U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Nine Elderly Fire Victims 

in Residential Hotel

Miami Beach, Florida

USFA-TR-041/April 1990

U.S. Fire Administration Fire Investigations Program

T

he U.S. Fire Administration develops reports on selected major fires throughout the country. 

The fires usually involve multiple deaths or a large loss of property. But the primary criterion 

for deciding to do a report is whether it will result in significant “lessons learned.” In some 

cases these lessons bring to light new knowledge about fire--the effect of building construction or 

contents, human behavior in fire, etc. In other cases, the lessons are not new but are serious enough 

to highlight once again, with yet another fire tragedy report. In some cases, special reports are developed to discuss events, drills, or new technologies which are of interest to the fire service.

The reports are sent to fire magazines and are distributed at National and Regional fire meetings. The 

International Association of Fire Chiefs assists the USFA in disseminating the findings throughout the 

fire service. On a continuing basis the reports are available on request from the USFA; announcements of their availability are published widely in fire journals and newsletters.

This body of work provides detailed information on the nature of the fire problem for policymakers 

who must decide on allocations of resources between fire and other pressing problems, and within 

the fire service to improve codes and code enforcement, training, public fire education, building 

technology, and other related areas.

The Fire Administration, which has no regulatory authority, sends an experienced fire investigator 

into a community after a major incident only after having conferred with the local fire authorities 

to insure that the assistance and presence of the USFA would be supportive and would in no way 

interfere with any review of the incident they are themselves conducting. The intent is not to arrive 

during the event or even immediately after, but rather after the dust settles, so that a complete and 

objective review of all the important aspects of the incident can be made. Local authorities review 

the USFA’s report while it is in draft. The USFA investigator or team is available to local authorities 

should they wish to request technical assistance for their own investigation.

This report and its recommendations were developed by USFA staff and by TriData Corporation, 

Arlington, Virginia, its staff and consultants, who are under contract to assist the USFA in carrying 

out the Fire Reports Program.

The USFA greatly appreciates the cooperation received from the Miami Beach Fire Department. 

Particular thanks go to Fire Chief Braniard Dorris.

For additional copies of this report write to the U.S. Fire Administration, 16825 South Seton Avenue, 

Emmitsburg, Maryland 21727. The report is available on the Administration’s Web site at http://

www.usfa.dhs.gov/

Nine Elderly Fire Victims

in Residential Hotel

Miami, Florida

Investigated by: Charles Jennings

This is Report 041 of the Major Fires Investigation Project conducted

by TriData Corporation under contract EMW-90-C-3338 to the United

States Fire Administration, Federal Emergency Management Agency.

Department of Homeland Security

United States Fire Administration

National Fire Data Center

U.S. Fire Administration

Mission Statement

As an entity of the Department of Homeland 

Security, the mission of the USFA is to reduce life and economic losses due to fire 

and related emergencies, through leadership, advocacy, coordination, and support. 

We serve the Nation independently, in coordination with other Federal agencies, 

and in partnership with fire protection and 

emergency service communities. With a 

commitment to excellence, we provide public education, training, technology, and data 

initiatives.

TAblE oF CoNTENTS

OVERVIEW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

SUMMARY OF KEY ISSUES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

THE BUILDING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

FIRE PROTECTION FEATURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

THE FIRE DEPARTMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

THE FIRE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

INCIDENT COMMAND/INVESTIGATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

FIRE DEVELOPMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

OCCUPANT BEHAVIOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

LESSONS LEARNED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

APPENDICES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

APPENDIx A: Fontana Hotel Floor Plans Showing Extent of Structural Collapse . . . . . . . . . . 8

APPENDIx B: Fontana Hotel Fire Victims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

APPENDIx C: Enlarged Floor Plans Showing Room of Residence and 

Final Position of Victims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

APPENDIx D: Florida Statute on Sprinklers in Hotels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

APPENDIx E: Photographs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

1

Nine Elderly Fire Victims in Residential Hotel

Miami beach, Florida

Local Contacts: Braniard Dorris, Chief

Miami Beach Fire Department

2300 Pine Tree Drive

Miami Beach, Florida 33140

oVERVIEW

Early in the morning of April 6, 1990, a fire in a Miami Beach hotel killed nine occupants and injured 

24, including 4 firefighters. The building, known as the Fontana Hotel, was originally constructed in 

1951. Although the building was officially designated as a hotel, most of its occupants were elderly 

and used the building as a permanent residence. Of the nine fatalities, the youngest was over 75 

years old.

