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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF ALASKA 

LATRELL DONEL WYNNE, 

Appellant, 

v. 

STATE OF ALASKA, 

Appellee. 

Court of Appeals No. A-11540 

Trial Court No. 3AN-11-6228 CR 

O P I N I O N

No. 2615 — August 31, 2018 

Appeal from the Superior Court, Third Judicial District, 

Anchorage, Philip R. Volland, Judge. 

Appearances: Ben Crittenden, Attorney at Law, Anchorage, 

under contract with the Office of Public Advocacy, for the 

Appellant. Kenneth M. Rosenstein, Assistant AttorneyGeneral, 

Office of Criminal Appeals, Anchorage, and Craig W. Richards, 

Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee. 

Before: Mannheimer, Chief Judge, Allard, Judge, and Suddock, 

Superior Court Judge. * 

Judge MANNHEIMER. 

* Sitting by assignment made pursuant to Article IV, Section 16 of the Alaska 

Constitution and Administrative Rule 24(d). 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

1 

Under Alaska’s pattern jury instructions, jurors are told that they should 

distrust the testimony of any accomplice to the charged crime. 1 

The present case involves two co-defendants — Troy Williams and Latrell 

Donel Wynne — who were charged with jointly committing two robberies. (The two 

men were charged with robbing the occupant of one apartment, and soon thereafter 

robbing the occupants of a second apartment in the same building). 

Williams and Wynne were tried together. Williams decided not to testify, 

but Wynne took the stand at trial. In his testimony, Wynne asserted that he had no 

connection to any robbery committed in the second apartment. With regard to the 

robbery committed in the first apartment, Wynne asserted that he had been an innocent 

bystander — that his co-defendant Williams was solely responsible for that robbery. 

At the end of the trial, at the request of Williams’s attorney, the trial judge 

gave Criminal Pattern Jury Instruction 1.21 — an instruction which told the jurors that, 

if they concluded that Wynne was likely a participant in the robbery, then they should 

view Wynne’s testimony with distrust. 

The jury acquitted both Wynne and Williams of the robbery committed in 

the second apartment. With regard to the robbery committed in the first apartment, the 

See Alaska Criminal Pattern Jury Instructions 1.20 and 1.21. Both of these pattern 

instructions tell the jurors that the testimony of any “participant” in the charged crime should 

be viewed with distrust. The two instructions then clarify: “This does not mean that you may 

arbitrarily disregard such testimony, but you should give it the weight you consider 

appropriate after examining it with care and caution and in light of all the evidence.” 

We note that these instructions use the word “participant” rather than the word 

“accomplice”. “Participant” is conceivably broader than “accomplice”, because the word 

“participant” potentially includes people who did not act with a culpable mental state, and 

who therefore could not be held criminally liable for the events they participated in. The 

present case does not require us to inquire further into this matter. 

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2 

jury found Wynne guilty of this crime, but the jury was unable to reach a verdict with 

respect to Williams. 

Wynne (the sole defendant convicted of anything at the trial) now appeals 

his robbery conviction. He argues that the trial judge committed error when the judge 

instructed the jurors to evaluate whether Wynne was a participant in the robbery, and to 

view Wynne’s testimony with distrust if they found that he was a participant. 

For the reasons explained in this opinion, we hold that the “distrust the 

testimony of an accomplice” jury instruction should not have been given under the 

circumstances of this case. But though we conclude that it was error to give this 

instruction, we conclude that the error was harmless under the facts of Wynne’s case. 

We therefore affirm Wynne’s conviction. 

