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26–078PDF 2006

THE INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS BUDGET REQUEST

FOR FISCAL YEAR 2007

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON 

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

FEBRUARY 16, 2006

Serial No. 109–190

Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/international—relations 

(II)

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 

HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois, Chairman 

JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey, 

Vice Chairman 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

PETER T. KING, New York 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado 

RON PAUL, Texas 

DARRELL ISSA, California 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia 

MARK GREEN, Wisconsin 

JERRY WELLER, Illinois 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

THADDEUS G. MCCOTTER, Michigan 

KATHERINE HARRIS, Florida 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas 

J. GRESHAM BARRETT, South Carolina 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

MICHAEL MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

TOM LANTOS, California 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

SHERROD BROWN, Ohio 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

BARBARA LEE, California 

JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York 

EARL BLUMENAUER, Oregon 

SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada 

GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California 

ADAM B. SCHIFF, California 

DIANE E. WATSON, California 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

BETTY MCCOLLUM, Minnesota 

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky 

DENNIS A. CARDOZA, California 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

THOMAS E. MOONEY, SR., Staff Director/General Counsel 

ROBERT R. KING, Democratic Staff Director 

KRISTEN GILLEY, Senior Professional Staff Member 

JEAN CARROLL, Full Committee Hearing Coordinator 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESS 

The Honorable Condoleezza Rice, The Secretary of State, U.S. Department 

of State .................................................................................................................. 6

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Condoleezza Rice: Prepared statement ........................................ 10

APPENDIX 

The Honorable Ted Poe, a Representative in Congress from the State of 

Texas: Prepared statement .................................................................................. 61

The Honorable Dan Burton, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Indiana: Prepared statement .......................................................................... 61

The Honorable Joseph Crowley, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of New York: Prepared statement ...................................................................... 63

The Honorable Connie Mack, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Florida: Prepared statement ........................................................................... 64

The Honorable Gregory W. Meeks, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of New York: Prepared statement ............................................................ 65

Responses from the Honorable Condoleezza Rice to questions submitted for 

the record by: 

The Honorable J. Gresham Barrett, a Representative in Congress from 

the State of South Carolina ............................................................................. 65

The Honorable Earl Blumenauer, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of Oregon ................................................................................................. 67

The Honorable Dan Burton ................................................................................. 72

The Honorable Joseph Crowley .......................................................................... 73

The Honorable Connie Mack ............................................................................... 78

The Honorable Michael McCaul, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of Texas ................................................................................................... 80

The Honorable Gregory W. Meeks ...................................................................... 82

The Honorable Grace F. Napolitano, a Representative in Congress from 

the State of California ...................................................................................... 89

The Honorable Ted Poe ....................................................................................... 90

The Honorable Edward R. Royce, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of California ............................................................................................ 92

The Honorable Adam B. Schiff, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of California ............................................................................................ 92

The Honorable Christopher H. Smith, a Representative in Congress from 

the State of New Jersey and Vice Chairman, Committee on International 

Relations ............................................................................................................ 101

The Honorable Thomas G. Tancredo, a Representative in Congress from 

the State of Colorado ........................................................................................ 111

The Honorable Diane E. Watson, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of California ............................................................................................ 115

(1)

THE INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS BUDGET 

REQUEST FOR FISCAL YEAR 2007

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 16, 2006

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 1:32 p.m., in room 

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Henry J. Hyde (Chairman of the Committee) presiding. 

Chairman HYDE. The Committee will come to order. Before beginning our hearing, I would like to announce that our colleague, 

Russ Carnahan of Missouri, has been fortunate or unfortunate, depending on your perspective, to be assigned to this Committee. The 

Minority Members have completed their Subcommittee assignments, which reflect his membership. Without objection, the Subcommittee assignments of the Minority Members, which the Members have before them, are adopted by the Committee, and the 

Chair recognizes Mr. Lantos, the senior Democrat for such purposes as he may require. 

Mr. Lantos. 

Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Chairman, we are all anxious to get going with 

the hearing with our distinguished Secretary. Let me just say, on 

behalf of all the Democrats, how delighted we are to have Russ 

Carnahan join us. He has a distinguished record of public service. 

He will be very valuable. He is very lucky to attend his first meeting with the Secretary of State. 

Chairman HYDE. The Chair will announce, because of the importance of the hearing today and the lack of time for all of us to participate in questioning, the opening statements will be made by 

myself and Mr. Lantos, and we will not have any further opening 

statements, but this will permit more time for striking the last 

word and getting a little more detailed conversation with our witness. So I think it will work out to everybody’s advantage. 

Lying at the heart of America’s relationship with the world is a 

paradox. We have global reach, voluntarily assuming responsibility 

for preserving peace and order in much of the world for the blessed 

charge of bettering the lives of its inhabitants. And yet, we are absolutely very distant from that world, stubbornly uninstructed by 

its ancient cynicism and preaching a confidence in the future that 

defies the constraints of the present. This paradox, to massively engage the world while living on an autonomous island in the global 

sea, is made possible by our unprecedented power. It is a truism 

that power breeds arrogance. A far greater danger however, stems 

from the self-delusion that is the more certain companion. For our 

2

individuals and countries alike, power inevitably distorts perceptions of the world by insulating them in a soothing cocoon that is 

impervious to what scientists term ‘‘disconfirming evidence.’’

Our power then has the grave liability of rendering our theories 

about the world immune from failure. But by becoming deaf to easily discerned warning signs, we may ignore long-term costs that result from our actions and dismiss reverses that should lead to a reexamination of our goals and means. 

To illustrate my point, let me focus on a school of thought that 

has gained increasing prominence in our national debate, namely, 

the assertion that our interests are best advanced by assigning a 

central place in the foreign policy of our Nation to the worldwide 

promotion of democracy. I call this the golden theory. 

I should state at the outset, my own conviction that democracy 

and freedom are directly linked and that democracy has proven 

highly beneficial in those states where it has been securely established. But I take issue with those who argue that it is self-propagating and that it invariably produces beneficent results, for this 

view rests on a misinterpretation of cause and effect in our history. 

Proponents rest much of their case on the triumph of democracy 

in post-World War II Europe and East Asia, focusing on the peace, 

stability and cooperation those war torn regions have experienced 

in its aftermath. 

Certainly, democracy contributed enormously to these regions’ 

transformations, but I would argue that this outcome depended far 

more on the direct and long-term presence of American power. Far 

from being inevitable, prior to 1945, democracy had been virtually 

wiped out in Europe, even before Hitler began his conquests. It had 

been delegitimized in most of the continent, and authoritarian governments had become the norm. Democracy held on in Britain and 

in remnants elsewhere in Europe, but ultimately survived only because of United States intervention in the war. 

Following the Allied victory, democracy was reintroduced on the 

continent in large part because the overwhelming United States 

presence made it possible and virtually mandatory throughout 

Western Europe. From this beginning we developed enormous resources toward enforcing order, promoting cooperation, defending 

against invasion, removing barriers, reviving economies, and a host 

of other unprecedented innovations. The resulting transformation 

is usually ascribed to the workings of democracy, but it is due far 

more to the impact of the long-term U.S. presence. And that role 

continues to this day, 16 decades later. 

In regions where our presence extended over long periods, as in 

East Asia, the common result was peace, stability and cooperation, 

with democracy as an added and reinforcing benefit. But few areas 

outside those fortunate lands have become stably democratic, with 

examples, such as India, being exceptions that are far too rare. 

I note these cases because they are invariably cited by those who 

believe that similar transformations can be affected elsewhere by 

the magic elixir of democracy alone. But democracy is more than 

a single election, or even a succession of them. It is a way of life 

for a nation embracing its life and institutions, and all their complexity and embraced in turn by its people and their actions, 

thoughts and beliefs. Viewed in its more complete historical conVerDate Mar 21 2002 16:22 Sep 12, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\FULL\021606\26078.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
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text, implanting democracy in large areas would require that we 

possess an unbounded power and undertake an open-ended commitment of time and resources, which we cannot and will not do. 

But without that long-term dominant American position, the odds 

of enduring success are long indeed. 

Fidelity to our ideals means that we have little choice, but to 

support freedom around the world. No one with a heart or a head 

would wish it otherwise. But we also have a duty to ourselves and 

to our own interests, which may sometimes necessitate actions focused, or more tangible returns than those of altruism. We must 

also be cognizant of the fact that a broad and energetic promotion 

of democracy may produce not peace and stability, but revolution. 

We can and have used democracy as a weapon to destabilize our 

enemies, and we may do so again, but if we unleash revolutionary 

forces in the expectation that the result can only be beneficent, I 

believe we are making a profound, and perhaps uncorrectable mistake. History teaches that revolutions are very dangerous things, 

more often destructive than benign and uncontrollable by their 

very nature. Upending established order based on theory is far 

more likely to produce chaos than shining uplands. Edmund 

Burke’s prescient warning of the deadly progress of the French revolution, a revolution guided by intoxicating theory and heedless of 

all warnings, endures. 

There is no evidence that we or anyone can guide from afar revolutions we have set in motion. We can more easily destabilize 

friends and others and give life to chaos and to avowed enemies 

than ensure outcomes in service of our interests and security. 

May I return to my original theme, namely that our enormous 

power allows us to maintain a highly theoretical approach to the 

world, one that draws so deeply from the universal truths embedded in our makeup as to be impervious to contrary evidence. 

I am not making an abstract point. We are well advanced into 

an unformed era in which new and unfamiliar enemies are gathering forces, where a phalanx of aspiring competitors must inevitably constrain and focus our options. In a world where the ratios 

of strength narrow, the consequences of miscalculation will become 

progressively more debilitating. The costs of golden theories will be 

paid for in the currency of our interests. 

For some, the promotion of democracy promises an easy resolution to the many difficult problems we face, a guiding light on a 

dimly-seen horizon. But I believe that great caution is warranted 

here. Without strong evidence to the contrary, we should not readily believe that without an enduring American presence, democracy 

can be so easily implanted and nourished in societies where history 

and experience suggest it is quite alien. It may, in fact, constitute 

an uncontrollable experiment with an outcome akin to that faced 

by the Sorcerer’s Apprentice. 

A few brief years ago, history was proclaimed to be at an end, 

our victory engraved in unyielding stone, our preeminence garlanded with permanence. But we must remember that Britain’s 

majestic rule vanished in a few short years, undermined by unforeseen catastrophic events and unmanaged enemies that overwhelmed the impregnable palisades of the past. 

4

We must not allow our enormous power to delude us into seeing 

the world as a passive thing to be remade in an image of our choosing. Instead, let us take guidance from the wisdom of our 

forebearers, whose clear-eyed and sober-minded understanding of 

this world made possible the miracles of our country’s birth, its 

flourishing and its repeated triumphs. 

Now I turn to my good friend, Tom Lantos, the Ranking Democratic Member for such remarks as he may care to make. 

Mr. LANTOS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let me first 

join you in welcoming our most distinguished Secretary of State, 

who conducted her first hearing in office with enormous diplomatic 

skill. We are all the beneficiaries of her wisdom and judgment and 

experience and we are delighted to welcome her. 

Let me also say a special thanks to her for earlier this week 

hosting the commemoration of the 50th anniversary of the 1956 

Hungarian uprising and for delivering a magnificent address on 

that occasion. The Hungarian uprising in 1956 has some serious 

lessons for us, not only in terms of the passion and commitment 

that people have to free and open societies, their willingness to undertake a struggle for living in free and open societies at an enormous cost, but also that success doesn’t come instantaneously. 

The 1956 uprising, despite the heroism of gigantic proportions of 

the freedom fighters, ended in defeat. It was a temporary defeat 

and it was followed in 1989 by the collapse of the Iron Curtain, the 

opening up of Central and Eastern Europe, and the integration of 

these countries into both NATO and the European Union. And 

those who seem to have no patience with the long struggle for democracy and freedom would do well to reread the history of the uprising in 1956 and its final culmination in ultimate victory in 1989. 

Madam Secretary, the events of 2005 have been momentous. 

They bring to mind the words of one of your predecessors, Dean 

Acheson, when he was asked to describe foreign policy. As you recall, he said, ‘‘It’s one damn thing after another.’’

Today, in the House, we have a rather good day. A bipartisan bill 

offered by our Chairman and Congresswoman Ileana Ros-Lehtinen 

and myself on Iran, was passed by a vote of 404 to 4. I think this 

legislation was meant to help change Tehran’s calculations of what 

lies ahead—hopefully, by diplomacy and pressure, but if necessary, 

with international sanctions. 

Iran has flouted every nuclear safeguard agreement and reneged 

on every commitment it has made. The International Atomic Energy Agency has documented that Iran acquired designs, equipment and facilities to produce nuclear weapons grade uranium and 

plutonium from the same nuclear black market that used to supply 

Libya, and Iran experimented with trigger material for a nuclear 

bomb. 

I believe, Madam Secretary, we should be especially wary of the 

hidden traps within the seemingly attractive Russian offer to perform Iran’s uranium fuel enrichment services on Russian territory. 

Russia has long been a lifeline to Iran’s nuclear development. Russian companies have aided Iran’s missile programs and may be 

continuing such assistance as we speak. 

If Iran were to agree to Russia’s offer to enrich uranium, it is expected there might be enough loopholes in the agreement for Iran 

5

to gain vital Russian experience and technology for a covert nuclear 

weapons material production program on Iranian soil, and while 

the rest the world would be slumbering in the false belief that the 

Iranian nuclear crisis has been averted. 

Mr. Chairman, today I want to take advantage of the opportunity 

of the presence of our Secretary of State to focus on Russia. This 

topic has many diverse implications for our diplomacy, raising challenges of enormous complexity we will have to face. 

Let me preface my remarks, Mr. Chairman, by stating that I am 

a true friend of Russia and of the Russian people to whom I am 

profoundly grateful for liberating my native city of Budapest from 

Nazi oppression in 1945. I have traveled to Russia on countless occasions beginning in 1956, and I have a tremendous respect and 

admiration for the achievements of the Russian people as they 

shook off the chains of totalitarianism and tried to join the democratic world. 

Recent events compel us to think very hard about Russia’s future. Police state tactics are making a comeback. Prominent Russian businessmen and intellectuals are fighting for their very survival, facing arrest, and as we speak, prison in Siberia. 

Under Putin, Russia has continued to participate in the Group 

of Eight industrialized democracies, and it expects to host a summit in St. Petersburg this summer. But under Putin, Russia has 

moved rapidly away from the democratic path of the 1990s and has 

moved in the direction of its authoritarian past. 

Putin has taken steps to consolidate his authority by increasing 

pressure on opposition political parties, strengthening state control 

over national broadcast media, pursuing politically-driven prosecutions of independent leaders. 

Putin’s government has made changes to make regional governors appointed rather than elected, and the government exercises 

direct control over the hiring and dismissal of judges. The Parliament is no longer independent. 

We have a remarkable situation where the Executive, the Judicial and the Legislative Branches and the media are basically 

under the control of the Kremlin. This is a long ways from the Soviet Union but it has dramatically undermined the democratic beginnings that President Yeltsin undertook. 

Russia’s actions vis-a ́-vis its neighbors, including Ukraine, Georgia and the former Soviet Republics of Central Asia and the Baltic 

States indicates that Russia is attempting to undermine both their 

democracy and their economies. 

Just 2 weeks ago, the Russian military chief of staff was in Syria 

discussing new arms deals, including modern air defense systems. 

Today, Putin’s Russia offers us fresh reason to doubt its sincerity 

as a real player on the international stage. It has announced undercutting of the agreement of the Quartet, that it will hold talks 

with the terrorist group Hamas at the beginning of next month in 

Moscow. 

By agreeing to host Hamas, Russia has shown how phony and 

how hollow is its attempt to make its struggle with Chechnya a 

part of the international war against terrorism. Putin’s invitation 

to Hamas breaks the rules, and it is to be condemned as a cheap 

6

and vulgar appeal to the worst elements of a fanatical and violent 

Islamic struggle. 

We must do our utmost, Mr. Chairman, to ensure that Russia 

does not revert back to a regime that will become an enemy of this 

country. We want to be friends with Russia, we admire the Russian 

people, but current leadership trends in Moscow are extremely disturbing. 

That is why some of us feel, Mr. Chairman, that the G–7 must 

reconsider Russia’s participation in what has come to be called the 

G–8, when point in fact, only seven members of the G–8 represent 

industrial democracies and politically free societies. Russia is unable to meet the commitments of membership in the G–8. 

Madam Secretary, I hope you will be able to enlighten us both 

on the subject of Iran and Russia during the course of your presentation and I look forward to your testimony. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman HYDE. Madam Secretary, it is a great pleasure to have 

you with us and you certainly are one witness who needs no introduction. And so please proceed with your testimony. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE CONDOLEEZZA RICE, THE 

SECRETARY OF STATE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Secretary RICE. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, thank you Congressman Lantos. I am delighted to have an 

opportunity to appear before this Committee. It has been just a little over a year since I was confirmed as Secretary of State and it 

has been, as Congressman Lantos said, a very eventful year. 

I have prepared a written testimony that I would like to enter 

into the record with your permission, Mr. Chairman, but I will not 

read it so that we don’t all have to suffer through the reading of 

it and therefore we can have maximum time for questions. Instead, 

I will just make a few remarks. 

Chairman HYDE. Without objection, so ordered. 

Secretary RICE. We have seen monumental changes over the last 

year, and certainly, over the last several years since September 

11th and the terrible attacks against this country. We have been 

engaged in a war on a group of terrorists who show no regard for 

innocent life, who spawn an ideology of hatred so great that they 

take innocent life without even thinking, whether it is the Twin 

Towers of New York or a wedding party, a Palestinian wedding 

party in Jordan, or whether it is school children in Russia, or 

whether it is a Metro in London. 

They take innocent life not as collateral to their efforts but as the 

target of their efforts. And I think that we need to understand that 

this is a different kind of war. As a part of that war, rather, to 

make certain that any peace we achieve in that war will be a permanent one, the President has noted the importance of the spread 

of liberty and democracy as anecdotes to the ideology of hatred that 

we are experiencing in the world. 

This is a process that we know well. It is a process that is difficult. It was difficult in this country, it was difficult in Europe, it 

was difficult in Asia. It is not easy to have men and women who 

have been accustomed to either repression or coercion as the means 

of settling political issues to turn instead to processes of comVerDate Mar 21 2002 16:22 Sep 12, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\FULL\021606\26078.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
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promise and cooperation, but indeed, if we are to have a more 

peaceful environment, that is exactly the process that we must encourage around the world. 

The United States cannot, of course, impose democracy, but democracy does not have to be imposed, tyranny has to be imposed. 

Men and women long for liberty. We see that when we see long 

lines of men and women, many of them illiterate in Afghanistan, 

along on dusty roads, to vote for the first time in Presidential or 

Parliamentary elections; when we see the same in Iraq where they 

have voted three times in the face of terrorist threats. We see it 

in places like Liberia where after decades of civil war, we have just 

experienced elections. 

I want to say one of the most heartening things I have done in 

recent years was to go to the inauguration of the Liberian President, who I think is going to try to bring that once proud country 

back to prosperity and democracy. We see it too in the troubled 

places like Haiti where there were elections that were largely free 

and fair and where there appears now to be a chance for movement 

forward. 

It is not always a process that produces outcomes that are in accordance with our desires, but I do think we have to speak out as 

Americans for the process. Nonetheless, a vote, an election is not 

the full story. With governing comes responsibility and so what has 

happened in the Palestinian territories with an election for which 

the Palestinian people should be congratulated, an election that 

was free of violence, free and fair, but that brought to power 

Hamas, a terrorist organization that has killed thousands of innocent people in its quest. 

There is now a responsibility first and foremost of the international community to make it very clear that a Palestinian Government, any Palestinian Government will have to meet international standards set out in the Quartet statement of the recognition of Israel’s right to exist, disarming militias, disarming violence, because it is not possible to pursue a peaceful life for your 

people on the one hand in the political process and to have a foot 

in the camp of terrorism on the other. 

And so the United States will stand strong in its determination 

that the next Palestinian Government will have to live up to those 

standards. 

We have seen major changes in places like Lebanon where a government struggles to come out from under the yolk of Syrian occupation and Syrian oppression. And we just yesterday—2 days ago, 

we were able to commemorate the assassination of Prime Minister 

Rafik Hariri, and to, once again, state with the Lebanese people 

our desire that they should have a better, more democratic and political future in which all Lebanese are represented. 

It is a difficult course and there have been setbacks along that 

course. I will perhaps—Congressman Lantos at some other point in 

the hearing address the questions about Russia. Obviously we are 

very concerned about issues of democracy in Russia, issues of the 

nongovernmental organization law, issues of freedom of the press, 

issues of the use of Russian gas and oil as a potential pressure 

point against neighbors, and it is especially important because as 

we try to encourage democratic development in the countries that 

8

emerged from the Soviet Union, Russia’s attitudes toward those developments is key. So we are supportive of, and working hard for, 

continued democratization in Ukraine, Kurdistan, Georgia, in 

places that have broken free and are trying to move forward. 

We have other challenges as well, particularly the challenge of 

Iran, which is emerging, I think, as one of the great challenges for 

the United States, a strategic challenge for the United States and 

for those who desire peace and freedom. After all, Iran’s policies in 

the world’s most volatile region are policies that are destabilizing, 

they are policies that use terrorism and terrorist surrogates to destabilize this very volatile region. 

We note in particular that the world has come together concerning Iran’s ambitions for a nuclear weapon. Let me be very 

clear, this is not about civil nuclear energy for the Iranian people. 

Iran can have a civil nuclear program. The problem is that no one 

trusts Iran with the fuel cycle because Iran has been cheating for 

18 years on its obligations under the International Atomic Energy 

Agency. 

So we succeeded over the last year in bringing together most of 

the world, almost all of the world, with the exception of Iran’s sidekick Syria, Venezuela, which, of course, is a challenge to democracy 

in our own hemisphere, and in Cuba, a country, I think, where democracy cannot be used in the same sentence with Cuba so perhaps those three in a sense belong together in their support of 

Iran. 

But the rest of the world either supported or abstained on a resolution that has sent the Iranian dossier to the security council. 

I want to assure Members of the Committee we will do everything that we can to deny Iran this course of the development of 

a nuclear weapon but also remind the world that this has to be understood in the context of broader Iranian policies in the region, in 

Lebanon, in Iraq, in the Palestinian territories. We will also remind the world that Iran is a country that is going 180 degrees in 

the other direction in terms of democracy for its own people. The 

Iranian people deserve better. This is a people who are connected 

to the outside world, it is a great culture, they are great people, 

and they deserve to be able to govern themselves. 

I announced yesterday that the Administration would be seeking 

a supplemental appropriations; $75 million additional funding for 

democracy promotion in Iran. We will have to seek some changes 

to our regulatory regime so we can work with nongovernmental organizations, work with human rights advocates. We will be getting 

back to you about that. We believe this is an important thing to 

do. 

In that regard, I want to thank very much the House and this 

Committee and the sponsors of the resolution just passed on Iran. 

It helps us very much. Thank you for doing that because I think 

it helps us very much, Chairman Hyde, Congressman Lantos, Congresswoman Ros-Lehtinen, because the world can see the United 

States is united through both branches of its Government on this 

issue concerning Iran. So thank you very much for that. 

Finally, let me say that there are other challenges. The United 

States is a country that I think recognizes now that we are not isolated from the world. That when there are countries that are poorly 

9

governed, that there are failed states that cannot control their own 

borders, meet their own peoples’ needs. When states become like 

Afghanistan, we suffer. Afghanistan became a failed state and became the home training ground for al-Qaeda, and we suffered. Not 

just on September 11th. We suffered with the Cole, we suffered 

with the Embassy bombings. 

The failed state is a real threat to our peace and security. It is 

also a threat to us to have states that cannot sustain themselves. 

And so I have been working with our foreign assistance community 

to make some changes to the way that we in the State Department 

and USAID will try and align our foreign assistance to support the 

development of well-governed states, states that govern wisely, 

that fight corruption, are eligible for funding under the Millennium 

Challenge Account. 

But even those not yet capable of Millennium Challenge compacts have to be encouraged to take responsibility for taking care 

of the needs of their people. We do not want foreign assistance to 

become a permanent dependency, we want it to be an enabler for 

well-governed states. 

I have, therefore, under my authorities, made some changes to 

our foreign assistance organization. I want to say that we have a 

very fine foreign assistance organization. USAID is on the front 

lines in the promotion of democracy, in caring for the most vulnerable populations and leading our teams in humanitarian disasters. 

We do need better alignment, here in Washington as well as in the 

field of our foreign assistance priorities. 

The United States wants to always remain, I think, a country 

that is compassionate. That is why the President has doubled official development assistance, why we have the President’s emergency plan for AIDS relief, why we have the plan for malaria relief 

and so on. 

But I know too that the American people are demanding, of all 

of us, good stewardship of their dollars, fiscal responsibility. I know 

that the American people are facing many, many priorities in this 

budget season. And so I want to assure you that we are trying to 

do everything that we can at the State Department to make certain 

that we are not just standing still, but rather that we are transforming ourselves to meet the challenges of the 21st century. That 

has meant that we have made some changes too; to the way that 

we are positioning our diplomacy. I have called it global repositioning. It is a bit the counterpart to the repositioning of our military forces that the Pentagon has done. 

But it means that we are asking our officers to serve in places 

that are of growing interest to us, places like India and China and 

Brazil and that we are moving some people out of places where we 

have very fine relationships but where the demands are just different, largely in Europe. 

So it has been an eventful year for the Department. I want you 

to know that the men and women of the State Department are 

some of the finest people with whom I have ever worked. They are 

dedicated, they are unafraid, they are on the front lines, they are 

working very, very hard, many times in places without their families for more than a year, places like Baghdad and Kabul. And they 

do it without complaint because they know that this moment in 

10

history is a critical one and they want to be a part of this moment 

in history. 

But I am very, very proud of the men and women of the State 

Department. I am very proud of what the United States is doing 

in the world and I am humbled to be the Secretary of State of this 

country. Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of the Secretary of State follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE CONDOLEEZZA RICE, THE SECRETARY OF

STATE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee. 

I appreciate this opportunity to address the Committee and to talk about America’s role in meeting the unprecedented challenges of our world today. I look forward 

to working closely with Congress to ensure that America’s diplomacy has the necessary resources to secure our interests, advance our ideals, and improve people’s 

lives around the world. In all of these mutual efforts, of course, we must remain 

committed to our responsibility to be good stewards of the American taxpayers’ 

hard-earned dollars. 

The President’s FY 2007 International Affairs Budget for the Department of 

State, USAID, and other foreign affairs agencies totals $35.1 billion. President Bush 

also plans to request supplemental funding to support emergency, one-time programs that are essential to the success of some of our highest foreign policy priorities. 

This money will do more than support our diplomacy; it will strengthen our national security. America today is a nation at war. We are engaged in a long conflict 

against terrorists and violent extremists. Across the world, the members of our Foreign Service, Civil Service, and our Foreign Service Nationals are advancing America’s diplomatic mission, often working in dangerous places far away from their 

friends and loved ones. Our nation’s men and women in uniform are also shouldering great risks and responsibilities. They are performing with courage and heroism, and many have made the ultimate sacrifice to secure our way of life. Today, 

I want to recognize these courageous public servants and their families, who endure 

long periods of service abroad and painful separation with fortitude. 

America’s enemies remain eager to strike us again, but our actions in the past 

four years have weakened their capability. Our diplomacy plays a vital role in defeating this threat. We are building partnerships with traditional allies and with 

new partners that share our perception of the threat. Most importantly, we are 

working directly with foreign citizens who wish to build thriving free societies that 

replace hatred with hope. 

Mr. Chairman, I would now like to offer an overview of the current mission of 

the men and women of the State Department—a mission that we have called transformational diplomacy. 

A NEW DIPLOMACY FOR A TRANSFORMED WORLD

In his Second Inaugural Address, President Bush laid out the vision that leads 

America into the world: ‘‘It is the policy of the United States to seek and support 

the growth of democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, 

with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world.’’

The President’s vision stems from the recognition that we are living in an extraordinary time, one in which centuries of international precedent are being overturned. 

The prospect of violent conflict among great powers is more remote than ever. 

States are increasingly competing and cooperating in peace, not preparing for war. 

Peoples in China, India, South Africa, Indonesia, and Brazil are lifting their countries and regions to new prominence. Democratic reform has begun in the Middle 

East. And the United States is working with our democratic partners in every region of the world, especially our hemispheric neighbors and our historic treaty allies 

in Europe and Asia, to build a true form of global stability: a balance of power that 

favors freedom. 

At the same time, other challenges have assumed new urgency. The greatest 

threats today emerge more within states than between them, and the fundamental 

character of regimes matters more than the international distribution of power. It 

is impossible to draw neat, clear lines between our security interests, our development goals, and our democratic ideals in today’s world. Our diplomacy must integrate and advance all of these goals together. 

11

So I would define the objective of transformational diplomacy this way: To work 

with our many partners around the world to build and sustain democratic, well-governed states that will respond to the needs of their people and conduct themselves 

responsibly in the international system. This is a strategy rooted in partnership, not 

paternalism—in doing things with other people, not for them. We will use America’s 

diplomatic power and our foreign assistance to help foreign citizens better their own 

lives, build their own nations, transform their own futures, and work with us to 

combat threats to our common security, including the spread of weapons of mass 

destruction. 

PRACTICING TRANSFORMATIONAL DIPLOMACY

Faced with such extraordinary challenges, we must transform old diplomatic institutions to serve new diplomatic purposes, and we must empower our people to practice transformational diplomacy. With the generous support of the Congress, my 

good friend and predecessor, Colin Powell, brought American diplomacy into the 

21st century. Now, my leadership team and I are building on this strong foundation 

and beginning the generational work of transforming the State Department. This 

will not only strengthen national security, it will improve our fiscal stewardship. We 

are committed to using American taxpayers’ dollars in the most effective and responsible way possible to strengthen America’s mission abroad. 

In the past year, we have begun making changes to our organization and our operations that will enable us to advance transformational diplomacy. We are forwarddeploying our people to the cities, countries, and regions where they are needed 

most. We are starting to move hundreds of diplomats from Europe and Washington 

to strategic countries like China, India, South Africa, and Indonesia. We are giving 

more of our people new training and language skills to engage more effectively with 

foreign peoples. We are enabling our diplomats to work more jointly with America’s 

servicemen and women. And I have announced that I am creating a new position 

of Director of Foreign Assistance. This reform will transform our capability to use 

foreign assistance more efficiently and more effectively to further our foreign policy 

goals, to bolster our national security, to reduce poverty, and to improve people’s 

lives around the world. 

We are making the initial changes using our existing authority, and the additional funding we are requesting in the FY 2007 budget will help us continue implementing our vision to transform the State Department to meet the challenges of the 

21st century. For this purpose, we are requesting $9.3 billion for State Department 

operations. 

Transformational diplomacy begins with our people—ensuring that they are in the 

right places, with the necessary tools and training to carry our their mission. We 

are requesting $23 million for 100 new positions on the new frontlines of our diplomacy: key transitional countries and emerging regional leaders in Africa, Latin 

America, the Middle East, and Asia. These new positions will complement the 100 

that we are already repositioning as part of our ongoing effort to change our global 

diplomatic posture. This repositioning effort will require a renewed commitment to 

secure and modernize our many posts overseas, and we are seeking $1.5 billion for 

security-related construction and rehabilitation of our diplomatic facilities. 

In addition to requesting new positions, we will continue to invest in our people, 

our greatest resource. More and more, we are calling upon our diplomats to leave 

their families and serve at unaccompanied ‘‘hardship posts’’ that now make up 20 

percent of our yearly overseas assignments. With your help, as part of our effort to 

modernize the Foreign Service, we will institute a new pay-for-performance system 

that fairly compensates our men and women working abroad. We will also further 

our efforts to train America’s diplomats to speak critical languages like Chinese, 

Urdu, and Arabic, which they will increasingly need, in addition to more traditional 

languages, as they progress in their careers. New training will also make full use 

of dynamic new technologies, and we are asking for $276 million to integrate our 

workforce with the latest information technology and to support professional training needed for success. 

These new tools and training will better enable our nation’s diplomats to tell 

America’s story to the people of the world, and in turn, to listen to the stories they 

have to tell. We have heard the legitimate criticisms that have been made of our 

public diplomacy, and we are rethinking how we do business. I have stressed that 

public diplomacy is the responsibility of every single member of our diplomatic 

corps, not just our public diplomacy specialists. One idea we are beginning to implement is the creation of forward-deployed, regional public diplomacy centers. These 

centers, or media hubs, will be small, lean operations that work out of our embassies or other existing facilities, enabling us to respond quickly to negative propaVerDate Mar 21 2002 16:22 Sep 12, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00015 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\FULL\021606\26078.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
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ganda, to correct misinformation, and to explain America’s policies and our principles. The $351 million that we seek will be essential for us to continue revitalizing 

our public diplomacy. 

To complement our public diplomacy, we must ensure that America remains a 

welcoming place for all tourists, students, and businesspeople, while at the same 

time protecting our homeland from terrorists and criminals who would exploit our 

open society to do us harm. The State Department, in partnership with the Department of Homeland Security, has taken new steps in the past year to realize the 

President’s vision of secure borders and open doors through information technology. 

Our request of $1.1 billion will fund the Border Security Program and enable us to 

hire 135 new consular officers and passport staff to meet the growing demand of 

foreign citizens seeking to travel to America, while maintaining our fundamental 

commitment to serve each and every American citizen when they go abroad. At the 

same time, we are seeking $474 million to support our educational and cultural exchanges, which increase mutual understanding between our citizens and the peoples 

of the world. 

Finally, we must continue to enable our nation’s diplomats to work effectively 

with their partners in the United Nations and other international organizations. We 

seek $1.6 billion to fund U.S. assessed and voluntary contributions to international 

organizations. The United States takes our international obligations seriously, and 

we remain committed to strengthening the financial stability, efficiency, and effectiveness of international organizations. 

DEFEATING TERROR AND ADVANCING LIBERTY

The President’s FY 2007 budget will help prepare the men and women of the 

State Department to meet the goals of transformational diplomacy. Our principal 

objectives are to stem the tide of terrorism and to help advance freedom and democratic rights. 

We are requesting $6.2 billion to strengthen the coalition partners who are standing shoulder to shoulder with us on the front lines in the fight against terrorism. 

Our assistance empowers our partners to practice more effective law enforcement, 

police their borders, gather and share essential intelligence, and wage more successful countrerterrorism operations. In many states, our assistance will also help to 

bolster thriving democratic and economic institutions reducing the societal schisms 

that terrorists exploit for their own ideological purposes. Our FY 2007 request includes, among others, $739 million for Pakistan, $560 million for Colombia, $154 

million for Indonesia, $457 million for Jordan, and $335 million for Kenya. 

Essential to winning the war on terrorism is denying our enemies the weapons 

of mass destruction that they seek. Our diplomacy cannot focus on non-proliferation 

alone; we must also develop new tools and new policies of counter-proliferation: actively confronting and rolling up the global networks involving rogue states, outlaw 

scientists, and black market middlemen who make proliferation possible. We are 

building on the achievements of the Proliferation Security Initiative, the G–8 Global 

Partnership, and UN Security Council Resolution 1540. We are working to stop Iran 

and North Korea from succeeding in their quest for weapons of mass destruction, 

and we continue to do everything in our power to deny terrorists access to the 

world’s most dangerous weapons, including threatening conventional weapons like 

MANPADS. The FY 2007 budget proposes to increase funding for our State Department’s efforts to help countries fight the proliferation of dangerous weapons and materials. 

These requirements are essential and immediate, but our vision must look beyond 

present horizons. To defeat the threat of terrorism, we must work to build a future 

of freedom and hope. As President Bush has said, in the long run, liberty and democracy are the only ideas powerful enough to defeat the ideology of hatred and violence. Freedom is on the march today all around the world, and the United States 

must continue to open a path for its expansion, especially in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

In December, over 12 million Iraqi people voted in free elections for a democratic 

government based on a constitution that Iraqis themselves wrote and adopted. 

Through their actions, the overwhelming majority of Iraqis are demonstrating that 

they support freedom and oppose terrorism. The democratic government that is taking shape in Baghdad today should support human rights, foster new opportunities 

for prosperity, and give all Iraqis a stake in a free and peaceful future. It should 

separate stalwart Iraqis from the purveyors of terror and chaos. Iraq is on a track 

of transformation from brutal tyranny to a self-reliant emerging democracy that is 

working to better the lives of its people and defeat violent extremists. 

Although Iraqis are undertaking this work themselves, international assistance 

remains essential to Iraq’s success. U.S. assistance is helping Iraqis to build their 

13

security capabilities, empowering civil society and democratic institutions, increasing and improving the production and availability of electricity, distributing millions 

of new textbooks, providing access to clean water for millions of Iraqis, and helping 

protect millions of Iraqi children from disease. The President’s request of $771 million, along with the forthcoming supplemental 

request, is an essential part of our National Strategy for Victory in Iraq. The funding for the Department’s operations and programs is a critical counterpart to the 

efforts of our troops in the field as we pursue our integrated security, economic, and 

political tracks to success in Iraq. The supplemental request will fund programs that 

are integral to our counter-insurgency campaign and to the operating and security 

costs of our diplomatic mission, while the FY 2007 request supports capacity development essential for Iraq’s transition to self-reliance. The money requested by State 

will allow us to work effectively with our Iraqi partners to advance our strategy of 

‘‘Clear, Hold, Build’’—clearing areas of insurgent control, holding newly gained territory under the legitimate authority of the Iraqi government, and building economic 

infrastructure and capable national democratic institutions that are essential to 

Iraq’s success. 

Our work also continues in Afghanistan. After the United States, along with our 

allies and friends, removed the Taliban regime, the Afghan people set out to liberate 

themselves. They did so with the international community by their side. And today, 

the Afghan people have achieved the ambitious vision that we all set together four 

years ago in Bonn, Germany: a fully functioning, sovereign Afghan government. 

This government was established through successful presidential and parliamentary 

elections, in which millions of men and women voted freely for the first time. Today, 

Afghanistan has a democratic constitution; an emerging free economy; and a growing, multi-ethnic army that is the pride of the Afghan people. 

Despite this dramatic progress, there is still much hard work to be done. Presi- dent Bush’s request of $1.1 billion for Afghan reconstruction, along with supplemental funding to be requested, will allow us to continue helping the people of Afghanistan meet the remaining political, economic, and security challenges they face. 

With your continued support, along with help from NATO, the United Nations, and 

all other contributors from the international community, we can help the Afghan 

people complete their long journey toward a future of hope and freedom. 

The people of Iraq and Afghanistan are helping to lead the transformation of the 

Broader Middle East from despotism to democracy. This is a generational challenge, 

in which elections are an important and necessary beginning. The freedom to choose 

invests citizens in the future of their countries. But as President Bush has said, one 

election does not establish a country as a democracy. Successful democracies are 

characterized by transparent, accountable institutions of governance; a thriving civil 

society that respects and protects minority rights; a free media; opportunities for 

health and education for all citizens; and the official renunciation of terrorism and 

ideologies of hatred. On this last point especially, we will continue to insist that the 

leaders of Hamas must recognize Israel, disarm, reject terrorism, and work for lasting peace. Helping the nations of the Broader Middle East to make progress in 

building the foundations of democratic societies is the mission of the Middle East 

Partnership Initiative, for which we are seeking $120 million. We are also requesting $80 million for the National Endowment for Democracy to continue its good 

work in promoting lasting democratic change all around the world. 

The progress of the Broader Middle East is hopeful, but it still faces determined 

enemies, especially the radical regime in Tehran. Iran is a strategic challenge to the 

United States, and we have a comprehensive view of the threat that Iran poses. The 

regime is seeking to develop nuclear weapons. It is a leading state sponsor of terrorism. It is working to destabilize its region and to advance its ideological ambitions. And the Iranian government oppresses its own people, denying them basic liberties and human rights. Through its aggressive and confrontational behavior, Iran 

is increasingly isolating itself from the international community. 

In recent months, U.S. diplomacy has broadened the international coalition to address Iran’s nuclear ambitions, and Iran’s case will soon be heard in the U.N. Security Council. Our goal now is to broaden this coalition even further, to intensify the 

international spotlight and encourage our many international partners to respond 

to the full spectrum of threats that the Iranian regime poses. 

For our part, the United States wishes to reach out to the Iranian people and support their desire to realize their own freedom and to secure their own democratic 

and human rights. The Iranian people should know that the United States fully 

supports their aspirations for a freer, better future. Over the past two years, the 

Department of State has invested over $4 million in projects that empower Iranian 

citizens in their call for political and economic liberty, freedom of speech, and respect for human rights. We are funding programs that train labor activists and help 

14

protect them from government persecution. We are working with international 

NGOs to develop a support network for Iranian reformers, political dissidents, and 

human rights activists. We will devote at least $10 million to support these and 

other programs during this year (FY 2006), and we are eager to work more closely 

with Congress to help Iranian reformers build nationwide networks to support 

democratic change in their country. 

MEETING GLOBAL CHALLENGES

Like terrorism and nuclear proliferation, many of the greatest challenges in today’s world are global and transnational in nature. These threats breach even the 

most well-defended borders and affect all nations. Today’s global threats require 

global partnerships, and America’s diplomats are helping us transform our relationships with countries that have the capacity and the will to work on a global basis 

to achieve common purposes—countries like India, Japan, South Korea, Australia, 

El Salvador, and our allies in Europe. 

One major global threat comes from disease, especially the scourge of HIV/AIDS. 

This pandemic affects key productive members of societies: the individuals who 

drive economies, raise children, and pass on the customs and traditions of their 

countries. The United States is committed to treating people worldwide who suffer 

from AIDS because conscience demands it, and also because a healthier world is a 

safer world. The hallmark of our approach is the President’s Emergency Plan for 

AIDS Relief. This program is the largest international initiative ever by one nation 

to combat a single disease. The Emergency Plan combines our strong bilateral programs with complementary multilateral efforts to fight AIDS and other debilitating 

infectious diseases through contributions to the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria, of which America is by far the largest contributor since the 

program’s inception. 

The Emergency Plan is rooted in partnership. Our approach is to empower each 

nation to take ownership of its own fight against HIV/AIDS through prevention, 

treatment, and care. The results to date have been remarkable. In the past two 

years, the Emergency Plan has expanded life-extending antiretroviral treatment to 

471,000 people worldwide, 400,000 of whom are located in sub-Saharan Africa. And 

as of last year, the Emergency Plan has extended compassion and care to more than 

1.2 million orphans and vulnerable children. The President’s 2007 Budget requests 

$4 billion, $740 million more than this year, to continue America’s leadership in the 

global fight against HIV/AIDS. 

The 2007 budget also includes $225 million to fight malaria, which is a major killer of children in sub-Saharan Africa. This request is part of the President’s pledge 

to increase U.S. funding of malaria prevention and treatment by more than $1.2 billion over five years. The United States is committed to working with the international community to increase preventive and curative programs in 15 African 

countries with particularly high rates of infection by 2010. We seek to reduce malaria deaths by 50 percent in these countries after three years of full implementation. 

The United States is also playing a key global role in preparing for the threat 

of a possible avian influenza pandemic-providing political leadership, technical expertise, and significant resources to this effort. In September 2005, President Bush 

announced the International Partnership on Avian and Pandemic Influenza. The 

Partnership, which includes 89 countries and nine international organizations, generates political momentum and coordinating action among all partners. At the January 2006 International Pledging Conference on Avian and Pandemic Influenza held 

in Beijing, the United States pledged $334 million in current budget authority to 

protect health in the United States and around the world. The most effective way 

to protect the American population from an influenza outbreak is to contain it beyond our borders. The 2007 Budget provides resources to continue these activities 

in countries already experiencing outbreaks of influenza and in other countries on 

the cusp of infection. 

Another key global challenge is to curtail the illicit drug trade and to dissolve the 

relationships between narco-traffickers, terrorists, and international criminal organizations. The 2007 Budget requests $722 million for the Andean Counterdrug Initiative, which advances the President’s goal of strengthening democracy, regional 

stability, and economic development throughout the hemisphere. The Initiative provides funding for law enforcement, security programs, and alternative livelihood assistance for those at risk from the trade of illicit narcotics. 

Finally, as we transform our diplomacy to meet the increasingly global challenges 

of the 21st century, the United States remains committed to putting the power of 

our compassion into action wherever and whenever it is needed. In 2005, the United 

15

States led the world with our generous emergency responses to people suffering 

from unprecedented natural disasters—from the Indian Ocean tsunami, to the 

earthquake in Pakistan, to the mudslides in Central America. Our swift action has 

helped to provide relief, to prevent the spread of disease, and to begin restoring livelihoods and rebuilding these devastated regions. The United States remains the 

world’s most generous provider of food and other emergency humanitarian assistance. Throughout the world, we are also helping refugees to return to their countries of origin. When that is not a viable option, the United States leads the international community in resettling refugees here in our nation. The FY 2007 request 

of $1.2 billion for humanitarian relief, plus $1.3 billion in food aid, will ensure that 

we are prepared to extend the reach of American compassion anywhere in the 

world. 

