Filed 4/11/22 P. v. Tran CA2/7

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

LAP PHUOC TRAN,

Defendant and Appellant.

 B308320

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. KA079094)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 

Angeles County, Christian R. Gullon, Judge. Affirmed.

Law Offices of Gita B. Kapur & Associates and Geoffrey 

Pogue, for Defendant and Appellant. 

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief 

Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior 

Assistant Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews, Supervising 

Deputy Attorney General, and Michael J. Wise, Deputy Attorney 

General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

_______________________
2

INTRODUCTION

In 2007, Lap Phuoc Tran was facing up to seven years in 

prison, pleaded guilty under a negotiated plea agreement and 

received a prison term of three years. Before his plea, he signed 

an advisement of rights, waiver and plea form. He acknowledged 

that if he was not a citizen of the United States, his plea would 

result in deportation, exclusion from admission or reentry, and 

denial of naturalization or amnesty in the United States. 

Thirteen years later, he moved to vacate his conviction 

under Penal Code sections 1016.5 and 1473.7, subdivision (a)(1), 

arguing that his advisement was inadequate and that had he 

understood he would be deported, he would not have pleaded

guilty.1 The trial court denied his motion.

We affirm. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Tran’s 1995 Conviction, 1995 Application for 

Naturalization and 2019 Motion To Vacate His Conviction

In May 1995, Tran was convicted of selling, transporting or 

offering to sell a controlled substance, in violation of Health and 

Safety Code section 11352, subdivision (a), in an unrelated case.

Before this conviction, Tran had applied to become a 

naturalized United States citizen. In August 1996, the 

Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), now subsumed 

into the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), denied his

application because he was still on probation for his 1995 

conviction. INS informed Tran that the denial was “without 

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
3

prejudice,” and he “appear[ed] to be eligible for naturalization on 

or after 5-2-98, and [he could] file a new application then.” 

In September 2019, Tran filed a motion to vacate his 1995 

conviction under sections 1016.5 and 1473.7. In December 2019,

the trial court granted Tran’s motion under section 1016.5 and 

found the request for relief under section 1473.7 moot. The court 

vacated the conviction and set aside the plea. After the People 

announced they could not proceed, the court granted Tran’s 

motion to dismiss the case under section 1382. 

B. Tran’s 2007 Negotiated Plea Agreement and Conviction

In May 2007, the Los Angeles County District Attorney’s 

Office filed a felony complaint against Tran, alleging two counts:

transportation of a controlled substance in violation of Health 

and Safety Code section 11379, subdivision (a), (count 1) and 

possession of a controlled substance for sale in violation of Health 

and Safety Code section 11378 (count 2). As to both counts, the 

district attorney alleged Tran’s 1995 conviction was a prior 

conviction under Health and Safety Code section 11370.2, 

subdivision (a), which provides for a three-year enhancement. 

Tran faced a maximum prison term of seven years.

Donald Rance Welch, privately retained counsel, 

represented Tran. 

In June 2007, Tran agreed to a negotiated disposition for a 

three-year prison sentence. He signed a standard “Felony 

Advisement of Rights, Waiver, and Plea Form” (plea form). 

Under the negotiated plea agreement, Tran would plead guilty to 

count 1, without admitting any enhancement allegations, in 

exchange for a three-year prison sentence. He initialed the form 

next to the advisement of the immigration consequences of his 

plea that if he was “not a citizen of the United States, [he] must 
4

expect [his] plea of guilty or no contest will result in [his]

deportation, exclusion from admission or reentry to the United 

States, and denial of naturalization and amnesty.” Tran also 

initialed the form next to the acknowledgment that he “had a full 

opportunity to discuss with [his] attorney . . . the consequences of 

[his] plea.” Above his signature on the form, Tran acknowledged 

he had “read and initialed each of the paragraphs above and 

discussed them with [his] attorney. [His] initials mean that [he 

has] read, understand[s] and agree[s] with what is stated in the 

paragraph.” Welch also signed the form stating, “[Welch has] 

reviewed this form with [his] client. [Welch has] explained . . . 

the consequences of the plea.” 

On the same day, the trial court held a plea hearing. The 

court began by asking Tran if he read and understood the plea 

form, to which Tran responded, “Yes.” The court asked Tran if 

after reading the form he had any questions about any of his 

rights or the consequences of his plea. Tran responded, “No.” 

