### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT NAS HVILLE N ove m be r 18, 200 3 S es sio n
JOSEP H D . T AY LOR

v. S TAT E OF TEN NES SEE

Direc t Appeal from the Circ uit Court for Marshall County

No. 15223 Charles Lee , Judge

No. M2003- 00138-CCA -R3-P C - F iled Fe bruary 20, 2004

Pe tit ion er, J os eph Ta

y lor , f ile d a pe tit ion fo r p os t- c on vic tio n r e lie f whic h w a s su bs e qu e ntl y a me nd e d. F oll ow inga

n e vid e nti ary

he ari ng , th e tr ia l c ourt

di sm is sed the pe tit ion . O n a pp e a l, Petitioner argues that his trial counsel r ender ed inef fec tiv e a ssistance of c ounsel bec ause he (1) f ailed to a de qu a te ly

me e t w ithPe tit ion e r p ri or to tr ia l; ( 2) fa ile d to int e rv ie w a nd c a ll c e rt a in w itn e sse s to testify ; (3) fa iled to reque st a jury instruction on assault as a le sser-inc luded o ff en s e of attempted rape ; and ( 4 ) f a il e d to o b je c t t o th e c la s s if

ic a ti o no f Pe ti ti o n e r

a s a c ar e e r o f f e n d e r w h e nth e trial court sente nced Petitioner f or attempted r ape. Petitioner a ls o al l eges that his appellate c ounsel rende re d ineffe ctive assistanc e of c ounsel when he failed to a ppeal the c lassification of Petitioner
as a c are er of

fende r for purposes of se ntencing . After a thoroug h revie w of the r ecor d, the judg ment of the trial c ourt is affir

med in part a

nd reve rsed in par

t, and this case is re manded to the trial court for a new se ntencinghear ing in a ccor dance with this opi nion.
Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Trial Court Affir m e d in P ar t; Re ve r se d in P ar t; Re m ande d forNe w Sent e nc ing He ar ing

T H O M A S T. W O O D A LL , J ., deli v ered the opinion of the cour t, in which G AR Y R. W ADE , P.J ., and N OR MA M C G EE O G LE , J ., joined. N. Andy My rick, Jr., Fay etteville, Tenne ssee, f or the a ppellant, J oseph D. Ta

y lor.

Pa ul G . Summe rs , A tto rn e y

Ge ne ra l and

Re po rt e r; El iza

be th B . M ar

n e y , A s s i sta

nt A tto rn e y

Ge ne ra l; Wil liam Michael McCown, District Attorney Gene ral; and Weakley E. Ba rnar d, Assistant District Attorney Gene ral, for

the appe llee, the State of Tenne ssee.
OP IN ION

I. Bac kgr ound Following a jury trial, Petitioner was convicted of attempt to c ommit sexual battery , attempt to commit rape, a

nd ag g ravated kidnapping

. The fa cts surroundingPetitioner’s convictions wer e-2-

summarized by

this Court i n Petitioner’s direc t appea l in St a t e v

. T a yl or , 63 S.W .3d 400 (Tenn. Cr im. Ap p. 20 01 ) a s f

oll ow s:

De fe nd ant m e t th e vic tim , th ir te e n- y e ar- old

A. S., wh ile he liv e d ne xt doo r t o the vic tim ' s f

a mil y on Park

Str e e t in L e wi sb ur g , T e nn e sse e . ( Th e min or vic timwi ll be re fer red to he rein by

his init ials.) On May

16, 1999, approximately three to four
wee ks after

Def endant moved to a

nother house in the s ame neighbor hood, A.S. rode his bicy cle pa st Defen d an t ' s new a ddress. He stopped to say "H i" whe n he noticed Def endant wor

king on his car in the drivewa y

. Def endant informed A.S. that he was planning to dr ive to Shelby ville to visi t a frie nd and, if A.S. ca me bac k at 11:00 a.m., he c ou ld a c c omp any

De fe nd ant o n th e tr ip. De fe nd ant a lso tol d A. S. that hi s p are nts did not need to know of the ir plan.

In t h e m e an t i m e , A

. S

. w e n t t o l o o k f o r h i s s i x t e e n
- ye ar
- o l d

b r o t h e r , T i m o t h y, wh o w a s f

ish ingin a

ne arb y c re e k. B e c a

us e Ti mot

hy wo re a watc h, A. S. a sk e d h im to keep him informed of the time so A.S. c ould return to De fenda nt's house at 11:00. Ti mot hy di d no t c omp ly

wi th h is r e qu e st. Whe n A .S. arr ive d at D e fe nd ant' s h ou se twenty minutes late, Def

endant told hi m t h e t ri p was off and invited him into the house to watc h television instead. A.S. acc epted.

The tele vision was in De fenda nt's be droom, and they

started watching a sca

ry prog ram. I nitially , A.S. sat on one end of Defenda nt's bed and Defenda

nt sat on the oth e r. Approxima te ly

fi ft e e n mi nu te s late r, De fe nd ant s tart e d " sc oo tin g " c los e r t o A.S. E ventually , when they wer e sitti ng only inches a part, De fenda

nt placed his ha

nd on A.S.'s be lly

near his belly button and beg an to rub it in a circ ular motion. Def endant told A.S. that "he liked g irls, but he liked boy s, too" and that , "i f [ A.S.] f-- -ed him, he would buy

[A.S .] any

thing." A.S. started to cr

y . He told Def

endant he

" wa sn ' t li ke that" and

pu sh e d h im a

wa y . A .S. wa s sc are d at thi s po int a nd de c ide d to l eave. B ut before he could take more than f ive steps towar d the door, De fenda nt pic ke d h im u

p b y the wa ist wi th b oth

arm s and " sla mme d" him

on to t he be d. A. S. land e d o n h is b a c k a

nd his he a d h it the wa ll. De fe nd ant p inn e d A .S. do wn wi th h is body and told him to st op cry

ing- -he " didn't have to be sc are d."

