BACKGROUND PAPER

Retaliatory Issues for the

U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces

June 1978

Congress of the United States

Congressional Budget Office

Washington, D.C.

RETALIATORY ISSUES FOR THE

U.S. STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES

The Congress of the United States

Congressional Budget Office

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Washington, D.C. 20402

PREFACE

The most important role for U.S. strategic nuclear forces is

to deter Soviet nuclear attacks by the threat of retaliation.

Because of increased vulnerability of U.S. land-based missiles and

the improved Soviet civil defense program, questions have been

raised concerning the ability of U.S. forces to retaliate effectively in the future against the Soviet Union. Proposals to

develop several new weapon systems to respond to these threats

have been presented to the Congress.

This background paper, prepared at the request of the Senate

Budget Committee, discusses the capabilities of both current and

possible future strategic nuclear forces to destroy industrial and

military targets in the Soviet Union after absorbing a massive

Soviet surprise attack. Together with a companion paper, Counterforce Issues for the U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces, this study

supports a forthcoming budget issue paper on strategic nuclear

forces for fiscal year 1979. In accordance with CBO's mandate to

provide objective analysis, this paper offers no recommendations.

This paper was prepared by John B. Shewinaker and Mary R.

Tietz of the National Security and International Affairs Division

of the Congressional Budget Office, under the supervision of

James R. Blaker, David S.C. Chu, and John E. Koehler. Computer

programming was done by James Reierson of the Computer Sciences

Corporation and Virginia G. France of CBO. Cost estimates were

provided by Edward A. Swoboda of CBO's Budget Analysis Division.

The authors wish to acknowledge the assistance of Nancy J. Swope,

Robert R. Soule, and Carl R. Neu. Patricia H. Johnston edited the

manuscript, and Connie S. Leonard prepared it for publication.

Alice M. Rivlin

Director

June 1978

111

CONTENTS

Page

PREFACE iii

SUMMARY xi

CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION 1

Why Measure Retaliatory Effectiveness? ... . 3

CHAPTER II. RETALIATORY CAPABILITIES 5

How Many U.S. Weapons Would Survive

a Soviet Attack? 10

How Many U.S. Weapons Would Reach

Soviet Targets? 11

How Much Damage Would be Inflicted

on the Soviet Union? 14

CHAPTER HI. THE EFFECT OF SOVIET CIVIL

DEFENSE MEASURES 21

The Soviet Civil Defense Program 21

Effects of Population Protection

Measures 22

Effects of Industrial Protection

Measures 24

CHAPTER IV. RETALIATORY FORCE STRUCTURE 29

U.S. Retaliatory Force Options 30

APPENDIX A. SOVIET CIVIL DEFENSE 37

APPENDIX b. SNAPPER DAMAGE ASSESSMENT MODEL:

INPUT DATA AND MAJOR ASSUMPTIONS 49

APPENDIX C. GLOSSARY 61

IT

TABLES

TABLE 1. ESTIMATED CHARACTERISTICS OF

CURRENT U.S. STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES

TABLE 2. ESTIMATED CHARACTERISTICS OFU.S. STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES

IN THE MID-1980S: FINITE DETERRENCE

FORCE STRUCTURE

Page

TABLE 3. ESTIMATED CHARACTERISTICS OF

U.S. STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES

IN THE 1990s: FINITE DETERRENCE

FORCE STRUCTURE

TABLE 4. ESTIMATED U.S. STRATEGIC FORCES

SURVIVING A HYPOTHETICAL SOVIET

FIRST STRIKE 12

TABLE 5. RETALIATORY CAPABILITIES OF THE

FINITE DETERRENCE FORCE . . . , 20

Vll

FIGURES

Page

FIGURE 1. EFFECT OF INDUSTRIAL HARDENING

ON POSEIDON EFFECTIVENESS 26

FIGURE 2. EFFECT OF INDUSTRIAL HARDENING

ON TRIDENT EFFECTIVENESS . 26

FIGURE 3. EFFECT OF INDUSTRIAL HARDENING

ON BOMB EFFECTIVENESS 27

FIGURE 4. EFFECT OF INDUSTRIAL HARDENING

ON CRUISE MISSILE EFFECTIVENESS 27

APPENDIX FIGURES

Page

FIGURE A-l. SOVIET CIVIL DEFENSE . 40

FIGURE B-l. DAMAGE FROM POSEIDON SUBMARINES 55

FIGURE B-2. DAMAGE FROM B-52s CARRYING

CRUISE MISSILES 56

FIGURE B-3. DAMAGE FROM BOMBERS 58

IX

28-512 O - 78 - 2

SUMMARY

One of the most important roles for U.S. strategic nuclear

forces is the deterrence of Soviet nuclear attacks by the threat

of retaliation. This paper focuses on this retaliatory role: that

is, the capability of U.S. nuclear forces to destroy people,

industrial plants, and military forces in the Soviet Union in

retaliation for a Soviet nuclear attack against the United States.

At present, the United States can effect great destruction on

the Soviet Union in a second-strike attack. CBO's analysis

indicates that, even after receiving a massive, surprise Soviet

nuclear attack aimed at destroying U.S. nuclear forces, at least

120 U.S. bombers, 17 Poseidon submarines, and 700 land-based,

intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) would survive. This

means that the United States would nave about 5,000 nuclear

weapons remaining after absorbing a Soviet first strike. Assuming

about 1,000 of these weapons were held in reserve and the remainder were launched in retaliation against the Soviet Union,

enough weapons would be expected to hit their intended targets to

destroy 80 percent of the Soviet industrial target base and 90

percent of military facilities other than missile silos. _!/ This

retaliation could kill between 20 million and 95 million people in

the Soviet Union, depending on the effectiveness of Soviet civil

defense efforts.

Each component of the present U.S. strategic nuclear forces—

bombers, ICBMs, and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs)

--has great, independent, destructive power. Each has the

capability, independently, of destroying 75 percent or more

I/ The Soviet industrial target base does not include all of

~ Soviet industry. Rather, it is a target base that includes

those facilities that have been estimated to be important

targets for a major retaliatory strike. "Military facilities

other than silos" include Soviet army, air force, and naval

installations as well as theater nuclear weapons and all

nuclear weapon storage sites—in other words, all military

targets other than ICBM silos ana their launch control

facilities.

XI

TT
of the Soviet industrial target base even after absorbing a

massive Soviet nuclear attack. (This assumes that all ICBM,

bomber, or SLBM weapons are allocated solely to industry and

none to military targets.) Together, the three components of the

strategic forces provide important hedges against unexpected

Soviet technological breakthroughs. If, for example, the Soviets

were capable of destroying all U.S ICEMs in a surprise nuclear

attack—a capability that few believe the Soviet Union possesses—those bomber and submarine forces that would be expected

to survive the attack could still be expected to destroy about

85 percent of the Soviet industrial target base if no weapons

were allocated to military targets or held in reserve. Even

if the Soviets destroyed all of the U.S. nuclear weapons launched

by ICBMs and submarine-launched missiles, U.S. bombers could

still destroy about 75 percent of the Soviet industrial base.

Alternatively, if the Soviets developed an air defense system that

prevented U.S. bombers from reaching their targets, the surviving

U.S. ICBM and submarine forces could still destroy some 90 percent

of the Soviet industrial target base.

Soviet civil defense efforts might erode the destructive

potential of current U.S. forces. With no Soviet civil defense

measures, for example, a U.S. retaliatory strike could be expected

to kill about 95 million people, slightly over one-third of the

total population. A moderately effective program might reduce

fatalities to about 40 million; a more effective program, which

could evacuate 75 percent of the people in the cities to the

countryside and place nearly, all the people in shelters, might

reduce fatalities to about 20 million people, less than 10 percent

of the population.

There is, however, a tradeoff between Soviet civil defense

programs and the capability of the Soviet Union to launch a

surprise attack; that is, it is unlikely that the Soviet Union

could implement an effective civil defense program without

alerting the United States to a pending attack. The higher the

U.S. alert posture, the greater the number of U.S. weapons

remaining after a Soviet first strike—weapons that could, with

careful retargeting and retention of forces in reserve, counteract

Soviet civil defense efforts. An effective Soviet evacuation plan

would, for example, take at least three days to accomplish.

Since an extensive evacuation could not be hidden from the United

States, the United States would almost certainly place its own

nuclear forces on alert. If the Soviet Union launched a first

strike against U.S. nuclear forces that were on alert, about 2,500

more weapons would survive than if an attack had been targeted

Xll
against U.S. nuclear forces in their normal, day-to-day alert

status. These remaining weapons would be sufficient both to

destroy nearly all Soviet cities and military facilities and to

retain about 4,000 Poseidon warheads in reserve. These reserve

weapons, in turn, could be used to continue the conflict. 2/

If. the Soviet Union were to harden extensively its industrial machinery by the use of sandbags or by other means

in preparation for nuclear war, this work would also take time and

would be unlikely to escape the detection of the United States.

The warning given by these efforts would allow the United States

to place its bomber force on alert. Given a high alert status,

the surviving U.S. bomber force (with its larger-yield weapons)

would be capable of destroying a higher percentage of hardened

industry than would be possible if the United States had not been

alerted to an impending attack by Soviet industrial hardening

efforts.

SOVIET CAPABILITIES AND TARGET GROWTH IN THE FUTURE

The future destructive potential of the U.S. strategic

nuclear forces will depend in large part on what improvements the

Soviet Union makes to its own forces over the next decades. As

the Soviet Union increases the number of its missile warheads (by

replacing single warheads on ICBMs with multiple independently

targeted reentry vehicles, or MIRVs) and improves their accuracy,

the U.S. Minuteman ICBMs will become more vulnerable to attack.

Soviet industrial growth could increase the number of U.S. weapons

that would be required to achieve about the same percentage of

destruction as is now possible. Finally, it is possible that

Soviet technological breakthroughs in air or ballistic missile

defense or in antisubmarine warfare could occur in the future.

Soviet technological breakthroughs of the sort that would be

necessary to neutralize various components of the U.S. nuclear

forces could occur, but they seem unlikely on the basis of what is

now known or projected. Further, there is normally some time

between a breakthough and the deployment of weapons that make use

of a new technology.

2/ To carry out this strategy, the United States would require

survivable reconnaissance assets to identify targets, a

command center to designate targets to the surviving forces,

and some means of communication.

XI 1.1
To simulate nuclear exchanges between the United States

and the Soviet Union for the mid-to-late 1980s and the 1990s,

a reasonable set of assumptions must be selected to deal with

these uncertainties. A baseline set of U.S. forces, described

below as a finite deterrence force, was constructed and its

capabilities were computed under the following assumptions:

o The number of U.S. Minuteman missiles that could survive

a surprise Soviet counterforce attack will decrease from

about 700 currently to less than 500 in the early-to-mid

1980s, and to fewer than 100 by the 1990s, because of the

improved accuracy of Soviet ICBMs.

o The Soviet Union will not achieve a technological breakthrough in air defense or antisubmarine warfare sufficient

to offset currently programmed or future improvements

in the capabilities of U.S. weapons. Specifically,

through the 1990s, four out of five surviving bombers will

penetrate Soviet air defenses, and all submarines at sea

will survive a Soviet first strike through the 1990s.

o The growth of Soviet industrial facilities will not

increase requirements for additional U.S. weapons to

destroy them by more than 40 percent by the 1990s.

o The number of Soviet military facilities against which

U.S. nuclear strikes might be targeted will not increase

in the future.

o Half of the Soviet industrial base will be "hardened" in

such a way as to be protected from destruction incurred by a building collapse.

U.S. RETALIATORY CAPABILITIES IN THE FUTURE

Finite Deterrence

Given the assumptions, one way in which the Congress could

maintain the current level of retaliatory capability over the next

10 to 15 years would be by developing a finite deterrence force.

This option would improve current U.S. strategic nuclear forces by

deploying cruise missiles on B-52 bombers and Trident I missiles

in submarines. It would build toward a force structure composed

of 330 B-52 bombers (half of which would be armed with cruise

missiles), 60 FB-llls, 20 Trident submarines with Trident I

xiv
missiles, and 1,000 land-based Minuteman missiles. 3_/ The finite

deterrence force would cost about $120 billion (in fiscal year

1979 dollars) between fiscal year 1979 and the year 2000 for

investment and for operation and maintenance.

Based on the assumptions regarding Soviet improvements over

the next two decades, this finite deterrence force could probably:

o Emerge from a no-warning, massive Soviet first strike with

operable U.S. forces of some 120 bombers, 16 submarines,

and 90 Minuteman missiles; and

o In retaliation, destroy 80 to 90 percent of the Soviet

industrial target base and military targets; while

o Holding over 500 Trident I weapons in reserve to continue

the nuclear conflict, if required after the first exchange, in addition to 500 Trident I weapons as a hedge

against target growth.

In addition, such a finite deterrence force would provide

hedges against a Soviet technological breakthrough. CBO's calculations indicate that the U.S. force would be capable of destroying 75 percent of the industrial target base in the Soviet

Union in spite of a major breakthrough in air defense, antisubmarine warfare, or antiballistic missile defense. The following

table summarizes the retaliatory capabilities of the finite

deterrence force and its hedge capabilities over the next 15

years.

