FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION 

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

FINAL REPORT 

INSPECTION OF THE COMMISSION’S 

WESTLAW DATABASE SERVICE 

JULY 2001

ASSIGNMENT 01-05
TABLE OF CONTENTS

DESCRIPTION PAGE 

Background..........................................................................................................................1

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology.............................................................................2

Inspection Results.............................................................................................................2

Management of Westlaw User Accounts................................................................3

Review of Financial Transactions............................................................................5

Advance Payments..................................................................................................8
Background 

The Office of Inspector General (OIG) initiated an Inspection of the Westlaw database 

service after learning that a separated employee’s Westlaw account remained open 

several months after the employee left the agency. The OIG expanded the Inspection 

to review the payment process for the service after discovering improper1

 duplicate 

payments had been made to the Westlaw vendor. 

The Federal Election Commission (FEC), established in 1975, is an independent 

regulatory agency that enforces and administers the Federal Election Campaign Act 

(FECA). Enforcement of FECA includes the following: facilitating public disclosure of 

finance activity; providing information and policy guidance to the public and elected 

officials; encouraging voluntary compliance with the disclosure and other requirements 

of the Act; and enforcing the statute through audits, investigations, and civil litigation. In 

addition, the Commission manages the public funding programs for Presidential 

campaigns and conventions. The FEC is located in Washington, D.C., and has 

approximately 338 permanent and temporary employees. 

The FEC contracts with West Group, a division of the Thomson Corporation, to receive 

the Westlaw research service. Westlaw provides FEC staff with on-line access to legal 

and business databases, information such as Federal court decisions, Congressional 

information, and Federal statutes. 

Management approves access for Commission staff whose jobs would benefit from the 

Westlaw database service, such as attorneys in the Office of General Council (OGC). 

The Westlaw contract amount for fiscal year 2001 is $130,608, which generally provides 

FEC users unlimited access to databases designated in the “fixed rate” plan. Premium 

databases, not included in the “fixed rate” plan, are also accessible to all FEC Westlaw 

users, and result in additional charges to the FEC. 

Exhibit 1-Westlaw.com Internet Login Screen Individuals with active Westlaw 

user accounts are able to 

access the Westlaw service 

virtually anywhere; at work, 

home, or on travel status. The 

Westlaw service is accessible 

using a personal computer (PC) 

with access to the Internet. 

Primarily, FEC Westlaw users 

access the service using the 

West Group software 

Westmate, installed on FEC 

computers. In addition, user 

accounts can also access the 

Westlaw service using a Web 

based service on the Internet. 

[See Exhibit 1] 

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 The General Accounting Office defines improper payments as payments that should not have been made or were 

made for incorrect amounts. U.S. General Accounting Office, Billions in Improper Payments Continue to Require 

Attention, (GAO-01-44, page 5, October 27, 1999). 
Therefore, as long as a user has access to the Internet, regardless of location, the 

Westlaw service, including premium services, are accessible with a valid user account. 

The Office of General Counsel’s Library Office is responsible for administration of the 

FEC’s Westlaw program. Management of the Westlaw program by the Library includes 

the following responsibilities: 

• Negotiation of the annual contract fees with the West Group vendor. 

• 	 Training of Commission staff on the use of the Westlaw service, or coordination of 

training provided by West Group. 

• Notifications to add or remove employee Westlaw user accounts. 

• 	 Review and approval of receiving reports to ensure proper billing and to enable the 

payment for services received. 

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 

The objectives of the Inspection were to:

(1) Ensure that the Westlaw accounts of separated staff are properly canceled; and

(2) Review the improper Westlaw financial payments to determine the cause and

evaluate the payment process. 

The OIG reviewed the following documentation in order to achieve the stated Inspection 

objectives: 

• Westlaw purchase orders, receiving reports, and invoices; 

• Active Westlaw user list and Westlaw database usage reports; 

• FEC employee clearance forms for separated staff; 

• FEC current employee list and separation dates of prior staff; 

• U.S. Department of Treasury Financial Manual; 

• 31 U.S. Code, section 3324(d), Advances; and 

• 	 Decision of the Comptroller General of the United States, Authority to Make Advance 

Payments for Technical Support Associated with Computer Software Packages, B256692, June 22, 1995 (1995 Westlaw 373859). 

