No. 19-1398

IN THE 

Supreme Court of the United States

REPRESENTATIVE TED LIEU ET AL.,

Petitioners,

v.

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION,

Respondent.

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari 

to the United States Court of Appeals for the 

Federal Circuit

BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE POLITICAL SCIENTISTS

GINGER D. ANDERS.

Counsel of Record

JONATHAN S. MELTZER

LAUREN E. ROSS

MUNGER, TOLLES & OLSON LLP

1155 F Street NW, 7th Floor

Washington, DC 20004-1357

(202) 220-1100

Ginger.Anders@mto.com

Counsel for Amici Curiae 
i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE................................ 1

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT .................................... 3

ARGUMENT............................................................... 6

I. SUPER PACS HAVE BECOME A MAJOR 

FORCE IN FEDERAL ELECTIONS, 

GREATLY EXPANDING THE ROLE OF 

UNLIMITED CONTRIBUTIONS IN THE 

CAMPAIGN FINANCE SYSTEM................... 6

A. Super PAC Spending Has Skyrocketed 

since SpeechNow ................................... 6

B. A Small Number of Super PACs have 

Been Responsible for the 

Overwhelming Majority of Super PAC 

Independent Expenditures ................. 11

C. Super PACs’ Independent 

Expenditures Are Mainly 

Concentrated in Competitive 

Campaigns, Enhancing Their 

Potential Influence over Elections...... 15

II. SUPER PACS’ CLOSE ASSOCIATION AND 

INFORMAL COORDINATION WITH 

CANDIDATES AND PARTIES WEAKENS 

THE EFFECTIVENESS OF

CONTRIBUTION LIMITS APPLYNG ONLY 

TO CANDIDATES AND PARTIES............... 17

A. Super PACs and Candidates or 

Parties Broadcast The Fact that 

Particular Super PACs’ Sole Purposes 
ii

Are to Support a Particular Candidate 

or Party................................................ 18

B. Single-Candidate and Party-Centered 

Super PACs are Often Staffed By 

Individuals Whose Backgrounds Make 

Clear Their Associations With and 

Abilities to Assist a Particular 

Candidate or Party.............................. 20

C. Super PACs Undertake a Variety of 

Campaign Functions to Complement 

and Amplify Candidates’ Efforts ........ 21

III. “DUAL GIVING” UNDERMINES FEDERAL 

CONTRIBUTION LIMITS ............................ 23

A. A Small Number of Wealthy 

Individual Donors Provide the Vast 

Majority of Individual Contributions 

to Super PACs ..................................... 23

B. A Small Number of Organizational 

Donors Provide the Vast Majority of 

Organizational Contributions to Super 

PACs. ................................................... 25

C. Wealthy Donors’ Dual Giving To 

Parties or Candidates and the Super 

PACs Supporting Them Undermines 

Federal Contribution Limits............... 26
iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

FEDERAL CASES

FEC v. Colorado Republican Fed. 

Campaign Comm.,

533 U.S. 431 (2001) ................................................2

SpeechNow.org v. Federal Election 

Commission,

599 F.3d 686 (D.C. Cir. 2010) ...................... passim

FEDERAL STATUTES

52 U.S.C. § 30101(17) ..................................................4

52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(1)(C)...........................................3

FEDERAL REGULATIONS

11 C.F.R. §§ 109.20–109.23 .......................................17

OTHER AUTHORITIES

2018 Top Donors to Outside Spending 

Groups, OpenSecrets.org, 

https://www.opensecrets.org/outsides

pending/summ.php?cycle=2018&disp

=D&type=O&superonly=S ...................................25
iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

(continued)

Page(s)

2020 Outside Spending, by Super PAC, 

OpenSecrets.org, 

https://www.opensecrets.org/outsides

pending/summ.php?chrt=V&type=S; 

2020 Outside Spending, by Group, 

OpenSecrets.org, 

https://www.opensecrets.org/outsides

pending/summ.php?chrt=V&type=H............. 11, 12

America First Super PAC, 

https://www.a1apac.org/.......................................18

Raymond Arke, Linda McMahon, 

Trump Donor and Cabinet Member, 

to Head Pro-Trump Super PAC (April 

1, 2019), 

https://www.opensecrets.org/news/20

19/04/linda-mcmahon-to-head-protrump-super-pac/ ..................................................21

Anne Baker, The Fundraising 

Disadvantages Confronting American 

Political Parties, 13 The Forum 223 

(2015) ....................................................................27

Michael Barber, Donation Motivations: 

Testing Theories of Access and 

Ideology, 69 Political Research 

Quarterly 148 (2016)...................................... 27, 28
v

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

(continued)

Page(s)

Michael Beckel, Senate Majority Leader 

Harry Reid Solicits Cash for New 

Democratic Super PAC (June 22, 

2011), 

https://www.opensecrets.org/news/20

11/06/senate-majority-leader-harryreid-solicits/ ..........................................................19

Bipartisan Policy Center, Campaign 

Finance in the United States: 

Assessing an Era of Fundamental 

Change (Jan. 2018), 

https://bipartisanpolicy.org/report/the

-state-of-campaign-finance...................................22

Adam Bonica, Expert Report, Equal 

Citizens (2018), 

https://equalcitizens.us/wpcontent/uploads/2018/10/BonicaExpert-Report.pdf.................................................24

Richard Briffault, Coordination 

Reconsidered, 113 Colum. L. Rev. 

Sidebar 88 (May 2, 2013) .....................................17

Richard Briffault, Super PACs, 96 Minn. 

L. Rev. 1644 (2012)......................................... 3, 4, 9
vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

(continued)

Page(s)

Campaign Finance Institute, Press 

Release: Political Parties and 

Candidates Dominated the 2016 

House Elections While Holding Their 

Own in the Senate (April 13, 2017), 

http://www.cfinst.org/pdf/federal/cong

ress/2016/PartyIE_Table3.pdf .............................16

Nicholas Confessore & Eric Lichtblau, 

‘Campaigns’ Aren’t Necessarily 

Campaigns in the Age of ‘Super 

PACs’, New York Times, May 17, 

2015, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/18/us/politics/super-pacs-are-remaking-16-campaigns-official-or-not.html ...................................18

Contribution Limits for 2019-2020,

https://www.fec.gov/resources/cmscontent/documents/contribution_limit

s_chart_2019-2020.pdf ..................................... 6, 24

Corporate & LLC Contributions to 

SuperPACs, OpenSecrets.org, 

https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/

d/138cCta_eIYHToVqDZdsV4mCM7q

BYHEjWgCxvUU3sR6Q/edit#gid=75

8087243.................................................................25

Anthony Corrado, The Regulatory 

Environment of the 2016 Election, in 

Financing the 2016 Election .......................... 22, 23
vii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

