PIN : 081
ARMY HISTORICAL SERIES

American Military History

Volume 1

The United States Army

and the

Forging of a Nation, 1775–1917

Second Edition

Richard W. Stewart

General Editor

Center of Military History

United States Army

Washington, D.C., 2009
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

American military history / Richard W. Stewart, general editor. — 2nd ed.

 p. cm. — (Army historical series)

 Includes bibliographical references and index.

 1. United States—History, Military. 2. United States. Army—History. I. Stewart, 

 Richard W. (Richard Winship), 1951– II. Center of Military History. III. Title. IV. 

 Series.

 E181.A44 2009

 355’.00973—dc22 2009011595

Revised Edition—First Printed 2005—CMH Pub 30–21
Army Historical Series

Advisory Committee

(As of October 2008) 

Reina J. Pennington

Norwich University

U.S. Army Center of Military History

Jeffrey J. Clarke, Chief of Military History

William T. Allison

Georgia Southern University

Lt. Gen. William B. Caldwell IV

U.S. Army Combined Arms Center

James J. Carafano

The Heritage Foundation

Brig. Gen. Edward C. Cardon

U.S. Army Command and General

Staff College

Brig. Gen. Patrick Finnegan

U.S. Military Academy

John F. Gilmartin

Ohio State University

Joyce E. Morrow

Administrative Assistant to the

Secretary of the Army

Mark P. Parillo

Kansas State University

Col. Thomas Torrance

U.S. Army War College

Lt. Gen. David D. Valcourt

U.S. Army Training and Doctrine

Command

Paul M. Wester Jr.

National Archives and Records

Administration

Chief Historian

Chief, Histories Division

Editor in Chief

Richard W. Stewart

Joel D. Meyerson

Keith R. Tidman 

v

Contents

Page

 Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiii

 Preface to the 2005 Edition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xv

Chapter

1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

 What Is Military History?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

 Theory and Practice of War. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

 The American Military System. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

2. The Beginnings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

 The European Heritage. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

 The Military Revolution. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

 Eighteenth Century European Warfare. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

 The Colonial Scene. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

 Colonial Militia. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

	 	 	 The Colonies in the World Conflict, 1689–1783. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

	 	 	 The American Rifle. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

 The Colonial Heritage. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

3. The American Revolution, First Phase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

 The Outbreak. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46

 Formation of the Continental Army. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50

 The Invasion of Canada and the Fall of Boston. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53

 The New Nation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55

 Evolution of the Continental Army. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57

 The British Problem. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61

 Of Strategy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63

	 	 	 The British Offensive in 1776. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64

 Trenton and Princeton. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70

4. The Winning of Independence, 1777–1783 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75

 The Campaign of 1777. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75

 Valley Forge. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85

 First Fruits of the French Alliance. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87

 The New Conditions of the War. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89

 British Successes in the South. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90

 Nadir of the American Cause. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93

 Greene’s Southern Campaign. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95

 Yorktown: The Final Act. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98

 Surrender of Cornwallis. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101

 The Summing Up: Reasons, Lessons, and Meaning. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
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Chapter Page

5. The Formative Years, 1783–1812 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107

 The Question of a Peacetime Army. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107

 Toward a More Perfect Union. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111

 The Militia. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114

 Military Realities in the Federalist Period. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116

 The Indian Expeditions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116

 Battle of Fallen Timbers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120

 The Perils of Neutrality. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120

 The Quasi War with France. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121

 Defense under Jefferson. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123

 The Army and Westward Expansion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124

 American Reaction to the Napoleonic Wars. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127

6. The War of 1812 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131

 Origins of the War. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131

 The Opposing Forces. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132

 The Strategic Pattern. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136

 The First Campaigns. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136

 The Second Year, 1813. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139

 The Last Year of the War, 1814 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148

 New Orleans: The Final Battle. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153

7. Toward a Professional Army . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159

 Organizing an Army. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160

 The War Hatchet Raised in Florida. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161

 John C. Calhoun and the War Department. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164

 Pioneering in the West. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166

 The Second Seminole War, 1835–1842. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168

 Westward Expansion and the Texas Issue. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173

	 	 	 The Professional Officer. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174

8. The Mexican War and After . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177

 The Period of Watchful Waiting. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177

 Battles of Palo Alto and Resaca de la Palma. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178

 War Is Declared. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180

 Monterrey Campaign. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182

 Battle of Buena Vista. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184

 The Landing at Vera Cruz. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187

 Battle of Cerro Gordo. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188

 Contreras, Churubusco, Chapultepec. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189

 Occupation and Negotiation in Mexico City. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192

 The Army on the New Frontier. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192

 Increasing the Peacetime Army. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 194

 Weapons and Tactics on the Eve of the Civil War. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 194

9. The Civil War, 1861 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199

 Secession, Sumter, and Standing to Arms. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199

 The Opponents. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 206

 First Bull Run (First Manassas). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 209

	 	 	 The Second Uprising in 1861. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 214
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10. The Civil War, 1862 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223

 The War in the East: The Army of the Potomac Moves South. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223

 Jackson’s Valley Campaign. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 225

 Peninsula Campaign. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 227

 The Seven Days’ Battles. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 228

 Second Bull Run. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 230

 Lee Invades Maryland. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 232

 Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 234

 Fiasco at Fredericksburg. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 237

 The War in the West: The Twin Rivers Campaign. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 239

 Capture of Forts Henry and Donelson. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 240

 Confederate Counterattack at Shiloh. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 242

 Perryville to Stones River. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 244

 The War West of the Mississippi. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 248

11. The Civil War, 1863 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 253

 The East: Hooker Crosses the Rappahannock. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 253

 Chancellorsville: Lee’s Boldest Risk. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 256

 Lee’s Second Invasion of the North. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 258

 Gettysburg. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 261

 The West: Confusion over Clearing the Mississippi. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 267

 Grant’s Campaign against Vicksburg. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 268

 Chickamauga Campaign. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 272

 Grant at Chattanooga. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 278

12. The Civil War, 1864–1865 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 283

 Unity of Command. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 283

 Lee Cornered at Richmond. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 287

 Sherman’s Great Wheel to the East. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 292

 Thomas Protects the Nashville Base. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 296

 Lee’s Last 100 Days. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 298

 Dimensions of the War. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 301

13. Darkness and Light: The Interwar Years, 1865–1898 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 307

 Demobilization, Reorganization, and the French Threat in Mexico. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 307

 Reconstruction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 308

 Domestic Disturbances. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 311

 The National Guard Movement. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 312

 Isolation and Professional Development. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 313

 Line and Staff. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 316

 Technical Development. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 317

 Civil Accomplishment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 320

14. Winning the West: The Army in the Indian Wars, 1865–1890 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 325

 The Setting and the Challenge. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 326

 Life in the Frontier Army. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 326

 The Bozeman Trail. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 330

 The Southern Plains. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 332

 The Northwest. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 335

 The Southwest. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 337

 The Northern Plains. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 339
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15. Emergence to World Power, 1898–1902 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 347

 A New Manifest Destiny. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 347

 Trouble in Cuba. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 348

 Mobilizing for War. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 349

	 	 	 Victory at Sea: Naval Operations in the Caribbean and the Pacific. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 352

 Operations in the Caribbean. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 353

 Battle of Santiago. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 355

 The Fall of Manila. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 359

 The Philippine-American War, 1899–1902. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 360

 The Boxer Uprising. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 366

16. Transition, Change, and the Road to War, 1902–1917 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 371

 Modernizing the Armed Forces. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 372

 Reorganization of the Army: Establishment of the General Staff. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 375

 Reorganization of the Army: The Regular Army and the Militia. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 379

 The Creation of Larger Units. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 380

 Caribbean Problems and Projects. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 381

 The Army on the Mexican Border. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 383

	 	 	 The National Defense Act of 1916. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 387

 An End to Neutrality. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 389

 The Army Transformed. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 390

 Epilogue: The American Army, 1775–1917 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 393

 Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 397

Maps

No.

 1. Colonial North America. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

 2. Braddock’s Expedition, June–July 1755. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

 3. Boston-Concord Area, 18–19 April 1775. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

 4. American Attack on Quebec, 28 August–2 December 1775. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54

5. Retreat from New York, October–December 1776. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67

6. Attack on Trenton, 26 December 1776. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72

 7. Pennsylvania–New Jersey Area of Operations, 1777–1778. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78

 8. Battle of Germantown, 4 October 1777. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80

 9. Burgoyne’s March on Albany, June–October 1777. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82

10. The Southern Area, 1778–1781. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91

11. Battle of the Cowpens, 17 January 1781. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97

12. Concentration of Forces at Yorktown, April–October 1781. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100

13. The Northern Frontier, 1783–1812. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110

14. Westward Expansion and Exploration, 1803–1807. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125

15. The Northern Frontier, War of 1812. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133

16. Niagara River Area, War of 1812. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143

17. The Southern Frontier, War of 1812. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145

18. Chesapeake Bay Area, 1812–1814. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147

19. Westward Expansion, 1815–1845. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167

20. Second Seminole War: Florida, 1835–1842. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170
ix

No. Page

21. The Mexican War, 1846–1847. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181

22. The Civil War Area of Operations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201

23. The Eastern Theater: Major Battles, 1861–1865. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 208

24. Battle of Bull Run, 16–21 July 1861. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211

25. Jackson’s Valley Campaign: The Eastern Theater, March–June 1862. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 226

26. Peninsula Campaign, May–July 1862. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 229

27. Battle of Antietam, 17 September 1862. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 235

28. Battle of Fredericksburg, 13 December 1862. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 238

29. Battle of Shiloh, 6 April 1862. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 243

30. Battle of Stones River, 31 December 1862. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 247

31. Battle of Chancellorsville, 1–6 May 1863. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 255

32. Battle of Gettysburg, 1–3 July 1863. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 262

33. Vicksburg Campaign, March–July 1863. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 269

34. Battles near Chattanooga, September–November 1863. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 273

35. Wilderness to Petersburg, May 1864–April 1865. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 289

36. Drive to Atlanta, 4 May–2 September 1864. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 294

37. The Civil War, 1861–1865. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 303

38. The Trans-Mississippi West: Some Posts, Tribes, and Battles of the Indian Wars, 

1860–1890. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 329

39. Battle of Little Bighorn, 25–26 June 1876. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 342

40. Greater Antilles Area of Operations, 1898. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 351

41. Siege of Santiago, 1–17 July 1898. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 357

Illustrations

The Army Seal. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Battle Streamers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Alexander the Great. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

Gustavus Adolphus. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

Brown Bess Musket. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

American Artillery Crew in Action during the Revolutionary War. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

Vauban’s Fortress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

King Philip (Metacom). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

First Muster. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

Braddock’s Defeat. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

Flintlock Rifle. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

Minutemen Bid Their Families Farewell. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47

Presenting the Declaration of Independence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56

Pattern 1777 Cartridge Box. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61

George Washington at Princeton. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65

Surrender of Hessian Troops to General Washington after the Battle of Trenton, 

 December 1776. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71

Friedrich Wilhelm von Steuben. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77

Nathanael Greene. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79

Benedict Arnold. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84

English-made Pistols Presented to George Washington. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88

“The Swamp Fox” Brigadier General Francis Marion with SC Militia. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93

Surrender of Lord Cornwallis at Yorktown, Virginia, October 19th, 1781. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102

Alexander Hamilton. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
x

Page

Henry Knox. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113

Washington Reviewing the West Army at Fort Cumberland, Maryland. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115

Arthur St. Clair. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117

Anthony Wayne. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118

West Point, New York. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122

William Clark. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126

Meriwether Lewis. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126

Uniform Coat of Private of Connecticut Artillery, ca. 1808 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132

Wooden Canteen of the Revolutionary War Era. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136

Henry Dearborn. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139

Winfield Scott. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142

Jacob J. Brown. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150

Battle of New Orleans. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154

Pattern 1812 Bell Crown Shako. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160

William Harris Crawford. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161

Major General Andrew Jackson, President of the United States. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162

Model 1803 Harpers Ferry Rifle. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162

Knapsack for Volunteer Militia, ca. 1830. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168

Osceola of Florida. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169

On Stone. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173

Stephen Watts Kearny. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174

Gen’ Scott’s Entrance into Mexico. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184

Pillow’s Attack Advancing through the Woods of Chapultepec. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189

Topographical Engineers Exploring the Colorado River. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193

Noncommissioned Officer Frock Coat, ca. 1861. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200

Artillery Fuse or Primer Pouch, ca. 1861. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200

View of Balloon Ascension, ca. 1862. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203

Union Volunteers in Camp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 204

Officers of the 55th Infantry at Fort Gaines. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 214

Army Camp #6. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 216

General McClellan’s Field Glasses. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217

Model 1861 Springfield Rifle. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 218

Naval Engagement in Hampton Roads. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 224

General George B. McClellan. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 225

General “Jeb” Stuart, C.S.A., 1863. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 228

H. W. Halleck. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 230

Orange and Alexandria Railroad Military Bridge. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 231

General Halleck’s Hardee Hat. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 231

General Longstreet. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 232

The Bloody Lane, Battle of Antietam. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 233

107th Infantry Guards in Front of the Guard House. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 236

General Burnside. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 239

Joseph L. Hooker. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 254

General Jackson. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 257

Battle Flag for the Army of Northern Virginia, ca. 1863. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 259

Gettysburg Battlefield. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 261

Little Round Top Signal Flag. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 263

Rudolph Ellis of Philadelphia as Officer of the Day. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 266

General Bragg. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 274

General Forrest. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 274

Battle of Chickamauga. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 276
xi

Page

Union Officers on Missionary Ridge. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 278

President Lincoln. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 284

Forage Cap Belonging to General Grant. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 285

General Sherman. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 286

Grant’s Council of War near Massaponax Church in Virginia. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 287

Sheridan’s Ride. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 293

Reveille on a Winter Morning. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 297

A Nurse Caring for Wounded Union Soldiers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 298

General Grant. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 300

General Lee. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 301

Henry O. Flipper. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 308

Emory Upton. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 314

Model 1898 Krag-Jörgensen Rifle. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 318

Members of the Greely Expedition. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 321

Artillery Helmet of the Late Nineteenth Century. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 326

General Custer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 335

Thornburgh’s Battle. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 336

Tracking Victorio. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 338

Geronimo Meeting with General Crook. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 340

Sitting Bull. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 341

Insignia of the Indian Scouts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 341

Nebraska—Crazy Horse and his band of Oglala on their way from Camp Sheridan to surrender to 

 General Crook at Red Cloud Agency, May 6. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 343

Wreck of the Maine, 1898. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 348

Khaki Field Coat for a Pennsylvania Artilleryman. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 352

Embarking for Cuba. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 354

Colonel Roosevelt in Rough Rider Uniform. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 356

San Juan Hill, July 10, 1898. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 358

General Otis’ Staff and Assistants in Manila, 1899. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 361

Officer’s Sleeping Quarters in China, ca. 1900. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 366

Army War College’s Roosevelt Hall. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 368

Caliber .45 Pistol. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 373

Elihu Root, Secretary of War, 1899–1904. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 375

Wright Bros. Experimental Military Aircraft. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 378

Construction of Locks for the Panama Canal. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 382

John Joseph Pershing. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 385

Illustrations courtesy of the following sources: cover illustration by Elzie R. Golden; 8, 79, 113, 132, 

136, 142, 160, 161, 168, 173, 189, 193, 200, 216, 217, 230, 231 (bottom), 233, 254, 259, 263, 266, 276,

285, 293, 326, 336, 338, 352, 354, 358, 368, 375, 378, 385, Department of the Army; 20, 22, 237,

298, 308, 382, Corbis; 25, Fort Lewis Museum, Fort Lewis, Wash.; 24, 39, 40, 65, 88, 162, 184, 218,

278, 297, 318, West Point Museum Art Collection, U.S. Military Academy; 27, A Treatise of Fortifications, John Muller; 29, 162, 169, 225, 274, 286, 335, 343, 356, Library of Congress; 31, U.S. Army

National Guard; 47, 56, PictureHistory.com; 71, 84, George Washington Bicentennial Commission;

77, 117, 118, 126, 139, Independence National Historical Park; 93, 232, National Park Service; 102,

Yale University Art Gallery; 109, National Gallery of Art; 115, Metropolitan Museum of Art; 122, 

U.S. Senate Collection; 154; New Orleans Museum of Art; 174, Department of the Navy; 203, 204, 

214, 224, 228, 231 (top), 239, 257, 261, 284, 287, 300, 301, 314, 321, 340, 341 (top), 348, 361, 366,

National Archives; 373, David C. Cole. Other illustrations from public domain.

xiii

Foreword

American Military History provides the United States Army—in particular, its young officers,

NCOs, and cadets—with a comprehensive but brief account of its past. The Center of Military 

History first published this work in 1956 as a textbook for senior ROTC courses. Since then it has

gone through a number of updates and revisions, but the primary intent has remained the same. 

Support for military history education has always been a principal mission of the Center, and this 

new edition of an invaluable history furthers that purpose. 

The history of an active organization tends to expand rapidly as the organization grows larger 

and more complex. The period since the Vietnam War, at which point the most recent edition 

ended, has been a significant one for the Army, a busy period of expanding roles and missions and

of fundamental organizational changes. In particular, the explosion of missions and deployments 

since 11 September 2001 has necessitated the creation of additional, open-ended chapters in the 

story of the U.S. Army in action.

This first volume covers the Army’s history from its birth in 1775 to the eve of World War

I. By 1917, the United States was already a world power. The Army had sent large expeditionary 

forces beyond the American hemisphere, and at the beginning of the new century Secretary of War 

Elihu Root had proposed changes and reforms that within a generation would shape the Army of 

the future. But world war—global war—was still to come. The second volume of this new edition 

will take up that story and extend it into the twenty-first century and the early years of the war on

terrorism.

The Center of Military History has continued to refine the new design for these volumes to

reflect the highly visual nature of contemporary textbooks. This work’s primary audience is still

the young officer and NCO; but by adopting a more illustrated format, it also hopes to promote a

greater awareness of the Army’s history within the American public. In so doing, its authors remain 

mindful of the Center’s responsibility to publish an accurate and objective account that reflects the

highest professional historical standards. The Center owes no less to the soldier and the veteran, to 

the student and the teacher, and to those pursuing a personal interest in learning more about the 

Army’s campaigns—and about its role in the larger history of the nation. 

Washington, D.C. JEFFREY J. CLARKE

24 September 2009 Chief of Military History

xv

Preface

The story of the United States Army is always growing and changing. Historians constantly 

seek to reinterpret the past while accumulating new facts as America’s Army continues to be challenged on new foreign battlefields. Nor does the Army, as an institution, ever stand still. It necessarily changes its organization, materiel, doctrine, and composition to cope with an ever-changing 

world of current conflict and potential danger. Thus, the Center of Military History is committed

to preparing new editions of American Military History as we seek to correct past mistakes, reinterpret 

new facts, and bring the Army’s story up to date. This new edition of that textbook, an important 

element in soldier and officer education since 1956, seeks to do just that.

This edition of American Military History builds on the previous edition, published in 2005, and 

expands its coverage to include an analysis of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq up to January 2009. 

This expanded section is necessarily only an initial survey of the first eight years of the war on

terrorism; it is far from the final word on the subject. It may take an additional decade or more to

collect sufficient documents, interviews, memoirs, and other sources to know the details of military

and political planning, the implementation of those plans on the global battlefield, and the impact

on the Army as an institution and on the nation. The events of the past eight years are more like 

current events than they are history. History—the detailed telling of a story over time based upon all 

the extant evidence—requires more time to find and analyze the documents and facts and bring to

bear on that evidence the insight that comes only from perspective. However, today’s soldiers need 

their story told. The events in which they participate and in which they are such important elements 

need to be given some form and order, no matter how tentative. The Army continues to be the 

nation’s servant, and the soldiers that make up that Army deserve their recognition. They continue 

to protect our freedom at great personal risk to themselves and incalculable cost to their loved ones. 

This is their continuing story.

Washington, D.C. RICHARD W. STEWART

24 September 2009 Chief Historian

xvii

Preface to the 2005 Edition

Despite the popular image of the solitary historian immured in the stacks of a library or 

archives, history is very much a collective enterprise. This is true not only in philosophical terms (all 

historians stand on the shoulders of previous generations of scholars) but also in the practical sense 

that historians rely heavily on the work of many others when they attempt to weave a narrative that 

covers centuries of history. American Military History is truly such a collaborative work. 

Over the years numerous military historians have contributed to the earlier versions of this 

textbook published in 1956, 1969, and 1989. In this latest telling of the story of the U.S. Army, additional scholars inside and outside the Center of Military History have conducted research, written or 

revised chapters and inserts, or reviewed the texts of others. Other experts have edited text, proofed 

bibliographies, prepared maps, and located photographs to bring this book together. 

It is important to highlight those historians and other professionals who have helped make this 

book a reality. Indeed, there were so many contributors that I hasten to beg forgiveness in advance if 

I have inadvertently left someone off this list. First, I wish to thank those many scholars outside the 

Center of Military History who voluntarily gave of their time to review chapters of this book and 

provide their expertise to ensure that the latest scholarship and sources were included. These scholars include: John Shy, Don Higginbotham, Robert Wright, John Mahon, William Skelton, Joseph 

Dawson, Joseph Glathaar, Gary Gallagher, Carol Reardon, Mark Grimsley, Perry Jamieson, Robert 

Wooster, Brian Linn, Timothy Nenninger, Edward Coffman, David Johnson, Stanley Falk, Mark 

Stoler, Gerhard Weinberg, Edward Drea, Steve Reardon, Allan R. Millett, Charles Kirkpatrick, and 

Eric Bergerud. Their careful reviews and suggested additions to the manuscript enriched the story 

immeasurably and saved me from numerous errors in interpretation and fact. Within the Center of 

Military History, of course, we have a number of outstanding historians of our own to draw upon. 

The Center is, I believe, as rich in talent in military history as anywhere else in the country; and I was 

able to take advantage of that fact. In particular, I would like to thank the following historians from 

the Histories Division for their writing and reviewing skills: Andrew J. Birtle, Jeffrey A. Charlston, 

David W. Hogan, Edgar F. Raines, Stephen A. Carney, William M. Donnelly, William M. Hammond, 

and Joel D. Meyerson. Within the division, every member participated in writing the short inserts 

that appear throughout the text. In addition to the names previously listed, I would be remiss if I did 

not also thank Stephen J. Lofgren, William J. Webb, Dale Andrade, Gary A. Trogdon, James L. Yarrison, William A. Dobak, Mark D. Sherry, Bianka J. Adams, W. Blair Haworth, Terrence J. Gough, 

William A. Stivers, Erik B. Villard, Charles E. White, Shane Story, and Mark J. Reardon. Whether 

they have been in the division for one year or twenty, their contributions to this work and to the 

history of the U.S. Army are deeply appreciated. 

I particularly wish to thank the Chief of Military History, Brig. Gen. John Sloan Brown, for his 

patience and encouragement as he reviewed all of the text to provide his own insightful comments. 

He also found time, despite his busy schedule, to write the final two chapters of the second volume to bring the story of the U.S. Army nearly up to the present day. Also, I wish to thank Michael 

Bigelow, the Center’s Executive Officer, for his contribution. In addition, I would like to note the

support and guidance that I received from the Chief Historian of the Army, Jeffrey J. Clarke, and 

the Editor in Chief, John W. Elsberg. Their experience and wisdom is always valued. I wish to thank 
xviii

the outstanding editor of American Military History, Diane M. Donovan, who corrected my ramblings, tightened my prose, and brought consistency to the grammar and style. Her patience and 

skilled work made this a much finer book. I also wish to thank those who worked on the graphics,

photographs, and maps that helped make this book so interesting and attractive. This book would 

not have been possible without the diligence and hard work of the Army Museum System Staff, as 

well as Beth MacKenzie, Keith Tidman, Sherry Dowdy, Teresa Jameson, Julia Simon, and Dennis 

McGrath. Their eye for detail and persistence in tracking down just the right piece of artwork or 

artifact or providing the highest quality map was of tremendous value. 

Although countless historians have added to this text over the years, I know that any attempt to 

write a survey text on the history of the U.S. Army will undoubtedly make many errors of commission and omission. I take full responsibility for them and will endeavor, when informed, to correct 

them as best I can in future editions. In conclusion, I wish to dedicate this book to the finest soldiers

in the world, to the men and women who have fought and died in service to the United States over 

two centuries and those who continue to serve to protect our freedom. They have built America 

into what it is today, and they continue to defend the principles upon which our great country was 

founded. This is their story.

Washington, D.C. Richard W. Stewart

14 June 2004 Chief, Histories Division
T he history of the United States Army lies firmly in the mainstream of modern Western military development. Heir to European traditions, the American Army has both borrowed from 

and contributed to that main current. Molded by the New World environment, a product of democratic and industrial revolutions, it has at 

the same time evolved, along with the nation it serves, uniquely. To 

the present generation of Americans faced by continuing challenges 

to their national security, the role that force and military institutions 

have played in American history becomes of increasing interest and 

importance. This volume is an introduction to the story of the U.S. 

Army and the American military history of which the Army’s story is 

an integral part.

What Is Military History?

Military history today has a much wider scope than previous generations of scholars granted it. More than simply the story of armed 

conflict, of campaigns and battles, it is the story of how societies form

their institutions for their collective security and how those institutions 

operate in peace and war. It is the story of soldiers and the subculture 

of which they are a part. It includes the entire range of economic, 

social, legal, political, technological, and cultural issues that arise from 

the state’s need to organize violence to preserve its existence and 

accomplish its national goals. Military history cannot be viewed as a 

separate, quaint, subset of the wider history of a society. It is an integral 

part of a society; and the essence of a military, the armed citizen, is a 

reflection of that society.

War is only one aspect of military history, though it remains the 

critical test for any military establishment and thus an essential aspect. 

The changes in warfare over time are thus a legitimate focus for the student of military history. The American Army has been both a recipient 

of and a contributor to the fruits of the changes in warfare pioneered 

by the Western world. The United States was born in the eighteenth 

1

Introduction
American Military History

2

century, during the great age of European dynastic wars involving, 

generally, armies of professional, uniformed soldiers whose maneuvers 

and battles left the civilian masses of a nation-state largely unaffected. 

Until the latter part of that century, wars were relatively simple and 

restricted in area, forces, and objectives. This changed with the advent 

of the “nation in arms” during the French Revolution and Napoleonic 

Wars. Warfare became conflicts of mass armies of conscripts, motivated by revolutionary ideology. With the spread of the industrial revolution in the following century, warfare grew even more complex and 

exerted an ever-increasing influence on more elements of society. This

new era in warfare coincided with the evolution of the United States 

as an independent nation. In the first half of the twentieth century the

effects of large-scale wars became so pervasive that they were felt not 

only by the combatant nations but throughout the entire world, now 

seemingly grown more compact due to the advent of faster transportation and communications means. The outcome in those wars was no 

longer measured in terms of the preservation of national honor or 

the conquest of territory, familiar in eighteenth century warfare, but in 

terms of national survival. Thus, as warfare in the past two centuries 

broadened to involve more and more people and more and more of the 

energies and resources of society to fight it—or during the Cold War,

to deter it—the definition was extended to encompass more activities.

Broadly defined, military history lies on the frontier between general history and military art and science. It deals with the confluence

and interaction of military affairs with diplomatic, political, social, 

economic, and intellectual trends in society. To understand it therefore 

requires some knowledge of both general history and military art. In 

its American context it represents many interrelated facets. Certainly it 

involves wars—all kinds of wars. It may surprise Americans, who traditionally have regarded themselves as a peaceable and unmilitary people, 

to learn that the range of warfare in their national experience has been 

quite wide, and the incidence quite frequent. 

Born in a revolution, a violent struggle often considered a prelude 

to modern ideological struggles, the United States has since endured 

a bitter Civil War, participated in numerous international wars, and 

has recently been thrust into a global war on terrorism. In American 

national experience, war itself has undergone considerable change and 

oscillation from one mode to another. The American Revolution was a 

limited war of the eighteenth century variety, although one fought on 

the backdrop of a “people’s war” between Tories and Patriots over the 

loyalty of each small village and town. The War of 1812, the Korean 

conflict of 1950–1953, and the Gulf War in 1991 were later models

of limited conflict fought for specific, limited objectives short of the

total destruction and occupation of the foes’ homelands. The American Civil War introduced the age of total war to which World Wars I 

and II added their bloody chapters. The Cold War involved mobilizing 

and militarizing huge segments of society never before affected by warfare. The current war on terrorism, with its potential for direct attacks 

on the American homeland and the pervasive (and invasive) security 

requirements for defending against such attacks, affects all aspects of 

American society. Over the centuries, war has cut deeper and deeper 

into the life of the nation. 

Broadly defined, military history 

lies on the frontier between 

general history and military art 

and science.
Introduction

3

After World War II, under the shadow of nuclear weapons that 

threaten all civilization with annihilation, warfare returned to earlier 

forms. Guerrilla wars, foreshadowed in American experience by the 

long-continuing Indian Wars and the Philippine Insurrection of 1899–

1902, returned as American forces became engaged in counter-insurgency warfare during the Vietnam War (1964–1973) and in support to

various Central American nations, notably El Salvador, in the 1980s. 

Today, modern conflicts include operations that could be classified as

“small wars” such as Operation Just Cause in Panama in 1989 and 

humanitarian and peacekeeping operations in Haiti, Somalia, and the 

former Yugoslavia. The line between war and peace, already blurred by 

nation-building operations and “police actions,” grew even more difficult to discern as the twentieth century drew to a close with the U.S.

Army involved in dozens of small-scale operations around the world. 

The direct attack on America on September 11, 2001, featuring the use 

of terrorism to kill over 3,000 Americans at the World Trade Center 

towers and the Pentagon, further changed the equation in ways still not 

fully known. 

Wars used to be regarded as clearly definable exercises in violence

when diplomacy failed and statesmen handed over to soldiers the burden of achieving victory. They were usually marked by formal ceremonies: a declaration at the beginning and a surrender and peace treaty at 

the end. Since World War II these formalities are no longer the fashion. 

War and peace have become blurred. Neither in Korea nor in Vietnam 

was war officially declared. The debate in Congress before the initiation

of hostilities in the Gulf War led only to a congressional resolution of 

support, not a declaration of war. 

Endings of military operations also are not clearly marked. No 

peace treaty followed the surrender of Germany in World War II or the 

truce in Korea in 1953. The Vietnam War ended with a treaty, but one 

the North Vietnamese promptly violated. Despite a decisive tactical victory for the United States, the confused political and diplomatic situation 

after the Gulf War continued to simmer, with United Nations resolutions and arms inspection programs in shambles and economic embargoes rapidly disappearing. The renewal of the war with Iraq in March 

2003 resolved many of the problems of a still-dangerous regime at the 

cost of creating a host of others. While changes in the nature of warfare 

have affected the conduct of war and the role of the military and society in it, participation in organized violence in all its forms is still a vital 

component of military history that must be studied. Not only must the 

causes, conduct, and consequences of a war be analyzed, but as the line 

between war and peace becomes more indistinct, the periods between 

the wars require renewed interest from students of military history.

Besides war in the broad sense, there is another major facet that 

military history must address and that military historians of this generation have found more and more integral to their subject. That is 

the study of the military as an institution and a manifestation of state 

power. The way in which a state organizes for violence and the multifaceted effects of that effort are critical to understanding war and its 

impact on the society of which the military is often but a reflection.

To apply force, societies organize armies. Reflecting the national culture and varying in their impact on it, armies are institutions, social 

Wars used to be regarded as 

clearly definable exercises in 

violence when diplomacy failed 

and statesmen handed over to 

soldiers the burden of achieving 

victory.
American Military History

4

entities in themselves. Some armies have close relations with the societies from which they are drawn; others are a class apart. For example, 

during much of U.S. history the Army was scattered in frontier posts 

and physically isolated from the rest of society. But in the period since 

World War II, civil-military relations have been close. As institutions, 

armies take form and character. Their institutional outlines are manifested in a number of ways, some overt, some subtle: organization 

and administration, system of training, mode of supply, planning for 

mobilization and the conduct of war, methods of fighting on the battlefield, weaponry and utilization of technology, system of command

and control, selection of manpower and leaders, and relations with 

the civilian population and authorities. The whole host of policies, 

doctrines, customs, traditions, values, and practices that have grown 

up about armies is an important part of the institutional story. The 

impact of the selective service system (the draft) on many aspects of 

American life in this century is in itself a significant story. Its ending,

for all intents and purposes, in 1973 and the creation of the all-volunteer Army has equal and far-reaching significance. Many elements of

that significance are still not yet fully revealed.

All the facets of change in the military as an institution thus represent histories in themselves and reflect other changes in the nature of

warfare, technology, and a country’s internal development and external 

responsibilities. A shift in one component will inevitably have an impact 

on the institutional structure. For example, a fundamental change in 

weaponry, equipment, or technology, be it the adoption of gunpowder, 

the rifled musket, the airplane, the tank, the atomic bomb, night-vision

devices, or precision-guided munitions, will inevitably affect the traditional modes of fighting and reverberate throughout the institutional

framework. The phenomenon of cultural lag evident in other human 

institutions also applies to military organizations, and some armies have 

been slower to adopt changes than others, often with fatal results in the 

test of battle.

While the U.S. Army as a social entity has evolved to meet its primary mission—to fight—in its American institutional context military

The Army Seal

The Army Seal was used originally during the American 

Revolution to authenticate documents. It displayed the designation “War Office,” which was synonymous with Headquarters of the Army, and the Roman date MDCCLXXVIII 

(1778) the first time it was used. It remained unchanged 

until 1974, when the War Office banner was replaced with 

“Department of the Army” and the date was changed to 

1775, the year in which the Army was established. The seal 

embodies the Army’s ideals of loyalty, vigilance, perseverance, truth, courage, zeal, fortitude, remembrance, determination, constancy, achievement, dignity, and honor. 
Introduction

5

history must also treat the Army as a social force in peace. From the 

beginning the Army has played a role in developing the country: in 

exploring, guarding the frontier, and constructing roads; in engineering, 

transportation, communication, sanitation, and medicine; and in flood

control. At the same time the Army has served as a vehicle for social 

mobility of certain disadvantaged groups, for example, European immigrants in the nineteenth century, African Americans in the 1950s and 

1960s, and Hispanic Americans today. The mixture of the European

legacy, native environment, democratic ideals and values, and national 

experience in war and peace have combined to mold the Army into a 

distinct institution in American life, a unique blend of professional and 

civilian elements. Indeed, as Russell F. Weigley, a student of the Army’s 

institutional history, has well expressed it, the story of the American 

Army is really a history of “two armies”: “a Regular Army of professional soldiers and a citizen army of various components variously 

known as militia, National Guards, Organized Reserves, selectees.”

It has been said that every generation rewrites its history. Its own 

needs and problems inevitably make it take fresh looks at its own past 

for light, understanding, guidance, and alternative courses of action. 

Nowhere is this necessity more evident than in the field of American military history today—broadly conceived. During most of the 

national existence of the United States the liberal democratic tradition 

and geographic isolation combined to subordinate in the public mind 

the role of force and military institutions in its history. Blessed by relatively weak neighbors on the north and south and safe behind its ocean 

barriers, the United States could define its security in terms of its own

boundaries and frontiers. The military factor in its heritage, birth, and 

development tended to be discounted. But when scientists began to 

conquer space and time in the twentieth century and the European 

system that had maintained order in the nineteenth century began to 

crumble under the impact of two world wars, Americans began to find

their security bound up with the fates of other countries. The nation 

that began the twentieth century with a strong sense of security by 

mid-century began to feel insecure. George F. Kennan, former director 

of the Policy Planning Staff of the Department of State, elaborates, 

“A country which in 1900 had no thought that its prosperity and way 

of life could in any way be threatened by the outside world had arrived 

by 1950 at a point where it seemed to be able to think of little else but 

this danger.” The Cold War and then our involvement in the Global 

War on Terrorism put an end to America’s lingering beliefs in isolation 

and safety. Not since the era of the founding fathers has survival in a 

dangerous world become such an urgent issue and the foundations of 

national security of such concern. An essential element of maintaining 

that national security must be the study of war in theory and practice. 

Both the theory and the practice of war must be analyzed together to 

gain the fullest perspective.

Theory and Practice of War

One question that has long interested students of the theory and 

practice of military affairs is whether war is an art or a science. This 

is no small question in an age when the lure of technology seeks to 

Not since the era of the founding 

fathers has survival in a 

dangerous world become such an 

urgent issue.
American Military History

6

reduce so much of human behavior to scientific principles or mechanistic templates. In the eighteenth century, the age of enlightenment, 

when the systematic study of war began, military theory regarded warfare as mathematical and scientific. A general who knew mathematics

and topography, the theorists optimistically maintained, could conduct 

campaigns with geometrical precision and win wars without bloody 

battles. In Europe, the violent shock of Napoleonic warfare brought 

a rude end to the notion of war as a purely scientific or mathematical game. But insofar as the application of physical pressure upon the 

enemy involves the use of mechanical tools under certain predictable or 

calculable conditions, it is possible to speak in terms of military science. 

The systematic application of science to the development of weapons 

and to technology in general is a comparatively recent development. 

Since World War II, techniques of research and analysis have been 

enlisted from scientific fields to make calculations and choices among

complex weapon systems and in the management of huge defense programs more exact. Over and above the techniques, the successful conduct of war at all levels of command requires assessing unpredictable 

variables and taking calculated risks under circumstances for which no 

precise precedent exists. Since the “fog of war” still holds and wars 

involve men as well as machines, warfare remains in many ways what it 

has always been essentially—an art.

Military theorists have long searched for the principles underlying the art of war. They have sought to distill from the great mass of 

military experience over the centuries simple but fundamental truths to 

guide commanders through the fog of war. They have evolved lists of 

principles from an analysis of the campaigns and the writings of the 

great captains of war, such as Julius Caesar, Frederick the Great, Napoleon Bonaparte, and Helmuth von Moltke. Occasionally the masters 

have provided their own set of precepts. Foremost among the analysts have been Henri de Jomini, Carl von Clausewitz, Ardant du Picq, 

Alfred Thayer Mahan, Ferdinand Foch, Giulio Douhet, Basil H. Liddell 

Hart, J. F. C. Fuller, and Sun Tzu. The axioms range from the Confederate Lt. Gen. Nathan B. Forrest’s oft-misquoted advice, “Git thar fustest 

with the mostest men,” to Napoleon’s 115 maxims. The lists differ in 

emphasis as well as in number. Some theorists have stressed that the 

battle is all and the defeat of the enemy’s armed forces the correct 

objective, others that the best path to victory is by indirect methods 

and approaches that avoid confrontations and rely upon maneuver and 

psychological pressure.

Today, all great nations recognize principles of war and incorporate them in one manner or another into military doctrine. The lists 

vary from nation to nation. In the modern dress of the Western world, 

the accepted principles are essentially a post-Napoleonic conception, 

advanced by Clausewitz, the great Prussian philosopher of war of 

the early nineteenth century, and his contemporary, Jomini, the wellknown French general and theorist. Since the United States shares a 

common military heritage and a common body of military thought 

with Europe, American students of war have also sought to reduce the 

conduct of war to certain essential premises. The U.S. Army recognizes 

nine such principles: objective, offensive, maneuver, mass, economy of 

force, unity of command, security, surprise, and simplicity. The proper 

American students of war have 

also sought to reduce the conduct 

of war to certain essential 

premises.
Introduction

7

application of these principles is still essential to the exercise of effec-

tive military operations. First, let us define them.

Objective. Direct every military operation towarda clearly defined,

decisive, and attainable objective. The ultimate military objective may 

be the complete destruction of an enemy’s armed forces and his will 

tofight.Thewider political objective may be the complete defeat and

reconstruction of an enemy nation that will involve regime change and 

political, economic, and social reshaping. Each intermediate objec-

tive must have the precise mix of force applied to it to attain decisive 

results. Every commander must understand the overall military and 

political objectives of the application of force and how his element will 

contribute to attain those goals. The principle of objective, with a series 

of intermediate objectives, helps all elements of an operation focus on 

what must be done and by whom.

Offensive. Seize, retain, and exploit the initiative. In order to achieve 

victory, a commander must undertake offensive operations. Offensive 

operations make the enemy react to your moves and keep him on the 

defensive and off balance. Offensive permits the commander to retain 

the initiative. This does not mean that defensive operations have no 

place on the battlefield. Going onto the defensive can conserve forces

,

allow for a logistical pause, or force an enemy to attack to his distinct 

disadvantage. However, a defensive mindset ultimately surrenders the 

initiative to the enemy. Only offensive operations can, in the end, force 

your will on the enemy.

Maneuver. Place the enemy in a disadvantageous position through 

the

flexible application ofcombat power. Maneuver is anessential

ingredient of combat power. It contributes materially to exploiting 

successes and in preserving freedom of action and reducing vulner-

ability. The object of maneuver is to dispose a force in such a man-

ner as to place the enemy at a relative disadvantage and thus achieve 

results that would otherwise be more costly in men and materiel. Suc-

cessful maneuver requires

flexibility in organization, administrative

support, and especially command and control. It is the antithesis of 

permanence of location and implies avoidance of stereotyped pat-

terns of operation.

Mass. Concentrate the effects of combat power at the decisive place 

and time. Mass is much more than mere numbers. Many armies through 

theyears have hadagreaternumber of soldiers on any given battlefield

but still have failed to win. Mass is thus the concentration of military 

assets against

a specific target. Mass focuses the right mix of combined

arms (infantry, armor, artillery) and airpower to overcome even an oth

-

erwise superior enemy force. Proper application of mass can permit 

numerically inferior forces to achieve decisive combat results.

Economy of Force. Allocate minimum essential combat power to sec-

ondary efforts. Skillful and prudent use of combat power will enable 

the commander to accomplish the mission with minimum expenditure 

of resources

. Combat power on the battlefield is

a limited resource

. If

you use it in one place, it is not available in another. Commanders must 

choose carefully how to use the exact amount of necessary force in the 

primary and secondar

y attacks to ensure sufficient combat power at the

right place and time. This will allow other assets to focus on other tar

-

gets. At times, a commander may use his forces in one area to defend, 
American Military History

8

deceive, or delay the enemy or even to conduct retrograde operations 

to free up the necessary forces for decisive operations in another area. 

Unity of Command. For every objective, ensure unity of effort under 

one responsible commander. The decisive application of full combat 

power requires unity of command, which obtains unity of effort by the 

coordinated action of all forces toward a common goal. While coordination may be attained by cooperation, it is best achieved by vesting a 

single commander with the requisite authority to get the job done. 

Security. Never permit the enemy to acquire an unexpected advantage. Security is essential to the preservation of combat power and is 

achieved by measures taken to prevent surprise, preserve freedom of 

action, and deny the enemy information of friendly forces. Since risk 

is inherent in war, application of the principle of security does not 

imply undue caution and the avoidance of all risk. Security frequently is 

enhanced by bold seizure and retention of the initiative, which denies 

the enemy the opportunity to interfere. The principle of security does 

require, however, that risks be calculated carefully and that no unnecessary chances are taken.

The Army Flag and

Campaign Streamers

Prior to 1956 the Army was the only armed service 

without a flag to represent the entire service. Prompted 

by the need for a flag to represent the Army in joint service ceremonies, in 1955 Secretary of the Army Wilber 

M. Brucker requested the creation of the Army Flag. The 

design was a simplified version of the Army Seal placed 

on a white background that included a scroll designation 

United States Army with the numerals 1775 displayed 

below and the Army’s campaign streamers attached to 

the spearhead of the flagstaff. 

The Army has defined an official campaign as a 

particular combat action or series of actions that has 

historical significance or military importance to the Army 

and the nation. The concept of campaign streamers 

began during the Civil War, when the War Department 

instructed regiments to inscribe the names of their meritorious battles on their national colors. In 1890 the War 

Department directed that regimental honors be engraved 

on silver rings placed on the staffs of regimental flags. In 

1920 the War Department ordered that each regimental 

color would bear streamers, in the colors of the campaign 

medal ribbon, for each campaign in which the regiment 

had fought. The creation of the Army Flag provided a 

means to display all the Army’s campaigns (175 in 2003).

Battle Streamers

Richard Hasenauer, 1976
Introduction

9

Surprise. Strike the enemy at a time or place or in a manner for 

which he is unprepared. Surprise can decisively shift the balance of 

combat power. Surprise may allow for success out of proportion to the 

effort expended. It is not essential that the enemy be taken completely 

unaware, but only that he becomes aware too late to react effectively. 

Factors contributing to surprise include speed, deception, application 

of unexpected combat power, effective intelligence and counterintelligence (including communications and electronic intelligence and security), and variations in tactics and methods of operation.

Simplicity. Prepare clear, uncomplicated plans and clear, concise 

orders to ensure thorough understanding and minimize confusion. 

Simplicity contributes to successful operations. If other factors are 

equal, the simplest plan is preferred. In multinational operations, differences in language, culture, and doctrine complicate the situation; 

simple plans and orders can help minimize the confusion inherent in 

such environments.

Many examples of the successful employment or violation of 

these principles can be cited in American military history, and illustrations will be given in appropriate places in subsequent chapters. Each 

case requires careful study in its own context. For example, we may 

note briefly that the proper objective has often eluded commanders in

war. The British in the American Revolution, for example, were never 

clear as to their prime objective: whether to capture strategic positions, to destroy the Continental Army, or simply to try by an appropriate show of force to woo the Americans back to their allegiance 

to the Crown. As a result, their victories over Washington’s army in 

the field seldom had much meaning. In another case, not until after

many years of fighting the elusive Seminoles in the Florida swamps

did Col. William J. Worth realize that the destruction of their villages 

and sources of supply would end the conflict. In the limited wars

and expeditions since 1945, however, the United States has sought 

to achieve objectives short of the total destruction of the enemy or 

of his productive capacity. What was the objective in Vietnam? It 

was not the conquest of the North, but the establishment of a viable 

political entity in South Vietnam. That did not require so much military force as political. The objective is often even more elusive, and 

can change over time, in peacekeeping or humanitarian relief operations. In Somalia, the original mission in 1992 of providing food to 

a starving people changed over time into the objective of remaking a 

country and achieving political stability. A violent reaction by a number of factions resulted in an American retreat from that country. The 

traditional concept of “victory” and “winning” has taken on a different meaning in the new political context of warfare in the post–Cold 

War age. Overwhelming force has often been replaced with the necessity for restraint and only carefully applied military force. Fresh support has been given to Clausewitz’s reminder that a successful war is 

one in which the political objectives for which it is waged are achieved 

by suitable means and at appropriate cost. Wars are fought to achieve 

political aims.

No principle has been more ingrained in American military thinking than the belief that only offensive action can achieve decisive results. 

Offensive action seizes and retains the initiative. One of many examples is 

Many examples of the successful 

employment or violation of 

these principles can be cited in 

American military history.
American Military History

10

Washington’s brilliant attack atTrenton in 1776,when his small,tattered,

and nearly starving force turned on their pursuers with a lightning attack 

against a Hessian outpost to revitalize the Revolution. There are some 

instances, however, when the defense has in certain cases more advan-

tages than the offensive. Some of the most notable actions in Ameri-

can military history, such as Maj. Gen. Andrew Jackson’s stand at New 

Orleans at the end of the War of 1812, have involved the defense. Yet it 

is offensive action that achieves the most decisive results and wins wars.

No one would deny the necessity of maneuver to success in mili-

tary operations. Brilliant examples have occurred throughout Ameri-

can military history. During Operation 

DesertStorm in 1991, the 

forces of General H. Norman Schwarzkopf ’s army moved hundreds 

of miles through the Saudi Arabian desert in a “great wheel” to attack 

the Iraqi flank. Attempts at direct assault, rather than maneuver, have

often led to bloody and indecisive actions. In the Civil War, Maj. Gen. 

Ambrose E. Burnside of the Army of the Potomac conducted one of 

the bloodiest and most useless attacks of the war when he launched 

his army in a massive frontal assault against Confederate positions on 

Marye’s Heights at

Fredericksburg in 1862. Evena successful maneuver

can be subject to criticism—witness the controversy over General of 

the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower’s decision to advance across Europe 

along a continuous broad front rather than permit one of his major 

forces to thrust deep into Germany during World War II. Nevertheless, 

a well-organized and controlled force can often maneuver successfully 

to achieve victory over a larger, but more ponderous, enemy force.

The principle of mass, often called concentration, probably offers 

more examples of successful and unsuccessful application than any 

other. Eisenhower’s invasion of the Normandy beaches in 1944 is a 

brilliant example of the massing of all elements of combat power at 

the decisive time and place. Conversely, those commanders who fail 

to mass enough forces or combat power often suffer defeat. On the 

second day at Gettysburg in 1863, General

Robert E. Lee attacked

the supposedly “undefended” high ground on the Union left at Little 

RoundTop, but late in the day and with insufficient strength. However,

earlier in 1863, Lee’

s division of his army at Chancellorsville into three

separate elements is a classic success. He left one portion to engage 

the enemy in a holding battle at Fredericksburg while striking with the 

rest against the advancing Union Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker. After halt-

ing Hooker in his tracks, Lee divided his army again and sent Lt. Gen. 

Thomas J. “Stonewall” Jackson around the Union right to launch a sur-

prise attack on the enemy flank.The risk involved in this violation of

the principle of mass was carefully calculated and brilliantly executed.

The successful application of economy of force has usually resulted 

in brilliant gains. MacArthur’s “island hopping” strategy in World War 

II is an excellent example of economizing force by bypassing Japanese 

island strongholds and isolating them with air and naval power, while 

using the freed-up forces to strike elsewhere and keep the enemy off 

balance. No principle of war is probably more important today, in this 

era of limited war, than restraint in the use of force and the precise 

calculation of only the exact amount of force needed. 

Unity of command was successfully achieved for the Union under 

Lt. Gen. Ulysse

s

S

. Grant, but only in 1864 after three years of confused
Introduction

11

A commander has to do all he 

can to make elements of the 

overall plan clear, concise, and 

direct.

leadership and divided objectives. In World War II, the interservice 

conflicts between General Douglas S. MacArthur and Admiral Chester

W. Nimitz, each engaged in major offensive operations against Japan 

along two disparate axes of advance, indicate that this principle can in 

some respects be violated and military victory gained. But often lack of 

unity of command leads to misunderstandings, wasted resources, and 

confused objectives.

Security and surprise are obvious necessities and closely related. In 

the Civil War at Antietam, there were security violations on both sides. 

General Lee’s orders for the concentrations of his forces were wrapped 

in some cigars and found by a Union soldier. Maj. Gen. George B. 

McClellan, the Union commander, failed to reconnoiter the approaches 

to the battlefield before the action took place. The success of the Chinese Communist intervention in Korea in November 1950 resulted 

both from a United Nations security failure and from a carefully 

planned surprise movement into Korea by massive Communist forces. 

Surprise can achieve startling results; security lapses can also achieve 

startling results—for the other side.

Of all the principles of war, none is now probably harder to follow above the battalion level than the principle of simplicity. Modern 

warfare, involving mechanization, electronic equipment, airborne and 

amphibious operations, joint or even combined operations with foreign 

forces, is inherently not simple. Even the ostensibly easy movement of 

a small tank-infantry-artillery team cannot be termed simple. In counterinsurgency operations or nation-building missions the integration 

of military with political, economic, sociological, and psychological 

factors often leads to an even higher degree of complexity. But a commander has to do all he can to make elements of the overall plan clear, 

concise, and direct. Even tactical operations can sometimes become 

too complex for the commanders to execute. Washington, fresh from 

a series of brilliant maneuvers at Trenton and Princeton, planned to 

use a complex attack against a British outpost at Germantown in 1777. 

His plan involved coordinating the movement and convergence of 

four columns of inexperienced troops moving over different roads at 

night. Columns got lost, delayed, and confused. Washington thus lost 

the advantage of surprise and failed to mass his forces; he was forced 

to retreat in defeat. The plan proved too complicated for successful 

execution.

The growing complexity and variety of modern warfare has led students of military affairs to take a fresh look at these principles. Since 

World War II a debate has been raging in military literature over the 

precise meaning and application of the principles, a debate fed by the 

new circumstances of nuclear and counterinsurgency warfare. The discussion revolves around four major questions: Are the present principles too exclusive? Are they too inclusive? Does modern insurgent 

and nuclear warfare make them obsolete? To what degree does technology change any of the principles? To some extent this is a debate over 

semantics. The defenders point out that the principles are as valid in 

modern as in ancient warfare; that each age must make its own applications of the “fundamental truths.” Critics argue that they are not immutable scientific laws of universal applicability; that they require constant

reexamination; that no two military situations are ever completely alike; 
that the principles are merely methods and common-sense procedures 

adopted by great captains in the past; and that changes in the conditions 

of war alter their relative importance. Moreover, some claim that new 

technology, computers and weapon systems, have destroyed whatever 

validity remained in the principles. The principles, these critics conclude, 

are no substitute for imaginative thinking, logical analysis, broad profes-

sional knowledge, and highly developed qualities of leadership.

Perhaps the key point to remember, whatever the outcome of the 

ongoing debate among the theorists, is that war remains fundamentally 

an art. Dennis Hart Mahan, famed West Point professor and teacher of 

the Civil War generals, put it well: “In war as in every other art based 

upon settled principles there are exceptions to all general rules. It is in 

discovering these cases that the talent of the general is shown.” Even 

the defenders of the principles stress that the art of war lies in their 

interpretation and application. Within limits, the principles of war nev-

ertheless remain a useful tool for analysis, a general frame of reference, 

and a checklist for examining past campaigns. Themselves an inheri-

tance from the past, these adages offer no substitute for real historical 

inquiry or for thinking and action on the par

t of the officer.They rep-

resent

generalizations and premises rather than fixed immutablerules.

They provide general guides that on the whole have in the past led to 

military success. As in the past, the victorious captain will have to adapt 

concepts or improvise others most suitable to the particular circum-

stances facing him.

All

theorists agree that in the final analysis the ar

t of

war is what

men make it. To quote Mahan again, “No soldier who has made him

-

self conversant with the resources of his art, will allow himself to be 

trammeled

b

y an exclusive system.” He

must be flexible

. He

must lear

n

to deal with men. Moreover, Napoleon stated that in war, “The moral is 

to the physical as three to one.” The ability to penetrate the fog of war 

and make the correct decision is the heart of leadership, and leadership 

is at the heart ofwar. Indeed, flexibility and leadership mightwell be

added as tenth and eleventh principles, basic concepts inherent to all 

the others. It is not surprising, therefore, that the qualities that make for 

good leadership have long interested the Army and that a whole body 

of literature has grown up about the theoretical and practical founda-

tions of this phase of the military art.

The military like other professions has developed its own language 

to allow easy communication. Aside from the principles of war, it is 

useful for the student of military history to become familiar with other 

terms commonly encountered in the literature. In the theory of war-

fare, strategy and tactics have usually been put into separate categories. 

Strategy deals with both the preparation for and the waging of war and 

has often been defined as

the ar

t of projecting and directing

campaigns.

To tactics, its close partner, military jargon has reserved the art of execut-

ing plans and handling troops in battle. Strategy is usually regarded as 

the prelude

t

o

the battlefield,tactics asthe action onthe battlefield. As

society and warfare have grown more complex, the term strategy has 

been gradually broadened from its eighteenth century connotation as 

the “art of the general,” far beyond its original, narrow military meaning. 

In the nineteenth century, and even more in the twentieth, distinctions 

began to be blurred between strategy as a purely military phenomenon American Military History

12
and national strategy of a broader variety involving a combination of 

political, economic, technological, and psychological factors, along with 

the military elements, in the management of national policy. As a result, 

the term grand strategy (or higher strategy) has come to connote the art of 

employing all the resources of a nation or coalition of nations to achieve 

the objects of war (and peace). The broad policy decisions governing 

the overall conduct of war or its deterrence are the prerogative of the 

chief of state and his principal advisers. The strategist, whether in the 

narrower or broader sense, deals in many uncertainties and his art is the 

calculated risk. At the opposite end of the scale are minor tactics, the term 

used to describe the maneuver of small units. Falling in between is the 

concept of operational art that involves the maneuver of large-scale units 

(divisions and corps) to achieve victory that often has strategic results. 

Despite distinctions in theory, strategy, operational art, and tactics 

cannot always be easily separated in practice. The language of operational maneuver—putting one’s army into the most favorable position 

to engage the enemy and depriving the enemy of freedom of movement—is also largely the language of tactics. Thus, envelopment is an 

attack on an enemy’s flank and toward his rear, usually accompanied by

an attack on his front. A turning movement is a wide enveloping maneuver, 

passing around the side of the enemy’s main forces and attacking him 

from the rear. Double envelopment involves an attack on both flanks of

the enemy while his center is held in check. A penetration is an attack on 

the enemy’s front by driving a wedge into it or piercing it completely. 

It may be followed by an enveloping attack on one or both flanks. In

connection with these four basic forms of attack, two terms are often 

used: main effort, concentrating on the critical point in the enemy’s position, and secondary effort, pinning down the remainder of the enemy or 

moving against a secondary objective to obtain an important but less 

critical result.

Linking strategy, operational art, and tactics and attracting more 

and more attention is logistics, defined simply as the art of planning

and carrying out the movement and maintenance of forces. This field

also has been greatly broadened as warfare has expanded and grown 

more technological and complex. Logistics deals with the deployment 

of military forces and their equipment to the theater of operations, 

along with innumerable services, to feed, clothe, supply, transport, 

and house the troops. The connecting links—the network of railways, 

waterways, roads, and air routes by which an armed force in the field

is reinforced and supplied from its base of operations in the home 

or friendly area—are the lines of communications. The theater of operations

comprises the combat zone as well as the supply and administration 

area directly connected with military operations.

In modern warfare the major divisions of the military art (strategy, logistics, operational art, and tactics) are closely interdependent. 

One field merges into the others, and changes in one inevitably lead to

changes in the others. Sometimes weapons have appeared on the battlefield before military theory and planning have fully absorbed them,

and adjustments throughout the art have been slow to follow. In the 

Civil War, for example, the widespread use of the rifled musket upset

the relation among the combat arms; the range and accuracy of these 

weapons in the hands of defending infantry shattered the effectiveness 

Introduction

13

The strategist, whether in the 

narrower or broader sense, deals 

in many uncertainties and his art 

is the calculated risk.
of the concentrated attack in which Napoleonic strategy culminated. 

But, as often has been observed in the history of warfare, armaments 

and weapons are more readily changed than ideas. Napoleon’s principles continued to be upheld, sometimes with disastrous consequences 

on the battlefield. An oft-cited case of the appalling repercussions of

holding concepts too long or rigidly is the French offensive spirit in 

World War I that led to massed infantry attacks against entrenched 

German troops with machine guns.

It is clear that in modern warfare theory and practice have not 

always been the same. Wars, particularly in the great coalition conflicts

of the twentieth century, are not run by rules or theories. Once joined, 

modern war has had a way of breeding its own strategy, tactics, and 

weapons. More than ever, for successful commanders, flexibility has

become the only sure guide. World War I, beginning as a war of mass 

offensives, was a classic case of arrested strategy that required new 

tactics and weapons to dig the war out of the trenches. The AngloAmerican strategy against Germany in World War II proved a compromise of the theory of mass and concentration upheld by the U.S. 

Army and Prime Minister Winston Churchill’s attack on the periphery. 

Despite attention to principles, Allied strategy in World War II was a 

hybrid product hammered out largely on the “anvil of necessity.” In 

war, moreover, military strategy varies with political direction and goals. 

In this vein, Clausewitz had argued that military strategy must respond 

to national policy and political aims. Perhaps he best summed up the 

political context of modern war in his assertion, “War is not merely a 

political act, but also a real political instrument, a continuation of policy 

carried out by other means.” “War,” he concluded, “admittedly has its 

own grammar, but not its own logic.”

The American Military System

To organize for national security, each nation adopts the military 

system most suited to its culture, needs, and policies. Some nations 

have traditionally tended to concentrate significant segments of their

economy on the maintenance of huge military forces and to determine 

national policies largely in terms of their military implications. While 

the United States shares with Europe a legacy of military thought and 

practice whose roots lie deep in the past, its military system has grown 

out of its own national experience.

The form of government, the traditions of the people, the nature 

of the country, and its geographical position in relation to other powers have had a profound influence upon American military institutions.

In turn, those institutions reflect the American culture and way of life.

Indeed, the Army is essentially an institutional form adapted by American society to meet military requirements. The American military system has been developed to place a minimum burden on the people and 

give the nation a reasonable defense without sacrificing its fundamental

values. From the beginning, the United States has sought to reconcile 

individual liberty with national security without becoming a nation in 

arms. The balance is often difficult to achieve.

Chief characteristics of American culture that have a bearing on 

its military system include the value placed upon human beings as indiAmerican Military History

14

While the United States shares 

with Europe a legacy of military 

thought and practice whose roots 

lie deep in the past, its military 

system has grown out of its own 

national experience.
viduals; life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness and peace; the desire 

to achieve decisive results quickly; a talent for the design and use of 

machinery; highly developed productive capacity and managerial skills; 

and great material wealth. These characteristics underline the American 

penchant for absolutes: the sharp distinction between war and peace; 

the insistence on complete victory; an abhorrence of casualties; and 

the desire for short, decisive, offensive action in warfare. They help 

account for the traditional American attitude toward war as an aberra-

tion in which the bully who disturbed the peace must be soundly and 

quickly thrashed so American society can return to normalcy. They 

also point to the importance of public opinion in a democracy in rais-

ing and supporting armed forces and to the reason why wars against 

disturbers of the peace are apt to take on the character of moral cru-

sades. They help explain the traditional rhythm of sharp expansion of 

the armed forces in wartime and precipitate contraction after the end 

of hostilities.

In turn, these characteristics and attitudes have shaped the Army 

in its organizational relationships and in its philosophy of operations. 

They account also for such distinctive Army features as the develop-

ment of

great mechanical power, the stress on firepower rather than

sheer manpower, and the concentration on quick victory by offensive 

operations.

Throughout its existence the United States has been compelled 

to provide for military security. The degree to which the provisions 

were made has varied with the nature and magnitude of the particu-

lar threat. Until technology reduced the distance separating the United 

States from the Old World, the forces in being could be, and were, 

small. At the same time the deep-seated American reluctance to devote 

a large proportion of the national wealth to the support of a standing 

military force played an important part in the development of a system 

based upon a small professional nucleus that could be expanded in time 

of need by the induction of citizen-soldiers. This initial system took 

advantage of the ocean barriers favoring the United States and the bal-

ance of power existing in Europe. In accord with Washington’s injunc-

tion, it held forth the possibility of acquiring greater strength by tem-

porary alliances during extraordinary emergencies but the avoidance of 

permanent, “entangling” alliances. Since World War II the rise of new 

foes and the destruction of the balance of power in Europe and the Far 

East caused a drastic change in the American military system. During 

the Cold War, the United States maintained relatively large standing air, 

land, and sea forces around the world, ready for immediate action and 

for cooperation with the forces of its many allies. Even with the col-

lapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the end of the Cold War, Ameri-

can standing forces remained comparatively larger and more powerful 

than at any other time in our history. The challenge of worldwide ter-

rorism will doubtless see new changes in our military system. 

The American Army as it exists today has evolved through a his-

torical process that parallels the social, economic, and political devel-

opment of the United States. Its evolution may in general be divided 

into three periods: colonial, continental expansion, and global opera-

tions. During

thecolonial period(1607–1775),the militia ofthevari

-

ous colonies defended the settlers while they were establishing them-

Introduction

15
American Military History

16

selves in America and helped England eliminate the French from 

North America. This was the period of roots and origins, of the 

transplanting of military institutions from abroad, particularly from 

England, and of

their modification inthe NewWorld. Duringtheera

of continental expansion (1775–1898), the militia and volunteers and 

the Continental Army and its successor, the Regular Army, played a 

significant role in bringingthe United States into being, inwinning

important extensions of national territory, in saving the nation from 

internal destruction, and in exploring, policing, and governing the vast 

regions of the West. This was the period of national independence 

and consolidation. In the wars of this era, the Army’s activities were 

concentrated on problems vital to the establishment, maintenance, 

and expansion of a nation based on new concepts of individual free-

dom and representative government. Only once in this period, during 

the

RevolutionaryWar, didthe Armyfightwiththe help of allies and

then only on a temporary basis.

The year 1898, which saw the outbreak of the Spanish-American 

War, the symbol of “looking outward,” was an important turning point. 

It marked the emergence of the United States as a world power. In 

the third period (1898 to the present), the Army has carried the flag

to the four corners of the earth. Its assigned role has been to serve as 

a principal instrument for promoting American policies and Ameri-

can interests overseas and protecting the nation against the menace of 

tyrannical power. In the two great world wars of the twentieth century, 

as well as in Korea and Vietnam, the United States fought alongside 

associated or allied nations. In the increasing complexity of modern 

war, its operations have become inseparably intertwined with those of 

the Navy and the Air Force. In the history of the nation and the Army 

of the twentieth century, World War II became an important dividing 

line whose full implications are still not entirely clear. Since World War 

II the revolution in the strategic position of the United States, its emer-

gence as leader of the free world and of allies in military combination, 

the Cold War, the nuclear age, and the Global War on Terrorism have 

presented unprecedented challenges to traditional American concepts 

and institutions in national security. 

Whatever the U.S. Army’s future contribution, it is as an instrument 

of force, the primary mission of an army, that it has played its major 

role in American history. From desperate hand-to-hand engagements 

with the American Indian to vast battles with motorized and armored 

forces, from revolutionary war to world war, civil to foreign war, guer-

rilla to counterguerrilla war, from hot to cold war, and to the war on ter-

rorism, the Army has figured prominently in the nation’s conflicts while

continuing to make important contributions to the general welfare and 

to the preservation of domestic order in peacetime.

One final pointmust be made about the essence of the American

Army. We should always remember that it is the Army of the nation 

and as such responds to the nation’s elected leaders. The leaders of the 

U.S. Army have consistently adhered to a principle basic to the Ameri-

can military system, that the Army is an instrument of civilian authority. 

This principle

, which General

Washington firmly established in practice

during the Revolutionary War, was embodied in the Constitution of the 

United States as a fundamental safeguard of republican institutions. 
Introduction

17

The supremacy of civilian authority is the American solution to the 

problem of forestalling any possible danger from a standing army. 

Until World War II, American military policy was centered on 

the maintenance of very small regular forces and reliance on citizensoldiers in cases of national emergency. In the colonial period almost 

every able-bodied man was a member of the militia and could be called 

out in case of need; and this system continued in force at least theoretically during the first two centuries of national existence. It was usually, nonetheless, the citizen-volunteer who swelled the Army’s ranks in 

earlier wars. This changed during the Cold War with the continuation 

of the idea of universal obligation for military duty under selective 

service in time of national emergency. The return to the earlier idea of 

a small professional regular army, backed up by an organized militia, 

the National Guard and Army Reserves, has changed the equation 

again. Yet this relatively small professional force undergoes other risks 

such as being separated physically, socially, and even culturally from 

society as a whole with all that entails for a nation that values civilian 

control of the military. It remains to be seen to what degree this return 

to a regular volunteer force, this time under the pressure of a worldwide struggle against terror, creates tensions between the military and 

society at large.

In an age when forces in being may determine the outcome of 

a war or an emergency action in peacetime, the principle of reliance 

on masses of citizen-soldiers has given way to the concept of small, 

efficient professional forces supported by a select body of trained

reserves. The increasing complications of modern warfare, the great 

rapidity with which attacks can be launched with modern weapons, and 

the extensive overseas commitments of the United States have negated 

the traditional American habit of preparing for wars after they have 

begun. But whatever the future composition of the Army, it will still 

have to incorporate the historic principle, ingrained in the nation’s military system, of being representative of the people and subject to civilian control.

To be truly progressive, a military system, like most evolving 

human institutions, must operate in two planes of time: the present and 

the future. In the field of national security, the choices in the twentieth

century were never easy; those for the twenty-first promise to be even

more challenging. The citizen and the soldier cannot know what path 

to follow unless they are aware of the breadth of alternatives that have 

been accepted or rejected in the past. Philosopher George Santayana’s 

dictum that those who ignore the past are condemned to repeat its 

mistakes is nowhere more apt than in military history. At the same time 

the blend of the historical with the military art reinforces the caution 

that no two periods or operations are precisely alike, that the easy analogy and the false comparison must be avoided, and that the past must 

be interpreted in proper context and depth. For the fledgling officer,

as well as for the citizen, American military history provides a laboratory of experience; an accumulation of continuities and disparities; a 

rich storehouse of courage, sacrifice, and knowledge; and a source of

inspiration and wisdom. It is to the multifaceted story of the American 

Army, how it originated and developed and what it contributed to the 

nation in war and peace, that we now turn.

In the field of national security, 

the choices in the twentieth 

century were never easy; those 

for the twenty-first promise to be 

even more challenging.

The United States as a nation was in its origins a product of English 

expansion in the New World in the seventeenth and eighteenth 

centuries, a part of the general outward thrust of West European 

peoples in this epoch. British people and institutions, transplanted to a 

new continent and mixed with people of different origins, underwent 

changes that eventually produced a distinctive American culture. In no 

area was the interaction of the two influences—European heredity and

American environment—more apparent than in the shaping of the 

military institutions of the new nation.

The European Heritage

The European military heritage reaches far back into antiquity. 

Organized armies under formal discipline and employing what we 

would recognize as definite systems of battlefield tactics first appeared

in the empires of the Near East in the second millennium b.c. During that time, Mediterranean military establishments rivaled in numbers and in the scope of their conflicts anything that was to appear in

the Western world before the eighteenth century. In the fourth century 

b.c., Alexander the Great of Macedonia brought all these empires and 

dominions, in fact most of civilization known to the Western world, 

under his suzerainty in a series of rapid military conquests. In so doing, 

he carried to the highest point of development the art of war as it was 

practiced in the Greek city-states. He used the phalanx—a solid mass 

infantry formation using pikes as its cutting edge—as the Greeks had 

long done. But he put far greater emphasis on heavy cavalry and contingents of archers and slingers to increase the maneuverability and 

capability of his armies.

The Romans eventually fell heir to most of Alexander’s empire and 

extended their conquests westward and northward to include presentday Spain, France, Belgium, and England, bringing these areas within 

the pale of Roman civilization. The Romans built on the achievements 

of Alexander and brought the art of war to its zenith in the ancient 

2

The Beginnings
world. They perfected, in the legion, a tactical military unit of great 

maneuverability comparable in some respects to the modern division; 

performed remarkable feats of military engineering; refined sophisticated war machines such as the ballista and the catapult; and developed 

elaborate systems for fortification and siege craft. With this system,

they built a great empire that endured for hundreds of years. 

As the Pax Romana (“Roman Peace”) disintegrated in Western 

Europe, the Roman Empire in the West was succeeded first by a number of kingdoms of Germanic tribes and eventually by a highly decentralized political system known as feudalism, under which a multitude 

of warring nobles exercised authority over local areas of varying size. 

The art of war underwent profound change, with the armored knight 

on horseback succeeding to the battlefield supremacy that under the

Greeks and Romans had belonged primarily to disciplined formations 

of infantry. Society in the Middle Ages was highly stratified, and a rigid

division existed between the knightly or ruling noble class and the great 

mass of peasants who tilled the soil, most of them as serfs bound to 

the nobles’ estates. 

Warfare became for the most part a monopoly of the ruling classes, 

for only men of substance could afford horse and armor. Every knight 

owed a certain number of days of military service to his lord each year 

in a hierarchical, or pyramidal, arrangement, the king at the apex and 

the great mass of lesser knights forming the base. But lords who were 

strong enough could defy their superiors with relative impunity. Fortified

castles with moat and drawbridge, built on commanding points of terrain, furnished sanctuaries where lesser lords with inferior forces could 

defy more powerful opponents. Nonetheless, wherever freemen were 

found, in town or countryside, they continued to bear arms on occasion 

as infantry, although often as mere adjuncts to armies composed of 

heavy cavalry. This yeoman class was stronger, for the most part, in England than on the Continent. Even after the Norman Conquest brought 

feudal institutions to England, the ancient Saxon tradition of the fyrd, or 

militia, which required every freeman between sixteen and sixty to bear 

arms in defense of his country, remained alive. In 1181 the English King 

Henry II declared in his Assize of Arms that every freeman should keep 

and “bear these arms in his [the king’s] service according to his order 

and in allegiance to the lord King and his realm.”

Vestiges of feudal institutions survived even into the twentieth 

century, nowhere more prominently than in European military organizations where the aristocracy, descendants of the old feudal nobility, 

long dominated the officer ranks and continued its traditions of service, honor, and chivalry. At the other end of the scale, the militia system, so prominent in British and American history, also owed much to 

medieval precedents, for the Saxon fyrd and Henry II’s Assize of Arms 

underlay the militia tradition transplanted from England to America.

Between the fourteenth and sixteenth centuries, the feudal order 

as the basic political organization of European society gave way gradually to new national states under the hereditary rule of royal families. 

The growth of towns with their merchant and artisan classes and the 

consequent appearance of a money economy enabled ambitious kings 

to levy taxes and borrow money to raise and support military forces 

and to unify and rule their kingdoms. The Protestant Reformation of 

American Military History

20

Alexander the Great

Image removed due to

license restrictions
the sixteenth century shattered the religious unity of Western Christen

-

dom. A long series of bloody wars ensued in which the bitter animosity 

of Protestant and Catholic was inextricably mixed with dynastic and 

national ambition in provoking conflict.

Changes in military organization, weapons, and tactics went hand 

in hand with political, social, and economic change. During the later 

Middle Ages, formations of disciplined infantry using longbow, cross-

bow, pike (a long spear), and halberd (a long-handled ax with a pike 

head at the end) reasserted their superiority on the battlefield.The

introduction of gunpowder in the fourteenth century began a process 

of technological change in weapons that was to enhance that superior-

ity; more immediately, gunpowder was used in crude artillery to bat-

ter down the high “curtain” walls of medieval castles. The age of the 

armored knight and the castle slowly gave way to an age of mercenary 

infantry and new types of fortifications.

The Military Revolution

During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in Western Europe, 

a profound change occurred in the military capabilities of that por-

tion of the Continent, a change so profound that it can accurately be 

phrased a revolution in the military art. In a relatively short space of 

time, European armies transformed themselves into highly disciplined 

and powerful military machines that lay the foundations for the coming 

European dominance of the world. 

There were a number of key elements to this revolution. Armies 

grew larger with more efficient means to supply their material

wants

with a corresponding increase in the scope of warfare. Advances in 

fortification techniques (especially theTrace Italienne, with its revolution-

ary use of bastions as artillery firing platforms) established powerful

city-states able to protect an expanding middle class. Tactical innova

-

tions led to a more highly disciplined force in which infantry armed 

with muskets, cavalry, and artillery merged into a standing national 

army. More ambitious strategies resulted from these new, more capa-

ble forces. Finally, this new type of army and form of warfare had a 

tremendous social, economical, and political impact on society. This 

military revolution shaped Europe into a collection of warlike, even 

predatory, states where constant innovation and technological experi-

mentation was necessary for survival. 

When this energy and destructive power was forced outward from 

Europe as part of this competition, great empires formed to dominate 

the world until the middle of the twentieth century. The foundation of 

the empire building of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was laid 

in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and its impact on the British 

Empire in America was profound.

In the religious and dynastic wars of the sixteenth and seventeenth 

centuries, as mercenary armies came more and more to be national 

armies, various weapons employing gunpowder gradually replaced pike 

and halberd as the standard infantry weapons, and armor gradually dis-

appeared from

the bodie

s of both infantry and

cavalry soldiers. Atfirst,

musketeers were employed alongside pikemen in square formations, the 

pikemen protecting the musketeers while they reloaded. The army of 

the beginnings

21
Gustavus Adolphus in the Thirty Years’ War in Germany (1618–1648)

brought together these two weapons into a mixed, flexible formation

that capitalized on their strengths and covered their weaknesses. When 

combined with dynamic leadership and artillery and cavalry support, 

the formations proved highly successful. As the wheel-lock musket succeeded the matchlock harquebus as a shoulder arm and the flintlock

in turn supplanted the wheel lock, armies came to rely less and less on 

the pike, more and more on firepower delivered by muskets. By 1700,

with the invention of a socket bayonet that could be fitted onto the

end of the flintlock musket without plugging the barrel, the pike disappeared entirely and along with it the helmet and body armor that had 

been designed primarily for protection against pikes and swords. Meanwhile, commanders learned to maneuver large bodies of troops on the 

battlefield and to employ infantry, cavalry, and artillery in combination.

The blending of such capabilities, today called combined-arms warfare, 

proved decisive on the early modern battlefield. National armies composed of professional soldiers came once again to resemble the imperial 

forces that had served Alexander the Great and the Roman emperors.

In the Thirty Years’ War, religious passions combined with private 

armies led by rapacious military entrepreneurs to create a conflict of

virtually unprecedented ferocity and destructiveness. In reaction to this 

descent into barbarism, European warfare turned away from “total” 

war and refocused on “limited” wars fought with professionals for 

dynastic and national rather than local or religious interests. After the 

chaos and destruction that had attended the religious wars, rulers and 

ruling classes in all countries seemed to seek some measure of stability 

and order. Beginning with the wars of Louis XIV of France in 1660,

dynastic rivalries were to be fought out by professional armies within 

the framework of an established order. The eighteenth century European military system that resulted constituted a powerful environmental influence on the military origins of the United States.

Eighteenth Century European Warfare

In contrast to wars of the seventeenth century and the great world 

wars of the twentieth century, eighteenth century warfare was essentially 

limited in character. It was often fought by rival states for restricted territorial gains and not for the subjugation or total religious conversion 

of whole peoples or nations. Professional armies and navies, without 

the mass mobilization of men, economic resources, and public opinion 

that has characterized the more ideological conflicts of the seventeenth

and twentieth centuries, generally conducted the war. Except in areas 

where military operations took place, the people in the warring nations 

carried on their everyday life as usual.

The professional armies employed in this “limited” warfare 

reflected the society from which they sprang. Although Europe’s aristocratic class no longer exercised political power independent of its 

kings, it remained the dominant privileged class, producing the proprietors of the great estates and leaders of the national armies. The 

great masses of people remained for the most part without property or 

voice in the government, either tilling the soil on the nobles’ estates or 

working in the shops and handicraft industries in the towns. Absolute 

American Military History

22

Gustavus Adolphus

Image removed due to

license restrictions
monarchy was the prevailing form of government in every European 

country save England, the Netherlands, and certain smaller states on 

the Continent. In England, where the constitutional power of Parliament was successfully established over the king, Parliament was by no 

means a democratic institution but one controlled by the landed gentry 

and wealthy merchants.

The military distinction nobles had formerly found in leading their 

own knights in battle they now sought as officers in the armies of their

respective kings. Aristocrats filled the higher commands, while “gentlemen” of lesser rank and means usually served as captains and lieutenants. Advancement to higher ranks depended as much on wealth and 

influence at the court of a monarch as on demonstrated merit on the

battlefield. Eighteenth century officers were hardly professionals in the

modern sense of the word, usually having entered the service as mere 

boys through inheritance or purchase of a commission. Except for 

technical specialists in artillery and engineering, they were not required 

to attend a military school to train for their duties.

As the officers came from the highest classes, so the men in the

ranks came from the lowest. They were normally recruited for long 

terms of service, sometimes by force, from among the peasants and 

the urban unemployed; more than a sprinkling of paupers, ne’er-dowells, convicts, and drifters were in the ranks. Since recruiting extended 

across international boundaries, foreign mercenaries formed part of 

every European army. Discipline, not patriotic motivation, was the 

main reliance for making these men fight. Penalties for even minor

offenses ran as high as a thousand lashes, and executions by hanging or 

firing squad were frequent. The habit of obedience inculcated on the

drill ground carried over into battle, where, it has often been said, the 

men advanced because they preferred the uncertainties of combat to 

the certainty of death if they disobeyed orders. The army of Frederick 

the Great of Prussia was built into a military machine of near clock-like 

precision by brutal discipline and unquestioning obedience throughout 

the officer corps and rank and file soldiers.

Most of the significant European wars of the period were fought

over terrain that was open, relatively flat, and thickly populated. Generally, fighting took place only in favorable weather and during daylight

hours; rain or darkness quickly called a halt to a battle. The large armies 

with their cumbersome formations were almost impossible to control 

under such conditions. By December opposing armies usually retired to 

winter quarters, where they awaited spring to resume hostilities. Road 

and river transportation systems were for the time highly developed, 

facilitating the movement of men and supplies. Food for men and forage for horses were usually available in the areas of military operations, 

but all supplies were customarily obtained by systematic and regular 

procedures, not by indiscriminate plunder. Each nation set up along the 

line of march of its army a series of fortresses or magazines in which 

replacement supplies, foodstuffs, “staples,” and forage for the horses 

could be stored.

Eighteenth century armies were composed predominantly of 

infantry, with cavalry and artillery as supporting elements. Because battles were usually fought in open country, cavalry could be employed to 

full advantage. As for artillery, it was used in both attack and defense, 

the beginnings

23

Eighteenth century officers 

were hardly professionals in 

the modern sense of the word, 

usually having entered the 

service as mere boys through 

inheritance or purchase of a 

commission.
either in campaigns of maneuver or in siege warfare. Some eighteenth 

century commanders used the three arms skillfully in combination, but 

the clash of infantry usually decided the issue. In the eighteenth century, infantry was truly the “Queen of Battle.”

The standard infantry weapon of the time was the flintlock musket

with bayonet, and probably the most famous model was the British 

Brown Bess. The Brown Bess had a smoothbore barrel three-feet-eightinches long with a fourteen-inch socket bayonet and fired a smooth

lead ball about three-quarters of an inch in diameter. The musket was 

highly inaccurate since the barrel had no rifling and the charge necessarily fit loosely, permitting the escape of gas and reducing the effect of

the propelling charge. It misfired occasionally and was useless when the

powder in the priming pan got wet. The rate of fire was at best about

three rounds per minute. When the ball hit within its effective range, 

150 to 200 yards, its impact was terrific, tearing ghastly holes in flesh

and shattering bone; but the inherent inaccuracy of the weapon practically precluded its use, even for volley fire, at ranges greater than 100

yards. The ineffectiveness of the smoothbore musket as a firearm made

its attached bayonet almost as important as its firepower, and infantry

relied on the bayonet for shock action against an enemy softened by 

musketry fire, as well as in its continuing role as a final defense against

cavalry attack. 

Cavalrymen were armed variously with pistol and lance, carbine 

and sword, depending on the country and the time. Pistol and carbine 

were discharged at close range against the ranks of opposing infantry 

or cavalry, while lance and sword were used for close-in shock action. 

Cavalry was most effective when used in a reconnaissance or foraging 

role and as a pursuit force after an enemy infantry formation had been 

broken.

There were many different kinds of artillery with a wide variety of 

bore sizes. The larger pieces were mainly for siege warfare and were 

relatively immobile. Artillery used in the field was lighter and mounted

on wheeled carriages pulled by men or horses. Whether siege or field,

these artillery pieces were like the muskets smoothbore muzzle-loaders, 

very limited in range and highly inaccurate. Loading and firing were

even slower than in the case of the musket, since the artillerymen had 

to swab out the cannon barrel with water after each round to prevent 

any residue of burning powder from causing a premature explosion. 

There was no traverse, and the whole carriage had to be moved to 

change the direction of fire. Cannon fired mainly solid iron balls or,

at shorter ranges, grapeshot and canister. Grapeshot was a cluster of 

small iron balls attached to a central stem (thus resembling a bunch of 

grapes) and dispersed by the explosion of a propellant charge. Canister consisted of loose pellets placed in a can and when fired had even

greater dispersion than grape. At close range against a tightly packed 

infantry formation, it was devastating.

The nature of the soldiers, their weapons, and the terrain go far 

to explain the tactics used. These tactics were usually designated linear

tactics to distinguish them from earlier mass formations such as the 

Spanish Tercio or the column formations Napoleon later employed. 

Gustavus Adolphus, the Swedish king and military innovator, in the 

Thirty Years’ War was among the first to use linear tactics. They came

American Military History

24

Brown Bess Musket, the British Infantryman’s 

Basic Arm from About 1740 until the 1830s 
into general use in European armies during the later dynastic wars 

of Louis XIV of France, with the invention of the socket bayonet. 

Frederick the Great of Prussia carried them to their ultimate state 

of perfection, and his armies were the most methodically ordered in 

Europe. In the mid eighteenth century the Frederician system was the 

model that others tried to imitate.

In the employment of linear tactics, troops marched onto the 

battlefield in columns and then deployed into line. A line consisted

of a number of battalions or regiments—the terms were then practically synonymous—formed three or more ranks deep. In the ranks the 

men stood shoulder to shoulder and delivered their fire. Loading, firing,

and bayonet charge were all performed at command in a drill involving 

many separate motions. Firing, insofar as officers were able to maintain

rigid discipline, was entirely by volley, the purpose being to achieve the 

greatest mass of firepower over a given area. The goal was always the

“perfect volley.” Individual, aimed fire, given the characteristics of the

smoothbore flintlock musket, was deemed to be of little value.

Artillery was deployed in the line with the infantry, cavalry on the 

flanks or in the rear. Usually, commanders also kept an infantry force

in reserve for use at a critical point in the battle. In the traditional eighteenth century battle, both forces would be drawn up in similar formation, and the battle would be opened by artillery fire from both sides.

In the midst of this fire, the attacking infantry would move forward,

maintaining the rigid linear formation in which it was trained and stopping as frequently as necessary to dress its lines and fill in the holes

in the ranks made by enemy fire. At a range of 50 to 100 yards, the

attacking line would halt on the command of its officers. At a second

command, a volley would be fired and answered by the opposing line;

or there might be a great deal of jockeying over who should fire first,

the beginnings

25

American Artillery Crew in Action during the Revolutionary War, Alan Archambault 
for it was considered an advantage to take, not to give, the first volley

and to deliver one’s own answering volley at closer range. In any case, 

the exchange of volleys would continue until one side determined to 

try to carry the field by bayonet or cavalry charge, usually committing

its reserves in this action. If either side was able to carry the field,

the victorious commander then sought to execute a successful pursuit, 

destroying the enemy’s army; the defeated commander attempted to 

withdraw his force in a semblance of order to a fortress or other defensive position, there to re-form and fight another day.

Despite the almost game-like movement of units on the battlefield like outsized chess pieces, eighteenth century battles were bloody

affairs. At Zorndorf in 1758, for instance, the victorious army of Frederick lost 38 percent of its soldiers, the defeated Russians about half 

of theirs. Professional soldiers were difficult to replace, for there was

no national reservoir of trained manpower to draw on and it took 

two years or more to train a recruit properly. Commanders, therefore, 

sparing of the blood of their soldiers, sought to avoid battle and to 

overcome the enemy by a successive series of maneuvers against his 

line of communications. They also tried to take advantage of terrain 

features and of fortified positions; to strike by surprise or against the

flanks of the enemy, forcing him to realign his forces while fighting;

and to employ artillery and cavalry to the greatest advantage in paving 

the way for infantry assault. Fortresses, normally constructed along the 

frontiers to impede the advance of an invading army, played a vital role 

in these maneuvers. It was considered axiomatic that no army could 

leave a fortress in its rear athwart its line of communications, that any 

major fortified point had to be reduced by siege. By 1700 the arts of

both fortification and siege craft had been reduced to certain geometric principles by Marshal Sebastien Vauban, a distinguished soldier and 

engineer in the service of Louis XIV.

Vauban’s fortresses were star-shaped and carried the style of the 

sixteenth century Trace Italienne (thick earthen walls with protruding 

bastions serving as artillery platforms) to its ultimate conclusion. Vauban designed thick stonewalls partially sunk into the earth and covered 

with earthen ramparts. Jutting forth from the walls were diamondshaped bastions that allowed the mounted artillery to have mutually 

supporting fields of fire. Surrounding the fortress was a ditch or moat

with a second, smaller wall in front of it with earth sloped against the 

wall to absorb the shock of cannon balls. These fortresses were expensive to build but nearly impregnable from direct assault.

Vauban’s system for attacking this or any other type of fortified

position was known as an approach by parallel lines. Once a fortress had 

been surrounded and outside aid cut off, batteries of siege artillery were 

brought up to within 600 yards of the fortress walls, the guns being so

placed as to rake the lengths of the bastions with enfilade fire; behind

these guns, the first parallel trench was dug to protect the gunners and

assault troops. Zigzag approach trenches were then dug forward about 

200 yards to the points from which a second parallel was constructed, 

then the same process was repeated with a third parallel. Infantry and 

siege artillery were moved forward as each parallel was completed until, 

in the third, they were beneath the outer wall of the fortress. From this 

vantage point the artillery could batter a breach in the main wall and the 

American Military History

26

Despite the almost gamelike movement of units on the 

battlefield like outsized chess 

pieces, eighteenth century battles 

were bloody affairs.
infantry could take the fortress by storm; but at that point in the battle 

the fortress commander usually surrendered to avoid further bloodshed. 

Under Vauban’s system the capture of a fortress by a superior besieging 

force was usually only a matter of time; and the siege was conducted, 

often in leisurely fashion, along lines as rigidly fixed as those of the

formal battle in the open field. But often time favored the defender,

as sickness or supply problems forced the besieging force to withdraw. 

Logistics was often the key to successful defense or capture of a Vauban-type fortress. 

Perhaps the most indelible picture of formal eighteenth century 

warfare that has survived is Voltaire’s story of French and British officers at the Battle of Fontenoy in 1745 bowing politely to each other 

and each inviting the other side to fire the first volley, thus starting the

carnage that was to follow. This picture has a certain ludicrous quality 

about it, but there was method in their madness as there was in eighteenth century warfare generally. The line that fired first was often at a

disadvantage if a resolute enemy charged before they had a chance to 

reload. 

The eighteenth century army was adapted to the European environment of the time, to the political and social climate as well as to the 

geography and terrain. Men knowledgeable in military matters at the 

time firmly believed that no body of poorly trained citizens, however

numerous and inspired, could stand before the disciplined ranks of professionals. If today we can see many of the weaknesses in the eighteenth 

century military system that were not so obvious to contemporaries (its 

basic lack of flexibility, a paucity of true professional leadership, and its

failure to effectively mobilize national resources for war), these perceptions result from a vastly different social and political environment.

The Colonial Scene

The environment in the British colonies of North America was different from that of Europe. America was a new continent, heavily forested and sparsely populated. The main enemy with whom the English 

colonists had first to contend was the American Indian, who neither

the beginnings

27

Vauban

Sébastien Le Prestre de Vauban (1633–1707) was the 

foremost military engineer of his day. Born to a family of 

French nobility, Vauban entered the French Army at the age 

of seventeen, quickly showed a marked talent as an engineer, 

and captured the eye of King Louis XIV in the 1650s. For the 

next half century, he conducted nearly 50 sieges, fought in 

140 engagements, fortified the French frontiers with 33 new 

fortresses, and remodeled 300 more. As well as revolutionizing siege craft and defensive fortifications, Vauban contributed to the growing professionalization of the military.
knew the rules of European warfare nor cared to learn them, but who 

had a military system of his own. Colonial society from its very beginnings developed along more democratic and individualistic lines than 

society in England or continental Europe. Military institutions and practices, though heavily influenced by English patterns, also evolved in the

seventeenth and eighteenth centuries along different lines. It would be 

a mistake to call the society that took form in the thirteen English colonies in North America a new society, for in most respects it followed 

the English pattern of social, economic, and political organization. But 

England itself had stronger democratic traditions than existed on the 

Continent, and important differences in the environment gave these 

English traditions much stronger force in America. Here, there was no 

titled nobility exercising a monopoly on governmental office or holding a vested title to most of the land. While an aristocracy of wealth 

soon appeared, it was never able to exercise the same prerogatives as 

titled nobility. Besides, it was far easier to move from the poorer to 

the wealthier class, since acquisition of landed wealth was easier in a 

country where land was plentiful and labor to work it scarce. If older 

settled areas tended to develop something approaching the pattern of 

European class distinction, new frontiers were constantly opening up 

where dissatisfied individuals could move and find new opportunities.

Life under these conditions bred a spirit of individualism and selfreliance.

In political life, this spirit found expression in the elected assemblies that played an increasingly important part in the government of 

each of the colonies. Each colony had a government modeled generally 

on England’s. Though there were variations in the pattern, the prevailing form consisted of a royal governor appointed by the British Crown, 

a council appointed by the governor from the ranks of the colonial 

aristocracy, and a popular assembly elected by the landholders. Modeled on the British House of Commons, these popular assemblies in 

the colonies rested on a much broader democratic base, since property 

ownership—the main qualification for voting in Britain and America in

this age—was far more widespread in the colonies. The colonial assemblies claimed the same prerogatives vis-à-vis the royal governor that the 

British Parliament exercised in its relations with the Crown, including 

control of the purse and regulation of the military establishment of 

the colony.

The growth of the colonies and resulting encroachment into Indian 

territories resulted in a dynamic that both enhanced and threatened the 

colonist’s way of life. While the colonist based his growth on economics, the Indian’s way of life—and way of warfare—grew out of social 

and cultural motivations.

The Indian method of warfare in the forest, perforce adopted by 

the colonists also, was the most significant influence in developing and

preserving the spirit of individualism and self-reliance in the military 

sphere. Before the European came to America, the Indian had relied on 

bow and spear or tomahawk and knife; but he soon learned the value 

of muskets and was not long in obtaining them in trade for his valuable 

furs. With bow or musket, his method of fighting was the same. The

Indian tribes with whom the colonists first came in contact had no organized system of war; warriors generally formed voluntary bands under 

American Military History

28

Colonial society from its 

very beginnings developed 

along more democratic and 

individualistic lines than society in 

England or continental Europe.
war chiefs and took off on the warpath. In battle each Indian fought 

a separate opponent without regard for his fellows. Indians avoided 

pitched battle whenever possible, instead seeking victory by surprise and 

careful use of cover and concealment. Only when they had the advan-

tage did they close in for hand-to-hand combat. In such combat the 

Indian brave lacked neither skill nor courage. Since he cared little about 

the rules of European warfare, he sometimes slaughtered men, women, 

and children indiscriminately or adopted prisoners permanently into his 

tribe. The favorite Indian tactic was a surprise raid on an isolated settle-

ment. When the settlers organized a pursuit, the Indians lay in wait and 

ambushed them.

The European colonist soon adapted his tactics to the Indian’s, 

quickly learning the value of surprise and stealth. To avoid ambush, he 

sent out scouts as the Indians did, frequently employing friendly Indians 

in

the role

. Instead of

fighting intheclosed formations of Europe

, he

too adopted the open formation and fought from behind trees, rocks, 

and fences. (If the Indians were accused of scalping dead and wounded, 

it should be noted that colonial soldiers occasionally did the same.) In 

such

fighting more depended on individual initiative andcouragethan

on strict discipline and control. Many of these tactics and techniques 

would serve the colonists well in their later war with Britain.

The European settlers also learned to benefit from some of the

enemy’s weaknesses. For all their cunning, the Indians never learned 

the lesson of proper security and often did not post guards at night. 

Nor did they like to fight in winter. Expeditions into the Indian country

used as a favorite technique an attack on an Indian village at dawn and 

in the winter. This attack almost invariably came as a surprise; and the 

colonists, imitating the perceived savagery of their opponent, burned 

the Indian’s villages and sometimes slaughtered all the inhabitants indis-

criminately. Destruction of Indian villages and stocks of food proved 

to be the most effective colonial strategy, if also the most brutal.

The settlers tried to provide some permanent protection for their 

frontiers by erecting forts along the westernmost line of settlement in 

each colony, moving them forward as the line of settlement moved. 

These forts were not the elaborate earth and masonry structures of 

the beginnings

29

King Philip

Metacom, a Pokanoket chief from southern New England, 

was known to the English settlers of Plymouth, Massachusetts 

Bay, and Rhode Island as King Philip. The charismatic sachem 

forged a coalition of Wampanoag, Nipmuc, Pucumtuck, and 

Narragansett Indians to stem the flow of English settlers into 

their territories. Tensions ran high; after several settlers and 

Indians were killed in an intensifying spiral of violence, the con-

flict called King Philip’s War began in 1675. Hostilities ended in 

1676, when Metacom was captured and decapitated. His head 

remained on public display in Plymouth for nearly twenty-five 

years.
Europe but simple rectangular enclosures, their walls constructed of 

upright sharpened logs. Usually there were wooden blockhouses at each 

corner. These rude frontier forts served as points to which settlers and 

their families could retreat for protection in time of Indian trouble. 

Having no artillery, the Indians found the forts hard to take and could 

rely only on burning arrows to set them afire, on surprise attack, or on

direct frontal assault. From the last alternative they almost invariably 

shrank. Their war chiefs possessed no power to order any group of 

braves to undertake an assault in which they would suffer heavy casualties for the sake of gaining an objective.

Colonial Militia

For fighting Indians, colonial governments were in no position to

form professional armies, even had the nature of Indian warfare lent itself 

to such a practice. Instead they fell back on the ancient British tradition of 

the militia. This tradition took on new vitality in America at the same time 

it was declining in England, where, after Oliver Cromwell’s time, most 

of the country’s battles were fought on the sea and in foreign lands. The 

British government came to rely on its regular army and navy just as other 

European states did, despite a deep political tradition of opposition to a 

standing army. Each of the thirteen colonies (except for Pennsylvania, 

where Quaker influence was dominant) enacted laws providing for a compulsory militia organization generally based on the principle of the Saxon 

fyrd that required every able-bodied free male from sixteen to sixty to render military service. Each member of the militia was obligated to appear 

for training at his county or town seat a certain number of days each year, 

to provide himself with weapons, and to hold himself in readiness for call 

in case of Indian attack or other emergency.

Each colony maintained a separate militia establishment, and each 

concentrated on the problems of protecting or extending its own frontiers. Cooperation among the militias of the various colonies was confined to specific expeditions in which two or more colonies had an

interest. The militia was by and large a local institution, administered 

in county and town or township under the general militia laws of each 

colony. It was closely integrated with the social and economic structure 

of colonial society. Though the royal governors or colonial assemblies 

appointed the general officers and the colonels who commanded militia districts, the companies in each locality usually elected their own 

officers. This practice seemingly put a premium on popularity rather

than wealth or ability, but rank in the militia generally corresponded 

with social station in the community.

Each militiaman was expected to provide his own weapon—

usually a smoothbore musket—and ammunition, clothing, and food 

for a short expedition, just as the British knight had been required to 

provide his own horse, armor, and suitable weapons for feudal warfare. 

Local authorities maintained reserve supplies of muskets to arm those 

too poor to buy them and collected stores of ammunition and sometimes small cannon that could be dragged along through the wilderness. 

For very long campaigns, the colonial government had to take charge, 

the assembly appropriating the money for supplies and designating the 

supply officers or contractors to handle purchasing and distribution.

American Military History

30

Each member of the militia was 

obligated to appear for training 

at his county or town seat a 

certain number of days each 

year, to provide himself with 

weapons, and to hold himself in 

readiness.
Although the militia was organized into units by county or township, 

it hardly ever fought that way. Instead the local unit served as a training and mobilization base from which individuals could be recruited for 

active operations. When a particular area of a colony was threatened, the 

colonial government would direct the local militia commander to call out 

his men and the commander would mobilize as many as he could or as he 

thought necessary, selecting the younger and more active men for service. 

For expeditions into the Indian country, usually individuals from many 

localities were chosen and formed into improvised units for the occasion. 

Selection was generally voluntary, but local commanders could be legally 

empowered to draft both men and property if necessary. Drafted men 

were permitted the option of hiring substitutes, a practice that favored 

the well-to-do. Volunteer, drafted man, and substitute, all paid while on 

active duty, alike insisted on the militiaman’s prerogative to serve only a 

short period and return to home and fireside as quickly as possible.

As a part-time citizen army, the militia was naturally not a welldisciplined, cohesive force comparable to the professional army of the 

age. Criticism of the militia was frequent. Moreover, its efficiency, even

for Indian fighting, varied from colony to colony and even from locality

to locality within the same colony, depending on the ability and determination of commanders and the presence or absence of any threat. 

When engaged in eliminating an Indian threat to their own community, 

militiamen might be counted on to make up in enthusiasm what they 

lacked in discipline and formal training. When the Indian threat was 

pushed westward, people along the eastern seaboard tended to relax. 

Training days, one day a week in the early years of settlement, fell to 

one a month or even one a year. Festivities rather than military training increasingly became the main purpose of many of the gatherings, 

and the efficiency of the militia in these regions declined accordingly.

In some towns and counties, however, the military tradition was kept 

alive by volunteers who formed their own units, purchased distinctive 

uniforms, and prepared themselves to respond in case of war or emergency. These units became known as the volunteer militia and were the 

the beginnings

31

The First Muster

With no army from home to protect 

them, English settlers in America had to 

provide for their own defense. Initially, 

this was done at the local level; but on 

December 13, 1636, the Massachusetts 

Bay colony organized its disparate 

militia companies into three regionally 

based regiments. This date is considered 

the birthday of what would eventually 

become the U.S. National Guard. The 

picture depicts the first muster of the 

First Muster, Don Troiani, 1985 colony’s East Regiment.
predecessors of the National Guard of the United States. In Pennsyl

-

vania, which lacked a militia law until 1755 and then passed one that 

made militia service voluntary rather than compulsory, all units were 

composed of volunteers.

One of the more unpleasant manifestations of the militia system 

in America occurred in those colonies, most but by no means all in the 

south, with a large slave population. Fears of slave uprising and the rap-

idly growing imbalance between black and white populations in some 

areas of the colonies led to the establishment of militia units focused on 

detecting and defeating the smallest sign of trouble among the African 

slave population. In South Carolina in 1739, almost one hundred slaves 

organized themselves, seized weapons, and killed several white colonists 

before being suppressed by hastily raised militia soldiers. The resulting 

fear and legislative attempts to deal with the issue ensured that a primary 

focus of an organized militia in South Carolina, and later the rest of the 

southern colonies, was on internal security against the slaves.

On the frontier, where Indian raids were a constant threat, train-

ing days were frequent and militia had to be ready for instant action. 

Except on the frontier

, where proficiency in this sort ofwarfarewas

a matter of survival, it is doubtful that colonial militia in general were 

really adept in forest fighting

.

Training dayswere devoted not to the

techniques of fighting Indian

s but to learning the drill and motions

required ona European battlefield.When raidswere to be conducted

against the Indians, often popularly elected officers selected individual

volunteers from the militia to serve for the duration of the expedition. 

Thus the militia existed mostly as an internal defense force and a pool 

of trained manpower for ad hoc colonial expeditions against the Indi-

ans or other enemies, such as the nearby French Canadians. 

The Colonies in the World Conflict, 1689–1783

While England was colonizing the eastern seaboard from Maine to 

Georgia, France was extending its control over Canada and Louisiana 

and asserting its claim to the Great Lakes region and the Mississippi 

Valley in the rear of the British colonies. (Map 1) Spain held Florida, 

an outpost of its vast colonial domains in Mexico, Central and South 

America, and the larger islands of the West Indies. England and France 

were invariably on opposite sides in the four great dynastic coalition 

wars fought in Europe between 1689 and 1763. Spain

was allied with

France in the last three of these conflicts.

Each of these European wars had its counterpart in struggles 

between British and French and Spanish colonists in America, inter-

mingled with a quickening of Indian warfare all along the frontiers as 

the contestants tried to use the Indian tribes to their advantage. Ameri-

cans and Europeans called these wars by different names. The War 

ofthe League ofAugsburg (1689–1697)was known in America as

King William’s War, the War of Spanish Succession (1701–1713) as 

Queen Anne’s War, the War of Austrian Succession (1744–1748) as 

King George’s

War, and the final and decisive conflict, the SevenYears’

War (1756–1763) as theFrench and IndianWar. All thesewars involved

control of the North American continent; in the last of them it became 

the principal point at issue in the eyes of the British government. American Military History

32
The main centers of French strength were along the St. Lawrence 

River in Canada and at the cities of Quebec and Montreal. The strategic line 

along which much of the fighting took place in the colonies lay between

New York and Quebec, either on the lake and river chain that connects the 

Hudson with the St. Lawrence in the interior or along the seaways leading 

from the Atlantic up the St. Lawrence. In the south, the arena of conflict

lay in the area between South Carolina and Florida and Louisiana. In 1732 

the British government established the colony of Georgia primarily as a 

military outpost in this region and as a dumping ground for their convicts.

In the struggle for control of North America, the contest between 

England and France was vital, the conflict with Spain, a declining power,

important but secondary. This latter conflict reached its height in the

the beginnings

33

Map 1

Mississippi R

Mississippi R

Ohio R

Lake Huron

Lake Erie

Lake Ontario

Lake Michigan

Lake Superior

St. Lawrence R

Gulf of 

St. Lawrence

ATLANTIC

OCEAN

Lake

Champlain

Hudson R

Ft. Duquesne

(Ft. Pitt)

85 ̊

85 ̊ 70 ̊

35 ̊

45 ̊ 45 ̊

35 ̊

70 ̊

Jamestown (site)

Charleston

New Orleans

Albany

Boston

Montreal

Quebec

Port Royal

Halifax

Louisbourg

New York

Philadelphia

Cape Breton

Island

PENNSYL V ANIA

CANAD A

NEW

HAMPSHIRE

CONNECTICUT

RHODE ISLAND

DELAWARE

NEW

JERSEY MARYLAND

VIRGINIA

NORTH

CAROLINA

SOUTH

CAROLINA

GEORGIA

N E W

Y O R K

M A S S A C H U S E T T S

0 100 200 300 400

Miles

COLONIAL NORTH AMERICA
“War of Jenkins’ Ear” (1739–1742), a prelude to the War of Austrian 

Succession, which pitted the British and their American colonists against 

the Spanish. In the colonies the war involved a seesaw struggle between 

the Spanish in Florida and the West Indies and the English colonists in 

South Carolina and Georgia. Its most notable episode, however, was a 

British expedition mounted in Jamaica against Cartagena, the main port 

of the Spanish colony in Colombia. The mainland colonies furnished 

a regiment to participate in the assault as British regulars under British 

command. The expedition ended in disaster, resulting from climate, dis-

ease, and

the bungling of Britishcommanders. Only about 600 ofover

3,000 Americans who participated ever returned to their homes. The 

net result of the war itself was indecisive, and it did little to inspire the 

average American soldier with admiration for British military leadership.

The

firstthreewarswiththeFrenchwere also indecisive.The nature

ofthefightingwasmuchthe same asthat inthe IndianWars. Althoughthe

French maintainedgarrisons of regulars in Canada,theywere never suffi

-

cientto bearthe brunt ofthefighting.TheFrench Canadians also hadtheir

militia, a more centralized and all-embracing system than in the English 

colonies; but the population of the French colonies was sparse, scarcely a 

twentieth of that of the British colonies in 1754. The French relied heavily 

on Indian allies

whomtheyequippedwithfirearms.Theywere far more

successfulthanthe British in influencingthe Indians

.

Their sparse popula

-

tion posed little threat to Indian lands; and the French-controlled fur trade 

depended on Indian workers, while the British colonies saw Indians as an 

obstacle to settlement. The French could usually count on the support 

of the Indian tribes in the Great Lakes and Ohio Valley regions, though 

the British

colonists did maintaingreater influencewiththe powerful Iro-

quois Confederacy in New York. The French constructed forts at strategic 

points, like Niagara and Detroit, and garrisoned them with small numbers 

of regulars, a few of whom they usually sent along with militia and Indian 

raiding parties to supervise operations. Using guerrilla methods, the French 

gained many local successes and indeed kept the frontiers of the English 

colonies in a continual state of alarm, but they could achieve no decisive 

results because of the essential weakness of their position.

The British and their colonists usually took the offensive and 

sought to strike by land and sea at the citadels of French power in Can-

ada. The British Navy’s control of the sea made possible the mounting 

of sea

expeditions against Canada and at the same time made it difficult

for the French to reinforce their small regular garrisons. In 1710 a com-

bined British and colonial expedition captured the French fort at Port 

Royal on Nova Scotia, and by the treaty of peace in 1713 Nova Scotia 

became an English possession. In 1745 an all-colonial expedition spon-

sored by Massachusetts captured Louisbourg on Cape Breton Island in 

what was perhaps the greatest of colonial military exploits, only to have 

the stronghold bargained away in 1748 for Madras, a post the French 

had captured from the British in India.

While militia units played an important part in the colonial wars, 

colonial governments resorted to a different device to recruit forces for 

expeditions outside their boundaries such as that against Louisbourg. 

This was the volunteer force, another institution that was to play an 

important part in all American wars through the end of the nineteenth 

century. Unlike the militia units, volunteer forces were built from the American Military History

34
top down. One of the colonial governors or assemblies chose the commanding officer, who in turn enlisted his men. The choice of a commander was made with due regard for his popularity in the colony, since 

this was directly related to his ability to persuade officers and men to

serve under him. While the militia was the main base for recruitment 

and the officers were almost invariably men whose previous experience was in the militia, indentured servants and drifters without military 

obligation were also enlisted. The enlistment period was only for the 

duration of a campaign, at best a year or so, not for long periods as in 

European armies. Colonial assemblies had to vote money for pay and 

supplies, and assemblies were usually parsimonious as well as unwilling 

to see volunteer forces assume any of the status of a standing army. 

With short enlistments, inexperienced officers, and poor discipline by

European standards, even the best of these colonial volunteer units 

were, like the militia, often held in contempt by British officers.

The only positive British gain up to 1748 was Nova Scotia. The 

indecisive character of the first three colonial wars was evidence of

the inability of the English colonies to unite and muster the necessary 

military forces for common action, of the inherent difficulty of mounting offensives in unsettled areas, and of a British preoccupation with 

conflicts in Europe and other areas. Until 1754 the British government

contented itself with maintaining control of the seas and furnishing 

regulars for sea expeditions against French and Spanish strongholds. 

Until 1755 no British regulars took part in the war in the interior, 

though small “independent companies” of indifferent worth were stationed continuously in New York and occasionally in other colonies. 

No colony, meanwhile, was usually willing to make any significant contribution to the common cause unless it appeared to be in its own interest. Efforts to form some kind of union, the most notable of which 

was a plan that Benjamin Franklin promoted in a colonial congress held 

at Albany in 1754, all came to naught.

Between 1748 and 1754 the French expanded their system of forts 

around the Great Lakes and moved down into the Ohio Valley, establishing Fort Duquesne at the junction of the Allegheny and Monongahela 

Rivers in 1753 and staking a claim to the entire region. In so doing, they 

precipitated the final and decisive conflict that began in America two

years before the outbreak of the Seven Years’ War in Europe. In 1754 

Governor Robert Dinwiddie of Virginia sent young George Washington at the head of a force of Virginia militia to compel the French to 

withdraw from Fort Duquesne. Washington was driven back and forced 

the beginnings

35

The Capture of Louisbourg

Guarding the mouth of the St. Lawrence River, the fortress of Louisbourg protected French settlements inland. The Massachusetts General Court voted in secret to attack the seemingly impregnable 

seaport 600 miles northeast of Boston. Colonial prisoners who had been held at the fort told of 

dispirited troops, masonry in disrepair, a shortage of gunpowder, and poorly mounted cannon. An 

eclectic American colonial force of 4,000 attacked after the drift ice left Gabarus Bay. A seven-week 

siege led to a spectacular victory in June 1745 for the colonists, who suffered minimal casualties.
to surrender, certainly an inauspicious beginning to his military career. 

The British government then sent over two understrength regiments of 

regulars under Maj. Gen. Edward Braddock,a soldier of forty-fiveyears’

experience oncontinental battlefields,to accomplishthetask inwhich

the militia had failed. Accustomed to the parade-ground tactics and the 

open terrain of Europe, Braddock placed all his faith in disciplined regu-

lars andclose-order formations. Hefilled his regimentswith American

recruits and early in June 1755 set out on the long march through the 

wilderness to Fort Duquesne with a total force of about 2,200, including 

a body of Virginia and North Carolina militiamen. (Map 2) Washington 

accompanied the expedition but had no command role.

Braddock’s force proceeded westward through the wilderness in 

traditional column formation with 300 ax men in front to clear the road 

and a train of wagons in the rear. The heavy train so slowed his prog-

ress that about halfway he decided to let it follow as best it could and 

went ahead with about 1,300 selected men, a few cannon, wagons, and 

packhorses. As he approached Fort Duquesne, he crossed the Monon-

gahela twice to avoid a dangerous and narrow passage along the east 

side where ambush might be expected. He sent Lt. Col. Thomas Gage 

(later to gain a measure of infamy as the general in charge of the raids 

on Lexington and Concord in 1775) with an advance guard to secure 

the site of the second crossing, deemed a likely spot for an ambush. 

Gage found no enemy, and the entire force crossed the Monongahela 

the second time on the morning of

July 9, 1755, then confidently took

up the march toward Fort Duquesne, only seven miles away.

About three-quarters of a mile past the Monongahela crossing, 

Gage’s advance guard suddenly came under fire froma body ofFrench

and Indians concealed in the woods. Actually, it was a very inferior force 

of 70 French regulars, 150 Canadian militiamen (many mere boys), 

and 650 Indians who had just arrived on the scene aftera hasty marc

h

from Fort Duquesne. Some authorities think Gage might have changed 

the whole course of the battle had he pushed forward and forced the 

enemy onto the open ground in their rear. Instead he fell back on the 

main body of Braddock’s troops, causing considerable confusion. This 

confusion was compounded when the French and Indians slipped into 

the forests on the flanks of the British troops

, pouring their fire into

a surprised and terrified mass of men whowasted their returnvolleys

onthe air

. “Scarce an officer or soldier,” wrote one of the participants,

“can say they ever saw at one time six of the Enemy and the greatest 

part never saw a single man.”

None of the training or experience of the regulars had equipped 

them to cope with this sort of attack, and Braddock could only exhort 

them to rally in conventional formation.

Two-thirds of his officers fell

dead or wounded. The militia, following their natural instincts, scat

-

tered and took positions behind trees; but there is no evidence they 

delivered any effective fire

, since

French and Indian losses for the day

totaled only twenty-three killed and sixteen wounded. The few British 

cannon appear to have been more telling. Braddock, mortally wounded 

himself, finally attempted to withdraw his force in some semblance

of order; but the retreat soon becamea disordered flight.The panicstricken soldiers did not stop even when they reached the baggage wagons many miles to their rear. American Military History

36
Despite the completeness of the victory, the French and Indians 

made no attempt to pursue. The few French regulars had little control 

over the Indians, who preferred to loot the battlefield and scalp the

wounded. The next day the Indians melted back into the forest, and the 

French commandant at Duquesne noted in his official report, “If the

enemy should return with the 1,000 fresh troops that he has in reserve 

in the rear, at what distance we do not know, we should perhaps be 

badly embarrassed.” The conduct of the battle was not so reprehensible as the precipitate retreat of the entire force to the safety of the 

settled frontiers when no enemy was pursuing it.

Although Braddock had been aware of the possibilities of ambush 

and had taken what he thought were necessary precautions, in the 

the beginnings

37

Map 2

Fort Duquesne

Fort Cumberland

Fort Necessity

Carlisle

Ohio River

Allegheny River

Juniata River

Monongahela River

Potomac River

Shenandoah River

Alexandria

Winchester

June–July 1755

BRADDOCK’S EXPEDITION

Approximate Route of English Troops

French and Indian Ambush

10 0 2 10 0 30

Miles

ELEVATION IN FEET

0 1000 2000 3000 and Above
broader sense he violated the principles of security and maneuver: 

When the ambush came he had little idea how to cope with Indian 

tactics in the forest. As he lay dying on the wagon that transported 

him from the battlefield, the seemingly inflexible old British general is

alleged to have murmured, “Another time we shall know better how to 

deal with them.”

Braddock could not profit from his appreciation of the lesson,

but the British Army did. “Over the bones of Braddock,” writes Sir 

John Fortescue, the eminent historian of the British Army, “the British 

advanced again to the conquest of Canada.”

After a series of early reverses of which Braddock’s disastrous 

defeat was only one, the British government under the inspired leadership of Prime Minister William Pitt was able to achieve a combination of British and colonial arms that succeeded in overcoming the last 

French resistance in Canada and in finally removing the French threat

from North America. In this combination, British regular troops, the 

British Navy, British direction, and British financial support were the

keys to victory; the colonial effort, though considerable, continued to 

suffer from lack of unity.

As an immediate reaction to Braddock’s defeat, the British Government sought to recruit regulars in America to fight the war, following

the precedent set in the Cartagena expedition. Several American regiments were raised, the most famous among them Col. Henry Bouquet’s 

Royal Americans. On the whole, however, the effort was a failure, for 

most Americans preferred short service in the militia or provincial 

volunteer forces to the long-term service and rigid discipline of the 

British Army. After 1757 the British government under Pitt, now convinced that America was the area in which the war would be won or 

lost, dispatched increasing numbers of regulars from England—a total 

of 20,000 during the war. The British regulars were used in conjunction 

with short-term militia and longer-term volunteer forces raised in the 

service of the various individual colonies. The most effective device 

to assure the sort of colonial cooperation the British desired was to 

shoulder the principal financial burden, reimbursing individual colonies

for most of their expenses and providing the pay and supply of many 

of the colonial volunteer units to ensure their continued service. Massachusetts, Connecticut, and New York furnished about seven-tenths 

of the total colonial force employed. 

Braddock’s defeat was not repeated. In no other case during the 

French and Indian War was an inferior guerrilla force able to overcome 

any substantial body of regulars. The lessons of the debacle on the 

Monongahela, as the British properly understood, were not that regular forces or European methods were useless in America or that undisciplined American militia were superior to regular troops. They were 

rather that tactics and formations had to be adapted to terrain and the 

nature of the enemy and that regulars, when employed in the forest, 

would have to learn to travel faster and lighter and to take advantage 

of cover, concealment, and surprise as their enemies did. Or the British 

could employ colonial troops and Indian allies versed in this sort of warfare as auxiliaries, something the French had long since learned to do.

The British adopted both methods in the ensuing years of the 

French and Indian War. Light infantry, trained as scouts and skirmishAmerican Military History

38

“Another time we shall know better 

how to deal with them.”
ers, became a permanent part of the British Army organization. When 

engaged in operations in the forest, these troops were clad in green or 

brown clothes instead of the traditional red coat of the British soldier, with their heads shaved and their skins sometimes painted like the 

Indians’. Special companies, such as Maj. Robert Rogers’ Rangers, were 

recruited among skilled woodsmen in the colonies and placed in the 

regular British establishment.

Despite this employment of light troops as auxiliaries, the British 

Army did not fundamentally change its tactics and organization in the 

course of the war in America. The reduction of the French fortress at 

Louisbourg in 1758 was conducted along the classic lines of European 

siege warfare. The most decisive single battle of the war was fought in 

the open field on the Plains of Abraham before the French citadel of

Quebec. In a daring move, Maj. Gen. James Wolfe and his men scaled 

the cliffs leading up to the plain on the night of September 12, 1759, 

and appeared in traditional line of battle before the city the next morning. Maj. Gen. Louis Joseph, the Marquis de Montcalm, the able French 

commander, accepted the challenge; but his troops, composed partly 

of militia levies, proved unable to withstand the withering “perfect volleys” of Wolfe’s exceptionally well-disciplined regiments.

The ultimate lesson of the colonial wars, then, was that European 

and American tactics each had a place; either could be decisive where 

conditions were best suited to its use. The colonial wars also proved 

that only troops possessing the organization and discipline of regulars, 

whatever their tactics, could actually move on, seize, and hold objectives and thus achieve decisive results.

Other important lessons lay in the realm of logistics, where American conditions presented difficulties to which European officers were

unaccustomed. The impediments to supply and transport in a vast, 

undeveloped, and sparsely populated country limited both the size and 

variety of forces employed. The settled portions of the colonies produced enough food, but few manufactured goods. Muskets, cannon, 

the beginnings

39

Braddock’s Defeat, Artist Unknown, ca. 1870
powder, ball, tents, camp kettles, salt, and a variety of other articles 

necessary for even the simple military operations of the period almost 

all had to come from Europe. Roads, even in the settled areas, were 

poor and inadequate; forces penetrating into the interior had to cut 

their roads as they went, as Braddock did. Movement by water, when 

possible, was by far more efficient. These logistical problems go far to

explain why the fate of America was settled in battles involving hardly 

one-tenth the size of forces engaged in Europe in the Seven Years’ War 

and why cavalry was almost never employed and artillery to no great 

extent except in fixed fortifications and in expeditions by sea when

cannon could be transported on board ship. The limited mobility of 

large regular forces, whatever the superiority of their organization and 

tactics, put a premium both on small bodies of trained troops familiar 

with the terrain and on local forces, not so well trained, already in an 

area of operations. Commanders operating in America would ignore 

these logistical limitations at their peril.

The American Rifle

By the end of the French and Indian War, a new weapon had 

appeared on the frontier in Pennsylvania and to the south, one far better suited to guerrilla warfare than was the musket. This weapon would 

later become renowned as the Kentucky rifle. The effects of rifling

a gun barrel, that is, of making spiral grooves that imparted a spinning effect to the bullet, giving it greater range and accuracy, had been 

known for some centuries in Germany and Switzerland. But the early 

rifles made there were too heavy and slow to load to be of military use.

The Germans who settled in Pennsylvania developed, around 1750, a 

much lighter model, far easier and faster to load. They used a bullet 

smaller than the bore and a greased patch to keep the fit tight. This

early American rifle could, in proper hands, hit a target the size of a

man’s head at 200 yards.

Despite its superior range and accuracy, the rifle was to undergo

almost a hundred years of development before it would supplant the 

musket as the standard infantry weapon. At first, each individual piece

was handmade and each required a custom-made bullet mold. The 

standard bayonet would fit none of them. The rifle was effective only

in the hands of an expert trained in its use. The rate of fire was only

American Military History

40

Rogers’ Rangers

In 1755 Robert Rogers (1731–1795) recruited a company of woodsmen near his home in New 

Hampshire and was ordered by the British “to range the woods” and harass the French along the frontier. 

Rogers’ Rangers, as his unit came to be known, was one of several ranger companies the British formed as 

a counter to the Indian allies of the French. Rogers and his men infiltrated into French-held areas of the 

northern colonies and Canada, using stealth and surprise to win several important engagements. After the 

French and Indian War, Rogers wrote down twenty-eight “Ranging Rules” learned during his encounters 

with an unconventional enemy; they are enshrined to this day in U.S. Army Ranger training.

This flintlock rifle, originally intended for hunting, 

dates from 1800–1820. One of the few truly 

American art forms of early America, the rifle 

inspired the design of U.S. military rifles that 

emerged from U.S. armories beginning in 1803.
about one-third that of the musket; and therefore, without bayonet, the 

rifle could hardly be used by troops in the line. For the guerrilla tactics

of the frontier, however, where men did not fight in line but from

behind trees, bushes, and rocks, it was clearly a superior weapon. Like 

the tactics of the American forest, it would have its place in any future 

war fought in America.

The Colonial Heritage

In the Indian Wars and the colonial wars with France, Americans 

gained considerable military experience, albeit much of it in guerrilla 

warfare that did not require the same degree of organized effort and 

professional competence as the European style. The British had, after 

all, directed the major effort against the French in Canada. Many colonials later to become famous in the Revolution had served their military 

apprenticeship as officers of middle rank in the French and Indian War:

George Washington, Israel Putnam, Philip Schuyler, and John Stark, 

for instance, in provincial forces and Charles Lee, Horatio Gates, and 

Richard Montgomery in the British Army.

Certain traditions had been established that were to influence

American military policy and practice right down to the two great world 

wars of the twentieth century. One of these was primary reliance on 

the militia for defense and on volunteer forces for special emergencies and expeditions. Another was that relatively permanent volunteer 

units should be formed within the militia. The fear of a standing army 

of professionals, an English heritage, had become an even stronger 

article of faith in America. The colonial experience also established a 

strong tradition of separatism among the colonies themselves, for each 

had for many years run its own military establishment. Within each 

colony, too, the civilian authority represented in the popular assembly 

had always kept a strict rein on the military, another tradition that was 

to have marked effect on American military development.

Some characteristics of the American soldier that were to be fairly 

constant throughout all future wars had also made their appearance. 

The American soldier was inclined to be highly individualistic and 

to resent discipline and the inevitable restrictions of military life; he 

sought to know why he should do things before he would put his heart 

the beginnings

41

George Washington

in the French and Indian War

George Washington (1732–1799), as a 22-year-old lieutenant colonel in the Virginia militia, 

was a principal player at the opening of the French and Indian War. In 1754 he led a small force 

of Virginians to try to compel the French to relinquish control of Fort Duquesne, which was strategically placed to control the Ohio Valley. After a skirmish with a French reconnaissance party, he 

fell back to a hastily constructed stockade, Fort Necessity, where he resisted a larger French force 

before finally surrendering. A year later he served under Braddock and ultimately took part in 

Brig. Gen. John Forbes’ successful campaign to capture what is now Pittsburgh.
into doing them. If in the end he accepted discipline and order as a 

stern necessity, he did so with the idea of winning victory as quickly as 

possible so he could return to his normal civilian pursuits.

These traditions and characteristics were the product of a society 

developing along democratic lines. The military strengths and weaknesses they engendered were to be amply demonstrated when the 

American soldier took up arms against his erstwhile comrade, the British regular, in the American Revolution.

Discussion Questions

1. To what degree is the American Army a European Army? 

2. How did our early colonial experience modify our European 

military inheritance?

3. What did the British learn about the nature of warfare in the 

Americas from their initial defeats in the French and Indian War? How 

could this have helped them in their later fight against the “colonists”?

4. Why did the British and American armies defeat the French and 

their French-Canadian allies?

5. What did the British learn about the military capabilities of their 

American “cousins”? What should they have learned?

6. Why didn’t the rifle immediately replace the musket on the

battlefield?

Recommended Readings

Anderson, Fred. Crucible of War: The Seven Years’ War and the Fate of 

Empire in British North America, 1754–1766. New York: Vintage 

Books, 2001.

Ferling, John E. A Wilderness of Miseries: War and Warriors in Early America. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1980.

Leach, Douglas E. Arms for Empire: A Military History of the British Colonies in North America. New York: Macmillan, 1973.

Malone, Patrick M. The Skulking Way of War: Technology and Tactics Among 

the New England Indians. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 

1993.

Shy, John W. Toward Lexington: The Role of the British Army in the Coming of the 

Revolution. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965.

Other Readings

Anderson, Fred. A People’s Army: Massachusetts Soldiers and Society in the 

Seven Years’ War. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 

1984.

Fregault, Guy. Canada: The War of Conquest, trans. Margaret M. Cameron. Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1969.

American Military History

42
Gipson, Lawrence H. The British Empire Before the American Revolution, 15 

vols. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1963–1970, vols. 6–8.

Leach, Douglas E. The Northern Colonial Frontier, 1607–1763. New York: 

Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1966.

———. Flintlock and Tomahawk: New England in King Philip’s War. New 

York: Macmillan, 1958.

Lepore, Jill. The Name of War: King Philip’s War and the Origins of American 

Identity. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1998.

Melvoin, Richard I. New England Outpost: War and Society in Colonial Deerfield. New York: W. W. Norton, 1989.

Pargellis, Stanley. Lord Loudon in North America. Hamden, Conn.: Archon 

Books, 1968.

Parker, Geoffrey. The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise 

of the West, 1500–1800, 2d ed. New York: Cambridge University 

Press, 1996.

Peckham, Howard H. The Colonial Wars, 1689–1762. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964.

Rawlyk, George A. Yankees at Louisbourg. Orono: University of Maine 

Press, 1967.

Richter, Daniel K. The Ordeal of the Longhouse: The Peoples of the 

Iroquois League in the Era of European Colonization. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1992.

Robinson, W. Stitt. The Southern Colonial Frontier, 1607–1763. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1979.

Shea, William L. The Virginia Militia in the Seventeenth Century. Baton 

Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1983.

Stacey, Charles P. Quebec 1759: The Siege and the Battle, rev. ed. Toronto: 

Rubin Brass Studio, 2002.

White, Richard. The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the 

Great Lakes Region, 1650–1815. New York: Cambridge University 

Press, 1991.

Wright, J. Leitch, Jr. The Only Land They Knew: The American Indians in the 

Old South. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1999.

the beginnings

43

The American Revolution came about fundamentally because by 

1763 the English-speaking communities on the far side of the

Atlantic had matured to the extent that their interests and goals 

were distinct from those of the ruling classes in the mother country. 

British statesmen failed to understand or adjust to the situation. Ironically enough, British victory in the Seven Years’ War set the stage for 

the revolt, for it freed the colonists from the need for British protection against a French threat on their frontiers and gave free play to the 

forces working for separation.

In 1763 the British government, reasonably from its own point

of view, moved to tighten the system of imperial control and to force 

the colonists to contribute to imperial defense. As part of an effort to 

make the costs of empire be borne by all British subjects, his majesty’s 

government sought to create an “American Establishment,” a force of 

10,000 British regular soldiers in North America. The cost of this military force would be paid for by taxes the British Parliament levied on 

Americans. This imperial defense plan touched off the long controversy about Parliament’s right to tax that started with the Stamp and 

Sugar Acts and led to a final provocative deed in December 1773 at the

“Boston Tea Party.” This party resulted in the destruction of a cargo of 

East India Company tea by a patriot mob in a protest against “taxation 

without representation.”

The ten-year controversy over taxation escalated to violence in 

large measure because several successive British ministries failed to 

understand the differences that had grown between the American colonies and the metropolitan power. Although possessing a professional 

army and navy, the British government nevertheless failed to act decisively enough to enforce British regulations or work toward the more 

viable form of imperial union that the colonial leaders, at least until 

1776, insisted they sought.

3

The American

Revolution, First Phase
American Military History

46

In response to the Boston Tea Party, the King and his ministers 

blindly pushed through Parliament a series of measures collectively 

known in America as the Intolerable Acts: closing the port of Boston, 

suspending civilian government in Massachusetts, and massing troops 

in Boston under the military rule of Maj. Gen. Sir Thomas Gage. Out-

raged by the heavy-handed response to one colony, the other American 

political leaders called for a continental congress, in effect an American 

parliament, to coordinate a political drive to defend what the colonists 

deemed to be their rights and interests as Englishmen.

Since 1763 the

colonial leaders, in holding that only theirown pop-

ular assemblies, not the British Parliament, had a right to levy taxes on 

Americans, had raised the specter of an arbitrary British government 

collecting taxes in America to support red-coated regulars who might 

be used not to protect the frontiers but to suppress American liberties. 

Placing Massachusetts under military rule gave that specter some sub-

stance and led directly to armed revolt.

The Outbreak

The First Continental Congress meeting at Philadelphia on Sep-

tember 5, 1774, addressed respectful petitions to Parliament and King 

but also adopted nonimportation and nonexportation agreements in 

an effort to coerce the British government into repealing the offending 

measures. To enforce these agreements, committees were formed in 

almost every county, town, and city throughout the colonies. In each 

colony, these committees soon became the effective local authorities, 

the base of a pyramid of revolutionary organizations with revolution-

ary assemblies, congresses, or conventions, and with committees of 

safety at the top.

