ORAL ARGUMENT NOT YET SCHEDULED

No. 19-5072

_______________________________________________

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

_______________________________________________

REPRESENTATIVE TED LIEU, et al.,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION,

Defendant-Appellee.

_______________________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

_______________________________________________

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION’S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF ITS 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY AFFIRMANCE AND OPPOSITION TO 

APPELLANTS’ REQUEST TO HOLD THE FEC’S MOTION IN ABEYANCE

_______________________________________________

Lisa J. Stevenson 

Acting General Counsel

lstevenson@fec.gov

Kevin Deeley 

Associate General Counsel

kdeeley@fec.gov

Harry J. Summers

Assistant General Counsel

hsummers@fec.gov

June 17, 2019

Jacob S. Siler

Attorney

jsiler@fec.gov

Tanya Senanayake

Attorney

tsenanayake@fec.gov

FEDERAL ELECTION 

COMMISSION

1050 First Street NE

Washington, DC 20463 

(202) 694-1650

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

 Page

ARGUMENT........................................................................................................1

I. THE DISTRICT COURT DECISION SHOULD BE SUMMARILY 

AFFIRMED BECAUSE THE COMMISSION DID NOT ACT 

CONTRARY TO LAW UNDER 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(8).......................2

A. The Commission Meets the Standard for Summary 

Affirmance....................................................................................... 2

B. Whether the Commission Acted Contrary to Law Under 

FECA Does Not Hinge on the Future Viability of SpeechNow, 

and Lieu’s Claims Are Unpersuasive in Any Event ........................5

II. SUMMARY AFFIRMANCE IS WARRANTED BECAUSE THIS 

ACTION IS NOT AN APPROPRIATE VEHICLE BY WHICH TO 

CHALLENGE THE VALIDITY OF SPEECHNOW ................................9

III. THIS COURT SHOULD NOT HOLD THE FEC’S MOTION FOR 

SUMMARY AFFIRMANCE IN ABEYANCE...................................... 12

CONCLUSION.................................................................................................. 14

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases Page

Buggs v. Powell, 293 F. Supp. 2d 135 (D.D.C. 2003)..........................................6

Carey v. FEC, 864 F. Supp. 2d 61 (D.D.C. 2012)............................................. 12

FDIC v. Bender, 127 F.3d 58 (D.C. Cir. 1997)....................................................6

Grant Med. Ctr. v. Hargan, 875 F.3d 701 (D.C. Cir. 2017).................................3

Lieu v. FEC, 370 F. Supp. 3d 175 (D.D.C. 2019) ............................................ 5-6

McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. 185 (2014)...........................................................7

Orloski v. FEC, 795 F.2d 156 (D.C. Cir. 1986)....................................................5

Po Kee Wong v. U.S. Solicitor Gen., No. 12-5102, 2012 WL 3791302 

 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 8, 2012) ...............................................................................3

Republican Party of La. v. FEC, 219 F. Supp. 3d 86 (D.D.C. 2016), 

 aff’d, 137 S. Ct. 2178 (2017) ........................................................................7

SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686 (D.C. Cir. 2010)......................................8

Stephenson v. Cox, 223 F. Supp. 2d 119 (D.D.C. 2002) ......................................6

Taxpayers Watchdog, Inc. v. Stanley, 819 F.2d 294 (D.C. Cir. 1987)............ 2, 4

Unity08 v. FEC, 596 F.3d 861 (D.C. Cir. 2010)........................................... 10-11

Univ. of Great Falls v. NLRB, 278 F.3d 1335 (D.C. Cir. 2002)...........................5

Statutes

52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(8)(A)..................................................................................1

52 U.S.C. § 30110.............................................................................................. 10

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Rules

D.C. Cir. Rule 27(g)(1)...................................................................................... 13

Fed. R. App. P. 29(b)(2) .................................................................................... 14

Fed. R. App. P. 35(c) ......................................................................................... 13

Miscellaneous

D.C. Cir. Handbook of Practice and Internal Proc. ........................................... 13

Br. for FEC, Keating v. FEC, No. 09-5342, ECF No. 1220957

 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 15, 2009)..............................................................................9

Br. of Appellee FEC, SpeechNow.org v. FEC, No. 08-5223, 

 ECF No. 1207856 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 23, 2009)...............................................8

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ARGUMENT

This case centers on whether a federal agency’s administrative enforcement 

decision was permissible, not whether a 2010 decision of this Court was correct. 

