U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Evacuation of Nanticoke, PA

Due to Metal Processing 

Plant Fire

Nanticoke, Pennsylvania

USFA-TR-005/March 1987

Homeland

Security

U.S. Fire Administration Fire Investigations Program

T

he U.S. Fire Administration develops reports on selected major fires throughout the country. 

The fires usually involve multiple deaths or a large loss of property. But the primary criterion 

for deciding to do a report is whether it will result in significant “lessons learned.” In some 

cases these lessons bring to light new knowledge about fire--the effect of building construction or 

contents, human behavior in fire, etc. In other cases, the lessons are not new but are serious enough 

to highlight once again, with yet another fire tragedy report. In some cases, special reports are developed to discuss events, drills, or new technologies which are of interest to the fire service.

The reports are sent to fire magazines and are distributed at National and Regional fire meetings. The 

International Association of Fire Chiefs assists the USFA in disseminating the findings throughout the 

fire service. On a continuing basis the reports are available on request from the USFA; announcements of their availability are published widely in fire journals and newsletters.

This body of work provides detailed information on the nature of the fire problem for policymakers 

who must decide on allocations of resources between fire and other pressing problems, and within 

the fire service to improve codes and code enforcement, training, public fire education, building 

technology, and other related areas.

The Fire Administration, which has no regulatory authority, sends an experienced fire investigator 

into a community after a major incident only after having conferred with the local fire authorities 

to insure that the assistance and presence of the USFA would be supportive and would in no way 

interfere with any review of the incident they are themselves conducting. The intent is not to arrive 

during the event or even immediately after, but rather after the dust settles, so that a complete and 

objective review of all the important aspects of the incident can be made. Local authorities review 

the USFA’s report while it is in draft. The USFA investigator or team is available to local authorities 

should they wish to request technical assistance for their own investigation.

For additional copies of this report write to the U.S. Fire Administration, 16825 South Seton Avenue, 

Emmitsburg, Maryland 21727. The report is available on the Administration’s Web site at http://

www.usfa.dhs.gov/

Evacuation of Nanticoke, Pennsylvania

Due to Metal Processing Plant Fire

Investigated by: Hollis Stambaugh

This is Report 005 of the Major Fires Investigation Project conducted

by TriData Corporation under contract EMW-86-C-2277 to the United

States Fire Administration, Federal Emergency Management Agency.

Homeland

Security

Department of Homeland Security

United States Fire Administration

National Fire Data Center

U.S. Fire Administration

Mission Statement

As an entity of the Department of Homeland 

Security, the mission of the USFA is to reduce life and economic losses due to fire 

and related emergencies, through leadership, advocacy, coordination, and support. 

We serve the Nation independently, in coordination with other Federal agencies, 

and in partnership with fire protection and 

emergency service communities. With a 

commitment to excellence, we provide public education, training, technology, and data 

initiatives.

Homeland

Security

Table of Contents

OVERVIEW. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

THE COMMUNITY. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

THE BUILDING/OCCUPANCY. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

THE FIRE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

THE DECISION TO EVACUATE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Assessing the Threat: Pre-fire Planning and CHEMTREC. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Weather Conditions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

THE EVACUATION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

PREPAREDNESS BEFORE THE FIRE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

TOXICITY LEVEL READINGS SLOW IN COMING. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

CAUSE OF FIRE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

LESSONS LEARNED. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Map of Nanticoke Area. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Diagram of apparatus locations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

PHOTOGRAPHS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

1

EVACUATION OF NANTICOKE, PENNSYLVANIA

DUE TO METAL PROCESSING PLANT FIRE

Nanticoke, Pennsylvania

March 24, 1987

Local Contacts: Fire Chief Don Casey

Nanticoke Fire Department

Ridge and Market Streets

Nanticoke, PA 18634

717-735-6290

James Siracuse

Executive Director

Luzerne County Emergency

Management Agency

Control Center, Courthouse

Wilkes-Barre, PA 18711

717-825-1776

OVERVIEW

On March 24, 1987, shortly after midnight, an electrical fire at a metal processing plant in Nanticoke, 

Pennsylvania, generated a cloud of potentially toxic fumes which caused 15,000 residents to be 

rousted from sleep and evacuated from their homes. Emergency workers operating from local and 

county Emergency Operations Centers staged an extraordinarily smooth and successful evacuation, 

including the relocation of over 250 hospital and nursing home patients. The disaster showcased 

the value of good emergency operations planning, training, coordination, and practice as well as the 

wisdom of pre-fire plans.

