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STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. ROBERT LEANDRY

(AC 36741)

DiPentima, C. J., and Lavine and Keller, Js.

Argued September 8—officially released November 17, 2015

(Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of

Hartford, Suarez, J.)

Kirstin B. Coffin, assigned counsel, for the appellant (defendant).

Matthew R. Kalthoff, special deputy assistant state’s

attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Gail P. Hardy,

state’s attorney, and John F. Fahey, senior assistant

state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).
Opinion

DiPENTIMA, C. J. The defendant, Robert Leandry,

appeals from the judgment of conviction,rendered after

a jury trial, of robbery in the first degree in violation

of General Statutes § 53a-134 (a) (3) and assault in the

second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-60

(a) (2). On appeal, the defendant claims that (1) the

evidence was insufficient to support the judgment of

conviction for both counts, (2) the trial court improperly charged the jury on robbery in the first degree, and

(3) the court abused its discretion in certain evidentiary

rulings. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The jury reasonably could have found the following

facts that are relevant to this appeal. In September,

2012, Patrick Jalbert was employed by an independent

security company, which provided security services to

Save-A-Lot, a grocery store in Hartford. After Jalbert

observed the defendant behaving oddly in the grocery

store, he went to the management office to view the

store’s surveillance monitors. Jalbert then observed the

defendant walk to the freezer aisle section of the store,

select bags of frozen shrimp, and pack the bags into

his pants. Having confirmed that the defendant

bypassed the cashiers and exited the store with the

merchandise, Jalbert immediately left to intercept the

defendant.

Once outside, Jalbert confronted the defendant. After

Jalbert told him to stop, the defendant removed one

bag of frozen shrimp from his pants, placed it on top

of nearby shopping carts, and started to walk away.

Knowing that more merchandise was hidden inside the

defendant’s pants, Jalbert grabbed the defendant’s arm

to prevent him from leaving. When Jalbert attempted

to handcuff him, the defendant resisted and stated: ‘‘I

have a needle.’’1 After this statement, while trying to

separate himself from the defendant, Jalbert felt something stab him in his left forearm. Although Jalbert did

not see the hypodermic syringe at that moment, he saw

a blood mark on his arm.

The defendant then ran into the plaza parking lot. As

Jalbert pursued him, he was able to see a hypodermic

syringe in the defendant’s right hand. During the defendant’s attempt to flee, an employee from the adjacent

furniture store joined in the pursuit. When both men

approached him, the defendant stated that he was

infected with AIDS, hepatitis, or ‘‘something to that

effect.’’ The employee from the furniture store was first

to reach the defendant, which prompted Jalbert to warn

him that the defendant had a hypodermic syringe. After

a brief struggle, both men managed to subdue the defendant, and Jalbert handcuffed him.

Within minutes, officers from the Hartford Police

Department arrived on the scene. Officer Kenneth

Labbe spoke with Jalbert, who explained what had
occurred with the defendant, including having been

stabbed with a hypodermic syringe. Labbe noticed a

mark on Jalbert’s forearm that was consistent with

being stabbed with a hypodermic syringe. While Labbe

was speaking with Jalbert, the defendant was ‘‘spontaneously uttering . . . [that] he did not have HIV and

that he only had hepatitis.’’ Jalbert was transported to

Saint Francis Hospital and Medical Center in Hartford

via ambulance, where he was treated for superficial

scratches, what appeared to be puncture wounds, and

exposure to a blood-borne pathogen.

The defendant was charged with robbery in the first

degree and assault in the second degree. The jury found

the defendant guilty on both counts. The court sentenced him to a total effective term of eight years of

incarceration and five years special parole. This appeal

followed. Additional facts will be set forth as necessary.

I

SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE CLAIMS

The defendant first claims that there was insufficient

evidence to support his conviction on both counts. Specifically, he argues that the evidence presented by the

state does not support a conviction of robbery in the

first degree because it fails to show that he either used

or threatened to use a dangerous instrument. In addition, the defendant argues that the evidence does not

establish that he was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt

of assault in the second degree because the evidence

fails to show that he intended to or caused physical

injury to Jalbert.

We first begin by setting forth the law relevant to an

insufficiency of the evidence claim. As a preliminary

matter, ‘‘[a] defendant who asserts an insufficiency of

the evidence claim bears an arduous burden.’’ State v.

Hopkins, 62 Conn. App. 665, 669–70, 772 A.2d 657

(2001). This court ‘‘[i]n reviewing [a] sufficiency [of

evidence] claim . . . [applies] a two part test. First, we

construe the evidence in the light most favorable to

sustaining the verdict. Second, we determine whether

upon the facts so construed and the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom, the jury reasonably could have

concluded that the cumulative force of the evidence

established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. . . . In

this process of review, it does not diminish the probative force of the evidence that it consists, in whole or

in part, of evidence that is circumstantial rather than

direct. . . . It is not one fact, but the cumulative impact

of a multitude of facts which establishes guilt in a case

involving substantial circumstantial evidence. . . .

‘‘While . . . every element [must be] proven beyond

a reasonable doubt in order to find the defendant guilty

of the charged offense, each of the basic and inferred

facts underlying those conclusions need not be proved

beyond a reasonable doubt. . . . If it is reasonable and
logical for the jury to conclude that a basic fact or an

inferred fact is true, the jury is permitted to consider

the fact proven and may consider it in combination

with other proven facts in determining whether the

cumulative effect of all the evidence proves the defendant guilty of all the elements of the crime charged

beyond a reasonable doubt. . . . We ask . . . whether

there is a reasonable view of the evidence that supports

the jury’s verdict of guilty. . . .

‘‘Furthermore, we are mindful that [w]e do not sit as

a [seventh] juror who may cast a vote against the verdict

based upon ourfeeling that some doubt of guilt is shown

by the cold printed record. We have not had the jury’s

opportunity to observe the conduct, demeanor, and attitude of the witnesses and to gauge their credibility.