THREE GOALS OF U.S. FOREIGN ASSISTANCE

The United States will continue to build strong partnerships to meet the global 

challenges that increasingly define international security in the 21st century. But 

we recognize that many states cannot meet the basic responsibilities of sovereignty, 

including just and effective control over their own territory. In response, the United 

States must assist the world’s most vulnerable populations through our transformational diplomacy—using our foreign assistance and working with our partners 

to build state capacity where little exists, help weak and poorly governed states to 

develop and reform, and empower those states that are embracing political and economic freedom. These are three main goals of our country assistance programs, with 

the ultimate purpose being ‘‘graduation’’ from foreign economic and governance assistance altogether. Vibrant private sectors in free, well-governed states are the surest form of sustainable development. 

Building State Capacity 

We must do all we can to anticipate and prevent the emergence of failed states 

that lead to humanitarian crises, serious regional instability, and havens for terror 

and oppression that threaten our security. On September 11, we were attacked by 

terrorists who had plotted and trained in a failed state, Afghanistan. Since then, 

we have spent billions of dollars and sacrificed precious lives to eliminate the threat 

and liberate the brutally repressed people of Afghanistan. We must use all the tools 

and resources available not only to prevent future failed states, but to help nations 

emerging from conflict and war to become responsible, democratic states. 

The Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization was established 

to address complex and challenging situations around the globe. Partnering with the 

international community, we will help countries in crisis achieve a path to lasting 

peace, good governance, and economic development. Working in conjunction with 

our lead regional bureaus, our Reconstruction and Stabilization office is already beginning to advance this mission in the field. It deployed a team to Sudan to assess 

the effectiveness of our assistance programs in implementing the Comprehensive 

Peace Agreement, in negotiating a political settlement in Darfur, in delivering humanitarian assistance, and in establishing security. As a result of these assessments 

and planning efforts, U.S. resources have been allocated more effectively to help 

people in need in Sudan. Our office has also helped the Haitian people take a decisive step toward a better future, pinpointing problems with voter registration and 

the electoral council in time for them to be remedied before last week’s historic elections. 

The 2007 Budget proposes to strengthen this office’s ability to lead U.S. planning 

efforts for countries and regions of most concern, and to coordinate the deployment 

of U.S. resources when needed. The Budget proposes $75 million, including a Conflict Response Fund to build our civilian response capabilities, to prevent failing 

states, and to respond quickly and effectively to states emerging from conflict 

around the world. With an early and effective civilian response, we can reduce the 

need for a more robust and costly military commitment by more quickly shifting responsibility for key functions to civilian actors. 

Our efforts to build state capacity continue in Sudan. The need for security is of 

the utmost importance to this effort, and the Comprehensive Peace Accord (CPA) 

points the way forward. The CPA, which ended 22 years of North-South civil war 

in Sudan, is the framework for resolution of conflict throughout Sudan. The CPA 

created a Government of National Unity that shares power and wealth, and establishes elections at every level by 2009. 

Implementing the CPA is essential to ending the genocide in Darfur. The United 

States is appalled by the ongoing atrocities that have persisted in Darfur, and we 

continue to lead the ongoing international effort to aid the region’s displaced people, 

assisting over 1.8 million internally-displaced persons and over 200,000 Sudanese 

16

refugees in Chad. I ask for your full support of the President’s upcoming supplemental request, which will include support for the African Union and for transition 

to a UN Peacekeeping Mission to bring peace to this war-torn area. We are requesting $1.1 billion in the FY 2007 budget to transition to peace in Sudan, meet humanitarian needs, lay the foundations for economic development, and strengthen sustainable democratic institutions. 

We are also continuing to partner with the people of Haiti to advance the cause 

of freedom and build lasting foundations of a democratic state. Just last week, the 

people of Haiti held fair and free elections. We now look forward to working with 

the citizens of Haiti, their newly elected government, and the international community to help Haiti chart a positive path of freedom and prosperity by strengthening 

good governance, improving security and the rule of law, fostering economic recovery, and addressing critical humanitarian needs. 

As is evident by the hard work and sacrifice of the UN peacekeepers in Haiti, 

international peacekeeping missions carried out by the United Nations and partner 

organizations are essential to creating the secure conditions conducive for democratic elections and basic state capacity. The $1.3 billion request for these efforts 

worldwide is also crucial to facilitating the delivery of humanitarian relief and providing a stable political and economic environment that fosters democratic institutions and development. To continue to provide well-trained, effective peacekeepers 

that understand and respect human rights, I am requesting over $100 million for 

the third year of the Global Peace Operations Initiative to train and equip 75,000 

troops by 2010. Current missions and capacity building efforts increase our security 

at home and provide relief to the heroic troops in our own armed forces. 

Helping Developing States and the Most Vulnerable Populations 

Where the basic foundations of security, governance, and economic institutions 

exist, the United States is advancing bold development goals. Under President 

Bush, the United States has embarked on the most ambitious development agenda 

since the Marshall Plan, including a new debt relief initiative, the doubling of Official Development Assistance since taking office, and funding for the international 

financial institutions that is linked to performance. Development is an integral pillar of our foreign policy. In 2002, for the first time, the President’s National Security 

Strategy elevated development to the level of diplomacy and defense, citing it as the 

third key component of our national security. States that govern justly, invest in 

their people, and create the conditions for individual and collective prosperity are 

less likely to produce or harbor terrorists. American diplomacy must advance these 

development principles. 

U.S. development assistance focuses on building the tools for democratic participation, promoting economic growth, providing for health and education, and addressing security concerns in developing nations, while at the same time responding to 

humanitarian disasters. Such investments are crucial to improving the lives of people around the world and enhancing our own national security. At the same time, 

we must invest in reform in countries so that these efforts will not go to waste, but 

provide both the necessary tools and the right incentives for host governments to 

secure the conditions necessary for their citizens to achieve their full potential. 

Relieving the burden of heavily indebted countries is essential to ending a destabilizing lend-and-forgive approach to development assistance for poorer countries 

and allowing these countries to progress on the road to prosperity. At the 

Gleneagles summit last July, the G–8 agreed on a landmark initiative to provide 

100 percent cancellation of qualifying Heavily Indebted Poor Countries’ debt obligations to the World Bank, the African Development Bank, and the International 

Monetary Fund. U.S. leadership was instrumental in securing this agreement. We 

estimate that a total of 42 countries will receive up to $60 billion in debt relief as 

a result of this initiative. The Budget that I present to you today fully supports the 

U.S. share of the multilateral debt forgiveness provided by the G–8 proposal. 

The United States and our G–8 partners went much further than relieving debt. 

I ask you to go much further as well and support our government’s commitment for 

the most ambitious package for Africa ever supported by the G–8. This package will 

fight malaria, HIV/AIDS, and corruption and help create an environment where democracy and economic opportunity can flourish. Specifically, the 2007 Budget supports the President’s commitment to double our assistance to Africa between 2004 

and 2010. In addition, the request supports the U.S. Government’s commitment to 

help African countries to build trade capacity; to educate their citizens through the 

four year, $400 million Africa Education Initiative; and to combat sexual violence 

and abuse against women through a new Women’s Justice and Empowerment Initiative. 

17

Although Africa is a focus of our efforts to reduce poverty and invest in people 

and reform, it is by no means the only continent on which our resources are directed. We seek a total of $2.7 billion for Development Assistance and Child Survival and Health funds. By investing in the citizens of developing countries, we are 

investing in the future of the American people. 

Empowering Transformational States 

The final goal of our country assistance programs is to empower those states that 

are governing justly and to help them address key constraints to their economic 

growth and poverty reduction. The flagship of our efforts is the Millennium Challenge Account, which is helping states that are making measurable progress to 

achieve sustainable development and integration into the global economy. 

In 2002, in Monterrey, Mexico, the nations of the world adopted a new consensus 

on how to reduce international poverty. Developed nations agreed to dramatically 

increase their amount of assistance to developing countries, and developing countries committed to making progress toward good governance, economic freedom, and 

an investment in the health and education of their people. In response to this 

Monterrey Consensus, our Administration and the Congress created the revolutionary Millennium Challenge Account, which targets billions of dollars in new development assistance to countries that meet benchmarks of political, economic, and 

social development. This innovative approach partners with and invests in low and 

lower-middle income countries that take ownership for their own sustainable development and poverty reduction. 

In the past year, we have accelerated our efforts to negotiate and sign development compacts between transformational countries and the Millennium Challenge 

Corporation. To date, the MCC has identified 23 countries eligible for development 

compacts, and we have approved compacts worth a total of $1.5 billion with eight 

countries: Armenia, Benin, Cape Verde, Georgia, Honduras, Madagascar, Nicaragua, 

and Vanuatu. Nine eligible countries have prepared proposals totaling $3.1 billion, 

and another six will soon submit proposals of their own. We are seeking $3 billion 

of new funding in the FY 2007 budget, with the goal of approving up to 10 new compacts. 

As important as our foreign assistance is, free trade is ultimately the key to every 

country’s sustained development and economic growth. As the President stressed in 

the State of the Union, promotion of free trade is essential to enhancing the prosperity of the American people and to supporting developing countries in their effort 

to participate fully in the global economy. The Bush Administration has signed or 

negotiated free trade agreements with Chile, Singapore, Jordan, Bahrain, Oman, 

Morocco, Australia, five Central American countries plus the Dominican Republic, 

and most recently, Peru. Fostering free trade is a vital part of our development policy. In the past five years, the United States has more than doubled our investment 

in helping developing countries to trade freely and competitively in the global economy. We pledged at the recent WTO ministerial in Hong Kong to increase this assistance to $2.7 billion by 2010, and our FY 2007 request for trade-related development assistance will be an important step toward that ambitious and hopeful goal. 

Mr. Chairman: America’s purpose in this young century is to marry our democratic principles with our dramatic power to build a more hopeful world. Our purposes are idealistic, that is true; but our policies are realistic, and we are succeeding. President Bush and I have called upon the men and women of the State 

Department to practice transformational diplomacy, and they are rising to this challenge with enthusiasm and courage. They are helping our many partners around the 

world to build a future of freedom, democracy, and hope for themselves and their 

families. 

Realizing the goals of transformational diplomacy will require a sustained effort 

over the course of a generation. Most importantly, it will require a strong partnership with the Congress. We at the Department of State will do our part to use our 

existing authority to make our foreign assistance more effective and to enhance our 

ability to serve as responsible stewards of the American taxpayers’ money. Our goal 

in establishing the new position of Director of Foreign Assistance is a first step. We 

welcome a dialogue with Congress about how we can work together to improve 

America’s foreign assistance further, enabling us to respond more quickly and more 

effectively to the world’s development challenges. By making America’s foreign assistance more efficient and more effective, we will help people around the world to 

improve their lives, we will strengthen the hope that comes with freedom, and we 

will advance our national security.

Chairman HYDE. Thank you, Madam Secretary. We will now 

take motions to strike the last word for 5 minutes. 

18

Mr. Lantos. 

Mr. LANTOS. Thank you much, Mr. Chairman. 

Soon, Madam Secretary, we will be revisiting the Iran-Libya 

Sanctions Act, and because of your extremely carefully, calibrated 

policy it will no longer encompass Libya because Libya has moved 

in a very desirable direction, given up its weapons of mass destruction, and is moving toward normalized relations with us. But we 

will have Iran very much on our agenda. 

And I would like to ask you to sort of project for us the future 

of the Kabuki Dance in which Iran and the civilized world is engaged in. We had great success at Vienna, a very strong vote, but 

we are a long ways from Iran’s compliance with the demands of the 

civilized community. 

I would be grateful if you can comment on what your plans are 

with respect to future United States policy toward Iran. And in this 

connection, if I may, it seems to some of us that the extremely 

promising UN investigation of the assassination of the late Prime 

Minister of Lebanon has slowed down in recent times. Syria is attempting to escape its clear cut responsibility for that odious mass 

murder which resulted in the death of a couple of dozen people. I 

would like to ask you what you plan to do to reinvigorate that investigation. 

Secretary RICE. Thank you, Congressman Lantos. First of all, on 

the ILSA. We recognize that it will come up for reauthorization in 

the summer. There is a lot that could happen between now and 

then, and right now we are working very hard to maintain the 

strongest possible coalition so that Iran gets the right message. But 

as I said to Senate Foreign Relations yesterday, I do not underestimate the challenge that we have in getting robust action should 

Iran continue to defy the international community when we go into 

the security council. 

There are many different interests that will be represented there 

by many different countries, and we will have to work very hard 

to get robust measures. I am nonetheless—I am not pessimistic 

about it because Iranians are doing nothing but defy. They are giving really no reason to believe that they are going to live up to the 

just demands of the international community. 

So I would like to continue to work with our close friends and 

with others in the international community. I think we should not 

jump to the conclusion as to what kinds of sanctions might be appropriate. I think we ought to look at the effect on the international community, but also on what would be most effective on 

the Iranian regime, hopefully not hurting the Iranian people with 

whom we have no quarrel. I would hope that we would also look 

frankly at what we might be able to do as like minded states. If 

we cannot get everyone to agree, there may be some measures that 

like minded states can take that will still have a significant effect 

on the Iranian economy. 

It is also the case that just the fact that the Iranians are in the 

Security Council and behaving in this way is already costing the 

Iranian economy in terms of capital fight. A number of banks have 

pulled out because of reputational risks. I think as this continues, 

you will see more of that. And Iran, I do not believe, can endure 

the kind of international isolation that for instance North Korea 

19

endures because it is a state that, in some sense, thrives on its own 

isolation. Iran is a very different country, with trading relations, 

with a population that travels, with a leadership that travels. 

And so I think we will look at all the tools but I would like to 

reserve how we might go about improving ILSA, and you are right 

and thank you for your very nice comments about Libya, but you, 

too, Congressman Lantos, have worked hard at that relationship 

and we have gotten some very good forward movement. 

Let me just, on the investigation, we have had the transfer of responsibility from Mr. Mellice to Mr. Bromitz. It has taken, as you 

might imagine, when that happens, things do slow down as the 

new investigator gets up to speed. But those who have met him say 

that he is a serious investigator, he is tough-minded. We will need, 

I really do believe, to go back to the Security Council at some time 

in the not too distant future to get a report on what is happening 

with Syrian cooperation, because the resolution demanded full and 

complete Syrian cooperation. I don’t believe that we have gotten 

that, and I think we will have to go back and, at least, take stock 

of where we are. 

We have, as you know, taken advantage of another Congressional 

tool, the Syrian Accountability Act, to designate some further Syrian personalities who have been involved in one way or another in 

the investigation. And so we are not sitting still, but I think you 

are right, Congressman, we are going to need to really reenergize 

that and I think once we have given Investigator Bromitz a little 

time to get up to speed, we probably want to go back to the Security Council. 

Mr. LANTOS. Thank you, Madam Secretary. 

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Leach of Iowa. 

Mr. LEACH. I would like to turn to another part of the world, that 

being North Korea. As you know in the context of six party talks 

last September, the North Koreans agreed to dissolve their nuclear 

program, except the MPT and accept IAEA safeguards. Since then, 

little progress has been made and so one of the questions is do we 

have new plans for Six-Party reinvigoration, do we have any plans 

for alternative approaches that might supplement the six party 

talks. For example, there has been discussion of the possibility of 

a joint United States-South Korean initiative to bring a formal end 

to the Korean War. 

So my query to you is, where do you see the future of the SixParty Talks? Are you considering supplemental initiatives that 

could involve the Executive Department people visiting North 

Korea, and are we at a stand-still, or is there light at the end of 

the tunnel? 

Secretary RICE. Well, thank you, Congressman Leach. We have 

been very active with the Chinese and with others in being very 

clear that we are prepared at any time with no conditions to go 

back to the 6 party talks. In fact, Secretary Chris Hill met with his 

counterpart in Beijing last month, because the Chinese believed 

that this might be helpful in pushing the North Koreans back to 

the talks. The North Koreans have focused on the fact that the 

United States has been pursuing defensive measures to deal with 

illicit North Korean activities, for instance, the counterfeiting of 

20

our money, which we are going to have to pursue whether we are 

in Six-Party Talks or not. 

It is simply the responsibility of the United States Government 

to pursue these measures if someone is trying to counterfeit our 

currency. And I think, actually, the North Koreans are getting very 

little traction with the other states with the argument that that is 

the reason they won’t go back to the Six-Party Talks. 

We are ready to go back at any time. We have heard mixed messages from the North Koreans on this. It is my hope they are ready 

to go back, and ready to go back seriously to discuss what was in, 

I think, a very good statement out of the September meetings that 

gives a way ahead, not just on the nuclear issue, although the nuclear issue remains the center, but on a variety of other parts of 

the dialog that could begin. If you remember, the statement of principles talked about other kinds of issues that might be addressed 

as well. 

We are more than ready to do that. At this point our conversations are principally with our other interlocutors, South Korea, 

Japan, China and, to a certain extent, Russia. But it is our hope 

that the Chinese, in particular, are going to be able to convince the 

North Koreans that it is time to come back to the talks and to come 

back seriously. We are ready. 

Mr. LEACH. Thank you, Madam. Yield. 

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Ackerman of New York. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Good to see you again, Madam Secretary. Thank 

you for your good work. Madam Secretary, on February 1, President Bush was asked if the United States would defend Israel militarily, a very specific question, not in general, but militarily. And 

the President answered rather unambiguously, ‘‘You bet we’ll defend Israel, period.’’

That was crystal clear, very understandable. I take the President 

at his word and think that he was entirely profound and justified. 

Unfortunately, the next day, the Washington Post reported that 

White House staff were suggesting that that is really not what the 

President meant to say and that his statement should have been 

no different from previous comments that we are committed to ‘‘the 

security of Israel as a vibrant Jewish state and we are committed 

to the safety of Israel.’’ There is a world of difference between the 

two positions. 

I would like to ask a very simple question. Will the United States 

defend Israel militarily? Before you answer, and I know there is a 

lot of temptation, I think that the only answer that is clearly understandable is yes, period. Less than that, an answer with an explanation is really a watered-down version of what we thought was 

a clear and unmistakable policy. 

Secretary RICE. Well, thank you. First of all, let me just say that 

the President was speaking, of course, for the United States and 

our complete and total commitment to the existence and prosperity 

of Israel as a Jewish state. That is longstanding American policy. 

That has not changed. We have with Israel always recognized that 

Israel believes first and foremost that it must be capable of defending itself and that its defense is the responsibility of the Israeli 

Government, to the Israeli people. That is why we have had strong 

defense relationships, strong support for Israeli military programs, 

21

strong cooperation, for instance, in missile defense on the Arrow 

system, and a strong commitment to make certain that Israel can 

carry out its obligation to its people to defend itself. 

We also, with Israel, this President, in particular, has defended, 

I think without reservation, the right of Israelis to defend themselves, particularly against terrorism, which they have experienced 

at so many times. But I think that what you are saying, Congressman Ackerman, is that what the President is stating is that we are 

totally and completely committed to Israel as a Jewish state to its 

existence, to its continuance, to its prosperity, and that we will 

stand by our ally. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. So there is no, ‘‘Yes, period’’? 

Secretary RICE. Congressman, I think I have stated it best. The 

President has stated it. We are going to——

Mr. ACKERMAN. The President said, ‘‘You bet.’’ So I will ask you, 

will you say, ‘‘You bet’’? 

Secretary RICE. When the President says, ‘‘You bet,’’ he means 

it. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. The White House said something else, and you 

didn’t repeat what he said. 

Secretary RICE. When the President says, ‘‘You bet,’’ by the way, 

he is the one who matters, he means it. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. He is not the one we have the ability to talk to 

right now. 

Secretary RICE. Congressman——

Mr. ACKERMAN. I am sure the President means it, but there is 

an awful lot of people interpreting for him after he says what he 

means. 

Secretary RICE. Congressman, my point is when the President 

says it, he means it. The way that we discharge our duty and responsibility to Israel, because the Israelis themselves say it, is that 

Israel——

Mr. ACKERMAN. I want to go to a different question. Maybe I will 

get more of a slam dunk answer or something. It is a question 

about the legitimacy of Hamas, of which there is probably a thousand different questions on what our policy is. First, the Palestinian Authority derives its legitimacy out of a contrived process 

called the Oslo Agreement, in which there was an exchange of letters signed by the authority and Israelis which mutually recognized 

each other and each other’s right to exist. That is the document 

that gave status to the Palestinian Authority. 

There has been a change or in the midst of a process of change 

in the government in the Palestinian Authority. The very fact that 

Hamas becomes the Government of the Palestinian Authority violates the Oslo agreement because it is an organization, a terrorist 

organization, according to you, according to us, according to the Europeans, a terrorist organization, and therefore, from the outset, by 

agreement, should not have been allowed to participate in the election. My first question goes to why did——

Chairman HYDE. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Chairman, I have waited 2 minutes less 

than an hour to ask the question. 

Chairman HYDE. Everybody has to be treated the same. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Chairman. 

22

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Ackerman. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. I would note for the record that we usually have 

a clock that indicates when we have a minute left. I don’t know if 

I was given 5 minutes or 1 minute or 2 minutes. 

Chairman HYDE. Take my word for it, your time expired. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. It might be there but my vision is impaired by 

something that is covering it because none of us can see it. 

Chairman HYDE. Without objection, the gentleman is granted 2 

additional minutes. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. I thank the Chair. 

Chairman HYDE. I hope he can finish then. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Chairman, I can and I do appreciate that, 

but these are key questions and we get very little time to talk to 

the Secretary and we benefit greatly from the leadership on both 

sides making statements, but the membership would like to ask 

questions. My question is Hamas. Why did we pressure the Israelis 

to allow them to participate in the election in complete contravention of the agreement that the Palestinians had that terrorist organizations such as Hamas would not be allowed to participate. 

And inasmuch as they are now the government, what do we do 

about it? Your statement that the leaders of Hamas—and I am 

quoting from your statement—‘‘must recognize Israel, disarm, reject terrorism and work for lasting peace.’’ Or what? Do we recognize them now? Do we deal with them? It is our policy not to deal 

with terrorist organizations. Do we give them legitimate status because they were elected without any mechanical flaws to the process? 

Secretary RICE. Our policy is very clear on this. First of all, the 

Palestinians wanted to have an election in which all Palestinians 

could participate, and we supported that decision, the understanding being and if you look back at the Quartet statement prior 

to the election——

Mr. ACKERMAN. Was that a mistake? 

Secretary RICE. I believe it was important for the Palestinians to 

have their election in a way that they believed legitimate. We, however, say and believe that Hamas is a terrorist organization and 

no, we will not deal with a terrorist organization. We will not fund 

a terrorist organization. We will make certain that we do everything that we can to work with the international community so 

that others do not fund a terrorist organization. And I believe that 

Hamas has come to the point that it has to make a choice. If it is 

going to govern and reach the aspirations of the Palestinian people 

for a peaceful life, it can’t, on the one hand, say that it wants to 

have a partner in peace, and on the other hand, that partner 

doesn’t have a right to exist. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Must they change their charter? 

Secretary RICE. They must recognize Israel and Israel’s right to 

exist, which is the core of their charter. 

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Burton from Indiana. 

Mr. BURTON. Mr. Chairman, I would like to preface my remarks 

by saying I hope that you will show the same kind of deference to 

all the other Members that you just showed to Mr. Ackerman. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. I hope so. 

23

Mr. BURTON. Mr. Ackerman traditionally goes 2 or 3 minutes 

longer than the rest of us. And I think it is unfortunate that the 

Chair continues to give him that privilege. 

Now let me just ask a couple of questions real quickly. First of 

all, I think you’re a great Secretary of State, and second, I would 

like to bring your attention back to the western hemisphere if I 

might. I have two questions, and I will let you answer those questions together. 

First of all, President Chavez of Venezuela, who has been a problem for some time, who is getting $100 million a day in oil revenues and has about $3 million in reserves, $60 million of that coming from the United States, has reached out evidently to Iran, and 

the head of their Parliament is coming over or is there now for a 

visit. And Cuba, Nicaragua—Hamas, he is allegedly going to give 

$50 million to Hamas. We just heard a discussion about that. It is 

a known terrorist organization. 

And I would just like to know what the Administration is going 

to do and is doing to deal with President Chavez and give us some 

guidance on how you think the Congress should address this very 

severe issue. 

He is allegedly spreading money all over the place down there. 

I talked to a number of Presidents in various countries in Central 

and South America that are very concerned about his influencing 

the elective process in those countries. And so I would like to get 

your take on that. 

The second thing I would like to say, we met with President 

Uribe yesterday of Colombia, and we talked to him on a number 

of issues. But one of the issues that was of most concern to him 

was the war against drugs. 

He was also concerned about the Free Trade Agreement, which 

I won’t get into right now, but nevertheless, he was concerned 

about the war against drugs. They have lost 22 aircraft over the 

last year, and they need those in order to continue their effective 

fight against narcotics trafficking. They have done an outstanding 

job so far under his leadership. But they need the tools with which 

to continue the fight. Their budget, the Administration’s budget 

this year is cutting the interdiction, drug interdiction, moneys by 

about $11 million. And I was wondering if the Administration 

would reconsider that in a supplemental or something, because 

most of us feel the war against drugs is so very important and vital 

not only to the security of the United States but to the well-being 

of a lot of our kids. 

So if you could answer those two questions, I would really appreciate it. And Mr. Chairman, I want you to know, I got all those 

questions done in 3 minutes. I didn’t need 7 or 8. 

Chairman HYDE. It was a remarkable performance. 

Secretary RICE. Congressman Burton, first of all, Latin America, 

the western hemisphere is our neighborhood. And it is essentially 

important that we have a safe and secure neighborhood and one 

where democratic progress is continuing, and I think it is fair to 

say that one of the biggest problems we face in that regard, are the 

policies of Venezuela, which, as you rightly say, are attempting to 

influence neighbors away from democratic processes. 

24

We are doing a couple of things. One is that we are working with 

others to try and make certain that there is a kind of united front 

against some of the kinds of things that Venezuela gets involved 

in. Frankly, one of the problems that we face is that you have a 

bit of a relationship or quite a relationship between Cuba and Venezuela at this point, which I think is a particular danger to the region. 

We have noted—for instance, I will give you an example of what 

I will call this inoculation strategy. In Nicaragua, it was very clear 

that support for Daniel Ortega, lining up with Aleman, was producing a situation in which the democratically elected Government 

of Nicaragua could not function and the fingerprints of others were 

on that situation. 

Bob Zoellick went to Nicaragua. We took some steps against 

some of the figures there with financial freezes and visa denials. 

And I think we have helped to begin to turn that situation around. 

It is not yet stable. But we have begun to turn it around. So sometimes, with us or with the OAS, it is intervening very directly to 

try to help a democratic government stabilize itself against that 

sort of outside pressure. 

Sometimes it is the Organization of American States helping in 

that process. And I think we do have a very good person in Mr. 

Insulza there who is an active secretary general of the Organization of American States in trying to create that. 

The best thing that we can do is to have an alternative, though, 

for these places that are vulnerable to this kind of particular brand 

of Latin American populism that has taken democratic states down 

the drain before. 

And so, when we were able to pass the Central American Free 

Trade Agreement, I think it made a huge difference to the stabilization of Central America. And hopefully we can continue and 

get free trade agreements with the Andean nations we are now 

working with, Peru, Colombia and others. 

Trade assistance, caring about the poor, the message has been a 

little bit sometimes just growth, not about the concerns of the poor, 

and so we are working to retool some of our programs to deal with 

the most vulnerable in health and education. 

I think these are answers to the Venezuelan Government. That 

and working with responsible governments, even responsible governments of the left, like the Brazilian Government or the Chilean 

Government, to try and counter these influences. We also have to 

raise the profile on some of the things that are going on in Venezuela. This kangaroo trial of Sumate is a disgrace. And just a couple of days ago, I was on the telephone with my European Union 

counterpart, the foreign minister of Austria, with the Spanish foreign minister, with the Brazilian foreign minister, saying, you really have to pay attention to what is going on here. We have to expose what is going on here. And indeed the European Union now 

has observers in that trial. I think we just have to let the world 

know what is going on. 

It has been useful that there is international support for this 

truckers union strike that is going on in Venezuela where I think 

labor could play—international labor—could play a role in exposing 

the pressures on free trade, union movements in the way that 

25

international labor did with solidarity in Poland. There are now 

people in Venezuela who need that help. So the international community has just got to be much more active in supporting and defending the Venezuelan people. 

Finally, as to Colombia, I know that we have had some small 

cuts. We do not believe that it will undermine the interdiction program that we are—that we have anticipated for Colombia. We work 

very closely with them. We are even in the process now of moving 

on to what the follow on to plan Colombia will be so that we don’t 

have a gap and so that we stabilize what, as you say, is a good, 

success story for what the Colombians have been doing. 

Obviously, it is a tough budget year. We have had to make 

some—but we really do believe that this is a program that is adequate to the task. 

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Faleomavaega of American Samoa. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Madam Secretary, I want to take you to the 

Pacific now. I just have two issues. I only have 5 minutes. And I 

will not even expect a response from you so all I need is a big yes 

nod that you are in a position to make the decision and dispense 

with these two issues very clearly and precisely, and I hope you 

will bear with me. 

Madam Secretary, I have approximately 20,000 United States 

citizens, United States nationals, living in my district who are married to citizens from other countries, the Independent State of 

Samoa. While citizen nationals enjoy unlimited right to travel to 

and from the United States, their spouses are not. I understand 

that it is a law that the visa applications apply—appear for both 

interview and biometrics in order to apply for a visa. My constituents and their spouses are burdened with a 3,400-mile, 7-hour 

flight to and from Auckland, New Zealand, and an air fair that 

averages over $1,500 with hotel expenses. And given these restrictions, it is more frustrating there is no guarantee whether that visa 

will be issued. It is my understanding, Madam Secretary, that we 

do have an Embassy in Apia, Samoa, that has been fully equipped 

to secure the necessary documentation as far as properly processing visa applications. And I would really appreciate your assistance in allowing an officer from our consular office out of Aukland, 

New Zealand, to come to Papua Samoa and to process the visa applications. And you can well understand and appreciate the burdensome—the financial burden it is causing my little district out 

there in the Pacific. 

Issue number two: Last week, a frontpage headline of the Washington Post stated, and I quote, ‘‘A lost world in Indonesia yields 

riches for scientists.’’ This frontpage article was about the discovery 

of an unknown region of rare plants, flowers and animals recently 

discovered in the province of West Papua New Guinea as part of 

Indonesia. Media outlets throughout the world were eager to give 

media coverage to this new discovery. No doubt this was an exciting scientific discovery in West Papua New Guinea. But I am deeply saddened, Madam Secretary, that the newly discovered plants 

and animals of West Papua New Guinea could be worthy of 

frontpage news and yet the plight and suffering of the indigenous 

people of West Papua New Guinea was totally ignored. The people 

of West Papua New Guinea, Madam Secretary, have struggled for 

26

some 40 years to seek their right of self determination from Indonesia’s brutal military rule. Yet their gut-wrenching cause rarely 

receives a note from our own Government, its former colonial ruler 

the Dutch, Australia, New Zealand and other Pacific and European 

domestic nations. 

Only a few weeks ago, Madam Secretary, on January 17, 43 West 

Papuan, seven of them are children, arrived on the shores of Australia to seek asylum. They had left their homes in West Papua 

New Guinea and sailed some 2,200 miles during a monsoon season 

in a small open boat; 43 Papuans fled a rapidly deteriorating 

human rights environment where the Indonesian military has committed human rights abuses and atrocities against the people of 

West Papua for decades. Yet no one would give heed to their suffering or plead their cause before the world community of nations. 

Madam Secretary, in 1969, 1,200 West Papuan elders, with the 

lives of their own families being threatened by the Indonesian military, were forced into voting supposedly while not surprisingly 

unanimously on behalf of some 1 million West Papuans to make 

West Papua at part of Indonesia. This Act of No Choice is generally 

regarded in the international community as a fraudulent tactic 

that was used by Indonesia’s military regime to claim control of 

West Papua. Last year, 37 Members of the Congressional Black 

Caucus and myself joined in calling on the United Nations’ review 

of the Act of No Choice that was forced upon the people of West 

Papua by President Suharto’s military regime. 

My colleague, Mr. Payne, and I have called about the African nations to request a United Nations General Assembly review of the 

Act of No Choice since the United Nations was involved. Secretary 

Kofi Annan informed us that should the Assembly decide to revisit 

this issue, he will do his utmost to implement the Assembly’s mandate. 

Madam Secretary, I plead with you again, the crisis in West 

Papua New Guinea will not go away. We need your help. I would 

repeat again that the issue of West Papua is not an internal matter 

for the Government of Indonesia to resolve given the historical evidence that clearly questions Indonesia’s claim of sovereignty over 

West Papua New Guinea. This said, Madam Secretary, I am hopeful that in the spirit of America’s great mission of diplomacy to end 

tyranny in our world that our Government will stand with the people of West Papua, and support their right to self determination, 

just as we gave East Timor a couple of years ago. Thank you, 

Madam. Just give me the nod, Madam Secretary. 

Secretary RICE. That would be dangerous, Representative. 

Let me address a couple of things. First of all, I will look into 

the visa issue that you raise. We have been trying to create visa 

policies that do take some of the load off people who are trying to 

get visas. I don’t know the specific case, but I will refer to our consular affairs people and ask for an answer, and we will get back 

to you. 

Of course, as you know, United States policy is that Papua is a 

part of Indonesia. We do, however, represent with Indonesia all the 

time the need for the sensitivity to and protection of people, of minorities within Indonesia and for significant autonomy for those 

27

populations. And so you can be sure that the issue is not off of our 

radar screen even though we may not agree on the same solution. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, Madam Secretary. 

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Smith of New Jersey. 

Mr. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I apologize, Madam Secretary, I didn’t get to hear your testimony. Sam 

Alito, who is actually from my home town of Hamilton, was being 

sworn in at 2:05, so I made my way over there for the historic investiture of a wonderful and very fine judge. So I apologize, I didn’t 

get to hear you. I do have 19 questions, like my friend from American Samoa, but I will collapse it to just a couple and submit the 

remainder for the record if I could. 

In Vietnam, where I was recently on a human rights trip, I met 

with Venerable Thich Quang Do and about 60 dissidents in Ho Chi 

Minh City, Hue and in Hanoi, including a cyber dissident’s wife. 

But also when I met with Venerable Thich Quang Do, who is under 

pagoda arrest, as you know, or house arrest as is Father Ly, I also 

met with Father Le Thanh Que. We had just gotten a report that 

the Venerable Thich Quang Do had been arrested. I would hope 

that the Department would, by any means possible, try to effectuate his release. He is, as you know the head of the Unified Buddhist Church of Vietnam, a wonderful man who uses the Internet 

and often finds his e-mails and the like are very severely curtailed. 

In regards to the push toward WTO extension by the Vietnamese 

while they are on CPC status, Country of Particular Concern, in 

my opinion it would be unconscionable for us to be collaborating 

with them to get the benefits of WTO while they are going in the 

opposite direction on religious freedom and are persecuting as 

never before. 

Secondly, yesterday we had a very extensive hearing on the 

abuse of the internet by China and by other repressive countries. 

I introduced the Global Internet Freedom Act of 2006, a comprehensive effort to try to mitigate this abuse and to at least stop 

the partnering of some corporations like Yahoo!, Cisco and others 

with the secret police in places like China. And I would hope that 

the Department could provide early recommendations for any 

changes or additions or deletions that you think are important 

when it comes to this. 

I applaud your Internet freedom effort that you announced earlier this week. And hopefully, that will come. I would say parenthetically that Ambassador Gross and Mr. Keith did a wonderful 

job yesterday at the hearing. So you might want to touch on that 

briefly. 

On trafficking, thank you for the fine job that you and the President and Ambassador Miller are doing on human trafficking. The 

signature of the President on the new bill I think will greatly take 

us to that next level. But you are doing a wonderful job. And I 

would hope that we continue and expand. I would ask you to take 

a look at Sudan, which is on the tier 2 watch list, but should be 

put back on tier 3. 

They have not lived up to some of the suggestions and some of 

the ameliorating actions that they said they would take. And they 

certainly are not looking at child slavery, which they have been acVerDate Mar 21 2002 16:22 Sep 12, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00031 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\FULL\021606\26078.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
28

cused of and I think they stand convicted of. North Korea, we 

haven’t accepted, to the best of my knowledge, a single person for 

refugee status. The human rights in North Korea bill, which Mr. 

Leach was the prime sponsor of, is a wonderful bill. I think it still 

awaits full implementation, and that goes to the issue of refugees. 

And finally, on the issue of Liberia, our Subcommittee, and I 

know the Full Committee and Members of Congress are very, very 

encouraged by your efforts to provide additional moneys to the 

newly elected President Johnson-Sirleaf, but anything further we 

could do collaboratively together to make sure that she succeeds 

and to ensure her protection. We are very concerned about other 

personal security. In 5 minutes, that is all we get to ask. 

Secretary RICE. Thank you very much. On Vietnam and religious 

freedom, we are working very hard, and we are trying to use the 

leverage of all that we are doing with Vietnam. The fact is that I 

will be in the region, of course, for the Asia regional forum some 

time this summer, and I am sure that if I were to go there, we 

would want to be in a better place than we are right now on 

human rights. Barry Lowenkron our Assistant Secretary For Democracy, was just there to have conversations—or will be there to 

have conversations. We want to push very hard on the religious 

freedom side. 

On the Internet, thank you for being supportive of the task force 

that we have put together. This is a new difficult area. I frankly 

think that the Chinese are going to have a very hard time trying 

to control the Internet. The fact is, it is a very special tool, but it 

is a very special tool that can promote democracy. And we recognize that. And we recognize how important it is that people who 

are on the Internet not somehow be persecuted for having been on 

the Internet. And we have seen those cases in China. And, we are 

working to develop policies that develop ideas so that we can be 

reasonable contributors to anything that we want to see going forward. I felt we needed to get organized inside the Department of 

State first. And so we will do that work, and we will do it quickly. 

Thank you for your comments on trafficking. Ever since the 

President put this on the agenda a couple of years ago with the 

United Nations, it has been a central issue for us. I do believe that 

we are doing a good job in calling these issues to attention. Countries don’t like to be in tier 2 or tier 3. That gives us a lot of leverage. And you can be certain that we will keep working it. And we 

will—I believe we are to review Sudan after a 6-month period, and 

so we will make that a serious review. 

Finally, on North Korea, we are very appreciative of the North 

Korea Human Rights Act. I think it is something that has brought 

to the fore the problems for human rights in North Korea and the 

fate and condition of the North Korean people. We have a human 

rights envoy now in, Jay Lefkowitz. As a matter of fact, I met with 

him just a couple of days ago. We are going to get him out more. 

One of the things we really need is, we need the rest of the international community to also pay attention to this issue. 

The EU has a human rights dialogue with North Korea that is 

largely moribund. And how they pursue that will matter to whether or not this becomes an issue. We have talked about this issue 

29

with South Korea, which has not always been an easy conversation. 

But the South Koreans of course do take the refugees. The Mongolians, we were just in Mongolia, and the Mongolians have been 

stalwart in refugees. 

We are reviewing our policies on refugees, reviewing them with 

DHS, reviewing them with the FBI, to see if we can find a way to 

participate in the refugee activities as well. 

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Payne of New Jersey. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much. 

Thank you, Madam Secretary. It is good to see you again, and 

all the hard work that you are doing well. 

Let me ask you about Sudan. We have indicated that with the 

Sudan Peace Act, South Sudan under the Government of Salva Kiir 

is supposed to be able to have—to not have restrictions on development and ESF funds. 

Now, Chairman Hyde’s Darfur Accountability Act, H.R. 3127 in 

the Senate passed legislation certainly even clarifies more what is 

meant by the Government of Sudan and the Government of Southern Sudan. But your State Department, continually indicates to us 

that they cannot operate and support officially South Sudan. And 

it seems that that is not in the spirit of the Darfur Peace Act. And 

so if that could be clarified, we would appreciate it because they 

tend to be confused. And it is actually restricting development in 

the south. 

As you know, they are supposed to have a referendum after 6 

years to decide whether the government will come together in unity 

or whether there will be two separate Sudans. So I think it is important to clarify that so that we can move forward. 

I would also like to ask that since we have the presidency of the 

Security Council with Ambassador Bolton, it may be an opportunity for us to do some bold statement on Darfur. It would appear 

to me that, you know, the African Union says they do not, since 

they are having difficulties with lack of funding for peacekeepers, 

that they were not opposed to the UN taking over. Of course they 

would like African Union troops to be integrated into the UN force. 

And so I think it would be a bold step if Ambassador Bolton would 

take a bold stand on the question. 

As you know, things are worsening in Darfur. The Government 

of Sudan is still encouraging the Janjaweed to kill and rape and 

maim. And so, if we could have a strong resolution and if the Chinese decide they want to veto it, then let them do it. Let’s expose 

them. Or let’s not use the excuse that China may not go along with 

it or Russia—China gets away with everything. And at some point, 

we have to start saying that the world is not run by China time. 

We have got to be able to say that we are tired of always coming 

out on the short end of the negotiations with China. 

And so I would hope that we would take advantage of that situation. And just finally, there is some of the people in State are starting to equate a small band of people who are fighting, who are freedom fighters, JEM and the SLA, who are in Sudan, who are protecting themselves against the Government of Sudan. And they are 

starting to equate this small group equal to the atrocities of the 

30

government. And I hope that we don’t do that. That is a dangerous 

thing. There is no comparison, as you know. 

Just to finally, in the Ethiopian-Eritrean situation. We have absolutely practically zero funding for Eritrea, even though we have 

had difficulties with the President of Eritrea. It would appear to 

me that it was Ethiopia that violated the borders agreement. And 

if we could somehow try to work with Eritrea. I think that the accord said that Badme belonged to Eritrea and that they were right. 

Ethiopia rejected it. We still have very strong relations with 

Ethiopia. But we have cut Eritrea off totally. I don’t think it is fair. 

I know they are both difficult to deal with. But I would hope that 

we could look at that. 

And also, finally, in Nairobi where the Somali legislature is attempting to come up with a government—as a matter of fact, there 

are about seven Americans who are a part of their national legislature. If we could at least have our Kenya Embassy—and they are 

asking if we could give them technical assistance or just recognize 

that they exist. Thank you very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Secretary RICE. Thank you, Congressman Payne. 

On the matter of being able to develop the south, we do believe 

that while we work on Darfur, we cannot let the Comprehensive 

Peace Agreement fail. And as you know, Salva Kiir was here just 

not too long ago, and Rebecca Gurang was just here. And of course, 

we want to develop the south. We do believe that there are restrictions currently on what we can do in the south because the restrictions apply to Sudan as a whole. But we are looking at that. We 

have got people looking intensively at what we can do. 

We are particularly concerned, for instance, about rail links and 

transportation links to be able to bring the country together. The 

transportation minister, Mrs. Gurang, described the problems of 

being unable to use mobility even for humanitarian means. And so 

I can—I will tell you, we will look very closely at it. We have already asked our lawyers and our experts to look very clearly at 

what can be done. And if we need to come back to you to get some 

dispensation, then I think we will do that. Because we don’t want 

the Comprehensive Peace Agreement to fail. 

We are very concerned about Darfur, particularly now with the 

threat of West Darfur and destabilization in Chad looming. We are 

looking very hard at what we can do to support the AMIS mission, 

the African Union Mission until we could get a blue-hatted mission, 

and we would hope during our presidency to be able to get a Security Council resolution for a UN mission. The holdup right now is 

that the African Union has not requested it. And people are resistant or reluctant to do so without African Union backing, given that 

they are still going to be the dominant part of the force. But we 

are working very closely with the AU to try to get this resolved because we would like to use our presidency to highlight the Darfur 

issue. 

We are also working in Abuja, directly in Abuja to try to bring 

rebels—and I don’t disagree about not getting into any kind of an 

equivalence between the rebels and the government, but we do 

need the rebels and the government to come to some kind of an 

31

agreement to form a basis on which you could, like the CPA, again 

to reintegrate west—to reintegrate Darfur into Sudan. 

On the matter of Ethiopia and Eritrea, we have been trying to 

work with both parties. Without determining who is or is not responsible for what happened, Assistant Secretary Jendayi Frazer 

went out to the region. She was ready to meet with the Eritreans. 

They weren’t quite ready. We are going to pursue it again because 

we believe that we can have an effect. 

As you know, we even appointed a U.S. envoy, General Fulford, 

to be someone who could go back and forth to work on this issue. 

We are working, for instance, to try to perhaps convene the committee of witnesses to try to restimulate discussion on both the 

grievances of Eritrea and Ethiopia. 

