76424 Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 244 / Wednesday, December 20, 2006 / Notices 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Railroad Administration 

[FRA Emergency Order No. 25, Notice 

No. 1] 

Toledo, Peoria and Western Railway; 

Emergency Order To Prevent 

Operation of Trains on Railroad Bridge 

No. 29.11 of the Toledo, Peoria and 

Western Railway 

The Federal Railroad Administration 

(FRA) of the United States Department 

of Transportation (DOT) has determined 

that public safety compels issuance of 

this Emergency Order requiring the 

Toledo, Peoria and Western Railway 

(TPW, a subsidiary of RailAmerica, Inc., 

to discontinue operation of trains or any 

railroad on-track equipment by anyone 

on a railroad bridge it owns spanning 

Prairie Creek (hereinafter designated as 

‘‘Bridge 29.11’’) near the City of 

LaHogue, Illinois. The bridge shall 

remain out of service until it has been 

properly repaired and its capacity 

determined by a registered professional 

engineer licensed to practice in the State 

of Illinois who is technically proficient 

in the field of timber railroad bridge 

engineering. 

Authority 

Authority to enforce Federal railroad 

safety laws has been delegated by the 

Secretary of Transportation to the 

Federal Railroad Administrator. 49 CFR 

1.49. Railroads are subject to FRA’s 

safety jurisdiction under the Federal 

railroad safety laws, 49 U.S.C. 20101, 

20103. FRA is authorized to issue 

emergency orders where an unsafe 

condition or practice ‘‘causes an 

emergency situation involving a hazard 

of death or personal injury.’’ 49 U.S.C. 

20104. These orders may impose such 

‘‘restrictions and prohibitions * * * 

that may be necessary to abate the 

situation.’’ (Ibid.) 

Background 

TPW, a common carrier, is a part of 

the general railroad system of 

transportation. The track segment in 

which the Bridge 29.11 is located 

extends approximately 180 miles from 

Peoria, Illinois to Logansport, Indiana. 

TPW Bridge 29.11 crosses Prairie 

Creek at Mile Post 29.11, one-half mile 

east of LaHogue, Illinois. The bridge is 

approximately 100 feet north of County 

Road 1800N and one-half mile east of 

County Road 200E. Approximate 

geographic coordinates are 40°45′50.5′′ 

North latitude and 88°04′46.4′′ West 

longitude. There is no commercial water 

traffic on Prairie Creek. 

TPW hauls mixed freight, including 

hazardous material, across the bridge. 

Current traffic levels are two trains per 

day, one each way, six days a week. Car 

weights are limited by TPW to 286,000 

pounds. 

Configuration of the Bridge 

The bridge carries a single tangent 

main track. Its total length is 58 feet. It 

incorporates three Spans, numbered east 

to west as spans 1, 2 and 3. For 

reference in this and other documents 

relating to this Emergency Order, the 

bridge components are numbered from 

east to west and north to south, with the 

east end bent or abutment numbered as 

0, and the north stringer in each span 

numbered as 1. 

Superstructure 

Spans 1 and 3 are timber pile trestletype of approximately 13 feet in length. 

Span 2, approximately 30 feet in length, 

is of the deck plate girder design, with 

two built-up girders placed under this 

track. 

Spans 1 and 3 each have eight timber 

stringers, 8 inches wide by 16 inches 

deep by 14 feet long. Four stringers are 

bolted together into each of two chords 

which are essentially centered under 

each rail. Span 2 is a 30 foot steel deck 

plate girder-type span two girders 

supporting the track. 

Substructure 

End bents 0 and 3 consist of five 

driven timber piles with a timber cap. 

Intermediate bents 1 and 2, which also 

support the steel girders of span 2, each 

have two rows of six driven timber 

piles. Each row of piles in bents 1 and 

2 has a timber cap and one row of 

timber cross blocking above the caps. 

Above the cross blocking under the deck 

plate girder span are two transverse 

timbers laid side by side. Above the 

cross blocking under the timber spans 

there are three transverse timbers 

stacked on top of each other. 

Track 

Track ties rest directly on top of the 

stringers, and support in turn tie plates 

and the two continuously welded 

running rails, 112 pounds per yard. 

There are no rail joints on the bridge. A 

metal strap is attached to the top of the 

outside edge of the ties to maintain 

spacing. 