. . . The scope of our factual inquiry on appeal is limited. This court cannot substitute its own judgment for

that of the jury if there is sufficient evidence to support

the jury’s verdict.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation

marks omitted.) State v. Torres, 82 Conn. App. 823,

825–27, 847 A.2d 1022, cert. denied, 270 Conn. 909, 853

A.2d 525 (2004).

With these principles in mind, and construing the

evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the

verdict, we determine that the jury reasonably could

have concluded that the cumulative force of the evidence established the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt as to each count.

A

Count One—Robbery in the First Degree

The defendant first argues that there was insufficient

evidence to support his conviction ofrobbery in the first

degree in violation of § 53a-134 (a) (3).2 Specifically, the

defendant argues that the evidence did not sufficiently

establish that he used a hypodermic syringe to stab

Jalbert and that, under the circumstances, the hypodermic syringe was not a dangerous instrument.3 We

disagree.

1

The following additional facts are relevant to the

defendant’s claim that there was insufficient evidence

to prove that he used a hypodermic syringe to injure

Jalbert. While at Saint Francis Hospital and Medical

Center, Karen Bigge, a physician assistant, treated Jalbert. She testified to seeing ‘‘some superficial scratches

and what appeared to be some puncture wounds’’ to

Jalbert’s left arm, which were consistent with having

been stabbed with a hypodermic syringe. Jalbert’s medical records were admitted into evidence and corroborated Bigge’s testimony.

In addition to Bigge’s testimony, the court admitted

into evidence two video exhibits without objection from

the defendant. The first video exhibit showed footage
from the Save-A-Lot surveillance system. As the jury

viewed the video, Jalbert testified to the events taking

place. The video showed the defendant exiting the store

with Jalbert in pursuit. The jury could see that once

outside the store, Jalbert attempted to apprehend the

defendant. Jalbert identified for the jury the moment

when he was stabbed with the hypodermic syringe.

As to the second video exhibit, Jalbert testified that

the property management company, which owned the

plaza where Save-A-Lot was located, operated its own

security cameras. These cameras covered a sector of

the parking lot that the Save-A-Lot cameras did not.

Sometime after the incident, the plaza’s property management company allowed Jalbert to view its surveillance monitors, and Jalbert testified to using his cell

phone to film the footage displayed on the computer

screen. This video showed the defendant running

through the parking lot, the furniture store employee

and Jalbert chasing and apprehending the defendant,

and the Hartford police officers arriving on the scene.

The jury also could see Jalbert pointing to his left forearm on multiple occasions while speaking with the

police officers.

The evidence before the jury indicating thatthe defendant used a hypodermic syringe to stab Jalbert consisted of not only testimony from Jalbert, but also

testimony from Bigge and Labbe, as well as two video

exhibits and Jalbert’s medical reports. The defendant

characterizes Jalbert’s testimony about when he saw

the hypodermic syringe as inconsistent. The defendant

also points to the inconsistent testimony between Jalbert, who testified to one puncture wound, and Bigge,

who testified that she saw ‘‘what appeared to be some

puncture wounds to [Jalbert’s] arm.’’ (Emphasis

added.) The defendant argues that Bigge’s use of the

plural form of ‘‘wound’’ when combined with Jalbert’s

testimonial inconsistencies is enough to establish that

there was insufficient evidence at trial to prove that the

defendant stabbed Jalbert in the arm with a hypodermic

syringe. However, ‘‘[i]t is axiomatic that evidentiary

inconsistencies are for the jury to resolve, and it is

within the province of the jury to believe all or only

part of a witness’testimony.’’ State v. Meehan, 260Conn.

372, 381, 796 A.2d 1191 (2002). We conclude the evidence before the jury was sufficient to allow it to resolve

any evidentiary inconsistencies.

Construing the evidence in the light most favorable

to sustaining the verdict, the jury reasonably could have

concluded that the cumulative force of the testimony

of Jalbert,Bigge, and Labbe, as well as the video exhibits

and Jalbert’s medical records, established that the

defendant used a hypodermic syringe to stab Jalbert in

the arm.

2
The defendant also contends that the evidence was

insufficient to prove that the hypodermic syringe was

a dangerous instrument under the circumstances. We

disagree.

The following additional facts are relevant to this

claim. The hypodermic syringe was admitted into evidence as a full exhibit at trial. Jalbert testified that

once the defendant was apprehended, he dropped the

hypodermic syringe, and it landed approximately four

feet away. To his recollection, the hypodermic syringe

was uncapped and the needle portion of the hypodermic

syringe was broken. Jalbert testified that he pointed

out the hypodermic syringe to the police officers.

At trial, however, Hartford police Officer Steven

Suchecki testified that Jalbert handed him the hypodermic syringe. During cross-examination, Suchecki could

not ascertain from where Jalbert had gotten the hypodermic syringe, but he did testify that Jalbert indicated

that the hypodermic syringe came from the defendant.

Suchecki also testified that when he secured the hypodermic syringe at the scene, it was uncapped and the

needle portion of the hypodermic syringe was bent.

The jury heard additional testimony concerning the

hypodermic syringe from Gerald Kumnick, a police

inspector with nearly nineteen years of experience.

Kumnick testified that he and the prosecutor conducted

an experiment with the same hypodermic syringe that

was introduced at trial. As part of the experiment, Kumnick testified that he inflated a rubber glove, twisted

the end of the glove, and held it steady so the prosecutor

could stab the glove. On the first attempt, the hypodermic syringe created a small hole in the glove but did

not cause it to deflate. When the prosecutor plunged

the hypodermic syringe into the inflated rubber glove

a second time, it ‘‘popped like a balloon would pop.’’

