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65–479 PDF 2011

ASSURING THE FREEDOM OF AMERICANS 

ON THE HIGH SEAS: THE UNITED STATES 

RESPONSE TO PIRACY 

(112–17) 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

COAST GUARD AND MARITIME TRANSPORTATION 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON 

TRANSPORTATION AND 

INFRASTRUCTURE 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

MARCH 15, 2011 

Printed for the use of the 

Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure 

( 

Available online at: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/browse/ 

committee.action?chamber=house&committee=transportation 

COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE 

JOHN L. MICA, Florida, Chairman 

DON YOUNG, Alaska 

THOMAS E. PETRI, Wisconsin 

HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina 

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

GARY G. MILLER, California 

TIMOTHY V. JOHNSON, Illinois 

SAM GRAVES, Missouri 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia 

JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio 

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

TOM REED, New York 

ANDY HARRIS, Maryland 

ERIC A. ‘‘RICK’’ CRAWFORD, Arkansas 

JAIME HERRERA BEUTLER, Washington 

FRANK C. GUINTA, New Hampshire 

RANDY HULTGREN, Illinois 

LOU BARLETTA, Pennsylvania 

CHIP CRAVAACK, Minnesota 

BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas 

LARRY BUCSHON, Indiana 

BILLY LONG, Missouri 

BOB GIBBS, Ohio 

PATRICK MEEHAN, Pennsylvania 

RICHARD L. HANNA, New York 

STEPHEN LEE FINCHER, Tennessee 

JEFFREY M. LANDRY, Louisiana 

STEVE SOUTHERLAND II, Florida 

JEFF DENHAM, California 

JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma 

NICK J. RAHALL II, West Virginia 

PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon 

JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

JERROLD NADLER, New York 

CORRINE BROWN, Florida 

BOB FILNER, California 

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas 

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland 

LEONARD L. BOSWELL, Iowa 

TIM HOLDEN, Pennsylvania 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts 

TIMOTHY H. BISHOP, New York 

MICHAEL H. MICHAUD, Maine 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California 

DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois 

MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii 

JASON ALTMIRE, Pennsylvania 

TIMOTHY J. WALZ, Minnesota 

HEATH SHULER, North Carolina 

STEVE COHEN, Tennessee 

LAURA RICHARDSON, California 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland 

(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON COAST GUARD AND MARITIME TRANSPORTATION

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey, Chairman 

DON YOUNG, Alaska 

HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina 

ANDY HARRIS, Maryland 

FRANK C. GUINTA, New Hampshire 

CHIP CRAVAACK, Minnesota 

BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas 

JEFFREY M. LANDRY, Louisiana, 

Vice Chair 

JOHN L. MICA, Florida (Ex Officio) 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland 

CORRINE BROWN, Florida 

TIMOTHY H. BISHOP, New York 

MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii 

MICHAEL H. MICHAUD, Maine 

NICK J. RAHALL II, West Virginia 

(Ex Officio) 

(III) 

(V) 

CONTENTS Page 

Summary of Subject Matter .................................................................................... vi 

TESTIMONY 

Amend, Kurt, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Political 

and Military Affairs, U.S. Department of State ................................................ 5 

Caldwell, Stephen L., Director, Maritime Security and Coast Guard Issues, 

U.S. Government Accountability Office, accompanied by Pendleton, John 

H., Director, Defense Capabilities and Management, U.S. Government Accountability Office 1 .............................................................................................. 5 

Cook, Admiral Kevin S., Director of Prevention Policy for Marine Safety, 

Security, and Stewardship, U.S. Coast Guard ................................................... 5 

Wechsler, William F., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Counternarcotics and Global Threats, U.S. Department of Defense ............................. 5 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

LoBiondo, Hon. Frank A., of New Jersey .............................................................. 24 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY WITNESSES 

Amend, Kurt ............................................................................................................ 26 

Caldwell, Stephen L., and Pendleton, John H. ..................................................... 49 

Cook, Admiral Kevin S. ........................................................................................... 74 

Wechsler, William F. ............................................................................................... 79 

SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD 

Amend, Kurt, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Political 

and Military Affairs, U.S. Department of State, responses to questions 

from Hon. Rick Larsen, a Representative in Congress from the State of 

Washington ........................................................................................................... 35 

1Mr. Pendleton did not provide verbal testimony during the hearing. 

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(1) 

ASSURING THE FREEDOM OF 

AMERICANS ON THE HIGH SEAS: 

THE UNITED STATES RESPONSE TO PIRACY 

TUESDAY, MARCH 15, 2011 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON COAST GUARD AND

MARITIME TRANSPORTATION, 

COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:00 a.m. in room 

2167, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Frank A. LoBiondo, 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. The committee will come to order. The subcommittee is meeting this morning to review efforts by the United 

States and the international community to respond to piracy on the 

high seas, and hopefully help prevent future attacks. 

Since the subcommittee’s last hearing on this topic, Somali pirates have vastly expanded the range of their attacks on merchant 

vessels to encompass much of the western Indian Ocean. But even 

more alarming, the pirates have dramatically increased the number and viciousness of their attacks. This includes the recent hijacking of the U.S. sailing vessel, Quest, which ended in the ruthless murder of four United States citizens. 

I believe I speak for all of us who are on this subcommittee when 

I express my sincerest and deepest condolences to the families of 

the victims, and my outrage at this brutal violence against American citizens. As I said at our last hearing, piracy cannot be tolerated by the United States. I really think we need to re-emphasize 

that. We just cannot tolerate it. And the international community. 

This hearing provides us with a chance to examine ways to respond to that ongoing threat. Piracy has become a multimillion-dollar industry, as a result of ransoms that continue to be paid out 

by vessel ownership groups. I do not think we are tracking ransom 

payments to the extent that we should be. 

As a result, I am extremely concerned piracy could be benefitting 

the terrorist groups operating in Somalia, and that these groups 

could use their profits to carry out terrorist acts here, at home, and 

abroad. At the same time, I am worried the Federal Government 

may hold vessel owners criminally liable for ransoms they pay to 

free captive mariners. 

Many in the maritime community are looking at ways to enhance 

security of merchant vessels, including the placement of armed security personnel aboard ships. A vessel’s crew has every right 

2 

under U.S. and international law to defend themselves and their 

vessel. However, I do have some concerns about the guidance going 

out to these mariners, and hope to hear more about how we keep 

them informed of the latest avoidance and response measures. 

The United States has place Navy and Coast Guard assets in the 

region, and has partnered with other nations to protect vessels in 

the area. I applaud the services for taking action, but I am concerned about the effectiveness of these efforts. We know that several of the pirates captured by the naval forces of other countries 

are not being prosecuted. Instead, they are only returned to shore, 

where they are free to resume their illegal activity. I am interested 

in learning more about the procedures by which suspects are being 

prosecuted. 

Piracy is recognized internationally as a crime against all nations, and to which all nations must respond. It is incumbent on 

us to examine ways to minimize, if not end, this threat and its impact on both world commerce and our own national economy. 

I want to thank the witnesses for appearing here today, I look 

forward to their testimony. With that, I would like to yield to Mr. 

Larsen for any remarks he would like to make. 

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for calling today’s hearing. 

Piracy, particularly off the Somalia coast, is a disruptive threat 

to world shipping. 

Tragically, just last month, piracy also became deadly for Jean 

and Scott Adam of Marina del Rey, California, and their friends, 

Phyllis Macay and Bob Riggle of Seattle, Washington. I, too, extend 

my sympathies to the families. 

These four individuals posed a threat to no one. They were not 

mariners involved in international trade. The Adams were living a 

lifelong dream. Ms. Macay and Mr. Riggle were friends joining in 

the adventure. While the circumstances of their deaths are still 

being investigated, we do know that they were killed by their Somali captors while their release was being negotiated. But for these 

pirates, these four U.S. citizens would be alive and well today. 