The rationale of the jury instruction on distrusting the testimony of an 

accomplice 

The jury instruction directing jurors to view the testimonyofan accomplice 

with distrust has been a feature of Alaska law since territorial days. This instruction was 

mandatory from 1887 until 1975. 2 Then, in 1975 (as we shall explain), our supreme 

When Congress first established a civil government for Alaska in 1884, Congress 

decreed that the then-current laws of Oregon would apply in Alaska. See 23 United States 

Statutes 24, ch. 53, § 7 (1884). At that time, Oregon law mandated that juries be instructed 

that the testimony of an accomplice should be viewed with distrust. See Hill’s Annotated 

Laws of Oregon, § 845 (1887). This provision was included in Alaska’s first compilation 

of laws, the Carter Code of 1900. See Thomas H. Carter, The Laws of Alaska (1900), § 673. 

It was carried forward in every subsequent compilation of Alaska law until statehood. See 

1913 Compiled Laws of Alaska, § 1505; 1933 Compiled Laws of Alaska, § 4263, and 1949 

Alaska Compiled Laws Annotated, § 58-5-1. After statehood, this provision was no longer 

included in the Alaska Statutes. Instead, it was incorporated in the Alaska Criminal Rules. 

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court amended Alaska Criminal Rule 30(b) so that judges were authorized to give this 

instruction, but they were no longer required to do so. 

The rationale behind this jury instruction is explained by Dean John Henry 

Wigmore in his treatise on evidence, Evidence in Trials at Common Law (Chadbourn 

revision, 1978), § 2057, Vol. 7, page 417: 

The reasons which have led to this distrust of an 

accomplice’s testimony are not far to seek. He may expect to 

save himself frompunishment by procuring the conviction of 

others. It is true that he is also charging himself, and in that 

respect he has burned his ships. But he can escape the 

consequences of this acknowledgement, if the prosecuting 

authorities choose to release him, provided he helps them to 

secure the conviction of his partner in crime[.] ... 

However, Wigmore also points out the limit of this rationale: 

The essential element, however, it must be remembered, is 

this supposed promise or expectation of conditional 

clemency. If that is lacking, the whole basis of distrust fails. 

Ibid. 

The modern history of this jury instruction in Alaska 

Fromthetimeofstatehood until1975, whenever anaccompliceto thecrime 

testified at a defendant’s trial, Alaska Criminal Rule 30(b) required the trial judge to 

instruct the jury that the testimony of an accomplice should be viewed with 

– 4 – 2615
 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

3 

distrust. 3 This duty was imposed on trial judges regardless of whether either party asked 

for the instruction. 

But this aspect of the law began to change in 1974, when the Alaska 

Supreme Court decided Anthony v. State, 521 P.2d 486 (Alaska 1974). 

The defendant in Anthony was charged with committing a murder for hire. 

Verna Hofhines, the woman who allegedly hired Anthony to kill her husband, ultimately 

reached a plea agreement with the State: she pleaded guilty to murder, and she testified 

against Anthony at his trial. 4 

Anthony’s jury received the standard jury instructions on weighing the 

credibility of witnesses — i.e., instructions embodying the principle that jurors are 

entitled to consider a witness’s potential bias and their potential interest in the outcome 

of the case. 5 And Anthony’s attorney apparently thought that these standard jury 

instructions gave him sufficient scope to attack Hofhines’s testimony — because 

Anthony’s attorney did not ask the trial judge to give a “distrust the testimony of an 

accomplice” instruction. 6 But on appeal, Anthony argued that his conviction should be 

reversed becauseCriminal Rule30(b) madethe“distrust thetestimony ofanaccomplice” 

instruction mandatory, even when the instruction was not requested. 7 

Before 1975, Criminal Rule 30(b)(2) provided that, “whether or not requested to do 

so, [the court] shall give the following basic instructions on all proper occasions: ... (2) That 

the testimony of an accomplice ought to be viewed with distrust ... .” (Quoted in Anthony 

v. State, 521 P.2d 486, 488 n. 2 (Alaska 1974).) 

4 Anthony, 521 P.2d at 488. 

5 Id. at 497. 

6 Id. at 490. 

7 Ibid. 

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In a three-to-two decision, the supreme court concluded that the trial 

judge’s failure to give a “distrust the testimony of an accomplice” instruction required 

reversal of Anthony’s conviction. 

