIE CARNES, and JILL PRYOR, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

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This appeal arises from frauds allegedly committed by Defendants, and 

comes to us following the district court’s denial of Plaintiff’s motions for relief 

from the voluntary dismissal of its complaint. Upon review of the record and the 

parties’ briefs, we AFFIRM for the reasons set forth below.

I. BACKGROUND1

After spending a decade working on the Space Shuttle program in 

Huntsville, Alabama, thermodynamics engineer José A. Rodriguez (“Rodriguez”) 

decided he wanted to pursue a long-held interest in business. So in 1990, at the 

urging of a friend, Rodriguez formed and incorporated Rismed Oncology Systems, 

Inc. (“Rismed Oncology” or “Rismed”) to “suppl[y] medical equipment to Latin 

America, principally Venezuela.” 

A number of years later, sensing a demand from his customers for dialysis 

supplies, Rodriguez developed an expertise in the area and “began marketing 

dialysis sales through” Rismed Oncology. Over a five year span, from 1999 to 

2004, Rodriguez made “several attempts to break into the dialysis business in 

Venezuela[,]” with the ultimate aim of becoming the sole supplier of dialysis 

products to the Instituto Venezolano de los Seguros Sociales (“IVSS”)—the 

Venezuelan equivalent of the United States Social Security Administration. He

 

1

 The following facts are taken from Plaintiff’s Complaint and Motion to Set Aside the 

District Court’s Order of Dismissal. We assume them to be true for purposes of our review here.

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eventually found success: IVSS placed an order with Rismed Oncology for over 

350,000 dialysis kits, paying the corporation $13.7 million between March and 

August 2005. Sales representative Daniel Esgardo Rangel Baron (“Rangel 

Baron”)—the biological father of Rodriguez’s stepson, the ex-husband of his wife,

and a resident of Caracas—was put in charge of the account. 

IVSS appeared satisfied with Rismed Oncology, as it placed a second order 

with the corporation, this time representing 100% of its dialysis supplies needs.

2

 

But sometime in late 2005 and early 2006, Rangel Baron made a series of troubling 

representations to Rodriguez about the order: first, that the Venezuelan government 

was postponing it; second, that it “was ‘being processed’” and should arrive 

“sometime during the fourth quarter of 2005”; and finally, that it had been 

cancelled. Rather than proceed with Rismed, Rangel Baron informed Rodriguez 

that IVSS had decided to award the purchase order to “Continental”—a medical 

supply company that Rangel Baron had allegedly formed with his biological son, 

Daniel Alberto Rangel Di Nardo (“Daniel Rangel”), whom Rodriguez had raised 

since Daniel was thirteen. 

Or so Rangel Baron said. What actually happened, Rodriguez learned, was 

that Rangel Baron directed the incorporation of a number of companies in a 

number of locations, all called Rismed Dialysis Systems, Inc. Specifically, Rangel 

 2

 The initial order represented 25% of IVSS’s dialysis supplies needs. 

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Baron and his sister, Isabel Rangel Baron, incorporated a Rismed Dialysis Systems 

in Venezuela (“Rismed Dialysis Venezuela”); Daniel Rangel incorporated a 

Rismed Dialysis Systems in Alabama (“Rismed Dialysis Alabama”); Rangel 

Baron, under Daniel Rangel’s name, incorporated a Rismed Dialysis Systems in 

Florida (“Rismed Dialysis Florida”); and Rangel Baron and partner Orlando Araya 

Amador incorporated a Rismed Dialysis Systems in San Jose, Costa Rica (“Rismed 

Costa Rica”). 

The ramifications of Rangel Baron’s creation of these Rismed Dialysis

companies is two-fold. First, while Rodriguez had incorporated his company as

Rismed Oncology and operated its oncology business under that name, he actually 

conducted Rismed’s dialysis business under the trade name “Rismed Dialysis 

Systems.” This trade name was emblazoned on all of Rismed’s dialysis products,

and it was the name by which Rismed’s vendors knew the company. Second,

when IVSS paid an invoice to Rismed Oncology, it simply made the payment out 

to “Rismed.”3

 

Given the above, it should come as no surprise that IVSS never cancelled its 

second order for dialysis supplies from Rismed Oncology, but “continued to make 

purchase orders for the dialysis kits under the contract trade name ‘RISMED,’” and 

did so through at least February 2013. In short, if Plaintiff’s allegations are 

 3

 To pay invoices, IVSS would wire the funds to Rismed’s bank account in Alabama. 

