NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-1832-14T1

 A-2409-14T1

MAURA RICCI, n/k/a MAURA MCGARVEY,

Plaintiff-Appellant/

Cross-Respondent,

v.

MICHAEL RICCI,

Defendant-Respondent,

and 

CAITLYN RICCI, 

Intervenor-Respondent/

Cross-Appellant.

_____________________________________

MAURA RICCI, n/k/a MAURA MCGARVEY

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

MICHAEL RICCI, 

Defendant-Appellant,

and

CAITLYN RICCI,

Intervener-Respondent.

_____________________________________

Submitted November 3, 2016 - Decided 

APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION

February 9, 2017

APPELLATE DIVISION

February 9, 2017
2 A-1832-14T1

Before Judges Lihotz, Hoffman and Whipple.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Chancery Division, Family Part, Camden 

County, Docket No. FM-04-0239-98.

Petersen & Martone, attorneys for appellant/ 

cross-respondent (Kelli M. Martone, on the 

briefs).

Morgenstern & Rochester, LLP, attorneys for 

respondent/cross-appellant (Andrew L. 

Rochester, on the brief).

Smithbridge, LLP, attorneys for appellant 

Michael Ricci in A-2409-14, join in the 

brief of appellant/cross-respondent Maura 

Ricci in A-1832-14.

The opinion of the court was delivered by 

LIHOTZ, P.J.A.D.

More than thirty years have passed since the Supreme Court 

issued Newburgh v. Arrigo, 88 N.J. 529 (1982), which held "the 

privilege of parenthood carries with it the duty to assure a 

necessary education for children." Id. at 543. Necessary 

support for unemancipated children could include contribution 

toward the cost of a college education, even though the child 

has attained the age of majority. Id. at 543. Since then, 

courts have struggled to define the scope of this parental 

obligation, as circumscribed by facts and circumstances unique 

to each family. In this case, we examine the court's role in 

navigating the interplay between emancipation and a parent's 
3 A-1832-14T1

obligation to provide for a child's support in the form of 

college tuition, when the child has left the parent's home. 

Plaintiff Maura McGarvey appeals from several Family Part 

orders mandating she and defendant Michael Ricci, plaintiff's 

former husband, contribute to the college tuition expenses of 

intervenor, their now twenty-three-year-old daughter, Caitlyn 

Ricci. Plaintiff and defendant agreed Caitlyn was emancipated 

when she left her mother's home to reside with her grandparents 

at age nineteen. Plaintiff and defendant filed a consent order 

terminating child support. Thereafter, Caitlyn moved to 

intervene in the matrimonial matter, seeking to vacate the 

emancipation order and require her parents to provide funds 

allowing her to attend college. In the October 11, 2013 order, 

the judge permitted Caitlyn to intervene and required plaintiff 

and defendant to pay the tuition cost for Gloucester County 

Community College (the community college), which was less than 

$2,000. 

Prior to completing her associate's degree, Caitlyn 

transferred to Temple University, in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 

(the university). She moved for plaintiff and defendant to pay 

annual tuition for the university, which, after awarded 

financial aid, was significantly more than the tuition at the 

community college. On October 31, 2014, a newly assigned judge 
4 A-1832-14T1

considered Caitlyn's motion. He concluded the issue was 

adjudicated and governed by the October 11, 2013 order. 

Accordingly, without benefit of a plenary hearing or review of 

financial documentation, the newly assigned judge "enforced" the 

October 11 order and required plaintiff and defendant satisfy 

the university's outstanding tuition, fees, and the cost of 

books. 

Plaintiff and defendant sought reconsideration and were 

assigned to return to the initial motion judge. Unfortunately, 

he limited his review to the provisions of the first order, not 

the October 31, 2014 order. Thus, the judge declined to examine 

whether and to what extent plaintiff and defendant could and 

should pay tuition to the university. He noted Caitlyn did not 

discuss attending the university in her October 2013 motion, 

revealing only plans to attend a state university once she 

earned her associate's degree. In the December 6, 2014 order, 

the judge considered the factors identified in Newburgh, as to 

the request plaintiff and defendant satisfy community college 

tuition. There was no discussion regarding payment for the 

university. In that regard, the judge declined to reconsider 

the order to pay the university tuition set forth in the October 

31, 2014 order. 
5 A-1832-14T1

Plaintiff appeals from the October 11, 2013, October 31, 

2014 and December 6, 2014 orders. Defendant also appeals from 

these orders. The matters were consolidated and we granted 

defendant's motion to join in and rely on the brief submitted by 

plaintiff. Caitlyn filed a cross-appeal, challenging plaintiff's 

attack on the October 11, 2013 order and argued the denial of 

her request for attorney's fees in the October 31, 2014 and 

December 6, 2014 orders was error. 

Following our review, we conclude the judge properly 

allowed Caitlyn to intervene in this action to advance her 

request for support. However, the record is void of the basis 

establishing Caitlyn was unemancipated at the time of the 

October 11, 2013 review. As more thoroughly discussed in our 

opinion, emancipation is a legal determination, which must be 

resolved prior to awarding support, including payment of college 

costs. Because this analysis is absent, we reverse and vacate 

the provisions of the challenged order addressed to emancipation 

and payment of support. We remand this matter for plenary 

review. 

I.

These facts are found in the record. Plaintiff and 

defendant were divorced when Caitlyn was four years old. 

Plaintiff was the parent of primary residence, defendant 
6 A-1832-14T1

exercised regular parenting time and provided child support. 

The record reflects the parents shared decision-making 

responsibility regarding Caitlyn's care.

Caitlyn graduated from high school in June 2012. Various 

actions resulted in the conclusion Caitlyn was not ready to live 

away at college. With her parents' urging and support, Caitlyn 

enrolled part-time in the community college. However, 

estrangement with her parents heightened, and Caitlyn left her 

mother's home in February 2013, to reside with her paternal 

grandparents. Plaintiff and defendant agreed Caitlyn was 

emancipated. This decision was memorialized in a March 30, 2013 

consent order terminating defendant's obligation to pay child 

support. 

Legal action followed as Caitlyn moved to intervene in her 

parents' dissolution action. She sought to vacate the March 30, 

2013 order of emancipation, compel payment of her full-time 

community college education costs, provide financial assistance 

to acquire a new car, continue her health insurance coverage, 

and pay counsel fees and costs. Plaintiff and defendant 

objected to the relief Caitlyn requested. Specifically, both 

parents challenged Caitlyn's request to intervene and asserted 

her conduct demonstrated her desire to be independent of 

parental control, which obviated any obligation for support. 
7 A-1832-14T1

In an accompanying certification, Caitlyn briefly mentions 

the family dynamics, stating, "substantial personal problems 

. . . necessitated that I move out of my mother's home . . . . 