It is clear that today’s pirate is no Jack Sparrow. Although piracy has been a threat to seafaring nations for thousands of years, 

the emergence of aggressive and persistent attacks off the Horn of 

Africa is especially concerning. 

The killing of these four hostages aboard the Quest certainly increased the attention of the international community on piracy, 

and the international community has increased its focus on piracy. 

The stats are startling. The New York Times reported in late 

February that more than 50 vessels were currently captive, ranging 

from Thai fishing trawlers to European tankers, super-tankers, 

with more than 800 hostages. These hostages represent mariners 

and sea-farers that are only doing their jobs. Once captured, these 

hostages can be held in deplorable conditions for months before release. 

It is time for the international community to stop this injustice. 

The Gulf of Aden and the adjoining Indian Ocean constitute a critical shipping corridor. GAO’s September report, about which we 

will hear more a little bit later, their report on piracy states that 

over 33,000 ships pass through the Gulf of Aden annually. This inVerDate Aug 31 2005 13:42 Sep 16, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00020 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\HEARINGS\112\CG\3-15-1~1\65479.TXT JEAN
3 

cludes tanker ships moving 10 to 15 percent of world petroleum 

shipments. For vessels headed west, the alternative route is around 

the tip of Africa, and adds 4,900 nautical miles to the transit. 

The rise of piracy in the region puts mariners in danger, and 

poses an economic burden on ocean carriers and shipping companies. In fact, according to a Chatham House report, insurance premiums in the London insurance market for traveling through the 

Gulf rose tenfold in 2008. 

Several factors have contributed to the frequency of these attacks: a large number of high-value targets passing through the 

Gulf; global proliferation of the small arms trade; and, most significantly, persistent civil violence, lawlessness, and economic dislocation in Somalia. Somalia does not have a functioning government. 

And with pirates having virtually an unlimited ability to operate 

from Somalia, piracy cannot be eliminated solely from the sea. So 

I am particularly interested to hear what the State Department 

witness will say on this subject. 

Last week, Bloomberg reported that China and Russia will be 

leading a new effort at the U.N. to curb the threat of piracy off the 

coast of Somalia, and defeat Al Qaeda-linked terrorists fighting to 

seize control of that nation. According to this report, Russia had 

circulated a draft resolution that would commit the U.N. Security 

Council to ‘‘urgently begin talks on the creation of three courts for 

piracy cases.’’ I would be interested to hear what the progress of 

this, and the likelihood of this resolution is. 

The international community has stepped up efforts to combat 

piracy. CTF 151, a multinational effort led by the U.S., the European Union operation, Atalanta, the NATO operation, which the 

U.S. also supports, and independent deployers are patrolling the 

area and providing greater protection to ships traveling through 

the Gulf. I would be interested to hear what our Department of Defense witness has to say about giving us an update on these efforts. 

And the International Maritime Bureau’s piracy reporting center 

and MARAD have helped inform the maritime community about piracy and how to implement best practices for ships to evade and 

defend themselves from pirate attacks, and I look forward to the 

Coast Guard’s comments on this effort. 

GAO’s report from last September discusses several challenges, 

and I think describes a mixed bag of success. Prosecution of alleged 

pirates remains logistically difficult, although I note that on February 16th the pirate associated with the attack on the Maersk 

Alabama was sentenced to 33 years by a New York district judge. 

The pirates have greatly expanded their areas of attack to an 

area as large as the lower 48 States. There have been a steady increase in the number of attacks and the rate of success has declined. But the number of hostages being held is increasing, and 

the ransoms being paid are increasing. 

These issues raise important questions for our panel. Are the efforts of the U.S. and the international community succeeding, or 

are they failing? Are the rules of engagement changing, and do we 

need to change with it? In light of the recent killings, is transit in 

this area becoming more or less dangerous? 

When it come to piracy in the 21st century, there is no X that 

marks the spot to point us in the right direction. But there are sevVerDate Aug 31 2005 13:42 Sep 16, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00021 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\HEARINGS\112\CG\3-15-1~1\65479.TXT JEAN
4 

eral ways that U.S. policymakers can help combat piracy: encourage the international commercial maritime industry to adopt best 

practices; continue advances in the use of defensive technologies on 

ships; help coastal States in pirate-prone areas boost their coastal 

monitoring and interdiction capabilities; and provide resources to 

the Coast Guard and MARAD, so they can continue to advise the 

industry on how to strengthen its own security. 

With that, Mr. Chairman, I thank you again for holding this 

hearing, and I look forward to our witnesses. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Thank you, Mr. Larsen. Mr. Landry, do you have 

a statement? 

Mr. LANDRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be brief. I thank 

you for calling this hearing, and our witnesses, for giving their 

time to testify. 

Article 1, section 8 of our Constitution clearly gives Congress the 

ability to define and punish piracy and felonies committed on the 

high seas, and offenses against the law of nations. And while piracy was a great concern to our founding fathers, many had 

thought this had been a bypass in history. 

However, we have not—seen a resurgence of piracies in ways not 

seen since the 19th century. Last year, piracy caused between $7 

billion to $12 billion in damage to our world’s economy. Shipping 

in the Suez Canal is down 10 percent, due to piracy concerns, an 

amount equal to the downturn in the canal’s usage caused by the 

downturn in the world’s economy. 

It appears this trend will continue in 2011. Already this year 

there have been 87 pirate attacks worldwide, including 61 off the 

Horn of Africa, and Somalia pirates now hold 33 vessels and 711 

hostages. As someone whose district is directly dependant upon 

international shipping, I am very concerned about this trend. Any 

reduction in international shipping commerce will ultimately impact the 28,000 men and women who work in my maritime district. 

As such, I look forward to your testimony, and working with you 

all to address these issues. Thank you. I yield back the balance of 

my time. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Thank you, Mr. Landry. Now we will move on to 

our witnesses today. Our witnesses include: Admiral Kevin Cook, 

director of prevention policy; Mr. William Wechsler, deputy assistant secretary of defense for counternarcotics and global threats; 

Mr. Kurt Amend, principal deputy assistant secretary of state for 

political and military affairs; and Mr. Stephen Caldwell, director of 

maritime safety and Coast Guard issues for GAO. I would like to 

welcome you all for being here today, and, Admiral Cook, I look forward to your testimony. 

5 

TESTIMONY OF KEVIN S. COOK, DIRECTOR OF PREVENTION 

POLICY FOR MARINE SAFETY, SECURITY, AND STEWARDSHIP, U.S. COAST GUARD; WILLIAM F. WECHSLER, DEPUTY 

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR COUNTERNARCOTICS AND GLOBAL THREATS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 

DEFENSE; KURT AMEND, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT 

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR POLITICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE; AND STEPHEN L. 

CALDWELL, DIRECTOR, MARITIME SECURITY AND COAST 

GUARD ISSUES, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 

Admiral COOK. Well, good morning, Mr. Chairman, Ranking 

Member Larsen, and distinguished members of the subcommittee. 

With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I would like to have my written testimony entered into the record. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Yes, without objection. 

Admiral COOK. Thank you. I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you and discuss maritime piracy and the Coast Guard’s 

role in addressing the threat to freedom of the seas, to the safety 

of shipping, and, most importantly, to the safety of mariners. 

We were all saddened by the death at the hands of pirates of 

four U.S. citizens on board the sailing vessel Quest. This underscores the importance for all mariners, recreational and commercial, to understand the risks associated with operating in areas 

where piracy is prevalent. 

The Coast Guard continues to be a leader in coordination with 

U.S. interagency and industry partners, with the International 

Maritime Organization, or IMO, and through the international contact group on piracy off the coast of Somalia, working to strengthen 

preventative measures from merchant ships, and to develop international regimes for prosecution of apprehended pirates. 

Although many nations have provided naval forces to the region 

to counter the piracy threat, it remains critical for individual vessels to take appropriate measures to reduce the vulnerability to attacks. The responsibility for combating maritime piracy is a shared 

one. Responsibility is shared among vessel owners and operators, 

governments, and the international community. 

