BACKGROUND PAPER

Force Planning and

Budgetary Implications of

U.S. Withdrawal from Korea

May 1978

Congress of the United States

Congressional Budget Office

FORCE PLANNING AND BUDGETARY IMPLICATIONS

OF U.S. WITHDRAWAL FROM KOREA

The Congress of the United States

Congressional Budget Office

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Washington, D.C. 20402

Stock No. 052-070-04527-2

PREFACE

The withdrawal of U.S. ground combat troops from South Korea

(principally the 2nd Division), scheduled to begin later this

year, provides the Congress with an opportunity to re-examine

planning priorities for U.S. conventional forces. Decisions

concerning the disposition of the returning troops are likely to

affect the U.S. defense posture and defense spending in the

next few years. This study, prepared at the request of the House

Budget Committee, addresses the implications of the Korea withdrawal for U.S. force planning. It proceeds from the assumption

that the troops will be withdrawn in accordance with President

Carter's announced policy decision. The paper discusses the

relationship between broad defense policy approaches and the

disposition of the 2nd Division, and provides estimates of the

costs or savings of alternative policy options. In accordance

with CBO's mandate to provide objective analysis, the study offers

no recommendations.

This paper was prepared by Beth Bloomfield of the National

Security and International Affairs Division of the Congressional

Budget Office, under the supervision of David S.C. Chu and James

R. Blaker. The author gratefully acknowledges the contributions

of Martin D. Levine, Nancy J. Swope, Mary R. Tietz, and Marion

F. Houstoun, who edited the manuscript. Cost estimates were

provided by Edward A. Swoboda. Connie S. Leonard prepared the

paper for publication. The author is particularly indebted to

Edwin A. Deagle, Jr. and Charles A. Sorrels, whose earlier work at

CBO on U.S. forces in Korea provided a foundation for this study.

Alice M. Rivlin

Director

May 1978

111

CONTENTS

Page

PREFACE iii

SUMMARY ix

CHAPTER i. INTRODUCTION i

CHAPTER II. IMPLICATIONS OF THE KOREA WITHDRAWAL

FOR U.S. GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES PLANNING ... 7

U.S. Defense Posture and Ground Forces ... . 7

U.S. Force Planning for NATO 8

The Future Role of U.S. Forces in Korea ... . 10

U.S. Military Aid for South Korea 13

Defense Department Plans for the

2nd Division 16

CHAPTER III. POLICY OPTIONS AND COST IMPACTS ....... . 19

Option I: Delete the 2nd Division

from the Force Structure 21

Option II: Reconfigure the 2nd Division

and Designate It for NATO Warfare 23

Option III: Designate the 2nd Division

for Deployment in a "Half-War"

Contingency 27

APPENDIX. THE MILITARY BALANCE BETWEEN NORTH AND

SOUTH KOREA 33

TABLES

Page

TABLE 1.

TABLE 2.

TABLE 3.

POLICY OPTIONS, BY KEY VARIABLES 20

EFFECT OF POLICY OPTIONS ON ARMY

FORCE STRUCTURE

COST EFFECTS OF POLICY OPTIONS

21

29

APPENDIX TABLE

TABLE A-l. KEY MILITARY INDICATORS, NORTH AND SOUTH

KOREAN ARMED FORCES, CALENDAR YEAR 1977 . 35

VII

SUMMARY

Since 1950, the United States has maintained a major military

presence in South Korea as part of its larger force structure in

the Western Pacific. Early in 1977, President Carter announced

his decision to withdraw U.S. combat forces (primarily the 2nd

Infantry Division and support units) from South Korea by 1982.

The President's plan calls for a phased withdrawal of all U.S.

ground forces from Korea over a five-year period, with the first

group returning to the United States by the end of 1978. U.S. air

and naval units will remain in South Korea, as will some intelligence and logistics support elements.

Although the initial phases of the withdrawal from Korea may

only minimally affect the current defense budget, several unresolved but related issues are likely to affect future budgets and

to require Congressional review:

o Should the 2nd Division be retained in the force structure?

o Should the division be mechanized, either in place of or in

addition to other divisions slated for conversion?

o Should new base facilities be built to accommodate all or

part of the division? If so, where should they be built?

o Would retention of these forces require procurement of

additional strategic mobility and logistics assets?

o Should the level of compensatory military aid to South

Korea be the same as that recommended by the President or

should it be more or less?

The answers to these questions involve decisions that will

shape the defense posture and defense spending priorities of the

United States. The departure of U.S. ground forces from Korea

affords the Congress, therefore, an important opportunity to

re-examine priorities for U.S. conventional forces. The question

of the disposition of these forces after their withdrawal is one

of how best to allocate defense resources to meet changing U.S.

security needs. This study examines the implications of different defense policy approaches for the future role of the

IX

27-537 O - 78 - 2
2nd Division in the overall force structure. Several options for

its disposition are presented, along with estimates of the costs

or savings that might accrue from each.

The United States plans its general purpose forces to fight

one-and-one-half wars simultaneously, and it can deploy 19 active

ground combat divisions in support of that objective. For force

planning purposes, a war between NATO and the Warsaw Pact is

considered the major contingency. The Middle East, the Persian

Gulf, and Korea are seen as likely spots for a "half war" to

develop. The fiscal year 1979 defense budget submitted to the

Congress indicates growing concern over the military balance in

Central Europe and provides for certain U.S. initiatives to

upgrade its NATO-committed forces. But there is no clear consensus among defense analysts or in the Congress either about the

military balance or about which aspects of U.S. NATO forces should

be improved. Recent planning scenarios stress the importance of

rapid reinforcement for NATO and suggest that buying larger and

more heavily armored forces may prove futile if they cannot be

deployed in time to affect the outcome of a war in Europe.

The Defense Department (DoD) has announced its intention to

convert the 2nd Division from an infantry to a mechanized division

as it returns from Korea. Although a basing decision is not

expected until mid-summer 1978, DoD is reportedly considering

distributing the returning forces among three bases in the northeastern United States. A reduction in the active strength of the

division, relying instead on a reserve component, is also under

consideration. But conflicting statements about the future

mission of the 2nd Division have been made, and a number of

issues with potential budgetary impact await action by both

the Executive Branch and the Congress.

A decision on the level of compensatory aid to South Korea is

associated with the withdrawal of the 2nd Division. Although U.S.

withdrawal plans reflect a judgment that South Korea will soon be

able to defend itself on the ground, U.S. forces could be called

upon to intervene in case of renewed conflict in Korea. The

United States possesses enough forces—without the 2nd Division—

to handle a range of possible contingencies in Korea. In more

demanding cases, however,, a simultaneous crisis in Central Europe

could present difficulties for U.S. military planners. Thus,

continued military assistance in order to help ensure that South

Korea is able to maintain its side of a stable military balance

may be desirable. The Administration has proposed a five-year

program of foreign military sales (FMS) totaling $1.4 billion,
supplemented by a grant of approximately $800 million worth of

equipment left behind by departing U.S. troops.

The options presented in this paper are categorized according

to three policy orientations. The choice of one of those approaches tends to imply the outcome of a number of separate but

associated decisions regarding the disposition of the 2nd Division: in particular, its configuration (infantry or mechanized,

full strength or reserve components, split up or stationed

together), where and how it is based, mobility and logistics

support available to it, and the level of compensatory aid to

South Korea.

Option I would delete the 2nd Division from the force structure. Proponents of deactivating the division judge that the

United States currently possesses adequate forces to meet likely

contingencies both in NATO and elsewhere. Despite some initial

costs to implement the plan, this option would generate savings of

approximately $1.28 billion from fiscal year 1979 through fiscal

year 1983. Nevertheless, deleting a division from the force

structure might imply a higher level of military assistance for

South Korea, largely to counter perceptions of waning American

interest in Asia. ,

Another policy approach to this issue would be to reconfigure

the 2nd Division and designate it for NATO warfare in Central

Europe. The options discussed in this second category embody

three different strategies. All three would, however, entail

mechanizing the 2nd Division to meet the demand for more heavily

armored forces for NATO. All three options would also require

that the division be stationed where it could easily and quickly

be transported to the European battlefield. In some cases,

additional strategic mobility forces—principally airlift—might

be necessary. The emphasis on Europe implied by this approach

argues for a moderate to high level of compensatory military aid

for Korea.

