This memorandum opinion was not selected for pub lication in the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Please see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restricti ons on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated errors or other deviations from the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does not include the filing date. IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 1 STATE OF NEW MEXICO, 2 Plaintiff-Appellee, 3 v. No. 32,227 4 RUBEN MARQUEZ, 5 Defendant-Appellant. 6 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF DOÑA ANA COUNTY 7 Fernando R. Macias, District Judge 8 Gary K. King, Attorney General 9 Margaret McLean, Assistant Attorney General 10 Santa Fe, NM 11 for Appellee 12 Bennett J. Baur, Acting Chief Public Defender 13 Will O’Connell, Assistan t Appellate Defender 14 Santa Fe, NM 15 for Appellant 16 MEMORANDUM OPINION 17 SUTIN, Judge. 182 {1} Defendant appeals his convictions for ars on and conspiracy. We issued a notice 1 of proposed summary disposition, proposi ng to affirm. Defe ndant has filed a 2 memorandum in opposition. After due consideration, we remainunpersuaded. We 3 therefore affirm. 4 {2} Defendant has raised two issues, ch allenging both the sufficiency of the 5 evidence to support his convictions and the propriety of the sentence imposed. 6 Because we previously addressed these matters in the notice of proposed summary 7 disposition, we will not re iterate at length here. 8 {3} With respect to the sufficiency of the evidence, as we previously explained, 9 Defendant’s conviction for ar son was supported by evidence that Defendant aided and 10 abetted the commission of arson by drivi ng two other individuals to and from a 11 location where they deliberately started a firewith an intent to damage or destroy a 12 structure and its contents. [MIO 1-2] This supplied an adequate evidentiary basis for 13 a conviction based on accessory liability. See NMSA 1978, § 30-1-13 (1972); State 14 v. Carrasco , 1997-NMSC-047, ¶ 6, 124 N.M. 64, 946 P.2d 1075 (providing that “[a] 15 person who aids or abets in the commissi on of a crime is equally culpable”); see, e.g. , 16 State v. Armijo , 120 N.M. 702, 703, 905 P.2d 740, 741 (Ct. App. 1995) (observing 17 that a getaway driver may properly be pros ecuted and punished as a principal). It is 18 also sufficient to support a conviction for conspiracy. See id. (observing that a 193 getaway driver may properly beheld criminally liable as both an accomplice and a co1 conspirator). 2 {4} In his memorandum in opposition, Defendant continues to argue that his 3 convictions should be reversed in light of the State’s failure to prove that he knew in 4 advance that the other indivi duals intended to commit arson. [MIO 2] However, the 5 requisite knowledge and inte nt could properly be inferred from the circumstantial 6 evidence. See State v. Riley , 82 N.M. 298, 299, 480 P.2d 693, 694 (Ct. App. 1971) 7 (“The question of whether the alleged aider and abettor did share the principal’s 8 criminal intent, and whether he knew the latter acted with criminal intent, is one of 9 fact for the jury and may be inferred fro m circumstances.” (internal quotation marks 10 and citation omitted)); see also State v. Johnston , 98 N.M. 92, 95, 645 P.2d 448, 451 11 (Ct. App. 1982) (observing that conspiracy is rarely susceptible of direct proof and 12 that circumstantial evidence is sufficient tosupport a conspiracy conviction). As we 13 previously observed, the fact that Defendant maintained otherwise does not render the 14 State’s evidence insubstantial. See generally State v. Rojo , 1999-NMSC-001, ¶ 19, 15 126 N.M. 438, 971 P.2d 829 (observing that “the jury is free to reject [a d]efendant’s 16 version of the facts”). 17 {5} With respect to the second issue on app eal, Defendant continues to argue that 18 his sentence is disproportionate to the degree of culpability in th is case and constitutes 194 cruel and unusual punishment. [MIO 5-8] However, as we previously observed, 1 Defendant’s sentence is within the permissibl e statutory range. “It is the Legislature’s 2 province to set penalties for crimes and only in exceptional circumstances will the 3 court invade this province.” State v. Rueda , 1999-NMCA-033, ¶ 16, 126 N.M. 738, 4 975 P.2d 351. The four-year sentence of incar ceration imposed in this case, together 5 with five additional years su spended and a two-year period of supervised parole [RP 6 76], does not in our estimation constitutepunishment so disproportionate to the 7 character of the offenses as to “shock the general conscience or violate principles of 8 fundamental fairness.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). We 9 therefore reject Defendant’s challenge to his sentence. 10 {6} Accordingly, for the reasons stated earlier and in the notice of proposed 11 summary disposition, we affirm. 12 {7} IT IS SO ORDERED. 13

__________________________________ 14 JONATHAN B. SUTIN, Judge 15

WE CONCUR: 16

_________________________________ 17 MICHAEL D. BUSTAMANTE, Judge 185 _________________________________ 1 LINDA M. VANZI, Judge 2