The OIG communicated with the following internal and external individuals to conduct

the Inspection:

(1) West Group vendor employees;

(2) FEC Accounting Officer;

(3) FEC Administrative Officer; and

(4) FEC Library Director.

The OIG Inspection was conducted in accordance with the President’s Council on

Integrity and Efficiency’s Quality Standards for Inspections.

Inspection Results 

Overall, the OIG found weaknesses in the oversight of the Westlaw service by the 

Library Office responsible for the program. A pattern of improper payments occurred 

over a four year period. Specifically, four duplicate payments were approved for 

payment, totaling approximately $33,772. All of the duplicate payments were 

subsequently recovered from the vendor after discovery of the improper payments. 

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In addition, the OIG found inadequate management of user accounts. Over 42% of all 

current accounts were assigned to separated FEC staff. This weakness created an 

unnecessary financial exposure to the FEC due to the potential for separated staff to 

access premium databases billed to the FEC. The OIG review revealed user accounts 

of former employees were accessed after the employees’ separation from the FEC; 

however, all access occurred in the “fixed rate” databases; therefore no additional direct 

expense was found as a result of the unauthorized access. 

The OIG concluded the weaknesses were the result of inadequate internal controls of 

the Westlaw program. The OIG also concluded the four improper duplicate payments 

were inadvertent errors, and not the result of fraud or abuse. 

Management of Westlaw User Accounts 

The OIG initiated this Inspection after learning that a separated employee’s Westlaw 

account remained open several months after the employee left the agency. The 

Inspection included a review of all current Westlaw user accounts to identify whether an 

appropriate process is in place to ensure Westlaw user accounts are canceled upon an 

employee’s separation from the FEC. Current Westlaw user accounts found assigned 

to separated staff were further reviewed to determine whether the accounts were 

accessed after the employees left the FEC, and whether the access resulted in 

unauthorized charges billed to the FEC. 

The OIG contacted the Westlaw vendor and obtained a list of all current user accounts. 

This list was compared to reports of current and separated FEC staff to identify whether 

current Westlaw accounts were assigned to separated staff. Westlaw reported a total of 

262 current FEC user accounts. The OIG found 111 of the 262 accounts, or 42%, were 

assigned to former FEC staff. Several current accounts were assigned to staff that 

separated from the Commission as far back as 1992. A further review of the 111 

separated staff accounts revealed six users’ accounts had been accessed subsequent 

to the employees’ separation. 

Account activity on three of the six accounts accessed after the employee separations 

were the result of an automatic Westlaw search capability called Westclip. Westclip 

allows a user to configure the Westlaw service to automatically search for keywords at a 

predetermined frequency (daily, weekly, etc.). For example, the Westclip service could 

search the Westlaw databases for the keywords “Federal Election Commission” on a 

daily basis. The user would then be notified by the Westclip service when the keywords 

appeared in one of the databases selected, such as a recent court case. 

Apparently, the three separated employees did not cancel the Westclip service upon 

leaving the FEC. Since the employees’ accounts were not properly canceled upon their 

separation, the Westclip searches continued. In one instance, the Westclip service was 

active on an account for approximately eighteen months, involving over 4264 Westclip 

searches. Fortunately, the Westclip service is included in the FEC fixed rate, and did 

not result in any direct additional cost to the FEC. 

Three other Westlaw accounts were accessed after the employees’ separation. None of 

the three resulted in additional charges to the FEC. The OIG could not determine 

whether the separated employees were the individuals who actually accessed the 

accounts. It is possible current employees who inherited the personal computers of the 

separated employees, may have been able to use the separated employees’ accounts. 

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Exhibit 2-Westmate Login Dialogue Box 

The Westlaw software Westmate 

used by the FEC allows users to 

configure the software to remember 

their username and login password 

so that the user does not have to reenter the information each time the 

service is used. [See Exhibit 2] 

Therefore, the separated employees 

may have used the remember 

password option, allowing anyone 

with access to their PC the ability to 

logon as the separated employee. 

The remember password capability is not recommended since anyone with physical

access to a user’s PC could access the service using someone else’s account.