A. S. w a s una

ble to m ov e his arm s with De fe nd ant on top of him , an d h e did
no t st op c ry

inge ve n a ft e r De fe nd ant or de re d him to sto p. Whe n De fe nd ant tol d A .S. that "he might as w ell f-- - [ him] now because he knowed [sic] that [ A.S.] was g oing to g o home and tell mom and dad," A.S. started cr ying e ven har der. D efe ndant let him sit up then, but stay ed right beside him on the bed. They wer e sitting only

inches
a pa rt , a nd the te le vis ion wa s sti ll on

. Whe n De fe nd ant tur ne d his he a d to loo k at it , A.S. saw his chanc e for esca pe and "took off running " as fast as he c ould. Once out the fr on t do or , A.S . le a

pe d o nto his bic y c le and

ro de awa y . H e te sti fi e d th a t he did
no t lo ok ba c k a nd wa s una wa re wh e the r o r n ot D e fe nd a nt c ha se d h im.-3- After A.S. arrive d home, he immediately found his brother, T imothy , who
was ne x t doo r at t h e neig hbor' s house. Timothy testified that A.S. was c rying a nd up se t. A ft e r A .S. tol d h im that D e fe nd ant " tr ie d to ra pe him ," Ti mot

hy ma de A. S. t e ll the ir fathe r, Jame s, wh a t ha

pp e ne d. Jame s to ok

A. S. wit h h im t o f

ind De fe nd ant. Shortly there afte r, they

discovere d Def

endant a s they

wer e driving t o his house. Defen dan t was head ed in th e op po si te d ir ect io n an d s mi led at t hem as h e pas sed . By the t ime J ames turne d the ca r ar ound, Def

endant wa s g one. James proce eded to the police depar

tment a nd repor ted the incident. The police arr ested De fenda nt ear ly the
ne xt day , b e tw e e n 2 :00 and 3:0 0 a .m. At trial, A.S. further

testified that he ha d visited Defe ndant on other oc casions bu t T imo thy

wa s o rd ina

ri ly wi th h im. Th e y

us ua lly on ly

sta y e d f if te e n o r t we nty minutes and watc hed television or t alked about car s and baseball car ds. They often
sat in De fe nd ant' s b e dr oo m be c a us e it w a s th e only roo m witha te le vis ion . A .S. te sti fied th a t, p ri or

to t his inc ide nt, De fe nd ant h a d n e ve r g ive n h im a re a so n to be lie ve that he and

De fe nd ant w e re no t f

ri e nd s.

Be th Rhoton, an investigator with the L ewisburgPolice Depa rtment, testified that she usually

worke d case s where sex abuse was invo l ved. Rhoton interviewe d A. S. o n M ay

16 , 1 99 9, be tw e e n a

pp ro xima te ly

5:0 0 a nd 6:3 0 p .m. A.S

. was sti ll shak i n g , and appe are d very nervous a

nd scar ed. On c ross- examination, Rhoton te sti fi e d th a t A .S. did

no t r e qu ir e me dic a l tr e a tme nt. Taylor , 63 S.W .3d at 404-05.

F o l l o w i n g a

s e nt e n c i n g

h e a r i n g , t h e t r i a l c o u rts e n t e n c e d P e t i t i o n e r

t o e l e v e nm o n t h s , t w e n t ynin e da y s fo r

h i s a t t e mp t e d

s e xu a l b a t t e r

y c o n v i c t i o n , f

i f t e e ny e ar s a s a

c ar e e r o f f e n d e r f o r his attempted ra

pe convic tion, and twelve y ear s as a violent 100% Rang e I offe nder f or his ag g ravated kidnapping conviction. The tria l court o rd er ed that Petitioner’s conviction for attempted sexual battery be mer g ed with his conviction for attempted rape , and his c onviction f or attempted ra

pe be merg ed with his conviction for a g g ravated kidnapping. On appeal, Petitioner ar g ued that the evidenc e wa s insufficient to support his convictions o n al l t hree offe nses. In addition, Petiti oner challeng ed his sentenc e, ar g uing that the trial court f ailed to g ive prope r cons i d er at i on to the mitigating fac tor provided in Te nnessee Code Annotated se ction 39-13-304( b)(2) , and that the tria l
c ourt e rr e d in se nte nc ing him a s a care e r of fe nd e r fo r the atte mpt e d r a pe c on vic tio n b e c a

us e the State failed to provide adequate notice that it was se eking an enhanc ed punishment. The State a ppeale d the merg er of

Petitioner’s convictions into a sing le conv i ct i o n for a g g ravated kidnapping and
re q u es t ed t h at t h i s C o u rt re i n s t a t e P e t i t i o n e r ’ s s e p ar a t e c o n v i c t i o n s an d o r d e r c o n s e c u t i v e s e n t e n ci n g.
On dire c t a

p p e a l, this Court conc luded that the evide nce w as suffic ient to support Petiti oner’ s three convictions. Ba sed on the fa cts prese nted in the ca se, ho we v er , we concluded that dual convictions for attempted sexual battery and attempted r ape c ould not be sustained and r ever sed and dismiss ed Petitioner’s c onviction for attempted sexual battery

. We also conclude d that Petitioner’s-4-

offe nse of a g g ravated kidnapping was incidental to the offe nse of attempt to commit rape unde r Sta te v. Anthony , 817 S.W .2d 299 (Tenn. 1991) . There fore , pursuant to Anthony , w e r e v e r sed the trial court’s me rge r of Petitioner’s convic tion for attempted r ape into his conviction for ag g ravated kidnappi n g; re v er s edan d

d i s m i s s edt h e a ggra v at ed kidnapping convic tion; and reinstated Petitioner’s conviction and se ntence for attempted rape

. Taylor , 63 S.W .3d at 403-04.