(continued)

Page(s)

Diana Dwyre & Evelyn Braz, Super PAC 

Spending: Strategies and Goals, 13 

The Forum 245 (2015).............................. 11, 12, 16

Diana Dwyre, Political Parties and 

Campaign Finance: What Role Do the 

National Parties Play?, Paper 

prepared for the Campaign Finance 

Task Force, Bipartisan Policy Center, 

Washington, D.C. (revised May 

2017), 

https://bipartisanpolicy.org/wpcontent/uploads/2019/05/PoliticalParties-and-Campaign-FinanceWhat-Role-Do-the-National-PartiesPlay.-Diana-Dwyre.-DianaDwyre.pdf................................................................9

John DiStaso, Pro-GOP Super PAC 

begins $15 million fall ad campaign 

attacking Hassan, WMUR (Sept. 1, 

2016), 

https://www.wmur.com/article/progop-super-pac-begins-15-million-fallad-campaign-attackinghassan/5214664 ....................................................21

Victoria A. Farrar-Myers & Richard 

Skinner, Super PACs and the 2012 

Elections, 10 The Forum 105 (2013).............. 17, 23
viii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

(continued)

Page(s)

Peter Francia, John Green, Paul 

Herrnson, Lynda Powell & Clyde 

Wilcox, The Financiers of 

Congressional Elections (2003) ............................28

James Gimpel, Frances Lee & Shanna 

Pearson-Merkowitz, The Check is in 

the Mail: Interdistrict Funding Flows 

in Congressional Elections, 52 

American Journal of Political Science 

373 (2008) .............................................................28

Granite State Solutions, 

OpenSecrets.org, 

https://www.opensecrets.org/pacs/ind

expend.php?cmte=C00580381&cycle

=2016.....................................................................10

John C. Green, Financing the 2016 

Presidential Nomination Campaigns,

in Financing the 2016 Election ...................... 10, 15

Paul S. Herrnson, Jennifer A. Heerwig, 

& Douglas M. Spencer, The Impact of 

Organizational Characteristics on 

Super PAC Financing, in The State 

of the Parties (John C. Green, Daniel 

J. Coffey, & David B. Cohen, eds., 

2018).................................................... 11, 21, 22, 25
ix

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

(continued)

Page(s)

Karl Evers-Hillstrom, Biden Statement 

Guides Donors from one Super PAC 

to Another, OpenSecrets.org (May 20, 

2020), 

https://www.opensecrets.org/news/20

20/05/biden-guides-super-paccontribs/ ................................................................20

Jeb Bush, OpenSecrets.org, 

https://www.opensecrets.org/pres16/c

andidate?id=N00037006 ......................................10

Robin Kolodny & Diana Dwyre, 

Convergence or Divergence: Do 

Parties and Outside Groups Spend on 

the Same Candidates and Does it 

Matter? 46 American Political 

Research 375 (2018) ....................................... 15, 16

David B. Magleby, Change and 

Continuity in the Financing of the 

2016 Election, in Financing the 2016 

Election .................................................................22

David B. Magleby and Jay Goodliffe, 

Interest Groups in the 2016 Election 

in Financing the 2016 Election .......... 12, 15, 19, 24
x

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

(continued)

Page(s)

Thomas E. Mann & Anthony Corrado, 

Party Polarization and Campaign 

Finance, Brookings Center for 

Effective Public Management (July 

15, 2014). 

https://www.brookings.edu/research/

party-polarization-and-campaignfinance/..................................................................16

New Hampshire Senate 2016 Race, 

OpenSecrets.org, 

https://www.opensecrets.org/races/su

mmary?cycle=2016&id=NHS1.............................11

Molly E. Reynolds & Richard L. Hall, 

Financing the 2016 Congressional 

Election, in Financing the 2016 

Election ................................................................10

Jesse H. Rhodes, Brian F. Schaffner & 

Raymond J. La Raja, Detecting and 

Understanding Donor Strategies in 

Midterm Elections 71 Political 

Research Quarterly, 503 (2018)...........................28

Spending in Federal Elections 2010-

2018, OpenSecrets.org, 

https://www.opensecrets.org/outsides

pending/index.php?type=Y&filter=S .....................7
xi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

(continued)

Page(s)

Stipulated Order and Consent Judgment, Carey v. Federal Election 

Commission, Civ. No. 11-259 RMC 

(D.D.C Aug. 19, 2011), ECF No. 28 .......................7

Super Connected, Public Citizen

(October 14, 2014), 

https://www.citizen.org/wpcontent/uploads/super-connected2014-citizens-united-outside-groupsreport.pdf ..............................................................19

Super Connected (2014), Public Citizen, 

update on report published in 

October 2014 (January 14, 2015).........................21

Super PACs: How Many Donors Give, 

OpenSecrets.org, 

https://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/donorstats?cycle=2018&type=I ............................... 23, 24

Super PACs: How Many Donors Give, 

OpenSecrets.org, 

https://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/donorstats?cycle=2020&type=O....................................25
xii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

(continued)

Page(s)

Ian Vandewalker, Shadow Campaigns: 

The Shift in Presidential Campaign 

Funding to Outside Groups, Brennan 

Center for Justice (Aug. 2019), 

https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/

default/files/analysis/Shadow_Campa

igns.pdf ........................................................... 19, 20

Stephen R. Weissman, Joe Biden’s 

Super PAC Stumble, The Hill (Nov. 

20, 2019)................................................................19

Stephen R. Weissman, The SpeechNow 

Case and the Real World of 

Campaign Finance, Free Speech for 

People (Oct. 2016), 

https://freespeechforpeople.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/10/FSFPWeissman-Report-final-10-24-16.pdf............. 26, 27

Stephen R. Weissman, The SpeechNow 

Case and the Real World of 

Campaign Finance, Part II: 

Undermining Federal Limits on 

Contributions to Political Parties, 

Free Speech For People (May 2017), 

https://freespeechforpeople.org/wpcontent/uploads/2017/05/ResearchReport-2017_01.pdf ..............................................27
xiii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

(continued)

Page(s)

Alan Zibel, Oligarch Overload, Public 

Citizen, 

https://www.citizen.org/article/oligarc

h-overload/ ............................................................24
1

INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE1

Amici curiae are political scientists specializing 

in research on federal campaign financing, including a 

strong focus on Super PACs. Their findings have been 

published in leading scholarly journals and books.