A great deal of uncertainty is associated with calculations

of retaliatory capabilities. And, even if tne calculations

outlined above were roughly accurate, two major questions remain:

3/ The projected U.S. forces for finite deterrence assume that

~~ the first Trident submarine would enter the U.S. fleet in

1980 and that succeeding units would enter the fleet six

years after authorization by the Congress. To the extent that

delays in the Trident program are not recouped by an increase

in the production rate to two submarines a year in the 1980s,

the capabilities of the finite deterrence force are somewhat

overstated.

xv

TT
RETALIATORY CAPABILITIES OF THE FINITE DETERRENCE FORCE:

SOVIET TARGET BASE

PERCENT DAMAGE TO

Current

Mid1980s 1990s

Total Force a/

Industrial target base 80 80 80

Military targets 90 90 90

Capability to Hedge Against

Soviet Developments b/

Against ABM: No ballistic missile

warheads, only bombers attack

Industrial target base only 75 . 80-85 75-85

Industrial and military targets 35 55-60 50-60

Against ICBM vulnerability: No surviving

ICBMs, only bombers and submarines attack

Industrial target base only 85 90 90

Industrial and military targets 65 80-85 75-85

Against ASW: No surviving submarines,

only bombers and ICBMs attack

Industrial target base only 90 85-90 80-85

Industrial and military targets 70 70-75 55-65

Against air defense: No bomber weapons,

only submarines and ICBMs attack

Industrial target base only 90 90 85-90

Industrial and military targets 75 75-80 60-70

a/ Weapons expected to survive a first strike are allocated to achieve

over 80 percent damage to the industrial target base, assuming half

were hardened to 30 pounds per square inch (psi). One thousand submarine warheads are held in reserve. The remainder of the weapons are

allocated to military targets other than silos (at least one ballistic

missile weapon is allocated to each military airfield and 100 SRAMs are

allocated to air defense sites). No Soviet ICBM silos are included in

the military target base.

b/ All surviving weapons of forces indicated are allocated; no weapons

are held in reserve. For the mid-1980s column, the low end of the

range assumes a 20 percent growth in industrial targets; the high

end assumes no growth. For the 1990s column, the low end of the

range assumes a 40 percent growth in industrial targets; the high

end assumes no growth.

xvi
Would Soviet decisionmakers make the same assessment as U.S.

leaders of the ultimate results of a nuclear exchange? Whatever

their assessment, would it deter them from initiating an exchange?

There are no clear answers to these questions. Development

of a finite deterrence force would be a shift away from the

concept of three surviving force components because the current

U.S. Minuteman force is assumed to be vulnerable to Soviet

nuclear attack by the 1990s. A finite deterrence force would

be an indication that the United States did not intend to match

Soviet capabilities to destroy land-based missiles.

A finite deterrence force would appeal to those who believe

that the ability to devastate the Soviet Unon in response to

a nuclear attack on the United States is an adequate deterrent and

who see little rationale for the procurement of additional nuclear

forces. On the other hand, criteria other than retaliatory

capability must be considered in determining U.S. strategic force

posture, such as how the strategic balance may be perceived by

allies and other nations.

Maintain a Survivable Land-Based Missile Force

Although the factors discussed above make it seem improbable,

a finite deterrence force might entail some risk to U.S. retaliatory capability in the fuure. If the increasing vulnerability

of U.S. ICBM silos were paralleled by the emergence of a very

effective Soviet civil defense program as well as the development

of an effective Soviet air defense, the capabilities of the finite

deterrence force would be eroded—particularly before Trident 1

enters the force in large numbers. It is most unlikely that

all these events would occur simultaneously. But if they did

take place over the next decade, they would reduce the level of

destruction the United States could inflict on the Soviet Union,

while still retaining a large reserve of weapons for possible use

after a retaliatory strike.

The Congress could seek to counteract what seems the most

probable of future changes—the increasing vulnerability of

the Minuteman force—by supporting the development and deployment

of a less vulnerable land-based system. The procurement of 300 ixtX

missiles, for example, would maintain a land-based component

of the U.S. nuclear arensal that would be significantly less

xvn

28-512 0-78-3
vulnerable to a Soviet attack than the current Minuteinan force. 4/

This would increase the hedges against Soviet breakthroughs in

antisubmarine warfare and air defense. As measured by the ability

to destroy both industrial and military targets, the addition of

300 MX missiles would result in 75 to 85 percent damage in case of

a breakthrough by the Soviets in both areas. But this kind of

insurance would be expensive. It would add some $30 billion (in

fiscal year 1979 dollars) to the costs of the strategic forces,

for a total cost of aoout $150 billion over the 22-year period

between fiscal years 1979 and 2000.

Other Options

Other options to strengthen the strategic forces would

include increasing the capability of both the submarine force

and the bomber force. Additions to both forces would be required

to increase the capability to hedge against a Soviet breakthrough

in antisubmarine warfare and air defense. A forthcoming budget

issue paper on U.S. strategic nuclear forces will discuss these

alternatives as well as force requirements for a U.S. capability

to destroy Soviet silos.

47 Current plans call for mobile basing for MX missiles. The

missiles would be moved either within underground trenches

or among protective above-ground shelters.

XVlll
CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION

The military forces of the United States—both strategic

nuclear and general purpose—provide the nation with the capability to threaten, attack, or resist other nations. I/ Because

U.S. forces are large and diverse, the range of options they offer

is broad. The perception that the United States has capable

forces that can be used in many areas and circumstances serves to

deter adversaries and reassure allies, thereby helping to maintain

the security of the nation and achieve some valuable international

political objectives.

Strategic nuclear forces play various roles in shaping

perceptions, providing deterrence by threats of retaliation,

and destroying targets in wartime. This paper focuses on the

retaliatory role of strategic nuclear forces—that is, how they

deter Soviet nuclear attacks by providing the United States with

the capability to destroy people, industrial targets, and military

forces in the Soviet Union, even after U.S. forces have themselves

been attacked by a Soviet "first strike."

There is no way to determine exactly how much damage the

United States should be able to inflict on the Soviet Union in

I/ U.S. military forces are usually divided into two broad

~ categories: strategic nuclear and general purpose. The

strategic nuclear forces include intercontinental ballistic

missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles

(SLBMs), B-52 and FB-111 bombers, air defense missiles and

interceptors defending North America, and the associated

units and facilities required to control and support these

forces. (See the Glossary for descriptions of weapons systems

discussed in this paper.) The remaining U.S. air, sea, arid

ground forces are termed "general purpose forces." The

term "strategic nuclear forces" is used rather than "nuclear

forces" because the general purpose forces include a number of

shorter-range systems—such as nuclear artillery, nuclearcapable fighter/attack aircraft, and short-range missiles—

that are capable of delivering nuclear weapons.
order to deter a nuclear attack. That depends on how large

the stakes in some future conflict might be perceived to be,

the costs both sides might be willing to bear, and the losses

they see each other as willing to risk. Yet, to judge the

adequacy of the U.S. nuclear arsenal, some criterion of damage

is required.

Several such criteria have been suggested. In the late

1960s, then Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara identified the

capability to destroy large portions of Soviet industry and

population as a useful measure of the deterrent value of the U.S.

strategic nuclear forces. 2j More recently, Secretary of Defense

Brown identified the capacity to destroy a minimum of 200 major

Soviet cities as the level necessary to deter a Soviet nuclear

attack. 3/ Current official doctrine identifies the capability to

destroy "targets critical to enemy post-war power and recovery"

(which include military forces and industry) as a measure of

retaliatory strength. 4/

This paper calculates the destructive potential of the U.S.

strategic nuclear forces that would be expected to survive a

massive Soviet attack on the U.S. forces that is launched without

warning. The extent of destruction to the Soviet industrial and

military target base that could be achieved by the surviving

2/ For example, in the annual Defense Department report for

fiscal year 1969, Secretary of Defense McNamara said: "I

would judge that a capability on our part to destroy, say,

one-fifth of her population and one-half to three-quarters of

her industrial capacity would serve as an effective deterrent.

Such a level of destruction would certainly represent intolerable punishment to any 20th century industrial nation."

(See Department of Defense, Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1969,

p. 50.)

3/ Department of Defense, Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1979,

P- 55.

_4/ Fiscal Year 1978 Authorization for Military Procurement, Research and Development, and Active Duty, Selected Reserve,

and Civilian Personnel Strengths, Hearings before the Senate

Committee on Armed Services, 95:1 (January-February 1977),

Part 2, pp. 838-839.
U.S. forces is computed, as well as the number of Soviet fatalities in such a nuclear exchange. 5/

WHY MEASURE RETALIATORY EFFECTIVENESS?

There are several reasons why it is important to try to

calculate whether the United States has now and will continue to

have "enough" strategic nuclear destructive power to deter the

Soviet Union from launching a nuclear attack. The U.S. ICBM force

will become increasingly vulnerable as new, more accurate ICBMs

enter the Soviet strategic forces. Therefore, fewer weapons

will be available for a U.S. retaliatory strike. Civil defense

programs and efforts to protect Soviet industry from the effects

of nuclear war are improving. Meanwhile, recent Administration

decisions, such as those to cancel procurement of the B-l bomber

and to introduce the cruise missile into the U.S. strategic

nuclear weapons inventory, are changing U.S. capabilities.

Thus, the Congress will make decisions on a number of important issues over the next several years that will involve

judgments about the adequacy of U.S. nuclear forces to deter a

Soviet attack. These judgments require answers to the following

questions:

o How many U.S. weapons are required to inflict significant

damage to the Soviet industrial target base in a second,

retaliatory strike?

o How many additional weapons are required to attain a

capability to attack Soviet general purpose forces?

o What effect do Soviet civil defense preparations have on

the U.S. retaliatory capability?

The Congress will implicitly answer these questions wnen it

determines the pace of development and procurement of a new

5/ The Soviet population is not currently targeted in Department

of Defense plans for the use of U.S. strategic nuclear forces.

Yet in an actual nuclear exchange, millions of people would be

killed, and estimates of the number of people killed in a

postulated nuclear strike have commonly been used as a measure

of destructive potential.

TT
generation of strategic nuclear weapons—MX mobile ICBMs, Trident

nuclear submarines, Trident missiles, cruise missiles, and cruisemissile carriers. In resolving these issues, the Congress will be

defining the strategic nuclear relationship between the United

States ana the Soviet Union for the rest of this century.

The U.S. nuclear arsenal consists of thousands of nuclear

weapons, and there are thousands of possible targets in the

Soviet Union. In oraer to assess the capability of U.S. forces

to retaliate effectively against the Soviet Union, the SNAPPER

Damage Assessment Model developed for the Air Force by the Pvand

Corporation was used to calculate the results displayed in

this paper. The computer model, postulated targets, and major

assumptions are discussed in Appendix B. 6/

Chapter II describes and assesses the current retaliatory

capabilities of the United States and assesses the future capabilities of a baseline force. Chapter 111 addresses the potential

impact of Soviet civil defense measures on these capabilities.

The paper concludes with assessments of various courses the

Congress could take, from supporting little, if any, change to

current U.S. strategic nuclear forces to providing for the introduction of a new generation of weapons to those forces.

6/ The model does not account for several limitations in weapons

targeting: there are no range limitations on offensive

weapons, no computation of "footprints" for multiple-warhead

missiles (a Poseidon missile, for example, must have 10

targets within the area in which it can disperse its warheads), and no restrictions on bomber targets. (In reality, a

bomber must have a programmed track and must attack targets on

that track.) The net effect is that the model moderately

overstates capabilities.
CHAPTER II. RETALIATORY CAPABILITIES

The ability of the U.S. strategic nuclear forces to destroy

Soviet industrial and military targets is generally used as a

measure of retaliatory capability. By this measure, the U.S.

arsenal is quite potent.

U.S. strategic nuclear forces consist of three components:

land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (iCBMs), long-range

bombers, and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBKs). The

characteristics of the current arsenal are displayed in Table 1.

Even after absorbing a massive Soviet first strike while U.S.

forces were in their normal, day-to-day alert status:

o Each component of the arsenal could, by itself, destroy

at least 75 percent of the industrial target base in the

Soviet Union; JL/

o Two of the three components could destroy at least 65

percent of the Soviet industrial target base and of the

military targets other than ICBM silos; 2j and

o All three components could destroy over 80 percent of

the industrial target base and general purpose force

targets and governmental centers, while keeping 1,000

weapons in reserve to continue the conflict if required.

Current U.S. weapons systems have little capability to

destroy Soviet ICBM silos.

I/ The industrial target base used for CBO calculations does not

~~ include all Soviet industry. Instead, the base is an estimate

of the Soviet industrial targets that the United States would

want to destroy in a major retaliatory strike.

2/ Military targets other than silos, as defined in this paper,

~ include Soviet army, air force, and naval installations as

well as theater nuclear weapons and all nuclear weapon storage

sites—in other words, all types of military targets other

than ICBM silos and their launch control facilities.

IT "in
TABLE 1. ESTIMATED CHARACTERISTICS OF CURRENT U.S. STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES a/

Launcher

ICBMs

Minuteman II

Minuteman III

Titan

Total ICBMs

Submarine Missiles

Polaris

Poseidon

Total SLBMs

Bombers

B-52D

B-52G/H

FB-111

Total Bombers

Grand Total

Warheads

per

Number Vehicle

450 1

550 3

54 1

1,054

160 1

496 " 10

656

75 4 Bombs

255 4 SRAMs/4 Bombs

60 2 SRAMs/2 Bombs

390

2,100

Total

Warheads

450

1,650

54

2,154

160

4,960

5,120

300

2,040

240

2,580

9,854

Yield

in

Megatons b/

1.00

0.17

9.00

0.60

0.04

1.00

0.20/1.00

0.20/1.00

Circular

Error

Reliability c/ Probable

0.80

0.80

0.75

0.80

0.80

0.76

0.70/0.76

0.70/0.76

1,800 ft

700 ft

3,000 ft

3,000 ft

1,500 ft

1,000 ft

1,200/1,000

1,200/1,000

d/

ft

ft

SOURCES: There is fairly wide agreement among various unclassified estimates of U.S. nuclear forces. For ICBM and SLBM

figures, see Hon. Thomas J. Downey, "How to Avoid Monad and Disaster," Foreign Policy (Fall 1976), pp. 178-179;

Statement of the Honorable Robert L. Leggett, in Vladivostok Accord: Implications to U.S. Security, Arms Control,

and World Peace, Hearings before the Subcommittee on International Security, House Committee on International

Relations, 94:1 (June-July 1975), pp. 8-14; and Kosta Tsipis, "The Accuracy of Strategic Missiles," Scientific

American (July 1975), p. 190. Minuteman III CEP of 700 ft. (see "U.S. Plans 'Cold-Launch' ICBMs," Aviation Week

and Space Technology (February 4, 1974), p. 14) assumes the more accurate MK-12A warhead has not yet been deployed. For bomber estimates, see Archie L. Wood, "Modernizing the Strategic Bomber Force Without Really Trying—

A Case Against the B-l," International Security (Fall 1976) and Alton H. Quanbeck and Archie L. Wood, Modernizing

the Strategic Bomber Force (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1976), p. 36.

a/ See the Glossary for descriptions of weapons systems.

_b_/ A megaton is a measure of the destructive power of a nuclear weapon and is equivalent to 1,000,000 tons of TNT.

cj Reliability is the probability that a weapon will operate as designed. For bomber weapons, the probability of penetrating Soviet air defenses is also included.