Option II-A would split up the 2nd Division and substitute

the troops for reserve units now used to "round out" other active

divisions. A principal advantage of this option would be the

increased readiness' of the overall ground forces and relatively

low additional military construction costs. It would, however,

mean the loss of one Army divisional command structure. Total

costs of Option II-A could approach $1.48 billion. Option II-B

calls for the reduction of the 2nd Division to two active brigades, rounding it out with reserves. This would yield some

XI
savings in manpower costs, but base construction and support

costs for a NATO mission might be substantial. Option II-B

could cost $790 million cumulatively. Option II-C would keep the

division together as a full-strength division. This option would

enhance U.S. NATO capabilities because the force could be trained

and deployed rapidly as a single unit. Nevertheless, it could be

a very expensive option, costing as much as $1.79 billion.

Option III would designate the 2nd Division for deployment in

a half-war contingency in Asia or elsewhere. The division would

be re-equipped as a light infantry division capable of rapid

response in a crisis. Proponents of this option argue that it

would have a high political value and would provide a hedge

against "half-war" scenarios calling for relatively high force

levels. Despite that advantage, this option would tend to duplicate already existing forces; thus, it might contribute only

marginally to overall U.S. capabilities. Option III would entail

relatively low costs, including a lower level of military aid for

South Korea, and could be expected to cost about $1.32 billion

from fiscal year 1979 through fiscal year 1983.

The budgetary impact of these options is summarized in the

following table.

xn
COST EFFECTS OF POLICY OPTIONS: CHANGES TO FISCAL YEAR 1979-1983 FIVEYEAR DEFENSE PROGRAM: BY FISCAL YEAR, IN MILLIONS OF FISCAL YEAR 1979

DOLLARS a/

Policy Options 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 Total

New Base

Cost

Add-On b/

Option I:

Delete from

Forces cj

Option II-A:

Split Up and

Substitute

for Reserves

Option II-B:

Reduce Size

and Round Out

with Reserves

Option II-C:

Keep Together

at Full

Strength

Option III:

Designate as

Contingency

Force

-60 -110 -240 -370 -500 -1,280

290 500 440 150 100 1,480

260 500 320 -120 -170 790 350

290 730 580 130 60 1,790 550

270 540 480 40 -10 1,320 450

a/ Estimates of the costs of each option assume that the 9th Division

~~ will be mechanized (see "U.S. Shapes Goals for NATO Summit," Aviation

Week and Space Technology (May 8, 1978), p. 18). The costs of strategic mobility programs and military assistance to South Korea are

excluded.

b/ Estimates of the costs of each option assume that basing for the

~ 2nd Division will not require construction of extensive military

facilities. If, however, the division were based at a site with only

limited facilities, additional construction costs would be incurred.

The total new base cost add-on would vary according to option.

c/ Option I assumes that the division being deleted is an infantry

division.

Xlll

CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION

U.S. interests in the Korean peninsula—where American combat

troops have been stationed since 1950—reflect both its strategic

significance and its historic role in Asian great-power politics.

American involvement in the Korean War served to cement an enduring U.S. commitment to the security of the Republic of Korea

(ROK). Recent developments in Asia, principally the end of the

Vietnam War and the opening of relations with the People's

Republic of China, have led to a re-examination of the U.S.

military presence in Asia and the Western Pacific.

Early in 1977, President Carter announced plans to withdraw

the remaining U.S. ground forces from South Korea. Discussing his

decision, the President stated:

I think it is accurate to say that the time has come

for a very careful, very orderly withdrawal over

a period of four or five years of ground troops,

leaving intact an adequate degree of strength in

the Republic of Korea to withstand any foreseeable

attack and making it clear to the North Koreans, the

Chinese, the Soviets, that our commitment to South

Korea is undeviating and is staunch.

We will leave there adequate intelligence forces,

observation forces, air forces, naval forces, and a

firm, open commitment to our defense treaty, so there

need not be any doubt about potential adversaries

concerning our support of South Korea. I/

The withdrawal of U.S. ground forces from South Korea

affords the Congress an opportunity to reassess certain aspects of

the conventional force posture of the United States in Asia and

elsewhere. Although our ground forces in Korea represent only a

small fraction of U.S. military might, this study focuses on their

I/ Press conference of President Carter, May 26, 1977.
place in the overall force structure. The question of what to do

with the departing troops can be settled in a variety of ways,

depending upon differing policy orientations. This study seeks to

illuminate the relationship between broad defense policy choices

and the eventual disposition of the U.S. troops in Korea and

to provide some estimates of the costs of alternative policies.

This study does not discuss the advantages and disadvantages

of the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Korea. Rather, it begins

with the assumption that they will be withdrawn in accordance

with President Carter's announced decision. Similarly, related

but essentially political issues—for example, such questions as

a specific U.S. location for these troops and South Korean

cooperation with U.S. government investigations—are not addressed

here because they do not bear directly on the national security

policy questions under consideration.

When the Vietnam war ended in the early 1970s, many Americans

expected a "peace dividend" in the form of lower defense budgets.

Similarly, there are those who anticipate that the withdrawal

of U.S. ground forces from Korea will mean a savings for U.S.

taxpayers. Whether or not such savings materialize depends, of

course, upon what is done with the troops once they return home.

If they were disbanded, savings could prove substantial. If they

remained in active status, real savings would be unlikely. If

they were committed to more demanding missions than Korea,

Department of Defense (DoD) costs could rise. On the other hand,

however, the forces withdrawn from Korea could indeed represent a

dividend, in the sense that they could provide DoD with additional resources to meet challenges that might otherwise generate

even higher defense budgets.

Plans for the initial phases of the troop withdrawal from

Korea may only minimally affect the fiscal year 1979 defense

budget now before the Congress, but alternative options for

the future of these troops could have widely varying budgetary

implications over the next five years. Several key issues associated with the withdrawal plans remain undecided, though they are

certain to require Congressional review. Taken as a whole, those

decisions enable the Congress to play a significant role in

shaping both U.S. force posture and future defense budgets.

It is unlikely, however, that the key spending decisions

identified here will be pending in the Congress simultaneously.

Because of the phased nature of the withdrawal, the Defense

Department may be able to postpone final decisions in some
areas without seriously disrupting withdrawal plans. Other

decisions may require prompt attention. And some may depend on

prior actions. Indeed, the Defense Department and the Congress

may wish to preserve the maximum degree of flexibility during the

withdrawal in order to monitor and assess its military and political consequences.

Approximately 40,000 U.S. military personnel are currently

stationed in Korea. 2/ Of these, about 7,000 are Air Force

personnel, and there is a small complement of Navy and Marine

Corps personnel as well. Only about half of the 32,000 Army

personnel are ground combat troops; the rest perform various

support functions.

The bulk of the American forces leaving Korea will be the

14,000-man 2nd Division and associated support units. The President has announced that the first group of troops (800 combat and

2,600 support troops) will leave Korea by the end of calendar year

1978. 3_/ Much of the weaponry belonging to the division will be

turned over to the Koreans. The equipment slated for transfer has

been valued at approximately $800 million by the Administration.

Selected air defense and long-range artillery will also be transferred to South Korea, and some U.S. units will be disbanded. As

2/ Major components of the U.S. military presence in South Korea

are: the 2nd Infantry Division; a major logistics support

element (19th Support Brigade); the 38th Air Defense Artillery

Brigade (Improved Hawk surface-to-air missile units); the

Fourth Missile Command (long-range artillery support to the

South Korean army); command, control, and communications

units; tactical intelligence units; one U.S. Air Force wing,

including three squadrons of F-4 tactical fighters; and

Air Force support elements for maintenance of two air bases in

"caretaker" status for potential deployment of additional U.S.

tactical aircraft.