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accurate, Rangel Baron orchestrated a scheme whereby he usurped Rismed 

Oncology’s contract with IVSS by utilizing the same products, supplies, and 

company name that had for years been used by Rismed. Rangel Baron concealed 

this scheme from Rodriguez and explained his new-found wealth by claiming that

IVSS had cancelled its contract with Rismed Oncology and had awarded it instead 

to his father-son corporation, Continental. Rangel Baron fooled IVSS by 

convincing it to change the routing numbers for bank accounts to which it wired 

payments to those he established in connection with each Rismed Dialysis 

company he had formed. (He had previously failed to persuade IVSS to change 

the name of the contract award from Rismed Oncology to Continental.) And he 

pulled the wool over the eyes of Rismed’s vendors by incorporating his companies 

under Rismed’s trade name. 

Thus, to the outside world it seemed that the only thing different about 

IVSS’s subsequent orders was the routing information for payments. But really, 

Rangel Baron had siphoned away roughly $50 million worth of business from 

Rismed Oncology and Rodriguez: his employer and the man who had raised his 

son. 

Rodriguez learned of Rangel Baron’s scheme in July 2012 and when seven 

months of “efforts to avoid a lawsuit” failed, he filed suit in the Northern District 

of Alabama on behalf of Rismed Oncology. The complaint alleged three federal 

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RICO claims and two state law fraud claims against Rangel Baron; Isabel Rangel 

Baron; Rismed Dialysis Venezuela (the “Foreign Defendants”); and Rismed 

Dialysis Alabama and Rismed Dialysis Florida (the “Domestic Defendants”). 

Almost immediately after Rodriguez filed the lawsuit, he was contacted by a 

minister, Daniel Garlick (“Garlick”), with whom he and Daniel Rangel were close. 

Garlick impressed upon Rodriguez that litigation would be a treacherous path,

detrimental to his family and faith, and that instead he should engage in Christian 

mediation with Daniel Rangel to work through the dispute. Rodriguez agreed, and 

he and Garlick traveled to Miami to “resolve the lawsuit and the underlying 

disagreements.” 

With Garlick acting as mediator, Rodriguez and Daniel Rangel ironed out 

their differences over the course of an extended lunch. Afterward, Garlick drafted 

a document that the parties refer to as the “Miami Agreement[,]” which outlined 

their basic obligations to one another. Generally, Rodriguez agreed to 

“[i]rrevocably [c]lose[]” Rismed’s lawsuit and give Daniel Rangel an ownership 

interest in a side business, while Daniel Rangel agreed to provide capital to that

company and to give Rodriguez an ownership position in his own side business. 

Both Rodriguez and Daniel Rangel signed the Miami Agreement on March 28, 

2013. 

Next, the parties’ attorneys set to work drafting a settlement agreement. The 

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document they created more or less provided that the parties would release any 

claims they may have had as a result of the IVSS imbroglio and that Rodriguez 

would transfer shares in his side business to Daniel Rangel. Notably, however, the 

Settlement Agreement did not incorporate every obligation outlined in the Miami 

Agreement. Despite being advised by his attorneys that the Settlement Agreement 

did not protect him to any meaningful degree and that he should not sign the 

document, Rodriguez did so anyway on April 3, 2013. So too did Daniel Rangel. 

The next day, pursuant to Rodriguez’s obligations under the Miami 

Agreement, Rismed Oncology filed a motion to voluntarily dismiss its complaint 

with prejudice, “as a settlement ha[d] been reached in th[e] action.” Four days 

later, Rismed filed a second motion to voluntarily dismiss its complaint with 

prejudice that was exactly the same as the first, except for the addition of one 

paragraph. That paragraph, in full, stated:

[c]onsent [for a voluntary dismissal] has been obtained from the 

domestic parties[,] all of whom have been served in this matter. The 

foreign parties have not stated a position with regard to the dismissal 

(Rismed Dialysis Systems, C.A. (Venezuela), Daniel Esgardo Rangel 

Baron, [and] Isabel Rangel Baron).