The incident in Nanticoke taught and/or confirmed many important lessons; the most outstanding 

of the positive lessons were:

• Pre-fire plans are critical to decisionmaking about proper firefighting tactics and measures to 

protect the population during hazardous materials incidents.

• Emergency management planning followed up by training and field exercises enhances the 

quality of volunteer response.

• Prior exposure to evacuation alert and notification procedures helps residents avoid panic 

and respond sensibly when a real emergency occurs.
2

• The presence of a nuclear power plant can enhance local preparedness for all disasters requiring evacuation due to current Federal requirements for the utility to help sponsor (fund) 

preparedness exercises.

Emergency personnel at the city and county levels were well informed and well rehearsed in their 

respective roles for a disaster requiring evacuation. The residents of the area, too, were knowledgeable about warning and alert signals and basic evacuation guidelines. A comprehensive pre-fire plan 

prepared two months before this fire occurred, gave local fire officials an immediate reading on 

the types of chemicals and dyes used at the plant – information which in turn they reviewed with 

CHEMTREC, and which lead to an efficient and appropriate series of decisions.

THE COMMUNITY

Nanticoke, Pennsylvania, has a population of slightly over 13,000 people, and is located approximately ten miles southwest of Wilkes-Barre. The general area is one where coal reigned as king, having been the largest known site of anthracite in the world. Deep mining left the valley with serious 

subsidence risks and other related, potential hazards. Flooding from the Susquehanna River which 

borders the area on the west occurs frequently. In addition, there are a number of natural and manmade hazards, such as dynamite factories and a major fuel supply tank close to the airport, which 

may impact on the residents and are outlined in the county’s Hazards Vulnerability Analysis Report. 

These emergencies-waiting-to-happen, coupled with the presence of the Susquehanna Steam Electric 

(nuclear) Station in the county gave rise to the preparation of comprehensive emergency response 

plans and annual evacuation drills.

Local officials estimate that 70 percent of the town’s residents are age 65 and older. Most of these 

people live in private homes; the rest of Nanticoke’s senior citizens reside in three high-rises for the 

elderly and two nursing homes. There is also a State-owned hospital in the town.

Nanticoke is protected by a 210-member volunteer fire department. Eight paid drivers assure a 

limited, around-the-clock presence at the stations. The Nanticoke Fire Department has six engine 

companies, one truck company, and two ambulances.

THE BUILDING/OCCUPANCY

In 1973, Spencer Metal Processing Company set up shop in a three-story 100-year-old brick and 

wood building that originally had been the site of a coal company. The central floor area is open 

from the first floor through the third to accommodate the large processing vats on the main level 

and rising steam.

Spencer Metal is an aluminum finishing business, also called an “anodizing shop.” The primary work 

of the business is to put protective coatings on aluminum and other metals to ward off corrosion. 

The plant also processes side-view mirrors for all Ford Motor Company trucks and vans. Twentynine different hazardous materials, such as acids and dyes, are used in the plant and stored in the 

large processing tanks, as well as in containers on the premises. Among the hazardous chemicals on 

site are sulfuric acid, nitric acid, phosphoric acid, acrylic acid, ammonia, caustic soda, and chromic 

acid. Contact with the vapor from these chemicals can cause reactions ranging from eye irritation to 

lung damage, depending on the concentration and combination of chemicals.

The plant employs 52 people on two 20-22 people shifts with a third (swing) shift of about seven 

employees. It was during the third shift in the early morning hours that a devastating fire broke out.
USFA-TR-005/March 1987 3

THE FIRE

Shortly before 12:30 a.m., on Tuesday, March 24, the foreman at Spencer Metal smelled what he 

described as burning wire or rubber. He left his first floor office to investigate, but could not see 

much initially because the anodizing process creates a lot of steam. As he looked up to the third level 

he saw a 35-foot flame shooting along the rafter of the roof. He got a fire extinguisher and ran to 

the second floor level where smoke prevented him from going further. He quickly warned a female 

employee there about the fire and she left immediately. Then he returned to the first floor to evacuate 

the other employees. After he was sure everyone had left the building, he re-entered the plant to call 

the fire department. Flames were showing through the roof by the time he went back outside.

Nanticoke’s fire headquarters, less than a mile from Spencer Metal, logged in the first alarm at 12:30 

a.m. The chronology of major actions that developed afterward is shown in the following table.

key Actions Taken During Nanticoke Fire and Evacuation*

Time Situation Actions Taken

12:30 a.m. 1st Alarm Engine 3 and Truck 1 dispatched. Fire Chief Don 

Casey contacted immediately.

12:33 2nd Alarm Engines 1, 2, 4, and 5 dispatched.

12:34 3rd Alarm Engine 6 called to report to headquarters.