II. P os t- Co nvi c ti on H e ar ing At the post-conviction hear ing, Petitioner testified that his c ounsel only met with him three times prior to trial, and none of the meeting s lasted more than thirty minutes. Petit ioner c oncede d that his counsel discussed the e lements of the c harg ed off enses with him, as we ll as the potential sentenc ing r ang es an d s entenc es, and that thirty minutes was suffic ient time to ex plain his side of the story to his counsel. Petitioner said, howeve r, that his counsel never discussed possible defe nses or the State’s pr oof with him, and conseque ntly all of the State’s e vidence at trial wa s a “sur prise.” Petitioner said that his trial counsel should have f iled a motion for a bill of particula rs so that they could discover

what evide nce the State had. Petitioner ag ree d that he wa s prese nt at the pre liminary h ea ri n g an d

co n ce d edt h at h i s co u n s e l a d eq u at el y cr o s s -e x am i n edt h e v i ct i m at t h e h ea ri n g. Petitioner also could not say what def ense should have been raised other than Petitioner’s asse rtion that he did

no t c omm it the c ha

rg e d o ff e ns e s.

Pe tit ion e r s a id t

hat hi s c ouns e l sh ou ld h a ve c a lle d h is n e ig hb or a s a wi tne ss. Pe tit ion e r s a id that the neighb o r would have te stified that the victim was not upset or in a r ush when he left Petitioner’s house. Petitioner said his counsel made a unilatera l decision not to call the neig hbor,
a s w e ll a s Pe tit ion e r’ s mot he r and sis te r, a s wi tne sse s. Pe tit ion e r e xpla ine d th a t hi s mo the r w ou ld have te sti fi e d th a t Pe tit ion e r w a s in the ho us e , no t wo rk ing on his c ar, the fi rs t tim e the vic timc a me by , and his sister would have testified that Petitioner had a g ood relatio n s h i p wi t h the victim’s family . On cr oss-examination, P etitioner admitted that his mother wa s at churc h when the of fense s occur red, and that his sister’s potential testimony had no bea

ring on Petitioner’s g uilt or innocence

. No n e o f t h es e w i t n es s es t es t i fi edat P et i t i o n er ’s p o s t -c o n v i ct i o nh ea ri n g.

Pe tit ion e r a lso sa id that he c ho se no t to te sti fy be c a us e he wa s a fr a id the State wo uld dis c los e his prior convictions during cross-e x amination. Petitioner said that he did not reme mber the c ourt’s ruling that his prior convictions could not be used to impea ch him if he testified. Petitioner stated that he re quested a

char g e to the jury

on the les s er -i n cl u d ed offe nse of a ssault, but his counsel ref used to reque st such an instruction.

Petitioner’s counsel testified that he spent at least ten to twe lve hours with Petiti oner pr ior to the trial. He w ent over

Petitioner’s version of the incident a couple of times, and the investig ator also talked with Petitioner. Counsel stated that he discussed the State’s proof with Petitioner. The investigator spoke with Petitioner’s neig hbor, but the neig hbor said that he did not know a ny thing about the eve nts that occurr ed on the da y of t he offense. Counsel said that Petitioner’s mother wa s not present whe n the victim came ove r the sec ond time , an d whether or not Petitioner was in the house or in the y ard when the victim stopped by the first time w as not particula rly rele vant. Counsel-5-

a lso sa id t hat Pe tit ion e r’ s si ste r’ s o bs e rv a tio n th at Pe tit ion e r a nd the vic timwe re c los e and sp e nt a lot of time toge ther wa s not benefic ial to Petiti oner’ s defe nse.
Counsel said that Petiti oner’ s only defe nse was that he did not commit the offe nse, and he did no t be lie ve any

oth e r d e fe ns e wa s a va ila ble

. I t wa s a lso c ouns e l’ s be lie f that the e vid e nc e did not support an instruction as to the lesser -included of fense of assa

ult. I n addition, counsel fe lt that a motion for a bill of particula rs was unnece ssary beca

use there was no question as to the time and location of the c harg ed off enses, or how the off

enses a lleg edly

occur red. Counsel co n fi rm ed that both he and the tr ial court infor med Petitioner that his prior convictions could not be used to impeach him sh ou ld h e e le c t to te sti fy

a t tr ia l.

At the conc lusion of the post-conviction hea ring , the trial cour

t dismi ssed Petitioner’s pe tit ion . T he tr ia l c ourt

sp e c if ic a lly a c c re dit e d th e te sti mony

of Pe tit ion e r’ s c ouns e l c on c e rn inghis prepa ration for trial and his meeting s with Petiti oner a nd resolved a

ny inconsistencies in favor of the State. The trial c ourt co n cluded that c ounsel’s per formanc e excee ded the standa rds expected of attorney s in criminal case s. The trial court found that counse l interviewe d all potential witnesses and made a tactica l de cision not to called the neig hbor and Petitioner’ s mother and sister to testify . The trial court a lso concluded that Petiti oner f ailed to show that he w as pre judiced by

the ab s en ce of these witnesse s at trial. The trial court found that Petitioner failed to show that the results of his trial would have be en any differ ent had the tr ial court instructe d the jury as to the off

ense of assault as a lesser included off

ense of attempted ra

pe.
Prior to Petiti oner’ s post-conviction hea ring , the State stipulated that Petitioner’s prior convictions consisted of six C las s E felonies a nd one Class D fe lony

which re moved him from consideration as a career off ender for the attempted rape conviction. The tria l court, howe ver, c on c lud e d th a t th e iss ue of Pe tit ion e r’s sen te nc inga s a c are e r o ff

e nd e r h a d b e e n p re vio us ly de te rm ine d o n Pe tit ion e r’ s d ir e c t a pp e a l. T he tr ia l c ourt

g ra nted t he S tat e’s mot ion

to d ism iss Petitioner’s claim that he ha d been e rrone ously sentenc ed as a

car eer offe nder.