The district court granted Rismed’s motion on April 9, 2013. It noted that Rismed 

had served its complaint on the Domestic Defendants, who consented to the 

dismissal, but had not effected service on the Foreign Defendants, who “ha[d] not 

stated a position on the issue.” Nevertheless, the court dismissed all claims, 

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against all defendants, with prejudice. 

Nearly eight months passed when, on November 22, 2013, Rismed

Oncology filed a motion for relief from the above order, pursuant to Federal Rules 

of Civil Procedure 60(b)(3) and 60(b)(6).4 Rismed premised this motion upon 

newly-discovered “fraud, misrepresentation, deceit[,] and illegality” by which the 

Defendants obtained the Settlement Agreement, which agreement was the reason 

Rismed voluntarily dismissed its claims with prejudice. 

Essentially, Rismed alleged that Daniel Rangel only negotiated, agreed to, 

and partially performed under the Settlement Agreement to “buy time” to finalize 

and complete Rangel Baron’s scheme and that he had no intention of fulfilling his 

end of the bargain. Specifically, Rismed claimed that Daniel Rangel engaged in 

this conduct to enable his mother, Liliana Di Nardo Rodriguez (“Di Nardo”)—

Rodriguez’s wife at the time and Rangel Baron’s ex-wife—to fraudulently transfer 

and sell two properties that belonged to Rodriguez. Upon completion of these 

transfers, Di Nardo divorced Rodriguez and moved to Caracas to be with her exhusband, Rangel Baron. Daniel Rangel cut off all communication with Rodriguez. 

Rismed claimed that given these actions, the Settlement Agreement and order 

dismissing its lawsuit should be set aside. 

 4

 Before then, though, Rismed, Rodriguez, and two other companies filed suit in 

Alabama state court against a number of individuals, including Daniel Rangel, Rangel Baron, 

and Garlick, alleging various fraud claims. After hearing oral argument, the state court 

dismissed the action in a one paragraph order, which was not appealed. 

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In a thorough order, the district court denied Rismed’s motion. As to its 

Rule 60(b)(3) claims, the court found Rodriguez’s reliance upon any fraud to be

unreasonable, given that he was represented by counsel, understood the importance 

of the Miami Agreement, and deeply desired to resolve the dispute in order to 

repair familial relationships. As the court wrote: “[i]n short, [Rodriguez] closed 

his eyes where ordinary diligence required him to see, and thereby was willingly 

deceived.” With respect to the Rule 60(b)(6) claims, the court found them 

improperly classified, as they hinged upon fraudulent acts of Daniel Rangel and Di 

Nardo, and Rule 60(b)(6) “applies only to conduct that does not fit within the first 

five clauses of Rule 60(b).” Again, the court questioned Rodriguez’s level of 

ignorance as to Daniel Rangel’s and Di Nardo’s actions and motivations. 

Following the court’s denial, Rismed filed two motions. The first was a 

lengthy motion for reconsideration, citing, among other things, (1) errors in the 

court’s consideration of Di Nardo’s fraudulent transfers and the role they played in 

the Settlement Agreement, (2) errors in the court’s consideration of Garlick’s role

in Rodriguez’s and Daniel Rangel’s lives, and (3) the need for full discovery. The 

court granted this motion, allowing the parties a limited period of time to explore 

“the issue of whether [Rodriguez] was tricked or induced by fraud into executing 

the ‘Settlement Agreement’ that precipitated the dismissal of [Rismed’s] action on 

April 9, 2013.” Rismed’s second motion noted that it had finally served the 

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Foreign Defendants with process and asked the court to set aside its order of 

dismissal under Rule 60(b)(4), which Rismed now claimed was void since it 

addressed previously unserved parties. 

Reconsideration of Rismed’s motion, additional briefing, and “hundreds of 

pages of evidentiary materials” did not change the court’s mind. It still concluded 

that Rismed Oncology failed to produce “‘clear and convincing evidence that an 

adverse party obtained [the dismissal of this action with prejudice] through fraud, 

misrepresentation, or other misconduct.’” In particular, the court noted that

Rodriguez had the support of counsel throughout the settlement process and

understood that the settlement document had to reflect the Miami Agreement to 

retain its protections. Yet, Rodriguez still chose to sign the Settlement Agreement 

and dismiss Rismed Oncology’s action anyway because he “got [his] son and 

grand kids back[.]” Thus, the court concluded, Rismed failed to show Rodriguez’s 

reliance on “the alleged frauds that led to dismissal of [Rismed’s] action” was 

reasonable under the circumstances. The court did not address Rismed’s 60(b)(4) 

motion, denying it as moot. 