3/ "President Slows U.S. Pullout from Korea," The Washington

Post (April 22, 1978). The manpower reduction will actually

be managed by an advance cutoff of replacements. Thus, in

order to meet the timetable established for the first phase of

the withdrawal, personnel replacement cutoffs would begin by

mid-summer 1978. The U.S. withdrawal from South Vietnam was

handled in a similar manner. See "Army to Feel Pullout Effect

by Summer," Army Times (March 27, 1978).

27-537 O - 78- 3
the President indicated, U.S. tactical air and naval forces

will remain in place, as will intelligence units. Secretary of

Defense Brown has further stated that the United States will

maintain some logistics support forces in South Korea as part of

the compensatory package. 4/

Since the American troops will leave behind much of their

weaponry, they will have to be re-equipped if they are retained as

part of the active Army. The current active Army force structure

includes seven "light" and nine "heavy" divisions. The Army plans

to convert two of its light (infantry) divisions to heavier

mechanized divisions. At issue is whether to mechanize the 2nd

Division, either in place of one or in addition to both of

them. Because of the long lead time involved in the production of

tanks, armored fighting vehicles, and other heavy equipment

required to outfit an entire division, the Army has requested $99

million in procurement funds in the fiscal year 1979 budget to

begin conversion of the 2nd Division and its support units.

Recent base closures and the addition of three active divisions to the force structure have left the Army without a domestic

U.S. base capable of accommodating an additional full-strength

division. No existing base installation has the requisite combination of adequate housing, training grounds, and support facilities for the entire 2nd Division. Maintaining the division as a

single entity would require building extensive new facilities,

perhaps by expanding an existing installation. Splitting the

division into brigade-sized units and stationing them separately

would probably also require some base construction. Substituting

some reserve units for active units could ease the demand for

permanent base facilities (and save manpower costs), but this

alternative would be feasible only if the division's home base

were accessible to reservists.

An additional consideration in selecting a U.S. base for the

2nd Division is the suitability of its geographical location.

Proximity to the 2nd Division's most likely theater of action and,

in particular, to available strategic mobility assets will be

important planning factors. Mechanization could also affect both

4/ Statement of Secretary of Defense Harold Brown before the

House International Relations Committee concerning the withdrawal of U.S. ground forces from Korea (February 22, 1978;

processed).
the selection of a base and the level of military construction,

because of additional demands for space in training and equipment

storage.

The fiscal year 1979 budget contains no funds to support

restationing of the 2nd Division. A decision on final stationing

is not expected until mid-summer 1978. A supplemental request

or some reprogramming of military construction authority will

probably be required to accommodate the first returning troops.

Depending upon the post-Korea mission of the 2nd Division,

changes in the level of U.S. mobility forces and logistics support

may also be implied. If these troops were no longer deployed as

part of U.S. forward-based forces, airlift or sealift assets would

be needed to transport them to overseas battlefields. In certain

more demanding scenarios, additional strategic—that is, transoceanic—mobility forces might be needed to deploy an extra

division in a timely fashion. Alternatively, airlift requirements

for rapid deployment could be reduced by pre-positioning equipment

for the division in or near the theater. Although the fiscal year

1979 budget submission makes no explicit connection between

withdrawal from Korea and the level of U.S. strategic mobility and

logistics procurement programs, the Congress may wish to examine

that question closely in its review of this and subsequent defense

budgets.

The issue of military aid for Korea will be considered

by the Congress independently of the issue of the future role

of the 2nd Division. Nevertheless, different options for the

troops may imply different levels of military aid, primarily

because of political perceptions, both here and abroad. The

special military assistance package negotiated with the South

Koreans and now pending approval in the Congress is intended to

compensate for the withdrawal of U.S. ground forces in two ways.

First, an aid program might compensate for any loss in military

ground capabilities resulting from the U.S. withdrawal and

thereby stabilize the military balance between North and South

Korea. Secondly, an aid program might serve as a political signal

that the United States remains firmly committed to the defense of

South Korea.

Chapter II of this study examines the implications of the

withdrawal from Korea for U.S. general purpose force posture

and planning. More specifically, it addresses critical issues in

U.S. ground force planning for two contingencies. The first

contingency is a war in Europe between NATO and the Warsaw Pact.
NATO has a high priority in the fiscal year 1979 defense budget,

and this study presents some of the advantages and disadvantages

of assigning the 2nd Division a NATO mission. The second contingency is a smaller conflict, involving U.S. forces elsewhere in

the world. Korea could exemplify such a contingency, and this

study discusses the contributions the United States might need to

make in the event of future hostilities there. The Administration's proposed military aid package for South Korea is discussed

within that framework. (An Appendix briefly examines the military

balance between North and South Korea as background for this

discussion.) The section closes with a discussion of DoD plans

for the 2nd -Division and raises a number of issues for Congressional consideration.

Chapter III presents the Congress with a range of policy

options for the future of the 2nd Division and their estimated

cost impact. Four key variables, each one of which may have

significant budgetary impact, are identified and discussed within

the framework of each option: configuration, basing, mobility and

logistics, and compensatory aid. The options described here

conform to three distinct policy approaches. One would disband

the 2nd Division. A second set of options would designate

the division for NATO reinforcement. A third would earmark it as

a contingency force oriented primarily toward Asia.
CHAPTER II. IMPLICATIONS OF THE KOREA WITHDRAWAL FOR U.S.

GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES PLANNING

U.S. DEFENSE POSTURE AND GROUND FORCES

In considering what to do with the 2nd Division once it has

been withdrawn from Korea, the Congress confronts choices that may

affect the defense posture and the overall force structure of the

United States. The withdrawal from Korea thus provides the

Congress with an opportunity for reexamining priorities for U.S.

conventional forces. What U.S. forces are needed to meet our NATO

obligations? What kinds of forces would be required in a NATO

war? Does the United States have enough—or too many—light

divisions in its force structure for Asian—or other—contingencies? Do combined force requirements justify present force

levels?

As Secretary of Defense Brown has detailed in his annual

report to the Congress, the United States plans its general

purpose forces in terms of their ability to fight one-and-one-half

wars simultaneously. A war between the Warsaw Pact and NATO is

defined as the major contingency; hence it receives primary

emphasis in military planning. For force planning purposes, the

Middle East, the Persian Gulf, and Korea are viewed as the most

likely alternatives for a "half war." _!_/ Other specialized forces

are also maintained as hedges against unforeseen minor contingencies elsewhere in the world.

The United States can field 19 active ground combat divisions, 16 Army and 3 Marine. Of those, 10 are so-called "light"

divisions, including 7 Army infantry, airborne, and airmobile

divisions, and all the Marine divisions. Light infantry divisions

are characterized by a relatively low ratio of firepower to

manpower and by a traditional reliance on the individual foot

soldier for mobility on the battlefield. Because its heavy

airlift requirements are comparatively small, a light division can

be deployed overseas with relative ease and speed. The light

I/ Department of Defense, Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1979,

~ pp. 80-81.
-Jlllllll

buying expensive new strategic assets, there are numerous practical and political difficulties associated with it. 8J

The nature of a NATO war—particularly its timing—also bears

on the question of the right mix of active and reserve units for

NATO reinforcement. When the Army added three divisions, it did

not increase the number of its troops, in part because it is

relying more heavily on the reserves. The Army's affiliation

program, in which some reserve units are associated with active

units, is indicative of current defense planning, designed

to deploy at least some of the reserves at an early stage of a

European war. At the same time, however, the reserves have

encountered difficulties in maintaining their readiness. 9/

THE FUTURE ROLE OF U.S. FORCES IN KOREA

A new outbreak of hostilities in Korea is regarded by the

Defense Department as one of the most plausible and demanding

scenarios for the "half war." Despite important asymmetries, the

military balance between North and South Korea now seems even

enough to present substantial risk to North Korea that an attack

could fail. 10/ In recent years, the disparity between North and

South Korea has diminished, as the forces on both sides have grown

and been modernized. In 1971, after the withdrawal of one of the

two U.S. infantry divisions then deployed in Korea, South Korea

8/ For a discussion of strategic mobility force options, see

Congressional Budget Office, U.S. Air and Ground Conventional

Forces for NATO; Mobility and Logistics Issues, Background

Paper (March 1978). An alternative to deploying heavy armored

forces against Warsaw Pact tank divisions might be to equip

some U.S. light divisions with less expensive but highly

effective and more easily transportable antitank weapons,

such as precision-guided munitions.

