SENATOR MITCH McCONNELL, et al.,

 Plaintiffs,

 v.

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, et al., 

 Defendants.

NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION OF

AMERICA, et al., 

 Plaintiffs,

 v.

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, et al., 

 Defendants.

EMILY ECHOLS, a minor child, by and

through her next friends, TIM AND WINDY

ECHOLS, et al.,

 Plaintiffs,

 v.

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, et al., 

 Defendants.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Civ. No. 02-582 (CKK, KLH, RJL)

Civ. No. 02-581 (CKK, KLH, RJL)

Civ. No. 02-633 (CKK, KLH, RJL)
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF THE

UNITED STATES, et al., 

 Plaintiffs,

 v.

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, et al., 

 Defendants.

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF

BROADCASTERS, 

 Plaintiff,

 v.

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, et al., 

 Defendants.

AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR

AND CONGRESS OF INDUSTRIAL

ORGANIZATIONS, et al.,

 Plaintiffs,

 v.

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, et al., 

 Defendants.

Civ. No. 02-751 (CKK, KLH, RJL)

Civ. No. 02-753 (CKK, KLH, RJL)

Civ. No. 02-754 (CKK, KLH, RJL)
CONGRESSMAN RON PAUL, et al.,

 Plaintiffs,

 v.

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, et al., 

 Defendants.

REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE, 

et al., 

 Plaintiffs,

 v.

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, et al.

 Defendants.

CALIFORNIA DEMOCRATIC PARTY, et

al.,

 Plaintiffs,

 v.

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, et al., 

 Defendants.

Civ. No. 02-781 (CKK, KLH, RJL)

Civ. No. 02-874 (CKK, KLH, RJL)

Civ. No. 02-875 (CKK, KLH, RJL)
4

VICTORIA JACKSON GRAY ADAMS, et

al.,

 Plaintiffs,

 v.

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, et al.,

 Defendants.

REPRESENTATIVE BENNIE G.

THOMPSON, 

et al., 

 Plaintiffs,

 v.

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, et al.,

 Defendants.

Civ. No. 02-877 (CKK, KLH, RJL)

Civ. No. 02-881 (CKK, KLH, RJL)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

(May 1, 2003)

COLLEEN KOLLAR-KOTELLY, District Judge: 

I. INTRODUCTION

The recent issues confronting Congress related to campaign finance are neither novel

nor unfamiliar:

The idea is to prevent . . . the great aggregations of wealth from using their

corporate funds, directly or indirectly, to send members of the legislature to

these halls in order to vote for their protection and the advancement of their
5

interests as against those of the public. It strikes at a constantly growing evil

which has done more to shake the confidence of the plain people of small

means of this country in our political institutions than any other practice which

has ever obtained since the foundation of our Government. And I believe that

the time has come when something ought to be done to put a check to the

giving of $50,000 or $100,000 by a great corporation toward political purposes

upon the understanding that a debt is created from a political party to it.

Elihu Root, Addresses on Government and Citizenship 143 (Bacon and Scott ed. 1916)

(original statement made before the Constitutional Convention of the State of New York in

1894).

Many believe that when an individual or association of individuals makes large

contributions for the purpose of aiding candidates of political parties in

winning the elections, they expect, and sometimes demand, and occasionally,

at least, receive, consideration by the beneficiaries of their contributions which

not infrequently is harmful to the general public interest.

65 Cong. Rec. 9507-9508 (1924) (Statement of Sen. Joseph Robinson).

We all know that money is the chief source of corruption. We all know that

large contributions to political campaigns not only put the political party under

obligation to the large contributors, who demand pay in the way of legislation,

but we also know that large sums of money are used for the purpose of

conducting expensive campaigns through the newspapers and over the radio;

in the publication of all sorts of literature, true and untrue; and for the purpose

of paying the expenses of campaigners sent out into the country to spread

propaganda, both true and untrue.

86 Cong. Rec. 2720 (1940) (Statement of Sen. John Bankhead).

The unchecked rise in campaign expenditures coupled with the absence of

limitations on contributions and expenditures, has increased the dependence

of candidates on special interest groups and large contributors.

H.R. Rep. No. 93-1239, at 3 (1974).

We have gone from basically a small donor system in this country where the

average person believed they had a stake, believed they had a voice, to one of

extremely large amounts of money, where you are not a player unless you are
6

in the $100,000 or $200,000 range, many contributions in the $500,000 range,

occasionally you get a $1 million contribution. . . . Many Members are tired of

picking up the paper every day and reading about an important issue we are

going to be considering, one in which many interests have large sums at stake

and then the second part of the story reading about the large amounts of money

that are being poured into Washington on one side or the other of the issue--the

implication, of course being clear, that money talks and large amounts of

money talk the loudest.

147 Cong. Rec. S2958 (daily ed. March 27, 2001) (statement of Senator Fred Thompson).

Although these statements each reflect discrete points in the history of campaign finance

regulation in this country, they reflect the same sentiment: over the course of the last

century, the political branches have endeavored to protect the integrity of federal elections

with carefully tailored legislation addressing corruption or the appearance of corruption

inherent in a system of donor-financed campaigns. 

In the area of campaign finance regulation, congressional action has been largely

incremental and responsive to the most prevalent abuses or evasions of existing law at

particular points in time. For example, consistent with the Constitution, Congress has been

permitted to prohibit the use of corporate treasury funds for contributions and expenditures

to federal candidates and their parties, forbid the use of union dues in connection with federal

elections, cap contributions by individuals to candidates and parties, offer presidential

candidates the option of financing their general election campaigns with money from the

public fisc, and subject coordinated expenditures to contribution limitations. This process

has been evolutionary, and the deliberative nature of the legislative effort is not unexpected

given the fact that campaign finance is an extraordinarily challenging area to legislate,
7

particularly given the strong First Amendment interests at stake. On the one hand,

congressional action in this area plainly implicates an individual’s right to be free from

government regulation, a right that is unquestionably at its apogee in the context of political

speech. On the other hand, legislation in this area is designed to embolden public confidence

in the political system, which thereby ultimately encourages individuals to participate and

engage in the electoral process. See Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Comm. v.

Federal Election Comm’n (“Colorado I”), 518 U.S. 604, 609 (1996) (per curiam) (observing

that in assessing the constitutionality of FECA’s various provisions the Supreme Court

“essentially weigh[s] the First Amendment interest in permitting candidates (and their

supporters) to spend money to advance their political views against a ‘compelling’

governmental interest in assuring the electoral system’s legitimacy, protecting it from the

appearance and reality of corruption”); see also Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 198

(1992) (“Perhaps foremost among these serious issues are cases that force us to reconcile our

commitment to free speech with our commitment to other constitutional rights embodied in

government proceedings.”).

Mindful of these competing constitutional interests, Congress has moved deliberately

and often slowly to address evasion or abuse of the law. Building a consensus in an area so

penetratingly close to the heart of the First Amendment requires serious consideration. In

fact, in the case of the legislation presently before the Court, the legislative process took over
1

 Although campaign finance reform was considered during the 104th Congress, see,

e.g., Campaign Reform Act of 1996, H.R. 3820, 104th Cong. (1996) (considered on the

House floor, but failed by a vote of 162-259, 142 Cong. Rec. H8,516 (daily ed. July 25,

1996)), deliberations on BCRA’s precursors did not begin until the One Hundred and Fifth

Congress. The bills introduced in the One Hundred and Fifth Congress, One Hundred and

Sixth Congress, and One Hundred and Seventh Congress, relating to campaign finance,

include, but are not limited to: “Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 1997,” H.R. 493 (105th

Cong.); “Campaign Reform and Election Integrity Act of 1998,” H.R. 3485 (105th Cong.);

“Campaign Finance Improvement Act of 1998,” H.R. 3476 (105th Cong.); “Bipartisan

Campaign Integrity Act of 1997,” H.R. 2183 (105th Cong.); “Campaign Reporting and

Disclosure Act of 1998,” H.R. 3582 (105th Cong.); “Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of

1997,” S. 25 (105th Cong.); “Senate Campaign Financing and Spending Reform Act,” S. 57

(105th Cong.); “Campaign Finance Reform and Disclosure Act of 1997,” S. 179 (105th

Cong.); “Clean Money, Clean Elections Act,” S. 918 (105th Cong.); “Grassroots Campaign

and Common Sense Federal Election Reform Act of 1998,” S. 1689 (105th Cong.); “Voter

Empowerment Act of 1999,” H.R. 32 (106th Cong.); “Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of

1999,” H.R. 417 (106th Cong); “Clean Money, Clean Elections Act,” H.R. 1739 (106th

Cong.); “FEC Reform and Authorization Act of 1999,” H.R. 1818 (106th Cong.); “Campaign

Integrity Act of 1999,” H.R. 1867 (106th Cong.); “Citizen Legislature and Political Freedom

Act,” H.R. 19 22 (106th Cong.); “Campaign Reform and Election Integrity Act of 1999,”

H.R. 2668 (106th Cong.); “PAC Limitation Act of 1999,” H.R. 2866 (106th Cong.);”Open

and Accountable Campaign Financing Act of 2000,” H.R. 3243 (106th Cong.); “FEC Reform

and Authorization Act of 2000,” H.R. 4037 (106th Cong.); “Campaign Finance Improvement

Act of 2000,” H.R. 4685 (106th Cong.); “Campaign Finance Disclosure on Sales of Personal

Assets Act of 2000,” H.R. 4989 (106th Cong.); “Informed Voter Act of 2000,” H.R. 5507

(106th Cong.); “Campaign Finance Improvement Act of 2000,” H.R. 5596 (106th Cong.);

“Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 1999,” S. 26 (106th Cong.); “Federal Election

Enforcement and Disclosure Reform Act,” S. 504 (106th Cong.); “Clean Money, Clean

Elections Act,” S. 982 (106th Cong.); “Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 1999,” S. 1593

(106th Cong.); “Campaign Finance Integrity Act of 1999,” S. 1671 (106th Cong.); “Open and

Accountable Campaign Financing Act of 2000,” S. 1816 (106th Cong.); “Campaign Finance

Reform and Disclosure Act of 2000,” S. 2565 (106th Cong.); “Bipartisan Campaign Reform

Act of 2001,” H.R. 2356 (107th Cong.); “Campaign Reform and Citizen Participation Act

of 2001,” H.R. 2360 (107th Cong.); and “Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Act of

2001,” S. 27 (107th Cong.).

8

six years of study and reflection by Congress.

1

 This thoughtful and careful effort by our

political branches, over such a lengthy course of time, deserves respect. See, e.g., Rust v.
9

Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 223-224 (1991) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“This Court acts at the

limits of its power when it invalidates a law on constitutional grounds. In recognition of our

place in the constitutional scheme, we must act with great gravity and delicacy when telling

a coordinate branch that its actions are absolutely prohibited absent constitutional

amendment.”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also FEC v. Nat’l Right

to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 209 (1982) (“This careful legislative adjustment of the federal

electoral laws, in a cautious advance, step by step, to account for the particular legal and

economic attributes of corporations and labor organizations warrants considerable

deference.”) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Nevertheless, it is the province of the

judiciary to intervene when Congress has struck the wrong balance and disproportionately

transgressed First Amendment rights in the name of reform. While navigating this balance

is undoubtedly complex, such a task is demanded by the dictates of the Constitution and the

well worn path of interpretation of congressional action relating to campaign finance

legislation by the Supreme Court of the United States.

It is within this historical framework that the incremental changes Congress strives

to accomplish in enacting the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-

155, 116 Stat. 81 (2002) (“BCRA”) are properly understood. BCRA is yet another step in

the careful evolution of the campaign finance laws targeted at addressing exceptions to the

constitutionally permissible laws that are already in force. Indeed, BCRA was enacted in

large measure to amend the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, 2 U.S.C. §§ 431 et seq.
2

 As Senator Fritz Hollings wryly observed during the Senate debate on BCRA:

It amused me the other day when they said we finally had some debate going

on in the Senate. The reason we have a debate is because this is the first

subject we know anything about. All the rest of it is canned speeches that the

staff gives you, and you come out and you talk about Kosovo, you talk about

the defense budget, or you talk about the environment, and you read scientific

statements and everything – but we know about money. Oh boy, do we know.

147 Cong Rec. S2852-53 (daily ed. March 26, 2001) (statement of Senator Fritz Hollings).

10

(“FECA”), and any constitutional interpretation of BCRA must, as its starting point,

recognize the role BCRA plays within the current state of federal law. In other words, it

must be remembered that the statutory provisions at issue were designed by Congress as a

comprehensive approach to the abuses of FECA that legislators and candidates were acutely

aware of in their capacity as political actors.2

 BCRA was designed to ameliorate FECA’s

most glaring abuses, while staying true to the constitutional boundaries set forth by the

judiciary.

Presently before this three-judge District Court are eleven consolidated actions

challenging much of BCRA as unconstitutional and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief

to prohibit its enforcement. Plaintiffs and Defendants have filed cross motions for judgment

pursuant to Rule 54 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Suffice it to say, the legal

challenges raised by this litigation are complex and raise issues of fundamental importance

to the conduct and financing of federal election campaigns.

In resolving these challenges, I have endeavored to adopt a cohesive constitutional

framework in adjudicating Plaintiffs’ claims, premised on the extensive record in this case
3

 I cannot agree with Judge Henderson, who appears to characterize my opinion, along

with the per curiam opinion, and Judge Leon’s opinion, as “upholding a portion [of BCRA]

here and striking down a fragment [of BCRA] there until they [Judge Leon and Judge

Kotelly] have drafted legislation the Congress would never have enacted – all in the name

of deference to that body.” Henderson Op. at 5 (first emphasis added, second emphasis in

original). I would observe that my opinion does not sift through various sections of BCRA

that have been challenged, adopting some and rejecting others. Rather, my decision is

predicated on lengthy discussions of both the record and the governing caselaw. In

undertaking this analysis, I have only found three sections unconstitutional in their entirety;

the same three sections that Judge Henderson and Judge Leon have each found

unconstitutional. I have also, with Judge Leon, severed one section from a disclosure

provision in Section 201; but this is no different from Judge Henderson severing a phrase

from Section 323(e). Henderson Op. at Part IV.D.4. It is also important to note that I have

not “drafted legislation.” Id. Nothing in my opinion rewrites BCRA in any manner

whatsoever. I have accepted the statute on its face, finding its core provisions constitutional,

with exceptions noted above as to some ancillary provisions.

11

and Supreme Court precedent. It is an approach that I believe is consistent with our common

law traditions: a decision is rooted in the record of this case and guided by the constitutional

boundaries established by the Supreme Court’s campaign finance jurisprudence. Under this

approach, I have only found three of the challenged sections unconstitutional: Sections 213,

318, and 504. The provisions I have found unconstitutional are all provisions of BCRA that

are not central to its core mission and are entirely severable without doing injustice to the

remainder of the law. The rest of the challenged provisions I find either constitutional or

nonjusticiable, with the small exception, as observed in the per curiam opinion, of one

disclosure provision contained in Section 201. In the case of Section 201, Judge Leon and

I have severed subsection (5) of Section 201; a relatively minor change that does not impair

the remaining disclosure provisions of the Act.3
12

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION ....................................................... 4

TABLE OF CONTENTS ................................................. 12

FINDINGS OF FACT ................................................... 16

TITLE I: BCRA NONFEDERAL MONEY (“SOFT MONEY”) PROVISIONS ......... 17

National Party Nonfederal Money Fundraising and Spending ......... 17

The Rise of Nonfederal Money Spending ................... 22

The Rise of Nonfederal Money Is Not Related to “Party Building”

............................................... 25

National Party “Issue Advocacy” Campaigns Funded With Nonfederal

Money ......................................... 27

Get-Out-The-Vote (GOTV) .............................. 60

Voter Registration ...................................... 64

Redistricting .......................................... 67

Other Activities Paid for with Nonfederal Funds .............. 69

The State Parties Have Become “Branches” of the National Parties

............................................... 75

Summary ............................................. 80

The Role of Federal Lawmakers in Political Party Nonfederal Fundraising

.................................................... 82

Federal Lawmakers Run the Party Committees ............... 82

Federal Lawmakers Solicit Nonfederal Funds for the National Party

Committees ..................................... 88

Nonfederal Funds are Given with Intent to Assist Specific Members of

Congress; Political Parties Keep Track of Contributions

Members of Congress Raise ........................ 99

Federal Lawmakers and National Party Committees Solicit Nonfederal

Funds for State Parties ............................ 104

Summary ............................................ 108

Corruption ................................................ 109

Vote Buying/Bribery ................................... 110

Donors are Pressured to Make Contributions to Political Parties

.............................................. 116

Federal Officeholders’ Awareness of Who Donates to Parties . . 120

Evidence Regarding Contributions and Access to Federal Lawmakers

.............................................. 127
13

Empirical Evidence Linking Donations to Corruption ......... 177

Summary ............................................ 178

Public Perception of Corruption ............................... 179

Summary ............................................ 190

Nonprofit Groups’ Involvement in Federal Elections ............... 191

The Effect of BCRA on Interest Group Activity ................... 199

State Party Fundraising ...................................... 204

Fundraising By National Party Officials & Federal Officeholders for

State Parties .................................... 204

CDP and CRP Fundraising .............................. 206

TITLE II: ELECTIONEERING COMMUNICATIONS THAT AFFECT FEDERAL ELECTIONS

......................................................... 211

The Origins of the Problem Congress Sought to Solve With Title II ... 211

The Rise of Issue Advocacy Campaigns Funded by Corporate & Labor Union

General Treasuries .................................... 212

Express Advocacy Not Widely Used Nor An Effective Means of Campaign

Advertising .......................................... 219

Current Federal Law Does Not Distinguish Between Pure Issue

Advertisements and Candidate-Centered Issue Advertisements

................................................... 225

Candidate-Centered Issue Advocacy Has Risen Because it Permits

Corporations & Labor Unions to Influence Federal Elections with

General Treasury Funds While Avoiding FECA’s Restrictions . . 236

Organizations’ Use of Candidate-Centered Issue Advocacy .......... 239

Federal Candidates and Political Parties Know and Appreciate Who Runs

Candidate-Centered Issue Advertisements in Their Races

................................................... 274

Candidate-Centered Issue Advertisements Are Empirically Distinguishable

from “Pure” Issue Advertisements ....................... 285

BCRA’s Restriction on “Electioneering Communication” ........... 303

The Primary Definition of Electioneering Communication is Narrowly

Tailored to Radio & Television Advertisements ............. 305

The Primary Definition of Electioneering Communication is Narrowly

Tailored by Broadcast Advertisements Appearing Sixty Days Before a

General Election and Thirty Days Before a Primary Election, That

Name a Candidate, and Are Targeted to that Candidate’s Electorate

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 313

Expert Reports on BCRA’s Effect on Political Advertising .......... 336

Conclusion .......................................... 348

TITLE III: MISCELLANEOUS ........................................ 349
14

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW .............................................. 356

Title II: NONCANDIDATE CAMPAIGN EXPENDITURES ............. 356

Sections 201, 203 and 204: The Prohibition on Electioneering

Communications ...................................... 356

Introduction ......................................... 357

Standard of Review ................................... 359

Express Electoral Advocacy is Not a Constitutional Requirement

.............................................. 364

The Evisceration of Section 441b ......................... 386

Conclusion ..................................... 406

Title II of BCRA is Narrowly Tailored to Serve a Compelling

Governmental Interest ............................ 408

BCRA’s Prohibition on Electioneering Communications; the

Primary Definition Serves Compelling Governmental

Interests ................................. 408

Sections 201, 203, and 204 of BCRA are Narrowly Tailored to

Serve Compelling Governmental Interests ....... 427

Plaintiffs’ Underbreadth Challenge ....................... 464

Plaintiffs’ Challenge Relating to Exemption for News Stories,

Commentaries or Editorials from a Broadcast Station ... 471

Conclusion Regarding Title II ........................... 475

Section 213 ............................................... 477

TITLE I: REDUCTION OF SPECIAL INTEREST INFLUENCE ......... 478

Section 101: Soft Money of Political Parties ..................... 478

Background: The Rise of Nonfederal Money as a Means of Financing

Federal Elections ................................ 481

Plaintiffs’ First Amendment Challenges ................... 488

Standard of Review .............................. 488

Title I is Constitutional Under the First Amendment .... 491

Title I Is Closely Drawn .......................... 562

Conclusion ..................................... 593

Plaintiffs’ Equal Protection and Underbreadth Claims ........ 594

Plaintiffs’ Federalism Challenge ......................... 600

Conclusion .......................................... 608

Title III: MISCELLANEOUS ...................................... 610

Sections 304, 305, 307, 316, and 319 ........................... 610

Section 318: Prohibition of Contributions by Minors .............. 610

Title V: ADDITIONAL DISCLOSURE PROVISIONS .................. 614

Section 504 ............................................... 614
15

CONCLUSION ....................................................... 615

APPENDIX .......................................................... 618

Expert Reports on BCRA’s Effect on Political Advertisements ............ 618

The CMAG Data Set ........................................ 618

The Annenberg Public Policy Center Reports ..................... 625

The Goldstein Expert Report .................................. 627

Buying Time Studies ........................................ 639

AFL-CIO Advertisements Run Within 30 Days of a Primary Election ....... 696

Empirical Studies on Corruption .................................... 703
4

 Almost exclusive reliance on the litigants’ proposed findings of fact, which I have

already indicated is a method of fact finding that I do not employ, should lead to a careful

examination by the reviewing Court of the adopted findings. See Berger v. Iron Workers

Reinforced Rodmen Local 201, 843 F.2d 1395, 1404 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (per curiam) (“While

‘the fact that the trial judge has adopted proposed findings does not, by itself, warrant

reversal,’ ‘it does raise the possibility that there was insufficient independent evaluation of

the evidence and may cause the losing party to believe that his position has not been given

the consideration it deserves.’”) (quoting Photo Elecs. Corp. v. England, 581 F.2d 772, 777

(9th Cir.1978)); id at 1408.

16

II. FINDINGS OF FACT

Reviewing a record in a case involving protected First Amendment rights requires

serious examination and analysis of the underlying testimony and documentary evidence.

Therefore, with few exceptions, I have not relied on or cited to the Findings of Fact proposed

by the litigants. To ensure accuracy and to eliminate any gloss or characterizations added by

the parties, I have reviewed and cited the underlying documents, depositions, or declarations

and have, in many instances, chosen to quote directly from the original sources.4

I have endeavored to develop a factual record that is commensurate with my legal

approach. Accordingly, even though in regard to my Conclusions of Law I am in dissent on

most of Title I, as well as in dissent with regard to the primary definition of electioneering

communication in Title II, I have found it appropriate to adequately set forth the bases of my

Factual Findings to assist the appellate review of the three-judge District Court’s decisions,

and because the nature of my legal positions demand it.

Having set forth the following preliminaries, I now turn to my Findings of Fact.

While the record is exhaustive–replete with multiple sources for each point–I have focused
5

 I am compelled to respond to Judge Henderson, who, without any elaboration, has

criticized three of my Findings in particular as leaving her “‘with the definite and firm

conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Henderson Op. at 67 n.55 (quoting Easley

v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 242 (2001) (citing my Findings ¶¶ 2.13; 1.82-1.83). In the

examples Judge Henderson cites, she points to two summaries and an introduction; ignoring

the surrounding Findings in support of the evidentiary record. I have in my Findings

discussed in great detail the foundation and basis for the particular Findings she cites. See

infra Findings ¶¶ 2.8, 2.8.1-2.8.3.5; 1.73-1.81; 1.83.1-1.83.7. Judge Henderson does not

assail that analysis nor does she in any way indicate a reasoned basis for her disagreement.

As such, I must respectfully disagree with her view that a “mistake has been committed” in

regard to these three Findings of Fact.

In addition, although Judge Henderson determines that the record is largely

superfluous to her legal conclusions, see Henderson Op. at 7 n.1 (“[a]lthough the actions

before us have produced a large (but probably unnecessary) record”) (emphasis added), she

seemingly urges the Supreme Court to adopt her “Alternative Findings of Fact” “as an

alternative to those of the majority,” id. at 67, and in conclusory fashion alleges mistakes in

the Findings of Fact of the “majority,” without any specificity. Id. Given that Judge

Henderson’s findings are “an alternative to those in the majority,” I have not found it prudent

to catalogue each instance where I disagree with her factual conclusions. I would simply

observe that I respectfully disagree that Judge Henderson’s “Alternative Findings of Fact”

are a more appropriate and accurate “alternative to those [Findings of Fact] of the majority.”

Id.

17

on selecting from the complete record, facts that are probative in supporting my legal

conclusions, distinguishing, where appropriate, between disputed and uncontroverted

evidence. In short, I have exercised my discretion to be selective without sacrificing, to the

best of my ability, my due diligence.5

TITLE I: BCRA NONFEDERAL MONEY (“SOFT MONEY”) PROVISIONS

National Party Nonfederal Money Fundraising and Spending

1.1 As discussed both in the per curiam opinion and my own conclusions of law, FECA

was silent on how to draw lines around money raised outside of FECA’s source and
6

 Thomas Mann is one of Defendants’ experts. I note that neither Plaintiffs nor

(continued...)

18

amount limitations for political parties to spend on activities that were expected not

to be used for the purpose of influencing a federal election. The FEC’s opinions and

rulemakings drew that line by permitting state and national party committees to pay

for the nonfederal portion of their administrative costs and voter registration and

turnout programs with monies raised under relevant state laws (not FECA), even if

they permitted contributions from sources such as corporations and labor unions that

were prohibited under FECA. As a result, national and state parties began to raise socalled “soft money,” which described these nonfederal funds–not subject to FECA

limits and restrictions–to pay for a share of election-related activities.

1.2 It is undisputed that over the past two decades the parties have raised and spent an

increasing amount of nonfederal funds. 

1.3 In 1980 the national Republican party spent roughly $15 million

in soft money, the Democrats $4 million. This constituted 9%

of total spending by the two national parties. In 1984 the

amount of soft money spent by the national parties increased

marginally to $21.6 million but it constituted a smaller share

(5%) of total national party activity. In 1988 . . . . [p]arty soft

money spending more than doubled to $45 million, which was

11% of national party totals . . . . By 1988, both parties had

developed effective means of courting large soft money donors.

After the election, Republicans revealed that they had received

gifts of $100,000 each from 267 donors; Democrats counted 130

donors contributing $100,000 or more. . . .

Mann6

 Report at 12-13 [DEV 1-Tab 1] (citations omitted). 
6

(...continued)

Defendants have challenged the qualifications of any of the designated experts in this case.

19

1.4 The FEC began tracking nonfederal donations in the 1992 election cycle. During that

cycle the Democratic and Republican parties together raised $86.1 million in

nonfederal funds. During the 1994 election cycle the two major parties raised $101.6

million in nonfederal funds; during the 1996 election cycle they raised $263.5 million

in nonfederal funds; during the 1998 election cycle they raised $222.5 million in

nonfederal funds; during the 2000 election cycle they raised $487.5 million in

nonfederal funds; and during the 2002 election cycle they raised $495.8 million in

nonfederal funds. See FEC, News Release: Party Fundraising Reaches $1.1 Billion

in 2002 Election Cycle (Dec. 18, 2002), available at http://www.fec.gov/press/

20021218party/20021218party. html.

1.4.1 There was 

a threefold increase in national party soft money activity

between 1992 and 1996—from $80 million to $272 million. Soft

money as a share of total national party spending jumped from

16% to 30%. Both parties and their elected officials worked

hard to solicit soft money donations from corporations, wealthy

individuals, and labor unions. During the 1996 election the

national party committees received ... approximately 27,000

contributions from federally prohibited sources . . . Less than

$10 million of the $272 million was contributed directly to state

and local candidates in the 1996 cycle. . . . The two parties

transferred a total of $115 million in soft money to state party

committees, which financed two-thirds of state party soft money

expenditures. . . . State party soft money expenditures for

political communication/advertising jumped from less than $2
20

million in 1992 to $65 million in 1996. 

Mann Report at 21-22 [DEV 1-Tab 1] (citation omitted). During the 1996

election cycle, the top 50 nonfederalmoney donors made contributions ranging

from $530,000 to $3,287,175. Id. at 22. Three of the top 50 nonfederal money

donors to the national political parties in 1996 were state political parties.

Mann Expert Report Tbl. 5 [DEV 1-Tab 1]. 

1.4.2 The total amount of soft money spent [in the 1998 midterm

election cycle]—$221 million—was less than in 1996 but more

than double the previous midterm election. And soft money as

a share of total spending by the national parties jumped to 34%.

The congressional party campaign committees put a premium on

raising and spending soft money to advance the election

prospects of their candidates. . . . Both national party committees

had discovered they could finance campaign activity on behalf

of their senatorial candidates with soft money in the form of

‘issue advocacy.’ The same pattern, more pronounced with the

Democrats than the Republicans, was evident in the House

campaign committees.

Mann Report at 23 [DEV 1-Tab 1] (citation omitted).

1.4.3 [S]oft money financing of party campaigning exploded in the

2000 election cycle. Soft money spending by the national parties

reached $498 million, now 42% of their total spending. Raising

a half billion dollars in soft money [in 2000] took a major effort

by the national parties and elected officials, but they had the

advantage of focusing their efforts on large donors. . . .The top

50 soft money donors . . . each contributed between $955,695

and $5,949,000. Among the many soft money donors who gave

generously to both parties were Global Crossing, Enron and

WorldCom.

Mann Report at 24-25 [DEV 1-Tab 1] (citation omitted). “A total of $280
7

 Donald Green is one of Defendants’ experts.

21

million in soft money—well over half the amount raised by the six national

party committees—was transferred to state parties [in 2000], along with $135

million in hard money.” Id. at 26. “By contrast, the national parties

contributed . . . only $19 million directly to state and local candidates, less than

4% of their soft money spending and 1.6% of their total financial activity in

2000.” Mann Report at 26 [DEV 1-Tab 1] (citation omitted). The table below

“shows the trend in hard and soft money donations to the political parties since

the 1991-1992 election cycle, when the FEC first began tracking these figures.

Soft money donations rose from $86.1 million to $495.1 million between

1991-2 and 1999-2000, but hard money contributions rose markedly as well,

from $445 million to $741 million.” Green7 Expert Report at 30 [DEV 1-Tab

3].

1991-92 1993-94 1995-96 1997-98 1999-2000

Hard

Money

$445.0 $384.7 $638.1 $445.0 $741.0

Soft Money $86.1 $101.6 $262.1 $224.4 $495.1

Total $531.1 $486.3 $900.2 $669.4 $1,236.1

Id. (Tbl. 1: National Party Receipts 1992-2000) (figures in millions) (based on

“FEC Reports Increase in Party Fundraising for 2000” release of May 15,

2001). Defendants’ expert Donald Green points out that while the amount of
22

money flowing into the campaign finance system has continued to grow, “the

lawmakers subject to its influence remain constant in number.” Green Rebuttal

Report at 22 [DEV 5-Tab 1]. 

1.4.4 During the first 18 months of the 2001-2002 election cycle the parties reported

nonfederal receipts of $308.2 million, which is a 21 percent increase over the

same period during the 1999-2000 cycle. The FEC notes that this increase is

“all the more significant given that typically parties raise more in Presidential

campaign cycles than in non-presidential campaigns.” Press Release, Federal

Election Commission, Party Fundraising Growth Continues (Sept. 19, 2002)

FEC141-0001 [DEV 28]. By October 16, 2002, the parties had raised over

$421 million in nonfederal funds. News Release, Federal Election

Commission, National Party Fundraising Strong in Pre-Election Filings,

available at http://www.fec.gov/press/20021030partypre.html/20021030party

pre.html. 

The Rise of Nonfederal Money Spending

1.5 The figures above demonstrate that although nonfederal receipts and spending began

to grow in the 1980s, this trend accelerated beginning in 1996.

1.6 Experts from both parties attribute the accelerated rise in nonfederal money spending

to President Bill Clinton and his political consultant Dick Morris’ use of such funds

during the 1996 campaign to fund 
8

 David Magleby is an expert for Defendants.

23

television ads designed to promote Clinton’s reelection. While the ads

prominently featured the President, none of these costs were charged

as coordinated expenditures on behalf of Clinton’s campaign. Instead

the party paid the entire cost, based on a legal argument never before

made: that party communications which did not use explicit words

advocating the election or defeat of a federal candidate could be treated

like generic party advertising and financed, according to the FEC

allocation rules, with a mix of soft and hard money.

Mann Report at 18 [DEV 1-Tab 1]. In the words of Plaintiffs’ expert Raymond La

Raja, this “maneuver . . . catapulted soft money.” La Raja Cross Exam. Ex. 3 at 45

[JDT 15] (Raymond Joseph La Raja, American Political Parties in the Era of Soft

Money (2001) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California at Berkeley).

The strategy to deploy soft money for [political advertising] is

described in a series of memos from Dick Morris. . . . Morris says, “I

met with . . . attorney[s] . . . and explained the kinds of ads I had in

mind. Fortunately, they said the law permitted unlimited expenditures

by a political party for such ‘issue-advocacy’ ads. By the end of the

race, we had spent almost thirty-five million dollars on issue-advocacy

ads (in addition to about fifty million dollars on conventional

candidate-oriented media), burying the Republican proposals and

building a national consensus in support of the president on key issues.”

Magleby8 Expert Report at 11 (quoting Dick Morris, Behind the Oval Office: Getting

Reelected Against All Odds 141, 624 (1999)) [DEV 4-Tab 8]. “The national

Democratic party managed to finance two-thirds of its pro-Clinton ‘issue ad’

television blitz by taking advantage of the more favorable allocation methods

available to state parties. They simply transferred the requisite mix of hard and soft
24

dollars to party committees in the states they targeted and had the state committees

place the ads.” Mann Expert Report at 22 [DEV 1-Tab 1]; see also La Raja Cross

Exam. Ex. 3 at 14, 37-48 [JDT 15] (discussing the emergence of “party soft money”);

Finding ¶ 1.26.1 (discussing allocation regime).

1.7 Experts for both sides agree that “[i]t did not take the Republican party long to

respond in kind by promoting Bob Dole and Jack Kemp.” Magleby Expert Report at

11 [DEV 4-Tab 8]; see also La Raja Cross Exam. Ex. 3 at 46 [JDT Vol. 15] (“The

Dole-Kemp campaign responded to the Morris plan with its own party-based media

strategy.”).

In May of 1996, the Republican National Committee announced a $20

million “issue advocacy” advertising campaign. Its purpose, in the

words of the chairman, would be “to show the differences between

Dole and Clinton and between Republicans and Democrats on the

issues facing our country, so we can engage full-time in one of the most

consequential elections in our history.” These presidential

candidate-specific ads, like the Democratic ones, were targeted on key

battleground states and financed with a mix of hard and (mostly) soft

money. Both parties were now financing a significant part of the

campaigns of their presidential candidates outside of the strictures of

the FECA and well beyond the bounds of the 1979 FEC ruling that

national parties may raise corporate and union funds and solicit

unlimited donations from individuals “for the exclusive and limited

purpose of influencing the nomination or election of candidates for

nonfederal office.”

Mann Expert Report at 20 (citation omitted) [DEV 1-Tab 1]; see also infra Findings

¶ 1.20.1 (Republican consultants’ discussion about whether such advertisements met

the “issue advocacy test”).
9

 Since January 2001, Joe Lamson has served as the Communications Director for the

Office of Public Instruction of the State of Montana, a post he also held from early 1997 until

January 2000. During 2000, Lamson managed Nancy Keenan’s campaign to represent

Montana’s Congressional district. During 1996, Lamson managed Bill Yellowtail’s campaign

to represent Montana’s Congressional district. From 1983 through 1996, Lamson served as

the state director for United States Representative Pat Williams’ Congressional office in

Montana. During this same period, Lamson also managed Congressman Williams’ election

campaigns in Montana. From 1981 to 1983, Lamson was Executive Director of the Montana

Democratic Party. Lamson provided a sworn declaration in Colorado Republican Fed.

Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 41 F. Supp. 2d 1197 (D. Colo. 1999), aff’d, 213 F.3d 1221 (10th

Cir. 2000), rev’d, 533 U.S. 431 (2001). Lamson Decl. ¶¶ 2-3 [DEV 7-Tab 26].

25

1.8 This approach for the use of nonfederal funds spilled over into congressional races.

Mann Expert Report at 20 [DEV 1-Tab 1]; see also Lamson9 Decl. ¶ 9 (describing

both parties’ national committees’ use of nonfederal money to run advertisements in

a race for Congress in Montana). 

1.9 By the end of the 2000 election cycle, it was clear that although “[s]cholars might

differ about how best to change the campaign finance system, . . . they could not avoid

the conclusion that party soft money and electioneering in the guise of issue advocacy

had rendered the FECA regime largely ineffectual.” Mann Expert Report at 26.

The Rise of Nonfederal Money Is Not Related to “Party Building”

1.10 “The parties’ expanding use of soft money for the promotion or attack of particular

candidates . . . . [runs] counter to the stated purposes of soft money which were to

permit parties to raise unlimited amounts of money for ‘party building’ purposes,

unlike hard money which is subject to the contribution limits given to the parties to

help elect or defeat candidates.” Magleby Expert Report at 11 [DEV 4-Tab 8].
10 Senator William Brock he served as United States Representative from Tennessee

from 1963 until 1971. From 1971 until 1977, he served as a United States Senator from the

State of Tennessee. From 1977 until 1981, he served as Chairman of the Republican

National Committee. Brock Decl. ¶ 2 [DEV 6-Tab13]. 

11 Senator David Boren served as a United States Senator from Oklahoma from 1979-

1994. Boren Decl. ¶ 2 [DEV 6-Tab 8]

26

Magleby notes that “[t]he content of such ads does nothing to foster party

infrastructure. Those who make the ads and manage the campaigns are consultants,

who often do not even reside in the state where the election is taking place.” Magleby

Expert Report at 49 [DEV 4-Tab 8]. Plaintiffs’ expert La Raja concurs, finding that

the political parties “exploit federal campaign finance laws by using soft money for

candidate support even though federal laws require them to use it for generic party

building.” La Raja Cross Exam. Ex. 3 at 74-75; see also La Raja Cross Exam. at 67

[JDT Vol. 15] (finding that “more non-federal funds in the allocation accounts are

used for media rather than what I call party building”).

1.11 As former Senator Brock10 attests, nonfederal money 

by and large is not used for ‘party building.’ To the contrary, the

parties by and large use the money to help elect federal candidates -- in

the Presidential campaigns and in close Senate and House elections.

Far from reinvigorating the parties, soft money has simply strengthened

certain candidates and a few large donors, while distracting parties

from traditional and important grassroots work.

Brock Decl. ¶ 6 [DEV 6-Tab 9]; see also Boren11 Decl. ¶ 4 [DEV 6-Tab 8] (“[S]oft
12 Peter Buttenwieser is a large contributor to the Democratic Party. He estimates that

from the 1996 election cycle through the 2002 cycle, he has donated over $2.8 million in

non-federal funds to national committees of the Democratic Party, including over $1.2

million in the 2000 election cycle. Also from the 1996 election cycle through the current

cycle, he estimates that he and his wife have contributed approximately $100,000 per cycle

in federal funds to federal candidate committees and other federal political committees not

affiliated with political parties. During this same period, he has also hosted many hard money

fundraising events for federal candidates in Philadelphia. Buttenwieser Decl. ¶ 6 [DEV 6-

Tab 11].

13 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 44 n.52 (1976).

27

money is not used purely for ‘party building’ activities”); Buttenwieser

12 Decl. ¶ 15

[DEV 6-Tab 11] (explaining that there is little difference between federal and

nonfederal money beyond the source and amount limitations on federal money,

because national and state political parties use nonfederal money to influence federal

elections).

National Party “Issue Advocacy” Campaigns Funded With Nonfederal Money

1.12 As the experts for both parties note, the rise in nonfederal money fundraising was

spurred by the new-found ability to run “issue advertisements” designed to affect

federal elections.

1.13 Witnesses involved in the political process all agree that political party “issue

advocacy” includes communications, paid for in whole or part with nonfederal money,

that attack or support a candidate by name while claiming to be an issue discussion

outside the reach of federal election laws and do not use the Buckley express advocacy

language referred to as “magic words.”13 
14 Senator Warren Rudman was elected to the United States Senate from New

Hampshire in 1980 where he served two terms. Rudman Decl. ¶¶ 1, 3 [DEV 8-Tab 34]. 

28

Members of Congress and candidates for federal office agree that political

party advertisements paid for with nonfederal funds often influence elections. See

146 Cong. Rec. H428 (Feb. 15, 2000) (Rep. Ganske) (noting that parties in the 1996

election cycle “took . . . [nonfederal] money and they did not use it to just go out and

get a voter registration guide, they used that money for issue ads on TV that were

nothing less than full campaign attack ads. Independent surveys have shown that 80

percent of those, quote, issue ads were actually attack ads.”); Shays Decl. in RNC ¶¶

7, 8 [DEV 68-Tab 40] (“The political parties . . . use these [nonfederal] funds not for

general party-building activities, but instead on television advertisements that are

designed to influence the outcome of federal elections (and are often indistinguishable

from candidate-sponsored campaign ads.”); Meehan Decl. in RNC ¶ 13 [DEV 68-Tab

30] (“I believe that ‘issue ads’ by party committees are designed to and do affect the

outcomes of elections, that they defeat candidates, and that they drive up the costs of

elections.”); Rudman14 Decl. ¶ 12 [DEV 8-Tab 34] (“The parties use soft money to

help federal candidates get elected by running so-called ‘issue ads’ funded with soft

money in closely contested federal races.”); McCain Decl. ¶¶ 15, 17 (describing

political party advertising demonstrating that political “parties circumvent federal

contribution and spending limits by running candidate ads under the guise of ‘issue
15 Since early 2001, Linda Chapin has been the Director of the Metropolitan Center

for Regional Studies at the University of Central Florida. Chapin Decl. ¶ 2 [DEV 6-Tab 12]

received about 49% of the votes cast. Id. ¶ 4. From 1998 to 2000, Chapin directed the

Orange County (Florida) Clerk’s Office. Id. ¶ 2. Prior to that, Chapin was elected to two

successive four-year terms, in 1990 and 1994, as County Chairman of Orange County. Id.

The County Chairman is a strong executive position roughly equivalent to a mayoral office.

Id. In recognition of Chapin’s work as County Chairman, she received a Public Service

Excellence Award from then-President Bill Clinton in 1997, and an Alumni Achievement

Award from the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University in 1999. Id. Prior

to her tenure as County Chairman, she was elected to a four-year term on the Orange County

Commission in 1986.

16 Terry S. Beckett is a Democratic political consultant who has spent about 25 years

working on political campaigns. Beckett Decl. ¶ 2 [DEV 6-Tab 3]. Beckett worked on the

1976 and 1980 Presidential campaigns of Jimmy Carter, the 1978 Bill Nelson Congressional

campaign, and she ran Dick Batchelor’s 1982 Congressional campaign. Id. Beckett also

endeavored to establish a House Democratic Caucus within the Alabama legislature in the

mid 1980’s. Id. Beckett ran Gary Hart’s 1988 Presidential campaign in Florida and

Louisiana, and Dick Gephardt’s 1988 Presidential campaign in Florida. Id. In 1986, Beckett

did the polling on Linda Chapin’s campaign for Orange County (Florida) Commissioner, and

ran Chapin’s 1990 and 1994 campaigns for Orange County Chairman. Id. Beckett also

served as general consultant on Ms. Chapin’s 2000 campaign to represent Florida’s Eighth

Congressional district, overseeing the work of the campaign manager and the media and

polling consultants. Id. Beckett has also been involved in government having worked on the

Executive Staff for Bob Graham from 1981-82 when he was the Governor of Florida and

also serving as Ms. Chapin’s Chief of Staff from 1991 to 1994 when she was County

Chairman. Id. In addition, Beckett worked for a polling firm during the 1980s. Id.

29

advocacy.’”); Chapin15 Decl. ¶ 11 [DEV 6-Tab 12] (stating that the National

Republican Campaign Committee (“NRCC”) ran television advertisements during her

2000 Congressional campaign designed to influence the result of the election); Bloom

Decl. ¶ 10 [DEV 6-Tab 7].

Political consultants agree as well. See Beckett16 Decl. ¶ 11 (“The NRCC itself

ran television ads in the 2000 Congressional campaign. . . . which as I recall were run
17 Rocky Pennington is a Republican political consultant. Pennington Decl. ¶ 2 [DEV

8-Tab 31]. He is the owner and President of three Florida companies engaged in political

activities: Southern Campaign Resources, Direct Mail Systems, Inc., and Summit

Communications. Id. Southern Campaign Resources, which Pennington founded in 1982,

does general consulting primarily for Florida state campaigns, but has also done

Congressional races in Florida, including Congressman Cliff Steams’ first race in 1988 in

Ocala, Bill Sublette’s 2000 campaign in the Eighth Congressional district, and Congressman

Jeff Miller’s 2001 special election in the Panhandle. Id. Direct Mail Systems, founded in

1981, is a direct mail company with roughly 100 employees that has done fundraising and

has sent voter contact mail for candidates, parties and interest groups in Florida and

elsewhere. Id. Direct Mail Systems has also sent voter contact mail for some of Florida’s

Republican Congressional delegation, as well as for state Republican parties in many other

states. Finally, Summit Communications, which Pennington founded in 2000, creates

political advertising for television and radio and buys airtime for various campaigns, such

as Congressman Miller’s 2001 general election campaign. Id.

18 Gail Stoltz has been employed as the Political Director of the DNC since May 2001.

From 1998 through 2001, she worked for the Service Employees International Union as

Government Affairs Director. Prior to this she worked as Political Director for the

Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee (“DSCC”) and in various capacities for the

Democratic National Committee (“DNC”). Stoltz Decl. ¶ 1.

30

in the two months prior to the general election . . . . [which] were clearly intended to

influence the election result.”) & Ex. 3 (storyboards of two of these advertisements)

[DEV 6-Tab 3]; id. ¶ 9 (describing Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee

(“DCCC”) efforts during the same election); Lamson Decl. ¶¶ 9, 17, Ex. 2-4 [DEV

7-Tab 26] (noting that political parties ran “issue ads” designed to influence the

outcome of the Montana Congressional election in both 1996 and 2000); Pennington17

Decl. ¶ 10-11, 13-15 [DEV 8-Tab 31] (discussing how parties can and have used issue

advocacy to affect federal elections). The DNC’s political director also concurs.

Stoltz18 Decl. ¶ 16 [DEV 9-Tab 39] (“In my experience, issue ads affect elections.
31

The ads can either demoralize or confuse voters so that they do not vote, or they can

energize a voter base for or against a party or its candidates. During a presidential

election year, the ads definitely make a difference when a presidential candidate is

featured.”).

In addition, experts for both sides agree that these “issue ads” are intended to

and do support the campaigns of federal candidates. See La Raja Cross Exam. Ex. 3

at 15 [JDT Vol. 15], 101-04; Magleby Expert Report at 40-42 [DEV 4-Tab 8].

Characteristics of National Party Nonfederal Campaign Advertisements

1.14 Many national political party committee “issue ads” have focused on the positions,

past actions, or general character traits of federal candidates, as part of efforts to

influence federal elections. 

Scripts of these advertisements confirm this. See, e.g., ODP0021-01393 [DEV

70-Tab 48] (Republican National Committee’s (“RNC”) advertisement titled

“Pledge,” discussed infra Findings ¶ 1.20.2; ODP0023-02288 to 95 [DEV 70-Tab 48]

(sample scripts of “Keep More” with different sponsors identified (i.e. RNC, CRP,

“[state party name]”). Some versions of the advertisement end with “[Member Name]

kept his promise and voted for the middle-class tax cut. Clinton vetoed it,” while

others end with “Congressman [___] voted for the largest tax increase in American

history . . . and against Republican efforts to roll it back.”); ODP0023-02308 [DEV

70-Tab 48] (national political party advertisement titled “Fool Me Once,” beginning
32

with the line “Compare the Clinton rhetoric with the Clinton record,” discussing

statements President Clinton made and actions on the same issues, and concluding

with the line “Tell President Clinton you won’t be fooled again.”); ODP0023-02313

[DEV 70-Tab 48] (RNC advertisement titled “Stripes,” which states in part: “Bill

Clinton . . . He’s really something. He’s now trying to avoid a sexual harassment

lawsuit claiming he is on active military duty. . . . Active Duty? Bill Clinton. . . He’s

really something.”); ODP0023-02314 [DEV 70-Tab 48] (script of the RNC’s “The

Story,” discussed supra Finding ¶ 1.20.1); ODP0023-02326 (national political party

advertisement titled “More,” stating that “Under President Clinton, spending on

illegal[] [immigrants] has gone up. While wages for the typical worker have gone

down. . . . Tell President Clinton to stop giving benefits to illegals, and end wasteful

Washington spending.”); ODP0023-02389-92 [DEV 70-Tab 48] (three versions of a

national political party advertisement titled “Control” stating that “Washington labor

bosses and liberal special interest groups want to buy control of Congress,” and

explaining why these groups think a named candidate “will vote their way. . . to return

to higher taxes and more wasteful spending”); ODP0029-00010-25 [DEV 70-Tab 48]

(national political party advertisement titled “High Taxes” and related documents.

“High Taxes” states that a Congressional candidate while “in the state legislature. .

. voted to raise corporate and personal income tax rates almost 18 percent. He even

supports raising social security tax limits.”); ODP0029-00031 [DEV 70-Tab 48]
33

(national political party advertisement titled “Family Budget,” stating that a

Congressional candidate raised taxes while in state and local government, and

concluding: “If you think your family pays enough in taxes . . . Call [____]. Tell her

to stop raising your taxes.”) (emphasis in original); ODP0029-00041 [DEV 70-Tab

48] (national congressional committee advertisement supporting a candidate who

“knows you have better things to do with your money than pay higher taxes”); see

also ODP0029-00114 [DEV 70-Tab 48]; ODP0029-00169 [DEV 71-Tab 48];

ODP0029-00177 to 79 [DEV 71-Tab 48]; ODP0029-00235 to 37 [DEV 71-Tab 48];

ODP0029-00329 [DEV 71-Tab 48]; ODP0029-00339 [DEV 71-Tab 48];

ODP0041-00177 to 78 [DEV 71-Tab 48]; ODP0041-00202 to 06 [DEV 71-Tab 48];

ODP0041-00220 to 23 [DEV 71-Tab 48]; ODP0041-00280 to 82 [DEV 71-Tab 48];

ODP0041-00352 to 54 [DEV 71-Tab 48]; ODP0041-01261 [DEV 71-Tab 48];

ODP0041-01275 [DEV 71-Tab 48]; ODP0029-00138 to 47 [DEV 71-Tab 48];

ODP0036-01403 to 06 [DEV 71-Tab 48]; ODP0036-02931-32 [DEV 71-Tab 48];

ODP0041-00269-71 [DEV 71-Tab 48]; ODP0041-01024 to 27 [DEV 71-Tab 48];

ODP0041-01219 [DEV 71-Tab 48] (other political party advertisements that focus on

the positions, past actions, or general character traits of federal candidates, and related

documents).

1.15 Many political party committee “issue ads” have compared the positions or past

actions of competing federal candidates, portraying one position negatively and the
34

other positively, as part of efforts to influence federal elections. Scripts provided to

the Court confirm this fact. See, e.g., ODP0023-02387 [DEV 70-Tab 48] (national

political party advertisement comparing candidate positions on issues, stating that

“Congressman [____] voted for our plan to give families a $500 per child tax credit.

. . . [Opponent] voted for Jim Florio’s $2.8 billion tax increase which increased your

income, sales and gas taxes.”); ODP0029-00149 [DEV 71-Tab 48] (national political

party advertisement stating that one candidate “support[s] the $500 per child tax credit

and ending the tax penalty on married couples,” while the other “voted against” those

ideas); ODP0029-00159 [DEV 71-Tab 48] (national political party advertisement

stating that one candidate “wants Washington bureaucrats to decide what’s right for

our kids,” while the other “supports local school control”) (emphasis in original);

ODP0041-00585-86 [DEV 71-Tab 48] (national congressional campaign committee

advertisement stating that one candidate “supports a program” that “spends millions

to hire more bureaucrats,” while the other “supports proposals that spend less on

bureaucrats and more on local schools”); ODP0041-00729-32 [DEV 71-Tab 48]

(national political party advertisement stating that one candidate supports a welfare

program that “is restoring responsibility, pride and self-worth,” while the other “voted

against moving able-bodied welfare recipients from welfare to work”) (emphasis in

original); ODP0041-01152 [DEV 71-Tab 48] (national political party advertisement

stating that one candidate “doesn’t support tax cuts for Idaho working families,” while
35

the other “has a different view”) ; ODP0041-01177 [DEV 71-Tab 48] (national

political party advertisement stating that one candidate was “the only member of

Congress who did not want to tell parents when a child molester moved into their

neighborhood,” while the other “supports laws that protect our children and keep

violent criminals in jail for their full terms”); ODP0041-01189 [DEV 71-Tab 48]

(national political party advertisement stating that one candidate voted against a

measure to “abolish the tax code to force meaningful reform,” while the other “wants

to abolish the tax code, so we can create a tax code that is fairer and simpler for

working families”); ODP0041-01198 [DEV 71-Tab 48] (national political party

advertisement noting that one candidate “supports tax cuts for working families,”

while the other “voted against billions worth of tax cuts for working families”);

ODP0041-01266 [DEV 71-Tab 48] (national political party advertisement noting that

one candidate “pushed for tax increases” while the other “knows lower taxes and

responsible government spending are better policies”); ODP0041-01337 [DEV

71-Tab 48] (national political party advertisement noting that one candidate “supports

Senator Kennedy’s ultra liberal plan to mandate spending increases of 25 billion

dollars over the next five years,” while the other “supports lower taxes”).

1.16 Political parties aim their nonfederal money largely at competitive races. The political

party committees spend millions of nonfederal dollars in competitive U.S. Senate

races and hundreds of thousands of dollars or more in competitive U.S. House races.
19 Senator Dale Bumpers served two terms as Governor of Arkansas, from 1971 to

1975. Bumpers Decl. ¶ 2 [DEV 6-Tab 10]. After his time as Governor, Bumpers served as

a Member of the United States Senate, representing the State of Arkansas, from 1975 to

1999. Id. After he retired from the Senate, Senator Bumpers spent one year directing the

Center for Defense Information, a nonprofit think-tank based in Washington, D.C. Id. He

currently practices law in Washington D.C. at the law firm Arent Fox Kintner Plotkin &

Kahn, PLLC. Id. ¶ 3.

36

Magleby Report at 39 [DEV 4-Tab 8]. See also McConnell Dep. at 237 [JDT Vol. 19]

(“I think every Senator realizes that the resources of the National Republican

Senatorial Committee [“NRSC”] are going to be deployed to the . . . maximum extent

in places where there are competitive races”); Bumpers19 Decl. ¶ 4 [DEV 6-Tab 10]

(“Party committees focus their resources on competitive races.”); McCain Decl. ¶ 22

[DEV 8-Tab 29] (“[P]arties generally focus their soft money spending first on taking

care of the parties’ current officeholders and on the candidates running for open seats

and after that on the challengers running against incumbents”).

1.16.1 For example, television and radio electioneering advertising by political parties

played an important role in the 2000 Congressional elections in Florida’s

Eighth District, “a very close open-seat race.” Beckett Decl. ¶¶ 4, 9 [DEV 6-

Tab 3] (noting that the winning candidate garnered 51% of the vote). Political

parties on both sides of these campaigns ran so-called “issue ads” that were

financed partly with nonfederal money but clearly directed at influencing the

outcome of the election. The DCCC ran television advertising praising Linda

Chapin, the Democratic candidate, or criticizing the Republican candidates,
20 One advertisement run during the final 60 days of the election campaign, paid for

by the DCCC through the Florida Democratic Party, attacked Chapin’s challenger, stating

the following:

Announcer: “I’m pro-gun.” That’s how he described himself to the Orlando

Sentinel. Pro-gun. He wants to get rid of the Brady Bill, the common-sense

law that says we should just wait 5 days before purchasing a handgun. Progun. He even opposes mandatory trigger locks to keep children safe from

harm. “I’m pro-gun.” He’s Ric Keller, and you should tell him to support

sensible gun safety for a change.

Chapin Decl. ¶ 9 & Ex. 1-2 [DEV 6-Tab 12]; Beckett Decl. ¶ 9 -DEV 6-Tab 3].

21 One advertisement paid for by the NRCC ran within 60 days of the election and

stated the following: 

Announcer: It was Tyson vs. McNeeley, the fight shown on Pay-PerView, bought and paid for by the county jail system. Linda Chapin’s

county commission ran the jail system that paid for Cable TV for

convicts at [its] work-release center. Under Chapin, Convicts also got

new TVs and VCRs. The Sentinel wrote cells are carpeted. The day

room has padded furniture, such is life for hundreds of Orange County

Jail prisoners. Ask Chapin why convicts got Cable TV.

Chapin Decl. ¶ 11 & Ex. 3-2 [DEV 6-Tab 12]; Beckett Decl. ¶ 11; Pennington Decl. ¶ 14.

37

through the Democratic State Party in order to take advantage of the more

favorable hard money-soft money allocation ratios enjoyed by state parties.20

Beckett Decl. ¶ 9, Ex. 1 [DEV 6-Tab 3]; Chapin Decl. ¶ 9 [DEV 6-Tab 12];

see also Bloom Decl. ¶ 10, Ex. 1-1, 1-4, (describing a similar situation for the

2000 election campaign in Florida’s 22nd Congressional District) [DEV 6-Tab

7]. The NRCC and the Florida Republican Party also ran television

advertisements in the two months prior to the general election, most of which

criticized Chapin’s record or positions, and which witnesses testify were

clearly intended to influence the election results.21 Chapin Decl. ¶ 10, Ex. 2
22 Elaine Bloom is currently engaged in consulting, public speaking, and community

activities. Bloom Decl. ¶ 2 [DEV 6-Tab 7]. In 2001, Bloom was a candidate for Mayor of

Miami Beach, Florida. Id. In 2000, Bloom was the Democratic candidate in the general

election to represent Florida’s 22nd Congressional district, running against the incumbent

Republican Clay Shaw, who had served in Congress for nearly 20 years. Id. (Shaw won the

race by approximately 500 votes out of over 200,000 cast). Prior to the 2000 race, Bloom

served as a member of the Florida House of Representatives for over 18 years, from 1974 to

1978 (representing Northeast Dade County) and from 1986-2000 (representing Miami Beach

and Miami). Id. Bloom was Speaker Pro-Tempore of the Florida House from 1992 to 1994,

and also served as chair of several legislative committees, including the Health Care

Committee, the Joint Legislative Management Committee, the Joint Legislative Auditing

Committee, and the Tourism and Cultural Affairs Committee. Id. 

38

[DEV 6-Tab 12]; Beckett Decl. ¶ 10, Ex. 2 [DEV 6-Tab 3]; Pennington Decl.

¶ 14, Ex. 3 [DEV 8-Tab 31]; see also Bloom22 Decl. ¶ 11, Ex. 2 (Republican

party ads in 2000 Florida 22nd District Congressional race) [DEV 6-Tab 7].

1.16.2 Most interest groups, in contrast [to political parties], seek to

build relationships with officeholders as a way of improving

access to the legislative process and lobbying their position. In

political science, there is strong empirical support for the theory

that interest groups allocate resources primarily to pursue the

“access” strategy, meaning they give to candidates who are most

likely to win office, which is usually the incumbents (see, for

example, Herrnson 2000). Political parties, however, allocate

resources for electoral strategies, meaning they contribute

money to a party candidate who is in a potentially close election.

La Raja Expert Report ¶ 14 [RNC Vol. VII].

1.17 “Almost 92% of party ads in the 2000 election never even identified the name of a

political party, let alone encouraged voters to register with the party, to volunteer with

the local party organization, or to support the party.” Buying Time 2000 at 64 [DEV

46]. Defense Expert Magleby concurs, finding “only 15 percent of the ads in 1998
23 Jonathan Krasno and Frank Sorauf are experts for Defendants.

39

and 7 percent of the ads in 2000 mentioned the party by name in the ad, except in the

tag line indicating which party committee paid for the ad.” Magleby Expert Report

at 49 [DEV 4-Tab 8]. 

1.18 Out of the estimated $25.6 million spent by political parties on advertisements in the

1998 election cycle, $24.6 million went to fund advertisements that referred to a

federal candidate. See Krasno & Sorauf23 Expert Report at Table 1. Out of 44,485

commercials, 42,599 referred to a federal candidate. Id. Viewers perceived 94

percent of these advertisements as electioneering in nature. Id. at Table 7. 

1.19 Plaintiffs’ own experts and witnesses testify that “[i]ssue advertising outside the

context of electioneering by political parties is rare.” RNC expert Nelson Polsby Dep.

in RNC v. FEC, 98-CV-1207 (D.D.C) (hereinafter “RNC”) Ex. 3, at 5 [DEV 66-Tab

5]. In this case, the Plaintiffs' expert, Professor Raymond La Raja, acknowledges that

“issue advertisements” are intended to and do support the campaigns of federal

candidates. La Raja Cross Exam. Ex. 3 at 14-15 [JDT Vol. 15] (“[I]ssue ads, however,

have been designed with the intent of boosting the campaigns of targeted candidates.

. . . Rather than use soft money to shore up weak state and local organizations, or

enforce party discipline in government, parties invest primarily in issue ads that help

candidates.”) [JDT Vol. 15]; La Raja Decl. ¶ 16(b) [RNC Vol. VII] (“Political parties

use nonfederal money to develop and disseminate political messages.”). RNC
24 Terry Nelson is the RNC’s Deputy Chief of Staff and Executive Director of Political

Operations. Nelson Dep. at 8-9 [JDT Vol. 24]

25 Thomas Josefiak is Chief Counsel of the RNC. Josefiak Decl. ¶ 1 [RNC Vol. I].

40

political operations director Terry Nelson24 testifies that the RNC engages in “issue

advocacy in order to achieve one of our primary objectives, which is to get more

Republicans elected.” Nelson Dep. at 191 [JDT Vol. 24]. This conclusion is echoed

by Defense Expert Magleby. Magleby Expert Report at 45 [DEV 4-Tab 8] (“The

content, tactics and strategy [of political party advertisements] are generally

indistinguishable from the candidate campaigns, except that party campaign

communications are generally more negative in tone.”)

1.19.1 An RNC official provides examples of advertisement campaigns he claims the

RNC ran for “the exclusive purpose of influencing the legislative and policy

debate.” Josefiak25 Decl. ¶ 91 [RNC Vol. I]. These campaigns dealt with the

issues of the balanced budget amendment, welfare reform, and education. Id.

One of these advertisements’ purpose

was to communicate the Republican Party’s position that the

federal government must control its reckless appetite for deficit

spending. This particular advertisement featured President

Clinton, and included numerous clips of him stating a different

number of years in which he would balance the budget. The

advertisement explained, “Talk is cheap. Double talk is

expensive. Tell Mr. Clinton to support the Balanced Budget

Amendment.

Id ¶ 91(c). Josefiak calls this advertisement “one of the most memorable and
41

effective broadcast advertisements in [RNC] history.” Id. This commercial

was run in May 1996, id., the same time the RNC was running very similar socalled “issue advertisements” attacking President Clinton as part of an effort

to assist the Dole presidential campaign which was low on funds, see infra

Findings ¶ 1.20. RNC advertisements addressing welfare reform were also run

in the summer of 1996, “comparing Clinton’s rhetoric on welfare reform with

his record on welfare reform.” Josefiak Decl. ¶ 91(d)[RNC Vol. I].

Comparing President Clinton’s statements with his record was a major theme

of RNC advertisements run during this period in aid of the Dole campaign.

See infra Findings ¶¶ 1.20, 1.20.2.

Another RNC advertisement ran in October 2002, the month before a

federal election,“nationwide in support of the Republican Party’s education

agenda,” and had the following script:

Male: Every child can learn . . .

Female: . . . and deserves a quality education in a safe school.

Male: But some people say some children can’t learn . . .

Female: . . . so just shuffle them through.

Male: That’s not fair.

Female: That’s not right.

Male: Things are changing. A new federal law says every child

deserves to learn.

Female: It says test every child to make sure they’re learning

and give them extra help if they’re not.

Male: Hold schools accountable. Because no child should be in

a school that will not teach and will not change.

Female: The law says every child must be taught to read by the

3

rd grade. Because reading is a new civil right.
42

Male: President Bush’s No Child Left Behind Law.

Female: The biggest education reform and biggest increase in

education funding in 25 years.

Male: Republicans are working for better, safer schools . . .

Female: . . . so no child is left behind.

Male: That’s right . . . Republicans.

Announcer: Learn how Republican education reforms can help

your children. Call 1-800-843-7620. Help President

Bush and leave No Child Behind.

Paid for by the Republican National Committee.

Josefiak Decl. ¶ 91(e) & RNC Ex. 2428 [RNC Vol. I]. The decision by the

RNC to run this advertisement, about legislation that had already passed,

within one month of a federal election raises questions about whether

promoting education policy was the only goal of this advertisement.

These presumably are the best examples the RNC had of its “genuine

issue advocacy.” I find that two of these commercials, when viewed in

context, clearly had an electioneering purpose in addition to any policy goal.

The third, concerning education, may also have sought to promote Republican

candidates. These examples reinforce the determination of the RNC’s own

experts: genuine issue advocacy on the part of political parties is a rare

occurrence. See supra Findings ¶ 1.19.

1.20 Political parties also engage in “issue advocacy” to help their candidates whose

campaigns are low on funds. For example, the RNC spent $20 million on issue

advertisements from March 18, 1996, through the Republican National Convention

in August, designed to boost Senator Dole’s image at a time when he had virtually run
26 Pat Huyck was the RNC’s Director of Accounting as of 1999. Huyck Decl. in

Mariani v. United States, 3: CV-1701 (M.D. Pa) ¶¶ 3, 5 [DEV 79-Tab 60]. 

43

out of federal matching primary funds. The RNC paid for a portion of these issue

advertisements with nonfederal funds, including the costs of creating and/or

disseminating advertisements that attacked President Clinton’s record on welfare

reform, taxes, and budgetary policy. Thompson Comm. Report at 4014-16, 7520,

8294; Annenberg Report 1997 at 66; Huyck26 Decl. in Mariani v. United States, 3:

CV-1701 (M.D. Pa) (hereinafter Mariani) ¶¶ 3, 5 [DEV 79-Tab 60]; see also Huyck

Decl. in Mariani Attach. A [DEV Supp.-Tab 9] (text of advertisements paid for by the

RNC and other Republican party committees in part with nonfederal money). 

The RNC conducted a detailed analysis of several advertisements it was

planning to run in various markets. The advertisements consisted of two themes:

build up then-Senator and Republican presidential candidate Bob Dole, and attack

President Bill Clinton. These advertisements were tested in focus groups to see the

effect they had on undecided voters. The advertisement used to build up Senator Dole

told his life story and never mentioned the words “vote for,” “elect,” or any of the

“magic words” of express advocacy. The second set of advertisements showed

President Clinton speaking on a certain issue, then publicly stating the opposite. All

of the commercials were tested to see which would give help Senator Dole and hurt

President Clinton in the polls. Memorandum to Haley Barbour from Charlie Nave and
44

Joel Mincey, dated May 28, 1996, FEC MUR 4553, Fabrizio Dep. Ex. 5 [DEV 55-Tab

113] (INT011830); FEC MUR 4553, Fabrizio Dep. at 83-94 [DEV 55-Tab 113]

(despite working as a consultant for Senator Dole, Fabrizio McLaughlin and

Associates were sharing their data with the RNC, NRSC, and NRCC).

1.20.1 One example from this effort is “The Story”:

Audio of Bob Dole: We have a moral obligation to give our

children an America with the opportunity and values of the

nation we grew up in.

Voice Over: Bob Dole grew up in Russell, Kansas. From his

parents he learned the value of hard work, honesty and

responsibility. So when his country called . . . he answered. He

was seriously wounded in combat. Paralyzed, he underwent nine

operations.

Audio of Bob Dole: I went around looking for a miracle that

would make me whole again.

Voice Over: The doctors said he’d never walk

again. But after 39 months, he proved them

wrong.

Audio of Elizabeth Dole: He persevered, he never

gave up. He fought his way back from total

paralysis.

Voice Over: Like many Americans, his life experience and

values serve as a strong moral compass. The principle of work

to replace welfare. The principle of accountability to strengthen

our criminal justice system. The principle of discipline to end

wasteful Washington spending.

Voice of Bob Dole: It all comes down to values. What you

believe in. What you sacrifice for. And what you stand for.

Fabrizio Dep. Ex. 2; McCain Decl. ¶15. The RNC paid for “The Story,” in

part with nonfederal money, and it was intended to help Senator Dole in the

Presidential election. Huyck Decl. in Mariani ¶ 3 [DEV 79-Tab 60]; FEC
45

MUR 4553, Fabrizio Dep. at 50 [DEV 55-113]; McCain Decl. ¶ 15 [DEV

8-Tab 29]. 

The RNC’s Curt Anderson and Wes Anderson wrote to the RNC

Chairman regarding the Dole “Story” advertisement, stating: “We could run

into a real snag with the Dole Story spot. Certainly, all the quantitative and

qualitative research strongly suggests that this spot needs to be run. Making

this spot pass the issue advocacy test may take some doing.”

ODP0025-02018-20 [DEV 70-Tab 48]. Senator Levin commented: “[a]ny

reasonable person looking at that ad at that particular time in the Presidential

season would say: It’s not an ad about welfare or wasteful spending; it is an ad

about why should we elect that particular nominee.” 145 Cong. Rec. S12747

(1999) (Sen. Levin). Senator Dole himself stated that “The Story” “never says

I’m running for President. I hope that it’s fairly obvious since I’m the only one

in the picture.” Center for Responsive Politics, A Bag of Tricks: Loopholes

in the Campaign Finance System (1996) at 13, ODP0018-00172 [DEV 69-Tab

48].

1.20.2 Another example from the RNC’s 1996 issue advocacy campaign is “Pledge”

Clinton: I will not raise taxes on the middle class.

Announcer: We heard this a lot.

Clinton: We gotta give middle class tax relief, no matter

what else we do.

Announcer: Six months later, he gave us the largest tax

increase in history. Higher income taxes, income taxes
46

on social security benefits, more payroll taxes. Under

Clinton, the typical American family now pays over

$1,500 more in federal taxes. A big price to pay for his

broken promises. Tell President Clinton: You can’t

afford higher taxes for more wasteful spending.

Annenberg Report 1997 at 66; see also Huyck Decl. in Mariani ¶¶ 3 & Attach.

A [DEV 79-Tab 60].

1.21 The political parties understand that their issue advocacy campaigns affect federal

elections, and they sponsor them with that purpose. This fact is evident from the 1998

“Operation Breakout” issue advocacy campaign mounted by the NRCC in cooperation

with the RNC. “Operation Breakout” was touted as an effort to “ensure that the

[Republican] party not only maintains, but expands our majorities in Congress.”

ODP0031-00299 [DEV 71-Tab 48] (September 25, 1998, letter from RNC Chair

Nicholson to donor thanking him for his donation to “Operation Breakout”); see also

ODP0033-00534 [DEV 71-Tab 48] (RNC Solicitation letter for “Operation

Breakout,” describing it as an effort to “hold onto our majority in the House”).

1.22 The nature of the political parties’ issue advertisements, detailed supra, demonstrates

what any observer of politics has come to know: political party “issue advocacy”

campaigns are targeted at federal elections, particularly competitive races, and are

intended to, and do affect the outcome of those contests. 

National Parties Expend A Large Proportion of their Nonfederal Funds for “Issue Advocacy”

1.23 The national political parties spend a large proportion of their budgets on “issue
27 John Oliver is Deputy Chairman of the RNC.

47

advertisements” that are designed to help elect federal officeholders and candidates.

In 2000, for example, the RNC spent an estimated $70-75 million dollars on the

production and broadcasting of television and radio advertisements, including both

issue advocacy and coordinated expenditures. Oliver

27 Dep. at 148-49 [DEV

Supp.-Tab 1]. Id. “During the 2000 presidential election year, the largest single

portion of the DNC budget was used for issue advertising.” Marshall Decl. ¶ 3 [DEV

8-Tab 28].

1.24 Defense expert David Magleby’s study estimates that “over half, and sometimes as

much as three-quarters, of soft money expenditures go to broadcast advertising.”

Magleby Expert Report at 49 [DEV 4-Tab 8]. 

1.25 As Defendants’ expert Donald Green, relying on an article by Plaintiffs’ expert La

Raja, observes:

[T]he original exemptions for soft-money were justified partly on the

grounds that get-out-the-vote activity would help strengthen parties. As

it happened, only a small fraction of the soft money (or hard money, for

that matter) that flowed to state and national parties was spent on voter

mobilization activity, even broadly conceived to include direct mail and

commercial phone banking. According to the classification system

presented by La Raja and Jarvis-Shean (2001, p.3), 8.5% of national

party soft money expenditures went to ‘mobilization’ and ‘grassroots.’

The figures for state and local parties are each 15%.

D. Green Report at 14 n.17 [DEV 1-Tab 3] (citing Raymond La Raja and Elizabeth

Jarvis-Shean, Assessing the Impact of a Ban on Soft Money: Party Soft Money
48

Spending in the 2000 Elections. (Unpublished manuscript: Institute of Governmental

Studies and Citizens’ Research Foundation 2001).

National Parties Funnel Nonfederal Funds Through State Parties for the Purchase of

Advertisements Designed to Affect Federal Elections

1.26 The evidence clearly demonstrates that a large proportion of nonfederal funds

transferred from the national to the state parties is targeted for the purchase of specific

issue advertisements designed by the national parties. These advertisements are

overwhelmingly intended to affect federal elections. This is done in large part

because the state parties have better federal/nonfederal allocation ratios which allows

such state-bought advertisements to be purchased with a greater proportion of

nonfederal funds.

1.26.1 Defense expert Magleby explains how the FEC’s allocation regime makes

nonfederal fund transfers to the state parties attractive to the national parties.

Parties can stretch their soft money even further by transferring

soft and hard money to state parties where they can achieve a

better ratio of soft to hard dollars than if they spent the money

themselves. This is because the ratio of soft to hard dollars for

party spending if done by the national patty committees is 35

percent soft and 65 percent hard for presidential years, and 40

percent soft and 60 percent hard for off years, but if done by

state parties the ratio of soft to hard dollars is greater. The

reason for this difference is state parties are allowed to calculate

their soft/hard ratio based on the ratio of federal offices to all

offices on the ballot in any given year. Both political parties

have found spending soft money with its accompanying hard

money match through their state parties to work smoothly, for

the most part, and state officials readily acknowledge they are

simply “pass throughs” to the vendors providing the broadcast
49

ads or direct mail. 

Magleby Expert Report at 37 [DEV 4-Tab 8]. Other witnesses and evidence

support this contention, which no one disputes. See, e.g., Marshall Decl. ¶ 3

[DEV 8-Tab 28] (testifying that in 2000 the DNC transferred funds to the state

parties to take advantage of their allocation rates); see also 11 C.F.R. §

106.5(b)(2)(i) (2001) (during presidential election years national party

committees required to pay for their mixed activities with at least 65 percent

in federal funds); id. at § 106.5(b)(2)(ii) (during nonpresidential election years

national party committees required to pay for their mixed activities with at

least 60 percent in federal funds).

1.26.2 The national political parties take advantage of this allocation regime when

planning and executing their advertising budgets. One RNC memorandum

contains a chart which 

clearly demonstrates what we already clearly know, that any

media we place in the target presidential states should be placed

through state parties. The average ballot allocation in the top 17

target states is 37% federal - 63% non-federal, this obviously

contrasts very well with our 65% federal - 35% non-federal

allocation.

RNC Memorandum dated March 18, 1996, titled “Ballot Allocation of Target

States” ODP0025-02720 to 21 [DEV 70-Tab 48]. The memorandum

concludes that by using the state political parties, rather than directly making

the purchase, the RNC would save $2.8 million in federal funds on a $10
50

million media buy. Id. see also ODP0021-1365 to 1367 [DEV 70-Tab 48]

(memorandum from Haley Barbour to the California House Republicans,

discussing the need to make a media buy in California and stating that “[t]o

accomplish this buy, the [RNC] would transfer funds to the California

Republican Party, which would actually buy the advertising. Under FEC

regulations, the California Republican Party must pay for the advertising with

one-third FEC contributions and two thirds nonfederal dollars”); McConnell

Dep. at 267-77 [JDT Vol. 19] (stating that the NRSC prefers to transfer funds

to state parties who then purchase NRSC advertisements with a more favorable

federal/nonfederal fund allocation ratio); Nelson Dep at 76-77 [JDT Vol. 24]

(stating that purchasing political advertisements through state parties has two

advantages: (1) better federal/nonfederal fund allocation ratios and (2) “having

[a] state disclaimer [on the advertisement] is generally better than having a

national disclaimer on it”); Marshall Decl. ¶ 3 [DEV 8-Tab 28] (noting that in

2000, the largest single portion of the DNC budget was used for issue

advertising, but that “[t]he DNC typically did not expend money for these issue

ads itself, but instead transferred both federal and non-federal money to the

state parties to make these expenditures”); ODP0023-02358 to 65 [DEV

70-Tab 48] (RNC tally of “1996 Media Buys,” listing advertisements

purchased, price, and the amount of federal and RNSEC funds used);
51

ODP0023-03560 to 660 [DEV 70-Tab 48] (RNC report of 1996 fund transfers

to state parties used for “party building/media buy”); ODP0025-01560 [DEV

70-Tab 48] (memorandum from the Republican National Finance Committee

dated May 24, 1996, titled “California T.V. Money,” discussing the need to

raise $4 million in nonfederal funds in two weeks which would then be

transferred to the CRP in order to “get on the air and stay on the air for the

next three months in CA”) (emphasis in original); supra Findings ¶¶ 1.6 (in

1996 the DNC financed two-thirds of its Clinton presidential campaign issue

advocacy through state party transfers), 1.4.3 (Mann) (over half of the

nonfederal money raised by the national party committees was transferred to

the state parties during the 2000 election cycle).

1.26.3 The national political party committees transferred $9,710,166 in federal funds

to state political party committees during the 1992 election cycle, $9,577,985

during the 1994 election cycle, $49,967,893 during the 1996 election cycle,

$30,475,897 during the 1998 election cycle, and $131,016,957 during the 2000

election cycle. The national political party committees transferred

$18,646,162 in nonfederal funds to state political party committees during the

1992 election cycle, $18,442,749 during the 1994 election cycle, $113,738,373

during the 1996 election cycle, $69,031,644 during the 1998 election cycle,
28 Robert W Biersack served as the Supervisory Statistician for the FEC from 1983

to February 2002. As the Supervisory Statistician, he was responsible for evaluating the

quality, reliability, and validity of information contained in the FEC disclosure databases.

Currently, he is Deputy Press Officer for the FEC, a position he has held since February

2002. Biersack Decl. ¶ 1 [DEV 6-Tab 6]. 

29 Kathleen Bowler is the Executive Director of the CDP. Bowler Decl. ¶ 1.

52

and $265,927,677 during the 2000 election cycle. Biersack28 Decl. Tbls. 4, 8

[DEV 6-Tab 6].

1.26.4 State political parties use a large portion of the transferred nonfederal money

to finance public communications that support or oppose a federal candidate.

See Bowler29 Decl. ¶ 15 (explaining that “[t]he majority of [national transfers

to the CDP] were for issue advocacy”). According to Plaintiffs’ expert La

Raja, “[i]t appears that both parties . . . use soft money transfers primarily to

execute national campaign strategy through state parties.” La Raja Cross

Exam. Ex. 3 at 103 [JDT Vol. 15]. La Raja finds that “more non-federal funds

in the allocation accounts are used for media rather than what I call party

building,” La Raja Cross Exam. at 67 [JDT Vol. 15] (La Raja’s definition of

“party building” does not include administrative spending); La Raja Expert

Report ¶ 22 [RNC Vol. VII] (finding that in 2000, 44 percent of transferred

nonfederal funds were used for media expenditures and 30 percent for

administrative overhead). La Raja concludes that “state parties invest most

soft money from the national parties in federal races,” but notes that “these
53

investments have considerable effects on races further down the ticket.” La

Raja Cross Exam. Ex. 3 at 139 [JDT Vol. 15] (La Raja dissertation) [JDT Vol.

15]; see also La Raja Cross Exam. 17-18 (stating that he stands by the

conclusions reached in his dissertation).

1.26.4.1 A good example of this system comes from the Republican Party of New

Mexico (“RPNM”). A 1998 financial statement from the state party shows

that it received revenues of $1,524,634 in nonfederal transfers from other

Republican organizations, $1,110,987 in individual contributions, and just

$389,552 in federal transfers from Republican organizations. The RPNM

spent over one-third of its 1998 revenues, $1,062,095, on “issue

advocacy—television, radio and mail.” INT810-1605 to 12 (RNC

NM0406326 - 33) [DEV 114].

1.26.5 These issue advertisements funded by nonfederal transferred funds are mainly

intended to support federal candidates. Plaintiffs’ expert La Raja notes that

“one of the goals” of national party allocation of nonfederal funds to state

parties is to help federal candidates in close elections, and that his

“impression” is that it is their primary goal. La Raja Cross Exam. at 73-74

[JDT Vol. 15]; see also Magleby Expert Report at 39 (“[National party s]oft

money is largely aimed at competitive [federal] races.”). La Raja finds that the

parties “are highly functional rather than responsible. Rather than use soft
30 James Jordan is the Executive Director of the DSCC. Jordan Decl. ¶ 1 [DEV 7-Tab

21].

54

money to shore up weaker organizations, or reward state party members for

moving closer to national party ideology, the national organizations use soft

money like hard money – to pursue the short-term goal of winning elections.”

La Raja Cross Exam. Ex. 3 at 75 [JDT Vol. 15]; see also id. at 15 (stating that

parties invest soft money primarily “in issue ads that help candidates”).

According to La Raja, the national parties’ spending of nonfederal funds is

proof that “they are functional parties dedicated to winning elections.” Id. at

25; see also La Raja Cross Exam. Ex. 1 (La Raja Decl.) ¶ 11(a) (“American

political parties have focused primarily on winning elections . . . .”) [JDT Vol.

15]. 

1.26.6 Representatives of the Congressional committees acknowledge that fund

transfers from their committees to state parties are used primarily for federal

election advertising. See Jordan30 Decl. ¶ 68 [DEV 7-Tab 21] (“In my

experience, the large majority of the DSCC’s nonfederal transfers to state and

local party committees have been to support the nonfederal share of issue

advocacy communications. Frequently, these communications refer to

Democratic Senate candidates or their Republican opponents, while not
31 Alexander Vogel is General Counsel for the NRSC. Vogel Decl. ¶ 1 [DEV 9-Tab

41].

32 Donald McGahn is General Counsel for the NRCC. McGahn Decl. ¶ 1 [DEV 8-Tab

30].

33 Howard Wolfson is Executive Director of the DCCC. Wolfson Decl. ¶ 1 [DEV 9-

Tab 44].

55

expressly advocating any candidate’s election or defeat.”); Vogel31 Decl. ¶ 63

[DEV 9-Tab 41] (“In my experience, the large majority of the NRSC’s

nonfederal transfers to state and local party committees have been to support

the nonfederal share of issue advocacy communications. Frequently, these

communications refer to Republican Senate candidates or their Democratic

opponents, while not expressly advocating any candidate’s election or

defeat.”); McGahn32 Decl. ¶ 55 [DEV 8-Tab 30] (“In my experience, the large

majority of the NRCC’s nonfederal transfers to state and local party

committees have been to support the nonfederal share of issue advocacy

communications. . . . Frequently, these communications refer to Republican

House candidates or their Democratic opponents, while not expressly

advocating any candidate’s election or defeat.”); Wolfson33 Decl. ¶ 63 [DEV

9-Tab 44] (“In my experience, the large majority of the DCCC’s nonfederal

transfers to state and local party committees have been to support the

nonfederal share of issue advocacy communications. Frequently, these

communications refer to Democratic House candidates or their Republican
56

opponents, while not expressly advocating any candidate’s election or defeat.”)

see also La Raja Cross Exam. Ex. 3 at 69 (La Raja dissertation) [JDT Vol. 15]

(“It would be particularly surprising for congressional campaign committees

to venture outside their traditional scope of helping candidates and invest in

state party organizations.”).

1.26.7 Representatives of the congressional campaign committees also admit that they

retain control over the advertisements their nonfederal money transfers are

used to purchase. Jordan Decl. ¶¶ 72-73 [DEV 7-Tab 21] (“When the DSCC

transfers funds to state party committees, including nonfederal funds, for the

purpose of disseminating issue advocacy communications, it first develops the

communications in consultation with media consultants, who are generally

retained by the state party at the request or suggestion of the DSCC, and then

provides the communications to the state party, together with the necessary

funds to distribute them locally. State parties may, but generally do not, reject

the communications. . . . The DSCC does not permit issue advocacy

communications it supports to be recorded or produced until they have been

approved by DSCC counsel and DSCC senior employees.”); Vogel Decl. ¶ 67-

68 [DEV 9-Tab 41] (“When the NRSC transfers funds to state party

committees, including nonfederal funds, for the purpose of disseminating issue

advocacy communications, it first develops the communications in
57

consultation with the state party and media consultants, who are generally

retained by the state party at the request or suggestion of the NRSC, and then

provides the communications to the state party, together with the necessary

funds to distribute them locally. State parties may, but generally do not, reject

the communications. . . . The NRSC does not permit issue advocacy

communications it supports to be recorded or produced until they have been

approved by NRSC counsel and NRSC senior employees.”); McGahn Decl. ¶¶

58-59 (“When the NRCC transfers funds to state party committees, including

nonfederal funds, for the purpose of disseminating issue advocacy

communications, it first develops the communications in consultation with the

state party and media consultants, and then provides the communications to the

state party, together with the necessary funds to distribute them locally. State

parties may, but generally do not, reject the communications. . . . The NRCC

does not permit issue advocacy communications it supports to be recorded or

produced until they have been approved by me, as NRCC counsel, and NRCC

senior employees.”); Wolfson Decl. ¶¶ 66-67 (“When the DCCC transfers

funds to state party committees, including nonfederal funds, for the purpose

of disseminating issue advocacy communications, it first develops the

communications in consultation with media consultants, who are generally

retained by the state party at the request or suggestion of the DCCC, and then
58

provides the communications to the state party together with the necessary

funds to distribute them locally. State parties may, but generally do not, reject

the communications. . . . The DCCC does not permit issue advocacy

communications it supports to be recorded or produced until they have been

approved by DCCC counsel and DCCC senior employees.”).

1.26.7.1 On September 28, 1998, NRSC Executive Director Steven Law wrote thenNRSC Chairman Senator Mitch McConnell recommending that the NRSC

fund an issue ad playing off an article that appeared in Nevada’s largest

newspaper. Democratic Senatorial candidate Harry Reid “got bad reviews for

an over-the-top, hostile performance, suggesting a line of attack that builds on

our six-month-long message that Harry Reid says one thing in Nevada and

does the opposite in Washington. . . . If we went in this direction, I would

suggest running this spot for one week at 1000 [gross ratings point], to be

followed with our last ad in the Nevada issue advocacy campaign, on lawyers’

fees.” ODP0036-02931-32 [DEV 71-Tab 48]. Law’s idea was later

implemented in an advertisement paid for by the Republican State Central

Committee of Nevada. ODP0036-01403 to 06 [DEV 71-Tab 48].

1.26.7.2 Documents in the record also demonstrate that the state political parties are

merely conduits between the national political parties and their media

consultants. See, e.g., CRP 00367 [IER Tab 28] (fax from the NRCC to the
34 Elizabeth Blaise Hazelwood is the RNC’s political director. Hazelwood Dep. at 10.

59

CRP’s Victory 2000 project proving CRP “wiring info” and informing the

state party that the “[m]oney will be in your account today . . . . Please wire

back to Strategic Media”); CDP 02095-101, 2103-04, 2106 [IER Tab 12] (wire

transfer instructions from the DNC to the CDP for media buys); CDP 02984-

89 [IER Tab 12] (detailing transfer of funds from DCCC to CDP for media

buy).

1.26.7.3 The RNC and DNC also transfer nonfederal funds to state parties to pay for

advertisements over which the national party committees retain control. See

Castellanos Dep. (Sept. 27, 2002) at 111-12 (stating that when working on

advertisements for state parties, National Media dealt with an RNC

representative, not a state party member); Marshall Decl. ¶ 4 (noting that the

DNC normally approved the content of the advertisement and the amount of

money to be spent before calling the state party in question “to let it know that

an ad was coming”); Josefiak Dep. at 97-98 [JDT Vol. 11] (acknowledging

that the RNC transfers funds to state parties to pay for RNC advertisements);

Huyck Decl. in Mariani ¶4 (stating that in 1995-1996 the RNC transferred

funds to state party committees to pay for issue advertisements related to the

1996 Presidential election campaign) [DEV 79-Tab 60]; Hazelwood34 Dep. at

118-19 (RNC transfers funds to state parties to pay for issue advertisements).
60

In 2000, the RNC raised over $254 million, a majority of which was

transferred to the state parties for various activities. Josefiak Dep. at 76 [JDT

Vol. 11]; see also FEC, National Party Transfers to State/Local Committees:

January 1, 1999 to December 31, 2000, available at http://www.fec.gov/press/

051501partyfund/tables/nat2state.html (during the 2000 election cycle the

RNC made transfers of approximately $129 million—$93.2 million in

nonfederal funds and $35.8 million in federal funds—to state and local

parties). The greatest expenditures from these transfers were for political

advertising and administrative expenses. Josefiak Dep. at 76-77 [JDT Vol.

11].

1.27 The evidence above clearly demonstrates that the national political parties transfer

nonfederal money through their state party affiliates for the purpose of buying socalled “issue advertisements” at a better allocation ratio. These advertisements are

created and controlled by the national political parties, with the state political parties

merely accepting the nonfederal money transfers and passing the funds on to media

consultants as directed by the national political parties. These advertisements are

intended to affect federal elections without using express advocacy terminology. 

Get-Out-The-Vote (GOTV)

1.28 It is undisputed that GOTV efforts, paid for with nonfederal funds by national party

committees and targeted at federal elections, directly assist federal candidates, as well
35 Alan Philp testified on behalf of the Colorado Republican Party. Philp Dep. at 9

[JDT Vol. 26].

61

as state and local candidates of the same party whose elections are held on the same

day. Declarations from representatives of the four major congressional campaign

committees attest to the fact that these committees “transfer[] federal and nonfederal

funds to state and/or local party committees for . . . get-out-the-vote efforts. These

efforts have a significant effect on the election of federal candidates.” Jordan Decl.

¶ 69 [DEV 7-Tab 21]; Wolfson Decl. ¶ 64 [DEV 9-Tab 44]; Vogel Decl. ¶ 64 [DEV

9-Tab 41]; McGahn Decl. ¶ 56 [DEV 8-Tab 30] (emphasis added); see also Josefiak

Decl. ¶ 26 [RNC Vol. I] (Republican Party “Victory Programs” which include GOTV

components are designed to benefit candidates at the federal, state and local

levels)(emphasis added); Philp35 Dep. at 47, 49 (when asked “[are there a]ny other

services that the party provides to federal candidates,” answering that the Colorado

Republican Party’s GOTV “program is designed to benefit all candidates.”).

1.28.1 Documentary evidence corroborates the testimony that GOTV efforts assist

federal candidates. See, e.g., CDP 00859 [IER Tab 1.I] (letter thanking a CDP

donor and noting that CDP’s “get-out-the-vote efforts” would help “increase

the number of Californian Democrats in the United States Congress, continue

Democratic leadership in the State Senate, take back the State Assembly -- and

deliver California’s 54 electoral votes for President Bill Clinton’s and Vice
62

President Al Gore’s re-election.”) (emphasis added); CRP 07164 [IER Tab

1.F] (letter from the Executive Director of the Dole-Kemp campaign, stating

in part: “Unfortunately, federal law prohibits the Dole/Kemp campaign from

accepting any contributions after the last day of the national convention.

However, you can still support the Dole/Kemp ticket by sending your

contribution to the Victory ‘96 fund, which will support the party’s ‘get out the

vote’ operation and help us ensure a successful campaign in California . . .”)

(emphasis added); infra Findings ¶ 1.60 (McConnell letter noting that the

Kentucky Victory 2000 campaign, which included a GOTV component, “was

an important part of President George W. Bush’s impressive victory in

Kentucky last year, and it will be critical to my race and others next year”).

1.28.2 Defendants’ expert Donald Green concludes that 

[t]he evidence from California, as well as from numerous

opinion surveys and exit polls that demonstrate the powerful

correlation between voting at the state and federal levels, shows

quite clearly that a campaign that mobilizes residents of a highly

Republican precinct will produce a harvest of votes for

Republican candidates for both state and federal offices. A

campaign need not mention federal candidates to have a direct

effect on voting for such a candidate. That parties recognize this

fact is apparent, for example, from the emphasis that the

Democrats place on mobilizing and preventing ballot roll-off

among African-Americans, whose solidly Democratic voting

proclivities make them reliable supporters for office-holders at

all levels. As a practical matter, generic campaign activity has

a direct effect on federal elections. 

Green Expert Report at 14 [DEV 1-Tab 3].
36 Jay Banning has served as the RNC’s Director of Administration and Chief

Financial Officer since 1983, and has been employed by the RNC in these and other

capacities for twenty-six years. Banning Decl. ¶ 1 [RNC Vol. III].

37 Robert Duncan is a Member of the RNC from the State of Kentucky. At the time

the RNC’s Complaint in this case was filed, he served as Treasurer of the RNC, but as of July

2002 he became its General Counsel. Duncan Decl. ¶ 1 [RNC Vol. VI].

38 Bruce Benson is Chairman of the Colorado Republican Party. Benson Decl. ¶ 1

[RNC Vol. VIII]. 

63

1.28.3 The RNC transfers nonfederal funds to state political parties to subsidize voter

mobilization activities of the state parties. Banning36 Decl. ¶ 31 [RNC Vol.

III]; see also Duncan37 Decl. ¶¶ 11-12 [RNC Vol. VI]. According to Josefiak,

the RNC also helps state and local parties fundraise for these voter

mobilization efforts. See Josefiak Decl. ¶¶ 63, 65-72 [RNC Vol. I]; see also

Benson38 Decl. ¶ 10 [RNC Vol. VIII] (“[T]he Republican national party

committees also assist [the Colorado Republican Party] in raising money for

these party building programs.”).

1.29 The CDP and the CRP conduct GOTV door-to-door canvassing campaigns, phone

banks and mailings. Since federal, state and local candidates are on the same ballot

in California, these efforts affect all the candidates on the ballot. This fact explains

why these efforts usually required the state parties to use a mix of federal and

nonfederal money to pay for such activities. See, e.g., Bowler Decl. ¶ 20.b. (noting

that CDP slate cards and door hangers often mention both federal and nonfederal

candidates and thus were funded with the mix of funds); id. (50 to 60 percent of
64

CDP’s paid phone banks make reference to a federal candidate and must therefore be

paid for with a mix of funds); see also Erwin Aff. ¶ 10. It is important to note,

however, that under BCRA's Levin Amendment state political parties may still use a

mix of nonfederal and federal funds to pay for GOTV efforts for elections that include

federal candidates, as long as they use nonfederal funds raised in accordance with the

provision. Of course, for elections without a federal candidate on the ballot, BCRA

does not impose any restrictions.

1.30 It is clear that nonfederal funds used to finance GOTV efforts for elections with

federal candidates on the ballot affect federal elections. It is clear that GOTV

activities target a certain political party’s likely voters and attempts to get them to the

polls. Even if the intent behind such efforts were to only affect state and local

contests, increasing the number of Democrats, for example, who vote in a state and

local election will undoubtedly increase the number of votes for the federal

Democratic candidates who share the same ballot. This fact is well-known and

appreciated by the national political parties and federal candidates.

Voter Registration

1.31 It is undisputed that voter registration efforts, paid for with nonfederal funds by the

national party committees in the period before federal elections, directly assist federal

candidates, as well as state and local candidates from the same party whose elections

are held on the same day. As Dr. Mann notes: 
65

In a series of advisory opinions, the Commission sought to ensure that

a portion of state party activities benefiting [sic] both federal and

nonfederal candidates be paid for with hard money. In Advisory

Opinion 1975-21, the Commission ruled that a local party committee

had to use hard dollars to pay for a part of its administrative expenses

and voter registration drives, on the grounds that these functions have

an indirect effect on federal elections. It used this opinion in

regulations it issued in 1977 governing allocation of administrative

expenses between federal and nonfederal accounts. The allocation was

to be made “in proportion to the amount of funds expended on federal

and non-federal elections, or on another reasonable basis.” (11 C.F.R.

106.1(e) 1978).

Mann Expert Report at 9 [DEV 1-Tab 1] (emphasis added).

1.32 Representatives of the four major congressional campaign committees, confirm that

the four committees“transfer[] federal and nonfederal funds to state and/or local party

committees for . . . voter registration . . . efforts. These efforts have a significant

effect on the election of federal candidates.” Jordan Decl. ¶ 69 [DEV 7-Tab 21];

Wolfson Decl. ¶ 64 [DEV 9-Tab 44]; Vogel Decl. ¶ 64 [DEV 9-Tab 41]; McGahn

Decl. ¶ 56 [DEV 8-Tab 30] (emphasis added); see also CDP 00859 [IER Tab 1.I]

(letter thanking a CDP donor and noting that CDP’s “voter registration . . . efforts”

would help “increase the number of Californian Democrats in the United States

Congress, continue Democratic leadership in the State Senate, take back the State

Assembly--and deliver California’s 54 electoral votes for President Bill Clinton’s and

Vice President Al Gore’s re-election.”) (emphasis added); see also Findings ¶ 1.60

(McConnell letter noting that the Victory 2000 campaign, which included a voter

registration component “was an important part of President George W. Bush’s
39 Ryan Erwin is the Chief Operating Officer of the CRP. Erwin Aff. ¶ 1.

66

impressive victory in Kentucky last year, and it will be critical to my race and others

next year”); Philp Dep. at 49 (when asked “[are there a]ny other services that the party

provides to federal candidates,” answering that the Colorado Republican Party’s

GOTV “program is designed to benefit all candidates. That could include voter

registration and so on and so forth.”).

1.33 CRP official Erwin39 testifies that “[t]he overwhelming amount of [voter registration]

activity is ‘generic’ voter registration activity urging potential registrants to ‘Register

Republican.’” Erwin Aff. ¶ 9. Erwin testifies that the CRP has paid for voter

registration—with a mix of federal and nonfederal funds—through its Operation

Bounty program, in which Republican county central committees, Republican

volunteer organizations and Republican candidates for federal and state office

participate. Through its Operation Bounty drives, the CRP has typically registered

over 350,000 Republican voters in each election cycle since the 1984 election cycle

(except 1997-98). See Erwin Aff. ¶ 9; see also CDP App. at 1185 [PCS 4] (charting

CRP’s voter registration activity by election cycle since 1984 cycle). 

Ms. Bowler states that the CDP’s expenditures on voter

registration—consisting of a mix of federal and nonfederal funds—were

approximately $145,000 in the 1996 election cycle; $300,000 in the 1998 cycle;

$100,000 in the 2000 election cycle; and $185,000 during the period from January 1,
67

2001 to June 30, 2002. See Bowler Decl. ¶ 20.a. Ms. Bowler notes that the CDP’s

expenditures for voter registration were higher in 1998 (a year with eight statewide

elections) than in 2000 (a presidential election year). Id. CRP and CDP officials

testify that “it is often the case that these voter registration activities are primarily

driven by the desire to affect State and local races.” Erwin Aff. ¶ 14a; Bowler Decl.

¶ 20.a. 

Whatever their intention, the evidence supra, makes clear that these efforts

affect federal elections; particularly as demonstrated by the CDP’s fundraising

materials. See Findings ¶ 1.32). Moreover, under the Levin Amendment state

political parties may still use a mix of nonfederal and federal funds to conduct voter

registration efforts for elections that include federal candidates, as long as they use

nonfederal funds raised in accordance with the provision. Of course, for those

elections without a federal candidate on the ballot, BCRA does not impose any

restrictions.

Redistricting

1.34 The national parties use nonfederal funds, as well as federal funds, toward their

redistricting efforts, and these efforts are of value to Members of Congress because

the changes in the composition of a Member’s district can mean the difference

between reelection and defeat.

1.34.1 As Defendants’ expert Donald Green notes:
68

The most important legislative activity in the electoral lives of

U.S. House members takes place during redistricting, a process

that is placed in the hands of state legislatures. The chances that

a House incumbent will be ousted by unfavorable district

boundaries are often greater than the chances of defeat at the

hands of the typical challenger. Thus, federal legislators who

belong to the state majority party have a tremendous incentive

to be attuned to the state legislature and the state party

leadership.

For example, in early 1999 the Republican National Committee,

recognizing that state legislatures in Tennessee and Georgia

would soon control redistricting, transferred substantial sums of

money to those states’ Republican parties in an effort to win the

few seats necessary to gain the majority. As Edwin Bender, in

a report for the National Institute on Money in State Politics

explains: “In a number of states with legislatures that are

controlled by narrow margins, a win or two in the state House or

Senate in 2000 could mean the difference between a

redistricting committee controlled by Democrats or Republicans,

and districts that favor one party over the other . . . . As a result,

national party organizations have been flooding the states with

campaign donations, both soft money and hard, to influence the

redistricting process.

Green Expert Report at 11-12 [DEV 1-Tab 3].

1.34.2 The RNC uses a mix of federal and nonfederal funds to support redistricting

efforts, including redistricting litigation. Josefiak Decl. ¶ 74 [RNC Vol. I]. In

2002, for example, the RNC budgeted approximately $4.1 million on

redistricting. Seventy percent of the redistricting budget was to be funded with

nonfederal money. Banning Decl. ¶ 28.i [RNC Vol. III]. The RNC spends

more overall on state legislative redistricting than on congressional

redistricting. Josefiak Decl. ¶ 74 [RNC Vol. I]; see also infra Findings ¶
69

1.78.1 (Fortune 100 Company nonfederal money budget request noting that

“because both [national] parties will be working to influence redistricting

efforts during the next two years, we anticipate that we will be asked to make

soft money contributions to these efforts. Redistricting is a key once-a-decade

effort that both parties have very high on their priority list.”).

1.34.3 Mr. Alan Philp, of the Colorado Republican Party, testifies that his party and

the Colorado Democratic Party played a significant role in the state’s

legislative redistricting process. Philp Dep. at 65 [JDT Vol. 26]. Philp states

that the results of the redistricting process “[c]an have a significant impact” on

candidates for federal office. Id. at 66. He notes that the Colorado

Congressional delegation discussed redistricting with the Colorado Republican

Party. Id. 

Other Activities Paid for with Nonfederal Funds

1.35 Administrative Expenses: The FEC allowed the RNC to pay for its administrative

overhead—including salaries, benefits, equipment, and supplies for party operations

at RNC headquarters in Washington, D.C.—with a mix of federal and nonfederal

funds. See Banning Decl. ¶ 27 [RNC Vol. III]; Bowler Decl. ¶ 15. “During the 2000

election cycle, the RNC spent $35.6 million of nonfederal funds and $52.9 million of

federal funds on administrative overhead.” Banning Decl. ¶ 27 [RNC Vol. III].

“Administrative overhead includes the operating costs of RNC facilities, such as
70

utility bills and maintenance, fundraising costs, and routine expenses for travel and

supplies. Administrative overhead also includes the salaries of RNC employees.” Id.

According to Plaintiffs’ expert La Raja, the RNC spent about one-quarter of their

nonfederal disbursements on administration and overhead during the 2000 election

cycle and transferred 67 percent to the state parties. La Raja Expert Report ¶ 14(c)

[RNC Vol. VII]. State parties spent about 30 percent of their nonfederal money

disbursements during the 2000 election cycle on administrative expenses and

overhead. La Raja Expert Report ¶ 22 [RNC Vol. VII]; see also Bowler Decl. ¶ 15

(stating that allocation is required for administrative expenses like rent, utilities, and

salaries). The fact these expenditures required a mix of federal and nonfederal funds

demonstrates that these activities affect federal elections. See also supra Findings ¶

1.26.4 (Plaintiffs expert La Raja stating administrative expenses are not “party

building” activity).

1.36 Training Seminars: Banning testifies that the RNC used a mix of federal and

nonfederal funds to conduct training seminars for Republican candidates, party

officials, activists and campaign staff, many of whom are involved in state and local

campaigns and elections. Topics included grassroots organizing, fundraising and

compliance with campaign finance regulations. During the 2000 election cycle at

least 10,000 people attended RNC-sponsored training sessions, including 117 “nuts

and bolts” seminars on grassroots organizing and get-out-the-vote activities. During
71

the same cycle the RNC spent $391,000 in nonfederal funds and $671,000 in federal

funds on such training and support. See Banning Decl. ¶ 28(c) [RNC Vol. III]; see

also La Raja Expert Report at 11 [RNC Vol. VII] (parties “help candidates by training

them and their campaign staff,” support which “can make an important difference in

whether a candidate chooses to run for office, particularly in an era of cash-intensive

campaigning that requires skillful application of advanced campaign technologies”).

According to La Raja, the RNC spent $8.5 million in nonfederal funds directly on all

of its grassroots and voter mobilization activities for the 2000 election cycle. La Raja

Expert Report ¶ 14(c) [RNC Vol. VII]. This constitutes about one-half of one percent

of all RNC nonfederal spending during the 2000 election cycle. See Biersack Decl.

Table 2 [DEV 6-Tab 6] (showing the RNC spent $163,521,510 in nonfederal funds

during the 2000 election cycle). Furthermore, by virtue of the fact these activities

were paid for with a mix of federal and nonfederal funds demonstrates that they affect

federal elections.

1.37 State and Local Governmental Affairs: The RNC provided $100,000 of seed money

for the formation of a Republican state attorneys general association that focuses on

state issues. RNC Ex. 978; see also Josefiak Decl. ¶¶ 82-84 [RNC Vol. I]. According

to Banning, during the 2000 election cycle the RNC spent $199,000 in nonfederal

funds and $333,500 in federal funds on state and local governmental affairs. See

Banning Decl. ¶ 28.b [RNC Vol. III]. The nonfederal funds the RNC spent on state
72

and local governmental affairs constituted a minuscule percentage of the RNC’s

$163,521,510 nonfederal budget for the 2000 election cycle. See Biersack Decl.

Table 2 [DEV 6-Tab 6]. Furthermore, by virtue of the fact these activities were paid

with a mix of federal and nonfederal funds demonstrates that they affect federal

elections.

1.38 Minority Outreach: Banning states that the RNC used a mix of federal and nonfederal

funds to support efforts to increase minority involvement and membership in the

Republican Party. During the 2000 election cycle the RNC spent $1,211,000 in

nonfederal funds and $2,163,000 in federal funds on support of allied groups and

minority outreach. See id. ¶ 28.e. This nonfederal expenditure also constituted a

minuscule percentage of the RNC’s total nonfederal spending for the 2000 election

cycle. See Biersack Decl. Table 2 [DEV 6-Tab 6]. Furthermore, by virtue of the fact

these activities were paid for with a mix of federal and nonfederal funds demonstrates

that they affect federal elections.

1.39 State and Local Elections: The RNC’s Josefiak testifies that “the RNC actually

focuses many of its resources on purely state and local election activity,” Josefiak

Decl. ¶ 19 [RNC Vol. I]; however, the figures provided to the Court do not support

this contention. For example, in 1999 and 2000 the RNC donated approximately $7.3

million in nonfederal funds to state and local candidates. Josefiak Decl. ¶ 61 [RNC

Vol. I]; Banning Decl. ¶ 28(a) [RNC Vol. III]. However, this amount is a small
73

fraction of the $163,521,510 in nonfederal funds it spent during the 2000 election

cycle. Biersack Decl. Table 2 [DEV 6-Tab 6]. Plaintiffs’ expert La Raja finds that

the Republican Party allocated just seven percent ($9.5 million) of their nonfederal

funds during the 2000 election cycle for contributions to state and local candidates.