Rismed later tried one final motion for reconsideration, but the court 

affirmed its earlier findings in a summary order. This appeal followed in 

December 2014. 

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II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We generally review a district court’s denial of relief under Rule 60(b) for 

an abuse of discretion. BUC Int’l Corp. v. Int’l Yacht Council Ltd., 517 F.3d 1271, 

1275 (11th Cir. 2008); see, e.g., Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce N.A., Inc., 

741 F.3d 1349, 1355 (11th Cir. 2014) (reviewing a 60(b)(6) ruling for abuse of 

discretion). “‘A district court abuses its discretion if it applies an incorrect legal 

standard, applies the law in an unreasonable or incorrect manner, follows improper 

procedures in making a determination, or makes findings of fact that are clearly 

erroneous.’” Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Nat’l Urological Grp., Inc., 785 F.3d 477, 

481 (11th Cir. 2015) (quoting Citizens for Police Accountability Political Comm. v. 

Browning, 572 F.3d 1213, 1216–17 (11th Cir. 2009)).

A Rule 60(b)(4) ruling receives a more stringent review, however. Because 

the validity of a judgment or order is a question of law, “‘[w]e review de novo . . . 

a district court’s ruling upon a Rule 60(b)(4) motion to set aside a judgment as 

void[.]’” Baragona v. Kuwait Gulf Link Transp. Co., 594 F.3d 852, 854 (11th Cir. 

2010) (quoting Burke v. Smith, 252 F.3d 1260, 1263 (11th Cir. 2001)).

III. ANALYSIS

A. The District Court Did Not Err By Denying Rismed’s Rule 

60(b)(4) Claims

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(4) provides a means by which a court 

can relieve a party from a void judgment or order. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4); see 

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Burke, 252 F.3d at 1263. When evaluating a Rule 60(b)(4) motion, the district 

court possesses no discretion: “the judgment is either void or it is not.” Burke, 252 

F.3d at 1267. The remedy for a void judgment or order is similarly limited—the 

only relief available is for the court to set it aside. Id. “Generally, a judgment is 

void under Rule 60(b)(4) ‘if the court that rendered it lacked jurisdiction of the 

subject matter, or of the parties, or if it acted in a manner inconsistent with due 

process of law.’” Burke, 252 F.3d at 1263 (quoting In re Edwards, 962 F.2d 641, 

644 (7th Cir. 1992)). 

Regarding the order from which it seeks relief, Rismed Oncology argues that 

[t]he claims against the Foreign Defendants could not have been 

dismissed with prejudice, because the [district court] lacked the 

authority to effect such a dismissal over the Foreign Defendants, as 

they were never served. Where service of process is insufficient, the 

[district court] has no power to render judgment, and the judgment is 

void.

Rismed further notes that the Foreign Defendants were not parties to the Miami 

Agreement or Settlement Agreement and never consented to nor presented a 

position on its motion for dismissal. Boiled down, Rismed’s argument is that the 

district court could not dismiss the Foreign Defendants because they were neither 

served nor waived service. The court’s order is therefore void, Rismed claims, and 

must be set aside. For the following reasons, we disagree.

This Court has previously stated that “[g]enerally, where service of process 

is insufficient, the court has no power to render judgment and the judgment is 

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void.” In re Worldwide Web Sys., Inc., 328 F.3d 1291, 1299 (11th Cir. 2003) 

(citing Varnes v. Local 91, Glass Bottle Blowers Ass’n, 674 F.2d 1365, 1368 (11th 

Cir. 1982) and Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 

(1950)). That is so because insufficient service of process “implicates personal 

jurisdiction[,]” and personal jurisdiction “‘recognizes and protects an individual 

liberty interest. It represents a restriction on judicial power not as a matter of 

sovereignty, but as a matter of individual liberty.’” Id. (quoting Ins. Corp. of 

Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 701–03 (1982)).