This loosely knit combination of de facto governments superseded 

theconstituted authorities andestablishedfirmcontroloverthewhole

country before the British were in any position to oppose them. The de 

facto governments took over control of the militia and other colonial 

military resources such as armories and powder stores. They also identi-

fiedwhich local militia officerscould betrusted andwhichwere known

to be loyal to Britain. Where possible the various colonies reorganized the 

standing militia and formed rapid response units, including the famous 

Minutemen intended to turn out fully armed “in a minute’s notice.” In 

colonies

wherea Britishgovernor’s officialcontroloverthe militiacould

not be challenged, volunteer companies began training under the guid

-

ance of veterans of the French and Indian War. As winter turned into 

spring in 1775, patriot leaders were busily shaping the military forces that, 

if the necessity arose, might oppose the British Army in the field.

Massachusetts, the seat of the crisis, led the way in making military 

preparations. The Provincial Congress, eyeing Gage’s unprecedented 

military force in Boston, directed town officials to formally enlist

a

third of their adult males as Minutemen. It began plans to combine 

local militia companies into regiments and started selecting generals 

to command the force. It also began to collect ammunition, artillery 

pieces, and other military stores at locations outside of Gage’s immedi-

ate reach. One of the most important of these depots lay at Concord, 

about twenty miles inland from Boston.
The American Revolution, First Phase

47

General Gage learned of the collection of military stores at Concord and determined to send a force of Redcoats to destroy them. 

His preparations were made with the utmost secrecy. Yet so alert and 

ubiquitous were the patriot eyes in Boston that when the picked British force of 700 men set out on the night of April 18, 1775, two messengers, Paul Revere and William Dawes, preceded them to spread the 

alarm throughout the countryside. At dawn on the next day, when the 

British arrived at Lexington, the halfway point to Concord, they found 

a body of militia drawn up on the village green. Some nervous finger—

whether of a British regular or an American militiaman is unknown 

to this day—pressed a trigger. The impatient British regulars, apparently without any clear orders from their commanding officer, fired a

volley then charged with the bayonet. The militiamen dispersed, leaving eight dead and ten wounded on the ground. The British column 

went on to Concord, engaged in another unanticipated skirmish, and 

destroyed such of the military stores as the Americans had been unable 

to remove. Their return journey to Boston took a civil disturbance issue 

and transformed it into open warfare.

By this time, the alarm had spread far and wide, and both ordinary 

militia and Minutemen had assembled along the British route. From 

behind walls, rocks, and trees, and from houses, they poured their fire

into the columns of Redcoats, while the frustrated regulars found few 

targets for their accustomed volleys or bayonet charges. Only the arrival 

of reinforcements from Gage enabled the British column to get back 

to the safety of Boston. At day’s end the British counted 273 casualties 

out of a total of 1,800 men engaged; American casualties numbered 

95 men, including the toll at Lexington. What happened was hardly a 

tribute to the marksmanship of New England farmers—it has been 

estimated that 75,000 shots poured from their muskets that day—but 

The Minuteman

The Minuteman of 1775 did not represent 

an entirely new idea. The Massachusetts militia’s 

tradition of readiness went back long before 

King Philip’s War; a colonywide directive in 

1645 ordered that 30 percent of the entire 

militia force be ready “at halfe an howers warning.” The Minutemen were selected out of the 

wide pool of able-bodied militia—in essence 

the entire male population of the colony—to be 

ready at any time for emergency operations. 

They were organized into companies that usually 

consisted of neighbors. Most carried their own 

smoothbore flintlock muskets, though there was 

a fund to purchase weapons for militiamen

too poor to buy their own. By the spring of 1775 some militia companies were drilling every week and 

practicing marksmanship. When word of a British advance on Concord spread through the country north 

of Boston in the early hours of that April Wednesday, the Minutemen were ready.

Minutemen Bid Their Families Farewell

 Artist and Date Unknown

Image removed due to

license restrictions
American Military History

48

it did testify to a stern determination of the people of Massachusetts 

to resist any attempt by the British to impose their will by armed force.

The spark lit in Massachusetts soon spread throughout the rest of 

the colonies. Whatever really may have happened in that misty dawn 

on Lexington Green, the news that speedy couriers riding horses to 

exhaustion carried through the colonies from New Hampshire to 

Georgia was of a savage, unprovoked British attack and of farmers rising in the night to protect their lives, their families, and their property. 

Lexington, like Fort Sumter, Pearl Harbor, and September 11 in subsequent years, furnished an emotional impulse that led all true patriots 

to gird themselves for battle. From the other New England colonies, 

militia poured in to join the Massachusetts men; together they soon 

formed a ring around Boston. Other forces mobilized under Ethan 

Allen of Vermont and Benedict Arnold of Connecticut seized the British forts at Ticonderoga and Crown Point, strategic positions on the 

route between New York and Canada. These posts yielded valuable 

artillery and other military stores. The Second Continental Congress, 

which assembled in Philadelphia on May 10, 1775, found itself forced 

to turn from embargoes and petitions to the problems of organizing, 

directing, and supplying a military effort.

Before Congress could assume effective control, the New England 

forces assembled near Boston fought another battle on their own. After 

Lexington and Concord, the New England colonies implemented their 

military plans and, as they had in the earlier wars with the French and 

Indians, moved to replace the militia gathered before Boston with volunteer forces, constituting what may be loosely called a New England 

army. Each of the four New England states raised and administered its 

own force under its own commander. As might be expected with such 

a loose organization, discipline was lax and there was no unified chain

of command. Though Artemas Ward, the Massachusetts commander, 

exercised overall control by informal agreement, it was only because 

the other commanders chose to cooperate with him; all decisions were 

made in council. The volunteers in the Connecticut service had enlisted 

until December 10, 1775, those from the other New England states 

until the end of the year. The men were dressed for the most part in 

homespun clothes and armed with muskets of varied types; powder 

and ball were short, and only the barest few had bayonets.

Late in May Gage received limited reinforcements from England, 

bringing his total force to 6,500 rank and file. With the reinforcements

came three major generals of reputation—Sir William Howe, Sir Henry 

Clinton, and Sir John Burgoyne—men destined to play major roles in 

England’s loss of its American colonies. The newcomers all considered 

that Gage needed more elbow room and proposed to fortify Dorchester Heights, a dominant position south of Boston previously neglected 

by both sides. News of the intended move leaked to the Americans, 

who immediately countered by dispatching a force onto the Charlestown peninsula, where other heights, Bunker Hill and Breed’s Hill, 

overlooked Boston from the north. (Map 3) The original intent was 

to fortify Bunker Hill, the eminence nearest the narrow neck of land 

connecting the peninsula with the mainland, but the working party sent 

out on the night of June 16, 1775 decided instead to move closer in and

construct works on Breed’s Hill—a tactical blunder, for these exposed 

As might be expected . . . 

discipline was lax and there was 

no unified chain of command.
The American Revolution, First Phase

49

works could much more easily be cut off by a British landing on the 

neck in their rear.

The British scorned such a tactic, making a conscious decision to 

try and stop the conflict short with a psychologically crushing demonstration of brute force. However, the British generals committed a critical error, having assumed that the assembled “rabble in arms” would 

disintegrate in the face of an attack by disciplined British regulars. On 

the seventeenth Gage ferried some 2,200 of his men under Howe over 

to the tip of the Charlestown peninsula under the cover of Royal Navy 

warships. Howe then sent his troops directly against the American positions, by this time manned by perhaps an equal force. Twice the British 

advanced on the front and flanks of the redoubt on Breed’s Hill; and

twice the Americans, holding their fire until the compact British lines

were at close range, decimated the ranks of the advancing regiments 

and forced them to fall back and re-form. With reinforcements Howe 

carried the hill on the third try, largely because the Americans had run 

short of ammunition and had no bayonets. The American retreat from 

Breed’s Hill was, for inexperienced volunteers and militia, an orderly 

one; and Howe’s depleted regiments were unable to prevent the escape. 

British casualties for the day totaled a staggering 1,054, almost half the 

force engaged, as opposed to American losses of about 440.

The Battle of Bunker Hill (Bunker gave its name to a battle actually 

fought on Breed’s Hill) has been aptly characterized as a “tale of great 

Map 3

Bunker Hill

Morton’s Hill

Breed’s Hill

Nook’s Hill

Dorchester

Heights

Mystic River

Charles River

M y s t i c R i v e r

Noddle’s I.

Causeway

Concord

Lexington

Medford

Charlestown

Cambridge

Watertown

Waltham

BOSTON

Roxbury

Charlestown

BOSTON

 18–19 April 1775

BOSTON-CONCORD AREA

Miles

0 1

Miles

1 1 0 2

Route of British Troops
American Military History

50

blunders heroically redeemed.” The American command structure violated the principle of unity of command from the start; in moving onto 

Breed’s Hill, the patriots exposed an important part of their force in 

an indefensible position, violating the principles of security, mass, and 

maneuver. Gage and Howe, for their parts, sacrificed all the advantages

the American blunders gave them, violating the principles of maneuver and surprise by undertaking a frontal attack on a fortified position.

Their gamble to end the rebellion with a single stroke had failed. 

Bunker Hill was a Pyrrhic victory, its strategic effect practically nil 

since the two armies remained in virtually the same position they had 

held previously. Its consequences, nevertheless, cannot be ignored. 

Although frequently depicted as a force of farmers and townsmen, 

fresh from their fields and shops, with hardly a semblance of orthodox

military organization, the New Englanders used their militia training 

to field forces modeled on the British. Led by officers with, in some

case, more direct combat experience than many of Gage’s, the Americans had met and fought on equal terms with a professional British 

Army. On some of the more senior British commanders this astonishing feat had a sobering effect, for it taught them that American 

resistance was not to be easily overcome; never again would British 

commanders lightly attempt such an assault on Americans in fortified positions. Many Americans, on the other hand, misread the battle.

Bunker Hill, along with Lexington and Concord, went far to create 

an American myth that the citizen-soldier when aroused by patriotic 

emotion is more than a match for the trained professional, a tradition 

that was to be reflected in American military policy for generations

afterward.

Formation of the Continental Army

The response of George III and his ministers to the events at Lexington, Concord, and Bunker Hill was a determined effort to subdue 

the rebellious colonists by force. It took time to mount this effort, and 

after Bunker Hill the Americans enjoyed a respite lasting almost a year. 

During most of this period the Second Continental Congress reacted 

to the events in New England and New York by hesitantly assuming the 

mantle of leadership, but it continued to assert that these actions were 

defensive in nature. It charged that Americans had banded together to 

oppose the unconstitutional actions of Parliament but that they still 

hoped to find a formula for reconciliation by appealing directly to the

King for justice. Military preparations were designed for a short struggle, to endure no longer than the end of the year 1776. Nevertheless,

the Americans took advantage of the respite to create a national army, 

to consolidate their hold on the governmental machinery throughout 

the thirteen colonies, to invade Canada, and finally to force the British

to evacuate Boston.

The creation of the Continental Army was in the long run perhaps 

their most significant achievement. Some time before Bunker Hill the

Massachusetts Provincial Congress, aware of the necessity of enlisting the support of all the colonies in the struggle against the British, 

appealed to the Continental Congress to adopt the New England army. 

Because of the need to preserve secrecy, Congress made its decision as 

The Americans had met and 

fought on equal terms with a 

professional British Army. 
The American Revolution, First Phase

51

a committee of the whole. After determining the necessity of accepting national responsibility for the troops at Boston and in New York, 

Congress voted to create the Continental Army on June 14, 1775. On 

the same day it voted to raise ten companies of riflemen—the first

soldiers to be enlisted directly in the Continental service—in Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia to march north to join the army before 

Boston. The message was clear: This was no regional outbreak of violence but was instead the united response of all of the mainland North 

American colonies.

The next day, June 15, Congress chose George Washington, a Virginian, to be Commander in Chief. As was the case with the riflemen,

Congress made the choice for geographical and political as much as for 

military reasons. The New Englanders felt a southerner should be chosen for the post to prove that this was not a New England–only conflict. Washington’s military experience was perhaps greater than that of

any other American, and he came from the largest and most important 

of the southern colonies. His impressive appearance, quiet and confident manner, and good work in the military committees of Congress 

had impressed all.

The choice proved fortunate. Washington himself recognized, 

when he accepted the command, that he lacked the requisite experience 

and knowledge in handling large bodies of men. His whole military 

experience had been in frontier warfare during the French and Indian 

War. But he had commanded a brigade of troops from several colonies 

during the capture of Fort Duquesne in the French and Indian War—

he was the only native-born American up to that time to command a 

force of that size. Experience gained as a political leader in his native 

Virginia and in directing the business affairs of his large plantation at 

Mount Vernon also stood him in good stead. He brought to the task 

traits of character and abilities as a leader that in the end more than 

compensated for his lack of European military experience. Among 

these qualities were a determination and a steadfastness of purpose 

rooted in an unshakable conviction of the righteousness of the American cause, a scrupulous sense of honor and duty, and a dignity that 

inspired respect and confidence in those around him. Conscious of his

own defects, he was always willing to profit by experience. From the triThe Army Birthday

The creation of a truly American Army on June 14, 1775, was highly significant to the history of our 

emerging nation. While the colonial militias and volunteer Minutemen were easily aroused in anger and 

invaluable in controlling population and resources in the countryside, they often melted away as fast 

as they were raised. In addition, those forces often identified with their own state or region. However, 

the first ten companies of Continental Army soldiers were a national force even before the nation was 

fully formed. The first continentals were recruited from several states and were sent from one end of the 

thirteen colonies and then states to another. In time a nation would grow out of the seeds planted by each 

continental soldier as he signed up not as a “summer soldier” or “sunshine patriot,” to use the immortal 

words of Tom Paine, but as an American soldier in service to his nation whenever and wherever needed.
American Military History

52

als and tribulations of eight years of war he was to learn the essentials 

of strategy, tactics, and military organization.

Congress also appointed four major generals and eight brigadiers to 

serve under Washington,set up a series of staff offices closely resembling

those in the British Army, prescribed a pay scale and standard ration, and 

adopted Articles of War to govern the military establishment. The same 

mixture of geographical, political, and military considerations governed 

the choice of Washington’s subordinates. Two-thirds of them came from 

New England, in recognition of the fact that the existing army was a New 

England army. Three others—Charles Lee, Horatio Gates, and Richard 

Montgomery—were chosen because of their experience in the British 

Army. Lee in particular, who had come from England to the colonies in 

1773, was in 1775 deemed the foremost military expert in America, and 

he was for a time to be Washington’s first assistant.

The army of which Washington formally took command on July 

3, 1775, he described as “a mixed multitude of people ... under very 

little discipline, order or government.” Out of this mixed multitude, 

Washington set out to create an army shaped in large part in the British 

image. Basing his observations on his experience with British regulars 

during the French and Indian War, he wrote: “Discipline is the soul of 

an army. It makes small numbers formidable; procures success to the 

weak and esteem to all.” Employing Gates, his experienced Adjutant 

General, to prepare regulations and orders, the Commander in Chief 

set out to inculcate discipline. He and his staff made a strenuous effort 

to halt the random comings and goings of officers and men and to

institute regular roll calls and strength returns. Suspicious of the “leveling” tendencies of the New Englanders, Washington made the distinction between officers and enlisted men more rigid. He introduced

various punishments (lash, pillory, wooden horse, and drumming out 

of camp), and courts-martial sat almost constantly.

While establishing discipline in the existing army, Washington had 

at the same time to form a new one enlisted directly in the Continental 

service. Out of conferences with a congressional committee that visited camp in September 1775 emerged a plan for such an army, composed of 26 regiments of infantry of 728 men each, plus 1 regiment of

riflemen and 1 of artillery, 20,372 men in all, to be uniformly paid, supplied, and administered by the Continental Congress and enlisted to the 

end of the year 1776. Except for the short term of enlistment, it was an

excellent plan on paper; but Washington soon found he could not carry 

it out. Both officers and men resisted a reorganization that cut across

the lines of the locally organized units in which they were accustomed 

to serve. The men saw as their first obligation their families and farms

at home, and they were reluctant to reenlist for another year’s service. 

On December 10, despite pressures and patriotic appeals, many of the 

Connecticut men went home and militia from New Hampshire and 

Massachusetts had to be brought in to fill their places in the line. Others, who had jeered and hooted when the Connecticut men left, also 

went home when their enlistment expired only three weeks later. On 

January 1, 1776, when the army became “Continental in every respect,”

Washington found that he had only slightly more than 8,000 troops in 

the lines around Boston instead of the 20,000 planned. Returns in early 

March showed only a thousand or so more. “I have often thought how 

“Discipline is the soul of an 

army. It makes small numbers 

formidable; procures success to 

the weak and esteem to all.”
The American Revolution, First Phase

53

much happier I would have been,” wrote a sorely tried commander, “if, 

instead of accepting a command under such circumstances, I had taken 

up musket on my shoulder and entered the ranks, or, if I could have 

justified the measure to posterity and

myown conscience, had retired

to the back country and lived in a Wigwam.”

While waiting for the regiments to reach full strength, short-term 

militiacontinuedtofillthegaps inthe lines.A Continental Army had

been formed, but it fell far short of the goals Washington and Congress 

had set for it. This army was enlisted for but a year, and the whole trou-

blesome processwould haveto be repeated attheend of 1776.The short

term of enlistment was, of course, a cardinal error; but in 1775 everyone, 

including Washington, had anticipated only a short campaign.

While organizing and disciplining his army, Washington had also to 

maintainthe siege of Boston andovercome his deficiencies in supply.

In these efforts he was more successful. Congress and the individual 

colonies sponsored voyages to the West Indies, where the French and 

Dutch had conveniently exported quantities of war materials. Wash-

ington put some of his troops on board ship and with an improvised 

navy succeeded in capturing numerous British supply ships. He sent 

Col. Henry Knox, later to be his Chief of Artillery, to Fort Ticond-

eroga; and Knox in

thewinter of 1775–1776 brought somefifty pieces

of captured cannon to Cambridge over poor or nonexistent roads in 

icebound NewYork and New England. By March 1776, despite defi-

ciencies in the number of continentals, Washington was ready to close 

in on Boston.

The Invasion of Canada and the Fall of Boston

The major military operations of 1775 and early 1776were not

around Boston but in faraway Canada, which the Americans considered 

the fourteenth colony needing only a little shove to join the others in 

rebellion against Britain. Canada seemed a tempting and vulnerable tar-

get. To take it would eliminate a British base at the head of the familiar 

invasion route along the lake and river chain connecting the St. Law-

rence with the Hudson. Congress, while appealing to the Canadians to 

join in the cause, in late June 1775 instructed Maj. Gen. Philip Schuyler 

of New York to take possession of Canada if “practicable” and “not 

disagreeable to the Canadians.”

Schuyler managed to get together a force of about 2,000 men from 

New York and Connecticut, thus forming the nucleus of what was to 

become known as the Northern Army. In September 1775 Brig. Gen. 

Richard Montgomery set out with this small army from Ticonderoga 

with the objective of taking Montreal. To form a second prong to the 

invasion, Washington detached a force of 1,100 under Col. Benedict 

Arnold, includinga contingent of riflemen under Capt. Daniel Mor-

gan of Virginia, to proceed up the Kennebec River, across the wilds 

of Maine, and down the Chaudière to join with Montgomery before 

Quebec. (See Map 4.) Montgomery, advancing along the route via Lake 

George, Lake Champlain, and the Richelieu River, was seriously delayed 

at the British fort at St. Johns but managed to capture Montreal on 

November 13. Arnold, meanwhile, had arrived opposite Quebec on 

November 8, after one of the most rugged marches in history. Part of 
American Military History

54

his force had turned back, and 

others were lost by starvation, 

sickness, drowning, and desertion. Only 600 men crossed the

St. Lawrence on November 13, 

and in imitation of Wolfe scaled 

the cliffs and encamped on the 

Plains of Abraham. It was a 

magnificent feat, but the force

was too small to prevail even 

against the scattered Canadian 

militia and British regulars who, 

unlike Montcalm, shut themselves up in the city and refused 

battle in the open. 

Arnold’s men were finally

forced to withdraw to Point 

aux Trembles, where Montgomery joined them with all the 

men he could spare from the 

defense of Montreal—a total 

of 300. Although the Canadians did raise two regiments for 

the Continental Army, most did 

not rally to the American cause. 

With the enlistments of about 

half their men expiring by the 

new year, Arnold and Montgomery undertook a desperate 

assault on the city during the 

night of December 30 in the 

middle of a raging blizzard. 

The defenders outnumbered 

the Americans, and the attack 

was a failure. Montgomery was 

killed and Arnold wounded.

The wounded Arnold, 

undaunted, continued to keep 

up the appearance of a siege 

with the scattered remnants of 

his force while he waited for 

reinforcements. Continental 

regiments raised in New York, 

New Jersey, and Pennsylvania 

came in driblets. There were 

never enough to build a force capable of again taking the offensive, 

though a total of 8,000 men were eventually committed to the Canadian campaign. Smallpox and other diseases took their toll; and the 

supply line never brought in adequate food, clothing, or ammunition. 

Meanwhile, the British received reinforcements and in June 1776 struck

back against a disintegrating American army that retreated before them 

almost without a fight. By mid-July the Americans were back at TiconMap 4

3 Nov

13 Nov

Richelieu River

Lake

Champlain

Lake

George

S t . L a w r e n c e R i v e r

Chaudière River

Connecticut River

Kennebec River

Hudson River

St. Johns

Ft. Ticonderoga

Montreal

Crown Point

Pte.-aux-Trembles

QUEBEC 

Pt. Levis

Cambridge

BOSTON

0 5 25 0

Miles

28 August–2 December 1775

AMERICAN ATTACK ON QUEBEC

Arnold’s Route, 11 Sep–8 Nov 1775

Montgomery’s Route, 28 Aug–2 Dec 1775

High Ground Above 600 Feet
The American Revolution, First Phase

55

deroga, where they had started less than a year earlier. The initiative on 

the northern front passed to the British.

While the effort to conquer Canada was moving toward its dismal end, Washington finally took the initiative at Boston. On March

4, 1776, he moved onto Dorchester Heights and emplaced his newly

acquired artillery in position to menace the city; a few days later he 

fortified Nook’s Hill, standing still closer in. On March 17 the British

moved out. It would be presumptuous to say that their exit was solely a 

consequence of American pressure. Sir William Howe, who succeeded 

Gage in command, had concluded long since that Boston was a poor 

strategic base and intended to stay only until the transports arrived to 

take his army to Halifax in Nova Scotia to regroup and await reinforcements. Nevertheless, Washington’s maneuvers hastened his departure, 

and the reoccupation of Boston was an important psychological victory for the Americans, balancing the disappointments of the Canadian campaign. The stores of cannon and ammunition the British were 

forced to leave behind were a welcome addition indeed to the meager 

American arsenal.

The New Nation

The Declaration of Independence on July 4, 1776, established a

new nation and transformed a limited uprising to secure rights within 

the British Empire into a far-reaching revolution aimed at complete 

independence from British control. Since the King and his ministers 

had determined to restore British rule, the Americans now faced a long, 

hard struggle for independence that required a sustained national effort 

such as they had not expected in 1775.

The new nation was still a weak confederation of thirteen independent states. Such national feeling as existed was a new phenomenon 

growing out of common opposition to British measures. Colonial tradition, divided loyalties, the nature of the economy, and the spirit of 

a revolt born in opposition to the use of military force to suppress 

popular liberties all worked against the creation of any new strong central authority capable of mobilizing resources effectively for the long 

struggle that lay ahead.

The thirteen states proclaiming their independence in 1776 possessed a total population of about 2.5 million people, but not all the 

males of military age were part of the military potential. About 20 

percent were African American slaves who except under special circumstances were not eligible for service, though African Americans did 

serve in the Revolution in integrated units (a feature that Americans did 

not repeat until after World War II). A significant minority within the

colonies remained loyal to the King, either reluctantly out of sense of 

obligation or passionately as armed supporters. As in any society, there 

were also the apathetic and indifferent who swayed with the tide. The 

genuine patriots still provided a far larger potential of military manpower than the British could possibly transport and supply across the 

Atlantic, but most of the men of military age were farmers with families. Whatever their patriotic sentiments, few were ready to undertake 

long terms of military service, fearing that their farms and families at 

home would suffer. Accustomed to the tradition of short-term militia 

The Americans now faced a long, 

hard struggle for independence 

that required a sustained national 

effort.
American Military History

56

service under local commanders, they infinitely preferred it to longer

terms in the Continental Army.

The economy of the thirteen new states was neither self-sufficient

nor truly national. The states were essentially a collection of separate 

agricultural communities accustomed to exchanging their agricultural 

surplus for British-manufactured goods and West Indian products. 

Manufacturing was still in its infancy, and America produced few of 

the essentials of military supply. Despite diligent efforts to promote 

domestic production during the war years, the Continental Army had 

to rely primarily on captures and imports from Europe and the West 

Indies, run through a British blockade, for much of its military hardware and even for clothing. While the country produced foodstuffs in 

ample quantity, transport from one area to another was difficult. The

normal avenues of commerce ran up and down the rivers, not overland; 

roads running north and south were few and inadequate. There were 

always shortages of wagons, boats, and other means of transportation. 

Under these circumstances, it was far easier to support local militia for a 

few days or weeks than any sizable and continuously operating national 

army in the field.

The governmental machinery created after the Declaration was 

characterized by decentralization and executive weakness. The thirteen 

new “free and independent states” transformed their existing de facto 

Presenting the Declaration of Independence, John Trumbull, 1796

Image removed due to

license restrictions
The American Revolution, First Phase

57

revolutionary governments into legal state governments by adapting 

institutions. Almost invariably the new constitutions vested most of the 

powers of government in the state legislatures, successors to the popular assemblies of the colonial period, and severely restricted the executive authority of the governors. At the national level the same general 

distrust of strong authority was apparent; and the existing Continental 

Congress, essentially a gathering of delegates chosen by the state legislatures and without either express powers of its own or an executive 

to carry out its enactments, was continued as the only central governing body. Articles of Confederation stipulating the terms of union and 

granting Congress specific but limited powers were drawn up shortly

after the Declaration, but jealousies among the states prevented ratification until 1781. In the interim, Congress exercised most of the powers 

granted it under the Articles; but the Articles did not include either the 

right to levy taxes or the power to raise military forces directly under its 

auspices. Congress could only determine the Confederation’s need for 

troops and money to wage war and set quotas for the states to meet in 

proportion to their population and wealth. It had no means of ensuring 

that the states met their quotas; indeed, they seldom did.

One major weakness of this decentralized structure was that it provided no adequate means of financing the war. The state legislatures,

possessing the power to tax that Congress lacked, hesitated to use it 

extensively in the face of popular opposition to taxation and was usually 

embarrassed to meet even its own expenses. Congress very early took 

unto itself the power to issue paper money and to negotiate domestic 

and foreign loans, but it shared these powers with the states, which also 

printed paper money in profusion and borrowed both at home and 

abroad to the extent they could. The paper money was a useful expedient in the early part of the war; indeed, the Revolution could not have 

been carried on without it. But successive issues by Congress and the 

states led to first gradual and then galloping inflation, leaving the phrase

“not worth a Continental” as a permanent legacy in the American language. The process of depreciation and the exhaustion of credit gradually robbed both the states and Congress of the power to pay troops, 

buy supplies, and otherwise meet the multitudinous expenses of war.

Evolution of the Continental Army

It is not surprising that under these circumstances Washington 

never got the kind of army molded in the European image that he 

desired. The experience before Boston in 1775 was repeated many 

times, as local militia had to be called in frequently to give the American 

Army a numerical superiority in the field. The Continental Army nevertheless became the center of American resistance and its commander, 

Washington, the symbol of the patriot cause. The extent to which militia could be expected to rally to that cause was very largely determined 

by the Continental Army’s success or failure in the field.

Though the militia belonged to the states, the Continental Army 

was a creation of the Continental Congress. Congress prescribed its 

size and composition, chose its generals, commissioned its officers, and

governed the system for its administration and supply. Suspicious on 

principle of a standing army and acutely aware of historic examples of 

Articles of Confederation 

stipulating the terms of union 

and granting Congress specific 

but limited powers were drawn 

up shortly after the Declaration, 

but jealousies among the states 

prevented ratification until 1781. 

In the interim, Congress exercised 

most of the powers granted it 

under the Articles; but the Articles 

did not include . . . the power to 

raise military forces directly.
American Military History

58

seizure of political power by military leaders, its members kept a watch-

ful eye on the Army’s commanders and insisted they defer to civilian 

authority. Washington countered these suspicions by constantly defer-

ring to congressional wishes, and he was rewarded by the assiduity with 

which Congress usually adopted his recommendations.

Lacking an executive, Congress had to rely on committees and 

boards to carry out its policies—unwieldy devices at best and centers 

of conflicting interest and discord at

worst. InJune 1776 it set upa

Board ofWar and Ordnance

, consisting of five of its members, the

lineal ancestor of the War Department. In 1777 Congress changed the 

composition of the board, directing that it henceforth be made up of 

persons outside Congress who could devote full time to their military 

duties. Neither of these devices really worked well, and Congress con-

tinually handled administrative matters by action of the entire member-

ship or by appointment of special committees to go to camp. In 1781, 

with the implementation of the Articles of Confederation, the board 

was replaced by a single Secretary at War.

Under the Articles of Confederation, while the Continental Con-

gress passed the authorizing legislation setting the terms, size, and con-

figuration of the army, the states remained responsible for raising the

troops. Therefore, recruiting and equipping efforts depended heavily 

on thirteen separate bodies, each acting in response to local condi-

tions and concerns. State authorities called out militia sometimes at the 

request of Congress and sometimes on their own initiative. When they 

joined the Continental Army, the militia normally shared in its supplies 

and equipment. The states, however, maintained an interest in supply-

ing and administering the troops of their own “lines” as well as their 

militia. As a result, the Continental agents continually went through 

delicate negotiations with state officials any time they tried to accom

-

plish major tasks. Lines of authority crisscrossed at every turn.

Itwas an inefficient military system for an organized national

effort. Washington could never depend on having enough trained men 

or supplies

. He continually inveighed against sending militia to fight

his battles andb

y early 1776 had concluded that he needed an army

enlisted for the duration of the war. Congress did not, as has often 

been charged, ignore his wishes. In October it voted a new establish-

ment, superseding the plan developed for the army before Boston in 

1775 and haphazard arrangements made in the interim for raising Con-

tinental regiments in various states. This establishment was to contain 

eighty-eight infantr

y regiments, or about 60,000 men, enlisted to serve

three years or “during the present war,” with each state assigned a quota 

in proportion to its population. After the disastrous retreat across New 

Jersey in December 1776, Congress authorized additional regiments to

be recruitedbyWashington’s officers directly into the Continental ser-

vice, including regiments of artillery and light cavalry. These regiments 

remained the authorized strength of the Continental Army until 1781, 

when Congress cut it to fifty-nine.

The large army fell short from the start. Many states found it 

impossible to sustain their quotas, especially as the war dragged on. 

By the winter of 1777–1778, the effort to enlist men for the dura-

tion of the war collapsed; the following spring, with the sanction of 

Washington, Congress reverted to a system of shorter enlistments and 
The American Revolution, First Phase

59

recommended to the states that they institute a system of drafting men 

from the militia for one year’s service. This first American wartime

draft was applied irregularly because it was not a national program. 

Each state followed its own policies and procedures, some effectively; 

but most states performed no better when trying to draft men than 

they had when trying to encourage volunteers. Bounties, instituted by 

both the states and the Congress very early in the war and progressively 

increased one step behind the pace of inflation, also produced only

temporary and irregular results.

The coin did have another side. In reality the shortage of arms and 

ammunition and of facilities for producing them limited the number 

of men who could be kept continuously in the field as effectively as did

the failure of enlistment drives. The militia system allowed many ablebodied males to perform part-time military service and still remain 

most of the time in the labor force that kept the economy going. It is 

doubtful whether the American economy could have sustained such 

an army as Washington and Congress had proposed in 1776, even had

there been a central administration with adequate power. As it was, the 

small Continental Army that did remain in the field intermittently faced

extreme hardship and even near starvation. On the other hand, the 

American ability to raise local armies in any threatened region helped 

to balance the strategic mobility that the British Fleet gave to the British Army. Although militia generally did not perform well in regular 

warfare, when highly motivated and ably led they could fight well on

terrain suited to their capabilities. Washington and most of his generals recognized this and sought to use the mobilized militia for flank

security or to perform envelopments of isolated British detachments 

and outposts. Given the conditions under which the Revolution was 

fought, the American military system was more effective than its critics 

have recognized, though it failed to provide adequately for a sustained 

military effort over a period of years.

Perhaps Washington’s greatest achievement was simply in maintaining the Continental Army continuously in the field. Despite its

many vicissitudes and defeats, that army remained constituted as an 

Extract from the Draft Articles of Confederation, 

Article XVIII, July 12, 1776

The United States assembled shall have Authority for the Defence and Welfare of the United 

Colonies and every of them, to agree upon and fix the necessary Sums and Expences—To emit Bills, 

or to borrow Money on the Credit of the United Colonies—To raise Naval Forces—To agree upon 

the Number of Land Forces to be raised, and to make Requisitions from the Legislature of each 

Colony, or the Persons therein authoritized [sic] by the Legislature to execute such Requisitions, for the 

Quota of each Colony, which is to be in Proportion to the Number of white Inhabitants in the Colony, 

which Requisitions shall be binding, and thereupon the Legislature of each Colony or the Persons 

authorized as aforesaid, shall appoint the Regimental Officers, raise the Men, and arm and equip 

them in a soldier-like Manner; and the Officers and Men so armed and equipped, shall march to the 

Place appointed, and within the Time agreed on by the United States assembled.
American Military History

60

ever-present threat to any British field force, while the American militia

units solidified patriot control of all the areas not fully garrisoned by

the British. The Army of the United States was thus shaped by the 

war into a distinctively American military organization, neither a replica 

of a professional European Army on which it was modeled nor yet 

the type of national army raised by conscription that was to appear in 

France after the Revolution of 1789.

The Continental Army operated in territorial divisions or departments, each containing one or more maneuver forces. Washington 

exercised direct command over the main area and defended the Middle 

States, operating most of the time in the area between New York City 

and Philadelphia. After the British retreat from Boston, the New England department operated mostly in the Rhode Island area. The Northern Department was located in northern New York, and the Southern 

Department controlled military operations in the Carolinas, Virginia, 

and Georgia. Two additional departments existed at times with limited 

independent roles: the Western Department centered on Pittsburgh, 

and the Canadian Department focused on Canada until the retreat 

from that region in the summer of 1776. A special territorial area, the

Highlands Department, consisting of the mountains in the vicinity of 

West Point, was an area of such great strategic concern that it deserved 

its own department. 

Although Washington was Commander in Chief of the Continental Army, the commanders of the other departmental armies still operated with a considerable measure of independence. Congress, rather 

than Washington, named their commanders and communicated directly 

with them. Of the two “separate armies,” the Northern Army was by 

far the most important until 1777; the small Southern Army performed 

limited defensive missions in a relatively quiet sector of the country. 

By 1780 the situation was reversed as the British transferred their main 

effort to the southern states.

The Continental Army was composed mainly of infantry with limited cavalry and artillery. The basic unit of infantry organization was 

the regiment, composed of eight or more companies. Regiments were 

administrative formations; different terms were used when talking about 

tactical employment. A battalion served as the basic tactical unit. It contained eight platoons, the number needed in linear warfare to provide 

a constant wave of volley fire. Customarily in both the American and

British armies of the Revolution, a regiment of eight companies would 

form a single battalion with each company serving as a single platoon. A 

brigade was usually formed of several regiments plus an attached direct 

support artillery company and was usually commanded by a brigadier 

general; a division consisted of several brigades commanded by a major 

general. In the northern areas, the artillery consisted of a brigade of four 

regiments and several separate companies under the Chief of Artillery, 

Henry Knox. Knox employed some of the separate companies in direct 

support of the infantry brigades but used others in garrison or general support assignments. The army’s mounted arm consisted of four 

regiments of light dragoons, normally employed in reconnaissance and 

counterreconnaissance duties, plus several smaller units, including two 

deep-strike partisan corps (a mix of light dragoons and light infantry). 

Other regular forces included a corps of engineers; three companies of 

Although Washington was 

Commander in Chief of the 

Continental Army, the commanders 

of the other departmental armies 

still operated with a considerable 

measure of independence.
The American Revolution, First Phase

61

sappers and miners; several military police elements; two regiments of 

artificers, who handled the servicing and repair of ordnance and vehicles; and a headquarters guard force.

Washington was provided with a staff generally corresponding to 

that of contemporary European armies. One of his critical staff officers was the Quartermaster General, responsible not only for transportation and delivery of supplies but also for arranging the camp, 

regulating marches, and employing the army’s watercraft. There were 

also an Adjutant General (responsible for issuing orders for the commander and administrative paperwork), a Judge Advocate General, a 

Paymaster General, a Commissary General of Musters, several Commissary Generals of Provisions (procurement and issue of rations), a 

Clothier General, a Chief Surgeon, and a Chief Engineer. Each of the 

separate armies usually had staff officers in these positions, designated

as deputies to those of the main army. Early in 1778 the Continental Army introduced a new innovation—the Inspector General. This 

officer provided a focal point for developing standard battle drills and

written tactical texts and during the second half of the war emerged as 

Washington’s de facto chief of staff.

All these staff officers had primarily administrative and supply

functions. The modern concept of a general staff that acts as a sort 

of collective brain for the commander had no real counterpart in the 

eighteenth century. For advice on strategy and operations, Washington 

relied on a council of war made up of his principal subordinate commanders; and, conforming to his original instructions from Congress, 

he usually consulted the council before making major decisions.

Both organization and staff work suffered from the ills that 

afflicted the whole military system. Regiments were constantly under

strength, were organized differently by the various states, and prior to 

Valley Forge used varying systems of drills and training. In the promotion of officers in the state lines, Continental commanders shared

authority with the states; the confused system gave rise to all sorts of 

rivalries, jealousies, and resentment, leading to frequent resignations. 

Staff officers were generally inexperienced, and few had the patience

and perseverance to overcome the obstacles posed by divided authority, 

inadequate means, and poor transportation and communication facilities. The supply and support services of the Continental Army never 

really functioned efficiently; and with the depreciation in the currency,

they came close to collapse.

The British Problem

Whatever the American weaknesses, the British government faced no 

easy task when it undertook to subdue the revolt by military force. Even 

though England possessed the central administration, stable financial

system, and well-organized army and navy that the Americans so sorely 

lacked, the whole establishment was ill prepared in 1775 for the struggle 

in America. A large burden of debt incurred in the wars of the preceding 

century had forced crippling economies on both Army and Navy. British 

administrative and supply systems, though far superior to anything the 

Americans could improvise, were also characterized by division and confusion of authority; and there was much corruption in high places.

Contrary to popular belief, American soldiers 

in the Revolutionary War generally carried 

cartridge boxes, rather than powder horns and 

shot pouches. The cartridge box held fixed 

cartridges of paper for faster loading, even in 

damp weather. This Pattern 1777 cartridge box 

represents one of the Army’s first attempts at 

standardizing military equipment.
American Military History

62

To suppress the revolt, Britain had first to raise the necessary forces,

then transport and sustain them over 3,000 miles of ocean, and finally

use them effectively to regain control of a vast and sparsely populated 

territory. Recruiting men for an eighteenth century army was most difficult. The British government had no power to compel service except in

the militia in defense of the homeland, and service in the British Army 

overseas was immensely unpopular. To meet Howe’s request for 50,000 

men to conduct the campaign in 1776, the ministry resorted to an old

practice of obtaining auxiliary troops, mercenaries, from many of the 

small German states, particularly Hesse-Cassell (hence Hessians). These 

German states were to contribute almost 30,000 men to the British service during the war—complete organizations with their own officers up

to the rank of lieutenant general and schooled in the system of Frederick 

the Great. Howe did not get his 50,000 men; but by midsummer 1776 his

force had grown to 30,000 British and Hessians, and additional reinforcements were sent to Canada during the year. 

Maintaining a force of this size proved to be another problem. 

The attrition rate in America from battle losses, sickness, disease, and 

desertion was tremendously high. English jails and poorhouses were 

drained of able-bodied men; bounties were paid; patriotic appeals were 

launched throughout England, Scotland, and Ireland; and all the ancient 

methods of impressments were tried. But the British were never able to 

recruit enough men to meet the needs of their commanders in America 

and at the same time defend the home islands and provide garrisons in 

the Caribbean, the Mediterranean, Africa, and India. 

Providing adequate support for this army over a long ocean supply 

line was equally difficult. Even for food and forage, the British Army

had to rely primarily on sea lines of supply. Transports were in short 

supply, the hardships of the two-to-four-month voyage terrible, and the 

loss of men and supplies to natural causes heavy. Moreover, though the 

Americans could muster no navy capable of contesting British control 

of the seas, their privateers and the ships of their infant navy posed 

a constant threat to unprotected troop and supply transports. British commanders repeatedly had to delay their operations to await the 

arrival of men and supplies from England.

Once in America, British armies could find no strategic center or

centers whose capture would bring victory. Flat, open country where 

warfare could be carried on in European style was not common. Woods, 

hills, and swamps suited to the operations of militia and irregulars were 

plentiful. A British Army that could win victories in the field over the

continentals had great difficulty in making those victories meaningful.

American armies seemed to possess miraculous powers of recuperation; a British force, once depleted or surrendered, took a tremendous 

effort to replace.

As long as the British controlled the seas, they could land and 

establish bases at nearly any point on the long American coastline. The 

many navigable rivers dotting the coast also provided water avenues of 

invasion well into the interior. But to crush the revolt, the British Army 

had to cut loose from coastal bases and rivers. When it did so, its logistical problems multiplied and its lines of communications became vulnerable to constant harassment. British armies almost inevitably came 

to grief every time they moved very far from the areas where they 

British armies could find no 

strategic center or centers whose 

capture would bring victory.
The American Revolution, First Phase

63

could benurturedby supply ships from the homeland.These difficul-

ties, a British colonel asserted in 1777, had “absolutely prevented us this 

whole war from going fifteen miles froma navigable river.”

The British could not, in any case, ever hope to muster enough 

strength to occupy with their own troops the vast territory they sought 

to restore to British rule. Their only real hope of meaningful victory 

was to use Americans loyal to the British cause to control the country, 

as one British general put it, to help “the good Americans to subdue 

the bad.” However, there were many obstacles to making effective use 

of the Tories. Patriot organization, weak at the center, was strong at the 

grass roots, in the local communities throughout America; the Tories 

were neither well organized nor energetically led. The patriots seized 

the machinery of local government in most communities at the outset, 

held it until the British Army appeared in their midst, and then nor-

mally regained it after the British departed. Strong local control enabled 

the patriots to root out the more ardent Tories at the very outset, and 

by making an example of them to sway the apathetic and indifferent. 

British commanders were usually disappointed in the number of Tories 

who flocked to their standards and even more upset

b

y the alacrity with

which many of them switched their allegiance when the British Army 

departed. They found the Tories a demanding, discordant, and puzzling 

lot; they made no earnest effort to enlist them in British forces until late 

in the war. By 1781 they had with their armies some 8,000 “provincial 

rank and file”; perhaps 50,000 in all served the British in some military

capacity during the war.

On the frontiers, the British could also expect support from the 

Indian tribes who almost inevitably drifted into the orbit of whatever 

power controlled Canada. But support from the Indians was a twoedged sword, for nothing could raise frontier enthusiasm for battle like 

the threat of an Indian attack. Ruthless Indian raids would often polar-

ize a frontier community that otherwise might have remained sympa-

thetic or at least neutral to the British cause.

Finally,

the British hadtofightthewarwith oneeye ontheir ancient

enemies in Europe. France, thirsting for revenge for its defeat in the 

Seven Years’ War, stood ready to aid the American cause if for no other 

purpose than to weaken British power. By virtue of the Bourbon family 

connections, France could almost certainly carry Spain along in any war 

with England. France and Spain could at the very least provide badly 

needed money and supplies to sustain the American effort and force the 

British to divert their forces from the contest in America. At most, the 

combined

Franco-Spanishfleet mightwell provea match forthe British

Fleet and neutralize that essential control of the seas the British needed 

to carry on the American war. As the war dragged on, the British found 

themselves increasingly isolated from the international community.

Of Strategy

The story of the American Revolution can hardly be told in terms 

of long-term strategy and its success or failure. Neither side ever had 

any really consistent plan for the conduct of the war. The British, who 

retained the strategic initiative most of the time, failed to use it to great 

advantage. They were highly uncertain about their objective; they laid 
American Military History

64

plans from year to year and seldom coordinated them even for a single 

year. Blame for this uncertain approach falls in almost equal part on 

the administration in England and the commanders in America. King 

George III; Lord North, his Principal Minister; and Lord George Germain, Secretary of State for the American Department, were the three 

British officials mainly responsible for the conduct of the war. If they

never provided the timely guidance that might have been expected of 

them, their inability to do so came about in part because the commanders in the field never furnished accurate enough predictions of what to

expect and differed so much among themselves as to the proper course 

to pursue. In assessing blame in this fashion, one must keep in mind the 

difficulties of logistics and communications under which the British

labored, for these difficulties made it virtually impossible to coordinate

plans over great distances or to assemble men and materials in time to 

pursue one logical and consistent plan. 

The American strategy was primarily defensive and consequently 

had to be shaped largely in terms of countering British moves. Uncertainties as to the supply of both men and materials acted on the American side even more effectively to thwart the development of a consistent plan for winning the war. Yet Washington was never so baffled by

the conditions of the war or uncertain of his objective as were the various British commanders. After some early blunders, he soon learned 

both his own and the enemy’s strengths and weaknesses and did his 

best to exploit them. Though unable to develop a consistent plan, he 

did try to develop a consistent line of action. He sought to maintain his 

principal striking force in a central position to block any British advance 

into the interior; to be neither too bold nor too timid in seeking battle 

for limited objectives; to avoid the destruction of his army at all costs; 

and to find some means of concentrating a sufficient force to strike a

decisive offensive blow whenever the British overreached themselves. 

He showed a better appreciation than did the British commanders of 

the advantages in mobility their Navy gave them. After 1778, when the 

French entered the war, he clearly saw that the decisive blow he desired 

could be struck only by a combined effort of the Continental Army 

and the French Fleet.

The British Offensive in 1776

If the British ever had a single strategic objective in the war, it was 

the Hudson River–Lake Champlain line. The British believed that by 

taking and holding this line they would separate New England, considered to be the principal center of the rebellion, from colonies they considered more malleable in the south. Howe proposed to make this the 

main objective of his campaign in 1776 by landing at New York, securing a base of operations there, and then pushing north. He wanted to 

concentrate the entire British force in America in New York, but the 

British government diverted part of it to Canada in early 1776 to repel

the American invasion, laying the groundwork for the divided command that was so to plague British operations thereafter.

After the evacuation of Boston, Howe stayed at Halifax from March 

until June, awaiting the arrival of supplies and reinforcements. While he 

tarried, the British government ordered another diversion in the south, 

The American strategy was 

primarily defensive and 

consequently had to be shaped 

largely in terms of countering 

British moves. 
The American Revolution, First Phase

65

aimed at encouraging the numerous loyalists who, according to the royal 

governors watching from their havens on board British warships, were 

waiting only for the appearance of a British force to rise and overthrow 

rebel rule. Unfortunately for the British, a naval squadron and army 

expedition sent from Ireland under Sir Peter Parker was delayed and did 

not arrive off the American coast until late in May. By this time all hopes 

of effective cooperation with the Tories had been dashed. Loyalist contingents had been completely defeated and dispersed in Virginia, North 

Carolina, and South Carolina. 

Parker joined Lt. Gen. Henry Clinton, sent south by Howe, off 

the North Carolina coast. Undeterred by the local setbacks, they determined to attack Charleston, the largest city in the south. There, South 

Carolina militia and newly raised continentals from the Carolinas and 

Virginia had prepared and manned defenses under the guidance of 

Maj. Gen. Charles Lee, whom Washington had dispatched south to 

assist them. The South Carolinians, contrary to Lee’s advice, centered 

their defenses in Fort Moultrie, a palmetto log fort constructed on 

Sullivan’s Island, commanding the approach to the harbor. It was an 

unwise decision, somewhat comparable to that at Bunker Hill, but fortunately for the defenders the British had to mount an uncoordinated 

attack in haste. Clinton’s troops landed on nearby Long Island, but 

George Washington as

Military Commander

Although George Washington is universally 

acknowledged as the “father of his country,” it 

is only fitting to explain his position in history as 

a great military leader. If one merely scores him 

based on battlefield wins and losses, he might 

not be viewed in the first rank of commanders. However, his dynamic leadership qualities, 

strategic vision, and ability to make the most of 

tactical mobility make a mere tally of victories 

and defeats meaningless. Not for nothing did 

General Howe call him a “wily old fox.”

Washington took the rawest of American 

raw material and made soldiers out of them. 

He then kept them together as an army in the 

field despite defeats and deprivations and 

often turned on the pursuing British forces like a 

fox and dealt them sharp blows before escaping again. He learned from his mistakes, maintained a force in being, bottled up the British 

in coastal enclaves, and finally isolated and 

forced the surrender of a large British Army. 

He was a great military commander.

George Washington at Princeton

Charles Peale Polk, 1777 
American Military History

66

on the day the Navy attacked, June 28, the water proved too deep for 

them to wade across to Sullivan’s Island as expected. The British Army 

consequently sat idly by while the gunners in Fort Moultrie devastated 

the British warships. Sir Peter suffered the ultimate indignity when his 

pants were set afire.

The battered British Fleet hastily embarked the British soldiers and 

sailed north to join Howe at New York, for it was already behind schedule. For three years following the fiasco at Charleston the British were

to leave the south unmolested. Overconfident Americans decided they

did not need to send any large regular forces to the south, creating a 

weakness that would come back to haunt them. The latent loyalists in 

the south, whatever their potential strength in 1775, never recovered 

from the devastating blows they suffered while expecting British help. 

Loyalist refugees in London and New York, however, continued to insist 

that large numbers of loyal subjects of the King were still waiting for the 

British in the south, ready to rise again if only British troops returned. 

Howe was meanwhile beset by other delays in the arrival of transports from England, and his attack did not get under way until late 

August, leaving insufficient time before the advent of winter to carry

through the planned advance along the Hudson River–Lake Champlain 

line. He therefore started his invasion of New York with only the limited objective of gaining a foothold for the campaign the following 

year.

The British commander had, when his force was all assembled, 

an army of about 32,000 men, supported by a powerful fleet under

the command of his brother, Admiral Richard Howe. To oppose him, 

Washington had brought most of his army down from Boston; Congress exerted its utmost efforts to reinforce him by raising Continental regiments in the surrounding states and issuing a general call for 

the militia. Few of Washington’s roughly 19,000 troops could match 

Howe’s forces in training, nor did his senior commanders have much in 

the way of experience in maneuvering large forces in the open. 

Washington and Congress made the same decision the South Carolinians had made at Charleston and Maj. Gen. Sir Guy Carleton had 

made in Canada in 1775—to defend their territory in the most forward 

positions—and they paid the price for their mistake. The geography of 

the area gave the side possessing naval supremacy an almost insuperable advantage. The city of New York stood on Manhattan Island, surrounded by the Hudson, Harlem, and East Rivers. (Map 5) There was 

only one connecting link with the mainland, Kingsbridge across the 

Harlem River at the northern tip of Manhattan. Across the East River 

on Long Island, Brooklyn Heights stood in a position dominating the 

southern tip of Manhattan. With the naval forces at their disposal, the 

Howes could land troops on either Long Island or Manhattan proper 

and send warships a considerable distance up either the East or the 

Hudson River.

Washington decided he must defend Brooklyn Heights on Long 

Island if he was to defend Manhattan. He therefore divided his army 

between the two places—a violation of the principle of mass and the 

first step toward disaster. For all practical purposes, command on Long

Island was also divided. Maj. Gen. Nathanael Greene, to whom Washington first entrusted the command, came down with malaria and was

Few of Washington’s roughly 

19,000 troops could match 

Howe’s forces in training, nor 

did his senior commanders have 

much in the way of experience in 

maneuvering large forces in the 

open. 
Map 5

Harlem

Heights

Kip’s

Bay East River

H u d s o n R i v e r

H a rl em Ri v e r

NEW YORK

Bedford

Brooklyn

Kingsbridge

M A N H A T T A N I .

 to Jamaica

H u d s o n R i v e r

Passaic River

Hackensack River

Raritan River

Assunpink Creek

D e l a w a r e R i v e r

L O

N

G I S L A

N

D

S T A TEN

ISLAND

McConkey’s Ferry

Pell’s Pt.

PENNSYL V ANIA

NEW Y ORK

NEW JERSE Y

NEW JERSE Y

Newburgh

Peekskill

Stony Point

North Castle

White

Plains

Dobbs

Ferry

NEW YORK

Brooklyn

Morristown

New Brunswick Perth Amboy

Princeton

Trenton

Bordentown

West Point

Ft. Lee Ft. Washington

27 August 1776

BATTLE OF LONG ISLAND

American Lines (Approx)

British Attack

Miles

0 3

October–December 1776

RETREAT FROM NEW YORK

Miles

10 0 10

Route of American Retreat
American Military History

68

replacedby Maj. Gen.John Sullivan. Not completely satisfied with

this arrangement, at the last moment Washington placed Maj. Gen. 

Israel Putnam over Sullivan; but Putnam hardly had time to become 

acquainted with the situation before the British struck. The forces on 

Long Island,numbering about 10,000,were disposed in fortifications

on Brooklyn Heights and in forward positions in back of a line of 

thickly wooded hills that ran across the southern end of the island. Sul-

livan was in command on the left of the American forward line, Brig. 

Gen. William Alexander on the right. Four roads ran through the hills 

toward the American positions. (See Inset, Map 5.) Unfortunately Sul-

livan, in violation of the principle of security, left the Jamaica-Bedford 

road virtually unguarded.

Howe consequently was able to teach the Americans lessons in 

maneuver and surprise. On August 22 he landed a force of 20,000 on 

the southwestern tip of Long Island and, in a surprise attack up the 

Jamaica-Bedford road against

the American leftflank,crumpledthe

entire American position. Alexander’svaliantfight onthe rightwent

for naught as some of the more inexperienced American units along 

the line

fled interror beforethe British and Hessian bayonets, fall

-

ing bac

ktothe fortifications on Brooklyn Heights. Had Howe pushed

his advantage immediately, he might have carried the heights and 

destroyed half of the American Army then and there. Instead, perhaps 

rendered cautious by his repulse the previous year at Bunker Hill, he 

halted at nightfall and began to dig trenches, signaling an intent to take 

the heights by “regular approaches” in traditional eighteenth century 

fashion. Washington managed to evacuate his forces across the East 

River on the night of August 29. According to one theory, wind and 

weather stopped the British warships from entering the river to prevent 

the escape; according to another, the Americans had placed impedi-

ments in the river that effectively barred their entry. In any case, it was 

a narrow escape, made possible in large measure by the skill, bravery, 

and perseverance of Col. John Glover’s Marblehead Regiment, infan-

trymen

who had been recruited from Massachusettsfishing villages,

who manned the boats.

Washington had two weeks to prepare his defenses on Manhattan 

before Howe struck again, landing a force at Kip’s Bay above the city 

of New York (now about 34th Street) on September 15 under the cover 

of a devastating naval bombardment. Raw Connecticut militia posted 

behind shallow trenches at this point broke and ran “as if the Devil was 

in them,” defying even the efforts of a raging Washington to halt them. 

Howe once again had an opportunity to split the American Army in 

two and destroy half, but again he delayed midway across the island to 

wait until his entire force had landed. General Putnam was able to bring 

the troops stationed in the city up the west side of Manhattan to join 

their compatriots in new fortifications on Harlem Heights

.There, the

Americans held out for another month and even won a morale-enhanc

-

ing skirmish; but this position was vulnerable to being outflanked.

In mid-October Howe landed again in Washington’s rear at Pell’s 

Point.

The American commander then finally evacuated the Manhattan

trap via Kingsbridge and took up a new position at White Plains. He 

left a garrison behind to hold Forts Washington and Lee, on opposite 

sides of the Hudson, in an attempt to block British ships from going 
The American Revolution, First Phase

69

up the river. Howe launched a probing attack on the American position 

at White Plains and was repulsed; but Washington, sensing his inability 

to meet the British in battle on equal terms, moved away to the north 

toward the Hudson highlands. Uncertain of Howe’s next move, Washington divided his forces into three elements. Lee with one contingent 

remained on the east side of the Hudson to counter any advance into 

Connecticut. Washington crossed over to the west bank with a comparable force to counter any attempt by Howe to invade New Jersey. Maj. 

Gen. William Heath occupied the forts in the Highlands themselves to 

provide the lines of communication between the two maneuver forces 

and to prevent a British advance up the river. On November 16 Howe

turned against Fort Washington and with the support of British warships on the Hudson stormed it successfully, capturing 3,000 American 

troops and large quantities of valuable munitions. Greene then hastily 

evacuated Fort Lee; by the end of November Washington, with mere 

remnants of his army, was in full retreat across New Jersey with Lord 

Charles Cornwallis, detached by Howe, in hot pursuit.

While Washington was suffering these disastrous defeats, the army 

that had been gathered was slowly melting away. Militia left by whole 

companies when their periods of service expired. Casualties and disease 

took their toll among the continentals. By early December Washington had crossed the Delaware River into Pennsylvania, where his small 

force began to regroup and draw supplies from Philadelphia’s extensive 

network of depots. Other regiments, including forces released by the 

British retreat to Canada, slowly joined him while other regiments from 

Lee’s force swung through the Highlands and started south toward 

Washington (without their general, who was captured in a tavern by 

a British cavalry raid). Washington’s situation was precarious, but he 

determined to go on the offensive as soon as possible and began planning a lightning descent on West Jersey toward the end of December.

Neither the unreliability of the militia nor the short period of 

enlistment fully explained the debacle that had befallen the Continental 

Army. Washington’s generalship also came under criticism. In contrast 

to the defeat of British invasion forces at Charleston and Lake Champlain, where militia seemed to be more effective than Continental regulars, the main defenses of the important city of New York crumpled 

at the first blow. Many faulted the Commander in Chief’s decision to

hold Fort Washington. General Lee, the ex–British colonel, ordered 

by Washington to bring his forces down from New York to join him 

behind the Delaware, delayed, believing that he might himself salvage 

the American cause by making incursions into New Jersey. He wrote 

Horatio Gates, “entre nous [between us], a certain great man is most 

damnably deficient.”

There was only one bright spot in the picture in the autumn of 

1776. While Howe was routing Washington around New York City,

other British forces under Carleton were attempting to follow up the 

advantage they had gained in repulsing the attack on Canada earlier 

in the year. Carleton rather leisurely built a flotilla of boats to carry

British forces down Lake Champlain and Lake George, intending at 

least to reduce the fort at Ticonderoga before winter. Benedict Arnold 

countered by throwing together a much weaker flotilla of American

boats to contest the British passage. Arnold lost this naval action on 

While Washington was suffering 

these disastrous defeats, the 

army that had been gathered 

was slowly melting away.
American Military History

70

the lakes, but he so delayed Carleton’s advance that the British commander reached Ticonderoga too late in the year to consider undertaking a siege. He returned his army to winter quarters in Canada, leaving 

the British with no advance base from which to launch the next year’s 

campaign. Once again Arnold had shown himself one of the most 

dynamic and courageous of the patriot commanders.

Although the consequences were to be far reaching, this limited 

victory did little to dispel the gloom that fell on the patriots after Washington’s defeats in New York. The British, aware that Continental enlistments expired at the end of the year, had high hopes that the American Army would simply fade away and the rebellion would collapse. 

Howe halted Cornwallis’ pursuit of Washington and sent Clinton with 

a detachment of troops under naval escort to seize Newport, Rhode 

Island. He then dispersed his troops into winter quarters, establishing 

a line of posts in New Jersey at Perth Amboy, New Brunswick, Princeton, Trenton, and Bordentown and retiring himself to New York. 

Howe had gained the object of the 1776 campaign, a strong foothold,

and possibly, as he thought at the time, a great deal more.

Trenton and Princeton

While Howe rested comfortably in New York, he dispatched 

Clinton to capture Newport, Rhode Island, as a much-desired winter 

anchorage for the Royal Navy. Washington took advantage of this distraction. By the last week of December 1776, Washington had built up

a small, but competent striking force of veteran regiments about 7,000 

strong. If he was to use this force, he would have to do so before the 

enlistments expired on December 31. With great boldness, Washington formulated a plan to strike enemy garrisons along the Delaware 

River early on the twenty-sixth of December, when the troops might be 

expected to have relaxed their guard for holiday revelry. The plan was 

for American forces to cross the river simultaneously and conduct raids 

on the outposts at Trenton and Bordentown, each held by a reinforced 

brigade of Hessian soldiers. A Continental force of around 2,400 men 

under Washington’s personal command was to cross the Delaware at 

McConkey’s Ferry above Trenton and then proceed in two columns by 

different routes, converging on the opposite ends of the main street of 

Trenton in the early morning of December 26. (See Map 6.) A second 

force, mainly militia under Col. John Cadwalader, was to cross below 

near Bordentown to attack the Hessian garrison there. A third force, 

also militia, under Brig. Gen. James Ewing, was to cross directly opposite Trenton to block the Hessian route of escape across Assunpink 

Creek.

Christmas night was cold, windy, and snowy; and the Delaware 

River was filled with blocks of ice. These adverse conditions prevented

Cadwalader and Ewing from fulfilling their parts of the plan. Driven on

by Washington’s indomitable will, the main force did cross as planned; 

the two columns, commanded respectively by Greene and Sullivan, 

converged on Trenton at eight o’clock in the morning of December 

26, taking the Hessians completely by surprise. A New England private

noted in his diary for that day: “This morning at 4 a clock we set off 

with our Field pieces and Marched 8 miles to Trenton where we ware 

The British . . . had high hopes 

that the American Army would 

simply fade away and the 

rebellion would collapse.
The American Revolution, First Phase

71

attacked by a Number of Hushing and we Toock 1000 of them besides 

killed some. Then we marched back and got to the River at Night and 

got over all the Hushing.” This rather undramatic description of a very 

dramatic event was not far wrong, except in attributing the attack to the 

“Hushings.” The Hessians surrendered after a fight lasting only an hour

and a half. Forty were killed, and the prisoner count was 918. Only 400 

escaped to Bordentown, only because Ewing was not in place to block 

their escape. The Americans lost only 2 dead and 2 wounded, among 

the wounded being future President James Monroe.

Encouraged by this success, Washington determined to make 

another foray. By an impassioned appeal to the patriotism of the men, 

supplemented by an offer of a $10 bounty in hard money, he persuaded 

at least part of his old army to remain for six more weeks. With a 

force of around 5,000 Washington again crossed the Delaware on the 

night of December 30–31. By this time Cornwallis had hastily gathered together the scattered British garrisons in New Jersey and took 

up a position confronting Washington at Trenton on January 2, 1777. 

Convinced that he had the Americans in a trap, he put off battle until 

the next day because of the exhausted state of his troops. In the night 

Washington slipped away, leaving campfires burning brightly to deceive

Surrender of Hessian Troops to General Washington after the Battle of Trenton, December 1776, Artist Unknown, 1850

Image removed due to

license restrictions
American Military History

72

the British. The next morning he struck another surprise blow at Princeton, inflicting heavy losses on three British regiments just leaving the

town to join Cornwallis. Washington then went into winter quarters in 

the hills around Morristown, New Jersey. Cornwallis did not pursue. 

The British had had enough of winter warfare, and Howe drew in his 

outposts in New Jersey to New Brunswick and Perth Amboy.

Trenton and Princeton not only offset the worst effects of the 

disastrous defeats in New York but also restored Washington’s prestige 

as a commander with friend and foe alike. In the execution of the two 

strokes east of the Delaware, Washington had applied the principles 

of offensive, surprise, and maneuver with great success and finally

achieved stature as a military commander. If these victories did not 

assure him that he could recruit such an army as Congress had voted, 

they did at least guarantee that he would be able to field a force the following year. Sir William Howe found that, despite his smashing rout of 

the Americans in New York, he was left with little more than that city, a 

foothold in New Jersey, and the port of Newport in Rhode Island. The 

rebellion was far from being crushed.

Map 6

Assunpink Creek

D e l a w a r e R i v e r

WASHINGTON’S

MAIN BODY

SULLIVAN

GREENE

McConkey’s

Ferry

to Bordentown

TURNPIKE TO PRINCETON

OLD ROAD TO PRINCETON

TRENTON

26 December 1776

ATTACK ON TRENTON

Axis of American Advance

Miles

1 1 0
The American Revolution, First Phase

73

Discussion Questions

1. Discuss the various differences between the Massachusetts Min-

utemen and the British troops they fired on during the battles of Lex-

ington and Concord.

2. What were the strengths and weaknesses of the British military 

system and the new American Army in the opening days of the Revolu-

tion? What challenges did each side face in its attempts to prosecute its 

military operations?

3. Given the state of the American Army in 1776, how do

you

think Washington should have conducted operations in the New York 

City area? What should Howe have done?

4. Discuss the element of surprise in Washington’s attacks at Tren-

ton and Princeton. Did he make good use of this principle? What were 

the dangers in relying on surprise?

5. What role did Congress play in setting military policy and deter-

mining military operations in the opening days of the Revolution? Why 

was this important?

6.Whywas it importanttocreatethe Continental Army in 1775

rather than relying upon the existing state militias to prosecute the war? Recommended Readings

Flexner, James T. George Washington in the American Revolution, 1775–1783. 

Boston: Little, Brown, 1968.

Higginbotham, Don. The War of American Independence: Military Attitudes, 

Policies, and Practices. Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1983.

Mackesy, Piers. The War for America, 1775–1783. Lincoln: University 

of Nebraska Press, 1992.

Middlekauff, Robert. The Glorious Cause: The American Revolution, 

1763–1789. New York: Oxford University Press, 1982.

Royster, Charles W. A Revolutionary People at War: The Continental Army 

and American Character, 1775–1783. New York: Norton, 1981.

Tourtellot, Arthur B. William Diamond’s Drum: The Beginning of the War 

of the American Revolution. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1959.

Ward, Christopher. The War of the Revolution, ed. John R. Alden, 2 

vols. New York: Macmillan, 1952, vol. 1.

Other Readings

Alden, John R. General Gage in America: Being Principally a History of His 

Role in the American Revolution. New York: Greenwood Press, 1969.

Brown, Wallace. The Good Americans: The Loyalists in the American Revolu-

tion. New York: William Morrow, 1969.

Conway, Stephen. The War of American Independence, 1775–1783. New 

York: Edward Arnold, 1995.

Cress, Lawrence D. Citizen in Arms: The Army and the Militia in American 

Society to the War of 1812. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 

Press, 1982.
American Military History

74

French, Allen. The First Year of the American Revolution. New York: Octagon Books, 1968.

Gross, Robert A. The Minutemen and Their World. New York: Hill & 

Wang, 1976.

Gruber, Ira D. The Howe Brothers and the American Revolution. New York: 

Atheneum, 1972.

Higginbotham, Don, ed. Reconsiderations on the Revolutionary War: Selected 

Essays. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1978.

Hoffman, Ronald, and Peter J. Albert, eds. Arms and Independence: The 

Military Character of the American Revolution. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1984.

Palmer, Dave R. The Way of the Fox: American Strategy in the War for America, 1775–1783. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1975.

Wright, Robert K., Jr. The Continental Army. Washington, D.C.: U.S. 

Army Center of Military History, 1983.
The year 1777 was perhaps the most critical for the British. The 

issue, not necessarily understood clearly in London or America 

at the time, was whether the British could score such success in 

putting down the American revolt that the French would not dare enter 

the war openly to aid the American rebels. Yet it was in this critical year 

that British plans were most confused and British operations most disjointed. The British campaign of 1777 therefore provides one of the 

most striking object lessons in American military history of the dangers 

of divided command.

The Campaign of 1777

With secure bases at New York and Newport, Sir William Howe 

had a chance to get the early start in 1777 that had been denied him 

the previous year. His first plan, advanced on November 30, 1776, was

probably the most comprehensive put forward by any British commander during the war. He proposed to maintain a small force of 

about 8,000 to contain Washington in New Jersey and 7,000 to garrison 

New York, while sending one column of 10,000 from Newport into 

New England and another column of 10,000 from New York up the 

Hudson to form a junction with a British force moving down from 

Canada. On the assumption that these moves would be successful by 

autumn, he would next capture Philadelphia, the rebel capital, then 

make the southern provinces the “objects of the winter.” For this plan, 

Howe requested 35,000 men, 15,000 more effective troops than he had 

remaining at the end of the 1776 campaign. Lord George Germain,

the Secretary of State responsible for strategic planning for the American theater, could promise Howe only 8,000 replacements. Even before 

receiving this news, but evidently influenced by Trenton and Princeton,

Howe refined his plan and proposed to devote his main effort in 1777

4

The Winning of

Independence, 1777–1783
American Military History

76

to taking Philadelphia. On March 3, 1777, Germain informed Howe 

that the Philadelphia plan was approved but that there might be only 

5,500 reinforcements. At the same time Germain and the king urged a 

“warm diversion” against New England.

Meanwhile, Sir John Burgoyne, who had succeeded in obtaining 

the separate military command in Canada, submitted his plan for an 

advance south to “a junction with Howe.” Germain and the king also 

approved this plan on March 29, though they had earlier approved of 

Howe’s intention to go to Philadelphia. Because of the lag in communicating across the Atlantic, Germain and other senior planners in London 

viewed themselves merely as coordinators and providers of resources, 

not as operational commanders. Operational decisions, they felt, should 

be made by the commanders on the scene. They seem to have expected 

that Burgoyne and Howe would work together without direction from 

London. Specifically, they believed that Howe would be able to form

his junction with Burgoyne by the warm diversion or that he would take 

Philadelphia quickly and then turn north to aid Burgoyne. In any case, 

they felt sure that Howe’s drive south would draw Washington and most 

American troops away from Burgoyne. Once Germain approved the 

two separate plans, difficulties in communicating in a timely manner left

Howe and Burgoyne to go their separate ways. 

Howe’s Philadelphia plan left only enough force in New York under 

General Sir Henry Clinton for what the latter would call “a damn’d 

starved offensive,” but Clinton’s orders called upon him only to assist 

Burgoyne’s drive. His first priority remained the safety and security of

New York City and its outposts. There is no question that Burgoyne 

knew before he left England for Canada that Howe was going to Philadelphia, but ambitious “Gentleman Johnny” was determined to make 

a reputation in the American war. Never one to doubt his own abilities and having enjoyed swift victory by driving the Americans from 

the Ticonderoga complex with minimal effort, Burgoyne quickly convinced himself that he could succeed alone. Even when he learned certainly on August 3, 1777, that he could not expect Howe’s cooperation, 

he persisted in his design. As Howe thought Pennsylvania was filled

with loyalists, Burgoyne cherished the illusion that legions of Tories in 

upstate New York and western New England were simply awaiting the 

appearance of the king’s troops to rally to the colors.

Again in 1777 the late arrival of Howe’s reinforcements and supply ships gave General George Washington time that he sorely needed. 

Men to form the new Continental Army came in slowly, and not until 

June did the Americans have a force of 8,000. On the northern line, the 

defenses were even more thinly manned. Supplies for troops in the field

were also short, but the arrival of the first three ships bearing secret aid

from France vastly improved the situation. They were evidence of the 

covert support of the French government; a mission Congress sent 

to France was meanwhile working diligently to enlist open aid and to 

embroil France in a war with England. The French Foreign Minister, 

Charles Gravier, the Comte de Vergennes, had already decided to take 

that risk when and if the American rebels demonstrated their serious 

purpose and ability to fulfill it by some signal victory in the field.

With the first foreign material aid in 1777, the influx of foreign

officers into the American Army began. These officers were a mixed

Again in 1777 the late arrival of 

Howe’s reinforcements and supply 

ships gave General George 

Washington time that he sorely 

needed. 
The Winning of Independence, 1777–1783

77

blessing. Most were adventurers in search of fortune or of reputation 

with little aptitude for adjusting themselves to American conditions. 

Few were willing to accept any but the highest ranks. Nevertheless, 

many brought with them professional military knowledge and competence the Continental Army sorely lacked. When the misfits were

culled out, the knowledge and competence were used to considerable 

advantage. Louis DuPortail, a Frenchman, and Thaddeus Kosciuszko, 

a Pole, did much to advance the art of engineering in the Continental 

Army. Casimir Pulaski, another Pole, organized its first genuine cavalry

contingent. Johann de Kalb and Friedrich Wilhelm von Steuben, both 

Germans, and Maj. Gen. Gilbert du Montier, the Marquis de Lafayette, 

an influential French nobleman who financed his own way, were all to

make valuable contributions as trainers and leaders. But as the 1777 

campaign began, these foreign volunteers had not yet had time to make 

much of an impact on the Continental Army.

In the spring of 1777 Washington’s army occupied high ground at 

Middlebrook, New Jersey, in a position either to bar Howe’s overland 

route to Philadelphia or to move rapidly up the Hudson to oppose 

any northward advance. Washington confidently expected Howe to

move north to form a junction with Burgoyne but decided he himself 

must stay in front of the main British Army wherever it went. Following the principle of economy of force, he disposed a small part of 

his army under Maj. Gen. Israel Putnam in fortifications guarding the

approaches up the Hudson, and at a critical moment detached a small 

force to aid Maj. Gen. Philip Schuyler against Burgoyne. The bulk of 

his army he kept in front of Howe in an effort to defend Philadelphia. 

Forts were built along the Delaware River, and other steps were taken 

to block the approach to the Continental capital by sea.

In the effort to defend Philadelphia, Washington again failed but 

hardly so ignominiously as he had the year before in New York. With 

American forts and a galley squadron blocking a direct advance up the 

Delaware River, in August Howe put most of his army on board ship 

and sailed down the coast and up the Chesapeake Bay to Head of Elk 

(now Elkton) in Maryland, putting himself even farther away from Burgoyne. (See Map 7.) Surprised by Howe’s movement, Washington did 

not oppose the landing but rapidly shifted his own force south and 

took up a position at Chad’s Ford on Brandywine Creek, blocking the 

approach to Philadelphia. 

There, on September 11, 1777, Howe executed a flanking movement reminiscent of his tactics on Long Island the previous year. He 

sent Lt. Gen. Wilhelm van Knyphausen’s largely Hessian column directly 

against the American position at Chad’s Ford to fix the American attention on that part of the battlefield. During the predawn darkness Howe

and Lord Charles Cornwallis took the larger part of the British army 

north by back roads and crossed the Brandywine at unguarded lesser 

fords miles upstream, hoping to take Washington from the flank and

rear. 

Confusing reports caused by inadequate reconnaissance befuddled Maj. Gen. John Sullivan, who commanded the American forces 

on that flank. Washington himself realized what was happening only

at the eleventh hour. He immediately ordered Sullivan to lay a trap, set 

up a reverse slope ambush on high ground, and shifted reinforcements 

Friedrich Wilhelm von Steuben 

Charles Willson Peale, 1782
Map 7

SULLIVAN

GREENE

CORNWALLIS

KNYPHAUSEN

To West Chester

Chad’s

Ford

F

F

F

F

F

F

To Chester

Dilworth

Parkerville

Sconneltown

H udson Ri v e r

Pa s s a i c Ri v e r

Ra rit an Ri v e r

Br an dy w in e Cr e e k

Sk ip pa ck Cr e e k

Sch uy l k i l l Ri v e r

Susquehanna Ri v e r

C h e s a p e a k e B a y

D e l a w a r e R i v e r

B r a n d y w i n e C r e e k

Chad’s Ford

Sandy Hook

Staten

Island

PENNSYLV ANIA

PENNSYLV ANIA

NEW JERSE Y

NEW JERSE Y

NEW Y ORK

MARYLAND

DEL A W ARE

NEW YORK

Monmouth

New Brunswick

Princeton

Trenton

Whitemarsh

Germantown

PHILADELPHIA

Chester

Warren’s Tavern

Valley Forge

Head of Elk

Stony Point

Ft. Clinton

Ft. Montgomery

West Point

Ft. Mercer

Ft. Mifflin

0 2 1

Miles

11 September 1777

BATTLE OF BRANDYWINE

Ford

High ground above 300ft

 F

0 4 10 20 30 0

Miles

1777–1778

AREA OF OPERATIONS

PENNSYLVANIA–NEW JERSEY
The Winning of Independence, 1777–1783

79

under Maj. Gen. Nathanael Greene from positions facing Knyphausen to extend Sullivan’s line. Cornwallis and Howe moved slowly, preventing the British plan from working as intended; ironically, that very 

slowness worked to their advantage. Because the Americans lacked 

iron discipline, they kept creeping up to the crest of their ridge to look 

for the British. Alert scouts, mostly Hessian jaegers (woodsmen armed 

with rifles), noted the movement; and Howe avoided walking into the

trap. 

What followed was one of the most intense battles of the war. In 

a series of five separate attacks, the British drove Sullivan off the high

ground in some confusion. General Greene with two brigades of Virginians allowed Sullivan’s men to fall back through their lines and then 

carried out a valiant rear-guard action lasting until dark. Once he could 

hear the sounds of the fighting, Knyphausen drove across the ford and

struck Brig. Gen. Anthony Wayne’s defenses that had been weakened 

by the transfers, forcing the Americans to fall back. Darkness and the 

heavy, bloody fighting left Howe’s men too exhausted to pursue, and

the Continental Army retired in good order to Chester. However, the 

way to Philadelphia was now left open to Howe. 

Howe followed his victory at the Brandywine with a series of maneuvers comparable to those he had executed in New York and entered 

Philadelphia with a minimum of fighting on September 26. A combined

attack of British Army and Navy forces shortly afterward reduced the 

forts on the Delaware and opened the river as a British supply line.

On entering Philadelphia, Howe dispersed his forces, stationing 

9,000 men at Germantown, north of the city; 3,000 in New Jersey; and 

the rest in Philadelphia. As Howe had repeated his performance in New 

York, Washington sought to repeat Trenton by a surprise attack on Germantown. The plan was much like that he used at Trenton but involved 

far more complicated movements by much larger bodies of troops. Four 

columns (two assault forces of continentals under Sullivan and Greene 

and two flank security forces of militia), moving at night over different roads, were to converge simultaneously on Germantown at dawn 

on October 4. (See Map 8.) The plan violated the principle of simplicity, for such a maneuver would have been difficult even for well-trained

Nathanael Greene (1742–1786) 

A Quaker with no prior military experience, Nathanael Greene 

rose through the ranks of the Continental Army and became one of 

George Washington’s most trusted generals. In 1777 Greene became 

the Continental Army’s Quartermaster, though he longed for a battlefield command. That opportunity came in August 1780, when General 

Gates, the hero of Saratoga, was resoundingly defeated by the British 

at Camden in South Carolina. As commander of the southern campaign 

of 1780–1782, Greene brilliantly combined conventional and unconventional fighting. His strategy forced the decisive battle of Yorktown, 

which broke the back of British control in the southern colonies.

Nathanael Greene

Charles Willson Peale, 1783
American Military History

80

professionals to execute. The two columns of continentals arrived at different times and fired on each other in an early morning fog. Despite losing the element of surprise, the Americans drove forward and smashed 

two elite battalions of British light infantry. 

Initial success rapidly turned to disappointment. Part of a British 

regiment took cover in Cliveden, the Chew family mansion, and opened 

a galling fire on Americans attempting to move up or join the advance.

Instead of isolating and bypassing this annoyance, the inexperienced 

American generals held up a large portion of the Maryland Division 

while they argued whether they could leave a “fortress” in their rear. 

The British, though surprised, had better discipline and cohesion and 

were able to re-form and send fresh troops into the fray. Once Washington realized that he had lost the chance for a decisive victory, he 

Map 8

M I L I T I A

M I L I T I A

S U L L I V A N

G

R

E

E

N

E

C h e s t n u t H i l l

Schuy l k i l l Ri v e r

Wissahickon Creek

GERMANTOWN

Ford

to Philadelphia

Chew Mansion

4 October 1777

BATTLE OF GERMANTOWN

Miles

1 1 0

Axis of American Advance

British Position (Approx.)

ELEVATION IN FEET

0 200 400 and Above
The Winning of Independence, 1777–1783

81

wisely chose to avoid risking his army and broke contact.The Ameri-

cans retreated about 8:00 a.m., leaving Howe’s troops in command of 

the field.

After Germantown Howe once again concentrated his army and 

moved to confront Washington at Whitemarsh, hoping to lure the Vir-

ginian into a rash attack. The ploy failed, so he withdrew to winter quar-

ters in Philadelphia without giving battle. Washington chose the site 

for his own winter quarters at a place called Valley Forge, twenty miles 

northwest of the city. Howe had gained his objective, but it proved of 

no lastingvalue to him. Congress fledwest toYork,Pennsylvania. No

swarms of loyalists rallied to the British standards. And Howe had left 

Burgoyne to lose a whole British army in the north.

Burgoyne set out from Canada in June, his object to reach Albany 

by fall. (See Map 9.) His forcewas divided into tw

o parts.

The first and

largest part (7,200 British and Hessian regulars and 650Tories, Cana-

dians, and Indians under his personal command) was to take the route 

down Lake Champlain to Ticonderoga and thence via Lake George to 

the Hudson. The second (700 regulars and 1,000 Tories and Indians 

under Col. Barry St. Leger) was to move via Lake Ontario to Oswego 

and thence down the Mohawk Valley to join Burgoyne before Albany. 

In his preparations, Burgoyne evidently forgot the lesson the British 

had learned in the French and Indian War: In the wilderness, troops 

had to be prepared to travel light and fight lik

e Indians. He carried

138 pieces of artillery anda heavy load of officers’ personal baggage.

Numerous ladies of high and low estate accompanied the expedition. 

When he started down the lakes, Burgoyne did not have enough horses 

and wagons to transport his artillery and baggage once he had to leave 

the water and move overland.

At

first Burgoyne’s American oppositionwasveryweak: only about

2,500 continentals at Ticonderoga and about 450 at old Fort Stanwix, 

the sole American bulwark in the Mohawk Valley. Dissension among 

the Americans was rife; the New Englanders refused to support Schuy-

ler, the aristocratic New Yorker who commanded the Northern Army, 

and openly intrigued to replace him with their own favorite, Maj. Gen. 

Horatio Gates. Ticonderoga fell to Burgoyne on June 27 all too easily. 

The American forces dispersed, and Burgoyne pursued the remnants 

down to Skenesborough. Once that far along, he decided to continue 

overland to the Hudson instea

d of returning to Ticonderoga to float

his force down Lake George, though much of his impedimenta still had 

to be carried by boat down the lake.

The overland line of advance was already a nightmare, running 

along wilderness trails, through marshes, and across wide ravines and 

creeks swollen by abnormally heavy rains. Schuyler, who had wrestled 

with supply problems during the French and Indian Wars on this very 

ground, adopted the tactic of making it even worse by destroying 

bridges, felling trees into Burgoyne’s path, and digging trenches to let 

the waters of swamps onto drier ground. The British were able to move 

at a rate of little more than a mile a day and took until July 29 to reach 

Fort Edward on the Hudson. By that time Burgoyne was desperately 

short of horses, wagons, and oxen. Yet Schuyler, with an unstable force 

of 4,500 men discouraged by continual retreats, was in no position to 

give battle.
Map 9

Bemis

Heights

Bemis

Heights

Br. Positions

from 20 Sep

18 Jun

27 Jun

7 Jul

19 Sep 16 Aug

3–20 Aug

6 Aug

from Ft. Oswego

ST. LEGER

19 Sep 7 Oct

20 Sep

12 Sep

Mi l l Cr e e k

H u d s o n R i v e r

Lake

Champlain

Lake

George

Hudson River

Mohawk River

to Saratoga

Freeman’s Farm

to Kingston

to Montreal

Crown Point

Ft. Ticonderoga

Ft. Edward

Ft. Stanwix

Skenesborough

Saratoga

Bennington

ALBANY

Oriskany

June–October 1777

BURGOYNE’S MARCH ON ALBANY

Miles

0 3 10 20 0

Axis of British Advance

High Ground Above 1000 Feet

Miles

0 1

BATTLES 

SOUTH OF SARATOGA
The Winning of Independence, 1777–1783

83

Washington did what he could to strengthen the Northern Army 

at

this juncture. Hefirst dispatched Maj. Gen. Benedict Arnold, his

most aggressivefieldcommander, and Maj. Gen. Benjamin Lincoln,a

Massachusetts man noted for his influencewiththe New England mili-

tia. OnAugust 16 he detached Col. Daniel Morganwith 500 riflemen

from the main army in Pennsylvania and ordered them along with 750 

men from Putnam’s force in the New York highlands to join Schuyler. 

The riflemenwerecalculatedto furnish an antidote for Burgoyne’s

Indians who despite his efforts to restrain them were terrorizing the 

countryside.

It was the rising militia, rather than Washington, that was to pro-

vide the Northern Army with the most numerous reinforcements. 

Nothing worked more to produce this result than Burgoyne’s employ-

ment of Indians. The murder and scalping of a white woman, Jane 

McCrea, dramatized the Indian threat as nothing else probably could 

have. New England militiamen now began to rally to the cause, though 

they still refused to cooperate with Schuyler. New Hampshire com-

missioned John Stark, a colonel in the Continental Army and a veteran 

of Bunker Hill and Trenton, as a brigadier general in the state service 

(a rank Congress had denied him), and Stark quickly assembled 2,000 

men. Refusing Schuyler’s request that he join the main army, Stark took 

up a position at Bennington in southern Vermont to guard the New 

England frontier

. OnAugust 11 Burgoyne detacheda force of 650

men under Hessian Col. Friedrich Baum to forage for cattle, horses, 

and transport in the very area Stark was occupying. At Bennington on 

August 16, Stark annihilated Baum’s force and nearly did the same to

a

second column of reinforcements Burgoyne sent to rescue Baum. Bur-

goyne not only failed to secure his much-needed supplies and transport 

but also lost about a tenth of his command.

Meanwhile, St. Leger with his Tories and Indians had appeared 

before Fort Stanwix on August 2. The garrison, fearing massacre by 

the Indians, was determined to hold out to the bitter end. On August 4, 

the Tryon County militia under Brig. Gen. Nicholas Herkimer set out 

to relieve the fort but was ambushed by the Indians in a wooded ravine 

near Oriskany. The militia, under the direction of a mortally wounded 

Herkimer, took cover in the woods and fought a bloody, ferocious, 

close-quarters battle all afternoon in a summer thunderstorm. Both 

sides suffered heavy losses; and though the militia was unable to relieve 

Stanwix, the losses discouraged St. Leger’s Indians, who were already 

restless in the static sieg

e operation at Stanwix. More significantly, the

Continentalgarrison of the for

t sallied out during the Oriskany fight

and destroyed most of St. Leger’s camp and siege supplies.

Despite Shuyler’s own weak position, when he learned of the plight 

of the Stanwix garrison he courageously detached Benedict Arnold 

with 950 continentals to march to its relief. Arnold devised a ruse that 

took full advantage of the dissatisfaction and natural superstition of 

the Indians. Employing a half-wit Dutchman, his clothes shot full of 

holes, and a friendly Oneida Indian as his messengers, Arnold spread 

the rumor that the continentals were approaching “as numerous as the 

leaves on the trees.” The Indians, who had special respect for any mad-

man, departed in haste; and St. Leger was forced to abandon the siege 

and retreat to Canada.
American Military History

84

Bennington and Stanwix were serious blows to Burgoyne. By early 

September he knew he could expect help from neither Howe nor St. 

Leger. Disillusioned about the Tories, he wrote Germain: “The great 

bulk of the country is undoubtedly with Congress in principle and zeal; 

and their measures are executed with a secrecy and dispatch that are not 

to be equaled. Wherever the King’s forces point, militia in the amount 

of three or four thousand assemble in twenty-four hours; they bring 

with them their subsistence, etc., and the alarm over, they return to 

their farms.” Nevertheless, gambler that he was, Burgoyne crossed the 

Hudson to the west side on September 13 and 14. A victim of his 

own preconceptions and already seeking to protect himself politically, 

Burgoyne now stated that his orders required him to get to Albany at 

all costs. While his supply problem daily became worse, his Indians, 

sensing approaching disaster, drifted off into the forests, leaving him 

with little means of gaining intelligence of the American dispositions.

The American forces were meanwhile gathering strength. Congress finally deferred to New England sentiment on August 19 and

replaced Schuyler with Gates. Gates was more the beneficiary than the

cause of the improved situation, but his appointment helped morale 

and encouraged the New England militia. (Washington’s emissary, General Lincoln, also did his part.) Gates did not change Schuyler’s tactics 

and continued to take full advantage of Burgoyne’s plight. He advanced 

his forces four miles north and took up a position, surveyed and prepared by the Polish engineer Kosciuszko on Bemis Heights, a few miles 

below Saratoga. Against this position, Burgoyne launched his attack on 

September 19 and was repulsed with heavy losses. In the battle, usually 

known as the First Battle of Freeman’s Farm, Arnold persuaded Gates 

to let him go forward to counter the British attack. Colonel Morgan’s 

riflemen, in a wooded terrain well suited to the use of their specialized

weapon, took a heavy toll of British officers and men.

Benedict Arnold (1741–1801)

Benedict Arnold was one of the most talented American generals of 

the Revolutionary War, a man whose energy was matched only by his ego. 

He was instrumental in defeating the British at Saratoga, a victory that 

gained the fledgling United States the open support of France. In 1780 

Arnold commanded West Point, a fort situated on a bluff overlooking a 

tricky double bend in the Hudson River. All vessels had to pass the guns of 

West Point, and its possession would have assured the British easy communication between their forces in Canada and those occupying New York 

City. Smarting at Congress’ lack of appreciation for his role at Saratoga 

three years earlier, Arnold plotted with Maj. John André of the British 

Army to deliver West Point to the enemy. André, wearing civilian clothes, 

was captured after one of their meetings and subsequently hanged as a 

spy; Arnold escaped to command British coastal expeditions during the 

closing years of the war. He died in London in 1801.

Benedict Arnold

Copy of Engraving by H. B. Hal 

After John Trumbull

Image removed

due to license

restrictions
The Winning of Independence, 1777–1783

85

After Freeman’s Farm, the lines remained stable for three weeks. 

Burgoyne had heard that Clinton, with the force Howe had left in New 

York, had started north to relieve him. Clinton in fact had finally received

reinforcements from Europe and launched a lightning strike against 

Putnam’s weakened Highlands Department. The British stormed Forts 

Clinton and Montgomery on the Hudson on October 6 and forced a

path through the mountains. Clinton could not do more because he 

received explicit orders from Howe to send the reinforcements on to 

Philadelphia. He took a chance and sent out a small diversion to Kingston but returned to New York when that probe indicated it could do 

nothing of value.

Burgoyne was left to his fate. Gates strengthened his entrenchments and calmly awaited the attack he was sure Burgoyne would have 

to make. Militia reinforcements increased his forces to around 10,000 

by October 7. Meanwhile, Burgoyne’s position grew more desperate. 

Unable to hold his supply line open, Burgoyne faced a choice. He could 

cut his losses and fall back toward Canada and safety, or he could stay 

and fight. He chose to stay and fight in hopes of defeating the army in

front of him and pushing on to Albany. Food was running out; the animals had grazed the meadows bare; and every day more men slipped into 

the forest, deserting the lost cause. With little intelligence of American 

strength or dispositions, on October 7 Burgoyne sent out a reconnaissance in force to feel out the American positions. On learning that the 

British were approaching, Gates sent out a contingent including Morgan’s riflemen to meet them; a second battle developed, usually known

as Bemis Heights or the Second Battle of Freeman’s Farm. Although 

Gates intended to fight a cautious, defensive battle, he lost control of

his own men. Arnold, an open supporter of Schuyler and critic of the 

cautious Gates, had been placed under house arrest for insubordination. When Arnold learned of Burgoyne’s probe, he impetuously broke 

arrest and rushed into the fray, distinguishing himself before he was 

wounded in leading an attack on Breymann’s Redoubt. The British suffered severe losses, five times those of the Americans, and were driven

back to their fortified positions.

Two days after the battle, Burgoyne withdrew to a position in 

the vicinity of Saratoga. Militia soon worked around to his rear and 

hemmed him in from the north as well. His position hopeless, Burgoyne finally capitulated on October 17 at Saratoga. The total prisoner

count was nearly 6,000, and great quantities of military stores fell into

American hands. The victory at Saratoga brought the Americans out 

well ahead in the campaign of 1777 despite the loss of Philadelphia. 

What had been at stake soon became obvious. In February 1778 France 

negotiated a treaty of alliance with the American states, tantamount to 

a declaration of war against England.

Valley Forge

The name of Valley Forge has come to stand, and rightly so, as a 

patriotic symbol of suffering, courage, and perseverance. The hard core 

of continentals who stayed with Washington during that bitter winter 

of 1777–1778 suffered much indeed. Supply problems caused some 

men to go without shoes, pants, and blankets. Weeks passed when there 

The British suffered severe losses, 

five times those of the Americans, 

and were driven back to their 

fortified positions. 
American Military History

86

was no meat, and men were reduced to boiling and eating their shoes. It 

was no place for “summer soldiers and sunshine patriots.”

The symbolism of Valley Forge should not be allowed to obscure 

the fact that the suffering was largely unnecessary. While the soldiers 

shivered and went hungry, food rotted and clothing lay unused in 

depots throughout the country. True, access to Valley Forge was difficult, but little determined effort was made to get supplies into the

area. The supply and transport system had broken down. In mid-1777 

both the Quartermaster and Commissary Generals resigned along with 

numerous subordinate officials in both departments, mostly merchants

who found private trade more lucrative. Congress, in refuge at York, 

Pennsylvania, and split into factions, found it difficult to find replacements. If there was not, as most historians now believe, an organized 

cabal seeking to replace Washington with Gates, there were many, both 

in and out of the Army, who were dissatisfied with the Commander in

Chief; and much intrigue went on. Gates was made President of the 

new Board of War set up that winter, and at least two of its members 

were Washington’s enemies. In the administrative chaos at the height of 

the Valley Forge crisis, there was no functioning Quartermaster General at all.

Washington weathered the storm, and the Continental Army would 

emerge from Valley Forge a more effective force than before. With his 

advice, Congress instituted reforms in the Quartermaster and Commissary Departments that temporarily restored the effectiveness of both 

agencies. Washington’s ablest subordinate, General Greene, reluctantly 

accepted the post of Quartermaster General. The Continental Army 

itself gained a new professional competence from the training given 

by Steuben.

Steuben appeared at Valley Forge in February 1778. He represented 

himself as a baron, a title of dubious validity, and as a former lieutenant 

general on the staff of Frederick the Great. (In reality he had been only 

a captain. The fraud was harmless, for Steuben had a broad knowledge 

of military affairs and had the ability to communicate with the American soldiers and teach them the basics of their new craft.) Appointed 

Valley Forge

After a disappointing fall campaign that ended with a British army occupying Philadelphia, George 

Washington cast about for winter quarters for his troops. He found a site among the thickly wooded hills 

around Valley Forge. The American camp lay somewhat to the north, but within easy striking distance, of 

the main road from Philadelphia to York, where the Continental Congress had taken refuge. This allowed 

his army to provide protection for the revolution’s governing body. Valley Forge lay in a rich agricultural 

region that the contending armies had picked over extensively during the previous year. Dependent 

almost entirely on a wretchedly mismanaged supply system, the Americans were chronically short of food 

and clothing through much of the winter until Nathanael Greene, one of America’s ablest commanders, 

took over as Quartermaster General. Steuben’s drill instruction has received wide credit for bolstering 

American morale, but Greene’s efficiency proved equally important. When in June 1778 the Continental 

Army finally marched out of Valley Forge to face the British again, it was well prepared in mind and 

body for what would follow.
The Winning of Independence, 1777–1783

87

by Washington as Inspector General in charge of a training program, 

Steuben vigorously drilled the troops that remained under arms during the winter of 1777–1778 at Valley Forge. He taught the Continental Army a simplified but effective version of the drill formations and

movements of European armies and the proper care of equipment and 

supplemented American marksmanship with instruction on the use of 

the bayonet, a weapon in which British superiority had previously been 

marked. All through the training, Steuben never lost sight of a major 

difference between the American citizen-soldier and the European professional. He early noted that American soldiers had to be told why they 

did things before they would do them well, and he applied this philosophy in his training program. His trenchant good humor and vigorous 

profanity delighted the Continental soldiers and made the rigorous drill 

more palatable. After Valley Forge, continentals would fight on equal

terms with British regulars in the open field.

First Fruits of the French Alliance

While the Continental Army was undergoing its ordeal and transformation at Valley Forge, Howe dallied in Philadelphia, forfeiting 

whatever remaining chance he had to win a decisive victory before 

the effects of the French alliance were felt. He had had his fill of the

American war; and the king accepted his resignation from command, 

appointing General Clinton as his successor. As Washington prepared 

to sally forth from Valley Forge, the British Army and the Philadelphia 

Tories said goodbye to Howe in a series of lavish parties. However, 

Clinton already had orders to evacuate the American capital. With the 

French in the war, the strategic situation had changed dramatically. 

England now had to ensure the safety of the long ocean supply line to 

America, as well as its valuable commercial possessions in other parts 

of the world, in particular the rich sugar plantations of the Caribbean. 

Clinton’s orders were to detach 5,000 men to the West Indies and 3,000 

to Florida and to return the rest of his army to New York by sea. He 

was then to give thought to recovering the southern states, where once 

again ever-hopeful refugees insisted the majority of the population 

would rally to the royal standard.

As Clinton prepared to depart Philadelphia, Washington had 

high hopes that the war might be won in 1778 by a cooperative effort 

between his army and the French Fleet. Charles Hector, the Comte 

d’Estaing, with a French naval squadron of eleven ships of the line 

and transports carrying 4,000 troops left France in May to sail for the 

American coast. D’Estaing’s fleet was considerably more powerful than

any Admiral Howe could immediately concentrate in American waters. 

For a brief period in 1778, the strategic initiative passed from British 

hands; Washington hoped to make full use of it.

Clinton had already decided, before he learned of the threat from 

d’Estaing, to move his army overland to New York prior to making any 

detachments, largely because he lacked sufficient transports to make

the voyage by sea. On June 18, 1778, he set out with about 10,000 

men. Washington, having gathered by that time about 12,000, immediately occupied Philadelphia and then took up the pursuit of Clinton. 

His council of war was divided, though none of his generals advised a 

With the French in the war, the 

strategic situation had changed 

dramatically. 
American Military History

88

“general action.” The boldest, General Wayne, and the young General 

Lafayette urged a “partial attack” to strike at a portion of the British 

Army while it was strung out on the road. The most cautious, Maj. Gen. 

Charles Lee, who had been exchanged and had rejoined the army at 

Valley Forge, advised only guerrilla action to harass the British columns. 

On June 26 Washington decided to take a bold approach, though he

issued no orders indicating an intention to bring on a general action. 

He sent forward an advance guard composed of almost half his army 

to strike at the British rear when Clinton moved out of Monmouth 

Court House on the morning of June 27. Lee, the cautious, claimed the 

command from Lafayette, the bold, when he learned the detachment 

would be so large.

In the early morning Lee advanced over rough ground that had not 

been reconnoitered and made contact with the British rear, but Clinton 

reacted quickly and maneuvered to envelop the American right flank.

Lee, feeling that his force was in an untenable position and underestimating the training transformation of the American Army during the 

encampment at Valley Forge, fell back in confusion. Washington rode 

up and, exceedingly irate to find the advance guard in retreat, exchanged

harsh words with Lee. He then assumed direction of what had to be a 

defense against a British counterattack. The battle that followed, involving the bulk of both armies, lasted until nightfall on a sultry day with 

both sides holding their own. For the first time the Americans fought

well with the bayonet as well as with the musket and rifle, and their

battlefield behavior generally reflected the Valley Forge training. Nevertheless, Washington failed to strike a telling blow at the British Army, 

for Clinton slipped away in the night and in a few days completed the 

retreat to New York. Lee demanded and got a court-martial at which 

he was judged, perhaps unjustly, guilty of disobedience of orders, poor 

conduct of the retreat, and disrespect for the Commander in Chief. As 

a consequence he retired from the Army, though the controversy over 

his actions at Monmouth was to go on for years.

Washington meanwhile sought his victory in cooperation with the 

French Fleet. D’Estaing arrived off the coast on July 8, and the two 

commanders at first agreed on a combined land and sea attack on New

York; but d’Estaing feared he would be unable to get his deep-draft 

ships across the bar that extended from Staten Island to Sandy Hook 

to get at Howe’s inferior fleet. They decided to transfer the attack to

the other and weaker British stronghold at Newport, Rhode Island, a 

city standing on an island with difficult approaches. They agreed that

the French Fleet would force the passage on the west side of the island 

and an American force under General Sullivan would cross over and 

mount an assault from the east. The whole scheme soon went awry. The 

French Fleet arrived off Newport on July 29 and successfully forced the 

passage; Sullivan began crossing on the east on August 8, and d’Estaing 

began to disembark his troops. Unfortunately, at this juncture Admiral Howe appeared with a reinforced British Fleet, forcing d’Estaing to 

reembark his troops and put out to sea to meet him. As the two fleets

maneuvered for advantage, a great gale scattered both on August 12. 

The British returned to New York to refit and the French Fleet to Boston; d’Estaing decided to move on to tasks he considered more pressing in the West Indies. Sullivan was left to extricate his forces from an 

A fellow Virginian presented these 

English-made pistols (manufactured 

about 1749) to General Washington as a 

token of esteem in March 1778. 
The Winning of Independence, 1777–1783

89

untenable position as best hecould, and thefirstexperiment inFrancoAmerican cooperation came to a disappointing end with recriminations 

on both sides.

The fiasco at Newport ended any hopes for an early victor

yover

the British as a result of the French alliance. By the next year, as the 

French were forced to devote their major attention to the West Indies, 

the British regained the initiative on the mainland; the war entered a 

new phase.

The New Conditions of the War

After France entered the war in 1778, it rapidly took on the dimen-

sions ofa major European aswell as an American conflict. In 1779

Spain declared war against England, and in the following year Holland 

followed suit.

The necessity of fighting European enemies in theWest

Indies and other areas and of standing guard at home against invasion 

weakened the British effort against the American rebels. Yet the Ameri-

cans were unable to take full advantage of Britain’s embarrassments, 

for their own effort suffered more and more from war weariness, lack 

of strong direction, and inadequate finance. Moreover, the interests of

the European states fighting Britain did not necessarily coincide with

American interests. Spain and Holland did not ally themselves with the 

American states at all, and even France found it expedient to devote its 

major effort to the West Indies. Finally, the entry of ancient enemies 

into the fray spurred the British to intensify their effort and evoked 

some, if not enough, of that characteristic tenacity that has produced 

victory for England in so many wars. Despite the many new commit-

ments the British were able to maintain in America an army that was 

usually superior in numbers to the dwindling Continental Army, though 

it was never strong enough to undertake offensives again on the scale 

of those of 1776 and 1777.

Monmouth was the last major engagement in the north between 

Washington’s and Clinton’s armies. In 1779 the situation there became 

a stalemate and remained so until the end of the war. The defense 

system Washington set up around New York with its center at West 

Point was too strong for Clinton to attack. The British commander 

did, in late spring 1779, attempt to draw Washington into the open 

by descending in force on unfinished American outpost fortifications

at Verplanck’s Point and Stony Point, but Washington refused to take 

the bait. When Clinton withdrew his main force to New York, the 

American commander retaliated on July 15, 1779, by sending General 

Wayne with an elite corps of light infantry on a stealthy night attack 

on Stony Point, a successful action more notable for demonstrating 

the proficiency

withwhichthe Americans no

w used

the bayonetthan

for any important strategic gains. Thereafter the war around New York 

became largely an affair of raids, skirmishes, and constant vigilance 

on both sides. Twice in 1780 large British forces pushed into northern 

New Jersey in foraging operations intended to lure Washington into 

the open, but bot

h

timestheflexible American defensive belt repulsed

them easily. 

Clinton’s inaction allowed Washington to attempt to deal with 

British-inspired Indian attacks. Although Burgoyne’s defeat ended the 
American Military History

90

threat of invasion from Canada, the British continued to incite the 

Indians all along the frontier to bloody raids on American settlements. 

From Fort Niagara and Detroit, they sent out their bands, usually led 

by Tories, to pillage and burn in the Mohawk Valley of New York, the 

Wyoming Valley of Pennsylvania, and the new American settlements in 

Kentucky. Although local defense was primarily the responsibility of 

state governments and the militia, the pressure on the Mohawk frontier 

soon prompted a Continental response. In August 1779 Washington 

detached General Sullivan with a force to deal with the Iroquois in 

Pennsylvania and New York. Sullivan laid waste the Indians’ villages 

and defeated a force of Tories and Indians at Newtown on August 29. 

Although Sullivan’s mission did not end Indian frontier raids, it essentially broke the back of Iroquois power and ensured the flow of supplies to the army from these fertile areas.

In the winter of 1778–1779, the colony of Virginia had sponsored 

an expedition that struck a severe blow at the British and Indians in the 

northwest. Young Lt. Col. George Rogers Clark, with a force of only 

175 men ostensibly recruited for the defense of Kentucky, overran all 

the British posts in what is today Illinois and Indiana. Neither he nor 

Sullivan, however, was able to strike at the sources of the trouble—

Niagara and Detroit. Indian raids along the frontiers continued, though 

they were somewhat less frequent and less severe.

British Successes in the South

Late in 1778 the British began to turn their main effort to the 

south. The king’s ministers hoped to bring the southern states into 

the fold one by one. From bases there, they would strangle the recalcitrant north. A small British force operating from Florida cooperated with the first reinforcements sent by Clinton and quickly overran thinly populated Georgia in the winter of 1778–1779. Alarmed by 

this development, Congress sent General Lincoln south to Charleston 

in December 1778 to command the Southern Army and organize the 

southern effort. It hoped that he could repeat his performance during 

the Saratoga campaign as a leader who could mix Continental regulars 

and militiamen. Lincoln gathered 3,500 continentals and militiamen; 

but in May 1779, while he maneuvered along the Georgia border, the 

British commander, Maj. Gen. Augustine Prevost, slipped around him 

to raid Charleston. The city barely managed to hold out until Lincoln 

returned to relieve it. (Map 10)

In September 1779 Admiral d’Estaing arrived off the coast of 

Georgia with a strong French Fleet and 6,000 troops. Lincoln hurried

south with 1,350 Americans to join him in a siege of the main British base at Savannah. Unfortunately, the Franco-American force had to 

hurry its attack because d’Estaing was unwilling to risk his fleet in a position dangerously exposed to autumn storms. The French and Americans 

mounted a direct assault on Savannah on October 9, abandoning their 

plan to make a systematic approach by regular parallels. The British in 

strongly entrenched positions repulsed the attack in what was essentially 

a Bunker Hill in reverse, with the French and Americans suffering staggering losses. D’Estaing then sailed away to the West Indies, Lincoln 

returned to Charleston, and the second attempt at Franco-American 

Although Burgoyne’s defeat 

ended the threat of invasion from 

Canada, the British continued 

to incite the Indians all along 

the frontier to bloody raids on 

American settlements. 
LINCOLN

Surrendered

12 May

29 Mar

CLINTON

8 Apr

BR FLEET

Ashley River

Ft. Johnson

CHARLESTON

Ft. Moultrie

Waxhaw Cr

Fishing Cr

Broad R

Saluda R

Congaree R

Wateree R

Catawba R

Santee R

Pe e D e e R

Cape Fe a r R

Sa v annah R

29 May 1780

25 Apr 1781 16 Aug 1780

18 Aug 1780

17 Jan 1781

15 Mar 1781

8 Sep 1781

9 Oct 1779

7 Oct 1780

 King’s Mt

Hobkirk’s Hill

NOR TH CAROLINA

VIRGINIA

SOUTH CAROLINA

GEORGIA

Cheraw Hill

Charleston

Georgetown

Wilmington

Guilford

Hillsborough

Charlotte

Camden

Winnsboro

Rocky Mount

Ninety-Six

Augusta

Savannah

Beaufort

Cowpens

Eutau Springs

0 5 40302010 0

Miles

0 2 1

Miles

1778–1781

THE SOUTHERN AREA

Engagement, Date Indicated

High Ground Above 1000 Feet

March–May 1780

SIEGE OF CHARLESTON

Map 10
American Military History

92

cooperation ended in much the same atmosphere of bitterness and dis-

illusion as the first.

Meanwhile Clinton, urged on by the British government, deter-

mined to push the southern campaign in earnest. In October 1779 

he withdrew the British garrison from Newport, pulled in his troops 

from outposts around New York, and prepared to move south against 

Charleston with a large part of his force. With d’Estaing’s withdrawal, 

the British regained control of the sea along the American coast, giving 

Clinton a mobility that Washington could not match. While Clinton 

drew from New York and Savannah to achieve a decisive concentration 

of force (14,000 men) at Charleston, Congress had sent only piecemeal 

reinforcements to Lincoln over difficult overland routes.

Applying the lessons of his experience in 1776, Clinton this time

carefully planned a coordinated Army-Navy attack. First, he landed his 

force on John’s Island to the south, then moved up to the Ashley River, 

investing Charleston from the land side. (See Inset, Map 10.) Lincoln, 

under strong pressure from the South Carolina civilian authorities, con-

centrated his forces in a citadel defense on the neck of land between 

the Ashley and Cooper Rivers, leaving Fort Moultrie and other harbor 

defenses lightly manned. On April 8 British warships successfully forced 

the passage past Moultrie, investing Charleston from the sea. The siege 

then proceeded in traditional eighteenth century fashion, and on May 

12, 1780, despite a masterful delaying defense that humiliated Clinton, 

Lincoln had to surrender his

entire force of 5,466 men in thegreatest

disaster to befall the American cause during the war. Meanwhile, Col. 

Abraham Buford with 350 Virginians was moving south to reinforce 

the garrison. When he learned of the garrison’s fate, Buford tried to 

withdraw; but Lt. Col. Banastre Tarleton with a force of British light 

cavalry and infantry took Buford by surprise at the Waxhaws, a district 

near the North Carolina border, and slaughtered most of Buford’s men 

after they attempted to surrender. This brutality shocked most Ameri-

cans and, as had happened with the Jenny McCrea incident, motivated 

the militia forces to take to the field in ever-increasing numbers.

After the capture of Charleston, Clinton returned to New York 

with about a third of his force, leaving General Cornwallis with 8,000 

men to follow up the victory. Cornwallis established his main seaboard 

bases at Savannah, Beaufort, Charleston, and Georgetown. In the inte-

rior, he extended his line of control along the Savannah River westward 

to Ninety-Six and northward to Camden and Rocky Mount. Cornwallis’ 

force, however, was too small to police so large an area, even with the 

aid of

theTories who took to the field.Though no organized Conti

-

nental force remained in the Carolinas and Georgia, American guer-

rillas, led by Brig. Gens. Thomas Sumter and Andrew Pickens and Lt. 

Col. Francis Marion, began to harry British posts and lines of com-

munications and to battle the bands of Tories. A bloody, ruthless, and 

confused civil war ensued, its character determined in no small degree 

by Tarleton’s action at the Waxhaws. In this way, as in the Saratoga 

campaign, the American grass roots strength began once again to assert 

itself and to deny the British the fruits of military victory.

On June 22, 1780, the Maryland Division (two understrength bri-

gades) from Washington’s army arrived at Hillsborough, North Carolina, 

to form the nucleus of a new Southern Army around which militia could 
The Winning of Independence, 1777–1783

93

rally and which could serve as the nerve center of guerrilla resistance. In 

July Congress, without consulting Washington, provided a commander 

for this army in the person of General Gates, the hero of Saratoga. Gates 

soon lost his northern laurels. Gathering a force of about 4,000 men, 

over half of them militia, and ignoring the advice of his subordinates 

who were more familiar with the terrain, he set out to attack the British post at Camden, South Carolina. Instead of taking a more circuitous 

route that could be supported logistically, Gates marched through a district already denuded of food. Cornwallis hurried north from Charleston 

with reinforcements, and his army of 2,200 British regulars made contact 

with Gates outside Camden on the night of August 15. 

In the battle that ensued the following morning, Gates deployed 

his militia on the left and the continentals under Maj. Gen. Johann de 

Kalb on the right. Morning fog, compounded by the smoke muskets, 

prevented each of the two parts of the American force from seeing 

what was happening to the other. The militia was still forming when 

Cornwallis struck, and they fled in panic before the British onslaught.

On the other side of the field, de Kalb’s continentals drove back the

British forces opposing them. At this point the British who had driven 

the militia from the field wheeled on the continentals and brought an

end to the valiant but hopeless fight. Tarleton’s cavalry pursued the

fleeing Americans for thirty miles, killing or making prisoner those who

lagged. Gates himself fled too fast for Tarleton, reaching Hillsborough,

160 miles away, in three days and leaving his men to fend for themselves. To add to the disaster, Tarleton caught up with General Sumter, 

whom Gates had sent with a detachment to raid a British wagon train, 

and virtually destroyed his force in a surprise attack at Fishing Creek on 

August 18. Once more South Carolina seemed safely in British hands.

Nadir of the American Cause

In the summer of 1780 the American cause seemed to be at as low 

an ebb as it had been after the New York campaign in 1776 or after the

defeats at Ticonderoga and Brandywine in 1777. Defeat in the south 

Francis Marion (1732–1795)

When Charleston, South Carolina, fell to the British in 

1780, organized American resistance broke down, initially 

leaving the defense of the southern colonies in the hands of 

guerrilla bands. One of the most famous guerrilla leaders 

was Francis Marion, who became known as the Swamp Fox 

for his tactic of hiding in back-country marshes before sallying forth to harass the British with lightning raids. Marion and 

other guerrillas played a key role in General Greene’s Southern Campaign, pinning down British units while Continental 

Army regulars prepared for the decisive battles to come in 

1780–1781. “The Swamp Fox” Brigadier General 

Francis Marion with SC Militia

Robert Wilson oil painting, 1980 
American Military History

94

was not the only discouraging aspect of patriot affairs. In the north, a 

creeping paralysis had set in as the patriotic enthusiasm of the early war 

years waned. The Continental currency had depreciated virtually out of 

existence, and Congress was impotent to pay the soldiers or purchase 

supplies. At Morristown, New Jersey, in the winter of 1779–1780, the 

army suffered worse hardships than at Valley Forge. Congress could do 

little but attempt to shift its responsibilities onto the states, giving each 

the task of providing clothing for its own troops and furnishing certain 

quotas of “specific supplies” for the entire Army. The system of specific

supplies worked not at all. Not only were the states laggard in furnishing 

supplies, but when they did it was seldom at the time or place they were 

needed. This breakdown in the supply system was more than even General Greene as Quartermaster General could withstand; in early 1780, 

under heavy criticism in Congress, he resigned his position.

Under such difficulties, Washington had to struggle to hold even a

small Army together. Recruiting of continentals, difficult to begin with,

became almost impossible when the troops could neither be paid nor 

supplied adequately and had to suffer such winters as those at Morristown. Enlistments and drafts from the militia in 1780 produced not 

quite half as many men for one year’s service as had enlisted in 1775 

for three years or the duration. While recruiting lagged, morale among 

those men who had enlisted for the longer terms naturally fell. Mutinies 

in 1780 and 1781 were suppressed only by measures of great severity.

Germain could write confidently to Clinton: “so very contemptible

is the rebel force now ... that no resistance ... is to be apprehended 

that can materially obstruct ... the speedy suppression of the rebellion ... the American levies in the King’s service are more in number 

than the whole of the enlisted troops in the service of the Congress.” 

The French were unhappy. In the summer of 1780 they occupied the 

vacated British base at Newport and moved in a naval squadron and 

4,000 troops under the command of Lt. Gen. Jean Baptiste Donatien 

de Vimeur, the Comte de Rochambeau. Rochambeau immediately 

warned his government: “Send us troops, ships and money, but do not 

count on these people nor on their resources, they have neither money 

nor credit, their forces exist only momentarily, and when they are about 

to be attacked in their own homes they assemble ... to defend themselves.” Another French commander thought only one highly placed 

American traitor was needed to decide the campaign.

Clinton had in fact already found his highly placed traitor in Benedict Arnold, the hero of the march to Quebec, the naval battle on the 

lakes, Fort Stanwix, and Saratoga. “Money is this man’s God,” one of 

his enemies had said of Arnold earlier; evidently, he was correct. Lucrative rewards promised by the British led to Arnold’s treason, though 

he evidently resented the slights Congress had dealt him; and he justified his act by claiming that the Americans were now fighting for the

interests of Catholic France and not their own. Arnold wangled an 

appointment as commander at West Point and then entered into a plot 

to deliver this key post to the British. Washington discovered the plot 

on September 21, 1780, just in time to foil it, though Arnold himself 

escaped to become a British brigadier.

Arnold’s treason in September 1780 marked the nadir of the patriot 

cause. Yet in the closing months of 1780, the Americans somehow put 

Arnold’s treason in September 

1780 marked the nadir of the 

patriot cause.
The Winning of Independence, 1777–1783

95

together the ingredients for a final and decisive burst of energy in 1781.

Congress persuaded Robert Morris, a wealthy Philadelphia merchant, 

to accept a post as Superintendent of Finance; Col. Timothy Pickering, 

an able administrator, would replace Greene as Quartermaster General. 

Greene, as Washington’s choice, was then named to succeed Gates in 

command of the Southern Army. General Lincoln, exchanged after 

Charleston, was appointed Secretary at War; and the old board was 

abolished. Morris took over many of the functions previously performed by unwieldy committees. Working closely with Pickering, he 

abandoned the old paper money entirely and introduced a new policy 

of supplying the army by private contracts, using his personal credit as 

eventual guarantee for payment in gold or silver. It was an expedient 

but, for a time at least, it worked.

Greene’s Southern Campaign

It was the frontier militia assembling “when they were about to be 

attacked in their own homes” who struck the blow that actually marked 

the turning point in the south. Late in 1780, with Clinton’s reluctant 

consent, Cornwallis set out on the invasion of North Carolina. He sent 

Maj. Patrick Ferguson, who had successfully organized the Tories in the 

upcountry of South Carolina, to move north simultaneously with his 

“American Volunteers,” spread the Tory gospel in the North Carolina 

back country, and join the main army at Charlotte with a maximum number of recruits. Ferguson’s advance northward alarmed the independentminded “over-mountain men” in western North Carolina, southwest 

Virginia, and what is now east Tennessee. A picked force of mounted 

militia riflemen gathered on the Catawba River in western North Carolina, set out to find Ferguson, and brought him to bay at King’s Mountain near the border of the two Carolinas on October 7. In a battle of 

patriot against Tory (Ferguson was one of only a handful of British soldiers present), the patriots’ triumph was complete. Ferguson himself was 

killed, and few of his command escaped death or capture. Some got the 

same “quarter” Tarleton had given Buford’s men at the Waxhaws.

King’s Mountain was as fatal to Cornwallis’ plans as Bennington had 

been to those of Burgoyne. The North Carolina Tories, cowed by the fate 

of their compatriots, gave him lame support. The British commander on 

October 14, 1780, began a wretched retreat in the rain back to Winnsboro, 

South Carolina, with militia harassing his progress. Meanwhile, Clinton, 

King’s Mountain

Sir Henry Clinton remembered King’s Mountain as “the first ... of a Chain of Evils that ... at last 

ended in the total loss of America.” On October 7, 1780, when only a few continentals and isolated 

guerrillas blocked the restoration of British rule in the south, 1,400 “over-mountain men” and militia surrounded and overran the wooded hilltop position of 1,100 Tories and killed their leader, Major Ferguson. 

The victory not only gave the patriots time to regroup for the campaign that eventually led to Yorktown 

but also proved a major patriot victory in the vicious struggle for political allegiances in the south.
American Military History

96

acting on guidance from London, launched an expedition of 2,500 

men under Benedict Arnold to establish a base in Virginia to reinforce 

Cornwallis.

The frontier militia had turned the tide; but having done so, they 

returned to their homes. To keep the tide moving against the British 

was the task of the new commander, General Greene. When Greene 

arrived at Charlotte early in December 1780, he found 1,50

0 men fit

for duty, only 949 of them continentals. The army lacked clothing and 

provisions and had little systematic means of procuring them. Greene 

decided not to engage Cornwallis’ army in battle until he had built up 

his strength, instead to pursue delaying tactics to wear down his stron-

ger opponent. To accomplish this goal, he built on Gates’ earlier dis-

positions. Gates had created a mobile screening force from his best 

troops. Greene first took the unorthodox ste

p of dividing his army in

the face of a superior force, moving part under his personal command 

to Cheraw Hill and the augmented light screening forces under Brig. 

Gen. Daniel Morgan west across the Catawba over 100 miles away. It 

was an intentional violation of the principle of mass. Greene wrote: I am well satisfied with the movement.... It makes the most of my inferior

force, for it compels my adversary to divide his, and holds him in doubt as 

to his own line of conduct. He cannot leave Morgan behind him to come at 

me, or his posts at Ninety-Six and Augusta would be exposed. And he cannot 

chase Morgan far, or prosecute his views upon Virginia, while I am here with 

the whole country open before me. I am as near to Charleston as he is, and as 

near Hillsborough as I was at Charlotte; so that I am in no danger of being cut 

off from my reinforcements.

Left unsaid was the fact that divided forces could live off the land 

much easier than one large force and would constitute two rallying 

points for local militia instead of one

. Greenewas in effect sacrificing

mass to enhance maneuver.

Cornwallis, at this point in his career an aggressive commander 

often prone to act before thinking, had determined to gamble every-

thing on a renewed invasion of North Carolina. Ignoring Clinton’s 

warnings, he depleted his Charleston base by bringing almost all his 

supplies forward. In the face of Greene’s dispositions, Cornwallis 

divided his army into not two but three parts. He sent a holding force 

to Camden to contain Greene, directed Tarleton with a fast-moving 

contingent of 1,100 infantr

y and cavalry to find and crush Morgan,

and moved cautiously with the remainder of his army up into North 

Carolina to cut off any of Morgan’s force that escaped Tarleton.

On January 17, 1781, Tarleton caught up with Morgan west of 

King’s Mountain at a place called the Cowpens, an area of open forest 

near the Broad River. (Map 11) Morgan chose this site to make his stand 

less by design than by necessity, for he had intended to get across the 

Broad. Nevertheless, on ground seemingly better suited to the action 

of regulars, he achieved a little tactical masterpiece, making the most 

effective use of his heterogeneous force, numerically equal to that of 

Tarleton but composed of three-fourths militia. Selecting a low hill 

as the center of his position, he placed his Continental infantry on it, 

deliberately leaving his flanks open. In front of the main line he posted

militia infantr

y in two lines, instructing the first line to fire two

volleys
The Winning of Independence, 1777–1783

97

and then fall back on the second, the combined line to fire until the

British pressed them, then to fall back to the rear of the continentals 

and re-form as a reserve. He placed Lt. Col. William Washington’s cavalry detachment behind the hill, ready to charge the attacking enemy at 

the critical moment. Every man in the ranks was informed of the plan 

of battle and the part he was expected to play in it.

On finding Morgan, Tarleton ordered an immediate attack. His

men moved forward in regular formation and were momentarily 

checked by the militia rifles; but, taking the retreat of the first two lines

to be the beginning of a rout, Tarleton’s men rushed headlong into the 

steady fire of the continentals on the hill. When the British were well

advanced, the American cavalry struck them on the right flank, broke

Map 11

MILITIA

REORGANIZED

C O N T I N E N T A L S 

M O R G A N ’ S

MILITIA

DELAYING FORCE

C

A

V

A L R Y T A R L E T O N

to the Broad River

BATTLE OF THE COWPENS

0 500

Yards

Terrain covered with open woods

(Schematic)

17 January 1781
American Military History

98

the British cavalry, and then wheeled on the infantry. The militia, having re-formed, charged out from behind the hill to hit the British left. 

Caught in a classic double envelopment, the British surrendered after 

suffering heavy losses. Tarleton managed to escape with only a small 

force of cavalry he had held in reserve. It was on a small scale and 

with certain significant differences a repetition of the classic double

envelopment of the Romans by a Carthaginian army under Hannibal 

at Cannae in 216 b.c., an event of which Morgan, no reader of books,

probably had not the foggiest notion. But it was a clever use of the 

terrain and troops by one of the American Army’s most intuitive and 

inspirational commanders.

Having struck this fatal blow against Tarleton, Morgan still had to 

move fast to escape Cornwallis. Covering 100 miles and crossing two 

rivers in five days, he rejoined Greene early in February. Cornwallis by

now was too heavily committed to the campaign in North Carolina to 

withdraw. Hoping to match the swift movement of the Americans, he 

destroyed all his superfluous supplies, baggage, and wagons and set forth

in pursuit of Greene’s army. The American general retreated through 

North Carolina into southern Virginia and crossed to safety behind the 

Dan River. Cornwallis’ exhausted forces began to retreat into North 

Carolina to reach their depot and replenish their supplies. As the British 

started south, Greene recrossed the Dan and followed, keeping just out 

of reach of his adversary to avoid any battle he did not wish. Finally, on 

March 15, 1781, at Guilford Court House in North Carolina, on ground 

he had chosen himself, Greene gave battle. By this time he had collected 

1,500 continentals and 3,000 militia to oppose the 1,900 regulars the 

British could muster. The British nominally won this contest because 

they managed to hold the field after a hard-fought battle, but they suffered disproportionate casualties of about one-fourth of the force 

engaged. It was like Bunker Hill a Pyrrhic victory. His ranks depleted 

and his supplies exhausted, Cornwallis withdrew to Wilmington on the 

coast to once again rebuild his army. Then he decided to move north to 

join the British forces General Clinton had sent to Virginia.

Greene, his army in better condition than six months earlier, 

pushed quickly into South Carolina to reduce the British posts in the 

interior. He fought two battles—at Hobkirk’s Hill on April 25 and at 

Eutaw Springs on September 8—losing both but with approximately 

the same results as at Guilford Court House. One by one the British interior posts fell to Greene’s army or to militia and partisans. By 

October 1781 the majority of the British had been forced to withdraw 

to their two strongholds along the coast, Charleston and Savannah. 

Greene had lost battles but won a campaign. In so doing, he paved the 

way for the greater victory to follow at Yorktown.

Yorktown: The Final Act

As Howe and Burgoyne went their separate ways in 1777, each 

seemingly determined to satisfy only personal ambitions, so Clinton 

and Cornwallis in 1781 paved the road to Yorktown with their disagreements and lack of coordination. Clinton was Cornwallis’ superior 

in this case, but the latter enjoyed the confidence of Germain to an

extent that Clinton did not. Clinton, believing that without substantial 

Caught in a classic double 

envelopment, the British 

surrendered after suffering 

heavy losses.
The Winning of Independence, 1777–1783

99

reinforcements the British could not operate far from coastal bases, had 

opposed Cornwallis’ ventures in the interior of the Carolinas. When 

Cornwallis came to Virginia, he did so without even informing his 

superior of his intention.

Since 1779 Clinton had sought to paralyze the state of Virginia by 

conducting raids up its great rivers, arousing the Tories, and establish-

ing a base in the Chesapeake Bay region. (See Map 12.) He thought 

this base might eventually be used as a starting point for one arm of a 

pincers movement against Pennsylvania for which his own idle force in 

New York would provide the other. A raid conducted in the Hampton 

Roads area in 1779 was highly successful; but when Clinton sought to 

follow it up in 1780, the force sent for the purpose had to be diverted 

to Charleston to bail out Cornwallis after King’s Mountain. Finally, in 

1781 he

got an expedition into Virginia,a contingent of 1,600 under

the American traitor, Benedict Arnold. In January Arnold conducted a 

destructive raid up the James River all the way to Richmond. His pres-

ence soon proved to be a magnet that drew forces of both sides to 

Virginia.

In an effort to trap Arnold, Washington dispatched Lafayette to 

Virginia with 1,200 of his scarce continentals and persuaded the French 

to send a naval squadron from Newport to block Arnold’s escape by 

sea.

The planwentawry whena British fleet drove theFrench squadron

back to Newport and Clinton sent another 600 men to Virginia along

with a new commander, Maj. Gen. William Phillips. Phillips and Arnold 

continued their raids, which Lafayette was too weak to prevent. Then 

on May 20 Cornwallis arrived from Wilmington and relieved Phillips. 

With additional temporary reinforcements sent by Clinton, he was able 

to

fielda force of about 7,000 men, abouta quarter of the British

strength in America. Washington sent down an additional reinforce

-

ment of 800 continentals under General Wayne; but even with Virginia 

militia, Lafayette’s force remained greatly outnumbered.

Cornwallis and Clinton were soon working at cross-purposes. 

Cornwallis proposed to carry out major operations in the interior of 

Virginia, but Clinton saw as little practical value in this tactic as Corn-

wallis did in Clinton’s plan to establish a base in Virginia to launch 

amphibious raids along the Chesapeake Bay. Cornwallis had no respect 

for his superior’s military skills and saw no reason to give up his inde-

pendent command. Instead, he did his level best to ignore Clinton’s 

orders. Cornwallis at

firstturnedtothe interior andengaged ina fruit-

less pursuit of Lafayette north of Richmond. Then, on receiving Clin-

ton’s positive order to return to the coast and return part of his force 

to New York, Cornwallis moved back down the Virginia peninsula to 

take up station at Yorktown, a small tobacco port on the York River 

just off the Chesapeake Bay. In the face of Cornwallis’ insistence that 

he must keep all his troops with him, Clinton vacillated, reversing his 

own orders several times and in the end granting Cornwallis’ request. 

Lafayette and Wayne followed Cornwallis cautiously down the penin-

sula, lost a skirmish with him at Green Spring near Williamsburg on 

July 6, and

finallytook upa position at Williamsburgt

o

keep aneye

on Yorktown.

Meanwhile, Washington had been trying to persuade the French to 

cooperate in a combined land and naval assault on New York in the 
Map 12



O C T

C L I N

T

O

N ( - )

J U N – J U L

A P R – M

A Y

C O

R

N

W A

L

L I S

19 Oct

BRITISH SURRENDERED

Mohawk R

Hudson R

James R

Ch e s ape a k e Ba y

Y o r k R i v e r

J U N – J U L R O C H A M B E A U

A P R

L

A F AY E T T E

A U G –

S E P

F R E N C H

A N D A M E R I C A N F O R C E S

 

1st Parallel

2d Parallel

ELEMENTS OF THE FRENCH NAVY CONTROLLING CHESAPEAKE BAY

SEP–OCT

WASHING TON (-) AND ROCHAMBEAU

PENNSYL V ANIA

VIRGINIA

NORTH

CAROLINA

MARYLAND

DEL A W ARE

CONNECTICUT

M A S S A CHUSETTS

NEW HAMPSHIRE

VERMON T

RHODE

ISLAND

NEW Y ORK

NEW JERSE Y

Cape

Hatteras to Williamsburg

Gloucester Point

Wyoming Valley

Newtown

Newburgh Newport

Trenton

Philadelphia

Head of Elk

Baltimore

Annapolis

Richmond

Petersburg

Wilmington

YORKTOWN

New York

YORKTOWN

April–October 1781

CONCENTRATION OF FORCES

AT YORKTOWN

Miles

0 100

Miles

0 1

6–9 October 1781

SIEGE OF YORKTOWN
The Winning of Independence, 1777–1783

101

summer of 1781. Rochambeau brought his 4,000 troops down from 

Newport and placed them under Washington’s command. The pros-

pects were still bleak, since the combined Franco-American regular 

force numbered but 10,000 and would still be outnumbered by Clin-

ton’s 17,000 in

well-fortified positions.Then onAugust 14Washington

learned that the French Fleet in the West Indies, commanded by Admiral 

Francois de Grasse, would not come to New York but would arrive in 

the Chesapeake later in the month and remain there until October 15. 