The building was equipped with hard-wired smoke detectors in guest rooms, a fire alarm system 

with manual stations and corridor smoke detectors, and standpipes. Other fire protection included 

solid-core 20-minute doors on guest rooms and fire doors separating corridors.

The fire department arrived to find the hotel’s lobby fully involved and heavy fire venting from windows the width of the first floor. Heavy smoke and fire were spreading rapidly throughout the hotel. 

Numerous guests were rescued by firefighters.

The fire destroyed the front portion of the structure, burning through the roof. The remainder of the 

hotel received smoke and heat damage, although many of the rooms were spared from fire damage.

The building had received several improvements to fire safety features as a result of code enforcement activities of the Miami Beach Fire Department. Ironically, the building was required by State 

law to install an automatic sprinkler system in 1991.
2 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

SUMMARY oF KEY ISSUES

Issues Comments

Cause of Fire Undetermined

The Building Three-story hotel, 200 by 90 feet. The building contained 102 guest rooms. Ordinary construction with masonry bearing walls and poured reinforced concrete columns and beams. The floor 

and roof were made of wood. The building was served by three stairways and one elevator.

Fire Protection Equipment Building equipped with standpipe system, hard-wired smoke detectors in guest rooms, fire alarm 

system with manual stations and corridor smoke detectors. Battery detectors also present in 

some rooms. No sprinklers present.

Delayed Discovery Fire is believed to have originated in a concealed space above a first floor storage room. The first 

indication of a fire occurred when fire dropped through the ceiling of the storage room, igniting 

mattresses and other materials.

Fatalities Nine victims, all over 75 years of age. Several died while evacuating. One victim died in the 

elevator.

Evacuation Over 100 occupants were evacuated. Extreme difficulty in accounting for occupants, though all 

people were eventually accounted for.

THE bUIlDING

The Fontana Hotel was originally constructed in 1951 under the Miami Beach Building Code. At the 

time of construction, the only fire protection features required were a standpipe system and enclosed 

stairways. The three-story, “L” shaped building was approximately 200 feet by 90 feet.

The building was of ordinary construction with masonry bearing walls and poured reinforced concrete columns and beams. The floors and roof were made of wood. Interior partitions were primarily plaster on metal lath.

The construction of the building created concealed spaces which ran the length of each floor in the 

space between the floor and ceiling. In addition, there was a major pipe chase which ran from the 

first floor ceiling to the attic. This pipe chase, which was adjacent to the elevator shaft, was approximately five by ten feet and carried plumbing and other building services (see floor plan, Appendix 

A). The interior framing of this pipe shaft was exposed wood. The openings on to each floor were 

not fire stopped.

This pipe chase and the construction of the floors effectively created a single concealed space that ran 

the length of the building from the first floor to the attic. A photograph of typical floor construction 

is included in Appendix E.

Directly adjacent to the Fontana Hotel was a similar structure called the Prince Michael Hotel. The 

Prince Michael Hotel was virtually a mirror image of the Fontana and at its closest point (the short 

part of the “L”) was about ten feet away from the Fontana. The building then formed a courtyard 

with the Fontana that was occupied by an outdoor swimming pool and an outdoor seating area.

FIRE PRoTECTIoN FEATURES

A number of fire protection improvements were made in the building. Battery operated smoke detectors were ordered to be installed in each guest room in January 1986. In 1987, solid-core doors 

with self closers were installed in each guest room. Hard-wired smoke detectors were installed in 
USFA-TR-041/April 1990 3

October of 1989. Emergency lighting was provided in each stairwell. Fire doors were located in the 

long corridor on each floor.

A manual fire alarm system was upgraded to include corridor smoke detection. The building fire 

alarm was also equipped to shut down the air handling system.

THE FIRE DEPARTMENT

The Miami Beach Fire Department operates four engines, two ladders, and six rescue (advanced life 

support emergency medical services [EMS]) units from four stations. They operate with a minimum 

of four personnel per company. They protect a resident population of about 98,000. Of 234 personnel, about 200 are uniformed firefighters. Basic life support EMS is provided by a private ambulance 

company.

THE FIRE

There were several people in the lobby of the building during the period before the fire. The night 

manager and several others in the lobby reported smelling smoke shortly after 0300 hours. Upon 

investigating, the top of a mattress piled in the storeroom off the lobby was discovered to be on fire. 