Typically, insufficient service of process on a party operates to prohibit a 

court from entering a default judgment against that party. See, e.g., id. at 1298–

1301 (affirming denial of motion to set aside default because defendant waived 

objection for insufficient service of process) and Varnes, 674 F.2d at 1370 

(reversing with directions to vacate default against party not properly served). 

This is true generally of personal jurisdiction, of which service of process is a 

subset. A court cannot enter a binding judgment against a party over which it lacks 

personal jurisdiction. See McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222 (1957) 

(“Since Pennoyer v. Neff, this Court has held that the Due Process Clause of the 

Fourteenth Amendment places some limit on the power of state courts to enter 

binding judgments against persons not served with process within their 

boundaries.”) (internal citation omitted); see generally Louis Vuitton Malletier, 

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S.A. v. Mosseri, 736 F.3d 1339 (11th Cir. 2013) (affirming denial of 60(b)(4) 

motion because defendant had sufficient minimum contacts) and Baragona v. 

Kuwait Gulf Link Transp. Co., 594 F.3d 852 (11th Cir. 2010) (affirming order 

vacating judgment for lack of service and minimum contacts).

Rismed Oncology believes these concepts should also extend to prohibit a 

court from entering an order dismissing claims against a defendant that has not 

been served. Yet Rismed cites no authority that supports such an application, nor 

can we find any. In contrast, dictum in Varnes implies that a court may dismiss a 

complaint that was not properly served upon all the parties against which it was 

filed. 674 F.2d at 1370 (“Moreover, the reason given for dismissal of the 

complaint against [the served party], if valid, also required dismissal of the 

complaint as to [the unserved party].”). And in the context of the Prison Litigation 

Reform Act a district court may, “prior to service of process,” dismiss a complaint 

that is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, 

or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such. See, e.g., 

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989) and Caldwell v. Warden, FCI 

Talladega, 748 F.3d 1090, 1096 n.11 (11th Cir. 2014).

Further, Rismed’s theory of service and personal jurisdiction conflicts with 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) and 12(b)(5), and would restrict a

plaintiff’s ability to dismiss its complaint under Rule 41(a)(2). That is, if a court 

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could only dismiss claims asserted against a party over which it possessed 

jurisdiction, as Rismed suggests, it would lose the ability to grant a motion to 

dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction or insufficient service of process. Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 12(b)(2), (5); cf. PVC Windoors, Inc. v. Babbitbay Beach Constr., N.V., 598 

F.3d 802 (11th Cir. 2010) (affirming grant of motion to dismiss for lack of 

personal jurisdiction) and Prewitt Enters., Inc. v. Org. of Petroleum Exporting 

Countries, 353 F.3d 916 (11th Cir. 2003) (affirming grant of motion to dismiss for 

lack of service of process). And requiring that a court possess jurisdiction over a 

defendant in order to dismiss claims against that party would engraft an additional 

element onto Rule 41(a)(2), which permits a court to grant a plaintiff’s motion to 

dismiss its complaint so long as no defendant has pled a counterclaim (or, if one 

has, so long as the counterclaim can “remain pending for independent 

adjudication”). Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2); cf. Pontenberg v. Boston Scientific Corp., 

252 F.3d 1253 (11th Cir. 2001) (discussing Rule 41(a)(2)).

Finally, the order from which Rismed seeks relief is different in kind from 

the judgments for which this Court normally requires personal jurisdiction to exist. 

Here, the district court granted Rismed’s motion to dismiss its own complaint with 

prejudice. The court’s order concerns the unserved Foreign Defendants only

insofar as it did away with the claims against them, but it does not bind the Foreign 

Defendants in the same manner as it does Rismed. Notably, until the court ordered 

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them to respond to Rismed’s motion for relief, no defendant had filed an answer, 

motion to dismiss, or counterclaim or otherwise made an appearance in the case. 

Thus, by dismissal of the suit against them, the Foreign Defendants lost nothing; to 

the contrary, their anxiety over litigation, if they had any, was eliminated. Contra 

Int’l Shoe Co. v. State of Wash., Office of Unemp’t Compensation & Placement, 

326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (“Historically the jurisdiction of courts to render 

judgment in personam is grounded on their de facto power over the defendant’s 

person. Hence his presence within the territorial jurisdiction of [the] court was 

prerequisite to its rendition of a judgment personally binding him.”) and Pennoyer 

v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 729–34 (1877) (discussing “the force and effect of judgments 

rendered against non-residents without personal service of process upon them”), 

overruled in part on other grounds by Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977). In 

short, the district court did not err by denying Rismed Oncology’s Rule 60(b)(4)

claims, because its order was not void.