FRA Activity Related to the Bridge 

On August 8, 2006, two FRA Bridge 

Safety Specialists, on FRA Chief 

Inspector and a TPW Track Foreman 

observed the bridge. The serious bridge 

conditions and a track defect (warp) on 

the bridge were noted and discussed 

with the TPW Track Foreman. FRA 

determined that the warp condition on 

the bridge was caused by deteriorated 

and crushing stringers. On August 11, 

2006, an FRA Bridge Safety Specialist 

discussed the condition of this bridge 

with TPW’s Roadmaster. A conference 

call was held on August 31, 2006, with 

FRA, TPW, and RailAmerica officials 

specifically to discuss bridge conditions 

on the TPW and TPW’s bridge 

management program. During this call, 

the condition of this bridge was 

discussed. TPW and RailAmerica 

officials agreed to immediately repair 

this and other bridges. On October 31, 

2006, an FRA Bridge Safety Survey 

Report of the TPW was sent to TPW and 

RailAmerica officials. The condition of 

this bridge was shown on page 4 of that 

report. 

An FRA Bridge Safety Specialist 

conducted an observation of the bridge 

on December 13, 2006, after notifying 

TPW several days in advance of his 

plans. TPW elected not to accompany 

the FRA specialist during that 

observation, which was conducted from 

below the bridge. The FRA observation 

of the bridge on December 13, 2006, 

revealed no evidence of repairs to the 

bridge or the track since the initial 

bridge observation on August 8, 2006. 

The condition of the bridge on 

December 13, 2006, enumerated below, 

is the basis for FRA to issue this 

Emergency Order. 

Condition of the Bridge 

The FRA observation of Bridge 29.11 

on December 13, 2006, revealed the 

following conditions: 

Span 1: 

Stringer 1—West end is hollow, 

decayed and crushing with 

horizontal cracking. 

Stringer 2—West end is hollow and 

decayed. 

Stringer 3—West end is decayed. 

Stringer 4—Horizontal shear crack 

entire length. West end is hollow, 

decayed and crushing. 

Stringer 5—Horizontal shear crack 

entire length. West and is hollow, 

decayed and crushing. 

Stringer 6—West end is hollow and 

decayed. 

Stringer 7—West end is hollow and 

decayed. 

Stringer 8—Stringer has failed. 

Span 3: 

Stringer 1—West end is crushing 

severely with multiple horizontal 

cracks. East end hollow. 

Stringer 2—East end hollow 

Stringer 3—West end of the stringer 

appears to be crushing. East end 

hollow. 

Stringer 4—Horizontal shear crack 


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Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 244 / Wednesday, December 20, 2006 / Notices 76425 

entire length. West end is crushing. 

East end hollow. 

Stringer 5—West end hollow with 

numerous horizontal cracks. East 

end hollow. 

Stringer 6—East end hollow. 

Stringer 7—East end hollow. 

Stringer 8—West end hollow, decayed 

and crushing with horizontal 

cracks. 

In span 1, a vertical gap of 

approximately .75 inches exists between 

the south rail and the tie plates, and a 

vertical gap of 1.25 inches exists 

between the track ties and stringer 8 at 

the southwest corner of the span. 

Span 1 was observed while a 

westbound mixed freight train crossed 

the bridge at approximately 10 miles per 

hour. Vertical deflection of stringer 8 

was measured at mid-span by attaching 

a tape measure to the stringer and 

referencing the movement against a 

fixed object near the ground. Several 

loaded cars each caused a deflection of 

approximately 1.25 inches. A deflection 

measurement was not taken while the 

locomotive was on the span. Significant 

vertical deflection was also observed but 

not measured in span 3. 

Many of the cross blocks in bents 1 

and 2 have various degrees of decay and 

voids. The timber under the west end of 

the stringers in span 1 has split 

lengthwise with approximately onequarter of the timber broken off. 

Evaluation of Bride Conditions 

Using the live load deflection 

measurements in span 1 and by 

observing deterioration, crushing, and 

distress of the stringers in spans 1 and 

3, FRA has determined that TPW’s 

Bridge 29.11 is in imminent danger of 

catastrophic failure under a train at any 

time. 

Failure of the bridge under load could 

have very serious consequences. The 

bridge failure could cause the train to 

fall into the creek below, seriously 

injuring any railroad employees on the 

train and any other persons in the 

vicinity of Prairie Creek. A derailment 

could block the creek resulting in 

widespread flooding in the immediate 

area. Locomotive diesel fuel or 

hazardous materials in the train could 

cause severe environmental damage to 

Prairie Creek and the Iroquois River into 

which it eventually flows. 

Finding and Order 

FRA has concluded that any future 

railroad use of Bridge 29.11 on the 

Toledo, Peoria and Western Railway 

poses an imminent and unacceptable 

threat to public and employee safety. 