The court accepted Tran’s form. 

Regarding immigration consequences, the district attorney 

asked Tran, “I don’t know if this applies to you or not, but if 

you’re not a citizen of the United States, a conviction for this 

offense will have the consequences of denial of naturalization, 

denial of entry, denial of citizenship, and denial of amnesty. Do 

you understand that?” Tran responded, “Yes, ma’am.” 

The district attorney confirmed Tran was providing a Cruz 

waiver to remain out of custody before sentencing so he could be 

present for the birth of his child.

2 

2 See People v. Cruz (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1247.
5

Tran pleaded guilty to count 1. The court said it “again will 

accept the plea . . . .” 

For his Cruz waiver, Tran agreed to plead guilty to count 2 

and admit the prior conviction allegation, with the understanding

that count and allegation would be dismissed when he returned 

for sentencing. 

Regarding immigration consequences, the court said, “I am 

required to tell you if you’re not a citizen of this country, you’ll be 

denied rights to citizenship, naturalization, or the right of reentry should you leave the country and then thereafter seek to 

return.” The court asked if Tran understood his rights and the 

consequences of his plea, and Tran responded, “Yes, sir.” 

Tran pleaded guilty to count 2 and admitted the prior 

conviction allegation. In August 2007, Tran was sentenced to 

three years in state prison.

C. Tran’s 2009 Notice To Appear and Final Removal Order 

In March 2009, DHS served Tran with a Notice to Appear 

for removal proceedings under section 240 of the Immigration 

and Nationality Act, charging him as removable based on his 

June 2007 conviction. In April 2009, an immigration judge 

ordered Tran’s removal to Vietnam. Since July 2009, Tran has 

been permitted to continue residing in the United States under 

an Order of Supervision.3

3 The Order of Supervision states Tran was being placed 

under supervision because the agency “has not effected your 

deportation or removal during the period prescribed by law . . . .” 

Tran explains in his opening brief that Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement has been unable “to effectuate [his] removal order 
6

D. Tran’s 2020 Motion To Vacate His 2007 Conviction

According to Tran, he first learned of “the actual 

immigration consequences of [his 2007] conviction” in February 

2009 when he was placed in removal proceedings. Tran sought 

legal counsel in February 2018, who informed him of the 

possibility of post-conviction relief under section 1473.7, 

subdivision (a)(1). 

In March 2020, approximately 13 years after his conviction, 

Tran filed a motion to vacate his 2007 conviction under sections 

1016.5 and 1473.7, subdivision (a)(1). Tran argued the trial court 

failed to advise him on the record of the immigration 

consequences of his plea, which damaged his ability to 

meaningfully understand, defend against, or knowingly accept 

the adverse immigration consequences of his guilty plea. 

In support of his motion, Tran submitted a declaration 

describing his understanding of the immigration consequences 

when he entered his guilty plea in 2007. Tran explained he did 

not understand that by pleading guilty, he would be subjected to 

deportation and permanent separation from his family and that 

being “deported to Vietnam due to [his] guilty plea was not 

something [he] had considered.” Tran explained he was 30 years 

old when he entered his plea in 2007, at which time he had been 

living in the United States for 30 years, was a legal permanent 

resident (his original status had been asylee), had two children 

from a prior relationship, was expecting his first child with his 

due to the state of international relations between the United 

States and Vietnam . . . .” Tran was released, pending 

deportation or removal, on certain conditions, including that he

“appear in person at the time and place specified, upon each and 

every request of the Service, . . . for deportation or removal.” 
7

wife and had never been back to Vietnam. Had he known of the 

immigration consequences that would result from his conviction, 

“[i]t would have greatly impacted [his] decisionmaking process.” 

Tran maintained he would not have pleaded guilty and instead 

would have made further inquiries with his attorney, sought an 

alternative plea, or if none were available, he “would have 

preferred to take [his] case to trial.” Tran remembered his 

“attorney telling [him] that the plea offer was good because if 

[Tran] took [his] case to trial then [he] would likely lose and be 

facing a longer prison sentence.” Tran did not remember 

discussing his “immigration status or the specific immigration 

consequences of the charges” with his attorney. Tran said, “[His] 

attorney never informed [him] that [Tran’s] conviction in this 

case would make [him] inadmissible to the United States, would 

prevent [him] from being able to naturalize, and ultimately lead 

to [his] deportation” or that it would exclude him from applying 

for various forms of relief from removal. According to Tran, since 

his conviction in 2007, he had “completely turned [his] life 

around,” had steady employment and provided for his family. 

