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### MEM ORA ND UM OP INION No. 04-09-00006- CV Claudia BA KER , Appellant
v . Alfre d Alan BA KER , Appellee F ro m th e 40 7th

Judic ia l D ist

ri c t Co ur t, B e xar County , T e xas Trial Court No. 2006-CI -07889 Honora ble J ohn D. Gabr iel, J r. , J udg e Presiding Opinion by : Steven C. Hilbig , J ustice Sitt ing: Catherine Stone, Chief J ustice Phy lis J . Speedlin , J ustice Steven C. Hilbig , J ustice Deliver ed and F iled: October 21, 2009 AFF I RMED AS MODI FI ED Claudia Ba

ker a ppeals fr om a final de cre e of divorc e, cla iming the tria l cour t erred in the
manner in which prope rty

was distributed. We modify the dec ree and af

fi rm t h e fi n al decr ee of divorce as modified.04
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- 2- B ACKG ROUND I n May 2006, Claudia filed a pe tition fo r d ivorce . Alfre d answe red a nd counter -petitioned for divorc e. Ac cordingto these plea dings, the parties we re ma rried on July

30, 1984, separ ated on J uly 12, 1992, and had no c hildren. The matter wa s tried to the cour t. The main issues at trial inv olv e d a

re sid e nc e loc a te d at 21 6 Pr ime ra Str e e t, O lmo s Pa

rk , T e xas. At

the tim e of tria l, o nly Claudia was living in the Primera Stree t residenc e. At tr ia l, A lf re d te sti fi e d h e inh e ri te d $ 30 0, 00 0. 00 in 1 99 6 a nd pla c e d it

in s e pa ra te a c c ounts . A l f r e d c o n t e n d e d

h e s p e n ta b o u t$ 1 5 4 , 8 4 9
. 2 4 o f th i s i n h e r i t an c e f un d o nth e P r i m e r a

S tr e e tP r o p e rty. Acc ording to A l fr ed ’s t estimony , he spent a pproxi mately

$2,000.00 from his inheritanc e on a mortg ag e pay

ment for the Primer a Stree t property , approximately $102,000.00 from his inheritanc e to pay off the ba lance of the note on the Primera Street proper ty , and $50,000.00 from his inheritance to make imp ro ve me nts on the Pr ime ra

Str e e t pr op e rt

y . A lf re d f ur the r t e sti fi e d th e imp ro ve me nts increas ed the va lue of the Primer a Stree t property “at lea st $50,000.00, if not more.” No documentar

y evidenc e or other proof was offere d to corr oborate Alfre d’s t estimony about the sourc e of the $50,000.00 used to make the improvements. Cla ud ia did no t pe rs on a lly

a pp e ar at tr ia l, but

did so thr ou g h c ouns e l. C la

ud ia did no t di sp ute Albert’s c laim to reimbursement for the mortg ag e-r elated pa y ments and stipulated Alfre d was
e nti tle d to re imb ur se me nt in the amou nt of $1 04 ,8 49 .2 4 fo r the se pa y me nts . How ever , C la

ud ia argued ag ainst Alfre d’s re imbursement claim for $50,000.00 for his se parate prope rty used to make improvements on the Primera Street prope rty .04
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- 3- Th e on ly e vid e nc e to s up po rt

Al fr e d’ s c la im i s his te sti mony the $5 0, 00 0 w a s h is s e pa rate proper ty derive d from an inheritanc e and the pr operty value wa s enhanc ed by

the same a

mount. The only other evidence is Claudia’s deposition testimony that she did not believe A lfred spe nt $50,000 of his separ ate pr operty

or that the prope rty

value wa s enhanc ed by

that amount. At the conc lusion of t he trial, the trial cour t gr anted the divor ce, a

war ded Claudia the r ight to purcha se Alfr ed’s interest in the Primera Street proper ty for $268,630.95, and set a dea dline for Cla ud ia to e xer c ise thi s r ig ht. Th e tr ia l c ourt a lso or de re d that in t

he e ve nt C la

ud ia fa ile d to purc ha se Alfre d’s intere st, Claudia was to vac ate the Primer a Stree t property so the proper

ty could be sold. Finally , the trial cour

t specified the manner

in which the proc eeds of

the sale were to be distributed to C la ud ia and Al fr e d. Th e fi na l de c re e of div or c e pr ov ide s in

re le va nt p art , Di vis ion of Mari ta l E state Th e Court

fi nd s th a t th e fo llo wi ngis a just and right division of the parties’ marital esta te , h av i n g d

u e r e g ar d f o r t h e r i g h t s o f

e a c hp arty.