It is a complicated issue as you well know. But I just want you 

to know that it has very high-level attention. Assistant Secretary 

Frazer has it as a personal task which she is working. And you can 

be certain it will get full attention. 

And I will look into the Somalia issue. I am not familiar enough 

to comment. 

Chairman HYDE. Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. 

Madam Secretary, thank you for being such a wonderful spokesperson for the ideals that we hold as a country and that should be 

universally adopted as freedom and human rights, respect for the 

opinion of others and democracy. And few people who come into 

this hearing room get a spontaneous standing ovation. I think that 

says a lot for the respect that a lot of us give to you. 

I would like to ask you questions on three issues. The Palestinian Authority that you have heard a lot of discussion about in 

this Committee; secondly, the ‘‘wet-foot, dry-foot’’ policy for Cuban 

freedom seekers; and thirdly, the UN Human Rights Council. 

On the issue of direct aid and nonhumanitarian project assistance to the Palestinians, as you know, it is a grave concern to 

many of us in this Committee. Can you provide further details on 

the current status of our programs and our funding for the Palestinian territories? And I know that this has been a review that is 

underway. What is new with this review? 

Related to that issue, the United States courts have found that 

the Palestinian Authority has been responsible for the deaths of 

Americans through acts of terrorism sanctioned by the PA. The 

courts have actually issued judgments against the PA for over $100 

million to compensate to the victims’ families. Does the Administration intend to withhold funding for the PA to pay off these judgments? Are the efforts underway to execute the judgments using 

frozen Palestinian Authority assets? And those are my questions on 

the PA. 

Regarding the ‘‘wet-foot, dry-foot’’ policy for Cuban refugees, that 

remains in place. It was started by the Clinton Administration but 

has been carried over. As you pointed out in your opening statement, the word democracy cannot be used in the same sentence as 

Cuba. That is very well said. The Castro regime remains a gross 

violator of human rights, and he does practice torture against those 

who disagree with the regime’s policy. 

32

So this Clinton era policy appears to have been placed, to place 

the U.S. at odds with our international human rights obligations 

concerning torture and refugees. And most recently it resulted in 

a decision by our Government saying that the old 7-mile bridge located in my congressional district in the Keys, was not U.S. territory. And it means that they were sent back. 

I respectfully request that the Administration reconsider this 

failed policy that has cost so many lives and, specifically, those 15 

Cubans. 

And lastly, Madam Secretary, the UN Human Rights Council, I 

know that you have made this a priority, but there are some worrisome parts about it that I would like to raise with you: The lack 

of substantive criteria for membership on this new council; secondly, the proposed secret balloting, which combined with the two 

thirds or simple majority vote could actually keep the democracies, 

such as ours, off the new council while empowering rogue states. 

And if this proposal is adopted, we could have gone from bad to 

worse in our efforts to get true accountability for human rights violators. 

So I hope that the United States, and you especially, with Ambassador Bolton, are working closely with our democratic allies to 

prevent this travesty. So I wanted to know the current status of 

our efforts regarding the UN Human Rights Council. 

Thank you, Madam Secretary. 

Secretary RICE. Thank you very much. First, on the Palestinian 

Authority, let me restate very clearly that the United States considers Hamas a terrorist organization. That has not changed. And 

without a change in Hamas, it is not going to change. 

That means that the Palestinian—any Palestinian Government, 

whatever the outcome of the election has been, any Palestinian 

Government will have to meet what are now internationally established requirements. These are not the requirements of the United 

States. These were established by the Quartet. And these requirements include, at a very basic level, the recognition of Israel’s right 

to exist, the foregoing of violence, and disarming militias. These are 

the basics of being a peaceful and respectable government. 

And so we are reviewing our assistance. We are reviewing it really in three ways. First of all, we are reviewing to make certain that 

there is no funding that has already gone out that would be at risk 

if there is a change in government. And so we have said to the Palestinians, we want to be able to recover that money because we do 

not intend to have American dollars spent by Hamas Government. 

And so we put the Palestinian Authority on notice. 

We have also begun to review the whole wide range of our assistance programs. 

We want to be able to be responsive to very basic humanitarian 

needs of the Palestinian people. I really don’t want to see us not 

participate in programs for the immunization of Palestinian children. We have, I think, obligations to refugees who live in squalid 

conditions. And we do that through the United Nations agencies 

that we do this through, agencies like this, all around the world. 

So I am quite certain that we would be segregating those funds. 

But I just want to note that there are certain humanitarian concerns that we want to be attentive to. 

33

The third point that I would make is that we also are working 

very hard so that others will have similar policies because the 

Israelis have a right, I think, if they have good relations with a 

country, to expect that that country is not going to fund a government that is dedicated to the destruction of Israel. And so we have 

been working very hard with the international community. 

But we are reviewing these policies. We are reviewing the program. We will update you as that review goes. 

We are committed to continuing to fund the caretaker government until there is a Hamas Government. Israel also, as you know, 

has transferred tax revenues to that same government so I think 

there is also an international consensus about that. 

I recognize that there are claims. We have not, as a general matter, frozen assets to pay those claims. But we will have to see what 

comes of this as we look at the changing and different circumstances in the Palestinian territories. 

As to the immigration policies and the refugee policies and ‘‘wetfoot, dry-foot,’’ the goal here is to keep Fidel Castro from playing 

games with our refugee policy. And you know better than I, Congresswoman Ros-Lehtinen, that he has done it before and he will 

do it again. And so that is why we have had fairly restrictive policies of this kind. 

We recognize that Cubans are fleeing a terrible government. We 

have tried to be compassionate and humanitarian. I don’t know the 

details of the specific case in your district. But we will get back to 

you on that. 

Finally, on the Human Rights Council, absolutely, we want a 

human rights council that is not just a substitute for the old bad 

human rights commission where Sudan actually was a member at 

the time that it was committing genocide. It made no sense. 

We focused very much on—the two-thirds we think will work. I 

recognize the danger that you mentioned. But we think that the 

two-thirds will work. 

We also believe that we can look at the number, the total number, on the council. But what we must have are some criteria for 

who is on. And the criterion that we think is most appropriate—

it is actually a fairly simple criterion—if you are under a UN Security Council resolution for human rights abuses or for terrorism, 

you shouldn’t be on the Human Rights Council. We think this is 

kind of self-evident. 

But we are pressing this position with those who don’t think it 

is self-evident. We will see if we can come to some agreement. But 

I want to assure you that it is not the case that we want just any 

human rights council. We want one that is at least an improvement over the human rights commission. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. That you very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Sherman of California. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you, Madam Secretary. I have several 

questions I hope you will respond to for the record, and I will end 

with a question that I hope you can respond to orally. 

When you were last here last year, I asked you and your Department for suggestions on how to rationalize the reports that you 

have to furnish to Congress. I note that a couple of human rights 

34

reports are due pretty much right after each other. I was seeking 

to reduce the work load of the State Department and its personnel 

by asking for you to outline how Congress can change the deadlines 

for these reports and eliminate unnecessary and duplicative reporting. 

Surprisingly, over the last year, I haven’t heard from you. I am 

ready and charged to try to make life easier for your Department. 

Next, I hope that the United States will support Israel if it 

chooses not to support—turnover customs duties and taxes to a 

Hamas-led Government. You said that no country should be funding a government trying to destroy Israel. I think the one country 

that shouldn’t, that especially should not fund such a government 

is Israel. 

Next, the Administration has requested nearly 40 percent more 

military assistance for Azerbaijan than Armenia despite an informal agreement with Congress to maintain military aid parity between the two countries. This informal agreement was reached 

when we allowed the President to waive Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act which previously had prevented any military aid 

to Azerbaijan. 

In light of Azerbaijan’s President’s recent threats to resume war 

and in light of this informal agreement with Congress, I would 

hope that you would provide for military parity between the two 

countries. I note also that your request for economic aid to Armenia 

represents a one-third cut from what Congress provided for 2006. 

I am confident that Congress will provide as much in 2007 as we 

did in 2006, and I hope that you will be supporting that effort. 

Next, turning to a couple of organizations listed on the terrorist 

list that are not hostile to the United States or its allies. Congressman Tancredo and I wrote you on January 6th asking you to set 

forth a roadmap for the MEK to use in order to be taken off the 

foreign terrorist organizations list. 

The response was, the State Department doesn’t provide such 

roadmaps, and yet the State Department did in fact spell out the 

steps that should be taken by the IRA and the PLO when those organizations successfully got themselves off the terrorist list. 

I would point out that the LTTE is part of the peace process in 

Sri Lanka and so I would hope that you would once again consider 

issuing a roadmap to those two organizations. What should they do 

to get off the list? And in doing so, I think you could improve their 

behaviors substantially and perhaps they could—and given the fact 

that neither is hostile to the United States, and one has been very 

helpful to the United States, I think that that is an appropriate 

policy. 

As to Iran, I commend you for seeking to spend $75 million to 

aid democracy in broadcasting. Your request only requests money 

for government broadcasting, bureaucrats. I would hope that Congress would have some money for the private broadcasters who 

have proven their ability to generate a Farsi listening and viewing 

audience. 

Now, all this democracy effort is not a substitute for economic 

and diplomatic pressure. The Iranian people have to know that 

their government’s nuclear policy is hurting the country. And that 

is why I would hope that you would support not only a reauthorizaVerDate Mar 21 2002 16:22 Sep 12, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00038 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\FULL\021606\26078.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
35

tion of ILSA but making it more robust and the Administration enforcing it and action to prevent United States companies from 

doing business in Iran through their foreign subsidiaries. 

I hope that tomorrow you have a chance to call the World Bank 

and suggest that they not disburse money to Tehran until such 

time as the Security Council has a chance to review the situation. 

I would hate to give them a concessionary loan disbursement in 

February and then get sanctions against them in March. I hope 

you would ban non-energy imports from Iran as it is your right and 

the Administration’s right to do. 

And finally, I hope that you would hint to the Chinese that their 

access to our markets cannot be guaranteed if they thwart our efforts on Iran and nuclear weapons, particularly in the Security 

Council. 

The final question, the one I hope you can respond to orally, 

deals with the fact that one of the first acts taken by the Bush Administration upon taking office was to restore the so-called Global 

Gag Rule, which prohibits U.S. assistance to organizations which 

use their own money to provide abortion services or even to provide 

counseling about abortion. In his first interview after taking office 

as Secretary of State, your predecessor Colin Powell, said he opposed the Global Gag Rule. I wonder if you could tell us whether 

you are opposed personally to the Global Gag Rule or whether you 

are in favor of the current policy which, in effect, bans assistance 

to some of the world’s most effective family planning organizations. 

Secretary RICE. Thank you. I will, of course, respond to the questions that you put. We will get those to you, Congressman. Let me 

say on the one on rationalizing reports, though, we will get back 

to that rather quickly. That will make a lot of people in my building very happy. So we will work on that one with you. 

I support our policy on family planning. I think it is the right 

policy for our country. It is the President’s policy. It is not as if we 

don’t spend a lot of money on family planning. It is not as if we 

don’t spend a lot of effort on making available to people options for 

family planning. 

Indeed, if you look at our budget for family planning, it is a significant portion of, I think, the second largest account, for instance, 

within our child and health safety accounts. And so, I think we are 

doing a good job of providing those services to women and discharging our duties. But I fully support the policy. 

Mr. SHERMAN. I would point out that taxpayers——

Chairman HYDE. Gentleman’s time has long since expired. 

The gentleman from California, Mr. Rohrabacher. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much and welcome to Capitol Hill. You have done a great job, and we applaud you for that. 

We also applaud especially the President’s democracy initiative 

which you were playing such a important role in. I would suggest, 

and you don’t have to comment on this, but nothing would prove 

the sincerity of the President’s democracy initiative more than if 

some time during your tenure in office as Secretary of State that 

the world could see you in Burma beside Aung San Suu Kyi, if 

nothing else, that would be incredibly symbolic to the sincerity of 

our pro-democracy pro-human rights efforts. 

36

Second, another suggestion is Russia, of course, remains a pivotal country in charting the course for a more positive future, more 

stable future for that part of the world and for the entire world for 

that matter. 

I was just dismayed early on after the collapse of communism 

that Russia was frozen out of many of the markets, and they had 

many things to offer to the United States. They have been frozen 

out of those markets as well as around the world, then the West 

insisted that the Russians pay for the debt that was left them from 

the communist dictatorship that they had left behind. Those two 

things have had a tremendously negative impact on the Russian 

people. Well, I think it is time we should be working with Russia. 

And I know the President is trying to do this as much as he can, 

in cooperation to try to give carrots rather than just sticks to the 

Russian people and the Russian Government to do the right thing. 

One suggestion would be to—is General Atomics, a company in 

my State, California, has developed a new process for nuclear reactors that eats plutonium and will not produce anything that could 

help build a bomb. The Russian companies are in partnership with 

this American firm. We could offer to build a new nuclear plant for 

the Iranians with Russian help that could not in any way be used 

to create a bomb. And if the Iranians turned us down, they are exposed for exactly what their evil intentions are. 

Now to some questions. 

Opium production in Afghanistan. The two of us have spoken 

about this many times. Other people have spoken about it. It is 

reaching a crisis stage. It reached a crisis stage last year. And it 

still continues to grow. When will we be willing to use those tools 

that are available to us? They used to be classified. It no longer is 

classified, there is a potential micro herbicide that could destroy 

that crop in a very quick way. I understand that the State Department isn’t even using the funds to do scientific research on that 

micro herbicide. We need to have some action on opium production 

in Afghanistan. And if that herbicide offers us a way to get rid of 

it, we should do so and then try to help the Afghans build their 

economy. 

Finally, here we are in the middle of this struggle for democracy, 

and Iraq is straining our resources. Our troops are exhausted. They 

are spread too thin. But we have a noble goal in mind, which is 

building democracy in the Middle East as a shining example to the 

Muslim world, but we need to be responsible and do things in an 

appropriate way. 

There is one thing that could add tremendously to our effort in 

the sense that we have our troops that are spread so thin. I think 

we still have 1,700 troops in Kosovo after a decade. There is no excuse for us not to have moved on that situation and corrected it. 

They have an elected system in Kosovo. It could be—they will 

never be ready for independence if they are not now. 

We have with us today somewhere, even in this room or the next 

room, the foreign minister of Albania who has suggested that if we 

can end this situation in Kosovo, get these people the right to vote 

and have a democratic government, which is what they want, Albania will dramatically increase their troops, their troop level to Iraq, 

which they already have committed troops to Iraq. Thus we could 

37

eliminate the troops we need to have in Kosovo and have more support. 

And plus these are Muslim countries. So why aren’t we taking 

advantage of this? Why are we sitting back afraid to take any action because something might go wrong in Kosovo while it has such 

a detrimental impact on our overall effort? And that is my question. Thank you very much. 

Secretary RICE. Thank you. Well, on Kosovo, we are in fact now 

really stepping up our activities, our diplomatic efforts to try and 

resolve Kosovo. I think this would have been, Congressman, really 

the right criticism 6 or 7 months ago. I felt myself that we were 

not active enough on Kosovo. 

And in fact, we had some discussions within NATO with our colleagues, and I had some discussions in the EU; we all agreed that 

this is an issue that has got to be resolved one way or another. 

The UN has appointed a very experienced envoy, Mr. Albert 

Rohan, and we have, the United States, also, appointed an envoy, 

Frank Wisner, to really now go out and take on this issue and see 

if we can get it resolved. 

It obviously has very important implications for the future of 

Serbian Montenegro. It has very important implications for the future of Albania. It is a big issue. And I don’t mean to suggest that 

it can be resolved easily. But we are now, I think, on course. Nick 

Burns, the Under Secretary, and Dan Fried, the Assistant Secretary, spent a great deal of time on this over the summer months 

to try to put us in a position to really now launch a major diplomatic effort to see if we can resolve it. 

I think it is in that context that we want to think about our troop 

contribution because we said that we would be a part of this 

KFOR, in together, out together. Obviously, we can even make 

some adjustments. The military committee of NATO has even suggested some adjustments to the posture as it is there now. And we, 

the United States, want to support that. 

But there is a lot of activity now on Kosovo, and hopefully, we 

can bring it to some resolution. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. You don’t have to answer about the opium, 

but you know we are concerned about it. Thank you very much. 

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Engel of New York. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And Madam Secretary, thank you for yours and the President’s 

principled and strong support for the state of Israel and strong 

stand on the Iranian nuclear issue. I think it is very important. There is, in the 2007 budget, $150 million for aid for the West 

Bank and Gaza. And I want to just identify myself with all the concerns that were raised before me about any money going to a 

Hamas-led Government. 

I thank you for that. 

I was the author of the Syria Accountability Act which you mentioned in your testimony. And it has been a useful tool, as you said, 

to go over after the Syrian bad guys. I am wondering if you could 

tell us, why hasn’t the Administration implemented all of the act? 

There is still pieces of the act that still can be implemented. 

And I want to call to your attention that there are a number of 

Lebanese who are apparently in Syrian prisons and who we are 

38

trying to make an issue because the international community has 

not really made that any kind of an issue. And I want to highlight 

it. And so I am wondering if you can look into that as well. 

I want to commend Mr. Rohrabacher for his excellent statement 

on Kosovo. And I want to commend you for your excellent answer 

on Kosovo. I just got back from President Rugova’s funeral. I have 

been to Kosovo many times, and President Rugova was a personal 

friend of mine. And I agree with your analysis that, 6 or 7 or 8 

months ago, that would have been a fair thing to say. I am glad 

that the Administration is finally engaged and engaged in the right 

way. 

I think that there will not be progress in Kosovo unless the 

United States is very much engaged, and I know with Mr. Wisner 

and others, I hope that we can push the issue and have a timetable 

for final status negotiations and not let this drag on indefinitely. 

I am a strong supporter of independence for Kosovo because I believe that once the former Yugoslavia broke up and other components of it were allowed to become independent, I don’t think the 

people of Kosovo can ever be governed by Belgrade again given the 

history. And so I think independence makes a lot of sense. 

And as you know, the Albanians are very pro-American, the 

Kosovo Albanians and the Albanian Albanians, and I think they 

rely on us to look after their interests. And so I hope the Administration would take a pro-independence position as the only viable 

future for Kosovo and that we would push a final status and negotiations, and we need to be involved. 

And finally, I, this morning, voted as the Ranking Member on 

the Western Hemisphere Subcommittee. And I just wanted to, 

since we are talking about budget, when we look at the proposed 

fiscal year 2007 budget for Latin America, the budget proposes 

slashing spending in Latin America and the Caribbean across the 

board with two exceptions. That is the HIV/AIDS program and 

funding for projects in three of the CAFTA countries. But given 

that 25 to 40 percent of the region’s population still toils in grinding poverty, it is very difficult I think to justify a third consecutive 

year of drastic cuts in core developmental accounts for countries in 

Latin America and the Caribbean. We have seen the votes in Haiti, 

for instance. And it gives us hope. And you mentioned Haiti in 

terms of democracy. The budget proposes, decreasing core development assistance to Haiti by approximately 20 percent. 

The true contributing countries to Haiti, of which we are not, depend on us, because they believe that we and other donors will provide the developmental assistance that is necessary to establish the 

foundations for democracy and a lasting peace in Haiti. So I would 

hope that, you know, we would honor our commitment to this 

peacekeeping mission, but it is hard to do it if we eviscerate our 

development programs in the country. 

Same thing with Bolivia. We have this new fellow Morales there 

who spews anti-American rhetoric. Cutting developmental programs in the country, in Bolivia, along with counter narcotic and 

other assistance packages, seems to me, is going in the wrong direction. So I was wondering if you could comment on that as well 

and the other things as well as and the Syrian accountability and 

Hamas. 

39

Secretary RICE. Thank you very much. 

On Hamas, let me just underscore our determination on this 

issue. Because foreign—we had requested the money for the West 

Bank and Gaza in anticipation of being able to work with a Palestinian Authority that was dedicated to peace. If there is a Palestinian Government that is not dedicated to peace and not dedicated 

to the right of the partner in peace to exist, then foreign assistance 

makes no sense in that context. 

And so our goal is to remain firm on that, recognizing the humanitarian needs, as I mentioned, but to remain firm and to try 

to get others to remain firm as well. 

And let me say, you know, I have seen stories that it is punishment somehow. This is not the issue. The issue is that it is simply 

not practical to support a government that is dedicated to violence 

and dedicated to the destruction of one of our best allies. It simply 

isn’t going to happen. And so I just want to underscore that. 

The Syrian Accountability Act is a very important tool. And I 

have had a chance to thank you before, Congressman Engel, for 

your work in that. We have used a great deal of it. We have designated some other individuals just a little while ago. There are a 

couple of pieces that we think might actually be more effective if 

we can get some multilateral support. 

And so, we have been working, in a sense holding our peace, to 

try to see if we can get some more multilateral support. But we intend to use the Syrian Accountability Act and use it to its fullest. 

As to Western Hemisphere, it has indeed been a difficult budget 

year. And we have had to make some difficult decisions. But first 

of all, the commitment to the Western Hemisphere, it is our neighborhood. We have to be committed to it. And it is a neighborhood 

that is experiencing difficulty with many of the fragile democracies 

in the region. I had dinner just a couple of nights ago with the foreign ministers of Colombia, El Salvador, Mexico and Panama. They 

wanted to come and talk about their region and talk about how we 

might band together to support some of the fragile democracies 

since those are all stronger democracies. And so we are working in 

that way. 

Some of the change in our request, indeed, while development assistance has been reduced, it reflects in part a refocus of that assistance to certain target countries; it reflects that there is a shift 

from some middle-income countries. It also reflects that we—while 

we do not substitute Millennium Challenge Assistance funding for 

development assistance, sometimes there is overlap. With Nicaragua and Honduras we have sizable Millennium Challenge compacts now that we have signed. We anticipate probably being able 

to do the same with El Salvador in the near future. 

If you look only at development assistance, I think it is possible 

to miss that we also have increased the economic support funding 

for El Salvador and Guatemala and the Dominican Republican in 

this same period of time. 

So I am not taking issue, Congressman, with the fact that we 

have had to make some cuts in development assistance, but I think 

that we are balancing these programs in a way to maintain a commitment to the needs of these countries, to fund through ESF, 

which provides for the more flexible budget support, for instance, 

40

funding that they can use and to begin to work on these Millennium Challenge compacts which are sizable and transformational 

efforts in these countries. 

The final point on Haiti, we had a commitment of $400 million 

to Haiti. This budget allows us to make that commitment. But as 

I said when I was asked this in another Committee, we do now 

have a newly elected government in Haiti that will hopefully bring 

a period of stability to Haiti. We are very supportive and supporting the peacekeeping mission. The core groups meets frequently of which we are a member, and we are active in that. But 

as the government develops now, I think we will want to look at 

what we need to do to support Haiti. This is a chance for a country 

that has had too few chances, and I think you will see that we will 

be looking at what resource needs we have for Haiti as this new 

government gets up and running. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you. 

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Royce of California. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Madam Secretary, as you know, there are a number of Members 

of Congress that have been quite concerned about the actions taken 

by the former President of Liberia Charles Taylor and, of course, 

the Special Court in Sierra Leone. He faces trial there for crimes 

against humanity. I think all of us remember the testimony we 

have seen here before this Committee of young children without 

ears, without arms, all victims of Taylor. 

I think that trying Charles Taylor is not only an issue of justice, 

it is also really about ending an era of unaccountability in international relations where a head of state can undertake these acts. 

But in addition to that, it is also practical because while he is harbored in Nigeria, Mr. Taylor continues, frankly, to make phone 

calls and to conspire, and I believe that if he is not tried, he will 

eventually, as he has said he is going to do, return to Liberia to 

knock down everything the international community and you have 

done to try to rebuild that country. 

My concern is this: The Court’s mandate is soon to expire, so 

time is going to run out on bringing him to justice. I have asked 

Liberia’s new President that we expect her to turn over Taylor. 

This is certainly what civil society has asked her to do. We are 

waiting for her words and then for their President to act. 

Frankly, there hasn’t always been a unified message on this. I 

know you represented our country at the inauguration in January, 

an event Americans should be very, very proud of given the role 

Americans have played in helping Liberia and in stabilizing Liberia. But Taylor is looming, so I would like to ask your thoughts on 

bringing him to justice. 

Secretary RICE. Well, as you know, Congressman, we believe 

very strongly that he ought to be brought to justice, and that he 

ought to be brought to justice as soon as possible. We will work 

with all parties concerned to see that happen. He is a danger. He 

needs to be brought to justice, as you said, not just for reasons of 

reconciliation and justice, but because we don’t want him in a capacity or capability to come back. And so I think there is a very 

strong interest, and there should be a very strong interest, in the 

Liberian Government, also the African States that helped to arVerDate Mar 21 2002 16:22 Sep 12, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00044 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\FULL\021606\26078.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
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range his ouster to see this resolved. And so you can be sure that 

it is the policy of the United States to pursue that. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Madam Secretary. I will also mention we had $13 million mandated for the Special 

Court. We do not want to see some of that money reprogrammed. 

I will make that point again. 

And I am going to ask the Chairman, I have got a question on 

a program designed to keep terrorists from acquiring shoulder-fired 

missiles. I would like to submit that for the record if I could, and 

then close with my thoughts on Sudan. 

Because the President and you have made it clear that you intend to use the UN Security Council meeting that the United 

States has this month, and I am going to commend you for this, 

with the intent and purpose of passing a resolution to transfer security and peacekeeping responsibilities in Darfur from the African 

Union forces there to a UN force likely with a proactive chapter 7 

mandate, and I wanted to share with you I think that increased 

mandate is going to do a lot for deterrence. 

I, along with Congressman Diane Watson, made a trip to Darfur, 

Sudan. We had an opportunity to meet with AU forces, which told 

us about their limited size and mandate. They took us through a 

village that had been attacked. They observed that, frankly, the 

plan that you are orchestrating is the right one. If the Security 

Council acts, an additional 10,000 troops may be put under UN 

command, and 5,000 troops may become active in southern Sudan 

to bring up the force level there. All of that will not only deter attacks, but also deter the Sudanese Army, which often participates 

in those attacks. We saw direct evidence of that from children who 

drew us accounts of bombings and military personnel that have 

participated on the ground along with being attacked. 

I would also close with the concern we had. The hotelier who 

saved so many people was with us on that trip. As you know, he’s 

become quite an outspoken voice for human rights. And one of the 

things that lately happened, there was an attempt on his life in 

Belgium, and recently I talked with him and he shared with me 

about—concerns about some comments that I have seen on the 

wire, comments made by the Government of Rwanda in which they 

have threatened him. Anything we can do in the United States to 

convince the Rwandan Government to back off and just allow this 

man to speak his mind would be very much in the interest——

Chairman HYDE. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Meeks of New York. 

Mr. MEEKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Great to see you. 

Let me ask you a few quick questions, if you will, first dealing 

with the Western Hemisphere. I know in your statement you 

talked about democracies moving in the great divide that we have 

here and how people came to vote for the first time in large numbers. Having been one who listened to your testimony in regards 

to Venezuela, but being at the recall election and seeing the long 

lines of individuals there waiting to vote and get elected, and then 

looking at a number of elections in the Western Hemisphere the 

next few years, Brazil, Mexico, Colombia, Nicaragua, it seems to 

me with few exceptions it is likely the voters across the region will 

42

elect progressive governments that are apt to challenge and more 

readily disagree with the Washington consensus. 

My question then is what will and how does the Administration 

intend to deal with that trend that seems to be moving rapidly in 

the Western Hemisphere; more particularly Bolivia and dealing 

with Evo Morales? 

There are various questions whether or not he has talked about, 

for example, eliminating cocaine, but the legal cultivation of coca, 

how are we going to deal with that? Do we think he is being honest 

with that and continue to work with them on cocaine interdiction, 

that whole piece, or are we going to let the same kind of isolation, 

I guess, that we have or tried to have with Venezuela to also happen with some of these other countries that are being developed? 

Lastly I am concerned in dealing with Colombia. When I look at 

Colombia and the paramilitary demobilization of Colombia, there 

have been many come to my office that have been concerned, saying that—many are concerned the demobilization process is failing 

to dismantle the paramilitaries, and argue that less than one weapon has been turned in for every two paramilitaries who demobilize. 

And they point out that the current process does little to ensure 

that these groups cease drug trafficking, violence against political 

opponents and other crimes. I want to know does the State Department share that concern? 

Finally, in Colombia the other piece that I observed, there is over 

3 million people who have lost their land from political violence. 

Many were forced off by these same paramilitaries. And part of 

what the agreement was, was for them to have virtually no jail 

time or repercussion was that they were to turn back over some of 

this land. 

I want to know if the State Department and the United States 

is going to help to ensure that there is return of the land so the 

people who have been displaced have an opportunity to get back. 

Lastly, my concern is also the plight of Afro descendants and the 

indigenous people. They are the poorest of the poor. Many places, 

no potable water. There is a strong need for support for capacity 

building, infrastructure building, and what, if anything, is the 

State Department doing with regard to the plight of African Colombians throughout the region? 

Secretary RICE. Thank you. First of all, on the governments that 

are coming to power, I think we have to be very clear that a freely 

elected government, we are not going to say that if it is from the 

left, the United States can’t deal with it. And so the issue is not 

whether a government is left or right, it is whether it governs 

democratically once it is in power. 

We have reached out to Mr. Morales. In fact, the President called 

him to congratulate him upon his election. And so we have tried 

to leave an opening there to work with Bolivia, and we will hope 

to be able to work with Bolivia. 

Statements about coca and coca production are problematic because we believe trying to wipe out the drug trade in the Andean 

region has been one of the strongest and most important elements 

of our policy for a long time, dating back a couple of Administrations now, and we want to see that continue. 

43

But I can assure you that we are not failing to reach out to new 

governments as they come into power in Latin America. It does 

mean that we recognize that—one of the things that we talked 

about when we were recently at a meeting in Monterrey is that 

perhaps the need to speak more forcefully about governments’ responsibility not just to macroeconomic stability, which tends to be 

the way that the Washington consensus is viewed, but also to social welfare, to health for the people, education for the people, that 

that needs to be a part of our dialog with these countries as well. 

And I think you would see that, for instance, through the work 

that we are doing in the Millennium Challenge Compact, in places 

like Nicaragua and Honduras. There is a very strong emphasis on 

the antipoverty measures as well as progrowth, really trying to 

give people a way out of poverty. 

We have teaching centers of excellence to train teachers. We are 

going to have to make clear to people that this has been a very important part of our policy, but perhaps has gotten lost in the rhetoric about macroeconomic stabilization. 

In terms of the Colombians, they have made an awful lot of 

progress in a real short period of time. If you think about just 4 

or 5 years ago, this was a country where bombs went off all the 

time in Bogota; where people were afraid to leave their homes; 

where paramilitary forces were growing, not being demobilized. 

And, yes, it is not perfect, Congressman Meeks. I would be the first 

to say there are things about the demobilization law we would prefer to see somewhat tougher. But when countries are trying to 

come out of what in effect was, if not a civil war, a very, very tough 

insurgency and trying to fight terrorism and trying to find a point 

of reconciliation between the various parts of the country, I think 

we owe them some leeway to do that. 

What we can do is to be vigilant about how this is being carried 

out, and in that way I think we are being vigilant. Our Ambassador Wood works very hard on these demobilization issues. We 

said to the Colombians they have got more work to do on the 

human rights side with the paramilitaries. 

So it is something we are very vigilant about, but I think they 

have done a remarkable job about finding a point at which reconciliation can begin. 

Finally, as to Afro descendants, I agree with you, I think this 

also has to be a part of our discourse with these countries. It 

should not be left to populists who might be irresponsible with the 

issue, especially as a country that ourselves is made up of diverse 

peoples. When I was in Brazil, I was sharing with my Brazilian 

counterparts the fact that Brazil’s makeup is more like the makeup 

of the United States than any other country in the world. I have 

said to my counterpart, who wants me the next time to go to the 

Afro-Brazilian parts of Brazil, I would love to do that because I 

think these are connections that we have with Latin America as a 

multicultural society to encourage them to support and to admire 

their own multicultural heritage and to do something for Afro descendants. 

I will tell you one of the things I have said to our folks as we 

are doing exchange programs and students visitor programs, we 

need to reach out beyond the normal channels that might produce 

44

exchange students to the United States that would not have indigenous or Afro descendant populations represented. I think the 

United States can do a lot to reach out to these people, too, and 

we are trying to do that. We just recently had a group of Brazilian 

students who were going to go all over the country, live in Iowa 

and Nebraska and Texas and Louisiana, and I was pleased to see 

that a number of them were Afro descendants in Brazil. 

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Chabot of Ohio. 

Mr. CHABOT. Madam Secretary, we appreciate the outstanding 

job that you have been doing representing our Nation around the 

world at this very critical time in our Nation’s history, so thank 

you. 

I want to begin by addressing an issue that I have been involved 

in for many years now, that of international parental child abduction. We have discussed this in the past. We have discussed one of 

the most egregious cases involving an American citizen, Corrina 

Sylvester, who, when barely a year old, was kidnapped by her 

mother and taken to Austria where she remains today. That was 

more than 10 years ago. 

Since that time her long-suffering father Tom has played by all 

the rules. He sought and won orders in the Austrian courts for return of his daughter, including an affirmation by the Austrian Supreme Court. He has won a judgment in the European Court of 

Human Rights, which determined the government violated the 

human rights of both Tom and his daughter when it failed to enforce an Austrian court order that she be returned to the United 

States. That same court determined Tom Sylvester’s human rights 

were violated when Austria failed to provide a fair and speedy 

trial. 

He has met with and gained the support of two of your predecessors, Secretary Albright and Secretary Powell. You were made 

aware of the case, and you were very helpful in getting our message to the Austrian officials. Attorney General Ashcroft raised the 

case in Vienna. I have gone to the Hague to discuss the case with 

the Austrian Central Authority there and recently discussed it with 

the Austrian Chancellor. Even the President of the United States 

has addressed the case with the Austrian Ambassador. But today 

he remains in Cincinnati, hoping and praying the phone will ring 

and that he is finally going to be reunited with his daughter. 

We appreciate the work done by the State Department officials 

there. Ambassador Maura Hardy has been a great advocate for 

Tom and regularly in touch with me and my office. We very much 

appreciate the help we have received from you and your predecessors. But it seems to me that we have got to take a new look 

at this case. However sincere, our efforts have failed. Tom Sylvester spends every day of his life trying to figure out how he can 

make a life with his daughter while the Austrian Government arrogantly thumbs its nose on international law. 

I am at a loss, Madam Secretary. It is clear that the Austrian 

Government isn’t fazed by Tom Sylvester’s suffering or our frustration and anger. So perhaps it is time for Congress to address this 

case specifically, not a general resolution on parental child abduction as we have done in the past, but a resolution that addresses 

this particular case. I am quite certain that I would find a pretty 

45

receptive committee and a pretty receptive House. I would be 

happy to hear any suggestions or guidance you might want to offer, 

and I hope we are able to get together soon with Mr. Sylvester to 

discuss this further. 

In the time I have got left, let me address one other issue, the 

cross-strait relations in the Taiwan Straits and our Government’s 

role. I happen to be one of the Co-Chairman of the Congressional 

Taiwan Caucus. 

I have got a cartoon which I believe came from the Taipei Times. I am sorry, I don’t have a better production or larger. It shows a 

haggard-looking fellow labeled Taiwan who is trying to extricate 

himself from a body of water because he is being approached by a 

shark, which is labeled China, and he has being greeted by a large 

and menacing Uncle Sam, who appears to be holding a baseball 

bat, and Uncle Sam is saying, ‘‘Get back in there, we don’t want 

to alter the status quo.’’

I use this cartoon as an illustration of the frustration that I am 

sure Taiwan’s leaders must be feeling, and, frankly, the same frustration I am feeling. It seems that every time the democratically 

elected President opens his mouth, we read reports about consternation at the State Department and ominous quotes about 

their attempt to change the status quo with its neighbor the People’s Republic of China. 

Most recently, I understand, the State Department was concerned about their President’s decision to abolish the National Unification Council, which is a relic of the days which unification with 

China was advocated by the Taiwanese Government. They spend 

about US$31.00 a year. 

What I do think is dangerous is the ever-growing arms buildup 

at the PRC. They have 784 missiles directed at Taiwan, and they 

increase that by about 100 per year, and they recently passed an 

antisecession law. Those, I think, are threats to the status quo. 

I will admit I am not a fan of the One China policy, and I think 

it is dangerous to pursue a policy that favors a dictatorship that 

continues to threaten war with Taiwan and has gained a reputation as one of the world’s leading weapons proliferators. 

I know the State Department’s position on the One China policy, 

but I wonder if the signals our diplomats are sending out to the 

world could be a little more balanced, and I would seek your comments. 

Secretary RICE. Thank you. 

On the case that you mentioned, the abduction case that you 

mentioned, of course we have worked very, very hard, we continue 

to work hard, with the Austrian Government. It is in their courts. 

But, of course, we are always open to discussing the case with you 

further, and if at some point it makes sense for me to meet with 

the gentleman, I am also happy to do that. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much. 

Secretary RICE. The question of Taiwan, of course, does arise in 

the context of the policy that we have pursued now for many Administrations, a policy that does recognize that there is one China, 

but has tried also to make space for Taiwan in international organizations and international groupings. We have been very strong 

advocates of having Taiwan in the World Health Organization. We 

46

have insisted that Taiwan continue to be a part of the economic 

parts of APEC. I think we have tried to give Taiwan space to be 

active in international politics. 

We have also been very clear that we have obligations under the 

Taiwan Relations Act to help Taiwan defend itself, and therefore 

I have proposed that there are things that could be done for modernization of Taiwanese forces with the help of the United States. 

We haven’t always gotten, Congressman, a particularly satisfactory 

response on the Taiwanese side to issues about defense modernization, but we have been prepared to discharge our duties in that regard. 

The fact is that we believe that the best course is to have a situation in which neither side tries to change the status quo unilaterally. We also believe that the Chinese should not provoke Taiwan, 

and we have been very clear to them on the same count. And so 

while I understand that you have differences with the policy, I 

think the United States Government is carrying out the policy in 

a way that is, we believe, consistent with our interests, but also 

consistent with our values in trying to support Taiwan’s democracy, 

to give it room and space within the international community, to 

give it a way to engage the international community, and to do 

that within the context of this policy. 

Chairman HYDE. Ms. Lee of California. 

Ms. LEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Good to see you, Madam Secretary. Thank you for being so generous with your time today. 

Let me first talk about Haiti and ask a question. Once again the 

Haitian people have elected a President, and they have once again 

demonstrated their true commitment to democracy. Now, as the 

New York Times reported on January 29th, this article revealed 

what many of us have believed all along, that there have been actually external forces destabilizing Haiti. 

Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask for unanimous consent to 

place this article into the record. 

Chairman HYDE. Without objection, so ordered. 

Ms. LEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

This report described how the United States Ambassador at that 

time was consistently undercut by the International Republican Institute, the IRI, which receives funding from not only the State Department and USAID, but corporations like Halliburton and others. 

It also talked about the closeness of the White House and how it 

attempted to undercut the Ambassador in carrying out a fairer policy toward Haiti in terms of a policy of engagement. 

So I just wanted to ask you, and I know we disagree on this, but 

what and how do you see now our relationship with Haiti? Do you 

intend to have two separate channels of engagement, one an official 

one, another what I consider a covert one? Again, I hope we don’t 

do this, but I am concerned that the United States might once 

again try to undermine democracy in Haiti, and I think, again, this 

article really reveals quite factually what took place. 

The second question I would like to ask is about Cuba. Again, I 

know we disagree on the long-term blockade and its benefits, but 

I have been contacted by a variety of religious institutions, and we 

have written you a letter about this, and they had previously reVerDate Mar 21 2002 16:22 Sep 12, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00050 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\FULL\021606\26078.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
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ceived licenses to allow them just to travel to Cuba to develop and 

maintain relations with their church counterparts there. Now they 

are suddenly being denied their licenses for reasons that I quite 

simply don’t understand. These groups include mainstream religious organizations. Let me just list some of these: The Alliance for 

Baptists, the United Methodist Church, Evangelical Lutheran 

Church in America, Church World Service, Presbyterian Church of 

America, and the United Council of Churches of Christ in the 

United States of America. 

To me this is quite reminiscent of the 2004 crackdown on the 

American educational exchange program. The collective impact of 

the denial of these licenses is to really interfere with and impede 

the establishment of long-term relationships, between national 

churches and their local congregations, as well as to significantly 

limit the scope of church-to-church relations between churches in 

the United States and churches in Cuba. 

These are serious restrictions, I believe, on the work of these 

churches. Whatever the relations—and, again, as I said, I don’t 

agree with United States policies toward Cuba, but that is not an 

issue here, I don’t think. Whatever our relations are with Cuba, we 

shouldn’t be taking measures that redefine denominational structures and interactions between the United States and which also 

restrict religious freedom and harm relationships between churches 

in both countries. 

So I would like to know why the United States religious organizations are being attacked really by the State Department in terms 

of preventing the historical ties that they have heretofore benefited 

from, really. 

Finally, I just want to find out, given some of the most recent 

statements in terms of Darfur, what is happening in terms of our 

position that genocide is occurring in Darfur. Are we still moving 

forward on everything that it takes to implement all of the actions 

that need to be implemented as a result of the declaration of genocide, or have we actually backed off of that declaration now? 

Thank you again, Madam Secretary. 

Secretary RICE. Thank you, Congresswoman Lee. 

It is our view that genocide was committed and, in fact, continues in Darfur, and we are doing everything that we can to deal 

with the impact of this government on—of the situation in Darfur 

on the helpless people of Darfur, whether it is humanitarian work, 

to the crisis with the rebels, or trying to get a more active international security presence there through a UN security force. So 

we are extremely active, but our policy on this has not changed. 

On Cuba, I will have to look at the specific case. I have to say 

that I have not—did not know about specific cases of licensing. I 

will say that I don’t think that there is anything that passes for 

religious freedom in Cuba, and so the notion that somehow our 

churches going there are contributing to religious freedom in a 

place where religious freedom is so clearly denied, I think I would 

question the premise. 

But I am happy to look into the premise of what we are not licensing now that we were licensing in the past. It is true that we 

are trying, through tighter restrictions on licensing of travel, to 

make it more difficult for the regime to skim sources which it can 

48

then use to continue to oppress its people, which is precisely what 

happens. But I am happy to get back to you with the specific answer on this case. 

As to Haiti, Congresswoman Lee, I simply have to say that I 

don’t agree with the premise that the United States was somehow 

trying to undermine democracy in Haiti, because the United States 

Government was demanding of the Aristide Government to do the 

things that he agreed to do when the last Administration went out 

of its way and took great risks to return him to power. There were 

eight points that he was supposed to follow, and he wasn’t following any of them. 

It was the obligation of the United States to worry then about 

the fate of the Cuban people. The kind of nongovernmental organizations, IRI, or NDI or others, they work worldwide, and around 

the world they are known to be organizations that work in political 

party—helping political parties to be built not with regards to specific parties, but the process of building political parties; that carry 

out seminars on the education of people in democratic processes, 

that help train election workers. I mean, they build the foundation 

to—sort of the infrastructure of democracy. That is what they do. 

Now, I do know that in some places when they do that, there are 

governments that say the that they are interfering with their governments. And it wouldn’t be the first place that a Haitian Government might say that because we have heard that in a lot of other 

places. Congressman Lantos was just talking about the nongovernmental organization law in Russia. I don’t think we ever want to 

get to the place that we brand our own nongovernmental institutions that are really trying just to build the infrastructure of democracy as somehow undermining democracy because they are 

helping to build opposition and helping to build institutions that 

are not in the pocket of the government. And sometimes that is the 

charge. 

Now, I can’t speak to Ambassador Curren. I don’t think I ever 

met him, but I can tell you that at the time the United States Government worked with the international community to give the Haitian people a chance after the Aristide regime had sent thugs into 

the street to burn down police stations and Port-au-Prince was in 

flames, a good thing was done for the Haitian people, and it came 

out that a good thing was done for the Haitian people when they 

just conducted the elections they had. 

We are going to work with this new government. We want this 

government to succeed. We have—as I said earlier, we are going 

to work to see what other resources we may need to support this 

government, because its in our interest that there be a democratic 

Haiti and a Haiti that is stable and starting finally to move toward 

prosperity. 

So I think the United States over the last several years, and I 

would count here not just this Administration, but the Clinton Administration as well, has had a good record of trying to help the 

people of Haiti get out of the desperate circumstances in which 

they live. 

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Paul of Texas. 

Mr. PAUL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and welcome, Madam Secretary. 

49

I want to make one quick comment about the question asked you 

by the gentleman from New York regarding Israel. And he seemed 

not to be happy with your answer, that there was a slight qualification, which certainly I thought was justifiable. 

I think the problem with a question like that is it is misdirected. 