5

B. The District Court Did Not Err By Denying Rismed’s Rule 

60(b)(6) Claims

Rule 60(b)(6) is a “catchall provision”; it permits a court to “relieve a party 

from a final judgment ‘upon such terms as are just,’ provided that the motion is 

 

5

 We express no view on whether Rismed might be able to pursue an action against the 

Foreign Defendants. Cf. Norfolk S. Corp. v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 371 F.3d 1285, 1289 (11th 

Cir. 2004) (res judicata effect of dismissal based on settlement agreement is determined by the 

terms of the agreement “as interpreted according to traditional principles of contract law”).

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made within a reasonable time and is not premised on one of the grounds for relief 

enumerated in clauses (b)(1) through (b)(5).” Liljeberg v. Health Servs. 

Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 863 and n.11 (1988) (citing Klapprott v. United 

States, 335 U.S. 601, 613 (1949) and 11 C. Wright & A. Miller, Fed. Practice & 

Procedure § 2864 (1973)); Cano v. Baker, 435 F.3d 1337, 1342 (11th Cir. 2006). 

Relief under Rule 60(b)(6) “‘is an extraordinary remedy which may be 

invoked only upon a showing of exceptional circumstances[,]’” and that “absent 

such relief, an extreme and unexpected hardship will result.” Crapp v. City of 

Miami Beach, 242 F.3d 1017, 1020 (11th Cir. 2001) (quoting Griffin v. Swim-Tech 

Corp., 722 F.2d 677, 680 (11th Cir. 1984)); Galbert v. W. Caribbean Airways, 715 

F.3d 1290, 1294 (11th Cir. 2013) (same). In other words, the movant “‘must 

demonstrate a justification so compelling that the district court was required to 

vacate its order.’” Galbert, 715 F.3d at 1294 (quoting Cano, 435 F.3d at 1342). 

However, even under exceptional circumstances, the decision to grant Rule 

60(b)(6) relief is a matter for the court’s sound discretion. Id. at 1294 (citing 

Cano, 435 F.3d at 1342 and Seven Elves, Inc. v. Eskenazi, 635 F.2d 396, 402 (5th 

Cir. Unit A 1981)).

Here, Rismed claims an entitlement to relief from the district court’s order 

because “several conflicts of interest [] existed between Garlick’s role as facilitator 

(or mediator) and his relationship with [] Rangel, which extended not only through 

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mediation, but the Settlement Agreement, and dismissal.” (Emphasis in original.) 

Specifically, Rismed notes that Garlick and Daniel Rangel engaged in a for-profit 

joint venture to sell “Bibles, Music, and Biblical Resources” and that Daniel 

Rangel personally wired Garlick a total of $60,000 ($10,000 of which was a 

personal gift to help his sick child). Had Garlick disclosed this relationship, 

Rodriguez claims he would not have participated in the mediation and therefore 

would not have voluntarily dismissed Rismed’s lawsuit. This bias and prejudice, 

Rismed believes, entitles it to relief under Rule 60(b)(6). Again, we disagree.

As noted, to obtain relief under Rule 60(b)(6) a movant must demonstrate 

“exceptional circumstances” that will lead to “extreme and unexpected hardship” 

without court intervention. Griffin, 722 F.2d at 680. The circumstances must be 

“so compelling that the district court was required to vacate its order.” Galbert, 

715 F.3d at 1294. The district court below did not abuse its discretion by 

concluding that Rismed has not identified such circumstances in this case.