12:39 4th Alarm Mutual aid requested from neighboring Tilbury to help 

with back-up at fire headquarters.

12:41 Ladder truck develops hydraulic leak. Replacement ladder truck requested from Hanover 

Township.

12:43 Concern mounts over possibility of chemicals running off into stream and ultimately 

the Susquehanna River.

Heavy rescue truck from Civil Defense called to begin 

help with diking. City backhoe requisitioned to do job 

faster.

12:45 Emphasis begins to shift from putting out 

fire to protecting population from toxic 

cloud.

City and County Emergency Management offices 

notified.

12:50 Evacuation looms as a possibility. Fire department calls CHEMTREC which advises 

they should act on “worst possible case scenario.” 

Information radioed to fire chief. 

1:20 Concern continues over air and water 

quality.

City alerts regional office of the Environmental 

Protection Agency.

1:28 City alerts State Department of Environmental 

Resources (County also contacted DER).

1:45 Evacuation options reviewed. 

Communication with City and County EOCs 

continues.

Mayor of Nanticoke is contacted. Fire chief recommends evacuation.

continued on next page

* Nanticoke firefighter Chester Prymowicz maintained an on-going log of the situation as he managed the dispatch 

operations from Fire Headquarters.
4

Time Situation Actions Taken

2:21 Mayor confers with other emergency 

officials.

Mayor calls for evacuation of western section of 

Nanticoke. (See Evacuation Area Map.)

2:38 Hospital is evacuated.

2:50 Mayor calls for evacuation of the rest of west side and 

northwest quadrant.

3:10 Evacuation orders carried out for East Ridge to 

Market Street to city limits, including Birchwood 

Nursing Home and Hanover section. (See map.)

3:42 Entire town of Nanticoke, Sheatown, and the Alden 

sections of Newport Township are evacuated. (See 

map.)

6:30 Primary fire extinguished. Spot fires continue to be put out until 1:30 p.m.

The first engine to arrive laid a 4-inch supply line and began firefighting operations. As more volunteers arrived, they helped to lay additional lines. Engine 2 hooked up to a hydrant 700 feet south 

of the property then connected dual lines into the aerial. At that point, the ladder truck hydraulics 

failed. A diagram of fireground apparatus deployment is detailed in Figure 1.

Nanticoke used all of its available equipment to control the fire. At the height of the blaze, they 

needed six engines, one truck, two ambulances, and a rescue truck with paramedics. The only time 

back-up assistance was involved in firefighting occurred when the ladder truck developed a hydraulic leak, early in the fire. A call to Hanover Township brought a 75-foot ladder truck and a service 

truck to supplement Nanticoke’s units.

By 6:30 that morning the fire was extinguished, leaving behind only the burned-out remains of the 

building. Some portions of the brick walls were still standing but the roof and other sections were 

destroyed by the blaze. Firefighter efforts saved the out buildings and outside storage containers.

THE DECISION TO EVACUATE

The call to CHEMTREC, made 20 minutes after the first alarm was received, started the clock ticking 

toward the eventual evacuation of over 15,000 Nanticoke area residents. The decision on whether 

or not to evacuate could not be made on a moment’s notice – yet neither did officials have time to 

waste. Careful review of all aspects of the emergency had to be assessed and shared among all the 

jurisdictions involved.

First of all, moving hospital and nursing home patients carries its own special risks, and evacuation 

in general gives rise to numerous potential accidents. Secondly, three major and several smaller 

neighboring jurisdictions would be involved in any decision to evacuate.

The Luzerne County Emergency Management Agency would be in charge of coordinating and lending assistance to local evacuation efforts. Spencer Metal’s location at the far western edge of Nanticoke 

placed sections of contiguous Newport Township in jeopardy. Thus, both the local Nanticoke and 

Newport Township Emergency Operations Centers would have to be activated. Support from nearby 

jurisdictions in the form of transportation (buses and ambulances for the evacuation) as well as 
USFA-TR-005/March 1987 5

Reception Centers for evacuees would draw even more emergency personnel into the situation. 

The Fire Chief, Mayor, and Emergency Management Director of Nanticoke, the County Emergency 

Management Agency’s Executive Director, and Newport Township officials had to weigh these factors. Ultimately, the decision rested with Nanticoke Mayor John Haydock.

After considering advice from Nanticoke Fire Chief Don Casey and consulting separately with the 

county and city emergency management directors, the mayor decided to begin evacuating the city 

in stages.