La Raja Expert Report ¶ 14(b) [RNC Vol. VII]. Furthermore, according to Defense

expert Mann, the two national parties donated “only $19 million directly to state and

local candidates, less than 4% of their soft money spending and 1.6% of their total

financial activity in 2000.” Mann Report at 26 [DEV 1-Tab 1] (citation omitted).

1.39.1.1 The RNC also provides testimony that it “sometimes devotes significant

 resources toward states with competitive gubernatorial races even though the

races for federal offices are less competitive.” Josefiak Decl. ¶ 62 [RNC Vol.

I]. According to Josefiak, in 2000, most observers believed that Indiana was

a “safe” state for George W. Bush and that it did not have a competitive Senate

race. “Nevertheless, the RNC committed significant resources to the state in

hopes of influencing the gubernatorial race.” Josefiak Decl. ¶ 62 [RNC Vol.

I]. 

Josefiak’s declaration provides no figures to allow the Court to

determine what constitutes “significant resources.” Furthermore, although

Indiana may have been a “safe” state for the Republican presidential candidate

and the Republican candidate for U.S. Senate, the Indiana ballot provided
74

voters with three federal races in which to vote, meaning that many

expenditures, even if intended to only influence a single state race, affected

federal election races. Most importantly, nothing in BCRA prevents the RNC

from using unlimited amounts of federal funds to affect any state election.

1.39.1.2 Five States—Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, New Jerseyand Virginia—hold

elections for state and local office in odd-numbered years when there are

typically no federal candidates on the ballot. See Josefiak Decl. ¶ 41 [RNC

Vol. I]. Likewise, numerous cities—including Houston, Indianapolis, Los

Angeles, Minneapolis and New York City—hold mayoral elections in oddnumbered years. See id. RNC officials state that for elections in which there

is no federal candidate on the ballot, the RNC frequently trains state and local

candidates, contributes to state and local candidate campaign committees,

funds communications calling for election or defeat of state and local

candidates, and supports get-out-the-vote activities. See Banning Decl. ¶ 28(a)

[RNC Vol. III]; Josefiak Decl. ¶¶ 19, 41-59 [RNC Vol. I]. The RNC’s CFO

Jay Banning testifies that in 1999 and 2001, including transfers to state parties,

direct contributions to local and state campaigns, and direct RNC expenditures,

the RNC spent approximately $21 million in nonfederal funds in 1999 and

2001 (approximately $5.7 million in 1999, $15.7 million in 2001). Banning

Decl. ¶ 28(a) [RNC Vol. III]; see also Duncan Decl. ¶¶ 14-15 [RNC Vol. VI]
40 Art Torres is the elected chair of the CDP. Torres Decl. ¶ 1 [3 PCS].

75

(discussing RNC contributions to Kentucky state and local races). Defendants’

expert Mann states that donations to gubernatorial candidates in an odd

numbered year is not something intended to affect a Federal election. Mann

Cross Exam. at 71. Again, BCRA does not preclude the national political

parties from spending unlimited federal funds on such activities. Furthermore,

state political parties can spend nonfederal funds on such campaigns without

limit as long as no federal election is held at the same time. See, e.g., Torres40

Decl. ¶ 8 [3 PCS] (stating that the CDP has spent millions of dollars in

nonfederal funds supporting candidates in Los Angeles). 

1.40 With the exception of administrative expenses, the activities paid for with nonfederal

funds listed supra constituted a very small portion of the political parties’ nonfederal

expenditures during the 2000 election cycle. Furthermore, administrative expenses,

training seminars, expenditures on state and local governmental affairs, and minority

outreach, were all paid for with a mixture of federal and nonfederal funds meaning

that these activities have some impact on federal elections. 

The State Parties Have Become “Branches” of the National Parties

1.41 The evidence supra clearly demonstrates that nonfederal money has not been used

primarily for “party building” activities as the authorizing rationale envisioned; rather,

the funds are being used by the national parties for electioneering activities and the
76

state parties have been coopted as part of this effort. 

1.42 The emergence of nonfederal money as a potent force in national politics has made

the state political parties, according to Plaintiffs’ expert La Raja, “more reliant on the

national parties. They have worked more with the national parties. They have

become what I term branch organizations, which to me is not a pejorative. It means

they work more closely with the national organization,” “they still retain autonomy.

However, they’re integrated more with the national party structure.” La Raja Cross

Exam. at 43-44, 60 [JDT Vol. 15]. This has lead to a “nationalized party system,

[where] state parties use national party resources to advance national party goals.”

Id. at Ex. 3 at 88, 101. “The national parties employ the state parties as instruments

to pursue federal electoral goals, particularly through issue ads sponsored by state

organizations [paid for with nonfederal money transferred from the national political

parties].” Id. at 104.

1.43 The close affiliation between the state, local and national parties is clear from their

cooperation during election campaigns that include state and federal elections. 

1.43.1 Ms. Bowler testifies that the CDP works closely with the DNC in planning and

implementing “Coordinated Campaigns,” the purpose of which is to allocate

resources and coordinate plans for the benefit of Democratic candidates up and

down the entire ticket. Party officials, candidates at all levels of the ticket and

their agents participate in Coordinated Campaigns and collectively make
77

decisions regarding the solicitation, receipt, directing, and spending of the

CDP’s funds, both federal and nonfederal. Bowler Decl. ¶¶ 5, 29 [3 PCS].

According to Bowler, the CDP is “integrally related to the [DNC].” Id. ¶ 5.

1.43.2 The RNC’s “Victory Plans” are voter contact programs designed to support the

entire Republican ticket at the federal, state, and local levels. The RNC works

with every state party to design, fund and implement the Plans. See Benson

Decl. ¶8 [RNC Vol. VIII]; Josefiak Decl. ¶26 [RNC Vol. I]; Peschong Decl.

¶¶4-5 [RNC Vol. VI].

1.43.2.1 According to RNC Chief Counsel Josefiak, Victory Plans are formulated and

implemented after extensive and continuous collaboration between the RNC

and the state parties; each Plan is tailored to the unique needs of each State and

designed to stimulate grassroots activism and increase voter turnout in the

hopes of benefitting candidates at all levels of the ticket. Josefiak Decl. ¶¶25-

40 [RNC Vol. I]. According to Mr. Erwin, the CRP works closely with the

RNC in planning and implementing a Victory Plan. The Victory Plan is

implemented in the general election cycle with the full involvement of RNC

staff, CRP staff, state legislative leadership and representatives from the top

of the ticket campaigns. See Erwin Aff. ¶ 4 [3 PCS]. “By their nature, the

Victory Plans and the programs specified in them span the calendar year, not

just the 60 or 120 days prior to the election.” Peschong Decl. ¶ 4 [RNC Vol.
41 John Peschong is the RNC’s Regional Political Director for the Western Region.

Peschong Decl. ¶ 1.

78

VI]. The Victory Plans generally incorporate rallies, direct mail, telephone

banks, brochures, state cards, yard signs, bumper stickers, door hangers, and

door-to-door volunteer activities. Id.

1.43.2.2 According to Josefiak, in 2000 the RNC transferred approximately $42 million

to state parties to use in Victory Plan programs, 60 percent (about $25 million)

of which was nonfederal money, not including money spent on broadcast

“issue advertising.” Josefiak Decl. ¶ 31 [RNC Vol. I]; see also Peschong41

Decl. ¶¶ 4, 8-9 [RNC Vol. VI] (stating that “[t]he RNC typically provides a

very substantial share of the funding of state victory programs.”).

1.43.2.3 State Republican party officials observe that because there are often numerically more state and local races than federal races during a given election,

Victory Plans “often place greater emphasis” on the non-federal races. See

Benson Decl. ¶ 8 [RNC Vol. VIII]; Bennett Decl. ¶ 17.k [RNC Vol. VIII]

(stating that the average ratio of state and local candidates to federal candidates

in Ohio in 2002 is 18 to 1). This observation does not change the fact that Victory

Plans are designed to “support the entire ticket.” Benson Decl. ¶ 8 [RNC Vol.

VIII] (emphasis added).
79

Efforts to Address the Role of Nonfederal Funds in Campaign Finance Must Limit State

Party Use of Nonfederal Funds that Affect Federal Elections

1.44 It is clear that state political party electoral activities affect federal elections,

especially when state and federal elections are held on the same date. The record

establishes that federal officeholders value these services and that they solicit

nonfederal donations for the state political parties in order to assist their own

campaigns. National political parties also solicit nonfederal donations for their state

counterparts and transfer nonfederal funds as part of their efforts to affect federal

elections. See infra Findings ¶ 1.59. The workings of this campaign finance system

demand that if one wants to address the impact of nonfederal money, one cannot

ignore the state role in the system. Former Members of Congress concur. Former

Senator Rudman states clearly:

To curtail soft-money fundraising and giving, it is necessary to have a

comprehensive approach that addresses the use of soft money at the

state and local party levels as well as at the national party level. The

fact is that much of what state and local parties do helps to elect federal

candidates. The national parties know it; the candidates know it; the

state and local parties know it. If state and local parties can use soft

money for activities that affect federal elections, then the problem will

not be solved at all. The same enormous incentives to raise the money

will exist; the same large contributions by corporations, unions, and

wealthy individuals will be made; the federal candidates who benefit

from state party use of these funds will know exactly whom their

benefactors are; the same degree of beholdenness and obligation will

arise; the same distortions on the legislative process will occur; and the

same public cynicism will erode the foundations of our democracy --

except it will all be worse in the public’s mind because a perceived

reform was undercut once again by a loophole that allows big money

into the system.
80

Rudman Decl. ¶ 19 [DEV 8-Tab 34]. Former Senator Brock comments:

It does no good to close the soft money loophole at the national level,

but then allow state and local parties to use money from corporations,

unions, and wealthy individuals in ways that affect federal elections.

State and local parties use soft money to help elect federal candidates

both by organizing voter registration and get-out-the-vote drives that

help candidates at all levels of the ticket, and by using soft and hard

money to run ‘issue ads’ that affect federal elections. Therefore, for

soft money reforms to be truly effective, it is vitally important to

require the use of hard money at the state level to pay for activities that

affect federal elections.

Brock Decl. ¶ 8 [DEV 6-Tab 9].

Summary

1.45 The evidence supra clearly demonstrates that nonfederal money has become an

increasingly important part of the national political parties’ campaign efforts. The

increase in nonfederal fundraising and spending, especially since 1994, has been

dramatic, and is due to the advent of the so-called “issue advertisement.” Political

party issue advertisements do not include words of express advocacy, but are

engineered to still have an impact on federal elections. Despite their effect, the fact

that these advertisements do not constitute express advocacy has allowed the political

parties to use nonfederal money, raised in part from the treasuries of corporations and

labor unions, to fund these commercials and thereby skirt campaign finance laws.

Furthermore, these advertisements make a mockery of the original justification for

allowing the political parties to raise these funds, as they have nothing to do with

“party building.” Plaintiffs’ own expert finds that these funds have been spent
81

primarily on electioneering and not on strengthening the political parties.

The fact that the national political parties found a huge loophole through which

to circumvent the federal campaign finance regime was only the first step. In order

to maximize the power of this new-found political tool, the national political parties

coopted their state party affiliates, or branches as Plaintiffs’ expert calls them, and

funneled nonfederal funds through them in order to take advantage of the state

political parties’ more attractive allocation ratios. By doing so, the national parties

minimized the amount of federal funds needed to purchase advertisements designed

to affect federal elections– advertisements that in the spirit of FECA should have been

paid for completely with federal funds. As a result, the state political parties became

an integral part of the national political parties’ nonfederal money strategy, and

therefore any effort to deal with the use of nonfederal funds in the campaign finance

regime requires addressing the state political parties.

Not all nonfederal funds are spent on political advertisements, but these

advertisements constitute the largest category of nonfederal spending of the national

and state political parties. Furthermore, other activities, such as voter registration and

GOTV, that are paid for in part with nonfederal funds clearly affect federal elections

when state and local elections are held on the same day as the federal election.

Redistricting efforts affect federal elections no matter when they are held. In sum, the

political parties used nonfederal funds to circumvent FECA and affect federal
82

elections.

The Role of Federal Lawmakers in Political Party Nonfederal Fundraising

1.46 Unlike other entities, political parties have uniquely close relationships with

candidates they nominate and support, and who, in turn, lead the party. See D. Green

Expert Report at 7-9 [DEV 1-Tab 3]; McCain Decl. ¶¶ 22-23 [DEV 8-Tab 29]. The

Colorado Republican Party has stated in past litigation: “A party and its candidate are

uniquely and strongly bound to one another because: [a] party recruits and nominates

its candidate and is his or her first and natural source of support and guidance[;] [a]

candidate is identified by party affiliation throughout the election, on the ballot, while

in office, and in the history books[;] [a] successful candidate becomes a party leader,

and the party continues to rely on the candidate during subsequent campaigns[;] [a]

party’s public image largely is defined by what its candidates say and do[;] [a] party’s

candidate is held accountable by voters for what his or her party says and does[;] [a]

party succeeds or fails depending on whether its candidates succeed or fail. No other

political actor shares comparable ties with a candidate.” Brief of Colorado

Republican Party in FEC v. Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. (“Colorado

II”), 533 U.S. 431, 457 (2001), at 19-20; see also id. at 7-8, 26-31; Philp Dep. at 47-

54 [JDT Vol. 26]. 

Federal Lawmakers Run the Party Committees

1.47 The national committees of the two major political parties are: the Republican
83

National Committee (“RNC”); the National Republican Senatorial Committee

(“NRSC”); the National Republican Congressional Committee (“NRCC”); the

Democratic National Committee (“DNC”); the Democratic Senatorial Campaign

Committee (“DSCC”); and the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee

(“DCCC”). Vogel Decl. ¶ 6 [DEV 9-Tab 41]; McGahn Decl. ¶ 6 [DEV 8-Tab 30] ;

Jordan Decl. ¶ 6 [DEV 7-Tab 21]; Wolfson Decl. ¶ 6 [DEV 9-Tab 44]. The primary

purpose of the congressional committees is to ensure the election of candidates from

their respective parties to their respective legislative body and otherwise support the

goals of their party. Id. 

The national party committees are dominated by elected public officials

-- the president or presidential candidate in the case of the Republican

and Democratic National Committees, the top House and Senate party

leaders for the congressional campaign committees. . . . There is no

meaningful separation between the national party committees and the

public officials who control them.

Mann Expert Report at 29 (citations omitted) [DEV 1-Tab 1]; see also Krasno &

Sorauf Expert Report at 9-10 (“Simply put, no wall between the national parties and

the national government exists.”), 12-13 (“Party committees are headed by or enjoy

close relationships with their leading officials, individuals who by virtue of their

positions, reputations, and control of the legislative machinery have special influence

on their colleagues.”) [DEV 1-Tab 2]; Green Expert Report at 9-10 [DEV 1-Tab 3]

(“Political parties, it should be noted, are structured along very different principles

from the American government. One such principle is the separation and dispersal of
84

power, of which one finds many examples in the Constitution. . . . Leaders of

legislative party caucuses may also serve as members or leaders of party campaign

committees. Furthermore, party leaders are drawn disproportionately from the ranks

of those who hold important legislative leadership posts. . . . [T]he internal structure

of parties permits, for example, former U.S. Senator D’Amato, who chaired the

[RSCC] from 1995-97, to at the same time serve as chair of the Senate Banking,

Housing, and Urban Affairs Committee. Parties, in contrast to the lawmaking

institutions they inhabit, are organized in ways that concentrate authority, entrusting

multiple roles to particular individuals.”); Rudman Decl. ¶ 6 [DEV 8-Tab 34]; Vogel

Decl. ¶ 4 [DEV 9-Tab 41] (NRSC is comprised of sitting “Republican Members of

the United States Senate . . . . The chair of the NRSC is elected by the Republican

Caucus of the United States Senate.”); Jordan Decl. ¶ 4 [DEV 7-Tab 21] (the DSCC

“is comprised of sitting Democratic Members of the United States Senate . . . . The

chair of the DSCC is appointed by the Democratic Leader of the United States

Senate.”); McGahn Decl. ¶ 4 [DEV 8-Tab 30] (the NRCC includes the “entire elected

Republican leadership” and its executive committee includes “the Speaker of the

House, the Majority Leader, the Republican Whip, Conference Chairman, the

Conference Vice-Chairman, the Conference Secretary, the Policy Chairman and the

NRCC Chairman”); Wolfson Decl. ¶¶ 4 [DEV 9-Tab 44] (the DCCC is comprised of

sitting Democratic Members of (or Delegates to) the United States House of
85

Representatives, and the Chair of the DCCC is elected by the Democratic Caucus of

the United States House of Representatives).

1.48 “For at least a century [the national party committees] have been melded into their

party’s presidential campaign every four years, often assuming a subsidiary role to the

presidential candidate’s personal campaign committee. The presidential candidate has

traditionally been conceded the power to shape and use the committee, at least for the

campaign.” Sorauf/Krasno Report in Colorado Republican at 27 [DEV 73-Tab C]. 

Political parties are primarily concerned with electing their candidates and the

money they raise is spent assisting their candidates’ campaigns. As Congressman

Meehan explained:

The ultimate goal of a political party such as the Democratic Party is to

get as many Party members as possible into elective office, and in doing

so to increase voting and Party activity by average Party members. The

Party does this by developing principles on public policy matters the

Party stands for, and then by finding candidates to run for the various

political offices who represent those principles for the Party. When the

Party finds its candidates, it tries to raise money to help get like-minded

people to participate in the elections, and to try to get the Party’s

candidates the resources they need to get their message out to voters.

In my experience, political parties do not have economic interests apart

from their ultimate goal of electing their candidates to office.

Meehan Decl. in RNC ¶¶ 3-4 [DEV 68-Tab 30]. Senator Bumpers testifies that he is

“not aware that the [Democratic] party has any interest in the outcome of public

policy debates that is separate from its interest in supporting and electing its

candidates.” Bumpers Decl. ¶ 6 [DEV 6-Tab 10]. Senator McCain testifies that
86

“[t]he entire function and history of political parties in our system is to get their

candidates elected, and that is particularly true after the primary campaign has ended

and the party’s candidate has been selected.” McCain Decl. ¶ 23 [DEV 8-Tab 29].

1.49 In general, the RNC espouses three core principles as guiding the mission of the

national Republican Party, which includes electing candidates to national, state and

local offices who represent the RNC’s political views. In practice, electing these

candidates is the RNC’s primary focus. 

1.49.1 The RNC’s Chief Counsel, Thomas Josefiak, attests that 

[t]he Republican Party has a long and rich history advocating

some core principles: a smaller federal government, lower taxes,

individual freedom, and a strong national defense. The RNC

achieves these principles through three primary means: (1)

promoting an issue agenda advocating Republican positions on

issues of local, state, regional, national and international

importance; (2) electing candidates who espouse these views to

local, state and national offices; and (3) governing in accord

with these views. Although these efforts sometimes overlap,

they also frequently occur independently of one another.

Josefiak Decl. ¶ 22 [RNC Vol. I]. Other documents in the record, however,

show that the RNC and Republican state parties’ primary purpose is to elect

Republican candidates to office. See, e.g., RNC’s Resp. to FEC RFA’s in

RNC, No. 40 [DEV 68-Tab 35]; ODP0021-02003 [DEV 70-Tab 48] (RNC

Memorandum in which Chairman Haley Barbour states: “The purpose of a

political party is to elect its candidates to public office, and our first goal is to

elect Bob Dole president. . . . Electing Dole is our highest priority, but it is not
42 Janice Knopp is the RNC’s Deputy Director of Finance/Marketing Director. Knopp

Decl. ¶ 1 [RNC Vol. V]. 

43 Pat Brister is the Chairman of the Republican Party of Louisiana. Brister Decl. ¶

1 [RNC Vol. VIII].

87

our only priority. Our goal is to increase our majorities in both houses of

Congress and among governors and state legislatures.”); Knopp42 Cross Exam.

at 10 [JDT Vol. 13] (stating that the primary purpose of the RNC is “to elect

Republicans to state, local, and national office”); Brister43 Decl. ¶ 4 [RNC Vol.

VIII] (“The Republican Party of Louisiana’s primary purpose is to help elect

Republicans to office ‘from the courthouse to the White House’”). Whether

the Republican Party’s “core principles” drive its pursuit of electoral

majorities, or vice versa, is a chicken-or-the-egg type quandary that I need not

resolve at this juncture. What is clear from the evidence, however, is that

regardless of whether or not it is done to advocate the party’s principles, the

Republican Party’s primary goal is the election of its candidates who will be

advocates for their core principles. As Dr. Green observes: “In order to obtain

power a party must win elections; and in order to win elections, elected

officials scramble to claim credit for good legislative deeds while publicizing

the misdeeds of the opposition party.” Green Expert Report at [DEV 1-Tab 3].

1.50 The evidence makes clear that the national party committees are creatures of their

elected federal politician members, who run them and set their priorities. It is clear
44 Senator Paul Simon served as a United States Senator for Illinois from 1985 to

1997, and was a Member of the House of Representatives from 1975 to 1985. Prior to being

elected to Congress, Senator Simon served as Lieutenant Governor of Illinois from 1968 to

1972, and served in the Illinois House of Representatives from 1954 to 1962 and in the

Illinois State Senate from 1962 to 1966. Simon Decl. ¶ 1 [DEV 9-Tab 37]. 

45 Senator Alan Simpson served as United States Senator from Wyoming from 1979

(continued...)

88

that the national party committees are focused on electing their candidates to federal

office, and in the case of the DNC and RNC are actually subsumed by their respective

Presidential candidates’ campaigns. Given these facts, it is not surprising that the

national party committees use their elected officials to solicit donations.

Federal Lawmakers Solicit Nonfederal Funds for the National Party Committees

1.51 It is a common practice for Members of Congress to be involved in raising both

federal and nonfederal dollars for the national party committees, sometimes at the

parties’ request. The personal involvement of high-ranking Members of Congress is

a major component of raising federal and nonfederal funds.

Current and former Members of Congress acknowledge this fact. See, e.g.,

Rudman Decl. ¶ 12 [DEV 8-Tab 34]; Bumpers Decl. ¶¶ 7-9 [DEV 6-Tab 10]; Simon44

Decl. ¶ 7 [DEV 9-Tab 37] (“While I was in Congress, the DCCC and the DSCC

would ask Members to make phone calls seeking contributions to the party. They

would assign me a list of names, people I had not known previously, and I would just

go down the list. I am certain they did this because they found it more effective to

have Members make calls.”); Simpson45 Decl. ¶ 4 [DEV 9-Tab 38]; McCain Decl. ¶¶
45(...continued)

to 1997. Simpson Decl. ¶ 2 [DEV 9-Tab 38].

89

2, 21 [DEV 8-Tab 29] (“Soft money is often raised directly by federal candidates and

officeholders, and the largest amounts are often raised by the President, Vice

President and Congressional party leaders.”); Feingold Dep. at 91–93 [JDT Vol. 6];

Shays Decl. ¶ 18 [DEV 8-Tab 35] (“Soft money is raised directly by federal

candidates, officeholders, and national political party leaders. National party officials

often raise these funds by promising donors access to elected officials. The national

parties and national congressional campaign committees also request that Members

of Congress make the calls to soft money donors to solicit more funds.”); Meehan

Decl. in RNC ¶ 6 [DEV 68-Tab 30] (“Members of Congress raise money for the

national party committees, and I have been involved in such fund-raising for the

Democratic Party. At the request of the Party Members of Congress go to the

[DCCC] and call prospective donors from lists provided by the Party to ask them to

participate in Party events, such as DCCC dinners or [DNC] dinners. These lists

typically consist of persons who have contributed to the Democratic Party in the

past.”). 

Representatives of the House and Senate congressional campaign committees

testify that their committees and their leadership ask Members of Congress to raise

funds in specified amounts or to devote specified periods of time to fundraising.
46 Wade Randlett is Chief Executive Officer of Dashboard Technology, a World

WideWeb technology consulting firm based in San Francisco, California. Prior to founding

Dashboard Technology, Mr. Randlett served on the management teams of two other software

companies. He was the Democratic political director at the Technology Network, also

known as TechNet, a Palo Alto-based non-profit corporation and political service

organization which he co-founded in 1996. Prior to starting TechNet, he spent many years

as a political fundraiser and general political consultant, working primarily in the Silicon

Valley area of Northern California, but also throughout California and to some extent in

major metropolitan areas in other parts of the nation. Randlett Decl. ¶ 2 [DEV 8- Tab 32].

90

Jordan Decl. ¶ 33 [DEV 7-Tab 21]; Vogel Decl. ¶¶ 32-33 [DEV 9-Tab 41]; McGahn

Decl. ¶¶ 34-35 [DEV 8-Tab 30]; Wolfson Decl. ¶ 35 [DEV 9-44] (stating that the

DSCC, NRSC, NRCC, and DCCC ask members of Congress to raise money for the

committees).

Political donors also testify that Members of Congress solicit nonfederal

money. See, e.g., Randlett46 Decl. ¶¶ 6-9 [DEV 8-Tab 32] (“I’ve been involved in

political fundraising long enough to remember when soft money had little value to

federal candidates. Ten years ago, a Senator might call a potential donor and the

donor would say something like, ‘I would love to write you a check; I’m a big fan of

yours; but I’m federally maxed, so I can’t do it. If you like, I could write a soft money

check to your state party.’ And the Senator might say, ‘Don’t bother. The soft money

just doesn’t do me any good.’ However, in recent election cycles, Members and

national committees have asked soft money donors to write soft money checks to state

and national parties solely in order to assist federal campaigns. Most soft money

donors don’t ask and don’t care why the money is going to a particular state party, a
47 Robert Rozen worked as a lobbyist for various interests at the law firm Wunder,

Diefenderfer, Cannon & Thelen from 1995 until 1997. For the last six years, he has been a

partner in a lobbying firm called Washington Counsel; now Washington Council Ernst &

Young. Mr. Rozen represents a variety of corporate, trade association, non-profit, and

individual clients before both Congress and the Executive Branch. His work includes

preparing strategic plans, writing lobbying papers, explaining difficult and complex issues

to legislative staff, and drafting proposed legislation. He also organizes fundraisers for

federal candidates and from time-to-time advises clients on their political contributions.

Rozen Decl. ¶ 4 [DEV 8-Tab 33]

48 Daniel Murray served as a government relations specialist for Sprint, GTE and

BellSouth Corporations from 1982 until 1995. As Executive Director of those companies,

he assisted them and their PACs in selecting candidates and political groups for financial

(continued...)

91

party with which they may have no connection. What matters is that the donor has

done what the Member asked.”). 

Lobbyists also find that Members of Congress are involved in fundraising for

their political parties. See Rozen47 Decl. ¶ 15 [DEV 8-Tab 33] (“Even though soft

money contributions often go to political parties, the money is given so that the

contributors can be close to, and recognized by, Members, Presidents, and

Administration officials who have power. Members, not party staffers or party chairs,

raise much of the large soft money contributions. Party chairs do not have that much

power because the DNC and the RNC by themselves don’t have power to do anything.

So people are not giving to be close to the party chairs. The Members of Congress

and the President are the heart of the national parties. The elected officials are the

ones who are really raising the money, either directly or through their agents.”); see

also Murray48 Dep. in Mariani at 41-42 [DEV 79-Tab 58]; Rozen Decl., Ex. A ¶ 7
48(...continued)

support in both federal and nonfederal funds. During this period he also served on the

Democratic Business Council of the DNC, the Advisory Council of the Democratic

Leadership Council, the 1998 and 1992 DNC Convention Site Selection Committees, the

DSCC Leadership Circle, the DCCC Annual Dinner Committee, the RSCC Annual Dinner

Committee, and steering committees for many House and Senate campaigns. Since 1995,

he has acted as a government relations consultant for business and other clients. Murray Aff.

in Mariani ¶¶ 3-5 [DEV 79-Tab 59].

92

[DEV 8-Tab 33]. 

Finally, documentary evidence corroborates this testimony. ODP0037-00062

[DEV 71-Tab 48] (Letter to NRSC Chairman’s Foundation member seeking a renewal

contribution signed by Senator McConnell); ODP0037-00884 [DEV 71-Tab 48]

(letter from Senator McConnell thanking donor for $5,000 federal and $25,000

nonfederal donation to NRSC’s issue advocacy campaign); ODP0031-00821 (letter

from contributor to RNC with contribution, stating “Congressman Scott McInnis

deserve [sic] most of the recruitment credit”); ODP0037-00882 (a solicitation letter

from Senator McConnell to potential donor at the Microsoft Corporation, expressing

the hope that this person would “take a leadership role with [McConnell] at the NRSC

in support of the Committee’s issue advocacy campaign. The resources we raise now

will allow us to communicate our strategy through Labor Day. . . . Your immediate

commitment to this project would mean a great deal to the entire Republican Senate

and to me personally.”); ODP0037-01171 to 72 [DEV 71-Tab 48] (correspondence

referencing solicitations by federal officeholders and candidates); infra Finding ¶
49 Steven T. Kirsch is founder and Chief Executive Officer of Propel Software

Corporation. He has donated millions of dollars to the Democratic Party and to “progressive

candidates and groups.” Kirsch Decl. ¶¶ 2, 4 [DEV 7-Tab 23]. 

93

1.74.3 (Fortune 100 company’s documents stating that Members of Congress had

requested nonfederal donations). 

1.52 “The parties often ask Members to solicit soft money from individuals who have

maxed out to the Member’s campaign.” Simpson Decl. ¶ 6 [DEV 9-Tab 38]; see also

Meehan Decl. in RNC ¶ 6 (“Party leaders also ask a Member to call his or her own

‘maxed out’ donors--those who have contributed to that Member the maximum

amount of ‘hard money’ allowed under the [FECA]--in order to request further

donations to the Party including those which are not restricted by the Act (‘soft

money’).”) [DEV 68-Tab 30]; Billings Decl., Ex. A ¶ 12 [DEV 6-Tab 5]; Jordan Decl.

¶ 20 [DEV 7-Tab 21] (“When donors have reached their federal contribution limit,

the DSCC frequently encourages them to make additional donations to the DSCC’s

nonfederal account.”); Wolfson Decl. ¶ 21 (same for DCCC); Vogel Decl. ¶ 20 (same

for NRSC); McGahn Decl. ¶ 21 (same for NRCC); Sorauf/Krasno Report in Colorado

Republican, at 13-14 [DEV 68-Tab 44]; ODP0018-00620 to 21 [DEV 69-Tab 48]

(federal candidate noting that he “recently sent a letter to [his] maxed out donors

suggesting contributions to the NRCC”); Kirsch

49 Decl. ¶ 8 (“[O]nce a federal

candidate understands that a donor has maxed out, there will often be a request that

the donor make soft money donations to a national party committee, as has been
94

suggested when I have been in that situation.”) [DEV 7-Tab 23]; La Raja Cross Exam.

Ex. 3 at 54 [JDT Vol. 15] (“[I]t is common practice for a candidate to encourage

donors to give to the party when they have ‘maxed’ their federal contributions to his

or her committee”). 

1.53 Mr. Vogel, General Counsel of the NRSC, testifies that “[s]ometimes, the NRSC

urges Republican Senators to contact particular donors because of shared public

policy views, such as outreach efforts to the high-tech community by Senators with

an interest in those issues.” Vogel Decl. ¶ 28 [DEV 9-Tab 41]; see also id. Tab D at

NRSC 066-000009 (draft letter from chairmen of the NRSC and NRCC Technology

Committees inviting High Technology CEOs to the 1998 Republican House-Senate

Dinner in response “to your industry’s plea for a voice on the cutting edge issues so

important to the future of high technology” and noting that the dinner is the “most

prestigious annual event, and all Republican members of the U.S. House and Senate

will be in attendance.”) [DEV 9-Tab 41]. The DCCC engages in similar practices.

Wolfson Decl. ¶ 31 [DEV 9-Tab 44] (“Sometimes, the DCCC urges Democratic

House Members to contact particular donors because of shared public policy views.

For example, the DCCC has sought and received assistance from particular

Democratic House Members in fundraising from the labor community, because those

Members had a strong public record of support for labor.”); see also Randlett Decl.

¶ 6 [DEV 8-Tab 32] (“National party committees often feel they need to raise a
50 Beverly Shea is the RNC’s Finance Director. Shea Decl. ¶ 1 [RNC Vol. V].

95

certain amount of soft money for a given election cycle. To reach that overall goal,

they may divide up potential donors by geography, affiliated organization, or issue

interests. The party committees decide which Members of Congress should contact

these potential donors, and these Members then put in a certain amount of call time

at the national committee soliciting the money. A Member and a potential donor may

be matched because the Member is on a legislative committee in which the donor has

a particular interest, whether economic or ideological.”).

1.54 Despite the foregoing evidence, the Finance Director of the RNC states that it is

“exceedingly rare” for the RNC to rely on federal officeholders for personal or

telephonic solicitations of major donors. See B. Shea50 Decl. ¶ 17 [RNC Vol. V]. She

states that by RNC policy and practice, the RNC Chairman, Co-Chairwoman, Deputy

Chairman, fundraising staff or members of major donor groups—not federal

officeholders—undertake initial contact and solicitation of major donors of both

federal and nonfederal funds. Id. Whether or not initial solicitations by federal

officials on behalf of the RNC are rare, the record shows that they are made.

RNC0178497 (May 10, 1996, letter from RNC Chairman Haley Barbour to Senators,

asking to use their name for a “membership recruitment package,” which while “not

directly solcit[ing] funds,” “will serve as a set-up letter for the membership invitation

package that will be mailed several days after this letter.”). Furthermore, Members
51 Senator David Boren served as a United States Senator from Oklahoma from 1979-

1994. Boren Decl. ¶ 2 [DEV 6-Tab 8]

96

of Congress solicit funds for the RNC from those who have donated in the past. See,

e.g., RNC0266088-91 (handwritten notes determining which Member of Congress

would call particular potential donors); RNC0250514-15 (April 1997 solicitation

letter from Speaker Gingrich asking donors “to continue [their] support [for] the

President’s Club”); Moreover, it is clear that Ms. Shea does not speak for the NRSC

or the NRCC which clearly use Members to solicit funds. See, e.g., Findings ¶ 1.51.

1.55 Raising nonfederal funds for the political parties can be in a Member’s interest. For

example, the amount of money a Member of Congress raises for the national political

party committees often affects the amount the committees give to assist the Member’s

campaign. See, e.g., Boren51 Decl. ¶ 4 [DEV 6-Tab 8] (“[T]he DSCC and other

national party organizations kept records, or ‘tallies’ of how much soft money a

Senator had raised for the party. The DSCC then gave little [nonfederal] money to

the campaigns of those Senators who had not raised adequate [nonfederal] party

funds. In my view, this practice demonstrates very clearly that soft money is not used

purely for ‘party building’ activities, but that there is at least a working understanding

among the party officials and Senate candidates that the money will benefit the

individual Senators’ campaigns.”); id. (explaining that because he “minimized” the

amount of time he spent raising soft money for the DNC, he “received almost no
52 In 1980, during President Carter’s re-election campaign, Robert Hickmott worked

at the Democratic National Committee (“DNC”) as an Associate Finance Director. Hickmott

Decl. ¶ 2 [DEV 6-Tab 19]. Following the general election, Hickmott became the Executive

Director of a new DNC entity, the Democratic Business Council (“DBC”), where he served

until 1983. Id. During 1985-86, Hickmott served as National Finance Director for

then-Congressman Timothy Wirth’s Senate campaign, and from 1987 until early 1989, on

Senator Wirth’s Senate staff. Id. After that, Hickmott was in private practice as an attorney

until January 1991, when he joined the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee

(“DSCC”) as Deputy Executive Director. Id. In 1993, Hickmott worked for four years as

the Associate Administrator for Congressional Affairs at the Unites States Environmental

(continued...)

97

money from the Democratic Party for my campaigns.”); Bumpers Decl. ¶ 11 [DEV

6-Tab 10] (“Members who raise money for the DSCC expect some of that money to

come directly back to them. Part of this unwritten but not unspoken rule is that if you

do not raise a certain amount of money for the DSCC, you are not going to get any

back. The DSCC does not give a candidate the maximum allowed unless he or she has

raised at least a certain amount for the DSCC.”); infra Findings ¶ 1.56.1 (statement

of Senator Simpson). 

Members also have an interest in a strong party that can assist its federal

officeholders. See, e.g., Bumpers Decl. ¶ 10 [DEV 6-Tab10] (“When a Member

raises money for the party, there is a sense on the part of the Member that he or she

is helping his or her own campaign by virtue of raising that money. When Members

raise funds for the DNC, it helps the DNC perform its function of keeping tabs on

statements, policies, and votes of opposition party members and groups.”). 

Former DNC and DSCC official and current lobbyist Robert Hickmott52
52(...continued)

Protection Agency, then for two years as a counselor to then-Secretary Andrew Cuomo at the

United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”). Id. In 1999,

Hickmott left HUD and joined The Smith-Free Group (“Smith-Free”), a small governmental

affairs firm located in Washington, D.C. Id. ¶ 3. Hickmott is currently a Senior Vice

President at Smith-Free and one of the six principals in the firm. Id. Hickmott is a regular

contributor to candidates for Congress, for President, and the national party committees,

primarily to Democratic candidates, but also to several Republicans, as well. Id. In the

1999-2000 cycle, he contributed just over $7,000 and in the 2001-2002 cycle, he has

contributed a little more than $10,000. Id. Hickmott provided a declaration in Federal

Election Commission v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee, 41 F. Supp.

2d 1197 (D. Colo. 1999), aff’d, 213 F.3d 1221 (10th Cir. 2000), rev’d, 533 U.S. 431 (2001)

(“Colorado II”); See Colorado II, 533 U.S. at 458.

98

testifies that even incumbents with safe seats have incentives to raise money for the

parties. He explains: 

Incumbents who were not raising money for themselves because they

were not up for reelection would sometimes raise money for other

Senators, or for challengers. They would send $20,000 to the DSCC

and ask that this be entered on another candidate’s tally. They might do

this, for example, if they were planning to run for a leadership position

and wanted to obtain support from the Senators they assisted. This

would personally benefit them, in addition to doing their part to retain

Democratic control of the Senate, which would preserve the legislative

power of all Democratic Senators.

Hickmott Decl., Ex. A ¶ 18 [DEV 6-Tab 19]; see also id. ¶ 13 (attesting that Senators

were very concerned about whether or not donors’ checks were tallied to them); infra

Findings ¶ 1.56.3 (describing the DSCC tallying/credit system). Senator McCain

attests that 

[t]he parties encourage Members of Congress to raise large amounts of

soft money to benefit their own and others’ re-election. At one recent

caucus meeting, a Member of Congress was praised for raising $1.3
99

million dollars for the party. James Greenwood, a Republican

Congressman from Pennsylvania, recently told the New York Times

that House leaders consider soft money fundraising prowess in

assigning chairmanships and other sought-after jobs. . . . I share Mr.

Greenwood’s concerns.

McCain Decl. ¶ 7 [DEV 8-Tab 29]. Finally, the political parties’ power over

Members of Congress provides additional incentive to fundraise for the national party

committees. As Dr. Green notes: “The ubiquitous role that parties play in the lives

of federal officials means that no official can ignore the fundraising ambitions of his

or her party.” Green Expert Report at 15 [DEV 1-Tab 3]. 

Nonfederal Funds are Given with Intent to Assist Specific Members of Congress; Political

Parties Keep Track of Contributions Members of Congress Raise

1.56 Nonfederal money is often given to national parties with the intent that it will be used

to assist the campaigns of particular federal candidates, and it is often used for that

purpose. 

1.56.1 Senator Simpson testifies that “[d]onors do not really differentiate between

hard and soft money; they often contribute to assist or gain favor with an

individual politician. When donors give soft money to the parties, there is

sometimes at least an implicit understanding that the money will be used to

benefit a certain candidate. Likewise, Members know that if they assist the

party with fundraising, be it hard or soft money, the party will later assist their

campaign.” Simpson Decl. ¶ 6 [DEV 9-Tab 38]. “Although soft money cannot

be given directly to federal candidates, everyone knows that it is fairly easy to
53 Senator Timothy Wirth served in the U.S. House of Representatives from 1974 to

1986, representing the Second Congressional District of the State of Colorado. From 1987

through 1992 he served as Senator for the State of Colorado in the United States Senate.

Wirth Decl. Ex. A ¶ 2 [DEV 9-Tab 43].

100

push the money through our tortured system to benefit specific candidates.”

Id. ¶ 7. Senator Wirth53 understood that when he raised funds for the DSCC,

donors expected that he would receive the amount of their donations multiplied

by a certain number that the DSCC had predetermined, assuming that the

DSCC had raised other funds. Wirth Decl. Ex. A ¶¶ 5, 8 [DEV 9-Tab 43]; see

also FEC v. Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. (“Colorado II”),

533 U.S. 431 (2001); Bumpers Decl. ¶¶ 10-12 [DEV 6-Tab 10]; Simon Decl.

¶ 10 [DEV 9-Tab 37].

1.56.2 Individual nonfederal money donors have made specific requests that the

national political party apply their nonfederal money gifts to particular federal

campaigns. See, e.g., RNC0035464 [DEV99], RNC0032733-34 [DEV 92]

(fundraising letters requesting that nonfederal money donations be used for

particular federal elections). As one experienced donor observes: “The

committee receiving . . . a soft money donation [solicited by a Member of

Congress from a ‘maxed out’ contributor] understands that it has been raised

by or for a particular federal candidate, and this affects how much the

committee spends on behalf of that candidate. I have discussed with national
54 Arnold Hiatt engaged in substantial political spending for a number of years. He

estimates that from the 1992 election cycle through 1997, he donated approximately $60,000

in federal funds, mostly to federal candidates, with a few contributions to federal political

action committees (“PACs”). In October of 1996, he gave a $500,000 nonfederal donation

to the DNC. In February of 2001, he made a $5000 hard money donation to the League of

Conservation Voters’ PAC, and believes that is the only hard money donation he has given

since 1997. Hiatt Decl. ¶ 5 [DEV 6-Tab 18]. 

101

party committees the spending of such soft money to benefit federal

candidates.” Kirsch Decl. ¶ 8 [DEV 7-Tab 23]; see also Hiatt54 Dep. at 114-18

(explaining that anyone donating nonfederal money is indirectly giving it to the

campaigns of federal candidates and officeholders, and stating that his soft

money donations were earmarked for particular candidates but that he does not

know if the money was actually spent on those candidates).

1.56.2.1 Plaintiff Thomas McInerney, a large individual contributor to the Republican

Party, states that he donated amounts in excess of $57,500 per election cycle

to Republican organizations at the national, state and local levels. For

example, in 2002, he donated $250,000 to the RNC, in addition to other

donations to national, state and local political committees. He states that his

donations were intended to support state and local candidates and political

parties. McInerney Aff. ¶¶ 4, 10, 12 [9 PCS]. Mr. McInerney’s affidavit does

not state whether or not these funds were used in the manner he desired, only

that “it is his understanding” that they were used for such activities. Id. ¶¶ 11,

13, 15. Regardless of whether his donations were used for state and local
102

political activities, the record is clear that Mr. McInerney represents an

exception to the general rule that donors give money to the national parties

with the intent that they will be used to assist federal candidates. Furthermore,

if Mr. McInerney wants to donate funds to state parties for activities that affect

state and local elections, nothing in BCRA prevents him from doing so. See

also infra Findings ¶ 1.61.

1.56.3 The DSCC maintains a “credit” program that credits nonfederal money raised

by a Senator or candidate to that Senator or candidate’s state party. Jordan

Decl. ¶¶ 36-39 [DEV 7-Tab 21]. Amounts credited to a state party can reflect

that the Senator or candidate solicited the donation, or can serve as a donor’s

sign of tacit support for the state party or the Senate candidate. Jordan Decl.

¶¶ 37-40, Tabs F, G [DEV 7-Tab 21]. According to former DSCC official

Hickmott, Senators were very concerned about whether or not donors’ checks

were tallied to them. Hickmott Decl., Ex. A ¶ 13 [DEV 6-Tab 19]; see also

supra Findings ¶ 1.55 (Senator Boren commenting on the tallying system and

effect of a candidate’s fundraising for the national political committee on the

support the candidate’s campaign received from the national party).

1.56.4 Both the NRCC and NRSC are aware of which Members have raised funds for

their committees, and may advise Members of amounts they have raised, in

order to encourage Members to aid the collective interest of preserving or
103

obtaining a majority in the House or Senate. McGahn Decl. ¶¶ 34-35 [DEV

8-Tab 30]; Vogel Decl. ¶¶ 33, 36 [DEV 9-Tab 41]. Similarly, although the

DCCC uses “no formal credit or tally program,” it “advises Democratic House

Members of the amounts they have raised for the DCCC, ascribing particular

contributions to the fundraising efforts of the Member in question.” Wolfson

Dec. ¶ 36 [DEV 9-Tab 44]; Thompson Dep. at 28-29 [JDT Vol. 32] (testifying

that the DCCC “provide[s] the entire Democratic Caucus with the amounts of

money raised by name of every Democratic member of Congress. . . . [a]t the

Democratic Caucus meeting. . . . I think it’s a method used to let people know

that if the DCCC is going to be successful all members should participate.”).

1.57 Federal candidates also raise nonfederal money through joint fundraising committees

formed with national committees. See Buttenwieser Decl. ¶¶ 8-14 [DEV 6-Tab 11].

One common method of joint fundraising is for a national congressional committee

to form a separate joint fundraising committee with a federal candidate committee.

A joint fundraising committee collects and deposits contributions, pays related

expenses, allocates proceeds and expenses to the participants, keeps required records,

and discloses overall joint fundraising activity to the FEC. Wolfson Decl. ¶ 40 [DEV

9-Tab 44]; Vogel Decl. ¶¶ 39-45 [DEV 9-Tab 41]; Jordan Decl. ¶¶ 41, 50 [DEV

7-Tab 21]; Oliver Dep. at 258 [DEV Supp.-Tab 1]. 

A typical allocation formula for joint fundraising between the

[congressional campaign committees] and a federal candidate will
104

allocate the first $2,000 of every contribution from an individual to the

participating candidate, with $1,000 designated to the primary election

and $1,000 to the general election; and the next $20,000 to the

[congressional campaign committee’s] federal account. Because the

[congressional campaign committee] is normally the only participant

eligible to receive nonfederal funds, any remaining amounts of an

individual contribution will be allocated to the [congressional campaign

committee’s] nonfederal account, as will the entirety of any

contribution from a federally prohibited source. 

Wolfson Decl. ¶ 42 [DEV 9-Tab 44]; Vogel Decl. ¶ 41 [DEV 9-Tab 41]; Jordan Decl.

¶ 45 [DEV 7-Tab 21]. Two experts characterize the joint fundraising system as one

“in which Senate candidates in effect raise[] soft money for use in their own races.”

Krasno and Sorauf Expert Report at 13 [DEV 1-Tab 2].

1.58 It is clear from the record that in practice Members of Congress actively solicit large

nonfederal donations to their political parties, often at the behest and direction of the

political parties. The political parties encourage Members to solicit such donations

and reward those who are successful by assisting their campaigns. Furthermore,

although the raising of nonfederal funds is rationalized as an effort to pay for “party

building” activities, it is clear that this money is solicited by Members and given by

donors with the understanding that it will be used to assist the campaigns of particular

federal candidates.

Federal Lawmakers and National Party Committees Solicit Nonfederal Funds for State

Parties

1.59 National party committees direct donors to give nonfederal money to state parties in

order to assist the campaigns of federal candidates. See, e.g., Kirsch Decl. ¶ 9 [DEV
55 Alan G. Hassenfeld has served as Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive

Officer of Hasbro, Inc. since 1989, a global company based in Rhode Island with annual

revenues in excess of $3 billion. Hasbro designs, manufactures, and markets toys, games,

(continued...)

105

7-Tab 23] (“The national Democratic party played an important role in my decisions

to donate soft money to state parties in [the 2000 election] cycle, recommending that

I donate funds to specific state parties just before the election. They said, essentially,

if you want to help us out with the Presidential election, these particular state parties

are hurting, they need money for get-out-the-vote and other last minute campaign

activities.”). Robert Hickmott, a former DNC and DSCC official testifies: 

Once you’ve helped a federal candidate by contributing hard money to

his or her campaign, you are sometimes asked to do more for the

candidate by making donations of hard and/or soft money to the

national party committees, the relevant state party (assuming it can

accept corporate contributions), or an outside group that is planning on

doing an independent expenditure or issue advertisement to help the

candidate’s campaign. These types of requests typically come from

staff at the national party committees, the campaign staff of the

candidate, the candidate’s fundraising staff, or former staff members of

the candidate’s congressional office, but they also sometimes come

from a Member of Congress or his or her chief of staff . . . . Regardless

of the precise person who makes the request, these solicitations almost

always involve an incumbent Member of Congress rather than a

challenger. As a result, there are multiple avenues for a person or

group that has the financial resources to assist a federal candidate

financially in her or her election effort, both with hard and soft money.

Hickmott Decl. ¶ 8 [DEV 6-Tab 19]; see also Buttenwieser Decl. ¶ 16 [DEV 6-Tab

11] (“The DSCC has also requested that I provide assistance to state parties.”);

Hassenfeld55 Decl. ¶ 9 [DEV 6-Tab 17] (“In 1992, when I told the Democratic Party
55(...continued)

interactive software, puzzles and infant products. He also sits on a number of civic and

philanthropic boards. He is a member of the Board of Trustees of the University of

Pennsylvania and Deerfield Academy, he serves on the Dean’s Council of the Kennedy

School of Government at Harvard, and sits on the board of Refugees International. He also

run three charitable foundations: the Hasbro Charitable Trust, the Hasbro Children’s

Foundation. and a family foundation. Hassenfeld Decl. ¶¶ 2-3 [DEV 6-Tab 17].

106

that I wanted to support then-Governor Bill Clinton’s presidential campaign, they

suggested that I make a $20,000 hard money contribution to the DNC, which I did.

The Democratic Party then made clear to me that although there was a limit to how

much hard money I could contribute, I could still help with Clinton’s presidential

campaign by contributing to state Democratic committees. There appeared to be little

difference between contributing directly to a candidate and making a donation to the

party. Accordingly, at the request of the DNC, I also made donations on my own

behalf to state Democratic committees outside of my home state of Rhode Island. . .

. Through my contributions to the political parties, I was able to give more money to

further Clinton’s candidacy than I was able to give directly to his campaign.”);

Randlett Decl. ¶ 9 [DEV 8-Tab 32] (“[N]ational committees have asked soft money

donors to write soft money checks to state and national parties solely in order to assist

federal campaigns.”); Josefiak Decl. ¶ 68 [RNC Vol. I] (“It is . . . not uncommon for

the RNC to put interested donors in touch with various state parties. This often occurs

when a donor has reached his or her federal dollar limits to the RNC, but wishes to

make additional contributions to the state party. When this happens, the RNC will
107

often suggest that the donor make contributions to certain state parties that are most

in need of funds at that time.”).

1.60 Federal officeholders have directed contributors to the state parties when the

contributors have “maxed out” to the candidate or when it appears that the state party

can most effectively use additional money to help that officeholder or other federal

candidates. As one candidate’s solicitation letter stated, “you are at the limit of what

you can directly contribute to my campaign,” but “you can further help my campaign

by assisting the Colorado Republican Party.” FEC v. Colorado Republican Fed.

Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431, 458 (2001) (quoting an August 27, 1996 fundraising

letter from then-Congressman Allard); see also Philp Dep. Ex. 14 [JDT Vol. 26]

(same letter); MMc0014 [DEV 117-Tab 2] (letter to a contributor stating: “Since you

have contributed the legal maximum to the McConnell Senate Committee, I wanted

you to know that you can still contribute to the Victory 2000 program . . . . This

program was an important part of President George W. Bush’s impressive victory in

Kentucky last year, and it will be critical to my race and others next year” signed by

Senator McConnell with the handwritten note: “This is important to me. Hope you

can help”); Buttenwieser Decl. ¶¶ 15-16 [DEV 6-Tab 11] (“Federal candidates have

often asked me to donate to state parties, rather than the joint committees, when they

feel that’s where they need some extra help in their campaigns. I’ve given significant

amounts to the state parties in South Dakota and North Dakota because all the
108

Senators representing those states are good friends, and I know that it’s difficult to

raise large sums in those states.”); Hickmott Decl. ¶ 8 [DEV 6-Tab 19] (quoted supra

Findings ¶ 1.59); Randlett Decl. ¶ 9 [DEV 8-Tab 32] (“Members [of Congress]. . .

have asked soft money donors to write soft money checks to state and national parties

solely in order to assist federal campaigns.”).

1.61 Plaintiff Thomas McInerney states that he donates over $10,000 per year to state and

local political party organizations to be spent on state and local organizations and

elections. McInerney Aff. ¶¶ 4, 10, 12 [9 PCS]. Mr. McInerney’s affidavit does not

state whether or not these funds were used in the manner he desired, only that “it is

his understanding” that they were used for such activities. Id. ¶¶ 11, 13, 15.

Regardless, nothing in BCRA prevents Mr. McInerney from donating funds to state

and local party organizations – the law only restricts the types of activities on which

these nonfederal funds may be spent. However, if Mr. McInerney’s purpose in

donating these funds is to assist state and local parties and candidates, BCRA ensures

that his funds will be spent only on activities that exclusively affect state and local

parties and elections, and not on practices that constitute federal election activity.

Summary

1.62 The evidence clearly demonstrates that federal officeholders not only solicit

nonfederal donations for the national political committees, but also for state political

parties. The testimony and documentary evidence makes clear that candidates value
109

such donations almost as much as donations made directly to their campaigns and that

these donations assist federal candidates’ campaigns. Furthermore, the evidence

makes clear that the national parties also direct nonfederal donations to their state

party affiliates for the purpose of affecting federal elections. This evidence also

corroborates the findings that GOTV and voter registration efforts by state parties

affect federal elections. See, e.g., supra Findings ¶¶ 1.28, 1.31. Most importantly,

the close nexus between the national political parties and federal officeholders led

BCRA’s framers to conclude that: 

Because the national parties operate at the national level, and are

inextricably intertwined with federal officeholders and candidates, who

raise the money for the national party committees, there is a close

connection between the funding of the national parties and the

corrupting dangers of soft money on the federal political process. The

only effective way to address this [soft money] problem of corruption

is to ban entirely all raising and spending of soft money by the national

parties.

148 Cong. Rec. H409 (daily ed. Feb. 13, 2002) (statement of Rep. Shays).

Corruption

1.63 The fact that Members of Congress are intimately involved in the raising of money

for the political parties, particularly unlimited nonfederal money donations, creates

opportunities for corruption. The record does not contain any evidence of bribery or

vote buying in exchange for donations of nonfederal money; however, the evidence

presented in this case convincingly demonstrates that large contributions, particularly

those nonfederal contributions surpassing the federal limits, provide donors access to
110

federal lawmakers which is a critical ingredient for influencing legislation, and which

the Supreme Court has determined constitutes corruption. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424

U.S. 1, 27 n.28 (1976) (citing Buckley, 519 F.2d at 839 nn.37-38).

Vote Buying/Bribery

1.64 No Member of Congress testifying in this case states that he or she has ever

changed his or her vote on any legislation in exchange for a donation of nonfederal

funds to his or her political party. See, e.g., Resp. of FEC to RNC’s First and Second

Reqs. for Admis. at 2-3 (admitting lack of evidence); McCain Dep. at 171-74 (unable

to identify any federal officeholder who changed his or her vote on any legislation in

exchange for a donation of non-federal money to a political party); Snowe Dep. at 15-

16 (same); Jeffords Dep. at 106-07 (same); Meehan Dep. at 181-83 (same); Shays

Dep. at 171 (same); see also 148 Cong. Rec. S2099 (daily ed. March 20, 2002)

(statement of Sen. Dodd) (“I have never known of a particular Member whom [sic]

I thought cast a ballot because of a contribution.”); 147 Cong. Rec. S2936 (daily ed.

March 27, 2001) (statement of Sen. Wellstone) (“I don’t know of any individual

wrongdoing by any Senator of either party.”). 

1.65 Senator Rudman notes:

I understand that those who opposed passage of the Bipartisan

Campaign Reform Act, and those who now challenge its

constitutionality in Court, dare elected officials to point to specific

[instances of vote buying]. I think this misses the point altogether.

[The access and influence accorded large donors] is inherently,

endemically, and hopelessly corrupting. You can’t swim in the ocean
111

without getting wet; you can’t be part of this system without getting

dirty.

Rudman Decl. ¶ 10 [DEV 8-Tab 34].

1.66 Consistent with Senator Rudman’s testimony, the record, while not containing

evidence that nonfederal funds have purchased votes, includes testimony from former

and current Members of Congress describing the influence of nonfederal funds on the

political system. Former Senator Simpson states: 

Too often, Members’ first thought is not what is right or what they

believe, but how it will affect fundraising. Who, after all, can seriously

contend that a $100,000 donation does not alter the way one thinks

about--and quite possibly votes on--an issue? . . . When you don’t pay

the piper that finances your campaigns, you will never get any more

money from that piper. Since money is the mother’s milk of politics,

you never want to be in that situation.

Simpson Decl. ¶ 10. Senator Simpson also relates that

Large donors of both hard and soft money receive special treatment. No

matter how busy a politician may be during the day, he or she will

always make time to see donors who gave large amounts of money.

Staffers who work for Members know who the big donors are, and

those people always get their phone calls returned first and are allowed

to see the Member when others are not.

Id. ¶ 9. Former Senator Simon testifies: 

It is not unusual for large contributors to seek legislative favors in

exchange for their contributions. A good example of that which stands

out in my mind because it was so stark and recent occurred on the next

to last day of the 1995-96 legislative session. Federal Express wanted

to amend a bill being considered by a Conference Committee, to shift

coverage of their truck drivers from the National Labor Relations Act

to the Railway Act, which includes airlines, pilots and railroads. This

was clearly of benefit to Federal Express, which according to published
112

reports had contributed $1.4 million in the last 2-year cycle to

incumbent Members of Congress and almost $1 million in soft money

to the political parties. I opposed this in the Democratic Caucus,

arguing that even if it was good legislation, it should not be approved

without holding a hearing, we should not cave in to special interests.

One of my senior colleagues got up and said, ‘I’m tired of Paul always

talking about special interests; we’ve got to pay attention to who is

buttering our bread.’ I will never forget that. This was a clear example

of donors getting their way, not on the merits of the legislation, but just

because they had been big contributors. I do not think there is any

question that this is the reason it passed.

Simon Decl. ¶¶ 13-14 [DEV 9-Tab 37]; see also Colorado II, 533 U.S. 431, 451 n.12

(2001) (quoting Senator Simon); Feingold Dep. at 62 [JDT Vol. 6] (testifying that in

the fall of 1996 a senior Senator suggested to Senator Feingold that he support the

Federal Express amendment because “they just gave us $100,000”). Former Senator

Boren testifies:

Donations, including soft money donations to political parties, do affect

how Congress operates. It’s only natural, and happens all too often,

that a busy Senator with 10 minutes to spare will spend those minutes

returning the call of a large soft money donor rather than the call of any

other constituent. . . . 

As a Member of the Senate Finance Committee, I experienced the

pressure first hand. On several occasions when we were debating

important tax bills, I needed a police escort to get into the Finance

Committee hearing room because so many lobbyists were crowding the

halls, trying to get one last chance to make their pitch to each Senator.

Senators generally knew which lobbyist represented the interests of

which large donor. I was often glad that I limited the amount of soft

money fundraising I did and did not take PAC contributions, because

it would be extremely difficult not to feel beholden to these donors

otherwise. I know from my first-hand experience and from my

interactions with other Senators that they did feel beholden to large

donors.
113

Senator Boren Decl. ¶¶ 7-8 [DEV 6-Tab 8]; see also id. ¶ 9 (“Many Congressmen vie

for positions on particular committees such as Finance and Ways and Means in large

part because it makes it much easier for them to raise money. They then spend large

amounts of their scarce time raising money for their party from businesses that have

specific matters pending before their committees.”).

1.67 It is clear that political parties are involved in efforts to influence federal officeholders

with regard to the passage or defeat of specific legislation. The motivation behind

these efforts may not be imparted to the officeholder. However, an internal document

shows that on at least one occasion the motivation for doing so was associated with

donors’ interest in the legislation.

1.67.1 Senator Rudman testifies that while the RNC would lobby him to take a

position on legislation, it never asked him to take a particular position because

a donor had contributed soft money to the party. Rudman Dep. at 77-82 [JDT

Vol. 27]. Senator McCain testifies that “there are many times where the

Republican National Committee tried to change my votes and other votes of

other Republicans . . . [T]he Republican National Committee constantly

weighs in on legislation before the Congress of the United States,” McCain

Dep. at 171-72 [JDT Vol. 18], but he also states that he does not “know [if it

was] in exchange for donations or not.” Id. The record, however, also

contains a call sheet titled “Team 100 One-On-One with [a national
114

association],” for a call that took place on February 28, 2000, in Chairman Jim

Nicholson’s office. RNC0159740 [DEV 95]. Included on the sheet were

instructions to thank the group for upgrading to Team 100. Id. The call sheet

includes handwritten comments, including: “Gary Miller sponsoring

Brownfield Legislation. Boehlert + Bliley against. Working w/ Speaker.

Asked JN help. JN agreed to talk to Boehlert @ the possible time. When

appropriate. . . . Call Sen. Abraham about support homebuilders - Property

Rights Bill . . . . Lott good friend of homebuilders.” Id.

1.68 Although one Defense expert believes it does not occur, two present Members of

Congress testify that threats have been made by the political parties to withhold

financial support due to Members’ positions on issues. See Shays Dep. at 172-84

[JDT Vol. 29] (stating Republican Party never attempted to change his vote, but that

“[i]t was made clear to a number of my colleagues if they voted for the campaign

finance reform, they would get no campaign contributions”); McCain Decl. ¶ 7 [DEV

8-Tab 29] (“At times, when Members seek to support legislation their congressional

leaders oppose, they are threatened with the prospect that their leaders will withhold

soft money being spent on their behalf.”); Defense Expert Mann Cross Exam. at 113-

15 [JDT Vol. 17] (“I would be shocked if [the RNC] ever did such a thing. . . . [T]he

point is to win the margin seat, to control the majority for the party, not to weaken a

potentially vulnerable candidate. . . . It would be self-defeating. That isn’t how it
115

works.”). The FEC does not investigate or make determinations of national parties

using federal money to induce federal legislators to support or oppose specific

legislation, and therefore has no knowledge of whether such practices occur.

Vosdingh Dep. at 89 [RNC Vol. VIII].

1.69 Plaintiffs’ own expert Raymond La Raja recognizes the corruption potential inherent

in nonfederal donations to the political parties. In a recently published book, La Raja

argues that limiting nonfederal money donations reduces “the potential for corruption

by eliminating the super donors.” Green Rebuttal Report at 4 [DEV 5-Tab 1] (quoting

Raymond La Raja, Sources and Uses of Soft Money: What Do We Know?, in A

User’s Guide to Campaign Reform at 106 (Gerald C. Lubenow ed., 2001). He

continues:

If only a modest portion of party soft money goes to fund issue ads, it

is worth re-examining the question: how is soft money harmful? The

obvious answer is that it permits candidates, contributors, and parties,

to circumvent federal laws limiting campaign contributions. If party

soft money can help a specific candidate, then corporations, unions, or

wealthy individuals can simply funnel contributions to candidates

through the parties. And the potential for quid pro quo exchange

between contributor and policymaker escalates with the size of the

contribution. 

Id. (citing same at 105). In fact, La Raja asserts that “[t]o reduce the potential for

corruption, I recommend that Congress place a cap on soft money contributions or,

if soft money is banned, raise the limits on hard money contributions.” Id. (citing

same at 106). In his dissertation, La Raja makes a similar recommendation. La Raja
116

Cross Exam. Ex. 3 at 147 [JDT Vol. 15]; see also id. at 105 (“In a society in which

political participation is unequal among socioeconomic groups it is discomforting to

think that wealthy people and organizations might have disproportionate influence on

government policies simply because they can write large checks to politicians. For

this reason alone, policymakers might pause before granting dispensations to political

parties though these institutions may perform valuable functions in democratic

politics.”). La Raja concludes that 

[t]here are two distinct benefits of using soft money. First, the parties

can raise these funds in large increments. Although most soft money

contributions are relatively small – the average per source is less than

$10,000 – the parties solicit large amounts from corporations, unions

and wealthy individuals. . . .

Another important advantage of soft money is that the parties can

concentrate these funds in key races. By exploiting soft money rules,

the parties effectively sidestep the federal ceilings that prevent them

from allocating resources efficiently in the closest contests. To

navigate around the federal restrictions on soft money the parties have

developed close ties with their state parties because these affiliates

receive special exemptions for party building activity.

Id. at 51 (emphasis added); see also id. at 74-75 (concluding that parties “exploit

federal campaign finance laws by using soft money for candidate support even though

federal laws require them to use it for generic party building”); La Raja Cross Exam.

17-18 [JDT Vol. 15] (stating that he stands by the conclusions reached in his

dissertation).

Donors are Pressured to Make Contributions to Political Parties

1.70 Corporate donors, trade associations, and individual donors are pressured to make
56 CED is “an independent non-partisan research and policy organization of some

200 Trustees who are prominent business leaders and educators.” Kolb Decl. I ¶ 1 [DEVTab 24].

57 Charles Kolb is CED’s president. Kolb Decl. I ¶ 1 [DEV 7-Tab 24].

117

large contributions to the parties.

1.70.1 The Committee for Economic Development (CED)56 released a “survey, which

was conducted by the Tarrance Group, . . . drawn from telephone interviews

of a random sample of 300 corporate executives employed by major U.S.

corporations.” Kolb57 Decl. ¶ 9 [DEV 7-Tab 24]. The survey showed that

“[n]early three-quarters of [senior executives of the nation’s largest

businesses] (74 percent) say pressure is placed on business leaders to make

large political donations. The main reasons corporate America makes political

contributions, the executives said is fear of retribution and to buy access to

lawmakers. Seventy five percent say political donations give them an

advantage in shaping legislation; and nearly four-in-five executives (78

percent) called the system ‘an arms race for cash that continues to get more

and more out of control.’” Id. ¶ 9 & Ex. 6.

1.70.1.1 Plaintiffs challenge these poll results, noting that Kolb, CED’s President, could

not provide details regarding how the Tarrance Group conducted the survey.

See Proposed Findings of Fact of the RNC, Republican Party of Colorado, the

Republican Party of Ohio, the Republican Party of New Mexico, the Dallas
118

County (Iowa) Republican County Central Committee, and Mike Duncan

(“RNC Proposed Findings”) ¶ 115(b) (citing Kolb Dep. at 128, 145 [JDT Vol.

13]). They also state that many of the survey questions did not distinguish

between federal and nonfederal funds. Id. (citing Kolb Dep. Ex. 5). With

regard to the first criticism, the fact that a person who commissioned a study

could not explain how the polling firm actually conducted the survey, without

more, does not render the poll flawed. Plaintiffs have provided no information

which indicates that the Court should view the Tarrance Group’s work with

caution. In fact, in his deposition, Kolb explained that the Tarrance Group is

“a professional polling firm. They know how to do their business pretty well

and they’re fairly well respected from everything we could tell,” Kolb Dep. at

145 [JDT Vol. 13], and the RNC did not challenge this assessment in the

deposition or in their filings. In fact, the record shows that The Coalition– an

organization supported by a number of Plaintiffs– used the Tarrance Group for

its own polling. See infra Findings ¶ 2.6.2.2. As for the second criticism, it

is true that the pollsters did not ask those surveyed to distinguish between

federal and nonfederal funds; however, the fact that nearly 80 percent called

the campaign finance system “an arms race for cash that continues to get more

and more out of control” strongly suggests that political party contribution

coercion does not stop once a donor reaches the federal contribution limits.
119

1.70.2 Lobbyist Robert Rozen testifies that 

[i]n some cases corporations and trade associations do not want

to give in amounts over the hard money limits, but they feel

pressured to give in greater amounts and end up making soft

money donations as well. They are under pressure, sometimes

subtle and sometimes direct, from Members to give at levels

higher than the hard money limits. For example, some Members

in a position to influence legislation important to an industry

naturally wonder why a company in that industry is not

participating in fundraising events. 

Rozen Decl. ¶ 8 [DEV 8-Tab 33]; see also Brian McGrory, Businesses Drawn

to Campaign Reform, Boston Globe, February 13, 1997, ODP0018-00457-60

[DEV 69-Tab 48] (quoting Howard Marlowe, a Washington lobbyist, as

saying: “We are spending tens of millions of dollars to satisfy the constant

craving of congressmen or the parties for money and our own craving for

access. . . . You don’t know if you say ‘no’--and you may have given five

times already--whether they will shut off the access you have been buying with

all these other contributions. We need the access.”).

1.70.3 A national survey of major congressional donors conducted in 1997 found that

a majority were critical of the campaign finance system and supportive of

reform. John Green, Paul Herrnson, Lynda Powell, and Clyde Wilcox,

Individual Congressional Campaign Contributors: Wealthy, Conservative and

Reform-Minded (1998), FEC 101-0282, 0283 [DEV 45-Tab 110]. Eighty

percent of respondents agreed that “office-holders regularly pressure donors
120

for contributions,” while one-half agreed “that contributors regularly pressure

office-holders for favors and seek access to government.” Id. at 0290. 

1.70.4 Former Senator Boren testifies that “Donors . . . feel victimized. Now that I’ve

left office, I sometimes hear from large donors that they feel ‘shaken down.’”

Boren Decl. ¶ 10.

Federal Officeholders’ Awareness of Who Donates to Parties

1.71 Some present and past officeholders, corroborated by separate documentary evidence,

testify that many in Congress are aware of the identities of contributors of large

donations to the political parties. Some officeholders testify that they personally are

unaware of who donates to the political parties, but they are mostly BCRA cosponsors, aligned against these types of large, unregulated contributions and not active

participants in nonfederal fundraising, or Members who have distanced themselves

from receiving this information. 

1.71.1 Some Members of Congress testifying in this case state that they personally

are unaware of who donates money to their parties. See Feingold Dep. at 115-

16 [JDT Vol. 6] (“Q: How generally are . . . Senators made aware of, if at all,

the amounts and identities of soft money donors to the national committees?

A: I don’t know exactly how that’s done or how much it’s done.”): Snowe

Dep. at 223-24 [JDT Vol. 31] (unaware of nonfederal donors to the RNC);

Jeffords Dep. at 96 [JDT Vol. 11] (“somewhat” aware of nonfederal donors to
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the national political parties); Meehan Dep. at 179 [JDT Vol. 22] (aware of

few nonfederal donors to national party committees, only because “from time

to time I read who they are in the newspaper”). The record shows that when

Members do not know the identity of contributors, it is sometimes because

those officeholders made a conscious effort to remain unaware or that their

staff handled such information. See, e.g., Senator Feingold Dep. at 115 [JDT

Vol. 6] (explaining that while he does not know how Senators are made aware

of the identity of donors of nonfederal money to national parties, it is because

he “made a real effort to be far away from that part of the process so [he is] not

privy to or aware of exactly how that’s done and to what extent it’s done.”);

Congressman Meehan Dep. at 178-79 [JDT Vol. 22] (explaining that he was

unaware of the Democratic National Committee’s “tallying” process, by which

the amount of money the DNC spends on a particular candidate is related to

the amount of nonfederal money that candidate raised for the DNC, but that he

was “probably one of the last people that they would let know about the

tallying process”); Rudman Dep. at 75-78 [JDT Vol. 27] (explaining that while

he did not know the identity of contributors who donated “either hard or soft

money” to the RNC, that the RNC “probably” provided him with that

information but he “didn’t have any interest in it. I was the most disinterested

candidate in money of anyone you’ve probably ever run into. . . . And [if such
122

reports] came to the office, the [administrative assistant] took them and

probably read them.”).

Senator McConnell has stated that during his 18 years in the United

States Senate he has met thousands of Americans with whom he has shaken

hands, posed for photographs, answered questions and discussed legislative

issues. The overwhelming majority of these meetings were with people who

do not donate funds to the Republican Party at the national, state, or local

level. Senator McConnell also states that he is typically unaware of the

donation history of individuals with whom he meets. McConnell Aff. ¶ 13 [2

PCS]. While Senator McConnell may generally not be aware of the donation

history of each of the individuals he meets, he is aware of the donation history

of some specific large donors. For example, Senator McConnell sent the

following letter to a contributor which stated in part:

It was a pleasure seeing you at the Senate-House Dinner last

week. The dinner was not a good time to talk, but I wanted to

let you know about the August 12 fundraiser I am having at your

neighbor[’s] . . . home. . . .

In addition to your $2,000 contribution in the last election cycle,

I was proud to also receive $1,000 each from [five other

donors]. Their support again would be greatly appreciated.

McConnell Dep. Ex. 11 [JDT Vol. 19] (MMc0987). The letter is signed

“Mitch” and includes the following handwritten note: “As you may recall, any

contributions to my ‘02 campaign will count against your $25,000 annual hard
123

money limit in ‘02 + not ‘99. Hope you can help.” Id. 

Another handwritten letter states: “Thanks so much for your continuing

friendship and support. Your commitment for $2000 each from you + your

lady will be very helpful in my reelection next year. Thanks again + I look

forward to hearing from you soon. Mitch.” Id. Ex. 5 (MMc0753); see also

Findings ¶ 1.60 (letter to contributor noting that he had given the maximum

amount of federal funds to Senator McConnell’s campaign); McConnell Dep.

at 38-41 [JDT Vol. 19] (explaining that a particular company collected

$47,000 for his campaign because its chairman, who is a friend of Senator

McConnell’s, hosted a fundraiser for the McConnell campaign)

1.71.2 Many others testify that federal officeholders and candidates are typically

aware of who donates to their parties. 

Former and current Members of Congress state that they and their

colleagues are aware of who makes large contributions to their parties. See,

e.g., Bumpers Decl. ¶¶ 18, 20 [DEV 6-Tab 10] (explaining that officeholders

of both parties are aware of contributors’ identities, that he had “heard that

some Members even keep lists of big donors in their offices,” and that “you

cannot be a good Democratic or a good Republican Member and not be aware

of who gave money to the party. If someone in Arkansas gave $50,000 to the

DNC, for example, I would certainly know that.”); 148 Cong Rec. H352 (daily
124

ed. Feb. 13, 2002) (statement of Rep. Shays) (recognizing that “it’s the

candidates themselves and their surrogates who solicit soft money. The

candidates know who makes these huge contributions and what these donors

expect. Candidates not only solicit these funds themselves, they meet with big

donors who have important issues pending before the government; and

sometimes, the candidates’ or the party’s position appear to change after such

meetings.”); Senator Simpson Decl. ¶ 5 [DEV 9-Tab 38] (explaining that

“[p]arty leaders would inform Members at caucus meetings who the big donors

were. If the leaders tell you that a certain person or group has donated a large

sum to the party and will be at an event Saturday night, you’ll be sure to attend

and get to know the person behind the donation. . . . Even if some members

did not attend these events, they all still knew which donors gave the large

donations, as the party publicizes who gives what.”); Senator Boren Decl. ¶ 6

[DEV 6-Tab 8] (testifying that “[e]ach Senator knows who the biggest donors

to the party are” because “[d]onors often prefer to hand their [nonfederal

money contribution] checks to the Senator personally, or their lobbyist informs

the Senator that a large donation was just made.”); Congressman Bennie G.

Thompson Dep. at 28-29 [JDT Vol. 32] (testifying that the DCCC “provide[s]

the entire Democratic Caucus with the amounts of money raised by name of

every Democratic member of Congress.”); McCain Decl. ¶ 6 [DEV 8-Tab 29]
125

(“Legislators of both parties often know who the large soft money contributors

to their party are, particularly those legislators who have solicited soft money,”

and “[d]onors or their lobbyists often inform a particular Senator that they have

made a large donation.”); Senator Simon Decl. ¶ 16 [DEV 9-Tab 37] (stating

that he was more likely to first return the telephone call of a donor to his

campaign than someone who had not donated, and that increased access for

those who give large contributions to the party is not fair to those who cannot

afford to give contributions at all); Wirth Decl. Ex. A ¶ 17 [DEV 9-Tab 43]

(“[C]andidates were generally aware of the sources of the funds that enabled

the party committee to support their campaigns.”).

Party officials and a political donor state that Members of Congress are

made aware of who makes large donations to their party. Vogel Decl. ¶¶

25-28 [DEV 9-Tab 41] (explaining that the NRSC distributes lists of potential

donors to incumbents so that they can solicit donations); McGahn Decl. ¶¶ 21,

34-37 [DEV 8-Tab 30] (same for NRCC); Jordan Decl. ¶¶ 20, 25-28 [DEV 7-

Tab 21] (same for DSCC); Wolfson Decl. ¶¶ 21, 28-31 [DEV 9-Tab 44] (same

for DCCC); Randlett Decl. ¶ 10 [DEV 8-Tab 32] (“Information about what

soft money donors have given travels among the Members in different ways.

Obviously the Member who solicited the money knows. Members also know

who is involved with the various major donor events which they attend, such
126

as retreats, meetings and conference calls. And there is communication among

Members about who has made soft money donations and at what level they

have given, and this is widely known and understood by the Members and their

staff.”).

1.71.3 The record also contains evidence showing that sometimes large donors make

their identities known to Members of Congress. This memorandum from a

large, influential interest group consisting of major corporations from a

particular industry, discusses an upcoming meeting between the group’s

representatives and Senator McConnell, then head of the NRSC. [citation

sealed]. The “objectives” of the meeting included “apprising him of [sic]

industry’s concern with attention on” an issue directly related to their industry

and “expressing [the group’s] willingness to be a resource, substantively and

politically, to assist in maintaining a Republican majority in 2000.” Id; see

also Findings ¶¶ 1.75.1 (testimony about donors choosing to personally deliver

donations to Senator Chuck Robb when he was Chairman of the DSCC),

1.75.2 (Senator McCain statement: “Donors or their lobbyists often inform a

particular Senator that they have made a large donation.”), 1.75.2 (statement

by Sen. McCain).

1.72 It is clear from the evidence supra that many Members of Congress know who

donates to their political parties, and that those who do not can easily find such
127

information. In fact the record suggests that for a Member not to know the identities

of these donors, he or she must actively avoid such knowledge as it is provided by the

national political parties and the donors themselves. This finding is not particularly

unexpected given that many Members of Congress actively solicit federal and

nonfederal contributions for their parties. See supra Findings ¶ 1.51. 

The fact that some Members know who donates large amounts of money to

their political parties is a necessary corollary to the next set of findings which

demonstrates that many who give large donations to the political parties, particularly

unrestricted nonfederal donations, are provided with access to federal lawmakers.

This access provides these donors with the opportunity to influence legislation.

Evidence Regarding Contributions and Access to Federal Lawmakers

1.73 The record contains a substantial amount of evidence showing that large donations to

the political parties, particularly nonfederal contributions, provide donors with special

access to federal lawmakers. This access is valued by contributors because access to

lawmakers is a necessary ingredient for influencing the legislative process.

Contributors find that nonfederal funds are most effective at obtaining special access,

and to ensure that they maintain this access donors contribute to both political parties.

The political parties take advantage of contributors’ desire for access by structuring

their donor programs so that as donations increase, so do the number and intimacy of

special opportunities to meet with Members of Congress. The facts below make clear
58 Mr. Andrews is an attorney and lobbyist at the Washington, D.C. firm of Butera &

Andrews, specializing in government relations and federal legislative representations. He has

been an active lobbyist before Congress since 1975. Prior to that time, he served as Chief

Legislative Assistant to then United States Senator Sam Nunn. Prior to forming Butera &

Andrews, he worked in the government relations practice at the Washington office of the

law firm of Sutherland, Asbill & Brennan. During his career, he has represented clients from

throughout the nation and abroad, and they have included major corporations, trade

associations, coalitions, and state governmental entities. He has worked with clients on a

(continued...)

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that this effect of nonfederal donations corrupts the political system.

Donors Give Nonfederal Donations in Order to Obtain Special Access to Federal Lawmakers

1.74 Testimony in the record from lobbyists, Members of Congress, and individual and

corporate donors, demonstrates that major contributors to the political parties give

nonfederal donations for the purpose of obtaining increased access to, and

strengthening their relationships with federal officeholders.

1.74.1 Lobbyists state that their clients make donations to political parties to achieve

access. According to lobbyist, and former DNC and DSCC official, Robert

Hickmott “[t]here is a very rare strata of contributors who contribute large

amounts to the DSCC because they actually believe in Democratic politics. .

. . The majority of those who contribute to political parties do so for business

reasons, to gain access to influential Members of Congress and to get to know

new Members.” Hickmott Decl., Ex. A. ¶ 46 [DEV 6-Tab 19]; see also Rozen

Decl. ¶ 10 (“[L]arge political contributions are worthwhile because of the

potential benefit to the company’s bottom line.”) [DEV 8-Tab 33]; Andrews58
58(...continued)

broad array of issues including environmental matters, federal taxation, banking, financial

services, housing, and many others. He has served two terms as President of the American

League of Lobbyists, and Washingtonian magazine named him as [sic] of “Washington’s

Top 50 Lobbyists.” Andrews Decl. ¶ 1 [DEV 6-Tab 1]

129

Decl. ¶ 8 (stating that sophisticated political donors “typically are trying to

wisely invest their resources to maximize political return.”) [DEV 6-Tab 1].

Wright Andrews explains: 

Sophisticated political donors - particularly lobbyists, PAC

directors, and other political insiders acting on behalf of specific

interest groups - are not in the business of dispensing their

money purely on ideological or charitable grounds. Rather,

these political donors typically are trying to wisely invest their

resources to maximize political return. Sophisticated donors do

not show up one day with a contribution, hoping for a favorable

vote the next day. Instead, they build longer term relationships.

The donor seeks to convey to the member that he or she is a

friend and a supporter who can be trusted to help the federal

elected official when he or she is needed. Presumably, most

federal elected officials recognize that continued financial

support from the donor often may be contingent upon the donor

feeling that he or she has received a fair hearing and some

degree of consideration or support.

Andrews Decl. ¶ 8 [DEV 6-Tab 1]. Lobbyist Robert Rozen testifies that

[t]ypically, a contributor gives money to establish relationships,

to be able to lobby on an issue, to get close to Members, to be

able to have influence. While an elected official of course does

not have to do something because somebody gave, a

contribution helps establish a relationship, and the more you

give the better the relationship. It is not that legislation is being

written in direct response to somebody giving a lot of money.

Rather, it is one step removed: relationships are established

because people give a lot of money, relationships are built and
130

are deepened because of more and more money, and that gets

you across the threshold to getting the access you want, because

you have established a relationship.

Rozen Decl., Ex. A ¶ 12 [DEV 8-Tab 33].

1.74.2 Some former and current Members of Congress testify that donors expect to

establish relationships with officeholders in return for their nonfederal

donations to the national political parties. Former Senator Rudman explains:

By and large, the business world, including corporations and

unions, gives money to political parties. . . [because] they

believe that if they decline solicitations for such contributions,

elected and appointed officials will ignore their views or, worse,

that competing business interests who do make large

contributions to the party in question will have an advantage in

influencing legislation or other government decisions. The same

is true in the preponderance of cases where wealthy individuals

give $50,000, $100,000, $250,000, or even more to political

parties in soft money donations.”).

Rudman Decl. ¶ 5 [DEV 8-Tab 34]; see also Bumpers Decl. ¶ 14 [DEV 6-Tab

10] (“Although some donors give to Members and parties simply because they

support a particular party or Member, the lion’s share of money is given

because people want access. If someone gives money to a party, out of

friendship with a Member, that donor may never ask for anything in return.

However, although many people give money with no present intention of

asking for anything in return, they know that if they ever need access they can

probably get it. Donations can thus serve as a type of insurance.”); id. ¶ 13

(testifying that people give money to party committees feel that they are
131

“ingratiating themselves” with the federal officeholder who solicits the

donation); Wirth Decl., Ex. A. ¶ 5 [DEV 9-Tab 43] (stating that those donors

who made contributions to the state party “almost always did so because they

expected that the contributions would support my campaign,” and that,

generally, “they expected that [the Senator] would remember their

contributions.”); Brock Decl. ¶ 5(a) [DEV 6-Tab 9] (testifying that large givers

“for their part, feel they have a ‘call’ on these officials. Corporations, unions,

and wealthy individuals give these large amounts of money to political parties

so they can improve their access to and influence over elected party members.

Elected officials who raise soft money know this.”); Boren Decl. ¶ 9 [DEV 6-

Tab 8] (“[Members of Congress] know exactly why most soft money donors

give - to get access and special influence based on their contributions.”).

1.74.3 Business contributors also testify that nonfederal donations to parties are made

to obtain access to federal officeholders. Roger Tamraz, an American

businessman involved in investment banking and international energy projects,

made donations to the DNC during the 1996 election cycle. When asked

during Congressional hearings whether one of the reasons he made the

contributions was because he “believed it might get [him] access?,” Mr.

Tamraz responded: “Senator, I’m going even farther. It’s the only reason–to

get access. . . .” Thompson Comm. Report at 2913 n.46 (quoting page 63 of
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Mr. Tamraz’s testimony before the committee). Some corporate donors view

nonfederal donations as the cost of doing business. See Hassenfeld Decl. ¶ 16

(“Many in the corporate world view large soft money donations as a cost of

doing business, and frankly, a good investment relative to the potential

economic benefit to their business. . . . I remain convinced that in some of the

more publicized cases, federal officeholders actually appear to have sold

themselves and the party cheaply. They could have gotten even more money,

because of the potential importance of their decisions to the affected

businesses.”) [DEV 6-Tab 17]; Randlett Decl. ¶ 5 [DEV 8-Tab 32] (stating

that “many soft money donations are not given for personal or philosophical

reasons. They are given by donors with a lot of money who believe they need

to invest in federal officeholders who can protect or advance specific interests

through policy action or inaction. Some soft money donors give $250,000,

$500,000, or more, year after year, in order to achieve these goals. For most

institutional donors, if you’re going to put that much money in, you need to see

a return, just as though you were investing in a corporation or some other

economic venture.”); see also Kirsch Decl. ¶ 14 (stating that “[major] donors

perceive that they are getting a business benefit through their special access,

and that it is a good investment for them.”) [DEV 7-Tab 23].

Documents submitted show that a Fortune 100 company makes large
133

contributions to national party committees with the expectation that its

contributions will cultivate or strengthen its “relationships” with particular

Members of Congress. See, e.g., Internal Fortune 100 company memorandum

entitled “Justification for donation to [DSCC]” (October 25, 2000) [citation

sealed] (“I am requesting a check for $50,000.00 to the Democratic Senatorial

Campaign Committee (DSCC). Senator Robert Torricelli is the chairman for

the DSCC and in a recent conversation with the Senator, he requested the

above amount from [our company]. Senator Torricelli has been a friend to

[our company] for many years and he has shown himself to be a thoughtful

voice regarding issues in our industry. He currently serves on the Judiciary,

Foreign Relations & Governmental Affairs and Rules and Administration

Committees. I feel this would be a great opportunity to strengthen our

relationship with Senator Torricelli and the DSCC.”); Internal Fortune 100

company memorandum entitled “Justification for donation to [DSCC]”

(December 12, 2000) [citation sealed] (“I am requesting a check in the amount

of $50,000 to the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee (DSCC).

Senator Patty Murray (D-WA) is the new chairman of the DSCC . . . . Senator

Murray sits on the Senate Committees on Appropriations, Budget, Health,

Education, Labor and Pensions, and Veterans Affairs. This donation would

further enhance our ties with the DSCC and get our relationship with Senator
134

Murray off to a good start.”); Internal Fortune 100 company memorandum

entitled “[DCCC]/Congressman Bill Luther” (May 7, 2001) [citation sealed]

(“I am requesting a check for $25,000.00 to the [DCCC] to support party

building activities in response to a request from Congressman Bill Luther.

Congressman Luther has been a friend to [our company] for many years . . . .

He currently serves on the Commerce Committee, the Subcommittees for

Telecommunications, Trade & Consumer Protection as well as the Finance and

Hazardous Materials. I feel this would be a great opportunity to strengthen our

relationship with Congressman Luther.”); Internal Fortune 100 company

memorandum entitled “Georgia Senate 2002” (July 19, 2001) [citation sealed]

(“I am requesting a check for $10,000.00 on behalf of Georgia Senate 2002.

Senator Cleland has been reaching out to his key supporters and he has

contacted [our company] for financial assistance with Georgia Senate 2002.

This is very important to Senator Max Cleland and over the years, Senator

Cleland has been a good friend to [our company]. I feel this would be a great

opportunity to strengthen our relationship with Senator Cleland.”). One

legislative advocate from this company described the benefits reaped from

contributing $100,000 to the NRCC: “I think we established some goodwill

with [Congressman] Tauzin, both by [our company] contributing at the

$100,000 level to the NRCC dinner he chaired last month and by my
135

participation in the NRCC Finance Committee for the dinner. Tauzin

understood that [our company] participated at the same level as the major . .

. companies [in our industry] did, and he expressed genuine interest in trying

to begin to reach out to the competitive industry. In sum, I think the event was

a real positive for [our company].” Internal Fortune 100 company

memorandum entitled“NRCC Leadership Dinner 2000,” dated April 4, 2000,

[citation sealed].

An internal RNC document also shows that donors often give to the

national parties to achieve access to lawmakers. RNC0177216 [DEV 95] (note

written on stationery of RNC’s Team 100 Director, Haley Barbour, stating

“they have pretty much decided to join T-100 . . . . They want access to

political players . . . . Their top issue is tort reform”).

1.74.4 One experienced individual donor testifies that “[l]arge soft money donors

give in order to obtain access and influence.” Hiatt Decl. ¶ 11 [DEV 6-Tab

18]. 

1.74.5 Plaintiffs’ expert La Raja testifies that interest groups probably pursue an

access strategy when they give money to political parties. La Raja Cross

Exam. at 89 [JDT Vol. 15].

Large Nonfederal Donations Provide Donors Access to Federal Lawmakers

1.75 The record demonstrates that large donations, especially nonfederal contributions, to
136

the political parties provide donors with access to Members of Congress. The record

is a treasure trove of testimony from Members of Congress, individual and corporate

donors, and lobbyists, as well as documentary evidence, establishing that

contributions, especially large nonfederal donations, are given with the expectation

they will provide the donor with access to influence federal officials, that this

expectation is fostered by the national parties, and that this expectation is often

realized. As one former Member of Congress puts it: “[A]ccess is it. Access is

power. Access is clout.” Boren Decl. ¶ 7 [DEV 6-Tab 8] (quoting Rep. Mazzoli).

1.75.1 Testimony from lobbyists demonstrates that large donations, particularly in

nonfederal form, are a necessary ingredient for a successful lobbying campaign

because they provide their clients with access to federal lawmakers, which

allows them to influence legislation. 

Lobbyist Robert Rozen testifies that large nonfederal donations are

essential for developing relationships with Members of Congress, which in

turn lead to access, which in turn lead to influence over policy. 

I know of organizations who believe that to be treated seriously

in Washington, and by that I mean to be a player and to have

access, you need to give soft money. As a result, many

organizations do give soft money. . . . They give soft money

because they believe that’s what helps establish better contacts

with Members of Congress and gets doors opened when they

want to meet with Members. There is no question that money

creates the relationships. Companies with interests before

particular committees need to have access to the chairman of

that committee, make donations, and go to events where the
137

chairman will be. Even if that chairman is not the type of

Member who will tie the contribution and the legislative goals

together, donors can’t be sure so they want to play it safe and

make soft money contributions. The large contributions enable

them to establish relationships, and that increases the chances

they’ll be successful with their public policy agenda. Compared

to the amounts that companies spend as a whole, large political

contributions are worthwhile because of the potential benefit to

the company’s bottom line. 

Rozen Decl. ¶ 10 [DEV 8-Tab 33]; see also id. ¶ 14 (“You are doing a favor

for somebody by making a large [soft money] donation and they appreciate it.

Ordinarily, people feel inclined to reciprocate favors. Do a bigger favor for

someone--that is, write a larger check--and they feel even more compelled to

reciprocate. In my experience, overt words are rarely exchanged about

contributions, but people do have understandings: the Member has received a

favor and feels a natural obligation to be helpful in return. This is how human

relationships work. The legislative arena is the same as other areas of

commerce and life. It is similar to a situation that has been in the news

recently: an investment banking firm made shares of hot initial public offerings

available to the officers of Worldcom Inc., while Worldcom Inc. executives

were giving the firm tens of millions of dollars in investment-banking

business. There doesn’t have to be a specific tie-in to achieve the result.”).

Lobbyist Robert Hickmott, who is a former DNC and DSCC official,

testifies that he advises his clients to make contributions in order to “establish
138

relationships. Having those relationships in many ways then helps us get

meetings and continue that relationship.” Hickmott Dep. at 50 [JDT Vol. 10].

Hickmott testifies that when Senator Robb was chairman of the DSCC he

would go to the DSCC offices where he would “accept checks from

individuals or organizations who wanted to give money to the DSCC and they

wanted face time with Chairman Chuck Robb.” Id. at 94-95. Donors would

“use this as an opportunity not only to make a contribution to the DSCC, but

also to convey to Senator Robb what their group or individual position was on

an issue.” Id. at 95.

Lobbyist Daniel Murray’s testimony in a prior case, which has been

incorporated into the record of this case, states that 

contribut[ing] soft money . . . has proven to provide excellent

access to federal officials and to candidates for federal elective

office. Since the amount of soft money that an individual,

corporation or other entity may contribute has no limit, soft

money has become the favored method of supplying political

support. . . . [S]oft money begets both access to law-makers and

membership in groups which provide ever greater access and

opportunity to influence.

Murray Aff. in Mariani ¶ 14 [DEV 79-Tab 59].

1.75.1.1 Although there are varying views as to whether lobbying efforts are a more

effective means of achieving access to federal officeholders than large

nonfederal contributions, there is no dispute that large nonfederal contributions

provide an additional means of obtaining access to officeholders and are
139

generally part of modern lobbying plans. While one lobbyist concedes that his

clients hire him because he is able to provide them access to lawmakers

regardless of the client’s donation history, one of the ways he is able to provide

this service is through nonfederal donations he and his firm arrange for

Members of Congress and their political parties. Moreover, Plaintiffs have not

presented the testimony of a single lobbyist who believes that nonfederal

money donations do not assist clients in their efforts to gain access to influence

federal lawmakers.

1.75.1.2 Some testimony presents lobbying as a more effective method of obtaining

access to federal lawmakers than nonfederal donations. See RNC Finance

Director B. Shea Decl. ¶ 45 [RNC Vol. V] (“It is obvious why major donors

to the RNC do not regularly use their donations as a means to obtain ‘access.’

All or virtually all who have personal or organizational business with the

federal government retain or employ professional lobbyists.”); Former Senator

Bumpers Dep. in RNC at 39 [DEV 63-Tab 1] (“[M]oney really does buy access

. . . . [a]t some level that’s true of campaign contributions, and it’s almost

always true in the cases of lobbying”) but see infra Findings ¶ 1.75.2 (Former

Senators Rudman, Boren and Simpson’s views on access). Evidence was also

presented that many entities that donate nonfederal funds to political parties

also spend vast sums of money lobbying federal officeholders, sometimes
59 The donors were Philip Morris ($3,017,036 in nonfederal contributions to national

political parties, $19,580,000 in lobbying expenditures), Joseph E. Seagram & Sons

($1,938,845 in nonfederal contributions to national political parties, $550,000 in lobbying

expenditures), RJR Nabisco ($1,442,931 in nonfederal contributions to national political

parties, $1,637,688 in lobbying expenditures), Walt Disney Co. ($1,359,500 in nonfederal

contributions to national political parties, $980,000 in lobbying expenditures), and Atlantic

Richfield ($1,250,843 in nonfederal contributions to national political parties, $4,360,000 in

federal and state lobbying expenditures). Resp. of Intervenors to RNC’s First and Second

Reqs. for Admis. at 23-24.

60 The donors were Philip Morris ($2,446,316 in nonfederal contributions to national

political parties, $38,800,000 in lobbying expenditures), Communications Workers of

America ($1,464,250 in nonfederal contributions to national political parties, $460,000 in

lobbying expenditures), AFSCME ($1,340,954 in nonfederal contributions to national

political parties, $2,460,000 in lobbying expenditures), Amway Corp. ($1,312,500 in

nonfederal contributions to national political parties, $$240,000 in lobbying expenditures),

American Financial Group ($1,210,000 in nonfederal contributions to national political

parties, $20,000 to $40,000 in lobbying expenditures)

140

exceeding their donations by many multiples. See Resp. of Intervenors to

RNC’s First and Second Reqs. for Admis. at 23-24 (admitting that top five

corporate nonfederal donors during the 1996 election campaign donated

$9,009,155 to national party committees and same five corporations spent

$27,107,688 on lobbying during 1996 alone59); id. at 24-25 (admitting that top

five corporate donors of nonfederal funds during 1997 and 1998 donated

$7,774,020 to national party committees and same five corporations spent

$42,000,000 on lobbying during that same period60); see also Primo Cross

Exam. at 164 [JDT Vol. 27] (noting that nonfederal donations “is a piddling

amount of money . . . relative to what corporations spend on lobbying and . .

. philanthropy”); Mann Cross Exam. at 49 [JDT Vol. 17] (“It’s not either or.
141

Is more money spent on lobbying than soft money donations? Yes. It varies

tremendously. In some sectors it’s 2-1, in others 4-1, 10-1. You have given

an example in a particular case of 15-1, but the fact is most of the

organizations and economic interests doing that lobbying, inside and outside

lobbying, are also intimately involved in the political financing game and

making large contributions to political parties.”). One lobbyist states that his

clients hire him in large part because of his contacts on Capitol Hill and

because he has access to federal officeholders whether or not their clients have

donated money to candidates, officeholders or parties. See Hickmott Dep. at

46-47, 50-51 [JDT Vol. 10]; but see id. at 50 (noting that his firm gives

“contributions to establish relationships. Having those relationships in many

ways then helps us get meetings and continue that relationship.”); Andrews

Cross Exam. at 19-20 [JDT Vol. 1] (acknowledging that some organizations

gain access by means other than money, such as by using celebrity

individuals).

1.75.1.3 Lobbyists maintain that “basic” or traditional lobbying activities are “alone

insufficient to be effective in many instances in lobbying endeavors. To have

true political clout, the giving and raising of campaign money for candidates

and political parties is often critically important.” Andrews Decl. ¶ 5 [DEV

6-Tab 1]; Murray Aff. in Mariani ¶¶ 6-7 [DEV 79-Tab 4] (testifying that
142

“[a]long with each . . . legislative plan [a plan to “advance the client’s

legislative agenda”], and essential to achieving the client’s goals, I develop a

parallel political financial support plan. In other words, I advise my clients as

to which federal office-holders (or candidates) they should contribute and in

what amounts, in order to best use the resources they are able to allocate to

such efforts to advance their legislative agenda. Such plans also would include

soft money contributions to political parties and interest groups associated with

political issues.”); see also Meehan Dep. in RNC at 40-41 [DEV 66-Tab 4]

(“[P]ower and influence in Washington is not just the amount of soft money

an industry contributes to the political parties. I would say that also it’s the

amount of PAC money that they contribute to the political candidates, it’s the

amount of hard money they contribute, it’s the amount of lobbying money that

they expend in order to influence members of Congress.”). Furthermore,

testimony from lobbyists shows contributions help lobbyists gain access to

lawmakers. Lobbyist Wright Andrews comments: 

The amount of influence that a lobbyist has is often directly

correlated to the amount of money that he or she and his or her

clients infuse into the political system. Some lobbyists help raise

large “soft money” donations and/or host many fundraising

events for key legislators. Some simply represent a single client

with very deep pockets and can easily reach into large corporate

or union funds for “soft money” donations or other allowable

expenditures that may influence legislative actions. Those who

are most heavily involved in giving and raising campaign

finance money are frequently, and not surprisingly, the lobbyists
143

with the most political clout.

Andrews Decl. ¶ 12 [DEV 6-Tab 1]; see also Hickmott Dep. at 50 [JDT Vol.

10]. Andrews testifies that it has become a common practice for lobbyists to

“host a number of fundraisers.” Andrews Decl. ¶ 16 [DEV 6-Tab 1] He

explains that “[w]hereas the political parties periodically organize ‘gala’ events

in large ballrooms filled with hundreds of donors, lobbyists now often prefer

attending smaller events hosted by other lobbyists, with only ten or fifteen

people participating, all sitting at a dinner or breakfast table with the invited

guest elected official. This type event allows lobbyists a better opportunity to

build more personal relationships and to exchange views.” Id. 

1.75.2 Former and current Members of Congress testify that contributions provide

donors with access to influence federal lawmakers. Former Senator Rudman

describes the system bluntly:

Special interests who give large amounts of soft money to

political parties do in fact achieve their objectives. They do get

special access. Sitting Senators and House Members have

limited amounts of time, but they make time available in their

schedules to meet with representatives of business and unions

and wealthy individuals who gave large sums to their parties.

These are not idle chit-chats about the philosophy of democracy.

In these meetings, these special interests, often accompanied by

lobbyists, press elected officials -- Senators who either raised

money from the special interest in question or who benefit

directly or indirectly from their contributions to the Senator’s

party -- to adopt their position on a matter of interest to them.

Senators are pressed by their benefactors to introduce

legislation, to amend legislation, to block legislation, and to vote
144

on legislation in a certain way. No one says: ‘We gave money so

you should do this to help us.’ No one needs to say it -- it is

perfectly understood by all participants in every such meeting.

. . .

Large soft money contributions in fact distort the legislative

process. They affect what gets done and how it gets done. They

affect whom Senators and House members see, whom they

spend their time with, what input they get, and -- make no

mistake about it -- this money affects outcomes as well 

Rudman Decl. ¶¶ 7, 9 [DEV 8-Tab 34]. Senator Simpson testifies that groups

used “to give to someone who was for your philosophy,” but now “[i]t’s giving

so you can get access.” Simpson Dep. at 11-12 [JDT Vol. 30]. Senator Boren

finds the “comments some of [his] colleagues have made about the system are

completely consistent with [his] own experience. For example, former Rep.

Romano Mazzoli (D-Kentucky) said: ‘People who contribute get the ear of the

member and the ear of the staff. They have the access--and access is it.

Access is power. Access is clout. That’s how this thing works. . .’ Similarly,

Rep. Jim Bacchus (D-Fla.) has explained: “I have on many occasions sat down

and listened to people solely because I know they had contributed to my

campaign.” Boren Decl. ¶ 7 [DEV 6-Tab 8] (citation omitted). Former

Senator Simon attests:

Giving to party committees also helps you gain access to

Members. While I realize some argue donors don’t buy favors,

they buy access. That access is the abuse and it affects all of us.

If I got to a Chicago hotel at midnight, when I was in the Senate,

and there were 20 phone calls waiting for me, 19 of them names

I didn’t recognize and the 20th someone I recognized as a $1,000
145

donor to my campaign, that is the one person I would call. You

feel a sense of gratitude for their support. This is even more true

with the prevalence of much larger donations, even if those

donations go to a party committee. Because few people can

afford to give over $20,000 or $25,000 to a party committee,

those people who can will receive substantially better access to

elected federal leaders than people who can only afford smaller

contributions or can not afford to make any contributions.

When you increase the amount that people are allowed to give,

or let people give without limit to the parties, you increase the

danger of unfair access. 

Simon Decl. ¶ 16 [DEV 9-Tab 37]. Senator McCain notes:

At a minimum, large soft money donations purchase an

opportunity for the donors to make their case to elected officials,

including the President and Congressional leaders, in a way

average citizens cannot. Many legislators have been in situations

where they would rather fit in an appointment with a soft money

contributor than risk losing his or her donation to the party.

Legislators of both parties often know who the large soft money

contributors to their party are, particularly those legislators who

have solicited soft money. Members of Congress interact with

donors at frequent fundraising dinners, weekend retreats,

cocktail parties, and briefing sessions that are held exclusively

for large donors to the party. Donors or their lobbyists often

inform a particular Senator that they have made a large

donation. When, as a result of a Member’s solicitation,

someone makes a significant soft money donation, and then the

donor calls the Member a month later and wants to meet, it’s

very difficult to say no, and few of us do say no.

McCain Decl. ¶ 6 [DEV 8-Tab 29]; see also Shays Decl. ¶ 9 [DEV 8-Tab 35]

(“Soft money donations, particularly corporate and union donations, buy

access and thereby make it easier for large donors to get their points across to

influential Members of Congress. The donors of large amounts of soft money
146

to the national parties are well-known to the leadership and to many other

Members of Congress. The access to elected officials that large donors receive

goes far beyond an average citizen’s opportunity to be heard.”).

1.75.2.1 Defendant-Intervenors who testified in this case state that they personally do

not provide special access to individuals or corporations that provide large

contributions to parties, regardless of whether the donation is in federal or

nonfederal funds. See Feingold Dep. at 116 [JDT Vol. 6] (“I cannot imagine

a situation where . . . I would meet with somebody because they gave soft

money.”); Snowe Dep. at 210-11 [JDT Vol. 31] (stating she has never given

preferential access to any donor, federal or nonfederal, and that “[e]verybody

has access to my office to the extent that I have time available”); Jeffords Dep.

at 96-97 [JDT Vol. 11] (stating person’s status as a donor to national party

committee does not “affect [his] decisions as to who [he] meet[s] with or

give[s] access to”); Meehan Dep. at 180 [JDT Vol. 22] (stating he provides

no preferential access to nonfederal donors); Cross Exam. of Shays at 20-21

[JDT Vol. 29] (agreeing he “pretty much [has] an open door policy to meet

people who want to talk to [him] about important legislative issues”). Given

the efforts these Members of Congress have made over the past years to reform

the political system, it is not surprising that they would have such policies.

These Members, however, do not claim to speak for the rest of their
61 Mr. Greenwald is currently Chairman Emeritus of United Airlines, the largest

employee majority-owned company in the United States. From 1994 through his retirement

in 2000, he served as the Chairman and CEO of United. Prior to that, he was vice chairman

at Chrysler Corporation and worked at Ford Motor Company. Greenwald Decl. ¶ 2 [DEV

6-Tab 16] 

147

colleagues.

1.75.3 Corporate donors testify that contributions provide access to influence

lawmakers. Wade Randlett testifies that “many members of the business

community recognize that if they want to influence what happens in

Washington, they have to play the soft money game. They are caught in an

arms race that is accelerating, but that many feel they cannot afford to leave or

speak out against.” Randlett Decl. ¶ 14 [DEV 8-Tab 32]. 

Chairman Gerald Greenwald61 testifies that 

labor and business leaders are regularly advised that—and their

experience directly confirms that—organizationsthatmake large

soft money donations to political parties in fact do get preferred

access to government officials. That access runs the gamut from

attendance at events where they have opportunities to present

points of view informally to lawmakers to direct, private

meetings in an official’s office to discuss pending legislation or

a government regulation that affects the company or union. . . .

[Some unions and corporations] give large soft money

contributions to political parties – sometimes to both political

parties – because they are afraid to unilaterally disarm. They do

not want their competitors alone to enjoy the benefits that come

with large soft money donations: namely, access and influence

in Washington. Though a soft money check might be made out

to a political party, labor and business leaders know that those

checks open the doors to the offices of individual and important

Members of Congress and the Administration, giving donors the
148

opportunity to argue for their corporation’s or union’s position

on a particular statute, regulation, or other governmental action.

Labor and business leaders believe--based on experience and

with good reason--that such access gives them an opportunity to

shape and affect governmental decisions and that their ability to

do so derives from the fact that they have given large sums of

money to the parties.

Greenwald Decl. ¶¶ 10, 12 [DEV 6-Tab 16]; see also Hassenfeld Decl. ¶¶ 23-

24 (“I think companies in some industries have reason to believe that because

their activities are so closely linked with federal government actions, they must

participate in the soft money system in order to succeed.”) [DEV 6-Tab 17].