Kumnick concluded that ‘‘the glove popped from the

[hypodermic syringe] being poked into it.’’

In addition to Kumnick’s testimony, the jury heard

from Bigge, who testified that she examined the hypodermic syringe. In her opinion, the hypodermic syringe

was capable of transmitting blood-borne pathogens.

This opinion was based on observing the presence of

a needle in the hypodermic syringe. Bigge also testified

that blood-borne pathogens, such as HIV, hepatitis B,

or hepatitis C, could be transmitted through metal or

plastic from a hypodermic syringe. In the case of a

person infected with hepatitis, the disease could cause

abdominal pain, yellowing of the skin, and damage to

organs.

The defendant argues that the hypodermic syringe

was not a dangerous instrument under the circumstances. On appeal, the defendant claims that it was

unclear whetherthe hypodermic syringe was ‘‘ever used

or [brandished]’’ to argue that there was insufficient
evidence for a jury to conclude that the hypodermic

syringe was a dangerous instrument. The defendant’s

argument is unavailing.

We now set forth the law that guides our analysis

disposing of the defendant’s claim that the hypodermic

syringe was not a dangerous instrument. At the time

of the defendant’s arrest, the Penal Code defined, in

relevant part, a dangerous instrument as ‘‘any instrument, article or substance which, under the circumstances in which it is used or attempted orthreatened to

be used, is capable of causing death or serious physical

injury . . . .’’ General Statutes § 53a-3 (7). ‘‘[A]n ordinary object may be a dangerous instrument. Therefore,

[e]ach case must be individually examined to determine

whether, under the circumstances in which the object

is used or threatened to be used, it has the potential

for causing serious physical injury. . . . The question

of whether in the given circumstances a particular

object was used as a dangerous instrument is a question

of fact for the jury.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. McColl, 74 Conn. App. 545,

554, 813 A.2d 107, cert. denied, 262 Conn. 953, 818 A.2d

782 (2003).

‘‘[T]he analysis focuses on the actual circumstances

in which the instrument is used in order to consider

the instrument’s potential to cause harm. . . . The statute neither restricts the inquiry to the exact manner in

which the object was actually used, nor requires any

resulting serious physical injury. . . . The facts and

circumstances need show only that the general way

in which the object was used could potentially have

resulted in serious physical injury. . . . The object’s

potential for injury, therefore, must be examined only

in conjunction with the circumstances in which it is

actually used or threatened to be used, and not merely

viewed in terms of its dangerous capabilities in the

abstract.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks

omitted.) State v. Schultz, 100 Conn. App. 709, 721,

921 A.2d 595, cert. denied, 282 Conn. 926, 926 A.2d

668 (2007).

Contrary to the defendant’s argument, there was evidence to show that the hypodermic syringe was a dangerous instrument. For instance, Jalbert testified to

hearing the defendant state that he had a hypodermic

syringe, to feeling a sharp pain on his left forearm and

seeing a blood mark, and to seeing the defendant running with a hypodermic syringe in his right hand. Additionally, Bigge and Labbe testified to seeing a wound

on Jalbert’s arm that was consistent with his having

been stabbed with a hypodermic syringe. As the final

arbiter of credibility of any witness, the jury was free

to disbelieve Jalbert, Bigge, or Labbe. Moreover, ‘‘[o]n

appeal, we cannot revisit the jury’s decision to believe

the witnesses.’’ State v. Robinson, 125 Conn. App. 484,

489, 8 A.3d 1120 (2010), cert. denied, 300 Conn. 911, 12
A.3d 1006 (2011).

In addition to this testimony, the jury had the hypodermic syringe that was recovered at the scene for its

evaluation. The state also produced evidence that the

hypodermic syringe was able to puncture an inflated

glove. Through Bigge’s testimony, the jury learned that

the hypodermic syringe could transmit blood-borne

pathogens. Therefore, when evaluating all of the evidence before it, the jury reasonably could have concluded that being stabbed with a hypodermic syringe

potentially contaminated with a blood-borne pathogen

constituted a dangerous instrument.4

We conclude that when construing the evidence in

the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict and

the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom, the jury

reasonably could have concluded that the cumulative

force of the evidence established the defendant’s guilt

beyond a reasonable doubt as to robbery in the first

degree. Accordingly, the defendant’s claim must fail.

B

Count Two—Assault in the Second Degree

The defendant next claims that there was insufficient

evidence to support his conviction of assault in the

second degree. Specifically, the defendant contends

that because his statement, ‘‘I have a needle,’’ could

have been a warning or that Jalbert’s injury could have

been accidental, a reasonable jury could not have concluded that he intended to cause injury. The defendant

also argues that because Jalbert did not see the defendant stab him with a hypodermic syringe, as well as

inconsistencies between the testimony of Jalbert and

Bigge, a reasonable jury could not have concluded that

he caused Jalbert’s injury. We disagree.

We set forth the relevant law that disposes of the

defendant’s claim that the state did not provide sufficient evidence to support his conviction of assault in the

second degree. At the time the defendant was arrested,

§ 53a-60 (a) provided, in relevant part, that ‘‘[a] person

is guilty of assault in the second degree when . . . (2)

with intent to cause physical injury to another person,

he causes such injury to such person . . . by means

of . . . a dangerous instrument other than by means

of the discharge of a firearm . . . .’’ At the time the

defendant was arrested, ‘‘physical injury’’ was defined

as ‘‘impairment of physical condition or pain . . . .’’

General Statutes § 53a-3 (3).

‘‘Intent is a question of fact, the determination of

which should stand unless the conclusion drawn by the

trier is an unreasonable one. . . . [T]he [jury is] not

bound to accept as true the defendant’s claim of lack

of intent or his explanation of why he lacked intent.