He saw immediately that if he could achieve a superior concentration of 

force on the land side while de Grasse still held the bay, he could destroy 

the British army at Yorktown before Clinton had a chance to relieve it.

The movements that followed illustrate most effectively a success-

ful application of the principles of the offensive, surprise, objective, 

mass, and maneuver. Even without unified command of Army and

Navy forces, Franco-American cooperation this time was excellent. 

Admiral Louis, the Comte de Barras, immediately put out to sea from 

Newport to join de Grasse. Washington sent orders to Lafayette to 

contain Cornwallis at Yorktown. Employing an elaborate deception to 

convince Clinton that the Americans were about to attack New York, 

on August 21 Washington started the major portion of the FrancoAmerican army on a rapid secret movement to Virginia via the Chesapeake Bay, leaving only 2,000 Americans under General Heath behind 

to watch Clinton.

On August 30, while Washington was on the move south, de Grasse 

arrived in

the Chesapeakewith hisentirefleet oftwenty-four ships of

the line and a few days later debarked 3,000 French troops to join Lafay

-

ette. Admiral Thomas Graves, the British naval commander in New 

York, meanwhile had put out to sea in late August with nineteen ships 

of the line, hoping either to intercept Barras’ squadron or to block de 

Grasse’s

entry int

o

the Chesapeake. He faile

d

t

o

find Barras; andwhen

he arrived off Hampton Roads on September 5, he found de Grasse 

already in the bay. The French admiral sallied forth to meet Graves, and 

the

twofleets fought an indecisive action offthe Virginiacapes.Yet for

all practical purposesthe victory laywiththeFrench, forwhilethefleets

maneuvered at sea for days following the battle, Barras’ squadron slipped 

into the Chesapeake and landed heavy artillery for the siege. Then de 

Grasse got back into the bay and joined Barras, confronting Graves with 

so superior

a naval force that he decided to return to New York to refit.

Surrender of Cornwallis

WhenWashington’s army arrived at Williamsburg on September 26,

theFrenchFleetwas infirmcontrol ofthe bay, blocking Cornwallis’ sea

route of escape. A decisive concentration had been achieved. Count-

ing 3,000 Virginia militiamen, Washington had a force of over 9,000 

Americans and 6,000Frenchtroopswithwhichtoconductthe siege.

It proceeded in the best traditions of Marshal Sebastien Vauban under 

the direction of French engineers. Cornwallis obligingly abandoned his 

forward position on September 30, and on October6thefirst parallel

was begun 600yards fromthe main British position. Artillery placed

along the trench began its destructive work on October 9. By October 

11 the zigzag connecting trench had been dug 300 yards forward and 
American Military History

102

work on the second parallel had begun. Two British redoubts needed to 

be reduced to extend the line to the York River. Washington brilliantly 

carried out that action by using a surprise attack at bayonet point just 

after dark: Americans under Lafayette took Redoubt 10; and Frenchmen 

under Lafayette’s brother-in-law, the Viscount Louis-Marie Noailles, 

secured Redoubt 9. This accomplished, Cornwallis’ only recourse was a 

desperate attempt to escape across the river to Gloucester Point, where 

the allied line was thinly held. A storm on the night of October 16 frustrated his attempt to do so, leaving him with no hope except relief from 

New York. Clinton had been considering such relief for days, but he 

acted too late. On the very day, October 17, that Admiral Graves set sail 

from New York with a reinforced fleet and 7,000 troops for the relief

of Yorktown, Cornwallis began negotiations on terms of surrender. On 

October 19 his entire army marched out to lay down its arms with the 

British band playing an old tune, “The World Turned Upside Down.”

So far as active campaigning was concerned Yorktown ended 

the war, though neither side realized it at the time. Both Greene and 

Washington maintained their armies in positions near New York and 

Charleston for nearly two years more, but with only some minor skirmishing in the south. Cornwallis’ defeat led to the resignation of the 

British Cabinet and the formation of a new government that decided 

the war in America was lost. With some success, Britain devoted its 

energies to trying to salvage what it could in the West Indies and in 

India. The independence for which Americans had fought thus virtually became a reality when Cornwallis’ command marched out of its 

breached defenses at Yorktown.

The Summing Up: Reasons, Lessons, and Meaning

The American victory in the War of the Revolution was a product 

of many factors, no one of which can be positively assigned first imporSurrender of Lord Cornwallis at Yorktown, Virginia, October 19th, 1781

John Trumbull, 1820

Image removed due to

license restrictions
The Winning of Independence, 1777–1783

103

tance. Washington, looking back on the vicissitudes of eight years, could 

only explain it as the intervention of “Divine Providence.” American 

historians in the nineteenth century saw that divine providence as hav-

ing been manifested primarily in the character and genius of the modest 

Commander in Chief himself. Washington’s leadership was clearly one 

of the principal factors in American success; it seems fair to say that the 

Revolution could hardly have succeeded without him. Yet in many of 

the events that led to victory—Bennington, Saratoga, King’s Mountain, 

and Cowpens, to name but

a few—his personal influence was remote.

Today many scholars stress not the astonishment that Washington 

felt at the victory of a weak and divided confederation of American 

statesover thegreatest power of the age but the practical difficulties

the British faced in suppressing the revolt. These were indeed great, but 

they do not appear to have been insuperable if one considers military 

victory alone and not its political consequences. The British forfeited 

several

chances for militar

y victory in 1776–1777, and again in 1780

they might have won had they been able to throw 10,000 fresh troops 

into the American war. American military leaders were more resource-

ful and imaginative than their British counterparts, and they proved 

quite capable of profiting from British blunders

. In addition to George

Washington, Nathanael Greene, Henry Knox, Daniel Morgan, and 

Benedict Arnold showed remarkable military abilities; of the foreign 

volunteers, Steuben and the young Lafayette were outstanding. The 

resourcefulness of this extraordinary group of leaders was matched 

by the dedication to the cause of the Continental rank and file

. Only

men so dedicated could have endured the hardships of the march to 

Quebec, the crossing of the Delaware, Valley Forge, Morristown, and 

Greene’s forced marches in the southern campaign. British and Hessian 

professionals never showed the same spirit; their virtues were exhibited 

principally in situations where discipline and training counted most.

The militia, the men who fought battles and then went home, also 

exhibited this spirit on many occasions. The militiamen have been gen-

erally maligned as useless

by one school of thought and glorifiedby

another as the true victors in the war. Any balanced view must rec

-

ognize that their contributions were great, though they would have 

counted for little without the Continental Army to give the American 

cause that continued sustenance that only a permanent force in being 

could give it. It was the ubiquity of the militia that made British victo-

riesover the continentals in the field so meaningless. And the success

with whic

h the militia did operate derived from the firm political con-

trol the patriots had established over the countryside long before the 

British were in any position to challenge it—the situation that made the 

British task so difficult in the first place.

For allthese American virtues and British difficulties and mistakes,

the Americans still required French aid—money, supplies, and in the last 

phase military force—to win a decisive and clear-cut military victory. 

Most of the muskets, bayonets, and cannon used by the Continental 

Army came from France. The French contested the control of the seas 

that was so vital to the British and compelled them to divert forces from 

the American mainland

t

o other areas.

Thefinal strok

e at

Yorktown,

though a product of Washington’s strategic conception, was possible 

only because of the temporary predominance of French naval power 
American Military History

104

off the American coast and the presence of a French army. The French 

entered the war for reasons of their own national interest, but they were 

no less instrumental in the winning of American independence.

French aid was doubly necessary because the American war effort 

lacked strong national direction. The Revolution showed conclusively 

the need for a central government with power to harness the nation’s 

resources for war. It is not surprising that in 1787 nearly all those who 

had struggled so long and hard as leaders in the Continental Army or 

in administrative positions under the Congress were to be found in the 

ranks of the supporters of a new constitution that created such a central 

government with a strong executive and the power to “raise armies and 

navies,” call out the militia, and directly levy taxes to support itself.

The strictly military lessons of the Revolution were more equivocal. Tactical innovations were not radical; but they did represent a culmination of the trend, which started during the French and Indian 

War, toward employment of light troops as skirmishers in conjunction 

with traditional linear formations. By the end of the war both armies 

were fighting in this fashion. The Americans strove to develop the

same proficiency as the British in regular line-of-battle tactics, while

the British adapted to the American terrain and tactics by employing 

skirmishers and fighting when possible from behind cover. Washington was himself a military conservative, and Steuben’s training program was designed to equip American troops to fight in European

fashion with modifications to provide for the increased use of light

infantry. The guerrilla tactics that characterized many actions, principally those of the militia, were no product of the design of Washington or his leading subordinates but of circumstances over which they 

had little control. The American rifle, most useful in guerrilla actions

or in the hands of skirmishers, played no decisive role in the Revolution. It was of great value in wooded areas, as at Saratoga and King’s 

Mountain; but for open-field fighting, its slow rate of fire and lack of

a bayonet made it inferior to the musket.

Since both militiamen and continentals played roles in winning the 

war, the Revolutionary experience provided ammunition for two diametrically opposed schools of thought on American military policy: 

the one advocating a large Regular Army, the other reliance on the miliBadge of Military Merit

In 1782, near the end of the Revolutionary War, General Washington created the Badge of 

Military Merit, an individual award for enlisted men. Exceptional gallantry or extraordinary fidelity and essential service, documented by local commanders and approved by General Washington, 

qualified a soldier for a heart-shaped, purple-cloth badge with the word “MERIT” embroidered in 

the heart’s center that the recipient wore over the left breast. Only three men, all from Connecticut units, received the Badge of Military Merit: Sgts. Daniel Bissell, Jr., William Brown, and Elijah 

Churchill in 1783. The award fell into disuse after the Continental Army disbanded. Despite assertions that the Purple Heart created in 1932 was a revived Badge of Military Merit, the only connection between the two awards was some similarity in design and color.
The Winning of Independence, 1777–1783

105

tia as the bulwark of national defense. The real issue, as Washington 

fully recognized, was less militia versus regulars—for he never believed 

the infant republic needed a large standing army—than the extent to 

which militia could be trained and organized to form a reliable national 

reserve. The lesson Washington drew from the Revolution was that the 

militia should be “well regulated,” that is, trained and organized under a 

uniform national system in all the states and subject to call into national 

service in war or emergency.

The lesson had far greater implications for the future than any of 

the tactical changes wrought by the American Revolution. It balanced 

the rights of freedom and equality proclaimed in the Declaration of 

Independence with a corresponding obligation of all citizens for mili-

tary service

tothe nation.Thisconcept,whichwastofindexplicit

expression in the “nation in arms” during the French Revolution, was 

also implicit in the American; and it portended the end of eighteenth 

century limited

war foughtb

y professional armies officered

b

y an aris-

tocratic class. As Steuben so well recognized, American continentals 

were not professional soldiers in the European sense and militia even 

less so.

Theywere insteada people’s armyfighting foracause. Inthis

sense then, the American Revolution began the “democratization of 

war,” a process that eventually lead to the new concept of a nation in 

arms. 

Discussion Questions

1.Whatwere the flaws in the British plan of 1777?Would the

offensive have been successful if it were implemented as planned? 

2. List the reasons behind Burgoyne’s defeat at Saratoga. How 

could he have done things differently? Could he have been successful?

3. Why were the British not more successful in rallying Tory sup-

port to the Crown? 

4. Discuss the strengths and weaknesses of a guerrilla army such as 

that formed in the south by Sumter, Pickens, and Marion? Can guerrilla 

forces alone defeat regular troops?

5. What were the critical elements of the American victory at 

Yorktown? 

6. Ho

w crucial

was foreign suppor

t in the American victory in the

Revolution? 

Recommended Readings

Billias, George A., ed. George Washington’s Generals. Westport, Conn.: 

Greenwood Press, 1967.

Higginbotham, Don, ed. Reconsiderations on the Revolutionary War: 

Selected Essays. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1978.

Hoffman, Ronald, and Peter J. Albert, eds. Arms and Independence: The 

Military Character of the American Revolution. Charlottesville: Univer-

sity of Virginia Press, 1984.

Middlekauf, Robert. The Glorious Cause. New York: Oxford University 

Press, 1986.
American Military History

106

Morgan, John S., and Daniel J. Boorstein. The Birth of the Republic, 1763–

1789. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993.

Shy, John. A People Numerous and Armed: Reflections on the Military Struggle 

for American Independence. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 

1990.

Wright, Robert K., Jr. The Continental Army. Washington, D.C.: U.S. 

Army Center of Military History, 1983.

Other Readings

Billias, George A., ed. George Washington’s Opponents: British Generals and 

Admirals of the American Revolution. New York: William Morrow, 

1969.

Bowler, R. Arthur. Logistics and the Failure of the British Army in America, 

1775–1783. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975.

Buchanan, John. The Road to Guilford Courthouse: The American Revolution 

in the Carolinas. Hoboken, N.J.: John Wiley and Sons, 1999.

Buel, Richard, Jr. Dear Liberty: Connecticut’s Mobilization for the Revolutionary War. Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1980.

Calloway, Colin G. The American Revolution in Indian Country: Crisis and 

Diversity in Native American Communities. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995.

Carp, E. Wayne. To Starve the Army at Pleasure: Continental Army Administration and American Political Culture, 1775–1783. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1984.

Cress, Lawrence D. Citizens in Arms: The Army and Militia in American 

Society to the War of 1812. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 

Press, 1982.

Dann, John C., ed. The Revolution Remembered: Eyewitness Accounts of the 

War for Independence. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983.

Larrabee, Harold A. Decision at the Chesapeake. New York: C. N. Potter, 

1964.

Rossie, Jonathan G. The Politics of Command in the American Revolution. 

Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1975.

Royster, Charles. A Revolutionary People at War: The Continental Army and 

American Character, 1775–1783. New York: Norton, 1981.
On September 24, 1783, three weeks after the signing of the 

Treaty of Paris formally ended the war, Congress directed 

General George Washington to discharge “such parts of the 

Federal Army now in Service as he shall deem proper and expedient.” 

For the time being, Washington retained the force facing the British at 

New York and discharged the rest of the continentals. After the British 

quit New York, he kept only one infantry regiment and a battalion of 

artillery, 600 men in all, to guard the military supplies at West Point and

other posts.

The period leading up to this demobilization was a stormy one for 

the Congress. During the winter of 1782 the Army had grown impatient, and rumors that it would take matters into its own hands gained 

credence when several anonymous addresses were circulated among 

the officers at Newburgh, urging them not to fight if the war continued or not to lay down their arms if peace were declared and their pay 

accounts left unsettled. In an emotional speech to his old comrades, 

Washington disarmed this threat. He promised to intercede for them; 

in the end, Congress gave in to the officers’ demands, agreeing to award

the men their back pay and to grant the officers full pay for five years

instead of half pay for life. Demobilization then proceeded peacefully, 

but it was against the background of these demands and threats that 

Congress wrestled with a major postwar problem, the size and character of the peacetime military establishment. In the way of most governments, Congress turned the problem over to a committee, this one 

under Alexander Hamilton, to study the facts and make recommendations for a military establishment.

The Question of a Peacetime Army

Congress subscribed to the prevailing view that the first line of

national defense should be a “well-regulated and disciplined militia 

5

The Formative Years

1783–1812
American Military History

108

sufficiently armed and accoutered.” Its reluctance to create a standing

army was understandable; a permanent army would be a heavy expense, 

and it would complicate the struggle between those who wanted a 

strong national government and those who preferred the existing loose 

federation of states. Further, the recent threats of the Continental officers strengthened the popular fear that a standing army might be used 

to coerce the states or become an instrument of despotism. The English experience with General Oliver Cromwell and his military dictatorship in the mid-seventeenth century still exerted a powerful influence

over the political ideas of the mother country and the former colonies.

General Washington, to whom Hamilton’s committee turned first

for advice, echoed some of these fears. He pointed out that a large 

standing army in time of peace had always been considered “dangerous to the liberties of a country” and that the nation was “too poor 

to maintain a standing army adequate to our defense.” The question 

might also be considered, he continued, whether any surplus funds that 

became available should not better be applied to “building and equipping a Navy without which, in case of War we could neither protect our 

Commerce, nor yield that assistance to each other which, on such an 

extent of seacoast, our mutual safety would require.” He believed that 

America should rely ultimately on an improved version of the historic 

citizens’ militia, a force enrolling all males between eighteen and fifty

liable for service to the nation in emergencies. He also recommended 

a volunteer militia, recruited in units, periodically trained, and subject 

to national rather than state control. At the same time Washington did 

suggest the creation of a small Regular Army “to awe the Indians, protect our Trade, prevent the encroachment of our Neighbors of Canada 

and the Floridas, and guard us at least from surprises; also for security 

of our magazines.” He recommended a force of four regiments of 

infantry and one of artillery, totaling 2,630 officers and men.

Hamilton’s committee also listened to suggestions made by General Friedrich von Steuben; Maj. Gen. Louis le Bèque du Portail, Chief 

Engineer of the Army; and Benjamin Lincoln, Secretary at War. On 

June 18, 1783, the committee submitted a plan to Congress similar to 

Washington’s but with a more ambitious militia program. Congress, 

however, rejected the proposal. Sectional rivalries, constitutional quesThe Newburgh “Conspiracy”

Mutiny was in the air on March 15, 1783. Having suffered through years of deprivation, many soldiers 

were angry that the Continental Congress seemed unwilling to pay them their salaries or to fulfill pledges 

for postwar pensions. When Washington learned that the Army’s officers planned to meet to threaten the 

Congress, he decided to crash the party. Just as the meeting was about to begin, Washington entered the 

room and made a speech urging the officers to remain loyal. Seeing that many remained unswayed, he took 

out a letter, hesitated, and then reached into his pocket to produce a pair of glasses, explaining, “Gentlemen, you will permit me to put on my spectacles, for I have not only grown gray but almost blind in the 

service of my country.” This simple act accomplished what his oratory had not. Ashamed and teary eyed, the 

assembled officers immediately pledged their loyalty to Congress. Mutiny had been avoided.
The Formative Years, 1783–1812

109

tions, and, above all, economic objections were too strong to be overcome. The new republic lacked even a rudimentary administrative and 

revenue base.

The committee thereupon revised its plan, recommending an even 

larger army that it hoped to provide at less expense by decreasing the 

pay of the regimental staff officers and subalterns. When asked, Washington admitted that detached service along the frontiers and coasts 

would probably require more men than he had proposed, but he disagreed that a larger establishment could be provided more economically than the one he had recommended. A considerable number of the 

delegates to Congress had similar misgivings; and when the committee 

presented its revised report on October 23, Congress refused to accept 

it. During the winter of 1783 the matter rested. Under the Articles of 

Confederation an affirmative vote of the representatives of nine states

was required for the exercise of certain important powers, including 

military matters, and on few occasions during this winter were enough 

states represented for Congress to renew the debate.

In the spring of 1784 the question of a permanent peacetime army 

became involved in the politics of state claims to western lands. The 

majority of men in the remaining infantry regiment and artillery battalion were from Massachusetts and New Hampshire, and those states 

wanted to be rid of the financial burden of providing the extra pay

they had promised the men on enlistment. Congress refused to assume 

the responsibility unless the New England states would vote for a 

permanent military establishment. The New England representatives, 

led by Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts, insisted that Congress had 

no authority to maintain a standing army, but at the same time they 

wanted the existing troops to occupy the western forts situated in land 

claimed by the New England states. New York vigorously contested the 

New England claims to western lands, particularly in the region around 

Oswego and Niagara, and refused to vote for any permanent military 

establishment unless Congress gave it permission to garrison the western forts with its own forces.

The posts that had been the object of most concern and discussion dominated the Great Lakes and the St. Lawrence River. (See Map 

13.) Located on American territory south of the boundary established 

by the peace treaty of 1783, the posts were in the hands of British 

troops when the war ended; but by the terms of the treaty they were 

to be turned over to the United States as speedily as possible. Congress 

agreed that a force should be retained to occupy the posts as soon as 

the British left. The problem was how and by whom the troops were 

to be raised. A decision was all the more urgent because the government was in the midst of negotiating a treaty with the Indians of the 

Northwest. As Washington had suggested, a sizable force “to awe the 

Indians” would facilitate the negotiations. But the deadlock between 

the New England states and New York continued until early June 1784.

Finally, on the last two days of the session, Congress rushed 

through a compromise. It ordered the existing infantry regiment and 

battalion of artillery disbanded, except for eighty artillerymen retained 

to guard military stores at West Point and Fort Pitt. It tied this discharge 

to a measure providing for the immediate recruitment of a new force 

of 700 men, a regiment of eight infantry and two artillery companies, 

Alexander Hamilton

John Trumbull, 1792

Image removed due to

license restrictions
American Military History

110

which was to become the nucleus of a new Regular Army. By not making requisitions on the states for troops, but merely recommending that 

the states provide them from their militia, Congress got rid of most of 

the New England opposition on this score; by not assigning a quota for 

Massachusetts and New Hampshire, Congress satisfied the objections

of most of the other states.

Four states were called upon to furnish troops: Pennsylvania (260),

Connecticut (165), New York (165), and New Jersey (110). Lt. Col.

Josiah Harmar of Pennsylvania was appointed commanding officer.

By the end of September 1784 only New Jersey and Pennsylvania had 

filled their quotas by enlisting volunteers from their militia.

Congress had meanwhile learned that there was little immediate 

prospect that the British would evacuate the frontier posts. Canadian 

fur traders and the settlers in Upper Canada had objected so violently to 

this provision of the peace treaty that the British government secretly 

directed the Governor-General of Canada not to evacuate the posts 

without further orders. The failure of the United States to comply with 

Map 13

Harmar’s Defeat

Tippecanoe St. Clair’s Defeat

Fallen Timbers

L a k e M i c h i g a n

L a k e H u r o n

L a k e S u p e r i o r 

L a k e E r i e

L a k e O n t a r i o

St. Lawrence River

Ottawa River

Ohio River

Mississippi River

U P P E R C A N A D A

L O W E R C A N A D A

Ft. Niagara

Pt. Au Fer

Oswegatchie

Oswego

Ft. Stanwix

Ft. Rensselaer

West Point

Carlisle

Ft. Pitt

Ft. Vincennes

Ft. Detroit

Ft. Miami

Ft. Washington

Ft. Michilimackinac

Springfield Albany

New York

Philadelphia

Erie

Montreal

Quebec

(Cincinnati)

1783–1812

THE NORTHERN FRONTIER

Posts in U.S. Territory Held by British until 1796

Engagement with Indians

100 0 100 200

Miles

Boundaries as of 1791
The Formative Years, 1783–1812

111

a stipulation in the treaty regarding the recovery of debts owed to loyalists provided the British an excuse to postpone the evacuation of the 

posts for twelve more years. So the New Jersey contingent of Colonel 

Harmar’s force was sent to Fort Stanwix, in upstate New York, to assist 

in persuading the Iroquois to part with their lands. The remainder of 

the force moved to Fort MacIntosh, thirty miles down the Ohio River 

from Fort Pitt, where similar negotiations were carried on with the 

Indians of the upper Ohio.

Toward a More Perfect Union

Postwar problems revealed a number of serious defects in the 

Articles of Confederation. The federal government lacked a separate 

executive branch and a judiciary. Although Congress exercised a certain 

amount of executive as well as legislative power, it lacked the power to 

tax. To some of the delegates the conflicts and dissension between the

states over the western lands seemed to carry the seeds of civil war. 

Rioting and disturbances in Massachusetts throughout the fall and winter of 1786 strengthened the pessimism of those who feared the collapse of the new nation. A severe commercial depression following on 

the heels of an immediate postwar boom was causing particular distress 

among the back-country farmers. Angry mobs gathered in the Massachusetts hills, broke up the meetings of the courts, harried lawyers and 

magistrates out of the villages, and began to threaten the government 

arsenal in Springfield.

On October 20, 1786, Congress responded to the threat by calling

on several states to raise a 1,340-man force to serve for three years. This 

time the New England states did not object to congressional action; 

but before any of the soldiers voted by Congress could reach the scene, 

local militiamen repulsed an attack on the Springfield Arsenal led by

Daniel Shays in late January 1787. A few days later a large reinforcement from the eastern part of the state arrived at Springfield and put an

end to the disorders. Recruiting for the force authorized by Congress 

continued until the following April. By then about 550 men had been 

enlisted, and the question of expense was becoming bothersome. Congress therefore directed the states to stop recruiting and to discharge the 

Congress and Civilian Control

The framers of the Constitution were deeply concerned over the potential danger of military 

power. Hence, they carefully crafted a separation of the powers concerning national security issues 

between the executive and legislative branches. The framers designated the President as “Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, 

when called into the actual service of the United States.” To balance this executive authority, they 

stipulated that Congress would “raise and support Armies ... provide and maintain a Navy ... make 

Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces,” and “provide for calling 

forth the Militia.” Consequently, the founding fathers effectively precluded either the executive or 

the legislature from having sole power over the military while ensuring that civilian control over the 

military was a basic principle of the new United States.
American Military History

112

troops already raised, except those in two artillery companies retained 

to guard West Point and the Springfield Arsenal. Shays’ Rebellion was

thus responsible for the first augmentation of the federal Army. More

important, it was one of the incidents that helped persuade Americans 

that they needed a stronger government.

Rising concern over the ineffectiveness of the federal government, 

particularly in matters of finance and commercial regulation, finally led

to the convening of a Constitutional Convention in the spring of 1787. 

To strengthen the military powers of the government was one of the 

principal tasks of the convention, a task no less important than establishing its financial and commercial authority. The general problem facing the convention, that of power and the control of power, came into 

sharp focus in the debates on military matters, since the widespread 

suspicion of a strong central government and the equally widespread 

fear of a standing army were merged in the issue of the government’s 

military powers. Those who mistrusted a powerful government argued 

against a broad grant of authority not only in the fields of taxation and

commercial regulation, but, and with especial force, in military matters as well. Even those like Hamilton who wanted to give the central 

government wide latitude in handling both purse and sword were also 

somewhat wary of standing armies. They too were concerned over the 

possible usurpation of political power by a military force or its use by 

officeholders as an instrument for perpetuating their personal power.

Hamilton and his supporters nevertheless were willing to have the 

country run the risk of sacrificing some freedom for safety’s sake. In

the final compromise the problem of the military powers of the central

government was resolved through the system of checks and balances 

built into the new Constitution.

Central to the system of checks and balances was the idea of specified and reserved powers. The states were to have all the powers not

specifically granted to the central government. The Constitution clothed

the central government with adequate authority to raise and maintain 

an army without calling on the states. By giving Congress power to 

levy taxes, the Constitution provided the central government with the 

necessary financial means; by creating a separate executive branch, the

Constitution made it possible for the government to conduct its daily 

business without constant reference to the states. The Constitution 

gave Congress the exclusive power to declare war, raise armies, and 

provide for a navy. It also empowered Congress to call forth the militia 

“to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel 

Invasions.” But authority over the militia was a shared power. Congress 

could provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia and 

governing “such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the 

United States,” but the Constitution specifically reserved to the states

the authority to appoint militia officers and to train the militia “according to the discipline prescribed by Congress.”

The militia issue was also central to the shaping of the Second 

Amendment to the Constitution: the right to keep and bear arms. If the 

founding fathers recognized the centrality of freedom of speech, the 

press, and assembly, they also made clear those freedoms would only 

remain secure if the people could keep and bear arms as an ultimate 

check on the power of the government. The Second Amendment has 

In the final compromise the 

problem of the military powers 

of the central government was 

resolved through the system of 

checks and balances built into the 

new Constitution.
The Formative Years, 1783–1812

113

been much politicized since its adoption as part of the Bill of Rights, 

but there is no question that the architects of our government believed 

that the people in arms—the militia—were the final guarantors of our

freedom. Any subsequent reinterpretations of that amendment must 

start with the fact that our leaders, fresh from their experiences in 

the Revolutionary War, relied on the militia as the centerpiece of our 

national military establishment. The concept of the militia and the right 

to bear arms are inextricably joined.

The new Constitution introduced an important innovation by 

assigning all executive power to the President. The Secretary of War, 

therefore, became directly responsible to the President and not to Congress. The Constitution specifically provided that the President should

be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy. As such, his powers were exclusive, limited only “by their nature and by the principles 

of our institutions.” The President had the right to assume personal 

command of forces in the field, but he could also delegate that right.

As Commander in Chief, he was responsible for the employment and 

disposition of the armed forces in time of peace and for the general 

direction of military and naval operations in time of war.

In April 1789 Washington became the first President under the new

Constitution; on August 7 Congress created the Department of War. 

There was no change, however, in either the policy or the personnel of 

the department. General Henry Knox, who had succeeded Washington as commander of the Army and had been handling military affairs 

under the old form of government, remained in charge. Since there 

was no navy, a separate department was unnecessary; at first the War

Department included naval affairs under its jurisdiction. Harmar, who 

had been given the rank of brigadier general during the Confederation 

period, was confirmed in his appointment, as were his officers; and the

existing miniscule Army was taken over intact by the new government. 

In August 1789 this force amounted to about 800 officers and men.

All the troops, except the two artillery companies retained after Shays’ 

Rebellion, were stationed along the Ohio River in a series of forts built 

after 1785.

So small an Army required no extensive field organization to supply its needs. In keeping with the accepted military theory that the 

Quartermaster was a staff officer necessary only in time of war, the

Confederation Congress had included the Quartermaster General and 

his assistants among the others discharged in 1783 and had placed the 

military supply system under civilian control. It had made the civilian Secretary responsible for the transport, safekeeping, and distribution of military supplies and the Board of Treasury responsible for 

procuring and purchasing all military stores, including food and clothing. Except during a brief period in which the Secretary of War was 

allowed to execute contracts for Army clothing and subsistence, the 

new federal government retained the supply system established under 

the Confederation, adding in 1792 the civilian Office of the Quartermaster General to transport supplies to the frontier posts during the 

Indian expeditions. In 1794 Congress established the Office of the

Purveyor of Public Supplies in the Treasury and the Office of Superintendent of Military Stores in the War Department to continue the 

same broad supply functions established in the Confederation period. 

Henry Knox

James Harvey Young, 1873
American Military History

114

This organization of military supply remained in effect with only slight 

modification until 1812.

The contract system the Office of the Purveyor of Public Supplies

used to procure food and equipment operated much as it had in colonial times. Contracts were awarded to the lowest bidder, who agreed to 

deliver and issue authorized subsistence at a fixed price to troops at a

given post. The contractor was obliged to have on hand at all times sufficient rations to feed the troops, providing subsistence for at least six

months in advance at the more distant posts. The procurement, storage, 

and distribution of all other supplies for the Army were centralized in 

Philadelphia, where the Purveyor contracted for all clothing, camp utensils, military stores, medicines, and hospital stores and the Superintendent 

of Military Stores collected and issued them when needed by the troops. 

The contract system was supposed to be more economical and efficient

than direct purchase, but its weaknesses were soon apparent. The quality 

of the supplies and the promptness of their delivery were dictated by the 

contractor’s profit interest and relative degree of corruptness.

The method of arms procurement was a variation of the contract 

purchase system. Convinced that the development of a domestic arms 

industry was essential to independence, Hamilton had urged as early 

as 1783 “the public manufacture of arms, powder, etc.” A decade later 

Secretary Knox reported to Congress that although arms could be purchased more cheaply in Europe, the bargain price was of little significance “compared with the solid advantages which would result from 

extending and perfecting the means upon which our safety may ultimately depend.” Congress responded by expanding the number of U.S. 

arsenals and magazines for the stockpiling of weapons and by establishing national armories for the manufacture of weapons. The first

national armory was established at Springfield, Massachusetts, in 1794

and a second the same year at Harpers Ferry, Virginia. Despite these 

developments the government still purchased most of its armament 

abroad, and many years would pass before domestic industry could 

supply the government’s needs.

The Militia

Time and again Washington pointed out that the only alternative to 

a large standing army was an effective militia, yet his efforts and those 

of Knox and Hamilton to make the militia more effective by applying 

federal regulation failed. Congress passed the basic militia law in May 

1792. It called for the enrollment of “every able-bodied white male citizen” between eighteen and forty-five and the organization of the militia into divisions, brigades, regiments, battalions, and companies by the 

individual states, each militiaman providing his own “arms, munitions, 

and other accouterments.” The law that survived the legislative process 

bore little resemblance to the one Washington and Knox had proposed. 

It left compliance with its provisions up to the states and in the end did 

little more than give federal recognition to the colonial militia organization that had plagued Washington during the Revolution. Despite these 

limitations, the act did preserve the idea of a citizen soldiery, a concept of profound importance to the future of the country; and it also 

provided for the creation of special volunteer units to supplement the 

Time and again Washington 

pointed out that the only 

alternative to a large standing 

army was an effective militia.
The Formative Years, 1783–1812

115

obligatory mass system. The volunteers, organized into companies, met 

regularly for military training under elected officers. With antecedents

in the organized military associations of the colonial era, this volunteer 

force later became the National Guard.

Training and discipline were the keys to an effective militia, but 

despite the act of 1792 the militia was to be neither disciplined nor 

well trained. When permitted to fight in less standardized fashion,

either from behind fortifications or as irregulars, militiamen could give

a good account of themselves. But only highly trained troops could 

be expected to successfully employ the complicated, formal linear tactics of the day. Strictly interpreting the constitutional provision that 

reserved to the states the authority to train the militia, Congress left 

the extent and thoroughness of training completely to the states and 

merely prescribed Steuben’s system of discipline and field exercises as

the rules to be followed.

The limitations placed on the length of tours of duty and the circumstances for which the militia might be called into federal service 

further impaired its usefulness. No militiamen could be compelled to 

serve more than three months in any one year, nor could the President 

order the militia to duty outside the United States. The effect of these 

limitations would be readily apparent during the War of 1812.

Washington Reviewing the West Army at Fort Cumberland, Maryland

Frederick Kemmelmeyer, ca. 1794

Image removed due to

license restrictions
American Military History

116

The President first exercised his authority to employ militia for

suppressing insurrection and executing the laws of Congress in 1794, 

when he sent a large force of militia under Maj. Gen. Henry Lee into 

western Pennsylvania during the Whiskey Rebellion. Lee encountered 

no resistance. As a show of force, the demonstration was impressive; 

as an indication of the military value of the militia in an emergency, it 

was inconclusive.

Military Realities in the Federalist Period

The military policies of the new nation evolved realistically in 

response to foreign and domestic developments. First, there was little 

actual military threat to the United States from a foreign nation. Britain 

had no desire or design to reconquer its lost colonies, although both 

Britain and Spain sought to curb the United States from expanding 

beyond the borders established by the treaty of 1783. The military alliance that bound the United States to England’s archrival, France, was 

a potential source of danger, but England and France were at peace 

until 1793. When the U.S. and France fought an undeclared war from 

1798 to 1800, it was almost entirely a naval confrontation. Second, the 

jealousy of the individual states toward one another and toward the 

federal government made it difficult to establish a federal army at all

and defeated efforts to institute federal regulation of the militia beyond 

the minimum permitted by the Constitution. Third, the federal government, plagued by financial problems, had to pare expenditures to the

bone. Fourth, Americans were extremely reluctant to serve in the Army, 

either as regulars or as volunteers, for more than a brief period. At no 

time could the government recruit enough men to bring the Regular 

Army up to authorized strength. In view of these drawbacks, a large 

regular military establishment was not feasible. Even a well-trained militia that could augment the regular force was lacking.

The Indian Expeditions

Free of the threat of foreign invasion, the young republic nevertheless faced a serious security problem in the West, where the new 

settlers demanded protection against the Indians as well as an equitable 

administration of the vast new territories won in the peace of 1783. 

The Indian problem was an old one. Under the relentless pressure of 

the pioneers and because of the grants made to Continental soldiers, 

the frontier was rapidly receding. The Confederation Congress had 

tried to cope with the situation by concluding a series of treaties with 

the various Indian groups, but the treaties failed to keep pace with the 

expansion of the frontier boundaries. The Indians, supported by British arms and the British presence in the Northwest, ferociously resisted 

the incursions of the settlers. In the years of the Confederation, they 

killed or captured over 1,500 settlers in the Kentucky Territory alone.

The Indians fought the settlers all along the frontier, but several 

factors militated against federal intervention in the Southwest during the first years of Washington’s administration. In 1790 the United

States concluded a treaty with the Creeks, the most powerful of the 

Southwest tribes, a treaty that the Spanish in Louisiana, eager to mainFree of the threat of foreign 

invasion, the young republic 

nevertheless faced a serious 

security problem in the West. 
The Formative Years, 1783–1812

117

tain their profitable trade with the Indians, would be likely to support.

Georgia and South Carolina introduced a further argument against 

intervention when they objected to the presence of federal forces 

within their borders.

The situation was entirely different in the Northwest. There, federal troops had been occupied chiefly in driving squatters out of the

public domain and protecting the Indians’ treaty rights, a duty that 

neither endeared them to the settlers nor trained them in the art of 

war. Since the enactment of the Northwest Ordinance in 1787, settlers 

had been pouring into the Ohio country and were demanding federal 

protection. Their demands carried a veiled threat: If the government 

ignored their plight, they would turn to Spain and England for succor. 

The federal union could be destroyed in its infancy, or at the very least 

its future expansion could be forestalled by resurgent European influence in the region.

Tardily and somewhat inadequately, the new government groped 

for a response to the West’s challenge. In President Washington’s first

annual message to Congress, he called for the defense of the frontier against the Indians. Congress responded by raising the authorized 

strength of regulars to 1,283. Aware that this force was inadequate to 

protect the entire frontier, Secretary Knox planned to call on the militia 

to join the regulars in an offensive to chastise the Miami Indian group 

as a show of force. In June 1790 he ordered General Harmar, in consultation with Arthur St. Clair, Governor of the Northwest Territory, 

to lead the expedition. Under an authorization given him the preceding 

fall, St. Clair called on Pennsylvania and Kentucky to send 1,500 militiamen to Harmar at Fort Washington, now Cincinnati. (See Map 13.)

The untrained and undisciplined militia was a weak reed on which 

to lean in a sustained campaign against the Indians, but Knox knew 

the militia’s strengths as well as its weaknesses. Depending on the faststriking, mounted militiamen to support the regulars, Knox wanted 

Harmar to conduct a “rapid and decisive” maneuver, taking advantage 

of the element of surprise, to find and destroy the Indian forces and

their food supplies. But the two-phased operation Harmar and St. Clair 

Arthur St. Clair

(1736?–1818)

A Scotsman by birth, Arthur St. Clair came to America as a 

young officer in the British Army during the French and Indian 

War. In 1762 he resigned his commission and settled outside of 

Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. When the Revolution began, he joined 

the Continental Army and served ably throughout the conflict. 

After the war, he returned to civil life, serving in the Continental 

Congress before becoming governor of the Northwest Territory. 

Stubborn and unimaginative, St. Clair was never popular with his 

troops. He was, however, a true patriot, a brave and generally 

competent soldier, and a thoroughly honest man. 

Arthur St. Clair

Charles Willson Peale, 1782
American Military History

118

concocted bore little resemblance to Knox’s proposed tactics. Harmar 

planned a long march northward from Fort Washington to the Miami 

villages concentrated at the headwaters of the Wabash River. A second 

column under Maj. John Hamtramck would ascend the Wabash from 

Fort Vincennes, Indiana, destroying villages along the way and finally

joining with Harmar’s column after a 150-mile march.

The expedition was a complete failure. Hamtramck left Vincennes 

with 330 regulars and Virginia militia on September 30; but after an 

eleven-day march, during which a few Indian villages were burned, the 

militia refused to advance farther. Harmar also set out on September 30. 

After struggling through the wilderness for more than two weeks with 

a force of 1,453 men, including 320 regulars, he reached the neighborhood of the principal Indian village near what is now Fort Wayne, Indiana. Instead of pushing on with his entire strength, Harmar on three 

successive occasions sent forward unsupported detachments of about 

200 to 500 militiamen plus fifty or sixty regulars. The undisciplined

militia could not be restrained from scattering in search of Indians and 

plunder. After two of the detachments suffered heavily in brushes with 

the Indians, Harmar took the rest of his army back to Fort Washington. 

His conduct was severely criticized; but a court of inquiry, noting the 

untrained troops with which Harmar had been provided and the lateness of the season, exonerated him.

Secretary Knox’s injunctions for a rapid and decisive maneuver 

were again ignored when the government decided to send another 

expedition against the Northwest Indians in 1791. Congress raised the 

size of the invasion force, adding a second infantry regiment to the 

Regular Army and authorizing the President to raise a corps of 2,000 

men for a term of six months, either by calling for militia or by enlisting 

volunteers into the service of the United States. The President commissioned Governor St. Clair a major general and placed him in command of the expedition. So slowly did recruiting and the procuring of 

“Mad” Anthony Wayne

(1745–1796)

Anthony Wayne achieved fame during the Revolution as 

an aggressive commander with a fiery temper. After the war, 

he fell hopelessly in debt. Seeking immunity from prosecution, 

he ran for Congress and was elected, only to be unseated a 

few months later due to election irregularities. Down and out, 

Wayne eagerly grasped at the opportunity to take command 

of the Army after St. Clair’s defeat. The government made the 

offer with some trepidation, as Washington believed Wayne 

was “addicted to the bottle.” Thomas Jefferson considered 

him to be the type of person who would “run his head against 

a wall where success was both impossible and useless.” He 

proved, however, to be the right man for the job. Anthony Wayne

James Shaples, Sr., 1795
The Formative Years, 1783–1812

119

supplies proceed that St. Clair was unable to set out before September 

17; only by calling on the neighboring states for militia was he able to 

bring his force up to strength. When St. Clair’s force finally marched

out of Fort Washington, it consisted of about 600 regulars, almost all

the actual infantry strength of the U.S. Army, in addition to about 800 

enlisted “levies” and 600 militiamen.

By November 3, St. Clair had advanced about one hundred miles 

northward from Cincinnati. Most of his force, now numbering about 

1,400 effectives, encamped for the night near the headwaters of the 

Wabash. Neglecting the principle of security, St. Clair had not sent out 

scouts; just before dawn a horde of about 1,000 Indians fell upon the 

unsuspecting troops. Untrained, low in morale as a result of inadequate 

supplies, and led by a general who was suffering from rheumatism, 

asthma, and “colic,” the army was thrown into confusion by the sudden 

assault. St. Clair and less than half his force survived unscathed: there 

were 637 killed and 263 wounded.

The United States was alarmed and outraged over St. Clair’s defeat. 

Some urged that the government abandon the Indian Wars and accept 

the British proposal for an Indian buffer state in the Northwest, but 

Washington well understood the strategic implications of such a 

scheme and decided instead to mount a third expedition. He appointed 

Maj. Gen. “Mad” Anthony Wayne, the dashing commander of the 

Pennsylvania Line during the Revolution, to succeed St. Clair. Congress 

doubled the authorized strength of the Army by providing for three 

additional regiments, two of which were to be infantry and the other 

a composite regiment of infantry and light dragoons. It tried to avoid 

the bad effects of short-term enlistment by adding the new regiments 

to the Regular Army as a temporary augmentation to be “discharged 

as soon as the United States shall be at peace with the Indian tribes.” 

Congress also agreed to Secretary of War Knox’s proposed reorganization of the Army into a “Legion,” a term widely used during the 

eighteenth century that had come to mean a composite organization of 

all combat arms under one command. Instead of regiments, the Army 

was composed of four “sublegions,” each commanded by a brigadier 

general and consisting of 2 battalions of infantry, 1 battalion of riflemen, 1 troop of dragoons (cavalrymen trained to fight either mounted

or dismounted), and 1 company of artillery. 

Egotistical, blustery, and cordially disliked by many of his contemporaries, General Wayne nevertheless displayed little of his celebrated 

madness during the expedition. His operation was skillfully planned. 

Correcting previous mistakes, he insisted on rigid discipline and strict 

training; conscious of the welfare of his men, he saw to it that supplies 

were adequate and equipment satisfactory. These military virtues finally

won for the United States its elusive victory.

In the spring of 1793 General Wayne took the Legion down the 

river to Cincinnati, where he tried to persuade the Indians to submit 

peacefully. When negotiations broke down, the Legion followed the 

route that Harmar and St. Clair had taken. Wayne was in even poorer 

health than St. Clair but more determined. Like St. Clair, he moved 

slowly and methodically, building a series of forts and blockhouses 

along his line of march. Despite his efforts to improve morale, he 

found desertion as serious a problem as had his predecessors.

Some urged that the government 

abandon the Indian Wars and 

accept the British proposal for 

an Indian buffer state in the 

Northwest, but Washington 

well understood the strategic 

implications of such a scheme.
American Military History

120

Battle of Fallen Timbers

Reinforced by mounted militia in July 1794, Wayne led about 3,000 

men to within a few miles of Fort Miami, a post the British had recently 

established on the site of what is now Toledo. There, on August 20, 

1794, almost within sight of the British guns, the Indians attacked. The 

Americans held their ground and then with a furious bayonet charge 

drove the enemy out of the cover of fallen trees that gave the Battle 

of Fallen Timbers its name. In the open prairie, the Indians were at the 

mercy of Wayne’s mounted volunteers; in less than an hour the rout 

was complete.

Ignoring the protest of the British commander at Fort Miami, 

Wayne remained for several days, burning the Indian villages and 

destroying crops before leading the Legion back to Cincinnati. The 

western tribes, their resistance broken, finally agreed on

August 3, 1795,

in the Treaty of Greenville to make peace and cede their lands in Ohio 

to the United States. Their submission had been hastened by news that 

England was about to evacuate the frontier posts.

In the years following the Battle of Fallen Timbers, settlers pushed 

rapidly into Ohio and beyond into lands still claimed by the Indians. 

To resist these encroachments, Tecumseh, chief of the Shawnees, and 

his brother, the Prophet, organized a tribal confederacy aimed at keep-

ing the settlers out. Urged on by the settlers, Governor William Henry 

Harrison of the Indiana Territory decided in the summer of 1811 to 

strike at the Indians before they could descend on the settlements. Sec-

retary of War William Eustis approved Harrison’s scheme and placed 

300 regulars under his command in addition to his 650 militia includ

-

ing mounted riflemen. Moving north from Vincennes at the end of

September, Harrison built a fort on the edge of the Indian country and 

then continued to the neighborhood of Tecumseh’s principal village 

on Tippecanoe Creek. (See Map 13.) On November

6 he halted abouta

mile west of the village, encamping his force in the form of a trapezoid 

around the wagons and baggage on a piece of high-wooded ground 

that rose above the marshy prairies.

The Indians struck just before dawn. Harrison’s situation was very 

similar to that of St. Clair, and for a time his force seemed about to suffer the same fate. Furious hand-to-hand combat followed the Indians’ 

wild charge that carried them into the camp itself. Although taken by 

surprise, the soldiers rallied and then counterattacked. The end came 

when the mounted riflemen charged in on the Indians and drove them

from the field. Harrison lost 39 men killed and missing and had 151 wounded, of whom 29 died. The engagement by no means solved the 

frontier problem in the Northwest, but this problem was soon over-

shadowed by the outbreak of war with England. Its most permanent 

legacy

wasa tradition of battlefield courag

e that helped Harrison win

the Presidency in 1841.

The Perils of Neutrality

While the United States was launching a new government and 

defending the frontier, France had undergone a revolution that within 

a few years led to a general European war. Britain joined the coalition 
The Formative Years, 1783–1812

121

against France in 1793 and in the first year of the war instituted a blockade, seizing at least three hundred American merchant vessels. In 1794 

Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court John Jay negotiated a treaty 

with Britain to settle a number of border and trade issues unresolved 

after the War of Independence. The treaty eased the mounting crisis in 

Anglo-American relations. Through acquiescing in the British doctrine 

of contraband, the United States settled some long-standing questions, 

including evacuation of the frontier posts, but only at the expense of 

domestic unity and peaceful relations with the French. Regarding Jay’s 

treaty as evidence of a pro-British policy on the part of the United 

States, France retaliated by seizing American vessels that were trading 

with the British, by sending secret agents to stir up the Creek Indians 

along the southern frontier, and by meddling in American politics in an 

attempt to bring about the defeat of the “pro-British” administration. 

These were the new and serious problems that President Washington 

bequeathed to his successor, John Adams, in 1797.

Adams inherited a military establishment with an authorized 

strength of about 3,300 officers and men. In 1797 Congress dropped

the Legion that had served well in the frontier fighting, and the Army

returned to a regimental type of organization with four regiments of 

infantry, a Corps of Artillerists and Engineers, and two companies of 

light dragoons more appropriate to the duties of border defense. During 1796 and early 1797 there had been some redeployment into the

Southwest; by 1797 nine companies of infantry, about two companies 

of artillery, and the entire force of dragoons were stationed along the 

southwestern frontier. Up in the old Northwest, there were five infantry companies at Detroit and smaller detachments at a dozen scattered 

forts elsewhere in the territory. Fort Washington was the major installation. There were also small garrisons at the important seaports that had 

been fortified after 1794 by French technicians, émigrés of the recent

revolution. The rest of the Army was stationed along the Canadian 

border from the lakes eastward and at the older posts, like West Point, 

Carlisle, and Fort Pitt.

The Quasi War with France

When the French continued to attack American vessels and refused 

to receive the newly appointed American Minister, President Adams 

called Congress into special session to consider national defense. He 

particularly urged that immediate steps be taken to provide a navy. He 

also recommended that harbor defenses be improved, that additional 

cavalry be raised, that the Militia Act of 1792 be revised to provide for 

better organization and training, and that the President be authorized 

to call an emergency force, although he saw no immediate need for the 

last. Congress approved the naval recommendations; but except for a 

modest appropriation for harbor defenses and an act authorizing the 

President to call out 80,000 militiamen for a maximum term of three 

months, it voted down the military recommendations.

By the spring of 1798 France’s actions had thoroughly upset the 

country. President Adams again recommended an expanded defense 

program, which this time fared somewhat better in Congress. Congress 

passed the recommended naval increases and created the separate Navy 

When the French continued to 

attack American vessels and 

refused to receive the newly 

appointed American Minister, 

President Adams called Congress 

into special session to consider 

national defense.
American Military History

122

Department. Of the three regiments the administration recommended 

adding to the Regular Army, Congress authorized the additional artillery but not the cavalry. With respect to the infantry regiment, the Secretary of War proposed to Congress that it might also create a marine 

infantry unit. Instead, Congress voted the U.S. Marine Corps into existence, making it part of the Army or Navy, according to whether the 

marines served on land or on shipboard. Congress also increased the 

number of companies in each of the four regular infantry regiments 

from eight to ten; voted a sizable sum for harbor defenses and ordnance; and authorized a Provisional Army, the emergency force that 

Adams had suggested the year before.

Again Congress tried to avoid the defects of short-term enlistments by setting the duration of the “existing differences between the 

United States and the French Republic” as the term of enlistment for 

the Provisional Army. Reluctant to abandon its traditional reliance on 

short-term militia volunteers, Congress turned down another presidential request for an increase in the Regular Army, instead giving him the 

authority to accept privately armed and equipped volunteer units for 

short-term service. Adams never made use of this authority but went 

ahead with the plans to raise the twelve infantry regiments and one 

cavalry regiment that made up the Provisional Army. He persuaded 

Washington to come out of retirement to accept command as a lieutenant general and at Washington’s request appointed Alexander Hamilton 

as the senior major general. By the beginning of 1799 the officers had

been appointed, and in May 1799 recruiting began. By the time the Provisional Army was disbanded in June 1800, around 4,100 men had been 

The Founding of West Point

In October 1776 the Continental Congress 

authorized a committee to begin planning for a 

military academy, but political support for the idea 

remained uncertain until the need for domestically 

trained engineers and artillerists overcame the fear 

inspired by the European experience with professional military officers and totalitarianism. Despite 

the 1794 creation of the rank of cadet in the Corps 

of Artillerists and Engineers manning the fortifications at West Point, New York, formal instruction 

of those cadets did not begin until September 

21, 1801. By ordering that instruction, President 

Jefferson reversed his early opposition to a military 

academy, seeing it as a way of promoting the study 

of engineering and science in the growing nation. 

On March 16, 1802, Congress approved the 

President’s action and authorized the creation of the Corps of Engineers and a military academy under its 

control at West Point. That date marks the official birth of the U.S. Military Academy, but the institution’s 

organization and funding remained uncertain for more than a decade.

West Point, New York

Seth Eastman, 1875
The Formative Years, 1783–1812

123

mobilized, assembled in camps, and given from six to twelve months’ 

training. Hamilton directed the preparation of new drill regulations to 

replace Steuben’s, but before the task was finished the French crisis had

ended and the Provisional Army was discharged.

The possibility that the United States might ally itself with Britain 

helped persuade the French to agree to negotiations. Furthermore, the 

French had been pressing Spain to return Louisiana as a step toward 

restoring their colonial empire in America, and for this venture peace 

with the United States was necessary. On September 30, 1800, the 

United States and France signed a treaty in which France agreed to 

recognize American neutrality, thus formally ending the alliance of 

1778, and to refrain from seizing American vessels that were not carrying contraband. On the very next day, October 1, 1800, France and 

Spain signed a secret treaty that turned Louisiana over to France. A few 

months later England and her allies made peace with France.

Defense under Jefferson

President Thomas Jefferson took office in 1801 committed to a

policy of peace and economy. With Europe at peace and American 

relations with France and England better than they had been for ten 

years past, Congress proceeded to economize. It sold the Navy that 

had acquitted itself so well in the quasi war with France, retaining only 

the frigates and a few of the other larger ships. Instead of ships for 

the defense of U.S. harbors and coastline, Jefferson touted the idea of 

building a number of small, armed gunboats as a less expensive alternative. The Army did not feel the effect of the economy drive until March 

1802. Until then the military establishment was much as Adams had 

left it after the Provisional Army troops had been discharged, with an 

authorized strength of 5,438 officers and men and an actual strength

of about 4,000. In the reduction of March 1802 Congress cut back the 

total strength of the Army to 3,220 men, approximately what it had 

been in 1797 when Adams took office. It was more than 50 percent

stronger in artillery, but the more expensive cavalry was eliminated.

When Congress reduced the size of the Army it also abolished 

the Office of the Quartermaster General and in its place instituted a

system of contract agents. It divided the country into three military 

departments, each with a military agent. Each agent, with his assistants, 

was responsible for the movement of supplies and troops within his 

department. Since the assistant agents were also appointed by the President, the three military agents had no way to enforce accountability on 

their subordinates. This system soon led to large property losses.

Since the Revolution, the Army had suffered from a lack of trained 

technicians, particularly in engineering science, and had depended 

largely upon foreign experts. As a remedy Washington, Knox, Hamilton, and others had recommended the establishment of a military 

school. During Washington’s administration, Congress had added the 

rank of cadet in the Corps of Artillerists and Engineers with two cadets 

assigned to each company for instruction. But not until the Army reorganization of 1802 did Congress create the separate Corps of Engineers, consisting of ten cadets and seven officers, assigned to West

Point to serve as the staff of a military academy. Within a few years 

With Europe at peace and 

American relations with France 

and England better than they had 

been for ten years past, Congress 

proceeded to economize.
American Military History

124

the U.S. Military Academy became a center of study in military science 

and

a source of trained officers. By 1812 it listed eighty-ninegraduates,

sixty-five of them still serving in the Army and playing an important

role in operations and the construction of fortifications.

The Army and Westward Expansion

Not long after Thomas Jefferson became President, rumors reached 

America that France had acquired Louisiana from Spain. The news was 

upsetting. Many Americans, including Jefferson, had believed that when 

Spain lost its weak hold on the colonies the United States would auto-

matically fall heir to them. But, with a strong power like France in pos-

session, it was useless to wait for the colonies to fall into the lap of the 

United States like ripe fruit. The continued presence of France in North 

America also raised a new security problem. Up to this time the problem 

of frontier defense had been

chiefly pacifyingthe Indians

,

keepingthe

western territories from breaking away, and preventing American settlers 

from molesting the Spanish. Now, with a strong, aggressive France as 

backdoor neighbor, the frontier problem became tied up with the ques-

tion of security against possible foreign threats. The transfer of Loui-

siana to France also marked the beginning of restraints on American 

trade down the Mississippi. In the past, Spain had permitted American 

settlers to send their goods down the river and to deposit them at New 

Orleans. Just before transferring the colony, however, Spain revoked the 

American right of deposit, an action that made it almost impossible for 

Americans to send goods out by this route.

These considerations persuaded Jefferson in 1803 to inquire about 

the possibility of purchasing New Orleans from France. When Napo-

leon, anticipating the renewal of the war in Europe, offered to sell the 

whole of Louisiana for $15 million, Jefferson quickly accepted and sud-

denly doubled the size of the United States. The Army, after taking for-

mal possession of Louisiana on December 20, 1803, established small 

garrisons at New Orleans and the other former Spanish posts on the 

lower Mississippi. Jefferson later appointed Brig. Gen. James Wilkin-

son, who had survived the various reorganizations of the Army to 

become senior officer

, as first Governor of the new territory.(Map 14)

Six months before the Louisiana Purchase, President Jefferson had 

persuaded Congress to support an exploration of the unknown terri-

tory west of the Mississippi River. The acquisition of the Louisiana 

Territory now made such an exploration even more desirable. It was no 

accident that the new nation and its president turned to the Army for 

this most important mission. Soldiers possessed the toughness, team-

work, discipline, and training appropriate to the rigors they would face. 

The Army also had a nationwide organization, even in 1803, and thus 

the potential to provide requisite operational and logistical support. It 

was perhaps the only truly national institution in America other than 

the Congress itself.

To lead the expedition, Jefferson chose Capt. Meriwether Lewis, 

a 28-year-old infantry officer who combined the necessary leadership

ability and woodland skills with the potential to be an observer of 

natural phenomena. Lewis in turn received the President’s permission 

to select William Clark as his cocaptain. A former infantry company 
Map 14

L E W I S

1 8 0 6

C L A R K

1 8 0 6

1 8 0 6 1 8

0

4

–

1

8

0

5 1 8 0 5 – 1 8 0 6

1

8

0

6

–

1

8

0

7

P

A

C

I

F

I

C

O

C

E

A

N

G U L F O F M E X I C O

Sa

cra

m

e

n

to

R

i

ve

r

Salt River

Co ol ar do R vi er

Arkansas River

N. Platte River

Missouri River

S. Platte R vi er

Snake River

Co ul mbia River

Great Salt Lake

Oh oi

R vi er

Rio Grande

M si s si

i s

pp

R

i

evi r Santa Fe

Chihuahua

Natchitoches

New Orleans

St. Louis

Pike's Peak

Staked

Plain

0 300 100 100 200

Miles

1803–1807

WESTWARD EXPANSION AND EXPLORATION

Louisiana Purchase, 1803

Lewis and Clark, Date IndicatedPike, Date IndicatedHigh Ground Above 3000 Feet
American Military History

126

commander, Clark was a superb leader of men and an expert woodsman. Both men had served under General Wayne along the western 

frontier. Of the 48 men who accompanied Lewis and Clark up the Missouri River to the Mandan villages in 1804, 34 were soldiers and 12 were 

contract boatmen. The two other men were York, Clark’s manservant, 

and George Drouillard, the contract interpreter. Of the 31 individuals 

who made the trip with Lewis and Clark to the Pacific coast in 1805 and

back in 1806, 26 were soldiers. The other five were York, Drouillard,

and the Charbonneau family (Toussaint, Sacagawea, and their newborn 

son, Jean Baptiste). 

From the summer of 1803 to the fall of 1806, the expedition was

an Army endeavor, officially the “Corps of Volunteers for North Western Discovery.” It led Americans across the breadth of the vast continent for the first time. Its scientific agenda brought back invaluable

information about flora, fauna, hydrology, and geography. Its benign

intent resulted in peaceful commerce with Indians encountered en 

route. The expedition was, all things considered, a significant example

of America’s potential for progress and creative good.

While Lewis and Clark were exploring beyond the Missouri, General Wilkinson sent out Capt. Zebulon M. Pike on a similar expedition to 

the headwaters of the Mississippi. In 1807 Wilkinson organized another 

expedition. This time he sent twenty men under Captain Pike westward 

into what is now Colorado. After exploring the region around the peak 

The Lewis and Clark Expedition

The Lewis and Clark Expedition (1803–1806) was a military 

mission from start to finish. The 

U.S. Army furnished the organization and much of the manpower, 

equipment, and supplies. Over 

the course of two years, four 

months, and ten days, the soldiers 

traveled 7,689 miles and brought 

back invaluable geographic 

and scientific data, including the 

first detailed map of the region. 

The Lewis and Clark Expedition 

has become an enduring symbol 

of the American spirit, selfless 

service, and human achievement. 

It succeeded in large measure 

because it tapped the spirit of 

the American soldier and the 

organization, leadership, and 

courage of the U.S. Army. 

William Clark

Charles Willson Peale, ca. 1810

Meriwether Lewis

Charles Willson Peale, ca. 1807
The Formative Years, 1783–1812

127

that bears his name, Pike encountered some Spaniards who, resentful 

of the incursion, placed his party under armed guard and escorted it to 

Santa Fe. From there, the Spanish took the Americans into Mexico and 

then back across Texas to Natchitoches, once more in American territory. Despite the adversity, the Lewis and Clark Expedition and those of 

Captain Pike contributed much to the geographic and scientific knowledge of the country and today remain as great epics of the West.

To march across the continent might seem the manifest destiny 

of the republic, but it met with an understandable reaction from the 

Spanish. The dispute over the boundary between Louisiana and Spain’s 

frontier provinces became a burning issue during Jefferson’s second 

administration. Tension mounted in 1806, as rumors reached Washington of the dispatch of thousands of Spanish regulars to reinforce 

the mounted Mexican militiamen in east Texas. Jefferson reacted to the 

rumors by calling up the Orleans and Mississippi Territories’ militia 

and sending about 1,000 regulars to General Wilkinson to counter the 

Spanish move. The rumors proved unfounded; at no time did the Spanish outnumber the American forces in the area. A series of cavalry skirmishes occurred along the Sabine River, but the opposing commanders 

prudently avoided war by agreeing to establish a neutral zone between 

the Arroyo Hondo and the Sabine River. The two armies remained 

along this line throughout 1806, and the neutral zone served as a de

facto boundary until 1812.

American Reaction to the Napoleonic Wars

The second round of the great conflict between England and

France began in 1803, shortly after the purchase of Louisiana. It was 

a much more serious affair than the earlier conflict. Both Britain and

France adopted policies under which American merchant shipping, 

whether carrying contraband or not, was subject to search and seizure. 

The Napoleonic Wars and the consequent depredations on American 

commerce were less a threat to national security than a blow to national 

pride. Jefferson responded to the challenge by withdrawing American 

shipping from the seas. His successor in 1809, James Madison, adopted 

the even riskier policy of economic coercion. A series of trade and 

embargo acts from 1807 to 1810 attempted to force England and France 

to limit their trade restrictions in their dealings with the United States.

Legislation failed to keep the United States from becoming embroiled 

in the war and was unsuccessful in forcing England or France to respect 

neutral trade. Neither Jefferson nor Madison recognized that under the 

new scheme of economic warfare being waged by both England and 

France the American measures were in effect provocative acts likely to 

bring the United States into the war on one side or the other. The resultant crippling of American trade so thoroughly disunited the American 

people that the government could not count on the loyalty and support 

of a sizable part of the population when conflict did break out.

International tension was so great in the months after the Embargo 

Act of 1807 that Congress, while rejecting Jefferson’s proposal for 

recruiting a 24,000-man volunteer force, authorized the recruitment of 

6,000 men as a temporary addition to the Army. In the last month of

his administration President Jefferson sent more than 2,000 of these 

Legislation failed to keep the 

United States from becoming 

embroiled in the war and was 

unsuccessful in forcing England or 

France to respect neutral trade.
American Military History

128

men to General Wilkinson to defend “New Orleans and its dependen-

cies” against an expected English invasion. The invasion never materi-

alized, but poor leadership and bureaucratic mismanagement bordering 

on criminal combined with the tropical heat to accomplish what no 

British invasion could have done. More than 1,000 men, half of Wilkin-

son’s army, died in Louisiana.

By January 1810 relations with Britain had so deteriorated that 

President Madison recommended the recruitment of a volunteer force 

of 20,000. Congress, apparently satisfied with the existing militia sys-

tem, again refused to vote for a volunteer force. Not until January 1812 

did it increase the Army’s strength, when it added thirteen additional 

regiments, totaling about 25,700 men, and authorized the President to 

call 50,000 militiamen into service.

The additional men would soon be needed. On June 18, 1812, 

Congress declared war against England. At the same time a Senate pro-

posal to declare war against France failed by only two votes. Discussion Questions

1. To what extent was George Washington the “indispensable man” 

in the formation of the United States of America and in ensuring the 

practice of civilian control of the military?

2. How has the concept of the militia changed since the early days 

of the republic?

3. How would you characterize the U.S. Army under the Articles of 

Confederation? What effect did Shays’ Rebellion have upon the military 

needs of the new republic?

4. Discuss the

tangible benefits to the United States resulting from

the Lewis and Clark Expedition. Why did President Jefferson choose 

the U.S. Army to perform this mission?

5.Which tacticsworked andwhich did not in fighting the Indians

onthe early frontier?Which forcewas more suited to fighting these

campaigns: regulars or militia? Why?

6. Of what

valuewas the newly establishedU.S. Militar

y Academy

at West Point to the Army and to the country as a whole? Recommended Readings

Ambrose, Stephen E. Undaunted Courage: Meriwether Lewis, Thomas Jefferson, 

and the Opening of the American West. New York: Simon & Schuster, 

1996.

Bird, Harrison. War for the West, 1790–1813. New York: Oxford University 

Press, 1997.

Coakley, Robert W. The Role of Federal Military Forces in Domestic Disorders, 

1789–1878. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 

1989.

Coffman, Edward M. The Old Army: A Portrait of the American Army in 

Peacetime, 1789–1898. New York: Oxford University Press, 1985.
The Formative Years, 1783–1812

129

Crackel, Theodore J. Mr. Jefferson’s Army: Political and Social Reform of the Military Establishment, 1801–1809. New York: New York University Press, 

1987.

Guthman, William H. March to Massacre: A History of the First Seven Years 

of the United States Army, 1784–1791. New York: McGraw-Hill, 

1975.

Kohn, Richard H. Eagle and Sword: The Federalists and the Creation of the 

Military Establishment in America, 1783–1802. New York: Free Press, 

1975.

Prucha, Francis P. The Sword of the Republic: The United States Army on the 

Frontier, 1783–1846. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1977. 

Stagg, J. C. A. Mr. Madison’s War: Politics, Diplomacy, and Warfare in the 

Early American Republic, 1783–1830. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983.

Sword, Wiley. President Washington’s Indian War: The Struggle for the Old 

Northwest, 1790–1795. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 

1985.

Other Readings

Adams, Henry. The Formative Years: A History of the United States During 

the Administrations of Jefferson and Madison, ed. Herbert Agar. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1974.

Brookhiser, Richard. Alexander Hamilton, American. New York: Free 

Press, 1999.

Callahan, North. Henry Knox: General Washington’s General. New York: 

Rinehart, 1958.

Cleaves, Freeman. Old Tippecanoe: William Henry Harrison and His Time. 

New Town, Conn.: American Political Biography Press, 1990.

DeVoto, Bernard, ed. The Journals of Lewis and Clark. Boston: Houghton 

Mifflin, 1997.

Jacobs, James R. The Beginnings of the U.S. Army, 1783–1812. Port Washington, N.Y.: Kennikat Press, 1972.

Perkins, Bradford. Prologue to War: England and the United States. Berkeley: 

University of California Press, 1961.

Slaughter,Thomas P. The Whiskey Rebellion: Frontier Epilogue to the American Revolution. New York: Oxford University Press, 1986.

To Great Britain the War of 1812 was simply a burdensome adjunct 

of its greater struggle against Napoleonic France. To the Canadians it was clearly a case of naked American aggression. But to the 

Americans it was neither simple nor clear. The United States entered 

the war with confused objectives and divided loyalties and made peace 

without settling any of the issues that had induced the nation to go to 

war.

Origins of the War

The immediate causes of the war were seizure of American ships, 

insults and injuries to American seamen by the British Navy, and rapid 

expansion of the American frontier. The British outrages at sea took 

two distinct forms. One was the seizure and forced sale of merchant 

ships and their cargoes for allegedly violating the British blockade of 

Europe. Although France had declared a counterblockade of the British Isles and had seized American ships, England was the chief offender 

because its Navy had greater command of the seas. The British further 

outraged the United States by capturing men from American vessels for 

forced service in the Royal Navy. The pretext for impressment was the 

search for deserters, who, the British claimed, had taken employment 

on American vessels.

The reaction in the United States to impressments differed from 

that aroused by the seizure of ships and cargoes. In the latter case the 

maritime interests of the eastern seaboard protested vigorously and 

demanded naval protection, but rather than risk having their highly 

profitable trade cut off by war with England, they were willing to take

an occasional loss of cargo. Impressments, on the other hand, presented no such financial hardship to the ship owners, whatever the

consequences for the unfortunate seamen, and the maritime interests 

tended to minimize it.

To the country at large the seizure of American seamen was much 

more serious than the loss of a few hogsheads of flour or molasses.

6

The War of 1812
American Military History

132

When a British naval vessel in June 1807 attacked and disabled the USS 

Chesapeake and impressed several members of the crew, a general wave 

of indignation rose in which even the maritime interests joined. This 

was an insult to the flag; and had President Thomas Jefferson chosen

to go to war with England, he would have had considerable support. 

Instead he decided to clamp an embargo on American trade. In New 

England, scores of prosperous ship owners were ruined and a number 

of thriving little seaports suffered an economic depression from which 

few recovered. While the rest of the country remembered the Chesapeake affair and stored up resentment against Britain, maritime New 

England directed its anger at Jefferson and his party.

The seat of anti-British fever was in the Northwest and the lower 

Ohio Valley, where the land-hungry frontiersmen had no doubt that 

their troubles with the Indians were the result of British intrigue. Stories 

circulated after every Indian raid of British Army muskets and equipment found on the field. By 1812 the westerners were convinced their

problems could best be solved by forcing the British out of Canada and 

annexing it to the United States.

While the western “war hawks” urged war in the hope of conquering Canada, the people of Georgia, Tennessee, and the Mississippi 

Territory entertained similar designs against Florida, a Spanish possession. The fact that Spain and England were allies against Napoleon 

presented the southern war hawks with an excuse for invading Florida. 

By this time, also, the balance of political power had shifted south and 

west; ambitious party leaders had no choice but to align themselves 

with the war hawks, and 1812 was a presidential election year.

President James Madison’s use of economic pressure to force England to repeal its blockade almost succeeded. The revival of the NonIntercourse Act against Britain, prohibiting all trade with England and 

its colonies, coincided with a poor grain harvest in England and with 

a growing need for American provisions to supply the British troops 

fighting the French in Spain. As a result, on June 16, 1812, the British

Foreign Minister announced that the blockade on American shipping 

would be relaxed. Had there been fast trans-Atlantic communications 

of any kind, war might well have been averted. However, before the 

news of the British concessions reached him, Madison had sent a message to Congress on June 1 listing all the complaints against England 

and asking for a declaration of war. Dividing along sectional lines, the 

House had voted for war on June 4; but the Senate approved only on 

June 18 and then by only six votes.

The Opposing Forces

At the outbreak of the war, the United States had a total population of about 7.7 million people and was very unprepared for war. A 

series of border forts garrisoned by very small Regular Army detachments stretched along the Canadian boundary: Fort Mackinac, on the 

straits between Lake Michigan and Lake Huron; Fort Dearborn, on 

the site of what is now Chicago; Fort Detroit; and Fort Niagara, at 

the mouth of the Niagara River on Lake Ontario. (Map 15) The actual 

strength of the Regular Army in June 1812 totaled 11,744 officers and

men, including an estimated 5,000 recruits enlisted for the additional 

Uniform Coat Worn by a Private of 

Connecticut Artillery, ca. 1808
Map 15

K A L M E C I H G I A N

L A K E H U R O N

Geor gi a n Ba y

L A

K E E R I E

L A K E O N T A R I O

Mohawk R

R nos du H

St. L wa er nce R

Ottawa R

hci R R ueil e

hC et a augay R Lake

Champlain

Thames R

oi h O R

Put-in Bay

MICHIGAN

TERRITORY

ILLINOIS

 TERRITORY

INDIANA

TERRITORY

OHIO PENNSYLVANIA

NEW JERSEY

NEW YORK

VERMONT

MASS.

CONN.

U

P

P

E

R

C

A

N

A

D

A

LOWER CANADA

Ft. Meigs

Ft. Stephenson

Ft. Malden

Ft. Detroit

Ft. Dearborn

(Chicago)

Ft. Niagara

Ft. Erie

Ft. Michilimackinac

Ft. Mackinac

Oswego

Montreal

Kingston

York

(Toronto)

Erie

(Presque Isle)

New York

Newburgh

Albany

Buffalo

Sacket’s Harbor

Ogdensburg

Plattsburg

Pittsburgh 

War of 1812

THE NORTHERN FRONTIER

Battle of the Thames, 5 Oct 1813

0 200 100

Miles
American Military History

134

force authorized the preceding January, in contrast to an overall authorized strength of 35,600. The U.S. Navy consisted of 20 vessels: the 3

large 44-gun frigates, 3 smaller frigates of the Constellation class rated at 

38 guns, and 14 others.

Congress did not lack the will to prepare for war. In March 1812 it 

had tried to place the Army’s supply system on a more adequate footing by establishing a Quartermaster Department on the military staff 

in place of the inefficient and costly military agent system. At the same

time Congress created the Office of the Commissary General of Purchases in the War Department, and for the first time since the Revolution the Army’s supply system was placed under the exclusive control 

of the Secretary of War. In May Congress had made provision for an 

Ordnance Department responsible for the inspection and testing of all 

ordnance, cannon balls, shells, and shot; the construction of gun carriages and ammunition wagons; and the preparation and inspection of 

the “public powder.” It enlarged the Corps of Engineers by adding a 

company of bombardiers, sappers, and miners and expanded and reorganized the Military Academy at West Point. In addition to increasing 

the Regular Army, Congress had authorized the President to accept 

volunteer forces and to call upon the states for militia. The difficulty

was not planning for an army, but raising one.

One of the world’s major powers was ranged against the United 

States; but on the basis of available resources, the two belligerents were 

rather evenly matched. Most of Britain’s forces were tied up in the war 

against Napoleon, and for the time being very little military and naval 

assistance could be spared for the defense of Canada. At the outbreak 

of the war, there were about 7,000 British and Canadian regulars in 

Upper and Lower Canada (now the provinces of Ontario and Quebec). 

With a total white population of only half a million, Canada itself had 

only a small reservoir of militia to draw upon. When the war began, 

Maj. Gen. Isaac Brock, the military commander and civil governor of 

Upper Canada, had 800 militiamen available in addition to his 1,600

regulars. In the course of the war, the two provinces put a total of 

about 10,000 militiamen in the field; whereas in the United States, probably 450,000 of the militiamen saw active service, though not more 

than half of them ever got near the front. 

Uncle Sam

One of the enduring symbols of America is that of Uncle Sam. His origins are somewhat obscure, but the most 

convincing story is that he was originally a Troy, New York, meatpacker named Sam Wilson. Sam Wilson was 

given a contract in 1812 to supply meat for the troops in New York and New Jersey. His firm put the preserved 

meat in wooden barrels and stamped them “U.S.” When the barrels reached the troops, some of whom were 

apparently from the Troy area, the troops supposedly remarked that the “U.S.” must stand for Uncle Sam! Ostensibly from these humble beginnings grew a character in nineteenth century political cartoons of a tall, bearded 

man dressed in striped pants and wearing a vest and star-spangled hat. James Montgomery Flagg would render 

this American symbol most powerfully in his 1916–1917 recruiting poster of a stern Uncle Sam pointing a finger 

at the viewer and stating, “I want you for U.S. Army.” 
the war of 1812

135

The support of Indian tribes gave Canada one source of manpower 

that the United States lacked. After the Battle of Tippecanoe, Tecumseh, 

the Shawnee chief, had led his warriors across the border into Canada. 

There, along with the Canadian Indians, they joined the forces opposing the Americans. Perhaps 3,500 Indians were serving in the Canadian 

forces during the Thames River campaign in the fall of 1813, probably 

the largest number that took the field at any one time during the war.

The bulk of the British Navy was also fighting in the war against

Napoleon. In September 1812, three months after the outbreak of war 

with the United States, Britain had no more than eleven ships of the 

line, thirty-four frigates, and about an equal number of smaller naval 

vessels in the western Atlantic. These were all that could be spared for 

operations in American waters, which involved the tremendous tasks 

of escorting British merchant shipping, protecting the St. Lawrence 

River, blockading American ports, and at the same time hunting down 

American frigates.

A significant weakness in the American position was the disunity

of the country. In the New England states, public opinion ranged 

from mere apathy to actively expressed opposition to the war. A good 

many Massachusetts and Connecticut ship owners outfitted privateers

(privately owned and armed vessels that were commissioned to take 

enemy ships), but how much of this was a result of patriotism and how 

much was hope for profit remains a matter of conjecture. Many New

Englanders went so far as to sell grain and provisions to the British. 

Throughout the war, there were serious problems in raising and sustaining the militia from New England. Nevertheless, several of those 

states spent hundreds of thousands of dollars on local defense even 

if they contributed little directly to the federal effort. And despite the 

regional disaffection with the war, New England was second only to 

the Mid-Atlantic States in providing regular units: New England raised 

thirteen regiments of soldiers, whereas New York, New Jersey, and 

Pennsylvania combined provided fifteen.

Canada was not faced with the same degree of public opinion challenges. Nevertheless, many inhabitants of Upper Canada were recent 

immigrants from the United States who had no great desire to take 

up arms against their former homeland. Other Canadians thought that 

Tecumseh

After Tecumseh’s death in battle while leading warriors of his own Shawnee and other tribes during the War of 1812, he became a revered symbol of the noble warrior dying in battle for a cause. 

Tecumseh had watched Indian lands in the Northwest Territory whittled away by a series of treaties with 

individual tribes and urged intertribal cooperation to halt the advance of white settlement. Yet his idea 

of a united Indian front against white expansion never came to pass. Instead, clan and local loyalties 

prevailed. Tecumseh did not enjoy unanimous backing even from his own tribe, the Shawnees. His program of unity and organization was attractive to the very white people he opposed, for it was just what 

they would have done; but it ran counter to the customs and traditions of the Indian people he meant to 

defend and failed to attract them in sufficient numbers.
American Military History

136

the superiority of the United States in men and material made any 

defense hopeless. That General Brock was able to overcome this spirit 

of defeatism and obtain the degree of support he needed to defend 

Canada is a lasting tribute to the quality of his leadership.

The Strategic Pattern

The fundamental military strategy of the United States was simple 

enough. The primary undertaking would be the conquest of Canada. 

The United States also planned an immediate naval offensive, whereby 

a swarm of privateers and the small Navy would be set loose on the 

high seas to destroy British commerce. The old invasion route into 

Canada by way of Lake Champlain and the Richelieu River led directly 

to the most populous and most important part of the enemy’s territory. The capture of Montreal would cut the line of communications 

upon which the British defense of Upper Canada depended, making 

the fall of that province inevitable. But this invasion route was near the 

center of disaffection in the United States from which little local support could be expected. The places where enthusiasm for the war ran 

high and where the Canadian forces were weak offered a safer theater 

of operations, though one with fewer strategic opportunities. Thus, 

in violation of the principles of objective and economy of force, the 

first assaults were delivered across the Detroit River and across the

Niagara River between Lake Erie and Lake Ontario rather than along 

the Hudson–Lake Champlain–Montreal line of advance.

The war progressed through three distinct stages. In the first, lasting until the spring of 1813, England was so hard pressed in Europe 

that it could spare neither men nor ships in any great number for the 

conflict in North America. The United States was free to take the initiative, to invade Canada, and to send out cruisers and privateers against 

enemy shipping. During the second stage, lasting from early 1813 to the 

beginning of 1814, Britain was able to establish a tight blockade but still 

could not materially reinforce the troops in Canada. During this stage 

the American Army, having gained experience, won its first successes.

The third stage, in 1814, was marked by the constant arrival in North 

America of British regulars and naval reinforcements, which enabled 

the enemy to raid the North American coast almost at will and to take 

the offensive in several quarters. At the same time, in this final stage of

the war American forces fought their best fights and won their most

brilliant victories.

The First Campaigns

The first blows of the war were struck in the Detroit area and at

Fort Mackinac. President Madison gave Brig. Gen. William Hull, Governor of the Michigan Territory, command of operations in that area. Hull 

arrived at Fort Detroit on July 5, 1812, with a force of about 1,500 Ohio 

militiamen and 300 regulars, which he led across the river into Canada 

a week later. (See Map 15.) At that time the whole enemy force on the 

Detroit frontier amounted to about 150 British regulars, 300 Canadian 

militiamen, and some 250 Indians led by Tecumseh. Most of the enemy 

forces were at Fort Malden, about twenty miles south of Detroit, on 

This wooden, barrel-type canteen was the 

Regular Army’s most popular model from the 

Revolutionary War through the early republic.
the war of 1812

137

the Canadian side of the river. General Hull had been a dashing young 

officer in the Revolution, but by this time age and its infirmities had

made him cautious and timid. Instead of moving directly against Fort 

Malden, Hull issued a bombastic proclamation to the people of Canada 

announcing their imminent liberation from “tyranny and oppression”; 

but he stayed at the river landing almost opposite Detroit. He sent out 

several small raiding detachments along the Thames and Detroit Rivers, 

one of which returned after skirmishing with the British outposts near 

Fort Malden. 

In the meantime General Brock, who was both energetic and daring, sent a small party of British regulars, Canadians, and Indians across 

the river from Malden to cut General Hull’s communications with Ohio. 

By that time Hull was discouraged by the loss of Fort Mackinac, whose 

sixty defenders had quietly surrendered on July 17 to a small group of 

British regulars supported by a motley force of fur traders and Indians 

who at Brock’s suggestion had swiftly marched from St. Joseph Island, 

forty miles to the north. Hull also knew that the enemy in Fort Malden had received reinforcements (which he overestimated tenfold) and 

feared that Detroit would be completely cut off from its base of supplies. Taking counsel of his fears, on August 7 he began to withdraw his 

force across the river into Fort Detroit. The last American had scarcely 

returned before the first men of Brock’s force appeared and began

setting up artillery opposite Detroit. By August 15 five guns were in

position and opened fire on the fort, and the next morning Brock led

his troops across the river. Before Brock could launch his assault, the 

Americans surrendered. Militiamen were released under parole; Hull 

and the regulars were sent as prisoners to Montreal. Later paroled, Hull 

returned to face a court-martial for his poor conduct during the campaign, was sentenced to be shot, and was immediately pardoned.

On August 15, the day before the surrender, the small garrison 

at distant Fort Dearborn, acting on orders from Hull, had evacuated 

the post and started out for Detroit. The column was almost instantly 

attacked by a band of Indians who massacred the Americans before 

returning to destroy the fort.

“Regulars by God”

On July 5, 1814, the 22d U.S. Infantry demonstrated at Chippewa, Canada, that the American 

republic had fielded a professional army capable of standing up to the British Army on a conventional 

battlefield. That spring Brig. Gen. Winfield Scott formed the 1st Brigade of regulars, consisting of the 9th, 

11th, 22d, and 25th Infantries, near Buffalo, New York. An ardent student of European military training, 

Scott quickly shaped his brigade into a disciplined force that took the British by surprise when deployed 

to block a British advance into New York. Deceived by the gray uniforms American militia units usually 

wore, the British only belatedly realized they had encountered regular troops. The U.S. soldiers steadily 

advanced toward their opponents, seemingly unperturbed by musket volleys that tore through their ranks, 

causing the British commanding general to exclaim, “Those are Regulars, by God!” Today the memory of 

the victory at Chippewa lives on in the tradition of gray uniforms worn by cadets of the Military Academy 

at West Point and in the unofficial motto, “Regulars by God,” of the 6th and 22d Infantries.
American Military History

138

With the fall of Mackinac, Detroit, and Dearborn, the entire territory north and west of Ohio fell under enemy control. The settlements 

in Indiana lay open to attack, the neighboring Indian tribes hastened 

to join the winning side, and the Canadians in the upper province lost 

some of the spirit of defeatism with which they had entered the war.

Immediately after taking Detroit, Brock transferred most of his 

troops to the Niagara frontier, where he faced an American invasion 

force of 6,500 men. Maj. Gen. Stephen van Rensselaer, the senior

American commander and a New York militiaman, was camped at 

Lewiston with a force of 900 regulars and about 2,300 militiamen. Van 

Rensselaer owed his appointment not to any active military experience, 

for he had none, but to his family’s position in New York. Inexperienced as he was in military art, van Rensselaer at least fought the enemy, 

which was more than could be said of the Regular Army commander 

in the theater, Brig. Gen. Alexander Smyth. Smyth and his 1,650 regulars and nearly 400 militiamen were located at Buffalo. The rest of the 

American force, about 1,300 regulars, was stationed at Fort Niagara.

Van Rensselaer planned to cross the narrow Niagara River and 

capture Queenston and its heights, a towering escarpment that ran perpendicular to the river south of the town. From this vantage point, he 

hoped to command the area and eventually drive the British out of the 

Niagara peninsula. Smyth, on the other hand, wanted to attack above 

the falls, where the banks were low and the current less swift; and he 

refused to cooperate with the militia general. With a force ten times 

that of the British opposite him, van Rensselaer decided to attack alone. 

After one attempt had been called off for lack of oars for the boats, 

van Rensselaer finally ordered an attack for the morning of October 13.

The assault force numbered 600 men, roughly half of them New York

militiamen. The attack did not go well. Several boats drifted beyond 

the landing area; and the first echelon of troops to land, numbering far

fewer than 500, was pinned down for a time on the riverbank below the 

heights. The men eventually found an unguarded path, clambered to 

the summit, and, surprising the enemy, overwhelmed his fortified battery and drove him down into Queenston.

Later in the morning the Americans repelled a hastily formed counterattack, during which General Brock was killed. This, however, was 

the high point of van Rensselaer’s fortunes. Although 1,300 men were 

successfully ferried across the river under persistent British fire from a

fortified battery north of town, less than half of them ever reached the

American line on the heights. Most of the militiamen refused to cross 

the river, insisting on their legal right to remain on American soil; and 

General Smyth ignored van Rensselaer’s request for regulars. Meanwhile, British and Canadian reinforcements arrived in Queenston, and 

Maj. Gen. Roger Sheave, General Brock’s successor, began to advance 

on the American position with a force of 800 troops and 300 Indian 

skirmishers. Van Rensselaer’s men, tired and outnumbered, put up a 

stiff resistance on the heights but in the end were defeated, with 300 

Americans killed or wounded and nearly 1,000 captured.

After the defeat at Queenston, van Rensselaer resigned and was 

succeeded by the unreliable Smyth, who spent his time composing 

windy proclamations. Disgusted at being marched down to the river on 

several occasions only to be marched back to camp again, the new army 

With a force ten times that of 

the British opposite him, van 

Rensselaer decided to attack 

alone. . . . The attack did not go 

well.
the war of 1812

139

that had assembled after the battle of Queenston gradually melted away. 

The men who remained lost all sense of discipline, and finally at the

end of November the volunteers were ordered home and the regulars 

were sent into winter quarters. General Smyth’s request for leave was 

hastily granted, and three months later his name was quietly dropped 

from the Army rolls.

Except for minor raids across the frozen St. Lawrence, there was no 

further fighting along the New York frontier until the following spring.

During the Niagara campaign the largest force then under arms, commanded by Maj. Gen. Henry Dearborn, had been held in the neighborhood of Albany, more than two hundred and fifty miles from the scene

of operations. Dearborn had a good record in the Revolutionary War 

and had served as President Jefferson’s Secretary of War. Persuaded to 

accept the command of the northern theater, except for Hull’s forces, 

he was in doubt for some time about the extent of his authority over 

the Niagara front. When it was clarified, he was reluctant to exercise

it. Proposing to move his army, which included seven regiments of 

regulars with artillery and dragoons, against Montreal in conjunction 

with a simultaneous operation across the Niagara River, Dearborn was 

content to wait for his subordinates to make the first move. When van

Rensselaer made his attempt against Queenston, Dearborn, still in the 

vicinity of Albany, showed no sign of marching toward Canada. At the 

beginning of November he sent a large force north to Plattsburg and 

announced that he would personally lead the army into Montreal, but 

most of his force got no farther than the border. When his advance 

guard was driven back to the village of Champlain by Canadian militiamen and Indians and his Vermont and New York volunteers flatly

refused to cross the border, Dearborn quietly turned around and 

marched back to Plattsburg, where he went into winter quarters.

If the land campaigns of 1812 reflected little credit on the Army,

the war at sea brought lasting glory to the infant Navy. Until the end of 

the year the American frigates, brigs of war, and privateers were able to 

slip in and out of harbors and cruise almost at will; and in this period 

they won their most brilliant victories. At the same time, American privateers were picking off English merchant vessels by the hundreds. 

Having need of American foodstuffs, Britain was at first willing to take

advantage of New England’s opposition to the war by not extending 

the blockade to the New England coast; but by the beginning of 1814 it 

was effectively blockading the whole coast and had driven most American naval vessels and privateers off the high seas.

The Second Year, 1813

On land, the objects of the American plan of campaign for 1813 

were the recapture of Detroit and an attack on Canada across Lake 

Ontario. (See Map 15.) For the Detroit campaign, Madison picked 

Brig. Gen. William Henry Harrison, governor of the Indian Territory and hero of Tippecanoe. The difficulties of a winter campaign

were tremendous, but the country demanded action. Harrison therefore started north toward Lake Erie at the end of October 1812 with 

about 6,500 men. In January 1813 a sizable detachment of around

1,000 men pushed on to Frenchtown, a small Canadian outpost on the 

Henry Dearborn

Charles Willson Peale, 1796
American Military History

140

Raisin River, twenty-six miles south of Detroit. There, the American 

commander, Brig. Gen. James Winchester, positioned his men, their 

backs to the river with scant natural protection and their movements 

severely hampered by deep snow. A slightly larger force of British 

regulars, militiamen, and Indians under Col. Henry Proctor soundly 

defeated the Americans, killing over 100 Kentucky riflemen and capturing about 500. The brutal massacre of wounded American prisoners by their Indian guards made “Remember the Raisin” the rallying 

cry of the Northwestern Army, but any plans for revenge had to be 

postponed, for Harrison had decided to suspend operations for the 

winter. He built Forts Meigs and Stephenson and posted his army near 

the Michigan border at the western end of Lake Erie.

The Ontario campaign was entrusted to General Dearborn, who 

was ordered to move his army from Plattsburg to Sacket’s Harbor, 

where Commodore Isaac Chauncey had been assembling a fleet. Dearborn was to move across the lake to capture Kingston and destroy the 

British flotilla there, then proceed to York (now Toronto), the capital of

Upper Canada, to capture military stores. Finally, he was to cooperate 

with a force from Buffalo in seizing the forts on the Canadian side of 

the Niagara River.

The American strategy was basically sound. The capture of Kingston, the only tenable site for a naval station on the Canadian side of 

Lake Ontario, would give the United States control of the lake and, 

by cutting the British lines of communications, frustrate enemy plans 

for operations in the west. After the fall of Kingston, the operations against York and the Niagara forts would be simple moppingup exercises. When the time came to move, however, Dearborn and 

Chauncey, hearing a rumor that the British forces in Kingston had 

been reinforced, decided to bypass that objective and attack York first.

About 1,700 men sailed up Lake Ontario without incident, arriving off 

York before daybreak on April 27. Dearborn, who was in poor health, 

turned over the command of the assault to Brig. Gen. Zebulon Pike, 

the explorer of the Southwest. The landing, about four miles west of 

the town, was virtually unopposed. The British garrison of 600 men,

occupying a fortification about halfway between the town and the landing, was overwhelmed after sharp resistance; but just as the Americans 

were pushing through the fort toward the town, a powder magazine 

exploded, killing or disabling many Americans and a number of British 

soldiers. Among those killed was General Pike. Remnants of the garrison fled toward Kingston, 150 miles to the east. The losses were heavy

on both sides—almost 20 percent of Dearborn’s forces had been killed 

or wounded. With General Dearborn incapacitated and General Pike 

dead, the troops apparently got out of hand. They looted and burned 

the public buildings and destroyed the provincial records. After holding 

the town for about a week, they recrossed the lake to Niagara to join 

an attack against the forts on the Canadian side of the Niagara River.

Meanwhile, Sacket’s Harbor had been almost stripped of troops 

for the raid on York and for reinforcing the army at Fort Niagara. At 

Kingston, across the lake, Sir George Prevost, the Governor General 

of Canada, had assembled a force of 800 British regulars in addition to 

militia. Taking advantage of the absence of Chauncey’s fleet, which was

at the other end of the lake, Prevost launched an attack on Sacket’s HarThe troops apparently got 

out of hand. They looted and 

burned the public buildings and 

destroyed the provincial records.
the war of 1812

141

bor with his entire force of regulars on the night of May 26. The town

was defended by about 400 regulars and approximately 750 militiamen 

under the command of Brig. Gen. Jacob Brown of the New York militia. Brown posted his men in two lines in front of a fortified battery to

cover a possible landing. Coming ashore under heavy fire, the British

nevertheless pressed rapidly forward, routed the first line, and pushed

the second back into the prepared defenses. There, the Americans held. 

The British then tried two frontal assaults but were repulsed with heavy 

losses. While they were re-forming for a third attack, General Brown 

rallied the militia and sent it toward the rear of the enemy’s right flank.

This was the turning point. Having suffered serious losses and in danger of being cut off, the British hurriedly withdrew to their ships.

On the same day Prevost sailed against Sacket’s Harbor, General 

Dearborn at the western end of Lake Ontario was invading Canada 

with an army of 4,000 men. The operation began with a well-executed 

and stubbornly resisted amphibious assault led by Col. Winfield Scott

and Comdr. Oliver Hazard Perry, U.S. Navy, with Chauncey’s fleet providing fire support. Outnumbered by more than two to one, the British

retreated, abandoning Fort George and Queenston to the Americans. 

(See Map 16.) An immediate pursuit might have sealed the victory; but 

Dearborn, after occupying Fort George, waited several days and then 

sent about 2,000 men after the enemy. The detachment advanced to 

within ten miles of the British and camped for the night with slight 

regard for security and even less for the enemy’s audacity. During the 

night a force of about 700 British soldiers attacked the camp and thoroughly routed the Americans. Dearborn withdrew his entire army to 

Fort George. About two weeks later, a 500-man detachment ventured 

fifteen miles outside the fort and, when attacked, surrendered to a force

of British and Indians that was half as large. After these reverses there 

was no further action of consequence on the Niagara front for the 

remainder of the year. Dearborn, again incapacitated by illness, resigned 

his commission in early July. Both armies were hard hit by disease, and 

the American forces were further reduced by the renewal of the war in 

the west and by an attempt against Montreal.

Hull’s disaster at Detroit in 1812 and Harrison’s unsuccessful winter campaign had clearly shown that any offensive action in that quarter 

depended upon first gaining control of Lake Erie. Commander Perry

had been assigned the task of building a fleet and seizing control of the

lake. Throughout the spring and summer of 1813, except for the time 

The Burning of York

American strategy in 1813 focused on cutting Canada in half. An assault force under the direct 

command of Zebulon Pike landed at York, present-day Toronto, then the capital of Upper Canada. 

The Americans also hoped to capture two British warships to shift the balance of naval power on Lake 

Ontario but failed. After occupying the town for three days and carrying away military supplies, the 

Americans torched many of the town’s public buildings. Burning public places was an acceptable form of 

warfare at the time, and later the British burned Washington, D.C. 
American Military History

142

he had joined Dearborn’s force, the 27-year-old Perry had been busy 

at

Presque Isle assembling his fleet, guns

, and crews. By the beginning

of August his force was superior to that of the British in every respect 

except long-range armament. Sailing up the lake, he anchored in Put-inBay, near the line still held by General Harrison in the vicinity of Forts 

Meigs and Stephenson. There, on September 10 Perry met the British 

Fleet, defeated it, and gained control of Lake Erie.

As soon as the damage to Perry’s ships and the captured British ves-

sels had been repaired, Harrison embarked his army and sailed against 

Fort Malden.

A regiment of mountedKentucky riflemen under Col.

Richard M. Johnson moved along the shore of the lake toward Detroit. 

Vastly outnumbered on land and now open to attack from the water, 

the British abandoned both Forts Malden and Detroit and retreated 

eastward. Leaving a detachment to garrison the forts, Harrison set out 

after the enem

y with theKentucky cavalry regiments, five brigades of

Kentucky volunteers, and a part of the 27th Infantry, a force of about 

3,500 men. On October 5 he made contact with the British on the 

banks of theThames River about eighty-five miles from Malden.(See 

Map 15.) The enemy numbered about 2,900, of whom about 900 were 

British regulars and the remainder Indians under Tecumseh. Instead of 

attacking with infantry in the traditional line-against-line fashion, Har-

rison ordered a mounted attack. The maneuver succeeded completely. 

Unable to withstand the charging Kentuckians, the British surrendered 

in droves. The Indians were routed; Tecumseh, who had brought so 

much trouble to the western frontier, was killed. Among those who 

distinguished themselves that day was Commander Perry, who rode in 

the front rank of Johnson’s charge.

As a result of the victory, which illustrated successful employment 

of the principles of offensive and mass and highlighted the importance 

of combined land-sea operations, Lake Erie became an American lake. 

The Indian confederacy was shattered. The American position on the 

Detroit frontier was reestablished, a portion of Canadian territory was 

brought under American control, and the enemy threat in that sector Winfield Scott (1786–1866)

Born to a southern aristocratic family near Petersburg, 

Virginia, the six-foot-five-inch Scott was commonly referred to as 

Old Fuss and Feathers because of his attention to detail and elabo-

rate uniforms. Many disliked him personally because of his arrogant 

demeanor and overt political ambition. While he never received a 

formal military education, Scott was a voracious reader who studied 

the great works on military science. He was a dynamic and brave 

battlefield commander during the War of 1812 and devised a use-

ful drill for his men that trained them well for the fight. Most scholars 

recognize that Scott was the most gifted and influential military 

thinker in America from the War of 1812 through the early years of 

the American Civil War.
Map 16

BURLINGT ON HEIGHTS

Falls LUNDY’S LANE

Grand River

LAKE ERIE

Ch pi pewa

R vi er

Niaga

ra

Ri

ve

r

LAKE ON T ARIO

27 May 1813

25 July 1814

13 Oct 1812

3 July 1814

5 July 1814

CANAD A

UNITED

S T A TES

Newark

Queenston

Lewiston

Chippewa

Black Rock

Buffalo

Ancaster

Ft. George

Ft. Niagara

Ft. Schlosser

Ft. Erie

War of 1812

NIAGARA RIVER AREA

Battle Sites, Date Indicated

Trace of roads is approximate

5 5 0

Miles
American Military History

144

was eliminated. There was no further fighting here for the rest of the

war. It was a decisive victory.

The small remnant of the British force that had escaped capture at 

the Thames—no more than 250 soldiers and a few Indians—made its 

way overland to the head of Lake Ontario. Harrison, after discharging 

his Kentucky volunteers and arranging for the defenses of the Michigan Territory, sailed after it with the remainder of his army. He arrived 

at the Niagara frontier at an opportune time, since the American forces 

in that theater were being called upon to support a two-pronged drive 

against Montreal.

The expedition against Montreal in the fall of 1813 was one of 

the worst fiascoes of the war. It involved a simultaneous drive by two

forces: one, an army of about 4,000 men assembled at Plattsburg on 

Lake Champlain under the command of Brig. Gen. Wade Hampton, 

and another of about 6,000 men under the command of Maj. Gen.

James Wilkinson, which was to attack down the St. Lawrence River from 

Sacket’s Harbor. Hampton and Wilkinson were scarcely on speaking 

terms, and there was no one on the spot to command the two of them. 

Neither had sufficient strength to capture Montreal without the other’s

aid; each lacked confidence in the other, and both suspected that the

War Department was leaving them in the lurch. At first contact with the

British, about halfway down the Chateaugay River, Hampton retreated 

and, after falling back all the way to Plattsburg, resigned from the Army. 

Wilkinson, after a detachment of about 2,000 men was severely mauled 

in an engagement just north of Ogdensburg, also abandoned his part 

of the operation and followed Hampton into Plattsburg.

In the meantime, during December 1813 the British took advantage of the weakened state of American forces on the Niagara frontier. They recaptured Fort George and crossed the river to take Fort 

Niagara, which remained in British hands until the end of the war. 

Before evacuating Fort George, the Americans had burned the town of 

Newark and part of Queenston. In retaliation the British, after assaulting Fort Niagara with unusual ferocity, loosed their Indian allies on 

the surrounding countryside and burned the town of Buffalo and the 

nearby village of Black Rock.

During 1813 a new theater of operations opened in the south. Maj. 

Gen. (of the Tennessee militia) Andrew Jackson, an ardent expansionist, wrote the Secretary of War that he would “rejoice at the opportunity of placing the American eagle on the ramparts of Mobile, Pensacola, and Fort St. Augustine.” (Map 17) For this purpose Tennessee had 

raised a force of 2,000 men to be under Jackson’s command. Congress, 

after much debate, approved only an expedition into that part of the 

gulf coast in dispute between the United States and Spain and refused 

to entrust the venture to the Tennesseans. Just before he went north to 

take part in the Montreal expedition, General Wilkinson led his regulars 

into the disputed part of West Florida and without meeting any resistance occupied Mobile, while the Tennessee army was left cooling its 

heels in Natchez.

An Indian uprising in that part of the Mississippi Territory soon to 

become Alabama saved General Jackson’s military career. Inspired by 

Tecumseh’s earlier successes, the Creek Indians took to the warpath in 

the summer of 1813 with a series of outrages culminating in the masThe expedition against Montreal 

in the fall of 1813 was one of 

the worst fiascoes of the war.
the war of 1812

145

sacre of more than 500 men, women, and children at Fort Mims. Jackson, with characteristic energy, reassembled his army, which had been 

dismissed after Congress rejected its services for an attack on Florida, 

and moved into the Mississippi Territory. His own energy added to his 

problems, for he completely outran his primitive supply system and dangerously extended his line of communications. The hardships of the 

campaign and one near defeat at the hands of the Indians destroyed 

any enthusiasm the militia might have had for continuing in service. 

Jackson was compelled to entrench at Fort Strother on the Coosa River 

and remain there for several months until the arrival of a regiment of 

the Regular Army gave him the means to deal with the mutinous militia. 

Map 17

Horseshoe

Bend

Alabama R

Tallapoosa R

Coosa R

Mississippi R

Tombigbee R

G U L F O F M E X I C O

TENNESSEE

KENTUCKY VIRGINIA

NOR TH CAROLINA

SOUTH CAROLINA

GEORGIA

MISSISSIPPI

TERRITOR Y

L OUISIANA TERRITOR Y

E AST

FLORID A

(SPAIN)

WES T

FLORID A

(SPAIN)

Charleston

Savannah

Natchez

Pensacola

New Orleans

Mobile

Fort Strother

Fort Mims

Fort St. Augustine

War of 1812

THE SOUTHERN FRONTIER

Territory in Dispute between

United States and Spain

100 0 100

Miles
American Military History

146

At the end of March 1814 Jackson decided he had sufficientstrength

for a decisive blow against the Indians, who had gathered a force of 

about 900 warriors and many women and children in a fortified camp at

the Horseshoe Bend of the Tallapoosa River. Jackson had about 2,000 

militia and volunteers, nearly 600 regulars, several hundred friendly Indians, and a few pieces of artillery. The attack was completely successful. 

A bayonet charge led by the regulars routed the Indians, whom Jackson’s 

forces ruthlessly hunted down and killed all but a hundred or so of the 

warriors. “I lament that two or three women and children were killed by 

accident,” Jackson later reported. The remaining hostile tribes fled into

Spanish territory. As one result of the campaign Jackson was appointed 

a major general in the Regular Army. The campaign against the Creeks 

had no other effect on the outcome of the war, but for that matter neither had any of the campaigns in the north up to this point.

Fighting also broke out during 1813 along the east coast, where 

a British fleet blockaded the Delaware and Chesapeake Bays, bottling up the American frigates Constellation at Norfolk and Adams in 

the Potomac. (Map 18) Opposed only by small American gunboats, the 

British under Admiral Sir John Warren sought “to chastise the Americans into submission” and at the same time to relieve the pressure on 

Prevost’s forces in Canada. With a flotilla that at times numbered fifteen

ships, Rear Adm. Sir George Cockburn, Warren’s second in command, 

roamed the Chesapeake during the spring of 1813, burning and looting 

the prosperous countryside. Reinforced in June by 2,600 regulars, Warren decided to attack Norfolk, its navy yard and the anchored Constellation providing the tempting targets. Norfolk’s defenses rested chiefly

on Craney Island, which guarded the narrow channel of the Elizabeth 

River. The island had a seven-gun fortification and was manned by 580

regulars and militia in addition to 150 sailors and marines from the Constellation. The British planned to land an 800-man force on the mainland 

and, when low tide permitted, to march onto the island in a flanking

movement. As the tide rose, another 500 men would row across the 

shoals for a frontal assault. On June 22 the landing party debarked four 

miles northwest of the island, but the flanking move was countered

by the highly accurate marksmanship of the Constellation’s gunners and 

was forced to pull back. The frontal assault also suffered from welldirected American fire, which sank three barges and threw the rest into

confusion. After taking eighty-one casualties, the British sailed off in 

disorder. The defenders counted no casualties.

Frustrated at Norfolk, Warren crossed the Roads to Hampton, 

where he overwhelmed the 450 militia defenders and pillaged the town. 

“Old Hickory”

Known as Old Hickory, Andrew Jackson (1767–1845) was said to be as tough as a hickory tree. During 

his duel with Charles Dickinson in 1806, he broke two of his ribs and a bullet lodged so near his heart that 

he suffered for his remaining thirty-nine years. A militia general who until 1813 had never led troops in 

combat, he is best known for his efforts in the Creek War, 1813–1814, and during the War of 1812 in the 

four battles at New Orleans. Jackson became the seventh U.S. President.
Map 18

C H E S A P E A K E B A Y

Patuxent River

Potomac River

Hampton

Norfolk

Baltimore

Bladensburg

WASHINGTON

Benedict

VIRGINIA

VIRGINIA

MARYLAND

MARYLAND

D E L A W A R E

1812–1814

CHESAPEAKE BAY AREA

10 0 10 20

Miles
American Military History

148

A portion of the fleet remained in the bay for the rest of the year, blockading and marauding; but the operation was not an unalloyed success. 

It failed to cause a diversion of American troops from the northern 

border and, by strengthening popular resentment (Cockburn was vilified

throughout the country), helped unite Americans behind the war effort.

The conduct of the war in 1812 and 1813 revealed deficiencies in

the administration of the War Department that would plague the American cause to the end. In early 1813 Madison replaced his incompetent 

Secretary of War William Eustis with John Armstrong, who instituted 

a reorganization that eventually resulted in the substitution of younger, 

more aggressive field commanders for the aged veterans of the Revolution. Congress then authorized an expansion of the Army staff to help 

the Secretary manage the war. In March it re-created the Offices of the

Adjutant General, Inspector General, Surgeon, and Apothecary General and assigned eight topographical engineers to the staff.

Competent leadership meant little, however, without sufficient

logistical support; and logistics, more than any other factor, determined 

the nature of the military campaigns of the war. Lack of transportation 

was a major problem. The United States was fighting a war on widely

separated fronts that required moving supplies through a wilderness 

where roads had to be built for wagons and packhorses. For this reason, 

ammunition and clothing supplies proved inadequate. General Harrison 

had to depend on homemade cartridges and clothing from Ohio townsmen for his northwestern campaign, and Brig. Gen. Winfield Scott’s

regulars would fight at Chippewa in the gray uniforms of the New York

militia. Winter found the troops without blankets, inadequately housed, 

and without forage for their horses. Most important, the subsistence 

supply failed so completely that field commanders found it necessary to

take local food procurement virtually into their own hands.

Transportation difficulties accounted for only part of the problem.

The supply system devised in 1812 proved a resounding failure. Congressional intent notwithstanding, the Quartermaster General had never 

assumed accountability for the money and property administered by his 

subordinates or administrative control over his deputies in the south and 

northwest. Moreover, the functions of his office, never clearly defined,

overlapped those of the Commissary General. In a vain attempt to 

unravel the administrative tangle, Congress created the Office of Superintendent General of Military Supplies to keep account of all military 

stores and reformed the Quartermaster Department, giving the Quartermaster General stricter control over his deputies. In practice, however, 

the deputies continued to act independently in their own districts.

Both Congress and the War Department overlooked the greatest 

need for reform as the Army continued to rely on contractors for the 

collection and delivery of rations for the troops. With no centralized 

direction for subsistence supply, the inefficient, fraud-racked contract

system proved to be one of the gravest hindrances to military operations throughout the war.

The Last Year of the War, 1814

After the setbacks at the end of 1813, a lull descended on the northern frontier. In March 1814 Wilkinson made a foray from Plattsburg 

The conduct of the war in 1812 

and 1813 revealed deficiencies 

. . . that would plague the 

American cause to the end.
the war of 1812

149

with about 4,000 men and managed to penetrate about eight miles into 

Canada before 200 British and Canadian troops stopped his advance. It 

was an even more miserable failure than his attempt of the preceding 

fall.

In early 1814 Congress increased the Army to 45 infantry regiments, 4 regiments of riflemen, 3 of artillery, 2 of light dragoons, and

1 of light artillery. The number of general officers was fixed at 6 major

generals and 16 brigadier generals in addition to the generals created

by brevet. Secretary of War Armstrong promoted Jacob Brown, who 

had been commissioned a brigadier general in the Regular Army after 

his heroic defense of Sacket’s Harbor, to the rank of major general 

and placed him in command of the Niagara–Lake Ontario theater. He 

also promoted the youthful George Izard to major general and gave 

him command of the Lake Champlain frontier. He appointed six new 

brigadier generals from the most able, but not necessarily most senior, 

colonels in the Regular Army, among them Winfield Scott, who had

distinguished himself at the battle of Queenston Heights and was now 

placed in command at Buffalo.

British control of Lake Ontario, won by dint of feverish naval 

construction during the previous winter, obliged the Secretary of War 

to recommend operations from Buffalo, but disagreement within the 

President’s Cabinet delayed adoption of a plan until June. Expecting 

Commodore Chauncey’s naval force at Sacket’s Harbor to be strong 

enough to challenge the British Fleet, Washington decided upon a 

coordinated attack on the Niagara peninsula. (See Map 16.) Secretary 

Armstrong instructed General Brown to cross the Niagara River in 

the vicinity of Fort Erie and, after assaulting the fort, either to move 

against Fort George and Newark or to seize and hold a bridge over the 

Chippewa River, as he saw fit.

Brown accordingly crossed the Niagara River on July 3 with his 

force of 3,500 men, took Fort Erie, and then advanced toward the 

Chippewa River, sixteen miles away. There, a smaller British force, 

including 1,500 regulars, had gathered to oppose the Americans. General Brown posted his army in a strong position behind a creek with 

his right flank resting on the Niagara River and his left protected by a

swamp. In front of the American position was an open plain, beyond 

which flowed the Chippewa River; on the other side of the river were

the British.

Brevet Rank

A brevet was a commission or promotion giving an officer in either the regulars or the volunteers a nominal 

rank higher than the one for which he received a salary. The Continental Congress adopted it during the American Revolution to recognize heroism in combat and long-term meritorious service. Thus, a particular brave captain 

could be “promoted” to brevet major during a war but would revert to his permanent rank at the end of the war. 

After 1812 a brevetted officer could receive additional pay only if the President had assigned him a position 

that required the higher rank. The wholesale dispensation of brevets during the Civil War discredited the system, 

and Congress abolished it altogether following the War with Spain.
American Military History

150

In celebration of Independence Day, General Scott had promised 

his brigade a grand parade on the plain the next day. On July 5 he 

formed his troops, numbering about 1,300; but on moving forward discovered British regulars had crossed the river undetected and had lined 

up on the opposite edge of the plain. Scott ordered his men to charge, 

and the British advanced to meet them. The two lines approached each 

other, alternately stopping to fire and then moving forward, closing

the gaps torn by musketry and artillery fire. They came together first

at the flanks, about sixty or eighty yards apart at the center. At this

point the British line crumbled and broke. By the time a second brigade sent forward by General Brown reached the battlefield, the British

had withdrawn across the Chippewa River and were retreating toward 

Ancaster on Lake Ontario. Scott’s casualties amounted to 48 killed and 

227 wounded; British losses were 137 killed and 304 wounded.

Brown followed the retreating British as far as Queenston, where 

he halted to await Commodore Chauncey’s fleet. After waiting two

weeks for Chauncey, who failed to cooperate in the campaign, Brown 

withdrew to Chippewa. He proposed to strike out to Ancaster by way 

of a crossroad known as Lundy’s Lane, from which he could reach the 

Burlington Heights at the head of Lake Ontario and at the rear of the 

British.

Meanwhile, the British had drawn reinforcements from York and 

Kingston and more troops were on the way from Lower Canada. Sixteen thousand British veterans, fresh from Arthur Wellesley, the Duke 

of Wellington’s victories over the French in Europe, had just arrived 

in Canada, too late to participate in the Niagara campaign but in good 

time to permit the redeployment of the troops that had been defending the upper St. Lawrence. By the time General Brown decided to pull 

back from Queenston, the British force at Ancaster amounted to about 

2,200 men under General Phineas Riall; another 1,500 British troops 

were gathered at Fort George and Fort Niagara at the mouth of the 

Niagara River.

As soon as Brown began his withdrawal, Riall sent forward about 

1,000 men along Lundy’s Lane, the very route by which General Brown 

intended to advance against Burlington Heights; another force of more 

Jacob J. Brown (1775–1828)

After trying his hand at teaching, writing, surveying, and working as a secretary to Alexander Hamilton, Jacob Brown became a 

prosperous landowner in western New York in the early 1800s. His 

stature in the community led to his appointment as the local militia 

commander. When war broke out, Brown made up for his lack of 

military knowledge with enthusiasm and combativeness. Dubbed the 

Fighting Quaker because of his religious background, Brown was 

one of the most successful American commanders of the war. After 

the war he rose to become the Commanding General of the Army. Jacob J. Brown

John Wesley Jarvis, 1815

Image removed due to

license restrictions
the war of 1812

151

than 600 British troops moved out fromFort George and followed

Brown along the Queenston road; while a third enemy force of about 

400 men moved along the American side of the Niagara River from 

Fort Niagara. Riall’s advance force reached the junction of Lundy’s 

Lane and the Queenston road on the night of July 24, the same night 

Brown reached Chippewa, about three miles distant. Concerned lest 

the British force on the opposite side of the Niagara cut his line of 

communications and entirely unaware of Riall’s force at Lundy’s Lane, 

General Brown on July 25 ordered Scott to take his brigade back along 

the road toward Queenston in the hope of drawing back the British 

force on the other side of the Niagara. In the meantime, that force had 

crossed the river and joined Riall’s men at Lundy’s Lane. Scott had not 

gone far when much to his surprise he discovered himself face-to-face 

with a strong enemy element.

The ensuing battle, most of which took place after nightfall, was 

the hardest fought, most stubbornly contested engagement of the war. 

For two hours Scott attacked and repulsed the counterattacks of the 

numerically superior British force, which, moreover, had the advan-

tage of position. Then both sides were reinforced. With Brown’s whole 

contingent engaged, the Americans now had a force equal to that of 

the British, about 2,900. They were able to force back the enemy from 

his position and capture his artillery. The battle then continued without 

material advantage to either side until just before midnight, when Gen-

eral Brown ordered the exhausted Americans to fall back to their camp 

across the Chippewa River. The equally exhausted enemy was unable to 

follow. Losses on both sides had been heavy, each side incurring about 

850 casualties. On the American side, both General Brown and General 

Scott were severely wounded, Scott so badly that he saw no further ser-

vice during the war. On the British side, General Riall and his superior, 

General Drummond, who had arrived with the reinforcements, were 

wounded. Riall was taken prisoner.

Both sides claimed Lundy’

s Lane as

a victory, with some justifi-

cation, but Brown’s invasion of Canada was halted. Commodore 

Chauncey, who failed to prevent the British from using Lake Ontario 

for supply and reinforcements, contributed to the ambiguous outcome. 

In contrast to the splendid cooperation between Harrison and Perry 

on Lake Erie, relations between Brown and Chauncey were far from 

satisfactory. A few days after the Battle of Lundy’s Lane the American 

army withdrew to Fort Erie and held this outpost on Canadian soil until 

early in November.

Reinforced after Lundy’s Lane, the British laid siege to Fort Erie 

at the beginning of August but were forced to abandon the effort 

on September 21 after heavy losses. Shortly thereafter General Izard 

arrived with reinforcements from Plattsburg and pushed forward as far 

as Chippewa, where the British were strongly entrenched. After a few 

minor skirmishes, he ceased operations for the winter. The works at 

Fort Erie were destroyed, and the army withdrew to American soil on 

November 5.

During the summer of 1814 the British had been able to rein-

force Canada and to stage several raids on the American coast. East-

port, Maine, on Passamaquoddy Bay, and Castine, at the mouth of the 

Penobscot River, were occupied without resistance. This operation was 
American Military History

152

something more than a raid since Eastport lay in disputed territory, 

and it was no secret that Britain wanted a rectification of the boundary.

No such political object was attached to British forays in the region of 

Chesapeake Bay. (See Map 18.) 

On August 19 a force of some 4,000 British troops under Maj. 

Gen. Robert Ross landed on the Patuxent River and marched on Washington. At the Battle of Bladensburg, five days later, under the eyes of

President Madison, who had arrived on the scene with a number of 

civilian officials just before the battle, Ross easily dispersed the 5,000

militia, naval gunners, and regulars hastily gathered together to defend 

the capital. The British then entered Washington, burned the Capitol 

Building, the White House, and other public buildings and returned to 

their ships.

Baltimore was next on the schedule, but that city had been given time 

to prepare its defenses. A rather formidable line of redoubts covered the 

land approach; the harbor was guarded by Fort McHenry and blocked 

by a line of sunken gunboats. On September 13 a spirited engagement 

fought by Maryland militia, many of whom had run at Bladensburg just 

two weeks before, delayed the invaders and caused considerable loss, 

including General Ross, who was killed. When the fleet failed to reduce

Fort McHenry, the assault on the city was called off.

The British attacks in the Chesapeake Bay region were both high 

and low points for the American cause. The destruction of Washington after a humiliating defeat was certainly demoralizing. However, the 

successful defense of Baltimore, and in particular the stirring events 

around the defense of Fort McHenry that would be enshrined forever 

in Francis Scott Key’s poem, “The Star-Spangled Banner,” had a farreaching impact on the war and on later American history.

Two days before the attack on Baltimore, the British suffered a 

much more serious repulse on Lake Champlain. After the departure of 

General Izard for the Niagara front, Brig. Gen. Alexander Macomb had 

remained at Plattsburg with a force of about 3,300 men. Supporting 

this force was a small fleet under Commodore Thomas Macdonough.

Across the border in Canada was an army of British veterans of the 

Napoleonic Wars whom Prevost was to lead down the route Burgoyne 

had taken thirty-seven years before. Moving slowly up the Richelieu 

River toward Lake Champlain, Prevost crossed the border and on 

Battle of Bladensburg, August 24, 1814

Derisively known as the Bladensburg Races due to the unseemly manner in which U.S. troops left the 

field, the defeat owed more to poor command arrangements than the inexperience of the militia that 

formed the bulk of American forces. The U.S. commander, Brig. Gen. William H. Winder, was indecisive 

and exhausted from having to organize the defense of the capital without a staff. His subordinates were 

often uncooperative, while on the day of the battle he received the unwelcome “help” of Secretary of 

State James Monroe. Without consulting anyone, Monroe redeployed the army in a most unfortunate 

manner. Even President Madison wandered onto the field, almost getting himself captured in the process. 

In the end, the troops could not overcome the disarray of their superiors.
the war of 1812

153

September6 arrived before Plattsburg with about 11,000 men.There,

he waited for almost a week until his naval support was ready to join 

the attack. With militia reinforcements, Macomb now had about 4,500 

men manning a strong line of redoubts and blockhouses that faced a 

small river. Macdonough had anchored his vessels in Plattsburg Bay, 

out of range of British guns but in a position to resist an assault on the 

American line. On September 11 the British flotilla appeared and Pre-

vost ordered a joint attack. There was no numerical disparity between 

the naval forces but an important one in the quality of the seamen. 

Macdonough’s ships were manned by well-trained seamen and gunners, 

the British ships by hastily recruited French-Canadian militia and sol-

diers with only a sprinkling of regular seamen. As the enemy vessels 

came into the bay the wind died; and the British were exposed to heavy 

raking fire from Macdonough’

s long guns.

The Britishworked theirway

in andcame to anchor; and the two fleets began slugging at each other,

broadside by broadside. At the end the British commander was dead 

and his ships battered into submission. Prevost immediately called off 

the land attack and withdrew to Canada the next day.

Macdonough’s victory ended the gravest threat that had arisen so 

far. More important, it gave impetus to peace negotiations then under 

way. News of the two setbacks, Baltimore and Plattsburg, reached Eng-

land simultaneously, aggravating the war weariness of the British and 

bolstering the efforts of the American peace commissioners to obtain 

satisfactory terms.

New Orleans: The Final Battle

The progress of the peace negotiations influenced the British to

continue an operation that General Ross, before his repulse and death 

at Baltimore, had been instructed to carry out: a descent upon the gulf 

coast to capture New Orleans and possibly sever Louisiana from the 

United States. (See Map 17.) Maj. Gen. Sir Edward Pakenham, one of the 

Duke of Wellington’s distinguished subordinates, was sent to America 

to take command of the expedition. On Christmas Day, 1814, Paken-

ham arrived at the mouth of the Mississippi to find his troops disposed

on a narrow isthmus below New Orleans between the Mississippi River 

and a cypress swamp. They had landed two weeks earlier at a shallow 

lagoon some ten miles east of New Orleans and had already fought 

one engagement. In this encounter, on December 23, General Jackson, 

who had taken command of the defenses on December 1, almost suc-

ceeded in cutting off a British advance detachment of 2,000, but after a three-hour fight in which casualties on both sides were heavy, he was

compelled to retire behind fortifications covering New Orleans.

Opposite the British and behind a ditch stretching from the river 

to the swamp, Jackson had raised earthworks high enough to require 

scaling ladders for an assault. About 3,500 men with another 1,000 in 

reserve manned the defenses. It was a varied group, composed of the 

7th and 44th Infantry Regiments, Major Beale’s New Orleans Sharp-

shooters, LaCoste and Daquin’s battalions of free African Americans, 

the Louisiana militia under General David Morgan, a band of Choctaw 

Indians, the Baratarian pirates, and a motley battalion of fashionably 

dressed sons and brothers of the New Orleans aristocracy. To support 
American Military History

154

his defenses, Jackson had assembled more than twenty pieces of artillery, including a battery of nine heavy guns on the opposite bank of 

the Mississippi.

After losing an artillery duel to the Americans on January 1, Pakenham decided on a frontal assault in combination with an attack against 

the American troops on the west bank. The main assault was to be 

delivered by about 5,300 men, while about 600 men under Lt. Col.

William Thornton were to cross the river and clear the west bank. 

As the British columns appeared out of the early morning mist on 

January 8, they were met with murderous fire, first from the artillery,

then from the muskets and rifles of Jackson’s infantry. Achieving mass

through firepower, the Americans mowed the British down by the hundreds. Pakenham and one other general were killed and a third badly 

wounded. More than 2,000 of the British were casualties; the American 

losses were trifling.

Suddenly, the battle on the west bank became critical. Jackson did 

not make adequate preparations to meet the advance there until the 

Battle of New Orleans, Jean Hyacinthe de Laclotte, 1815

Image removed due to

license restrictions
the war of 1812

155

British began their movement, and by then it was too late. The heavy 

guns of a battery posted on the west bank were not placed to command 

an attack along that side of the river; and only about 800 militia, divided 

in two groups a mile apart, were in position to oppose Thornton. The 

Americans resisted stubbornly, inflicting greater losses than they suffered, but the British pressed on, routed them, and overran the battery. 

Had the British continued their advance, Jackson’s position would have 

been critical; but Pakenham’s successor in command, appalled by the 

repulse of the main assault, ordered Thornton to withdraw from the 

west bank and rejoin the main force. For ten days the shattered remnant 

of Pakenham’s army remained in camp unmolested by the Americans, 

then reembarked and sailed away.

The British appeared off Mobile on February 8, confirming Jackson’s fear that they planned an attack in that quarter. They overwhelmed 

Fort Bowyer, a garrison manned by 360 regulars at the entrance to

Mobile Harbor. Before they could attack the city itself, however, word 

arrived that a treaty had been signed at Ghent on Christmas Eve, two 

weeks before the Battle of New Orleans. The most lopsided victory of 

the war, which helped propel Andrew Jackson to the Presidency, had 

been fought after the war was officially over.

The news of the peace settlement followed so closely on Jackson’s 

triumph in New Orleans that the war as a whole was popularly regarded 

in the United States as a great victory. Yet, at best, it was a draw. American strategy had centered on the conquest of Canada and the harassment of British shipping. The land campaign had failed miserably, and 

during most of the war the Navy was bottled up behind a tight British 

blockade of the North American coast. The initial success of the privateering effort had enriched a few individuals but was no substitute 

for a robust navy and did little to achieve the war aims. Ironically, the 

greatest losers in the war were probably the Indians. The Battles of 

the Thames in the north and Horseshoe Bend in the south dealt them 

blows from which they never recovered and in the south set the stage 

for the forcible removal of most members of the tribes of the “Five 

Civilized Nations” to the west.

If it favored neither belligerent, the war at least taught the Americans several important lessons. Although the Americans were proud 

of their reputation as the world’s most expert riflemen, the rifle played

only a minor role in the war. On the other hand, the American soldier 

displayed unexpected superiority in gunnery and engineering. Artillery 

contributed to American successes at Chippewa, Sacket’s Harbor, Norfolk, the siege of Fort Erie, and New Orleans. The war also boosted the 

reputation of the Corps of Engineers, a branch that owed its efficiency

chiefly to the Military Academy. Academy graduates completed the fortifications at Fort Erie, built Fort Meigs, planned the harbor defenses

of Norfolk and New York, and directed the fortifications at Plattsburg.

If larger numbers of infantrymen had been as well trained as the artillerymen and engineers, the course of the war might have been entirely 

different.

Sea power played a fundamental role in the war; and when combined sea-land operations went well, the resulting campaign was generally successful. In the west, both opponents were handicapped in overland communication, but the British were far more dependent on the 

The news of the peace settlement 

followed so closely on Jackson’s 

triumph in New Orleans that the 

war as a whole was popularly 

regarded in the United States as 

a great victory.
American Military History

156

Great Lakes for the movement of troops and supplies for the defense 

of Upper Canada. In the east, Lake Champlain was strategically impor-

tant as an invasion corridor to the populous areas of both countries. 

Just as Perry’s victory on Lake Erie decided the outcome of the war in 

the far west, Macdonough’s success on Lake Champlain decided the 

fate of the British invasion in 1814 and helped influence the peace

negotiations.

The much-maligned militia performed, on the whole, as well and 

as poorly as the Regular Army. The defeats and humiliations of the 

regular forces during the first years of thewar matched those of the

militia, just as in a later period the Kentucky volunteers at the Thames 

and the Maryland militia before Baltimore proved that the state citizensoldier could perform well. The keys to the militiamen’s performance, 

of course, were training and leadership, the two areas over which the 

national government had little control. The militia, occasionally com-

petent, was never dependable; though in relationship to the regulars its 

record was comparable. However, in the nationalistic period that fol-

lowed the war, when the exploits of the regulars were justly celebrated, 

an ardent young Secretary of War, John Calhoun, would be able to con-

vince Congress and the nation that the first line of American defense

should be a standing army. Discussion Questions

1. What advantages did the United States have in the War of 

1812 that it did not have during the American Revolution? What 

disadvantages?

2. Discuss why the contractor system of supply failed so miserably.

3. How did the effectiveness of the militiamen and regulars com-

pare in this war?

4. Give some positive and negative examples of leadership during 

the war of 1812. Did either side adhere to the principle of unity of 

command? If so, when?

5.

Whatwas the tactical significance of the Battles of Lundy’

s Lane

and Chippewa? What effect did the battles have on American and Brit

-

ish morale?

6.

Whatwerethe American strategic objectives of thewar?Were

they achieved?

Recommended Readings

Gilpin, Alec R. The War of 1812 in the Old Northwest. East Lansing: Mich-

igan State University Press, 1958, especially chs. 3–7, 10–11.

Hickey, Donald R. The War of 1812: A Forgotten Conflict. Urbana: Univer-

sity of Illinois Press, 1989.

Horsman, Reginald. The Causes of the War of 1812: National Honor or 

National Interest?, 2d ed., ed. Bradford Perkins. Huntington, N.Y.: R. 

E. Krieger Pub. Co., 1976.
the war of 1812

157

James, Marquis. Andrew Jackson: The Border Captain. Norwalk, Conn.: 

Easton Books, 1960, chs. 9–20.

Lord, Walter. The Dawn’s Early Light. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994.

Mahon, John K. The War of 1812, 2d ed. New York: Da Capo Press, 

1991.

Malcolmson, Robert. Lords of the Lake: The Naval War on Lake Ontario. 

Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1999.

May, Ernest, ed. The Ultimate Decision: The President as Commander in Chief. 

New York: George Braziller, 1960, ch. 2.

Owsley, Frank L., Jr. Struggle for the Gulf Borderlines: The Creek War and the 

Battle of New Orleans, 1812–1815, 2d ed. Tuscaloosa: University of 

Alabama Press, 2000.

Remini, Robert V. Andrew Jackson and the Course of American Empire, 

1767–1821. New York: Harper & Row, 1977.

Whitehorne, Joseph A., Carlton Jones, and Joseph W. A. Whitehorne. 

The Battle of Baltimore, 1814. Mount Pleasant, S.C.: The Nautical and 

Aviation Publishing Company of America, 1997.

Other Readings

Adams, Henry. The War of 1812, ed. H. A. DeWeerd. New York: Cooper Square Press, 1999.

Brooks, Charles B. The Siege of New Orleans. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1961.

Coles, Harry L. The War of 1812. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 

1965.