An Eli Lilly and Company memorandum statesthat its 1995-96 political

“contributions and the related activities we have participated in have been key

to our increased role and ability to get our views heard by the right policy

makers on a timely basis; in other words, a smart investment.” Eli Lilly and

Company Memorandum (Jan. 15 1997), ODP0018-00481 to 86 [DEV 69-Tab

48].

1.75.4 The former Chairman of the DNC testifies that “[m]any contributors of large

sums of money- both Republicans and Democrats - gain access to party and

governmental officials that they otherwise would not have. With this access,

contributors are able to make their cases to people who make public policy and
62 Mr. Donald Fowler from 1971 until 1980, he served as Chairman of the South

Carolina Democratic Party and from January 1995 until January 1997 he served as Chairman

of the Democratic National Committee. Fowler Decl. ¶ 2 [DEV 6-Tab 13].

149

take official governmental action.” Fowler62 Decl. ¶ 6 [DEV 6-Tab 13]

1.75.5 Individual donors testify that contributions provide access to influence federal

officeholders on issues of concern to them. Steven Kirsch testifies that 

[p]olicy discussion with federal officials occurs at major donor

events sponsored by political parties. I have attended many such

events. They typically involve speeches, question and answer

sessions, and group policy discussions, but there is also time to

talk to Members individually about substantive issues. For

example, at a recent event. I was able to speak with a Senator

representing a state other than California and we had a short

conversation about how our respective staffers were working

together on a particular issue.

Kirsch Decl. ¶ 12 [DEV 7-23]. Similarly, Peter Buttenwieser testifies: 

Events, meetings and briefings held for soft money donors

provide opportunities for the donors to hear speeches and

engage in policy discussions with federal office holders. There

is also a certain amount of politicking and lobbying at these

events. This is true particularly in the side discussions, in which

donors can approach office holders and discuss their issues.

Buttenwieser Decl. ¶ 25 [DEV 6-Tab 11]. He also observes that

[t]here is no question that those who, like me, make large soft

money donations receive special access to powerful federal

office holders on the basis of the donations. I am close to a

number of Senators, I see them on a very consistent basis, and

I now regard the Majority Leader as a close friend. I understand

that the unusual access I have correlates to the millions of

dollars I have given to political party committees, and I do not

delude myself into thinking otherwise. Not many people can
150

give soft money on that scale, and it naturally limits the number

of those with that level of access.

Id. ¶ 22. Arnold Hiatt testifies that 

[a]s a result of my $500,000 soft money donation to the DNC,

I was offered the chance to attend events with the President,

including events at the White House, a number of times. I was

offered special access as a result of the contributions I had

made, though I generally never took advantage of that access.

One event that I did attend was a dinner at the Mayflower Hotel

in Washington, D.C. in approximately March 1997 with

President Clinton and Vice-President Gore. The dinner was for

the largest donors to the DNC, about thirty people. I did not

plan on attending but I went because several people urged me to

use the occasion to speak in favor of campaign finance reform.

I used the opportunity to talk to the President about how the

campaign finance system in this country had become a crisis,

and argued that the crisis provided an opportunity for the

President to provide some leadership. I don’t think that we got

the leadership I was seeking on the campaign finance issue, but

I did get the chance to make a personal pitch to the President as

a result of my donation.

Hiatt Decl. ¶ 9 [DEV 6-Tab 18]. Hiatt testifies that others in attendance also

shared their views on policy matters of importance to them as the event was

advertised as an opportunity to “give advice to the president.” Hiatt Dep. at

119-21 [JDT Vol. 10]; see also Hassenfeld Decl. ¶ 12-13 [DEV 6-Tab 17]

(“[W]hen given the opportunity, some donors try to pigeonhole or corner

Members, in a less than diplomatic way, to discuss their issues at these
63 Mr. Charles Geschke is Chairman of the Board of Adobe Systems, Inc., which he

co-founded in 1982. Geschke Decl. ¶ 1 [DEV 6-Tab 14]. Since 1994, Mr. Geschke

estimates that he has donated over $150,000 in federal funds to federal political committees,

and over $18,000 in nonfederal funds to national party committees. Id. ¶ 3 [DEV 6-Tab 14].

151

events.”); Geschke63 Decl. ¶ 5 [DEV 6-Tab 14] (testifying that in connection

with $50,000 in federal and nonfederal donations made to the DNC he and his

wife attended a dinner of 10 to 12 people with President Clinton “last[ing] two

or three hours, and consist[ing] primarily of a conversation about issues of

importance to the nation and the President’s program”); RNC 0026901 [IER

Tab 7] (note from the director of the RNC’s Team 100 program thanking a

donor for “facilitating Dow [Chemical]’s generous contribution to the

Republican Party. It’s a timely donation as we head into the final hours of the

campaign. Give me a call . . . and we can figure out when is a good time to

bring your Dow [Chemical] leadership into town to see [RNC Chairman]

Haley [Barbour], [Senate Majority Leader Robert] Dole & [Speaker of the

House] Newt [Gingrich].”); RNC 00031843 [IER Tab 7] (letter from donor to

RNC Chairman Jim Nicholson telling him “I do feel I have benefited [sic]

from Team 100 in the audience it has afforded me with party leaders”); RNC

0194817 [IER Tab 1.E] (letter from RNC to a pharmaceutical company asking

the company for its opinion and suggestions on the enclosed RNC “health care

package” and a $250,000 donation to join the RNC’s Season Pass program).
64 Mr. McInerney’s affidavit includes statements about his understanding of the legal

effect of New York campaign laws which is irrelevant to the cases at bar. See McInerney

Aff. ¶ 8 [9 PCS]. His affidavit also contains statements which suggest an incomplete

understanding of the impact BCRA will have on his campaign donations.

152

Thomas McInerney, a large contributor to the Republican party, states

that his support for the Republican Party at the national, state, and local levels

is not dependent upon gaining access to federal officeholders. McInerney

states that he would support the Republican Party whether or not he was

solicited by a federal officeholder and whether or not his contribution resulted

in attendance at an event that included federal officeholders. McInerney Aff.

¶ 17 [9 PCS]. Even so, McInerney attests that he has been offered access to

federal officeholders in exchange for his donations of nonfederal funds. Id.

64

The Political Parties Facilitate Access to Members of Congress for Their Large Contributors

1.76 Party leaders facilitate direct communications on matters of policy between nonfederal

money donors and officeholders. Several documents in the record demonstrate this

fact.

For example, a handwritten note dated February 21, 1995 from RNC Chairman

Haley Barbour to [a major donor] stated, in part: “Dear [____]: Thank you for your

very thoughtful memo on the estate and gift tax law. I’ve read it and will pass it along

to appropriate Senators, Representatives and staff folks when I’m on the Hill

tomorrow.” ODP0031-01403 to 04 [DEV 71-Tab 48]. A March 28, 1995, letter from
153

House Ways and Means Committee Chairman Bill Archer (R-TX) to the donor

thanked the donor for his “intriguing” proposal, noting Archer’s personal preference

that the estate and gift taxes be repealed completely. ODP0031-01412 [DEV 71-Tab

48]. A March 31, 1995 letter from the donor to Team 100 Director Timothy Barnes

enclosed the donor’s 1995 Team 100 membership check and requested that Barnes

provide Barbour with a copy of Archer’s March 28, 1995 letter. ODP0031-01406 to

11 [DEV 71-Tab 48]. Team 100 membership requires a $100,000 donation every four

years, with $25,000 donations in each intervening year. Findings ¶ 1.77.1.

A handwritten note dated Oct. 27, 1995, from RNC Chairman Haley Barbour

asks Senate Majority Leader Bob Dole to meet with the CEO of Pfizer, a member of

the RNC’s “Team 100” nonfederal money donor group, to discuss an extension of the

Section 936 tax credit:

Dear Bob 

[___], CEO of Pfizer, has asked to see you on Wed. 11/1. He is

extremely loyal and generous. He also is not longwinded. He’ll tend to

his business and not eat up extra time. They have proposed a [Internal

Revenue Code §] 936 solution that [Republican Senator William] Roth

and [Republican Congressman Bill] Archer are considering. I’m sure

that is the issue. I’d appreciate it if you’d see Bill. [signed] Haley.

ODP0025-02456 to 57 [DEV 70-Tab 48]. 

A letter from the chairmen of the Congressional Forum of the NRCC addressed

to the Association of Trial Lawyers of America discusses an upcoming Congressional

Forum Chairman’s Dinner, and notes: “[o]ur event will give you an excellent
154

opportunity to meet with the Members of the [Judiciary Committee] to discuss issues

relevant to your organization.” ODP0042-00025 [DEV 71-Tab 48]; see also July 10,

1996 letter from John Palmer to [redacted addressee] (reminding addressee that

Palmer had asked him to join the RNC’s Team 100, and noting that RNC Chair

Barbour escorted new Team 100 member and Energy CEO [______] on four

appointments that were “very significant” in legislation affecting companies like his

and made him “a hero in his industry”), ODP0023-02043 [DEV 70-Tab 48];

RNC0044465 [DEV 93] (Memorandum from Tim Barnes of the RNC to Royal Roth

noting that someone from [a company] had been “trying to establish a contact in

Senator Dole’s office for [a company executive]. As you know, [this executive] has

been very generous to the RNC. If there is any way you can assist, it would be greatly

appreciated.”); ODP0030-03512 to 13 [DEV 71-Tab 48] (notes of telephone call

between Jim Nicholson of the RNC and a Team 100 member, which states that

Nicholson will take up an issue discussed with Senator Trent Lott); [DEV 71] Letter

from RNC Chairman Jim Nicholson to [a donor], August 18, 1998, copies to House

Speaker Newt Gingrich, House Majority Leader Dick Armey and Congressman John

Linder ODP0033-00534(stating “I appreciate your interest in helping us hold onto our

majority in the House. . . . I can tell you every single dollar of your contribution will

go directly into Operation Breakout. . . . If you will make your check out (which can

be personal or corporate) to the Republican National Committee and annotate it for
155

Operation Breakout I will personally show a copy of it to Newt, Dick Armey and

John Linder. Please feel free to accompany it with a transmittal letter containing any

other message that you choose.”); ODP0042-000654 (memorandum to all

Congressional Forum members from the chairmen, informing them of an upcoming

dinner featuring members of the Banking Committee, noting that “[o]ur event will

give you an excellent opportunity to meet with members of the committee to discuss

issues relevant to your organization”) ; ODP0042-01111 [DEV 71-Tab 48] (letter

from NRCC to the Federal Managers’ Association, noting an upcoming dinner where

the addressee could express “interests and concerns regarding upcoming legislation”);

RNC0156717 (letter from RNC to Senator Hagel staffer, asking Senator Hagel to

meet with a donor for four “key” reasons including: “[h]e runs [sic] $80,000,000 high

tech business,” and “[h]e just contributed $100,000 to the RNC.”).

In addition to these documents, the record includes corroborating testimony

like that of former Senator Wirth who states:

The Democratic national campaign committees sometimes asked me to

meet with large donors to the party whom I had not met before. At the

party’s request, I met with the donors. I understood that the donors’

goal in making the large contributions was often to occasion meeting(s)

with me or other prominent Democratic congressional leaders to press

their positions on legislative issues. On these occasions, sometimes all

I knew about the donor would be the issue in which he was interested.

Wirth Decl. Ex. A ¶ 15 [DEV 9-Tab 43]. Former DNC Chairman Donald Fowler

testifies:
156

Party and government officials participate in raising large contributions

from interests that have matters pending before Executive agencies, the

Congress, and other government agencies. Party officials, who are not

themselves elected officials, offer to large money donors opportunities

to meet with senior government officials. Donors use these

opportunities - White House and congressional meetings - to press their

views on matters pending before the government.

Fowler Decl. ¶ 8 [DEV 6-Tab 13].

1.76.1 The RNC’s Finance Director attests that the RNC does not arrange meetings

with government officials for any of its donors—federal or nonfederal. B.

Shea Decl. ¶ 44 [RNC Vol. V]. She states that the RNC Finance Division,

“[a]s a matter of policy,” passes along requests from donors for meetings with

a federal officeholder to that officeholder’s scheduling staff “without inquiring

into the purpose of the proposed meeting,” “neither . . . advocate[s] a meeting

nor ascertain[s] whether a meeting has been arranged,” does not provide to the

officeholder’s scheduler the amount of the money that donor has contributed

to the party. Id. at 44, 46. When asked about this policy during her crossexamination, Ms. Shea testified that the policy is an informal, unwritten policy.

B. Shea Dep. at 80 [JDT Vol. 29]. She does not say whether this policy

applies only to the RNC Finance Division or to the entire committee.

Furthermore, the policy is more nuanced than Ms. Shea’s declaration implies.

According to Ms. Shea, the RNC Finance Division’s “policy” is to not “force”

federal officeholders to meet with donors, but that it may pass along requests
157

to a Member’s scheduler and say “this is a Team 100 member, could you see

if you could fit them in.” Id. at 82. Indicating that a person is a Team 100

member, which means they give the RNC $100,000 every four years, with

$25,000 donations each intervening year, while not informing the scheduler of

the precise amount of money the donor gave the RNC, does give the Member’s

office the message that the individual interested in a meeting is a major donor.

See also supra, Findings ¶ 1.76 (other instances of RNC officials setting up

meetings for major donors with Members of Congress). Furthermore, as

Senator Simon has stated, “Staffers who work for Members know who the big

donors are, and those people always get their phone calls returned first and are

allowed to see the Member when others are not.” See supra Findings ¶ 1.66.

1.77 The political parties have structured their donation programs so that donors are

encouraged to contribute larger amounts in order to get access to more exclusive and

intimate events at which Members of Congress are present. The evidence also shows

that the parties use the enticement of access to secure larger donations. For example,

a letter from then-RNSC Chairman Senator McConnell explained that a $25,000

nonfederal fund donation would provide the donor membership in the NRSC’s

Chairman’s Foundation whose benefits “include four to five small dinner meetings

annually, each focused on a specific Senate Committee. The meetings consist of a

briefing with the top committee staff members, followed by a reception and dinner
158

with the staffers and Republican members of the committee to discuss the issues.

Foundation members are also invited to all Senatorial Trust events which provide an

additional four opportunities year to meet with our Republican Senate Majority.”

ODP0037-02271 [DEV 71-Tab 48].

1.77.1 RNC documents show that the RNC’s donor programs offer greater access to

federal office holders as the donations grow larger, with the highest level and

most personal access offered to the largest soft money donors.

ODP0018-00113 to 36 [DEV 69-Tab 48] (RNC Brochure “Donor Programs”);

see also Resps. RNC to FEC’s First RFA’s, No. 62 [DEV 12-Tab 10]. The

RNC offers its donors a range of different donor programs, for a range of

different donor financial levels and interests. ODP0025-00375 to 79 [DEV

70-Tab 48] (“Summary of RNC’s Donor Programs”). The RNC President’s

Club required a $1,000 annual contribution, or $2,000 per couple per year, and

held a meeting in Washington, D.C. at least once a year which included policy

briefings and discussions led by Republican political leaders. Id. at

ODP0025-00375; B. Shea Decl. ¶ 14.b [RNC Vol. V]. The Chairman’s

Advisory Board required a $5,000 annual hard money contribution and offered

a “vigorous and informal exchange of views among Board members and party

leaders. . . . Board meetings include three or four panel discussions, each

chaired by a Congressional leader or senior policy adviser with particular
159

expertise in the area under consideration.” ODP0025-00375 to 77 [DEV

70-Tab 48]. According to the document, the Chairman’s Advisory Board was

established “to enlist the personal energy and professional expertise of

Republican leaders in business and community affairsin developing policy and

campaign strategies at the highest levels for the party.” ODP0025-00375 to 77

[DEV 70-Tab 48]. The Republican Eagles required an annual contribution of

$15,000 (individual) or $20,000 (with spouse or nonfederal/corporate). Id.

ODP0025-00377 to 0378, ODP0025-00429 [DEV 70-Tab 48]. The Eagles

program offered a series of national and regional meetings with elected

Republican Congressional leaders, special access to Republican events, and

other benefits. ODP0025-00428 [DEV 70-Tab 48]; ODP0030-02838 to 39

[DEV 71-Tab 48]. The Team 100 program required a donation of $100,000

upon joining and every fourth year thereafter, with $25,000 donations required

in each of the three intervening years. ODP0014-00983, ODP0014-01457 to

58 [DEV 69-Tab 48]. The Team 100 program offered members national and

regional meetings with the Republican Party leadership throughout the year,

special events, membership in the Eagles program, the opportunity to

participate in international trade missions, and other benefits.

ODP0025-00377, ODP0025-00424, ODP0025-01705 to 13 [DEV 70-Tab 48].

The Season Ticket program required a donation of $250,000 upon joining and
160

renewals thereafter. ODP0022-03045 to ODP0022-3046, ODP0023-02480,

ODP0025-01569 [DEV 70-Tab 48]; ODP0030-03408 [DEV 71-Tab 48]. The

“Season Ticket” or “Season Pass” program offered the greatest and most

exclusive range of RNC donor program benefits, including one Team 100

membership, two Eagle memberships, special access to a range of Republican

Party events, and the assistance of RNC support staff. ODP0025-01569 [DEV

70-Tab 48]. The RNC also offers the Regents program designed for members

who give an aggregate amount of $250,000 in nonfederal funds per two-year

election cycle. B. Shea Decl. ¶ 14.g [RNC Vol. V].

1.77.2 The NRSC also offered several major donor programs. In 1995 and 1996, the

NRSC offered a corporate donor program called “Group 21” or “G21,” which

required an annual donation of $100,000. ODP0037-02246, ODP0037-02275,

ODP0037-02281 [DEV 71-Tab 48]. The “Group 21” program offered donors

“small dinners with [then-NRSC Chairman] Senator D’Amato and other

senators” and other “VIP benefits.” ODP0037-02275 [DEV 71-Tab 48]. The

Chairman’s Foundation required an annual corporate (meaning nonfederal

money) donation of $25,000. ODP0036-03603 [DEV 71-Tab 48]. The

Senatorial Trust required an annual donation of $10,000 (personal) or $15,000

(corporate). ODP0036-03873 to 74 [DEV 71-Tab 48]. The Presidential

Roundtable required an annual donation of $5,000 in personal or corporate
161

funds. ODP0037-00315 [DEV 71-Tab 48]. See also ODP0036-03525 (letter

signed by Senator McConnell to NRSC member asking him to renew his

membership, noting that “[y]our non-federal contribution to the Chairman’s

Foundation will allow us to put our federal dollars directly towards the Senate

campaigns, where they are desperately needed.”); ODP0036-3562 (letter

signed by Senator McConnell thanking addressee for joining the Chairman’s

Foundation); ODP0036-03595 (letter signed by Senator McConnell soliciting

someone to join the Chairman’s Foundation); ODP0037-01861 to 69 (NRSC

brochure) [DEV 71-Tab 48]; Vogel Decl. ¶ 51 (“The NRSC uses a variety of

donor programs to motivate persons to donate funds. These programs tend to

be associations of donors and fundraisers, who are grouped by the nature and

extent of the funds given or raised.”), Tabs A, J [DEV 9-Tab 41] (2002

Senatorial Trust materials).

1.77.3 “The DSCC hosts several different types of events to motivate persons to

donate funds. These events are often attended by Democratic Senators,

Democratic Senate candidates, other Democratic holders of federal office,

Democratic Cabinet officials and other celebrities who neither seek nor hold

federal office.” Jordan Decl. ¶ 52 [DEV 7-Tab 21]. For example, during the

1996 election cycle, the DSCC offered memberships in its “Leadership

Circle.” COL0002-00698 [DEV 78-Tab 152]. Membership required a
162

$10,000 annual contribution for individual donors, and $15,000 for PACs. Id.

Benefits included “special Leadership Circle weekend retreats and issue

seminars with Senators and Washington officials. . . . Leadership Circle

members also receive tickets to the annual Senate Fall Dinner, followed by a

day of issue oriented meetings with Senators and political experts.” Id. The

DSCC also offered memberships to its “Majority Trust,” “the premiere donor

program of the DSCC for individuals who contribute $20,000 per calendar

year.” Id. “The Majority Trust offers important programs, weekends and

retreats throughout the year attended by Democratic Senators.” Id. The DSCC

also solicits donations for special events. For example, for the DSCC’s 1999

Annual Fall Dinner, a $50,000 nonfederal donation bought the donor benefits

including a priority table at the dinner and one ticket to the VIP Reception.

Jordan Decl. Attach. L (DSCC-L-0025).

1.77.4 The NRCC offers individuals or PACs that contribute $15,000 annually, or

corporations that give $20,000 annually, membership in its Congressional

Forum which “has been designed to give its members an intimate setting to

develop stronger working relationships with the new Republican

Congressional majority,” ODP0042-01226 [DEV 71-Tab 48], and the “benefit

that attracts most Forum members are the dinners with Committee Chairmen

and the Republican members from each Committee,” ODO0042-00028 [DEV
163

71-Tab 48]. These dinners “average about 75 people including Members—that

means at least two Committee Members at every table.” ODP0042-00171 to

72 [DEV 71-Tab 48]. “In addition to the monthly dinners, we offer two annual

meeting weekends, a golf tournament and a dinner with the Elected Leadership

and all the Committee Chairs is included as a benefit of . . . . Forum

membership.” Id. Forum benefits also include all the Benefits of the NRCC’s

House Council program. ODP0042-01226 [DEV 71-Tab 48]; see also ATT

000018 [DEV 7-Tab 20] (invitation to 1999 Republican Senate-House Dinner,

with escalating benefits including meetings, receptions and a breakfast with

Congressional leaders).

1.77.5 “The DCCC uses a variety of donor programs to motivate persons to donate

funds. These programs tend to be associations of donors and fundraisers, who

are grouped by the nature and extent of the funds given or raised.” Wolfson

Decl. ¶ 53 [DEV 9-Tab 44]. For the 2002 election cycle, the DCCC’s “Major

Donor Programs” included the Business Forum, which required an annual

contribution of $10,000. Id. at Tab J (DCCC-J-0007). Business Forum

Members’ benefits included “[b]i-monthly political briefings and receptions

with the House Democratic Leadership and other Democratic pro-business

Members in the House of Representatives[, an a]nnual retreat with

Chairwoman Lowey and the House Democratic Leadership[, an] annual
164

Democratic Congressional Dinner event package[, and a] bi-monthly

conference call/briefing with Leader Gephardt and Chairwoman Lowey. Id.

(capitalization altered). The Majority Council required a $50,000 annual

contribution, and included the bi-monthly conference call, “complementary

invitations to all DCCC fundraising events, including the Annual Democratic

Congressional Dinner with private reception and political briefing[, and]

complementary invitations to Premiere Retreats with Leader Gephardt,

Chairwoman Lowey, House Democratic Leadership and Ranking Members.

Id. (capitalization altered). Membership to the National Finance Board

required a $100,000 annual contribution, and included as benefits all of the

“Majority Council” benefits as well as “two private dinners with Leader

Gephardt, Chairwoman Lowey, House Democratic Leadership and Ranking

Members[ and] two retreats with Leader Gephardt and Chairwoman Lowey in

Telluride, CO and Hyannisport, MA.” Id. (capitalization altered).

1.77.6 The state parties also use the promise of access to federal lawmakers to

encourage larger donations. See, e.g., CDP 0098 [DEV 106] (CDP brochure

showing that those who contribute $100,000 to the CDP are classified by the

party as “Trustees,” and that the CDP “recognizes its extraordinary supporters

with extraordinary opportunities,” providing “Trustees” with “[e]xclusive

briefings, receptions and meetings with officials such as U.S. Senator Dianne
165

Feinstein, U.S. Senator Barbara Boxer, Lt. Governor Gray Davis, Controller

Kathleen Connell and other national figures.”); CRP-00269 (flyer titled “The

California Golden Circle,” noting that “[t]hrough Golden Circle contributions,

California Republicans have been able to elect leaders from the White House

to the State House,” that Golden Circle members will assist the CRP “goal . .

. to deliver fifty-five electoral votes for our Republican Presidential nominee

in 2004, maintain a Republican majority in Congress, and elect a Republican

Legislature,” and including among Golden Circle “Membership Benefits”

“private receptions/meetings held throughout California with local, state and

national Republican leaders to discuss current political issues”).

1.77.7 Contributors request to be seated with certain lawmakers at these donor events.

For example, an RNC “Table Buyer’s Guest List” sheet for “The Official 1995

Republican Inaugural Gala” filled out by “Am. Banker’s Ass’n/Nation’s

Bank” contained a request to sit with certain Members of Congress and

“anyone on House Banking Comm.” ODP0023-3288 [DEV 70-Tab 48]; see

also 2000 RNC Gala Leadership Levels, undated, RNC0022509 [DEV 92];

2000 RNC Attendance Forms, April 20, 2000, RNC0236323 [DEV 97] (filled

out by Microsoft attendee requesting to be seated with a particular Senator or

“Leadership Commerce Comm. or Judiciary”); RNC0145258 [DEV 93] (filled

out by Chevron corporation attendee, requesting to be seated with a Member
166

from California, Louisiana or Texas); RNC0202199 [DEV 96] (filled out for

the MBNA table, requesting to be seated with five particular Senators);

RNC0202200 [DEV 96](filled out for the Reliant Resources, Inc. table, asking

to be seated with one specific Representative and five named Senators); RNC

0032805 - 06, RNC 0032799 [DEV 92] (request for Burger King Chairman

and Team 100 member who donated $100,000 to be seated with Senator Fred

Thompson and three other Senators, and document showing Senator

Thompson was placed at the Burger King table). PhRMA’s Judith Bello

testifies that the five Members of Congress PhRMA listed as requested “VIP”

to be seated at its table at the 2000 Republican House-Senate dinner were all

Members who had responsibility or oversight over issues of importance to the

pharmaceutical industry. Bello Dep. at 82 [JDT Vol. 1]. 

1.77.8 The political parties have used such opportunities to promote their various

donor clubs. For example, Senator McConnell, as head of the NRSC, wrote

a solicitation letter which noted that the Republican Senate Council ($5,000

annual PAC contribution) and the Chairman’s Foundation ($25,000 annual

corporate gift) provide “excellent opportunities for both corporate executives

and Washington representatives to meet and discuss current issues with

leading Republican Senators.” ODP0036-03603 [DEV 71-Tab 48]; see also

RNC 0286400 [IER Tab 4] (offering $250,000 donors to the RNC Gala Co-
167

Chairman status which included a “Breakfast and Photo Opportunity with

[Senate Majority Leader] Trent Lott and [Speaker of the House] Newt

Gingrich,” as well as a “Luncheon with Republican House and Senate

Leadership and the Republican House and Senate Committee Chairmen of

your choice”).

1.77.9 According to lobbyist Robert Rozen:

[S]oft money contributions built around sporting events such as

the Super Bowl or the Kentucky Derby, where you might spend

a week with the Member, are even more useful. At the events

that contributors are entitled to attend as a result of their

contributions, some contributors will subtly or not-so-subtly

discuss a legislative issue that they have an interest in.

Contributors also use the events to establish relationships and

then take advantage of the access by later calling the Member

about a legislative issue or coming back and seeing the Member

in his or her office. Obviously from the Member’s perspective,

it is hard to turn down a request for a meeting after you just

spent a weekend with a contributor whose company just gave a

large contribution to your political party.

Rozen Decl. ¶ 11 [DEV 8-Tab 33]; see also COL0002-00698 (flyer listing

DSCC Donor Programs, and including as part of its Majority Trust 1996

program, “a weekend in Aspen, CO in January, Superbowl weekend, Mardi

Gras with Senator Breaux, a Jefferson Weekend in Charlottesville, VA in June,

and the annual summer retreat on Nantucket Island in July.”).

1.77.10 Sometimes the link between large donations and special access to elected

federal officials is even more direct. A call sheet prepared for then-DNC
168

Chair Fowler instructs him to call a number of large contributors ask for

donations, and invite them for lunch with the President of the United States

(“POTUS”). DNC 113-00137 to 38 [DEV 134-Tab 7] (“Ask her to give 80k

more this year for lunch with Potus on October 27th.”) (“Ask him to write

another 100K to become a Managing Trustee for the campaign and come to

lunch with POTUS on Oct. 27.”). A CDP call sheet entitled “Child Call List,

5/16/96,” includes the notation that a potential donor should be asked “if they

might be able to do $25,000 for a small mtg with the President, you know it’s

steep, but want to include them in these types of meetings.” CDP 00124 [IER

Tab 11].

Nonfederal Donations are More Effective than Federal Contributions at Procuring Access

for Donors

1.78 Donors give nonfederal money, rather than federal money, to political parties because

large nonfederal donations are more effective for obtaining access to federal officials

than several small federal contributions. See, e.g., Hickmott Decl., Ex. A. ¶ 47 [DEV

6-Tab 19] (explaining that “[i]f you want to get to know Members of Congress, or

new Members of Congress, it is more efficient to write a $15,000 check to the DSCC

and to get the opportunity to meet them at the various events than it would be to write

fifteen $1,000 checks to fifteen different Senators, or Senators and candidates.”);

Andrews Decl. ¶ 14 [DEV 6-Tab 1] (stating that “a properly channeled $100,000

corporate soft money donation to the national Republican or Democratic
169

congressional campaign committees can get the corporate donor more benefit than

several smaller hard dollar contributions by that corporation’s PAC. Although the

donations are technically being made to political party committees, savvy donors are

likely to carefully choose which elected officials can take credit for their

contributions. If a Committee Chairman or senior member of the House or Senate

Leadership calls and asks for a large contribution to his or her party’s national House

or Senate campaign committee, and the lobbyist’s client is able to do so, the key

elected official who is credited with bringing in the contribution, and possibly the

senior officials, are likely to remember the donation and to recognize that such big

donors’ interests merit careful consideration.”); Randlett Decl. ¶ 13 [DEV 8-Tab 32]

(“[Soft money donors] get a level of attention that a $1,000 hard money donor never

will. Even someone who wrote 25 $1,000 hard money checks but no soft money is

going to get much less attention and appreciation than someone who wrote one large

soft money check.”); Rozen Decl. ¶ 12-13 [DEV 8-Tab 33] (“Donors to the national

parties understand that if a federal officeholder is raising soft money--supposedly

‘non-federal’ money--they are raising it for federal uses, namely to help that Member

or other federal candidates in their elections. Many donors giving $100,000,

$200,000, even $1 million, are doing that because it is a bigger favor than a smaller

hard money contribution would be. That donation helps you get close to the person

who is making decisions that affect your company or your industry. That is the reason
170

most economic interests give soft money, certainly not because they want to help state

candidates and rarely because they want the party to succeed. . . . The bigger soft

money contributions are more likely to get your call returned or get you into the

Member’s office than smaller hard money contributions.”); Geschke Decl. ¶ 9 [DEV

6-Tab 14] (“Corporations and individuals can use soft money donations to get special

access to federal office holders and at least the appearance of influence on issues that

are important to them financially or politically. Hard money contributions do not

provide the same opportunities for influence on federal policy as soft money

donations do.”); Simon Decl. ¶ 16 [DEV 9-Tab 37] (“Because few people can afford

to give over $20,000 or $25,000 to a party committee, those people who can will

receive substantially better access to elected federal leaders than people who can only

afford smaller contributions or can not afford to make any contributions.”); Kirsch

Decl. ¶ 9 [DEV 6-Tab 14] (“Corporations and individuals can use soft money

donations to get special access to federal office holders and at least the appearance of

influence on issues that are important to them financially or politically. Hard money

contributions do not provide the same opportunities for influence on federal policy as

soft money donations do.”).

1.78.1 In a memorandum to a high-level Fortune 100 company executive outlining a

proposed $1.4 million nonfederal fund budget for FY1999, members of the

Company’s governmental affairs staff noted that 
171

[w]ith both houses of Congress and the White House hotly

contested this cycle, the importance of soft money, and

consequently the efforts by the parties to raise even more soft

money, is greater than ever. On the Democratic side, [our

company’s] advocates have already fielded soft money calls

from House Democratic Leader Gephardt, House Democratic

Caucus Chairman Frost, Democratic Congressional Campaign

Chairman Kennedy, and Democratic Senatorial Campaign

Chairman Torricelli. Similar contacts to raise soft money have

been made by Republican congressional leaders.

In addition to the increased pressure from party and

congressional leaders, it is clear that our direct competitors and

potential competitors are weighing in with big soft money

donations.

Memorandum from a Fortune 100 company’s legislative advocate to a highlevel executive, dated March 4, 1999, [citation sealed]. The nonfederal budget

request was justified by a number of rationales:

First, due to a significant [sic] in the number of events scheduled

by the parties for their donors, the number of opportunities . . .

to develop relationships with elected and administration officials

has never been greater. As the parties compete more vigorously

for soft money dollars, the number and quality of events for

interacting with both the leadership and rank and file Members

has been greatly increased. Between the six main committees

(DNC, DSCC, DCCC. RNC, NRCC, NRSC) there are events

both in and out of [Washington, D.C.] almost every day of the

week.

Two, . . . the parties have become increasingly reliant on soft

money and both feel it is critical to their success in coming

elections. Not surprisingly, this has made the parties especially

sensitive to which companies contribute soft money, and which

don’t. As noted, our traditional competitors continue to

contribute large amounts of soft money and as [our company]

expands its business into new areas (e.g. cable, internet,

networking) it faces new types of competitors, primarily in the

computer and high tech industry, that also contribute heavily.
172

Failure to maintain our soft money participation during this

election cycle – given the heightened scrutiny those

contributions will receive in the current competitive climate –

may give our new and traditional competitors an advantage in

Washington.

Three, the next Administration will also be determined in this

election cycle. Consequently, we will be asked to use soft money

contributions to support both national parties at an even greater

level than during a non-Presidential year. Funding for the

national conventions and next year’s national party committee

requests should be anticipated in this year’s budget and

contributed when appropriate to foster the development of

relationships with the key officials of the next Administration.

Finally, because both parties will be working to influence

redistricting efforts during the next two years, we anticipate that

we will be asked to make soft money contributions to these

efforts. Redistricting is a key once-a-decade effort that both

parties have very high on their priority list. Given the priority of

the redistricting efforts, relatively small soft money

contributions in this area could result in disproportionate

benefit.

Id.

Donors Often Contribute Nonfederal Funds to Both Major Political Parties in Order to

Ensure Access and Prevent Retaliation

1.79 The record shows that many large contributors give to both political parties. Forty of

the top 50 nonfederal money donors in 1996 donated to both political parties, as did

35 of the top nonfederal money donors in 2000. Mann Expert Report at Tbls. 5-6

[DEV 1-Tab 1]. Most of the top nonfederal contributors who gave to only one

political party were either state political party committees (four in 1996) or labor

unions (three in 1996, seven in 2000). Id. Those involved in political fundraising

explain that this practice is a result of donors’ desire to have special access to
173

lawmakers from both parties, and also out of concern that if the contributor gives to

only one political party the other will perceive an imbalance and punish the donor.

Evidence from the corporate world demonstrates that major nonfederal donors

give to both political parties in order to ensure access to lawmakers from both

political parties. CEO Randlett comments that “[a]s a donor with business goals, if

you want to enhance your chances of getting your issues paid attention to and

favorably reviewed by Members of Congress, bipartisanship is the right way to go.

Giving lots of soft money to both sides is the right way to go from the most pragmatic

perspective.” 

Internal corporate documents corroborate Mr. Randlett’s testimony. An Eli

Lilly and Company memorandum shows that the company was concerned about a

Washington Post article listing it as a significant donor to the Republican party. The

memorandum discusses contributions being made at Democratic party events

occurring in the near future. The memorandum concludes with: “[___] has talked to

the White House and we can get back into this by giving $50[,000] - 100,000 to the

DNC– says they would be pleased with this.” ODP0018-00463 [DEV 69-Tab 48];

see also id. at ODP0018-00461 (the Washington Post article), ODP0018-00462

(photocopy of part of the article with handwritten note stating “Dems are upset. Calls

from employees about imbalance. White House stays Dem we are in trouble”).

Similarly, an internal Fortune 100 company memorandum states the following:
174

Attached please find an invoice from the NRSC for [our company’s]

commitment of $25,000 in soft money. As you know, this request was

approved during the PAC meeting this week. We recently approved a

soft money donation to the New Dominion Fund, requested by Senator

Chuck Robb. At the time this request was approved, the team

determined that our support in this race would be equal. The request

attached balances [our company’s] support in this race, as a

contribution to the RNSC has been requested by George Allen. 

Internal memorandum (Oct. 26, 2000), [citation sealed].

One lobbyist explains that many “companies and associations that do give soft

money typically contribute to both parties . . . because they want access to Members

on both sides of the aisle.” Rozen Decl. ¶ 7 [DEV 8-Tab 33]. Members of Congress

are also cognizant that donors give nonfederal funds to both parties. As former

Senator Bumpers observes: “Giving soft money to both parties, the Republicans and

the Democrats, makes no sense at all unless the donor feels that he or she is buying

access.” Bumpers Decl. ¶ 15; see also id. (noting that the “business community

makes such donations quite often”).

Individual donors also acknowledge that nonfederalmoney donors give to both

parties in order to ensure special access to federal lawmakers on both sides of the

aisle. Hiatt Decl. ¶ 12 [DEV 6-Tab 18] (testifying “[p]eople give soft money

donations to both parties because they want to make sure they have access regardless

of who’s in the White House, filling the Senate seat, or representing the

Congressional district.”); Buttenwieser Decl. ¶ 23 [DEV 6-Tab 11] (“I am aware that

some soft money donors, such as some corporations, give substantial amounts to both
175

major political parties. Based on my observations, they typically do this because they

have a business agenda and they want to hedge their bets, to ensure they get access

to office holders on the issues that are important to them. This occurs at the national

and state levels.”); Geschke Decl. ¶ 10 [DEV 6-Tab 14] (“In my view, donors who

give large amounts of soft money to both major parties are probably hedging their bets

in trying to get influence. They may feel that influence with one party is not sufficient

to achieve their financial or policy goals, especially now that power in Congress is

pretty evenly balanced.”).

1.80 The political parties are aware of this practice, as evidenced by an Ohio Republican

Party document titled “Why People Give,” which lists “so that they will have access

to whoever is the winner” as one reason behind contributions. RNC OH 0418778

[IER Tab 1.H]. The record demonstrates that they have parlayed this knowledge into

leverage which they use to pressure donors who have given to the other party to give

to theirs as well. CEO Randlett explains how the political parties take advantage of

this situation:

[I]f you’re giving a lot of soft money to one side, the other side knows.

For many economically-oriented donors, there is a risk in giving to only

one side, because the other side may read through FEC reports and have

staff or a friendly lobbyist call and indicate that someone with interests

before a certain committee has had their contributions to the other side

noticed. They’ll get a message that basically asks: “Are you sure you

want to be giving only to one side? Don’t you want to have friends on

both sides of the aisle?” If your interests are subject to anger from the

other side of the aisle, you need to fear that you may suffer a penalty if

you don’t give. First of all, it’s hard to get attention for your issue if
65 Professor Paul Herrnson is one of Defendant’s experts. 

176

you’re not giving. Then, once you’ve decided to play the money game,

you have to worry about being imbalanced, especially if there’s

bipartisan control or influence in Washington, which there usually is.

In fact, during the 1990’s, it became more and more acceptable to call

someone, saying you saw he gave to this person, so he should also give

to you or the person’s opponent. Referring to someone’s financial

activity in the political arena used to be clearly off limits, and now it’s

increasingly common. 

Randlett Decl. ¶ 12 [DEV 8-Tab 32].

1.80.1 Plaintiffs maintain that the record “establishes that organizations and

individuals may give to both parties because they desire to be actively involved

in the political process.” RNC Proposed Findings of Fact ¶ 119 (citing Bello

Dep. at 39 [stating that it is “traditional” for PhRMA to “support the

convention activities for both Republicans and the Democrats” because “we

are good civic participants”] and Herrnson65 Dep. at 495 [DEV 65]

[acknowledging “it is possible” that “donors of soft money provide money to

political parties because they support some members of . . . one party, and

some members of another party”]). This self-serving statement of a PhRMA

representative and Dr. Herrnson’s acknowledgment that a hypothetical

scenario was possible, support the RNC’s contention that “organizations and

individuals may give to both parties because they desire to be actively involved

in the political process.” The extensive testimony and documentary evidence
177

discussed supra, however, shows that the primary reason why entities and

individuals do give to both parties is to ensure access to federal lawmakers.

Moreover, interests in participating in the political process and an interest in

obtaining access to legislators to influence them are neither incompatible nor

mutually exclusive.

Empirical Evidence Linking Donations to Corruption

1.81 Experts testifying in this case agree that no study attempting to statistically or

empirically link donations to corruption by federal officials is without flaws.

However, even if these studies were universally accepted, it is clear that they would

be of limited utility for the purposes of this case. As Defendants’ expert Thomas

Mann notes, “[m]ost of this research has examined the connections between PAC

contributions (a surrogate for interested money) and votes in the House and Senate.”

Mann Expert Report at 32 [DEV 1-Tab 1]. However, as Mann observes, there are 

a myriad of ways in which groups receive or are denied favors beyond

roll-call votes. Members can express public support or opposition in

various legislative venues, offer amendments, mobilize support, help

place items on or off the agenda, speed or delay action, and provide

special access to lobbyists. They can also decline each of these

requests. 

Id. at 33 (citations omitted). In addition, Mann notes that the

currency of campaign contributions extends well beyond PAC

contributions to members’ campaign committees. These include

brokered if not bundled individual contributions, contributions to

leadership PACs controlled by members, contributions to parties and

candidates in targeted races and informally credited to members, soft-
66 Mann notes that where the variables of “[p]arty, ideology, constituency, mass public

opinion and the president . . . . are less significant, there is evidence that interest group

contributions, particularly to junior members of Congress, have influenced roll call votes –

for example, on financial services regulation.” Mann Expert Report at 32-33 DEV 1-Tab 1]

(citing Thomas Stratmann, Can Special Interests Buy Congressional Votes? Evidence from

Financial Services Legislation. Paper (prepared for delivery at the 2002 Annual Meeting of

the American Political Science Association, Boston, 29 August - 1 September), available

from the APSA Proc eedings Web site: http://apsaproceedings.cup. org

/Site/papers/022/022023 StratmannT.pdf. 2002.

178

money contributions to parties and section 527 committees connected

to members, and direct expenditures on ‘issue ad’ campaigns. 

Id. at 34. Mann concludes that the “ways and means of potential influence (and

corruption) are much more diverse than those investigated in the early scholarly

research.” Id. at 34.66 Many of these studies also suffer from the fact that the

interactions between donations and legislative action are difficult to observe. See,

e.g., Sorauf Cross Exam. at 132 [JDT Vol. 31]; see also Appendix ¶ III (for more

analysis of these studies).

Summary

1.82 The immense quantity of testimonial and documentary evidence in the record

demonstrates that large nonfederal contributions provide donors special access to

influence federal lawmakers. This access is shown to be coveted by these donors

because it provides them the opportunity to have their voices heard and to influence

legislation on policy matters of concern to them. Testimony from lobbyists, major

donors, federal lawmakers and political party officials, as well as internal political
179

party and corporate documents, shows that donors expect to receive this access, that

this expectation is fostered by the political parties and federal lawmakers, and that

special access is in fact provided to major donors. Corroborating this evidence is the

fact that nonfederal money donors often give to both political parties, which

demonstrates that in many cases, large nonfederal donations have less to do with

political philosophy than with obtaining access to power. The record also makes clear

that the best method of obtaining special access to federal lawmakers is through large

nonfederal donations, rather than smaller donations under the federal campaign

finance regime.

The political parties have taken advantage of the desire of donors for special

access by structuring their entire fundraising programs to entice larger donations with

the promise of increased and more intimate access to federal officials. The political

parties have also pressured donors to give donations, playing off donors’ fears of

denial of access or political retribution. From this record it is clear that large

donations, particularly unlimited nonfederal contributions, have corrupted the political

system. This fact has not been lost on the general public, as is explored infra.

Public Perception of Corruption

1.83 The record demonstrates that the public believes there is a direct correlation between

the size of a donor’s contribution to a political party and the amount of access to, and

influence on, the officeholders of that political party that the donor enjoys thereafter.
67 Mark Mellman is “CEO of The Mellman Group, a polling and consulting firm. .

. . Mellman has helped guide the campaigns of some fifteen U.S. Senators, over two dozen

Members of Congress, and three Governors, as well as numerous state and local officials.

In addition, Mellman works with a variety of public interest organizations . . . and corporate

clients . . . He has served as a consultant on politics to CBS News, a presidential debate

analyst for PBS, a contributing analyst for The Hotline, National Journal’s daily briefing on

politics, and is currently on the faculty of The George Washington University’s Graduate

School of Political Management.” Mellman and Wirthlin Report at 2 [DEV 2-Tab 5]. 

68 Richard Wirthlin is “Chairman of the Board of Wirthlin Worldwide, a strategic

opinion research firm he founded in 1969, which now is one of the top companies in its field.

Wirthin is perhaps best known as President Reagan’s strategist and pollster. . . . Mellman and

Wirthlin Report at 2-3 [DEV 2-Tab 5]. He is widely respected in the “field of social science

research and one of this country’s most respected political and business strategists.” Id.

Wirthlin “was chief strategist for two of the most sweeping presidential victories in the

history of the United States. In 1981 he was acclaimed Adman of the Year by Advertising

Age for his role in the 1980 campaign and in 2001 was one of four Republicans awarded

American University’s ‘outstanding contribution to campaign consulting.’ In the same year,

he was designated ‘Pollster of the Year’ by the American Association of Political

Consultants.” Id. at 3. The Washington Post named Wirthlin “the prince of pollsters” and

George Gallup, Jr. said Wirthlin is “one of the very best at our craft.” Id. 

69 The survey was conducted over a period of five days (August 28, 2002 through

September 1, 2002), and the pollsters made an average of 4.58 dialings per telephone number

in the sample set in order to ensure that the sample was representative. See Mellman and

Wirthlin Report at 22-23 [DEV 2-Tab 5]. The study’s contact rate was 38 percent, more than

double the industry average of 15 percent. Id. at 23. The rate of refusal of the respondents

who refused to be polled was within the normal range for a random telephone survey

conducted in the United States. Id. The pollsters took several steps to avoid bias. Id. at 24;

see also Wirthlin Cross Exam. at 40 (explaining that the pollsters took steps to avoid bias by

randomly ordering the questions, “so that there is no sequence developed where one question

(continued...)

180

1.83.1 A research poll of 1,300 adult Americans conducted by two prominent political

pollsters, Mark Mellman67 and Richard Wirthlin,68 finds that the public

perceives that large donations as having a corrupting influence on federal

officeholders.69 See Mellman and Wirthlin Report [DEV 2-Tab 5].
69(...continued)

may, if always asked in the same order, affect[] the second question.”). The statistical

margin of sampling error, that is, the error due to sampling versus if the pollsters talked to

every American in the United States, is 2.7 percentage points: the actual opinions of

Americans will be within 2.7 percentage points of those reported in the study 95 percent of

the time. Id. at 22. 

181

Mellman and Wirthlin conclude that “[a] significant majority of

Americans believe that those who make large contributions to political parties

have a major impact on the decisions made by federally elected officials.” In

addition, Mellman and Wirthlin find that many Americans believe that the

“views of these big contributors sometimes carry more weight than do the

views of constituents or the best interests of the country.” Id. at 6 [DEV 2-Tab

5]. The major findings of their poll include:

• Seventy-seven percent of Americans believe that big contributions to

political parties have at least some impact on decisions made by the

federal government. Fifty-five percent thought big contributions had

a great deal of impact; 23 percent thought such donations had some

impact. Id.

• Seventy-one percent of Americans “think that members of Congress

sometimes decide how to vote on an issue based on what big

contributors to their political party want, even if it’s not what most

people in their district want, or even if it’s not what they think is best
182

for the country.” Id. at 7.

• A “large majority (84%) think that members of Congress will be more

likely to listen to those who give money to their political party in

response to their solicitation for large donations.” Id. at 8.

• “Over two-thirds of Americans (68%) . . . think that big contributors to

political parties sometimes block decisions by the federal government

that could improve people’s everyday lives.” Id. at 8.

• “[A]bout four in five Americans think a Member of Congress would be

likely to give special consideration to the opinion of an individual, issue

group, corporation, or labor union who donated $50,000 or more to

their political party (81%) or who paid for $50,000 or more worth of

political ads on the radio or TV (80%). By contrast, only one in four

Americans (24%) think that a member of Congress is likely to give the

opinion of someone like them special consideration.” Id. at 9.

1.83.1.1 The Mellman and Wirthlin Report did not measure the public’s understanding

of the campaign finance system, and did not ask if the respondents understood

the difference between nonfederal and federal donations. See Cross Exam. of

Mellman at 31-35 [JDT Vol. 22]. Mellman testifies that the purpose of the

poll was to measure the public’s perceptions. Id. at 31. According to

Plaintiffs’ expert, Q. Whitfield Ayres, the public does not understand the
183

distinction between federal and nonfederal donations and is not aware of

campaign finance regulations. See Ayres Expert Report ¶ 8(a). Dr. Shapiro,

an expert for Defendants, responds that 

[t]he public does not need detailed knowledge about . . . the

nuances of existing campaign finance regulations, and the extent

to which these regulations are enforced in order to form strong

opinions toward campaign finance. The public can easily

understand how political donations can lead to political access

and influence--how political parties and politicians will pay

attention to those who give money to the parties. The public has

long questioned the motivations of, and responded with distrust

toward labor unions, corporations, special interests more

generally, and the government itself. The public is especially

troubled and animated by these problems when they become

blatantly visible in widely publicized incidents and scandals

such as those involving Enron and the large soft money

donations to the Democratic Party and the roles played by the

Clinton Administration, President Bill Clinton, and Vice

President Al Gore.

Shapiro Rebuttal Report at 9 [DEV 5-Tab 2] (citations omitted). Mr. Ayers

also comments that his research finds that “every conclusion that the

Wirthlin-Mellman report reached about ‘large’ or ‘big’ contributions and

contributors applies with equal force to the new, hard money limits in the

BCRA.” Ayers Rebuttal Report at 4 [RNC Vol. VIII]. Mr. Wirthlin notes that

what Mr. Ayers’ research demonstrates is that “in the eyes of most Americans

. . . $50,000 is considered [a] large” contribution, but comments that if that is

the case then the nonfederal donations given in the past which far exceed

$50,000 would be viewed as even larger. Wirthlin Cross Exam. at 148, 155
184

[JDT Vol. 32]. And, “as you move up the scale, there’s going to be pretty

close to unanimity on what constitutes big in the form of campaign

contributions.” Mellman Cross Exam. at 69 [JDT Vol. 22]. 

1.83.2 The results of the Mellman-Wirthlin study are confirmed by the research of

Robert Shapiro, a professor at Columbia University, who analyzed public

perception of nonfederal money contributions to political parties by reviewing

all publicly available opinion survey data sources. Shapiro Expert Report at

7-8. [DEV 2-Tab 6]. The survey data Shapiro examined was comprised mostly

of telephonic opinion polls. Id. at 8. Specifically, Shapiro focused on “public

opinion data based on responses to surveys that were fielded since 1990” to

determine the public’s answers to several questions, including two questions

which read: “To what degree has the public perceived corruption in politics

connected to the influence of money and large campaign donations?” and

“What have been the public’s perceptions and opinions toward the substantial

political donations in the form of soft money contributions to political

parties?” Id. at 3, 8. According to Shapiro, poll results show that the “public

has opposed large unregulated soft money contributions to political parties

[and] that the public has been troubled by large soft money donations.” Id. at

13. In addition, Shapiro concluded that the poll data showed “that a

substantial proportion of the public has perceived corruption in the political
185

system, and that we have been losing ground.” Id. at 11.

1.83.3 Former and current Members of Congress testify that their constituents believe

that these large contributions to parties present an appearance of corruption.

See Simpson Decl. ¶ 14 DEV 9-Tab 38] (testifying that “[b]oth during and

after my service in the Senate, I have seen that citizens of both parties are as

cynical about government as they have ever been because of the corrupting

effects of unlimited soft money donations.”); 144 S. Cong. Rec. S1041 (Feb.

26, 1998) (statement of Sen. Baucus) (stating that “[p]eople tell me they think

that Congress cares more about ‘fat cat special interests in Washington’ than

the concerns of middle class families like theirs. Or they tell me they think the

political system is corrupt.”); 146 Cong Rec. S4262 (May 23, 2000) (statement

of Sen. Feingold) (stating that “[t]he appearance of corruption. . . . We all

know it’s there. We hear it from our constituents regularly. We see it in the

press, we hear about it on the news.”); Letter from Representative Asa

Hutchinson to RNC Chairman Nicholson dated July 9, 1997, ODP0014-00003-

4 (declining to support Nicholson’s proposed campaign finance legislation

because Hutchinson had to balance Nicholson’s concerns “with a concern of

my constituents which is that their influence in politics is being diminished by

the abuses of soft money . . . . If our party is unable to enact meaningful

campaign finance reform while we’re in control of Congress, then I believe
186

this failure to act will result in more cynicism and create a growing lack of

confidence in our efforts.”); Congressman Meehan Decl. in RNC ¶¶ 15-17

[DEV 66-Tab 4] (stating that “there is a strong feeling in my [Congressional]

district that soft money is corrupting the political process and influencing

elections. My constituents feel that very large donations to the party

committees, on the order of twenty-five, fifty or one hundred thousand dollars

from one company or individual, have a corrupting influence.”); Rudman Decl.

¶ 13 [DEV 8-Tab 34] (“The soft money system not only distorts the legislative

process, it breeds deep cynicism in the minds of the public. I know this from

my own experience in talking to citizens and voters over the years.”).

1.83.4 Large donations made by groups or persons with an interest in pending

legislative activity, even if not corrupting, create an appearance of corruption,

especially when the donations are given in close proximity to legislative action

on bills of interest to the donors. Senator McCain states: 

While the [generic drug] bill was pending [in 2002], the NRSC

and NRCC held a large gala fundraiser to raise almost $30

million in largely soft money contributions, a substantial portion

from pharmaceutical companies. According to newspaper

reports, among the largest contributors to the gala were

GlaxoSmithKline PLC ($250,000), PhRMA ($250,000), Pfizer

($100,000), Eli Lilly & Co. ($50,000), Bayer AG ($50,000) and

Merck & Co. ($50,000).

McCain Decl. ¶ 11 [DEV 8-Tab 29]. 

[T]here’s an appearance [of corruption] when there’s a million
187

dollar contribution from Merck and millions of dollars to your

last fundraiser that you held, and then there is no progress on a

prescription drug program. There’s a terrible appearance there.

There’s a terrible appearance when the Generic Drug Bill, which

passes by 78 votes through the Senate, is not allowed to be

brought up in the House shortly after a huge fundraiser with

multimillion dollar contributions from the pharmaceutical drug

companies who are opposed to the legislation.

McCain Dep. [JDT Vol. 18] at 174-175. 

Senator Feingold commented that 

members of the National Consumer Bankruptcy Coalition, an

industry lobbying group made up of the major credit card

companies such as Visa and Mastercard and associations

representing the Nation’s big banks and retailers, gave nearly

$4.5 million in contributions to parties and candidates. . . .

Some of the campaign contributions from these companies seem

to be carefully timed to have a maximum effect. It is very hard

to argue that the financial largess of this industry has nothing to

do with its interest in our consideration of bankruptcy

legislation. For example, on the very day [in 1998] that the

House passed the conference report last year and sent it to the

Senate, MBNA Corporation gave a $200,000 soft money

contribution to the National Republican Senatorial Committee.

145 Cong. Rec. S14067-68 (Nov. 5, 1999); see also Feingold Dep. at 67 [JDT

Vol. 6]. “[A] $200,000 contribution [was] given 2 days after the House marked

up a bankruptcy bill by MBNA. OK, it is not illegal. Conceded. Maybe it is not

even corrupt, but it certainly has the appearance of corruption to me and I think

to many people.” 145 Cong. Rec. S12593 (Oct. 14, 1999) (statement of Sen.

Feingold). Senator Feingold has also stated that “[t]he appearance of

corruption is rampant in our system, and it touches every issue that comes
188

before us.” 147 Cong. Rec. S2446 (Mar. 19, 2001) (statement of Sen.

Feingold); see also 147 Cong. Rec. S3248-49 (April 2, 2001) (statement of

Sen. Levin) (“[P]ermitting the appearance of corruption undermines the very

foundation of our democracy — the trust of people in the system.”).

1.83.5 The Defendants have also submitted a substantial number of press reports

which suggest that large soft money donations present the appearance of

corruption. See, e.g., Jackie Koszczuk, Soft Money Speaks Loudly on Capitol

Hill This Season, Cong. Q., June 27, 1998, at 1736; Jill Abramson, Money

Buys A Lot More Than Access, N.Y. Times, Nov. 9, 1997, at 4; Jane Mayer,

Inside the Money Machine, The New Yorker, Feb. 3, 1997, at 32; Don Van

Atta, Jr. and Jane Fritsch, $25,000 Buys Donors ‘Best Access to Congress’,

N.Y. Times, Jan. 27, 1997, at A1; see also Krasno and Sorauf Report at 19-20

DEV 1-Tab 2]; Primo Rebuttal ¶ 7 [2 PCS] (stating that “[t]he news media

reinforces this view [that money distorts the political process] by portraying

the political process as being driven by campaign contributions ....”). Senator

Rudman states

Almost every day, the press reports on important public issues

that are being considered in Congress. Inevitably, the press

draws a connection between an outcome and the amount that

interested companies have given in soft money. . . . Even if a

Senator is supporting a position that helps an industry for

reasons other than that the industry gave millions to his party, it

does not appear that way in the public eye.
189

Rudman Decl. ¶ 11 [DEV 8-Tab 34].

1.83.6 High-level political contributors testify that large nonfederal donations corrupt

the political system or present an appearance of corruption. See, e.g.,

Hassenfeld Decl. ¶ 19 [DEV 6-Tab 17] (“It is obvious to me that large soft

money donations do buy access, that they can influence federal policy, and that

they are corrupting to federal officeholders and to donors. Additionally, these

unlimited donations to political parties pose a far greater risk than do hard

money contributions to candidates of at least the appearance, if not the reality,

of special interest influence on federal policy.”); Kirsch Decl. ¶ 15 [DEV 7-

Tab 23] (“[T]he current system of financing federal elections permits

corruption to flourish.”); Buttenwieser Decl. ¶ 30 [DEV 6-Tab 11] (“Large soft

money donations can create at least the appearance of influence on federal

policy making. . . ”). 

A national survey of major congressional donors conducted in 1997

found that a majority were critical of the campaign finance system and

supportive of reform. John Green, Paul Herrnson, Lynda Powell, and Clyde

Wilcox, Individual Congressional Campaign Contributors: Wealthy,

Conservative and Reform-Minded (1998), FEC 101-0282, 0283[DEV 45-Tab

110]. Seventy-six percent of those surveyed believed the campaign finance

system is either “broken and needs to be replaced,” or “has problems and needs
190

to be changed.” Id. Three-quarters of those surveyed supported a “ban on

large ‘soft money’ donations.” Id. at 0291.

1.83.7 Plaintiff’s expert La Raja notes that 

[O]ne cannot ignore the central claim of reformers that the cashbased electoral environment fosters mistrust of the political

system. Observing the amounts of money raised and spent in

campaigns makes the average American skeptical that the

political process is fair. Such doubts raise questions about

political legitimacy. Even if politicians are not corrupt – and

there has been minimal evidence to prove this claim – there is

certainly the appearance of corruption. . . . 

It does not help matters that parties contribute to the arms race

in campaigns. By using soft money parties raise the ante in

elections. Candidates feel vulnerable to parties and interest

groups that sponsor issue ads so they raise more money than

ever. Campaign costs increase as each side fights to a draw . .

. . Thus, the foraging for campaign money contributes to the

perspective that money corrupts the system.

La Raja Cross Exam. Ex. 3 at 144-45 [JDT Vol. 25].

Summary

1.84 It is clear that the effect of large contributions on the political process has not been

lost on the public. The polling surveys entered into the record provide powerful proof

that the presence of large donations create the appearance of corruption in the eyes of

the majority of Americans. Although Plaintiffs point out that BCRA’s new federal

limits are considered by Americans to constitute large contributions, the fact remains

that nonfederal donations made under FECA were often much larger and therefore

would be seen by Americans as more corrupting. Major donors who participate and
191

witness nonfederal fundraising believe that these donations present at the very least

an appearance of corruption. Members of Congress have seen first-hand the cynicism

these large, unregulated donations have bred in the minds of their constituents, and

acknowledge the appearance of corruption inherent in large contributions made by

those interested in legislation as the legislation is being considered by federal

lawmakers. While it is not clear whether or not the public understands the exact

contours of the campaign finance system and the nonfederal/federal money

distinction, it is clear they view large contributions as corrupting. 

Nonprofit Groups’ Involvement in Federal Elections

1.85 Political parties and federal candidates work with nonprofit groups on campaign

activities, and they have raised nonfederal money for, and directed and transferred

nonfederal money to nonprofit groups for use in activities that affect federal elections.

1.85.1 The national party committees direct donors to donate nonfederal money to

certain interest groups that then use such funds for broadcast issue

advertisements and other activities that influence federal elections. For

example, Steve Kirsch testifies that the national Democratic Party played an

important role in his decision to donate soft money to “certain interest groups

that were running effective ads in the effort to elect Vice-President Gore, such

as NARAL. The assumption was that the funds would be used for television

ads or some other activity that would make a difference in the Presidential
192

election.” Kirsch Decl. ¶ 10 [DEV 7-Tab 23]; see also Buttenwieser Decl. ¶

18 [DEV 6-Tab 11] (“I estimate that, over the last decade, I have given

roughly $2 million to interest groups engaged in political activity, including

non-profit corporations. . . . [because I believe the field work they do] can have

important effects on political campaigns. I decide which of these groups to

give to primarily on my own, though I have also discussed with DSCC

personnel which groups are effective at these grassroots activities.”). 

1.85.2 The RNC, NRSC, and NRCC have all made nonfederal donations to the

National Right to Life Committee, an independent group that assists

Republican candidates through “issue advocacy” activities. Resps. Nat’l Right

to Life Pls. To Defs.’ First Interrogs., No. 3 [DEV 10-Tab 5]; see also

RNC0065691A, RNC0065691 [DEV Supp.-Tab 3] (October 18, 1996, letter

from the Republican National State Elections Committee to National Right to

Life with enclosed $500,000 donation, stating in part “[y]our continued efforts

to educate and inform the American public deserves recognition”). After the

NRSC’s 1994 donation, then-NRSC Chairman Senator Phil Gramm told the

Washington Post that the party made this donation because it knew the funds

would be used on behalf of several specific Republican candidates for the

Senate, saying he had “made a decision...to provide some money to help

activate pro-life voters in some key states where they would be pivotal to the
193

election.” Id. at 5975; see also RNC 0373365 [IER Tab 31] (letter from the

Republican National State Elections Committee to the American Defense

Institute notifying the group of a $300,000 donation from the RNSEC’s “nonfederal component” to assist the group’s “efforts to educate and inform

Americans living overseas of their civic responsibilities.”); RNC 0373370,

0373376, 0373381 (three letters to Americans for Tax Reform all dated in

October 1996, providing the group $1,000,000, $2,000,000, and $600,000

donations in recognition of the group’s “efforts to educate and inform the

American public); Thompson Comm. Report at 4013 (majority report) (“In

addition to direct contributions from the RNC to nonprofit groups, the senior

leadership of the RNC helped to raise funds for many of the coalition’s

nonprofit organizations.”); id. at 5934 (minority report) (“[T]he Committee

received evidence indicating that both political parties suggested to supporters

that theymake contributions to sympathetic groups), 5983 (“Tax-exempt ‘issue

advocacy’ groups and other conduits were systematically used to circumvent

federal campaign finance laws”.)

1.85.3 The DNC has also made contributions to nonprofit groups to be used on

activities that affect federal elections. Marshall Decl. ¶ 9 [DEV 8-Tab 28]

(DNC official attesting that “[i]nfrequently, the DNC also makes small

contributions to outside groups such as non-profit voter registration and get out
194

the vote organizations focusing their efforts on minority and low-income

communities, to assist with these groups’ important work in empowering

minority and low-income citizens.”).

1.85.4 The National Right to Work Committee “pays for its advertising from its

treasury, [and] admits that certain Members of Congress or Executive Branch

Officials have generally encouraged financial support for the Right to Work

cause and, specifically, for the support of NRTWC in advocating for these

issues, through lobbying as well as issue advertising.” Resp. Nat’l Rt. Work

Comm. to Defs. First RFAs, No. 17 [DEV 12-Tab 2].

1.85.5 Members of Congress assist nonprofit groups raise funds for the purpose of

affecting national elections. Congressman Ric Keller signed a Club for

Growth fundraising letter dated July 20, 2001 which credited the Club for his

own 2000 electoral success and assured potential donors that their money

would be used to “help Republicans keep control of Congress.” CFG00208-10

[DEV 130-Tab 5]; see also NRW-2812 [DEV 129-Tab 2] (letter from

Congressman Pete Sessions asking the recipient to meet with National Right

to Work Committee personnel regarding the Committee’s effort to “stop Big

Labor from seizing control of Congress in November”). Nonprofit groups

have influenced the outcome of federal elections. See Pennington Decl. ¶¶ 15,

19 [DEV 8-Tab 31] (discussing the Club for Growth’s impact on the 2000
195

Congressional election in Florida’s Eighth District); see also infra Findings ¶

? (Bumpers) (“Members or parties sometimes suggest that corporations or

individuals make donations to interest groups that run “issue ads.” Candidates

whose campaigns benefit from these ads greatly appreciate the help of these

groups.”).

1.85.6 Ms. Bowler testifies that most committees that are organized to support or

oppose ballot measures in California are organized as 501(c)(4) committees.

She states that virtually all of the ballot measure committees in California

engage in activity that can be characterized as get-out-the-vote activity under

BCRA. Bowler Decl. ¶ 30 [3 PCS]. This fact is undoubtedly known to the

CDP as summary judgment was entered against the state political party for its

nonfederal contribution to a ballot measure committee which was not reported

to the FEC and spent almost entirely on voter registration activities. See FEC

v. CDP, No. S-97-0891 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 14, 1999) (order granting summary

judgment). Judge Garland E. Burrell, Jr. of the Eastern District of California

found that on the basis of this conduct the CDP had “violated the FECA and

the allocation rules by funding a generic voter drive that targeted Democrats.”

Id. at 15. This example shows that ballot measure committees engage in voter

mobilization efforts that affect federal elections, see also Findings ¶¶ 1.28,

1.32, and that permitting nonfederal donations and solicitations to such groups
196

would allow political parties to circumvent BCRA.

1.85.7 “Virtually every member of Congress in a formal leadership position has his

or her own 527 group. . . . In all, Public Citizen found 63 current members of

Congress who have their own 527s. Another 38 members of Congress have

a stake in the Congressional Black Caucus [] 527. 527 groups are also popular

with influential congressional committee chairmen. . . . And 527s are

increasingly popular with other members of Congress, who want to be more

influential. . . .” Public Citizen Congress Watch, Congressional Leaders’ Soft

Money Accounts Show Need for Campaign Finance Reform Bills, Feb. 26,

2002, at 6 [DEV 29-Tab 3]. “For congressional leaders, 527 groups appear to

collect about as much money as their campaign committees and often as much

as their leadership PACs.” Id. at 9.

1.85.7.1 “There are basically two kinds of 527s active in federal politics: those that exist

to promote certain politicians (which Public Citizen calls ‘politician 527s’) and

those that exist to promote certain ideas, interests and partisan orientations in

election campaigns. . . . Politician 527s generally serve as soft money arms of

‘leadership PACs,’ which incumbents use to aid other candidates and

otherwise further their own careers. Like the campaign committees of

members of Congress, leadership PACs can receive only ‘hard money’

contributions, which are limited in amounts and may not come directly from
197

corporations or unions. Politician 527s use their soft money mainly to sponsor

events that promote their own careers, help create a ‘farm team’ of successful

state and local candidates, and spur partisan ‘get-out-the-vote (GOTV)’

efforts.” Id. at 6.

1.85.7.2 Many donors to Member 527 organizations donate with the intent of

influencing federal elections. For example, Peter Buttenwieser testified that

in early 2002 he donated $50,000 to a 527 organization, Daschle Democrats,

which ran broadcast ads in South Dakota supporting Senator Tom Daschle in

response to the attacks that had been made against him. Mr. Buttenwieser

stated: “I was willing to do this because I felt that the attacks were hurting

Senator Daschle and Senator Tim Johnson’s re-election campaign as well.”

Buttenwieser Decl. ¶ 20 [DEV 6-Tab 11].

1.85.7.3 Twenty-seven industries (including individuals, such as executives, associated

with the industries) contributed $100,000 or more in just a single year to the

top 25 politician 527 groups. These industries accounted for 52 percent of all

contributions to the top 25 politician 527s. The top 10 industries contributing

were: computers/Internet, securities & investments, lawyers/law firms,

telephone utilities, real estate, TV/movies/music, air transport, tobacco, oil &

gas, and building materials and equipment. Top corporate contributors

included AT&T, SBC Communications, Philip Morris, Mortgage Insurance
198

Companies of America, Clifford Law Offices, U.S. Tobacco and American

Airlines. Overall, only 15 percent of total contributions to the top 25 politician

527’s came in amounts of less than $5,000. Democratic party committees and

unions also contributed over $100,000 to the top politician 527s. In fact,

Democratic party committees (mainly the DNC) were the single largest

contributor to politician 527s. Almost all of this money (81 percent) went to

the Congressional Black Caucus 527. Public Citizen Congress Watch,

Congressional Leaders’ Soft Money Accounts Show Need for Campaign

Finance Reform Bills, Feb. 26, 2002, at 10–11 [DEV 29-Tab 3].

1.85.8 According to Kathleen Bowler of the CDP, Section 527 organizations include

political clubs. The CDP has contributed to these groups “to assist [them] with

very basic administrative and organizational costs, as well as for voter

registration activities.” Bowler Decl. ¶ 31. Bowler attests that these groups

“traditionally engaged in grass-roots GOTV activity, they are not engaged in

direct activities in connection with federal elections.” Id. Similarly, 

CRP for many election cycles has provided and paid for partisan

voter registration, through its Operation Bounty program in

which Republican County Central Committees, Republican

volunteer organizations and Republican candidates for state and

federal office may participate, and through supplementary paid

voter registration drives. Most of these participating groups

and organizations are Internal Revenue Code section 527

organizations.

Erwin Aff. ¶ 9. 
199

Since California’s state elections are held at the same time as federal

elections, GOTV efforts in California will affect federal elections, even if

these effects are unintentional. See supra Findings ¶ 1.28.

1.86 It is clear that prior to BCRA, the political parties donated nonfederal funds to

nonprofit entities which then used those funds to affect federal elections in ways that

assisted the political party that donated the money. Furthermore, federal candidates

have solicited funds for nonprofit corporations that have assisted them in their

campaigns, and donors note that the political parties and federal candidates have

directed them to donate to specific nonprofit groups in order to affect federal

elections. What the record shows is that BCRA’s framers were aware of this budding

practice which would become a gaping loophole if not addressed by the campaign

finance reform legislation in light of BCRA’s other provisions affecting the collection

and use of nonfederal funds by the national and state political parties.

The Effect of BCRA on Interest Group Activity

1.87 Experts expect that little of the nonfederal money donations to political parties barred

by BCRA will now be made to interest groups. See Mann Cross Exam. at 164-65

[JDT Vol 17] (“I think [BCRA] is going to produce a tremendous shift in resources

from television to ground activities -- registration, mobilization, get out the vote. Yes,

some of this will be by interest groups.”); Green Rebuttal Report at 19 [DEV 5-Tab

1] (“I doubt that much of the money that currently goes to parties in the form of soft
200

money will go instead to PACs and other tax-exempt organizations. The money

donated to political parties is given with an eye toward the special favors that only a

political party can deliver by dint of its ubiquitous role in all levels of government.

No interest group can approximate the scope or influence of a political party; no

interest group has the same presence in the lives or careers of politicians. It therefore

seems unlikely that money seeking access will flow in appreciable quantities to much

less propitious interest group destinations.”). 

1.88 One interest group and one political consultant predict that some nonfederal money

donors will donate their money to interest groups. Kate Michelman, President of

NARAL, has stated that nonfederal donors seeking to “elect people who embody their

values will be looking to [donate to] groups like NARAL, which do serious political

work and are seasoned operatives.” Gallagher Decl. ¶ 61 [RNC Vol. XIII] (“If

[nonfederal donors] can’t give to the parties . . . they are going to find other means.”

(quoting Michelman)). Michael Lux, President and Co-founder of Progressive

Strategies, L.L.C., a political consulting firm, testifies that he expects that “[t]here

will be organizations who will be able to raise more money because folks who used

to give to the party will now give to outside groups. And hopefully I will be involved

in many of those projects,” although “obviously you never know the unintended

consequences of specific pieces of legislation”). Lux Dep. at 50-52 and Ex. 2 [RNC

Vol. 16].
70 Frances Beinecke is the Executive Director of the NRDC. Beinecke Decl. ¶ 1 [RNC

Vol. IX].

71 Deborah Sease is the Legislative Director of the Sierra Club. Sease Decl. ¶ 1 [RNC

Vol. XIX].

72 Morton Keller is an experts for the Plaintiffs.

201

1.89 One RNC official testifies that she does not believe interest groups can replace

political parties. B. Shea Dep. at 90 [JDT Vol. 29] (agreeing that interest groups

could never replace political parties). 

1.90 Plaintiffs supply the Court with testimony showing that prior to BCRA, interest

groups, unlike political parties, were rarely required to make public disclosure of their

receipts, donors, disbursements, and activities. See Beinecke70 Decl. ¶¶ 3, 9 [RNC

Vol. IX] (prior to BCRA, National Resources Defense Council (NRDC) did not have

to file disclosure forms with FEC or disclose to the public amounts donated by

foundations); Gallagher Decl. ¶ 15 [RNC Vol. XIII] (prior to BCRA National

Abortion and Reproductive Rights Action League (NARAL) was not required to track

whether it received donations from persons outside United States); Sease71 Decl. ¶ 11

[RNC Vol. XIX] (prior to BCRA, Sierra Club was not generally required to report

identity of individual donors to any government entity); see also Keller72 Expert

Report ¶ 42 [RNC Vol. VIII] (stating that his understanding is that the political

activities of interest groups “are far less transparent than those of parties”). 

While this may have been the case prior to BCRA, BCRA contains provisions
73 John Dendahl is the State Chairman of the Republican Party of New Mexico.

Dendahl Decl. ¶ 1 [RNC Vol. VIII]. 

74 Robert Bennett has served as Chair of the Ohio Republican Party since 1988.

Bennett Decl. ¶ 1-2 [RNC Vol. VIII].

202

addressing the lack of transparency in interest group political activity. See BCRA §§

201, 212. Therefore, this testimony describes conditions under a different campaign

finance regime and does little to assist the Court in determining the impact on

campaign finance disclosure of any hypothetical future increase in interest group

activity. 

1.91 State Republican party officials comment that interest groups engage in voter

registration, voter identification, get-out-the-vote activities, and lobbying of

officeholders, Dendahl73 Decl. ¶ 11 [RNC Vol. VIII]; Bennett74 Decl. ¶ 11 [RNC Vol.

VIII] (declaring he has read about such interest group activities in the media). Bruce

Benson, the Chairman of the Colorado Republican Party predicts that “Special

Interest Groups will fill the void caused by the reduction in Political Party activity

since they will not have to report the unlimited contributions from any source they

will be able raise and spend.” Benson Decl. ¶ 12 [RNC Vol. VIII]. 

It appears that Mr. Benson’s assessment does not take into account BCRA’s

new disclosure requirements for certain expenditures made by interest groups. See

BCRA §§ 201, 212.

1.92 John Peschong, the RNC’s Regional Political Director for the Western Region states
203

that “In recent election cycles, I have observed that some of the major interest groups,

such as the AFL-CIO, NEA, CTA, and NAACP, have reduced their reliance on

broadcast issue advocacy, and shifted reliance to grassroots voter mobilization

activities.” Peschong Decl. ¶¶ 13-14 [RNC Vol. VI].

1.93 During the closing weeks of the 2000 campaign, the NAACP National Voter Fund

registered over 200,000 people, put 80 staff in the field, contacted 40,000 people in

each target city, promoted a get-out-the-vote hotline, ran three newspaper print ads

on issues, made several separate direct mailings, operated telephone banks, and

provided grants to affiliated organizations. See Green Cross Exam. at 15-20, Ex. 3

[JDT Vol. 9]; McCain Cross Exam. at 70-72 [JDT Vol. 18]. The NAACP reports that

the program turned out a million additional black voters and increased turnout (over

1996 numbers) among targeted groups by 22 percent in New York, 50 percent in

Florida and 140 percent in Missouri. Green Cross Exam. Ex. 3 [JDT Vol. 9]. The

NAACP’s effort, which cost approximately $10 million, was funded in large part by

a single $7 million donation by an anonymous individual. Id. at 20, Ex. 3; McCain

Cross Exam. at 73-74 [JDT Vol. 18].

1.94 According to Mary Jane Gallagher, NARAL’s Executive Vice President, in 2000,

NARAL spent $7.5 million and mobilized 2.1 million pro-choice voters. The group

also made 3.4 million phone calls and mailed 4.6 million pieces of election mail. See

Gallagher Decl. ¶ 24 [RNC Vol. XIII].
204

1.95 I find the effect BCRA will have on interest group activity unclear. While testimony

in the record reveals that some nonfederal donations that went to the national political

parties under FECA, and are now barred under BCRA, will go to interest groups, no

witness has provided an assessment as to how much nonfederal money will be

redirected to interest groups. Furthermore, the evidence regarding the lack of

transparency with regard to interest group political activity does not take into account

BCRA’s new disclosure requirements that apply to such activities, and therefore is not

helpful to the Court. 

State Party Fundraising

Fundraising By National Party Officials & Federal Officeholders for State Parties

1.96 According to RNC officials, the RNC provides financial and fundraising assistance

to state and local candidates and parties through a variety of means. See Dendahl

Decl. ¶ 10 [RNC Vol. VIII]; Duncan Decl. ¶ 13 [RNC Vol. VI]; Josefiak Decl. ¶ 44,

65-72 [RNC Vol. I]; B. Shea Decl. ¶¶ 32-40 [RNC Vol. V]; see also La Raja Expert

Report ¶ 12(b) [RNC Vol. VII] (discussing national party support for state parties

generally). For example, RNC officers have sent fundraising letters on behalf of state

and local candidates during off-year election cycles. See, e.g., RNC Ex. 292 (RNC

0332976) (fundraising letter signed by Deputy RNC Chairman Jack Oliver on behalf

of Bret Schundler’s New Jersey gubernatorial campaign); Josefiak Decl. RNC Ex.

1162 [RNC Vol. I] (fundraising letter signed by Haley Barbour on behalf of George
205

Allen’s Virginia gubernatorial campaign); Josefiak Decl. RNC Ex. 1766 [RNC Vol.

I] (fundraising letter signed by Haley Barbour on behalf of New Jersey Republican

Party); Feingold Dep. Ex. 12 [JDT Vol. 6] (fundraising letter from Jim Nicholson on

behalf of Norm Coleman’s Minneapolis mayoral campaign). Robert Duncan, current

General Counsel and former Treasurer of the RNC, was actively involved in

fundraising activities for the Republican Party of Kentucky and for Kentucky state

candidates. He sponsored receptions and hosted and attended fundraising dinners in

support of the Kentucky Republican Party. Duncan Decl. ¶¶ 5-6 [RNC Vol. VI]. 

The RNC states that prior to BCRA,

RNC officers were intimately and substantially involved in helping

state and local candidates raise money in accordance with state and

federal law. Since becoming Chairman of the RNC in February 2002,

Marc Racicot has made 82 trips in his capacity as Chairman to 67 cites

in 36 states. Virtually all of these trips have involved assisting state

and local parties and candidates with fundraising. See Josefiak Decl.

¶ 70. RNC Co-Chairwoman Ann Wagner and Deputy Chairman Jack

Oliver have made 31 and 33 trips respectively since becoming RNC

officers, the majority of which involved providing fundraising

assistance to state and local parties and candidates. Id. For example,

Ann Wagner was the keynote speaker at a fundraising dinner for the

Shelby County Tennessee Republican Women’s Club on September 8,

2001. See RNC Exh. 301.

RNC Proposed Findings of Fact ¶ 42. However, the Josefiak Declaration upon which

the RNC relies does not support its contention. Josefiak only states that the “majority

of these trips have had significant fundraising components to them,” Josefiak Decl.

¶ 70 [RNC Vol. I]; he says nothing about the type of fundraising accomplished during
206

these trips. Only one of these 146 trips is documented to have been for the purposes

of state or local party fundraising. See RNC Ex. 301. 

Nothing prevents RNC officials from raising federal funds for state candidates.

See BCRA § 101(a); FECA § 323(a); 2 U.S.C. § 441i(a) (barring officers of agents

of national political party committees from soliciting or directing contributions “that

are not subject to the limitations, prohibitions, and reporting requirements of this

Act.”).

1.97 Senator McConnell attests that he engages in fundraising activities for state and local

candidates, such as speaking at a state party fundraiser or attending a candidate rally.

McConnell Aff. ¶ 5 [2 PCS]. Under BCRA, Senator McConnell may continue “to

attend, speak, or be a featured guest at a fundraising event for a State, district or local

committee of a political party.” BCRA § 101; FECA § 323(e)(3); 2 U.S.C. §

441i(e)(3).

CDP and CRP Fundraising

1.98 The CDP and the CRP present evidence regarding their general fundraising activities

and claim that BCRA will adversely affect their revenues. See Bowler Decl. ¶¶ 10,

12, 19, 23, 35 & Ex. A [3 PCS] (discussing CDP’s federal and nonfederal fundraising

achievements, methods, and difficulties, and the impact BCRA will have on CDP

fundraising); Torres Decl. ¶ 9 [3 PCS] (discussing the effect of BCRA on CDP

fundraising and therefore CDP activities); Erwin Aff. ¶¶ 12, 13, 15(a) & CDP App.
207

at 1189 [3 PCS] (discussing CRP’s fundraising programs and activities and the effect

BCRA will have on these activities). These claims, however, are speculative and not

based on any analysis. Bowler Dep. at 9-14 [JDT Vol. 3] (acknowledging that the

CDP had not discussed any strategies for changing either its fundraising or

operational activities to adjust to the requirements of the BCRA, that no one at the

CDP had talked with any strategists or consultants with respect to ways in which the

party might change either its fundraising or operational activities in response to the

BCRA, and acknowledging that CDP’s assessment of BCRA’s effect was based on

an analysis on how the law would have affected their past fundraising without looking

at different ways money could have been raised); Erwin Dep. at 131-40 [JDT Vol. 5]

(admitting the CRP did not conduct an analysis of how it would change its fundraising

or operations to adapt to BCRA, that the party does not “know what the ramifications”

of BCRA will be on its fundraising receipts, and that he does not know how much of

the nonfederal money that was collected by the national parties will now be directed

at the CRP); see also Philp Dep. at 18-22 [JDT Vol. 26] (testifying that the Colorado

Republican Party has done no formal analysis to determine BCRA’s effect on the

political party’s revenue flow, and has not consulted with fundraising experts to

determine different ways to fundraise under BCRA). 

Furthermore, since the state political parties collect many donations in small

increments, they could be classified as either federal or nonfederal contributions. No
208

party has provided the three-judge panel with analysis taking this fact into account.

The CDP and CRP also present testimony and documentary evidence concerning the

effect the Levin Amendment will have had on their nonfederal fundraising. See

Bowler Decl. ¶ 19 & Ex. A [3 PCS]; Torres Decl. ¶ 7 [3 PCS]; Erwin Aff. ¶ 13 [3

PCS]. In addition to not being the product of a serious, forward-looking analysis, the

testimony is not sufficiently precise and leaves as many questions as it answers. For

example, the CDP’s evidence regarding the impact of the Levin amendment on its

nonfederal money fundraising does not make clear if the amount of funds it claims

will be “reduced” includes the initial $10,000 of these donations which are permitted

to be used for federal election activity under BCRA, or deducts those sums to present

a more accurate calculation. See Bowler Decl. ¶ 19 & Ex. A [3 PCS].

Finally, Plaintiffs’ own expert Raymond La Raja finds that “new rules that

limit soft money fundraising will not present a problem for parties already constrained

by similar limits under state law.” La Raja Cross Exam. Ex. 3 at 148 [JDT Vol. 15]

(La Raja dissertation). He notes that “in states where campaigns are expensive and

where parties rely on major donors” such measures “will hamper party activity and

create some confusion. . . . Although state parties will adapt, the middling and weaker

state parties might suffer the most. . . .” Id. However, he concludes that the “[o]ne

thing we can be sure of is that parties will figure out the ground rules and they will

find an important role for themselves within the new campaign finance regime.” Id.
209

at 150. 

As such, I find the CDP and CRP’s analysis of BCRA’s impact on their

fundraising activities speculative and lacking probative value. 

1.99 The amount of nonfederal money the CRP and CDP raise themselves is much more

than the nonfederal funds they receive from transfers from the national parties.

CDP/CRP 1171 [3 PCS] (in the 2000 election cycle, 19.1 percent of all CRP

nonfederal money came from national party transfers); CDP/CRP 35, 37, 39 [3 PCS]

(in 2000, 36 percent of all CDP nonfederal money was from national party transfers).

Ms. Bowler states, however, that “the percentage of ‘soft money’ falling into this

category would vary from state to state, as well as by election cycle . . .” Bowler

Rebuttal Decl. ¶ 3 [3 PCS]. 

1.99.1 According to Ms. Bowler “[t]he majority of [national transfers] were for issue

advocacy, although money has been transferred for voter registration, get-outthe-vote activities, and even administrative expenses. We are able to raise a

substantial amount of money for our non-Federal activities and do not rely on

national party transfers for those purposes.” Bowler Decl. ¶ 16 [3 PCS]; see

also id. ¶ 12 (explaining that in the 1999-2000 cycle, the CDP raised

$15,617,002 in nonfederal funds, which it used to fund state and local

activities); Bowler Rebuttal Decl. ¶ 4 [3 PCS] (explaining that the CDP pays

for much of its voter registration and get-out-the-vote activities with money
210

raised by the state party). To the extent the CDP uses its nonfederal funds for

purely state campaign activity, BCRA has no effect on such expenditures. As

noted supra, Findings ¶ 1.28, 1.32, GOTV and voter registration activities

affect federal elections in states like California that hold their state and local

elections in conjunction with federal elections. As such, these activities could

be paid for with federal funds or with an FEC-specified allocated mix of

federal and nonfederal funds (raised pursuant to the Levin Amendment). See

BCRA § 101; FECA § 323(b)(2)(a)-(c); 2 U.S.C. 441i(b)(2)(a)-(c).
211

TITLE II: ELECTIONEERING COMMUNICATIONS THAT AFFECT FEDERAL ELECTIONS

2.1 The Origins of the Problem Congress Sought to Solve With Title II

Federal law has long prohibited corporations and labor unions from spending general

treasury funds in connection with a federal election. The Supreme Court’s

interpretation of FECA in a series of cases beginning in 1976 has limited FECA's

control over corporate and labor union involvement with federal elections. Prior to

BCRA, corporations and labor unions exploited these limitations and spent general

treasury funds in massive amounts to influence federal elections with “issue

advertising” campaigns. 

2.1.1 In FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., the Supreme Court held that

the prohibition on corporations and labor unions using general treasury funds

on expenditures in connection with a federal election was overbroad,

narrowing the restriction to corporate and union spending on “express

advocacy.” FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc. (“MCFL”), 479 U.S.

238, 249 (1986) (“We therefore hold that an expenditure must constitute

‘express advocacy’ in order to be subject to the prohibition of § 441b.”). In

Buckley, the Supreme Court provided examples of express advocacy: “‘vote

for,’ ‘elect,’ ‘support,’ ‘cast your ballot for,’ ‘Smith for Congress,’ ‘vote

against,’ ‘defeat,’ ‘reject.’” Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44 n.52. These examples

have been referred to as the “magic words” because if they are invoked by an
75 As discussed, supra, independent expenditures differfrom coordinated expenditures

in that coordinated expenditures are treated as contributions under FECA.

212

organization, they trigger FECA’s limitations. 

2.1.2 As a result of MCFL, corporations and labor unions were permitted to use their

general treasury funds on independent expenditures in connection with a

federal election, provided that those independent expenditures

75 did not contain

words of “express advocacy.” In other words, corporations and labor unions

could use their general treasury funds to pay for an advertisement which

influenced a federal election, provided that the corporation or labor union did

not use any of Buckley’s “magic words” in the advertisement. Magleby Expert

Report at 5-6, 9, 10 [DEV 4-Tab 8]; see also Krasno and Sorauf Expert Report

at 50 [DEV 1-Tab 2].

2.2 The Rise of Issue Advocacy Campaigns Funded by Corporate & Labor

Union General Treasuries

Approximately ten years after MCFL, during the 1996 election cycle, corporations and

labor unions began aggressively to use general treasury funds to pay for “issue

advocacy” campaigns that avoided express advocacy but were designed to influence

federal elections.

2.2.1 The Annenberg Center for Public Policy has been studying issue advocacy

since the early 1990s. See Annenberg Public Policy Center, Issue Advocacy

Advertising During the 1999-2000 Election Cycle (“Annenberg Report 2001”)
76 Sidney Milkis is an expert for the Plaintiffs.

213

at 1 [DEV 38 Tab-22]. In addition to Defendants, Plaintiffs and their experts

have cited to and included the Annenberg Study in their materials, and have

not specifically challenged any of the Center’s findings. See, e.g., NRA 196

[11 PCS]; La Raja Decl. ¶¶ 24(h) [RNC Vol. VII] (quoting Annenberg Study),

¶ 20(b) & Figure 10 (quoting Annenberg data); Milkis76 Decl. ¶ 49 [RNC Vol.

VII] (citing Annenberg Study). See also infra App. ¶¶ I.B.1-I.B.6. Congress

also relied on the Annenberg studies. 147 Cong. Rec. S2455 (daily ed. March

19, 2001) (statement of Sen. Olympia Snowe) (“Let there be no mistake. The

record I intend to outline will show these advertisements constitute

campaigning every bit as much as any advertisements run by candidates

themselves or any ad currently considered to be express advocacy and

therefore subject to Federal election laws.”); id. at 2456 (statement of Sen.

Olympia Snowe) (citing Annenberg Report 2001). Accordingly, I rely on the

Annenberg Center’s results as uncontroverted evidence.

2.2.2 According to the Annenberg Center’s research, issue advertisements generally

fall into three categories: candidate-centered, legislation-centered, and general

image-centered. Annenberg Report 2001 at 13. “Candidate-centered

advertisements make a case for or against a candidate but do so without the use

of the ten words delineated in Buckley.” Id. (noting that these advertisements
77 Other commentators have referred to two types of advertisements: candidatecentered (also called electioneering) issue advertisements and genuine issue advertisements.

Advertisements designed to genuinely influence debate over a particular issue are known as

“true” or “genuine” issue advertisements, while those issue advertisements designed to

influence a federal elections are known as “electioneering” or “candidate-centered” issue

advertisements. Krasno and Sorauf Expert Report at 65 [DEV 1-Tab 2] (“Advertising data

show that there are two distinct types of issue ads, those that are basically candidate-oriented

and electioneering in nature, and those that only present or urge action on an issue. The

former are nearly identical in format, structure, and timing to ads produced by candidates,

while the latter bear little or no resemblance to electioneering.”). 

214

“usually present a candidate in a favorable or unfavorable light and then urge

the audience to contact the candidate and tell him or her to support the

sponsoring organization’s policy position.”). Legislation-centered

advertisements “seek to mobilize constituents or policy makers in support of

or in opposition to pending legislation or regulatory policy.” Id. (noting that

these advertisements usually mention specific, pending legislation). Finally,

general image-centered advertisements are “broadly written to enhance the

visibility of an organization or its issue positions, but are not tied directly to a

pending legislative or regulatory issue.” Id.

77 Throughout the Findings and

my opinion. I will generally use the nomenclature candidate-centered issue

advertisements (or electioneering issue advertisements) and genuine or pure

issue advertisements. Genuine issue advertisements include both legislationcentered and general image-centered issue advertisements.

2.2.3 In discussing the 1999-2000 election cycle, the Annenberg Center found that
78 The report the Annenberg Study produced following the 1997-1998 election cycle

placed this estimate at between $275 million to $340 million. Annenberg Public Policy

Center, Issue Advocacy Advertising During the 1997-1998 Election Cycle (“Annenberg

Report 1998”) at 1 [DEV 66-Tab 6].

215

“[t]he type of issue ad that dominated depended greatly on how close we were

to the general election. . . . Though candidate-centered issue ads always made

up a majority of issue ads, as the election approached the percent [of]

candidate-centered spots increased and the percent of legislative and image ads

decreased, such that by the last two months before the election almost all

televised issue spots made a case for or against a candidate.” Id. at 14

(emphasis added).

2.2.4 Overall, the Annenberg Center concludes that “[o]ver the last three election

cycles the numbers of ads, groups, and dollars spent on issue advocacy has

climbed.” Id. at 1. During the 1996 election cycle, the Annenberg Center

estimated that $135 million to $150 million was spent on multiple broadcasts

of about 100 advertisements. Annenberg Report 2001 at 1 [DEV 38-Tab 22].

In the next election cycle (1997-1998), the Annenberg Center found that 77

organizations aired 423 advertisements at a cost of between $250 million and

$340 million. Id.

78 In the 1999-2000 election cycle, the Annenberg Center

found that 130 groups spent over an estimated $500 million on 1,100 distinct

advertisements. Id. For the 1999-2000 election cycle, the Republican and
216

Democratic parties accounted for almost $162 million (31%) of this spending;

Citizens for Better Medicare, $65 million (13%); Coalition to Protect

America’s Health Care, $30 million (6%); U.S. Chamber of Commerce, $25.5

million (5%); AFL-CIO, $21.1 million (4%); National Rifle Association, $20

million (4%); U.S. Term Limits, $20 million (4%). Id. These groups and the

two parties accounted for two out of every three (67%) dollars spent on issue

ads in the 2000 cycle. Id. (noting that other groups spent a combined $166.2

million (33%) on issue advocacy during the 1999-2000 election cycle); see

also La Raja Decl. ¶ 20(b) & Figure 10 [RNC Vol. VII] (quoting Annenberg

data and noting that “[t]hese figures . . . closely match my own data on

party-based issue ads collected by examining financial reports filed with the

FEC”).

2.2.5 In addition to the spectacular rise in candidate-centered issue advertising,

political scientists and experts testify that by the 2000 election cycle, PAC

interest groups ran dramatically fewer advertisements that referred to a federal

candidate than non-PAC interest groups.

2.2.5.1 Political Scientist Anthony Corrado found that one of the “most notable direct

consequences of the FECA” was the “proliferation of PACs.” Anthony

Corrado, A History of Federal Campaign Finance Law at 18 [DEV 29-Tab

17]. Corrado’s historical research concludes that “from 1974 to 1986, the
217

number of committees registered with the FEC increased from 1,146 to 4,157,

while the amounts they contributed to candidates rose from about $12.5

million to $105 million.” Id. Corrado determined that campaign finance

regulation was a major factor in the growth of PACs. Id. “The FECA

sanctioned PACs, and groups and organizations had an incentive to form PACs

since the law established a higher contribution limit for PACs than for

individual donors.” Id. at 18-19; see also Keller Decl. ¶¶ 57 [RNC Vol. VIII]

(“[T]he unintended consequences of previous campaign finance legislation

[has been] the growth of PACs and more powerful advocacy and interest

groups.”), 42 (“Political action committees (PACs) have rapidly grown in

numbers.”); Milkis Decl. ¶ 34 [RNC Vol. VII] (“Consequently, during the

1970s, the number of Political Action Committees (PACs) exploded.”).

2.2.5.2 Defendants’ expert Magleby finds that by the 2000 election cycle, the number

of PACs had increased to only 4,499. Magleby Expert Report at 16 [DEV 4-

Tab 8]. Plaintiffs’ expert Keller notes that by March 31, 2002, the number of

federal PACs had dropped to 4,328. Keller Decl. ¶ 42 [RNC Vol. VIII]; see

also Milkis Decl. ¶ 35 [RNC Vol. VII] (same). By the 2000 election cycle,

non-PAC interest groups ran 74,024 political advertisements referring to a

federal candidate, compared to only 3,663 by interest group PACs. Goldstein

Expert Report at 10 [DEV 3-Tab 7] (Table 1B); see also Rosenthal Decl. ¶ 25
218

(discussing that since 1995 the AFL-CIO’s PAC has not made any independent

expenditures); cf. Magleby Report at 14-15 [DEV 4-Tab 8] (“If parties and

interest groups can effectively communicate a ‘vote for’ or ‘vote against’

message with party soft money and electioneering advocacy money, as the

studies show they can, then it is not surprising that we have seen so much

growth in this form of campaigning in recent election cycles.”).

2.2.6 After studying the dramatic rise of candidate-centered issue advertisements

over a seven year period, the Annenberg Center concluded inter alia that:

1) The amount of money spent on “issue advocacy” is rising

rapidly.

2) Instead of creating the number of voices Buckley v. Valeo

had hoped, issue advocacy allowed groups such as the parties,

business and labor to gain a louder voice.

3) The distinction between issue advocacy and express

advocacy is a fiction.

4) Issue advocacy masks the identity of some key players and

by so doing, it deprives citizens of information about source of

messages which research tells us is a vital part of assessing

message credibility.

Annenberg Report 2001 at 1 [DEV 38-Tab 22]. As Plaintiffs’ expert Raymond

J. La Raja states, “‘Over the last three election cycles, the number of groups

sponsoring ads has exploded, and consumers often don’t know who these

groups are, who funds them, and whom they represent.’” La Raja Decl. ¶

24(h) [RNC Vol. VII] (quoting Annenberg Report 2001 at 1).

2.2.7 It is therefore uncontroverted that “[b]y the early 1990s and especially by
219

1996, interest groups had developed a strategy to effectively communicate an

electioneering message for or against a particular candidate without using the

magic words and thus avoid disclosure requirements, contribution limits and

source limits.” Magleby Expert Report at 10 [DEV 4-Tab 8]. Political

consultant Douglas L. Bailey explained why it was not until the 1996 election

cycle that corporations and labor unions began to make heavy use of issue

advocacy as a tool of electioneering. Political consultant Bailey testifies:

When I consulted on dozens of campaigns in the 1970s and

1980s, we operated under essentially the same set of rules that

governed in 1996, but many of today’s practices would have

been considered dangerous and wrong then, both politically and

legally. In the post-Watergate era, we were worried about not

only obeying the rules, but also assuring that our clients were

seen as trying to clean up the image of the political process. But

due to a lack of enforcement and a willingness on the part of

some to win at all costs, these concerns appear to have

dissipated. 

Bailey Decl. ¶ 14 [DEV 6-Tab 2].

2.2.8 As this section illustrates, the uncontroverted record demonstrates that since

the 1996 election cycle, candidate-centered issue advertisements have been

used by corporations and labor unions to influence federal elections with

general treasury funds.

2.3 Express Advocacy Not Widely Used Nor An Effective Means of Campaign

Advertising

Exacerbating this development, is the undisputed fact that the overwhelming majority
220

of modern campaign advertisements do not use words of express advocacy, whether

they are financed by candidates, political parties, or other organizations. It is also

uncontroverted that political consultants do not employ express advocacy when

making campaign advertisements because they do not view it as an effective means

of campaign advertising. As a result, corporations and labor unions are able to pay

for the most effective form of political advertisements when seeking to influence

federal elections.

2.3.1 Empirical study demonstratesthatmodern campaign advertisements do not use

words of express advocacy. Dr. Goldstein finds, that 11.4 percent of the

433,811 advertisements aired by candidates met the express advocacy test

during the 2000 federal election. Goldstein Amended Expert Report at 16

[DEV 3-Tab 7]. Conversely, 88.6 percent of candidate advertisements in 2000

“were technically undetected by the Buckley magic words test.” Id. This result

demonstrates “that magic words are not an effective way of distinguishing

between political ads that have the main purpose of persuading citizens to vote

for or against a particular candidate and ads that have the purpose of seeking

support for or urging some action on a particular policy or legislative issue.”

Id. Former Senator Rudman confirmed these empirical results observing that

“[m]any, if not most, campaign ads run by parties and by candidates

themselves never use . . . ‘magic words.’ It is unnecessary.” Rudman Decl. ¶
79 In 1968, Bailey founded Bailey, Deardourff & Associates, which was among the

first national political consulting firms, working for Republican candidates for Governor,

Congress, Senate, and President. The firm’s clients included Gerald Ford’s Presidential

Campaign, and over fifty successful campaigns for Governor or the United States Senate in

17 states. Bailey Decl. ¶ 1 [DEV 6-Tab 2]. As campaign consultant, Bailey’s job was “to

plan the campaign and then create broadcast advertisements that would shape its outcome.”

Id. ¶ 2. In 2000, Bailey was among the first eight recipients of the American

University-Campaign Management Institute’s “Outstanding Contribution to Campaign

Consulting Award given to the consultants “who have best represented the ideals of the

profession and shown concern for the consequences of campaigns on public attitudes about

our democratic process.” Id. Bailey also has done work for political parties and issue

advocacy groups. Id. ¶¶ 9-12.

221

18 [DEV 8-Tab 34].

2.3.2 The uncontroverted testimony of political consultants demonstrates that it is

neither common nor effective to use the “magic words” of express advocacy

in campaign advertisements. The political consultants’ testimony, which I

adopt as part of my Findings, is worth repeating in toto; particularly given the

fact that the testimony of these political consultants is uncontroverted on these

points and is not rebutted by the production of any contrary political consultant

testimony by Plaintiffs discussing this subject.

Republican Political Consultant Douglas L. Bailey79

In the modern world of 30 second political advertisements, it is rarely

advisable to use such clumsy words as “vote for” or “vote against.” If

I am designing an ad and want the conclusion to be the number “20,”

I would use the ad to count from 1 to 19. I would lead the viewer to

think “20,” but I would never say it. All advertising professionals

understand that the most effective advertising leads the viewer to his or

her own conclusion without forcing it down their throat. This is

especially true of political advertising, because people are generally
222

very skeptical of claims made by or about politicians.

 

Contrary to what many people would like to believe, it is well known

among campaign consultants that the “swing voters” who regularly

determine the outcome of elections usually vote on candidate

personalities, rather than issues. Regardless of the substantive topic of

any particular ad, one of the single most important message [sic] that

a political ad can convey is the underlying sentiment that a candidate

has values similar to or different than the target viewers of the ad. A

campaign commercial is most effective if the candidate is perceived as

likeable to the citizens relaxing in their living rooms, and if the viewers

feel comfortable that the candidate shares their values. Often, the

substantive issue is merely the vehicle used to demonstrate personal

qualities.

In the era of the 30 second ad, it is a mistake to view any particular

electioneering advertisement as a campaign in and of itself. Over time,

a campaign defines a candidate through a combination of style, image,

and issues. Even shortly after watching an ad, the target audience

usually doesn’t remember the ad’s substantive details. Rather, the

viewers just get a feel for the candidate. It takes a lot of these “feels”

to make up a campaign. Thirty second campaign ads, therefore, must

be viewed collectively. It is impossible for the political ad consultant

to truly close a positive sale until after he has had time to build the

candidate’s image through a series of 30 second spots.

Even if an electioneering ad aired in August, September, or October

used words such as “vote for,” “support,” or “cast your ballot,” it would

do little good. People’s minds may change from day to day about how

they intend to vote, or more likely, they aren’t significantly focused on

whom to vote for until the days immediately prior to the election. Thus,

the only real sale date is on election day in November. In the months

leading up to that ‘sale date,’ the most important positive thing an ad

can do is to create a general impression of a candidate that the voters

will internalize over time, and that will hopefully sink in by election

day.

Even if the goal of an early-September electioneering ad were to make

a direct pitch for a vote, it would be nearly impossible to do it

effectively. It is amazing how short thirty seconds really is when you
80 Strother is a political consultant, and President and founder of

Strother/Duffy/Strother. Strother Decl. ¶ 1 [DEV 9-Tab 40]. He is also Chairman of the

Board of the American Association of Political Consultants, and last year served as its

President. Id. Since 1967, he has worked for more than 300 campaigns. Id. Representative

clients at the presidential, congressional, and gubernatorial levels have included Lloyd

Bentsen, Paul Simon, Gary Hart, Bill Clinton, Al Gore, Mary Landrieu, and Zell Miller. Id.

In the last two decades alone, his firm has “helped elect candidates in 44 states and five

countries, including 13 Senators, 8 Governors, and scores of Congress members. [His firm

has] won more Democratic Primaries than any other firm.” Id.

223

are trying to craft a political ad. There is barely enough time to

effectively convey a single theme. If you change course in the final

five seconds of an ad, you may undo everything that you have

attempted to accomplish in the previous 25 seconds. Therefore, it is

uncommon that you would see a political advertisement on television

that says “Candidate X is tough on crime” and then breaks that flow

and switches to the entirely separate point of “Please vote for Candidate

X.”

Bailey Decl. ¶¶ 3-4, 6-8 [DEV 6-Tab 2].

Democrat Political Consultant Raymond Strother80

[M]edia consultants prefer putting across electioneering messages

without using words such as “vote for.” Good media consultants never

tell people to vote for Senator X; rather, you make your case and let the

voters come to their own conclusions. In my experience, it actually

proves less effective to instruct viewers what you want them to do.

They have to come to their own conclusion. Americans like to think

they make up their own minds and determine their own fate. Without

even mentioning an upcoming election, the media consultant can count

on the electoral context and voters’ awareness that the election is

coming. Voters will themselves link your ad to the upcoming election.

When viewed months or years after the election a particular ad might

look like pure issue advocacy unrelated to a federal election. However,

during the election, political ads–whether candidate ads, sham issue

ads, true issue ads, positive ads, negative ads or whatever–are each seen

by voters as just one more ingredient thrown into a big cajun stew.

Thus, there is precious little difference in how you go about crafting
224

“issue ads” and candidate ads.

Strother Decl. ¶ 4 [DEV 9-Tab 40]. During the crossexamination period, Strother made another observation:

What you’re trying to do is give people enough information [sic] they

can make up their own minds. Of course, you’re leading them to make

up their minds in one direction, but I don’t call that hard sale. People

tend not to vote for issues anyway, most of the time. They tend to vote

for the individual, and they measure the individual by issues.

Strother Cross Exam. at 43 [JDT Vol. 32]; see also id. at 44 (observing that

90% of candidate advertisements Strother has put together in his career have

not used express advocacy).

2.3.3 Unrebutted expert testimony confirms the view of political consultants. 

Krasno and Sorauf state that:

the practices of political advertisers are not dissimilar from those

of commercial advertisers. Car ads rarely exhort viewers to

“buy” a Chevrolet, nor do soft drink ads urge people to “drink”

their product. The most aggressive ads usually urge viewers to

do no more than call or visit a website for information. . . . This

atmospheric approach to commercial advertising–where the

product is presented in various desirable tableaus–has become

increasingly popular. It serves the general strategy of

advertisers to present viewers with a variety of reasons to

choose their product, hoping that they will latch onto one. Too

heavy-handed an approach might interfere with this process by

raising viewers’ defenses. Political ads seem to follow the same

strategy, hoping that citizens will grow to prefer a candidate

without being told to troop to the polls. That may or may not be

an effective approach, but it is the one that advertisers use and

that regulators and courts must reckon with.

Krasno and Sorauf Expert Report at 54 [DEV 1-Tab 2] (footnote omitted); see
225

also Magleby Report at 15 [DEV 4-Tab 8] (“The absence of magic words in

electoral communications does not impede the ability of media consultants to

craft an electioneering message. In fact, candidates rarely use the magic words

in their own ads.”). 