III. Inef fective Assistance of Cou nsel

A. Standard of

Review

I n his appea l, Petiti oner a ll ege s t h at hi s trial and appe llate counse l rende red ine ffe ctive assistance of counse l. A petitioner seeking post-conviction relief must establish his allegations by cl ea r a n d co n v i n ci n g ev i d en ce

. T en n

. C o d e A n n

. § 4 0 -3 0 -2 1 0 (f ) (1 9 9 7 ). T h e t ri al co u rt ’s fi n d i n gs of fa ct in a post-c o n v i cti on hear ing a re a ffor ded the we ight of a jury verdic t. Blac k

v . S tate , 794 S.W. 2d 75 2, 75 5 ( Te nn . Cr im. Ap p. 19 90 ). Th e re fo re , th is C ourt may no t r e -w e ig h o r r e -e va luate these fin d in g s n o r s u

b s ti tute it s in f

e r e n c e s f o r th o s e o f th e tr ia l ju d g e u n le s s th e e v id e n c e in the
rec ord pre ponderates ag ainst those finding s. Sta te v . H on e y c utt , 54 S.W .3d 762, 766-67 (Te nn. 20 01 ); State v. Burns , 6 S .W.3d 453, 461 (Tenn. 1999). In addition, questions concer ning the
c re dib ili ty

of wi tne sse s and

the we ig ht a

nd va lue g ive n th e ir

te sti mony is re so lve d b y

the tr ia l c ourt ,-6-

and not this Court. Ho ne

y c utt , 54 S.W .3d at 766-67. Howeve r, the trial cour t’s application of the l aw to the f

acts is re viewed de novo , without a presumption of cor rec tness. F

i e ld s v . Stat e , 40 S.W .3d 450, 458 (Tenn. 2001) . A claim that c o u n s el rendere d ineffe ctive assistanc e is a mix ed question of fac t a

nd law and the ref

ore a lso subject to de novo re view. Id. ; Burns , 6 S.W .3d at 461. When a petitioner see ks post-convicti o n relief on the basis of inef fec tive assistance of counsel, he must establish that counsel’s perfo rmanc e fe ll below “the r ang e of c ompetence demande d of attorne y s in criminal case s.” Ba x te r v . R os e , 5 2 3 S

. W

. 2 d

9 3 0 , 9 3 6 ( T e n n

. 1 9 7 5 )

. In
a dd iti on , he mu st s ho w that c ouns e l’ s in e ff e c tiv e pe rf

or manc e a c tua lly

a dv e rs e ly

imp a c te d h is defe nse. Strickland v. W ashington , 466 U.S. 668, 693, 104 S. C t. 2052, 2067, 80 L . Ed. 2d 674 (1 98 4) . In r e vie wi ngc ouns e l’ s p e rf or manc e , th e dis tor

tio ns of hin ds ig ht m

us t be a vo ide d, and

thi s Court will not s econ d -gu es s counsel’s de cisions reg ardingtrial strateg ies and tac tics. Hellard v. State, 62 9 S. W.2 d 4 , 9 (Ten n. 19 82 ). The re vie wi ngc ourt , th e re fo re , s ho uld no t c on c lud e that a pa rt ic ula r a c t or omi ssi on by c ouns e l is unre a so na

ble me re ly

be c a us e the str a te g y

wa s uns uc c e ssf

ul. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S. Ct. at 2065. Rather, c ounsel’s alleg ed er rors should be judg ed from counse l’s perspe ctive at t h e p oint of time they wer e made in light of a ll the fac ts and circ umstances at that time. Strickland , 466 U.S. at 690, 104 S. Ct . at 2066. A petitioner must satisfy

both prong s of the Strickland test befor e he or she may preva il on
a claim of ineffe ctive assistance of counse l. See H enley v. State, 960 S.W .2d 572, 580 (Tenn. 1997)

. Th a t is , a pe tit ion e r m

us t not on ly sh ow tha t hi s c ouns e l’ s p e rf or manc e fe ll b e low

a c c e pta ble standards, but that such pe rfor mance was pre

judicial to the petitioner. Id. F a il u r e to s a ti s f y e it h er p ro ng will result in the denial of re lief. Id. A c c o r d in g ly , th is Co u rt n e e d n o t a d dr e s s one of the components if the pe titioner fails to establish the other. Strickland , 466 U.S. at 697, 104 S. Ct . at 2069.

B. Inadequate Repre sentation Petitioner argues that the time his trial counsel spent with him prior to trial wa s insufficient to a de qu a te ly pr e pa

re a de fe ns e or to inf

or m Pe tit ion e r of the c ha

rg e s a g a ins t hi m. P e tit ion e r a lso claims that his trial counsel fa i l ed t o co n s ult with him about potential witnesses whose testimony may have be en bene ficial to Petitioner’s def ense. When a

petitio n er claims that his counsel’s repr esentation was inadequate, he or s h e “m u s t show that counsel’s r epre sentation fell below a n objective standa

rd of r easona

bleness.” S

tr ic k land , 466 U .S. a t 68 8, 10 4 S. Ct. a t 20 64 ; Burns , 6 S.W .3d at 462. In our re view, we must ex ten d t o co unsel “a strong presumption that his or her conduct fell within the wide rang e of re asonable profe ssional assistance.” Strickland , 466 U.S. at 689.

Th e tr ia l c ourt

fo un d th a t c ouns e l’ s c on su ltatio n w ithPe tit ion e r p ri or to t ri a l a s w e ll a s h is prepa ration for trial far exceede d the rang e of conduct expected of defe nse attorney s as outlined by
our supreme c ourt in Baxter

. Petitioner’s descr iption of counsel’s activities prior to trial varie d from those portra

y ed by counsel. The trial court, howe ver, s p e c if ic a lly acc redited the testimony

of counse l-7-

and re solved all inconsistencies in the State’ s favor . We conclude that the evidenc e does not preponde rate ag ainst the trial cour t’s finding that counsel’s a ssistance wa s not ineffe ctive.