Representative Ted Lieu and the other appellants (collectively, “Lieu”) brought 

this action under a provision of the Federal Election Campaign Act (“FECA”) to 

challenge the Federal Election Commission’s (“FEC” or “Commission”) decision 

not to pursue enforcement proceedings against ten political committees named in 

Lieu’s administrative complaint. The standard of review for such an action is 

whether the Commission acted contrary to law when it dismissed the 

administrative complaint. See 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(8)(A). Using this standard, 

the district court correctly held that the Commission had permissibly followed the 

D.C. Circuit’s decision in SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686, 695 (D.C. Cir. 

2010) (en banc), when it dismissed the administrative complaint. The sole 

question presented here is whether the Commission acted contrary to law in

declining to pursue enforcement of the matter. On this question, the merits are so 

clear that further briefing will provide no benefit and summary affirmance is 

plainly warranted. 

Rather than refuting the Commission’s arguments, Lieu instead contends 

that summary affirmance is not appropriate because Lieu wishes to engage in full

briefing on the correctness of the SpeechNow decision. To this end, Lieu also 

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requests that this Court hold the Commission’s summary affirmance motion in 

abeyance pending consideration of Lieu’s planned petition for initial hearing en 

banc, a judicial mechanism that is rarely permitted. But reevaluating the merits of 

the unanimous en banc SpeechNow opinion is not necessary to resolve the appeal 

in this Court, and Lieu’s petition does not warrant withholding summary 

disposition where the standard for that relief is so clearly met. Lieu claims that

judicial resources would be conserved by his proposed briefing structure, but to the 

contrary, there is no basis to burden all active judges of the court with a petition for 

initial en banc hearing of an appeal that so clearly lacks merit. 

Accordingly, this Court should grant summary affirmance to the 

Commission and deny Lieu’s affirmative request to hold the motion for summary 

affirmance in abeyance. 

I. THE DISTRICT COURT DECISION SHOULD BE SUMMARILY 

AFFIRMED BECAUSE THE COMMISSION DID NOT ACT 

CONTRARY TO LAW UNDER 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(8)

A. The Commission Meets the Standard for Summary Affirmance 

This Court should summarily affirm the district court’s decision because the 

merits are so clear that “no benefit will be gained from further briefing and 

argument of the issues presented.” Taxpayers Watchdog, Inc. v. Stanley, 819 F.2d 

294, 298 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (per curiam). The sole question presented in this 

challenge is whether it was contrary to law for the Commission to dismiss Lieu’s 

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administrative complaint in light of the D.C. Circuit’s decision in SpeechNow and 

similar decisions by six other circuit courts. (See FEC’s Mot. for Summary 

Affirmance (“FEC Mem.”) at 15-19 (Doc. #1787446).) With regard to this 

question, the law and the facts that warrant summary affirmance are not in dispute. 

Lieu concedes that the SpeechNow decision compelled the Commission to 

dismiss his administrative complaint, and that he did not “expect[] the FEC . . . to 

overrule [SpeechNow].” (Appellants’ Resp. in Opp’n to FEC’s Mot. for Summ. 

Affirmance and Affirmative Req. to Hold FEC’s Mot. in Abeyance (“Opp’n”) at 4 

(Doc. #1790270).) SpeechNow is a clear and binding judicial holding that directly 

applies to the conduct at issue in Lieu’s administrative complaint. In fact, Lieu 

states that he “acknowledged at every stage — before the [FEC] and again before 

the district court — that SpeechNow remains the law of this Circuit.” (Id. at 3.) 

Lieu also does not dispute that “obeying judicial decisions is usually what courts 

expect agencies to do.” Grant Med. Ctr. v. Hargan, 875 F.3d 701, 703 (D.C. Cir. 

2017). In light of Lieu’s failure to counter these critical elements of the 

Commission’s motion, this Court should summarily affirm the district court’s

decision. See Po Kee Wong v. U.S. Solicitor Gen., No. 12-5102, 2012 WL 

3791302, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 8, 2012) (finding waiver of arguments and 

concession of a motion for summary affirmance where a response did not “address 

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any of the arguments raised by appellee in its motion for summary affirmance or 

any argument pertaining to the district court’s dismissal of his complaint”).