Beyond coordination, the Coast Guard shares responsibility 

through our law enforcement detachment boarding teams, which 

operate at the request, and in support of, the U.S. central command’s mission to deter, disrupt, and suppress piracy. 

Helping to share the responsibility with the industry, the Coast 

Guard continues to update its requirements for U.S. flag commercial ships to modify their security plans, plans which are required 

by the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002. Vessel owners and operators are required to conduct a risk assessment for 

each vessel prior to entering high-risk waters, including the identification of counterpiracy measures. Plans must be submitted to the 

Coast Guard for approval under the commandant’s authority in his 

maritime security directive, MARSEC 104.6. 

The ships most vulnerable to piracy, those with low freeboard 

and/or slow, include provisions for armed private security teams, 

among other measures. Beyond U.S. flag direction, the Coast 

Guard has a unique role to play internationally. 

6 

The Coast Guard is co-chair, with the Maritime Administration, 

of working group three, dedicated to shipping self-awareness under 

the contact group on piracy off the coast of Somalia. The contact 

group was created on January 14, 2009, pursuant to the U.N. Security Council resolution 1851. This international forum brings together countries, organizations, and industry groups to coordinate 

political, military, and other efforts to bring an end to piracy, and 

to ensure that pirates are brought to justice. Nearly 600 countries 

and multiple international organizations participate in the contact 

group. 

Through working group three, the Coast Guard has facilitated 

the shipping industry’s development of preventative measures to 

reduce vulnerability to attack, known as industry best management practices for vessels operating off the Horn of Africa region. 

And just recently, on February 28, 2011, the working group convened and chartered an effort to develop formal guidelines for 

armed security teams for adoption by other flag state administrations. The international shipping community is changing their position on armed security teams, and we welcome that change. 

Also internationally, by delegation from the State Department, 

the Coast Guard provides head of the United States delegation for 

international maritime organization meetings and activities. The 

IMO has passed resolutions establishing a framework for international cooperation, updated counterpiracy guidance, and promoted judicial mechanisms, so that pirates, once caught, face 

meaningful and just punishment under the rule of law. ‘‘Piracy: Orchestrating the Response,’’ will be the theme for IMO’s focus this 

year. 

In closing, Mr. Chairman, I want to assure you that the Coast 

Guard is committed to fulfilling its statutory and regulatory responsibilities for the safety and security of U.S. merchant vessels 

and crews. We will remain engaged with the industry in implementation of counterpiracy measures identified in our MARSEC directive, as well as within the international maritime community, 

through our role at IMO and the contact group. 

The Coast Guard’s oversight of the U.S. flag fleet is the international gold standard, and we will continue to make improvements wherever possible. We will also continue to use formal-notice-to-mariner warnings and all other communication channels to 

ensure recreational boaters are aware of piracy risks. 

Thank you for the opportunity to be here today, and I look forward to your questions. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Thank you, Admiral Cook. 

Mr. Wechsler? 

Mr. WECHSLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Representative 

Larsen, and other distinguished members of the subcommittee. I 

appreciate this opportunity to testify about the growing problem of 

piracy on the high seas. I have submitted a written statement for 

the record. I will briefly summarize that this morning. 

I would like to begin, as you all did, by expressing my sincere 

condolences to the friends and families of the four victims of the 

recent pirating of the sailing vessel, Quest: Jean and Scott Adam, 

Phyllis Macay, and Robert Riggle. Congressman Larsen, I understand that Ms. Macay and Mr. Riggle were from your State of 

7 

Washington, as you noted. This tragedy stands as a stark reminder 

of what is at stake, as we continue to grapple with this complex 

challenge. 

Mr. Chairman, as you stated, we cannot just tolerate piracy. We 

also, as you stated, believe that freedom of navigation is critical to 

our national security and international commerce, and is a core 

principle of the law of the sea. Piracy endangers innocent mariners, 

disrupts commerce, causes economic damage, and perpetuates instability ashore. 

Disrupting piracy will continue to be a challenge for several reasons. First and foremost, the root causes of Somali piracy lie in the 

poverty and instability in that troubled country. Somalia simply 

lacks the criminal justice institutions necessary to deter piracy. 

Since January 2010, Somali pirates received as much as $85 million in the form of ransom payments. In a country where the per 

capital GDP is about $600, the prospect of these large ransoms has 

led to the development of a complex network of pirate facilitators 

and financiers. In the long run, the international community’s ability to confront the Somalia-based piracy problem will be directly 

linked to Somalia’s ability to provide effective governance. 

Secondly, the geographic area affected is vast. Today, Somali pirates operate in an area covering approximately 2.5 million square 

nautical miles. Actually, larger than that in recent days. That is 

comparable, as a map that we provided, to the size of the continental United States, a vast area. The sheer size of this area 

makes it difficult for naval assets to reach the scene of a pirate attack quickly enough to make a difference. To adequately patrol 

such an area would require more ships than are currently in the 

inventory of all of the world’s navies. 

Further complicating this challenge is the fact that these pirate 

vessels easily blend in with ordinary, legitimate shipping when 

they are not engaged in acts of piracy. 

Third, even when pirates are captured, as was noted previously, 

they are often not prosecuted and held accountable. Although piracy is a crime of universal jurisdiction, many States lack the appropriate domestic laws to prosecute pirates. Other States may 

have appropriate domestic legal frameworks, but lack the prosecutorial and judicial capacity to hold pirates accountable. And worse 

yet, other States simply lack the political will to take action. 

Finally, as the members of this subcommittee know, the Department of Defense has many other urgent priorities around the globe. 

In the Horn of Africa our existing and planned counterterrorism activities remain vital to confronting terrorism in the region. Many 

of the resources most in demand for counterpiracy activities, such 

as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets, are the 

same assets that are urgently required elsewhere. 

These multidimensional challenges illustrate that there will be 

no simple solution to this problem. However, it is worth noting 

that, of the more than 33,000 vessels that transit the Gulf of Aden 

each year, less than one-half of 1 percent of these are attacked. 

And, fortunately, these attacks have succeeded only about a third 

of the time. 

In support of the National Security Council’s action plan, DoD’s 

primary role is to interrupt and terminate acts of piracy. We play 

8 

a supporting role in preventing pirate attacks by reducing the vulnerability of the maritime domain, and facilitating the prosecution 

of suspected pirates. 

The United States is most actively engaged in counterpiracy operations through combined task force 151, a component of combined 

maritime forces, and one of 3 international counterpiracy coalitions 

made up of navies of more than 30 nations—as was noted, NATO’s 

operations, Ocean Shield, and the European Union’s operation, 

Atalanta. Combined maritime forces also regularly host international coordination meetings in Bahrain to share information 

and deconflict counterpiracy efforts in the region. 

The Department of Defense is also working with the international contact group for piracy off the coast of Somalia on numerous initiatives related to industry, operations, public diplomacy, 

and legal issues. We are supporting the Departments of State and 

Treasury in efforts to make piracy less lucrative by going after the 

funding. 

We will continue to work with regional States to develop their capacity to patrol the seas and hold pirates accountable. We will also 

work, when possible, with local authorities in Somalia to address 

the on-shore components of piracy. Many of these efforts complement our development and counterterrorism goals in the region. 

While much remains to be done, we are seeing concrete results 

of these efforts. Since August 2008, international efforts have led 

to the destruction or confiscation of more than 100 pirate vessels, 

and the confiscation of numerous weapons, including small arms 

and rocket-propelled grenades. The international community has 

also turned over nearly 800 pirates to various countries for prosecution. 

Countering piracy in the region must be a shared responsibility 

with the shipping industry, as was noted by my Coast Guard colleague. By following the best management practices, the majority 

of pirate attacks can be thwarted without any need for military 

intervention. These practices range from hardening the vessel to 

maintaining professional civilian armed services team on board, 

and can mean the difference between a successful and a failed pirate attack. 