I did not fit in well with her new family." She also stated "I 

. . . had substantial problems with my father's new family[,] 

and thus he was not an option." 

Plaintiff and defendant's pleadings cast a different light 

on the parent-child relationship. Both parents expressed their 

love for Caitlyn and a willingness to address issues as a 

family; however, plaintiff and defendant separately opposed 

Caitlyn's motion based on her conduct and choices. Their 

certifications detail the difficulties experienced with 

Caitlyn's dangerous decisions and disobedience, which started 

while she was in high school. Caitlyn's conduct included 

smoking marijuana while driving, engaging in underage drinking 

and sexual activity, participating in explicit sexual 

conversations on the internet, and attempting to hurt herself. 

Plaintiff explained she attempted to counsel her daughter, 

who nevertheless did not obey her requests, expressed dislike 

for imposed rules, and chose to leave her home. Plaintiff 

asserted Caitlyn "willingly, knowingly, [and] voluntarily left 

and went [out] on her own." 
8 A-1832-14T1

Defendant discussed his view of Caitlyn's trouble with 

alcohol, drugs, and impulsive behavior, as well as her acts of 

opposition to plaintiff's imposition of discipline, including a 

curfew and the obligation to perform household chores. 

Defendant related his efforts to discuss these concerns with 

Caitlyn, which she repeatedly rebuffed. He stated Caitlyn 

refused to answer her parents' texts or calls prior to filing 

her motion. Caitlyn had not spoken to either parent for six 

months; she ignored birthdays, a family member's illness, and 

mother and father's day. Finally, defendant pointedly objected 

to Caitlyn's decision to reside with his parents, showing 

unequivocally he was estranged from them and blamed them for 

exacerbating parental relationship difficulties with Caitlyn. 

The record also informed regarding Caitlyn's college 

decisions. These facts are undisputed. When she was accepted 

to attend Montclair State University, plaintiff and defendant 

discussed contributing $5,000 each towards annual college costs, 

with the remainder satisfied by Caitlyn obtaining student loans. 

However, because of Caitlyn's behavior, it was agreed she was 

not ready to live away from home, and should first attend 

community college. Defendant paid the summer and fall 2012 

community college tuition, and Caitlyn attended part-time. In 

the winter of 2012, Caitlyn sought to attend the Disney College 
9 A-1832-14T1

program in Florida. Plaintiff and defendant jointly agreed to 

support Caitlyn's effort as a way of testing her readiness to 

live on her own. They fully paid for her participation and 

assisted her move to Florida. Unfortunately, within a month of 

arriving, Caitlyn was expelled for underage alcohol use as the 

host of a party in the dorms. 

The parties disagreed on events occurring after Caitlyn 

returned from Florida. Plaintiff and defendant wanted Caitlyn 

to return to community college to compete her associate's 

degree. With defendant's support, plaintiff outlined a course 

of discipline, work, and community college courses demanded of 

her daughter. Plaintiff recounted how Caitlyn rejected these 

attempts to restore discipline and make-up missed college 

credits, stating she wanted instead to spend the summer with 

friends. Plaintiff asserted Caitlyn indulged in what she 

labeled frivolous spending, inappropriate use of Facebook, and 

multiple nights spent away from home. Plaintiff initiated 

counselling, but Caitlyn attended only one session and refused 

to continue. Caitlyn then decided to move to her grandparents' 

home where she was not restricted. 

Caitlyn's version expressed a different story. Caitlyn 

maintained she did not "run to her grandparents in defiance"; 

rather, plaintiff "kicked [her] out" when she returned from 
10 A-1832-14T1

Disney. Alternatively, Caitlyn attributed the move to her 

grandparents as her parents' "suggestion." Further, she 

characterized the behavior outlined by her parents as "things 

that teenagers typically do" and insisted the control exerted by 

her parents' demands was "impossible." Caitlyn asserted she was 

following the college path her parents dictated and accepted all 

conditions imposed, except the demand to work full-time and take 

three summer classes. She insisted the imposed unrealistic 

demands pushed her beyond the sphere of parental influence. 

Caitlyn initiated litigation only after plaintiff and 

defendant separately informed her they would not pay her 

community college costs because she was not residing with either 

of them. Caitlyn asserted she was a full-time community college 

student and, upon completion of her associate's degree, planned 

to attend Rowan University. Pay stubs reflected Caitlyn grossed 

more than $400 per week waitressing. 

During oral argument, in response to plaintiff's suggested 

request for a plenary hearing to determine whether Caitlyn was 

unemancipated, the Family Part judge stated:

Well, there may be a time in a future 

year that you need a plenary hearing, but 

based on the cost of the college for this 

year, I really think that would be overkill 

and I feel that the [c]ourt would have 

enough based upon the excellent briefs and 

the certifications that were submitted that 

I could make a decision today.
11 A-1832-14T1

Defendant's counsel asked whether the order was intended to 

address just the current community college tuition request or 

possible future costs at a four-year school. The judge answered 

"I don't think I can do that." 

The judge granted Caitlyn's motion to intervene. 

Describing the matter as a "unique situation," he deemed Caitlyn 

"un-emancipated [sic] solely for the purpose of a potential 

contribution from [her parents] as it relates to college costs." 

In rendering his order, the judge rendered his order, stating he 

sought "to make the best economic decision[,]" and limited the 

order's provisions to payment of community college costs for the 

2013-2014 school year. He ordered Caitlyn to seek and apply for 

loans and scholarships to reduce expenses. Caitlyn represented 

she had done so and was awarded $2,500. Noting financial 

information was not in the record, the judge stated plaintiff 

and defendant were to split remaining "costs related to . . . 

tuition, fees and books." 

Also, the order stated: 

4. For subsequent school years, before 

determining . . . [p]laintiff and 

[d]efendant's contribution to Caitlyn's 

tuition, fees and book costs, Caitlyn shall 

apply for all eligible loans and apply all 

eligible scholarships toward her tuition, 

fees, and book[] costs.
12 A-1832-14T1

5. On future matriculation (beginning the 

[f]all of 2014), the [p]laintiff and 

[d]efendant shall exchange tax returns and 

the three (3) most recent paystubs in 

regards to determining a child support 

percentage for each party. This child 

support percentage breakdown will determine 

the amount that the parties will pay towards 

Caitlyn's college tuition and books[,] after 

Caitlyn has obtained all financial aid, 

grants, and scholarships. 

. . . .

9. For future academic years, all parties 

will attend economic mediation if they 

cannot agree to Caitlyn's college tuition, 

fees, and books. 

The order denied Caitlyn's request for contribution toward 

the purchase of a new car and found plaintiff always maintained 

health insurance coverage for Caitlyn, making the request moot. 

Finally, "in a compensatory manner," the judge awarded Caitlyn 

$1,000 in counsel fees and costs, payable $500 by each parent, 

which "shall come off the parties' contribution towards 

Caitlyn's college costs for tuition, fees and books for the 

2013-[20]14 academic year." 