.... R e a l P r o p e rt y C o m m o n l y K n o w n a s 2 1 6 P r i m e r a

S tr e e t , O l m o s P ar

k , B e x ar C o un ty, Texas, 78212-2053. I T I S ORDERED AND DECR E E D t hat CL AUDIA B AKER shall have the rig ht to purchase the interest of AL FRED ALAN B AKER in the re al proper ty commonly

kn o wn as 216 Primera

Street, Olmos Park, Texas, for the sum of $2 68 ,6 30 .9 5, it be ing F UR TH ER ORDE RED that c e rt if ie d fu nd s in the a fo re sa id amount be paid to AL FRED ALAN B AKER by CL AUDI A BA KER on or bef ore Aug ust 27, 2008.... I n th e e ve nt t

hat CLAU DIA B AKER d oe s n ot p ay to AL F RED ALANB AKER i n cer tified funds the a fore said sum o n or bef ore Aug ust 27, 2008, I T I S ORDERED AND DE CREED that the propert y an d all improvements locate d there on at 216 Primera Stree t, Olmos P ark, Te x as...s h al l b e sold under the f ollowing ter

ms and c on dit ion s:

....04
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1 ... See H al am ka v. H al am ka , 7 9 9 S .W .2 d 3 5 1 , 3 5 4 (T e x . A p p .— T e x a rk a n a 1 9 9 0 , no w rit) (s ta ting the e sta te to b e d ivid e d in a d ivo rc e p ro c e e d ing is t h e c o m m u n ity e sta te ).

- 4- 4. The Court ORDERS that CL AUDIA BAKER vacate t he af oresa id premises and re move there from all of her persona l pr operty of any kind whatsoeve r not later tha n 6:00 p.m. on August 29, 2008. 5. Th e ne t sa le s p ro c e e ds
.. .s ha ll b e dis tr ibute d a s f oll ow s:

.... b. CL AUDIA B AKER shall re ceive the sum of $47,627.40, said sum

re pr ese nti ng

he r se pa ra te pr op e rty

inte re st i n th e afo re

sa id p ro pe rty . c. AL FRED AL AN B AKER shall rec eive the sum of $154,849.24, sa id su m r e pr ese nti ng

his se pa ra te pr op ert

y inte re st i n th e afo re

sa id pr op e rty . d. Any

net sales proce eds rema ining afte r the af oresa id sums have bee n paid shall be distributed fifty perc ent (50%) to CL AUDIA B AKER and fi ft y pe rc e nt ( 50 %) to A L F RED ALANB AKER. (empha sis added). N o finding s of fa ct wer e re quested. On a pp e a l, b oth

Cla ud ia and Al fr e d re pr e se nt t

hat th e Pr ime ra

Str e e t pr op e rt

y wa s se pa rate proper ty beca use it was purc hased jointly by the parties befor e their ma rriag e. We note, howe ver, the div or c e de c re e div ide s th e Pr ime ra Str e e t pr op e rt

y un de r the “

jus t and ri g ht” sta nd ard , w hic h is the standar d for dividing community proper ty , and allocates reimburse ments to Claudia and Alfr ed
w h i c h “ r e p r e s e n t [ ] ” t h e i r “ s e p ar a t e p r o p e rty i n t e r e s t [ s ] ” i nth e P r i m e r a S tr e e tp r o p e rty. 1 Ba sed on the re cord be fore us, it appear s the trial cour t treated t he P rimera Street property as community , not sep ar a te , p r o p e rty . N e it

h e r Cl a u d ia n o r A lf

r e d a s s ign e r

r o r to th is d e te r

mi n a ti o n ; th e r e f

o r e , our
r e v i e w w i l l b e d o n e a c c o r d i n g l y.04
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- 5- S TA N D A R D O F REVIEW W e re view a tr ial court’s division of prope rty for a buse of discr etion. Mu rff

