THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE 

CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING 

EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR. 

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Supreme Court 

Jorge V. Esguerra, Appellant, 

v. 

Jamie V. Brown, individually and d/b/a Southeastern 

Services, Robert Baroni, Boyd R. Laughlin and 

Associated Construction Consultants, Inc., Defendants, 

Of whom Robert Baroni, Boyd R. Laughlin and 

Associated Construction Consultants, Inc. are, 

Respondents. 

Appellate Case No. 2010-174706 

Appeal From Beaufort County 

Marvin H. Dukes, III, Master-in -Equity 

Memorandum Opinion No. 2012-MO-047 

Heard October 4, 2012 – Filed November 21, 2012 

AFFIRMED 

Sean Michael Bolchoz, of Hale & Bolchoz, of Hilton 

Head Island, for Appellant. 
 

James Frederick Berl, of Law Offices of James F. Berl, 

of Hilton Head Island, and John William Farrell, of 

Hilton Head Island, for Respondents. 

PER CURIAM: Appellant sued defendant Brown and respondents Baroni, 

Laughlin, and Associated Construction Consultants, Inc. (ACCI) for damages 

incurred when Brown renovated appellant's vacation condominium on Hilton Head 

Island. After a non-jury trial, the master found for appellant on all his claims 

against Brown and awarded him $307,520.73 in damages and attorney’s fees. He 

found for respondents on all issues, and appellant appeals. We affirm. 

FACTS 

Appellant, an Ohio resident, hired Brown d/b/a Southeastern Services to renovate 

appellant's condo. Brown, who was not properly licensed, approached Baroni, 

seeking to have Baroni and his company, ACCI, assist him in obtaining a building 

permit for the project. While Baroni initially rebuffed Brown, he met with Brown 

later and conditionally agreed to help him "pull" a permit from the town of Hilton 

Head. 

It is uncontested that Brown eventually obtained a building permit from Hilton 

Head for appellant's project using ACCI's information. When Brown's work on the 

renovations was unsatisfactory, appellant reported Brown to the South Carolina 

Department of Labor, Licensing, and Regulation's Contracting Board (LLR). 

Brown admitted he was not licensed, and eventually was cited by LLR for several 

statutory violations arising out of his work on appellant's condo. 

In the course of LLR's investigation into Brown's licensure, LLR's attention was 

drawn to respondent Baroni and ACCI and their relationship to Brown in 

connection with appellant's renovations. Following an investigation, Baroni and 

ACCI entered a Consent Agreement admitting they unlawfully lent their license1

 to 

Brown. Under the terms of this Agreement, Baroni and ACCI agreed to pay a 

$1,000 penalty and to be placed on probation for one year. 

1 See S.C. Code Ann. § 40-11-110(A)(9) (2011). 
ISSUES 

1. Did the master err in refusing to allow appellant to invoke 

non-mutual collateral estoppel on the issue of license 

lending? 

2. Did the master err in finding appellant failed to prove 

respondents were the proximate cause of his damages? 

ANALYSIS 

Pursuant to the doctrine of collateral estoppel, a party may be precluded from 

relitigating an issue decided in a previous action. Non-mutual collateral estoppel 

may be asserted by a non-party to the first action in the second action, unless the 

party sought to be precluded lacked a full or fair opportunity to litigate the issue in 

the first action, or there are other circumstances that justify permitting the party to 

relitigate the issue in the second case. South Carolina Prop. and Cas. Ins. Guar. 

Ass'n v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 304 S.C. 210, 403 S.E.2d 625 (1991). 

Circumstances which may justify relitigation, and thus deny a party non-mutual 

offensive collateral estoppel, are found in the Restatement (Second) of Judgments 

§ 28 and § 29. Id. 

Here, the master concluded that two exceptions found in § 28 applied. Assuming 

without deciding that this was error, appellant must also demonstrate the master 

erred in finding Brown's negligent work rather than respondents' license lending 

and other alleged statutory violations were the proximate cause of appellant's 

damages. See, e.g., Madison ex rel. Bryant v. Babcock Center, Inc., 371 S.C. 123, 

638 S.E.2d 650 (2006) (proximate cause requires proof of both causation in fact 

and legal cause). The question of proximate cause is ordinarily for the finder of 

fact. Id. 

This is an action at law tried to a judge alone. In this type of case, the credibility of 

witnesses and the weight of the evidence is exclusively for the master. Regions 

Bank v. Strawn, ____ S.C. ____, ____ S.E.2d ____ (Ct. App. 2012). We find there 

is evidence in the record supporting the master's finding that respondents' statutory 

violations were not the proximate cause of appellant's damages. Id.; Madison ex 

rel. Bryant, supra. 
CONCLUSION 

The order of the master is 

AFFIRMED. 

TOAL, C.J., PLEICONES, BEATTY, KITTREDGE and HEARN, JJ., 

concur.