I would also note that, in all cases where armed private security 

teams have been used, crews have successfully kept pirates from 

boarding their vessel. I am very pleased with the comment from my 

Coast Guard colleague, who stated today that industry’s views on 

this question have been changing recently. 

Many have questioned whether there are connections between piracy and international terrorism. At the moment, the motivations 

of Somali pirates appear to be solely financial, rather than ideological. While I must caution about the extent of our intelligence and 

knowledge in Somalia and with the pirates is limited, at this point, 

as best as we can tell, we do not see operational or organizational 

alignment between al-Shabaab or other terrorists and the pirates. 

But we do see interactions mostly of a coercive nature that benefit 

terrorists. We need to ensure that piracy does not evolve into a 

powerful funding source for violent extremist organizations. 

Finally, Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, we 

recognize the problem of piracy is not just a problem for Somalia. 

9 

In recent years, pirate activity has also occurred in west Africa, the 

Straits of Malacca, and elsewhere. Although the complete elimination of piracy is unlikely, we believe that we can and must reduce piracy attacks through deterrents, disruption, interdiction, 

and punishment. Doing so will require a coordinated effort amongst 

the U.S. Government, private industry, and our international partners. We are confident that progress can be made in that fashion. 

Thank you for the opportunity to testify, and I welcome your 

questions and comments. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Thank you. 

Mr. Amend? 

Mr. AMEND. Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the subcommittee, it is an honor to appear before you this morning to describe the Department of State’s contributions to our government’s 

efforts to combat piracy off the coast of Somalia, to answer any 

questions you might have, and to identify ways we might do better. 

And if I could ask that the written testimony I provided be included in the record of today’s proceedings. 

Let me begin by saying that, since this committee met on the 

same subject in February of 2009, and notwithstanding an increase 

in international awareness of and efforts to deal with piracy, it 

seems as though the problem has only grown worse. The ruthless 

killing to which others have referred already this morning of four 

Americans on board the Quest on February 22nd underscores the 

increasing risks to recreational and commercial mariners in the region, and the pernicious effects of this kind of transnational crime. 

At Secretary Clinton’s direction, we have begun an intensive internal review of our counterpiracy strategy, a process that will be 

finalized shortly. Throughout our strategy re-think, we will consult 

closely with Congress, as well as with a number of executive departments and agencies. Our goal is to develop a recalibrated strategy that, once implemented, will enhance the safety and security 

of Americans on the high seas. 

As we move forward, we will consider a range of actions. We will 

continue to collaborate with key international partners by discouraging the payment of ransoms, by stressing compliance by the shipping industry with self-protection best management practices, by 

encouraging the prosecution of suspected pirates in national courts, 

by soliciting contributions of military forces for counterpiracy operations, and by seeking financial contributions to the contact group’s 

trust fund to defray the expenses associated with prosecution and 

incarceration of pirates. 

At the same time, we will follow a dual track, a diplomatic approach in Somalia, and examine appropriate counterpiracy assistance to stem piracy from Somalia’s shores. We will work with port 

States in the shipping industry to help them develop and implement creative ways to protect their ships and their mariners. We 

will consider how best to support U.N. efforts to build judicial and 

incarceration capacity in the region, and to develop new options for 

regional incarceration to include a specialized prosecution mechanism in the region. 

Not least, we will consult closely with the Department of Defense, our colleagues at the Department of Defense, and in the intelligence community, to explore ways to disrupt and dismantle piVerDate Aug 31 2005 13:42 Sep 16, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00027 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\HEARINGS\112\CG\3-15-1~1\65479.TXT JEAN
10 

rate operations, both at sea and on shore. And we will focus more 

intently on the life blood of piracy, the formal and informal financial flows that nurture and sustain this form of criminal behavior. 

We will coordinate closely with intelligence, financial, and law enforcement communities to identify and remove from operation pirate leaders, organizers, and financiers—the pirate kingpins, if you 

will. 

In doing all of this, we are mindful that the root cause of piracy 

has been, and will likely continue to be, State failure in Somalia. 

Until good governance, stability, and a modicum of economic development prevail on land, piracy at sea will remain a threat. 

Our focus will thus be on the kinds of near and medium-term actions that will increase significantly risks to the pirates, while reducing by equal measure any potential rewards that they think 

they may gain. 

This concludes my opening remarks, and I look forward to your 

questions. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Mr. Caldwell? 

Mr. CALDWELL. Chairman LoBiondo, Ranking Member Larsen, 

other Members of the Committee, Mr. Landry, thank you very 

much for having GAO up here to testify on piracy. Allow me to introduce my colleague behind me, John Pendleton, who is from our 

defense team and worked with me jointly on this work. 

Before I proceed, I would also like to share my condolences with 

the victims of piracy. 

GAO’s contribution to this discussion is our review of the NSC 

action plan, and the U.S. Government’s progress against that. We 

show that progress in a so-called report card on page five of our 

statement. And, in addition to that, in our September report we 

also recommended that the action plan be revised. 

We recommended three specific revisions: first, to address 

changes in piracy operations and tactics; second, to start gathering 

information on the cost and effectiveness of counterpiracy operations; and then, finally, to clarify agency roles with the specific 

lines of actions that were in the action plan. 

Since September, when we issued that report, the piracy situation has continued to deteriorate, and I have some graphics that 

I would like to share with the committee, if possible. [Graphics 

shown.] 

The first graphic here shows the area of piracy off of Somalia. 

The dark rectangle you see is the internationally recommended 

transit corridor. The dotted line that you see off the coast is 1,000 

miles out, an area where piracy is now occurring. 

The next chart shows a mileage comparison of the coast of Somalia to the coast of the eastern U.S., a distance stretching from Portland, Maine, to Miami, Florida. 

Next is a series of maps showing the expansion of piracy. First 

we have 2007, where the pirates focus their attacks relatively close 

to the coast of Somalia. Next is 2008, where the pirates focus their 

attacks on the heavily transited Gulf of Aden. 

Then, in 2009, the pirates continued attacks in the Gulf of Aden, 

but moved further off Somalia, as naval vessels began to patrol the 

transit corridor. 

11 

Then, in 2010, you can see the pirates continue to attack further 

out, spreading both eastward and southward, aided somewhat by 

the use of hijacked mother ships. 

And finally, in 2011 here, so far pirates continue to attack further out, using mother ships, spreading northward toward the 

Straits of Hormuz, which is a key oil tanker route. 

Then, finally, we have a slide showing the totality of all the attacks over the last several years. 

Next is a bar chart showing the number of attacks from 2007 to 

2010, which shows that total attacks have stabilized or actually declined in the last 2 years, but the pirates’ success rate is starting 

to rebound. 

And then this final graphic here shows the rapid increase in the 

number of seafarers that have been held hostage, particularly the 

growth between 2007 and 2008. And then, more recently, between 

2009 and 2010. 

In our view, this deteriorating situation for piracy, again, calls 

for a more urgent need to revise the plan along the line of our recommendations. Based on our most recent communications with the 

NSC, they do plan to revisit and update the action plan along the 

lines that we have discussed. In addition, as indicated by Mr. 

Amend here, State Department plans to revisit some of its plans 

and efforts. Both of these are hopeful signs, but we recognize that 

revising plans by themselves will not end piracy. The U.S. will 

need to take additional steps, both long-term and short-term, and 

in conjunction with our allies and with industry, to mitigate piracy. 

In closing, thank you very much. I will be happy to respond to 

any questions. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Thank you. Mr. Larsen, you want to kick it off? 

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Caldwell, with regards to your charts and the numbers, in my statement I said it’s 

sort of a mixed bag of success. It is sort of like fighting drugs sometimes in the U.S. If you crack down on meth, the price of meth goes 

up, because you start cutting off the supply, or you raise the cost 

of the transaction, as a result. 

And it seems that that argument could be used to explain the 

numbers that you are pointing out. We are out there, we are on 

the water, we are making it more difficult, so we are seeing more 

attacks, more hostages, we are seeing ransoms go up, the average 

ransom go up. Is that an accurate assessment? 