v . M ur ff, 615 S.W .2d 696, 699 (Tex.1981). Ther e is no abuse of discretion if ther e is some evidenc e of a substantive and probative char acte r to support the dec ision. Garza v. Garza, 217 S.W .3d 538, 549 (Tex.App.–San Antonio 2006, no pet.). Trial cour t’s finding s are revie wed f or leg al and f

actua l
s ufficie ncy . Id. I n family law ca ses the abuse of discre tion standard of r eview ove rlaps with the traditional sufficie ncy

standards of

revie w; there fore , legal and fa ctual insuffic iency are not independe nt gr ounds of re versible e rror . Instead, they constitute fac tors rele vant t o the assessment of whether the trial court abused its discretion. Id. “In considering whether the trial cour t abused its discretion beca

use the e vidence is leg ally or fa ctually

insufficient, we apply

a two-pr ong test: (1) did the trial court have sufficient evidenc e upon which to exercise its discre tion, and (2) did the tria l court e rr in its a

pplication of that discretion? ” Id. We then consider whether , based on the evidenc e, the trial cour

t made a r easona

ble dec ision. Id.

D I S CUS S I ON RE I M B URS E M E NT F OR I M PROV EM ENTS I n h e r f ir st i ssu e , Cl a

ud ia argues tw o r e a so ns why the tr ia l c ourt

a bu se d it s d isc re tio n in
awa rd ing$5 0, 00 0. 00 to A lf

re d a s se pa

rate pr op e rt

y imp ro ve me nts to t

he Pr ime ra

pr op e rt y . Fi rs t, Cla ud ia a sse rt s A lf

re d fa ile d to e sta

bli shby c le ar a nd c on vin c inge vid e nc e the $5 0, 00 0 w a s se pa rate proper ty beca use the only

evidenc e to suppor

t A lfred’ s reimburse ment claim was his uncor roborated testimony . Second, Claudia a sserts Alfre d failed to e stablish his right to reimburse ment beca use the04
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- 6- only evidenc e prese nted was the amount paid for the improve ments not the enhanc ed value of the pr op e rt y a ft e r t he imp ro ve me nts . I n Texas, a ll mar ital pr operty is e ither separ ate or community proper ty . Hilley v. H

illey , 342 S.W .2d 565, 567 (Tex. 1961)
. Separate proper ty consists of proper

ty acquir ed bef

ore ma rriag e, or proper ty acquir ed duringmarria g e by gi ft , d ev i s e, or de scent. T EX . C O N ST . art . X VI , § 15 ; T EX . F AM . C ODE ANN . § 3.001 (Ve rnon 2006). Community proper ty consists of proper

ty , other than separ ate pr operty , acquir ed by ei t h er s p ouse duringmarria g e. T EX . F AM . C ODE ANN . § 3.002 (V e rn on 20 06 ); Ba rn e tt v . B ar

ne tt , 67 S.W .3d 107, 111 (Tex. 2001). There is a statutory

presumption that all proper ty possessed by

either spouse duringor on dissoluti on of m arr iag e is community proper ty . T EX . F AM . C ODE ANN . § 3.003(a) (Ve rnon 2006); Ba rn e tt , 67 S.W .3d at 111. To over come the c ommunity proper ty presumptio n u p o n d i v orce , a spouse claiming assets as separ ate proper ty is r equire d to e stablish their separ ate c hara cter

by clea r and convinc ing e vidence . T EX . F AM . C ODE ANN . § 3.003(b) ( Ver non 2006). Clear

and convinc ing
e vid e nc e me ans the me a sure or de g re e of pr oo f t hat w il l pro du ce in th e min d o f t he tr ie r o f f

a c t a firm belief

or convic tion as to the truth of the alleg ations soug ht to be established. T EX . F AM . C ODE ANN . § 101.007 (Ve rnon 2008). When a par

ty seeks r eim b u rs em en t for a benef it confer red by his separate estate to the
c omm un ity e state , th e pa

rt y se e kin g re imb ur se me nt m ust pro ve the be ne fi t aro se fr om a se pa rate estate by clea r and convincing evidenc e. Bec kner v . Bec kner , N o . 0 2
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ry 5, 2009, no pet.)(me m. op.)
. When funds from one marital estate are used t o make capital i mprovements to the prope rty of anothe r marital e state, the04
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- 7- proper measure of re imbursement is not the amount paid to make the improve ments, but the enhanc ement value of the re ceivingestate. P e n ic k v . P enick , 7 8 3 S.W .2d 194, 196 (Tex. 1999); Anderson v. G illil and , 684 S.W .2d 673, 675 (Tex. 1985). Enhanc ement value is deter mined by the marke t value of the proper ty befor e the improve ments were made a s compar ed to the marke t value of the prope rty