Deportation would cause his family to “suffer an insurmountable 

amount of emotional and financial hardship.” 

Tran also supported his motion with naturalization 

certificates for his parents and birth certificates for his three 

younger siblings and two children born in the United States, all 

dated before his plea. In addition, he submitted his marriage 

certificate (his wife was born in the United States), a birth 

certificate for his third child born in the United States and letters 

from his wife, children, parents, siblings and employer all dated 

after his plea. 
8

The trial court held a hearing in September 2020. The

court explained its understanding that “as a baseline before [the 

court allows] a withdrawal of a plea,” there has to be an

“imminent” adverse immigration consequence. Given Tran’s

removal order had been in place for 11 years without being 

executed, the court inquired about the existence of an “imminent” 

harm. The court also asked about evidence “at the time of the 

plea that there would have been some other issue that would 

have changed” Tran’s decision to plead guilty. The court

observed that at the time of his arrest Tran “admitted to selling 

the dope [and] [s]aid he was doing it to pay for child support.” 

The court noted the absence of a declaration from Welch, Tran’s 

plea counsel. 

Tran primarily argued that the trial court and the district 

attorney did not substantially comply with the immigration 

advisement requirement of section 1016.5 because they failed to 

include deportation as one of the consequences. Tran also argued 

that combined with the court’s failure to comply with section 

1016.5, the notice to appear and removal order were sufficient to 

establish adverse immigration consequences resulting from 

Tran’s guilty plea. Further, given the removal order, Tran 

“can be picked up and taken back into ICE detention at any 

moment . . . .” 

The People did not file an opposition, but at the hearing,

pointed out that “there was a plea form in there and that [the 

prosecutor] did advise him of the consequences.” 

The trial court orally denied Tran’s motion without 

explaining why. 
9

DISCUSSION

On appeal, Tran argues the trial court erred in denying his 

motion to vacate his conviction under sections 1016.5 and 1473.7, 

subdivision (a)(1).

But we conclude there was no error because Tran failed to 

establish the prejudice required under sections 1016.5 and 

1473.7, subdivision (a)(1).

A. Governing Law and Standard of Review

1. Section 1016.5

Section 1016.5 requires that the trial court advise the 

defendant of possible adverse immigration consequences before 

accepting a guilty or no contest plea. Specifically, “if the 

defendant is not a citizen of this country, conviction of the 

charged offense ‘may have the consequences of deportation, 

exclusion from admission to the United States, or denial of 

naturalization . . . .’” (People v. Arriaga (2014) 58 Cal.4th 950, 

957; see § 1016.5, subd. (a).)

Under section 1016.5, when a court does not advise a 

defendant, who is not a United States citizen, of possible adverse 

immigration consequences before accepting a plea, the defendant 

may have his conviction vacated and withdraw his plea: “‘If . . . 

the court fails to advise the defendant as required by this section 

and the defendant shows that conviction of the offense to which 

[the] defendant pleaded guilty or nolo contendere may have the 

consequences for the defendant of deportation, exclusion from 

admission to the United States, or denial of naturalization . . . the 

court, on [the] defendant’s motion, shall vacate the judgment and 

permit the defendant to withdraw the plea of guilty or nolo 
10

contendere, and enter a plea of not guilty.’” (Arriaga, supra, 58 

Cal.4th at p. 957, quoting § 1016.5, subd. (b).)

A defendant seeking relief under section 1016.5 must 

establish three elements: “(1) that the advisements were not 

given; (2) that the conviction may result in adverse immigration 

consequences; and (3) that the defendant would not have pled 

guilty or no contest had proper advisements been given.” (People 

v. Arriaga, supra, 58 Cal.4th at pp. 957-958.) “The defendant 

bears the burden of demonstrating prejudice.” (People v. 