It is assumed that this is a question that should be asked the Administration or one individual, but there was a time in our history 

where traditionally that question should be asked the Congress. I 

know that has been a long time ago, but I would like to remind 

individuals that the whole idea of militarily being involved in the 

defense of another country is a congressional function, and it was 

never meant to be done by the Executive Branch nor decided by 

one individual. 

The other thing I would like to make a comment about were your 

remarks about the political conditions in Iran. I know they are far 

from perfect, but sometimes we should think about compared to 

what. If we compare what is happening in Iran to Saudi Arabia, 

I mean, they are looking pretty good. Saudi Arabia doesn’t elect 

their President. They don’t have a legislative branch elected by the 

people. They don’t allow women to vote. 

And so I would just suggest that we should compare things rather than easily condemning a country for the process and not recognize some of the progress that they made. So we talk about democracy, but when they have it, and we don’t like it, we come down 

pretty hard on them, and I think we should be cautious about that. 

I have just two brief questions, and the first one is has Iran ever 

been explicitly found by the IAEA to be in any violation of its nuclear nonproliferation obligations? And the second question is rather brief as well. In light of the fact that we have a rather aggressive policy of spreading democracy around the world, and in particular in the Middle East, why don’t we call for immediate free 

and fair elections in Pakistan? 

Secretary RICE. Thank you. 

On Iran, part of the issue is always, is the country going forward 

or backwards? Again, Congressman Lantos talked about Russia. 

That has to be one of your considerations. And Iran is going backwards. There was a time when Iran had independent voices in it 

that were willing to challenge not just the government, but the 

mullahs. Those days are gone, and the reason that they are gone 

is when they held the election, and I would put that word in 

quotes, the candidates who could stand were selected by the Guardian Council. I think that is not really an election. 

And so I think we have to be careful to not confuse what is going 

on in Iran with the practice of democracy. Yes, they go to the polls, 

and, yes, they choose between candidates, but they choose between 

candidates who have been selected for them, which I think is not 

the practice of democracy as we know it. 

In fact, Iran was found to be in noncompliance with its obligations in the September resolution of the IAEA Board of Governors 

last fall. That resolution was then tabled, awaiting further discussion, further action, and that resolution is one of the resolutions 

that was then forwarded to the Security Council in the action that 

was taken. 

Mr. PAUL. So it has been tabled. 

50

Secretary RICE. Yes. They have been found in noncompliance. 

Finally, Pakistan is to have elections in December 2007. We have 

pressed the Pakistanis that those should be free and fair elections. 

As a matter of fact, I think, Congressman, if you look back, I gave 

a press conference when I was in Pakistan with the Foreign Minister and said that we expect those to be free and fair elections. 

Pakistan is a country coming out of a period of extraordinary extremism, because of, I think, bad policies on the part of a lot of people, including us, frankly, where we kind of abandoned that region 

after the Soviets were defeated in Afghanistan. 

Pakistan, which had been a transit point for the freedom fighters 

going into Afghanistan to resist the Soviets, a lot of those people 

came back and became extremists within Pakistan. Those are the 

people who spawned al Qaeda, who tried twice to assassinate 

Musharraf and so on. 

So this is a country that has come a long way in terms of enlightenment. Musharraf has said extremism and modernity cannot exist 

in the same body. But, yes, we want them to have free and fair 

elections, and it is one of the issues that we raise consistently. 

Mr. PAUL. Thank you, ma’am. 

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Crowley of New York. 

Mr. CROWLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Madam Secretary, welcome back again before the Committee. Let 

me first thank you. You don’t know about this, but there was an 

incident. A constituent of mine, one Kelly Fitzpatrick, was murdered in the Dominican Republic, and her family was going 

through a very, very difficult time in finding who was responsible 

for it and getting any justice there. 

Because of the efforts of Brian Nichols and all those at the Caribbean desk, justice was brought to the perpetrators who committed 

that heinous act of murder against my constituent. On behalf of 

her family I want to thank you and your offices for seeing that 

through. It really meant a great deal to that family and didn’t get 

widespread publicity. There were other incidents around the world 

that got tremendous amount more publicity than this. But I want 

to let you know how appreciative the family is, and if you could 

relay it to the parties, I would appreciate that. 

Secretary RICE. Thank you. 

Mr. CROWLEY. For several years now the Administration has 

used the fact that the UNFPA has a small pilot program in China 

as justification for withholding all United States support in China. 

A recent report makes clear that the UNFPA has worked to move 

China away from target, quota and birth limits as having an impact on that country. In Chang-hwa County, one of 30 rural counties the organization works, the lifting of birth limits has resulted 

in a dramatic reduction in the number of abortions and a more balanced sex ratio amongst newborns. In short, the program has resulted in fewer abortions and more baby girls being born. 

More than 800 counties have voluntarily developed the model as 

their own. The small pilot program is beginning to have a national 

impact and is leading to more choice, more freedom, and less coercion. 

Why would the Administration continually refuse to support such 

effective work in expanding human rights in China, and will this 

51

information have any impact on the Administration’s determination on funding for the UNFPA in the upcoming fiscal year? 

Secretary RICE. We will certainly take a look at the information, 

Congressman. I think that our view is that the programs that are 

run in China are programs that are coercive programs, that support the Chinese Government’s coercive policies on——

Mr. CROWLEY. Do you believe UNFPA is involved in that? 

Secretary RICE. We believe it has funded organizations that are 

involved in that, and we want to maintain that separation. We are 

using—let me just say, we are using the money well that is not 

going to those programs. We are using it in other family planning 

and issues for women’s health. And so I think the money is being 

used well, but we are very concerned about what that organization 

is doing, and I think we would want to be very careful not to fund 

the coercive policies of the Chinese Government. 

Mr. CROWLEY. Do you support the work of the UNFPA? 

Secretary RICE. As a general matter, yes. 

Mr. CROWLEY. Thank you, Madam Secretary. 

On another issue, I was able to include an amendment in the foreign relations authorization to open an additional consulate in 

southern India to help deal with the excessive amount of time it 

takes to process visas in India. I didn’t see additional funds for a 

new consulate in this year’s budget. Does the State Department 

plan on building a new consulate in southern India to help alleviate that problem? 

Secretary RICE. We are looking at where we need to build new 

consulates, but obviously the budgetary resources, given all of the 

security concerns we have with existing Embassies and consulates, 

is also a question. 

What we are doing through work I am doing with Mike Chertoff, 

we are trying to see if there are other ways we might be able to 

process visas in places that do not have easy access to our consular 

services. We are even looking to see if we can safely, through experimentation with the so-called paperless process for visa application, use technology. We are exploring every option. I can’t promise 

that we are going to be able to afford to build a consulate in southern India. 

I did mention when we talked about transformational diplomacy 

that we are trying to get our diplomats out to parts of these countries where we can’t have full presences, but we recognize very 

much the fact that it is very hard for people to get visas out in 

some of these places, and we are seeing if we can use other methods other than building full-fledged consulates, because I frankly 

don’t think we can afford it. 

Mr. CROWLEY. Madam Secretary, I head to India this evening. 

Since the inspection of the President’s PEPFAR program, I have 

been calling for the inclusion of India in that program. Most of the 

response I got from the Administration is while India is not one of 

the 15 nations receiving PEPFAR funding, they are the 16th largest recipient of HIV/AIDS. While it sounds like a good response, 

India has the second most HIV cases at 5.1 million, and receives 

the lowest dollar-per-person ratio, $5.70 per person. For example, 

Guyana, 11,000 cases, $1,272 per person. What does the AdminisVerDate Mar 21 2002 16:22 Sep 12, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00055 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\FULL\021606\26078.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
52

tration plan to do to assist India before they surpass South Africa 

in numbers? 

Secretary RICE. We have an extensive HIV/AIDS program in 

India. We decided that PEPFAR needed to concentrate on the 15 

most vulnerable states, and it is an integrated program for those 

states. Not only are we continuing to provide funding to the Indian 

Government for HIV/AIDS, but we would hope also that the Indian 

Government would step up its own funding for it, and that is a conversation we have. 

We have to remember that India is an odd case because while 

there is still great pockets of poverty, this is an economy that is 

growing rapidly and where resources need to be put to some of 

these uses. India is not like some of the African countries that we 

fund under PEPFAR that, frankly, have no resources. 

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Flake of Arizona. 

Mr. FLAKE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And, Secretary Rice, I agree with your assessment of Cuban democracy. It is kind of an oxymoron. The question becomes how do 

we best foster change there. I think after 47 years it is reasonable 

maybe to question our policy. 

I would ask you specifically about an incident that happened, I 

believe, last week in Mexico, or recently in Mexico, where there 

was a Cuban delegation meeting with a United States delegation 

in a United States-owned hotel in Mexico City. The Cubans were 

expelled, and the hotel, the United States-owned hotel, now faces 

a possible Mexican fine of nearly a half million dollars. They are 

in a Catch-22. If they house the Cubans, supposedly they would be 

subject to a million-dollar fine from the United States Government. 

If we continue with what seems to be a new policy of enforcing 

a decades-old policy, we are going to put U.S. franchises all over 

the world in this same predicament. What are we planning to do 

in that regard? 

Secretary RICE. I know this case quite well. As you might imagine, it came to my attention. I think that we are trying to enforce 

the policies more effectively because, frankly, the Cuban regime is 

in perhaps the last years of transition, and we want to make certain the Cuban regime—that Fidel’s regime is not capable of replicating itself later on. And so we have toughened the policies on 

travel and the like. Where there are dysfunctions or dislocations, 

of course, we have to go and look to see what some of the actual 

impact is, but I think as a general matter it is only appropriate 

that we enforce these requirements. 

I talked with the Mexican Foreign Minister about this just the 

other night, and I said we will look into this, we will try to work 

with you so that there are not undue consequences for American 

or Mexican concerns, but I think we have to try to enforce the policies. We are not going to get anywhere if we don’t enforce the policy. 

Mr. FLAKE. That means any United States hotel chain in the 

world has to worry about fines now if they house any Cuban, any 

Syrian, any Iranian. It is going to be applied across the board; is 

that what you are telling me? 

Secretary RICE. I think we have to look at dysfunctions. But 

when you put a country under sanctions, it is under sanctions. And 

53

in some cases we are dealing with very serious, very serious matters, whether it is Cuban democracy or Iranian nuclear weapons or 

destabilization of the Middle East. 

Mr. FLAKE. We straddle, and you have very well, myself and 

some others, and have written about the ‘‘wet-foot, dry-foot’’ policy. 

That is an acrobatic straddle that works fairly well; otherwise we 

might provoke an immigration crisis. But if we were to take the position, as we sometimes take when it is convenient, that Cuba is 

an exporter of terrorism, they are on the terrorism list, then how 

in the world could you countenance a ‘‘wet-foot, dry-foot’’ policy? If 

Fidel is in charge of everything, surely he can put a Cuban on 

United States shores with both feet dry that we then accept with 

virtually no questions asked. 

So we really don’t believe that policy, or we do. We straddle it 

well. 

Secretary RICE. It is actually not the history of how he has done 

it. I think we have some evidence of how he operates when he 

wants to cause a migration crisis in the United States. 

I take your point, Congressman. I understand that there are consequences for American concerns because we are enforcing the policies more tightly. And, of course, we will look to see if there are 

dysfunctions that cause particular hardships. But we do have to try 

and enforce our policies or we shouldn’t have them. 

Mr. FLAKE. What I would ask is we do so consistently or not at 

all instead of selectively saying this group may or may not agree 

with our policy with regard to Cuba, and therefore we are going to 

enforce it against them and not others. 

Secretary RICE. I don’t think that is what is happening, Congressman, but we will look at the case. 

Chairman HYDE. The Secretary has to leave at 4:30, and so we 

are going to curtail the questions down to 3 minutes from the 

former 5 and let us see how far we go. 

Mr. Weller for 3 minutes. 

Mr. Weller, I am sorry. Ambassador Watson and then Mr. 

Weller. 

Ms. WATSON. I was just getting ready to give the Secretary a 

compliment. 

Thank you so much. 

I wanted to say to the Secretary, thank you. When Ed Royce and 

myself came back from Darfur, we met with the President and you 

in that meeting, and I suggested that you focus in on Darfur, and 

you did, and I would put in writing some follow-up questions on 

your meeting. 

There is a group leaving in the morning, as you know. They will 

go there, and then I will seek information from them as well. I am 

particularly interested in an effective multilateral civilian protection policy, how we work with the AU and the UN. So thank you. 

As you might know, I represent the 33rd District in California, 

which includes Korea Town, and it is a large segment in my community of Los Angeles, and I am proud to say it is home to the single largest number of Korean American voters and taxpayers in the 

United States. 

As you might expect, given the interests of my constituents, Korea’s effort to join the visa waiver program is very important to me. 

54

There are currently more than 2 million Korean Americans, and, 

in addition to my own district, there are 236 other congressional 

districts where at least 1,000 Korean Americans reside. The visa 

waiver program is available to 27 other countries, including some 

such as Andorra, and do little business with the United States and 

send few visitors here. 

South Korea’s entry into the visa waiver program would automatically affect the lives of every single Korean American living in 

the United States because that would permit relatives, friends and 

business associates to visit them without having to undergo the 

cumbersome process that is required of a visa application. 

And I have heard from my constituents that Korea business people have been discouraged from coming to the United States to attend conventions and trade shows because of the time-consuming 

process of applying for a visa. This means that business opportunities, trade and investment opportunities and job creation opportunities are being missed. 

I understand that after his meeting last November with President Rho, President Bush asked that you put together a roadmap 

that would eventually bring Korea into the visa waiver program. 

So my two-part question. First, what is the status of that roadmap 

process; and, second, what can Congress do to assist, to effect their 

entry? Thank you. 

And the other questions about the protective plan, I will take it 

in writing. In fact, I will write you, and you can respond. 

Secretary RICE. Thank you very much. I will be happy to respond. 

On the visa waiver program we are working with the Koreans. 

Our Ambassador is working with the Koreans. The problem is that 

you have to have a certain denial rate or below a certain denial 

rate in order to be eligible for the visa waiver program. South 

Korea is actually very, very close, to be honest. We believe that we 

can get South Korea there with just a little bit of hard work. But 

we do have in statute the requirements for the visa waiver program, and we can’t just waive the statutes for the visa waiver program for specific countries. We have to have a worldwide standard. 

So what we have been trying to do with countries—it is an issue 

with Poland, an issue with a number of other countries—what we 

have been trying to do is get those countries to that standard by 

helping to work through those processes and roadmap to get there. 

The Ambassador is working very hard on it, and he believes he is 

making progress, but you can be sure it is something we are working very hard, but we do have a worldwide standard that we have 

to maintain. 

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Weller. 

Mr. WELLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Madam Secretary, thank you for being here and your patience 

today. 

Like several of my colleagues, before I ask a question, I do want 

to draw your attention to a constituent issue. We had a terrible 

tragedy 3 years ago that affected a family in Joliet, Illinois. Brett 

Midlock was tragically killed in a swimming pool accident in Playa 

del Carmen, Mexico. By all appearances it was a result of negligence and improper safety by the hotel. 

55

I am going to be giving a letter to you and your staff after the 

hearing which I ask you to look into, but clearly the family feels 

the Mexican justice system has not responded as they should in 

this case. 

I do want to congratulate you. Tom Shannon was a great appointment as your Assistant Secretary for this hemisphere. As I 

travel and talk with leaders, they appreciate his conscientious voice 

on behalf of the United States. I commend you on that appointment. 

Second, I want to commend you for the progress that has been 

made in establishing the International Law Enforcement Academy 

in this hemisphere. Finally, after a decade of work and trying to 

get it done, we now have the first class going through the class. It 

has worked to professionalize law enforcement and encourage cooperation across borders. 

The issue I want to focus on is narcotics. Drugs enslave millions. 

Trafficking of narcotics funds terrorism around the world and including our own hemisphere. I have three concerns. One is our 

counternarcotics programs. We have made progress particularly in 

Colombia in the antidrug initiative, however, we recently saw a 

candidate opposing our programs campaign on that and win. I 

would like your thoughts on that. 

Two, Europe’s role. Forty percent of the cocaine that has shipped 

outside of Colombia, for example, goes to Europe. We spend hundreds of millions of dollars, but by appearances it appears Europe 

does very little. What can we do to convince our European friends? 

Third is recognizing about 70, 80, maybe even 90 percent of the 

narcotics that come up to the United States through Latin America 

come through Mexico, and I am interested in hearing from you how 

we are working with the Mexican Government to stem that tide, 

but also what we should be doing from a border measure here in 

the Congress to help prevent those narcotics from crossing the 

Mexican border into ours. 

Secretary RICE. On the last part about Mexico, the State Department along with DHS has been working to improve as a part of our 

Western Hemisphere initiatives—to improve border security, and, 

in fact, we have a significant increase in budgetary resources to 

border security because we recognize that, frankly, the same problem that causes your problem with drugs causes your problem with 

terrorism, causes your problem with arms running, corrupt border 

guards and the like. It is all a part of the same piece. So we definitely are trying to improve our border security, and we have increased funding for it. 

The Mexican Government, I think, has been—this Mexican Government has been more cooperative than any other Mexican Government in trying to help in border enforcement. It is not perfect. 

We have a lot of work to do. There are often very great frustrations 

in terms of specific cases. But we have improved the coordination, 

particularly on issues of drug trade. 

Now there are areas—and I am sure if Congressman Flake were 

still here, he would note that there are areas particularly in the 

Southwest where we continue to have problems with violence and 

the drug trade. But we—not just DHS, not just State, but also JusVerDate Mar 21 2002 16:22 Sep 12, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00059 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\FULL\021606\26078.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
56

tice has had very extensive work with the Mexicans to try and improve our ability to deal with the drug trade. 

It is a very good point about the Europeans and the Colombians. 

I do think that this is an issue that we can bring up. There needs 

to be more of a sense of a kind of worldwide approach to the funding of some of these efforts on the drug trade. We have borne a lot 

of the responsibility, most of the responsibility, for, I think, a very 

successful Andean counterdrug initiative. 

As you rightly say, we aren’t the only recipients of this, and I 

think as the world looks, we are seeing also in Afghanistan where 

most of it ends up in Europe we are still playing a major role. 

I think there is a growing understanding that the counternarcotics problem has to be understood as a kind of global problem 

into which everyone contributes, because the drugs can end up anywhere. 

Finally, I would just note that I do think that we are having an 

effect, but one thing that occurred to me, in the Bolivian case, is 

we are doing a major public education campaign in Afghanistan. 

That was the first thing the Afghans said. We have to have a public campaign that delegitimizes opium and poppy growing and that 

says, good Afghans don’t do that. 

And it occurred to me that, I don’t know how aggressive we have 

been in recent years, maybe we take it a bit too much for granted 

that people know that coca growing is not a legitimate thing to do. 

But it is something we need to look at. As I said, we are going to 

have problems with the Morales Government if that remains their 

policy. But we are reaching out to them to see if we can get them 

to adopt more responsible policies in that regard. 

Chairman HYDE. We have time for one more. I am sorry to have 

to—you guys waited all day. 

But it is just impossible to add more hours to our Secretary’s 

time. 

Mr. Carnahan. 

Mr. CARNAHAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you, Madam Secretary. I will be brief because I know 

this has been long. But I want to ask two questions. First, about 

Iran, I want to congratulate you for your successful diplomatic efforts and getting the IAEA board of directors to report Iran’s nuclear activities to the UN Security Council. And as you know, the 

House today overwhelmingly passed a resolution to support in 

those efforts. My question is, really, what now? And what sanctions 

are appropriate for the U.S. to propose if we get down that road, 

and what do you believe the Security Council would support? 

Secretary RICE. Well, thank you. And again, let me thank the 

Congress for the Iran resolution. I think it will help us. 

The course now, now that we are in the Security Council, we 

have a whole set of tools that we would not have had outside the 

Security Council, which is why we spent so much energy trying to 

get there. But I will not want to underestimate for you the difficulty of deciding what the next steps should be and particularly 

trying to maintain a coalition around a set of robust steps. 

Now, if Iranians continue to defy the international community in 

the way that they are doing, enrichment and reprocessing on 1 day, 

57

introducing—they are introducing the UF6 into the centrifuges—a 

lot more people are going to be prepared to take robust measures. 

But I think we have to look carefully, and we are beginning the 

diplomacy, or we have been doing the diplomacy with our colleagues around the world to look at what steps ought to be taken. 

I wouldn’t jump to the conclusion that any particular kinds of 

sanctions are going to be either effective or would be wise. But obviously, there are going to have to be consequences for the Iranians’ continued defiance. And we are going to look at the full 

range. We are going to look at anything particularly that might 

have an effect on the Iranian regime’s ability to do business. 

I think we want to be careful to try and stay away from sanctions that really do target the Iranian people. I have heard, for instance, well, maybe we should deny the Iranian soccer team to go 

to the World Cup. I think that is the kind of thing you don’t want 

to do. It just angers the population and drives them closer to the 

regime. But the regime has financial assets. The regime has activities it has to engage in. 

Already, there are people who are leaving Iran because of 

reputational risks. There are companies that don’t want to deal 

with Iran. I think the more that there is clearly a unified position 

that Iran will have to suffer consequences if it doesn’t come back 

to the international consensus, you’re going to see that, whatever 

we do, you will start to see more, even voluntary activity of people 

unwilling to deal with Iran. 

But we—I don’t want to get out ahead of the diplomacy. We are 

beginning to discuss what specific measures might be appropriate 

and at what time. 

Mr. CARNAHAN. And one last thing with regard to a report last 

year about—a GAO on the rising anti-Americanism sentiment 

around the world, can you tell us what kind of progress has been 

made in this past year since that report came out? 

Secretary RICE. Yes. We have put a lot of effort into revamping 

our public diplomacy efforts. I think we have to recognize that the 

United States has had to do some hard things. We have had to get 

rid of a couple of really bad regimes. We have had to tell people 

that this terrorist threat is a long-term threat. We have had to say 

that there are people who are hijacking Islam on behalf of this terrorist cause. And those are not always popular positions. 

We have had to defend Israel’s right to defend itself. We have 

had to say that Yasser Arafat was corrupt and not worthy of our 

support in leading the Palestinian people. And these are things 

that have in some ways been unpopular. 

We have had to be tough in the war on terrorism. I went to Europe. I explained why the United States has had to be tough with 

terrorists within the law. I have explained why we have had to 

keep open certain practices, like rendition, again, things that have 

not made us very popular. 

But that doesn’t mean that we should be subject to bad information being out about us. So one of the things that Karen Hughes 

has spent a lot of time on is simply being able to counter what 

sometimes comes out as stories that are simply not true. 

The story that we desecrated the Koran is still out there, even 

though everybody knows that that story was not true. People put 

58

out things about Guantanamo that are simply not true. We have 

to do a better job of countering the propaganda against us. 

We have to do a better job of getting our people out on Arab language television. And we are seeking Arabic speakers, people who 

can really go out and address populations. 

We have to do a better job of getting people here on exchanges, 

students and business people, and, intellectuals here on exchanges 

and our people out to those countries. Because the best way to get 

to know America is to know Americans and to come to America. 

And there, the work that I am doing with Mike Chertoff to make 

our visa policies still safe and secure but able to allow for more 

freedom of movement of peoples, I think, is very important. 

And, finally, I think, over time, as we speak more and more to 

the aspirations of people for liberty and freedom, recognizing that, 

particularly in the Middle East, for 60 years, we really didn’t speak 

to those aspirations—we were willing to tolerate a kind of blind eye 

toward those aspirations—I think you will start to see people 

change. 

I saw a rather desultory report this morning on some of the attitudes about Americans, but then I heard that in Afghanistan, 70 

percent of Afghans have a favorable opinion of the United States. 

Now why do you think that is? I don’t think it is because we are 

fighting in Afghanistan. I think it is because these people know 

that we gave them a chance for liberty, that we gave them a 

chance for a free life, that we are committed to Afghanistan. And 

I think you will start to see that happen around the world. 

Under Secretary Hughes is, as we speak, on her way to the Middle East to engage in the conference with Muslim scholars and others about crossing these civilizations and dialogue between them. 

So we have got a lot of activities under way. And it is going to 

be incumbent on us to do more to reach out, to have a conversation 

not a monologue. It is going to require us to know these cultures 

better. 

When I was a graduate student in the Soviet studies, I studied 

on fellowships that were funded in part with government funding 

and in part with foundation funding because people wanted to have 

young people who would study the Soviet Union and know the language and know the culture because it was important to our national security. 

Well, nothing is more important to our national security than 

knowing the cultures of the Middle East and knowing Farsi and 

knowing Arabic and knowing Chinese. And we therefore are trying 

to rebuild some of our capability in those ways. 

In brief, as we get to know people better, and they get to know 

us better by a variety of means, as we counter the negative stereotypes against the United States, as we counter the propaganda 

against us, I think we will do better. But it is going to take some 

time. This is not something that is going to change overnight, but 

I do think it will change. 

Mr. CARNAHAN. Thank you. 

Secretary RICE. Thank you. 

Chairman HYDE. Madam Secretary, as we close, Mr. Lantos has 

a short statement. 

Secretary RICE. Thank you. 

59

Mr. LANTOS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, if we had 

been in Torino, Italy, you would have the task of awarding a gold 

medal to our witness, which she richly deserves. I respectfully request that all Members, if the Secretary is willing, have 2 weeks 

to submit questions for the record. 

Chairman HYDE. Without objection, and as we close, Madam Secretary, I would like to echo what Ms. Ros-Lehtinen stated regarding the importance of continuing to apply pressure on the Castro 

dictatorship, the need to do more to hasten a transition to democracy in Cuba, and to that end, I hope you will provide full funding 

of ESF resources for the USAID section 109 programs that have a 

proven track record in getting assistance to the growing dissident 

movement in Cuba. 

And after that commercial, I want to say, you did a brilliant job, 

very instructive. And we look forward to hearing from you again. 

Thank you. 

Secretary RICE. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you Congressman Lantos. 

Chairman HYDE. The Committee stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:44 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.] 

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A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE TED POE, A REPRESENTATIVE IN

CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF TEXAS

The United States government is responsible for the integrity of its borders and 

the safety of the American people. There is no debating this. However, thousands 

of immigrants from many nations are illegally crossing into the United States. Certain governments in the Americas have full knowledge that vast sums of their citizens are knowingly violating our laws. Yet these governments don’t seem to show 

any desire to stem the tide of lawlessness that is originating from within their own 

borders. It is imperative that the Administration works with these nations to uphold 

the integrity of our northern and southern borders. While Congress works to find 

ways to secure our homeland against unlawful invasions, I am eager to see what 

steps will be taken to resolve this situation diplomatically. 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DAN BURTON, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF INDIANA, AND CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this important hearing. I want to welcome 

Secretary Rice and salute her courage and steadfast leadership over the course of 

the past year, in her capacity as Secretary of State. Thank you for being here today, 

to discuss with us the Administration’s foreign policy budget for fiscal year 2007 

(FY07). 

I look forward to hearing your vision for the coming year, more about the Department’s Transformation Diplomacy Reorganization, and other inter-Agency initiatives 

to strengthen our nation’s security through international engagement and cooperation. 

The year 2005 witnessed some incredible, historic events. Steps toward greater 

democracy were demonstrated with the elections in places like Iraq, Afghanistan, 

Haiti, Liberia, Egypt, and amongst the Palestinian people. The outpouring of aid 

from our nation’s government and individual citizens helped to ease the pain and 

suffering of the hundreds of thousands of victims of the Pakistani earthquake, letting them know that they have a friend in the United States. I traveled to 

Islamabad and Muzafarabad in December and feel deeply proud of the men and 

women in uniform from the Task Force Eagle Aviation Brigade, the Army hospital 

team, naval mobile reconstruction battalion, and all the personnel delivering humanitarian aid, providing logistic support, and medical treatment. Their efforts are 

appreciated. I also know you share my optimism and support for the steps President 

Mussharraf and PM Singh are taking to resolve tensions over Kashmir. 

US Armed Forces are fighting the war on terror in Iraq, Afghanistan, and many 

other fronts alongside our allies, confronting insurgents and suicide bombers. The 

terrorists no longer have a base in Afghanistan and they are making futile attempts 

with help from Syria and Iran, to overturn Iraq’s democratic government and return 

that country to the rule of tyrants. Their ultimate goal is to establish a radical, PanIslamic empire across North Africa, through the Middle East and South Asia, all 

the way to Indonesia. They want to acquire weapons of mass destruction, to destroy 

Israel, and cause massive casualties in Europe and the United States. 

Our first priority remains the War on Terror. Our progress in Iraq is remarkable—despite what is reported in the papers—and we need to remember that Iraq 

can’t transition from being under a dictatorship to a thriving democracy overnight. 

It takes time, just as it took time here in the US. And the Iraqi people moved one 

step closer to democracy when parliamentary elections were held without issue at 

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the end of 2005. Those election results showed a larger number of seats going to 

the Sunnis than in the prior election, which is great news—it shows the progress 

we’ve made in engaging all the entities that make up the Iraqi people. 

We must continue to pave the way to a free, democratic Iraq—one that can spread 

the message of freedom to its neighbors throughout the Middle East—and not capitulate to the terrorists who are resolved to bring tyranny back to Iraq. 

But Iraq is only one piece of the puzzle. Wahhabism—the dangerous interpretation of Islam to which Osama bin Laden and his cohorts prescribe—is still the law 

of the land in Saudi Arabia, and despite its promises to make Saudi Arabia a more 

tolerant place, the Kingdom continues to propagate the violent strain of Islam. They 

teach it, they fund it, and they adhere to it strictly. These fanatical policies lay the 

foundation for the creation of more terrorists, increased money to support them, and 

inevitably, more violent deaths of innocent people across the world, as we saw on 

July 7th in London. 

Neighboring Iran continues to defy the international community and each day 

moves closer to developing weapons-grade material that can be used in a nuclear 

weapon against the United States or its allies. Even worse is the prospect that Iran 

could provide any terrorist entity or rogue state with easy access to these weapons 

of mass destruction. I applaud the efforts you have made and know you will continue to work with our allies to deny Iran the capabilities it is pursuing to bolster 

its weapons program. 

Madam Secretary, as you know, we need a robust foreign policy which is able to 

deal with these threats and which is geared towards enabling the forces that have 

the potential to transform many countries in the Middle East from places of repression, to places of hope, as we are doing in Iraq. 

But as the Iraqi people are fighting—and dying—for their freedom, there are dark 

spots across the globe where basic freedoms of human rights are eroded more and 

more each day. The military government of Burma, for instance, uses internationally outlawed practices such as child labor, rape and torture on its own citizens to 

accomplish its objectives, causing thousands of Burmese to flee their homeland. 

Cuba continues its long-standing practice of forbidding any political dissent whatsoever, imprisoning those who are found guilty in overcrowded facilities where they 

are likely to suffer malnutrition, and physical and sexual abuse. Women in Saudi 

Arabia are still not permitted to show their faces in public, and when they are beaten by their husbands, which happens far too frequently, they can’t escape their 

plight because they still need written permission from a male relative in order to 

travel. 

President Bush has reminded us that ‘‘freedom enables men and women to live 

lives of dignity. And freedom gives the citizens of a nation confidence in a future 

of peace for their children and grandchildren.’’ If the citizens of a country are not 

given their basic human rights, they are not free. We need to help those people, 

wherever they may be. 

But these egregious violations of human rights don’t just happen abroad—the 

practice of human trafficking in women and children, especially from Latin American countries, has landed right here in our own backyard. Women are brought here 

with alarming frequency and forced into prostitution, which has led to an increase 

in brothels right here, in the Washington DC Area, and all around the country. 

With the establishment of these brothels comes an increase in violence and presence 

of criminals and gangs in our residential areas looking to profit from them, most 

notably, members of the violent gang, MS–13. This is an exceptionally violent group 

made up primarily of illegal aliens whose initiation tactics often includes arming 

children with machetes to maim and murder innocent civilians or their rivals. 

It is often said, ‘‘weak states pose as great a threat to our national security as 

strong states.’’ States in Latin America that do not overcome their ‘‘cultures of lawlessness’’ pose a risk to our national security and we need to provide help where 

we can. Mexico and Guatemala’s problems with gangs are OUR problems. Haiti’s 

problems with crime, poverty and HIV/AIDS are OUR problems. Colombia’s problems with drug trafficking are OUR problems. Bolivia’s problems with poverty are 

OUR problems. The region’s problems are OUR problems. 

We need to help the people of Latin America, and make conditions at home better 

for them. Last year we took some important steps when we passed CAFTA. This 

agreement will bring greater prosperity to the countries of Central America, enhancing the quality of life for its people, and creating more incentive for the people of 

those countries to stay and work there, with their families. 

One of the cornerstones of the President’s foreign policy strategy is to use trade 

as an engine of economic growth, to alleviate poverty and promote economic freedom. In the Andean countries like Peru and Colombia, U.S. strategic interests are 

63

advanced when trade and investment follow the steps those governments are taking 

to free markets, the rule of law, and to sound macroeconomic policies. 

We need to continue working to stop narco-traffickers. Drugs continue to pour into 

our country from Latin America everyday, affecting millions of US citizens nationwide. In fact, my home state of Indiana saw a dramatic rise in the use of 

methamphetamines among youngsters, many of whom have suffered overdoses and 

will never be the same again. We must change the conditions in Latin America 

which enable and empower drug smugglers and their political allies to conduct business. 

Moreover, the political climate in Latin America is cause for concern. Venezuela’s 

Hugo Chavez solidified his sharp turn to the left and during the past year he has 

continued to seize private property, steadily eroded the democratic principles of free 

speech and free press, and has worked aggressively to forge an anti-American alliance, extending from his own neighbors, like Cuba, all the way to the Middle East, 

with Iran. Yesterday the Vice President of Venezuela extended an invitation to 

Hamas, though a visit has not been confirmed. 

A Leftist bloc has started to take shape in Latin America. There has been a resurgence of left-leaning movements, some of which seek open conflict with the United 

States. Others, like the Sandinista comeback in Nicaragua, have yet to solidify their 

power. Our foreign policy needs to be able to deal effectively and productively with 

the difficult situation we face in Latin America, and also to be able to encourage 

and remind countries like Nicaragua that freedom and liberty are always better 

than repression and tyranny. 

Secretary Rice, you have demonstrated your commitment to democracy. You have 

handled impossible situations with grace and ease, and I believe your mastery of 

statecraft will enable you to help us address all these issues I have outlined today. 

I look forward to further collaboration with you and your colleagues on the tough 

challenges that lie ahead. 

Mr. Chairman, once again thank you for convening this hearing. 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JOSEPH CROWLEY, A REPRESENTATIVE IN

CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Chairman Hyde and Ranking Member Lantos—thank you for conducting this important hearing on the President’s international affairs budget request. 

I also would like to thank Secretary Rice for coming in this afternoon to brief the 

Committee and answer our questions. I look forward to hearing your remarks. 

Before you begin I would like to make as brief of remarks a member of Congress 

can regarding my views on the changes in the world since the President took office. 

The world was transformed on September 11, 2001—the events of this day set 

into motion a battle that continues to rage on, a battle against extremists who wish 

to make the world into Afghanistan under the Taliban’s control. 

We must not allow the freedom and democracy we cherish to expire into the backward world that was once Afghanistan 

The way to ensure we don’t repeat our past mistakes is by using our foreign aid 

to uplift those who are less fortunate and I am sad to say I do not see this budget 

doing that. 

Our foreign affairs budget should be used to change the hearts and minds of those 

who wish to destroy us, not just as handouts to the countries that are supporting 

this struggle. 

As I looked through the fiscal year 2007 budget I am troubled by the priorities 

the President has set out. 

I represent one of the most diverse districts in the country and I know my constituents whether they are from Asia or Latin America are concerned about how we 

provide aid to the world. 

Normally, I would see a proposed 14% increase as a positive step but not when 

the increase comes at the expense of existing programs that have continually been 

successes. 

The cuts focused on what should remain our countries core development programs. 

We have been a country that has always paid special attention to humanitarian 

issues and I believe this budget goes against the precedent we have set in helping 

the worlds neediest. 

I support the ideal of the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) but this program 

is still in its infancy. 

I cannot support the MCA at the expense of programs that provide basic education, child survival and maternal health care. 

64

These are not the only accounts that are taking hits—I am troubled that I have 

yet to see an all accounts number for international family planning and I urge you 

to provide that number today. 

I trust this is not a stall tactic because of the President’s pledge not to let international family planning fall below the $425 million level. 

This budget also cuts substantial funding from Latin America and the Caribbean 

at a time when we should be focusing more attention on our neighbor to the South 

not less. 

The 21% cut to development assistance is unacceptable at a time when it is in 

our national security interest to ensure a stability and security of our neighbors to 

the South. 

We must also concentrate on other areas of the globe that are important to our 

strategic interests and I’ll be headed to one such region later tonight. 

South Asia is an important region to the U.S. not only because of its large population but because we must do all we can to support our fellow democracies. 

Since the inception of the Presidents Emergency Plan for HIV/AIDS Relief 

(PEPFAR), I have been calling for the inclusion of India. 

Most of the responses I have gotten from the Administration revolve around the 

fact that while India is not one of the 15 nations receiving PEPFAR funding they 

are the 16th largest recipient of HIV/AIDS funding. 

While this sounds like a good response, India has the second most HIV/AIDS 

cases at 5.1 million and receives the lowest dollar per person ration at $5.70 compared with say Guyana with a reported 11,000 case at $1272.73. 

We need to be doing more to assist India before they surpass South Africa and 

the situation gets beyond all of our control. 

As you know, I hold a special place in my heart for Bangladesh, not just because 

I represent the largest population of Bangladeshi’s in the country but because I 

deeply care about the future of the second most populous Muslim nation. 

Bangladesh has been having problems over the past few years, which is why I 

decided to make my third visit next week. 

It is not in the interest of the world to see Bangladesh continue down its current 

path and I hope the message I carry and the friendship and trust I have built with 

the people and the parties of Bangladesh will put them on the right path toward 

an open and transparent society. 

I’ll end my remarks hear but we must push the issue of democracy forward but 

not just by holding elections but building the transparent institutions that will sustain a democracy. 

Thank you. 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE CONNIE MACK, A REPRESENTATIVE IN

CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF FLORIDA

I want to thank Chairman Hyde for having this important hearing today. 

I also want to thank Secretary Rice for coming before the committee this afternoon. I appreciate your sharing your insight and candor today. 

Twenty years ago, President Ronald Reagan and the United States were very active in encouraging the adoption of democracy and free markets as political and economic models to promote freedom, security, and prosperity throughout Latin America. 

These ideals helped defeat the insurgencies and the communist influence advanced by the former Soviet Union and Cuba. 

However, in the decades that have passed, the United States has witnessed a 

growing and gathering storm that is brewing in our own backyard in Latin America. 

Governing power is growing ever-more concentrated in just a few hands, while 

democratic institutions have been eroded. 

For example, in Venezuela, with Hugo Chavez at the helm, he is using stateowned oil money to underwrite his iron-fisted control of the Venezuelan people, and 

to back his alliances with leftist leaders and causes throughout Latin America. 

In a September interview with Newsweek, Chavez was clear in his motives: ‘‘I am 

a revolutionary. I have to support the left-wing movements in Latin America. We 

have to change Latin America.’’

Chavez is snuffing-out a free press and free speech with new laws that impose 

jail terms on journalists for ‘‘gravely offending’’ the president or government. 

And, to ensure his unfettered ability to spread his anti-freedom messages 

throughout the region, Chavez last year launched his own television network, 

Telesur. In recent weeks, Telesur announced a formal alliance with Al-Jazeera, bolVerDate Mar 21 2002 16:22 Sep 12, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00068 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\FULL\021606\26078.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
65

stering Chavez’s socialist-based propaganda with the resources and reach of pro-terrorist programming. 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE GREGORY W. MEEKS, A REPRESENTATIVE

IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Madam Secretary: 

It is always a pleasure to see you, thank you for your testimony this afternoon, 

I appreciate you sharing with us the goals of the Department and how you will promote democracy throughout the world. 

Madam Secretary, you may not be aware of this but yesterday, I along with a bipartisan group of Members launched the Middle East Economic Partnership Caucus 

because we believe that through engagement, stability will develop and the best way 

to engage the region is for people to benefit economically. And, I look forward to 

working with you to build this global stability and bring about freedom to those 

being repressed. 

In my work on the International Relations Committee, I have made it my mission 

to build diplomatic relations with democratically elected leaders throughout the 

world. I am hoping that your State Department will join me in engaging democratically elected leaders such as Hugo Chavez in Venezuela and will reach out to build 

bridges across Latin America by agreeing to work with the newly elected leader of 

Bolivia Evo Morales and the democratically elected leader of Chile, Michelle 

Bachelet and other democratic governments even if we don’t necessarily agree with 

their politics. 

I understand the need to reorganize the Dept. of State and I think the proposal 

you have put forward is ambitious. However, I would encourage you to do your best 

to ensure your State Department represents the ethnic diversity of the United 

States because a cookie cutter system of recruitment and promotion has not worked 

to spread democracy throughout the globe. 

In addition, all post including hardship posts assignments should evenly represent 

the diversity of this country. It has been my experience that most post throughout 

the world does not reflect America and the more diverse our presence abroad is, the 

more we stand to gain. I would encourage you to share this message with the new 

Director of Foreign Assistance as well. 

Madam Secretary, our relationship with the World must yield economic benefits 

to those most severely impacted from hundreds of years of oppression. As we engage 

our neighbors in the Western Hemisphere, I have notice a serious cut in our foreign 

assistance dollars therefore, leaving little money for infrastructure development particular in the Andean regions. These cuts are severely affecting African Latinos and 

indigenous communities. How can we promote democracy and the benefits thereof 

while people don’t have potable water or working sewage systems? 

I would caution you on the cuts currently being made in the region because it 

gives the impression that if we don’t like you then we will not work with you and 

that is wrong. We are rapidly loosing friends and influencing no one in Latin America. 

RESPONSES FROM THE HONORABLE CONDOLEEZZA RICE, THE SECRETARY OF STATE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY THE

HONORABLE J. GRESHAM BARRETT, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

Question: 

As you know, last summer U.S. and Russian negotiators tentatively resolved the 

question of liability protections for important cooperative programs related to nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction. 

a) What steps are necessary for this issue to be permanently resolved? 

Response: 

Last July, U.S. and Russian negotiators completed the text of a protocol on liability protections for the 2000 U.S.-Russian plutonium disposition agreement. The Russian government has indicated that it recently approved that protocol for signature, 

but is re-examining what it claims is a minor issue related to conforming the Russian-language version to the English text. We hope that issue can be resolved quickly so that the protocol can be signed in early June. The United States and Russia 

both envision that the liability provisions in this protocol could also be used, as appropriate, in future cooperative nonproliferation and security-related agreements between the governments where such protections are required. Each such agreement 

66

would have to specify certain parameters (such as duration) for applicability of those 

protections to its programs and activities. 

Question: 

As part of the President’s Advanced Energy Initiative, the Administration has unveiled the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership or G–NEP. Under this program, the 

U.S. would work with its international partners to create a safe, orderly system of 

worldwide nuclear power generation without adding to the danger of weapons proliferation. 

a) What countries is the U.S. currently seeking to partner with on this important 

initiative and how has the message been received? 

b) What is the size and scope of the program? 

Response: 

a) The United States has completed initial consultations with China, France, 

Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the International Atomic Energy Agency 

on the key objectives of GNEP. It is anticipated that future technology development 

and demonstration would be coordinated with nations having advanced civilian nuclear energy programs. In the course of meetings held since February 2006, France, 

Japan, and Russia have agreed in principle to substantial coordinated R&D collaboration with the U.S. in preparation for, and execution of, the GNEP technology demonstrations. The U.S. has also met directly with many other countries for detailed 

discussions, including Canada and South Korea. There has been general agreement 

on the vision for the GNEP technical strategies. Once the new technology is demonstrated, we would envision working with a much larger number of nations who 

are potential recipients for fuel supply and spent fuel management services. 

b) GNEP establishes an integrated path forward for the expansion of nuclear energy in the United States and abroad in a manner that will meet nuclear nonproliferation goals, increase energy security, abate pollution and avoid greenhouse 

gas emissions. In partnership with other like-minded nations, the U.S. would work 

to establish a fuel leasing and advanced recycling program that would provide fuel 

services to nations who chose to operate reactors but not operate complete fuel cycles. Another GNEP goal is the design and deployment of exportable nuclear reactors that are well-suited to the infrastructure of developing countries and that incorporate improved safety and proliferation-resistant technologies. Through GNEP, the 

U.S. would accelerate the development of proliferation resistant fuel recycling technology that could reduce the amount of waste requiring geologic disposal, thus reducing the need for additional repositories as nuclear generating capacity increases 

in the future. The cost for the first three years of the program is estimated to be 

$1.8 billion, to focus on the research and development needed to design and develop 

detailed cost and schedule estimates for the three demonstration facilities that are 

proposed under GNEP—an engineering scale demonstration of the Uranium Extraction-plus technology, the Advanced Burner Reactor technology, and the Advanced 

Fuel Cycle Facility. By mid-2008, the Department of Energy will have developed 

cost and schedule estimates of sufficient quality to inform a decision on proceeding 

to construction and demonstration. 