afte r the improveme nts were made. Hernande z v. He rnandez , No. 04-08-00709- CV, 20 09 WL15 47 74 6, a t *3 (T e x. Ap p. —Sa n A nto nio June 30 , 2 00 9, no pe t.) (m e m. o p. ); Garza v. Ga rza , 217 S.W .3d 538, 548 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2006, no pet.). A party claiming the rig ht of re imbursement has the bur den of ple adingand proving the expenditures and improveme nts were made a nd they are reimbursa

ble. Vallone v. Vallone , 644 S.W .2d 455, 459 (Tex. 1982); Ga rza , 217 S.W .3d at 546. Cla ims fo r re imb ur se me nt ar e e qu ita ble c la ims fa lli ngwi thi n th e dis c re tio n o f t he tr ia l c ourt . Vallone , 644 S.W .2d at 459. The discretion to be exercised by a trial c ourt in evaluating a claim for reimburse ment is as broad a s the discre tion ex erc ised in m akinga just and prope r division of the community

estate. Penick

, 783 S.W .2d at 197. Neve rtheless, a trial court a buses this discretion when it acts without guidingrules or pr inciples, or whe n its ruling is arbitra ry or unre asonable
. W

or for d v. Stamper , 801 S.W .2d 108, 109 (Tex. 1990). Alfre d testified he spent $50,000.00 on the i mprovements, and the i mprovements enha nced the value of

the P ri m era Street prope rty “at lea st $50,000.00.” Howe ver, A lfred pr esente d no evidenc e of the proper

ty ’s marke t val u e bef

ore the improvements wer e made as compa red to the proper ty ’s marke t value af

ter the improve ments were made. Without such evidence, Alfred did not prese nt evidence of the enhance d value of the Primera Stre et prope rty as re quired by

the standar d set04
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- 8- out b y t h e s u p re m e court. See Penick v. Pe nick, 7 83 S.W. 2d

19 4, 19 6 ( Te x. 19 99 ); Anderson v. Gilliland , 6 84 S.W. 2d

67 3, 67 5 ( Te x. 19 85 ). We h old the tr ial c ourt

a bu se d it s d isc re tio n in
aw ar d i n g A l f

r e d $ 5 0 , 0 0 0
. 0 0 a s r e i mb u r s e m e n tf o r i mp r o v e m e n t s t o th e P r i m e r a S tr e e tp r o p e rty. Ha vin g de te rm ine d Alf

re d f a ile d to e sta

bli shthe e nh anc e me nt v a lue of the imp ro ve me nts , we ne ed not deter

mine whether

Alfre d’s uncor

roborated testimony

satisfied the c lear

and convinc ing evidenc e standa

rd. B U Y OU T A M OUNT I nh er s ec o n d i s s u e, C l au d i a a rgu es th e t ri al co urt ab u s edi t s d i s cr et i o nb y “a s s i gn i n g a purcha se price at which Claudia c ould buy out A lfred’ s interest in the proper ty beca use no evide nce was pre sented to show the va lue of the pr operty or of the buy -out price .” Claudia did not raise at the trial court a

ny complaint as to the buy out or the price . The pa rties discussed with the court the va lue of t h e p ro p er t y after the close of evide nce a nd g ave the court the f

igur es upon which the final calc ulation was dete rmined. The trial court ha d no other figures on whic h to make a de termination of the va lue of the pr operty or the buyout price. Moreove r, the divorc e dec ree mere ly provided Claudia the r ight to pu rc h as e t he Primera Street p r o p e rty b y A u g u s t 2 7 , 2 0 0 8 , f

o r $ 2 6 8 , 6 3 0
. 9 5
. I f

Cl a u d ia e le c te d n o t t o d o s o , th e nthe pr op erty wo uld be so ld a

nd Cla ud ia and Al fr e d w ou ld r e c e ive the ir se pa ra te pr op e rt y int e re sts . No thi ngin t