. . . Intent may be, and usually is, inferred from the

defendant’s verbal or physical conduct. . . . Intent

may also be inferred from the surrounding circum-
stances. . . . The use of inferences based on circumstantial evidence is necessary because direct evidence

of the accused’s state of mind is rarely available. . . .

Intent may be gleaned from circumstantial evidence

such as the type of weapon used, the manner in which

it was used, the type of wound inflicted and the events

leading up to and immediately following the incident.

. . . Furthermore, it is a permissible, albeit not a necessary or mandatory, inference that a defendant intended

the natural consequences of his voluntary conduct.’’

(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)

State v. Andrews, 114 Conn. App. 738, 744–45, 971 A.2d

63, cert. denied, 293 Conn. 901, 975 A.2d 1277 (2009).

The jury reasonably could have found that the defendant intended to cause Jalbert physical injury through

the direct and circumstantial evidence presented at

trial. It is well established that ‘‘[t]here is no distinction

between direct and circumstantial evidence [so] far as

probative force is concerned . . . . In fact, circumstantial evidence may be more certain, satisfying and

persuasive than direct evidence.’’ (Citation omitted;

internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Teti, 50

Conn. App. 34, 39, 716 A.2d 931, cert. denied, 247 Conn.

921, 722 A.2d 812 (1998). The jury was able to evaluate

Jalbert’s credibility as he recounted the struggle with

the defendant, and the jury had the opportunity to

observe the altercation on the video. Therefore, the

jury reasonably could have rejected the defendant’s

argumentthat his statement concerning the hypodermic

syringe was a warning or that Jalbert’s wound was accidental.

Likewise, the jury also reasonably could have concluded that the defendant caused Jalbert’s injury. The

jury heard testimonial evidence from Jalbert, Bigge, and

Labbe. Also, it viewed the second video exhibit and

reviewed Jalbert’s medical report. Jalbert testified to

hearing the defendant state that he had a hypodermic

syringe, which was followed by sharp pain. Both Bigge

and Labbe testified to seeing a wound consistent with

being stabbed with a hypodermic syringe. Although

there were inconsistencies between the testimony of

Jalbert and Bigge as to the wound, the jury was free

to resolve these inconsistencies in a manner consistent

with a finding of guilt. See State v. Meehan, supra, 260

Conn. 381. Therefore, the jury reasonably could have

credited Jalbert’s testimony and concluded that the

defendant caused Jalbert’s injury in light of the following: (1) Bigge’s physical examination and testimony; (2)

testimony from two police officers attesting to having

seen a puncture wound; (3) video evidence of Jalbert

pointing to his arm; and (4) Jalbert’s medical records.

Because the jury, having considered the direct and circumstantial evidence,rejected the defendant’s theories,

‘‘[his argument] is inadequate to support his sufficiency

of the evidence claim.’’ State v. Johnson, 71 Conn. App.

272, 283, 801 A.2d 890, cert. denied, 261 Conn. 939, 808
A.2d 1133 (2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1207, 123 S. Ct.

1286, 154 L. Ed. 2d 1052 (2003).

We conclude that when construing the evidence in

the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict and

the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom, the jury

reasonably could have concluded that the cumulative

force of the evidence established the defendant’s guilt

beyond a reasonable doubt as to assault in the second

degree. Accordingly, the defendant’s claim is without

merit.

II

IMPROPER JURY CHARGE CLAIM

The defendant next claims that the court improperly

charged the jury on robbery in the first degree. Specifically, the defendant argues that the court erroneously

denied his requested charge pursuant to State v. Nicholson, 71 Conn. App. 585, 591–92, 803 A.2d 391, cert.

denied, 261 Conn. 941, 808 A.2d 1134 (2002). We are

not persuaded.

The following additional facts are relevant to this

claim. In anticipation of the charge conference, the

defendant submitted a written request to charge. See

Practice Book § 42-16. The defendant requested that

the following language be incorporated into the court’s

charge to the jury: ‘‘The charge of robbery in the first

degree requires either the actual use of a dangerous

instrument, or its threatened use, demonstrated by an

actual display or words combined with an overt display of the threatened instrument.’’ (Emphasis added.)

The defendant cited Nicholson as authority for the proposed instruction. The court declined to give the charge

requested by the defendant and instead charged the

jury, in relevant part, as follows: ‘‘A person is guilty of

robbery in the first degree when, in the course of the

commission of the crime of robbery or of immediate

flight therefrom, he used or threatened the use of a

dangerous instrument.’’

We set forth the relevant law governing the defendant’s improper jury charge claim. The standard of

review for claims of instructional impropriety is well

established. ‘‘Our review of the defendant’s claim

requires that we examine the [trial] court’s entire charge

to determine whether it is reasonably possible that the

jury could have been misled by the omission of the

requested instruction.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Kitchens, 299 Conn. 447, 454–55, 10 A.3d

942 (2011).

‘‘The principal function of a jury charge is to assist

the jury in applying the law correctly to the facts which

[it] might find to be established . . . . When reviewing

[a] challenged jury instruction . . . we must adhere to

the well settled rule that a charge to the jury is to be

considered in its entirety . . . and judged by its total

effect rather than by its individual component parts.
. . . [T]he test of a court’s charge is . . . whether it

fairly presents the case to the jury in such a way that

injustice is not done to either party . . . .’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) State v. Perry, 108 Conn.

App. 788, 792, 949 A.2d 537, cert. denied, 289 Conn. 912,

957 A.2d 881 (2008).

‘‘The duty of the trial court [in a criminal case] is to

instruct the jury on the law applicable to the case [and]

. . . in charging the [members of the] jury in a criminal

case, to give to them such instructions as may be

required to enable them to understand the nature of

the offense charged and the questions which they are

to decide, to weigh the evidence applicable to such

questions, and to intelligently decide them.’’ (Citations

omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. St.