Petitioner also contends that his counse l failed to consult with him as to whether Petitioner’ s ne ig hb or sh ou ld h a ve be e n c a lle d to te sti fy fo r t he de fe ns e . H e poin ts ou t th a t tr ia l c ouns e l ha s a d u t y t o ca l l wi t n es s es wh o m ay b e o f b en ef

i tt o t h e d ef

en s e c i t i n g State v. Zimmerman , 823 S.W .2d 220, 227 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991)

. Whil e an atto rn e y

sh ou ld c on su lt w ith his c lie nt as of te n as ne c e ssa

ry , tac tic a l and

str a te g ic decisions as to how the ca se should be pre sented a nd manag ed ar e g ener ally left to the def

endant’ s counsel. S

e e F a r e t t a v

. C

a l i f or nia , 4 2 2 U. S. 806, 820, 95 S. C t. 2525, 2534, 45 L . Ed. 2d 562 (1 97 5) ; He lla rd

v . S tate , 6 29 S.W. 2d

4, 9 ( Te nn . 1 98 2) ; Baxter , 523 S.W .2d at 932-33 (quoting United States v. De Coster , 487 F.2d 1197, 1203- 04 (D.C. C ir. 1973)). Our defe renc e to counse l’s ta c tic a l de c isi on s, ho we ve r, a pp lie s o nly

if “ the c ho ic e s a

re inf or me d o nes bas ed up on

a de qu a te prepa ration.” Coo

pe r v . S tate , 8 4 7 S

. W

. 2 d

5 2 1 , 5 2 8 (T en n

. C ri m

. Ap p

. 1 9 9 2 ) ( ci t i n g He lla rd , 629 S.W. 2d a t 9; De Cos ta , 487 F.2d at 1201). Petitioner contends that his neig hbor could have testified that the vic tim left P et i t i o n er’s house ca lmly

rathe r than in a hur

ried manne r as por

tr ay ed b y t h e S t ate. Counsel testified that the investigator interviewe d the neig hbor who said that he did not see any thing on the da

y of the in c id e n t. B a s e d o n th is in te r v ie w , c o u n s e l d e te r

mi n e d th a t th e n e ig hb o r c o u ld n o t pr ovide any evidenc e that would be be nefic ial to Petiti oner’ s defe nse.
The t ri al court accr edited the testimony of Petitioner’s counse l conce rning the potential testimony , or lac k there of, of this witness. Moreove r, the trial c ourt conc luded, and we ag ree , that Pe tit ion e r f

a ile d to sh owthat he wa s p re jud ic e d by the a

bs e nc e of thi s witn e ss at tr ia l. I n ord e r t o support his claim that trial counsel fa iled to call ce rtain witnesses to Petitioner ’ s d etriment, Petitioner must show, throug h the witness’ testimony at the evide ntiary

hear ing, that he would have testified favor ably and provide d critica l evidence in support of Petitioner’s def ense. Black, 794 S. W.2d at 757. Wit hout any

proof at the post-conviction hearing as t o the t estimony the witness would have offe red, P et i t i o n er

ca n n o td em o n s t ra t e t h at h e w as p re j u d i ce d b y co u n s el ’s fa i l u re t o ca l l h i s n eighbor to testify on his behalf. Id. Petitioner is not entitl ed to re lief on this issue.

C. Failure to Request a Charg e on L esser -Included Of fense s Although Petitioner c oncede s that a jury instruct i o n o n lesser- included off enses wa s discussed by

his trial counsel and the t rial court prior to the t rial court’s char g e to the jury , Petitioner contends that his trial counse l was ineff ective f or not making a for

mal reque st for an instruc tion on assault as a

lesser inc luded-off

ense of attempted ra

pe. Counsel testified that h e d id not press the issue beca

use he did not think the evidence would support such a n instruction. Following the d i s c u s s i o ni n w h i c h c o u n s e l r a i s e d t h e i s s u e o f l e s s e r
- i n c l u d e d o f f e n s e s , t h e t r i a l c o u rt , a l b e i tt a c i t l y, de c lin e d to c ha

rg e the jur

y on any of fe ns e s o the r t

ha n th e c ha rg e d o ff e ns e s.-8-

The post-c onviction court found that Petitioner fa iled to show that he wa s prejudice d by trial counsel’s f

ailure to pursue a cha

rg e on lesser -included of

fense s. Although c onceding that such an instruction might have been r equire d, the post-conviction court conclude d that the er ror, if a ny , was harmless be y ond a re asonable doubt beca use the jury convicted Petiti oner of both attempted ra pe and attempted sexual battery

. See State v . W illiams , 977 S.W .2d 101 (Tenn. 1998)

.
I n his br ie f, Pe tit ion e r lim its his argume nt t o tr ia l c ouns e l’ s f a ilure to m or e a g g re ssi ve ly pr e ss for a n instruction on lesser-inc luded offens es. The duty to instruct on applicable le sser-inc luded offe nses, howeve r, re sides with the trial court r eg ardle ss of whethe r or not def ense c ounsel makes
su c h a re qu e st. Te nn

. Cod e Ann. § 4 0-1 8-1 10 (1 99 7) ; State v. Burns , 6 S.W .3d 453, 464 (Tenn. 1999). The tr ial court indicated to counsel that it was disi nclined to consider c harg ing the jury on any of fe ns e oth e r tha

n tho se c ha

rg e d. Pe tit ion e r h a s f

a ile d to sh owthat a

mor e a g g re ssi ve re qu e st by trial counsel for a charg e on assault as a lesser- included off

ense w ould have swa

y ed the tria l court to provide such a

n instruction. As this Court has previously noted, “[a]ny

defic iency

of per formanc e in fa iling to press the instruction iss u e [ wh en the tria l court re fuses to g ive the re quested instruction] would have to be attributed t o a

p p e ll a te counsel.” Y

as mo nd Fe nd e rso n v . S tate , No. E2001-01088- CCA-R3-PC, 2002 W L 832205 (Tenn. Crim. App., Knoxville, May 2, 2002), perm. to appeal de nied ( T e n n

. 2 0 0 2 ). Pe t i t i o n er did not contend that his appellate counsel wa s ineffe ctive for failing to appea l the trial
c ourt ’s ins tr

uc tio ns to t

he ju ry , n or

did Pe tit ion e r o ff

e r p ro of a t th e po st- c on vic tio n h e ari ngto
e sta bli shany de fi c ie nc ie s in

the pe rf or manc e of his a pp e llate c ouns e l. Pet iti on e r i s n ot e nti tle d to relief on this iss ue.