Aj CEP is a measure of the delivery accuracy of a weapon system. It is the radius of a circle within which half the

weapons aimed at a target are expected to fall.
The amount of destruction the United States would be able

to inflict on the Soviet Union in a retaliatory strike in the

future depends, of course, on developments in both nations'

strategic forces over the next decade. Improvements in the

accuracy and destructive power of Soviet ICBMs could, for example,

mean that fewer U.S. weapons would be left to retaliate against

the Soviet Union after a Soviet first strike. Soviet improvements

in air defenses or in civil defense measures could also erode

the destructive potential of U.S. nuclear forces. Industrial

expansion could increase the number of targets and, therefore, the

number of weapons required to destroy those targets. In contrast,

improvements in U.S. forces over the next decade might more than

compensate for changes in the forces or defenses of the Soviet

Union.

In short, predictions about the future strategic nuclear

relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union

require a number of assumptions. A systematic assessment requires the construction of a baseline U.S. force structure, the

effectiveness of which can be judged against projections of Soviet

improvements in the future. To do so, CBO has constructed what

may be termed a "finite deterrence" force for the United States,

the components of which for the mid-1980s and 1990s are portrayed

in Tables 2 and 3. The finite deterrence force represents a

continuation of strategic nuclear programs currently underway.

As Table 3 shows, the U.S. strategic nuclear forces in

the 1990s would differ from today's forces (see Table 1) primarily

through the introduction of cruise missiles and Trident submarines. It postulates the same ICBM force as currently exists,

a decline in the total number of delivery systems (as the more

capable Trident submarine replaces the older Polaris and Poseidon

submarines), but an increase in total warheads. _3/

This, then, was the baseline force used in simulations of

U.S. retaliatory strikes against the Soviet Union. In estimating

the retaliatory capabilities of U.S. forces, there are several key

questions:

3/ The finite deterrence force does not include weapons systems

~~ like the MX or Trident II. It is a baseline projection

against which the addition of these systems can be compared

(see Chapter IV).

28-512 O - 78 - 4
TABLE 2. ESTIMATED CHARACTERISTICS OF U.S. STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES IN THE MID-1980S:

FORCE STRUCTURE a/

FINITE DETERRENCE

00

Launcher

ICBMs

Minuteman II

Minuteman III

Titan

Total ICBMs

Submarine Missiles

Poseidon

Poseidon C-4

Trident I

Total SLBMs

Bombers

B-52G/H

B-52CM

FB-111

Total Bombers

Grand Total

SOURCES: Trident I

and Space

Warheads

per

Number Vehicle

450

550

54

1,054

336

160

240

736

165

165

60

390

2,180

1

3

1

10

8

8

6 SRAMs/4 bombs

20 cruise missiles

2 SRAMs/2 bombs

Yield

Total in

Warheads Megatons b/

450

1,650

54

2,154

3,360

1,280

1,920

6,560

1,650

3,300

240

5,190

13,904

missile estimates from "New Propellant

Technology (October 13, 1975), p. 15.

Alarm Planners,"

from Kosta Tsipis

Aviation Week and Space

1.00

0.17

9.00

0.04

0.10

0.10

0.20/1.00

0.20

0.20/1.00

Circular

Error

Reliability c/ Probable d/

0.80

0.80

0.75

0.80

0.80

0.80

0.70/0.76

0.70

0.70/0.76

Evaluated for Trident Second

Cruise missile yield from

Technology (July 11, 1977)

, "Cruise Missiles," Scientific American (February

, p. 17.

1977), p.

1,800 ft.

700 ft.

3,000 ft.

1,500 ft.

1,500 ft.

1,500 ft.

1,200/1,000 ft.

300 ft.

1,200/1,000 ft.

Stage," Aviation Week

"ICBM Guidance Curbs

Cruise missile CEP

29. Cruise missiles

assumed carried by 75 B-52Ds and 90 B-52Gs.

aj See the Glossary for descriptions of weapons systems.

b/ A megaton is a measure of the destructive power of a nuclear weapon and is equivalent to 1,000,000 tons of

TNT.

c/ Reliability is the probability that a weapon will operate as designed. For bomber weapons, the probability of penetrating Soviet air defenses is also included.

d_/ CEP is a measure of the delivery accuracy of a weapon system. It is the radius of a circle within which

half the weapons aimed at a target are expected to fall.
TABLE 3. ESTIMATED CHARACTERISTICS OF U.S. STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES IN THE 1990s:

STRUCTURE a/

FINITE DETERRENCE FORCE

Launcher

ICBMs

Minuteman II

Minuteman III

Titan

Total ICBMs

Submarine Missiles

Poseidon C-4

Trident I

Total SLBMs

Bombers

B-52G/H

B-52CM

FB-111

Total Bombers

Grand Total

SOURCES: Trident I

and Space

Warheads

per

Number Vehicle

450

550

54

1,054

80

480

560

165

165

60

390

2,004

missile

1

3

1

8

8

6 SRAMs/4 bombs

20 cruise missiles

2 SRAMs/2 bombs

Yield

Total in

Warheads Megatons b/

450

1,650

54

2,154

640

3,840

4,480

1,650

3,300

240

5,190

11,824

estimates from "New Propellant

Technology (October 13, 1975),

Alarms Planners,"

from Kosta Tsipis

Aviation Week and Space

p. 15.

1.00

0,17

9.00

0.10

0.10

0.20/1.00

0.20

0.20/1.00

Circular

Error

Reliability c/ Probable d/

0.80

0.80

0.75

0.80

0.80

1,800 ft.

700 ft.

3,000 ft.

1,500 ft.

1,500 ft.

0.70/0.76 1,200/1,000 ft.

0.70

0.70/0.76

Evaluated for Trident Second

Cruise missile yield from

Technology (July 11, 1977), p. 17.

, "Cruise Missiles," Scientific American (February 1977), p.

300 ft.

1,200/1,000 ft.

Stage," Aviation Week

"ICBM Guidance Curb

Cruise missile CEP

29. Cruise missiles

assumed carried by 75 B-52Ds and 90 B-52Gs.

aj See the Glossary for descriptions of weapons systems.

A megaton is a measure of the destructive power of a nuclear weapon and is equivalent to 1,000,000 tons of

TNT .

cj Reliability is the probability that a weapon will operate as designed.

ability of penetrating Soviet air defenses is also included.

For bomber weapons, the probd/ CEP is a measure of the delivery accuracy of a weapon system. It is the radius of a circle within which

half the weapons aimed at a target are expected to fall.
o How many U.S. weapons would survive a Soviet attack now

and in the future, after the Soviet Union improved the

accuracy and destructive potential of its ICBM force?

o How many of the surviving U.S. weapons would likely reach

their targets in a retaliatory U.S. strike on the Soviet

Union?

o How mucn damage would they inflict?

HOW MANY U.S. WEAPONS WOULD SURVIVE A SOVIET ATTACK?

If the Soviet Union launched a massive, surprise nuclear

attack against U.S. strategic nuclear forces today, portions of

each component of the U.S. nuclear forces would be destroyed, but

a potent U.S. retaliatory capability would remain. Those bombers

that are normally on alert (30 percent under current policy)

should survive, along with that portion of the U.S. submarine

force at sea—about 55 percent of the Poseidon fleet. If, given

current estimates of Soviet capabilities, the Soviets attacked

the U.S. ICBM force with the most accurate missiles in their

inventory, some 70 percent of the Minuteman force would be

expected to survive.

With the full deployment of the Soviet SS-18 and SS-19

missile systems in the early-to-mid 1980s, 4/ fewer U.S. landbased ICBMs would survive a Soviet surprise first-strike attack.

CBO's analysis indicates, for example, that only about 40 to 60

percent of the U.S. ICBMs portrayed in the finite deterrence force

for the mid-1980s (see Table 2) would survive in such a situation.

The number of ICBMs that would survive would be even fewer in the

latter half of the 1980s (only about 10 percent), assuming the

4/ SS-18 and SS-19 missiles are the most capable of the new

Soviet missiles now being deployed. Each carries a large

number of high-yield, independently targeted warheads (the

SS-18 carries eight to ten; the SS-19 carries up to six) so

that each missile would have the potential of destroying

several Minuteman silos. Under the likely SALT II ceilings,

the Soviet Union could deploy 308 SS-18 missiles; only 250

would be required to target two warheads on each of the 1,000

Minuteman silos.

10
Soviet Union would have deployed another generation of large, more

accurate ICBMs by then.

But the number of surviving bombers would remain about

the same in the next decade or more, assuming that about the same

number would be on alert and could move away from the airfields

targeted by the Soviet Union. Likewise, the number of surviving

U.S. submarine-launched warheads would not be reduced by Soviet

improvements in their nuclear forces. Instead, with the introduction of Trident submarines, the number of surviving submarinelaunched warheads would probably increase in the 1980s because of

additional submarines. In the 1990s, the number of surviving

warheads would be about the same as today because the larger

proportion of Trident submarines that would normally be at sea at

any given time would compensate for the decrease in the size of

the submarine force. (About 66 percent of the Trident submarine

fleet would be at sea at any given time under normal day-to-day

alert conditions, compared to roughly 55 percent of today's

Poseidon fleet.)

These calculations were based on the assumption that the

United States would have no warning of a Soviet nuclear attack

before it was launched. If there were some warning and, in

response, the United States heightened its alert status to what is

termed a generated alert condition, the number of U.S. strategic

nuclear forces that could be expected to survive a Soviet strike

would be much larger. Table 4 shows the estimated surviving

nuclear forces for both a surprise attack and one that occurs

after a period of tension in which the number of forces on alert

is increased. 5/

HOW MANY U.S. WEAPONS WOULD REACH SOVIET TARGETS?

Those weapons that survived a Soviet first strike must

then be able to penetrate Soviet air space in order to reach

their targets. Both land- and sea-based U.S. ballistic missiles

launched in retaliation would probably face little opposition from

a Soviet antiballistic missile (ABM) defense now or over the next

5/ For a detailed discussion of the ability of U.S. forces to

survive a Soviet first strike, see Congressional Budget

Office, Counterforce Issues for the U.S. Strategic Nuclear

Forces, Background Paper (January 1978), pp. 9-30.

11
TABLE 4. ESTIMATED U.S.

(WARHEADS)

STRATEGIC FORCES SURVIVING A HYPOTHETICAL SOVIET FIRST STRIKE

Minuteman Cruise

Titan II III Poseidon Trident SRAM Bomb Missile Total

Current Forces

Day-to-Day Alert 31 331 1,062 2,720

Generated Alert 31 331 1,062 3,968

Finite Deterrence Force

Mid-1980s

Day-to-Day Alert 10 205 753 1,920

Generated Alert 10 205 753 2,560

1,984

2,752

342

912

336

888

432

1,152

236

624

1,000

2,640

4,918

7,456

6,444

10,432

1990s

Day-to-Day Alert

Generated Alert

2

2

41

41

150

150

2,880

3,968

336

888 '

236

624

1,000

2,640

4,6*5

8,313

SOURCES: The number of surviving bombers and submarines was computed from Tables 1-3 based

on a 30 percent bomber alert rate, 55 percent for Poseidon and 66 percent for

Trident submarines for the day-to-day alert case. For generated alert conditions,

80 percent of the bombers and submarines were assumed to be on alert. (See Department of Defense, Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1978, p. 133; and Fiscal Year 1978

Authorization for Military Procurement, Research and Development, and Active Duty,

Selected Reserve, and Civilian Personnel Strengths, Hearings before the Senate

Committee on Armed Services, 95:1 (April 1977), Part 10, p. 6621.) The number of

surviving ICBMs for current forces is based on calculations using 1,840 warheads on

310 Soviet MIRVed missiles, all accurate to 1,500 feet CEP with 0.75 reliability

and 2,000 psi (pounds per square inch) hardness for Minuteman silos. For the

mid-1980s and 1990s ICBM forces, estimates are taken from Congressional Budget

Office, Counterforce Issues for the U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces, Background

Paper (January 1978).
decade. 6/ U.S. bombers would face an extensive—but surmountable—network of air defenses. Tj Bombers could choose their

point of entry into the Soviet Union to minimize exposure to air

defenses, concentrate to saturate the defenses, and use supersonic

Short-Range Attack Missiles (SRAMs) to destroy surface-to-air

missile (SAM) sites. Thus, estimates of the current capability

of U.S. bombers to penetrate to their targets are as high as

85 percent. j3/ In other words, 17 out of every 20 bombers should

be expected to reach their targets.

In the future, CBO assumes that the bombers in the finite

deterrence force will maintain about the same level of capability—about four out of every five would penetrate to their

targets—despite future Soviet air defense improvements. Soviet

improvements could include an extended perimeter air defense

based on airborne radars capable of long-range detection; a

look-down, shoot-down interceptor (an aircraft capable of detecting and destroying low-flying aircraft and missiles) somewhat

similar to the present U.S. F-14/Phoenix air-to-air missile

system; and an advanced mobile surface-to-air missile system.

But for each presumed Soviet air defense development, there

appears to be an adequate U.S. counter. Cruise missiles, which

are expected to enter the finite deterrence force in the 1980s

6J ABMs are limited by treaty to the system now existing around

Moscow, which is believed to be relatively ineffective. The

Soviets are believed to be experimenting with a chargedparticle beam weapon for defense against ballistic missiles.

The problems of charged-particle beam generation, propagation, and pointing are such, however, that the successful

development of a system that would be effective against

ballistic missiles would appear to be far in the future.

See Richard L. Garwin, "Charged-Particle Beam Weapons?"

Congressional Record (July 27, 1977), p. S12931.

TJ Alton H. Quanbeck and Archie L. Wood in Modernizing the

Strategic Bomber Force (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings

Institution,1976)cite estimates of 3 percent U.S. attrition

in the 1972 December bombing raids against North Vietnam

and 1 to 1.5 percent Israeli attrition in the 1973 war

(see pp. 64-65).

8/ Ibid., p. 65.

13

TT~nn
and 1990s, could be launched before U.S. bombers could be attacked

by Soviet air defenses. Cruise missiles are difficult to detect

because of the small target they present to search radars and

because their low-level flight further limits radar detection.