Caitlyn was accepted to attend the university, commencing 

in the fall 2014. She notified plaintiff she was leaving 

community college and requested plaintiff complete the Free 

Application for Federal Student Aid (FAFSA). Plaintiff agreed 

to do so but suggested Caitlyn first obtain her associate's 
13 A-1832-14T1

degree, noting she and defendant could not afford the 

university's tuition cost. 

Caitlyn filed a motion to enforce litigant's rights, 

seeking an order compelling plaintiff and defendant to attend 

economic mediation to fix their respective contributions toward 

the university's tuition, fee and book costs and to reimburse 

past community college costs. 

Caitlyn stated the university's financial aid evaluation 

"was calculated as if there would be no parenting [sic] 

contribution." Total aid reduced the $27,000 annual tuition and 

fees by $19,180 per year, of which $14,000 represented student 

loans. Caitlyn believed it reasonable to incur only federally 

subsidized student loans, limiting her debt to $5,500. 

Consequently, she required plaintiff and defendant to allocate 

the remaining $17,000 per year. Thereafter, Caitlyn met with 

the university's Senior Assistant Director of Student Financial 

Services. When Caitlyn explained she was "unemancipated" for 

college expense purposes, the university rescinded the financial 

aid package and required one parent complete the FAFSA. 

Plaintiff opposed Caitlyn's motion; defendant did not file 

pleadings but appeared. The case was assigned to a different 

Family Part judge. The judge ordered the parties comply with 

the October 11, 2013 order's prerequisite for economic 
14 A-1832-14T1

mediation. His September 10, 2014 order also required they 

exchange financial information for the purposes of mediation, 

and plaintiff agreed to complete the FAFSA parental disclosure. 

The parties identified a mediator, and the session occurred in 

early October 2014.1 Mediation was not successful. 

Returning to the newly assigned motion judge, Caitlyn 

asserted her revised financial aid award was $9,250 per year. 

She applied for three of four additional loans suggested by 

plaintiff, but the lenders required co-signors. Caitlyn argued 

the October 11, 2013 order directed plaintiff and defendant to 

allocate the university tuition and requested an order directing 

them to split the cost equally. Plaintiff and defendant opposed 

this request, asserting the order was limited to 2013-2014 

community college tuition and left open other college costs. 

Further, the parents maintained the judge never considered 

payment of the university's tuition, which they agreed they 

could not afford. 

The newly assigned motion judge viewed plaintiff and 

defendant's request not as a change in circumstances, but as a 

request for reconsideration of the October 11, 2013 order. He 

concluded reconsideration was not properly before him and must 

 

1 Plaintiff's brief states mediation was held on October 2, 

while Caitlyn and plaintiff's pleadings identify mediation was 

held on October 9.
15 A-1832-14T1

be handled by the initial motion judge. Enforcing his 

interpretation of that order's provisions, he ordered plaintiff 

and defendant to satisfy the university tuition 40% and 60% 

respectively. The October 31, 2014 order also scheduled a 

plenary hearing to decide reimbursement of community college 

costs and ordered the parties to mediate any modification 

requests or future disputes. Finally, the judge denied 

Caitlyn's application for attorney's fees. 

Plaintiff and defendant moved for reconsideration of the 

October 31, 2014 order. Both argued the order was unfounded, as 

Caitlyn unilaterally left plaintiff's home; refused to 

compromise her demands or return home; transferred to an 

expensive out-of-state university; abandoned completion of 

community college or attending Rowan. Moreover, Caitlyn refused 

to communicate with her parents and continued to act 

independently, without regard to parental input. Finally, the 

court never reviewed whether and to what extent plaintiff and 

defendant should or could pay for any expenses beyond community 

college tuition.

Caitlyn opposed the motions and filed a cross-motion for 

counsel fees. She additionally filed a separate motion seeking 

an order of contempt, sanctions, and enforcement of litigant's 

rights. Disposition was returned to the original motion judge.
16 A-1832-14T1

Concluding the October 11, 2013 order was interlocutory, 

the judge limited his review to reconsideration of that order 

and declined to reconsider challenges to the October 31, 2014 

order, stating "for today, I can't address that." The judge 

agreed to clarify Caitlyn's obligation to apply for "all 

eligible loans . . . and all eligible scholarships." In his 

oral opinion, he explained Caitlyn must attempt to apply for and 

make a reasonable effort to secure "five or six" scholarships. 

He then reviewed each provision of the October 11, 2013 order 

and concluded the requirement to pay community college tuition 

was "de minimis." The judge ordered plaintiff and defendant to 

equally satisfy the claimed balance of $906 and rejected 

Caitlyn's request for attorney's fees. 

This court consolidated plaintiff's appeal and Caitlyn's 

cross-appeal. Defendant joins in the brief submitted by plaintiff. 

II.

A.

"When reviewing a trial judge's order, we defer to factual 

findings 'supported by adequate, substantial, credible 

evidence.'" Spangenberg v. Kolakowski, 442 N.J. Super. 529, 535 

(App. Div. 2015) (quoting Gnall v. Gnall, 222 N.J. 414, 428 

(2015)). However, reversal is warranted when the expressed 

factual findings are "so manifestly unsupported by or 
17 A-1832-14T1

inconsistent with the competent, relevant and reasonably 

credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice." Elrom 

v. Elrom, 439 N.J. Super. 424, 433 (App. Div. 2015) (quoting 

Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J.

474, 484 (1974)). 

Discretionary determinations, supported by the record, are 

examined to discern whether an abuse of reasoned discretion has 

occurred. Gac v. Gac, 186 N.J. 535, 547 (2006). 

While an "abuse of discretion . . . defies 

precise definition," we will not reverse the 

decision absent a finding the judge's 

decision "rested on an impermissible basis," 

considered "irrelevant or inappropriate 

factors," Flagg v. Essex Cnty. Prosecutor, 

171 N.J. 561, 571 (2002) (citations . . . 

omitted), "failed to consider controlling 

legal principles or made findings 

inconsistent with or unsupported by 

competent evidence." Storey[v. Storey], 373 

N.J. Super. [464,] 479 [(App. Div. 2004)].

[Elrom, supra, 439 N.J. Super. at 434.]

This court does not accord the same deference to a trial 

judge's legal determinations. Reese v. Weis, 430 N.J. Super.

552, 568 (App. Div. 2013). Rather, all legal issues are 

reviewed de novo. Ibid. 

B.

As a preliminary matter, we examine Caitlyn's cross-appeal 

urging dismissal of plaintiff's attack on the October 11, 2013 

order as time barred. R. 2:4-1(a) (requiring appeals be filed 
18 A-1832-14T1

within forty-five days of the date final judgment or order is 

entered). "Where the appeal is untimely, the Appellate Division 

has no jurisdiction to decide the merits of the appeal." In re 

Hill, 241 N.J. Super. 367, 372 (App. Div. 1990) (citing Alberti 

v. Civil Service Comm'n, 41 N.J. 147, 154 (1963)). 