IV . C ar e e r Offen de r St at us Petitioner argues that he was denied eff ective assistance of

counsel at his sentencing hear ing when his t rial counsel failed to object to Petitioner’s classification as a c are er of fende r for purposes of dete rmining his sente nce. Petitioner also argues that appe llate counse l was ineff ective f or fa iling to r a ise Pe tit ion e r’ s im

pr op e r o ff

e nd e r c la ssi fi c a tio n o n a

pp e a l.

A “ca ree r offe nder” is a defe ndant who has rec eived “any combination of six (6) o r m o re Class A, B, or

C prior felony convictions, and the defe ndant’s conviction offe nse is a Class A, B , or C f e lony .” Te nn . Co de Ann. § 40 -3 5- 10 8( a )( 1)

. I f a de fe nd ant i s d e te rm ine d b e y on d a re a so na ble doubt t o b e a car eer

offe nder, the defe ndant’s sente nce is set at the maxi mum term within the applicable Rang e I I I

. Id. § - 10 8( c ). Th e re le a se e lig ibi lity fo r a c are e r of fe nd e r d oe s n ot o c c ur

un til afte r ser vice of 60% of the imposed se ntence less any sentenc e cr edits. Id. § -501(f ).
A “pe rsistent offe nder,” as re levant her e, is a def endant who ha s rec eived “ [a] ny combination of five or more prior

felony convictions within the conviction class or highe r, or within the next two (2) lower felony

classes, w here applicable .” Id

. § -107(a )(1) . I f a de fenda nt is determined to be a persistent offe nder, he or she is se ntence d within Range I I I

. Id. § -107(c ). The r elea se elig ibilit y for-9-

a Rang e I I I , persistent off ender , occur s after

service of 45% of

the impo sed sentenc e less any sentenc e cr edits. Id . § -501(e ).

P et i t i o n er wa s co n v i ct edo f a t t em p t edrap e, a C l as s C fe l o n y

. At t h e p o s t -c o n v i ct i o nh ea ri n g, the State sti pu late d that Peti tio ne r’ s pri or c on vic tio ns c on sis te d of six Cla ss E f e lon ie s and

on e Cla ss D fe lony . Petitioner’s prior fe lony convic t i o n s ar e clea

rly inadequate to support a findingthat Petitioner is a car eer

offe nder a s defined in s e c ti o n 4 0

- 3 5 -108(a )(1) . These c onvictions are, how ever , sufficie nt to support a persistent off ender classification under sec tion 40-35-107(a )(1)

. The State c oncede d in its brief that the off ender classification assigne d to Petit i o n er w as improper ther eby

implicitl y

conce ding the ineffe ctiveness of counsel in fa i l i n g to object to the offe nder c lassification used by the trial court to de termine Petitioner’s sentenc e for attempted ra

pe.
A def endant is entitled to the assistance of an attorney whose role includes bring ing “ such
s k i l l an d kn o wl ed ge a s wi l l re n d er

t h e tr i al a re l i ab l e ad v er s ar i al t es t i n g p ro ce s s ” a n d t h e p ro ce ed i n gs fair. Strickland , 466 U.S. at 685, 688, 104 S. Ct . at 2063, 2065. Trial c ounsel’s conduc t is measured by an o bje c tiv e sta

nd ard of re a so na

ble ne ss, and the pe tit ion e r b e ars the burd e n o f p ro vin g that hi s counsel’s conduct fell outside “the wide rang e of profe ssionally competent assistance.” Id . at 688, 699, 104 S. Ct . at 2064, 2066. Amon g co u n s el ’s d uties is the require ment that counsel c onduct p r o p e r le g a l inv e s ti g ation. B a xter , 5 2 3 S

. W

. 2 d at 9 3 3 (q u o t i n g DeCoster , 487 F.2d at 1203-04.) “[E] ffe ctive counse l must be awar e of the possible punishment a pplicable to his or her

client.” Dean
v . S tat e , 59 S

. W

. 3 d 663, 668 (Tenn. 2001) . We conclude that the conduct of Petitioner’s trial
c ouns e l in fa ili ngto e ns ur e that Pe tit ion e r w a s se nte nc e d in a c c or da nc e wi th statut or

y g uid e lin e s f

e ll below the r ang e of c ompetence demande d of attorne y s in criminal case s. S ee i d

. (trial counse l’s failure to obje ct to or appea l the improper jury instruction on the rang e of th e d ef endant’ s punis hme nt c on sti tut e d in e ff e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e ); see also He nley, 9 6 0 S

. W

. 2 d at 5 7 9 (c i t i n g Baxter , 523 S.W .2d at 936). Clearly , if trial counsel had objected to Petitioner’s c lassification as a car eer of fe nd e r at th e sente nc inghe ari ng , th e tr ia l c ourt wo uld have ha d th e op po rt

un ity to c or re c tly sentenc e Petitioner base d on his prior felony rec ord.