The Anthony majority acknowledged that Anthony’s attorney had focused 

the defense case on attacking Hofhines’s credibility. But the majority declared that even 

ifthedefenseattorney’s cross-examination and closingargumenthadbeen“devastating”, 

the purpose of Criminal Rule 30(b) would not have been fulfilled. The majority stated 

that the purpose of the rule was to emphasize to the jurors that distrust of an accomplice’s 

truthfulness was not merely something that could be argued by an advocate; rather, it was 

a rule of law “cloak[ed] [with] the judge’s impartial authority”. Id., 521 P.2d at 491. 

The two dissenting members of the court, on the other hand, rejected the 

majority’s premise that the law required a trial judge to set a judicial imprimatur on the 

concept that an accomplice’s testimony should be viewed with distrust. 

The dissenters pointed out that the “sole issue” in Anthony’s case was the 

credibility of the State’s chief witness, Hofhines. As described in the dissent, “The entire 

closing argument of both parties was basically directed to either building up or attacking 

her credibility”, and “the fact that she had been charged with the [murder] and had 

entered a plea of guilty was the basic starting point for evaluating her motive for 

testifying.” 8 

The dissenters pointed out that the jurors had received the standard 

instructions on evaluating a witness’s testimony based on the witness’s “bias and interest 

in the outcome of the case”, as well as an instruction on the rule that a criminal 

conviction cannot rest on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice. 9 

8 Id. at 497. 

9 Ibid. 

– 6 – 2615
 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Under these circumstances, the dissenters concluded, the trial judge’s 

failure to expressly instruct the jurors that an accomplice’s testimony should be viewed 

with distrust did not rise to the level of plain error — i.e., it did not constitute “such basic 

and fundamental unfairness [as] to call for the intervention of this court [when there was 

no] objection in the trial court.” 10 

A year and a half later, in Supreme Court Order No. 222, the supreme court 

effectively adopted the dissenters’ position. 

SupremeCourtOrderNo.222amendedCriminal Rule30(b)by eliminating 

the provision that required trial judges to give the “distrust the testimony of an 

accomplice” instruction in all circumstances, even when neither party requested that 

instruction. 

This change to Rule 30(b) was an implicit rejection of the position taken 

by the Anthony majority: the position that, whenever an accomplice testifies at a criminal 

trial, the trial is fundamentally unfair unless the jury receives an instruction in which the 

judge expressly endorses the principle that the testimony of an accomplice should be 

viewed with distrust. 

Instead, under the amended version of Rule 30(b), Alaska law reflects the 

position of the Anthony dissenters: When an accomplice testifies, and when neither party 

requests a “distrust the testimony of an accomplice” instruction, the trial can still be fair 

so long as the judge instructs the jurors that they are entitled to consider a witness’s 

potential bias, a witness’s potential motive for testifying, and a witness’s interest in the 

outcome of the case — instructions that allow the lawyers full scope to attack and defend 

the credibility and weight of the accomplice’s testimony. 11 

10 Ibid. 

11 See Alexander v. State, 611 P.2d 469, 479 (Alaska 1980), where the supreme court 

(continued...) 

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Situations in which it may be inappropriate to give the “distrust the 

testimony of an accomplice” instruction 

Because Alaska law no longer takes the view that an explicit “distrust the 

testimony of an accomplice” instruction is a mandatory component of a fair trial, Alaska 

trial judges must actively consider whether this instruction should be given, even when 

one of the parties affirmatively asks for the instruction. 

As we have explained, the rationale behind this jury instruction is the 

possibility that an accomplice to a crime will falsely incriminate another person in an 

effort to obtain clemency from the government — in Wigmore’s words, “to save himself 

from punishment by procuring the conviction of others”, thus prompting “the 

prosecuting authorities [to] choose to release him”. As our own supreme court stated in 

Fresneda v. State, 458 P.2d 134, 144 (Alaska 1969), “An accomplice’s testimony is 

viewed with distrust, because the accomplice usually believes he has a personal interest 

in aiding the prosecution.” 

