United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted March 13, 2019

Decided March 13, 2019

Before

MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge

MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge

AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge

No. 18‐2384

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff‐Appellee,

v.

ANTHONY T. TAYLOR,

Defendant‐Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Northern District of Illinois,

Western Division.

No. 3:06‐CR‐50068‐1

Philip G. Reinhard,

Judge.

O R D E R

   

Anthony Taylor was convicted in 2006 of bank robbery, using a firearm in

furtherance of a crime of violence, and possessing a firearm as a felon. See 18 U.S.C.

§§ 2113, 924(c)(1), 922(g)(1). He was sentenced to 138 months’ imprisonment and

5 years’ supervised release. Shortly after his release from prison in 2017, Taylor violated

various terms of his supervised release by possessing a controlled substance (cocaine)

and being convicted in state court of two crimes. At the revocation hearing he was

resentenced by the district court to 16 months’ imprisonment, within the sentencing

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
No. 18‐2384    Page 2

guidelines policy‐statement range of 12 to 18 months. Taylor filed a notice of appeal,

but his appointed counsel asserts that the appeal is frivolous and moves to withdraw

under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). Taylor responded to counsel’s motion.

See CIR. R. 51(b).

We point out that Anders does not govern our review of counsel’s motion to

withdraw. United States v. Wheeler, 814 F.3d 856, 857 (7th Cir. 2016). A defendant facing

revocation of supervised release does not have a constitutional right to counsel unless

he challenges the appropriateness of the revocation or asserts substantial and complex

grounds in mitigation. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 790–91 (1973); United States

v. Eskridge, 445 F.3d 930, 932–33 (7th Cir. 2006). Taylor did neither. Nevertheless, we

follow the Anders safeguards to ensure consideration of potential issues.

See Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 554–55 (1987); United States v. Brown, 823 F.3d

392, 394 (7th Cir. 2016). Because counsel’s brief appears to be thorough and addresses

issues that an appeal of this kind might be expected to involve, we limit our review to

the subjects that counsel discusses, along with the contentions in Taylor’s response.

See United States v. Bey, 748 F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir. 2014).

Counsel first explores whether Taylor could argue that the district court abused

its discretion by revoking his supervised release. See United States v. Musso, 643 F.3d 566,

570 (7th Cir. 2011). A district court may revoke supervised release under 18 U.S.C.

§ 3583(e)(3) if it finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant violated a

condition of release. See United States v. Mosley, 759 F.3d 664, 669 (7th Cir. 2014). Here,

Taylor’s state court convictions provided objective evidence that he violated conditions

of release. Moreover, Taylor admitted to the violations, and counsel finds no basis on

which to argue that Taylor’s admissions were unknowing or involuntary. Challenging

the revocation would be frivolous.   

Counsel next considers whether Taylor could challenge the sentence imposed

but correctly concludes that this challenge would be frivolous. At his revocation

hearing, Taylor admitted that he had been convicted in state court of two Grade B

violations. With a criminal history category of IV, Taylor’s recommended

reimprisonment range was 12 to 18 months, see U.S.S.G. § 7B1.4(a), and we may

presume that his within‐range sentence of 16 months is reasonable, see Rita v.

United States, 551 U.S. 338, 347 (2007), United States v. Jones, 774 F.3d 399, 404 (7th Cir.

2014). We see no errors in these calculations that would overcome that presumption.

   
No. 18‐2384    Page 3

Counsel also considers but rightly rejects an argument challenging the district

court’s application of the pertinent factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). See 18 U.S.C.

§ 3583(e)(3). The court highlighted the nature and circumstances of the offense, noting

that Taylor had been on supervised release for only four months before committing two

felonies. The court also alluded to Taylor’s criminal history, which it characterized as

“not favorable.” Finally, the court pointed out that Taylor had not benefited from his

supervised release, acknowledging his failure to find employment.   

   

In his response brief, Taylor repeats his arguments at sentencing that his federal

revocation sentence should run concurrently with his state prison term. But the district

court decided to impose a consecutive sentence based on the nature of Taylor’s offense

and the guidelines policy statement. Nothing in the record indicates that the court

abused its discretion in doing so. See U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(d) & cmt. 4; United States v.

Sandidge, 784 F.3d 1055, 1064–67 (7th Cir. 2015).   

   

Accordingly, we GRANT counsel’s motion to withdraw and DISMISS the

appeal.