he div or c e de c re e re qu ir e s Cl a ud ia purc ha se the pr op e rt

y fo r $ 26 8, 69 0. 95 or

pr e ve nts her f rom purcha sing the proper ty on the open mar

ket at a d i ff

er en t price . The trial c ourt did not abuse its discre tion.04
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- 9- H OM E S T E AD I n he r thi rd iss ue , Cla

ud ia argue s the tr ia l c ourt e rr e d in or de ri ng he r to va c a te the pr op e rt y and the pr operty

sold beca use the Primera

Street prope rty

was he r hom estea d. Claudia contends the pr op e rt y is p ro te c te d a

nd e xemp t fr om fo rc e d sa le and the c la ims of

c re dit or s a

nd he r d ue pr oc e ss rig hts were violated. Additionally , Claudia asser ts the Primera proper

ty was sepa rate proper

ty and the pr op e r p ro c e dure fo r d ivi sio n o f n on -c omm un ity re a l pr op e rt

y is a pa rt iti on su it. To prese rve a complaint for appellate review, the rec ord m ust show the complaint wa s made with sufficient spec ificity to make the tria l co u rt awa re of the complaint. T EX . R. A PP . P. 33.1(a)
. Moreove r, in order

for the homestead protec tion to arise, a party must assert and pr ove the e x istence of a homestead exemption. Mc In ty rev . M

c In ty re , 7 22 S.W. 2d

53 3, 53 8 ( Te x. Ap p. —Sa n A nto nio 1986, no writ). Claudia’s only mention of a homestea d exemption was in h er Sec ond Amended Moti o n for Ne w Trial whe rein she stated “[t] he trial c ourt abused its discre tion in ruling that Petitioner vacate her

homestead.” Claudia did not plead or prove a homestea d exemption i n the trial court, a ssert any

constitutional viol ation, or plea d for a par t i t i o n . The e rror

raised in Claudia’ s Second Amende d Motion for NewTrial wa s not sufficiently specific to make the tr ial court a war e of her complaint and did not prese rve e rror on the homestea d claim. SeeT EX . R. A PP . P. 33.1(a)
. Howeve r, eve n if Clau dia’s complaint wa s prese rved f or appe llate re view, Claudia’s homestead c laim fails. Claudia bases he r hom es t ea d cl aim on the pre mise the Primera Stree t proper ty was sepa rate proper

ty owned jointly

by Claudia and Alfr ed. Nothing in the rec ord shows the trial cour

t determined the Primera Stree t property was separate property or t hat Claudia re quested04
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- 10- the cour t to do so. The decr ee distrib uted the Primera Street prope rty

as community

proper ty and neither Claudia nor

Alfre d complained of

this dist ribution. F ur the rm or e , a

tr ia l c ourt

ha s b ro a d pow e r to or de r a “j us t and ri g ht” div isi on of c omm un ity pr op e rt y , in c lud ingthe po wer to or de r t he sa le of the ho me ste a d a

nd the pa rt iti on of the pr oc e e ds
. Laster v. First Huntsville Props. Co. , 826 S.W .2d 125, 131 (Tex. 1991). When the proper ty is sold, the ho me ste a d r ig ht atta c he s to the pr oc e e ds of the pa rt iti on sa le , a nd th ese pro c e e ds are g e ne ra lly protec ted from c reditors. See id. Even if Cl audia had asser ted and proved her

homestead e x emption, t h e t r i a l c o u rth a d

t h e p o w e r

t o o r d e r t h e s a l e o f

th e P r i m e r a

S tr e e tp r o p e rty. The trial court did not err in order ing the Primera St ree t property be vac ated a

nd sold, and the sale proc eeds distributed to Claudia and A lfred. C ONCL US I ON Th e div or c e de c re e is mod if ie d to re du c e Al fr e d’ s r e imb ur se me nt a wa rd fr om $ 15 4, 84 9. 24 to $104,849.24 as his se para

te proper ty interest in the Primera

Street prope rty . See T EX . R. A PP . P. 43.2(b) (stating appellate court may modify the trial cour

t’s judgme nt and af

firm the judg ment as modified); Bec kner , 2009 WL 279485, at *1 (modifying a final divorce decr ee to de lete a r eimbursement a war d, and af firming the dec ree as modified). We a ffirm the f inal divorce decr ee a s modified.
Steven C. Hilbig, Just ice