U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402–0001

28–810 PDF 2006

S. HRG. 109–485

NATO: FROM COMMON DEFENSE TO

COMMON SECURITY

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

FEBRUARY 7, 2006

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana, Chairman

CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska

LINCOLN CHAFEE, Rhode Island

GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia

NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio

LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee

JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire

LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska

MEL MARTINEZ, Florida

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., Delaware

PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland

CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin

BARBARA BOXER, California

BILL NELSON, Florida

BARACK OBAMA, Illinois

KENNETH A. MYERS, Jr., Staff Director

ANTONY J. BLINKEN, Democratic Staff Director

(II)

CONTENTS

Page

Hagel, Hon. Chuck, U.S. Senator from Nebraska ................................................. 3

Jones, GEN James L., Jr., USMC, Supreme Allied Commander Europe

(SACEUR), Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers Europe, Mons, Belgium .. 3

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 8

Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana, opening statement ........... 1

ADDITIONAL STATEMENT AND QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE

RECORD

Biden, Hon. Joseph R., Jr., U.S. Senator from Delaware, prepared statement . 24

Jones, GEN James, Jr., responses to questions submitted by Senator Lugar ... 26

(III)

(1)

NATO: FROM COMMON DEFENSE TO COMMON

SECURITY

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 7, 2006

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Washington DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9 a.m., in room SD–

419 Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard G. Lugar (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Lugar and Hagel.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR, U.S.

SENATOR FROM INDIANA

The CHAIRMAN. This hearing of the Foreign Relations Committee

is called to order. Today the Foreign Relations Committee meets to

discuss the evolution of the NATO Alliance and its operations in

Afghanistan. We are especially honored to welcome our good friend

GEN James Jones, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, to share

with us his insights on NATO’s transformation and its role in Afghanistan and other regions outside the Alliance’s borders.

General Jones has brought energy and imagination to nontraditional operations outside of Europe. In August, I had the pleasure

of joining General Jones in North Africa on a humanitarian mission to facilitate the release of the last of 404 Moroccan prisoners

of war held by the Polisario. The release of these prisoners involved

United States mediation between Morocco and Algeria, two Muslim

nations with whom we are seeking closer ties. General Jones’ military-to-military contacts with these nations and the logistic support

he was able to deliver through the European Command were essential to the success of this humanitarian mission. The ease with

which he and his personnel worked the Moroccans and Algerians

demonstrated how successful they have been in building ties to

militaries outside of Europe.

The time when NATO could limit its missions to the defense of

continental Europe is far in the past. With the end of the cold war,

the gravest threats to Europe and North America originate from

other regions of the world. This requires Europeans and Americans

to be bolder in remaking our alliances, forging new structures, and

changing our thinking. We must reorient many of our national security institutions, of which NATO is one of the most important.

To be fully relevant to the security and well-being of the people of

its member nations, NATO must think and act globally.

In particular, NATO must engage with nations on its perimeter

to promote security and stability. Many nations in North Africa,

2

the Middle East, Central Asia, and South Asia have suffered from

instability and conflict generated by demographics, religious extremism, autocratic governments, and stagnant economic systems. I

applaud NATO’s Partnership for Peace, Mediterranean Dialog, and

Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, which seek to create partnerships

with selected countries across Eurasia, the Middle East, and Africa.

These initiatives enhance our security and stability through new

regional engagement on common security issues, including military-to-military cooperation. NATO has been a valuable instrument

for helping nations reform and professionalize their militaries. It

also has participated in many humanitarian missions, including its

recent 3-month effort in Pakistan following the devastating October

earthquake.

Geographic distance should not dissuade NATO leaders from developing stronger links with nations willing to cooperate with

NATO missions and activities. Australia and New Zealand already

support the NATO operation in Afghanistan, and Japan and South

Korea have expressed their interest in closer links to NATO.

In coming months, special attention must be paid to NATO’s support for the African Union and its peacekeeping mission in Darfur.

The African Union’s efforts to respond to the genocidal violence in

Sudan have been augmented by NATO’s assistance with transportation, communication, and other logistical requirements. Because

of continuing violence in Sudan, last week the U.N. Security Council asked the Secretary General to begin planning for a U.N. peacekeeping force in Darfur. Such a mission would reinforce and eventually absorb the African Union contingent. The proposed U.N.

force is likely to require expanded NATO logistics support.

In 2002, the Bush aministration proposed the Prague Capabilities Commitment and the NATO Response Force, the NRF. These

initiatives were designed to facilitate the creation of an agile, flexible, and expeditionary military capability that can respond to security challenges beyond the borders of Europe. While progress has

been made, some members have fallen behind in meeting these

commitments. This must change if NATO is to be fully effective.

NATO’s effort to stabilize Afghanistan exemplifies the challenges

facing the Alliance in its transition to a global mission responsive

to its common security. We have witnessed a steady political transition in Afghanistan since the fall of the Taliban in 2001. The Afghans held successful Parliamentary and Provincial elections last

fall. The international community displayed strong support for Afghanistan at the London Donor’s Conference just last week and the

newly concluded Afghanistan Compact is a credible plan for

strengthening the security, economy, and governance of the nation.

Despite the progress and renewed commitments, severe threats

to Afghanistan’s future remain, especially from terrorism, religious

extremism, and the narcotics trade. Overcoming these challenges

will require a sustained international commitment, of which NATO

is the most important component.

While Operation Enduring Freedom continues to prosecute the

war on terror in Afghanistan, NATO is poised to take on a more

robust security and reconstruction role. The decision by the Netherlands last week to commit up to 1,700 troops to the NATO-led reconstruction mission in southern Iraq was an important affirmation

3

of the importance of this mission. These expanded NATO operations, first in southern Afghanistan and then in eastern Afghanistan, will be a test of NATO’s capacity to defend its security ‘‘in

depth,’’ far from Europe’s borders.

Afghanistan presents a difficult environment, but NATO must be

resourceful, resilient, and ultimately successful. Failure would be a

disaster for global security. As NATO’s Secretary General commented last week, ‘‘If we fail, the consequences of terrorism will

land on our doorstep, be it in Belgium, Amsterdam, the United

States, or whatever.’’

We look forward very much to our discussion with General Jones

today and we thank him for his willingness to join us. I’d like to

recognize Senator Hagel’s presence. Senator Hagel, do you have a

comment or a statement?

STATEMENT OF HON. CHUCK HAGEL, U.S. SENATOR FROM

NEBRASKA

Senator HAGEL. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I would echo what

you have just said and add my welcome to our distinguished guest

today, General Jones. Look forward to his testimony. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Hagel. General

Jones, will you please proceed. Please give a full report. As I’ve

mentioned to you privately, this is a day in which we want to hear

from you extensively about your experiences and your mission.

STATEMENT OF GEN JAMES L. JONES, JR., USMC, SUPREME

ALLIED COMMANDER EUROPE (SACEUR), SUPREME HEADQUARTERS, ALLIED POWERS EUROPE, MONS, BELGIUM

General JONES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Senator Hagel,

it’s—thank you both for allowing me the opportunity to make a

presentation before this distinguished committee. I’m most grateful

for the invitation to come here this afternoon.

Today I’m appearing before you in my capacity as the Supreme

Allied Commander in Europe and also the commander of United

States European Command. In so doing, I will provide you with a

brief overview of current NATO activities and in my remarks I will

focus on NATO’s greatest challenges this year in 2006 which is the

expansion of the International Security Assistance Force or ISAF

mission across the southern and eastern regions of Afghanistan, as

well as NATO’s efforts to bring its premier transformational vehicle, the NATO Response Force, to full operational capability by October of this year.

Before you, you have a brief summary of NATO’s ongoing missions and operations and this will provide you a reference as we

discuss these topics. Before I begin, I would like to introduce one

member of my party in particular, SGM Alfred McMichael. Sergeant Major McMichael is completing his 36th year on active duty

as a U.S. Marine. He has served a long, and has a long and distinguished, career. He was the sergeant major of the Marine Corps

when I was the commandant of the Marine Corps in my tours from

1999 to 2003 and then agreed to come over and become the first

sergeant major of Allied Command Operations in NATO.

And I entrusted him with a very simple mission statement and

that is to go forth and expose the value of noncommissioned officers

4

and staff noncommissioned officers to countries of the Alliance who

had no such experience. As you know, the eastern block countries

of the former Soviet Union do not have the NCO structure in their

armed forces. And in the 3 years that the sergeant major has been

here with his colleagues, nine countries now have NCO and staff

NCO programs that did not have them before. He has accomplished

this job with his usual passion and enthusiasm and also a great

deal of leadership and personal style. He’s a consummate diplomat

and he has had a vision and a purpose and he has achieved his

mission spectacularly and I would like to introduce a truly great

American and a great marine to you and certainly someone without

whom I could not have done my job at all. And he will be leaving

active duty this summer after 36 years of duty. I know of no marine who’s made a greater contribution, not only to the Marine

Corps, but also to the international community that we’re developing as we speak.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you ask him to stand, please, so we can

recognize him. Thank you so much for being a part of our hearing.

We’re honored.

General JONES. Mr. Chairman, Senator Hagel, as you both know,

NATO is rapidly transforming. At the Prague Summit in November

of 2002, NATO members signaled their recognition of the changing

security environment and the need to make major shifts in both organization and military capabilities of the Alliance. NATO is making progress and is perhaps in the midst, in my view, of the most

fundamental physical and philosophical transformation in its history.