Graves, Donald E. When Right and Glory Lead! The Battle of Lundy’s Lane, 

1814, 2d ed. Toronto: Robin Brass Studio, 1997.

Mahan, Alfred T. Sea Power in Its Relation to the War of 1812. New York: 

Scribner, 1903.

Mason, Philip, ed. After Tippecanoe: Some Aspects of the War of 1812. East 

Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1963.

Muller, Charles. The Darkest Day: The Washington-Baltimore Campaign During the War of 1812. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 

2003.

Stagg, J. C. A. Mr. Madison’s War: Politics, Diplomacy, and Warfare in the 

Early American Republic, 1783–1830. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983.

The War of 1812 sent the Army of the young republic a decidedly 

mixed message of valor and glory interspersed with cowardice and 

blunders. The performance of both regulars and militia had been 

very uneven, although each improved as the conflict drew to a close. In

a sort of role reversal, what glory did appear from the victories on the 

Niagara frontier in 1814 had gone not to the fabled citizen-soldier but 

to the oft-despised professional. Admittedly, the militia, when properly 

led as during the Battle of New Orleans, had on occasion done well; 

but after the war many military realists questioned the ability of the 

Army to employ him effectively. There were several reasons for this. It 

was extremely hard to obtain from state governments accurate figures

on how many militiamen were available. Another critical limitation on 

their effectiveness was that since militiamen by their very nature were 

citizen-soldiers, they did not necessarily live close to where fighting

would occur, especially if that were on the frontier. Moreover, the states 

jealously kept control of arming, disciplining, and training their militia 

and resisted having the men serve out of state. Though training was 

crucial, the War Department was limited to making recommendations 

and supplying training manuals. The Army could not enforce the type 

of rigorous training that had enabled Bvt. Maj. Gen. Winfield Scott to

convert regular soldiers, some of them as raw as militiamen, into the 

professionals who had excited the admiration of even the British at 

Chippewa and Lundy’s Lane.

For the thirty years after the War of 1812 to the beginning of the 

Mexican War, the Army of the United States would slowly and painfully 

evolve into a professional force with generally recognized standards of 

training, discipline, and doctrine. The first branch schools would open

their doors. The U.S. Military Academy would turn out highly motivated 

professional officers, many of whom were trained engineers, to lead the

Army. The new officer corps, including many experienced veterans of

7

Toward a

Professional Army
American Military History

160

the War of 1812 who had supplanted the superannuated veterans of 

the Revolutionary War, would gain an increased sense of identification

as a corporate body of professionals. These officers, tested in countless

postings on the expanding frontier and bloodied in the Creek and Seminole Wars, would serve as a skilled cadre, ready when called upon in 

1846 to lead a “lightning war” of conquest against Mexico that would

vastly increase the size of the United States.

Organizing an Army

As soon as President James Madison proclaimed the peace in February 1815, the Congress, forced to meet at Blodgett’s Hotel because 

the Capitol lay in blackened ruins, acted promptly to create a small but 

efficient professional army that was thought adequate, with the addition

of the militia, to guard against a repetition of the disasters of the War of 

1812. Congress voted a peacetime army of 10,000 men (in addition to 

the Corps of Engineers), about a third of the actual wartime strength, a 

figure in marked contrast to the 3,220-man regular peacetime establishment under President Thomas Jefferson. Organization and leadership 

were also improved. The nine wartime military districts, headed generally 

by superannuated holdovers from the Revolution, were converted into 

two divisions, a northern with four territorial departments and a southern 

with five, commanded by officers who had made their reputations in the

War of 1812: Maj. Gen. Jacob Brown, Division of the North, and Maj. 

Gen. Andrew Jackson, Division of the South.

By midsummer 1815, for the first time in nearly a year, President

Madison had a full-time Secretary of War. After the forced resignation 

of Secretary of War John Armstrong at the end of August 1814, mainly 

as a result of the burning of Washington, Secretary of State James Monroe served as Secretary of War until March 1815, when illness induced 

him to turn over the office to Secretary of the Treasury Alexander J.

Dallas as an additional duty. In the spring of 1815 Madison appointed 

William H. Crawford, Minister to France, as Secretary of War. By August 

1815 he had returned from Paris and was able to take up his duties.

Crawford had a record of distinguished service in the U.S. Senate. 

He had declined the appointment as Secretary of War later offered to 

Armstrong; but he had maintained a deep interest in the War Department, especially in the General Staff that Congress created in the 

spring of 1813. Because its purpose was mainly to conduct the housekeeping functions of the Army, it was not a general staff as the term 

was used a hundred years later but resembled rather the modern special staff. Under it had been placed the Quartermaster, Topographical, 

Adjutant General, Inspector General, Ordnance, Hospital, Purchasing, 

and Pay Departments; the Judge Advocates; the Chaplains; the Military 

Academy; and the commanding generals of the nine military districts 

and their logistical staffs. Furthermore, by stationing in Washington at 

the War Department certain officers of the General Staff—the Adjutant and Inspector General (a dual function performed by one officer)

with two assistants, the Commissary General of Ordnance with three 

assistants, the Paymaster of the Army, and the Assistant Topographical 

Engineer—Congress had provided a management staff for the Secretary of War, who hitherto had only a few clerks to assist him. Rare Pattern 1812 Bell Crown Shako 

 Manufactured ca. 1830
toward a professional army

161

Watching events from Paris in the fall of 1813, Secretary Crawford begged Albert Gallatin “For God’s sake” to “endeavor to rid the 

army of old women and blockheads, at least on the general staff.” The 

reorganization of the Army in the spring of 1815 weeded out most 

of the incompetents. When Crawford took office he recommended to

Congress the retention of the General Staff, because the history of the 

early campaigns in the late war had convinced him of “the necessity of 

giving to the military establishment, in time of peace, the organization 

which it must have to render it efficient in a state of war.”

The only major change he recommended was the addition of the 

Quartermaster General to the management staff in Washington. He 

also recommended an increase in the Corps of Engineers. Crawford’s 

proposals went into effect by Act of Congress on April 24, 1816; and

a few days later Congress authorized the President to employ a “skilful 

assistant” in the Corps of Engineers, thus securing the services of a brilliant military engineer, Brig. Gen. Simon Bernard, who had served under 

Napoleon. Congress also voted $838,000, by today’s standards nearly $8 

million, for a major program of coastal fortification, an effort to prevent

a repetition of the humiliations suffered in the War of 1812.

At the same time Congress appropriated $115,800 for new buildings at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point and $22,171 for books, 

maps, and instruments. Given the small size of the federal government in the early republic, these were substantial sums to devote to the 

fledgling institution. With Secretary Crawford’s sponsorship, facilities

and staff of the academy were expanded, the curriculum broadened, 

regulations for admission tightened, and provision made for a Board 

of Visitors. In September 1816 the cadets first received gray uniforms,

honoring (according to tradition) the regulars of Chippewa and Lundy’s Lane, who wore the rough gray kersey of the New York militia 

because they lacked jackets of regulation federal blue.

Having fostered a peacetime professional army, Crawford might 

have used his considerable influence with Congress to strengthen it if

he had been left in office longer, as he wished. But in the fall of 1816

President Madison asked him to resign and become Secretary of the 

Treasury in order to bring Henry Clay into the cabinet as Secretary of 

War. Clay and several others declined the appointment. For more than 

a year George Graham, the War Department’s chief clerk, was Acting 

Secretary of War. During that period, as the threat from Europe lessened, Congress began to lose interest in the peacetime army. The actual 

strength had fallen to about 8,200 men at the time John C. Calhoun 

took the oath as Secretary of War on December 8, 1817. The new Secretary was faced with proposals to cut the Army’s authorized strength, 

abolish the General Staff, and discontinue the Military Academy. But 

before Calhoun could devote his talents to staving off such proposals, 

he was faced with an outbreak of Indian warfare on the border between 

Georgia and the Spanish province of Florida.

The War Hatchet Raised in Florida

The Indians threatening the Georgia frontier were the Lower 

Creeks, a faction of the Creek Nation that had fled to Florida after

being defeated in 1814. Called the Red Sticks because of their red war 

William Harris Crawford

Daniel Huntington, 1875
American Military History

162

U.S. Model 1803 Harpers Ferry Rifle

clubs, they settled in the swamps and palmetto forests along with Seminole Indians. The Seminoles were an amalgam of Indian bands mixed 

with fugitive African American slaves who had migrated from the river 

valleys of Georgia and Alabama to the protective swamps and pine 

barrens of Florida. These Indians went unrestrained by weak Spanish 

officials, shut up in their enclaves at St. Augustine on the east coast, St.

Marks in central northern Florida, and Pensacola on the west coast.

Poorly treated by settlers and U.S. government agents, these Indians were ripe for open resistance. The spark came from an unexpected 

source. The Lower Creeks and Seminoles, already suspicious and disgruntled, were encouraged to attack American settlers in Georgia by 

two British adventurers from the Bahamas. Lt. Col. Edward Nicholls 

had employed the Indians in his abortive expedition against Mobile in 

the summer of 1814 and had left them well armed when he sailed away 

to England in 1815. Another instigator was a trader, Alexander Arbuthnot. Both incited the Indians by telling them the false story that the 

southern part of Georgia, which the Creeks had surrendered in the 

treaty of 1814, had been returned to them by the Treaty of Ghent and 

thus Americans were settling on lands that belonged to the Indians.

By the fall of 1817 the U.S. Army was attempting to protect the 

settlers by reinforcing Fort Scott, a log fort built at the southwestern 

tip of Georgia where the Chattahoochee and Flint Rivers combine 

to form the Apalachicola. Flowing through Florida to the Gulf, the 

Apalachicola provided a supply route from Mobile or New Orleans to 

the fort. At the end of November 1817 an Army keelboat ascending 

the Apalachicola in advance of supply transports was attacked from the 

bank by a party of Indians who killed or captured thirty-four of the forty 

persons aboard: soldiers and wives of soldiers.

The news of the attack, reaching Washington on December 26,

1817, brought on the conflict known as the First Seminole War. Calhoun ordered General Jackson to proceed immediately from Nashville 

to Fort Scott and take command and authorized him to request additional militia in case he thought the force on the scene (800 regulars 

and about 1,000 Georgia militia) insufficient. Jackson, who had already

reported to the War Department that he was expecting trouble in Florida, “the war hatchet having been raised,” acted promptly. Calculating 

that the three-month Georgia militia might have gone home before he 

could arrive at Fort Scott, he sent out a call for 1,000 six-month volunteers from West Tennessee. Dispatching to Fort Hawkins in central 

Georgia an officer with $2,000 to buy provisions and ordering further

stores to come forward by ship from New Orleans, Jackson, escorted 

by two mounted companies, set off in advance of the troops.

Riding into Fort Hawkins on the evening of February 9, Jackson 

was enraged to discover that the contractor who had agreed to supply 

him with rations had failed to do so. For more than a thousand men, 

he reported to Calhoun, there was not “a barrel of flour or a bushel of

corn.” Procuring locally some pigs, corn, and peanuts, he kept going, 

arriving at Fort Scott on March 9. There, he learned that ships loaded 

with provisions from Mobile had come into the mouth of the Apalachicola. To Jackson it was all important to protect these boats from Indians who might attack them from the riverbank. He set off next morning 

with his Georgia militiamen and 400 regulars from Fort Scott on a proMajor General Andrew Jackson, 

President of the United States

Thomas Sully, ca. 1820, from engraving 

by James B. Longacre
toward

a professional army

163

tective march down the east bank of the Apalachicola. Six days later he 

was at the river mouth. He halted his force and ordered Lt. James Gads-

den of the Corps of Engineers to build a fort, named Fort Gadsden, for 

storing the supplies he was expecting from New Orleans.

Jackson’s supply flotilla, delayed

byagale, did not arrive until March

25. The following day he began his campaign. His objective was a large 

Indian settlement on the Suwannee River, 150 miles to the east, where 

a force of several thousand Indians and slaves under a Seminole chief, 

Billy Bowlegs, was said to be preparing for battle. Because he needed 

a supply base nearer than Fort Gadsden, he decided to take the Span-

ish fort of St. Marks on the way and arranged for the supplies to be 

brought by ship to the bay of St. Marks.

Stopping at the Ochlockonee River to make canoes for the crossing 

and farther along to clean out some Indian villages, on April 7 Jackson 

took St. Marks, in the process capturing Arbuthnot, whom he impris-

oned. In the meantime a brigade of friendly Upper Creek Indians had 

ridden up along with the first detachment of the

Tennesseevolunteers.

Because of the failure in supply, the main body of Tennesseeans did 

not catch up with Jackson until April 11, when he was well on the 

swampy trail to Bowlegs’ Town.

The campaign was something of an anticlimax. From Bowlegs’ 

Town the Indians and slaves had fled, having beenwarnedby Arbuth-

not. The only gains were corn and cattle to feed Jackson’s troops and 

the capture of a third adventurer from the Bahamas, Robert C. Ambris-

ter, who had been arming and drilling Bowlegs’ men. Ambrister was 

taken back to St. Marks and along with Arbuthnot was tried by a mili-

tary court and executed. Dismissing the Georgia militia and the Indian 

brigade, Jackson proceeded west with his regulars and Tennesseeans. 

At Fort Gadsden, early in May, he learned that Indians were assembling 

in

Pensacola. He seizedPensacola, ran up the American flag, and left

a garrison there as well as at St. Marks when he returned to Nashville 

late in May.

Jackson’s highhanded actions in the First Seminole War—his inva-

sion of Spanish territory, capture of Spanish forts, and execution of 

British subjects—might have had serious diplomatic repercussions if 

Spain or Great Britain had chosen to make an issue of them; but neither 

nation did. Negotiations with Spain for the purchase of Florida were 

already under way, and shortly after the return of the forts to Spain, the 

Adams-Onís Treaty ceded Florida to the United States in February 1819.

For the Army the most significant aspect of the

war had bee

n the

near total breakdown in the supply system. From the time Jackson rode 

out of Nashville in late

January 1818 until his first encounter with the

Indians early in April, he had had to devote all his energies to feed-

ing his troops. The principal reason for this was the failure of civil-

ian contractors. The folly of depending on civilians for so essential an 

item as rations had been amply demonstrated in the War of 1812, and 

Jackson’s experience in the First Seminole War only underscored it. At 

Calhoun’s suggestion the Congress in April 1818 required contractors 

to deliver rations in bulk at depots and provided a better system of 

Army-controlled transportation and supply methods

.

For the first time

since the Revolutionary War, the Army had a Subsistence Department, 

headed by the Commissary General of Subsistence.
American Military History

164

John C. Calhoun and the War Department

Calhoun was convinced that the American frontier ought to be 

protected by regulars rather than by the militia. Calling the militia into 

active service, he wrote Brig. Gen. Edmund P. Gaines, was “harassing 

to them and exhausting to the treasury. Protection is the first object,

and the second is protection by the regular force.” But providing a 

regular force capable of protecting the frontiers north, south, and west, 

as well as the seacoast, was another matter. In 1820 the Congress called 

upon the Secretary of War to report on a plan for the reduction of the 

Army to 6,000 men. Calhoun suggested that the reduction, if it had

to come, could be effected by cutting the enlisted personnel of each 

company to half strength. In time of war the Army could be quickly 

expanded to a force of 19,000 officers and men. This was the start of

the “expansible army” concept. 

On March 2, 1821, Congress passed the Reduction Act that cut the 

enlisted strength of the Army by half (from 11,709 to 5,586) but cut

the size of the officer corps by only a fifth (from 680 to 540). Thus,

even though the Congress had cut the end strength of the Army overall, its limited reduction of the officer corps confirmed that the idea of

an expansible army was beginning to achieve a measure of acceptance. 

Calhoun, although concerned with the drastic nature of the cuts, pronounced himself reasonably satisfied. The retention of a proportionally larger officer cadre would allow the Army to expand more rapidly

upon the approach of war. This was a key milestone on the road to 

recognizing that the Regular Army and its officer corps was the first

line of our nation’s defense rather than relying totally upon the militia 

or hastily raised, equipped, and trained volunteer units.

The Reduction Act also provided for 7 regiments of infantry and 4 

regiments of artillery instead of the existing 8 regiments of infantry, a 

rifle regiment, a regiment of light artillery, and a corps of artillery comprising 8 battalions. The Ordnance Department was staffed by artillery officers; no ordnance officers were commissioned until 1832. The

Northern and Southern Divisions were abolished and replaced by an 

Eastern and a Western Department, under the respective commands 

of Generals Scott and Gaines. Only one major general was provided. 

Because General Jackson had resigned from the Army to become Governor of Florida, the commission remained with General Brown, the 

hero of Sacket’s Harbor in the War of 1812.

To provide a senior line officer in the chain of command, lack of

which had been a serious deficiency during the War of 1812, Calhoun

brought Brown to Washington in a position that later became known 

as Commanding General of the Army. Brown held it until his death 

in 1828, when he was succeeded by Maj. Gen. Alexander Macomb. 

When Macomb died in 1841, Maj. Gen. Winfield Scott was appointed.

Made a brevet lieutenant general in 1847 (the first three-star general

since George Washington), Scott served as Commanding General of 

the Army until his retirement in 1861.

Secretary Calhoun’s administration accomplished many other 

important innovations in Army management. Beginning in mid-1822, 

recruiting depots were opened in major cities, east and west, to enlist 

men for the Army at large, not for specific units. Though regimental

The retention of a proportionally 

larger officer cadre . . . was a 

key milestone on the road to 

recognizing that the Regular 

Army and its officer corps was 

the first line of our nation’s 

defense.
toward a professional army

165

recruiting continued, the General Recruiting Service in its first three

years of operation enlisted about 68 percent more men than did the

regiments. General Scott prepared a new manual of infantry tactics for 

regulars and militia and, on the basis of his research in Paris in 1815, 

prepared the Army regulations of 1821, going minutely into every 

detail of the soldier’s life, including the ingredients of his soup. The 

first commissioned Surgeon General, Joseph Lovell, whom Calhoun

appointed, further improved the soldier’s diet. Also, by requiring daily 

weather reports from all medical officers, in an attempt to find some

correlation between weather and army diseases, Lovell provided basic 

data for the first study of weather in the United States and the most

complete data of the sort in the world.

Under Calhoun, the work of seacoast fortification went steadily

forward. By 1826 eighteen harbors and ports from the Penobscot River

to the mouth of the Mississippi had been fortified with a total of thirtyone works, generally consisting of sloping earthworks covered with 

grass and backed by stone or brick walls. By 1843 the harbor defense 

program had been extended to thirty-five or forty coastal areas with

sixty-nine fortifications either in place or under construction. By then

the War Department was placing greater emphasis on heavy artillery 

(24- and 32-lb. guns and 8-inch howitzers) to keep pace with increasingly heavy naval armaments.

Calhoun early turned his attention to the Military Academy, where 

Crawford’s attempts at rehabilitation had been impeded by controversy 

stirred up by the arbitrary actions of Superintendent Capt. Alden Partridge. After Partridge was removed and Bvt. Maj. Sylvanus Thayer was 

appointed Superintendent in July 1817, the academy became a vital 

force in maintaining a corps of professionally trained officers. The War

Department had sent Thayer to Europe in 1815 as one of the first of a

succession of Army officers sent abroad in the early nineteenth century

to study, among other things, foreign military schools. With Calhoun’s 

support, Thayer organized the West Point cadets into tactical units, created the Commandant of Cadets, improved the curriculum, and introduced new methods of instruction. Under his administration, West 

Point became the premier school for engineers in the United States. 

For his achievements during his sixteen-year superintendence, Thayer 

became known as the father of the U.S. Military Academy. 

Military education was further advanced in 1824, when, as a result 

of Calhoun’s proposal for a “school of practice” for men in service, 

Sylvanus Thayer (1785–1872)

Sylvanus Thayer, “father of the Military Academy,” became Superintendent of that struggling institution just 

nine years after graduating from it. Thayer assumed command in 1817 and instituted sweeping reforms that 

reflected lessons from his recent tour of European military academies. He introduced a strict code of discipline, 

emphasized honor and integrity, formalized and expanded the curriculum, ranked cadets within each class, 

improved the faculty, and confirmed West Point as the foremost engineering school in the nation. When Thayer 

left in 1833, the U.S. Military Academy was fully comparable to its European counterparts.
American Military History

166

the Artillery School atFortress Monroewas established. Itwas the first

of the Army’s specialist schools; but unlike most modern schools, it 

instructed not individuals but an entire unit, which was assigned there 

for a year’s tour of duty. It was closed in 1835, when all the students 

were sent to Florida to meet the threat of the Second Seminole War, 

and itwas not reopened until 1858. In 1826, the Infantry School of

Practice was established at Jefferson Barracks, Missouri. Both schools 

were major milestones in the development of a standard doctrine and 

common training regimen for the new professional army.

In 1818 Calhoun formedthefirst official andcomplete artillery

system forthethreecategories of artillery(field, siege andgarrison,

and seacoast), following recommendations by a board of artillery and 

ordnance officers he had appointedto studythe issue.The system

was base

d largely on

that offieldcarriages developedb

y

the famous

French artillerist, General Jean Baptiste de Gribeauval. During the 

next twenty years growing doubts about the Gribeauval system led 

succeeding Boards of Ordnance to recommend a newer French sys-

tem, based on that of the British, called the stock-trail because the 

carriage used a single trail of a solid block of wood rather than the 

old twin trail. It was simpler than the previous system and introduced 

interchangeability in carriages and parts. Approved by Secretary of 

War Joel R. Poinsett and adopted in 1839, the stock-trail was used in 

the Mexican War. The same board that recommended it also endorsed 

the introduction of rockets and rocket units into the U.S. Army. The 

rocket contemplated was patterned after the famous Congreve the 

British used in the War of 1812.

Pioneering in the West

In the three decades after 1815, the Army pushed westward ahead 

of the settlers, surveying, fortifying, and building roads. (Map 19) 

Stockades and forts built and garrisoned in Iowa, Nebraska, and Kan-

sas became the footholds of settlement in the wild frontier; just outside 

the walls could be found gristmills, sawmills, and blacksmith shops, all 

of them erected by the troops. Fort Leavenworth, established in 1827 

as the

first permanent for

t on the

western bank of the Missouri River,

was the main base for Army expeditions sent out along the Santa Fe 

and Oregon Trails. An important Army explorer in the 1830s, Capt. 

Benjamin L. E. Bonneville of the 7th Infantry, took a four-year leave of 

absence and made

valuable observations concerning thePacific coast.

These early expeditions were made by infantrymen using steamboats, 

wagons, and oxcarts. The expert horsemanship and tactical mobility 

of the Indians on the Great Plains also prompted the Army in 1832 

to organize its first battalion of mounted rangers.

The battalionwas

expanded the following year into a regiment of dragoons, essentially 

horse-mounted infantry, the first cavalry-type units to appear in the Regular Army since 1815.

A western man became Secretary of War in 1831. Lewis Cass, for-

mer Governor of Michigan,

was to be the first long-ter

m Secretary

since Calhoun. Lik

e Calhoun, he had hardly assumed office when an

Indian war broke out. By 1831 American emigrants pouring westward 

after the opening of the Erie Canal in 1824 were settling on Indian 
Map 19

OREGON

COUNTRY

C

A

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F

O

R

N

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Ft. Snelling

1822

Ft. Madison

1805

Ft. Edwards

1814

Ft. Leavenworth

1827

Ft. Scott

1842

Ft. Gibson

1824

Ft. Jesup

1822

Ft. Monroe Jefferson Barracks (St. Louis)

1826

Ft. Osage

(Clark)

1808

Ft. Smith

1817

Ft. Towson

1824

Ft. Washita

1842

Ft. Armstrong

1819

Ft. Atkinson

1840

Chicago

Buffalo

New York

WASHINGTON

Pensacola

New Orleans

Nacogdoches

Savannah

GA.

S.C.

N.C.

ALA.

KY.

VA.

PA.

MD.

DEL.

N.J.

N.Y.

N.H.

R.I.

ME.

MASS.

CONN.

VT.

MO.

ILL. IND.

MICH.

OHIO

ARK.

TENN.

MISS.

LA.

TEXAS

FLA.

M

E

X

I

C

O

C A N A D A

Defeat of

Black Hawk

1832

Lake Super oi r

gi hci

M

ek

a

L

na

Lake Huron

L. Erie

L O. ntar oi

Oh oi R

St.

L

wa er nce R

R

n

o

sd

u

H

Missouri R

S. P al tte R

N. Platte R

Arkansas R

M si

i s

ss

ppi

R

i

Nueces R

Rio Grande

Sabine R

Snake R

Sa

c

ra

m

e

n

t

o

R

Columbia R

Great Salt

Lake

Red R

Erie Canal

0 300 100 100 200

Miles

1815–1845

WESTWARD EXPANSION

Boundary Fixed by Treaty with Spain, 22 February 1819Territory in Dispute with Mexico,by Texas and later United StatesTerritory in Dispute betweenUnited States and Great Britain
American Military History

168

lands in western Illinois from which the Sac and Fox Indians had been 

pushed out to the prairies west of the Mississippi River. A band of 

Sac warriors under Chief Black Hawk, called the British Band because 

they had served with the British during the War of 1812, crossed the 

Mississippi in the spring of 1831 and began burning settlers’ houses. 

General Gaines, commanding the Western Department, moved in with 

a large body of regulars and volunteers; and Black Hawk retired across 

the river. But the chief returned a year later with 500 warriors and 1,500 

women and children with the intention of reestablishing his people on 

the east bank of the river.

Cass, who knew the importance of impressing the Indians with a 

show of force, ordered Col. Henry Atkinson, commanding at Jefferson Barracks, to take the field with regulars of the 6th Infantry and

told General Scott to bring about 1,000 infantry and artillery from the 

East Coast. The Governor of Illinois called out a large force of militia. (Among them was the young Abraham Lincoln, elected captain of 

his company, who later became the sixteenth President of the United 

States.) After an inconclusive brush with the Indians, most of the Illinois 

volunteers returned home. On August 2, 1832, Atkinson with 500 regulars and as many volunteers as he had been able to collect caught up with 

the Indians in southern Wisconsin at the confluence of the Bad Axe

River and the Mississippi and defeated them decisively, with the help of 

an Army steamboat carrying a 6-lb. gun firing canister. Five days after

the battle General Scott arrived, but he had with him only a remnant of 

his forces. Cholera had broken out aboard his crowded transports on the 

Great Lakes, killing or disabling one third of the force. Many others had 

deserted or could not be brought forward for fear of contagion. Nevertheless, by that time Scott’s men were no longer needed.

The Second Seminole War, 1835–1842

Early in 1832, at the direction of Secretary Cass, the U.S. Indian 

commissioner in Florida negotiated a treaty with the Seminoles, ratified

in 1834, by which the Indians would relinquish their lands in Florida 

and move to Arkansas. The deadline was eventually set at January 1, 

1836. However, many of the Indians were determined to resist what

they viewed as the theft of their lands. Long before the deadline, the 

Seminoles, led by a charismatic half-Indian named Osceola, demonstrated that they would not go peaceably. Numerous sugar plantations 

in north and central Florida were raided and burned. These outbreaks 

of violence led the Army to reinforce Fort Brooke on Tampa Bay and 

Fort King, near present-day Ocala in central Florida, about a hundred 

miles to the northeast. By December 1835, nine companies of artillery 

and two of infantry—five hundred thirty-six officers and men—were

in Florida under the command of Bvt. Brig. Gen. Duncan L. Clinch.

On the afternoon of December 28, 1835, Osceola with sixty warriors hidden near Fort King killed Wiley Thompson, the agent appointed 

to superintend the removal, as he was taking a walk outside the fort. 

Also killed was his dinner companion, Lt. Constantine Smith, and several nearby settlers. The same day another party of 180 warriors attacked 

a slow-moving column of 110 regulars led by Bvt. Maj. Francis L. Dade, 

about halfway between Fort Brooke and Fort King. The strung-out col- Knapsack for Volunteer Militia, ca. 1830
toward a professional army

169

umn, which included a 6-lb. cannon, was ambushed by carefully concealed Seminoles under war leaders Micanopy, Alligator, and Jumper. 

The first volley cut down Major Dade and almost half his force. The

remnant retreated under fire and hastily erected a triangular log breastwork some two hundred yards from the ambush site. The defenders 

kept shooting as long as the ammunition held out, but gradually their 

fire slackened. By late in the afternoon, the defenders were helpless

and the Indians rushed the breastworks, wielding their tomahawks and 

clubs. Only two men from the column escaped back to Fort Brooke, 

both severely wounded; and one died of his wounds within the next few 

months. The Second Seminole War had begun. (See Map 20.)

Although the Dade Massacre took place west of a line dividing 

the Eastern and Western Departments and was therefore in General 

Gaines’ department, President Andrew Jackson and Secretary Cass preferred to give the command to General Scott. Gaines, who was then on 

an inspection trip in New Orleans, was ordered to the western frontier 

of Louisiana to take command of all U.S. troops in the region adjoining 

the boundary with Texas.

General Scott left Washington on January 21, 1836. Stopping in

South Carolina and Georgia to arrange for militia and supplies and 

to set up a depot in Savannah, he did not arrive at his headquarters 

in Florida near St. Augustine until February 22. Because of logistical 

troubles and the difficulty of moving troops over primitive, unexplored

terrain to Tampa Bay (where he had planned a three-pronged offensive 

to bottle up the Seminoles in a swamp nearby), it was April 5 before he 

could begin his campaign there. By that time the Seminoles had melted 

away into the Everglades. Since hot weather had set in, the militiamen, 

whose three-month terms of service had expired, were ready to go 

home. As a South Carolina militia officer summed up the campaign,

Osceola

Osceola was born to a Red Stick Creek mother and a 

father of Scots descent. He immigrated to Florida after General Jackson’s defeat of the Red Sticks in the Creek War 

(1813–1814). In Florida, Osceola joined a Seminole Indian band 

and rose to prominence despite his non-Seminole origins. Having 

refused to sign the treaty forcing the Seminoles and other Florida 

Indians to emigrate to reservations in Arkansas, he became a 

leader of those who fought emigration. From 1835 to 1837, he 

resisted Army efforts to capture or kill him and his followers. He 

was legendary for his ability to use the swampy terrain, guerrilla tactics, and the fighting abilities of his followers to repel or 

damage larger forces. Osceola was seized in October 1837 

while negotiating under a flag of truce. Suffering from several 

illnesses, he was transported to Fort Moultrie, South Carolina, 

where he died on January 30, 1838. Osceola of Florida

George Catlin, 1838
Map 20

Suwanee R

St. John’s R

St. John’s R

Oklawaha R

A TLAN TIC OCEAN

GULF OF MEXICO

Lake George

Lake

Apopka

Lake Okeechobee

Kanapaha Prairie

Camp Island

Clinch’s Battle

Dade’s Battle

Lockahatchee

Okeechobee

Chakaika’s Island

Okeefenokee Swamp

Big Cypress Swamp

T H E

E

V E

R

G L A

D E S

Cape Florida

Ft. White

Ft. Fanning

Ft. Wacahoota

Ft. Drane

Ft. Clinch

Ft. Heilman

Ft. King

Ft. Dade

Ft. Brooke Ft. Harrison

Ft. Gardner

Ft. Bassinger Ft. Floyd

Ft. Denaud

Ft. Lauderdale

Ft. Dallas

Ft. Pierce

Ft. Mellon

Ft. Lane

Ft. Christmas

Ft. Taylor

Ft. Foster

Ft. Cummings

Jacksonville

Palatka

St. Augustine

New Smyrna

Micanopy

Okihumpky

Payne’s Landing

Volusia

Spring Garden

Charlotte Harbor

Key West

F L O R I D A

ALABAMA GEORGIA

SECOND SEMINOLE WAR

FLORIDA

1835–1842

0 10 20 30 40 50 100

Miles

Engagement

Seminole Reservation Boundary, 1823

Seminole Reservation Boundary, 1842
toward a professional army

171

“Two months were consumed in preparations and effecting nothing, 

and the third in marching to Tampa and back again.”

Though Scott’s experiences in the Second Seminole War resembled 

in some respects those of Jackson in the First Seminole War eighteen 

years before, there were two important differences. First, the logistical failure was a failure in transportation, not in supply. The depots 

had been adequately stocked; but wagons, roads, and Army maps were 

lacking. Second, General Scott had to contend with the intrusion of 

a subordinate commander, General Gaines, who disregarded orders 

and brought a large force of Louisiana militiamen from New Orleans 

by ship to Tampa Bay in February. Supplying this force with rations 

intended for Scott’s troops, Gaines fought an inconclusive battle with 

the Indians and returned to New Orleans in March.

During May General Scott at his headquarters near St. Augustine 

managed to antagonize many of the Florida settlers by accusing them 

of cowardice. He further alienated the volunteers by officially requesting the War Department in Washington that he be sent 3,000 “good 

troops (not volunteers).” Floridians burned him in effigy and cheered

when he was transferred to Georgia at the end of May to put down an 

uprising of the Creek Nation, which was threatening to spill over from 

eastern Alabama into Georgia and Florida. There, the general got into 

trouble again with Bvt. Maj. Gen. Thomas S. Jesup, in command of 

operations in Alabama. Jesup had the temerity to win a battle with the 

Indians before Scott could put his own elaborate plans into effect, to 

the latter’s great displeasure. In a letter to one of the President’s advisers, Jesup charged Scott with unnecessary delay: “the Florida scenes 

enacted all over again.”

The upshot of the controversy with Jesup was Scott’s recall to 

Washington to face a court of inquiry. The court absolved him of all 

blame for the Florida fiasco, but he did not return to the Seminole War.

Instead, he was given diplomatic missions for which he had demonstrated his ability during the South Carolina Nullification Crisis in 1833,

when he managed to strengthen the federal forts around Charleston 

without provoking hostilities. He was also successful in resolving several conflicts that broke out between American and Canadian settlers

on the northern frontier and in persuading 15,000 Cherokee Indians in 

Georgia to move west peaceably.

The war in Florida continued for six years. General Jesup, commanding from late 1836 to May 1838, was not able either to persuade

the Indians to leave Florida or to drive them out. He did, however, 

manage to drive a wedge between the Seminoles and their escaped slave 

allies and, in a major coup, to capture the Seminole leader Osceola by 

luring him into a conference under a flag of truce. Despite this treachery, however, the war dragged on. Jesup assembled a large force of 

over 4,500 regulars and 4,000 volunteers. He divided this force into 

separate columns and launched them into Seminole strongholds in 

central and southern Florida. Colonel Zachary Taylor, in command of 

one of the columns, collided with a strong and dug-in Seminole force 

of 500 warriors near Lake Okeechobee. Attacking on Christmas Day 

1837, Taylor and his column of around 1,000 men charged the Seminole positions. After several hours of intense fighting, one wing of the

Seminoles broke and retreated into the safety of the swamps. The rest 

The war in Florida continued for 

six years. General Jesup . . . was 

not able either to persuade the 

Indians to leave Florida or to 

drive them out.
American Military History

172

were then routed in one of the largest and hardest fought battles of the 

Second Seminole

War. It costTaylor 26 killed and 112wounded, while

the Seminoles lost fewer than 14; but it was still a victory for the army. 

It also earned Taylor his brevet as brigadier general.

Bvt. Brig. Gen. Zachary Taylor succeeded Jesup as overall com-

mander in Florida in May 1839. He adopted a policy of dividing the 

disaffected region into small districts and searching out the Indians 

with a pack of bloodhounds—a brief and unsuccessful experiment that 

aroused a furor in the United States. Taylor’s search-and-destroy meth-

ods might have produced results, given time, but the War Department 

insisted on another attempt at negotiation and suspended hostilities. 

The raids were resumed. Taylor asked to be relieved and was followed 

by Bvt. Brig. Gen. Walker K. Armistead, who again tried negotiation and 

failed. In May 1841 Armistead was succeeded by Col. William J. Worth, 

who brought about a radical change. Hitherto the campaign in Florida 

had been suspended during the summer season when fever and dys-

entery were prevalent. Worth campaigned throughout the summer of 

1841, preventing the Indians from raising and harvesting crops. By wag-

ing a ruthless war of extermination and by destroying food supplies and 

dwellings, he routed the Indians out of their swamps and hammocks 

and permitted

thewart

o be officially

ended inAugust 1842;though

scattered bands held out in the Everglades for years to come.

The Second Seminole War had been guerrilla warfare of a kind 

the Armywas not equippedto fight.The effort depleted theRegu-

lar Army so seriously that in July 1838 its authorized strength had to 

be increased from 7,000 to 12,500 men. About 10,000 regulars and as 

many as 30,000 short-term volunteers had been engaged from 1835 

to 1842 in one of the longest sustained campaigns fought against the 

American Indian. Almost 1,600 men had lost their lives in battle or

from disease, and about $30 million had been spent to ship 3,800 halfstarved Seminoles west. Many of the regular units that had fought in 

the war went on to Georgia and Alabama to aide in the forced removal 

of the Cherokees from their ancestral lands along the “Trail of Tears” 

to their new western reservation. This was not the last time that the 

Army was forced to be the instrument of a ruthless policy of dispos-

session directed against the American Indian.

With money and effort, the Army had bought experience, espe-

cially in transportation—the most pressing problem of the war. For 

example, the Quartermaster General had developed a light pontoon 

wagon, lined with India rubber cloth, for crossing rivers. At General 

Jesup’s request, the Secretar

y of

War revived the corps of artificers that

had been authorized for the War of 1812. It provided mechanics and 

laborers to keep wagons and boats in repair. The war also taught a great 

deal about water transportation. Before it was over, the Army was turn-

ing away from dependence on steamboats hired from private contrac-

tors to Army-owned steamboats, more reliable and cheaper in the end. 

(Contractors once again had proved unreliable partners in the military 

effort.) The problem of navigating shallow rivers was solved by build-

ing flat-bottomed bateaux.

These lessons in transportationwere to be

put to good use in the Mexican War; but the lesson that contractors 

were on the whole unreliable and corrupt had to learned and relearned 

at the Army’s expense on a regular basis.
toward a professional army

173

Westward Expansion and the Texas Issue

Army pioneering expeditions from Fort Leavenworth in the 1820s 

and 1830s had been undertaken mainly for making treaties with the 

Great Plains Indians and for protecting trading caravans. Beginning in 

the early 1840s the prime consideration was to help the American settlers pouring westward. In 1842, 2d Lt. John C. Fremont of the Corps 

of Topographical Engineers led an expedition to explore and map the 

Platte River country for the benefit of emigrants moving over the Oregon Trail; his second expedition in 1843 reached Sacramento in Upper 

California.

In 1842 Fremont reported seeing emigrant parties of 64 men with

16 or 17 families. Three years later, when Col. Stephen W. Kearny

marched five companies of the 1st Dragoons over the Oregon Trail

primarily for the protection of the emigrants, he saw on the trail 850 

men and about 475 families in long caravans followed by thousands of 

cattle. The trickle had begun to turn into a flood.

Some of the pioneers on the Oregon Trail settled in Upper California; but the main stream of American migration into Mexican territory flowed to Texas. Between 1825 and 1830, approximately 15,000

immigrants with several thousand African American slaves poured into 

Texas. In March of 1836 they proclaimed their independence from

Mexico. The Mexicans, under General Antonio 

Lopez de Santa Ana, moved against the rebels and 

destroyed the garrison in the Alamo after a siege 

that lasted thirteen days. American volunteers 

rushed across the Sabine River to help the Texans. 

General Gaines, stationed on the western frontier 

of Louisiana to defend Louisiana and maintain 

American neutrality, was authorized to cross the 

Sabine River (generally regarded as the boundary 

line) but not to go beyond Nacogdoches, fifty miles

west of the Sabine, which marked the extreme limit 

of American claims. He was at the Sabine when 

Maj. Gen. Sam Houston won his victory over Santa 

Ana at San Jacinto on April 21, 1836. Fired by wild

rumors of Mexican reinforcements, Gaines crossed 

the Sabine with a force of regulars and in July occupied Nacogdoches, remaining there until recalled in 

December 1836.

For nearly ten years Texas existed as an 

independent nation, desiring annexation to the 

United States but frustrated because annexation had become tied up with the slavery controversy. Northerners saw annexation as an 

attempt by the South to extend slavery. During this decade Mexico, refusing to recognize 

Texan independence, made sporadic attempts 

to recover its lost province. Raids marked by 

the extreme ruthlessness and ferocity of both 

Texans and Mexicans kept the country along 

the border in constant turmoil.

On Stone, A. Koellner. This lithograph shows the full dress of an officer 

in the Dragoon Corps, ca. 1841.
American Military History

174

The Professional Officer

The exploration of the West and the Seminole and Creek Wars 

severely tested the fledgling U.S. Army. The Army’s organization fluctuated according to the political winds of the time with only a slowly 

evolving sense by the nation’s leaders that a standing professional Army 

was essential for national security. Problems in supply, training, equipment, and pay were only painfully sorted out under the press of circumstances. Central to solving these problems was the slow but steady 

evolution of a professional officer corps. This growth can in no small

measure be attributed to the quality of new officers emerging from

the U.S. Military Academy. Year after year young cadets were tested 

and trained to increasingly rigorous standards and commissioned to 

take their places as professional officers. Their training as professional

engineers as well marked them as valuable commodities in civilian life; 

and whether they remained in the Army for a career or fulfilled their

obligation and left the service, they contributed to the Army and to the 

society as a whole. 

Tested in combat in the Seminole Wars, placed in charge of a 

small team of explorers, charged with building a road or dredging a 

harbor, Army officers developed a strong sense of corporate identity

that bound them closer and closer together as a distinct entity within 

society. They developed professional codes of standards, behavior and 

ethics that provided a self-policing mechanism essential to any profession. As they moved, often with their families, from post to post on 

the expanding frontiers of the country, they turned inward to their 

own community to build a support structure of obedience, duty, and 

honor. Common opportunities for training, starting at West Point and 

continuing at the various branch schools, when coupled with shared 

experience in combat or at isolated military posts, bred an increasing 

identification with an officer class. The officer corps was beginning to

view itself as a distinct entity within the Army and the nation. These 

officers soon found themselves thrown together and tested again in

the fire of battle upon the outbreak of war with Mexico. The war

would see West Point–trained officers clearing the path into Mexico

City as the nation again called upon the Army to lead the way into new 

lands.

Stephen Watts Kearny

(1794–1848)

Kearny served in the Army from the War of 1812 through his 

death in 1848. He served with the 1st Dragoons from its formation 

in 1833 through the Mexican War. Well-liked and respected by 

his men, Kearny is known to some as the father of U.S. Cavalry. He 

protected pioneers traveling on the Santa Fe, Mormon, and Oregon 

Trails and gained fame for his western explorations and his heroic 

service during the War with Mexico.
toward a professional army

175

Discussion Questions

1. Discuss the importance of the U.S. Military Academy at West 

Point to the Army of the early nineteenth century. In what sense did 

the U.S. Army become more professional during this period? What 

reforms contributed to this result? 

2. The wars against the Seminoles lasted for years and took thousands of troops to subdue and remove a relative handful of Indians. 

Why did this take so long? Which tactics worked and which did not?

3. What were the major roles and missions of the Army in the 

early settlement of the West from 1815 to 1845? How effective was the 

Army in performing these missions?

4. What was the “expansible army” policy proposed by Secretary of 

War Calhoun? To what degree do we have an expansible army today? 

What were some alternatives to this idea in the nineteenth and twentieth 

centuries?

5. What were the advantages and disadvantages of using contractors to provide military support such as rations, clothing, transportation, and other services during this period? Why was the Army so slow 

to develop its own internal logistics capability?

6. Compare and contrast the Army on the eve of the War of 1812

to the Army on the eve of the war with Mexico. What were the similarities and differences? What factors accounted for the changes?

Recommended Readings

Coffman, Edward. The Old Army: A Portrait of the American Army in 

Peacetime, 1784–1898. New York: Oxford University Press, 1986.

Johnson, Timothy. Winfield Scott: The Quest for Military Glory. Lawrence: 

University Press of Kansas, 1998.

Mahon, John K. History of the Second Seminole War, 1839–1842. Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1985.

Morrison, James L., Jr. “The Best School in the World”: West Point, The 

Pre–Civil War Years, 1833–1866. Kent, Ohio: Kent State University 

Press, 1986.

Prucha, Francis P. The Sword of the Republic: The United States Army on the 

Frontier, 1783–1846. New York: Macmillan, 1969.

Remini, Robert V. Andrew Jackson and the Course of American Empire, 

1761–1821. New York: Harper & Row, 1977.

Skelton, William B. An American Profession of Arms: The Army Officer 

Corps, 1784–1861. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1992.

Other Readings

Browning, Robert S. Two If By Sea: The Development of American Coastal 

Defense Policy. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1983.

Goetzmann, William H. Army Exploration in the American West 1803–

1863. Austin: Texas State Historical Association, 1991.
American Military History

176

Sprague, John T. The Origin, Progress, and Conclusion of the Florida War.

Tampa, Fla.: University of Tampa Press, 2000.

Walton, George H. Sentinel of the Plains: Fort Leavenworth and the American 

West. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1973.
Receiving by the new telegraph the news that James K. Polk had 

been elected to the Presidency in November 1844, President 

John Tyler interpreted the verdict as a mandate from the people 

for the annexation of Texas, since Polk had come out strongly in favor 

of annexation. On March 1, 1845, Congress jointly resolved to admit 

Texas into the Union and the Mexican Government promptly broke 

off diplomatic relations. President Polk continued to hope that he 

could settle by negotiation Mexico’s claim to Texas and acquire Upper 

California by purchase as well. In mid-June, nevertheless, anticipating 

Texas’ Fourth of July acceptance of annexation, he ordered Bvt. Brig. 

Gen. Zachary Taylor to move his forces from Fort Jesup on the Louisiana border to a point “on or near” the Rio Grande to repel any invasion 

from Mexico.

The Period of Watchful Waiting

General Taylor selected a wide sandy plain at the mouth of 

the Nueces River near the hamlet of Corpus Christi and beginning 

July 23 sent most of his 1,500-man force by steamboat from New 

Orleans. Only his dragoons moved overland, via San Antonio. By midOctober, as shipments of regulars continued to come in from all over 

the country, his forces had swollen to nearly 4,000, including some volunteers from New Orleans. This force constituted nearly 50 percent of 

the 7,365-strong Regular Army. A company of Texas Rangers served as

the eyes and ears of the Army. For the next six months tactical drilling, 

horse breaking, and parades, interspersed with boredom and dissipation, went on at the big camp on the Nueces. Then in February Taylor 

received orders from Washington to advance into disputed territory 

to the Rio Grande. Negotiations with the Mexican government had 

broken down.

8

The Mexican War

and After
American Military History

178

The march of more than a hundred miles down the coast to the 

Rio Grande was led by Bvt. Maj. Samuel Ringgold’s battery of “flying

artillery,” organized in late 1838 on orders from Secretary of War Joel 

R. Poinsett. It was the last word in mobility, for the cannoneers rode on 

horseback rather than on limbers and caissons. Taylor’s supply train of 

300 ox-drawn wagons brought up the rear. On March 23 the columns 

came to a road that forked left to Point Isabel, ten miles away on the 

coast, where Taylor’s supply ships were waiting, and led on the right to 

his destination on the Rio Grande, eighteen miles southwest, opposite 

the Mexican town of Matamoros. Sending the bulk of his army ahead, 

Taylor went to Point Isabel to set up his supply base, fill his wagons,

and bring forward four 18-lb. siege guns from his ships.

At the boiling brown waters of the Rio Grande opposite Matamoros, Taylor built a strong fort, which he called Fort Texas, and mounted 

his siege guns. At the same time he sent messages of peace to the Mexican commander on the opposite bank. These were countered by threats 

and warnings and on April 25, the day after the arrival at Matamoros of 

General Mariano Arista with two or three thousand additional troops, 

by open hostilities. The Mexicans crossed the river in some force and 

attacked a reconnoitering detachment of sixty dragoons under Capt. 

Seth B. Thornton. They killed eleven men and captured Thornton and 

the rest, many of whom were wounded.

Taylor reported to President Polk that hostilities had commenced 

and called on Texas and Louisiana for about 5,000 militiamen. His 

immediate concern was that his supply base might be captured. Leaving 

an infantry regiment and a small detachment of artillery at Fort Texas 

under Maj. Jacob Brown, he set off May 1 with the bulk of his forces 

for Point Isabel, where he stayed nearly a week strengthening his fortifications. After loading two hundred supply wagons and acquiring two

more ox-drawn 18-pounders, he began the return march to Fort Texas 

with his army of about 2,300 men on the afternoon of May 7. About 

noon the next day, near a clump of tall trees at a spot called Palo Alto, 

he saw across the open prairie a long dark line with bayonets and lances 

glistening in the sun. It was the Mexican Army.

Battles of Palo Alto and Resaca de la Palma

Containing some of the best regular units in the Mexican Army, 

General Arista’s forces barring the road to Fort Texas stretched out on 

Bragg, Lee, Grant, and Davis in the Mexican War

For the first time in the Mexican War, graduates of the U.S. Military Academy held a majority of 

field and staff officer positions. General Scott later commented that without these officers the war 

would have lasted longer and been much more costly. The West Pointers vindicated themselves and 

the academy in the eyes of many average Americans. The Mexican War also proved to be a training ground for men like Braxton Bragg, Robert E. Lee, Ulysses S. Grant, and Jefferson Davis, who 

thirteen years after the conflict in Mexico led large armies during the American Civil War.
the mexican war and after

179

a front a mile long and were about 4,000 strong. Taylor, who had placed 

part of his force in the rear to guard the supply wagons, was outnumbered at least two to one; and in terrain that favored cavalry, Arista’s 

cavalry overwhelmingly outnumbered Taylor’s dragoons. On the plus 

side for the Americans, their artillery was superior. Also, among Taylor’s junior officers were a number of capable West Point graduates,

notably 2d Lt. George C. Meade and 2d Lt. Ulysses S. Grant, who were 

to become famous in the Civil War.

On the advice of the young West Pointers on his staff, Taylor 

emplaced his two 18-lb. iron siege guns in the center of his line and 

blasted the advancing Mexicans with canister. His field artillery—

bronze 6-lb. guns firing solid shot and 12-lb. howitzers firing shell, in

quick-moving attacks threw back Arista’s flanks. The Mexicans were

using old-fashioned bronze 4-pounders and 8-pounders that fired solid

shot and had such short ranges that their fire did little damage. During

the battle Lieutenant Grant saw their cannon balls striking the ground 

before they reached the American troops and ricocheting so slowly that 

the men could dodge them.

During the afternoon a gun wad set the dry grass afire, causing

the battle to be suspended for nearly an hour. After it resumed, the 

Mexicans fell back rapidly. By nightfall, when both armies went into 

bivouac, Mexican casualties, caused mostly by cannon fire, numbered

320 killed and 380 wounded. Taylor lost only 9 men killed and 47 

wounded. One of the mortally wounded was his brilliant artilleryman, 

Major Ringgold.

At daybreak the Americans saw the Mexicans in full retreat. Taylor decided to pursue but did not begin his advance until afternoon, 

spending the morning erecting defenses around his wagon train, which 

he intended to leave behind. About two o’clock he reached Resaca de 

la Palma, a dry riverbed about five miles from Palo Alto. There, his

scouts reported that the Mexicans had taken advantage of his delay to 

entrench themselves strongly a short distance down the road in a similar shallow ravine known as Resaca de la Guerra, whose banks formed 

a natural breastwork. Narrow ponds and thick chaparral protected 

their flanks.

Taylor sent forward his flying artillery, now commanded by Lt.

Randolph Ridgely. Stopped by a Mexican battery, Ridgely sent back for 

help; Taylor ordered in a detachment of dragoons under Capt. Charles 

A. May. The dragoons overran the Mexican guns but on their return 

were caught in infantry crossfire from the thickets and could not prevent the enemy from recapturing the guns. American infantrymen later 

captured the pieces. Dense chaparral prevented Taylor from making 

full use of his artillery. The battle of Resaca de la Palma was an infantry 

battle of small-unit actions and close-in, hand-to-hand fighting.

The Mexicans, still demoralized by their defeat at Palo Alto and 

lacking effective leadership, gave up the fight and fled toward Matamoros. Their losses at Resaca de la Palma were later officially reported

as 547 but may have been greater. The Americans lost 33 killed and 

89 wounded. In the meantime, Fort Texas had been attacked by the 

Mexicans on May 3 and had withstood a two-day siege with the loss of 

only two men, one of them its commander for whom the fort was later 

renamed Fort Brown.

Lieutenant Grant saw their 

cannon balls striking the ground 

before they reached the 

American troops and ricocheting 

so slowly that the men could 

dodge them.
American Military History

180

The panic-stricken Mexicans fleeing to Matamoros crossed the Rio

Grande as best they could, some by boats, some by swimming. Many 

drowned; others were killed by the guns of Fort Texas. If Taylor’s regulars, flush with victory and yelling as they pursued the enemy, had been

able to catch up with Arista, they could probably have taken his demoralized army, complete with guns and ammunition. But Taylor had failed 

to make any provision for crossing the Rio Grande. He blamed the War 

Department’s failure to provide him with pontoon equipment (developed during the Second Seminole War), which he had requested while 

he was still at Corpus Christi. Since that time, however, he had done 

nothing to acquire bridge materials or boats, although the West Pointers had urged him to do so. Lieutenant Meade reported that “the old 

gentleman would never listen or give it a moment’s attention.” Not until 

May 18, after Taylor had brought up some boats from Point Isabel, was 

he able to cross into Matamoros. By that time Arista’s army had pulled 

back into the interior to rest, recoup, and fight another day.

War Is Declared

On the evening of May 9, the day of the battle of Resaca de la 

Palma, President Polk received a message from the War Department 

that informed him of the attack on Captain Thornton’s detachment on 

April 25. Polk, already convinced by the breakdown in negotiations with 

Mexico that war was justified, immediately drafted a message declaring

that a state of war existed between the United States and Mexico. Congress passed the declaration, and Polk signed it on May 13. Congress 

then appropriated $10 million and substantially increased the strength 

of the Army. (After the Second Seminole War the authorized strength 

had been cut from 12,500 to 8,500. This had been done by reducing 

the rank and file strength of the regiments, instead of eliminating units,

thus firmly establishing the principle of an expansible Army.) Congress

raised the authorized enlisted strength of a company from 64 to 100

men, bringing the rank and file up to 15,540, and added a regiment of

mounted riflemen and a company of sappers, miners, and pontoniers

(engineers for pontoon bridges). Also, the President was authorized to 

call for 50,000 volunteers for a term of one year or the duration of the 

war.

The President went into the war with one object clearly in view—

to seize all of Mexico north of the Rio Grande and the Gila River and 

westward to the Pacific. After his discussions with Maj. Gen. Winfield

Scott, the outlines of a three-pronged thrust emerged. (Map 21) General Taylor was to advance westward from Matamoros to the city of 

Monterrey, the key to further progress in northern Mexico. A second 

expedition under Brig. Gen. John E. Wool was to move from San Antonio to the remote city of Chihuahua in the west, an expedition later 

directed southward to Saltillo near Monterrey. A third prong under Col. 

Stephen W. Kearny was to start at Fort Leavenworth, capture Santa Fe 

and ultimately continue to San Diego on the coast of California. Part 

of Kearny’s forces under volunteer Col. Alexander W. Doniphan later 

marched south through El Paso to Chihuahua. Although small in numbers, only 1,600 strong, Kearny’s and Doniphan’s forces posed strategic

threats to Mexico’s northern states.

The President went into the war 

with one object clearly in view—

to seize all of Mexico north of the 

Rio Grande and the Gila River 

and westward to the Pacific.
the mexican war and after

181

Polk was counting on “a brisk and a short war”; not until July did 

he and his Secretary of War, William L. Marcy, even begin to consider 

the possibility of an advance on Mexico City by landing a force on the 

Gulf of Mexico near Vera Cruz. General Scott was not so optimistic. 

He was more aware of the problems of supply, transportation, communications, and mobilization involved in operations against Mexico, 

a country with a population of 7 million and an army of about 30,000, 

many with experience gained by twenty years of intermittent revolution. Scott’s preparations seemed too slow to Polk. Ostensibly for that 

reason, but also because success in the field might make the politically motivated Scott a powerful contender for the Presidency, Polk 

decided not to give him command of the forces in the field. When

news came of the victories at Palo Alto and Resaca de la Palma, Polk 

promoted Zachary Taylor to the brevet rank of major general and gave 

Map 21

19–20 Aug 1847

Contreras

8 Sep 1847

Molino del Rey

20 Aug 1847

Churubusco

13 Sep 1847

Chapultepec

18 Apr 1847

Cerro Gordo

9–28 Mar 1847 Vera Cruz

8 May 1846

Palo Alto

9 May 1846

Resaca de la Palma

21–23 Sep 1846 Monterrey

22–23 Feb 1847

Buena Vista

6 Dec 1846

San Pascual

UPPER

CALIFORNIA

L O W E R

C A L I F O R N I A

Pt. Isabel

Lobos I.

K E A R N Y

1 8 4 6

D O N I P H A N 1 8 4 7

W O O L 1 8 4 6

S

C

O

T

T 1 8 4 7

TAYLOR

1846

Nueces River

Rio Grande

Sabine River

Brazos River

Gila River

P A

C I F I C

O

C

E

A

N

Ft. Jesup

Ft. Brown

TEXA S

ARK.

LA.

MEXICO

San Antonio

Camargo

Corpus Christi

Matamoros Saltillo

Parras

Victoria

Tampico

Vera Cruz

Jalapa Mexico City

Puebla

San Luis Potosí

San Diego

El Paso del Norte

Santa Fe

Chihuahua

0 100 200 300

Miles

1846–1847

THE MEXICAN WAR

Axis of U.S. Advance

High Ground Above 6000 Feet
American Military History

182

him command of the army in Mexico, risking the possibility that Taylor 

might also use

a victory to vault into high political office.

Monterrey Campaign

Taylor’s planwas to move on Monterrey with about 6,000 men via

Camargo, a small town on the San Juan River, a tributary of the Rio 

Grande about 130 miles upriver. From Camargo, where he intended to 

set up a supply base, a road led southwest about 125 miles to Monterrey 

in the foothills of the Sierra Madres. His troops were to march overland 

to Camargo, his supplies to come by steamboat up the Rio Grande. 

But he could not move immediately because he lacked transportation—

partly because of his failure to requisition in time and partly because 

of the effort required to build more wagons in the United States and to 

collect shallow-draft steamboats at river towns on the Mississippi and 

the Ohio and send them across the Gulf of Mexico. Ten steamboats 

were in operation at the end of July, but wagons did not begin arriv-

ing until November, after the campaign was over. To supplement his 

wagon train, reduced to 175, Taylor had to rely on 1,500 Mexican pack 

mules and a few native oxcarts.

In manpower Taylor had an embarrassment of riches. May saw 

the arrival of the first of thethree-month militia he had requested on

April 26 fromthegovernors ofTexas and Louisiana. Withthem came

thousands of additional six-month volunteers from neighboring states 

recruited by Bvt. Maj. Gen. Edmund P. Gaines, commander of the 

Department of the West, on his own initiative—a repetition of his 

impulsive actions during the Second Seminole War. More than 8,000 

of these short-term volunteers were sent before Gaines was censured 

by a court-martial for his unauthorized and illegal recruiting practices 

and transferred to New York to command the Department of the East. 

Very few of his recruits had agreed to serve for twelve months. All the 

rest were sent home without performing any service; in the meantime 

they had to be fed, sheltered, and transported. In June the volunteers 

authorized by Congress began pouring into Point Isabel and were quar-

tered in a string of camps along the Rio Grande as far as Matamoros.

By August Taylor had a force of about 15,000 men at Camargo, 

an unhealthy town deep in mud from recent heavy rains and sweltering 

under heat that rose as high as 112 degrees. Many of the volunteers 

became ill, and more than half were left behind when Taylor advanced 

toward Monterrey at the end of August with 3,080 regulars and 3,150 

volunteers. The regulars with a few volunteers were organized into the 

First and Second Divisions, the volunteers mainly into a Field Divi-

sion, though two regiments of mounted Texans were thought of as the 

Texas Division. More than a fourth of the troops were mounted, among 

them the First Mississippi Rifle

Regiment underaWestPointgraduate

recently elected to Congress, Col.Jefferson Davis.The mounted rifle-

men had percussion rifles; the infantrymenwere armed with flintloc

k

smoothbore muskets. Taylor placed great reliance on the bayonet. He 

had

a lo

w opinion of artillery, and though

warned that field pieceswere

not effective against the stone houses of Mexican towns, he had in 

addition to his four field batteries only two 24-lb. howitzers and one

10-inch mortar, the latter his only real siege piece.
the mexican war and after

183

By September 19 Taylor’s army reached Monterrey, a well-fortified

city in a pass of the Sierra Madres leading to the city of Saltillo. Monterrey was strongly defended by more than 7,000 Mexicans with better 

artillery than the Mexicans had had at Palo Alto—new British 9- and 

12-lb. guns. Taylor, encamped on the outskirts of Monterrey, sent out 

reconnoitering parties accompanied by engineers and on September 20 

began his attack. On the north the city was protected by a formidable 

citadel, on the south by a river; and it was ringed with forts. Taylor sent 

one of his regular divisions, with 400 Texas Rangers in advance, around 

to the west to cut off the road to Saltillo; and after a miserable night of 

drenching rain it accomplished its mission the next day, September 21, 

though at a cost of 394 dead or wounded, a high proportion of them 

officers. Taylor placed his heavy howitzers and one mortar in position

to fire on the citadel and sent the remainder of his forces to close in

from the eastern outskirts of the town. By the third day both attacks 

were driving into the city proper, the men battering down doors of 

the stone and adobe houses with planks, tossing lighted shells through 

apertures, and advancing from house to house rather than from street 

to street—tactics that were to be used a century later by American 

troops in Italian and German towns.

The climax came when the 10-inch mortar was brought up to lob 

shells on the great plaza into which the Mexican troops had been driven. 

On September 24 the Mexican commander offered to surrender on 

condition that his troops be allowed to withdraw unimpeded and that 

an eight-week armistice go into effect. Taylor agreed to the proposal. 

He had lost some 800 men to battle casualties and sickness, besides 

quantities of arms and ammunition, and he was about 125 miles from 

his base. Moreover, he believed that magnanimity would advance the 

negotiations for peace that had begun when President Polk allowed 

General Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna to return to Mexico from exile 

in Havana to exert his influence in favor of a treaty.

When Polk received the news from Monterrey by courier October 

11, he condemned Taylor for allowing the Mexican Army to escape 

and ordered the armistice terminated. On November 13 Taylor sent 

a thousand men 68 miles southwest to occupy Saltillo, an important

road center commanding the only road to Mexico City from the north 

that was practicable for wagons and guns. Saltillo also commanded the 

road west to Chihuahua and east to Victoria, capital of Tamaulipas, the 

province that contained Tampico, the second largest Mexican port on 

the gulf. The U.S. Navy captured Tampico November 15. On the road 

to Chihuahua was the town of Parras, where General Wool’s expedition of about 2,500 men arrived early in December after a remarkable 

march from San Antonio. On the way Wool had learned that the Mexican troops holding Chihuahua had abandoned it; accordingly, he joined 

Taylor’s main army. Taylor thus acquired a valuable West Point–trained 

engineer officer who had been scouting with Wool, Capt. Robert E.

Lee.

Taylor was planning to establish a strong defensive line, ParrasSaltillo-Monterrey-Victoria, when he learned that most of his troops 

would have to be dispatched to join General Scott’s invasion of Mexico 

at Vera Cruz, an operation that had been decided upon in Washington in mid-November. Scott arrived in Mexico in late December. He 

Both attacks were driving into 

the city proper, the men . . . 

advancing from house to house 

rather than from street to 

street—tactics that were to be 

used a century later by American 

troops in Italian and German 

towns.
American Military History

184

proceeded to Camargo and detached almost all of Taylor’s regulars, 

about 4,000, and an equal number of volunteers, ordering them to rendezvous at Tampico and at the mouth of the Brazos River in Texas. 

Taylor, left with fewer than 7,000 men, all volunteers except two squadrons of dragoons and a small force of artillery, was ordered to evacuate 

Saltillo and go on the defensive at Monterrey.

Enraged, Taylor attributed Scott’s motive to politics. Hurrying back 

to Monterrey from Victoria, he decided to interpret Scott’s orders as 

“advice” rather than as an order. Instead of retiring his forces to Monterrey, he moved 4,650 of his troops (leaving garrisons at Monterrey

and Saltillo) to a point eighteen miles south of Saltillo, near the hacienda 

of Agua Nueva. This move brought him almost eleven miles closer to 

San Luis Potosi, 200 miles to the south, where General Santa Anna was 

assembling an army of 20,000. Most of the 200 miles were desert, which 

Taylor considered impassable by any army; moreover, both he and Scott 

believed that Santa Anna would make his main effort against Scott’s 

landing at Vera Cruz, the news of which had leaked to the newspapers. 

On February 8, 1847, Taylor wrote a friend, “I have no fears.”

At the time he wrote, Santa Anna was already on the march north 

toward Saltillo. Stung by newspaper reports that he had sold out to the 

Americans, Santa Anna risked a daring strategic move. He was determined to win a quick victory, and he thought he saw his opportunity 

when his troops brought him a copy of Scott’s order depleting Taylor’s 

forces, found on the body of a messenger they had ambushed and 

killed. Leading his army across barren country through heat, snow, and 

rain, by February 19 Santa Anna had 15,000 men at a hacienda at the 

edge of the desert, only thirty-five miles from Agua Nueva. One of the

hardest fought battles of the Mexican War was about to begin.

Battle of Buena Vista

On the morning of February 21 scouts brought word to General 

Taylor that a great Mexican army was advancing, preceded by a large 

Gen’ Scott’s Entrance into Mexico, C. Nebel, ca. 1855
the mexican war and after

185

body of cavalry swinging east to block the road between Agua Nueva 

and Saltillo. That afternoon Taylor withdrew his forces up the Saltillo 

road about 15 miles to a better defensive position near the hacienda 

Buena Vista, a few miles south of Saltillo. There, a mile south of the 

clay-roofed ranch buildings, mountain spurs came down to the road 

on the east, the longest and highest known as La Angostura; between 

them was a wide plateau cut by two deep ravines. West of the road was 

a network of gullies backed by a line of high hills. Leaving General 

Wool to deploy the troops, Taylor rode off to Saltillo to look after his 

defenses there.

By next morning, Washington’s Birthday (the password was 

“Honor to Washington”), the little American army of fewer than 5,000 

troops, most of them green volunteers, was in position to meet a Mexi-

can army more than three times its size. The American main body was 

east of the road near La Angostura, where artillery had been emplaced, 

commanding the road. West of the road, the gullies were thought to be 

sufficient protection.

Santa Anna arrived with his vanguard around eleven o’clock. Dis-

liking the terrain, which by no means favored cavalry (the best units in 

his army), he sent a demand for surrender to Taylor, who had returned 

from Saltillo. Taylor refused. Then Santa Anna planted artillery on the 

road and the high ground east of it and sent a force of light infantry 

around the foot of the mountains south of the plateau. About three 

o’clock a shell from a Mexican howitzer on the road gave the signal for 

combat; but the rest of the day was consumed mainly in jockeying for 

position on the mountain spurs, a competition in which the Mexicans 

came off best, and the placing of American infantry and artillery well 

forward on the plateau. After a threatening movement on the Mexican 

left, Taylor sent a Kentucky regiment with two guns of Maj. Braxton 

Bragg’s Regular Army battery to the high hills west of the road, but 

no attack occurred there. Toward evening Taylor returned to Saltillo, 

accompanied

b

y the First Mississippi Rifles and

a detachment of dra-

goons. At nightfall his soldiers, shaken by the size and splendid appear-

ance of the Mexican army, got what sleep they could.

The next day, February 23, the battle opened in earnest at dawn. 

Santa Anna sent a division up the road toward La Angostura, at the 

head of the defile; but American artillery and infantrymen quickly

broke it, and no further action occurred in that sector. The strongest 

assault took place on the plateau, well to the east, where Santa Anna 

launched two divisions, backed by a strong battery at the head of the 

southernmost ravine. The Americans farthest forward, part of an Indi-

ana regiment supported by three cannons, held off the assault for half 

an hour; then their commander gave them an order to retreat. They 

broke and ran and

were joined in their flightby adjoining regiments.

Some of the men ran all theway back to Buena Vista, where they fired

at pursuing Mexican cavalrymen from behind the hacienda walls.

About nine o’clock that morning, when the battle had become 

almost a rout, General Taylor arrived from Saltillo with his dragoons, 

Colonel Davis’ Mississippi Rifles, and some men of the Indiana regi

-

ment whom he had rallied on the way. They fell upon the Mexican 

cavalry that had been trying

t

o outflank the Americans north of the

plateau. In the meantime Bragg’s artillery had come over from the hills 
American Military History

186

west of the road, and the Kentucky regiment also crossed the road to 

join in the fight. A deafening thunderstorm of rain and hail broke early

in the afternoon, but the Americans in the north field continued to

force the Mexicans back.

Just when victory for the Americans seemed in sight, Santa Anna 

threw an entire division of fresh troops, his reserves, against the plateau. Rising from the broad ravine where they had been hidden, the 

Mexicans of the left column fell upon three regiments—two Illinois 

and one Kentucky—and forced them back to the road with withering 

fire, while the right stormed the weak American center. They seemed

about to turn the tide of battle when down from the north field galloped two batteries, followed by the Mississippians and Indianans led 

by Jefferson Davis, wounded but still in the saddle. They fell upon the 

Mexicans’ right and rear and forced them back into the ravine. The 

Mexicans’ left, pursuing the Illinois and Kentucky regiments up the 

road, was cut to pieces by the American battery at La Angostura.

That night Santa Anna, having lost 1,500 to 2,000 men killed and 

wounded, retreated toward San Luis Potosi. The Americans, with 264

men killed, 450 wounded, and 26 missing, had won the battle. A great

share of the credit belonged to the artillery; without it, as General Wool 

said in his report, the army could not have stood “for a single hour.” 

Moving with almost the speed of cavalry, the batteries served as rallying 

points for the infantry. The fighting spirit of the volunteers and the able

and courageous leadership of the officers were beyond praise. Perhaps

the greatest contribution to the victory had been Zachary Taylor himself. Stationed all day conspicuously in the center of the battle, hunched 

on his horse “Old Whitey” with one leg hooked over the pommel of 

his saddle, disregarding two Mexican bullets that ripped through his 

coat, and occasionally rising in his stirrups to shout encouragement, he 

was an inspiration to his men, who swore by him. Under such a leader 

they felt that defeat was impossible.

Taylor knew little of the art of war. He was careless in preparing 

for battle and neglected intelligence; he often misunderstood the intention of the enemy and underestimated the enemy’s strength. But he 

possessed a high degree of physical and moral courage, which according to Jomini are the most essential qualities for a general. He constantly sought to regain the initiative by attacking the enemy. He and his 

subordinates used the principle of the offensive to turn the tide of the 

battle several times by the end of the long day.

Buena Vista ended any further Mexican threat against the lower 

Rio Grande. On the Pacific coast, Colonel Kearny led one of the most

extraordinary marches in American history, across deserts and rugged 

mountains. His force left Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, on June 2, 1846,

and headed for California via the Santa Fe Trail. After capturing Santa 

Fe without firing a shot on August 18, he continued his march to the

west. Convinced through an erroneous intelligence report from “Kit” 

Carson that California had already fallen to U.S. forces, Kearny left most 

of his forces in Santa Fe and continued on to California with a single 

dragoon company. He marched his men nearly 1,000 miles over snowcapped mountains and through desolate, snake-infested deserts. After 

finally reaching California on December 4, the exhausted dragoons

were reinforced by thirty-five marines. Learning that the Californios, or

A high degree of physical and 

moral courage . . . according 

to Jomini are the most essential 

qualities for a general.
the mexican war and after

187

native Mexican population, were in revolt, Kearny attacked a force of 

seventy-five Californios at San

Pascual two days later to assist the belea-

guered American garrison at San Diego. Kearny’s dragoons took heavy 

losses against the skilled Californio lancers, but they withdrew before 

crushing Kearny’s force. After relieving the garrison at San Diego, 

Kearny joined other U.S. forces in the region to recapture Los Angeles. 

On January 8, 1847, a joint force of sailors, marines, and dragoons 

under Kearny engaged 350 Californios at the San Gabriel River, south 

of Los Angeles. After a brief but hard-fought battle, the Californios 

withdrew and formally capitulated on January 13.

Early in February 1847 a force of Missouri volunteers detached 

from Kearny’s command and led by Colonel Doniphan had set out 

from Santa Fe to pacify the region of the upper Rio Grande. Crossing 

the river at El Paso, they defeated a large force of Mexicans, mostly 

militia, at Chihuahua, less than a week after Taylor’s victory at Buena 

Vista. Thus by March 1847, America’s hold on Mexico’s northern prov-

inces was secure. All that remained to complete the victory was the 

capture of Mexico City.

The Landing at Vera Cruz

Froma rendezvous at Lobos Island almost fifty miles south of

Tampico, General Scott’s force of 13,660 men, of whom 5,741were

regulars, set sail on March 2, 1847, for the landing near Vera Cruz—the 

first major amphibious landing in the history of theU.S. Army. On

March 5 the transports were off the coast of their target, where they 

met a U.S. naval squadron blockading the city. In a small boat, Scott, his 

commanders, and

a party of officers including Lee

, Meade,

Joseph E.

Johnston, and Pierre G. T. Beauregard ran close inshore to reconnoiter 

and

were almost hitb

y

a shell fired from the island fortress of SanJuan

de Ulua opposite Vera Cruz. That shell might have changed the course 

of the Mexican War and the Civil War as well.

Scott chose for the landing a beach nearly three miles south of the 

city, beyond the range of the Mexican guns. On the evening of March 

9, in four hours more than 10,000 men went ashore in landing craft, 

sixty-five heavy surf boats that had been towed to the spotb

y steamers.

The troops proceeded inland over the sand hills with little opposition 

from the Mexican force of 4,300 behind the city’s walls. The landing 

of artillery, stores, and horses, the last thrown overboard and forced to 

swim for shore, was slowed by a norther that sprang up on March 12 

and blew violently for four days, but by March 22 seven 10-inch mor-

tars had been dragged inland and emplaced about half a mile south of 

Vera Cruz. That afternoon the bombardment began.

Town and fort replied, and it was soon apparent that the mor-

tars were ineffective. Scott found himself compelled to ask for naval 

guns from the commander of the naval force, Commodore Mat-

thew

C

.

Perry.The six naval guns—three 32-pounders firing shot and

three 8-inch shell guns—soon breached the walls and demoralized the 

defenders. On March 27, 1847, Vera Cruz capitulated.

Scott’s next objective was Jalapa, a city in the highlands about 

seventy-four miles from Vera Cruz on the national highway lead-

ing to Mexico City. Because on the coast the yellow fever season was 
American Military History

188

approaching, Scott was anxious to move forward to the uplands at once, 

but not until April 8 was he able to collect enough pack mules and wag-

ons forthe advance.Thefirstelements, under Bvt. Maj. Gen. David E.

Twiggs, set out with two batteries. One was equipped with 24-lb. guns, 

8-inch howitzers, and 10-inch mortars. The other was a new type of 

batteryequippedwith mountain howitzers and rockets, officered and

manned by the Ordnance Corps. The rocket section, mainly armed with 

the Congreve, carried for service tests a new rocket, the Hale, which 

depended for stability not on a stick but on vents in the rear, which also 

gave ita spin likethat of an artillery projectile.The rocketswerefired

from troughs mounted on portable stands. In addition to his two batter-

ies, General

Twiggs hada squadron of dragoons, in all about 2,600 men.

He advancedconfidently,though Scott hadwarned himthata substan-

tial army commanded by Santa Anna lay somewhere ahead. On April 

11, after Twiggs had gone about thirty miles, his scouts brought word 

that Mexican guns commanded a pass near the hamlet of Cerro Gordo.

Battle of Cerro Gordo

Near Cerro Gordo, the national highway ran through a rocky 

defile. On the left of the approaching Americans, Santa Anna with

about 12,000 men had emplaced batteries on mountain spurs; and 

on the right of the Americans, farther down the road, his guns were 

emplaced ona high hill, ElTelegrafo. He thus had firm command of

the national highway, the only means he thought Scott had of bringing 

up his artillery.

Fortunately for Twiggs, advancing on the morning of April 12, the 

Mexican gunners opened fire before he

was within rang

e and he

was

able to pull his forces back. Two days later Scott arrived with reinforce

-

ments, bringing his army up to 8,500. A reconnaissance by Captain 

Lee showed that the rough country to the right of El Telegrafo, which 

Santa Anna had considered impassable, could be traversed to enable 

the Americans to cut in on the Mexican rear. The troops hewed a path 

through forest and brush; when they came to ravines, they lowered 

the heavy siege artillery by ropes to the bottom then hoisted it up the 

other side. By April 17 they were able to occupy a hill to the right of El 

Telegrafo, where they sited the rocket battery. Early on the morning of 

April 18 the battle began.

Though Santa Anna, by then forewarned, had been able to 

plant guns to protect his flank, he could not withstand the American

onslaught.The Mexicans brok

e and fled into the mountains. By noon

Scott’s army had won a smashing victory at a cost of only 417 casual

-

ties, including 64 dead. Santa Anna’s losses

were estimated at more than

a thousand.

Scott moved next morning to Jalapa. The way seemed open to 

Mexico City, only 170 miles away. But now he faced a serious loss in 

manpower. The term of enlistment of seven of his volunteer regiments 

was about to expire, and only a handful agreed to reenlist. The men had 

to be sent home at once to minimize the danger of yellow fever when 

they passed through Vera Cruz. The departure of the volunteers, along 

with wounds and sickness among the men remaining, reduced the army 

to 5,820 effectives.
the mexican war and after

189

In May Scott pushed forward cautiously to Puebla, then the second largest city in Mexico. Its citizens were hostile to Santa Anna and 

had lost hope of winning the war. It capitulated without resistance on 

May 15 to an advance party under General Worth. Scott stayed there 

until the beginning of August, awaiting reinforcements from Vera Cruz 

(which by mid-July more than doubled his forces) and awaiting the outcome of peace negotiations then under way. A State Department emissary, Nicholas P. Trist, had arrived on the scene and made contact with 

Santa Anna through a British agent in Mexico City. Trist learned that 

Santa Anna, elected President of Mexico for the second time, would 

discuss peace terms for $10,000 down and $1 million to be paid when 

a treaty was ratified. After receiving the down payment through the

intermediary, however, Santa Anna made it known that he could not 

prevail upon the Mexican Congress to repeal a law it had passed after 

the battle of Cerro Gordo that made it high treason for any official to

treat with the Americans. It was clear that Scott would have to move 

closer to the capital of Mexico before Santa Anna would seriously consider peace terms.

Contreras, Churubusco, Chapultepec

For the advance on Mexico City, Scott had about 10,000 men. He 

had none to spare to protect the road from Vera Cruz to Puebla; therefore, his decision to move forward was daring. It meant that he had 

Pillow’s Attack Advancing through the Woods of Chapultepec, James Walker, 1848
American Military History

190

abandoned his line of communications or, as he phrased it, “thrown 

away the scabbard.” On August 7 Scott moved off with the lead division, followed at a day’s march by three divisions with a three-mile-long 

train of white-topped supply wagons bringing up the rear. Meeting no 

opposition—a sign that Santa Anna had withdrawn to defend Mexico 

City—Scott by August 10 was at Ayolta on a high plateau fourteen 

miles from the city.

The direct road ahead, entering the capital on the east, was barred 

by strongly fortified positions. Scott therefore decided to take the city

from the west by a wide flanking movement to the south, using a narrow muddy road that passed between the southern shores of two lakes 

and the mountains and skirted a fifteen-mile-wide lava bed, the Pedregal, before it turned north and went over a bridge at Churubusco to the 

western gates of Mexico City.

The Pedregal, like the terrain around El Telegrafo, had been considered impassable; but Captain Lee again made a way through. He found 

a mule path across its southwestern tip that came out at the village of 

Contreras. Scott sent a force under Bvt. Maj. Gen. Gideon J. Pillow to 

work on the road, supported by Twiggs’ division and some light artillery. They came under heavy fire from a Mexican force under General Gabriel Valencia. Pillow, manhandling his guns to a high position, 

attacked on August 19; but his light artillery was no match for Valencia’s 

68-lb. howitzer, nor his men for the reinforcements Santa Anna brought

to the scene. American reinforcements made a night march in pouring 

rain through a gully the engineers had found through the Pedregal to fall 

upon the Mexicans’ rear on the morning of August 20 simultaneously 

with an attack from the front. In seventeen minutes the battle of Contreras was won, with a loss to Scott of only 60 killed or wounded; the

Mexicans lost 700 dead and 800 captured, including 4 generals.

Scott ordered an immediate pursuit, but Santa Anna was able to 

gather his forces for a stand at Churubusco, where he placed a strong 

fortification before the town at the bridge and converted a thick-walled

stone church and a massive stone convent into fortresses. When the 

first American troops rode up around noon, they were met by heavy

musket and cannon fire. The Mexicans fought as never before; not until

midafternoon could Scott’s troops make any progress. At last the fire

of the Mexicans slackened, partly because they were running out of 

ammunition; and the Americans won the day, a day that Santa Anna 

admitted had cost him one third of his forces. About 4,000 Mexicans 

Chapultepec and “Los Niños”

Chapultepec, an imposing castle nearly 200 feet above the Valley of Mexico, housed a military 

academy for young men. Nearly fifty cadets stayed to oppose an American advance. U.S. troops 

used scaling ladders to assault the castle and captured the garrison of 1,000 after a sharp fight. 

During the battle, five cadets were killed and a sixth wrapped himself in the Mexican flag and 

jumped to his death in the valley below. Simply known as “los niños” (the children), the cadets’ heroic 

actions proved a powerful image of Mexican resistance, pride, and nationalistic spirit.
the mexican war and after

191

had been killed or wounded, not counting the many missing and cap-

tured. The battle had also been costly for Scott, who had 155 men killed 

and 876 wounded, approximately 12 percent of his effective force.

The victory at Churubusco brought an offer from Santa Anna to 

reopen negotiations. Scott proposed a short armistice, and Santa Anna 

quickly agreed. For two weeks Trist and representatives of the Mexican 

government discussed terms until it became clear that the Mexicans 

would not accept what Trist had to offer and were merely using the 

armistice asa breathing spell. On September6 Scott haltedthe discus-

sions and prepared to assault Mexico City.

Though refreshed by two weeks of rest, his forces now numbered 

only about 8,000. Santa Anna was reputed to have more than 15,000 

and had taken advantage of the respite to strengthen the defenses of 

the city. And ahead on a high hill above the plain was the Castle of 

Chapultepec guarding the western approaches.

Scott’s first objective, about half

a milewest of Chapultepec,was

a range of low stone buildings, containing a cannon foundry, known 

as El Molino del Rey. It was seized on September 8, though at heavy 

cost from unexpected resistance. At eight o’clock on the morning of 

September 13, after a barrage from the 24-lb. guns, Scott launched a 

three-pronged attack over the causeways leading to Chapultepec and up 

the rugged slopes. Against a hail of Mexican projectiles from above, his 

determined troops rapidly gained the summit, though they were delayed 

at the moat waiting for scaling ladders to come up. By half past nine 

o’clock the Americans were overrunning the castle despite a valiant but 

doomed defense by brave young Mexican cadets. Scarcely pausing, they 

pressed on to Mexico City by the two routes available and by nightfall 

held two gates to the city. Exhausted and depleted by the 800 casualties 

suffered that day, the troops still had to face house-to-house fighting;

but at dawn the next day, September 14, the city surrendered.

Throughout the campaign from Vera Cruz to Mexico City, General 

Scott had displayed not only dauntless personal courage and fine quali-

ties of leadership but great skill in applying the principles of war. In 

preparing for battle he would order his engineers to make a thorough 

reconnaissance of the enemy’s position and the surrounding terrain. 

He

was thus able to execute brilliant flanking movementsover terrain

that the enemy had considered impassable, notably at Cerro Gordo and 

the

Pedregal, the lattera fine illustration of the principle of surprise.

Scott also knew when to violate the principles of warfare, as he had 

done at Puebla when he deliberately severed his line of communica-

tions. Able to think beyond mere tactical maneuver, Scott was perhaps 

thefinest strategic thinker in the American Army in the first half of the

nineteenth century.

“He sees everything and counts the cost of every measure,” said 

Captain Lee. Scott for his part ascribed his quick victory over Mexico, 

won without the loss of any battle, to the West Pointers in his army, 

Lee, Grant, and many others. As for the troops, the trained and disci-

plined regulars had come off somewhat better than the volunteers; but 

all the army on the whole had fought well. Scott had seen to it that the 

men fought at the right time and place. Grant summed it up: “Credit 

is due to the troops engaged, it is true, but the plans and strategy were 

the general’s.”
American Military History

192

Occupation and Negotiation in Mexico City

For two months the only responsible administration in Mexico 

was the American military government under Scott. The collection 

of revenues, suppression of disorder, administration of justice, all the 

details of governing the country were in the hands of the Army. It 

has been said that some Mexicans believed that Scott’s administration 

of their city was more efficient and respectful of Mexican property

than their own government’s. It was an instructive lesson in the value 

of a careful and relatively enlightened occupation policy. When the 

Mexicans finally organized a government with which Commissioner

Trist could negotiate a peace treaty, dispatches arrived from Washington instructing Trist to return to the United States and ordering 

Scott to resume the war. Knowing that the Mexicans were now sincerely desirous of ending the war and realizing that the government 

in Washington was unaware of the situation, both Trist and Scott 

decided to continue the negotiations.

On February 2, 1848, the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo was signed. 

The U.S. Senate ratified it on March 10, but powerful opposition developed in Mexico. Not until May 30 were ratifications exchanged by the

two governments. Preparations began immediately to evacuate American troops from Mexico. On June 12 the occupation troops marched 

out of Mexico City; on August 1, 1848, the last American soldiers 

stepped aboard their transports at Vera Cruz and quitted Mexican soil.

By the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo the United States agreed to 

pay Mexico $15 million and to assume the unpaid claims by Americans against Mexico. In return, Mexico recognized the Rio Grande as 

the boundary of Texas and ceded New Mexico (including the present states of Arizona, New Mexico, Utah, and Nevada, a small corner 

of present-day Wyoming, and the western and southern portions of 

Colorado) and Upper California (the present state of California) to the 

United States. Mexico lost almost half of its land area to the United 

States by the terms of the treaty.

The Army on the New Frontier

The victory over Mexico, as well as the settlement of the Oregon 

boundary frontier in June 1846, added to the United States a vast territory that was to occupy the Army almost exclusively in the postwar 

years. For generations, the Army was to be the only force for law and 

order throughout thousands of square miles. First, the Army needed to 

explore this vast new conquest. In this task the Corps of Topographical 

Engineers played the leading role. Some knowledge of the new region 

had been gained by expeditions such as those of Capt. Benjamin L. E. 

Bonneville, Kearny, and 2d Lt. John C. Fremont; more had been gained 

during the Mexican War by “topogs” attached to Kearny’s march to 

California and Wool’s to Saltillo and after the war by Maj. William H. 

Emory’s work with the Mexican Boundary Commission. But much still 

remained to be done.

The most significant and far-reaching explorations were those to

locate routes for transcontinental railroads. The first effort was directed

toward the southwest, seeking an “ice-free, mountain-free” route. In 

The collection of revenues, 

suppression of disorder, 

administration of justice, all the 

details of governing the country 

were in the hands of the Army.
the mexican war and after

193

that area, the necessity for defense against Comanches, Apaches, and 

Navahos meant that most of the Army had to be stationed between 

San Antonio and Fort Yuma. Forts had to be constructed, roads built, 

rivers sought as avenues of supply, and Indian trails mapped. In 1853 

Congress authorized similar explorations on a northern route to the 

Pacific from Chicago and a central route from St. Louis.

Railroad construction did not begin until after the Civil War. Emigrants setting out for the West, in increasing numbers after the discovery of gold in California in 1849, used wagon trains across plains 

populated by warlike Indian tribes. The Army guarded the several transcontinental wagon routes and managed to keep the tribes in check. 

During the decade of the fifties there were no fewer than twenty-two

distinct Indian “wars,” as well as the unusual task of controlling some 

particularly troublesome settlers.

In 1857 reports filtered back to the east from Utah that the settlement of Mormons there had deliberately massacred a party of Arkansas pioneers at a place called Mountain Meadow. The settlers, having 

been attacked by a party of Indians, surrendered to a Mormon militia 

contingent posing as rescuers and allowed themselves to be disarmed. 

On September 11, 1857, the Mormons summarily executed 120 of the 

survivors: men, women, and all children over the age of ten. Seventeen children were “adopted” by the Mormons but were later returned 

east to their relatives. This and other instances of defiance of federal

authority prompted the dispatch of two sizable military expeditions 

from Fort Leavenworth. However, despite some tensions, a full-scale 

“Mormon War” never became a reality.

Army expeditions such as those from Fort Leavenworth, marching through primitive country where no local procurement was possible, had to carry all requirements, from horseshoe nails to artillery. 

Supplying the frontier posts, some as far as a thousand miles from 

inland waterways, entailed great effort. All goods had to be hauled in 

wagons or carried by pack train. The difficulty of supplying posts in

the arid regions of the Southwest led in 1855 to an interesting experiment, strongly backed by Secretary of War Jefferson Davis, in the use 

Topographical Engineers Exploring the Colorado River near Chimney Peak
American Military History

194

of camels as pack animals. Seventy-five were imported from the Middle

East and sent to Texas. They showed that they could carry heavy loads, 

walk sure-footedly over ground no wagon could traverse, and subsist 

by grazing and on little water; but their appearance on the roads stampeded wagon and pack trains, and teamsters hated and feared them. 

The public and the Army turned against them, and the camel experiment ended in failure.

Increasing the Peacetime Army

By the end of 1848 the Army had reverted to a peacetime strength 

somewhat smaller than the 10,000 authorized in 1815. It was stretched 

very thin by its manifold duties on the vast new frontier. On the recommendations of General Scott and Secretary of War George W. Crawford, Congress in June 1850 approved enlarging the companies serving 

on the frontier to 74 privates, a considerable increase over the 50 in the 

dragoons, 64 in the mounted rifles, and 42 in the artillery and infantry

authorized at the end of 1848. Thereafter 90 of the 158 companies 

were enlarged; by the end of 1850 the Army was authorized 12,927 

officers and men.

When Jefferson Davis became Secretary of War in 1853, he 

strongly urged a larger Army, one that could expand to 27,818 men in 

time of war by enlarging the company to 128 men. Davis desired new 

mounted regiments for frontier service, because only highly mobile 

units could hope to handle the Indians. In March 1855 Congress added 

4 new regiments to the existing 15 (2 of dragoons, 1 of mounted rifles,

4 of artillery, and 8 of infantry). They were the 1st and 2d Cavalry Regiments and the 9th and 10th Infantry Regiments. The mounted arm thus 

consisted of dragoons, mounted rifles, and cavalry until the Civil War,

when all mounted regiments were called cavalry.

Weapons and Tactics on the Eve of the Civil War

At Davis’ insistence the new infantry units were armed with 

percussion-cap, single shot, muzzleloading rifled muskets instead of

smoothbore muskets. Nineteenth century technological developments 

had made possible an accurate, dependable muzzleloading rifle with at

least as fast a rate of fire as the smoothbore musket. This was partly due

Jefferson Davis and the Camels

As Secretary of War, Jefferson Davis (1808–1889) believed that the deserts of the American 

southwest were ideally suited for the use of camels. At his urging, Congress in 1855 authorized 

money to purchase camels from North Africa and ship them to Texas. Despite the hardiness of the 

animals and their ability to carry heavy loads over difficult terrain, the camel experiment was not 

a success. The beasts smelled horrible, frightened mules and horses, and were apparently even 

more ornery than mules. Despite several successful uses, most were eventually sold at public auction 

or released into the wild to slowly die out. 
the mexican war and after

195

to the application of the percussion-cap principle to the rifle and partly

to the adoption in 1855 of the Minié ball or bullet, a lead projectile

tapering forward from its hollow base. To load and fire, the soldier bit

open the paper cartridge, poured the powder down the barrel, rammed 

in the paper to seat the charge, and then rammed the bullet home. He 

then put the cap in place, full-cocked the piece, aimed, and fired. Sparks

from the cap fired the powder. The force of the explosion expanded

the hollow base of the bullet to fit the rifling, and the bullet left the barrel spinning and thus with considerable accuracy. Its effective range was 

400 to 600 yards as compared with only around 100 yards for smoothbore muskets. The rate of fire was a theoretical three rounds per minute, though this was seldom attained in practice.

In 1855 the national armories began making only rifles and started

converting smoothbores into rifles, but the work took time. By the end

of 1858 the Springfield and Harpers Ferry Armories had manufactured

only 4,000 of the new type of rifle, the Springfield .58, a muzzleloader.

Breechloading, permitting a much more rapid rate of fire, had to await

the development of a tight-fitting, but easy-moving bolt and a cartridge

that would effectively seal the breech. Many breechloaders were on the 

market in the 1850s; and the Army began testing all available models but did not complete its tests before 1861. Effective breechloading

rifles required metallic rather than paper cartridges to prevent escape of

gases at the breech. Metallic cartridges were invented in 1856 but were

not produced in large numbers until after 1861.

The introduction of rifling into field and coast artillery increased

the accuracy and more than doubled the effective range; but rifled guns,

which had to await the development of advanced manufacturing techniques, did not immediately supplant the smoothbores. During this 

period an important smoothbore piece was introduced for the light 

batteries, the 12-lb. bronze cannon called the Napoleon for Napoleon 

III. Capt. Robert P. Parrott’s rifled cannon was developed in 1851 but

did not come into use on an appreciable scale until the Civil War. The 

application of the Minié principle to artillery did much to further the

use of rifled artillery; though grape and canister, shell (high explosive

Breechloaders Versus Muzzleloaders

By the nineteenth century the theoretical advantages of breechloading firearms—faster firing and 

easier loading while concealed or mounted—had long been known. The U.S. Army adopted breechloaders, in the form of the Hall rifles and carbines, during much of the first half of the nineteenth century; but 

practical difficulties, in the form of a complicated mechanism and an inadequate gas seal at the breech, 

outweighed the benefits. By the Civil War technical advances would make breechloading more feasible, 

but the enormous industrial problem of equipping the armies with new weapons and ammunition would 

make existing muzzleloaders the mainstay of both Union and Confederate forces. Private purchase and 

political influence within the Union Army, however, allowed the successful fielding of some breechloading 

rifles and carbines, notably the Sharps, Spencer, and Henry designs. Just after the Civil War the Army, 

faced simultaneously with the need to acquire a modern rifle and a peacetime budget, adopted the Allin 

“trap-door” action as a means to convert its enormous wartime stock of rifled muskets. 
American Military History

196

and shrapnel), and solid shot, all used in the Mexican War, were still 

standard.

Rockets declined in favor. The brief experience with them in the 

Mexican War had not been impressive. After the war, continued experimentation failed to remove faults of eccentricity in flight and instability.

The rockets often exploded prematurely, so troops were reluctant to use 

them; moreover, they tended to deteriorate in storage. More important 

than any of these considerations was the fact that the new rifled artillery

was decidedly superior to rockets in range, accuracy, and reliability.

Tactical doctrine did not entirely keep pace with the development of 

weapons. In an effort in that direction, Secretary Davis prescribed light 

infantry tactics for all infantry units. In general, this meant reducing the 

line of the infantry from three to two ranks and placing increased emphasis on skirmishers. Formations, however, were still rigid: Men stood 

shoulder to shoulder (it was almost impossible to load a muzzleloader 

lying down), and intervals between units were small. These relatively 

dense formations would in the early days of the Civil War offer inviting 

targets, but it was perhaps the most effective way to mass small-arms fire

until the early twentieth century development of the machine gun.

At the U.S. Military Academy during this period, such great names 

as Robert E. Lee and Dennis Mahan, author of many works on engineering and fortification, appeared on the roster of staff and faculty.

The Artillery School of Practice was reopened; and, with the appearance in 1849 of Bvt. Maj. Alfred Mordecai’s Artillery for the United States 

Land Service, the Army had for the first time a full, accurate description

of its system of artillery. Secretary Davis sent Mordecai, along with 

Maj. Richard Delafield and Capt. George B. McClellan, to Europe to

study all aspects of the Crimean War in particular and European military institutions and development in general. The study of American 

military theory was stimulated by the publication in 1846 of Henry

Wager Halleck’s Elements of Military Art and Science. Such volumes 

as Scott’s Instructions for Field Artillery, the General Regulations for 

the Army of the United States, Hardee’s Tactics, and the new volume 

on infantry tactics sponsored by Davis were made available to Army 

officers and a few others; though not enough were obtained to furnish

copies to the militia. A number of military schools had been founded 

Dennis Hart Mahan (1802–1871)

After graduating at the top of West Point’s Class of 1824, under the leadership of Sylvanus 

Thayer, Dennis Hart Mahan remained at the Academy as a professor of engineering, mathematics, and 

military science, 1824–1871. Mahan’s 1847 Elementary Treatise on Advance-Guard, Out-Post, and 

Detachment Service of Troops became the first major American work on strategy and tactics. Derived 

from Antoine-Henri de Jomini’s analysis of Napoleonic warfare, Mahan’s emphasis on rules and principles and failure to address technological change or innovation would play a significant role in the 

Civil War. Most of the academy graduates on both sides of the conflict had studied under Mahan, and 

many other officers used his book as a field manual. Mahan’s thought had an enduring impact on U.S. 

Army doctrine, just as his oldest son, Alfred Thayer Mahan, would later shape naval strategy.
the mexican war and after

197

throughout the country, with the South having a slight edge, an advan-

tage that

was to providenumerous capable officers to the Confederacy

when the Civil War broke out. Discussion Questions

1. How risky was the strategy of a three-pronged attack on Mex-

ico? What could have gone wrong?

2. What were President Polk’s diplomatic and political objectives 

during the Mexican War? What methods did he use to obtain them?

3. Why did the mix of volunteer and Regular Army units work well 

in the Mexican War? What could have gone wrong?

4. Discuss the strengths and weaknesses of Generals Scott and 

Taylor. Under whom would you rather have served, and why?

5. How would you characterize the occupation of Mexico City? 

What lessons could be drawn from this experience?

6. Discuss the role of technological advances inweaponry on the

verge of the Civil War. What tactical options changed for commanders 

on the battlefield as

a result of those advances? Recommended Readings

Bauer, K. Jack. The Mexican War, 1846–1848. New York: Macmillan, 

1974.

———. Zachary Taylor: Soldier, Planter, Statesman of the Old Southwest. 

Newtown, Conn.: American Political Biography Press, 1994.

Chance, Joseph E. Jefferson Davis’s Mexican War Regiment. Jackson: Uni-

versity Press of Mississippi, 1991.

Eisenhower, John. So Far from God: The U.S. War with Mexico. New York: 

Anchor Books, 1990.

Johnson, Timothy D. Winfield Scott: The Quest for Military Glory. Law-

rence: University Press of Kansas, 1998.

McCaffrey, James. Army of Manifest Destiny: The American Soldier in the 

Mexican War. New York: New York University Press, 1992.

Risch, Erna. Quartermaster Support of the Army: A History of the Corps, 

1775–1939. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military His-

tory, 1962, chs. 6–8.

Utley, Robert M. Frontiersmen in Blue: The United States Army and the Indian, 

1848–1865. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1981.

Winders, Richard B. Mr. Polk’s Army: The American Military Experience 

in the Mexican War. College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 

1997.

Other Readings

Bill, Alfred Hoyt. Rehearsal for Conflict: The War With Mexico, 1846–1848, 

2d ed. New York: Cooper Square, 1969.

Connor, Seymour A., and Odie B. Faulk. North America Divided: The 

Mexican War, 1846–1848. New York: Oxford University Press, 

1971.
American Military History

198

Dawson, Joseph G. III. Doniphan’s Epic March: The 1st Missouri Volunteers 

in the Mexican War. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1999.

Frazier, Donald, ed. The United States and Mexico at War: Nineteenth Century Expansion and Conflict. New York: Macmillan, 1998.

Goetzmann, William H. Army Exploration in the American West, 1803–

1863. Austin: Texas State Historical Association, 1991.

Johannsen, Robert W. To the Halls of the Montezumas: The Mexican War in 

the American Imagination. New York: Oxford University Press, 1985.

Lavender, David. Climax at Buena Vista: The American Campaigns in Northeastern Mexico. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1966.

Singletary, Otis A. The Mexican War. Chicago: University of Chicago 

Press, 1960.

Smith, George W., and Charles Judah. Chronicles of the Gringos: The U.S. 

Army in the Mexican War, 1846–1848: Accounts of Eyewitnesses and 

Combatants. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1968.
During the administration of President James Buchanan, 1857–

1861, tensions over the issue of extending slavery into the

western territories mounted alarmingly and the nation ran its 

seemingly inexorable course toward disunion. Along with slavery, the 

shifting social, economic, political, and constitutional problems of 

the fast-growing country fragmented its citizenry. After open warfare 

broke out in Kansas Territory among slaveholders, abolitionists, and 

opportunists, the battle lines of opinion hardened rapidly. Buchanan 

quieted Kansas by calling in the Regular Army, but it was too small and 

too scattered to suppress the struggles that were almost certain to break 

out in the border states.

In 1859 John Brown, who had won notoriety in “Bleeding Kansas,” seized the Federal arsenal at Harpers Ferry, Virginia, in a mad 

attempt to foment a slave uprising within that slaveholding state. Again 

Federal troops were called on to suppress the new outbreak, and pressures and emotions rose on the eve of the 1860 elections. Republican

Abraham Lincoln was elected to succeed Buchanan; although he had 

failed to win a majority of the popular vote, he received 180 of the 303 

electoral votes. The inauguration that was to vest in him the powers of 

the presidency would take place March 4, 1861. During this lame-duck

period, Mr. Buchanan was unable to control events and the country 

continued to lose its cohesion.

Secession, Sumter, and Standing to Arms

Abraham Lincoln’s election to the Presidency on November 6,

1860, triggered the long-simmering political crisis. Lincoln’s party was

opposed to the expansion of slavery into the new western territories. 

This threatened both the economic and political interests of the South, 

since the Southern states depended on slavery to maintain their way 

of life and their power in Congress. South Carolina on December 20 

enacted an ordinance declaring that “the union now subsisting between 

South Carolina and other States, under the name of the ‘United States 

9

The Civil War, 1861
American Military History

200

of America,’ is hereby dissolved.” Within six weeks, six other deepSouth states seceded from the Union and seized Federal property inside 

their borders, including military installations, save Fort Pickens outside 

Pensacola and Fort Sumter in Charleston Harbor. (Map 22) To the 

seven states that formed the Confederate States of America on February 18, 1861, at Montgomery, Alabama, the U.S. government’s retention

of the forts was equivalent to a warlike act. To provide his fledgling

government with a military force, on March 6 the new Confederate

Executive, Jefferson Davis, called for a 100,000-man volunteer force to 

serve for twelve months.

The creation of a rival War Department south of the 35th Parallel 

on February 21 shattered the composition of the Regular Army and 

disrupted its activities, particularly in Texas, where Maj. Gen. David E. 

Twiggs surrendered his entire command. With an actual strength of 

1,080 officers and 14,926 enlisted men on June 30, 1860, the Regular

Army was based on five-year enlistments. Recruited heavily from men

of foreign birth, the U.S. Army consisted of 10 regiments of infantry, 

4 of artillery, 2 of cavalry, 2 of dragoons, and 1 of mounted riflemen.

It was not a unified striking force. The Regular Army was deployed

within seven departments, six of them west of the Mississippi. Of 198 

line companies, 183 were scattered in 79 isolated posts in the territories. 

The remaining 15 were in garrisons along the Canadian border and on 

the Atlantic coast. They were patently unprepared for the mission of 

forcibly returning the Southern states to the union. 

Created by Secretary of War John C. Calhoun and expanded by 

Secretary of War Davis in 1853, the departments of the U.S. Army had 

become powerful institutions by the eve of the Civil War. Within each 

of the trans-Mississippi departments, a senior colonel or general officer

by brevet commanded 2,000 officers and men. All the states east of the

Mississippi constituted the Department of the East, where Bvt. Maj. 

Gen. John E. Wool controlled 929 regulars. 

A department commander was responsible for mobilizing and 

training militia and volunteer forces called into Federal service and for 

coordinating his resources with any expeditionary force commander 

who operated inside his territory or crossed through his department. A 

department commander often doubled in command, having responsibility for the administration of his department as well as for conduct of 

operations in the field. He often had a dual staff arrangement, one for

the department and another for the campaign. For strategic guidance 

and major decisions he looked to the President and General in Chief; 

for administrative support he channeled his requirements through the 

Secretary of War to the appropriate bureau chief. In the modern sense 

he had no corps of staff experts who could assist him in equating his 

strategic goals with his logistical needs. In many respects the departmental system was a major reason why the Union armies during the 

Civil War operated like a team of balky horses. A system well suited to 

the demands of maintaining a small peacetime force could not effectively organize and manage combat forces consisting of hundreds of 

thousands of soldiers.

The 1,676 numbered paragraphs of the U.S. Army Regulations

governed the actions of a department commander. The provisions 

concerning Army organization and tactics were archaic in most cases 

Above: Noncommissioned Officer Frock Coat, 

ca. 1861; Below: Artillery Fuse or Primer 

Pouch Made by Watervliet Arsenal, ca. 1861
Map 22

Ft. Henry

Ft. Donelson

Island No. 10

Ft. Pickens

Ft. Monroe

Ft. Sumter

Ft. Moultrie

Ft. Hattaras

Ft. Clark

Pea Ridge

Cumberland

Gap

Cape Fear

Sa

v annah R

Tennessee R

Arkans

as R

si

s

si

M

i s

pp i

R

Ohio R

C

mu berland R

PENNSYLV ANIA

DELAWARE

NEW

JERSE Y

MARYLAND

VIRGINIA

NOR TH CAROLINA

SOUTH CAROLINA

GEORGIA

ALABAMA

MISSISSIPPI

L OUISIANA

ARKAN SAS

Y INDIAN TERRITOR

SAS KAN

MISSOURI

ILLINOIS

INDIANA

OHIO

KENTUCKY

TENNESSEE

WEST VIRGINIA

(1863)

S TEXA

FLORID A

St. Joseph

St. Louis

Springfield Indianapolis

New Madrid

Cairo

Columbus

Perryville

Cincinnati

Bowling Green

Louisville

Danville

Petersburg

Norfolk

Lynchburg

Raleigh

New Bern

Fredericksburg Staunton

Winchester

Cumberland

Pittsburgh

Carlisle

Gettysburg

Harrisburg

Philadelphia

Baltimore

Macon

Savannah

Charleston

Augusta

Wilmington

Meridian

Iuka

Corinth

Pittsburg Landing

Savannah

Decatur

Franklin

Nashville

Murfreesboro

Chattanooga

Stevenson

La Fayette

Atlanta

Columbus

Columbia

Montgomery

Knoxville

Memphis

Vicksburg

Shreveport

Jackson

Port Hudson

Baton Rouge

New Orleans

Mobile

Pensacola

Jacksonville

WASHINGTON

RICHMOND

100 100 0

Miles

AREA OF OPERATIONS

THE CIVIL WAR

High Ground Above 1500 Feet
American Military History

202

despite Davis’ efforts in 1857 to update the regulations to reflect the

experience of the Mexican War. During the Civil War the Regulations 

would be slightly modified to incorporate the military laws passed by

two wartime Congresses. In the South, these same regulations would 

govern the policy and procedures of the Confederate forces.

The roster of the Regular Army was altered considerably by Davis’ 

action in creating the Confederate Army. Of the 1,080 in the active 

officer corps, 286 resigned or were dismissed and entered the Confederate service. (Conversely, only 26 enlisted men are known to have

violated their oaths.) West Point graduates on the active list numbered 

824; of these, 184 were among the officers who turned their backs on

the United States and offered their swords to the Confederacy. Of the 

900 graduates then in civil life, 114 returned to the Union Army and 99 

others sought Southern commissions. General in Chief Winfield Scott

and Col. George H. Thomas of Virginia were among the few prominent Southerners who fought for the Union. More serious than their 

numbers, however, was the high caliber of the officers who joined the

Confederacy; many were regimental commanders, and three had commanded at departmental level.

With military preparations under way, Davis dispatched commissioners to Washington a few days after Lincoln’s inauguration on March 

4, 1861, to treat for the speedy takeover of Forts Sumter and Pickens.

Informally reassured that the forts would not be provisioned without proper notice, the envoys returned to Montgomery expecting an 

uneventful evacuation of Sumter. President Lincoln had to move cautiously, for he knew Sumter’s supplies were giving out. As each March 

day passed, Sumter aggravated the harshness of Lincoln’s dilemma. In 

case of war, the fort had no strategic value. And if Lincoln reinforced 

it, Davis would have his act of provocation and Lincoln might drive 

eight more slaveholding states out of the Union. Yet if Sumter was 

not succored, the North might cool its enthusiasm for the Union concept and become accustomed to having a confederation south of the 

Mason-Dixon Line. There were no easy choices for the new President.

President Lincoln spent two weeks listening to the conflicting

counsel of his constitutional advisers and made up his own mind on 

March 29 to resupply Fort Sumter with provisions only. No effort 

would be made to increase its military power. By sea he soon dispatched 

a token expedition and on April 8 notified South Carolina’s governor

of his decision. The next move was up to the local Confederate commander, Brig. Gen. Pierre G. T. Beauregard. On the eleventh, Maj. 

Robert Anderson, Sumter’s commander, politely but firmly rejected a

formal surrender demand. At 4:30 the next morning Confederate batteries began a 34-hour bombardment. Anderson’s ninety-man garrison 

returned it in earnest, but Sumter’s guns were no match for the concentric fire from Confederate artillery. Offered honorable terms on April

14, Anderson surrendered the Federal fort, saluted his U.S. flag with

fifty guns, and, with his command, was conveyed to the fleet outside the

harbor to be taken to New York City.

Unquestionably, the Confederates fired the first shot of the war

and with that rash act removed many difficulties from Lincoln’s path in

his efforts to preserve the Union. On the fifteenth Lincoln personally

penned a proclamation declaring the seven Southern states in insurrecMore serious than their numbers, 

however, was the high caliber 

of the officers who joined the 

Confederacy.
the civil war, 1861

203

tion against the laws of the United States. To strangle the Confederacy, 

on the nineteenth Lincoln declared the entire coast from South Carolina 

to Texas under naval blockade. To augment the reduced Regular Army, 

Lincoln asked the governors of the loyal states for 75,000 militiamen 

to serve for three months, the maximum time permissible under existing laws. With a unanimity that astonished most people, the Northern 

states responded with 100,000 men. Within the eight slave states still in 

the Union, the call for militia to suppress the rebellion was angrily and 

promptly rejected; and the President’s decision to coerce the Confederacy moved Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Arkansas to join 

it. The border states of Missouri, Kentucky, Maryland, and Delaware 

were still undecided; and each side moved cautiously to avoid pushing 

them into the other’s camp.

As spring changed into summer the magnitude of the job that 

the Union had proclaimed for itself—the conquest of an area the size 

of western Europe, save Scandinavia and Italy, defended by a plucky 

and proud people and favored by military geography—was imperfectly 

understood. Although Lincoln later emerged as a diligent student of 

warfare, he was as yet unversed in the art. His only service in the military had been as a junior officer of volunteers during the Black Hawk

war, and he had seen no combat action. His rival, Davis, from the 

outset knew his military men quite well and thoroughly understood the 

mechanics of building a fighting force. He had commanded a volunteer regiment in the Mexican War and was experienced at the national 

policy level due to his service as Secretary of War. Yet, as time passed, 

Davis would mismanage his government and its military affairs more 

and more.

The Balloon Experiment

On June 19, 1861, Thaddeus 

Lowe (1832–1913) ascended from 

the lawn of the White House in a 

tethered, hydrogen-filled spherical balloon and telegraphed his 

observations of the Confederate 

lines across the Potomac to the 

ground. It was a stunt—an effective one. Lowe, one of the country’s 

leading balloonists before the war 

and passionately convinced that 

aerial reconnaissance would greatly 

aid military operations, needed 

high-level support to force balloons 

upon a skeptical Army hierarchy. 

With the backing of President Lincoln, he achieved a trial. The Army rarely used balloons to their 

best advantage, and the experiment lapsed after Chancellorsville.

View of Balloon Ascension, ca. 1862
American Military History

204

Virginia’s secession caused Col. Robert E. Lee, Scott’s choice to be 

the Union’s field leader, to resign his commission and offer his services

to his state. The Confederates moved their capital to Richmond, Virginia, site of the largest iron works in the South and 100 miles south 

of the Union capital, Washington. On May 23 Union forces crossed 

into northern Virginia and occupied Arlington Heights and Alexandria. With Virginia and North Carolina in rebellion, Lincoln extended 

the naval blockade and called for a large volunteer army backed by an 

increased regular force.

Correctly anticipating that Congress in its session to open on July 

4 would approve his actions, Lincoln, on his own authority, established 

40 regiments of U.S. Volunteers (42,034 men) to serve three years or 

for the duration of the war. He ordered the Regular Army increased by 

1 regiment of artillery, 1 of cavalry, and 8 of infantry (actually, 9 regiments were added), or 22,714 men, and the Navy by 18,000 sailors. The 

new regular infantry regiments were each to have 3 battalions of about 

800 men, in contrast to the 1-battalion structure in the existing regular 

and volunteer regiments. However, because the recruits preferred the 

larger bonuses, laxer discipline, and easygoing atmosphere of the volunteers, most of the newly constituted regiments were never able to fill

their additional battalions to authorized strength. The volunteer units 

were state units, not Federal or regular units.

The enthusiastic response to Lincoln’s various calls forced him to 

ask the governors to scale down the induction of men. The overtaxed 

camps could not handle the increasing manpower. In raising the Army, 

Lincoln used methods that dated back to Washington’s day. The combat 

efficiency and state of training of the new units varied from good to

very poor. Some militia regiments were well trained and equipped, others were regiments in name only. The soldiers often elected their own 

company officers, and the governors commissioned majors and colonels. The President appointed generals. Although many of the newly 

Union Volunteers in Camp
the civil war, 1861

205

commissioned officers proved to be enthusiastic, devoted to duty, and

eager to learn, incompetents were also appointed. Before the end of 

1861, however, officers were being required to prove their qualifications before examining boards of regular officers; those found unfit

were allowed to resign.

Frequently advised by governors and congressmen, Mr. Lincoln 

selected generals from among leading politicians to give himself a 

broader base of political support. Some political generals, such as John 

A. Logan and Francis P. Blair, Jr., distinguished themselves, whereas 

many others proved military hindrances. Lincoln gave a majority of the 

commissions in the first forty volunteer units to regulars on active duty,

to former West Pointers like George B. McClellan (who had resigned 

to pursue a business career) or to those who had held volunteer commissions during the Mexican War. On the other hand, Davis never gave 

higher than a brigade command to a Confederate volunteer officer until

he had proved himself in battle.

Both North and South failed to develop a good system to replace 

individuals in volunteer units. The Confederacy, though hamstrung by 

its insistence that Texans be commanded by Texans and Georgians by 

Georgians and by governors’ insistent demands for retaining home 

guards, did devise a regimental system that stood up well until the closing days of the war. Except for Wisconsin, Illinois, and Vermont, the 

Union armies never had an efficient volunteer replacement system.

As battle losses mounted and the ranks of veteran regiments thinned, 

commanders were forced to send men back to their home states on 

recruiting duty or face the disbandment of their regiments. Northern 

governors with patronage in mind preferred to raise new regiments, 

allowing battle-tested ones to decline to company proportions.

The enlisted Regular Army was kept intact for the duration of the 

war. Many critics believed that the Union should have used regulars to 

cadre the volunteer units. But this practice was initially impossible during the summer of 1861 for at least two reasons. Lincoln did not foresee a long war, and the majority of regulars were needed on the frontier until trained men could replace them. In addition, Lincoln’s critics 

overlooked the breakdown in morale that would have accompanied the 

breakup of old line regiments, many of which had histories and honors 

dating back to the War of 1812. An officer holding a regular commission in 1861 had to resign to accept a commission in the volunteers

The Baltimore Riots

As a slave state with economic and cultural ties to both sections, Maryland required careful handling from Abraham Lincoln’s government, which faced isolation if the state seceded. On April 19, 

1861, while marching through Baltimore to catch the Washington train, four companies of the 6th Massachusetts Regiment traded shots with a mob. Four soldiers and twelve civilians died. Initially, President 

Lincoln agreed to route units away from Baltimore. When more units arrived in Washington, however, 

the government imposed military rule on Baltimore, imprisoning secessionists without trial and suppressing newspapers. The state legislature rejected secession, saving Maryland for the Union.
American Military History

206

unless theWar Department specifically released him. Most regulars

were loath to resign, uncertain that they would be recalled to active duty 

after thewar.Thus, during 1861 and part of 1862, promotion in the

Regular Army was slow. All regulars could accept commissions in the 

volunteersby 1862, and in many cases the year they had spent in smallunit command seasoning had its reward in advancing them to higher 

commands. Ulysses S. Grant and William T. Sherman, both U.S. Mili-

tary Academygraduates returning from civilian life, asked specifically

forvolunteer regimental commands at first and soon advanced rapidly

to general officer posts.

The Opponents

As North and South lined up for battle, the preponderance of pro-

ductive capacity, manpower, and agricultural potential clearly lay on the 

side of the North. Its crops were worth more annually than those of the 

South, which had concentrated on growing cotton, tobacco, and rice. 

Between

February and May 1861 the Confederate authorities missed

the opportunity to ship baled cotton to England and draw bills against 

it for the purchase of arms. In sea power, railroads, material wealth, and 

industrial capacity to produce iron and munitions, the North was vastly 

superior to the South. This disparity became even more pronounced as 

the ever-tightening blockade gradually cut off the Confederacy from 

foreign imports. The North had more mules and horses, a logistical 

advantage of great importance since supplies had to be carried to the 

troops from rail and riverheads.

The difference in manpower was also critical. According to the cen-

sus of 1860, the population of the United States

numbered 31,443,321.

About 23 million of them were in the twenty-two Northern states and 

9 million in the eleven states that later seceded. Of the latter total, 3.5 

million

were slaves.The size of the opposing armieswould reflect this

disparity. At one time or another about 2.1 million men would serve 

in the Northern armies, while 800,000–900,000 men would serve the 

South. Peak strength of the two forces would be about 1 million and 

600,000, respectively.

Yet not all the advantages lay with the North. The South pos-

sessed good interior lines of communications; and its 3,550-mile coast-

line, embracing 189 harbors and navigable river mouths,

was difficult

to blockade effectively. Possessors of a rich military tradition in wars 

against the British, Spanish, Mexicans, and Indians, the Southerners 

initially managed to form redoubtable cavalry units more easily than the 

North and used them with considerable skill against the invading infan-

try. As the war moved along, the armies on both sides demonstrated 

high degrees of military skill and bravery. Man for man they became 

almost evenly matched, and their battles were among the bloodiest in 

modern history.

Jefferson Davis hoped that the sympathy or even the intervention 

of European powers might more than compensate for the Confed-

eracy’s lack of material resources. This hope, largely illusory from the 

start, became less and less likely of realization with the emancipation of 

the slaves, with every Union victory, and with the increasing effective-

ness of the blockade.
the civil war, 1861

207

Militarily, the South’s greatest advantage over the North was simply 

the fact that if not attacked it could win by doing nothing. To restore 

the Union the Federal forces would have to conquer the Confederacy. 

Thus the arena of action lay below the strategic line of the Potomac 

and Ohio Rivers. Here, geography divided the theater of war into three 

interrelated theaters of operations. The Eastern Theater lay between 

the Atlantic Ocean and the Appalachian Mountains; the Western Theater embraced the area from the Appalachians to the Mississippi; and 

the Trans-Mississippi Theater ran westward to the Pacific Ocean.

In the east, the triangular shape of northern Virginia made it a 

difficult target to attack and provided it some advantage. The northern apex of the state aimed like an arrow at the Federal capital. The 

Potomac River and the lower Chesapeake Bay formed the right leg of 

the triangle; its left bounded on the Blue Ridge and the adjacent Shenandoah Valley. The base of the triangle followed the basin of the James 

and Appomattox Rivers, whereon stood Richmond, halfway between 

the bay and the valley. For three-and-a-half years Federal commanders 

would be defeated on the legs and in the center of this triangle as they 

tried to take Richmond and defeat the Army of Northern Virginia. 

Operating on these interior lines, General Lee would strike any Union 

force attempting to invade and follow up with lightning invasions of 

the North to keep it off balance. In the three neighboring counties of 

Virginia within this triangle, more than half a million men would clash 

in mortal combat over the course of four years. More soldiers—Union 

and Confederate—would die in these three counties than in the Revolutionary War, the War of 1812, the War with Mexico, and all the Indian 

Wars combined. (See Map 23.)

The hammer for swinging against the anvil of Union forces in Virginia came from the line of the Ohio River as Union forces moved 

along the invasion routes of the Green, Cumberland, Tennessee, and 

Mississippi Rivers. To breach the lower reaches of the Appalachians, 

the Federals needed the railroad centers at Nashville, Chattanooga, and 

Atlanta; with them they could strike north through the Carolinas toward 

the line of the James. But in the spring of 1861, the anvil and hammer

concept had not yet occurred to the military leaders in Washington. 

Only the General in Chief, Scott, had a concrete strategic proposal for 

waging total war. He recommended that Lincoln take the time to train 

Anaconda Plan

General in Chief Winfield Scott devised his plan for the blockading and slow crushing of the 

rebellion, likened to a snake slowly strangling its prey, because he wanted to avoid a bloody and 

destructive war that would for generations estrange the South from the rest of the nation. He reckoned that the Confederacy would have no choice but to sue for peace and readmission to the Union 

once economic hardship spread throughout the South and Europe refused to grant diplomatic recognition to the rebellious southern states. Critics said such a plan might take years to work, if it ever did; 

thus the best strategy was a quick, decisive military campaign against Richmond. After four bloody 

years, the implementation of something very like the Anaconda Plan drove the South to its knees.
Map 23

1–3 Jul 1863

Gettysburg

17 Sep 1862

Antietam

21 Jul 1861

1st Bull Run

29–30 Jul 1862

2d Bull Run

9 Jun 1863 Brandy Station

24 May 1862

Winchester

23 Mar 1862

Kernstown

23 May 1862

Front Royal

8–21 May 1864

Spotsylvania

13 Dec 1862

5–7 May 1864 Fredericksburg

Wilderness 1–6 May 1863

Chancellorsville

26 Jun 1862

Mechanicsville

11 May 1864

Yellow Tavern

31 May 1862

Fair Oaks

27 Jun 1862

Gaines' Mill

3 Jun 1864

Cold Harbor

29 Jun 1862

Savage Station

1 Jul 1862

Malvern Hill

30 Jun 1862

Frayser's Farm

15 Jun 1864–12 Apr 1865

Siege of Petersburg

1 Apr 1865

Five Forks

8 May 1862

McDowell 8 Jun 1862

Cross Keys

9 Jun 1862

Port Republic

to Danville

Cedar Mt

Turner’s Gap

Crampton’s

Gap

Ashby’s Gap

B L U E R I D

G

E

M

T N S

C

U

M B E R L A

N D

V A L L E Y

Potomac R

Antietam Cr

Susquehanna River

Shenandoah R

North Fork

South Fork

Bull Run

Aquia Cr

South Anna R

North Anna R

Mattaponi R

York R

James R

James R

Appomattox R

C H E S

A P E A K E B A Y

Potomac R

Patuxent R

MARYLAND

PENNSYL V ANIA

VIRGINIA

DEL A W ARE

Cumberland

Romney

Franklin

Moorefield

Winchester

Kernstown

Strasburg

Front Royal

Sperryville

New Market

Gettysburg

Cashtown

Chambersburg

Emmitsburg

Frederick

Sharpsburg

Hagerstown

McConnellsburg

Martinsburg

WASHINGTON

Leesburg

Orange

Chancellorsville

Spotsylvania

Culpeper

 Brandy Station

Manassas

Chantilly

Centreville

Alexandria

Fredericksburg

Gordonsville

Charlottesville

RICHMOND

Bermuda Hundred

Petersburg

Williamsburg

West Point

Urbana

Harrison’s Landing

Suffolk

Norfolk

Yorktown

Lynchburg

Appomattox

Cross Keys

Port Republic

Staunton

BALTIMORE

Havre de Grace

York

Harrisburg

Harpers Ferry

Carlisle

Ft. Monroe

0 10 20 30 40

Miles

1861–1865

MAJOR BATTLES

THE EASTERN THEATER

Engagement, Date Indicated

Major Railroads

High Ground Above 1000 Feet
the civil war, 1861

209

an army of 85,000 men and that he enforce the naval blockade of the 

Confederacy. Then the Army was to advance down the Mississippi to 

divide and conquer the South. The press ridiculed the strategy, calling 

it the Anaconda Plan, analogous to an anaconda snake’s slowly squeezing its prey to death. But few leaders examined the South in terms of 

its military geography or concentrated on a strategy to prevail over it. 

Instead, most thought in terms of political boundaries and a short war, 

perhaps even just one major battle, which would end with the capture 

of Richmond.

First Bull Run (First Manassas)

In the early summer of 1861 the partly trained ninety-day militia,

the almost untrained volunteers, and one newly organized battalion of 

regulars—a total force of 50,000 Federals commanded by Brig. Gen. 

Irvin McDowell—defended the nation’s capital. Thirty miles to the 

southwest, covering the rail and road hub at Manassas, Virginia, General Beauregard posted 20,000 Confederates, to be joined by 2,000 more 

within a few days. To the left, on their defensive line along the Potomac, 

the Confederates stationed another 11,000 men under Brig. Gen. Joseph 

E. Johnston in the Shenandoah Valley town of Winchester. Opposing 

Johnston around Martinsburg, with the mission of keeping the Confederates in place, was Maj. Gen. Robert Patterson with 18,000 Federals. 

On the extreme right of the Confederate northern Virginia defense line 

was Col. John B. Magruder’s force, which had recently repulsed Maj. 

Gen. Benjamin F. Butler’s Union troops at Big Bethel, Virginia, on 10 

June and forced them back into their sanctuary at Fort Monroe.

Big Bethel, the first large-scale engagement of the Civil War, demonstrated that neither opponent was as yet well trained. The Confederates had started preparations earlier to protect northern Virginia 

and therefore might have had a slight edge on their opponents. General McDowell, only recently a major of regulars, had less than three 

months to weld his three types of units (militia, volunteer, and regular) 

into a single fighting force. He attempted to do too much himself, and

there were few competent staff officers in the vicinity to help him.

McDowell’s largest tactical unit was a regiment until just before he 

marched out of Alexandria. Two to four brigades, plus a battery of 

regular artillery—the best arm against raw infantry—formed a division. 

In all, thirteen brigades were organized into five divisions. McDowell

parceled out his forty-nine guns among his brigade commanders, who 

in turn attached them to their regiments. His total force for the advance 

was 35,732 men, but of these one division of 5,752 men dropped off 

to guard roads to the rear.

McDowell’s advance against Beauregard on four parallel routes 

was hastened by Northern opinion, expressed in editorials and Congressional speeches, which demanded immediate action. Scott warned 

Lincoln against undertaking the “On to Richmond” campaign until 

McDowell’s troops had become disciplined units. But Lincoln, eager to 

use the ninety-day militia before they departed, demanded an advance, 

fully aware that the Confederates were also unseasoned and cherishing 

the belief that one defeat would force the South to quit. Scott, influenced by false intelligence that Beauregard would move immediately on 

Lincoln, eager to use the ninetyday militia before they departed, 

demanded an advance, fully 

aware that the Confederates 

were also unseasoned and 

cherishing the belief that one 

defeat would force the South to 

quit. 
American Military History

210

Washington, acceded. McDowell’s battle plan and preparations acceler-

ated accordingly. The plan, accepted in late June, called for Butler and 

Patterson to prevent the Confederates facing them from reinforcing 

Beauregard while McDowell advanced against Manassas to outflank

the Southern position. Scott called it a good plan on paper but knew 

Johnston was capable of frustrating it if given the chance. McDowell’s 

success against the Confederate center depended upon a rapid thirtymile march, if 35,000 Federals were to keep 22,000 Confederates from 

being reinforced.

OnJuly 16, 1861, the largest army ever assembled on the North

American continent up to that time advanced slowly on both sides of 

the Warrenton pike toward Bull Run. McDowell’s marching orders were 

good, but the effect was ruined by one unwise caution to the brigade 

commanders: “It will not be pardonable in any commander ... to come 

upon a battery or breastwork without a knowledge of its position.” 

The caution recalled to McDowell’s subordinates the currently sensa-

tionalized bugbear of the press of the Federal forces’ being fooled by 

“masked batteries.” (The term originated at Sumter, where a certain 

battery was constructed, masked by a house that was demolished just 

before the guns opened fire.) Accordingly, 35,000 men moved with

extreme caution just fiv

e miles on the seventeenth.

The next day the

Federals occupied Centreville, four miles east of Stone Bridge, which 

carried the Warrenton pike over Bull Run creek. (Map 24)

Beauregard’s advance guards made no effort to delay the Federals 

but fell back across the battle line, now extending three miles along the 

west bank of Bull Run, which meandered from Stone Bridge southeast 

until it joined the Occoquan stream. The country was fairly rough, cut by 

streams and thickly wooded. It presented formidable obstacles to attack-

ing raw troops, but a fair shelter for equally raw troops on the defensive. 

On the eighteenth, while McDowell’s main body waited at Centreville 

for the trains to close up, the leading division demonstrated against 

Beauregard’s right around Mitchell’s Ford. The Federal infantry retired 

after

a sharpmusketryfight, anda 45-minute artillery duelensued. Itwas

thefirstexchange of four standardtypes of artillery ammunition for

allmuzzleloading guns,whether rifled or smoothbore. Solid shot, shell,

sphericalcase or shrapnel, andcanister fromeightFederal gunsfiring

415 rounds were answered by seven Confederate pieces returning 310 

rounds. Steadily withdrawing its guns, the oldest and best-drilled unit of 

the South, the Washington Light Artillery of New Orleans, broke off 

the

fight againstwell-trainedU.S. regular artillery. Bot

h sides had used

rifled artillery,whichgreatly increasedthe accuracy andgavea rang

e

more than double that of the smoothbores. Yet throughout the war 

rifled guns never supplantedthe new,easily loaded Napoleons. Inthe

fight, defective Confederate ammunitionfired fromthree new 3-inch

iron rifleswould notfly point foremost buttumbled and lost range

against McDowell’s gunners. That the error went undetected for days 

reveals the haste in which Davis had procured his ordnance.

Sure that hisgreen troops could not flank the Confederate right,

McDowell tarried two more fateful days before he attacked in force. 