2.4 Current Federal Law Does Not Distinguish Between Pure Issue Advertisements

and Candidate-Centered Issue Advertisements

Not only are words of express advocacy uncommon and ineffective in campaign

advertising, it is also undisputed that they are ineffective criteria for distinguishing

between genuine issue advertisements and advertisements that do not use express

advocacy but are designed to influence a federal election.

2.4.1 Experts provided uncontroverted testimony to support this point. “The ‘magic

words’ defined in Buckley v. Valeo do not provide an effective way to

determine whether advertisements have the purpose and/or effect of supporting

or opposing particular candidates.” Magleby Report at 5 [DEV 4-Tab 8]; see

also Krasno and Sorauf Expert Report at 58 [DEV 1-Tab 2] (“The magic

words test, however, does not distinguish between [pure issue advertisements

and candidate-oriented issue advertisements]; indeed it does not distinguish

between ads sponsored by candidates and any type of issue ad, or even

between political and commercial advertising. Whatever its utility might once

have been, this standard is now irrelevant to how political ads are designed.”).

2.4.2 Present and former officeholders and candidates likewise provide
226

uncontroverted testimony that “magic words” do not distinguish pure issue

advertisements from candidate-centered issue advertisements. 147 Cong. Rec.

S3072 (2001) (Senator Russ Feingold) (“People didn’t need to hear the socalled magic words to know what these ads were really all about.”); 147 Cong.

Rec. S3036 (Senator John McCain) (“[W]e can demonstrate that the Court’s

definition of “express advocacy”–magic words–has no real bearing in today’s

world of campaign ads.”). Senator Carl Levin made the following statement

on the floor of the Senate in 1998:

To show the absurd state of the law, at least in some circuits, we

can just look at one of the 1996 televised ads that was paid for

by the League of Conservation Voters and which referred to

House Member Greg Ganske, a Republican Congressman from

Iowa, who was then up for reelection. This is the way the ad

read:

It’s our land; our water. America’s environment must be

protected. But in just 18 months, Congressman Ganske has

voted 12 out of 12 times to weaken environmental protections.

Congressman Ganske even voted to let corporations continue

releasing cancer-causing pollutants into our air. Congressman

Ganske voted for the big corporations who lobbied these bills

and gave him thousands of dollars in contributions. Call

Congressman Ganske. Tell him to protect America’s

environment. For our families. For our future.

The ad sponsor claimed that was an issue ad, an ad that

discussed issues rather than a candidate, and so could be paid for

by unlimited and undisclosed funds. If one word were changed,

if instead of ‘Call Congressman Ganske,’ the ad said, ‘Defeat

Congressman Ganske,’ it would clearly qualify as a candidate ad

subject to contribution limits and disclosure requirements. In

the real world, that one word difference doesn’t change the
81 Elain Bloom is currently engaged in consulting, public speaking, and community

activities. Bloom Decl. ¶ 2 [DEV 6-Tab 7]. In 2001, Bloom was a candidate for Mayor of

Miami Beach, Florida. Id. In 2000, Bloom was the Democratic candidate in the general

election to represent Florida’s 22nd Congressional District, running against the incumbent

Republican Clay Shaw, who had served in Congress for nearly 20 years. Id (Shaw won the

race by approximately 500 votes out of over 200,000 cast). Prior to the 2000 race, Bloom

served as a member of the Florida House of Representatives for over 18 years, from 1974 to

1978 (representing Northeast Dade County) and from 1986-2000 (representing Miami Beach

and Miami). Id. Bloom was Speaker Pro-Tempore of the Florida House from 1992 to 1994,

and also served as chair of several legislative committees, including the Health Care

Committee, the Joint Legislative Management Committee, the Joint Legislative Auditing

Committee, and the Tourism and Cultural Affairs Committee. Id. 

227

character or substance of that ad at all. Both versions

unmistakably advocate the defeat of Congressman Ganske.

144 Cong. Rec. S10073 (1998) (Senator Carl Levin) (advertisement text in

italics); see also Decl. of Elaine Bloom ¶ 5 [DEV 6-Tab 7] (“In my experience

in campaigns for federal, state and local office, including my involvement in

the television advertising we ran in my race for Congress, no particular words

of advocacy are needed for an ad to influence the outcome of an election.

Many so-called ‘issue ads’ are run in order to affect election results.”).81 As

former Senator Dale Bumpers testifies:

Soft money also finds its way into our system through

so-called “issue advertisements” sponsored by outside

organizations that mostly air right before an election.

Organizations can run effective issue ads that benefit a

candidate without coordinating with that candidate. They

have experienced professionals analyze a race and

reinforce what a candidate is saying. These ads influence

the outcome of elections by simply stating “tell him [the

opponent] to quit doing this.” The “magic words” test is
82 Since early 2001, Linda Chapin has been the Director of the Metropolitan Center

for Regional Studies at the University of Central Florida. Chapin Decl. ¶ 2 [DEV 6-Tab 12].

Chapin was the Democratic candidate in the 2000 general election to represent Florida’s

Eighth Congressional District, which was an open-seat race. Id. ¶ 4. In the November 2000

general election, her Republican opponent received about 51% of the votes cast, and Chapin

received about 49% of the votes cast. Id. ¶ 4. From 1998 to 2000, Chapin directed the

Orange County (Florida) Clerk’s Office. Id. ¶ 2. Prior to that, Chapin was elected to two

successive four-year terms, in 1990 and 1994, as County Chairman of Orange County. Id.

The County Chairman is a strong executive position roughly equivalent to a mayoral office.

Id. Prior to her tenure as County Chairman, she was elected to a four-year term on the

Orange County Commission in 1986.

228

completely inadequate; viewers get the message to vote

against someone, even though the ad may never

explicitly say “vote-against-him.”

Bumpers Decl. ¶ 26 [DEV 6-Tab 10]; see also Chapin Decl. ¶ 7 [DEV 6-Tab

12] (“Based on my experience in campaigns for federal and local office,

including the television advertising we ran in my races for County Chairman

and Congress, I am familiar with political campaign ads. No particular words

of advocacy are needed in order for an ad to influence the outcome of an

election.”).82 Congressman Christopher Shays, a Defendant-Intervenor,

testifies:

Although the Supreme Court has identified a limited

category of “magic words” that make an advertisement

a campaign advertisement, my experience as a candidate

and a Member of the House is that this limited test is

inadequate to identify campaign ads. Campaign ads need

not include phrases such as “vote for,” “re-elect” or “vote

against” to be effective campaign tools, and the practice

of large numbers of so-called “issue ads” before an

election proves it.
229

Shays Decl. ¶ 12 [DEV 8-Tab 35].

2.4.2.1 Federal officeholders and candidates also testify that, based on their experience, the intent behind issue advertisements that mention the name of a federal

candidate, are aired right before the election, and broadcast to the candidate’s

electorate, is to influence the election. Chapin Dep. at 27 [JDT Vol. 5] (“It’s

possible that you could debate the [fact that issue advertisements run within 60

days of an election can be both intended to influence the outcome of an

election and intended to promote a particular perspective on a particular public

policy issue], but in my experience those ads are almost entirely intended to

influence the outcome of an election.”); see also Paul Dep. at 27-28 [JDT Vol.

25] (Plaintiff Congressman Ron Paul testifying that the outside group issue ads

run in his 2000 Congressional campaign were intended to influence the

election.).

2.4.3 The uncontroverted testimony of political consultants confirms that there is no

difference between campaign advertisements that contain words of express

advocacy and candidate-centered issue advertisements that are designed to

influence federal elections but that do not use the “magic words” of Buckley.

Consequently, it is uncontroverted that political consultants are able to easily

create advertisements designed to influence federal elections that do not use

words of express advocacy, and therefore, can be paid for with funds from
230

prohibited sources (corporation and labor union general treasury funds). 

Republican Political Consultant Douglas L. Bailey

The notion that ads intended to influence an election can easily

be separated from those that are not based upon the mere

presence or absence of particular words or phrases such as “vote

for” is at best a historical anachronism. When I first entered this

business, and up through the mid-1980s, we were regularly able

to purchase five minute slots of air time. In a five minute spot,

I could introduce a candidate, bring the viewer to a comfort

level with the candidate, cover a few different substantive

issues, and at the end, have the candidate make a direct appeal

for a vote. In this by-gone era, it made sense for a candidate to

appeal directly for votes using words such as “vote for,”

“support,” or”cast your ballot” on the basis of a more full or

substantive story told in a five minute time period. By contrast,

in a 30 second ad, there is not enough time to make a positive

direct sale.

Bailey Decl. ¶ 5 [DEV 6-Tab 2].

Democrat Political Consultant Raymond Strother

Because it is so easy for consultants in my business to make ads

that will influence federal elections without triggering the need

to use hard dollars to pay for them, the difference between hard

money and soft money is a joke. If I want to use soft money to

influence an election, there is no real difference in what I do to

create the ad. The only thing that is different is the tag line at

the end. From the point of view of a media consultant, there is

no real difference between ending an advertisement with “Vote

for Senator X” versus ending an advertisement with “Tell

Senator X to continue working hard for America’s families.”

The public simply does not differentiate between ads that are

otherwise identical, but contain these slightly different tag lines

at the very end.

When we design, produce, and run “issue ads” that mention

specific candidates for federal office and that are aired in
231

proximity to an election, these ads are for only one purpose: to

effect [sic] the outcome of an election. To call these ads “issue

ads” is a sham. We know that these ads have been paid for with

soft money; we know why we have been hired; and we know

how easy it is to make sham issue ads that comply with the law,

but nevertheless affect federal elections. We know this even

without explicit instructions from our clients. Any media

consultant who says otherwise isn’t telling the truth. This is

what everyone in the business does and you know what you are

supposed to produce. It is playing within the current set of

rules, but these rules need to be changed.

One common trick that makes the job of creating sham issue ads

even easier is the two-camera candidate shoot. Sometimes, the

media consultant for the candidate’s campaign committee will

shoot the film and sell it to the media consultant for a third party

for a reasonable rate. They simply take 2 cameras on a shoot

when they are filming the candidate’s ad. Camera A shoots the

footage for the candidate’s ad, and Camera B takes nearly

identical footage that is then sold to other media consultants for

a nominal fee. The media consultant for the third party just has

to buy the film from Camera B and put on a clever tag line at the

end. In this way, the candidate’s media consultant gets direct

control over the images of the candidate used in the issue

groups’ ads.

Strother Decl. ¶¶ 3, 8, 11 [DEV 9-Tab 40].

Republican Political Consultant Rocky Pennington

Many soft money ads that avoid the magic words are clearly

intended to affect federal elections. Parties and interest groups

would not spend hundreds of thousands of dollars to runs [sic]

these ads 15 days before an election if they were not trying to

affect the result. These candidate-specific ads are not usually

run the year before the election or the week after. The usual

final tag line for soft money electioneering is to “call” or “ask”

or “tell” a candidate to stop or continue doing something, often

something vague like fighting for the right priorities. This is

pretty silly, because it’s hard to imagine thousands of people
232

calling the candidate in response to the ad and saying, keep

doing this, this is wonderful. These standard final words, like

“tell,” have become the real “magic words” in modern

campaigning. I imagine some smart lawyer came up with them,

because the real audience for them is not the voters, but the

courts who may be examining the ad after the election. 

Pennington Decl. ¶ 10 [DEV 8-Tab 31]. Both the Chamber of Commerce and

AFL-CIO admit that “[t]he ultimate way to tell an elective official to do

something is through the voting process.” G. Shea Dep. at 46 [JDT Vol. 30];

Josten Dep. at 230 [JDT Vol. 12] (“I would say that [voting against a

candidate] is probably one of the best ways to tell a politician you don’t like

what they are doing.”). Plaintiffs attempt to challenge this premise by citing

text from Senator Feingold’s deposition that his constituents do call him about

issues they may have seen in issue advertisements; however, a careful reading

of the colloquy makes clear that the type of advertisements his constituents

may have seen is never clarified. I cannot conclude from this exchange that

the advertisements that led to those telephone calls would be covered by Title

II of BCRA. During his deposition, Senator Feingold only indicates that he

receives calls from constituents in response to television advertisements.

Senator Feingold was not specifically asked if these advertisements were the

type covered under Title II of BCRA. Feingold Dep at 238-39 [JDT Vol. 6]

(“Q. . . . You mentioned ads, and I have shown you ads which say call Senator

so and so, contact Senator so and so. Your constituent sometimes do call you
233

and contact you, do they not? A. Yes, they do. Q. And they sometimes

talk about issues including abortion, right to life issues and other issues, do

they not? A. Yes, they do. Q. In your opinion, are they sometimes affected

by advertisements that they have seen on television? A. I’m sure they are.”).

Democrat Political Consultant Terry S. Beckett

I am aware of the idea that particular “magic words” might be

required in order for an advertisement to influence an election.

However, in fact no particular words of advocacy are needed in

order for an ad to influence the outcome of an election. No list

of such words could be complete: if you list 50, savvy political

actors will find 100 more. For example, many so-called “issue

ads” run by parties and interest groups just before an election

attack a candidate, then end by supposedly urging the viewer to

“tell” or “ask” the candidate to stop being that way. These ads

are almost never really about issues. They are almost always

election ads, designed to affect the election result, and many do

affect the election result. You can see this most clearly in the

ones that amount to personal attacks, or that criticize a candidate

on several unrelated “issues.” In fact, in my experience,

candidates tend to shy away from such negative attack ads

because there would be political repercussions for them. But

entities like the DCCC [Democratic Congressional Campaign

Committee] and the Club for Growth do not have such

constraints. Based on my observations, the candidate ads in the

2000 Congressional race, which were financed with federal

funds (“hard money”), were actually more about “issues” than

the supposed “issue ads” run by political parties and interest

groups, which I understand were financed at least in part with

non-federal funds(“soft money”).

Beckett Decl. ¶ 8 [DEV 6-Tab 3].

Democrat Political Operative Joe Lamson

Based on my experience in managing many federal election
83 Metaksa served as Chairman of the National Rifle Association Political Victory

Fund and as Executive Director of the NRA Institute for Legislative Action. She made the

statement above in her opening remarks to the American Association of Political

Consultants’ Fifth General Session on “Issue Advocacy.” INT 015987, Opening Remarks

at the American Ass’n of Political Consultants Fifth General Session on “Issue Advocacy,”

Jan. 17, 1997, at 2 [DEV 38-Tab 25]. During this litigation, NRA Executive Vice President

Wayne LaPierre testified that Ms. Metaksa is “someone who was knowledgeable about

NRA’s political strategies” and was someone who was “a reliable and trustworthy employee

of NRA.” LaPierre Dep. at 11 [JDT Vol. 14]. Plaintiffs have not objected to Ms. Metaksa’s

statement on hearsay grounds and given Mr. LaPierre’s comments, I find Ms. Metaksa’s

statement trustworthy and rely on it for purposes of my Findings.

234

campaigns, I am familiar with campaign advertising. No

particular words of advocacy are needed in order for an

advertisement to influence the outcome of an election. When

political parties and interest groups run “issue ads” just before

an election that say “call” a candidate and tell her to do

something, their real purpose is typically not to enlighten the

voters about some issue, but to influence the result of the

election, and these ads often do have that effect. Parties and

groups generally run these pre-election “issue ads” only in

places where the races are competitive. These “issue ads”

generally stop on the day of the election. For example, these

groups could run ads explaining Nancy Keenan’s position on the

issues after the November general election so that people could

discuss them over the Thanksgiving dinner table, but it doesn’t

seem to work that way.

Lamson Decl. ¶ 6 [DEV 7-Tab 26].

Former Chair of Plaintiff NRA Political Victory Fund Tanya K. Metaksa83

Today, there is erected a legal, regulatory wall between issue

advocacy and political advocacy. And the wall is built of the

same sturdy material as the emperor’s clothing.

Everyone sees it. No one believes it. It is foolish to believe

there is any practical difference between issue advocacy and

advocacy of a political candidate. What separates issue

advocacy and political advocacy is a line in the sand drawn on
235

a windy day.

We engaged in issue advocacy in many locations around the

country. Take Bloomington, Indiana, for example. Billboards

in that city read, 

“Congressman Hostettler is right.”

“Gun laws don’t take criminals off Bloomington’s streets.”

“Call 334-1111 and thank him for fighting crime by getting

tough on criminals.”

Guess what? We really hoped people would vote for the

Congressman, not just thank him. And people did. When we’re

three months away from an election, there’s not a dime’s worth

of difference between “thanking” elected officials and

“electing” them.

INT 015987, Opening Remarks at the American Ass’n of Political Consultants

Fifth General Session on “Issue Advocacy,” Jan. 17, 1997, at 2 [DEV 38-Tab

25].

2.4.4 As a result of these developments, Congress found that FECA, as construed

by the Courts to limit only independent expenditures containing Buckleydefined express advocacy, was no longer relevant to modern political

advertising. See, e.g., 148 Cong. Rec. S2117 (2002) (Statement of Sen. James

Jeffords) (“The ‘magic words’ standard created by the Supreme Court in 1976

has been made useless by the political realities of modern political advertising.

Even in candidate advertisements, what many would say are clearly

advertisements made to convince a voter to support a particular candidate, only

10 percent of the advertisements used the ‘magic words.’”); see also 148

Cong. Rec. S2116 (2002) (Statement of Sen. Carl Levin) (“[T]he Brennan
236

Center study found that of the ads actually run by candidates and paid for with

hard money specifically on behalf of their election or defeat, only 9 percent

used the seven magic words and phrases identified by the Supreme Court.

That is compelling evidence that the magic words identified by the Supreme

Court are not a complete test of what constitutes electioneering ads. More is

at work here than just the seven magic words identified by the Supreme

Court.”).

2.5 Candidate-Centered Issue Advocacy Has Risen Because it Permits Corporations

& Labor Unions to Influence Federal Elections with General Treasury Funds

While Avoiding FECA’s Restrictions

It is uncontroverted that the shift toward using issue advocacy can be explained by

three phenomena. “First, it permits groups and individuals to avoid disclosure.

Second, it allows them to avoid contribution limits. Third, it permits some groups

(such as corporations and labor unions) to spend from generally prohibited sources.”

Magleby Report at 18 [DEV 4-Tab 8]; see also Krasno and Sorauf Expert Report at

50 [DEV 1-Tab 2] (Avoiding FECA allows advertisers to collect any sum of money

from any source they can. Avoiding FECA allows advertisers to conduct their

operations without disclosing their activities to the public.”).

2.5.1 Avoid Disclosure

It is not disputed that one advantage to using candidate-centered issue

advertising to influence federal elections is that the advertisements are outside
237

FECA’s purview. Accordingly, disclosure is not required for the organization

paying for these advertisements. Magleby Expert Report at 18 [DEV 4-Tab

8] (“The 1996, 1998 and 2000 election cycles all saw examples of groups who

sought to avoid accountability for their communications by pursuing an

electioneering advertising/election advocacy strategy rather than limiting their

activities to independent expenditures or other activities expressly permitted

by the FECA.”). Indeed, Plaintiffs’ expert Sidney M. Milkis notes:

It is important to point out, however, that interest groups have

also increased their political advertisements that connect, indeed

subordinate the discussion of issues to electioneering, much of

it negative in tone. As an Annenberg Public Policy Center study

indicates, the ads of special interest groups represented 68% of

all spending on issue ads in the 1999-2000 cycle; interest groups

spent more than $347 million on these issue advertisements.

The names of these groups did little to tell viewers who the

sponsors of these messages were; indeed, in some cases they

were misleading. For example, The Citizens for Better

Medicare, which spent $65 million on television ads, is funded

primarily by the pharmaceutical industry. Not only were the

funding sources of interest groups ads more misleading than

party-sponsored ads, they also tended to be more negative,

especially in the early stages of the 2000 campaign.

Milkis Decl. ¶ 49 [RNC Vol. VII] (citing Annenberg Report 2001). Aside

from the observation of Plaintiffs’ expert Milkis about the lack of disclosure

relating to political advertisements, two further examples illustrate this point:

• In 1998, the AFL-CIO helped pay for ads in the Connecticut

Fifth Congressional District race through a group named the

“Coalition to Make Our Voices Heard.” Steven Rosenthal

defended campaigning under an obscure name in this case
238

saying, “Frankly we’ve taken a page out of their book [other

interest groups] because in some places it’s much more effective

to run an ad by the ‘Coalition to Make Our Voices Heard’ than

it is to say paid for by ‘the men and women of the AFL-CIO.’”

Magleby Expert Report at 18-19 [DEV 4-Tab 8] (citing Rosenthal’s comments

at a lunchtime discussion panel at the Pew Press Conference).

• One or more sources of the funds used by Plaintiff NRA to

finance at least one political advertisement that identified a

candidate and that was broadcast on television or radio within

the 60 days preceding a general election in a state or

Congressional district in which that candidate was running for

federal office has not been publicly disclosed. 

Resps. of the NRA and the NRA Political Victory Fund to Def. FEC’s First

Req. for Admis., No. 12, 5 [DEV 12-Tab 9] (“The NRA is not required under

applicable law to disclose the specific individuals who provide it with funding,

and it respects the strong desire of many of its members and contributors to

remain anonymous.”).

2.5.2 Avoid Source Limitations

Federal law has long prohibited corporations and labor unions from using their

general treasury funds for federal election purposes. Therefore, another

advantage to candidate-centered issue advertising is that the advertisements

can be paid for with general treasury funds and thereby avoid FECA’s source

restrictions. Magleby Expert Report at 19 [DEV 4-Tab 8] (“The ability of

corporations and trade unions to effectively campaign through electioneering
239

advertisements and election advocacy” under the rubric of issue advocacy by

avoiding the magic words, “makes a sham of these longstanding federal

laws.”).

2.5.3 Avoid Contribution Limitations

As donations of nonfederal funds are not limited by federal law, “groups can

raise larger amounts of money in less time.” Magleby Expert Report at 19

[DEV 4-Tab 8] (For example, “groups like Citizens for Better Medicare,

Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, NAACP National

Voter Fund, and NARAL, were able to far exceed what individuals, PACs or

parties could do through hard money contributions.”); id. at 10 (“[T]his

method of advocacy allows groups to accept unlimited contributions to pay for

the communications.”). This fact provides another advantage of using

candidate-centered issue advocacy.

2.6 Organizations’ Use of Candidate-Centered Issue Advocacy

Examples from the record demonstrate that organizations use candidate-centered issue

advertising as a means of avoiding FECA’s restrictions.

2.6.1 AFL-CIO’s Issue Advocacy Media Campaign Surrounding the 1996 Federal

Election

The evidence demonstrates that the AFL-CIO’s issue advertising campaign in

and around the 1996 federal general election was designed to influence the

election and was paid for with general treasury funds.
84 Denise Mitchell is the Special Assistant for Public Affairs to AFL-CIO President

John J. Sweeney. Mitchell Decl. ¶ 1 [6 PCS]. She was appointed to this position on

November 1, 1995, shortly after Sweeney was elected President of the AFL-CIO. Id. Prior

to assuming this position, Mitchell had worked with Sweeney in a similar role for a number

of years when he was President of the Service Employees International Union and she had

assisted in his campaign for election to the position of AFL-CIO President. Id. Mitchell has

worked in marketing and media relations for unions and other non-profit organizations on

working family issues for more than 20 years. Id. In her current position, Mitchell has the

primary responsibility for overseeing all public relations activities of the AFL-CIO including

all AFL-ClO use of broadcast and print media. Id. ¶ 2. Mitchell is responsible for making

the operational decisions as to both the substance and the method of communication of the

AFL-CIO’s message to union members and to the general public. Id. Mitchell makes the

strategic and logistical decisions regarding the AFL-CIO’s media buys, and, within policy

guidelines, makes the editorial decisions regarding the content of the AFL-CIO’s

communications.

240

2.6.1.1 Denise Mitchell,84 Special Assistant for Public Affairs to AFL-CIO President

John J. Sweeney, states that she “realize[s] that AFL-CIO advertising could

affect how citizens vote. . . . [T]hey may in some cases have an indirect effect

on election outcomes. . . . This, however, has never been the point of our

broadcast advertising program. . . .” Mitchell’s statement is controverted by

evidence from the record that the AFL-CIO did not attempt to rebut or

discount:

• A September 18, 1996, memorandum from a polling firm

analyzed the potential impact of five issue advertisements in

terms of their likely effect on voters. Memorandum from Guy

Molyneux and Molly O’Rourke of the polling firm Peter D. Hart

Research Associates, Inc., to the AFL-CIO’s Special Assistant

for Public Affairs, Denise Mitchell, “Ad Targeting” (Sept. 18,

1996), AFL-CIO 001614–16 [DEV 124] (“[The advertisement]
241

Taxes appears to be the single strongest spot, in terms of

reaching the widest range of voters and affecting people’s

impression of the incumbent’s Issue position. It should

especially be directed to younger voters. [The advertisement]

Kids is also very strong, and again should be directed to young

people. [The advertisements] Medicare, Homes, and Retire are

most effective with older audiences. If you can only run 4 spots,

[the advertisement] Retire is probably the one to drop.”)

(emphasis added); see also Memorandum from Geoff Garin and

Guy Molyneux of Peter D. Hart Research Associates, Inc. to

Denise Mitchell, “AFL-CIO Mall Intercepts Survey” (Sept. 13,

1996), AFL-CIO 001582-84 [DEV 124] (Mall Intercept Survey

of individuals’ reactions to these advertisements including how

the advertisements made the respondents feel about fictitious

congressman’s position on each issue); see also Mitchell Cross

Exam. at 66-75 [JDT Vol. 23].

• On March 29, 1996, Mitchell received a memorandum from a

campaign consultant analyzing political media consultants for

the AFL-CIO. The memorandum stated:

Political campaigns are superheated environments where

the objective is not, always, to make the best looking

spot. The objective is to communicate with the

persuadables at the time they are making their decision.

Being able to pivot the entire campaign at exactly the

right time is the real talent of a media consulting firm.

Consequently, there is little reward for great spots.

No one knows better than you how consuming this can

be. . . . 

[These advertisements can be done], but you must

understand that you will be asking these political

consultants to do it under rules they have never had to

follow before. . . .

What [all of these firms can do] is manage the political

message in a volatile environment.

Memorandum from Joe Cowart of Joseph Cowart Campaign

Consulting to Denise Mitchell, “Political Media Consultants”

(Mar. 29, 1996), AFL-CIO 001702–04 [DEV 124].
242

• An October 9, 1996, internal memorandum from the AFL-CIO’s

Brian Weeks to AFL-CIO’s Mike Klein discussed where media

buys might be placed to help Dick Durbin in his Illinois Senate

race, based on Mr. Durbin’s lack of resources to air

advertisements in certain markets. Memorandum from Brian

Weeks to Mike Klein, “Electronic Buy for Illinois Senator”

(Oct. 9, 1996), AFL-CIO 005244 [DEV 125].

Accordingly, with regard to the AFL-CIO’s issue advertising campaign that

aired before the 1996 general election, I find that Mitchell’s statement that the

indirect effect on election outcomes has never been the point of the AFLCIO’s broadcast advertising program, Mitchell Decl. ¶ 70 [6 PCS], carries no

weight in light of these internal documents. 

2.6.1.2 It is clear that the AFL-CIO’s issue advocacy campaign was designed to

influence the 1996 general election and was accomplished through candidatecentered issue advocacy so as to avoid FECA’s source limitations.

Independent expert testimony, which has not be countered by the AFL-CIO

with any contrary expert testimony, demonstrates that the AFL-CIO’s 1996

issue advocacy campaign was designed to influence federal elections:

The 1996 initiative by labor into unregulated and unlimited

electioneering communications was substantial. The AFL-CIO

spent a reported $35 million dollars (see Deborah Beck, Paul

Taylor, Jeffrey Stanger, and Douglas Rivlin, “Issue Advocacy

Advertising During the 1996 Campaign: A Catalog,” report

series by the Annenberg Public Policy Center, no. 16, 16

September 1997, 10), much of it on television, aimed at

defeating 105 members of Congress, including 32 heavily

targeted Republican freshmen. See Paul Herrnson,

Congressional Elections: Campaigning at Home and in
243

Washington, (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly,

1998), 123. Labor broadcast television commercials in forty

districts, distributed over 11.5 million voter guides in

twenty-four districts and ran radio ads in many others. See

“Labor Targets,” Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 26

October 1996, 3084; Jeanne I. Dugan, “Washington Ain’t Seen

Nothin’ Yet,” Business Week Report, 13 May 1996, 3.

Magleby Expert Report at 10 n.7 [DEV 4-Tab 8] (citation omitted); Mann

Expert Report at 28 [DEV 1-Tab 1] (“The AFL-CIO was one of the first

nonparty groups in 1996 to seize the opportunity to broadcast electioneering

ads under the guise of issue advocacy (Dwyre 1999); they continue to avail

themselves of that opportunity today (Magleby 2002).”); Krasno and Sorauf

Expert Report at 52 [DEV 1-Tab 2] (“For example, the AFL-CIO in the first

issue ad campaign in House elections in 1996 acknowledged its intent to help

Democratic candidates, and its results were measured accordingly.”) (footnote

omitted); see also Mitchell Dep. at 96-97 [JDT Vol. 23] (stating that in 1996,

in the 60 days before the election, in terms of dollars spent by the AFL-CIO

on broadcast advertising, the substantial majority of that money was spent on

advertisements that mentioned members of the House of Representatives). 

2.6.1.3 In fact, Mitchell admits that some of the AFL-CIO’s advertisements were

intended to directly or indirectly influence the 1996 general election. Mitchell

testifies that after Congress adjourned on October 3, 1996, the AFL-CIO

discontinued its broadcast advertisements “aimed at immediately pending
244

legislative issues.” Mitchell Decl. ¶ 42 [6 PCS]. The AFL-CIO then began to

run “electronic voter guides” which compared the positions of congressional

candidates on various issues. Id.; Mitchell Cross Exam. at 183-84 [JDT Vol.

23] (“Is there any ad which the AFL-CIO ran in the 60-day period prior to the

federal elections of 2000, 1998 and 1996 where you concede that a purpose

was to affect the vote in the forthcoming election? . . . A Well, would you

include indirectly affect? Do you want to ask it that way? Q I will start with

that way. A Okay. You know, certainly the voter guides in particular had

that as a purpose.”); see also id. at 184 (“Q You do concede that the ads that

you ran in the 60 days prior to 2000, 1998 and ‘96 might have had the effect

of influencing votes in the forthcoming election, don’t you? A I don’t -- right,

I don’t deny that among other things they might have had an effect on how

citizens perceived office holders and had an effect on their vote.”).

2.6.1.4 In an FEC investigation into organized labor’s role in the 1996 election, the

General Counsel found:

In the nine flights broadcast between late June and

mid-September, 1996, the advertisements would criticize the

incumbent member of Congress named therein, frequently in

harsh terms, about his or her record on the issue that was the

subject of the advertisement. However, with the exception of a

flight of advertisements on the topic of the minimum wage that

aired in late June and early July, 1996, there was no clear

connection between the content of the advertisements and any

legislation that was then the subject of intensive legislative

action at the time of the advertisements. The targets of these
245

advertisements were uniformly both Republicans and

incumbents. In the eight flights that began in late September

and continued through election day, the advertisements took the

form of so-called “electronic voter guides,” comparing the

Republican incumbent and the Democratic challenger (or the

Republican and Democratic nominees, in the cases of open

seats) on a particular issue; the Democratic candidate’s record

was uniformly presented more favorably than the Republican

candidate’s. The scripts of both kinds of advertisements

appeared to have been carefully designed to avoid “express

advocacy” of the election or defeat of any candidate. . . .

FEC MUR 4291, General Counsel’s Report, June 9, 2000, at 5-6, INT003837-

38 (footnote omitted) [DEV 52-Tab 3]. The investigation into the AFL-CIO’s

tactics sought to ascertain whether AFL-CIO had coordinated election-related

communications with candidates for Federal office, their campaigns, or with

political parties. Id. at 1. The investigation “developed no evidence of any

instance in which the AFL-CIO made any communication to the general public

after coordination with a recipient candidate or party committee that meets the

standard for coordination set forth in FEC v. The Christian Coalition, 52 F.

Supp. 2d 45 (D.D.C. 1999).” Id. at 3. As a result of this conclusion, the

General Counsel recommended to the Commission that the investigation into

organized labor’s role in the 1996 elections be closed. Id. at 1. Although the

FEC concluded that there was no coordination under governing caselaw, the

agency did find that with one exception the issue advertisements were directed

at particular officeholders and candidates during the election cycle.
246

2.6.1.5 Other political organizations viewed the AFL-CIO’s issue advertising

campaign as designed to influence federal elections. One of the complaints

filed with the FEC against the AFL-CIO was brought by the National

Republican Congressional Committee (“NRCC”). McCain Decl., Attach. F

[DEV 8-Tab 29] (Complaint in MUR 4307). The NRCC stated in their

complaint:

The [AFL-CIO] TV ads are careful not to specifically violate

phrases contained in Sec. 100.22(a) such as “vote against Old

Hickory” or “defeat accompanied by a picture of one or more

candidate/s/” or “reject the incumbent”. However there is

clearly a violation of Sec. 100.22(b). If one reads the language

of that section and looks at the entire picture including external

events it is obvious that any informed American clearly knows

that the purpose of these ads is “expressly advocating” defeat

of the Republican who is the subject of the ad.

Id. at 1 (emphasis added). 

2.6.1.6 The AFL-CIO has presented no uncontroverted evidence to substantiate their

claim that the intended purpose of their issue advocacy with regard to the 1996

general election was unrelated to electing or defeating candidates for federal

office. The AFL-CIO does concede, in fact, that its issue advocacy does have

an affect on voters during the election cycle. Moreover, there is no dispute

that the AFL-CIO’s advertising campaign did affect the 1996 general election.

Of the 32 House Republican freshmen the AFL-CIO targeted in 1996, 12 were

defeated. Annenberg Report 1997 at 13 [DEV 38-Tab 21].
247

2.6.2 The Coalition–Americans Working for Real Change’s Issue Advocacy Media

Campaign Surrounding the 1996 Federal Election

The evidence demonstrates that similar to the AFL-CIO’s issue advertising

campaign during the 1996 election cycle, business interests (known as The

Coalition–Americans Working for Real Change) responded with their own

issue advocacy campaign designed to influence the election and paid for with

corporate general treasury funds thereby permitting these corporations to evade

FECA’s source limitations. The record also demonstrates that by running

candidate-centered issue advertisements The Coalition was able to avoid

FECA’s disclosure requirements and hide its corporate sponsors behind an

ambiguous and unobjectionable pseudonym. 

2.6.2.1 In their proposed findings, the Chamber of Commerce, NAM, and the

Associated Builders and Contractors claim that “Defendants’ assertion that

The Coalition’s 1996 activities show that preelection issue ads are merely

candidate ads in disguise is mistaken. Participants in The Coalition were

unanimous that its ads were intended to respond to issue ads being run by the

AFL-CIO.” Proposed Findings of Fact of Chamber, NAM, Associated

Builders and Contractors, et. al. ¶ 24. Bruce Josten, Executive Vice President

for Government Affairs for the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, testifies that the

purpose of the advertisements aired during the 1996 federal election was to

respond to attack advertisements paid for by the AFL-CIO and organized by
248

its president, Mr. John Sweeney, and not to influence the election of any

federal candidate. Josten Dep. at 165 [JDT Vol. 12] (“The purpose of this

coalition, specifically, only, uniquely was to respond to [John Sweeney’s] ads

and the false statements in them, in some cases, up to 75 Congressional

districts. That was the mission of this coalition.”). Mr. Josten explained that

there “were TV markets where John Sweeney ran an ad accusing a member of

Congress about their votes on the issues that I mentioned earlier, and in the

spring he started running ads that were not true, and we would follow him”

with television ads paid for by the Coalition. Id. at 44. According to Mr.

Josten, the AFL-CIO commercials attacked Members of Congress who had

supported pro-business initiatives and legislation favored by the Coalition.

“My objective was to knock down impressions that Mr. Sweeney and his

advertisers and campaigns were trying to undertake and express our viewpoints

exactly the opposite of that and let the viewers make their own decision about

that dialogue that was being imposed on them.” Id. at 88. 

2.6.2.2 Josten’s testimony is controverted by specific evidence in the record that

indicates that one purpose of the advertising campaign was to influence the

1996 general election:

• In 1996, the Coalition sought proposals from advertising firms for a

“campaign to re-elect a pro-business Congress.” TC00698 [DEV 121].

Media consultant Alex Castellanos of National Media, Inc. opened his

proposal to the Coalition by stating: “Thank you for the opportunity to
249

present two 30 second television and one 60 second radio scripts, as

requested, to your campaign to re-elect a pro-business Congress.” Id.

• The Coalition commissioned firms to conduct polls and focus groups

to measure voter responses to their advertisements. AV0024-40,

0046-47, 0060-64, 0106-118, 0139-41 [DEV 121]. The Coalition

retained two polling organizations in 1996, the Tarrance Group and

American Viewpoint, to test whether specific Coalition and AFL-CIO

advertisements would make participants more or less likely to vote for

particular federal candidates. FEC MUR No. 4624, General Counsel’s

Report, April 20, 2001, at 22-23 [DEV 53-Tab 6]; Josten Dep. at

68-114 [JDT Vol. 12]. One firm surveyed “voter attitudes nationwide,”

TC 00513-37 [DEV 121], and another survey tested possible Coalition

ads on focus groups, including one of “Swing Voters.” AV0139-41,

AV0037-40 [DEV 121].

• A June 28, 1996, Tarrance Group memorandum to the Coalition stated:

“The net result among swing voters in Cleveland was that 25% of

participants were moved closer to voting for a Republican candidate for

Congress and about half of the participants were moved against

national labor leaders. In other words, the response ads not only

leveled the playing field, but put some points on the board for

Republican candidates as well.” AV139 [DEV 121] (stating that

Republican Members of Congress are “currently under attack by

AFL-CIO advertising” and are “outgunned and outclassed” and if

“targeted Republicans ever hope to be operating on an even playing

field during the 1996 election, it will require that an outside voice come

to their defense.”).

• A July 12, 1996, memorandum to the Coalition from American

Viewpoint on “Key Findings of the Pre-Test in Des Moines Media

Market of Iowa 4” concludes that Congressman “Greg Ganske is in

deep trouble in the Des Moines Market,” and states that “this is one of

the most challenging districts that could have been chosen to assess the

impact of your advertising. . . . If advertising can move numbers in this

district, it should be effective in most other districts. Voters have not

yet focused on the union’s campaign as only 25% has seen the

commercials. As a result, there is still time to reach them with a

substantial buy.” Memorandum from Gary Ferguson to the Coalition

Steering Committee, “Key Findings of the Pre-Test in the Des Moines
250

Market of Iowa 4” (July 12, 1996), NAW0002, 05 [DEV 121].

• One Coalition document included five headings referring to 1996

Congressional races: “Lean/Tilt DEM,” “Toss-Up/Tilt GOP,” “Lean

GOP,” “GOP Favored,” and “Watch List.” TC-00662-63 [DEV 121].

Under each heading is a list of candidates, and next to the names an

indication of whether there has been a single or double media buy, or

whether the buy has been pulled. Id.

• In late 1996, the Coalition commissioned the Tarrance Group to

conduct a detailed post-election analysis. The Tarrance Group,

Coalition Post-Election Survey Analysis, NAM0206-27, at NAM0213

[DEV 121]. The Tarrance Group reported:

The Coalition commissioned this research to assess the

impact of their two-month advertising campaign and its

relative effect on voters in the face of the very

aggressive, year-long campaign sponsored by the

AFL-CIO. Given that four of the six Republican

candidates tested in this research won their respective

races, one could conclude that the Coalition’s efforts

were a success–as they were in the vast majority of the

targeted districts in which the Coalition was involved. 

To be sure, the most compelling empirical evidence that

Coalition dollars were spent effectively is the fact that

although the AFL-CIO outspent the Coalition by nearly

7 to 1 and began their onslaught almost a year earlier,

voters in the tested districts were only twice as likely

(36% average) to recall having seen, read, or heard the

labor union’s advertising as they were the business

coalition’s advertising (16% average).

Memorandum from Brian Tringali and Gary Ferguson of

American Viewpoint and the Tarrance Group to Chuck

Greener of the Coalition, “Key Findings from

Post-Election Surveys in OH-6, IA-4, WA-1, WA-5,

WA-9, and KY-1,” (November 22, 1996), NAM0208

[DEV 121]; see also “Report on Accomplishments”

TC00610-13 [DEV 121] (document Coalition sent to its
251

members noting the successes of the Coalition’s

campaign among swing voters).

Accordingly, as to The Coalition’s issue advertising campaign that aired

before the 1996 general election, I find that Josten’s statement that the purpose

of the coalition was “only” to respond to the advertising campaign of the AFLCIO, Josten Dep. at 165 [JDT Vol. 12], carries no weight in light of these

internal documents. 

2.6.2.3 It is clear that The Coalition’s issue advocacy campaign was designed to

influence the 1996 general election and was accomplished through candidatecentered issue advocacy so as to avoid FECA’s source and disclosure

limitations. Independent evidence confirms that The Coalition’s issue

advertising campaign surrounding the 1996 general election was designed to

influence the election. This expert testimony, which has not been controverted

by any contrary expert testimony by Plaintiffs, concludes that:

The business community responded to [the 1996 initiative by

labor into unregulated and unlimited electioneering

communications] with their own unlimited and undisclosed

communications, again avoiding any of the magic words.

Partners in the business response were the National Federation

of Independent Business (NFIB), U.S. Chamber of Commerce,

the National Association of Wholesaler-Distributors, the

National Restaurant Association and the National Association

o f M anufacturers. Their group, called th e

“Coalition–Americans Working for Real Change,” was active in

thirty-seven House races, spent an estimated $5 million on over

thirteen thousand television and radio commercials, and mailed

over two million letters mainly in support of Republicans, to
252

owners of small business. See Paul Herrnson, “Parties and

Interest Groups in Postreform Congressional Elections,” in

Interest Group Politics, 5th ed., ed. Allan Cigler and Burdett A.

Loomis (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 1998),

160-61. 

Magleby Report at 10 n.7 [DEV 4-Tab 8]; see also Josten Dep. at 29 [JDT

Vol. 12]; Huard Dep. at 58 [JDT Vol. 11] (both noting that Coalition spent

roughly $5 million on the campaign). 

2.6.2.4 The FEC likewise concluded that the purpose of the Coalition’s 1996 issue 

advocacy campaign was to influence the federal election. FEC MUR No.

4624, General Counsel’s Report, April 20, 2001, at FEC MUR 4624, General

Counsel’s Rep., April 20, 2001, at 35 [DEV 53-Tab 6] (“The facts set out

above establish that the Coalition’s communications were undertaken for the

purpose of influencing federal elections . . . .”); id. at 44-45 (recommending

that the case against the Coalition be closed). Like the AFL-CIO, although the

FEC recommended that the case be closed, that decision does not change the

fact that it found that the Coalition sought to influence the 1996 general

election with its issue advertising campaign.

2.6.3 Citizens for Better Medicare

Citizens for Better Medicare (“CBM”) is an organization funded by the

pharmaceutical industry that spent heavily on candidate-centered issue

advertisements designed to influence the 2000 general election and paid for
253

with the general treasury funds of their corporate members, thereby avoiding

the source limitations of FECA. Like The Coalition, CBM also used issue

advocacy to avoid FECA’s disclosure requirements.

2.6.3.1 Timothy Ryan, former executive director of CBM, testifies that CBM is an 

organization sponsored by PhRMA, an industry trade association, and its

activities were primarily financed by major drug companies. Ryan Dep. at 13

[JDT Vol. 27] (“We solicited funding from the pharmaceutical companies to

underwrite our efforts.”); id. at 10-11 (“PHRMA was really the leading

organization to organize and fund CBM.”); PH 0379 [DEV 128-Tab 2] (Letter

from PhRMA President and CEO to Amgen, “enclosing a contribution form

for the grassroots and local media activities of CBM . . . . All information in

your reply will be kept in strict confidence except as required by law or a court

of competent jurisdiction.”); CBM 0029 [DEV 128-Tab 1] (tally of donations

from major drug companies to CBM in FY 2001, totaling $39,586,892.32).

Despite the source of its funding, CBM describes itself as “a grassroots

organization representing the interests of patients, seniors, disabled Americans,

small businesses, pharmaceutical research companies and many others

concerned with Medicare reform.” CBM: Who We Are . . . [DEV 128-Tab 1].

Given that it is undisputed that the pharmaceutical industry financed CBM,

CBM stands as an example of how FECA’s disclosure requirements can be
254

avoided by running candidate-centered issue advertisements behind a

misleading name like “Citizens for Better Medicare.”

2.6.3.2 At the point in time the House of Representatives was considering a prescription drug benefit bill, Ryan testifies that CBM ran a series of advertisements

that did not refer specifically to individual Members of Congress. Ryan Dep.

at 42 [JDT Vol. 27]; see also Castellanos Dep. at 103-04 [JDT Vol. 4]. This

practice changed during the 60 days before the election where CBM’s

advertising focused on specific federal candidates. See supra Findings ¶

2.6.3.3.

2.6.3.3 Judith Bello, senior adviser to PhRMA, states that PhRMA supported a

market-oriented approach to prescription drug coverage, and Republicans

typically endorsed that type of plan. Bello Dep. at 149-50 [JDT Vol. 1]. Alex

Castellanos, a political consultant with National Media, testifies that CBM

understood that the Democrats planned to use the prescription drug issue as a

major theme in the 2000 election. Castellanos Dep. at 94–95. In response, in

the 60 days prior to the 2000 general election, CBM and the U.S. Chamber of

Commerce spent heavily on “issue ads” supporting those Members and

attacking Democratic candidates. Annenberg Report 2001 at 4, 20-22 [DEV

38-Tab 22]. Castellanos states that these advertisements mentioned Members’

names. Castellanos Dep. at 63–66 [JDT Vol. 4]; see also Ryan Dep. at 68–72,
255

79–85 [JDT Vol. 27]; Josten Dep. at 191–97 [JDT Vol. 12]; Bloom Decl. ¶¶

6, 14, 16 [DEV 6-Tab 7]; Mitchell Dep. at 198–204 [JDT Vol. 23]; USA-CBM

00004 [DEV 128-Tab 1] (October 20, 2000, Memorandum to CBM file

outlining “CBM Campaign Summary”) (noting that for Fall 2000 the

advertising theme was “Keep it Local” and discussing advertising strategy

“[a]s the November 2000 elections grew closer”).

2.6.3.4 According to Timothy Ryan, much of CBM’s advertising strategy leading up

to the 2000 election was aimed at supporting candidates attacked in AFL-CIO

advertising. Ryan Dep. at 68-72 [JDT Vol. 27]; Castellanos Dep. at 63-66

[JDT Vol. 4]. CBM spent about $65 million on television advertising in the

2000 election cycle. Ryan Dep at 15 [JDT Vol. 27]. “Citizens for Better

Medicare . . . spent almost as much money on issue ads as either political

party,” accounting for 13 percent of issue ad spending for the 1999-2000 cycle.

La Raja Decl. ¶ 20(b) & Tbl. 10 [RNC Vol. VII] (reproduced from the

Annenberg Public Policy Center).

2.6.3.5 The issue advocacy campaign of CBM run in the 60 days prior to the 2000

federal election demonstratesthat these advertisements were designed to influence the

federal election and evade FECA’s source restrictions. This example also illustrates

how organizations are able to use campaign-centered issue advocacy to avoid FECA’s

disclosure limitations and hide their identities behind euphemistic organizational
256

names.

2.6.4 The National Rifle Association

In addition to the AFL-CIO, The Coalition, and CBM, the National Rifle

Association's (“NRA”) use of issue advocacy around the 2000 federal election

also clearly establishes that corporations use issue advocacy to directly

influence federal elections and evade FECA’s source limitations.

2.6.4.1 The NRA used issue advocacy to influence the 2000 federal election.

Documentary evidence demonstrates this point:

• The NRA’s media consultant, Angus McQueen, wrote an August 2000

memo entitled “NRA National Election Media Recommendations.” The

memo notes that the NRA’s first objective is to “influence [the]

outcome of [the] presidential election and other key congressional seats

in 10 ‘battle ground’ states.” McQueen Cross Exam., Ex. 2,

NRA-ACK 17913-15 [JDT Vol. 22]. McQueen is an advertising

professional whom the NRA produced to testify specifically about the

NRA’s paid media program. See generally McQueen Decl. [11 PCS].

• Executive Vice President of the NRA, Wayne LaPierre, sent out a

fundraising letter from the NRA to its members that stated that he

“spent what it took [in 2000] to defeat Al Gore, which amounted to

millions more than we had on hand.” LaPierre Dep. Ex. 3 at 3

(NRA02575 [DEV 120]) [JDT Vol. 14]. LaPierre testified: “We took

some money out of the reserves to cover the deficit that NRA had at the

end of the 2000 year. . . . [The Gore advertising] was probably . . . the

main contributing factor.” LaPierre Dep. at 105 [JDT Vol. 14]. 

• The fundraising letter from LaPierre also stated that “I could choose to

spend as much as the NRA possibly could, to get our message to

gun-owning voters in critical swing states -- or I could hold funds in

reserve for battles during 2001 and beyond.” LaPierre Dep. Ex. 3 at 3

(NRA02575 [DEV 120]) [JDT Vol. 14]; see also LaPierre Dep. at 95-

106 [JDT Vol. 14] (observing that the NRA spent $5 million to defeat
257

Al Gore). During his deposition, Mr. LaPierre was asked repeatedly if

he had “spent what it took to defeat Al Gore.” Id. at 95-102. Mr.

LaPierre admitted that the statement was truthful, id. at 102, but sought

to characterize it as about more than the Presidential election, id. at

101-02 (“Q. Is it true that regular NRA “spent what it took to defeat Al

Gore”? A. If you include the culture of the country, yes. Al Gore was

trying to change the culture of the country. We prevented him from

doing it. That was the battle. It wasn’t only an election battle. All

these politicians think of this stuff only in election terms. And it’s

like–it’s like they’re 30 years out of date. The fact is this is about the

air. It’s about the airwaves. It’s about the hearts and minds of

America. And that’s where the battle is being fought. And they’re not

willing to concede that. Yet we live it every day. So I’m not willing to

concede the point that this was only about the elections, because the

elections were about the air. And the air is what we were fighting for,

that people breathe. We didn’t want it to be only anti-firearm second

amendment air, which is what they were trying to put out there.”).

• LaPierre also testifies that he chose to do as much as he could for

critical swing voters in swing states, meaning battleground states with

respect to the Presidency, and in what were perceived to be close

Congressional races. LaPierre Dep. at 157-58 [JDT Vol. 14]; see also

id. at 159-165, 220-21. 

2.6.4.2 The NRA created an advertising campaign in which “infomercials” would be

run from September 1, 2000 to November 6, 2000. Two of the NRA’s

objectives were to “influence political elections where Republican seats are

jeopardized” and “increase awareness of key gun issues as the Presidential

election approaches.” Memorandum from Jay Finks of the NRA’s media firm

Ackerman-McQueen to Melanie Hill of the NRA, “NRA Infomercial Fall

Focus Campaign,” June 5, 2000, NRA-PVF 00429-00432, at NRA-PVF 00429

[DEV 120].
258

2.6.4.3 Wayne LaPierre also testifies that the NRA “hoped [an NRA infomercial

critical of Presidential candidate Al Gore] would impact the election.”

LaPierre Dep. at 177 [JDT Vol. 14]. When asked if the advertisement was

designed in part to persuade viewers that they ought to vote against Gore,

LaPierre testified: “We’re happy if it did that. And, yeah, we’re thrilled if it

did that.” Id. at 174-75. LaPierre thought that the Gore infomercials would

have a “positive” political impact on the election: “Positive impact would

mean a vote . . . against Al Gore.” Id. at 277.

2.6.4.4 Not only does internal documentation and testimony from NRA officials

demonstrate that the purpose of the group's 2000 issue advocacy campaign was

to influence the federal election, the text of two radio advertisements

illustrates the point as well. Moreover, these radio advertisements demonstrate

that there is no meaningful difference between candidate-centered issue

advertisements and campaign advertisements that use Buckley’s magic words.

As the following demonstrates, at least one of the “issue ads” paid for with

funds from the NRA’s general treasury was virtually identical to express

advocacy paid for by the NRA’s PAC, with the terms of express advocacy in

the PAC advertisement simply being omitted:
259

PAC Advertisement Non-PAC Advertisement

MR HESTON: 

Did you know that right now in federal court,

Al Gore’s Justice Department is arguing that

the Second Amendment gives you no right to

own any firearm? No handgun, no rifle, no

shotgun.

And when Al Gore’s top government lawyers

make it to the U.S. Supreme Court to argue

their point, they can have three new judges

handpicked by Al Gore if he wins this

election.

Imagine . . . what would Supreme Court

Justices Hillary Clinton, Charlie Schumer,

and Dianne Feinstein do to your gun rights?

And what you think wouldn’t matter any

more. Because the Supreme Court has the

final say on what the Constitution means.

When Al Gore’s Supreme Court agrees with

Al Gore’s Justice Department and bans

private ownership of firearms, that’s the end

of your Second Amendment rights.

Please, vote freedom first. Vote George W.

Bush for President.

ANNCR: Paid for by the NRA Political

Victory Fund and not authorized by any

candidate or candidate’s committee.

NRA-ACK 14190 [DEV 120] (emphasis in

original).

HESTON: Other issues may come and go,

but no issue is as important as our

freedom. And the day of reckoning is at

hand.

Did you know that right now in federal court,

Al Gore’s Justice Department is arguing that

the Second Amendment gives you no right to

own any firearm? No handgun, no rifle, no

shotgun.

And when Al Gore’s top government lawyers

make it to the U.S. Supreme Court to argue

their point, they can have three new judges

hand-picked by Al Gore if he wins this

election.

Imagine . . . what would Supreme Court

Justices Hillary Clinton, Charlie Schumer and

Dianne Feinstein do to your gun rights?

And what you think wouldn’t matter any

more. Because the Supreme Court has the

final say on what the Constitution means.

When Al Gore’s Supreme Court agrees with

Al Gore’s Justice Department and bans

private ownership of firearms, that’s the end

of your Second Amendment rights.

ANNCR: Paid for by the National Rifle

Association.

NRA-ACK 14192 [DEV 120] (emphasis in

original).
260

NRA-ACK 14190, 14192 [DEV 120]. When confronted with these two scripts

during his cross-examination, Angus McQueen, who created these two

advertisements, admitted that one of his purposes in designing the commercials

was to influence the results of the federal election. McQueen Cross Exam. at

41 [JDT Vol. 22] (“Insofar as providing information to an informed citizenry,

the answer is a qualified yes.”). Indeed, Mr. Wayne LaPierre testifies that

these two scripts were “exactly the same.” LaPierre Dep. at 269 [JDT Vol. 14];

id. at 270-71 (observing that in the Non-PAC advertisement, Mr. Heston’s

reference to the “day of reckoning” is a reference to the 2000 federal election).

These two advertisements are emblematic of the meaningless distinction

between candidate-centered issue advocacy run in close proximity to a federal

election and advertisements that use express words of advocacy and are paid

for with federal funds from a corporate or union PAC. Accordingly, I find that

the NRA’s issue advocacy campaign paid for with general treasury funds and

run during the 2000 election was designed to influence that election and evade

FECA’s restrictions.

2.6.5 The Club for Growth

2.6.5.1 The Club for Growth provides another example of a corporation using

general treasury funds on issue advocacy designed to influence a federal

election. See CFG 000421 [DEV 130-Tab 5] (Board of Directors’ minutes)
261

[document sealed].

2.6.5.2 David Keating, The Club for Growth’s Executive Director admits that CFG’s

issue advocacy, “although educational, may also affect elections.” Keating

Decl. ¶ 8 [8 PCS]. Keating comments that “CFG has an overarching desire to

change public policy which far exceeds any desire to affect elections.” Id. It

is clear from documentary evidence and independent evidence that The Club

for Growth aims to change public policy by influencing federal elections.

2.6.5.3 The Club for Growth’s mission statement states that the Club “is primarily

dedicated to promoting the election of pro-growth, pro-freedom candidates

through political contributions and issue advocacy campaigns.” CFG 000217

[DEV 130-Tab 5].

2.6.5.4 In a brochure soliciting donations, The Club for Growth noted: “Before the

elections, the Club plans to invest $1 million in television advertising in key

congressional districts to advance our pro-growth issues. This is a tactic the

unions have used so effectively against pro-growth candidates. These issue

advocacy campaigns can make all the difference in tight races.” CFG 000223

[DEV 130-Tab 5]; cf. NRW-02814 [DEV 129-Tab 2] (January 2, 2001,

fundraising letter from the National Right to Work Committee noting that it

had run “more than 1,000 television ads in Virginia, Nevada, Florida and

Nebraska shining a spotlight on the differences between the candidates in
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those states on Right to Work”).

2.6.5.5 The testimony of political consultant Rocky Pennington, who worked for

Republican candidate Bill Sublette is that:

[i]nterest group broadcast ads had a very significant effect on

the outcome of the 2000 Congressional race [in Florida’s Eighth

district], especially the ads run by the Club for Growth. . . .

[T]he Club for Growth and [competing Republican candidate

Ric] Keller had made their relationship well known, and the

Club for Growth ads clearly reflect an intent to help elect Mr.

Keller. . . . In my view, the ad entitled “Keller Sublette Higher

Taxes” . . . was a very, very effective one, and had it not run

just before the primary, I believe Mr. Sublette would have

reached 50% and there would have been no run-off. Our polling

at that time indicated that we were in good shape, until the Club

for Growth ads began.

Pennington Decl. ¶ 15 and Ex. 3-1 [DEV 8-Tab 31]; see also Keating Decl. ¶

17 (“Within thirty days of the 2000 primary election in Florida, [The Club for

Growth] ran approximately $90,000 in television and radio voter education

advertising discussing the tax voting record of Bill Sublette.”).

2.6.5.6 Independent expert testimony confirms that The Club for Growth uses issue

advocacy to influence federal elections. Krasno and Sorauf Report at 52 [DEV

1-Tab 2] (“The Club for Growth, a conservative Republican group, bluntly

discusses its electioneering activities on its website; they include direct

contributions, bundled contributions, and issue ads.”).

2.6.5.7 Without question, The Club for Growth aggressively used issue advocacy to

influence the 2000 federal elections. The Club for Growth paid for these
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advertisements with corporate general treasury funds and thereby evaded

FECA’s restrictions.

2.6.6 Candidate-Centered Issue Advertisements May Be Run About Issues In Which

the Group Running Them Has No Particular Interest

Aside from the foregoing examples, another indicia that an issue advertisement

has an electioneering purpose is that, in certain instances, candidate-centered

issue advertisements are run by organizations who have no organizational

interest in the advertisement's “issue.”

2.6.6.1 Federal candidate Linda Chapin testifies that 

[t]he Florida Women’s Vote project of EMILY’s List also ran

a television ad in the [2000 Florida Eighth District

Congressional] campaign[,] . . . which as I recall was run in the

two months prior to the general election[.] The ad praises my

record on gun safety and ends with the line: “Tell Linda Chapin

to continue fighting.” This ad is clearly intended to influence

the election result. Based on my observations, EMILY’s List is

not particularly interested in gun control issues. However, they

are interested in supporting pro-choice female candidates like

me, and this ad serves that purpose. 

Chapin Decl. ¶ 13 [DEV 6-Tab 12]; id., Ex. 4 (advertisement storyboard); see

also Chapin Dep. at 35-36 [JDT Vol. 5] (“Q. Did the ads [run by EMILY’s

List] mention your commitment to being pro-choice? A. No, and I think that’s

one thing that was interesting about these ads was that they were not about

choice; they were about other subjects.”); Beckett Decl. ¶ 13 [DEV 6-Tab 3]

(The advertisement run by EMILY’s List “praises Ms. Chapin’s record on gun
264

safety . . . . EMILY’s List is all about being pro-choice; gun safety is not their

issue. Clearly, this ad is trying to elect Ms. Chapin. And I was not the only

one who thought so. This ad was up during a period in the first half of

October 2000 when the Chapin campaign was not on the air, in order to save

resources. The [Republican candidate Ric] Keller[’s] campaign noticed this

and complained to a reporter, saying that this was a clear sign of coordination.

I explained . . . that I had been advised by our consultants in Washington that

under the current rules I was allowed to tell anyone what my plans were, as

long as no one told me what their plans were. EMILY’s List clearly knew

what my plans were, they knew I was going dark at that time. I can only

surmise that they decided to run this ad at that time based on that information.

Obviously, the Keller campaign viewed this ad as one designed to assist Ms.

Chapin’s candidacy.”); id. Ex. 4 (advertisement storyboard). 

2.6.6.2 The Associated Builders and Contractors’ Edward Monroe, in testifying about

an ABC issue advertisement that discussed federal candidate Melissa Hart’s

past actions of pushing for the “strongest possible penalties for child molesters

who attempt to lure children over the internet,” admitted that pushing for such

penalties was not a particular concern of ABC members as compared to the

general public. Monroe Dep. at 65-67, 90-91 [JDT Vol. 23]. Indeed, Monroe

testifies, “[a]s previously answered, no, [the pushing for strongest possible
265

penalties for child molesters who attempt to lure children over the Internet] is

not a particular concern to the general public of contractors or general group

of contractors.” Id. at 91. ABC attempts to explain this away in their

proposed findings of fact by citing Monroe’s redirect examination where

Plaintiffs attempted to rehabilitate his testimony. Proposed Findings of Fact

of Chamber, NAM, Associated Builders and Contractors, et. al. ¶ 26 (“ABC’s

membership has a distinctive ethos: ‘very strong patriotic red, white and blue

God and country association,’ so that issues like children and pornography are

important and pushed by state affiliates.”) (citing Monroe Cross at 100-01).

On re-cross examination, Defense counsel confirmed the following: 

Q Would you turn to page 66 of your deposition. I will read to you

starting with line 20. Do you see that? A Yes. Q Question, “Do

your contractor and builders members have any different or special

interest in child molestation as compared to the general public?”

Answer, “No.” Did you give that testimony and was it truthful? A 

Yes.

Monroe Cross Exam. at 102 [JDT Vol. 23]. Accordingly, I find that Plaintiff

ABC has not cast any doubt on the conclusion that ABC ran candidatecentered issue advertisements about issues that were not of greater concern to

its membership than to the general public. This conclusion leads me to find

that the ABC advertisements relating to Melissa Hart’s views on punishment

for child molesters were designed to influence the election.

2.6.6.3 David Keating, executive director of The Club for Growth, testifies that during
266

the 2000 election cycle, The Club for Growth gave $20,000 to the American

Conservative Union to support an issue advertisement which discussed Senate

candidate Hillary Clinton’s residency in New York. Keating Dep. at 58-59

[JDT Vol. 12] (“Q. Whether or not Hillary Clinton is a resident of New York

State really doesn’t have anything to do with the Club for Growth’s interest in

pro-growth conservative Republican elected officials, does it? A. It doesn’t

seem to directly, no.”).

2.6.6.4 The testimony of Defense expert Magleby notes the following example of an

advocacy organization running an issue advertisement not connected to its

mission:

An example of an interest group which not only masked its

identity through an innocuous name, but ran ads on a topic

unrelated to the function or purpose of the group was The

Foundation for Responsible Government (FRG). In 1998 FRG

spent nearly $300,000. Who was “The Foundation for

Responsible Government?” The trucking industry. Upon

investigation, Professor Eric Hrzik of the University of NevadaReno found that the trucking industry was upset with Senator

Reid for supporting legislation that would have banned triple

trailer trucks. Rather than discuss their policy difference with

Reid on triple-trailer trucks, FRG ran mostly positive ads late in

the campaign, discussing Reid’s opponent, John Ensign’s

positions on health care and taxes.

Magleby Report at 28-29 [DEV 4 – Tab 8] (footnotes omitted).

2.6.6.5 A Citizens for Life press release, issued on January 9, 2000, about three weeks

before the New Hampshire Republican Presidential primary, announced that
267

the organization had begun airing an advertisement entitled “Funny Diseases”

on several New Hampshire radio stations with the following script:

Four million Americans suffer from Alzheimer’s disease—a

brain disorder that causes progressive mental impairment.

According to a September 1, 1999 Associated Press report, here

is what Senator John McCain once had to say about the

devastating memory loss produced by this disease: “The nice

thing about Alzheimer’s is you get to hide your own Easter

eggs.” . . . McCain also once jokingly referred to the Leisure

World home for senior citizens as “Seizure World.” This

information is brought to you by Citizens For Life, a New

Hampshire pro-life organization.

NRLC-00017 [DEV 130-Tab 1]; see also NRLC-00016 (Press Release)

(claiming that the advertisement is timely because the New Hampshire State

Senate will be voting in January on a bill to legalize assisted suicide). I find

that this advertisement was designed to influence the primary election.

2.6.6.6 These examples indicate that corporations spend general treasury funds on

candidate-centered issue advertisements to influence federal elections and

thereby avoid FECA’s requirements.

2.6.7 Candidate-Centered Issue Advertisements May Be Run About Past Votes

Without Discussing Upcoming Legislation or May Be Run About Issues Not

Pending Before the Legislature

The record indicates that organizations often run candidate-centered issue

advertisements about Members’ past votes on bills without discussing any

future legislation or run advertisements about a Member’s position on an issue

that is not pending before Congress at the time the advertisement is aired.
268

These kinds of advertisements are another indication of organizations running

candidate-centered issue advertisements, paid for with general treasury funds,

that are designed to influence a federal election.

2.6.7.1 A series of advertisements run by the AFL-CIO illustrates the point that issue

advertisements designed to influence federal elections can focus on a past vote

of a particular member and not on encouraging a Member to vote in a

particular way on pending or future issues or legislation. Issue advertisements

that fall into this category provide strong indicia that these purpose of these

commercials is to influence the outcome of a federal election because they

only provide analysis of the Member’s past vote. See, e.g., Mitchell Decl. ¶

61 [6 PCS] (AFL-CIO advertisement “Job,” which ran between September 13

and 25, 2000, criticized candidates for already having voted “to prevent an

important OSHA regulation intended to prevent repetitivemotion injuries from

being implemented”) Ex. 1 at 101-02, 141-42 (“Yet Congressman __________

voted to block federal safety standards that would help protect workers from

this risk.”) [6 PCS]; id. ¶ 58 (AFL-CIO advertisement “Help” targeted

“Republican Representatives who had voted against the Patient’s Bill of Rights

when it passed the House in October, 1999”), Ex. 138 (“Yet Melissa Hart has

sided with the insurance companies, opposing the real Patients’ Bill of

Rights.”); id. ¶ 59 (AFL-CIO advertisements “Sky” and “Protect,” run in July
85 The full text of “Protect” is:

PHARMACIST: The Senior Citizens today can’t afford their

medication. They come in and I know they’re skipping medication so

they can pay for their food. With the rising cost of medication today,

it could wipe out anybody at any time.

VOICE: Yet Congressman Jay Dickey sided with the drug industry. He

voted no to guaranteed Medicare prescription benefits that would

protect seniors from runway [sic] prices. Tell Dickey quit putting

special interests ahead of working families.

PHARMACIST: Watching people walk away without the medication

takes a little bit out of me every day.

Mitchell Decl. Ex. 140 [6 PCS].

269

and August of 2000, criticized “twelve different Representatives who had

voted at the end of June to pass prescription drug legislation that failed to

guarantee drug benefits under Medicare”), Ex. 139 (“Sky”) (“Yet

Congressman Kuykendall voted against guaranteeing seniors prescription

benefits under Medicare. . . . ) (emphasis in original), Ex. 140 (“Protect”)85

(“Yet Congressman Jay Dickey sided with the drug industry. He voted no to

guaranteed Medicare prescription benefits that would protect seniors from

runway [sic] prices.”).

2.6.7.2 Another example of candidate-centered issue advertisements designed to

influence federal elections is Plaintiff U.S. Chamber of Commerce’s

advertisementsrun during the 2000 federal election attacking various Members

on the prescription drug issue that was not pending before Congress at the time

the advertisement was aired. See Josten Dep. 191-230 & Exs. 23-23I [JDT
270

Vol. 12]. Most of these advertisements concluded by instructing viewers to

tell the targeted Members to “stop supporting a big government prescription

drug plan.” Id. Exs. 23-23I. However, these same advertisements included no

telephone number to call, see id. at 194, and by the time the advertisements

aired, there was no prescription drug issue then pending before Congress, id.

at 208-11. Indeed, a few of these advertisements were run against candidates

who were not even incumbents. Josten Dep. at 197, 212, 227 & Exs. 23A,

23D, 23E, 23I [JDT Vol. 12]. Hence, the point of these advertisements was

likely not to influence any pending issue before the Congress, because the

candidate mentioned was not even a Member of Congress.

2.6.7.3 These examples demonstrate that organizations run advertisements about past

votes or about issues no longer before Congress. The purpose of these types

of candidate-centered issue advertisements is to influence a federal election

with general treasury funds and to avoid FECA’s restrictions.

2.6.8 Candidate-Centered Issue Advertisements Often Permit the Candidate to

Avoid Running “Negative” Advertising or Otherwise Assist the Candidate by

Running Advertising While the Candidate is Low on Funds

Two other indicia that candidate-centered issue advocacy is designed to

influence a federal election and thereby avoid FECA’s restrictions over
86 Two examples of “negative” candidate-centered issue advertisements are:

Americans For Job Security Advertisement “Are you Taxed Enough Already?”

In this advertisement, an announcer states that “Gore plans to squeeze more money

out of middle class families at the gas pump. . . . Gore’s ideas are so extreme. If they

ever came to pass, Americans would truly be Gored at the pump.” CMAG

Storyboards [DEV 48-Tab 3]. 

Cheney Myanmar

This advertisement, run by an unknown group, stated that a “brutal military regime

in Myanmar . . . forced men, women and children into slave labor to assist the

building of an oil pipeline by . . . Haliburton . . . we just can’t trust Dick Cheney a

heartbeat away from the presidency.” CMAG Storyboards [DEV 48, Tab 3; IER Tab

15.].

271

organizations (a) helping a candidate by running negative advertisements86 so

as to permit the candidate to run positive advertisements and (b) helping a

candidate by running advertisements where and when the candidate cannot due

to budget constraints.

2.6.8.1 Political consultants testify that electioneering issue advertisements often

focus on candidates as opposed to issues. Raymond Strother testifies:

Character ads were once the province of the candidate

committees. Now, however, candidates often avoid “going

negative” themselves, and rely on third parties to do this dirty

work for them. If a trade association or a labor union runs an ad

about the honesty and integrity–or lack thereof–of a candidate

for federal office, their intent to influence the election is obvious

and unmistakable.

Strother Decl. ¶ 9 [DEV 9-Tab 40]; see also Beckett Decl. ¶ 8 [DEV 6 – Tab

3] (“[I]n my experience, candidates tend to shy away from . . . negative attack
87 LaRocco served as a Member of Congress from 1990 to 1995, representing the First

Congressional District of Idaho. LaRocco Decl. ¶ 2 [DEV 7-Tab 27]. He served two terms

and lost his 1994 reelection campaign. Id. 

272

ads because there would be political repercussions for them. But entities like

the DCCC [Democratic CongressionalCampaign Committee] and the Club for

Growth do not have such constraints. Based on my observations, the candidate

ads in [one] 2000 Congressional race, which were financed with federal funds

(‘hard money’), were actually more about ‘issues’ than the supposed ‘issue

ads’ run by political parties and interest groups, which I understand were

financed at least in part with non-federal funds (‘soft money’).”).

2.6.8.2 Former Representative Larry LaRocco87 testifies:

In my 1994 Congressional reelection campaign, many outside

interest groups targeted me for defeat, and they used soft money

to advance their goal. These organizations ran television

advertisements in markets my opponent did not. For example,

to my knowledge, my opponent did not buy any media in the

Spokane market–which covered 40% of my district–but other

groups, such as pro-term limit organizations, ran ads in that

market which criticized my policies. Unlike my opponent, these

outside organizations were not required to disclose the sources

of their funding. This tactic suggested there may have been

some communication between the advertisers and my

opponent’s campaign.

LaRocco Decl. ¶ 5 [DEV 7-Tab 27].

2.6.8.3 Evidence in the record also demonstrates that organizations run issue

advertisements to assist candidates when their campaigns are low on funds,
273

which is an indication that these advertisements serve an electioneering

purpose. For example, an advertisement run during Linda Chapin’s campaign

for the House of Representatives by EMILY’s List, praising Chapin’s record

on gun safety, was aired “during a period in the first half of October 2000

when the Chapin campaign was not on the air, in order to save resources. . . .

EMILY’s List . . . knew I was going dark at that time. I can only surmise that

they decided to run this ad at that time based on that information.” Beckett

Decl. ¶ 13 [DEV 6-Tab 3]; see also supra Findings ¶ 2.6.1.1 (AFL-CIO

memorandum discussing where media buys could be placed to help the Durbin

Senate campaign which could not air advertisements due to a lack of

resources).

2.6.8.4 Both negative candidate-centered issue advertisements aired to enable

federal candidates to run positive advertisements and candidate-centered issue

advertisements run in areas where candidates lack funding to purchase air

time, provide additional indicia that corporate and labor union issue

advertising is focused on influencing federal elections while avoiding FECA's

restrictions.

2.6.9 In sum, I find that these examples and characteristics of electioneering issue

advertisements illustrate that corporations and labor unions routinely use

candidate-centered issue advocacy as a means of influencing federal elections.
274

2.7 Federal Candidates and Political Parties Know and Appreciate Who Runs

Candidate-Centered Issue Advertisements in Their Races

Candidate-centered issue advertisements paid for with corporate and labor union

general treasury funds and designed to influence the federal election permit

corporations and labor unions to inject immense aggregations of wealth into the

process. Candidate-centered issue advertisements paid for from the general treasuries

of these organizations radically distorts the electoral landscape.

2.7.1 Campaign consultants and a lobbyist testify that candidates are acutely aware

of third-party interest groups who run candidate-centered issue advertisements

on behalf of their candidates and that candidates appreciate the support of

those organizations. Political consultant Strother testifies:

Campaign consultants, and candidates themselves, pay very

close attention to the political advertisements broadcast in their

districts. Every campaign that I have been associated with in the

past several years has kept very close watch on who is

advertising, and when and where. Candidates, who are often

already elected officials, all keep track of who is helping them,

who is sitting on the sidelines, and who is attacking them.

Candidates in tight races are especially grateful to the issue

groups who run ads on the candidate’s behalf.

Strother Decl. ¶ 13 [DEV 9-Tab 40]; see also Lamson Decl. ¶ 19 [DEV 7-Tab

26]; Beckett Decl. ¶ 16. The uncontroverted testimony of lobbyist Wright

Andrews provides:

Sophisticated political donors–particularly lobbyists, PAC

directors, and other political insiders acting on behalf of specific

interest groups–are not in the business of dispensing their money
275

purely on ideological or charitable grounds. Rather, these

political donors typically are trying to wisely invest their

resources to maximize political return. Sophisticated donors do

not show up one day with a contribution, hoping for a favorable

vote the next day. Instead, they build longer term relationships.

The donor seeks to convey to the member that he or she is a

friend and a supporter who can be trusted to help the federal

elected official when he or she is needed. Presumably, most

federal elected officials recognize that continued financial

support from the donor often may be contingent upon the donor

feeling that he or she has received a fair hearing and some

degree of consideration or support.

Often, corporate clients seek their lobbyists’ advice concerning

how their money is best spent, whether it be by contributing

their PAC’s hard money directly to candidates, donating soft

money to the political parties, or funding independent

expenditures such as broadcast ‘issue ads.’ Although the answer

for each client will depend upon various circumstances,

including the goals that client is working to achieve, unregulated

expenditures–whether soft money donations to the parties or

issue ad campaigns–can sometimes generate far more influence

than direct campaign contributions.

Another practice used to secure influence in Washington is for

an interest group to run so called “issue ads.” “Issue ads” run in

close proximity to elections may influence the outcome of the

election. Moreover, such ads may influence the elected official

who is seeking reelection to come out in support of or

opposition to particular legislation due to the response local

voters have to the ads. These ads are noticed by the elected

officials on whose behalf, or against whom, these ads are run.

An effective advertising campaign may have far more effect on

a member than a direct campaign contribution or even a large

soft money donation to his or her political party that is used for

political purposes in his or her district or state. These ads often

have the effect of showing an elected official that a lobbyist’s

particular issue can have consequences at the ballot box. Given

how useful “issue ads” can be in creating political clout with

candidates, it is laughable to have a system that prohibits
276

corporations and labor unions from giving even a penny to a

candidate, but allows them to funnel millions into positive or

negative advertising campaigns that may influence election

outcomes and that many candidates are likely to be influenced

by.

Andrews Decl. ¶ 8, 13, 17 [DEV 6-Tab 1]. Plaintiffs have put forth no

contrary evidence to rebut the testimony of these consultants and lobbyist.

2.7.2 Former officeholders and candidates confirm the view of the consultants that

Members of Congress and federal candidates are very aware of who ran

advertisements on their behalf and feel indebted to those who spend money to

help get them elected. Former Senator Bumpers testifies:

Members or parties sometimes suggest that corporations or

individuals make donations to interest groups that run “issue

ads.” Candidates whose campaigns benefit from these ads

greatly appreciate the help of these groups. In fact, Members

will also be favorably disposed to those who finance these

groups when they later seek access to discuss pending

legislation.

Politicians especially love when a negative “issue ad” airs

against their opponents. If these politicians did not feel that the

issue ads were helping them, they would call the people

sponsoring them and tell them to stop, or they would hold a

press conference and angrily denounce the ads. But that rarely,

if ever, happens.

Bumpers Decl. ¶¶ 27-28 [DEV 6-Tab10]; see also Chapin Decl. ¶ 16 [DEV

6-Tab 12] (“Federal candidates appreciate interest group electioneering ads

like those described above that benefit their campaigns, just as they appreciate

large donations that help their campaigns. I appreciated the ads run by
277

EMILY’s List on my behalf. In general, candidates in the midst of a

hard-fought election like mine appreciate any help that comes their way.”).

2.7.3 Indeed, interest groups can be the ones who apprise politicians of the

advertisements that they run on their behalf. For example, The Coalition sent

tapes of the advertisements it aired in 1996 to Joyce Gates, assistant to House

Republican Conference Chairman John Boehner. FEC MUR No. 4624,

General Counsel’s Rep., April 20, 2001, at 30 [DEV 53-Tab 6]. As the

General Counsel’s Report publicly indicates, the Coalition’s Alan Kranowitz

testified in an FEC investigation that the Coalition sent the tapes to “show the

Republican Members of the House that we were, indeed, doing something,

after the fact.” Id. The Coalition also provided tapes of the ads to RNC

Political Director Curt Anderson. Id. at 32; see also Josten Dep. at 266-67

[JDT Vol. 12] (“Those ads after they were aired were shown to Congressman

Bayner [sic].”).

2.7.4 Politicians who benefit from the help provided by corporate and labor union

general treasury fund spending on their races raise money for these

organizations to demonstrate their appreciation. Congressman Ric Keller, for

whose 2000 open-seat campaign the Club for Growth had run issue

advertising, signed a Club for Growth fundraising letter dated July 20, 2001.

The letter stated:
278

The Club for Growth selected my race as one of its top

priorities. . . . 

Since the Club targets the most competitive races in the country,

your membership in the Club will help Republicans keep control

of Congress.

CFG000208-210, at CFG000208, 09 (emphasis in original) [DEV 130-Tab 5];

see supra Findings ¶ 2.6.5.5 (Pennington) (describing how The Club for

Growth’s candidate-centered issue advertisements helped Keller win the

primary election).

2.7.5 Groups aggressively push to be recognized for the role they played in helping

a candidate get elected to office. After Election Day, the Coalition listed ideas

“on maximizing the credit the Coalition should get for its 1996 activities,”

including whether to “[m]ake a report to each Member that [it] helped and

actively solicit formal thanks.” Memorandum to Alan Kranowitz, Bruce

Josten and Elaine Graham from Larry McCarthy of Cannon McCarthy Mason

Limited, Next Steps for the Coalition, dated Nov. 17, 1996, TC00802-04, at

TC00803 [DEV 121].

2.7.6 The AFL-CIO admits that it made the financing of at least one political

advertisement that identified a Candidate and was broadcast on television or

radio within the 60 days preceding a general election in a state or

congressional district in which that Candidate was running for federal office

known to a Member or Candidate, and known to a Political Party. Resps.
279

AFL-CIO and COPE to FEC’s First RFA’s, Nos. 20-21 [DEV 12-Tab 5].

2.7.7 The AFL-CIO admits that at least one candidate or Member of Congress has

expressed appreciation or gratitude for its financing of at least one political

advertisement that identified a Candidate and was broadcast on television or

radio within the 60 days preceding a general election in a state or

congressional district in which that Candidate was running for federal office.

Resps. AFL-CIO and COPE to FEC’s First RFA’s No. 22 [DEV 12-Tab 5].

2.7.8 Some candidates or their political committees requested or suggested that the

AFL-CIO broadcast advertisements in their districts in 1996. FEC MUR 4291,

General Counsel’s Rep., June 9, 2000, at 21 [DEV 52-Tab 3].

2.7.9 Mellman and Wirthlin, based on their August-September 2002 poll, state:

Americans see very little difference between the influence of a

soft money donation to a political party and the funding of

political ads on television and radio. . . . 

If an individual, issue group, corporation, or labor union paid

for 50,000 dollars or more worth of political ads on the radio or

TV that benefitted a Member of Congress, how likely would the

Member of Congress be to give their opinion special

consideration because of the ads–would they be very likely,

somewhat likely, somewhat unlikely, or very unlikely to give

them special consideration because of the ads, or don’t you have

an opinion on this?

80% TOTAL LIKELY

37% Very likely

43% Somewhat likely

10% TOTAL UNLIKELY

5% Somewhat unlikely
280

5% Very unlikely

9% Don't have opinion

0% Don' t know Refused

Mellman and Wirthlin Report at 9-10 [DEV 2-Tab 5]; see also Resp. NAB to

FEC’s First RFA’s, No. 3. [DEV 12-Tab 7] (admitting “that access to members

of Congress and Executive branch officials is one factor out of many that

might conceivably affect federal legislation and executive decisions and

policies assuming all other circumstances are equal”). 

2.7.10 Political parties are equally grateful for the support that issue advocacy

organizations perform for their candidates. 

2.7.10.1 An internal RNC document entitled “Coalitions Plan” states:

The RNC Coalitions effort should be judged by the simple

question–will it get us more votes on election day?

Their [sic] will no doubt need to be countless meetings,

committees, and tribunals to provide all the customary access

that the myriad of entities have come to expect, but ultimately

every activity that we engage in should be done to win votes. .

. . 

There are many organizations that can routinely deliver

measurable influence of behalf of Republicans, but there are

five groups that have distinguished themselves. The RNC

should give these five organizations a great deal of attention.

These groups are the:

National Rifle Association

National Right to Life Committee

National Right to Work Committee

National Federation of Independent Business

Christian Coalition
281

These organizations deliver a disproportionate percentage of the

Republican Base on election day. They should receive special

and constant attention. We must prioritize our limited resources

toward these organizations. . . . 

An important aspect of any RNC Coalitions work will be done

to engage the many other organizations that work within the

political arena. . . . 

The RNC will establish a regular meeting of key organizations.

This meeting should be held at least three times a year. The

emphasis should by on the free exchange of important

information about the upcoming elections. Each meeting should

be an event featuring the Chairman, Co-Chair, RNC Regional

Field Representatives and at least one high pro-file [sic]

Member of Congress. Examples would be Newt Gingrich, Trent

Lott, Dick Armey, etc.

RNC0275390-RNC0275396, at RNC0275390-91 [DEV 97] (emphasis added).

2.7.10.2 An RNC slide show presented how interest group broadcast issue advocacy

was used to help candidates in the 2000 election cycle:

Outside Help for Democrats in 2000

Liberal groups spent record amounts assisting Democrats in 2000.

Highest Issue Advertising Spenders: Planned Parenthood–$14 million,

NAACP–$10.5 million, Sierra Club–$9.5 million. NARAL–$7.5

million. 

(Annenberg Public Policy Center of the University of Pennsylvania,

“Issue Advertising in the 1999-2000 Election Cycle”).

Outside Help for Republicans

Business Roundtable–$6 million (2/3rds supporting Republicans),

NRA–$15/20 Million 

(Annenberg Public Policy Center of the University of Pennsylvania,

“Issue Advertising in the 1999-2000 Election Cycle”).

Impact of Third Party Spending for the 2000 Cycle

In 2000 it was estimated that more than $509 million was spent on issue
282

advocacy television and radio advertising. Third parties accounted for

almost $347 million (68%) of this spending. 

Republican Party–$83.5 million (16%), Democratic Party–$78.4

million (15%). 

(Annenberg Public Policy Center of the University of Pennsylvania,

“Issue Advertising in the 1999-2000 Election Cycle”).

RNC Counsel’s Office, “‘Soft’ Dollars: What They Mean for the Republican

Party,” RNC0248802-RNC0248809, at RNC0248808-09 [DEV 97] (emphasis

in original). 

2.7.10.3 An RNC document states that “third party special interests [sic] groups . . . are

permitted to raise and spend soft money for issue advocacy purposes. Liberal

special interest groups spent record amounts assisting Democrats in 2000 . . .

. In fact, of the $500 million spent on issue advertisements during the 2000

cycle, 68% ($347 million) was spent by third part[y] special interest groups –

more than twice the amount spent by both political parties combined.” “Issue

Updates Campaign Finance Reform Concerns and Effects,”

RNC0318573-RNC0318576, at RNC0318575 [DEV 98].

2.7.10.4 On October 18, 1996, the RNC, through its non-federal component, the

Republican National State Elections Committee, gave $500,000 to the National

Right to Life Committee with a cover letter from RNC Chairman Haley

Barbour to NRLC Executive Director David O’Steen stating: “Your continued

efforts to educate and inform the American public deserves [sic] recognition.”

RNC0065691A [DEV 134-Tab 8]; see also RNC0065691 [DEV 134-Tab 8]
283

(copy of the check). In October 1999, the National Right to Life Committee

received a $250,000 donation from the NRCC which was “put in NRLC’s

general fund.” Resps. Nat’l Rt. Life Pls. to Defs’ First Interrogs., No. 3 [DEV

10-Tab 15]. NRLC representatives “were present at a meeting with Rep. Tom

Davis when he presented the check to National Right to Life.” Id.

2.7.10.5 DNC Political Director Gail Stoltz spoke generally about the recent developments of using issue advertising for electioneering purposes. Stoltz stated: “In

my experience, issue ads affect elections. The ads can either demoralize or

confuse voters so that they do not vote, or they can energize a voter base for

or against a party or its candidates. During a presidential election year, the ads

definitely make a difference when a presidential candidate is featured.” Stoltz

Decl. ¶ 16 [DEV 9-Tab 39].

2.7.10.6 Political parties and candidates have directed donors who have maxed out their

federal contributions to give money to nonprofit corporations who can then

spend money on issue advocacy. Robert W. Hickmott provides the following

uncontroverted testimony:

As both a contributor to candidates and parties, and as a lobbyist

who advises clients about political spending, I am personally

aware of the fundraising practices of federal candidates. Once

you’ve helped a federal candidate by contributing hard money

to his or her campaign, you are sometimes asked to do more for

the candidate by making donations of hard and/or soft money to

the national party committees, the relevant state party (assuming

it can accept corporate contributions), or an outside group that
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is planning on doing an independent expenditure or issue

advertisement to help the candidate’s campaign. These types of

requests typically come from staff at the national party

committees, the campaign staff of the candidate, the candidate’s

fundraising staff, or former staff members of the candidate’s

congressional office, but they also sometimes comes [sic] from

a Member of Congress or his or her chief of staff (calling from

somewhere other than a government office). Regardless of the

precise person who makes the request, these solicitations almost

always involve an incumbent Member of Congress rather than

a challenger. As a result, there are multiple avenues for a person

or group that has the financial resources to assist a federal

candidate financially in his or her election effort, both with hard

and soft money.

Hickmott Decl. ¶ 8 [DEV 6-Tab 19].

2.7.11 While the record does not have any direct examples of votes being exchanged

for candidate-centered issue advocacy expenditures, I find that the record

demonstrates that candidates and parties appreciate and encourage

corporations and labor unions to deploy their large aggregations of wealth into

the political process. If nothing else, I find that the record presents an

appearance of corruption stemming from the dependence of officeholders and

parties on advertisements run by these outside groups.

2.7.12 Accordingly, I find that Congress was correct in concluding that a problem

existed with the state of FECA. Corporations and labor unions were routinely

spending general treasury funds on advertisements designed to influence

federal elections and they were able to use general treasury funds to pay for the

most potent form of political advocacy–advertisements that do not use words
285

of express advocacy. This conclusion leads to the following question: are

candidate-centered issue advertisements objectively distinguishable from pure

issue advertisements so that one may distinguish genuine issue advocacy from

electioneering without considering subjective factors? The record

unequivocally answers that question in the affirmative.

2.8 Candidate-Centered Issue Advertisements Are Empirically Distinguishable from

“Pure” Issue Advertisements

Pure issue advertisements are empirically distinguishable from candidate-centered

issue advertisements designed to influence an election on a number of bases: (a) issue

advertisements designed to influence federal elections almost always identify a

candidate for federal office; (b) issue advertisements designed to influence federal

elections are generally run in close proximity to a federal election; and (c) issue

advertisements designed to influence a federal election are run in states and

congressional districts with close races.

2.8.1 Candidate-Centered Issue Advertisements Almost Always Identify a Candidate

for Federal Office

I find that issue advertisements designed to influence a federal election almost

always refer to specific candidates by name. Generally speaking, pure issue

advertisements are less likely to refer to a federal candidate by name. 

2.8.1.1 The uncontroverted testimony of political consultants who have designed

genuine issue advertisements confirms this finding. Plaintiffs failed to
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produce any political consultants who have designed issue advertisements to

rebut directly this testimony.

• Political consultant Doug Bailey testifies: 

In addition to the work we did for candidates at Bailey,

Deardourff, we also did political ads for political parties and

issue groups. When we were creating true issue ads (e.g, for

ballot initiatives . . .), and when we were creating true party

building ads, it was never necessary for us to reference specific

candidates for federal office in order to create effective ads. For

instance, we created a serious [sic] of ads opposing a . . .

referendum in Florida which made no reference to any

candidates. We were successful in conveying our message, and

the referendum failed two to one. . . .

Similarly, issue organizations can design true issue ads without

ever mentioning specific candidates for federal office. In my

decades of experience in national politics, nearly all of the ads

that I have seen that both mention specific candidates and are

run in the days immediately preceding the election were clearly

designed to influence elections. From a media consultant’s

perspective , there would be no reason to run such ads if your

desire was not to impact an election. This is true not only in the

60 days immediately prior to an election, but probably also in

the 90 or 120 days beforehand. 

Bailey Decl. ¶¶ 9, 11 [DEV 6-Tab 2] (emphasis added); see also Strother Decl.

¶ 7 [DEV 9-Tab 40] (emphasis added) (observing that the pure issue

advertisements he had made during his career “did not mention any candidates

by name. Indeed, there is usually no reason to mention a candidate’s name

unless the point is to influence an election.”).

2.8.1.2 Uncontroverted expert testimony likewise confirms the view that issue
88 Evidence for this finding is based on the Expert Report of Kenneth M. Goldstein.

Goldstein compiled this information from data supplied by Campaign Media Analysis Group

(CMAG). Goldstein Expert Report at 2 [DEV 3-Tab 7]. Although Plaintiffs question the

completeness and accuracy of the CMAG data, I accept the CMAG data as a valid database.

See infra Findings 2.12.1. Moreover, nowhere do Plaintiffs challenge the data of when

candidates’ names were mentioned in the advertisements.

287

advertisements designed to influence a federal election almost always mention

the name of a federal candidate. Krasno and Sorauf Expert Report at 55-56

[DEV 1-Tab 2] (“The most obvious characteristic shared by candidate ads and

candidate-oriented issue ads is their emphasis on candidates. Candidate names

appear in virtually all of these spots, with candidates most likely to identify

themselves in their ads and candidate-oriented issue ads most likely to identify

the opposing candidate (in some pejorative way). Pure issue ads, on the other

hand, were much less likely to mention a candidate for federal office . . . .”).

2.8.1.3 A sampling of issue advertising campaigns demonstrates that candidates are

often mentioned in the advertisements only as election day approaches.88

• Citizens for Better Medicare (“CBM”)

During the final three weeks before the 2000 federal election, CBM

aired 6,010 spots that mentioned a candidate and only eight spots that

did not mention a candidate. Goldstein Expert Report, App. A, Tbl.

17A [DEV 3-Tab 7]. In the final 63 days before the election, CBM ran

a total of 14,975 advertisements. Id. Of these advertisements 10,876

mentioned a federal candidate, while 4,099 did not mention a federal
89 The Annenberg Report describes Planned Parenthood as “a pro-family planning

political advocacy group.” Annenberg Report 2001 at 24 [DEV 38 - Tab 22].

288

candidate. Id. From January 1 through September 4, 2000, CBM ran

23,867 television spots, none of which mentioned a candidate. Id.

• Chamber of Commerce

Between January 1, 2000, and Election Day 2000 (November 6, 2000),

the Chamber of Commerce ran a total of 7,574 advertisements. Id. Tbl.

17B. All of these advertisements were run in the seven weeks before

the election and all of these advertisements mentioned a federal

candidate. Id.

• Planned Parenthood89

Between January 1, 2000, and Election Day 2000 (November 6, 2000),

Planned Parenthood ran a total of 6,523 advertisements. Id. Tbl. 17C.

In the 63 days before the election, 185 advertisements were run that did

not mention a federal candidate, while 5,916 advertisements were run

that mentioned a federal candidate. Id. (noting that the only time

Planned Parenthood ran advertisements that mentioned a federal

candidate’s name was in the five weeks prior to the election).

• AFL-CIO

Between January 1, 2000, and Election Day 2000 (November 6, 2000),

the AFL-CIO ran a total of 18,324 advertisements. Id. Tbl. 17D. In the
90 The Annenberg Report describes Emily’s List as “an organization dedicated to

helping Democratic women who support abortion rights get into office.” Annenberg Report

2001 at 22 [DEV 38 - Tab 22].

91 The Annenberg Report describes Americans for Job Security as a “pro-business

lobbying group.” Annenberg Report 2001 at 23 [DEV 38-Tab 22].

289

63 days before the election 10,099 advertisements were run and each

mentioned a federal candidate. Id. During this same time period, the

AFL-CIO ran no advertisements that did not mention a federal

candidate. Id.

• Women Voters: A Project of Emily’s List90

Between January 1, 2000, and Election Day 2000 (November 6, 2000),

Emily’s List ran a total of 2,680 advertisements. Id. Tbl. 17E. In the

63 days before the election, 7 advertisements were run that did not

mention a federal candidate, while 2,665 advertisements were run and

each mentioned a federal candidate. Id. (noting that the only time

Emily’s List ran advertisements that mentioned a federal candidate’s

name was in the seven weeks prior to the election).

• Americans for Job Security91

Between January 1, 2000, and Election Day 2000 (November 6, 2000),

Americans for Job Security ran a total of 6,062 advertisements. Id. Tbl.

17F. In the 63 days before the election, 5,073 advertisements were run

and each mentioned a federal candidate. Id. During this same time
92 The Annenberg Report describes the Business Round Table as “an organization that

represents the CEO’s of America’s largest corporations.” Annenberg Report 2001 at 20

[DEV 38-Tab 22].

93 The Annenberg Report describes Handgun Control as an “advocacy group

supporting legislation to promote gun safety.” Annenberg Report 2001 at 25 [DEV 38-Tab

22].

290

period, Americans for Job Security ran only advertisements that

mentioned federal candidates. Id.

• Business Round Table92

Between January 1, 2000, and Election Day 2000 (November 6, 2000),

the Business Round Table ran a total of 8,158 advertisements. Id. Tbl.

17G. In the 63 days before the election, 4,571 advertisements were run

and each mentioned a federal candidate. Id. During this same time

period, the Business Round Table ran only advertisements that

mentioned federal candidates. Id.

• Handgun Control93

Between January 1, 2000, and Election Day 2000 (November 6, 2000),

Handgun Control ran a total of 3,383 advertisements. Id. Tbl. 17H. In

the 63 days before the election, 3,146 advertisements were run and each

mentioned a federal candidate. Id. During this same time period,

Handgun Control ran only advertisements that mentioned federal

candidates. Id.
94 The Annenberg Report describes the Sierra Club as “a pro-environment advocacy

group.” Annenberg Report 2001 at 23 [DEV 38-Tab 22].

95 The Annenberg Report describes the League of Conservation Voters as a

“pro-conservation advocacy and education group.” Annenberg Report 2001 at 23 [DEV 

38-Tab 22].

291

• Sierra Club94

Between January 1, 2000, and Election Day 2000 (November 6, 2000),

the Sierra Club ran a total of 2,270 advertisements. Id. Tbl. 17I. In the

63 days before the election, 22 advertisements were run that did not

mention a federal candidate, while 1,707 advertisements were run that

did mention a federal candidate. Id.

• League of Conservation Voters95

Between January 1, 2000, and Election Day 2000 (November 6, 2000),

the League of Conservation Voters ran a total of 5,027 advertisements.

Id. Tbl. 17J. In the 63 days before the election, 371 advertisements

were run and each advertisement did not mention a federal candidate,

while 1,705 advertisements were run that mentioned a federal

candidate. Id. (noting that the only time the League of Conservation

Voters ran advertisements mentioning a federal candidate’s name was

in the eight weeks prior to the election).

2.8.1.4 Candidate-centered issue advertisements almost always name a federal

candidate. This finding is neither surprising nor controverted. As the
292

examples of the interest group advertisements indicate, however, issue

advertisements generally start naming a federal candidate only as the election

draws near.

2.8.2 A Majority of Candidate-Centered Issue Advertisements are Run in Close

Proximity to a Federal Election

As the sampling of interest group advertisements above illustrates, as the

election draws near, advertisements that name a federal candidate are much

more common than issue advertisements that do not name a federal candidate.

I find that most candidate-centered issue advertisements appear in close

proximity to a federal election. In the case of the general election, which has

been most heavily studied, it is clear that candidate-centered issue

advertisements are most prevalent within sixty days of a federal election. 

2.8.2.1 The Annenberg Public Policy Center found that by the last two months before

the election, almost all televised issue spots made a case for or against a

candidate. Annenberg Report 2001 at 14 [DEV 38-Tab 22]. The Annenberg

Report, a study relied on by Plaintiffs, concluded:

The type of issue ad that dominated depended greatly on how

close we were to the general election. During the two-year

election cycle 71% of distinct issue ads were candidate-centered,

16% were legislation-centered, and 13% were general-image

centered. However, distinct ads from before the final two

months of the election were 43% candidate-centered, 35%

legislation centered, and 22% general-image oriented. That

picture flipped when looking at unique ads from the last two

months of the election. In that case fully 89% of unique ads
96 The Chart is based on data compiled by Kenneth Goldstein. Goldstein Expert

Report, App. A, Table 16 [DEV 3-Tab 7]. Goldstein observed all interest group

advertisements run during the forty-four weeks prior to the election using CMAG data.

Although Plaintiffs dispute the completeness of his data set, see Appendix, none of the

experts have criticized that the data demonstrates that in the sixty days prior to a federal

election, the clear majority of issue advertisements mention the name of a federal candidate.

293

were candidate-centered, while just 3.6% were legislative

centered, and 7.4% were general-image issue ads. In other

words candidate-centered issue ads became much more

prominent as the election approached. . . . 

When we took into account how many times these ads aired and

not just the number of different ads, we found an even greater

percent were candidate-centered. Television spots airing after

Super Tuesday were 87% candidate centered, 9.5%

legislative-centered, and 3.6% image oriented. By breaking that

time period down further and looking only at spots that aired

September to November, we found that there was a greater

percentage of candidate-centered ads in the last two month of

the campaign than in the last eight. Fully 94% of issue ads aired

after August made a case for or against a candidate. Just 3.1%

were legislative ads, and 2.3% were general image ads. Though

candidate-centered issue ads always made up a majority of issue

ads, as the election approached the percent candidate-centered

spots increased and the percent of legislative and image ads

decreased, such that by the last two months before the election

almost all televised issue spots made a case for or against a

candidate.

Id. (emphasis added).

2.8.2.2 In the sixty days prior to a federal election, interest group advertisements that

mention a federal candidate rise dramatically, whereas issue advertisements

that do not mention a federal candidate remain fairly constant during the

course of the year.96 A graph using data from the 2000 election cycle compiled
294

by Kenneth Goldstein illustrates this point:
295

2.8.2.3 The uncontroverted testimony of experts confirms that the airing of issue

advertisements designed to influence a federal election is at its zenith in the

final weeks prior to an election. Magleby Expert Report at 18 [DEV 4-Tab 8]

(“Genuine issue ads are more generic or ‘educational’ on their face than ads

that are electioneering in nature. They are also rare in the period before an

election.”); id. at 33 (“In the contests we monitored in 1998, most interest

group electioneering advocacy came in the final weeks of the campaign. In

2000, 58% of the interest group electioneering advocacy came in the last two

weeks of the election.”); Goldstein Expert Report at 17 [DEV 3-Tab 7] (“The

CMAG database provides empirical evidence of a strong positive correlation

between [an advertisement’s reference to a federal candidate and the proximity

in time of the broadcast of the advertisement to the federal election] and

consequently of its validity as a test for identifying political television

advertisements with the purpose or effect of supporting or opposing a

candidate for public office.”). The conclusions of these experts has not been

contradicted by any contrary expert testimony introduced by Plaintiffs in this

litigation.

2.8.2.4 As the Annenberg Center, experts in this case, and the empirical data establish,

candidate-centered issue advocacy is run in close proximity to federal

elections.
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2.8.3 A Majority of Candidate-Centered Issue Advertisements Are Run in States and

Congressional Districts with Close Races

2.8.3.1 The empirical data and the uncontroverted testimony of experts and political

consultants in this case demonstrate that candidate-centered issue

advertisements are run in congressional districts or states where there are close

races.

2.8.3.2 Defense expert Magleby states that:

Interest groups . . . take aim at particular states with competitive

U.S. Senate races or congressional districts where the outcome

is in doubt. In 1998, 2000, and 2002, I conducted numerous

interviews with key staff in scores of interest groups to assess

where they engage in electioneering advertisements. . . . The

widely shared view of interest groups is that they campaign

where their investment can make a difference and that is almost

always in competitive contests. This tendency has been

reinforced by the exceedingly close margin of party control in

Congress in recent years. Interest groups routinely do their own

polls to inform them on where to spend their electioneering

advocacy money. For example, before they sent mailings, the

NEA [National Education Association] conducted surveys to

determine “if they could make a difference” with their spending.

Magleby Report at 31 (footnotes omitted) [DEV 4-Tab 8]; see also Krasno and

Sorauf Report at 57 (footnote omitted) [DEV 1-Tab 2] (Candidate and

candidate-oriented issue ads “are narrowly targeted to air in only the most

closely contested elections.”). 

2.8.3.3 Political consultants also provide uncontroverted testimony that candidatecentered issue advertisements are concentrated on competitive races in the
97 The CMAG data is discussed in detail in the Appendix to my opinion and Finding

¶ 2.12.1.

297

weeks before a federal election. Political consultant Strother testifies:

In addition to mentioning a candidate and proximity in time to

election day, another informative factor is to look at where the

ad was run. When media consultants want to influence

elections, they air their ads in competitive districts and

battleground states. Thus, in addition to looking at the ad itself,

to discern electioneering intent you might also look at the Cook

Report of competitive or ‘toss-up’ races. Those are the most

likely places where the advertisements could have an impact on

the outcome of an election. Thus, when a political party or an

issue group focuses an advertising campaign on competitive

districts, the intent to influence the election is clear. By

contrast, when the goal is to persuade members of Congress to

vote one way or another on a piece of pending legislation, an

issue ad campaign will be targeted at the undecided members. 

Strother Decl. ¶ 9 [DEV 9-Tab 40]; see also Lamson Decl. ¶ 6 [DEV 7-Tab

26] (“Parties and groups generally run these pre-election ‘issue ads’ only in

places where the races are competitive.”).

2.8.3.4 Empirical data likewise demonstrates that candidate-centered issue advertisements are concentrated in congressional districts and states with contested

elections. “The CMAG database97 shows that interest group financed

television ads that mentioned a candidate and were broadcast within 60 days

of an election were highly concentrated in states and congressional districts

with competitive races.” Goldstein Expert Report at 20 [DEV 3-Tab 7] (“As

shown in Table 5, during the 2000 senatorial elections, 89.2 percent of such
98 In determining which races were competitive, Goldstein relied on his professional

judgment as informed by various media sources including the Cook Report which he attached

to his expert report. Goldstein Expert Report at 20 n.17 [DEV 3-Tab 7]. The Cook Report

is also used by Plaintiffs to handicap races. LaPierre Dep. at 196 [JDT Vol. 14] (“Q. What

were your sources of information from which you determined which races were close or

which races were in battleground states or whatever? A. Newsletters, the media, just the

general turning on the television. I mean, everybody–there are no secrets in–when you get

into a campaign, I mean, everybody knows. I mean, it’s–the columnists, the TV, the radio,

the–I mean, every newsletter you pick up, whether it’s the Cook Report. . . .”); Ryan Dep.

at 76-77 [JDT Vol. 27] (recalling that he would check the Cook Report to find out which

races of Congress were competitive).

298

interest group ads ran in states where the race was competitive. Four states

accounted for 77 percent of the ads broadcast by interest groups; political

parties broadcast 65 percent of their ads in these four states. Interest group ads

were particularly important in Michigan, where interest groups broadcast 22

percent of the total ads broadcast in the race.”);98 id. at 21 (“The geographical

distribution of interest group ads in Senate elections closely paralleled that of

the political parties, which ran 90.6 percent of their ads in those competitive

states. The same was true in House elections. As demonstrated in Table 6,

during 2000, 85.3 percent of interest group financed ads broadcast within 60

days of the election were aired in congressional districts with competitive

elections. Similarly, the political parties ran 98.2 percent of their ads in those

districts.”) (footnotes omitted); see generally id. at 3, 20-24, Tbls. 5- 6; Krasno

and Sorauf Report, App. Tbls. 4-5 [DEV 1-Tab 2]; see also Buying Time 2000

at 53 [DEV 46] (“The competitiveness of candidate races also affects the
299

magnitude and timing of political advertising.”). This expert testimony has not

been challenged by Plaintiffs with any contrary expert evidence.

2.8.3.5 Indeed, even Plaintiff NRA admits that it targets its issue advocacy campaigns

toward competitive races. NRA Executive Vice President Wayne LaPierre

testified that “ the other thing that makes an impact on what the NRA does is

NRA–NRA, in terms of its election efforts–and when I say NRA, I’m

including the whole organization–tends to focus on competitive races.”

LaPierre Dep. at 118 [JDT Vol. 14]; see also id. at 105 (“Q. Is it correct that

the NRA spent as much as it could to get its message to gun owning voters in

critical swing states? A. That’s true.”) 196 (“Okay. Now, we’ve talked a little

bit about the location of your ads and that they were at least concentrated on

close races or battleground states. You and I may differ on whether that–A.

Right. Q.–where the proportion is, but they’re concentrated on those races. A.

Right.”); supra Findings ¶ 2.6.4.1 (national election media recommendations

by NRA media consultant who proposes focusing issue advocacy on ten

congressional seats in ‘battle ground’ states).

2.8.4 In sum, the uncontroverted record establishes that pure issue advocacy is

empirically distinguishable from candidate-centered issue advocacy on the

basis of (a) whether the federal candidate is named; (b) whether the

advertisement is run in close proximity to a federal election; and (c) if the
300

advertisement is run in a competitive race. As the uncontroverted testimony

of Defense expert David Magleby states:

A number of indicia make clear that the ads run by individuals

and interest groups are in reality electioneering ads that are

meant to influence, and do influence, elections: These

electioneering ads generally name a candidate, run close in time

to the election, target the named candidate’s district, are run

primarily in competitive races, and generally track the themes in

the featured candidate’s campaign.