Mr. CALDWELL. Yes. I think there is two things at play. One is 

that the Gulf of Aden and the transit corridor there is a fairly narrow area, much easier to patrol for naval vessels. And I think the 

pirate success rate started to decline in 2009, as those naval vessels moved into that area. That is also the year that the pirates 

started—I think maybe late 2009 they started to shift further out, 

through the use of mother ships, and things like that. 

In terms of the ransoms, certainly it has proven to be a profitable 

business model for the pirates. And as some of the other witnesses 

have said, until you start to get at the profit that is motivating 

this, I think it will be pretty hard to stop it. 

Mr. LARSEN. Mr. Amend, with regards to the profit motive, and 

what the State Department is doing in conjunction with either Department of Justice or Department of Treasury to get at the finVerDate Aug 31 2005 13:42 Sep 16, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00029 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\HEARINGS\112\CG\3-15-1~1\65479.TXT JEAN
12 

anciers of piracy—because these folks in the skiffs are, you know, 

they are the frontline folks, but they are not driving piracy, it 

seems. It seems the financiers are driving piracy. 

What are we doing about identifying who these people are with 

the big money to cut them off? 

Mr. AMEND. Thank you, that is an excellent question. What we 

are doing through the multilateral diplomatic effort, the contact 

group, 60-nation-member contact group, we are working to establish a fifth working group that will focus solely on financial flows, 

and to pull together the Departments of Treasury, the intelligence 

community, and Justice, and our international partners to share 

information, but then to attempt to identify the informal and financial—informal and formal financial flows, and to—— 

Mr. LARSEN. Can I ask a question about that? Because you established the contact group in 2009. You had four working groups. 

Mr. AMEND. That is right. 

Mr. LARSEN. And now you are only getting—now you are telling 

me now you are only getting to this fifth group to look at financial 

flows. Why was that not established in 2009, with the other 4 

working groups? 

Mr. AMEND. The initial establishment was four working groups 

to focus on naval operations, best management practices, public diplomacy efforts, and then the kind of legal mechanisms that we 

want countries to embrace to allow them to prosecute. And only recently have we focused on the financial aspect. But I think this is 

a good sign. We—State Department hosted, on March 1st, an ad 

hoc meeting. A number of nations attended, and have pledged their 

interest in taking this a step further. 

Mr. LARSEN. I think it is a good sign, too. Has there been a reluctance over the last 2 years from the Department of Treasury to be 

involved in this? 

Mr. AMEND. No, I would not say that. I think only now as pirates 

have pivoted and proved to be very adept and shift their tactics, 

I think we have recognized that we need to shift tactics, and to 

look at other ways to attack the more senior leaders in the structure, in the networks themselves, that are behind this. 

Mr. LARSEN. I may come back to this in a second round. But, Admiral Cook, with regards to the shift in the international shipping 

community’s view on private armed security guards, can you talk 

about—can you tell us when that might be a ratified decision, and 

we can start seeing that implemented? 

Admiral COOK. Congressman, I will tell you the way it is right 

now. The U.S. stepped out in this regard, and actually, we were 

criticized internationally for doing that. 

And then, as the piracy issue continues to evolve—and then I 

would say that the Quest was a punctuation point for several of the 

countries thinking about this—and it just happened to occur a 

week or so ahead of the last contact group meeting that I cochaired, where this sentiment was finally expressed. We put it on 

the agenda to drive it, but in other meetings we weren’t able to get 

the countries to reciprocate and look at this. 

So, they are at the stage now, I would say, if I could put a pulse 

on the international community, where they are accepting the reality that this is what needs to be done. But there are complicaVerDate Aug 31 2005 13:42 Sep 16, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00030 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\HEARINGS\112\CG\3-15-1~1\65479.TXT JEAN
13 

tions with countries’ national legislation for flag states, such as 

Germany. Germany prohibits the use of arms on their ships. And 

we have had several ship owners that have reflagged their ships 

to other flags. 

So, I would say it will not be a seamless incorporation. The contact group does not have standing—like the IMO does, under the 

U.N. It is termed an ad hoc group, although you can tell by the 

representation it is quite robust. 

And so I would say by September we will have the framework 

available, and then the countries will be able to either adopt it or 

adapt it. But while this is going on, I can tell you that there is an 

increase in the number of private security teams from different flag 

state authorizations, and some shipping companies who maybe reluctantly are doing this without true flag state concurrence. 

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Mr. Harris, do you have questions? 

Dr. HARRIS. No. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Admiral Cook, most of the cost to combat and 

deter piracy is being borne by the United States and maybe a few 

other countries who have some capacity or will to deal with this. 

I think, meanwhile, flag-of-convenience nations, which register 

most of the ships that are coming under attack, do not seem to be 

providing much, if any, contributions in the anti-piracy effort. 

Has consideration been given to try to talk to them, force them, 

develop a means to require flag-of-convenience states to pay their 

fair share for the cost of naval and military operations to pursue 

the pirate ships? 

Admiral COOK. Mr. Chairman, I certainly do not want to deflect 

the question. I think that—more appropriately, I think that would 

be under the defense moniker where, you know, the navies are 

working together under a combined task force, and also drawing in 

whatever other support that they can. 

The Coast Guard has not approached those flags to specifically 

pay for naval protection. What we have done is, though, continued 

to press for those flag states to pressure their ship owners to provide long-range information and tracking, LRIT, information to the 

Maritime Safety Center Horn of Africa, which is the EU body 

which tracks ships through the high-risk waters, so that we actually have a better understanding of the picture, and naval vessels 

can do a better distribution of their resources. But as far as directly asking them to do something momentarily, that has not been 

done, sir. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. For the State Department, Mr. Amend, would 

you want to take a stab at that last question? I mean is this something the State Department is looking at, at all? 

Mr. AMEND. Yes, it is. This is one option among the range of options that we are considering. And, again, there are a number of 

aspects to it, host governments that are less enthusiastic about it, 

but will continue to look at, yes. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. For Mr. Wechsler, as compared with other flag 

states there are relatively few number of U.S. flag vessels that are 

transiting the waters in the Horn of Africa. Is the Department of 

Defense currently tracking the movements of suspected pirates— 

are you able to do that at all—that are based at sea? 

14 

Mr. WECHSLER. We are able to do that in part, and our limitations are a result of just the sheer size of the area at sea that we 

are dealing with. Where we know of the pirates, where we do have 

information of the pirates, we are able to move rapidly and take 

appropriate action, as we have most recently, as have some of our 

partner nations. 

South Koreans, the Indians have recently taken quite powerful 

action. And it should be noted that the Pakistanis currently lead 

151. So there are a number of countries that do take action. And 

we take action when we are close to a U.S. flag vessel that is attacked by pirates. And we have also taken action when it is not a 

U.S. flag vessel, but we are the closest, and we are abiding by our 

responsibilities under the law of the sea. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Are you able to supply, on a timely basis, intelligence information to U.S. flag vessels when you are coming on it? 

Mr. WECHSLER. Yes, there are procedures, and it all depends on 

the specific circumstances of the vessel that is in the process of 

being attacked, or has been attacked. When we have a mechanism 

to communicate directly with the people on the ship, we most certainly do so. 

The ability for us to do so will have a lot to do with whether or 

not the ship is abiding by all the best practices that have been established, whether they have a safe room, whether that room has 

communications, whether they were able to get there, whether they 

were able to delay the pirates from taking their ship, from a variety of the evasive actions that they were—that they should be taking. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Mr. Amend, I wanted to come back to part of 

your statement, where you said we have not gotten to any of these 

folks on shore, on land-based. I mean it seems that with the vast 

area that was outlined at sea, that getting to some of these bad actors on land is the way to go. 

I mean is there anything you can—we might be getting into an 

area we cannot talk about here, but since you mentioned it during 

your statement, I mean, it is an obvious area we need to get to. 

How does this—— 

Mr. AMEND. Right. And here I think I need to be mindful of the 

views of my colleague and those of the Department of Defense on 

the various—the range of options that are out there. 