While NATO has achieved some notable successes since 2002 in

transforming its military structure, the Alliance finds itself at the

strategic crossroads between the 20th and the 21st centuries. Nations of the Alliance now totaling 26 increasingly display greater

political will to undertake missions of great strategic distances in

Afghanistan and Iraq and even in Africa, and I’ve put a chart up

here just to focus your attention on the 30,000 or so NATO troops

that are engaged at great distances in the world.

This collective will signals that NATO is becoming more

proactive than reactive, more expeditionary than static, and more

diverse in its capabilities, and while this emergent NATO is to be

celebrated, encouraged, and supported, one cannot fail to emphasize that the political will to do more is as yet not completely accompanied by an equal political will to resource in men, money,

and material; this new-found appetite.

Despite nonbinding agreements at the Prague Summit of 2002

that nations should strive to maintain their defense budgets at no

less than 2 percent of their respective gross domestic products,

today only seven nations have achieved this goal.

Similarly, in terms of manpower pledges of nations for support

to headquarters and operations, we are currently not meeting our

goals in that regard.

Finally, our efforts to procure agreed upon strategic capabilities,

such as strategic lift, the Alliance ground surveillance system, computer information systems and the like, have not been funded adequately, thereby perpetuating critical shortfalls in the Alliance.

5

Encouragingly however, the recently concluded Munich Security

Conference which you just referred to, Mr. Chairman, lent great

support to the primacy of NATO as the premier venue for transatlantic discussions and future actions with regard to security

issues. Chancellor Merkel’s eloquent speech at the conference on

Saturday the 4th of February was instrumental in the conference’s

reaffirmation of NATO’s enduring value to our transatlantic relationship.

Mr. Chairman, Senator Hagel, it is clear that publics on both

sides of the Atlantic clearly understood what the Alliance represented during the cold war. We were united despite occasional

‘‘family disagreements’’ around the central anchor point of prevailing over the threat posed by the former Soviet Union. Regrettably, I doubt that our publics today on either side of the ocean

fully understand the need, nature, and purpose of the Alliance in

the post-cold-war era of the 21st century. On that score we can and

must do better.

As we head toward the NATO Summit of November 2006, in

Riga, Latvia, NATO will strive to redefine itself in a world facing

asymmetric challenges posed by nonstate actors, emerging threats

to energy supplies, and perhaps critical infrastructures, and a requirement for more proactive activities, security, stability, and reconstruction to deter future crises from developing, all of which include the many facets of terrorism and all of which will define

NATO’s activities in 2006 and beyond.

Our Secretary General, Mr. Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, is outlining

an ambitious agenda for this year which will include new and revitalized partnership programs with special emphasis placed on the

NATO Russia and NATO Ukraine relationships, possibilities for

further NATO enlargement in the future, and the development of

new collective capabilities for NATO’s military use.

From an operational standpoint, NATO is experiencing one of the

busiest times in its history with over 28,000 NATO and non-NATO

troops from 42 nations serving under the NATO flag. We are conducting operations on three continents and I believe that this operations tempo will continue to increase in 2006.

In Iraq, NATO has deployed a successful training mission to

Baghdad to assist the government’s efforts to establish security and

stability. NATO’s in-country staff officer mission complements the

work of the United States-led multinational security transition

command in Iraq to train Iraq security forces. In September 2005,

with support from the NATO training mission, Iraq opened its National Defense University. NATO has also provided numerous

training opportunities for Iraqi officers and civilian leaders in educational facilities across Europe and coordinated the acquisition

and delivery of donated military equipment from NATO nations to

the Iraqi security forces.

In Africa, as I testified before you last September, NATO and the

European Union jointly responded to an African Union request to

airlift forces for the African Union mission in Sudan from across

Africa. NATO generated and coordinated the majority of the airlift,

provided personnel to assist with staff capacity building activities

in key African Union headquarters, and deployed training teams to

work with their African Union counterparts. NATO support is comVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:43 Jul 25, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 800927.SEN SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1
6

mitted until May 2006. A NATO African Union strategic partnership is developing and extensions or expansion of NATO support

beyond May 2006, if requested by the African Union, may be forthcoming.

Closer to Europe, NATO’s only Article V operation, Operation Active Endeavor, continues to not only counter terrorism and illegal

activities in the Mediterranean but provides an opportunity for

non-NATO partnership for peace and Mediterranean dialog nations

to enhance their involvement and interoperability. In 2006, indeed

this month, two Russian vessels will deploy to Operation Active

Endeavor, join the mission along with Ukrainian vessels anticipated next year. Formal discussions have commenced on the possible involvement of Algerian, Israeli, Moroccan, and Georgian participation as well.

May I take a moment, Mr. Chairman, to underscore the value of

your trip to Algeria and Morocco just a few months ago to assist

and to coordinate the release of 404 prisoners and their return

from Algeria to Morocco which has been the anchor point of a resurgence of good will toward the United States in the North African region.

On mainland Europe, we recently observed the 10th anniversary

of international involvement in the Balkans. Through its security

sector reform initiatives, NATO has successfully set the conditions

in the region for the peaceful transition to democratic institutions

and progress toward politically subordinate and reformed militaries. Working closely with the European Union, political institutional incentives linked to the standards of behavior have encouraged Balkan States to recognize the benefits of closer integration

with the European Union and NATO and led to considerable

progress in the capture of persons indicted for war crimes, however, more work remains to be done in this area.

NATO’s forces in Kosova are undergoing a transition to a lighter

and more mobile and deployable structure that exploits technology

and a more agile and better trained force to manage the security

situation. As the Kosova status talks develop over the coming

months and consensus is hopefully reached between ethnic

Kosovar, Albanian, and Serbian communities, NATO should be postured to reduce force levels significantly in the Province and in the

Balkans in general.

NATO’s most ambitious operation, the International Security Assistance Force, known as ISAF, currently encompasses half of the

territorial landmass of Afghanistan and will expand into the south

and then to the east in 2006. This chart to my left is a graphic pictorial of the diversity that is present in Afghanistan in the sectors

and the stages by which NATO has expanded. First, going to the

north then to the west near Herat and now shortly to the south

and then around to the east, if you will, in a counterclockwise direction.

As NATO assumes the responsibility for security and stability,

its force levels will ultimately surpass that of the coalition’s and

will constitute one of the largest operations in Alliance history. It

will go from 9,000 troops at present to 25,000 when expansion is

complete. It is envisioned that when expansion is complete that the

7

United States will still be the largest troop-contributing nation to

the mission.

In ISAF, NATO has built it on the coalition concept of provincial

reconstruction teams and successfully supported the Government of

Afghanistan and its Presidential National Assembly in provincial

council elections. Expansion will present NATO with many new

and complex challenges but NATO and U.S. coalition commanders

are working very closely to ensure that the transition of responsibility is effective and continues to provide credible, professional,

and legitimate Afghan political and security infrastructures.

Finally, through its primary transformational vehicle, the NATO

Response Force, the Alliance attempts to meet emerging crises

across the full spectrum of military missions at strategic distance

and in the most challenging of environments. Most recently and

due to its agility, flexibility, and expeditionary nature, the NATO

Response Force was selected to assist in the humanitarian relief efforts for both Hurricane Katrina and in the wake of the Pakistan

earthquake. But the NRF faces challenges. Force generation efforts

for future NATO Response Force rotations are not producing a

complete and balanced force which is a cause for concern. The principle reason for this problem, I believe, is that NATO has not reformed its 20th century funding mechanisms that require nations

to pay all costs associated with the transport and sustainment of

their deployed forces. We have yet to take into account the full impact of the 21st century expeditionary nature of NATO operations.

NATO’s funding arrangements were appropriate when forces did

not deploy outside the European theater of operations such as during the cold war. However, with operations being conducted today

at great distances our current approach to resourcing our operations actually acts as a disincentive for nations to contribute

forces for deployments.

While NATO has made progress in approving revised funding

guidelines to fund critically needed strategic lift in support of this

year’s NRF certification exercise scheduled for June in Cape Verde,

Africa, as well as the operational and strategic reserve forces, much

work remains to be accomplished.

As we speak today, full operational capability for the NRF by October of this year is still at risk.

As I conclude these opening remarks, I’d like to leave you with

a final thought. Today the transatlantic security link embodied by

the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is viable, vital, and vibrant. The proposals being considered by the nations in 2006, if

adopted, will go a long way toward helping NATO enhance its increasingly critical role in providing collective security and strategic

stability. NATO has been, and needs to remain, a great alliance.

Great alliances should be expected to do great things. It is possible,

even probable in my view, that NATO’s most important contributions and most important missions still lie in its future.

Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for the privilege to make

these opening remarks and I’d be happy to respond to any questions you might have.

[The prepared statement of General Jones follows:]

8

PREPARED STATEMENT OF GEN JAMES L. JONES, JR., USMC, SUPREME ALLIED COM- MANDER, EUROPE (SACEUR), SUPREME HEADQUARTERS, ALLIED POWERS EUROPE, MONS, BELGIUM

Chairman Lugar, Senator Biden, distinguished members of this committee, I am

very grateful for your invitation to come and speak to you this afternoon. Today,

I am appearing before you as the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe; in doing so,

I will provide you with a brief overview of current NATO activities. In my remarks,

I will focus on NATO’s greatest challenges in 2006, namely the expansion of the

International Security Assistance Force or ISAF mission across the southern and

eastern regions of Afghanistan, as well as NATO’s efforts to bring its premier transformational vehicle, the NATO Response Force, to full operational capability. We

have distributed to each of you a brief summary of NATO’s ongoing missions and

operations. This will provide you a reference as we discuss these topics.

