NOTICE: NOT FOR PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE

LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION ONE

In re the Matter of:

EUGENE ANAYA, Petitioner/Appellant,

v.

SANDRA L. ANAYA, Respondent/Appellee.

No. 1 CA-CV 13-0606

Appeal from the Superior Court in Apache County

No. S0100DO201000157

The Honorable Kay H. Wilkins, Judge Pro Tempore

AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED

COUNSEL

Hamblin Law Office, P.L.C., Eagar

By Bryce M. Hamblin

Counsel for Petitioner/Appellant

R. John Lee, Attorney at Law, St. Johns

By R. John Lee

Counsel for Respondent/Appellee
ANAYA v. ANAYA

Decision of the Court

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MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Patricia K. Norris delivered the decision of the Court, in 

which Judge Samuel A. Thumma and Judge Kent E. Cattani joined.

N O R R I S, Judge:

¶1 Eugene Anaya appeals from the superior court’s order 

finding the consent decree that dissolved his marriage to Sandra L. Anaya 

ambiguous and ordering him to pay Sandra spousal maintenance of 

$1,089.59 per month. For the following reasons, we affirm the order as 

modified. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 The superior court dissolved Eugene and Sandra’s marriage 

by consent decree on March 23, 2011. The consent decree, which is 

discussed in more detail below, awarded Eugene the parties’ marital 

residence (subject to a mortgage) and awarded Sandra the exclusive use of 

the residence until their minor child turned 18. The decree also required 

Sandra to maintain the residence. 

¶3 Subsequently, Sandra petitioned the court to hold Eugene in 

contempt, alleging he had stopped making the mortgage payments on the 

residence; and Eugene petitioned the court to order Sandra to vacate the 

residence, alleging she had failed to maintain it. After an evidentiary 

hearing, the court found Sandra had violated the consent decree by failing 

to maintain the residence and ordered her to vacate the residence. The 

court also found the decree ambiguous and ruled that the provision of the 

decree that allowed Sandra to live in the residence was a spousal 

maintenance obligation. Accordingly, the court found Eugene had 

violated the consent decree by failing to pay spousal maintenance (in the 

form of the mortgage payments on the residence) and ordered him to pay 

Sandra spousal maintenance directly in the amount of $1,089.59 -- the 

amount of the monthly mortgage payment on the residence -- with the 

obligation beginning after she vacated the residence. 

DISCUSSION

¶4 This appeal requires us to review the superior court’s 

interpretation of the decree, and thus, our review is de novo. Cohen v. 
ANAYA v. ANAYA

Decision of the Court

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Frey, 215 Ariz. 62, 66, ¶ 10, 157 P.3d 482, 486 (App. 2007). Eugene first 

argues the court should not have ordered him to pay spousal maintenance 

because the decree only gave Sandra the right to live in the residence, 

rather than the right to any monetary spousal maintenance. Sandra, on 

the other hand, argues the decree granted her spousal maintenance --

which essentially took the form of housing -- and thus, Eugene was 

required to pay her monetary spousal maintenance when the court 

ordered her to vacate the residence. 

¶5 A consent decree is “an independent resolution by the court 

of the issues before it and rightfully is regarded in that context and not 

according to the negotiated intent of the parties.” In re Marriage of Zale, 

193 Ariz. 246, 249, ¶ 11, 972 P.2d 230, 233 (1999) (citation omitted).1 The 

general rules of interpretation for a written document apply to the 

interpretation of a consent decree, Cohen, 215 Ariz. at 66, ¶ 11, 157 P.3d at 

486, but we may not consider parole evidence, Zale, 193 Ariz. at 249-50, 

¶¶ 10-15, 972 P.2d at 233-34. The first step in construing a consent decree

is to determine if it is ambiguous, which is a question of law for the court. 

Cohen, 215 Ariz. at 66, ¶ 11, 157 P.3d at 486. A decree is ambiguous if it is 

subject to more than one reasonable interpretation. Id. 

¶6 The parties have each offered a reasonable interpretation of 

the decree, and thus, we agree with the superior court that the decree is 

ambiguous. Although Eugene argues the decree is not ambiguous and is 

subject to one meaning only, he overlooks that the meaning of the decree 

is derived from its context and structure. See Cohen, 215 Ariz. at 66, ¶ 12, 

157 P.3d at 486. Eugene’s interpretation of the decree cannot be squared 

with other provisions of the decree that pertain to spousal maintenance. 

Although the provision of the decree that granted Sandra the right to live 

in the residence does not mention monetary spousal maintenance, it, as 

well as other provisions in the decree, refer to spousal maintenance. 

¶7 The consent decree is roughly divided into three sections: an 

“Affirmations Section” beginning at page four containing the parties’ 

factual and legal affirmations; a “Findings Section” beginning at page one 

containing the court’s findings; and an “Orders Section” beginning at 

page three containing the court’s orders. 

 1The parties have argued it is the intent of the court, and not 

the negotiated intent of the parties, that governs the interpretation of the 

decree, and thus, we have resolved this appeal under that framework. 
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¶8 In paragraph six of the Affirmations Section labeled 

“Maintenance/Support,” the parties agreed “that spousal maintenance 

and child support should be as outlined above.” The reference to “as 

outlined above” included paragraph ten of the Findings Section, which

read as follows: 

10. Spousal Maintenance/Support

a. The parties agree that [Sandra] shall 

live in the aforementioned residence and enjoy 

its exclusive use until the parties’ minor child 

reaches the age of 18 or until [Sandra] 

abandons the premises. [Sandra] is responsible 

for maintenance of the residence. This 

provision shall terminate if [Sandra] should 

damage the premises or fail to maintain 

beyond normal wear and tear.

b. The parties agree that [Eugene] shall 

pay child support to [Sandra] through the 

clearinghouse in the amount of $800.00 per 

month to commence on April 1, 2011. 