Assessing the Threat: Pre-fire Planning and CHEMTREC

One of the most important aspects of Nanticoke’s successful evacuation was the fact that the fire 

department had had the foresight to become familiar with conditions at Spencer Metal before the 

fire occurred. Chief Casey, Deputy Chief William Ives, and Firefighter Mark Pavelitz conducted an 

on-site visit three months earlier to obtain a list of all the chemicals used in the metal processing, 

to scope out the floor plans, and to prepare drawings. Thus, when the department placed the call 

to CHEMTREC, fire department personnel were able to supply a complete list of chemicals used and 

stored at the plant. CHEMTREC then advised that they should assume the worst and take action 

accordingly.

Sulfuric acid was the major concern. This acid is one of the strongest known, and when combined 

with water reacts violently, creating a toxic cloud. In small doses, the vaporized acid burns the eyes, 

throat, and skin. Breathing a strong concentration can destroy lung tissue, and can kill.

The standard operating procedure for protecting populations from sulfuric acid toxic clouds, according to the U.S. Department of Transportation Handbook, is to evacuate within a radius of 280 feet to 

a maximum of 2.2 miles. Weather is a factor in deciding how far to evacuate. Nanticoke area officials 

had to ponder all these variables.

Weather Conditions

On the night of the fire, Nanticoke was experiencing a temperature inversion. The air above 3,000 

feet was warmer than the air near the ground. This created a stagnant system with very light (3-10 

mph) winds. The inversion prevented the rise and dissipation of the toxic cloud that formed during 

the fire. The plume remained virtually stationary while upper atmosphere winds were shifting from 

south to northwest, to southeast, and then to northeast. It was hard to predict when the inversion 

would break up, and which direction the wind would be blowing when it did.

THE EVACUATION

By the time Mayor Haydock ordered the evacuation to begin, Nanticoke, Newport Township, and 

Luzerne County already had activated their Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs). Volunteers had 

been called in to staff their posts and the system was ready to respond.

At the County’s EOC, the operations, communications, transportation, police, mass care, and medical/health group coordinators were setting the stage to provide support for Nanticoke’s evacuation. Other volunteers stood by to carry out directives from their group coordinators. The County 

Emergency Management Executive Director, Jim Siracuse, alerted the Pennsylvania Emergency 

Management Agency (PEMA) in Harrisburg that a chemical fire was burning and that citizen evacuation was a possibility. The county wanted PEMA to know as early as possible that the State might 
6

be called on to authorize requests for assistance from neighboring counties. According to State 

emergency response plans, such inter-county requests are to be generated through PEMA, which in 

turn, put the National Guard and State police on alert.

One of the three consoles in the County Communications Center (co-located with County EOC) was 

dedicated to handle all emergency-related dispatch. The other two consoles continued to monitor 

regular police, fire, and ambulance calls elsewhere in the county. These actions were carried out in 

accordance with previously developed emergency plans. A remote radio transmitter was used for 

live broadcast from the EOC to disseminate information over the Emergency Broadcast System (EBS). 

A siren system installed to provide public warning and route alert teams (emergency vehicles with 

public address systems) were activated to notify residents of the situation and advise them to tune to 

EBS stations for additional information.

At this point in the emergency, the county also began notifying the State hospital in Nanticoke and 

the nursing homes of the possibility that the mayor might order an evacuation. Nearby hospitals 

assigned as support medical facilities were called to begin planning for bed availability and triage so 

they would be ready to accept patients evacuated from Nanticoke.

Meanwhile, at the Nanticoke EOC, Executive Director John Fedorchak and his staff had moved from 

fire headquarters, where they had set up a limited EOC early in the emergency, to the Municipal 

Building across the street. They directed their attention to assessing the types and amount of transportation support needed to begin evacuating residents. These estimates were updated over the 

course of the evacuation as more territory was added to the evacuation area. The city communicated 

their support requirements to the county which had responsibility for filling needs the city could 

not meet with their own resources.

City EOC staff also had to determine what help was required for alerting the public. Calls were placed 

to the three high-rises for the elderly so they could be ready should the order come to evacuate.

Mayor Haydock then gave the nod for the first evacuation. Many actions occurred simultaneously. 

County communications activated the closest sirens within range of the first evacuation area. There 

are 110 sirens in the system which can be sounded singly, in groups, or as an entire system. At the 

same time, the county “went live” on the Emergency Broadcast System. A uniform message – used 

in the broadcasts and by the route alert teams – was prepared and distributed. According to plan, 

the notice was brief. Paraphrased, it announced, “There is a chemical fire in Nanticoke. At this time 

the exact level of chemicals or toxicity from the fire is unknown. As a precautionary measure we are 

evacuating (border streets of area).”