In fact, the only ground on which Lieu opposes summary affirmance is that 

“plenary briefing would elucidate and preserve issues for further appeal.” (Opp’n 

at 25.) However, the briefing that Lieu requests relates to the admitted “goal of 

this litigation” — to convince the Court en banc to “modify or reverse” 

SpeechNow — not whether the FEC acted contrary to law under section 

30109(a)(8). (Opp’n at 1, 13.) The requested briefing thus does not concern the 

actual, central “issues presented [in this case],” Taxpayers Watchdog, Inc., 819 

F.2d at 298, and provides no basis to deny summary affirmance regarding the 

agency’s obviously correct enforcement determination. 

Lieu provides no other serious argument in opposition to summary 

affirmance. While Lieu contends that the issue of whether FECA forecloses a 

declaratory judgment against a Commission advisory opinion is an issue of first 

impression and therefore unsuitable for summary disposition (Opp’n at 22, 26), the 

district court did not address that argument below. The FEC included a description 

of the advisory opinion as background but did not present the issue in its motion 

for summary affirmance. Therefore, this Court also need not make any 

determination as to that issue in order to grant summary affirmance. 

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B. Whether the Commission Acted Contrary to Law Under FECA

Does Not Hinge on the Future Viability of SpeechNow, and Lieu’s 

Claims Are Unpersuasive in Any Event

The standard of review for the Commission action at issue here is wellsettled. Lieu brings this action under FECA’s judicial review provision at

52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(8) to challenge the Commission’s decision not to pursue 

enforcement proceedings against the respondents in the administrative complaint 

that he filed with the agency. In challenges to agency action under section 

30109(a)(8), a decision is “contrary to law” if “the FEC dismissed the complaint as 

a result of an impermissible interpretation of” FECA or “if the FEC’s dismissal of 

the complaint, under a permissible interpretation of the statute, was arbitrary or 

capricious, or an abuse of discretion.” Orloski v. FEC, 795 F.2d 156, 161 (D.C. 

Cir. 1986). The contrary-to-law standard “requires affirmance if a rational basis 

for the agency’s decision is shown.” Orloski, 795 F.2d at 167 (citation omitted). 

Of course, courts are not obligated to give binding deference to an administrative 

agency’s interpretation of judicial precedent or of the Constitution. See, e.g., Univ. 

of Great Falls v. NLRB, 278 F.3d 1335, 1341 (D.C. Cir. 2002).

Under this standard, the district court correctly found that the Commission 

permissibly applied binding circuit precedent in dismissing Lieu’s administrative 

complaint, and that ultimately “[i]t cannot be said that the FEC’s determination, 

which was based on SpeechNow, was contrary to law.” Lieu v. FEC, 370 F. Supp. 

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3d 175, 186 (D.D.C. 2019). Lieu agrees that the FEC appropriately considered 

SpeechNow in dismissing the administrative complaint, but then argues that this 

dismissal was contrary to law because, Lieu contends, “SpeechNow is contrary to 

law.” (Opp’n at 4.) Yet Lieu does not dispute the FEC’s contention that 

determinations under the section 30109(a)(8) contrary-to-law standard include 

taking into account binding judicial precedent, and therefore the FEC’s point is 

effectively conceded. See Buggs v. Powell, 293 F. Supp. 2d 135, 141 (D.D.C. 

2003) (“It is understood in this Circuit that when a plaintiff files an opposition to a 

dispositive motion and addresses only certain arguments raised by the defendant, a 

court may treat those arguments that the plaintiff failed to address as conceded.” 

(citing FDIC v. Bender, 127 F.3d 58, 67–68 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Stephenson v. 

Cox, 223 F. Supp. 2d 119, 121 (D.D.C. 2002))). 

Lieu also provides no authority to support his claim that the Commission’s

determinations could be “contrary to law” under section 30109(a)(8) when the 

agency simply decides to acquiesce to binding Circuit precedent or declines to

proceed with enforcement that would be based on speculation that the court of 

appeals might later reverse that precedent. Even if SpeechNow were to be 

modified in some future case by the Court en banc or by the Supreme Court, the 

FEC did not act contrary to law under section 30109(a)(8) when it relied on 

judicial precedent that was binding at the time.