Question: 

I am concerned about the recent developments in Iran pertaining to their non-compliance with their non-proliferation obligations to the UN Security Council. If the 

Russian Federation does not terminate its arrangements with Iran to provide technical expertise in developing their nuclear technologies, then the FY07 budget includes language specifying 60% of the $514 million requested as ‘‘Assistance for the 

Independent States of the Former Soviet Union’’ will be withheld from the Russian 

Federation. 

a) What criteria is the State Department using for this determination? 

b) Is it the State Department’s objective to put financial pressure on other countries to agree with our position on Iran? 

Response: 

Iran’s pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability in violation of its Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) obligations, and its 20-year history of serious IAEA safeguards violations in hiding those efforts, are of serious concern to the Administration and to the international community. We are working diligently with others in 

the international community, including Russia, to raise pressure on Iran to come 

back into compliance with its obligations and to give the world confidence that it 

has abandoned its nuclear weapons efforts. 

Section (e)(1) under the heading ‘‘Assistance for the Independent States of the 

Former Soviet Union’’ in the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related 

67

Programs Appropriations Act, 2006 (P.L. 109–102) states that of certain types of 

funds allocated for assistance for the Government of the Russian Federation, sixty 

percent shall be withheld from obligation until the President determines and certifies that the Government of Russia has (A) terminated implementation of arrangements to provide Iran with technical expertise, training, technology, or equipment 

necessary to develop a nuclear reactor, related nuclear research facilities or programs, or ballistic missile capability; and (B) is providing full access to international 

non-government organizations providing humanitarian relief to refugees and internally displaced persons in Chechnya. 

This provision has appeared in appropriations legislation for the past several 

years. The President has never made this certification and, thus, sixty percent of 

such assistance to the Government of Russia has been withheld from obligation. 

This provision is only one of the levers we could potentially wield in our ongoing 

efforts to bring Iran into compliance with the international community’s requirements. Assuming the provision is included in Fiscal Year 2007 appropriations legislation, we will examine the situation and determine whether such a determination 

and certification should be made. 

Russia agrees that Iran must not develop a nuclear weapons capability, and has 

been working closely with the U.S. at the IAEA Board of Governors, in the UN Security Council, and elsewhere, to address this issue. Russia joined at the IAEA 

Board of Governors meeting in February in reporting Iran to the UN Security Council, and is working with us at the UNSC to add the Council’s weight to the steps 

called for in previous IAEA Board resolutions. 

The President and many of the world’s leaders have repeatedly made clear that 

a nuclear-armed Iran is unacceptable. A nuclear-armed Iran would have profoundly 

negative consequences for regional and international security, and could possibly 

shatter the international nonproliferation regime. We are working with many countries, including Russia, to prevent the transfer to Iran of equipment or expertise 

that it could use to advance its nuclear weapons and missile programs. Russia 

shares our strategic goal of persuading Iran to abandon its pursuit of a nuclear 

weapons capability, and we will continue to work closely with Russia, the EU–3 and 

others to persuade Iran to change its current course. 

RESPONSES FROM THE HONORABLE CONDOLEEZZA RICE, THE SECRETARY OF STATE, 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY THE

HONORABLE EARL BLUMENAUER, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE

STATE OF OREGON

Question: 

On December 1, 2005, President Bush signed the ‘‘Senator Paul Simon Water for 

the Poor Act’’ into law, making access to safe water and sanitation for developing 

countries a specific policy objective of United States foreign assistance programs and 

directing the State Department, in broad consultation, to develop a strategy to further 

this objective. I understand that the responsibility for developing this strategy has 

been delegated to the Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs (OES). I am concerned, however, that OES does not yet have the support to overcome obstacles they identify in current foreign assistance practices to 

meeting the intent, scope, and requirements of the law, including directing assistance 

to the places with the greatest need, coordinating and integrating United States 

water and sanitation assistance programs with other United States development assistance programs, coordinating United States water and sanitation assistance programs with programs of other donor countries and entities, and meeting the goal of 

seeking to reduce by one-half from the baseline year 1990 the proportion of people 

who are unable to reach or afford safe drinking water and the proportion of people 

without access to basic sanitation by 2015. I am also concerned that the implementation of the Act will be constrained by OES’ capacity, despite the best efforts of its 

skilled public servants. 

Do the State Department officials to whom the development of this strategy has 

been designated have your support in making the necessary changes to current foreign assistance practices to fulfill the intent, scope, and requirements of the Senator 

Paul Simon Water for the Poor Act? How do you intend to ensure that these officials 

have the necessary capacity to do the same? 

Response: 

Our report in response to the legislation will be submitted to Congress on June 

1. I have designated the OES Bureau as the lead for this effort. They have worked 

closely with the full range of functional and regional bureaus in the department, 

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USAID, and many other agencies, including the EPA, USACE, CDC, USGS, and 

NOAA, among others. Under Secretary Dobrianksy has personally followed this 

process, meeting regularly with Assistant Secretary Claudia McMurray and the staff 

drafting the report, and keeping me informed of progress. Assistant Secretary 

McMurray chaired the April Town Hall meeting, an important part of our external 

consultation process, and has been in regular communication about the development 

of this report with Assistant Administrator Jackee Schafer, of USAID’s EGAT Bureau. 

The preparation of this report is taking place as we reexamine our development 

assistance priorities and approaches. Our new approach recognizes the role that provision of basic services, including water, can plan in building and sustaining democratic, well-governed states that respond to the needs of their people. I have asked 

OES to work with the Director of Foreign Assistance to develop an approach that 

is fully consistent with our overall development assistance strategy. 

Question: 

Last month, the administration pledged $52 million for the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate to spur a new generation in energy production technology to temper the future growth in projected carbon dioxide emissions. 

How much of this money is new and additional rather than a re-labeling of existing 

technology transfer funds? How much of this will be directed at nuclear and coal 

technologies? What role will proven, commercially-viable technologies such as wind 

power, solar power, and sustainable biomass play? Will the partnership include any 

market based incentives to encourage the deployment of clean energy technologies? 

Response: 

As part of the President’s Fiscal Year 2007 Budget, the Administration has proposed $52 million in new and additional funding to support the work of the AsiaPacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate. 

The Partnership advances U.S. goals of enhancing energy security, reducing 

harmful air pollution, and reducing greenhouse gas emissions intensity in the context of sustained economic growth. 

Partner countries are prioritizing the deployment of a range of cleaner energy 

technologies, including renewable energy technologies. The Partnership’s Task Force 

on Renewable Energy and Distributed Generation is focusing on expanding the use 

of technologies to harness wind power, solar power, hydropower, geothermal energy, 

and bioenergy. 

Partnership task forces will also work to expand the use of cleaner coal technologies, recognizing their potential for cost-effectively reducing emissions of air pollutants and greenhouse gases. 

In addition, the Partnership will explore market based approaches to encourage 

the deployment of clean energy technologies. 

The Partnership has no current plans to undertake activities related to nuclear 

technologies. 

Question: 

Hunger and food security continue to be critical humanitarian issues across much 

of sub-Saharan Africa and parts of Asia, as well as a major impediment to poverty 

reduction and economic productivity. I am pleased that the Fiscal Year 2007 budget 

request provides the flexibility to make 1⁄4 of emergency food aid funds available for 

local and regional purchase or as cash contributions. This will make food aid less 

expensive, more effective, and allow it to be more responsive to the impact on local 

markets. However, some have expressed concerns that these proposals for flexibility 

are an attempt to weaken the food aid program, reduce its size, and divide its supporters. Can you assure the Committee that your intent is to strengthen, rather than 

weaken, food aid programs? 

Response: 

It is our intent to strengthen the program by making it more effective. At the 

same time, the bulk of our program will continue to benefit American business as 

it has done in the past. We believe, however, that regardless of this, the groups who 

have historically supported food aid will continue to see the value of preventing famine and promoting food security abroad. Despite increasing pressure to reduce 

spending levels overall, the Administration’s budget request to Congress did not cut 

food aid for humanitarian crises. However, in the face of mounting emergency food 

aid needs, the new flexibility to purchase food aid locally will enable the United 

States to more effectively carry out the primary purpose of this program which is 

to save lives. 

69

Question: 

As a strong supporter of foreign assistance, I share the goals behind recently announced efforts to reform foreign assistance and make programs at the State Department and USAID more effective. At the same time, a number of questions have been 

raised about whether the new ‘‘transformational diplomacy’’ framework and efforts 

to bring USAID programs more closely under the control of the State Department 

will weaken the critical poverty reduction mission in favor of a focus primarily on 

governance and well-governed countries and whether long-term development efforts 

will be overtaken by short-term political and geo-strategic considerations. These fears 

have been exacerbated by yet another round of deep cuts in the President’s budget 

to core development accounts such as Development Assistance and Child Survival 

and Health and by the recent release of the ‘‘Policy Framework for Bilateral Foreign 

Aid.’’ Will proven programs aimed at poverty reduction and promoting human productivity such as basic education, health, agricultural development, drinking water 

and sanitation, and microfinance become less of a focus in U.S. foreign assistance 

programs under this new policy? 

Response: 

The new Framework for Foreign Assistance defines five objectives that, if 

achieved, support the transformational diplomacy goal of ‘‘helping to build and sustain democratic, well-governed states that will respond to the needs of their people 

and conduct themselves responsibly in the international system’’. These five objectives are: Peace and Security, Governing Justly and Democratically, Investing in 

People, Economic Growth and Humanitarian Assistance. Within the objective of Investing in People, you will find programs related to health, education, and the environment. Within the objective of economic growth you will find programs related to 

increasing agricultural productivity and the use of tools such as microfinance. Poverty reduction and improved human productivity will be achieved with USG support 

of well performing programs across the five objective areas that are building capacity at a local level. 

Implementation of the new Framework does not imply less focus on any one particular area of foreign assistance programs. Rather, the Framework serves to align 

U.S. foreign assistance programs with U.S. foreign policy goals and illustrate the 

opportunity costs associated with investing in one objective over another. As the 

Framework is applied to fiscal year 2007 funds, we will better assess the programmatic changes associated with this new approach. We look forward to briefing 

Congress throughout this process. 

Question: 

At the 2002 Monterrey Conference on Financing for Development, the United States 

agreed to a commitment to provide 0.7% of gross national product (GNP) as official 

development assistance (ODA) to developing countries by 2015. Despite recent increases, in 2004 the United States provided only 0.16% GNP in ODA, ranking it 21 

out of 22 major donor countries in terms of ODA as a percentage of GDP. Is it still 

the policy of the United States to meet its commitment to provide 0.7% by 2015? If 

so, how does the administration intend to make that happen? If not, have development finance needs changed, how does the administration intend to develop new resources to finance international development, and why does the United States appear 

to have a lesser commitment to international development? 

Response: 

The United States has never endorsed global aid volume targets. It sees the setting of targets as impractical (technically and legally) and timeframes for achievement as politically unacceptable. However, as stated in paragraph 42 of the 

Monterrey Consensus, the United States and the donor community will make efforts 

to move towards additional ODA (0.7%) but not as a binding commitment. Some 

other donors then and subsequently have specifically committed themselves to the 

0.7% target. 

At Monterrey in March 2002, the President announced an increase of 50 percent 

in U.S. foreign assistance by 2006, which translates into a $5 billion increase in Official Development Assistance (ODA) by 2006 from the 2000 base year total of $10.0 

billion. The United States surpassed its Monterrey commitment in FY 2003, three 

years in advance, when we achieved an ODA level of $16.3 billion. The United 

States continued to increase its ODA levels to $19.7 billion in 2004 and $27.5 billion 

in 2005—nearly tripled the 2000 level which raised the ODA/GDP ratio to 0.22 percent. The surge in U.S. ODA in 2000–2005 is the largest increase in U.S. foreign 

assistance since the Marshall Plan. The United States is the largest donor of ODA, 

more than double the ODA level for Japan in 2005. 

70

The United States emphasizes the dynamic role of private flows and the responsibility of developing countries themselves in the attainment of sustainable development. The Monterrey Consensus highlights these positions and clearly states the 

complementary, not primary, role of ODA in promoting democracy and economic 

growth. 

In terms of total economic engagement, the United States is the largest net importer of goods from developing countries as well as the largest source of private 

capital and private giving. The United States Official Development Assistance aims 

to leverage and expand these private flows which, in concert with domestic resources and good governance in the developing countries, represent the new resources for sustainable international development. 

Question: 

Similarly, in 2000 the United States joined the other members of the United Nations in unanimously adopting the Millennium Declaration, containing the Millennium Development Goals. However, in advance of the 2005 Millennium Summit, 

media reports indicate that Ambassador John Bolton attempted to remove every reference to the Millennium Development Goals from the Summit’s draft outcome document. Does the administration support achieving of the Millennium Development 

Goals? If so, was Ambassador Bolton acting on his own authority in contravention 

of administration policy? 

Response: 

As President Bush has made clear, the Administration strongly supports the Millennium Development Goals (also called the MDGs). 

In 2000, countries, including the United States, endorsed a set of time-bound 

goals related to poverty, hunger, health, education, and HIV/AIDS in the Millennium Declaration. 

Subsequent to the adoption of the Millennium Declaration, the UN Secretariat assigned indicators to the goals. These indicators were not endorsed by governments. 

Some of them violate U.S. policy, for example, the official development assistance 

(ODA) target of 0.7% of donors’ GNP. 

Over time there developed an ambiguity as to the meaning of MDGs; some parties 

used them to refer to the agreed-to goals; some used them to refer to the indicators. 

In the negotiations of the 2005 Summit Outcome Document, we successfully negotiated a definition of the Millennium Development Goals in the Outcome Document, 

defining the term to refer to the goals adopted in the Millennium Declaration of 

2000. 

Question: 

I understand that the State Department’s Architectural Design Branch is currently 

pushing all new office buildings to achieve LEEDΤΜ Certification and that three new 

U.S. embassies in Cote d’Ivoire, Armenia, and Bulgaria all feature recycled materials, daylighting, and landscape plant selections that don’t require irrigation systems. What are the State Department’s plans to promote the use of green building 

techniques and standards and what Congress can do to help the Department in this 

effort? 

Response: 

The building industry has an internationally recognized system to measure sustainable design and construction that is promulgated by the U.S. Green Building 

Council (USGBC). This system is the Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design (LEED) Green Building Rating System. LEED focuses on the following categories:

1. Sustainable Sites

2. Water Efficiency

3. Energy & Atmosphere

4. Materials & Resources, and

5. Indoor Environmental Quality

The Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations (OBO) began using the system in 

1999 as a yardstick to benchmark achievements in sustainable design and construction. OBO’s Design and Engineering Division (DE) requires new embassy and consulate compounds to earn 26 (out of 69) points defined by the LEED Green Building 

Rating System. The Architectural Design Branch of DE is currently finalizing the 

LEED certification for the new embassy compound in Sofia, Bulgaria. Two other 

pilot projects used LEED: Abidjan, Cote d’Ivoire, and Yerevan, Armenia. These two 

71

projects included many environmental features and represent best practice in green 

building technology. 

The embassy compound in Sofia earned points for site selection, brownfield redevelopment, reduced site disturbance, alternative transportation, heat island effect, 

water efficient irrigation, building water conservation, optimizing energy performance, chlorofluorocarbons reduction, commissioning, low emitting materials, thermal 

comfort, indoor chemical pollutant control, enhanced indoor air quality, enhanced 

life safety and security, and non-chemical water treatment of cooling tower water. 

The overall success of these three pilot projects was the catalyst for the present requirements to earn LEED certification. 

In January 2006, the Department of State joined 18 other Federal Agencies in 

signing the Federal Leadership in High Performance and Sustainable Buildings 

Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), which defined and galvanized Federal commitment to sustainable design and construction. OBO’s Sustainability Program:

1. Refines Policy & Contract Requirements

2. Pilots Emerging Technology

3. Collaborates with USGBC, Federal Agencies, and the Office of the Federal 

Environmental Executive

4. Continues Education & Training, and

5. Formally Recognizes Outstanding Performance by Design-Build Contractors

OBO is working to earn formal LEED certification for several other new embassy 

compounds including Panama City, Panama and Athens, Greece. At the time when 

security is of paramount importance to Americans overseas, OBO continues to 

produce high-performing buildings that are successful models of sustainable design 

and construction. OBO has recently submitted its Standard Embassy Design (SED) 

for evaluation and LEED certification so that green building features are embedded 

in the prototype design given to its Design/Build contactors. USGBC has partially 

approved the SED application. 

The successful implementation of sustainable technologies and strategies is challenged by budget decisions that focus on the initial outlays without consideration 

of the long-term savings and environmental benefits that will accrue through efficient operation over the life of the facility. We appreciate Congressional support of 

our programs, as well as interest in our LEED and sustainable building initiatives. 

Two more of OBO’s recent energy conservation projects are discussed in the attachment to this response. 

ATTACHMENT—NOTABLE OBO ENERGY CONSERVATION PROJECT

OBO has undertaken two projects to achieve sustainability in our building program through energy conservation: ‘‘Mag lev’’ chillers at Embassy Tokyo and a photovoltaic system at the U.S. Mission to the UN at Geneva. 

Tokyo 

At Embassy Tokyo, OBO is installing Magnetic Levitation (mag lev) Bearing Air 

Conditioning Technology that the Multistack Corporation of West Salem, WI manufactures. ‘‘TurboCor’’ breakthrough ‘‘mag lev’’ chiller technology fulfills an engineering promise to reduce motor and compressor bearing friction and heat, therefore, 

wasted energy. The benefits include:

• Unlike conventional oil lubricated compressors, the friction reduction promises sustainability in the form of peak efficiency over the life of the compressor.

• Oil-less compressors increase refrigeration cycle efficiency.

• Reduced friction and improved refrigeration efficiency lower the Embassy’s 

electrical energy cost.

• The ‘‘TurboCor’’ eliminates lubrication cost entirely and reduces maintenance 

costs.

• There is no need for a cooling tower and associate systems and maintenance. 

The system is tiny in comparison with the chiller and cooling tower system 

it replaces.

• The ‘‘TurboCor’’ chiller consists of modules that can be lifted to the roof in 

the Embassy elevator eliminating the need for a costly crane hoist.

• The six ‘‘TurboCor’’ modules significantly reduce the mass on the roof in this 

earthquake prone city, which improves safety. 

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Geneva 

Another OBO effort was the Geneva Photo Voltaic Project. It is the largest solar 

energy project (118 kWH peak) ever installed at a U.S. Government building overseas and was inaugurated at the U.S. Mission to the UN in Geneva on August 31, 

2005—a joint Swiss-American public-private partnership in Renewable Energy 

Technologies.

• The payback period of 9.04 years includes: Capital costs; Swiss subsidy; electric revenue; and cooling and fac ̧ade costs avoided.

• This ‘‘High Performance and Sustainable Building project supports the President’s National Energy Policy.

• General Charles E. Williams, OBO director, described it as OBO’s flagship 

projects for the State Department’s efforts to make U.S. embassies worldwide 

‘‘greener’’ and more self-sufficient.

• The progressive energy policies of Geneva’s Service Cantonale de L’Energie 

(ScanE) and the local power utility Services Industriels de Geneva (SIG) are 

central to the project. 

RESPONSES FROM THE HONORABLE CONDOLEEZZA RICE, THE SECRETARY OF STATE, 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY THE

HONORABLE DAN BURTON, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF

INDIANA

Question: 

I understand that the consular affairs office at the U.S. Embassy in Seoul has not 

been able to meet the growing demand for non-immigrant visas to the U.S. due to 

lack of space and personnel, resulting in unnecessary delays and frustration for our 

Korean friends, not to mention substantial loss of economic opportunity to the United 

States, particularly in the travel and tourism sectors. 

In light of this situation and considering that Korea has long been one of our closest allies, is there something we can do to help put more resources into our Consulate 

in Seoul? Or, alternatively, in your efforts to reorganize and reallocate the State Department’s diplomatic assets, is it possible to open up one or more additional consular offices in other Korean cities, perhaps first by reopening the U.S. Consulate in 

Pusan? I appreciate your thoughts on this matter. 

Response: 

Prior to August 1, 2003, the date the law mandating that a consular officer personally interview almost all applicants came into effect, the U.S. Embassy in Seoul 

interviewed about 35 percent of Koreans desiring U.S. visas. Today, almost all visa 

applicants must appear for personal interviews, putting significant demands on our 

staffing and physical space. 

In the past 24 months, the Department of State has assigned five additional Korean-speaking consular officers to assist with the added workload, bringing the total 

number of officers adjudicating visas to 37, one of the largest such complements 

worldwide. In addition, the consular section has been renovated and 13 more interviewing windows added. As a result of these improvements, as of May 15, 2006, the 

wait for a tourist or student visa appointment was only three days. Visa demand 

in Korea continues to increase, however, and there is simply no more room in the 

present facility for more staff or windows. The planned construction of a new Embassy (and larger consular section) is still several years away, delayed by the discovery of historically significant artifacts on several sites under consideration. 

Opening another Consulate in Korea would require significant investment of new 

financial and personnel resources. We have no plans to expand at the current time 

but continue to look at ways in which the visa process can be made even less burdensome. 

Question: 

What is your view on the recent Broadcasting Board of Governors vote to eliminate 

the Voice of America (VOA) Turkish Service? Turkey, a predominantly Muslim country with a secular population, has been a steadfast ally of the United States and I 

strongly believe Turkey should continue to play a prominent role in U.S.-EU and 

U.S.-Middle East relations. With the growth of alternative media sources in Turkey, 

such as Al Jazeera, shouldn’t the United States continue to broadcast its message 

to the people of Turkey via VOA as an important part of President Bush’s Middle 

East Peace Initiative? 

73

Response: 

The Administration’s FY 07 budget focuses on U.S. foreign policy priorities and 

the struggle against extremism. In order to fund high priority enhancements, difficult choices had to be made. 

One of the factors taken into consideration in considering language service cuts 

was audience reach. In the case of VOA Turkish radio, audience share appears to 

be quite low (less than 2 percent for radio). Another factor was the presence of a 

vibrant, competitive local media environment. In Turkey, audiences have access to 

hundreds of private TV and satellite channels, local radio stations, and print publications. 

VOA Turkish television continues to broadcast a weekly 30-minute program that 

initial surveys indicate has higher audience reach than radio, but BBG is validating 

these results. 

Question: 

The Administration’s request for international basic education for Fiscal Year 2007 

is $256 million. The President highlighted the importance of basic education, especially the unmet educational needs of girls throughout the world, in the State of the 

Union. I applaud you in joining the President by including education among the elements critical to transformational diplomacy. Why then has the Administration decided to cut funding drastically to programs that support the transformational 

change that is the stated goal of our foreign assistance? 

Response: 

The new Strategic Framework for Foreign Assistance describes five objectives 

that, if achieved, will support the transformational diplomacy goal of ‘‘helping to 

build and sustain democratic, well-governed states that will respond to the needs 

of their people and conduct themselves responsibly in the international system’’. 

One of the key programs in the Investing in People objective is basic education for 

women and girls. The importance of these programs is also reflected in the 

$70million increase in the FY07 request over the FY06 requested level for basic education. 

RESPONSES FROM THE HONORABLE CONDOLEEZZA RICE, THE SECRETARY OF STATE, 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY THE

HONORABLE JOSEPH CROWLEY, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE

OF NEW YORK

Question: 

In addition, given the funding cuts to basic education from the Development Assistance Account (DA) and that funding for basic education from other accounts, such 

as the Economic Support Fund (ESF), is focused on only a few countries that are 

strategically important to the U.S., such as Afghanistan, Iraq and Sudan: 

a) How will the funding cuts to DA impact the overall U.S. assistance for basic 

education? 

b) Will the number of countries receiving basic education assistance be reduced? 

c) What countries will be affected? 

d) What are the Administration’s priorities for basic education funding? 

e) How many fewer children will be educated because of this dramatic cut in funding? 

Response: 

The decline in DA funding for education reflects a decline in the overall level of 

DA funding. The proportion of basic education within the DA request remains unchanged from FY 2006. At the same time, the ESF request has increased and will 

partially offset the lower levels of DA. Please see accompanying chart.

74


26078a.eps
75

Forty-seven out of 49 countries that are receiving basic education assistance in 

FY 2006 will continue to receive assistance in basic education in FY 2007. Of the 

original 49, 45 of these countries will receive DA and/or ESF funds.

• In Madagascar and Rwanda, specific basic education interventions are coming 

to successful completion in FY 2006, e.g., by fulfilling our commitment to provide basic education to genocide orphans in Rwanda.

• The elimination of basic education funding for Benin in the FY 2007 request 

was a result of the decision to better focus and concentrate DA resources in 

Africa. With the exception of a small amount of democracy governance funding targeted at fighting corruption, the Benin program in the FY 07 request 

now addresses only child survival and health issues.

• Malawi’s DA program was also reduced in size and scope in order to better 

concentrate scarce DA resources where the greatest results could be achieved. 

As a result, funding for basic education was eliminated.

The FY 2007 budget request provides for increases in Basic Education funding for: 

Kenya, Liberia, Mali, Namibia, Nigeria, Somalia, Uganda, Afghanistan, Cambodia, 

Jordan, Morocco, Yemen, Bolivia, and the Dominican Republic. 

The Administration’s priorities for basic education funding adapted to individual 

countries’ needs are to improve early childhood development, primary education and 

secondary education, delivered in formal and non-formal settings. It includes literacy, numeracy, and other basic skills programs for youth and adults. 

Many factors besides USAID programming levels affect school enrollment. Effective assistance for basic education demonstrates results and complements other 

forms of assistance in integrated country strategies. Our objective is to increase access to a quality education, through both formal and informal channels, for all, in 

the developing world in the context of rapidly expanding school enrollments. 

Question: 

Given the strong support from key leaders like Bishop Tutu, the support of the 

United States and 9 other countries on the Council, and the support of the Secretary 

General, isn’t the next logical step that we press for a binding UN Security Council 

resolution on Burma in the coming months? 

Response: 

The U.S. has led the way in pressing for United Nations action on Burma, and 

we are engaged on many levels. 

As we have said consistently, we believe the situation in Burma is so dire—and 

the threats emanating from the country so clear—that the UN Security Council has 

a critical role to play in addressing the tragedy unfolding there. There is clearly 

growing concern among Council members about the deplorable situation in Burma. 

We look forward to Under Secretary General for Political Affairs Gambari’s report 

to the Security Council on his recent trip there. 

We will work with other Council members to find a way to support Under Secretary General Gambari’s efforts to press for the release of political detainees, including Aung San Suu Kyi, and to promote inclusive and genuine political dialogue 

in Burma that empowers Burma’s people to decide their own future. We are not ruling out any Council action, up to and including a possible resolution. At the same 

time, we also continue to coordinate our bilateral diplomatic efforts with partners 

and key players in the region. 

As President Bush said in Kyoto, ‘‘The people of Burma live in the darkness of 

tyranny—but the light of freedom shines in their hearts. They want their liberty—

and one day, they will have it.’’

Question: 

In his FY07 budget, the president proposes deleting important condom non-disparagement language, which Congress included in the FY06 spending bill. This language ensures that the information overseas health clinics provide to clients about 

condoms, in the context of global AIDS work, be medically accurate and include the 

public-health benefits and failure rates of condom use. May I assume that you agree 

that groups receiving U.S. funds to provide information about the role of condoms 

in preventing HIV/AIDS should provide information that is complete and medically 

accurate? 

Response: 

The President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) programs support the 

provision of full and accurate information about correct and consistent condom use 

76

reducing, but not eliminating, the risk of HIV infection; and support access to 

condoms for those most at risk for transmitting or becoming infected with HIV. 

The ABC (Abstinence, Be Faithful, and Correct and Consistent Condom Use) approach recognizes that comprehensive services, including risk reduction and risk 

avoidance counseling, linkages to HIV counseling and testing, treatment of sexually 

transmitted infections (STIs), and promotion of correct and consistent condom use, 

are essential means of reducing the risk of HIV infection for individuals who engage 

in high-risk activity. 

Question: 

Can you explain why administration would want to strike this assurance? Are 

there any other instances in which we pay overseas health clinics to omit or censor 

medically accurate information? 

Response: 

There are no instances in which PEPFAR funds overseas health clinics to intentionally omit or censor medically accurate information. 

Question: 

In your January 2005 remarks about transformational diplomacy and foreign assistance reform, you talked about the Administration’s goal of increasing the effectiveness of U.S. international assistance and putting taxpayer money to the best use 

possible. One of the clearest lessons from the past three decades of development experience is that in order to be effective, development efforts must take into account the 

different roles that women and men play in societies when designing interventions. 

If we are truly committed to increasing the effectiveness of our assistance, institutional reform efforts must look at how U.S. assistance can finally fully integrate gender systematically across all programs so that both women and men benefit. How 

will you address the lack of consistent gender integration in U.S. international assistance initiatives? 

Response: 

I intend to hold those who implement foreign assistance accountable for integrating gender into their programs and for showing results. The Office of Women 

in Development is developing an analysis of how USAID has performed in integrating gender into the previous country strategy system and into procurement decisions. These efforts will form a basis for strengthening the integration of gender in 

all areas of U.S. foreign assistance. 

Question: 

I want to target this question specifically to the Administration’s Fiscal Year 2007 

request for funding for peacekeeping in Sudan. Last year, the total Administration 

request for Sudan peacekeeping was $375 million, which supported the roughly 

5,000-strong UNMIS force in southern Sudan. This year, the request for Sudan 

Peacekeeping includes a healthy increase of $67 million—about 18% more than 2006. 

If all goes well at the Security Council, an additional 10,000 troops may be put 

under UN command in Darfur, and 5,000 more troops may become active in southern Sudan to bring that force up to its planned level. Can you outline for the Committee how the funds requested for peacekeeping in Sudan will be apportioned between Darfur and southern Sudan and how the possible tripling of the forces in 

Sudan can be sustained by this request level? 

Response: 

The Administration request of $442 million for FY 2007 for UNMIS Sudan operations reflects the annualized costs of expanding the mission into the Darfur region 

in FY 2006. 

In the absence of detailed specific UN plans for a full year of Sudan operations 

in FY 2007 including a Southern element and a Darfur element, we estimate that 

the United States will be assessed $282 million for the basic UNMIS operations mission for the South and that Darfur operations would add $160 million to that 

amount. 

Question: 

After the historic events in 2004, there is a new priority on Europe—a democratic 

Ukraine. I know the support the Administration has for this young democracy. Stating that, do you think that support has been adequately reflected in this year’s budget? 

77

Response: 

The Administration is committed to supporting Ukraine’s democratic transition. 

In worldwide assistance, the Administration has placed a priority on the Millennium Challenge and Global HIV/AIDS Initiative (GHAI) assistance accounts. 

Ukraine has qualified for FY06 Millennium Challenge Account Threshold status and 

has submitted a two-year, $45.6 million Threshold Plan to the Millennium Challenge Corporation for funding consideration. The Administration has also requested 

a FREEDOM Support Act country assistance budget for Ukraine of $85 million for 

FY 07. Funding needs in Ukraine need to be carefully prioritized given the decline 

in the Administration’s overall FY 07 FREEDOM Support Act funding request to 

$441 million (down from the $508 million FY06 appropriation), as well as the ever 

larger percentage of the Ukraine FSA budget needed to meet the U.S. pledge for 

the Chernobyl shelter (approximately $20 million of the requested $85 million). That 

said, based on current assessments and a Ukrainian MCA Threshold Program (if 

approved), our proposed FY07 Ukraine budget will cover the funding needs we anticipate for Fiscal Year 2007. 

Question: 

The administration has requested nearly 40% more military assistance (FMF, 

IMET, NADR) for Azerbaijan than Armenia ($10,180,000 for Azerbaijan and only 

$6,290,000 for Armenia), despite an agreement with Congress to maintain military 

aid parity between the countries when Congress authorized the President to waive 

Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act which prevents military assistance to Azerbaijan. 

Why has the Administration violated this understanding concerning military aid 

parity? 

Response: 

As a Co-Chair of the OSCE Minsk Group, our goal is to help Armenia and Azerbaijan achieve a peaceful resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Military assistance to both countries in light of that ongoing conflict is carefully considered and 

calibrated to ensure that it does not hamper ongoing efforts to negotiate a peaceful 

settlement between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Although the Rambouillet summit between the two presidents marked a temporary stall in negotiations, the process has 

gained momentum again with a series of individual visits by Minsk Group CoChairs to the region. We continue to view 2006 as the necessary window for the 

sides to reach an agreement. At the same time, we are strongly urging the presidents to prepare their publics for peace, not for war. 

While we do not have a policy that security assistance funding levels for Armenia 

and Azerbaijan should be identical, we work to ensure that assistance does not adversely affect the military balance between the two states. We do not believe that 

the differences in security assistance in the FY 2007 budget requests undermine 

prospects for peace or send the wrong message. 

The waiver of Section 907 of the FREEDOM Support Act every year since 2002 

has allowed us to provide military assistance that enhances Azerbaijan’s interoperability with NATO and U.S. forces and furthers U.S. peacekeeping objectives. These 

funds also allow us to assist Azerbaijan in developing capabilities to promote Caspian security and indigenous humanitarian demining capabilities. We provide assistance to Armenia for similar purposes. 

Question: 

United States policy in the South Caucasus seeks to foster regional cooperation and 

economic integration and includes open borders and transport and communication 

corridors. In a move that undermines U.S. efforts to end Turkey’s blockade of Armenia, the President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev has initiated a project to construct a 

new rail line linking Turkey, Georgia, and Azerbaijan while bypassing Armenia. The 

proposal is estimated to cost up to $800 million and would take three years to complete. 

The aim of this costly approach is to isolate Armenia by enhancing the ongoing 

Turkish and Azerbaijani blockades and to keep the existing Turkey-Armenia-Georgia 

rail link shut down. This ill-conceived project runs counter to U.S. policy, ignores 

the standing Kars-Gymri route, is politically and economically flawed and serves to 

destabilize the region. 

As reported in August by Azertag—Azerbaijan’s official news agency, President 

Aliyev declared, ‘‘We are currently working on a new project—a new rail road KarsAkhalkalaki-Tbilisi-Baku . . . If we succeed with this project, the Armenians will 

end in complete isolation, which would create an additional problem for their future, 

their already bleak future. . . .’’

78

This proposed rail link would not only undermine U.S. policy goals for the region, 

but would also specifically isolate Armenia as evidenced by President Aliyev’s recent 

remarks. Does the Administration support the rail line that would bypass Armenia 

as an alternative to the Kars-Gymri route? 

Response: 

The U.S. Government strongly encourages regional integration in the Caucasus. 

Removing trade barriers would improve regional integration and enhance economic 

cooperation and development. 

Regional integration should, of course, include all countries of the region. We have 

long believed that opening the border between Turkey and Armenia would contribute to the economies of both countries. 

The proposed railway would bypass Armenia, and thus, not facilitate integration 

of all three South Caucasus countries. We have no plans to support such a railway 

financially. 

Question: 

Has the Administration allocated or expended any federal agency funds or otherwise provided financial support for the intended project? 

Response: 

No, the Administration has not allocated or expended any federal agency funds 

or otherwise provided financial support for the intended project 

Question: 

What steps is the Administration taking to urge the government of Azerbaijan to 

reject this counterproductive proposal? 

Response: 

We consider this proposal to be a commercial matter between sovereign governments. None of these governments have specifically asked the United States to support the project politically or financially. 

The U.S. Government strongly encourages regional integration in the Caucasus. 

Removing trade barriers would improve regional integration and enhance economic 

cooperation and development. 

The proposed railway would bypass Armenia and thus not be beneficial to regional integration. We have no plans to support such a railway financially. 

RESPONSES FROM THE HONORABLE CONDOLEEZZA RICE, THE SECRETARY OF STATE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY THE

HONORABLE CONNIE MACK, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF

FLORIDA

VENEZUELA

Question: 

Secretary Rice, would you comment on the situation in Venezuela and discuss what 

other areas where we should concentrate resources in Venezuela? 

Response: 

The Administration repeatedly has expressed our concern about the deterioration 

of democracy in Venezuela and the government’s increasingly authoritarian direction. 

Over the past year, we have witnessed greater concentration of power in the executive, elimination of checks and balances, persecution of the democratic opposition 

and civil society, restrictions on press freedom, erosion of property rights, and increased militarization. Venezuela’s cooperation on counter-narcotics and counter-terrorism has deteriorated significantly. The amount of illicit drugs transiting through 

Venezuela is on the rise, and the government has continued to deepen its relationship with state sponsors of terrorism such as Cuba and Iran. 

Strengthening democracy in the Hemisphere is an important part of the President’s Global Freedom Agenda. It is a core goal of the Hemisphere’s democracies 

themselves, as expressed in the Inter-American Democratic Charter. To help preserve democratic space for civil society, the Administration is providing funding to 

a variety of human rights, civic, and other NGOs. We are also supporting political 

party building efforts on a bi-partisan basis through the International Republican 

Institute (IRI) and the National Democratic Institute (NDI). At the same time, we 

are closely monitoring draft legislation in the Venezuelan Congress which would severely restrict the right of Venezuelan NGO’s to accept assistance from abroad. 

79

The international community can play a key role by providing political and financial support for civil society groups who need resources to carry out their work. The 

Administration is reaching out to our European and Hemispheric friends to fill this 

need, and we are encouraged by their positive response. 

In our public diplomacy efforts, we are reaching out to traditionally marginalized 

communities in Venezuela by providing opportunities to learn English; opening information resource centers to the public; bringing high school baseball players and 

coaches to the U.S.; offering public service and leadership training seminars in the 

U.S. for young Venezuelans; and offering grants to child care and youth centers in 

poor communities. 

As a signatory to the Inter-American Democratic Charter, Venezuela has a responsibility to uphold democracy, human rights and rule of law. We will continue 

to work with our international partners, the Organization of American States and 

civil society to help all Venezuelans realize their democratic aspirations. 

Question: 

In your opinion, how serious are the threats posed by President Cha ́vez to the region? 

Response: 

The Administration is deeply concerned about the Venezuelan government’s effort 

to undermine the Hemispheric consensus on democracy, economic integration, and 

security by subverting democratic institutions at home, promoting statist economic 

policies, and meddling in the affairs of neighboring countries. 

The Venezuelan government is harming the country’s democratic institutions and 

its economic future. Venezuela’s poor cooperation on counter-narcotics and failure to 

work to interdict the increased movement of illicit drugs and narco-traffickers 

through its territory last year resulted in its decertification, pursuant to Section 706 

of 2002–2003 the Foreign Relations Authorization Act (p.l. 107–228), for having 

‘‘failed demonstrably’’ to adhere to its counter-narcotics obligations. The government’s counter-terrorism cooperation has been equally deficient. Its growing ties to 

Iran, close relationship and intelligence cooperation with Cuba, and failure to deny 

safe-haven to Colombian FARC and ELN terrorists are not conducive to the peace 

and stability. 

The Venezuelan government’s overt efforts to influence presidential elections in 

Peru, its intervention in Bolivia, bullying tactics in regional fora and use of petrodiplomacy to try to win loyalty are generating a backlash. Mexico and Peru both 

have publicly expressed their concern. In November of last year, Mexico expelled the 

Venezuelan Ambassador for participating in partisan political activities. 

We are reaching out to our friends in the region and Europe to try to steer Venezuela in a more democratic and cooperative direction and looking for ways to engage Venezuela on counter-narcotics and counter-terrorism. We are bringing these 

concerns to the attention of arms suppliers as Venezuela continues its arms buildup program. 

The Administration is committed to working with responsible, democratic governments across the political spectrum to increase freedom and opportunity and reduce 

poverty by strengthening democratic institutions, promoting free trade and development, and investing in people. The ten elections (both presidential and legislative) 

in the region in 2006 are providing an opportunity for citizens to decide their future. 

We are confident that most governments and the majority of the Hemisphere’s citizens will choose a genuine democratic path. 

Question: 

For the last nine months, I have been working with the State Department and the 

United States Embassy in the Bahamas on the behalf of two Cuban doctors, Dr. 

David Gonzalez-Mejias and Dr. Marialis Darias-Mesa, who are being held in a prison camp in Nassau, Bahamas. However, despite numerous official requests for their 

release and meetings between our governments, the Bahamian government continues 

to deliberate and drag its feet about releasing these doctors to our custody. I want 

to thank Ambassador John Rood for all of his help in the case. And, I want to ask 

for your continued assistance on fighting for the release of these doctors to US custody so they can start a new life in freedom. 

Any ideas on how we can get the two Cuban doctors being held in the Bahamas 

released? 

Response: 

On March 14, The Bahamas released two Cuban dentists, Marialis Darias Mesa 

and David Gonzalez Mesa, thus allowing them to be reunited with their families in 

80

the United States. We are pleased that The Bahamas arrived at this decision, which 

was based on humanitarian grounds. 

RESPONSES FROM THE HONORABLE CONDOLEEZZA RICE, THE SECRETARY OF STATE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY THE

HONORABLE MICHAEL MCCAUL, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE

OF TEXAS

Question: 

In the 20 plus years since Hezbollah was founded by Iranian revolutionaries, they 

have spread their agents and their influence as far around the globe as they could. 

Beneath our noses they have established a vast network of sleeper agents and fundraisers across the Western Hemisphere, including within the United States itself. 

For several years the Justice Department investigated a group of Hezbollah terrorists who ran among other things cigarette smuggling operations out of Charlotte, 

North Carolina. The funds raised from these and other illegal activities were shipped 

back to Lebanon to help finance Hezbollah’s global operations. Each member of this 

cell had received training in weapons and explosives prior to coming to the U.S. They 

were able to enter the U.S. by flying from the Middle East to various locations in 

South America, and use fake South American passports to enter the U.S. 

We concentrate a lot of effort cleaning terrorists out of Iraq, and with good reason, 

however the terrorists have been able to build a vast network in our own backyard. 

What diplomatic efforts have we attempted, or can we attempt in the future to address the problem of Hemispheric Security? What diplomatic efforts can the U.S. use 

to work with the countries in our hemisphere to find and remove these terrorist 

agents? 

Response: 

The Administration shares Congress’ concern about Hezbollah’s global reach and 

its efforts to spread its influence in our hemisphere. Hezbollah and its sponsor state 

Iran have been implicated in the only terrorist attacks perpetrated by Islamic radicals in Latin America—the bombings of the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires in 

1992, and of the Argentina-Israel Mutual Association in 1994 that killed over 100 

people. 

While there is no credible evidence of the existence currently of operational 

Hezbollah cells in Latin America, Hezbollah has numerous supporters and sympathizers throughout Arab and Muslim communities in the region who are involved 

primarily in raising funds for the terrorist group, by licit and illicit means. 

We are working with all our partners in the Americas to heighten awareness of 

this threat and to take the necessary measures to contain and eventually dismantle 

their activities in this hemisphere. Our focus has been on thwarting terror financing, improving border controls, strengthening our friends’ intelligence capabilities, 

and urging adoption of stricter counterterrorism legislation. Together, we have made 

important progress in all areas. 

Since 9/11, governments in the Americas have adopted myriad legislation and regulatory frameworks to deny the use of the formal international financial and payments system to would-be terrorists. During this process, the United States has provided technical assistance to various allies, and established information-sharing 

mechanisms between our financial transaction oversight body (FINCEN) and those 

of our friends. Progress on this front, for example, has allowed Panama, a nation 

which just six years ago was named a non-cooperating jurisdiction with regard to 

money laundering by the multinational Financial Action Task Force, to become a 

leader in anti-money laundering and anti-terror financing legislation that today 

lends its expertise to the region and around the world. 

As regards, border controls, the United States has provided, through the Organization of American States’ Interamerican Committee Against Terrorism (CICTE in 

Spanish), over $5 million for training to improve airport and maritime port security 

and to strengthen our allies’ capabilities to regulate who is moving into and through 

their countries. We are also working on a bilateral basis with selected countries to 

upgrade their terrorist lookout systems at ports of entry. 

On the critical component of intelligence, U.S. bilateral cooperation with our hemispheric partners is, with only a few notable exceptions, excellent. Perhaps more importantly, intelligence and information sharing among our neighbors is at an unprecedented high. We are particularly encouraged by the growing collaboration 

among Brazil, Argentina and Paraguay to address smuggling, drug and arm trafficking, money laundering, fraud, intellectual property piracy, and other 

transnational crime in the region where the three meet, the Tri Border Area. This 

81

is a region where persons we suspect of supporting Hezbollah previously ran criminal enterprises virtually unmolested. No longer. Through formal dialogue with the 

U.S., the three have begun to institutionalize what were once ad-hoc cooperative or 

coordinated activities among local officials. And a number of these suspects have 

been prosecuted by our three partners for a variety of crimes. 