Their professional efforts to inform the public about 

campaign finance issues have included: holding leadership positions in nonpartisan organizations and task 

forces, serving as experts in court cases, testifying before Congress and the Federal Election Commission, 

and writing for general interest publications. Amici 

are interested in sharing with the Court relevant empirical research on Super PACs, which shows how they 

have substantially transformed the federal campaign 

finance system over the last decade. 

Anne E. Baker is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at Santa Clara University. Dr. Baker’s 

research focuses on the influence of money on congressional elections and representation as well as its impact on the electoral operations and strategies of political parties and interest groups.

Robert G. Boatright is a Professor of Political 

Science at Clark University and Director of Research 

at the National Institute for Civil Discourse at the 

University of Arizona. He has served as a research fellow and member of the academic advisory board at the 

 1 Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 37.6, amici affirm that no 

counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in part, and 

that no person or entity other than amici and their counsel made 

a monetary contribution intended to fund the preparation or submission of this brief. The parties have consented to the filing of 

this brief.
2

Campaign Finance Institute, and a member of Bipartisan Policy Center's Campaign Finance Task Force.

Anthony Corrado is a Professor of Government 

at Colby College and former Chair of the Board of 

Trustees of the Campaign Finance Institute. He 

served as an expert witness in FEC v. Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431 (2001), and 

this Court cited and quoted his expert report in its 

opinion in that case.

Diana Dwyre is a Professor of Political Science 

at California State University, Chico who does research on U.S. campaign finance, political parties, and 

congressional elections. She is the 2020-2022 President of the American Political Science Association Political Organizations and Parties organized section.

John C. Green is the Director of the Bliss Institute of Applied Politics and a Distinguished Professor 

of Political Science at the University of Akron. He has 

published extensively on campaign finance, with a 

particular emphasis on presidential campaigns and 

Super PACs.

Stephen R. Weissman is the former Associate 

Director for Policy of the non-partisan Campaign Finance Institute, where he produced political and legal 

analyses of major campaign finance issues. Previously, he was Associate Professor of Political Science 

and Political Economy at the University of Texas at 

Dallas.

Clyde Wilcox is a Professor of Government at 

Georgetown University. He has written widely on interest groups and campaign finance, and has served as 

an expert witness on national and state campaign finance cases, including SpeechNow.org v. FEC.
3

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 

In SpeechNow.org v. Federal Election Commission, 599 F.3d 686 (D.C. Cir. 2010), the D.C. Circuit 

held that 52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(1)(C)’s limitation on 

“contributions to independent expenditure-only organizations” violated the First Amendment. Id. at 696. 

The Government elected not to appeal that decision to 

this Court because it believed that the “particularly 

limited nature of SpeechNow’s contribution and expenditure practices means that the court of appeals’ 

decision will affect only a small subset of federally regulated contributions.” Letter from Eric Holder, Attorney Gen., to Harry Reid, Senate Majority Leader at 2 

(June 16, 2010), perma.cc/G9KL-MHMS. More than a 

decade later, campaign finance data and academic research make clear that that prediction could not have 

been more wrong. 

SpeechNow paved the way for the introduction 

of a new actor in campaign finance: “Independent Expenditure-only” Political Committees or, as they are 

more commonly known, “Super PACs.” Unlike ordinary Political Action Committees (“PACs”), which can 

“both make contributions to candidates and engage in 

independent spending that expressly advocates the 

election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate for 

federal office,” Super PACs are permitted only to make 

independent expenditures. Richard Briffault, Super 

PACs, 96 Minn. L. Rev. 1644, 1647 (2012). These independent expenditures may be used to “expressly advocat[e] the election or defeat of a clearly identified 

candidate” but cannot be “made in concert or cooperation with or at the request or suggestion of such candidate, the candidate’s authorized political committee, 

or their agents, or a political party committee or its 
4

agents.” 52 U.S.C. § 30101(17); see also SpeechNow, 

599 F.3d at 689. Super PACs are able to solicit unlimited contributions from donors to fund their independent expenditures, whereas contributions to PACs are 

limited. Briffault, Super PACs, 96 Minn. L. Rev. at 

1647.

Since SpeechNow, academics have closely studied the rise of these organizations. That research has 

identified three major changes in campaign financing 

that are attributable to Super PACs.

First, Super PACs, fueled by unlimited contributions, have assumed an outsized role in the financing of federal elections in the last decade, often surpassing more conventional sources of campaign financing, 

including regular PACs, party committees, and sometimes even candidates themselves. Their activity has 

increased from 2% of total federal election spending in 

the 2010 elections to 23% in 2016 and 2018. Notably, 

between eight and 23 Super PACs have accounted for 

75% of all Super PAC independent expenditures in 

each of the last five federal election cycles. These 

groups are predominantly devoted to advancing a single-candidate or party, and they primarily focus their

expenditures on close races that determine which 

party controls Congress and the Presidency. Thus, 

tremendous power has been concentrated in the hands 

of a small number of wealthy Super PACs that strive 

to influence the outcome of some of the most consequential elections. 

Second, although FEC regulations prohibit Super PACs from formally coordinating their communications and strategy with campaigns, Super PACs often maintain close relationships with campaigns and 
5

harmonize their operations with them. Single-candidate and party-centered Super PACs are often publicly 

sanctioned, and sometimes even launched, by candidates and party leaders, who also participate in the 

groups’ events and fundraising. And they are frequently managed by former staff members, consultants, vendors, and donors of the very campaigns they 

assist, who are able to use their intimate knowledge of 

past candidate or party strategies to guide Super PAC 

activities. These groups are able to mirror and complement campaign activities, and even assume traditional campaign functions, without depending on prohibited private communications with campaigns. As 

Super PACs that accept unlimited contributions are 

increasingly seen by donors, candidates and party 

leaders, as extensions of candidates and parties’ campaigns, contribution limits that apply only to candidates and parties become less meaningful and effective. 

Third, Super PACs tend to be financed by a 

small number of wealthy individuals and organizations. Typically, the top 100 individual and top 100 

organizational donors provide 75-80% of total individual and organizational contributions to Super PACs. 

High proportions of these donors combine substantial 

direct, limited contributions to candidates and parties 

with larger, unlimited contributions to Super PACs 

supporting the same candidates and parties. The size 

of those individuals’ donations to Super PACs dwarf 

their contributions to candidates or parties. In 2016, 

for example, 20 individuals made contributions to Super PACs ranging from $10 million to $89.5 million. 