NATO is rapidly transforming. At the Prague Summit in November 2002, NATO

member nations signaled their recognition of the changing security environment and

the need to make major shifts in both organization and its military capabilities.

NATO is making progress and is perhaps in the midst of the most fundamental

physical and philosphical transformation in its history.

While NATO has achieved some notable success since 2002 in transforming its

military structure, the Alliance finds itself at the stategic crossroads between centuries. Nations of the Alliance, now totalling 26, increasingly display greater political will to undertake missions at great strategic distances (Afganistan, Iraq, and

even Africa). This collective will signals that NATO is becoming more proactive than

reactive, more expeditionary than static, and more diverse in its capabilities. While

this emergent NATO is to be celebrated, encouraged, and supported, one cannot fail

to emphasize that the political will to do more is, as yet, not accompanied by an

equal political will to resource—in men, money, and material—this new-found appetite.

Despite nonbinding agreements, at the Prague Summit of 2002, that nations

should strive to maintain their defense budgets at no less than 2 percent of their

respective GDP, today only seven nations have achieved this goal. Similarly, in

terms of manpower pledges of nations for support to headquarters and operations,

we are currently not meeting our goals. Finally our efforts to produce agreed upon

strategic capabilities (i.e., Strat Lift, Alliance Ground Surveillance System, Computer Info System) have not been funded adequately thereby perpetuating critical

shortfalls in the Alliance.

Encouragingly, the recently concluded Munich Security Conference lent great support to the primacy of NATO as the premier venue for transatlantic discussions and

future actions with regard to all security issues. Chancellor Merckel’s eloquent

speech at the conference on Saturday, 4 February, was instrumental in the conference’s reaffirmation of NATO’s enduring value to our transatlantic relationship.

Mr. Chairman, Senator Biden, members of the committee, it is clear that publics

on both sides of the Atlantic clearly understood what the Alliance represented during the cold war. We were united, despite occasional ‘‘family disagreements,’’ around

the central ‘‘anchor point’’ of prevailing over the threat posed by the former Soviet

Union. Regrettably, I doubt that our publics today, on either side of the ocean, understand the need, nature, and purpose of the Alliance in the post-cold-war era of

the 21st century.

As we head toward the NATO Summit of November 2006 in Riga, Latvia, NATO

will strive to redefine itself in a world facing asymetric challenges posed by nonstate

actors, emerging threats to energy supply and perhaps critical infrastructures, and

a requirement for more proactive activities (security, stability, and reconstruction)

to deter future crises from developing—all of which include the many facets of terrorism, and all of which will define NATO’s activities in 2006 and beyond. NATO

Secretary General de Hoop Scheffer is outlining an ambitious agenda for this year,

which will include new and revitalized partnership programs, with special emphasis

placed on the NATO-Russia and NATO-Ukraine relationships; possibilities for further NATO enlargement in the future; and the development of new collective capabilities for NATO’s use.

From an operational standpoint, NATO is experiencing one of the busiest times

in its history, with over 28,000 NATO and non-NATO troops from 42 nations serving under the NATO flag. We are conducting operations on three continents, and

I believe that this operations tempo will continue to increase in 2006.

In Iraq, NATO has deployed a successful training mission to Baghdad to assist

the government’s efforts to establish security and stability. NATO’s in-country staff

officer mission complements the work of the U.S.-led multinational security transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC–I) to train Iraqi security forces. In September 2005,

9

with support from the NATO training mission, Iraq opened its National Defense

University. NATO has also provided numerous training opportunities for Iraqi officers and civilian leaders in educational facilities across Europe and coordinated the

acquisition and delivery of donated military equipment from NATO nations to the

Iraqi security forces.

In Africa, as I testified before you last September, NATO and the European Union

jointly responded to an African Union (AU) request to airlift forces for the AU mission in Sudan (Darfur) from across Africa. NATO generated and coordinated the majority of airlift, provided personnel to assist with staff capacity-building activities in

key AU headquarters, and deployed training teams to work with their AU counterparts. NATO’s support is committed until May 2006. A NATO–AU strategic partnership is developing, and extensions or expansion of NATO support beyond May 2006,

if requested by the AU, may be forthcoming.

Closer to Europe, NATO’s only Article V operation, Operation Active Endeavour

(OAE), continues not only to counter terrorism and illegal activities in the Mediterranean, but provides an opportunity for non-NATO ‘‘partnership for peace’’ and

‘‘Mediterranean dialogue’’ nations to enhance their involvement and interoperability.

In 2006, Russian vessels will deploy to OAE, with Ukrainian vessels anticipated in

2007. Formal discussions have commenced on the possible involvement of Algerian,

Israeli, Moroccan, and Georgian participation as well.

On mainland Europe, we recently observed the 10th anniversary of international

involvement in the Balkans. Through its security sector reform initiatives, NATO

has successfully set the conditions in the region for the peaceful transition to democratic institutions and progress toward politically subordinate and reformed militaries. Working closely with the European Union, political and institutional incentives linked to standards of behavior have encouraged Balkan States to recognize

the benefits of closer integration with the EU and NATO and led to a considerable

progress in the capture of persons indicted for war crimes. However, more work remains to be done in this region.

NATO’s Forces in Kosovo are undergoing a transition to a lighter, more mobile

and deployable structure that exploits technology and a more agile and better

trained force to manage the security situation. As the Kosovo status talks develop

over the coming months and consensus is hopefully reached between ethnic Kosovar

Albanian and Serbian communities, NATO should be postured to reduce force levels

significantly in the province and in the Balkans in general.

NATO’s most ambitious operation, the International Security Assistance Force

(ISAF), currently encompasses half of the territorial landmass of Afghanistan and

will expand into the south and then the east in 2006. As NATO assumes responsibility for security and stability, its force levels will ultimately surpass the coalition’s,

and will constitute one of the largest operations in Alliance history—from 9,000

troops at present to 25,000 when expansion is complete. It is envisioned that when

expansion is complete, the United States will be the largest troop-contributing nation to this mission.

In ISAF, NATO has built on the coalition concept of provincial reconstruction

teams and successfully supported the Government of Afghanistan in its Presidential, National Assembly, and Provincial Council elections. Expansion will present

NATO with many new and complex challenges, but NATO and U.S. coalition commanders are working very closely to ensure that the transition of responsibility is

effective and continues to develop credible, professional, and legitimate Afghan political and security structures.

Finally, through its primary transformational vehicle—the NATO Response Force

(NRF)—the Alliance attempts to meet emerging crises across the full spectrum of

military missions, at strategic distance, and in the most challenging of environments. Most recently, and due to its agility, flexibility, and expeditionary nature,

the NRF was selected to assist in the humanitarian relief efforts for both Hurricane

Katrina and in the wake of the Pakistan earthquake.

But the NRF faces challenges. Force generation efforts for future NRF rotations

are not producing a complete and balanced force, which is a cause for concern. The

principal reason for this problem, I believe, is that NATO has not reformed its 20th

century funding mechanisms that require nations to pay all costs associated with

the transport and sustainment of their deployed forces. We have yet to take into

account the full impact of the 21st century expeditionary nature of NATO operations. NATO’s funding arrangements were appropriate when forces did not deploy

outside the European Theater of operations, such as during the cold war. However,

with operations being conducted today at strategic distances, our current approach

to resourcing our operations actually acts as a disincentive to nations contributing

forces for deployments. While NATO has made progress in approving revised funding guidelines to fund critically needed strategic lift in support of this year’s NRF

10

certification exercise, scheduled for June in Cape Verde, as well as the operational

and strategic reserve forces, much work remains to be accomplished. As we speak

today, full operational capability for the NRF by October is at risk.

As I conclude these opening remarks, I’d like to leave you with a final thought:

Today, the transatlantic security link embodied by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is viable, vital, and vibrant. The proposals being considered by the nations

in 2006, if adopted, will go a long way toward helping NATO enhance its increasingly critical role in providing collective security and strategic stability. NATO has

been, and needs to remain, a great alliance. Great alliances should be expected to

do great things. It is possible, even probable in my view, that NATO’s most important contributions and most important missions are still in its future.

Mr. CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you very much, General Jones. We’ll

have rounds of questions and alternate between Senator Hagel and

myself and others who may join us during the course of the questions.

Let me begin by mentioning as you have, that the NATO countries have affirmed that the success of NATO and the success of

ISAF are vital to their security interests. They’ve accepted the fact

that the defense of Europe is not the issue, that threats to NATO

countries are from outside. Describe what you find to be the political difficulties that lead to this budget situation that you described

in which 2 percent of GDP has been strongly suggested as a level

of support. NATO nations have regularly agreed with that, but only

seven nations have met that in the current year.

Now, just anecdotally reading the press, I think we all understand that each nation in NATO has very pressing needs for health

care, education, and a social safety net for the elderly and the poor.

The demands of publics in each of those countries are insistent

with regard to these. The rate of economic growth in some of the

NATO countries has been limited even in the larger countries.

They have devoted maybe 1 percent, as opposed to the 3 or 4 percent the United States has to their military budgets, so there’s

some constrictions there, obviously, in terms of income. You must

feel this almost each day of your leadership as you work with these

various countries. Is it going to be possible realistically for countries to measure up to the 2 percent level?