The effective size of the missile as seen by a radar (radar

cross-section) can be further reduced in the future. These

characteristics, coupled with greater speed and maneuverability in

the future, would defeat the Soviet mobile surface-to-air systems

postulated for the next decade. In addition, cruise missiles are

relatively inexpensive, permitting the procurement of large

numbers that can saturate air defense systems.

If the Soviets do extend their air defense capability further

from their borders by employing an Airborne warning and Control System (AWACS), the United States could develop longer-range

cruise missiles that could be launched before tiie bombers were

detected, 9/ as well as improved electronic countermeasure (ECM)

equipment and defensive missiles to shoot down Soviet interceptors* Finally, there are likely to be other factors that

may compensate for Soviet air defense improvements. Ballistic

missiles could be used to destroy Soviet airfields that support

AWACS and fighters well ahead of the time bombers attempt to

penetrate. (A first wave of bombers carrying supersonic attack

missiles could also attack the fighter bases.)

Weapons that survive a Soviet first strike are expected to be

very successful in penetrating Soviet air space. Because of the

ABM treaty and the dim prospects•for the development of types of

defensive systems other than ABM missiles, the warheads that are

successfully launched from ballistic missiles should reach their

targets. Bombers and cruise missiles should be able to stay well

ahead of Soviet air defense developments, as outlined above.

HOW MUCH DAMAGE WOULD BE INFLICTED ON THE SOVIET UNION?

The U.S. weapons that successfully penetrated Soviet air

space would probably destroy roughly 90 percent of the military

targets other than missile silos and about 80 percent, of the

Soviet industrial target base in the absence of extensive Soviet

civil defense measures or efforts to harden industrial or military

This response would, of course, be eliminated as an option if

a SALT II agreement severely limited cruise missile range.

14
targets. 10/ All Soviet governmental centers at the national

and republic levels would be destroyed, as well as about half of

the provincial centers. About 90 million people—over one-third

of the total Soviet population—would be killed by the nuclear

detonations and radioactive fallout.

Current Forces

Since each of the three components of the current nuclear

forces could destroy over 75 percent of the Soviet industrial

target base, current U.S. forces are considered to be well hedged

against technological surprises. For example, in the highly

unlikely event that the Soviets developed and quickly deployed

a perfect ABM system (that is, one that could destroy all 4,000

incoming ICBM and SLBM warheads), the bomber force alone could

destroy about 75 percent of Soviet industrial targets, ll/

The U.S. submarine and land-based missile forces could destroy

about 90 percent of the Soviet industrial base or some 75 percent

of both the general purpose military targets and the industrial

target base—a good hedge against the rapid deployment of an

advanced air defense system against bombers. The U.'S. bomber

and submarine forces could destroy some 85 percent of the Soviet

industrial target base, or 65 percent of both the general purpose

military and the industrial target base—a hedge against development of an effective Soviet capability to destroy Minuteman

silos. Finally, U.S. bombers and ICBMs could destroy about 90

percent of the Soviet industrial target base or 70 percent of the

general purpose military targets and the industrial target base

in the unlikely event of a Soviet antisubmarine warfare (ASW)

development that could negate the U.S. submarine force.

10/ To harden is to improve the protection afforded by structural

shielding against the blast, heat, and radiation of nuclear

explosions. (See Appendix A for a discussion of hardening

methods.) These calculations assume half of the industrial

targets are hardened to the extent that machinery will not

be damaged if the buildings in which it is housed collapse.

ll/ This assumes that only bombers are targeted against the

industrial base. Less damage would be expected if all three

force components were optimally allocated prior to the strike

and then all the missile warheads failed to reach their

targets.

28-512 O - 78 - 5

TI~1TTT
Thus, CBO's calculations confirm that current U.S. forces

are capable of massive retaliation against the Soviet Union

in the event of a nuclear war. Even after absorbing a surprise

Soviet nuclear attack, enough U.S. warheads would survive to hit

their intended targets and devastate the Soviet Union.

It is conceivable that, after such an exchange, the Soviet

Union would still possess some ICBMs. None of the weapons currently in the U.S. inventory is particularly effective against

hardened silos that house land-based missiles. 12/ But the United

States would also possess nuclear power after an exchange.

Sufficient weapons would remain in reserve to continue the

conflict, if required, and to hedge against uncertainty in the

results of nuclear war. 13/

Finite Deterrence Force

Over the next two decades, a number of factors could decrease

the destructive potential of U.S. retaliatory capabilities.

For one thing, Soviet industrial growth could increase the number of potential targets in the future. This, in turn, might

increase the required number or capability of surviving U.S.

nuclear forces that would be necessary to achieve about the

same percentage of destruction as is now possible. Furthermore, hardening by the Soviets could reduce the effectiveness

of weapons currently in the U.S. arsenal and could lead to a

12/ The best current system, Minuteman III with a reported 0.17

megaton warhead and a 70U ft. CEP (see Table 1), would have a

0.40 probability of destroying improved silos (2,000 pounds

per square inch (psi) hardness) with reliability included.

This means that 1,400 Minuteman III warheads (out of an

inventory of 1,650) would be expected to destroy only 500

Soviet silos. A bomb would be slightly more effective, with

a 0.45 destruction probability, but would take much longer to

reach the target than a missile system.

13/ In the force simulations, 1,000 U.S. warheads carried by

submarines were withheld as a reserve. (See Appendix B for

details.)

16
requirement for larger yield and/or improved accuracy. 14/

Finally, Soviet civil defense measures might also reduce the

future effectiveness of U.S. nuclear forces. 15/

Yet, despite these factors, CBO's calculations suggest that a

finite deterrence force, such as that outlined by Tables 2 and 3,

would maintain a high level of destructive capability. By the

mid-1980s, this baseline force would include Trident submarines,

10 Poseidon submarines carrying Trident I missiles, and cruise

missiles carried by B-52 bombers. 16/ As Table 4 suggests, such a

force would increase the number of U.S. warheads available for a

retaliatory strike. (Over 6,000 weapons would be expected to

survive a Soviet first strike, compared to 5,000 in the current

forces.) The increased number of -weapons and the newer systems

would, in turn, improve the retaliatory effectiveness of the U.S.

forces despite Soviet industrial expansion or hardening measures.

Thus, in simulating a U.S. retaliatory strike in the 1980s,

CBO's calculations indicate the finite deterrence force could

destroy over 80 percent of the industrial target base in the

Soviet Union, assuming the number of separate installations did

not increase. Soviet governmental control centers could be

heavily struck, with 95 percent destruction expected at the

republic level and over 50 percent at the provincial level. Over

14/ "Superhard" targets such as ICBM silos are not expected to

increase in number but may be hardened even further as

a result of an ongoing Soviet modernization program. The

effectiveness of current and proposed weapons for destroying

Soviet silos is discussed in Congressional Budget Office,

Counterforce Issues for the U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces,

pp. 31-44.

15/ The effects of Soviet civil defense measures to harden

industrial targets and to save people are discussed in

Chapter III.

16/ The projected U.S. forces for finite deterrence were based on

fleet introduction of the Trident submarine in 1980 and

assumed six years from authorization to delivery. To the

extent that recent delays in the Trident program are not

recouped by an increase in the production rate to two submarines a year in the 1980s, the capabilities of the finite

deterrence force are somewhat overstated.

17

TT~1TTT
90 percent of the general purpose military targets could be

expected to be destroyed. A reserve force of 1,000 submarine

weapons was not used in these calculations in order to provide

for possible growth in the industrial base and to continue the

conflict, if required.

The forces for finite deterrence in the mid-1980s would also

appear to be well hedged against technological surprise:

o Should the Soviets deploy a -perfect ABM system in the

1980s, the bomber force alone would have the capability of

destroying 80 to 85 percent of the Soviet industrial

target base, or 55 to 60 percent of both the general

purpose military targets and the industrial target base.

o Should the Soviets develop a perfect ASW system, the

bomber and ICBM forces could be expected to destroy 85 to

90 percent of the Soviet industrial target base.

o Should the Soviets deploy a perfect air defense system,

ICBMs and submarine-based weapons could be expected to

destroy over 90 percent of the Soviet industrial target

base.

o Should all U.S. ICBMs be vulnerable to Soviet attack,

the bomber and submarine forces could destroy over 90

percent of the Soviet industrial target base, or 80 to 85

percent of both the general purpose military targets and

the industrial target base.

CBO's simulations, then, suggest that the deployment of Trident

and cruise missile systems, as postulated by the finite deterrence

force, would both maintain the destructive potential of the

current forces and improve the hedges against Soviet technological

advances.

CEO believes that this situation would last into the 1990s.

By that time, the Minuteman force could be vulnerable to a Soviet

first strike with less than 10 percent of the force expected to

survive a Soviet attack. Thus, fewer weapons—some 4,500 versus

6,000 for the mid-1980s force—would be expected to be available

for a retaliatory strike.

But the higher yield of Trident I missiles compared to

Poseidon missiles would permit the allocation of fewer weapons to

industrial targets, while maintaining a damage expectancy of over

18
80 percent. Assuming that a reserve force of 1,000 Trident I

warheads were withheld to hedge against industrial target growth

and to continue a conflict if required, CBO's calculations

indicate that the same high levels of expected damage to governmental centers could be achieved. The allocation of the remaining

weapons to military targets could result in the destruction of

over 90 percent of the Soviet general purpose forces.

The baseline forces of the 1990s would also provide a

reasonable hedge against technological uncertainty, even if it is

assumed that Minuteman silos would be vulnerable by that time.

Either the bomber or the submarine force would, individually,

be capable of destroying 75 to 85 percent of the Soviet industrial

target base, depending on the growth in the number of new industrial plants. This capability would hedge against uncertainties in air defense, ASW, and ABM developments by the Soviet

Union, as well as against U.S. ICBM vulnerability.

The results of the simulations are portrayed in Table 5.

19
TABLE 5. RETALIATORY CAPABILITIES OF THE FINITE DETERRENCE FORCE:

DAMAGE TO SOVIET TARGET BASE

PERCENT

Current

Mid1980s 1990s

Total Force aj

Industrial target base 80 80 80

Military targets 90 90 90

Capability to Hedge Against

Soviet Developments b/

Against ABM: No ballistic missile

warheads, only bombers attack

Industrial target base only 75 80-85 75-85

Industrial and military targets 35 55-60 50-60

Against ICBM vulnerability: No surviving

ICBMs, only bombers and submarines attack

Industrial target base only 85 90 90

Industrial and military targets 65 80-85 75-85

Against ASW: No surviving submarines,

only bombers and ICBMs attack

Industrial target base only 90 85-90 80-85

Industrial and military targets 70 70-75 55-65

Against air defense: No bomber weapons,

only submarines and ICBMs attack

Industrial target base only 90 90 85-90

Industrial and military targets 75 75-80 60-70

aj Weapons expected to survive a first strike are allocated to achieve

over 80 percent damage to the industrial target base, assuming half

were hardened to 30 pounds per square inch (psi). One thousand submarine warheads are held in reserve. The remainder of the weapons are

allocated to military targets other than silos (at least one ballistic

missile weapon is allocated to each military airfield and 100 SRAMs are

allocated to air defense sites). No Soviet ICBM silos are included in

the military target base.

bj All surviving weapons of forces indicated are allocated; no weapons

are held in reserve. For the mid-1980s column, the low end of the

range assumes a 20 percent growth in industrial targets; the high

end assumes no growth. For the 1990s column, the low end of the

range assumes a 40 percent growth in industrial targets; the high

end assumes no growth.

20
CHAPTER III. THE EFFECT OF SOVIET CIVIL DEFENSE MEASURES

To what extent would an effective Soviet civil defense

program affect the potentially high level of destruction of the

finite deterrence force? On the one hand, CBO's calculations

suggest that an effective Soviet civil defense program could

reduce the destructive potential of the current U.S. strategic

nuclear forces, particularly if the Soviet Union launched a

massive, surprise, first-strike attack on U.S. forces. But, on

the other hand, it appears that an effective Soviet civil defense

program would not escape the detection of the United States. U.S.

nuclear forces would thus be alerted to an impending Soviet attack

and, with a reallocation of targets, could recoup much of their

destructive potential. Since efforts by the Soviet Union to

harden industrial machinery and to evacuate population would

likely be detected by the United States in enough time to place

U.S. nuclear forces on an alert status, the number of U.S. weapons

that should survive a Soviet first strike would likely be sufficient to achieve at least as much industrial and military destruction as would occur with no civil defense program.

Soviet fatalities could be reduced by an effective evacuation

program. If the United States wanted to increase the number

of expected fatalities, it should be prepared to hold enough

survivable forces in reserve to continue the conflict for weeks or

months after the initial nuclear exchange. The United States

should also be prepared to provide target information to those

forces. This would require survivable reconnaissance systems to

identify targets as well as command and control systems to provide

target data to the forces. This chapter examines these relationships in more detail.

THE SOVIET CIVIL DEFENSE PROGRAM

The Soviet Union has developed an extensive civil defense

system. I/ According to former Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld:

I/ See Appendix A for a description of the Soviet civil defense

program.

21
This civil defense capability—if it continues to

grow as we expect—coupled with high accuracy and

more reliable (Soviet) missiles, could adversely

affect our ability to implement the U.S. deterrent

strategy. Thus it could provide the Soviets with

both a political and a military advantage in the

event of nuclear crisis. 2/

Today's Soviet civil defense program is an outgrowth of

an organization established in 1932 under the Soviet Ministry

of Internal Affairs. In the early 1970s, A.T. Altunin was

appointed to head the civil defense organization. Although

there have been no major changes in the direction of the Soviet

program since about 1972, efforts to reorganize and strengthen the

program have been undertaken under Altunin1s leadership. 3/

The Soviet civil defense program is designed to protect

population through a shelter and evacuation program and to protect

industry by shielding machinery and reducing damage from secondary

effects such as fire. It is thought that the Soviets could make

the transition to a war-ready posture in about three to four days

if advance preparations were complete and in a week or so if they

were incomplete. 4/

EFFECTS OF POPULATION PROTECTION MEASURES

The principal protective measures for the Soviet population

include evacuation and the provision of shelters. In the absence

of civil defense measures to protect the Soviet population,

CBO's calculations indicate that about 95 million fatalities (or

35 percent of the population) and 10 million injuries (about

5 percent of the population) could be expected from a U.S. retaliatory strike following a massive, surprise nuclear attack by the

2/ Department of Defense, Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1978,

_

_3_/ Major General George Kolt, USAF, "The Soviet Civil Defense

Program," Strategic Review (Spring 1977), pp. 51-67.