Engineers reconnoitered for an undefended ford north of Stone 

Bridge. Finding no vedettes at the ford near Sudley Springs, McDowell 

decided to envelop the Confederate left on July 21 and destroy the 
Map 24

Catharp ni Cr

Young's Br

Bull Run

Cub

Ru

n

Broad Run

Sudley Springs

New Market

Groveton

Centreville

Manassas

Gainesville

Hay Market

 M A N A S S A S G A P R R

ORANGE AND AL E X ANDR IA R R

U N F I N I S H E D R R

Stone Bridge

Henry

Robinson

THOROUGHFARE

GAP

to Washington

WARRENTON TURNPIKE

J O H N S T O N

F R O M

S H E N A N D O A H VA L L E Y

Afternoon

21 Jul

20 Jul

Morning

21 Jul

B E A U R E G A R D

M c D O W E L L ' S M A I N E F F O R T

21 JUL

DIVERSION 21 JUL FORDS PROBED 18 JUL

UNION

16–20 JUL

CONCENTRATION

16–21 July 1861

BATTLE OF BULL RUN

Axis of Union MovementAxis of Confederate MovementMajor EngagementHigh Ground Above 500 Feet

Miles

1 2 1 0
American Military History

212

Manassas Gap Railroad to keep Johnston from reinforcing the outnumbered Beauregard. The idea was excellent, but the timing was slow.

While McDowell frittered away four-and-a-half days before he was 

ready to envelop in force, new tools of warfare swung the advantages 

of mobility, surprise, and mass at critical points toward Beauregard. 

On July 17 spies in Washington told of McDowell’s departure from 

Alexandria. By electric telegraph Beauregard in turn alerted Richmond. 

Davis, also telegraphing, ordered commanders around Richmond, at 

Aquia Creek, and at Winchester to concentrate their available strength 

at Manassas. Johnston lost no time in deceiving Patterson by using Col. 

J. E. B. Stuart’s cavalry as a screen and adroitly maneuvering his infantry 

away from the valley. Johnston selected the best overland routes for his 

artillery and cavalry marches and arranged for railroad officials to move

his four infantry brigades. Brig. Gen. Thomas Jackson’s lead brigade, 

accompanied by Johnston himself, covered fifty-seven miles in twentyfive hours by road and rail to reach Beauregard on the twentieth.

At daylight on the twenty-first McDowell unmasked the first phase

of his attack plan. Three brigades of Brig. Gen. Daniel Tyler’s division 

appeared before Stone Bridge; and a huge, 30-lb. Parrott rifle dragged

into place by ten horses commenced a slow fire directed by six cannoneers of the 2d U.S. Artillery. Five brigades in two divisions directly under 

McDowell’s command meanwhile marched on an eight-mile circuitous 

route toward the undefended ford at Sudley Springs. McDowell’s goal 

was the Confederate left rear and a chance to cut the railroad. The movement was not unobserved, however. At 9:00 a.m. a signal flag wigwag

from the Henry house announced the point of the enveloping columns 

at Sudley’s crossing, and the intelligence was immediately relayed to 

Beauregard and Johnston, three miles away on the Confederate right.

The first weight of the Federal attack fell against eleven Confederate companies and two guns. For an hour McDowell’s regiments, firing

one by one and moving forward cautiously in piecemeal fashion, tried 

to overrun Beauregard’s left flank. The timid tactics gave Beauregard

time to redeploy ten regiments across a three-mile front to form a second defensive line across the north face of the hill behind the Henry 

house. At 10:30 a.m., as the summer sun grew hotter, a portentous dust 

cloud ten miles northwest of Manassas heralded the arrival of Kirby 

Smith’s brigade, the tail of Johnston’s reinforcements from the Shenandoah Valley.

For two hours the roar of the battle swelled in volume. Federal 

musketry crashes and the thunder from the heavier pieces indicated 

that McDowell was now committing whole brigades supported by four 

batteries of artillery. North of the Warrenton turnpike, the Confederate infantry began to lose its brigade cohesion and fall back in disorder. 

As Beauregard and Johnston rode to the sound of battle, 10,000 Federals were punishing 7,000 Confederates in the vicinity of the Henry and 

Robinson houses. Johnston, though senior in command, turned the 

battle over to Beauregard and galloped off toward Manassas to direct 

the arrival of reinforcements. Brig. Gen. Barnard E. Bee’s brigade was 

pushed back from its advanced position toward the flat-crested hill

behind the Henry house, where Jackson’s newly arrived brigade had 

formed. In rallying his routed troops, Bee shouted: “Look at Jackson’s 

Brigade; it stands like a stone wall! Rally behind the Virginians!” (Out 

In rallying his routed troops, 

Bee shouted: “Look at Jackson’s 

Brigade; it stands like a stone 

wall! Rally behind the Virginians!”
the civil war

, 1861

213

of these words came a nickname that Jackson would carry to his grave, 

and afte

r his death in 1863 the ConfederateWar Department officially

designated his unit the Stonewall Brigade.) Screened by a wooded area, 

three brigades regrouped behind Jackson’s lines; and the rally became a 

great equalizer as McDowell’s strength dissipated to 9,000 men with no 

immediate infantry reserves in sight.

The cloud of dust moved closer to Manassas Junction, but McDow-

ell ignored it and allowed a lull to settle over his front for almost two 

hours. At 2:00 

p.m., having deployed two batteries of regular artillery 

directly to his front around the Henry house with insufficient infantry

protection, McDowell renewed the battle. By midafternoon the dust 

had blended sweaty uniforms into a common hue, and more and more 

cases of mistaken identity were confusing both sides in the smoke of 

the battle. Then, as part of the confusion, came a fateful episode. To the 

right front of McDowell’s exposed artillery, a line of advancing blueclad infantry, the 33d Regiment, Virginia Volunteers, suddenly appeared 

through the smoke. The Federal artillery commander ordered canister, 

but thechief artillery officer on McDowell’s staffoverruled the order,

claiming that the oncoming blue uniforms belonged to friendly infantry 

arriving in support. The Virginians advanced to within seventy yards 

of the Federal guns, leveled their muskets, and let loose. The shock 

of their volley cut the artillery to shreds; and for the remainder of the 

day nine Federal guns stood silent, unserved, and helpless between the 

armies.

About 4:00 

p.m., Beauregard, with two additional fresh brigades, 

advanced his entire line. Shorn of their artillery, the faltering Federal 

lines soon lost cohesion and began to pull back along the routes they 

knew; there was more and more confusion as they retired. East of Bull 

Run, Federal artillery, using Napoleon smoothbores in this initial pull-

back from the field, proved to the unsuspecting Confederate cavalry,

using classic saber-charging tactics, that a determined line of artillery

-

men could reduce cavalry to dead and sprawling infantry in minutes.

As in so many battles of the Civil War yet to come, there was no 

organized pursuit in strength to cut the enemy to ribbons while he fled

from the immediate area ofthe battlefield. At BullRun, theFederal

withdrawal turned intoa panic-stricken flight about 6:30

p.m., when 

Cub Run Bridge, about a mile west of Centreville, was blocked by over-

turned wagons. President Davis, just arrived from Richmond, had two 

daylight hours to arrive at a decision for pursuit. In council with John-

ston and Beauregard, Davis instructed the whole Confederate right to 

advance against the Centreville road, but apparently his orders were 

never delivered or Beauregard neglected to follow them. Davis thus lost 

a splendid opportunity for seeing in person whether the unused infan-

try and artillery on the right of his line could have made a concerted 

effort to destroy McDowell’s fleeing forces. Logistically,

Federal booty

taken over the next two days by the Confederates would have sustained 

them for days in an advance against Washington.

Strategically, Bull Run was important to the Confederates only 

because the center of their Virginia defenses had held. Tactically, the 

action highlights many of the problems and deficiencies that

were typi-

cal of the first year of thewar. BullRunwasa clash between large, illtrained bodies of recruits who were slow in joining battle. The rumor 
American Military History

214

of masked batteries frightened commanders; plans called for maneuvering the enemy out of position, but attacks were frontal; security 

principles were disregarded; tactical intelligence was nil; and reconnaissance was poorly executed. Soldiers were overloaded for battle. Neither commander was able to employ his whole force effectively. Of 

McDowell’s 35,000 men, only 18,000 crossed Bull Run and casualties 

among these, including the missing, numbered about 2,708. Beauregard, with 32,000 men, ordered only 18,000 into action and lost 1,982.

Both commanders rode along the front, often interfering in smallunit actions. McDowell led his enveloping column instead of directing 

all his forces from the rear. Wisely, Johnston left the battlefield and

went to the rear to hasten his Shenandoah Valley reserves. Regiments 

were committed piecemeal. Infantry failed to protect exposed artillery. 

Artillery was parceled out under infantry command; only on the retreat 

was the Union senior artillery officer on the scene allowed to manage

his guns. He saved twenty-one guns of the forty-nine that McDowell 

had. Beauregard’s orders were oral, vague, and confusing. Some were 

delivered, others were never followed.

The Second Uprising in 1861

The Southern victory near Manassas had an immediate and longrange effect on the efforts of both the Northern and the Southern 

states. First, it compelled Northern leaders to face up to the nature 

and scope of the struggle and to begin the task of putting the Union 

Shield of the Capital: The Washington Forts

In 1861, after the secession of the southern states, the 

city of Washington stood as a 

symbol of the Union. In the midst 

of hostile Virginia and unfriendly 

Maryland, northern leadership worried over the safety of 

their capital. After the disaster 

at Bull Run, General McClellan 

appointed Maj. John G. Barnard 

to supervise the construction 

of a fortification system for 

Washington. By the end of the 

year, Barnard had overcome 

manpower and terrain problems 

to construct forty-eight forts around the city. With the fighting in northern Virginia from 1862–1864, the threat 

to the capital remained and its defenses were continually improved. By the end of the war, Washington had 

become the world’s most heavily fortified city, surrounded by sixty-eight enclosed forts and batteries with over 

900 guns, supported by another ninety-three batteries for field guns and twenty miles of trenches.

Officers of 55th Infantry at Fort Gaines, near Tenley, D.C.
the civil war

, 1861

215

on a full war footing. Second, it made them more willing to heed the 

advice of professional soldiers directing military operations along a vast 

continental land front from Point Lookout, Maryland, to Fort Craig 

in central New Mexico. Third, Confederate leaders, after their feeling 

of invincibility quickly wore off, called for 400,000 volunteers, sought 

critical military items in Europe, and turned to planning operations that 

might swing the remaining slaveholding states and territories into the 

Confederacy. Finally, the most potent immediate influence of Bull

Run

was upon the European powers, which eyed the Confederacy as a bel

-

ligerent with much potential for political intervention and as a source 

of revenue. Unless the

U.S. Navy could make it unprofitable for pri-

vate merchant ships to deliver arms to Southern ports and depart with 

agriculturalgoods, speculative capitalwould flow increasingly into the

contraband trade

.

Strategically, in 1861 the Navy made the most important contribu-

tion toward an ultimate Union victory. At considerable expense and in 

haste to make the blockade effective, the Navy by the end of the year 

had assembled 200 ships of every description, armed them after a fash-

ion, and placed them on station. With new congressional acts regarding 

piracy, revenue, confiscation, and enforcement in hand, commanders

ofthis motley fleet intercepted more and more swift blockaderunners

steaming out of Nassau, Bermuda, and Havana on their three-day run 

to Wilmington, North Carolina; Charleston, South Carolina; or Savan-

nah, Georgia. In two round trips a blockade runner, even if lost on 

its

thirdvoyage, still produceda considerable profit to itsowner. By

the end of 1861 suc

h profit

was no longer easy, because the Navy had

many new fast ships specially fitted for blockade duty in service.

After 1861 the navalcharacter of thewarchanged.Therewas no

Civil War on the high seas except for the exciting exploits of three or 

four Confederate cruisers that raided commercial shipping. As the war 

progressed, both opponents perfected the nature and construction of 

ships and naval ordnance for a war that would be fought in coastal 

waters or inside defensible harbors

.The three mainweapons, the rifled

naval gun, the armored ram, and the torpedo mine, were developed 

and used in novel ways. To offset the defensive use of these weapons 

by the South, theU.S. Navy beginning inAugust 1861 landed more and

more Army expeditionary forces and gradually gained footholds in the 

vicinity of Mobile, Savannah, Charleston, and Wilmington. By the end 

of the war, joint Navy-Army expeditions would convert the sea block-

ade into a military occupation and would seal off all major ports in 

the South. Even more important

were the river fleets of theU.S. Navy

on the Ohio

, Missouri, and Mississippi Rivers.

These fleets

, operating

closely with the local Army commanders, provided essential elements 

in the evolving Union strategy of splitting the Confederacy along the 

natural invasion routes of the river valleys. 

The defeat at Bull Run was followed by “a second uprising” in 

the North that greatly surpassed the effort after Sumter’s surrender. 

President Lincoln and Congress set to with a will to raise and train 

the large Federal armies that would be required to defeat the South, 

to selec

t competent Army field commanders, and to reorganize and

strengthen theWar Department. OnJuly 22, 1861, Lincolncalled fora

500,000-man force of three-year volunteers and during the rest of July 
American Military History

216

quickly disbanded the ninety-day militia. The more experienced men 

entered the newly authorized volunteer force. Meanwhile, the volunteer quota and the increase of regulars, mobilized after Sumter, had so 

far progressed that camps and garrisons, established at strategic points 

along the 1,950-mile boundary with the border states and territories, 

were bustling with activity. As July ended, Congress authorized the volunteers to serve for the duration of the war and perfected their regimental organization. Four regiments were grouped into a brigade, and 

three brigades formed a division. The infantry corps structure would be 

fixed when the President directed. In effect, the Lincoln administration

was building a Federal force, as opposed to one based on joint stateFederal control and support. State governors, given a quota according 

to a state’s population, raised 1,000-man volunteer regiments, bought 

locally whatever the units needed, shipped them to federal training centers, and presented all bills to the U.S. government. Accordingly, Congress floated a national loan of $250 million.

Pending the transformation of volunteer forces, both opponents necessarily suspended major military operations in the east for 

the remainder of 1861. President Lincoln conferred frequently with

General Scott and his military advisers about steps already taken to 

strengthen Union forces along the continental front. Regular Army 

units were consolidating their position at Fort Craig and Fort Union to 

protect the upper Rio Grande valley against any Confederate columns 

coming from Texas. To protect communication lines to the Pacific and

the southwest and to guard Federal supplies at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and St. Louis, Missouri, Union troops were deployed in eastern 

Kansas and across central Missouri. 

In terms of territorial gain and long-term strategic value, the Western Theater of Operations was more active in 1861 than wasthe Eastern.

Both Union and Confederacy coveted Kentucky and Missouri. The conArmy Camp #6, Amos G. Chapman, n.d.
the civil war, 1861

217

fluence of the Tennessee, Cumberland, and Ohio Rivers lay within Kentucky; while the vast Mississippi-Missouri river network flowed through

Missouri. Whoever controlled these two states and these rivers had a 

great strategic advantage. At the onset of hostilities, Kentucky adopted a 

policy of neutrality. The loss of Kentucky, in Lincoln’s judgment, would 

be “nearly the same as to lose the whole game,” so he carefully respected 

Kentucky’s decision in May to remain neutral. But a Confederate force 

occupied the strategically important town of Columbus, Kentucky, overlooking the Mississippi River, on fears that Brig. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant, 

poised across the Ohio River at Cairo, Illinois, would do so first. The

rebel move into Kentucky violated that state’s neutrality stance, and Kentucky’s legislature responded by requesting that Union forces remove the 

Confederate invaders. On September 6 Grant launched a joint ArmyNavy operation into Kentucky and occupied the towns of Paducah and 

Southland at the mouth of the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers. This 

move prevented further Confederate advances in Kentucky and positioned Grant’s forces for campaigns in 1862.

In Missouri, pro-Southern and Unionist sympathizers fought a violent campaign for control. A 6,000-man Federal force under Brig. Gen.

Nathaniel Lyon defeated Southern militia to occupy the state capital 

at Jefferson City. A Confederate army of nearly 13,000 moved from 

Arkansas to destroy the smaller Union force. At Wilson’s Creek, Lyon 

launched a preemptive strike against the rebel camp in the early morning of 10 August, dividing his numerically inferior troops and assaulting 

from the north and south. The Southern army quickly recovered and 

regrouped. Outgunned, the Union force fought off three Confederate 

counterattacks against Bloody Hill before it was able to break contact 

and withdraw. Based on the number of troops engaged, Wilson’s Creek 

was the most costly Civil War battle in 1861, with the Confederates losing 1,222 killed and wounded. Union casualities were 1,317, including 

Lyon, the first general officer to be killed in the conflict. The victory

at Wilson’s Creek buoyed Confederate morale. But Union forces under 

Charles C. Fremont and later Henry W. Halleck occupied central Missouri and contained rebel forces in the southwestern corner of the state 

for the remainder of 1861.

A battle with equally long-term consequences was fought for western Virginia. Forty counties elected to secede from Virginia and asked 

for Federal troops to assist them in repelling any punitive expeditions 

emerging from the Shenandoah Valley. Between May and early July 

1861, Ohio volunteers, under the command of Maj. Gen. George B.

McClellan, occupied the Grafton area of western Virginia, hoping to 

protect the railroad that linked the Ohio Valley with Baltimore. In a 

series of clashes at Philippi, Beverly, and along the Cheat River, McClellan’s forces checked the invading Confederates, paving the way for West 

Virginia’s entrance into the Union. Even the arrival of Jefferson Davis’ 

principal military adviser and Commander of the Confederate forces in 

Virginia, not yet the Commander of the Army of Northern Virginia, 

General Robert E. Lee, failed to reverse Union gains. Lee attempted 

to coordinate several overly ambitious offensives in the Tygart and 

Kanawha River valleys; but poor roads, dispirited troops, miserable 

weather, and shortages of supply led to a series of failures. He returned 

to Richmond after this failure of his first major campaign by the end of General McClellan’s Field Glasses, ca. 1861
American Military History

218

October 1861. His reputation as a military commander suffered, while

that of his principal foe, General McClellan, soared; some saw McClellan as the “hope of the North.”

Although the border strife intensified in the west, Scott attended

to the more important front facing Virginia. The nation’s capital was 

imperiled, the Potomac was directly under Confederate guns, and Maryland and Delaware were being used as recruiting areas for the Southern cause. On July 22, Lincoln, following Scott’s advice, summoned 

McClellan, who was thirty-five years old at the time, to Washington,

and assigned him command, under Scott, of all the troops in the Washington area. McClellan’s reputation was unrivaled, and the public had 

acclaimed him for his victories in western Virginia. On August 21 

McClellan named his force the Army of the Potomac and commenced 

molding it, with considerable skill, into a formidable machine.

McClellan organized the Army of the Potomac into eleven 10,000-

man divisions, each with three brigades of infantry, a cavalry regiment, 

and four six-gun batteries. In general the other Union armies adopted 

this structure, and the Confederates deviated from the model only 

in their cavalry organization. In the Army of Northern Virginia, for 

example, General Lee treated his cavalry as a tactical arm, grouped first

as a division and later as a cavalry corps. Union cavalry consisted of 

little more than mounted infantry, carrying out a multitude of duties, 

such as serving as pickets, wagon train escorts, and couriers for the division commander. McClellan planned, once Lincoln activated the corps, 

to withdraw one-half of the artillery pieces from each infantry division 

and center them at corps level as a reserve to be deployed under army 

command. He insisted that the .58-caliber single-shot, muzzleloading 

Springfield rifle be the standard weapon of the infantry, and most of

the Army of the Potomac possessed it when corps were organized on 

March 8, 1862.

McClellan completely transformed the military atmosphere around 

Washington before the end of 1861. He was an able administrator, but

his critics doubted his abilities as a top field commander. And from the

day McClellan activated the Army of the Potomac, he was politically 

active in trying to oust Winfield Scott. Finally, on November 1, the aged

and harassed General in Chief, taking advantage of a new law, retired 

from the Army. That same day, acting on assurances that McClellan 

could handle two tasks concurrently, Lincoln made McClellan the 

General in Chief and retained him in command of the Army of the 

Potomac. By the ninth, basing his action on Scott’s earlier groundwork, 

McClellan carved out five new departments in the west, all commanded

by Regular Army officers. In addition, he continued the work of the

new Department of New England, where General Butler was already 

forming volunteer regiments for scheduled amphibious operations off 

the Carolina coast and in the Gulf of Mexico.

For the Union cause in Kentucky, the new General in Chief ’s move 

came none too soon. After Kentucky declared for the Union on September 20, both sides rapidly concentrated forces in western Kentucky. 

Maj. Gen. Albert S. Johnston, recently appointed to command Confederate forces in the west, fortified Bowling Green and extended his

defensive line to Columbus. Union troops immediately occupied Louisville and planned advances down the railroad to Nashville, Tennessee, Model 1861 Springfield Rifle, Caliber .58
the civil war, 1861

219

and eastward into the Appalachians. By November 15, the commanders of the Departments of the Ohio and the Missouri, dividing their 

operational boundaries in Kentucky along the Cumberland River, were 

exchanging strategic plans with McClellan in anticipation of a grand 

offensive in the spring of 1862.

The outpouring of troops and their preparations for battle disrupted the leisurely pace of the War Department. In haste to supply, 

equip, and deploy the second quota of volunteers, a score or more 

of states competed not only against one another but also against the 

Federal government. Profiteers demanded exorbitant prices for scarce

items, which frequently turned out to be worthless. Unbridled graft and 

extravagance were reflected in the bills that the states presented to the

War Department for payment. After Bull Run a concerted, widespread 

movement emerged for the dismissal of Secretary of War Simon Cameron, who had failed to manage his office efficiently. Cameron selected

Edwin M. Stanton, former Attorney General in President Buchanan’s 

Cabinet, as his special counsel to handle all legal arguments justifying 

the War Department’s purchasing policies. Knowing that the cabinet 

post had considerable potential, Stanton worked hard to restore the 

War Department’s prestige. Behind the scenes Stanton aided his fellow 

Democrat, McClellan, in outfitting the Army of the Potomac. As the

summer faded, Stanton, having once scoffed at Lincoln early in the war, 

ingratiated himself with the President and his key Cabinet members by 

urging his pro-Union views. In January 1862 Lincoln replaced Cameron

with Stanton, who immediately set out to make his cabinet position the 

most powerful in Lincoln’s administration.

Self-confident, arrogant, abrupt, and contemptuous of incompetent military leaders, Stanton was also fiercely energetic, incorruptible,

and efficient. Respecting few men and fearing none, he did his best to

eliminate favoritism and see to it that war contracts were honestly negotiated and faithfully filled. Few men liked Stanton, but almost all high

officials respected him. Stanton insisted that the Army receive whatever

it needed, and the best available, so no campaign by any Union army 

would ever fail for want of supplies.

From the day that Stanton took office, the structure of the War

Department was centralized to handle the growing volume of business. 

Each bureau chief reported directly to Stanton, but the responsibility 

became so heavy that he delegated procurement and distribution matters to three assistant secretaries. Because the Quartermaster General’s 

Department transported men and materiel, operated the depot system, 

constructed camps, and handled the largest number of contracts, it 

soon became the most important agency of the General Staff. Hardworking, efficient, and loyal, Montgomery C. Meigs as Quartermaster

General was an organizing genius and one of the few career officers

to whom Stanton would listen. To complete his department, Stanton 

added three major bureaus during the war: the Judge Advocate General’s Office in 1862; the Signal Department in 1863; and the Provost

Marshal General’s Bureau in 1863 to administer the draft (enrollment)

act. In the same year the Corps of Topographical Engineers merged 

with the Corps of Engineers.

Stanton faced mobilization problems and home front crises of 

unprecedented magnitude. Loyal states were bringing half a million 

Stanton insisted that the Army 

receive whatever it needed, 

and the best available, so no 

campaign by any Union army 

would ever fail for want of 

supplies.
American Military History

220

men under arms. Grain, wool, leather, lumber, metals, and fuel were 

being turned into food, clothing, vehicles, and guns, and thousands of 

draft animals were being purchased and shipped from every part of 

the North. A well-managed Federal authority was needed to assume 

the states’ obligations, to train volunteer units in the use of their tools 

of war, and then to deploy them along a vast continental front. By 

exploiting the railroad, steamship, and telegraph, the War Department 

provided

fieldcommandersa noveltype of mobility intheir opera-

tions. Stanton’s major task was to control all aspects of this outpouring 

of the nation’s resources. If war contracts were tainted, the Union sol-

diers might despair. Moral aswell asfinancial bankruptcycouldeasily

wreck Union hopes of victory. In addition, Stanton had the job of sup-

pressing subversion, of timing the delicate matter of enrolling African 

Americans in the Army, and of cooperating with a radical-dominated 

Congress, a strong-willed Cabinet, and a conservative-minded Army. 

With a lawyer’s training, Stanton, like Lincoln, knew little about mili-

tary affairs, and there was little time for him to learn. Anticipating that 

President Lincoln would soon call for War Department plans for the 

spring 1862 offensives, Stanton researched

every document hecould

find on Army administration,consulted his bureauchiefs about readi-

ness, and prepared himself to work with the General in Chief on stra-

tegic matters.

When he took office, Stanton found that theWar Department hada

rival in the form of the Joint Congressional Committee on the Conduct 

of the War. The committee originated in an investigation of a badly 

executed reconnaissance at Ball’s Bluff on the Potomac on October 

21, 1861, in whic

hvolunteer officer and popular former Senator Col.

Edward D. Baker, was killed. By subsequently searching out graft and 

inefficiency, the committee did

valuable service, but it alsovexed the

President, Stanton, and most of the generals during the war. Composed 

of extreme antislavery men without military knowledge and experience, 

the committee probed the battles, tried to force all its views regarding 

statecraft and strategy on the President, and put forward its own can-

didates for high command. Suspicious of proslavery men and men of 

moderate views

, it considered that the onlygenerals fit for officewere

those who had been abolitionists before 1861.

As the year ended both North and South were earnestly preparing 

for a hard war. Both opponents were raising and training huge armies 

totaling nearly a million men. Fort Sumter and bloody Bull Run were 

over, and each side was gathering its resources for the even bloodier 

struggles to come.

Discussion Questions

1. Howwas theWar Department organized in 1861? Discuss the

administrative and tactical organization of the U.S. Army units at the 

onset of the Civil War.

2. What military and political challenges did Lincoln as Commander 

in Chief face after the secession of the Southern states? How did Fort 

Sumter change the situation?
the civil war

, 1861

221

3. What advantages and disadvantages did each side have at the 

beginning of the war? Discuss their relative importance to the ultimate 

outcome.

4. Discuss the campaign of First Bull Run. What were the goals of 

the two armies, and how did they seek to achieve them? Why did the 

Confederates win? Why did the Union lose?

5. How did McClellan reorganize the Union Army? Was the reor-

ganization effective? What were its principal strengths and weaknesses?

6. Asses

s the relative strengths and

weaknesses of the Union and

Confederatewar efforts at the end of 1861.Which side doyou think

was in the best overall position? Recommen

ded Readings

Catton, Bruce. The Coming Fury: The Centennial History of the Civil War, 3 

vols. Garden City: Doubleday, 1963, vol. 1.

Davis, William C. Look Away: A History of the Confederate States of America. New York: Free Press, 2002.

Foote, Shelby. The Civil War: A Narrative, 3 vols. New York: Random 

House, 1958, vol. 1.

Hagerman, Edward. The American Civil War and the Origins of Modern 

Warfare: Ideas, Organization and Field Command. Bloomington: Indi-

ana University Press, 1988.

Josephy, Alvin M., Jr. The Civil War in the American West. New York: 

Vintage Books, 1993.

Linderman, Gerald E. Embattled Courage: The Experience of Combat in the 

American Civil War. New York: Free Press, 1987.

Newell, Clayton R. Lee vs. McClellan: The First Campaign. Washington, 

D.C.: Regnery, 1996.

Rafuse, Ethan S. A Single Grand Victory: The First Campaign and Battle of 

Manassas. Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources, Inc., 2002.

Other Readings

Brooksher, William R., Bloody Hill: The Civil War Battle of Wilson’s Creek. 

Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s Inc., 1995.

Davis, William C. Battle of Bull Run: A History of the First Major Campaign 

of the Civil War. Garden City: Doubleday, 1977.

Freeman, Douglas Southall. Lee’s Lieutenants: A Study in Command, 3 vols. 

New York: Scribner Classics, 1997, vol. 1. 

McPherson, James M. Battle Cry of Freedom. New York: Oxford Univer-

sity Press, 1988.

Mitchell, Joseph B. Military Leaders of the Civil War, 2d ed. McLean, Va.: 

EPM Publications, 1988.

Piston, William G., and Richard W. Hatcher III. Wilson’s Creek: The Second Battle of the Civil War and the Men Who Fought It. Chapel Hill: 

University of North Carolina Press, 2000.

Sears, Stephen W. George B. McClellan: The Young Napoleon. New York: 

Da Capo Press, 1999.

I

n 1862 the armed forces of the United States undertook the first

massive campaigns to defeat the Southern Confederacy. Better organization, training, and leadership would be displayed on both sides 

as the combat became more intense. Young American citizen-soldiers 

would find that war was not a romantic adventure, and their leaders

would learn that every victory had its price. It was to be a year of bitter 

lessons for both sides.

As the winter of 1861–1862 wore on, General in Chief George B.

McClellan, who more often than not took counsel of his fears, exaggerated his difficulties and the enemy’s strength while discounting the

Confederacy’s problems. He organized, drilled, and trained the Army 

of the Potomac while western forces under his general command accomplished little. President Abraham Lincoln and the Union waited 

impatiently for a conclusive engagement. But neither the Union nor the 

Confederate Army showed much inclination to move, each side seemingly intent on perfecting itself before attempting to strike what each 

hoped would be a decisive blow.

The President was particularly eager to support Unionist sentiment in east Tennessee by moving forces in that direction. Above all 

he wanted a concerted movement to crush the rebellion quickly. In an 

effort to push matters, Lincoln issued General War Order No. 1 on 

January 27, 1862. This order, besides superfluously telling the armies to

obey existing orders, directed that a general movement of land and sea 

forces against the Confederacy be launched on February 22, 1862. Lincoln’s issuance of an order for an offensive several weeks in advance, 

without considering what the weather and the roads might be like, has 

been scoffed at frequently. But apparently he issued it with the primary 

purpose of getting McClellan to agree to move.

The War in the East: The Army 

of the Potomac Moves South

As the year 1862 began, in the Eastern Theater plans prepared

in Washington were aimed at the capture of Richmond rather than 

10

The Civil War, 1862
American Military History

224

destruction of the army commanded by Joseph E. Johnston, now a full 

general. Precise methods for reaching the Confederate capital differed. 

President Lincoln favored an overland advance that would always keep 

an army between the Confederates and Washington. McClellan agreed 

at first and then changed his views in favor of a waterborne move

by the Army of the Potomac to Urbana on the Rappahannock. From 

there, he could drive to Richmond before Johnston could retire from 

the Manassas area to intercept him. He felt that the Washington fortifications, an elaborate system of earthen forts and battery emplacements 

then in advanced stages of construction, would adequately protect the 

capital while the field army was away. Johnston, however, rendered this

plan obsolete; he withdrew from Manassas to Fredericksburg, halfway 

between the two capitals and astride McClellan’s prospective route of 

advance. Early in March McClellan moved his army out to the deserted 

Confederate camps around Manassas to give his troops some field experience. While he was in the field, Lincoln relieved him as General in

Chief, doubtless on the ground that he could not command one army 

in the field and at the same time supervise the operations of all the

armies of the United States. Lincoln did not appoint a successor. For 

a time he and Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton took over personal 

direction of the Army with the advice of a newly constituted Army 

board consisting of the elderly Maj. Gen. Ethan A. Hitchcock and the 

chiefs of the War Department bureaus.

Naval Engagement in Hampton Roads, J. Davis after C. Parsons, 1863
the civil war, 1862

225

When events overtook the Urbana scheme, McClellan began to advocate a seaborne move to Fort Monroe, Virginia (at the tip of the peninsula formed by the York and James Rivers), to be followed by an overland advance up the peninsula. If the troops moved fast, he maintained, 

they could cover the seventy-five miles to Richmond before Johnston

could concentrate his forces to stop them. This plan had promise, for 

it took advantage of Federal control of the seas and a useful base of 

operations at Fort Monroe and there were fewer rivers to cross than by 

the overland route. Successful neutralization of the Confederate ironclad Virginia (formerly the U.S.S. Merrimac) by the Union’s revolutionary 

ironclad Monitor on March 9 had eliminated any naval threat to supply 

and communications lines, but the absence of good roads and the difficult terrain of the peninsula offered drawbacks to the plan. Lincoln approved it, providing McClellan would leave behind the number of men 

that his corps commanders considered adequate to ensure the safety of 

Washington. McClellan gave the President his assurances but failed to 

take Lincoln into his confidence by pointing out that he considered the

Federal troops in the Shenandoah Valley to be covering Washington. In 

listing the forces he had left behind, he counted some men twice and 

included several units in Pennsylvania not under his command.

Embarkation began in mid-March, and by April 4 advance elements had moved out of Fort Monroe against Yorktown. The day before, however, the commander of the Washington defenses reported 

that he had insufficient forces to protect the city. In addition, Lt. Gen.

Thomas J. “Stonewall” Jackson had become active in the Shenandoah Valley. Lincoln thereupon told Stanton to detain one of the two 

corps that were awaiting embarkation at Alexandria. Stanton held back 

Brig. Gen. Irvin McDowell’s corps of 30,000 men, seriously affecting 

McClellan’s plans.

Jackson’s Valley Campaign

While a small Confederate garrison at Yorktown made ready to 

delay McClellan, Johnston hurried his army to the peninsula. In Richmond, Confederate authorities had determined on a spectacularly bold 

diversion. Robert E. Lee, who had moved rapidly to the rank of full 

general, had assumed the position of military adviser to Confederate President Jefferson Davis on March 13. Charged with the conduct 

of operations of the Confederate armies under Davis’ direction, Lee 

saw that any threat to Washington would cause progressive weakening of McClellan’s advance against Richmond. He therefore ordered 

Jackson to begin a rapid campaign in the Shenandoah Valley close to 

the Northern capital. (See Map 25.) The equivalent of three Federal divisions was sent to the valley to destroy Jackson. Lincoln and Stanton, 

using the telegraph and what military knowledge they had acquired, 

devised plans to bottle up Jackson and destroy him. But Federal forces 

in the valley were not under a locally unified command. They moved

too slowly; one force did not obey orders strictly; and directives from 

Washington often neglected to take time, distance, or logistics into 

account. Also, in Stonewall Jackson, the Union troops were contending against one of the most outstanding field commanders America

has ever produced. Jackson’s philosophy of war was: “Always mystify, 

General George B. McClellan

Matthew Brady, 1861
Map 25

6

8

1

7

2 9

10

11

5

4

3

Fremont

(15,000)

Banks

(18,000)

Ashby’s Gap

Manassas

Gap

B l u e R i d g e M t n s

M a s s a n u t t e n M t n s

Turner’s

Gap

Crampton’s

Gap

Potomac R

Antietam

Cr

Shenandoah R

North Fork

South Fork

Bull Run

North Anna R

M A R Y LAN D

W E S T VIRGINIA

PENN S Y L V A NIA

VIRGINIA

Cumberland

Romney

Franklin

McDowell

Moorefield

Sharpsburg

Hagerstown

Martinsburg

Leesburg

Orange

Chancellorsville

Spotsylvania

Culpeper Brandy Station

Gordonsville

Charlottesville

Staunton

Harpers Ferry

Winchester Kernstown

Strasburg

Front Royal

Cross Keys

Port Republic

New Market CHRONOLOG Y

 1 Battle of Kernstown, 23 March

 2 Battle of McDowell, 8 May

 3 Jackson Returns to New Market, 20 May

 4 Jackson joins Ewell at Luray, 21 May 

 5 Battle of Front Royal, 23 May 

 6 Banks withdraws North, 24 May 

 7 Battle of Winchester, 25 May 

 8 Intended Federal Trap, Strasbourg, 31 May 

 9 Battle of Cross Keys, 8 June

10 Battle of Port Republic, 9 June

11 Jackson moves to join Lee, 24 June 

JACKSON’S VALLEY CAMPAIGN

THE EASTERN THEATER

March–June 1862

0 10 20 30

Miles

Dispositions of Federal Troops

Route of Jackson’s Valley Campaign

High Ground above 1000 Feet
the civil war

, 1862

227

mislead, and surprise the enemy, if possible; and when you strike and 

overcome him, never give up the pursuit as long as your men have 

strength to follow; for an army routed, if hotly pursued, becomes 

panic-stricken and can then be destroyed by half their number.”

The Shenandoah Valley was essential to both sides. It provided the 

rebels with critical agricultural provisions and was crucial in the Union’s 

defense of Washington, D.C. As a result, the Union Army attempted 

to hold it with 23,000 troops while General Jackson and his force of 

10,000 maneuvered rapidly throughout the region. The valley took on 

additional importance when General McClellan began his advance on 

Richmond during the Peninsula Campaign, because McClellan pulled 

troops out of the valley to reinforce his move against the Confederate 

capital. Jackson responded quickly, using the mountains as shields to his 

operations and crisscrossing through various gaps and passes to appear 

unexpectedly near the surprised Union forces. He began by making a 

long forced march to strike the Union position at Kernstown on March 

23, 1862.

Thetactical victory that resulted not only threwtheFeder-

als off balance, but it also prevented troops from being transferred to 

the Union invasion and thus kept a full Union corps of 40,000 men 

under General McDowell from joining the Peninsula Campaign. This 

movement along with several other forced marches during the cam-

paign earned Jackson’s men the epithet “foot cavalry” for their ability to 

cover great distances to strike the Union at its weakest points.

Jackson went on to defeat Union forces at McDowell, Virginia, on 

May 8; at Front Royal on May 23; and at Winchester on May 25. The 

Union command subsequently committed nearly 50,000 troops in mul-

tiple converging columns to trap Jackson. Instead of retreating, Jackson 

audaciously attacked and defeated elements of that force at Cross Keys 

and Port Republic on June 8 and 9. After that, Federal troops withdrew 

from the valley, allowing Jackson, again in a forced march, to join Lee 

in time for the Seven Days’ Battles. Jackson’s Valley Campaign was one 

of the most brilliant military operations of the Civil War, and military 

historians continue to study it for its effective use of the principles of 

maneuver, offensive, and surprise.

Peninsula Campaign

When McClellan reached the peninsula in early April he found a 

force of ten to fifteen thousand Confederates under Maj. Gen.

JohnB

.

Magruder barring his path to Richmond. Magruder, a student of drama 

and master of deception, so dazzled McClellan that instead of brushing 

the Confederates aside he spent a month in a siege of Yorktown. But 

Johnston, who

wanted to fight the decisive action closer to Richmond,

decided to withdraw slowly up the peninsula. At Williamsburg, on May 

5, McClellan’s advance elements made contact with the Confederate 

rear guard under Maj. Gen. James Longstreet, who successfully delayed 

the Federal advance. McClellan again pursued in leisurely fashion, al-

ways believing that he was outnumbered and about to be attacked in 

overwhelming force by Johnston. By May 25 two corps of the Army of 

the Potomac had turned southwest toward Richmond and crossed the 

sluggish Chickahominy River. The remaining three corps were on the 

north side of the stream with the expectation of making contact with 
American Military History

228

General “Jeb” Stuart, C.S.A., 1863

George S. Cook

McDowell, who would come down from Fredericksburg. Men of the 

two corps south of the river could see the spires of the Confederate 

capital, but Johnston’s army was in front of them. (Map 26)

Drenching rains on May 30 raised the Chickahominy to flood stage

and seriously divided McClellan’s army. Johnston decided to grasp this 

chance to defeat the Federals in detail. He struck on May 31 near Fair 

Oaks. His plans called for his whole force to concentrate against the 

isolated corps south of the river, but his staff and subordinate commanders were not up to the task of executing them. Assaulting columns 

became confused, and attacks were delivered piecemeal. The Federals, 

after some initial reverses, held their ground and bloodily repulsed the 

Confederates.

When Johnston suffered a severe wound at Fair Oaks, President 

Davis replaced him with General Lee. Lee for his part had no intention 

of defending Richmond passively. The city’s fortifications would enable

him to protect Richmond with a relatively small force while he used the 

main body of his army offensively in an attempt to cut off and destroy 

the Army of the Potomac. He ordered Jackson back from the Shenandoah Valley with all possible speed.

The Seven Days’ Battles

McClellan had planned to use his superior artillery to break through 

the Richmond defenses, but Lee struck the Union Army before it could 

resume the advance. Lee’s dispositions for the Battle of Mechanicsville on June 26 present a good illustration of the principles of mass

and economy of force. On the north side of the Chickahominy, he 

concentrated 65,000 men to oppose Brig. Gen. Fitz-John Porter’s V

Corps of 30,000. Only 25,000 were left before Richmond to contain 

the remainder of the Union Army. When Lee attacked, his timing and 

coordination were not yet refined. Jackson of all people seemed lethargic and moved slowly; and the V Corps defended stoutly during the day. 

McClellan thereupon withdrew the V Corps southeast to a stronger 

position at Gaines’ Mill. Porter’s men constructed light barricades and 

made ready. Lee massed 57,000 men and assaulted 34,000 Federals on 

June 27. The fighting was severe, but numbers told and the Federal

line broke. Darkness fell before Lee could exploit his advantage, and 

McClellan took the opportunity to regroup Porter’s men with the main 

army south of the Chickahominy.

At this point McClellan yielded the initiative to Lee. With his line 

of communications to White House, his supply base on the York 

River, cut and with the James River open to the U.S. Navy, the Union 

commander decided to shift his base to Harrison’s Landing on the 

south side of the peninsula. His rear areas had been particularly shaky 

since Confederate cavalry under Brig. Gen. J. E. B. Stuart had ridden 

completely around the Union Army in a daring raid in early June. The 

intricate retreat to the James, which involved 90,000 men, the artillery 

train, 3,100 wagons, and 2,500 head of cattle, began on the night of 

June 27 and was accomplished by using two roads. Lee tried to hinder 

the movement but was held off by Federal rear guards at Savage Station on June 29 and at Frayser’s Farm (Glendale) on the last day of 

the month.
Map 26

Malvern Hill

29 Jun

31

May

1 Jul

30 Jun

27 Jun

26 Jun

S T U A R T

13–15 Jun

J a m e s R i v e r

Chickahominy River

Pamunk e y Ri v e r South Anna River

A ppoma ttox Ri v e r

Harrison’s Landing

Yellow Tavern

Mechanicsville

Gaines

 Mill

Cold Harbor

Fair Oaks Savage Station

RICHMOND

Hanover

Glendale

White House

PETERSBURG

Bermuda Hundred

Union Position

Confederate Position

Axis of Confederate Movement

May–July 1862

PENINSULA CAMPAIGN

Roads and positions are approximate

5 0 5

Miles

ELEVATION IN FEET

0 100 200 and Above
American Military History

230

By the first day of July McClellan had concentrated the Army of

the Potomac on a commanding plateau at Malvern Hill, northwest of 

Harrison’s Landing. The location was strong, with clear fields of fire

to the front and the flanks secured by streams. Massed artillery could

sweep all approaches, and gunboats on the river were ready to provide fire support. The Confederates would have to attack by passing

through broken and wooded terrain, traversing swampy ground, and 

ascending the hill. At first Lee felt McClellan’s position was too strong

to assault. Then, at 3:00 p.m. on July 1, when a shifting of Federal 

troops deceived him into thinking there was a general withdrawal, he 

changed his mind and attacked. Again staff work and control were 

poor. The assaults, all frontal, were delivered piecemeal by only part of 

the army against Union artillery, massed hub to hub, and supporting infantry. The Confederate formations were shattered, costing Lee some 

5,500 men. On the following day the Army of the Potomac fell back to 

Harrison’s Landing and dug in. After reconnoitering McClellan’s position, Lee ordered his exhausted men back to the Richmond lines for 

rest and reorganization. His attacks, while costly, had saved Richmond 

for the Confederacy.

The Peninsula Campaign cost the Union Army 15,849 men killed, 

wounded, and missing. The Confederates, who had done most of the 

attacking, lost more: 20,614. Improvement in the training and discipline

of both armies since the disorganized fight at Bull Run was notable.

But just as significant was the fact that higher commanders had not yet

thoroughly mastered their jobs. Except in McClellan’s defensive action 

at Malvern Hill, which was largely conducted by his corps commanders, 

neither side’s higher command had been able to bring an entire army 

into coordinated action.

Second Bull Run

The failure of the Union forces to take Richmond quickly forced 

President Lincoln to abandon the idea of exercising command over the 

Union armies in person. On July 11, 1862, he selected as new General

in Chief Maj. Gen. Henry W. Halleck, who had won acclaim for the 

victories in the west. The President did not at once appoint a successor 

in the west, which was to suffer from divided command for a time. Lincoln wanted Halleck to direct the various Federal armies in close concert to take advantage of the North’s superior strength. If all Federal 

armies coordinated their efforts, Lincoln reasoned, they could strike 

where the Confederacy was weak or force it to strengthen one army 

at the expense of another; eventually they could wear the Confederacy 

down, destroy the various armies, and win the war.

Halleck turned out to be a disappointment. He never attempted to 

exercise field command or assume responsibility for strategic direction

of the armies. But, acting more as military adviser to the President, he 

nevertheless performed a valuable function by serving as a channel of 

communication between the Chief Executive and the field commanders. He adeptly translated the President’s ideas into terms the generals 

could comprehend and expressed the soldiers’ views in language that 

Mr. Lincoln could understand. However, he did not solve the strategic 

coordination problem of the Union. H. W. Halleck 

Alonzo Chappel, 1862
the civil war, 1862

231

Shortly before Halleck’s appointment, Lincoln decided to consolidate the various Union forces in the Shenandoah Valley and other parts 

of western Virginia—45,000 men—under the victor of a small battle 

in the west at Island No.10, Maj. Gen. John Pope. Pope was brought 

East with high expectations, but he immediately disenchanted his new 

command by announcing that in the West the Federal armies were used 

to seeing the backs of their enemies. Pope’s so-called Army of Virginia 

was ordered to divert pressure from McClellan on the peninsula. But 

Jackson had left the valley, and Federal forces were scattered. On August 3 Halleck ordered McClellan to withdraw by water from the peninsula to Aquia Creek on the Potomac and to affect a speedy junction 

at Fredericksburg with Pope. Meanwhile, Pope began posting the Army 

of Virginia along the Orange and Alexandria Railroads to the west of 

Fredericksburg.

Lee knew that his Army of Northern Virginia was in a dangerous 

position between Pope and McClellan, especially if the two were to 

unite. On July 13 he sent Jackson with forces eventually totaling 24,000 

men to watch Pope. After an initial sparring action at Cedar Mountain 

on August 9, Jackson and Pope stood watching each other for nearly 

a week. Lee, knowing that McClellan was leaving Harrison’s Landing, 

departed Richmond with the remainder of the Army of Northern Virginia and joined Jackson at Gordonsville. The combined Confederate 

forces outnumbered Pope’s, and Lee resolved to outflank and cut off

the Army of Virginia before the whole of McClellan’s force could be 

brought to bear.

A succession of captured orders enabled both Lee and Pope to 

learn the intentions of the other. Pope ascertained Lee’s plan to trap 

him against the Rappahannock and withdrew to the north bank astride 

the railroad. Lee, learning that two corps from the Army of the Potomac would join Pope within days, acted quickly and boldly. He sent General Halleck’s Hardee Hat 

Manufactured ca. 1859

Orange and Alexandria Railroad Military Bridge
American Military History

232

Jackson off on a wide turning movement through Thoroughfare Gap 

in the Bull Run Mountains around the northern flank of Pope’s army

and subsequently followed the same route with the divisions commanded by General Longstreet.

Pope took note of Jackson’s move but first assumed that it was

pointed toward the Shenandoah Valley. Then Jackson, covering nearly 

sixty miles in two days, came in behind Pope at Manassas on August 

26, destroyed his supply base there, and slipped away unmolested. Pope

marched and countermarched his forces for two days trying to find the

elusive Confederates. At the same time the Union commander failed to 

take Lee’s other forces into account. As a result he walked into Lee’s 

trap on the site of the old battlefield at Bull Run. Pope attacked Jackson, posted behind an abandoned railroad embankment, but again the 

attack consisted of a series of piecemeal frontal assaults that were repulsed with heavy casualties. By then Porter’s V Corps from the Army 

of the Potomac had reached the field and was ordered to attack Jackson’s right (south) flank. By this time also, Longstreet’s column had

burst through Thoroughfare Gap; and deploying on Jackson’s right, it 

blocked Porter’s move.

The next day, August 30, Pope renewed his attacks against Jackson, who he thought was retreating. Seizing the opportunity to catch 

the Federal columns in an exposed position, Lee sent Longstreet 

slashing along the Warrenton turnpike to catch Pope’s flank in the air.

The Federal army soon retired from the field; and Pope led it back to

Washington, fighting an enveloping Confederate force at Chantilly on

the way.

Lee, by great daring and rapid movement, and by virtue of having 

the Confederate forces unified under his command, had successfully

defeated one formidable Union army in the presence of another even 

larger one. Halleck, as General in Chief, had not taken the field to coordinate Pope and McClellan, and Pope lost the campaign despite the 

advantage of interior lines.

President Lincoln, desiring to use McClellan’s admitted talents 

for training and reorganizing the battered eastern armies, had become 

convinced that bitter personal feelings between McClellan and Pope 

prevented them from working effectively in the same theater. On September 5 Halleck, upon the President’s order, dissolved the Army of 

Virginia and assigned its units to the Army of the Potomac. He sent 

Pope to a command in Minnesota. The Union authorities expected that 

McClellan would be able to devote several months to training and reorganization, but Lee dashed these hopes.

Lee Invades Maryland

Up to this point the Confederates in the east had been following an 

inherently defensive strategy, though tactically they frequently assumed 

the offensive. But Davis and Lee, for a complicated set of political 

and military reasons, determined to take the offensive and invade the 

North in coordination with Maj. Gen. Braxton Bragg’s drive into Kentucky. Militarily, in the east, an invasion of Maryland would give Lee a 

chance to defeat or destroy the Army of the Potomac, uncovering such 

cities as Washington, Baltimore, and Philadelphia, and to cut Federal 

Lee, by great daring and rapid 

movement, had successfully 

defeated one formidable Union 

army in the presence of another 

even larger one.

General Longstreet
the civil war, 1862

233

communications with the states to the west. Lee also retained hopes 

that he could bring Maryland into the Confederacy.

The Army of Northern Virginia, organized into two corps (Longstreet’s consisting of five divisions and Jackson’s of four divisions)

plus Stuart’s three brigades of cavalry and the reserve artillery, numbered 55,000 effectives. Lee did not rest after the second battle of Bull 

Run but quickly crossed the Potomac and encamped near Frederick, 

Maryland, from which he sent Jackson to capture an isolated Federal 

garrison at Harpers Ferry. The remainder of Lee’s army then crossed 

South Mountain and headed for Hagerstown, about twenty-five miles

northwest of Frederick, with Stuart’s cavalry screening the right flank.

In the meantime McClellan’s Army of the Potomac, 85,000 men organized into six corps, marched northwest from Washington and reached 

Frederick on September 12. Of the 85,000, however, 20,000 were green 

troops that had only joined the Army in the summer of 1862.

At this time McClellan had a stroke of luck. Lee, in assigning missions to his command, had detached Maj. Gen. D. H. Hill’s division 

from Jackson and attached it to Longstreet and had sent copies of his 

orders, which prescribed routes, objectives, and times of arrival, to 

Jackson, Longstreet, and Hill. But Jackson was not sure that Hill had 

received the order. He therefore made an additional copy of Lee’s order 

and sent it to Hill. One of Hill’s orders, wrapped around some cigars, 

was somehow left behind in an abandoned camp, where it was picked 

up on September 13 by Union soldiers and rushed to McClellan. Waving the captured orders, McClellan is supposed to have stated, “Here is 

a paper with which, if I cannot whip Bobbie Lee, I will be willing to go 

home.” This windfall gave the Federal commander an unmatched opportunity to defeat Lee’s scattered forces in detail if he pushed quickly 

through the gaps. However, McClellan vacillated for sixteen hours. Lee, 

The Bloody Lane, Battle of Antietam, James Hope, 1889
American Military History

234

informed of the lost order, sent all available forces to hold the moun-

tain gaps, so it was nightfall on the fourteenth before McClellan fought 

his way across South Mountain.

Lee retreated to Sharpsburg on Antietam Creek, where he turned 

to

fight. Pinned between Antietam Creek and thePotomac with no

room for maneuver and still outnumbered since Jackson’s force had yet 

to return to the main body after capturing Harpers Ferry, Lee relied on 

the advantage of interior lines and the boldness and the fighting ability

of his men. It was a dangerous move, however, and could have resulted 

in the total destruction of his army.

McClellan delayed his attack until September 17, when he launched 

an uncoordinated series of assaults that drove back the Confederates 

in places but failed to breaktheir line. Heavy fighting swelled across

ripe fields and up through rocky glens that became known to histor

y

as theWestWood, the Cornfield, the EastWood, Bloody Lane, and

Burnside’s Bridge. (Map 27) One Southerner remembered the attacking 

Unioncolumns: “With flagsflying and the long unfaltering lines rising

and falling as they crossed the rolling fields

, it looked as though noth-

ing

could stop them.

” But when the massed fire of field guns and small

arms struck such human waves, a Union survivor recalled, it “was like a 

scythe running through our line.”

McClellan, like too many leaders during the Civil War, could not 

bring himself to commit his reserve (the V Corps under Porter) at the 

strategic moment. Although adored by his men, as one of the veterans 

wrote after the war, he “never realized the metal that was in his grand 

Army of the Potomac.” Jackson’s last division arrived just in time to 

head off

thefinal assaultsby Maj. Gen. Ambrose E. Burnside’scorps,

and at the end of the day Lee still held most of his line. Casualties were 

heavy. Of 70,000 Federal troops nearly 13,000 were killed, wounded, 

or missing; and of the 40,000 or more Confederates engaged, almost 

10,000 were casualties. It was the bloodiest single day of the war, and the 

bloodiest day in American history. Although Lee audaciously awaited 

new attacks on September 18, McClellan left him unmolested; and that 

night the Army of Northern Virginia withdrew across the Potomac.

Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation

Antietam was tactically a draw, but the fact that Lee was turned back 

from his invasion of the North made it a strategic victory and gave Presi-

dent Lincoln an opportunity to strike at the Confederacy psychologically 

and economically by issuing his preliminary Emancipation Proclamation 

on September 22, 1862. Lincoln,while opposedto slavery and itsexten-

sion to the western territories, was not an abolitionist. He had stated 

publicly that the war was being fought over union or secession, with 

the slavery question only incidental, and had earlier overruled several 

generals who were premature emancipators. But he wanted to strike at 

the economy and military sustainment power of the Confederate states 

and to appeal to antislavery opinion in Europe. He had awaited the op-

portune moment that a Union victory would give him and decided that 

Antietam was suitable. Acting on his authority as Commander in Chief, 

he issued the proclamation that all slaves in states or districts in rebellion 

against

the United States onJanuary 1, 1863,would bethenceforward
Map 27





525

475

525

525

575

575

525

475

425

525

525

525

475

425

525

425 475

375

475

425

375

525

Antietam

Creek

LEE

JACKSON

LONGSTREET

A. P. HILL

SUMNER

II Corps

COX

IX Corps

HOOKER

I Corps

MANSFIELD

McCLELLAN

XII Corps

FRANKLIN

VI Corps

Morning Attack

Morning Attack

Afternoon Attack

Late Afternoon Attack

PORTER

V Corps

B

U

R

N

S I D

Burnside Bridge E

(Lower Bridge)

Snavely's Ford

The North Woods

The Cornfield

The West Woods

The East Woods

Dunkard Church

Middle Bridge

H A G E R S T O W N P I K E

S M O K E T O W N R O A D

B O O N S B O R O P I K E

Smoketown

Porterstown

SHARPSBURG

BATTLE OF ANTIETAM

17 September 1862

Contour Interval in Feet

U. S. Army Attack

Confederate Front

0 1600

Yards
American Military History

236

The Emancipation Proclamation

Throughout the Civil War, four slave states—Delaware, Maryland, Kentucky, and Missouri—had 

not seceded. Union strategy depended on retaining these states and the loyalty of their influential 

slaveholding residents. Therefore, the Lincoln administration overrode early efforts by some northern generals (Fremont in Missouri in 1861 and Hunter in coastal enclaves of South Carolina early in 

1862) to end slavery within their commands. Only when Union forces held several of the Confederacy’s leading cities (Memphis, Nashville, and New Orleans) and had defeated a southern offensive 

at the battle of Antietam in September 1862 was Lincoln able to issue a proclamation that freed 

Confederate slaves, but not those in the border states or in Union-occupied territory. Union armies 

continued to advance, though, and more than 100,000 former slaves from the liberated regions 

were able to join the ranks of the U.S. colored troops during the last two years of the war.

and forever free. The proclamation had no effect initially: only the states 

in rebellion were affected, and those states had no intention of implementing the proclamation. Slaves in the slaveholding border states that 

remained loyal to the Union were not touched, nor were the slaves in 

those Confederate areas that had been subjugated by Union bayonets. 

Thus the Emancipation Proclamation had no immediate effect behind 

the Confederate lines, except to cause a good deal of excitement. But 

thereafter, as Union forces penetrated the South, the newly freed people 

deserted the farms and plantations and flocked to the colors.

African Americans had served in the Revolution, the War of 1812, 

and other early wars; but they had been barred from the Regular Army 

and, under the Militia Act of 1792, from the state militia. The Civil 

War marks their official debut in American military forces. Recruiting

of African Americans began under the local auspices of Maj. Gen. 

David Hunter in the Department of the South as early as April 1862.

There was a certain appeal to the idea that blacks might assure the 

freedom of their enslaved brethren in the South by joining in the battle 

for it, even if they served for lower pay in segregated units under white 

officers. On July 17, 1862, Congress authorized recruitment of Afri107th Infantry Guards in Front of the Guard House

Image removed due to

license restrictions
the civil war

, 1862

237

can Americans while passing the antislavery Second Confiscation Act. The Emancipation Proclamation put the matter in a new light; and on 

May 22, 1863,theWar Department established the Bureau of Colored

Troops, another innovation of the Civil War in that it was an example 

ofFederalvolunteer formations without official ties to specific states

(others being the various U.S. sharpshooter regiments and the invalid 

Veteran Reserve Corps). By the end of the war 100,000 African Ameri-

cans had enrolled as U.S. Volunteers while many other blacks served in 

state units, elsewhere in the armed forces, and as laborers for the Union 

Army. About 180,000 African Americans served the Union cause over 

the course of the war, making them an irreplaceable source of Army 

manpower. 

Fiasco at Fredericksburg

After Antietam both armies returned to face each other in Virginia, 

Lee situated near Culpeper and McClellan at Warrenton. But McClel-

lan’s slowness, his failure to accomplish more at Antietam, and perhaps 

his rather arrogant habit of offering gratuitous political advice to his 

superiors, coupled with the intense anti-McClellan views of the joint 

Congressional Committee on the Conduct of the War, convinced Lin-

coln that he could retain him in command no longer. On November 7 

Lincoln replaced him with Burnside, who had won distinction in opera-

tions that gained control of ports on the North Carolina coast and who 

had led the IX Corps at Antietam. Burnside, acutely aware of his own 

limitations, accepted the post with reluctance.

Burnside decided to march rapidly to Fredericksburg and then to 

advance along the railroad line to Richmond before Lee could inter-

cept him. (See Map 28.) Such a move by the army, now 120,000 strong, 

would cut Lee off from his main base. Burnside’s advance elements 

reached the north bank of the Rappahannock on November 17, well 

ahead of Lee. But a series of minor failures delayed the completion of 

pontoon bridges, and Lee moved his army to high ground on the west 

side of the river before the Federal forces could cross. Lee’s situation 

resembled McClellan’s position at Malvern Hill that had proved the 

folly of frontal assaults against combined artillery and infantry strong 

points. But Burnside thought the sheer weight of numbers could smash 

through the Confederates.

To achieve greater ease of tactical control, Burnside had created 

three headquarters higher than corps—the Right, Center, and Left 

Grand Divisions under Maj. Gens. Edwin V. Sumner, Joseph Hooker, 

and William B. Franklin, respectively—with two corps plus cavalry as-

signed to each grand division. Burnside originally planned to make the 

main thrust by the Center and Left Grand Divisions against Jackson’s 

positions on a long, low-wooded ridge southeast of the town. The 

Right Grand Division would cross three pontoon bridges at Freder-

icksburg and attack Marye’s Heights, a steep eminence about one mile 

from the river where Longstreet’s men were posted. On the morning 

of December 15, he weakened the attack on the left, feeling that under 

cover of 147 heavy sieg

e and field guns on the heights on the Union

side of the river much could be achieved by a better-balanced attack 

along the whole line.
Map 28

TELEGRAPH ROAD

PLANK ROAD

SUNKEN ROAD

U N F I N I S H E D R R

Falmouth

FREDERICKSBURG 

to Aquia Creek Station 

to Richmond

M a r y e ’s H e i g h t s

Hamilton’s

Crossing 

LONGSTREET

JACKSON 

Pontoon Bridges

HOOKER

SUMNER

U N I O N

A R T I L L E R Y

AND

FRANKLIN

Deep Run

Hazel Run

Canal

Ditch

R a p p a h a n n o c k R i v e r

M a s s a p o n a x R i v e r

Union Line Before Attacks

Limit of Union Advance

Confederate Line

13 December 1862

BATTLE OF FREDERICKSBURG

1000 0 1000

Yards

ELEVATION IN FEET

0 100 200 and Above
the civil war, 1862

239

Burnside’s engineers had begun laying the bridges as early as December 11. But harassment from Confederate sharpshooters complicated the 

operation, and it was not until the next day that all the assault units were 

over the river. After an artillery duel on the morning of the thirteenth, 

the fog lifted to reveal dense Union columns moving forward to the attack. Part of the Left Grand Division, finding a weakness in Jackson’s

line, drove in to seize the ridge; but as Burnside had weakened this part 

of the assault, the Federals were not able to hold against Confederate 

counterattacks. On the right, the troops had to cross a mile of open 

ground to reach Marye’s Heights, traverse a drainage canal, and face a 

fusillade of fire from the infamous sunken road and stone wall behind

which Longstreet had placed four ranks of riflemen. In a series of assaults the Union soldiers pushed to the stone wall but no farther. As a 

demonstration of valor, the Union attacks all along the line were exemplary; as a demonstration of tactical skill, they were tragic. Lee, personally 

observing the failed attacks on the Confederate right wing, commented: 

“It is well that war is so terrible—we should grow too fond of it.”

The Army of the Potomac lost 12,000 men at Fredericksburg, while 

the Army of Northern Virginia suffered only 5,300 casualties. Burnside 

planned to renew the attack on the following day. Jackson, whose enthusiasm in battle sometimes approached the point of frenzy, suggested 

that the Confederates strip off their clothes for better identification

and strike the Army of the Potomac in a night attack. But Lee knew of 

Burnside’s plans from a captured order and vetoed the scheme. When 

the Federal corps commanders talked Burnside out of renewing the attack, both armies settled into winter quarters facing each other across 

the Rappahannock. Fredericksburg, a disastrous defeat, was otherwise 

noteworthy for the U.S. Army in that the telegraph first saw extensive

battlefield use, linking headquarters with forward batteries during the

action—a forerunner of twentieth century battlefield communications.

The War in the West: The Twin Rivers Campaign

Students of the Civil War often concentrate their study on the cockpit of the war in the east—Virginia. The rival capitals lay only a hundred 

Jackson, whose enthusiasm in 

battle sometimes approached 

the point of frenzy, suggested 

that the Confederates strip 

off their clothes for better 

identification and strike the Army 

of the Potomac in a night attack.

Sideburns

At the onset of the American Civil War, many considered 

Union Maj. Gen. Ambrose E. Burnside (1824–1881) a brilliant 

commander. He was relegated to a supporting role, however, 

after his costly failure to capture Fredericksburg in December 

1862. He is best remembered for his peculiar facial hairstyle. 

Burnside let his hair connect to his moustache, while he kept his 

chin clean shaven. At the time, this style became known as burnsides. Later, while he served as a senator from Rhode Island, 

the syllables were reversed to create the now familiar term 

“sideburns.”
American Military History

240

miles apart, and the country between them was fought over for four 

years; and, arguably, the Eastern Theater had a more immediate effect on 

public opinion and morale in the much more populous east. But it was 

the Union armies west of the Appalachians that marched the greatest 

distances and struck some of the hardest blows against the Confederacy.

These Union forces in late 1861were organized intotwo separate

commands. Brig. Gen. Don Carlos Buell commanded 45,000 men from 

a headquarters at Louisville, Kentucky; while General Halleck with head-

quarters at St. Louis, Missouri, had 91,000 under his command. These 

troops were generally raw, undisciplined western volunteers. Logistical mat-

ters and training facilities were undeveloped, and as Halleck once wrote in 

disgust to his superior in Washington, “affairs here are in complete chaos.”

Affairs were no better among the Confederate forces farther south. 

Facing Buell and Halleck were 43,000 scattered and ill-equipped Confed-

erate troops under General Albert Sidney Johnston. Charged with defend-

ing a line that stretched for more than 500 miles from western Virginia 

to the border of Kansas, Johnston’s forces mostly lay east of the Mis-

sissippi River. They occupied a system of forts and camps from Cum-

berland Gap in western Virginia through Bowling Green, Kentucky, to 

Columbus, Kentucky, on the Mississippi. Rivers and railroads provided 

Johnston with most of his interior lines of communications, since most 

of the roads were virtually impassable in winter. To protect a lateral rail-

road where it crossed two rivers in Tennessee and yet respect Kentucky’s 

neutrality and to block the critical Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers, the 

Confederates had built Fort Henry on the Tennessee River and Fort Do-

nelson on the Cumberland River just south of the boundary between the 

two states. This gave the Confederates an important strategic advantage. 

On the other hand, hampering the Confederate buildup were Southern 

governors whose states’ rights doctrine led them to believe that defense of 

their respective states had higher priority than pushing forward the needed 

men and munitions to a Confederate commander, Johnston, at the front.

At the beginning of 1862, Hallec

k and Buell

were supposed to be

cooperating but had yet to do so effectively. On his own, Buell moved 

in mid-January to give token response to Lincoln’s desire to help the 

Unionists in east Tennessee. One of his subordinates succeeded in 

breaching the Confederate defense line in eastern Kentucky in a local 

action near Mill Springs, but Buell failed to exploit the victory.

In Halleck’s department, Brig. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant, at the time an 

inconspicuous district commander of volunteers at Cairo, Illinois, had 

meanwhile proposed a river expedition up the Tennessee to take Fort 

Henry. After some hesitancy and in spite of the absence of assurance 

of support from Buell, Halleck approved a plan for a joint Army-Navy 

expedition. On

January 30, 1862, he directed 15,000 men under Grant,

supported by armored gunboats and river craft of the U.S. Navy under a flag officer, Andrew H. Foote, to “take and hold Fort Henry.” The

actions of subordinate commanders were at last prodding the Union 

war machine to move.

Capture of Forts Henry and Donelson

Grant landed his troops below Fort Henry and together with Foote’s 

naval force moved against the Confederate position onFebruary 6. At
the civil war, 1862

241

“No terms except unconditional 

and immediate surrender can 

be accepted. I propose to move 

immediately upon your works.”

the Federals’ approach the Confederate commander sent most of his 

men to Fort Donelson. Muddy roads delayed the Union Army’s advance, but Foote’s seven gunboats plunged ahead and in a short firefight induced the defenders of Fort Henry to surrender. Indeed, the

Confederates had lowered their colors before Grant’s infantry could 

reach the action. The Tennessee River now lay open to Foote’s gunboats all the way to northern Alabama.

General Grant was no rhetorician. Sparing with words, he never 

bombarded his troops with Napoleonic manifestos as McClellan did. 

After the capture of Fort Henry he simply telegraphed the somewhat 

surprised Halleck: “I shall take and destroy Fort Donelson on the 8th 

and return to Fort Henry.” But inclement weather delayed the Federal movement until February 12. Then river craft carried some of 

the troops around to Fort Donelson. The rest of the troops moved 

overland under sunny skies and unseasonably mild temperatures. The 

spring-like weather induced the youthful soldiers to litter the roadside 

with overcoats, blankets, and tents.

Winter once more descended upon Grant’s forces (soon to swell to 

nearly 27,000 men) as they invested Fort Donelson. Johnston, sure that 

the fall of this fort would jeopardize his entrenched camp at Bowling 

Green, hurried three generals and 12,000 reinforcements to Fort Donelson and then retired toward Nashville with 14,000 men. Even without reinforcements, Fort Donelson was a strong position. The main 

earthwork stood 100 feet above the river and with its outlying system 

of rifle pits embraced an area of 100 acres. The whole Confederate position occupied less than a square mile. Grant and Foote first attempted to reduce it by naval bombardment, which had succeeded at Fort 

Henry. But this time the Confederate defenders handled the gunboats 

so roughly that they withdrew. Grant then prepared for a long siege, 

although the bitter cold weather and lack of assault training among his 

troops caused him to have some reservations.

The Confederates, sensing they were caught in a trap, attempted a 

sortie on February 15 and swept one of Grant’s divisions off the field.

But divided Confederate command, not lack of determination or valor 

on the part of the fighting men, led to the ultimate defeat of the attack.

The three Confederate commanders could not agree upon the next 

move, and at a critical moment Grant ordered counterattacks all along 

the line. By the end of the day Union troops had captured a portion of 

the Confederate outer works. Now surrounded by Union forces that 

outnumbered them almost two to one, the Confederate leaders decided 

they were in a hopeless situation. In a scene resembling something from 

a comic opera. Brig. Gen. John B. Floyd, who had been Buchanan’s Secretary of War and feared execution as a traitor, passed the command 

to Brig. Gen. Gideon Pillow. Pillow passed the command immediately 

to Brig. Gen. Simon B. Buckner, who asked Grant, an old friend, for 

terms. Soon afterward Grant sent his famous message: “No terms except unconditional and immediate surrender can be accepted. I propose 

to move immediately upon your works.” A legend and a nickname—

Unconditional Surrender Grant—were born.

Some Confederates escaped with Floyd and Pillow, and Col. Nathan B. Forrest led his cavalry through frozen backwaters to safety. But 

the bulk of the garrison, “from 12,000 to 15,000 prisoners ... also 
American Military History

242

20,000 stand of arms, 48 pieces of artillery, 17 heavy guns, from 2,000 

to 4,000 horses, and large quantities of commissary stores,” fell into 

Federal hands. It was a major Union victory.

Poor leadership, violation of the principle of unity of command, 

and overly strict adherence to position defense had cost the South the 

key to the gateway of the Confederacy in the west. The loss of the two 

forts dealt the Confederacy a blow from which it never fully recovered. 

Johnston had to abandon Kentucky and most of middle and west Ten-

nessee. The vital industrial and transportation center of Nashville soon 

fell to Buell’s advancing army. Foreign governments took special notice 

of

the defeats.For the North, the victorieswere the firstgood news

of the war. They set the strategic pattern for further advance into the 

Confederacy. In Grant the people had a new hero, and he received pro-

motion to major general.

Confederate Counterattack at Shiloh

As department commander, Halleck naturally received much credit 

for these victories. President Lincoln decided to unify command of all 

the western armies, and on March 11 Halleck received the command. 

Halleck, nicknamed Old Brains, was well known as a master of the 

theory and literature of war. Lincoln’s decision gave him jurisdiction 

over four armies: Buell’s Army of the Ohio; Grant’s Army of the Ten-

nessee; Maj. Gen. Samuel R. Curtis’ Army of the Southwest in Mis-

souri and Arkansas; and Pope’s Army of the Mississippi. While Pope, 

in cooperation with Foote’s naval forces, successfully attacked New 

Madrid and Island No. 10 on the Mississippi River, Halleck decided to 

concentrate Grant’s and Buell’s armies and move against Johnston at 

Corinth in northern Mississippi. Grant and Buell were to meet at Shiloh 

(Pittsburg Landing) near Savannah on the Tennessee River. Well aware 

of the Federal movements, Johnston decided to attack Grant before 

Buell could join him. (Map 29 ) The Confederate army, 40,000 strong, 

marched out of Corinth on the afternoon of April 3. Muddy roads and 

faulty staff coordination made a shambles of Confederate march dis-

cipline. Mixed-up commands, artillery and wagons bogged down in the 

mud, andgreen troops who insisted upon shooting their rifle

s at every

passing rabbit threatened to abort the whole expedition. Not until late 

in the afternoon of April 5 did Johnston’s army complete the 22-mile 

march to its attack point. Then the Confederate leader postponed his 

attack until the next morning, and the delay proved costly.

Grant’s forces were encamped in a rather loose battle line and ap-

parently anticipated no attack. The position at Shiloh itself was not 

good, for the army was pocketed by the river at its back and a creek 

on each flank. Because the army

was on an offensive mission, it had

not entrenched. Grant has often been criticized for this omission, but 

entrenchment was not common at that stage of the war. However, the 

fact that the principle of security was almost completely disregarded is 

inescapable. Very little patrolling had been carried out, and the Federals 

were unaware that a Confederate army of 40,000 men was spending the 

night of April 5 just two miles away. The victories at Forts Henry and 

Donelson had apparently produced

overconfidence in Grant’s army,

whic

h like

Johnston’swas only partly trained. Even Grant reflected this
Map 29





GRANT

33,000 Troops

Gunboats

NOON

MORNING

ELMS, ARMY OF THE OHIO

EVENING

HORNET'S NEST

Surrendered

1730/6 April

EVENING

MORNING

JOHNSTON

40,000 Troops

NOON

S n a k e C r e e k

O w l C r e e k

T e n n e s s e e R i v e r

Lick River

to Corinth

to Hamburg

to Crump

to Purdy

D i a m o n d I s l a n d

Pittsburg Landing

to Savannah

Shiloh Church

Tennessee R

Purdy

Crump Savannah

Shiloh Ch.

Hamburg

Corinth

TENNESSEE

MISSISSIPPI

0 10

Miles

APPROACHES TO SHILOH

High Ground Above 500 Feet

1000 0 1000

Yards

6 April 1862

BATTLE OF SHILOH

Union Position

Confederate Position

ELEVATION IN FEET

0 400 450 500 550 600 and Above
American Military History

244

feeling, for he had established his headquarters at Savannah, nine miles 

downstream.

Achieving near total surprise, Johnston’s men burst out of the 

woods

early on April 6, so early that Union soldiers turned out into

their company streets from their tents to fight. Some fled to the safe-

ty of the landing, but most of the regiments fought stubbornly and 

yielded ground slowly. One particular knot of Federals rallied along 

an old sunken road, which the Confederates named the Hornet’s Nest 

because of the stinging shot and shell they had to face there. Although 

this obstacle disrupted Johnston’s timetable of attack, by afternoon the 

Confederates had attained local success elsewhere all along the line. 

At the same time the melee of battle badly disorganized the attackers. 

Johnston’s attack formation had been awkward from the beginning. He 

had formed his three corps into one column with each corps deployed 

with divisions in line so that each corps stretched across the whole 

battlefront, one behind the other. Such a formation could be effectively 

controlled neither by army nor corps commanders.

Then, almost at the moment of victory, Johnston himself was 

mortally wounded while leading a local assault. General Beauregard, 

Johnston’s successor, suspended the attack for the day and attempted to 

straighten out and reorganize his command. As the day ended, Grant’s 

sixth division, whic

h had lost itsway while marching to the battlefield,

reached Shiloh along with advance elements of Buell’s army.

The next morning Grant counterattacked to regain the lost ground, 

and the Confederates withdrew to Corinth. There was no pursuit. Shiloh 

was the bloodiest battle fought in North America up to that time. Of 

63,000

Federals, 13,000were casualties.The Confederates lost 11,000.

Fortunate indeed for the Federals had been Lincoln’s decision to unify 

the command under Halleck; this act had guaranteed Buell’s presence 

and prevented Johnston from defeating the Union armies separately. 

Grant came in for much denunciation for being surprised, but Presi-

dent Lincoln loyally sustained him. “I can’t spare this man; he fights.”

Halleck was a master of military maxims, but he had failed to con-

centrate all his forces immediately fora final defeat of Beauregard.

As it was, Pope and Foote took Island No. 10 in April, opening the 

Mississippi as far as Memphis. Halleck, taking personal command of 

Grant’s and Buell’s forces, then ponderously advanced toward Corinth. 

Remembering Shiloh, he proceeded cautiously, and it was May 30 be-

fore he reached his objective. Beauregard had already evacuated the 

town. Meanwhile, Capt. David G. Farragut with a naval force and Maj. 

Gen. Benjamin

F. Butler’

s land units cracked the gulf coast fortifica-

tions of the Mississippi and captured New Orleans. By mid-1862, only

strongholds at Vicksburg and Port Hudson on the Mississippi blocked 

complete Federal control of that vital river.

Perryville to Stones River

Despite these early setbacks the Confederate armies in the west 

were still full of fight. AsFederal forces advanced deeper into the Con-

federacy, it became increasingly difficult for them to protect the long

lines of river, rail, and road supply and communications. Guerrilla and 

cavalry operations by colorful Confederate “wizards of the saddle” 
the civil war

, 1862

245

like John Hunt Morgan, Joseph Wheeler, and Colonel Forrest followed 

Forrest’s adage of “Get ’em skeered, and then keep the skeer on ’em.” 

Such tactics completely disrupted the timetable of Federal offensives.

By summer and fall rejuvenated Confederate forces under General 

Bragg, Lt. Gen. Edmund Kirby Smith, and Maj. Gen. Earl Van Dorn 

were ready to seize the initiative. Never again was the South so close to 

victory, nor did it ever again hold the initiative in every theater of the 

war.

The overall Confederate strategy called for a three-pronged ad-

vance from the Mississippi River all the way to Virginia. Twin columns 

under Bragg and Smith were to bear the brunt of the western offensive 

by advancing from Chattanooga into east Tennessee, then northward 

into Kentucky. They were to be supported by Van Dorn, who would 

move north from Mississippi with the intention of driving Grant’s 

forces out of west Tennessee. The western columns of the Confed-

eracy were then to unite somewhere in Kentucky.

At the same time these movements were to be coordinated with the 

planned invasion of Maryland, east of the Appalachians, by General 

Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia. Much depended upon speed, good 

coordination of effort and communications, and the result of the at-

tempts to woo Kentucky and Maryland into the arms of the Confed-

eracy. Victory could stimulate Northern peace advocates, such as the 

Southern sympathizers known as Copperheads, to lobby for a peace 

treaty. Furthermore, a successful invasion might induce Great Britain 

and France to recognize the Confederacy and to intervene forcibly to 

break the blockade. This last hope was a feeble one. Emperor Napo-

leon III was interested primarily in advancing his Mexican schemes; 

he considered both recognition and intervention but would not move 

without British support. Britain, which pursued the policy of recog-

nizing de facto governments, would undoubtedly have recognized the 

Confederacy eventually had it won the war. The British government 

briefly

flirtedwith the idea of recognition and might have done so if

the Confederates had put together a string of victories, but throughout 

the war Britain adhered to a general policy of neutrality and respect for 

the Union blockade.

At first, thingswentwell forthe Confederates in thewest. Bragg

caught Buell off guard andwithout fightinga battle forced theFed

-

eral evacuation of northern Alabama and central Tennessee. But when 

Bragg entered Kentucky, he became enmeshed in the politics of “gov-

ernment making” in an effort to set up a state regime that would bind 

Kentucky to the Confederacy. Also, the Confederate invasion was not 

achieving the expected decisive results, since few Kentuckians joined 

Bragg’s forces and an attempt at conscription in east Tennessee failed 

completely. Without popular support, the invading Confederate forces 

faced eventual failure.

Buell finally caught up with Brag

g at

Perryville,Kentucky, on Oc

-

tober 7. Finding the Confederates in some strength, Buell began con-

centrating hisown scattered units

.

The next morning, fighting began

around Perryville over possession of drinking water. Brig. Gen. Philip 

H. Sheridan’s division forced the Confederates away from one creek 

and dug in. The battle as a whole turned out to be a rather confused affair, as Buell sought to concentrate units arriving from several different 
American Military History

246

directions on the battlefield itself. Early in the afternoon Maj. Gen.

Alexander M. McCook’s Union corps arrived and began forming a 

line of battle. At that moment Maj. Gen. Leonidas Polk’s Confederate 

corps attacked and drove McCook back about a mile, but Sheridan’s 

troops held their ground. Finally a Union counterattack pushed the 

Confederates out of the town of Perryville. Buell himself remained 

at headquarters, only two-and-a-half miles from the field, completely

unaware of the extent of the engagement until it was nearly over. The 

rolling terrain had caused an “acoustic shadow,” whereby the sounds 

of the conflict were completely inaudible to the Federal commander.

While the battle ended in a tactical stalemate, Bragg suffered such severe casualties that he was forced to retreat. Coupled with Van Dorn’s 

failure to bypass Federal defenses at Corinth and carry out his part of 

the strategic plan, this setback forced the Confederates to abandon any 

idea of bringing Kentucky into the Confederacy.

By Christmas Bragg was back in middle Tennessee, battered but 

still anxious to recoup his losses by recapturing Nashville. Buell, having been dilatory in pursuing Bragg after Perryville, had been replaced 

in command of the Army of the Ohio (now restyled the Army of the 

Cumberland) by Maj. Gen. William S. Rosecrans. In spite of urgent 

and even threatening letters from the War Department, the new commander would not move against Bragg until he had collected abundant 

supplies at Nashville. Then he would be independent of the railroad 

line from Nashville to Louisville, a line of communications continually 

cut by Confederate cavalry.

On December 26 Rosecrans finally marched south from Nashville.

Poorly screened by Union cavalry, his three columns in turn knew little about Confederate concentrations near Murfreesboro, thirty miles 

southeast of the Tennessee capital. Here, Bragg had taken a strong 

position astride Stones River on the direct route to Chattanooga and 

proposed to fight it out. Rosecrans moved into line opposite Bragg

on the evening of December 30. Both army commanders proceeded 

to develop identical battle plans—each designed to envelop the opponent’s right flank. Bragg’s objective was to drive Rosecrans off his

communications line with Nashville and pin him against the river. 

Rosecrans’ plan had the same objective in reverse, that of pinning the 

Confederates against the stream. Victory would probably belong to the 

commander who struck first and hard.

Hardee’s Tactics

Before William J. Hardee (1815–1873) published Rifle and Infantry Tactics drill manual in 1855, 

the Army used Winfield Scott’s system based on eighteenth-century French experience and training. 

When 1840s-era longer rifles dictated changes in infantry tactics, then–Secretary of War Jefferson 

Davis selected Hardee as a brevet lieutenant colonel to design the changes. Published in June 1855, 

Tactics created a lighter, faster infantry but failed to solve the problem of accurate rifle fire from 

great distances. After Hardee joined the Confederate Army in 1861, he revised his manual; the 

South used it almost exclusively during the Civil War.
the civil war, 1862

247

Insufficient Federal security, as well as Rosecrans’ failure to ensure

that the pivotal units in his attack plan were also properly posted to 

thwart Confederate counterattacks, resulted in Confederate seizure of 

the initiative as the battle of Stones River opened on December 31. 

(Map 30) At dawn Maj. Gen. William J. Hardee’s corps with large cavalry support began the drive on the Federal right. Undeceived by their 

opponent’s device of extra campfires to feign a longer battle line, Confederate attacking columns simply pushed farther around the Union 

flank and promptly rolled the defenders back. Applying the principles

of mass and surprise to achieve rapid success, Bragg’s battle plan forced 

Rosecrans to modify his own. The Union leader pulled back his left 

Map 30

H A R D E E

McCOOK

P O L K

B R E C K I N R I D G E

( H A R D E E )

1000 (approx.)

T H O M A S

CRITTENDEN

0700 (approx.)

Overall Creek

West Fork of Stones River

to Chattanooga

Franklin Road

Lebanon Turnpike

Nashville Turnpike

Wilkinson Turnpike

MURFREESBORO

0 10

Miles

Union Positions, Dawn, 31 Dec

Confederate Positions, Dawn, 31 Dec

Confederate Attacks

Confederate Movement, Time Indicated

Union Movement, Time Indicated

Confederate Positions, Afternoon, 31 Dec

Union Positions, Afternoon, 31 Dec

31 December 1862

BATTLE OF STONES RIVER
American Military History

248

flank division,which had jumped offto attack Maj. Gen.JohnC. Breck-

inridge’s Confederate units north of Stones River. While Sheridan’s di-

vision, as at Perryville, provided stubborn resistance to General Polk’s 

corps in the center, Hardee’s units continued their drive and by noon 

saw the Union battle line bent back against the Nashville pike. Mean-

while, the Confederate cavalry had wrought havoc among Rosecrans’ 

rear area elements. As was typical of many Civil War battles, the attack-

ing columns of Polk and Hardee became badly intermingled. Their men 

began to tire, and by afternoon repeated Confederate assaults against 

the constricted Union line along the Nashville pike had bogged down.

That night Rosecrans held a council of war. Some of the subor-

dinate commanders wanted to retreat. Rosecrans and two of his corps 

commanders, Maj. Gen. Thomas L. Crittenden and Maj. Gen. George 

H. Thomas, vetoed the scheme. Brigades were then returned to their 

proper divisions, stragglers rounded up, and various other adjustments 

made in the

Federal position. NewYear’s Day, 1863, dawned quietly,

and little action occurred that day.

The sunrise of January 2 revealed Rosecrans still in position. Bragg 

directed Breckinridge to attack the Union left wing, once more thrown 

across Stones River on the north. But massed Union artillery shattered 

the assaults, and counterattacking Federals drove Breckinridge’s men 

back to their line of departure. The armies remained stationary on 

January 3, but Brag

g finally withdrew from the battlefield that evening,

permitting victory to slip from his grasp. Tactically a draw, Stones River 

so badly mangled the Army of the Cumberland that it would be im-

mobilized for six months. Yet, more than most other battles of the war, 

Stones River

wasa conflict between the wills of the opposing army

leaders. Rosecrans, supported by Thomas and others, would not admit 

himself beaten and in the end won a victory of sorts.

The

great Confederate counteroffensives of 1862 had failed in

the west, yet Chattanooga, the key to east Tennessee and Georgia, re-

mained in Southern hands. Farther west, Federal forces had penetrated 

only slightly into northern Mississippi. The war was simply on dead 

center in the west at the end of the year.

The War West of the Mississippi

If the major fighting of the CivilWar occurred in the “older” pop-

ulated sections of the United States, the youthful area of the American 

frontier across the Mississippi saw its share of action also. Missouri 

and Kansas, deeply involved in the political issues that precipitated the 

conflict, and even the distant New MexicoTerritory,were all touched

by military operations.

The Southwest was a particularly rich plum, for as one Confeder-

ate commander observed, “The vast mineral resources of Arizona, in 

addition to its affording an outlet to the

Pacific, makes its acquisition

a matter of some importance to our Govt.” Also, it was assumed that 

Indians and the Mormons in Utah would readily accept allegiance to 

almost any government other than that in Washington. The Far West 

was seen as an area of great opportunity for the Confederates.

It

was with these motives in mind that early in 1862 Confederate

forces moved up the Rio Grande valley and proceeded to establish that 
the civil war

, 1862

249

part of New Mexico Territory north of the 34th Parallel as the Confed-

erate Territory of Arizona. Under Brig. Gen. Henry H. Sibley, inven-

tor of a famous tent bearing his name, the Confederates successfully 

swept all the way to Santa Fe, capital of New Mexico, bypassing several 

Union garrisons on the way. But Sibley was dangerously overextended; 

and Federal troops reinforced by Colorado volunteers surprised the 

advancing Confederates in Apache Canyon on Marc

h 26 and 28 as the

Confederates sought to capture the largest Union garrison in the terri-

tory at Fort Union.

One of the bypassed Federal columns under Col. Edward R. S. 

Canby from Fort Craig meanwhile joined the Fort Union troops against 

the Confederates. Sibley, unable to capture the Union posts, unable to 

resupply his forces, and learning of yet a third Federal column con-

verging on him from California, began a determined retreat down the 

Rio Grande valley. By May he was back in Texas and the Confeder-

ate invasion of New Mexico had ended.

The fighting, ona small scale

by eastern standards, provided valuable training for Federal troops in-

volved later in Indian Wars in this area. Indeed, while the Confederate 

dream of

a new territory and an outlet to thePacificwas shatteredb

y

1862, Indian leaders in the mountain territories saw an opportunity to

reconquer lost land while the white men were otherwise preoccupied. 

In 1863 and 186

4 both Union and Confederate troops in the Southwest

were kept busy fighting hostile tribes.

In Missouri and Arkansas, fighting had erupted ona large scale

b

y

theearly spring of 1862.Federal authorities had retaineda precari

-

ous hold over Missouri when General Curtis with 11,000 men chased 

disorganized Confederates back into Arkansas. But, under General Van 

Dorn and Maj. Gen. Sterling Price, the Confederates regrouped and 

embarked upon a bold counteroffensive that ended only at Pea Ridge 

on March 7 and 8. Here, Van Dorn executed a double envelopment as 

half his army stole behind Pea Ridge, marched around three-fourths of 

Curtis’ force, and struck Curtis’ left rear near Elkhorn Tavern while the 

other half attacked his right rear. But in so doing, the Confederates un-

covered their own line of communications; and Curtis’ troops turned 

around and fought off the attacks from the rear. After initial success, 

Van Dorn and Price were unable to continue the contest and withdrew. 

For three more years guerrilla warfare would ravage Missouri, but the 

Union grip on the state was secure.

The year 1862, whic

h began with impressive Union victories in the

west, ended in bitter frustration in the east. Ten full-scale and costly 

battles had been fought, but no decisive victory had yet been scored by 

the forces of the Union. The Federals had broken the great Confeder-

ate counteroffensives in the fall, only to see their hopes fade with the 

advent of winter. Apparently the Union war machine had lost its earlier 

momentum and only decisive victories could regain the initiative.
American Military History

250

Discussion Questions

1. How and why did Union war aims and policies change over the 

course of the war?

2. Which theater of war was the most decisive in 1862, and why?

3. What are the benefits and problems of achieving unity of command? Could the Union have accomplished the goal of unity of command effectively? Why didn’t it?

4. Why should the Peninsula Campaign have worked? What caused 

it to fail, and how did this failure impact on Union war aims?

5. “War is too important to leave to the generals.” To what degree 

does this apply to the Civil War in 1862?

6. It has been said that many of the political generals appointed by

Lincoln delayed Union victory through sheer incompetence. Attack or 

defend this observation, citing examples.

Recommended Readings

Catton, Bruce. Glory Road. New York: Anchor Books, 1990.

———. Mr. Lincoln’s Army. New York: Anchor Books, 1990.

Connelly, Thomas L. Army of the Heartland: The Army of Tennessee, 1861–

1862. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2001.

Freeman, Douglas Southall. Lee’s Lieutenants: A Study in Command, 3 vols. 

New York: Scribner Classics, 1997, vol. 1, chs. 10–43; vol. 2.

Hennessy, John J. Return to Bull Run: The Battle and Campaign of Second 

Manassas. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1999.

Sears, Stephen W. To the Gates of Richmond: The Peninsula Campaign. New 

York: Ticknor & Fields, 1992.

Sword, Wiley. Shiloh: Bloody April. New York: William Morrow, 1974.

Tanner, Robert G. Stonewall in the Valley: Thomas J. “Stonewall” Jackson’s 

Shenandoah Valley Campaign, Spring 1862, rev. ed. Mechanicsville, Pa.: 

Stackpole Books, 1996.

Williams, Kenneth P. Lincoln Finds a General: A Military Study of the Civil 

War, 5 vols. New York: Macmillan, 1949–1959, vol. 1, chs. 4–13; 

vol. 2, chs. 14–16; vol. 3, chs. 5–15; vol. 4, chs. 10–11.

Williams, T. Harry. Lincoln and His Generals. New York: Gramercy 

Books, 2000, chs. 4–8.

Other Readings

Cooling, Benjamin F. Forts Henry and Donelson: The Key to the Confederate 

Heartland. Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1987.

Cozens, Peter. No Better Place To Die: The Battle of Stones River. Urbana: 

University of Illinois Press, 1990.

Dowdy, Clifford. The Seven Days: The Emergence of Lee. New York: Little, 

Brown, 1964.

Esposito, Vincent J., ed. The West Point Atlas of American Wars, 2 vols. 

New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1978, vol. 1, Maps 25–83.
the civil war, 1862

251

Glatthaar, Joseph T. Forged in Battle: The Civil War Alliance of Black Soldiers and White Officers. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University 

Press, 2000.

Jones, Virgil C. The Civil War at Sea, 3 vols. New York: Holt, Rinehart, 

and Winston, 1960, vol. 1, chs. 25–28; vol. 2, chs. 1–16.

Luvaas, Jay, and Harold W. Nelson, eds. Guide to the Battle of Antietam: 

The Maryland Campaign in 1862. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1996.

Sears, Stephen. Landscape Turned Red: The Battle of Antietam. Norwalk, 

Conn.: Easton Press, 1988.

Shea, William L., and Earl J. Hess. Pea Ridge: Civil War Campaign in the 

West. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1992.

Vandiver, Frank E. Rebel Brass: The Confederate Command System. Baton 

Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1993.

At the beginning of 1863 the Confederacy seemed to have a fair

chance of ultimate success on the battlefield. But during this

year three great campaigns would shape the outcome of the war 

in favor of the North. One would see the final solution to the control

of the Mississippi River. A second, concurrent with the first, would

break the back of any Confederate hopes for success by invasion of 

the North and recognition abroad. The third, slow and uncertain in 

its first phases, would result eventually in Union control of the strategic gateway to the South Atlantic region of the Confederacy—the 

last great stronghold of secession and the area in which the aims of 

military operations were as much focused on destroying the economic 

infrastructure of the South as defeating main-force rebel units. 

The East: Hooker Crosses the Rappahannock

The course of the war in the east in 1863 was dramatic and in

many ways decisive. After the battle of Fredericksburg in December 

1862, Maj. Gen. Ambrose E. Burnside’s Army of the Potomac went

into winter quarters on the north bank of the Rappahannock, while 

the main body of General Robert E. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia held Fredericksburg and guarded the railway line to Richmond. 

During January of the new year, Burnside’s subordinates intrigued 

against him and went out of channels to present their grievances to 

Congress and President Abraham Lincoln. When Burnside heard of 

this development, he asked that either he or most of the subordinate 

general officers be removed. The President, not pleased with either

Burnside’s string of failures or his ultimatum, accepted the first alternative and on January 25, 1863, replaced Burnside with Maj. Gen.

Joseph Hooker. The new commander had won the sobriquet Fighting Joe from overly enthusiastic journalists because of his reputation as a hard-fighting division and corps commander. He was highly

favored in Washington, but in appointing him the President wrote a 

fatherly letter in which he warned the general against rashness and 

11

The Civil War, 1863
American Military History

254

overambition, reproached him for plotting against Burnside, and concluded by asking for victories.

Under Hooker’s able administration, discipline and training 

improved. Morale, which had fallen after the Fredericksburg debacle, 

rose as Hooker regularized the furlough system and improved the flow

of rations and other supplies to his front-line troops. Abolishing Burnside’s grand divisions, Hooker returned to the previous corps organization of seven corps, each numbering about 15,000 men. One of Hooker’s most effective innovations was the introduction of corps badges to 

provide a sense of identity in a unit and improve esprit de corps. He 

also took a long step toward improving the army’s cavalry arm, which 

up to this time had been assigned many diverse duties and was split 

up into small detachments. Hooker regarded cavalry as a combat arm 

of full stature, and he concentrated his units into a cavalry corps of 

three divisions under Brig. Gen. George Stoneman. On the other hand, 

Hooker made a costly mistake in decentralizing tactical and administrative control of his artillery to his corps commanders. This may have 

improved tactical usage of artillery, but it prevented the focusing of 

massive amounts of artillery on a single front. As a result the artillery, 

in which the Union had a distinct advantage in numbers, would not be 

properly massed in the coming action at Chancellorsville and thus was 

not as effective as it could have been.

Hooker had no intention of repeating Burnside’s tragic frontal 

assault at Fredericksburg. With a strength approaching 134,000 men, 

Hooker planned a bold double envelopment that would place strong 

Union forces on each of Lee’s flanks. (Map 31) He hoped to take 

advantage of his superior numbers to outmaneuver Lee. He ordered 

three of his infantry corps to move secretly west up the Rappahannock and Rapidan and to ford the streams to outflank Lee to the north.

Meanwhile, two more corps, having conspicuously remained opposite 

Fredericksburg, were to strike across the old battlefield there to tie

down Lee’s forces. Two more corps were held in reserve. The cavalry 

corps, less one division that was to screen the move upriver, was to raid 

far behind Lee’s rear to divert him. 

Hooker’s plan was superb, his execution faulty. The three corps 

moved quickly up the river and by the end of April had crossed and 

advanced to the principal road junction of Chancellorsville. They were 

now in the so-called Wilderness, a low, flat, confusing area of scrub

timber and narrow dirt roads in which movement and visibility were 

extremely limited. Maj. Gen. John Sedgwick crossed the Rappahannock 

at Fredericksburg on the twenty-ninth, and the two remaining corps 

moved to within supporting distance of Hooker at Chancellorsville. 

So far everything had gone according to plan, except that Stoneman’s 

diversion had failed to bother Lee. One of Brig. Gen. J. E. B. Stuart’s 

brigades kept Stoneman under surveillance while the main body of 

cavalry shadowed Hooker so effectively that the Southern commander 

knew every move the Union Army made. By the morning of April 30, 

Lee was aware of what was afoot and knew that he was threatened by 

double envelopment. Early on May 1, Hooker was sending his columns 

east, toward the back door to Fredericksburg. A less bold and resolute 

man than Lee would have retreated south at once and with such ample 

justification that only the captious would have found fault. But the

Joseph L. Hooker 

Matthew Brady, n.d.
Map 31





Rappahannock River

Rappahannock R

Massaponax River

Rap di an River

Rapidan R

U N F I N I S H E D R R

2

3

3

2 May

Evening

1 May

3–6 May

4 May

3

1–3 May

J A C K S O

N

H O L D I N G F O R C E

LEE

60,000

30 Apr

LEE

S T U A R T ’ S C A V A L R Y ( - )

3

3

1–3 May

Evening

1 May

3–5 May

6

5

29 Apr

29–30 Apr

27–30 Apr

HOOKER

134,000

4 May

ET EL RG APH ROAD

PLANK ROAD

BROCK ROAD

U.S. Ford

Germanna

Ford

Kelly’s Ford

Scott’s Ford

Banks' Ford

Salem Church

U.S. Ford

Todd’s Tavern

Catherine Furnace

Wilderness

Tavern

Wilderness Church

W

I

L

D

E

R

N

E

S

S

Ely’s Ford

to Spotsylvania

to Orange

to Richmond

Marye’s Heights

W I L D

E

R

N

E

S

S

FREDERICKSBURG 

Falmouth

Falmouth

Fredericksburg

Spotsylvania

Chancellorsville

Chancellorsville

Axis of Union MovementAxis of Confederate MovementHigh Ground Above 300 Feet

27–30 April 1863

APPRO

ACH TO THE BATTLE

5 1

Miles

Union Position, Date IndicatedConfederate Position, Date IndicatedAxis of Union MovementAxis of Confederate Movement

1–6 May 1863

BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE

0 1 1 2

Miles

ELEVATION IN FEET

300 200 400 and Above 0 100
American Military History

256

Southern general, his army numbering only 60,000, decided to take a

bold risk. Using the principles of the offensive, maneuver, economy of 

force, and surprise to compensate for his inferior numbers, he decided 

to attack an enemy almost twice his size. Instead of retreating, he left a 

small part of his army to hold the heights at Fredericksburg and started 

west for Chancellorsville with the main body. Lee’s superb intelligence 

and reconnaissance, based largely on his expert cavalry force, provided 

him with accurate and timely intelligence so Hooker’s every move was 

known to him while his own were hidden from Hooker.

Chancellorsville: Lee’s Boldest Risk

It seemed as if at this point in the battle Hooker simply lost his 

courage. Since he did not know exactly where Lee was, he began taking counsel of his fears and failed to follow his own plan. Over the 

vehement protests of his corps commanders, he ordered the troops 

back into defensive positions around Chancellorsville, surrendering the 

initiative to Lee. The Federals established a line in the forest, felled trees 

for an abatis, and constructed earth-and-log breastworks. Their position faced generally east and south, anchored on the Rappahannock on 

the east; but in the west along the Orange turnpike, it was weak, unsupported, and hanging in the air. Lee brought his main body up and on 

May 1 made contact with Hooker’s strong left. At the same time, Stuart’s cavalry discovered Hooker’s vulnerable right flank and promptly

reported the intelligence to Lee. Conferring that night with Lt. Gen. 

Thomas “Stonewall” Jackson, Lee made a truly daring decision. Facing 

an army much greater than his own, having already divided his forces 

by leaving some units back at Fredericksburg, he decided to divide his 

forces again to further envelop the envelopers. Accordingly, Lee committed 17,000 men against Hooker’s left to hold it in place while Jackson with 26,000 men made a wide, fifteen-mile swing to get beyond

Hooker’s right flank. Lee’s decision was technically a violation of the

principles of mass and concentration; but the principles are guides, not 

laws. A bold commander can knowingly undertake a higher measure 

of calculated risk if the potential reward is high enough. And Lee was 

probably the boldest risk taker of the war. In addition, while Lee’s two 

forces were separated, their common objective was the Army of the 

Potomac and their ultimate routes converged on a common center. 

General Orders 100

General Orders 100, Instructions for the Government of the Armies of the United States in the 

Field, dated April 24, 1863, was drafted by professor Francis Lieber, a German immigrant who had 

sons fighting on both sides of the Civil War. The orders established guidelines for the conduct of war, 

particularly with regard to the treatment of enemy soldiers, prisoners, and occupied civilian populations. The orders attempted to strike a balance between humanitarian impulses and the brutal necessities of war. They were widely copied by European armies and provided a framework upon which 

subsequent international law would be based.
the civil war

, 1863

257

Jackson’s force, in a ten-mile-long column, moved out before day-

break on May 2, marching southwest

firstthen swinging northwestto

get into position. The Federals noted that something was happening off 

to the south but were unable to penetrate the defensive screen; Hooker 

soon began to think that Lee was actually retreating. In the late afternoon 

Jackson turned onto the Orange turnpike beyond Wilderness Tavern. 

This move put himwest of Hooker’s rightflank; sincethewoodsthinned

out a little at this point, it was possible to form a line of battle. Because 

time was running short and the hour was late, Jackson deployed in col-

umn of divisions, each division formed with brigades abreast, the same 

kind of confusing formation General Albert S. Johnston had used at Shi-

loh. Shortly after 5:00 

p.m. Jackson’s leading division, shrieking the “rebel 

yell” and driving startled rabbits and deer before it, came charging out of 

the woods, rolling up the different brigades of Maj. Gen. Oliver O. How-

ard’s XI Corps. Despite a few heroic attempts to stand in the face of the 

rebel onslaught, the Union troops retreated in disarray. Jackson pressed 

forward, but fresh Union troops, the disorganization of his own men, 

and oncoming darkness stymied the attack. While searching for a road 

that would permit him to cut off Hooker from United States Ford across 

the Rappahannock,

Jackson fell victimt

o friendly

fire.The Confederate

leader was wounded and died eight days later. During the night of May 

2, Stuart, Jackson’s temporary successor as corps commander, re-formed 

his lines. Against Stuart’s right Hooker launched local counterattacks that 

atfirstgained some success, butthe next morning hewithdrew hiswhole

line. Once more Hooker yielded the initiative at a moment when he had 

a strong force between Lee’s two divided and weaker forces.

Stuart renewed the attack during the morning as Hooker pulled his line 

back. To complicate matters further, Hooker was knocked unconscious 

when a shell struck the pillar of the Chancellor house against which he 

was leaning. Until the end of the battle he was dazed and incapable of The Death of Stonewall Jackson

Soon after dark on the second day of fighting at Chancellors-

ville, a bullet fired by his own troops struck down one of the South’s 

most celebrated soldiers, the corps commander Thomas Jackson 

(1824–1863). Confederate soldiers in the part of the battle line 

where Jackson fell were understandably nervous, for a band of 

200 federal troops had just been discovered and taken prisoner 

in the woods behind the Confederate front line. Not long after, 

some Confederates caught sight of a lone Union officer between 

the two armies, and a few shots fired at him grew into a general 

fusillade along a brigade-wide front. A little while later, on a path 

through another part of the woods, Jackson received the wounds 

that contributed to his death from pneumonia a week later. The shots 

that felled him may not have “doomed the Confederacy,” as one 

historian has put it, but it was certainly the most famous friendly fire 

incident in American history.
American Military History

258

exercising effective command, but he did not relinquish it nor would the 

army’s medical director declare him unfit. Union artillery, centrally located

but not centrally controlled, might have proven decisive at this point of 

the battle; but its fires were not coordinated. Meanwhile Sedgwick, who

shortly after Jackson’s attack had received orders to proceed through Fredericksburg to Chancellorsville, had assaulted Marye’s Heights. He carried it 

about noon on May 3, but the next day Lee once more divided his command, leaving Stuart with 25,000 to guard Hooker, and moved himself 

with 21,000 to thwart Sedgwick. In a sharp action at Salem Church, Lee 

forced the Federals off the road and northward over the Rappahannock at 

Banks’ Ford. Lee made ready for a full-scale assault against the Army of the 

Potomac, nowhuddledwith its back against the river on May 6; but Hooker

ordered retirement to the north bank before the attack. Confederate losses 

were 13,000, Federal losses 17,000. But Lee lost a great deal with the death 

of Stonewall Jackson. Actually, Lee’s brilliant and daring maneuvers had 

defeated only one man—Hooker—and in no other action of the war did 

moral superiority of one general over the other stand out so clearly as a 

decisive factor in battle. Chancellorsville exemplified Napoleon’s maxim:

“The General is the head, the whole of the army.” When the general was 

offensively minded and not averse to calculated risks, the result was dramatic. Chancellorsville remains an example of what a bold commander can 

accomplish against a larger, but poorly coordinated, enemy. Using trusted 

corps commanders, operating along interior lines, and carefully orchestrating a maneuver led Lee to what many consider his boldest victory.

Lee was so successful in part because Hooker made so many mistakes. Hooker was in many ways a talented tactical commander with a 

good reputation. But in spite of Lincoln’s injunction, “This time, put in all 

your men,” he allowed nearly one-third of his army to stand idle during 

the heaviest fighting. Here again was a general who could effectively lead

a body of troops under his own eyes but could not use maps, reports, 

and messages to evaluate and control situations that were beyond his 

range of vision. Hooker, not the Army of the Potomac, lost the battle of 

Chancellorsville. Poor coordination, poor intelligence, irresolute decisions, 

and timid reactions to setbacks led to Hookers’ being completely “outgeneraled.” Yet for the victors, Chancellorsville was in many ways a hollow 

triumph. It was dazzling, a set piece for the instruction of students of the 

military art ever since, but it had been inconclusive, winning glory and little 

more. It left government and army on both sides with precisely the problems they had faced before the campaign began. However, Lee had triumphed once again as he drove the Union forces back onto the defensive. 

His logistical lines were secure, and Richmond remained unthreatened. 

Now it was time again for him to take the war into the North.

Lee’s Second Invasion of the North

By 1863 the war had entered what Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman

later called its professional phase. The core of troops was well trained, 

although a constant flow of new replacements required constant “seasoning”; and large numbers had ample combat experience. Officers had

generally mastered their jobs and were deploying their forces fairly skillfully in accordance with the day’s tactical principles. Furthermore, the 

increased range and accuracy of weapons, together with the nature of 

Here again was a general who 

could effectively lead a body 

of troops under his own eyes but 

could not use maps, reports, and 

messages to evaluate and control 

situations that were beyond his 

range of vision.
the civil war, 1863

259

the terrain, had induced some alterations in tactics—more skirmishers 

and increasing distance between soldiers as they sought to avoid the 

worst effects of the hail of rifled musket fire—alterations that were

embodied in a revised infantry manual published in 1863. Thus, by the

third year of the war, battles had begun to take on certain definite characteristics. The battle of Gettysburg in early July is a case in point.

Gettysburg was, first of all, a generally unplanned battle—neither side

knew that their forces would be brought together at that obscure crossroads 

for the greatest land battle on the North American continent. It stands 

out in American myth as one of the most dramatic battles with individual 

heroism and extraordinary valor on both sides as victory or defeat seemed 

separated by only a hair’s breadth. The three-day battle began as a meeting 

engagement, followed by each side’s attempting to bring a preponderance 

of troops onto the field as the battle raged. Some 43,500 Americans were

casualties of this great battle, and Lincoln’s address over the cemetery of 

the dead was to be enshrined as a masterpiece of American historic prose. 

Gettysburg has become the most famous of the battles of that cruel war.

After the great victory at Chancellorsville in May, the Confederate 

cause in the Eastern Theater had looked exceptionally bright. If 60,000

men could beat 134,000, then the Confederacy’s inferiority in manpower 

was surely offset by superior generalship and skill at arms. Vicksburg was 

not yet under siege, although Maj. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant had ferried his 

army over to the east bank of the Mississippi. If Confederate President 

Jefferson Davis and General Lee were overly optimistic, they could hardly 

be blamed. Both felt it important to take the battle into the enemy’s territory to relieve the threat against Richmond, gather subsistence for the 

troops from the rich Northern farmland, and perhaps, just perhaps, garner another astounding victory that might capture Washington itself or 

force the Union to sue for peace. It was a gamble, of course, but Lee 

was a gambler and Davis only slightly less so. Lee made ready to move 

into Pennsylvania. By this time the Union objectives in the east were 

clearly defined: to continue operations against Confederate seaports—an

attempt to seize Fort Sumter on April 7 had failed—and to destroy Lee’s 

army. President Lincoln’s orders made clear that the destruction of the 

Army of Northern Virginia was the major objective of the Army of the 

Potomac. The capture of Richmond was to be only incidental.

On June 30, 1863, the Army of the Potomac numbered 115,256 officers and enlisted men with 362 guns. It consisted of 51 infantry brigades

organized into 19 divisions, which in turn formed 7 infantry corps. The 

cavalry corps had 3 divisions. The field artillery, 67 batteries, was assigned by

brigades to the corps, except for army reserve artillery, restoring much of 

the power of the chief of artillery and redressing the problem of decentralized misuse of artillery noted at Chancellorsville. The Army of Northern 

Virginia, having numbered 76,224 men and 272 guns in late May, now was

organized into 3 infantry corps, each led by a lieutenant general and larger 

than its Union counterpart. The death of Jackson had forced this change, 

with Richard S. Ewell and Ambrose P. Hill joining James Longstreet as lieutenant generals and commanders of the reorganized corps. Stuart’s cavalry 

retained its role, directly answering to Lee. In each corps were 3 divisions, 

and most divisions had 4 brigades. Of the 15 field artillery battalions of 4

batteries each, 5 battalions were attached to each corps under command of 

the corps’ artillery chiefs, leaving no artillery in army reserve.

A Battle Flag for the Army of 

Northern Virginia, ca. 1863
American Military History

260

In early June Lee began moving his units away from Fredericksburg. In his advance he used the Shenandoah and Cumberland Valleys, 

for by holding the east-west mountain passes he could readily cover 

his approach route and lines of communications. Hooker got wind of 

the move; he noted the weakening of the Fredericksburg defenses, and 

on June 9 his cavalry, commanded by Brig. Gen. Alfred Pleasonton, 

surprised Stuart at Brandy Station, Virginia. Here on an open plain was 

fought one of the few mounted, saber-swinging, cut-and-thrust cavalry 

combats of the Civil War. Up to now the Confederate cavalry had been 

superior; but at Brandy Station, the Union horsemen “came of age,” 

and Stuart was lucky to hold his position.

When the Federals learned that Confederate infantrymen were 

west of the Blue Ridge and heading north, Hooker started to move to 

protect Washington and Baltimore. Earlier Lincoln had vetoed Hooker’s proposal to seize Richmond while Lee went north. As the Army 

of Northern Virginia moved through the valleys and deployed into 

Pennsylvania behind cavalry screens, the Army of the Potomac moved 

north on a broad front, crossing the Potomac on June 25 and 26. Lee

dispersed his forces to gain speed of movement and gather as much in 

the way of supplies as possible. He had extended his infantry columns 

from McConnellsburg and Chambersburg on the west to Carlisle in the 

north and York on the east.

After Brandy Station and some sharp clashes in the mountain passes, 

Stuart set forth on another dramatic ride around the Union Army. 

Granted a maximum degree of discretion by Lee, Stuart operated largely 

on his own initiative but forgot that his primary role was to serve as 

Lee’s eyes and ears. He failed to send back messages on the movements 

of the Union Army and did not adequately screen Confederate movements from Union cavalry. The results were disastrous. It was only on the 

afternoon of July 2, with his troopers so weary they were almost falling 

from their saddles, that Stuart rejoined Lee in the vicinity of Gettysburg, 

too late to have an important influence on the battle. His absence had

deprived Lee of prompt, accurate information about the Army of the 

Potomac. When Lee learned from one of Longstreet’s spies on June 28 

that Hooker’s men were north of the Potomac, he ordered his widespread and vulnerable units to concentrate at once near Cashtown.

After Chancellorsville, Lincoln, though advised to drop Hooker, 

had kept him in command of the Army of the Potomac on the theJames Longstreet (1821–1904)

Known as Old Pete and Lee’s War Horse, Longstreet became one of the Civil War’s most controversial figures. Hard hitting in the attack, he nevertheless sensed the power of the tactical defense 

in an age of rifled weapons and field fortifications and preferred to fight from the defensive. His 

performance at Gettysburg drew fire from postwar critics who believed that, when Lee rejected 

his repeated advice to outflank the strong Federal position, Longstreet sulked and thereby cost the 

South the battle. Yet Lee never uttered direct criticism of Longstreet, who stood by him to the end at 

Appomattox. He was one of the most valued and trusted lieutenants to General Lee.
the civil war, 1863

261

ory that he would not throw away a gun because it has misfired once.

But Hooker soon became embroiled with Maj. Gen. Henry W. Halleck 

over whether or not he had the authority to move troops out of Harpers Ferry to reinforce his army and, in a moment of pique, requested 

his own relief. Lincoln, losing all confidence in Hooker’s judgment,

promptly took him up on his offer. Hooker was replaced by one of his 

corps commanders, Maj. Gen. George G. Meade, who was awakened 

unexpectedly before dawn on June 28 to receive word of his promotion. He immediately faced the challenge of assuming command of an 

Army that had only limited time to find, fix, and defeat a dangerous

foe. Meade, who was to command the Army of the Potomac for the 

rest of the war, started north on a broad front at once but within two 

days began planning to fight a defensive action in Maryland and issued

orders to that effect. However, not all his commanders received the 

order, and events overruled him.

Gettysburg

During the afternoon of June 30 outposts of both armies clashed 

north and west of the quiet little Pennsylvania market town of Gettysburg. The terrain in the area included rolling hills and broad, shallow 

valleys. Gettysburg was the junction of twelve roads that led to Harrisburg, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Washington, and the mountain passes 

to the west that Lee controlled. As initial elements of both forces collided, the local commanders sent reports and recommendations to their 

superiors, who relayed them upward; both armies, still widely dispersed, 

started moving toward Gettysburg. (See Map 32.)

On July 1 Union cavalrymen under the command of Brig. Gen. 

John Buford, Jr., fought a dismounted delaying action against infantry 

troops of General Hill’s Third Corps northwest of town. By this stage 

of the war cavalrymen, armed with saber, pistol, and breechloading 

Part of the Gettysburg Battlefield, ca. 1863. 

Matthew Brady, a photographer who organized and led a significant 

effort to chronicle the Civil War in photographs, stands in the center.
Map 32

H A R R I S B U R G R O A D

E M M I T S B U R G R O A D

TA N E Y T O W N R O A D

C A R L I S L E R O A D

C H A M B E R S B U R G P I K E

B A LT I M O R E P I K E

Y O R K T U R N P I K E

to Cashtown

Wheat

Field

Peach

Orchard

Round

Top

Little

Round

Top

C E M E T E R Y R I D

G E

Culp’s

Hill Cemetery

Hill

S E M I N A R Y R I D G E

Rock Creek

Willoughby's Run

(75,000)

LEE

2 Jul

2 Jul

3 Jul 2 Jul

1 Jul

1 Jul

Devil’s

Den

(90,000)

MEADE

GETTYSBURG 

Axis of Confederate Attack, Date Indicated

Confederate Position

Union Position

1–3 July 1863

BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG

ELEVATION IN FEET

0 450 500 550 600 650 and Above

0 1

Miles
the civil war, 1863

263

carbine, were often deployed as mounted infantrymen who rode to 

battle but fought on foot. The range and accuracy of the infantry’s 

rifled muskets made it next to impossible for mounted men to attack

foot soldiers in position, but in this instance the infantry was attacking 

dismounted troopers in defensive positions. With their superior speed, 

mobility, and firepower, cavalrymen, as witnessed in the Gettysburg

campaign, were especially useful for screening and reconnaissance but 

also for advance guard actions in which they seized or held important 

hills, river crossings, and road junctions pending the arrival of infantry. 

During the morning hours of July 1, this was the role Union horsemen 

played on the ridges north and west of Gettysburg. Buford, with a keen 

eye for terrain and confidence in his troops, identified the key terrain of

Cemetery Hill and held the enemy in place until the arrival of Maj. Gen. 

John F. Reynolds’ I Corps at ten o’clock in the morning and Howard’s 

XI Corps by noon.

By midday on the first, two corps of the Army of the Potomac

were locked in battle with Hill’s Confederate Corps, with elements of 

Ewell’s Corps moving up to support it. The latter, advancing from the 

north and northeast, broke the stretched lines of the XI Corps and 

drove the Federals back through Gettysburg in confusion. The Union 

infantry rallied behind artillery positioned on Cemetery Hill south of 

the town. Lee, who reached the field about 2:00 p.m., ordered Ewell at 

about 4:30 or 5:00 to take Cemetery Hill, “if he found it practicable.” 

However, before preparations were complete for an attack, it began to 

get dark and Ewell failed to press his advantage. By nightfall the Confederates settled into positions extending in a great curve from northeast of Culp’s Hill, westward through Gettysburg, thence south on 

Seminary Ridge. During the night the Federals, enjoying interior lines, 

moved troops in strength onto the key points of Culp’s Hill, Cemetery 

Hill, and Cemetery Ridge, forming a great inverted “fishhook.”

Meade arrived on the battlefield at midnight and, despite the confusion inherent in arriving in the midst of operations, quickly had a 

grasp of the battle. He decided to fight on that ground and not retreat.

Accordingly, he put his forces in movement for a major defensive battle 

and completed his dispositions by the morning of July 2. The Union 

line was strong except in two places. In the confusion of battle, Little 

Round Top was unoccupied except for a series of small signal detachments. And the commander of the III Corps, Maj. Gen. Daniel E. Sickles, on his own responsibility moved his line forward from the south 

end of Cemetery Ridge to higher ground near the Peach Orchard; his 

corps lay in an exposed salient. He believed he was moving forward 

onto higher and more easily defensible ground, but he completely failed 

to coordinate his action. By early afternoon, five corps were arrayed

along the Union battle line with one in reserve and one more still 

marching to reach Gettysburg.

On the Confederate side, Lee still retained the power of choice. He 

could continue the attack, despite the unfavorable ground and the fact 

that not all his troops were yet in place. He could play it safe and wait, 

bring up the rest of Longstreet’s corps, or even try to get the Union 

Army to attack him in his own strong position on Seminary Ridge. Or 

he could break contact and retreat, hoping to bring the Union Army 

out of its positions and maneuver against it as it attempted to pursue 

Little Round Top Signal Flag
American Military History

264

him. However, Lee was not in the mood to retreat or passively defend; 

he wanted to attack despite his disadvantages. 

Lee was faced with the usual dilemma of generals on the attack 

during the Civil War. Every commander wanted to combine frontal 

assaults with envelopments and flanking movements, but the difficulty

of timing and coordinating the movements of such large, often not 

fully trained, bodies of men in broken terrain made intricate maneuvers difficult. The action on the second day at Gettysburg graphically

illustrates the problem. Lee wanted to bring up Longstreet’s corps to 

strike at the Federal left while Hill and Ewell attacked to their fronts. 

However, coordination broke down. Longstreet’s men were forced to 

march almost in front of Union positions to reach their attack positions and had to countermarch on a number of occasions to avoid 

being observed. The attack did not start until almost four in the afternoon. As they moved forward, they struck strong Union positions at 

a jumbled pile of rocks, south of the Peach Orchard and forward of 

Little Round Top, nicknamed the Devil’s Den. The smoke of battle was 

thick over the fields south of Gettysburg, and the cries of the wounded

mingled with the crash of musketry. The whole sector had become a 

chaos of tangled battle lines as units overlapped each other. 

As the battle was raging to the east of Little Round Top, Brig. Gen. 

Gouverneur Warren discovered that no infantry held this critical position. Through General Meade he passed a request to the commander 

of the V Corps, Maj. Gen. George Sykes, to send two brigades and 

some artillery to the hill. They arrived just in time. The Confederates 

moved through the Devil’s Den and launched a furious assault against 

Little Round Top, now defended by Col. Strong Vincent’s brigade composed of regiments from Maine, New York, Pennsylvania, and Michigan. The Union soldiers threw assault after assault back. Particularly 

hard hit was the 20th Maine, commanded by Col. Joshua Chamberlain. 

The Confederates attacked time and time again, but were each time 

driven back. Finally, running short on ammunition, Colonel Chamberlain ordered a desperate bayonet charge that broke the rebel attackers’ 

spirit. The position at Little Round Top was safe. 

With Little Round Top secured by the Union, Longstreet threw 

a second division against Sickles’ troops in the Peach Orchard and 

Wheatfield; this cracked the Federal line, and the Confederate troops

drove as far as Cemetery Ridge before Meade’s reserves halted their adJoshua L. Chamberlain (1828–1914)

A former Bowdoin College professor, Colonel Chamberlain had led the 20th Maine for only a 

month when they met destiny at Gettysburg. Late in the afternoon of July 2, 1863, the 20th Maine 

repulsed three Confederate assaults against the extreme Union left among the boulders and trees 

along the southern slopes of Little Round Top. Again, enemy infantry climbed the hill. Low on ammunition with no help available and retreat inadmissible, a wounded Chamberlain ordered a bayonet 

charge. Those Confederates not killed or captured fled in panic; and Little Round Top, key to the 

Union line, was secured. Chamberlain received the Medal of Honor.
the civil war, 1863

265

vance. Lee attempted to coordinate his units so that they would attack 

progressively from right to left, and one of Hill’s divisions assaulted 

Cemetery Ridge in piecemeal fashion but was driven off. In the north, 

Ewell attacked about 8:00 p.m. and captured some abandoned trenches 

near Culp’s Hill, but Federals posted behind stone walls proved too 

strong. As the day ended the Federals held all their main positions. The 

Confederates had fought hard and with great bravery, but the Union 

Army, operating in interior lines, had been able to move troops in a 

timely fashion to all threatened spots in the line and had stubbornly 

defended against the Confederate assaults. 

Meade, after requesting the opinions of his corps commanders in 

a council of war, decided to defend, rather than attack, on July 3. Lee 

planned to launch a full-scale, coordinated attack along the line with 

all the forces he could muster. The main attack, however, was to be a 

massive frontal assault by nine brigades from three divisions of Longstreet’s and Hill’s corps against the Union center, which was held by 

Maj. Gen. Winfield Scott Hancock’s II Corps. The assault was to be

preceded by a massive artillery barrage.

The infantry’s main fire support during the war was provided by

direct-firing field artillery. Rifled guns of relatively long range were

available and could have provided indirect fires, but the soldiers on

both sides preferred the 12-lb. smoothbore cannon, especially the 

popular Napoleon. Rifled cannon were harder to clean; their fuses were

not always as effective; their greater range could not always be effectively used because development of a good indirect fire control system

would have to await the invention of the field telephone and the radio;

and the rifled guns had to be rebored once the rifling wore down.

Both types of cannon were among the artillery of the two armies at 

Gettysburg.

About 1:00 p.m. on July 3, Confederate gunners opened fire from

140 pieces along Seminary Ridge in the greatest artillery bombardment 

witnessed on the American continent up to that time. For perhaps two 

hours the barrage continued, destroying Union artillery and caissons in 

the center of the line. The Union infantry was able to shelter behind a 

stone wall that ran in front of its position and was relatively unharmed. 

“Pickett’s” Charge

“For every Southern boy fourteen years old,” William Faulkner wrote, “not once but whenever he wants 

it, there is the instant when it’s still not yet two o’clock on that July afternoon in 1863.” It was then, on the third 

day of the battle of Gettysburg, that the Confederates launched an assault by more than 10,000 infantry, 

intended to break the Union line on Cemetery Ridge. A low rise divided the approach to the Union lines, so 

that neither Pickett’s Virginian Division nor the predominantly North Carolinian Division to its left could see, 

much less support, the other during most of the advance. Under heavy artillery fire all the way, the attack 

failed. Union forces held their ground, and Lee’s army began its retreat to Virginia the next day. Recriminations continued for decades afterward, with North Carolinians blaming Virginians for the failure and Virginians blaming General Longstreet, a Georgian. Asked in later years why the charge had failed, Pickett 

himself is supposed to have answered, “Well, I always thought the Yankees had something to do with it.”
American Military History

266

The Union artillery, while taking a beating, was not knocked out; artillery reinforcements were quickly rushed to the threatened center. 

Union guns did slow their rate of firing, in part to conserve ammunition, and the silence seemed to be a signal that the Confederates should 

begin their attack.

Under the overall tactical command of General Longstreet, around 

11,000 men emerged from the woods on Seminary Ridge, dressed their 

three lines as if on parade, and began the mile-long, twenty-minute 

march toward Cemetery Ridge. Although known popularly as Pickett’s Charge after Maj. Gen. George E. Pickett, over half the soldiers 

belonged to units other than Pickett’s division. Brig. Gen. James J. Pettigrew, in charge of Maj. Gen. Henry Heth’s division of four brigades, 

led another main element. Two brigades from Maj. Gen. William D. 

Pender’s division, commanded by Maj. Gen. Isaac R. Trimble, joined 

them. In essence there were two poorly coordinated assaults on the 

Union Center with Trimble and Pettigrew on the Confederate left and 

Pickett’s three brigades on the right. 

The assault force, forty-seven regiments altogether, moved at a 

walk until it neared the Union lines then broke into a run as it neared 

the summit of the ridge. Union artillery on the south end of the ridge 

opened fire and enfiladed the gray ranks. Despite heavy casualties the

Rudolph Ellis of Philadelphia as Officer of the Day, Jefferson Chalfont, n.d.
the civil war

, 1863

267

Confederateskept their formation until they came within rifle and can-

ister range of the II Corps; by then the lines and units were intermin-

gled. Remnants of Pickett’s three brigades actually reached and crossed 

the stone wall defended by Brig. Gen. John Gibbon’s 2d Division of the 

II Corps, only to be quickly cut down or captured. Pettigrew’s men were 

hit in the front and flankby deadly rifle fire and canister and fell short

of breaching the Union lines north of a sharp turn in the stone wall 

called the Angle. Trimble’s men tried to support Pettigrew’s attack but 

were broken

b

y Union fire and could

g

o no farther.

The survivors of

all three divisions withdrew to Seminary Ridge, and the field fell quiet.

Both Union and Confederate forces were too exhausted for further 

attacks. Both sides had fought hard and with great valor. Among 90,000 

effective Union troops and 75,000 Confederates, there were more than 

51,000 casualties. The Army of the Potomac lost 3,155 killed, 14,529 

wounded, and 5,365 captured or missing

. Of the Army of Northern

Virginia, 3,903 were killed, 18,735 wounded, and 5,425 missing or cap

-

tured. If Chancellorsvillewas arguably Lee’s finest battle, Gettysburg

was clearly his worst; yet the reversal did not unnerve him or reduce 

his effectiveness as a commander. The invasion had patently failed, 

and on July 4 he began to retreat toward the Potomac. As that river 

was flooded, it

was several days before hewas able to cross

. Mr. Lin-

coln, naturally pleased over Meade’s defensive victory and elated over 

Grant’s capture of Vicksburg, thought the

war could end in 1863 if

Meade launched a resolute pursuit and destroyed Lee’s army on the 

north bank of the Potomac. But Meade’s own army was too mangled; 

and the Union commander moved cautiously, permitting Lee to return 

safely to Virginia on July 13.

Gettysburg was the last important action in the Eastern Theater in 

1863. Lee and Meade maneuvered against each other in Virginia, but

therewas no more significant fighting in the East.Therewere stirring

events in the Western Theater, however.

The West: Confusion over Clearing the Mississippi

In the west, the major challenge facing the Union armies was 

the capture of Vicksburg and the seizure of control of the Missis-

sippi River. Initially, however, the Federals faced the same problems of 

divided command that had plagued armies in the east. General Grant, 

with

over 60,00

0 men, remained in

westernTennessee guarding com

-

munication lines. Brig. Gen. Don Carlos Buell’s army of 56,000, after

containing Bragg’s invasion of Kentucky, had been taken over by Maj. 

Gen. William S. Rosecrans, whose hard-won victory at Murfreesboro at 

the end of 1862 had nevertheless immobilized the Army of the Cum-

berland for nearly half a year. To the south, Union forces under the 

command of Maj. Gen. Nathaniel P. Banks controlled New Orleans as 

part of the Department of the Gulf. Coordinating the movement of all 

these forces would prove a true leadership challenge.

Late in 1862President Lincoln and Secretar

y of

War Edwin M.

Stanton worked out their own plans to accomplish the fall of Vicks

-

burg, however without coordinating that plan effectively with their 

senior military commanders. They wrote somewhat vague orders for 

a simultaneous advance north from New Orleans and south from 
American Military History

268

Tennessee. General Banks was to command the move northward from 

New Orleans, and command of the southbound expedition was to go 

to Maj. Gen. John A. McClernand. Both were relatively untried as Army 

commanders. They were also volunteer officers and politicians who

often dabbled in intrigue to gain favors. Further, McClernand was to 

operate within Grant’s department but independently of him, often a 

recipe for trouble. When General Halleck found out about the LincolnStanton plan, he persuaded the President to put Grant in command 

of the southbound expedition and to make McClernand one of his 

subordinates.

Grant’s Campaign against Vicksburg

General Grant first tried a combined land and water expedition

against Vicksburg in December 1862–January 1863. He sent General

Sherman downriver from Memphis, but the Confederates under Maj. 

Gen. Earl Van Dorn and Brig. Gen. Nathan B. Forrest raided and cut his 

200-mile-long line of communications. Sherman himself bogged down 

before Vicksburg; Grant, perhaps also wishing to keep close rein on 

McClernand, who ranked Sherman, then determined on a river expedition that he would lead in person. Late in January Grant arrived near 

Vicksburg with upwards of 45,000 men organized into three corps: the 

XIII Corps under McClernand, the XV Corps under Sherman, and the 

XVII Corps under Maj. Gen. James B. McPherson. During the ensuing 

campaign Grant received two more corps as reinforcements to bring 

his total strength to 75,000 men.