And then second, the other challenge you’ve mentioned. If we are

going to operate out of area, the forces and the backup, the logistic

support will literally be lifted to the area. At the time of the first

conflict stages in Afghanistan, frequently NATO nations complained that they were not being called upon, that Article V had

been invoked and yet their sacrifices were not being requested. But

the practical answer to that frequently was that there was no ability on the part of the nations to literally lift their forces to Afghanistan or to the theaters that might be involved. It is not clear that

that has changed materially.

So address, if you will, the political factors, and the likelihood of

countries overcoming those to get to the level of support that seems

to be accepted as the budget’s standard, and then the lift of capacity, the communications support, quite apart from the infrastructure, to get to the places outside of Europe.

General JONES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. These are pressing

problems in the Alliance and I might just start off by saying that

such problems are understandable in the context of what NATO

was built to do in the 20th century versus what we’re asking it to

do right now. Large fixed land masses, heavyset tank divisions

11

massed along the border to defend against possible attack by the

Warsaw Pact countries was the order of the day and NATO never

really had the ambition to move to very long distance. Our response to an invasion was defensive. It would have been massive

but it was defensive. We never really developed a force to take the

first strike, if you will, at least with the land armies.

So with the disappearance of the Soviet Union we found ourselves with this very, very large fixed organization, static organization, and, also if you will, a mentality that essentially said, well,

we don’t use NATO until we have to react to something and if

there’s nothing there then so much the better. And so NATO’s ability to take this large static force and transform it into something

that you see on this chart to my right, and the various distances,

was really not something that could be done overnight. That kind

of transformation, especially with 19 countries and now 26, is very

hard to do, and many of our Warsaw Pact—former Warsaw Pact,

now member nations—had very large land armies also built on the

idea that they would never leave the European landmass. Many of

them are conscripted armies. The idea of a professional force was

certainly not in their vocabulary when they became—until they became NATO members.

So part of the challenge is how do you retool the force so that

it can be useful and how do you convert the apparatus that supports all of this, the budgeting, the funding, not only in the NATO

community but also in each nation, and those problems are different. It’s hard for me to speculate as to whether we can achieve

2 percent. On the face of it, I would think we could. It doesn’t seem

to be—it doesn’t seem to be an awful lot to ask given what NATO

is about to do, but, obviously, nations have a difficult time doing

that. Part of the problems that they have doing that is that many

of them have invested certain ways.

For example, certain countries have—of their budget—are paying

70 to 75 percent of their defense budget on salaries, for example.

When you are past 50 percent on manpower costs, you really have

little ability to do much of anything else by way of transformation.

I can honestly say that I believe that every country is really trying

to do the right thing. It’s just takes a while to turn the ship

around. I would be hopeful that we can see the budget’s turnaround, particularly in the face of these threats and I think as

NATO reinvents itself and reexplains itself to our publics, I think

that there will be more of a demand that NATO, as an alliance, be

asked to do more things in a proactive way, in a crisis preventive

mode, in a security mode, than it has been in the past.

But that’s going to take time and it’s going to take concerted political leadership to convince 26 nations that this is something that

clearly has to be done. So, on the one hand, we can be optimistic

and glad that the Alliance is doing what it’s doing, and on the

other hand, we do have to realistically put forth some concerns that

we can’t keep going in the way of doing more without being able

to change the way we fund these operations.

And having said that, I’d like—I also support the Secretary General of NATO in his efforts to bring about some aspects of common

funding to our operations instead of leaving the full cost to the nations who generously provide their forces. And certainly the smallVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:43 Jul 25, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00015 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 800927.SEN SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1
12

er nations would be victimized by that because they will never

have the budgets to be able to provide rotating battalions and

squadrons, especially as our missions tend to be for longer duration

and over great strategic distances.

With regard to out-of-area operations, this is, in fact, a new era

for NATO and because we are still largely tooled for the other century where nations were responsible for the total expense and total

support of their deployed forces, we now have what we call national

support elements that follow the national forces, not under NATO

but under national command to provide the logistics, to provide the

capabilities and the support that their forces need at these great

distances.

So in order to bring about greater efficiencies, we are, for the

first time, working at multinational logistics, multinational intelligence architecture, multinational communications that are fully

interoperable, and multinational common funding ideas for such

things as strategic airlift and other things that we currently have

as a major shortfall.

I think we’ll make good progress in that, toward that. I think

that this is something that the Alliance will discuss during the balance of the year and perhaps by the NATO Summit we can get

some decisions that will move NATO into that direction.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask, given the debate that goes on in our

own government about the future of our Armed Forces, certainly

thought has been given to the fact that large fixed armies, large

groups of people moving in what used to be conventional ways, may

not be appropriate for the kinds of threats the United States seems

to find with cell groups, insurgents, guerilla warfare. Therefore, the

need for flexibility, the need for very different kinds of instruments

of war is required. You’re describing, I think correctly, the fact that

European countries had fixed armies that did not anticipate going

anywhere. We’re going to defend the heartland, or at least the

neighbors. Suddenly they try to transform to a situation in which

they might have to go somewhere and have logistics support. The

issue probably arises for them now, what about the debate in the

United States? How does this influence our military doctrine if

we’re going to fight insurgents or cell groups?

While we’re in the midst of this great reorganization, what sort

of training do we undertake, or what kind of missions are likely in

terms of threats to us? We’ve defined the whole issue as being no

longer necessarily the defense of Europe but the meeting of threats

well outside of Europe.

I’m just curious, as the NATO commanders meet, or the national

leaders and so forth, leaving aside the summit, a conspicuous meeting of this sort, is there discussion of military doctrine within these

countries? Given the number of them and the number of varieties

of debates, I suspect this makes the cohesion of all of this, the leadership of NATO, especially daunting. But if you can, as an insider,

describe really what is going on.

General JONES. Mr. Chairman, it is daunting but there’s a lot of

energy associated with these discussions. The fact of the matter is

that when it comes to transformation most, if not all, of our allies

take a keen interest in what it is the United States is doing and

through—and fully understand where we were and where we’ve

13

come in transformation and study very closely the general trend

lines and most specifically associated with joint forces command in

Norfolk which is the center of our transformation.

In my theater in the NATO context and in the European command, the components, Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines, play

a dominant role in assisting our allies in achieving interoperability

and achieving transformational capabilities, and that’s why our forward basing in Europe is still very, very important. It certainly

does not have to be as robust as it was during the cold war but

the footprint that we’ve proposed for UCOM’s transformation will

allow us greater strategic agility with the forces that we have at

greater strategic distances. The types of—for the foreseeable future

the types of threats that we face will be better defeated by

proactive presence and chosen very carefully, obviously, but by engaging with our allies in a concerted effort to bring about transformation in regions that left unattended could be the next, the future Afghanistans and Iraqs in the next 10 or 15 years.

And so I would say, that one of principal elements of transformation of NATO is that there’s a greater understanding that

mass does not equal capability. It’s what you’re able to do with

what you have that matters, and in that context we are also telling

new members like the Baltic States, asking them not to invest in

air forces since we have enough and we—by Article V—we guarantee their security anyway.

So there’s an awful lot of dialog going on and countries are very

focused. They are transforming their forces, they are shrinking the

mass and trying to develop new capabilities.

Where I get concerned is where they reduce their forces and size

and also reduce their budgets. To me that’s not transformation, it’s

just—that’s lesser capability. The value of transformation is to reduce the mass of your force, maintain your budgets if not increase

the budgets, and then apply those savings toward new technologies

and capabilities. The countries that are doing that are making

great contributions. So my feeling is we’re moving in the right direction. We need to do the things that I mentioned in my opening

statements to accelerate it, but generally this is a new concept and,

as I mentioned, I think we have two kinds of transformation in the

Alliance, one physical and the other cultural. What do you do with

the forces that you have, what is NATO willing to do with it? Are

we really willing to be a proactive alliance which I think is really

the destiny of our future operations.

The CHAIRMAN. I’d like to recognize Senator Hagel for questions.

Senator HAGEL. Mr. Chairman, thank you, and again, General

Jones, welcome. I would add my recognition to the sergeant major

who is seated behind you for his years of contributions and service

to our country. Sergeant Major, thank you.

When I was in the Army for a brief time, generals always scared

me but sergeant majors frightened the hell out me and I don’t

think that has ever changed.

But it is because of the sergeant majors of our Armed Forces as

you have appropriately recognized General Jones, that we have

built the finest noncommissioned officer corps really in the history

of the world and it’s because of people like the gentleman sitting

behind you who have been responsible for that, so thank you.

14

I would also like you to say hello to General Wald and thank him

for his service and for all the good work that he has done for our

country and continues to do. Much of what you have reflected on

here, as you know better than anyone, General Jones, has been because of the relationship that you and General Wald have had, and

the work that he has given and the leadership he’s provided. So

please give General Wald our thanks as well.

As you know, because of you and General Wald, General Jones,

I’ve had some opportunities over the last few years to spend some

time with you and your team in some of the areas that you have

noted in your statement and I have seen firsthand the kind of work

and imagination and focus that you have brought to our efforts in

relationship with our partners in NATO and they are transformational, yes, but they are really in line as much as any time,

I think, in the history of our country or the world with the changing dynamics of challenges and opportunities that face all of us.

In respect to that point, as you have noted in your opening comments and as I had an opportunity to read your white paper this

morning which you have given us. Would you expand a bit on the

concept that you’ve talked about here on potential NATO partnerships outside the boundaries of the original concept of NATO. You,

I think, referenced Australia, Japan, other relationships. How

would that play out, what kind of commitments would be born and

expected, what kind of mission statements might be included in

that? Thank you.