Magleby Report at 6 [DEV 4-Tab 8] (emphasis added). Magleby outlines a

general rule that candidate-centered issue advertising is distinguishable from

pure issue advertising.

2.8.5 Despite being able to empirically distinguish candidate-centered issue

advocacy from pure issue advocacy, the record demonstrates that it is very

difficult, if not impossible, to determine the objective behind an advertisement

by simply listening or viewing the advertisement; particularly when that

advertisement is viewed outside the context of the election. 

2.8.5.1 Political Consultant Raymond Strother testifies:

None of us, without understanding the context and the time, can

tell you what a sham ad is and a nonsham ad. You can’t do that

by looking at pictures or even looking at the ads. When I was

teaching at Harvard, I brought Doug Bailey up to lecture my

class. He showed [a] series of commercials, and he said, “Okay,

which is the best commercial,” and everybody voted. “The

worse commercial,” and everybody voted. He said, “You’re all

wrong. There is no best or worse commercial because none of

you are qualified to judge these commercials because you don’t

know the context in which they were run or the problems they
99 The text of the advertisement is as follows:

Worried about rising healthcare costs? Then look out for the trial

lawyers. They want Congress to pass new liability laws that could

overwhelm the system with expensive new healthcare lawsuits.

Lawsuits that could make the trial lawyers richer. That could make

healthcare unaffordable for millions. Senator Lauch Faircloth is

fighting to stop the trial lawyers [sic] new laws. Call him today and tell

(continued...)

301

were to solve.” When I look at storyboards, I have no way of

knowing if they’re fake, real, et cetera, because I don't know the

time -- I don’t know anything about them.

Strother Cross Exam. at 90-91. Strother’s testimony demonstrates that it is

difficult to discern the true purpose of an advertisement without viewing it in

its context. Rather, as discussed above, the best way to distinguish pure issue

advocacy from candidate-centered issue advocacy is through empirical

variables dealing with when and where the advertisement is run, and whether

it mentions a federal candidate.

2.8.5.2 An example of the difficulty of discerning the objective behind an

advertisement is presented by Defendants and comes from the 1998 Senate

campaign between incumbent Senator Lauch Faircloth and now-Senator John

Edwards. An advertisement run during the campaign by the American

Association of Health Plans (“AAHP”) told viewers to call Senator Faircloth

“today and tell him to keep up his fight” against trial lawyers’ efforts to pass

new liability laws. Gov’t Opp’n at 82-83; Def. App. C, Tab 1 at 1 (“Look Out

for the Lawyers”).99 Defendants point out that this advertisement might appear
99(...continued)

him to keep up his fight. Because if trial lawyers win, working families

lose.

Def. App. C, Tab 1 at 1. This advertisement was submitted by Plaintiffs on a CD as a

“powerful illustration of the . . . type of issue advocacy that would be prohibited by BCRA’s

primary definition of ‘electioneering communications.’” McConnell Br. at 61.

302

to be an example of “genuine issue advocacy” if not for the fact that “[a]t the

time this ad was run, the airwaves in North Carolina were saturated with

millions of dollars of ads run by Senator Faircloth’s campaign, by the

Republican party, and by interest groups portraying Edwards as a ‘deceptive,’

truth stretching trial lawyer. Edwards’ own campaign ads trumpeted Edwards

as a trial lawyer ‘fighting for the people.’” Gov’t Opp’n at 83; see also Def.

App. C, Tab 1 at 2 (Faircloth-sponsored advertisement titled “Stretch the

Truth,” asking: “Who teaches other lawyers how to stretch the truth? Meet

personal injury lawyer John Edwards.”); id. at 3 (Faircloth-sponsored

advertisement titled “You are,” telling voters they were paying for Edwards’

campaign because “[h]e makes millions suing people. Our hospitals and

family doctors, so we all pay more for medical care”); id. at 4 (Fairclothsponsored advertisement titled “The Truth,” stating “Newspapers say “. . .

[Edwards] has the lawyer’s habit of stretching the truth.”); id at 7 (Edwardssponsored advertisement titled “Who I Am,” which states: “As a young lawyer,

I decided to represent people, not big insurance companies.”); id at 5-6, 8-12.
303

2.9 BCRA’s Restriction on “Electioneering Communication”

As discussed earlier, Congress clearly recognized that labor unions and corporations

were easily evading FECA’s prohibition on their use of general treasury funds to

influence federal elections by running broadcast advertisements that did not use words

of express advocacy but were clearly designed to influence federal elections.

Moreover, as discussed above, these general treasury funds purchased the most

effective form of political communication. In Buckley, the Supreme Court observed

that “the distinction between discussion of issues and candidates and advocacy of

election or defeat of candidates may often dissolve in practical application.” Buckley,

424 U.S. at 42. For this reason, the Supreme Court made clear that a test

distinguishing between a discussion of issues and a discussion of candidates that

relied on the subjective intent of the listener was problematic. Id. at 44 (“In short, the

supposedly clear-cut distinction between discussion, laudation, general advocacy, and

solicitation puts the speaker in these circumstances wholly at the mercy of the varied

understanding of his hearers and consequently of whatever inference may be drawn

as to his intent and meaning. Such a distinction offers no security for free

discussion.”) (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 535 (1945)). In enacting

Title II’s restriction on “electioneering communication,” Congress recognized the

Supreme Court’s admonition in Buckley that legislation distinguishing between issue

advocacy and candidate discussion must, if at all possible, avoid reliance on the
304

subjective impressions of the listener. BCRA accomplishes this feat with the primary

definition of electioneering communication. 

2.9.1 Section 203 of BCRA extends the prohibition on corporate and labor union

general treasury funds being used in connection with a federal election to

cover “electioneering communication”. BCRA § 203; FECA § 316(b)(2); 2

U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2). Section 201 of BCRA amends section 304 of FECA by

adding the following definition of an “electioneering communication”:

(i) The term “electioneering communication” means any

broadcast, cable, or satellite communication which–

(I) refers to a clearly identified candidate for Federal

office;

(II) is made within– 

(aa) 60 days before a general, special, or runoff election for the

office sought by the candidate; or

(bb) 30 days before a primary or preference election, or a

convention or caucus of a political party that has authority to

nominate a candidate, for the office sought by the candidate; and

(III) in the case of a communication which refers to a candidate

for an office other than President or Vice President, is targeted

to the relevant electorate.

BCRA § 201(a); FECA § 304(f)(3)(A); 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(A). Under this

definition, in order to constitute an electioneering communication, therefore,

the communication (a) must be disseminated by cable, broadcast, or satellite,

(b) must refer to a clearly identified Federal candidate, (c) must be distributed

within certain time periods before an election, and (d) must be targeted to the

relevant electorate. Id. The fact that the communication must be “targeted to
305

the relevant electorate,” means that, in the case of House and Senate races, the

communication will not constitute an “electioneering communication” unless

50,000 or more individuals in the relevant Congressional district or state that

the candidate for the House or Senate are seeking to represent can receive the

communication. BCRA § 201; FECA § 304(f)(3)(C); 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(C).

2.9.2 By adopting a definition of electioneering communication that by and large is

premised on the empirical determinants that Congress found distinguish pure

issue advocacy from candidate-centered issue advocacy, Congress adopted a

definition of electioneering communication that rejected reliance on the

subjective impressions of the listener and focuses on objective variables that

do an impressive job, in most circumstances, of distinguishing between

candidate-centered issue advertising and pure issue advertising. The lone

question remaining is whether the primary definition of electioneering

communication is narrowly tailored to capture candidate-centered issue

advocacy from pure issue advocacy. After carefully reviewing the evidence

in the record, I conclude that it is narrowly tailored.

2.10 The Primary Definition of Electioneering Communication is Narrowly Tailored

to Radio & Television Advertisements

Electioneering communication is narrowly defined to only include communications

disseminated by cable, broadcast, or satellite. By including only the media that were

found by Congress to be problematic, the primary definition of electioneering
306

communication is narrowly tailored.

2.10.1 Defense expert Magleby observes that broadcast advertising is the most

prevalent form of communicating candidate-centered issue advocacy.

Magleby states that 

[b]roadcast advertising is the most visible mode of

communicating an electioneering message and is believed to be

the most effective for reaching a mass audience. In all of the

contests we monitored in 1998 and 2000, interest groups used

broadcast, including television and radio, to communicate with

voters. . . . 

Broadcast advertising was an especially important element in all

of the competitive races we monitored in 2000. . . . In Senate

races, television and radio were also major components of the

candidate and outside money campaigns. . . .

Radio is also an effective communications tool for

electioneering by interest groups. As with television, if the

communications do not use the particular language of express

advocacy, the groups do not report the expenditures to the FEC,

and stations do not provide the same disclosure that they provide

for campaign communications by candidates. Academics

monitoring our sample of competitive contests in 2000 found the

interest groups making use of radio for electioneering efforts

included the NRA, Americans for Limited Terms, U.S.Chamber

of Commerce, NFIB, NEA, League of Conservation Voters,

Million Mom March PAC, Planned Parenthood and the National

Right to Life PAC. Of the 105 radio ads we recorded, only 20

ads contained the magic words.

Magleby Expert Report at 22 [DEV 4-Tab 8]. 

2.10.2 Those intimately involved in making candidate-centered issue advertisements

confirm this expert testimony.

• Denise Mitchell, Special Assistant for Public Affairs to AFL-CIO
307

President John J. Sweeney, confirms this conclusion. Mitchell states:

The AFL-CIO also sometimes purchases newspaper

advertising for its issue advocacy. We have usually done

so in newspapers with high readership among Members

of Congress and their staffs . . . . When we are seeking to

influence and mobilize public opinion, however, we

almost always have used broadcast advertising because

it is far more cost-effective; most people get their news

and information from broadcast sources; newspaper

readership is tilted toward higher-income readers, and we

try to reach working and middle-class families; and

broadcasts simply have a more potent effect, including

the ability to generate additional ‘free media’ . . . . Also,

newspapers are a more passive medium, with less

immediacy than broadcast, and are less likely to generate

action, and it is far harder to convey in print the human,

personal impact of legislative issues -- a key part of our

strategy and effectiveness.

Declaration of Denise Mitchell ¶ 28 [6 PCS]; see also id. ¶ 29

(explaining why the AFL-CIO does not use direct mail or telephone

banks to reach the general public).

• Political consultant Rocky Pennington testifies that 

[e]ffective electioneering is crucial in political

campaigns. Television, an emotion-based medium, is the

most effective. Radio can also be effective, depending

on the specific market you’re trying to reach. For

example, if you’re in a Republican primary and want to

reach Republican males between the ages of 18 and 45,

Rush Limbaugh radio is probably a good buy. Direct

mail can also be very effective, in a different way, since

it is more of an information-based medium. You’re

reaching voters at different levels, and it’s good to have

a good mix. The above media are good for both

candidate and third party communications in a campaign.
308

Pennington Decl. ¶ 9 [DEV 8-Tab 31]. Pennington provides an

example of a particularly effective candidate-centered issue

advertisement run on the radio:

Other interest groups also ran ads trying to elect Mr.

Keller in the Republican primary and the run-off. One ad

run against Mr. Sublette that I thought probably cost us

a couple points in the primary was a radio spot run, as I

recall, primarily on conservative talk radio and maybe

some Christian stations by Americans for Limited Terms.

This ad attacked Mr. Sublette on tax and other issues,

basically calling him a big government liberal, while

praising Mr. Keller as a real conservative. 

Id. ¶ 16. 

• Communications consultant Angus McQueen, who has “provided

strategic communications advice and services to the” NRA and the

NRA PVF for approximately 22 years, states that among the various

media outlets “for conveying [NRA’s] message, the most powerful is

the use of ‘paid broadcast media,’ which simply refers to paid media

that is broadcast over network, cable, or satellite television, or over the

radio.” McQueen Decl. ¶¶ 3, 10 [11 PCS]. 

2.10.3 As a result of the following testimony and discussion, I disagree with the

NRA’s contention that “[a]ds broadcast over the internet are comparable to

those broadcast over TV and radio in terms of their public reach and impact.”

Proposed Findings of Fact of the NRA and NRA PVF ¶ 22. In support of this
309

finding, the NRA cites only to three items of evidence. This evidence does

not support the NRA’s conclusion.

2.10.3.1 The first piece of evidence is the declaration of Angus McQueen, the NRA’s

long-time communications consultant, which notes that the Internet has

become an “increasingly important part of how information becomes

disseminated in our society,” resulting in “information [being] disseminated

more rapidly, by a greater variety and multitude of diverse sources, than in was

in the past.” McQueen Decl. ¶ 17 [11 PCS] (emphasis added). “Thus, as

illustrated by the popularity of the NRA’s website and its “NRA Live!” service

[a daily NRA webcast news program], groups like the NRA have in a sense

taken over part of the role previously played by the media.” Id. This

testimony only observes that the Internet is becoming an “increasingly

important” means of communication. It makes no effort to compare traditional

television and radio advertising to Internet communications. With the NRA’s

webcast, “NRA Live!”, viewers make a choice to go to the website and

download or watch the program, while advertisements on television and radio

are aired throughout programming without any viewer choice. The NRA fails

to explain this critical distinction. The Internet and television and radio

advertising are completely different forms of media and without testimony

comparing the two, I find this evidence does not support the NRA’s
310

conclusion.

2.10.3.2 The second piece of evidence is a submission of “NRA Live!” viewership

statistics for the periods of March 1999 through March 2000 and March 2001

through August 2002. NRA App. at 322-23. The NRA makes no effort to

compare these numbers to traditional television and radio ratings and therefore

it is impossible from this submission to determine if the NRA Internet program

has a comparable impact to that of traditional television and radio advertising.

Moreover, the viewership statistics are missing data during the period of April

2000 through to March of 2001; precisely the period around the 2000 federal

election. As a result, the data does not even demonstrate if the NRA program

was being viewed more or less during the election cycle.

2.10.3.3 Third, the NRA provides two videotapes containing multiple editions of “NRA

Live!” Broadcasts. NRA App. I. This evidence does absolutely nothing to

prove that the Internet has the same impact as television and radio

broadcasting.

2.10.3.4 In sum, I do not find that the Internet is now, or was, a comparable medium to

television and radio broadcast advertising. Indeed, the NRA’s own media

consultant testifies that “paid media that is broadcast over network, cable, or

satellite television, or over the radio,” is the “most powerful” medium for

conveying its message. McQueen Decl. ¶ 10 [11 PCS]. If the Internet medium
311

was as effective as the NRA claims, then it is unclear why the NRA spent as

much money on candidate-centered broadcast issue advertising as it did

during the 2000 elections. Why not just spend the funds on Internet

advertising if that were as effective? The NRA does not answer this question.

2.10.4 Although there seems to be agreement that direct mail is an important tool of

campaigning, there is no evidence in the record that it is nearly as effective as

broadcast advertising. Defendants’ expert Magleby states that campaign mail

“can be very effective.” Magleby Expert Report at 25 [DEV 4-Tab 8]. Rocky

Pennington, a political consultant, comments that direct mail is usually a

component of political campaign plans. Pennington Decl. ¶ 3 [DEV 8-Tab

31]. Much like newspaper advertising, direct mail is “a more passive medium,

with less immediacy than broadcast, and [is] less likely to generate action.”

Mitchell Decl. ¶ 28 [6 PCS]. Accordingly, I do not find direct mail to be as

effective or as problematic as broadcast candidate-centered issue advertising.

2.10.5 For the same reason I do not find newspaper advertising to be as effective as

candidate-centered issue advertisements broadcast on radio and television.

The NRA proposes the following finding: 

Newspaper ads often dwarf broadcast ads, especially radio ads,

in terms of their expense. For instance, a full-page ad in the

New York Times would cost $65,000 whereas a 60 second radio

broadcast that recites precisely the same text in a small market

such as Peoria would cost only $75. 
312

Proposed Findings of Fact of the NRA and NRA PVF ¶ 20. In support of this

statement, the NRA cites to two pieces of evidence: a statement by their

communications consultant, Angus McQueen, that a 60 second radio

commercial in a major media market costs $850, while one in a smaller market

sells for $75, McQueen Decl. ¶ 24 [NRA App. 34], and a declaration that is

unidentified stating that a group called “Campaign for America” purchased a

full-page advertisement in July 1998 in the New York Times which cost

$64,581.30, NRA App. 256-57 ¶ 12. Simply because a print advertisement is

more expensive in the New York Times than a local radio spot in Peoria does

not mean that the latter is relatively more effective. The far more useful

comparison would be between an advertisement in The New York Times, a

newspaper with nationwide circulation, and a broadcast advertisement aired

on a national broadcast network. The NRA has not produced any evidence to

demonstrate that when the comparison is properly restated it is more effective

to communicate in print advertising. Indeed, Plaintiffs concede that it is not

as effective. Mitchell Decl. ¶ 28 [6 PCS] (“When we are seeking to influence

and mobilize public opinion, however, we almost always have used broadcast

advertising [as opposed to newspaper advertising] because it is far more

cost-effective; most people get their news and information from broadcast

sources; newspaper readership is tilted toward higher-income readers, and we
313

try to reach working and middle-class families; and broadcasts simply have a

more potent effect, including the ability to generate additional ‘free media’ .

. . . Also, newspapers are a more passive medium, with less immediacy than

broadcast, and are less likely to generate action, and it is far harder to convey

in print the human, personal impact of legislative issues -- a key part of our

strategy and effectiveness.”). Accordingly, I do not find that newspaper

advertising poses a comparable problem to that of broadcast advertisements

detailed supra.

2.10.6 The primary definition of electioneering communication is narrowly tailored

to only the communication media that was problematic. The evidence

demonstrates that more than any other medium, broadcast advertisements were

the vehicle through which corporations and labor unions spent their general

treasury funds to influence federal elections. This focus is neither overbroad

nor underinclusive in scope as my Findings demonstrate.

2.11 The Primary Definition of Electioneering Communication is Narrowly Tailored

by Broadcast Advertisements Appearing Sixty Days Before a General Election

and Thirty Days Before a Primary Election, That Name a Candidate, and Are

Targeted to that Candidate’s Electorate

BCRA only applies to broadcast advertisements that refer to a federal candidate, that

are targeted at the candidate’s electorate, and that are broadcast within sixty days of

a general election and thirty days of a primary election. By focusing on these

characteristics, the primary definition of electioneering communication demonstrates
314

narrow tailoring. 

2.11.1 As an initial matter, it is important to observe that Dr. Milkis, Plaintiffs’

expert, testifies that advertising aired more than 30 days before a primary or

more than 60 days before an election “can serve to frame the terms of debate.”

Milkis Rebuttal Decl. ¶ 9 [RNC Vol. VII]. For example, there are examples

of arrangements between political parties and candidates, whereby political

parties have run advertisements for the candidates during the summer months

when the candidate was low on funds, which permitted the candidate to save

money to be spent on advertisements later in the election cycle. Magleby

Expert Report at 47 [DEV 4-Tab 8] (noting such arrangements between

Senators Debbie Stabenow and Chuck Robb and their political parties during

the 2000 election cycle). Nevertheless, even though advertisements aired

outside the thirty and sixty day period can influence voters, Congress

recognized that most candidate-centered issue advertisements were targeted in

close proximity to a federal election. See supra Findings ¶¶ 2.8.1.3, 2.8.2

(discussing the fact that candidate-centered issue advocacy is concentrated in

the weeks surrounding federal elections).

2.11.2 It is also important to note that it is unrebutted that advertisements naming

federal candidates, targeted to their electorate, and aired in the period before

the election, influence voters. Political consultant Raymond Strother, testifies
315

that in his experience consulting for candidates’ campaigns, all political

advertisements that mention a candidate’s name in the weeks leading up to an

election, regardless of intent and regardless of whether express advocacy is

used, influence voters. Strother Cross Exam. at 70 [JDT Vol. 32] (“I do not

believe there are issue ads run immediately before an election that mentioned

the candidate that aren’t important in the decision-making process of the

voter.”). Strother’s belief is based on his view that voters assimilate and

process information from a variety of different sources; creating, in his

parlance, a “big cajun stew.” Id. at Ex. 1 (Strother Declaration) ¶ 4. These

various sources ultimately combine to help a voter make a decision. Strother

elaborated on this point during cross examination:

[P]eople, although they’re interested, they’re casually interested

voters. Often you’ll run an ad with a certain line in it, and when

you poll or go into a focus group, they credit the line to your

opponent. That’s how casually they watch television, but it’s in

this climate where they don’t know where they get their

information. Samuel Popkin wrote a book called, The

Reasoning Voter, and Popkin says that Americans assimilate

information through thousands of different sources to make their

opinions, and they’re not sure where they came from, but it’s a

big stew. It’s a bit of information here from a brother-in-law, a

bit of information here from the barber, a bit of information here

from a television ad or a radio ad, and they forget where the

information came from. 

Strother Cross Exam. at 34-35 [JDT Vol. 32]. This explanation is the reason

that Strother concludes that advertisements run immediately prior to a
316

candidate’s election that mention the candidate ultimately have some influence

on the decision-making process of the voter. See id. at 70; see also Resp. of

NAB to FEC’s First RFA’s, No. 4 [DEV 12-Tab 7] (“NAB admits that a

Political Advertisement might conceivably influence a federal election without

the use of any particular words as might many other factors depending upon

the circumstances of each individual race.”); supra Findings ¶ 2.3.2 (Bailey)

(“Over time, a campaign defines a candidate through a combination of style,

image, and issues. Even shortly after watching an ad, the target audience

usually doesn’t remember the ad’s substantive details. Rather, the viewers just

get a feel for the candidate. It takes a lot of these “feels” to make up a

campaign.”). 

Plaintiffs do not challenge Strother’s conclusion with contrary testimony

from other political consultants. Instead they rely on their own self-serving

testimony and self-selected advertisements they claim are pure issue

advertisements that would be unfairly captured by BCRA’s primary definition

of electioneering communication. BCRA’s primary definition of

electioneering communication presents an empirical test that ignores this type

of self-serving ex post facto rationalization by focusing on purely objective

criteria: broadcast advertisements, referring to a federal candidate, targeted to

that candidate’s electorate, and aired in close proximity to a federal election
100 According to the AFL-CIO, “Save” was run “[a]fter the [Taxpayer Relief Act]

(continued...)

317

influence voters.

2.11.3 For example, the McConnell Plaintiffs provide this three-judge District Court

with 21 advertisements aired during the 1998 and 2000 election cycles,

claiming they serve as “powerful illustrations of the amount and type of issue

advocacy that would be prohibited by BCRA’s primary definition of

‘electioneering communications.’” McConnell Br. at 61; PCS CD 8.

2.11.3.1 With regard to these allegedly “powerful illustrations” of BCRA’s overbreadth,

Defendants point out that nine of the twenty-one advertisements proffered by

the McConnell Plaintiffs would not have been affected by BCRA; eight were

not run within 60 days of a general election or 30 days of a primary contest,

and one was run in the Washington, D.C. media market where the two

Senators mentioned, Senator Jesse Helms of North Carolina, and Senator

Joseph Biden of Delaware, were not running for office. Gov’t Opp’n at 78 &

n.78 (identifying PCS CD 8 at Tracks 5, 7, 10, 12-17). Plaintiffs do not rebut

these statements. 

2.11.3.2 Of the advertisements that remain, four highlight past votes of the candidate,

PCS CD 8 at Tracks 9 (“Stabenow Death Tax,” Def. App. C, Tab 2 at 2), 18

(“Job,” Mitchell Decl. Ex. 141 [6 PCS]), 19, 20, four urge action on upcoming

votes, id. at Tracks 2, 3 (“Save,” 100 Mitchell Decl. Ex. 113 [6 PCS]), 6
100(...continued)

passed the House and was being considered in the Senate.” Mitchell Decl. ¶ 52 [PCS 6].

This advertisement was “intended to influence House Members in the event that the bill

returned for another vote in the Senate [sic].” Id. It was run between October 2 to October

9, 1998. Id. 

101 See supra Finding ¶ 2.8.5.2 (discussing this advertisement).

318

(“Label,” Mitchell Decl. Ex. 132 [6 PCS]), 11, three criticize candidate

positions on term limits, Medicare funding and a prescription drug plan, id. at

1, 8, 21, and one commends the candidate’s fight against trial lawyers,101 id.

at 4 (“Look Out For the Lawyers,” Def. App C, Tab 1 at 1). 

2.11.3.3 Of this meager showing, I do not consider the four advertisements on a

candidate’s past votes as probative. Criticizing a candidate on past votes in the

period of time immediately before a federal election with no indication of

future legislation on the issue likely serves no purpose other than to affect the

outcome of the election. As a result I find those four advertisements to be

examples of electioneering. See supra Findings ¶ 2.6.7. 

2.11.3.4 What the McConnell Plaintiffs are left with is at most eight advertisements that

they claim are pure issue advertisements that would be affected by BCRA. As

I have already concluded that it is very difficult, if not impossible, to discern

retroactively the true intent of an issue advertisement, see supra Finding ¶

2.8.5, I do not engage in a similar parsing of these advertisements. I would

note that it is very likely that these eight advertisements did influence federal
319

elections because they refer to a federal candidate in a broadcast advertisement

aired in close proximity to a federal election, and targeted to the candidate’s

electorate. See supra Finding ¶ 2.11.2. Moreover, Defendants, DefendantIntervenors, and my own Findings cast doubt on Plaintiffs’ assertion that these

advertisements did not serve an electioneering purpose, see, e.g., supra

Finding ¶ 2.8.5.2 (discussing trial lawyer advertisements around the

Edwards/Faircloth election). Nevertheless, the primary definition of

electioneering communication focuses on objective criteria precisely to avoid

trying to guess the true intent of an advertisement. For the foregoing reasons

even assuming these eight advertisements were pure issue advertisements, I do

not find that they demonstrate overbreadth. Simply put, eight advertisements

covering a pool of at least two election cycles–including both primaries and

general elections–do not serve as “powerful illustrations” of the overbreadth

of BCRA’s primary definition of “electioneering communications.”

McConnell Br. at 61.

2.11.4 Defendants identify an additional 39 advertisements Plaintiffs use in their

briefings as examples of genuine issue advertisements which would be unfairly

affected by BCRA’s provisions. Gov’t Opp’n at 77-94. Plaintiffs do not rebut

this figure. In addition to these advertisements, I have found four additional

advertisements alleged in declarations to be examples of legislative-centered
102 Laura W. Murphy has served as the ACLU's legislative director since 1993.

(continued...)

320

advertisements that would be affected by BCRA.

2.11.4.1 For twelve of these advertisements, Plaintiffs provide the Court with no

specific information regarding the dates they were run except that they were

aired in 1994. These twelve advertisements were sponsored by the NRA and

concerned the Brady gun law and a crime bill. NRA App. 885-88 [12 PCS];

see also LaPierre Decl. ¶ 21 [11 PCS] (stating only that the crime bill

commercials were run in 1994). Without any information as to their airing

dates, I am unable to reach any conclusion about them and therefore do not

consider them. Thirteen other commercials, also sponsored by the NRA,

would escape BCRA’s effects because they were run in 2000 and referred only

to President Clinton who was not a candidate for office at that time. NRA

App. 914-16 [12 PCS]. Accordingly, I exclude from consideration these

thirteen advertisements as well. 

2.11.4.2 Another advertisement, sponsored by the ACLU, I exclude from consideration

because it was clearly designed simply to provide the corporation standing to

challenge BCRA. The ACLU cites, as an example, an advertising campaign

directed at Speaker Dennis Hastert, who represents the fourteenth district of

Illinois, run in March of 2002, urging him to bring the Employment NonDiscrimination Act (ENDA) to a full vote in the House. Murphy102 Decl. ¶ 10
102(...continued)

Murphy Decl. ¶ 1 [3 PCS].

321

[3 PCS]; see also Text of advertisements, 3 PCS/ACLU 14-17. The

advertisement was broadcast on multiple Chicago and Aurora, Illinois radio

stations throughout the weekend of March 15-March 17, 2002. Id. Since the

advertisement was run within thirty days of a primary election, the commercial

would have constituted an electioneering communication under BCRA and

would have violated BCRA because it was paid for with the general treasury

funds of a corporation. Id. (observing that the “ACLU also hoped to highlight

the constitutional flaws of BCRA”). An internal ACLU document

demonstrates that the ACLU’s purpose in running the advertisement was to

create a commercial that would violate BCRA. A March 10, 2002, e-mail

from Laura Murphy, legislative director of the ACLU, to her colleagues,

explained why the ACLU’s March 2002 Hastert ad was run:

Anthony wants the ACLU to be in a position to challenge

Shays-Meehan when it becomes law as early as during the

Easter recess. As you know the issue advocacy restrictions

would select groups like the ACLU if we want to take out and

[sic] ad 30 days before a primary or 60 days before a general

election in broadcast, satellite or cable outlets. These ads would

have to reach 50,000 people or more and would have to mention

the name of a candidate. Steve thinks that the ads that we ran

during the 2000 election cycle would not qualify to give us clear

standing to challenge the law.

Anthony wants us to run these ads and he has said that he has

501(c) 4 money to do them! I have a chart in my office, but I
322

can also fax one to you from New York tomorrow 3-1-02, that

show all of the primary dates around the country. When You

[sic] get that, I need you to look at the states where there are

primaries and see if you can find a candidate whom we could

target for an issue ad. For example it is too soon to do an ad by

Tuesday, but Tuesday, March 12 is the Texas primary and we

could decide that Chet Edwards is on the fence about something

and run an ad that says, “Call Chet Edwards and ask him to

support xyz.” Anthony said that he has money to pay for such

an ad. Or we could target a Senator on election reform.

Remember it does not have to be TV, as the broadcast restriction

in Shays-Meehan covers radio as well. We would like to run

these ads before the bill becomes law. WHICH ONLY GIVES

US ABOUT TWO WEEKS TO PULL THIS TOGETHER!!

Phil, I know you have been busy with the web crisis (which you

did not tell me about), so you are probably crazed. But I was

hoping that Greg could take the lead on finding the issue that

will still be important in tow [sic] weeks where we can target a

member and it will make sense. I think that the issue we pick

should be a priority so that we do not waste 501(c)(4) money on

something we are not really concerned about.

Email Message Attached as Ex. to Resps. of American Civil Liberties Union

to Defendant’s Second Set of Requests for Production of Documents, Ex. B;

USA-ACLU-00003 [DEV 130-Tab 4] (italics added). Defense experts Krasno

and Sorauf comment on the ACLU’s Hastert advertisement:

In short, BCRA is remarkably successful in differentiating

between the vast majority of pure issue ads and

candidate-oriented issue ads. 

Nevertheless, the ACLU has demonstrated with a commercial

about gay rights, aired in House Speaker Dennis Hastert’s

district last spring before the GOP primary, that it is possible to

deliberately create a pure issue ad that runs afoul of BCRA.

This episode deserves special scrutiny, and we would emphasize
323

several points. It is telling, from our perspective as students of

elections and campaigns, that the ACLU was forced to fabricate

its own example of a pure issue ad that would be improperly

categorized by BCRA. Given the huge numbers of issue ads

broadcast in 1998 and 2000, if plaintiffs are correct in their dire

predications about how BCRA would damage free speech rights,

it should have been easy to find numerous real-life examples to

illustrate the same point. In fact, very few pure issue ads would

have been affected by BCRA. Even more telling, however, the

ad that the ACLU ran was designed in a specific way to trigger

BCRA. It need not have done so. 

Krasno and Sorauf Report at 62-63 [DEV 1-Tab 2]; see also Text of ads, 3

PCS/ACLU 16-17 (noting script of advertisement that the ACLU ran in the

print media over this issue). Given this information surrounding the

background of the ACLU advertisement, I exclude it from consideration.

2.11.4.3 Another advertisement run by the AFL-CIO, titled “Sky,” criticized Members

of Congress for a past vote. Mitchell Decl. Ex. 139 (“Sky”); see also id. ¶ 59

(failing to note whether there was any upcoming legislation related to the past

votes that the advertisement might have been targeting). Similar to my

conclusion above, I do not consider this advertisement because I find it to be

electioneering.

2.11.4.4 Of the remaining twelve advertisements, four commercials are discussed in

detail in other paragraphs of my Findings or the appendix to my opinion. See

Findings ¶¶ 2.6.6.2 (ABC advertisement concerning penalties for child

molesters), App. ¶ I.D.7.i, I.D.8.c (Anti-abortion commercial identifying
103 “California” and “It Can’t Happen Here” are discussed in greater detail supra, App.

¶ I.D.8.h.

104 “Tribute” includes the following statement delivered by Charlton Heston:

The NRA is baaaaaaack. [Much applause] All of this spells very serious

trouble for a man named Gore. [Applause]. That leads me to that one

mission that is left undone -- winning in November. . . . So, as we set

out this year to defeat the divisive forces that would take freedom away,

I want to say these fighting words for everyone within the sound of my

voice to hear and to heed and especially for you, Mr. Gore. “From my

cold dead hands.” [Much Applause].

NRA App. at 947 (emphasis in the original). The NRA states that this passage “simply

reflect[s] the NRA’s practice of soliciting members by mentioning anti-gun politicians.”

NRA Reply at 24.

105 The Southeastern Legal Foundation is a 501(c)(3) organization,McConnell Second

Amend. Compl. ¶ 36, which is exempt from BCRA’s restrictions on electioneering

communication. Final Rule, Electioneering Communications, 67 Fed. Reg. 65,190,

65,199-200 (Oct. 23, 2002) (to be codified at 11 C.F.R. 100.29(c)(6)).

324

Senators Kohl and Feingold); Findings ¶ 2.11.8.2 (“Deny” and “Barker”).

Another advertisement run by CBM was aired in response to commercials

aired by the AFL-CIO to “correct the issue debate and counter the distortions

in the ads that we just saw.” Ryan Dep. at 74-75. Of the remaining seven

advertisements, four are NRA-sponsored 30-minute “news magazines” (titled

“California,” “It Can’t Happen Here,” 103 “Million Mom March,” and

“Tribute”104), NRA Reply at 22-24, one was run by the Southeastern Legal

Foundation,105 60-Plus Association, theCenterfor Individual Freedom, and the

National Right to Work Committee, praising Senator McConnell’s stance on

campaign finance reform, McConnell Br. at 63, one was sponsored by the
106 Defendants dispute the argument that this advertisement did not have an

electioneering purpose based on the context in which the advertisement was run. Gov’t

Opp’n at 85-86. Defendants note the commercial was run only between November 1 and 6,

2000, when Congress was not in session. Id. at 85. The race was labeled a “toss-up” by the

Cook Report, and the advertisement’s “tag line – ‘Tell Matheson to make a decision. This

issue is too important to ignore.’ – played to the overall campaign theme that voters should

elect someone who is decisive and who shares their values.” Id. The Chamber does not

respond to these observations.

325

National Right to Life Committee and criticized Senator McCain’s position on

campaign finance reform, O’Steen Cross Exam. at 52, and one was a Chamber

of Commerce-sponsored commercial aired in Utah which pointed out that a

candidate had not taken a position on two competing drug prescription plans,

Chamber/NAM Br. at 5.106

2.11.4.5 I have been able to find an additional four advertisements that were cited by

Plaintiffs in declarations as being motivated by pending legislation and

happened to run within the 30 or 60-day BCRA windows. (AFL-CIO’s “No

Two Way,” “Spearmint,” “Spear,” and the Gun Owners of America’s armed

pilots advertisement). For purposes of this analysis I accept Plaintiffs’

characterization of these commercials.

2.11.4.6 Given my finding that it is very difficult to determine the objective behind the

advertisement without a thoroughgoing contextual analysis of the

advertisement, see supra Finding ¶ 2.8.5, I do not attempt to parse these

remaining sixteen advertisements to determine if their true purpose was to

affect an election. I make this statement even though I recognize that these
326

advertisements likely did influence the election by virtue of referring to a

federal candidate, in close proximity to a federal election, and targeted to the

candidate’s electorate, see supra Finding ¶ 2.11.2, and even though

Defendants, Defendant-Intervenors, and my own Findings demonstrate that

some of these advertisements were likely electioneering, See, e.g., supra

Finding ¶ 2.6.6.2 (discussing ABC’s advertisement on a candidate’s record on

child molestation legislation). Rather, I simply conclude that the evidence of

these advertisements cited in Plaintiffs briefing is not sufficient to render

BCRA overbroad. If Plaintiffs were correct, that BCRA would have such an

indelible effect on their ability to advertise about issues of importance to their

organization, I would have expected a more robust showing; particularly when

the examples they submitted are from as far back as 1996 and include

advertisements aired in close proximity to both primary and general elections.

As a result of all these considerations, I conclude that these remaining sixteen

advertisements do not demonstrate BCRA’s overbreadth; even if taken in

conjunction with the eight advertisements raised by the McConnell Plaintiffs

and discussed supra.

2.11.5 The AFL-CIO Plaintiffs have adopted a similar tactic as the McConnell

Plaintiffs in regard to primary elections and attempt through a series of

examples to show that BCRA’s thirty day window is overbroad. The AFL-
107 The AFL-CIO Plaintiffs also cite to a handful of advertisements that they claim are

pure issue advertisements that would appear within the sixty-day period. I have already

discussed these in my findings on the McConnell Plaintiffs’ twenty-one advertisements, in

the context of the thirty-nine advertisements spotted by Defendants and DefendantIntervenors in their briefing, and with regard to the four additional advertisements that I

found reviewing Plaintiffs’ submissions.

327

CIO Plaintiffs have put forth a number of advertisements which they claim are

“genuine issue advertisements” relating to pending legislation that BCRA

would capture because they ran on television and radio within 30 days of a

primary election. AFL-CIO Br. at 10-11 (citing Mitchell Decl. ¶¶ 32, 34-36,

37-39, 40, 50, 58-59). Instead of discussing these at length in my Findings, I

have analyzed them in my Appendix. See App. ¶¶ II.A.107 

2.11.5.1 These AFL-CIO examples constitute 336 cookie-cutter advertisementsselected

from a pool of at least three different election cycles. Of this number, I

determine that only 50 of these advertisements would have been arguably

affected by BCRA. Id. ¶ II.A.10. While I have some doubt that all of these

fifty remaining advertisements were designed purely to influence the pending

legislative debate and not a primary election outcome, given my finding that

discerning the true intent behind an advertisement is nearly impossible without

a fulsome understanding of the context in which the advertisement ran, see

supra Finding ¶ 2.8.5, I do not attempt to make that judgment with these

advertisements even though they likely had that effect given their content and

timing. See supra Finding ¶ 2.11.2. Given these factors and the fact that at
328

best the AFL-CIO Plaintiffs were only able to find fifty advertisements that

would be affected by BCRA out of federal primary elections covering at least

three election cycles, I conclude that the AFL-CIO Plaintiffs have not shown

that BCRA’s thirty day period is overbroad. Moreover, the record contains

other evidence that demonstrates that the thirty day primary window is

narrowly tailored.

2.11.5.2 Defendants’ experts comment that the

hodgepodge of different primary dates makes it difficult to

factor [the 30 day primary window] into the analysis, but we are

confident that it would have little effect on the proportion of

pure issue ads incorrectly captured by BCRA for the simple

reason that so few of these advertisements mention candidates

at all. Indeed, our examination of 1998 shows this to be true:

no pure issue ads would have been captured by the 30-day

primary period.

Krasno and Sorauf Expert Report at 61 [DEV 1-Tab 2].

2.11.5.3 The experts’ thesis is substantiated by empirical evidence regarding the thirty

day period. Defendant Intervenors are the only party that conducted a study

of the data to determine the impact of BCRA on advertisements run during the

2000 primary election period. Def. Int. Reply at 59. They found 76 distinct

advertisements, which aired more than 60 days before the election from the

CMAG database, comprising 16,916 airings. Id. at 59 & n.201. Of these

advertisements, three percent of the airings (522 out of 16,916) named a

candidate and were aired within 30 days of the candidate’s primary. Id. at 59
329

& n.202. Examining the student codings, the Defendant Intervenors found the

majority of the advertisements had been deemed “electioneering,” resulting in

a finding that of the advertisements identifying a candidate and airing within

30 days of a 2000 primary election, 1.2 percent were “genuine issue

advertisements.” Id. at 59. As none of the other parties submitted any study

dismissing these results or objecting to Defendant-Intervenors’ study, I accept

the conclusions reached therein. As I have already found that candidatecentered issue advertisements are used to influence primary elections, see

Findings ¶¶ 2.6.5.5, 2.10.2 (Pennington), 2.6.6.5 (New Hampshire Presidential

primary advertisement referencing Senator McCain), I conclude that on the

basis of my Findings relating to the AFL-CIO advertisements, Defense experts

Krasno & Sorauf’s results, and Defendant-Intervenors’ analysis, BCRA’s

thirty day window is narrowly tailored.

2.11.6 As discussed in this section, Plaintiffs have focused on examining the intent

behind their advertisements to demonstrate BCRA’s purported overbreadth.

However, Plaintiffs have not been able to provide any evidence to support this

position that is not either self-serving testimony or evidence rebutted by

contrary evidence.

2.11.7 There is a disputed issue of fact about whether advertisements that name a

federal candidate, are aired in that candidate’s electorate, and broadcast in
330

close proximity to the candidate’s election are ever pure issue advertisements.

Given this disputed issue, I cannot agree with Plaintiffs that the primary

definition of electioneering communication is overbroad.

2.11.7.1 Political consultants testify that there is minimal utility in running a genuine

issue advertisement in the 60 days before a federal election. As a result, issue

advertisements run in that time frame are most likely designed to influence the

outcome of a federal election. Pennington Decl. ¶ 10 [DEV 8-Tab 31]

(“Parties and interest groups would not spend hundreds of thousands of dollars

to run these [soft money] ads 15 days before an election if they were not trying

to affect the result. These candidate-specific ads are not usually run the year

before the election or the week after.”); Lamson Decl. ¶ 6 [DEV 7-Tab 26]

(“These ‘issue ads’ generally stop on the day of the election.”); Strother Decl.

¶ 7 [DEV 9-Tab 40] (“[T]hese issue advertisements were run when there were

no pending elections. For these true issue ads, we specifically avoided the

months right before the election because (a) air time would be more expensive;

and (b) each ad would just become part of the election season gumbo and

viewers would assume that it was just another election-related ad.”); Strother

Cross Exam. at 70-71 [JDT Vol. 32]; Bailey Decl. ¶12 [DEV 6-Tab 2].

Plaintiffs have provided no contrary political consultant testimony to rebut

these conclusions.
331

2.11.7.2 Defense expert testimony confirms the political consultants’ view that it is

impractical to run genuine issue advertisements in the weeks leading up to an

election, unless you are aiming to influence a federal election. Dr. Goldstein

states:

One concern sometimes raised by those opposed to the BCRA

regulations is that the restriction may harm interest groups by

preventing them from advertising on their issues at a time when

citizens are supposedly paying the most attention to politics.

There is no reason to believe that BCRA would significantly

hinder interest groups from effectively getting out their

messages on public policy issues. Running genuine issue ads

near an election does not increase the effectiveness of those ads;

in fact, it is likely that the ads’ effectiveness actually decreases.

. . .

In addition to being less effective at conveying their messages,

issue ads run close to an election are also less cost-effective,

since the price of scarce television and radio air time is higher

near an election than during the rest of the year.

Goldstein Expert Report at 32-33 [DEV 3-Tab 7]; see also infra App. ¶ I.C.8;

Magleby Expert Report at 20 [DEV 4-Tab 8] (“In contrast, genuine issue ads

are more likely to run earlier since rates are cheaper and proximity to an

election is less important.”); Krasno and Sorauf Expert Report at 57 [DEV 1-

Tab 2] (“Pure issue ads are more likely to respond to the congressional

calendar or an advertising strategy unrelated to an election.”).

2.11.7.3 Plaintiffs' experts dispute the Defense experts’ position and contend that it is

effective and necessary for corporations and labor unions to spend general
332

treasury funds on broadcast advertisements in the weeks before an election that

mention the name of a federal candidate and are targeted to the candidate’s

electorate. Monroe Decl. ¶¶ 18-19 [10 PCS] (“The defendants in this

proceeding have argued that ads run near the time of an election are evidence

that the association’s actual intent is to advocate the election of one candidate

or another. However, there are other, more valid, explanations for the timing

of our advertising. One is that serious legislative initiatives or regulatory

proposals often are considered near the time of elections. Also, it is clear that

members of the public are generally more receptive to and engaged in

considering government policy ideas and issues as elections near. If that is the

time when people will listen, that is the time to speak. And once an election

occurs, there seems to be a period of fatigue during which political matters are

of less interest, making issue ads then less effective.”); Huard Decl. ¶ 10 [10

PCS] (“NAM has run issue ads at times when no election was impending. In

broad terms, however, Americans tend to have greater interest in political

matters as an election approaches. At the same time, elected officials are most

attuned to the views of their constituents in the pre-election period. Thus, for

many purposes, the pre-election season is a critical time for issue ads.

Conversely, after an election public interest in public policy matters fades,

perhaps due to fatigue. Then, few issue ads are run soon after an election.”);
333

Murphy Decl. ¶ 12 [3 PCS] (“Finally, it is important to emphasize that the

blackout periods imposed by the BCRA–60 days before a general election and

30 days before a primary–are often periods of intense legislative activity.

During election years, the candidates stake out positions on virtually all of the

controversial issues of the day. Much of this debate occurs against the

backdrop of pending legislative action or executive branch initiatives. Some

of the President’s or Attorney General’s boldest initiatives are advanced during

election years–often within 60 days of a general election. This year, for

instance, legislation creating a new federal department of Homeland Security

is under consideration during this pre-election period.”); but see supra Finding

¶ 2.11.4.2 (only example of a pure issue advertisement created by ACLU that

would be effected by BCRA was intentionally created to violate BCRA in

order to provide ACLU with standing to challenge law). 

2.11.7.4 Plaintiffs’ expert Dr. Gibson agrees that running issue advertisements in

proximity to federal elections is effective; however, he does not respond to

Defendants’ expert’s view that commercials aired close to an election are more

expensive, or the fact that genuine issue advertisements tend to air in

conjunction with the legislative calendar as opposed to the federal election

cycle. See infra App. ¶ I.C.8.

2.11.8 On the basis of this dispute and my earlier Findings, I disagree with Plaintiffs’
334

claim that the legislative calendar can necessitate the running of issue

advertisements during the final days of an election campaign that refer to a

federal candidate and are targeted to the candidate’s electorate. 

2.11.8.1 Many deponents merely state that “serious legislative initiatives or regulatory

proposals often are considered near the time of elections,” without providing

actual examples of advertisements run in response to the legislative activity.

Monroe Decl. ¶ 18 [10 PCS]; see also Huard Decl. ¶ 11 [10 PCS] (“[I]ssue ads

supporting a particular tax bill may well be needed as the bill approaches a

vote. If it happens that primaries or elections are imminent, that does not

diminish the need to be able to speak out right then.”); Murphy Decl. ¶ 12 [3

PCS] (commenting that “the blackout periods imposed by the BCRA . . . are

often periods of intense legislative activity,” noting consideration of the

Homeland Security Department bill occurred within 60 days of the 2002

election, but listing political activities conducted that would not have been

affected by BCRA). This evidence is so general that, even if I were to

consider Plaintiffs’ point valid, I would find that it was not probative.

2.11.8.2 While two other organizations provide examples of advertisements run about

legislative issues that were actually pending before the legislature, this

testimony does not demonstrate that the primary definition of electioneering

communication is overbroad. Other than the AFL-CIO and the Gun Owners
108 The FEC’s investigation of the AFL-CIO’s 1996 political advertisement concluded

that 

[i]n the nine flights broadcast between late June and mid-September, 1996, the

advertisements would criticize the incumbent member of Congress named

therein, frequently in harsh terms, about his or her record on the issue that was

the subject of the advertisement. However, with the exception of a flight of

advertisements on the topic of the minimum wage that aired in late June and

early July, 1996, there was no clear connection between the content of the

advertisements and any legislation that was then the subject of intensive

legislative action at the time of the advertisements.

General Counsel’s Report, MUR 4291 (Jun. 9, 2000) at 5-6 [DEV 52-Tab 3]. The AFL-CIO

responds, stating that “No Two Way” was “broadcast in order to influence the ‘upcoming

budget fight on education programs’ and referred to related past votes to make its point.”

AFL-CIO Reply at 4 n.3 (quoting Mitchell Decl. ¶ 41 [6 PCS]).

335

of America (“GOA”), no other groups examples were provided of

advertisements run in the 60 days prior to an election or 30 days prior to a

primary directly addressing pending legislative activity. The examplesfrom the

AFL-CIO included advertisements regarding an “upcoming budget fight over

education programs” in September 1996. Mitchell Decl. ¶ 41 & Ex. 59 [6

PCS] (“No Two Way”).108 The labor group also ran commercials between

September 21 and 25, 1998, in eight congressional districts, opposing “fast

track” trade legislation, which was scheduled for a vote in the House of

Representatives on September 25, 1998. Mitchell Decl. ¶ 52 & Ex. 116 [6

PCS] (“Barker”). During the same month, the AFL-CIO also ran a “flight of

broadcasts” aimed at a scheduled Senate vote on HMO legislation that the

AFL-CIO considered to be inadequate, id. ¶ 51 & Exs. 105-07 (“Deny”), and

opposing the Taxpayer Relief Act which had been recently marked up by the
336

House Ways and Means Committee, id. ¶ 52 & Exs. 108-09 (“Spearmint” and

“Spear”); G. Shea Decl. ¶ 43 [7 PCS]. In 2002, the GOA ran a radio

advertisement in New Hampshire within 30 days of the primary election for

the New Hampshire Republican U.S. Senatorial nominee, which supported

legislation allowing airline pilots to be armed. Declaration of Lawrence D.

Pratt ¶ 5.

2.11.8.3 As I have stated throughout, it is nearly impossible to determine retroactively

the objective behind an issue advertisement, see supra Finding ¶ 2.8.5, and

consequently, I do not attempt to engage in an analysis of the true intent

behind these advertisements, even though it is highly likely that these

advertisements influenced the election on the basis of their content and timing,

see supra Finding ¶ 2.11.2. Rather, I conclude that this minimal showing from

the AFL-CIO and GOA does not provide a basis for concluding that the

primary definition of electioneering communication is overbroad.

2.12 Expert Reports on BCRA’s Effect on Political Advertising

Plaintiffs have not produced any studies of their own analyzing BCRA’s purported

effect on pure issue advertising. Instead, as discussed above, Plaintiffs prefer to rely

on picking out advertisements they claim are pure issue advertisements affected by

BCRA and criticizing studies relied on by Congress during their deliberations that

Defendants have produced for the litigation. In my Appendix, I describe the various
337

expert reports purporting to demonstrate the problems created by issue advocacy

advertisements affecting federal elections, as well as the narrow tailoring BCRA has

achieved to avoid affecting federal non-electioneering advertisements. See infra

Appendix. My Appendix examines the criticism of these studies. id. Overall, I find

that much, though not all, of the relevant evidence presented by the Defendants has

merit and has not been discredited by Plaintiff’s expert, Dr. Gibson, whose criticism

focused on the Buying Time studies. 

2.12.1 At the outset, it is clear that the data underling a majority of the studies,

provided by CMAG, is not without its limitations. App. ¶ I.A. I am aware that

CMAG’s coverage is not universal, that advertisements can be, and apparently

are missed, and that some information may not be present on the four-second

snapshot storyboards. Id. ¶ I.A.3. The most notable deficiency in the data

appears to be its inability to identify different “cookie cutter” advertisements

(advertisements identical except for mentioning different candidates). Id.

Despite pointing out these gaps, Dr. Gibson has not demonstrated how these

shortcomings affect a majority of the conclusions that can be drawn from the

CMAG data. Id. ¶ I.A.4. Furthermore, Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate

that the efforts taken by experts to remedy the “cookie cutter” effect for their

studies were deficient. Id. In addition, no evidence has been presented that

the data is biased in one way or the other based on the fact that CMAG does
338

not cover 20 percent of American households or local cable channels. Id. Dr.

Gibson’s hypothesis that the CMAG is more likely to miss “genuine issue

advertisements” is pure conjecture, and contradicted by Dr. Goldstein’s

testimony regarding the overinclusive nature of the advertisements provided

to CMAG by CMR. Id. ¶ I.A.3. Finally, the evidence shows that CMAG is

used as the basis for many political science studies which are peer-reviewed

and published by the top political science journals in the country, and is a

regular resource for politicians and political parties. Id. ¶ I.A.5. Given the

widespread acceptance of CMAG in academic and political circles, and the

fact that Plaintiffs were unable to demonstrate that its flaws result in bias, I

accept the CMAG data as a legitimate source of data for use in studies seeking

to understand the contours of political advertising, recognizing it has certain

limitations.

2.12.2 The Annenberg studies, discussed in Findings ¶¶ 2.2.1, 2.2.2, 2.2.3, 2.2.4,

2.2.6 (conclusions), 2.8.2.1, supra, as far as I can discern, have not been

challenged by anyone. In fact, as mentioned above, the record shows that

Members of Congress, Defendants’ experts, and even Plaintiffs’ experts rely

on the Annenberg Reports, and as such I find no reason not to accept their

conclusions as well. See Findings ¶ 2.2.6 (Annenberg Center concluding inter

alia that “[i]nstead of creating the number of voices Buckley v. Valeo had
339

hoped, issue advocacy allowed groups such as the parties, business and labor

to gain a louder voice” and that the “distinction between issue advocacy and

express advocacy is a fiction”).

2.12.3 Dr. Goldstein provides an expert report based on his own findings derived

from his own version of the CMAG data from the 2000 election, which he had

updated since providing it to the Buying Time 2000 authors. App. ¶ I.C.

Unrebutted are his findings that: interest group advertising in 2000 was

concentrated in so-called “battleground” states; roughly 11 percent of

candidate-sponsored advertisements in 2000 used express advocacy

terminology; interest group advertisements, which identified a candidate in

2000, tended to be broadcast within the final 60 days of the election campaign,

whereas those that did not identify a candidate were spread more evenly

throughout the year; and interest group advertisements that mentioned

candidates in 2000 were highly concentrated in “battleground states.” Id. Dr.

Goldstein’s uncontroverted conclusions further demonstrate that BCRA’s

primary definition of “electioneering communication” narrowly focuses on the

key empirical determinants that separate genuine issue discussion from

electioneering. I accept these uncontroverted findings.

2.12.4 Plaintiffs have attempted to discredit the Buying Time reports specifically

through the expert reports of Dr. Gibson. Dr. Gibson presents various
340

criticisms of the reports in an effort to have the Court dismiss them or find Dr.

Gibson’s alternative conclusions more acceptable. The effort is not unlike that

of a piñata party: if one hits the piñata enough, it will eventually crack apart.

Although some of these “hits” have merit, I point out that neither Plaintiffs nor

Dr. Gibson have attempted to conduct their own similar study, or even

replicate a discrete portion of the Buying Time studies, despite the fact that the

underlying materials were provided to them by Defendants. Presenting the

Court with contradictory results from such a study would have been far more

persuasive than the recalculations of incorrect versions of the Buying Time

data sets and the often conjectural and speculative criticism proffered by

Plaintiffs and Dr. Gibson.

2.12.5 In terms of the Buying Time reports in general, I would not discount the studies

because they were approached with a particular result in mind. The testimony

shows that policy perspectives and effective scientific research are not

mutually exclusive. App. ¶ I.D.7.b. The “cleaning” of the data that Dr.

Gibson finds suspicious appears, from the testimony, to be a necessary

function for databases of the size produced for the Buying Time reports and not

the function of bias. Id. ¶ I.D.7.n. Fixing miscodings and resolving the

“cookie cutter” issues required such actions. Id. The confusion among the

experts as to the correct database to use to analyze the studies’ findings, see id.
341

¶ I.D.7.d, decreases the utility of Dr. Gibson’s Expert Report, but also

undermines the notion that the Buying Time authors manipulated the data in

order to achieve their desired results. The fact that the Brennan Center

maintained previous versions of the Buying Time data sets suggests that their

changes were not part of an effort to introduce bias into the data set.

2.12.6 I also do not take issue with the studies’ designers seeking to determine the

mental perceptions of ordinary viewers. Studies based on subjective opinions

are an accepted practice in the social sciences. Id. ¶ I.D.7.i. The evidence also

demonstrates that although university students are not necessarily

representative of society as a whole, relying on student impressions as the

basis for academic conclusions is an accepted scholarly practice. Id. ¶ I.D.7.h.

2.12.7 Much, if not all, of the objective findings in the Buying Time reports have not

been undermined by Plaintiffs’ expert. For example, Plaintiffs have not

challenged the findings in Buying Time that very few advertisements utilize

express advocacy terminology, and that interest group advertisements, which

identify candidates, are concentrated toward the end of the election campaign.

Id. ¶ I.D.7.a. I find that this objective data is insulated from the great majority

of criticism leveled at the Buying Time reports. Id. (Dr. Gibson commenting

that “[e]ntirely objective characteristics of the ads (e.g., whether a telephone

number is mentioned in the text of the ad) present few threats to reliability.”).
342

Furthermore, some of these results are supported by those of the unrebutted

Annenberg Report 2001. See id. ¶ I.B.1.

2.12.8 However, I am troubled by the fact that coders in both studies were asked

questions regarding their own perceptions of the advertisements’ purposes, and

that these perceptions were later recoded. See, e..g., id. ¶ I.D.8.c. When such

changes are made, it is difficult to determine their effect on the findings in the

reports. The principal casualty in this regard are the conclusions the Buying

Time studies make regarding the percentage of “genuine” issue advertisements

“captured” by BCRA. Buying Time 1998 finds that seven percent of genuine

issue advertisements aired over the course of 1998 were aired in the final 60

days of the election campaign and mentioned a candidate, and Dr. Krasno

determined that out of all of the advertisements identifying a candidate sixty

days before the election, 14.7 percent were “genuine” issue advertisements.

Id. ¶ I.D.6.a, I.D.7.r.(2). Dr. Gibson found figures from the Buying Time 1998

data ranging from 16 percent to 60 percent. Id. ¶ I.D.7.r.(3). Buying Time

2000 finds that 0.6 percent of the advertisements aired in the final sixty days

of the 2000 campaign which identified a candidate were “genuine” issue

advertisements. Id. ¶ I.D.6.b. The results from both Buying Time studies are

based on coders’ answers to the questions asking for their opinions on the

commercials’ purpose. Id. ¶ I.D.4. 
343

2.12.9 For Buying Time 1998, it is clear that a small number of advertisements

disputed in this litigation, which aired a considerable number of times, were

coded as “genuine” issue advertisements, but that the coders continued to fill

out the survey sheets as if they had found the advertisements to be

“electioneering” commercials. Id. ¶ I.D.7.r.(3). This fact undermines Dr.

Gibson’s, Dr. Krasno’s, and Buying Time 1998’s conclusions about the impact

BCRA would have had on genuine issue advertisements over the course of

1998 or within the final 60 days of the election. I cannot determine based on

the record which view of the student coding is correct, and as such I find this

matter in dispute and do not accept either side’s conclusion on this particular

point.

2.12.10 Buying Time 2000 suffers from a similar infirmity, although the reasons for the

changes appear to be more the result of the authors’ perceptions than on

coding irregularities, id. ¶ I.D.8.c, and for that reason, I cannot accept its

finding that, of all of the issue advertisements run within 60 days of the 2000

election that mentioned a candidate, 0.6 percent were genuine advertisements,

id. ¶ I.D.6.b. However, Dr. Goldstein finds that if one includes all of the

advertisements that Plaintiffs allege were recoded from genuine to

electioneering commercials, the most “conservative” calculation of

advertisements aired in the final 60 days of the 2000 election also identifying
344

a candidate, which were “genuine,” is 17 percent. Id. ¶ I.D.8.c. This figure is

not rebutted by Plaintiffs or their expert.

2.12.11 Dr. Gibson also argues that since the majority of advertisements coded as

electioneering were also coded as having policy matters as their primary focus,

the studies in fact demonstrate that the vast majority of advertisements

captured by BCRA are genuine issue advertisements. App. ¶¶ I.D.7.p, I.D.8.e.

I reject this argument. As Defendants’ experts have clearly demonstrated, the

fact that an advertisement may focus on issues does not preclude the possibility

that the advertisement is designed to promote a candidate. Id. ¶ I.D.7.p . Dr.

Lupia’s beer commercial analogy illustrates this point effectively. Id. (Lupia

observes that many beer commercials do not focus on the product, but rather

people “engaged in a range of activities that we can call ‘wild nights out.’”

Accordingly, it is not unreasonable to “perceive that the purpose of the ad is

to get” the viewer to buy the beer, “but to judge its primary focus as wild

times.”) Furthermore, the results for candidate-sponsored advertisements

demonstrate that even when a person running for office airs an advertisement

in an effort to win election, he or she more often than not focuses those

commercials on policy matters as a means of conveying a candidate’s values

and not directly on the personal characteristics of the candidates. Id. ¶ I.D.7.p;

see also supra ¶ 2.3.2 (Bailey) (Over time, a campaign defines a candidate
345

through a combination of style, image, and issues. Even shortly after watching

an ad, the target audience usually doesn’t remember the ad’s substantive

details. Rather, the viewers just get a feel for the candidate. It takes a lot of

these “feels” to make up a campaign.”).

2.12.12 In any event, I view these calculations as largely an academic exercise. The

expert testimony in this case demonstrates the subjective nature of the effort

of trying to capture mental impressions of viewers, and illustrates how one

person’s genuine issue advertisement can be another’s electioneering

commercial. Id. ¶ I.D.7.i, I.D.8.c. Determining the purpose of an

advertisement is a subjective enterprise, and that appears to be why BCRA’s

framers have used objective criteria to define “electioneering communication.”

Furthermore, as Dr. Lupia explains, these exercises can help us determine what

BCRA’s impact would have been on past behavior, but they do not necessarily

tell us how BCRA will affect non-electioneering issue advertisements in the

future. Id. ¶ I.D.7.r.(4). 

2.12.13 I also address Dr. Gibson’s assertion that 30,108,857 group-citizen genuine

issue communications would have been affected by BCRA. App. ¶ I.D.7.q.

Dr. Gibson applied gross rating point data to 707 of the 713 genuine issue

advertisement airings Krasno and Sorauf found would be captured by BCRA

to reach this figure. Id. Defendants have not responded to Dr. Gibson’s
346

calculation, in part because Dr. Gibson raises it for the first time in his rebuttal

expert report. Id. Although 30 million group-citizen communications is

certainly an impressive figure on its face, a closer inspection reveals that the

figure is not as oppressive as it sounds. 

2.12.13.1 First, these thirty million communications are airings of three distinct

advertisements aired 707 times. Therefore, these 30 million communications

actually represent only three messages transmitted during programs whose

aggregate viewership constitutes 30 million households. As Dr. Gibson has

not provided a citation to the source of the gross rating point data he used, I

cannot verify his figures. However, it is clear that one advertisement, “HMO

said no” represents the majority of the 707 airings, having been broadcast 118

times in Greensboro, 126 times in Raleigh-Durham, and 211 in St. Louis (I

cannot determine where the other two advertisements, “CENT/Breaux” and

“CCS/No Matter What” were aired). Id. ¶ I.D.7.r.(2) n.201. The data shows

that even if “HMO said no” had reached every household in Greensboro,

Raleigh-Durham, and St. Louis with a television, the number of households

receiving the message would be 2,529,450. Id. Given this calculation, and the

lack of direction provided by the experts in this case, it appears that while 30

million genuine issue communications would have been affected by BCRA,

the actual number of households affected is much lower, although not
347

necessarily insignificant, because many of the 30 million households obviously

received the group-citizen communications numerous times. 

2.12.13.2 Second, Dr. Gibson provides no context for his 30 million communications

figure. He does not discuss whether or not these 707 airings were received by

a greater or lesser percentage of households than the other 4140 airings which

were run within 60 days of the 1998 election and identified a candidate. If one

takes the average number of households that received a single airing of one of

the three genuine advertisements in 1998, 42,586 (30,108,857/

707), and multiplies

it by the total airings of commercials mentioning a candidate and run within

60 days of the election, the result is 206,414,342 group-citizen issue

communications (42,586 * 4847). This figure, admittedly not precise,

demonstrates that the amount of group-citizen genuine issue communications

(Dr. Gibson’s 30 million figure) is likely a small proportion of the total amount

of group-citizen issue communications captured by BCRA’s “electioneering

communication” definition (represented by the 206 million communications

figure above). In fact, this exercise is merely an amplification of the Krasno

and Sorauf analysis and results in the same 14 percent figure that Drs. Krasno

and Sorauf determined represents the amount of genuine issue advocacy that

would be captured by BCRA. App. ¶ I.D.7.r.(2). Again, Dr. Gibson’s 30

million communications figure could constitute a greater or lesser percentage
348

of the universe of communications mentioning a candidate and airing within

60 days of the 1998 election, but I am given no basis for making such a

determination.

2.12.13.3 Therefore, although I do not reject Dr. Gibson’s calculation, I find that the

record does not provide me with a sufficient basis for assessing its significance

and therefore its utility for determining whether BCRA is overbroad is

minimal at best.

2.13 Conclusion

Based on the extensive evidence presented in the record, it is entirely possible to

distinguish pure issue advocacy from candidate-centered issue advocacy without

relying on the listener/viewer attempting to discern the “true” intent of the

advertisement. These empirical determinants form the basis of the primary

definition’s objective test: issue advertisements that mention a federal candidate, are

broadcast on radio or television, are aired in the candidate’s electorate, and are aired

in close proximity to a federal election. While there may be advertisements sharing

these characteristics that are not intended to influence an election, the record

demonstrates that as an objective matter advertisements sharing these characteristics

influence the outcome of federal elections. When corporations and labor unions pay

for these advertisements with general treasury funds, they are in violation of

longstanding federal policy.
349

TITLE III: MISCELLANEOUS

3.1 The Federal Election Commission has recommended that Congress take measures to

prevent contributors from using their minor children as a method of circumventing

campaign finance laws. FEC Annual Report 1992 at 69 (recommending that

Congress “establish a minimum age for contributors” due to the FEC’s finding that

“contributions are sometimes given by parents in their children’s names”) [DEV 14-

Tab 1]; FEC Annual Report 1993 at 50 (recommending that Congress adopt a

“presumption that contributors below age 16 are not making contributions on their

own behalf” due to the FEC’s finding that “contributions are sometimes given by

parents in their children’s names” and noting that “Congress should address this

potential abuse by establishing a minimum age for contributors, or otherwise provide

guidelines ensuring that parents are not making contributions in the name of another”)

[DEV 14-Tab 2]; FEC Annual Report 1994 at 56 (same) [DEV 14-Tab 3]; FEC

Annual Report 1995 at 56 (same) [DEV 14-Tab 4]; FEC Annual Report 1996 at 55-56

(same) [DEV 14-Tab 5]; FEC Annual Report 1997 at 54 (same) [DEV 15-Tab 6];

FEC Annual Report 1998 at 44 (same) [DEV 15-Tab 7]; FEC Annual Report 1999 at

50 (same) [DEV 15-Tab 8]; FEC Annual Report 2000 at 43 (same) [DEV 15-Tab 9].

3.2 The Thompson Committee Majority Report recommended precluding “those

ineligible to vote . . . from making contributions to candidates for federal office.”

Thompson Comm. Report at 4506. The majority found “substantial evidence that
350

minors are being used by their parents, or others, to circumvent the limits imposed on

contributors.” Id. 

3.3 Senator Christopher Dodd stated on the Senate floor: “Normally when we go out and

solicit campaign contributions we do not limit it to the individual. We also want to

know whether or not their spouse or their minor or adult children would like to make

some campaign contributions. As long as such contributions are voluntary, then those

individuals may contribute their own limit . . . .” 147 Cong. Rec. S2933 (daily ed.

Mar. 27 2001) (Sen. Christopher Dodd). 

3.4 Senator McConnell testifies that he “occasionally” asks donors who have given the

maximum level of federal money to his campaign if they have family members who

would be willing to contribute to the campaign as well. McConnell Dep. at 99-100

[JDT 19]. He also states that “occasionally” donors send checks on behalf of their

children. Id. at 132. 

3.5 The evidence shows that at least four investigations into contributions made by minors

were initiated in response to press articles. See Pre-MUR 318, 00890-933 [DEV 43-

Tab 4]; see also FEC MUR 4254, FEC119-0016 [DEV 43-Tab 4] (letter from a father

under investigation to the FEC stating that the FEC’s investigation relied on a

newspaper article).

3.6 Defendants cite to 14 newspaper articles which discuss contributions by minors. See

Alan C. Miller, Minor Loophole, L.A. Times, Feb. 28, 1999, reprinted in 148 Cong.
351

Rec. S2146-S2148 (2002); David Mastio, The Kiddie-Cash Caper: Gifts from minors

are the next big campaign loophole, Slate, May 21, 1997, INT013275–INT013280

[DEV 134-Tab 3]; Rise in student gifts begs question: Was law broken?, USA Today,

May 20, 1997, at 12A, FEC101-0001 [DEV 134-Tab 3]; Chris Harvey, The Young

and the Generous: Md. Children Give to Campaigns, Wash. Post, Nov. 20, 1995, at

B01, FEC137-0009-0011 [DEV 134-Tab 3]; Alex Knott, Members Cash In on Kid

Contributions, Roll Call, June 5, 1995, at A-1, reprinted in 148 Cong. Rec. S2146

(2002); Jerry Landauer, Kiddies Go Krazy Over Carter, Break Open Piggy Banks,

Wall St. J., July 8, 1976, at 1, 27, FEC137-0008 [DEV 134-Tab 3]; John Kruger,

Youths 2-17 follow parents’ lead in political contributions, The Hill, Nov. 27, 1999,

INT013287 [DEV 42-Tab 2], at 1, 53; Michelle Malkin, Kiddie-case collections open

fund-raising loophole, Seattle Times, May 27, 1997, INT013272–INT013274 [DEV

42-Tab 2]; Kid Stuff, Roll Call, June 15, 1995, INT013262 [DEV 42-Tab 2];

Youthful Donors, Political Finance and Lobby Reporter, June 14, 1995 [DEV 42-Tab

2], at 10; Kids count, especially in campaign gifts, The Knoxville News-Sentinel,

June 11, 1995, INT013265–INT013266 [DEV 42-Tab 2], at F3; Karin

Wahl-Jorgensen, Some Folks Channel Political Gifts Through Children, Plain Dealer,

May 28, 1995, INT013282–INT01328 [DEV 42-Tab 2], at 9A; David Mastio,

Students Donate to Ca ndidates, Tulsa World, March 11, 1995,

INT013258–INT013260 [DEV 42-Tab 2]. 
352

3.7 It is clear that not all campaign contributions by minors are in fact donations by their

parents. See, e.g., Decl. of Jessica Mitchell ¶ 9 (“. . . I made a contribution to [Tim

Feeney’s] campaign just recently, in the amount of Five Dollars.”) [1 Echols ES Tab

5]; Decl. of Pamela Mitchell ¶ 20 (“I have never used my daughter’s name, or any

other person’s, in making a political donation, in order to avoid limits that the law

places on my ability to support candidates of whom I approve.”) [1 Echols ES Tab

10].

3.8 There have been a number of instances where the FEC has found that individuals have

made contributions in their children’s names in violation of campaign finance laws

prohibiting the making of contributions in the name of another person. 

3.8.1 The FEC found that an individual violated campaign finance laws by “making

four (4) contributions -- $1,000 each -- to four (4) Federal campaign

committees in the name of his infant son during the calendar years 1992 and

1993.” FEC MUR 4484, INT 15778 [DEV 52-Tab 5]. The four campaign

committees either returned the funds or disclosed the contribution as a debt

owed to the contributor in an amended quarterly report in response to inquiries

by the FEC. Id. at INT 15826-29. The contributor and the FEC entered into

a conciliation agreement that included a civil penalty of $4,000. Id. at INT

15789-94.

3.8.2 The FEC found that a contributor contributed $1,000 in the names of his two
353

daughters, ages 4 and 8, on November 7, 1988, the same day he made a $1,000

contributions in his own name. FEC MUR 3268, INT 15612 [DEV 43-Tab 3].

The Commission elected not to pursue its case against the contributor, in part

because he had pled guilty to criminal charges of defrauding investors and had

filed for bankruptcy. Id. at INT 15613. 

3.8.3 The FEC found that a contributor donated $4,000 in postage stamps in 1993

to a federal campaign committee in the names of his seven and eleven year old

children. FEC MUR 4048, FEC119-0008-09 [DEV 43-Tab 5]. The FEC and

the contributor entered into a conciliation agreement, pursuant to which the

contributor agreed to pay a $7,500 civil fine. Id. at FEC119-0012. 

3.8.4 The FEC found that a contributor took money from the bank accounts of his

one year old and three year old children to make three $1,000 contributions in

their names to federal candidates. FEC MUR 4255, FEC 101-0046-47 [DEV

134-Tab3].

3.9 FECA does not require political committees to seek or report the age of contributors.

Gov’t Br. at 202.

3.10 The FEC states that it “faces unique and significant practical problems in attempting

to investigate and prove whether a child knowingly and voluntarily made a particular

contribution and thus whether the child’s parent violated the contribution limits.

Gov’t Amended Proposed Findings of Fact ¶ 794. In some cases, parents have
354

refused to submit their children to FEC questioning. FEC MUR 4254, USA

CIV00932 [DEV 43-Tab 4] (report explaining that parents refused to allow their

children to be questioned). The Commission maintains that determining whether or

not children of a certain age are capable of making “knowing and voluntary”

contributions is a subjective undertaking, made more difficult by parental influence

and what the FEC deems to be “self-serving affidavits.” Gov’t Amended Proposed

Findings of Fact ¶ 794; FEC MURs 4252-4255, General Counsel’s Report at 5, 10,

USA-CIV00925, 930-31 [DEV 43-Tab4] (“[I]t is difficult to accept the notion that

children as young as eight years old are capable of ‘knowingly and voluntarily’

making the decisions to contribute to political campaigns. However, in the absence

of anything in the Commission’s regulations such as a presumption that a young child

may not make contributions this becomes a very subjective decision. In this matter

there does not appear to be any choice but to accept the assurance affirmed by

affidavits that these were knowing and voluntary decisions.”). The FEC also claims

that “[q]uerying youngsters about their knowledge of politics and their relationship

with their parents may threaten the privacy of the family.” FEC Findings of Fact ¶

794. In support of this contention, the Commission proffers a letter from an attorney

representing a family investigated by the FEC which states

[my clients] believe that the general process of inquiry of the instant

FEC Docket is unduly intrusive into the privacy of their family affairs

. . . .

By the very act of responding truthfully to the instant Interrogatories
355

and Document requests, [my clients] must open up their efforts to

conduct their family affairs, to inculcate civic and political virtues and

to teach values to their children to scrutiny by public officials . . . . The

untoward effects are to . . . invade privacy and private communications

of husband and wife and of parents and children and possibly to create

disruption in normal family functioning merely by responding to an

apparently legitimate FEC inquiry.

FEC MUR 4254, FEC119-0017, 0021 [DEV 43-Tab 4].
356

III. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

I find it most appropriate to discuss BCRA's Title II first, before turning to my

discussion of Title I, and the other remaining provisions of BCRA that are addressed in this

opinion.

I. Title II: NONCANDIDATE CAMPAIGN EXPENDITURES

Sections 201, 203 and 204: The Prohibition on Electioneering Communications

The McConnell, NRA, Chamber of Commerce, NAB, and AFL-CIO Plaintiffs all

challenge the prohibition on corporate and labor disbursements for electioneering

communications. These Plaintiffs also challenge both definitions of “electioneering

communication” (the primary definition and the fallback definition). 

As discussed in the per curiam opinion, FECA Section 441b prohibits corporations

and labor unions from using their general treasury funds on contributions or expenditures in

connection with a federal election. 2 U.S.C. § 441b. Sections 203 and 204 of BCRA extend

this prohibition to “electioneering communication.” BCRA provides for two definitions of

electioneering communication—a primary definition and a backup definition to be

substituted in the event the main definition is held to be constitutionally infirm. Given the

uncontroverted record of abuse and circumvention of the longstanding prohibition of Section

441b, I find the primary definition of electioneering communication, and the corresponding

restrictions in sections 203 and 204, constitutional. As a result, I find BCRA’s restriction on

the ability of corporations and labor unions to spend general treasury funds on electioneering
357

communications to be facially constitutional as a matter of law, including its application to

section 501(c)(4) and section 527(e)(1) corporations that do not receive an MCFL exemption.

As my opinion on the constitutionality of the primary definition does not command

a majority, I am cognizant that the majority who have found the primary definition

unconstitutional must tackle the constitutionality of the backup definition of electioneering

communication. To that end, I concur in the judgment reached by Judge Leon’s opinion on

this question. Accordingly, the final judgment of the three-judge District Court panel reflects

my support of his opinion as an alternative to my own finding that the primary definition of

electioneering communication is constitutional. Given my view of the constitutionality of

the primary definition, I have no further occasion to consider the constitutionality of the

backup definition.

A. Introduction

For close to one hundred years the political branches have made the choice, consistent

with the Constitution, that individual voters have a right to select their federal officials in

elections that are free from the direct influence of aggregated corporate treasury wealth

and–for over fifty years–free from the direct influence of aggregated labor union treasury

wealth. The rationale for the prohibition is simple, persuasive, and longstanding. First, such

a restriction “ensure[s] that substantial aggregations of wealth amassed by the special

advantages which go with the corporate form of organization should not be converted into

political ‘war chests’ which could be used to incur political debts from legislators who are
109 In this manner, Title II neatly dovetails with the nonfederal funds prohibitions

contained in Title I. Whereas the political parties have expressed their frustration that Title

I will diminish their importance relative to special interest groups, see, e.g., RNC Br. at 13,

(continued...)

358

aided by the contributions.” FEC v. Nat’l Right to Work Comm. (“NRWC”), 459 U.S. 197,

207 (1982). Second, such a prohibition “protect[s] the individuals[,] who have paid money

into a corporation or union for purposes other than the support of candidates[,] from having

that money used to support political candidates to whom they may be opposed.” Id. at 208.

In other words, when corporations and labor unions spend their general treasury funds to

influence federal elections, our coordinate branches have stated that they must use segregated

funds voluntarily and deliberately committed by individual citizens for that purpose.

Since 1996, this longstanding prohibition has become a fiction, with abuse so overt

as to openly mock the intent of the law. The record persuasively demonstrates that

corporations and unions routinely seek to influence the outcome of federal elections with

general treasury funds by running broadcast advertisements that skirt the prohibition

contained in section 441b by simply avoiding Buckley’s “magic words” of express advocacy.

In enacting Title II, Congress responded to this problem by tightly focusing on the main

abuse: broadcast advertisements aired in close proximity to a federal election that clearly

identify a federal candidate and are targeted to that candidate’s electorate. In devising Title

II, Congress has returned to a regime where corporations and labor unions must use federal

money from a separate segregated fund explicitly designated for federal election purposes

when seeking to influence federal elections.109
109(...continued)

Title II ensures that these special interest organizations, except those explicitly qualifying for

MCFL-status, will have to run broadcast advertisements that influence a federal election with

the same federal dollars that the political parties will have to use to pay for their

advertisements (except that BCRA increases the amount of federal money that the parties can

raise relative to their special interest counterparts).

359

Indeed, the record conclusively establishes that the “magic words” of express

advocacy identified in Buckley are rarely used in any form of electioneering advertisements

in the modern political campaign. Findings ¶ 2.3. The perverse consequence of this situation

is that advertisements that avoid express advocacy are not only the type of advertisements

that political consultants generally employ for their candidate clients, they are also precisely

the advertisements that corporations and labor unions, prior to BCRA, were permitted to run.

Accordingly, as the record demonstrates, corporations and labor unions, with minimal effort,

were able to influence federal elections with their general treasury funds; a practice long

prohibited by Congress and contrary to that enforced by the judiciary.

It is for these reasons, particularly given the overwhelming record in this case, that I

find facially constitutional the prohibition in Title II on corporations and labor unions using

general treasury funds for electioneering communications. 

B. Standard of Review

Plaintiffs first contend that both Buckley and MCFL foreclose any Congressional

regulation of speech that does not constitute express advocacy, and as a result, Title II fails

as a matter of law because BCRA’s restrictions on electioneering communication apply to

broadcast advertisements that do not contain express advocacy. McConnell Br. at 51
360

(“Buckley and MCFL condemn Congress’ regulation of speech that does not constitute

express advocacy.”). In other words, Plaintiffs posit that the Court does not even need to

reach the question of whether BCRA is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental

interest, because both Buckley and MCFL announce a substantive rule of constitutional law;

namely, that Congress may not regulate any speech that does not qualify as express advocacy

as that term has become known.

As a matter of law, and as discussed infra, I find Plaintiffs’ argument on this point

unpersuasive. Neither Buckley nor MCFL create a rule of substantive constitutional law

whereby Congress can only regulate political speech containing words of express advocacy.

Rather, Buckley and MCFL used the express advocacy standard as a means of construing

otherwise unconstitutionally vague portions of FECA. As I do not view Buckley and MCFL

as prohibiting future Congressional regulation of political speech, I reach the question of

whether BCRA is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest. 

In turning to that question, it bears pointing out that the parties argue in their briefing

about who bears the “burden” in this litigation, with each side pointing the finger at the other.

Compare Gov’t Br. at 131 (“[Plaintiffs] efforts to shoulder [their] burden all fail.”) with

McConnell Reply at 32 (“Defendants incorrectly argue throughout their briefs that plaintiffs

bear the burden of demonstrating that BCRA’s ban on electioneering communications is

overly broad.”) (emphasis in original). Throughout this litigation, Defendants argue that

Plaintiffs bear a burden of demonstrating that the law is substantially overbroad. Defendants
361

contend that as Plaintiffs bring a facial challenge to these sections of BCRA, they must

establish that the prohibition on corporate and labor union spending of general treasury funds

on electioneering communications is substantially overbroad. See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 122

S.Ct. 1700, 1713 (2002); Ashcroft v. The Free Speech Coalition, 122 S.Ct. 1389, 1398-99

(2002). As the Supreme Court instructed in Broadrick v. Oklahoma, “the Court has altered

its traditional rules of standing to permit–in the First Amendment area–attacks on overly

broad statutes with no requirement that the person making the attack demonstrate that his

own conduct could not be regulated by a statute drawn with the requisite narrow specificity.”

Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612 (1973) (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted).

Plaintiffs wait until their reply briefs to address Defendants’ salient argument on this

point. McConnell Reply at 32, Chamber/NAM Reply at 4-5. Plaintiffs essentially argue that

there are two kinds of facial challenges under the First Amendment. The first, involves

statutes that injure “third parties,” and involves the Broadrick line of cases. Chamber Reply

at 4. The second facial attack is where “a plaintiff invokes its own First Amendment rights

in a way that subjects a statute to strict scrutiny.” Chamber/NAM Reply at 5 (citing R.A.V.

v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 381 & n.3 (1992); Sec’y of State of Md. v. Joseph H.

Munson, Co., 467 U.S. 947, 965-66 & n.13 (1984)). Plaintiffs argue that they belong in this

latter category.

The difficulty with Plaintiffs’ position, however, is that none of their submissions
362

describe in specific detail any advertisements, referring to particular candidates in any races,

that Plaintiffs intend to produce or air at any time in the future, and that would fall within

BCRA’s electioneering communication provisions. As such, it is difficult to argue that

Plaintiffs have demonstrated affirmatively and concretely, in any kind of detail, the scope of

their claimed First Amendment injuries. 

Nevertheless, none of the parties dispute the fact that the framework for reviewing the

constitutionality of these sections is strict scrutiny. Tr. at 252 (Waxman) (“The standard is

strict scrutiny, there’s no doubt about it. This is political speech. This is core political

speech.”). Moreover, a number of Plaintiffs do have a history of using corporate and labor

union general treasury funds to pay for electioneering communications.

In practical terms, given the way Defendants have argued this case, the debate over

the “burden” is largely academic. Defendants present their Title II arguments by primarily

demonstrating that the law meets a strict scrutiny test. Indeed, to some degree, Defendants

have essentially conflated the strict scrutiny and substantial overbreadth inquiries. See Tr.

at 251-52 (Waxman) (“And that brings us to the real constitutional issue, whether the burdens

that Congress’ new law imposes on speech are narrowly tailored to serve compelling public

interests; or, more precisely, again because this is a facial challenge, whether plaintiffs have

demonstrated that the new provisions are substantially overbroad in relation to their

legitimate goals.”). Furthermore, as I find that the provisions in Title II are constitutional

under this strict scrutiny review, the question of which party bears the burden is also largely
363

irrelevant. Consequently, although I am convinced that Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that

the “electioneering communication” provisions in Title II are substantially overbroad, I

analyze the law under the strict scrutiny framework consistent with Defendants’ presentation

in their briefing.

In undertaking this latter analysis, I will examine whether BCRA’s restrictions on

electioneering communications are narrowly tailored to serve a compelling public interest.

Under this strict scrutiny review, I find that the restrictions on corporate and labor union

spending on electioneering communications are constitutional at this facial challenge stage,

meaning that BCRA’s restrictions on political speech are narrowly tailored to serve a

corresponding compelling governmental interest.

The remainder of my opinion on this question is divided into four parts. The first

section contains my reasons for finding that express advocacy is not a constitutional

requirement. On this point, I am joined by Judge Leon and therefore speak for the Court.

The second portion provides my dissenting view that the primary definition of electioneering

communication is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest. In the third

and fourth sections, I write for the Court and discuss my reasons for concluding that

Plaintiffs’ underbreadth argument and Plaintiffs’ challenge to the “media exemption” both

lack merit.
364

C. Express Electoral Advocacy is Not a Constitutional Requirement

1. The Origins of the Express Advocacy Test

I conclude that in the context of regulating federal elections, Congress may restrict

corporate and union spending on political speech which does not contain words of express

electoral advocacy, provided that such restrictions are narrowly tailored to serve a compelling

governmental interest. In condemning Title II, Plaintiffs insist that Buckley announced a

substantive rule of constitutional law, such that Congress is forever prohibited from

regulating any political speech that does not contain explicit words of express advocacy–even

if the political speech being regulated is paid for with corporate or labor union general

treasury funds. McConnell Opp’n at 38 (“Buckley thus leaves no doubt that its expressadvocacy test is a constitutional requirement.”). Plaintiffs provide very little textual analysis

of the Buckley and MCFL decisions and instead overstate the extent of the Buckley holding

to satisfy their purpose. 

In reviewing Title II, it should be noted that none of the parties dispute the fact that

the electioneering communication restrictions in Title II regulate more political speech than

just express advocacy. Therefore, if I conclude that the express advocacy standard is forever

enshrined in the Constitution, then the restrictions on electioneering communications in Title

II would be condemned as a matter of law before any analysis of substantial overbreadth is

even performed. In taking a step back and analyzing Buckley and MCFL, it becomes

apparent, however, that the express advocacy standard devised by the Supreme Court in
110 More specifically, this provision in FECA “prohibit[ed] all individuals, who are

neither candidates nor owners of institutional press facilities and all groups, except political

parties and campaign organizations, from voicing their views ‘relative to a clearly identified

candidate’ through means that entail aggregate expenditures of more than $1,000 during a

calendar year.” Buckley, 424 U.S. at 39-40.

365

Buckley is not a substantive rule of constitutional law that operates as a per se restriction on

future Congressional action. 

In Buckley, the Supreme Court considered a provision of FECA that limited the

amount of money individuals and certain groups could independently expend “relative to”

a clearly identified federal candidate.110

 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 39-51 (discussing section

608(e)(1) of FECA). Section 608(e)(1) of FECA provided that “[n]o person may make any

expenditure . . . relative to a clearly identified candidate during a calendar year which, when

added to all other expenditures made by such person during the year advocating the election

or defeat of such candidate, exceeds $1,000.” Id. at 39 (omission in original) (emphasis

added). Prior to directly considering the constitutionality of section 608(e)(1), the Supreme

Court stated that “[b]efore examining the interests advanced in support of [the provision’s]

expenditure ceiling, consideration must be given to appellants’ contention that the provision

is unconstitutionally vague.” Id. at 40 (emphasis added). 

In undertaking the vagueness inquiry, the Supreme Court was particularly troubled by

the phrase “relative to” as it appeared in the provision under consideration. Id. at 40-44.

Observing that the law did not define the phrase, the Supreme Court found that “[t]he use of

so indefinite a phrase as ‘relative to’ a candidate fails to clearly mark the boundary between
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permissible and impermissible speech unless other portions of [the provision] make

sufficiently explicit the range of expenditures covered by the limitation.” Id. at 41-42.

Interpreting the phrase in its context, the Supreme Court stated that the “context clearly

permits, if indeed it does not require, the phrase ‘relative to’ a candidate to be read to mean

‘advocating the election or defeat of’ a candidate.” Id. at 42. Accordingly, the Supreme

Court, used the context of the provision to make a “first-cut” at construing the vague phrase

“relative to.”

Even with this clarification, however, the Supreme Court found that the vagueness

inquiry was merely “refocuse[d]” and, thus, not completely resolved. Id. at 42. Confronted

with the challenge of interpreting “advocating the election or defeat of a candidate” the

Supreme Court was once again concerned about an interpretation of the wording of the

statute that covered more speech than was actually necessary. The Supreme Court remarked

that:

the distinction between discussion of issues and candidates and advocacy of

election or defeat of candidates may often dissolve in practical application.

Candidates, especially incumbents, are intimately tied to public issues

involving legislative proposals and governmental actions. Not only do

candidates campaign on the basis of their positions on various issues, but

campaigns themselves generate issues of public interest.

Id. In other words, the Supreme Court found that even if it was permissible to construe the

phrase “relative to” as the equivalent of “advocating the election or defeat of a candidate,”

the vagueness inquiry was not complete because such a construction did not provide a bright

line between permissible speech and impermissible speech and had the potential to cause
111 The McConnell Plaintiffs seize on this quotation as immutable proof that express

advocacy is somehow chiseled in stone as a constitutional requirement. McConnell Opp’n

at 34 (Buckley’s adoption of this bright line test “was not merely an exercise in statutory

construction.”). However, as is clear from the context in which this quotation was made, the

Supreme Court in making this statement was observing that the phrase “relative to” could not

be remedied by a simple reference to the context of the provision, but rather, needed further

narrowing before the vagueness concerns would be ameliorated.

367

speakers to self censor genuine issue discussion in order to avoid violating the statute.

111

 

In fact, to underscore its apprehension that its first narrowing construction was not

satisfactory, the Supreme Court quoted a passage at length from Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S.

516, 535 (1945):

[W]hether words intended and designed to fall short of invitation would miss

that mark is a question both of intent and of effect. No speaker, in such

circumstances, safely could assume that anything he might say upon the

general subject would not be understood by some as an invitation. In short, the

supposedly clear-cut distinction between discussion, laudation, general

advocacy, and solicitation puts the speaker in these circumstances wholly at

the mercy of the varied understanding of his hearers and consequently of

whatever inference may be drawn as to his intent and meaning. 

Such a distinction offers no security for free discussion. In these conditions

it blankets with uncertainty whatever may be said. It compels the speaker to

hedge and trim.

Id. at 43 (quoting Thomas, 323 U.S. at 535). To satisfy its concerns, therefore, the Supreme

Court further construed section 608(e)(1) to apply “only to expenditures for communications

that in express terms advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate for

federal office.” Id. at 44. In a footnote, the Supreme Court observed that “[t]his construction

would restrict the application of § 608(e)(1) to communications containing express words of

advocacy of election or defeat, such as ‘vote for,’ ‘elect,’ ‘support,’ ‘cast your ballot for,’
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‘Smith for Congress,’ ‘vote against,’ ‘defeat,’ ‘reject.’” Id. at 44 n. 52. These phrases have

come to be known as the “magic words,” see Findings ¶ 2.1.1, because a communication that

invokes one of these words unquestionably qualifies as express advocacy and falls within the

ambit of FECA. Notably, even with this narrowing construction, the Supreme Court struck

down section 608(e)(1) as unconstitutional under the First Amendment. See id. at 44-51.

The Supreme Court also imported the “express advocacy” requirement into another

provision of FECA that it found unconstitutionally vague. Section 434(e) of FECA required

individuals and certain groups to disclose contributions and expenditures. Contributions and

expenditures were each defined in terms of the use of money or other valuable assets “for the

purpose of influencing” the nomination or election of candidates for federal office. Id. at

77. The Supreme Court found that the phrase “for the purpose of influencing” was

unconstitutionally vague. Id. (“It is the ambiguity of this phrase that poses constitutional

problems.”). Finding no legislative history to help guide the statutory analysis, the Court

turned to construing the disclosure provision in such a manner so as “to avoid the shoals of

vagueness.” Id. at 78 (emphasis added). 

When attempting to construe the phrase in relation to expenditures, the Court

encountered “line-drawing problems.” Id. To resolve this difficulty, the Supreme Court,

again, interpreted the phrase in the same manner in which it had interpreted the vague portion

of section 608(e)(1). Id. at 79 (“Although the phrase, ‘for the purpose of . . . influencing’ an

election or nomination, differs from the language used in § 608(e)(1), it shares the same
369

potential for encompassing both issue discussion and advocacy of a political result.”). As

a result, the Supreme Court found that “[t]o insure that the reach of § 434(e) is not

impermissibly broad, we construe ‘expenditure’ for purposes of that section in the same way

we construed the terms of s 608(e) to reach only funds used for communications that

expressly advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate.” Id. at 80. So

construed, the Supreme Court held that section 434(e) was narrowly tailored to serve a

sufficiently important governmental interest. Id. at 80-82.

Ten years later in MCFL, the Supreme Court again invoked the express advocacy test.

MCFL, 479 U.S. at 248-49. In doing so, the Supreme Court gave insight into the reasoning

behind the origins and purpose of the express advocacy test. The MCFL Court wrote that in

Buckley, “in order to avoid problems of overbreadth, the Supreme Court held that the term

‘expenditure’ encompassed ‘only funds used for communications that expressly advocate the

election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate.’” Id. (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 80).

With this in mind, the Supreme Court turned to the question before it, which was whether the

term “expenditure,” as used in section 441b, was again vague. Having found that Buckley

had adopted the express advocacy construction for the term “expenditure” in the provision

requiring disclosure of independent expenditures, it is not surprising that the Court found the

term “expenditure” for purposes of section 441b to also require the express advocacy

construction. Id. at 249 (“We agree with appellee that this rationale requires a similar

construction of the more intrusive provision that directly regulates independent spending.
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We, therefore, hold that an expenditure must constitute ‘express advocacy’ in order to be

subject to the prohibition of § 441b.”) (emphasis added).

2. The Express Advocacy Test is Not a Substantive Rule of

Constitutional Law

As is clear from the discussion above, both Buckley and MCFL explicitly invoked the

express advocacy test only as a means of statutory construction. In Buckley, the Supreme

Court was confronted with two different provisions of FECA that both presented vagueness

challenges for the Court. As a result, the Supreme Court turned to the “‘cardinal principle’

of statutory interpretation . . . that when an Act of Congress raises ‘a serious doubt’ as to its

constitutionality, ‘this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly

possible by which the question may be avoided.’” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 689

(2001) (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932)); see also Frisby v. Schultz, 487

U.S. 474, 483 (1988) (observing the “‘well-established principle that statutes will be

interpreted to avoid constitutional difficulties”). I do not believe that in devising the express

advocacy standard, the Supreme Court in Buckley was announcing an unalterable principle

of constitutional law that would prohibit future congressional action directed toward express

and issue advocacy. See Wisconsin Realtors Ass’n v. Ponto, 233 F. Supp. 2d 1078, 1085

(W.D. Wis. 2002) (“I am not convinced that Buckley was intended to work such a significant

inhibition on future legislative efforts to address problems raised by the competing state

interests and constitutional imperatives inevitably associated with express and issue

advocacy.”); Nat’l Fed’n of Republican Assemblies v. United States, 218 F. Supp. 2d 1300,
371

1325 (S.D. Ala. 2002) (“The plaintiffs’ second error is their insistence that Buckley held that

all political speech other than express electoral advocacy lies beyond the reach of

constitutional regulation, including disclosure requirements.”); see also Va. Soc’y for Human

Life, Inc. v. FEC, 263 F.3d 379, 392 (4th Cir. 2001) (“[W]e are bound by Buckley and MCFL,

which strictly limit the meaning of ‘express advocacy.’ If change is to come, it must come

from an imaginative Congress or from further review by the Supreme Court.”). Rather, the

Buckley Court was particularly concerned with construing vague provisions of a statute in

order to avoid reaching difficult questions of constitutional law. In the case of section

608(e)(1), the Supreme Court was unsuccessful–even after construing the statute in an effort

to avoid vagueness problems, the provision still failed to satisfy exacting First Amendment

scrutiny. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44-45. Whereas, in the case of section 434(e), the statutory

construction successfully salvaged the statute which, as narrowed, bore “a sufficient

relationship to a substantial governmental interest.” Id. at 80.

 The McConnell Plaintiffs argue that it is “unfathomable” that Defendants would

suggest the express advocacy test was not constitutionally ordained. McConnell Opp’n at

35-36 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 80) (“To insure the reach of § 434(e) is not

impermissibly broad, we construe ‘expenditure’ for purposes of that section in the same way

we construed the terms of § 608(e) to reach only funds used for communications that

expressly advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate.”) (emphasis

removed). However, as the quoted language explicitly indicates, the Supreme Court
112 The McConnell Plaintiffs also offer the argument that because Buckley invoked

First Amendment caselaw during its initial discussion of “General Principles,” it was clear

that Buckley was creating a rule of substantive constitutional law when it articulated the

express advocacy standard. McConnell Opp’n at 37, McConnell Reply at 27 (citing Buckley,

424 U.S. at 14) (noting that Buckley cited Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214 (1966) and New

York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)). However, Plaintiffs fail to point out that these

citations appear in the section “General Principles” and were cited for the uncontroversial

proposition that the “First Amendment affords the broadest protection to . . . political

expression.” Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14 (emphasis added). It defies logic to argue that because

the Supreme Court invoked First Amendment caselaw for the proposition that FECA’s

restrictions on contributions and expenditures operate in the area of the most fundamental

First Amendment rights, that the Court was implicitly–thirty pages later–hewing express

advocacy into constitutional stone.

372

construed the statutory language in an effort to save the provision from unconstitutional

overbreadth. By adopting a narrowing construction to this vague provision, the Supreme

Court easily found section 434(e) constitutional. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 80-82. Further

diminishing the credibility of the McConnell Plaintiffs’ argument is the fact that the Buckley

phrase quoted by the McConnell Plaintiffs appears in the midst of a section the Supreme

Court entitled “Vagueness Problems.” Id. at 76.112

Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ reasoning is faulty when they argue that the “express

advocacy doctrine reflects more than a concern about vagueness.” ACLU Opp’n at 4; accord

McConnell Opp’n at 37 (“[I]t is nonsensical to read the opinion as merely addressing

statutory vagueness.”). In adopting the express advocacy doctrine, the Supreme Court was

engaging in statutory construction in order to avoid unnecessarily declaring specific portions

of FECA unconstitutional. In fact, nowhere in Buckley or MCFL does the Supreme Court

explicitly state that the express advocacy test is a constitutional requirement. Each time the
113 Plaintiff ACLU also states that Title II of BCRA applies to advertisements “that

merely ‘refer’ to a candidate” and that, as a result, Title II “should be struck down.” ACLU

Br. at 13. The ACLU’s argument lacks merit because the primary definition of BCRA does

not place a “ban on communications that merely ‘refer’ to a candidate.” ACLU Br. at 13.

Rather, BCRA prohibits corporations and labor unions from funding broadcast

advertisements with general treasury funds, which refer to a federal candidate, run in close

proximity to an election and are targeted to the candidate’s relevant electorate. Corporations

(continued...)

373

Supreme Court has invoked the express advocacy standard it has done so in the context of

construing a vague portion of FECA. I would expect that if the Supreme Court were

announcing a substantive rule of constitutional law it would have stated it explicitly in either

of these two cases. 

Plaintiff ACLU takes a snippet of the Buckley opinion, and without offering any

textual analysis of the case, argues that Buckley’s clear ruling is that “the government’s

regulation of expenditures can only reach ‘communications that in express terms advocate

the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate. . . .’” ACLU Br. at 13 (quoting

Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44). However, the Supreme Court stated in full: “We agree that in

order to preserve the provision against invalidation on vagueness grounds, § 608(e)(1) must

be construed to apply only to expenditures for communications that in express terms

advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate for federal office.” Buckley,

424 U.S. at 44 (emphasis added). When the quoted portion appears in its full context, it

appears obvious the extent to which Plaintiff ACLU has misconstrued Buckley’s words. The

express advocacy test in Buckley was merely an appropriate exercise in statutory

construction.113
113(...continued)

and labor unions are, of course, free to fund as many of these prohibited advertisements as

they desire from their separate segregated fund. I doubt anyone disputes the proposition that

had Congress enacted a law that had banned communications that “merely ‘refer’ to a

candidate” that such a law would be declared overbroad and unconstitutional. Id. However,

the restriction related to electioneering communications in BCRA is much narrower than

Plaintiff ACLU describes in its briefing and is targeted to communications that influence

federal elections.

374

Plaintiffs are correct that the Buckley Court “did not posit a bipolar world of issue

advocacy and express advocacy.” However, they err in concluding that the Supreme Court,

therefore, “permitted regulation only where it is unmistakably clear that the speech at issue

can only be characterized as express advocacy.” McConnell Br. at 49; see also ACLU Br.

at 15 (“Only ‘express advocacy’ can be subject to regulation; issue advocacy is free from

permissible regulation.”). As Judge Richard W. Vollmer recently observed:

The Supreme Court in Buckley employed no such terminology and recognized

no such dichotomy. Rather, the Buckley Curt [sic] saw political speech as

comprised of “issue discussion” and “advocacy of a political result.” 424 U.S.

at 79. This would represent only a semantic difference if “advocacy of a

political result” were confined to express electoral advocacy, for then “issue

discussion” would occupy the same territory that the plaintiffs claim for “issue

advocacy”--that is, all political speech that is not express electoral advocacy.

The Buckley Court, however, recognized that advocacy of a political result

extends beyond express electoral advocacy . . . . The Buckley Court introduced

express electoral advocacy as a benchmark to provide speakers the clear

boundary that the statutory cap on independent expenditures otherwise lacked.

Id. at 43- 44. If express electoral advocacy were the only form of electoral

advocacy that exists, the Court would not have been concerned that speakers

could not tell the difference between issue discussion and electoral advocacy;

the Court established the express electoral advocacy standard precisely

because other forms of electoral advocacy exist but may prove difficult to

distinguish from issue discussion. . . . 
375

Nat’l Fed’n of Republican Assemblies, 218 F. Supp. 2d at 1324 (emphasis added). Plaintiffs

are mistaken in their conclusion that in not establishing a “bipolar world,” the Supreme Court

has necessarily decreed a rule of substantive constitutional law. As Judge Vollmer points

out:

Electoral advocacy is not automatically immune from regulation but, to the

extent it cannot easily be distinguished from issue discussion, it may be

necessary to exclude electoral advocacy from regulation so as to avoid

self-censorship by uncertain speakers and the resulting abridgement of issue

discussion. The bright line of express electoral advocacy was required under

Section 434(e), not because all speech falling short of express electoral

advocacy is immune from regulation, but because no other means of readily

distinguishing electoral advocacy from issue discussion presented itself.

Id. at 1328-29 (emphasis added). The point of Buckley and MCFL was not that Congress can

only regulate express advocacy. Rather, the Supreme Court in these cases took a vague

statute and construed it in such a manner so as to create a bright line because the statute itself

did not provide any “other means of readily distinguishing electoral advocacy from issue

discussion.” Id. at 1329.

a. Other Cases Cited by Plaintiffs Are Not Relevant or Are

Distinguishable

Plaintiffs’ briefing, while heavy on hyperbole attacking Defendants’ submissions, is

incredibly light on textual analysis of the Buckley and MCFL opinions. Perhaps attempting

to shift attention away from their lack of a robust discussion of Buckley, Plaintiffs attempt

to bolster their position by citing to a series of lower court cases that Plaintiffs claim uphold

the express advocacy standard as a rule of constitutional law. McConnell Br. 51-53. I
376

acknowledge that there is some dicta in these cases which suggests that the express advocacy

test is a constitutional requirement. Nevertheless, the language in these cases is dicta, is not

binding precedent, and for the reasons discussed in this section, is unpersuasive. 

The cases cited by Plaintiffs fall mainly into two categories. First, many of their cited

cases involve courts striking down FEC regulations attempting to broaden the Supreme

Court’s express advocacy standard. Not surprisingly, courts rejected the FEC’s efforts

because neither they nor the Commission has the authority to redefine the statutory test.

These courts correctly observed that Congress or the Supreme Court were the appropriate

branches to undertake such steps. BCRA is therefore consistent with this strand of caselaw.

The second grouping of cases involve federal courts striking down state statutes and state

regulations that had a variety of constitutional defects. In these cases, the state statutes at

issue all captured too much pure issue advocacy without fashioning an appropriate test that

predominantly regulated electoral advocacy. BCRA differs from these state provisions in

that with BCRA, Congress, supported by a plethora of evidence and experience, created a

narrowly tailored definition of electioneering communication that is specifically focused on

communications that influence federal elections.

With regard to the cases where courts struck down FEC regulations, the Commission,

and not Congress, had sought to define express advocacy broader than the Supreme Court

had permitted in Buckley. See, e.g., Va. Soc’y for Human Life, 263 F.3d at 385, 392 (striking

down FEC regulation 11 C.F.R. § 100.22(b) that defined express advocacy in such a manner
377

so as to include communications that “could only be interpreted by a reasonable person as

containing advocacy of the election or defeat of one or more clearly identified candidates”);

Maine Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. FEC, 98 F.3d 1, 1 (1st Cir. 1996) (summarily affirming

district court decision to strike down same regulation); Right to Life of Dutchess Cty., Inc.

v. FEC, 6 F. Supp. 2d 248, 253 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (striking down same regulation). In relation

to this broadly defined FEC regulation, these courts held that neither they nor the FEC had

the authority to change the express advocacy test, concluding that to do so required further

congressional or Supreme Court action. In fact only one decision concluded that the FEC

could make such a regulation, FEC v. Furgatch, 807 F.2d 857 (9th Cir. 1987), a case that

has been largely discredited. See, e.g., Chamber of Commerce of the United States of

America v. Moore, 288 F.2d 187, 194 (5th Cir. 2002) (citing cases disagreeing with

Furgatch). In attempting to create these regulations, the FEC’s efforts produced provisions

plagued with vague terms that raised the same concerns that troubled the Buckley Court,

placing the speaker at the mercy of the subjective intent of the listener to determine if a

communication was covered by FECA. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 43 (“‘In short, the

supposedly clear-cut distinction between discussion, laudation, general advocacy, and

solicitation puts the speaker in these circumstances wholly at the mercy of the varied

understanding of his hearers and consequently of whatever inference may be drawn as to his

intent and meaning.’”) (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 535 (1945)). Indeed, the

consensus among the judiciary has been that courts “are bound by Buckley and MCFL, which
114 Other cases relied on by Plaintiffs concern other FEC regulations relating to voter

guides. Clifton v. FEC, 114 F.3d 1309, 1317 (1st Cir. 1997); Faucher v. FEC, 928 F.2d 468,

472 (1st Cir. 1991).

378

strictly limit the meaning of ‘express advocacy.’ If change is to come, it must come from an

imaginative Congress or from further review by the Supreme Court.” Va. Soc’y for Human

Life, 263 F.3d at 392 (emphasis added).114 Unlike the present case, the absence of further

congressional action led these courts to strike down the FEC’s regulation.