There are certainly—there are diplomatic concerns with the—any 

action that might bring the fight on shore, because of the potential 

blowback to—and the way that we would exacerbate an already difficult situation on land where there has been no functioning government in Somalia for 20 years now, where we are concerned 

about a range of issues, humanitarian, economic development, and 

other issues. 

But I really cannot—I think probably in this forum, that is probably as much as I can say. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. I understand that, and I will maybe switch gears 

with one of my other committees at another time, the intelligence 

committee, where we can take this up. 

But I just say collectively, out of frustration, so what about if a 

commercial vessel was boarded and taken? And what if it had a 

crew of 30? And what if they were all slaughtered? 

15 

And what about if—you know, go through these—I mean what 

will it take for us to finally say, ‘‘We are not going to try to hold 

hands and serve warm milk and cookies and figure out how to 

solve this problem,’’ because at a certain point there has got to be 

a breaking point for the US of A to say, ‘‘We have had enough, and 

if we are not going to get cooperation from other nations’’—I am 

not talking about putting troops on the ground there or anything 

else. We have all kinds of other means. 

Mr. AMEND. Mr. Chairman, I would say that we are at that 

point. I think the February 22nd tragedy has galvanized Secretary 

Clinton and those of us at the State Department to take a really 

hard and cold look at the range of options that are before us. So 

I think that we are in that process. We are looking at what is out 

there, and what could be done. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. On—switching gears a little bit, still for you, the 

Executive Order 13536 names 11 individuals, 2 of whom are known 

to be head of pirate gangs. It effectively outlaws cooperation with 

these individuals, or support of their activities. The maritime community is very concerned that the prohibition on providing material 

support will make ransom payments liable for prosecution. 

Will the industry be held liable for ransom payments they made 

in the past, if they are later found to have ended up in the hands 

of one of the 11 individuals listed in the Executive order? 

Mr. AMEND. Mr. Chairman, I do not think there is a clear answer 

to that. I don’t know that that—we would know, until that has 

been tested. And I will go back to the Department and try to develop a fuller written response to that question. But I do not know. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. And are you or someone in the Department actively trying—attempting to track ransom payments? 

Mr. AMEND. Well, I think that is part of the effort that I described earlier, in response to Congressman Larsen’s question. 

Working with Treasury, and the intel community, and Justice, and 

others, we are trying to do that, trying to do a much better job of 

that now. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Thank you. Mr. Caldwell, you mentioned in your 

statement that growing ransom proceeds may undermine regional 

security and contribute to other threats, including terrorism. Are 

there any indications that terrorist organizations are using piracy 

as a source of revenue? 

Mr. CALDWELL. Mr. LoBiondo, we at GAO do not have independent intelligence capabilities. And the word we are getting from 

the DoD and the intelligence community is that there is no clear 

nexus now between piracy and terrorism. 

But even as Mr. Wechsler said, in the work he has done with 

DoD and drug interdiction, these different forces feed on each other 

for instability, whether it is greed or political ideology, and sometimes these groups start cooperating, or change their motivation. 

So, it is certainly a concern. I think we know the long-term solution to Somalia is governance on land. And when you have these 

organizations, whether they are terrorist or whether they are pirate and criminal, their interest is to prevent and undermine such 

governance. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Mr. Larsen—Mr. Landry, do you now have a 

question? 

16 

Mr. LANDRY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. You exited for a moment there, 

Mr. LANDRY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. OK. 

Mr. LANDRY. I just have a few questions for the admiral. 

Does the Coast Guard have the authority to deploy maritime 

safety and security teams internationally to deter piracy? 

Admiral COOK. Could you repeat the question for me, please, 

Congressman? 

Mr. LANDRY. Does the Coast Guard have the authority to deploy 

maritime safety and security teams internationally to deter piracy? 

Admiral COOK. Well, we have the authority, but we respond to 

the combatant commanders under Department of Defense. So, unless we were doing a law enforcement action independent from a 

Coast Guard cutter, we reserve our resources to be deployed with 

the Department of Defense, under their combatant commander’s direction. 

Mr. LANDRY. Could you deploy those members aboard U.S. flag 

merchant vessels? 

Admiral COOK. That could be done, although it is a significant 

resource issue, and I think that has been discussed in several other 

forums, that we do not have the capacity to meet the needs of U.S. 

flag merchant ships with armed teams from the Coast Guard. 

Mr. LANDRY. OK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Mr. Cravaack, do you have any questions? 

Mr. CRAVAACK. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I do. Good morning. Thank 

you all for coming today. Admiral, thank you for the great work all 

your Coast Guard people do for us on a daily basis that we know 

nothing about. And thank you for all the men and women of the 

great Coast Guard. 

I do have a couple of questions. I do apologize for getting in late. 

I was at another committee meeting. And I do have a question for 

Director Caldwell. 

I am a little concerned about some of the possibilities—and I 

have read conflicting information, so I really do not—I am looking 

for your guidance here on some of the money that might be transferred from piracy to, like, al-Shabaab in the African region. Could 

you comment a little bit more about that, fill me in a little—what 

you are seeing and what you are hearing? 

Mr. CALDWELL. We do not have any intelligence information, Mr. 

Cravaack, that is independent from the executive branch. And the 

official story is that there is not a clear nexus between al-Shabaab 

and the pirates. 

But there certainly is a concern that that cooperation could grow. 

Both of them are involved in illicit activities, and if, under certain 

circumstances it becomes in their interest to cooperate, to undermine any type of governance, in Somalia, that it could occur, sir. 

Mr. CRAVAACK. Thank you, sir, for that. Do you have any idea 

if there is any foreign terrorist organizations that are funding these 

operations? They have to get their money from somewhere, because 

I understand they do have some pretty heavy weapons. 

Mr. CALDWELL. I am probably not the expert on that, but the pirates are getting the money from the ransoms. So they do not need 

independent funding. The pirates have got a very clear source of 

17 

funds, and it is through the shippers, or whoever is paying the ransom, the insurers, through kidnap and ransom insurance. And the 

business model that they have, at this point, does not require any 

additional money coming in from other sources. 

Mr. CRAVAACK. OK. Thank you, sir. Is there anybody else on the 

panel who can comment on this regarding terrorist organizations 

versus the pirates that are off the coast, as of right now? 

Mr. WECHSLER. Sir, what I would say is, first, with an important 

caveat about the limits of our intelligence and information on this 

question. And then, secondly, what I would say is that, to the best 

of our knowledge right now, we do not see them—those two entities, the terrorists and the pirates—being operationally or organizationally aligned. 

We do, from time to time, see a relationship of coercion, which 

ends up with money from pirates potentially going to terrorist organizations. That is the best that we have at the moment. 

Mr. CRAVAACK. So there may be a window of opportunity there. 

OK. Thank you very much, gentlemen. I appreciate your testimony 

today. I yield back, sir. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. OK. Mr. Harris, do you have anything? 

Dr. HARRIS. Just one brief question, Mr. Chairman. Again, 

thanks to the panel for coming to testify. 

As I read over, Mr. Amend, your testimony, on the bottom of 

page seven it talks basically about how we are going to try to deal 

with this through diplomatic terms. And it says, ‘‘We are examining appropriate counterpiracy assistance, enhancing youth employment programs.’’ 

Now, I have got to tell you, I mean, it kind of rings—you know, 

sounds like midnight basketball or something. I mean tell me that 

the United States is not depending on youth employment programs 

to stop the slaughter of—that occurred aboard the Quest. Tell me 

that. Assure me that we are not depending upon enhancing youth 

employment programs in a country where there is not even a real 

government. 

Mr. AMEND. Congressman Harris, we are not depending, I am 

here to tell you that. 

Dr. HARRIS. Thank you very much. I hope the next time you 

come to us, you make it a little clearer in here that that is—you 

know, that is one of the things we are counting on. Thank you. 

Yield back the time. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Mr. Larsen? 