9J For discussion of reserve issues, see Congressional Budget

Office, Improving the Readiness of the Army Reserve and

National Guard: A Framework for Debate, Budget Issue Paper

(February 1978).

10 See the Appendix for a more detailed discussion of the

military balance between North and South Korea.

10
embarked upon a major effort to improve its armed forces. In

1976, South Korea began a second five-year Force Improvement Plan

(FIP). The United States now plans to withdraw the remaining

infantry division and its combat support units during the next

several years. That decision reflects an estimate that South

Korea will be able to defend itself against North Korea without

U.S. ground forces.

The U.S. 2nd Infantry Division and its support units—which

account for less than 5 percent of all U.S. and South Korean

troops—do not appear to materially affect the balance, given the

level of forces maintained by North and South Korea. Although

they possess useful capabilities, U.S. ground forces are stationed

in Korea primarily for political and deterrence purposes, not as

critical resources in defending South Korea against North Korean

attack. Thus, the problem of offsetting the withdrawal of U.S.

ground forces is primarily a political one whose solution necessarily implies judgments as to what constitutes an effective

deterrent.

U.S. officials have been careful to emphasize that, despite

the planned withdrawal of ground troops, the American commitment

to South Korea remains firm, ll/ Such statements of intent have

been supplemented by actions designed to demonstrate their seriousness. The United States plans to augment its tactical air

forces in Korea, adding 12 F-4s to the 60 already there. 12/ And

in March 1978, U.S. and South Korean armed forces participated in

a well-publicized joint exercise, reported to be the largest

peacetime exercise ever staged by American forces overseas. 13/ A

continued pattern of such activity can. be expected to have an

impact throughout Northeast Asia.

ll/ See, for example, Secretary of Defense Brown's statement to

the National Press Club, May 25, 1977; President Carter's

remarks to newspaper editors as reported in the Washington

Post (January 15, 1978).

12/ U.S. Department of State, Report on Korea: 1977, p. 10;

"President Slows U.S. Pullout from Korea," The Washington

Post (April 22, 1978).

13/ "U.S. Moves to Show Ability to Rush to Seoul's Aid," Washington Post (March 16, 1978).

11

27-537 O - 78 - 4
Nevertheless, should deterrence fail in Korea, U.S. forces

would probably be called upon to intervene. Their role would vary

across a range of possible scenarios. Given a continued fairly

stable military balance between North and South Korea, the escalation of a low-level incident into a full-scale war through a

series of miscalculations could be as likely to occur as a premeditated attack. To bolster deterrence and preserve the balance,

a rapid response by U.S. forces in the Pacific might be necessary.

The Secretary of Defense has identified the forces immediately

available to respond to a Korean crisis: nine squadrons of

land-based fighter/attack aircraft (three squadrons in Korea),

the two brigades of the Third Marine Amphibious Force (including

its tactical air wing) in Japan (Okinawa), and the 20 to 25

combat ships of the Seventh Fleet, including two aircraft carriers. 14/

In the case of an unaided North Korean attack across the

Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), South Korean ground forces appear

capable of maintaining their own defenses. That assessment

underlies the decision to withdraw the 2nd Infantry Division.

The reintroduction of the 2nd Division—or a similar unit—appears

to be redundant of South Korean capabilities, and it would

probably add only marginally to the military effort against the

attackers. In those circumstances, the most valuable U.S. contribution would be additional tactical air power, brought in as

necessary from elsewhere in the Pacific or from the continental

United States (CONUS). U.S. logistics support might also be

14/ Department of Defense, Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1979,

p. 91. To illustrate, the United States responded swiftly to

the August 1976 tree-cutting incident near Panmunjom, in

which two American officers were killed. A squadron of F-4s

from Okinawa was deployed to Korea the day after the incident occurred. Within 15 hours of a decision, a squadron of

F-llls arrived in Korea from Mountain Home AFB, Idaho.

Within three days, the aircraft carrier MIDWAY and its Task

Group arrived on station in the Korea Strait. See statement

of Gen. George S. Brown, in Military Posture and H.R. 5068:

Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for

Fiscal Year 1978, Hearings before the House Committee on

Armed Services, 95:1 (February, March, and April 1977),

Part 1, p. 164.

12
required. Nevertheless, the Department of Defense plans to

maintain the capability to reintroduce the 2nd Division "should

conditions so dictate." 15/

In the event of a major war in Korea in which Chinese or

Soviet troops participated, South Korean forces would require

major ground reinforcements from the United States. The reintroduction of a single infantry division would in itself make

little difference. At the height of the Korean War, for example,

the United States deployed eight divisions in Korea. Although

there are adequate forces in the U.S. force structure, without the

2nd Division, to meet a North Korean attack aided by Soviet or

Chinese forces, a simultaneous crisis in Europe—or the threat of

one—could force a difficult choice.

The character and level of U.S. force requirements needed to

meet a conflict in Korea would depend in part on South Korean

defense capabilities. The United States has an interest in

ensuring that South Korea can maintain its side of a stable

military balance. To the extent that the South Koreans are unable

to accomplish that by themselves, a continued program of U.S.

military assistance may be warranted.

U.S. MILITARY AID FOR SOUTH KOREA

In 1971» following the withdrawal of a U.S. infantry division, the United States and the Republic of Korea (ROK) developed

a five-year modernization plan for the South Korean armed forces,

financed by $1.5 billion in U.S. military assistance. The program

was largely a success, although its completion was delayed. In

mid-1975, South Korea initiated its own Force Improvement Plan

(FIP), with a price tag of $5.5 billion. President Park's

stated goal at that time was independence of U.S. support within

five years. The FIP included substantial increases in modern

fighter aircraft, air defense improvements, an upgraded tank force

and acquisition of TOW antitank missiles, improved artillery, and

improvements in logistics and war reserve stocks.

President Carter's decision to withdraw U.S. ground forces

prompted the South Koreans to revise the FIP, an effort which is

15/ Department of Defense, Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1979,

p. 91.

13
still underway. The FIP is being financed by substantial increases in the South Korean defense budget, made possible by

the continuing high rate of growth of the South Korean economy.

Nevertheless, the South Korean government is likely to encounter

difficulties in financing the foreign exchange requirements

for the kinds and amounts of weapons in the FIP, and it has sought

substantial foreign military sales (FMS) credits from the U.S.

government. In fiscal year 1978, the Congress approved $275

million in FMS credits for South Korea. The President has requested $275 million for fiscal year 1979, and the Administration

expects to ask for a similar amount for each of the next few

years.

In addition, the U.S. withdrawal plan includes provisions

for turning over to the South Korean armed forces, on a grant

basis, much of the equipment belonging to the 2nd Division.

President Carter has requested the Congress to approve legislation

authorizing the transfer of approximately $800 million worth of

that equipment, including tanks, TOW antitank missiles, longrange artillery, and surface-to-air missile batteries. 16/ The

division's inventory of about 100 M60 tanks will return "with the

unit, and the Koreans will instead be given some 200 older M48s,

which will be modernized and equipped with bigger guns. U.S. and

South Korean officials have announced that such "compensatory

measures will be implemented in advance of or in parallel with

the withdrawals." 17/

Consistent with its goal of self-reliance, South Korea has

built up an impressive indigenous arms industry over the last

16/ The $800 million calculation is the replacement cost, depreciated for the age and estimated condition of the equipment

at the anticipated time of transfer. The total equipment

value will depend on the inflation rate at the time of actual

transfer as well as on the condition of the equipment and

attrition. Also, under the "special authority" provision of

the proposed legislation, the items projected for transfer

could change somewhat in type and quantity.