General JONES. Senator, thank you very much for mentioning

General Wald who is the deputy commander of the United States

European Command and who’s been there just a little bit longer

than I have. That’s slightly over 3 years. There isn’t a day that

goes by that I don’t give thanks for General Wald and his leadership of UCOM.

As you know, his headquarters—our headquarters is in Stuttgart, Germany. NATO’s military headquarters is in Mons, Belgium,

and I find myself spending most of my time either in Belgium or

in some country around our 91 country area of operation and it is

a source of immense gratification and confidence and pleasure that

I’ve had the privilege of working with Chuck Wald for the last 3

years.

Most of the initiatives that have really taken off and blossomed

concerning Africa have been as a result of the vision and the efforts

and the persistency of Chuck Wald. Similarly, our U.S. interests in

the Caspian Guard initiatives in the Caucasus also are the product

of his tenacity and his vision. He’s an extraordinary member of the

Armed Forces, an extraordinarily gifted leader, valued friend, and

is really the—really deserves much, much of the credit of anything

good that UCOM is doing and I’m very grateful to have had him

for these 3 years.

The prospect of future partnerships in NATO is one of the subjects that the Secretary General is interested in developing as we

head toward the summit in Riga in November. As you can see by

the map on Afghanistan, you’ll see a number of flags there that

represent non-NATO countries. In fact, in the north and in the

west of Afghanistan right now, which is NATO’s area of operation,

we have 35 countries operating in partnership with NATO. As you

15

know, we’re an alliance of 26 so 9 countries in addition to our

NATO members are working with us.

Australia, which you mentioned in your question, is scheduled to

join in the expansion toward stage three in the south, later on this

year in the summertime, and so we have a tradition now in habitual relations of associations with different countries. As you know,

we have a standing committee for Russia and the Ukraine. As I

mentioned, we’re joining two fully qualified interoperable Russian

warships to Operation Active Endeavor this month in the Mediterranean. So the precedent of working with other countries from

geographically diverse regions in the world is there. It works, it’s

effective, it will be a political decision in NATO as to how they

wish to formalize that in however way. I wouldn’t be able to predict

how that might come out but clearly the appetite and the trend is

for more such relationships and at the military-to-military level, of

course, that’s a good thing. So we’ll just have to wait and see how

it turns out but there are many countries on the books that are trying to have a formal relationship with NATO. The last one to come

to my attention is President Karzai wishes to have a formal relationship with NATO for Afghanistan. We’ll just have to wait and

see how that works out politically but the appetite to welcome offers from other countries is certainly there.

Senator HAGEL. Thank you. The Russian relationship that you

have just noted in using a couple of examples of the military-tomilitary relationship, depending on a number of uncontrollables

and dynamics that will unfold as the world evolves over the next

few years, how do you see a relationship with Russia developing in

the context of NATO, what we saw over the last few years how

Russia was absorbed into, at least, a framework of a relationship.

It appears that it has worked pretty well evidenced by the continuation of the military-to-military relationship. How do you see that

evolving?

General JONES. Well, whether my answer is as a U.S. officer or

as NATO officer, it will evolve in the context of political guidance

and approval. Having said that, the approval and the guidance that

we have has allowed for a evolving relationship that has been very

satisfying on both counts.

And, of course, our counterparts in Russia would obviously not

be authorized to engage as they are with either NATO or the

United States European Command had they not had their political

approval as well. So in NATO I’ve had official exchanges with my

counterpart in Moscow, have been received in Moscow as a NATO

commander. I’ve received him in Mons as the Chief of Defense of

the Russian Federations Armed Forces. More of those are scheduled to take place. The NATO/Russia level of ambition is for, I

think, around 50 measurable events this year for working toward

achieving greater interoperability. We have a good working dialog

and I have a Russian general officer and his staff permanently at

SHAPE to work on these mutual issues. In the United States European Command, we have under the leadership of General Bell, who

I asked to take the lead because it’s primarily an army-to-army relationship but although not limited exclusively to that. General

Bell, who recently left for new duties in Korea, was absolutely instrumental in developing a very, very good relationship which reVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:43 Jul 25, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00019 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 800927.SEN SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1
16

sulted in, among other things, Russian NCO’s coming to school at

our base at Grafenwoehr, Germany, and going through NCO

courses, lectures by the sergeant major of the United States Army

Europe at the Russian Military Academy about NCO’s and their

role in the American Army, and many, many such exchanges of

Russian military personnel and U.S. personnel which have been

very satisfying and, I imagine, that will continue, certainly as far

ahead as I can see, through the rest of this year.

So within the context of what our respective governments authorize us to do, I think we’re doing some good things and building

long-term ties and relationships between people at all levels who

know each other, understand each other, and gradually I think the

mystique or the mysterious element between—that might have existed at some point is dissipating in terms of the military to military relationships.

Senator HAGEL. Thank you. You noted in your remarks and then

certainly it’s in the white paper of Sudan, Darfur, NATO’s role

evolving especially in lift capacity and other areas of support. What

do you gauge as the most significant threat to the continent of Africa when you look at as you also noted oil, natural gas resources

on the west coast, other significant geopolitical strategic factors

there?

In answering that if you would also address NATO’s involvement

now, their continued involvement, how training, what is appropriate, and any way you’d like to enlarge upon that.

Thank you.

General JONES. Africa is such an immense continent and it’s one

that I have grown more and more interested in as I spend more

time in Europe. And, of course, the UCOM European Command

has responsibility for the majority of Africa with the exception of

the Horn of Africa which is a central command responsibility, but

I’d like to add very quickly that General Abizaid and I have made

the lines that exist in the unified command line virtually blurry because where his interests end or where mine begin and when mine

end and his begin are very, very soft lines and we work very well

together, both commands work very well together to make sure

that we do the right thing and help each other be successful.

And in that context, missions like the Joint Task Force Horn of

Africa, to me are symbolic of, and representative of, the types of

missions that we’re likely to be engaged in for the foreseeable future after the shooting stops in Iraq and Afghanistan. This JTF

Horn of Africa has done some very, very important things for the

region that they’re involved in.

And I guess the way to answer your question, Senator, is that

for a continent like Africa it seems to me that a regional approach

is absolutely vital because the African Union, and indeed Africans,

now see themselves as five different regions. And that seems to be

a good way, I think, to address the future of Africa.

I wouldn’t say that the threats that face Africa can be encompassed in one or two words because it depends on what region

we’re talking about. The ones that I know best, obviously, are

North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa and Western Africa. I’m

learning about others, as we all are, but one of the things I’ve been

impressed with is that in North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa the

17

common concern by all of those countries is what’s going on inside

their borders that they might not know about. They’re concerned

about the spread of radical fundamentalism, they’re concerned

about the recruiting of warriors for the fundamentalist movement

to not only be trained in their vast ungoverned spaces in some

cases, but also migrating to fight in Iraq and Afghanistan and then

coming back to Africa to their countries to destabilize their countries.

The United States has been working very closely with the North

African and Sub-Saharan African countries, the majority of them,

and has been very helpful in helping them train their Armed

Forces, understand their—what’s going on in their countries using

our own assets and others and providing the means by which we

can help them help themselves in capturing terrorists and people

that are wanted by a number of governments and who are now behind bars.

In West Africa, obviously in Nigeria, you have a consortium of

approximately 10 nations in an area that, I think, is worthy of significant attention by the United States because of its immense potential from an energy standpoint, but also from the standpoint of

how we would like the future to be shaped there. Nigeria, as an

example, is a country that has a northern half that is Muslim, a

southern half that is Christian. It’s a country that’s the seventh

largest oil producing country in the world but it is a country that

has—I think it’s widely recognized—has a series of problems; recently had a fairly significant hostage situation. At sea there are

problems associated with piracy.

One oil company executive, whose company works out of Nigeria, has told me that his company plans on losing $1 billion in revenue

each year due to illegal bunkering—that’s to say tapping of their

pipelines. So this is an important region for the world, really, and

for our own domestic interests and, I believe, that in those areas

and elsewhere in Africa, that we have a great opportunity to invest

our assets, use our forces, at fairly low level of financial—from a

financial expense standpoint and to achieve results far out of proportion to the investment.

Put another way, I believe that the correct strategy for Africa is

to be more proactive and less reactive. Using Liberia as an example

where we seem to go to Liberia every 5 years to fix something, our

strategy now is to help Liberians help themselves but with a continual level of engagement, very low level: Special Operations

Forces, Marines, engineers, the correct advisors to help their security structures take hold and do the things that we can to help

these struggling democracies so that they can be successful over

the long haul.

Obviously, in Africa, the American military is not going to solve

the whole problem and I believe that the future in such areas will

be—we will be successful to the extent that we can integrate all aspects of our national influence and so the future from my standpoint in engagement and in theater security strategies should be

one that is much more cohesive, much more all-encompassing in

terms of our interagency, much more understandable by all of us

so that we understand what our purposes are, and I would advocate that more empowerment at the regional level from the standVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:43 Jul 25, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00021 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 800927.SEN SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1
18

point of resources to bring about change in a rapid—as rapid a

manner as possible.