At the end of the message, the radio and television stations carrying the alert asked residents to 

avoid using the phones. If they absolutely needed more information, they could call Rumor Control 

whose number was given. At the EOC, Rumor Control already was in operation and a Media Center 

was established on the first floor of the County Courthouse, away from the direct work area of the 

EOC in the basement, yet close enough to allow access to the latest emergency news.

In Nanticoke, volunteers went door-to-door telling residents to evacuate. As people awoke to the 

sound of the sirens and the calls to leave, most thought something had happened at the nuclear plant 

because drills in the past had focused on evacuating for radiological emergencies. Consequently, 

many citizens were familiar with the alert process.

The evacuation was conducted in textbook-like manner. Those who could leave the area on their 

own drove out of the city to stay with relatives or friends in nearby towns, or to the designated 
USFA-TR-005/March 1987 7

Reception Center/Mass Care Facility three miles northeast of Nanticoke at Hanover Area High School. 

Reportedly there were no accidents – not even fenderbenders, as the mass exodus proceeded. People 

in main thoroughfares yielded to motorists trying to gain access from side streets. Though traffic 

understandably was slow, the residents were able to leave in good time and without panic.

Choosing the school in Hanover at a host site for evacuees was a departure from the evacuation 

plan in place for a nuclear disaster – and is an example of how all-hazard evacuations can vary 

from those specific to radiological emergencies. Normally, reception centers would be located 

outside a 10-mile radius (and a safe distance) from the nuclear power plant. However, since the 

evacuation radius for this type of chemical fire was 2.2 miles maximum, it was reasoned that there 

was no need to relocate people any further away then absolutely necessary. The recently completed 

all-hazards evacuation plan annex called for just this sort of analysis in choosing shelter locations. 

As the Hanover High School became full, Red Cross volunteers who were assigned responsibility 

for staffing the mass care centers opened up other centers and helped direct the populace to those 

spots. The County EOC handled making arrangements for the main mass care facility and the 

various smaller public shelters.

As it turned out, only about 2,000 of the 15,000 evacuees sought refuge in mass care centers. The 

remainder either had other homes where they could go or were patients at the nursing homes 

or the hospitals and were evacuated by ambulance or bus to nearby medical centers. By far, the 

majority of the 2,000 (1,500) went to Hanover Area High School. Other sites each housed 

between 35-300 evacuees.

Over 250 patients from the hospital and nursing homes also were transferred with few known 

incidents. In accordance with city and county plans, Nanticoke emergency personnel maintained 

a steady stream of requests for transportation vehicles from the county. County staff, in turn, consulted their lists of suppliers and requisitioned the ambulances and buses needed in Nanticoke. Over 

100 ambulances responded to the call for help. Nanticoke EOC staff dispatched vehicles as they 

arrive at fire headquarters. A copy of each patient’s medical chart accompanied them to their new, 

temporary facility.

While all this was occurring, the County EOC lined up county and State policy and National Guard 

units to handle traffic control, access control, and security in and around Nanticoke. Existing plans 

assigned these tasks to the Police Group, and the plan was carried out as written.

Most of the activity during the Spencer fire and evacuation centered on the Nanticoke and County 

EOC’s. Newport Township, under the guidance of Executive Director Norman Bodeck though, was 

in readiness as part of their population prepared for evacuation. An example of their cooperation 

during the events of March 24 is demonstrated in the way they took charge of helping Township 

evacuees. Realizing that the county had their hands full coordinating the evacuation in general and 

that Township resources were not tied up fighting the fire as was the case in Nanticoke, Newport 

Township radioed that they would handle arrangements for sheltering relocated residents in their 

jurisdiction. They set up a mass care center in a private building and staffed it with EOC volunteers. They had to ask the county for supplies because the center was not Red Cross approved and 

thus did not qualify for supplies from that organization. Nonetheless, the County EMA Director 

was pleased with the Township’s adherence to the basic tenets of the plan for local and county EOC 

coordination during disasters – that the local jurisdiction is the first line resource and the county 

lends support to and coordinates resource requests from the local EOC, as needed. The Nanticoke 

EOC operated likewise.
8

By dawn, the evacuation of residents and patients was completed. Without exception, those involved in 

the events of the emergency reacted with praise about how smoothly the evacuation was handled.

PREPAREDNESS BEFORE THE FIRE

Why were the Nanticoke Fire Department and the city and county EOCs so well prepared? Local 

officials indicated that their excellence in preparedness was due to large part to the presence of the 

Susquehanna nuclear power station. After the 1979 nuclear power incident at Three Mile Island, 

State and Federal regulations on community disaster planning around nuclear reactors tightened. 