4/ Civil Preparedness Review, Report by the Joint Committee on

Defense Production, 95:1 (April 1977), Part II, p. 71.

22
Soviet Union. If 60 percent of the Soviet population were evacuated to fallout shelters (30 percent in basements and 30 percent

in special shelters) before an attack came, about 85 million

fatalities and about 15 million injuries could be expected. Thus,

shelters alone might not be adequate to reduce casualties significantly.

While evacuation of major cities would take some time, the

number of expected fatalities could be reduced by moving people

away from the vicinity of nuclear .explosions. A moderately

effective program might evacuate 50 percent of the urban dwellers

and place 50 percent of the total population in shelters and

another 25 percent of them in basements. Such a program would be

expected to reduce fatalities to about 40 million and casualties

to about 13 million. A more effective program could evacuate 75

percent of the people in the cities and place 70 percent of

the people in shelters and 20 percent of them in basements.

Fatalities in this case would be reduced to about 20 million and

casualties to about 10 million people. _5_/

Even with a very effective evacuation and shelter program,

more than one out of every ten Soviet citizens would be expected

to be killed or injured in a nuclear attack. These calculations,

however, are based on U.S. forces that might survive a Soviet

surprise attack while in a normal peacetime alert condition.

Since an effective Soviet evacuation plan would take at least

three days to implement and would likely be detected by the United

States, U.S. nuclear forces would presumably be placed on alert.

If so, some 1,200 additional Poseidon warheads and 1,300 more

bomber weapons could be expected to survive a Soviet attack, in

addition to the 5,000 weapons surviving under peacetime alert

conditions. These 2,500 additional weapons could then be targeted

against smaller Soviet cities (those with populations over 4,000)

that were not previously targeted for attack. Such an attack

could both significantly increase casualties and disrupt complex

communal life by destroying shelters, medical facilities, and

distribution systems.

Alternatively, the 3,500 surviving ICBMs and bomber weapons

could be allocated to industrial and .military targets while

holding 4,000 Poseidon weapons in reserve. This weapon allocation would be expected to destroy some 80 percent of the Soviet

5/ As a point of reference, there were over 20 million Russian

casualties in the six-year period 1940-1945.

23

1UT
industrial target base despite hardening and 90 percent of

the military targets. The large number of reserve weapons would

permit continued attacks, assuming that adequate surveillance

systems survived the Soviet attack. The more the Soviets concentrated their population on beginning reconstruction, the more

effective further attacks would likely be. 6/ Such a prospect of

continued death and destruction would militate against any Soviet

belief that their civil defense program supported a "war-winning

strategy."

EFFECTS OF INDUSTRIAL PROTECTION MEASURES

The second important component of the Soviet civil defense

program is protection of industry. The most important aspect

of industrial protection is the survival of critical machinery

in an operable condition. Three levels of protection were

considered in CBO's calculations. First, the Soviets were assumed

to take steps to reduce the vulnerability of machinery to damage

from secondary effects of nuclear detonations such as fire. Most

of these measures fall under the heading of good housekeeping and

were assumed to be accomplished in each damage expectancy calculation. 7/ The second level of protection would be measures to

protect machinery from damage resulting from the collapse of

buildings in which the machinery is housed. If permanent canopies

and special foundations were constructed, overpressures on the

order of 20-40 pounds per square inch (psi) would be required

to achieve serious damage to heavy machinery. Finally, some

machinery could be covered with sandbags or mounded with dirt.

About 80 psi overpressure would be required to achieve serious

damage levels in this case. _8/

Figures 1 through 4 illustrate the effects of industrial

hardening on the independent capabilities of submarine and bomber

6/ To carry out this strategy, the United States would require

survivable reconnaissance assets to identify targets, a

command center to designate targets to the forces that would

survive a nuclear exchange, and some means of communication.

2J No damage from secondary effects is included in the computations .

&_/ See Appendix A, pp. 43-46.

24
weapons. The figures show the percentage of the industrial target

base that would be expected to be destroyed if all weapons that

survived a Soviet attack were targeted against industry. For

example, in Figure 1, a force of 20 Poseidon submarines (11 would

be expected to survive a Soviet surprise attack) would be expected

to achieve over 85 percent damage to the industrial target base,

assuming the targets were not hardened to resist nuclear effects.

If all industries were hardened to 30 psi, the same number of

submarine weapons would be expected to achieve only 50 percent

destruction. Of course, all machinery could not be so hardened,

so the damage in an actual strike would be' greater.

More extensive hardening measures could further reduce the

effectiveness of Poseidon weapons. Figure 1 also illustrates the

damage expectancy if all industry were hardened to 80 psi.

In this case, it is assumed that such measures would be detected

by the United States in time to alert the submarine force, so that

it would survive a Soviet attack. Even so, these submarines would

be expected to destroy less than 50 percent of the industrial

target base. The effect on the retaliatory capability of this

force would depend on how many plants could be hardened, on the

type of industry, and on the inherent resistance of the machinery

to nuclear effects.

The increased yield of Trident I missile warheads would

make them more effective against harder targets, as shown in

Figure 2. The 16 Trident submarines surviving out of a force of

20 submarines could, under generated alert conditions, destroy

over 75 percent of the Soviet industrial target base even if all

machinery were hardened to 80 psi. The replacement of Poseidon

missiles by Trident missiles will improve the U.S. capability to

counter Soviet civil defense measures.

Bombs, with their larger yield, are less affected by hardening, as shown in Figures 3 and 4. Increasing industrial

hardness to 30 psi would have little effect on expected damage

from bombs. For example, with 360 bombers in the force, 100 would

be expected to survive a first strike, assuming normal peacetime

alert. These bombers would be expected to destroy about 70

percent, of the Soviet industrial target base without hardening.

Some 65 percent of the industrial target base might be destroyed

by the same 100 bombers even if hardened to 30 psi. Twice as many

weapons would be available if the force was on generated alert,

and these could achieve greater damage expectancy in the unlikely

case that all industry was hardened to 80 psi. The 288 surviving

bombers on generated alert (of a force of 360) would be expected

to destroy over 80 percent of the industrial target base.

25

T Tr'ITTT
N>

Figure 1

Effect of Industrial Hardening on Poseidon

Effectiveness

ff ••••• Nominal Hardness, Day-to-Day Alert

Machinery Hardened to 30 psi, Day-to-Day Alert

Machinery Hardened to 80 psi. Generated Alert

I i I .

Figure 2.

Effect of Industrial Hardening on Trident

Effectiveness

10 20

Poseidon Submarines

Nominal Hardness, Day-to-Day Alert

Machinery Hardened to 30 psi, Day-to-Day Alert

Machinery Hardened to 80 psi. Generated Alert

10 20

Trident Submarines
Figure 3

Effect of Industrial Hardening on Bomb

Effectiveness

Nominal Hardness, Day-to-Day Alert

Machinery Hardened to 30 psi, Day-to-Day Alert

Machinery Hardened to 80 psi. Generated Alert

I I I

Figure 4

Effect of Industrial Hardening on Cruise

Missile Effectiveness

400 600

B-52s with Bombs

800 1000

Nominal Hardness, Day-tb-Day Alert

Machinery Hardened to 30 psi, Day-to-Day Alert

Machinery Hardened to 80 psi. Generated Alert

I I

200 300

B-S2s with Cruise Missiles
.till

If cruise missiles were used, fewer bombers would be required

for an attack on Soviet industry because each bomber could carry a

larger number of.weapons. For example, a force of some 200 B-52s

(60 surviving under peacetime alert) with cruise missiles would be

sufficient to achieve 85 percent damage to the industrial target

base, assuming no hardening. This force could destroy about 75

percent if all the industrial targets were hardened to 30 psi. An

extensive Soviet industrial hardening program would take time and

would probably be conducted in conjunction with an evacuation

plan. If U.S. intelligence should detect such Soviet activities,

the nuclear forces would be alerted. The number of bombers that

would be expected to survive a Soviet attack would be increased

significantly. The larger bomber force would be expected to

destroy about 85 percent of the industrial target base.

Protection of machinery from damage resulting from building

collapse could be an effective civil defense measure for the

Soviet Union. All industry is not amenable to such efforts, but

the proportion is unknown. Clearly, it is important to identify

those industries that use machinery that is naturally resistant to

blast damage, such as lathes and milling equipment, and to allocate more destructive weapons, such as bombs or cruise missiles,

to those targets. If such an allocation were made, current and

projected U.S. forces would be capable of destroying a high

percentage of industrial targets with only a marginal increase in

the number of weapons allocated to them. The deployment of cruise

missiles would increase the capability of the bomber force to

destroy hardened industrial targets because cruise missiles are

nearly as effective as bombs and many more can be carried on a

B-52. Similarly, Trident I missiles will be more effective

against industrial hardening than the Poseidon missiles which they

will replace.

28
CHAPTER IV. RETALIATORY FORCE STRUCTURE

A number of general criteria have traditionally been used by

planners as guides to sizing and structuring U.S. nuclear forces.

Many of these criteria have been accepted by the Congress and

probably will continue to be employed in the future.

One major criterion might be a called a conservative, or

"worse-case" orientation toward estimating U.S. force requirements. I/ That is, in planning strategic nuclear forces, very

demanding situations are assumed—such as considering what forces

would be necessary to achieve various levels of destruction

against the Soviet Union, even after the United States had

absorbed a massive, surprise nuclear strike. In calculating these

requirements, planners often give the Soviet Union the benefit of

the doubt in areas of technical uncertainty. These biases are

generally supported by the Congress because of the risks of not

having enough strategic nuclear forces. There is a national

consensus that, in the strategic nuclear relationship between the

United States and Soviet Union, there should be little or no

question that the price paid for a nuclear strike against the

United States would be very, very high. This orientation has been

adopted in CBO's calculations.

Other general criteria are also used in determining U.S.

force requirements. Prudence, for example, might dictate that the

United States not only maintain enough potential destructive power

to devastate the Soviet Union in a retaliatory attack, but also

hold additional forces in reserve to continue a nuclear exchange

or to deter other nuclear powers from trying to take advantage of

the United States in the aftermath of a nuclear war. CBO's

calculations have assumed a sizable reserve force. 2/'

I/ See Appendix B for a discussion of assumptions.

2/ The number of weapons that should be procured for the reserve

~ role is a matter of judgment, but it is clear that a reserve

force should be survivable and capable of responding to

national direction in a post-nuclear environment. Submarinebased missiles would be a very secure basing system for a

29

TT'ITIT
Likewise, some requirements might exist for what has been

termed a limited nuclear strike option—that is, a U.S. decision

to attack a very limited number of targets in the Soviet Union in

order to show resolve during a crisis or to respond to a limited

Soviet strike. CBO did not specifically allocate any weapons for

this mission because it would precede a massive Soviet first

strike against U.S forces and would alert the U.S. strategic

nuclear forces.

U.S. RETALIATORY FORCE OPTIONS

Since the advent of the nuclear age, much analytic effort has

been devoted to generating nuclear force requirements that meet

the above, as well as a wide range of other planning, criteria.

A great deal of uncertainty accompanies these efforts, however.

While U.S. weapons reliability can be determined with some precision, the future effectiveness of Soviet defenses or of programs

to harden their industries and protect their command and control

facilities against the effects of a nuclear attack are necessarily

more difficult to measure. And there is always the chance of an

unexpected technological breakthrough by the Soviet Union that

could severely challenge the validity of the calculations that

enter into planning criteria.

Finally, even if the calculations outlined in this paper were

roughly accurate, two major questions would remain: Would Soviet

decisionmakers make the same assessment as U.S. leaders of the

ultimate results of a nuclear exchange? Whatever their assessment, would it deter them from initiating the exchange?

There are no clear answers to these questions. In broad

terms, the Congress has several alternatives. It could accept the

vulnerability of the current ICBM force, rely primarily on the

bomber and submarine forces, and move into the future with what

has been described as a finite deterrence force. Or it could seek

reserve force because of their survivability, reprogramining

capability, and ability to continue to operate for long

periods following a nuclear exchange. For the purpose of

estimating force effectiveness in this paper, 1,000 surviving

warheads in nuclear submarines were set aside for a reserve

force and were not included in the calculations of total

force effectiveness.

30
to maintain the three survivable strategic force components

and procure new generations of land-based ICBMs like the MX.

Alternatively, it could seek to improve further the sea-based or

air-based capability.

A Finite Deterrence Force

The finite deterrence force—used as the baseline in this

paper (see Tables 2 and 3)—could inflict severe damage in

retaliation against Soviet governmental centers, industry, and

military targets (other than ICBM silos) despite possible civil

defense measures. This force structure would also provide a large

reserve force to hedge against an increase in the number of

targets, civil defense measures, and the uncertainty inherent in

nuclear conflict. The bomber and submarine forces would each have

an independent capability to destroy most of the Soviet industrial

target base. Those who believe that these capabilities represent

an adequate deterrent might see little rationale for developing

additional nuclear forces such as the MX, Trident II, or cruise

missile carriers. The finite deterrence forces would cost about

$120 billion (in fiscal year 1979 dollars) for procurement and

operating costs from fiscal years 1979 through 2000. 3/

Maintaining a Survivable Land-Based Missile Force

There may be concern about the robustness of the hedges

available in the finite deterrence force. While there would

always be great uncertainty involved, U.S. and Soviet planners

could assume that a massive Soviet first strike in the late 1980s

could destroy nearly the entire U.S. land-based Minuteman ICBM

force, even under the restraints likely to be imposed by a SALT II

or subsequent agreement. Thus, a commitment to the finite deterrence force would carry with it a conscious decision to shift away

from a survivable land-based missile component of the strategic

3_/ The B-52 and KC-135 tanker forces will probably have to

be replaced in the early 1990s. If the B-52 force is replaced

with a comparable mix of advanced penetrating bombers and

wide-bodied cruise missile carriers and if wide-bodied aircraft replace the present tanker force, then an additional

$35-45 billion (in fiscal year 1979 dollars) would have to be

spent in the 1990s to maintain a strategic bomber force.

31

Trim'
nuclear forces and to forego the additional hedges against Soviet

technological breakthroughs in air defense or antisubmarine

warfare that could be provided by survivable, land-based ICBMs.