Senator HAGEL. General Jones, thank you. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Hagel. Let me

just pick up for a moment on the African discussion because both

in my opening statement and you in your opening statement, General Jones, have discussed briefly our trip this summer. I want to

just, for the record, give an illustration of the importance of General Jones’ command and NATO in Africa. The specifics of my

going to Africa were because the National Security Council and the

White House were hopeful, because of conversation with President

Bouteflika of Algeria, that the 404 remaining Moroccan prisoners

held by the Polisario, not under control of Algeria but with influence, might be released because of the desire for better relations

between President Bouteflika and the King of Morocco. So this

went on and off several times. We finally were on again, but the

circumstances were such that President Bouteflika felt, after a 3-

hour conversation that we had that he would not be able to accompany me to the Polisario as had been the original plan. Our Ambassador, because we do not recognize the Polisario, could not go down

500 miles into the desert either. To the rescue came General Jones

who could. Now, his ability to do this came because of the nature

of his command. Even more importantly, General Jones was able

to furnish two large aircraft at the airport there in Tindouf and 38

marines aboard the aircraft. Logistically, and practically, that was

tremendously important. In the event we got the 404 prisoners out

of the camp. Some of them were in very dire straits in terms of

their medical condition. Many had been prisoners for over 20 years

in the desert. That was a remarkable feat.

I mention these things because of the flexibility to be able to do

these things and General Jones’ own flexibility in terms of schedule, the aircraft, the fact that it did work. It was the time the

Polisario wanted to release people, and so they were released. And

then we found, as the General will recall, that the King of Morocco,

who we anticipated would be excited about the situation, was, in

fact, giving public statements of enragement, once again venting

his thoughts about the Algerians and what they had meant all this

time.

Nevertheless, at the airport, when the people came off the planes

and we greeted them warmly, in good campaign style and so forth,

the Moroccan officials responded to this, formed a line, began shaking hands, much to their credit in the Moroccan press. The King

did decide to have a meeting the next day and General Jones was

available for that meeting. He went with me and our Ambassador

to see the King, which was very important to try to seal the sense

of good will that came from our mission and likewise from his, both

as an American but more importantly, in this case, as the NATO

commander.

And I mention all of these things, and I could mention more, to

illustrate that the range of NATO now is very broad. Much of the

excitement that I see has come from General Jones’ leadership, and

that of his other persons with him who have seen the possibilities.

In this case, two Muslim countries, one of them very energy rich,

19

all with traditions of various sorts, next door to some other countries that are difficult—a very, very important area.

Now, let me just progress from that discussion to something altogether different. And that is that it’s been suggested that not all

nations in NATO necessarily have the same military doctrines or

goals. It may be unfair, but let me just ask frankly. It’s been suggested, for example, that the French do not believe that NATO

should be involved in counterinsurgency operations. If that is true,

fair enough. If it’s not, please expunge it from the record. But are

there differences, as we go into these new missions, and

counterinsurgency is a part of it, the guerrilla fighting or the

breakup of cells, are there arguments over what the role is, or what

kind of tactics certain countries will have, as opposed to others?

How in the world do you put together a force under those conditions?

General JONES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As you well know, in

the Alliance of 26 countries, all of whom must agree 100 percent

before you embark on any mission, all of whom must agree on the

rules of engagement for that mission, and all of whom can provide

their forces and attach certain restrictions on the use of those

forces in support of those missions, this is—this presents—as the

Alliance gets bigger and bigger, it presents obviously a bigger and

bigger problem for all of us.

Everybody in NATO, all members understand that for commanders to be successful, they have to have a force with a clearly

defined mission and as few impediments in accomplishing that mission as possible. However, in the case of some of our missions, notably Afghanistan and Iraq, where there are political differences,

very serious political differences, it is possible to get an agreement

on the missions and yet have countries decide to either opt in or

opt out depending on their national policies. To their credit, they

don’t wish to derail the mission but they do reserve the right to

participate in the way that they see fit. And such is the case in Afghanistan.

There are different views in the Alliance, some born over the history of the Alliance, as to how NATO itself should be used, whether

or not NATO should be proactive in its use or whether it should

largely be reactive. There are different views on how the NATO Response Force, which is really the transformational engine of change

in the Alliance that was agreed upon in the Prague Summit of

2002 how that force should or should not be used. This is all part

and parcel of NATO’s general trend toward transformation and

doing things differently and thinking about things differently for

its future.

In the case of Afghanistan, we have come up with a solution of

a command structure that will allow for NATO to expand to full

control of the entire operation. It will be a NATO operation. The

United States will be one of the contributing countries. I would

imagine that by the time we finish this, sometime this year, that

the commander of the operation will be a British officer and we will

have a NATO operation that will take on the whole spectrum of

conflict, less the more aggressive hunt for the terrorists and notably the more aggressive counterterrorism mission.

20

NATO’s preference is to focus on the antiterrorism which is more

defensive in nature and we are—we have reached a 26-member

consensus on how to do that. It provides for a direct line to General

Abizaid, who will command the forces that have signed up for that

particular mission, and a system whereby all the others will report

to the commander of the NATO forces for the balance of those missions. And we have figured out how to deconflict the two and to live

in—to make it cohesive and to make it effective. And so I’m not—

I have no doubt that we’ll be successful in doing that.

But to get back to your question, there are differences of views

at the national political levels of what NATO should or should not

do. It’s not necessarily just always about counterterrorism. There

are different views as to whether NATO should engage in the

training of police forces, for example. The training of a police force

is a significant problem in Afghanistan. It has not gone—it is not

as advanced as the training of the Afghan National Army, for example, and there are different views on whether NATO should do

a mission like that. There are different views on whether NATO

should participate in counterdrug operations. The biggest problem

in Afghanistan has to do with counterdrugs. There are strong views

in the Alliance as to what the role is for NATO in that campaign

as well.

This is the essence of NATO. It’s—we eventually come to an

agreement——

The CHAIRMAN. As you point out there’s shifting around forces to

begin with. And we’ve described that business of evolution. The discussion of missions probably also is an agenda item as the countries come together. I think you’ve described well the pragmatic decision you’ve come to in Afghanistan. It may not be the same one

you would come to in country ‘‘X’’ or ‘‘Y’’ or what have you down

the trail because that might evolve likewise.

General JONES. Yeah. I should add, Mr. Chairman, if I could,

that the counterterrorism is a recognized mission under NATO doctrine. As a matter of fact, Operation Active Endeavor is an Article

V counterterrorism mission that many nations participate in, albeit

a naval mission.

In the case of France—France has 250 special operations soldiers

working under United States command in Afghanistan on the

counterterror mission itself, so on the aggressive end of things.

The CHAIRMAN. That’s an important point to make.

General JONES. It’s a mixed—while France may have a different

view on what NATO should be doing, I think we should point out

that France is the third largest contributing nation in terms of

troops to all NATO missions and is providing very, very—has now

for several years provided some very fine forces in support of our

counterterrorist operations in the more difficult missions in Afghanistan.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you go a little bit further into another potential mission? There have been hints in the last few months that

from time to time energy resources might be utilized for national

strategic purposes, namely, that the country may cut off energy resources to another country. And this is an act that does not involve

aircraft flying over a country or tanks coming through or troops on

the ground, but in a strategic sense of national welfare or betterVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:43 Jul 25, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00024 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 800927.SEN SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1
21

ment, it could be devastating, given the dependance that so many

European countries have on Russia, specifically. Algeria, for example, is, I understand, the second largest supplier of natural gas to

Europe, one of the other areas in which you have been working

quietly and strategically.

What kind of discussion, if any, has proceeded in NATO channels

about those sorts of threats, which are entirely different from military aggression or even insurgency or cells of terrorists and so

forth, but potentially devastating to the welfare and the economies

of countries, maybe even their vital being if they’re a small country? What is to be done with regard to this?

General JONES. Mr. Chairman, the discussions on those issues

are currently ongoing. As a matter of fact, some of the Verkunde

Conference in Munich, this weekend, was devoted to that. Mr.

Sergey Ivanov from Russia was there, the Deputy Prime Minister,

to answer questions which are very topical given the recent temporary disruption of oil coming from Russia which sent some shock

waves through Europe, as well, because they fully realize the extent of their dependance on Russian gas.

This topic is developing, literally as we speak, and I think the

Allies, the member nations, are, in fact, now very interested in not

only the implications of the cut-offs, if you will, or the manipulation

that could be made politically of something that could be very, very

destabilizing to various economies. But also they are considering

what it is that an organization like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization could do to assure the security of the delivery of energy

and also the protection of some of our critical infrastructures at the

strategic level.

This is a question of trying to decide where national responsibilities end and the strategic Alliance responsibilities might begin.

Very embryonic discussions but certainly very topical in terms of

the timing and ongoing as we speak, the Secretary General and the

Ambassadors are considering just what part of the coming summit

in November this should play.

So to me this is part and parcel of gradual recognition that rather than just sit back and wait for things to happen, what are the

things—the question is what are the things that NATO could be

doing to preclude bad things from happening, and what is it that

we could do to affect the landscape, is really gradually emerging.

I think one of the things that people are concerned with is, obviously, not only the flow of energy but the fact, the possibility that

nonnation state actors, terrorists for example, could significantly

impede the flow of oil through terrorists actions. And the question

comes, what is it that an organization like NATO could do to assure those kinds of securities as well as the destination points to

where the energy comes, whether it’s by sea, by land, by train, by

air, by truck. Those kinds of questions are now being discussed and

I think that’s very healthy and it’s certainly a way I think that

NATO can better explain itself to its publics in the future.

The CHAIRMAN. Yesterday, I had the privilege, at the invitation

of our Ambassador to NATO, to address the Security Council of the

United Nations. I talked about the energy situation that you describe as sort of embryonic in your policy. I suggested that it might

22

be for the Security Council an embryonic situation as they take a

look at their responsibilities.