Among other requirements, plant owners and operators were required to do a better job of assisting 

local emergency planners. In Luzerne County, the County EMA, the power plant, and the key at-risk 

jurisdictions developed a good working relationship.

For example, the Susquehanna Steam Electric Station and the EMA prepared an excellent public 

information brochure succinctly detailing what citizens should do in the event of a radiological 

disaster. The 18-page brochure is mailed out every year to all homes receiving utility bills. It lets 

people know their responsibilities and options in time of evacuation and contains clear information 

on routes, shelters, what to take, and where to get official news. The contents are reprinted in the 

blue pages of the telephone book. Many area residents knew what to do when the sirens range or 

the bullhorns of route alert teams awakened them because they had read this brochure.

The power plant also worked with local and county officials on both table-top and exercise drills. 

Federal regulations now require that nuclear plants and neighboring jurisdictions practice a fullscale, Federally-evaluated evacuation exercise every other year. Luzerne County EMA has organized 

and conducted three of these drills since the rule has been in effect (1981). But the county has done 

more than meet the minimum requirements. Fearing that too much is forgotten in the span of two 

years between drills, the county holds their own medical evacuation practices in the off years. They 

also conduct on-going training sessions for the 19 at-risk municipalities and four school districts 

within the 10-mile radius around the plant. On the Saturday before the fire, the county EMA held its 

first radiological response seminar that brought all the risk communities together at one time. PEMA 

plans to use the all-hazards plan prototype as a model for other Pennsylvania communities. Proof 

of the importance of planning, training, and conducting evacuation exercises was found during the 

Spencer fire and evacuation.

TOXICITY LEVEL READINGS SLOW IN COMING

One of the biggest problems faced by emergency officials during the Spencer fire and evacuation was 

getting an accurate reading of exactly how threatening the toxic cloud was. What types of chemicals 

and what quantities actually burned? How did those substances affect the quality of the air and 

water? Reliable air and water sample readings were not forthcoming for most of the day, thus complicating decisions on whether and when residents could return to their homes.

As soon as the County EMA was activated, they contacted the Pennsylvania Department of 

Environmental Resources which has a regional office in Wilkes-Barre. That State agency has responsibility for monitoring air quality. According to some reports, the DER mobile lab arrived without the 

proper equipment to monitor air quality. Water run-off samples were checked for contamination, 

and DER verified that any contaminated water run-off was being contained by the dike system on 

site. They had no word on the toxic cloud. Since early firefighting had created water runoff before 

diking operations could begin, as a precautionary measure the county notified communities downstream at 3:40 a.m. that some chemicals might have leaked into the Susquehanna River.
USFA-TR-005/March 1987 9

Meanwhile, representatives from the Federal Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) showed up. 

Still the county received no word on air quality. Ultimately, the county sent a technical group of 

representatives from the EOC who had access to testing equipment from local colleges. They donned 

protective gear, took air and water samples, then turned their readings (“slightly above normal”) 

over to DER and EPA for further analysis. The county stressed that they needed the results quickly 

because if conditions were untenable for re-entry, mass care centers needed to begin preparing to 

feed and house evacuees for that evening. Extra cots, bedding, and food had to be brought in from 

supply centers and shelter officials needed enough advance notice to set that in motion.

By the deadline of 2:30 p.m., county officials still had no answer; in fact, DER asked to receive the 

county’s readings again. Two hours later the county prepared to tell shelter operators that re-entry 

to Nanticoke could not yet be authorized. They checked again with DER for word on the air tests 

and asked to be informed immediately of the results. Instead, DER, minutes later, broadcast news 

over television stations that evacuees could return. The county scrambled quickly to dispatch traffic 

control units to ease the congestion as 15,000 people made their way back to Nanticoke.

CAUSE OF FIRE

The cause of Spencer Metal Company’s early morning blaze was not immediately known. Clues to 

the fire’s origin were gleaned, however, from the early observations of the foreman and several shift 

workers who saw flames glancing over the rafters inside the roof. At the time of the fire, electricians 

were in the process of piping the wires throughout the building.

After the fire, the State Fire Marshal’s Office conducted an investigation into the cause. Their conclusion: It was an electrical fire caused by corrosion of the wires, probably as a result of exposure over 

time to the caustic fumes from the metal processing vats.

LESSONS LEARNED

If the Spencer fire and evacuation proved anything, it proved the value of pre-fire planning and 

emergency preparedness. Credit for the safe and orderly evacuation of 15,000 people rested largely 

with four key factors.