But as Wigmore explains, this rationale does not apply if the “supposed 

promise or expectation of conditional clemency ... is lacking”. In such cases, “the whole 

basis of distrust fails”, and the instruction is no longer supported. 

Many times, of course, a defense attorney will request a “distrust the 

testimony of an accomplice” instruction in the traditional circumstances that gave rise 

to the instruction: circumstances where an accomplice to the crime testifies for the 

government in exchange for favorable treatment. But accomplices sometimes testify at 

criminal trials under other circumstances. 

11 (...continued) 

held that a trial was fair even though the trial judge declined to give one of the other 

instructions that were formerly mandated by Criminal Rule 30(b) — the instruction to view 

a defendant’s out-of-court verbal admissions with caution. 

– 8 – 2615
 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

For instance, this Court has acknowledged that, from time to time in 

prosecutions for physical or sexual abuse of a child, there will be a significant possibility 

that the spouse of the defendant is an uncharged accomplice to the acts of abuse. See 

State v. Morris, 680 P.2d 1190, 1194 n. 3 (Alaska App. 1984). In such cases, there will 

be times when the defendant’s spouse takes the stand and denies that the acts of abuse 

occurred, or minimizes the seriousness of those acts. In these instances, if the judge 

gives a “distrust the testimony of an accomplice” instruction, the jurors may well 

perceive this instruction as a judicial directive to distrust the exculpatory testimony of 

the spouse. 

Another non-traditional situation was presented to this Court in Hohman 

v. State, 669 P.2d 1316 (Alaska App. 1983). The defendant in Hohman was a state 

legislator who was accused of personally accepting a bribe, and of offering a related 

bribe to another legislator. 12 To prosecute Hohman, the State immunized two other 

participants in the bribery scheme, Michael DeMan and Sigurd Larsen. 13 Both DeMan 

and Larsen were unwilling recipients of immunity — and when they were forced to 

testify, they testified in favor of Hohman. 14 

At the conclusion of Hohman’s trial, the judge instructed the jurors that 

they should examine the testimony of these immunized witnesses “with greater care than 

the testimony of an ordinary witness”. 15 On appeal, Hohman argued that this instruction 

12 Hohman, 669 P.2d at 1318. 


13 Id. at 1322. 


14 Id. at 1322 & 1323. 


15 Id. at 1322. 


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amounted to an adverse judicial comment on DeMan’s and Larsen’s exculpatory 

testimony, and that this judicial comment denied him due process of law. 16 

In rejecting Hohman’s claim of error, this Court noted that there was a long 

line of judicial decisions holding that it is proper to give a “distrust the testimony of an 

accomplice” instruction when an accomplice to a crime testifies in favor of the defendant 

— because of the significant chance that the accomplice will lie out of loyalty to the 

defendant. 17 

(Indeed, Michael DeMan was later convicted of perjury for the exculpatory 

testimony he gave at Hohman’s trial. See DeMan v. State, 677 P.2d 903, 906 (Alaska 

App. 1984).) 

Nevertheless, this Court stated that “a better practice” would have been for 

the trial judge to augment the standard instructions on evaluating witness credibility — 

by adding a clause which told the jurors that, in addition to the other factors bearing on 

witness credibility, the jurors could consider the fact that a witness had been granted 

immunity from prosecution. 18 By handling the situation this way, we explained, the 

judge could “avoid any possible danger that the jury [would] conclude that the trial judge 

[was] expressing an opinion on the weight of the evidence.” 19 

16 Ibid. 

17 Ibid. 

18 Id. at 1323. 

19 Ibid. 

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Application of this law to Wynne’s case 

Wynne’s case presents yet another factual scenario that falls outside the 

traditional rationale of the “distrust the testimony of an accomplice” instruction: a 

situation where two co-defendants are being tried together, and where one defendant 

takes the stand in an attempt to lay all the blame on the other defendant. 