17/ "Joint Statement of the Tenth Annual Republic of Korea—

United States Security Consultative Meeting" (July 26,

1977; processed).

14
decade, with U.S. technical assistance. 18/ The Koreans handle

all their own vehicle overhaul and repair, and they manufacture

many of their own heavy trucks. They rebuild M47 and M48 tanks

and manufacture many of their own spare parts. A fledgling

helicopter industry exists, and naval construction (mostly fast

patrol boats) is being developed. The South Korean defense

industry reportedly produces its own smaller hardware, such as

mortars, M16 rifles, grenade launchers, and submachine guns, as

well as heavier armaments and some ammunition. 19/ Today, 50

percent of all military equipment used in South Korea is produced

locally. Some observers believe that, by the early 1980s, South

Korea will be able to manufacture enough equipment to meet all its

military needs, with the exception of highly specialized electronic equipment and aircraft. This appears, however, to be

an optimistic assessment. 20/

The South Korean armed forces are still hampered by an

inefficient communications and command structure. U.S. advisory

assistance is focused on management systems to combat those

problems. A joint U.S.-ROK command structure, now being created,

will remain in place after U.S. ground forces leave, for both

technical and political reasons. The South Koreans are not yet

able to operate much of the advanced electronic equipment used for

intelligence purposes by U.S. support units in Korea. Skilled

technicians to operate and maintain a range of advanced weapons

systems are also in short supply. Thus, the withdrawal of some

U.S. combat support units will probably increase the demand for

U.S.-supported military training of South Koreans. The fiscal

18/ North Korea has its own well-established arms industry, producing much of its own equipment, apart from tanks, aircraft,

and some types of missiles. Most of North Korea's locally

manufactured weapons are built to Soviet design. Though the

South Korean arms industry is less well developed, South

Korea's strong economic and technological base should provide

a decided advantage over time.

19/ "War-Conscious South Korea is Growing as a World Supplier of

Military Goods," The Wall Street Journal (January 10, 1978);

"South Korea Builds a Defense Industry," New York Times

(October 10, 1977).

20/ "Seoul in Weapons Race," Far Eastern Economic Review (June

10, 1977), p. 10.

15
year 1979 military assistance budget submission contains $2

million to cover initial training costs.

DEFENSE DEPARTMENT PLANS FOR THE 2ND DIVISION

The Army has begun its plan to convert two infantry divisions

(the 24th Infantry at Ft, Stewart, Georgia, and the 9th Infantry

at Ft. Lewis, Washington) into mechanized divisions. This program

is consistent with reorienting the U.S. defense posture toward a

stronger primary emphasis on the possibility of a conventional war

in Europe against a heavily armored adversary. Earlier this year,

the Defense Department announced its intention to mechanize the

2nd Division upon its withdrawal from Korea and to delay the

previously planned conversion of the 9th Division. 21/

A decision about where to base the returning troops is not

expected until summer 1978. Nevertheless, the Defense Department

is reportedly considering distributing the forces among three

bases in the northeastern United States, where the climate and

terrain are more comparable to conditions in Europe than they are

at other available basing sites. 22/ Other options include bases

in the South, which could also involve transferring some units or

activities among installations. 23/ These arrangements could

entail some problems for readiness, since the division would be

split and brought together only periodically for training.

Furthermore, current facilities at most northeastern bases could

not easily accommodate mechanized units because of a relative

shortage of space for both equipment storage and maneuvers. The

Army is reportedly planning to retain two active brigades of the

2nd Division and to replace the third brigade with a reserve

component. 24/

21 / Department of Defense, Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1979,

pp. 141-142.

22/ "Shift Sought of Troops in Korea to 3 Northeast Bases," New

York Times (January 5, 1978), p. 11.

23/ "Stateside Shifts Seen in Second Division Move," Army Times

(April 24, 1978), p. 20.

24/ "Twenty Sites in Line as 2nd Division Home," Army Times

(January 16, 1978), p. 10.

16
President Carter has said that the 2nd Division will be

used as a reserve for a NATO conflict. 25/ At the same time,

the Defense Department has singled out the 2nd Division for

redeployment to Korea if the need should arise. 26/ Although

those two statements are not necessarily contradictory (to the

extent that the forces are fungible assets), the future mission of

the 2nd Division remains unclear. It appears, however, that these

troops are being reconfigured for NATO warfare, possibly leaving

the 9th Division on the West Coast as a light force for a Korean

contingency.

A number of issues stemming from the Korean troop withdrawal

remain unsettled. Many of these issues could significantly

affect the defense budget over the next few years. For example,

although the Army might shift procurement funds for mechanizing

another infantry division from the 9th to the 2nd Division,

thereby avoiding additional expenditures in fiscal year 1979, the

question of the proper light/heavy mix in the force structure

would still be unresolved. If additional divisions were to be

mechanized, additional funding would eventually be required. 27/

Associated issues merit close attention as well; for example,

strategic mobility requirements for a significantly heavier force

could add to defense costs.

2.57 "South Korea Still 'Strong Ally, ' Carter Says," Washington

Post (January 15, 1978).

26/ Department of Defense, Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1979,

p. 91.

27/ Recent reports suggest that DoD budget guidance for the

Army may include plans to mechanize the 9th Division by

fiscal year 1982. See, for example, "U.S. Goals for NATO

Summit," Aviation Week and Space Technology (May 8, 1978),

p. 18.

17

CHAPTER III. POLICY OPTIONS AND COST IMPACTS

In considering the fiscal year 1979 and subsequent defense

budgets, the Congress will have an opportunity to shape the

disposition of the forces being withdrawn from Korea. Options

for these forces can be grouped into three categories according to

policy orientation; cost impact is measured against DoD's current

five-year defense program. Option I would delete the 2nd Division

from the force structure, which could result in considerable

savings over the next five years. Options II-A, II-B, and II-C,

though differing in detail, would transfer the 2nd Division into

the pool of forces intended primarily for use in a NATO war.

Depending upon how this objective was accomplished, the cost

impact could vary from modest savings to large additional expenditures. Option III would maintain the 2nd Division as a light

force for contingencies, which would entail relatively low costs.

The choice of an overall policy option would logically

tend to dictate the outcome of a number of separate, but associated, decisions. Four of those decisions are likely to have

significant budgetary impact: the future configuration of the 2nd

Division, where and how it is to be based, mobility and logistics

support, and the level of compensatory military aid to South Korea

(see Table 1).

Each option described here assumes a phased withdrawal

of U.S. ground forces from South Korea,, to be accomplished over

a five-year period (1978-1982), in accordance with President

Carter's announced decision. These options are to some extent

illustrative and are not exhaustive of the range of possible

choices. Table 2 shows the impact of these options on the Army

force structure.

Under different circumstances, different combinations of

policies may be warranted, since the four key variables identified

here are responsive in different degrees to different pressures.

For example, the level of military aid to South Korea may depend

more heavily on U.S. foreign relations or on unrelated domestic

political factors than on the future orientation of the 2nd

Division. Indeed, the options presented here do not include

specific details for alternative military aid packages. Rather,

they are framed in terms of relative levels, using the Administration's proposed package as a baseline.