Pierre, 58 Conn. App. 284, 291, 752 A.2d 86, cert. denied,

254 Conn. 916, 759 A.2d 508 (2000). ‘‘The defendant is

entitled to a jury which is correctly and adequately

instructed.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State

v. Fletcher, 10 Conn. App. 697, 701, 525 A.2d 535 (1987),

aff’d, 207 Conn. 191, 540 A.2d 370 (1988). ‘‘It is of the

utmost importance that the instructions be clear and

comprehensible and provide guidance to the jury in

applying the law to the facts it finds established.’’ Id.,

704.

The court properly declined to give the defendant’s

proposed charge because the facts in this case were

distinguishable from the facts in Nicholson. In Nicholson, the defendant did not show or threaten the use of

a box cutter, but, by keeping his right hand in his pocket

as he verbally threatened the victim, gave the victim

‘‘the impression that [the defendant] may have possessed a knife, gun or other weapon in his pocket.’’

State v. Nicholson, supra, 71 Conn. App. 587. It was

only after the defendant was arrested that a box cutter

was found in his sweatshirt pocket. Id., 588. The court

in Nicholson concluded that ‘‘[a] conviction pursuant

to § 53a-134 (a) (3) cannot stand if the evidence merely

shows that the defendant was armed with a dangerous

instrument, or that he gave the impression by his words

or conduct that he was armed with a dangerous instrument.’’ Id., 591.

In this case, as the defendant resisted Jalbert’s

attempt to apprehend him, the defendant specified the

type of dangerous instrument he had on his person.

This factual distinction between the present case and

Nicholson supports the court’s decision to reject the

defendant’s written request to charge the jury. The court

correctly reasoned that the jury reasonably could have

concluded that ‘‘the dangerous instrument may be the

syringe that the defendant indicated he had [on his

person] . . . .’’ Therefore, the court properly rejected

the defendant’s requested charge to the jury.

In reviewing the jury charge as a whole, we conclude

that the jury instructions correctly applied the law. The
court adopted jury instructions on the elements of robbery in the first degree in accordance with the model

criminal jury instructions.5 This court has noted that

‘‘[w]hile not dispositive of the adequacy of the [jury]

instruction, an instruction’s uniformity with the model

instructions is a relevant and persuasive factor in our

analysis.’’ State v. Sanchez, 84 Conn. App. 583, 592 n.10,

854 A.2d 778, cert. denied, 271 Conn. 929, 859 A.2d

585 (2004).

Moreover, the jury charge provided ample guidance.

The jury was provided with the specific elements of

the charge, which tracked the statutory language, as

well as an explanation of each element. The court

defined key terms and legal concepts, namely, ‘‘robbery,’’ ‘‘larceny,’’ ‘‘dangerous instrument,’’ ‘‘serious

physical injury,’’and ‘‘immediate flight.’’ The court further explained the concepts of circumstantial and direct

evidence, while also pointing out that jurors may draw

logical and reasonable inferences from facts established

by the evidence. See State v. Lo Sacco, 11 Conn. App.

24, 29–30, 525 A.2d 977 (finding no error in jury charge

when judge read statute verbatim, explained each subsection, and defined key term for jury), cert. denied,

204 Conn. 812, 528 A.2d 1158 (1987). ‘‘As long as [the

instructions] are correct in law, adapted to the issues

and sufficient for the guidance of the jury . . . we will

not view the instructions as improper.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Kitchens, supra, 299 Conn.

455. We conclude thatthe jury charge,read in its totality,

provided proper guidance and did not mislead the jury.

Accordingly, the defendant’s claim fails.

III

EVIDENTIARY CLAIMS

Finally, the defendant claims that the court abused

its discretion by limiting his cross-examination of Jalbert and that this evidentiary ruling was harmful error.6

Specifically, the defendant claims that the court (1)

improperly sustained the state’s objections to defense

counsel’s line of questioning as to who paid Jalbert’s

medical expenses and as to whether he had filed a

workers’ compensation claim, and (2) improperly limited cross-examination exploring Jalbert’s motivation

in recording the video of the incident and his laughter

during the recording. The defendant argues that these

topics were relevant because they tended to show that

Jalbert lacked credibility, that he was seeking compensation for the incident, and that Jalbert harbored bias

against the defendant.7 The state counters that the

defendant failed to establish that the testimony was

relevant. We agree with the state and conclude that

the court did not abuse its discretion in sustaining the

state’s objections.

The following additional facts are necessary to

address this claim. At trial, the defendant attempted to
elicit testimony from Jalbert on cross-examination as

to who paid his medical expenses and whether he submitted a workers’ compensation claim. The state

objected to the questions, and the court sustained the

state’s objections on the ground that the information

sought was irrelevant.8 Afterward, defense counsel

cross-examined Jalbert on the video he had recorded

using his cell phone, which previously was admitted

into evidence as a full exhibit. When defense counsel

attempted to ask Jalbert about his intentions in making

the recording, the state objected to the question on

relevance grounds, and the court excused the jury.

In the colloquy that followed, defense counsel argued

that her line of questioning was meant to elicit relevant

testimony from Jalbert as to his motivation for taking

the video. Defense counsel stated that she ‘‘[believed]

that [Jalbert’s reason for recording the video] was to

[get] compensation for [the] incident,’’ which tended to

show that Jalbert had ‘‘interest in the outcome . . .

and [went] to his credibility.’’ Additionally, defense

counsel represented to the court that she wanted to

ask Jalbert whether he found any aspect of the video

amusing.

The original video recording contained audio. In it,

one can hear some commentary and laughter between

Jalbert and another individual. However, the jury did

not hear the audio portion of the video. Nevertheless,

defense counsel argued that any comment or laughter

from Jalbert was relevant to his credibility and tended

to show bias against the defendant.