The combination of U.S. ICBM silo vulnerability, a very effective

Soviet civil defense program, and the development of an effective

Soviet air defense, for example, could seriously reduce the

capabilities of the finite deterrence force. Since it is most

unlikely that all these events would occur over the next two

decades, the finite deterrence forces should continue to be

capable of great destruction in a retaliatory strike against the

Soviet Union. If one is concerned about the possible simultaneity

of these events, however, the importance of maintaining a secure

strategic deterrent could justify the investment of additional

money in U.S. nuclear forces.

One reaction to such concerns could be to move ahead with

the development and deployment of the MX mobile missile. The

procurement of 300 MX missiles would enhance the capability of the

retaliatory forces. Compared to the finite deterrence force, for

example (see Tables 2 and 3), such a force structure would improve

the hedges against ICBM vulnerability and Soviet developments in

air defense and antisubmarine warfare. Three survivable force

components would be maintained, each one independently capable

of destroying most of the Soviet industrial target base in a

retaliatory strike. MX would also provide a capability to attack

Soviet silos, because of the larger yield and better accuracy.

This program would add $30 billion (in fiscal year 1979 dollars)

to the costs of the strategic forces, assuming that 300 Minuter.ian

missiles were retired, for a total cost of about $150 billion over

the 22-year period of fiscal years 1979 to 2000.

Other Options

To increase the hedges against Soviet breakthroughs in air

defense and antisubmarine warfare, the capabilities of both the

submarine force and the bomber force would have to be improved.

Additional submarines with Trident I missiles or better weapons

such as Trident II would improve the hedge against Soviet air

defense improvements. Increasing the number of cruise missiles

in the bomber force would improve the hedge against Soviet antisubmarine warfare developments.

Criteria other than retaliatory capability must be considered

in determining U.S. strategic force posture, however. There may

be concern about possible asymmetry in counterforce capability in

32
that the Soviets could threaten an attack against Minuteman silos

but the United States would have no comparable capability against

Soviet silos. How the strategic balance may be perceived by

allies and other nations, as well as the effect of new procurement

on strategic arms control negotiations, is also important. A

forthcoming CBO budget issue paper will discuss these issues as

well as force requirements for a U.S. capability to destroy Soviet

silos.

33

Tr~lT7T
Illlt:.
APPENDIXE S

APPENDIX A. SOVIET CIVIL DEFENSE

Soviet military thought seems to reflect a straightforward

approach to nuclear warfare—once deterrence fails, nuclear

weapons should be employed with whatever intensity is necessary

to defeat the enemy. I/ Soviet nuclear doctrine apparently

emphasizes enemy military forces as the primary targets for their

weapons, followed closely by industry and political/administrative

control centers. Civil defense is important to the Soviets as a

logical contribution to minimizing damage from nuclear weapons and

continuing the war effort. It is possible that an effective

civil defense program could intimidate U.S. leaders during a

crisis because, having evacuated their people and protected their

industry, the Soviets could threaten U.S. cities without endangering their own.

The Soviet Union has developed an extensive civil defense

system. Soviet leaders have repeatedly stated that their "civil

defense is a threat to no one and has always pursued humane

goals." 2/ It is possible that the Soviet civil defense program

is indeed designed for the Soviet Union's own protection in case

war is inflicted upon it and is not aimed at achieving a capability to "win" a nuclear war. Still, a nuclear war would disrupt

their political and social system, so that the mere existence of

passive defenses would not necessarily make beginning a war

attractive to Soviet leaders. V.I. Chuikov, former Soviet Chief

of Civil Defense, has said, however, that the defensive strength

of a country is based not only on the ability of its armed forces

to wage war, but also on the ability to maintain a level of

industrial and agricultural production during a conflict to assure

I/ See Benjamin S. Lambeth, Selective Nuclear Options in Amer-

~ ican and Soviet Strategic Policy,R-2034-DDRE(SantaMonica:

Rand Corporation), December 1976.

2j A. Tolkunov, "In the Light of Day," Pravda (September 12,

1977), p. 5, reprinted in "Western Hemisphere," The Current

Digest of the Soviet Press (October 12, 1977), p. 17.

37

1FT
its successful conduct and the country's subsequent recovery. 2j

According to former Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, continued

growth of Soviet civil defense—coupled with high accuracy

and more reliable (Soviet) missiles—could adversely affect

the ability of the United States to implement its deterrent

strategy. 4Y The effectiveness of the Soviet civil defense

system and its effect on weapons requirements must therefore be

considered in developing a U.S. deterrent posture and in sizing

required forces.

HISTORY

Today's Soviet civil defense program is an outgrowth of

the Main Administration of Local Anti-Air Defense System (MPVO),

which was established in 1932 and was directed by the Soviet

Ministry of Internal Affairs. This system consisted of many

organizations in areas, primarily along Soviet borders, that were

particularly vulnerable to attack. In the early 1960s, MPVO was

renamed Civil Defense (GO), and direction of the program was

transferred to the Soviet Ministry of Defense. This change

reflected the development of Soviet thought concerning civil

defense. With the advent of nuclear weapons, the Soviet Union

realized that it is necessary to protect more than just border

targets. Therefore, civil defense has become an integral part of

the overall Soviet defense capability and, as such, is coordinated

with other defense plans. In the early 1970s, the leadership

of the civil defense organization passed to A.T. Altunin, who has

since been appointed General of the Army. Under his leadership, a

much needed reorganization and revivification of the Soviet civil

defense program has taken place.

THE RESPONSIBILITIES AND STRUCTURE OF THE SYSTEM

The Soviet civil defense program is responsible for the

protection of Soviet leadership, industry, and population. This

3/ Leon Goure, War Survival in Soviet Strategy: USSR Civil

Defense, Monographs in International Affairs (Miami: University of Miami Centef for Advanced International Studies,

1976), p. 47.

47 Department of Defense, Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1978,

p. 107.

38
involves familiarization of civilians and military personnel with

defense plans, protection of agriculture and water supplies,

dispersal and hardening of vital industries and services, emergency repair and restoration work, and assistance in natural

disasters. Soviet officials have observed that civil defense

measures are designed to enhance the country's "ability to rapidly

liquidate the consequences of enemy nuclear strikes, promptly

render extensive and diverse aid to casualties, and secure the

conditions for the more normal functioning of the facilities

of the national economy." 5/

The Soviet civil defense program is supported by a large,

primarily military staff. It operates through three major channels: the administrative government; industrial, agricultural,

and educational organizations; and a military civil defense

organization. A civil defense staff is incorporated into every

socialist republic government, with subordinate staffs in the

local governments of oblasts (districts), rayons (regions), and

towns (see Figure A-l). 6/ Each industrial, agricultural, and

educational ministry has a civil defense staff that is responsible

for civil defense formations in almost every factory, farm, and

school. All industrial and nonindustrial installations, laboratories, schools, and farms must have their own plans for civil

defense. • Tj

Training in civil defense begins in the grammar schools,

where short courses are given starting with the second grade, and

in Pioneer recreation camps, where most Soviet children spend two

weeks every summer. Since 1967, each pupil must, in the last

two years of school, have pre-induction military training that

includes a comprehensive review of civil defense and first aid.

University students take a 50-hour course qualifying them to be

civil defense instructors or leaders of paramilitary units.

5/ Dennis Ross, Rethinking Soviet Strategic Policy: Inputs and

Implications, ACIS Working Paper No. 5 (Los Angeles: University of California Center for Arms Control and International

Security, June 1977), p. 8.

6/ C.N. Donnelly, "Civil Defense in the Soviet Union," International Defense Review (August 1977), pp. 635-637.

Tj Peter Kruzhin, The Streamlining of Civil Defense in the USSR,

RL 415/76 (Radio Liberty Research, September 22, 1976), p. 11.

39
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entire work force. 8/

There are two major programs that train military officers for

civil defense: the Moscow Military Academy of Civil Defense of

the Soviet Union and the Higher Central Courses for Civil Defense

Officers of the Soviet Union.

The Military Civil Defense Forces branch of the Soviet armed

forces trains and directs a large part of the civilian civil

defense program as well as coordinates the military civil defense

role within the armed forces. A number of Army regiments (not at

full strength) are responsible for restoring communications

and for providing other services necessary to mobilize the country

for a war effort. Over 100,000 full-time civilian and military

personnel are apparently involved in the Soviet civil defense

program. 9/

Among the different groups contributing to civil defense

are the Civil Defense Communications Service (under local post

offices), the Service for the Maintenance of Civil Order (under

the local police), the Engineering Service (under local building

agencies), the Communal Technical Service, the Animal and Plant

Life Protection Services, and the Transport Service.

The Soviet civil defense organization can be compared to the

U.S. civil defense system as a point of reference. The U.S.

system consists of many federal agencies as well as state and

local agencies. The three major components—employing about 1,500

people—at the federal level are the Defense Civil Preparedness

Agency, whose director reports directly to the Secretary of

Defense; the Federal Preparedness Agency, under the General

Services Administration; and the Federal Disaster Assistance

Administration, under the Department of Housing and Urban Development. No central authority connects the various U.S.

programs, although they do function somewhat in partnership with

each other. Other organizations that aid U.S. civil defense

efforts are the National Weather Service, the Law Enforcement

Assistance Administration, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and

8/ Major George Kolt, USAF, "The Soviet Civil Defense Program,"

Strategic Review (Spring 1977), pp. 54-55.

9/ Department of Defense, Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1979, p. 52.

41

TTT1TTI
I ll

the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. 10/ At the

state and local level, some 4,700 state and local jurisdictions—

employing some 5,400 people—are involved in civil defense

activities. Training is conducted at the Civil Defense Staff

College, ll/

PROTECTION OF THE SOVIET POPULATION

In the 1960s, the Soviets developed a plan to protect their

population in case of nuclear war. The program consists of

major efforts to shelter the leadership—political, military,

and Communist Party—in very substantial protective structures, a

lesser effort to protect key workers in less effective shelters,

and an evacuation scheme for the bulk of the population. 12/ The

Soviet plan to protect its workers relies heavily on evacuation,

although the pace of shelter construction has increased in recent

years. The goal of the program is to provide shelter for half of

the work force in cities and to evacuate the remaining off-shift

workers outside the cities. 13/

The plan for the remainder of the population is evacuation

into the countryside and the quick building of simple shelters.

Field experiments conducted by the United States, following

instructions from the Soviet Civil Defense Manual, "have demonstrated that, with only written instructions and available

tools and materials, untrained civilians can within two days

10/ U.S. General Accounting Office, Civil Defense: Are Federal,

State, and Local Governments Prepared for Nuclear Attack?

LCD-76-464 (August 8, 1977), pp. 1-6.

ll/ Fiscal Year 1978 Authorization for Military Procurement, Research and Development, and Active Duty, Selected Reserve,

and Civilian Personnel Strengths, Hearings before the Senate

CommitteeonArmedServices,95:1 (April 1977), Part 10,

p. 6940.

12/ Interview with Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, U.S.

News and World Report (September 5, 1977), p. 21.

13/ Military Posture and H.R. 5068 (Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1978), Hearings

before the House Committee on Armed Services, 95:1 (February

1977), Part 6, pp. 212-213.

42
construct expedient shelters enabling them to survive at least 15

psi shock overpressure and the most intense fallout radiation

likely to be encountered." 14/

Planning for the protection of the population in the Soviet

Union includes a combination of physical, military, and civil

defense training as well as psychological indoctrination. Implementation of such a large-scale and administratively complex

program is not without shortcomings. There are difficulties in

planning the evacuation of large numbers of people from cities,

and major problems could be expected if a plan were implemented

by people who had not received training. Moreover, while the

urban population in the Soviet Union is increasing, the pace of

construction of hardened shelters in Soviet cities is proceeding

slowly. The outlying districts are also becoming urbanized and,

consequently, even with evacuation, population density in many

areas would be quite high.

Several studies in recent years have focused on the Soviet

evacuation program and speculated on its effectiveness. A

report to the Joint Committee on Defense Production of the U.S.

Congress by the Boeing Aerospace Company in November 1976 stated

that: L5_/

If the Soviet urban population remains in the cities,

the Soviet Union would lose most of its industrial

work force. Even use of urban shelters would not

help much against a U.S. attack designed to destroy

population. However, using only minimal dispersal—

such as could be obtained by ordering the population

to walk for one day away from the cities—fatalities

could be significantly reduced if simple shelters of

the type shown in Soviet manuals were constructed

or if the U.S. followed a policy of retaliating

14/ Conrad V. Chester and Eugene P. Wigner, "Population Vulnerability: The Neglected Issue in Arms Limitation and the

Strategic Balance," Orbis (Fall 1974), pp. 763-769.

15/ "Industrial Survival and Recovery after Nuclear Attack," a

report to the Joint Committee on Defense Production, in

Defense Industrial Base: Industrial Preparedness and Nuclear

War Survival, Hearings before the Joint Committee on Defense

Production, 94:2 (November 17, 1976), Part I, p. 65.

43
against industrial targets. A full 3-day evacuation

of the type called for in Soviet plans would reduce

fatalities [from the immediate blast and short-term

fallout effects] to no more than 10 million people.

This latter figure approximates that given by a

Soviet civil defense text.

These high survival figures are based upon optimistic expectations

of the possible success of the Soviet evacuation system. The

Soviets have not publicized results of their evacuation drills, if

they do indeed have drills, so it is not clear that these high

survival rates could be achieved under wartime conditions. 16/

If there were follow-on nuclear strikes by the United States,

the evacuation plan could be much less effective: 17/

The more the Soviets concentrated population to

begin reconstruction in the aftermath of a first or

second phase of attack, the more effective further

attacks would be. The more they dispersed to avoid

such consequences, the slower recovery would go

forward. In addition to the effects of concussion,

firestorm, and radiation, there would be the incalculable tolls of disease, infirmity, and disruption

of complex communal life.

PROTECTION OF SOVIET INDUSTRY

The basic methods for protecting industry include dispersal,

bomb-resistant construction, protection of critical machinery,

and fire-protection. During a crisis, industry can either

maintain full production, maintain some output, convert to a

more needed product, or close down production entirely in order

16/ It should be noted that U.S. civil defense plans include

the provision of community shelters for 80 percent of the

population, local plans for feeding 125 million people in

group shelters, and prepared releases for radio, television,

and newspapers to provide the requisite information when

required.