Arendtsz (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 613, 617.) Specifically, he “must 

prove it was reasonably probable he or she would not have 

entered a guilty, no contest or nolo contendere plea if properly 

advised.” (Ibid.)

We review an order denying a section 1016.5 motion for 

abuse of discretion. (People v. Superior Court (Zamudio) (2000) 

23 Cal.4th 183, 192; People v. Limon (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 

1514, 1517-1518; accord, People v. Arendtsz, supra, 247 

Cal.App.4th at p. 617.) “An exercise of a court’s discretion in an 

arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd manner that results in a 

manifest miscarriage of justice constitutes an abuse of 

discretion.” (Limon, at p. 1518.)

2. Section 1473.7, subdivision (a)(1)

Under section 1473.7, subdivision (a)(1), a defendant may 

vacate a conviction if the defendant establishes a prejudicial 

error that prevented the defendant from understanding, 

defending against, or knowingly accepting the immigration 

consequences of the defendant’s plea: “A person who is no longer 

in criminal custody may file a motion to vacate a conviction or 

sentence [because] [t]he conviction or sentence is legally invalid 

due to prejudicial error damaging the moving party’s ability to 
11

meaningfully understand, defend against, or knowingly accept 

the actual or potential adverse immigration consequences of a 

plea of guilty or nolo contendere.”

A defendant seeking relief under section 1473.7, 

subdivision (a)(1), must make two showings: (1) an error 

“damaging the moving party’s ability to meaningfully 

understand, defend against, or knowingly accept the actual or 

potential adverse immigration consequences” of the plea, and (2) 

prejudice.4 (People v. Vivar (2021) 11 Cal.5th 510, 528 (Vivar).) 

“[S]howing prejudicial error under section 1473.7, subdivision 

(a)(1) means demonstrating a reasonable probability that the 

defendant would have rejected the plea if the defendant had 

correctly understood its actual or potential immigration 

consequences.” (Id. at p. 529.)

A defendant must establish a ground for relief by a 

preponderance of the evidence under section 1473.7. (§ 1473.7, 

subd. (e)(1).) “[W]hen a defendant seeks to withdraw a plea 

based on inadequate advisement of immigration consequences, 

we have long required the defendant corroborate such assertions 

with ‘“objective evidence.”’” (Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 530.)

“[T]he only finding that the court is required to make is 

whether the conviction is legally invalid due to prejudicial error 

damaging the moving party’s ability to meaningfully understand, 

defend against, or knowingly accept the actual or potential 

adverse immigration consequences of a plea of guilty or nolo 

contendere.” (§ 1473.7, subd. (e)(4).)

4 There are other requirements that must be met when 

moving to vacate a conviction under section 1473.7, subdivision 

(a)(1). (§ 1473.7, subds. (b)(2), (e)(1).) But we need not address 

them since they are not challenged.
12

We review the denial of a section 1473.7 motion 

independently. (Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 524-525.) 

“‘[U]nder independent review, an appellate court exercises its 

independent judgment to determine whether the facts satisfy the 

rule of law.’ [Citation.] When courts engage in independent 

review, they should be mindful that ‘“[i]ndependent review is not

the equivalent of de novo review . . . .”’ (Id. at p. 527.) The 

motion is reviewed independently because of “the history of 

section 1473.7, the interests at stake in a section 1473.7 motion, 

the type of evidence on which a section 1473.7 ruling is likely to 

be based, and the relative competence of trial courts and 

appellate courts to assess that evidence.” (Ibid.) 

B. Tran Failed To Establish Prejudicial Error as Required by

Sections 1016.5 and 1473.7, Subdivision (a)(1)

The trial court did not err by denying Tran’s motion to 

vacate his conviction under sections 1016.5 and 1473.7, 

subdivision (a)(1). We need not decide whether the proper 

advisements were given under section 1016.5 or whether there 

was an error damaging his ability to understand the immigration 

consequences of his plea under section 1473.7 because he did not 

establish by a preponderance of the evidence that any error was 

prejudicial.