Vicksburg had almost a perfect location for defense. (Map 33) At 

that point on the river, bluffs rose as high as 250 feet above the water and 

extended for about 100 miles from north to south. North of Vicksburg 

lay the Yazoo River and its delta, a gloomy stretch of watery, swampy 

bottom land extending 175 miles from north to south, 60 miles from

east to west. The ground immediately south of Vicksburg was almost 

as swampy and impassable. The Confederates had fortified the bluffs

from Haynes’ Bluff on the Yazoo, 10 miles above Vicksburg, to Grand 

Gulf at the mouth of the Big Black River 40 miles below. Vicksburg 

could not be assaulted from the river, and sailing past it was extremely 

hazardous. The river formed a great “U” there, and Vicksburg’s guns 

threatened any craft that tried to run by. For the Union troops to attack 

Grant and Headquarters

Grant prospered because he could learn the complexities of command away from Washington 

and the glare of newspaper publicity. He made mistakes and learned from them. Because of the 

scarcity of trained officers, his staff initially consisted of civilians in uniform; and he formed the habit 

of writing his own orders. They were clear, succinct, unambiguous—like the man himself. He cultivated 

a climate at his headquarters that allowed free-wheeling discussion of the difficulties and possibilities facing his forces, what one historian has labeled “an open headquarters.” Junior officers could 

express their opinions, and Grant could pick and choose among them.
PEMBERTON

(32,000)

4 Jul

Surrendered

GRANT

(45,000)

S H E R M A N

29–30 Apr

M

c

C

L

E

R N A N D

&

M c P H E R S O N

Mar–Apr

18 May

17 May 16 May

12 May

14 May

1 May

30 Apr

Champion's Hill

Pearl River

B gi B al ck R vi er Mississippi River

Canal

Canal

aY

oz o River

JACKSON

Hard Times

Grand Gulf

Bruinsburg

Port Gibson

Raymond

VICKSBURG

to Haynes' Bluff

Axis of Union AdvanceConfederate PositionVicksburg Perimeter

March–July 1863

VICKSBURG CAMPAIGN

0 10

Miles

Map 33
American Military History

270

successfully, they would have to get to the high, dry ground east of 

town. This would put them in Confederate territory between two enemy 

forces. Lt. Gen. John C. Pemberton commanded some 30,000 men in 

Vicksburg, while the Confederate area commander, General Joseph E. 

Johnston (now recovered from his wound at Fair Oaks), concentrated 

the other scattered Confederate forces in Mississippi at Jackson, the 

state capital, 40 miles east of Vicksburg.

During late winter and early spring, with the rains falling, the 

streams high, and the roads at their wettest and muddiest, overland 

movement was impossible. Primarily to placate discontented politicians 

and a critical press, Grant made four attempts to reach high ground east 

of Vicksburg. All four were unsuccessful, foiled either by Confederate 

resistance or by natural obstacles. One of the more spectacular efforts 

was digging canals. These projects had as their objective the clearing of 

an approach by which troops could sail to a point near the high ground 

without being fired on

b

y Vicksburg’s guns. All failed.

That Grantkept

on trying in the face of such discouragement is a tribute to his dogged 

persistence, and that Lincoln supported him isa tribute to his confi-

dence in the general. The trouble was that Grant had been on the river 

for two months, and by early spring Vicksburg was no nearer falling 

than when he came.

On April 4 in a letter to Halleck, Grant divulged his latest plan to 

capture Vicksburg. Working closely with the local naval commander, 

Rear Adm. David D. Porter, Grant evolved a stroke of great boldness. 

He decided to use part of his force above Vicksburg to divert the Con-

federates. The main body would march southward on the west side of 

the Mississippi, cross to the east bank below the city, and, with only 

five days’ rations, strik

e inland to live offa hostile country withouta

line of supply or retreat. As he told Sherman, the Union troops would 

carry “what rations of hard bread, coffee, and salt we can and make the 

country furnish the balance.” Porter’s gunboats and other craft, which 

up to now were on the river north of Vicksburg, were to run past the 

batteries during darkness and then ferry the troops over the river. Sher-

man thought the campaign too risky, but the events of the next two 

months were to prove him wrong.

While Sherman demonstrated near Vicksburg in March, McCler-

nand’s and McPherson’s corps started their advance south. The rains 

let up in April, the waters receded slightly, and overland movement 

became somewhat easier

. Onthe night of April 16Porter led his river

fleet past Vicksburg, whose guns

, once the move

was discovered, lit up

the black night with an eerie bombardment. All but one transport made 

it safely; and starting on April 30, Porter’s craft ferried the troops east-

wardover the river at Bruinsburg below Grand Gulf.Thefinal march

against Vicksburg was ready to begin.

At this time the Confederates had more troops in the vicinity than 

Grant had but never could make proper use of them. Grant’s swift 

move had bewildered Pemberton. Then too, just before marching down-

stream, Grant had ordered a brigade of cavalry to come down from the 

Tennessee border, riding between the parallel north-south railroad lines 

of the Mississippi Central and Mobile and Ohio. Led by Col. Benjamin 

H. Grierson, this force sliced the length of the state, cutting railroads, 

fighting detachments of Confederate

cavalry, andfinally reaching Union
the civil war, 1863

271

lines at Baton Rouge, Louisiana. Most important, for the few days that 

counted most, it drew Pemberton’s attention away from Grant and kept 

the Confederate general from discerning the Union’s objectives.

Once more, divided counsel hampered the coordination of Confederate strategy. Davis had sent Johnston west in December 1862 to

take overall command of the theater, an imposing task, for Pemberton’s 

army in Mississippi and Bragg’s in Tennessee were widely separated. 

Things were further confused by Davis’ directive to Pemberton to hold 

Vicksburg at all costs while Johnston recognized the potential trap and 

ordered him to move directly against Grant. In such a situation Pemberton could do little that was right. He tried to defend too great an 

area; he had not concentrated but dispersed his forces at Vicksburg, 

the Big Black River, and along the railroad line to Jackson, where Johnston was gathering more troops. As is often the case, whoever tries to 

defend everything often ends up losing everything.

Grant took Port Gibson on May 1, and Sherman’s corps rejoined 

the main force. Now the Union commander decided that he must defeat 

Johnston before turning on Vicksburg. He moved northeastward and 

fought his way into Raymond on May 12, a move that put him squarely 

between Johnston and Pemberton and in a position to cut the Confederate line of communications. The next day Sherman and McPherson marched against the city of Jackson with McClernand following 

in reserve ready to hold off Pemberton if he attacked. The leading 

corps took Jackson on May 14 and drove its garrison eastward. While 

Sherman occupied the state capital to fend off Johnston, the other two 

corps turned west against Pemberton and Vicksburg. Pemberton tried 

too late to catch Grant in open country. He suffered severe defeats at 

Champion’s Hill (May 16) and Big Black River Bridge (May 17) and was

shut up in Vicksburg. In eighteen days Grant’s army had marched 200 

miles, had won four victories, and had finally secured the high ground

along the Yazoo River that had been the goal of all the winter’s fruitless 

campaigning. In this lightning operation, Grant had proven himself a 

master of maneuver warfare and a bold risk-taker.

Grant assaulted the Vicksburg lines on May 15 and 22, but as Sherman noted of the attacks: “The heads of columns have been swept 

away as chaff from the hand on a windy day.” The only recourse now 

was a siege. Grant settled down and removed McClernand from command after the attack of May 22, during which the corps commander 

sent a misleading report, then later slighted the efforts of the other 

corps and publicly criticized the army commander. Grant replaced him 

with Maj. Gen. Edward O. C. Ord and ordered the army to dig trenches 

around the city and place powerful batteries of artillery to command 

the enemy positions.

The rest was now a matter of time, as Sherman easily kept Johnston away and the Federals advanced their siege works toward the Confederate fortifications. Food became scarce, and the troops and civilians

inside Vicksburg were soon reduced to eating mules and horses. Shells 

pounded the city, and the Federal lines were drawn so tight that one 

Confederate soldier admitted “a cat could not have crept out of Vicksburg without being discovered.” The front lines were so close that the 

Federals threw primitive hand grenades into the Confederate works. By 

July 1 the Union troops had completed their approaches and were ready 

Food became scarce, and the 

troops and civilians inside 

Vicksburg were soon reduced to 

eating mules and horses. 
American Military History

272

for another assault. But Vicksburg was starving, and Pemberton asked 

for terms. Grant offered to parole all prisoners, and the city surrendered 

on Independence Day. Since Grant was out of telegraphic contact with 

Washington, the news reached the President via naval channels on July 

7, the day before General Banks’ 15,000-man army, having advanced 

upriver from New Orleans, captured Port Hudson. The Union now 

repossessed the whole river and had sliced the Confederacy in two. 

Once more Grant had removed an entire Confederate army—40,000 

men—from the war, losing only one-tenth that number in the process.

Chickamauga Campaign

One week before the surrender of Vicksburg and the Union victory at Gettysburg, General Rosecrans moved out of Murfreesboro, 

Tennessee, and headed for Chattanooga, one of the most important 

cities in the south because of its location. (Map 34) It was a main junction on the rail line linking Richmond with Knoxville and Memphis. 

President Lincoln had long recognized the importance of railroads in 

this area. In 1862 he said, “To take and hold the railroad at or east

of Cleveland [near Chattanooga], in East Tennessee, I think fully as 

important as the taking and holding of Richmond.” Furthermore, 

at Chattanooga, the Tennessee River cuts through the parallel ridges 

of the Appalachian Mountains and forms a natural gateway to north 

or south. By holding the city, the Confederates could threaten Kentucky and prevent a Union penetration of the southeastern part of the 

Confederacy. If the Union armies pushed through Chattanooga, they 

would be in position to attack Atlanta, Savannah, or even the Carolinas 

and Richmond from the rear. As Lincoln told Rosecrans in 1863, “If

we can hold Chattanooga and East Tennessee I think the rebellion 

must dwindle and die.”

After the spring and summer campaigns in the east, the Davis 

government in Richmond approved a movement by two divisions of 

Longstreet’s corps of Lee’s army to the west to reinforce the hardpressed Bragg. Longstreet’s move, a 900-mile trip by rail involving 

10,000–15,000 men and six batteries of artillery, began on September 9. 

Railroads in the Civil War

During the decade before the Civil War U.S. railroads expanded from 9,000 miles of track to 

over 30,000, located disproportionately in the North; the Northern railroads were also generally better constructed, managed, and maintained. Superior rail communications gave the Union an enormous 

advantage in strategic mobility, largely negating the Confederacy’s nominal possession of interior lines. 

Movement of supplies by rail was crucial for both armies, so that the securing or destruction of railways 

were important campaign objectives. In addition, substantial troop movements by rail were an important 

feature of Civil War operations, most notably the transfer of two Union corps totaling 25,000 men from 

Virginia to Tennessee in autumn 1863 to lift the siege of Chattanooga. Union forces advancing into Confederate territory were supported by the U.S. Military Railroad—by the end of the war, the largest railroad in the world—whose operations were overseen by the West Point–trained engineer Herman Haupt. 
Map 34

(62,000)

BRAGG

(40,000)

BRAGG

BRAGG

LONGSTREET

(65,000)

ROSECRANS

(60,000)

GRANT

24 Sep–25 Nov

SIEGE OF

CHATTANOOGA

18–20 Sep

BATTLE OF

CHICKAMAUGA

24 Nov

SHERMAN

25 Nov

THOMAS 24 Nov

HOOKER

ROSECRANS

to Bridgeport

to La Fayette

T E N N E S S E E

G E O R G I A

A L A .

G A .

T E N N .

G A .

R A C C O O N

M T N

M I S

S I O

N A

R

Y R I D

G E

L O O K O U

T

M

T

N

Lookout Mtn

1000

1000

West Chickamauga Creek

Lookout Creek

Chattanooga Creek

Te n n e s s e e R i v e r

Rossville

CHATTANOOGA

CHATTANOOGA

Stevenson

Bridgeport Rossville

Ringgold

Dalton

Resaca

La Fayette

September 1863

APPROACH TO CHATTANOOGA

0 10

Miles

Confederate Position

Union Position

September–November 1863

BATTLES NEAR CHATTANOOGA

ELEVATION IN FEET

0 800 1500 and Above

0 5

Miles
American Military History

274

But a force under Burnside, who now commanded the Department of 

the Ohio, which was not part of Rosecrans’ command, had penetrated 

the Cumberland Gap and had driven the Confederates from Knoxville. 

Longstreet had to go around by way of Augusta and Atlanta and did 

not reach Bragg until September 18. The rail network was rickety, and 

Longstreet’s soldiers quipped that such poor rolling stock had never 

been intended to carry such good soldiers. Movement of Longstreet’s 

troops from Virginia was nevertheless an outstanding logistical achieve-

ment for the Confederacy and a bold operational move.

Rosecrans meanwhile began planning how to use his numerical 

superiority

(he had 65,000availabletroopsto Bragg’s 46,250)to maneu-

ver Bragg out of his positions in eastern Tennessee and move against 

Chattanooga. Faced with Confederates in strong positions around his 

base at Murfreesboro, Rosecrans decided to conduct a series of feints 

to mislead the enemy. Starting on June 24, he dispatched one division 

to the southwest of the city and a corps to the east to distract Bragg 

while moving the bulk of his army under corps commanders Maj. 

Gens. George H. Thomas and Alexander M. McCook to the southeast 

in a main attack on a critical mountain gap. Despite torrential rainfall 

and problems with muddy roads, the Union troops successfully seized 

Hoover’s Gap, unhinging the Confederate defensive line. Forced to 

retreat, Bragg fell back on Tullahoma to defend his supply lines. How-

ever, after a few days of recovery it was apparent to him that Rosecrans 

intended

to use his superior forcestocontinuetryingto outflank his

position. Rather than be trapped, Bragg retreated again and, abandon

-

ing eastern Tennessee, he moved back over the rain-swollen Tennessee 

River on

July 6. He returnedto Chattanooga and preparedto defend

that key city. In a few weeks of rapid maneuvering, Rosecrans had 

driven Bragg’s forces back to where they had started their offensive 

almost a year before. 

After months of delay Rosecrans had accomplished the feat of 

completely outmaneuvering Bragg without a major battle. He next 

demonstrated across the river from Chattanooga as a diversion while 

actually sending the bulk of his army to cross the Tennessee River miles 

to the southwest. He planned to get in behind Bragg and bottle him up 

in Chattanooga. However, the Confederate general saw through the 

scheme and slipped away southward, abandoning the city while care-

fully planting

rumors that his armywas demoralized and in flight.Rose

-

crans then resolved to pursue, a decision that would have been wise if 

Bragg had been retreating in disorder.

There were few passes through the mountains and no good lateral 

roads. In full pursuit mode, Rosecrans dispersed his army in three col-

umns over a forty-mile front to make use of the various passes. Watch-

ing Rosecrans carefully, Bragg stopped his retreat and concentrated his 

army about September 9 at La Fayette, Georgia, twenty miles south of 

Chattanooga. As his force was three times as large as any one of the 

Union columns, Bragg anticipated that he could hit each column in turn 

and defeat Rosecrans in detail. But his intelligence service failed him: 

he thought there were two, rather than three, Union columns and pre-

pared plans accordingly. He first planned to strik

e what he thought

was

Rosecrans’ right (actually Thomas’ corps in the center) at McLemore’s 

Cove on September 10. However, his subordinates moved slowly, and 

General Bragg

General Forrest
the civil war, 1863

275

the attacks were made in desultory fashion. By the time Bragg’s forces 

could converge, Thomas had pulled his troops back into safe positions. 

Bragg next planned to strike at Maj. Gen. Thomas L. Crittenden’s corps 

on the Union left flank. Again, poor coordination prevented him from

catching the enemy; Crittenden also pulled back behind the safety of 

Missionary Ridge. Thus, twice in three days Bragg missed a fine opportunity to inflict a serious reverse upon the Federals because of his subordinates’ failure to carry out orders.

By September 13 Rosecrans was at last aware that Bragg was not 

retreating in disorder but was preparing to fight. The Union commander

ordered an immediate concentration, but this would take several days 

and in the meantime his corps were vulnerable. Although Bragg was 

usually speedy in executing attacks, this time he delayed, awaiting the 

arrival of Longstreet’s corps. He intended to attack the Union left in an 

attempt to push Rosecrans southward away from Chattanooga into a 

mountain cul-de-sac where the Federals could be destroyed.

By September 17 Bragg was positioned just east of Chickamauga 

Creek, a sluggish stream surrounded by dense woods. (See Map 34.) 

When Longstreet’s three leading brigades arrived on September 18, 

Bragg decided to cross the Chickamauga and attack the Federal left. 

But Rosecran’s forces there, with two corps almost fully concentrated, 

defended the fords so stoutly that only a few Confederate units got over 

the creek that day. During the night more Confederates slipped across, 

and by morning of the nineteenth about three-fourths of Bragg’s army 

was over the creek and poised to attack.

By then, however, Rosecrans’ third corps had arrived on the scene 

and Bragg faced a much stronger force than he had expected. The 

heavily wooded battlefield had few landmarks, and some units had difficulty maintaining direction. Bragg planned to attack all along the Union 

line, starting on its left and rippling down the line to the Union right in 

quick succession from roughly northeast down to the southwest. Over 

the course of the day, several of Bragg’s toughest divisions (Maj. Gens. 

Alexander P. Stewart’s, John Bell Hood’s and Patrick R. Cleburne’s) 

attacked and almost broke through the Union line on three separate 

occasions. Only the hasty movement of Union reserves stemmed the 

tide in each case. 

The fighting was brutal and often hand-to-hand in the dense woods

along the choked Chickamauga Creek. It was afterward called a soldier’s 

battle, with little chance for grand strategy or operational deployments 

The New York Draft Riots

On July 13–17, 1863, several thousand rioters, mostly working-class Irish Catholics, smashed and 

burned government buildings and facilities belonging to the Republican Party to protest a newly implemented federal conscription system. They also attacked some well-to-do citizens on the street because 

they resented the $300 dollar commutation clause that allowed a wealthy man to hire a substitute to go 

in his place. Many rioters also vented their anger against blacks, killing at least a dozen, because they 

objected to fighting for the freedom of slaves who might then take their jobs by working for lower wages. 
American Military History

276

except for the tactical shifting of small units in response to crisis. By 

the evening of the nineteenth neither side had gained much terrain and 

the troops lay exhausted in the dense woods. The Union troops labored 

all night to cut down trees to fortify their positions as the Confederates 

gathered and reorganized for the next day’s attacks.

Bragg, sensing victory but seeking to ensure a coordinated attack 

on the twentieth, reorganized his army into two wings: the right wing 

under the command of corps commander Lt. Gen. Leonidas Polk and 

the left wing under the newly arrived General Longstreet. He planned 

to begin the attack again in the north with Polk attacking at dawn followed by attacks all along the front from northeast to southwest. Longstreet would attack last with three divisions into nearly the center of 

the Union line.

Confusion started the day on the twentieth; Lt. Gen Daniel H. Hill, 

now subordinate to Polk, failed to receive any orders to attack as the 

lead element of Polk’s wing. Polk had not been found by a messenger 

the night before and had no knowledge of the day’s plan. Finally, Hill’s 

corps attacked at 9:30. The attack against Thomas’ corps was delivered 

with spirit; and Thomas began requesting, and Rosecrans providing, 

reinforcements to fight off the rebels. By late morning it seemed as if

the line was holding, but even more reinforcements were being readied to move to the aid of the Union left. At that moment, Longstreet 

attacked with four divisions in column formation against the Union 

center and right. Moving along a road but under cover of the dense 

woods, Longstreet’s men exploded out of the tree line and attacked 

the Union positions. Their attack had even more impact since they hit 

a hole in the Union line created inadvertently by Rosecrans’ moving a 

division out of line because of an erroneous staff report. The combination of a gap in the lines and a powerful Confederate attacking column blew away Union defenses. As the lead Confederate division commander later put it, the attack “cast the shattered fragments to the right 

and left.” The attack penetrated a mile into Union lines, and Rosecran’s 

right wing and center evaporated. The men fled in panic back toward

Chattanooga. General Rosecrans himself was caught up in the rout and 

fled on horseback with most of his staff to the safety of the city.

Battle of Chickamauga, James Walker, 1864
the civil war, 1863

277

Snodgrass Hill

At approximately 11:20 a.m. on September 20, 1863, General Longstreet’s corps of Bragg’s Army 

of the Tennessee smashed through a gap in the Federal lines along Chickamauga Creek, Georgia. North 

of the break, the troops under General Thomas fell back to a natural defensive position provided by 

Snodgrass Hill and Horseshoe Ridge. By early afternoon the Confederates appeared ready to carry this 

position, but General Granger, who had marched to the sound of the guns, arrived with reinforcements 

just in time. Thomas and Granger held the position until nightfall, protecting the retreat of Rosecran’s shattered Army of the Tennessee. That evening Thomas broke contact and withdrew, ending one of the great 

defensive stands of the Civil War that earned Thomas his nickname: Rock of Chickamauga. 

The only major Union units left on the field of battle by early afternoon of September 20 were the hard-pressed divisions of Thomas’ 

corps. Adding to these units as they stood their ground were bits and 

pieces of regiments fleeing from the disaster on the Union right flank.

These units and survivors pulled back onto a small piece of high ground 

called Snodgrass Hill to the rear of Thomas’ original defensive position. Arriving at this site in the early afternoon, Thomas saw that only 

a strong defense would preserve what was left of the army. If the position fell, he stood a good chance of losing the entire army and the city 

of Chattanooga. He began shifting units from different parts of his 

hasty defensive line to deal with successive Confederate attacks. When 

Longstreet brought his divisions on line against him, he must have 

despaired of holding; but the timely arrival of elements of Maj. Gen. 

Gordon Granger’s reserve corps with fresh troops and more ammunition stemmed the Confederate tide. From then until darkness fell, Longstreet sent attack after attack up the hill against the stubborn federals. 

But Thomas, who won for himself and the U.S. 19th Infantry the title 

Rock of Chickamauga, held the line. A Confederate remembered that 

afternoon how “the dead were piled upon each other in ricks, like cord 

wood, to make passage for advancing columns.” As darkness fell and the 

exhausted Confederates ceased their attacks, Thomas slowly withdrew 

his units from Snodgrass Hill and conducted a careful withdrawal back 

toward Chattanooga. His retreat was in good order, saving almost twothirds of the Army of the Cumberland from total destruction.

After the draining daylong attacks, Bragg concluded that no further 

results could be attained that day. Polk, Longstreet, and Forrest pleaded 

with him to push the defeated Federals and recapture Chattanooga. But 

18,000 casualties (the Federals had lost only 1,500 fewer) so unnerved 

Bragg that he permitted Thomas to withdraw unmolested from the 

field to a blocking position extending from Missionary Ridge west to

Lookout Mountain. The next day Thomas retired into Chattanooga. 

Polk wrote to President Davis of Bragg’s “criminal negligence,” and 

Forrest a week later insubordinately told the army commander, “You 

have played the part of a damned scoundrel, and are a coward and if 

you were any part of a man I would slap your jaws.” Yet nothing could 

erase completely the fact that the Confederates had won a great victory 

and had Rosecrans’ army in a trap.
American Military History

278

Grant at Chattanooga

Rosecrans’ army, having started out offensively, was now shut up 

in Chattanooga as Bragg took up positions on Lookout Mountain and 

Missionary Ridge dominating the city. The Union commander accepted 

investment and thus surrendered his freedom of action. Burnside, at 

Knoxville, was too far away to render immediate aid. There were no 

strong Confederate units north of Chattanooga, but Rosecrans’ line of 

communications was cut away. The Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad, instead of running directly into the city, reached the Tennessee 

River at Stevenson, crossed at Bridgeport southwest of Chattanooga, 

and ran through Confederate territory into town. River steamers could 

get to within only eight miles of Chattanooga; beyond, the Tennessee 

River was swift and narrow. Supplies therefore came over the mountains 

in wagons; but starting September 30, Confederate cavalry under Maj. 

Gen. Joseph Wheeler, one of Bragg’s cavalry commanders, raided as 

far north as Murfreesboro. Though heavily and effectively opposed in 

his effort to tear up the railroad, he managed to destroy many precious 

Union supply wagons. With the mountain roads breaking down under 

the heavy traffic in wet weather, rations in Chattanooga ran short. Men

went hungry, and horses and mules began to die of starvation. Rosecrans prepared to reopen his line of communications by means of an 

overland route to the west. But this route was dominated by Confederate troops on Raccoon and Lookout Mountains. Additional troops to 

clear these strong points were required if the Army of the Cumberland 

was to survive.

Washington finally awoke to the fact that an entire Union army was

trapped in Chattanooga and in danger of capture. In a midnight counUnion Officers on Missionary Ridge, James Walker, 1864
the civil war

, 1863

279

cil meeting on September 23, the President met with Secretary Stan-

ton, General Halleck, and others to determine what could be done. As 

General Meade was not active in the east at that time, they decided to 

detach two corps, or about 20,000 men, from the Army of the Potomac 

and send them by rail to Tennessee under the command of General 

Hooker, who had been without active command since his relief in June. 

The selected forces included ten artillery batteries with over 3,000 mules 

and horses. The 1,157-mile journey involved four changes of trains, 

owing to differing gauges and lack of track connections, and eclipsed 

all other such troop movements by rail up to that time. The troops 

began to entrain at Manassas Junction and Bealton Station, Virginia, on 

September 25, and fiv

e days later the first trains arrived at Bridgeport,

Alabama. Not all the troops made such good time: for the majority 

of the infantry the trip consumed about nine days. And movement of 

the artillery, horses, mules, baggage, and impedimenta was somewhat 

slower. Combined with a waterborne movement of 17,000 men under 

Sherman from Mississippi, the reinforcement of the besieged Rose-

crans was a triumph of skill and planning.

Chickamauga had caused Stanton and his associates to lose con-

fidence in

Rosecrans.For sometime Lincoln had been dubious about

Rosecrans, who, he said, acted “like a duck hit on the head” after Chick

-

amauga; but he did not immediately choose a successor. Finally, about 

mid-October, he decided to unify command in the west and to vest 

it in General Grant, who still commanded the Army of the Tennes-

see. In October Stanton met Grant in Louisville and gave him orders 

that allowed him some discretion in selecting subordinates. Grant was 

appointed commander of the Military Division of the Mississippi, which 

embraced the Departments and Armies of the Ohio, the Cumberland, 

and the Tennessee and included the vast area from the Alleghenies to 

the Mississippi River north of Banks’ Department of the Gulf. Thomas 

replaced Rosecrans as Commander of the Army of the Cumberland, 

and Sherman was appointed to command Grant’s old Army of the 

Tennessee.

Now that Hooker had arrived, the line of communications, or the 

“cracker line” to the troops, could be opened. Rosecrans had actually 

shaped the plan, and all he needed was combat troops to execute it. On 

October 26 Hooker crossed the

Tennessee at Bridgeport and attacked

eastward. Within two days he had taken the spurs of the mountains, 

other Union troops had captured two important river crossings, and 

the supply line was open once more. Men, equipment, and food moved 

via riverboat and wagon road, bypassing Confederate strong points, to 

reinforce the besieged Army of the Cumberland.

In early November Bragg weakened his besieging army by sending 

Longstreet’s force against Burnside at Knoxville. This move reduced 

Confederate strength to about 40,000 about the same time Sherman 

arrived with two army corps from Memphis. The troops immediately 

at hand under Grant (Thomas’ Army of the Cumberland, two corps 

of Sherman’s Army of the Tennessee, and two corps under Hooker 

from the Army of the

Potomac) no

w

numbered about 60,000. Grant

characteristically decided to resume the offensive with his entire force.

The Confederates had held their dominant position for so long 

that they seemed to look on all of the Federals in Chattanooga as their 
American Military History

280

ultimate prisoners. One day in November Grant went out to inspect 

the Union lines and reached a point where Union and Confederate 

picket posts were not far apart. Not only did his own troops turn out 

the guard, but a smart set of Confederates came swarming out, formed 

a neat military rank, snapped to attention, and presented arms. Grant 

returned the salute and rode away. But plans were already afoot to divest 

the Confederates of some of their cockiness.

Grant planned to hit the ends of the Confederate line at once. 

Hooker would strike at Lookout Mountain; Sherman, moving his army 

upstream across the river from Chattanooga and crossing over by pontoons, would hit the northern end of Missionary Ridge. While they 

were breaking the Confederate flanks, Thomas’ men could make limited, holding attacks on the center. The Army of the Cumberland’s 

soldiers, already nursing a bruised ego for the rout at Chickamauga, 

realized that in the eyes of the commanding general they were secondclass troops.

Hooker took Lookout Mountain on November 24 after a short 

struggle known as the Battle above the Clouds because of the height 

of the mountain and the mist that enshrouded it. On the same day 

Sherman crossed the Tennessee at the mouth of Chickamauga Creek 

and gained positions on the north end of Missionary Ridge. The next 

day his attacks bogged down as he attempted to drive south along the 

ridge. To help Sherman, Grant directed the Army of the Cumberland 

to take the rifle pits at the foot of the west slope of Missionary Ridge.

These rifle pits were the first of three lines of Confederate trenches.

Thomas’ troops rushed forward and seized the pits. Then, having a 

score to settle with the Confederates positioned above them, the troops 

kept going up the hill despite attempts by their officers to stop them.

Coming under fire from the pits above and in front of them, the Federals inexorably swept up the hill. One of the charging Union soldiers, 

Lt. Arthur MacArthur, father of Douglas MacArthur, was awarded the 

Medal of Honor for his heroism. 

When Grant observed this movement, he muttered that someone 

was going to sweat for it if the charge ended in disaster. But Thomas’ 

troops drove all the way to the top, some shouting “Chickamauga, 

Chickamauga”; in the afternoon Hooker swept the southern end of 

the ridge. The Federals then had the unusual experience of seeing a 

Confederate army disintegrate into precipitate retreat, throwing their 

blankets, knapsacks, and even weapons away as they ran. The surprised 

bluecoats beckoned to their comrades: “My God! Come and see them 

run!” Bragg personally mounted his horse and tried to stem the rout, 

but to no avail. Grant pursued Bragg’s army the next day, but one Confederate division skillfully halted the pursuit while Bragg retired into 

Georgia to regroup.

The battles around Chattanooga and the subsequent campaign in 

eastern Tennessee ended in one of the most complete Union victories of the war. Bragg’s army was defeated, men and materiel captured, 

and the Confederates driven south. The mountainous defense line that 

the Confederates had hoped to hold had been pierced; the rail center 

of Chattanooga was permanently in Union hands; and the rich, foodproducing eastern Tennessee section was lost to the Confederacy. 

Relief had come at last for the Union sympathizers in eastern TenThe Army of the Cumberland’s 

soldiers, already nursing a 

bruised ego for the rout at 

Chickamauga, realized that in 

the eyes of the commanding 

general they were second-class 

troops.
the civil war, 1863

281

nessee. With Chattanooga secured as a base, the way was open for an 

invasion of the lower South.

Discussion Questions

1. What strategic challenges and choices did the North and South 

face in the opening days of 1863? What did each side choose to do with

their opportunities and dangers?

2. Compare Hooker’s plan to attack the Army of Northern Virginia with Rosecran’s plan to seize Chattanooga. Why did one fail and 

the other succeed?

3. Compare Lee’s second invasion of the North with his first. What

are the similarities and differences in rationale, plans, and outcomes?

4. It is nearly midnight, July 1, 1863, at Gettysburg. Choose the role

of Lee or Meade, devise a plan for the next day, and describe the steps 

you would need to follow to implement that plan.

5. What opportunities were available to Bragg after the battle of 

Chickamauga? What possibilities were left in November 1863? What

would you have done?

6. Did the Confederacy stand any chance of independence by the

end of 1863? To what degree would a negotiated settlement have been

the best course of action for President Davis? 

Recommended Readings

Carter, Samuel III. The Final Fortress: The Campaign for Vicksburg, 1862–

1863. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1980, chs. 8–23.

Catton, Bruce. Glory Road. New York: Anchor Books, chs. 3–6.

Coddington, Edwin B. The Gettysburg Campaign: A Study in Command. 

Norwalk, Conn.: Easton Press, 1989.

Foote, Shelby. The Civil War: A Narrative, 3 vols. New York: Random 

House, 1963, vol. 2.

Freeman, Douglas Southall. Lee’s Lieutenants: A Study in Command, 3 vols. 

New York: Scribner Classics, 1997, vol. 2, chs. 25–36; vol. 3, chs.

1–18.

Gallagher, Gary W., ed. Fighting for the Confederacy: The Personal Recollections 

of General Edward Porter Alexander. Chapel Hill: University of North 

Carolina Press, 1989.

Grant, Ulysses S. Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant. New York: Penguin 

Books, 1999.

Sears, Stephen W. Chancellorsville. Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1996.

Weigley, Russell F. A Great Civil War: A Military and Political History, 

1861–1865. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2000.

Williams, Kenneth P. Lincoln Finds a General: A Military Study of the Civil 

War, 5 vols. New York: Macmillan, 1949–1959, vol. 4, chs. 10–13; 

vol. 5.

Williams, T. Harry. Lincoln and His Generals. New York: Gramercy 

Books, 2000, chs. 9–12.
American Military History

282

Other Readings

Coakley, Robert W. The Role of Federal Military Forces in Domestic Disorders, 

1789–1878. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1989.

Editors of Military Affairs. Military Analysis of the Civil War. Milwood, 

N.Y.: KTO Press, 1977.

Esposito, Vincent J., ed. The West Point Atlas of the Civil War. New York: 

Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1978, vol. 1, maps 84–116.

Jones, Virgil C. The Civil War at Sea, 3 vols. New York: Holt, Rinehart, 

and Winston, 1960–1962, vol. 2, chs. 17–24; vol. 3, chs. l–7.

Nelson, Harold W., and Jay Luvaas, eds. The U.S. Army War College Guide 

to the Battle of Gettysburg. Carlisle, Pa.: South Mountain Press, 1986.

Spruill, Matt, ed. Guide to the Battle of Chickamauga. Lawrence: University 

of Kansas Press, 1993.

Tucker, Glenn. Chickamauga: Bloody Battle in the West. Dayton: Morningside, 1975.

Wiley, Bell. The Life of Billy Yank: The Common Soldier of the Union. Baton 

Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1978.

———. The Life of Johnny Reb: The Common Soldier of the Confederacy. 

Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1978.
F

rom Bull Run to Chattanooga, the Union armies had fought their 

battles without benefit of either a grand strategy or a supreme

field commander. Even after the great victories of 1863, the situation in 1864 reflected this lack of unity of command. During the

final year of the war the people of the North grew restless; and as

the election of 1864 approached, many of them advocated a policy of

making peace with the Confederacy. President Abraham Lincoln never 

wavered. Committed to the policy of destroying the armed power of 

the Confederacy, he sought a general who could pull together all the 

threads of an emerging strategy and then concentrate the Union armies 

and their supporting naval power against the secessionists. After Vicksburg in July 1863, Lincoln leaned more and more toward Maj. Gen.

Ulysses S. Grant as the man whose strategic thinking and resolution 

could lead the Union armies to final victory.

Unity of Command

Acting largely as his own General in Chief, although Maj. Gen. 

Henry W. Halleck had been given that title after George B. McClellan’s 

removal in early 1862, Mr. Lincoln had watched the Confederates fight

from one victory to another inside their cockpit of northern Virginia. 

In the Western Theater, Union armies, often operating independently 

of one another, had scored great victories at key terrain points. But 

their hold on the communications base at Nashville was always in jeopardy as long as the elusive armies of the Confederacy could escape to 

fight another day at another key point. The twin, uncoordinated victories at Gettysburg and Vicksburg, 900 miles apart, only pointed out 

the North’s need for an overall strategic plan and a general who could 

carry it out.

Having cleared the Mississippi River, Grant wrote to Halleck and 

the President in the late summer of 1863 about the opportunities now

open to his army. Grant first called for the consolidation of the autonomous western departments and the coordination of their individual 

12

The Civil War, 1864–1865
American Military History

284

armies. After this great step, he proposed to isolate the area west of 

the line Chattanooga-Atlanta-Montgomery-Mobile. Within this region, 

Grant urged a “massive rear attack” that would take Union armies in 

the Gulf Department under Maj. Gen. Nathaniel P. Banks and Grant’s 

Army of the Tennessee to Mobile and up the Alabama River to Mont-

gomery. The U.S. Navy would play a major role in this attack. Simultane-

ously, Maj. Gen. William S. Rosecrans was to advance overland through 

Chattanooga to Atlanta. All military resources within this isolated area 

would be destroyed.

Lincoln vetoed Grant’s plan in part by deferring the Mobile-Mont-

gomery phase. The President favored a demonstration by Banks up the 

Red River to Shreveport to sho

w the American flag to theFrench occu-

pying Mexico. Napoleon III had sent French soldiers to that country to 

install Maximilian, archduke of Austria, as emperor, taking advantage 

of the U.S. preoccupation with the Civil War. This was a clear violation 

of the Monroe Doctrine, but Lincoln could do little more than protest 

and demonstrate at the time. Banks’ Department of the Gulf was left 

out of the consolidation of the other western commands under Grant 

in October 1863.

Grant’s plan was further stymied after the Union defeat at Chick-

amauga and the subsequent need to break the siege at Chattanooga. 

After his own victory at Chattanooga in November, however, Grant 

wasted few hours in writing the President what he thought the next 

strategic moves should be. As a possible winter attack, Grant revived 

the touchy Mobile campaign while the Chattanooga victors were gath-

ering strength for a spring offensive to Atlanta. Grant reasoned that 

Lee would vacate Virginia and shift strength toward Atlanta. For the 

Mobile-Montgomery plan, Grant asked for Banks’ resources in the 

Gulf Department. Lincoln again balked because the Texas seacoast 

would be abandoned. Grant’s rebuttal explained that Napoleon III 

would really be impressed with a large Army-Navy operation against 

Mobile Bay. The Red River campaign, Grant believed, would not pro-

vide as dramatic a demonstration. The President told Grant again that 

he had to heed the demands of Union diplomacy, but at the same time 

he encouraged Grant to enlarge his strategic proposals to include esti-

mates for

a grand Federal offensive for the coming spring of 1864.

Grant’s plan of

January 1864 projecteda four-prongedcontinental

attack. In concert, the four armies were to move on Atlanta, on Mobile 

(after Banks took Shreveport), on General Robert E. Lee’s communica-

tions by a campaign across the middle of North Carolina on the axis 

New Bern–Neuse River–Goldsboro–Raleigh–Greensboro, and on Lee’s 

Army of Northern Virginia in the hope of defeating it in an open battle. 

Lincoln opposed the North Carolina phase, fearing that Grant’s diver-

sion of 60,000

effective bayonets from formationscoveringWashington

wastoo dangerous. Lincoln knewthat Lee’seyeswere alwaysfixed on

the vast amount of supplies in the depots around the Washington area.

Though Lincoln scuttled some of Grant’s professional schemes, 

he never lost his esteem for Grant’s enthusiasm and intelligence. In 

February 1864 Congress revived Winfield Scott’

s old rank of lieuten

-

ant general; and Grant was promoted on March 9, making him senior 

to all Union officers. Lincoln relieved Halleck as General in Chief

and ordered Grant to Washington to assume Halleck’s post; Halleck 

President Lincoln
the civil war, 1864–1865

285

remained as Lincoln’s military adviser and Chief of Staff, but his position was decidedly inferior to Grant’s. During March the President, the 

new General in Chief, and Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton ironed 

out command arrangements that had plagued every President since the 

War of 1812. Lincoln and Stanton relinquished powerful command, 

staff, and communications tools to Grant. Stanton, greatly impressed 

with Grant’s public acclaim, cautioned his General Staff Bureau chiefs 

to heed Grant’s needs and timetables.

General in Chief Grant reported directly to the President and the 

Secretary of War, keeping them informed about the broad aspects of 

his strategic plans and telling them in advance of his armies’ needs. 

However, Grant removed himself from the politics of Washington 

and established his headquarters in northern Virginia with the Army of 

the Potomac. Though he planned to go quickly to trouble spots, Grant 

elected to accompany the Army of the Potomac under Maj. Gen. George 

G. Meade to assess Lee’s moves and their effects on the other columns of 

the Union Army. By rail or steamboat, Grant was never far from Lincoln, 

and in turn the President visited Grant frequently. To tie his far-flung

commands together, Grant employed a vast telegraph system. 

In a continental theater of war larger than Napoleon’s at its zenith, 

Grant’s job, administratively, eventually embraced four military divisions, totaling seventeen subcommands wherein 500,000 combat 

soldiers would be employed. At Washington, Halleck operated a war 

room for Grant. Halleck eased his heavy administrative burden of 

studying the several Army commanders’ detailed field directives by

preparing brief digests, thus saving the General in Chief many hours 

of reading detailed reports. Halleck also kept Grant informed about 

supply levels at base depots and advance dumps in Nashville, St. Louis, 

City Point, Washington, Philadelphia, Louisville, and New York City. 

Under Stanton, Quartermaster General Montgomery C. Meigs, the 

most informed logistician and supply manager of his day, dispatched 

men and munitions to Grant’s subcommands according to a strategic timetable. As the spring offensive progressed, Stanton, Halleck, 

and Meigs gave Grant a rear-area team that grasped the delicate balance between theater objectives and the logistical support required to 

achieve them.

Grant spent the month of April on the Rapidan front developing his final strategic plan for ending the war. In essence, he recapped

all his views on the advantages to be gained from his victories in the 

Western Theater. He added some thoughts about moving several Federal armies, aided by naval power when necessary, toward a common 

center in a vast, concentrated effort. He planned to stop the Confederates from using their interior lines. He intended to maneuver Lee away 

from the Rapidan Wilderness and defeat the Army of Northern Virginia in open terrain by a decisive battle. Another Union force collected 

from the Atlantic seaport towns of the Deep South was to cut the 

James–Appomattox River line to sever Lee’s rail and road links with the 

other parts of the Confederacy. Simultaneously, Maj. Gen. William T. 

Sherman’s group of armies would execute a wide wheeling movement 

through the South to complete the envelopment of the whole country 

east of the Mississippi. Banks was still scheduled to make the attack 

through Mobile. Sherman’s and Banks’ assaults were meant to fix the

Kepie, or Forage Cap, Belonging 

to General Grant
American Military History

286

rebels on the periphery while Grant struck at the center, or, as Lincoln 

described the plan, “Those not skinning can hold a leg.”

By mid-April 1864 Grant had issued specific orderstoeachcom-

mander of the four Federal armies that were to execute the grand strategy. 

In round numbers the Union armies were sending 300,000 combat troops 

against 150,000 Confederates defending the invasion paths. Meade’s Army 

of the Potomac and Maj. Gen. Ambrose E. Burnside’s independent IX 

Corps, a combined force of 120,000 men, constituted the major attack 

column under Grant’s

overall direction.Theenemy had 63,000troops

facing Grant along the Rapidan. Two subsidiary thrusts were to support 

Meade’s efforts. Commanding a force of 33,000 men, Maj. Gen. Benja-

min F. Butler with his Army of the James was to skirt the south bank of 

the James, menace Richmond, take it if possible, and destroy the railroads 

below Petersburg. Acting as a right guard in the Shenandoah Valley, Maj. 

Gen. Franz Sigel’s 23,000 Federals were to advance on Lee’s rail hub at 

Lynchburg, Virginia. With the northern Virginia triangle under attack, in 

the continental center of the line, Sherman’s 100,000 men were to march 

on Atlanta, annihilat

e GeneralJoseph E.Johnston’s 65,000 soldiers, and

devastate the resources of central Georgia. On the continental right of the 

line, Banks was to disengage as soon as possible along the Red River and 

with Rear Adm. David C. Farragut’s blockading squadron in the Gulf of 

Mexico make a limited amphibious landing against Mobile. The day for 

advance would be announced early in May.

In rising from regimental command to General in Chief, Grant had 

learned much from experience; if he sometimes made mistakes, he rarely 

repeated them. Not a profound student of the literature of warfare, he 

had become by the eve of his grand campaign one of those rare leaders 

who combine the talents of the strategist, tactician, and logistician and 

who marry those talents to the principle of the offensive. His operations, 

especially those around Vicksburg, were models of the execution of the 

principles of war. He was calm in crisis; reversals and disappointments Sherman

“War is cruelty, and you cannot refine it,” wrote William T. 

Sherman (1820–1891) to the mayor of Atlanta as he ordered all 

civilians out of the city before occupying it. Sherman prosecuted 

the war zealously. His troops began the year 1864 by tearing 

up 205 miles of railroad line in the state of Mississippi (“the most 

complete destruction of railroads ever beheld,” Sherman reported) 

and ended it with the famous March to the Sea from Atlanta to 

Savannah. Sherman was popular with the troops, partly because 

he was far more successful than most Union generals and partly 

because his nervous temperament inclined him to stop and chat with 

anyone along the route of march, whether teamster, enlisted man, or 

officer. His letters and memoranda, both during the Civil War and 

after (he served as Commanding General of the Army from 1869 

to 1883), show exemplary concern for the well-being of his soldiers.
the civil war, 1864–1865

287

did not unhinge his cool judgment. He had what some have called “three 

o’clock in the morning” courage, keeping his composure even in those 

moments in the middle of the night when fears could often overpower 

lesser commanders. Grant also had mastered the dry-as-dust details of 

the logistical system and used common sense in deciding when to use the 

horse-drawn wagon, the railroad, or the steamboat in his strategic moves. 

Above all, Grant understood and applied the principle of modern war 

that the destruction of the enemy’s economic resources—his ability to 

sustain his forces—is as necessary as the annihilation of his armies.

Lee Cornered at Richmond

On the morning of May 4, 1864, Meade and Sherman moved out

to execute Grant’s grand strategy. The combat strength of the Army 

of the Potomac, slimmed down from seven unwieldy corps, consisted of three infantry corps of 25,000 rifles each and a cavalry corps.

Commanding the 12,000-man cavalry corps was Maj. Gen. Philip H. 

Sheridan, an energetic leader whom Grant brought east on Halleck’s 

recommendation. Meade had dispersed his cavalry, using troopers as 

messengers, pickets, and train guards; but young Sheridan, after considerable argument, eventually succeeded in concentrating all of his sabers 

as a separate combat arm. Grant reorganized Burnside’s IX Corps of 

20,000 infantrymen, held it as a strategic reserve for a time, and then 

assigned the IX Corps to Meade’s army. Lee’s army, now 70,000 strong, 

was also organized into a cavalry and three infantry corps.

Grant’s Council of War near Massaponax Church in Virginia, May 21, 1864. 

General Grant is standing behind the bench, looking over General Meade’s 

shoulder at a map.
American Military History

288

Grant and Lee were at the height of their careers, and this was their 

first contest of wills. Having the initiative, Grant crossed the Rapidan

and decided to go by Lee’s right, rather than his left. (Map 35) First, 

Grant wanted to rid himself of his reliance on the insecure Alexandria 

and Orange Railroads for supplies. Second, he wanted to end the Army 

of the Potomac’s dependence on a train of 4,000 wagons (the Army’s 

mobility was hobbled by having to care for 60,000 animals). Finally,

Grant wanted to use the advantages of Virginia’s tidewater rivers and 

base his depots on the Chesapeake Bay. He was willing to accept the 

risk inherent in moving obliquely across Lee’s front in northern Virginia. He also hoped to find a weakness to his front that would allow

him to slip around Lee’s flank and get between him and Richmond.

With little room for maneuver, Grant was forced to advance through 

the Wilderness, where Hooker had come to grief the year before. As 

the army column halted near Chancellorsville to allow the wagon trains 

to pass the Rapidan, on May 5 Lee struck at Meade’s right flank. Grant

and Meade swung their corps into line and hit back. The fighting in the

Battle of the Wilderness, consisting of assault, defense, and counterattack, was close and desperate in tangled woods and thickets. Artillery 

could not be brought to bear. The dry woods caught fire, and some of

the wounded died miserably in the flame and smoke. On May 6 Lee

attacked again. Lt. Gen. James Longstreet’s I Corps, arriving late in 

battle but as always in perfect march order, drove the Federals back. 

Longstreet himself received a severe neck wound, inflicted in error by

his own men, which took him out of action until October 1864. Lee, at

a decisive moment in the battle, his fighting blood aroused to a white

heat, moved forward personally and looked as if he wanted to lead an 

assault in person; but men of the Texas brigade with whom Lee was 

riding persuaded the Southern leader to go to the rear and direct the 

battle as their army commander. On May 7 neither side renewed the 

fight. The indecisive battle cost the Union nearly 17,000 casualties and

the South some 10,000. 

Now came the critical test of Grant’s execution of strategy. He 

had been worsted, though not really beaten, by Lee, a greater antagonist than General Braxton Bragg, General Albert S. Johnston, or Lt. 

Gen. John C. Pemberton. After an encounter with Lee, each of the 

former Army of the Potomac commanders, McClellan, Burnside, and 

Hooker, had retired north of the Rappahannock River and postponed 

any further clashes with that great tactician. But Grant was of a different breed. He calmly ordered his lead corps to move south toward 

Spotsylvania as rapidly as possible to get around Lee’s flank and interpose the Army of the Potomac between Lee and Richmond, hoping to 

achieve by mobility what he had not been able to do with battle.

Lee detected Grant’s march and, using roads generally parallel to 

Grant’s, also raced toward the key road junction at Spotsylvania. Maj. 

Gen. J. E. B. Stuart’s cavalry harassed and slowed Grant; Lee arrived 

first and quickly built strong earth-and-log trenches over commanding ground that covered the roads leading to Richmond. In this crossroads race, Sheridan’s cavalry would have been useful; but Meade had 

dissipated the cavalry corps’ strength by deploying two divisions of 

horse to guard his already well-protected trains. Sheridan and Meade 

argued once again over the use of cavalry, and the General in Chief 

Lee, . . . his fighting blood 

aroused to a white heat, moved 

forward personally and looked 

as if he wanted to lead an 

assault in person.
Map 35

Pamunkey River

Mattaponi River

South Anna River

North Anna River

Chickahominy River

James River

Appomattox River

Rappahannock River

Potomac River

Rapidan River

Aquia Cr

5–7 May

22–27 May

1–12 Jun

13 Jun

T O

3–

A

9

P

A

P

pr

O M AT T O X

1865

C O N F E D E R AT E W I T H D R AWA L

28–31 May

8–21 May

31 Mar

1 Apr

U N I O N P U R S U I T

SIEGE OF PETERSBURG

15 Jun 1864–2 Apr 1865

WILDERNESS

to Danville

RICHMOND

Yellow Tavern

Mechanicsville

Cold

Harbor

Bermuda Hundred

Petersburg

Five Forks

Fredericksburg

Chancellorsville

Orange

Spotsylvania

Culpeper

White House

Axis of Union Advance

Confederate Position

May 1864–April 1865

WILDERNESS TO PETERSBURG

10 0 10

Miles
American Military History

290

backed Sheridan, allowing him to concentrate his cavalry arm. Grant 

gave Sheridan a free hand to stop Stuart’s raids. Leading his corps 

south on May 9 in a long ride toward Richmond, its objective a decisive 

charge against Stuart, Sheridan did the job. He fought a running series 

of engagements that culminated in a victory at Yellow Tavern, just six 

miles north of Richmond, on May 11; the gallant Stuart was mortally 

wounded. The South was already short of horses and mules, and Sheridan’s raid ended forever the offensive power of Lee’s mounted arm. 

Lee, in addition, had lost another irreplaceable commander.

For four days beginning May 9 Meade struck in force at Lee’s positions around Spotsylvania Court House but was beaten back each time. 

Twice the Federals broke through the trenches and divided Lee’s army, 

but in each case the attackers became disorganized. Supporting infantry did not or could not close in, and Confederate counterattacks were 

delivered with such ferocity that the breakthroughs could be neither 

exploited nor held. On the morning of the eleventh, Grant wrote Halleck: “I propose to fight it out on this line if it takes all summer.” He

seemed as good as his word when the next day Grant launched an 

attack with twenty-four brigades under Maj. Gen. Winfield Scott Hancock, II Corps commander, against a narrow segment of the Confederate trench line. The attack, in an area known as the Bloody Angle or the 

Mule Shoe, broke the position wide open; and Union troops captured 

an entire Confederate division and two Confederate generals. Lee, however, recovered his equilibrium and reestablished his defensive line. On 

May 20, having decided the entrenchments were too strong to capture, 

Grant side-slipped south again, still trying to envelop Lee’s right flank.

His persistence led one Confederate to say of Grant, “we have met a 

man this time, who either does not know when he is whipped or who 

cares not if he loses his whole Army.”

With smaller numbers, Lee skillfully avoided Grant’s trap and 

refused to leave entrenched positions to be destroyed in open battle. 

Lee retired to the North Anna River and dug in. Grant did not attack 

the position directly but severed Confederate rail lines to the north 

and west of Lee before moving southeast again. Grant continued to 

move to his left in a daring and difficult tactical maneuver. Butler had

meanwhile advanced up the peninsula toward Richmond, but General 

Cold Harbor

After several days of inconclusive sparring at North Anna, General Grant maneuvered his men 

southward in yet another attempt to outflank General Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia. On May 31, 

1864, General Sheridan’s cavalry seized a vital crossroads near Cold Harbor. By gaining possession of 

Cold Harbor itself, Grant would be able to maneuver his army between Lee and the Confederate capital of Richmond. Late on June 1, the Union VI and XVIII Corps launched an assault that met with partial 

success. A follow-on Federal assault was delayed twenty-four hours as Grant waited for the II Corps to 

arrive. At dawn on June 3, the II, VI, and XVIII Corps attacked and were repulsed after briefly penetrating the enemy defensive line. Union casualties exceeded 7,000, while Confederate losses were 1,500. 

Cold Harbor pointed out once again the folly of frontal assaults against fortified positions.
the civil war, 1864–1865

291

P. G. T. Beauregard outmaneuvered him in May and bottled up Butler’s 

men at Bermuda Hundred between the James and Appomattox Rivers. 

Eventually Butler and Banks, who did not take Mobile, were removed 

from command for their failure to carry out their assignments in the 

grand strategy.

Lee easily made his way into the Richmond defenses with his right 

flank on the Chickahominy and his center at Cold Harbor, the site of

the Gaines’ Mill action in 1862. The front extended for eight miles. A

number of attacks on June 1 and 2 ended in Union repulses. However, 

on June 3 Grant thought he detected a weakness in the Confederate 

position and assaulted Lee’s center at Cold Harbor. Though bravely 

executed, the attack was badly planned. The Confederates repulsed it 

with gory efficiency. In only a few short hours, Grant lost over 7,000

Union casualties; he later regretted that he had ever made the attempt. 

Cold Harbor climaxed a month of heavy fighting in which Grant’s

forces had 55,000 casualties against 32,000 for Lee. However, Grant 

was able to make good his losses within days of the battle, whereas Lee 

had no way to replace his. 

After Cold Harbor, Grant executed a brilliant maneuver in the face 

of the enemy. He assembled all his corps on the north bank of the 

deep, wide James by June 14 and, stealing a march on Lee, sent them 

rapidly across a 2,100-foot pontoon bridge to the south bank. Once 

across, Grant began a move on lightly defended Petersburg. However, 

the maneuver came to nothing due to General Beauregard’s stubborn 

defense of Confederate positions around Petersburg and General Butler’s failure to prosecute a prompt supporting attack. The frustrated 

attacks slowed Grant enough to allow Lee to rush back and secure this 

vital city. Establishing a new and modern base depot at nearby City 

Point, complete with a rail line linking the depot with the front lines, 

Grant on June 18 undertook siege operations at Petersburg below Richmond, an effort that continued into the next year.

After forty-four days of continuous maneuver and fighting, Grant

had finally fixed Lee in a condition of position warfare. This was now

a war of trenches and sieges, conducted ironically enough by two masters of mobile warfare. Such warfare favored the side with the greater 

numbers and best logistics: the Union. Mortars were used extensively, 

and heavy siege guns were brought up on railway cars. Grant still 

sought to get around Lee’s right and hold against Lee’s left to prevent 

The Crater

To breach the Confederate trenches at Petersburg, Union troops tunneled forward and placed 

a mine containing four tons of black powder under the opposite lines. An all-black infantry division 

trained for the assault; but the Army of the Potomac’s General Meade, worried about political consequences if the black troops took heavy casualties, substituted an untrained white division the day 

before the mine was to blow. The first attack on July 30, 1864, went awry, and the black division 

had to enter the battle anyway; but by that time the Confederate defenders had recovered from 

initial shock and held their position around the thirty-foot-deep crater. Total Union casualties for the 

day were 3,798, nearly one-fifth of those engaged, for no gain.
American Military History

292

him from shortening his line and achieving a higher degree of con-

centration. When Lee moved his lines to counter Grant, the two com-

manderswere ineffect maneuveringtheir fortificationstotry andgain

an advantage. However, Lee had earlier declared that he had to keep 

Grant fromgettingtotheJames River andfixing him in position. “If

he gets there,” he stated, “it will become a siege, and then it will be a 

mere question of time.” Grant was now on the James, and the siege 

was firmly in place.

To help break the deadlock, Lee decided to ease the pressure with 

one of his perennial raids up the Shenandoah Valley toward Wash-

ington. In early July Confederate Maj. Gen. Jubal A. Early’s corps 

advanced against Maj. Gen. David Hunter, who had replaced Sigel. 

Hunter, upon receiving confused orders from Halleck, retired north 

down the valley. When he reached the Potomac, he turned west into the 

safety of the Appalachians and uncovered Washington. Early saw his 

chance and drove through Maryland. Delayed by a Union force on July 

9 near Frederick, he reached the northern outskirts of Washington on 

July 11 and skirmished briskly in the vicinity of Fort Stevens. President 

Lincoln and Quartermaster General Meigs were interested spectators. 

At City Point, Grant had calmly received the news of Early’s raid. Using 

his interior waterway, he embarked the men of his VI Corps for the 

capital, where they landed on the eleventh. When Early realized he was 

engaging troops from the Army of the Potomac, he managed to escape 

the next day. 

Grant decided that Early had eluded the Union’s superior forces 

because they had not been under a single commander. He abolished 

four separate departments and formed them into one that embraced 

Washington, western Maryland, and the Shenandoah Valley. In August 

Sheridan was put in command with orders to follow Early to the death. 

Sheridan spent the remainder of the year in the valley, employing and 

coordinating his infantry, cavalry, and artillery in a manner that has won 

the admiration of military students ever since. He met and defeated 

Early at Winchester and Fisher’s Hill in September and shattered him 

at Cedar Creek in October. To stop further raids and prevent Lee from 

feeding his army on the crops of that fertile region, Sheridan devas-

tated the Shenandoah Valley.

Sherman’s Great Wheel to the East

On March 17, 1864, Grant had met with Sherman at Nashville

and told him his role in the grand strategy. Sherman, like Grant, held 

two commands. As Division of the Mississippi Commander, he was 

responsible for the operation and defense of a vast logistical system 

that reached from a communications zone at St. Louis, Louisville, and 

Cincinnati to center on a large base depot at Nashville. Strategically, 

Nashville on the Cumberland River rivaled Washington, D.C., in impor-

tance. A ninety-mile military railroad, built and operated by Union 

troops, gave Nashville access to steamboats plying the Tennessee River. 

Connected with Louisville by rail, Nashville became one vast store-

house and corral. If the city were destroyed, the Federal forces would 

have to fall back to the Ohio River line. Wearing his other hat, Sherman 

wasa field commander with three armies under his direction.
the civil war

, 1864–1865

293

With the promise 

of the return of his two 

crack divisions from the 

Red River expedition 

by May 1864 and with

a

splendid administrative 

system working behind 

him, Sherman was ready 

to leave Chattanooga in 

the direction of Atlanta. (See Map 36.) His mission was to destroy Johnston’s armies and capture 

Atlanta, after Richmond 

the most important 

industrial center in the 

Confederacy. With 254 

guns, Sherman matched 

his three small armies, 

and a separate cavalry 

command—a total force 

of more than 100,000 

men—against Johnston’s 

Army of Tennessee and 

Polk’s Army of Missis-

sippi, including Maj. Gen. Joseph Wheeler’s cavalry, 65,000 men.

Sherman moved out on May 4, 1864, the same day the Army of

the Potomac crossed the Rapidan. Johnston, realizing how seriously he 

was outnumbered, decided to go on the defensive, preserve his forces 

intact, hold Atlanta, and delay Sherman as long as possible. There was 

always the hope that the North would grow weary of the costly strug-

gle and that some advocate of peaceful settlement might defeat Presi-

dent Lincoln in the election of 1864.

From May4 through mid-July the

tw

o forces maneuvered against each other.

Therewere daily fights but

few large-scale actions. As Sherman pushed south, Johnston would take 

up a strong position and force Sherman to halt, deploy, and reconnoi-

ter. Sherman

would then outflankJohnston, who in tur

n

would retire

to a new line and start the process all over again. On June 27 Sher

-

man, unable to maneuver because the roads were muddy and seriously 

concerned by the unrest in his armies brought about by constant and 

apparently fruitless marching, decided to assault Johnston at Kenesaw 

Mountain. This attack against prepared positions, like the costly failure 

at Cold Harbor, was beaten back at the cost of 3,000 Union casualties. 

Sherman returned to maneuver and slowly but surely forced Johnston 

back to positions in front of Atlanta.

Johnston had done his part well. He had accomplished his mis-

sions and had so slowed Sherman that Sherman covered only 100 miles 

in seventy-four days. Johnston, his forces intact, was holding strong 

positions in front of Atlanta, his main base; but by this time President 

Jefferson Davis had grown impatient with Johnston and his tactics of 

cautious delay. In July he replaced him with Lt. Gen. John B. Hood, a 

much more impetuous commander.

Sheridan’s Ride 

Buchanan T. Reed, n.d.
Map 36

Kenesaw

Mtn

CHATTANOOGA

Rossville

La Fayette

Dalton

Resaca

Adairsville

Rome

Cassville

Cartersville

Dallas

Marietta

ATLANTA

Decatur

Jonesboro

Lovejoy

SHERMAN

OCCUPIES

ATLANTA

1–2 Sep

20–23 May

25–28 May

26 May–3 Jul

4–10 Jul

30 Aug–2 Sep

5–14 May

13–16 May

19 May

West Chickamauga Cr

Oostanaula R

Coosa R

Etowah R

Chattahoochee R

Peach Tree Cr

T E N N E S S E E

G E O R G I A

A L A B A M A

G E O R G I A

Axis of Union Advance

Confederate Position

High Ground Above 1000 Feet

4 May–2 September 1864

DRIVE TO ATLANTA

10 0 10

Miles
the civil war, 1864–1865

295

On July 20, while Sherman was executing a wide turning movement around the northeast side of Atlanta, Hood left his fortifications

and attacked at Peach Tree Creek. When Sherman beat him off, Hood 

pulled back into the city. While Sherman made ready to invest, Hood 

attacked again and failed again. Sherman then tried cavalry raids to 

cut the railroads, just as Johnston had during the advance from Chattanooga, but Sherman’s raids had as little success as Johnston’s. Sherman then began extending fortifications on August 31. Hood, who

had dissipated his striking power in his assaults, gave up and retired 

to northwest Alabama. Sherman marched into Atlanta on the first

two days of September, depriving the South of one of its key cities 

and railroad junctions. Sherman hoped that if Mobile could be taken, 

a shorter line for his supplies by way of Montgomery, Alabama, or 

still better by the lower Chattahoochee to Columbus, Georgia, would 

open. Tightening the noose still further, Admiral Farragut had entered 

Mobile Bay on August 5, 1864, with four Monitors and fourteen other

ships but had no troops to take Mobile itself. Nevertheless, the capture of the harbor left the South with only one major port: Wilmington, North Carolina.

The fall of Atlanta gave President Lincoln’s campaign for reelection in 1864 a tremendous boost. In addition, the psychological lift

given the Union by Admiral Farragut’s personal heroism in the battle 

of Mobile Bay greatly added to Lincoln’s prestige.

Atlanta was only a halfway point in Sherman’s vast wheel from the 

Western Theater toward the rear of Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia. 

Abandoning the idea of catching up with Hood, Sherman by telegraph 

outlined his next strategic move to Lincoln and Grant in early September 1864. Sherman’s two proposals proved him an able strategist

as well as a consummately bold and aggressive commander. To defend 

Nashville, he suggested that he send two corps, 30,000 men, back to 

Maj. Gen. George H. Thomas. That commander would raise and train 

more men and be in position to hold Tennessee if Hood came north. 

To carry the offensive against the economic heart of the Confederacy, 

Sherman recommended that he himself take four corps (62,000 men),

cut his own communications, live off the country, and march to the 

seacoast through Georgia, devastating and laying waste all farms, railways, and storehouses in his path. Whether he arrived at Pensacola, 

Charleston, or Savannah, Sherman reasoned he could hold a port, make 

Atlanta to the Sea and into the Carolinas

General Sherman led an army of 62,000 men on a massive raid through Georgia and South 

Carolina in late 1864 and early 1865. More than 90 percent of his enlisted force were combat 

veterans committed to victory, even if it meant war against noncombatants. Avoiding long, vulnerable 

logistics lines, Sherman’s troops moved fast by living off the land. Destroying Southern morale and 

crops shortened the war. At times cutting a 250-mile-wide path, the Union army decimated parts of 

Georgia and then created even more havoc in South Carolina, the heart of secession. It was an epic 

march that helped to break the back of the rebellion.
American Military History

296

contact with theU.S. Navy, and be refittedby Stanton and Meigs. Meigs

promised to do the logistical job; and Lincoln and Grant, though their 

reaction to the plan was less than enthusiastic, accepted it in a show of 

confidence in Sherman.

Before marching out of Atlanta, Sherman’s engineers put the torch 

to selected buildings and destroyed all railroads in the vicinity. On 

November 12, moving away from the Nashville depots toward Savan-

nah, the Division of the Mississippi troops broke telegraphic contact 

with Grant. They had twenty days’ emergency rations in their wagons 

but planned to replenish them by living off the country. Operating on a 

sixty-mile-wide front unimpeded by any Confederate force, Sherman’s 

army systematically burned or destroyed what it did not need. The 

march became something of a rowdy excursion, but the destruction 

of private homes and towns has perhaps been exaggerated by popular 

myth. Sherman concentrated on destroying Confederate warehouses, 

depots, railroad lines, and other elements that assisted the Confederate 

war effort. His thrust deep into the Confederacy also liberated thou-

sands of slaves, many of whom followed the Army in its march to the 

sea. Sherman’s campaign, like Sheridan’s in the Shenandoah, anticipated 

the economic warfare and strategic aerial bombardments of the twen-

tieth century.

On December 10 Sherman, having broken the classic pattern by 

moving away from his logistical base, arrived in front of Savannah. Con-

federate forces evacuated the seaport on December 21, and Sherman 

offered it to the nation as a Christmas present. Awaiting him offshore 

was Meigs’

floating seatrain,whichenabled himt

o

executethe last phase

of Grant’s strategy: a thrust north toward the line of the James River.

Thomas Protects the Nashville Base

Sherman, as the Western Theater commander, did not learn of 

Nashville’s fate until he reached Savannah. He had planned Nashville’s 

defense well enough by sending his IV and XXII Corps under Maj. 

Gen.John M. Schofield to screen Hood’s northward move from Flor-

ence, Alabama. Schofieldwas to allowThomas some time to assemble

50,000 men and strengthen Nashville. The aggressive Hood with his 

30,000 men had lost

agolden opportunity to trap Schofield at Spring

Hill,Tennessee, on November 29, 1864. Unopposed, the Union troops

made a night march across Hood’s front to escape capture. Bitterly dis

-

appointed, Hood overtook Schofield the next day at Franklin.

At this point Hood could have upset Grant’s timetable. Booty at 

Nashville might carry Hood to the Ohio or allow him to concentrate 

with Lee before Richmond. But Franklin turned into one of the Con-

federacy’s most tragic battles. It commenced about 3:30 

p.m. on No-

vember 30 and ended at dusk as Hood threw 18,000 of his veterans 

against a solidly entrenched force of Federals. Like Pickett’s Charge at 

Gettysburg, Hood’

s frontal assault

gained nothing

. He lost

over 6,000

men, about 15 percent of his total Army, including thirteen general 

officers. At nightfall Schofield brought his troops in behindThomas’

defenses at Nashville

.

Hood was in a precarious position. He had been far weaker than 

Thomas to begin with; the battle of Franklin had further depleted 
the civil war, 1864–1865

297

his army; and, even worse, his men had lost confidence in their commander. The Federals in Nashville were securely emplaced in a fortified

city that they had been occupying for three years. Hood could do little 

more than encamp on high ground a few miles south of Nashville and 

wait. He could not storm the city; his force was too small to lay siege; 

to sidestep and go north was an open invitation to Thomas to attack 

his flank and rear; and to retreat meant disintegration of his army. He

could only watch Thomas’ moves.

Thomas, the Rock of Chickamauga, belonged to the “last bootlace” school of soldiering; he wanted every detail of supplies in place 

before beginning any offensive operation. In comparison with Grant 

and Sherman, he was slow; but he was also thorough. He had gathered and trained men and horses and was prepared to attack Hood 

on December 10, but an ice storm the day before made movement 

impossible. Grant and his superiors in Washington fretted at the delay, 

and the General in Chief actually started west to remove Thomas. But 

on December 15 Thomas struck like a sledgehammer in an attack that 

militarily students have regarded as virtually faultless.

Thomas’ tactical plan was a masterly, coordinated attack. His heavily weighted main effort drove against Hood’s left flank while a secondary attack aimed simultaneously at Hood’s right. Thomas provided an 

adequate reserve and used cavalry to screen his flank and extend the

Reveille on a Winter Morning, Henry Bacon, ca. 1868
American Military History

298

envelopment of the enemy left. Hood, on the other hand, was overextended; and his thin line was concave to the enemy, denying him 

the advantage of interior lines. Hood’s reserve was inadequate, and his 

cavalry was absent on a minor mission.

The two-day battle proceeded according to Thomas’ plan as the 

Federals fixed Hood’s right while slashing savagely around the Confederate left flank. They broke Hood’s first line on December 15, forcing

the Southerners to retire to a new line two miles to the rear. The Federals repeated their maneuver on the sixteenth, and by nightfall the threesided battle had disintegrated into a rout of Hood’s army. Broken and 

defeated, it streamed southward, protected from hotly pursuing Union 

cavalry only by the intrepid rear-guard action of Maj. Gen. Nathan B. 

Forrest’s horsemen. The shattered Army of Tennessee reached Tupelo, 

Mississippi, on January 10, 1865, but no longer existed as an effective

fighting force. Hood was relieved of command, and his scattered units

were assigned to other areas of combat. The decisive battle of Nashville had eliminated one of the two great armies of the Confederacy 

from a shrinking chessboard.

Lee’s Last 100 Days

President Lincoln was delighted with Savannah as a Christmas 

present: In his congratulatory letter to Sherman and Grant, the Commander in Chief said that he would leave the final phases of the war to

his two leading professional soldiers. Accordingly, from City Point, on 

December 27, 1864, Grant directed Sherman to march overland toward

Richmond. At 3:00 p.m. on December 31, Sherman agreed to execute 

this last phase of Grant’s continental sweep. In the final 100 days of the

war, the two generals would clearly demonstrate the art of making the 

principles of warfare come alive and would prove that each principle 

was something more than a platitude. The commanders had a common 

objective: Grant and Meade would continue to hammer Lee. Sherman 

was to execute a devastating invasion northward through the Carolinas 

toward a juncture with Meade’s Army of the Potomac, then on the line 

Anne Bell, a Nurse, Caring for Wounded Union Soldiers

Image removed due to

license restrictions
the civil war

, 1864–1865

299

of the James River. Their strategy was simple. It called for the massing 

of strength and exemplified an econom

y of force. Itwould place Lee in

an untenable position, cutting him off from all other Confederate com-

manders and trapping him between two Union armies. Surprise would 

be achieved by reuniting all of Sherman’s original corps when Scho-

field, moving from centralTennesseeby rail, river, and ocean transport,

arrived at the Carolina capes. Solidly based on a centralized logistical 

system with protected Atlantic supply ships at their side, Grant and 

Sherman were ready to end Lee’s stay in Richmond.

Robert E. Lee, the master tactician, divining his end, wrote to Davis 

that the Confederates would have to concentrate their forces for a lastditch stand. In February 1865 the Confederate Congress conferred

supreme command of all Confederate armies on Lee, an empty honor. 

Lee could no longer control events. Sherman moved through Colum-

bia, South Carolina, in a destructive campaign much harsher than that 

visited on Georgia. Even the Union troops felt that South Carolina had 

started the war and should be punished for it. In February, Sherman 

took Wilmington, North Carolina, the Confederacy’s last available port, 

and then pushed on. Johnston, newly reappointed to a command, had 

the mission of stopping Sherman’s forces but could not. He interposed 

his small army of about 21,000 effectives in the path of two of Sher-

man’s corps at Bentonville, North Carolina, on March 19. His initial 

attack gained some ground, but by the next day more of Sherman’s 

forces were on the scene and Johnston had to continue his retreat. 

There would be no further major attempts to stop Sherman. 

At Richmond and Petersburg toward the end of March, Grant 

renewed his efforts along a 38-mile front to get at Lee’s right (west) 

flank. By no

w Sheridan’s cavalry and the VI Corps had returned from

the Shenandoah Valley, and the total force immediately under Grant 

numbered 101,000 infantry, 14,700 cavalry, and 9,000 artillery. Lee had 

46,000 infantry, 6,000 cavalry, and 5,000 artillery.

On March 29 Grant began his move to the left. Sheridan and the 

cavalry pushed out ahead by way of Dinwiddie Court House in order to 

strike at Burke’s Station, the intersection of the Southside and Danville 

Railroads, while Grant’s main body moved to envelop Lee’s right. But 

Lee, alerted to the threat, moved west. Lt. Gen. Ambrose P. Hill, who 

never stood on the defense if there was a chance to attack, took his 

corps out of its trenches and assaulted the Union left in the swampy 

forests around White Oak Road. He pushed Maj. Gen. Gouveneur 

K.

Warren’sV Corps bac

k at

first, butWarren counterattacked andb

y

March 31 had driven Hill back to his trenches. On that day Sheridan 

advanced toward Five Forks, a road junction southwest of Petersburg, 

and there encountered a strong Confederate force—cavalry plus two 

infantry divisions under Maj. Gen. George E. Pickett—which Lee had 

dispatched to forestall Sheridan. Pickett attacked and drove Sheridan 

back to Dinwiddie Court House, but there Sheridan dug in and halted 

him. Pickett then entrenched at Five Forks instead of pulling back to 

make contact with Hill, whose failure to destroy Warren had left a gap 

between him and Pickett, with Warren’s corps in between. Sheridan, 

still formally the commander of the Army of the Shenandoah, had 

authority from Grant to take control of any nearby infantry corps of 

the Army of the Potomac. He wanted Warren to fall upon Pickett’s 
American Military History

300

exposed rear and destroy him, but Warren moved too slowly and Pickett 

consolidated his position. On April 1 Sheridan attacked again but failed 

to destroy Pickett because Warren had moved his corps too slowly and 

put most of it in the wrong place. Late in the afternoon, however, the 

Union attack struck Pickett’s position in full force on both flanks. His

position outflanked, Pickett ordered a retreat, but not quickly enough

to avoid losing almost half his force of 10,000 as prisoners. 

Grant renewed his attack against Lee’s right on April 2. The assault 

broke the Confederate line and forced it back northward. The Federals 

took the line of the Southside Railroad, and the Confederates withdrew 

toward Petersburg. Lee then pulled Longstreet’s corps away from the 

shambles of Richmond to hold the line, and in this day’s action General Hill was killed. With his forces stretched thin, Lee had to abandon 

Richmond and the Petersburg fortifications. He struck out and raced

west toward the Danville Railroad, hoping to get to Lynchburg or Danville, break loose, and eventually join forces with Johnston. But Grant 

had Lee in the open at last. He pursued relentlessly and speedily, with 

troops behind (east of) Lee and south of him on his left flank, while

Sheridan dashed ahead with the cavalry to head Lee off. A running fight

ensued from April 2 through 6. Lt. Gen. Richard S. Ewell’s corps was

surrounded and captured at Sayler’s Creek. Lee’s rations ran out; his 

men began deserting and straggling. Finally, Sheridan galloped his men 

to Appomattox Court House, squarely athwart Lee’s line of retreat.

Lee resolved that he could accomplish nothing more by fighting.

He met Grant at the McLean House in Appomattox on April 9, 1865.

The handsome, well-tailored Lee, the very epitome of Southern chivalry, asked Grant for terms. Reserving all political questions for his own 

decision, Lincoln had authorized Grant to treat only on purely military matters. Grant, though less impressive in his bearing than Lee, was 

equally chivalrous. He accepted Lee’s surrender, allowed 28,356 paroled

Ulysses S. Grant (1822–1885)

Born Hiram Ulysses Grant and nicknamed Sam Grant during his 

early military experience in Mexico after graduation from West Point 

in 1843, Ulysses S. Grant bounced back from setbacks all of his life. 

His heavy drinking prompted his resignation from the Army in 1854 to 

avoid court-martial. He failed in a number of civilian jobs and was able 

to regain a commission in 1861 as a colonel of a volunteer regiment 

from Illinois only with the help of a local Congressman. He suffered military reversals at Belmont, Missouri, in 1861 and was caught by surprise 

at Shiloh the following year. Yet he also gained fame for his capture 

of Forts Henry and Donelson and his great victories at Vicksburg, 

Chattanooga, and over Robert E. Lee in a masterful campaign that in 

effect won the war. His memoirs, which he wrote as he lay dying to provide money for his nearly destitute family, are a masterpiece and show him as a caring, thoughtful, and 

simple man who was also a determined military commander. He is one of America’s greatest generals.
the civil war

, 1864–1865

301

Confederates to keep their horses and mules, furnished rations to the 

Army of Northern Virginia, and forbade the soldiers of the Army of 

thePotomac tocheer or fire salutes to celebrate the victoryover their

old antagonists.Johnston surrendered to Sherman on April 26.The last

major trans-Mississippi forcegave up the struggle on May 26, and the

grim fighting was over.

Dimensions of the War

Viewing the war in its broadest context, a historian could fairly 

conclude that a determined general of the North had bested a legend-

ary general of the South, probably the most brilliant tactician on either 

side, because the Union could bring to bear a decisive superiority in 

economic resources and manpower. Lee’s mastery of the art of warfare 

staved off defeat for four long years, but the outcome was never really 

in doubt. Grant and Lincoln held too many high cards; and during the 

last year of the war, the relations between the Union’s Commander 

in Chief and his General in Chief set an unexcelled example of civilmilitary coordination. This coordination was essential to prosecuting a 

multitheater war characterized by the slow, yet steady expansion of the 

area brought back under Federal control over the course of four years 

of struggle. (See Map 37.)

In this costly war, the Union Army lost 138,154 men killed in bat-

tle.This figure seems large, but it is only slightly more than half the

number (221,374) who died of other causes, principally disease, bring

-

ing the total Union dead to 359,528. Men wounded in action num-

bered 280,040. Figures for the Confederacy are incomplete, but at least 

94,000 were killed in battle, 70,000 died of other causes, and an esti-

mated 30,000 died in Northern prisons.

With the advent of conscription, mass armies, and long casualty 

lists, the individual soldier seemed destined to lose his identity and dig-

nity. These were the days before regulation serial numbers and dog tags 

(although some soldiers made individual tags from coins or scraps of 

paper). But by the third year of the war various innovations had been 

introduced to enhance the soldier’s lot. Union forces were wearing corps Robert E. Lee (1807–1870)

Four years after refusing the field command of the Union Army 

because he could not draw his sword against his native state of 

Virginia, Lee surrendered at Appomattox and, ironically, began his 

ascent to the status of perhaps the most admired figure in Ameri-

can military history. A modest, Christian gentleman, he was also a 

combative, bold, and skillful Napoleonic tactician who repeatedly 

turned back larger Federal forces in their efforts to capture the 

Confederate capital, Richmond. To Southerners, and indeed many 

Northerners, he remains the legendary symbol of the “Lost Cause,” 

defeated in the end only by superior numbers and resources.
American Military History

302

badges that heightened unit identification, esprit de corps, and pride in

organization. The year 1863 saw the first award of the highest U.S.

decoration, the Medal of Honor. Congress had authorized it on July 12, 

1862, and in 1863 Secretary Stanton gave the first medals to Pvt. Jacob

Parrott and five other soldiers. They had demonstrated extraordinary

valor in a daring raid behind the Confederate lines near Chattanooga. 

The Medal of Honor remains the highest honor the United States can 

bestow on any individual in the armed services.

Throughout the western world, the nineteenth century, with its 

many humanitarian movements, evidenced a general improvement in 

the treatment of the individual soldier; and the U.S. soldier was no 

exception. The more severe forms of corporal punishment were abolished in the U.S. Army in 1861. Although Civil War medical science

was primitive in comparison with that of today, an effort was made to 

extend medical services in the Army beyond the mere treatment of battle wounds. As an auxiliary to the regular medical service, the volunteer 

U.S. Sanitary Commission fitted out hospital ships and hospital units;

provided male and, for the first time in the U.S. Army, female nurses;

and furnished clothing and foods fancier than the regular rations. Similarly, the U.S. Christian Commission augmented the efforts of the regimental chaplains and even provided, besides songbooks and Bibles, 

some coffee bars and reading rooms.

The Civil War forced changes in the traditional policies governing the burial of soldiers. On July 17, 1862, Congress authorized the

President to establish national cemeteries “for the soldiers who shall 

die in the service of the country.” While little was done during the 

war to implement this Congressional action, several battlefield cemeteries (Antietam, Gettysburg, Chattanooga, Stones River, and Knoxville) 

were set up “as a final resting place for those who here gave their lives”

in lieu of some nameless corner of a forgotten field.

The great conflict had also forced changes in ideas about the obligation of citizens to perform military service. Attrition in manpower 

had forced both South and North to turn to conscription to keep 

their armies up to effective strength. The Confederate government 

had enacted a draft law as early as April 1862. Late in that year Union

governors were no longer able to raise enough troops for the Federal 

armies; and on March 3, 1863, Congress passed the Enrollment Act, an

outright assertion of national conscription by the central government. 

Andersonville and Elmira Prison Camps

Andersonville Prison in southern Georgia and Elmira Prison in south-central New York State became 

notorious during the final year of the Civil War for their deplorable living conditions and the high mortality 

rate of their inmates. Both camps suffered from severe overcrowding, rampant disease, and a lack of building supplies and food, the result mostly of wartime shortages and mismanagement rather than of deliberate 

malice (although in Andersonville there was evidence of the latter). Of the 45,613 Union prisoners held at 

Andersonville nearly 13,000 died; while at Elmira, nearly 3,000 of the 12,000 Confederates kept there 

perished. For his role the warden at Andersonville, Capt. Henry Wirz, was hanged in November 1865.
Map 37

1861

9 May 1862

11 Mar 1862

7 Nov 1861

29 Aug 1861

14 Mar 1862

10 May 1862

1861

12 Mar 186210 Mar 1863

7 Feb 1864

2 Mar 1862

25 Apr 1862 20 Sep 1861

Ft. Monroe

Ft. Pickens

Tennessee River

Arkansas River

si

s

si

M

i s ppi

River

Ohio River

C

mu berland River

PENNSYLV ANIA

DELAWARE

NEW

JERSE Y

MARYLAND

VIRGINIA

NOR TH CAROLINA

SOUTH CAROLINA

GEORGIA

ALABAMA

MISSISSIPPI

L OUISIANA

ARKAN SAS

Y INDIAN TERRITOR

KAN SAS

MISSOURI

ILLINOIS

MISSOURI

INDIANA

OHIO

KENTUCKY

TENNESSEE

WEST VIRGINIA

(1863)

TEXA S

FLORID A Ship Island

Cape Fear

Cape Hattaras

St. Louis

Cairo

Petersburg Norfolk

Baltimore

Savannah

Charleston

Wilmington

New Bern

Corinth

Nashville

Murfreesboro

Chattanooga

Atlanta

Knoxville

Memphis

Vicksburg

New Orleans

Mobile

Pensacola

Jac

F

ksonville

ernandina

St. Augustine

Port Royal

WASHINGTON

RICHMOND

1861–1865

THE CIVIL WAR

1862 1864

1863 1865

Area under Union Control, 1861Coastal Area under Union Control

Area Lost by Confederacy

100 100 0

Miles
American Military History

304

This law made able-bodied males between twenty and forty-five years

of age liable for national military service. The Enrollment Act was not 

popular, as bloody draft riots in New York demonstrated after Gettys-

burg. Both the Confederate and the U.S. laws were undemocratic: they 

did not apply equally to all individuals. They provided for exemptions 

that allowed many to escape military service entirely. Comparatively few 

men were ever drafted into the Federal service, but by stimulating men 

to volunteer the Enrollment Act had its desired effect.

The principal importance of the Enrollment Act of 1863, ho

w-

ever, does not lie in the effect it had on manpower procurement for 

the Civil

War.This measure established firmly the principle that every

citizen is obligated to defend the nation and that the Federal govern-

ment can impose that obligation directly on the citizen without the 

mediation of the states. In addition, the act recognized that the previ-

ous system oftotal reliance on militia andvolunteerswould not suffice

in a modern, total war.

As thewesternworld’s largest and longest conflict of the nine-

teenth century except the Napoleonic wars, the American Civil War has 

been argued about and analyzed since the fighting stopped. It continues

to excite the imagination because it was full of paradox. Old-fashioned 

in that infantry attacked in the open in dense formations, it also fore-

shadowed modern total war. Though not all the ingredients were new, 

railroads, telegraph communications, steamships, balloons, armor plate, 

rifledweapons, wire entanglements, the submarine, large-scale photog-

raphy, and torpedoes—all products of the burgeoning industrial revolu-

tion—gave new and

awesome dimensions to armed conflict. Itwas also

America’s deadliestwar andgreatest national struggle to define what

wewere asa nation.The final determinationwas clear. America could

not have endured “half-slave and half-free.” With the curse of slavery 

lifted and the long struggle of many of our nation’s newest citizens for 

their full civil rights just under way, the American Army turned to other 

unpleasant tasks: the occupation of the defeated Southern states and 

the long campaign to “settle” the Indian problem on the frontier. Discussion Questions

1. By 1864, what strategic options remained for the Confederacy?

2. Compare Grant’s 1864 campaign with Scott’s Anaconda

Plan of

1861. What are the similarities and differences?

3. Was Sherman’s and Sheridan’s destruction of crops, warehouses 

and factories necessary? Why or why not? What was an alternative 

Union strategy to compel Southern submission?

4. To what degree did the very principle the Confederates claimed 

they were fighting for (“states rights”) undermine their war effort?

5. Grant and Lee can be considered two of the greatest generals in 

American history. What were their strengths and weaknesses? 

6.Thesis:The American CivilWarwas the first modernwar.Why

is this true? Why is this false?
the civil war, 1864–1865

305

Recommended Readings

Castel, Albert. Decision in the West: The Atlanta Campaign of 1864. Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1992.

Catton, Bruce. A Stillness at Appomattox. Austin, Tex.: Holt, Rinehart 

and Winston, 2000.

Cooling, B. Franklin. Jubal Early’s Raid on Washington, 1864. Baltimore: 

Nautical and Aviation Publishing, 1989.

Glatthaar, Joseph T. The March to the Sea and Beyond: Sherman’s Troops in the 

Savannah and Carolinas Campaigns. New York: New York University 

Press, 1985.

Grimsley, Mark. And Keep Moving On: The Virginia Campaign, May–June 

1864. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2002.

McPherson, James M. The Battle Cry of Freedom. New York: Oxford University Press, 2003.

Scott, Robert G. Into the Wilderness with the Army of the Potomac, rev. ed. 

Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992.

Sommers, Richard J. Richmond Redeemed: The Siege at Petersburg. Garden 

City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Company, 1981.

Other Readings

Beringer, Richard E., et al. Why the South Lost the Civil War. Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1986.

Donald, David H., et al. Why the North Won the Civil War. New York: 

Simon and Schuster, 1996.

Hagerman, Edward. The American Civil War and the Origins of Modern 

Warfare: Ideas, Organization and Field Command. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988.

Jones, Archer. Civil War Command and Strategy: The Process of Victory and 

Defeat. New York: Free Press, 1992.

Linderman, Gerald E. Embattled Courage: The Experience of Combat in the 

American Civil War. New York: Free Press, 1987.

Tidwell, William A. April ’65: Confederate Covert Action in the American 

Civil War. Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1995.

With the end of the Civil War, the great volunteer army enlisted 

for that struggle was quickly demobilized and the U.S. Army 

became once again a small regular organization. During the 

ensuing period the Army faced a variety of problems, some old and 

some new. These included, besides demobilization, occupation duty in 

the South, a French threat in Mexico, domestic disturbances, Indian 

troubles, and, within the Army itself, the old awkward relationship 

between the line and the staff departments. Despite a relative isolation 

from civilian society during the period 1865–1898, the Army developed

professionally, experimented with new equipment of various kinds, and 

took halting steps toward utilizing the period’s new technology in weapons. In a period of professional introspection and physical isolation, 

the Army still contributed to the nation’s civil progress.

Demobilization, Reorganization, 

and the French Threat in Mexico

The military might of the Union was put on display late in May 

1865, when Meade’s and Sherman’s armies participated in a grand review

in Washington with Sherman’s army alone taking six and one-half hours 

to pass the reviewing stand on Pennsylvania Avenue. It was a spectacle 

well calculated to impress on Confederate and foreign leaders alike that 

only a strong government could field such a powerful force. But even as

these troops were preparing for their victory march, the War Department 

sent Sheridan to command an aggregate force of 80,000 men in the territory west of the Mississippi and south of the Arkansas, of which he 

put 52,000 in Texas. There Sheridan’s men put muscle behind previous 

13

Darkness and Light

The Interwar Years

1865–1898
American Military History

308

diplomatic protests against the presence of French troops in Mexico. 

The French had entered that country several years earlier ostensibly to 

collect debts, but since 1864 had maintained their puppet Maximilian on

a Mexican throne in the face of opposition from Mexican patriot forces 

under Benito Juarez. While the American Civil War lasted, the United 

States had been unable to do more than protest this situation, for even 

diplomacy if too vigorous might have pushed France into an alliance 

with the South. Now stronger measures seemed necessary.

The military might in being in May 1865 was ephemeral, for the

volunteers wanted to go home and Congress wanted to decrease the 

size of the Army. Because of the needs of occupation in the South and 

the French threat in Mexico, demobilization was spread over a period 

of eighteen months instead of the three in which it could have been 

accomplished. Nevertheless, it was rapid. On May 1, 1865, there were

1,034,064 volunteers in the Army, but by the middle of November,

over 800,000 of them had been paid, mustered out, and transported to 

their home states by the Quartermaster Corps. A year later there were 

only 11,043 volunteers left in the service, most of whom were U.S. Colored Troops. These were almost all mustered out by late October 1867.

Lt. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant, the General in Chief, wanted to increase 

the Regular Army, kept small during the Civil War, to 80,000 men, but 

neither Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton nor Congress would agree. 

Congress, on July 28, 1866, voted an establishment of 54,302 officers

and enlisted men. Actual strength reached about 57,000 on September 30, 1867, a peak until 1898. In 1869 Congress cut the number of

infantry regiments to 25 and the authorized strength to 45,000. In 1876

the regimental tables of organization were reduced to limit the total 

authorized force to 27,442, an authorization that remained virtually 

stationary until the Spanish-American War. A significant effect of the

Civil War on the new organization of the Army was a provision in the 

1866 act for four African American infantry regiments, reduced to two

in 1869, and two African American cavalry regiments, though most of

their officers would be white. In 1877 Henry O. Flipper of Thomasville,

Georgia, became the first African American graduate of West Point and

was assigned to one of these regiments, the 10th Cavalry. The infantry regiments were the 24th and 25th Infantries, and the other Cavalry 

regiment was the 9th Cavalry. During the long campaigns in the West 

these four regiments gained a certain measure of fame as tough and 

disciplined units.

Demobilization was not so rapid that Napoleon III was unaware of 

the strength of U.S. forces. In the spring of 1867 he finally withdrew his

troops from Mexico and left Maximilian to die before a juarista firing

squad. While there were other factors that help explain the French emperor’s action and historians are not agreed on his motives, he could not have 

ignored the determination to enforce the Monroe Doctrine embodied in 

Sheridan’s show of force, especially since Maj. Gen. John M. Schofield

was then on a special mission in France to make this point clear.

Reconstruction

The Civil War settled once and for all the questions of slavery and 

of state sovereignty, but after Appomattox the problems of reconHenry O. Flipper

Image removed due to

license restrictions
Darkness and Light: The Interwar Years, 1865–1898

309

struction remained and with them the Army’s involvement in Southern 

affairs. The nation had to be put back together, and the peace had to 

be won or the sacrifices of a terrible war would have been in vain. The

Army had a principal role in reconstruction from the very beginning. 

As the Union armies advanced in the South, the civil government collapsed, except in Sherman’s military district, and the Army found itself 

acting in place of the civil government by extending the function of its 

provost marshals from policing troops to policing and in effect governing the occupied areas. The duties of these provost marshals ranged 

from establishing garbage regulations to trying to determine the loyalty 

of Southern citizens. Near the end of the war, Congress created the 

Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen, and Abandoned Lands—the Freedmen’s Bureau—and put it under the Army. Its primary purpose was 

to protect and help the former slaves. In late 1865 most of the governmental functions of the provost marshals were transferred to this 

bureau headed by Maj. Gen. Oliver O. Howard, a Civil War corps commander and a professional officer with antislavery convictions of long

standing. As early as 1862 President Abraham Lincoln had appointed

military governors, civilians functioning with military support, in Tennessee, Louisiana, and North Carolina.

After Lincoln’s death, President Andrew Johnson went ahead with 

his own reconstruction plans. He declared the Civil War formally at an 

end in April 1866, liberally pardoned most former Confederates upon

their taking a loyalty oath, and then permitted them to reestablish civil 

government. The leniency of this program, some historians now maintain, led the Army, under Grant, with Stanton in the War Department, 

to look to Congress rather than to the President, the Commander in 

Chief, for aid in protecting the Union forces in the South from harassment. Congress at the same time was in fundamental disagreement with 

the President’s course. It therefore asserted its supremacy in a series of 

legislative acts, undoing all that President Johnson had done and placing the South under military control.

Congress set forth its basic plan in the Command of the Army 

Act (actually a part of the Army Appropriations Act of 1867) and the

The Army and the Freedmen’s Bureau

Congress established the Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen, and Abandoned Lands in March 1865 

to handle problems that had already arisen in Union-occupied parts of the South and were sure to 

persist after the Confederate surrender—especially that of convincing white southerners that slavery was in fact abolished. The Freedmen’s Bureau, as it soon became known, was an agency within 

the Department of War but not a part of the U.S. Army, although its administrators and field agents 

were commissioned officers of the volunteers and the regulars. Across the rural South, Freedmen’s 

Bureau agents spent most of their working hours adjudicating differences between landless black 

farmers and white landowners. The bureau also ran schools funded largely by private benevolent 

organizations and helped veterans of the U.S. Colored Troops file claims for bounties and pensions. 

Unfortunately, readmission of seceded states seemed more important to the nation than securing the 

rights of former slaves, and the Freedmen’s Bureau never realized its full potential.
American Military History

310

Tenure of Office and the FirstReconstruction Acts of March 1867.

The first of these providedthat all presidential orders to the Army

should be issued through the General in Chief, whose headquarters 

would be in Washington and who could be removed only with Sen-

ate approval. Similarly, theTenure of Office Act denied the President

authority to remove Cabinet officers without approval of the Senate.

The first of these acts sought to make Grant rather than the President

supremeover the Army, while theTenure of Office Act sought tokeep

Stanton in the War Department and the next year provided the prin

-

cipal basis for the impeachment of President Johnson when he sus-

pended the Secretary from office without the Senate’s consent.

The

FirstReconstruction Act dividedthe South intofive military

districts. The commanders of these districts were major generals who 

reported directly to Washington. This was an interesting command rela-

tionship, for it was customary to divide the country into geographical 

commands called divisions whose subordinate parts were called depart-

ments. In March 1867, however,therewere onlytwo divisions,the Mis-

souri andthePacific,withthe rest ofthecountry divided int

o

thefive

military districts ofthe Sout

h and into departments

that lik

e

thefive

districts reported directly to Washington. As time went by, the Army 

created additional geographical divisions; and in 1870 a Division of 

the South, comprising three territorial departments, administered mili-

tary affairs inwhat had beenthefive reconstruction districts.There is

a difference of opinion as to how much the First Reconstruction Act 

removed control of the reconstruction forces from President Johnson, 

although Grant advised Maj. Gen. Philip H. Sheridan, one of the dis-

trict commanders, that these commanders, rather than the Executive in 

Washington,

werethe sole interpreters ofthe act. InJuly 1867 Congress

incorporated this interpretation in the Third Reconstruction Act, which 

declared that “no district commander ... shall be bound in his action by 

any opinion of anycivil officer ofthe United States.” Asaconsequence

of the First and Third Reconstruction Acts, some historians regard the 

reconstruction forces as virtually a separate army under congressional 

control, thus distinguishing them from the forces in the territorial divi-

sions and departments that remained clearly under the President.

Under the Reconstruction Acts the district commanders had to 

cope with such matters as horse stealing, moonshining, rioting, civil 

court proceedings, regulating commercial law, public education, fraud, 

removing public officials

, registeringvoters, holding elections, and the

approving of new state constitutions by registered voters. This occu

-

pation duty absorbed somewhat more than one-third of the Army’s 

strength in 1867. As the Southern stateswere restored tothe Union

under the reconstruction governments, military rule came to an end 

and civil authorities assumed full control of state offices.This process

was largely completed in 1870.

With the end of congressional reconstruction, the Army’s direct 

supervision of civil affairs in the South came to an end and the number 

of troops on occupation duty, which already had fallen off markedly, 

was reduced further. Now its mission was to preserve the new state 

governments by continuing its protection of the African Americans 

and their white allies upon whom the governments rested, policing elec-

tions, helping

t

o apprehend

criminals, andkeepingthe peace inconflicts
Darkness and Light: The Interwar Years, 1865–1898

311

between rival state officials. The Ku Klux Klan, a postwar organization

that had a considerable membership by 1870–1871, became an object of 

special concern to the Army, as it did to Congress, because of the Klan’s 

terrorist tactics employed in an attempt to wrest the South from African 

American–Radical Republican control. Consequently, one of the most 

important Army functions in this period was support of federal marshals in an effort to suppress the Klan. This became an Army responsibility despite the restoration of state militia forces under the reconstruction governments as a means of relieving some of the burden on 

the regular troops, which were spread thin. Since many of these new 

militia forces consisted of African Americans, they were not very effective against white terrorists, who directed some of their acts against the 

militiamen themselves. These militia forces mainly performed general 

police duty and watched over elections and voting. Eventually, because 

of the opposition of white Southerners to African Americans in uniform, the African American militia forces were disbanded.

In April 1877, as a result of the compromise by which Rutherford 

B. Hayes became President after the disputed election of 1876, the last

of the troops on reconstruction duty in the South were transferred to 

other duty and the federal military occupation of the South came to an 

end. The Army’s role in the South in the years 1865–1877 was without

precedent in the United States.

Domestic Disturbances

Aside from the Indian Wars and Sheridan’s show of force on the 

Mexican border, the Army engaged in no conventional military operations of any consequence until the Spanish-American War, that is, for a 

period of over thirty years. There were, however, a number of domestic disturbances and incidents in which armed forces were used, not 

only in the South during the reconstruction period but elsewhere as 

well. Indeed, by 1878, when Congress forbade the use of federal troops 

without authorization by either “the Constitution or ... Congress,” 

there had been scores and perhaps hundreds of instances of their use 

by federal marshals in breaking strikes, enforcing local laws, collecting 

revenues, and arresting offenders.

In the summer of 1877 the Hayes administration used troops in 

the wave of railway strikes that marked the country’s first great national

labor dispute. These strikes spread to a dozen or more states and led to 

a number of requests for federal help. Thereupon, the Hayes administration pursued a policy of moving troops only to protect federal property or upon the request of a governor or federal judge. The Army 

stripped every post in Maj. Gen. Winfield Scott Hancock’s Military

Division of the Atlantic of its available men and also obtained troops 

from other posts. President Hayes also used some marines. During the 

strikes the President had his own source of information in Signal Corps 

observer-sergeants who reported to Washington at intervals concerning conditions as they saw them at their local weather stations.

Under the circumstances of their use, federal troops came into only 

limited contact with mobs during the 1877 strikes. They nevertheless 

contributed greatly to the restoration of order, as Hancock reported, “by 

their presence alone.” The positive results were not due to the size of 

Since many of these new militia 

forces consisted of African 

Americans, they were not very 

effective against white terrorists, 

who directed some of their acts 

against the militiamen themselves.
American Military History

312

the forces, for with only about 24,000 troops in the entire Army in 1877 

only a small detachment could be used at any one place. But these regular 

troops were well disciplined; taking their cue from the President himself, 

they acted with considerable restraint in putting down the strikes, neither 

losing a single soldier nor causing the death of many civilians.

Although the Army became involved in other strike duty in the 

succeeding years of the century, the best-known instance was in the 

Pullman, or railway, strike of 1894 that, though centered in Chicago, 

also affected other parts of the country. President Grover Cleveland’s 

order to hastily send troops to Chicago against the wishes of Governor 

John P. Altgeld provided that they should execute the orders and processes of federal courts, prevent obstructions to the movement of the 

mails, and generally enforce U.S. laws. In fact, they put down the strike. 

Other governors also protested the use of federal troops in their states. 

Maj. Gen. Nelson A. Miles, who commanded the 2,000 federal troops 

in Chicago (and who had advised against using them in the strike), did 

not use his men effectively, perhaps at first because he broke them

up into small detachments in support of policemen and marshals at 

scattered points. New orders, however, required him to concentrate his 

forces and authorized him to fire upon rioters after a proper warning.

A small company of regular troops under his command did fire upon a

mob in Hammond, Indiana, on July 8, 1894, when they were about to 

be overwhelmed by many times their own number. At least one rioter 

was killed and a dozen or more wounded in this action.

The violence was actually much less in 1894 than in 1877; but with 

only about 28,000 officers and enlisted men in the Army, Schofield, the

Commanding General, reported that while his troops performed their 

duty “promptly and effectively,” the situation taxed them “nearly to the 

limit.” He might have added that at least in California both sailors and 

marines were used. The U.S. Supreme Court unanimously sustained 

President Cleveland’s actions in Chicago during the 1894 strike, with 

the result that a legal precedent was set for using federal troops within 

a state without its consent.

The National Guard Movement

Despite the use of regular troops in notable instances, the organized militia under state control saw more strike duty than did the regulars in the years after the Civil War. The volunteer militia organizations 

that had existed since the colonial period became in effect the only real 

militia in existence in those years. The events of the seventies in particular led many to fear another insurrection, and as a result Congress 

introduced legislation to improve and to provide better arms for the 

organized militia. In 1879, in support of this effort, the National Guard 

Association came into being in St. Louis; between 1881 and 1892 every 

state revised its military code to provide for an organized militia. Most 

states, following the lead of New York, called their militia the National 

Guard. As such, it was by 1898 the principal reserve standing behind 

the Regular Army but remaining a state military force.

There was a certain martial enthusiasm in the 1870s and 1880s, 

despite the general antimilitarism of the period, which swelled the ranks 

of the Guard. Also, the Guard attracted some persons because it was 

The volunteer militia 

organizations that had existed 

since the colonial period became 

in effect the only real militia in 

existence in those years.
Darkness and Light: The Interwar Years, 1865–1898

313

a fraternal group that appealed to the manly virtues of physical fitness,

duty, and discipline; it attracted many because it was a kind of social 

club whose members enjoyed a local prestige. Although organized by 

states, the Guard had roots in the new nationalism of the period, as 

may be seen in its very name. Despite this new interest in the Guard, 

and although the War Department supported the Guard’s proposal for 

a new militia act, apathy, states’ rights, and antimilitarism prevented 

Congress from enacting the desired legislation. Through the efforts of 

the National Guard Association, the Guard nevertheless succeeded in 

securing an act in 1887 that doubled the $200,000 annual federal grant 

for firearms that the militia had enjoyed since 1808.

Isolation and Professional Development

The industrial unrest of the 1870s and later was a manifestation of 

the growing industrialization and urbanization of the nation in the last 

decades of the nineteenth century; but while labor organizations grew 

as never before, they were of relatively little influence until much later.

Meanwhile, perhaps partly as a reaction to the terrible experiences of 

the Civil War, the ideals and philosophy of what modern historian Samuel P. Huntington calls business pacifism became dominant. Among

other things, business pacifism rejected things military as outmoded in

an industrial world designed to produce and sell goods; and it made an 

impression upon both intellectuals and the popular mind. It manifested 

itself as either indifference or outright hostility to the Regular Army, 

affected military appropriations, and philosophically separated the 

Army from the people. In the late 1860s and the 1870s, as Army appropriations fell off (and in 1877 were not even made until November), 

the Army became isolated from the society at large. It became isolated 

not only socially, but physically as well, for much of the Army was on 

lonely duty in the West. Those years, according to Army historian William A. Ganoe, were “The Army’s Dark Ages.” They caused the Army 

and the Navy to look inward and to develop a truly military viewpoint 

that differed fundamentally from business pacifism and civilian liberal

thought in general.

Paradoxically, in Huntington’s words, the post–Civil War years were 

actually “the most fertile, creative, and formative in the history of the 

American armed forces.” It took such a period of peace to develop 

the professionalism that would find employment in the world wars of

the next century. In the Army, this professionalism took shape largely 

under the impetus of two men, General William T. Sherman and Col. 

Emory Upton, with the help of other reformers of lesser rank. Their 

contemporary, Rear Adm. Stephen B. Luce, was similarly the architect 

of a new professionalism in the U.S. Navy.

Sherman’s fame of course rests upon his record in the Civil War, 

but he was also the Commanding General of the Army for almost fifteen years from 1869, when he succeeded Grant, to 1883, when Sheridan succeeded him—a record second only to that of Winfield Scott.

Unlike Grant and two of the other five Commanding Generals before

him, Sherman remained out of politics and thus began the tradition 

of political neutrality, which would be adhered to long after his time, 

although not religiously. In this and other ways he oriented the thought 

Business pacifism . . . manifested 

itself as either indifference 

or outright hostility to the 

Regular Army, affected 

military appropriations, and 

philosophically separated the 

Army from the people.
American Military History

314

of the professional soldier. As Commanding General he became the 

architect for a system of postgraduate schools beyond the Military 

Academy through which an officer could learn the skills of his own

branch of the service and finally the principles of higher command.

Emory Upton, a protégé of Sherman’s, was the most influential

of the younger officers who worked to reform the Army. He graduated from West Point in 1861 and was brevetted a major general during the Civil War. After the war he prepared a new system of infantry tactics; served as commandant of cadets at the Military Academy, 

1870–1875; went on a mission to study the armies of Asia and Europe, 

which left him especially impressed by the German military system; and 

then became superintendent of theoretical instruction in the Artillery 

School at Fort Monroe. His best-known writings, The Armies of Asia and 

Europe (1878) and The Military Policy of the United States (1904), argued 

for numerous reforms. The second of these two books was unfinished

at the time of his death by suicide in 1881 but was put in order by an 

associate and, circulating in the Army, became influential long before its

publication. It presented a case for a strong regular military force based 

upon U.S. experience and subsequently provided the Regular Army with 

intellectual ammunition for shooting down the arguments of militia 

advocates for whom John A. Logan provided a text in his posthumously 

published Volunteer Soldier of America (1887). In Upton’s view, a wartime 

army should consist entirely of regular formations, which meant that 

all volunteers should serve under regular officers. Upton borrowed this

plan for an expansible Regular Army from John C. Calhoun. Without 

giving due weight to the strength of tradition, he wanted the United 

Emory Upton (1839–1881)

Emory Upton, West Point Class of 1861, emerged from 

the Civil War with a reputation for tactical innovation that 

he cemented with the 1867 publication of A New System of 

Infantry Tactics. Adopted by the Army, Upton’s system recognized the impact of breechloading rifles and other new 

technologies. He promoted reforms based on the Prussian 

military system and ideas such as the compulsory retirement 

of officers, advanced military schools, and examination for 

promotion. Secretary of War Elihu Root would arrange for 

the publication of The Military Policy of the United States, 

Upton’s unfinished manifesto, as the basis for his own reform 

agenda. Upton sowed the seeds for a federal reserve force 

and an expansible army built upon a professional core. 

Some later interpreters would skew his work to fit their own 

purposes. Some of these interpretations would exacerbate 

the natural tensions between that professional core and the 

volunteer, citizen-soldiers who must under wartime circumstances provide the bulk of the manpower for the Army.
Darkness and 

Light:The Interwar Years, 1865–1898

315

States to abandon its traditional dual military system and replace it with 

a thoroughgoing professional army on the German model.

The Military Academy at West Point was at the base of the pyra-

midal structure of the Army educational system. Unfortunately, much 

of the vitality went out of the instruction at West Point after 1871 with 

the departure of Dennis Hart Mahan, the intellectual godfather of the 

postwar reformers. Although the War Department removed West Point 

from control of the Corps of Engineers in 1866, the Academ

y contin-

ued to provide heavily mathematical training and to turn out military 

technicians but at the same time lost its former eminence as an engi-

neering school. As time went by, the technical content of the curricu-

lum in both the Military Academy and the Naval Academy was reduced; 

but by 1900 the effort to combine basic military and liberal arts subjects 

set both institutions off from other collegiate institutions and from the 

mainstream of education in the United States.

The period of reduced emphasis on technical instruction at the 

Military Academy saw the rise of the special postgraduate technical 

schools that Sherman favored. When the Engineers lost their respon-

sibility for

WestPoint in 1866

,

agroup of engineer officer

s founded

the Essayons Club, which became the Engineer School of Applica-

tion in 1885. In 1868 Grant revived Calhoun’s Artillery School at

Fort

Monroe, Virginia, which had been closed since 1860. Also in 1868a

signal school of instruction opened atFort Greble,D.C., and in 1869

moved to Fort Whipple (later Fort Myer), Virginia, where it contin-

ued until 1885. In 1881 Sherman founded the School of Application 

for Infantry and Cavalry at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Although at its 

beginning this school was little different from any of the other branch 

schools, it eventually fulfilled Sherman’s hopes and evolved,

withmuch

of the credit due to Col. Arthur L. Wagner, into the General Service 

and Staff College. The Medical Department under Surgeon General 

George Miller Sternberg founded the Army Medical School in 1893.

Included in the act of 1866 that fixed the organization of the post-

war Army was a provision authorizing the President to detail as many as 

twenty officers to teac

h military science in schools of higher learning.

This supplemented the part of the Morrill Act of 1862 that had pro-

vided for military instruction in land-grant colleges. By 1893 the num-

ber of instructors had increased to one hundred. In this program can 

be seen the beginnings of theReserve OfficerTraining Corps, although

it would not be organized as such for many years.

Another significant aspect of the developing military professional-

ism of the years following the Civil War was the founding of profes-

sional associations and journals. Notable among them were the U.S. 

Naval Institute, founded in 1873, whose Proceedings would become well 

known; the Military Service Institution of the United States, whose Journal would become a casualty of World War I; the United States Cavalry 

Association, which published the Cavalry Journal; and the Association 

of Military Surgeons, which published The Military Surgeon. In 1892 the 

Artillery School at Fort Monroe founded The Journal of the United States 

Artillery; and in 1893

agroup of officers atFort Leavenworth founded

the Infantry Society, which became the U.S. Infantry Association the 

following year and later published the Infantry Journal. Earlier, in 1879, 

United Service began publication as a journal of naval and military affairs. 
American Military History

316

Still earlier, in 1863, the Army and Navy Journal, as it came to be called, 

began a long run. It was not a professional journal like the others, but 

along with its social and other items about service personnel it carried 

articles, correspondence, and news of interest to military people that 

helped bind its readers together in a common professional fraternity.

Before the Civil War the Army had no professional personnel system in the modern sense. Traditionally, most officers came into the

service from the Military Academy at the lowest rank and received promotions on the basis of seniority. The war, however, at least made the 

need for a retirement system evident; and in 1861 Congress provided

for compulsory retirement for incapacity. In 1862 and 1870 it provided

that after thirty years’ service an officer might retire either voluntarily

or compulsorily at the President’s discretion. Finally, in 1882 legislation made retirement compulsory at age sixty-four, which prompted 

the retirements of Sherman, Maj. Gen. Montgomery C. Meigs, and 

Surgeon General Joseph K. Barnes. Beginning in 1890, promotions for 

all officers below the rank of major were by examination, thus insuring a minimum level of professional competence. In the mid-nineties, 

the Army instituted systematic character and efficiency reports for all

officers.

Line and Staff

There was no end, during the years between the Civil War and 

the turn of the century, to the old controversy between the line of 

the Army and the staff departments. The controversy had its roots in 

a legally divided responsibility and received nourishment from a conception of war as a science and as the natural purpose of the military. 

Although Congress made Grant a full general in 1866, and although

Sherman and Sheridan both held that rank after him, neither these officers (except Grant during postwar reconstruction) nor their successors 

were able to avoid the basic organizational frustrations of the office

of Commanding General. The problems were inevitable because, as 

Army regulations put it as late as 1895, the military establishment in the 

territorial commands was under the Commanding General for matters 

Fort Leavenworth and the West

The site of Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, on a bluff on the west bank of the Missouri River, is testimony 

to the independent judgment that army officers often had to exercise in 1827, the year of the fort’s 

founding. Under orders to find a suitable site on the east bank of the river, Col. Henry Leavenworth 

was unsatisfied with the terrain. He continued upstream until he came to a likely place on the west 

bank. Twenty years later national expansion put Fort Leavenworth in the middle of the United States, 

and by 1882 it had become the logical spot for a school to further the education of cavalry and infantry lieutenants. The School of Application, as it was called, provided junior officers from the Army’s 

scattered, often tiny garrisons with an education fit for the age of steam and electricity, of breechloading weapons and the new smokeless powder. Its successor, the Command and General Staff College, is 

still there. Fort Leavenworth is the oldest continually occupied Army post west of the Mississippi River.
Darkness and 

Light:The Interwar Years, 1865–1898

317

of discipline and military control, while the Army’s fiscal affairswere

conducted by the Secretary of War through the staff departments. At 

the same time, no statutory definition of the functions of the Com-

manding General existed except to a limited extent late in the century in 

the matter of research and development. In practice this situation also 

diluted the Commanding General’s control of the territorial depart-

ments, since obviously the distribution and diversion of logistical sup-

port for these departments by the staff heads and the Secretary of War 

would affect troop operations.

Basic to the controversy was an assertion of the primacy of the line 

over the staff departments, for which there was a theoretical founda-

tion in the developing conception of war as a science and the practice 

of that science as the sole purpose of military forces. Since the Army 

existed only tofight, it followed that its organization, training, and every

activity should be directed to the single end of efficiency in combat. Therefore, the staff departments, representing a technical-expertise 

approach to war, existed only to serve the purposes of the line, which 

represented professionalism. From that proposition it followed that the 

line, in the person of the Commanding General, should control the 

staff. It also followed that the Army should not become involved, as 

it did, in such activities as the advancement of science or exploration.

“The regular Army now is a very curious compound,” Sherman 

observed in 1874 in hearings on a bill to reduce the Army. As the Com-

manding General, he had “no authority,

control or influenceover any-

thing butthecavalry, artillery, and infantry, and suc

h staff officers as are

assigned by their respective chiefs, approved by the Secretary of War, and 

attached to these various bodies for actual service.” To him the three ser-

vices that he named were “the Army of the United States,” while the rest 

simply went “to make up the military peace establishment.” If the Army 

had to be pruned, he advised pruning the branches of this peace estab-

lishment, not the active regiments. To a question about who commanded 

the engineer battalion, he replied “God only knows, for I do not.” In his 

opinion the Ordnance Department was “the softest place in the Army.” 

Sons and nephews wanted to go into it, he declared, “especially young 

men

with influentialcongressional friends.” As forthe 450 men ofthe

“signal detachment,” Sherman regarded them as “no more soldiers than 

the me

n at

the Smithsonian Institution.They are making scientific obse

r-

vations of the weather, of great interest to navigators and the country at 

large. But what does a soldier care about the weather? Whether good or 

bad, he must take it as it comes.”

Sherman’s view was that of the Army command and of the line, 

but it did not prevail. In 1894 the situation in which heads of the staff 

departments spent their entire careers with their specialty and became 

technical rather than militar

yexpertswas modifiedby the requirement

that thereafter appointments to the staff departments should be from 

the line of the Army. However, this left the basic command problem 

still unresolved.

Technical Development

The record of the Army’s technical development in the years down 

to the end of the century was not one of marked and continuous 
American Military History

318

progress in every field, for it was hampered by military conservatism, insufficient funds, and the nation’s slowness in adapting inventive genius to the art of war. Yet there was considerable progress. In 

transportation, with the extension of the trans-Mississippi railroads, it 

became possible to move whole wagon trains by lashing the wagons to 

flatcars and transporting the mules in closed cars. In ordnance there

was progress, however slow; and there were notable beginnings, some 

of them of vast potential, in signal communications.

The Army was about as slow in adopting new weapons as it was 

in solving the problem of command that had plagued it for so long. 

Although Henry and Spencer breechloading repeating rifles with rimfire cartridges were used during the Civil War, the typical Civil War

infantry shoulder arm was a muzzleloading rifled musket. In the years

immediately following the war, the Ordnance Department, faced with a 

shortage of funds, converted thousands of the Civil War muzzleloaders 

into breechloaders. Desiring a better weapon, however, the Army convened a board in 1872 to examine and test existing weapons. After the 

board had examined over a hundred weapons, the Army adopted the 

single-shot Model 1873 Springfield breechloader. This fired a centerfire, .45-caliber cartridge, the caliber that the Ordnance Department

selected as most desirable for all rifles, carbines, and pistols. The 1889

model of this gun, which embodied its final modifications, was the

last of the Army’s single-shot, large-caliber, black-powder rifles and the

principal shoulder arm of the National Guard as late as 1898.

The Springfield remained in service even after the adoption of

newer weapons and despite the trend toward smokeless powder and 

repeating arms abroad. U.S. manufacturers were slow to develop the 

new powder, which had several clear advantages. It burned progressively, gradually increasing the velocity of the bullet as it traveled 

through the barrel. In addition, its increasing pressures permitted a 

refinement in the rifling that gave a greater spin to the bullet and produced a higher velocity and a flatter trajectory.

When smokeless powder became available in the United States, a 

board in 1890 recommended the adoption of the Danish .30-caliber, 

bolt-action Krag-Jörgensen rifle, which fired smokeless cartridges and

had a box magazine holding five cartridges. The Army adopted the

Krag, as it came to be known, in 1892; but Congress delayed production at the Springfield Armory for two years, until tests of fourteen

American models failed to find a superior weapon. By 1897 the Krag

had been issued throughout the Regular Army. When its manufacture 

was discontinued in 1904, the original 1892 model had been modified

twice, in 1896 and 1898.

Of the several types of the early machine gun available during the 

Civil War, the most successful was the Gatling gun, which the Army did 

not adopt until 1866 when the war was over. Even the advocates of this

gun failed to recognize its usefulness as an infantry weapon but instead 

looked upon it as either auxiliary to artillery or as a useful weapon for 

defending bridges or other fixed sites.

In artillery as in shoulder arms American technical genius lagged 

behind that in Europe, where breechloading artillery using smokeless powder became common in the late nineteenth century. Other 

European improvements were explosive shells and recoil-absorbing 

Model 1898 Krag-Jörgensen Rifle, 

.30–.40 Caliber
Darkness and 

Light:The Interwar Years, 1865–1898

319

devices, which permitted refiring without re-aiming after every shot

and opened the way to sophisticated sighting mechanisms and highly 

accurate indirect fire. Also, in the year before the Spanish-American

War the French invented their famous 75-mm. gun. The U.S. Army 

nevertheless adopted somegood rifled breechloaders, with the 3.2-inch

rifle asthe standard light field piece.These new guns replaced the old

smoothbores, and steel replaced iron in their construction; but they still 

used black powder. The Army also had begun to experiment with steel 

carriages, pneumatic or hydraulic brakes, and mechanisms for elevating, 

traversing, and sighting artillery pieces.

The progress in artillery and armor plate was at least partly the result 

ofthework of several boards.Thefirst ofthesewasthe joint ArmyNavy Gun Foundry Board provided by the Naval Appropriations Act 

of 1883. Its purpose was to consider the problem of how American 

industry could produce both armor plate and armor-piercing guns, upon 

which a modern navy depended, that would be comparable to the prod-

ucts of European industry. After touring European armament factories, 

the board recommended that the government award generous contracts 

to U.S. companies to stimulate their development of steels and forgings 

and that the government itself assemble the new materials into weapons 

at both the Naval Gun Factory and Army arsenals.

The new interest in the Navy in those years resulted in a need to 

examine

coastal fortifications,whichwould haveto be improved if

new ships were not to be tied down to defense of the principal har-

bors. As a consequence the Endicott Board was set up in 1885 to plan 

for restoration of

thecoastal fortifications. Neithertheworld situation

northeexisting navaltechnology justifiedtheestimatedcost of imple-

menting the board’s recommendations, but in 1888 Congress voted an 

initial appropriation and established a permanent body, the Board of 

Ordnance and

Fortification,t

o supervise programs

concernedwith

preparingcoastal fortifications.This boardwas significant asthefirst

War Department–wide agency for supporting research and develop

-

ment and as an attempt to place the important staff departments 

partly under the control of the Commanding General. Moreover, its 

failure served to point out the defects in the War Department’s orga-

nization. The board remained in existence until 1920, but in 1890 and 

1891 engineer expenditures and in 1892 ordnance expenditures were 

removed from

the board’

s supervision.

The actualwork onthe fortifi

-

cations that followed was never completed, but during the nineties the 

Army abandoned the old forts around the principal harbors in favor 

of earthworks, armor-plated concrete pits, and great 10- and 12-inch 

disappearing rifles.

During the years after the CivilWar therewere several signifi-

cant developments in signal communications under the Signal Corps, 

known as the Signal Service for many years. In 1867 theWar Depart-

ment restored electric field telegraphy to the Signal Corps, whic

h had

lost responsibility for it about three years earlier; and the corps quickly 

developed

a new flying or field telegraph train, using batteries

, sound-

ers, and insulated wire. Then after constructing a telegraph line along 

the east coast in 1873 as an aid to the Life-Saving Service, the Signal 

Corps built long telegraph lines in both the Southwest and Northwest 

to provide communication between isolated military posts. These also 
American Military History

320

provided facilities for transmitting weather reports. By 1881 these lines 

extended for slightly more than 5,000 miles.

In the late seventies, within a year or two of Alexander Graham 

Bell’s patenting of the telephone, the Army was using it experimentally at Fort Whipple and between that post and Signal Corps offices

in Washington. By 1889 a field-telephone kit, combining the Bell telephone, a Morse key, and a battery, had been developed but was believed 

too expensive for manufacture and issue at that time. About three years 

later, of ninety-nine garrisoned posts, fifty-nine had telephone equipment, some belonging to the Signal Corps and some rented from the 

Bell Telephone Company. About the same time the Army began using 

the telephone, it also became interested in the heliograph (mirrors 

reflecting sunlight to transmit Morse code) and found it to be particularly useful in the Southwest. There were also experiments as early as 

1878 with homing pigeons.

Perhaps most significant of all the Signal Corps experimentation

and developments of the period was the reintroduction of balloons 

into the Army in the early nineties for the first time since the Civil War.

In 1893 the Signal Corps exhibited a military balloon at the World’s 

Columbian Exposition in Chicago, and in 1896 it organized a model

balloon train at Fort Logan, Colorado. Here were the beginnings that 

would lead to the development of Army aviation.

The backwardness of the United States in military technology in 

the 1890s, despite some important developments, would be misleading unless one looked beyond the specific military facts to examine

the nation’s industrial base. The United States was already an industrial 

giant. In 1890, only twenty-nine years after the beginning of the Civil 

War, the United States pulled ahead of Great Britain in the production 

of both pig iron and steel and thus became the world’s leading producer. Moreover, in the decade of the nineties, the United States also 

surpassed Great Britain in coal production. In total manufactures, the 

nation’s share jumped from less than 20 percent of the world volume 

in 1880 to more than 35 percent in 1913. With such an industrial base 

and potential, the Army of the nineties had no real need for concern.

Civil Accomplishment

The U.S. Army performed a variety of highly useful civil functions in the interwar years, despite the new professionalism that decried 

such activities as contrary to the natural purpose of an army. Upon 

the United States’ purchase of Alaska from Russia in 1867 the Army

assumed responsibility for Alaskan affairs except in matters concerning customs, commerce, and navigation, which became a responsibility of the Treasury Department. This situation continued until June 

1877, when the Army withdrew from Alaska (partly because of the cost 

of maintaining a garrison in so remote a place) and left the Treasury 

Department in charge. For the next twenty years the Army’s principal 

role in Alaska was in support of various explorations conducted by 

Army personnel, which had begun at least as early as 1869 when Capt.

Charles W. Raymond of the Army Engineers explored the Yukon. 

Thereafter there were other explorations in the Yukon, the region of 

the Copper and Tanana Rivers, and to Point Barrow by variously 1st Lt. 

The U.S. Army performed a 

variety of highly useful civil 

functions in the interwar years, 

despite the new professionalism 

that decried such activities as 

contrary to the natural purpose 

of an army.
Darkness and Light: The Interwar Years, 1865–1898

321

Frederick Schwatka of the 3d Cavalry, 2d Lt. William R. Abercrombie 

of the 2d Infantry, 2d Lt. Henry T. Allen of the 2d Cavalry, and 1st Lt. 

Patrick Henry Ray of the Signal Corps.

Ray’s expedition to Point Barrow, 1881–1883, was successful in 

carrying out various meteorological and other observations. It returned 

safely, but the companion Lady Franklin Bay expedition to Ellesmere 

Island, 1881–1884, under 1st Lt. Adolphus W. Greely of the Signal 

Corps, was not nearly so fortunate. Although the Greely expedition 

reached a point farther north than any prior expedition and carried 

out its scientific observations, all but seven members of the party died

before rescue (and one person died afterward) through failure of prearranged plans for receiving supplies. The Greely expedition grew out 

of the plans of Signal Corps 1st Lt. Henry W. Howgate for an Arctic 

colony at Lady Franklin Bay and out of the proposals of the International Polar Conference in Hamburg in 1879 for a chain of meteorological stations about the North Pole. The Ray expedition stemmed 

from the Hamburg Conference.

After the Civil War, the rivers and harbors work of the Corps of 

Engineers increased considerably, contributing substantially to development of the nation’s water resources. Other notable contributions of 

the Engineers included their construction of public buildings, including supervision of the final work on the Washington Monument and on

the State, War, and Navy Building, together with Brig. Gen. Thomas L. 

Casey’s planning and supervision from 1888 to 1895 of the construction of what is now the main building of the Library of Congress. 

Beginning in 1878, the Engineers provided an officer to serve by presidential appointment as one of the three governing commissioners of 

the District of Columbia.

Of the four great surveys undertaken in the United States prior 

to establishment of the Geological Survey in the Interior Department 

Members of the Greely Expedition. Lieutenant Greely is in the 

front row, fourth from the left.
American Military History

322

in 1879, the Corps of Engineers had responsibility for two: the King 

Survey, 1867–1872, which made a geological exploration of the 40th

Parallel, and the Wheeler Survey, 1871–1879, the geographical survey 

west of the 100th Meridian. The latter was more of a military survey 

in the tradition of the old Corps of Topographical Engineers than was 

the former, essentially a civilian undertaking. Both of these surveys 

nevertheless collected specimens of great use to scientists in the fields

of botany, zoology, paleontology, and related disciplines.

Although the Navy was largely responsible for interoceanic canal 

surveys in the post–Civil War years, the first U.S. Isthmian Canal Commission, appointed by President Grant in 1872, had Brig. Gen. Andrew 

A. Humphreys, Chief of Engineers, as one of its three members. In 

1874 Maj. Walter McFarland, Corps of Engineers, went out with naval 

assistance to examine the Nicaragua and Atrato-Napipi canal routes; 

and in 1897 Col. Peter C. Hains of the Engineers was one of the members President William McKinley appointed to the Nicaragua Canal 

Commission.

In the years from 1870 to 1891 the War Department organized 

and operated under the Signal Corps the nation’s first modern weather

service using both leased telegraph lines and, after they were built, the 

Army’s own military lines for reporting simultaneous observations to 

Washington. Under Brig Gen. Albert J. Myer, the Chief Signal Officer,

the service gained international renown; but partly because of the hostility of the War Department and the Army to the essentially civil character of the weather service and to its cost, Congress in 1890 directed 

transfer of the service to the Department of Agriculture, where it 

became the Weather Bureau in 1891. This loss of the weather service 

marked a general decline in the role of the military services in the cause 

of science. Although the Signal Corps retained responsibility for military meteorology, the Army had little need of it until World War I.

Of all the Army’s civil contributions, those of its Medical Department, with immeasurable implications for the entire society, may well 

have been the most important. Indeed, medical research in the Army, 

in which a few outstanding men were predominant, did not reflect the

decline in research that affected the other military branches of the 

period. One of the most notable of the Army’s medical contributions 

was the Army Medical Library, or the Surgeon General’s Library, which, 

though founded in 1836, did not come into its own until after 1868,

when Assistant Surgeon John S. Billings began to make it into one of 

the world’s great medical libraries. Similarly, in the same period, Billings 

developed the Army Medical Museum, which had been founded during the Civil War, into what would become in fact a national institute 

of pathology.

George Sternberg, who became the Surgeon General in 1893, was 

the leading pioneer in bacteriology in the United States and a worthy 

contemporary of Louis Pasteur and Robert Koch. Sternberg’s official

duties provided some opportunity for his studies, although he performed most of his research independently, some of it in the Johns 

Hopkins Hospital in Baltimore under the auspices of the American 

Public Health Association. He was appreciated by all except the more 

conservative of his colleagues who resisted the germ theory to about 

the same degree as physicians in private practice.

This loss of the weather service 

marked a general decline in the 

role of the military services in the 

cause of science.
Darkness and 

Light:The Interwar Years, 1865–1898

323

The more than three decades from the end of the Civil War to the 

Spanish-American War took the Army through a period of isolation and 

penury in which it engaged in no large war but in which it had oppor-

tunity for introspection. It took advantage of this opportunity and in 

professional ways that would mean much to its future success moved 

from darkness and near despair into the light of a new military day. Yet 

throughout this period, the Army was engaged in a more active mission 

that for many allowed little time for retrospection or leisure, a mission 

that shaped Army traditions and myths for years to come. The Army 

had

awartofight before itwould see accomplished at least some ofthe

reforms toward which the new military professionalism looked—a long 

war in the American West against the Indians, or Native Americans. Discussion Questions

1. What was the role of the U.S. Army in the occupation of the 

Southern states after the Civil War? Why was this such an unpopular 

mission?