At this point, the occupants reportedly split up: one got a bucket of water to extinguish the fire, 

another returned to the front desk to call the fire department. The fire department received the call 

at 0308. Conditions within the lobby deteriorated rapidly. Within three minutes, the entire lobby 

was involved in fire. The occupants of the lobby evacuated and returned via the side door and began 

to knock on doors to awaken guests.

At 0311 units on-scene reported fire venting from the entire lobby. Several cars parked in the driveway of the hotel were also on fire. Building occupants were evacuating by the stairwells.

INCIDENT CoMMAND/INVESTIGATIoN

A chief officer arrived simultaneously with the first engine company and rescue unit and implemented the incident command system (ICS). A command post was established at the front of the 

building. Emphasis was placed on setting up rescue, medical and transport sections, while making 

an attack on the fire. A triage area was established in the street to the east of the Fontana Hotel.

A second alarm, consisting of one engine, one ladder and two rescue units was called for immediately upon arrival. A triage area was established in the street in front of the Prince Michael Hotel 

to the south of the Fontana Hotel. The first arriving ladder captain was assigned the rear sector and 

ordered to conduct a search for occupants.

A third alarm (mutual aid) was called for within seven minutes after arrival, consisting of three 

engines, one ladder, and a chief officer. Section assignments were made and the fire was attacked 

from all sides with emphasis placed on protecting the Prince Michael Hotel. A ladder pipe was 

placed in-service to protect the front portion of the Prince Michael Hotel.

One hundred seven firefighters, 10 engines, 4 ladders, and 10 ambulances were involved in this incident. Mutual aid was provided by the City of Miami and Metropolitan Dade County Fire Rescue. 

Firefighters were able to extinguish the bulk of the fire in the lobby and were actively attacking the 

fire in the ceiling area around the shaft when portions of the second floor began collapsing into the 

lobby. During this period, firefighters in the main wing of the building were able to maintain access 
4 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

to the corridors. Despite heavy heat and smoke conditions, access was made to most guest rooms in 

the hotel. Many occupants were evacuated from the structure during the fire.

Attack on the fire was finally changed to a defense mode due to deteriorating conditions within 

the structure. The fire had made significant headway in concealed spaces and the attic before it 

was discovered. The second floor had collapsed into the lobby about an hour into the blaze. The 

fire extended into the attic and burned the length of the building over the next several hours. Fire 

dropped from the attic into the third floor as it consumed the roof. The fire burned about four and 

one-half hours before being brought under control. Ultimately, much of the roof was destroyed as 

fire spread through the attic space. The front section of the building was basically gutted, with the 

fire burning through the room and causing collapse of the upper floors into the lobby area. (See 

Appendix A.)

One of the first concerns was to develop a list of those in the hotel. Unfortunately, the official guest 

list was destroyed in the fire, so a new list was constructed using the recollections of those occupants 

who had evacuated or had been rescued from the building. Residents of the hotel were transported 

to a community center, where they were asked to recall the room numbers and location of other 

hotel occupants. The media were alerted and broadcast several appeals to the public to call a special 

number at the Miami Beach Fire Department if they had any information concerning the whereabouts of any resident of the hotel. Despite these efforts, there were still 21 people unaccounted for 

after two days. Eventually, through calls to the Miami Beach Fire Department and investigation, the 

list of the missing was reduced to nine.

Identification and recovery of the bodies of the people who died in the fire was difficult because 

of the extensive damage and structural collapse. Three fatalities were removed in the course of fire 

operations. The rest were recovered after the fire was extinguished. Other agencies assisting the 

Miami Beach Fire Department investigators included the Florida State Fire Marshal’s Office, the Dade 

County Medical Examiner, the Metropolitan Dade County Fire Department, the Miami Beach Police 

Department, and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms.

Approximately 100 investigators were involved with the fire in some way (cause and origin, interviewing witnesses, etc.). Progress in the investigation was slow as layer after layer of material had to 

be removed to expose bodies and evidence related to the determination of the fire’s cause.

Dog teams were also brought in to help locate victims in the building. The remains of the last fatality 

were removed five days after the fire.

Local elected officials were notified during the fire and were on hand to approve acquisition of heavy 

equipment needed for the search of the building and investigation. It is estimated that the scene 

investigation, recovery of bodies, and related items cost the city over 50,000 dollars.