In support of her argument, defense counsel cited

various cases, as well as § 6.5 of the Connecticut Code

of Evidence,9

for the proposition that ‘‘evidence

intending to show a witness’ bias, prejudice, or interest

[was] never a collateral impeachment of a witness . . .

[and] may be accomplished through the introduction

of [extrinsic] evidence in addition to examining the

witness correctly.’’ Afterreviewing the cited references,

the court sustained the state’s objection, reasoning that

even though cross-examination showing a motive, bias,

and interest of a particular witness is never collateral,

‘‘[i]n this particular case . . . any [w]orkers’ [c]ompensation action or any action to recover payments of medical bills . . . [does not] go to show bias that this

witness has against this particular defendant.’’ As to

the video, the court sustained the state’s objection

because the recording was shown to the jury without

sound, and ‘‘[what is] relevant [was] actually what happened in the tape itself . . . .’’

We begin by setting forth the relevant law that guides

our analysis of the defendant’s claim that the court

abused its discretion in certain evidentiary rulings. ‘‘The

primary interest secured by confrontation is the right

to cross-examination . . . and an important function

of cross-examination is the exposure of a witness’ moti-
vation in testifying. . . . Cross-examination to elicit

facts tending to show motive, interest, bias and prejudice is a matter of right and may not be unduly

restricted.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State

v. Benedict, 313 Conn. 494, 510, 98 A.3d 42 (2014). ‘‘[A]s

a generalrule cross-examination of the prosecuting witness should be allowed to show the pendency, existence

and status of civil action . . . arising out of the same

set of circumstances as those which served as the basis

forthe criminal prosecution.’’(Internal quotation marks

omitted.) State v. Reis, 33 Conn. App. 521, 524–25, 636

A.2d 872, cert. denied, 229 Conn. 901, 640 A.2d 118

(1994). ‘‘However, [t]he [c]onfrontation [c]lause guarantees only an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever

way, and to whatever extent, the defense may wish.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Badaracco,

156 Conn. App. 650, 674, 114 A.3d 507 (2015).

Our Supreme Court has ‘‘emphasized in numerous

decisions . . . that the confrontation clause does not

give the defendant the right to engage in unrestricted

cross-examination. . . . [For example, a] defendant

may elicit only relevant evidence through cross-examination. . . . The proffering party bears the burden of

establishing the relevance of the offered testimony.

Unless a proper foundation is established, the evidence

is irrelevant. . . . Relevance may be established in one

of three ways. First, the proffering party can make an

offer of proof. . . . Second, the record can itself be

adequate to establish the relevance of the proffered

testimony. . . . Third, the proffering party can establish a proper foundation for the testimony by stating a

good faith belief that there is an adequate factual basis

for his or her inquiry.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Benedict, supra, 313

Conn. 511. ‘‘The trial court has wide discretion to determine the relevancy of evidence and the scope of crossexamination. Every reasonable presumption should be

made in favor of the correctness of the court’s ruling

in determining whether there has been an abuse of

discretion.’’ State v. Barnes, 232 Conn. 740, 746–47, 657

A.2d 611 (1995).

At trial, the defendant made no offer of proof, and,

on appeal, he relies on State v. Colton, 227 Conn. 231,

630 A.2d 577 (1993), to argue that the court abused its

discretion by ‘‘ignoring any possible financial interest

[Jalbert may have had] in the outcome.’’ (Emphasis

omitted.) Therefore, the defendant argues, ‘‘if the jury

had been permitted to know that Jalbert was seeking

financial compensation [through a workers’ compensation claim] for the injury, [it] would probably have

looked at his credibility differently . . . .’’

The defendant’s reliance on Colton fails for two reasons. First, our Supreme Court in Colton found reversible error when the trial court precluded extrinsic
evidence showing motive and bias of the state’s chief

witness after direct examination testimony provided

the foundation for the defendant to attempt to impeach

the witness through cross-examination. State v. Colton,

supra, 227 Conn. 238–39, 247. In this case, Jalbert, on

direct examination, did not testify to missing work, to

filing a workers’ compensation claim, or to needing

assistance paying any expenses in connection with this

incident. Therefore, the defendant on cross-examination did not have a foundation for the court to allow him

to inquire about Jalbert’s medical expenses or about a

speculative workers’ compensation claim. See State v.

Barnes, supra, 232 Conn. 749–50 (‘‘[i]t is entirely proper

for a court to deny a request to present certain testimony that will further nothing more than a fishing expedition . . . or result in a wild goose chase’’ [citation

omitted; internal quotation marks omitted]). Second, in

Colton, the defendant made several offers of proof to

establish that the proffered evidence, although extrinsic, impeached the witness’ testimony. State v. Colton,

supra, 242–45. The defendant in this case made no offer

of proof showing that Jalbert was attempting to benefit

financially. Upon the state’s objection to questions pertaining to medical expenses and a workers’ compensation claim, the defendant made no offer of proof as to

what evidence he expected to elicit from Jalbert;rather,

in his effort to argue for the relevancy of the matter,

the defendant merely stated that he wanted to ‘‘show

whether they initially refused [a workers’ compensation

claim] because [Jalbert’s actions were] outside the

scope of his employment.’’ (Emphasis added.) The

defendant’s speculative inquiry into whether Jalbert

filed a workers’ compensation claim cannot be considered an offer of proof.10 See State v. Conrod, 198 Conn.

592, 597, 504 A.2d 494 (1986) (‘‘An offer of proof, properly presented, serves three purposes. First, it should

inform the court of the legal theory under which the

offered evidence is admissible. Second, it should inform

the trial judge of the specific nature of the offered

evidence so the court can judge its admissibility. Third,

it thereby creates a record adequate for appellate

review.’’ [Internal quotation marks omitted.]), quoting

Mad River Orchard Co. v. Krack Corp., 89 Wn. 2d 535,

537, 573 P.2d 796 (1978).