2. What role should the U.S. Army have in domestic disturbances 

such as riots, large-scale strikes, etc.? What more recent uses of the 

Army in domestic interventions can you think of?

3. What is the difference between the militia and the National 

Guard? 

4. What does the phrase “military professionalism” mean to you? 

Is the purpose of military education the learning of technical skills, 

the inculcation of a professional ethos or culture, or something else 

completely? 

5. The argument of “line versus staff ” is no longer as contentious 

as it oncewas. However, are there still differences between officers who

are technical experts and those who are more generalists? If so, why is 

this a problem?

6.To what extent should the Army be involved in essentially non-

military missions such as exploration, weather forecasting, or other 

“civilian” occupations?Recommen

ded Readings

Abrahamson, James L. America Arms for a New Century: The Making of a 

Great Military Power. New York: Free Press, 1981.

Ambrose, Stephen. Upton and the Army. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State 

University Press, 1993.

Coakley, Robert W. The Role of Federal Military Forces in Domestic Disorders, 

1789–1878. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military His-

tory, 1988.

Cooper, Jerry M. The Army and Civil Disorder: Federal Military Intervention 

in Labor Disputes, 1877–1900. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 

1980.

———. The Rise of the National Guard: The Evolution of the American Militia, 1865–1920. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 

1997.
American Military History

324

Coffman, Edward M. The Old Army: A Portrait of the American Army in 

Peacetime, 1784–1898. New York: Oxford University Press, 1986.

Huntington, Samuel P. The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of 

Civil-Military Relations. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957. 

Leckie, William H. The Buffalo Soldiers: A Narrative of the Negro Cavalry 

in the West, rev. ed. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2003.

Risch, Erna. Quartermaster Support of the Army: A History of the Corps, 

1775–1939. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1989.

Other Readings

Armstrong, David A. Bullets and Bureaucrats: The Machine Gun and the 

United States Army, 1861–1916. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 

1982.

Bruce, Robert V. 1877: Year of Violence. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 

1959.

Caswell, John E. Arctic Frontiers: United States Explorations in the Far North. 

Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1956.

Dawson, Joseph G. III. Army Generals and Reconstruction: Louisiana, 

1862–1877. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1982.

Hill, Jim D. The Minute Man in Peace and War: A History of the National 

Guard. Harrisburg, Pa.: Stackpole Co., 1964.

Hume, Edgar E. Victories of Army Medicine: Scientific Accomplishments of 

the Medical Department of the United States Army. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1943.

Jamieson, Perry D. Crossing the Deadly Ground: United States Army Tactics, 

1865–1899. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1994. 

Nenninger, Timothy K. The Leavenworth Schools and the Old Army: Education, Professionalism and the Officer Corps of the United States Army, 

1881–1918. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1978.

Thomas, Benjamin P., and Harold M. Hyman. Stanton: The Life and Times 

of Lincoln’s Secretary of War. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 

1980.
Perhaps because of a tendency to view the record of a military 

establishment in terms of conflict, the U.S. Army’s operational

experience in the quarter century following the Civil War has 

come to be known collectively as the Indian Wars, although those 

inhabitants of America described by the catchall name of Indian did 

not have anything like a monolithic culture or society. Previous struggles with various Indian tribes, dating back to colonial times, had generally been limited as to scope and opponent (the Pequot war in New 

England that virtually exterminated that tribe being one of the more 

notable exceptions) and took place in a period when the Indian could 

withdraw or be pushed into vast reaches of uninhabited and as yet 

unwanted territory to the west. By 1865 this safety valve was fast disappearing; routes of travel and pockets of settlement had multiplied 

across the western two-thirds of the nation, and as the Civil War closed 

Americans in greater numbers and with greater energy than before 

resumed the quest for land, gold, commerce, and adventure that had 

been largely interrupted by the war. 

The showdown between the older Americans and the new, 

between two ways of life that were basically incompatible, was at hand. 

The besieged Indian, with an alien civilization pressing in and a main 

source of livelihood, the buffalo, threatened with extinction, was faced 

with a fundamental choice: surrender or fight. Many chose to fight,

and over the course of twenty-five years the struggle ranged over the

plains, mountains, and deserts of the American West, a small-scale war 

characterized by skirmishes, pursuits, massacres, raids, expeditions, 

battles, and campaigns of varying size and intensity. Given a central 

role in dealing with the Indian, the Army made a major contribution to 

14

Winning the West

The Army in the Indian Wars

1865–1890
American Military History

326

continental consolidation and in the process shaped itself as a culture 

and as an institution in many ways.

The Setting and the Challenge

After Appomattox the Army had to muster out over a million volunteers and reconstitute a regular establishment that had languished 

during the Civil War when bounties and short enlistments made service 

in the volunteers more profitable. There were operational commitments

to sustain during and after the transition, some an outgrowth of the 

war just ended and others the product of internal and external situations that could not be ignored. Whereas the prewar Army of the 1850s 

was essentially a frontier Army, the postwar Army became something 

more. To defense of the frontier were added military occupation of 

the southern states, neutralization of the Mexican border during Napoleon’s colonial enterprise under Maximilian, elimination of a Fenian 

(Irish Brotherhood) threat to Canada in the Northeast, dispersion of 

white marauders in the border states, and a growing mission of coastal 

defense. But the mission of pacifying the frontier consumed much of 

the interest and attention of large numbers of Army officers and men

in the years between the Civil War and the Spanish-American War.

Life in the Frontier Army

One of the determining factors about life in the U.S. Army on the 

frontiers of America was the small size of the force engaged in operations in relative isolation from the country and from the rest of the Army. 

The Army was scattered throughout hundreds of small forts, posts, outposts, and stations throughout the American West, often with little more 

than a company of cavalry or infantry in each post. This isolation bred, 

on one hand, a strong sense of camaraderie, of bonding, within the 

Army in a way that only shared suffering can do. The officers and men

often felt part of an extended family that had to look inward for strength 

as it relied on its own customs, rituals, and sense of honor separate from 

that distant civilian world or even from the very different military society 

“back East.” This sense of unity, of “splendid isolation,” kept the Army 

as an institution together during the harsh missions of western frontier 

duty but at the same time led far too often to professional and personal 

stagnation. Promotion was slow, and chances for glory were few given 

the dangers and hardships of small-unit actions against an elusive foe. 

The isolation also bred a certain measure of reliance upon each 

other, as officers and soldiers developed various customs and rituals to

bring structure to their lives. The formal rituals of a frontier post—life 

regulated by bugle calls, formal parades, Saturday night dances for the 

officers, distinctive uniforms, and unit nicknames—were attempts to

deal with the tensions and pressures of a harsh life for a soldier and 

his family with low pay and little prestige. While perhaps glamorous in 

retrospect, or when seen through the eye of Hollywood movies, such 

small communities also had their share of drunkenness, petty squabbles, corruption, arguments over rank and quarters, and other seemingly minor disputes so well known by any who have experienced life in 

small-town America. It was a life at once dangerous and monotonous, 

Artillery Helmet of the 

Late Nineteenth Century
winning the west

: the army in the indian wars, 1865–1890

327

comradely and isolated, professionally rewarding and stultifying. With 

low pay, poor quarters, an indifferent public, and a skilled foe that was 

at once feared, hated, and admired, the officers and men of the frontier

Army seemed caught in a never-ending struggle with an elusive enemy 

and their environment. One historian summarized the Army post dur-

ing this period on the frontier this way: “If one description could alone 

fit all frontier posts, itwould bea monotonous routine relaxed only

slightly by the color of periodic ceremony.” This shared culture created 

many of the institutionalmyths and customs that continue to influence

the Army’s image of itself to this day. 

The manpower strains of all the various missions after the Civil 

War plus manning all the frontier posts and stations badly strained the 

resources of a shrinking Regular Army. As the post–Civil War Army 

took shape, its strength began a decade of decline, dropping from an 

1867 level of 57,000 to half that in 1876, then leveling off at an

aver-

age of 26,000 for the remaining years up to the

War with Spain. Effec-

tive strength always lay somewhere below authorized strength, seriously 

impaired by high rates of sickness and desertion, for example. Because 

the Army’s military responsibilities were of continental proportions, 

involving sweeping distances

, limited resources, and far-flung opera-

tions, an administrative structure was required for command and con

-

trol. The Army was, therefore, organized on a territorial basis, with 

geographical segments variously designated as divisions, departments, 

and districts

.Therewere frequent modifications of organization,

rearrangements of boundaries, and transfers of troops and posts to 

meet changing conditions. (See Map 38.)

Development of a basic defense system in the trans-Mississippi West 

had followed the course of empire. Territorial acquisition and explora-

tion succeeded by emigration and settlement brought the settlers increas-

ingly into collision with the Indians and progressively raised the need 

for military posts along the transcontinental trails and in settled areas.

The annexation of Texas in 1845, the settlement of the Oregon 

boundary dispute in 1846, and the successful conclusion of the Mexi

-

can War with the cession to the United States in 1848 of vast areas of 

land all had drawn the outlines of the major task facing the Army in 

the West in the middle of the nineteenth century. During the period 

between the Mexican and Civil Wars, the Army had established a rea-

sonably comprehensive system of forts to protect the arteries of travel 

and areas of settlement across the frontier. At the same time the Army 

had launched operations against Indian tribes that represented actual or 

potential threats to movement and settlement.

Militarily successful in some cases, these operations nevertheless 

hardened Indian opposition, prompted wider provocations on both 

sides, and led to the delineation of an Indian barrier to westward 

expansion extending down the Great Plains from the Canadian to the 

Mexican border. Brig. Gen. William S. Harney, for example, responded 

to the Sioux massacre of Lt. John L. Grattan’s detachment with a punishing attack on elements of that tribe on the Blue Water in Nebraska 

in 1855. Farther south, Col. Edwin V. Sumner hit the Cheyennes on the 

Solomon Fork in Kansas in 1857 and Bvt. Maj. Earl Van Dorn fought 

the Comanches in two successful battles, at Rush Spring in future Okla-

homa and Crooked Creek in Kansas in 1858 and 1859, respectively. 
American Military History

328

The Army on the Great Plains found itself in direct contact with a 

highly mobile and warlike culture that was not easily subdued.

In the Southwest, between the wars, Army units pursued Apaches 

and Utes in New Mexico Territory, clashing with the Apaches at 

Cieneguilla and Rio Caliente in 1854 and the Utes at Poncha Pass in 

1855. There were various expeditions against branches of the elusive 

Apaches that involved hard campaigning but few conclusive engage-

ments suc

h as the one at Rio Gila in 1857. Itwas in this region in 1861

that Lt. George N. Bascom moved against Chief Cochise, precipitating 

events that opened a quarter century of hostilities with the Chiricahua 

Apaches.

In the Northwest, where numerous small tribes existed, there were 

occasional hostilities between the late 1840s and the middle 1860s.

Their general character was similar to operations elsewhere: settler 

intrusion, Indian reaction, and U.S. Army or local militia counteraction 

with superior force. The more important events involved the Rogue 

River Indians in Oregon between 1851 and 1856 and theYakima,Walla

Walla, Cayuse, and other tribes on both sides of the Cascade Mountains 

in Washington in the latter half of the 1850s. The Army, often at odds 

with civil authority and public opinion in the area, found it necessary 

on occasion to protect Indians from settlers as well as the other way 

around. 

The Regular Army’s frontier mission was interrupted by the onset 

of the Civil War, and the task of dealing with the Indians was trans-

ferred to the volunteers. Although the Indians demonstrated an aware-

ness of what was going on and took some satisfaction from the fact 

that their enemies

were fighting each other, there is little evidence that

they took advantage of the transition period between removal of the 

regulars and deployment of the volunteers. The so-called Great Sioux 

Uprising in Minnesota in 1862 that produced active campaigning in the

Upper Missouri River region in 1863 and 1864was spontaneous, and

other clashes around the West were the result not of the withdrawal of 

the Regular Army from the West but of the play of more fundamen-

tal and established forces. The volunteer units were in many instances 

commanded by men of a very different stamp than were Regular Army 

units. In one instance, a Colorado volunteer cavalry unit, commanded 

by a volunteer colonel named John M. Chivington, attacked and massa-

cred several hundred peaceful Cheyenne Indians at Sand Creek, Colo-

rado, in 1864 in one the

worst atrocities of thewesternwars.There

were dangers in relying on volunteer units in this essential peacekeeping 

role. In any case,

b

y 1865

overall Army strength in the frontier depart

-

ments

was about double what it had been in 1861.Thevolunteerskept

pace with a continuing and gradually enlarging westward movement by 

further developing the system of forts their predecessors had begun.

The regional defense systems established in the West in the 1850s 

and 1860s provided

a framework forthe deployment ofthe Army as it

returned from the Civil War to its frontier responsibilities. In the late sum

-

mer of 1866

thegeneralcommand and administrative structure for frontier

defense comprised the Division of the Missouri, containing the Depart

-

ments of Arkansas, Missouri, Dakota, and the Platte; the Division of the 

Pacific,

consisting ofthe Departments of California andthe Columbia;

and the independent Department of the Gulf, whose area included Texas. 
Map 38

M O D O C

B A N N O C K

B L A C K F E E T

C R O W

C H E Y E N N E

P A I U T E

S I O U X

S H E E P E A T E R

N E Z P E R C E

A R A P A H O

S H O S H O N I

S I O U X

P A W N E E

S I O U X

N A V A H O

U T E

C O M A N C H E

S O U T H E R N C H E Y E N N E

A P A C H E

K I O W A

A R A P A H O

1878

Birch Creek

1860

Pyramid Lake

La

1872–73

va Beds

Clearwater

1877

Big Hole

1877

Fetterman Disaster

1866

Rosebud

1876

Little Bighorn

1876

New Ulm

1862

Ft. Ridgely

1862

Birch Coulee

1862

Wood Lake

1862

Kildeer Mtn

1864

Hay eld

Fight

1867

Canyon Creek

1877

Dull Knife

1876

Platte Bridge

1865

Sand Creek

1864

Palo Duro Canyon

1874

Washita

1868

Adobe Walls

1864–1874

Beecher's Island

1868

Summit Springs

1869 Milk Creek

1879

Big Dry Wash

1882

Apache Pass

1862

Cibicu Creek

1881

Canyon de los Embudos

1886

Skeleton Canyon

1886

Salt River Canyon

1872

Canyon de Chelly

1864

Wagon Box Fight

1867

White Bird

Canyon

1877

Bear Paw Mtn

1877

Slim Buttes

1876

Warbonnet Creek

1876

Wounded Knee

1890

P A C I F I C O C E A N

C

A

N

A

D

A

Crook-Geronimo Conference

MEXICO

Ft. Buford

1866

Ft. Abraham Lincoln

1872

Ft. Yates

1874

Ft. Sully

1863 Ft. Meade

1878

Ft. Laramie

1849

Ft. D.A. Russell

1867

Ft. Lyon

1860

Ft. Garland

1858

Ft. Bascom

1864

Ft. Wingate

1862

Ft. Huachuca

1877

Ft. Lowell

1862

Ft. Thomas

1876

Ft. McDowell

1865

Ft. Verde

1864

Ft. Yuma

1850

Ft. Seldon

1865

Ft. Cummings 1863

Ft. Bowie

1862

Ft. Bayard

1866

Ft. Apache

1869 Ft. Stanton

1855

Ft. Concho

1867

Ft. Richardson

1867

Ft. Clark

1852

Ft. Griffin

1867

Ft. Stockton

1859 Ft. Davis

1854

Ft. Quitman

1859

Ft. Bliss

1849

Ft. Sumner

1862

Ft. Union

1851

Ft. Douglas

1862 Ft. Churchill

1860

Ft. Halleck

1867

Ft. Bridger

1858

Ft. Boise

1863

Ft. Klamath

1863

Ft. Hall

1834

Ft. Fetterman

1867

Ft. Reno

1865

Ft. Phil Kearny

1866

Ft. Randall

1856

Ft. McPherson

1863

Ft. Omaha

1863

Camp Supply

1868

Ft. Sill

1869

Ft. Leavenworth

1827

Ft. Dodge

1864

Ft. Larned

1859

Ft. Harker

1864

Ft. 

Wallace

1865 Ft. Hayes

1865

Ft. Riley

1855

Ft. Kearney

1848

Ft. Robinson

1874

Ft. Keogh

1876

Ft. Benton

1869

Ft. C.F. Smith

1867

Ft. Ellis

1867

Ft. Shaw

1867

Ft. Colville

1859

Ft. Steilacoom

1849

Ft. 

Walla 

Walla

1856

Ft. Vancouver

1849

Posts Battles

SOME POSTS, TRIBES, AND

BATTLES OF THE INDIAN 

WARS

1860–1890

THE TRANS-MISSISSIPPI WES

T

NOTE: State boundaries are shown to identify the location of historical sites.

100 0 300 200 100

Miles
American Military History

330

However, by 1870 the Division of the Pacific included the Departments

of the Columbia, California, and Arizona and the Department of the Missouri covered the Departments of the Dakota, the Platte, and the Missouri; 

the Department of Texas was included in the Division of the South. 

The Army’s challenge in the West was one of environment as well 

as adversary, and in the summer of 1866 General Grant sent a number

of senior-officer inspectors across the country to observe and report

on conditions. The theater of war was uninhabited or only sparsely 

settled, and its great distances and extreme variations of climate and 

geography accentuated manpower limitations, logistical and communications problems, and the difficulties of movement. The extension

of the rail system only gradually eased the situation. Above all, the 

mounted tribes of the Plains were a different breed from the Indians 

the Army had dealt with previously in the forested areas of the East. 

Despite the fact that the Army had fought Indians in the West in the 

period after the Mexican War, much of the direct experience of its 

officers and men had been lost during the Civil War years. Until frontier proficiency could be reestablished the Army would depend on the

somewhat intangible body of knowledge that marks any institution, 

fortified by the seasoning of the Civil War.

Of the officers who moved to the forefront of the Army in the

Indian Wars, few had frontier and Indian experience. At the top levels 

at the outset, Grant had had only a taste of the loneliness of the frontier outpost as a captain. William T. Sherman had served in California 

during the 1850s but had not been involved in fighting. Philip H. Sheridan had served about five years in the Northwest as a junior officer,

but neither Nelson A. Miles nor Oliver O. Howard had known frontier service of any kind. Wesley Merritt, George A. Custer, and Ranald 

S. Mackenzie all had graduated from West Point into the Civil War; 

and John Gibbon had only minor involvement in the Seminole War 

and some garrison duty in the West. Alfred Sully, also a veteran of the 

Seminole War and an active campaigner against the Sioux during Civil 

War years, fell into obscurity, while Philip St. George Cooke was overtaken by age and Edward R. S. Canby’s experience was lost prematurely 

through his death at Indian hands. Christopher Augur, Alfred H. Terry, 

and George Crook were among the few upper-level Army leaders of 

the Indian Wars that had pre–Civil War frontier experience.

Thus, to a large degree the officers of the Indian Wars were products of the Civil War. Many brought outstanding records to the frontier, but this was a new conflict against an unorthodox enemy. Those

who approached their new opponent with respect and learned his ways 

became the best Indian-fighters and in some cases the most helpful

in promoting a solution to the Indian problem. Some who had little 

respect for the “savages” and placed too much store in Civil War methods and achievements paid the penalty on the battlefield. Capt. William

J. Fetterman would be one of the first to fall as the final chapter of the

Indian Wars opened in 1866.

The Bozeman Trail

While the Civil War was still in progress, gold was discovered in 

Montana and fortune seekers flocked to the area. Lines of communicaThe theater of war was 

uninhabited or only sparsely 

settled, and its great distances 

and extreme variations of climate 

and geography accentuated 

manpower limitations, logistical 

and communications problems, 

and the difficulties of movement.
winning the west: the army in the indian wars, 1865–1890

331

tions to the fields around Virginia City lay along circuitous routes, and

pressure mounted for more direct access. The Army explored the possibilities and adopted a route, pioneered by John Bozeman, extending 

from Fort Laramie on the North Platte River and Oregon Trail, northwestward along the eastern base and around the northern shoulder of 

the Big Horn Mountains. Unfortunately, the trail cut through hunting 

grounds that a treaty in 1865 had reserved for the Sioux, Northern

Cheyennes, and Arapahos.

The Indians resisted white incursions, and Maj. Gen. Patrick E. 

Connor’s Powder River Expedition failed to stop their depredations. In 

1866 the government, under public pressure and attracted to the gold

resources as a means of relieving the financial strains of the Civil War,

opened new negotiations but with indifferent results. A few friendly 

chiefs signed a new agreement at Fort Laramie, but others led by Red 

Cloud of the Sioux stalked out defiantly when Col. Henry B. Carrington

marched in with a battalion of the 18th Infantry on his way to establish 

posts along the Bozeman Trail even before agreement with the Indians 

had been reached.

Although motivated by a sense of justice, treaty-making with the 

Indians more often than not constituted an exercise in futility for both 

parties. On the Indian side the tribes were loosely knit societies of individualists living a nomadic existence under leaders whose control and 

influence fluctuated with the fortunes of war. A treaty was no more

binding than the degree of power, authority, and allegiance a leader 

might muster at any given time, Washington’s understanding to the contrary. On the U.S. side, although the authority of negotiating officials

was unquestioned, the power to enforce treaty provisions on highly 

independent settlers was another matter, and as breach after breach 

provoked the Indian to action, the Army was invariably called in to 

protect the offending citizens and punish the Indians, almost regardless 

of which group was at fault.

Colonel Carrington’s battalion of 700 men departed Fort Laramie 

in June 1866 for the Big Horn country. Despite Red Cloud’s threat to

oppose the move, several families, including the commanding officer’s,

accompanied the force. At Fort Reno on the Powder River, some miles 

beyond the end of the telegraph, Carrington with a regular company 

relieved two companies of the 5th U.S. Volunteers, former Confederate 

prisoners who became so-called galvanized Yankees when they agreed 

Galvanized Yankees

During the last year of the Civil War, Plains Indian warfare reached a crescendo as more and more 

white travelers passed through the tribes’ hunting territory. To keep the routes open, the Union Army 

recruited six regiments of Confederate prisoners of war out of the prison camps in the North. Those who 

signed up were mostly landless “poor whites” and immigrants who had been drafted into the Confederate 

Army and were disillusioned with the Southern cause. Swapping Confederate gray for Union blue, these 

“Galvanized Yankees” (so nicknamed after the process to cover metal with a rust-resistant zinc coating) 

garrisoned forts on major transportation routes until the Regular Army arrived to take their place in 1866.
American Military History

332

to frontier Indian service in exchange for their freedom. Farther north-

west, 225 miles from Fort Laramie, Carrington selected a site on the 

Piney tributary of the Powder River to construct his headquarters post, 

Fort Phil Kearny. Five companies remained there while the other two 

were sent another ninety miles out to establish Fort C. F. Smith at the 

northern edge of the Big Horns.

Fort Phil Kearny became the focus of enemy attention and during 

its brief existence remained in a virtual state of siege. On December 21, 

1866, the Indian

s attackedawood train six miles from the fort. Captain

Fetterman, who had been brevetted a lieutenant colonel in Civil War 

actions and now boasted that with eighty men he could ride through 

the whole Sioux Nation, asked to lead a relief column. Indian decoys 

demonstrated invitingly before the rescue party, withdrawing gradually 

over Lodge Trail Ridge northwest of the post. Fetterman fell for the 

ruse and against Carrington’s orders crossed the ridge with eighty men 

at his back. In a carefully executed ambush the Indians wiped out the 

entire force, including two civilians who had gone along to try out their 

new Henr

y repeating rifles,

weapons far superior to the Springfield

muzzleloaders carried by the infantrymen and the Spencer carbines car-

ried by the cavalrymen in the detail.

The Army was more successful in two other notable actions on 

the BozemanTrail. InAugust 1867 the Indians launched separate but

apparently coordinated attacks against a haying detail near Fort Smith 

and

awood detail outsideFortKearny. In the Hayfield Fight 19 soldiers

and6 civilians under Lt. Sigismund Sternberg, equipped with converted

breechloading Springfields and several repeating rifles, held offvastly

superior odds with a loss of only 3 killed and 2 wounded. In the Wagon 

Box Fight, Capt. James Powell, with 31 men similarly armed and sta-

tioned behind wagon boxes removed from their running gear, held off 

a much larger force of Sioux and Cheyennes for a good four hours, 

withstanding mounted and dismounted attacks by several hundred war-

riors at various times, with only

6 killed and2 wounded.

It is risky to deal in statistics concerning Indian participation and 

casualties in western campaigns. Accounts vary widely, are founded 

on shaky evidence, and require some balancing and juggling merely 

to reach a general order of magnitude, much less an accurate assess-

ment of the facts in a given situation. There is no doubt that the Sioux 

and Cheyennes suffered serious casualties in the Hayfield and

Wagon

Box fights.For the Army, however, thesewere defensive engagements;

it lacked sufficient force in the Upper Plains to undertake offensive

operations. At the same time there was sentiment in the East to treat 

with rather than chastise the Indians. The government withdrew the 

garrisons and abandoned the Montana road in July 1868.

The Southern Plains

The Army during the Indian Wars was habitually unable to balance 

resources with requirements, both because of limited manpower and 

because of the continental size of the theater of operations. As Lt. 

Gen. William T. Sherman, commanding the Division of the Missouri, 

aptly expressed the challenge: 
winning the west: the army in the indian wars, 1865–1890

333

Were I or the department commanders to send guards to every point where 

they are clamored for, we would need alone on the plains a hundred thousand 

men, mostly of cavalry. Each spot of every road, and each little settlement 

along five thousand miles of frontier, wants its regiment of cavalry or infantry

to protect it against the combined power of all the Indians, because of the bare 

possibility of their being attacked by the combined force of all the Indians.

It was the good fortune of both the Army and the citizen in the 

West that the Indians rarely acted in concert within or between tribes, 

although had they done so the Army might have been able to regularly 

employ large units instead of dispersing troops in small detachments all 

over the frontier and might also have had better luck in forcing its elusive opponents to stand and fight. But troops and units were at a premium, so much so in 1868 that Maj. Gen. Philip H. Sheridan decided to

try an unusual expedient to carry out his responsibilities in the Department of the Missouri.

Sheridan directed Maj. George A. Forsyth to “employ fifty firstclass hardy frontiersmen, to be used as scouts against the hostile 

Indians, to be commanded by yourself.” Recruited at Forts Harker 

and Hays in Kansas, the command took the field in late August in a

region frequented by Comanches, Kiowas, Southern Cheyennes, and 

Arapahos, augmented by some Sioux roaming south of the Platte. 

The tribes were restive: The Kansas Pacific Railroad was advancing through their country, frightening the buffalo—their source of 

food, clothing, and shelter—and attracting white settlement. The 

Cheyennes were still smoldering over the massacre of 200 of Black 

Kettle’s peaceful band, including women and children, by Col. John 

M. Chivington and his Colorado volunteers on Sand Creek in 1864

and had demonstrated their mistrust of the whites when Maj. Gen. 

Winfield Scott Hancock penetrated their area with a large expedition

in 1867.

Forsyth and the Indians collided on the Arickaree Fork of the 

Republican River at dawn on November 17, 1868, when a combined

war party of 600 Cheyennes, Sioux, and Arapahoes attacked him in a

defensive position on a small island in the riverbed. The Indians pressed 

the fight for three days, wounding Forsyth and fifteen of his scouts

and killing his second in command, Lt. Frederick H. Beecher, his surgeon, and four other soldiers. Among Indian casualties in this Battle of 

Beecher Island was the influential Cheyenne leader Roman Nose. The

first rescue force on the scene was Capt. Louis H. Carpenter’s company

of black troopers of the 10th Cavalry. 

By the late 1860s the government’s policy of removing Indians

from desirable areas, graphically represented by the earlier transfer of 

the Five Civilized Tribes from the Southeast to Oklahoma (the Cherokees called it the Trail of Tears), had run its course and was succeeded 

by one of concentrating them on reservations. The practice of locating 

tribes in other than native or salubrious surroundings and of joining 

uncongenial bands led to more than one Indian war. Some bands found 

it convenient to accept reservation status and government rations during the winter months, returning to the warpath and hunting trail in 

the milder seasons. Many bands of many tribes refused to accept the 

treaties offered by a peace commission and resisted the government’s 

The practice of locating tribes in 

other than native or salubrious 

surroundings and of joining 

uncongenial bands led to more 

than one Indian war.
American Military History

334

attempt to confine them to specificgeographical limits; it fell to the

Army to force compliance. In his area, General Sheridan now planned 

to hit the Indians in their permanent winter camps.

While a winter campaign presented serious logistical problems, it 

offered opportunities for decisive results. If the Indians’ shelter, food, 

and livestock could be destroyed or captured, not only the warriors but 

their women and children were at the mercy of the Army and the ele-

ments, and there was little left but surrender. These tactics, amounting 

to the total destruction of the Indian culture, raised certain moral ques-

tions for many officers and men that were never satisfactorily resolved.

Sheridan devised a plan whereby 3 columns would converge on the 

Indian wintering grounds just east of the Texas Panhandle: 1 from Fort 

Lyon in Colorado, 1 from Fort Bascom in New Mexico, and 1 from 

Camp Supply in the Indian Territory later to be called Oklahoma. The 

7th Cavalry under Lt. Col. George A. Custer fought the major engage-

ment of the campaign. Custer found the Indians on the Washita River 

and struck Black Kettle’s Cheyenne village with eleven companies and 

from four directions at dawn on November 29, 1868, as the regimental

band played “Gerry Owen,” still the 7th Cavalry’s regimental song. A 

fierce fight developed, whic

h the Indians continued from surrounding

terrain. By midmorning Custer learned that this was only one of many 

villages of Cheyennes, Arapahos, Kiowas, and Comanches extend-

ing for miles along the Washita. Facing such odds, Custer hastened to 

destroy the village and its supplies and, notably, about 875 ponies and 

horses; used an offensive maneuver to deceive the enemy; and under 

cover of darkness withdrew from the field, taking 53

women andchil

-

dren as prisoners

.The 7th Cavalry lost 21 officers and men killed and

13 wounded in the Battle of the Washita; the Indians lost perhaps 50 

killed and as many wounded. This battle was yet another instance of 

hitting the Indians in the winter months when the destruction of their 

villages and stored food killed or weakened more than did the initial 

military attack. 

The Kiowas and Comanches did not lightly relinquish their hunt-

ing grounds and forsake their way of life. Some lived restlessly on a res-

ervation in Indian Territory around Fort Sill; others held out. Sherman, 

now Commanding General of the U.S. Army; Sheridan, commanding 

the Division of the Missouri; and their field commanders

would have

to undertake several more major campaigns before these tribes were 

forced to accept reservation life. In 1871 reservation Kiowas raided 

into Texas, killing some teamsters of a government wagon train. Gen-

eral Sherman, visiting at Fort Sill, had the responsible leaders (Satanta, 

Satank, and Big Tree) arrested in a dramatic confrontation on the post 

between armed Indians and soldiers in which only Sherman’s cool-

ness prevented an explosion. Satank was later killed while attempting 

escape, and Satanta and Big Tree were tried and imprisoned for two 

years. Again in custody in 1876, Satanta took his own life.

There were other incidents on the Southern Plains before the Indi-

ans there were subjugated. An Army campaign in 1874–1875, known 

as the Red River War, involved about 3,000 troops and was launched 

in fiv

e columns, one under the command of Col. Nelson A. Miles and

another under Col. Ranald S. Mackenzie, from bases in Texas, New 

Mexico, and Indian Territory against the Texas Panhandle refuge of 
winning the west: the army in the indian wars, 1865–1890

335

the Plains tribes. On September 24 Colonel Mackenzie and the 4th Cavalry found the winter camps of the Comanches, Kiowas, Cheyennes, 

and Arapahos in the deep Palo Duro Canyon on the Staked Plains. 

Mackenzie’s surprise attack separated the Indians from their horses and 

belongings, which were destroyed. The campaign continued all winter 

and into the following spring, with many Indians finally surrendering in

desperation and being placed on the reservation.

The Northwest

Not all the Indian Wars were fought with Plains tribes. The Army 

engaged in wars with several Pacific slope tribes in the 1870s, and the

operations were widely scattered over the mountainous northwestern 

quarter of the trans-Mississippi West.

The Modoc War of 1872–1873 began when the Modocs, who had 

been placed on a reservation in southern Oregon with the more numerous and traditionally unfriendly Klamaths, returned without permission to their home in the Lost River country on the California border. 

When the Army attempted in November of 1872 to take them back 

to the reservation, fighting broke out and the Indians retreated into a

natural fortress, the Lava Beds at the southern end of Tule Lake. Over 

the course of six months there were four engagements in which regular and volunteer troops with superior strength and weapons incurred 

heavier losses than did their opponents. The extended efforts of a 

peace commission made little headway and ended in tragedy when two 

of the members, Brig. Gen. Edward R. S. Canby and the Reverend 

Eleaser Thomas, both unarmed, were shot while in conference with 

the Indians. The Modocs finally surrendered; and four of their leaders,

including Canby’s murderer, Captain Jack, were hanged.

Custer

George A. Custer (1839–1876) graduated from West 

Point in 1861. A charismatic leader who won renown for his 

bold cavalry charges, he was commanding a brigade of 

cavalry two years later and a division within three. In 1866 

the end of the Civil War and the reorganization of the Regular Army reduced Custer to lieutenant colonel and second in 

command of a regiment. He “found some difficulty in adapting 

himself to his altered position,” wrote his commanding general, 

sponsor, and champion, Philip Sheridan, when Custer’s indiscipline and erratic behavior resulted in a court-martial and 

a year’s suspension without pay. As Custer led his regiment 

toward the Little Bighorn, no one is certain what his real hopes 

and ambitions were; but it is clear that his goal, as ever, was 

personal glory. Unfortunately, he and most of his command 

were killed to gain that fame. General Custer during His Civil War Heydey
American Military History

336

The practice of uprooting the Indians from their homeland was 

also the cause of the Nez Perce War in 1877. The Nez Perce had been 

friendly to the settlers from the days of their contact with Lewis and 

Clark. Although they had ceded some of their lands to the newcomers, they refused to give up the Wallowa Valley in northeastern Oregon. 

Encroachment increased, stiffening the lines of political pressure back to 

Washington and leading inevitably to decisions favorable to the settlers 

and mandating the removal of the Nez Perce to the Lapwai Reservation 

across the Snake River in Idaho. Some elements of the tribe complied; but 

Chief Joseph and his people did not, and the Army was ordered to move 

them. A series of irresponsible actions by both sides led to hostilities. 

In a remarkable campaign that demonstrated the unique capabilities of guerrilla forces and the difficulties that formal military units have

in dealing with them, the Nez Perce led the Army on a 1,300-mile chase 

over the Continental Divide punctuated by a number of sharp engagements. The Indians used the terrain to great advantage, fighting when

circumstances favored them, side-stepping around opposing forces or 

breaking contact when the situation dictated it. They lived off the land, 

while the Army was tied to supply trains that were vulnerable to Indian 

attack. But their women and children often hindered the Indians’ freedom of movement, and eventually Army superiority in strength and 

weapons began to tell. Indian rifles were no match for howitzers and

Gatling guns, and Indian mobility could not outstrip the Army’s use 

of the telegraph to alert additional forces along the Nez Perce line of 

flight. The battles of White Bird Canyon, Clearwater, Big Hole, Canyon Creek, and Bear Paw Mountain involved hundreds of troops and 

Thornburgh’s Battle (against the Ute Indians), Frank Tenney Johnson, 1965

Image removed due to

license restrictions
winning the west: the army in the indian wars, 1865–1890

337

numerous units under Maj. Gen. Oliver O. Howard, Col. John Gibbon, Maj. Samuel D. Sturgis, and Lt. Gen. Nelson A. Miles. There were 

heavy casualties on both sides before Chief Joseph surrendered. Joseph 

concluded the peace talks with one of the most memorable speeches 

in western history. “Hear me, my Chiefs,” one army observer remembered Joseph saying, “I am tired. My heart is sick and sad. From where 

the sun now stands I will fight no more forever.”

In 1878 and 1879 Army forces took the field against various bands

of Indians in mountain areas of the Northwest. Operations against 

the Bannocks, Sheepeaters, and Utes were relatively minor. The Bannock War was caused by settler intrusion on the Camas Prairie in Idaho, 

where camas roots were a prime source of food for the Indians. The 

Sheepeater War, also centered in Idaho, broke out when the Indians 

were charged with several murders they probably did not commit. The 

Ute War in northwestern Colorado grew out of the misguided methods 

and impractical idealism of Indian Agent Nathan C. Meeker. Regardless of what caused them, these wars meant hard campaigning and 

casualties for the Army and the Indians.

The Southwest

The Apaches were among the Army’s toughest opponents in the 

Indian Wars. The zone of operations embraced the territories of Arizona and New Mexico, western Texas, and Mexico’s northern provinces. Despite the fact that hostile Apaches were relatively few in number and the theater was essentially secondary, they tied down sizable 

forces over a long period of time.

Post–Civil War Apache troubles extended from the late 1860s, when

the Army campaigned against Cochise, through the seventies and eighties, 

when Victorio and Geronimo came to the fore. On the Army side the 

important factor was the assignment of Bvt. Maj. Gen. George Crook to 

the Southwest, where he served two tours between 1871 and 1886. Crook

was an able administrator as well as an outstanding soldier and proved to 

be a relentless opponent of the Indian on the battlefield and a steadfast

friend off it. As commander of the Department of Arizona he organized 

at key locations a number of mobile striking forces under experienced 

frontier officers and launched them in a concerted campaign supported

by mule pack trains. Acting under an 1866 congressional act that authorized the Army to enlist up to a thousand Indian scouts (they came from 

General Crook (1828–1890)

Graduating thirty-eighth in a class of forty-three at West Point, George Crook would be the 

lowest ranking cadet ever to attain the rank of major general in the Regular Army. Laconic and 

reserved, Crook reveled in field duty. Wounded while fighting Indians in 1857, he carried the 

arrowhead to his grave. During the Civil War he rose to command a corps. Afterward he returned 

to the frontier, where he would remain for the rest of his career. A keen student of Indian life and 

culture, he died while still on active duty after thirty-eight years of military service.
American Military History

338

traditionally friendly tribes like the Crow and Pawnee or from friendly elements of warring tribes), Crook also employed Apache scouts. Converging columns and persistent pursuit brought results, and he left Arizona in 

relative quiet when he went to the Department of the Platte in 1875.

The quiet in the Southwest did not last long. Largely at the instigation of politicians, merchants, contractors, and other self-serving 

whites, several bands of mutually uncongenial Apaches were transferred from desirable areas to the unhealthy San Carlos Reservation 

in the Arizona lowlands. As a result, much of what Crook had accomplished was undone as disgruntled Apaches again turned to raiding and 

killing. In the summer of 1881, for example, an Apache medicine man 

stirred the Indians to heights of religious fervor that led to a sharp 

clash on Cibicu Creek with troops commanded by Col. Eugene A. Carr, 

one of the Army’s most experienced Indian-fighters. The action was

highlighted by perhaps the most notable instance of disaffection when 

the Indian scouts with the command turned on the regulars.

Throughout the Indian Wars there was constant friction between the 

War and the Interior Departments over the conduct of Indian affairs. A 

committee of the Continental Congress had first exercised thisresponsibility. In 1789 it was transferred to the Secretary of War, and in 1824 a Bureau 

of Indian Affairs was created in the War Department. When the Department of the Interior was established in 1849, the Indian Bureau was transferred to that agency. Thus administration of Indian affairs was handled 

Tracking Victorio, Don Stivers, 1988

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winning the west

: the army in the indian wars, 1865–1890

339

by one department while enforcement lay with another. General Crook 

explained to a congressional committee in 1879: “As it is now you have a 

divided responsibility. It is like having two captains on the same ship.”

Crook returned to Arizona in 1882 to restore the Apaches’ confi

-

dence in the white administration, move the Apaches along the paths 

of civilization, and spar constantly with the Indian Bureau. On the 

military side, he took the field against dwindlingnumbers of hostiles,

cooperating with Mexican officials and authorized to cross the interna-

tional boundary in pursuit of the renegades. Crook met with Geron-

imo inthe Sierra Madre Mountains in March of 1886 and negotiated

a surrender that brought in all but Geronimo and a few followers who 

backed out at the last moment. When Washington failed to back the 

field commander in the conditions on which he had negotiated the sur-

render, Crook asked to be relieved. Miles replaced him, and Lt. Charles 

B. Gatewood entered Geronimo’s mountain fastness to arrange a sur-

render and bring the Apache campaigns to a close.

The Northern Plains

All the elements of the clash of cultures and civilizations were 

present in the events leading to the final subjugation of the Indians.

The mounted tribes of the Great Plains were astride the main corridors 

of westward expansion, and this was the area of decision. The treaty 

of 1868 had set aside the Great SiouxReservation in South Dakota;

and the Army had abandoned the Bozeman Trail, leaving the Powder 

River region as Indian country. The Sioux, the Northern Cheyenne, 

and their allies were thus north of the main transcontinental artery 

along the Platte. Although the arrangement worked for several years, it 

was doomed by the seemingly irresistible march of settlers. The Sioux 

rejected whiteovertures fora right-of-way for the NorthernPacific

Railroad; when surveyors went ahead anyway they ran into Indian resis

-

tance, which led to the dispatch in 1873 of a large military expedition 

under Col. David S. Stanley up the Yellowstone Valley. The next year 

General Sheridan sent Custer and the 7th Cavalry on a reconnaissance 

through the Black Hills, within the Sioux Reservation. When geologists 

with the expedition found gold, the word spread rapidly and prospec-

tors filtered into the area despite the Army’s best efforts to

keep them

out. Another treaty was broken, and band by band angry reservation 

Indians slipped away to join nontreaty recalcitrants in the unceded 

Powder River region of Wyoming and Montana.

In December 1875 the Indian Bureau notified the Sioux and

Northern Cheyennes that they had to return to the reservation by the 

end of the following month. Since the Indians were in winter quarters 

in remote areas and would have had little chance against the elements, 

they did not obey. As the deadline passed, the Commissioner of Indian 

Affairs appealed to the Army to force compliance. Sheridan, mindful 

of his success with converging columns against the Southern Plains 

tribes, determined upon a similar winter campaign in the north.

Two columns were planned: one under Crook from Fort Fetterman 

and the other under Brig. Gen. Alfred H. Terry from Fort Abraham 

Lincoln in the Dakota

Territory. In Marc

h 1876 Crook’s force, directly

commanded by Col. Joseph J. Reynolds, launched its foray on schedule 
American Military History

340

but returned within a month. Reynolds had entered the valley of the 

Powder and surprised a Cheyenne-Sioux camp but failed to press an 

initial advantage and withdrew without punishing the Indians. Terry’s 

column never left its fort. The abortive campaign was not renewed until 

the spring, when Sheridan pressed his subordinates into renewing their 

attacks, this time with three columns under Crook, Gibbon, and Terry 

directed against the Powder River area. 

General Terry marched west from Fort Abraham Lincoln in Dakota 

Territory in May, his principal element the 7th Cavalry under Custer. 

Colonel Gibbon had earlier moved east from Fort Ellis in western Montana with a mixed force of infantry and cavalry, while General Crook 

moved north from Fort Fetterman on the North Platte in Wyoming at 

the end of May with a force heavily weighted in cavalry. Crook made 

the first contact. The Sioux and Northern Cheyennes learned of his

approach along Rosebud Creek, and 1,500 warriors moved to meet him. 

Crook had fifteen companies of cavalry and five of infantry, 1,000 men,

plus another 300 friendly Indians and civilians. The two forces met on 

roughly equal terms on the seventeenth in heavy fighting. Tactically, neither side carried the field conclusively enough to claim a victory. Strategically, Crook’s withdrawal to a supply base to the south gave the Battle 

of the Rosebud the complexion of a defeat for the Army, especially in 

view of developments on the Little Bighorn River fifty miles northwest,

which his continued advance might have influenced decisively.

While Crook was moving north to his collision on the Rosebud, 

Terry and Gibbon, marching from east and west, had joined forces on the 

Yellowstone River at its confluence with the Powder, where a supply base

serviced by river steamer was established. Terry sent out the 7th Cavalry 

to scout for Indian sign, and Maj. Marcus A. Reno with six companies 

(the cavalry company was not called a troop until 1883) reconnoitered up 

the Powder, across the Tongue River, and into the valley of the Rosebud. 

Here on June 17 Reno found a fresh trail leading west out of the valley 

and across the Wolf Mountains in the direction of the Little Bighorn. He 

was unaware, and was thus unable to inform his superiors, that Crook 

Geronimo (left center) at Meeting with General Crook 

(second from right, seated) in 1886
winning the west: the army in the indian wars, 1865–1890

341

was also in the Rosebud valley and had been engaged and blocked by a 

large force of Indians not far upstream on this very same day.

Terry held a council of war aboard the steamer Far West to outline 

his plan. Custer’s 7th Cavalry would move south up the Rosebud, cross 

the Wolf Mountains, and enter the Little Bighorn valley from the south. 

Gibbon, joined by Terry, would ascend the Bighorn River and its tributary, the Little Bighorn, from the north, trapping the Indians between 

the two forces.

As it happened, Custer moved at least a day early for the cooperative action envisioned in Terry’s plan. On June 25, 1876, the 7th Cavalry

crossed the Wolf Mountains and moved into the valley of the Little Bighorn. (See Map 39.) Custer was confident of his capability to handle whatever he ran up against, convinced that the Indians would follow their usual 

practice of scattering before a show of force and completely unaware 

that he was descending upon one of the largest concentrations of Indians 

ever assembled on the Plains. Perhaps as many as 6,000–7,000 Sioux and

Northern Cheyennes, with as many as 2,000 warriors under such leaders 

as Crazy Horse, Sitting Bull, Gall, Crow King, Lame Deer, Hump, and 

Two Moon, would confront Custer in the Battle of the Little Bighorn.

Around noon of this Sunday in June, Custer sent Capt. Frederick 

W. Benteen with three companies to scout to the left of the command, 

not an unusual move for a force still attempting to fix the location of an

elusive enemy and expecting him to slip away on contact. It is also possible that Custer, knowing the value of the principle of surprise, hoped 

to catch the foe unawares. About 2:30 p.m., still two miles short of the 

river when the upper end of an Indian village came into view, Custer 

advanced three more companies under Major Reno with instructions 

to cross the river and charge the Indian camp. With five companies

Custer moved off to the right, still screened by a fold of ground from 

observing the extent of his opposition, perhaps with the thought of 

hitting the Indians from the flank—of letting Reno hold the enemy by

the nose while he, Custer, kicked him in the seat of the pants. As Custer 

progressed, he rushed Sgt. Daniel Kanipe to the rear to hurry the pack 

train and its one-company escort forward and shortly afterward dispatched Trumpeter John Martin with a last message to Benteen that a 

“big village” lay ahead and to “be quick—bring packs.”

Indian Scouts

When engaged in Indian campaigns, the U.S. Army often employed 

scouts as guides, trackers, and diplomats. American commanders realized that 

the most effective scouts were Indians recruited from each tribe’s traditional 

enemies. For example, Cheyenne warriors were often employed in campaigns 

against the Sioux. Indian scouts gained the confidence and respect of Army 

leaders who quickly learned to follow their advice. George Custer, however, 

ignored warnings from his Arickara and Crow scouts not to advance against the Indian villages on the Little 

Big Horn and as a result lost 267 men in battle. The insignia of the Indian Scouts, crossed arrows, was later 

adopted as the special insignia of the First Special Service Force, a commando unit, in World War II and as 

the branch insignia of U.S. Army Special Forces.

Sitting Bull
Map 39

3200

3300

3300

3300

3300

3300

3300

3400

3400

3400

3200

3200

3100

3100

3200

Little Bighorn River

Deep Coulee

Medicine Trail Coulee

Shoulder Blade Creek

Cedar Coulee

Reno Creek

Northern Cheyenne

Oglala Brule

Blackfoot

Hunkpapa

Minniconjou

Sans Arc

Indian Movement after Custer’s Defeat

Reno’s

1st Position

Reno’s

2d Position Reno’s

Entrenchment

Weir’s attempt

to aid Custer

Smith

Calhoun

Keogh

Yates

Custer

T. E. Custer

Reno’s Retreat

Reno’s Advance

Benteen’s Route

Custer’s Advance

Custer’s Advance

Custer’s Advance

BATTLE OF LITTLE BIGHORN

25–26 June 1876

Contour Interval in Feet

0 5000

Feet

U. S. Army Movement, known

U. S. Army Movement, probable

Indian Movement, known

Indian Movement, probable

Custer’s Troop Position

Reno and Benteen’s Troop Position
winning the west: the army in the indian wars, 1865–1890

343

The main phase of the Battle of the Little Bighorn lasted about 

two hours. Reno, charging down the river with three companies and 

some Arickara scouts, ran into hordes of Indians, not retreating, but 

advancing, perhaps mindful of their creditable performance against 

Crook the week before and certainly motivated by a desire to protect 

their women and children and cover a withdrawal of the villages. Far 

outnumbered, suffering heavy casualties, and in danger of being overrun, Reno withdrew to the bluffs across the river and dug in.

Custer and his five companies, about 230 strong, moved briskly

along the bluffs above the river until, some four miles away, beyond 

supporting distance and out of sight of the rest of the command, they 

were brought to bay and overwhelmed by an Indian force that heavily 

outnumbered them. When the last man had fallen and the dead had 

been plundered, the Indians turned their attention to Reno once again. 

Due to the absence of any military survivors, the exact conduct of 

Custer’s “last stand” will probably never be known. 

While the Indians had been chiefly absorbed on the Custer section of the field, Benteen’s battalion and the pack train and its escorting company had moved up and gone into a defensive perimeter with 

Reno’s force. An attempt to move in force in Custer’s direction, despite 

a complete lack of knowledge of his location and situation, failed; the 

Reno defensive position was reoccupied and remained under attack 

until dark of the twenty-fifth and on through daylight hours of the

twenty-sixth. The siege was finally lifted with the arrival of the TerryGibbon column on June 27.

The Custer disaster shocked the nation and was the climax of the 

Indian Wars. The Army poured troops into the Upper Plains; and the 

Indians scattered, some, like Sitting Bull’s band, to Canada. But gradually, under Army pressure or seeing the futility of further resistance, 

the Indians surrendered and 

returned to the reservation. Thus 

their greatest single victory over 

the U.S. Army sowed the seeds 

of the Indians’ ultimate defeat 

as the United States brought to 

bear its overwhelming power to 

settle the issue once and for all.

The last feeble gasp of the 

Indian Wars occurred in 1890 

and grew out of the fervor of 

the Ghost Dance religion. The 

Sioux were particularly susceptible to the emotional excitement and the call of the old way 

of life represented in these ceremonies, and their wild involvement frightened the agent on the 

Sioux Reservation into calling for 

military protection. The Army 

responded by a series of military 

actions known as the Pine Ridge 

Campaign. One part of that 

Nebraska—Crazy Horse and his band of Oglala on their way from Camp 

Sheridan to surrender to General Crook at Red Cloud Agency, May 6,

from engraving by Berghavy /sketch by Hottes; June 1877
American Military History

344

campaign had the 7th Cavalry, now commanded by Col. James W. Forsyth, move to Wounded Knee Creek on the Pine Ridge Agency, where 

on December 29 the regiment attempted to disarm Big Foot’s band. An 

Indian’s rifle was discharged into the air as two soldiers disarmed him,

precipitating a battle in which more than 150 Indians, including women 

and children, were killed and a third as many wounded, while 25 soldiers 

were killed and another 37 wounded.

The Battle of Wounded Knee was the last Indian engagement to 

fall in the category of warfare; later incidents were more in the realm 

of civil disturbance. The nineteenth century was drawing to a close, and 

the frontier was rapidly disappearing. Territories were being replaced 

by states, and new settlers, towns, government, and law were spreading across the land. The buffalo were gone, and the Indians were confined to reservations to depend on the government for subsistence. An

expanded rail system was available to move troops quickly to trouble 

spots, and the Army could now concentrate its forces at the larger and 

more permanent posts and relinquish numerous smaller installations 

that had outgrown their usefulness. By 1895 the Army was deployed 

more or less equally around the country on the basis of regional rather 

than operational considerations.

In the quarter century of the Indian Wars the Army met the Indian 

in over a thousand actions, large and small, all across the American 

West. It fought these wars with peacetime strength and on a peacetime budget, while at the same time it helped shape Indian policy and 

was centrally involved in numerous other activities that were part and 

parcel of westward expansion and of the nation’s attainment of its 

“manifest destiny.” Along the way it developed a military culture of 

self-sufficiency, of experienced small-unit leaders and professionals

serving together as part of a brotherhood of arms. Operations against 

the Indians seasoned the Army and forged a core of experienced leaders who would serve the republic well as it moved onto the world scene 

at the turn of the century.

Pine Ridge

The Pine Ridge Reservation in South Dakota was the site of the last military conflict between the 

U.S. Army and American Indians. The reservation became the focal point of the Ghost Dance religion founded by the Paiute shaman Wovoka in 1890. Wovoka taught that a Messiah was coming to 

liberate the Indians and return their world to a time before whites had arrived. The Bureau of Indian 

Affairs banned the Ghost Dance and requested that the Army disperse its converts. This resulted 

in an extensive military campaign from November 17, 1890, to January 21, 1891, with multiple 

converging columns conducting operations in the states of Nebraska and North and South Dakota. 

Over 5,500 soldiers were involved in these operations to disarm and control Indians, which resulted 

in numerous armed engagements and dozens killed or wounded. The most controversial and costly 

battle of the campaign, for both sides, was the Battle of Wounded Knee on December 29, 1890; 

but the battle cannot be understood outside of the wider context of the campaign.
winning the west

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345

Discussion Questions

1. How did the Army have to change its organization and tactics to 

fight the Indian Wars as opposed to how it fought the Civil War?

2. Compare the Seminole Indian Wars with the Indian Wars on the 

Great Plains. What were the similarities and differences?

3.

Which of the Indian-fighterswas most successful in his cam

-

paigns, and why? Of the two approaches used—harsh destruction 

of villages and foodstuffs or winning of “hearts and minds” through 

assimilation and gentle treatment—which seemed to work best?

4. Why did hundreds of Indians join the Army as Indian Scouts—

some earning the Medal of Honor for bravery against other Indians?

5. How would you have settled the “Indian question” during the 

1860s and 1870s?What meanswould have beenavailable toyou as an

Army officer tochange what happened to the Indians, and howwould

you use those means?

6. What was Fetterman’s big mistake? Custer’s? Recommended Readings

Hutton, Paul A. Phil Sheridan and His Army. Norman: University of 

Oklahoma Press, 1999.

Larson, Robert W. Red Cloud: Warrior-Statesman of the Lakota Sioux. Nor-

man: University of Oklahoma Press, 1997.

Leckie, William H. The Buffalo Soldiers: A Narrative of the Negro Cavalry in 

the West. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1967.

McDermott, John D. A Guide to the Indian Wars of the West. Lincoln: 

University of Nebraska Press, 1998.

Rickey, Don. Forty Miles a Day on Beans and Hay: The Enlisted Soldier Fighting the 

Indian Wars. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1963.

Sklenar, Larry. To Hell with Honor: Custer and the Little Bighorn. Norman: 

University of Oklahoma Press, 2000.

Tate, Michael L. The Frontier Army in the Settlement of the West. Norman: 

University of Oklahoma Press, 1999.

Utley, Robert M. Cavalier in Buckskin: George Armstrong Custer and the Western Military Frontier. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2001.

———. Frontier Regulars: The United States Army and the Indian, 1866–

1891. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1984.

Wooster, Robert. The Military and United States Indian Policy, 1865–1903. 

Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1995.

Other Readings

Athearn, Robert G. Forts of the Upper Missouri. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: 

Prentice-Hall, 1967.

Dunlay, Thomas W. Wolves for the Blue Soldiers: Indian Scouts and Auxilia-

ries with the United States Army, 1860–1890. Lincoln: University of 

Nebraska Press, 1982.

Hampton, Bruce. Children of Grace: The Nez Perce War of 1877. Lincoln: 

University of Nebraska Press, 2002.
American Military History

346

Prucha, Francis P. The Great Father: The United States Government and the 

American Indians. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1995.

Reardon, Carol. Soldiers and Scholars: The U.S. Army and the Uses of Military 

History, 1865–1920. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1990.

Smith, Thomas T. The U.S. Army and the Texas Frontier Economy, 1845–

1900. College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1999.

Utley, Robert M. The Lance and the Shield: The Life and Times of Sitting Bull. 

New York: Ballantine Books, 1994.
I

n the latter part of the nineteenth century the United States, hitherto 

largely provincial in thought and policy, began to emerge as a new 

world power. Beginning in the late 1880s more and more Americans displayed a willingness to support imperialistic ventures abroad, 

justifying this break with traditional policy on strategic, economic, religious, and emotional grounds. Much of the energy that had been channeled earlier into the internal development of the country, especially 

into westward expansion along the frontier (which, according to the 

Census Bureau, ceased to exist as of 1890), was now diverted to enterprises beyond the continental United States. It was only a matter of 

time before both the Army and the Navy were called upon to support 

America’s new interests overseas.

A New Manifest Destiny

This new manifest destiny first took the form of vigorous efforts

to expand American trade and naval interests overseas, especially in 

the Pacific and Caribbean. Thus, in the Pacific, the United States took

steps to acquire facilities to sustain a growing steam-propelled fleet. In

1878 the United States obtained the right to develop a coaling station 

in Samoa and in 1889, to make this concession more secure, recognized the independence of the islands in a tripartite pact with Great 

Britain and Germany. In 1893, when the native government in Hawaii 

threatened to withdraw concessions, including a site for a naval station at Pearl Harbor, American residents tried unsuccessfully to secure 

annexation of the islands by the United States. Development of a more 

favorable climate of opinion in the United States in the closing years of 

the century opened the way for the annexation of Hawaii in 1898 and 

Eastern Samoa (Tutuila) in 1899.

In the same period the Navy endeavored with little success to 

secure coaling stations in the Caribbean and Americans watched with 

15

Emergence to World Power

1898–1902
American Military History

348

interest the abortive efforts of private firms to build an isthmian canal

in Panama. American businessmen promoted establishment of better 

trade relations with Latin American countries, laying the groundwork 

for the future Pan American Union. And recurrent diplomatic crises, 

such as the one with Chile in 1891–1892 that arose from a mob attack 

on American sailors in Valparaiso and the one with Great Britain over 

the Venezuelan–British Guiana boundary in 1895, drew further attention to the southern continent.

Trouble in Cuba

While economic and strategic motives contributed significantly to

the new manifest destiny, it was concern for the oppressed peoples 

of Cuba that ultimately launched the United States on an imperialistic course at the turn of the century. Cuba’s proximity to the United 

States and strategic location had long attracted the interest of American expansionists. Yet they were a small minority, and only when the 

Cubans rebelled against the repressive colonial policies of Spain did the 

general public turn its attention to the Caribbean island. This was true 

in 1868, when the Cubans initiated a decade-long rebellion, and again

in 1895, when they rose up once more against continuing repression 

by the mother country. Many Americans soon favored some kind of 

intervention, but President Grover Cleveland was determined that the 

United States should adhere to a policy of strict neutrality. Events in 

Cuba increasingly made this difficult.

When after almost a year of costly fighting the Spanish had failed to

suppress the rebellion, they turned to harsher measures. A new CaptainGeneral in Cuba, Valeriano Weyler, attempted to isolate the rebels from 

the population by herding women, children, and old people from the 

countryside into detention camps and garrisoned towns. This poorly 

executed reconcentrado policy led to the death of thousands of civilians from disease and starvation. Weyler’s methods gave newspapers 

in the United States an opportunity to make sensationalistic attacks on 

Spanish policies. They portrayed the war in Cuba as a struggle between 

the “butcher” Weyler and high-minded patriots struggling bravely for 

freedom from Old World authoritarianism.

Despite mounting public pressure, Cleveland’s successor as President, William McKinley, also tried to avoid war with Spain. He might 

Maine
emergence to world power, 1898–1902

349

have succeeded had the American battleship Maine not been sunk on 

February 15, 1898, in Havana harbor as a result of a mysterious explosion with a loss of 260 lives. The vessel was in port ostensibly on a

courtesy call but actually to provide protection for American citizens 

in Cuba. A naval investigating commission appointed by the President 

announced on March 25 that the Maine had gone down as a result of an 

external explosion, a conclusion that even today is in doubt. To most 

Americans, however, the report indicated Spanish treachery. After diplomatic efforts failed to defuse the crisis, Congress on April 19 authorized the use of force to secure Cuba’s independence. Six days later, 

on April 25, Congress issued a formal declaration of war. So began 

the conflict that McKinley and Cleveland had tried to avoid, a war for

which the country was ill prepared.

Mobilizing for War

The extent of unpreparedness for overseas combat varied considerably in the two military services. In the decade preceding the war, 

the Navy, thanks to the efforts of career officers such as Rear Adm.

Stephen B. Luce, Capt. Alfred T. Mahan, and Benjamin Tracy, Secretary of the Navy in Harrison’s administration, as well as to the willingness of Congress to appropriate the necessary funds, had carried out 

an extensive construction and modernization program. The historical 

writings of Alfred T. Mahan were particularly influential in establishing

the framework of a global, blue-water fleet focused on the dominance

of the Navy, the establishment of refueling bases, and the aggressive 

protection of commerce. During the same period, the Naval War College at Newport, Rhode Island (established in 1885 through the efforts 

of Admiral Luce), had provided the Navy with a strong corps of professional officers trained in the higher levels of warfare and strategy,

including the far-ranging doctrines of Mahan.

The Army was not so fortunate. During the quarter of a century 

preceding 1898, the Army averaged only about 26,000 officers and

men, most of whom were scattered widely across the country in company- and battalion-size organizations. Consequently, the Army rarely 

had had an opportunity for training and experience in the operation of 

units larger than a regiment. Moreover, the service lacked a mobilization plan, a well-knit higher staff, and experience in carrying on joint 

operations with the Navy. The National Guard was equally ill prepared. 

Though the Guard counted over 100,000 members, most units were 

poorly trained and inadequately equipped. Thus, while most regulars 

were armed with Krag-Jorgensen rifles firing smokeless powder cartridges, most guardsmen were still equipped with Springfield rifles that

could fire only black powder ammunition.

The utility of the Guard was further compromised by question as 

to whether it was legal for Guard units to serve abroad. Consequently, 

as in the Civil War, the national government on April 22 called upon 

the states to raise 125,000 volunteers for federal service. Guardsmen 

were encouraged to enlist, and in some cases entire regiments of militia 

volunteered for federal service, thereby permitting the units to remain 

intact. In most cases, however, guardsmen enrolled as individuals and 

took their places alongside men devoid of any military background in 

The Army rarely had had an 

opportunity for training and 

experience in the operation of 

units larger than a regiment.
American Military History

350

entirely new organizations. War fever soon led Congress to increase 

the size of the volunteer force by an additional 75,000 and to create 

some special forces, including 10,000 enlisted men “possessing immunity from diseases incident to tropical climates,” the so-called Immunes. 

It also authorized more than doubling the size of the Regular Army to 

nearly 65,000. By war’s end in August 1898, the regular forces numbered 59,000 and the volunteers 216,000, a total of 275,000. Regardless

of whether these men were regulars or volunteers, the vast majority of 

them had had little or no military experience prior to the war.

Mobilizing, equipping, and supplying the burgeoning wartime Army 

placed a severe burden on the War Department. With neither a military 

planning staff nor in peacetime the funds necessary to plan for war, the 

department was ill prepared for any kind of major mobilization. Further 

complicating matters were basic disagreements concerning the strategy 

to be followed and the way mobilization should be conducted.

To the extent the United States had a strategy for the conduct of 

the war against Spain, it consisted of maintaining a naval blockade of 

Cuba while Cuban insurgent forces carried on a harassing campaign 

against Spanish troops on the island. Supporters of this policy (Captain 

Mahan was among its more articulate advocates) believed that it would 

lead eventually to the surrender of the Spanish forces and the liberation 

of Cuba. No direct clash between American and Spanish troops was 

visualized; American land forces would simply occupy Cuba as soon as 

the Spanish departed.

More or less in conformity with this strategy, Maj. Gen. Nelson 

Miles, Commanding General of the Army, proposed to assemble, train, 

and equip a small force of about 80,000 using the Regular Army as a 

nucleus. There would be ample time to prepare this force, since Miles 

deemed it unwise to land any troops in Cuba before the end of the 

unhealthy rainy season in October. The first step was to concentrate

the entire Regular Army at Chickamauga Park, Georgia, where it could 

receive much-needed instruction in combined-arms operations.

So deliberate and cautious a plan, however, was by mid-April 1898 

not in harmony with the increasing public demand for immediate 

action against the Spanish. With an ear to this demand, Secretary of 

War Russell M. Alger ignored General Miles’ advice. He ordered the 

regular infantry regiments to go to New Orleans, Tampa, and Mobile, 

where they would be ready for an immediate descent on Cuba. (Map 40) 

“Embalmed Beef”

In December 1898 Nelson A. Miles, the Commanding General of the Army, made a sensational 

public charge that refrigerated beef supplied to the Army during the Spanish-American War had 

been “embalmed” with harmful preservative chemicals. Miles also criticized canned boiled beef that 

the troops universally reviled for its poor quality, tastelessness, and often nauseatingly spoiled condition. Official inquiries found no evidence of harmful chemicals in either type of beef but concluded 

that use of the easily spoiled canned beef in the tropics was a serious mistake. Despite these findings, the myth of embalmed beef persisted in the public imagination.
emergence to world power, 1898–1902

351

(Later some infantry troops did go to Chickamauga Park, where they 

trained with the regular cavalry and artillery concentrated there.)

The decision to mobilize large volunteer forces compounded 

the problems of equipping, training, and supplying the Army. In the 

spring and summer of 1898, thousands of enthusiastic but inexperienced volunteers poured into newly established camps. A taste of 

military life soon curbed the enthusiasm of most of them, for in the 

camps they found chronic shortages of the most essential equipment. 

Even such basic items as underwear, socks, and shoes were lacking. A 

steady diet of badly prepared food, unbelievably poor sanitary conditions, and inadequate medical facilities complemented the equipment 

shortages. Red tape and poor management in the War Department’s 

supply bureaus (the Ordnance Department possibly excepted) delayed 

correction of some of the worst deficiencies, while the shortage

of capable volunteer officers further limited the quality of training

received in the camps.

Confusion and inefficiency likewise characterized the War Department’s conduct of operations. Since Congress had provided no 

Map 40

22 Jun–17 Jul 1898

OPERATIONS IN CUBA

25 Jul–13 Aug 1898

OPERATIONS IN

PUERTO RICO

14–20 Jun 1898

SHAFTER’S V CORPS

Tampa

Cienfuegos

Havana

Guantánamo Santiago de Cuba

80o 75o

20o

80o 75o 70o

20o

24o

28o

24o

Key West

BAHAMA

 ISLANDS

Jamaica Puerto Rico

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

HAITI

CUBA

FLORID A

1898

AREA OF OPERATIONS

GREATER ANTILLES

0 100 200 300

Statute Miles
American Military History

352

machinery in the department for the peacetime coordination of foreign 

policy with the country’s military posture, the nation went to war without any kind of overall plan of operations or even adequate intelligence 

about the enemy. Given time, the Army might have devised adequate 

operational plans; but public opinion, political pressures, and the trend 

of events demanded the launching of an immediate expedition against 

the Spanish in Cuba.

Victory at Sea: Naval Operations in the 

Caribbean and the Pacific

Fortunately, it turned out that the really decisive fighting of the

war fell to the much better prepared Navy, although last-minute alterations in its strategic plan seriously threatened to reduce its effectiveness. Shortly after the war began, rumors circulated that an enemy fleet

under Admiral Pascual Cervera y Topete was approaching the east coast 

of the United States. An alarmed public demanded that measures be 

taken to defend the Atlantic seaboard. In deference to this demand, the 

Navy Department in late April 1898 withheld some of its best fighting

ships from Rear Adm. William T. Sampson’s North Atlantic Squadron, 

sent to blockade Cuba. These ships, formed into a “flying squadron”

under Commodore Winfield S. Schley, set up a watch for Cervera. This

move was in conflict with the provisions in the Navy’s strategic plan

that, based upon Mahan’s doctrines, called for maintaining Sampson’s 

squadron at full strength in the Caribbean, ready to intercept any Spanish fleet sent to relieve Cuba.

In the western Pacific, meanwhile, the Navy was able to adhere

to its strategic plan—the latest version of which had been completed 

in June 1897. Developed by officers at the Naval War College in collaboration with the Office of Naval Intelligence, the plan provided

for an attack on the Philippines, leading to the destruction of Spanish 

warships there, the capture of Manila, and a blockade of the principal 

Philippine ports. The basic objectives of the plan were to weaken Spain 

by cutting off revenues from the Philippines and to place the United 

States in the position of having something to offer the Spanish as an 

inducement to make peace after Cuba had been freed.

The Navy began to actively prepare for war in January 1898, 

and in late February Theodore Roosevelt, as Acting Secretary of the 

Navy (Secretary John D. Long was ailing), cabled orders to American 

naval commanders, instructing them to get their squadrons in readiness for action. Commodore George Dewey of the Asiatic Squadron 

responded by assembling his ships at Hong Kong, where they could 

take on coal and supplies preparatory to an attack on the Philippines. 

Thus, on April 24, when McKinley finally ordered the Asiatic Squadron

to initiate hostilities, Dewey was ready. He sailed into Manila Bay on the 

night of April 30 and the following morning located Spain’s weak and 

dilapidated naval squadron at Cavite. In a few hours and without loss 

of a single American life, he sank or disabled the entire Spanish force. 

In the days immediately following, he also silenced the land batteries 

defending Manila harbor; but the city itself continued to resist. With 

barely enough men to maintain his own squadron, Dewey requested 

the dispatch of land forces from the United States to help take Manila. 

A Pennsylvania artilleryman would wear a khaki 

cotton field coat such as this.
emergence to world power, 1898–1902

353

While Dewey blockaded Manila and awaited reinforcements, the 

Filipinos rose up in revolt against their Spanish overlords. The Philippines had rebelled against Spain in 1896, a conflict that had ended only

in December 1897 with a pact that had included the exile of the insurgent leadership to Hong Kong. Spain, however, did not fully live up to 

its part of the pact; and upon the outbreak of war between the United 

States and Spain in April 1898, pro-independence Filipinos once again 

took up arms against the Spanish. Seeking to capitalize on this development, Dewey arranged for Emilio Aguinaldo, the leader of 1897 insurgent government, to return to the Philippines in May. Aguinaldo immediately sought to reassert control over the revolutionary movement, 

forming an army and declaring the islands independent. By the time 

American ground troops began to arrive at the end of June, Filipino 

revolutionaries already controlled the majority of the archipelago, as 

the Spanish Army had withdrawn to Manila and a few other key cities. 

The Americans thus joined the Filipinos in besieging Manila.

Operations in the Caribbean

As in the Pacific, naval developments would determine when and

where the Army undertook operations in the Caribbean. During the 

early part of May 1898, the whereabouts of the Spanish Fleet under 

Admiral Cervera remained a mystery. Lacking this information, the 

Army could not precisely fix the point where it would launch an attack.

Nevertheless, the War Department pushed preparations at Tampa, 

Florida, for an expedition under General Miles to be put ashore somewhere near Havana. But persistent rumors of the approach of the 

Spanish Fleet to Cuban waters delayed this expedition while the Navy 

searched further for Cervera. News at last reached Washington near the 

end of May that the Spanish admiral had skillfully evaded the American 

naval blockade and on the nineteenth had slipped into the bay at Santiago de Cuba. (See Map 40.)

The Navy, at first not at all certain that it was actually Cervera’s fleet

in Santiago, sent Admiral Sampson to inspect the harbor. As soon as 

the American naval commander had ascertained that the four cruisers 

and several smaller war vessels were indeed Spanish, he bombarded the 

forts at the entrance to Santiago Bay. Unable to silence them, Sampson decided against trying to run the heavily mined harbor entrance. 

Instead, he sent Lt. (Junior Grade) Richmond P. Hobson to bottle up 

Emilio Aguinaldo (1869–1964)

Despite modest military abilities, Emilio Aguinaldo embodied the Philippines’ struggle for independence; and his capture, while not ending the rebellion, certainly helped weaken it. After taking an oath of 

allegiance to the United States, Aguinaldo spent the next thirty years as a farmer. When Japan invaded 

the Philippines in 1941, he participated in the Japanese puppet government. Charged as a collaborator 

after the war, he was soon pardoned. Having lived through three colonial administrations, he finally witnessed the birth of a free and independent Philippines in July 1946. He died in 1964 at the age of 95.
American Military History

354

the enemy fleet by sinking the collier Merrimac athwart the channel.

When this bold project failed, Sampson requested army forces to seize 

the Spanish batteries, at the same time dispatching marines ashore to 

secure a site for a naval base east of Santiago. In the first land skirmish

of the Cuban campaign, the marines quickly overcame enemy resistance and established the base at Guantánamo Bay.

Upon receipt of Sampson’s request for land forces, the War Department, already under strong public pressure to get the Army into action, 

ordered Maj. Gen. William R. Shafter to embark with the V Corps from 

Tampa as soon as possible to conduct operations against Santiago in 

cooperation with the Navy. This corps was the only one of the eight 

that the War Department had organized for the war that was anywhere 

near ready to fight. Composed chiefly of regular Army units, it had

been assembling at Tampa for weeks when the order came on May 31 

for its embarkation; it would require another two weeks to get the corps 

and its equipment on board and ready to sail for Cuba.

Many factors contributed to the slow pace of preparation. There 

was no overall plan and no special staff to direct the organization of 

the expeditionary force. Moreover, Tampa was a poor choice for marshaling a major military expedition. Selected because of its proximity 

Embarking for Cuba, Charles Johnson Post, 1930
emergence to world power, 1898–1902

355

to Cuba, Tampa had only one pier for loading ships and a single-track 

railroad connecting with mainline routes from the north. It could not, 

therefore, readily accommodate the flood of men and materiel pressing

in upon it. So great was the congestion that freight cars were backed 

up on sidings as far away as Columbia, South Carolina, waiting to gain 

accessto the port.Whena freight car finally did reach the port area,

there were no wagons to unload it and no bill of lading to indicate 

what was in it. When it came to loading the ships, of which there were 

not enough to carry the entire corps, supplies and equipment were put 

on board with little regard for unloading priorities in the combat zone 

should the enemy resist the landings.

In spite of the muddle at Tampa, by June 14 nearly 17,000 men 

were ready to sail. On board were 18 regular and 2 volunteer infan-

try regiments; 10 regular and 2 volunteer cavalry squadrons serving 

dismounted;1 mounted cavalry squadron;6 artillery batteries; anda

Gatling gun company. The expedition comprised a major part of the 

Regular Army, including all of the regular African American combat 

regiments. Departing Tampa on the morning of the fourteenth, the V 

Corps joined its naval convoy the next day off the Florida Keys and by 

June 20 had reached the vicinity of Santiago.

While the troops on board endured tropical heat, unsanitary condi-

tions, and cold, unpalatable rations, Shafter and Sampson conferred on 

how to proceed against Santiago. Sampson wanted the Army to storm 

the fort on the east side of the bay entrance and drive the Spanish from 

their guns

.

Then his fleet could clearaway the mines and enter Santiag

o

Bay to fight Cervera’s squadron. Lacking heavy artillery, Shafterwas

not sure his troops could take the fort, which crowned a steep hill. He 

decided instead to follow the suggestion of General Calixto Garcia, the 

local insurgent leader, and land his forces at Daiquiri, east of Santiago 

Bay. (See Map 41.)

On June 22, after heavy shelling of the landing areas, the V Corps 

disembarked amid circumstances almost as confused and hectic as 

those at Tampa. Captains of many of the chartered merchant ships 

refused to bring their vessels close to shore. Their reluctance slowed the 

landing of troops and equipment already handicapped by a shortage 

of lighters. Horses, simply dropped overboard to get ashore on their 

own, swam out to sea in some instances and were lost. An alert enemy 

defense might well have taken advantage of the chaotic conditions to 

oppose the landings effectively. But the Spanish, though they had more 

than 200,000 troops in Cuba—36,000 of them in Santiag

o Province—

did nothing to prevent Shafter’s men from

getting ashore

. Some 6,000

landed on June 22 and most of the remaining 11,000 on the two days 

following. In addition, 4,000 to 5,000 insurgents under General Garcia 

supplemented the American force.

Battle of Santiago

Once ashore, elements of the V Corps moved westward toward 

the heights of San Juan, a series of ridges immediately east of Santiago, 

where well-entrenched enemy troops guarded the land approaches to 

the city. On June 23, Brig. Gen. Henry W. Lawton, commanding the 

vanguard, advanced along the coast from Daiquirí to Siboney, which 
American Military History

356

then became the main base of operations. The next day, Brig. Gen. 

Joseph Wheeler, the Confederate Army veteran, pushed inland along 

the road to Santiago with dismounted cavalry to seize Las Guásimas 

after a brief skirmish with rear guard elements of a retiring Spanish 

force. This move brought American units within five miles of the San

Juan Heights, where they paused for a few days while General Shafter 

assembled the rest of his divisions and brought up supplies. Even in 

this short time, Shafter could observe the debilitating effects of tropical 

climate and disease on his men. He was aware, too, that the hurricane 

season was approaching. Consequently, he decided to launch an immediate attack on the defenses of Santiago.

Shafter’s plan was simple: a frontal attack on the San Juan Heights. 

For this purpose, he deployed Brig. Gen. Jacob F. Kent’s infantry division 

on the left and Wheeler’s dismounted cavalry on the right, the entire force 

with supporting elements comprising 8,000 troops. But before he made 

the main advance on the heights, Lawton’s infantry division with a supporting battery of artillery, more than 6,500 men, was to move two miles

north to seize the fortified village of El Caney, cutting off Santiago’s

water supply and, if necessary, intercepting rumored Spanish reinforcements. This action completed—Shafter thought it would take about two 

hours—Lawton was to turn southwestward and form on the right flank

of Wheeler’s division for the main assault. A brigade that had just landed 

at Siboney was to advance in the meantime along the coast in a feint.

The attack, which moved out at dawn on July 1, soon became badly 

disorganized because of poor coordination, difficult terrain, and tropical

heat. The corpulent Shafter, virtually prostrated by the heat, had to leave 

the direction of the battle to others. At a stream crossing on the crowded 

main trail to San Juan Heights, enemy gunners scored heavily when a towed 

Signal Corps balloon pinpointed the front of the advancing line of troops. 

Lawton’s division, delayed in its seizure of El Caney by a stubborn enemy 

defense, misplaced artillery, and the necessity of withdrawing a volunteer 

unit armed only with telltale black powder, did not rejoin the main force 

until after the assault had ended. Despite these unexpected setbacks, Kent’s 

and Wheeler’s divisions at midday launched a strong frontal attack on the 

The Rough Riders

The 1st U.S. Volunteer Cavalry, initially commanded by Col. Leonard 

Wood, was popularly known as the Rough Riders. It was composed of 

western volunteers, cowboys, and woodsmen and raised in large measure 

by the forceful personality of its second in command, the future President 

Theodore Roosevelt. During the Spanish-American War, the unit charged 

detached Spanish works on Kettle Hill in front of Santiago, Cuba, on July 

1, 1898, along with other elements of the Cavalry Division, V Corps. 

Roosevelt led the Rough Riders from the front, revolver in hand. Concurrently the 1st Division attacked the main Spanish position on San Juan 

Ridge. By the time the Americans reached the Spanish lines, the defenders 

had fled. Newspaper accounts magnified the Rough Riders’ role in the victory but not their bravery and daring. Colonel Roosevelt in Rough 

Rider Uniform, ca. 1898
Map 41

XXX

V

Landings

X X

2 (LAWTON)

Captured El Caney

1630, 1 July

X X

1 (KENT)

XXX

V SHAFTER X X

Dsmtd(WHEELER)

Santiago

Harbor

Santiago

Harbor

30

24

Naval Demonstration

22 June

22–23

23

23–24

Kettle Hill

San Juan

Hill

Cuban Guerrillas

under Garcia

2–17 July

SANTIAGO DE CUBA

El Caney

Sevilla

Daiquirí

Siboney

Las Guásimas

El Pozo

Morro Castle

SANTIAGO DE CUBA

El Caney

El Pozo

Route of U.S. AdvanceSpanish Harbor Defenses

22–30 June 1898

APPROACH TO SANTIAGO

0 5

Miles (Approx.)

Axis of U.S. Attack, 1 July

U.S. Position, 1 July

U.S. Position, 3–17 July

Spanish PositionsSpanish Forts

1–17 July 1898

SIEGE OF SANTIAGO

Form Line Interval About 50 Feet

0 1000 1000 2000

Yards
American Military History

358

Spanish forward defensive positions. 

Cavalry units of Wheeler’s division, 

including the 9th Cavalry and part 

of the 10th, both African American 

regiments, and the 1st U.S. Volunteer 

Cavalry (the “Rough Riders”), now 

commanded by newly commissioned 

Lt. Col. Theodore Roosevelt, seized 

Kettle Hill, separate from the central 

heights. Then Kent’s infantry regiments, supported by Gatling guns, 

stormed up San Juan Hill in the main 

ridge line, driving the Spanish from 

blockhouse and trench defenses 

and compelling them to retire to a 

strongly fortified inner line. Thus

the day ended with the Americans’ 

having achieved most of their initial 

objectives. The cost was high: nearly 

1,700 casualties sustained since the 

start of operations against Santiago.

Concerned with the increasing 

sickness that was thinning the ranks 

of the V Corps and faced by a wellorganized Spanish second line of 

defense, General Shafter cabled 

Secretary Alger on July 3 that he 

was considering withdrawing about 

five miles to higher ground between

the San Juan River and Siboney. 

The shift would place his troops in 

a position where they would be less 

exposed to enemy fire and easier

to supply. Alger replied that “the 

effect upon the country would be 

much better” if Shafter continued 

to hold his advanced position.

The V Corps commander then 

sought to get the Navy to enter Santiago Bay and attack the city. But 

neither the Navy Department nor President McKinley was willing to 

sanction this move. Just when the whole matter threatened to become 

an embarrassing public debate between the two services, the Spanish 

resolved the issue.

By early July serious shortages of food and ammunition had convinced the Spanish that Santiago must soon fall. While Cervera considered 

flight from the port hopeless, he had no recourse but to attempt it. Officials

in both Havana and Madrid had ordered him, for reasons of honor, to 

escape when Santiago appeared about to surrender. Finally, on the morning 

of July 3, while Sampson and Shafter conferred ashore, Cervera made his 

dash for the open sea, hoping to reach the port of Cienfuegos on the south 

coast of Cuba. As soon as the Spanish Fleet appeared, Sampson’s squadron, temporarily under the command of Commodore Schley, gave chase 

San Juan Hill, July 10, 1898, Charles Johnson Post, 1930
emergence to world power, 1898–1902

359

and in less than two hours destroyed Cervera’s force; four cruisers were 

crippled and run ashore, one destroyer was beached, and another was sunk.

A few days later General Shafter persuaded the Spanish leaders in 

Santiago that they had no choice except to surrender. On July 16 they

signed the unconditional terms demanded by the McKinley administration, which provided for the surrender of 11,500 troops in the city 

and 12,000 others in the vicinity of Santiago. The formal surrender 

ceremony took place on the following day.

During preparations for the Santiago campaign, General Miles personally had been overseeing the organization of a second expedition to 

seize Puerto Rico. On July 21 he sailed from Guantánamo with more 

than 3,000 troops. His original strategy was to land at Cape Fajardo 

in the northeast part of the island, where he could establish a base of 

operations for a subsequent advance west to the capital, San Juan. For 

reasons not entirely clear, but probably because of a desire not to have 

to cooperate with the Navy in the attack on San Juan, Miles, while still 

at sea, changed his plans and on July 25 landed forces at Guanica on 

the southeastern coast. Meeting virtually no opposition, the Americans 

shortly occupied the port of Ponce. In early August, after the arrival 

of more than 10,000 additional troops from the United States, General 

Miles, using Ponce as a base of operations, launched a four-column 

drive toward San Juan. There was little bloodshed—casualties for the 

campaign totaled fewer than fifty—and, in fact, most Puerto Ricans

welcomed the American troops. The campaign ended on August 13 

when word reached the island that Spain had signed a peace protocol 

the previous day.

Back in Cuba, conditions for the Army were much less pleasant. The 

spread of malaria, typhoid, and yellow fever among Shafter’s troops at 

Santiago threatened to have far deadlier consequences than had the actual 

fighting. Concern over this problem led a number of Shafter’s senior

officers to draft a joint letter proposing immediate evacuation of the

Army from Cuba. Addressed to the Commanding General, this round 

robin letter came to the attention of the press before it reached Shafter. 

Hence, Washington officials read it in the newspapers before learning of

its content from the general himself. Naturally the whole episode, coming at the time when peace negotiations were beginning, caused a sensation. Although acutely embarrassing for the Army and General Shafter, 

the incident did have the salutary effect of hastening measures to evacuate thousands of troops to Montauk Point, Long Island, where the Army 

Medical Department already had taken steps to establish a quarantine 

camp. There, those who had contracted tropical infections received the 

necessary treatment. The Army’s nearly disastrous experience with the 

debilitating effects of disease and climate in Cuba did, however, spur the 

Medical Corps to determine the causes of yellow fever, inaugurating a 

long-term program of research and study into what henceforth would 

be a permanent concern of the Army, the maintenance of the health and 

effectiveness of American troops in a tropical environment.

The Fall of Manila

In another tropical setting halfway around the world from Cuba, 

the final military episode of the war took place. On June 30 the first

The spread of malaria, typhoid, 

and yellow fever among troops 

at Santiago threatened to have 

far deadlier consequences than 

had the actual fighting.
American Military History

360

contingent of American ground troops disembarked in the Philippines. 

By the end of July 1898, 13,000 volunteer and 2,000 regular troops, con-

stituting the VIII Corps under Maj. Gen. Wesley Merritt, had reached 

the islands

.Thesetroops hadembarked fromwestcoast ports(chiefly

SanFrancisco)witha minimum oftheconfusion and difficultythat had

characterized the launching of the Cuban expedition. In spite of the 

longvoyage acrossthePacific,theywere ingoodcondition and ready

to start operations against the 13,000 Spaniards trapped inside Manila. 

Between the Americans and the Spanish lay Aguinaldo’s revolutionary 

army, also numbering around 13,000 men. 

Although the Americans and the Filipinos shared a common inter-

est in defeating Spain, relations between the allies deteriorated steadily 

during the summer. The most important reason was a fundamental 

difference in objectives. The goal of the insurgents was immediate 

independence for the Philippines. After some hesitation, the McKinley 

administration began to express the view that the United States ought 

to retain the islands for itself. Thus, by late summer the two allies eyed 

each other warily.

The Spanish commander in Manila realized his situation was hope-

less but believed he must put up at least token resistance, not only for 

honor’s sake, but also to avoid a court-martial back home. He greatly 

feared that a rebel assault might lead to a massacre of the garrison. The 

Americans shared the Spaniard’s desire to keep the insurgents out of 

Manila, not only for humanitarian reasons but also to deny the inde-

pendence movement the political legitimacy it would garner by occupy-

ing the capital city, a prize the Americans wanted for themselves. After 

persuading the Filipinos to give them a small portion of the front lines, 

Dewey struck a secret deal with the Spanish governor in which the 

Spanish agreed to make only minimal resistance to an American assault 

if the Americans in turn promised to keep the Filipino army out of 

the city. On August 13, after a short but not entirely bloodless battle, 

Merritt’s soldiers occupied central Manila, shutting out their chagrined 

allies. Operations at Manila cost the Americans a total of 17 killed and 

105 wounded.

Formal surrender ceremonies came the following day—actually 

two days after the government in Madrid had signed a protocol sus-

pending hostilities. News of the protocol had not yet reached Manila 

because

a cable Dewey had cu

t when he first entered Manila Bay still

had not been repaired.

After negotiations in Paris in the fall of 1898, the United States 

and Spain signed a peace treaty on December 10. By its terms Spain 

gave up sovereignty over Cuba, which became an independent state, 

ceded Puerto Rico and Guam to the United States, and accepted $20 

million in payment for the Philippines. Thus fatefully did the Ameri-

cans commit the nation to a new role as a colonial power in the Far 

East, with momentous future consequences that few at the time could 

anticipate.

The Philippine-American War, 1899–1902

News of the Treaty of Paris brought no comfort to Filipino nation-

alists. Since the fall of Manila an uneasy truce had existed between the 
emergence to world power, 1898–1902

361

Filipino army that continued to surround Manila and the Americans 

inside the city. After consolidating his hold over much of the archipelago, Aguinaldo established a republic with a capital at Malolos, 

northeast of Manila, and made preparations to resist the United States 

should it attempt to assert its claims of sovereignty over the islands. As 

the soldiers of both sides waited anxiously to see if the U.S. Congress 

would ratify the Treaty of Paris, relations between the erstwhile allies 

deteriorated and scuffles became common. It was only a matter of time

before full-scale violence erupted.

That moment came on the night of February 4, 1899, when Filipino and American patrols traded shots near a disputed village in the 

neutral zone that separated the two armies. The firing quickly spread

along the entire front line; and at dawn Maj. Gen. Elwell S. Otis, who 

had replaced General Merritt, launched an offensive to drive the Filipinos off the high ground that overlooked the northern portion of the 

American lines. Though no one knows to this day who fired the first

shot, the war was on. Meanwhile, back in Washington, a deeply divided 

Senate narrowly ratified the Treaty of Paris on February 6. Having formally purchased the Philippines from Spain, the United States declared 

its newfound possession to be in a state of insurrection. Thomas B. 

Reed, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, remarked ruefully, 

“We have bought ten million Malays at $2.00 a head unpicked, and 

nobody knows what it will cost to pick them.”

In February 1899 Aguinaldo’s Army of Liberation of the Philippines 

had arrayed up to 40,000 men around Manila with additional detachments of militia distributed throughout the archipelago. Organized as 

General Otis’ Staff and Assistants in Their Quarters in Manila, 1899
American Military History

362

a conventional military force, the Army of Liberation lacked training, 

discipline, and equipment. Worst of all, it was plagued with incompe-

tent and inexperienced leaders. Otis, by contrast, had fewer than 20,000 

men available in Manila, the vast majority of whom were state volun-

teers who expected to be discharged now that the war with Spain had 

ended. Nevertheless, the volunteers fought well: by late February they 

had driven the Filipino army from Manila and crushed a revolt within 

the city itself. By the end of March the VIII Corps had captured the 

capital ofthePhilippineRepublic at Malolos

,

twenty-five mile

s north-

east of Manila and inflicteda series of sharp defeats onFilipino forces.

Aguinaldo’s army would never recover from the losses it suffered during 

the

firstweeks ofthewar interms of men, materiel, and morale. Never-

theless, it stubbornly remained inthefield, retiringtothe north in front

of the advancing Americans while additional detachments continued to 

threaten Manila from the south, compelling Otis to launch several expe-

ditions into southern Luzon to stabilize his southern flank. The summer of 1899 brought a hiatus to the campaign. The small 

size of Otis’ army became increasingly felt the farther he pushed from 

Manila, while disease and fatigue reduced some regiments

b

y 60 percent.

The onset of the monsoon season further complicated the situation, as 

did the political need to send the state volunteers home. Congress had 

attempted to meet the military needs of the new war in March when it 

authorized the enrollment of a temporary force of 35,000 volunteers 

for Philippines service. Unlike the volunteers of 1898, who had been 

organized

b

y the states under officers appointed

b

y state

governors,

the men of 1899 were organized directly by the federal government as 

U.S. Volunteers, with a term of service set to expire at the end of June 

1901. By September 1899 the new U.S. Volunteer regiments, together 

with additional units of regulars, had begun to arrive in the Philippines; 

but their arrival merely offset the departure of the state volunteers, 

thus leaving the VIII Corps with an effective force of just under 27,000 

men. 

Otis nevertheless was determined to press ahead with a major 

offensive north of Manila, an offensive that he hoped would destroy 

the Army of Liberation once and for all. In early October he launched 

a three-pronged attack. Moving up on the right, General Lawton cap-

tured San Isidro and approached San Fabian on the Lingayen Gulf in an 

attempt to prevent the insurgent army from retreating into the moun-

tains. Maj. Gen. Arthur MacArthur of Civil War fame, in the center, 

pushed up the central Luzon plain, seized Tarlac, and then moved on 

to Dagupan. Meanwhile, Brig. Gen. Loyd Wheaton, on the left, went by 

ship from Manila to San Fabian, moving inland to defeat the insurgents 

at San Jacinto before linking up with MacArthur at Dagupan. The oper-

ation succeeded in destroying part of Aguinaldo’s army and dispersing 

the remainder, but it did not end the war. Aguinaldo escaped into the 

mountains of northern Luzon, and in November 1899 he ordered the 

remnants of his army to shift from conventional to guerrilla warfare. 

The change of tactics was well considered. The Philippine Islands 

were a labyrinth of rice paddies, mountains, and jungles pierced only 

by rough trails and a few primitive roads. In this arena, Filipino guer-

rillas enjoyed numerous advantages over the Americans, not the least 

of which were their familiarity with the terrain and people and their 
emergence to world power, 1898–1902

363

acclimation to the region’s enervating tropical climate. Aguinaldo, real-

izing that he lacked the resources to conduct a coordinated, conven-

tional defense, organized his forces into a number of highly autono-

mous regional commands, each of which included a core of full-time 

“regular” soldiers backed by part-time militiamen. Together, these 

forces waged a war of ambushes, raids, and surprise attacks designed 

to keep the Americans off balance. Although some guerrillas wore 

uniforms, many did not; and even those who freely did changed into 

civilian clothes and hid their weapons to disguise their true identity 

from American patrols. This “chameleon act,” whereby the guerrillas 

transformed themselves into obsequious “amigos” in the blink of an 

eye, made them difficult to counter, especially given the Army’s lac

k of

familiarity with Filipino language and customs.

Complementing the guerrillas in the field

wasa clandestine civilmilitary organization that acted as a shadow government in the villages, enforcing insurgent edicts, raising recruits, collecting supplies and 

“taxes,” and gathering intelligence on American activities. Since many 

of the leaders of the resistance were from the middle and upper classes, 

they were able to exploit the oligarchic nature of Philippine society 

and the system of patron-client relationships upon which it was based 

to further the movement’s influence

over the people

. Using

a mixture

of genuine nationalism, paternalism, propaganda, and terror (includ-

ing the assassination of pro-American Filipinos), the leaders of the 

resistance maintained their control over the population despite their 

inability to defeat the U.S. Army in the field.

In fact, military victory was never the aim of Filipino leaders after 

1899. Instead, they sought to undermine America’s will to continue the 

struggle by harassing U.S. military forces. The Filipinos were well aware 

that many Americans opposed the government’s venture in imperial-

ism, and they consciously played to this audience. Realizing that 1900 

was an election year in the United States, they sought to stir up as much 

trouble as they could in the hope that a disenchanted electorate would 

replace McKinley with the avowed anti-imperialist, William Jennings 

Bryan, in the presidential election.

Otis responded to the changed circumstances of the war by divid-

ing the VIII Corps into several geographical commands, each of which 

was responsible for the pacification of

a particular region ofthe Philip

-

pines. Regiments assigned to these districts were further broken down 

and dispersed among hundreds of small posts, most of which were 

located in or near towns. The posts served three purposes: they helped 

protect the population from guerrilla intimidation; they interfered with 

the ability of the population to provide food and recruits to the guer-

rillas; and they served as launching pads for innumerable small-unit 

patrols and raids into the bush in search of the guerrillas and their 

bases.

The dispersion caused many difficulties in terms of logistics,

morale, and command and control, while the effects of disease and 

fatigue threatened to undermine the effectiveness of many small gar-

risons. Nevertheless, the aggressive posture adopted by the Americans 

kept the guerrillas dispersed and on the run, thereby undermining both 

their ability and their will to continue the war.

Tactically the Army performed well during the guerrilla phase 

of the Philippine War. Guerrilla ambushes, while frustrating and 
American Military History

364

difficultto prevent,were rarely devastating andcould becountered

by sound tactics and proper security measures. Meanwhile, the Ameri-

cans attempted to take the war to the enemy, sending small columns 

to search for and destroy his camps and supply bases while other units 

made night raids on villages to round up suspected insurgent leaders. 

The clandestine nature of the enemy’s organization frequently frus-

trated these operations, but over time the Americans gradually eroded 

the insurgents’ capability to resist. Of particular assistance in spreading 

control and separating the guerrillas from the ordinary citizens was the 

growing number of Filipinos who agreed to take up arms in American 

service—over 15,000 by war’s end in such organizations as the Philip-

pine Constabulary, the Philippine Scouts, and various other police and 

paramilitary organizations. 

Bullets were not America’s only answer to Filipino resistance, 

however, for Otis was not just the commander of American military 

forces in the Philippines but the military governor as well. Following 

McKinley’s instructions

to “wintheconfidence, respect, and admira-

tion of the inhabitants of the Philippines,” both Otis and General 

MacArthur who succeeded him in May 1900 worked to restore the 

norms of civil society. They built schools and roads, refurbished mar-

kets, and introduced improved systems of health and sanitation. They 

offered amnesty to guerrillas willing to turn themselves in and rewards 

to those who handed over their weapons as well. They restored gov-

ernment services, at

first using American officers asgoverning officials

but gradually transferring political control to Filipinos, beginning in 

the towns and villages. They were aided in their work by a body of 

American civilian commissioners led by William H. Taft that became 

the legislature for the Philippines in the fall of 1900. Although soldiers 

and civilians sometimes clashed over their respective authority and the 

speed at which the transition from military to civilian rule should take 

place, both worked toward the mutual goal of restoring law, order, and 

administration to the Philippines. 

By

theend ofthe first full year of guerrillawarfare, the Americans

had clearly gained the upper hand. Hounded by American forces (which 

had reached an all time high of 70,000 men) dispirited by McKinley’s 

reelection, and tempted by American promises of future peace and 

prosperity, one Filipino leader after another laid down his arms and 

returned to civil life. For those who refused to come in from the bush, 

MacArthur stepped up the pressure, permitting the use of imprison-

ment, deportation, execution, and the confiscation and/or destruc-

tion of property to punish guerrillas and their supporters to a greater 

degree than had been permitted heretofore. MacArthur and Taft com-

plemented this firmer wielding of the swordbyagreater extension

of the olive branch, creating in December 1900 the Federalist Party, a 

Filipino political organization that supported American rule in return 

for the establishment of representative government and increased local 

autonomy. The party proved an effective tool in competing with resis-

tance leaders for the allegiance of the Filipino people. Then, in March 

1901, a small band of American soldiers and Filipino auxiliaries led by 

Brig. Gen. Frederick Funston dealt the resistance a further demoraliz-

ing blow when they succeeded in capturing Aguinaldo through a ruse. 

By

July 1901 sufficient progress had been made to permit the establish-
emergence to world power, 1898–1902

365

ment of full civilian rule in many parts of the Philippines under Taft, 

who became Governor-General of the Philippines. 

Despite this progress, another full year of war remained. The 

most serious fighting occurred in southern Luzon and on the island of

Samar, where the resistance movement remained strong. The burden 

for these last campaigns fell upon the regulars as the U.S. Volunteers of 

1899 mustered out of service in the summer of 1901. Hardest hit was 

the 9th Infantry, which lost nearly an entire company to a guerrilla surprise attack in the village of Balangiga, Samar, in September 1901. The 

Army responded to this continued resistance with increasingly stringent methods, including the destruction of buildings and crops and 

the imposition of population concentration measures not unlike the 

notorious reconcentrado methods that had proven so distasteful to the 

American public prior to the outbreak of the Spanish-American War. 

Some officers, frustrated by the enemy’s elusiveness, even resorted to

torture to gain information. These sterner measures, coupled with the 

continued promise of equitable treatment and representative government, ultimately broke the back of the resistance movement. The last 

major revolutionary commanders surrendered in the spring of 1902; 

and on July 4 the United States officially proclaimed the insurrection

to be over. In actuality, some sections of the Philippines continued to 

be troubled by violence, banditry, and rebellion for several more years, 

particularly in the Moslem areas that had never been fully pacified by

Spain. But American rule was never seriously challenged again. 

In his official report upon the end of the war, Secretary of War

Elihu Root concluded, “it is evident that the insurrection has been 

brought to an end both by making a war distressing and hopeless on 

the one hand and by making peace attractive.” Ultimately, the United 

States employed a carrot-and-stick policy to both entice and cower 

the Filipino population into submission. Force broke the back of the 

resistance; positive measures undermined it and helped reconcile the 

nationalists to their defeat. Neither would have been as effective without the other, but finding the right mix of benevolence and coercion

had been difficult.

Ultimately, over 126,000 regular and volunteer soldiers served in

the Philippines between 1899 and 1902. Of these, 1,000 died in battle 

or of wounds received in battle, 3,000 more died of disease and other 

causes, and nearly another 3,000 were wounded. The price of empire 

was not inconsiderable.

Frederick Funston (1865–1917)

A born adventurer who lacked formal military training, Frederick Funston fought alongside Cuban 

revolutionaries before receiving a volunteer commission in 1898. Sent to the Philippines, he fought with 

distinction but was denied a commission in the Regular Army. He was about to muster out in early 1901 

when he learned of the location of Aguinaldo’s headquarters. Throwing caution to the wind, he penetrated Aguinaldo’s headquarters by pretending to be a prisoner, then turned the tables and seized 

Aguinaldo. The exploit won Funston a commission as a brigadier general in the Regular Army. 
American Military History

366

The Boxer Uprising

One important argument advanced for retaining the Philippines 

was that they would serve as a convenient way station on the way to 

China. The dominant problem in China at the end of the nineteenth 

century was its threatened partition by the Great Powers, who sought to 

carve up the weak Manchu Empire into a number of colonies, protectorates, and “spheres of influence.” The United States had no territorial ambitions in China and opposed partition, largely because it feared 

losing access to China’s lucrative commercial markets. Consequently, in 

September 1899 the United States announced its preference for what it 

termed an Open Door policy in China in which everyone would enjoy 

equal access to trading rights. 

Years of foreign exploitation, however, had fueled anti-foreign and 

anti-Christian sentiment in China that was about to erupt into violence. 

In early 1900 a secret society dedicated to purging China of foreign 

influences, known to westerners as the Boxer movement, began killing

foreigners and Chinese Christians. The Dowager Empress sympathized 

with the Boxers, and consequently the government did little to stop 

them. The wave of violence climaxed in June when a large force of 

Boxers entered Peking. Fearing for their lives, most foreigners as well as 

many Chinese converts fled to the foreign legations quarter in Peking,

defended by a composite force of 600 legation guards and civilians.

There, they were besieged by thousands of Boxers.

Although the McKinley administration disliked the idea of becoming involved in foreign alliances, it agreed to join with the other powers 

(Britain, France, Germany, Russia, Austria-Hungary, Italy, and Japan) 

to rescue their beleaguered nationals. About 100 U.S. marines joined 

a 2,100-man international force under British Admiral Sir Edward 

Typical Officer’s Sleeping Quarters in China, ca. 1900
emergence to world power, 1898–1902

367

“I’ll Try, Sir!”

Company E, 14th Infantry, part of the allied relief expedition to Peking, held a position directly 

opposite the thirty-foot-high city walls on August 14, 1900. The unit had no ladders or ropes, but the 

company commander believed it possible to scale the wall using hand holds. He called for volunteers. A young soldier, Musician Calvin P. Titus, said, “I’ll try, sir!” Titus, although under fire, made it 

to the top; the remainder of his company soon followed. It was a critical action toward allowing the 

allies to force their way into the city and relieve the besieged legations.

Seymour in an attempt to relieve the foreign quarter in Peking. Vastly 

outnumbered, the relief column failed to reach the imperial capital. 

Meanwhile, on June 17 coalition warships bombarded the Taku forts 

guarding Tientsin, the port city nearest to Peking. Regarding both the 

Seymour expedition and the assault on the Taku forts as hostile acts, the 

Chinese government declared war on the coalition nations and added 

its own troops to those besieging the foreign legations. Meanwhile, 

coalition forces besieged Tientsin, which finally fell to assault on July

13–14—an assault that cost the 9th Infantry eighty-eight casualties 

when coalition commanders committed the regiment to an ill-considered attack over marshy ground that stalled under heavy fire.

Tientsin’s fall opened the way to Peking, and during the following 

weeks additional coalition troops arrived to create a second relief expedition, this time numbering 19,000 men. The American contribution to 

this second force, officially titled the China Relief Expedition, consisted

of 2,500 soldiers and marines under Maj. Gen. Adna R. Chaffee. On 

August 4 the multinational force set out for Peking, seventy miles away, 

in temperatures that exceeded 100 degrees. Since the coalition lacked an 

overall leader, decisions were made by majority vote in a council of the 

various national commanders. Coordination between the various contingents was difficult at best and contributed to a friendly fire incident

in which Russian artillery mistakenly opened fire on American infantry. Such shortcomings notwithstanding, the expedition succeeded in 

defeating the Chinese in several sharp engagements and arrived outside 

of Peking in mid-August. 

A final council of war assigned each national contingent a gate to

attack along the city’s outer walls but agreed to postpone the assault 

when the Russian commander stated that his troops needed time to 

recuperate from the grueling march from Tientsin. The agreement was 

short lived, however, for on the evening of August 13 the Russians 

stole a march on the rest of the allies and attacked Peking on their own 

at the gate originally assigned to the Americans. News of the Russian 

action led first the Japanese and then the American and British contingents to make a mad dash for the city. There, on the morning of the 

fourteenth, they found the Russians pinned down at the Tung Pien gate 

unable to make further headway. Soldiers of the 14th Infantry scaled 

the city’s outer wall and cleared the gate, relieving the trapped Russians and opening the way for additional soldiers to pour into the city. 

Meanwhile, the British penetrated the outer wall at another point and 
American Military History

368

relieved the legation quarter. The following day, Capt. Henry J. Reilly’s 

Light Battery F of the U.S. 5th Artillery shattered the gates of the city’s 

inner wall with several well-placed salvos, opening the way for the allied 

troops to occupy the central Imperial City. 

The capture of Peking and the relief of the legation quarter did 

not end operations in China. The coalition organized a military government in which each nationality was given a section of Peking to 

govern, while expeditions combed the countryside to root out the last 

vestiges of Boxer resistance. The American contingent participated 

in only a few of these expeditions, partly because the United States 

was anxious to transfer troops back to the ongoing war in the Philippines and partly because it believed that the expeditions, often brutally 

conducted, did more harm than good. In a few months all resistance 

had ended, but prolonged negotiations delayed the final signing of the

Boxer Peace Protocol until September 1901. Under its terms the Chinese government agreed to pay the coalition members $333 million and 

to give them exclusive control over the legation quarter with the further 

right to place troops along the Peking-Tientsin-Shanhaikwan railway to 

ensure open communications between the capital and the sea. 

After the conclusion of peace, the American contingent left China 

except for a detachment from the 9th Infantry that remained in Peking 

as a legation guard until 1905 when marines resumed this duty. The 

Boxer Peace Protocol had long-term implications for the Army, however, for in 1912 the United States decided to invoke its right to station 

troops along the Peking-Tientsin-Shanhaikwan railway when revolution threatened China’s internal stability. Thus began the 15th Infantry’s 

long sojourn in China, duty that would last until 1938 when the United 

States, fearful of becoming embroiled in Japan’s escalating aggression 

against China, withdrew the garrison after a 26-year stay.

All totaled, some 5,000 soldiers participated in the China Relief 

Expedition of 1900–1901. Of these, about 250 were killed, wounded, 

Army War College

When Secretary of War Elihu Root took office in 1899, the Army lacked a senior service school. The 

officer corps of what had been scant years before a frontier Army required educational preparation for 

modern war. Recognizing this need, which his military advisers confirmed, Root in November 1901 directed 

that a War College be 

established. In February 1903 

President Theodore Roosevelt 

and Secretary Root spoke at 

the laying of the cornerstone 

for the Army War College 

building, designed by the 

prominent architectural firm 

of McKim, Mead, and White, 

at Washington Barracks (now 

Army War College’s Roosevelt Hall, Fort McNair Fort McNair), D.C.
emergence to world power, 1898–1902

369

or died of disease. The participation of the United States in the expedi-

tion marked the first time since the American

Revolution that the coun-

try had joined with other powers in a military operation. The nation’s 

first foray into coalitionwarfare had not been easy, marred as itwasby

poor planning, miscommunication, and national jealousies. Suspicious 

of the motivations of some of its “allies” and desirous of maintain-

ing its freedom of action, the United States refused to put its troops 

under the command of foreigngenerals during the conflict. Never-

theless, the intervention in China represented one more instance of 

America’s changing role in world affairs. Although many Americans still 

believed that the nation could adhere to its historic principles of iso-

lationism, America’s growing economic and political interests abroad 

demanded otherwise. The dawn of the twentieth century had heralded 

the first stirrings of the United States asaworld power; and as events

in Cuba, China, and the Philippines had demonstrated, changes would 

be needed in many long-established institutions and policies to meet 

the requirements posed by the nation’s growing role in world affairs. Discussion Questions

1. How did political considerations influence the planning and exe-

cution of military operations in Cuba, the Philippines, and China? Do 

similar considerations influence military operations today?

2. How well prepared was the United States to project power 

beyond its borders in 1898?

3. What challenges did the U.S. Army face in waging expeditionary 

warfare at the turn of the century? Do these same challenges remain 

today?

4. Should the United States have intervened in Cuba at all? Explain 

your answer.

5. How did the Army overcome guerrilla warfare in the Philippines?

6.

What lessons can be derivedb

y studying

multinational opera-

tions during the Boxer Rebellion? Recommen

ded Readings

Birtle, Andrew J. U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations 

Doctrine, 1860–1941. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Mili-

tary History, 2001.

Cosmas, Graham A. An Army for Empire: The U.S. Army in the 

Spanish-American War. College Station: Texas A&M University 

Press, 1998.

Gates, John M. Schoolbooks and Krags: The U.S. Army in the Philippines, 

1898–1902. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1973.

Linn, Brian M. The Philippine War, 1899–1902. Lawrence: University 

Press of Kansas, 2000. 

Purcell, Victor. The Boxer Uprising: A Background Study. Hamden, Conn.: 

Archon Books, 1974, especially ch. 12.
American Military History

370

Risch, Erna. Quartermaster Support of the Army: A History of the Corps, 

1775–1939. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1989, ch. 12.

Tan, Chester C. The Boxer Catastrophe. New York: Octagon Books, 1967.

Trask, David F. The War With Spain in 1898. Lincoln: University of 

Nebraska Press, 1996.

Other Readings

Alger, Russell A. The Spanish-American War. New York: Harper, 1901.

Cosmas, Graham A. “San Juan Hill and El Caney, 1–2 July 1898,” in 

America’s First Battles, ed. Charles E. Heller and William A. Stofft. 

Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1986.

May, Glenn A. Battle for Batangas: A Philippine Province at War. New 

Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1991.

Sexton, William T. Soldiers in the Sun: An Adventure in Imperialism. Freeport, N.Y.: Books for Libraries Press, 1971.
F

or the United States the opening years of the twentieth century 

were a time of transition and change. At home it was a period of 

social change, often designated the Progressive Era, when political leaders such as President Theodore Roosevelt undertook to solve 

the economic and social problems arising out of the rapid growth of 

large-scale industry in the late nineteenth century. Increasing public 

awareness of these problems as a result of the writings of the “Muckrakers” and social reformers provided popular support for efforts to 

solve them by legislative and administrative measures. In foreign affairs 

it was a period when the country had to begin adjusting its institutions 

and policies to the requirements of its new status as a world power with 

imperial responsibilities. In spite of a tendency after the end of the 

War with Spain to follow traditional patterns and go back to essentially 

isolationist policies, the nation’s new responsibility for overseas possessions, its expanding commercial interests abroad, and the continued unrest in the Caribbean made a reversion to insularity increasingly 

unfeasible.

The changing conditions at home and abroad inevitably affected 

the nation’s military establishment. During the decade and a half 

between the War with Spain and American involvement in World War 

I, both the Army and the Navy would undergo important reforms in 

organization and direction. Although the United States did not participate in any major conflict during these years, both services were

frequently called upon to assist with administration of newly acquired 

possessions overseas. Both aided with protection of investments 

abroad threatened by native insurrections, revolutions, and other 

internal disturbances. And both contributed in other ways to upholding the vital interests of the nation in an era of greatly increased competition for commercial advantage and colonial empire. Much of the 

experience gained in the decades of the Indian Wars was used to great 

16

Transition, Change, and the

Road to War, 1902–1917
American Military History

372

advantage in the essentially constabulary duties required to police an 

empire, but much needed to be done to modernize the military and 

prepare it for its new role in world affairs.

Modernizing the Armed Forces

The intensification of international rivalries led most of the Great

Powers to seek additional protection and advantage in diplomatic alliances and alignments. By the early years of the twentieth century the 

increasingly complex network of agreements had resulted in a new and 

precarious balance of power in world affairs. This balance was constantly in danger of being upset, particularly because of an unprecedented arms race characterized by rapid enlargement of armies and 

navies and development of far more deadly weapons and tactics. While 

the United States remained aloof from such “entangling alliances,” it 

nevertheless continued to modernize and strengthen its own armed 

forces, giving primary attention to the Navy—the first line of defense.

The Navy’s highly successful performance in the Spanish-American War increased the willingness of Congress and the American public to support its program of expansion and modernization. For at 

least a decade after the war Theodore Roosevelt, Senator Henry Cabot 

Lodge of Massachusetts, and other leaders who favored a “Big Navy” 

policy with the goal of an American fleet second only to that of Great

Britain had little difficulty securing the necessary legislation and funds

for the Navy’s expansion program.

For the Navy another most important result of the War with Spain 

was the decision to retain possessions in the Caribbean and the western Pacific. In the Caribbean, the Navy acquired more bases for its

operations such as that at Guantanamo Bay in Cuba. The value of these 

bases soon became apparent as the United States found itself intervening more frequently in the countries of that region to protect its 

expanding investments and trade. In the long run, however, acquisition 

of the Philippines and Guam was even more significant, for it committed the United States to defense of territory thousands of miles 

from the home base. American naval strength in the Pacific had to be

increased immediately to ensure maintenance of a secure line of communications for the land forces that had to be kept in the Philippines. 

One way to accomplish this increase, with an eye to economy of force, 

was to build a canal across the Isthmus of Panama to allow Navy ships 

to move more rapidly from the Atlantic to the Pacific as circumstances

demanded. Another was to acquire more bases in the Pacific west of

Hawaii, which was annexed in 1898. Japan’s spectacular naval victories 

in the war with Russia and Roosevelt’s dispatch of an American fleet on

a round-the-world cruise from December 1907 to February 1909 drew 

public attention to the problem. But most Americans failed to perceive 

Japan’s growing threat to U.S. possessions in the western Pacific, and

the line of communications to the Philippines remained incomplete 

and highly vulnerable.

The Navy worked hard to expand the fleet and incorporate the latest technological developments in ship design and weapons. The modernization program that had begun in the 1880s and had much to do 

with the Navy’s effectiveness in the Spanish-American War continued 

By the early years of the 

twentieth century the increasingly 

complex network of agreements 

had resulted in a new and 

precarious balance of power in 

world affairs.
Transition, Change, and the Road to War, 1902–1917

373

in the early 1900s. Construction of new ships, stimulated by the war 

and Roosevelt’s active support, continued at a rapid rate after 1898 until 

the Taft administration and at a somewhat slower pace thereafter. By 

1917 the United States had a Navy unmatched by any of the Great 

Powers except Great Britain and Germany.

The Army, aware of the serious deficiencies revealed in the War

with Spain and of the rapid technological changes taking place in the 

methods of warfare, also undertook to modernize its weapons and 

equipment. Development of high-velocity, low-trajectory, clip-loading 

rifles capable of delivering a high rate of sustained fire had already

made obsolete the Krag-Jörgensen rifle, which the Army had adopted

in 1892. In 1903 the Regular Army began equipping its units with the 

improved bolt-action, magazine-type Springfield rifle, which incorporated the latest changes in weapons technology. The campaigns of 1898 

also had shown that the standard rod bayonet was too flimsy; starting

in 1905, the Army replaced it with a sturdy knife bayonet. The 1906

addition of a greater propellant charge in ammunition for the Springfield provided even higher muzzle velocity and deeper penetration of

the bullet. Combat at close quarters against the fierce charges of the

Moros in the Philippines demonstrated the need for a hand weapon less 

cumbersome and having greater impact than the .38-caliber revolver. 

The Army found the answer in the recently developed .45-caliber Colt 

automatic pistol, adopted in 1911, that was to remain a mainstay of the 

Army for most of the rest of the century.

Far more significant in revolutionizing the nature of twentieth

century warfare than these improved hand weapons was the rapidfiring machine gun. The manually operated machine gun—the Gatling

gun—which the Army had adopted in 1866, was employed successfully

in the Indian Wars and the Spanish-American War. American inventors, 

The Colt .45

In 1892 the Army began to replace the .45-caliber, 

single-action revolvers it had used since 1873 with a 

more modern .38-caliber, double-action weapon. During 

the Philippine campaigns, a series of bloody encounters 

with highly motivated Moro tribesmen in the close country 

of Mindanao showed that the lighter weapon’s stopping 

power was insufficient. A series of tests using commercially 

available ammunition against live and cadaver animals 

by the Ordnance Department in 1904 led to a specification for a .45-caliber pistol firing a 230-grain bullet 

at 800 feet per second. Manufacturers submitted nine 

pistols (six semiautomatic models, two conventional doubleaction revolvers, and the unique Webley-Fosbery automatic revolver) for ordnance testing in early 1907. 

A redesigned version of the winning pistol, John M. Browning’s Colt Model 1906 semiautomatic, was 

adopted in 1911 and served with only minor modifications as the Army’s main handgun until 1985. 

Pistol, Caliber .45, M1911. Browning’s self-loading 

pistol had a detachable seven-round magazine.

Image removed due to

license restrictions
American Military History

374

including Hiram Maxim, John Browning, and Isaac N. Lewis, the last 

an officer in

the Army’scoast artillery,tooka leading part in develop-

ing automatic machine guns in the years between the Civil War and 

World War I. Weapons based on their designs were adopted by many 

ofthe armies oftheworld. But not untilfighting began inWorldWar

I would it be generally realized what an important role the machine 

gun was to have in modern tactics. Thus, in the years between 1898 

and 1916, Congress appropriated only anaverage of $150,000 annu-

ally for procurement of machine guns, barely enough to provide four 

weapons for each regular regiment and a few for the National Guard. 

Finally in 1916 Congressvoted $12 million for machine-gun procure-

ment, but the War Department held up its expenditure until 1917 

while a board tried to decide which type of weapon was best suited to 

the needs of the Army.

Development of American artillery and artillery ammunition also 

lagged behind that of west European armies. The Army did adopt in 

1902

a new basic fieldweapon, the three-inch gun with an advanced

recoil mechanism. Also, to replace the black powder that had been the 

subject of such widespread criticism during the War with Spain, both 

the Army and the Navy took steps to increase the domestic output of 

smokeless powder. By 1903 production

was sufficient to supply most

American artillery for the small Regular Army.

Experience gained in the Spanish-American War also brought 

some significantchanges in the Army’s coastal defense program.The

hurriedly improvised measures taken during the war to protect Atlantic 

ports from possible attack by the Spanish Fleet emphasized the need 

for modern seacoast defenses. Under the strategic concepts in vogue, 

construction and manning of these defenses were primarily Army 

responsibilities since in

wartime the naval fleet had to bekept intact,

ready to seek out and destro

y

the enemy’s fleet. On the basis of recom

-

mendations by the Endicott Board, the Army already had begun an 

ambitious coastal defense construction program in the early 1890s. In 

1905 a new board headed by Secretary of War William Howard Taft 

made important revisions in this program with the goal of incorporat-

ing the latest techniques and devices. Added to the coastal defense arse-

nal

were fixed, floating, and mobile torpedoes and submarine mines. At

the same time the Army’s Ordnance Department tested new and more 

powerful rifled artillery for installation in the coastal defense fortifica-

tions in keeping with the trend toward larger and larger guns to meet 

the challenge of naval weapons of ever-increasing size.

Of the many new inventions that came into widespread use in the 

early twentieth century in response to the productive capacity of the 

new industrial age, nonewas to havegreater influence on military strat-

egy, tactics, and organization than the internal combustion engine. It 

made possible the motor vehicle, which, like the railroad in the previ-

ous century, brought a revolution in military transportation, and the 

airplane and tank, both of whic

h

would figure importantly inWorld

War I. The humble internal combustion engine was not as exciting or as 

dramatic a development as the machine gun or a new type of howitzer, 

but its long-term impact changed the face of warfare and made pos-

sible the huge mechanized formations that were to dominate war in the 

latter half of the twentieth century. 
Transition, Change, and the Road to War, 1902–1917

375

Reorganization of the Army 

Establishment of the General Staff

After the Spanish-American War the Army also underwent important organizational and administrative changes aimed in part at overcoming some of the more glaring defects revealed during the war. Although 

the nation had won the war with comparative ease, many Americans 

realized that the victory was attributable more to the incompetence of 

the enemy than to any special qualities displayed by the Army. In fact, 

as a postwar investigating commission appointed by President William 

McKinley and headed by Maj. Gen. Granville M. Dodge brought out, 

there was serious need for reform in the administration and direction 

of the Army’s high command and for elimination of widespread inefficiency in the operations of the War Department.

No one appreciated the need for reform more than Elihu Root, 

a New York lawyer whom McKinley appointed Secretary of War in 

1899. The President had selected Root primarily because he seemed 

well qualified to solve the legal problems that would arise in the Army’s

administration of recently acquired overseas possessions. But Root 

quickly realized that if the Army was to be capable of carrying out its 

new responsibilities as an important part of the defense establishment 

of a world power, it had to undergo fundamental changes in organization, administration, and training. Root, as a former corporation 

lawyer, tended to see the Army’s problems as similar to those faced by 

business executives. “The men who have combined various corporations ... in what we call trusts,” he told Congress, “have reduced the 

cost of production and have increased their efficiency by doing the

very same thing we propose you shall do now, and it does seem a pity 

that the Government of the United States should be the only great 

industrial establishment that cannot profit by the lessons which the

world of industry and of commerce has learned to such good effect.”

Beginning in 1899, Root outlined in a series of masterful reports his 

proposals for fundamental reform of Army institutions and concepts 

to achieve that “efficiency” of organization and function required of

Elihu Root

“I took the United States for my client,” said seasoned New 

York attorney Elihu Root (1845–1937) of his accession as Secretary of War in 1899. Having been denied enlistment in the Union 

Army because of poor health, he was not a veteran. Yet despite 

his initial unfamiliarity with military affairs, Secretary Root initiated 

some of the most significant Army reforms of the twentieth century. 

He subsequently served as Secretary of State and U.S. Senator. 

For his War Department role in administering Cuba, Puerto Rico, 

and the Philippines acquired in the Spanish-American War, and his 

work as Secretary of State on U.S. relations with Japan and Latin 

America, he received the Nobel Peace Prize for 1912.

Elihu Root, 

Secretary of War, 1899–1904 

Raimundo de Madrazo, 1907
American Military History

376

armies in the modern world. He based his proposals partly upon rec-

ommendations made by his military advisers (among the most trusted 

were Adjutant General Maj. Gen. Henry C. Corbin, and Lt. Col. William 

H. Carter) and partly upon

the viewsexpressedby officerswho had

studied and written about the problem in the post–Civil War years. Root 

arranged for publication of Col. Emory Upton’s The Military Policy of the 

United States(1904), an unfinished manuscriptthat advocateda strong,

expansible Regular Army as the keystone of an effective military estab-

lishment. Concluding that after all the true object of any army must be 

“to provide for war,” Root took prompt steps to reshape the American 

Army into an instrument of national power capable of coping with the 

requirements of modern warfare. This objective could be attained, he 

hoped, by integrating the bureaus of the War Department, the scattered 

elements of the Regular Army, and the militia and volunteers.

Root perceived as the chief weakness in the organization of the 

Army the long-standing division of authority, dating back to the early 

nineteenth century, between the Commanding General of the Army 

and the Secretary of War. The Commanding General exercised dis-

cipline and

controloverthetroops inthefield;whilethe Secretary,

through the military bureau chiefs, had responsibility for administra-

tion and

fiscal matters.Root propose

d

t

o

eliminatethis division of

authority between the Secretary of War and the Commanding General 

and to reduce the independence of the bureau chiefs. The solution, he 

suggested, was to replace the Commanding General of the Army with 

a Chief of Staff, who would be the responsible adviser and executive 

agent of the President through the Secretary of War. Under Root’s 

proposal, formulation of broad American policies would continue 

under civilian control.

A lack of any long-range planning by the Army had been another 

obvious deficiency in the

War with Spain, andRoot propose

d to

over

-

come this by the creation of a new General Staff, a group of selected 

officers who

would be free to devote their full time to preparing mili

-

tary plans. Planning in past national emergencies, he pointed out, nearly 

always had been inadequate because it had to be done hastilyb

y officers

already overburdened with other duties. Pending congressional action 

on his proposals, Root in 1901 appointed an ad hoc War College Board 

to act as an embryonic General Staff. In early 1903, in spite of some 

die-hard opposition, Congress adopted the Secretary of War’s recom-

mendations for both a General Staff and a Chief of Staff but rejected 

his request that certain of the bureaus be consolidated.

By this legislation Congress provided the essential framework for 

more efficient administration of the Army.

Yet legislation could not

change overnight the long-held traditions, habits, and views of most 

Army officers or of some congressmen and the American public. Sec-

retary Root realized that effective operation of the new system would 

require an extended program of reeducation. This need for reeduca-

tion was one important reason for the establishment of the Army War 

College in November 1903. Its students

, already experienced officers,

would receive education in problems of the War Department and of 

high command in the field. As it turned out, they actually devoted

much

of their time to war planning, becoming in effect the part of the Gen

-

eral Staff that performed this function.
Transition, Change, and the R

oad to War, 1902–1917

377

In the first years after its establishment the General Staff achieved

relatively little in the way of genuine staff planning and policy making. 

While staff personnel did carry out such appropriate tasks as issuing 

in 1905 the first Field ServiceRegulations forgovernment and orga-

nization of troops in the field, drawing up the plan for an expedition-

ary force sentto Cuba in 1906, and supervising the Army’s expanding

school system, far too much of their time was devoted to day-to-day 

routine administrative matters.

The General Staff did make some progress in overcoming its early 

weaknesses.Throughexperience, officers assignedtothe staffgradually

gained awareness of its real purpose and powers. In 1910, when Maj. 

Gen. Leonard Wood became Chief of Staff, he reorganized the General 

Staff, eliminating many of its time-consuming procedures and direct-

ing more of its energies to planning. With the backing of Secretary of 

War Henry L. Stimson (1911–1913), Wood dealt a decisive blow to that 

element in the Army itself that opposed the General Staff. In a notable 

controversy, he and Stimson forced the retirement in 1912 of the leader 

of this opposition, Maj. Gen. Fred C. Ainsworth, The Adjutant General.

The temporary closing of most Army schools during the SpanishAmerican War and the need to coordinate the Army’s educational system with the Root proposals for creating a War College and General 

Staff had provided an opportunity for a general reorganization of the 

whole system, with the overall objective of raising the standards of pro-

fessional training of officers

. In 1901 theWar Department directed that

the schools of instruction for officers thereafter should be the Militar

y

Academy at West Point; a school at each post of elementary instruction 

in theor

y and practice; the five service schools (the Artillery School,

Engineer School of Application, School of Submarine Defense [mines 

and torpedoes], School of Application for Cavalry and Field Artillery, 

and Army Medical School); a General Staff and Service College at Fort 

Leavenworth; and a War College. The purpose of the school at Leaven-

worth henceforth

was to train officers in the employment of combined

arms and prepare them for staff and command positions in large units. 

To meet the requirements for specialized training as a result of new 

developments in weapons and equipment, the Army expanded its ser-

vice school system, adding the Signal School in 1905, the Field Artillery 

School in 1911, and the School of Musketry in 1913.

Creation of the General Staff unquestionably was the most impor-

tant organizational reform in the Army during this period, but there 

were also a number of other changes in the branches and special staff 

designed to keep the Army abreast of new ideas and requirements. The 

Medical Department, for example, established Medical, Hospital, Army 

Nurse, Dental, and Medical Reserve Corps. In 1907 Congress approved 

the division of the artillery into the Coast Artillery Corps and the Field 

Artillery and in 1912 enacted legislation consolidating the Subsistence 

and Pay Departments with the Quartermaster to create the Quarter-

master Corps, a reform Secretary Root had recommended earlier. The 

act of 1912 also established an enlisted Quartermaster service corps, 

marking the beginning of the practice of using service troops instead 

of civilians and combat soldier details.

In

the newfield of militaryaviation,the Army faile

d

t

o

keep pac

e

with early twentieth century developments. Contributing to this delay 
American Military History

378

were the reluctance of Congress to 

appropriate funds and resistance within 

the military bureaucracy to the diversion of already limited resources to a 

method of warfare as yet unproved. 

The Army did not entirely neglect 

the new field—it had used balloons

for observation in both the Civil and 

Spanish-American Wars and, beginning in 1898, the War Department 

subsidized for several years Samuel 

P. Langley’s experiments with powerpropelled, heavier-than-air flying

machines. In 1908, after some hesitation, the War Department made funds 

available to the Aeronautical Division 

of the Signal Corps (established a year 

earlier) for the purchase and testing of 

Wilbur and Orville Wright’s airplane. 

Although the Army accepted this airplane in 1909, another two years passed 

before Congress appropriated a relatively modest sum ($125,000) for aeronautical purposes. Between 1908 and 

1913, it is estimated that the United 

States spent only $430,000 on military and naval aviation, whereas in the 

same period France and Germany each 

expended $22 million; Russia, $12 million; and Belgium, $2 million. Not until 

1914 did Congress authorize establishment of a full-fledged Aviation Section

in the Signal Corps. The few military 

airplanes available for service on the 

Mexican border in 1916 soon broke

down, and the United States entered 

World War I far behind the other belligerents in aviation equipment, organization, and doctrine.

The Army and the Wright Brothers

On July 30, 1909, a frail biplane sporting a 24-horsepower engine took off from the parade ground 

at Fort Myer, Virginia. Orville Wright was at the controls with Lt. Benjamin D. Foulois aboard as a passengerobserver. This was the third and final test to see if the flyer, as Orville and his brother Wilbur referred to 

their machine, satisfied the War Department’s specifications for a military “aeroplane.” In slightly more than 

twenty-eight minutes they returned, having traveled an average speed of 42.583 miles per hour over a 

measured course. The U.S. Army Signal Corps purchased the world’s first military aircraft for $30,000.