The cause of the fire remains undetermined. Investigators were able to determine the point of origin 

to be in the ceiling space of the storage room off the lobby. No defects in the building’s electrical 

system were found, nor were any accelerants detected. Other causes ruled out included boilers and 

vending machines.

FIRE DEVEloPMENT

The fire originated in the concealed space above the storage room adjacent to the lobby. It is likely 

that combustion products spread upward through the pipe chase and “mushroomed” in the attic 
USFA-TR-041/April 1990 5

before the fire developed to such a point that the ceiling in the storage room failed and began falling 

in. The failure of the ceiling in the storage room provided the fire with a supply of oxygen, which 

intensified the fire throughout the building. The rapid fire development in the lobby area is consistent with the extensive fire growth in the concealed spaces in the first floor ceiling, which undoubtedly began to affect the structural integrity of the second floor above the lobby.

According to building occupants, the fire in the storage room was the first indication of a problem 

in the building. Residents of the hotel returning as little as 20 minutes before the fire was discovered 

traveled through the lobby, rode the elevator (adjacent to the pipe chase), and exited on upper floors 

without noticing any indication of fire or smoke.

Once the lobby area became involved in fire, smoke spread rapidly throughout the structure. Hotel 

staff alerting occupants and assisting them out of the building reported that the upper floors became 

obscured with smoke within minutes of the fire’s discovery. Several occupants who were able to 

escape reported that smoke detectors were sounding throughout the building. Firefighters entering 

the building encountered heavy smoke and heat conditions during search operations.

It is not believed that the air handling system played a significant role in the spread of the fire or 

smoke.

The stairways remained tenable throughout the fire. The front stairway, however, was contaminated 

above the second floor when one victim was overcome while attempting to exit. The victim’s body 

blocked the stairway door in the open position.

Single station hard-wired smoke detectors in guest rooms did activate. There were conflicting statements as to whether the building fire alarm was activated. The control wiring for the alarm ran 

through the concealed space where the fire originated, leading some to believe that by the time a 

manual station was pulled, the fire alarm wiring was destroyed. The fire alarm control panel was 

located in an office behind the front desk and remained basically intact throughout the fire. (See 

photograph, Appendix E.) The fact that corridor smoke detectors did not activate was consistent 

with the development of fire.

When the hotel installed hard-wired detectors in guest rooms, they left the battery-operated detectors in-place. Many of these battery-operated units functioned during the fire. (The presence of 

these battery-operated units, some of which were in disrepair, led to some inaccurate media reports 

that there were no working smoke detectors in the guest rooms.)

oCCUPANT bEHAVIoR

The Miami Beach Fire Department estimates that there were about 140 people in the Fontana Hotel 

on the morning of the fire. Most occupants were asleep when the fire was discovered. Of the nine 

fatalities, several were overcome while attempting to exit the structure. A complete listing of victims 

with ages and room of residence is included in Appendix B. A floor plan showing the room of residence and position of fatalities when recovered is included in Appendix C.

One fatality, whose room was located across the hall from an exit, was discovered fully dressed, with 

coat and shoes, and had a purse containing valuables. Apparently, she took time to get dressed and 

collect valuables before leaving. She was found on the floor of her room carrying a flashlight, which 

was still on when she was removed. Her delay to gather belongings cost her life. A photograph of 

her room (205) showing its closeness to the exit is included in Appendix E.
6 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

It is believed that most of the victims found in the lobby were originally on upper floors. Their bodies were recovered amid the burned debris from the collapse of the second and third floors in the 

lobby area. It is not clear whether they had attempted to evacuate before they were overcome.

One victim was killed when she attempted to exit the third floor by using the elevator. The elevator 

stalled on the first floor and she was overcome.

lESSoNS lEARNED

1. Vigorous enforcement of the fire code pays off.

 Although there was considerable life loss in this fire, the code provisions incorporated in the 

building over the years undoubtedly played a role in reducing the loss of life. The Miami 

Beach Fire Department took the previous owners of the building to court over installation of 

fire protection equipment. They should be applauded for their continued emphasis on code 

enforcement.

2. Sprinklers are needed in old structures.

 Florida law required that all hotels be equipped with sprinklers by October 1, 1991. That legislation was in danger of expiring when this fire occurred. Although it was retained as a law 

in Florida, October 1991, was too late for the victims of this fire. (A copy of the Florida law is 

included in Appendix D.)

3. Provisions should be made to provide adequate communications for mutual aid 

companies.