Equally important, almost all the nations of the hemisphere have adopted legislation codifying the obligations imposed on UN Member States by UN Security Council Resolutions 1267, 1373 and 1540. These are the foundations of international law 

in the fight against terrorism. 

Challenges remain. Most of our neighbors in the hemisphere have high competing 

priorities for scarce public resources, making it politically difficult to invest even 

modestly in CT capabilities when basic social services such as education and 

healthcare remain under-funded. Official corruption is another serious problem that 

can undermine the most advanced training and the most sophisticated detection systems. 

We have more to do in the legislative arena—no Latin American country has in 

place, or is seriously considering adopting, Terrorist Designation regimes that would 

make membership in and support for a designated terrorism organization a crime. 

In the case of Hezbollah, this is an especially high hill to climb, particularly as a 

some of our neighbors consider Hezbollah a legitimate political party. 

Last, we must contend with Cuba and Venezuela. The former has been a state 

sponsor of terrorism for many years, although we have no credible information of 

Cuban involvement with Hezbollah. The latter was recently designated by Secretary 

Rice, under the Arms Export Control Act, as a state that is ‘‘not cooperating fully’’ 

with U.S. efforts against terrorism. This determination was based on Venezuela’s 

overall actions against terrorism, the Venezuelan government’s public statements in 

international fora addressing terrorism, Venezuela’s conduct toward terrorist organizations, and the Venezuelan government’s relations with state sponsors of terror. 

On all fronts, the behavior of the Venezuelan government was found, and remains, 

wanting. 

As regards ties to Hezbollah, the Chavez government is pursuing closer relations 

with Hezbollah’s principal sponsor Iran. Venezuela has concluded a plethora of 

agreements with Iran, ranging from investment pacts, to pledges of support against 

military aggression (ostensibly from the United States), to defending Iran’s nuclear 

ambitions and voting, along with Syria and Cuba only, against referring Iran to the 

UN Security Council to answer for its attempts to develop nuclear energy without 

any UN or International Atomic Energy Agency oversight. 

Question: 

A very under noticed aspect of the situation in the Palestinian territories is the oppression of Palestinian Christians. This group is an ever shrinking minority whose 

situation has worsened with the election of Hamas, a group whose tolerance towards 

minorities is not only less that stellar but downright appalling. Many traditionally 

Christian towns and cities including Bethlehem, the birthplace of Jesus, have been 

systematically cleansed of Christian population and influence. This was as true 

under Fatah leadership as it will be under Hamas. 

Why has this issue not been brought to the forefront of our dealings with the Palestinians? What good is a Palestinian Democracy if there is no tolerance towards minorities? What can we do to improve the situation of Palestinian Christians? 

Response: 

We share your concerns about the dwindling presence of Palestinian Christians 

and the election of Hamas, an organization that is on the State Department’s list 

of Foreign Terrorist Organizations. Our Office of International Religious Freedom 

closely monitors the situation of all religious minorities in Israel and the Occupied 

Territories. The U.S. Consulate General in Jerusalem discusses religious freedom 

issues with the Palestinians, and the U.S. Embassy in Tel Aviv discusses religious 

freedom issues with the Government of Israel as part of its overall policy to promote 

human rights in the Occupied Territories. 

Although, President Mahmud Abbas has taken steps to eliminate religious incitement, there have been reports that Palestinian Authority (PA) security forces and 

judicial officials have colluded with criminal elements to extort property illegally 

from Christian landowners in the Bethlehem area. While we are unaware of any 

recent reports of Christians being targeted for extortion or abuse, the PA has not 

taken action to investigate past injustices allegedly perpetrated by PA officials. 

According to Christian leaders, most of the Christians in the Bethlehem area left 

their homes not due to religious discrimination, but for economic and security reasons associated with the violence of the Second Intifada, the restrictions resulting 

82

from Israeli closure policies, and the construction of the Israeli separation barrier, 

and the negative impact of both on the local economy. However, with the election 

of the Hamas government, we will watch closely for any movement toward restrictions on religious freedom for the Palestinian people and discrimination against religious minorities. 

RESPONSES FROM THE HONORABLE CONDOLEEZZA RICE, THE SECRETARY OF STATE, 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY THE

HONORABLE GREGORY W. MEEKS, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE

STATE OF NEW YORK

Question: 

The 2007 foreign aid request foresees a sharp decline in badly needed development 

aid to Latin America through USAID’s core accounts (DA, CSH and ESF). The region-wide request of $462 million through these accounts represents a 10 percent 

drop from 2006 levels and a 17 percent drop from 2005. The budget also includes 

cuts in alternative developments for the Andean region, outside of Colombia. Given 

that between 25–40 percent of the region’s population still toils in grinding poverty, 

how do you justify a third consecutive year of drastic cuts in core development accounts for the countries in Latin America and the Caribbean? The Western Hemisphere Subcommittee of this committee held hearings on development needs in Latin 

America, and subcommittee members, including both the chair and the ranking 

member, expressed great concern at the drop in U.S. assistance to Latin America. 

Now we see a proposal that cuts assistance even further, in the face of real needs 

in the region. Please tell us where Latin America fits in the Administration’s foreign 

policy priorities, and how this budget reflects that? 

Response: 

Latin America is an important priority for the Administration. Foreign assistance 

for the region has nearly doubled since the start of this Administration, from 

$862,452,000 in FY 2001 to $1,696,841,000 in FY 2007. Although the FY 2007 request for Latin America represents an overall decrease of one percent from the FY 

2006 request, it does not reflect a reduced commitment to Latin America. The President’s request will provide sufficient funds to maintain key programs. In addition 

to FY 2007 foreign assistance, the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) has approved compacts for Nicaragua ($175 million) and Honduras ($215 million). On February 8, MCC’s Board approved a $35 million program for Paraguay as a Threshold 

Country. MCC funding has actually increased the total resources available to the 

region. 

Question: 

As of February 15, 26,000 Colombian paramilitaries are to have turned themselves 

in to the government in exchange for light (or no) penalties, and entered programs 

for their ‘‘reinsertion’’ into society. 

a) Some 3 million people in Colombia have lost their land from political violence, 

one million just in the last few years. Many African-Colombians and indigenous people were forced off their land by paramilitary threats and brutal violence. Yet the 

paramilitaries who have demobilized have turned in remarkably little in the way of 

land. When the Colombian government talks about reparations to victims, it seems 

to be largely symbolic, and does not include land. What will the United States do 

to ensure that paramilitary groups reveal their illicit land holdings as they are supposed to do in order to receive judicial benefits? How will the United States help to 

ensure that returns are possible for at least some of Colombia’s 3 million displaced? 

How will the United States ensure that our programs do not support projects on land 

obtained by violence? 

b) The African Colombian community is being ravaged by violence and there has 

been an increase in violence over recent months. The affect on the population is devastating and as a result, the next generation cannot develop intellectually to solve 

there (sic) problems. As an alternative, we should extend full scholarships to African 

Colombians so they get the opportunity to acquire the educational skills to solve their 

own problems. In return, they will be great Ambassadors of U.S. democracy and way 

of life. How much money and what scholarships opportunities exist for African Colombians? How does this amount compare to dollar amounts from previous years? 

What programs are in the pipeline to increase the outreach and recruiting of African 

Colombians? 

c) Descendants of Africa are the poorest of the poor in Latin America ranking 

alongside indigenous communities, what is being done to address the needs of these 

83

communities particularly in the area of access to resources, education, healthcare, 

running water, etc. . . . and what is being done to make certain the voices of these 

communities are heard during trade talks? 

Response (a): 

The Justice and Peace Law requires individuals to confess involvement in all past 

crimes, turn over any proceeds of illegal activity or facilitate the turning over of illegal assets by his/her group, provide knowledge that could lead to the dismantling 

of illegal armed groups or facilitate the dismantlement of his/her own group, facilitate the release of or knowledge of the location of kidnap victims, and other acts 

that would demonstrate effective contribution to the national peace process. An individual can obtain the benefits provided by the law only after meeting these requirements. In addition, individuals who do not meet all the requirements of the Colombian demobilization program, including disclosure requirements, will not be eligible 

for any programs that receive U.S. assistance. 

To date, over 30,000 members of the Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) have 

collectively demobilized under the Justice and Peace Law. The AUC was required 

to concentrate its forces for demobilization, present lists of members, commit all 

members to the sign statements renouncing membership in the group, surrender all 

arms and munitions, release any kidnap victims or minors recruited into the group 

and turn over group proceeds of illegal activity. Between 2003 and 2006, the AUC 

turned over 59 urban properties, over 10,000 acres of rural properties, 149 vehicles 

and 3 airplanes. Surrender of these assets clearly represents only the beginning of 

the process. 

U.S. programs to assist the Colombian Government are intended to strengthen 

the legal framework for stricter implementation of the demobilization program. To 

do this, $1.7 million for strengthening the legal framework has been reprogrammed 

from FY 2005 funds. Additional funding will be the subject of further consultations 

with Congress. 

We believe procedures in place for providing support to development projects in 

Colombia are adequate to ensure that no projects will be undertaken with U.S. 

funds on land that may have been obtained by former paramilitaries through violence. 

Depending on circumstances, such safeguards include a vetting of all organizations selected to implement projects as well as investigations and assurances of 

property title. U.S. funds will not be used for economic development activities on 

stolen lands because the project reviews (conducted by both the technical assistance 

team and the local banks that provide loan funds) require proof that borrowers have 

legal titles to the land where development projects will be implemented. 

Additionally, we routinely vet all groups that apply for assistance to ensure that 

persons and groups to be assisted are not criminals, narcotics traffickers or terrorists, including through contacts with local police and with the Prosecutor General’s 

Office. 

Response (b): 

In 2005 the U.S. Embassy in Bogota ́ launched the Martin Luther King (MLK) 

English Language Fellows Program. This pilot program provides two years of 

English language and leadership training to economically disadvantaged Afro-Colombian university students who demonstrate leadership potential and a strong interest in U.S. post-graduate study. Prior to this program, there were no Department 

of State sponsored higher education programs that specifically targeted Afro-Colombians. 

The Department of State provided $15,000 in 2005 to fund 12 MLK Fellows from 

Bogota ́. In 2006 an additional $15,000 was provided to support 12 more MLK Fellows. Our Embassy in Bogota ́ has worked with private sources to secure an addi- tional $30,000 to replicate the program with 24 Fellows in Cali, Colombia’s third 

city. We plan to provide $350,000 in 2006 to support a new regional English teaching 

initiative targeted at marginalized communities throughout the Hemisphere. This 

program will provide Afro-Latino, indigenous, and other economically disadvantaged 

high school students in the region with English language training, as well as mentoring, and academic advising. The goal is to increase students’ access to higher education and prepare them for scholarship opportunities in Latin America and the 

U.S. including Fulbright, Humphrey, and other U.S. programs. There are plans for 

inclusion of at least nine Afro-Colombians in this new initiative. 

Response (c): 

In the specific case of Colombia, the United States has helped Afro-Colombian and 

indigenous communities find employment through alternative development proVerDate Mar 21 2002 16:22 Sep 12, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00087 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\FULL\021606\26078.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
84

grams, worked with communities to complete small infrastructure projects, provided 

support for several Afro-Colombian conferences aimed at formulating a development 

agenda, worked with communities to develop national, regional and local human 

rights action plans, provided food security assistance to vulnerable areas, supported 

internally displaced persons, and created a program to help prevent recruitment of 

Afro-Colombian youth into the armed conflict. 

All Latin American countries where the U.S. provides trade development assistance have committed to developing strategies for national trade capacity building. 

These strategies emphasize the establishment of processes and mechanisms for including input from the private sector and broader civil society. This broader effort 

by host-country governments to organize outreach events in both urban and rural 

venues provides objective information on the benefits of free trade and the scope of 

the treaties under negotiation. This in turn expands opportunities for the voices of 

all of a country’s citizens, including Afro-Latinos, to be heard during trade talks. 

While it is not known how widely host country governments vetted national Trade 

Capacity Building (TCB) strategies with Afro-Latino communities, these TCB strategies highlighted the need to help the poor (e.g., Afro-Latinos and/or indigenous communities) who may not or likely would not be able to compete in the face of cheaper 

imports coming in from the United States. In addition, particular attention was paid 

to arranging sessions for lead negotiators to meet with representatives of small- and 

medium-sized enterprises, with this opportunity being open to all such representatives, including any Afro-Latino or Indigenous representatives participating in a 

given round. 

Question: 

As of February 15, 2006, 26,000 Colombian paramilitaries are to have turned 

themselves into the government in exchange for light (or no) penalties, and entered 

programs for their ‘‘reinsertion’’ into society. 

(b) The African Colombian community is being ravaged by violence and there has 

been an increase in violence over recent months. The effect on the population is devastating and as a result, the next generation cannot develop intellectually to solve 

their problems. As an alternative, we should extend full scholarships to African Colombians so they get the opportunity to acquire the educational skills to solve their 

own problems. In return, they will be great Ambassadors of U.S. democracy and way 

of life. How much money and what scholarships opportunities exist for African Colombians? How does this amount compare to dollar amounts from previous years? 

What programs are in the pipeline to increase the outreach and recruiting of African 

Colombians? 

c) Descendants of Africa are the poorest of the poor in Latin America ranking 

alongside indigenous communities, what is being done to address the needs of these 

communities particularly in the area of access to resources, education, healthcare, 

running water, etc...and what is being done to make certain the voices of these communities are heard during trade talks? 

Response: 

The Fulbright Program strives to reflect the societies of the partner countries. The 

binational Fulbright Commission in Colombia, which provides scholarships for graduate study in the U.S., is actively working to attract African-Colombians to participate in the Fulbright Program. Despite their large representation in the population, 

African-Colombians are not widely represented in Colombian universities and most 

have little to no English, so there have been few Fulbright applicants from this sector to date. We are actively recruiting candidates outside Bogota and providing enhanced opportunities for Fulbright candidates to improve their English ability. The 

U.S. Embassy has established an initiative to offer English language scholarships 

for in-country study to African-Colombian undergraduates, thus allowing them to 

compete better in Fulbright’s merit-based open competition. In 2005/06, the first African-Colombian participated in the Fulbright Student Program. Funding provided 

by the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs was approximately $35,000. 

The State Department’s Fulbright Teacher Exchange Program, which supports 

classroom exchanges between U.S. and foreign teachers, is also working with the 

Fulbright Commission to reach public school teachers and gain broader access to the 

Colombian population. In academic year 2004/05, the first African-Colombian teacher, from Bogota, participated in the program. Funding provided by the Bureau of 

Educational and Cultural Affairs was approximately $25,000. 

Question: 

Bolivia’s new president, Evo Morales, is promising to crack down on cocaine production in his country, but he also wants to expand the legal cultivation of coca, 

which has a centuries-old tradition of use in Bolivia. His slogan is ‘‘zero cocaine, but 

85

not zero coca.’’ Is the United States willing to test the genuineness of his offer to increase cocaine interdiction and work with him on this effort? Is the State Department 

getting the sense that the Morales government has the political will to crack down 

on cocaine production and transshipment? The Morales government expressed concern that alternative development funding for Bolivia declined in the FY07 budget 

(a 26% cut in overall economic assistance to Bolivia from FY05 to FY07), and our 

Ambassador was cited in the press explaining this was a general budget cut rather 

than one directed at his government. Bolivia is the poorest country in South America. 

Yet, the President proposes to cut development programs in the country, along with 

counter-narcotic and other assistance packages. Why is the Administration trimming 

economic aid and alternative development funds for Bolivia at this moment? What 

concrete steps will your Department take to help ensure from the U.S. perspective 

that the relationship between our two countries remains cooperative and productive? 

Response: 

We remain committed to Bolivia and the important development work that we 

have begun. Although total foreign assistance to Bolivia decreased by 11% from 

$138.5 million in FY 2005 to $123.8 million in FY 2007 (requested), development 

funding to Bolivia (CSH, DA, ESF, PL–480, and soft-side ACI) has actually increased from $84.9 million in FY 2005 to $85.7 million in FY 2007 (requested). The 

requested level of funds for Bolivia in FY 2007 will be sufficient to maintain current 

programs. The reduction reflects U.S. Government efforts to realign interdiction activities, which continue to successfully interdict cocaine and precursor chemicals 

with Bolivia’s cooperation, without impacting development. 

In addition, security assistance programs funded through IMET and FMF have 

been suspended due to American Servicemembers’ Protection Act (ASPA) restrictions on countries party to the Rome Statute that have not signed an Article 98 

agreement with the U.S. Thus, our core development programs and food assistance 

have increased while our security assistance programs have ended. 

The Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) also continues to work with the 

Government of Bolivia on its five-year, US$598 million compact proposal, submitted 

by the Rodriguez administration last December. Bolivia is aware that maintaining 

eligibility for an MCC Compact requires continued commitment to good governance 

as measured by the indicators MCC tracks. These include the rule of law as well 

as economic policies that strengthen market forces in the economy. 

While Bolivia has seen some reduction in its ACI funding for eradication and 

interdiction due to competing priorities, at $35 million for FY 07 (a decrease from 

FY06 estimates), Bolivia will have sufficient funds to maintain current program levels. We are very concerned about the increase in coca cultivation in Bolivia and the 

corresponding anticipated increase in cocaine production by criminal traffickers. Bolivia has 15,000 more hectares under cultivation than what is currently allowed by 

Bolivian law (12,000 hectares). History has shown us that when coca cultivation increases, it is always accompanied by a corresponding increase in cocaine production. 

The interdiction of cocaine and precursor chemicals, however, continues with Bolivia’s cooperation. 

The United States seeks a constructive dialogue with the Bolivian government on 

key issues, including support for Bolivia’s political and economic development, and 

cooperation against the illegal drug trade. We have expressed our willingness to 

work with President Morales’s government on all levels. President Bush called 

President Morales February 1 to congratulate him on his electoral victory and express our support for the aspirations of the Bolivian people. I met personally with 

President Morales on March 11 and expressed our hope for a continued strong relationship, as did Assistant Secretary Tom Shannon on January 21 and INL Assistant 

Secretary Anne Patterson on April 25. The nature of our relations with the Morales 

government in the longer term will depend on the policies it adopts on a range of 

issues, including counternarcotics. 

Question: 

In recent weeks, we have heard Administration officials say a variety of things 

about Venezuelan president Hugo Cha ́vez. For instance, on February 2nd Thomas 

Shannon, the Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs, said ‘‘We 

aren’t interested in isolating Venezuela. Venezuela has isolated itself from us.’’ That 

same day, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld compared Cha ́vez to Hitler. Can you please 

provide us with an explanation of the Bush Administration’s current policy toward 

Venezuela? In particular, how does the Administration plan on addressing the gain 

in public appeal and executive power in Venezuela? At the same time, what are the 

Administration’s plans to avoid getting drawn into escalating rhetoric that does not 

86

serve our interests or the interest of the Hemisphere? How does the Administration 

differentiate between Cha ́vez and other elected leftist leaders in Latin America? 

Response: 

The United States and Venezuela traditionally enjoyed friendly relations based on 

a shared commitment to democracy. We would like to continue this relationship, but 

the Venezuelan government’s actions and discourse make this extremely difficult. 

We have not sought to confront Venezuela; on the contrary, through actions and 

words, it is the Government of Venezuela that has sought to isolate itself from a 

normal relationship with the United States. 

It is our intent to pursue positive relations with all governments in the region, 

regardless of ideological differences, as long as they are committed—in principle and 

in practice—to govern democratically, advance economic freedom, and invest in their 

people. We will continue to work with our allies in the region to pursue a positive 

agenda for Latin America, aimed at reducing poverty and increasing economic opportunity for the region’s marginalized majority. 

There are many reasons that cause us—and many others in Venezuela and in the 

Hemisphere—to be concerned about the state of democracy in Venezuela. These include a concentration of power in the executive, a politicized judiciary, a flawed and 

distrusted electoral authority, and the erosion of basic civil rights and rule of law. 

President Cha ́vez has undermined Venezuela’s system of checks and balances by politicizing formerly independent democratic institutions. The Supreme Court is 

packed with Cha ́vez’s allies and pro-Cha ́vez political parties now hold every seat in 

the National Assembly. The Cha ́vez administration has used its control of these institutions to harass and intimidate civil society groups, including opposition and 

NGO leaders, human rights organizations, religious groups and the media. 

To address these problems, we are reaching out to help foster political expression 

and support democratic institutions. The U.S. Government is funding projects by 

NGOs that work with civil society and political parties on a bi-partisan basis to support human rights, political party building, and democratic institutions. We are also 

working with our international partners, the Organization of American States and 

civil society to help all Venezuelans realize their democratic aspirations. 

Question: 

Last week, Haitians poured onto the streets of their country to cast their votes. Regardless of the eventual political outcome of the election, the incoming government 

and National Assembly will have to address the emaciated economy and desperately 

poor population of the country. Economic aid from the U.S. and other donors will 

continue to be sorely needed to get Haiti on its feet. Do you believe that now is the 

time to propose decreasing core development assistance to Haiti by approximately 20 

percent? Troop-contributing countries to the UN peace-keeping mission place their 

countrymen in the line of fire with the understanding that the U.S. and other donors 

will provide the development assistance that is necessary to establish the foundations 

for a lasting peace in Haiti. How will the Administration honor its commitment to 

this UN peacekeeping mission if the President eviscerates our development programs 

in the country? What is the comprehensive development program for Haiti, truncated 

programs that are not coordinated does not seem to be helping the country improve 

its position so is there a comprehensive development plan for Haiti? 

Response: 

Since early 2004, we have closely coordinated our efforts in Haiti with the international community and reinforced the internationalization of the response to the 

crisis. We also continue to work to ensure that the troop and police contributors to 

the UN Stabilization Mission (MINUSTAH) stay engaged in Haiti for the long-term. 

The Interim Cooperation Framework (ICF) is the coordination mechanism for 

international assistance to Haiti. It identifies critical needs during Haiti’s transition 

period (July 2004–September 2006) against which donors pledged $1.1 billion at the 

July 2004 World Bank Donors’ Conference in Washington. Over $950 million has 

been disbursed, of which over one third was disbursed by the United States. Donors 

recently decided to extend the ICF until the end of 2007, to conduct an evaluation 

of its strengths and weaknesses, and to organize a new pledging session in Port au 

Prince in July 2006 to cover under-funded priorities that will be addressed by the 

new government. 

The United States is committed to improving the lives of average Haitians, and 

we are Haiti’s largest bilateral donor. Our assistance program to Haiti funds jobs, 

environment and natural resource management, vocational training, food assistance 

and medical care, as well as technical advice and budget support to the government. 

We provide healthcare services to over a third of the Haitian population, and over 

2.2 million vaccination doses for children. We are fighting AIDS by reinforcing preVerDate Mar 21 2002 16:22 Sep 12, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00090 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\FULL\021606\26078.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
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vention efforts, expanding testing, and providing anti-retroviral treatment throughout the country. We support civil society organizations and the media, and provide 

credit to small and micro entrepreneurs. In addition, the USG was a major contributor to the 2006 elections in Haiti. 

While the requested FY 2007 DA and CSH request are reduced from FY 2006 levels, requests for other accounts, including ESF, PL–480, IMET, and Global HIV/

AIDS Initiative Account (GHAI) are increased. In total, the FY 2007 request of $193 

million is only a 0.7% reduction from $194 million in FY 2006. 

We believe the requested levels will enable us to carry out a robust program of 

assistance to Haitian government and the people of Haiti. 

Question: 

Eighteen months ago, the Administration went on record declaring the crisis in 

Darfur ‘‘genocide,’’ yet the President has not developed an effective multilateral civilian protection policy to stop the blood-shedding in that part of Sudan. The African 

Union monitoring force presently deployed was never a civilian protection force and, 

now even its monitoring capacities have run their limit. What is the President’s policy towards ending the genocide? And, how long before we actively and aggressively 

insert ourselves in the dialogue to use NATO forces as a transitional force to bridge 

between the African Union and United Nations peacekeeping operation to stop the 

genocide? 

Response: 

The United States, under the strong leadership of President Bush, has led the 

international response to the crisis in Darfur from the very beginning. Secretary 

Powell’s statement to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on September 9, 

2004 that genocide had occurred and may still be occurring in Darfur helped the 

United States galvanize the international community to make Darfur a priority. 

Subsequently, the UN Security Council (UNSC) adopted several resolutions on 

Sudan, including UNSC Resolution 1591 calling for targeted sanctions of those who 

commit violence or impede the peace process in Darfur. 

The key to a long-lasting solution to Darfur is a political settlement. The United 

States is actively participating in talks in Abuja, Nigeria under the mediation of the 

African Union (AU) and is confident that we will achieve a peace agreement soon, 

which would be an excellent first step towards peace in Darfur. Once this political 

framework is in hand, we will work closely with the Parties to fully implement its 

provisions. 

The Bush Administration also strongly supported the deployment of the 7,200 

strong African Union peacekeeping force, which has the mandate to monitor the 

ceasefire and actively protect civilians in imminent danger. Its presence in Darfur 

has reduced large-scaled organized violence on the ground, and helped create conditions conducive for the peace negotiations in Abuja. In addition, NATO is providing 

airlift and training support to the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS). The U.S. 

strongly supports expanding NATO assistance to AMIS. A precisely targeted assistance mission focusing on capacity building and mentoring of AMIS headquarters 

elements in Darfur could help increase the capability of AU forces already on the 

ground. The AU has neither requested nor has NATO offered to provide troops to 

participate directly in peacekeeping operations. The African Union has taken the 

lead in this crisis and NATO looks to play an appropriate supporting role. 

Question: 

Food security continues to elude Africa and keeps millions of children and families 

in a permanent state of nutritional deprivation. According to the World Food Program (WFP), nearly $2 billion in food aid will be required in 2006 to ward off widespread hunger and starvation, a goal not likely to be met. Donor fatigue often is cited 

as an explanation for the declining response to this hunger pandemic. Eliminating 

hunger in Africa will also require a major revolution in Africa’s food production to 

increase crop performance. Is the Administration prepared to make food security a 

top priority for Africa and how should that be achieved? What specifically will our 

relevant agencies do to help reduce hunger in Africa? Will the Administration move 

now to encourage our European partners to match efforts and work to assist in the 

efforts in the Horn of Africa before the situation gets worst? 

Response: 

Food security has long been a priority for this Administration. While the Administration’s commitment to food aid is an important component of our commitment to 

food security, food aid alone will not solve the underlying problems that result in 

chronic food insecurity. At Gleneagles last summer, the U.S. Government and its 

G–8 partners reaffirmed our support to the African Union-led initiative aimed at 

88

rationalizing national government and donor investments to assist those countries 

that are willing to make a political commitment to develop comprehensive food security and famine prevention programs. In East Africa, support for the African 

Union’s Comprehensive African Agricultural Development Program (CAADP) is coordinated and implemented regionally, and this year CAADP has committed to intensifying efforts with donors and member governments in Kenya, Uganda and 

Ethiopia. Specifically, beyond humanitarian aid to the Horn of Africa, in FY 2006 

the U.S. is providing over $288 million in development assistance to the region to 

support programs that address improved governance, mother-child health, HIV/

AIDS, sustainable economic growth and natural resource management. 

Question: 

Many African entrepreneurs feel left behind in the global trade regime because they 

lack access to capital, knowledge of international markets, and small business development support. The Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) opened the U.S. 

for African exports and created thousands of jobs, particularly in the apparel industry. However, it has not created African wealth. With the removal of apparel quotas 

internationally, African jobs created by AGOA have declined precipitously. 

What do you foresee as the Administration’s next step to encourage wealth creation 

in these AGOA countries? Will you undertake an initiative to increase Africa’s entrepreneurial capacities to trade with the U.S.? Other than MCA, how does the U.S. 

plan on competing with China for Africa’s market and what type of infrastructure 

and capacity building initiatives outside of MCA resources are being considered? 

Response: 

The African Growth and Opportunity Act has been and continues to be a success, 

increasing our two-way trade with Africa and diversifying the range of products 

being traded. In 2005, AGOA exports to the U.S. (including GSP) increased by 44 

percent to $38.1 billion, and total exports to the U.S. from sub-Saharan Africa 

(AGOA and non-AGOA) increased by 40 percent to $50.3 billion. U.S. exports to subSaharan Africa have also risen: by 20 percent in 2005 to $10.3 billion. Two-way total 

trade (exports plus imports) between the U.S. and sub-Saharan Africa increased 37 

percent in 2005, to just over $60 billion. 

It is true that in some categories, AGOA exports to the U.S. have fallen. AGOA 

exports of apparel declined by 12 percent in 2005, to $1.4 billion, as did exports in 

other sectors including minerals and metals, and transportation equipment. But exports from other sectors have continued to grow, including non-oil-related goods 

such as chemical products, agricultural products, machinery, and electronics. And 

despite the overall decline in apparel exports, some countries (including Botswana, 

Uganda, Ethiopia, Tanzania and Mozambique) increased their exports of apparel, 

demonstrating their ability to compete in global markets after the end of textile 

quotas. 

Due in part to this growing trade relationship with the U.S., sub-Saharan Africa 

has shown an impressive growth performance. Between 1997 and 2001, real GDP 

growth in sub-Saharan Africa averaged 3% per year. In 2005, real GDP grew by 

5.3% and is projected to grow at the same rate this year, according to the IMF. Even 

if the oil sector is excluded, the picture remains almost the same: real non-oil GDP 

grew by 5.2% in 2004 and in 2005. 

We agree, however, that more can be done to increase Africa’s entrepreneurial capacities, and in partnership with African nations themselves, we are doing more. 

The Administration is working on several fronts to help African nations improve 

their investment climate and undertake reforms which will allow the private sector 

to flourish. One such effort, the African Global Competitiveness Initiative, is providing $200 million of additional resources over five years to promote the export 

competitiveness of African countries and to expand African trade with the U.S., with 

other international trading partners, and regionally within Africa. USAID will also 

be working in partnership with USDA to implement a joint program to build sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) capacity in AGOA-eligible nations, to better enable 

these nations to export agricultural products to world markets. In addition, the U.S. 

Trade and Development Agency will be announcing and signing several new grants 

at the upcoming AGOA Forum here in Washington June 6 and 7. These grants will 

support feasibility studies for infrastructure projects in southern and West Africa, 

and for technical assistance to African regional organizations in the areas of financial market integration and regional aviation integration. These programs are but 

a few examples of a comprehensive approach to working in partnership with African 

countries to help them improve their investment climates and generate broad-based, 

private sector-led economic growth. 

89

RESPONSES FROM THE HONORABLE CONDOLEEZZA RICE, THE SECRETARY OF STATE, 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY THE

HONORABLE GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

Question: 

In mid-December 2005, Azerbaijani forces were caught on videotape demolishing 

yet again a medieval Armenian cemetery and historic carved stone crosses 

(khatchkars) that are over a 1,000 years old in the southern Nakhichevan region of 

Djulfa. A videotape of the demolition can be viewed at http://www.hairenik.com/

Haireniktv/HAlTVlClip04B.htm. The European Parliament recently passed a resolution condemning the desecration of the ancient religious site. What steps has the 

State Department taken to condemn this destruction of the cemetery? Has the State 

Department sent any officials to the site to investigate? 

Response: 

The United States is a strong proponent of preserving world cultural heritage, 

and we are aware that concerns have been raised that historic Armenian gravesites 

in Julfa, located in the Azerbaijani exclave of Nakhichevan, have been desecrated 

by Azerbaijani forces. 

We are urging the relevant Azerbaijani authorities to investigate the allegations 

of desecration of cultural monuments in Nakhichevan and take appropriate measures to prevent any desecration of cultural monuments. Armenia and Azerbaijan are 

both members of UNESCO (and OSCE), and Azerbaijan has raised these issues in 

those organizations. We have encouraged Armenia and Azerbaijan to work with 

UNESCO to investigate this incident. 

Question: 

Temporary Protected Status is due to expire this year for Salvadorans, Hondurans, 

and Nicaraguans, and the Guatemalan government has requested TPS for Guatemalans in the wake of Hurricane Stan. TPS provides an important contribution to 

Central America by ensuring flows of remittances that are a major revenue source 

for Central American economies; and the sudden deportation of Central Americans 

if the region does not have the capacity to absorb them could also have an effect on 

crime and social stability. Is the State Department recommending extension of TPS 

for those countries expiring and is it possible for Guatemalans to receive TPS? If not, 

is the State Department concerned with the effect on Central America? 

Response: 

On February 23, 2006, the Department of Homeland Security announced a 12-

month extension of Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for El Salvador, Honduras, 

and Nicaragua. This extension applies to nationals of those three countries who are 

currently living in the United States under TPS. With this 12-month extension, the 

TPS designation for El Salvador is currently set to expire on September 9, 2007. 

TPS for Honduras and Nicaragua is now set to expire on July 5, 2007. 

To date, Guatemala has not been granted TPS. After Hurricane Stan hit in October 2005, the U.S. Government sought to help the Guatemalan people directly by 

providing over $22 million to assist with recovery and reconstruction. The ongoing 

private sector initiative to help reconstruction has raised more than $2 million. 

The Department of Homeland Security makes TPS determinations, in consultation with the Department of State. The Department of State continues to monitor 

the situation in Guatemala closely as it relates to the statutory requirements of 

TPS. 

The State Department is very aware that Central America’s fragile economies are 

heavily dependent on remittances sent by Central Americans living in the U.S. and 

is cognizant of the direct connection between achieving economic progress in Central 

America and the successful consolidation of democracy in the region. In fact, the 

consolidation of democracy, the expansion of free markets and economic development are at the center of U.S. policy throughout the region. 

Question: 

Last year the House passed H.R. 2601, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for 

FY06 and FY07. An amendment was included to authorize the Secretary of State to 

provide training and assistance to identify unknown victims who were murdered in 

the Mexican city of Ciudad Juarez. What will the State Department do to continue 

addressing this issue? 

90

Response: 

Since June 2005, the U.S. Government has supported the work of an Argentine 

Forensic Team to identify the remains of women murdered in Ciudad Juarez. We 

are funding the DNA analysis required by this team at a laboratory in Virginia. The 

work has already resulted in five matches. This project will last through approximately August of this year. We have also procured a DNA database system for use 

by the forensic laboratory of the Office of the Attorney General of Mexico to attempt 

to identify remains of murder victims in Mexico, particularly women murdered in 

Ciudad Juarez. 

We have also provided training and capacity building on forensic investigations 

for investigative agents of the Attorney General’s Office of the State of Chihuahua, 

in which Ciudad Juarez in located, and expanded this assistance in 2006 to include 

six other states. 

Since 2003, the FBI El Paso Field Office has helped facilitate investigative training for the State of Chihuahua Special Unit for the Prosecution of Female Homicides. On a case-by-case basis and upon request, the FBI is helping investigations 

by processing evidence and conducting DNA testing. 

Question: 

My office has received worrisome accounts of the human rights situation in El Salvador. What is the administration doing to ensure protection of human rights and 

the rule of law in El Salvador? More specifically, what is the administration’s perception of the safety and working conditions of the Procuradora para la Defensa de 

los Derechos Humanos or Human Rights Ombudswoman, Dr. Beatrice Alamanni de 

Carillo? Has the State Department issued public support for Dr. Carillo and her office? 

Response: 

The human rights environment in El Salvador today has improved from years 

past but we continue to monitor problem areas, particularly the efficiency and fairness of the judicial system. The U.S. Embassy in El Salvador cooperates closely with 

a broad array of human rights organizations, including the Office of the Human 

Rights (PDDH) Ombudswoman Beatrice Carrillo. The Department of State recognizes the PDDH’s important constitutional role as an independent advocate for 

human rights, and its watchdog role in preventing human rights abuses. 

Much remains to be done to advance the rule of law in El Salvador. The Department of State helped the Government of El Salvador to draft and secure passage 

of a Witness Protection law, as well as a comprehensive Ethics in Government law. 

The Department also worked closely with the Government of El Salvador to professionalize the Salvadoran Supreme Court and make it less politically partisan. This 

effort paid dividends when five new Supreme Court justices were selected and confirmed by El Salvador’s Legislative Assembly. We believe the new justices possess 

better legal qualifications than their predecessors and were selected on the basis of 

professional expertise rather than political affiliation. 

In late 2005, the Salvadoran Legislative Assembly approved the location of a new 

International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA) in El Salvador. The ILEA will 

train police officers from all over Latin America, making them more competent technically but also more knowledgeable about legal procedures and respect for human 

rights. 

The safety of the Human Rights Ombudswoman Beatrice Carrillo and all Salvadorans is an important issue for the Department of State. We understand the Civilian National Police (PNC) has investigated various reports of threats made against 

her, and has posted additional police protection and surveillance to ensure her safety. 

RESPONSES FROM THE HONORABLE CONDOLEEZZA RICE, THE SECRETARY OF STATE, 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY THE

HONORABLE TED POE, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF TEXAS

Question: 

I can say without reservation that the issue of border security is of the utmost importance to the people of my home-state. This is an issue that is critical to the safety 

of U.S. citizens, and I would like to hear your thoughts on how we can further work 

with our neighbors to the South to maintain the integrity of our borders. In Maverick 

County, Texas, Mexicans account for only 23% of illegal border crossings. How can 

we work with Central and South American governments to stem the tide of illegal 

91

crossings into the United States? Are there any diplomatic measures being taken to 

gain their assistance in this matter? 

Response: 

The U.S. has an active dialogue with our neighbors regarding illegal immigration. 

The U.S. is seeking hemispheric support for cooperation on the facilitation of deportations, strengthened related counterterrorism efforts, and increased border security. 

Expedited removal is key to reducing the illegal border crossings by Central and 

South Americans. To implement expedited removal, DHS and the Department of 

State are working with governments in Central and South America to secure their 

cooperation in accepting the return of their citizens who are detained while trying 

to enter the United States illegally. As a result of our effort with the Central Americans, we have reduced the time needed to issue travel documents to deportees and 

increased the number of repatriation flights to Central America. 

Mexico, our southern neighbor, recognizes its responsibility to control illegal access to its southern border. In recent years, Mexico has apprehended increasing 

numbers of illegal migrants from Central America: 135,000 in 2002, 178,000 in 

2003, and 215,000 in 2004. Mexico has reinstituted visa requirements for Brazil, Ecuador, and South Africa, requiring travelers from those countries to be screened by 

consular officers before being admitted. The Government of Mexico has established 

checkpoints along some highways leading to the United States via Sonora to deter 

non-Mexicans who would transit through Mexico en route to illegal entry into the 

United States. In 2005, Mexico constructed two detention facilities for use in processing illegal immigrants for deportation from Mexico. 

Question: 

I have introduced the Passport for All Act, which would make a passport the only 

acceptable form of identification when entering the United States. This expands upon 

the State Department’s Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative, which requires travelers to have a passport or other secure, accepted document to enter or re-enter the 

United States. Why does the administration desire to develop another secure, accepted document when a passport already meets the criteria? Can you speak to the administration’s thoughts on how the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative, and the requirement of a passport for entry into the United States, would impact national security? 

Response: 

The Department of State believes that the U.S. passport is one of the world’s most 

secure and sought-after identity and nationality documents. At the same time, as 

we develop our plans to implement section 7209 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, we have noted that the traditional, book-style passport may 

not be the ideal format for a travel and identity document used by frequent crossers 

of our land borders. 

Thus, the Department of State has proposed to develop a card-format passport 

that will be adjudicated to the exact same standards as a traditional passport. This 

passport card, however, will be valid only at land border crossings. This passport 

card, we believe, addresses the requests of frequent crossers of our borders for a 

more convenient format while retaining the integrity and value of the passport as 

the document of choice (whether it be in book format or card format) as proof of 

citizenship and identity. In other words, the passport card proposed by the Department of State would not be an alternative document; it would be an alternative-format document. 

The second part of your question asks our opinion on how the elimination of the 

passport exemption under the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative (WHTI) would 

enhance national security. The 9/11 Commission Report identified the Western 

Hemisphere passport exemption as a national security vulnerability. This exemption 

permits purported U.S., Canadian, and Bermudan citizens to enter the United 

States on any one of a number or combination of unspecified documents, or even 

on a verbal declaration. 

The exemption places an enormous burden on border inspectors, who have to 

make very rapid decisions on the admissibility of individuals who present themselves at U.S. ports of entry. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officers evaluate 

passengers with passports for U.S. citizens and foreign travelers coming from Europe, Asia, Africa, and other international destinations. But those same people, arriving from Mexico, Canada, or the Caribbean, could today present a driver’s license, 

shopping club card, library card, baptismal certificate, birth certificate, or simply 

make a verbal declaration as to their citizenship. No matter how highly trained, or 

how experienced, the CBP officers do not have the same tools at their disposal for 

92

making critical decisions regarding admissibility for the individuals arriving with 

non-passport documents. 

Passports and passport cards are highly secure documents issued to applicants 

after they undergo a thorough adjudication process by well-trained specialists. Moreover, this adjudication takes place before the passport is issued and, of course, long 

before the passport is presented to a border inspector. This adjudication process, 

when combined with the sophisticated physical security features of a passport, make 

passports difficult to alter or counterfeit. Furthermore, a passport can be authenticated through robust, secure database systems. 

Acceptable travel documents today include a host of documents, including sometimes illegible birth certificates (more than 8,000 entities in the United States 

produce birth certificates), 50 state driver’s licenses, and driver’s licenses from U.S. 

territories and the Canadian provinces and territories. CBP intercepts thousands of 

fraudulent documents annually from people seeking entry to the United States 

under the passport exemption. Requiring passports or the previously discussed passport card would allow CBP officers to process travelers more efficiently while also 

making U.S. borders more secure. A passport or passport card requirement would 

also enable CBP to focus its inspections on those of most concern. 

RESPONSE FROM THE HONORABLE CONDOLEEZZA RICE, THE SECRETARY OF STATE, 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, TO QUESTION SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY THE

HONORABLE EDWARD R. ROYCE, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE

OF CALIFORNIA

Question: 

I was pleased to see in your written testimony the mention of the threat for terrorists acquiring MANPADS, or shoulder-fired missiles. As you know, I chair the Terrorism and Nonproliferation Subcommittee, so I share your concern about this 

threat—we know from past instances that it is very real. 

However, I was disappointed to see the Administration come in flat ($8.6 million) 

for its request for the Small Arms/Light Weapons Destruction account. I worry about 

the signal this sends. Can you lay out for the Committee the work of the Small Arms 

and Light Weapons Destruction Account and the Department’s plans for this $8.6 

million? 

Response: 

The Department of State’s small arms/light weapons (SA/LW) destruction program was created in 2001. Its purpose is to destroy surplus, unstable, loosely secured, or otherwise at-risk stocks of military SA/LW and associated munitions as 

well as to assist states to properly secure remaining stocks required for legitimate 

defense needs so that they will not leak into the illicit arms market. Since the program’s creation, approximately 900,000 pieces of SA/LW and over 80 million pieces 

of ammunition have been destroyed in 25 countries. Since 2003, much of the program’s focus has been on man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS)—destroying over 18,600 missiles in 18 countries. Countries that have received assistance include: Afghanistan, Albania, Angola, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, 

Cambodia, El Salvador, Guinea, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Liberia, Mozambique, Nicaragua, the Philippines, Romania, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Serbia and Montenegro, Sudan, Tajikistan, and Ukraine. 

Approximately half of the $8.6 million requested for FY 2007 would be expended 

in Europe and Eurasia, primarily to support continued reduction of large and aging 

stocks in the Balkans, Eastern Europe, and the former Soviet Union. Another significant portion would fund destruction of weapons caches and weapons collected 

through Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration projects in Africa and 

South and Central Asia. Remaining funds will be used in the Near East and worldwide as opportunities for new programs arise. In all of these programs, special attention will be given to opportunities to destroy at-risk MANPADS. 

RESPONSES FROM THE HONORABLE CONDOLEEZZA RICE, THE SECRETARY OF STATE, 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY THE

HONORABLE ADAM B. SCHIFF, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE

OF CALIFORNIA

Question: 

The Administration’s push for Democratic change in the Muslim Middle East has 

focused on pressing Arab regimes to hold elections. While I applaud the President’s 

93

efforts to expand the circle of democracy, I am concerned that we are neglecting essential steps that will help democracy to flourish and to take root in the Arab world. 

The atomization of secular political opposition and the lack of an independent civil 

society in most of the Arab world have forced political opposition to coalesce around 

Islamist movements. Many of the press accounts of the recent legislative elections in 

Egypt and in the Palestinian Authority described Islamist candidates who were able 

to use their opposition to the incumbent government as a way to reach out to more 

secular voters. 

It would seem to me that we ought to be putting more effort into helping Arab civil 

society to flourish as a necessary precursor to the growth of real democracy in the 

region. I also think that it is vital that we highlight the importance of an independent press as necessary to true political evolution. 