Mr. LARSEN. Mr. Amend, in the Coast Guard authorization bill 

we provided protection for U.S. citizens in U.S. courts for actions 

taken to defend against piracy. However, U.S. ships call at numerous foreign ports, as you know. And there is a potential that an action could be brought in a foreign court for acts on the high seas 

that were legally justified under U.S. law. 

So, can you answer for me, would the U.S. defend U.S. citizens 

against charges in a foreign court? 

Mr. AMEND. Absolutely. I think we would vigorously attempt to 

seek that they would not be held liable for any act that would be 

taken in self-defense. Absolutely. 

Mr. LARSEN. And how would that be accomplished? 

18 

Mr. AMEND. Well, through diplomatic means. I think we would 

put pressure on the host government not to pursue that kind of an 

action. 

Mr. LARSEN. So U.S. citizens defending themselves against piracy on the high seas can rely upon U.S. Government to defend 

them? 

Mr. AMEND. I think we would step forward and try to defend 

them. 

Mr. LARSEN. Thanks. I have a question about the cost of addressing piracy, Mr. Caldwell. You noted that there—that we do not 

really know what we spend, what we have been spending on combating piracy, and that was in your September 24, 2010, report. Do 

you have any update on that question? 

Mr. CALDWELL. We do not. The indication we had from the NSC 

is that that is one of the things they will consider as they revise 

their action plan. 

I do want to give the Department of Defense credit, because they 

were one of the departments that at least tried to come up with 

an estimate for us, based on steaming days of ships, and things 

like that. 

If I could, I will take this opportunity to add one other thing, in 

terms of the armed security teams on ships. That is a very efficient 

way to do things, because instead of having billion-dollar naval 

ships moving around pursuing pirates, you have got relatively 

small teams on merchant ships. And I wanted to point out something from an industry perspective, because I do deal with the industry quite a bit. 

Some of the industry’s initial concerns were that these armed security teams would lead to escalating violence, and I think, actually, the opposite has occurred. It is the escalating violence that 

has led to the increased use of these armed security teams. And a 

lot of the countries that initially opposed such teams, are now more 

actively supporting them, particularly countries—say the Philippines or Korea, where some of their seafarers have been killed. 

Mr. LARSEN. About 30 percent of the seafarers are actually Filipino. Is that about right? 

Mr. CALDWELL. Yes, they have a very high percentage. But a lot 

of those are working on cruise ships, which generally are not going 

through the pirate waters. 

One other thing about the flag states, and Mr. LoBiondo’s comments about their contribution. Some of the flag states recognize 

they do not have navies, so they are not going to be able to contribute naval forces. But they seem to be the countries that are 

more amenable to allowing armed security teams on board. 

Mr. LARSEN. Right. With regard to marine insurance, the general—my statement and from other sources said that, according to 

a Chatham House report, insurance rates, at least through the 

London insurers, has increased. But your report specifically says 

that rates in the United States have not increased. Can you explain the difference there? 

Mr. CALDWELL. No, sorry. I am not quite sure. 

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you. 

[Laughter.] 

19 

Mr. CALDWELL. That is the simple answer. There is other insurance, such as K&R insurance, which is not mentioned in a lot of 

the documents. Kidnapping and Ransom insurance is taken under 

a confidential agreement. So there is no public information on 

those rates and whether they are increasing. That is probably one 

source of these ransoms that are being paid. 

Mr. LARSEN. OK. Can you get back to us with any other information about that? 

Mr. CALDWELL. We can take that for the record. 

Mr. LARSEN. Would you do that, please? 

Mr. CALDWELL. We can come up with an explanation. Yes, sir. 

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you very much. Admiral Cook, can you talk 

about the difference between the vessels’ security plans that were 

established under the MTSA versus what are commonly known as 

the best management practices, and the extent that there are differences that were required of U.S. flag ships versus what the 

BMPs are being implemented on foreign flag ships, and how wide 

that difference is? And if it is too wide, how can we close it? 

Admiral COOK. Congressman, fundamentally, they are quite 

similar. Ultimately, though, in the BMPs, the best management 

practices, it makes a recommendation against the use of armed security teams. So that is a fundamental difference, right there. But 

basically—— 

Mr. LARSEN. So, in other words, in the vessel safety plans it says 

what compared to—on that issue—compared to BMPs? 

Admiral COOK. It says that because the owner is required to do 

the risk assessment based on the type of vessel and the area that 

it will be going—for example, the thing that is—really works 

against a ship is a low freeboard and a slow speed. 

Mr. LARSEN. Right. 

Admiral COOK. You know, they are obviously a target for piracy. 

So, in that case, the owner has a higher threshold to identify what 

mitigation procedures they would need, and that would—they 

would allow—we would allow them to use armed teams. Not arm 

the crew, but armed teams, so that the crew can remain focused 

on navigation and running the engine room. 

So—but generally, though, in concept, both of them target ways 

to prevent unwelcome entry by anyone, you know, pirates, of 

course, in particular. They highlight opportunities for non-lethal— 

talks about ship operations to evade pirates: increase your speed, 

in some cases you might alternate courses, so that it is more difficult to track the ship. 

Communication procedures need to be discussed within the ship’s 

crew and externally. For example, the ships have ship security 

alert systems, which are kind of those buttons like you picture in 

a bank, where a silent alarm goes off. In, for example, U.S. flag 

ships, the alarm goes off in our Coast Guard Atlantic area command center in Virginia, which enables us to then directly contact 

the ship—we do not contact the ship—the ship security officer back 

in the office, and see if their ship is located where the beacon is 

saying, and whether they might be involved in activities where 

they would be subject to piracy. 

And then, measures to protect the crew. For example, you have 

heard the term ‘‘citadel,’’ which would be a hardened room someVerDate Aug 31 2005 13:42 Sep 16, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00037 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\HEARINGS\112\CG\3-15-1~1\65479.TXT JEAN
20 

where inside the ship where the crew could then retreat. And it 

also requires some type of drills and exercise regime, so that the 

crew is well practiced into the communications, or the entry into 

the citadel, and those kind of things that would ultimately protect 

them in the final measure. 

So they are very similar, but they very much depart on the 

armed guard part. 

Mr. LARSEN. OK. I have further questions, but I will—— 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Admiral Cook, with the Coast Guard authorization bill last year we got some language about liability relief for 

owners and operators. And the Coast Guard is establishing standards for use of force for self-defense of vessels. Can you give us any 

idea when those standards will be published. 

Admiral COOK. Yes, Congressman. We went ahead and leveraged 

a document called a port security advisory that we already had in 

place, because there was a need from our U.S. flag shippers to 

know where their limits were, as far as use of force. 

And so, that document has been out for over a year. So when we 

saw the authorization act, we said this is an opportunity to test 

that port security advisory against the language for the authorization act, and publish it in the Federal Register with the language 

from the authorization act surrounding it, and ask for comments. 

The comment period closed on March 1st. The industry is generally 

very supportive of the language, and it walks through items such 

as use of force, use of deadly force, a variety of things that you 

would need to have on your mind like who is in charge—the master 

is always in charge—those types of things which are drawn out, 

which give them the framework, then, to do self-defense, and know 

that they will not be held civilly liable. 

So, we are expecting that that can be turned around here as we 

work in a couple of comments. Very soon we will be passing it over 

to the Department as soon as we can. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Mr. Landry, do you have anything else? 

Mr. LANDRY. No, sir, Mr. Chairman. Thank you. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Mr. Larsen? 

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Amend, 

with regards to the potential of sanctions against known piracy financiers, is that something that is in the State Department toolbox, 

and something the State Department is willing to do, to sanction 

individuals? 

Mr. AMEND. Yes, I think. Again, our review is not yet complete. 

I do not want to get too far ahead. But I cannot say at this point. 

The review process is not yet complete, and so I would not want 

to get cross-wise with our senior leadership. 

Mr. LARSEN. OK. But—and this is the review you mentioned in 

your testimony? Sort of—you did—the contact group was set up in 

2009. 