With regard to the second category of cases involving state law provisions, Plaintiffs

refer to these decisions solely in a footnote. McConnell Br. at 53 n.20. These cited cases are

each distinguishable because the state laws and regulations considered by the various courts

each disregarded the principles of vagueness and overbreadth articulated in Buckley or

reached too far in regulating issue advocacy. In Chamber of Commerce, the Fifth Circuit

pointed out that the state statute at issue “essentially adopted the language of the Supreme

Court’s decisions in Buckley and MCFL [which meant that the only decision that the court

needed to reach was] to determine whether the Chamber’s advertisements constitute ‘express

advocacy’ under the standard articulated [in the state statute].” Chamber of Commerce, 288

F.3d at 196. Accordingly, for the court in Chamber of Commerce, the only decision to reach

was whether the communications at issue in the case constituted express advocacy. There

is some unexplained dicta in the case which states that the “Supreme Court has held that the

First Amendment permits regulation of political advertisements, but only if they expressly

advocate the election or defeat of a specific candidate.” Id. at 190 (no citation provided).
379

For the reasons articulated in this section, I expressly disagree with such dicta, presented

without a thoroughgoing analysis of Buckley or any other support. See Nat’l Fed’n of

Republican Assemblies, 218 F. Supp. 2d at 1329-30 (citing Chamber of Commerce) (“While

some of these cases contain unexplained dicta arguably suggesting that express electoral

advocacy is a universal, constitutional limitation on disclosure requirements, none so holds

and none offers any textual analysis of Buckley that could support such a proposition.”).

In another case cited by Plaintiffs, North Carolina Right to Life, Inc. v. Bartlett, the

Fourth Circuit invalidated a North Carolina statute requiring political committees to make

certain disclosures. North Carolina Right to Life, Inc. v. Bartlett, 168 F.3d 705, 712-713 (4th

Cir. 1999). The Bartlett court found “unconstitutionally vague and overbroad” a state statute

that reached further than FECA in extending disclosure requirements to (1) groups that only

incidentally engage in express advocacy and (2) groups engaging in issue advocacy. Id. In

the same breath as it struck down the provision, the Fourth Circuit made clear that it would

have first endeavored to save the provision like the Supreme Court did in Buckley. Id. at 712

(“The question then is whether we may similarly construe North Carolina’s definition of

political committee to save it from being void for vagueness.”). The court in Bartlett,

therefore, only found that the North Carolina statute was not subject to a narrowing

interpretation, not that the express advocacy test was a permanent fixture of constitutional

law. However, to the extent some language in Bartlett could arguably lead in that direction,
115 Indeed in distinguishing Bartlett, the court in National Federation of Republican

Assemblies found:

Only a single case cited by the plaintiffs clearly stands for the proposition

asserted. In North Carolina Right to Life, Inc. v. Bartlett, 168 F.3d 705 (4th

Cir.1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1153 (2000), the Court stated that Buckley

“defined political committee as including only those entities that have as a

major purpose engaging in express advocacy in support of a candidate.” Id.

at 712 (emphasis in original). The Court offered no authority for this

proposition, which is plainly contrary to Buckley and which is dicta in any

event.

Nat’l Fed’n of Republican Assemblies, 218 F. Supp. 2d at 1330 (footnotes omitted).

380

I find it to be dicta unaccompanied by a serious textual analysis of Buckley.

115

Plaintiffs also cite Citizens for Responsible Government State Political Action

Committee v. Davidson, a case where the Tenth Circuit severed unconstitutional portions of

a Colorado campaign finance law. The state law defined independent expenditure to include

not only express advocacy, but also “expenditures for political messages which

unambiguously refer to any specific public office or candidate for such office.” Citizens for

Responsible Gov’t State Political Action Comm. v. Davidson, 236 F.3d 1174, 1187-88 (10th

Cir. 2000). The term “political message” was in turn defined as including messages

delivered by telephone, by print or electronic media, or by any other written material that

applied not only to express advocacy, but also to unambiguous references to candidates. Id.

at 1188. The Davidson court found that as applied to the plaintiffs, the law encroached on

legitimate issue advocacy, which “is a violation of the rule enunciated in Buckley and its

progeny.” Id. at 1194 (quoting Vermont Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. Sorrell, 221 F.3d 376,

387 (2d Cir. 2000)). From the plain text of the Colorado statutes, the laws were aimed not
381

just at electioneering, but also at pure issue discussion. No effort was made to draw a

different line than had been drawn in Buckley, and as a result, the Tenth Circuit severed those

constitutionally offensive portions. Davidson also contains unexplained dicta that “the

[Supreme Court in MCFL] clarified that express words of advocacy were not simply a helpful

way to identify ‘express advocacy,’ but that the inclusion of such words was constitutionally

required.” Id. at 1187. For the reasons set forth above, I disagree with this statement, and

consider it to constitute unpersuasive dicta.

The other cases Plaintiffs cite are equally unpersuasive. See Iowa Right to Life

Comm., Inc. v. Williams, 187 F.3d 963, 968-970 (8th Cir. 1999) (striking down a state

regulation defining express advocacy in a similar manner as 11 C.F.R. § 100.22(b) as

unconstitutional because the focus of the regulation is on “what reasonable people or

reasonable minds would understand by the communication”); Brownsburg Area Patrons

Affecting Change v. Baldwin, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 23325 at *5-*6 (7th Cir. 1999)

(upholding Indiana disclosure statute after Indiana Supreme Court certified that statute

applied only to organizations engaging in express advocacy). Indeed, the court in Iowa Right

to Life grounded its decision on the fact that the “State’s definition of express advocacy

creates uncertainty and potentially chills discussion of public issues.” Iowa Right to Life, 187

F.3d at 970. 

After reviewing these cases, I am convinced that none of the cases cited above offer

a convincing argument that express advocacy is a constitutional requirement. The vague and
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subjective terms associated with the provisions of FECA impelled the Buckley court to offer

the express advocacy construction. In turning to BCRA, it is clear that the primary definition

of electioneering communication does not present this problem.

3. The Primary Definition of Electioneering Communication is Not

Vague

Unlike the vagueness concerns which motivated the Supreme Court in Buckley and

MCFL, the primary definition of electioneering communication is not vague. Indeed, none

of the Plaintiffs argued in their briefing or at oral argument that the primary definition

presented any vagueness concerns. See McConnell Br. at 57-69; Tr. at 264-65 (Waxman)

(“No one is arguing--I don’t believe that any of the 82 plaintiffs in this case argue that the

principal definition that is the four-part test, is vague in any respect. It’s hard to imagine how

it could be less vague.”) (none of the Plaintiffs ever objected to this characterization). In

other words, there is no vagueness challenge to the primary definition presently before the

Court. 

Plaintiffs make a number of general arguments in opposition to the primary definition:

first, they contend that the primary definition fails because it regulates more speech than

express advocacy, McConnell Br. at 44-57; second, they argue that even if express advocacy

is not a constitutional requirement, the primary definition is unconstitutionally overbroad,

McConnell Br. at 57-69; third, they argue that the primary definition of electioneering

communications is “woefully” underinclusive, McConnell Br. at 75-77; and fourth, they

argue that the primary definition violates the Fifth Amendment, McConnell Br. at 77-81.
383

Nowhere, however, do any of the Plaintiffs argue that the primary definition is vague. Given

that among all of the seasoned political actors and organizations that comprise the remaining

77 Plaintiffs in this case, not one has argued that vagueness is a problem plaguing the

primary definition, I could decline to engage in a vagueness inquiry. See, e.g., Tri-State

Hosp. Supply Corp. v. United States, 142 F. Supp. 2d 93, 101 n.6 (D.D.C. 2001) (“The court

makes no ruling on such acts, however, because the United States has not briefed the issue.”);

Carter v. Cleland, 472 F. Supp. 985, 989 n.4 (D.D.C. 1979) (“This issue was not briefed by

the parties. No decision will be rendered on it.”); cf. Kattan v. District of Columbia, 995

F.2d 274, 276 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (“[T]his Court has recognized that a losing party may not use

a Rule 59 motion to raise new issues that could have been raised previously.”); United States

v. Wade, 255 F.3d 833, 839 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (issues that are not briefed are considered

“abandoned”) (citing Terry v. Reno, 101 F.3d 1412, 1415 (D.C. Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520

U.S. 1264 (1997)).

However, since Judge Henderson discusses the vagueness question in her opinion, see

Henderson Op. at Part IV.A, I note that even were I to entertain the vagueness question, I

would conclude that the primary definition of electioneering communication is free from any

vagueness infirmities. The primary definition of electioneering communication, as set forth

in section 201 of the Act, comprises four distinct elements, each designed to be clear,

objective, limited in scope, and directly responsive to the evidence concerning recent

electioneering by corporations and labor unions with their general treasury funds. An
116 The language in the statute, “refers to a clearly identified candidate for Federal

office,” BCRA § 201(a); FECA § 304(f)(3)(A); 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(A), does not suffer the

same problems that the Buckley court had with FECA’s “relative to” language. Although,

the definition of “refer” shares “relate” as a synonym, “refer” is a much more precise word.

Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary, Tenth Edition 1997 (defining refer as “1 a: to

have relation or connection: RELATE b: to direct attention usu. by clear and specific

mention.”) (emphasis added). Given that “refers to” is a much more exacting word than

“relative to,” and given that none of the Plaintiffs have complained that there is any

ambiguity with this wording, I find that this phrase does not suffer from the same vagueness

problems that plagued FECA when the Buckley court construed the phrase “relative to.”

384

advertisement falls within the definition, and therefore would have to be funded with money

from a labor union or corporation’s segregated fund, if, and only if, it satisfies each of the

following four elements:

A. It is broadcast by television, radio, cable, or satellite. Newspaper

advertisements, direct mail, billboards, phone banks, Internet advertisements,

door-to-door canvassing, or leaflets are not covered by the primary definition.

B. It refers to a “clearly identified candidate” for federal office. Broadcast

advertisements dealing with issues are not electioneering communications,

unless the advertiser chooses to mention or show a particular federal

candidate.116

C. It runs in the 60 days before a general election, or the 30 days before a

primary.

D. The advertisement is targeted to the identified candidate’s electorate.

Specifically, the advertisement must reach at least 50,000 voters in a relevant

state or district. 
385

BCRA § 201(a); FECA § 304(f)(3)(A); 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(A); see also Def.-Int. Br. at 110.

In a case construing a new Wisconsin statutory provision very similar to the primary

definition of “electioneering communication,” Chief Judge Barbara B. Crabb makes the

compelling point that the Wisconsin statute at issue in that case actually posed less of a

vagueness problem than the express advocacy standard identified in Buckley:

Whatever the potential constitutional flaws of Wisconsin’s new reporting and

disclosure scheme, vagueness does not appear to be one of them. In fact, the

state legislature’s approach appears to draw a line even brighter than the one

established in Buckley. The law makes clear that once a certain dollar

threshold is surpassed, the law’s disclosure requirements apply to any

communication referring to a clearly identified candidate that appears within

60 days of an election. A copy of a proposed advertisement and a calendar

are all that is necessary to make a conclusive advance determination that the

ad is subject to regulation. By contrast, the Buckley approach to express

advocacy still leaves room for a degree of uncertainty because, as plaintiffs

concede, the list of words and phrases identified in that opinion as constituting

express advocacy is illustrative, rather [than] exhaustive. Therefore, in a later

case involving the federal statute at issue in Buckley, the Court noted that the

definition of express advocacy it adopted in Buckley would also cover a

communication whose message “is marginally less direct than ‘Vote for

Smith.’” Federal Election Commission v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life,

Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 249 (1986). Just how “direct” an exhortation must be to

qualify as express advocacy under Buckley is not free of all uncertainty for

would-be political advertisers.

Wisconsin Realtors, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 1086 (emphasis added). The same could be said of

the primary definition of electioneering communication in BCRA. Electioneering

communication is more certain and more explicitly defined than Buckley’s and MCFL’s

explanation of express advocacy in that it provides objective criteria for potential political

communicators to follow. Although there is no exhaustive list of words falling under the
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rubric of express advocacy, the electioneering communication definition is precise as to what

communications are encompassed by its terms. Accordingly, I find none of the vagueness

concerns identified by the Buckley Court present with regard to the primary definition of

electioneering communication.

D. The Evisceration of Section 441b

1. Introduction

As discussed in the foregoing section, the Supreme Court in Buckley and MCFL

construed FECA’s restrictions on independent expenditures to apply only to expenditures

containing words of “express advocacy.” While the Supreme Court was prescient in

observing that such a construction with regard to limits on an individual’s independent

expenditures was bound to create loopholes in the regulatory system, Buckley, 424 U.S. at

45 (“It would naively underestimate the ingenuity and resourcefulness of persons and groups

desiring to buy influence to believe that they would have much difficulty devising

expenditures that skirted the restriction on express advocacy of election or defeat but

nevertheless benefitted the candidate’s campaign.”), the Supreme Court emphasized in

Buckley that it was without a record to uphold restrictions that went beyond express

advocacy, id. at 46 (“[T]he provision does not presently appear to pose dangers of real or

apparent corruption comparable to those identified with large campaign contributions.”)

(emphasis added). In keeping with our system of constitutional checks and balances, the

Supreme Court effectively sent the issue back to the political branches for further
387

consideration. The Supreme Court, in my view, never conclusively foreclosed

reconsideration of a limitation on independent expenditures, provided that such a restriction

was not vague and was supported by an adequate record. Indeed, in the context of restricting

corporate and labor union independent expenditures, the Supreme Court, after Buckley,

explicitly left this door open. See First Nat'l. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 788

n.26 (1978) (“Congress might well be able to demonstrate the existence of a danger of real

or apparent corruption in independent expenditures by corporations to influence candidate

elections.”).

The instant case presents such a record to the three-judge District Court and also

demonstrates the wisdom of then-Justice Rehnquist’s observation that the “careful legislative

adjustment of the federal electoral laws, in a cautious advance, step by step, to account for

the particular legal and economic attributes of corporations and labor organizations warrants

considerable deference.” NRWC, 459 U.S. at 209 (internal citation and quotation marks

omitted). Since 1996, corporations and labor unions have used their general treasury funds

to influence federal elections in direct contravention of the original intent of Section 441b

and its statutory predecessors. Congress responded to this problem by enacting Sections 201,

203, and 204 of BCRA. Therefore, before turning to a discussion of whether these sections

of BCRA are narrowly tailored, I shall briefly discuss the erosion of the express advocacy

test as a means of distinguishing between electoral advocacy and issue discussion. The

Findings of Fact demonstrate that Congress correctly observed that Section 441b was no
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longer effective at preventing corporations and labor unions from using their general treasury

funds to influence federal elections. Indeed, to quote a former NRA official, the state of the

Section 441b prohibition prior to BCRA was “built of the same sturdy material as the

emperor’s clothing.” Findings ¶ 2.4.3 (Metaksa). 

The Findings of Fact with regard to the evisceration of Section 441b resemble a

mosaic with each piece of evidence building on the next, and when viewed as a whole,

present a damaging portrait of corporations and labor unions using their general treasury

funds to directly influence federal elections. It is to this picture that I now turn.

2. The Rise of Spending on Issue Advocacy in Close Proximity to

Federal Elections

As discussed supra, in MCFL, the Supreme Court construed the prohibition on

expenditures in section 441b as only applying to expenditures containing words of “express

advocacy.” MCFL, 479 U.S. at 249 (“We therefore hold that an expenditure must constitute

‘express advocacy’ in order to be subject to the prohibition of § 441b.”). As a result of

MCFL, corporations and labor unions were permitted to use their general treasury funds on

independent expenditures in connection with a federal election, provided that those

independent expenditures did not contain words of “express advocacy.” In other words, so

long as corporations and labor unions did not use any of Buckley’s “magic words” in their

advertisement, they could use their general treasury funds to pay for advertisements that

influenced a federal election. Of course, if the corporation or labor union chose to use the

magic words in an advertisement, it could still do so, provided it paid for such a
117 As the Findings demonstrate, issue advertisements generally fall into three

categories: candidate-centered, legislation-centered, and general image-centered. Findings

¶ 2.2.2. Candidate-centered advertisements make a case for or against a candidate but do so

without using “magic words.” Id. These are the advertisements that BCRA seeks to

distinguish from other forms of issue advocacy.

118 The reason why it was not until 1996 that this explosion in candidate-centered issue

advocacy occurred, as political consultant Bailey explains, was that in post-Watergate

campaigns, it was important for candidates to be seen as attempting to clean up the political

process. Findings ¶ 2.2.7 (observing that “due to a lack of enforcement and a willingness on

the part of some to win at all costs, these concerns appear to have dissipated”).

119 The report the Annenberg Study produced following the 1997-1998 election cycle

(continued...)

389

communication from a segregated fund, thereby ensuring that there was political support for

the advertisement.

As a consequence of the Supreme Court’s decision in MCFL, candidate-centered issue

advertisements,117 funded with corporate and labor union general treasury funds, has

dramatically increased in recent election cycles. Findings ¶ 2.2. “By the early 1990s and

especially by 1996, interest groups had developed a strategy to effectively communicate an

electioneering message for or against a particular candidate without using the magic words

and thus avoid disclosure requirements, contribution limits and source limits.” Id. ¶ 2.2.7

(Magleby).118 The 2001 Annenberg Report, relied on by Defendants, Plaintiffs, and

Congress, establishes that during the 1996 election cycle, an estimated $135 million to $150

million was spent on multiple broadcasts of about 100 distinct advertisements, in the 1997-

1998 election cycle, 77 organizations aired 423 distinct advertisements at a cost of between

$250 million and $340 million,119 and in the 1999-2000 election cycle, 130 groups spent over
119(...continued)

placed this estimate at between $275 million to $340 million. See supra note 78.

120 As a representative sample, the Annenberg Report 2001 found that in the 2000

election cycle, the Republican and Democratic parties accounted for almost $162 million

(31%) of this spending on issue advocacy; Citizens for Better Medicare, $65 million (13%);

Coalition to Protect America’s Health Care, $30 million (6%); U.S. Chamber of Commerce,

$25.5 million (5%); AFL-CIO, $21.1 million (4%); National Rifle Association, $20 million

(4%); U.S. Term Limits, $20 million (4%). Findings ¶ 2.2.4.

121 Interestingly, the huge rise in issue advocacy spending during federal campaigns

far outpaces spending on the amount of PAC-sponsored advertising. Under the original

intent of FECA, corporations and labor unions that wished to sponsor electioneering

advertisements would have had to do so with segregated funds (e.g. “PAC money”). 2

U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2)(C). During the 2000 election cycle, non-PAC interest groups ran 74,024

political advertisements referring to a federal candidate, while PAC interest groups ran only

3,663 advertisements. Findings ¶ 2.2.5.2. Although none of the parties discuss this

discrepancy, and although there are likely a number of factors to explain it, it does not take

much imagination to conclude that one of the primary reasons that PAC advertising is so low

in comparison, is that if a corporation or labor union can fund the most effective form of

electioneering with general treasury funds, there is no need to try and raise PAC money or

comply with PACs’ disclosure provisions simply to run electioneering advertisements that

use words of “express advocacy.”

390

an estimated $500 million on 1,100 distinct advertisements. Id. ¶ 2.2.4.120 Plaintiffs’ own

expert readily concedes that the number of organizations sponsoring issue advertisements has

“exploded” over the last three election cycles. Id. ¶ 2.2.6 (La Raja).121 From their studies,

the Annenberg Public Policy Center concludes that the amount of money spent on “issue

advocacy” is increasing rapidly, that this development permits the political parties,

corporations, and labor unions to gain a “louder” voice, and that consequently, the

“distinction between issue advocacy and express advocacy is a fiction.” Id. Indeed, even the

political parties recognize the value which these outside corporations and labor unions bring
391

to the election with their issue advocacy. Id. ¶ 2.7.10.

3. “Magic Words” Are Rarely Used in Political Advertisements

As issue advocacy by corporations and labor unions has grown as a means of

influencing federal elections, the trend of all forms of political advertisements has been to

move away from words of express advocacy–whether they are advertisements produced by

candidates, political parties, or corporations and labor unions. Findings ¶ 2.3. The

unrebutted expert testimony demonstrates that only 11.4 percent of advertisements purchased

by federal candidates that aired during the 2000 election cycle would qualify as

electioneering under the “magic words” test. Id. ¶ 2.3.1 (Goldstein); see also id. ¶ 2.3.2

(Strother) (observing that 90% of candidate advertisements he has put together in his career

have not used express advocacy). Moreover, the uncontroverted testimony of political

consultants establishes that express advocacy is no longer considered an effective tool of

political advertising. Id. (Strother) (“Good media consultants never tell people to vote for

Senator X; rather, you make your case and let the voters come to their own conclusions. In

my experience, it actually proves less effective to instruct viewers what you want them to

do.”); (Bailey) (“In the modern world of 30 second political advertisements, it is rarely

advisable to use such clumsy words as ‘vote for’ or ‘vote against.’”). When Buckley was

handed down, express advocacy in political advertising was more common. Id. (Bailey).

Since the mid-1980s, political advertising has shifted and today the practices of political

advertisers–with only a mere 30 seconds to convey their messages–parallel commercial
392

advertisers where a “product is presented in various desirable tableaus . . . present[ing]

viewers with a variety of reasons to choose their product.” Id. ¶ 2.3.3 (Krasno and Sorauf)

(“Political ads seem to follow the same strategy, hoping that citizens will grow to prefer a

candidate without being told to troop to the polls.”).

4. Other Advantages of Using Issue Advocacy to Influence Federal

Elections

Aside from the fact that candidate-centered issue advocacy is a much more powerful

means to convey an electioneering message, it is uncontroverted there are other strong

incentives for using “issue advocacy” to influence federal elections. Id. ¶ 2.5. First, by

running “issue advertisements” in the immediate run-up to a federal election, corporations

and unions are able to avoid any of the disclosure requirements that ordinarily attach when

these groups use general treasury funds to influence federal elections. Id.; id. ¶ 2.5.1.

Plaintiffs’ Experts Milkis and La Raja equally concur that the rise of issue advocacy has

permitted issue organizations to hide their true identities while running these advertisements.

Id. ¶ 2.5.1 (Milkis); ¶ 2.2.6 (La Raja) (“Over the last three election cycles, the number of

groups sponsoring ads has exploded, and consumers often don’t know who these groups are,

who funds them, and whom they represent.”). As Plaintiffs’ expert Milkis candidly

observes, “For example, The Citizens for Better Medicare, which spent $65 million on

television ads [during the 2000 election cycle], is funded primarily by the pharmaceutical

industry.” Id. ¶ 2.5.1; see also id. (citing example of AFL-CIO running advertisements in

congressional race under the name “Coalition to Make Our Voices Heard”); id. (“Frankly
393

we’ve taken a page out of their book [other interest groups] because in some places it’s much

more effective to run an ad by the ‘Coalition to Make Our Voices Heard’ than it is to say paid

for by ‘the men and women of the AFL-CIO.’”) (Magleby) (citing comments of AFL-CIO

representative at a lunchtime discussion panel at the Pew Press Conference). As a result, not

only are corporations and unions able to fund the most effective form of political advertising

with their general treasury funds, but they are able to create corporations which have

euphemistic names and which, in many instances, serve as fronts for injecting corporate

general treasury funds into federal elections. Id. In addition to avoiding FECA’s disclosure

requirements, it is uncontroverted that another advantage of running election advertisements

as “issue advocacy” is that corporations and labor unions can use their general treasury funds

to influence federal elections which, as Defense Expert Magleby observes, “makes a sham

of these longstanding federal laws.” Id. ¶ 2.5.2. The uncontroverted testimony of Defense

Expert Magleby also makes clear that by avoiding PACs, these organizations can raise larger

amounts of funds more quickly than if they had to raise money to pay for their advertisements

using PACs. Id. ¶ 2.5.3.

5. The Impact of These Developments

Accordingly, when the Supreme Court’s construction of Section 441b in MCFL is

combined with the fact that very few political advertisements use words of express advocacy,

the result is obvious: corporations and labor unions, long prohibited from using their general

treasury funds to influence federal elections, are able to run the most effective form of
394

political advertising and the most widely used form of political advertising from their general

coffers. At the same time, the law constitutionally prohibits corporations and labor unions

from using general treasury funds to influence federal elections with advertisements that use

express words of advocacy–a style of advertising rarely used and described by political

consultants as ineffective. The unintended result of this development is that the longstanding

prohibition on the use of corporate and labor union general treasuries to influence federal

elections is undermined. Indeed, the role of corporations and labor unions in federal

elections is actually enhanced because these corporations and labor unions are able to fund

the most potent form of political advertising using treasury funds.

The testimony from political consultants, experts, and officeholders and candidates

convincingly bears this point out. The record demonstrates that the express advocacy test is

not a useful benchmark for distinguishing between campaign advertising and issue

advertising, that no particular words are necessary to create electioneering advertisements,

and that corporations and labor unions produce advertisements that directly influence federal

elections under the guise of “issue advocacy.” Id. ¶ 2.4. Despite the fact that MCFL

interpreted Section 441b as reaching more advocacy than the examples in Buckley's footnote

52, MCFL, 479 U.S. at 249, the test has proven ineffective at distinguishing between genuine

issue advocacy and electioneering paid for with corporate and labor union general treasury

funds. Indeed, as the testimony presented in this case convincingly demonstrates, no

particular words of advocacy are necessary for effective campaign advertisements; it is easier
395

for corporations and labor unions to skirt the prohibition contained in Section 441b. In sum,

Congress found that the express advocacy test, grafted onto Section 441b by the MCFL

Court, was no longer preventing corporations and labor unions from spending general

treasury funds on federal elections. Findings ¶ 2.4.4.

6. Corporations and Labor Unions Routinely Spend General

Treasury Funds on Advertisements Designed to Influence Federal

Elections

a. Political Consultants Testify that Candidate-Centered Issue

Advertisements are Electioneering

Advertisements designed to influence a federal election under the guise of issue

advocacy usually end by telling the viewer to call, ask, or tell a candidate to do something.

Findings ¶ 2.4.3 (Pennington). From the perspective of political consultants, who provide

testimony in this case, there is no practical difference between these “issue advertisements”

and those advertisements where express advocacy is used. Id. (Strother) (“From the point

of view of a media consultant, there is no real difference between ending an advertisement

with ‘Vote for Senator X’ versus ending an advertisement with ‘Tell Senator X to continue

working hard for America’s families.’”); (Beckett) (“However, in fact no particular words

of advocacy are needed in order for an ad to influence the outcome of an election. No list

of such words could be complete. . . .”); (Lamson) (“When political parties and interest

groups run ‘issue ads’ just before an election that say ‘call’ a candidate and tell her to do

something, their real purpose is typically not to enlighten the voters about some issue, but to

influence the result of the election, and these ads often do have that effect.”). Plaintiffs have
396

provided no contrary political consultant testimony to discredit the testimony of these

political consultants. I find the uncontroverted testimony of the political consultants

particularly compelling because it comes from well-known and respected professionals who

are engaged in the business of making political advertisements. See id. 

Ms. Tanya Metaksa, former Chair of the NRA PVF, stated in her opening remarks at

the American Association of Political Consultants’ Fifth General Session on “Issue

Advocacy” that “[i]t is foolish to believe there is any practical difference between issue

advocacy and advocacy of a political candidate. What separates issue advocacy and political

advocacy is a line in the sand drawn on a windy day.” Id. (Metaksa); see also id. (Strother)

(“When we design, produce, and run ‘issue ads’ that mention specific candidates for federal

office and that are aired in proximity to an election, these ads are for only one purpose: to

effect [sic] the outcome of an election.”). In concrete terms, perhaps the most striking

example of this “line in the sand drawn on a windy day,” is the two camera shoot, where

consultants bring two cameras to shoot an advertisement. Id. (Strother). The film in Camera

A is used by the candidate, while the nearly identical film in Camera B is sold for a nominal

fee to a third party who then “gets direct control over the images of the candidate used in the

issue groups ads.” Id. In my judgment, the testimony of political consultants provides

overwhelming evidence that corporations and labor unions spend general treasury funds on

advertisements that, while not using words of express advocacy, are designed to influence

federal elections.
397

b. Current and Former Officeholders and Candidates Testify that

Corporations and Labor Unions Use General Treasury Funds

to Pay for Advertisements Designed to Influence Federal

Elections

In addition to political consultants, current and former officeholders and candidates

testify that the express advocacy test has become meaningless, that no particular words of

advocacy are necessary to convey an electioneering message, and that corporations and labor

unions were using their general treasury funds to influence federal elections. Id. ¶ 2.4.2.

This testimony is particularly compelling given that the political actors supporting BCRA,

to borrow words from Justice Byron White, “included many seasoned professionals who have

been deeply involved in elective processes and who have viewed them at close range over

many years.” Buckley, 424 U.S. at 261 (White, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); see

also Colorado I, 518 U.S. at 650 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Congress surely has both wisdom

and experience in these matters that is far superior to ours.”). Even Plaintiff Congressman

Ron Paul conceded during his deposition that outside group issue advertisements run during

his 2000 congressional campaign were intended to influence the election. Findings ¶ 2.4.2.1

(Paul). Politicians from both political parties provide convincing testimony in this case, and

also provide important guidance through floor statements made during the debate over

campaign finance legislation, that in their considered judgment the express advocacy test was

not preventing corporations and labor unions from influencing federal elections using general

treasury funds, and that no particular words are necessary to convey an electioneering

message. Id. ¶ 2.4.2 (including statements and testimony from Feingold, McCain, Levin,
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Bloom, Bumpers, Chapin, and Shays).

c. Examples of Corporations and Labor Unions Demonstrate That

These Organizations Use Their General Treasury Funds to Pay

for Advertisements Designed to Influence Federal Elections

The record, however, goes beyond the testimony of experts, political consultants, and

present and past officeholders and candidates. The documented behavior of corporations and

labor unions also clearly demonstrates that issue advocacy is used as a tool of electioneering

by corporations and labor unions. Id. ¶ 2.6. The Findings, which culled the most salient

examples from the substantial record submitted by the parties, demonstrate that, for example,

the AFL-CIO, the Coalition, Citizens for Better Medicare, the NRA, and The Club for

Growth all used corporate general treasury funds to influence recent federal elections. Id.

¶¶ 2.6.1-2.6.5. Plaintiffs dismiss this evidence as merely “anecdotal,” McConnell Opp’n at

32, which is a characterization of the weight of the evidence and not a comment on whether

it is rebutted. To the contrary, the examples of corporations and labor unions using general

treasury funds to influence federal elections are not “anecdotal,” but powerful illustrations

of a regulatory regime in paralysis. Indeed, like a mosaic, these “anecdotal” examples when

combined with the other evidence in the record relating to the general ineffectiveness of

Section 441b, and the failure of the express advocacy test, make a compelling case for the

restrictions Congress arrived at in enacting Sections 201, 203, and 204 of BCRA.

1) The NRA

The Findings relating to the activities of Plaintiff NRA, however, really drive home
399

the point that the express advocacy test has become meaningless and that corporations spend

general treasury funds on candidate-centered issue advertisements to influence federal

elections. Id. ¶ 2.6.4. Aside from the NRA’s media consultant who stated that the first

objective of the NRA was to influence the outcome of the presidential election and other key

congressional races, id. at 2.6.4.1, the NRA ran two nearly identical radio advertisements in

the 2000 election: one paid for with PAC money which used express advocacy and one paid

for with corporate general treasury funds which did not use express advocacy. Id. ¶ 2.6.4.4.

The only real difference between the advertisements was that the one paid for with PAC

money said “Vote George W. Bush for President” at the end of the advertisement. Id. In my

view, this advertisement is a perfect example–the poster child–of how pointless the express

advocacy test is at distinguishing between genuine issue advocacy and electioneering

advertisements. In addition to this evidence, the Findings, particularly those resting on the

internal documents of the NRA, id. ¶ 2.6.4.1, also demonstrate just how driven the NRA was

to use general treasury funds, which fell outside the source and amount limitations of FECA,

to directly influence the 2000 federal election. Id. ¶ 2.6.4.

2) Citizens for Better Medicare and The Club for Growth

Another glaring example from the Findings includes the pharmaceutical industry’s

uncontroverted efforts to influence the 2000 elections, id. ¶ 2.6.3, by admittedly spending

over sixty-five million dollars on television advertising which, according to Plaintiffs’ expert

Dr. La Raja, was almost as much as either of the two political parties spent on issue
400

advocacy, Id. ¶ 2.6.3.4. The pharmaceutical industry's efforts were cloaked behind the name

“Citizens for Better Medicare.” I have concluded from the testimony and documents

submitted in this case that this issue advocacy campaign mounted during the 2000 election

cycle was designed to influence the federal election with corporate general treasury funds in

direct contravention of the historic prohibition on such activity. See id. ¶ 2.6.3; see also id.

¶ 2.6.3.4 (“Much of CBM’s ad strategy leading up to the 2000 election was aimed at

supporting candidates attacked in AFL-CIO advertising.”). 

In addition to CBM’s activities, I have also found that Plaintiff The Club for Growth

influenced the 2000 federal elections with corporate general treasury funds. Id. ¶ 2.6.5. The

Club for Growth openly acknowledges in their solicitation materials that “these issue

advocacy campaigns can make all the difference in tight races.” Id. ¶ 2.6.5.4. Moreover, the

activity of The Club for Growth in Florida in a 2000 Congressional race demonstrates in an

uncontroverted manner the power of a corporation when it uses general treasury funds to

influence federal primary elections. Id. ¶ 2.6.5.5.

3) AFL-CIO

With regard to the AFL-CIO’s issue advocacy campaign during the 1996 federal

election, I have found that the AFL-CIO used issue advocacy to influence the 1996 general

election. Findings ¶ 2.6.1. The internal documents surrounding the AFL-CIO’s efforts are

particularly revealing and directly contradict the AFL-CIO’s self-serving declaration

submitted in this case, which attempts to downplay the electoral considerations behind their
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advertisements. Id. ¶ 2.6.1.1 (observing that the indirect effect on election outcomes has

“never been the point of [the AFL-CIO’s broadcast advertising program”). The documents

demonstrate that media consultants were hired by the AFL-CIO to test how their advertising

would resonate with the electorate, how to create advertisements that “manage the political

message in a volatile environment,” and even how to place a media buy in Illinois to help a

Senate candidate when the candidate did not have the resources to fund advertising on his

own. Id. Moreover, other independent evidence, including expert testimony, establishes that

the AFL-CIO’s 1996 issue advocacy campaign was designed to influence the federal

election. Id. ¶¶ 2.6.1.2-2.6.1.5. The AFL-CIO does not refute or explain the discrepancy

between its general denial about its issue advocacy and these contrary evidentiary documents.

The Findings elaborate on these points and others in more detail, but I conclude from this

evidence that during the 1996 election campaign the AFL-CIO used general treasury funds

to influence a federal election, and therefore was able to circumvent FECA’s requirement

that their efforts be paid for with federal funds from a segregated account. See id. ¶ 2.6.1.6

(observing that twelve of the thirty-two House Republican freshman targeted by the AFLCIO were defeated). 

4) The Coalition–Americans Working For Real Change

In response to the AFL-CIO, Plaintiffs Chamber of Commerce, National Association

of Manufacturers, and National Association of Wholesaler-Distributors, and other business

entities, formed a corporation entitled the “Coalition–Americans Working for Real Change”
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also to influence directly the 1996 federal election. Id. ¶ 2.6.2. I have found that The

Coalition’s issue advocacy campaign around the 1996 election was designed to influence the

federal election. Id. Like the AFL-CIO, the internal documents of the Coalition demonstrate

that electoral strategies, and not “issue advocacy,” were at the heart of the Coalition’s efforts

in 1996. Id. ¶ 2.6.2.2. Indeed, the Coalition sought advice from consultants and polling

firms on how to maximize their ability to influence federal elections. Id. These internal

documents, combined with independent expert testimony and the FEC General Counsel’s

report,see id. ¶¶ 2.6.2.3-2.6.2.4, strongly contradict the Coalition’s self-serving efforts in this

litigation to portray their 1996 advertising campaign as something less than electioneering

advertisements in disguise. The Coalition used corporate general treasury funds to directly

influence the 1996 election and, therefore, was able to circumvent FECA’s policy of

compelling corporations to use federal money from a segregated account. See generally id.

¶ 2.6.2; see also id. ¶ 2.6.2.2 (post-election analysis done by Coalition’s polling firm).

The AFL-CIO and The Coalition presented no uncontroverted evidence that they did

not try to influence the 1996 federal election with issue advertisements. Moreover, these

organizations do not contest that they paid for these advertisements with general treasury

funds. The effort by the AFL-CIO and The Coalition to portray themselves as engaging in

issue advocacy, as opposed to electioneering, is belied by their own internal documents.
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d. Other Examples of Advertisements Demonstrate That

Corporations and Labor Unions Use Their General Treasury

Funds to Pay for Advertisements Designed to Influence Federal

Elections

Aside from the examples above of corporations and labor unions directly using

general treasury funds to influence federal elections, the attributes of so-called “issue

advertisements” in the Findings demonstrate the electioneering purpose behind these

commercials. 

1) Organizations Run Issue Advertisements About Which

They Have No Particular Organizational Interest

First, the Findings compellingly demonstrate that many candidate-centered issue

advertisements are run about issues in which the organization sponsoring the advertisement

has no interest. Id. ¶ 2.6.6. On this basis, it is clear that these advertisements were designed

to influence a federal election. For example, EMILY’s List, an organization dedicated to

pro-choice female candidates, ran advertisements on gun-control for federal candidate Linda

Chapin. Id. ¶ 2.6.6.1. Other examples from the Findings include the Associated Builders

and Contractors running an advertisement about a federal candidate that dealt with penalties

for child molesters. Id. ¶ 2.6.6.2 (admitting that such an advertisement is not of a particular

concern of contractors). In another situation, the Club for Growth funneled $20,000 to the

American Conservative Union to fund an issue advertisement relating to Hillary Clinton’s

candidacy which the Club candidly admitted at deposition had nothing to do with the Club’s

interest in pro-growth conservative Republicans. Id. ¶ 2.6.6.3. Another example is an
404

advertisement run by the trucking industry, under the pseudonym “The Foundation for

Responsible Government,” praising the record of an opponent of a Senator on health care and

taxes. Id. ¶ 2.6.6.4 (observing that the Senator was a target of the group because he

supported legislation banning triple trailer trucks). Finally, the group Citizens for Life, a

New Hampshire Pro-Life Organization, ran advertisements in 2000 against John McCain

criticizing jokes allegedly made by McCain about Alzheimer’s and a home for senior

citizens. Id. ¶ 2.6.6.5. The New Hampshire group claimed the advertisement was timely

because the New Hampshire State Senate was close to voting on a bill to legalize assisted

suicide. Id. I am not persuaded that any of these advertisements were anything other than

electioneering advertisements. Rather, these examples demonstrate that corporations spend

general treasury funds on candidate-centered issue advertisements to influence federal

elections. Id. ¶ 2.6.6.6.

2) Organizations Run Issue Advertisements About Past

Votes or About Issues No Longer Before Congress

Second, organizations run candidate-centered issue advertisements praising or

criticizing candidates for past votes or discussing a Member’s position on an issue not

pending before Congress. These candidate-centered issue advertisements are clearly

designed to influence federal elections. Id. ¶ 2.6.7. For example, the AFL-CIO has run a

series of advertisements on past votes of particular Members of Congress. Id. ¶ 2.6.7.1. As

discussed in my Findings, these advertisements are nothing more than campaign

advertisements. Id. Another example of this practice is the Chamber’s advertisements
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attacking various Members of Congress over the prescription drug issue that was not pending

before Congress when the advertisements were aired. Id. ¶ 2.6.7.2. Many of these

advertisements did not include a phone number to contact the Member, and some of the

advertisements were aired against candidates who were not even Members of Congress. Id.

The Chamber’s advertising in this regard was plainly designed to influence the federal

election. Id. These examples from the AFL-CIO and the Chamber also demonstrate that

corporations and labor unions used general treasury funds to pay for candidate-centered issue

advertisements designed to influence a federal election. Id. ¶ 2.6.7.3.

3) Organizations Air Advertisements When A Candidate

Lacks Funds to Run Advertisements and So a Candidate

Can Avoid Running Advertisements Attacking an

Opponent 

Corporations and labor unions also use general treasury funds to pay for candidatecentered issue advertisements (a) when candidates lack funds to put their own advertisements

on the air and (b) to attack a candidate's opponent so that the candidate can run only

“positive” advertisements. Id. ¶ 2.6.8. These indicators provide yet another powerful

indication that these “issue advertisements” are nothing short of campaign advertisements

designed to affect elections, paid for with the general treasury funds of corporations and

labor unions. Id. ¶ 2.6.8.4. The uncontroverted testimony of political consultants is that

negative character advertisements are often run by a third party because they shield the

candidate from the political repercussions that are likely to result if the candidate actually ran

the negative advertisement him or herself. Id. ¶ 2.6.8.1. In addition to allowing the
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candidate to refrain from running negative advertisements, organizations often run such

advertisements praising a candidate or criticizing the candidate’s opponent when the

candidate's campaign does not have resources to run advertising on its own. Id. ¶ 2.6.8.2

(former Representative discussing how his opponent did not buy media in a media market

that covered 40% of his district, but that other groups filled the void attacking the

Representative); id. ¶ 2.6.8.3 (beneficial advertisements by EMILY’s List ran when the

Chapin campaign was not on the air to save resources); id. ¶ 2.6.1.1 (internal memorandum

of the AFL-CIO discussing advertising buy by the union to help Illinois Senate candidate in

markets where the candidate lacked resources to air advertising). I conclude that these

advertisements were also clearly designed to influence a federal election and paid for with

the general treasury funds of corporations and labor unions.

7. Conclusion

In sum, it again bears emphasizing that FECA has always permitted corporations and

labor unions to run electioneering advertisements, provided that those advertisements were

paid for with money that came from a segregated fund dedicated specifically for federal

electioneering. As the examples above illustrate, the utility of Section 441b as a tool to

prevent corporate and labor union general treasury funds from influencing elections has been

effectively blunted. See id. ¶ 2.6.9. While the primary purpose of these advertisements

ultimately may be difficult to determine with precision, given the reticence of these

organizations to admit they are campaign advertisements, the effect of these advertisements
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on federal elections is legion. Consequently, as I state in my Findings, “Congress found that

FECA, as construed by the Courts, to only limit independent expenditures containing express

advocacy, was no longer relevant to modern political advertisements.” Id. ¶ 2.4.4; see also

id. ¶ 2.4.3 (unrebutted testimony of political consultant Bailey) (“The notion that ads

intended to influence an election can easily be separated from those that are not based upon

the mere presence or absence of particular words or phrases such as ‘vote for’ is at best a

historical anachronism.”). Congress appropriately concluded that corporations and labor

unions were openly violating the intent of its longstanding (and long-upheld) prohibition on

the use of corporate and labor union general treasury funds to influence elections.

In crafting the primary definition of electioneering communication, Congress

recognized just how difficult the task of discerning a speaker’s true intent can be for a court

or regulatory agency. Taking heed from Buckley’s stringent admonition that a distinction

between the discussion of issues and advocacy for the election or defeat of candidates “may

often dissolve in practical application” and that a law must be construed in a manner that

avoids “‘put[ting] the speaker in these circumstances wholly at the mercy of the varied

understanding of his hearers,’” Buckley, 424 U.S. at 42, 43, Congress crafted an objective,

impartial, and thoroughly simple test for distinguishing between electioneering and issue

advocacy. Congress recognized, as the record in this case indicates, that candidate-centered

issue advertisements influence federal elections. Congress thereafter drew an incredibly

clear bright-line test that focuses on the key empirical determinants that distinguish pure
408

issue advertisements from candidate-centered issue advertisements. The result is that

broadcast advertisements paid for by corporations or labor unions, aired in close proximity

to an election that clearly identify a federal candidate, and are targeted to that candidate’s

electorate, need to be paid for with federal funds from a segregated account. Congress,

therefore, is not prohibiting speech by any corporation or labor union; it is merely requiring

these organizations to pay for speech that ostensibly influences federal elections with

segregated funds that are regulated under FECA.

The question remaining is whether this bright line that Congress has drawn is

narrowly tailored to serve compelling governmental interests. I shall first turn to the

compelling governmental interests behind Title II and then shall move to a discussion of

whether Title II of BCRA is narrowly tailored to serve those compelling governmental

interests.

E. Title II of BCRA is Narrowly Tailored to Serve a Compelling Governmental

Interest

1. BCRA’s Prohibition on Electioneering Communications; the

Primary Definition Serves Compelling Governmental Interests

As discussed supra, Section 203 extends the longstanding prohibition on corporations

and labor unions making contributions or expenditures from general treasuries in connection

with federal elections to electioneering communications as defined in the primary definition.

BCRA § 203; FECA § 316(b)(2); 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2). Corporations and labor unions are

now prohibited from spending general treasury funds on electioneering communications, but
409

are permitted to spend unlimited federal money from separate segregated funds on

electioneering communications. Even though a corporation or labor union “remains free to

establish a separate segregated fund, composed of contributions earmarked for that purpose

by the donors . . . the corporation [or labor union] is not free to use its general funds for

campaign advocacy purposes [and w]hile that is not an absolute restriction on speech, it is

a substantial one.” MCFL, 479 U.S. at 253 (emphasis in original) (plurality opinion). As a

result, even though the Act permits corporations and labor unions to make electioneering

communications with their segregated funds, the prohibition in section 203 must be “justified

by a compelling state interest.” Id.

In discussing the compelling governmental interests in enacting sections 203 and 204,

Defendants rely on longstanding precedent of the Supreme Court that has already extensively

discussed the compelling interests related to government regulation of corporate and labor

union general treasury funds in the context of federal elections. Gov’t Br. at 133-134. The

Supreme Court’s prior discussions of the compelling interests needed to sustain restrictions

on corporate and labor union general treasury funds are equally applicable in the context of

Sections 203 and 204 of BCRA. Plaintiffs, with the exception of the NRA, do not seriously

question this position, but rather focus their energies on the fact that these provisions are not

narrowly tailored to serve these compelling governmental interests. As discussed infra, I find

Plaintiffs’ argumentation on that point to be rebutted by the extraordinary record in this case.

Before turning to these arguments, however, I shall briefly discuss the compelling
122

 The parties to the litigation have dubbed this compelling governmental interest

theory “Austin corruption.” Even though the statute in Austin only applied to corporations,

Austin, 494 U.S. at 655, the Supreme Court has long upheld a similar corruption rationale in

the case of labor unions. See Pipefitters, 407 U.S. at 415-16; UAW, 352 U.S. at 585; NRWC,

459 U.S. at 207-08.

410

governmental interests behind sections 203 and 204 in Title II.

In defending the constitutionality of Title II, Defendants rely on the compelling

governmental interest described in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652

(1990), and supported by a rich history of Supreme Court cases discussing Section 441b.122

Defendants also contend that the compelling governmental interest supporting the prohibition

on electioneering communications relates to the potential for the appearance of corruption

that occurs when corporations and labor unions pay for electioneering communications with

their general treasury funds. Tr. at 252 (Waxman) (“[T]he record in this case of the kind of

Austin corruption, and even potential quid pro quo corruption, absolutely dwarfs the

evidentiary record that the Supreme Court has considered in any of the cases it has decided,

including Buckley.”). As a corollary to this latter theory, Defendants also advance an anticircumvention rationale to justify these provisions, observing that “BCRA’s regulation of

electioneering communications furthers the compelling governmental interest in preventing

corruption of elected officials, not only on its own terms, but also by helping to ensure that

the new limits on soft money will not be easily evaded.” Gov’t Br. at 146. I conclude that

the first two theories of corruption are sufficient to uphold the challenged provisions and

therefore do not reach the third.
411

a. Corruption Related to Corporations and Labor Unions

The Supreme Court has long indicated that the government has a compelling interest

in placing restrictions on corporate and labor union involvement in federal elections so as to

prevent “the corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth,” facilitated

by either the corporate or union forms, on federal elections. Austin, 494 U.S. at 660. As

discussed supra, corporations and labor unions routinely seek to influence federal elections

with broadcast advertising campaigns, paid for with general treasury funds. Sections 203 and

204 of BCRA, which are plainly designed to combat this development, fulfill the same

purposes that the government identified as supporting Section 441b in NRWC and that the

Supreme Court upheld:

The first purpose of § 441b, the government states, is to ensure that substantial

aggregations of wealth amassed by the special advantages which go with the

corporate form of organization should not be converted into political “war

chests” which could be used to incur political debts from legislators who are

aided by the contributions. See United States v. United Automobile Workers,

352 U.S. 567, 579 (1957). The second purpose of the provisions, the

government argues, is to protect the individuals who have paid money into a

corporation or union for purposes other than the support of candidates from

having that money used to support political candidates to whom they may be

opposed. See United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106, 113 (1948).

We agree with the government that these purposes are sufficient to justify the

regulation at issue.

NRWC, 459 U.S. at 207-08. In a nutshell, NRWC encapsulates the compelling governmental

interests behind Section 441b, which also plainly serve as a basis for upholding BRCA

Sections 203 and 204.
412

The Supreme Court’s most recent discussion of these justifications was in Austin,

where the Supreme Court considered a Michigan state statute which was patterned after

section 441b, prohibiting corporations from making independent expenditures in connection

with state candidate elections. Austin, 494 U.S. at 655 n.1. The issue before the Court was

the constitutionality of the state’s ban on independent expenditures made by corporations,

which the Court held to be “constitutional because the provision is narrowly tailored to serve

a compelling state interest.” Id. at 655. In finding the compelling interest justifying

Michigan’s statute, the Court recognized a “different type of corruption in the political arena”

than the appearance of corruption that had been used to justify Buckley’s restrictions on

individuals making independent expenditures. Id. at 660. 

As a baseline, the Austin Court reiterated that “‘[p]reventing corruption or the

appearance of corruption are the only legitimate and compelling government interests thus

far identified for restricting campaign finances.’” Id. at 658 (quoting FEC v. Nat’l

Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 496-97 (1985) (“NCPAC”)) (alteration

in original). The plaintiff in Austin had argued that because the restriction at issue focused

on independent expenditures, as opposed to contributions, the danger of corruption or the

appearance of corruption was not present. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 47 (“Unlike

contributions, such independent expenditures may well provide little assistance to the

candidate’s campaign and indeed may prove counterproductive. The absence of

prearrangement and coordination of an expenditure with the candidate or his agent not only
413

undermines the value of the expenditure to the candidate, but also alleviates the danger that

expenditures will be given as a quid pro quo for improper commitments from the

candidate.”). 

The Austin Court responded by distinguishing this language on the basis that it applied

to independent expenditures made by individuals as opposed to those made by corporations.

Austin, 494 U.S. at 659. Indeed, Austin pointed out that the Court had left open the

possibility in Bellotti, that “a legislature might demonstrate a danger of real or apparent

corruption posed by such expenditures when made by corporations to influence candidate

elections.” Id. (emphasis added) (citing Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 788 n.26) (“The importance of

the governmental interest in preventing [corruption of elected representatives through the

creation of political debts] has never been doubted. The case before us presents no

comparable problem, and our consideration of a corporation’s right to speak on issues of

general public interest implies no comparable right in the quite different context of

participation in a political campaign for election to public office. Congress might well be

able to demonstrate the existence of a danger of real or apparent corruption in independent

expenditures by corporations to influence candidate elections.”) (emphasis added).

Having set forth this analysis, the Supreme Court found that regardless of whether the

danger of “financial quid pro quo corruption,” id. at 659 (internal citations and quotation

marks omitted), identified in Buckley as insufficient to uphold the limitation on independent

expenditures made by individual donors, was present in the case of a corporation (a question
414

clearly left open in Bellotti), the Court found that a “different type” of corruption rationale

was sufficient to serve as Michigan’s compelling interest. Id. at 659, 659-60. The Austin

Court stated this rationale as “the corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations

of wealth that are accumulated with the help of the corporate form and that have little or no

correlation to the public’s support for the corporation’s political ideas.” Id. at 660. The

Supreme Court was keen to point out that “the mere fact that corporations may accumulate

large amounts of wealth is not the justification for [Michigan’s restriction on independent

expenditures]; rather, the unique state-conferred corporate structure that facilitates the

amassing of large treasuries warrants the limit on independent expenditures.” Id. 

This “different” theory of corruption was not new as the Austin Court observed. Id.

at 659 (“We therefore have recognized that ‘the compelling governmental interest in

preventing corruption support[s] the restriction of the influence of political war chests

funneled through the corporate form.’”) (quoting FEC v.Nat’l. Conservative Political Action

Committee, 470 U.S. 480, 500-01 (1985) (“NCPAC”)) (also citing MCFL, 479 U.S. at 257).

In fact, in MCFL the Court pointed out:

We have described that rationale in recent opinions as the need to restrict “the

influence of political war chests funneled through the corporate form,”

NCPAC, 470 U.S. at 501; to “eliminate the effect of aggregated wealth on

federal elections,” Pipefitters, 407 U.S. at 416; to curb the political influence

of “those who exercise control over large aggregations of capital,” [UAW], 352

U.S. at 585; and to regulate the “substantial aggregations of wealth amassed

by the special advantages which go with the corporate form of organization,”

National Right to Work Committee, 459 U.S. at 207. This concern over the

corrosive influence of concentrated corporate wealth reflects the conviction

that it is important to protect the integrity of the marketplace of political ideas.
415

MCFL, 479 U.S. at 257. 

Outside the context of corporations, the Supreme Court has been generally solicitous

of a similar rationale for upholding Section 441b as applied to labor unions. In Pipefitters

and UAW, as the MCFL Court observed, the Supreme Court found that the compelling

governmental interest behind the regulation of corporations was applicable to labor unions.

Pipefitters, 407 U.S. at 415-16 (“When Congress prohibited labor organizations from making

contributions or expenditures in connection with federal elections, it was, of course,

concerned not only to protect minority interests within the union but to eliminate the effect

of aggregated wealth on federal elections.”); UAW, 352 U.S. at 585 (“To deny that [using

union dues to sponsor commercial television broadcasts designed to influence the electorate

to select certain candidates for Congress in connection with the 1954 elections] constituted

an ‘expenditure in connection with any [federal] election’ is to deny the long series of

congressional efforts calculated to avoid the deleterious influences on federal elections

resulting from the use of money by those who exercise control over large aggregations of

capital.”). As noted in NRWC, the government’s interest in enacting such a provision relates

to the fact that labor union members pay money into a union’s general treasury and that

money may be used to support candidates for office opposed by the individual union

member, NRWC, 459 U.S. at 208, a justification that applies with equal force to corporate

shareholders. Id. at 207. 

Except for the NRA, none of the Plaintiffs who challenge Title II explicitly contest
416

the asserted compelling governmental interests relating to preventing corruption or the

appearance of corruption that emanates from the particular legal and economic attributes of

corporations and labor unions. Given the longstanding history behind section 441b, this is

not unexpected. Despite this fact, the NRA Plaintiffs spend significant time in their

pleadings asserting that the compelling interest cannot support sections 203 and 204. NRA

Br. at 9-14; NRA Opp’n at 6-17, NRA Reply at 12-14. As clarified by their reply brief, the

NRA basically argues that this type of corruption only applies to those corporations that “use

resources amassed in the economic marketplace, to obtain an unfair advantage in the political

marketplace.” NRA Reply at 12 (quoting Austin, 494 U.S. at 659 (in turn quoting MCFL,

479 U.S. at 257)). In Austin, the Michigan Chamber of Commerce, relying on MCFL,

contended that the Michigan statute could not be applied to it because it was a “nonprofit

ideological corporation.” Austin, 494 U.S. at 661. The Supreme Court flatly rejected this

as-applied challenge. Id. at 662-65. In this case, the NRA asserts a similar argument: that

it is unlike the Michigan Chamber of Commerce in Austin, and therefore, broadly speaking,

Title II cannot be justified as preventing Austin corruption. NRA Reply at 12 (stating that

the NRA does not do business in the economic marketplace, nor derive market profits, nor

derive more than a negligible portion of its revenues from corporate contributions).

Basically, however, the NRA is using Austin as a means of making an as-applied challenge

to BCRA. 

To begin with, in MCFL, the Supreme Court stressed that the rationale for regulating
417

corporations and labor unions was “longstanding” and used to restrict “the corrosive

influence of concentrated corporate wealth” on federal elections. MCFL, 479 U.S. at 257.

The Supreme Court went on to explain that “[b]y requiring that corporate independent

expenditures be financed through a political committee expressly established to engage in

campaign spending, § 441b seeks to prevent this threat to the political marketplace.” Id. at

258. The resources available to the segregated fund, the Court reasoned, reflected “popular

support for the political positions of the committee.” Id. As a result, the Court observed that

“[r]egulation of corporate political activity thus has reflected concern not about use of the

corporate form per se, but about the potential for unfair deployment of wealth for political

purposes.” Id. 

Nevertheless, the Supreme Court concluded that the government could not uphold

Section 441b as applied to the plaintiff in MCFL based on this admittedly “longstanding”

rationale. Id. (“Groups such as MCFL, however, do not pose that danger of corruption.

MCFL was formed to disseminate political ideas, not to amass capital. The resources it has

available are not a function of its success in the economic marketplace, but its popularity in

the political marketplace. While MCFL may derive some advantages from its corporate

form, those are advantages that redound to its benefit as a political organization, not as a

profit-making enterprise.”). Therefore, the Supreme Court never questioned the

government’s asserted compelling interest in regulating corporations of all types--it merely

held that as applied to MCFL, the rationale was insufficient to support Section 441b’s
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restrictions.

The NRA would have us believe that this form of corruption is only available to

uphold Section 441b restrictions when the corporations being regulated are of the for-profit

variety. NRA Reply at 12. In Austin, and for that matter in MCFL, the Supreme Court made

no distinctions among different types of corporations when analyzing the compelling

governmental interest. The Austin Court thus broadly recognized that all corporations benefit

from the “state-conferred corporate structure that facilitates the amassing of large treasuries.”

Austin, 494 U.S. at 660; see also MCFL, 479 U.S. at 268 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part,

dissenting in part) (“I do not dispute that the threat from corporate political activity will vary

depending on the particular characteristics of a given corporation; it is obvious that large and

successful corporations with resources to fund a political war chest constitute a more potent

threat to the political process than less successful business corporations or nonprofit

corporations. . . . These distinctions among corporations, however are distinctions in degree

that do not amount to differences in kind.”) (emphasis added) (internal citation and quotation

marks omitted). The Court in MCFL merely held that as applied to the plaintiff in MCFL,

Section 441b could not be upheld by the longstanding compelling governmental interest

present in avoiding the corrosive effects of large treasuries of corporations accumulated with

the assistance of the corporate form. In Austin, the Court held that the state statute could be

applied to the plaintiff because the Michigan Chamber of Commerce did not qualify for an

MCFL exemption.
419

The NRA never directly disputes this proposition; rather, the organization essentially

contends that like the plaintiff in MCFL, and unlike the plaintiff in Austin, sections 203 and

204 of BCRA cannot be upheld when applied to the NRA because as an organization it does

not use resources amassed in the economic marketplace to obtain an unfair advantage in the

political marketplace. NRA Br. at 12; see also NRA Reply Br. at 12. The NRA implicitly

presents the Court with an as-applied challenge couched in Austin-terms instead of those of

MCFL. NRA Br. at 14 (“In any event, the NRA satisfies every criterion identified by the

Austin Court for extending the First Amendment’s protection to the independent political

expenditures of a nonprofit political advocacy corporation. . . .”). Of course, in making its

decision that the Michigan Chamber of Commerce did not qualify for an MCFL as-applied

exemption, the Austin Court was explicitly relying on MCFL. Austin, 494 U.S. at 661-62.

On July 31, 2002, the NRA filed a joint motion to stay, inter alia, discovery in this

case and agreed that they would also stay any as-applied challenge they had against BCRA

under MCFL until the Supreme Court resolved the merits of Plaintiffs’ challenge to BCRA.

NRA Joint Mot. to Stay (Jul. 31, 2002) at 1-2. On August 13, 2002, the three-judge District

Court entered an order granting this motion. NRA v. FEC, 02cv581 (D.D.C. Aug. 13, 2002)

(order on joint motion to stay) (“ORDERED that there will be a stay of discovery and

briefing of Plaintiffs’ contention that BCRA’s restrictions on ‘electioneering

communications’ are unconstitutional as applied to them.”). As is clear from their briefing

on this point, with the MCFL avenue closed to them, Plaintiff NRA uses Austin to argue that
420

BCRA, as applied to them, fails to satisfy any compelling governmental interest. NRA Reply

at 12 (observing that Title II cannot be justified as designed to present Austin-type corruption

because it does not amass resources in the economic marketplace.).

The NRA should not be able to litigate an as-applied challenge to Title II in direct

violation of the three-judge panel’s order, requested by the NRA, by merely cloaking such

a challenge under Austin as opposed to MCFL. Defendants point out that they did not

conduct discovery into the NRA’s business practices on the basis of this order and therefore

are in no position to discuss whether the NRA deserves an MCFL-type exemption. Gov’t

Opp’n at 107 n.109 (“Defendants have, thus, had no opportunity to discover facts that might

refute, inter alia, NRA’s contention about its profits derived from business activities.”); Def.-

Int. Opp’n at 67 n.208 (“Indeed, the NRA specifically stipulated with defendants in this case

that its as-applied challenge to coverage based on MCFL would be stayed pending the

outcome of the general facial challenge. See Joint Motion to Stay (filed on July 26, 2002),

at 2 (granted by the Court on Aug. 13, 2002).”). 

Any corporation that believesit deserves an MCFL-exemption may seek an exemption

under the FEC’s regulations–and any arguments relating to the strictness of those

regulations–are open to a challenge at that time, by making that claim, or by resisting

enforcement, just as the plaintiffs did in Austin and MCFL. Accordingly, the NRA’s claim

has no merit in this litigation, NRA v. FEC, 02cv581 (D.D.C. Aug. 13, 2002) (order on joint
123 In addition to the NRA, the ACLU also hints in its briefing that it fits within the

class of corporations deserving of MCFL-type protection. See ACLU Br. at 16. I am

extraordinarily skeptical that the NRA or the ACLU fit within the MCFL paradigm, which

Justice Brennan, the author of MCFL described as a “small” class of exempt organizations.

Austin, 494 U.S. at 672 (Brennan, J., concurring). First, each organization accepts corporate

funding, ACLU Br. at 2 n.2; NRA Br. at 2. In MCFL, the corporation had an explicit policy

against accepting corporate contributions. MCFL, 479 U.S. at 264. The NRA claims its

corporate contributions are “negligible,” NRA Br. at 2, while the ACLU argues that their

corporate donations are “extremely modest,”ACLU Br. at 17. These statements, themselves,

indicate that both organizations would be minimally burdened if they were to forgo corporate

funding so as to qualify for MCFL status. Nevertheless, the absolute amounts involved–

$85,000 for the ACLU, ACLU Br. at 2 n.2, and $385,000 for the NRA, NRA Br. at 2–are not

petty cash; particularly compared with what our Circuit has found to be de minimis. 

The D.C. Circuit has held, in a case involving the NRA itself, that an organization

may qualify for an MCFL exemption as long as it is not “a potential conduit for corporate

funding of political activity.” FEC v. NRA, 254 F.3d 173, 192 (D.C. Cir. 2001). In NRA, the

court stated that the appropriate test for this inquiry is whether “[t]he harm contemplated by

the statute stems from the absolute amount of corporate money an organization has to spend

in the political process, not from the relationship between corporate contributions and the

organization’s total revenues.” Id. (finding that $7,000 in corporate contributions in one year

precluded the NRA from taking advantage of the MCFL-exemption).

Moreover, the NRA openly admits that it engages in business activities. Compare

NRA Br. at 19 (discussing that it loses money on advertising in its magazines and sale of

NRA memorabilia but that it generates $1.7 million in rental income on leasing its building

space) with MCFL, 479 U.S. at 264 (observing that an MCFL-type corporations “cannot

engage in business activities.”). Furthermore, in MCFL, the plaintiff “was formed for the

express purpose of promoting political ideas, and cannot engage in business activities.”

MCFL, 479 U.S. at 264. In addition to its primary purpose of Second Amendment advocacy,

the NRA also “promotes public firearm safety, trains law enforcement agencies in the use of

firearms, sponsors shooting competitions, and advances hunter safety.” Findings ¶ 13.

Obviously, until a fuller factual record concerning these two organizations has been

developed, an as-applied challenge to Title II of BCRA is inappropriate.

421

motion to stay),123 and I conclude that the longstanding compelling governmental interests

behind Section 441b are equally applicable to Sections 203 and 204 of BCRA.

b. Appearance of Corruption

Moreover, I find that congressional action in this case could be justified under the
422

rationale that electioneering communications made with general treasury funds of

corporations and labor unions create an appearance of corruption. The record powerfully

demonstrates that electioneering communications paid for with the general treasury funds of

labor unions and corporations endears those entities to elected officials in a way that could

be perceived by the public as corrupting.

In my judgment, the record in this case with regard to interest group issue advocacy

substantially demonstrates the potential for the appearance of corruption given the current

practices of labor unions and corporations in connection with federal elections. As noted

supra, the Supreme Court in Bellotti left open the possibility that in the context of candidate

elections the record in a future case might be sufficient to justify restrictions on independent

expenditures paid for with the general treasury funds of corporations and labor unions.

Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 788 n.26 (“The overriding concern behind the enactment of statutes such

as the Federal Corrupt Practices Act was the problem of corruption of elected representatives

through the creation of political debts. The importance of the governmental interest in

preventing this occurrence has never been doubted. The case before us presents no

comparable problem . . . .”); see also NCPAC, 470 U.S. at 510 n.7 (White, J., dissenting)

(“The possibility was thus left open, and remains open, that unforeseen developments in the

financing of campaigns might make the need for restrictions on ‘independent’ expenditures

more compelling. . . . The time may come when the governmental interests in restricting such

expenditures will be sufficiently compelling to satisfy not only Congress but a majority of
124 On the other hand, it is sometimes the case that when a candidate is attacked, the

candidate and his/her consultants are unaware of who is running the negative advertisement

because the organization running the advertisement is cloaked behind a misleading name.

See generally Per Curiam Opinion Findings Related to BCRA’s Disclosure Provisions.

423

this Court as well.”). In my view, this case presents just such a record. See Findings ¶ 2.7.

The factual findings of the Court illustrate that corporations and labor unions routinely

notify Members of Congress as soon as they air electioneering communications relevant to

the Members’ elections. Findings ¶¶ 2.7.3, 2.7.6. The record also indicates that Members

express appreciation to organizations for the airing of these election-related advertisements.

Id. ¶¶ 2.7.2, 2.7.8. Indeed, Members of Congress are particularly grateful when negative

issue advertisements are run by these organizations, leaving the candidates free to run

positive advertisements and be seen as “above the fray.” Id. ¶ 2.7.2. Political consultants

testify that campaigns are quite aware of who is running advertisements on the candidate’s

behalf, when they are being run, and where they are being run. Id. ¶ 2.7.1.124 Likewise, a

prominent lobbyist testifies that these organizations use issue advocacy as a means to

influence various Members of Congress. Id.

The Findings also demonstrate that Members of Congress seek to have corporations

and unions run these advertisements on their behalf. Id. ¶ 2.7.8. The Findings show that

Members suggest that corporations or individuals make donations to interest groups with the

understanding that the money contributed to these groups will assist the Member in a

campaign. Id. ¶ 2.7.10.6; see also id. ¶ 2.7.4. After the election, these organizations often

seek credit for their support. Id. ¶ 2.7.5; see also id. ¶ 2.7.4. In a similar manner, political
424

parties are often grateful for the support of these organizations, id. ¶ 2.7.10, and parties have

sent contributions to these organizations, id. ¶ 2.7.10.4. Finally, a large majority of

Americans (80%) are of the view that corporations and other organizations that engage in

electioneering communications, which benefit specific elected officials, receive special

consideration from those officials when matters arise that affect these corporations and

organizations. Id. ¶ 2.7.9. 

The evidence, therefore, paints a picture of corporations and labor unions targeting

particular federal candidates or their opponents–that the organizations have a specific interest

in getting these particular candidates elected to federal office. The candidates and political

parties are well aware of these corporations and labor unions and are cognizant of which

organization is running advertisements supporting their candidacy. It is also quite clear that

these candidates are very appreciative of the additional electioneering support provided on

their behalf from the general treasuries of corporations and labor unions. All of this creates

the appearance of corruption, as is demonstrated by the polling data in the Findings.. 

The NRA also challenges this asserted interest, arguing that “gratitude” is not

corruption. NRA Opp’n at 8-12. The NRA misses the point of Defendants’ argument, which

is that the electioneering broadcasts disguised as “issue advocacy,” create a very significant

appearance of corruption. Defendants never argue that “gratitude” is corruption as the NRA

would have the Court believe. Rather, Defendant-Intervenors correctly observe that “[t]he

result is plain: candidates can be as beholden to corporations or unions that spend money to
425

help them through ad campaigns as they would be if the same entities wrote a check directly

to the campaign, or funneled the money through the political party.” Def.-Int. Br. at 108-09.

In my view, the potential for the appearance of corruption–identified as the compelling

justification for sections 203 and 204 of BCRA–relates to the very simple fact that when a

corporation or labor union spends millions of dollars from its general treasury on a campaign,

elected officials are likely to feel beholden when matters relating to these organizations arise.

In Buckley, the Supreme Court stated with regard to the independent expenditure

restrictions on individuals that

quite apart from the shortcomings of § 608(e)(1) in preventing any abuses

generated by large independent expenditures, the independent advocacy

restricted by the provision does not presently appear to pose dangers of real

or apparent corruption comparable to those identified with large campaign

contributions. The parties defending § 608(e)(1) contend that it is necessary

to prevent would-be contributors from avoiding the contribution limitations by

the simple expedient of paying directly for media advertisements or for other

portions of the candidate’s campaign activities. They argue that expenditures

controlled by or coordinated with the candidate and his campaign might well

have virtually the same value to the candidate as a contribution and would pose

similar dangers of abuse. Yet such controlled or coordinated expenditures are

treated as contributions rather than expenditures under the Act. Section

608(b)’s contribution ceilings rather than § 608(e)(1)’s independent

expenditure limitation prevent attempts to circumvent the Act through

prearranged or coordinated expenditures amounting to disguised contributions.

Buckley, 424 U.S. at 46-47 (emphasis added). The Court in Buckley wrote that the threat of

independent expenditures made by individuals did not “presently appear” to pose a danger

of possible corruption. Therefore, Buckley explicitly left open the possibility that a time

might come when a record would indicate that independent expenditures made by individuals
125 The NRA also argues that Title II cannot be justified as essential to prevent

circumvention of Title I, NRA Opp’n at 13-15. Because I find that the first two rationales

asserted by the government are sufficient, I do not need to reach whether this rationale

constitutes a compelling governmental interest. Consequently, I decline to reach the NRA’s

argument on this point.

426

to support candidates would raise an appearance of corruption. The Court concluded, in

1976:

[S]ection 608(e)(1) limits expenditures for express advocacy of candidates

made totally independently of the candidate and his campaign. Unlike

contributions,such independent expenditures may well provide little assistance

to the candidate’s campaign and indeed may prove counterproductive. The

absence of prearrangement and coordination of an expenditure with the

candidate or his agent not only undermines the value of the expenditure to the

candidate, but also alleviates the danger that expenditures will be given as a

quid pro quo for improper commitments from the candidate. Rather than

preventing circumvention of the contribution limitations, § 608(e)(1) severely

restricts all independent advocacy despite itssubstantially diminished potential

for abuse.

Buckley, 424 U.S. at 47. This discussion in Buckley spoke only of the lack of evidence in

that record with regard to restrictions on the independent expenditures of individuals; an

issue that has clearly not been foreclosed for corporations or labor unions. Bellotti, 435 U.S.

at 788 n.26 (“Congress might well be able to demonstrate the existence of a danger of real

or apparent corruption in independent expenditures by corporations to influence candidate

elections.”). In my view the record assembled by the parties in this case demonstrates that

a compelling governmental interest behind Congress’s regulatory effort was to prevent the

appearance of corruption. It is a legitimate interest and the NRA’s arguments are

unpersuasive.125
427

c. Conclusion

The compelling governmental interests identified by the Supreme Court in its

campaign finance jurisprudence apply equally to Sections 203 and 204 of BCRA. Plaintiffs,

aside from the NRA, do not challenge these bases as a justification for the restrictions on

electioneering communications contained in Title II. Rather, Plaintiffs vigorously contend

that the primary definition, as prohibited by Sections 203 and 204 of BCRA, is not narrowly

tailored to serve that compelling government interest and is overbroad as a matter of

constitutional law. It is this contention to which I now turn.

2. Sections 201, 203, and 204 of BCRA are Narrowly Tailored to

Serve Compelling Governmental Interests

I find that BCRA’s prohibition of corporate and labor union spending of general

treasury funds on electioneering communications, as defined in the primary definition, is

narrowly tailored to serve the aforementioned compelling governmental interests. In reading

the floor debates leading up to BCRA’s passage, I am impressed by the care with which

Congress crafted BCRA’s delicate balance between regulation of issue advocacy and

electoral advocacy, carefully weighing the serious First Amendment interests at stake. With

Title II, Congress created an objective, impartial approach based on empirical data that

provides objective indicia for distinguishing between electioneering advertisements and

genuine issue discussion.

a. Introduction

In briefing this issue, Plaintiffs take great pains to exaggerate the reach of BCRA’s
428

electioneering communication provision–a technique no doubt designed to assist their efforts

at demonstrating overbreadth. By so doing, Plaintiffs’ distort the actual reach and purpose

of Title II. See, e.g., NRA Br. at 5 (presenting the law as a close relative of the universally

condemned Sedition Acts of 1798). Given the extent to which Plaintiffs contort Title II to

serve their own rhetorical purposes, it is necessary to state once again what BCRA does and

does not accomplish in Title II.

The primary definition in section 201 is specifically focused on the pressing problem

of corporations and labor unions using general treasury funds to directly influence federal

elections under the guise of issue advocacy. Plaintiffs dismiss the primary definition in Title

II as a “sweeping” “condemnation of core political speech,” McConnell Opp’n at 43, and

characterize the restrictions in Title II as “staggeringly overbroad.” McConnell Br. at 59.

Despite these statements, the primary definition of “electioneering communication” includes

only communications that fulfill four, very discrete components: (a) they must be

disseminated by cable, broadcast, or satellite, (b) they must refer to a clearly identified

Federal candidate, (c) they must be distributed within 60 days before a general election or 30

days before a primary election, and (d) they must be targeted to the relevant electorate. 

BCRA § 201(a); FECA § 304(f)(3)(A); 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(A).

Furthermore, Section 201 also contains a provision which expressly exempts four

additional classes of communication from both the primary and backup definitions of

electioneering communication. The four categories excluded from the definition of
126 The first statutorily-created exemption is almost identical to a pre-existing

provision of FECA, 2 U.S.C. 431(9)(B)(i), that excludes from the definition of “expenditure”

news stories and editorials broadcast or published by the media. 2 U.S.C. § 431(9)(B)(i)

(“[Expenditure does not include] any news story, commentary, or editorial distributed

through the facilities of any broadcasting station, newspaper, magazine, or other periodical

publication, unless such facilities are owned or controlled by any political party, political

committee, or candidate.”). The parties have referred to this carve-out as the “media

exemption.” See infra.

127 This exemption prevents double reporting of an electioneering communication if

it already constitutes an expenditure or independent expenditure under the Act.

Electioneering Communications, 67 Fed. Reg. 65190, 65,197-98 (October 23, 2002) (to be

codified at 11 C.F.R. §100.29(c)(3)).

429

electioneering communication are:

(i) a communication appearing in a news story, commentary, or editorial

distributed through the facilities of any broadcasting station, unless such

facilities are owned or controlled by any political party, political committee,

or candidate;126

(ii) a communication which constitutes an expenditure or an independent

expenditure under . . . [FECA];127

(iii) a communication which constitutes a candidate debate or forum conducted

pursuant to regulations adopted by the Commission, or which solely promotes

such a debate or forum and is made by or on behalf of the person sponsoring

the debate or forum; or

(iv) any other communication exempted under such regulations as the

Commission may promulgate (consistent with the requirements of this

paragraph) to ensure the appropriate implementation of this paragraph, except

that under any such regulation a communication may not be exempted if it

meets the requirements of this paragraph and is described in section

301(20)(A)(iii) [which is a public communication that refers to a clearly

identified candidate for Federal office (regardless of whether a candidate for

State or local office is also mentioned or identified) and that promotes or

supports a candidate for that office, or attacks or opposes a candidate for that

office (regardless of whether the communication expressly advocates a vote

for or against a candidate)].

BCRA § 201(a); FECA § 304(f)(3)(B); 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(B). The final exemption in
128 Since the passage of BCRA, the Commission has promulgated two exemptions to

the definition of electioneering communication. The first, exempts communications paid for

by candidates for state or local office where the mention of a Federal candidate is “merely

incidental” and thus not in violation of Section 301(20)(A)(iii) of FECA. Electioneering

Communications, 67 Fed. Reg. at 65,198-99 (to be codified at 11 C.F.R. 100.29(c)(5)). The

second, exempts communications paid for by any charitable organization operating under

Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, which by law are not permitted to engage

in partisan political activity. Id. at 65,199-200 (to be codified at 11 C.F.R. 100.29(c)(6)).

Four of the McConnell Plaintiffs are Section 501(c)(3) organizations. McConnell

Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 30, 32, 36, 37 (identifying the Indiana Family Institute, Inc., the

National Right To Life Educational Trust Fund, the Southeastern Legal Foundation, Inc., and

U .S. d/b/a Pro-English as 501(c)(3) organizations). Given the FEC’s regulations, I find that

Court does not have jurisdiction over these four Plaintiffs on both standing and ripeness

grounds. These four Plaintiffs do not demonstrate any injury-in-fact, a necessary prerequisite

of standing. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992) (Plaintiffs have the

burden of establishing standing to bring their suit by demonstrating that they have: (1)

suffered an “injury in fact;” (2) which is “fairly traceable to the conduct complained of;” and

(continued...)

430

Section 201 provides the Commission with authority to promulgate further regulatory

exemptions to the definition of “electioneering communication.” However, the

Commission’s ability to create further regulatory carve-outs is closely circumscribed. First,

any future exemption must be consistent with the requirements of the electioneering

communication provision. Second, a communication cannot be exempted if it is a “public

communication” “that refers to a clearly identified candidate for Federal office . . . and that

promotes or supports a candidate for that office, or attacks or opposes a candidate for that

office.” BCRA § 101(b); FECA § 301(2)(A)(iii); 2 U.S.C. § 431(20)(A)(iii). As this latter

limitation essentially tracks the language of the fallback definition, the statute appears to

require the Commission not to stray from either definition of electioneering communication

when promulgating future exemptions.128
128(...continued)

(3) is capable of judicial redress.). Moreover, as Plaintiffs have presented “a controversy that

has not yet arisen and may never arise,” Wisconsin Right to Life v. Paradise, 138 F.3d 1183,

1187-88 (7th Cir. 1998), their claim is not ripe and the Court lacks jurisdiction to resolve

their specific challenge to the electioneering communications provision. Accordingly, I do

not believe that the Court has any jurisdiction over the claims of these four Plaintiffs in

relation to the electioneering communication provisions in Title II.

431

Plaintiffs present two overbreadth challenges to Title II. First, Plaintiffs argue that

the primary definition of electioneering communication applies to too many genuine issue

advertisements to be considered narrowly tailored. McConnell Br. at 57-69; McConnell

Opp’n at 42-48; McConnell Reply 33-40; NRA Br. at 17, 24-33; NRA Opp’n at 17-25; NRA

Reply at 22-25; ACLU Reply 7-10; AFL-CIO Reply at 8-9. Second, Plaintiffs contend that

Title II is unconstitutional because it applies to all corporations and does not contain a special

statutory carve-out for non-profit, MCFL-type corporations. McConnell Opp’n at 41-42;

NRA Br. at 17-24; ACLU Br. at 16-17; see also NRA Reply at 14-20; ACLU Reply at 2-7.

b. BCRA’s Restrictions on Electioneering Communication is

Narrowly Tailored

The restrictions in Title II on electioneering communications, as defined in the

primary definition, are narrowly tailored. As discussed supra, Congress can permissibly

regulate beyond express electoral advocacy only by ensuring that the law does not

unconstitutionally burden issue discussion. In creating Title II of BCRA, Congress created

a bright-line test that focuses on objective criteria common to broadcast advertisements that

directly influence federal elections. By constructing this bright-line test, and avoiding a test

that rests on subjectivity, Congress not only avoided the vagueness problems that plagued
432

FECA, but also specifically linked their findings of abuse of Section 441b to the provisions

in the primary definition. By using the main indicators of abuse – broadcast advertisements,

aired in close proximity to a federal election, containing a reference to a candidate, and

targeted to the candidate’s electorate – Congress created a clear rule that constitutionally

distinguishes between electioneering advertisements and genuine issue advertisements in the

overwhelming majority of cases.

The Findings conclusively demonstrate that genuine issue advocacy is empirically

distinguishable from issue advertisements seeking to influence a federal election. Findings

¶ 2.8. The vast majority of issue advertisements designed to influence a federal election

identify a federal candidate, are run sixty days prior to a general election, or thirty days

before a primary election, and are run in states or congressional districts with close races.

I shall briefly examine each of these in turn.

1) Issue Advertisements Designed to Influence a Federal

Election Almost Always Identify a Federal Candidate

The record in this case conclusively establish that issue advertisements designed to

influence a federal election almost always refer to a specific federal candidate. Id. ¶ 2.8.

Political consultants who create genuine issue advertisements present uncontroverted

testimony that when designing pure issue advertisements, “it was never necessary . . . to

reference specific candidates for federal office in order to create effective ads.” Id. ¶ 2.8.1.1

(Bailey) (discussing examples); see also id. (Strother) (pure issue ads did not mention any

candidates by name). The flip side of this coin, as the consultants allude to in their
433

testimony, is that when advertisements do mention a candidate’s name, particularly in the

period preceding an election, the advertisement’s primary purpose is usually to influence the

election. Id. (Bailey) (“In my decades of experience in national politics, nearly all of the ads

that I have seen that both mention specific candidates and are run in the days immediately

preceding the election were clearly designed to influence elections.”); id. (Strother) (“Indeed,

there is usually no reason to mention a candidate’s name unless the point is to influence an

election.”). Expert testimony concurs in the views of the political consultants. Id. ¶ 2.8.1.2

(Krasno & Sorauf) (“The most obvious characteristic shared by candidate ads and

candidate-oriented issue ads is their emphasis on candidates. . . . Pure issue ads, on the other

hand, were much less likely to mention a candidate for federal office. . . . ”) (Krasno &

Sorauf); ¶ 2.8.4 (Magleby) (“A number of indicia make clear that the ads run by individuals

and interest groups are in reality electioneering ads that are meant to influence, and do

influence, elections: These electioneering ads generally name a candidate. . . .”).

This point is driven home by additional evidence, which demonstrates that

advertisements run in the sixty days preceding a general election overwhelmingly mention

a federal candidate and those run outside that period overwhelmingly do not mention a

federal candidate. Id. ¶ 2.8.1.3 (discussing advertisements by Citizens for Better Medicare,

Chamber of Commerce, Planned Parenthood, AFL-CIO, EMILY’s List, Americans for Job

Security, Business Round Table, Handgun Control, Sierra Club, and League of Conservation

Voters). These facts strongly suggest that true issue advocacy need not mention a
129 No similar evidence was presented by Plaintiffs to show an opposite trend or

pattern.

130 Moreover, BCRA appropriately leaves untouched advertisements paid for with

corporate and labor union general treasury funds that do not refer to a federal candidate. For

example in the 63 days before the 2000 election, Citizens For Better Medicare ran 14,975

advertisements, of which 4,099 did not mention a federal candidate. Findings ¶ 2.8.1.3.

None of these advertisements that did not mention a federal candidate would be covered

under BCRA. However, the 6,000 advertisements that mentioned a federal candidate and

that were aired in the final three weeks of the 2000 election potentially would need to be paid

for with segregated funds if the advertisements met the other criteria of the primary definition

to be considered “electioneering communication.”

434

candidate’s name to be effective, and that when advertisements mention a federal candidate,

they are likely to be aired in close, temporal proximity to an election as part of an effort to

influence that election. This pattern is manifested repeatedly in other issue advocacy

organizations’ campaigns, demonstrating in an objective and unbiased manner the fact that

most advertisements designed to influence federal elections refer to a federal candidate.129

Id. By focusing on those advertisements that specifically refer to a federal candidate, Title

II of BCRA appropriately targets issue advertisements that are designed to influence an

election.130

 Id. ¶ 2.8.1.4.

2) A Majority of Candidate-Centered Issue Advertisements

are Run in the Sixty Days Prior to a General Election and

Thirty Days Prior to a Primary Election

The Findings also overwhelmingly demonstrate the appropriateness of BCRA’s sixty

and thirty day benchmarks. While advertisements appearing outside these time frames can

influence elections, Congress appropriately focused on the periods of time that most directly

influence federal elections. Id. ¶ 2.11.1. The Annenberg Study, which was not challenged
435

by Plaintiffs, and was relied on by Plaintiffs’ experts, as well as by Congress, concluded that

during the 2000 federal election “[f]ully 94% of issue ads aired after August made a case for

or against a candidate.” Id. ¶ 2.8.2.1. As the following chart from the findings illustrates,

issue advertisements that mention a federal candidate dramatically increase in the period 

before a federal election. In this case, the picture tells the entire story:

Id. ¶ 2.8.2.2. In addition, uncontroverted expert testimony in this case confirms that issue

advertisements aimed at influencing federal elections are aired in the period right before an

election. Id. ¶ 2.8.2.3; id. (Goldstein) (“The CMAG database provides empirical evidence
436

of a strong positive correlation between [an advertisement’s reference to a federal candidate

and the proximity in time of the broadcast of the advertisement to the federal election] and

consequently of its validity as a test for identifying political television advertisements with

the purpose or effect of supporting or opposing a candidate for public office.”). The

evidence establishes that Congress was correct to conclude that sixty days before a federal

election is the time corporations and labor unions have sought to use their general treasuries

to influence federal elections. See Findings ¶ 2.8.2.4. 

The thirty-day benchmark is similarly narrowly tailored. Plaintiffs complain that no

analysis of narrow tailoring “exists as to ads broadcast within 30 days of primaries or

conventions, and defendants appear to have abandoned any contention that there is any basis

in experience to prohibit such advertisements.” AFL-CIO Reply at 3 n.2. This argument is

incorrect; Defendants have put forth evidence concerning BCRA’s thirty-day window and

Plaintiffs have done nothing to contradict or challenge the evidence. As the Findings

establish, Defendant-Intervenors were the only party to actually study the impact of BCRA

on advertisements run during the 2000 primary election period. Findings ¶ 2.11.5.3. The

Defendant-Intervenors found only 76 distinct advertisements which aired more than 60 days

before the general election from the CMAG database, comprising 16,916 airings. Id. Of

these advertisements, only three percent of the airings (522 out of 16,916) named a candidate

and were aired within 30 days of the candidate’s primary. Id. Defendant-Intervenors

observed that of the advertisements identifying a candidate and airing within 30 days of a
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2000 primary election, only 1.2 percent were coded as “genuine issue advertisements.” Id.

Defendants’ experts Krasno and Sorauf make a similar finding. Id. ¶ 2.11.5.2. These experts

observe that the “hodgepodge of different primary dates makes it difficult to factor [the 30

day primary window] into the analysis, but we are confident that it would have little effect

on the proportion of pure issue ads incorrectly captured by BCRA for the simple reason that

so few of these advertisements mention candidates at all. Indeed, our examination of 1998

shows this to be true: no pure issue ads would have been captured by the 30-day primary

period.” Id. Plaintiffs make absolutely no effort to challenge this data, and I find the

evidence sufficient to demonstrate that the thirty-day time frame is supported by the record

in this case.

Indeed, the closest Plaintiffs come to challenging Defendants’ on this point is the

AFL-CIO’s citation to 336 cookie-cutter advertisements aired over three election cycles, only

50 of which would have been even covered by BCRA’s provisions. Findings ¶ 2.11.5.1. I

discuss these advertisements in more detail, infra, however it is clear that this evidence

represents the political advertising activity of only one interest group, albeit a particularly

active one. As such, this submission does not directly address Defendants’ analysis which

examines BCRA’s effect on issue advocacy during the primary cycle in general. I, therefore,

find that this AFL-CIO evidence does not change my finding that BCRA’s thirty-day period

is supported by the record as being narrowly tailored to achieve the governmental interest at

stake.
438

Moreover, Defendants provide uncontroverted evidence that the effect of

advertisements run during a primary can be just as damaging as advertisements run during

the general election. The record demonstrates that interest group broadcast advertisements

had a substantial effect on the outcome of the 2000 Congressional race in Florida’s Eighth

district, particularly with the advertisements run by The Club for Growth during the primary.

Id. ¶ 2.6.5.5 (Pennington); see also id. ¶ 2.10.2 (Pennington) (noting that radio

advertisements by Americans for Limited Terms attacking Mr. Keller’s opponent on taxes

and other issues was quite effective). The Club for Growth and Republican candidate Ric

Keller had made their relationship well known, and the Club for Growth ran advertisements

particularly helpful to Mr. Keller including one entitled “Keller Sublette Higher Taxes.” Id.

¶ 2.6.5.5 (Pennington). Keller’s Republican primary opponent, Bill Sublette, had been the

front-runner until this advertising campaign by The Club for Growth began. Id. Rocky

Pennington, Mr. Sublette’s campaign consultant, observed that Sublette would have garnered

50 percent of the vote in the Republican primary and not have had to face a run-off primary

contest had it not been for The Club for Growth advertisements. Id. 

After the election, in June of 2001, Congressman Ric Keller signed a Club for Growth

fundraising letter stating:

The Club for Growth selected my race as one of its top priorities. . . . 

Since the Club targets the most competitive races in the country, your

membership in the Club will help Republicans keep control of Congress.

Id. ¶¶ 2.7.4 (underline in original, italics added for emphasis). In my judgment, the Keller-
439

Sublette primary election advertising example epitomizes the reason Congress extended the

prohibition on electioneering communications to 30 days within primary elections. It also

demonstrates that simply because a primary election does not ultimately produce an

officeholder, since the winner only receives a chance to run for elected office, the risk of

corruption is still clearly present. See Findings ¶ 2.6.6.5 (New Hampshire Presidential

primary election advertisements referencing Senator McCain). The thirty-day prohibition

around primaries is therefore supported by the record.

The sixty and thirty-day figures are not arbitrary numbers selected by Congress, but

appropriate time periods tied to empirically verifiable data. The Findings persuasively

demonstrate that advertisements designed to influence a federal election mention the name

of a candidate and appear in the sixty and thirty days before a federal election or primary

contest. The primary definition of electioneering communication is narrowly tailored

because it focuses only on these periods of time, where it has been shown that candidatecentered issue advocacy is at its zenith and the influence of these advertisements on federal

elections is at its strongest. Indeed, expert testimony likewise concludes that the majority of

issue advertisements that mention a federal candidate appear in the period before an election.

Id. ¶ 2.8.2.3.

Unlike Judge Leon, I am equally unpersuaded by Plaintiffs’ claim that the legislative

calendar requires the running of issue advertisements during the periods covered by BCRA.

See, e.g., AFL-CIO Br. at 10-11; Findings ¶ 2.11.8. I do not find that Plaintiffs have
440

presented sufficient evidence to demonstrate this proposition. Findings ¶ 2.11.8.3. In many

instances, Plaintiffs conclusively allege that legislative activity occurs during this time frame

without providing either specific examples from the legislative calendar or examples from

their own issue advertising campaigns addressing these legislative issues. Id. ¶ 2.11.8.1. The

actual examples of some advocacy tied to specific pending legislation Plaintiffs present are

comparatively few and I conclude are not sufficient to demonstrate that BCRA is overbroad.

Id. ¶ 2.11.8.2. Importantly, Plaintiffs never overcome the fact that all issue advertisements

that refer to a federal candidate, that are run in close proximity to a federal election, and that

are targeted to the candidate’s electorate influence the outcome of the federal election. Id.

¶ 2.11.2. Nor do they overcome the evidence showing that most “pure” issue advertisements

do not mention the name of federal candidates. Id ¶ 2.8.1.1. Congress properly concluded

that advertisements mentioning a candidate run in this time frame have an electioneering

affect, even if they are run for a different purpose, and if these advertisements were paid for

by corporations and labor unions, Congress concluded, consistent with longstanding policy,

to require that these advertisements be paid for with segregated funds specifically designated

for election purposes.

Additionally, the record establishes that it is a disputed issue of fact as to whether it

is even effective to run “genuine” issue advertisements in the immediate run-up to a federal

election. Findings ¶ 2.11.7. Political consultants, current and former candidates and

officeholders, and Defendants’ expert witnesses contend that it is ineffective to run issue
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advertisements in close proximity to a federal election, and as a result, advertisements about

issues run during that time frame are likely designed to influence federal elections. Id.

¶¶2.11.7.1-2.11.7.2. Plaintiffs respond that it is necessary to run issue advertisements that

mention the name of a federal candidate close to an election because of the public’s greater

interest in public affairs during that time frame. Id. ¶¶ 2.11.7.3-2.11.7.4. Because this issue

is disputed, I reach no conclusion on this matter. What I do conclude is that with the primary

definition of electioneering communication, the test does not focus on the objective behind

the advertisement but rather objective determinants that have been empirically proven to

distinguish issue advertisements that influence federal elections from other types of issue

advertising.

Given the record presented to the Court, I conclude that BCRA captures the

overwhelming majority of advertisements that are designed to affect federal elections. Even

if the primary purpose of a broadcast advertisement is to pressure a Member of Congress on

pending legislation, the record demonstrates that advertisements mentioning a federal

candidate that run in close proximity to a federal election that are targeted at that candidate’s

electorate have a serious impact on elections. Still, BCRA only requires that these

advertisements be paid for with segregated funds as opposed to general treasury funds.

3) Most Candidate-Centered Advertisements That Mention

a Candidate for Federal Office Are Run in States and

Congressional Districts With Close Elections

The Court’s Findings conclusively demonstrate from the evidence that issue
442

advertisements designed to influence a federal election are focused predominantly on close

races. Findings ¶ 2.8.3. Expert and political consultant testimony, as well as empirical data,

all demonstrate this fact. Id. The obvious reason for focusing primarily on close races is that

corporations and labor unions endeavor to receive the most value out of each dollar spent on

advertising in order to maximize their influence on elections. Even Plaintiff NRA admitted

to focusing its advertisements on competitive races. Id. ¶ 2.8.3.5.

In my judgment, tailoring BCRA to apply only to “competitive races” would create

line-drawing difficulties that would make such a law unconstitutional. However, the primary

definition of electioneering communication is narrowly tailored in that it only focuses on

broadcast advertisements that are targeted to the relevant electorate of each candidate. This

means that, in the case of House and Senate races, the communication will not constitute an

“electioneering communication” unless 50,000 or more individuals in the relevant

congressional district or state that the candidate for the House or Senate are seeking to

represent can receive the communication. BCRA § 201; FECA § 304(f)(3)(C); 2 U.S.C. §

434(f)(3)(C). Broadcast advertisements that target substantial portions of the electorate who

decide a candidate’s political future are those most likely to influence an election, and earn

the candidate’s gratitude. I find that by applying only to a candidate’s relevant electorate,

the primary definition of electioneering communication is narrowly tailored. 

4) Legal Conclusions Relating To Expert Reports and

Plaintiffs’ Sample Advertisements

In my Findings and in the Appendix to this Opinion, I have made an effort to describe
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thoroughly the various expert reports purporting to demonstrate the problems created by issue

advocacy advertisements affecting federal elections, as well as the narrow tailoring Congress

achieved in BCRA to avoid affecting federal non-electioneering advertisements. I have also

devoted a great deal of effort and care to lay out the criticisms of these studies proffered by

Plaintiffs’ expert, and the responses to that criticism by Defendants’ experts. I have done so

because the record demonstrates that a number of the reports, such as the Buying Time and

the Annenberg Center studies, were relied upon by Congress in its consideration of BCRA

and the parties have presented the Court with a wealth of material aimed at bolstering or

discrediting them. In addition, Plaintiffs have attempted to demonstrate BCRA’s overbreadth

by discussing a series of advertisements that they claim would be unfairly captured under the

primary definition of electioneering communication. The problem with this approach is that

it asks the Court to sit as the viewer and find that these advertisements were pure issue

advertisements. The Buckley Court warned against a statutory test that relied on the viewer

and listener’s interpretation of a political message. I have declined, therefore, to engage in

this exercise. As my Findings discuss, I have reviewed Plaintiffs’ submission, including all

of their cited advertisements, and conclude that they do not demonstrate BCRA’s

overbreadth. See Findings ¶¶ 2.11.3-2.11.5.

Turning to the experts, as indicated in my Findings, I find that much, though not all,

of the relevant evidence presented by the Defendants has merit and has not been discredited

by Plaintiffs’ expert, Dr. Gibson, whose criticism focused on the Buying Time studies. Id.
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¶ 2.12. At the outset, it is worth pointing out that the conclusions reached in Dr. Goldstein’s

Expert Report are unrebutted on the following points: interest group advertising in 2000 was

concentrated in so-called “battleground” states; roughly 11 percent of candidate-sponsored

advertisements in 2000 used express advocacy terminology; interest group advertisements,

which identified a candidate in 2000, tended to be broadcast within the final 60 days of the

election campaign, whereas those that did not identify a candidate were spread more evenly

throughout the year; and interest group advertisements that mentioned candidates in 2000

were highly concentrated in “battleground states.” Id. ¶ 2.12.3. Dr. Goldstein’s

uncontroverted conclusions further demonstrate that BCRA’s primary definition of

electioneering communications narrowly focuses on the key empirical determinants that

separate genuine issue discussion from electioneering.

Plaintiffs have attempted to discredit the Buying Time reports primarily through the

expert reports of Dr. Gibson. Dr. Gibson presents various criticisms of the reports in an

effort to have the Court dismiss them or find Dr. Gibson’s alternative conclusions more

acceptable. As I mentioned in my Findings, the effort is not unlike that of a piñata party: if

one hits the piñata enough, it will eventually crack apart. Id. ¶ 2.12.4. Although some of

these “hits” have merit, I point out that neither Plaintiffs nor Dr. Gibson have attempted to

conduct their own similar study, or even replicate a discrete portion of the Buying Time

studies, despite the fact that the underlying materials were provided to them by Defendants.

Presenting the Court with contrary results from such a study would have been far more
445

persuasive than the recalculations of Buying Time data and the often conjectural and

speculative criticism proffered by Plaintiffs and Dr. Gibson.

Importantly, much, if not all, of the objective findings in the Buying Time reports have

not been undermined by Plaintiffs’ expert. For example, Plaintiffs have not challenged the

conclusions in Buying Time that very few advertisements utilize express advocacy

terminology, and that interest group advertisements which identify candidates are

concentrated toward the end of the election campaign. Id. ¶ 2.12.7. I find that this objective

data is insulated from the great majority of criticism leveled at the Buying Time reports. Id.

 (Dr. Gibson commenting that “[e]ntirely objective characteristics of the ads (e.g., whether

a telephone number is mentioned in the text of the ad) present few threats to reliability.”).

Furthermore, some of these results are supported by those of the unrebutted Annenberg

Reports. Id.

As my Findings discuss, I have not accepted either side’s discussion of the conclusion

in Buying Time 1998 related to the percentage of genuine issue advertisements that would

be affected by BCRA. Id. ¶¶ 2.12.5-2.12.9. Buying Time 1998 finds that seven percent of

genuine issue advertisements aired over the course of 1998 were aired in the final 60 days

of the election campaign and mentioned a candidate, and Dr. Krasno determined that out of

all of the advertisements identifying a candidate sixty days before the 1998 election, 14.7

percent were “genuine” issue advertisements. Id. ¶ 2.12.8. Dr. Gibson presented figures

from the Buying Time 1998 data ranging from 16 percent to 60 percent. Id. I have found that
131 Dr. Gibson also argues that since the majority of advertisements coded as

electioneering were also coded as having policy matters as their primary focus, the studies

in fact demonstrate that the vast majority of advertisements captured by BCRA are genuine

issue advertisements. As the Findings demonstrate, I reject this argument. Findings ¶

2.12.11. Defendants’ experts have clearly demonstrated that the fact an advertisement may

focus on issues does not preclude the possibility that the advertisement is designed to

promote a candidate. Id. Dr. Lupia’s beer commercial analogy illustrates this point

effectively. Id. Furthermore, the results for candidate-sponsored advertisements demonstrate

that even when a candidate running for office airs an advertisement in an effort to win

election, he or she more often than not focuses those commercials on policy matters and not

on personal characteristics of the candidates. Id.; see also supra ¶ 2.3.2 (Bailey).

446

given the record it is impossible to determine which expert’s view of the student coding is

correct, and as such I find this matter in dispute and do not accept either side’s conclusion

on the likely effect BCRA would have based on the Buying Time 1998 data.

In regard to Buying Time 2000, I do not accept its finding that, of all of the issue

advertisements run within 60 days of the 2000 election that mentioned a candidate, 0.6

percent were genuine advertisements. Id. ¶ 2.12.10. I reached this conclusion primarily

because Dr. Goldstein finds that if one includes all of the advertisements that Plaintiffs allege

were recoded from genuine to electioneering commercials, the most “conservative”

calculation of advertisements aired in the final 60 days of the 2000 election also identifying

a candidate, which were “genuine,” is 17 percent. Id.

131 This figure is not rebutted by

Plaintiffs or their expert.

As I also explain in my Findings, I view these calculations as largely an academic

exercise. Id. ¶ 2.12.12. The expert testimony in this case demonstrates the subjective nature

of the effort of trying to capture mental impressions of viewers, and illustrates how one
447

person’s genuine issue advertisement can be another’s electioneering commercial. Id. ¶

2.8.5. This is why BCRA’s framers have used objective criteria to define “electioneering

communication.” Furthermore, as Dr. Lupia explains, these exercises can help us determine

what BCRA’s impact would have been on past behavior, but they do not necessarily tell us

how BCRA will affect non-electioneering issue advertisements in the future. Id. For

example, the NRA claims that its 30-minute “news magazine” titled “California,” is genuine

issue advocacy but it would be unfairly affected by BCRA because it showed an image of the

group’s periodical, which featured a picture of Vice President Al Gore on the cover for a

few seconds. App. ¶ I.D.8.h. The advertisement was aired within 60 days of the 2000

election, and therefore would fall into BCRA’s “electioneering communication” definition.

I would note that it is clear that the NRA views Vice President Gore’s presence in the

advertisement as a coincidence and not a vital part of the commercial. Id. ¶ I.D.8.h. As such,

one would expect that with the enactment of BCRA, the NRA would change its behavior.

The NRA could leave the advertisement unchanged and only air it more than 60 days before

an election, or more than 30 days before a primary, and escape BCRA’s coverage. The NRA

could also show a periodical with a different cover and air the advertisement whenever it

liked. Or, the group could leave the advertisement unchanged, run it within the 60 day

window and pay for the commercial from its PAC funds. This is one example, but it

illustrates the point that trying to determine the number of advertisements that will be

unfairly subjected to BCRA based on past behavior does not account for adaptation of that
448

behavior based on the new reality. 

The fact that some genuine issue advertisements identified a candidate and were aired

within 60 days of an election in the past does not mean that the candidate’s presence was an

essential, as opposed to an incidental, aspect of the commercial, or that such a percentage

will remain constant. However, even if such conclusions could be drawn, it appears that the

least contested figure presented to the Court is that 17 percent of advertisements in 2000 that

would have been affected by BCRA were “genuine” issue advertisements. This figure is one

of the reasons that Judge Leon finds the primary definition of electioneering communication

to be substantially overbroad. I cannot agree with Judge Leon. First, I find these debates

over “actual” percentages of genuine issue advocacy illustrative of why the Supreme Court

in Buckley found that regulations relating to the subjective intent of the listener to be flawed.

Trying to discern whether an advertisement is electioneering or issue advocacy is very

difficult and open to debate. See Finding ¶ 2.8.5. Second, this number is the outermost

number of “genuine” issue advertisements that would be covered under BCRA; strong

arguments can be made that the number should be reduced. Given the evidence in this case

that broadcast advertisements aired in close proximity to a federal election, that mention the

name of a candidate, and that are targeted to the candidate’s electorate directly influence

federal elections, I find that Congress was correct to establish an objective test for

determining what constitutes electioneering. In other words, even if I were to accept the 17

percent figure as a valid metric for determining overbreadth, I find that the any such impact
132 As noted numerous times in this opinion, BCRA would not “prohibit” these

advertisements. These advertisements can be run, unaltered, if paid for from segregated

funds. In addition, if the advertisements are not run in the candidate’s electorate, BCRA

places no restrictions on these advertisements. If the advertisements are run more than 30

days before a primary or 60 days before a general election, BCRA imposes no restrictions

on these commercials.

449

of BCRA is substantially counterbalanced by the record in this case and the objective

empirical determinants related to these advertisements. For these reasons, I do not find Dr.

Goldstein’s conservative estimate of 17 percent to deem BCRA’s primary definition of

electioneering communication substantially overbroad.

Plaintiffs, as noted above, did not conduct their own empirical study like the Buying

Time study, but instead provided the Court with examples of advertisements that they claim

BCRA would have captured had it been in effect when they were aired. The McConnell

Plaintiffs provided a CD-ROM containing 21 advertisements they claim provide “powerful

illustrations of the amount and type of issue advocacy that would be prohibited by BCRA’s

primary definition of ‘electioneering communications.’”132 Id. ¶ 2.11.3. However, nine of

these advertisements would not fall under BCRA’s definition of electioneering

communication because they either were not targeted at a relevant electorate or were not

aired within 30 or 60 days of a primary or general election. Id. ¶ 2.11.3.1. Four of the

remaining advertisements focus on a candidate’s past votes with no reference to any pending

or future legislation. Id. ¶ 2.11.3.2. I reject the notion that these advertisements are

examples of genuine issue advocacy. Id. ¶ 2.11.3.3. It is difficult to imagine what purpose

an advertisement would have other than to promote the election or defeat of a candidate
133 I state “at most” due to the fact that Defendants have provided background for

almost all of the advertisements presented by Plaintiffs to the Court as genuine issue

commercials. Examining the advertisements with knowledge of the context in which they

were aired raises serious doubt in my mind that the true purpose of some of these

communications was to promote issues as opposed to candidates. Indeed, the uncontroverted

expert testimony states that in assessing the true purpose of an advertisement it is very

important to view the advertisement in the context of the election in which it was run, rather

than as part of a cold, factual record. Findings ¶ 2.8.5 (Strother). For example, one

advertisement submitted by the McConnell Plaintiffs exhorts viewers to “call” incumbent

Senator Lauch Faircloth “today and tell him to keep up his fight [against trial lawyers].

(continued...)

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when it is aired within 60 days of an election or 30 days of a primary, clearly identifies a

candidate, runs in that candidate’s electoral district, and focuses on the candidate’s past

voting record without referring to pending future legislation. Take, for example, the AFLCIO’s “Protect” advertisement:

PHARMACIST: The Senior Citizens today can’t afford their

medication. They come in and I know they’re skipping medication so

they can pay for their food. With the rising cost of medication today,

it could wipe out anybody at any time.

VOICE: Yet Congressman Jay Dickey sided with the drug industry. He

voted no to guaranteed Medicare prescription benefits that would

protect seniors from runaway prices. Tell Dickey quit putting special

interests ahead of working families.

PHARMACIST: Watching people walk away without the medication

takes a little bit out of me every day.