I’d be interested to hear your thoughts on this and I would also like to hear what 

the Department has been doing in this regard and what you plan to do in the coming 

fiscal year and beyond. 

Response: 

Thank you for raising this very important issue. I strongly agree that while civil 

society is still developing in much of the Middle East, it is and will continue to be 

the essential engine of democratic and economic growth. From closed and repressive 

regimes to emerging or struggling democracies, non-governmental organizations 

(NGOs) and media in the Middle East are beginning to take root and, in some cases, 

have a solid footing. The United States is working hard to strengthen the capacity 

of these organizations and support their work, including through assistance to address injustice and past abuses, promote rule of law, support women’s empowerment 

and build up the role of an independent press. We must also however, work with 

local governments to create a better legal environment for NGOs, foster partnerships for progress between NGOs and governments, and bolster the efforts of 

reformists within those governments. We are active on all these fronts across the 

Middle East. 

Although the precise number of Middle Eastern NGOs is not clear, given the unregistered status of many political and human rights groups, it is generally believed 

their numbers continue to increase. At last count, for example, there were roughly 

14,000 registered NGOs in Egypt alone. Most provide social and humanitarian services, often with the assistance of the international community, with a smaller group 

dedicated to the promotion of democracy and human rights protections. 

Empowered by internal political reforms, quiet U.S. support and increased assistance under this Administration, and networking with international democracy and 

human rights movements, these democracy defenders and independent journalists 

still often face significant hurdles from their own governments and from conservative factions in their society. Authoritarian regimes in Iran and Syria view any 

independent organization or information outlet as a threat to their monopoly on 

power and information, allowing only licensed and monitored organizations that 

offer a dutiful echo to the single voice of the State. In emerging or struggling democracies such as Egypt or Lebanon, civil society is often weak and split along sectarian 

or tribal lines. Laws throughout the region place significant restrictions on membership, fund-raising, contacts with foreign organizations or individuals, and licensing. 

These restrictions are often rationalized as a means to contain or counter Islamic 

fundamentalism and terrorism. However, since radical or religious groups often find 

informal ways to organize, these laws often serve only to weaken the same moderate 

and secular organizations and movements that could best counter violent extremist 

ideologies. 

In a restrictive environment, those courageous men and women who voice their 

concerns with official corruption, impunity, or misuse of power may face retaliation, 

vilification or even imprisonment, charged with defamation or treason. Efforts to 

peacefully assemble and present the government with legitimate grievances can 

meet with violent repression. Here the United States is using both the carrot and 

stick to support positive change, tying assistance to democratic progress and working to strengthen public awareness and internal support for key initiatives. 

In some nations, we have seen the public support of leaders for reform and increased public participation sabotaged by financial constraints, endemic corruption, 

social traditions, or weaknesses in government institutions and civil society. To address these problems, the United States is helping build partnerships between progressive governments and their citizens, providing through our own NGO partners 

the technical assistance and counsel needed to restructure and strengthen key institutions, reform legislation, and provide the tools for a new social contract. 

The United States will continue to use a variety of innovative tools in the Middle 

East to reach and sustain grassroots democrats and independent voices, whether it 

94

is through helping those individuals gain increased access to uncensored information, supporting training and networking with peers in the international community, or ‘‘naming and shaming’’ in international fora and the international media 

those who seek to impede the growth of civil society. We will continue to coordinate 

our diplomatic and programmatic efforts with those of like-minded countries 

throughout the world, working to build the strength and capacity of human rights 

and democracy defenders and to seek voluntary internal reform and progress. 

In FY06, our Democracy, Human Rights and Labor Bureau will dedicate $12.4 

million to this effort and the support of indigenous democrats in the region, including $6.5 million to support the growth of democracy in Syria and Iran. This will include programs to strengthen rule of law, judicial and electoral reforms, political 

pluralism, independent media, freedom of association and expression, and protections for fundamental human rights. Our FY07 request for $15 million includes $7 

million for Iran and $3 million for Syrian democracy. In addition, the Middle East 

Partnership (MEPI) is directing the majority of its $99 million budget in FY06 to 

the development of vibrant and politically active NGOs, democratic and moderate 

political parties, and independent media. USAID will invest over $200 million in 

FY06 to promote political reform in the areas of rule of law and human rights; good 

governance, including avenues for meaningful public participation and oversight; 

peaceful political competition and consensus-building; and support for civil society, 

including media. 

On November 12, 2005, 40 representatives of civil society were seated at the table 

with Ministers from their countries at the Forum for the Future Ministerial in 

Manama. For the first time in this region, these civil society leaders were empowered to sit down with their leaders, to report on their issues and challenge their own 

governments to move forward with critical reforms. These NGO representatives 

called for dialogue rather than confrontation to resolve issues, but pointed out that 

their organizations need freedom to operate and a legal framework that does not 

prohibit or restrict their independence or function. We strongly support and welcome the robust participation of civil society at the December Forum for the Future 

in Amman, and are confident that the new Foundation for the Future will further 

strengthen the capacity and positive role of NGOs in the region. 

Question: 

I was unsettled by your comment in the wake of the Hamas victory that ‘‘nobody 

saw it coming.’’ My understanding is that Mahmoud Abbas, Israeli experts in and 

out of government and other regional players were all concerned about a Hamas victory and were actively preparing for it. Four and a half years after the 9/

11 attacks, 

I would have expected that we would have better insight into political developments 

in the Muslim world. 

What do you think is contributing to this continued failure to understand the Arab 

world? What is the Department doing to increase its ability to predict political events 

in the region? Are other players in the interagency giving the Department adequate 

support in terms of assessing events in the Arab world? 

Response: 

Predicting elections is often a challenge, especially so in regions with rapidly 

evolving political and social forces. For this reason, it is important for the United 

States to evaluate and adjust our foreign policy tools. 

On January 16, 2006, I announced plans for global repositioning to restructure 

both the Department of State’s overseas and domestic staffing, and my vision for 

the future of the department. To meet current diplomatic challenges, I began a 

major repositioning of U.S. diplomatic personnel across the world. In a multiyear 

process, hundreds of positions will be moved to critical emerging areas in the Middle 

East, South Asia, East Asia, and elsewhere. Beginning this year, 100 current positions largely from Europe and Washington will be moved; 25 of these positions have 

been redirected to our Middle East posts, where additional staffing will make an essential difference. Currently, record numbers of diplomats are being trained in critical languages including Arabic, Urdu and Farsi. We are forward deploying our best 

Arabic-speaking diplomats, broadly coordinating our public diplomacy strategy both 

for the region and from the region, and acting in coordination and with the support 

of other concerned agencies. 

Question: 

The 9–11 Public Discourse Project, the follow-on to the 9–11 Commission, issued 

a follow-up report in November 2005 that gave a D grade to our efforts to prevent 

terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Do you agree with 

this assessment? It seems to me that we are in a situation that is roughly analogous 

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to that which existed before Katrina disaster in that the threat is well known, the 

consequences are understood, but insufficient action is being taken. 

Is there a comprehensive plan for securing weapons-usable nuclear material 

around the world? Are we proceeding at the fastest pace possible and meeting our 

targets? Is there an approximate date by which you expect the job to be completed? 

What can the Congress do to assist you in this effort? Is there sufficient coordination 

at the highest levels of the government or do we need to consider consolidating our 

nonproliferation efforts in one department? 

Response: 

We do not agree with the grade of ‘‘D’’ that was given for ‘‘Maximum effort by 

U.S. government to secure WMD’’ nor do we agree with the statement by the Public 

Discourse Project that countering the threat posed by WMD is ‘‘still not the top national security priority of the President and the Congress.’’ There is no greater priority by the President than keeping WMD out of the hands of terrorists. The State 

Department has adopted a comprehensive strategy for combating the threat of 

WMD terrorism. We have tailored our resources to suit this new comprehensive 

strategy, creating a new WMD Terrorism Office to establish a layered defense—in 

depth against WMD terrorism and combining the Arms Control Bureau and the 

Nonproliferation Bureau to create one single bureau, the International Security and 

Nonproliferation Bureau. This restructuring has resulted in a broader, more integrated understanding of the complex threat of WMD terrorism. 

One of the most crucial lessons learned from the events of 9/11 is the importance 

of interagency communication. Today, the State Department works closely with 

partners such as the National Counterterrorism Center and the National 

Counterproliferation Center to combat WMD terrorism. These two centers, which 

were established in accordance with the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission 

and the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding 

Weapons of Mass Destruction respectively, have proven vital to the work of the new 

WMDT Office, and we are beginning to reap the benefits of our cooperative efforts. 

Our Department contributes extensively to interagency efforts to prevent, detect, 

and respond to the threat or use of WMD by terrorists. We are undertaking national, multilateral and global efforts to deny terrorists access to the most dangerous 

materials. We are developing new tools and capabilities with partner nations to detect the movement of WMD and to disrupt linkages between WMD terrorists and 

their facilitators. We are also cooperating extensively with partners to manage and 

mitigate the consequences of such attacks, which includes improving our capabilities 

to attribute the source and responsible actors in an attack. In accordance with the 

strategy of transformational diplomacy articulated by Secretary Rice, we have utilized partnerships to defend against WMD terrorism rather than resorting to paternalism, strengthening and empowering governments around the globe to take responsibility and join us in our efforts as equals. 

The 9/11 Commission’s identification of WMD terrorism as the most grave danger 

facing the United States and its subsequent recommendation that ‘‘maximum effort’’ 

be devoted to combating this threat has generated a new focus and sense of urgency 

in our Department. We recognize that, even though important steps have been 

taken, much still remains to be done. The effects of a terrorist attack involving 

weapons of mass destruction would be nothing short of catastrophic. For this reason, 

we cannot and will not rest as long as terrorists continue to seek these weapons 

and attempt to use them against us. 

Question: 

At present, the Community of Democracies includes countries like Egypt, Qatar 

and Yemen which are not serious democracies. Last month, John Bolton suggested 

that Russia and China should be included in a reformed Human Rights Commission. What is the President’s vision for a substantive Community of Democracies and 

Human Rights Commission? What is the plan to pursue it and how actively is the 

plan being pursued? 

Response: 

There were over 140 participants and observers that were invited to the 2005 

Community of Democracies Ministerial in Santiago, Chile. Egypt, Qatar and Yemen 

were among the 17 invited observers. In 2001, the U.S. recommended that an intermediate status of observers be developed for those states that could not yet be described as democracies but were moving in that direction. 

The U.S. Government considers the Community of Democracies an important 

forum where democracies can come together to promote democratic principles and 

the consolidation of democratic institutions all over the world. As one of the 16 

members of the Convening Group, the U.S. is actively engaged in all aspects of the 

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Community. We attend every meeting, often at the Under Secretary level, to ensure 

that our voice and vision are a part of all discussions. We also regularly meet with 

the civil society actors who play an important role within the Community. We envision the Community as an alternative forum where we can promote our democratic 

principles with other likeminded democracies. Though still nascent, the CD has already successfully sponsored and participated in some projects that have had impact 

on the ground, most notably in Georgia and East Timor. We are currently working 

to establish working groups that will embark on important and action-oriented 

projects around the world. 

Although the U.S. voted against the UNGA resolution creating the new HRC due 

to its shortcomings and subsequently chose not to run for a seat, we remain committed to helping ensure that the new body’s mandate is effective in dealing with 

human rights violators. Though the U.S. will not have a vote when the HRC meets, 

we are committed to promoting and protecting human rights and are working with 

our allies on and off the HRC toward that goal. We will lobby heavily for candidates 

who are committed to effective action on the ground and who will encourage the 

Council to deal with the worst human rights situations such as in Iran, Cuba, 

Zimbabwe, Burma, Sudan, and North Korea. 

Question: 

Last June, the Washington Post reported that the State Department intervened to 

block the American Foreign Service Association (AFSA) from granting an award for 

‘‘constructive dissent’’ to John M. Evans, the U.S. Ambassador to Armenia. 

While speaking to an Armenian American group in California in February 2005, 

Ambassador Evans referred to the ‘‘Armenian Genocide’’ and said that the U.S. government owes ‘‘you, our fellow citizens, a more frank and honest way of discussing 

the problem.’’ He added that he had consulted a State Department lawyer who confirmed that the events of 1915 were ‘‘genocide by definition.’’ He stressed that, ‘‘there 

is no doubt in my mind what happened’’ and it was ‘‘unbecoming of us, as Americans, to play word games here.’’

Following this speech, AFSA decided to honor Evans with the ‘‘Christian A. Herter 

Award,’’ an honor that is intended to foster creative thinking and intellectual courage. As Washington Post staff writer Glenn Kessler revealed on June 9, 2005, the 

AFSA’s withdrew its award following pressure from ‘‘very serious people from the 

State Department.’’

Could you please provide a full explanation of any and all State Department activities surrounding the withdrawal of the award? 

Was there at any time discussion of how the decision to honor Evans might impact 

the visit of Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who visited Washington 

in June 2005? 

In this regard, can you please provide information concerning all communications 

(written or oral) about Ambassador Evans’ comments on the Armenian Genocide, including but not limited to communications between State Department employees and 

representatives of AFSA. 

Furthermore, please provide information on any efforts by Ambassador Evans 

while ‘‘working in the system’’ to challenge existing American policy regarding nonrecognition of the Armenian Genocide. 

Finally, can you assure this Committee that the Department of State has not—and 

will not—take any punitive action against Ambassador Evans for speaking out about 

the Armenian Genocide? 

Response: 

The July / August 2005 issue of ‘‘AFSA News’’ stated that the AFSA Awards Committee decided not to confer the Christian A. Herter Dissent Award on Ambassador 

Evans because, upon review, the nomination did not meet the criteria for the award. 

The Department did not directly or indirectly attempt to influence ASFA’s decision. 

The Washington Post article referred to was simply wrong. 

Ambassadors are charged with representing the Administration’s policies. Ambassador Evans’s comments on the tragic events of 1915 did not reflect the Administration’s policies; he himself later characterized the remarks as ‘‘inappropriate.’’ It 

would be inappropriate for the Department to provide information on certain discussions, such as internal personnel matters. We note, however, that the Department 

did not hold internal discussions on how a private, in this case ASFA, award for 

Ambassador Evans might impact the visit of a foreign government official. Furthermore, the Department is unaware of any internal efforts made by Ambassador 

Evans to challenge U.S. policy on the events of 1915. 

Ambassadors Evans, like all U.S. ambassadors, serves at the pleasure of the 

President. 

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Question: 

In its FY07 foreign aid request, the Administration has not maintained military 

parity between Armenia and Azerbaijan. 

The administration has requested nearly 40% more military assistance (FMF, 

IMET, NADR) for Azerbaijan than Armenia ($10,180,000 for Azerbaijan and only 

$6,290,000 for Armenia), despite an agreement with Congress to maintain military 

aid parity between the countries when Congress authorized the President to waive 

Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act which prevents military assistance to Azerbaijan. The agreement was arrived at during consideration of the FY02 aid package 

and was maintained for Fiscal Years 2003–2006. 

Given the delicacy of negotiations over Nagorno-Karabakh and the failure of last 

weekend’s Rambouillet meeting between Armenian President Robert Kocharian and 

Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliev, doesn’t the disparate aid requests send the wrong 

message and undermine prospects for peace? 

Response: 

As a Co-Chair of the OSCE Minsk Group, our goal is to help Armenia and Azerbaijan achieve a peaceful resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Military assistance to both countries in light of that ongoing conflict is carefully considered and 

calibrated to ensure that it does not hamper ongoing efforts to negotiate a peaceful 

settlement between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Although the Rambouillet summit between the two presidents marked a temporary stall in negotiations, the process has 

gained momentum again with a series of individual visits by Minsk Group CoChairs to the region. We continue to view 2006 as the necessary window for the 

sides to reach an agreement. At the same time, we are strongly urging the presidents to prepare their publics for peace, not for war. 

While we do not have a policy that security assistance funding levels for Armenia 

and Azerbaijan should be identical, we work to ensure that assistance does not adversely affect the military balance between the two states. We do not believe that 

the differences in security assistance in the FY 2007 budget requests undermine 

prospects for peace or send the wrong message. 

The waiver of Section 907 of the FREEDOM Support Act every year since 2002 

has allowed us to provide military assistance that enhances Azerbaijan’s interoperability with NATO and U.S. forces and furthers U.S. peacekeeping objectives. These 

funds also allow us to assist Azerbaijan in developing capabilities to promote Caspian security and indigenous humanitarian demining capabilities. We provide assistance to Armenia for similar purposes. 

Question: 

From January 9–20, 2006 the United Nations hosted a preparatory committee 

meeting for the second global conference aimed at eliminating the illicit small arms 

trade. The meeting was intended to set the agenda for a global conference to be held 

at the UN in late June and early July, at which governments will review implementation and clarify the Programme of Action (PoA) to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate 

the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, which was 

agreed to at the first global conference on small arms in July 2001. 

Unfortunately, after two weeks of discussions, governments achieved very little at 

this meeting. I am worried that we will be facing a repeat of last year’s NPT review 

conference last year, where a series of failures at the preparatory level set the stage 

for a completely failed review conference. 

a) Are you concerned about the outcome of the preparatory committee meeting and 

do you think that we are facing a situation that is analogous to the NPT conference 

last year? 

b) What are you and the Department doing to ensure that the conference is productive and takes steps toward the goal of eradicating the illicit small arms trade? 

Response: 

The U.S. delegation to the 2006 Review Conference is working very closely with 

other member states and the President-designate of the Conference, Permanent 

Representative of Sri Lanka to the United Nations, Ambassador Prasad 

Kariyawasam, to ensure that the conference is productive and takes steps toward 

the goal of eradicating the illicit small arms trade. We have conveyed to the Ambassador and others that the United States plans to play a positive role at the meeting 

by leading on issues where it sets the international standard. This includes areas 

such as export controls, where the United States is widely acknowledged as the 

world’s leader, by supporting, in principle, the United Kingdom’s Transfer Controls 

Initiative, as well as management of government arms stockpiles, and destruction 

of excess and obsolete small arms and light weapons. Our delegation has had a 

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range of bilateral discussions with key states, where we have emphasized the need 

to focus the conference on implementation of the Programme of Action, agreed to 

by all States in July 2001, instead of undertaking a slate of distracting and likely 

contentious new initiatives. Such an approach has resonated positively with many 

states. 

Question: 

Since all illicit weapons start off in authorized hands, eradicating the illegal trade 

starts with ensuring weapons do not fall out of legal channels. What other steps is 

the Department taking to increase global controls over the transfer of small arms and 

light weapons? 

Response: 

The Department has taken multiple measures to reduce the risk of weapons falling out of legal channels. The Department’s Directorate of Defense Controls carefully reviews all commercial export licenses for small arms and light weapons (SA/

LW) and ammunition, and our ‘‘Blue Lantern’’ end-use monitoring program is regularly deployed to ensure that U.S.-licensed defense exports are used only as authorized. Through the Export Control and Border Security Program (EXBS), we are 

working diligently with over 50 countries to ensure that they are equipped with an 

export control system that is based on robust laws and has the proper enforcement 

mechanism to implement them. 

On the multilateral front, the 40 Participating States of the Wassenaar Arrangement, including the United States, contribute to regional and international security 

and stability by promoting greater transparency and greater responsibility in transfers of conventional weapons to prevent destabilizing accumulations. In addition, 

through information sharing in the organization, proliferation concerns are highlighted and various agreements among the member states have resulted in tighter 

export controls to prevent illicit transfers. Similar efforts are undertaken at the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), where 55 participating 

States, including the United States, have agreed on measures for export controls on 

man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS), end-user certificates and verification 

procedures for SA/LW exports, and brokering controls over SA/LW. Within the 

OSCE, the United States has also provided funding for the destruction of surplus 

SA/LW in Tajikistan. The United States has also provided seminars in Tajikistan 

and Kazakhstan on the physical security and stockpile management of SA/LW. 

Through the NATO Partnership for Peace, the United States has taken the ‘‘lead 

nation’’ role for the first three-year phase of a trust fund project to destroy ammunition, SA/LW, and MANPADS. During this time, 33,000 tons of ammunition, 400,000 

pieces of SA/LW, and 1,000 MANPADS will be destroyed. 

Question: 

Prior to the change in export controls in 1999, the United States dominated the 

commercial satellite-manufacturing field with an average market share of 83 percent. 

Since that time, market share has declined to 50 percent Overall, US satellite manufacturers have lost somewhere between $2.5 and $6.0 billion since 1999 due primarily 

to International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) regulations. 

For example, the European Union has advocated the use of non U. S. commodities 

in satellite applications due to the difficulty of American export controls. Alcatel 

Alenia Space, a joint venture formed in 2005 by combining the space businesses of 

France’s Alcatel and Italy’s Finmeccanica is a genuine threat to American leadership 

in this vital sector. Alcatel announced earlier this decade that it would create an 

‘‘ITAR-free’’ spacecraft and by 2004, it had doubled its market share from around 

10% in 1998 to over 20%. 

The upshot is that the U. S. satellite industry has been adversely impacted, while 

other countries gain the advantage in the commercial satellite sector. 

What steps is the Department taking to streamline the regulatory process and prevent further erosion of market share for American companies? How can Congress 

help? 

Response: 

As you know, Congress mandated that civilian communications satellites be 

placed on the U.S. Munitions List and be subject to the export licensing jurisdiction 

of the State Department. 

A significant factor in the loss of market share by U.S. satellite manufacturers 

is the enhanced competitiveness of European manufacturers. European competitiveness also has been enhanced in part by the transfer of ITAR-controlled technology 

as part of various technology assistance agreements and manufacturing licensing 

agreements solicited by U.S. manufacturers. 

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The Department of State has undertaken a number of initiatives, with the Department of Defense, to streamline the export licensing process, while ensuring that 

U.S. defense exports remain out of the hands of governments and groups that would 

do us harm. One of these initiatives is a fully electronic licensing system called DTrade. Export license applications that are submitted through D-Trade are completed in half the time needed with the legacy paper system. 

The State Department has recently submitted to the committees on appropriations and foreign affairs of the Congress a report on the defense trade licensing 

process. This report discusses measures to improve that process. Among the areas 

in which Congress can help are the following:

• Relief from Congressionally mandated reporting requirements on arms transfers, including the Javits report and the 655 report.

• Raising the thresholds for notifying Congress on arms transfers (Section 36 

of the Arms Export Control Act).

• Relief from preclearance procedures (which are not mandated by law) for Section 36 arms transfers.

Apart from process improvements, the Department is responsive to proposed exports of commercial communications satellites that benefit U.S. manufacturers and 

that accord with U.S. national interests. For example, the prohibition on exports 

and sales to certain countries outlined in Section 126.1 of the ITAR recently was 

waived to allow for the potential export of a commercial communications satellite 

to Vietnam, a proscribed destination under the ITAR 

Question: 

I signed a letter to President Bush that was organized by Mr. Payne and several 

other Members. The Letter urges American leadership in authorizing a UN peacekeeping force for Darfur. What is the status of the discussions at the UN and do you 

anticipate that a UN force will be established? Has there been any discussion of what 

role the United States and our NATO allies might play in that force? 

Response: 

Following the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement in Abuja on May 5, I addressed the United Nations Security Council to urge support for deployment of a 

UN peacekeeping force to Darfur. On May 16, the Council unanimously adopted 

Resolution 1679, which called for deployment of a joint African Union (AU) and UN 

assessment team to prepare for the UN operation in Darfur. The joint AU/UN assessment team is expected to complete its work in Darfur before the end of June. 

Based on the joint AU/UN assessment, the Security Council will move forward on 

establishing the mandate and force strength of the UN operation in Darfur. We anticipate adopting a Security Council resolution by the end of July calling for a UN 

force in Darfur with a robust mandate to protect civilians under threat of violence, 

to enable delivery of humanitarian assistance, and to support implementation of the 

Darfur Peace Agreement. 

In the meantime, we are working with our NATO Allies to strengthen the African 

Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS), to assist its transition, and to support the UN mission in Darfur. To date, NATO has offered and the AU has accepted airlift, staff 

capacity building, assistance in establishing a joint operations center, lessons 

learned support, and pre-deployment certification of AU peacekeeping units. Additionally, the AU has invited NATO officials to Addis to discuss a NATO technical 

teams visiting Darfur to explore on-the-job capacity building to AMIS sector headquarters. The AU has not requested, nor has NATO offered to provide, combat 

troops to participate in peacekeeping operations. Alliance personnel are currently in 

Addis coordinating the agreed measures of support with their AU counterparts. Finally, as full details of a UN re-hat of AMIS emerge, NATO will be open to consultations with the UN as to how the Alliance might support a UN peacekeeping operation. 

Question: 

How much supplemental funding for UN peacekeeping will the Administration ask 

for in the forthcoming Defense supplemental request? Why would the Administration 

choose to underfund UN peacekeeping again in 2007? 

Response: 

In FY 2005 the Administration requested supplemental funding of $780 million 

in order to fund a shortfall in the CIPA account that resulted from the creation of 

several new peacekeeping missions after the submission of the regular budget request for FY 2005. Congress enacted supplemental funding of $680 million for CIPA, 

100

and authorized a transfer of $50 million from CIPA to the PKO account to support 

the African Union Mission in Darfur. This resulted in a net shortfall for FY 2005 

of $145.010 million. This, together with the projected shortfall for FY 2006 of 

$376.752 million totals $521.762 million. The FY 2006 supplemental budget contains a request of $69.8 million for the CIPA account for Sudan/Darfur as well as 

language providing transfer authority from the Peacekeeping Operations request 

which, in total, would offset a total of $129.8 million in the above total for a net 

shortfall of $391.962 million at the end of FY 2006. 

We expect that there will be no new shortfalls in FY 2007, i.e. that the request 

will be sufficient to pay FY 2007 assessments. We have asked for an increase in 

FY 2007 funding for Sudan operations in anticipation of the UN’s taking over operations in Darfur. 

Question: 

At a recent IPR roundtable hosted by the American embassy in Beijing, an assistant FBI director said U.S. companies lost $40 billion in 2004 alone from intellectualproperty rights violations, most of them committed in China. Russia was also cited 

as a major center of IPR violations. 

Despite years of U.S. government action to compel Russia and China to take specific steps to address the massive theft of U.S. intellectual property, the problem has 

only gotten worse. Russia and China continue to fail to provide effective protection 

of U.S. intellectual property as required under international obligations and a recent 

report by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office noted that IP infringement in China 

had reached ‘‘epidemic levels.’’

What has the State Department done, apart from cooperative efforts involving other 

executive branch agencies, to compel these governments to promptly address the inadequacies in their legal and enforcement regimes? For example, China has done little 

to create a robust criminal law regime to fight piracy and has instead relied on toothless administrative sanctions that merely become part of the cost of doing business 

for Chinese pirates. Do you see any evidence that China is making a commitment 

to using its criminal law to enforce intellectual property rights? 

How can Russia be permitted to join the WTO, a rules-based organization, if the 

Russian government cannot demonstrate the ability or the will to abide by international rules? What has the Department done to communicate to the Russian government that failure to address intellectual property rights issues will impede Russia’s entry into the WTO? 

Response: 

The Department of State is actively engaged with Beijing and Moscow at the 

highest levels to promote and protect American innovation and competitiveness in 

China and Russia. We agree that we need to see continued measurable results in 

both countries. 

In China, I and other senior State Department officials have pressed Beijing to 

substantially reduce piracy and counterfeiting and improve intellectual property 

rights protection and enforcement—coordinating our messages with those of our colleagues in other agencies and of other countries. In addition, through our International Intellectual Property Rights Enforcement Office in Washington, our Embassy in Beijing and our consulates throughout China, the State Department itself 

has advocated effectively and consistently on behalf of American businesses and entrepreneurs whose intellectual property rights have been violated. The U.S. Ambassador to China hosts an annual Roundtable that puts the critical concerns of American firms directly before senior Chinese government officials and promotes practical 

solutions. Our Consul General in Shenyang has worked successfully to ensure that 

government offices in Liaoning province use legal software, and our Consul General 

in Guangzhou has led business delegations to meet with local officials across 

Guandong province—resulting in first-time raids and crackdowns. We have also leveraged the State Department’s International Visitor Program to train Chinese IPR 

officials and company representatives on the importance of IPR protection and successful strategies and models to improve enforcement. 

Our engagement has contributed to positive developments. On April 11, during 

the U.S.-China Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade (JCCT) meeting, Beijing 

restated its commitments to increase criminal prosecutions and reduce exports of infringing products. In addition to new commitments on the use of legal software in 

government and in enterprises, Vice Premier Wu Yi also pledged to take action, including by imposing criminal penalties, against producers of pirated optical discs. 

Beijing also agreed to take steps to facilitate the transfer of IPR cases from the administrative to the criminal justice systems. 

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In addition, the Chinese government has issued a requirement that all personal 

computers manufactured in or imported into China be pre-installed with legal operating software. This step has already resulted in Chinese purchases of U.S. software, including an agreement by Lenovo, China’s top computer maker, to purchase 

more than $1.2bn of Microsoft products over the next 12 months. While pleased to 

note this progress, we share your recognition that much more remains to be done. 

The State Department will continue to use all available avenues to ensure Beijing 

meets all its JCCT commitments and uses its criminal law to create a climate of 

deterrence against IP infringement, consistent with its obligations under the WTO 

TRIPS Agreement. We will work together—with Congress, with other agencies, and 

with like-minded countries—to make that shared goal a reality. 

In Russia, we are likewise committed to combating significant and growing intellectual property theft using all available tools. We are working to advance our enforcement agenda through engagement with Russia in the G8, through the U.S.-

Russia Intellectual Property Rights Working Group, in our WTO bilateral and multilateral negotiations, and through targeted training of Russian law enforcement officials, industry representatives, forensic specialists, prosecutors, and judges. 

We regularly raise concerns about IPR infringement at the highest levels of the 

Russian government. President Bush has personally pressed President Putin on this 

issue, as have I, the Deputy Secretary, Ambassador Burns, and other senior State 

Department officials. We continue to insist on closing plants that produce pirated 

optical discs on government-owned property, shutting down internet sites selling unauthorized downloads, and improving border enforcement—including increased seizures and prosecutions. We have made it clear that Russia must take significant, 

sustained action to address these and other remaining issues in our bilateral WTO 

accession negotiations. 

The Administration’s efforts to promote stronger protection and enforcement of 

IPR in Russia have resulted in positive steps, including raids on optical disc plants 

and warehouses on restricted-access sites, new draft regulations to tighten the optical disc licensing regime, and prosecutorial investigation of the illicit music 

downloading site allofmp3.com. Clearly, however, a great deal remains to be done. 

President Putin has publicly recognized the need for better IPR enforcement in Russia. We will continue to urge him to follow his words with strong actions that both 

anchor and build on recent progress. 

RESPONSES FROM THE HONORABLE CONDOLEEZZA RICE, THE SECRETARY OF STATE, 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY THE

HONORABLE CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE

STATE OF NEW JERSEY AND VICE CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Question: 

Yesterday I chaired a hearing on how American technology and know-how is substantially enabling repressive regimes in China and elsewhere in the world to cruelly 

exploit and abuse their own citizens. Last December, cyber dissident Shi Tao was arrested and sentenced to 10 years of prison after Yahoo turned over information identifying him to the Chinese secret police. And last week in Atlanta (Feb 8), Chinese 

and Korean-speaking thugs beat up American citizen Dr. Peter Yuan Li and stole two 

computers, his wallet, his home telephone files from a locked cabinet. Dr. Li is the 

director of the Internet Freedom Project, which is creating cutting edge technology 

using proxy URLs to circumvent China’s extensive internet filtering system. These are 

only a few examples—there could be many more. 

a) Has there been any response by China regarding U.S. concerns that during the 

visit of President Bush in December, 2005, Chinese dissidents were arrested and harassed prior to and during the President’s visit? Has our ability to influence the PRC 

on human rights diminished? If so, why does the U.S. have less influence now to promote human rights with the Chinese government than before when we could expect 

Chinese dissidents to be released prior to the arrival of a Presidential visit? 

Response: 

We raised our deep concerns about the detention and harassment of Chinese activists prior to and during the President’s visit in November, and we have continued 

to do so at every opportunity, including the recent visit of President Hu Jintao to 

the U.S. in April. Regrettably, we received no official reply from Chinese authorities, 

but we do understand most if not all of the previously arrested individuals have by 

now been released from detention. 

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We are disappointed by the China’s lack of responsiveness to our human rights 

concerns, including the releases of prisoners of concern. The cooperation we saw on 

a number of issues of longstanding concern in 2005 has stalled and we are working 

hard to get it back on track, making it clear to China that bringing its human rights 

practices into compliance with international standards is a key part of becoming a 

stakeholder in the international system. 

We are also continuing to work to support those in China who are working for 

change. We are pressing for systemic reforms in China’s judicial system, and we 

fund rule of law programs and work also with Chinese non-governmental organizations to encourage the growth of China’s civil society as well as greater political participation. 

The State Department’s annual China human rights and religious freedom reports 

documents China’s serious abuses of human rights in violation of internationally 

recognized norms, stemming both from the authorities’ intolerance of dissent and 

the inadequacy of legal safeguards for basic freedoms. Human rights has and always 

will be an important part of our overall relationship with China and we will continue to press publicly in our reports and privately in meetings in Washington D.C. 

and Beijing, our human rights concerns with the Chinese government. 

Question: 

b) What has been the State’s Departments response to the PRC’s outrageous claim 

earlier this week that its internet regulations are ‘‘fully in line’’ with the rest of the 

world and that no one had been arrested just for writing online content? 

Response: 

We have consistently raised our concerns with the Chinese government over the 

restrictions it is placing on the free flow of information and the arrest and detention 

of Internet writers and cyber dissidents, who have done nothing more than peacefully express personal or political views on the Internet. We will continue to emphasize to our Chinese government interlocutors that allowing people the freedom to 

express themselves on the Internet and elsewhere doesn’t weaken China, but rather 

promotes stability at a time of dramatic social and economic transformation. A freer 

China will be a healthier China, in part because people who are free to express their 

views and participate in their own local governance have a stake in dealing with 

the economic and social issues confronting them. President Bush addressed the importance of Internet freedom in his recent meeting with President Hu. The State 

Department will continue to press China on this point and urge China to adhere 

to its international obligations. 

Question: 

What is the Administration’s plan to implement the TVPRA now that it has been 

enacted into law? Has the State Department requested adequate levels of funding for 

trafficking programs? 

Response: 

In FY 2005, the U.S. Government obligated approximately $95 million to 266 

international anti-trafficking in persons (TIP) projects in 101 countries, up from approximately $82 million in FY2004. These projects are working to ensure human 

trafficking is prevented, the survivors are protected, and the traffickers are put in 

jail. They are sponsored through the coordinated efforts of the Departments of State, 

Justice, Labor, Health and Human Services, and USAID. 

While funding was authorized in the 2005 TVPRA, there has been no corresponding appropriations legislation. Agencies are willing to tackle these issues, 

but have noted that it will be difficult to fulfill the mandates without additional 

funding. Appropriated funds consistent with levels proposed in the reauthorization 

are needed to fully meet Congressional mandates. In FY 2007, the Department of 

State requested approximately $26.54 million in anti-trafficking program funds; increased funding could lead to the rescue of more victims, the passage of more international laws, an increase in public awareness as well as other efforts to eliminate 

human trafficking. 

Question: 

Last year, the State Department placed Sudan on the Tier 2 watch list for trafficking in persons, which implied an improvement in their efforts to curb trafficking. 

We were told that this was a four-month experiment based on their support for the 

Committee for the Eradication of Abduction of Women and Children (CEAWC), an 

organization to repatriate trafficked persons. When I visited Sudan last summer, I 

met with this group, and they were concentrating on women kidnapped to become 

brides and not on the thousands of Sudanese sold into chattel slavery over the years. 

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Now the Government of Sudan has ended its’ support for that organization. Since 

State is now considering trafficking rankings for its June report, where would you 

say Sudan stands at this point? Do you really believe they have taken serious steps 

to redress the wrongs done to so many people sold into slavery in Sudan? 

Response: 

As communicated to you in a March 2006 letter from the Department’s Assistant 

Secretary of Legislative Affairs Jeffery Bergner, Sudan was elevated from a ranking 

of Tier 3 to Tier 2 Watch List in September 2005 based on commitments by the 

country to take additional future steps over the next year to combat human trafficking, coupled with positive anti-trafficking efforts undertaken between June and 

August 2005. Any failure by the Government of National Unity (GNU) to live up 

to its commitments will negatively impact its tier ranking. 

We recognize and share your concerns regarding chattel slavery in Sudan. This 

egregious practice remains a key focus of the Department of State and we are closely monitoring Sudan’s progress as it works to address these concerns. We have sent 

multiple staff to Khartoum, Southern Sudan, and Darfur to examine instances of 

slavery and a variety of other trafficking in persons issues. State Department officials have met with CEAWC and other GNU officials to push for the return of abducted and enslaved persons in accordance with international protection principles. 

As you noted, there was a break in national government funding to CEAWC in 

2005; however, the GNU granted funding in January 2006 that enabled CEAWC to 

make three separate efforts to return 340 people to Bahr el Ghazal in late January 

and early February 2006. We do not know if CEAWC will receive further funding 

from the GNU to continue its work. We continue to press the GNU to provide 

CEAWC the funding necessary to fulfill its mandate. 

As required by the Trafficking Victims Protection Act, Sudan’s tier ranking must 

be based on the government’s efforts to combat all forms of trafficking in persons 

occurring in the country. Abduction and resulting enslavement of individuals from 

the Nuba and Dinka tribes is but one form of trafficking in persons that exists in 

Sudan. When evaluating whether Sudan is taking steps to combat trafficking in persons, the Department must consider not only this form of slavery, but also the full 

scope of enslavement of Sudanese citizens, including forms such as children utilized 

as camel jockeys or soldiers, children in commercial sexual exploitation, forced domestic servitude, and bonded labor. 

On March 1, the Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons began 

drafting the 2006 TIP Report. The Department closely examined reports from NGOs 

and information gathered by Department personnel in Sudan in order to make its 

determination of Sudan’s 2006 tier ranking. The Report, due to be released in early 

June, will reflect, to the best of our ability, the GNU’s cumulative efforts to combat 

trafficking in persons since September 2005. 

Question: 

The Belarus Democracy Act mandated a report regarding the sale and delivery of 

weapons from Belarus to countries determined to be involved in terrorist activities 

and on Lukashenka’s personal wealth and assets. The report is now more than one 

year overdue, despite months of inquiries to the NSC and my January 6th letter 

(which has gone unanswered) to Stephen Hadley asking for its release. My understanding is that the State Department had prepared the report on time and transferred it back then to the NSC for final clearance. I would really appreciate your assistance in facilitating the transmission of this report. 

Response: 

The report was signed by the President for transmittal on March 16, 2006. The 

NSC provided the attached copies of the transmittal letters to Chairman Hyde and 

Ranking Member Tom Lantos. 

Question: 

While I welcome the Administration’s increased attention to the plight of Belarus, 

I am concerned by the $10 million requested for Belarus under the FREEDOM Support Act (which actually represents a decrease of almost $2 million from last year). 

Is this enough, especially when we are also expanding international broadcast efforts 

to that country, given Lukashenka’s almost total domination of the media? Is this 

the signal we want to send to those in Belarus struggling for freedom and democracy? 

Response: 

We are committed to standing with the people of Belarus in their struggle for a 

democratic future. We believe that, with the requested $10 million in FY 07 FREEVerDate Mar 21 2002 16:22 Sep 12, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00107 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\FULL\021606\26078.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
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DOM Support Act funds, we will have sufficient resources to fund a robust democracy promotion program in Belarus. We will have adequate funds to continue to expand external broadcasting and other independent media as conditions permit. The 

Administration has demonstrated its support for democracy in Belarus through a 

variety of measures including assistance to democratic forces, proactive diplomacy 

with European partners, and sanctions specifically targeted at those responsible for 

abuses. The pro-democracy signals that we are sending and will continue to send 

are very strong. 

Question: 

Russia recently has threatened to withdraw from the conventional arms control regime for Europe in response to our reasonable insistence that, before this regime is 

adapted by treaty, Moscow honor the commitments it made in Istanbul in 1999 regarding the presence of military forces and weaponry in both Moldova and Georgia. 

Russia is now also playing games regarding the status talks regarding Kosovo by 

claiming the result of those talks could provide Moscow with precedent and impetus 

to recognize breakaway regions in the former Soviet space. How serious are these 

threats? Will the United States remain firm in pressing Russian officials to honor 

their Istanbul commitments? 

Response: 

U.S. officials will continue to express at all levels and make clear our firm position that, together with other NATO Allies, we will only move to ratify the Adapted 

CFE Treaty once all remaining Istanbul commitments have been fulfilled. These remaining Istanbul commitments include, with regard to Moldova, the withdrawal of 

Russian military forces. Moldova has said that it wants all Russian forces, including 

the Russian peacekeeping force, withdrawn. We support Moldova’s sovereign right 

to make that decision. With regard to Georgia, there has been important progress 

this year, but Georgia and Russia still need to resolve the question of the Russian 

presence at the Gudauta base, in Abkhazia. 

The Russian Federation has expressed concern regarding what it considers the 

delay in entry into force of the Adapted Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty (A/CFE). Senior Russian officials have also stated that the current Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty) does not adequately address the 

Russian Federation’s security concerns. However, Russia has not formally suggested 

that it will withdrawal from the CFE Treaty. The CFE Treaty provides important 

benefits to all its signatories, including detailed information on the military forces 

of all participating states, and the opportunity to verify that information. NATO Allies have agreed that the Treaty is a cornerstone of European stability and security, 

and it benefits all of Europe, including Russia. 

These are issues that the United States raises with Russia in our bilateral exchanges, including at very senior levels. United States officials at all levels place 

great importance on pressing Russian officials on this subject. Most recently, Paula 

DeSutter, Assistant Secretary of State responsible for verification, compliance, and 

implementation of arms control treaties, and the head of the U.S. delegation to the 

third Review Conference of the CFE Treaty which began on May 29, traveled to 

Moldova on her way to the conference in Vienna, to underscore the continuing U.S. 

commitment to Moldova’s sovereignty. These are also issues that NATO and Russia 

discuss regularly in the NATO-Russia Council. 

Question: 

As Co-Chairman of the Helsinki Commission, I have repeatedly raised the need for 

improved standards of performance in Kosovo, not as a precondition for status talks 

but as a requirement to respect Europe-wide OSCE norms on human rights practices—regardless of the course or result of those status talks. It’s simply the right 

thing to do and needs to be done. With the passing of Kosovo President Rugova and 

the preparations of talks, however, can we expect concrete improvements in areas like 

freedom of movement and the ability of the displaced to return? What levers can we 

apply to ensure that real progress is made in these areas? What is the status of efforts 

to temporarily relocate displaced Roma currently residing in UN-run camps contaminated by lead, as well as to rebuild their original neighborhood? 

Response: 

The United States and its Contact Group partners are encouraging Martti 

Ahtisaari, U.N. Special Envoy for the Kosovo Status Talks, to address issues important to the protection of minority rights before discussing status. Negotiations on 

devolving competencies to Kosovo’s municipalities are scheduled to begin in lateFebruary, and we expect talks on other core issues like the protection of religious 

sites in Kosovo, minority rights and the economy to begin soon as well. 

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While the overall number of minority returns to Kosovo has been modest, we believe the status process can help resolve many of the impediments to returns. In 

addition to providing more effective and responsive local government, decentralization will likely lead to the creation of new municipalities and provide communities 

more control over areas such as healthcare, education and police/justice. Mechanisms to accelerate the pace of resolving outstanding property claims will also be 

addressed within the context of these talks, and my personal representative to the 

status process, Ambassador Frank Wisner, will continue to press the Kosovars to 

do more to implement the internationally-endorsed Standards. The United States is 

also encouraging both Serbia and Kosovo to finalize the terms of a Protocol on Returns as soon as possible. 

The United States continues to use its political and financial resources to work 

with the UN Mission in Kosovo and its international partners to find a sustainable 

solution for the displaced Roma currently living in polluted camps in northern 

Kosovo. While an alternate location has been established to temporarily house the 

displaced Roma, this community has not taken the opportunity to move. In addition 

to providing assistance to help educate the Roma about the dangers of lead and 

ways to mitigate its effects, the United States has set-aside approximately one million dollars to help with medical treatment as part of the relocation effort. Rubble 

clearing in the original Roma neighborhood began last year, but full-scale reconstruction of this community is proceeding slowly because of limited funding. 

Question: 

Uzbekistan is consistently ranked as one of the worst-of-the-worst for religious freedom. After the violence in Andijan last May, things have only gotten worse. Members 

of Congress and the US Commission on International Religious Freedom have consistently called for Uzbekistan to be designated a Country of Particular Concern 

under the International Religious Freedom Act. 