This “dual giving” undermines the limits that federal 

law places on individual contributions to candidates 
6

($2,800 per election) and party committees ($35,000 

per committee general account per year). See Contribution Limits for 2019-2020, https://www.fec.gov/resources/cms-content/documents/contribution_limits_chart_2019-2020.pdf. 

Contrary to DOJ’s assessment in 2010, it is 

clear that by enabling the growth of Super PACs, 

SpeechNow has substantially transformed the federal 

campaign finance system. Amici take no position on 

whether Super PACs are beneficial or detrimental to 

the American electoral system. Instead, they wish to 

make the Court aware of the political science scholarship that shows in the decade since SpeechNow, Super 

PACs have fundamentally changed the landscape of 

campaign finance. This case offers the Court an opportunity to review whether limits on contributions to 

independent expenditure-only organizations violate 

the First Amendment, a question of undeniable importance. See Supreme Court Rule 10(c). 

ARGUMENT

I. SUPER PACS HAVE BECOME A MAJOR 

FORCE IN FEDERAL ELECTIONS, 

GREATLY EXPANDING THE ROLE OF 

UNLIMITED CONTRIBUTIONS IN THE 

CAMPAIGN FINANCE SYSTEM 

A. Super PAC Spending Has 

Skyrocketed Since SpeechNow

The growth of Super PACs in the decade since 

SpeechNow has been meteoric. Super PACs accounted 

for less than two percent of expenditures in the 2010 

midterm elections. In 2016 and 2018, by contrast, they 

accounted for twenty-three percent of total election 
7

spending, constituting a staggering $1.674 and $1.526 

billion respectively.2 

A summary of the strong and steady increase in 

Super PACs’ influence in the federal campaign finance 

system is contained in Table 1.3

 2 These figures include spending by so-called “Hybrid PACs.” 

These fraternal twins of Super PACs were legalized in 2011 via a 

consent agreement that permits “nonconnected” political 

committees—PACs that donate to candidates and are subject to 

contribution limits—to create separate accounts for independent 

expenditures from unlimited contributions. See Stipulated Order 

and Consent Judgment, Carey v. Federal Election Commission 

Civ. No. 11-259 RMC (D.D.C Aug. 19, 2011), ECF No. 28. In 

practice these accounts are no different from Super PACs. We 

include them in “Super PACs” except where otherwise noted.

3 Super PAC independent spending for the ongoing 2020 

presidential election cycle was higher, as of June 20, 2020, than 

it was on the same date in 2012, 2014 or 2018. See 

https://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/index.php?type=Y

&filter=S. 
8
9

As Table 1 also shows, Super PACs now account 

for the vast majority of expenditures by organizations 

permitted to receive unlimited contributions.4

 During 

2012 and 2014, the first two full election cycles in 

which they were legal, Super PACs were responsible 

for two-thirds of spending by groups receiving unlimited contributions. By the 2016 and 2018 cycles they 

represented close to 80% of such expenditures. At the 

same time, as Super PACs have cemented their status 

as the dominant spender among groups receiving unlimited contributions, the proportion of total electoral 

spending funded by such contributions has more than 

doubled, rising from 12% in 2010 to 28% in 2018. 

Thus, Super PACs have brought about a major change 

in the campaign finance system, which was long based 

on limited contributions.

Because of their ability to receive unlimited contributions, Super PACs also increasingly outspend traditional political committees and regular PACs, which 

depend on limited donations. One study found that 

from 2010 to 2016, Super PAC independent expenditures rose from 4.8% to 43.6% of non-candidate spending, whereas national political parties’ contributions, 

coordinated spending, and independent expenditures 

declined from 18.8% to 13.3%, and traditional PACs’ 

expenditures fell from 37% to 20.6%. Diana Dwyre, 

Political Parties and Campaign Finance: What Role 

Do the National Parties Play? at 60, Paper prepared 

for the Campaign Finance Task Force, Bipartisan Policy Center, Washington, D.C. (revised May 2017), 

 4 Federal tax law permits two other types of organizations—

section 527 committees and section 501(c) organizations—to 

accept unlimited contributions, but restricts the type or amount 

of their political spending. Briffault, 96 Minn. L. Rev. at 1648-49.
10

https://bipartisanpolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/Political-Parties-and-Campaign-Finance-What-Role-Do-the-National-Parties-Play.-Diana-Dwyre.-Diana-Dwyre.pdf (Professor Dwyre provided full dollar figures and percentages for this 

graph). In 2016, Super PAC expenditures exceeded 

those of the party campaign committees by nearly 

$200 million. See Molly E. Reynolds & Richard L. 

Hall, Financing the 2016 Congressional Election, in Financing the 2016 Election 224. 

Another telling indication of the considerable 

role Super PACs now play in funding federal elections 

is their capacity to dominate independent spending 

within particular races. Single-candidate Super PACs 

have substantially outraised and outspent candidates 

in certain presidential and senatorial elections. For 

example, Right to Rise, the candidate-specific Super 

PAC supporting Jeb Bush for the Republican presidential nomination in 2016, raised $121.7 million,

while the Bush campaign raised only $34.1 million. 

See Jeb Bush, OpenSecrets.org, https://www.opensecrets.org/pres16/candidate?id=N00037006. Super 

PACs backing Marco Rubio, Scott Walker, Chris

Christie, John Kasich, and Carly Fiorina also all spent 

more than those candidates did in the 2016 cycle. See

John C. Green, Financing the 2016 Presidential Nomination Campaigns, in Financing the 2016 Election 

149. And Granite State Solutions, a single-candidate 

Super PAC active in the New Hampshire Senate election, spent $24.2 million in support of Senator Kelly 

Ayotte; whereas Ayotte spent only $19.6 million. Compare Granite State Solutions, OpenSecrets.org, 

https://www.opensecrets.org/pacs/indexpend.php?cmte=C00580381&cycle=2016 (detailing 
11

Granite State Solutions’ spending), with New Hampshire Senate 2016 Race, OpenSecrets.org, 

https://www.opensecrets.org/races/summary?cycle=2016&id=NHS1 (summarizing Ayotte’s). 

Also notable are two developments discussed 

below. First, the vast majority of the contributions 

amassed by Super PACs have been concentrated in the 

hands of a small number of organizations that focus 

their expenditures on a single candidate or party. Second, these funds are disproportionately spent on competitive electoral campaigns. 