"Generally, an order is considered final if it disposes of 

all issues as to all parties." Silviera-Francisco v. Bd. of 

Educ. of City of Elizabeth, 224 N.J. 126, 136 (2016). "By 

definition, an order that 'does not finally determine a cause of 

action but only decides some intervening matter pertaining to 

the cause[,] and which requires further steps . . . to enable 

the court to adjudicate the cause on the merits[,]' is 

interlocutory." Moon v. Warren Haven Nursing Home, 182 N.J.

507, 512 (2005) (alterations in original) (quoting Black's Law 

Dictionary 815 (6th ed. 1990)). 

The distinction between a final order, appealable of right, 

and an interlocutory order, which is not, is a "principle . . . 

easily stated," but "not always easily applied." Wein v. 

Morris, 194 N.J. 364, 377 (2008). The distinction is critical 

because finality is a jurisdictional prerequisite for appeal, R.

2:2-3, and neither the parties nor the trial judge "may invest 

the Appellate Division with jurisdiction it does not otherwise 
19 A-1832-14T1

have." Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 

2.2.1 on R. 2:2-3 (2017). 

Without consideration of the legal sufficiency of its 

terms, we note the October 11, 2013 order answered the question 

of whether Caitlyn could intervene in her parents' matrimonial 

action, imposed a limited provision regarding Caitlyn's 

emancipation, and fixed parental obligations for the 2013-2014 

community college tuition costs. The order's terms also 

addressed "future matriculation" and "subsequent school years," 

imposing executory obligations on all parties. Had the order 

resolved all issues regarding Caitlyn's post-secondary school 

education, it would have been final. However, its terms, as 

well as the judge's remarks on the provisions, show no final 

decision was made fixing the extent of the parental support 

beyond the 2013-2014 community college tuition costs.

The language used in paragraphs four and five of the order 

set procedures, laying the preliminary groundwork necessary to 

review allocation of future college costs. However, contrary to 

Caitlyn's assertion, which was erroneously adopted in the 

October 30, 2014 order, the issue was never finally adjudicated. 

For example, paragraph four expressed a need for additional 

review, reciting Caitlyn's obligations undertaken "before 

determining the [p]laintiff and [d]efendant's contribution" for 
20 A-1832-14T1

subsequent school years. In addition, paragraph nine mentioned 

future academic years and imposed an economic mediation 

prerequisite, which further demonstrates said issues were open. 

Moreover, during the October 11, 2013 hearing, the judge 

remarked he had not reviewed financial information and ordered 

payment shared because the amount was "de minimis." During the 

December 8, 2014 hearing, the judge clarified there were no 

prior discussions addressed to payment for the university or 

another college; the issues were limited to community college.2 

We conclude the October 11, 2013 order resolved 

intervention and dealt with the immediate community college 

tuition. The order settled only the interim issue and did not 

resolve all college contribution requests or finalize all rights 

and responsibilities of the parties by finally adjudicating the 

merits of all issues raised in the action. See Adams v. Adams, 

53 N.J. Super. 424, 429 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 30 N.J. 151 

(1959). 

Once the proceeding concluded on December 8, 2014, with the 

denial of reconsideration of the October 11, 2013 order and 

rejection of reconsideration of the October 31, 2014 order, the 

 

2 We recognize remarks by the initial judge in entering the 

order suggest the October 11, 2013 order's requirements for 

modest payment amount appeared directed to deescalate this 

family's growing alienation and sought to prompt healing of 

their emotional turmoil. 
21 A-1832-14T1

obligation for college contributions became final for purposes 

of appeal. Accordingly, plaintiff's appeal properly sought 

review of all orders leading to the final determination. See

Sutter v. Horizon Blue Cross Blue Shield of N.J., 406 N.J. 

Super. 86, 106 (App. Div. 2009) ("'An appeal from a final 

judgment raises the validity of all interlocutory orders' 

previously entered in the trial court." (quoting In re Carton, 

48 N.J. 9, 15 (1966))). 

III.

For the first time, plaintiff argues the challenged orders 

must be vacated because the Family Part has interfered with her 

constitutional right to raise her daughter. 

"[I]t is a well-settled principle that our 

appellate courts will decline to consider 

questions or issues not properly presented 

to the trial court when an opportunity for 

such a presentation is available unless the 

questions so raised on appeal go to the 

jurisdiction of the trial court or concern 

matters of great public interest."

[Zaman v. Felton, 219 N.J. 199, 226-27 

(2014) (quoting State v. Robinson, 200 N.J.

1, 20 (2009))].

See also Pressler & Verniero, supra, cmt. 3 on R. 2:6-2. 

Because we conclude clarification of the law is necessary, we 

have elected to address the merits of this argument.

Plaintiff's constitutional challenge maintains the court 

may not interfere with a joint parental decision to set 
22 A-1832-14T1

discipline and achievement requirements for Caitlyn. Caitlyn 

argues no constitutional violation arises. She urges the court 

properly enforced her right to support and her right to be 

educated, and suggests the controversy is only about money. 

These arguments speak to "the intersection between parents' 

fundamental liberty interest in the care, custody, and control 

of their children, and the state's interest in the protection of 

those children." Fawzy v. Fawzy, 199 N.J. 456, 472-73 (2009).

A.

Unquestionably, "[t]he right to rear one's children is so 

deeply embedded in our history and culture that it has been 

identified as a fundamental liberty interest protected by the 

Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United 

States Constitution." Id. at 473 (quoting Moriarty v. Bradt, 

177 N.J. 84, 101 (2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1177, 124 S. Ct.

1408, 158 L. Ed. 2d 78 (2004)). "The Federal and State 

Constitutions protect the inviolability of the family unit." In 

re Adoption of a Child by W.P. & M.P., 308 N.J. Super. 376, 382 

(App. Div. 1998) (citing Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651, 

92 S. Ct. 1208, 1212-13, 31 L. Ed. 2d 551, 558-59 (1972), 

vacated on other grounds, 163 N.J. 158 (2000). Therefore, 

"[p]arents have a constitutionally protected, fundamental 

liberty interest in raising their biological children." Id. at 
23 A-1832-14T1

382 (citing Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753, 102 S. Ct.

1388, 1394, 71 L. Ed. 2d 599, 606 (1982)). See also Wisconsin 

v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232-33, 92 S. Ct. 1526, 1541-42, 32 L. 

Ed. 2d 15, 35 (1972) (explaining the "primary role" of parents 

in raising their children is "an enduring American tradition" 

and establishing the historic recognition of that right as 

fundamental); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166, 64 S. 