Mo re ov e r, wh ile a

pp e llate c ouns e l is no t c on sti tut ion a lly re qu ir e d to ra ise e ve ry

c on c e iva ble issue on appea l, failure to r aise a n “obvious and signi fica

nt issue” such a s the one now be fore us ind ic a te s c on du c t f

a lli ng ou tsi de the re a so na ble ra ng e of c omp e te nc e e xten de d to de fe ns e c ouns e l. Se e Car pe nte r v . S

tate , _ _ S. W.3 d _

_, 20 04 WL51 81 8, *6 (T e nn . 2 00 4) ; Dean , 59 S.W .3d at 668- 69 . O nc e Pe tit ion e r e sta

bli sh e d h is p ri or

fe lony re c or d, the tr ia l c ourt wa s ob lig a te d to se nte nc e him in a c c or da

nc e wi th s tatut or

y g uid e lin e s. Te nn . Co de Ann. §§ 40 -3 5- 10 7( c ) a nd -1 08 (c ); Te nn . R. Crim. P. 32(b)

. I t is clear that had appe llate counse l raised the issue of Petitioner’s improper classification as a ca

ree r off ender b as ed on the inadequa cy of his felony

convictions, this Court would have r em anded the case for a new se ntencinghear ing. Petitioner ha s thus satisfied the prejudice prongof the Strickland test. See Strick

land , 466 U.S. at 691-92, 104 S. Ct. at 2066-67.

Whe n a pet iti on e r re c e ive s ine ff e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e fr om co un se l on an issu e pe rt a ini ngon ly to sentencing , the extent of the relief available under our

post-conviction statutes is to set aside the-10-

sentenc e and order a new sentenc ing hear ing. Sta te v . Ke nn e th S . G rif fin , No. E2000-02471- CCAR3-CD, 2001 WL 710178, *2 (Tenn. Crim. App., Knoxville, J une 25, 2001), perm. to appeal de nied (T e nn . 2 00 1) ; see also Goad v . State, 93 8 S.W.2 d 363 (T e nn . 1 99 6) ; Hartman v. State, 896 S.W .2d 94 (T e nn . 1 99 5) ; Brimme r v . S tate , 29 S.W .3d 497 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998)

.
Te nn e sse e Cod e Anno tate d s e c tio n 4 0- 30 -1 11 (a ) p ro vid e s th a t:

I f a tr ia l c ourt

fi nd s th a t the re wa s su c h a de nia l or inf ri ng e me nt of the ri g hts of the prisone r as to render the judgme nt void or voidable, including a finding that trial counsel was ineffe ctive on direc t appea l, the court shall vacate and se t aside the judgme nt or order

a dela y ed appe al as provided in this part and shall enter an appropr iate orde r and a

ny supplementary

order s that may

be nec essar

y and prope r.
There is nothing in the languag e of se ct ion 40-30-111(a ) that prohibits a trial cour t from order ing a new se ntencinghear ing when the petitioner is prejudice d by the ineff ective a ssistance of counsel only

during the sent en ci ng phase or on appea l as to a sentenc ing issue, but not during the g uilt phase of the tri al p ro ce ed i n gs. Cf. W all ac e v . S tate , 121 S.W .3d 652, 658 (Tenn. 2003) (nothing in the l anguag e of section 40-30-111(a) limit s the di scre tion of t he trial court in gr anting a dela y ed appe al to circ umstances whe re the petitioner wa s completely denied a direc t appea l). At the post-conviction hear ing, the State conce ded that Petitioner was improperly classified
as a c are er of

fende r, but argued that this g round for relief had been pre viously deter mined on direc t appea l and was the ref

ore w aived. Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-30- 106(g ). Alt h o u g h the trial cour t be lie ve d th a t Pe tit ion e r’ s se nte nc ingiss ue ha d “ so me me ri t,” it g ra nte d th e State ’s mot ion

to d ism iss thi s is su e a s p re vio us ly

de te rm ine d. We r e sp e c tf ull y dis a g re e wi th t

he tr ia l c ourt ’s c on c lus ion s. Petitioner’s appe llate counse l raised two se n t en cing issues on appea l, one of whic h is not rele vant to his post-conviction appea l. I n his second issue, Petitioner cha lleng ed his ca ree r off ender classification, not because of an ina dequate felony rec ord, but under an argument that the State had failed to provide sufficie nt notice that i t intended to seek an enhanc ed sentence. We c oncluded that the State’s notice w as suffic ient under Te nnessee Code Annotated s ec t i o n 4 0-35-202( a), a nd Petitioner failed to show a ny prejudice from an a lleg ed defic iency in the notice. Taylor , 63 S.W .3d
a t 41 3. Al tho ug h th is Co urt imp lic itl y up he ld P e tit ion e r’ s o ff

e nd e r c la ssi fi c a tio n, we did so on ly within the context of the issue raised by Petitioner’s appe llate counse l.
A p art ic ula

r a c t, e rr or or omi ssi on oc c ur ri ng duri ng the c ours e of

a tr ia l, h ow e ve r, may

ra ise
sever al distinct issues all related to the same er ror. F or example, the issuance of a searc h war rant
may be c ha lle ng e d a s la c kin g pr ob a ble c a us e or be c a

us e the ma g istra

te fa ile d to c omp ly

wi th R ule 41(c) of the Te nnessee Rules of Criminal Procedure . I f a de fenda nt challeng es o n l y t h e l ack of p ro b ab le ca

use on direc t appea l, then under the trial court’ s conclusion in the ca se sub judice , the defe ndant in our example w ould not be able to raise a n issue as to the ineff

ectivene ss of counsel f

or failing to challeng e the mag istrate’s f ailure to c omply

with Rule 41(c). We do not believe that the
rea ch of the definition of a pr eviously deter mined issue under se ction 40-30-106( g ) is so broad.-11-

“A g round for

relief is previously deter

mined if a c ourt of compe tent jurisdiction has ruled on the merits af

ter a full and fa ir hea

ring .” Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-30-106( g ). A full and f air he aring is a proce eding in which the petitioner is able to present pr oof and a rg ument on the claim. Carter
v . S tat e , 9 5 8 S