B. A Small Number of Super PACs have 

Been Responsible for the 

Overwhelming Majority of Super 

PAC Independent Expenditures

A small subset of Super PACs account for the 

great majority of the independent expenditures made 

by these organizations. See Paul S. Herrnson, Jennifer A. Heerwig, & Douglas M. Spencer, The Impact 

of Organizational Characteristics on Super PAC Financing, in The State of the Parties 250 (John C. 

Green, Daniel J. Coffey, & David B. Cohen, eds., 2018) 

(noting that from 2010 to 2016, “[t]he 72 groups that 

raised $10 million or more each...accounted for twothirds of all Super PAC receipts”). Indeed, in each 

election cycle from 2010 through 2018, just eight to 23 

groups accounted for 75% of Super PAC independent 

expenditures, with between three and seven supplying 

50% of them.5

 See 2020 Outside Spending, by Super 

 5 Independent expenditures, “vote for” or “vote against” appeals 

(on the air or on the ground), are the major Super PAC activities, 

comprising approximately two-thirds of all spending. They are 

the only ones where data allows comparisons among Super PACs. 

See Diana Dwyre & Evelyn Braz, Super PAC Spending: 
12

PAC, OpenSecrets.org, https://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/summ.php?chrt=V&type=S; 2020 Outside Spending, by Group, OpenSecrets.org, https://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/summ.php?chrt=V&type=H.

The highest spending Super PACs have specific 

characteristics. Political scientists distinguish between Super PACs by their missions: (1) single-candidate groups; (2) party-centered groups; and (3) more 

ideological or issue-oriented groups. See David B. 

Magleby and Jay Goodliffe, Interest Groups in the 2016 

Election in Financing the 2016 Election 105. The Super PACs that have dominated federal election spending fall principally into the first two categories. In fact,

single-candidate and party-centered Super PACs accounted for 75% of all Super PAC independent expenditures from 2010 through 2018. Outside Spending, 

OpenSecrets.org, https://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/.6

Indeed, the eight Super PACs that spent the 

most money in federal elections from 2010 to 2018—

comprising an eye-opening 47% of total Super PAC independent expenditures during this timeframe—were 

all either single-candidate or party-centered. See Table 2. Five of those groups focused on bringing a party 

to power in the House, Senate, or Presidency and operated in multiple election cycles. The remainder were 

 

Strategies and Goals, 13 The Forum 245, 258-260 (2015). For 

total spending, including operational expenses and transfers, see 

Table 1; for total independent expenditures, see n. 6, infra.

6 Of $3.027 billion in Super PAC independent expenditures in this 

time period, single-candidate groups made $990 million and 

party-centered ones $1.271 billion, totaling $2.262 billion.
13

single-candidate Presidential Super PACs which supported Democratic and Republican candidates Barack 

Obama, Mitt Romney, Hillary Clinton, and Bush.
14

Table 2: Top 8 Super PACs in Independent Expenditures 2010-18 (Millions of Dollars)

Group Partisan

Affiliation

Office Total 

Spending 

(in millions)

Senate Majority 

PAC7

Democratic Senate $271.2

Priorities USA Action (Obama, Clinton)Democratic President 226.2

Congressional 

Leadership Fund

Republican House 197.9

Senate Leadership 

Fund

Republican Senate 181.1

House Majority 

PAC

Democratic House 179.4

Restore Our Future (Romney)Republican President 142.1

American CrossroadsRepublican House, 

Senate, 

President

129.2

Right to Rise (J. 

Bush)

Republican President 86.6

Total IEs 1,414

(All Super PAC 

IEs)

3,027

Percentage of all 

Super PAC IEs

47%

Table Prepared using Federal Election Commission data, 

available at https://www.opensecrets.org/, June 12, 2020.

 7 This group was called “Majority PAC” in the 2012 cycle.
15

C. Super PACs’ Independent Expenditures Are Mainly Concentrated in Competitive Campaigns, Enhancing Their 

Potential Influence over Elections

Super PACs, especially single-candidate and 

party-centered ones, also tend to focus their expenditures on competitive races. See Magleby & Goodliffe,

supra, at 107.8 This strategy provides Super PACs 

even greater potential influence over the outcome of 

important elections than their already-considerable 

share of federal election spending might suggest. 

Single-candidate Super PACs’ preoccupation 

with competitive races is perhaps most visible in Presidential elections. During the 2016 presidential primaries, for example, Super PACs spent approximately 

$323 million on independent expenditures, 36% of 

what the candidates themselves spent. John C. Green, 

Financing the 2016 Presidential Nomination Campaigns, in Financing the 2016 Election, 154. 

But Super PACs have also spent heavily in competitive Senate races. The principal Senate Republican and Democratic party-centered Super PACs, for 

example, made all of their independent expenditures 

in 2016 in only 17 races. Their choices mirrored the 

 8 This behavior has not been observed as clearly in ideological or 

issue-oriented Super PACs, which may spend considerable sums 

in “safe districts” to advance their policy priorities or to obtain 

access to legislators who can affect their interests. Some groups 

spread their funds across non-competitive as well as competitive 

arenas. Kolodny & Dwyre, Convergence or Divergence: Do Parties 

and Outside Groups Spend on the Same Candidates and Does it 

Matter? 46 American Political Research 375, 395 (2018). Others,

however, are more inclined to focus on competitive races targeted 

by the relevant national party committees. Dwyre & Braz, infra, 

256. 
16

corresponding party campaign committee’s target list 

of competitive seats. In all but one of those races, the 

winner prevailed with 55% or less of the vote. See Table 3 of Campaign Finance Institute, Press Release: Political Parties and Candidates Dominated the 2016 

House Elections While Holding Their Own in the Senate (April 13, 2017), http://www.cfinst.org/pdf/federal/congress/2016/PartyIE_Table3.pdf. 

Similarly for the House, in 2012 party-centered 

Super PACs directed 91% of their independent expenditures to competitive races targeted by the Democratic or Republican campaign committees. See Diana 

Dwyre & Evelyn Braz, Super PAC Spending: Strategies and Goals, 13 The Forum 245, 255 (2015); see also

Thomas E. Mann & Anthony Corrado, Party Polarization and Campaign Finance, Brookings Center for Effective Public Management, 12-13 (July 15, 2014). 

https://www.brookings.edu/research/party-polarization-and-campaign-finance/. And in 2014, there was a 

“close match” between seats targeted by the pro-Democratic House Majority PAC and the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee. Robin Kolodny & 

Diana Dwyre, Convergence or Divergence: Do Parties 

and Outside Groups Spend on the Same Candidates 

and Does it Matter? 46 American Political Research 

375, 393 (2018). Likewise, in 2016, the House partycentered Super PACs concentrated on the 34 contests 

prioritized by the national committees of the major 

parties. Campaign Finance Institute, supra, Table 2, 

http://www.cfinst.org/pdf/federal/congress/2016/PartyIE_Table2.pdf.