Ct. 438, 442, 88 L. Ed. 645, 652 (1944) (identifying privacy 

interest attached to child rearing, labeled the "private realm 

of family life which the state cannot enter"); Meyer v. 

Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399, 43 S. Ct. 625, 626, 67 L. Ed. 1042, 

1045 (1923) (characterizing parental right to raise children 

"as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men"). 

As our Supreme Court has stated:

Deference to parental autonomy means that 

the State does not second-guess parental 

decision making or interfere with the shared 

opinion of parents regarding how a child 

should be raised. Nor does it impose its 

own notion of a child's best interests on a 

family. Rather, the State permits to stand 

unchallenged parental judgments that it 

might not have made or that could be 

characterized as unwise. That is because 

parental autonomy includes the "freedom to 

decide wrongly." 

[Fawzy, supra, 199 N.J. at 473-74 (quoting 

Janet Maleson Spencer & Joseph P. Zammit, 

Mediation-Arbitration: A Proposal for 

Private Resolution of Disputes Between 
24 A-1832-14T1

Divorced or Separated Parents, 1976 Duke 

L.J. 911, 913 (1976)).]

See also Sacharow v. Sacharow, 177 N.J. 62, 79 (2003) (holding 

the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United 

States Constitution "encompasses [the] 'fundamental right of 

parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and 

control of their own children.'" (quoting Troxel v. Granville, 

530 U.S. 57, 67, 120 S. Ct. 2054, 2061, 147 L. Ed. 2d 49, 60 

(2000))). 

Legislation has been enacted to address and protect the 

parent-child relationship. Specifically, N.J.S.A. 9:17-39 

states a "'parent and child' relationship means the legal 

relationship between a child and the child's . . . parents . . . 

to which the law confers or imposes rights, privileges, duties, 

and obligations." These rights, privileges, duties, and 

obligations extend to both parents "equally . . . regardless of

marital status." N.J.S.A. 9:17-40.

B.

One duty imposed by law requires parents provide financial 

support for their children. "The parental obligation to support 

children until they are emancipated is fundamental to a sound 

society." Kiken v. Kiken, 149 N.J. 441, 446 (1997). See

N.J.S.A. 9:17-53(c) (imposing an obligation to provide child 

support to those against whom parentage is established).
25 A-1832-14T1

"In an intact family, the law assumes the parents will 

provide for the children as well as they can." Kiken, supra, 

149 N.J. at 447. Payment of "[c]hild support after divorce is 

necessary to ensure that a child's basic needs are provided by 

his parents, who might otherwise neglect their responsibilities 

to maintain the child." Pascale v. Pascale, 140 N.J. 583, 590 

(1995). See N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(a) (authorizing courts to 

establish or modify child support in pending matrimonial 

actions). 

The Court has repeatedly emphasized "[c]hildren of divorce 

have the right to be supported at least according to the 

standard of living to which they had grown accustomed prior to 

the separation of their parents." Pascale, supra, 140 N.J. at 

592 (citations omitted). To that end, various principles have 

evolved.

First, "[o]ne of the fundamental concepts in 

American society is that parents are 

expected to support their children until 

they are emancipated, regardless of whether 

the children live with one, both, or neither 

parent." Burns v. Edwards, 367 N.J. Super.

29, 39 (App. Div. 2004) (citing Dunbar v. 

Dunbar, 190 U.S. 340, 351, 23 S. Ct. 757, 

761, 47 L. Ed. 1084, 1092 (1903)); see also

Cumberland Cnty. Bd. of Soc. Servs. v. 

W.J.P., 333 N.J. Super. 362, 365 (App. Div. 

2000) (noting that "[a]t common law, parents 

had an absolute duty to support their 

children"). The obligation to provide child 

support "is engrained into our common law, 
26 A-1832-14T1

statutory, and rule-based jurisprudence." 

Burns, supra, 367 N.J. Super. at 39.

Second, "it is settled that the best 

interests of the child [are] the greatest 

and overriding consideration in any family 

court matter." Monmouth Cnty. Div. of Soc. 

Servs. v. G.D.M., 308 N.J. Super. 83, 88 

(Ch. Div. 1997) (citing Wilke v. Culp, 196 

N.J. Super. 487, 489 (App. Div. 1984)). 

Accordingly, enforcing the parental duty to 

support children is "an inherent part of the 

'best interests of the child' rubric which 

underlies our family courts." Ibid. 

Accordingly, "a parent is obliged to

contribute to the basic support needs of an 

unemancipated child to the extent of the 

parent's financial ability[.]" Martinetti v. 

Hickman, 261 N.J. Super. 531, 546 (App. Div. 

1992). . . . "[C]hildren are entitled to be 

supported at least according to the standard 

of living to which they had grown accustomed 

prior to the separation of their parents," 

and the "talisman of concern is always the 

welfare of the child." Guglielmo v. 

Guglielmo, 253 N.J. Super. 531, 546 (App. 

Div. 1992).

Third, it is also firmly established that 

child support is for the benefit of the 

children; therefore, the right to receive 

support belongs to the children, not the 

custodial parent. Pascale, [supra], 140 

N.J. at 591; Patetta v. Patetta, 358 N.J. 

Super. 90, 94 (App. Div. 2003); L.V. v. 

R.S., 347 N.J. Super. 33, 41 (App. Div. 

2001); Blum v. Ader, 279 N.J. Super. 1, 4 

(App. Div. 1994).

[Colca v. Anson, 413 N.J. Super. 405, 414-15 

(App. Div. 2010).] 

The Legislature granted "equitable powers" to the Family 

Part, which allows the court to enter, revise or alter support 
27 A-1832-14T1

orders "from time to time as circumstances may require." 

N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23). 

Although parental disagreement is most often heightened in 

divorce matters, the event of divorce is not the basis of the 

court's authority. Rather, the State's parens patriae 

responsibility to protect the rights of children is the source 

of its authority. Importantly, a child's right to support is 

not "defeated merely because both parents are united in their 

determination to declare the child emancipated." Johnson v. 

Bradbury, 233 N.J. Super. 129, 136 (App. Div. 1989). 

However, the court's authority to impose support 

obligations is circumscribed: it terminates with a child's 

emancipation. Pascale, supra, 140 N.J. at 591; Martinetti, 

supra, 261 N.J. Super. at 512. "Where there is no longer a duty 

of support by virtue of a judicial declaration of emancipation, 

no child support can become due." Mahoney v. Pennell, 285 N.J. 

Super. 638, 643 (App. Div. 1995).

A determination of emancipation is a legal issue, imposed 

when the fundamental dependent relationship between parent and 

child ends. See Dolce v. Dolce, 383 N.J. Super. 11, 17 (App. 

Div. 2006) (stating emancipation is "the conclusion of the 

fundamental dependent relationship between parent and child"). 