19
TABLE 1. POLICY OPTIONS, BY KEY VARIABLES

Policy Options

Option I:

Delete

from Forces

Option II-A:

Designate

for NATO--

Split Up and

Substitute

for Reserves

Option II-B:

Designate

for NATO--

Reduce Size

and Round Out

with Reserves

Option II-C:

Designate

for NATO--

Keep Together

at Full

Strength

Option III:

Designate as

Contingency

Force

Configuration

N/A

Mechanize

troops affiliated

with mechanized

divisions;

re-equip

others as

infantry

Mechanize

two active

brigades

and the

reserve

round-out

brigade

Mechanize

entire

division

Re-equip

entire division as

infantry

Basing

N/A

Station in

U.S.; utilize

existing base

facilities;

upgrade as

necessary to

accommodate

active-duty

forces instead

of reserves

Station in

U.S. ; utilize

existing base

facilities;

renovate and

expand as

necessary

Station in

U.S.; utilize

existing base

facilities

if possible;

build new base

facilities

as necessary

to receive

entire division

Station in

U.S. ; upgrade

existing base

facilities to

Mobility

and

Logistics

N/A

Current

program

levels

Additional

strategic

airlift or

pre-position

equipment

in Europe

Additional

strategic

airlift or

pre-position

equipment

in Europe

Current

program

levels

Military

Aid to

South Korea

Higher level

Moderately

high level

Moderately

high level

Moderately

high level

Lower level

accommodate

entire infantry

division

20
TABLE 2. EFFECT OF POLICY OPTIONS ON ARMY FORCE STRUCTURE

Policy Options

Active Divisions

Reserve

Armored and (National

Mechanized Infantry Guard)

("Heavy") ("Light") Divisions Total

Fiscal Year 1979

DoD Programmed

Forces

Option I:

Delete from

Forces

Option II-A:

Split Up and

Substitute for

Reserves

10

11

24

23

11 24

Option II-B:

Reduce Size and

and Round Out

with Reserves

Option II-C:

Keep Together at

Full Strength

Option III:

Designate as

Contingency

Force

12

12

7-2/3 23-2/3

24

11 24

OPTION I: DELETE THE 2ND DIVISION FROM THE FORCE STRUCTURE

This option is designed to realize maximum savings from the

planned troop withdrawal. Instead of relocating the troops as

they leave Korea, this option would phase them out of the force

structure altogether, reducing the size of the Army from 16 to 15

21
active divisions. Deactivation would be completed by 1982,

proceeding apace with the withdrawal timetable.

The policy basis for a decision to deactivate the 2nd Division would be a judgment that the United States has sufficient

defense capabilities to meet likely and foreseeable threats

without that division. More specifically, such an evaluation

would conclude that, once the 2nd Division left Korea, other U.S.

forces for Asia would be adequate in the event of a conflict and

that U.S. forces currently earmarked for NATO warfare are adequate.

This option would generate substantial savings over a fiveyear period. Although there would be costs associated with

closing down military facilities and discharging military personnel, the level of savings would rise as units were phased out.

From fiscal year 1979 through fiscal year 1983, net savings could

be expected to reach a total of $1.28 billion (see Table 3 at the

end of this chapter).

This option would avoid major expenditures for new equipment,

refurbished basing facilities, and additional mobility and support

forces for the division.. Option I would, however, imply relatively high levels of military aid to South Korea, in part because

of an increased need for self-reliance on the part of the South

Korean armed forces. That is, there would be fewer U.S. forces

available to perform an unchanged global mission. In particular,

however, a large aid package would bolster political confidence

(on all sides) in the U.S. commitment to the defense of South

Korea under these altered circumstances.

Components of such an aid package, beyond the $800 million

proposed by the President, might include increased levels of

foreign military sales (FMS) credits during the withdrawal period

to finance such programs as an improved air defense capability,

increased tank inventories, and enlarged war reserve stocks

for South Korea. More FMS credits could amount to a total of $41

million in direct annual appropriations, or $205 million over the

five-year period. \J Art increase in the level of U.S. tactical

air forces in Korea—deploying another squadron of F-4s or substituting more advanced F-16s for some or all of the F-4s now

If Direct appropriations are required for 10 percent of the

total value of FMS credits granted by the United States to a

foreign nation.

22
deployed in South Korea—would be consistent with this option.

Deployment of an additional tactical squadron to Korea would cost

about $15 million annually. Thus, the savings realized by eliminating the 2nd Division could be partially offset by these aidrelated expendituresj and the net budgetary impact of Option I

over five years could be less than otherwise anticipated.

OPTION II; RECONFIGURE THE 2ND DIVISION AND DESIGNATE IT FOR

NATO WARFARE

Three different approaches to implementing this policy

choice are described here. Many proponents of a NATO-oriented

defense policy argue that the United States requires additional

forces to meet its NATO objectives and that the withdrawal of U.S.

ground forces from Korea offers an opportunity of adding an

"extra" division to U.S. NATO capabilities. Yet the 2nd Division,

as now constituted, may not be optimal for European warfare. For

example, some analysts argue that an additional infantry division

would add only marginally to U.S. and allied capabilities against

heavily armored Warsaw Pact forces. A principal issue, then, is

whether to convert the 2nd Division from an infantry to a mechanized force. A decision to mechanize that division would be

most clearly consistent with selection of a NATO-oriented policy

option.

This option would also require that the division be stationed

where it could move expeditiously to the European battlefield.

Adequate training grounds for NATO-type warfare should also be

available. This would probably necessitate construction of new

base facilities or renovation of existing ones. Current strategic

mobility and logistics programs would have to be evaluated to

determine whether they would be able to accommodate another NATO

division. In addition, a NATO-oriented option would argue

for a moderate to high level of military aid for South Korea,

given the implicit shift away from Asian concerns to the European

military balance.

Option II-A; Split Up the 2nd Division and Substitute for Reserve

Round-Out Brigades

Under this option, the 2nd Division would be withdrawn from

Korea in brigade-sized groups. Each brigade would be used

to round out one of three CONUS-based divisions that now use

23
reserve round-out brigades. 2/ The effect of substituting active

for reserve units would be to delete a division from the force

structure but to maintain currently authorized active manpower

levels.

Key decisions consistent with this option would be to:

o Mechanize units that would be affiliated with mechanized

infantry divisions and re-equip as infantry troops

that would round out infantry divisions.

o Upgrade some existing base facilities to accommodate

active-duty forces instead of part-time reserve units.

o Maintain the currently programmed level of strategic

mobility forces, since this option would substitute active

for reserve forces but would not add to the size of the

total force to be mobilized for a NATO war.

o Furnish a moderately high level of military aid to South

Korea; for example, undertake the proposed equipment

transfer package and continue current levels of FMS

credits during the withdrawal period.

The principal advantage of this option is that it should

improve the overall readiness and effectiveness of existing

forces. Military construction costs would probably be relatively

low, and support structures would probably require only minimal

expansion. If necessary, the reserve round-out units replaced by

elements of the 2nd Division could be retained.

On the other hand, the "splitting-up" option would entail

the loss of some flexibility on the part of the Army, because one

divisional command structure would be disbanded. In addition,

substituting active units for reserve round-out brigades would

2f The Army has four divisions that have only two active brigades. Reserve units are used to "round out" the divisions

and bring them up to full strength when necessary. Divisions

having round-out brigades are the 24th Mechanized Infantry

Division at Ft. Stewart, Georgia, the 5th Mechanized Infantry

Division at Ft. Polk, Louisiana, the 7th Infantry Division at

Ft. Ord, California, and the 25th Infantry Division in Hawaii.

24
dilute the Army's "total force" concept, which has emphasized

increased reliance on the reserves.

This option can be expected to generate moderate costs,

which are estimated to total $1.48 billion from fiscal year 1979

through fiscal year 1983 (see Table 3).

Option II-B; Reduce the 2nd Division to Two Active Brigades

and Round It Out with Reserves

This option would create another reserve-affiliated division,

but it would not change the total number of active divisions in

the Army force structure. Assuming that the authorized slots from

the deactivated third brigade were not allocated elsewhere, this

option could reduce overall active manpower levels and costs. The

reserve round-out brigade could be assigned from the pool of

existing unaffiliated reserve units.

Consistent with Option II-B would be decisions to:

o Mechanize the remaining two active brigades and the

reserve round-out brigade.

o Station the division in the central or eastern continental United States, utilizing existing base facilities

which would be renovated and expanded as necessary.

o Procure additional strategic mobility assets (aircraft) or

pre-position a division set of equipment in Europe.

o Provide a moderately high level of military aid to South

Korea.

This option would generate considerable associated expenditures, despite reduced manpower costs. Although an additional

mechanized division may be the best choice in view of NATO battlefield requirements, it would be virtually useless in the event of

a war unless it could be transported to the European theater

in time to make a difference in the allied effort. Hence, procuring heavy weapons for a mechanized infantry division might not

prove cost-effective unless sufficient airlift capacity were

also programmed. Pre-positioning a division set of equipment in

Europe would, however, drastically reduce airlift requirements

25
for this division in time of war. Military construction costs

for this option could also be substantial, depending upon the base

site.