17/ Thomas H. Etzold, "Soviet Civil Defense and U.S. Strategy,"

Air Force Magazine (October 1977), p. 39.

44
to be hardened against nuclear effects. The Soviet Union is

apparently concerned that key industries be able to remain at

least partially operational in order to allow the successful

conduct of a nuclear war. It is not clear, however, how such

production would contribute, even if a conflict occurred in

Western Europe. It is usually assumed that a conventional

war between NATO and Warsaw Pact forces in that area would end

before production would have any influence. Soviet doctrine does

not appear to be consistent on this point. The protection of

essential machinery is necessary, however, for a timely recovery

after a war.

Dispersal of Industry

Dispersal of industry is frequently mentioned as an important

contributor to industrial survival. The Soviet Union has built

many new factories outside of existing urban concentrations, but

most industrial siting remains a function of economic considerations such as proximity to labor, new or existing sources of

power, markets, raw materials, and transportation. 18/ There

are also other kinds of dispersal, such as locating new factories

far enough apart so that a single small warhead could not destroy

two adjacent factories or by locating individual buildings within

a factory far enough apart so that more than one small weapon

would be necessary to destroy an entire complex. Of course, the

United States has a plethora of small weapons which could negate

these measures.

Finally, dispersal can involve the crisis relocation of a few

critical industries. In World War II, the Soviets were able to

move all equipment out of a single factory in about 10 days. 19/

18/ Civil Preparedness Review, Report by the Joint Committee on

Defense Production, 95:1 (April 1977), Part II, pp. 75-76.

One such example would be the Kama River truck plant, which

produces 20 percent of the trucks in the Soviet Union. The

value of this kind of construction with respect to civil

defense is questionable, since this site is more concentrated

than U.S. production. Although located away from existing

facilities, this plant simply becomes-one more large target.

19/ Defense Industrial Base: Industrial Preparedness and Nuclear

War Survival, Hearings, Part I, pp. 69-71.

45
Ill It. .11

This type of dispersal requires more time than is normally assumed

to be available prior to a strike and would enable the United

States to put its forces on alert.

Protection of Machinery

Generally, industrial buildings suffer significant damage

at 2 to 5 pounds per square inch (psi) overpressure and total

destruction at 10 psi. Unprotected pieces of machinery can

often withstand greater overpressures if they are located in

open areas, but they then become vulnerable to damage from the

collapse of buildings adjacent to them. Different protective

measures have been tested by the Soviet Union, including the

construction of permanent in-place hardened canopies, hoods,

massive tie-down efforts, and foundations that increase to 20 to

40 psi the overpressure required to overturn and seriously damage

machinery. These methods, however, have only limited application,

since they are prohibitively .expensive and could require extensive

factory remodeling. 20/

Another type of protection is to sandbag or earthmound

machinery. This is a less expensive method that can protect

machinery to overpressures up to 80 psi 21/ and from falling

debris from the building in which it is housed. The effectiveness of sandbagging and earthmounding measures is limited by the

soil motion brought on by a nuclear explosion and by the fact that

the machinery cannot be used while covered. Also, the machinery

is susceptible to corrosion unless it is properly treated before

it is covered. Boeing Industries has conducted experiments

expanding on this Soviet concept in which machinery was first

surrounded by a crushable material, such as industrial chips (the

debris that results from milling operations), and then packed with

earth. This method has increased the protection factor up to 200

to 300 psi. It is not known whether the Soviets have considered

expanding on this concept beyond their published sandbagging

technique. A practical application of the Boeing method would

involve protecting half of a factory's critical machinery,

while leaving the remaining half in operation, or closing down

20/ Ibid. , pp. 80-87.

2JL/ Ibid. , p. 87.

46
production entirely in order to enhance the possibility that

a factory would survive a nuclear attack. 22/

Another protection method discussed in Soviet literature is

submersion of machinery. Some machines do not lend themselves to

being packed in dirt. In such cases, water can sometimes provide

a good alternative. After treating the machines with grease or

spray paint to protect them against corrosion, they can be quite

successfully submerged by creating a tank with sandbags. The tank

is then covered to protect the machinery from falling debris.

This can be accomplished in one or two days and is an inexpensive

method, but it has all the disadvantages of sandbagging.

Other simple, expedient steps can be taken to protect machinery by removing fire hazards from the immediate area. This

involves locating fuel storage sites away from critical machinery and training personnel to shut off machines and electrical

power before evacuating to shelters. Secondary effects from a

nuclear blast, such as fire or shorts in electrical systems, can

damage machinery just as effectively as primary effects can.

THE CURRENT STATE OF SOVIET CIVIL DEFENSE

It is known that the Soviets are prepared to protect some of

their critical industries in order to make them less vulnerable

both to secondary effects from nuclear explosions and to the

effects of distant detonations. The Soviet civil defense program

has begun to require that all service and industrial facilities

provide protection for their most valuable machinery and the

electrical power, steam, water, and chemical conduct systems;

establish underground electrical and telephone lines, water

reservoirs, pumping, and transformer stations; and protect their

fuel. 23/

It is thought that the Soviets could move into a war-ready

posture in three to four days if advance preparations were

Til Ibid., pp. 87-89, 106-107.

23/ Leon Goure, Soviet Civil Defense in the Seventies, prepared

for the U.S. Defense Civil Preparedness Agency (Miami: University of Miami Center for Advanced International Studies,

1975), pp. 66-74.

47

rr IFTTTIT
1I11L.JL 1. lUcomplete and in a week or so if they were incomplete. 24/ Recent

studies have not indicated any major changes in the direction of

the Soviet program since about 1971, but they do indicate that the

Soviets are progressing with their civil defense programs. 25/

The Department of Defense concluded that, "overall, there has been

no significant reduction in the vulnerability of Soviet industry

to nuclear attack." 26/

24/ Civil Preparedness Review, Report, Part II, p. 71.

25/ "Soviet Civil Defense: Insiders Argue Whether Strategic

Balance is Shaken," Science (December 10, 1976), p. 1142.

26/ Department of Defense, Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1979,

p. 48.

48
APPENDIX B. SNAPPER DAMAGE ASSESSMENT MODEL: INPUT DATA AND

MAJOR ASSUMPTIONS

The calculations in this paper are based on the SNAPPER

Damage Assessment Model developed for the Air Force by the Rand

Corporation. I/ The model provides a rapid means of calculating

the destruction expected from the detonation of a large number of

weapons, given explicit assumptions about target and weapon

characteristics. It does not incorporate operational planning

constraints such as range or footprints.

TARGETS

The model includes an industrial target base of some 1,400

general industrial areas and specific industrial plants in the

Soviet Union that are essential to economic and military recovery.

It also includes a military target base of some 1,300 military

airfields, naval bases, army depots, and nuclear storage sites. 2J

A population data base is also part of the model.

I/ Bruce W. Bennett, The SNAPPER Nuclear Damage Assessment

~~ Model, WN-9899-AF (Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation,

June 1977).

2/ These target bases have been chosen as reasonable represen-

~~ tations of what U.S. forces might attack. Of course, they

do not include all Soviet industrial and military installations, but they should include the major ones. Designating targets by specific industrial complexes rather than

large metropolitan areas permits a more accurate assessment of

weapons requirements. When the targets are specified as large

metropolitan areas, calculations are sometimes presented

solely in terms of equivalent megatonnage, without regard to

the numbers of weapons involved. For example, the annual

Defense Department report for fiscal year 1969 estimated that

about 400 equivalent megatons would be sufficient to destroy

half of Soviet industry (see Department of Defense, Annual

Report, Fiscal Year 1969, p. 50). Allocating weapons to

plants, as is done in the SNAPPER model, tends to emphasize

the number of weapons in addition to their yield. From

49
I It..11.

The analysis is structured so that an overall objective

regarding industrial damage is translated into specific objectives

for individual sectors. In other words, if an attack is designed

to achieve 80 percent damage to all industrial installations in

the target base, then weapons are allocated to destroy about

80 percent of steel production and about 80 percent of refinery

capacity.

All military targets in the target base (except ICBM silos)

are grouped together in a target set. Each class in the set—

airfields, naval bases, army depots, nuclear storage sites—is

given roughly the same value (that is, all airfields are as

important as all army depots). It should be noted that military

bases make up the target set rather than forces (such as ships and

tanks). It is difficult to estimate damage to mobile units such

as tanks because they may be moved to the field prior to the

arrival of the nuclear weapons. Although the targeting of bases

is used to estimate weapon requirements, whether or not such an

allocation should be made in an actual strike would depend on

events leading up to the crisis and on the amount of intelligence

available on troop movements.

Population is not directly targeted in the SNAPPER model,

but casualties are computed based on weapon aim points (which

depend on the target allocation) and the location of population.

Prompt effects from blast and radiation are computed using

standard Defense Intelligence Agency methodology. Fallout effects

are calculated using a fallout model developed by the Weapon

System Evaluation Group.

MAJOR ASSUMPTIONS

As in any model, the results generated depend on the series

of assumptions made regarding the necessary inputs. The following

categories are among the most important in this model.

Figures B-l, B-2, and B-3 (below), about 1,200 Poseidon

warheads with 140 equivalent megatons, 900 cruise missiles

with 300 equivalent megatons, or 700 bombs with 700 equivalent

megatons would achieve the same 80 percent expected damage to

the industrial targets in the SNAPPER base. Equivalent

megatons, then, is a poor indication of the destructive power

of an arsenal against industry when damage is assessed against

individual plants rather than metropolitan complexes.

50
Surviving Weapons

All the calculations of damage inflicted upon the Soviet

Union are based on those U.S. weapons that could be expected to

survive and remain operable after a massive, surprise nuclear

first strike by the Soviet Union. The calculations for total

force effectiveness also assume that the the United States

would withhold 1,000 warheads carried by submarines as a reserve

force. Weapons characteristics are shown in Tables 1, 2 and 3 in

Chapter II.

Target Growth

The number and type of industrial installations in the Soviet

Union that comprise the target base will undoubtedly change in

the future. (Military targets are not expected to increase

appreciably in numbers because the Soviets are emphasizing

qualitative improvements to their forces rather than quantitative

growth.) How such changes may affect weapons requirements is

uncertain. There will be expansion of current facilities, which

might not increase weapons requirements, and construction of

new plants, which could. For the purpose of estimating force

effectiveness in this paper, enough weapons are included in a

reserve force to maintain an effective retaliatory capability,

even if there is such a large growth in the number of industrial

targets that, by 1990, there would be a 40 percent increase in the

number of weapons required to achieve equivalent damage levels.

Weapon Allocation

Allocation of the weapons that may be expected to survive a

Soviet first strike requires judging how many weapons will be

allocated to Soviet industrial targets, how many to military

targets, and how many to silos. There is no satisfactory way

to make these judgments because of the very different targets

involved. These targets are valued in quite different termst

Industry may be evaluated in dollar terms—for example, its

output, its manufacturing value added, or the capital investment

in its plant. There are no comparable dollar values for military

targets.

One method for solving this problem is to assign values to

military targets that would be comparable to the value system used

for industry. Each military target would have to be evaluated.

51

TIT TT'TTTTT"
The decision as to whether or not a particular military target is

allocated a weapon is effectively made by the value that is

arbitrarily assigned to the facility.

An alternative method is to fix the damage to be achieved on

one set and use the remaining weapons to maximize damage on the

second. This is the system employed in this paper to estimate the

capability of current and projected forces. Destruction of 80

percent of the industrial target set appears to be a reasonable

objective. Weapon allocation is designed to achieve roughly

this damage level in each industrial category (steel mills,

refineries, etc.). The remaining weapons are used to maximize

damage to military targets.

Other Hedges

To hedge against Soviet civil defense measures, it is

assumed that half of the Soviet industrial base is hardened to 30

psi (that is, protection of machinery from building collapse).

DAMAGE EXPECTANCY

The probability of destroying a target as a result of a

nuclear strike is termed damage expectancy. A target may not

be destroyed because a weapon fails in the launch phase or

fails in flight (reliability), fails to travel to the target

(penetration—for example, a bomber may be shot down), misses the

target (accuracy), or the kill area of the weapon is smaller than

that of the target.

Mathematically, DE=l-(l-R x Pk)n, where

DE = damage expectancy;

R = reliability times probability of successful penetration;

Pk = the kill probability of the weapon against the

target;

n = the number of weapons of the same type allocated to

the target.

52
A weapon with a small yield that is allocated to a largearea target would not be expected to destroy the target completely. This will lower the kill probability. For example, a

half-mile-radius target complex composed of buildings (hardness

represented by a vulnerability number of 14Q7) that is attacked by

a 40-kiloton weapon (1,500 ft. CEP) would result in only a 0.80

probability of damage (Pk). A less accurate weapon would produce

a still lower Pk. For example, a 40-kiloton weapon with a 3,000

ft. CEP would have a 0.60 Pk against this hypothetical target.

Damage expectancy is used as a guide to the allocation

of weapons to targets. Although it computes damage to targets

and population casualties, the SNAPPER model does not actually

allocate weapons to targets. Such allocations must be provided as input data. To make such allocations requires that

relative values be assigned to targets. Then, by applying

damage expectancy to these values, one can choose among competing

targets. First, one weapon is assigned to each target, starting

with the most valuable and proceeding down the list. Eventually,

the additional gain from allocating a second weapon to the most

valuable target is more than would be obtained by attacking

an additional target. For example, if the first target has a

value of 1,000 and the weapon Pk is 0.80, then, assuming 100

percent reliability, one bomb would destroy 800 units of target

value. 3/ Allocating a second weapon to this target would result

in additional value destroyed of 160 units. 4/ Therefore, this

second weapon should be allocated to the first target before a

target valued at 159 units is attacked. Proceeding in this

fashion, a rough allocation of weapons can be made.

The first weapon allocated to a target class achieves

the greatest damage because it would be allocated to the most

valuable target. The second weapon could be allocated to the

next most valuable or to the same target but, in either case, it

would result in a smaller increase in damage than the first

weapon. As the number of weapons allocated to a target class

increases, the amount of damage expected from each additional

weapon decreases so that a point is reached where the allocation

of additional weapons produces little increase in damage.

_3/ 1,000 [1-(1 - 1 x .8)] = 800.