The failure to cancel Westlaw accounts of former employees created an unnecessary

financial risk to the Commission. All current user accounts have access to both the

“fixed rate” and premium Westlaw databases. As a result, it would have been possible

for a separated employee to access premium databases and incur costs charged to the

FEC.

Employee Clearance Process

The Library Director indicated a possible contributing factor for the failure to cancel

Westlaw accounts was inadequate notification of separating employees. Without such

notification, the OIG agreed it would be difficult for the Library to maintain an adequate

subscriber list of current staff.

The OIG performed a limited review of the FEC’s employee clearance process to 

determine whether the statement by the Library Director had merit. The FEC has a 

clearance process, administered by the Personnel Office, to ensure employees 

separating from the Commission have satisfied all obligations and surrendered all 

government property upon separation from the FEC. Several designated divisions are 

required to date and initial on an employee clearance form for each separating 

employee. Government property, such as building keys, FEC credentials, and Library 

materials are required to be returned to the appropriate division. The employee 

clearance form also serves as a notification to divisions. For example, the notification is 

necessary for the Data Systems Development Division so that computer passwords are 

disabled to prevent access to the FEC computer system by a separated employee. 

Based on the OIG’s review of the employee clearance process, and an examination of 

clearance forms for separated staff with current Westlaw accounts, the OIG was unable 

to find sufficient evidence to support the Library Director’s assertion that inadequate 

notice of separating employees to the Library had occurred. 

Conclusion 

During the Inspection, the OIG conveyed to the Library a concern for the active 

accounts of separated employees. The Library Director stated the accounts of 

separated employees had not been canceled because the responsibility has “not been a 

priority” of the Library. Based on the OIG’s discussions with the Library Director, the 

OIG believes the Director did not fully understand the potential for unauthorized access 

and additional charges that could occur as a result of the failure to cancel the user 

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accounts of separated staff. The OIG would have serious concern if the Library Director 

had a full understanding of the potential financial exposure and continued to believe the 

responsibility should not be a priority of the Library. 

The Library Office, during the Inspection, took appropriate steps to cancel all user 

accounts of separated employees and agreed to cancel user accounts of separating 

employees in the future. As an additional measure, the OGC informed the OIG the 

Library Office will provide quarterly reports to the General Counsel detailing Westlaw 

user account cancellations of departing employees to ensure the prompt cancellation of 

accounts. 

Suggestion 

The OIG suggested to the Personnel Office Director that a section be added to the FEC 

employee clearance form to require the signature and date of Library staff for 

cancellation of Westlaw user accounts upon an employee’s separation from the FEC. 

The Personnel Director agreed to make the change. 

Review of Financial Transactions 

During the Inspection, the OIG discovered a pattern of improper duplicate payments 

made to the Westlaw vendor. To determine the extent and cause of the improper 

payments, the OIG reviewed the Westlaw payment history and documentation for fiscal 

years 1998 to 2001, through March 2001. The OIG also conducted meetings with the 

Library Director, Accounting Officer, and Administrative Officer. West Group employees 

were contacted for additional information. 

Based on a review of Westlaw payments and supporting documentation, the OIG found 

four improper duplicate payments had been made in three of the four FYs reviewed 

(1998, 1999, and 2001). A fifth invoice in FY 2001 was improperly approved for 

payment by the Library Director, but did not obtain the necessary approval by the 

Administrative Officer for payment and therefore was not paid. 

Background 

The FEC’s vendor payment approval process involves several offices. The requisition 

office, for example the Library, orders goods or services for their individual division/office 

or the Commission as a whole. The requisition offices are required to perform an 

administrative review of invoices for payments to be processed. Vendor invoices are 

normally first received at the FEC by the Accounting Office. The Accounting Office then 

matches the invoice with the original purchase order and a blank receiving report to be 

completed by the requisition office. The documents are then forwarded to the 

requisition office for review. To enable the FEC to pay the vendor, the requisition office 

must complete the receiving report acknowledging proper receipt of the goods or 

services. Acceptance by the requisition office includes two primary requirements: (1) 

assurance the item(s) ordered have been inspected and are consistent with the original 

order; and (2) confirmation the vendor has not already been paid for the goods or 

services. Upon acceptance of the receiving report, the requisition office forwards the 

completed receiving report, along with copies of the purchase order and invoice to the 

Administrative Office. The Administrative Officer and Certifying Officer then perform 

additional reviews of all documentation associated with the invoice to ensure a proper 

and legal transaction has occurred allowing for payment of Federal funds. 