1. Pre-fire Planning is Essential to Adequate Response

The Nanticoke Fire Department had done a pre-fire plan of the Spencer plant with a list of all the 

chemicals on-site. The fire department could relay that information to CHEMTREC as they tried 

to decide the best strategy for fighting the blaze, protecting the firefighters, and safeguarding the 

population.

Chief Casey reported that in recent years, younger volunteers had been exposed to the value 

of pre-fire planning in their training classes, and added impetus to the department’s efforts to 

begin a systematic risk analysis of commercial and industrial facilities. Obviously, the time they 

spent reviewing conditions at Spencer Metal paid off.

2. Coordination of Local and County Emergency Plans Streamlines Emergency Response

The local and county emergency management agencies had interlocking emergency operation 

plans containing a basic plan, standard operating procedures, and resource/notification lists. 

Because these plans were so well coordinated chain of command was clear, roles and responsibilities were well-known, and communications were excellent.
10 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

3. Practice Makes Perfect

The emergency operations plans were not thick with dust or unfamiliar territory for key officials. Those in charge and those helping them knew what to do because such vital operations 

as alert and notification, traffic control, and evacuation had been taught in county-sponsored 

training and practiced repeatedly during field exercises. This experience paid off in a big way 

on March 24 as one after the other emergency worker reported that he or she knew instinctively 

what to do – their actions were like second nature.

Another benefit that was realized from the training and practice exercises was that the volunteers 

responded naturally to their roles and were well-prepared. Because the emergency management 

volunteers had been called upon regularly to participate in classroom and field training and to 

assist with other disasters over the years, they perceived their volunteer “jobs” as vital, took 

them seriously, and were accustomed to emergency operations. They had been kept active and 

involved and were ready to perform.

4. There is a Silver Lining to Having a Nuclear Power Plant as a Neighbor

Due to recently enacted Federal regulations, nuclear power plants are obligated to be good neighbors and actively lead in planning local radiological emergency response. Communities where 

nuclear plants are located should utilize this resource to the fullest, especially since the mere 

presence of such utilities place additional preparedness demands on the local jurisdiction.

Luzerne County developed a cooperative relationship with the Susquehanna Steam Electric 

Station which has helped fund various training and public awareness activities associated with 

evacuation due to a nuclear accident. The beauty of this arrangement has been the spin-off benefit of the Radiological Emergency Response Planning exercises to preparedness for other types 

of disasters in the county. Specifically, the activities undertaken in preparation for a potential 

incident at the nuclear power plant enabled fire and emergency officials and the general populace to handle the Spencer fire and evacuation with aplomb.

Other lessons can be learned from actions taken during the fire and evacuation:

• One person, the Nanticoke Mayor, was responsible for making the decision on evacuation. 

He took that responsibility and wisely conferred with other parties in a position to offer 

guidance.

• Key medical facilities and housing facilities for the elderly were given early warning of the 

pending evacuation.

• Most of the dispatching was done centrally from the County EOC.

• Rumor Control was activated early.

• A special media press center was set up at the County EOC which accommodated the media’s 

need-to-know yet protected the nerve center of the County EOC from interference as they 

carried out their duties.

• The fire department wisely acted to construct a small dike behind the plant to prevent the 

water from the firefighting operations from carrying chemicals into the Susquehanna tributary at the rear of the property.
USFA-TR-005/March 1987 11

While fire and evacuation actions were carried out in a praiseworthy manner, some problems did 

develop:

1. Ambulance Staging Area Needed

There was considerable congestion when dozens of mutual aid ambulances reported to Nanticoke 

Fire Headquarters where parking and circulation patterns are less than optimal. Nanticoke 

emergency officials are now considering amending their evacuation plan to allow for an ambulance staging area at a shopping center with ample parking outside city limits. An ambulance 

coordinator from their cadre of emergency personnel would be sent to the staging area to direct 

ambulance routing from there.

2. Tighter Perimeter Control Needed

Some problems arose with perimeter control and access at the site of the fire. Reporters and 

photographers were moving in to within 25 feet of the building while helicopters from the 

electronics media buzzed overhead. Some firefighters at the scene feared there would be a collision in midair. These issues are being reviewed to determine whether any changes to the plan 

could be made that would mitigate such problems.

3. More Protective Equipment Needed

The Nanticoke Fire Department, like many volunteer departments, is in need of more protective 

equipment for its firefighters. This fact was obvious during the Spencer fire as 110 firefighters 

had to share 20 air packs. The firefighters worked in shifts, providing relief in turn to the firefighters at the front line of the fire. Fire Chief Don Casey attributes the 22 incidents of respiratory problems, burning eyes, and related discomforts experienced by firefighters to their lack of 

sufficient protective gear. There also was one case of a minor injury and one firefighter suffered 

from exhaustion.