Moreover, the record is devoid of any concrete evidence that would have allowed the court to conclude

that the proffered testimony concerning payment of

Jalbert’s medical expenses or a speculative workers’

compensation claim was relevant. The defendant relies

on State v. Chance, 236 Conn. 31, 671 A.2d 323 (1996),

for the proposition that ‘‘cross-examination to elicit

facts tending to show that a witness’ testimony was

motivated by bias may not be unduly restricted.’’ In

that case, the trial court properly allowed the state to

impeach a defense witness because the elicited direct

examination testimony provided the proper foundation
to cross-examine the witness on bias. Id., 57, 59. In

this case, however, Jalbert’s testimony during direct

examination did not provide a basis for the defendant

to cross-examine Jalbert on medical expenses or a speculative workers’ compensation claim. Jalbert did not

testify that he owed money for having received medical

care, did not mention that he missed work because of

the injury, and did not state that he was seeking to file

a workers’ compensation claim. Jalbert did testify to

having gone to the hospital via ambulance, but that

alone was insufficient to establish an independent basis

in the record demonstrating how the proffered testimony would have shown witness bias or an interest in

the outcome of the case. See State v. Santiago, 224

Conn. 325, 332, 618 A.2d 32 (1992) (concluding that

there was specific evidence in record to adequately

establish relevance of proffered testimony concerning

relationship between state’s witness and police department in attempt to prove witness bias).

For similar reasons, we conclude that the defendant

failed to provide a good faith belief that there was an

adequate factual predicate to cross-examine Jalbert on

whether someone had paid his medical bills or whether

he had filed a workers’ compensation claim. On appeal,

the defendant relies on State v. Arline, 223 Conn. 52,

612 A.2d 755 (1992), to argue that he should have been

‘‘permitted to elicit facts on cross-examination as to

whether Jalbert had a pending civil claim arising out of

the same incident giving rise to the criminal prosecution

. . . .’’ The defendant’s reliance on Arline is misplaced.

In that case, our Supreme Court held that ‘‘[o]nce testimony regarding subsequent criminal charges against

the complainant and the existence of a civil claim had

been admitted into evidence . . . the defendant had a

right to argue in final argument any reasonable inferences from the facts elicited.’’ (Emphasis added.) State

v. Arline, supra, 59. In this case, the issue concerns

limiting cross-examination and not a closing argument,

but more importantly, nothing regarding Jalbert’s medical expenses or a workers’ compensation claim had

been admitted into evidence. To be fair, the court in

Arline did state that it is ‘‘generally accepted that the

pendency of a civil claim arising out of the same set of

circumstances as those that served as the basis for

a criminal prosecution is probative of a prosecuting

witness’ motive to lie because the outcome of the prosecution may be beneficial to the prosecuting witness.’’

(Emphasis added.) Id., 61. Because there was no evidence as to medical expenses or a workers’ compensation claim, and the defendant failed to articulate how

Jalbert could have benefited financially from the outcome of the case, the court could not apply the general

rule as stated in Arline. Our review of the transcript

reveals that the defendant neither established a proper

foundation for the proffered testimony nor stated a

good faith belief that Jalbert had a financial interest in
the outcome of the case. See State v. Benedict, supra,

313 Conn. 511.

The defendant’s argument that the court improperly

prevented cross-examination of Jalbert on the audio

portion of the second video exhibit also fails. Although

the defendant ‘‘believed that [Jalbertrecorded the video

to receive] . . . compensation for this incident,’’ he

offered no proof nor stated a good faith belief for this

assertion. See State v. Henry, 72 Conn. App. 640, 666–67,

805 A.2d 823 (concluding that court did not abuse discretion in disallowing proposed cross-examination

because defense counsel’s statement, ‘‘ ‘I know that he

was arrested on this witness’ statement,’ ’’ did not provide substantive information and lacked good faith

belief), cert. denied, 262 Conn. 917, 811 A.2d 1293

(2002). A thorough review of the record does not reveal

how the proffered testimony would have been relevant

or supported the defendant’s stand-alone belief that

Jalbert recorded the video for his financial interest. In

addition, the defendant failed to articulate any logical

connection between Jalbert’s comments or laughter on

the video (not heard by the jury) and the fact that he

claims that such evidence tends to show that Jalbert

lacked credibility or was biased against the defendant.

The court reasonably could have concluded that the

jury’s attention to the vital issues of the case could have

been distracted by cross-examination seeking information as to who, if anyone, paid Jalbert’s medical bill,

inquiring as to whether Jalbert filed a workers’ compensation claim, and eliciting testimony into Jalbert’s

motives for recording the video and whether he found

it amusing. See State v. Isabelle, 107 Conn. App. 597,

607, 946 A.2d 266 (2008) (‘‘[i]t is a reasonable exercise

of judicial discretion to exclude . . . evidence the relevancy of which appears to be so slight and inconsequential that to admit it would distract attention which

should be concentrated on vital issues of the case’’

[internal quotation marks omitted]).

The record in this case establishes that the court

did not abuse its discretion in sustaining the state’s

objection to the proposed cross-examination. Moreover, even if the court had erred as claimed by the

defendant, any error was harmless.11 Accordingly, the

defendant’s evidentiary claim must fail.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1

In the context of this case and for clarity, all subsequent ‘‘needle’’ references are identified as ‘‘hypodermic syringe.’’ See Stedman’s Medical Dictionary (27th Ed. 2000) p. 1774 (defining ‘‘hypodermic syringe’’ as a ‘‘small

[syringe] with a barrel . . . perfectly matched plunger, and tip [that is] used

with a hollow needle for subcutaneous injections’’).

2 General Statutes § 53a-134 (a) provides in relevant part that ‘‘[a] person

is guilty of robbery in the first degree when, in the course of the commission

of the crime of robbery as defined in section 53a-133 or of immediate flight

therefrom, he . . . (3) uses or threatens the use of a dangerous instrument . . . .’’