The past failure of the Toledo, Peoria 

and Western Railway to voluntarily 

remove the bridge from service and 

perform proper repairs persuades FRA 

that the agency cannot rely upon the 

cooperation of the railroad to protect 

public safety in relation to the Bridge 

29.11. I find that these unsafe 

conditions create an emergency 

situation involving a hazard of death or 

injury to persons. 

Accordingly, pursuant to the 

authority of 49 U.S.C. 20104 delegated 

to me by the Secretary of Transportation 

(49 CFR 1.49), it is ordered that the 

Toledo, Peoria and Western Railway 

Company shall discontinue, and shall 

not permit, the operation of trains or 

any railroad on-track equipment over its 

Bridge 29.11 while this emergency 

Order remains in effect. 

Relief 

The Toledo, Peoria and Western 

Railway may obtain relief from this 

Emergency Order by providing the 

Federal Railroad Administrator with a 

report of inspection and evaluation of 

repairs, indicating to FRA’s satisfaction 

that Bridge 29.11 has been acceptably 

repaired. The report shall be prepared 

and sealed by a registered professional 

engineer who is licensed to practice in 

the State of Illinois and is technically 

proficient in the field of timber railroad 

bridge engineering. The report shall 

state that the capacity of the entire 

bridge to carry safely railroad cars and 

locomotives has been restored. The 

configuration and weights of the loads 

for which the determination has been 

made shall be stated in the report, 

together with all calculations upon 

which that determination is based. The 

engineer’s evaluation shall include a 

calculation of the capacity of every loadbearing member of each span in Bridge 

29.11. The original of the engineer’s 

report, bearing the embossed imprint of 

the seal of the engineer, shall be 

provided to the Regional Administrator 

of FRA’s Region 4 before the report will 

be considered by FRA. Upon FRA’s 

approval of the engineer’s assessment of 

the bridge restoration, and following an 

inspection by FRA in which the agency 

finds the bridge properly repaired to 

safe condition, the Administrator will 

rescind this Emergency Order. 

Penalties 

Any violation of this order shall 

subject the person committing the 

violation to a civil penalty of up to 

$27,000, 49 U.S.C. 21301, 28 U.S.C. 

2461, and see 69 FR 30591. FRA may, 

through the Attorney General, also seek 

injunctive relief to enforce this order. 49 

U.S.C. 20112. 

Effective Date and Notice to Affected 

Persons 

The Emergency Order shall take effect 

at 12:01 a.m. (CST) on December 15, 

2006, and apply to all operations of 

trains or railroad on-track equipment on 

Bridge 29.11 on or after that time. 

Notice of this Emergency Order will be 

provided by publishing it in the Federal 

Register. Copies of this Emergency 

Order will be sent by mail or facsimile 

prior to publication to Mr. Buford 

Hunter, General Manager, Toledo, 

Peoria and Western Railway, 1990 East 

Washington Street, East Peoria, Illinois, 

61611; Mr. Joe Spirk, Chief EngineerCentral Business Unit of Rail America; 

and Mr. Scott Linn, Senior Vice 

President-Asset Management of 

RailAmerica, 5300 Broken Arrow 

Sound, NW., Boca Raton, Florida 33487; 

the Association of American Railroads; 

and the American Short Line and 

Regional Railroad Association. 

Review 

Opportunity for formal review of this 

Emergency Order will be provided in 

accordance with 49 U.S.C. 20104(b) and 

section 554 of Title 5 of the United 

States Code. Administrative procedures 

governing such review are found at 49 

CFR part 211. See 49 CFR 211.47, 

211.71, 211.73, 211.75, and 211.77. 

Issued in Washington, DC, on December 

14, 2006. 

Joseph H. Boardman, 

Administrator. 

[FR Doc. 06–9788 Filed 12–15–06; 2:56 pm] 

BILLING CODE 4910–06–M 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Railroad Administration 

Petition for Waiver of Compliance: 

Date and Location of Public Hearings 

By public notice published on 

December 8, 2006 (71 FR 71237), The 

Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) 

announced the receipt of a petition from 

BNSF Railway and Norfolk Southern 

Railway, two Class I Railroads, for a 

waiver of compliance from certain 

provisions of Title 49 Code of Federal 

Regulations (CFR) Part 232 Brake 

System Safety Standards for Freight and 

Other Non-Passenger Trains and 

Equipment, to begin implementation of 

Electronically Controlled Pneumatic 

(ECP) brake technology. In the notice, 

FRA stated that the facts appear to 

warrant a public hearing. (The petition 

is identified as Docket FRA–2006–

26435.) 

A public hearing is hereby set for 1 

p.m.–6 p.m. on Tuesday, January 16, 


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