It is not automatic and "need not occur at any particular age 
28 A-1832-14T1

. . . ." Newburgh, supra, 88 N.J. at 543. When circumstances 

surrounding the parent-child relationship support a finding the 

child is emancipated, "the parent relinquishes the right to 

custody and is relieved of the burden of support, and the child 

is no longer entitled to support." Filippone v. Lee, 304 N.J. 

Super. 301, 308 (App. Div. 1997). 

Deciding whether a child is emancipated requires a factsensitive analysis. Newburgh, supra, 88 N.J. at 543. "[T]he 

essential inquiry is whether the child has moved 'beyond the 

sphere of influence and responsibility exercised by a parent and 

obtains an independent status of his or her own.'" Filippone, 

supra, 304 N.J. Super. at 308 (quoting Bishop v. Bishop, 287 

N.J. Super. 593, 598 (Ch. Div. 1995)). A court's emancipation 

"determination involves a critical evaluation of the prevailing 

circumstances including the child's need, interests, and 

independent resources, the family's reasonable expectations, and 

the parties' financial ability, among other things." Dolce, 

supra, 383 N.J. Super. at 18 (citing Newburgh, supra, 88 N.J. at 

545).

A parent establishes "prima facie, but not conclusive, 

proof of emancipation" when a child reaches the age of majority, 

now eighteen. Id. at 17. See also N.J.S.A. 9:17B-3. Once the 

presumption arises, the burden of proof to rebut the statutory 
29 A-1832-14T1

presumption of emancipation shifts to the party or child seeking 

to continue the support obligation. Filippone, supra, 304 N.J. 

Super. at 308. 

"In certain situations, parents still have an economic duty 

to support children after their eighteenth birthday . . . ." 

Llewelyn v. Shewchuk, 440 N.J. Super. 207, 215 (App. Div. 2015) 

(quoting N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Services v. W.F., 434 N.J. 

Super. 288, 296 (App. Div.) (quoting Newburgh, supra, 88 N.J. at 

543), certif. denied, 218 N.J. 275 (2014)). "[W]hile parents 

are not generally required to support a child over eighteen, his 

or her enrollment in a full-time educational program has been 

held to require continued support." Patetta v. Patetta, 358 

N.J. Super. 90, 94 (App. Div. 2003). See also Newburgh, supra, 

88 N.J. at 543; Khalaf v. Khalaf, 58 N.J. 63, 71-72 (1971). 

"[I]n appropriate circumstances, the privilege of parenthood 

carries with it the duty to assure a necessary education for 

children." Newburgh, supra, 88 N.J. at 543. In this regard, 

college costs are recognized as a form of support for 

unemancipated children. See Gac, supra, 186 N.J. at 542 ("The 

Legislature and our courts have long recognized a child's need 

for higher education and that this need is a proper 

consideration in determining a parent's child support 

obligation."); Kiken, supra, 149 N.J. at 453 ("N.J.S.A. 2A:34-
30 A-1832-14T1

23(a) authorizes courts to enter reasonable and equitable 

support orders, including orders for the education of 

children."). 

Prior to addressing whether parental support is required 

for a child who reaches majority, the pivotal question is 

whether the child remains unemancipated. If so, the next 

consideration is whether the child has an aptitude for college. 

"Newburgh does not require . . . support and concomitant 

deferred emancipation for a child unable to perform adequately 

in his [or her] academic program." Filippone, supra, 304 N.J. 

Super. at 311-12. If each of these questions is affirmatively 

answered, then parental ability to afford the significant cost 

of college must be examined; it is not presumed.

Some parents cannot pay, some can pay in 

part, and still others can pay the entire 

cost of higher education for their children. 

In general, financially capable parents 

should contribute to the higher education of 

children who are qualified students. In 

appropriate circumstances, parental 

responsibility includes the duty to assure 

children of a college and even of a 

postgraduate education such as law school.

[Newburgh, supra, 88 N.J. at 544.]

To aid this determination, the Court in Newburgh provides 

specific factors guiding the analysis of whether and to what 

extent an obligation to pay for higher education is imposed. 

Id. at 545. The Newburgh factors 
31 A-1832-14T1

must be carefully applied by the trial court 

in light of a wide range of relevant facts 

and circumstances. The undertaking cannot 

be accomplished except after a presentation 

of all the evidence through direct and 

cross-examination and until the trial court 

has had an opportunity to observe the 

demeanor of the witnesses. The issue . . . 

implicates "highly significant policy 

considerations," and for this reason should 

not be decided on less than a full record. 

[Bradbury, supra, 233 N.J. Super. at 136-37 

(quoting Jackson v. Muhlenburg Hosp., 53 

N.J. 138, 142 (1969)).] 

"It remains the ultimate responsibility of the judiciary to 

address the fact[-]sensitive issue of emancipation when 

presented." Pennell, supra, 285 N.J. Super. at 643. As we have 

recently advised: "The critical evaluation required for 

emancipation determinations typically necessitates a plenary 

hearing, especially 'when the submissions show there is a 

genuine and substantial factual dispute[,]' which the trial 

court must resolve." Shewchuk, supra, 440 N.J. Super. at 217 

(quoting Hand v. Hand, 391 N.J. Super. 102, 105 (App. Div. 

2007)). So too, the examination of parental obligations to 

provide college contributions for unemancipated children 

requires a hearing. Bradbury, supra, 233 N.J. Super. at 136-37.

C.

Applying these principles to the facts at hand, we reject 

plaintiff's challenge attacking the order allowing Caitlyn to 
32 A-1832-14T1

intervene. We conclude the judge correctly determined Caitlyn 

had standing to do so. Llewelyn, supra, 440 N.J. Super. at 214; 

Bradbury, supra, 233 N.J. Super. at 136. See also Pressler & 

Verniero, supra, cmt. 1 on R. 4:33-1 (requiring a party moving 

to intervene must "show an interest in the subject matter of the 

litigation, an inability to protect that interest without 

intervention, lack of adequate representation of that interest, 

and timeliness of the application"). Caitlyn has an interest in 

advancing the position she is unemancipated and in need of her 

parents' support. 

However, plaintiff's challenge to the conclusion Caitlyn 

was unemancipated must be considered. Here, the October 11, 

2013 order and hearing record are void of factual findings 

supporting such a legal conclusion. Following our review, we 

are unable to determine how or why the judge concluded to vacate 

the prior order of emancipation. 