Tran argues that evidence of his extensive ties to the 

United States at the time of his plea sufficiently corroborated his

claim of prejudice. Tran also argues that, although the record 

contains no evidence of any discussion regarding an immigrationneutral plea, the absence of immigration-related concerns in the 

probation officer’s report supported both his declaration that he 

did not remember any conversation with his attorney about 

immigration consequences and the inference that “immigration 
13

was something that simply went overlooked” during the plea 

proceedings. Finally, Tran argues that his failure to fully 

comprehend the immigration consequences of his plea led to his 

failure to inquire further or try to negotiate an immigrationneutral plea.

The People contend Tran’s extensive ties to the United 

States, standing alone, were insufficient under Vivar to show 

that immigration consequences were his “primary concern”

during plea negotiations. The People argue that Vivar requires 

the court to consider the totality of the circumstances, and in the 

absence of any evidence, including from Tran’s plea counsel, of 

the other Vivar factors, Tran failed to establish prejudice by a 

preponderance of the evidence. The People dispute Tran’s 

characterization that immigration issues “simply went 

overlooked,” pointing to sections of the probation officer’s report 

that stated Tran was born in Vietnam and permanently 

registered in the United States. As to the possibility of an 

immigration-neutral plea, the People note that the evidence 

against Tran was “overwhelming” and that the negotiated plea 

agreement of three years was a “great deal.” 

In Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pages 529 to 530, the

Supreme Court explained: “When courts assess whether a 

petitioner has shown that reasonable probability, they consider 

the totality of the circumstances. [Citation.] Factors particularly 

relevant to this inquiry include the defendant’s ties to the United 

States, the importance the defendant placed on avoiding 

deportation, the defendant’s priorities in seeking a plea bargain, 

and whether the defendant had reason to believe an immigrationneutral negotiated disposition was possible.” (Id. at pp. 529-530.)
14

Considering the totality of the circumstances, as Vivar

requires, Tran’s evidence of ties to the United States at the time 

of the plea, without more, is insufficient to corroborate his claim 

that immigration consequences were his primary concern at the 

time of his plea.

5 Tran offered little or no evidence that any of 

the other “[f]actors particularly relevant to this inquiry”

supported a reasonable probability that he would have rejected 

the negotiated plea deal. (See Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at 

pp. 529-530.) There was no evidence that Tran had reason to 

believe an immigration-neutral resolution was possible. There 

was no evidence that Tran tried to negotiate such a resolution, 

and he does not explain, given the charges against him, what an 

immigration-neutral resolution could have looked like. The 

record also suggests the case against Tran was strong, and Tran’s 

trial counsel thought they would lose at trial. It does not appear

Tran had reason to believe an immigration-neutral disposition 

was possible.

Tran’s argument that he did not raise immigration issues 

during the plea negotiations because he failed to comprehend the 

full nature of the adverse immigration consequences of his plea is 

belied by the record. Tran knew he was not a citizen. The 

admonition in the plea form that Tran initialed and the 

prosecutor’s and the court’s oral admonitions, at a minimum, 

apprised him that there were some adverse immigration 

consequences. His 1995 conviction and the denial of his 

5 The question of what evidence is needed to adequately 

corroborate a defendant’s claim that immigration consequences 

were a paramount concern for purposes of establishing prejudice 

under section 1473.7 is currently before the Supreme Court. (See 

People v. Espinoza review granted Sept. 15, 2021, S269647.) 
15

application for naturalization in 1996 also alerted him, at least 

generally, to the possibility of immigration issues resulting from 

a conviction. 

Tran’s argument that section 1473.7 does not require a 

showing that immigration consequences were a defendant’s 

“primary focus” during plea negotiations conflicts with Vivar’s

instruction to consider the “importance the defendant placed on 

avoiding deportation, [and] the defendant’s priorities in seeking a 

plea bargain.” Tran urges that the absence of evidence showing

he was focused on some other issue means he was focused on 

immigration consequences. But the record reflects that Tran’s 

priority was to minimize his prison sentence. The only 

conversation about the plea deal Tran recalled having with his 

counsel involved his counsel telling him that the deal was good 

because Tran would likely lose at trial and face a longer prison 

sentence.