First, Rodriguez claims he relied upon Garlick’s advice and guidance when 

negotiating the Miami Agreement and Settlement Agreement with Daniel Rangel, 

and that Garlick led him astray because of the latter’s undisclosed relationship with 

Rangel. However, Rodriguez was represented by counsel throughout the 

settlement process. Though Garlick “frequently told the parties to not use their 

attorneys, [Rodriguez] always used [his] attorney . . . because [he] needed [his] 

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attorney’s assurance that the settlement agreement was drafted fair[ly] and 

accurate[ly], and with the appropriate legal terms understood and accepted in the 

United States.” Further, Rodriguez “relied on [his] attorney for making all the 

changes to the [Settlement Agreement,]” who did so “because [] the initial [] 

agreement did not settle [the parties’] disputes, but only dismissed [Rismed’s] 

claims in the federal lawsuit.” Nevertheless, despite his continued reliance on his 

attorneys, and in spite of being twice instructed by them not to sign the Settlement 

Agreement, Rodriguez did so anyway. 

Rodriguez argues that his decision to sign the Settlement Agreement resulted 

from Garlick’s deception; that is, Garlick told him “the attorneys had worked into 

the night finalizing the legalities of the document” and that it had “been . . . 

approved . . . and was ready for the parties’ signatures.” Assuming that Rodriguez

was so swayed by this representation as to deviate from his practice of conferring 

with his attorneys and to sign the Agreement without their blessing, Rodriguez and 

his attorneys had six days from that point until the court granted Rismed’s motion 

to read the document and confirm it accurately reflected the parties’ agreement. 

Moreover, Rodriguez used the very same attorneys who warned him not to sign the 

Settlement Agreement to file both of Rismed’s motions to voluntarily dismiss its 

case. So if Garlick did pressure or otherwise unduly influence Rodriguez into 

signing an unfinished Settlement Agreement that did not accurately reflect the 

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parties’ intent, Rodriguez had the opportunity to correct that error, and he failed to 

do so.

Second, even if Rodriguez had relied on Garlick’s advice during the 

settlement negotiations, he was not unfamiliar with the minister and his connection 

to Daniel Rangel. At the time, Rodriguez had known Garlick for more than ten 

years and “loved him like a brother.” Garlick stayed at Rodriguez’s home 

occasionally, and the latter approached the former for guidance when experiencing 

deep personal and family troubles. Further, Rodriguez had his own financial ties to 

Garlick, providing him with a credit card and making monetary donations to and 

for Garlick’s ministry over the years—including during the pendency of the 

lawsuit, settlement, and dismissal of Rismed’s action. And Rodriguez encouraged 

Daniel Rangel to assist Garlick with his sick child and to consider business with 

the minister. 

Related to this latter point, Rismed Oncology asserts that Garlick, as a 

Christian mediator, should be held to the same disclosure and recusal standards 

that 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) and Liljeberg, 486 U.S. 847, impose upon “justice[s], 

judge[s], [and] magistrate judge[s] of the United States[.]” In support, Rismed 

points to CEATS, Inc. v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 755 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2014). But 

in that case a district court ordered the parties before it to engage in mediation, and 

appointed a magistrate judge as mediator. Id. at 1358. Here, however, there is no 

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suggestion the district court recommended, in any way, that the parties attempt to 

resolve their dispute through formal mediation, nor was Garlick a court-appointed 

mediator (let alone a federal justice, judge, or magistrate judge). Rather,

Rodriguez and Daniel Rangel, of their own volition, resolved their dispute over a 

long lunch in Miami with their friend and minister, Garlick, whom they chose to 

act as facilitator. Rismed Oncology cites no authority that applies the § 455 and 

Liljeberg disclosure standards in such circumstances, nor can we find any. 

Also, even though the CEATS court held that the mediator there should have

disclosed his relationship to the parties involved in the litigation, it nevertheless 

affirmed the district court’s denial of Rule 60(b) relief. Id. at 1358, 1361–67. 

Given the above, and even assuming Rodriguez’s ignorance that Garlick might 

have felt more loyalty to Daniel than to Rodriguez, the CEATS holding provides no 

support for Rodriguez’s position. In summary, the district court did not abuse its 

discretion in finding that Rismed has not identified circumstances sufficiently 

extraordinary to warrant Rule 60(b)(6). See Liljeberg, 486 U.S. at 864 (“Rule 

60(b)(6) relief is accordingly neither categorically available nor categorically 

unavailable for all § 455(a) violations.”); compare Cano, 435 F.3d at 1341–42 

(scientific developments and alterations to Supreme Court precedent were not 

sufficiently compelling justifications that district court was required to vacate its 

order).

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We therefore AFFIRM the district court’s order denying Rismed 

Oncology’s request for relief.

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