Wright Bros. Experimental Military Aircraft, Imra Maduro Peixotto, 1909
Transition, Change, and the Road to War, 1902–1917

379

Reorganization of the Army 

The Regular Army and the Militia

In the years after the Spanish-American War nearly a third of the 

Regular Army troops, on the average, served overseas. Most were in 

the Philippines suppressing the insurrection and, when that conflict

officially ended in mid-1902, stamping out scattered resistance and

organizing and training a native force known as the Philippine Scouts. 

Other regulars were garrisoned in Alaska, Hawaii, China, and elsewhere. 

To carry out its responsibilities abroad and to maintain an adequate 

defense at home, the Regular Army from 1902 to 1911 had an average 

of 75,000 officers and men, far below the 100,000 that Congress had

authorized in 1902 to fill thirty infantry and fifteen cavalry regiments

supported by a corps of artillery. To make up for this deficiency in

size of the regular forces and at the same time to remedy some of the 

defects revealed in the mobilization for the War with Spain, the planners in the War Department recommended a reorganization of the 

volunteer forces.

Secretary Root took the lead in presenting to Congress in 1901 a 

program for reform of the National Guard. In response to his recommendations, Congress in 1903 passed the Dick Act, which thoroughly 

revised the obsolete Militia Act of 1792. It separated the militia into two 

classes—the Organized Militia, to be known as the National Guard, 

and the Reserve Militia—and provided that over a five-year period the

Guard’s organization and equipment would be patterned after that of 

the Regular Army. To help accomplish these changes in the Guard, the 

Dick Act made federal funds available; prescribed drill at least twice 

a month, supplemented with short annual training periods; permitted 

detailing of regular officers to Guard units; and directed the holding

of joint maneuvers each year. The new measure failed, however, to 

significantly modify the longstanding provisions that severely restricted

federal power to call up Guard units and control Guard personnel, 

which limited its effectiveness. Subsequent legislation in 1908 and 1914 

reduced these restrictions to some extent, giving the President the right 

to prescribe the length of federal service and with the advice and consent of the Senate to appoint all officers of the Guard while the Guard

was in federal service.

Philippine Scouts

A number of locally recruited scout companies were formed during the Philippine Insurrection 

(1899–1902) even before the 1901 law that formally authorized their creation as part of the U.S. Army. 

Filipinos served as enlisted personnel and NCOs in Philippine Scout units that by 1922 included infantry, cavalry, and field artillery regiments under an officer corps that remained primarily American even 

after Filipinos became eligible for commissioning through the U.S. Military Academy in 1914. Trained and 

equipped as Regular Army units, they mounted a valiant defense against the Japanese during World 

War II. Reconstituted as the New Scouts by the U.S. Armed Forces Voluntary Recruitment Act of 1945, the 

force continued to protect American and Filipino interests until its official dissolution in 1950.
American Military History

380

The military legislation passed in 1908 contained one additional 

provision that was to have far-reaching consequences. On April 23, 

1908, the creation of the Medical Reserve Corps authorized the place-

ment of several hundred medical personnel on a federal reserve status 

to be called to active duty if needed to augment the regular medical 

doctors. This was the small and humble beginning of the U.S. Army 

Reserve that in the future would train, commission, mobilize, and retain 

hundreds of thousands of officers

.This legislation established the third

component of the U.S. Army in addition to the Regular Army and the 

National Guard. The U.S. Army Reserve was to be a federal reserve, 

not belonging to the states, which would help provide the basis for the 

actual implementation of the expansible army theory.

The Creation of Larger Units

Although the largest permanent unit of the Regular Army in 

peacetime continued to be the regiment, experience in the SpanishAmerican War, observation of new developments abroad, and lessons 

learned in annual maneuvers alltestifiedtothe need for larger, more

self-sufficient unitscomposed ofthecombined arms. Beginning in

1905, the Field Service Regulations laid down a blueprint for the orga-

nization of divisions in wartime, and in 1910 the General Staff drew 

up a plan for three permanent infantry divisions to be composed of 

designated Regular Army and National Guard regiments. Because of 

trouble along the Mexican border in the spring of 1911, the plan was 

not implemented. Instead, the Army organized a provisional maneu-

ver division and ordered its component units, consisting of three bri-

gades of nearly 13,000 officers and men,

t

o

concentrate at San Ant

o-

nio, Texas. The division’s presence there, it was hoped, would end the 

border disturbances.

The effort only proved how unready the Army was to mobilize 

quickly for any kind of national emergency. Assembly of the division 

required several months. The War Department had to collect Regular 

Army troops from widely scattered points in the continental United 

States and denude every post, depot, and arsenal to scrape up the neces-

sary equipment. Even so, when the maneuver division finally completed

its concentration in August 1911, it was far from fully operational: none 

of its regiments were up to strength or adequately armed and equipped. 

Fortunately, the efficiency of the division

was not put to any battle

test; and within a short time it was broken up and its component units 

returned to their home stations. Because those members of Congress 

who had Army installations in their own districts insisted on retaining 

them, the War Department was prevented from relocating units so that 

there would be greater concentrations of troops in a few places. The 

only immediate result of the Army’s attempt to gain experience in the 

handling of large units was an effort to organize on paper the scat-

tered posts of the Army so their garrisons, which averaged 700 troops 

each, could join one of three divisions. But these abortive attempts to 

mobilize larger units were not entirely without value. In 1913, when the 

Army again had to strengthen the forces along the Mexican border, a 

division assembled in Texas in less than a week, ready for movement to 

any point where it might be needed.
Transition, Change, and the R

oad to War, 1902–1917

381

Caribbean Problems and Projects

The close of the War with Spain brought no satisfactory solution 

for the Cuban problem. Asa result of years of misrule and fighting,

conditions on the island were deplorable when the war ended. Under 

provisions of the Teller amendment, the United States was pledged to 

turn over the rule of Cuba to its people. American forces, however, 

stayed on to assist the Cubans in achieving at least a modicum of eco-

nomic and political stability.The first stepwas to set upa provisional

government, headed in the beginning by Maj. Gen. John R. Brooke 

and later by General Wood. This government promptly undertook a 

program of rehabilitation and reform. An outstanding achievement 

was eliminating yellow fever, which had decimated Army troops during 

the war. Research and experiments carried out by the Army Medical 

Department culminated in the discovery that

a specific typ

e of mos-

quito transmitted the dread disease. When a concerted effort was gen-

erated to control the places where that mosquito bred, the disease was 

dramatically reduced and the overall improvement in troop health in 

the tropics was significant. When order had been restored in Cuba, a constituent assembly 

met. Under the chairmanship of General Wood, it drew up an organic 

law for the island patterned after the American Constitution. At the 

insistence of the United States, this law included several clauses known 

as the Platt amendment, which also appeared in the subsequent treaty 

concluded in 1903 by the two countries. The amendment limited the 

amount of debt Cuba could contract, granted the United States naval 

bases at Guantanamo and Bahia Honda, and gave the United States 

the right to intervene to preserve “Cuban independence” and maintain 

a government “adequate to the protection of life, property and indi-

vidual liberty.” In 1902, after a general election and the inauguration 

of the republic’s first president, the Americans ended their occupa

-

tion. But events soon demonstrated that the period of tutelage in selfgovernment had been too short. In late 1906, when the Cuban government proved unable to cope with a new rebellion, the United States 

intervened to maintain law and order. On the advice of Secretary Taft, 

President Roosevelt dispatched more than 5,000 troops to Havana, the 

so-called Army of Cuban

Pacification that remained in Cuba until early

1909. Again in 1912 and 1917, the United States found it necessary to 

intervene but each time withdrew its occupying forces as soon as order 

was restored. Not until 1934 did the United States, consistent with its 

new Good Neighbor Policy, give up the right of intervention embodied 

in the Platt amendment.

The emergence of the United States as a world power with a primary 

concern for developments in the Caribbean Sea increased the long-time 

American interest in an isthmian canal. Discovery of gold in California 

in 1848 and the rapid growth of the West Coast states had underlined 

the importance of developing a shorter sea route from Atlantic ports to 

the

Pacific.The strategic nee

d for

acanalwas dramatized forthe Ameri

-

can people duringthe Spanish-AmericanWarbythe 66-dayvoyage of

the battleship Oregon from Puget Sound around Cape Horn to Santiago, 

where it joined the American Fleet barely in time to participate in the 

destruction of Admiral Pascual Cervera y Topete’s ships.
American Military History

382

A few months after the end of the War with Spain, McKinley told 

Congress that a canal under American control was “now more than 

ever indispensable.” By the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty of 1901, the United 

States secured abrogation of the terms of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty 

of 1850 that required the United States to share equally with Great 

Britain in construction and operation of any future isthmian canal. 

Finally, in 1903, the long-standing question of where to build the canal 

(Nicaragua or Panama) was resolved in favor of Panama. An uprising 

in Panama against the government of Colombia provided President 

Roosevelt with an opportunity to send American naval units to support 

the rebels, assuring establishment of an independent republic. The new 

republic readily agreed to permit the United States to acquire control of 

a ten-mile strip across the isthmus, to purchase the property formerly 

belonging to the French syndicate that had attempted to construct a 

canal in the 1880s, and to build, maintain, and operate an interoceanic 

canal. Congress promptly appropriated the necessary funds for work to 

begin, and the Isthmian Canal Commission set about investigating the 

problem of who should construct the canal.

When the commission advised the President that overseeing the 

construction of so vast a project was beyond the capabilities of any 

private concern, Roosevelt decided to turn the job over to the Army. He 

reorganized the commission, assigning to it new members—the majority were Army officers—and in 1907 appointed Col. George W. Goethals as its chairman and chief engineer. In this capacity, Goethals, a graduate of the Military Academy who had served in the Corps of Engineers 

since 1882, had virtually sole responsibility for administration of the 

canal project. Displaying great organizational ability, he overcame many 

serious difficulties, including problems of engineering, employee grievances, housing, and sanitation, to complete the canal by 1914. Goethals 

owed a part of his success to the support he received from the Army’s 

Medical Department. Under the leadership of Col. William C. Gorgas, 

Construction of Locks for the Panama Canal, April 5, 1913

Image removed due to

license restrictions
Transition, Change, and the Road to War, 1902–1917

383

who earlier had played an important role in administering the sanitation 

program in Cuba, the Army carried through measures to control malaria 

and virtually wipe out yellow fever, ultimately converting the Canal Zone 

into a healthy and attractive place to live and work.

The completed Panama Canal stood as a magnificent engineering

achievement and an outstanding example of the Army’s fulfillment of

a peacetime mission, but its opening and operation under American 

administration were also highly significant from the point of view of

military strategy. For the Navy, the Canal achieved economy of force by 

eliminating the necessity for maintaining large fleets in both the Atlantic and Pacific. For the Army, it created a new strategic point in the continental defense system that had to be strongly protected by the most 

modern fortifications manned by a large and well-trained garrison.

The Army on the Mexican Border

Early in the twentieth century the Army found itself frequently 

involved in hemispheric problems, not only with the countries of the 

Caribbean region, but also with the United States’ southern neighbor, Mexico. That nation, after a long era of relative political stability, 

entered a period of revolutionary turmoil. Beginning in 1911, internal 

conflicts in the northern part of the country led to recurrent incidents

along the Mexican border, posing a serious threat to peace. President 

William Howard Taft first ordered strengthening of the border patrols

and then, in the summer of 1911, concentration of the maneuver 

division at San Antonio. After a period of quiet, General Victoriano 

Huerta in 1913 deposed and replaced President Francisco Madero. The 

assassination of Madero shortly thereafter led to full-scale civil war 

between Huerta’s forces and those of General Venustiano Carranza, 

leader of the so-called Constitutionalists, and Emiliano Zapata, chief 

of the radicals. Woodrow Wilson, who had succeeded Taft as President, 

disapproved of the manner in which Huerta had come to power. In a 

significant shift from traditional American policy, the President decided

not to recognize Huerta on the grounds that his assumption of power 

did not meet the test of “constitutional legitimacy.” At the same time, 

Wilson imposed an arms embargo on both sides in the civil war. But in 

early 1914, when Huerta’s forces halted the Constitutionalists, Wilson 

endeavored to help Carranza by lifting the embargo.

The Army, Malaria, and the Panama Canal

William C. Gorgas (1854–1920) headed the Medical Department’s tropical disease program in 

Panama. It was one of the world’s great plague regions for yellow fever and malaria; twenty years 

earlier those diseases had wrecked a French company’s attempt to construct an interoceanic canal. 

Gorgas concluded that malaria posed the greatest danger in Panama. Upon arrival he launched 

an intensive study of the life cycle of the carrier, the mosquito. His efforts at mosquito abatement 

eradicated yellow fever but could only contain malaria. Still the death rate plummeted, removing 

the medical barrier to the successful completion of the Panama Canal. 
American Military History

384

Resentment over Wilson’s action contributed to the arrest in February of American sailors by followers of Huerta in the port of Tampico. 

Although the sailors were soon released with an expression of regret 

from Huerta, Rear Adm. Henry T. Mayo, commanding the American 

Fleet in the area, demanded a public apology. Huerta refused. Feeling 

that intervention was unavoidable and seeing an opportunity to deprive 

Huerta of important ports, President Wilson supported Admiral Mayo 

and proposed to occupy Tampico, seize Vera Cruz, and blockade both 

ports. When a German steamer carrying a cargo of ammunition arrived 

unexpectedly at Vera Cruz in late April, the United States put ashore 

a contingent of marines and sailors to occupy the port and prevent 

the unloading of the ship. Naval gunfire checked a Mexican counterattack and by the end of the month an American force of nearly 8,000 

(about half marines and half Army troops) under the command of 

Maj. Gen. Frederick Funston occupied the city. For a time war with 

Mexico seemed inevitable, but both Wilson and Huerta accepted mediation and the Mexican leader agreed to resign. Carranza had barely had 

time to assume office when his erstwhile ally, Francisco “Pancho” Villa,

rebelled and proceeded to gain control over most of northern Mexico.

Despite the precariousness of Carranza’s hold on Mexico, President Wilson decided to recognize his government. It was now Villa’s 

turn to show resentment. He instigated a series of border incidents 

that culminated in a surprise attack by 500 to 1,000 of his men against 

Columbus, New Mexico, on March 9, 1916. Villa’s troops killed a substantial number of American soldiers and civilians and destroyed considerable property before units of the 13th Cavalry drove them off. The 

following day President Wilson ordered Brig. Gen. John J. Pershing into 

Mexico to assist the Mexican government in capturing Villa.

On March 15 the advance elements of this punitive expedition 

entered Mexico in “hot pursuit.” For the next several months Pershing’s troops chased Villa through unfriendly territory for hundreds of 

miles, never quite catching up with him but managing to disperse most 

of his followers. Although Carranza’s troops also failed to capture Villa, 

Carranza soon showed that he had no desire to have the United States 

do the job for him. He protested the continued presence of American troops in Mexico and insisted upon their withdrawal. Carranza’s 

unfriendly attitude, plus orders from the War Department forbidding 

attacks on Mexicans who were not followers of Villa, made it difficult for Pershing to deal effectively with other hostile Mexicans who 

Pancho Villa

Pancho Villa (1878–1923) was an inspired leader of cavalry in the early years of the Mexican Revolution. Beginning in 1914, however, he lost a series of battles to President Carranza’s well-trained forces. Villa 

raided Columbus, New Mexico, in 1916, hoping to provoke American intervention and use Mexican national 

feeling to depose Carranza. Villa’s intimate knowledge of the terrain and his widespread popular support 

in northern Mexico allowed him to escape the grasp of General Pershing’s Punitive Expedition, but Carranza 

was much too wily to side with the Americans. Pershing thus lost militarily, while Villa lost politically. 
Transition, Change, and the Road to War, 1902–1917

385

blocked his path without running the risk of precipitating war. Some 

clashes with Mexican government troops actually occurred. The most 

important took place in June at Carrizal, where scores were killed or 

wounded. This action once again created a critical situation and led 

President Wilson to call 75,000 National Guardsmen into federal service to help police the border.

Aware that the majority of Americans favored a peaceful solution, Wilson persuaded Carranza to resume diplomatic negotiations. 

The two leaders agreed in late July to submit the disputes arising out 

of the punitive expedition to a joint commission for settlement. Some 

time later the commission ruled that the American unit commander in 

the Carrizal affair was at fault. Although the commission broke up in 

January 1917 without reaching agreement on a plan for evacuating Pershing’s troops, relations between the United States and Germany had 

reached so critical a stage that Wilson had no alternative but to order 

withdrawal of the punitive expedition.

Pershing failed to capture Villa, but the activities of the American troops in Mexico and along the border were not entirely wasted. 

Dispersal of Villa’s band put an end to serious border incidents. More 

important from a military point of view was the intensive training in 

the field received by both Regular Army and National Guard troops

who served on the border and in Mexico. Also, the partial mobilization drew more attention to the still-unsolved problem of developing 

a satisfactory system for maintaining in peacetime the nucleus of those 

trained forces that would supplement the Regular Army in national 

emergencies. Fortunately, many defects in the military establishment, 

especially in the National Guard, came to light in time to be corrected 

before the Army plunged into the war already under way in Europe.

John J. Pershing (1860–1948)

Pershing was often referred to as Black Jack Pershing, though 

the nickname’s origins are in doubt. His leadership of the 10th 

Cavalry Buffalo Soldiers, a colored unit, may have led to the harsh 

epithet; though he had previously taught at a school for African 

Americans near his hometown of Laclede, Missouri, which also could 

have been the nickname’s genesis. His pacification successes in the 

Philippines from 1901–1903 led to his direct promotion by President Theodore Roosevelt from captain to brigadier general and 

his appointment as Governor of Mindanao, where he served from 

1906 to 1913. He did not get along well with everyone, though; 

his battles with Chief of the War Department General Staff Peyton 

C. March over who was in control of the Army during World War I 

would lead to factions within the Army. His promotion after World 

War I to the unique rank of General of the Armies would cap an 

unusual career. John Joseph Pershing

Richard Leopold Seyffert, 1975
American Military History

386

America could not ignore the huge conflict raging in Europe. At

various times it seemed as if the country was going to be dragged into 

the war, only to retreat from the precipice each time. When the Ger-

mans sank the U.S. merchant ship Gulflight on May 1, 1915 and then the 

British liner Lusitania a week later with the loss of 128 American lives, 

American public opinion finally began to recognize thatthe United

States might have to become involved. Voices calling for more pre-

paredness began to seem more sensible.

Among the voices were those of former Secretary of War Elihu 

Root, ex-President Theodore Roosevelt, and former Secretary of War 

Henry L. Stimson. Another was that of General Wood, whose term as 

the Army’s Chief of Staff had expired just over a year after President 

Wilson and his peace-oriented administration had come to office.Fol-

lowing a practice he had introduced while Chief of Staff of conduct-

ing summer camps where college students paying their own way could 

receive military training, Wood lent his support to a similar four-week 

camp for business and professional men at Plattsburg Barracks, New 

York. Known as the Plattsburg idea, its success justified opening other

camps

, assuring

a relatively small but influential cadre possessing basic

military skills and imbued with enthusiasm for preparedness.

Yet these were voices of a heavily industrialized and articulate east. 

Few like them were to be heard from the rural south, the west, or a 

strongly isolationist midwest where heavy settlements of GermanAmericans (called by some, derisively, hyphenated Americans) detected 

in the talk of preparedness a heavy leaning toward the nation’s historic 

Anglo-Saxon ties. There was in the country a strong tide of outright 

pacifism, whic

h possessed an eloquent spokesman in Wilson’s Secretary

of State, William Jennings Bryan.

The depth of Bryan’s convictions became apparent in the govern-

ment’s reaction to the sinking of the Lusitania. Although Bryan agreed 

withthePresident’sfirst diplomatic protestoverthe sinking, he dissented

whenthePresident, dissatisfiedwiththe German reply and determined

to insist on the right of neutrals to engage in commerce on the high seas, 

insisted on a second and stronger note. The Secretary resigned.

Although sinkings by submarine continued through the summer 

of 1915, Wilson’s persistent protest at last produced an apparent diplo-

matic victory when in September the Germans promised that passen-

ger liners would be sunk only after warning and with proper safeguards 

for passengers’ lives. Decelerating their campaign, the Germans actu-

ally acted less in response to American protests than to a realization 

that they lacked enough submarines to achieve substantive victory by 

that means that would outweigh the diplomatic cost.

American commerce with Europe meanwhile continued, particularly 

in munitions; but because of the British blockade almost all was with the 

allied nations. The British intercepted ships carrying foodstuffs to Ger-

many and held them until their cargoes rotted. Just after mid-1915 they 

put

evencotton ona long list ofcontraband and blacklisted anyU.S.firm

suspected of trading with the Central Powers. These were deliberate and 

painful affronts, but so profitable

wasthemunitionstradethat onlythe

southern states, hurt by the loss of markets for cotton, raised loud pro

-

test. In October 1915 President Wilson repealed a ban earlier imposed 

on loans to belligerents, thereby further stimulating trade with the Allies.
Transition, Change, and the R

oad to War, 1902–1917

387

While Americans as a whole remained opposed to entering the war, 

their sympathy for the allied cause grew. A combination of allied pro-

paganda and German ineptitude was largely responsible. The propagan-

dists were careful to ensure that nobody forgot the German violation 

of Belgian neutrality, the ordeal of “Little Belgium.” Stories of babies 

mutilated and women violated by German soldiers were rampant. The 

French executed nine women as spies during the war; but it was the 

death of a British nurse, Edith Cavell, at the hands of the Germans 

that the world heard about and remembered. Clumsy German efforts 

at propaganda in

the United States backfiredwhentwo military atta-

chés assignedto posts in Americawere discoveredfinancingespionage

and sabotage. The Germans did their cause no further good in October 

1916when one oftheir submarines surfaced in Newport Harbor, sent

an officer ashoret

o deliver

a letter forthe German ambassador

,

then

submerged and sank nine allied ships close off the New England coast.

Continuing to champion neutrality and seeking—however unsuc-

cessfully—to persuade the belligerents to establish international rules 

of submarine warfare, President Wilson was personally becoming more 

aware of the necessity for military preparedness. Near the end of a 

nationwide speaking tour in

February 1916, he not only called for cre-

ation of “the greatest navy in the world” but also urged widespread 

military training for civilians, lest some day the nation be faced with 

“putting raw levies of inexperienced men onto the moder

n field of

battle.” Still upholding the cause of freedom of the seas, he refused to 

go along with congressmen who sought to forbid Americans to travel 

on armed merchant ships.

Wilson nevertheless continued to demonstrate a fervent hope for 

neutrality. A submarine attack in March on the French steamer Sussex

with Americans aboard convinced the President’s adviser, Edward M. 

“Colonel” House, and his new Secretary of State, Robert Lansing, that 

the nation should sever diplomatic relations with Germany.

A fiery

speec

h of self-justification

b

y the German

chancellor intheReich

-

stag and a cynical reply to an American note of protest did nothing 

to discourage that course. Wilson went only so far as to dispatch what 

amounted to an ultimatum, demanding that the Germans cease the 

submarine war against passenger and merchant vessels or face sever-

ance of relations with the United States.

While questioning the American failure to deal as sternly with the 

British blockade and rejecting the charge of unrestricted submarine war-

fare, Germany again agreed to conform to American demands for prior 

warning and for protecting the lives of passengers. Wilson in turn saw 

that unless something could be done about the British blockade the Ger-

man vow probably would be short lived. When a protest to the British 

availed nothing, the President offered the services of the United States to 

negotiate a peace. That brought little positive response from either side.

The National Defense Act of 1916

Some of the President’s growing inclination toward the cause of 

preparedness could be traced to increasing concern on the part of mem-

bers of his administration, most notably the Secretary of War, Lindley 

M. Garrison. As an annex to the Secretary’s annual report in September 
American Military History

388

1915, Garrison had submitted a study prepared by the General Staff 

entitled, “A Proper Military Policy for the United States.” Like propos-

als for reform advanced earlier by Stimson and Wood, the new study 

turned away from the Uptonian idea of an expansible Regular Army, 

which Root had favored, to the more traditional American concept of 

a citizen army as the keystone of an adequate defense force. Garri-

son proposed more than doubling the Regular Army, increasing federal 

support for the National Guard, and creating a new 400,000-man vol-

unteer force to be called the Continental Army, a trained reserve under 

federal control as opposed to the state control of the Guard.

Although Wilson refused to accept more than a small increase in 

the Regular Army, he approved the concept of a Continental Army. 

Garrison’s proposal drew support in the Senate, but not enough to 

overcome adamant opposition in the House of Representatives from 

strong supporters of the National Guard. Influential congressmen

countered with a bill requiring increased federal responsibility for the 

Guard, acceptance of federal standards, and agreement by the Guard 

to respond to a presidential call to service. Under pressure from these 

congressmen, Wilson switched his support to the congressional plan. 

This, among other issues, prompted Garrison to resign.

There the matter might have bogged down had not Pancho Villa 

shot up Columbus, New Mexico. Facing pressing requirements for the 

National Guard on the Mexican border, the two halls of Congress at 

last compromised, incorporating the concept of the citizen army as 

the foundation of the American military establishment but not in the 

form of a Continental Army. They sought instead to make the National 

Guard the nucleus of the citizen force.

Passed in May and signed into law the next month, the bill was 

known as the National Defens

e Act of 1916. It provided for an army

in no way comparable to those of the European combatants and pro

-

duced cries of outrage from those still subscribing to the Uptonian 

doctrine. It also contained a severe restriction inserted by opponents 

of

a strong General Staff, sharply limiting thenumber of officers who

could be detailed to serve on the staff at the same time in or near 

Washington. The bill represented nevertheless the most comprehen-

sive military legislation yet enacted by the U.S. Congress. The National 

Defense Act of 1916 authorized an increase in the peacetime strength

oftheRegular Armyovera period of fiv

e years to 175,000 men and

a

wartime strength of close to 300,000. Bolstered by federal funds and 

federal-stipulated organization and standards of training, the National 

Guard was to be increased more than fourfold to a strength of over 

400,000 and obligated to respond to the call of the President. The 

act also established both an Officers’ and an EnlistedReserve Corps

and a Volunteer Army to be raised only in time of war. This provi-

sion expanded the Medical Reserve Corps, established in 1908, into a 

full-spectrum federal reserve force that would mobilize and train over 

89,476 officers during

WorldWar I.To accomplish this

, the act created

a newReserve OfficerTraining Corps (ROTC) program to establish

training centers for officers at colleges and universities.

Going beyond the heretofore-recognized province of military leg-

islation, the National Defense Act of 1916 also

granted power to the

President to place orders for defense materials and to force industry to 
Transition, Change, and the Road to War, 1902–1917

389

comply. The act further directed the Secretary of War to conduct a survey of all arms and munitions industries. A few months later the Congress demonstrated even greater interest in the industrial aspects of 

defense by creating the civilian Council of National Defense made up 

of leaders of industry and labor, supported by an advisory commission 

composed of the secretaries of the principal government departments, 

and charged with the mission of studying economic mobilization. The 

administration furthered the preparedness program by creating the U.S. 

Shipping Board to regulate sea transport while developing a naval auxiliary fleet and a merchant marine.

An End to Neutrality

As a new year of war opened, German leaders decided that they 

had lost so many men at Verdun and on the Somme that they would 

have to assume the defensive on the Western Front; their only hope of 

quick victory lay with the submarines, of which they now had close to 

200. By operating an unrestricted campaign against all shipping, whatever the nationality, in waters off the British Isles and France, the Germans believed they could defeat the Allies within six months. While 

they recognized the strong risk of bringing the United States into the 

war by this tactic, they believed they could starve the Allies into submission before the Americans could raise, train, and deploy an Army. They 

were nearly right.

The German ambassador in Washington continued to encourage 

Wilson to pursue his campaign for peace even as the Germans made 

their U-boats ready. On January 31, 1917, Germany informed the U.S. 

government and other neutrals that beginning the next day U-boats 

would sink all vessels, neutral and allied alike, without warning.

While the world waited for the American reaction, President Wilson searched for some alternative to war. Three days later, still groping 

desperately for a path to peace, he went before the Congress not to ask 

a declaration of war but to announce a break in diplomatic relations. 

This step, Wilson hoped, would be enough to turn the Germans from 

their new course.

Wilson could not know it at the time, but an intelligence intercept 

already had placed in British hands a German telegram that when released 

would remove any doubt as to German intentions toward the United 

States. This message was sent in January from the German Foreign Secretary, Arthur Zimmermann, to the German ambassador to Mexico, proposing that in the event of war with the United States, Germany and Mexico would conclude an alliance with the adherence of Japan. In exchange 

for Mexico’s taking up arms against the United States, Germany would 

provide generous financial assistance. Victory achieved, Mexico was to

regain her lost territories of Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona.

Cognizant of the impact the message was bound to have on the 

United States, the British were nevertheless slow to release it; they had 

to devise a method to assure the Americans of its authenticity while 

concealing from the Germans that they had broken the German diplomatic code. On February 23, just over a month after intercepting the 

telegram, the British turned over a copy to the American ambassador 

in London.

In exchange for Mexico’s taking 

up arms against the United 

States, Germany would provide 

generous financial assistance. 

Victory achieved, Mexico was 

to regain her lost territories of 

Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona.
American Military History

390

When President Wilson received the news, he was angered but still 

unprepared to accept it as cause for war. In releasing the message to the 

press, he had in mind not inciting the nation to war but instead moving 

Congress to pass a bill authorizing the arming of American merchant 

ships, most of which were standing idle in American ports because of 

the submarine menace. As with the break in diplomatic relations, this, 

the President hoped, would so impress the Germans that they would 

abandon their unrestricted submarine campaign.

Congress and most of the nation were shocked by revelation of 

the Zimmermann message; but with their hopes for neutrality shat-

tered, pacifists and pro-Germans countered with

a roar of disbelief

that the message was authentic. Zimmermann himself silenced them 

when in Berlin he admitted to having sent the telegram.

In the next few weeks four more American ships fell victim to 

German U-boats. Fifteen Americans died. At last convinced that the 

step was inevitable, the President went before Congress late on April 2 to ask for a declaration of war. Four days later, on April 6, 1917, the

United States declared war on Germany: a war for which the U.S. Army 

was far from being prepared.

The Army Transformed

The years 1902 to 1917 saw the United States entering fully upon 

the world stage, and that entrance mandated that the Army change 

itself accordingly. The Army was forced to shed most of its Indianfighting past and transform itself into an Army for an empire. As an

imperial police force it pacified the Philippines, occupied Cuba and

Puerto Rico, and participated in the international intervention force 

into China during the Boxer Rebellion. At the same time, it continued 

to fulfill its obligations asa homeland security force as it conducted

operations along the southern border of the United States and into 

Mexico itself. The Army had by necessity become a much more capable 

force than ever before, equipped for overseas expeditions and for the 

essentially constabulary duties of America’s new empire.

Although the Army was forced to make numerous practical changes 

to cope with the new challenges of America’s becoming a world power, 

it also underwent a series of intellectual changes that established a frame-

work for even greater changes to come. At the heart of these changes 

were the reforms undertaken by Secretary of War Root during his years 

in office(1899–1904).TheseRoot reforms(changingthecommand

structure ofthe Armywiththeestablishment ofthe office of Chie

f

of Staff with a General Staff and breaking the power of the bureau 

chiefs; the creation of the National Guard with training, organization, 

and equipment in line with the Regular Army; and the reorganization of 

the Army school system including the establishment of the Army War 

College in 1903) were essential in increasing the professionalism of the 

Army and forcing it to look outward to the new challenges to come. 

Thanks to the reforms of the early twentieth century, for the first

time the Army would have some of the basic intellectual and proce

-

dural tools in hand to prepare and conduct contingency plans for a 

wide

variety of operations

. It

would havea corps of regular officers

and men supported by a National Guard available for federal service on 
Transition, Change, and the R

oad to War, 1902–1917

391

relatively short notice. When the National Defense Act enhanced the 

reforms in 1916, the result

was little short of revolutionary.TheRoot

reforms laid the basis for transforming the Army into a modern, albeit 

still modestly sized military force suitable for the new missions that had 

to be performed.

Yet events outside the United States were moving quicker than any 

peacetime reform packages could hope to contain. The United States’ 

involvement in the war in Europe would shortly mandate the whole-

sale remaking of it

s Army

yet again.This massiveconflictthat began

in 1914 in Europe was to change all of America’s assumptions when it 

came to armies and international commitments. The war was terrifying 

to behold, with million-man armies locked in deadly combat in trenches 

that scarred hundreds of miles of the landscape of northern France. 

Deadly armies of conscripts equipped with machine guns, vast arrays 

of artillery, airplanes, and tanks showed to any intelligent observer how 

ill prepared the American Army would be for the challenges of modern 

warfare. A new, and severe, test for American arms was on the horizon. Discussion Questions

1. What lessons do you believe the U.S. Army should have been 

able to use from its Indian-fighting days in the new situation of polic-

ing an empire?

2. Why was the Army so slow to adopt new technology even in the 

face of dramatic changes in the scope and scale of European warfare?

3. Of what value were the Root reforms? Why did a civilian Sec-

retary of War have to implement these reforms rather than the senior 

Army uniformed leadership?

4.Whatwas the “Plattsburg idea,” and how influential doyou think

it was?

5.Was the United States justified in intervening in Mexican affairs

in 1916?Whatwere some of the unintended consequences for theU.S.

Army as a result of this expedition?

6. Should America have enteredWorldWar I? How could it have

been avoided?

Recommended Readings

Abrahamson, James L. America Arms for a New Century: The Making of a 

Great Military Power. New York: Free Press, 1981.

Ball, Harry P. Of Responsible Command: A History of the U.S. Army War 

College. Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Alumni Association of the U.S. Army 

War College, 1983, chs. 1–7.

Challener, Richard D. Admirals, Generals, and American Foreign Policy, 

1898–1914. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973.

Finnegan, John R. Against the Specter of a Dragon: The Campaign for American Military Preparedness, 1914–1917. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood 

Press, 1974.
American Military History

392

Hewes, James E., Jr. From Root to McNamara: Army Organization and 

Administration, 1900–1963. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of 

Military History, 1983.

Lane, Jack C. Armed Progressive: A Study of the Military and Public Career of 

Leonard Wood. San Rafael, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1978.

Leopold, Richard W. Elihu Root and the Conservative Tradition. Boston: 

Little, Brown, 1954.

Morison, Elting E. Turmoil and Tradition: A Study of the Life and Times of 

Henry L. Stimson. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1960, chs. 9–15.

Nenninger, Timothy K. “The Army Enters the Twentieth Century, 

1904–1917,” in Against All Enemies: Interpretations of American Military History from Colonial Times to the Present, ed. Kenneth J. Hagen 

and William R.Roberts.Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1986.

———. The Leavenworth Schools and the Old Army: Education, Professionalism, and the Officer Corps of the United States Army, 1881–1918. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1978.

Smythe, David. Guerrilla Warrior: The Early Life of John J. Pershing. New 

York: Scribner’s, 1973.

Other Readings

Armstrong, David A. Bullets and Bureaucrats: The Machine Gun and the U.S. 

Army, 1861–1916. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1982.

Beale, Howard K. Theodore Roosevelt and the Rise of America to World Power. 

Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984.

Clendenen, Clarence C. Blood on the Border: The United States Army and the 

Mexican Irregulars. New York: Macmillan, 1969.

Detrick, Martha. The National Guard in Politics. Cambridge: Harvard Uni-

versity Press, 1965.

Deutrich, Mabel E. Struggle for Supremacy: The Career of General Fred C. 

Ainsworth. Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1962.

Langley, Lester D. The Banana Wars: United States Intervention in the Carib-

bean, 1898–1934. Wilmington, Del.: SR Books, 2002.

Linn, Brian. Guardians of Empire: The U.S. Army and the Pacific, 1902–

1940. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997.

McCullough, David. The Path Between the Seas: The Creation of the Panama 

Canal, 1870–1914. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1977.

Millett, Allan R. The Politics of Intervention: The Military Occupation of Cuba, 

1906–1909. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1968.

Reardon, Carol. Soldiers and Scholars: The U.S. Army and the Uses of His-

tory, 1865–1920. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1990.

Skowronek, Stephen. Building a New American State: The Expansion of 

National Administrative Capacities, 1877–1920. Cambridge: Cam-

bridge University Press, 1982, chs. 1, 2, 4, 7, Epilogue.
T

 he evolution of the U.S. Army, from its humble origins in the 

colonial militia through its official creation during the Revolution

and the massive bloodletting of the Civil War to the first tentative steps on the path to empire, was slow and uncertain. Throughout 

this long evolution, American citizens wavered between the ideals of a 

“nation in arms,” of a citizen militia, and the stability of a well-trained, 

professional standing army. Safe behind its ocean barriers and supported by the intellectual ideals of its enlightenment-trained founders, 

America resisted the creation of a large standing military force as both 

unnecessary and dangerous to its liberty. 

Yet, at the same time, few could doubt that a standing army often 

came in handy. How else was the frail new nation, huddled along the 

eastern seaboard of a massive continent, to cope with the continuing 

mission of Indian-fighting and frontier-policing for most of its formative years? At the same time, only an obtuse observer of the world stage 

could believe that the dynamic empires of Europe would not at some 

point in time turn their attentions again to the new republic. It was thus 

essential for a prudent nation to maintain a small, solid core of professional soldiers for an expansible force to preserve the security of the 

nation in any future conflict.

Building on the colonial tradition of defending the expanding settlements from Indians, the American Army could not ignore its vital 

role as a force in being even if it conflicted with the philosophy of

the founding fathers. Necessity required such a force; but inclination 

continued to keep it small, except during the years of crisis of the 

Revolution (1775–1783) and the Civil War (1861–1865). Even in those

instances, and especially in the latter case, much of the fighting was

Epilogue

The American Army

1775–1917
American Military History

394

done by volunteer formations that were disbanded at the end of the 

war; the

Regular Armygrew only slightly during America’s first century,

even during the horror of the Civil War.

A powerful, continuous dichotomy existed between the forces that 

wanted to rely primarily on a militia and those who saw the necessity for 

a strong standing army. Most of the American people maintained—and 

despite the evidence of their own experience continue to maintain—

that as members of a democracy they were basically peaceful in nature. 

Americans imaged themselves as an unmilitary people, content to go 

about their business of trade or farming with little notice given to the 

outside world and committed to the principles of peace. Though much 

taken with their self-image, Americans were in many ways very warlike. 

As a nation they constantly fought against Native American tribes and 

soon moved like a torrent into the west, sweeping away the indigenous 

people and conquering the Mexican lands between the coasts. 

This

expansionism,whateverthe rationale or justification,was

essentially a warlike act by a dynamic, restless, and violent people. 

Granted, most of the “conquest” was accomplished as much by waves 

of immigrants as by arms. There was only a small standing army to 

serve as initial scouts, military spearhead, and police force; but that 

small army was a critical factor in the expansion. Not content with 

merely conquering the continent, in the space of a few years America 

expanded outward int

othe Caribbean region and acrossthePacific

to Hawaii and the Philippines. At the same time Americans seemed 

content to follow George Washington’s words of advice to “steer 

clear of permanent alliances” and stand “against the insidious wiles 

of foreign influence.”

Thus Americansconvincedthemselvesthat asa

people apart they would not need a large standing Army despite their 

many aggressive tendencies. The oceans and a small Navy would pro-

tect them from others while they consolidated their hold on the middle 

portion of the continent. 

Yet both ideals, opposing a large standing army and staying out of 

foreign quarrels,

wereto be difficultto sustain inthetwentiethcentury

and beyond. Unbeknownst to Americans, the country was on the verge 

of an almost unrelenting series of

wars andconflicts ontheworld stage

that would demand new ideas and a new Army at each turn. The Army 

and its institutions would be forced to change, react, and change again 

in ways as yet unforeseen. If the previous centuries were any indication, 

the Army andthe American peoplewould remainflexibleenoughto

change and grow accordingly to respond to each new challenge ahead. 

An essential part of the Army’s ability to change and adapt was the 

slow, but far from steady, growth of professionalism within the Army: 

a sense that serving in the Army was a unique calling with special stan-

dards. The essence of a profession, as opposed to merely a vocation, is 

that a profession establishes standards of performance of a complex 

set of duties and responsibilities, often binds its practitioners to those 

standards with some form of oath or charge, and then internally cre-

ates a system of discipline to enforce those standards. Thus members 

of a profession, with their own unique bodies of wisdom, training, and 

beliefs, tend to believe that they stand apart from the rest of society. 

Historically the ministry, medicine, law, teaching, and the military have 

been viewed in western societies as professions; although over the years 
Epilogue: THE AMERICAN ARMY, 1775–1917

395

the term professional has been more and more widely used for a variety 

of trades and jobs.

If theU.S. Army isa profession, and it seems to fit the definition,

how then did the Army become thatway? How did soldiers and officers

begin to see themselves as professionals rather than just citizens tempo-

rarily serving in the military? What unique standards or duties did the 

Army adopt as part of this trend, and how did it enforce those stan-

dards? These are critical questions, especially given America’s current 

reliance on a professional military to perform myriad duties throughout 

the world. It can certainly be said that the seeds for today’s professional 

Army were sowed in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

The growth of professionalism in the U.S. Army probably occurred 

more quickly inthe officercorpsthan intheenlisted ranks. In partthis

was duet

o

the American military’s European heritage:the officers often

were members of the upper classes who brought their distinct sense of 

identity and apartness

withthem.This “classconsciousness” ofthe offi-

cer corps changed, albeit slowly, over time due to the inherently demo

-

cratic instincts of Americans who looked with deep suspicion on any 

manifestation of a “superior” class based on inherited wealth or social 

position.

The officercorps, recruited increasingly fromthe middleclass

with the path open to all through the portals of the Military Academy at 

West Point, became based on merit rather than social class.

Nevertheless, officers retained

a sense of belonging toa unique

“calling” with the unifying precepts of duty, honor, and country forming the standards that bound them to their profession and to each other. 

This sense of uniqueness spread throughout the Army as noncommis-

sioned officers and soldiers began to identify more and more with their

comrades in the Army rather than with civilians. Their service alone set 

them apart from most Americans. Uniforms, ceremonies, drill, rank, 

discipline, and other elements reinforced this sense of being different. 

This sense of apartness and uniqueness was probably a good thing. 

Without such a distinct corporate identity, the Army may not have been 

able to sustain itself during the years of isolation and trial on America’s 

frontiers.

Along with a sense of apartness, it was equally essential for the 

Army to establish standards of training and duty performance that 

would formally teach new members exactly what was expected of 

them. Initially, this would involve training all recruits in their units 

rather than any in standardized schools. Only officers

were exposed to

some measure of standardized training (here again, West Point led the 

way); but after the initial schooling that led to

a commission, officers

also were expected to learn on the job. Only after the Civil War did the 

Army begin to establish schools of application for the combat arms, 

and only after the start of the twentieth century did it create the Army 

War College for education in strategic thinking and higher levels of the 

management of war policy.

As the American Army faced test after test along the frontier, it 

increasingly developed standards not just of duty performance (what 

soldiers or officers nee

d

t

o do as

thetechnicalcomponents oftheir

craft) but also ofconduct: ho

w soldiers, officers, and noncommissioned

officers aret

o behave

towardeach other.Froma relative isolation from

American societygrewa sense of beingaself-sufficientsocialentitya

s
American Military History

396

well as a unique vocation with arduous tasks not borne or perhaps even 

understood by the rest of society. From this apartness grew customs, 

traditions, and behaviors every bit as important in forming a sense of 

professionalism as any listing of tasks or training in necessary technical 

skills. As the Army grew such a sense of corporate identity, it developed the belief that only other members of the society understood the 

special pressures of the military and only other members could discipline wayward soldiers or officers.

By the early days of the twentieth century, the U.S. Army can 

be said to have evolved into an organization with all the aspects of 

a profession: a unique set of skills, formal initiation and indoctrination, training, rituals, standards of conduct, and the means to enforce 

that conduct. Though small, especially by European standards, the U.S. 

Army on the eve of “The Great War” was a tried and tested organization with a strong sense of professional identity and deep roots and traditions based on years of service to the nation. Building upon the past 

and only reluctantly drawn into the future, the U.S. Army stood on the 

threshold of world conflict, not entirely understanding the challenges

ahead but nonetheless fully committed to respond to the needs of the 

nation wherever those needs led.
Abercrombie, 2d Lt. William R., 321

Adams, John, 121–22

Adams (frigate), 146

Adjutant General, 61, 148

Adjutant and Inspector General, 160

Adolphus, Gustavus, 22, 24

African Americans

alliances with Indians, 162, 163, 171

in the American Revolution, 55

in the Civil War, 220, 236–37

colonial militia used against, 32

and reconstruction, 310–11

in the Spanish-American War, 355, 358

in the U.S. Army, 308

in the War of 1812, 153

See also Colored Troops, U.S.; Freedmen’s Bureau; 

Segregation; Slavery, slaves.

Agua Nueva, Mexico, 184

Aguinaldo, Emilio, 353, 360–64, 365

Ainsworth, Maj. Gen. Fred C., 377

Alabama, 144–45, 162, 171, 172, 241, 245, 295

Alaska, 320, 379

Alexander, Brig. Gen. William, 68

Alexander the Great, 19, 22

Alger, Russell M., 350, 358

Allen, Ethan, 48

Allen, 2d Lt. Henry T., 321

Altgeld, John P., 312

Ambrister, Robert C., 163

Amendment, Second, 112–13

American Indians

alliances with African Americans, 162, 163, 171

as allies of the British, 34, 38–39, 116, 119, 120, 132

as allies of the British and Canadians in the War of 1812, 

135, 136–39, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 144, 168

as allies of the British in the Revolutionary War, 63, 81,

83, 84, 89–90

as allies of the French, 34, 36–37, 121

as allies of U.S. forces, 153, 163

as barrier to westward expansion, 120, 168, 327–28, 339

colonial militia used against, 30, 31, 32

destruction of Indian villages, 29, 90, 117–18, 120, 171, 

334

forced removals of, 155, 171, 172, 333, 336

forced onto reservations, 333, 334, 335, 339, 343, 344

and the Indian Wars, 1865–1890, 325–44

and Indian wars of the 1850s, 193

massacres of, 328, 333

massacres of U.S. Army elements by, 169, 327, 332

method of warfare, 28–29, 30, 38, 166

as scouts for U.S. Army, 333, 337–38, 343

treaties with, 109, 111, 116–17, 168, 173, 331, 333, 339

uprisings, 144–46, 249

weapons, 28–29

winter campaigns against, 334, 335, 339–40

See also Indian nations/tribes.

American migration, 173

American Revolution, 2, 9, 45–106. See also Civil War, 

American.

Ammunition

artillery, 24, 210, 374

black powder, 318, 319, 349, 356, 374

for the Continental Army, 59

lead balls, 24

Minié ball, 195

in the Revolutionary War, 48

shortages of, 48, 49, 54, 59, 148, 264, 358

smokeless powder, 318, 349, 374

See also Artillery; Bayonets; Guns; Rifles; Weapons.

Amphibious operations, 11, 141, 187, 286

Anaconda Plan, 207, 209

Anderson, Maj. Robert, 202

Andersonville Prison, 302

André, Maj. John, 84

Antietam Creek, 234, 236, 237

Apalachicola River, 162–63

Apothecary General, Office of the, 148

Appomattox Court House, Virginia, 260, 300, 301

Arbuthnot, Alexander, 162, 163

Arista, General Mariano, 178–80

Index
American Military History

398

Arizona, 192, 337–39

Arizona, Confederate Territory of, 249

Arizona, Department of, 337

Arkansas, 168, 169, 203, 249

Armed Forces Voluntary Recruitment Act of 1945, 379

Armistead, Bvt. Brig. Gen. Walker K., 172

Armor plate, 305, 319

Armstrong, John, 148, 160

Army and Navy Journal, 316

Army of Northern Virginia. See under Confederate armies.

Army of the Potomac. See under Union armies.

Arnold, Maj. Gen. Benedict, 48, 83, 84, 85, 96, 99, 103

on Lakes Champlain and George, 69–70

at Quebec, 53–54

treason of, 94–95

Articles of Confederation, 57, 58, 59, 109, 111

Artillery

ammunition for, 195–96, 210, 318–19, 374

battle management of, 214, 218, 254, 258–59

at coastal fortifications, 165, 195

howitzers, 165, 179, 182, 183, 185, 188, 190, 374

mobility of, 318–19

naval ordnance, 165, 215, 374

in siege warfare, 24, 187

system, 166, 196

types and developments, 24, 178, 188, 195–96, 210, 212,

213, 265, 318–19, 374

units, 60, 113, 119, 122, 123, 349

early European, 21, 22, 23–24, 25–26

flying artillery, 178, 179

in the Mexican War, 178, 182, 183, 185–86, 187, 188

in the War of 1812, 154, 155

See also Ammunition; Guns; Weapons.

Assize of Arms, 20

Atkinson, Col. Henry, 168

Atlanta, Georgia, 207, 272, 274, 284, 286, 293, 295–96

Augur, Christopher, 330

Aviation, 377–78

Badge of Military Merit, 104

Bahia Honda, Cuba, 375

Baker, Col. Edward D., 220

Balloons, 304, 320, 356, 378

Baltimore, Maryland, 152

Baltimore Riots, 205

Banks, Maj. Gen. Nathaniel P., 267, 268, 272, 279, 284, 285,

286, 291

Barnard, Maj. John G., 214

Barnes, Brig. Gen. Joseph K., 316

Barras, Admiral Louis, Comte de, 101

Bascom, Lt. George N., 328

Battle above the Clouds, 280

Baum, Col. Friedrich, 83

Bayonets, 48, 49, 87, 88, 89, 104, 182

charges, 120, 146, 264

French, 103

rod, 373

on smoothbore musket, 24

socket, 22, 25

See also Ammunition; Guns; Rifles; Weapons.

Beaufort, South Carolina, 92

Beauregard, Brig. Gen. Pierre G. T., 187, 202, 209–10, 

212–14, 244, 291

Bee, Brig. Gen. Barnard E., 212

Beecher, Lt. Frederick H., 333

Bell Telephone Company, 320

Bennington, Vermont, 83, 84

Benteen, Capt. Frederick W., 341, 343

Bentonville, North Carolina, 299

Bernard, Brig. Gen. Simon, 161

Big Bethel, Virginia, 209

Billings, John S., 322

Bissell, Sgt. Daniel, Jr., 104

Black Hawk, Chief, 168

Black Kettle, 333, 334

Bladensburg, Battle of, 152

Blair, Maj. Gen. Francis P., Jr., 205

Blockades

of Cuba, 350, 352, 353

of the Philippines, 352–53

of the Southern (Confederate) coast, 203, 204, 206, 209,

215, 244

of the United States by the British during the War of 

1812, 136, 139, 146, 148, 155

of Vera Cruz, Mexico, 187

Bloody Hill, Missouri, 217

Bonneville, Capt. Benjamin L. E., 166, 192

Bordentown, New Jersey, 70–71

Boston, Massachusetts, 46, 47–51, 52, 53, 55

Bounties, 59, 62, 71

Bouquet, Col. Henry, 38

Bowlegs, Billy, 163

Boxer Uprising, 366–69

Bozeman, John, 330

Bozeman Trail, 330–32, 335, 339

Braddock, Maj. Gen. Edward, 36–38, 41

Bragg, General Braxton, 229, 232, 272, 278, 284

in Mexican War, 178, 185–86

Western operations, 245–48, 267, 271, 274–77, 279–80

Brandy Station, Virginia, 260

Breckinridge, Maj. Gen. John C., 248

Breed’s Hill, Boston, 48–50

Brevet rank, 149

British Army

American recruits for, 34, 38

and the American Revolution, 46–50, 54–55, 62–72,

75–85, 87–104

and American Tories, 63, 65, 76, 83, 84, 87, 90, 92, 94, 95, 99
index

399

coordination with the Navy, 92

Indian allies, 38–39, 63, 83, 84, 89–90, 116, 119, 120, 135,

136–41, 142, 144, 168

officers, 50

recruiting for, 62

reinforcements for, 75, 76, 85, 89, 90, 99

strength, 66, 75, 81, 87, 92, 93, 98, 99, 101, 140–41, 142,

149

supplies for, 61, 62–63, 76, 79, 83, 84, 85, 87, 96, 98

transportation problems, 81, 83, 87–88

and the War of 1812, 135, 136–42, 144, 148–51

See also British Royal Navy; Great Britain.

British Royal Navy, 34

and the Revolutionary War, 49, 62–63, 64, 65–66, 68, 70,

88–89, 92, 99, 101

and the War of 1812, 131–32, 135, 142, 149, 151–53

See also British Army; Great Britain.

Brock, Maj. Gen. Isaac, 134, 136, 137, 138

Brooke, Maj. Gen. John R., 381

Brown, Maj. Jacob, 178, 179

Brown, Maj. Gen. Jacob J., 141, 149, 150–51, 160, 164

Brown, John, 199

Brown, Sgt. William, 104

Browning, John, 374

Brucker, Wilber M., 8

Bryan, William Jennings, 363, 386

Buchanan, James, 199, 241

Buckner, Brig. Gen. Simon B., 241

Buell, Brig. Gen. Don Carlos, 240, 242, 244, 245–46, 267

Buena Vista, Battle of, 184–87

Buffalo, New York, 138, 144, 149

Buford, Col. Abraham, 92

Buford, Brig. Gen. John, Jr., 261, 263

Bull Run, Virginia, 209–14, 215, 230–32

Bunker Hill, Battle of, 48–50

Bureau of Indian Affairs, 344

Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen, and Abandoned Lands. See

Freedmen’s Bureau.

Burgoyne, Maj. Gen. Sir John, 48, 76–77, 81, 83–85, 89–90,

98

Burnside, Maj. Gen. Ambrose E., 10, 234, 235, 237, 253, 

254, 274, 288

at Fredericksburg, 237–39

at Knoxville, 278, 279

leads IX Corps, 286, 287

Butler, Maj. Gen. Benjamin F., 209–10, 218, 244, 286,

290–91

Cadwalader, Col. John, 70

Calhoun, John C., 156, 161, 162, 163, 164–66, 200, 314–15

California, 177, 180, 186–87, 192, 193, 381

Camargo, Mexico, 182, 184

Camden, South Carolina, 79, 92, 93

Camels, 194

Cameron, Simon, 219

Canada, 40, 53–55, 110–11, 121

American attempt to annex, 132, 136–44, 148–51,

152–53, 155

British defense of, 134, 136–44, 148–51, 152–53

British troops in, 62, 64, 75, 76, 81, 134, 136–39

struggle between France and England for control of, 

32–41

and the War of 1812, 131, 134, 135–44, 148–51, 152–53

Canby, Brig. Gen. Edward R. S., 249, 330, 335

Cape Breton Island, Canada, 34, 39

Caribbean, 347–48, 371, 372, 381

Carleton, Maj. Gen. Sir Guy, 66, 69–70

Carpenter, Capt. Louis H., 333

Carr, Col. Eugene A., 338

Carranza, General Venustiano, 383, 384–85

Carrington, Col. Henry B., 331

Carrizal, Mexico, 385

Cartagena, Colombia, 34

Carter, Lt. Col. William H., 376

Casey, Brig. Gen. Thomas L., 321

Cass, Lewis, 166, 168, 169

Casualties

American

1807, 127

in the American Revolution, 47–48, 49, 62, 69, 71,

90, 92

in the Civil War, 212, 230, 234, 239, 244, 258, 259, 

267–68, 272, 277, 288, 291, 293, 296, 301

in the Indian Wars, 328, 332, 333, 334, 337, 343

in the Mexican War, 178, 183, 186, 187, 188, 190–91

in the Second Seminole War, 172

in the Spanish-American War, 358, 359, 360, 365

in the War of 1812, 137, 138, 140, 150, 151

American Indian, 327, 332, 333, 334, 337, 343

in the Boxer Uprising in China, 367, 368

British, 62, 71, 84, 85, 98, 140, 150, 151, 154

French, 90

Mexican, 179, 183, 186, 188, 190–91

Cavalries, 121–22, 123, 200

1st, 194

2d, 194

4th, 335

7th, 334, 339, 340–44

9th, 308, 358

10th, 308, 333, 358, 385

13th, 384

See also Cavalry units.

Cavalry Association, U.S., 315

Cavalry Journal, 315

Cavalry units

African American, 308, 333, 355, 358

armament, 24

Confederate, 206, 218, 228, 260, 287, 288, 290, 293, 298, 299
American Military History

400

Cavalry units—Continued

in the Spanish-American War, 356

Union, 200, 218, 254, 259, 260, 261, 263, 287, 288, 290,

293, 297–98, 299, 300

use by early European armies, 23, 24, 25

See also Cavalries.

Cavell, Edith, 387

Cemeteries, national, 302

Cemetery Hill, Gettysburg, 263

Cemetery Ridge, Gettysburg, 263, 264–65, 266

Centreville, Virginia, 210

Cerro Gordo, Battle of, 188–89, 191

Cervera y Topete, Admiral Pascual, 352, 353, 355, 358–59

Chaffee, Maj. Gen. Adna R., 367

Chamberlain, Col. Joshua, 264

Chancellorsville, Virginia, 254, 256–58

Chaplains, 160, 302

Chapultepec, Mexico, 189, 190

Charleston, South Carolina, 65–66, 90, 92, 93, 96, 98, 99,

102, 215

Charlotte, North Carolina, 95, 96

Chattanooga, Tennessee, 207, 245, 246, 248, 272, 274, 275,

277, 278–81, 284, 293, 300, 302

Chauncey, Commodore Isaac, 140, 141, 149, 150, 151

Chesapeake, USS, 132

Chesapeake Bay region, 99, 101, 146, 152, 207, 288

Chicago, Illinois, 132, 193, 312

Chickahominy River, 227

Chickamauga Campaign, 268–73, 275, 276, 277

Chickamauga Park, Georgia, 350

Chief of Staff, Army, 376, 377, 386

Chile, 348

China, 366–69, 379

China Relief Expedition, 367–68

Chippewa River, 149–51

Chivington, Col. John M., 328, 333

Cholera, 168. See also Disease.

Christian Commission, U.S., 302

Churchill, Sgt. Elijah, 104

Churubusco, Mexico, 189–90

Cincinnati, Ohio, 117, 119–20, 292

Civil War, American, 199–304

advantages of each side at beginning, 206–07, 209

destruction of Southern economy, 287, 296, 299

and European powers, 206, 215, 234, 245

mobilization for, 204, 215–16, 219–20

strategy of the North, 207, 209, 214–15, 216–17, 218–19,

220

strategy of the South, 207, 215, 245, 271

See also American Revolution; Confederate armies; 

Confederate States of America; individual battles; 

Slavery, slaves; Union armies.

Civilian authority over military, 57–58, 376

Clark, Lt. Col. George Rogers, 90

Clark, William, 124, 126

Clausewitz, Carl von, 6, 9, 14

Clay, Henry, 161

Cleburne, Maj. Gen. Patrick R., 275

Cleveland, Grover, 312, 348, 349

Clinch, Bvt. Brig. Gen. Duncan L., 168

Clinton, Lt. Gen. Sir Henry, 48, 65, 70, 76, 85, 89, 101, 102

and Benedict Arnold, 94, 96

Philadelphia evacuated by, 87–88

southern campaign of, 90, 92, 95, 98–99

Coalition warfare in the Boxer Uprising, 366–69

Coastal defenses, 374

Coastal fortifications, 161, 165, 319, 374

Cochise, Chief, 328, 337

Cockburn, Rear Adm. George, 146, 148

Cold Harbor, Virginia, 290, 291

Colorado, 192, 328, 337

Colored Troops, Bureau of, 237. See also African Americans; 

Freedmen’s Bureau; Segregation; Slavery, slaves.

Colored Troops, U.S., 236, 308, 309. See also African Americans; 

Freedmen’s Bureau; Segregation; Slavery, slaves.

Columbia, South Carolina, 299

Columbus, New Mexico, 384, 388

Combined-arms units, 380

Command of the Army Act, 309

Command and General Staff College, 316

Commanding General of the Army, 150, 164, 286, 313,

316–17, 319, 334, 350, 376

Commissary General, 61, 86, 148

Commissary General of Ordnance, 160

Commissary General of Purchases, Office of the, 134

Commissary General of Subsistence, 163

Communications, battlefield, 76, 239, 318, 319–20. See also

Signal communications.

Communications, lines of

British, 62–63, 137, 140, 151

Confederate, 206, 239, 242, 258, 260, 271, 274, 284, 285,

290

in the Mexican War, 188, 189

in the Philippines, 366

Union, 216, 225, 227, 230, 244, 267, 268, 270, 280, 285

in the War of 1812, 145, 151

See also Signal communications.

Concentration. See Mass.

Concord, Massachusetts, 46, 47

Confederate armies. See also Cavalry units, Confederate; 

Civil War, American; Confederate Third Corps; Union 

armies.

Army of the Mississippi, 242, 293

Army of Northern Virginia, 207, 218, 231, 233, 239, 245, 

253, 259–67, 284, 285, 290, 295, 301

Army of Tennessee, 277, 293, 298

Confederate States of America, 200, 206–07, 302, 304. See 

also Civil War, American.
index

401

Confederate Third Corps, 261

Confiscation Act, Second, 237

Congressional Committee on the Conduct of the War, Joint, 

220, 237. See also U.S. Congress.

Connecticut, 69, 110

Connor, Maj. Gen. Patrick E., 331

Conscription, 60, 245, 275, 301, 302, 304

Constellation (frigate), 134, 146

Constitution, U.S., and federal military powers, 112–13

Constitutional Convention, 112

Continental Army

ammunition for, 54, 55, 59

Canadian regiments in, 54

cavalry used by, 97–98

coordination with the French, 87–89, 90, 92

creation of, 50–53

demobilization of, 107

discipline, 52, 79, 94

militia used by, 57–58, 66, 69, 70–72, 85, 90, 92–93, 94,

95, 96–98, 101–02

morale, 94

officers, 51–52, 61, 66, 76–77, 107, 108

organization of, 58, 59–61

pay, 94

recruitment for, 51, 52–53, 54, 55–56, 58–59, 66, 72, 94

strength, 58, 70, 76, 85, 89, 90, 92, 93, 96, 98, 101–02, 107

supplies for, 53, 54, 56, 58, 59, 61, 69, 76, 81, 85–86, 90,

94, 95, 96, 107

training, 86–87, 88, 104

weapons used by, 88

Continental Congress, 86

First, 46

Second, 48, 50–51, 52, 53, 57, 58, 60

See also U.S. Congress.

Contractors, problems with, 114, 162, 163, 172, 219–20

Contreras, Mexico, 189

Cooke, Philip St. George, 330

Copperheads, 245

Corbin, Maj. Gen. Henry C., 376

Cornwallis, General (Lord) Charles, 69, 70, 77, 79

and southern campaign, 92, 93, 95, 96

at Trenton, 71–72

at Yorktown, 98–99, 101–02

Corps of artificers, 172

Corps of Artillerists and Engineers, 121, 122, 123

Corps badges, 254, 301–02

Corps of Engineers, 122, 123, 134, 155, 160, 161, 163,

219, 315, 321–22. See also Corps of Artillerists and 

Engineers; Corps of Topographical Engineers; 

Topographical engineers.

Corps of Topographical Engineers, 173, 192, 219. See also

Topographical engineers.

Corps of Volunteers for North Western Discovery, 126

Council of National Defense, 389

Cowpens, Battle of the, 96–98

Crawford, William H., 160, 161, 165, 192

Creek War, 146, 169

Crimean War, 196

Crittenden, Maj. Gen. Thomas L., 248, 275

Cromwell, General Oliver, 108

Crook, Bvt. Maj. Gen. George, 330, 337–40, 343

Cuba, 348–49, 350, 352, 353, 354–55, 356, 358–60, 372,

375, 377, 381, 383

Cuban Pacification, Army of, 381

Culp’s Hill, Gettysburg, 263, 265

Cumberland, Army of the. See under Union armies.

Cumberland River, 217, 219, 240, 292

Curtis, Maj. Gen. Samuel R., 242, 249

Custer, Lt. Col. George A., 330, 334, 335, 339, 340, 341, 

343

Dade, Bvt. Maj. Francis L., 168–69

Daiquiri, Cuba, 355

Dallas, Alexander J., 160

Davis, Jefferson, 178, 182, 186, 194–95, 196, 246

and the Civil War, 200, 202, 203, 205, 206, 213, 228, 277,

299

and effort to invade the North, 232, 259

and military commanders, 293

and military planning, 210, 225, 271, 272

Dawes, William, 47

Dearborn, Maj. Gen. Henry, 139, 140, 141–42

Delafield, Maj. Richard, 196

Delaware, 203, 218, 236

Delaware River, 70, 71, 72, 77, 79

Desertions, 54, 62, 119, 327

Detroit, Michigan, 121, 136–38, 139, 142

Detroit River, 136

Devil’s Den, Gettysburg, 264

Dewey, Commodore George, 352–53, 360

Dick Act, 379

Dickinson, Charles, 146

Dinwiddie, Robert, 35

Dinwiddie Court House, Virginia, 299

Discipline in military forces, 23, 31, 41–42, 48, 52, 79, 94, 

112, 115, 139

Disease

in the Mexican War, 182, 183, 187–88

and troop attrition, 62, 69, 141, 168, 301

in tropical climates, 356, 359, 362, 365, 381

See also Cholera; Malaria; Yellow fever.

District of Columbia, 321

Doctrine, development of, 166

Dodge, Maj. Gen. Granville M., 375

Doniphan, Col. Alexander W., 178, 185

Draft, military, 31, 59, 219

Draft laws, 302, 304

Draft riots, 275, 304
American Military History

402

Dragoons, 60, 119, 121, 139, 149, 166, 173, 178, 184–85,

187, 188, 194, 200

Drouillard, George, 126

Drummond, Maj. Gen. Gordon, 151

Early, Maj. Gen. Jubal A., 292

East, Department of the, 182, 200

Eastern Samoa, 347

Economic warfare, 127, 287, 295, 386

Economy of force, 6, 7–8, 10

Grant and Sherman use, 299

Lee uses, 228, 256

and the Panama Canal, 383

violation in the War of 1812, 136

Washington uses, 77

See also War, principles of.

Eisenhower, General of the Army Dwight D., 10

El Caney, Cuba, 356

Elementary Treatise on Advance-Guard, Out-Post, and Detachment 

Service of Troops (Mahan), 196

Elements of Military Art and Science (Halleck), 196

Ellesmere Island, Canada, 321

Elmira Prison, 302

Emancipation Proclamation, 234–37

Embargo Act of 1807, 127

Emory, Maj. William H., 192

Endicott Board, 319, 374

Engineer School of Application, 315, 377

Engineering, U.S. military superiority in, 155

Engineers. See Corps of Artillerists and Engineers; Corps 

of Engineers; Corps of Topographical Engineers; 

Topographical engineers.

England. See Great Britain.

English military establishments, early, 20

Enrollment Act, 302, 304

Essayons Club, 315

Estaing, Charles Hector, Comte d’, 87, 88–89, 90, 92

European military establishments, 19–27

Eustis, William, 120, 148

Ewell, Lt. Gen. Richard S., 259, 263–65, 300

Ewing, Brig. Gen. James, 70, 71

Expansible Army, 164, 180, 314–15, 376, 380, 388, 393

Fair Oaks, Virginia, 228

Fallen Timbers, Battle of, 120

Farragut, Rear Adm. David G., 244, 286, 295

Federal marshals, assisted by the U.S. Army, 311

Ferguson, Maj. Patrick, 95

Fetterman, Capt. William J., 330, 332

Feudalism, 20

Field Artillery School, 377

Field Artillery units

2d Artillery, 212

5th Artillery, 368

Field Service Regulations, 376, 380

First Reconstruction Act, 310

First Special Service Force, 341

Fishing Creek, South Carolina, 93

Five Civilized Nations, 155, 333

Five Forks, Virginia, 299

Flipper, Henry O., 309

Florida, 9, 32, 33–34, 87, 90, 132, 144, 145, 161–63, 168–72

Floyd, Brig. Gen. John B., 241

Foote, Andrew H., 240–41, 242, 244

Forbes, Brig. Gen. John, 41

Forrest, Lt. Gen. Nathan B., 6, 241–42, 245, 268, 277, 298

Forsyth, Maj. George A., 333

Forsyth, Col. James W., 344

Fortescue, John, 38

Fortification techniques in Europe, 21, 26–27

Forts

Bowyer, Alabama, 155

Brooke, Florida, 168–69

Brown, Texas, 179

C. F. Smith, Montana, 332

Craig, New Mexico, 215, 216, 249

Dearborn, Illinois, 132, 137, 138

Detroit, Michigan, 34, 90, 132, 136–37, 138, 139–40, 141–42

Donelson, Tennessee, 240–41, 300

Duquesne, Pennsylvania, 35–38, 51

Erie, Pennsylvania, 149, 151, 155

Gadsden, Florida, 163

George, New York, 141, 144, 149, 150–51

Greble, District of Columbia, 315

Hawkins, Georgia, 162

Henry, Tennessee, 240–42, 300

King, Florida, 168

Laramie, Wyoming, 331–32

Leavenworth, Kansas, 166, 173, 180, 186, 193, 216, 315,

316, 377

Lee, New York, 69

Logan, Colorado, 320

MacIntosh, Pennsylvania, 111

Mackinac, Michigan, 132, 136, 137, 138

Malden, Canada, 136–37, 142

McHenry, Maryland, 152

McNair, District of Columbia, 368

Meigs, Ohio, 140, 142, 155

Miami, Ohio, 120

Mims, Alabama, 144–45

Monroe, Virginia, 166, 209, 225, 314, 315

Moultrie, South Carolina, 65–66, 92, 169

Myer, Virginia, 315, 378

Necessity, Pennsylvania, 41

Niagara, New York, 34, 90, 132, 138, 140, 144, 150–51

Phil Kearny, Wyoming, 332

Pickens, Florida, 200, 202

Pitt, Pennsylvania, 109, 111, 121
index

403

Reno, Wyoming, 331

Scott, Georgia, 162–63

Sill, Oklahoma, 334

St. Marks, Florida, 162, 163

Stanwix, New York, 81, 83, 94, 111

Stephenson, Ohio, 140, 142

Stevens, District of Columbia, 292

Strother, Alabama, 145

Sumter, South Carolina, 48, 200, 202, 210, 215, 216, 220,

259

Texas, Texas, 178–80

Ticonderoga, New York, 48, 53, 69–70, 81

Union, New Mexico, 216, 249

Vincennes, Indiana, 118, 120

Washington, New York, 69

Washington, Ohio, 117, 118, 119, 121

Wayne, Indiana, 118

Whipple (Myer), Virginia, 315, 320

Forts, British, 48, 53, 109, 110–11, 120, 121

Forts, French, 34, 35

Forts, frontier, 29–30, 322–24

Forts, Spanish, 162, 163

Foulois, Lt. Benjamin, 378

France, 121

and the American Civil War, 241

American merchant vessels seized by, 121, 123, 127, 131

and aviation, 378

and China, 366

Indian allies used in colonial wars, 34, 36–37, 41

and Louisiana, 32, 33, 123, 124

and Mexico, 284, 308

and the Revolutionary War, 63, 64, 75, 76, 87–89, 90, 94,

99, 101–04

struggle with England for control of Canada, 32–33, 

34–40, 41

treaty of alliance with the American states, 85

and the War of 1812, 131

war with Great Britain, 121–23, 127

Franklin, Benjamin, 35

Franklin, Tennessee, 296

Franklin, Maj. Gen. William B., 237

Frederick, Maryland, 233, 292

Frederick the Great, 23, 25, 26, 62, 86

Fredericksburg, Virginia, 10, 224, 237, 254, 256, 258

Freedmen’s Bureau, 309. See also African Americans; 

Colored Troops, U.S.; Slavery, slaves.

Freeman’s Farm, First Battle of, 84

Freeman’s Farm, Second Battle of, 85

Fremont, Charles C., 217, 236

Fremont, 2d Lt. John C., 173, 192

French and Indian War (1756–1763), 32, 36–40, 41, 45, 117

French Fleet, 87, 88–89, 90, 92, 94, 99, 101–02, 103–04

Frontier settlements, protection of, 166

Funston, Maj. Gen. Frederick, 364, 365, 384

Gadsden, Lt. James, 163

Gage, Maj. Gen. Thomas, 36, 46–48, 49–50

Gaines, Bvt. Maj. Gen. Edmund P., 164, 168, 169–71, 173,

182

Gaines’ Mill, Virginia, 228, 291

Gallatin, Albert, 161

Ganoe, William A., 313

Garcia, General Calixto, 355

Garrison, Lindley M., 387–88

Gates, Maj. Gen. Horatio, 52, 69, 79, 81, 84, 85, 86, 93, 95,

96

Gatewood, Lt. Charles B., 339

General Orders 100, Instructions for the Government of 

the Armies of the United States in the Field, 256

General Service and Staff College, 315

General Staff, 387–89, 390

in the Civil War, 219

composition of, 160–61

plans developed by, 380

responsibilities of, 376–77

General Staff and Service College, 377

General War Order No. 1, 223

Geological surveys, 321–22

George III, King of England, 50, 55, 64, 76, 87

Georgetown, South Carolina, 92

Georgia, 33, 34, 90, 92, 132, 161–62, 171, 286, 295, 299

Germain, George, 75–76, 84, 94, 98–99

Germantown, Pennsylvania, 79–81

Germany, 347, 366, 385, 389–90

Geronimo, 337, 339

Gerry, Elbridge, 109

Gettysburg, Battle of, 10, 259–60, 261, 263–67

Ghost Dance religion, 343, 344

Gibbon, Col. John, 337, 341, 343

Gibbons, Brig. Gen. John, 267, 333

Glover, Col. John, 68

Goethals, Col. George W., 382

Gold rushes, 330–31, 339, 375, 381

Gorgas, Col. William C., 382, 383

Grafton, West Virginia, 217

Graham, George, 161

Granger, Maj. Gen. Gordon, 277

Grant, General Ulysses S., 178, 179, 191, 206, 240, 301

as General in Chief, 10–11, 284–304, 308, 309–10, 

313

plan for winning the Civil War, 283–84, 284–87, 296–97,

298–99

in the post–Civil War period, 316, 322, 326, 330

and the Vicksburg Campaign, 268–72

and the Western Theater of Operations in the Civil War, 

217, 240–42, 244, 259, 267–68, 279–80

Grasse, Admiral Francois de, 101

Grattan, Lt. John L., 327

Graves, Admiral Thomas, 101, 102
American Military History

404

Great Britain, 348, 382

and the American Civil War, 241

American merchant vessels seized by, 121, 127, 131

and the American Revolution, 9, 62–73, 75–103

and China, 366–68

and defense of Canada, 134, 136–44, 148–51, 152–53

France challenges for control of Canada, 32–33, 34–40, 

41

Indian allies, 34, 38–39, 116, 119, 120, 132, 136–39, 140,

141, 142, 144, 148–49, 168

and Samoa, 347

taxation of American colonists, 45–46

and the War of 1812, 128, 131–56

war with France, 121–23, 127

See also British Army; British Royal Navy.

Great Lakes region, 34, 35, 109

Greely, 1st Lt. Adolphus W., 321

Greene, Maj. Gen. Nathanael, 66, 68, 69, 70, 79, 86, 93,

94–95, 96, 98, 102, 103

Gribeauval, General Jean Baptiste de, 166

Grierson, Col. Benjamin H., 270–71

Guam, 360, 372

Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, 354, 359, 372, 381

Guerrilla warfare, 34, 40–41, 92–93, 104, 172, 336, 362–64,

365

Guilford Court House, North Carolina, 98

Gulf, Department of the, 267, 279, 284, 328

Gulf of Mexico, 181, 182, 218, 286

Gulflight (merchant ship), 386

Gun Foundry Board, Army-Navy, 319

Guns

Colt .45 revolver, 373

Brown Bess, 24

Gatling, 318, 355, 358, 373

machine guns, 318, 373–74

muskets, 13–14, 24, 25, 30, 48, 104, 182, 194–95, 263,

318

pistols, 24, 373

rifles, 40–41, 104, 182, 194–95, 218, 318, 349, 373

See also Ammunition; Bayonets; Rifles; Weapons.

Hains, Col. Peter C., 322

Halleck, Maj. Gen. Henry Wager, 196, 241, 244, 261, 268,

270, 279, 287, 292

as General in Chief, 230–31, 232, 283, 284

an Missouri, 217, 240

as western armies commander, 242

Hamilton, Maj. Gen. Alexander, 107, 108–09, 112, 114, 

122–23

Hammond, Indiana, 312

Hampton, Brig. Gen. Wade, 144

Hampton Roads, Virginia, 146, 148

Hamtramck, Maj. John, 118

Hancock, Maj. Gen. Winfield Scott, 265, 290, 311–12, 333

Harbor defenses, 121, 122, 155, 165

Hardee, Maj. Gen. William J., 246, 247–48

Harmar, Brig. Gen. Josiah, 110–11, 113, 117–18

Harney, Brig. Gen. William S., 327

Harpers Ferry, Virginia, 114, 233, 234, 261

Harpers Ferry Armory, Virginia, 195, 199

Harrison, Brig. Gen. William Henry, 120, 139–40, 141–42, 

144, 148

Harrison’s Landing, Virginia, 228, 230, 213

Haupt, Herman, 272

Hawaii, 347, 372, 379

Hayes, Rutherford B., 311

Heath, Maj. Gen. William, 69, 101

Heliograph, 320

Henry II, 20

Herkimer, Brig. Gen. Nicholas, 83

Heth, Maj. Gen. Henry, 262

Hill, Lt. Gen. Ambrose P., 259, 261, 263, 264–65, 299, 300

Hill, Lt. Gen. Daniel H., 233, 276

Hillsborough, North Carolina, 92–93

Hitchcock, Maj. Gen. Ethan A., 224

Hobson, Lt. Richmond P., 353–54

Holland, 89

Homing pigeons, 320

Hong Kong, 352

Hood, Lt. Gen. John Bell, 275, 293, 295, 296–98

Hooker, Maj. Gen. Joseph, 237, 253–54, 256–58, 260–61,

279–80, 288

Horseshoe Bend, Battle of, 146

Hospital ships, units, 302

House, Edward M. “Colonel,” 387

Houston, Maj. Gen. Sam, 173

Howard, Maj. Gen. Oliver O., 257, 263, 309, 330, 337

Howe, Admiral Richard, 66, 88–89, 98

Howe, Maj. Gen. William, 48, 65, 66, 77, 84, 85

Boston evacuated by, 55, 64

at Bunker Hill, 49–50

at New York, 68–70

at Philadelphia, 79–81

plans of, 75–76

Princeton, Battle of, 72

troops requested by, 62

Howgate, 1st Lt. Henry W., 321

Huerta, General Victoriano, 383, 384

Hull, Brig. Gen. William, 136–37, 139, 141–42

Humphreys, Brig. Gen. Andrew A., 322

Hunter, Maj. Gen. David, 236, 292

Huntington, Samuel P., 313

Idaho, 336, 337

Illinois, 90, 168

Imperialism, 347, 348, 360, 363, 369

Indian Affairs, Bureau of, 338–39

Indian expeditions, 116–20
index

405

Indian nations/tribes

Apache, 193, 328, 337–39

Arapaho, 331, 333, 334, 335

Arickara, 341

Bannock, 337

Cherokee, 171, 172, 333

Cheyenne, 327, 328, 331, 332, 333, 334–35, 339–41

Chiricahua Apache, 328

Choctaw, 153

Comanche, 193, 327, 334–35

Creek, 116, 121, 144–46, 161–63, 171

Crow, 341

Fox, 166, 168

Iroquois, 34, 90, 111

Kiowa, 333, 334–35

Klamath, 335

Lower Creek (Red Sticks), 161–62

Miami, 117–18

Modoc, 335

Narragansett, 29

Nez Perce, 336

Nipmuc, 29

Pokanotket, 29

Pucumtuck, 29

Sac, 168

Seminole, 9, 162–63, 168–72. See also Seminole Wars.

Shawnee, 120, 135

Sheepeater, 333

Sioux, 327, 328, 330, 331–32, 333, 339–43

Ute, 328, 337

Wampanoag, 29

See also American Indians.

Indian Scouts, 341

Indian Territory, 139, 334

Indiana, 90

Indiana Territory, 120, 139, 334

Indians, Canadian, 135

Indians, Great Plains, 166, 173

Indians, Northwest, 118

Infantries, 119, 121, 122, 200

6th, 137, 168

7th, 153–54, 166

9th, 137, 194, 365, 367, 368

10th, 194

11th, 137

14th, 367

15th, 368

18th, 331

19th, 277

22d, 137

24th, 308

25th, 137, 308

27th, 142

44th, 153–54

First Mississippi Rifle, 182, 185

Infantry Association, U.S., 315

Infantry School of Practice, 166

Infantry Society, 315

Inspector General, 61, 148, 160

Interior, Department of the, 338

International Polar Conference, 321

Iowa, 166

Isthmian Canal Commission, 322, 382

Izard, Maj. Gen. George, 149, 151, 152

Jackson, Maj. Gen. Andrew, 10, 144–46, 153–55, 160–64, 169

Jackson, Lt. Gen. Thomas J. (“Stonewall”), 10, 212–13, 225, 

227, 231–32, 233–34, 239, 256–58

Jalapa, Mexico, 187–88

Jamaica, 34

James, Army of the. See under Union armies.

James River, 99, 225, 228, 292, 296, 299

Japan, 366, 367, 368, 372, 389

Jay, John, 121

Jefferson, Thomas, 118, 123, 124, 127, 132

Jefferson Barracks, Missouri, 166, 168

Jesup, Bvt. Maj. Gen. Thomas S., 171, 172

John’s Island, South Carolina, 92

Johnson, Andrew, 309

Johnson, Col. Richard M., 142

Johnston, Maj. Gen. Albert S., 218, 240, 241, 242, 244, 257, 

288, 293, 299, 301

Johnston, General Joseph E., 187, 209–10, 212, 213, 214, 

224, 225, 227–28, 270–72, 286

Jomini, Henri de, 6, 186, 196

Joseph, Chief, 336–37

Juarez, Benito, 308

Judge Advocate General’s Office, 219

Kalb, Maj. Gen. Johann de, 93

Kanipe, Sgt. Daniel, 341

Kansas, 166, 216, 240, 248, 327, 333

Kansas Territory, 199

Kearny, Col. Stephen W., 173, 174, 180, 186–87, 192

Kenesaw Mountain, Georgia, 293

Kennan, George F., 5

Kent, Brig. Gen. Jacob F., 356, 358

Kentucky, 90, 117, 203, 216–17, 218–19, 232, 236, 240, 242,

245–46, 267, 272

Kentucky Territory, 116

Kettle Hill, Cuba, 356

Key, Francis Scott, 152

King George’s War, 1744–1748, 32, 33–34

King Philip’s War, 29, 47

King Survey, 1867–1872, 322

King’s Mountain, 95, 99, 104

Kingston, Canada, 140

Knox, General Henry, 53, 60, 103, 113, 114, 117–19, 123
American Military History

406

Knyphausen, Lt. Gen. Wilhelm van, 77, 79

Kosciuszko, Thaddeus, 77, 84

Ku Klux Klan, 311

Labor disputes, use of U.S. Army troops in, 311–12

Lady Franklin Bay expedition, 321

Lafayette, Maj. Gen. Gilbert du Montier, Marquis de, 77, 88, 

99, 101–02, 103

Lake Champlain, 136, 144, 149, 152, 156

Lake Erie, 136, 139–40, 141–42, 151, 156

Lake Ontario, 139, 140–41, 144, 149, 150, 151

Langley, Samuel P., 378

Lansing, Robert, 387

Latin America, 348

Lawton, Brig. Gen. Henry W., 355–56, 362

Leavenworth, Col. Henry, 316

Lee, Maj. Gen. Charles, 52, 65–66, 69, 88

Lee, Maj. Gen. Henry, 116

Lee, General Robert E., 10–11, 196, 204, 207, 217–19, 225

and attempts to bring Maryland into Confederacy, 

232–34, 245

and Battle of Chancellorsville, 254, 256–58

and Battle of Gettysburg, 259–67

and Fredericksburg, 237, 239, 253

as Grant’s opponent, 288, 290–92, 295, 299–301

and Mexican War, 178, 183, 187, 188, 190, 191

and Peninsula Campaign, 227, 230

principles of war applied by, 230, 231

Lewis, Isaac N., 374

Lewis, Capt. Meriwether, 124, 126

Lewis and Clark Expedition, 126, 127

Lewiston, New York, 138

Lexington, Massachusetts, 47–48

Lieber, Francis, 256

Life-Saving Service, 319

Lincoln, Abraham, 168, 215, 288, 294, 296–97, 305

and decision to go to war, 199, 202, 204–05

Emancipation Proclamation, 234–37

and military direction of Civil War, 207, 209–10, 216–17,

223, 224, 225, 230–31, 244, 260, 267–68, 272, 279,

284–85, 295, 301

and selection of generals, 204–05, 218, 232, 237, 242, 

253–54, 260–61, 270, 279, 283–85

Lincoln, Maj. Gen. Benjamin, 83, 84, 90, 92, 95, 108

Lines of communications. See Communications, lines of.

Little Bighorn, Battle of the, 335, 340–43

Little Round Top, Gettysburg, 263, 264

Lodge, Henry Cabot, 372

Logan, Maj. Gen. John A., 205, 314

Logistical support, 13, 39–40, 148

and siege warfare, 26–27

to Union forces under Grant, 287, 288, 296, 287, 300,

302

Long, John D., 352

Longstreet, Lt. Gen. James, 232, 233, 259, 260, 272, 274, 300

at Chickamauga, 275–77

at Gettysburg, 263, 264–65, 266

at Knoxville, 279

at Marye’s Heights, 239

at Williamsburg, 227

wounded, 288

Lookout Mountain, Tennessee, 277, 278, 280

Louis XIV, 25, 26, 27

Louisbourg, Cape Breton Island, 34, 39

Louisiana, 32, 33, 116–17, 123, 153–55, 309

Louisiana Purchase, 124

Louisiana Territory, 124–26

Lovell, Joseph, 165

Lowe, Thaddeus, 203

Luce, Rear Adm. Stephen B., 313, 349

Lundy’s Lane, New York, 150–51, 159, 161

Lusitania, 386

Lynchburg, Virginia, 286, 300

Lyon, Brig. Gen. Nathaniel, 217

MacArthur, Maj. Gen. Arthur, 280, 362, 364

MacArthur, General Douglas S., 10, 11

Macdonough, Commodore Thomas, 152–53

Mackenzie, Col. Ranald S., 330, 334–35

Macomb, Maj. Gen. Alexander, 152–53, 164

Madero, Francisco, 383

Madison, James, 127, 128, 132, 136, 139, 148, 152, 160, 161

Magruder, Maj. Gen. John B., 209, 227

Mahan, Capt. Alfred T., 196, 349, 350, 352

Mahan, Dennis Hart, 12, 196, 315

Maine, 348–49

Malaria, 359, 383. See also Disease.

Malvern Hill, Virginia, 230

Manassas, Virginia, 209–14, 224, 232

Manassas Gap Railroad, 210, 212

Maneuver, 6, 7, 10

British use in the Revolutionary War, 68

Grant uses, 268, 270–71, 288, 291

Greene uses, 96

Hooker uses, 254

Jackson uses, 225, 227

Lee uses, 232, 254, 256

Rosecrans uses, 274

Scott uses, 191

violated at Fort Duquesne, 37–38

violated during the Revolutionary War, 50

Washington uses, 72, 101–02

See also War, principles of.

Manila, Philippines, 352–53, 359–62

Mapping expeditions, 172

Maps, absence of, 169–70

March, General Peyton C., 385

Marcy, William L., 181
index

407

Marines, 146, 186, 187, 311, 312, 354, 366, 367, 368, 384. See 

also U.S. Marine Corps.

Marion, Lt. Col. Francis, 92, 93

Martin, John, 341

Marye’s Heights, Fredericksburg, 237, 239, 258

Maryland, 51, 203, 218, 232, 233, 236, 245, 261, 292

Mass, 6, 7, 14

Bragg uses, 247–48

in the Civil War, 10

Grant and Sherman use, 299

Greene violates, 96

Lee uses, 228

Lee violates, 256–57

McDowell uses, 212

in the Revolutionary War, 50, 66

in the War of 1812, 142, 154

Washington uses, 101

See also War, Principles of.

Massachusetts, 34, 46–48, 109, 110, 111

Massachusetts General Court, 35

Matamoros, Mexico, 178, 179, 180, 182

Maxim, Hiram, 374

Maximilian, Archduke of Austria, 284, 308

May, Capt. Charles A., 179

Mayo, Rear Adm. Henry T., 384

McClellan, Maj. Gen. George B., 11, 196, 205, 214, 217–18,

283

and the Army of the Potomac, 218, 224–25, 227–28, 230, 

232, 233–34, 237, 288

as General in Chief, 218–19, 223

McClernand, Maj. Gen. John A., 268, 270, 271

McCook, Maj. Gen. Alexander M., 246, 274

McCrea, Jane, 83

McDowell, Brig. Gen. Irvin, 209–10, 212–14, 225, 227–28

McFarland, Maj. Walter, 322

McKinley, William, 322, 348–49, 352, 358, 359, 360, 363,

364, 366, 375, 382

McPherson, Maj. Gen. James B., 268, 270–71

Meade, Maj. Gen. George C., 279, 291, 298, 307

as Army of the Potomac commander, 261, 285, 286, 287

at Battle of the Wilderness, 288

at Gettysburg, 263, 264–67

in Mexican War, 179, 180, 187

at Spotsylvania Courthouse, 290

Mechanicsville, Battle of, 228

Medal of Honor, 264, 302

Medical Corps, U.S. Army, 359

Medical Department, U.S. Army, 315, 322, 359, 377, 381, 

382–83

Medical officers, 165

Medical Reserve Corps, 377, 380, 388

Medical School, U.S. Army, 315, 377

Medical services, 302, 351

Mediterranean military establishments, 19

Meeker, Nathan C., 337

Meigs, Maj. Gen. Montgomery C., 219, 285, 292, 296, 316

Merchant ships, U.S., seizures of, 121, 123, 127, 131

Merritt, Maj. Gen. Wesley, 330, 360, 361

Metacom (Pokanoket chief), 29

Meteorological stations, 317, 318, 321, 322

Mexican Army, 178–87, 188–91

Mexican War, 174, 177–92, 327

Mexico, 32, 127, 160, 173, 174, 177–92, 284, 308, 337, 339,

380, 383–85, 389–90

Mexico City, Mexico, 181, 187, 188–92

Michigan Territory, 136, 144

Middle Ages, 20–21

Miles, Lt. Gen. Nelson A., 312, 330, 334, 337, 339, 350, 353, 

359

Military Academy, U.S., 123–24, 161, 178, 196, 202, 206,

308, 395

and Corps of Engineers, 155

established, 121

professional officer corps trained at, 159–60, 165, 174,

314, 315, 316, 377

reorganization of, 134

Military instruction in colleges, 315

Military Policy of the United States, The (Upton), 314, 376

Military Road, U.S., 272

Military Service Institution of the United States, 315

Military Stores, Office of the Superintendent of, 113–14

Military strategy, 12–13

of British in the Revolutionary War, 75

Confederate, 207, 271

in Europe, 21

in the Mexican War, 191

and the Panama Canal, 383

in the Revolutionary War, 62–64, 96–98, 103–04

for the Spanish-American War, 350–52

Union, 207, 209, 214–15, 216–17, 218–19, 220, 270

in the War of 1812, 136

Military Supplies, Office of Superintendent General of, 148

Military supply system

civilian control of, 113, 123, 163

contract agents, 123, 134, 162, 172

Quartermaster General role in, 61, 86, 94–95, 113, 148

See also Purveyor of Public Supplies, Office of the; 

Supplies.

Military tactics, 12–13

of American Indians, 36–38

in the battle for Fort Duquesne, 36, 37–38

developed during the Revolutionary War, 59, 104

doctrine, 196

door-to-door fighting, 183, 191

in Europe, 21–22, 23–27

for fighting in forests, 36–37, 38–39

guerrilla warfare, 34, 40–41, 92–93, 104, 172, 336, 360–65

light infantry tactics, 196
American Military History

408

Military tactics—Continued

linear tactics, 24–27

in the Mexican War, 183, 191

siege warfare, 26–27, 39, 92–93, 101–02, 151, 185, 239,

271–72, 291–92

terrain effects, 23, 38, 40, 96–98, 268, 270, 356, 358

Militia

Act of 1792, 121, 232, 373

authority of the President to call into service, 121, 127, 

134, 204

authority of states to call out, 58

British, 20, 30

in the Civil War, 204–05

colonial, 30–32, 38, 41, 46, 48, 50

composition of, 114

and Continental Army, 55–58, 59, 68

discipline in, 112, 115, 139

length of tours of duty, 31, 114

of Massachusetts Bay Colony, 31

mounted, 117, 120

mutinies, 145

officers for, 112, 204–05

organization of, 112, 114

restricted to duty inside the United States, 115, 138, 159

role in the new nation, 104–05, 108

as source of manpower for the Regular Army, 110, 160

state. See under Militias.

state responsibility for, 114–16, 204–05

training for, 30, 31, 32, 46, 50, 112, 115, 159, 204

used in labor disputes, 311

weapons for, 112, 114, 312

Militias

Canadian, 134, 136–39, 140–41, 149, 153

Connecticut, 38, 52, 68

French Canadian, 34, 36

Georgia, 162–63, 169

Illinois, 168, 186

Indiana, 120, 185

Kentucky, 117, 140, 142, 156, 186

Louisiana, 153, 155, 171, 178, 183

Maryland, 152, 156

Massachusetts, 38, 41, 46, 47–50, 52, 68

Mormon, 193

New England, 83, 84, 135

New Hampshire, 52, 83

New York, 38, 138–39, 141, 148, 161

North Carolina, 36, 95–96

Ohio, 136–37

Pennsylvania, 117

South Carolina, 65–66, 169

Tennessee, 144

Texas, 178, 182

Virginia, 36, 90, 92, 99, 101–02, 118, 146

Minnesota, 232, 328

Minutemen, 46, 47, 51

Missionary Ridge, Tennessee, 275, 277, 278, 280

Mississippi, Army of the. See under Confederate armies.

Mississippi, Division of the, 292

Mississippi, Military Division of the, 279

Mississippi River, 124, 168, 207, 215, 217, 240, 245, 253,

267, 279, 283

Mississippi Territory, 132, 144–45

Missouri, 203, 216–17, 236, 248, 249

Missouri, Department of the, 330, 333

Missouri, Division of the, 328, 332, 334

Missouri River, 126, 166, 217

Mitchell’s Ford, Virginia, 210

Mobile, Alabama, 144, 155, 213, 284, 286, 291, 295

Modoc War, 335

Mohawk Valley, New York, 81, 90

Monmouth Court House, New Jersey, 88, 89

Monroe, James, 71, 152, 160

Monroe Doctrine, 284, 308

Montana, 330, 332, 339

Montcalm, Maj. Gen. Louis Joseph, Marquis de, 39

Monterrey, Mexico, 180, 182–84

Monterrey Campaign, 182–84

Montgomery, Alabama, 200, 284, 295

Montgomery, Brig. Gen. Richard, 52, 53, 54

Montreal, Canada, 33, 53, 54, 136, 139, 144

Mordecai, Bvt. Maj. Alfred, 196

Morgan, Brig. Gen. Daniel, 53, 83, 84, 85, 96–98, 103, 153–54

Morgan, General David, 153–54

Mormon Trail, 174

Mormons, 193

Morrill Act of 1862, 315

Morris, Robert, 95

Morristown, New Jersey, 72, 94, 103

Mortars, 182, 183, 187, 188, 291. See also Weapons.

Mounted attacks, 142

Mounted rangers, 166

Mounted rifle regiments, 194, 200

Murfreesboro, Tennessee, 246, 267, 272, 274, 278

Myer, Brig. Gen. Albert J., 322

Napoleon III, 193, 245, 284, 308, 326

Napoleon Bonaparte, 6, 12, 14, 124

Napoleonic Wars, 2, 6, 127–28, 131–32, 134, 135, 152

Nashville, Tennessee, 236, 242, 246, 292, 293, 296–98

National Defense Act of 1916, 387–89, 391

National Guard, 82, 115, 318, 349–50, 379, 385, 388, 390

National Guard Association, 312

Naval Appropriations Act of 1883, 319

Naval bases, 372

Naval Gun Factory, 319

Naval Institute, U.S., 315

Naval Intelligence, Office of, 362

Naval War College. See War College, Naval.
index

409

Navy, Department of the, 121–22, 352, 358, 383. See also

U.S. Navy.

Nebraska, 166, 327, 344

Nevada, 192

New England region, 75–76, 83, 109–10, 111, 132, 135, 136,

139

New Hampshire, 83, 109, 110

New Jersey, 69–72, 79, 89, 110, 111

New Mexico, 192

New Mexico Territory, 244–49, 328, 337

New Orleans, Battle of, 146, 153–55, 159

New Orleans, Louisiana, 124, 127, 153–55, 159, 236, 244,

267–68, 272

New System of Infantry Tactics, A (Upton), 314

New York, 34, 35, 64–65, 66, 68–70, 76, 90, 109, 110

New York City, New York, 66, 68–70, 75, 76, 85, 87–88, 92,

99, 101, 102, 107

Newburgh Conspiracy, 108

Newport, Rhode Island, 70, 72, 88–89, 92, 94, 99, 101

Newtown, New York, 90

Niagara frontier, 34, 90, 132, 138–39, 140–42, 144, 149, 

152–53, 159

Niagara River, 132, 136, 138, 139, 140, 149, 150–51

Nicaragua Canal Commission, 322

Nicholls, Lt. Col. Edward, 162

Nimitz, Admiral Chester W., 11

Noailles, Viscount Louis-Marie, 102

Nobel Peace Prize, 375

Non-Intercourse Act, 132

Norfolk, Virginia, 146

North Carolina, 65, 95, 96, 98, 203, 204, 284, 309

North Dakota, 344

Northern Army, 53, 60, 81, 83

Northern Pacific Railroad, 339

Northern Virginia, Army of. See under Confederate 

armies.

Northwest Ordinance of 1787, 117

Northwest region, 121

Northwest Territory, 117, 135

Northwestern Army, 140

Nova Scotia, 34, 35

Objective, 6–7, 9

United States violates in the War of 1812, 136

Washington uses, 101–02

See also War, principles of.

Occupation governments

in Mexico, 190

in the Philippines, 358–59

Ohio, 117, 120, 137

Ohio, Army of the. See under Union armies.

Ohio, Department of the, 219, 274, 279

Ohio River, 113, 215, 217

Ohio Valley, 34, 35, 41, 132

Offensive, 6, 7, 9–10

Grant uses, 286–87

Jackson uses, 225–27

Lee uses, 256–58

in the Mexican War, 186

in the War of 1812, 142

Washington uses, 72, 101–02

See also War, principles of.

Oklahoma, 327, 333

Ontario, Canada, 134, 140

Open Door policy in China, 366

Operational art, 13

Ord, Maj. Gen. Edward O. C., 271

Ordnance Corps, 188

Ordnance Department, 134, 164, 317, 318, 351, 373, 374

Ordnance and Fortification, Board of, 319

Oregon, 192, 327, 328, 335–36

Oregon (battleship), 381

Oregon Trail, 166, 173, 174, 331

Osceola, 168, 171

Otis, Maj. Gen. Elwell S., 361–64

Pacific, Division of the, 328, 330

Pacific Ocean area, 347, 352–53, 372

Pacifism, 386, 390

Paine, Thomas, 51

Pakenham, Maj. Gen. Sir Edward, 153–55

Palo Alto, Texas, 178, 179, 181

Pan American Union, 348

Panama, 348, 372

Panama Canal, 372, 382–83

Parker, Sir Peter, 65–66

Parrott, Pvt. Jacob, 302

Parrott, Capt. Robert P., 195

Partridge, Capt. Alden, 165

Patterson, Maj. Gen. Robert, 209–10, 212

Paymaster of the Army, 160

Peach Orchard, Gettysburg, 263, 264

Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, 347

Peking, China, 366, 367–68

Pemberton, Lt. Gen. John C., 270–72, 288

Pender, Maj. Gen. William D., 266

Peninsula Campaign, 224–25, 227–28, 230

Pennsylvania, 30, 31, 51, 69, 76, 90, 110, 116–17, 255, 261,

263–67

Pensacola, Florida, 144, 162, 163

Perry, Commodore Matthew C., 187

Perry, Comdr. Oliver Hazard, 141–42

Perryville, Kentucky, 245, 246, 248

Pershing, Brig. Gen. John J., 384–85

Petersburg, Virginia, 142, 286, 291, 299, 300

Pettigrew, Brig. Gen. James J., 266–67

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 69, 75–76, 77, 79–81, 85, 86, 87, 114

Philippine Scouts, 364, 379
American Military History

410

Philippines, 352–53, 360–65, 366, 368, 373, 379

Philippines, Army of Liberation of the, 361–62

Phillips, Maj. Gen. William, 99

Pickens, Brig. Gen. Andrew, 92

Pickering, Col. Timothy, 95

Pickett, Maj. Gen. George E., 266–67, 299–300

Pickett’s Charge, 265

Pike, Brig. Gen. Zebulon M., 126, 140, 141

Pillow, Brig. Gen. Gideon J., 190, 241

Pine Ridge Campaign, 343, 344

Pitt, William, 38

Platt amendment, 381

Platte River region, 173

Plattsburg, New York, 139, 144, 148–49, 152–53, 155

Plattsburg Barracks, New York, 386

Pleasonton, Brig. Gen. Alfred, 260

Poinsett, Joel R., 166, 178

Point Barrow, Alaska, 320

Polk, James K., 177, 178, 180–81, 183

Polk, Maj. Gen. Leonidas, 246, 248, 276, 277

Pontoons, 172, 180, 237

Pope, Maj. Gen. John, 231–32, 242, 244

Portail, Maj. Gen. Louis le Bèque du, 77, 108

Porter, Rear Adm. David D., 270

Porter, Brig. Gen. Fitz-John, 228, 232, 234

Potomac, Army of the. See under Union armies.

Potomac River, 203, 218, 231, 233, 292

Powder River, 331–32, 339–40

Powell, Capt. James, 332

President of the United States

authorized to accept volunteer forces, 122, 134, 180, 182

authorized to call militiamen into service, 121, 127, 134

authorized to order defense materials, 388–89

call for militiamen for the Civil War, 203, 204

call for volunteers for the Civil War, 204, 215–16

as Commander in Chief, 113, 121

power to employ the militia, 115–16

powers with respect to the National Guard, 379, 390

Presque Isle, Pennsylvania, 142

Prevost, Maj. Gen. Augustine, 90

Prevost, General Sir George, 140–41, 146, 152–53

Price, Maj. Gen. Sterling, 249

Princeton, New Jersey, 70, 72

Principles of war. See War, principles of.

Privateers, 135, 136, 139, 155

Proctor, Col. Henry, 140

Professionalism, 159–60, 165–66, 315–17

“Proper Military Policy for the United States, A” (General 

Staff), 388

Provisional Army, 122–23

Provost Marshal General’s Bureau, 219

Provost marshals, 309

Public opinion

and American Indians, 332

and the American military system, 15, 41–42, 108, 112, 

394

in Great Britain, 153

and the Spanish-American War, 348–49, 350, 351–52, 372

of the U.S. Army in the late nineteenth century, 313

and the War of 1812, 135, 148

and World War I, 385

Puebla, Mexico, 189, 191

Puerto Rico, 359

Pullman strike, 312

Punitive expedition, 384–85

Purple Heart, 104

Purveyor of Public Supplies, Office of the, 113–14. See also

Military supply system; Supplies.

Putnam, Maj. Gen. Israel, 68, 77, 83, 85

Quartermaster Corps, 308, 377

Quartermaster Department, 134, 377

Quartermaster General, 61, 79, 86, 94–95, 113, 123, 148,

161, 172, 219, 285

Quartermaster service corps, 377

Quebec, Canada, 33, 39, 53, 94, 103, 134

Queenston, Canada, 138–39, 141, 144, 150–51

Railroads

in the Civil War, 207, 270–71, 272, 274, 278, 279, 280, 

286, 288, 291, 292, 296

as Confederate supply routes, 270–71, 272, 274, 290

construction of, 339

in the late nineteenth century, 318

strikes against, 311–12

transcontinental routes, 192–93

Raisin River, 140

“Ranging Rules,” 40

Rapidan River, 254, 285, 286, 288

Rappahannock River, 237, 239, 253, 256, 257, 258

Ray, 1st Lt. Patrick Henry, 321

Raymond, Capt. Charles W., 320

Reconstruction, 308–11

Recruiting Service, General, 165

Red Cloud, 331

Red River War, 334

Reduction Act (1921), 164

Reed, Thomas B., 361

Regulations, U.S. Army, 165, 196, 198, 200

Reilly, Capt. Henry J., 368

Reno, Maj. Marcus A., 340, 341, 343

Resaca de la Palma, Texas, 178–79, 180

Reserve Corps, 388

Reserve Militia, 379

Reserve Officer Training Corps, 315, 388

Revere, Paul, 47

Revolutionary War. See American Revolution.

Reynolds, Maj. Gen. John F., 263
index

411

Reynolds, Col. Joseph J., 339–40

Riall, General Phineas, 150–51

Richelieu River, 136

Richmond, Virginia, 99, 204, 207, 209, 223–25, 227–28, 230, 

231, 259, 260, 286, 288, 290–91, 300

Ridgely, Lt. Randolph, 177

Rifle and Infantry Tactics (Scott), 246

Rifles

Allin trap-door action for, 195

American, 104

Hall, 195

Henry, 195, 318, 332

improvements in, 195, 318, 332, 373

Kentucky, 40–41

Krag-Jörgensen, 318, 349, 373

percussion, 182, 194–95

Sharps, 195

Spencer, 195, 318, 332

Springfield, 195, 218, 318, 332, 349, 373

See also Ammunition; Bayonets; Guns; Weapons.

Ringgold, Bvt. Maj. Samuel, 178, 179

Rio Grande, 175–76, 177, 186, 199, 216, 248–49

Rochambeau, Lt. Gen. Jean Baptiste Donatien de Vimeur, 

Comte de, 94, 101

Rockets and rocket units, 166, 188, 196

Rogers, Maj. Robert, 39, 40

Rogers’ Rangers, 39, 40

Roman military establishments, 19–20, 22

Roman Nose, 333

Roosevelt, President Theodore, 356, 358, 368, 371, 372–73,

381, 382, 386

Root, Elihu, 314, 365, 368, 375–76, 377, 379, 386, 388, 390

Rosebud, Battle of the, 340–41

Rosecrans, Maj. Gen. William S., 246–48, 267, 272, 274–78,

279, 284

Ross, Maj. Gen. Robert, 152, 153

Rough Riders, 356, 358

Royal Americans, 38

Russia, 320, 366, 367, 372, 378

Sabine River, 127, 173

Sacagawea, 126

Sacket’s Harbor, New York, 140–41, 144, 149

Saltillo, Mexico, 180, 183, 184

Samoa, 347

Sampson, Rear Adm. William T., 352, 353–54, 355, 358

San Antonio, Texas, 177, 180, 183, 193, 380, 383

San Diego, California, 180, 187

San Juan Hill, Cuba, 355–56, 358

Sand Creek, Colorado, 328, 333

Sanitary Commission, U.S., 302

Santa Anna, General Antonio Lopez de, 183, 184, 185–86,

188, 189, 190, 191

Santa Fe Trail, 166, 174, 184

Santiago de Cuba, 353–59, 381

Saratoga, New York, 79, 84, 85, 104

Savannah, Georgia, 90, 92, 98, 215, 295

Schley, Commodore Winfield S., 352, 358

Schofield, Maj. Gen. John M., 296, 299, 308, 312

School of Application for Cavalry and Field Artillery, 377

School of Application for Infantry and Cavalry, 315, 316

School of Musketry, 377

School of Submarine Defense, 377

Schuyler, Maj. Gen. Philip, 53, 77, 81, 83, 84, 85

Schwarzkopf, General H. Norman, 10

Schwatka, Lt. Frederick, 316–17

Scott, General in Chief Winfield, 159, 165, 168–69, 171,

178, 196, 313

and the Civil War, 202, 204, 207, 209–10, 216, 218

and the Mexican War, 178, 180, 181, 183–84, 187–92

and War of 1812, 137, 141, 142, 148, 150, 151

Seacoast

British control of, 92

fortifications, 161, 165, 319, 374

vulnerability to British attack in the War of 1812, 136,

139, 146, 148, 151–52, 155

Seamen, American, impressment of, 131–32

Secretary at War, 58

Secretary of War, 113, 160, 317, 375

and control of the Army’s fiscal affairs, 375–76

directed to survey arms and munitions industries, 388–90

and the military supply system, 134, 388–90

staff, 160, 161, 317

and the U.S. Marine Corps, 122

Security, 6, 8, 11

Grant fails to observe, 242, 244

violated at Bull Run, 214

violated at Fort Duquesne, 37–38

violated in the Revolutionary War, 68

violated by Rosecrans, 247

violated by St. Clair, 119

violated in the War of 1812, 141

See also War, principles of.

Sedgwick, Maj. Gen. John, 254, 258

Segregation, 236–37, 308. See also African Americans; 

Colored Troops, U.S.; Slavery, slaves.

Seminary Ridge, Gettysburg, 265–66, 267

Seminole Wars, 162–63, 168–72

Settlers, 116, 117, 192–93

Seven Days’ Battles, 228, 230

Seven Years’ War (1756–1763), 32–40

Seymour, Admiral Sir Edward, 366–67

Shafter, Maj. Gen. William R., 354, 355, 356, 358–59

Sharpsburg, Maryland, 234

Shays, Daniel, 111

Shays’ Rebellion, 111–12

Sheave, Maj. Gen. Roger, 138

Shenandoah, Army of the. See under Union armies.
American Military History

412

Shenandoah Valley, Virginia, 207, 212, 217, 225, 227, 228, 

231, 232, 286, 292, 299

Sheridan, Maj. Gen. Philip H., 287, 288, 290, 292, 299–300, 

330

as Commanding General of the Army, 313, 316

and Indian campaigns, 334, 335, 339

on Mexican border, 307–08, 311

at Perryville, 245–46, 248

and Reconstruction, 310

Sherman, Lt. Gen. William T., 206, 287, 292–93, 307, 309,

315, 330

as Commanding General of the Army, 313–14, 317, 334

on frontier, 330, 332–33

at Missionary Ridge, 279–80

retirement of, 316

and southern campaign, 285–86, 295–96, 298–99

at Vicksburg, 268, 270–71

Shiloh, Battle of, 242–44

Shipping Board, U.S., 389

Sibley, Brig. Gen. Henry H., 249

Siboney, Cuba, 355–56

Sickles, Maj. Gen. Daniel E., 263, 264

Sieges

of Charleston, South Carolina, 92–93

of Fort Donelson, 240–42

of Fort Erie, 151

of Louisbourg, Cape Breton Island, 39

of Petersburg, Virginia, 291

Vauban’s system for, 26–27

of Vera Cruz, Mexico, 187

of Vicksburg, 268, 270–72

of Yorktown, 101–02

Sigel, Maj. Gen. Franz, 286, 292

Signal communications, 318, 319–20. See also

Communications, battlefield; Communications, lines of.

Signal Corps, 311, 319–20, 321, 322, 356, 378

Signal Department, 219

Signal Service, 319

Simplicity, 6, 9, 11, 79–80. See also War, principles of.

Slavery, slaves, 32, 199, 292, 234–35. See also African 

Americans; Civil War, American; Colored Troops, U.S.; 

Freedmen’s Bureau.

Smith, Lt. Constantine, 168

Smith, Lt. Gen. Edmund Kirby, 212, 245

Smyth, Brig. Gen. Alexander, 138–39

Snodgrass Hill, Tennessee, 277

Somalia, 9

South, Department of the, 236

South, Division of the, 310, 330

South Carolina, 32, 33, 34, 117

and the Civil War, 199–200, 202, 299

and the Revolutionary War, 65–66, 92–93, 95, 98

South Dakota, 339, 344

Southern Army, 60, 90, 92–93, 95

Spain

and Cuba, 348–49, 354, 356, 358–59, 360

and Florida, 32, 33–34, 132, 162, 163

and Louisiana, 116–17, 123

and Mexico, 32

and the Philippines, 352–53, 359–60

and Puerto Rico, 359, 360

and the Revolutionary War, 63, 89

and Southwestern border disputes, 126–27

and the War of 1812, 132, 144

Spanish-American War, 349–60, 379

Spanish Fleet, 352, 353, 358–59

Spotsylvania, Virginia, 288, 289

Springfield, Massachusetts, 114

Springfield Armory, Massachusetts, 195, 318

Springfield Arsenal, Massachusetts, 111–12

St. Clair, Maj. Gen. Arthur, 117–19, 120

St. Lawrence River, 33, 35, 109, 135, 139, 144

St. Leger, Col. Barry, 81, 83, 84

St. Louis, Missouri, 193, 216

Standing army

acceptance of the need for, 172–73

American public aversion to, 41, 57–58, 104–05, 112, 394

British public opposition to, 30

George Washington’s opinion on, 104–05, 394

impediments in the United States, 107–09

and the War of 1812, 156

Stanley, Col. David S., 339

Stanton, Edwin M., 219–20, 224, 225, 267–68, 279, 285,

296, 302, 308, 309–10

Stark, Brig. Gen. John, 83

State’s rights doctrine, 240

Sternberg, George Miller, 315, 322

Sternberg, Lt. Sigismund, 332

Steuben, Maj. Gen. Friedrich Wilhelm von, 77, 86–87, 103,

104, 105, 108, 115, 123

Stewart, Maj. Gen. Alexander P., 275

Stimson, Henry L., 377, 386, 388

Stone Bridge, Virginia, 210, 212

Stoneman, Brig. Gen. George, 254

Stones River, 244–46

Stony Point, New York, 89

Stuart, Maj. Gen. J. E. B., 212, 228, 233, 254, 256–58, 259,

260, 288, 290

Sturgis, Maj. Samuel D., 337

Submarine warfare, 386–87, 389–90

Sudley Springs, Virginia, 210, 212

Sullivan, Maj. Gen. John, 68, 70, 77, 79, 88–89, 90

Sully, Alfred, 330

Sumner, Maj. Gen. Edwin V., 237, 327

Sumter, Brig. Gen. Thomas, 92, 93

Supplies

for the British Army, 61, 62–63, 76, 79, 83, 84, 85, 87, 96,

98
index

413

for the Confederate Army, 256

for the Continental Army, 53, 54, 56, 58, 59, 61, 69, 76,

81, 85–86, 90, 93–94, 95, 96, 107

for European armies, 23

for frontier forts, 193–94

for Indian campaigns, 162–63

for militia units, 30–31, 46, 48, 58, 204

procurement of, 61, 86, 94–95, 113–14, 118–19, 123, 134,

148, 162–63, 171

quality of, 114

for Spanish-American War forces, 350, 355

for state militia, 58

transportation of, 113–14, 123, 171, 193–94

for U.S. forces in the War of 1812, 137, 145, 148

for the Union Army, 219, 254, 270, 278, 279, 280, 288, 

292, 295, 299

See also Military supply system; Purveyor of Public 

Supplies, Office of the.

Surgeon General, 148, 165

Surprise, 6, 9, 11

American Indian use, 29–30, 119, 120

Bragg uses, 245–46

British use in the Revolutionary War, 68

colonists use against American Indians, 29

Confederate use at Shiloh, 243, 244

Grant and Sherman use, 299

Jackson uses, 225, 227

Lee uses, 256–58

Scott uses, 191

violated during the Revolutionary War, 50

Washington uses, 70–72, 101–02

See also War, principles of.

Sykes, Maj. Gen. George, 264

Taft, William Howard, 364–65, 373, 374, 381, 383

Tallapoosa River, 146

Tampa, Florida, 171, 350, 353–54, 355

Tampico, Mexico, 183–84, 187, 384

Tarleton, Lt. Col. Banastre, 92, 93, 95, 96–98

Taylor, Maj. Gen. Zachary, 171–72, 177, 178, 179–87

Technical development, 313–14

Tecumseh, 120, 135, 136, 142

Telegraph, 239, 285, 304, 319, 322, 336

Telephone, 320

Teller amendment, 381

Tennessee, 95, 132, 144, 203, 223, 240–42, 245, 246, 267,

272, 274–80, 295, 309

Tennessee, Army of. See under Confederate armies.

Tennessee, Army of the. See under Union armies.

Tennessee River, 217, 241, 242, 272, 274, 278, 279, 292

Tenure of Office Act, 310

Territorial departments, control of, 317

Terry, Brig. Gen. Alfred H., 330, 339–41, 343

Texan Division, 182

Texas, 126–27, 173, 175–89, 192, 200, 216, 307–08, 327,

334–35, 337, 380

Texas Rangers, 177, 183

Thames, Battle of the, 135, 142, 144

Thayer, Bvt. Maj. Sylvanus, 165, 196

Third Reconstruction Act, 310

Thirty Years’ War, 22, 24–25

Thomas, Eleaser, 335

Thomas, Maj. Gen. George H., 202, 248, 274–75, 276–77,

279–80, 295, 296–98

Thompson, Wiley, 168

Thornton, Capt. Seth B., 178

Thornton, Lt. Col. William, 154–55

Tientsin, China, 367

Titus, Calvin P., 367

Toledo, Ohio, 120

Topographical engineers, 148, 160, 173, 192, 219. See also

Corps of Topographical Engineers.

Tories, American

British expectations regarding, 64–65, 66, 84, 87, 99

cooperation with British forces, 63, 64–65, 66, 83, 87, 90,

92, 94, 95

Toronto, Canada, 140

Tracy, Benjamin, 349

Trail of Tears, 172

Training, 23, 26, 122–23

for the Continental Army, 86–87, 88, 104

for militia, 30, 31, 32, 46, 50, 112, 115, 159, 202

for the Regular Army, 119, 159–60, 165–66, 174, 196–97,

220, 232, 240, 254, 258, 349, 351, 377, 386

for volunteer forces, 349–50, 351

Transportation

during the American Revolution, 56, 81, 87

developments in the late nineteenth century, 318

introduction of motorized vehicles, 374

during the Mexican War, 180, 182, 187–88

during the Seminole Wars, 169, 171, 172

during the Spanish-American War, 354–55

during the War of 1812, 148

by water, 172, 180

Treaties

Adams-Onís, 163

Clayton-Bulwer, 382

of Ghent, 155, 162

of Greenville, 120

of Guadalupe Hidalgo, 192

Hay-Pauncefote, 382

of Paris, 107, 360–61

Trenton, New Jersey, 70–72

Trimble, Maj. Gen. Isaac R., 266

Trist, Nicholas P., 189, 191, 192

Tutuila, American Samoa, 347

Twiggs, Maj. Gen. David E., 188, 190, 200

Twin Rivers Campaign, 239–240
American Military History

414

Tyler, Brig. Gen. Daniel, 212

Tyler, John, 177

Union armies

Army of the Cumberland, 246, 248, 267, 277, 278, 279,

280

Army of the James, 286

Army of the Ohio, 242, 246, 279

Army of the Potomac, 218, 224, 227–31, 239, 253, 

256–58, 259, 260–67, 279, 285, 286, 287, 288, 292,

298–300, 301

Army of the Shenandoah, 299–300

Army of the Tennessee, 242, 279, 298

Army of Virginia, 231, 232

See also Cavalry units, Union; Civil War, American; 

Confederate armies; U.S. Corps, I, II, III, IV, V, VI, IX, 

XI, XIII, XV, XVII, XXII.

Union regiments, 260

United Service, 315–16

Unity of command, 6, 8, 10–11

absent in early Revolutionary War organizations, 48, 50

British violations in the Revolutionary War, 64, 75,

98–99

Confederate failure to practice at Fort Donelson, 242

Grant’s use of, 292

Halleck’s failure to employ, 232

Lee’s use of, 232

of Union forces in the Civil War, 242, 267–68, 279, 283,

292

violated in the War of 1812, 144

See also War, principles of.

Upton, Col. Emory, 313, 314, 376

U.S. Army, 51

and African Americans, 236–37, 308, 355

Appropriation Act of 1867, 309

civil functions, 308–11, 320–23

and creation of the Confederate Army, 202

demobilization after the Civil War, 307, 308

desertions, 168

discipline, 119, 204, 254, 312, 317

establishment of, 109–11

as first line of national defense, 164, 174

flag, 8

isolation from society at large, 313, 326–27

joint operations with U.S. Navy, 215, 217, 240–42, 

270–72, 286

mobilization problems, 379, 385

modernization in the early twentieth century, 372–74

morale, 119, 205, 254

officers, 149, 159–60, 164, 165, 174, 200, 205–06, 258,

377

professionalism of, 23, 159–60, 165, 174, 316, 377,

389

training of, 123–24

organization of, 119, 121, 149, 160–61, 164, 174, 200,

202, 210, 219, 237, 308, 315, 327, 349, 350

as a professional force, 159–60, 313–16, 317, 320, 323,

349, 388, 394–96

and reconstruction, 308–11

recruitment for, 118–19, 164–65, 232

retirement system, 316

seal, 4

Spanish-American War mobilization, 349–52

strength, 113, 116, 117, 118–19, 121, 122, 123, 127,

132, 134, 160, 161, 164, 171, 180, 194, 200, 204,

308, 327

support to federal marshals, 311

terms of enlistment, 118, 119, 122

training, 119, 159–60, 165–66, 174, 196–97, 223, 232, 241,

254, 258, 349–52, 377, 385

U.S. Army Reserve, 380

U.S. Army War College. See War College, U.S. Army.

U.S. Congress

and Army installations, 380

and the Army staff, 148, 160–61

and the Civil War, 215–16

and civilian control of U.S. military, 111

and coastal fortification, 161, 319

and the Continental Army, 93–94, 107

Continental Army reforms, 86

General Staff and Chief of Staff created, 376

and the Mexican War, 180

military appropriations, 161, 216, 374, 378

and military officers, 164

and the military supply system, 134, 148

militia law, 114

and the National Guard, 380, 388

and the Panama Canal, 382

and the Philippines, 361

and presidential powers, 310, 388–89

proposed military establishment after the Revolutionary 

War, 108–12

and reconstruction of the South, 310

Regular Army organization, 160, 376

and the Spanish-American War, 350

and strength of the Army, 113, 116, 117, 118–19, 121,

122, 123, 127, 149, 160, 164, 192, 308, 350

and terms of military enlistment, 119, 122

and troops for service in the Philippines, 362

U.S. Navy and Marine Corps created, 121–22

U.S. Navy modernized, 374

and the War of 1812, 132, 144, 160

and the Weather Bureau, 322

See also Congressional Committee on the Conduct of the 

War, Joint.

U.S. Corps

I, 263

II, 265, 267, 290
index

415

III, 263

IV, 296

V, 228, 232, 234, 264, 299, 355, 356, 358

VI, 290, 292, 299

VIII, 290, 360, 362, 363

IX, 286, 287

XI, 257, 263

XIII, 268

XV, 268

XVII, 268

XVIII, 290

XXII, 296

U.S. Divisions

First, 182

Second, 182

U.S. Marine Corps, 122. See also Marines.

U.S. Military Academy. See Military Academy, U.S.

U.S. Navy

Asiatic Squadron, 352

blockade of Cuba, 350, 352

blockade of Southern (Confederate) coast, 203, 204, 206,

209, 215, 245

blockade of Vera Cruz, 187

in the Civil War, 203, 204, 206, 209, 215, 217, 240–42,

270–72, 286

coaling stations for, 347–48, 349

joint operations with the Army, 215, 217, 240–42, 270–72, 

286

and the Mexican revolution, 384

and the Mexican War, 183

modernization in the early twentieth century, 372–73

North Atlantic Squadron, 352

professionalism, 313, 347

river fleets, 215

ships, 121–22, 134, 213, 372–73

and the Spanish-American War, 352–54

and the War of 1812, 136, 139, 141–42, 153, 155–56

See also Navy, Department of the; War College, Naval.

U.S. Supreme Court, 121, 312

Utah, 192, 193, 248

Valencia, General Gabriel, 190

Valley Campaign, 225–27

Valley Forge, Pennsylvania, 81, 85–87

Van Dorn, Maj. Gen. Earl, 245, 246, 249, 268, 327

Van Rensselaer, Maj. Gen. Stephen, 138–39

Vauban, Marshal Sebastien, 26, 27, 101

Vera Cruz, Mexico, 181, 184, 187–89, 191, 192, 384

Vergennes, Charles Gravier, Comte de, 76

Vicksburg, Mississippi, 267–72

Vicksburg Campaign, 267–72, 300

Vietnam, 9

Villa, Francisco “Pancho,” 384, 385, 388

Vincent, Col. Strong, 264

Virginia, 51

and the Civil War, 202, 204, 207, 209–34, 237, 239, 288

and the Revolutionary War, 65, 96, 98–99, 101–02

Virginia, Army of. See under Union armies.

Volunteer Army (1916), 388

Volunteer Cavalry, U.S. 1st, 358

Volunteer service, 31, 108

and African Americans, 237

and American Indians, 328

authority of the President to call units, 122, 134, 180, 182, 

215–16

in the colonial wars, 34–35

demobilization of units after the Civil War, 308

discipline, 48

in the French and Indian War, 38

individual replacement system, 205

lack of a unified chain of command, 48, 50

in the Mexican War, 180–85, 186

officers, 34–35, 48, 204–06, 215–16, 349

organization of, 114–15, 216

in the Philippines, 360, 365

recruitment for, 180, 205, 215–16

reorganization of, 379

soldiers’ preference for service in, 204

for the Spanish-American War, 349–50, 351, 355

terms of enlistment, 34–35, 188, 204, 215–16

training for, 114–15, 215–16, 240

Volunteers

Colorado, 249

Confederate, 202, 205, 209, 213, 218

Florida, 171

Illinois, 168, 205

Kentucky, 142, 144, 156

Louisiana, 171, 178

Missouri, 187

New England, 48, 218

New York, 139

Ohio, 217

U.S. 5th, 331–32

Vermont, 139, 205

West Tennessee, 162, 163

Wisconsin, 205

Wabash River, 118, 119

Wagner, Col. Arthur L., 315

Wagon trains, 93, 179, 182, 193, 288, 318, 334

Wagons, 171, 172, 182

War, principles of, 6–14

Grant executes, 286–87, 288, 290–92, 298–301

Sherman executes, 298–301

Scott uses and violates, 189

See also Economy of force; Maneuver; Mass; Objective; 

Offensive; Security; Simplicity; Surprise; Unity of 

command.
American Military History

416

War of 1812, 10, 131–56, 174

lack of discipline among U.S. forces, 140

violation of economy of force in, 136

violation of objective in, 136

War of Austrian Succession (1744–1748), 32, 34

War College, Naval, 349, 352. See also Navy, Department of 

the; U.S. Navy.

War College, U.S. Army, 368, 376, 377, 390, 395. See also

Military Academy, U.S.; U.S. Army.

War College Board, 376

War Department, 113

and the Army supply system, 134

Bureau of Colored Troops, 237

Bureau of Indian Affairs, 338

and coastal fortification, 165

deficiencies of administration during the War of 1812, 

148

and the Mexican War, 180

purchasing policies, 219

reorganizations of, 215–16, 219, 319, 375–78

research and development efforts, 319, 322

and the Spanish-American War, 349–52

and use of militia, 164

and the weather service, 320, 322

War of Jenkins’ Ear (1739–1742), 34

Ward, Artemas, 48

Warren, Maj. Gen. Gouverneur K., 264, 299–300

Warren, Admiral Sir John, 146, 148

Washington, D.C., 141, 152

Confederate attacks on, 227, 292

defense in the Civil War, 209–10, 218, 225, 227, 260, 284,

292

Washington, George, 9–10, 11, 15, 16–17, 76, 104

as Commander in Chief, 51–53, 59–60, 65, 69, 72, 94,

102–04

council of war, 61, 87–88

and defense of New York, 66, 68–70, 89, 94

deference to civilian authority, 57–58

and demobilization of the Continental Army, 107

and Fort Duquesne, 35–36, 41, 51

and Indian expeditions, 117, 118–19

and need for a military school, 123

and Newburgh Conspiracy, 108 

opinion on military needs of the new nation, 104–05, 

108, 109, 114

as President, 113

return to military command in 1799, 122

and role of the militia in the new nation, 104–05

staff, 61

use of economy of force, 77

use of French forces, 88–89, 99, 101–02

use of mobilized militia, 59

at Valley Forge, 85–87

and victory at Yorktown, 101–02, 103–04

violation of mass, 66, 68

violation of simplicity, 79–80

Washington, Lt. Col. William, 97

Washington Light Artillery, 210

Washita River, 334

Waxhaws, South Carolina, 92

Wayne, Maj. Gen. Anthony, 79, 88, 89, 99, 118, 119–20

Weapons

American Indian, 28–29

British, 132

in the Civil War, 13–14, 218

coast artillery, 195

for the Continental Army, 59

domestic production of, 114

field artillery, 178, 182, 183, 186, 188, 193

Mexican Army, 181, 183, 185, 186, 188

in the Mexican War, 180, 181, 183, 185, 186

for the National Guard, 343

naval ordnance, 187, 215

procurement, 114

Union, 218

See also Ammunition; Artillery; Bayonets; Guns; Mortars; 

Rifles.

Weather reports, 165

Weather stations, 311, 317, 319–20, 322

Weigley, Russell F., 5

West Florida, 144–45

West Indies, 32, 34, 53, 56, 87, 88, 89, 90, 101, 102

West Point, New York, 84, 89, 94, 107, 109, 112, 121, 

123–24, 134

West Virginia, 217

Weyler, Valeriano, 348

Wheaton, Brig. Gen. Lloyd, 362

Wheeler, Maj. Gen. Joseph, 245, 278, 293, 356, 358

Wheeler Survey, 1871–1879, 322

Whiskey Rebellion, 116

Wilderness, Battle of the, 284

Wilkinson, Maj. Gen. James, 124, 126–27, 144, 148–49

Williamsburg, Virginia, 99, 101–02

Wilmington, North Carolina, 215, 295, 299

Wilson, Woodrow, 383–84, 385–86, 387–88

Winchester, Brig. Gen. James, 140

Winder, Brig. Gen. William H., 152

Winter campaigns

against American Indians, 334–35, 339–40

during the War of 1812, 139–40, 141

Wirz, Capt. Henry, 302

Wisconsin, 168, 205

Wolfe, Maj. Gen. James, 39, 54

Wood, Maj. Gen. Leonard, 356, 371, 381, 386, 388

Wool, Bvt. Maj. Gen. John E., 180, 183, 185, 186, 192, 200

World War II, 10, 11, 14

Worth, Col. William J., 9, 172, 189

Wounded Knee, Battle of, 334
index

417

Wright, Wilbur and Orville, 378

Wyoming, 192, 339

Wyoming Valley, Pennsylvania, 90

Yellow fever, 187, 188, 359, 381, 383. See also Disease.

York, Pennsylvania, 56

York (Toronto), Canada, 140, 141

Yorktown, Virginia, 79, 95, 98–99, 101–02, 103–04, 225, 227

Yukon, 320

Zapata, Emiliano, 383

Zimmermann, Arthur, 389–90