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Lieu’s claims that SpeechNow has lost its binding force are unavailing. Lieu 

contends that the Supreme Court has not yet addressed SpeechNow. (Opp’n at 8.) 

However, though the Supreme Court has not directly considered the central issue 

in SpeechNow, the Court did acknowledge SpeechNow in its controlling opinion in 

McCutcheon v. FEC in a way that supports the case’s continuing validity, as 

explained in the Commission’s opening brief. See 572 U.S. 185, 193 n.2 (2014) 

(plurality op.); FEC Mem. at 7. Lieu also relies on several other cases (Opp’n at 

17-21), but they fail to support his arguments about the viability of SpeechNow. In 

Republican Party of La. v. FEC (Opp’n at 20-21), for instance, the Supreme Court 

affirmed the decision of a three-judge district court that had explicitly 

distinguished SpeechNow on the basis that the political parties in that litigation 

differed from the independent expenditure-only political committees involved in 

SpeechNow. 219 F. Supp. 3d 86, 98 (D.D.C. 2016) (“[E]ven if contributions to 

independent-expenditure organizations present no potential for quid pro quo

corruption, contributions to political parties, for the reasons described in 

McConnell, have that potential.”), aff’d, 137 S. Ct. 2178 (2017).

Further, many of the alleged flaws in SpeechNow that Lieu presents here 

(Opp’n at 16-18, 21-22), including potential later factual developments, were 

actually raised before the SpeechNow court, to no avail. In SpeechNow, the 

Commission argued that FECA’s restrictions on contributions to political 

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committees were constitutional as applied to groups that make only independent 

expenditures. See 599 F.3d at 686. Lieu now argues that SpeechNow’s holding 

wrongly conflates the corruptive potential of contributions and expenditures. 

(Opp’n at 16-18.) But the Commission had argued in SpeechNow that Supreme 

Court cases striking down limits on expenditures were distinguishable because a 

more permissive standard of review applies to limits on contributions. See FEC 

Br. at 19-23 (Docket #1207856), SpeechNow.org v. FEC, No. 08-5223 (D.C. Cir. 

Sept. 23, 2009), http://www.fec.gov/law/litigation/speechnow_fec_brief_

092309.pdf (“SpeechNow PI Brief”). The Court of Appeals expressly rejected that 

argument, writing that limits on contributions to super PACs were unconstitutional 

“[n]o matter which standard of review” applies. SpeechNow, 599 F.3d at 696. 

The Commission also presented to the SpeechNow court the argument, 

echoed by Lieu here (Opp’n at 21-22), that a ruling striking down contribution 

limits for independent expenditure groups might “lead to the proliferation of 

independent expenditure political committees devoted to supporting or opposing a 

single federal candidate or officeholder and funded entirely by very large 

contributions.” SpeechNow PI Brief at 45. And the Commission warned that such 

groups might then gain “undue influence over officeholders” even “without 

directly coordinating with them” on campaign-related spending. Id. at 36-38. The 

FEC further provided particular historical examples raising questions of quid pro 

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quo danger and polling regarding the appearance of corruption in the context of 

independent expenditures. FEC Br. at 21-25 (Docket #1220957), Keating v. FEC, 

No. 09-5342 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 15, 2009), https://transition.fec.gov/law/litigation/

keating_ac_fec_brief.pdf. Lieu relies on court opinions issued after 2010 and 

recent research (Opp’n at 17-18, 21), but the FEC presented evidence of the type 

Lieu claims to have located and predicted many basic developments he describes

in its arguments to the D.C. Circuit.1

 These arguments did not carry the day in 

SpeechNow. Lieu fails to establish any new factual evidence calling the decision 

into such question that the FEC was required to ignore it when making 

enforcement determinations.

II. SUMMARY AFFIRMANCE IS WARRANTED BECAUSE THIS 

ACTION IS NOT AN APPROPRIATE VEHICLE BY WHICH TO 

CHALLENGE THE VALIDITY OF SPEECHNOW

Rather than countering the Commission’s showing that it did not act 

contrary to law in applying binding circuit precedent to dismiss Lieu’s 

administrative complaint, Lieu’s opposition brief focuses mainly on the alleged 

invalidity of SpeechNow. (Opp’n at 16-22.) Although it is true that, when 

“someone challenges an appellate precedent, they must initiate the challenge in an 

agency or lower court” (Opp’n at 3), an action under FECA’s provision for judicial 

 1 As Lieu acknowledges, of the two examples of purportedly relevant quid pro 

quos that he presents, one did not involve campaign spending and one was 

dismissed after trial for “factual insufficiency.” (Opp’n at 17-18 & n.17.)