Id. ¶ 2.6.7.1. The argument that this advertisement, and those like it, was aired to promote

an issue, and not to attack a candidate, strains credulity. Therefore, out of these 21 selfselected, and presumably most self-serving advertisements McConnell Plaintiffs provided

the three-judge panel, eight at most are genuine issue advertisements that would be affected

by BCRA.133 Id. ¶ 2.11.3.4.
133(...continued)

Because if trial lawyers win, working families lose.” Id. ¶ 2.8.5.2. From a detached

perspective, this advertisement appears to be advocating an anti-trial lawyer policy; however,

when one is informed that Senator Faircloth’s opponent was now-Senator John Edwards, a

prominent trial lawyer, and that advertisements both supporting and opposing Senator

Edwards focused on his trial lawyer credentials to the point that the phrase “trial lawyer” was

synonymous with John Edwards, it is difficult to view the advertisement as anything other

than electioneering. Id. However, as noted supra, ascertaining a political advertisement’s

true purpose is often a subjective exercise, one that Congress elected not to include in

BCRA’s primary definition of “electioneering communication.” As such, unless there is an

objective factor indicating that a proposed “genuine” advertisement is in fact an

electioneering commercial, I will accept Plaintiffs’ characterizations in the interests of a

conservative and objective analysis. The conservative figure above also includes “Save,”

which criticizes a candidate’s past vote but urges viewers to call the Member of Congress

and “tell him to vote no when the Gingrich plan comes up again,” intending, according to the

AFL-CIO, “to influence House Members in the event that the bill returned for another vote

in the [House].” Findings ¶ 2.11.3.2.

451

In addition, Defendants identify 39 advertisements that appear in Plaintiffs’ briefings,

which Plaintiffs claim are genuine issue advertisements. Id. ¶ 2.11.4. In addition to these

39 advertisements, I have found four additional advertisements alleged in declarations to be

examples of legislative-centered advertisementsthat would be affected by BCRA, id., as well

as a large number of cookie-cutter advertisements alluded to in the AFL-CIO’s Opening

Brief, which the group claims would be unfairly affected by BCRA’s 30-day primary

window, id. ¶ 2.11.5. I address the groupings of advertisements in turn.

The 39 advertisements scattered throughout Plaintiffs’ briefs include 12 NRA

advertisements which the group only identifies as having been aired sometime in 1994, and

13 commercials sponsored by the same group that aired in March of 2000, but mentioned

only President Clinton who was not then a candidate for office. Id. ¶ 2.11.4.1. On these
134 Again I use the qualifier “at most” due to the presence of advertisements whose

context makes me question the notion that they are genuine issue advertisements and not

electioneering commercials. See supra note 133. This conservative figure includes: the

Associated Builders and Contractor’s advertisement on penalties for child molesters, a

subject that the group acknowledges “is not [an issue of] particular concern to the general

public of contractors or general group of contractors;” Findings ¶ 2.6.6.2, and the NRA’s

“Tribute” where Charlton Heston discusses “winning in November” and states “as we set out

this year to defeat the divisive forces that would take freedom away, I want to say these

fighting words for everyone within the sound of my voice to hear and to heed and especially

for you, Mr. Gore. “From my cold dead hands.” Findings ¶ 2.11.4.4 (emphasis in original).

452

bases, I exclude these NRA commercials from consideration. I also exclude the ACLU’s

advertisement as an example of a “genuine issue advertisement” since it is clear that it was

engineered to provide the group standing to challenge BCRA and is the only example of a

past “electioneering communication” made by the group. Id. ¶ 2.11.4.2. I reject another, the

AFL-CIO’s “Sky,” since it, like the four in the McConnell Plaintiffs’ 21 advertisement

submission described supra, criticized a Member of Congress’s past vote without reference

to any pending or future legislation. Id. ¶ 2.11.4.3. Therefore, out of these 39 advertisements

Plaintiffs used in their briefings to illustrate the unfairness of BCRA, 12 at most are genuine

issue advertisements that would be affected by BCRA.134 Id. ¶ 2.11.4.6.

Four other advertisements were cited by Plaintiffs in declarations as being motivated

by pending legislation and happened to run within the 30 or 60-day BCRA windows. Id. ¶

2.11.4.5 (“No Two Way,” “Spearmint,” “Spear,” and the Gun Owners of America’s armed

pilots advertisement). For purposes of this analysis I accept Plaintiffs’ characterization of

these commercials. But see supra note 133.

Finally, the AFL-CIO mentions that a number of its legislation-focused
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advertisements would be affected by BCRA’s 30-day window. Looking at the “flights” of

advertisements detailed in its submissions, it appears that the vast majority of the “cookiecutter” advertisements that made up these flights would not have been affected by BCRA.

Findings ¶ 2.11.5.1; see also App. ¶ II.A. Out of 336 cookie-cutter advertisements cited to

by the AFL-CIO, 50 would have been regulated by BCRA. Finding ¶ 2.11.5.1; see also App.

¶ II.A. The rest were part of the same lobbying efforts, but were not aired within 30 days of

a named-candidate’s primary. Finding ¶ 2.11.5.1; see also App. ¶ II.A.

These Plaintiff-produced advertisements provide very little insight into what effect

BCRA would have had on political advertising in the past, or the effect it is likely to have

in the future. Of the 400 self-selected advertisements proffered by Plaintiffs as illustrations

of the overbreadth of BCRA, presumably the best examples available, less than 20 percent

(79/400) would have been affected by BCRA, even if the five advertisements focusing on

past votes in the absence of pending legislation are considered genuine issue advocacy.

Furthermore, Plaintiffs do not attempt to compare the volume of these advertisements with

a comparative total number of advertisements or airings of advertisements. Consequently,

I am left with no idea as to what these advertisements represent in terms of the overall

quantity of distinct advertisements aired over the four election cycles (1994, 1996, 1998, and

2000) in which Plaintiffs’ proffered advertisements were aired. These examples do little to

convince me of BCRA’s overbreadth, and if anything, suggest the opposite conclusion. 
454

5) Conclusion Relating to Narrow Tailoring

In my judgment, BCRA’s restriction on electioneering communication is narrowly

tailored to achieve the related compelling governmental interests. In devising Title II,

Congress followed the clear instruction from the Supreme Court in Buckley–that limitations

upon political speech could not hinge on the subjective intent of the listeners. Buckley, 424

U.S. at 43 (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 535 (1945)). Instead, Congress focused

on objective facts and concluded that issue advertisements designed to influence a federal

election shared a number of characteristics: first, the vast majority of issue advertisements

run in the period before an election mention a federal candidate; second, these commercials

are run in the sixty and thirty days before general or primary elections; and third, these

advertisements are targeted at the most competitive races. In devising the primary definition

of electioneering communication, Congress constructed a rule that only touched

advertisements matching the criteria Congress found to be problematic: broadcast

advertisements, referring to a federal candidate, targeting the candidate’s electorate, run in

close proximity to a federal election. Corporations and labor unions that desire to spend

general treasury funds on advertisements fitting these characteristics can do so; they simply

must pay for them with funding committed for that purpose by individuals who agree with

the message of the union or corporation. 

Congress properly determined that genuine issue advocacy can be discerned

empirically from electioneering advocacy. In crafting Title II, it arrived at a definition of
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electioneering communication that matched its findings. It is very difficult to argue with

Congress’s conclusion that broadcast advertisements mentioning a federal candidate, run in

close proximity to the candidate’s election, and targeting the candidate’s electorate do not

have a significant influence on federal elections. In my judgment, Congress was correct to

compel corporations and labor unions to pay for these advertisements with segregated funds

committed to the purpose of electioneering in federal elections.

c. Section 204 of BCRA Does Not Render Title II Fatally

Overbroad

Plaintiffs also argue that the restrictions on electioneering communications in Title

II are not narrowly tailored because they apply to all corporations and do not provide for a

specific statutory carve-out for corporations fitting the characteristics of the plaintiff in

MCFL. With the Snowe-Jeffords’ provision, BCRA appeared to provide for an exception

to the electioneering communication ban for certain types of corporations; however, this

exception has been eliminated by the “Wellstone Amendment,” now codified in Section 204.

The Snowe-Jeffords Provision would have permitted section 501(c)(4) organizations and

section 527(e)(1) organizations to make electioneering communications provided that the

organizations paid for these communications with money contributed by individuals,

disclosed the names and addresses of those individuals who had given more than $1,000 to

the account that paid for the communication, and, in the case of 501(c)(4) organizations,

ensured that corporate and individual contributions were segregated into two separate

accounts. The Wellstone Amendment, however, takes this exception away and requires
456

corporations organized under section 501(c)(4) and section 527(e)(1) of the Internal Revenue

Code to use segregated funding for electioneering communications. The Wellstone

Amendment was codified in a separate section of BCRA in order to preserve severability;

however, as I am persuaded that the Wellstone Amendment is constitutional, I do not find

it necessary to sever it from BCRA. 

Notably, the language in the Snowe-Jeffords Provision is silent as to whether or not

corporations of the type identified in MCFL would be included within the parameters of its

exception. In MCFL, the Supreme Court found that the prohibition in Section 441b on

making independent expenditures containing words of express advocacywas unconstitutional

as applied to a certain nonprofit, nonstock corporation. MCFL, 479 U.S. at 241. The

Supreme Court’s decision created an as-applied carve-out for certain nonprofit corporations

that met three characteristics of the corporation at issue in the case which were “essential”

to the Supreme Court’s holding. Id. at 263. First, the corporation was “formed for the

express purpose of promoting political ideas, and cannot engage in business activities

[which] ensures that political resources reflect political support.” Id. at 264. Second, the

corporation did not have any “shareholders or other persons affiliated so as to have a claim

on its assets or earnings [which e]nsures that persons connected with the organization will

have no economic disincentive for disassociating with it if they disagree with its political

activity.” Id. Third, the corporation “was not established by a business corporation or a

labor union, and it is its policy not to accept contributions from such entities [which] prevents
457

such corporations from serving as conduits for the type of direct spending that creates a threat

to the political marketplace.” Id. 

The decision in MCFL stands for the proposition that the prohibition on independent

expenditures containing words of express advocacy is unconstitutional as applied to a

“small” group of qualified nonprofit corporations that fit the parameters set out by the

majority in MCFL. Austin, 494 U.S. at 672 (1990) (Brennan, J., concurring). Although

FECA was not amended by Congress in the wake of MCFL, the Commission eventually

promulgated regulations exempting corporations fitting the criteria of MCFL, or Qualified

Nonprofit Corporations (“QNCs”), from the prohibition on independent expenditures

(expenditures containing words of express advocacy). 11 C.F.R. § 114.10(d)(1) (“A

qualified nonprofit corporation may make independent expenditures, as defined in 11 C.F.R.

§ 100.16, without violating the prohibitions against corporate expenditures contained in 11

C.F.R. part 114.”). In defining what kind of corporation can receive QNC status, the

Commission has hewed closely to the characteristics of the corporation in MCFL. See 11

C.F.R. § 114.10(c).

Given that Congress has never expressly codified the MCFL characteristics, it is not

unexpected that the Snowe-Jeffords Provision never indicates whether QNCs would be

included within the ambit of its exception. Nevertheless, the Snowe-Jeffords Provision, by

its terms, appears to include QNCs. The Snowe-Jeffords provision applies to all section

501(c)(4) organizations and all section 527(e)(1) organizations without exception. In
135 Some courts have found that the regulations establishing the test for which

corporations qualify for QNC-status is too rigid and excludes corporations that legitimately

deserve recognition under a more functional-based approach (for example, where the

corporation has accepted a de minimis amount of corporate donations). See North Carolina

Right to Life, Inc. v. Bartlett, 168 F.3d 705, 714 (4th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1153

(2000) (“We agree with those circuits that have addressed the question, each of which has

held that the list of nonprofit corporate characteristics in MCFL was not ‘a constitutional test

for when a nonprofit corporation must be exempt,’ but ‘an application, in three parts, of First

Amendment jurisprudence to the facts in MCFL.’”) (quoting Day v. Holahan, 34 F.3d 1356,

1363 (8th Cir.1994)); FEC v. Survival Educ. Fund, Inc., 65 F.3d 285, 292 (2d Cir.1995); see

also FEC v. Nat’l Rifle Ass’n, 254 F.3d 173, 190-91 (D.C. Cir. 2001). Even if a QNC were

permitted to accept a de minimis amount of corporate contributions, it would still be able to

qualify for Snowe-Jeffords by paying for its communication with funds from a segregated

account that contains funding from individuals only.

136 The disclosure of names and addresses of individual contributors is not any more

restrictive than the disclosure that the corporation in MCFL was forced to make. MCFL, 479

U.S. at 262 (“Even if § 441b is inapplicable, an independent expenditure of as little as $250

by MCFL will trigger the disclosure provisions of § 434(c). As a result, MCFL will be

required to identify all contributors who annually provide in the aggregate $200 in funds

intended to influence elections, will have to specify all recipients of independent spending

amounting to more than $200, and will be bound to identify all persons making contributions

over $200 who request that the money be used for independent expenditures. These

reporting obligations provide precisely the information necessary to monitor MCFL’s

independent spending activity and its receipt of contributions. The state interest in disclosure

(continued...)

458

addition, the Snowe-Jeffords Provision permits certain section 501(c)(4) organizations and

certain section 527(e)(1) organizationsto make electioneering communications, provided that

the funds used to pay for those communications comes from individuals who disclose their

names and addresses. The regulations defining a QNC mandate that for a corporation to

receive QNC-status, the corporation cannot receive corporate donations. 11 C.F.R. §

114.10(c) (4)(ii).135 By its terms, the Snowe-Jeffords Provision would therefore appear to

encompass QNCs.136
136(...continued)

therefore can be met in a manner less restrictive than imposing the full panoply of regulations

that accompany status as a political committee under the Act.”). Under the Snowe-Jeffords

Provision, only individuals who have contributed $1,000 in the aggregate during a calendar

year would have to disclose their names and addresses.

459

The Wellstone Amendment was added by Congress to force all corporations to fund

their electioneering communications through political action committees with federal funds.

147 Cong. Rec. S2847 (daily ed. Mar. 26, 2001) (statement of Sen. Paul Wellstone) (“Let me

be clear, this amendment does not say any special interest group cannot run an ad. . . . It only

says these groups and organizations need to comply with the same rules as unions and

corporations. Groups covered by my amendment can set up PACs, they can solicit

contributions, and they can run all the ads they want. All this amendment says is they cannot

use their regular treasury money. They can’t use the soft money contributions to run these

ads.”). Under the Snowe-Jeffords Provision, individuals could have given unlimited amounts

of nonfederal money to section 501(c)(4) organizations and section 527(e)(1) organizations

and these groups would have been permitted to engage in electioneering communications

provided that the groups paid for the advertisements with the funding contributed by the

individuals. The Wellstone Amendment compels these organizations to fund all of their

electioneering communications through a political action committee using federal funds. 

The Wellstone Amendment does not explicitly mention the status of corporations

fitting the characteristics of an MCFL corporation. During the final passage of BCRA in the

Senate, Senator McCain indicated that “[j]ust as an MCFL-type corporation, under the
137 The reference Senator McCain makes to the Snowe-Jeffords’ Provision is to the

entire prohibition on corporate and labor union general treasury funds being used for

electioneering communications, which was also known as “Snowe-Jeffords” throughout the

legislative history. Thus, Senator McCain is not referring to “Snowe-Jeffords” as it has been

discussed in this opinion as an exemption for section 501(c)(4) and section 527(e)(1)

organizations. Electioneering Communications, 67 Fed. Reg. at 65204 (“Senator McCain

specifically referred to that part of the Snowe-Jeffords amendment that prohibits the use of

[a corporation’s]treasury funds to pay for electioneering communications, the main provision

of this amendment that remains unaltered by the passage of the Wellstone amendment.”)

(internal citation and quotation marks omitted) (second brackets in original).

460

Supreme Court’s ruling, is exempt from the current prohibition on the use of corporate funds

for expenditures containing ‘express advocacy,’ so too is an MCFL-type corporation exempt

from the prohibition in the Snowe-Jeffords amendment on the use of its treasury funds to pay

for ‘electioneering communications.’” 148 Cong. Rec. S2141 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 2002)

(statement of Sen. John McCain).137

 

Picking up on Senator McCain’s statement, the FEC–in the recently promulgated

regulationsimplementing BCRA–has created an exemption for QNCs to make electioneering

communications. 11 C.F.R. § 114.10 (A qualified nonprofit corporation may make

electioneering communications, as defined in 11 C.F.R. 100.29, without violating the

prohibitions against corporate expenditures contained in 11 C.F.R. part 114.”). Although not

expressly provided for in the Wellstone Amendment, under Commission regulations, QNCs

are permitted, therefore, to spend unlimited amounts of money on electioneering

communications based on the implementing regulations by the FEC.

I am convinced that Section 204 is constitutional in its present state and would leave

for another day, in the context of an as-applied challenge, a determination of whether the
138 Future reviewing courts will not be writing on a blank slate. The Commission’s

regulations on the scope of the QNC exemption have been litigated multiple times. See supra

note 135. 

461

FEC’s regulations apply too narrowly and exclude corporations that should qualify for QNCstatus. In my judgment, it was permissible for Congress not to exempt nonprofit corporations

as a specific class from BCRA’s restrictions on the general-treasury funding of electioneering

communications. It goes without saying, and even Defendants concede, that MCFL

establishes that FECA’s (and now BCRA’s) restrictions on the use of corporate treasury

funds cannot constitutionally be applied to certain nonprofit corporations. Def.-Int. Opp’n

at 65. However, given the FEC’s regulations, I feel any argument relating to an MCFL

exemption is premature. Any corporation that believes it should fall within MCFL may seek

exemption under the FEC’s regulations.138 Moreover, if any corporation thinks that the

Commission’s regulations are too narrow in defining an MCFL, they may challenge them on

that basis at the appropriate time. As the Defendant-Intervenors nicely phrase the inquiry:

“The question is whether the new provisions added to FECA by BCRA may constitutionally

be applied to the same set of corporations (and, of course, unions, other groups, and

individuals) to which FECA’s existing provisions have long applied, and continue to apply.”

Def.-Int. Opp’n at 67. I answer that question in the affirmative and find that organizations

like the NRA or ACLU that desire MCFL treatment in order to be exempted under BCRA

need to present such a claim in the future as was done by the plaintiffs in Austin and MCFL.

Accordingly, I find that the Wellstone Amendment does not render Title II substantially
139 Judge Leon finds Title II of BCRA unconstitutional only insofar as it applies to

MCFL-corporations. However, I cannot agree with his conclusion that Sections 203 and 204

are unconstitutional because they do not create a specific statutory carve-out for MCFL

corporations. MCFL was an as-applied challenge, and the Supreme Court did not strike

down all of FECA as a result of its decision. Rather, the MCFL exemption is litigated on a

case-by-case basis. See MCFL, 479 U.S. at 271 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part,

dissenting in part) (foreshadowing that the result of the MCFL decision would be to spur

“costly litigation”). Therefore, I do not find a constitutional defect in the fact that BCRA

does not create a statutory carve-out for MCFL corporations. 

462

overbroad.139

d. Conclusion Relating to Compelling Governmental Interests and

Narrow Tailoring

Based on the objective, empirical evidence, I conclude that BCRA is narrowly tailored

to address the compelling governmental interests at stake in this case. As the Findings

provide, Congress concluded that corporations and labor unions were using their general

treasury funds to influence federal elections in violation of years of statutory prohibition.

Title II of BCRA addresses the concern of Congress that corporations and labor unions were

using their substantial aggregations of wealth to dominate the political environment. In that

vein, Title II protects the individuals who have paid money into a corporation or union for

purposes other than the support of candidate from having their money used to support

political candidates to whom they may be opposed. Finally, Title II also addresses the

potential for corruption that exists when corporations and labor unions make independent

expenditures that have the potential to create political debts. See Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 788

n.26.

In addressing both forms of corruption, the primary definition of BCRA creates an
463

objective test that identifies broadcast advertisements that influence a federal election.

BCRA focuses only on those broadcast advertisements that mention a federal candidate,

which, as demonstrated, is a key determinant of issue advertising that is essentially designed

to influence a federal election. In addition, BCRA only applies to broadcast advertisements

which, while mentioning a candidate, are targeted to that candidate’s electorate. Moreover,

BCRA only applies to these advertisements when they appear within the thirty days of a

candidate’s primary election or sixty days of the date of a general election. Nor is BCRA

overbroad because it applies to certain non-profit corporations. It is obvious that the

Supreme Court’s decision in MCFL means that BCRA cannot constitutionally be applied to

certain nonprofit corporations and the Commission’s regulations provide for this fact.

Finally, BCRA does not prohibit corporations and labor unions from making advertisements

meeting the aforementioned criteria. Rather, BCRA only requires that corporations and labor

unions pay for these advertisements with funding that comes from those committed to the

political ideals of the corporation and labor union; namely through PACs where disclosure

is present and where contributors are aligned with the political message of the corporation

or labor union.

In my view, Title II is narrowly tailored to serve these compelling governmental

interests. The primary definition of electioneering communication purposefully creates a

new objective test that draws a bright line between issue advocacy and electoral advocacy.

At this facial challenge stage, I find that it is narrowly tailored to serve compelling
140 To the extent that the McConnell Plaintiffs argue in a brief footnote that Title II

is underinclusive because it applies to advertisements that make only “passing” references

to federal candidates, McConnell Br. at 77 n.37, Plaintiffs fail to state how it would be

possible to create a restriction on electioneering communication that would be based on the

length of time a reference to a federal candidate is mentioned. I simply do not find this

argument persuasive.

464

governmental interests and therefore respectfully dissent from the conclusions reached by

Judge Henderson and Judge Leon on this point.

F. Plaintiffs’ Underbreadth Challenge

A number of Plaintiffs also argue that Title II of BCRA is unconstitutional because

it is fatally underinclusive. See, e.g., McConnell Br. at 75-77, 81; NRA Br. at 34-39;

Chamber/NAM Br. at 6. For example, Plaintiffs contend that Title II is underinclusive

because it does not restrict broadcast advertisements outside the thirty and sixty-day

windows. McConnell Br. at 75; NRA Br. at 37-38. The Plaintiffs also contend that BCRA

is underinclusive because it does not apply to print advertisements, direct mail, and the

Internet, McConnell Br. at 81; NRA Br. 33-37, and because it only applies to corporations

and labor unions, NRA Br. at 38.140

 Given our Circuit’s decision in Blount v. SEC, I am not persuaded by Plaintiffs

arguments on this score. The D.C. Circuit court in Blount stated:

[A] regulation is not fatally underinclusive simply because an alternative

regulation, which would restrict more speech or the speech of more people,

could be more effective. The First Amendment does not require the

government to curtail as much speech as may conceivably serve its goals.

While the rule chosen must “fit” the asserted goals, City of Cincinnati [v.

Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 428 (1993)], it must also, by virtue of

the narrow tailoring requirement discussed below, strike an appropriate
465

balance between achieving those goals and protecting constitutional rights.

Because the primary purpose of underinclusiveness analysis is simply to

“ensure that the proffered state interest actually underlies the law”, Austin, 494

U.S. at 677 (Brennan, J., concurring), a rule is struck for underinclusiveness

only if it cannot “fairly be said to advance any genuinely substantial

governmental interest”, FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 396

(1984), because it provides only “ineffective or remote” support for the

asserted goals, id. (citing Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv.

Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 564 (1980)), or “limited incremental” support, Bolger

v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 73 (1983). See also Florida Star

v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989) (government “must demonstrate its commitment

to advancing [its] interest by applying its prohibition evenhandedly. . . .

Without more careful and inclusive precautions against alternative forms of

[the harm], we cannot conclude that Florida’s selective ban . . . satisfactorily

accomplishes its stated purpose.”). Thus, with regard to First Amendment

underinclusiveness analysis, neither a perfect nor even the best available fit

between means and ends is required.

Blount v. SEC, 61 F.3d 938, 946 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (emphasis and alterations in original). As

concluded supra, there is a tight fit between the asserted compelling governmental interests

and the statutory provisions in Title II.

Plaintiffs first complain that BCRA is underinclusive because it regulates only

advertisements aired within 60 days of a general election or 30 days of a primary, as opposed

to advertisements falling just outside those periods. McConnell Br. at 75-77; NRA Br. at

37-38. As extensively discussed supra, BCRA focuses on issue advertisements designed to

influence a federal election. The law, therefore, regulates advertisements that only fall within

periods before federal elections. On the basis of empirical data, Congress concluded that

sixty days before a general election and thirty days before a primary election were the periods

of time in which issue advertisements were being used most often to influence federal
466

elections. While Plaintiffs expert, Dr. Milkis, observes that advertisements outside the thirty

and sixty day period have some effect on federal elections, Findings ¶ 2.11.1, the Findings

demonstrate that issue advertisements mentioning a federal candidate are most often aired

in the sixty days before a general election and the thirty days before a primary election. See

generally id. ¶ 2.11. Congress recognized that most candidate-centered issue advertisements

were run in close proximity to a federal election. See supra Findings ¶¶ 2.8.1.3, 2.8.2

(discussing the fact that candidate-centered issue advocacy is concentrated in the weeks

surrounding federal elections). In my judgment, focusing on periods outside the sixty and

thirty day windows would have rendered the primary definition fatally overbroad given the

empirical evidence presented about the timing of candidate-centered issue advertisements.

Accordingly, I find that Title II strikes an appropriate balance between achieving the

compelling governmental interests and protecting constitutional rights.

Plaintiffs next challenge Title II as underinclusive on the ground that its definition of

electioneering communication covers broadcast advertisements on television and radio, but

not advertisements run in other media, such as print, direct mail, or the Internet. McConnell

Br. at 81; NRA Br. at 33-36; see also Findings ¶ 2.10. As stated, however, by the AFL-CIO

Plaintiffs, “broadcast is the most potent medium available in this electronic age, which is

precisely why BCRA seeks to decisively impair groups’ access to it. Print advertising,

telephone banks, direct mail and other forms of non-broadcast communications pale in

comparison as mass communications outlet.” AFL-CIO Br. at 11. The Findings similarly
141 Plaintiffs’ citation to Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 122 S. Ct. 2528

(2002), is misplaced. McConnell Br. at 76; NRA Br. at 33. In Republican Party of

Minnesota, the Supreme Court struck down a state law that prohibited candidates for judicial

office from announcing their views on disputed legal or political issues. The Court found

the law to be underinclusive because it only prohibited a judge from announcing views on

a disputed issue during the pendency of his or her candidacy. Republican Party of

Minnesota, 122 S. Ct. at 2537 (observing that the day before an individual declares his or her

candidacy and after he or she is elected are both periods where the statute did not apply). In

the case of Republican Party of Minnesota, the Supreme Court concluded that if a judge’s

announcement of his or her legal views threatened his or her appearance of fairness, then that

threat existed regardless of whether the announcement occurred during his or her campaign.

See id. at 2537 (observing that “statements in election campaigns are such an infinitesimal

portion of the public commitments to legal positions that judges (or judges-to-be) undertake,

that this object of the prohibition is implausible”). Such is not the case with regard to the

thirty and sixty day windows of BCRA. The evidence in this case demonstrates that

broadcast issue advertisements airing outside the 30 and 60 day periods do not influence

federal elections to anywhere near the same degree as those aired within the 30 and 60 day

windows. Rather, it is in the immediate run-up to the federal election that issue advocacy is

most often exploited for electioneering purposes. Congress was correct to focus on the

problem and not attempt to prohibit more conduct than the record would support.

467

conclude that broadcast advertising on television and radio are the most potent form of

advertising. Findings ¶¶ 2.10.1-2.10.2.141

I disagree with the NRA’s conclusion that the other forms of media, like webcasts,

telemarketing, direct mail, email, and print advertisements will logically become the next

vehicle for corporations and labor unions looking to influence a federal election. In my

view, the flaw with this argument lies in the assumption that these other media are just as

effective as television and radio advertising for conveying an electioneering message. The

evidence at this juncture does not support this conclusion. Therefore, I also respectfully

disagree with Judge Henderson’s conclusion on this matter.

The NRA, for example, contends that its webcasts of “NRA Live!” which often
468

criticize politicians, are comparable to the NRA’s issue advertising campaigns broadcast

through radio or television. See NRA Br. at 36-37; Findings ¶ 2.10.3. The NRA’s evidence

in support of this assumption is not sufficient. First, the NRA offers a declaration of their

communications consultant Angus McQueen who states that the Internet has become an

“increasingly important part of how information becomes disseminated in our society.”

Findings ¶ 2.10.3.1 (emphasis added). However, congressional judgment regarding the

“careful legislative adjustment of the federal electoral laws, in a cautious advance, step by

step, to account for the particular legal and economic attributes of corporations and labor

organizations warrants considerable deference.” NRWC, 459 U.S. at 209 (internal citation

and quotation marks omitted). Merely because the Internet is “increasingly” part of how

society receives and disseminates information does not make it comparable to broadcast

advertisements over television and radio, which everyone acknowledges was the problem

Congress sought to address with BCRA. The other evidence presented by the NRA is a

submission of “NRA Live!” viewership statistics and various videotapes containing

broadcasts of “NRA Live!.” Findings ¶ 2.10.3.2. However, the NRA does not include any

expert or other testimony that “NRA Live!” is influencing federal elections to the same

degree as the NRA’s broadcast advertising campaigns. It is likely that there is no evidence

of such a phenomenon because in order to view “NRA Live!,” individuals must “opt-in” by

going to the NRA website and viewing the program. Those individuals choosing to do so

are likely more predisposed to the NRA’s views about political candidates than the undecided
469

voter watching a sitcom on a Thursday evening and viewing a thirty-second issue

advertisement critical of Al Gore. The risk of corrupting the political process is much more

powerful in the latter example than in the former. I cannot agree that Title II is flawed

because it did not extend BCRA’s restrictions to the Internet.

I reach the same conclusion for direct mail and newspaper advertising. Although

everyone agrees that direct mail can be “very effective,” Id. ¶ 2.10.4 (Magleby), there is no

evidence that direct mail has reached the degree of effectiveness as broadcast advertising.

Until such a conclusion is reached by Congress, I find it appropriate that it did not extend the

definition of electioneering communication to direct mail. In regard to newspaper

advertising, the NRA presents no testimony that newspaper advertising is as effective as

broadcast radio and television advertising. As Denise Mitchell, Special Assistant for Public

Affairs for AFL-CIO President John J. Sweeney, observes: “newspapers are a more passive

medium, with less immediacy than broadcast, and are less likely to generate action, and it is

far harder to convey in print the human, personal impact of legislative issues -- a key part of

our strategy and effectiveness.” Id. ¶ 2.10.2 (a conclusion, I note, that is also applicable to

direct mail). I agree and find the NRA’s arguments regarding print media unpersuasive. To

the extent that the NRA cites advertisements that are more expensive to run in newspapers

than advertisements run on radio, NRA Br. at 35; Findings ¶ 2.10.5, the NRA misses the

point; failing to provide a shred of evidence that the print medium has anywhere near the

effect as the broadcast media for conveying electioneering messages. Even the NRA’s own
470

communication consultant concedes that “paid broadcast media” is the most powerful means

of conveying the NRA’s messages. Findings ¶ 2.10.2 (McQueen).

In the final analysis, Congress appropriately tailored the primary definition of

electioneering communication to radio and television advertisements. Id. 2.10.6. The

uncontroverted testimony of experts and political consultants is that broadcast advertising is

the most effective form of communicating an electioneering message. Id. ¶ 2.10.1-2.10.2

(Magleby, Pennington). Even Plaintiff AFL-CIO concedes this point. AFL-CIO Br. at 11.

The fact that Congress did not extend the prohibition on electioneering communication to

non-broadcast advertisements does not render Title II unconstitutional as underinclusive

under the First Amendment.

Plaintiffs also contend that because the restrictions in Title II only apply to

corporations and labor unions, the law is underinclusive as it does not cover unincorporated

entities and wealthy individuals. NRA Br. at 38. Section 203 of BCRA amends 2 U.S.C. §

441b, a statute that has long regulated the activities of corporations and labor unions. The

Supreme Court has already rejected a similar argument in a footnote to its MCFL decision:

While business corporations may not represent the only organizations that pose

this danger, they are by far the most prominent example of entities that enjoy

legal advantages enhancing their ability to accumulate wealth. That Congress

does not at present seek to regulate every possible type of firm fitting this

description does not undermine its justification for regulating corporations.

Rather, Congress’ decision represents the “careful legislative adjustment of the

federal electoral laws, in a ‘cautious advance, step by step,’” to which we have

said we owe considerable deference. FEC v. National Right to Work

Committee, 459 U.S. 197, 209 (1982) (quoting NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin

Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 46 (1937)).
142 The Paul Plaintiffs also raise this claim. The Paul Plaintiffs argument is discussed

in the per curiam opinion.

143 I disagree with the NRA’s argument that the media exemption demonstrates that

BCRA is, in essence, a regulation of television programming. See NRA Br. at 47. BCRA,

in my judgment, is not akin to regulations that burden the editorial discretion of TV

companies by requiring them to carry certain programming content. Again, BCRA does not

prohibit speech. The NRA is free to run electioneering communications, provided they are

paid for with segregated funds. As Defendants correctly observe, “The amount the NRA can

(continued...)

471

MCFL, 479 U.S. at 259 n.11. In Austin, the Supreme Court found that the state statute

modeled after Section 441b, which did not apply to unincorporated associations or labor

unions, was not underinclusive. Austin, 494 U.S. at 665. The Supreme Court in Buckley held

that Congress had not assembled a record that would permit justifying restrictions on the

independent expenditures of individuals, see Buckley, 424 U.S. at 46; Congress should not,

therefore, be penalized for not limiting the amount that wealthy individuals can spend on

electioneering communications by following the dictates of a Supreme Court decision. See

Austin, 494 U.S. at 678 (Brennan, J., concurring) (statute not underinclusive because it

adheres to Supreme Court precedent). Given the prior decisions of the Supreme Court,

Plaintiffs’ underbreadth challenge on this ground fails.

G. Plaintiffs’ Challenge Relating to Exemption for News Stories,

Commentaries or Editorials from a Broadcast Station

Finally, the NRA Plaintiffs142 argue that the exemption in Title II of BCRA for news

stories, commentaries, or editorials–the “media exemption”–violates the Equal Protection

Clause and the First Amendment in that it is underinclusive. NRA Br. at 42.143 As discussed,
143(...continued)

spend on such ads is limited only by the willingness of its millions of individual members to

contribute to the NRA’s separate segregated fund, which in 2000 spent $17 million to

influence federal elections.” Gov’t Opp’n at 104. I therefore find the NRA’s argument on

this score unpersuasive.

472

supra, BCRA, like FECA, exempts certain communications distributed through the facilities

of a broadcasting station from regulation. BCRA § 201(a); FECA § 304(f)(3)(B); 2 U.S.C.

§ 434(f)(3)(B) (“a communication appearing in a news story, commentary, or editorial

distributed through the facilities of any broadcasting station, unless such facilities are owned

or controlled by any political party, political committee, or candidate” is not included in the

definition of electioneering communication). 

In my view, the Supreme Court foreclosed consideration of this issue with its decision

in Austin and the evidence that the NRA has put forward is not sufficient to alter the

conclusion reached in that case. In Austin, the Supreme Court found that the Michigan

statute’s exemption of media corporations from its expenditure restriction did not render the

statute unconstitutional. Austin, 494 U.S. at 666-67 (noting that the “media exception” in the

Michigan statute excluded from the definition of expenditure any “expenditure by a

broadcasting station, newspaper, magazine, or other periodical or publication for any news

story, commentary, or editorial in support of or opposition to a candidate for elective office

. . . in the regular course of publication or broadcasting”) (citation and footnote observing

that the Michigan exemption was similar to the exemption in FECA both omitted). The

Supreme Court concluded that the media exemption was bound to impose fewer restrictions
473

on the expression of corporations that are in the media business and therefore needed to be

justified by a compelling state purpose. The Supreme Court held:

Although all corporations enjoy the same state-conferred benefits inherent in

the corporate form, media corporations differ significantly from other

corporations in that their resources are devoted to the collection of information

and its dissemination to the public. We have consistently recognized the

unique role that the press plays in “informing and educating the public,

offering criticism, and providing a forum for discussion and debate.” Bellotti,

435 U.S. at 781. See also Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 219 (1966) (“[T]he

press serves and was designed to serve as a powerful antidote to any abuses of

power by governmental officials and as a constitutionally chosen means for

keeping officials elected by the people responsible to all the people whom they

were selected to serve”). The Act’s definition of “expenditure,” [citation

omitted] conceivably could be interpreted to encompass election-related news

stories and editorials. The Act’s restriction on independent expenditures

therefore might discourage incorporated news broadcasters or publishers from

serving their crucial societal role. The media exception ensures that the Act

does not hinder or prevent the institutional press from reporting on, and

publishing editorials about, newsworthy events. . . . A valid distinction thus

exists between corporations that are part of the media industry and other

corporations that are not involved in the regular business of imparting news to

the public. Although the press’ unique societal role may not entitle the press

to greater protection under the Constitution, Bellotti, supra, 435 U.S. at 782,

and n.18, it does provide a compelling reason for the State to exempt media

corporations from the scope of political expenditure limitations. We therefore

hold that the Act does not violate the Equal Protection Clause.

Austin, 494 U.S. at 667-68.

The NRA argues that the decision in Austin on this point was somehow a “close call”

and questions whether Austin “was correctly decided.” NRA Br. at 48. The NRA argues that

“the emergence of the internet and the absorption of the broadcast networks by non-media

conglomerates” change the role of media corporations in society. Id. at 42. According to the

NRA, since Austin was decided in 1990, there has been such a seismic shift in the structure
144 Moreover, as the NRA points out in its brief, NBC was acquired in 1985 by

General Electric, a move which predated the Austin Court’s decision. NRA Br. at 44 n.31.

474

of the media industry that Austin is no longer relevant. 

The NRA argues that the emergence of the Internet and the absorption of broadcast

networks by nonmedia companies have altered the nature of traditional companies and

therefore render Title II facially unconstitutional. NRA Br. at 42. I have discussed the

problems with the NRA’s Internet arguments, supra. With regard to the NRA’s arguments

about nonmedia companies purchasing media companies, the NRA’s entire line of argument

ignores the fact that the media exception only applies to the “facilities of any broadcasting

station,” BCRA § 201(a); FECA § 304(f)(3)(B); 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(B) (emphasis added),

not the facilities of any broadcasting company. The NRA provides no evidence that the

purchase of media corporations by other businesses has any impact on any “news story,

commentary, or editorial distributed through the facilities of any broadcasting station.”

BCRA § 201(a); FECA § 304(f)(3)(B); 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(B).144 Furthermore, it is not the

role of a district court, in my judgment, to question a binding decision of the United States

Supreme Court, particularly when the proffered evidence amounts to no more than a

disagreement with the Austin result. 

Given that the NRA’s evidence relating to the media exemption is entirely lacking,

there is no reason to engage in a further discussion of their argument. The equal protection

argument was settled in Austin, and for the same reasons announced in that decision, I find

that the NRA’s underinclusiveness argument is also without merit. Simply put, Austin is
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controlling.

H. Conclusion Regarding Title II

I have considered and rejected Plaintiffs’ other arguments made to the three-judge

District Court and conclude that the restrictions on electioneering communication, as defined

in the primary definition, are facially constitutional. In making this decision, I am extremely

cognizant of how rare it is for a decision to uphold a content-based restriction on speech.

Nevertheless, in finding these provisions in Title II constitutional I am motivated primarily

by the record assembled in this case and the history of government regulation of corporations

and labor unions in the context of federal elections.

In this case, the facts tell the story. The record convincingly demonstrates that

corporations and labor unions use general treasury funds to influence federal elections in

direct violation of years of federal policy. I am not convinced that Congress is powerless to

act to channel the corporate and labor union presence in federal elections through PACs

where disclosure is present and where contributors are aligned with the political message of

the corporation or labor union. The express advocacy test, in my view, is not a constitutional

requirement; what is required is an objective, bright-line rule that constitutionally

distinguishes between issue advocacy and advocacy intended to influence a federal election.

With the primary definition of electioneering communication, Congress fashioned a

test that includes all of the major characteristics of issue advertising designed to influence

a federal election: broadcast advertisements, aired in close proximity to a federal election,
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referring to a federal candidate, and targeted to that candidate’s electorate. In Congress’s

judgment, these advertisements influence federal elections in the overwhelming majority of

cases, despite Plaintiffs’ self-serving testimony in this case which, in many instances, is

belied by prior written statements and documentary evidence. In this facial challenge, on the

basis of the record assembled, and on the basis of the longstanding history of congressional

regulation of corporate and labor union involvement with federal elections, I find that

Congress’s decision to prohibit corporate and labor union spending on electioneering

communications with general treasury funds is one that meets the standard of strict scrutiny.

By enacting Title II, Congress recognized the paramount importance of having

legislation that controls electioneering communication and of preventing corporations and

labor unions from using general treasury funds to influence federal elections. After

reviewing the law under strict scrutiny review, I have found the primary definition of

electioneering communication constitutional. Given the importance of this issue to

Congress–as demonstrated by their enacting a backup definition to ensure that

electioneering communications would be regulated even in the event the primary definition

is found unconstitutional–I join, in the alternative, Judge Leon’s opinion regarding the

constitutionality of the backup definition of electioneering communication. Nevertheless,

as my opinion makes plain, I strongly believe that the primary definition is fully consistent

with the Constitution, and but for the position of the other judge’s on this three-judge District

Court, would not reach the backup definition.
477

Section 213

The only remaining provision of Title II that has not been addressed in my opinion or

the per curiam opinion, is Section 213 of BCRA. For the reasons stated in Judge Leon’s

opinion, I agree that Section 213 is unconstitutional. While the record is replete with

evidence related to the close nexus between parties and candidates in the fundraising process,

there is no evidence to demonstrate that a political party’s expenditures after nominating its

candidate are always coordinated. See 148 Cong. Rec. S2144 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 2002)

(statement of Sen. John McCain) (“We believe that once a candidate has been nominated a

party cannot coordinate with a candidate and be independent in the same election

campaign.”). Colorado I disproves this notion, and Defendants have put forward no

additional evidence to demonstrate that there are any special corruption problems with having

political parties make independent expenditures on behalf of their candidates. Colorado I,

518 U.S. at 618 (“The Government does not point to record evidence or legislative findings

suggesting any special corruption problem in respect to independent party expenditures.”).

Given the record in this case, I must concur with Judge Leon in finding Section 213

unconstitutional.
145 In regard to Title I, the Thompson Plaintiffs, in their briefing, initially presented

only an equal protection argument. Thompson Br. at vii; Thompson Opp’n at 1. I concur

entirely in Judge Henderson’s discussion of the Thompson Plaintiffs’ equal protection claim.

Henderson Op. at Part IV.D.4. To the extent the Thompson Plaintiffs have attempted to

argue a First Amendment claim, the tenor of their argument is that candidates from

economically disadvantaged areas need to be able to raise soft money to be competitive.

Thompson Reply at 7. First, candidates have never been able to directly raise or spend soft

money, so to the extent the Thompson Plaintiffs claim they are deprived of an effective tool

of financing, it only further convinces me of the extent to which federal candidates have

become dependent on nonfederal funds. Second, the Thompson Plaintiffs’ argument is

essentially a policy-based argument, better suited for the legislature than this three-judge

District Court panel. It has long been held that Congress has broad authority to set

contribution limitation amounts. See, e.g., Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC

(“Shrink Missouri”), 528 U.S. 377, 395-97 (2000). Finally, to the extent it is possible, I

subsume the Thompson Plaintiffs’ general First Amendment claims into the rest of my

discussion on the First Amendment.

146 Plaintiffs take a scattershot approach in regard to their Title I arguments, and

although I have considered all of their arguments, in the interest of both space and time, I

address only the ones I have determined are the most salient. The arguments not addressed

specifically lack merit.

478

II. TITLE I: REDUCTION OF SPECIAL INTEREST INFLUENCE

Section 101: Soft Money of Political Parties

The McConnell, RNC, CDP, and Thompson145 Plaintiffs all present a variety of

constitutional challenges to Title I of BCRA, premised on the First, Fifth, and Tenth

Amendments of the Constitution. After reviewing the record in this case, the governing

caselaw, and the parties’ lengthy briefing, I find that Plaintiffs’ arguments lack merit and that

Title I of BCRA is constitutional.146

 For well over two decades, the Commission has sought to regulate the use of

nonfederal funds by permitting the national, state, and local political party committees to
479

allocate expenses on “nonfederal” activities between their federal and nonfederal accounts.

The vast record in this case demonstrates that this system–a cobbled-together aggregation of

FEC regulations and advisory opinions–is in utter disarray with all of the different political

party units spending nonfederal money to influence federal elections. Congress was correct

in finding that in many instances, the allocation regime was a failure. The only way to return

the system to the original design of FECA was to prevent the national party committees from

raising money outside of the restrictions in FECA and to restrict the use of nonfederal funds

by the state and local party committees for “Federal election activity.” Seen from this

perspective, Title I is not a draconian realignment of the role of political parties. See, e.g.,

RNC Br. at 42. Rather, Title I operates as a fundraising restriction aimed at restructuring the

failed allocation regime that has produced a campaign finance system so riddled with

loopholes as to be rendered ineffective. Concomitantly, BCRA restores in large measure, the

federal campaign finance structure that had functioned effectively prior to the rise of

seductive “soft money.”

In other words, Congress created Title I of BCRA to fix the contribution limitations

of FECA that have fallen into severe disrepair, largely as a result of these aforementioned

regulations and advisory opinions. Title I accomplishes this goal by requiring the national

committees of the political parties to fund their operations with federally regulated money.

Equally important, the law also compels the state and local committees of the national

political parties to fund their Federal election activities with money raised in compliance with
480

federal law. Other provisions in Title I are designed to ensure the integrity of Title I, by

including restrictions on the ability of the committees of the national parties and their agents

to raise money for certain tax-exempt organizations and by placing limitations on federal and

state candidates in regard to certain campaign and fundraising activities. At the same time,

BCRA raises the limitations on “hard money” contributions to the national, state, and local

party committees to facilitate raising funds within this new statutory framework.

When stripped of Plaintiffs’ gloss, it becomes evident that Title I basically operates

as a contribution limitation on political party fundraising, amply supported by prior Supreme

Court caselaw and the immense record in this case. Given the sufficiently important

governmental interests long identified by the Supreme Court to support the contribution

restrictions like those at issue in Title I, Congress rightfully concluded that the only way to

combat the problems related to the abusive use of nonfederal funds was to: (a) limit the

funding of national committees of the political parties to money regulated by the federal

government, and (b) enact a series of limited, ancillary, prophylactic measuresinvolving state

and local committees and candidates to ensure the integrity of the national committee

nonfederal funds prohibition. In my judgment, Title I is constitutional.

My opinion presents a concurrence in part and a dissent in part. I concur with Judge

Leon’s view that in undertaking a First Amendment analysis of Title I, the relevant standard

of review is the scrutiny that the Buckley Court applied to contribution restrictions, that the

limitation in Section 323(b) on state parties’ activities described in Section 301(20)(A)(iii)
481

is constitutional, and that the restrictions on state candidates in Section 323(f) is

constitutional. I also concur in the judgment of Judge Henderson that Section 323(e) is

constitutional. My opinion begins with a brief discussion of the rise of nonfederal money as

a tool of national party financing for federal election purposes. Given that the conclusions

reached by Judge Henderson and Judge Leon turn primarily on Plaintiffs’ First Amendment

challenges, I next discuss those arguments, and provide the reasoning for my dissent on the

remaining issues. Finally, I provide my reasons for rejecting Plaintiffs’ Fifth Amendment

arguments and for finding that Plaintiffs lack standing to assert a challenge under the Tenth

Amendment to Title I.

A. Background: The Rise of Nonfederal Money as a Means of Financing

Federal Elections

As discussed at length in the per curiam opinion, Title I was enacted by Congress to

combat the growing problem of the national committees of the political parties raising funds

outside of the source and amount restrictions in FECA and using that money to influence

federal elections. In creating Title I, Congress attempted to shore-up the decades-old

contribution restrictions in FECA, which had been eroded as a result of a series of FEC

rulemaking and advisory opinions which established an allocation system. To accomplish

this goal, Congress eschewed the failed system of allocation percentages and prohibited

national political party committees from raising money that is not subject to federal source

and amount limitations.

The 1974 Amendments to FECA placed limitations on the source and the amount of
147 Under BCRA, the contribution limits have been raised. BCRA § 307(a); FECA

§ 315(a)(1); 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1)(A)-(B) (increasing limit on contributions to candidates

and candidates’ committees from $1,000 to $2,000 for individuals, and increasing the limit

on individual contributions to national political party committees from $20,000 to $25,000);

BCRA § 102; FECA § 315(a)(1); 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1)(D) (increasing limit on contributions

to state political party committees from $5,000 to $10,000); BCRA § 307(b); FECA §

315(a)(3); 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(3) (increasing aggregate limit on individual contributions from

$25,000 per year to $95,000 per two-year election cycle, of which $37,500 may be

contributed to candidates); BCRA § 307(c); FECA § 315(h); 2 U.S.C. § 441a(h) (increasing

limit on contributions by the Republican or Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committees

from $17,500 to $35,000). Moreover, many of these contribution limits are to be increased

annually to account for inflation as reflected in changes to the consumer price index. BCRA

§ 307(d); FECA § 315(c); 2 U.S.C. § 441a(c).

482

contributions to federal candidates and political parties. The law prohibited corporations and

labor unions from making contributions to political parties and federal candidates. 2 U.S.C.

§ 441b(a). FECA also limited an individual’s contributions to $1,000 per election to a

federal candidate, $20,000 per year to national political party committees, and $5,000 per

year to any other political committee such as a political action committee (“PAC”) or a state

party committee. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1). Individuals were likewise subject to an overall

annual limitation of $25,000 in total contributions. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(3).147 These

limitations have been consistently upheld by the Supreme Court. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 23-38;

NRWC, 459 U.S. at 207-10. The definitions of contribution and expenditure in FECA were

then, and remain now, limited to the donation or use of money or anything of value “for the

purpose of influencing an election for Federal office.” 2 U.S.C. § 431(8)(A)(i), (9)(A)(i).

The statute was therefore silent on how to draw lines around money raised outside of FECA’s

source and amount limitations for political parties to spend on activities that were expected
483

not to be used for the purpose of influencing a federal election.

As has been set out in much greater detail in the per curiam opinion, the FEC’s

opinions and rulemakings drew that line by permitting state and national political party

committees to pay for the nonfederal portion of their administrative costs and voter

registration and turnout programs with monies raised under relevant state laws (not FECA),

even if they permitted contributions from sources such as corporations and labor unions that

were prohibited under FECA. As a result, national and state political parties began to raise

so-called “soft money,” which described these nonfederal funds–not subject to FECA limits

and restrictions–to pay for a share of election-related activities that influenced federal

elections. Generally, the state political parties’ allocation rate was substantially lower than

the national party allocation rate. The rules, therefore, furnished national political parties

with an incentive to channel many of these expenditures through state political party

committees, since this approach allowed a higher proportion of the parties’ expenses to be

paid for with nonfederal funds which were much easier to raise than those funds raised

subject to FECA’s restrictions.

During the 1980 election cycle, the RNC spent approximately $15 million in

nonfederal funds and the DNC spent roughly $4 million, constituting nine percent of the

national political parties’ total spending. Findings ¶ 1.3. In 1984, the national political

parties spent, collectively, approximately $21.6 million in nonfederalfunds, which accounted

for five percent of their total spending. Id. By 1988, national party nonfederal funds
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increased to $45 million or eleven percent of national party spending. Id. In 1992,

nonfederal fundraising by the national parties reached $86.1 million, and nonfederal funds

were used for sixteen percent of the national parties’ spending. Id. ¶ 1.4, 1.4.1. With the

1996 election cycle, the national parties raised $263.5 million in nonfederal funds and

nonfederal money spending constituted approximately thirty percent of the national party

committees’ total spending. Id. 

The uncontroverted record demonstrates that in 1996 the dramatic rise in spending of

nonfederal funds by national political parties was tied to the development of issue advocacy

media campaigns. Originated by President William Clinton’s political consultant Dick

Morris, the move was eventually copied by the Republican Party. Id. ¶¶ 1.6, 1.7. Morris

used nonfederal funds to pay for advertisements that either promoted President Clinton by

name or criticized his opponent by name, while avoiding words that expressly advocated

either candidate’s election or defeat. Id. 1.6. While these advertisements prominently

featured the President, none of the costs associated with these advertisements were charged

as coordinated expenditures on behalf of President Clinton’s campaign, subject to the

FECA’s contribution limits. Id. Rather, the political party paid the entire cost, with a mix of

federal and nonfederal funds, arguing that political party communications that did not use

explicit words advocating the election or defeat of a federal candidate could be treated like

generic party advertising (that is, “Vote Republican!”) and financed, according to the FEC
148 As discussed in the per curiam opinion, the FEC had ruled that party committees

could sponsor issue advocacy advertisements that did not feature a federal candidate and pay

for these advertisements with a combination of hard and soft dollars as permitted under the

allocation regulations. Federal Election Commission Advisory Opinion 1995-25 (discussing

that allocation rules were permissible to allocate funding for “RNC plans to produce and air

media advertisements on a series of legislative proposals being considered by the U.S.

Congress, such as the balanced budget debate and welfare reform”).

485

allocation rules, with a mix of federal and nonfederal funds.148

 Id. In many cases, the

national political party committees used the state political party committees as vehicles for

implementing the issue advocacy campaign because the allocation rules were much more

favorable for state parties, and consequently, the advertisements could be financed with

nonfederal funds. See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 1.26.1, 1.26.2, 1.26.6. This approach later spread to

Congressional campaigns. Id. ¶ 1.8.

Political parties were now able to pay for such “issue advertisements” with a mix of

federal and nonfederal funds because the FEC treated these advertisements as “generic” party

advertisements. In order to fund these “generic” party advertisements or “issue

advertisements,” the political parties needed to raise an increasing amount of nonfederal

money. With this strategy firmly in place, the national political parties spent $221 million

in nonfederal funds on the 1998 midterm elections, or 34 percent of their total spending,

which was more than double the amount of nonfederal funds spent during the previous

midterm elections. Id. ¶ 1.4.2. With the 2000 elections, spending of nonfederal funds by the

national political parties reached $498 million, which was now 42 percent of their total

spending. Id. 1.4.3. The top 50 non-federal fund donors during the 2000 election cycle each
486

contributed between $955,695 and $5,949,000. Id. During the first 18 months of the 2001-

2002 election cycle, the political parties reported non-federal receipts of $308.2 million,

which is a 21 percent increase over the same period during the 1999-2000 cycle. Id. ¶ 1.4.4.

The FEC notes that this increase is “all the more significant given that typically parties raise

more in Presidential campaign cycles than in non-presidential campaigns.” Id.

It was in response to its view that the use of “soft money” was a problem that

Congress enacted Title I of BCRA. See, e.g., Investigation of Illegal or Improper Activities

in Connection with 1996 Federal Election Campaigns, S. Rep. No. 105-167, at 4468 (1998)

(“Thompson Committee Report”) at 4468 (majority report) (“soft money spending by

political party committees eviscerates the ability of FECA to limit the funds contributed by

individuals, corporations, or unions for the defeat or benefit of specific candidates”); id. at

4565 (minority report) (“Together, the soft-money and issue advocacy loopholes have

eviscerated the contribution limits and disclosure requirements in federal election laws and

caused a loss of public confidence in the integrity of our campaign finance system.”). The

original design of the FEC’s rules on allocation were to permit the political parties the

opportunity to raise nonfederal funds for purposes unrelated to federal elections. The parties

were permitted to pay for the nonfederal portion of their expenses with nonfederal funds.

Over time, however, what started out as a fairly simplistic approach to cost allocation

(nonfederal portions of administrative and get-out-the-vote (“GOTV”) activities could be

paid for with nonfederal funds), turned into a gaping loophole, which permitted the national
487

political parties to raise enormous sums of money to spend on federal elections–all outside

FECA’s source and amount limitations. In essence, the actions by the political parties at all

levels disproved the assumption that voter registration activity, voter identification, generic

campaign activity, and get-out-the-vote activity in relation to a federal election could be

allocated between nonfederal and federal accounts without inviting the political parties to

circumvent FECA’s carefully constructed contribution system and without creating anew the

same problems of corruption identified in Buckley involving unlimited individual

contributions. The parties’ actions confirmed the Supreme Court’s observation in Colorado

II, that “[d]espite years of enforcement of the challenged limits, substantial evidence

demonstrates how candidates, donors, and parties test the limits of the current law . . . .”

Colorado II, 533 U.S. at 457 (emphasis added). 

Prior to BCRA, the contribution regime carefully constructed in FECA, and upheld

in Buckley, had become nothing more than an elaborate fiction with the national political

parties and their state counterparts circumventing the restrictions with ease. Prior to BCRA,

federal candidates and officeholders, in conjunction with their political party committees,

raised large amounts of nonfederal money for purposes directly related to federal elections.

Beginning with issue advocacy strategy employed for the election campaign of President

William Clinton in 1996, the system took a turn for the worse as the political parties

scrambled to collect as much “soft money” as possible to fund “issue advertisements” that

were nothing short of campaign commercials in disguise. While loudly complaining about
149 I consider Plaintiffs’ First Amendment underbreadth challenge as part of my

analysis of their Equal Protection challenge, discussed infra. 

488

the other side’s tactics, neither side was willing to unilaterally disarm, and the pressure to

raise more and more money outside the system became increasingly intense, as the political

party committee receipts clearly demonstrate. In the face of what can only be described as

FEC lassitude to these problems, the political branches, after years of deliberation and

consensus, passed Title I to tackle the threat posed by nonfederal funds. Having set forth

these preliminary observations to provide context for my opinion, I now turn to Plaintiffs’

various constitutional challenges to Title I and explain why I have concluded that these

arguments lack merit. In engaging in the following analysis, I shall discuss the extensive

record established in this case, which demonstrates that Title I is a prophylactic measure

aimed both at the corruption or the appearance of corruption associated with nonfederal

funds and at the evasion of FECA’s source and amount limitations.

B. Plaintiffs’ First Amendment Challenges149

1. Standard of Review

Unlike the electioneering communication provisions in Title II, the litigants contest

the level of scrutiny that should control the Court’s review of Title I for First Amendment

purposes. Plaintiffs contend that the restrictions in Title I merit review under the lens of

strict scrutiny, see, e.g., McConnell Br. at 31-34; RNC Br. at 37-44, while Defendants argue

that the provisions in Title I should be analyzed under the “closely drawn” scrutiny that the

Buckley Court applied to contribution restrictions, see, e.g., Def. Opp’n at 3-4; Def.-Int.
489

Opp’n at 17-23. In my judgment, Title I is a fundraising restriction that merits review

entirely under Buckley’s “closely drawn” scrutiny applicable for contribution limitations.

Plaintiffs are mistaken when they argue that the restrictions in Title I partly impose

an expenditure cap and, therefore, Title I requires strict scrutiny. McConnell Br. at 33; RNC

Br. 51-53. Title I does not in any way limit political party committee spending on any

activity. These restrictions only indirectly affect expenditures by placing limitations on the

source and amount of funds available for the party committees to use in order to make

independent expenditures. Accordingly, the scrutiny applicable to contribution restrictions

is appropriate for Title I.

Plaintiffs also urge this three-judge panel to apply strict scrutiny because Title I

includes restrictions on the solicitation of nonfederal funds. I disagree with this theory as

well. From a functional perspective,Title I presents a comprehensive contribution restriction

that merits the scrutiny that Buckley applied to contribution restrictions. The Supreme Court

in Colorado II, found that FECA presents “a functional, not formal, definition of

‘contribution,’” because it included within the definition of contribution “coordinated

expenditures.” Colorado II, 533 U.S. at 438. According to the Supreme Court in Colorado

II, the Buckley Court acknowledged Congress’s functional classification, and “observed that

treating coordinated expenditures as contributions ‘prevent[s] attempts to circumvent the Act

through prearranged or coordinated expenditures amounting to disguised contributions.’”

Colorado II, 533 U.S. at 443 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 47) (also noting that Buckley
490

“enhanced the significance of this functional treatment by striking down independent

expenditure limits on First Amendment grounds while upholding limitations on contributions

(by individuals and nonparty groups), as defined to include coordinated expenditures”).

A functional view of BCRA’s solicitation restrictions demonstrates that they are

designed to counter potential evasion of contribution restrictions. As is discussed infra, the

record in this case is replete with incidents where the solicitation of nonfederal donations by

party officials and candidates threatens the integrity of FECA’s contribution restrictions.

Hence, like the expenditure limitations discussed in Colorado II, which are aimed at

preventing attempts to circumvent FECA’s contribution regime, BCRA’s solicitation

provisions are also designed to ensure the integrity of FECA’s contribution limitations and

not limit speech. Title I in its entirety, therefore, is properly considered within Buckley’s

contribution framework and is reviewed under the scrutiny set out in Buckley applicable to

contribution restrictions. See also NRWC, 459 U.S. at 210-11 (upholding restriction limiting

a corporation’s solicitation of contributions to corporation’s PAC to members of the

corporation on the basis of compelling governmental interests supporting the overall ban on

corporate contributions to candidates). 

Accordingly, I agree entirely with Judge Leon’s discussion in his opinion that the

three-judge District Court’s analysis of the provisions in Title I merits review under the

“closely” drawn scrutiny that the Buckley Court applied to contribution limitations and not

strict scrutiny, and I concur in that portion of his opinion. We both agree that the restrictions
150 Like Judge Leon, I observe that if the contribution limitations in Title I survive a

claim that it infringes associational rights, then it also survives a speech challenge under the

First Amendment. Shrink Missouri, 528 U.S. at 388; see also id. at n.3 (observing that

contribution standard of review likewise addresses the “correlative overbreadth challenge”).

151 I also do not conclude that Buckley’s contribution-expenditure dichotomy is

irrelevant to our review. McConnell Br. at 33 (stating that the “contributions-versusexpenditures dichotomy of Buckley does not directly apply”). Plaintiffs assert that the reason

for not applying Buckley is because Title I “effectively regulates the uses for which money

is raised and spent.” McConnell Br. at 33 (emphasis in original). The problem with this

argument is that all contribution limitations “effectively regulate” the uses for which money

is raised and spent. See Tr. at 92 (“All contribution limits have [an] indirect effect on

expenditures.”) (Bader). Accordingly, this argument fails to convince me that the

contribution-expenditure distinction is inapplicable to the restrictions at issue in Title I.

491

will be upheld in Title I, if the Government demonstrates that the provisions in Title I are

“closely drawn” to match a “sufficiently important interest.” Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25; see

also Shrink Missouri, 528 U.S. at 387-88.150 With that standard in mind, I now turn to the

sections of Title I and my analysis of whether these contribution restrictions are

constitutional.151

2. Title I is Constitutional Under the First Amendment

In my judgment, this three-judge District Court need not go further than Buckley to

uphold Title I from attack under the First Amendment. It is clear that Buckley provides

sufficient flexibility for Congress to have enacted Title I in order to address the problems

associated with political parties using nonfederal funds to influence federal elections. See

Shrink Missouri, 528 U.S. at 404 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“Buckley’s holding seems to leave

the political branches broad authority to enact laws regulating contributions that take the

form of ‘soft money.’”). The primary justifications for Title I are neither original nor
152 See NCPAC, 470 U.S. 480, 496-97 (1985) (observing that Buckley and Citizens

Against Rent Control held that these rationales “are the only legitimate and compelling

government interests thus far identified for restricting campaign finances”).

492

unprecedented. 

(a) Title I Serves The Same Sufficiently Important Interests

Identified in Buckley and its Progeny

Title I was enacted to fulfill the same interests in “preventing corruption or the

appearance of corruption” that the Buckley Court had found to support FECA’s limitations

on contributions.152 The Buckley Court held that FECA’s contribution limitations served the

sufficiently important interests of “the prevention of corruption and the appearance of

corruption spawned by the real or imagined coercive influence of large financial

contributions on candidates’ positions and on their actions if elected to office.” Buckley, 424

U.S. at 25 (emphasis added). Moreover, under the rubric of “preventing corruption or the

appearance of corruption,” the Supreme Court has also permitted Congress to enact

contribution limitations that serve to “prevent evasion” of the individual financial

contribution limitations already found constitutional by the Supreme Court. Id. at 38; see

also Colorado II, 533 U.S. at 456 (observing that “all members of the [Supreme] Court agree

that circumvention is a valid theory of corruption.”). 

Since Buckley, the Supreme Court has consistently reaffirmed the notion of

Congress’s ability to create reasonable contribution restrictions to stem the tide of corruption

and the appearance of corruption that exists in a regime of private candidate financing. See

Citizens Against Rent Control/Coalition for Fair Housing v. Berkeley (“Citizens Against Rent
493

Control”), 454 U.S. 290, 296-97 (1981) (“Buckley identified a single narrow exception to the

rule that limits on political activity were contrary to the First Amendment. The exception

relates to the perception of undue influence of large contributors to a candidate . . . . ”);

California Med. Ass’n. v. FEC, (“California Med. Ass’n.”) 453 U.S. 182, 194-195 (1981)

(noting that Buckley held that contribution limits “served the important governmental

interests in preventing the corruption or appearance of corruption of the political process that

might result if such contributions were not restrained”); see also Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 788

n.26 (“The overriding concern behind the enactment of statutes such as the Federal Corrupt

Practices Act was the problem of corruption of elected representatives through the creation

of political debts. The importance of the governmental interest in preventing this occurrence

has never been doubted.”) (internal citation omitted). Hence, the interests behind the

restrictions on political party nonfederal funds have long had support in the Supreme Court’s

campaign finance jurisprudence.

In this case, Congress concluded that donations of nonfederal money to the political

party committees had the same “coercive influence” on “candidates’ positions and on their

actions if elected to office” as the large contributions to candidates permitted prior to the

enactment of the individual contribution limitations in 1974. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25.

Congress also concluded that the individual contribution limitations were being circumvented

by political party committees at all levels who raised nonfederal funds and then spent those

funds for federal election purposes.
494

In advancing these long upheld rationales to support the provisions in Title I of

BCRA, I find that the evidence presented by Defendants to support these justifications is

more than sufficient. As the Supreme Court observed in Shrink Missouri: “The quantum of

empirical evidence needed to satisfy heightened judicial scrutiny of legislative judgments

will vary up or down with the novelty and plausibility of the justification raised.” Shrink

Missouri, 528 U.S. at 391. Given the Supreme Court’s discussion of contribution restrictions

beginning with Buckley, I find that Defendants do not break from well-established precedent

in offering support for Title I because Buckley has already established that Congress may

legislate: (a) to prevent corruption or the appearance of corruption inherent in the process

of raising large monetary contributions; and (b) to prevent circumvention of the valid

contribution limitations. As I demonstrate infra, the record before this three-judge District

Court is overwhelming and amply supports both of the asserted rationales. With the

foregoing in mind, I shall now briefly describe these interests and the evidence supporting

them.

(i) The Buckley Court’s Explanation of “Prevention of

Corruption”

Given that there is such disagreement in the briefing as to what the Supreme Court

meant by “prevention of corruption,” it is important to take stock of how the Buckley Court

used that phrase and the evidence it relied on to find that Congress was justified in enacting

FECA’s contribution restrictions. As the Supreme Court in Buckley held:

It is unnecessary to look beyond the Act’s primary purpose to limit the
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actuality and appearance of corruption resulting from large individual financial

contributions in order to find a constitutionally sufficient justification for the

$1,000 contribution limitation. Under a system of private financing of

elections, a candidate lacking immense personal or family wealth must depend

on financial contributions from others to provide the resources necessary to

conduct a successful campaign. The increasing importance of the

communications media and sophisticated mass-mailing and polling operations

to effective campaigning make the raising of large sums of money an ever

more essential ingredient of an effective candidacy. To the extent that large

contributions are given to secure a political quid pro quo from current and

potential office holders, the integrity of our system of representative

democracy is undermined. Although the scope of such pernicious practices

can never be reliably ascertained, the deeply disturbing examples surfacing

after the 1972 election demonstrate that the problem is not an illusory one.

Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26-27 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). As this passage illustrates,

the Buckley Court understood “corruption” as something intrinsic to the fundraising process

of large contributions in a “system of private financing of elections.” Id. at 26. The Supreme

Court’s rationale was grounded in the realistic and pragmatic understanding that “large

contributions are given to secure a political quid pro quo;” Id. at 26; see also id. at 27

(referring to “political quid pro quo” as the “danger of actual quid pro quo arrangements”)

(emphasis added). Indeed, in introducing the primary interest behind the individual

contribution limitations, the Supreme Court stated that the primary interest in FECA’s

contribution limitations “is the prevention of corruption and the appearance of corruption

spawned by the real or imagined coercive influence of large financial contributions on

candidates’ positions and on their actions if elected to office.” Id. at 25 (emphasis added).

Simply put, Buckley equates corruption with the fundraising process where access to elected
153 Given Buckley’s teaching on constitutional analysis of contribution restrictions, I

cannot agree with Judge Leon’s theory that a reviewing court should focus its analysis on

whether the use for which a contribution is put is corrupting. See generally Leon Op.

Buckley and its progeny all instruct that the fundraising process is the focal point of the

contribution restriction analysis, as my discussion in this section illustrates.

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officials and candidates is provided in exchange for large contributions.153

This point is underscored by the evidence relied on in the Buckley opinion to support

the Supreme Court’s discussion of the government’s interest in preventing corruption. See

id. at 27 n.28 (citing evidence from the Court of Appeals opinion in Buckley that relates to

access provided to donors who contribute large sums of money). That the Buckley Court

referred to the record from the Court of Appeals opinion deserves repeating here because it

demonstrates that in upholding the individual contribution limitations in FECA, the

“corruption” that concerned the Buckley Court was the access to federal candidates that large

contributors receive. As the Court of Appeals found:

Looming large in the perception of the public and Congressmen was the

revelation concerning the extensive contributions by dairy organizations to

Nixon fund raisers, in order to gain a meeting with White House officials on

price supports. The industry pledged $2,000,000 to the 1972 campaign, a

pledge known to various White House officials, with President Nixon

informed directly by Charles Colson in September 1970, as acknowledged by

the 1974 White House paper. 

Since the milk producers, on legal advice, worked on a $2500 limit per

committee, they evolved a procedure, after consultation in November 1970

with Nixon fund raisers, to break down the $2 million into numerous smaller

contributions to hundreds of committees in various states which could then

hold the money for the President’s reelection campaign, so as to permit the

producers to meet independent reporting requirements without disclosure. 

On March 23, 1971, after a meeting with dairy organization representatives,

President Nixon decided to overrule the decision of the Secretary of
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Agriculture and to increase price supports. In the meetings and calls that

immediately followed the internal White House discussion and preceded the

public announcement two days later, culminating in a meeting held by Herbert

Kalmbach at the direction of John Ehrlichman, the dairymen were informed

of the likelihood of an imminent increase and of the desire that they reaffirm

their $2 million pledge. 

It is not material, for present purposes, to review the extended discussion in

the Final Report on the controverted issue of whether the President’s decision

was in fact, or was represented to be, conditioned upon or “linked” to the

reaffirmation of the pledge.

Buckley, 519 F.2d at 839 n.36 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted) (cited in Buckley,

424 U.S. at 27 n.28). The Circuit Court in Buckley, as affirmed by the Supreme Court, found

that it was unnecessary to review the disputed issue of whether President Nixon’s decision

on price supports was actually changed by the $2,000,000 contribution. Instead, the Supreme

Court found it sufficient that the dairy farmers were given access to the President and his

officials in exchange for a sizable contribution. The corruption, thus, was associated with

the fact that the donation was given “in order to gain a meeting with White House officials

on price supports.” Id.

This conclusion is further borne out by other evidence discussed in the Court of

Appeals opinion and cited by the Supreme Court:

The findings document lavish contributions by groups or individuals with

special interests to legislators from both parties, e.g., by the American Dental

Association to incumbent Congressmen in California; by H. Ross Perot, whose

company supplies data processing for medicare and medicaid programs, to

members of the House Ways and Means and Senate Finance Committees, and

the House Appropriations Subcommittee for HEW.

The disclosures of illegal corporate contributions in 1972 included the

testimony of executives that they were motivated by the perception that this
154 The evidence in the Court of Appeals opinion relating to giving ambassadorships

in exchange for large donations discusses the conviction of one fundraiser under 18 U.S.C.

§ 600 for having promised a current Ambassador a more prestigious post in return for a

$100,000 contribution to be split between Senate candidates designated by the White House

and the 1972 campaign. Buckley, 519 F.2d at 840 n.38. Notably, the conviction did not

involve a federal candidate or officeholder and therefore does not stand for the premise that,

in citing this evidence, the Supreme Court requires evidence of bribery to support a

contribution restriction. The point was only made to demonstrate that “while the

appointment of large contributors [to ambassadorships] is not novel,” id., the activity

surrounding ambassadorships and the 1972 election “made the 1972 election a watershed for

public confidence in the electoral system,” id. at 840; see also id. at 839 n.36 (declining to

rely on evidence that a large contribution was connected to the decision-making of the

federal official).

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was necessary as a “calling card, something that would get us in the door and

make our point of view heard,” or “in response to pressure for fear of a

competitive disadvantage that might result.”

The record before Congress was replete with specific examples of improper

attempts to obtain governmental favor in return for large campaign

contributions.

Buckley, 519 F.2d at 839 n.37 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted) (cited in Buckley,

424 U.S. at 27); see also id. n.38 (discussing evidence relating to large contributions given

in exchange for ambassadorships).154 The Buckley Court, therefore, realized the problems

that inhere in a “system of private financing of elections,” where contributors who donate

large sums of money are given access to officeholders. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26. In making

this point, the Supreme Court eschewed relying on evidence that the contribution was

connected to the decision-making of the federal official, Buckley, 424 U.S. at 27 n.28 (citing

Buckley, 519 F.2d at 839 n.36) (finding such a question “not material”); rather, the provision

of a meeting in exchange for the contribution satisfied the Buckley Court. The Buckley Court

therefore equated corruption with the fundraising process and, in particular, the special
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access given to large contributors. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 30 (“Congress was justified in

concluding that the interest in safeguarding against the appearance of impropriety requires

that the opportunity for abuse inherent in the process of raising large monetary contributions

be eliminated.”) (emphasis added).

Given the Buckley Court’s understanding of corruption, it is not surprising that it

explicitly did not require evidence of bribery of federal officeholders and candidates to

support the contribution limitations in FECA. Id. at 27 (“Although the scope of such

pernicious practices can never be reliably ascertained, the deeply disturbing examples

surfacing after the 1972 election demonstrate that the problem is not an illusory one.”)

(emphasis added). In linking “corruption” with the fundraising process of large contributions

in a donor-financed system of elections and not on specific evidence of bribery, the Supreme

Court merely recognized the obvious: large contributions provide a “calling card” and can

help “obtain” government favors. Buckley, 519 F.2d at 839 n.37 (cited by Buckley, 424 U.S.

at 27 n.28). Contribution limitations served to “prevent corruption” by removing the

“coercive influence” that large contributions have when “given to secure a political quid pro

quo” from elected officials or candidates. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25, 26 (emphasis added). In

fact, implicit in Buckley’s rejection of the argument that bribery laws constituted a less

restrictive alternative than FECA’s contribution limitations was a recognition that the threat

addressed by bribery laws “deal[s] with only the most blatant and specific attempts of those

with money to influence governmental action.” Id. at 28; see also id. at 30 (“Not only is it
155 I therefore cannot agree with Judge Henderson, who states that the Supreme Court

“has not settled on a precise definition of ‘corruption.’” Henderson Op. at Part IV.A n.148.

To reach this proposition, Judge Henderson contrasts this quotation from the Shrink Missouri

(continued...)

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difficult to isolate suspect contributions, but, more importantly, Congress was justified in

concluding that the interest in safeguarding against the appearance of impropriety requires

that the opportunity for abuse inherent in the process of raising large monetary contributions

be eliminated.”).

Hence, it was very clear that in discussing corruption the Buckley Court concluded

that bribery laws were not simply enough and that contribution restrictions were targeted at

reducing the “coercive influence” of large monetary contributions on the political process.

Id. at 25; see also NCPAC, 470 U.S. at 497 (“Corruption is a subversion of the political

process. Elected officials are influenced to act contrary to their obligations of office by the

prospect of financial gain to themselves or infusions of money into their campaigns. The

hallmark of corruption is the financial quid pro quo: dollars for political favors.”) (emphasis

added). In sum, as the Shrink Missouri Court effectively articulated:

In speaking of “improper influence” and “opportunities for abuse” in addition

to “quid pro quo arrangements,” we recognized a concern not confined to

bribery of public officials, but extending to the broader threat from politicians

too compliant with the wishes of large contributors. These were the obvious

points behind our recognition that the Congress could constitutionally address

the power of money “to influence governmental action” in ways less “blatant

and specific” than bribery.

Shrink Missouri, 528 U.S. at 389 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 28) (emphasis added). This

statement, in a nutshell, is what Buckley meant by “corruption.”155
155(...continued)

majority opinion with JusticeThomas’ dissent in that case and the Supreme Court’s statement

in NCPAC that “[t]he hallmark of corruption is the financial quid pro quo: dollars for

political favors.” NCPAC, 470 U.S. at 497. Judge Henderson’s footnote does not cite

Buckley or even discuss its text in reaching this conclusion. As I have endeavored to explain

at length in this section of my opinion, Buckley has clearly provided guidance as to what the

Supreme Court meant by “corruption.” See also Colorado II, 533 U.S. at 441 (defining

“corruption [as] being understood not only as quid pro quo agreements, but also as undue

influence on an officeholder’s judgment, and the appearance of such influence”). 

Also on this point, I observe that although Judge Leon recognizes that corruption

involves “something more than a quid pro quo arrangement . . . as well as improper influence

or conduct by a donor that results in a legislator who is too compliant with the donor, Leon

Op. at Part I.A.3 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted), Judge Leon–while stating

the definition of corruption correctly–refers to corruption in his opinion as something

resembling the characteristics of bribery, id. (“whether the corruption is actual or perceived,

every traditional and accepted definition to date depends on the donor conferring, or being

perceived as having conferred a benefit on the candidate in return for something”) (citing and

quoting to Black’s Law Dictionary’s definition of “quid pro quo”). Thus, while Judge Leon

and I apparently agree on the definition of corruption as defined by the Supreme Court, I

cannot agree with the way Judge Leon employs his definition of corruption throughout his

opinion as something akin to bribery. See id. at Part I.B.2 (“there is no evidence in the record

of actual quid pro quo corruption”) (citing evidence that there is no evidence of vote buying

in the record). 

501

(ii) The Buckley Court’s Explanation of Prevention of the

“Appearance of Corruption”

Additionally, the Buckley Court observed that it was not only preferential access given

to large contributors through the fundraising process that was corrupting. The Supreme

Court also recognized that the public perception associated with a regime of large individual

contributions undermined faith in the government in the public at large. This concern was

another aspect of the corruption thesis that the Buckley Court found supported upholding the

individual limitations on contributions. As the Buckley Court states:

Of almost equal concern as the danger of actual quid pro quo arrangements is
502

the impact of the appearance of corruption stemming from public awareness

of the opportunities for abuse inherent in a regime of large individual financial

contributions. . . . Congress could legitimately conclude that the avoidance of

the appearance of improper influence “is also critical . . . if confidence in the

system of representative Government is not to be eroded to a disastrous

extent.”

Buckley, 424 U.S. at 27 (quoting Civil Service Comm’n v. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 565

(1973)) (emphasis added). Picking up on this discussion from Buckley, in Shrink Missouri,

the Supreme Court observed:

While neither law nor morals equate all political contributions, without more,

with bribes, we spoke in Buckley of the perception of corruption “inherent in

a regime of large individual financial contributions” to candidates for public

office, [Buckley, 424 U.S. at 27], as a source of concern “almost equal” to quid

pro quo improbity, ibid. The public interest in countering that perception was,

indeed, the entire answer to the overbreadth claim raised in the Buckley case.

Id. at 30. This made perfect sense. Leave the perception of impropriety

unanswered, and the cynical assumption that large donors call the tune could

jeopardize the willingness of voters to take part in democratic governance.

Democracy works “only if the people have faith in those who govern, and that

faith is bound to be shattered when high officials and their appointees engage

in activities which arouse suspicions of malfeasance and corruption.” United

States v. Mississippi Valley Generating Co., 364 U.S. 520, 562 (1961).

Shrink Missouri, 528 U.S. at 390. More recently, in Colorado II, the Supreme Court

observed that “corruption [was] understood not only as quid pro quo agreements, but also as

undue influence on an officeholder’s judgment, and the appearance of such influence.”

Colorado II, 533 U.S. at 441. 

Within the Buckley framework, it does not take too much imagination to realize the

appearance of corruption associated with nonfederal donations to political party committees,

particularly given that “Buckley demonstrates that the dangers of large, corrupt contributions
503

and the suspicion that large contributions are corrupt are neither novel nor implausible.”

Shrink Missouri, 528 U.S. at 391. In Buckley the evidence demonstrated that “corporations,

well-financed interest groups, and rich individuals had made large contributions . . . [which

was] more than sufficient to show why voters would tend to identify a big donation with a

corrupt purpose.” Id. at 391; see also Buckley, 519 F.2d at 838-40 (discussing “the trend

revealed by the polls” that demonstrated that in 1974, 69.9 percent of individuals found that

“the government is pretty much run by a few big interests looking out for themselves”). The

Buckley Court, therefore, understood the “appearance of corruption” as the public perception

that “large donors call the tune” that inherently exists in a donor financed election system that

permits large contributions.

(iii) Circumvention as a Valid Theory of Corruption

Aside from the corruption associated with the preferential access to officeholders that

large contributors receive through the fundraising process, and the public perception of

corruption inherent in a regime of large individual, financial contributions, the Supreme

Court recognized in Buckley that a circumvention of individual contribution limitations also

serves as a basis for justifying contribution restrictions. Prior to BCRA’s enactment, a donor

was limited to give $1,000 to a candidate and his or her authorized committee for any

election for Federal office. 2 U.S.C. § 441a. The same donor was limited to an aggregate

of $20,000 to the political committees established and maintained by a national political party

in any calendar year. In Buckley, the Supreme Court upheld FECA’s $25,000 limitation on
504

total contributions that an individual could make during any calendar year. In finding this

provision constitutional, the Court held that “this quite modest restraint upon protected

political activity serves to prevent evasion of the $1,000 contribution limitation by a person

who might otherwise contribute massive amounts of money to a particular candidate through

the use of . . . huge contributions to the candidate’s political party.” Buckley, 424 U.S. at

38 (emphasis added). 

In upholding the $25,000 total contribution limitation, under this “anti-circumvention”

theory, the Supreme Court did not engage in any separate constitutional balancing. In other

words, the Supreme Court never discussed whether the $25,000 limitation was “closely

drawn” to match a “sufficiently important interest.” Instead, in one paragraph, the Supreme

Court upheld the restriction on the premise that it was “no more than a corollary of the basic

individual contribution limitation” that the Supreme Court had already determined to be

constitutional. Id. at 38. Since Buckley, the “anti-circumvention” rationale has been upheld

by the Supreme Court and is a well-accepted theory for justifying congressional action in the

area of campaign finance. Colorado II, 533 U.S. at 456 (noting that “all members of the

[Supreme] Court agree that circumvention is a valid theory of corruption”); California Med.

Ass’n., 453 U.S. at 197-199 (plurality opinion) (upholding limitations on contributions to

nonparty multicandidate political committees under an anti-circumvention rationale). If the

provision in FECA limiting the total amount of contributions a donor could make was found

constitutional by the Buckley Court on the basis that it was designed to keep the individual
505

donor restrictions intact, it follows that the provisions in Title I–which are similarly designed

to prevent evasion of the individual contribution limits in FECA–are constitutional.

In Colorado II, the Supreme Court powerfully reaffirmed its commitment to the anticircumvention theory. Colorado II, 533 U.S. at 456-65. In Colorado II, the Supreme Court

upheld FECA’s limitations on coordinated expenditures by state political parties–a question

that it had remanded during the Colorado I litigation. Id. The Court observed in Colorado

II that “[s]ince there is no recent experience with unlimited coordinated spending, the

question is whether experience under the present law confirms a serious threat of abuse from

the unlimited coordinated party spending.” Id. at 457 (emphasis added). Put differently,

because unlimited coordinated expenditures had been prohibited since FECA, there was no

evidence of whether or not such a system was actually corrupting. The Supreme Court

concluded, however, that even though there was no evidence that unlimited coordinated

expenditures were corrupting, Congress was empowered to exercise its predictive judgment.

In the words of Defendant-Intervenors, Congress could preemptively act “to close loopholes

and to prevent evasion of the contribution restrictions and limits established in FECA, and

upheld in Buckley even in the absence of past abuses.” Def.-Int. Br. at 53. With no evidence

of present evasion, the Supreme Court in Colorado II found that “[d]espite years of

enforcement of the challenged limits, substantial evidence demonstrates how candidates,

donors, and parties test the limits of the current law, and it shows beyond serious doubt how

contribution limits would be eroded if inducement to circumvent them were enhanced by
156 Plaintiffs contend that in Colorado II, “the Court did not really apply an ‘anticircumvention’ rationale at all (despite some language in the Court’s opinion to the

contrary).” McConnell Opp’n at 23-24 (emphasis added). Plaintiffs’ contention is erroneous

given my reading of Colorado II.

506

declaring parties’ coordinated spending wide open.” Colorado II, 533 U.S. at 457 (emphasis

added).156

The anti-circumvention rationale articulated by the Colorado II Court clearly supports

the idea that Congress is entitled to exercise latitude in forming predictive judgments about

possible evasion and circumvention of the law and is able to act accordingly to prevent such

abuse. Circumvention of a current statutory regime or congressional prediction that

“evasion” will occur if a prophylactic rule is not adopted is consonant with the Buckley

Court’s understanding of corruption. The Buckley Court was concerned with the “real or

imagined coercive influence of large financial contributions on candidates’ positions and on

their actions if elected to office.” Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25. Certainly, if an individual or

organization is able to evade the law and engage in the kind of large financial giving that

FECA was designed to prevent, then the system would be nullified and the “real or imagined

coercive influence of large financial contributions” on candidates and officeholders would

still exist. Id. In other words, the corruption would still be present. However, in such a

situation, the appearance of corruption would only be worse. Where evasion is present in a

carefully regulated regime, faith in the law is undermined when it is widely known that others

are skirting the rules–even when what those individuals and organizations may be doing is

considered legal. In Colorado II, for example, the Supreme Court determined that if
507

unlimited coordinated expenditures were made legal, circumvention of the existing

contribution limits would occur. Colorado II, 533 U.S. at 460 (“If suddenly every dollar of

spending could be coordinated with the candidate, the inducement to circumvent would

almost certainly intensify.”). Circumvention as a theory of corruption, therefore, has a very

strong lineage in Supreme Court campaign finance jurisprudence and is simply a logical

outgrowth of Buckley’s teaching about corruption.

* * *

In sum, the Buckley decision represents an understanding that bribery laws are not

enough to capture the more subtle and pervasive influences that large financial contributions

can have on a donor-financed election system. The Supreme Court has long understood that

the fundraising process, itself, is the source of corruption when large donations are given in

exchange for access to influence federal officeholders and candidates. In enacting Title I of

BCRA, Congress focused on this same problem that had developed with regard to

fundraising of nonfederal funds.

(iv) Restrictions on Political Party Committee Fundraising are

Necessary to Effectuate These Sufficiently Important

Interests

As one scholar observes, “the rise of soft money, the enormous disparity between

FECA’s limits on individual and PAC donations to candidates and the much larger sums

given in soft money, and the role of federal officeholders in soliciting soft money

contributions to the parties suggest that donor-to-party-to-candidate conduit corruption is a
508

real possibility.” Richard Briffault, The Political Parties and Campaign Finance Reform,

100 Colum.L.Rev. 620, 649 (2000) [hereinafter Briffault]. The record in this case

demonstrates that the “donor-to-party-to-candidate conduit corruption” is no longer just a

“real possibility,” but a reality. Id.

In Colorado II, the Supreme Court recognized that the donor-to-party-to-candidate

conduit raised a legitimate concern regarding corruption. The Colorado II Court found that

“[w]hat a realist would expect to occur has occurred. Donors give to the party with the tacit

understanding that the favored candidate will benefit.” Colorado II, 533 U.S. at 458. For

this proposition, the Supreme Court cited a number of declarations, which Defendants have

again included in this litigation. The Supreme Court observed that without a restriction

limiting the political parties’ coordinated expenditures, the contribution limitations would

be rendered ineffective. Id. at 460 (“If suddenly every dollar of spending could be

coordinated with the candidate the inducement to circumvent would almost certainly

intensify.”). 

The evidence to support this finding bears repeating briefly here, because as the

Supreme Court in Colorado II found donations made to the political party, as opposed to

directly given to the candidate, can pose the same coercive influence that the restrictions in

FECA were targeted to address. In Colorado II, the Supreme Court observed that “the record

shows that even under present law substantial donations turn the parties into matchmakers

whose special meetings and receptions give the donors the chance to get their points across
157 Of course, it bears pointing out that the Supreme Court’s discussion of these

donations was in the context of contributions that were within the $20,000 limit on donations

to national party committees. The record in this case conclusively establishes that the

nonfederal funds pouring into the national party coffers is from prohibited sources and

significantly larger than the federal fund donations at issue in Colorado II.

509

to the candidates.” Colorado II, 533 U.S. at 461. As proof of this proposition, the Supreme

Court noted in a footnote that “the DSCC has established exclusive clubs for the most

generous donors, who are invited to special meetings and social events with Senators and

candidates.” Id. at 461 n.25. This evidence recognizes that large donations to political party

committees enables contributors to gain access to elected federal officeholders and

candidates.157

This view of political parties by the Supreme Court is confirmed by their statement

in Colorado II that “whether they like it or not, [political parties] act as agents for spending

on behalf of those who seek to produce obligated officeholders.” Id. at 452. One of the

pieces of evidence that the Supreme Court relied on to support this view was the testimony

of former Senator Paul Simon. Id. at 451 n.12. Senator Simon stated, “I believe people

contribute to party committees on both sides of the aisle for the same reason that Federal

Express does, because they want favors. There is an expectation that giving to party

committees helps you legislatively.” Id. (recounting a debate over a bill favored by Federal

Express during which a colleague exclaimed, “‘we’ve got to pay attention to who is buttering

our bread”).

In Colorado II, the Supreme Court also found persuasive the declaration of Robert
510

Hickmott, former Democratic fundraiser and National Finance Director for Timothy Wirth’s

Senate campaign, who testified that “‘[w]e . . . told contributors who had made the maximum

allowable contribution to the Wirth campaign but who wanted to do more that they could

raise money for the DSCC so that we could get our maximum [Party Expenditure Provision]

allocation from the DSCC.’” Id. at 458 (quoting declaration of Robert Hickmott) (second

set of brackets in original). The Supreme Court also recounted the testimony of Senator

Timothy Wirth that he “‘understood that when [he] raised funds for the DSCC, the donors

expected that [he] would receive the amount of their donations multiplied by a certain

number that the DSCC had determined in advance, assuming the DSCC has raised other

funds.’” Id. (quoting declaration of Timothy Wirth). Likewise, Leon G. Billings, former

Executive Director of the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee (DSCC), testified that

“‘[p]eople often contribute to party committees because they have given the maximum

amount to a candidate, and want to help the candidate indirectly by contributing to the

party.’” Id. (quoting declaration of Leon G. Billings). In addition, the Supreme Court found

merit in a fundraising letter from Congressman Wayne Allard, dated August 27, 1996,

explaining to a contributor that “‘you are at the limit of what you can directly contribute to

my campaign,’” but “‘you can further help my campaign by assisting the Colorado

Republican Party.’” Id. (quoting fundraising letter from Congressman Wayne Allard, dated

Aug. 27, 1996). In Colorado II, the Supreme Court also observed that an “informal

bookkeeping” system developed, which in the Democratic Party was known as the “tallying
511

system,” that would link donations to the party committees with the candidates that had

raised the money. Id. at 459. As explained by Mr. Hickmott and Senator Paul Simon, the

accounting system essentially was an agreement between the DSCC and the candidates’

campaign such that candidates were credited with generating donations for the DSCC. The

DSCC, in turn, would support the candidate based on the amount of donations the candidate

had collected for the DSCC. Id.; see also id. at 458 n.22 (noting that “tallying is a sign that

contribution limits are being diluted and could be diluted further if the floodgates were

open”). 

Accordingly, the Supreme Court has already accepted the proposition that “[p]arties

are thus necessarily the instruments of some contributors whose object is not to support the

party’s message or to elect party candidates across the board, but rather to support a specific

candidate for the sake of a position on one narrow issue, or even to support any candidate

who will be obliged to the contributors.” Colorado II, 533 U.S. at 451-52. Senator Simon’s

testimony, along with the rest of the Colorado II evidence cited by the Supreme Court, has

been included in this litigation. Plaintiffs have not made any effort to bring into question any

of this evidence, and I accept it and the conclusions reached in Colorado II with regard to

the evidence. 

(v) Evidence from the Record Supporting the Asserted

Government Interests

Before turning to the evidence from this record related to the asserted interests

discussed above, it is important to make one, brief observation. In the instant case, Plaintiffs
512

contend that the record before this Court, as relied on by Defendants, is nothing short of “an

onslaught of anecdotal material about the role of [nonfederal funds] in the political process.”

McConnell Opp’n at 3. I disagree with Plaintiffs’ characterization and find that the evidence

in this case is no different from evidence produced in virtually every other campaign finance

case that the Supreme Court has heard. Plaintiffs’ criticism of the evidence from this record

as merely “anecdotal” would have applied with equal force to the evidence the Supreme

Court found persuasive in Buckley and Colorado II. For example, as discussed above, in

Colorado II, the Supreme Court credited evidence from the FEC’s public records, and the

testimony of politicians, political consultants, party officials, scholars, and experts. To some

degree, Plaintiffs’ criticism of the record evidence as “anecdotal” only underscores the

difficulty that Plaintiffs have in rebutting the testimony in this record that the fundraising

process related to large donations of nonfederal funds to the party committees, particularly

at the national level, presents the same problems with corruption and the appearance of

corruption that was identified by the Supreme Court in Buckley.

(1) Evidence From the Record in this Case Relating

to “Corruption” and the “Appearance of

Corruption” as Defined in Buckley

Federal Officials Control the National Party Committees and are Intimately Involved in

Raising Nonfederal Funds for the National Party Committees

The record in this case makes it clear that federal officeholders and candidates control

the national political party committees and are so deeply involved in raising non-federal

funds for the national party committees that there is no meaningful separation between the
158 The RNC presented testimony suggesting that electing its candidates is only one

means of achieving its core political principles. Findings ¶¶ 1.49, 1.49.1. It claims it also

strives to achieve its core principles by promoting an issue agenda that reflects its principles

and governing in accordance with its principles. Id. ¶ 1.49.1. Its own internal documents

show that its primary purpose “is to elect its candidates to public office.” Id. Therefore, the

(continued...)

513

national committees and the federal candidates and officeholders that control them. Findings

¶¶ 1.50, 1.58. This finding supports the congressional decision to enact a complete ban on

nonfederal funds at the national political party level.

All six national political party committees are controlled and dominated by federal

officeholders or candidates. In the case of the DNC or RNC, both are headed by the

President or presidential candidate of each party. Findings ¶ 1.47. In the case of the national

congressional committees (DCCC, NRCC, DSCC, NRSC), the top leaders of each party in

the House and the Senate head the committees and exercise control over them. Id. This very

fact has led one of Defendants’ experts to conclude that “[t]here is no meaningful separation

between the national party committees and the public officials who control them.” Id.

Furthermore, “[f]or at least a century [the national party committees] have been melded into

their party’s presidential campaign every four years, often assuming a subsidiary role to the

presidential candidate’s personal campaign committee. The presidential candidate has

traditionally been conceded the power to shape and use the committee, at least for the

campaign.” Id. ¶ 1.48. 

The record also demonstrates that the primary purpose of the political parties is to get

as many of its candidates elected to public office. Id. ¶ 1.48.158 This purpose drives the
158(...continued)

testimony that electing candidates is not the RNC’s primary purpose is rebutted and cannot

be relied upon.

159 The RNC’s Finance Director states that it is rare for federal officials to make initial

personal or telephonic solicitations of major donors for the RNC because the RNC has a

policy against such practices. Findings ¶ 1.54. Whether such practices are rare or not, and

whether or not the Finance Department has such a policy, the record is clear that such

solicitations, initial and subsequent, do occur. Id. It is also clear that the Finance Director’s

statement does not extend to the NRSC or the NRCC. See id. ¶ 1.51. 

514

political parties’ fundraising efforts. As Congressman Meehan notes, “political parties do

not have economic interests apart from their ultimate goal of electing their candidates to

office.” Id. 

The national political party committees request and encourage Members of Congress

to solicit nonfederal money donations from contributors, and the personal involvement of

high-ranking Members of Congress is a major component of the political parties’ fundraising

programs.159 Id. ¶¶ 1.51, 1.53. The record is replete with testimony from current and former

Members of Congress, political contributors, and lobbyists, all recounting examples or

personal experiences where Members of Congress actively solicited nonfederal funds for

their political parties. Id. 1.51. This testimony is corroborated by numerous internal

documents from a Fortune 100 company requesting authorization for donations to national

party committees in response to requests made by Members of Congress. Id. ¶ 1.74.3. An

internal memorandum from this company notes that “[o]n the Democratic side, [our]

advocates have already fielded soft money calls from House Democratic Leader Gephardt,

House Democratic Caucus Chairman Frost, Democratic Congressional Campaign Chairman
515

Kennedy, and Democratic Senatorial Campaign Chairman Torricelli. Similar contacts to

raise soft money have been made by Republican congressional leaders.” Id. ¶ 1.78.1. In

addition, the record shows that national political party committees and candidates have

formed joint fundraising committees, which share the burdens and the receipts of these joint

ventures. Id. ¶ 1.57. These joint fundraising committees allow the national committees to

collect whatever amount a particular donor gives in excess of the federal funds the candidate

is permitted to accept. Id. All nonfederal funds raised by such joint committees go to the

political party. Id. 

Members have a number of reasons to oblige. First, as former Senator Dale Bumpers

testifies, helping the party benefits the Member because it aids the party in “perform[ing]

its function of keeping tabs on statements, politics and votes of opposition party members

and groups.” Id. ¶ 1.55. Former DNC and DSCC official Robert Hickmott observes that

raising money for one’s political party also helps the political party’s efforts to maintain or

obtain control of Congress, which serves the Member’s own interests. Id. Second, the

record demonstrates that while there may not be a formal commitment that the amount of

money spent by the national party committees on their Members’ behalf is connected to the

amount of money they raise, there is, in former Senator David Boren’s words, “at least a

working understanding among the party officials and Senate candidates that the [nonfederal]

money [raised by the candidate] will benefit the individual Senators’ campaigns.” Id.; see

also id. ¶ 1.56.3, 1.56.4. 
516

In regard to this latter point, as the Supreme Court already observed in Colorado II,

an “informal bookkeeping” system was developed within the DSCC known as the “tallying

system,” which was designed to credit different members with collecting donations for the

DSCC. Colorado II, 533 U.S. at 459 (observing that based on the members efforts, the

DSCC would determine its support for the candidate). The record in this litigation reflects

that the DSCC continues to maintain a “credit” program, which credits nonfederal funds

raised by a Senator or candidate for that person’s party. Findings ¶ 1.56.3. The NRCC,

NRSC and DCCC do not have such a system; however, they advise Members of the amounts

they have raised for the respective committees. Id. ¶ 1.56.4. Former Senator Simpson

testifies that: “[w]hen donors give soft money to the parties, there is sometimes at least an

implicit understanding that the money will be used to benefit a certain candidate. Likewise,

Members know that if they assist the party with fundraising, be it hard or soft money, the

party will later assist their campaign.” Id. ¶ 1.56.1. 

Former Senator Simpson’s observation about the donors’ understanding concerning

the use of the party donations is supported by other evidence in the record. A letter from an

RNC contributor with an enclosed contribution states that “Congressman Scott McInnis

deserve [sic] most of the recruitment credit.” Id. ¶ 1.51. Similarly, a lobbyist testifies that

donors are interested in making sure that particular Members of Congress receive “credit”

for their contributions:

Although the [nonfederal] donations are technically being made to political

party committees, savvy donors are likely to carefully choose which elected
160

 The record also contains the testimony of Plaintiff Thomas McInerney, a major

contributor to the Republican Party. He states that his nonfederal donations to the RNC were

intended to go to state and local election activities. Findings ¶ 1.56.2.1. This testimony does

not rebut the testimony of others that such donations are often given for use in federal

campaigns, id. ¶ 1.56.2, and his practice of giving to national political party committees to

assist state and local election activity appears to be an exception to the general rule.

Furthermore, nothing in BCRA prevents Mr. McInerney from donating nonfederal funds to

state and local parties for use in state and local elections.

517

officials can take credit for their contributions. If a Committee Chairman or

senior member of the House or Senate Leadership calls and asks for a large

contribution to his or her party’s national House or Senate campaign

committee, and the lobbyist’s client is able to do so, the key elected official

who is credited with bringing in the contribution, and possibly the senior

officials, are likely to remember the donation and to recognize that such big

donors’ interests merit careful consideration.

Id. ¶ 1.78. Additional testimony shows that individual donors request that their nonfederal

money contributions to the national party committees be applied to particular federal

campaigns. Id. ¶ 1.56.2.160

Third, at least with regard to the DSCC and its “credit” program, former DSCC

official Robert Hickmott testifies that Members can raise money and credit it to other

candidates to obtain support from those they assisted if they plan to run for a leadership post.

Id. ¶ 1.55. Fourth, the relationship between the candidate/Member and the party makes it

difficult for the candidate/Member to avoid raising funds for the party. As Defendants’

expert Donald Green puts it: “The ubiquitous role that parties play in the lives of federal

officials means that no official can ignore the fundraising ambitions of his or her party.” Id.;

see also id. ¶ 1.46 (describing the unique relationship between candidates/Members and their

parties). 
161 Other Members of Congress testify that they are personally unaware of who

donates to the parties; however, these Members are almost all Defendant-Intervenors who

were involved in the efforts to enact BCRA and, like Senator Feingold, have made efforts

to distance themselves from nonfederal fundraising or had little interest in such information.

Id. ¶ 1.71.1. Moreover, these Members do not claim to speak on behalf of all of their

colleagues. Id.

Senator McConnell attests that he typically does not know the donation history of the

individuals with whom he meets. The record demonstrates that he is aware of the donation

history of some of the major donors to his campaign, and has sought nonfederal donations

from at least one donor who had donated the maximum federal funds to his campaign. Id.

518

Federal Candidates and Officeholders in Most Instances Are Aware of the Largest

Contributors of Nonfederal Funds to the National Party Committees

The fact that federal officeholders are so intimately involved in the solicitation of

nonfederal funds suggests that they are cognizant of the identities of the major national party

committee donors, which in turn allows them to open their doors to these donors. Id. ¶ 1.71-

1.72. In fact, the evidence demonstrates that it is difficult for Members of Congress not to

know the identities of the large donors to their political parties. Id. As former Senator

Bumpers testifies: “you cannot be a good Democratic or a good Republican Member and not

be aware of who gave money to the party.” Id. ¶ 1.71.2. Indeed, Members of Congress testify

that they and their colleagues are cognizant of donations made to their parties.

161

 Id. 1.71.2.

For example, Congressman Shays stated on the floor of the House that “it’s the candidates

themselves and their surrogates who solicit soft money. The candidates know who makes

these huge contributions and what these donors expect.” Id. ¶ 1.71.2. Former Senator

Simpson testifies:

Party leaders would inform Members at caucus meetings who the big donors

were. If the leaders tell you that a certain person or group has donated a large
519

sum to the party and will be at an event Saturday night, you’ll be sure to attend

and get to know the person behind the donation. . . . Even if some members

did not attend these events, they all still knew which donors gave the large

donations, as the party publicizes who gives what.

Id. Similarly, Senator McCain observes that “[l]egislators of both parties often know who

the large soft money contributors to their party are, particularly those legislators who have

solicited soft money,” and that “[d]onors or their lobbyists often inform a particular Senator

that they have made a large donation.” Id. Former Senator Simon candidly testifies that he

would likely return a telephone call to a large contributor before making other calls. Id.

Accordingly, either as a consequence of a donor-based election system, or as a result of

federal candidates and officeholders raising large amounts of nonfederal funds for the

national parties, federal candidates and officeholders know who makes large donations to the

national party committees, which inevitably leads to special access for these donors to

influence federal lawmakers.

Large Nonfederal Funds Donations Provide Contributors Access to Federal Officeholders

In addition, the record clearly establishes that large nonfederal money contributors are

provided with special access to federal officeholders in a manner on par with the large

individual donors discussed in Buckley. Id. ¶¶ 1.75-1.80.1, 1.81. This access provides these

donors with opportunities to influence legislative activity, and is a major reason large

donations are made to the political parties. As one Member of Congress put it: “access is it.

Access is power. Access is clout. That’s how this thing works. . .” Id. ¶ 1.75.2. 

Although no empirical study has been able to demonstrate this point conclusively,
162 As an aside, I do not find it particularly surprising that an empirical study has not

been able to conclusively demonstrate this point. Access to federal officials may be subtle,

less open to verification, and therefore less likely to be captured by empirical review.

Furthermore, the fact that the FEC does not require nonfederal contributors to disclose these

contributions makes the feasibility of such a study even more remote. The inability to

empirically assess this matter would be troublesome if not for the record before this threejudge panel, which is rich with testimony from individuals intimately involved in nonfederal

fundraising who describe the unprecedented access given to those who contribute large sums

of nonfederal funds. In my judgment, the difficulty of being able to study this phenomenon

empirically is of little consequence given this evidence. See Findings ¶ 1.81-1.82; App. ¶ III

520

App. ¶ III, testimony from those intimately involved in national political fundraising, as well

as documents submitted as part of the record, provide powerful evidence that large

nonfederal money donations provide such donors access to influence federal lawmakers.162

Just like the Supreme Court panel that issued Buckley, I find this evidence–of specific

examples of access given to large contributors–probative and compelling.

Numerous prominent lobbyists testify that in order to have access to Members of

Congress, clients must combine their lobbying efforts with sizeable nonfederal money

donations. Id. ¶ 1.75.1. Failure to do so, according to lobbyist Robert Rozen, will hinder a

client’s ability “to be treated seriously in Washington,” by which he means, “to be a player

and to have access” Id. He explains that “relationships [with Members of Congress] are

established because people give a lot of money, relationships are built and are deepened

because of more and more money, and that gets you across the threshold to getting the access

you want, because you have established a relationship.” Id. ¶ 1.74.1. The other lobbyists

who testify in this case concur, including Daniel Murray, who notes that nonfederal funds,

“ha[ve] become the favored method of supplying political support,” which “begets . . . access
521

to law-makers” because of the lack of any limit on how much may be donated. Id. ¶ 1.75.1.

Cf. Buckley, 519 F.2d at 839 n.37 (“The disclosures of illegal corporate contributions in 1972

included the testimony of executives that they were motivated by the perception that this was

necessary as a “calling card, something that would get us in the door and make our point of

view heard,” Hearings before the Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities,

93d Cong., 1st Sess. 5442 (1973) (Ashland Oil Co. Orin Atkins, Chairman).”) (citation to

Findings omitted).

Plaintiffs point out that one of these lobbyists claims that he is hired because of his

ability to provide access to lawmakers regardless of whether or not the client has donated

money to the parties. Findings ¶ 1.75.1.2. Similarly, an RNC official states that lobbying

is a better way to achieve access to lawmakers than donating to their campaigns or parties,

and Plaintiffs note that many individuals and entities who donate large sums of nonfederal

funds also devote substantial sums to lobbying efforts, which can dwarf their nonfederal fund

donations. Id.. While these observations have merit, it is clear from lobbyists, such as

Wright Andrews, that the “amount of influence that a lobbyist has is often directly correlated

to the amount of money that he or she and his or her clients infuse into the political system.”

Id. ¶ 1.75.1.3 (emphasis added). In fact, Andrews notes that many lobbyists have taken to

hosting fundraisers themselves, which provide them with an opportunity to interact with

lawmakers in a setting of their choosing and concludes that “[t]hose who are most heavily

involved in giving and raising campaign finance money are frequently, and not surprisingly,
163 Some Defendant-Intervenors in this case testify that they personally do not provide

special access to large donors of nonfederal funds. Findings ¶ 1.75.2.1. These Members of

Congress do not claim to speak for their colleagues or contradict their colleagues’ testimony

that such access is provided to major donors. Id.; see also id. ¶ 1.75.2.