Proponents of this option contend that it would significantly

increase U.S. capabilities in a NATO war, at a tolerable cost.

Adding another mechanized division might provide a hedge against

the possibility that a NATO war would not end quickly but would

instead require U.S. reinforcements over a period of many months.

By cutting the active component of the division to two brigades,

manpower and support costs could be reduced. At the same time,

additional reserve units would have a chance to upgrade their

capabilities by training with an active division. Nevertheless,

the reserve affiliation would probably lead to a lower level of

readiness for the 2nd Division than would otherwise be the case.

Net costs of this option for the five-year period from

fiscal year 1979 through fiscal year 1983 can be expected to

total $790 million (see Table 3).

Option II-C: Keep the 2nd Division Together at Full Strength

This option would imply phasing out the 2nd Division from

Korea, as planned, and gradually reassembling it as a complete

active division by the end of the five-year period. The ultimate

effect of this option would be to maintain the current number of

active Army divisions and the same level of active manpower.

Although the transition period could cause some dislocation,

resulting in a somewhat lower level of force readiness, the

overall capability for NATO warfare would be improved by the time

the plan was completed. As in Option II-B, the addition of

another division designated for NATO reinforcement would require a

reevaluation of strategic airlift capabilities, to ensure that a

larger and heavier force could be transported rapidly in the event

of war.

Option II-C suggests decisions to:

o Mechanize the entire division.

o Station the division in one location in the central

or eastern continental United States, utilizing existing

base facilities to the extent possible and building

new ones as necessary.

26
o Procure additional strategic mobility assets (aircraft) or

pre-position a division set of equipment in Europe.

o Provide a moderately high level of military aid to South

Korea.

The chief advantage of Option II-C is that it would make

an entire additional active mechanized division available for NATO

reinforcement. Because the division would be kept together, it

could be trained and deployed as a single unit. This kind of

efficient organization would be important in a NATO situation

that demanded rapid response.

Nevertheless, this option could be quite expensive. Not only

would the Army incur the one-time outlay for re-equipping the 2nd

Division as a mechanized division, but it would also continue to

bear high manpower costs. In addition, the problem of finding

base facilities large enough to accommodate the entire division

would be a difficult one. And the solution would probably

entail substantial military construction costs, as well as continuing high maintenance and support costs.

Total costs for Option II-C can be expected to run as high

as $1.79 billion from fiscal year 1979 through fiscal year 1983

(see Table 3).

OPTION III: DESIGNATE THE 2ND DIVISION FOR DEPLOYMENT IN A

"HALF-WAR" CONTINGENCY

Under this option, the withdrawal of U.S. ground forces

from Korea would proceed as planned over a five-year period,

with the 2nd Division reassembled as a complete division by

the end of that period. Once reassembled, the 2nd Division would

be earmarked as a light contingency force. The contingency of

primary concern might be a renewal of hostilities on the Korean

peninsula, but this force could be useful in other situations as

well. As in Option II-C, overall capabilities would be somewhat

diminished during the transitional years because of problems of

dislocation.

Consistent with this option would be decisions to:

o Re-equip the 2nd Division as an infantry division, merely

replacing the weapons left behind for the South Koreans.

27

"T
o Station the division in CONUS (perhaps on the West Coast,

if an Asian contingency is to be stressed) and upgrade

base facilities if necessary.

o Maintain the currently programmed level of strategic

mobility forces.

\

o Furnish less military aid to South Korea than those

proposed by the Administration.

Undoubtedly, the strongest argument in favor of this option

is that it would provide a hedge against "half-war" contingencies

that could call for relatively high force levels. If accompanied

by specific actions, it could also serve as a clear signal of U.S.

intent to recommit ground forces to Korea if that became necessary. Thus, some Administration Asia experts maintain that basing

the 2nd Division on the West Coast would help quell Asian fears

that the United States is turning its back on the Pacific. Other

steps could be taken to bolster the impression of continued strong

U.S. resolve in Korea. For example, equipment for a U.S. division

could be pre-positioned in South Korea in order to facilitate the

rapid return of American combat troops and increase the credibility of the U.S. commitment to its defense.

Despite the high political value of this policy, it is not

clear that it would be cost-effective from a military standpoint.

Sufficient U.S. forces appear to be available at present to

respond to foreseeable contingencies, including a political crisis

or low-level incident between North and South Korea. In the case

of a new Korean war involving either the Soviet Union or China,

one U.S. infantry division would contribute only marginally to the

large force requirements that would be generated. In the face of

such a serious threat, the United States would have to draw upon

other forces in strategic reserve as well.

Option III is likely to be fairly low in cost. Procurement

costs to outfit an infantry division would be considerably less

than for a mechanized division. A major expenditure under this

option could be base construction costs, since there do not

appear to be facilities on the West Coast that can adequately

house an entire division. Additional mobility forces (principally

airlift) would probably not be needed to deploy an extra light

division overseas in time of crisis—unless that crisis were to

occur simultaneously with a major airlift operation to the

NATO front. Substantially less military aid for South Korea could

be tolerated.

28
Over the five years from fiscal year 1979 through fiscal

year 1983, Option III would cost a total of approximately

$1.32 billion (see Table 3).

TABLE 3. COST EFFECTS OF POLICY OPTIONS: CHANGES TO FISCAL YEAR 1979-1983

FIVE-YEAR DEFENSE PROGRAM: BY FISCAL YEAR, IN MILLIONS OF FISCAL

YEAR 1979 DOLLARS a/

New Base

Cost

Policy Options 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 Total Add-On bj

Option I:

Delete from

Forces cj -60 -110 -240 -370 -500 -1,280

Option II-A:

Split Up and

Substitute

for Reserves 290 500 440 150 100 1,480

Option II-B:

Reduce Size

and Round Out

with Reserves 260 500 320 -120 -170 790 350

Option II-C:

Keep Together

at Full

Strength 290 730 580 130 60 1,790 550

Option III:

Designate as

Contingency

Force 270 540 480 40 -10 1,320 450

a/ Estimates of the costs of each option assume that the 9th Division will be

~ mechanized (see "U.S. Shapes Goals for NATO Summit," Aviation Week and

Space Technology (May 8, 1978), p. 18). The costs of strategic mobility

programs and military assistance to South Korea are excluded.

b/ Estimates of the costs of each option assume that basing for the 2nd

~ Division will not require construction of extensive military facilities.

If, however, the division were based at a site with only limited facilities, additional construction costs would be incurred. The total new base

cost add-on would vary according to option.

c/ Option I assumes that the division being deleted is an infantry division.

29

APPENDI X

APPENDIX. THE MILITARY BALANCE BETWEEN NORTH AND SOUTH KOREA I/

Measurement of relative military capabilities is difficult

and, to some degree, it is always conjectural. There are several

reasons why this is so.

First, information about weapons, force structure, the

state of unit training, leadership capabilities, and the quality

of tactical planning is incomplete. In Korea this is true not

only for the North Korean forces but, to a lesser degree, for the

South Korean forces as well. Although we know a great deal about

South Korean weapons and units, we know less about South Korea's

plans for its own defense once U.S. ground forces have been

withdrawn. And, notwithstanding South Korean battle achievements in Vietnam, it is extremely difficult to predict the caliber

of South Korean military leadership.

Second, we are measuring not only weapons and units, but

also the probable outcome of battles and campaigns between North

and South Korean armed forces. There are no methods of analysis

capable of predicting battle outcomes with much certainty.

Further, it is inherently impossible to predict the impact of

superior leadership, unexpected weather, or just plain luck.

History is replete with instances in which smaller forces defeated

larger ones credited with superior combat power. Thus, it is no

surprise that military experts disagree about the combat significance of various force and weapon asymmetries between the military

forces of North and South Korea.