 Because of differing radio frequencies, there was difficulty communicating with mutual aid companies operating on this incident. While this did not cause considerable problems, there were 

some difficulties in coordinating the use of master streams late in the incident. Arrangements 

such as maintaining a supply of extra portable radios should be made to anticipate situations 

such as this.

4. Combustible concealed spaces deserve protection.

 This fire demonstrates the potential for loss when a fire originates in an area that is not provided 

with detection or suppression systems. When the fire reached a stage when it would activate 

the smoke detectors, it had grown to such a degree that the occupants had little time to escape. 

Additionally, the wiring for the fire alarm was compromised by the fire so that even manual 

activation of the alarm was not possible.

 Providing combustible concealed spaces with detection or suppression systems can prevent 

these types of fires from spreading before being detected.

5. Evacuation drills should be encouraged even when they are not required.

 A residential hotel such as the Fontana has a relatively stable population of residents so periodic 

fire drills can be an effective way to educate them on what actions to take in an emergency both 

to best protect themselves and to cooperate with an organized evacuation effort should the need 

arise. Injuries and possibly even fatalities might have been prevented in this fire if residents had 

received such training. Also, the extensive efforts and staff time on the part of the fire department required to account for evacuees could have been saved.
7

APPENDICES

A. Fontana Hotel Floor Plans Showing Extent of Structural Collapse

B. Fontana Hotel Fire Victims

C. Enlarged Floor Plans Showing Room of Residence and Final Position of Victims

D. Florida Statute on Sprinklers in Hotels

E. Photographs
8

APPENDIx A

Fontana Hotel Floor Plans 

Showing Extent of Structural Collapse
USFA-TR-041/April 1990 9

Appendix A (Continued)
10 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Appendix A (Continued)
11

APPENDIx b

Fontana Hotel Fire Victims

Name Age Room Victim Lived In

1. Sally Mur 75 years 340

2. Doris Fein 

aka Dorothy Trapanese 81 439

3. Selma Rauthaus 85 339

4. Sara Pollack 87 432

5. Martha Springer 88 205

6. Nettie Feingold 89 332

7. Jack Schwarz 92 330

8. Dr. Joseph Wels 92 227

9. Minnie Weinstein 93 433
12

APPENDIx C

Enlarged Floor Plans Showing Room of Residence and 

Final Position of Victims
13

APPENDIx D

Florida Statute on Sprinklers in Hotels
14 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Appendix D (Continued)
USFA-TR-041/April 1990 15

Appendix D (Continued)
16

APPENDIx E

Photographs

Slides and photographs are included with the master report at the USFA. Selected photos are presented on the following pages. They are by the author or were provided by the Miami Beach Fire 

Department (MBFD) as noted.
USFA-TR-041/April 1990 17Lobby of the Prince Michael Hotel, interior finish and construction is similar to that of the Fontana. (MBFD Photo)
18 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Exterior attack in progress, note fire involvement in attic.

(MBFD Photo)
USFA-TR-041/April 1990 19Front of hotel. (MBFD Photo)
20 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Aerial view of hotel after the fire. Note destruction of the roof and proximity of the Prince Michael Hotel.

(MBFD Photo)
USFA-TR-041/April 1990 21Front of hotel, lobby desk is located to far right along wall.
22 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Front of hotel, looking toward the Prince Michael Hotel.
USFA-TR-041/April 1990 23

Lobby, looking up through roof facing Collins Street.
24 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

First floor corridor, looking to rear of building from lobby. Fire door in foreground 

was closed throughout much of the fire.
USFA-TR-041/April 1990 25Typical floor construction, shown from ceiling of first floor room.
26 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Lobby, looking up pipe chase located adjacent to elevator shaft.
USFA-TR-041/April 1990 27

Outline of victim in smoke stain, Room 205. Victim was reportedly found carrying a 

flashlight (still on) and personal belongings in a purse.
28 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

View of Room 205, fire exit is visible across corridor.
USFA-TR-041/April 1990 29

Second floor, looking across to Room 301 from front stairway, area of origin is at base of photo.
30 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

View from second floor, front stairway looking straight across building. 

Lobby is at bottom of photo.
USFA-TR-041/April 1990 31

Manual fire alarm station and bell, third floor, at rear stair. Note extensive darkening soot.
32 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Remains of fire alarm control panel.

U.S.Government Printing Office: 1999-721-054-94276