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review of FEC enforcement decisions is not the appropriate vehicle by which to 

challenge the SpeechNow decision (FEC Mem. at 18-19). Review of Commission 

enforcement decisions cannot turn on speculation about potential future 

modifications of judicial decisions that were binding at the time of the agency 

action, and Lieu provides no authority suggesting otherwise. See supra pp. 5-6.

Recognizing that the Commission is not mandated to revisit court rulings 

through enforcement actions would not insulate the legal issues in SpeechNow 

from reexamination because there are other types of actions more appropriate for

the challenge that Lieu seeks to make here. For example, assuming standing at the 

time a complaint would be filed, Lieu could have brought a declaratory judgment 

suit to construe the constitutionality of FECA, either in an ordinary district court 

lawsuit or under FECA’s special review provision, 52 U.S.C. § 30110. In arguing 

that the continuing correctness of SpeechNow is an issue for the Court en banc

(Opp’n at 23-24), Lieu recognizes that the en banc Court rules on challenges to the 

constitutionality of FECA provisions in the 52 U.S.C. § 30110 context, a key 

mechanism Congress created for such review. But Lieu did not elect that 

procedure, instead choosing to bring an action for judicial review of a Commission 

enforcement decision under section 30109(a)(8). Additionally, he could have 

brought a direct challenge to the Commonsense Ten advisory opinion, which 

announced the Commission’s decision to acquiesce in SpeechNow. See, e.g., 

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Unity08 v. FEC, 596 F.3d 861, 864-65 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (holding that Commission 

advisory opinions are final agency actions subject to judicial review). Options like 

these would have presented the constitutional issue Lieu seeks without involving 

the FEC’s enforcement authority. 

In making these allegations in an administrative complaint, on the other 

hand, Lieu asked the Commission to bring an enforcement action against a large 

number of political committees and contributors that relied on SpeechNow. Yet 

Lieu does not dispute that, if the Commission had pursued enforcement action 

against the numerous respondents named in his administrative complaint, those 

respondents would have had to defend their conduct in further administrative 

proceedings and potential enforcement litigation, despite the authority in the D.C. 

Circuit and other jurisdictions holding that such conduct cannot be limited 

consistent with the First Amendment. This, of course, would also put the 

Commission into an untenable position: Contrary-to-law determinations could

result from the agency following binding judicial precedent, but declining to follow 

such precedent would also subject the agency to potential adverse legal rulings. 

Indeed, one court in this circuit ordered the Commission to pay legal fees after

concluding that the agency had “fail[ed] to appreciate binding precedent,” 

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including SpeechNow. (FEC Mem. at 18 & n.5 (quoting Carey v. FEC, 864 F. 

Supp. 2d 61 (D.D.C. 2012)).)

The FECA violations alleged in Lieu’s administrative complaint have

already been declared beyond the Commission’s constitutional enforcement 

authority by this Court en banc, a view unanimously adopted by many other 

circuits. (FEC Mem. at 16-18.) SpeechNow could be reconsidered in a different 

case, but the agency enforcement decision in this case was clearly not contrary to 

law, and the plenary briefing that Lieu requests would add nothing to the inquiry 

that is appropriate here.

III. THIS COURT SHOULD NOT HOLD THE FEC’S MOTION FOR 

SUMMARY AFFIRMANCE IN ABEYANCE 

Lieu provides no basis to delay the summary disposition of this appeal. 