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Three primary situations may occur in the receipt of goods or services. A full receipt of 

goods and services may occur, in which case, all goods or services ordered have been 

received and the payment may be made to the vendor. A full receipt is normally 

associated with a regular purchase order, for example an order for a computer. The 

regular purchase order form establishes the terms of the order for goods and services. 

Funds are then obligated, or set aside, at the time of the order. Once a valid invoice is 

received and approved, the set aside funds are used to pay the invoice. 

A partial receipt of goods or services may also occur. The requisition office must 

acknowledge partial receipt on the receiving report, and the appropriate amount to be 

paid to the vendor. Partial receipt of goods or services is often associated with a 

blanket purchase agreement (BPA), a type of reoccurring open purchase that does not 

require a new purchase order form to be completed each time a similar item is 

purchased. Monthly services, such as the Westlaw service, are a type of order that can 

be purchased using a BPA. Accounting for a BPA involves the obligation of funds, and 

then, as partial receipt of the order for goods and services are delivered, portions of the 

original set-aside funds are used to pay the vendor until eventually all or most of the 

funds are expended. BPAs require the requisition office to maintain an accurate and 

ongoing record of the payments, including the original order amount, and the 

subsequent receipt and payment for the partial goods and services. Effectively 

managed, this process provides a mechanism to decrease the likelihood invoices are 

paid twice. 

Lastly, a rejection of an invoice may occur, such as the non-receipt of goods or services, 

or an incorrect invoice. Rejection of an invoice requires the requisition office to contact 

the vendor to discuss the invoice. 

Finding 

Three of the four fiscal years (FYs) reviewed utilized a BPA to procure the Westlaw 

service; 1998, 1999, and 2001, the same years duplicate payments occurred. The 

following is a summary of the duplicate payments: 

Fiscal Year Duplicate Payment(s) 

1998 2 payments, totaling $13,650 

1999 1 payment, $9,214 

2000 None 

2001 1 payment, $10,908 

Total $33,772 

The OIG concluded the duplicate payments were the result of ineffective internal 

controls in the Library Office to monitor payments. The OIG concluded the Library did 

not have a system in place to track ongoing, open purchase orders. 

The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-123, Management 

Accountability and Control, requires the establishment of internal controls by Federal 

agencies to reasonably ensure that (i) programs achieve their intended results; (ii) 

resources are used consistent with agency mission; (iii) programs and resources are 

protected from waste, fraud, and mismanagement; (iv) laws and regulations are 

followed; and (v) reliable and timely information is obtained, maintained, reported and 

used for decision making. 

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Internal controls are an integral part of managing the FEC and provide reasonable 

assurance the Commission will operate in an effective and efficient manner, and comply 

with applicable laws and regulations. In a broad context, internal controls are the 

methods, procedures, and safeguards adopted by management to ensure that its goals 

are met. Examples of internal controls include the physical control over vulnerable 

assets, such as laptop computers, and the segregation of key duties and responsibilities 

among different people to reduce the risk of error or fraud. 

A standard internal control procedure contained in A-123 requires the accurate and 

timely recording of transactions by management. According to A-123, “transactions 

should be promptly recorded to maintain their relevance and value to management in 

controlling operations and making decisions. This applies to the entire life cycle of a 

transaction or event; from the initiation and authorization, through its final classification 

in summary records.” 

The Library Office did not have an effective system in place to monitor and record the 

events related to the open purchase orders. An effective system would have enabled 

the Library to account for the original order, or obligation, and also subsequent 

approvals for payment of the monthly/yearly invoices. As a result, upon receipt of an 

invoice for acceptance, the Library Office would be able to review a record of previously 

approved payments, and recognize whether the monthly or yearly payment had already 

been approved for payment. 