These findings make clear that Super PACs do 

not simply play a major role in federal election spending; they largely focus their spending on the most important races. This strategy increases their ability to 
17

influence which political party controls the Presidency 

and Congress. 

II. SUPER PACS’ CLOSE ASSOCIATION AND 

INFORMAL COORDINATION WITH CANDIDATES AND PARTIES WEAKENS THE 

EFFECTIVENESS OF CONTRIBUTION 

LIMITS APPLYNG ONLY TO CANDIDATES AND PARTIES 

FEC regulations prohibit Super PACs and other 

independent political groups from coordinating with 

candidates or party campaign committees. See 11 

C.F.R. §§ 109.20–109.23; see also Richard Briffault, 

Coordination Reconsidered, 113 Colum. L. Rev. Sidebar 88, 92 (May 2, 2013) (noting that a Super PAC’s 

spending will be “considered coordinated with a candidate...if there is either some close involvement of the 

candidate with the group in decisions concerning...a 

specific ad, or if there has been some transmission of 

information between the candidate and the group with 

respect to the campaign’s strategies, messages, or 

needs”). Nevertheless, Super PACs are able to use a 

variety of indirect means to associate themselves with 

campaigns and harmonize their activities with them. 

The result is “structurally independent but functionally coordinated” spending. Victoria A. Farrar-Myers 

& Richard Skinner, Super PACs and the 2012 Elections, 10 The Forum 105, 111 n.2, 111-14 (2013); see

also Mann & Corrado, Party Polarization, supra, at 6 

(noting that Super PACs are “formally separate and 

independent but effectively hardwired to [candidates 

and party campaigns]”).

As Super PACs accepting unlimited contributions are increasingly seen by donors, candidates and 

party leaders as extensions of candidates and parties’ 
18

campaigns, contribution limits applying only to candidates and parties become less meaningful and effective. 

A. Super PACs and Candidates or Parties 

Broadcast The Fact that Particular Super PACs’ Sole Purposes Are to Support 

a Particular Candidate or Party 

The predominant single-candidate and partycentered Super PACs almost always declare that their 

very purpose is to support a particular candidate or 

party, thereby closely associating themselves with 

their favorites. Those beneficiaries in turn often make 

clear to donors that a particular Super PAC will support their campaign via independent expenditures. 

The purpose of these signals is to ensure that donors 

to a candidate or party-centered Super PAC know contributions will be used in a way that is implicitly sanctioned by that candidate or party. 

Examples of this pattern abound. The America 

First Super PAC, for instance, currently includes material on its home page describing itself as the “Trump 

Super PAC” and prominently displays the “Make 

America Great Again” slogan. 

https://www.a1apac.org/. And Jeb Bush was listed as 

an honorary chairman of Right To Rise, the Super PAC 

that supported him, up until he began his formal campaign. Nicholas Confessore & Eric Lichtblau, ‘Campaigns’ Aren’t Necessarily Campaigns in the Age of ‘Super PACs’, New York Times, May 17, 2015, 

https://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/18/us/politics/super-pacs-are-remaking-16-campaigns-official-ornot.html. 

In turn, candidates and party leaders publicly 

signal their support for candidate or party-centered 
19

Super PACs. Ben Carson, for instance, stated that the 

US First PAC would “lay the groundwork” for his campaign. Ian Vandewalker, Shadow Campaigns: The 

Shift in Presidential Campaign Funding to Outside 

Groups, Brennan Center for Justice, 13 (Aug. 2019), 

https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/analysis/Shadow_Campaigns.pdf. And 

House and Senate Democratic and Republican leaders 

initiated the creation of party-centered Super PACs. 

Magleby & Goodliffe, supra, at 106.

Candidates, party leaders, or their surrogates 

also attend fundraisers and meetings of these groups. 

For example, in 2014, President Obama attended 

fundraisers for two Democratic congressional Super 

PACs. See Super Connected, Public Citizen, 14-15 (October 14, 2014), https://www.citizen.org/wp-content/uploads/super-connected-2014-citizens-unitedoutside-groups-report.pdf. And in 2011, Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid wrote letters introducing the 

new Senate Majority PAC to prospective donors, saying it was “solely devoted to leveling the playing field 

and protecting the Democratic majority in the Senate.” 

Michael Beckel, Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid 

Solicits Cash for New Democratic Super PAC, OpenSecrets.org (June 22, 2011), https://www.opensecrets.org/news/2011/06/senate-majority-leader-harryreid-solicits/. 

Finally, candidates and party leaders’ actions can 

subtly direct donations to a preferred Super PAC. For 

example, Joe Biden indicated his support for “Unite 

the Country,” a Super PAC run by his former aides, in 

November of 2019. Stephen R. Weissman, Joe Biden’s 

Super PAC Stumble, The Hill (Nov. 20, 2019). In midApril 2020, Biden in effect redirected donors to another Super PAC by releasing a statement praising 
20

Priorities USA Action. Contributions followed accordingly—Unite the Country raised over $18 million during the first three months of 2020, but just $7,000 in 

the last half of April after Biden’s announced his support for Priorities USA Action. The latter, meanwhile, 

raised over $7 million in April 2020. Karl Evers-Hillstrom, Biden Statement Guides Donors from One Super PAC to Another, OpenSecrets.org (May 20, 2020), 

https://www.opensecrets.org/news/2020/05/bidenguides-super-pac-contribs/.

B. Single-Candidate and PartyCentered Super PACs are Often 

Staffed By Individuals Whose 

Backgrounds Make Clear Their 

Associations With and Abilities to

Assist a Particular Candidate or 

Party 

Single-candidate and party-centered Super 

PACs are often run by the former staff members, 

consultants, vendors, and donors of the candidates 

they support. The presence of these individuals helps 

ensure that potential donors are aware of a Super 

PAC’s desire to effectively assist a campaign and that 

expenditures are deployed in a way that will be most 

useful to that campaign. 