The other suggestion is an older one, and that is that with regard to weapons of mass destruction, each country that has them

ought to declare what it has, secure what it has, and call upon the

assistance of others if you don’t have the money and the technical

expertise to do that, and then to think carefully, as the Non-Proliferation Treaty participants are doing, about the legitimate needs

of people for energy.

For example, Europeans may say that one way out of the jam is

to have nuclear powerplants, more of them, built on European soil.

NATO members may gain a degree of energy independence in this

way. However, one must examine the whole business of how fuel

comes to nations in legitimate ways, how spent fuel might be disposed of, how that separation is made between civilian use and potential military weaponization. And likewise, how the enforcement

situation of all this is to come, and what kind of responsibilities nations have, to make certain that there is not proliferation, that

there is not misuse of experiments.

Now, whether it be Iran and that particular neighborhood now,

or other countries later, this is clearly an issue in which countries

may not have come to conclusions as to what role they’re prepared

to play. But has this been a topic of debate also in NATO, quite

apart from our negotiators working with the three European states,

and now with others in the IAEA?

General JONES. Mr. Chairman, I think that, again, having just

come back from the Munich Security Conference, the question of

Iran was very topical as well and on everybody’s lips and the synergy between the American view and the European view, if I could

use European as a European identity, if you will, on this issue is

very, very much—seems to be very much aligned from the standpoint of concern and solidarity in expressing what it is that Iran

must do to comply with the will of the international community.

The Chancellor of Germany, Angela Merkel, was very clear on that

in her address to the conference as well. So this serves a little bit

as a forcing function within the Alliance as well and the European

Union that those discussions will increasingly, on the subject of

proliferation, will most likely also be on the rise in the future as

well.

The CHAIRMAN. The out-of-area movement to Afghanistan is

monumental in its significance of the Alliance. Now here come sets

of issues that are not exactly routine military. As you’re trying to

rearrange the forces to meet new challenges outside the continent,

here come challenges that may hit inside the continent, but in very

different ways. In the past perhaps people would say, well, a different group of people in our government deals with this, this is

not exactly a Department of Defense function. But then others

would say, well, it comes awfully close, in terms of national security, or at least the coordination between our diplomats and our

equivalent of the Pentagon or the National Security Council. This

really requires a coordination that we may not be prepared for individually as countries, quite apart from in an alliance with all sorts

of other national interests involved. And I know this is much on

your mind. That’s why I wanted to provide a forum for you to indiVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:43 Jul 25, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00026 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 800927.SEN SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1
23

cate that this has been on the mind not only of yourself as NATO

Commander, but likewise your colleagues in the other countries

that you’re visiting with, and that there is some synergy of movement to get this on the table and begin to massage it before a crisis

comes.

General JONES. I think it also serves to remind us as we focus

on insurgencies and terrorism that every now and then we

shouldn’t forget that there are also nation states out there that

could cause a great deal of damage as well.

And certainly the discussions on Iran remind us that it’s not just

about disparate to identify groups, sometimes a nation will rise and

present a clear—a clear danger to the stability and peace of the

threat to our collective security and we have to be ready for the

worst case at all times.

The CHAIRMAN. On the good side though, miraculously, and this

has not entered our discussion today, all of the countries that belong to NATO that comprise this Europe which may not be completely whole and free yet, but, as the President described it, is

now very large, have not offered a hint of potential aggression

against one another.

That is remarkable, given the history of the last millennium, in

which this is the only 50-year period in which that was not the

case. As we talk about all of the threats that we’ve discussed today,

outside of the box and so forth, inside the box it’s still a remarkable

story which sometimes is taken for granted. People say, well, what

has NATO done for me recently or so forth. Well, the fact is historically, just the fact that NATO is there, is well-governed, that

there’s good dialog, that there’s reaching out to these important

problems, is itself just a remarkable achievement that we ought to

celebrate at a hearing on NATO like this one.

General JONES. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much, and to

those who sometimes ask me the same thing, what’s the value of

NATO? I mean, what does it do and so we have long answers and

short answers and I’ll give you the short answer, but one of them

is to just ask people if they understand what the growth of NATO

has been just in the last 10 or 15 years to 26 countries today and

the fact that one indication of the health of the Alliance is that

there isn’t one nation that’s trying to leave NATO, and quite to the

contrary there’s probably 10 or 12 lined up that are really anxious

to become NATO members.

So clearly there’s value there and people understand it and all

you have to do is travel around a little bit and you get that sense.

And even nontraditional relationships with countries along the

North African littoral, for example, are blossoming, again, under

the NATO level of influence. I had one Chief of Defense of a North

African country ask me why Operation Active Endeavor did not

have a landward function to the south, of course, and meaning that

his country would welcome that. I found that astounding and certainly indicative of an alliance that is held in high esteem, increasingly high esteem by many people. And an alliance that not only

exists to provide the heavy hand, if you will, of military operations,

but also the softer hand of humanitarian and disaster relief such

as the very successful, recently completed, virtually just a few days

ago, operation in Pakistan, which I think really showed NATO to

24

that part of the world in a completely different light than their preconceived notions of NATO as essentially a war fighting force

which only did heavy-handed military operations and were absolutely stunned to discover the capacity that NATO had to bring

comfort to people who had lost everything in the aftermath of the

earthquake and to save lives and to do things that frankly surprised many people in that part of the world.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, it is a place with lots of ice and snow and

poor roads and all of the worst conditions for humanitarian work.

Let me just conclude by saying that you have many supporters of

NATO here on the home front, people who have served in administrations of the past and the present and all. I’ve received word from

some of these friends that they would like to begin to get together

for informal dinner meetings such as we’ve had in the past. In the

past we thought about who ought to be new members and then

evolved into what sort of new missions might come from all of this.

But I think there is a cadre of support, Democrats, Republicans,

people from many administrations, that have watched the evolution of this and who are very hopeful of being helpful in terms

of our own dialog here in our debates which are sometimes watched

by others. So I offer that word of assurance that the debates that

you are having and the strenuous business, as you’ve described, the

embryonic debates of new missions and goals, are being followed

carefully and supportively. We’re hopeful that we’ll be able to take

constructive action as you and others call upon us.

We thank you so much for this testimony, for the very useful materials that you have given to all members of the committee and

our staffs, and for your own personal testimony today. So saying,

the hearing is adjourned.

General JONES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[Whereupon, at 3:33 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

ADDITIONAL PREPARED STATEMENT AND QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., U.S. SENATOR FROM

DELAWARE

Mr. Chairman, thank you for convening a hearing on this important issue. I also

want to thank General Jones for his extraordinary leadership of the Alliance. The

American people and the citizens of NATO’s other members are very well served by

your diplomatic skill and strategic vision.

Over the last 15 years, relentless change has been one of the few constants in

the realm of Euro-Atlantic security. Some of those present may remember the inaugural meeting of NATO’s North Atlantic Cooperation Council in December 1991. Toward the end of the assembly, which brought together longtime NATO members and

representatives from the newly democratizing nations of Eastern Europe, the Soviet

Ambassador announced that his country had dissolved during the meeting and that

from that time on he would only represent the Russian Federation.

The end of the Soviet threat precipitated some of the changes facing NATO today,

but it was just one of many transformational events that NATO has confronted in

recent years. From the conflicts in the Balkans, to the invocation of article 5 following the 9/11 attacks, to the conflict in Afghanistan, to Iraq, to Darfur, NATO is

addressing security challenges today that go well beyond its original mandate of

protecting Europe from the Red Army.

The evolution of NATO’s mission and mandate is in itself an indication that the

Alliance is doing something right. Even more than equipment, training, or numbers,

adaptability has traditionally been the single most important attribute of any successful military force, and NATO has demonstrated a willingness to adapt when

25

faced with new challenges. However, the changes that have taken place to date,

while positive, will not be enough to guarantee NATO’s relevance in the future.

In order to remain the world’s preeminent security alliance, NATO needs to accelerate its evolution in at least three key areas related to the Alliance’s capability,

credibility, and equity.

CAPABILITY

The military operations NATO has engaged in since the mid-1990s have demonstrated the Alliance’s overwhelming might. But they have also exposed some vast

capability gaps between the United States and Europe. To ensure that future generations of United States and European troops will be able to train and deploy together, we must bridge this divide.

The primary responsibility for training and equipping our European allies falls on

European governments. Our NATO partners need to develop military forces that are

more capable, adaptable, and deployable. The NATO Reaction Force (NRF) represents a step in the right direction—I applaud the European countries that have

contributed to that effort. The United States must give priority to our ongoing commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan. But, in time, I hope we will participate in the

NRF, as well. The NRF will only achieve its goal of creating an agile, competent

force if it receives sustained funding and regular exercise. NATO’s member states

should work together to guarantee that those needs are satisfied.

One of the greatest challenges to NATO’s capabilities is the planned expansion

of its responsibilities in Afghanistan. Over the next few months, NATO troops will

start taking over from United States units in significant portions of southern Afghanistan. For the first time, NATO will be shouldering responsibility for a major

portion of the counterinsurgency and counterterrorism work in that country.

This transition should free up thousands of American troops for much-needed rotation back home, or for other necessary deployments. But there are still many unanswered questions about NATO’s mission in Afghanistan: Will the NATO troops

that replace American units be up to the vital task of tracking down and defeating

al-Qaeda and the Taliban? Will they have the necessary training, weapons, mobility

and logistics, and intelligence capacities? Will there be smooth cooperation and

interoperability between NATO troops and other coalition partners such as Japan,

South Korea, and Jordan? Will NATO be able to work with the nascent Afghan National Army? Perhaps most importantly, will the European nations supplying NATO

troops give them sufficiently tough rules of engagement?