As we have explained, Wynne testified at trial that any wrongdoing was 

committed solely by his co-defendant Williams. In response to Wynne’s testimony, 

Williams’s attorney requested the “distrust the testimony of an accomplice” instruction. 

At that point, the trial judge was faced with a conundrum. 

BecauseWynnewas chargedwith being aparticipant intherobberies, there 

was reason to think that he might be motivated to falsely lay the blame on Williams. 

Thus, Williams was seemingly entitled to have the jury instructed that Wynne’s 

testimony should be viewed with distrust. 

But under these circumstances, there was a significant risk that the jurors 

might view a “distrust the testimony of an accomplice” instruction as a judicial comment 

on how they should evaluate Wynne’s self-exculpatory testimony. 

We conclude that the proper course for trial judges in this situation is to 

refrain from giving the “distrust the testimony of an accomplice” instruction. We reach 

this conclusion for two reasons. 

First, the traditional rationale behind the instruction does not apply to this 

situation. There is no suggestion that Wynne had received or was negotiating for 

clemency from the authorities when he gave his testimony. And as Wigmore explains, 

if the “supposed promise or expectation of conditional clemency ... is lacking”, then “the 

whole basis of distrust fails”, and the jury instruction is no longer supported. 

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Second, the standard instructions on evaluating the credibility of witnesses 

already expressly direct the jurors to consider a witness’s potential bias, their potential 

motive for testifying, and their interest in the outcome of the case. 20 Under these 

standard instructions, when a case arises where one co-defendant takes the stand and 

testifies that the other defendant is wholly to blame, the attorney who represents the nontestifying defendant has full scope to attack the testimony of the testifying defendant. 

And the virtue of the standard instructions is that they offer no hint of the judge’s view 

of these matters. 

Although we conclude that it was error for the trial judge in Wynne’s case 

to give a “distrust the testimony of an accomplice” instruction, we nonetheless conclude 

that the error was harmless. We reach this conclusion for two reasons. 

First, given the facts of this case, it was obvious that Wynne had a potential 

motive to lie about his participation in the robbery and to try to falsely shift the blame 

to his co-defendant, Williams. We are convinced that the jury instruction about 

distrusting the testimony of an accomplice did not cause the jurors to be any more 

skeptical of Wynne’s testimony than they otherwise would have been. 

Second, the State’s evidence that Wynne committed the first robbery was 

quite strong. 

Earlier on the day of the robbery, Wynne asked his close friend, Jerika 

Ratcliff, to pick him up at his residence, and then to pick up Williams. Ratcliff drove 

Wynne and Williams to the apartment building where the robbery occurred. Wynne and 

Williams went inside. Sometime later, Wynne returned to the car alone. He was 

carrying a television set and a large hunting knife — items later identified as having been 

stolen during the robbery. 

20 See Alaska Criminal Pattern Jury Instruction 1.10 (2012). 

– 12 – 2615
 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Ratcliff and Wynne then waited in the car for Williams to return. When 

Ratcliff became anxious to leave, Wynne went back into the building, intending to 

retrieve Williams. But almost immediately, Wynne returned to the car alone, and he told 

Ratcliff to start driving. By this time, they could hear police sirens. 

The police pulled them over a short distance from the apartment building. 

Inside the car, the police found a bag containing a holster, masks, gloves, a knife, duct 

tape, a walkie-talkie, and sanitary wipes. 

Given the fact that there were obvious reasons why Wynne might be 

motivated to testify falsely, and given the strength of the evidence tying Wynne to the 

robbery, we conclude that the challenged jury instruction did not appreciably affect the 

jury’s verdict, and that the error was therefore harmless. 21 

Conclusion 

The judgement of the superior court is AFFIRMED. 

21 See Love v. State, 457 P.2d 622, 631-32, 634 (Alaska 1969). 

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