Directors of candidate-specific presidential 

Super PACs have included former campaign directors, 

chiefs of staff, and others with detailed knowledge of 

the candidate’s campaign strategy, supporters, and 

fundraising activities. For instance, the staff of proClinton Priorities USA Action included the political 

director, finance director, and pollster from her 2008 

presidential campaign. Vandewalker supra, at 17-18. 

And the director of America First Action, a Super PAC 

supporting Trump’s 2020 campaign, is Linda 
21

McMahon, a Trump donor and former Trump Cabinet 

member. Raymond Arke, Linda McMahon, Trump 

Donor and Cabinet Member, to Head Pro-Trump Super 

PAC, OpenSecrets.org (April 1, 2019), 

https://www.opensecrets.org/news/2019/04/lindamcmahon-to-head-pro-trump-super-pac/. 

Similar patterns exist at the congressional 

level. For example, the director of Granite State Solutions, the Super PAC active in favor of Ayotte in the 

2016 New Hampshire Senate race, was the director of 

Ayotte’s 2010 Senate campaign. John DiStaso, ProGOP Super PAC begins $15 million fall ad campaign 

attacking Hassan, WMUR (Sept. 1, 2016), 

https://www.wmur.com/article/pro-gop-super-pac-begins-15-million-fall-ad-campaign-attacking-hassan/5214664. And key former political advisers to 

Senator Mitch McConnell staffed Kentuckians for 

Strong Leadership, a pro-McConnell Super PAC, in 

2014. Public Citizen, Super Connected (2014), update 

on report published in October 2014 (January 14, 

2015), 8-9. 

Scholars evaluating this dynamic have

concluded that “[t]he shared relationships and mutual 

understandings between a candidate’s campaign staff 

and [single-candidate group’s] staff facilitate the 

‘orchestration’ of some of these organizations’ 

campaign efforts.” Herrnson, Heerwig, & Spencer, 

supra, at 251-52. 

C. Super PACs Undertake a Variety of 

Campaign Functions to Complement 

and Amplify Candidates’ Efforts

Super PACs do not merely indicate to donors 

that they are aligned with a particular candidate or 
22

party. They also serve as extensions of their campaigns. 

As previously noted, congressional party-centered Super PACs intervene in the same close races as 

their respective party committees. See supra, pp. 15-

16. Super PACs’ television advertisements often mirror or complement campaign themes, see Farrar-Meyers & Skinner, at 111-12, though they may be 

“more...oppositional in tone” towards candidates’ rivals, Bipartisan Policy Center, Campaign Finance in 

the United States: Assessing an Era of Fundamental 

Change, at 39, https://bipartisanpolicy.org/report/thestate-of-campaign-finance. And Super PACs assist in 

preparing candidates’ events and conducting opposition research. See David B. Magleby, Change and 

Continuity in the Financing of the 2016 Election, in Financing the 2016 Election 33; Anthony Corrado, The 

Regulatory Environment of the 2016 Election, in Financing the 2016 Election 74. 

Indeed, these groups increasingly perform 

many of the tasks traditionally undertaken by 

candidates or parties. See Herrnson, Heerwig, & 

Spencer, supra, at 253. An analysis of the activities of 

single-candidate Super PACs and other “outside 

groups” for major 2016 presidential candidates 

revealed eight different types of campaign-related 

activities that Super PACs undertook, including rapid 

response, field work, and campaign-specific events. 

Eleven candidates (all but Democrat Bernie Sanders) 

were the beneficiaries of Super PAC activity in at least

one, and usually more, of these categories. Magleby, 

supra, at 32, 44-47. Other ways in which Super PACs 

connect with campaigns without running afoul of the 

law include publicizing opposition research and 
23

utilizing publicly released video footage by candidates. 

Corrado, The Regulatory Environment of the 2016 

Election, in Financing the 2016 Election 74.

The close relationships between Super PACs 

and the campaigns they support blur the lines 

between these two groups. Citizens, donors, and 

political actors themselves are increasingly unlikely to 

perceive Super PACs as entities that are clearly 

distinct from campaigns. See Farrar-Myers & 

Skinner, supra, at 114. This development has 

rendered contribution limits applying only to 

candidates and parties less meaningful and less 

effective.

III. “DUAL GIVING” UNDERMINES 

FEDERAL CONTRIBUTION LIMITS

A relatively small number of very large donors 

provide the bulk of Super PAC financing. These unlimited contributions frequently benefit the same candidates and parties that those donors support directly 

through limited contributions. This “dual giving” undercuts federal contribution limits. 

A. A Small Number of Wealthy 

Individual Donors Provide the Vast 

Majority of Individual

Contributions to Super PACs 

The vast majority of Super PAC individual contributions in any election cycle consistently come from 

the top 100 individual donors. In 2018, for example, 

while 156,193 individuals gave a total of $852,159,552 

in reported contributions to Super PACs, $662,244,552 

of that total (78%) was collected from the top 100 donors. Super PACs: How Many Donors Give, OpenSe-
24

crets.org, https://www.opensecrets.org/outside-spending/donor-stats?cycle=2018&type=I. That number 

was similar in 2016 (73%), 2014 (73%), and 2012 

(67%). Id. 

The contributions of these individuals are orders of magnitude larger than the current legal limits 

for individual contributions to candidates ($2800 per 

primary or general election) and general accounts of 

party committees ($35,000 per committee per year). 

See Contribution Limits for 2019-2020,

https://www.fec.gov/resources/cms-content/documents/contribution_limits_chart_2019-2020.pdf. In 

2016, for example, twenty donors made contributions 

to Super PACs that ranged from $10 million to $89.5 

million. See Magleby & Goodliffe, supra, at 102. And 

a report by Public Citizen found that between 2010 

and 2020 just “25 people and their spouses” contributed nearly half of the “$3 billion in total individual 

Super PAC donations.” Alan Zibel, Oligarch Overload, 

Public Citizen, https://www.citizen.org/article/oligarch-overload/.

The explosion of individual contributions to Super PACs has greatly elevated the role of the top 400 

donors—“0.00016% of the voting age population”—in 

federal elections. See Adam Bonica, Expert Report, 

Equal Citizens, 7 (2018), https://equalcitizens.us/wpcontent/uploads/2018/10/Bonica-Expert-Report.pdf. 

From 2012 to 2016, donations to all political entities 

from this elite group rose from 10% ($772 million) to 

20% ($1.3 billion) of total contributions. See Id.

9

 9 This study does not indicate what percentage of this spending is 

attributable to contributions to Super PACs. However, as noted 
25

B. A Small Number of Organizational 

Donors Provide the Vast Majority of 

Organizational Contributions to 

Super PACs.