Over the next few months, we will all watch as NATO answers these questions.

CREDIBILITY

A second area in which NATO needs to evolve relates to its credibility. To retain

the respect NATO acquired during the military campaigns in the Balkans, NATO

members must not stand by and watch when atrocities are committed on their doorstep.

NATO has taken the unprecedented step of assisting the African Union with its

mission in Darfur, Sudan. Such cooperation is a first for both organizations. I fully

support NATO’s assistance to the African Union in Sudan—and I believe that it

could do even more.

The United Nations Security Council just passed a resolution authorizing a U.N.

peacekeeping mission in Darfur. But even if all goes as planned—and that is a big

if—it will be a year before such a mission is fully deployed. The African Union has

done an admirable job in Darfur. But it has never had the men, material, or mandate to stop the violence. And the security situation there continues to degenerate.

The people of Darfur cannot wait a year for it to improve. NATO could help by providing a small contingent to bridge the gap between the AU’s mandate and the full

deployment of the United Nations peacekeeping mission. A relatively small number

of NATO troops—to serve as advisors, to help with command and control, intelligence gathering and dissemination, communications and logistics—would help the

AU substantially improve the security environment in Darfur.

Both Congress and the administration have called what is going on in Sudan,

genocide. We must use all the resources at our disposal—including NATO—to stop

it.

EQUITY

Last, as NATO continues to expand—and I hope NATO will continue to expand—

the Alliance needs to address the equity issues that stem from its current system

of burden-sharing. When the allies founded NATO in 1949, the nations of Europe

were still digging their way out of the rubble and poverty left by World War II.

26

Under those circumstances, an arrangement in which each country picked up the

costs of its own NATO activities was the best available means of defending Europe

from the Soviet Union, despite the fact that it placed a disproportionate financial

burden on the United States. Fortunately, a lot has changed in the intervening

years and it is now time to revisit the way in which NATO funds its operations.

The current system in which costs ‘‘fall where they lie’’ creates a warped incentive

for inaction. Financially, NATO members can sometimes do better by sitting back

and letting others address threats to their security. NATO needs a more equitable

system with incentives for participation in NATO operations. Specifically, I hope

that future funding mechanisms will encourage countries to commit resources early

when security problems arise. Prevention is usually far less costly in blood and

treasure than crisis management after the fact.

Mr. Chairman, alliances are like any other relationship; you should only expect

out of them what you’re willing to put into them. In the case of NATO, its history

demonstrates that it is worthy of our support. I hope we will be able to work with

our allies to ensure that NATO remains indispensable to global peace and security.

For today, I look forward to General Jones’ testimony on how we can achieve that

goal.

RESPONSES OF GEN JAMES JONES, JR., TO QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR GEORGE

VOINOVICH

Question. I want to thank you for a thought-provoking discussion about how

NATO can promote common security and export stability. Please elaborate on how

NATO can expand its role in security, stability, and reconstruction, capabilities that

NATO established during operation in the Balkans and Afghanistan. Specifically, I

am interested in the concrete steps that NATO would take in order to prevent instability during its root phases rather than reacting to it once a situation has become

critical to common security. One proposal is to do more to train and professionalize

other militaries so that they do a better job to handle instability internally. Are

there specific regions in the world where you believe NATO should be getting involved now and/or where NATO should be working more closely with professional

militaries?

Answer. NATO has, since the end of the cold war, reached out to its neighbors

and built partnerships to improve regional security and to help partners reform

their militaries. Successful programs such as Partnership for Peace, Mediterranean

Dialogue, and most recently Istanbul Cooperation Initiative have helped foster increasingly strong relationships with nations to the east of Europe, around the rim

of the Mediterranean and the Middle East. Through these partnership programs we

are building lines of communication and understanding, and helping train and educate partners’ militaries to operate alongside NATO but also more effectively internally. Officer’s and NCO’s from partner nations train in NATO defense and education establishments, and partner units work alongside NATO units on exercises

and on some operations. Through these activities partners’ soldiers and officers see

NATO militaries working within democratic institutions, respecting the rule of law

and human rights.

A proactive, preventative approach to security and stability is considerably cheaper than a reactive one. NATO has the skills and standing to help train professional

militaries in areas of instability. However, NATO’s expertise lies in training at the

operational and strategic level. Most instability also needs to be addressed at the

tactical level and this is best done on bilateral basis. Therefore any NATO approach

to addressing regional or local instability would need to be done in conjunction with

a bilateral actor or with a lead NATO nation conducting the tactical level training.

NATO has, by its partnership programs and recent operations, demonstrated its ambition to work in those areas of the world where instability has an impact upon the

security of NATO nations. I do not see this level of ambition or area of interest diminishing.

Question. Please elaborate on how NATO is working with PfP nations to prepare

them for possible future integration or cooperation with NATO. How might cooperation with PfP nations, the EU, or the OSCE expand under your vision for NATO’s

future?

Answer. NATO encourages PfP nations to participate in NATO operations once

they have reached NATO-established standards and achieved NATO certification.

The path to operational participation for partners often starts many years before the

first individual joins a mission headquarters or the first partner unit joins a multinational formation. Participation in a partnership program is not a guarantee of

27

operational participation, the partner has to ‘‘add value’’ and be able to operate effectively at the level and in the environment they are required. Partnership usually

begins with exchanges of personnel at training establishments and schools, developing to establishing understanding on procedures and standards through discussion and exercises, and concluding with an ability to operate within a NATO-led operation alongside NATO nations’ units and formations.

NATO’s only Article V operation, Operation Active Endeavour, (an operation to

counter terrorism in the Mediterranean), is proving to be a helpful model to demonstrate the success of this method. Russian ships are currently training with

NATO ships off Italy and will formally join the operation in the summer. Ukraine,

Israel, Morocco, Georgia, Algeria, Croatia, Sweden, and Albania are each at various

practical or discussion stages with regard to this operation which is proving to be

a useful ‘‘entry’’ operation for nations who may not previously have considered working alongside NATO. Partners provide individuals and units to other NATO operations in the Balkans and Afghanistan. However, it is quite possible that successful

partnerships in Operation Active Endeavour will lead to increased participation by

partners in other NATO operations and, in due course, within NATO’s primary

transformation vehicle, the NATO Response Force, once it reaches full operating capability this year.

NATO has a strong military-to-military relationship with the EU currently and

works cooperatively and in a complementary manner in the Balkans and more recently in support of the African Union Mission in Sudan. Deputy SACEUR is the

operational head of EU operations and the lead on NATO operations. The EU’s operational headquarters is based at SHAPE and there are NATO and EU liaison cells

in our respective military planning headquarters. This relationship will, I believe,

strengthen and find a natural, complementary balance.

NATO is currently exploring its relationships with other regional and international actors like the United Nations and African Union. In a similar vein, any

future relationship will most likely be complementary, cooperative, and mutually

beneficial.

Question. What is the likelihood that other members of the Alliance would support

a more proactive role in common security and affirm the commitment at the 2006

NATO Summit? Which countries would be most supportive of this vision? Which

countries would oppose this vision? In the same vein, how do you think other security organizations would react to a pronounced vision of common security at the

2006 NATO Summit? Are there organizations, such as the Shanghai Cooperation

Organization or other groups, that would respond negatively to the concept of NATO

exporting stability and promoting common security? What would you propose the Alliance do to alleviate concerns?

Answer. At the NATO Heads of State Summit in Riga, Latvia, this November, nations have another opportunity to restate NATO’s enduring value toward the new

security environment and to what is certain to be a more expanded character of the

Alliance. We should encourage nations to take on a more proactive and agile approach to our common security.

One of Secretary General de Hoop Scheffer’s key objectives has been to improve

NATO’s working relationships with various international organizations, to include

those that focus on security (such as the European Union). Although NATO does

not have formal relations with organizations such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the Collective Security Treaty Organization, the Alliance

could assist in alleviating any concerns they may have over the transformation of

NATO in a 26+1 format, with partner and other nations who are members of those

international organizations.

Question. I understand that NATO continues to formally review KFOR’s mission

at 6-month intervals. These reviews provide a basis for assessing current force levels, future requirements, force structure, force reductions, and the eventual withdrawal of KFOR. I understand that the transformation is aimed at creating a more

efficient structure for KFOR and eliminating redundant administrative and support

forces while maintaining the force levels of maneuver troops. I am concerned about

the perception of U.S. withdrawal from KFOR while the negotiations on Kosovo’s

future status are at initial stages and instability, continues to pervade the region.

Additionally, I believe U.S. presence symbolizes the priority that our country places

on security in the regions. Do you agree that KFOR is critical to security in Kosovo

and that U.S. presence is important to the mission, practically or symobolically? Do

you believe there is a possibility that instability could reemerge in the region? What

conditions would need to be met before KFOR can withdraw from Kosovo?

28

Answer. Kosovo is at a critical juncture in its history. NATO has helped maintain

security and stability in that region for some time. As an alliance we should stand

together and give no reason for the parties involved in the status talks to believe

our collective will to see through what we started has in any way reduced. NATO

has the will to maintain its presence until stability is restored. However, restoration

of long-term stability is very much a decision of the Balkan States and not simply

an issue of military security. The people of the Balkans will need to recognize the

economic and political benefits a more stable and secure environment brings. NATO

must, therefore, work in partnership with other organizations and, in particular, the

European Union. A definitive timetable for withdrawing KFOR would depend on the

outcome of the status talks, and the steps taken by the international community to

support any agreements that are reached.

Æ