4. Better State and Federal Real Time Environmental Testing and Response Needed

An on-going frustration during the fire and its aftermath was lack of prompt air and water quality readings. Emergency plans and drills would benefit if the “outside” agencies responsible for 

environmental quality information would participate in the practices. These agencies need to be 

sure they are prepared to respond with personnel and equipment.
12 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series
USFA-TR-005/March 1987 13

15

PHOTOGRAPHS

Evacuation of Nanticoke, Pennsylvania 

Due to Metal Processing Plant Fire

Jack Kelley of the Citizen’s Voice, Wilkes-Barre, provided the following photographs to the U.S. Fire 

Administration as a courtesy for this report. The photographers were Jack Kelley and Rich Walton of 

the Citizen’s Voice and free-lance photographers Mark Moran and Jim Egliskis.

Photo Description

1 Firefighters on aerial work to protect west side of building.

2 Roof has collapsed as fire continues to burn.

3 Luzerne County Emergency Management Agency Executive Director Jim Siracuse (right) with staff 

members Kevin O’Brien and Jim Ruth respond quickly to Nanticoke’s requests for assistance.

4 County EMA Police Coordinators Ron Smith and Bill Barrett make transportation plans and discuss 

traffic control requirements.

5 Some of the more than 100 ambulances that converged at Nanticoke Fire Headquarters to evacuate 

250 hospital and nursing home patients.

6 Ambulance volunteers quickly transfer a patient to a nearby medical facility.

7 Nanticoke Fire Chief Don Casey (right) confers with Mayor Haydock (on phone) about status of fire 

control and evacuation.

8 Red Cross volunteer (right) reassures evacuees at public shelter.

9 Some of the 1,500 evacuees provided temporary lodging at Hanover Area High School.

10 Evacuees pass the time with coffee and news updates on transistor radios.

11 Pennsylvania Governor Robert Casey (center, seated) receives briefing at the County EOC. Other 

officials present are County Commissioners Trinisewski, Phillips, and Crossin; State Senator Musto; and 

Congressman Kanjorski.

12 By dawn the fire was under control. Firefighters remain on scene to check spot fires.

13 Regional EPA employees arrive to take air and water samples.

14 Regional EPA employees scrub down after checking toxicity levels.

15 Diking at rear and sides of building helped contain runoff from fire operations.

16 Only the company’s sign remains untouched by the fire.

17 Temporary office set up at the west side of the building.
16 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Photo 1. Firefighters on aerial work to protect west side of building.
USFA-TR-005/March 1987 17Photo 2. Roof has collapsed as fire continues to burn.
18 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Photo 3. Luzerne County Emergency Management Agency Executive Director Jim Siracuse (right) with staff 

members Kevin O’Brien and Jim Ruth respond quickly to Nanticoke’s requests for assistance.
USFA-TR-005/March 1987 19 Photo 4. County EMA Police Coordinators Ron Smith and Bill Barrett make transportation plans and discuss traffic control requirements.
20 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Photo 5. Some of the more than 100 ambulances that converged at Nanticoke Fire 

Headquarters to evacuate 250 hospital and nursing home patients
USFA-TR-005/March 1987 21Photo 6. Ambulance volunteers quickly transfer a patient to a nearby medical facility.
22 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Photo 7. Nanticoke Fire Chief Don Casey (right) confers with Mayor Haydock (on phone) 

about status of fire control and evacuation.
USFA-TR-005/March 1987 23Photo 8. Red Cross volunteer (right) reassures evacuees at public shelter.
24 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Photo 9. Some of the 1,500 evacuees provided temporary lodging at Hanover Area High School.
USFA-TR-005/March 1987 25Photo 10. Evacuees pass the time with coffee and news updates on transistor radios.
26 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Photo 11. Pennsylvania Governor Robert Casey (center, seated) receives briefing at the 

County EOC. Other officials present are County Commissioners Trinisewski, Phillips, and 

Crossin; State Senator Musto; and Congressman Kanjorski.
USFA-TR-005/March 1987 27Photo 12. By dawn the fire was under control. Firefighters remain on scene to check spot fires.
28 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Photo 13. Regional EPA employees arrive to take air and water samples.
USFA-TR-005/March 1987 29Photo 14. Regional EPA employees scrub down after checking toxicity levels.
30 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Photo 15. Diking at rear and sides of building helped contain runoff from fire operations.
USFA-TR-005/March 1987 31Photo 16. Only the company’s sign remains untouched by the fire.
32 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Photo 17. Temporary office set up at the west side of the building.