The Library Director informed the OIG during the Inspection that the Library did not have 

a system in place to monitor the open purchase orders. 

Recommendation 

The Library Office should develop an adequate system, in consultation with the

Accounting Office, to monitor open purchase orders. For example, a computer

spreadsheet could be developed to monitor open purchase orders; including obligations

of funds, and partial/final receipt of goods or services.

Management Response

The Office of General Counsel agreed with the finding. The OGC also stated “the

monitoring of vendor payments is a dual responsibility - that of the requisition office and

the Accounting Office.” In addition, the OGC believes that a new FEC accounting

system to be installed shortly by the Accounting Office and a recent training workshop

held by the Administrative Division on the proper procedures for completion of receiving

reports will enable the Commission to avoid making duplicate payments to vendors.

OIG Response 

The OIG acknowledges the Accounting Office also has an important role in preventing 

duplicate payments. The new accounting system is expected to add additional controls, 

such as the ability to identify the receipt of duplicate numbered invoices in order to 

prevent duplicate payments. This type of automated control, in combination with the 

proper monitoring of open purchase orders by the requisition office, should reduce the 

likelihood of duplicate payments. 

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Advance Payments 

In addition to the inspection of improper duplicate payments, the OIG also reviewed the 

FEC’s practice of making advance payments prior to full receipt of the Westlaw service. 

A review of the financial payments for FYs 1998-2001 revealed advance payments in 

each of the four FYs. Rather than pay on a monthly basis as invoices are received, the 

FEC chose to pay the full cost of the annual Westlaw service, usually by the third month 

of the twelve-month service period. 

Federal law provides an exception to the general requirement that payments to vendors 

be made only after goods and services have been received. 31 U.S. Code, section 

3324(d)(2), states the head of an agency may pay in advance for charges for a 

publication printed or recorded in any way for the auditory or visual use of the agency. 

The Comptroller General of the United States concluded in a 1995 decision that on-line 

databases fall under the definition of section 3324(d)(2), acceptable charges for 

advance payments. Therefore, the advance payments were made consistent with 

Federal law. Although the payments did not violate Federal law or regulation, the OIG 

suggests a further analysis by management is warranted to determine whether the 

Westlaw advance payments are in the best interest of the FEC and the Federal 

government. 

According to the Accounting Officer, the FEC chose to pay for Westlaw services in 

advance to decrease the chance of making a duplicate payment, and because “twelve 

payments instead of one is not cost-effective from an administrative standpoint.” In 

addition, in FYs 1999 and 2000, the FEC received a 2% cash discount for payment in 

advance. However, in FY 2001, the FEC did not receive a cash discount, but did pay in 

advance. 

According to the Accounting Officer, a more favorable rate was obtained for FY 2001 in 

which the cash discount was not available. In addition, the OGC asserted that the FEC 

negotiated access to additional Westlaw databases in lieu of a 2% discount for advance 

payment, an arrangement the OGC believed to be advantageous. However, the OIG 

found no evidence based on written documentation provided by the Library Office or 

obtained from the Westlaw vendor to indicate the more favorable rate or added Westlaw 

services were based on a requirement that payment be made in advance. The vendor 

informed the OIG that the FEC had the option in FY 2001 to pay in advance, or on a 

monthly basis. Obviously, from the vendor’s business standpoint, it is preferable to 

receive the payment in advance. 

The Department of Treasury, Financial Management Service’s supplement to the 

Treasury Financial Manual titled: “Cash Management Made Easy,” provides guidance to 

Federal agencies on cash management. Proper cash management by the Federal 

government results in the reduction of Federal borrowing, and savings of interest on 

Government funds. The guidance provides that Federal agencies must process 

payments of government obligations in a timely manner, neither early nor late. 

The OIG agrees with the general concept of the administrative burden on processing 

twelve payments rather than one and the avoidance of duplicate payments. However; in 

the case of the FY 2001 payment, where no cash discount was provided for the advance 

payment, and considering the significant amount of the payment ($130,608), the OIG 

suggests further analysis by management on whether this practice is advantageous to 

the government. In addition, implementation of a process to lessen the likelihood of 

duplicate payments will alleviate one of the two reasons given by the Accounting Office 

for the advance payments. 

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