. W

. 2 d

6 2 0 , 6 2 5 (T en n

. 1 9 9 7 ) ( qu o t i n g Ho us e v . S tate , 911 S.W .2d 705, 711 (Tenn. 199 5)). Petitioner did not raise , nor did we r eview, the appropr iateness of Petitioner’s offe nder classification based upon a r eview of his prior criminal rec ord. The pr oof and a rg ument nece ssary to sustain Petit ioner’s c ontention that he was improperly classified a s a ca

ree r off ender based on a

n insufficient number

and g rade of prior felony convictions is differ ent from the pr oof and a rg ument require d to addre ss Petiti oner’ s contention that the State’s notice to seek an enhanc ed sente nce w as defici en t

. T h u s, the issue of improper offe nder c lassification has not bee n previously deter mined as conte mplated by

Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 40-30-106(g ).

I n it s bri e f, the State re qu e sts thi s Cour t to re mand

fo r a ne w s e nte nc inghe ari ngfo r t he so le purpose of

corr ectingPetitioner’s rele ase eligibility to occur afte r 45% of the imposed sentenc e. The trial court, on the othe r hand, in its order denying Petitioner’ s petition for post-convicti on relief , a sk e d th is C ourt

to r e ins tate a ll o f P e tit ion e r’ s c on vic tio ns in the e ve nt a ne w se nte nc inghe ari ngis g rante d. The trial co u rt es s enti ally envisions that this action would return Petitioner’s c ase to the status it occupied prior to the or igina l sentencing hear ing and s ubsequent a ppeal, ther eby

g iving the State the opportunity

to choose whe ther to pursue the ag g ravated kidnapping , attempted ra pe, or at t em p t eds ex u al b at t ery

co n v i ct i o nd

u ri n g s en t en ci n g.
The doc trine of the la

w of the c ase, how ever , dictates that the de cision of the appe llate cour t must be followed by

the trial cour

t upon remand. State v. Carter , 114 S.W .3d 895, 902 (Tenn. 2003) (c i t i n g State v. Je

fferson , 31 S.W .3d 558, 561 (Tenn. 2000)). “In other wor ds, under the la w of the
c a se do c tr ine , a

n a pp e llate c ourt ’s de c isi on

on an is su e of

law i s b ind ing in late r tr ia ls a nd a pp e a ls of the same c a se if

the fa c ts o n th e se c on d tr ia l or a pp e a l are s ub sta

nti a lly the same a s th e fa c ts i n the first trial or a

ppeal.” Mem

phis Pu blishing Co. v. Tennesse e Pe troleum Underground Storage Tan k Bo ar d , 975 S.W .2d 303, 306 (Tenn. 1998). This Court’ s dismis sal of Petitioner’s a g g ravated kid na pp ingand a tte mpt e d s e xua l batte ry

c on vic tio ns on dir e c t a

pp e a l e sta bli sh e s the law of

the c a se an d p re cludes “ reinstateme nt” of Petitioner’s c onvictions for these of fense s on remand on Petitioner’s post-conviction appe al. We are not setting aside P etitioner’s conviction for attempted rape in this post -convic tion appeal, only his sentence for the attempted rape conviction.

We also decline to follow the State’ s sugg estion that we re m an d o n ly for the pur

pose of
corr ectingPetitioner’s elig ibilit y rele ase c lassificati o n t o 45%, leaving the leng th of his sentence
u n d i s turb edat fi ft ee ny ea rs

. T h e t ri al co u rt i n d i ca t edat t h e p o s t -c o n v i ct i o nh ea ri n g t h at al t h o u gh Pe tit ion e r’ s r e le a se e lig ibi lity mig ht b e re du c e d on re mand , the le ng th o f P e tit ion e r’ s se nte nc e wo uld most li kely

rema in at fiftee n y ear s. Nonethele ss, we are remanding this matter for a new sentenc ing hear ing dur ing w hich the leng th of Petitioner’s sentenc e as w e lla s Pe ti ti o n e r ’ s offe nder c lassification should be consider ed.

On c e Pe tit ion e r w a s c la ssi fi e d a s a c are e r o ff

e nd e r, the tr ia l c ourt

ha d n o c ho ic e bu t to
se nte nc e Petit ion e r t o th e ma ximumse nte nc e in R ang e I I Ifo r a Cla ss C fe lony , o r f

if te e n y e ars

.-12-

Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-108( c). A persistent offe nder, on the other ha nd, is subject to a sentenc e within Rang e I I I , which in this case is betwee n ten and f ifteen y ear s. Id. § -107(c ). The pr esumptive sentenc e for a Class C felony is the minim um sentence in the rang e if ther e ar e no enha nceme nt or mitigating fac tor s prese nt. Id . § -210(c ). The State ha s the burden of proving any

enhanc ement fac tors which jus tify a departure from the mini mum sentence

. State v. Gutierrez , 5 S.W .3d 641, 644 (T en n

. 1 9 9 9 ) ( ci t i n g Sta te v . P oo le , 9 45 S.W.2d 93 , 1 00 (T e nn . 1 99 7) ). L ike wi se , a pp lic a ble mitigating fac tors, if any , may reduc e the e nhance d sentenc e. Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-35- 113. On
rema nd, the State must prove the e x istence of one or more enhance ment fac tors in order to justi fy a sente nce longe r t han the pr esumptive minimum sentenc e of te n y ear s, and Petitioner will have the opportunity

to offer any evidenc e in mitigation of his sente nce.

CO NC LU SION

Af te r a c are fu l r e vie w o f t

he re c or d, we a ff

ir m the jud g me nt o f t

he tr ia l in pa rt and re ve rs e in part and r emand f

or a ne w sentenc ing he aringin acc ordanc e with this opinion.

___________________________________ THOMAS T. WOODAL L , J UDGE