3 Because we conclude that the jury reasonably could have found that
the defendant used the hypodermic syringe and that it was a dangerous

instrument, we do not need to reach the defendant’s claim that the evidence

did not sufficiently establish that he threatened Jalbert with a dangerous

instrument.

4 Courts in other jurisdictions have concluded that a hypodermic syringe

can be a dangerous instrument. See State v. Ainis, 317 N.J. Super. 127,

131–34, 721 A.2d 329 (Law Div. 1998) (holding that hypodermic syringe

purportedly infected with AIDS virus was ‘‘deadly weapon’’ under N.J. Stat.

§ 2C:43-7.2); People v. Nelson, 215 App. Div. 2d 782, 783, 627 N.Y.S.2d 412

(1995) (holding that hypodermic syringe purportedly infected with AIDS

virus constituted ‘‘dangerous instrument’’ within meaning of New York Penal

Law § 10.00 [13] even though prosecution did not prove needle portion of

hypodermic syringe was infected with virus).

5 The courtfollowed § 6.4-1 oftheCriminal Jury Instructions. SeeConnecticut Criminal Jury Instructions (Rev. to May 10, 2012) § 6.4-1, available at

http://www.jud.ct.gov/JI/criminal/part6/6.4-1.htm (last visited November 3,

2015). We note that the jury instructions used by the court during the

defendant’s trial have not changed in relevant part from the current revision.

6 We note that the defendant does not claim that the court’s ruling violated

his constitutional right to cross-examine Jalbert.

7 For the first time on appeal, the defendant advances other theories

concerning Jalbert’s alleged bias and self-interest in the outcome of the case

that were not presented at trial. For example, the defendant contends that

Jalbert was biased against store customers in general and was ‘‘portraying

himself as a victim to get compensation from the state victim’s fund.’’ We

do not address these claims. See State v. Russell, 67 Conn. App. 822, 826–27,

789 A.2d 1088 (‘‘We have consistently refused to consider evidentiary rulings

not properly preserved. Where the issue raised for the first time on appeal

is a matter of state evidentiary law . . . this court will deny the defendant

appellate review.’’ [Internal quotation marks omitted.]), cert. denied, 260

Conn. 901, 793 A.2d 1090 (2002).

8 The line of questioning at trial was as follows:

‘‘[Defense Counsel]: Now, did Brownard Security pay your bills?

‘‘[Jalbert]: Pay my bills?

‘‘[Defense Counsel]: Yes.

‘‘[Jalbert]: As in my—

‘‘[Defense Counsel]: Well, you had an ambulance bill and you must have

incurred medical bills?

‘‘[The Prosecutor]: Objection, relevance.

‘‘The Court: How is this relevant?

‘‘[Defense Counsel]: Your Honor, I would claim it to show whether they

initially refused because it was outside the scope of his employment.

‘‘The Court: Sustain. . . .

‘‘[Defense Counsel]: Did you file a [workers’ compensation] claim?

‘‘[The Prosecutor]: Objection, relevance.

‘‘The Court: Sustain.

‘‘[Defense Counsel]: Exception on that ruling, Your Honor.

‘‘The Court: Well, you don’t have to, but you—okay. Thank you. Noted.

‘‘[Defense Counsel]: Has anybody paid for your hospital bill?

‘‘[The Prosecutor]: Objection, relevance.

‘‘The Court: Sustain.’’

9 Section 6.5 of the Connecticut Code of Evidence provides: ‘‘The credibility of a witness may be impeached by evidence showing bias for, prejudice

against, or interest in any person or matter that might cause the witness to

testify falsely.’’

10 We also reject the defendant’s claim made during oral argument before

this court that the trial court has a sua sponte responsibility to solicit an

offer of proof. ‘‘We never have held that a trial court has an independent

obligation to order, sua sponte, a hearing on an evidentiary matter, in the

absence of both a request for a hearing and an adequate offer of proof.’’

(Emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. LaVoie, 158

Conn. App. 256, 268, 118 A.3d 708 (quoting State v. Sullivan, 244 Conn.

640, 651 n.14, 712 A.2d 919 [1998]), cert. denied, 319 Conn. 929, A.3d

(2015).

11 ‘‘We . . . note that the defendant [bears] the burden of establishing

harm from any evidentiary error. A defendant is not entitled to appellate

relief on the basis of an erroneous evidentiary ruling, however, without

demonstrating that the ruling was harmful to him in that it affected the

verdict. When an improper evidentiary ruling is not constitutional in nature,

the defendant bears the burden of demonstrating that the error was harmful.

. . . [A] nonconstitutional error is harmless when an appellate court has a
fair assurance that the error did not substantially affect the verdict. . . .

[O]ur determination that the defendant was harmed by the trial court’s

[evidentiary rulings] is guided by the various factors that we have articulated

as relevant [to] the inquiry of evidentiary harmlessness . . . such as the

importance of the [evidence] in the prosecution’s case, whether the [evidence] was cumulative, the presence or absence of evidence corroborating

or contradicting the [evidence] on material points, the extent of crossexamination otherwise permitted, and, of course, the overall strength of the

prosecution’s case. . . . Most importantly, we must examine the impact of

the evidence on the trier of fact and the result of the trial.’’(Internal quotation

marks omitted.) State v. Badaracco, supra, 156 Conn. App. 674–75.

Even if we were to assume that the court improperly limited the defendant’s cross-examination of Jalbert, we conclude that any error was harmless. Although Jalbert was the key witness, the state presented ample

corroborating testimonial, video, and physical evidence to support a finding

a guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, the defendant failed to meet

his burden, and the record does not show that the court’s alleged nonconstitutional evidentiary ruling substantially affected the verdict.