Third, the relationship between relative warfighting capabilities and deterrence remains mystifying and ambiguous. We

do not know why the North Koreans have refrained from attacking

South Korea thus far.

I/ This section on the military balance is drawn largely from

~ a previous CBO study, "The Military Balance Between North

and South Korean Forces and Its Policy Implications" (May 13,

1977). Estimates in this appendix have, however, been updated

and the analysis has been amplified.

33
Nonetheless, the problem is by no means hopeless. Counting

weapons and forces and estimating the relative effectiveness

of new versus old weapons systems does yield a strong sense of

the probabilities in combat. Moreover, in recent years, the

Department of Defense has made great strides in developing analytical techniques for predicting the outcome of battles between

modern forces. The results of computer simulation are crosschecked with independent, traditional analysis by senior military

officers experienced in combat. This analysis of the military

balance between North and South Korea reflects a review of recent

classified Defense Department studies as a check on the conclusions reached here.

Key indicators of the present balance between North and

South Korea are shown in Table A-l.

North Korea's advantages lie in the following areas:

o Large numbers of tanks (although not the latest Soviet

models);

o Large numbers of artillery pieces, mortars, and rocket

launchers;

o An extensive air defense system with large numbers of

weapons but virtually no modern radar-controlled mobile

guns or late-model surface-to-air missiles (SAMs);

o Greater numbers of, but less capable, tactical aircraft;

and

o Extensive unconventional warfare (commando) forces.

South Korea's strengths are:

o Superior ground force manpower, particularly with respect

to division staying power and reserves;

o Superior technical capability in tactical aircraft, antitank guided missiles, and probably tanks; and

o Prepared defense positions on advantageous terrain.

34
TABLE A-l. KEY MILITARY INDICATORS, NORTH AND SOUTH KOREAN

ARMED FORCES, CALENDAR YEAR 1977

North Korea South Korea

Population

Total Active Forces

Total Reserve Forces

Ground Forces

Combat divisions aj

Marine divisions a/

Tanks ~

Armored personnel carriers

Artillery

Rocket launchers

Mortars

Surface-to-air missiles

Anti-aircraft guns

Air Forces

Combat aircraft

Airlift aircraft

Helicopters

Navy

Combat vessels

16,720,000

500,000

Not Available

25

0

1,950

750 b/

3,024

1,200

9,000

250

5,500 b/

630

225

50

425-450

35,200,000

635,000

1,240,000

20

1-2/3

1,100

500

2,000

0

3,000

120

1,000

335

46

13

b/

b/

b/

80-90 b/

SOURCE: International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, 1977-1978 (London: 1977), pp. 60-61; U.S.

Troop Withdrawal from the Republic of Korea, Report to

the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations by Senators

Hubert Humphrey and John Glenn, 95:2 (January 1978),

p. 27.

aj North Korean divisions are modeled after USSR/PRC divisions,

~ and number about 10,000 men each—roughly 65 percent of the

strength of South Korean divisions, which follow U.S. division

organization. Most of the manpower differences, however, lie

in combat support and logistics troops. Actual deployed

combat strength in a North Korean division, including weapons,

is roughly the same as that of a South Korean division.

b/ These figures may be much lower than actual inventories.

35
South Korea's Force Improvement Plan (FIP) calls for more and

better tanks, tactical aircraft, antitank weapons, and artillery.

Its older weapons—M47 tanks, F-86F fighters, Nike-Hercules SAMs,

and 106 mm. antitank recoilless rifles—combined with new systems

like F-4 and F-5 fighters roughly match North Korean counterparts

but do not offset the larger inventories of the latter. Currently, the FIP is being restructured to take account of the U.S.

withdrawal by shifting priorities and adding new programs. 2j

Were these forces positioned in Europe, one might conclude

that the North Korean armed forces, though smaller, would be

capable of generating significantly more combat power—especially

in terms of armored forces, air defense, and close air support—

than South Korea. However, the geography of Korea—particularly

near the DMZ—tends to lessen some of those advantages. North

Korean armored forces, though numerous, cannot be used to maximum

effect in the hills and ridges that dominate the DMZ approaches to

South Korea. 3/ The South Korean army has recently taken steps

to exploit this geographical advantage, restructuring defense

2j Department of State, Report on Korea: 1977 (submitted in

accordance with Section 668 of the Foreign Assistance Act of

1961, as amended), p. 7.

3_/ The Korean War illustrates the importance of geography for the

structure of South Korean defenses. In June 1950, North

Korean forces attacked South Korea and, despite good defensive

terrain in the rugged Korean hills near the 38th Parallel,

South Korean forces quickly collapsed—a fact of some concern

regarding the prospects of a North Korean attack today. In

1950, however, North and South Korean forces were one-fifth

the size they are today, and there were insufficient infantry

to exploit the defensive character of the ridges and mountains. Moreover, the North Korean force was substantially

stronger than South Korea in every respect—a situation very

different from today. In April 1951, after seesaw campaigns

up and down the Korean peninsula, a North Korean/PRC force of

700,000 attacked across the 38th Parallel again, opposed by a

UN force of 555,000 (an army very similar to that of South

Korea today). That attack failed; UN forces held Seoul, gave

up 35 miles of ground, counterattacked, and captured what is

now the DMZ. The April 1951 campaign indicates that, with

forces of proper size, the character of the terrain distinctly

favors the defense.

36
units to match the terrain they defend. 4/ Moreover, South Korean

defenses below the DMZ include extensive~and well-constructed tank

barriers and prepared defense positions that enhance South Korean

combat capabilities.

North Korea's air defense capability is relatively unsophisticated and, without access to modern Soviet air defense systems,

North Korean forces cannot expect to provide a mobile, wellintegrated battlefield air defense system. This is also true of

South Korean air defenses, although improvements are planned.

Because both air forces are reasonably well sheltered and protected by anti-aircraft weapons and because battlefield air

defenses are not particularly strong on either side, aircraft

attrition would result mainly from air-to-air combat. Here, the

technological superiority of South Korean aircraft could, over

time, provide an edge. 5/

Another significant asymmetry whose impact is difficult to

measure is the North Korean numerical advantage in artillery,

mortars, and rocket launchers. Under fluid battle conditions,

those advantages could be significant. On the other hand, however, South Korean defensive positions are built to withstand

artillery fire and North Korean forces must expose themselves in

an attack, making the North Korean advantage in artillery less

significant. This also means that improvements in South Korean

artillery, such as those in the revised FIP, could have a high

payoff.

4/ "The Jitters on 'Freedom's Frontier1," Far Eastern Economic

~ Review (May 6, 1977), p. 27.

5/ The relatively small number of aircraft on both sides (as

compared to 1951) probably means that tactical air power

would not play as large a role in the ground battle as it

did in April 1951. This implies that if U.S. tactical air

assets were committed in substantial numbers in support of

South Korea, they could have a powerful impact. Senators

Humphrey and Glenn concluded in a report to the Senate Foreign

Relations Committee that U.S. fighter planes in Korea could,

if fully committed, achieve air superiority over the ground

battle within the first few days of a conflict. See U.S.

Troop Withdrawal from the Republic of Korea, Report to the

SenateCommitteeon Foreign Relationsby Senators Hubert

Humphrey and John Glenn, 95:2 (January 1978), p. 31.

37
A key issue is the defense of Seoul, South Korea's capital,

which is vulnerable because of its close proximity (30 miles) to

the DMZ. Some military analysts are concerned that, in a surprise

attack against the South, North Korea could mass its firepower in

support of infantry attacks to break through South Korean forward

defenses and launch a high-speed armored drive toward Seoul. The

South Korean FIP and current U.S. security assistance programs are

designed to reduce this risk by improving South Korean firepower,

antitank, mobility, and communications capabilities in order to

contain North Korean penetration north of Seoul.

Overall, the military balance between North and South Korea

appears stable, despite some important asymmetries. North Korea

is thus confronted with a substantial risk that an attack against

the South could fail. The present advantages favoring the north

do not appear to be decisive, given South Korean capabilities and

geographical factors.

38

O