Rule 1:7-4(a) requires a judge, "by an opinion or 

memorandum decision, either written or oral, find the facts and 

state [all] conclusions of law . . . on every motion decided by 

a written order that is appealable as of right . . . ." Fodero 

v. Fodero, 355 N.J. Super. 168, 170 (App. Div. 2002). We 

emphasize a judge's failure to perform the fact-finding duty 

"constitutes a disservice to the litigants, the attorneys and 
33 A-1832-14T1

the appellate court." Curtis v. Finneran, 83 N.J. 563, 569-70 

(1980) (quoting Kenwood Assocs. v. Bd. of Adjustment Englewood, 

141 N.J. Super. 1, 4 (App. Div. 1976)).

In opposing Caitlyn's motion, plaintiff and defendant 

asserted Caitlyn, by her own actions and decisions, was 

emancipated. The certifications accompanying the motion papers 

include quite divergent statements on this single issue. Not 

only is there a material dispute about why Caitlyn left 

plaintiff's home and did not seek residence with defendant, but 

also at issue is whether Caitlyn diligently pursued her 

secondary school education, whether she was a full-time student, 

and whether Caitlyn affirmatively rejected efforts undertaken to 

exercise reasonable parental influence to require she act 

responsibly. 

Plaintiff and defendant emphatically rejected the narrative 

they "secretly" sought emancipation to avoid financial 

responsibility. Rather, plaintiff and defendant maintain 

Caitlyn frivolously squandered their emotional and financial 

efforts because she desired to do what she wanted, without 

parental oversight. They argue Caitlyn rejected their authority 

to strike out on her own, sealing her emancipated status.

On the other hand, Caitlyn asserts she "made some mistakes" 

but was dutiful and reasonably compliant. However, her parents
34 A-1832-14T1

continued to impose "impossible" requisites, in a joint effort 

to thwart her efforts by foreclosing financial assistance. 

It appears the initial motion judge recognized plaintiff 

and defendant's prior provision of educational support to allow 

Caitlyn's attendance at community and Disney college. He may 

have assumed Caitlyn remained dependent and, therefore, was 

unemancipated. The judge's comments also suggest a desire to 

save the parties time and money by avoiding a plenary hearing on 

the subject, perhaps believing payment of the relatively small 

sum in controversy might mitigate fractures caused in the family 

and reunite the parties. 

Despite these very well intentioned purposes, the threshold 

legal question of emancipation, which must precede any Newburgh

analysis, was not examined. Plaintiff and defendant advanced 

facts showing Caitlyn, who was well over the age of eighteen, 

rejected parental guidance and advice, because they were 

accompanied by strings related to discipline and performance. 

Caitlyn does not deny she committed the complained of conduct or 

that her actions triggered parental demands for reform. Rather, 

she dismisses her behavior as "things that teenagers typically 

do," tempered by an admission she made some mistakes. 

Whether Caitlyn's actions were irresponsible, as plaintiff 

and defendant suggest, or youthful, as Caitlyn insists, begs the 
35 A-1832-14T1

question. What is required is an examination of events that 

triggered Caitlyn's departure from her mother's home and the 

resultant March 30, 2013 order of emancipation. The fact that 

Caitlyn is not living with either parent is significant. How 

that event occurred bears heavily on whether Caitlyn exercised 

"an independent status of . . . her own" and became emancipated. 

Filippone, supra, 304 N.J. Super. at 308. 

Caitlyn's subsequent decisions and interactions with her 

parents also bears on this issue. The dependent parent-child 

relationship indicative of unemancipation is not merely shown by 

a child's claimed need for financial support. Our jurisprudence 

unmistakably mandates there must be examination of the parentchild relationship itself. Shewchuk, supra, 440 N.J. Super. at 

216. In fact, a better description is the relationship is one 

of interdependence: the child's right to support and the 

parents' obligation to provide payment are inextricably linked 

to the child's acceptance and the parents' measured exercise of 

guidance and influence. Conversely, a finding of emancipation 

is a recognition of a child's independence from a parental 

influence.

Despite the detail of events and the expressed strength of 

conviction, the positions of the parties' in their pleadings are 

at odds, and the legal conclusion Caitlyn is unemancipated 
36 A-1832-14T1

cannot be upheld. Such "material factual disputes presented by 

the parties' pleadings bear directly on the legal conclusions 

required to be made and these disputes can only be resolved 

through a plenary hearing." Spangenberg, supra, 442 N.J. Super.

at 540-41. See Hand, supra, 391 N.J. Super. at 105 (stating a 

plenary hearing is necessary when the parties' submissions show 

a genuine and substantial factual dispute). The parties are 

entitled to present their proofs and the judge must sift through 

the evidence and state the supported factual findings. 

Importantly, "[t]he credibility of the parties' contentions may 

wither, or may be fortified, by exposure to cross-examination 

and through clarifying questions posed by the court[]" in a 

plenary hearing. Barblock v. Barblock, 383 N.J. Super. 114, 122 

(App. Div.), cert. denied, 187 N.J. 81 (2006). See also Segal 

v. Lynch, 211 N.J. 230, 264-65 (2012) (holding a "genuine, 

material and legitimate factual dispute" requires resolution 

following a plenary hearing). 

If her parents' prove their claims, Caitlyn's choices have 

consequences: a child is free to control his or her life; 

however, this course relieves her parents of the obligation to 

finance such self-determined decisions. See Black v. Black, 436 

N.J. Super. 130, 146 (Ch. Div. 2013) ("If an adult 'child' 

refuses to have a relationship with a parent without a clear 
37 A-1832-14T1

showing of exceptional circumstances, and . . . refuses to 

participate in trying to heal the relationship, . . . the 

child's message rings loud and clear . . . the parent/child 

relationship no longer has any value."). If the evidence 

sustains Caitlyn's version of events that her parents "threw" 

her out despite her rigorous compliance with their "impossible" 

demands, the court must protect the child's right to financial 

support.

We also correct what appears to be a misinterpretation of 

the law. We focus on the declaration Caitlyn was "unemancipated [sic] solely for the purpose of a potential 

contribution from [her parents] as it relates to college costs." 

A child's decision to seriously pursue a college education 

alone does not create the required dependency allowing him or 

her to be unemancipated. In Filippone, this court concluded the 

parties' son, who left home at age fourteen, was not emancipated 

until he reached the age of majority and, thereafter, 

unsuccessfully completed college classes. Filippone, supra, 304 

N.J. Super. at 312. In Llewelyn, we affirmed the Family Part's 

finding the plaintiff-child failed to rebut the presumption of 

emancipation, when she decided to leave her mother's home, 

despite her later pursuit of education as a full-time college 

student. Llewelyn, supra, 440 N.J. Super. at 218-19. 
38 A-1832-14T1

Thus, facts matter, and the judge must fully analyze all 

circumstances that separated Caitlyn from her parents and their 

homes. It is insufficient to merely review Caitlyn's decisions 

and her parents' financial status at the time Caitlyn filed her 

motion. An independent child choosing her own path is not 

entitled to support because support is due only to a child who 

is not emancipated. Pennell, supra, 285 N.J. Super. at 643. 