4/ This is computed as the difference in the effect of two

weapons (1,000 [1-(1 - 1 x .8) ]) and a single weapon

(1,000 [1-(1 - 1 x .8)]).

53

ITT TTTTTTT
Poseidon Weapons

An index of damage expected from Poseidon warheads is

displayed in Figure B-l for attacks against the industrial and

military target bases (exclusive of ICBM silos) used in this

paper. _5_/ Weapon reliability is included in the calculations.

Allocating 1,200 Poseidon warheads against industry would achieve

about 80 percent damage to the target base. Eight Poseidon

submarines at sea would have more than 1,200 warheads on board

("surviving submarine" line in Figure B-l). More submarines are

needed in the force to maintain eight at sea, however, because of

overhaul and repair requirements. Under alert conditions, all

submarines not in overhaul would be expected to be at sea so that,

out of ten submarines in the force ("generated alert" line), eight

would be at sea. If the force were not alerted, only those

submarines at sea on normal deployments might survive a Soviet

first strike. In this case, fifteen would be required in the

force ("day-to-day alert" line) in order to have eight at sea.

Therefore, under normal peacetime alert conditions, a force of

fifteen Poseidon submarines would be enough to achieve about 80

percent damage to the industrial target base even after a Soviet

first strike.

General purpose military targets are usually more resistant

to nuclear effects than industrial targets. Most weapon storage

sites, for example, are hardened so that a weapon must detonate

very close to the target to be effective. Poseidon warheads are

not particularly effective against hardened targets. Even if all

the Poseidon warheads expected to survive a Soviet surprise attack

were allocated to military targets, just over 50 percent of

the military target base would be expected to be destroyed (see

Figure B-l).

Cruise Missiles

Cruise missiles provide major advantages in nuclear warfare

because of their accuracy. Some 900 weapons would be expected

to destroy about 80 percent of the industrial target base (see

Figure B-2), and they could be carried by 45 surviving B-52s with

20 cruise missiles each. If it is assumed that the bombers must

_5_/ Complete destruction of the target base equals 100 on this

index.

54
Figure B-1

Damage from Poseidon Submarines

1000 1500

Surviving Warheads • • Poseidon

10

Surviving Poseidon Submarines

2000

10

Submarines in the Fore* (Generated Alert)

_| I I

15

10 15 20

Submarines in the Force (Day-to-day Alert)

55

2500

"¥ T~ flTTTTT
Figure B-2

Damage from B-52s Carrying Cruise Missiles

500 1000

Surviving Warheads -- Cruise Missiles

I

1500 2000

25 50

Surviving B-52s (Cruise Missile Carriers)

I I

75 100

25 50 75

B-52s in the Force (Generated Alert)

100 125

50 100 150 200

B-52s in the Force (Day-to-Day Alert)

250 300

56
survive a Soviet first strike, additional aircraft must be in the

force in order to insure the survivability of 45 aircraft. The

survivability of bombers is dependent on their alert rate. 6/ In

a time of crisis, the alert rate may be increased to 80 percent of

the force (generated alert). In this case, fewer than 60 B-52

bombers would be expected to destroy 80 percent of the industrial

target base. Against military targets, some 650 cruise missiles

would be expected to destroy about 50 percent of the military

target base. Only 40 bombers would be needed in the force,

assuming high alert rates, to assure the delivery of this number

of weapons.

Bombs

Figure B-3 displays the damage expected from bombers,

armed with four bombs each, for attacks against the industrial

and military target bases. 7/ The allocation of about 700 bombs

would be expected to destroy about 80 percent of industrial

target value. If each bomber carried four bombs, 175 aircraft

could deliver this attack. If a period of tension preceded the

start of a nuclear conflict and the bomber force was on generated

alert, over 200 bombers would have to be in the force to insure

that 175 survived. At the peacetime alert rate of 30 percent,

nearly 600 bombers would be needed in the force to destroy 80

percent of the industrial target base. Because of their higher

yields, bombs are somewhat more effective than cruise missiles

against military targets; about 550 bombs would be expected to

destroy about 50 percent of the military target base. Clearly, an

6/ A bomber is on normal peacetime, or day-to-day, alert when the

crew is in the alert facility with the aircraft in the normal

parking area. Higher alert states may be reached in times of

crisis. The crew may be in the aircraft at the end of the

runway, the auxiliary power unit may be running, and, at the

highest posture, the engines may be running. In peacetime, about 30 percent of the bomber force is on alert.

This proportion may increase in a time of tension up to about

80 percent of the force.

7/ B-52G/H bombers also carry SRAMs and would be more effective

in terms of damage to industrial targets than the aircraft

with bombs only that are shown in Figure B-3.

57

T~ TTTJITT
Figure B-3

Damage from Bombers

1000

Surviving Warheads - - Bombs

_J I

1500 2000

100 200 300

Surviving B-52 Bombers

J I

400

0

I

100

I

200 300 400

B-52s in the Force (Generated Alert)

I

200 400

B-52s in the Force (Day-to-Day Alert)

58
optimal weapons allocation would assign Poseidon warheads to

industrial targets and larger-yield weapons such as bombs to

military targets.

Other Weapons

Minuteman III warheads would be about as effective as cruise

missiles against either industrial or military targets. Their

slightly smaller yield and lower accuracy is offset by the higher

probability of penetration by the Minuteman warhead. The shortrange attack missiles (SRAMs) carried by bombers would be nearly

as effective as cruise missiles against industrial targets, but

their lower accuracy would result in less effectiveness against

military targets. Because Trident I warheads have the same

accuracy and reliability as Poseidon warheads but a larger yield,

they would be more effective than the Poseidon against both

industrial and military targets.

Silos

None of the weapons currently in the U.S. inventory is

particularly effective against the silos that house land-based

missiles. The best current system, Minuteman III with a reported

0.17 megaton warhead and a 700 ft. CEP (see Table 1 in Chapter II), would have a 0.40 probability of kill against improved

silos (2,000 psi hardness) with reliability included. This means

that 1,400 Minuteman III warheads (out of an inventory of 1,650)

would be expected to destroy only 500 Soviet silos. A bomb would

be slightly more effective, with a 0.45 kill probability but would

take much longer to reach the target than a missile warhead.

Future, more accurate weapon systems such as MX, Trident II,

and cruise missiles promise improved counterforce capability.

Including reliability and penetration probability, an MX warhead

would have a 0.82 kill probability} a cruise missile, about 0.65;

and Trident II, about 0.55. There are many arguments both for and

against the deployment of a counterforce capability. 8/ Until

these more accurate systems are deployed, however, there appears

to be little reason to allocate warheads against Soviet silos.

8/ For a detailed discussion of counterforce capability, see

Congressional Budget Office, Counterforce Issues for the U.S.

Strategic Nuclear Forces, Background Paper (January 1978).

59

IT TTi]nr
Alert Assumptions

An important planning assumption for force sizing is that

U.S. forces must be capable of retaliating after absorbing

a massive Soviet first strike when U.S. forces are in a normal

peacetime alert posture. As indicated by Figure B-l, if one

were to assume that nuclear war would start only after an increase

in tension, then a force of ten Poseidon submarines would be

sufficient for destroying much of Soviet industry. The use of the

surprise attack scenario for force planning, however, would

increase the force requirement by 50 percent. The alert rate is

even more important for bombers (see Figure B-3) because nearly

three times as many are required to be in the force for a surprise

attack scenario compared to the generated alert case.

60
APPENDIX C. GLOSSARY I/

Antiballistic Missile (ABM) System: A system to counter strategic

ballisticmissilesortheirelement s in flight trajectory.

Antisubmarine Warfare (ASW): Measures to detect, locate, track,

and destroy submarines currently primarily dependent upon acoustic

sensors.

B-52: The mainstay of the U.S. strategic bomber force since

the 1950s. About 250 late model G and H aircraft and 75 rewinged

D bombers are expected to remain in the inventory until the

early 1990s. Many of these will be equipped with cruise missiles

in the early 1980s, while others will continue to carry gravity

bombs and short-range attack missiles.

Ballistic Missile: Any missile which does not rely upon aerodynamic surfaces to produce lift and consequently follows a

ballistic trajectory (that is, one resulting when the body is

acted upon only by gravity and aerodynamic drag) when thrust is

terminated.

Circular Error Probable (CEP): A measure of the delivery accuracy

of a weapon system used as a factor in determining probable

damage to targets. It is the radius of a circle around the target

at which a missile is aimed within which the warhead has a 0.5

probability of falling.

Counterforce Strike: An attack aimed at an adversary's military

capability, especially his strategic nuclear military capability.

Cruise Missile: A guided missile which uses aerodynamic lift to

offset gravity and propulsion to counteract drag. The major

portion of a cruise missile's flight path remains within the

earth's atmosphere.

I/ Definitions are from SALT Lexicon, U.S. Arms Control and

Disarmament Agency, 1974; and from Projected Strategic

Offensive Weapons Inventories of the U.S. and USSR, Congressional Research Service, March 24, 1977.

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Cruise Missile Carrier (CMC): An aircraft capable of delivering

cruise missiles to within range of their targets. Current plans

call for the use of B-52 bombers in this role. In the mid-1980s,

wide-bodied commerical aircraft may be procured to supplement, and

eventually replace, the B-52 force.

Electronic Countermeasures (ECM) : Measures used by bombers or

other aircraft to negate the effectiveness of enemy air defense

radars, surface-to-air missiles, and interceptor aircraft.

Equivalent Megatons (EMT): A commonly used measure of the urban

area destructive power of a nuclear weapon that accounts for the

fact that area destructive power does not increase proportionately

with increases in yield. It is expressed by the relationship

EMT = N multiplied by Y to the 2/3 power, where N is the number of

weapons of yield Y.

FB-111: Medium bombers procured in small numbers in the late

1960s to supplement the B-52 force. Although capable of supersonic low-level flight, the aircraft's small range and payload

limits its effectiveness. Modified stretched FB-111H bombers may

be added to the bomber force in the 1980s.

First Strike (Nuclear): The launching of an initial strategic

nuclear attack before the opponent has used any strategic weapons

himself.

Generated Alert: A condition when forces are placed in a high

state of readiness, with the vast majority of the bomber force on

ground alert ready for rapid take-off and the vast majority of the

submarine force at sea.

Hardness: The amount of protection afforded by structural

shielding against blast, heat, and radiation effects of nuclear

explosions, usually measured in pounds per square inch (psi).

Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM): A land-based, rocketpropelled vehicle capable of delivering a warhead to intercontinental ranges (ranges in excess of about 3,000 nautical miles).

Kiloton (KT): The yield of a nuclear weapon equivalent to 1,000

tons of TNT.

Megaton (MT): The yield of a nuclear weapon equivalent to

1,000,000 tons of TNT.

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Minuteman: The mainstay of the U.S. ICBM force since the early

1960s. At the present time, the United States maintains a force

of 450 single-warhead Minuteman II missiles and 550 three-warhead

Minuteman III missiles.

MK-12A: A higher yield, more accurate warhead designed to replace

the MK-12 warhead presently deployed on Minuteman III missiles.

MK-12A warheads may also be deployed on MX ICBMs and Trident II

SLBMs.

Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicle (MIRV): Two or

more reentry vehicles carried by a single missile and capable of

being independently targeted.

MX: A more powerful, more accurate ICBM now in the research and

development stage that may supplement the Minuteman force in the

mid-1980s. Current plans call for mobile basing for MX missiles.

Missiles would be moved either within underground protective

trenches or among protective above-ground shelters.

Payload: The weapon and/or cargo capacity of any aircraft or

missile system, expressed variously in pounds, in number of

weapons, and in terms of missile warhead yields.

Polaris: U.S. submarines that carry the first generation of

submarine-launched Polaris missiles. Each submarine can carry 16

missiles. The Polaris is expected to begin leaving the force in

the early 1980s.

Poseidon: U.S. submarines that carry the first generation of

multiple-warhead, submarine-launched Poseidon missiles. Each

submarine can carry 16 missiles. The thousands of warheads

carried by these 31 submarines comprise the most survivable

element of the U.S. nuclear retaliatory capability. These submarines are expected to be replaced by Trident submarines during

the late 1980s and early 1990s.

Reentry Vehicle (RV): That portion of a ballistic missile

designed to carry a nuclear warhead and to reenter . the earth's

atmosphere in the terminal portion of the missile trajectory.

Second Strike: A term usually used to refer to a retaliatory

attack in response to a first strike.

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Silo: Underground facilities for a hard-site ballistic missile

and/or crew, designed to provide prelaunch protection against

nuclear effects.

Short-Range Attack Missile (SRAM) : An air-to-surface missile

carried by U.S. FB-111 and B-52 bombers.

SS-1S: A large Soviet surface-to-surface missile. The largest

ICBM in the world, the SS-18 can carry eight to ten megaton-range

warheads. Now being deployed, about 300 SS-18s may eventually

replace older, single-warhead SS-9s. Smaller SS-19s and SS-17s,

both multiple-warhead missiles, are currently replacing older,

single-warhead SS-lls.

SSBN: Nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine.

Strategic Stability: Strategic stability encompasses both crisis

stability and arms stability, and refers to a relationship

in which neither side has an incentive to initiate the use of

strategic nuclear forces in a crisis or perceives the necessity to

undertake major new arms programs to avoid being placed at a

strategic disadvantage.

Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM): A ballistic missile

carried in and launched from a submarine.

Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM): A surface-launched missile employed

to counter airborne threats.

Throw-Weight: Ballistic missile throw-weight is the maximum

useful weight which has been flight tested on the boost stages of

the missile. The useful weight includes weight of the reentry

vehicles, penetration aids, dispensing and release mechanisms,

guidance devices, reentry shrouds, covers, buses, and propulsion

devices with their propellants (but not the final stages) that are

present at the end of the boost phase.

Trident: U.S. submarines now under construction that are expected

to replace the Polaris/Poseidon fleet. Each submarine will be

able to carry 24 Trident I or Trident II missiles. The Trident II

missile, now entering research and development, will provide an

option to improve the accuracy and increase the destructive power

of the sea-based nuclear force in the mid-to-late 1980s.

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Warheads: That part of a missile, projectile, or torpedo that

contains the explosive intended to inflict damage.

Yield: The force of a nuclear explosion expressed in terms of the

number of tons of TNT that would have to be exploded to produce

the same energy.

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