First, there has been no “effort to preempt en banc consideration of the merits” 

(Opp’n at 3) here. To begin with, as Lieu admits, summary affirmance is a 

decision on the merits. (Id. at 14.) The FEC’s motion for summary affirmance 

only asks this Court to affirm the district court’s decision that the FEC did not act 

contrary to law because SpeechNow is binding precedent in this circuit, and the 

Commission’s dismissal was consistent with that precedent. Furthermore, this 

Court’s Order, the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, and the D.C. Circuit 

Rules anticipate that motions for summary disposition will often be considered 

prior to a petition for initial hearing en banc, so that appeals can be dispensed with 

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summarily — and without unnecessary briefing and argument — when that is 

warranted. Order (Docket #1779390) (setting deadline for dispositive motions); 

Fed. R. App. P. 35(c) (establishing filing deadlines for petitions for hearing and

rehearing en banc); D.C. Cir. Rule 27(g)(1) (“Any motion which, if granted, would 

dispose of the appeal or petition for review in its entirety . . . must be filed within 

45 days of the docketing of the case in this court.”). If a motions panel summarily 

disposes of this matter, the Court would likely conserve its resources. That is

because rather than facing a petition for initial hearing en banc that would require 

all active judges to consider the entire matter in the first instance — an 

extraordinary procedure that is rarely permitted — the en banc Court would at 

most face a later petition for rehearing en banc, which could be considered in due

course with the benefit of the panel’s views, a benefit that an initial hearing en 

banc would fail to provide.

Lieu is wrong to argue that this action is “well suited” for review en banc, 

but even if that were debatable, it would not mean that summary affirmance is 

unwarranted here. (See Opp’n at 16.) The Commission’s summary affirmance 

motion does not foreclose further review en banc or in the Supreme Court, though 

it is the “rare[]” case that is heard en banc. (D.C. Cir. Handbook of Practice and 

Internal Proc. at 58.) And summary affirmance does not limit the participation of 

amici, as Lieu suggests. (See Opp’n 15-16.) The Rules provide that amicus curiae 

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may file briefs with leave of the Court during the Court’s consideration of whether 

to grant rehearing en banc. Fed. R. App. P. 29(b)(2). Lieu also claims that the 

FEC seeks “a provisional decision on the merits” (Opp’n at 16), but to the 

contrary, the summary affirmance the FEC requests would dispose of this appeal, a 

result that is clearly warranted and that would promote judicial efficiency.

Lieu’s frequent contentions that SpeechNow was wrongly decided or at odds 

with Supreme Court precedent (Opp’n at 19-21) simply do not support a finding 

that the FEC acted contrary to law in dismissing Lieu’s administrative complaint, 

which is the actual question on which this appeal turns. SpeechNow was binding at 

the time of that dismissal, and it remains binding. The FEC’s choice not to initiate 

enforcement proceedings against the private parties identified in Lieu’s 

administrative complaint in order to overturn that unanimous decision was so 

clearly permissible that summary affirmance is warranted. 

CONCLUSION

This Court should summarily affirm the district court’s decision in favor of 

the Commission and deny appellants’ request to hold the motion in abeyance.

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Respectfully submitted,

Lisa J. Stevenson 

Acting General Counsel

lstevenson@fec.gov

Kevin Deeley 

Associate General Counsel

kdeeley@fec.gov

Harry J. Summers

Assistant General Counsel

hsummers@fec.gov

June 17, 2019

Jacob S. Siler

Attorney

jsiler@fec.gov

/s/ Tanya Senanayake

Tanya Senanayake

Attorney

tsenanayake@fec.gov

FEDERAL ELECTION 

COMMISSION

1050 First Street NE

Washington, DC 20463 

(202) 694-1650

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CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

This brief complies with the word limit of Fed. R. App. R. 27(d)(1)(E)(2) 

because the brief contains 3,208 words, excluding the parts of the brief exempted 

by Fed. R. App. P. 32(f).

The brief also complies with the typeface requirements of Fed. R. App. P. 

32(a)(5) and the type-style requirements of Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(6) because the 

brief uses the proportionally spaced typeface Microsoft Word 14-point Times New 

Roman.

/s/ Tanya Senanayake 

Tanya Senanayake

Attorney

Federal Election Commission

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this 17th day of June, 2019, I electronically filed the 

Federal Election Commission’s Reply in Support of Its Motion for Summary 

Affirmance and Opposition to Appellants’ Affirmative Request to Hold the FEC’s 

Motion in Abeyance with the Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals for the 

D.C. Circuit by using the Court’s CM/ECF system, which will serve all counsel of 

record. 

I further certify that I also will cause the requisite number of paper copies of 

the brief to be filed with the Clerk.

/s/ Tanya Senanayake 

Tanya Senanayake

Attorney

Federal Election Commission

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