For the reasons stated, we affirm the order allowing 

Caitlyn to intervene. We reverse, as factually unsupported, the 

provisions in the October 11, 2013 order concluding Caitlyn is 

unemancipated and plaintiff and defendant must provide college 

contributions. On these issues, the October 11, 2013 order is 

vacated, and the matter remanded for further proceedings, 

including a plenary hearing. See Tretola v. Tretola, 389 N.J. 

Super. 15, 20-21 (App. Div. 2006) (reversing a court's denial of 

the plaintiff-father's request to emancipate his son because the 

court "failed to recognize there were material facts in dispute 

and evidence beyond the motion papers necessary for resolution 

of the matter" following an evidentiary hearing, when the child 

is "both employed and attending college full time."). 

On October 31, 2014, the provisions of the October 11, 2013 

order were mistakenly viewed as requiring each parent contribute 

to any and all college costs. However, the record shows no 
39 A-1832-14T1

analysis of Newburgh's factors was undertaken, and the prior 

order was based on less than a complete record. Moreover, as we 

point out, no findings supported the issue of emancipation. 

Consequently, the October 31, 2014 order, which purported to 

enforce the October 11, 2013 order, is also vacated. We add 

these additional comments to aid review on remand. 

Once the issue of emancipation is decided, an obligation to 

pay college costs for an academically motivated unemancipated 

child requires a two-fold analysis. First, it demands a 

determination of whether equitable or other considerations 

militate against parents paying college costs. See Gac, supra, 

186 N.J. at 547 ("[A] parent or child seeking contribution 

should initiate the application to the court before the expenses 

are incurred. The failure to do so will weigh heavily against 

the grant of a future application."); Moss v. Nedas, 289 N.J. 

Super. 352, 356 (App. Div. 1996) (noting parent cannot be viewed 

as a "wallet" and deprived of involvement of college decision 

making process); Black, supra, 436 N.J. Super. at 146 ("[A] 

student's rejection of the opportunity to attempt reunification 

with a parent may be factually so compelling as to equitably 

overshadow and eclipse the other Newburgh factors, and tilt the 

scales of justice in favor of suspending or completely 
40 A-1832-14T1

terminating the parent's obligation to financially contribute 

towards the child's college education.").

Second, the court must scrutinize whether the parents are 

financially capable of contributing. Weitzman v. Weitzman, 228 

N.J. Super. 346, 357 (App. Div. 1988). This requires broader 

consideration than parental gross incomes. Other financial 

obligations, expenses and debts must be weighed. Here, for 

example, plaintiff and defendant each are responsible to support 

other minor children, which reduces income available to pay 

college costs. Indeed, the college student's contribution also 

should be factored. This includes assets, income, scholarships, 

loans and other financial aid.3

The October 31, 2014 order includes no analysis supporting

the allocation of the university tuition, fees and books, 40% to 

plaintiff and 60% to defendant. Therefore, even if Caitlyn is 

found to be unemancipated, the order cannot stand. See Rule

1:7-4(a). 

We reject Caitlyn's claim plaintiff's motion for 

reconsideration was untimely and also reverse the December 8, 

2014 order. Plaintiff challenged the October 31, 2014 order's 

interpretation of provisions ordered on October 11, 2013. 

 

3 We note, the December 6, 2014 order clarified Caitlyn's 

responsibility to apply for scholarships, and she acquired 

financial aid. 
41 A-1832-14T1

Unfortunately, the reviewing judge erred when he limited his 

authority to consider only the terms of the October 11, 2013 

order. 

IV. 

We turn to Caitlyn's cross-appeal, which seeks reversal of 

the provisions denying her application for attorney's fees on 

October 31, 2014 and December 8, 2014. New Jersey does not 

subscribe to a system that "loser pays." Statutory provisions, 

N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23, court rules, R. 5:3-5(c), R. 4:42-9(a), and 

interpretative case law, see, e.g., Mani v. Mani, 183 N.J. 70, 

94-95 (2005), clearly outline necessary considerations when 

imposing a counsel fee award. The reviewing judges made 

findings, albeit limited ones, regarding the plaintiff and 

defendant's good faith in advancing the arguments presented, 

which encompasses one consideration. Reese, supra, 430 N.J. 

Super. at 586. Nevertheless, since we have vacated the orders, 

attorney fee requests may abide the ordered remand proceedings. 

V.

In summary, the starting point of the remand proceedings 

determines whether Caitlyn was emancipated when she left her 

parents' homes. Only when Caitlyn proves she was unemancipated 

must a Newburgh analysis commence. See Newburgh, supra, 88 N.J.

at 542 ("Resolution of [the right to continued educational 
42 A-1832-14T1

support] centers on a parent's duty to support a child until the 

child is emancipated. Consequently, [the child], if 

unemancipated, may be entitled" to continued support). This 

includes all facts and circumstances surrounding the requested 

college contributions, including the scope and cause of ongoing 

estrangement and non-communication. Cf. Philipp v. Stahl, 344 

N.J. Super. 262, 272-73 (App. Div. 2001) (holding the absence of 

a relationship between parent and child was "one of the many 

factors that go into" the determination of post-secondary 

support), rev'd on other grounds, 172 N.J. 293 (2002). See also

Gac, supra, 186 N.J. at 546 (noting a parent or child seeking 

contribution for college expenses must inform and communicate 

with the parties concerning "the many issues inherent in 

selecting a college"); Nedas, supra, 289 N.J. Super. at 356. 

Upon an affirmative showing college contribution is warranted, 

the inquiry turns to the amount of the financial obligation 

itself. This encompasses parental ability to pay, Weitzman, 

supra, 228 N.J. Super. at 357 (stating among the Newburgh

factors, parents' ability to pay is clearly the most 

significant), the child's contributions, and reasonableness of 

choice to enroll in a chosen school, despite a comparable 

available education at other more economical universities, see
43 A-1832-14T1

Finger v. Zenn, 335 N.J. Super. 438, 444-45 (App. Div. 2000), 

certif. denied, 167 N.J. 633 (2001).

Our final comments are observational. A plenary hearing on 

emancipation, mandated by law, has one winner and the chasm 

between parents and child surely will widen whatever the 

outcome. The initial motion judge was very sensitive to this 

possibility and urged the parties to seek an alternate course to 

reach resolution. We applaud that effort imbued with common 

sense. We also recognize demands placed on our Family Part 

judges do not allow the luxury of uninterrupted consideration of 

one matter at a time. Therefore, in addition to being 

emotionally draining and time consuming, litigation is 

expensive. In light of these realities, before undertaking the 

course outlined by law, we encourage the parties give serious 

consideration to whether their positions, and hopefully their 

relationship, could be reconciled by a different course of 

dispute resolution, which unlike litigation, might more closely 

address the dynamic and complex interactions between parents and 

child. 

Affirmed in part, reversed and remanded in part for 

additional proceedings as discussed in this opinion.