Additionally, paragraph two of the Orders Section read as follows: 

“SPOUSAL MAINTENANCE/SUPPORT: [Eugene] shall pay child 

support to [Sandra] through the clearinghouse in the amount of $800.00 

per month.” Paragraph two of the Orders Section was labeled like 

paragraph ten of the Findings Section but, unlike paragraph ten of the 

Findings Section, did not reference Sandra’s right to live in the residence; 

instead, it simply addressed child support.

¶9 We examine the provisions of the decree to determine the 

court’s intent. See Lopez v. Lopez, 125 Ariz. 309, 310, 609 P.2d 579, 580 

(App. 1980) (“The intention of the court must be determined from all parts 

of the judgment . . . .” (citations omitted)). To accept Eugene’s argument 

would require us to, first, ignore the provisions in the Affirmations 

Section where the parties affirmed spousal maintenance and affirmed it 

would be “as outlined above.” Second, it would require us to ignore the 

references to spousal maintenance contained in the Findings Section and 

Orders Section. Third, it would be incompatible with the structure of 

paragraph ten of the Findings Section, in which subsection (a) referred to 

Sandra’s right to live in the residence and subsection (b) referred to 

Eugene’s obligation to pay Sandra child support. The heading of that 
ANAYA v. ANAYA

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section signified it pertained to two subjects: spousal maintenance and 

child support. And, because subsection (b) dealt specifically with the 

subject of child support, the most logical reading is that subsection (a) 

dealt with the other subject -- spousal maintenance. 

¶10 Moreover, Sandra’s right to live in the residence provided 

her with a basic necessity -- housing -- which supports interpreting the 

decree as awarding spousal maintenance. We must interpret the decree in 

the context of the court’s statutory duty to ensure that the division of 

marital property and award of spousal maintenance is fair and equitable. 

Ariz. Rev. Stat. (“A.R.S.”) § 25-317(B)-(C) (2007); Cohen, 215 Ariz. at 67, 

¶ 14, 157 P.3d at 487. Because we presume the court complied with this

duty, see Cohen, 215 Ariz. at 67, ¶ 14, 157 P.3d at 487, it would make no 

sense to interpret the decree as not providing for spousal maintenance 

when, at the time the court entered it, the record reflected the parties had 

been married more than 23 years; Sandra’s income was only 

approximately 15% of Eugene’s income; and she was to become the 

“primary physical custodian” of their minor child.2 See Benson v. State, 108 

Ariz. 513, 515, 502 P.2d 1332, 1334 (1972), quoted with approval in Zale, 193 

Ariz. at 250-51, ¶ 18, 972 P.2d at 234-35 (“A judgment which is ambiguous 

and uncertain may be read in connection with the entire record and 

construed accordingly.”).

¶11 In sum, harmonizing all of the provisions in the decree and 

assessing its overall structure in light of the court’s statutory duty, we 

agree with the superior court that Sandra’s right to live in the residence 

was a form of spousal maintenance. 

¶12 Eugene next argues that even if Sandra’s right to live in the 

residence was a form of spousal maintenance, it terminated when she 

failed to maintain the residence. Based on the placement of the 

termination provision, see supra ¶ 8, it is unclear whether “this provision” 

refers to the entire spousal maintenance provision generally, Sandra’s 

exclusive use of the residence, or merely the prior sentence outlining 

Sandra’s responsibility to maintain the residence. The termination 

provision, then, is also ambiguous because it is subject to more than one 

reasonable interpretation. See supra ¶ 5. 

 2The parties’ child support worksheet did not reflect that 

Eugene was paying spousal maintenance or that Sandra was receiving 

spousal maintenance or the in-kind value of spousal maintenance. 
ANAYA v. ANAYA

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¶13 As discussed, Sandra’s right to live in the residence was a 

form of spousal maintenance. And, because the consent decree gave 

Sandra the right to live in the residence until the parties’ minor child 

turned 18, the decree awarded her a finite number of years of spousal 

maintenance. If we were to interpret the termination provision as 

applying to the entire spousal maintenance provision, such an 

interpretation would conflict with Sandra’s entitlement to spousal 

maintenance for this finite period. Cf. Cohen, 215 Ariz. at 66, ¶ 12, 157 P.3d 

at 486 (appellate court will not “assign meaning to one provision which 

would render other provisions meaningless”). Therefore, because the 

consent decree entitled Sandra to spousal maintenance, the termination 

provision only applied to Sandra’s exclusive use of the residence. 

Although she forfeited her right to live in the residence because she failed 

to maintain it, she did not forfeit her right to spousal maintenance. Thus, 

we agree with the superior court that once Sandra vacated the residence, 

she became entitled to spousal maintenance in an amount equal to the 

monthly mortgage payments. 

¶14 The superior court did not specify a termination date for 

spousal maintenance, which, as discussed, is to occur when the parties’

minor child turns 18. Therefore, pursuant to the consent decree and 

A.R.S. § 12-2103 (2003), we modify the superior court’s order to specify 

Eugene’s obligation to pay Sandra spousal maintenance, to begin after she 

vacated the premises, will terminate when the parties’ minor child turns 

18. 

¶15 Eugene and Sandra have each requested attorneys’ fees on 

appeal but neither cited a basis for a fee award. Thus, we deny the fee 

requests. See Ariz. R. Civ. App. P. 21; In re Marriage of Kassa, 231 Ariz. 592, 

594, ¶ 7, 299 P.3d 1290, 1292 (App. 2013). We award Sandra her taxable 

costs on appeal, however, contingent upon her compliance with Arizona 

Rule of Civil Appellate Procedure 21. 

CONCLUSION

¶16 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the order of the 

superior court as modified.