Mr. AMEND. Right. 

Mr. LARSEN. You have done 2 years of work on that, there has 

been some success, there has been some challenges, and now you 

are looking at all this again, and part of what you are looking at 

in the future is whether or not you can identify, and second, when 

you—if you can identify, whether you should or you should not 

apply, or try to sanction—— 

21 

Mr. AMEND. Well, and—— 

Mr. LARSEN [continuing]. Piracy financiers. 

Mr. AMEND. To think creatively about a number of options, to include what you just mentioned, and to see how they could be 

sequenced in a way that would allow us to achieve a near and medium-term success. 

Mr. LARSEN. Yes, OK. So on March 21st, there is a plenary session of the contact group bringing together the work—— 

Mr. AMEND. Right. 

Mr. LARSEN [continuing]. Of the working groups, where presumably, there will be discussion and—on the recommendations that 

come out of the working groups. 

Is there anything that you all will be discussing that you might 

find helpful, getting support from this committee, this subcommittee, on? 

Mr. AMEND. No. I appreciate that offer. I think our focus, in large 

part, will be to pull together the thinking on proposals made by the 

U.N. about new judicial mechanisms in the region that might be 

more effective, to focus on the subject of financial flows, informal 

and formal financial flows. But let me take that question back and 

share that with my colleagues and respond in writing. 

Mr. LARSEN. I would—well, you have got a very short period of 

time to do that. 

Mr. AMEND. It is very—it is a narrow window. 

Mr. LARSEN. Absolutely. 

Mr. AMEND. But we can move quickly. 

Mr. LARSEN. I look forward to your quick response. 

Mr. AMEND. Yes. 

Mr. LARSEN. And I hope that is interagency, you are talking to 

an interagency group about that. 

Mr. AMEND. Yes, absolutely. 

Mr. LARSEN. With regards to prosecution, it might have been Mr. 

Wechsler who noted that there have been 800—for the sake of the 

law, 800 alleged pirates turned over for prosecution. How many 

have actually been prosecuted or awaiting prosecution? Because my 

understanding is that number is not very high. 

Mr. AMEND. I defer to information that is provided by the U.N., 

office on drugs and crime. It describes countries regionally and 

then internationally, currently detained and those that have been 

prosecuted. 

And I think your observation is accurate, that a few numbers 

have been prosecuted, significant numbers have been detained. Or 

up to 800, I think, is the round figure that we see. 

Mr. LARSEN. So up to 800 are current in detention? 

Mr. AMEND. Yes, and let me just give you an example. In the region, Somaliland, 88 all have been convicted; Puntland, 260, of 

which 200 have been convicted; Yemen, 120, all convicted; Oman, 

12, all convicted. More broadly, Netherlands, 10, 5 of which have 

been convicted, and on down the list. 

Mr. LARSEN. And what do you find the challenge to prosecution 

being? 

Mr. AMEND. The key challenge is, as I think was mentioned earlier, piracy is a crime of universal jurisdiction. And we seek diplomatically to get countries to take on national prosecutions, to 

22 

prosecute—to accept—take receipt of and then prosecute under 

their national laws, pirates. That is difficult. And a number of 

countries have stepped forward. Kenya, for example, I think has 

taken up to around 100 now. 

But it is an ongoing effort. It is an ongoing challenge to get countries to do this. Some are reluctant. 

Mr. LARSEN. You have all noted, as the chairman has noted and 

I have as well, that—the tragedy of the Quest, the sailing vessel 

Quest. Do you—any of you—have an assessment on whether this 

has changed the rules of engagement for the pirates, if they can be 

looked at monolithically? 

[No response.] 

Mr. LARSEN. I know it is a rather open-ended—but I would rather—if someone can volunteer—— 

Mr. WECHSLER. It is—with the caveat that this is an ongoing investigation, and so we are still learning a lot about what the individual motivations were of those specific pirates—but as a general 

proposition, our initial assessment is that this was in individual 

circumstances, and does not necessarily indicate a wide-ranging 

change of behavior, talking about this specific incident. 

That said, the wider trends, we do have concerns about the use 

of force by pirates more widely. 

Mr. LARSEN. Yes, yes. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Mr. Amend, the U.S., for a while, had a bilateral 

prosecution agreement with Kenya. And I guess we transferred, 

what was it, 25 or so pirates to Kenya. Kenya formally withdrew 

September of 2010. Do we know why they withdrew from the 

agreement? 

Mr. AMEND. My understanding is that they said that they had 

reached capacity. But since the suspension of that agreement, on 

a case-by-case basis, the Kenyans have accepted suspected pirates. 

And so we continue to work closely with the government there, notwithstanding the fact that we had an agreement that has been suspended, to, on a case-by-case basis, to seek their support in accepting new suspected pirates as incidents occur. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Has Kenya released pirates without prosecuting? 

Mr. AMEND. That I do not know, but I can get an answer back 

to you. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. So would you also be able to comment whether 

their withdrawal from the bilateral prosecution agreement has hindered prosecution efforts? 

Mr. AMEND. Well, I think, as a general principle, we would like 

countries to accept pirates—affected states to accept pirates and 

prosecute them. And so we certainly were disappointed. But we 

continue to work closely with the Kenyan Government so that they 

will make the right decision. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. And I am assuming we are—State Department 

is attempting to prevent other nations from just sort of catch-andrelease programs, so to speak? 

Mr. AMEND. That is right. That is right. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. OK. Thank you. Mr. Larsen, do you have more 

questions? 

Mr. LARSEN. Mr. Wechsler, we have heard testimony from you 

and the others about the expansion of the area that the pirates 

23 

have gotten into, about the size of the lower 48 States. We have 

heard from you that if you took all the ships in the navies around 

the world, that number would not be enough to patrol this area 

adequately. 

So, without, obviously, getting into too much operational detail 

for obvious reasons, what kind of options do we have, beyond what 

we are doing on the water, for degrading their capacity to operate 

in such a large area? 

Mr. WECHSLER. In addition to gaining better intelligence, which 

is always a preferred way to attack such problems on the sea—if 

you are cued by intelligence, it makes your work much, much better than if you are going around, hoping to come across a pirate, 

which we try not to do. 

But in addition to that, I would go back to the first order of 

statements that I and a bunch of my colleagues here have made, 

which is to make the ships—the vessels themselves much harder 

targets for the pirates. There is a significant number of steps that 

can be done to make these targets harder. And we have seen the 

success to date when targets have been made harder, that pirates 

cannot take them, will not take them, try and fail to take them. 

And those steps, as compared to having a lot of naval vessels, is 

a much more cost-effective way to address this problem on the sea. 

That all said, as you have said, and as we have said, the true 

solution to this problem is going to be on land, not on sea. 

Mr. LARSEN. With regards to issues within your area, on the intelligence side, as the State Department goes to phase two, or 

whatever you are calling it, looking at this, rethinking, will you be 

advocating, from a defense side, Defense Department, will you be 

advocating for more access to the use of intelligence assets in order 

to help with this problem? 

Mr. WECHSLER. Yes, there is a lengthy and comprehensive process for the global employment of forces and for other intelligencerelated processes to deploy and prioritize those assets. We make 

sure that the effort against piracy is included in that process, so 

that it can be ranked. 

I do have to say, though, sir, as I said in my testimony, when 

we are fighting a war in Afghanistan, and when ISR assets are in 

great demand in that war, that will understandably be our highest 

priority. And we are short of ISR assets, compared to demand, 

quite significantly. And that is the unfortunate situation in the Department of Defense. 

Mr. LARSEN. And there is no doubt about that, and there is no 

doubt we have heard that from Secretary Gates many times, as 

well. 

I think, Mr. Chairman, that is—those are my questions. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. OK. I think that will wrap us up. I would like 

to thank our panel very much. I do not imagine this will be the last 

we will be dealing with this. We look forward to some updates from 

you. And I thank you for being here. The committee is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:14 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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