Although organizational contributions to Super 

PACs make up about 40% of these groups’ contributions, see Herrnson, Heerwig & Spencer, supra, at 250, 

as with individual donors, a small number of contributors play an outsized role in funding these groups.

The top 100 organizational donors accounted for

80% or more of Super PAC receipts from organizations 

in each of the past four election cycles. See Super 

PACs: How Many Donors Give, OpenSecrets.org,

https://www.opensecrets.org/outside-spending/donorstats?cycle=2020&type=O. These contributors included a wide variety of organizations, especially unions, social welfare groups, professional associations 

and other Super PACs. See 2018 Top Donors to Outside Spending Groups, OpenSecrets.org,

https://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/summ.php?cycle=2018&disp=D&type=O&superonly=S.10

 

in Part I, donors have few other vehicles for unlimited 

contributions and Super PACs’ proportion of such donations has 

risen dramatically.

10 Despite many observers’ initial fears, corporations and LLCs do 

not constitute a major source of funds for Super PACs. Data from 

the Center for Responsive Politics indicates that since 2010 their 

contributions have amounted to 6 percent of the total funds 

raised by Super PACs. See Corporate & LLC Contributions to 

SuperPACs, OpenSecrets.org, https://docs.google.com/

spreadsheets/d/138cCta_eIYHToVqDZdsV4mCM7q
26

C. Wealthy Donors’ Dual Giving To 

Parties or Candidates and the Super 

PACs Supporting Them Undermines 

Federal Contribution Limits

High proportions of the top 100 Super PAC 

donors contribute both directly to a particular 

candidate or party and to one or more Super PACs 

(single-candidate, party-centered or ideological) 

supporting the same candidate or party. This “dual 

giving” ensures that certain wealthy donors are able 

to provide large-scale support for their expressly 

preferred candidate or party that exceeds, by many 

orders of magnitude, contribution limits for that 

candidate or party. 

In the 2012 and 2014 election cycles, 81 of the 

top 100 individual Super PAC donors contributed to 

both candidates and Super PACs supporting those 

same candidates. Stephen R. Weissman, The SpeechNow Case and the Real World of Campaign Finance, 

Free Speech for People, 2 (Oct. 2016), 

https://freespeechforpeople.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/FSFP-Weissman-Report-final-10-24-

16.pdf. In 2014, the average number of candidates 

benefiting from donors’ dual-giving was eight per donor. Id. at 6. These donors on average contributed 

$30,120 to their preferred candidates and $2,474,046 

to Super PACs supporting them. Id. at 4. As for organizational givers, 31 of the top 50 practiced such 

 

BYHEjWgCxvUU3sR6Q/edit#gid=758087243. Notably, 

however, it is not possible to trace all of the corporate money Super PACs receive. Although Super PACs must report contributions over $200 to the FEC, their 501(c) social welfare group and 

business league donors, are not required to reveal their contributors. 
27

dual-giving. Id. at 9. On average, each organizational 

donor assisted 33 candidates, with total direct contributions averaging $265,827 to preferred candidates 

and $3,157,832 to Super PACs supporting those same 

candidates. Id. 

Research has also revealed an overlap in donors 

to national political party committees and Super 

PACs, especially party-centered ones. Donors who 

contributed to one or more party committees in both 

2010 and 2012 were also likely to contribute to a wide 

variety of Super PACs. See Anne Baker, The Fundraising Disadvantages Confronting American Political 

Parties, 13 The Forum 223 (2015). Moreover, in 2012, 

48 of the top 103 individual donors to Super PACs simultaneously contributed both to party committees and 

party-centered Super PACs for that election cycle. On 

average, they gave $69,522 to party committees and 

$2,222,854 to party-centered Super PACs. See Stephen R. Weissman, The SpeechNow Case and the Real 

World of Campaign Finance, Part II: Undermining 

Federal Limits on Contributions to Political Parties, 

Free Speech For People, 7 (May 2017), 

https://freespeechforpeople.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/Research-Report-2017_01.pdf.

These figures suggest that many large donors 

are behaving strategically, combining their limited 

but direct contributions to favored candidates and parties with unlimited indirect ones to Super PACs for 

greater impact. This kind of activity is consistent with 

studies indicating that campaign donors are politically 

sophisticated and capable of strategically targeting 

their contributions to maximize their influence over 

election outcomes. See Michael Barber, Donation Motivations: Testing Theories of Access and Ideology, 69 
28

Political Research Quarterly 148 (2016); Peter Francia, John Green, Paul Herrnson, Lynda Powell & 

Clyde Wilcox, The Financiers of Congressional Elections (2003); James Gimpel, Frances Lee & Shanna 

Pearson-Merkowitz, The Check is in the Mail: Interdistrict Funding Flows in Congressional Elections, 52 

American Journal of Political Science 373 (2008). Of 

particular relevance is one of the only recent studies 

containing a special examination of wealthier donors, 

which found “evidence of a class of engaged and 

wealthy donors who spread their dollars widely” to 

“out-of-jurisdiction congressional candidates and ideologically congruent political organizations and PACs.” 

Jesse H. Rhodes, Brian F. Schaffner & Raymond J. La 

Raja, Detecting and Understanding Donor Strategies 

in Midterm Elections 71 Political Research Quarterly, 

503, 514 (2018). 

Even if many Super PAC donors are not consciously striving to circumvent contribution limits, the 

very existence of this dual giving undermines the functioning of those limits. Furthermore, it supports the 

earlier conclusion that donors increasingly perceive 

Super PACs as extensions of candidate and party campaigns. See supra Part II.

CONCLUSION

In the decade since SpeechNow was decided, Super PACs have left an indelible mark on federal elections. Super PACs accepting unlimited contributions 

spend nearly one in every four federal election campaign dollars, concentrated in the most competitive 

races. They enable million dollar, even tens of millions 

of dollar, donors to support organizations that market 

and conduct themselves as extensions of candidates’ 
29

and parties’ campaigns – regardless of federal contribution limits applying to those campaigns. This extraordinary transformation of the campaign finance 

system, enabled by SpeechNow, confirms that this 

case poses a question of undeniable importance. 

Respectfully submitted,

GINGER D. ANDERS

Counsel of Record

JONATHAN S. MELTZER

LAUREN E. ROSS

MUNGER, TOLLES & OLSON LLP

1155 F Street NW, 7th Floor

Washington, DC 20004-1357

(202) 220-1100

Ginger.Anders@mto.com

Counsel for Amici

July 22, 2020