The cases cited by Tran where relief was granted—Vivar,

supra, 11 Cal.5th 510, People v. Mejia (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 859 

(Mejia), Lee v. United States (2017) 582 U.S. __ [137 S.Ct. 1958, 

198 L.Ed. 2d 476] (Lee), People v. Camacho (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 

998 (Camacho), and People v. Ogunmowo (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 

67 (Ogunmowo)—are distinguishable. In those cases, there was 

objective evidence beyond strong ties to the United States 

demonstrating that immigration consequences were the 

defendant’s priority at the time of the plea and corroborating the 

defendant’s later statements that he would not have pleaded had 

he known of the adverse immigration consequences. (See Vivar, 

supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 517, 530, 531 [“Time and again, the 

record readily conveys how Vivar would have considered his 

immigration status ‘the most important part’ of his decision to 
16

plead”; the evidence included “[t]rial counsel’s recollection and 

contemporaneous notes” that reflected Vivar’s concerns about the 

immigration consequences of his plea; letters Vivar wrote to the 

trial court at or near the time of his plea in which he “objected to 

his immigration hold and emphasized” his deep family ties to the 

United States and said that his counsel failed to advise him that 

his plea would result in his deportation, and, had he been 

properly advised, he would not have pleaded guilty to the charge; 

the testimony of an immigration expert witness who established

Vivar could have entered a plea agreement avoiding mandatory 

deportation]; Camacho, supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1002-1003

[evidence included plea counsel’s testimony that he discussed 

immigration consequences with all his clients and that he told 

Camacho “‘because of his immigration problems, maybe the court 

would entertain a motion to terminate early after maybe a year 

and a half and expungement, so that might help’”]; Lee, supra, 

137 S.Ct. 1958 at pp. 1963, 1960 [in the context of determining

prejudice resulting from a Sixth Amendment violation based on

ineffective assistance of counsel, the evidence included testimony 

from Lee and plea counsel that “‘deportation was the 

determinative issue in Lee’s decision whether to accept the plea’”;

plea counsel further testified that although Lee’s defenses were 

weak, “had he known Lee would be deported upon pleading 

guilty, he would have advised him to go to trial”]; Ogunmowo, 

supra, 23 Cal.App.5th at pp. 69, 73 [evidence included an 

affidavit from plea counsel that he was aware Ogunmowo was a 

Nigerian native who recently received his “‘green card,’” and he 

“‘recall[ed] Mr. Ogunmowo being concerned about what would 

happen to his immigration status if he was convicted in this 

case’”].) In all these cases, except Mejia, the defendants provided
17

evidence from plea counsel and sometimes additional objective 

evidence that the defendants raised the issue of immigration 

consequences with their counsel or the trial court before their 

plea.

6 

In Mejia, supra, 36 Cal.App.5th at page 863, no declaration 

could be obtained because plea counsel was deceased. But in 

addition to the defendant’s deep ties to the United States, there 

was other objective evidence to support a reasonable belief the 

defendant would not have pleaded guilty had he known of the 

adverse immigration consequences. First, the case against the 

defendant had evidentiary weaknesses. (Id. at p. 872.) Second, 

the defendant in Mejia pleaded “straight up” to the court rather 

than under a negotiated disposition, resulting in a probationary 

sentence. (Ibid.) Third, the court in Mejia concluded that, even if 

the defendant lost at trial, it was “simply not realistic to imagine 

that the court would have then imposed the maximum prison 

sentence,” given that he had “no criminal record and this was an 

unsophisticated crime.” (Id. at p. 873.)

This case differs from Mejia in at least two ways. First, 

Tran had the opportunity to negotiate his disposition, and the 

evidence against him was strong. Second, the record is devoid of 

the type of evidence in Mejia and the other cases Tran cites, such 

as evidence from plea counsel, the plea transcript or other 

contemporaneous documents that could corroborate Tran’s claims

that he prioritized immigration consequences and that he would

6 The record is silent as to Tran’s attempt, if any, to contact 

his plea counsel. Although relief under section 1473.7, 

subdivision (a)(1), does not require a declaration from plea 

counsel, such a declaration may be a source of corroborating 

evidence about a defendant’s priorities when he pleaded guilty.
18

not have accepted the plea deal had he understood the 

immigration consequences. 

DISPOSITION

The order denying Tran’s motion to vacate his conviction is 

affirmed.

IBARRA, J.

*

We concur:

SEGAL, Acting P. J.

FEUER, J.

* Judge of the Santa Clara County Superior Court, assigned 

by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the 

California Constitution.