Considering the deteriorating conditions, do you anticipate Uzbekistan being designated in the near future? 

Response: 

We continue to be deeply concerned about and closely follow the treatment of religious believers in Uzbekistan, including the treatment of evangelical Christians and 

observant Muslims. We have raised religious freedom with the Karimov Government on many occasions and will continue to do so. Uzbekistan remains under consideration for designation as a CPC country and may be designated at any time during the year. 

Question: 

I wholeheartedly support the President’s vision for making democratization and respect for human rights the touchstone for all US foreign policy decisions. In Central 

Asia this policy has been challenged, as we’ve seen fraudulent elections in Azerbaijan 

and Kazakhstan, a dirty constitutional referendum in Armenia, increasing repression 

in Uzbekistan, backsliding in Tajikistan, confusion in Kyrgyzstan, and just plain 

craziness in Turkmenistan. 

What is the U.S. doing to push these governments to change? 

Response: 

We use a variety of diplomatic and programmatic tools to promote President’s 

Bush’s Freedom Agenda in Central Asia and the Caucasus. We continue to make 

clear to Central Asian and Caucasus leaders that our relationships in the region 

rest on shared interests in a broad agenda encompassing democratic and economic 

reform, energy and security. These elements are mutually reinforcing; only with cooperation on all three areas can we ensure stability and progress. We continue 

pressing these governments bilaterally and multilaterally at every level to cease 

human rights abuses and to take specific steps to address democracy deficits. A series of high-level U.S. officials have recently traveled to the region to emphasize this 

message including Assistant Secretary for European Affairs Daniel Fried in March, 

Vice President Cheney and Assistant Secretary for South and Central Asian Affairs 

Richard Boucher this May and myself last October. 

We will continue to work with our EU allies and within the UN and OSCE to 

press for reform and accountability for abuses. We plan to continue diplomatic, 

moral and material support for human rights and democracy activists in the region. 

U.S. officials regularly meet with activists, advocate on their behalf in their home 

country and in international fora, attend their trials when necessary and permitted, 

and provide material support for their efforts. 

Despite challenging working environments in Central Asia, our democracy programs in the region focus on strengthening the institutions of civil society and the 

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rule of law, fostering effective public advocacy, supporting human rights, improving 

the political process (including free and fair elections), increasing the accountability 

of government institutions, and supporting independent media. Our training and exchange programs seek to create a cadre of reform-minded citizens by reaching out 

to the next generation of leaders and giving them first-hand experience with the 

day-to-day functioning of a market-based, democratic system. 

KAZAKHSTAN: 

The Government of Kazakhstan’s democracy and human rights record is a mixture of progress and setbacks. We have suggested to the Government of Kazakhstan 

steps it could take to improve its record and we have urged progress on these at 

every opportunity. Some small steps resulted, although there have been a series of 

notable setbacks including the flawed December 2005 presidential election. President Bush sent President Nazarbayev a letter requesting that electoral violations 

be investigated and pursued. At the OSCE, we publicly pressed the Kazakhstani 

Government to address electoral violations and bring its laws and practices in line 

with OSCE standards. We will continue to work with the Government of 

Kazakhstan to urge and help it implement democratic reform. 

KYRGYZSTAN: 

We are concerned about the situation in Kyrgyzstan. We continue to press President Bakiyev and his government vigorously to institute a genuine dialogue with 

the opposition and civil society in order to combat corruption and organized crime, 

forge ahead with democratic reforms, in particular constitutional reform, judicial reform, implementation of OSCE electoral recommendations, and bringing 

Kyrgyzstan’s media laws and practices in line with international standards. 

The Kyrgyz Government has made some progress in improving communication 

with civil society and has implemented some of their requests by removing a few 

high-level officials from office. The recent civil society protests were peaceful. We 

were encouraged that President Bakiyev and Prime Minister Kulov jointly addressed the protestors on April 29. 

Kyrgyzstan submitted a Millennium Challenge Account Threshold Country Plan 

on May 12. It presents a well-focused set of programs that, if implemented, will promote the rule of law and address the critical concerns of corruption and organized 

crime. 

The United States has been a strong supporter of the OSCE Center in Kyrgyzstan 

and has provided substantial funds in extra-budgetary contributions to the continued operations of the Center in the Human, Political/Military as well as EconomicEnvironmental Dimensions. 

TAJIKISTAN: 

We are continuing to reinforce positive developments and engage the Government, 

the international community, and the Tajik public to advance progress toward 

democratic reform and respect for human rights. We are actively engaging with likeminded international and NGO implementing partners to lay the groundwork for a 

free, fair, and transparent November 2006 presidential election. Both in Washington 

and in the field, we continue to meet regularly with election officials, as well as with 

other diplomatic and international missions, to emphasize the need for free and fair 

elections, build election-monitoring capacity, and coordinate activities. 

A U.S.-funded NGO is conducting procedural and ethical training for members of 

the Precinct Electoral Commission, including implementation of OSCE election recommendations following the 2005 parliamentary elections. The United States also 

supports development of civic and election manuals and textbooks for NGO resource 

centers and school curricula. 

In October 2005, I met with political party leaders for a roundtable discussion of 

the political climate and encouraged them to continue democratic reforms and voice 

their opinions. Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs 

Richard Boucher and National Security Council Senior Director Elisabeth Millard 

echoed this message when they met with Tajikistan’s political party leaders, independent mass media representatives, and other civil society players in Dushanbe in 

May. 

TURKMENISTAN: 

The core problem in Turkmenistan is the repressive cult-of-personality regime run 

by Saparmurat Niyazov is designed to prevent citizens from demonstrating any kind 

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of democratic activity, from choosing their own leaders, to exercising freedom of religion, association, assembly and speech. 

U.S. diplomatic and assistance efforts are directed toward providing the population of Turkmenistan with the tools to develop democracy, a free market economy 

and improved education and health systems. The United States has expanded public 

outreach programs directed toward Muslim audiences and continued educational 

and professional exchange programs to give citizens greater contact with and understanding of democratic values. 

We regularly advocate on behalf of individual cases of abuse, coordinate closely 

with other diplomatic missions and international organizations, and fund programs 

targeted to develop civil society and promote the rule of law. In November 2005, the 

United States, EU, and several other countries jointly introduced a successful UN 

General Assembly resolution that condemned and called upon the Government of 

Turkmenistan to address severe human rights abuses. 

UZBEKISTAN: 

In Uzbekistan, we have made clear to the highest levels of the Uzbek Government 

that the U.S. will not sacrifice progress on democracy and human rights for the sake 

of our other interests. We have continued to call for an independent international 

investigation into the May, 2005 tragic events at Andijon, irrespective of the consequences. 

In addition, we undertook an immediate review of U.S. assistance to Uzbekistan 

after the Andijon massacre. As a result, aid to the central Government of 

Uzbekistan was severely limited, and numerous military, border security, and economic reform assistance programs were canceled. Approximately $3 million of these 

funds were reprogrammed to support additional democracy and human rights programs in Uzbekistan. We have also supported a resolution on Uzbekistan in the 

U.N. Third Committee and closely monitored trials of dissidents and oppositionists. 

Unfortunately, during the past year, the Government of Uzbekistan (GOU) has 

undertaken numerous actions to limit cooperation with the United States and the 

situation for human rights has not improved. The GOU has closed scores of nongovernmental organizations that had served as partners in implementing our assistance programs for the people of Uzbekistan. In addition, and notably, the GOU requested that we remove U.S. forces from its Karshi-Khanabad (K2) airbase, which 

had been a key facility in our fight against terrorism and our efforts in Afghanistan. 

Despite these setbacks, we will continue to shine an international spotlight on 

human rights abuses in Uzbekistan, including mistreatment of those who seek to 

practice their religion freely; press countries that have Uzbek refugees not to return 

them to Uzbekistan; and work to ensure the GOU improves its human rights record 

and fully implements the rule of law. 

We will continue to seek the truth about and accountability for the death of hundreds at Andijon. We will also continue to explore with our EU allies other means 

to hold the GOU accountable. 

ARMENIA: 

The U.S. strongly encouraged Armenia to hold a constitutional referendum in 

2005 consistent with international standards; we were disappointed with the outcome. The United States. pressed Armenian authorities to investigate allegations of 

fraud and take action against any parties involved in fraud. 

The United States. has designed a multi-year, multi-million dollar election strategy to aid the Government of Armenia in holding parliamentary and presidential 

elections in 2007 and 2008 that are consistent with international standards. 

The Millennium Challenge Corperation (MCC) found Armenia eligible for assistance in 2006. However, following the constitutional referendum, MCC sent a letter 

to Armenian President Kocharian to inform him that the conduct of the referendum, 

including allegations of fraud, electoral mismanagement, mistreatment of opposition 

party members, and uneven access to the media, called into question Armenia’s 

commitment to good governance. The letter further noted that the Armenian Government needed to make progress in MCC’s ‘‘ruling justly’’ category ‘‘to avoid either 

suspension or termination—actions that, per MCC policy, can be initiated even after 

a Compact is signed and in the implementation stage.’’ To avoid such action, the 

MCC encouraged the President to take specific corrective steps that would constitute progress. 

Significant democratization, human rights observance and respect for rule of law, 

including meaningful preparation for upcoming national elections, remain top priorities for the U.S. 

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AZERBAIJAN: 

The United States is engaged in broad-ranging diplomacy and democracy assistance to Azerbaijan, including transparency initiatives, technical assistance and support for civil society and grass roots development. In addition to these ongoing efforts, the United States pushed intensively for the Government of Azerbaijan to conduct parliamentary elections in 2005 (and 10 rerun elections in May 2006) according 

to international standards; we were disappointed that they did not, and urged corrective action after both election rounds. We support the OSCE’s post-election conclusions—which noted improvements in candidate registration, domestic observer 

participation and finger-inking to prevent fraud—while pointing to persistent problems and recommending areas to improve. President Bush raised our democracy 

concerns during his recent meeting with President Aliyev. We will continue to work 

through diplomatic engagement and assistance with the Government of Azerbaijan 

to encourage meaningful democratization, and will continue to urge respect for 

human rights and rule of law. 

Question: 

The United States has used the commemoration of the Dayton Peace Agreement’s 

10th anniversary last November to provide added impetus to needed constitutional 

reform in that country. Consensus on reform, however, has been difficult to achieve, 

and what has found consensus has been criticized. First, the existing package of reforms does not fully address the fundamental flaw of Dayton—basing statehood on 

a balance of ethnic groups rather than the will of the citizenry. Second, it repeats 

a Dayton practice—perhaps necessary ten years ago but not today—of reaching agreement without seeking broader public input. Can you comment on the validity of these 

criticisms and on the degree of U.S. support for more fundamental reforms of the 

Bosnian state structure? 

Response: 

In November 2005, the leaders of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s eight major political 

parties committed to pursue constitutional reforms to streamline the office of the 

Presidency and the Parliamentary Assembly and to strengthen the Council of Ministers. They pledged to make these changes by March 2006, the legislative deadline 

by which the reforms need to be enacted in order to take effect for the upcoming 

October 2006 elections. Given the limited time available for enacting these reforms, 

the parties decided to limit participation in negotiations to those that signed the November commitment. However, the package of reforms will be open for public debate 

and comment once it is submitted to parliament. 

The changes currently under discussion would only be first steps in a longer-term, 

multi-phased process. Additional reforms will be necessary for Bosnia and 

Herzegovina to further break down the ethnic divisions institutionalized by Dayton 

and to achieve full integration into Euro-Atlantic structures. We have committed to 

continue to help the Bosnians to pursue such reforms. 

Question: 

At a recent Helsinki Commission hearing, Assistant Secretary of State Fried outlined several areas of ‘‘vital and energetic’’ cooperation between our nation and Russia. Nevertheless, both he and Assistant Secretary Lowenkron also expressed the Administration’s concern regarding Russia’s commitment to, or perhaps lack of commitment to, internationally recognized human rights. I have in mind especially the recently-passed law on NGOs, which most observers consider unreasonably restrictive. 

Will the President raise human rights issues with President Putin at the July summit of the G–8 in St. Petersburg? 

Response: 

The President has the kind of relationship with President Putin that allows him 

to raise our concerns on various matters, including democracy, in a frank and direct 

manner. 

We remain concerned about democratic backsliding in Russia, including the new 

NGO law, and have repeatedly conveyed these concerns to the Russian government. 

Implementing regulations for the NGO law are expected to be adopted in mid-April. 

We have made clear to the Russian government our view that these implementing 

regulations should facilitate, not hinder, the work of NGOs in Russia. The G–8 is 

an organization of leading industrial democracies. The G–8 Presidency brings responsibility in these areas, but also the opportunity to highlight a country’s achievements. 

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Question: 

President Putin has invited leaders of Hamas to Moscow for talks, supposedly to 

‘‘persuade the group to give up its radical policies.’’ How do you interpret Moscow’s 

move? In general, how do you assess Russian cooperation as a member of the ‘‘Quartet’’ (US, UN, EU, Russia) seeking a peaceful solution to the Middle East conflict? 

Response: 

We are concerned about the Russian decision to reach out to Hamas. We have repeatedly stated that we do not see the utility in contacts with Hamas, or the Palestinian Autonomy’s government, until it accepts the principles outlined by the Quartet on January 30: a renunciation of violence, recognition of Israel, and acceptance 

of previous agreements and obligations, including the Road Map. 

Question: 

As you know, the North Korea Human Rights Act calls on the State Department 

to facilitate the submission of applications for refugee status by citizens of North 

Korea seeking refugee protection. As of the end of October 2005, the U.S. had not settled a single North Korean refugee. I included an amendment in this year’s State Department Authorization Bill that calls for a detailed description of the measures you 

have taken with respect to facilitating refugee application submissions under the Act. 

This description is to include country-specific information with respect to United 

States efforts to secure the cooperation and permission of the governments of countries in East and Southeast Asia to facilitate United States processing of North Koreans seeking protection as refuges. Can you tell me whether any North Koreans have 

been granted refugee status in the United States since last October and what measures are being taken to ensure the implementation of that provision if the Act? 

Response: 

We are pleased to note that we recently resettled six North Koreans in the United 

States. 

The Administration remains deeply concerned about the hardships suffered by the 

North Korean people and the plight of those North Koreans who have fled their 

country in search of asylum. Consistent with the intent of the North Korea Human 

Rights Act, we are working with regional governments and refugee organizations to 

find ways to effectively assist with cases of individual North Korean asylum seekers 

as they arise. As we highlighted in out October 2005 report to Congress on this subject, many host governments are reluctant to allow us to process cases of North Koreans asylum seekers on their territory. 

Question: 

The ink was barely dry on the 2006 Foreign Operations Appropriations bill which 

contained carefully chosen conditions limiting Foreign Military Financing and defense exports for the Indonesian military. Many of us were deeply disappointed that 

the waiver came without any obvious or sudden improvement in the Indonesian 

human rights situation. 

The FY07 budget request asks for $6.5 million FMF for Indonesia, a more than 

6-fold increase over expected FMF expenditure in FY06. 

What are the human rights benchmarks for disbursing this aid? Shouldn’t ending 

restrictions on foreign journalists in Papua, and implementation of special autonomy 

for Papua be among those benchmarks? 

Response: 

Fostering a stronger partnership with Indonesia, now the world’s third-largest democracy and home to more Muslims than any other country in the world, is critical 

to the national security of the United States. We face immediate challenges to our 

security interests in Southeast Asia, including terrorism, threats to strategic sea 

lanes, transnational threats to regional stability, and the omnipresent potential for 

natural disasters. In light of these challenges, it was necessary and prudent to exercise the National Security Waiver of restrictions on assistance to the Indonesian 

armed forces. The waiver has created a new climate of trust between the United 

States and Indonesia. Working together with a reforming, democratic Indonesia, we 

are now constructively and pro-actively confronting pressing challenges to our national security. 

The National Security waiver has also enabled the Administration to more vigorously assist the Indonesian Armed Forces in its internal reform process. We are assisting the Indonesian military to move towards becoming a modern, professionalized force that respects the rights of its citizens and is accountable to civilian authority. Our entire mil-mil assistance and engagement program with the Indonesian 

government is designed to emphasize and facilitate such reform. The floodgates to 

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advanced U.S. military hardware have not been thrown wide open. We continue to 

thoroughly examine the appropriateness of all military assistance to Indonesia and 

make decisions on a case-by-case basis. Each applicant for U.S. training is thoroughly vetted in accordance with Leahy guidelines. 

Since the fall of Suharto in 1998, Indonesia has made great strides in overcoming 

over three decades of authoritarianism. As reported in the 2006 State Department 

Human Rights Report, the overall human rights situation in Indonesia has continued to improve over the past year. The end of internal conflict in Aceh Province was 

a major step forward, and included the orderly and peaceful withdrawal of over 

22,000 military personnel. U.S. assistance has played a significant role in the Aceh 

peace process. There is evidence that the TNI has been willing to punish soldiers 

who have committed abuses during the conflict in Aceh, including a total of 160 convictions for human rights-related offenses in 2004 and 2005. Achieving accountability and ending the culture of impunity for members of the Indonesian security 

forces is critical for the long-term success of Indonesia’s democratic transformation. 

Indonesia faces many significant human rights challenges, particularly in areas 

of separatist sentiment such as the provinces Papua and West Irian Jaya. We firmly 

support the territorial integrity of Indonesia and do not condone any separatist 

movements, but we remain concerned about human rights conditions in Papua and 

West Irian Jaya. We continue to urge the Indonesian government to allow greater 

access to the region for international journalists, diplomats, and humanitarian organizations, and we believe that full implementation of the special autonomy law is 

important to addressing political, economic, and human rights concerns. President 

Yudhoyono has expressed his commitment to peacefully resolving the tensions in 

Papua and West Irian Jaya. 

A key area for improvement is establishing accountability for numerous human 

rights violations committed by the security forces. The Administration continues to 

emphasize the need to achieve credible accountability for atrocities committed in 

East Timor in 1999, including by members of the Indonesian military. After the failure of previous efforts to punish those responsible, Indonesia and East Timor have 

established the Indonesia-East Timor Truth and Friendship Commission (TFC). The 

Administration has emphasized to both Indonesia and East Timor that, in order to 

be credible, the TFC must name the perpetrators, be transparent, hold public hearings, involve the international community, and protect witness confidentiality. The 

Administration will continue to work with our Indonesian and East Timorese democratic partners to strengthen support for justice within their societies. We are also 

awaiting the UN Secretary General’s briefing to the Security Council on the UN 

Commission of Experts report submitted in May 2005. 

Question: 

Despite reforms, Vietnam remains a Communist dictatorship with a very poor 

human rights record. Today we have heard that Vietnamese Buddhist human rights 

activist Thich Quang Do of the banned Unified Buddhist Church of Vietnam, who 

has been under house arrest, was jailed. Yet there are proposals to raise IMET funds 

for Vietnam from $50m to $95m. How can we justify such aid for Vietnam? 

Response: 

We remain concerned about the unsatisfactory human rights situation in Vietnam 

and have been pressing the Government of Vietnam to change its policies and laws 

on human rights and religious freedom. We consistently raise our concerns with the 

Government of Vietnam about religious minority groups, including the Unified Buddhist Church of Vietnam, Thich Quang Do and their other leaders who remain 

under pagoda arrest. As you know, we suspended the bilateral human rights Dialogue with Vietnam in 2002 for lack of progress by Vietnam. 

The June 2005 White House meeting of Prime Minister Phan Van Khai and President Bush raised our bilateral relationship to a higher plane. The meeting also reinforced for the Vietnamese the importance this Administration attaches to human 

rights and democracy. The two leaders agreed to continue an open and candid dialogue on issues of common concern, including human rights and religious freedom. 

Vietnam’s willingness to more seriously address U.S. human rights concerns also 

came after Vietnam’s designation as a Country of Particular Concern and against 

the backdrop of Vietnam’s interest in joining the World Trade Organization. Both 

the Ambassador at Large for International Religious Freedom Hanford and Assistant Secretary for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor Lowenkron have conducted 

extensive high-level discussions with the Government of Vietnam. In May 2005, the 

U.S. concluded a landmark agreement with Vietnam on improving conditions for religious freedom. Vietnam had improved its legal framework for religion, but was facing challenges to implementation, progress on which became an integral part of the 

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agreement. In the months before and after the Prime Minister’s visit, Vietnam released 17 people who had been on the U.S. Government’s list of prisoners of concern. 

Due to the positive steps noted above, on February 20, 2006 we resumed the USVietnam Human Rights Dialogue in Hanoi to press for further progress. At the dialog, we urged the Government of Vietnam to permit greater freedom of religion and 

freedom of the press, to abolish restrictions on the Internet, to end current detention 

policies, to provide access to prisons by the international community, and to release 

all remaining political and religious prisoners of concern. 

One of the goals of our International Military Educational Training (IMET) program is to train foreign militaries in international standards of law, including 

human rights issues. IMET funding for Vietnam is currently being used to teach 

English to military personnel. As with all IMET funding, the Department carefully 

follows Leahy vetting procedures to ensure that human rights violators do not receive U.S. funding. 

RESPONSES FROM THE HONORABLE CONDOLEEZZA RICE, THE SECRETARY OF STATE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY THE

HONORABLE THOMAS G. TANCREDO, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE

STATE OF COLORADO

Question: 

Madam Secretary, while listening to the radio several weeks ago, I caught word 

of the ‘‘proactive diplomacy’’ which our Interest Section in Havana, Cuba has been 

carrying out under the leadership of Chief of Mission Michael Parmly. Madam Secretary, I was so impressed with this nose to nose style of diplomacy that I called 

down there, spoke with Edward Lee, the Deputy Chief of Mission and assured him 

that people here in Washington were watching and applauding their activities. 

Is this the sort of diplomacy that we can expect to see from other American diplomatic posts around the world? Secondly, despite the fact that President Castro has 

erected a wall to block the Cuban people from seeing the messages (he has also 

placed pictures of Abu Ghraib in front of the Interest Section), can our team down 

there continue to count on support from Washington? 

Response: 

The U.S. Interests Section in Havana enjoys the full support of the Department 

in its efforts to innovatively implement the President’s policy to break the Castro 

regime’s information blockade and expose Cubans to democratic ideals and free market principles. The President’s Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba underscored the need for innovative and energetic methods to break the Cuban government’s information blockade of the Cuban people. The second report of this Commission, which I chair along with Commerce Secretary Gutierrez, will pursue additional 

ways to communicate America’s message to the Cuban people. Part of this effort has 

been the installation of the streaming electronic billboard you refer to at the Interest Section’s offices on the Havana waterfront. The Cuban regime erected dozens of 

flagpoles to obscure the billboard from view, but it remains visible and it continues 

to broadcast news, messages of inspiration, and other items of interest. 

Question: 

Is the United States prepared to use all of the tools of diplomacy at its disposal 

to push for a UN peacekeeping force that has a mandate that allows forces on the 

ground to take proactive action to prevent the killing of innocent civilians? 

In the International Peacekeeping Activities section of the budget, I noticed that 

there is $441 million set aside for the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS). Are you prepared to use that funding to support operations in Darfur if need be? 

Response: 

Following the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement in Abuja on May 5, I addressed the United Nations Security Council to urge support for deployment of a 

UN peacekeeping force to Darfur. On May 16, the Council unanimously adopted 

Resolution 1679, which called for deployment of a joint African Union (AU) and UN 

assessment team to prepare for the UN operation in Darfur. We anticipate that the 

UN force will have a robust mandate to protect civilians in Darfur under threat of 

violence and to support implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement. Based on 

the joint AU/UN assessment, we expect that in mid-June the UN Secretary General 

will provide options to guide the Security Council in considering the mandate and 

force strength of the UN operation in Darfur. In addition to the funding in the Contributions for International Peacekeeping Activities account for the United Nations 

Mission’s work to enhance security throughout Sudan, including Darfur, the U.S. 

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has contributed about $220 million since 2004 to support the African Union mission. 

We have requested additional funding in the FY 2006 supplemental to continue our 

support. In the meantime, we are working with our partners to strengthen the African Union Mission in Sudan before its transition to the UN. We expect many of the 

African Union forces to be incorporated into the UN force. 

Question: 

Yesterday, I met with the Serbian Orthodox Christian Bishop of Kosovo. He described his concerns about what may happen to his people if Kosovo becomes an independent country. His fears were based on the record of violence directed against 

Serbs and other non-Albanians by what he considers the jihad terrorist and organized crime elements that are prevalent in that province. 

What reason is there to believe that security for the Serbian Christian population 

in Kosovo would be any more effectively secured in an independent Kosovo than has 

been the case so far under U.N. administration and NATO military control? 

Response: 

Violence targeting Kosovo Serbs and other minorities declined since the March 

2004 riots, which were primarily motivated by ethnic, not religious bias. While 

minor sporadic incidents of intimidation and violence continue, Kosovo’s provisional 

government has taken steps to foster reconciliation, including rebuilding more than 

90 percent of the homes damaged during the March violence and working closely 

with the Serbian Orthodox Church to repair the 30 churches damaged during these 

riots. We recognize, however, that this is only a start, and will continue to press 

Kosovo’s provisional government to do more to implement the internationally-endorsed Standards. 

As noted by U.N. Envoy Kai Eide in his October 2005 report on the situation in 

Kosovo, progress in defining Kosovo’s future status will also help encourage efforts 

to implement the Standards, many of which deal with protecting minorities. Following Ambassador Eide’s report, the UN Security Council endorsed Secretary General Annan’s proposal to begin status talks in 2005 with former Finnish President 

Martti Ahtissari as his envoy. The Contact Group is working closely with Mr. 

Ahtisaari to address areas related to protection of minorities before moving to status. One concrete way in which Serb and other minorities might feel a greater sense 

of empowerment is by devolving greater authorities to local communities; we expect 

talks on decentralization of government authority to begin later this month. We are 

also encouraging the Ahtisaari team to bring both sides to the table to begin discussing soon how to better protect religious sites and minorities in Kosovo. 

Following a status settlement, the United States and the European Union have 

agreed that a continued international civilian and military presence will be needed 

in Kosovo to help implement the settlement and ensure the protection of minority 

rights. Regardless of the status outcome, the new international civilian mission will 

possess executive authority and oversight in sensitive areas, such as police and justice, and will continue to work alongside the NATO-led Kosovo Force for the foreseeable future. 

Question: 

Secondly, it is my understanding that two of the primary mission statements of 

UNMIK (UN Mission in Kosovo) are to ‘‘maintain civil law and order and promote 

human rights’’. Madam Secretary, $50 million has been set aside in the ’07 budget 

to help fund UNMIK. Are you confident in that mission’s ability, working with its 

NATO counterparts, to protect the Christian minority living in Kosovo? 

Response: 

The UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) continues to oversee the development of 

meaningful self-government in Kosovo and provide—with the NATO-led Kosovo 

Force (KFOR)—a safe and secure environment for all residents of Kosovo in accordance to UN Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999). As part of the UN-led civilian 

mission, more than 2,000 international police officers, including approximately 270 

U.S. officers, currently serve alongside and oversee the development of the multiethnic Kosovo Police Service (KPS). In addition to the continued professional development and training of the KPS, KFOR is better prepared to respond to any widespread violence. Following the March 2004 riots, many KFOR national contingents 

removed caveats that limited their movements and ability to engage, and measures 

to increase KFOR’s crowd and riot control capabilities have also been improved. 

Question: 

I am pleased that the Bush administration has taken such a strong stand in favor 

of sowing democracy’s seeds around the world. In addition to planting the seeds of 

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democracy in new places, does the administration place the same emphasis on protecting new democracies that have sprung up in places like—for example—Taiwan? 

And without giving me the standard canned ‘‘we support the status quo’’ line, I’d like 

you to tell me what the administration is doing to improve our ties with Taiwan’s 

democratic government, and what we are doing to protect the ability of their public 

to make independent, democratic decisions free from undue coercion by China or 

from bureaucrats at the State Department. 

Response: 

The American people can be deeply proud of U.S. support for Taiwan’s democracy, 

prosperity, and security. Taiwan has no better friend in the world than the United 

States. 

We are far and away Taiwan’s most important partner in areas that matter to 

Taiwan’s security and welfare. As President Bush said last November in Kyoto, 

‘‘Modern Taiwan is free and democratic and prosperous. By embracing freedom at 

all levels, Taiwan has delivered prosperity to its people and created a free and 

democratic Chinese society.’’

Taiwan is our eighth largest trade partner, and we are Taiwan’s third largest 

trade partner. Deputy United States Trade Representative Karan Bhatia’s visit to 

Taipei May 25–26 for talks pursuant to the 1994 Trade and Investment Framework 

Agreement (TIFA) demonstrate our commitment to expand our already strong trade 

relations. Ambassador Bhatia is the highest-level administration official to visit Taiwan in the last six years. 

Taiwan fully participates in all Department of State education and cultural exchange programs, including citizen exchange programs on good governance and IPR 

protection. We actively reach out to the Taiwan press in recognition of the essential 

role it plays in Taiwan’s democratic society, and have numerous training and exchange programs for Taiwan’s judiciary. The Department recently increased funding 

for our bilateral Fulbright exchange program with Taiwan. 

The U.S. strongly supports Taiwan’s membership in organizations that do not 

limit membership to states. In multilateral organizations where its membership is 

not possible, we also support opportunities for Taiwan’s voice to be heard, recognizing Taiwan’s important role in economic and other transnational issues. Thanks 

in large part to consistent support from the United States, Taiwan is a full member 

of World Trade Organization (WTO) and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 

(APEC), and is now invited to participate in many technical activities of the World 

Health Organization (WHO). 

The advanced defensive systems, training, supplies, and maintenance that we 

make available to Taiwan in accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) enable Taiwan to provide for its self-defense. Also in keeping with the TRA, the United 

States maintains its own capability to respond to attempts to coerce Taiwan. 

Every U.S. President in the last 27 years has supported the ‘‘one China’’ policy 

because it enables meaningful and productive cooperation with the people of Taiwan, even as we seek a realistic but positive relationship with the PRC. In this context, maintenance of the status quo is essential to the welfare of Taiwan’s democracy, Taiwan’s security, and U.S. interests in the Western Pacific. 

Question: 

Madam Secretary, I was happy to see the $22.7 million in the budget for the African Development Foundation. As a Member who has consistently supported various 

micro-enterprise initiatives, I want to express my appreciation for the administration’s dedication to this project. However, after reading the State Department’s budget summary I am concerned that the ADF is depending on securing approximately 

$18 million in matching donations from African governments. Are you confident that 

they will come thru on their pledge? 

Response: 

Because of the success of ADF’s enterprise development program, African governments have offered to co-fund the Foundation’s programs to enable ADF to do more 

in their respective countries. The Foundation currently has Memoranda of Understanding with ten governments and two international corporations to provide $13.5 

million in annual contributions and five proposed strategic partnerships, valued at 

total $5.0 million annually. Governments have largely been reliable in making their 

cash contributions. The major problem is that ADF has not had adequate funding 

to fully match all firm and proposed contributions. Consequently, at the current 

level of funding, ADF would be able to leverage only a maximum $10.5 million in 

contributions in FY 2007 and would leave at least $8.0 million of this private cofunding on the table. (A list of the strategic partnerships is attached to this statement).

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26078b.eps
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RESPONSES FROM THE HONORABLE CONDOLEEZZA RICE, THE SECRETARY OF STATE, 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY THE

HONORABLE DIANE E. WATSON, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE

OF CALIFORNIA

Question: 

Madame Secretary, It is my understanding that during testimony before the Senate 

Foreign Relations Committee on February 15, 2006, you were asked about a proposal 

to reduce aid levels to El Salvador. I understand that you responded by saying that 

traditional aid to El Salvador was being reduced because they were now participating in the Millennium Challenge program. However, the administration has previously maintained that MCC funding would supplement, not replace traditional 

U.S. foreign assistance. So is the Administration changing its policy on the use of 

MCC as a supplement for traditional assistance rather than a replacement? If so, 

what is the rationale for that change? 

Response: 

President Bush committed in 2002 that MCA assistance would lead to an increase 

in overall development assistance by $5 billion by FY 2006 over then existing assistance levels, and he has exceeded that promise. Total U.S. Official Development Assistance (ODA), nearly doubled from $10 billion a year in 2000 to $19 billion in 

2004—reversing a 40-year trend in declines of ODA as a percentage of GDP. 

The President did not make any specific commitments regarding funding levels 

per country when he announced the MCA. Country-specific allocations are based on 

a variety of factors, and it is not uncommon for country levels to fluctuate based 

on political, economic, and security considerations. Countries may receive more or 

less assistance depending on the goals and activities of those programs. 

MCC Compacts are designed to reduce poverty through sustained economic 

growth by addressing the greatest barriers to development, as identified by the 

country. As MCC Compacts prove successful and the economy grows, it would be 

logical to expect there to be less of a need for non-MCC assistance. Hence, we would 

expect that, over time, assistance to these countries will be reduced. But to be clear, 

even in those cases where the Administration is now proposing modest cuts in some 

assistance programs to an MCA country with a Compact, these countries will all be 

receiving significantly more development assistance with the Compact plus other 

funding than they did without a Compact. 

As for El Salvador, we are currently negotiating a Millennium Challenge Account 

(MCA) compact with El Salvador and expect that compact to be very large. In my 

testimony to the House International Relations Committee on February 16, I discussed how we are balancing cuts with increases in economic support funding 

(ESF)—as in the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, and Guatemala—to provide more 

flexible budget support that will allow countries to begin work to improve their eligibility for MCA compacts. In the case of El Salvador, to address concerns about the 

period before the MCC Compact might enter into force, the Administration has increased funding for rural development assistance by $10 million for FY 2007. Moreover, once its MCA compact is agreed to and goes into effect, there will be, as I testified to your committee, a substantial increase in foreign assistance to the country—

assistance of a size and nature that I expect to have a significant and lasting impact 

in El Salvador by reducing poverty through economic growth. 

Foreign assistance for the Western Hemisphere has nearly doubled since the start 

of this Administration, from $862,452,000 in FY 2001 to $1,696,841,000 in FY 2007. 

Although the FY 2007 request for Latin America represents an overall decrease of 

one percent from the FY 2006 request, it does not reflect a reduced commitment to 

Latin America. The President’s request will provide sufficient funds to maintain key 

programs. In addition to FY 2007 foreign assistance, the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) has approved compacts for Nicaragua ($175 million) and Honduras 

($215 million). On February 8, MCC’s Board approved a $35 million program for 

Paraguay as a Threshold Country. MCC funding has actually increased the total resources available to the region. 

Question: 

It has consistently been the policy of the United States to seek the transfer of 

Charles Taylor, the Butcher of Liberia, to the Special Court in Sierra Leone so he 

can stand trial for war crimes. Last year Congress appropriated $13 million in the 

FY06 Foreign Operations appropriations bill to see the Court through the end of its 

mandate. All of Congress, and specifically the members of both the House International Relations and House Appropriations Committees, have made clear they 

want to see Taylor tried by the Special Court and that the United States government 

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should support that effort on all levels, including through financial support to the 

Court. However, it has come to our attention that the Administration has approached 

Congress in an attempt to reprogram significant amounts in the ESF [Economic Support Fund] account, significantly altering this $13 million. My understanding is that 

the State Department is seeking to reduce the amount the United States will provide 

to the Court to less than half of what Congress appropriated. Despite the recent commitment of the United Nations to provide additional funding, the failure of the 

United States to follow through on providing the full appropriated amount of $13 

million will hamper the Court and thereby prevent the United States from achieving 

its policy goal of seeing Charles Taylor tried by the Special Court. So my question 

is; is it still the policy of the U.S. State Department to seek the immediate transfer 

of Charles Taylor to the Special Court for trial, and, if so, why would the State Department seek to reprogram the $13 million necessary to make this happen? 

Response: 

The people of West Africa deserve to see an end to impunity and to see Charles 

Taylor face justice for these horrific crimes. We are committed to ensuring that the 

Special Court can complete its work in a timely manner and hold accountable those 

who bear the greatest responsibility for serious violations of international humanitarian law. We plan to continue to provide financial support, while encouraging 

other countries to contribute as well to ensure that the Special Court is fully funded. 

Question: 

The recent successful political process in Liberia is of major benefit to the United 

States and our strategic interests. However, rebuilding Liberia is not a one or two 

year effort. Rebuilding this country will take a sustained commitment. We have seen 

in the past how early optimism regarding countries emerging from conflict fades as 

news cameras move on to the next emergency and donors lose interest. Why did the 

administration not include any funding for Liberia in its recent supplemental funding request? What specific plans are in place, or being formulated, at the State Department and USAID, to sustain the long-term, multi-year commitment necessary to 

support Liberia’s reconstruction efforts? How can Congress help to sustain your efforts? 

Response: 

Thanks to strong Congressional support in Fiscal Years 2004, 2005, and 2006, the 

United States has been able to play the leading role in helping Liberia begin recovery from fourteen years of civil war, generations of corruption, and a near-total absence of government services and of respect for human rights and the rule of law. 

This funding is key to helping the new government of Liberia establish the conditions for consolidating the peace and building prosperity. 

Our FY 2006 programs, which are also reflected in the Administration’s FY 2007 request of $89.945 million for Liberia, will accomplish the following goals:

• Economic Support Funds (ESF) will continue to provide funding primarily for 

quick-impact reconstruction of schools, hospitals and government buildings in 

county centers using war-affected youth, as well as rural road construction 

needed to facilitate economic revival. It will also support transparent economic management (GEMAP), civil service retrenchment, national reconciliation (TRC), judicial reform and police training.

• Child Survival and Health (CSH) will expand primary health care in targeted 

communities; strengthen non-governmental organizations and county health 

teams organizationally; and expand health care training.

• Development Assistance (DA) will expand USAID’s community-focused, postwar rehabilitation and reconstruction activities. DA will increase access to 

justice, agricultural production and market access, train newly elected government officials, strengthen civil society and support education.

• International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) funds will 

provide civilian police to the UN mission to monitor, mentor and reform the 

Liberian National Police.

• Peacekeeping Operation funds (PKO) will support security sector reform 

(SSR). This funding will contribute to a multi-year effort to create a professional, capable and fiscally sustainable Liberian military.

• Foreign Military Financing (FMF) will complement SSR efforts with 

sustainment training and some military equipment.

• International Military Education and Training (IMET) will build professionalism and fund leadership and specialized skills training for the new Liberian military.

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• Migration and Refugee Assistance (MRA) funding for Africa will support the 

return and reintegration to Liberia of refugees and internally displaced persons and Liberian refugees from Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea, Sierra Leone, and 

Ghana.

We plan to sustain the long-term, multi-year commitment necessary to support Liberia’s reconstruction efforts by maintaining programs and funding levels to meet 

Liberia’s needs. We have ongoing discussions with the Liberian government about 

the country’s needs and will continue to consider those needs in conjunction with 

our policies and budget priorities. We will, of course, work closely with Congress in 

formulating and pursuing these priorities. 

Question: 

What is the Administration doing to convince the Government of Ethiopia that the 

current political impasse there is damaging to Ethiopia’s future and the future of the 

U.S./Ethiopia relationship? What efforts is the United States making to secure the 

immediate, unconditional release of all political prisoners in Ethiopia? 

Response: 

The United States has made very clear in the numerous meetings with the Ethiopian Government that the on-going political impasse is unsustainable and that the 

Government must engage in a good faith dialogue with Ethiopia’s various opposition 

groups to address the underlying causes of the current political crisis. Senior U.S. 

Embassy and Department of State officials continue to press senior government officials to take unilateral actions to demonstrate their goodwill in liberalizing the political space and remedy the perceived marginalization of various ethnic groups. 

Senior Department of State officials continue to call for the immediate release of all 

Ethiopian prisoners of conscience. Absent such actions, we have called for due process for detainees in accordance with Ethiopian and international law. 

Question: 

Recently I wrote to Assistant Secretary Sauerbrey regarding the issue of stateless 

persons. These are people without a recognized citizenship, who are thereby often deprived of a host of basic human rights. Stateless persons are a highly vulnerable 

group that is largely ignored and too often falls between the cracks of government 

bureaucracies, but which ought to be among the primary concerns of your bureau. 

Millions of stateless persons, especially those who are not also refugees, continue to 

be overlooked to an unacceptable degree by the U.S. and many other countries. What 

efforts is the State Department making on the issue of statelessness? Does the PRM 

Bureau plan to make this issue a focus? How can Congress help? What specific conversations has the U.S. government had with the governments of Pakistan and Bangladesh regarding the issue of stateless Biharis in Bangladesh? 

Response: 

As Article 15 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states: ‘‘Everyone has 

a right to a nationality.’’ As such, the prevention and reduction of statelessness is 

a humanitarian priority, which may also aid in lessening human rights abuses, 

forced displacements, trafficking in persons, and refugees flows. 

The Department appreciates and shares your concerns for stateless populations 

who are vulnerable to abuse and exploitation. The Bureau of Population, Refugees, 

and Migration (PRM) is working closely with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to support its mandate on statelessness. The PRM Assistant Secretary, along with her Senior Advisor, is reviewing policy and program 

areas where the Bureau can effectively extend protection to stateless populations 

most in need, whether through the Refugees Admissions program or other activities. 

The Bureau will seek to implement any recommendations resulting from this review, to the extent possible and in coordination with UNHCR and non-governmental 

organizations to alleviate the plight of stateless people around the world. The Bureau looks forward to briefing interested Members of Congress on on-going activities. 

Question: 

There are over 60 pending criminal prosecutions in Turkey against journalists, 

writers and other intellectuals for their speech. Most are accused of ‘‘denigrating 

Turkishness’’ under Penal Code 301. How has the administration publicly condemned these attacks on freedom of expression in Turkey and the penal code provisions that suppress speech? What is the administration doing to push Turkey to improve its respect for human rights and democratic norms? 

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Response: 

The United States engages the Government of Turkey on a broad range of human 

rights issues, including police and judicial practices, religious freedom, government 

ethics, trafficking in persons, the right of return for internally displaced people and 

freedom of expression. The 2005 Country Report on Human Rights Practices for Turkey notes a decrease in the number of cases against writers and an increase in the 

number of their acquittals. However, the report also notes that ‘‘individuals could 

not criticize the state or government publicly without fear of reprisal, and the government continued to restrict expression by individuals sympathetic to some religious, political and Kurdish nationals or cultural viewpoints.’’

Freedom of expression remains a major concern in Turkey and we continue to 

raise the issue, along with others, in our meetings with government officials at all 

levels as well as journalists and other members of civil society in Turkey. Consulate 

and Embassy officials follow these issues closely, and express U.S. concern by attending and reporting on Section 301 trials. The State Department regularly provides informal reports on these cases to several Congressional offices in response to 

their inquiries. The United States supported a professional exchange program in 

2005 for Turkish journalists designed to foster ethics and journalistic responsibility 

among younger reporters and to promote freedom of expression for editors and 

media gatekeepers. U.S. officials meet regularly with members of the bureaucracy, 

legislature, executive branch, and judiciary to encourage broad reforms, including 

freedom of expression and other reforms needed to meet EU accession criteria and 

fulfill Turkey’s OSCE commitments. 

Question: 

I am very concerned that the administration has not maintained military parity 

between Armenia and Azerbaijan in its FY07 foreign aid request, especially considering the fragile cease fire between Armenia and Azerbaijan and Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliev’s repeated threats to resume war to overtake Nagorno Karabagh. 

In light of these threats, how can the President justify providing more military assistance to Azerbaijan and can he continue to certify that U.S. military assistance will 

not undermine efforts to negotiate a peaceful settlement of the Nagorno Karabagh 

conflict? 

Response: 

As a Co-Chair of the OSCE Minsk Group, our goal is to help Armenia and Azerbaijan achieve a peaceful resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Military assistance to both countries in light of that ongoing conflict is carefully considered and 

calibrated to ensure that it does not hamper ongoing efforts to negotiate a peaceful 

settlement between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Although the Rambouillet summit between the two presidents marked a temporary stall in negotiations, the process has 

gained momentum again with a series of individual visits by Minsk Group CoChairs to the region. We continue to view 2006 as the necessary window for the 

sides to reach an agreement. At the same time, we are strongly urging the presidents to prepare their publics for peace, not for war. 

While we do not have a policy that security assistance funding levels for Armenia 

and Azerbaijan should be identical, we work to ensure that assistance does not adversely affect the military balance between the two states. We do not believe that 

the differences in security assistance in the FY 2007 budget requests undermine 

prospects for peace or send the wrong message. 

The waiver of Section 907 of the FREEDOM Support Act every year since 2002 

has allowed us to provide military assistance that enhances Azerbaijan’s interoperability with NATO and U.S. forces and furthers U.S. peacekeeping objectives. These 

funds also allow us to assist Azerbaijan in developing capabilities to promote Caspian security and indigenous humanitarian demining capabilities. We provide assistance to Armenia for similar purposes.

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