522

the lobbyists with the most clout.” Id. The lobbyist whom Plaintiffs tout as claiming he can

achieve special access for his clients regardless of their contribution history, can provide that

access in part because of political contributions made or arranged by his firm. Id. ¶ 1.75.1.2.

Furthermore, lobbyists testify that traditional lobbying alone is not in and of itself sufficient

to achieve a client’s goals and that contributions are usually part of a lobbyist’s “legislative

plan.” Id. ¶ 1.75.1.3. This point is bolstered by the numerous internal documents authored

by employees of a Fortune 100 company’s internal lobbying department, requesting

authorization to make nonfederal donations to national party committees as part of efforts

to “strengthen [its] relationship” with various federal lawmakers. Id. ¶ 1.74.3. In the words

of one expert, “[i]t’s not either or . . . . the fact is most of the organizations and economic

interests . . . lobbying, inside and outside lobbying, are also intimately involved in the

political financing game and making large contributions to political parties. Id. ¶ 1.75.1.2.

Numerous former and current Members of Congress also testify that entities and

individuals that make large contributions to the political parties do so because it provides

them with special access to lawmakers which allows them to influence legislation.163

 Id. ¶

1.75.2. Senator Rudman is blunt: 

Special interests who give large amounts of soft money to political parties do

in fact achieve their objectives. They do get special access. Sitting Senators

and House Members have limited amounts of time, but they make time
523

available in their schedules to meet with representatives of business and unions

and wealthy individuals who gave large sums to their parties. These are not

idle chit-chats about the philosophy of democracy. In these meetings, these

special interests, often accompanied by lobbyists, press elected officials --

Senators who either raised money from the special interest in question or who

benefit directly or indirectly from their contributions to the Senator’s party -

to adopt their position on a matter of interest to them. Senators are pressed by

their benefactors to introduce legislation, to amend legislation, to block

legislation, and to vote on legislation in a certain way. No one says: “We gave

money so you should do this to help us.” No one needs to say it -- it is

perfectly understood by all participants in every such meeting. 

Id. 

Representatives of corporate nonfederal money donors echo the lobbyists’ and former

Members’ testimony that nonfederal donations beget access. Id. 1.75.3. The Chairman

Emeritus of United Airlines testifies that large nonfederal donations provide donors with

benefits: 

namely, access and influence in Washington. Though a soft money check

might be made out to a political party, labor and business leaders know that

those checks open the doors to the offices of individual and important

Members of Congress and the Administration, giving donors the opportunity

to argue for their corporation’s or union’s position on a particular statute,

regulation, or other governmental action.

Id. The record contains internal documents which support this view. Id. ¶¶ 1.75.3, 1.78.1.

One internal corporate memorandum states that “contributions and the related activities we

have participated in have been key to our increased ability to get our views heard by the right

policy makers on a timely basis; in other words, a smart investment.” Id. 1.75.3. In addition,

a poll of a random sample of 300 corporate executives employed by major U.S. corporations

conducted by the Tarrance Group on behalf of the Committee for Economic Development
524

(“CED”) found that 75 percent of those surveyed said that “political donations give them an

advantage in shaping legislation.” Id. ¶¶ 1.70.1-¶1.70.1.1.

Wealthy individuals who donate large sums of nonfederal funds also share that they

were provided with unique access after they made large contributions to the political parties.

Id. ¶ 1.75.5. One individual testifies that after he made a $500,000 contribution to the DNC

he was invited to a number of events where President Clinton was in attendance, including

a small dinner with President Clinton and Vice President Gore that was billed as an

opportunity to “give advice to the President.” Id. He used the opportunity to speak in favor

of campaign finance reform and to urge the President to take a leadership role in the effort.

Id. Another donor testifies that $50,000 in political donations provided him and his wife the

opportunity to attend a dinner of 10 to 12 people, including President Clinton, which lasted

two to three hours and involved “primarily a conversation about issues of importance to the

nation and the President’s program.” Id. One wealthy contributor who states that he does

not give to the political parties in order to secure special access admits that he has been

offered such opportunities. Id.

The record establishes in compelling fashion that large nonfederal money donors are

provided access to federal officeholders and candidates in exchange for their large

contributions. Political parties play a role in facilitating this access to influence.

The National Party Committees Facilitate Access to Federal Officeholders for Their Large

Nonfederal Donors

Both political parties and their congressional committees have dangled access to
525

Members of Congress as an inducement to collect larger contributions from donors; these

donations often take the form of nonfederal funds. Id. ¶¶ 1.76-1.77.10. In fact, the political

parties have institutionalized this process by creating clubs for different ranges of donations;

as donations escalate, so do the opportunities to attend special events with Members of

Congress as well as the intimacy of these events. Id. For example, the NRCC’s

Congressional Forum was “designed to give its members [$15,000 PAC or individual

contributors or $20,000 corporate contributors] an intimate setting to develop stronger

working relationships with the new Republican Congressional majority.” Id. ¶ 1.77.2. The

NRSC’s Group 21 required an annual donation of $100,000 and provided members small

dinners with Senators and “VIP benefits.” Id. The DCCC also had a $100,000 donor club

called the “National Finance Board,” which provided donors “two private dinners with

Leader Gephardt, Chairwoman Lowey, House Democratic Leadership and Ranking

Members[ and] two retreats with Leader Gephardt and Chairwoman Lowey . . . .” Id. ¶

1.77.5. The state political parties have also used the enticement of special access to federal

candidates to induce larger donations. Id. ¶ 1.77.6. The best example of this is a CDP

brochure advertising the CDP’s Trustees program, which required a $100,000 donation to

the CDP. Id. The CDP “recognizes its extraordinary supporters with extraordinary

opportunities,” and provides “Trustees” with “[e]xclusive briefings, receptions and meetings

with officials such as U.S. Senator Dianne Feinstein, U.S. Senator Barbara Boxer . . . and

other national figures.” Id. 
526

Large contributions have therefore become the price of admission to attend events

where relationships can be formed with Members of Congress and legislative issues can be

discussed. Individual wealthy donors testify that “[p]olicy discussion with federal officials

occurs at” these major donor events. Id. ¶ 1.75.5. The events “include speeches, question

and answer sessions, and group policy discussions, but there is also time to talk to Members

individually about substantive issues.” Id. One witness testifies that, “when given the

opportunity, some donors try to pigeonhole or corner Members . . . to discuss their issues at

these events.” Id. One donor to the RNC’s Team 100, a club that requires a $100,000

donation every four years with $25,000 donations in each intervening year, wrote to the RNC

Chairman telling him, “I do feel I have benefitted from Team 100 in the audience it has

afforded me with party leaders.” Id.; see also id. ¶ 1.77.1 (describing the Team 100 program).

Lobbyist Robert Rozen describes the access provided by other political party events:

[S]oft money contributions built around sporting events such as the Super

Bowl or the Kentucky Derby, where you might spend a week with the

Member, are even more useful. At the events that contributors are entitled to

attend as a result of their contributions, some contributors will subtly or

not-so-subtly discuss a legislative issue that they have an interest in.

Contributors also use the events to establish relationships and then take

advantage of the access by later calling the Member about a legislative issue

or coming back and seeing the Member in his or her office. Obviously from

the Member’s perspective, it is hard to turn down a request for a meeting after

you just spent a weekend with a contributor whose company just gave a large

contribution to your political party.

Id. ¶ 1.77.9. A Fortune 100 company’s internal lobbying department justified its request for

a $1.4 million nonfederal funds budget for FY 1999 (from its general treasury) in part by
527

noting:

due to a significant [sic] in the number of events scheduled by the parties for

their donors, the number of opportunities . . . to develop relationships with

elected and administration officials has never been greater. As the parties

compete more vigorously for soft money dollars, the number and quality of

events for interacting with both the leadership and rank and file Members has

been greatly increased. Between the six main committees (DNC, DSCC,

DCCC, RNC, NRCC, NRSC) there are events both in and out of [Washington,

D.C.] almost every day of the week.

Id. ¶ 1.78.1. 

These events are touted by the parties as opportunities to meet and discuss issues with

Members of Congress. Id. ¶ 1.77.8. For example, Senator McConnell, as head of the NRSC,

wrote a solicitation letter which noted that the Republican Senate Council ($5,000 annual

PAC contribution) and the Chairman’s Foundation ($25,000 annual corporate gift) provide

“excellent opportunities for both corporate executives and Washington representatives to

meet and discuss current issues with leading Republican Senators.” The RNC sought

$250,000 donations as part of its Annual Gala, and offered such donors breakfast with the

Senate Majority Leader and Speaker of the House, as well as a “[l]uncheon with Republican

House and Senate Leadership and the Republican House and Senate Committee Chairmen

of your choice.” Id. Furthermore, the political parties accept donor requests as to which

Member they would like seated at their table at political party dinners. Id. ¶ 1.77.7. The

record shows that donors request to be seated with specific Members or with Members who

sit on particular committees, and that these requests have been met. Id. 

The parties also facilitate access to Members of Congress outside of their donor
164 Team 100 is an RNC donor club requiring a $100,000 donation every four years,

and $25,000 donations each intervening year. Findings ¶ 158.

528

events. According to Ms. Beverly Shea, the RNC Finance Division’s “policy” is to not

“force” federal officeholders to meet with donors, but that it may pass along requests to a

Member’s scheduler and say “this is a Team 100 member,164 could you see if you could fit

them in.” Id. ¶ 1.76.1. This statement appears to be accurate. Nothing in the record

demonstrates that meetings have been literally forced on Members of Congress. However,

there is ample evidence that RNC officials request meetings with Members of Congress on

behalf of large donors, which intimate or state bluntly the donor’s generosity to the political

party. A few examples illustrate how the RNC Finance Division’s policy operates. The

Chairman of the RNC handwrote the following note to Senate Majority Leader Robert Dole:

Dear Bob 

[____], CEO of Pfizer, has asked to see you on Wed. 11/1. He is extremely

loyal and generous. He also is not longwinded. He’ll tend to his business and

not eat up extra time. They have proposed a [Internal Revenue Code §] 936

solution that [Republican Senator William] Roth and [Republican

Congressman Bill] Archer are considering. I’m sure that is the issue. I’d

appreciate it if you’d see [him]. [signed] Haley.

Id. ¶ 1.76. Another appeal for a meeting makes the connection between access and money

even more apparent. An RNC letter sent to a staffer to Senator Hagel, asks Senator Hagel

to meet with a donor for four “key” reasons including: “[h]e runs [sic] $80,000,000 high tech

business,” and “[h]e just contributed $100,000 to the RNC.” Id. It also appears that RNC

officials are so confident that their “requests” for meetings with large donors will be granted

that they are offered to donors in advance of making such requests to the Member or the
529

Member’s staff. A letter from the RNC’s Team 100 director thanks a donor for “facilitating

Dow [Chemical]’s generous contribution to the Republican Party” and tells the donor: “Give

me a call . . . and we can figure out when is a good time to bring your Dow [Chemical]

leadership into town to see [RNC Chairman] Haley [Barbour], [Senate Majority Leader

Robert] Dole & [Speaker of the House] Newt [Gingrich].” Id.

This practice is not limited to the RNC. The former head of the DNC testifies: 

Party and government officials participate in raising large contributions from

interests that have matters pending before Executive agencies, the Congress,

and other government agencies. Party officials, who are not themselves

elected officials, offer to large money donors opportunities to meet with senior

government officials. Donors use these opportunities - White House and

congressional meetings - to press their views on matters pending before the

government.

Id. 

On some occasions the connection between access and donations has been made even

more obvious. Call sheets in the record from the DNC and the CDP include instructions such

as “Ask her to give 80k more this year for lunch with” President Clinton, and ask “if they

might be able to do $25,000 for a small mtg with the President.” Id. ¶ 1.77.10. 

In sum, the record reflects that political parties facilitate access to federal candidates

and officeholders in exchange for large nonfederal funds donations. It also reflects that some

major donors admit that they contribute nonfederal funds, not to help with party building, but

to gain access to federal candidates and officeholders.
530

Donors Contribute Large Nonfederal Money Donations to the National Party Committees

For the Purpose of Obtaining Access to Federal Officeholders

It is clear that donors understand the system. The record is replete with examples of

donors who give donations for the purpose of obtaining access to federal lawmakers and

thereby influence government policy. Id. ¶¶ 1.74-1.74.5. Perhaps Roger Tamraz – made

famous by his testimony during the Thompson Committee Hearings – summed it up best

when he was asked if he made contributions to the DNC because he believed it might get him

access and responded: “Senator, I’m going even farther. It’s the only reason . . . .” Id. ¶

1.74.3. Mr. Tamraz is not alone. One wealthy political fundraiser observes that “many soft

money donations are not given for personal or philosophical reasons. They are given by

donors with a lot of money who believe they need to invest in federal officeholders who can

protect or advance specific interests through policy action or inaction.” Id. He notes that

some nonfederal money donors give “$250,000, $500,000, or more, year after year,” and that

for this kind of investment “you need to see a return,” just like any other investment. Id.

Other witnesses experienced with political donations also describe these donations as an

“investment” or “the cost of doing business.” Id. One CEO comments that achieving access

is important to corporate givers and that “[f]ederal officeholders actually appear to have sold

themselves and the party cheaply. They could have gotten even more money, because of the

potential importance of their decisions to the affected businesses.” Id.

These donors have also discovered that nonfederal donations are more effective at

obtaining access to federal lawmakers than federal contributions. Id. ¶ 1.78. As former DNC
531

and DSCC official and current lobbyist Robert Hickmott observes: “If you want to get to

know Members of Congress, or new Members of Congress, it is more efficient to write a

$15,000 check to the DSCC and to get the opportunity to meet them at the various events

than it would be to write fifteen $1,000 checks to fifteen different Senators, or Senators and

candidates.” Id. This sentiment is echoed by various lobbyists and major party contributors,

including one lobbyist who notes that “a properly channeled $100,000 corporate soft money

donation to the national Republican or Democratic congressional campaign committees can

get the corporate donor more benefit than several smaller hard dollar contributions by that

corporation’s PAC.” Id. Lobbyist Robert Rozen describes the mentality starkly:

Donors to the national parties understand that if a federal officeholder is

raising soft money--supposedly “non-federal” money--they are raising it for

federal uses, namely to help that Member or other federal candidates in their

elections. Many donors giving $100,000, $200,000, even $1 million, are doing

that because it is a bigger favor than a smaller hard money contribution would

be. That donation helps you get close to the person who is making decisions

that affect your company or your industry. That is the reason most economic

interests give soft money, certainly not because they want to help state

candidates and rarely because they want the party to succeed. . . . The bigger

soft money contributions are more likely to get your call returned or get you

into the Member’s office than smaller hard money contributions.

Id. As such, it is abundantly clear that, in general, a large majority of major donors of

nonfederal funds to the political party committees contribute this money to gain access to

federal officeholders and candidates not to support a political philosophy or “party building”

activities. The fact that major nonfederal funds donors give to both political parties only

underscores this point.
165 The RNC claims that the record “establishes that organizations and individuals may

give to both parties because they desire to be actively involved in the political process.” Id.

¶ 1.80.1. In support of this statement, the RNC provides a statement by a PhRMA

representative that the group gives to the convention activities of both parties because “we

are good civic participants,” and a deposition statement from one of Defendants’ experts

acknowledging the possibility that donors provide support to both parties because they

support some members from each party. Id. Although these statements suggest that donors

“may” give to both parties for reasons other than access, they do not contradict the numerous

statements and documents in the record that demonstrate that special access is the primary

motivation for many donors who give to both parties. Id. Moreover, interests in participating

in the political process and in obtaining special access to legislators to influence them are

neither incompatible nor mutually exclusive.

532

Contributors of Nonfederal Funds Give to Both Political Parties to Ensure Special Access

The importance to large contributors of gaining access to federal lawmakers in order

to press their individual agendas leads many, in the words of one witness, to “hedge their

bets, to ensure they get access to office holders on the issues that are important to them.” Id.

¶ 1.79; see also id. ¶ 1.80. One CEO put it this way: “As a donor with business goals, if you

want to enhance your chances of getting your issues paid attention to and favorably reviewed

by Members of Congress, bipartisanship is the right way to go. Giving lots of soft money

to both sides is the right way to go from the most pragmatic perspective.” Id. ¶ 1.79. The

parties are aware of this view, as one document from the Ohio Republican party entitled

“Why People Give” includes the observation: “many people give to both sides so that they

will have access to whoever is the winner.” Id. ¶ 1.80.165 

The record also contains evidence that the political parties exploit contributors’ fears

of losing access if they back one political party and that party loses control of Congress. One

CEO describes the situation this way:
533

[I]f you’re giving a lot of soft money to one side, the other side knows. For

many economically-oriented donors, there is a risk in giving to only one side,

because the other side may read through FEC reports and have staff or a

friendly lobbyist call and indicate that someone with interests before a certain

committee has had their contributions to the other side noticed. They’ll get a

message that basically asks: “Are you sure you want to be giving only to one

side? Don’t you want to have friends on both sides of the aisle?” If your

interests are subject to anger from the other side of the aisle, you need to fear

that you may suffer a penalty if you don’t give. First of all, it’s hard to get

attention for your issue if you’re not giving. Then, once you’ve decided to

play the money game, you have to worry about being imbalanced, especially

if there’s bipartisan control or influence in Washington, which there usually

is. In fact, during the 1990’s, it became more and more acceptable to call

someone, saying you saw he gave to this person, so he should also give to you

or the person’s opponent. Referring to someone’s financial activity in the

political arena used to be clearly off limits, and now it’s increasingly common.

Id. ¶ 1.80; see also id. ¶ 1.70-1.70.4 (facts regarding pressure placed on political donors).

An internal Eli Lilly and Company document shows these concerns in action. Id. ¶ 1.79. The

Washington Post had listed the company as a top donor to the Republican party. Id. A

handwritten notation on a photocopy of the article says “Dems are upset . . . . White House

stays Dem we are in trouble,” and an internal memorandum refers to discussions with the

White House indicating that Eli Lilly “can get back into this by giving $50[,000]- 100,000

to the DNC– says they would be pleased with this.” Id. 

Another good example of this practice of giving to both political parties is that in

2000, a Fortune 100 company agreed to contribute $25,000 to the NRSC at the request of

George Allen, the then-Republican-candidate in the 2000 Senatorial race in Virginia against

incumbent Senator Chuck Robb. An employee noted that the company had donated to

Senator Robb’s Leadership PAC and that a similar contribution to the NRSC was necessary
166 The poll also showed that 76 percent of the major donors surveyed believed the

campaign finance system was either “broken and needs to be replaced,” or “has problems and

needs to be changed.” Id. ¶ 1.70.3. Three-quarters of respondents supported a “ban on large

‘soft money’ donations.” Id. 

534

to balance out the company’s support for the candidates. Id.

The Tarrance Group/CED poll of business leaders found that 74 percent of

respondents “say pressure is placed on business leaders to make large political donations.

The main reasons corporate America makes political contributions, the executives said is fear

of retribution and to buy access to lawmakers.” Id. ¶ 1.70.1. Another poll conducted in 1997

of major congressional donors found that 80 percent of those surveyed agreed that “officeholders regularly pressure donors for contributions.” Id. ¶ 1.70.3.166 Lobbyist Robert Rozen

provides context for this fear:

In some cases corporations and trade associations do not want to give in

amounts over the hard money limits, but they feel pressured to give in greater

amounts and end up making soft money donations as well. They are under

pressure, sometimes subtle and sometimes direct, from Members to give at

levels higher than the hard money limits. For example, some Members in a

position to influence legislation important to an industry naturally wonder why

a company in that industry is not participating in fundraising events. 

Id. ¶ 1.70.2. Former Senator Boren notes that political donors feel that they are victims of

“shake[] down[s].” Id. ¶ 1.70.4. One internal memorandum from a Fortune 100 company

notes that “our traditional competitors continue to contribute large amounts of soft money,”

and predicted that failure to “maintain our soft money participation during this election cycle

– given the heightened scrutiny those contributions will receive in the current competitive

climate – may give our new and traditional competitors an advantage in Washington. Id. ¶
535

1.78.1 (emphasis in original); see also Buckley, 519 F.2d at 839 n.37 (“The disclosures of

illegal corporate contributions in 1972 included the testimony of executives that they were

motivated by the perception that this was necessary . . . ‘in response to pressure for fear of

a competitive disadvantage that might result.’”) (quoting statement of former chairman of

American Airlines, George Spater) (internal citations omitted) (cited in Buckley, 424 U.S.

at 27 n.28).

The evidence detailed above clearly indicates that large donations to political parties,

especially nonfederal donations, open doors to federal lawmakers’ offices. The record shows

that the reverse is also true: failure to provide large nonfederal donations can effectively

block access to federal lawmakers. As one CEO put it: “It is obvious to me that large soft

money donations do buy access, that they can influence federal policy, and that they are

corrupting to federal officeholders and to donors. Additionally, these unlimited donations

to political parties pose a far greater risk than do hard money contributions to candidates of

at least the appearance, if not the reality, of special interest influence on federal policy.”

Findings ¶ 1.83.6; see generally id. (testimony and poll results demonstrating wealthy

individual donors find the campaign finance system as either corrupt or as creating the

appearance of corruption). In sum, the evidence demonstrates that major donors of

nonfederal money primarily give these contributions to the national committees to gain

access to federal officeholders. Notably, the record also demonstrates that major nonfederal

money donors give to the state and local committees for the benefit of federal officeholders
167 Victory programs are programs designed by the state Republican parties in

conjunction with the RNC and implemented by the state party with assistance from the RNC.

See Findings ¶¶ 1.43.2.

536

and candidates.

Federal Candidates Are Cognizant of the Benefits of Having Nonfederal Money Donors

Contribute to State Parties

Federal candidates understand that they can benefit from donations made to the state

political parties. The evidence discussed infra demonstrates that candidates solicit

contributions to the state parties to assist their campaigns. See infra at 556. However,

perhaps the most probative evidence of the importance federal candidates place on such

contributions is a letter written by Senator Mitch McConnell to one of his contributors. He

writes:

Since you have contributed the legal maximum to the McConnell Senate

Committee, I wanted you to know that you can still contribute to the Victory

2000167 program . . . . This program was an important part of President George

W. Bush’s impressive victory in Kentucky last year, and it will be critical to

my race and others next year.

Id. ¶ 1.60. Senator McConnell also handwrote: “This is important to me. Hope you can

help.” Id; see also id. (letter from Congressman Wayne Allard explaining to a contributor

that although maxing out to his campaign, the contributor could further help his campaign

by donating to the Colorado Republican Party).

These additional facts confirm that nonfederal donations to the state political parties

affect federal elections and are valued by federal candidates. It is therefore clear that such

donations to state political parties can result in access to federal officials while also providing
537

a route to circumvent FECA’s limitations.

Political Donations Achieve Political Results

As discussed at length earlier, in the context of supporting contribution restrictions,

Buckley and its progeny do not require evidence that large contributions to candidates were

conditioned upon a certain decision by a federal officeholder or candidate. Buckley, 519 F.2d

at 839 n.36 (cited in Buckley, 424 U.S. at 27 n.28) (“It is not material, for present purposes,

to review the extended discussion in the Final Report on the controverted issue of whether

the President’s decision was in fact, or was represented to be, conditioned upon or “linked”

to the reaffirmation of the pledge.”). Nevertheless, a few examples from my Findings of Fact

and prior caselaw illustrate that in many instances large nonfederal donations produce the

desired result for the donor. Indeed, why else would corporate executives refer to general

treasury contributions to the political parties as “investments” or the “cost of doing business”

if results were not obtained? See supra at 530. Although there is no evidence in the record

before this three-judge panel that federal bribery or gratuity laws have been violated in

exchange for nonfederal funds, see Findings ¶ 1.64, that is not what Buckley requires as a

basis for support of a contribution restriction. As Buckley observed, bribery laws “deal with

only the most blatant and specific attempts of those with money to influence government

action.” Buckley, 424 U.S. at 28. Contribution limitations, like those in Title I and in

Buckley, target the “opportunity for abuse inherent in the process of raising large monetary

contributions.” Id. at 30. Former Senator Rudman speaks to this point:
538

I understand that those who opposed passage of the Bipartisan Campaign

Reform Act, and those who now challenge its constitutionality in Court, dare

elected officials to point to specific [instances of vote buying]. I think this

misses the point altogether. [The access and influence accorded large donors]

is inherently, endemically, and hopelessly corrupting. You can’t swim in the

ocean without getting wet; you can’t be part of this system without getting

dirty.

Id. ¶ 1.65. The record in this case confirms Senator Rudman’s view that large nonfederal

contributions to the national political party committees achieve access. See id. ¶¶ 1.75-

1.80.1, 1.81. The record also contains an example demonstrating that large nonfederal

donations achieve their intended result– that is, having an effect “on candidates’ positions

and on their actions if elected to office.” Id. ¶ 1.66. Senator Simon testifies:

It is not unusual for large contributors to seek legislative favors in exchange

for their contributions. A good example of that which stands out in my mind

because it was so stark and recent occurred on the next to last day of the

1995-96 legislative session. Federal Express wanted to amend a bill being

considered by a Conference Committee, to shift coverage of their truck drivers

from the National Labor Relations Act to the Railway Act, which includes

airlines, pilots and railroads. This was clearly of benefit to Federal Express,

which according to published reports had contributed $1.4 million in the last

2-year cycle to incumbent Members of Congress and almost $1 million in soft

money to the political parties. I opposed this in the Democratic Caucus,

arguing that even if it was good legislation, it should not be approved without

holding a hearing, we should not cave in to special interests. One of my senior

colleagues got up and said, ‘I’m tired of Paul always talking about special

interests; we’ve got to pay attention to who is buttering our bread.’ I will never

forget that. This was a clear example of donors getting their way, not on the

merits of the legislation, but just because they had been big contributors. I do

not think there is any question that this is the reason it passed.

Findings ¶ 1.66; see also Colorado II, 533 U.S. 431, 451 n.12 (2001) (quoting Senator

Simon’s declaration); see also Findings ¶ 1.66 (Senator Feingold testifying that in the fall of
168 There is also testimony in the record suggesting that the political parties threaten

to withhold financial support for Members’ campaigns if they do not take the political party’s

position on an issue. Findings ¶ 1.68.

539

1996 a senior Senator suggested to him that he support the Federal Express amendment

because “they just gave us $100,000”). 

In addition, the record makes clear that the national political parties lobby their

Members of Congress on various legislative issues. Id. ¶ 1.67. A document in the record

suggests that at least on one occasion the political parties have asked Members to take a

position on an issue because of a donor’s interest in the issue. Id. ¶ 1.67.1.168 Furthermore,

Plaintiffs’ expert La Raja acknowledges that the “potential for quid pro quo exchange

between contributor and policymaker escalates with the size of the contribution,” and

recommends that “[t]o reduce the potential for corruption, I recommend that Congress place

a cap on hard money contributions or, if soft money is banned, raise the limits on hard money

contributions.” Id. ¶ 1.69. 

Therefore, while the record contains no evidence that federal bribery laws have been

broken–something not required by Buckley to support the contribution restrictions at issue

in the case–the record does contain certain examples showing that access achieves legislative

results and creates the potential for such arrangements. Findings ¶¶ 1.63, 1.68. Even without

this evidence, the access provided to federal officeholders and candidates by the political

party committees is more than sufficient to justify Congress’s decision to enact Title I.
540

Polling Data Demonstrates an Appearance of Corruption Relating to Large Donations to the

Political Parties

Evidence in the record demonstrates that the public, in response to the existence of

large nonfederal donations, perceives corruption in the nation’s campaign finance system.

Findings ¶ 1.84. A poll conducted by two prominent political pollsters, Mark Mellman and

Richard Wirthlin, shows that Americans believe that large donations to political parties affect

the decisions of Members of Congress. Id. ¶¶ 1.83.1, 1.83.1.1 The poll found that 77 percent

of Americans believe that big contributions to political parties have at least some impact on

decisions made by the federal government-- 55 percent believe the impact is great. Id.

Results from the 2002 Mellman and Wirthlin poll are also strikingly similar to those of a

survey conducted in 1974 and cited by the D.C. Circuit in Buckley, which reported that 69.9

percent of respondents believed that “the government is pretty much run by a few big

interests.” Buckley, 519 F.2d at 838-39. Mellman and Wirthlin’s survey found that 71

percent of those polled believe that Members of Congress make decisions based on what the

big contributors to their party want, even if it is not what their constituents want or what the

Member thinks is in the best interests of the country. Findings ¶ 1.83.1. An even greater

percentage, 84 percent, believe that Members are more likely to listen to large party

contributors because of their contributions, and 68 percent think that big contributors to

political parties have blocked decisions by the federal government that could improve

people’s everyday lives. Id. The poll also reflects that the public perceives that their views

are given less attention than those of large contributors. Eighty-one percent of those polled
541

believe that the views of those corporations, unions, interest groups or individuals who

donate $50,000 or more to a political party would likely receive special consideration from

Members of Congress, while only 24 percent believe a Member is “likely to give the opinion

from someone like them special consideration.” Id. 

Professor Robert Shapiro’s review of public opinion polls conducted since 1990

confirms the Mellman and Wirthlin conclusion that large nonfederal contributions are viewed

as corrupting by the public. Id. ¶ 1.83.2. He concludes that the public is troubled and

opposes large unregulated nonfederal contributions to political parties, that “a substantial

proportion of the public has perceived corruption in the political system, and that we are

losing ground.” Id. 

Another poll shows that 76 percent of high-level political contributors, those who

know the campaign finance system first-hand, are critical of the regime. Id. ¶ 1.83.6. The

polling data is confirmed by the testimony of corporate and individual donors stating that

nonfederal donations corrupt the campaign finance system or create the appearance of

corruption. Id. 

This polling data on the appearance of corruption reflects a dispiriting reality. The

public’s perception of the influence and effect of large nonfederal donations justified

Congressional action in enacting Title I.

Members of Congress Report that Constituents Are Concerned About Large Contributions

to Political Parties Which Demonstrates an Appearance of Corruption

In addition to the polling data, Members of Congress have expressed concern that
542

large contributions to their political parties create the appearance of corruption in the eyes

of their constituents. Id. ¶ 1.83.3. Among them is former Senator Simpson, who testifies that

“[b]oth during and after my service in the Senate, I have seen that citizens of both parties are

as cynical about government as they have ever been because of the corrupting effects of

unlimited soft money donations.” Id. Representative Asa Hutchinson wrote to the RNC

Chairman that he could not support the RNC’s proposed campaign finance bill because he

had to balance the RNC’s concerns 

with a concern of my constituents which is that their influence in politics is

being diminished by the abuses of soft money . . . . If our party is unable to

enact meaningful campaign finance reform while we’re in control of Congress,

then I believe this failure to act will result in more cynicism and create a

growing lack of confidence in our efforts.

Id. 

Members of Congress have also expressed concern over the appearance of corruption

inherent in the intersection of large contributions and legislative action on issues of concern

to the contributors. For example, Senator McCain testifies: 

[T]here’s an appearance [of corruption] when there’s a million dollar

contribution from Merck and millions of dollars to your last fundraiser that you

held, and then there is no progress on a prescription drug program. There’s a

terrible appearance there. There’s a terrible appearance when the Generic

Drug Bill, which passes by 78 votes through the Senate, is not allowed to be

brought up in the House shortly after a huge fundraiser with multimillion

dollar contributions from the pharmaceutical drug companies who are opposed

to the legislation.

Id. ¶ 1.83.4. In addition, Senator Feingold has remarked that “a $200,000 contribution [was]

given 2 days after the House marked up a bankruptcy bill by MBNA. OK, it is not illegal.
543

Conceded. Maybe it is not even corrupt, but it certainly has the appearance of corruption to

me and I think to many people.” Id. 

Examples like these are often picked up by the press, as evidenced by the sample press

articles provided by Defendants. Id. ¶ 1.83.5; see also id. (Senator Simpson and Plaintiffs’

expert Primo on the effect of press reports on the public’s perception of corruption); cf.

Buckley, 519 F.2d at 839 n.36 (“Looming large in the perception of the public and

Congressmen was the revelation concerning the extensive contributions by dairy

organizations to Nixon fund raisers, in order to gain a meeting with White House officials

on price supports.”). 

Plaintiffs’ expert La Raja comments:

[O]ne cannot ignore the central claim of reformers that the cash-based

electoral environment fosters mistrust of the political system. Observing the

amounts of money raised and spent in campaigns makes the average American

skeptical that the political process is fair. Such doubts raise questions about

political legitimacy. Even if politicians are not corrupt – and there has been

minimal evidence to prove this claim – there is certainly the appearance of

corruption. . . . 

It does not help matters that parties contribute to the arms race in campaigns.

By using soft money parties raise the ante in elections. Candidates feel

vulnerable to parties and interest groups that sponsor issue ads so they raise

more money than ever. Campaign costs increase as each side fights to a draw

. . . . Thus, the foraging for campaign money contributes to the perspective that

money corrupts the system.

Id. ¶ 1.83.7.

This testimony demonstrates that Members of Congress and political scientists were

aware of the public’s disaffection with the campaign finance system, and nonfederal money
544

in particular, prior to BCRA’s enactment. 

Conclusion 

In enacting Title I, Congress clearly was aware of the parallels between the “coercive

influence” of unlimited donations to federal candidates addressed by FECA’s contribution

limitations, and the “coercive influence” of nonfederal money donations to the national

political party committees the government asserts supports Title I. See, e.g., Thompson

Committee Report at 4563 (minority report) (“No one can deny that individuals who

contribute substantial sums of money to candidates are likely to have more access to elected

officials. And most of us think greater access brings greater influence. It was this concern

over linkages between money, access and influence -- amid allegations that Richard Nixon’s

1968 and 1972 presidential campaigns accepted individual contributions of hundreds of

thousands, even millions, of dollars -- that spurred Congress to enact the original campaign

finance laws. While those laws have evolved over the 20 years since that time, the goals

have remained the same: to prevent wealthy private interests from exercising

disproportionate influence over the government, to deter corruption, and to inform voters.”);

see also id. at 42-43 (majority report) (“Simply put, 25 years after Congress passed election

reform laws intended to insulate the President from an unseemly and potentially corrupting

involvement with campaign money, President Clinton spent enormous amounts of time

during the 1996 election cycle raising money. In the ten months prior to the 1996 election,

President Clinton attended more than 230 fundraising events, which raised $119,000,000.
545

The President maintained such a pace for over a year before the election, often attending

fundraisers five and six days each week. According to Presidential campaign advisor Dick

Morris, President Clinton ‘would say “I haven’t slept in three days; every time I turn around

they want me to be at a fundraiser . . . I cannot think, I cannot do anything. Every minute of

my time is spent at these fundraisers.” This frenzied pursuit of campaign contributions raises

obvious and disturbing questions. Can any President who spends this much time raising

money focus adequately upon affairs of state? Is it even possible for such a President to

distinguish between fundraising and policymaking?”). Congress appropriately recognized

that nonfederal money donations are primarily “given to secure a political quid pro quo from

current and potential office holders,” which undermines “the integrity of our system of

representative democracy.” Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26-27.

The record in this case is impressive and is much more substantial than what was

found in Buckley to support the contribution limitations at issue in that case. Prior to BCRA,

federal candidates and officials assisted their national political party committees in raising

enormous funds not only well outside FECA’s amount limitations, but also outside FECA’s

source limitations. The large nonfederal money donations were primarily given for one

purpose: they provided access to federal officeholders in order to exert influence over federal

legislative activity. Buckley and its progeny hold that Congress has broad authority to

combat the corruption associated with this situation. The corruption associated with

nonfederal donations to political party committees, and the appearance of corruption in the
546

mind of the public, therefore presents a compelling justification for Congress’s enactment

of Title I.

(2) Evidence From the Record in this Case Relating

to Circumvention

Before turning to the evidence of circumvention in the record, it bears repeating that

the record before the Supreme Court in Colorado II contained no actual evidence of political

parties making unlimited coordinated expenditures, but just a hypothesis of what could occur

if the “floodgates” to this practice were opened. Colorado II, 460 U.S. at 459 n.22. In this

case, the record before the three-judge District Court establishes in compelling fashion that

prior to the passage of BCRA, the contribution limitations in FECA were rendered

edentulous and that Congress, therefore, had justification to act. With that observation in

mind, I turn to the evidence in the record related to circumvention.

The National Party Committees Collect and Spend Nonfederal Funds Primarily to Avoid

FECA’s Contribution Limitations

The record in this case amply demonstrates that the national political parties have used

nonfederal funds to circumvent FECA’s contribution limits. The evidence leads me to the

same conclusion reached by Plaintiffs’ expert Raymond La Raja: 

By exploiting soft money rules, the parties effectively sidestep the federal

ceilings that prevent them from allocating resources efficiently in the closest

contests. To navigate around the federal restrictions on soft money the parties

have developed close ties with their state parties because these affiliates

receive special exemptions for party building activity.

Findings ¶ 1.69. As La Raja notes, the national political parties have used nonfederal funds
547

themselves, and through their state party counterparts, to affect federal elections, in

contravention of the spirit, if not the letter, of FECA.

The national political parties use nonfederal funds for electioneering purposes, despite

the fact that such funds are permitted under the rationale that they be used for “party

building” activities. Id. ¶ 1.41. The evidence shows that political parties spend a great deal

of the nonfederal funds that they raise on issue advocacy, id. ¶ 1.23-1.25, and testimony from

political party officials and experts, as well as documents in the record, show that very few

of these advertisements are aimed at party building, but rather are designed to affect federal

elections.

The National Party Committees Spend Nonfederal Funds on “Issue Advocacy”

Advertisements That Are Designed to Influence Federal Elections

The RNC’s own experts testify that “issue advocacy outside the context of

electioneering by political parties is rare,” and that party-sponsored issue advertisements are

intended to and do support the campaigns of federal candidates. Id. ¶ 1.19-1.19.1. These

assertions are supported by the numerous examples of these advertisements submitted for the

record, see, e.g., id. ¶¶ 1.14, 1.15 , as well as the testimony of Members of Congress, federal

candidates, political consultants, and an RNC official who acknowledges that the RNC’s

issue advocacy efforts are aimed at achieving a primary objective of getting more candidates

elected, id. ¶ 1.19, 1.13. Many of these advertisements focus on a candidate’s characteristics

or past actions (without reference to a future legislative event), such as one which noted that

a Congressional candidate had voted to raise taxes while in state and local government, and
548

concluded with the line: “If you think your family pays enough taxes . . . Call [___]. Tell her

to stop raising your taxes”. Id. ¶ 1.14. Other advertisements run by political parties compare

the past records of competing candidates in a stark and loaded fashion. Id. ¶ 1.15. One such

advertisement stated that one candidate was “the only member of Congress who did not want

to tell parents when a child molester moved into their neighborhood” but that the other

“supports laws that protect our children and keep violent criminals in jail for their full terms.”

Id. Another such advertisement told viewers that one candidate supported a welfare program

that “is restoring responsibility, pride and self-worth,” but that the other “voted against

moving able-bodied welfare recipients from welfare to work.” Id. (emphasis in original). 

The notion that such advertisements are intended to promote issues and not political

campaigns strains credulity.

The empirical evidence submitted shows that political party advertisements are

overwhelmingly candidate-centered. Ninety-two percent of party-sponsored advertisements

aired during the 2000 election did not identify the sponsoring political party by name, or

encourage voters to register with or support the party. Id. ¶ 1.17. During the 1998 election

cycle, of the $25.6 million spent by the political parties on advertisements, $24.6 million

went to commercials that referred to a federal candidate; out of the 44,485 advertisements

purchased by the parties, 42,599 identified a federal candidate. Id. ¶ 1.18. 

Furthermore, it is clear that the political parties run their advertisements largely in

competitive races, where the record shows they can have a significant impact on the outcome
169 Indeed, many of the characteristics of political party advertisements mirror those

of interest group-sponsored candidate-centered issue advocacy, detailed in my discussion of

Title II, supra.

549

of the election. Id. ¶¶ 1.16-1.16.1. The political parties also run advertisements to assist their

candidates’ campaigns when they are low on funds. Id. ¶ 1.20. For example, the RNC spent

$20 million in so-called “issue advocacy” to assist the Dole campaign between March and

August 1996 when the campaign had almost run out of money. Id. The advertisements run

by the RNC at this time included “The Story,” id. ¶ 1.20.1, and “Pledge,” id. 1.20.2, which

exemplify the two themes of the RNC’s campaign: build up then-Senator Dole and attack

then-President Clinton, id. ¶ 1.20. The record shows that the RNC had done “quantitative

and qualitative research [which] strongly suggest[ed] that [ “The Story”]needs to be run,” but

was concerned that “[m]aking this spot pass the issue advocacy test may take some doing.”

Id. 1.20.1. Nevertheless, the advertisement was run and paid for in part with nonfederal

funds. Id. 

This record convincingly demonstrates that political party advertisements, on which

much of the nonfederal funds collected by the national political party committees is spent,

influence federal elections and have little to do with “party building.”169

 Id. 1.10, 1.22. The

political parties are well aware of this as demonstrated by the fact one national political party

committee openly solicited funds for an issue advocacy campaign by describing it as an effort

“to ensure that the [Republican] party not only maintains, but expands our majorities in

Congress.” Id. ¶ 1.21. This reality, leads inevitably to the “conclusion that party soft money
170 The national political parties spend more nonfederal money on administrative

expenses, which constitute operating expenses such as salaries, benefits, supplies, and travel

expenses; however, Plaintiffs’ expert La Raja notes that these efforts do not constitute “party

building” activities. Findings ¶¶ 1.35, 1.26.4. Furthermore, these expenses are paid for with

a mix of funds demonstrating that they too have an effect on federal elections. Id. ¶ 1.35.

550

and electioneering in the guise of issue advocacy ha[s] rendered the FECA regime largely

ineffectual.” Id. ¶ 1.9.

National Party Committees Spend Comparatively Little Nonfederal Money on “Party

Building Activities,” Most of Which Have Some Impact on Federal Elections

Plaintiffs have provided examples of where national political parties have used

nonfederal, or a mix of nonfederal and federal money, for what they call “party-building”

activities. Activities such as state redistricting efforts, id ¶¶ 1.34-1.34.3, training seminars

for candidates, party officials, activists and campaign staff, id. ¶ 1.36, state and local

government affairs activities, id. ¶ 1.37, and minority outreach, id. ¶ 1.38, are all paid for

with a mix of federal and nonfederal funds which demonstrates that they have an effect on

federal elections, id. ¶ 1.40. Furthermore, the figures provided by the RNC show that these

activities constituted a very small percentage of their nonfederal and combined spending for

the 2000 cycle. Id. This finding computes with that of Plaintiffs’ expert Raymond La Raja,

who finds that only “8.5 percent of national party soft money expenditures went to

‘mobilization’ or ‘grassroots’” activities during the 2000 election cycle. Id. ¶ 1.25.170

The national political parties also spend nonfederal money on contributions to state

and local candidate campaigns. Id. ¶ 1.39. Defendants’ expert Thomas Mann found that

during the 2000 election cycle, “the national parties contributed only $19 million directly to
551

state and local candidates, less than 4% of their soft money spending and 1.6% of their total

financial activity in 2000.” Id. The RNC testifies that during the 2000 election campaign,

it donated approximately $7.3 million in nonfederal funds to state and local candidates. Id.

FEC documents show that this represents a very small percentage of the $163,521,510 in

nonfederal funds the RNC spent during the 2000 election cycle. Id. Again, it is evident that

despite Plaintiffs’ examples, the vast majority of nonfederal funds are not being used for

“party building” activities.

Nonfederal Money Donations Are Often Made on Behalf of Federal Candidates In Order to

Circumvent FECA’s Individual Limitations

Nonfederal donations to the national party committees, despite the fact they are

supposed to be used for “party building” purposes, are often solicited and made with the

intent that they will be used to assist a federal candidate’s campaign. Id. 1.56. Senator

Simpson observes that

[d]onors do not really differentiate between hard and soft money; they often

contribute to assist or gain favor with an individual politician. When donors

give soft money to the parties, there is sometimes at least an implicit

understanding that the money will be used to benefit a certain candidate.

Likewise, Members know that if they assist the party with fundraising, be it

hard or soft money, the party will later assist their campaign.

Id. ¶ 1.56.1. The Findings demonstrate that donors who give nonfederal funds to political

parties to support federal candidates are doing so to evade the individual contribution

limitations. See id. (“Although soft money cannot be given directly to federal candidates,

everyone knows that it is fairly easy to push the money through our tortured system to benefit
552

specific candidates.”) (quoting Senator Simpson). One donor explains that “[t]here appeared

to be little difference between contributing directly to a candidate and making a donation to

the [state] party. . . . Through my contributions to the political parties, I was able to give more

money to further Clinton’s candidacy than I was able to give directly to his campaign.” Id.

¶ 1.59.

These findings correlate to the record that was before the Supreme Court in Colorado

II, which stands for the same principle, that for donors the national political parties act as

conduits to federal candidates. See supra at 508. In the words of then-RNC Chairman Haley

Barbour: “the purpose of a political party is to elect its candidates to public office . . . .”

Findings ¶ 1.49.1. This sentiment is especially true with regard to the national congressional

campaign committees. As Plaintiffs’ expert La Raja observes, these committees traditionally

limit their activities to assisting their candidates’ campaigns. Id. ¶ 1.26.6. Therefore, the

record reflects that major nonfederal money donors use political parties to produce “obligated

officeholders.” Colorado II, 533 U.S. at 452. 

State and Local Party Committees Play an Integral Role in Helping the National Party

Committees Spend Nonfederal Funds on Federal Elections 

The record also demonstrates that the national political parties have used their state

political party “branches,” as Plaintiff’s expert Raymond La Raja terms them, as part of their

FECA circumvention scheme. Findings ¶ 1.42. Indeed, the RNC admitted as much in its

briefing:

The Republican Party is a single, unitary organization that comprises various
553

interrelated parts – the RNC, state and local parties, the RNC’s 165 members,

candidates identifying themselves as “Republicans,” and so forth. Indeed, the

state parties select the 165 voting members of the RNC, and the party through

its convention and other mechanisms nominates candidates.

RNC Opp’n at 23 (emphasis added). As La Raja concludes, the closeness between the state

and national political parties is a result of the attractiveness of using the state political

parties’ more favorable federal/nonfederal money allocation ratios to fund federal

electioneering practices. Findings ¶ 1.42. Large sums of nonfederal funds have been

transferred to the state political parties over the past decade. Id. ¶ 1.26.3. During the 2000

election cycle, over half of the nonfederal money raised by the national party committees was

transferred to the state political parties, a sum reaching $266 million. Id. ¶¶ 1.26.3, 1.4.3.

Rather than being used for “party-building” activities, as the rationale for nonfederal funds

provides, a large proportion of these funds were used to finance issue advertisements

intended to influence federal elections. Id. ¶¶ 1.26.4; see also id. ¶ 1.26. Plaintiffs’ expert

La Raja finds that when administrative expenses are excluded from the calculus, state

political parties invest most nonfederal funds transferred from the national political parties

on federal races, and concludes that more nonfederal funds are used for media rather than

party building. Id. Similarly former Senator William Brock, who is also a former Chairman

of the RNC, testifies that nonfederal funds are used almost exclusively to help elect federal

candidates and not for “party building.” Id. ¶ 1.11. A 1998 financial statement from the

Republican Party of New Mexico shows that it received revenues of $1,524,634 in

nonfederal transfers from other Republican organizations, $1,110,987 in individual
554

contributions, and $389,552 in federal transfers from Republican organizations. The state

political party spent over one-third of its revenues on “issue advocacy.” Id. ¶ 1.26.4.1.

Moreover, representatives of all the major national congressional committees testify

that they transfer nonfederal funds to state political parties in order to purchase

advertisements aimed at influencing federal elections. Id. ¶ 1.26.6. They also state that

although the state political parties may reject the national party committee’s requests that

transferred money be wired to specific consultants to pay for specific advertisements, they

generally comply with the request. In addition, advertisements supported with congressional

committee funds are not produced or recorded until the national party committees provide

final approval. Id. ¶ 1.26.7. Documentary evidence supports this testimony, and shows that

the state political parties are merely conduits in this process. Id. ¶ 1.26.7.2 (communications

from the NRCC to the CRP providing information about money that was wired to CRP’s

account with instructions to wire the money to a media consulting firm, and similar

documents from the DCCC to the CDP), ¶ 1.26.7.1 (NRSC memorandum suggesting an idea

for an attack advertisement, and a copy of an advertisement implementing the idea paid for

by the Republican State Central Committee of Nevada). These statements and documents

compute with Plaintiffs’ expert La Raja’s observation that “[i]t would be particularly

surprising for congressional campaign committees to venture outside their traditional scope

of helping candidates and invest in state party organizations.” Id. ¶ 1.26.6. The record also

demonstrates that the DNC and RNC operate in the same fashion. Id. ¶ 1.26.7.3, 1.26.7.2.
555

By purchasing these advertisements through the state political parties, the national political

parties take advantage of the better federal-to-nonfederal spending ratios under which the

state political parties operate. Id. ¶ 1.26.2, 1.27. 

In addition, both national political parties prepare and execute detailed campaign

strategies with their state affiliates for election campaigns that include state and federal

elections. Id. ¶ 1.43. The Democratic national and state political parties implement

“Coordinated Campaigns” which aim to allocate resources and coordinate plans for the

benefit of Democratic candidates up and down the entire ticket. Id. ¶ 1.43.1. The

Republican Party develops and implements similar plans with its state party affiliates called

“Victory Plans.” Id. ¶¶ 1.43.2-1.43.2.3. These plans demonstrate the close affiliation and

cooperation between the national and state political parties that has led one state political

party official to conclude that her state political party and national political party were

“integrally related.” Id. ¶ 1.43.1.

Therefore, it is very apparent that prior to BCRA’s enactment national political party

committees were using their state branches to assist in their circumvention of FECA, and in

the process were integrating the state political parties into the national political party

structure. Given this scenario, Congress made an appropriate predictive judgment that the

enactment of BCRA’s ban on nonfederal donations to the national political parties would

escalate the use of nonfederal donations to state political parties to circumvent national

campaign finance laws. Id. ¶¶ 1.44, 1.45.
556

It should be noted that Congress’s concern – that restrictions on state and local

political parties were necessary to prevent evasion of the nonfederal money ban at the

national committee level – is justified not only by the record in this case, but by Congress’s

institutional experience in the area of campaign finance regulation. The evidence before the

Buckley Court indicated that the $2 million contribution from the dairy industry to President

Nixon’s campaign was divided up into smaller amounts among hundreds of state-level

committees in order to avoid disclosure requirements. Buckley, 519 F.2d at 839 n.36 (cited

in Buckley, 424 U.S. at 27 n.28). Therefore, the technique of shifting money used to benefit

a federal candidate from the national level to the state level in order to avoid a federal

restriction is not new. Congress appropriately recognized the threat to the nonfederal funds

prohibition at the national committee level, if the state and local political party committees

were not prevented from using nonfederal funds on activities that directly influence federal

elections.

Nonfederal Money Donations Are Provided to State Party Committees on Behalf of Federal

Candidates In Order to Benefit the Federal Candidate

Furthermore, federal candidates and national party committees inform donors who

have given the maximum amount of federal funds to their campaigns/committees that they

can still help federal candidates by donating funds to state political parties. Findings ¶¶ 1.59,

1.60. An example of this is Congressman Wayne Allard’s letter relied on in Colorado II and

discussed supra at 510. One CEO describes the practice this way:

In 1992, when I told the Democratic Party that I wanted to support
557

then-Governor Bill Clinton’s presidential campaign, they suggested that I

make a $20,000 hard money contribution to the DNC, which I did. The

Democratic Party then made clear to me that although there was a limit to how

much hard money I could contribute, I could still help with Clinton’s

presidential campaign by contributing to state Democratic committees. . . .

Accordingly, at the request of the DNC, I also made donations on my own

behalf to state Democratic committees outside of my home state. . . . Through

my contributions to the political parties, I was able to give more money to

further Clinton’s candidacy than I was able to give directly to his campaign.

Findings ¶ 1.59. One wealthy contributor provides similar testimony:

Federal candidates have often asked me to donate to state parties, rather than

the joint committees, when they feel that’s where they need some extra help

in their campaigns. I’ve given significant amounts to the state parties in South

Dakota and North Dakota because all the Senators representing those states are

good friends, and I know that it’s difficult to raise large sums in those states.

The DSCC has also requested that I provide assistance to state parties.

Id. ¶ 1.60. As former DNC and DSCC official Robert Hickmott explains, “[o]nce you’ve

helped a federal candidate by contributing hard money to his or her campaign, you are

sometimes asked to do more for the candidate by making donations of hard and/or soft

money to . . . the relevant state party . . . .” Id. ¶ 1.59.

In addition, one CEO comments that in the past, donors who had reached their federal

limit would ask candidates if a nonfederal contribution would assist the campaign and were

told: “Don’t bother. The soft money just doesn’t do me any good.” However, 

in recent election cycles, Members and national committees have asked soft

money donors to write soft money checks to state and national parties solely

in order to assist federal campaigns. Most soft money donors don’t ask and

don’t care why the money is going to a particular state party, a party with

which they may have no connection. What matters is that the donor has done

what the Member asked.
558

Id. ¶ 1.51; see also id. ¶ 1.61. It is clear that these donations are valued by the national

political parties and federal candidates/officeholders who solicit them. Id. ¶ 1.62.

The record detailed above demonstrates that both major political parties collect

nonfederal funds, and direct nonfederal contributions to their state party “branches,” in order

to use that money to influence federal elections. The national political parties also transfer

nonfederal money through the state parties for the same purpose. The evidence shows the

amounts spent on “party building” and in support of state and local candidates is a small

fraction of the total amount of nonfederal funds raised by the national political parties. Not

including administrative expenses, the majority of these funds are used for so-called “issue

advocacy” designed to affect federal elections. After reviewing this record, I find myself in

agreement with Plaintiff’s expert La Raja: the parties

are highly functional rather than responsible. Rather than use soft money to

shore up weaker organizations, or reward state party members for moving

closer to national party ideology, the national organizations use soft money

like hard money – to pursue the short-term goal of winning elections.

Id. ¶ 1.26.5. 

Political Party Committees Suggest Donors Contribute to Issue Advocacy Organizations

The record also demonstrates that prior to BCRA, political parties and candidates

would solicit and donate funds to tax-exempt organizations, which would then fund activities

in order to influence federal elections on behalf of the political party or candidate-donor. Id.

¶ 1.85. Former DNC and DSCC official Robert Hickmott testifies that

[o]nce you’ve helped a federal candidate by contributing hard money to his or
559

her campaign, you are sometimes asked to do more for the candidate by

making donations . . . [to] an outside group that is planning on doing an

independent expenditure or issue advertisement to help the candidate’s

campaign. . . . As a result, there are multiple avenues for a person or group that

has the financial resources to assist a federal candidate financially in his or her

election effort, both with hard and soft money.

Findings ¶ 1.59.

In addition, the record reflects that each Republican Party national committee has

donated funds to the National Right to Life Committee, which Senator Phil Gramm, as

NRSC Chairman, explained was done to “help activate pro-life voters in some key states,

where they would be pivotal to the election.” Id. ¶ 1.85.2. Other documents in the record

show sizable political party donations have been made to nonprofit groups with common

political views in close proximity to federal elections to be used to mobilize the party’s

voters. Id ¶¶ 1.85.2, 1.85.3.

That such donations are used to affect federal elections is also demonstrated by the

fact that the national party committees and federal candidates or officeholders solicit

donations for tax-exempt groups. The National Right to Work Committee (“NRTWC”)

admits that “certain Members [of Congress] or Executive Branch Officials have generally

encouraged financial support for the Right to Work cause and, specifically, for the support

of NRTWC in advocating for these issues, through lobbying as well as issue advertising.”

Id. ¶ 1.85.4. A letter in the record from Congressman Pete Sessions asks a recipient to meet

with NRTWC personnel regarding the group’s effort to “stop Big Labor from seizing control

of Congress in November.” Id. ¶ 1.85.5. Similarly, Congressman Ric Keller signed a
560

fundraising letter for The Club for Growth, which assured potential donors that their money

would be used to “help Republicans keep control of Congress.” Id. The record also

demonstrates that the DSCC and DNC informs donors which tax-exempt organizations are

most effective at grassroots activities that affect federal elections. Id ¶ 1.85.1. Some of these

organizations are organized as ballot measure committees or political clubs that engage in

voter mobilization efforts which, when aimed at elections with federal candidates on the

ballot, affect federal elections. See id. ¶¶ 1.85.6, 1.85.8.

In addition, evidence in the record shows that federal officeholders and candidates

themselves have created their own tax-exempt organizations to assist in their election

activities. According to Public Citizen, 63 Members of Congress have organizations

organized under Section 527 of the Internal Revenue Code, and another 38 “have a stake in

the Congressional Black Caucus [] 527 organization.” Id. 1.85.7. These 527 organizations

are used to promote the Member’s career, as well as encourage strong state and local

candidates and spur partisan get-out-the vote efforts. Id. ¶ 1.85.7.1. One large DNC

contributor testifies that in early 2002 he donated $50,000 to the Daschle Democrats, a 527

organization, which ran advertisements in support of Senator Tom Daschle in response to

attacks made against him. The contributor made the donation “because [he] felt that the

attacks were hurting Senator Daschle and Senator Tim Johnson’s re-election campaign as

well.” Id. ¶ 1.85.7.2. The DNC has made large contributions to Section 527 groups

organized by candidates. Id. ¶ 1.85.7.3. Corporations also make large donations to federal
561

officeholder and candidate 527 organizations. Id. ¶ 1.85.7.3.

Congress was obviously concerned about this practice when it enacted Title I. For

example, legislative history reflects a discussion of Judith Vasquez’s contribution to a taxexempt organization. Ms. Vasquez wanted to contribute $100,000 to the DNC, however

because Ms. Vasquez was not a United States citizen, the donation was “problematic.”

Thompson Committee Report at 3663 (majority report). Therefore, Ms. Vasquez was told

to donate the money to “Vote Now ‘96,” “a tax-exempt GOTV organization that focused on

traditional Democratic constituencies.” Id. “Vasquez ultimately donated $100,000 to Vote

‘96.” Id. at 7105 (minority report). The legislative history also includes an NRSC document

entitled “Coalition Building Manual,” issued in 1994, the text of which was included in the

congressional record. Id. at 5969 (minority report) (discussing the document); see also id.

at 5987-6015 (Coalition Building Manual). The Manual states in particular that “[w]hat we

say about ourselves is suspect, but what others say about us is credible.” Id. at 5990

(emphasis in original).

It is clear that political parties and candidates have used tax-exempt organizations to

assist them in their efforts to win federal elections. Id. ¶ 1.86. Given this fact, and the fact

that BCRA prohibits state and national political parties from using nonfederal funds to affect

federal elections, the attractiveness of using these tax-exempt proxies would become even

more attractive to the political parties if nothing had been done by Congress to address this

obvious circumvention route. Id. 
562

Conclusion

The massive record in this case thus clearly demonstrates that the national political

party committees raise funds outside of Buckley’s source and amount limitations for purposes

directly related to federal elections. Moreover, state and local party committees, in addition

to nonprofit advocacy organizations, are used by the national party committees as part of

their circumvention scheme. Congress was correct to conclude, therefore, that a prohibition

on nonfederal funds at the national committee level would be ineffective at ending

circumvention of FECA’s contribution limitations. Accordingly, given the comprehensive

record developed in this case, which presents impressive evidence that nonfederal funds

secure easy evasion of the individual contribution limitations, I find that Congress was

justified in enacting Section Title I under an anti-circumvention theory of corruption.

(b) Title I Is Closely Drawn

(i) Section 323(a) is Closely Drawn

In my view, Section 323(a) is closely drawn to match the sufficiently important

governmental interests discussed above. When a court reviews a contribution limitation

enacted by a coordinate political branch, the court’s review is more deferential than if the

restriction at issue were an expenditure. In reviewing contribution restrictions, the Supreme

Court has deferred to congressional expertise as to both the need for prophylactic measures

or the particularities of those measures. See NRWC, 459 U.S. at 210 (“Nor will we second

guess a legislative determination as to the need for prophylactic measures where corruption
563

is the evil feared.”); see also NCPAC, 470 U.S. at 500 (observing that deference is proper,

but that it did “not suffice to establish the validity” of the expenditure restriction at issue in

that case); Def.-Int. Opp’n at 24. As Justice Breyer wrote in his concurring opinion in Shrink

Missouri:

In such circumstances–where a law significantly implicates competing

constitutionally protected interests in complex ways–the Court has closely

scrutinized the statute’s impact on those interests, but refrained from

employing a simple test that effectively presumes unconstitutionality. Rather,

it has balanced interests. And in practice that has meant asking whether the

statute burdens any one such interest in a manner out of proportion to the

statute’s salutary effects upon the others (perhaps, but not necessarily, because

of the existence of a clearly superior, less restrictive alternative). Where a

legislature has significantly greater institutional expertise, as, for example, in

the field of election regulation, the Court in practice defers to empirical

legislative judgments--at least where that deference does not risk such

constitutional evils as, say, permitting incumbents to insulate themselves from

effective electoral challenge. This approach is that taken in fact by Buckley

for contributions . . . . 

Shrink Missouri, 528 U.S. at 402 (Breyer, J., concurring) (emphasis added). Given my view

that this three-judge District Court should give deference to Congress’s judgment in the area

of contribution restrictions, and finding that no less restrictive alternative would ameliorate

the problems Congress sought to address with Section 323(a), I find the provision closely

drawn.

Plaintiffs argue that Section 323(a) is overbroad because it does not focus on the

amount or source of the national party committees’ funding and instead bans donations of

all nonfederal funds regardless of the amount. McConnell Br. at 38 (“To the extent that it

is the amount or source of donations of [nonfederal] funds which gives rise to actual or
564

apparent corruption, Title I contains no relevant tailoring at all.”) (emphasis in original);

McConnell Opp’n at 27; McConnell Reply at 21-22; see also RNC Br. at 45. Plaintiffs cite

the Hagel amendment as an example of a more narrowly tailored approach that Congress

should have adopted. McConnell Br. at 38 n.14. The Hagel amendment would have

imposed a $60,000 limit on aggregate donations of federal and nonfederal funds from any

one donor to a national party committee. I do not find Plaintiffs’ argument persuasive.

In Buckley, the challengers to FECA’s contribution limitations argued that the $1,000

limitation was “unrealistically low.” Buckley, 424 U.S. at 30. In flatly rejecting this

argument, the Supreme Court adopted the D.C. Circuit’s statement that “‘[i]f it is satisfied

that some limit on contributions is necessary, a court has no scalpel to probe, whether, say,

a $2,000 ceiling might not serve as well as $1,000.’” Id. (quoting Buckley, 519 F.2d at 842)

(observing that “Congress’ failure to engage in such fine tuning” by scaling the contribution

limitations based on the differences between congressional and Presidential campaigns was

not fatal to the contribution restrictions”). In much the same manner, Congress has made a

judgment that contributions of nonfederal funds to national political party committees

permits easy circumvention of FECA’s contribution limitations and raises an appearance of

corruption, and that the only means of addressing this problem is a complete ban at the

national political party level. Much as Buckley instructed that courts should not use a scalpel

to probe to see if a less restrictive means might be available, this three-judge District Court

should defer to Congress’s judgment that any cap on nonfederal funds would not ameliorate
171 Plaintiffs also argue that Section 323(a) is particularly overbroad with respect to

“minor parties” like the Libertarian Party which receives virtually no donations of large

amounts or donations from corporations. McConnell Br. at 38; McConnell Opp’n at 28-29.

Buckley forecloses this argument. In Buckley, the Supreme Court observed that “minor-party

candidates may win elective office or have a substantial impact on the outcome of an

election.” Buckley, 424 U.S. at 35; see also id. at 70. The Buckley Court, therefore, refused

to exempt minor parties, one of which was the Libertarian Party, see id. at 34 n.40, from the

contribution limitations. Accordingly, I do not find that BCRA is overbroad because it

applies to minor party candidates, and I also find that Plaintiffs have not presented sufficient

evidence to re-evaluate Buckley’s conclusion regarding minor parties.

565

the abuses it sought to be extinguished. Indeed, a cap on nonfederal funds would likely be

constitutionally suspect because the potential for circumvention would still exist and the

appearance of corruption surrounding $60,000 in donations to the national political party

committees would still be present. 

In short, Congress would not have accomplished its goal with such a cap because the

national political party committees would still be able to use the allocation percentages to

inject nonfederal funds into federal elections. Congress concluded that the FEC’s approach

for allocation was no longer acceptable at the national political party committee level. In my

judgment, Congress is entitled to make that judgment.171 Moreover, all nonfederal funds,

regardless of the source, pose the same potential for corruption. While corporate and labor

union donations of nonfederal funds may be more egregious in their use, given longstanding

federal policy against their use in federal elections, it is not simply corporate and labor union

donations that pose a problem. Contribution limitations are being directly circumvented by

individuals as well as corporations and labor unions. Plaintiffs’ argument that BCRA could

have been tailored better had it focused on particular sources is therefore unavailing.
566

Plaintiffs also contend that Section 323(a) is overbroad because it bans the receipt and

disbursement of nonfederal funds “no matter the purpose for which the funds are being given

or spent.” McConnell Br. at 39; McConnell Opp’n at 28; see also McConnell Reply at 22;

RNC Opp’n at 30-31. The critical assumption that Plaintiffs make is that the “use” of

nonfederal funds is what creates the actual or apparent corruption. McConnell Br. at 38. The

assumption by Plaintiffs is fatal to their argument.

As demonstrated above, the corruption associated with nonfederal funds is much

greater than the “uses” for which the money is put. Merely preventing the national political

party committees from spending nonfederal funds on certain activities would do nothing to

address the corruption associated with the national political party committees soliciting and

collecting nonfederal funds. The law is targeted at the collection and solicitation of

nonfederal funds, which are precisely the types of activities that Congress found posed the

greatest threat of corruption. Moreover, simply preventing the national political party

committees from using “soft money” to pay for the kinds of “issue” advertisements at which

Title II is directed, would do little, if anything, to prevent, in Buckley’s words, “the impact

of the appearance of corruption stemming from public awareness of the opportunities for

abuse inherent in a regime of large individual financial contributions.” Buckley, 424 U.S.

at 27. As amply demonstrated above, simply because the political party is the solicitor of the

funds is of no import, given that the political party committees are “agents for spending on

behalf of those who seek to produce obligated officeholders.” Colorado II, 533 U.S. at 452.
567

Regardless of the ultimate use of nonfederal funds, Congress appropriately concluded that

the solicitation and raising of nonfederal funds posed such a significant threat of corruption

that the only means of addressing the problem was a complete ban at the national committee

level.

In this vein, Plaintiffs argue that “the Supreme Court itself has already concluded that

the opportunity for corruption posed by unregulated soft money contributions to a party for

certain activities such as electing candidates for state office or for voter registration and get

out the vote drives is at best, attenuated.” RNC Br. at 45 (quoting Colorado Republican Fed.

Campaign Comm. v. FEC (“Colorado I”), 518 U.S. 604, 616 (1996)) (emphasis removed)

(internal quotation marks omitted). I disagree and find that the plurality opinion in Colorado

I actually provides authority for Congress’s enactment of Section 323(a). Justice Breyer’s

plurality opinion demonstrates this point:

We recognize that FECA permits individuals to contribute more money

($20,000) to a party than to a candidate ($1,000) or to other political

committees ($5,000). 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a). We also recognize that FECA

permits unregulated “soft money” contributions to a party for certain activities,

such as electing candidates for state office, see § 431(8)(A)(i), or for voter

registration and “get out the vote” drives, see § 431(8)(B)(xii). But the

opportunity for corruption posed by these greater opportunities for

contributions is, at best, attenuated. Unregulated “soft money” contributions

may not be used to influence a federal campaign, except when used in the

limited, party-building activities specifically designated in the statute. See §

431(8)(B). 

Colorado I, 518 U.S. at 616 (emphasis added). As is clear from the emphasized language,

the critical assumption behind Justice Breyer’s conclusion relating to nonfederal funds is that
172 The Defendant-Intervenors point out that in Colorado I

[t]he initial administrative complaint which led to the civil action was filed on

June 12, 1986, and the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment in the

civil action were filed in 1990, thereby shutting off further discovery. See

FEC v. Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 839 F. Supp. 1448, 1451

(1993), rev’d, FEC v. Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 59 F.3d

1015 (10th Cir. 1995), vacated, Colorado I, 518 U.S. 604 (1996). The

Colorado I plurality was careful to acknowledge that its conclusions about the

link between independent expenditures and corruption were premised on the

Court’s precedents in the absence of contrary factual evidence in the record.

See Colorado I, 518 U.S. at 617-18 (Court lacked “convincing evidence”;

“Government does not point to record evidence”). The language in the

controlling opinion suggests that the Court could revisit its conclusions if

faced with evidence calling those conclusions into doubt; for example, the

Court did not say that there could not be any “special dangers of corruption

associated with political parties,” only that it was “not aware of any” such

dangers. Id. at 616 (emphasis added).

Def.-Int. Reply Br. at 38 n.114.

568

“‘soft money’ contributions may not be used to influence a federal campaign, except when

used in the limited, party-building activities specifically designated in the statute.” Colorado

I, 518 U.S. at 616. However, as the record demonstrates in this case, Congress found that

nonfederal funds were being used in massive amounts to influence federal campaigns. The

pre-BCRA situation obviously changes the fundamental supposition underlying Justice

Breyer’s statement, which was premised on a factual record developed prior to the rise of soft

money as a financing tool for federal election purposes.172 Indeed, as Justice Breyer more

recently observed in his concurrence in Shrink Missouri, “After all, Buckley’s holding seems

to leave the political branches broad authority to enact laws regulating contributions that take

the form of ‘soft money.’” Shrink Missouri, 528 U.S. at 404 (Breyer, J., concurring).

Accordingly, I do not find Plaintiffs’ argument relating to Colorado I to have merit. With
173 This point applies equally to Plaintiffs’ suggestion that a more narrowly tailored

approach would have been to simply prohibit labor unions and corporations from

contributing nonfederal funds to the national political party committees. See McConnell

Opp’n at 27. Such a prohibition would not address the actual or apparent corruption

Congress sought to address with Section 323(a). The record amply demonstrates that the

corrupting potential of nonfederal funds donations was not simply confined to a particular

source but with the actual or apparent corruption posed by the solicitation of nonfederal

funds by federal officeholders and candidates and the problems created by the national

committees’ efforts to evade federal contribution limitations.

569

BCRA, Congress responded to the wholesale evasion of the contribution limitations and on

the basis of empirical evidence and experience, enacted Section 323(a), concluding “that the

potential for evasion of the individual contribution limits was a serious matter.” Colorado

I, 518 U.S. at 617.

Plaintiffs also argue that Section 323(a) is not closely drawn because it “sweeps in

activity relating only to state and local elections and therefore does not serve to get federal

candidates elected at all.” McConnell Br. at 39; McConnell Opp’n at 29; McConnell Reply

at 20-21. Plaintiffs’ argument, however, ignores the compelling reason behind Section

323(a): namely, that the close relationship between national political parties and federal

officials justified nothing else but a complete prohibition on raising nonfederal funds at the

national party committee level.173

Supreme Court precedent, the legislative history, and the record before this Court

powerfully demonstrate the need for the nonfederal funds prohibition at the national political

party committee level. As the Supreme Court observed in Colorado II, “[w]hat a realist

would expect to occur has occurred. Donors give to the party with the tacit understanding
570

that the favored candidate will benefit.” Colorado II, 533 U.S. at 458. The Findings of Fact

establish that there is “no wall between the national parties and the national government.”

Findings ¶ 1.47; see also Briffault at 651-52 (observing the web of relations linking major

donors, party committees and elected officials) (quoted with approval in Colorado II, 533

U.S. at 462-63). As Congress recognized, given the blurring of the lines between federal

officials and the national political party committees, the only way to address the problem

with nonfederal funds was to prohibit the national committees from raising it. Findings ¶

1.62. 

As discussed, supra, federal officeholders hold positions of power in both the national

political parties and the federal government. Briffault at 651 (“Under the current campaign

finance system, however, the ‘party-as-organization’ and the ‘party-in-government’ are

increasingly merged. Members of Congress constitute and control the CCCs [Congressional

Campaign Committees] that play the leading role in providing party money and campaign

services to congressional candidates. The President typically controls his party’s national

committee, and once a favorite has emerged for the presidential nomination of the other

party, that candidate and his party’s national committee typically work closely together. As

a result, large donations to the party organization are effectively donations not just to specific

candidates but to the party-in-government’s leadership, who use that money to protect or

expand their power in government, by spending in congressional races and the presidential

election.”). Indeed, officeholders and candidates who are successful fundraisers gain
571

enhanced stature in Congress as a result of their fundraising prowess. Findings ¶ 1.66

(statement of Senator Boren). In other words, it is often the case that those who are the best

“soft money” fundraisers are the most influential government officials. 

Given that the national political party committees and federal officeholders and

candidates are “inextricably intertwined,” Findings ¶ 1.62; see also ¶ 1.46, the national party

ban is closely drawn. The record overwhelmingly demonstrates that large “soft money”

donors are given access to special meetings with the President and key congressional leaders.

See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 1.75.5, 1.77.10. Accordingly, Congress was justified in placing a complete

ban on the national party committees raising nonfederal funds regardless of the ultimate use

of those funds and regardless of who ultimately solicits them.

Finally, Plaintiffs contend that Section 323(a) sweeps too broadly because it will have

“an immediate, debilitating, and long-lasting effect” on the national political party

committees. RNC Br. at 55. I find this argument implausible. It bears emphasizing that the

national political party committees have only been raising large sums of nonfederal funds in

recent years. I do not take Plaintiffs to be actually arguing that prior to the explosive growth

of nonfederal funds as a means of political party financing, political parties were somehow

handicapped and unable to effectively communicate their message. The idea, therefore, that

because political parties are now limited solely to federal funds they will be effectively

silenced, is nonsensical based on the record developed in this case. See RNC Br. at 54 (“The

net effects of BCRA will be massive layoffs and severe reduction of important core political
572

speech at the RNC, and reduction of many state parties to a ‘nominal’ existence.”). 

As Buckley observed, “[t]he overall effect of [FECA’s] contribution ceilings is merely

to require candidates and political committees to raise funds from a greater number of

persons and to compel people who would otherwise contribute amounts greater than the

statutory limits to expend such funds on direct political expression, rather than to reduce the

total amount of money potentially available to promote political expression.” Buckley, 424

U.S. at 21-22. The same applies to Section 323(a), which will require the national

committees of the political parties to raise funds from a greater number of persons.

Moreover, BCRA raises the individual contribution limitation to national political parties to

$25,000. Now each national political party committee is permitted to receive up to $15,000

from political action committees, 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(2)(B), and up to $25,000 from

individuals, BCRA § 307(a)(2); FECA § 315(a)(1); 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1)(B). In addition,

in comparing the federal funds raised by the political parties during the 1996 election cycle

with the 2000 election cycle, the Findings of Fact demonstrate that the amount of federal

funds raised has increased. Findings ¶ 1.4.2. Given that BCRA has increased the federal

funds limits for the national committees the suggestion that the absence of nonfederal funds

from the coffers of the national committees is going to create a “severe reduction of

important core political speech,” RNC Br. at 54, is simply not credible.

In sum, I am convinced that a ban on nonfederal funds raised by the national political

party committees is closely drawn to match the sufficiently important governmental interests.
174 Given my conclusion that Section 323(a), in its entirety, is constitutional, I need

not reach Judge Leon’s discussion narrowing Section 323(a). 

573

Deference to Congress’s judgment is warranted and appropriate for the contribution

restriction in Section 323(a). Moreover, given the record established in this case and judicial

precedent on the relationship of political parties and donors, I find that all of Plaintiffs’

arguments for why Section 323(a) is not closely drawn are without merit.174

(ii) Section 323(b) is Closely Drawn

Recognizing that the nonfederal funds prohibition on the national party committees

in Section 323(a) would be rendered entirely ineffective without some form of corresponding

restrictions on state, local, and district party committees use of nonfederal funds–a sensible

proposition given the evidence discussed above–Congress enacted Section 323(b).

Consistent with Congress’s recognition that some state party spending does exclusively affect

state elections, Congress doubled the hard money limitations available for state party

committees, BCRA § 102; FECA § 315(a)(1); 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1)(D), and permitted state

party committees to raise “Levin” funds to pay for Section 301(20)(A)(i) and (ii) activities,

provided that certain conditions are met. BCRA § 101 (a); FECA § 323(b)(2)(A)-(C); 2

U.S.C. § 441i(b)(2)(A)-(C). 

With Section 323(b), Congress struck a compromise between requiring state and local

political parties to use federal funds on “Federal election activity” and leaving to state law

the state political party financing of activities related to state and local elections. Indeed, as

one of the Senate sponsors stated:
574

[BCRA] represents a balanced approach which addresses the very real danger

that Federal contribution limits could be evaded by diverting funds to State and

local parties, which then use those funds for Federal election activity. At the

same time, the bill does not attempt to regulate State and local party spending

where this danger is not present, and where State and local parties engage in

purely non-Federal activities. We will not succeed in closing the soft-money

loophole unless we address the problem at the State and local level. We do

this, however, while preserving the rights and abilities of our State and local

parties to engage in truly local activity.

148 Cong. Rec. S2138 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 2002) (statement of Sen. John McCain).

The detailed evidence discussed supra, convincingly demonstrates that nonfederal

funds are funneled to the state political parties by the national political parties or donors at

the direction of the national political parties or federal officeholders and candidates, to be

used to influence federal elections. The evidence also shows that these contributions are

given with the intent and effect of influencing federal elections. In addition to the evidence

supra, representatives of all four of the national party congressional committees agree that

they transfer “federal and nonfederal funds to state and/or local party committees for voter

identification, voter registration and get-out-the-vote efforts. These efforts have a significant

effect on the election of federal candidates.” Findings ¶¶ 1.28, 1.32; see also id. ¶ 1.31.

These statements are corroborated by documentary evidence, id. ¶ 1.28.1, 1.32, as well as by

expert Donald Green who finds that

[t]he evidence from California, as well as from numerous opinion surveys and

exit polls that demonstrate the powerful correlation between voting at the state

and federal levels, shows quite clearly that a campaign that mobilizes residents

of a highly Republican precinct will produce a harvest of votes for Republican

candidates for both state and federal offices. A campaign need not mention

federal candidates to have a direct effect on voting for such a candidate. That
575

parties recognize this fact is apparent, for example, from the emphasis that the

Democrats place on mobilizing and preventing ballot roll-off among

African-Americans, whose solidly Democratic voting proclivities make them

reliable supporters for office-holders at all levels. As a practical matter,

generic campaign activity has a direct effect on federal elections. 

Id. ¶ 1.28.2; see also id. ¶ 1.30. Therefore these efforts by the state political parties in states

that hold their elections on the same day as federal elections, which the record shows are

funded in part by the national political parties, id. ¶ 1.28.3, 1.43.1, 1.43.2.1, affect federal

elections even if they are only intended to affect the state contests, id. ¶¶ 1.29, 1.33.

Congress clearly understood that political party committees are essentially one, large

interdependent organism and that without legislation targeted at state and local parties, the

new campaign finance law would permit easy evasion of the national party committee “soft

money” ban. Congress was appropriately concerned that if Title I of BCRA policed only

nonfederal donations at the national committee level, donors would simply make those same

donations to the state and local “branches” of the national committees, which would then use

those funds to influence federal elections. Congress would have accomplished little with a

direct prohibition at the national political party level if there was no corresponding restriction

on nonfederal funds at the state and local level, given the unitary nature of political parties.

Section 323(b) is a key provision of Title I designed to prevent the nonfederal funds

prohibition on the national parties in Section 323(a) from being rendered completely

ineffective.

In drafting Section 323(b), Congress was aware that under the FEC’s previous
576

allocation regime, state and local party committees were permitted to spend a mix of federal

and nonfederal funds on certain activities that directly influenced federal elections.

Congress found, however, that these allocation rules permitted easy evasion of the federal

contribution limitations because political parties at all levels were raising amounts, in many

instances, far in excess of federal contribution limitations. Those monies, instead of going

to fund a portion of nonfederal activity, were actually going to finance federal election

activity. Therefore, for the national political parties, Congress required that they be

exclusively financed with money raised according to federal law. With regard to the state

and local political parties, Congress refined the allocation rules to require that state parties

use exclusively federal funds when spending money on “Federal election activity.” Section

323(b), therefore, ensures that the state and local parties are no longer used as conduits for

national party spending of nonfederal funds to aid federal election campaigns. 

Section 323(b) accomplishes this goal by only limiting or, in some instances,

completely prohibiting state, district, and local political party committees’ use of nonfederal

funds when it is spent on: (1) voter registration activity that occurs within 120 days of a

regularly scheduled federal election; (2) voter identification, GOTV activity, or generic

campaign activity conducted in connection with an election where a federal candidate

appears on the ballot; (3) public communications that refer to a clearly identified candidate

for federal office and that promotes or supports or attacks or opposes a candidate for that

office; or (4) an employee who spends more than 25 percent of his or her time during a given
175 Throughout their briefing, Plaintiffs proffer various examples of what they claim

are “Federal election activit[ies],” which they then use to demonstrate BCRA’s

unconstitutionality. Many of these examples, however, are not covered under BCRA. For

example, the RNC suggests that the Republican Party of Ohio could not use nonfederal funds

to pay for printing a mailing of a flyer that reads “Vote Republican; John Smith for

Dogcatcher on November 6.” RNC Br. at 27. First, the printing and mailing of the flyer

would not be GOTV activity because it is not individualized. Also, it is not “generic

campaign activity” because it mentions a specific state candidate. Additionally, because it

only mentions a state candidate, it is not covered by Section 301(20)(A)(iii).

577

month on activities in connection with a federal election. BCRA § 101(b); FECA §

301(20)(A)(i)-(iv); 2 U.S.C. § 431(20)(A)(i)–(iv). Plaintiffs argue that “BCRA has imposed

a federally dictated clamp on the use of all state-regulated money.” CDP/CRP Opp’n at 16

(emphasis in original); see also McConnell Br. at 40 (Section 323(b) regulates “activity that

relates only to state and local elections and does not benefit federal candidates.”); CDP/CRP

Opp’n at 21 (Federal election activity “encompasses virtually all party activity”). Plaintiffs’

statements are clearly inaccurate. The definition of “Federal election activity” and the

corresponding restrictions on it in Section 323(b) are closely drawn to match the sufficiently

important interests discussed above.

175

It is true, no doubt, that Section 323(b) affects activity that has an impact on both

federal and state elections. However, this, in and of itself, does not instantly pose First

Amendment difficulties because the corruption related to nonfederal funds inheres in the

fundraising process where major nonfederal donations are provided in exchange for access

to federal officeholders and candidates–a process facilitated by the political party apparatus

at all levels. The record demonstrates that the state political parties were equal partners and
578

complicit in helping the national political parties raise and spend nonfederal funds for federal

election purposes. Recognizing, however, that not every activity in which a state political

party engages in affects federal elections, Congress sensibly limited the reach of BCRA to

“Federal election activities,” which are those activities at the state and local party level that

strongly benefit federal candidates. 

Since 1970, Congress has regulated the state and local political parties in this manner

by requiring them to pay for many of these “Federal election activities” with federal and

nonfederal funds. Plaintiffs’ never challenge the constitutionality of having to use allocation

percentages when paying for Section 301(20)(A) activities. If, as Plaintiffs’ apparently

concede, it is consistent with the Constitution to regulate how this activity is paid for in the

first instance, then it is difficult for Plaintiffs to offer any compelling First Amendment

argument that Congress is unable to require these activities to be paid for solely with federal

funds, particularly given the interests articulated in the foregoing section. Plaintiffs’ real

complaint is that they are unable to continue to use the allocation ratios to pay for Section

301(20)(A) activities as they have done since the late 1970s. However, given the record in

this case, I conclude that Congress is entitled to modify the allocation ratios as it has done

statutorily in Section 323(b). To reiterate, the Supreme Court instructs that courts should not

“second guess a legislative determination as to the need for prophylactic measures where the

corruption is the evil feared.” NRWC, 459 U.S. at 210; cf. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC,

512 U.S. 622, 665 (1994) (“courts must accord substantial deference to the predictive
579

judgments of Congress”). 

In 1987, Judge Thomas Flannery of the United States District Court for the District

of Columbia required the FEC to implement regulations standardizing the allocation system.

Common Cause v. FEC, 692 F. Supp. 1391, 1396 (D.D.C. 1987). Judge Flannery observed

that “it is possible that the Commission may conclude that no method of allocation will

effectuate the Congressional goal that all monies spent by state political committees on those

[volunteer materials, voter registration, and GOTV activities,] be ‘hard money’ under the

FECA.” Id. In 1987, it was determined that the allocation regime was sufficient. At the

time of BCRA’s passage, however, Congress determined that the allocation system was

ineffective at preventing nonfederal funds from influencing federal elections. 

Congress concluded, on the basis of the evidence before it, that the problems related

to nonfederal funds already existed at the state political party level and that, prospectively,

a national political party “soft money” ban would be entirely ineffective at the national level

without some corresponding regulations at the state and local political party level. I shall

briefly turn to each of the determinants of “Federal election activity.”

(1) Section 301(20)(A)(i) and (ii) Activities

With regard to Section 301(20)(A)(i) and (ii) activities, the Findings compellingly

demonstrate that voter registration activities, voteridentification, GOTV activities, or generic

campaign activity conducted in connection with an election where a federal candidate is on

the ballot will have an influence on federal elections. As discussed supra, the record
580

includes the testimony of the representatives of all four of the national party congressional

committees that they transfer “federal and nonfederal funds to the state party committees for

voter identification, voter registration and GOTV efforts.” Findings ¶¶ 1.28, 1.32 (officials

observing that “[t]hese efforts have a significant effect on the election of federal

candidates”); see also id. ¶ 1.28.1, 1.32 (CDP touting impact it has on federal elections with

voter registration, vote-by-mail, and get-out-the-vote efforts in a letter it sent to a

contributor). Furthermore, it is clear that efforts to encourage a particular political party’s

partisans to the polls, will assist all of that party’s candidates on the ballot, state, local and

federal alike. Voter mobilization efforts are designed to get a particular political party’s

faithful to the polls for a particular election.

Moreover, the Levin Amendment provides further evidence that Congress sought to

accommodate the interests of the state political party committees in drafting Section 323(b).

Given that a majority of states hold their elections at the same time as federal elections,

Congress recognized that Section 301(20)(A)(i) and (ii) activities would have a more

dramatic effect on state and local elections than on other activities. As a result, Congress

found it important to permit the state and local parties to supplement their federal funding

with nonfederal funds raised pursuant to the Levin Amendment to pay for these activities.

As long as the activity does not refer to a clearly identified candidate for federal office, the

funds are not used for certain broadcast communications, and the funds are raised directly

by the state or local political party according to the requirements of state law (in increments
581

of $10,000 or less) the state political party committees can use Levin funds to pay for Section

301(20)(A)(i) and (ii) activities. When paying for activities with Levin funds, the FEC’s

allocation percentages apply to the expenditure. 

As a result, the Levin Amendment essentially acts as a modified allocation system.

Congress determined that Section 301(20)(A)(i) and (ii) activity would often have a

significant effect on state elections, given that most states hold elections at the same time as

the federal government. By permitting the state and local parties to raise and spend “Levin

funds,” Congress allowed state and local political parties to continue to raise funds not

subject to FECA in a way that would not jeopardize the rest of the nonfederal money

restrictions in Title I. It can hardly be argued that a $10,000 donation to a state political party

committee poses a threat of corruption when the federal limit on individual giving to state

parties is also $10,000, BCRA § 102; FECA § 315(a)(1); 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1)(D), the limit

to national parties is $25,000, BCRA § 307(a)(2); FECA § 315(a)(1); 2 U.S.C. §

441a(a)(1)(B), and the total cap on individual contributions is $95,000 per two-year election

cycle, of which $37,500 may be contributed to candidates. BCRA § 307(b); FECA §

315(a)(3); 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(3). In other words, even though the Levin Amendment permits

some nonfederal money into the political party system, it does so in a way that will not create

a new loophole and also serves to accommodate state interests regarding their elections.

Because it was Congress’s desire to prevent a new loophole from emerging, when it

enacted the Levin Amendment, Congress prohibited transfers among or joint fundraising by
176 I am also not persuaded by the doomsday scenario described by the CRP and CDP

regarding the effect BCRA will have on their fundraising. Findings ¶¶ 1.98-1.99.1 (also

describing their fundraising and spending generally). Their estimations of BCRA’s impact

on their fundraising efforts are not based on any formal analysis, but instead on an

application of BCRA to past fundraising efforts which is explained in an imprecise manner

that leaves as many questions as it answers. Id. ¶ 1.98. It is unrealistic to think that the state

political parties will fundraise in exactly the same fashion under the BCRA regime as they

did under FECA. Furthermore, Plaintiffs’ own expert Raymond La Raja believes that BCRA

will not affect some state parties’ fundraising efforts at all, and while others may be affected,

“[o]ne thing we can be sure of is that parties will figure out the ground rules and they will

find an important role for themselves within the new campaign finance regime. Id. 

582

state and local political parties with respect to “Levin funds.” BCRA § 101, FECA §

323(b)(B)(iv), (C); 2 U.S.C. §§ 441i(b)(2)(B)(iv), (C). I am not persuaded by Plaintiffs’

arguments that these provisions are not closely drawn. McConnell Br. at 40; CDP/CRP Br.

at 36-39.176 As stated by Defendant-Intervenors, “[w]ere state and local parties free to

transfer $10,000 contributions among themselves, contributors could multiply the amount of

their permissible contribution to a particular party simply by funneling additional soft money

through other party committees.” Def.-Int. Br. at 63 n.228. By way of example, a donor

attempting to gain influence with a candidate in one congressional district could make ten

$10,000 contributions to ten local parties, on the understanding that the entire $100,000

would be transferred to the one party that was engaged in “Federal election activities” in that

candidate’s district. Def.-Int. Opp’n at 34. Of course, state and local political parties remain

free jointly to raise or transfer as much nonfederal funds as they desire to pay for activities

that are not considered “Federal election activity,” subject only to state restrictions.

With the Levin Amendment, Congress determined that state and local political party
177 In doing so, I am also not persuaded by Plaintiffs’ arguments that some of the

provisions in Section 301(20)(A)(i) and (ii) are vague; particularly “get-out-the-vote

activity.” See, e.g., CDP/CRP Br. at 33. First, I am not persuaded that a reasonable person

would have difficulty understanding what is meant by these terms, and the fact that these

provisions apply to political actors only strengthens my conviction. Second, the FEC has

promulgated implementing regulations related to “Federal election activity.” Prohibited and

Excessive Contributions: Non-Federal Funds or Soft Money, 67 Fed. Reg. 49,064, 49,083

(July 29, 2002). In my judgment, these regulations may mollify any constitutional

uncertainties related to these terms. See Martin Tractor Co. v. FEC, 627 F.2d 375, 384-387

(D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied sub nom. Nat’l Chamber Alliance for Politics v. FEC, 449 U.S.

954 (1980). In Martin Tractor, the Court of Appeals determined that the advisory opinion

process and the uncertainty of plaintiffs’ legal rights counseled against premature

constitutional adjudication because the “adversarial posture assumed by the parties and

contours of their dispute,” id. at 387, lacked clarity, unlike other cases that had found

ripeness in similar circumstances. Moreover, the fact the FEC “has said or done nothing .

. . to indicate how it construes the term ‘solicit,’” left the court “without substantial guidance

to decide this case or even to frame the constitutional issues at stake.” Id. at 387. Finally,

Plaintiffs have not spent much time briefing this issue, and I am therefore chary to strike

these provisions down without waiting to see if the FEC’s regulations ameliorate Plaintiffs’

vagueness concerns. In the interim, an Advisory Opinion process stands by to prevent any

potential chill that might be incurred by Plaintiffs.

583

committees should be permitted to spend limited amounts of nonfederal funds on certain

“Federal election activities.” Enacting this provision further demonstrates that Congress

made a significant effort to tailor the nonfederal money restrictions at the state party level.

Given that the provision must only be “closely drawn,” I find that Congress’s restrictions on

Section 301(20)(A)(i) and (ii) activities are constitutional.177

(2) Section 301(20)(A)(iii) Activity

Turning to Section 301(20)(A)(iii)–a public communication that supports or opposes

a clearly identified federal candidate–I likewise find this provision constitutional under the

First Amendment. In Judge Leon’s opinion, he explains why Congress’ decision to restrict
178 This statement applies with equal force to any of the portions of my colleagues’

opinions in which I am concurring.

584

state and local party organizations to funding Section 301(20)(A)(iii) activities with federal

funds is closely drawn to match a sufficiently important interest. I agree with his analysis

and concur with him that Section 323(b) is constitutional in restricting the state and local

party committees to spending federal funds on Section 301(20)(A)(iii) activities. I would

additionally point out that I am particularly persuaded by Judge Leon’s discussion of the fact

that Section 301(20)(A)(iii) is a restriction on a contribution (as opposed to an expenditure).

To the extent that Judge Leon’s opinion on this point is inconsistent with anything that I have

discussed in my own opinion–for example, my view of Buckley’s definition of corruption or

my view of what constitutes pure issue advocacy–I do not join those portions of Judge

Leon’s discussion.178

(3) Section 301(20)(A)(iv) Activity

Finally, with regard to Section 301(20)(A)(iv) activity–requiring state and local parties

to use federal funds to pay the salary of an employee who spends more than 25 percent of his

or her compensated time in a month in connection with a Federal election–I find that none

of the Plaintiffs have articulated a specific reason for striking the provision down. In other

words, Plaintiffs do not provide any specific argument as to why that provision is

unconstitutional. Given the paucity of specific briefing on this provision (Defendants have

also not spent any time addressing this specific provision), I would not hold Section

301(20)(A)(iv) facially unconstitutional.
585

(4) Conclusion

I find that Section 323(b) is closely drawn to match the sufficiently important

governmental interests at stake in this case. Congress was appropriately concerned, as the

record in this case tellingly indicates, that a prohibition on nonfederal funds at the national

level would be entirely ineffective without corresponding restrictions on the state and local

party committees. Section 323(b) is a closely drawn answer to that problem that continues

to permit State and local parties to raise as much nonfederal funds as they are able to raise,

consistent with state law, to be spent on activity that solely affects state elections. 

(iii) Section 323(c)

This provision is not specifically challenged by any Plaintiff. As such, I do not pass

on its constitutionality.

(iv) Section 323(d) is Closely Drawn

Section 323(d) is a measure intended to prevent political parties from using taxexempt groups as a means of evading FECA’s source, amount, allocation, and disclosure

requirements. BCRA § 101; FECA § 323(d); 2 U.S.C. § 441i(d). Section 323(d)

accomplishes this goal by prohibiting any political party committee or its agents from

“solicit[ing]” funds for or “mak[ing] or direct[ing]” any donations to either: (i) any

tax-exempt section 501 organization, see 26 U.S.C. § 501(c), that spends any money “in

connection with an election for Federal office (including expenditures or disbursements for

Federal election activity)”; or (ii) any section 527 organization, see 26 U.S.C. § 527, (other
179 Section 527 of the tax code defines a “political organization” as “a party,

committee, association, fund, or other organization (whether or not incorporated) organized

and operated primarily for the purpose of directly or indirectly accepting contributions or

making expenditures, or both, for an exempt function.” 26 U.S.C. § 527(e)(1). An “exempt

function” is defined as “the function of influencing or attempting to influence the selection,

(continued...)

586

than a state or local party or the authorized campaign committee of a candidate for state or

local office). BCRA § 101; FECA § 323(d)(1); 2 U.S.C. §§ 441i(d).

As discussed above, the record clearly indicates that prior to BCRA, the political

parties used tax-exempt organizations as a means of evading FECA’s requirements.

Congress was appropriately concerned that without restrictions on party solicitation and party

direction of federal and nonfederal money to tax-exempt interest groups, party committees

would continue to use satellite party organizations disguised as tax-exempt groups to

continue to circumvent FECA and also help the parties circumvent the new contribution

requirements in BCRA. Seen from this perspective, Section 323(d) is a reasonable,

prophylactic measure to which this three-judge District Court owes deference. NRWC, 459

U.S. at 210.

Section 323(d) is closely drawn because it only applies to Section 501(c) organizations

that “make[] expenditures or disbursements in connection with an election for Federal office

(including expenditures or disbursements for Federal election activity),” BCRA § 101;

FECA § 323(d)(1); 2 U.S.C. § 441i(d)(1) (emphasis added), and Section 527 organizations,

which by definition have been given tax-exempt status because they engage in political

activity.179 BCRA § 101; FECA § 323(d)(2); 2 U.S.C. § 441i(d)(2). Section 323(d),
179(...continued)

nomination, election, or appointment of any individual to any Federal, State, or local public

office or office in a political organization, or the election of Presidential or Vice- Presidential

electors, whether or not such individual or electors are selected, nominated, elected, or

appointed.” 26 U.S.C. § 527(e)(2).

587

therefore, focuses only on those non-profit organizations that have posed a threat to the

stability of the campaign finance regime. Parties continue to be permitted to contribute to

any 501(c) organization that does not engage in “Federal election activity,” BCRA § 101;

FECA § 323(d)(1); 2 U.S.C. § 441i(d)(1), and are free to contribute federal funds to PACs

formed by tax-exempt organizations that do engage in “Federal election activities,” BCRA

§ 101; FECA § 323(d)(2); 2 U.S.C. § 441i(d)(2).

Despite this tailoring, Plaintiffs make a number of arguments that exaggerate the reach

of Section 323(d). For example, the CDP Plaintiffs contend that Section 323(d) “prohibits

the parties from participating in ballot measure campaigns.” CDP/CRP Br. at 44. This

statement is incorrect as state political parties are not in any way prohibited by BCRA from

making direct expenditures to support or oppose ballot measures. BCRA does prohibit the

state and local committees from soliciting donations on behalf of and directing any donations

to an organization that engages in “Federal election activity.” To the extent that ballot

measure organizations, which the CDP Plaintiffs argue are “typically” Section 501(c)(4)

organizations, engage in “Federal election activity,” BCRA prohibits the political party

committees at all levels from directing monetary contributions to those organizations. 

There is no question that ballot measure organizations often engage in GOTV activity
588

in and around federal elections. Indeed, the CDP should understand this fact. On October

19, 1999, Judge Garland E. Burrell, Jr. of the Eastern District of California ordered summary

judgment for the Commission against the CDP because the CDP had contributed $719,000

in nonfederal funds to “Taxpayers Against Deception–No On 165,” a tax-exempt California

political committee opposed to a state spending referendum. FEC v. CDP, No. S-97-0891

(E.D. Cal. Oct. 14, 1999) (order granting summary judgment) at 2. None of the CDP’s

donations were reported to the FEC, id. at 7-8, and all but $2,000 of the money contributed

by the CDP was knowingly used for partisan voter registration. Id. at 2, 13. The ballot

committee persuaded the CDP to donate $719,000 to its organization because it promised to

target potential registrants that would be predisposed to vote for Democrats based on historic

voting patterns. Id. at 4. The district court in that case found that on the basis of this

conduct, the CDP had “violated the FECA and the allocation rules by funding a generic voter

drive that targeted Democrats.” Id. at 15. Accordingly, contrary to the CDP’s contention,

ballot measure committees can not only help a party committee avoid disclosure

requirements, but they can also help party committees avoid the allocation system. In other

words, in the FEC v. CDP case, the $719,000 in nonfederal funds transferred to the ballot

committee for voter registration did not have to be allocated between federal and nonfederal

accounts, as the CDP would have had to do if it had engaged in the same spending. See also

Findings ¶ 1.85.6.

The CDP Plaintiffs also make the argument that a party official could violate the law
589

“simply for contributing to his or her church, if the church has engaged in non-partisan

activities encouraging (or assisting) its members to vote.” CDP/CRP Br. at 46. This

statement is incorrect. Section 323(d) only prohibits actions by party officials “on behalf of”

the party committee. BCRA § 101; FECA § 323(d); 2 U.S.C. 441i(d). A party official’s

personal donation of his or her own money to a church, like other donations or solicitations

made by party officials individually on their own behalf, are simply not covered under

Section 323(d).

Section 323(d) applies to the party committees soliciting and directing federal and

nonfederal funds to these tax-exempt organizations. The evidence in this case and the record

before Congress demonstrates congressional concern with the role of tax-exempt

organizations in circumventing FECA’s contribution restrictions. See Findings ¶¶ 1.85-1.86.

As discussed earlier, the record in this case establishes that prior to BCRA, parties and

candidates would solicit and donate funds to tax-exempt organizations which would then be

used to influence federal elections on behalf of the party or candidate donor. The legal

advantage to employing a tax-exempt organization is that it avoids the source, amount,

disclosure, and allocation system of the FECA regime. Therefore, Congress recognized that

continuing to permit parties to solicit and direct federal funds to these tax-exempt

organizations logically posed a circumvention problem. Notably with BCRA, Congress does

permit political party committees to solicit and direct federal funds to PACs, which are

regulated under FECA and required to make disclosures and to accept only federal funds.
590

Tax-exempt organizations can establish political committees under the Act to which political

parties can direct funds or solicit donations to the PAC.

As the foregoing discussion indicates, I find that Congress acted prophylactically and

on the basis of a compelling record to ensure that tax-exempt organizations would not

undermine the Title I’s restrictions on nonfederal funds. As such, and on the basis of the

record before me, I determine that Section 323(d) is closely drawn and facially constitutional.

(v) Section 323(e) is Closely Drawn

I concur with Judge Henderson’s conclusion that Section 323(e) is constitutional

under the First Amendment, albeit on slightly different grounds. Given my conclusion

regarding the definition of Federal election activity, I do not find it necessary to narrowly

construe the provision. 

As discussed at length, political parties dangle access to federal candidates as bait to

lure large nonfederal money donors. In response to this obvious problem, Congress enacted

Section 323(e), which prohibits federal candidates and officeholders from soliciting,

receiving, directing, transferring, or spending any nonfederal funds in connection with a

federal election. BCRA § 101; FECA § 323(e)(1)(A); 2 U.S.C. § 441i(e)(1)(A). The statute

permits federal candidates or officeholders to raise nonfederal funds in connection with a

state and local election, provided that those funds do not exceed the federal contribution

limitations and are from sources permitted under federal law. BCRA § 101; FECA §

323(e)(1)(B)(i) and (ii); 2 U.S.C. § 441i(e)(1)(B)(i) and (ii). Notably, a federal officeholder
591

or candidate “may attend, speak, or be a featured guest at a fundraising event for a State,

district, or local committee of a political party.” BCRA § 101; FECA § 323(e)(3); 2 U.S.C.

§ 441b(e)(3). Also, federal candidates and officeholders may solicit money on behalf of any

tax-exempt Section 501(c) organization whose “principal purpose” is not 301(20)(A)(i) or

(ii) activity, so long as the solicitation does not specify how the funds will be spent. BCRA

§ 101; FECA § 323(e)(4)(A); 2 U.S.C. § 441i(e)(4)(A). Concomitantly, a federal candidate

is permitted to raise money for a tax-exempt Section 501(c) organization that does engage

in Section 301(20)(A)(i) and(ii) activity, subject to the condition that he or she may solicit

up to $20,000 per person per year from individuals only. BCRA § 101; FECA §

323(e)(4)(B)(i) and (ii); 2 U.S.C. § 441i(e)(4)(B)(i) and (ii).

BCRA is closely drawn because it permits federal candidates and officeholders to

continue to engage and fully participate in the political process, but closely circumscribes

their activities to prevent the kinds of problems that developed with their solicitation of

nonfederal funds. For example, under BCRA, a federal officeholder may raise up to $2,000

from an individual for use in a state election, but may not raise money from a corporation for

that purpose. However, to avoid undermining traditional political activity, BCRA permits

federal candidates and officeholders to appear and speak at state and local party events. Cf.

Findings ¶¶ 1.97, 1.96. Accordingly, Plaintiffs are simply wrong to claim that, under BCRA,

“aside from speaking at and attending fundraising events, federal officeholders and

candidates will otherwise be prohibited altogether from raising money directly for state and
592

local candidates.” McConnell Br. at 23-24. Rather, BCRA permits federal officeholders and

candidates to raise nonfederal funds for state candidates, provided that they are within the

federal source and amount limitations.

In my judgment, Defendants have adequately explained why Section 323(e) permits

federal officeholders and candidates to make certain solicitations for tax-exempt

organizations and why political parties and party officials under Section 323(d) are prohibited

from making the same solicitation. See RNC Br. at 46 (arguing the “[t]hese provisions

subjecting political parties to flat bans while permitting federal candidates and officeholders

to engage in the same activities reveal an utter lack of tailoring in the Act’s treatment of

parties.”). The reason for the difference is that unlike political party officials, candidates are

subject to limits on solicitation at all times, not whether or not they are acting on behalf of

the party. As Defendants suggest, “it was reasonable for Congress to allow candidates to

make solicitations under limited circumstances that accommodate the legitimate interests of

candidates in providing personal support for certain organizations, while retaining the

monetary limits that help minimize the risk of corruption.” Gov’t Opp’n at 39. Plaintiffs’

offer no real response to this in their filings.

As Judge Henderson has observed in regard to Section 323(e) in her opinion, “[i]t

bears emphasizing that the plaintiffs do not challenge this provision with the same vigor as

they do BCRA’s other non-federal fund restrictions.” Henderson Op. at 323. Given that

Plaintiffs have spent little time engaging in a discussion of these issues and the fact that the
593

record before this three-judge District Court amply supports the congressional decision to

regulate federal candidates in this manner, I find that under Buckley’s scrutiny applicable to

contribution restrictions, Section 323(e) is closely drawn and, therefore, consistent with the

First Amendment.

(vi) Section 323(f) is Closely Drawn

For the reasons set forth in Judge Leon’s opinion, I similarly find Section 323(f)

closely drawn to match the sufficiently important governmental interests discussed above.

(c) Conclusion

In my judgment, Title I is a closely drawn contribution restriction targeted at reducing

the corrosive influence of nonfederal funds on federal elections. As Justice Byron White

remarked in Citizens Against Rent Control: “Every form of regulation–from taxes to

compulsory bargaining–has some effect on the ability of individuals and corporations to

engage in expressive activity. We must therefore focus on the extent to which expressive and

associational activity is restricted by [the law at issue].” Citizens Against Rent Control, 454

U.S. at 310 (White, J., dissenting). Taking a comprehensive view of Title I, as I have done

in my discussion above, I conclude that any infringement on First Amendment protections

is more than outweighed by the significant state interests behind regulating nonfederal funds.

Accordingly, I find Title I consistent with the First Amendment guarantees of speech and

association and the ruling in Buckley.
180 As Professors Rotunda and Nowak discuss:

It is generally unnecessary to analyze laws which burden the exercise of First

Amendment rights by a class of persons under the equal protection guarantee,

because the substantive guarantees of the Amendment serve as the strongest

protection against the limitation of these rights. Laws which classify persons

in their exercise of these rights will have to meet strict tests for

constitutionality without need to resort to the equal protection clause. Should

the laws survive substantive review under the specific guarantees they are also

likely to be upheld under an equal protection analysis, for they have already

(continued...)

594

C. Plaintiffs’ Equal Protection and Underbreadth Claims

Plaintiffs contend that Title I is also unconstitutional because it violates the Fifth

Amendment by restricting the activities of political parties without imposing similar

restrictions on special interest groups. See, e.g., McConnell Br. at 40-43; RNC Br. at 57. As

a corollary to this argument, Plaintiffs contend that in treating political parties differently

from special interest organizations, Title I is fatally underinclusive because it “does not begin

to address the supposed access enjoyed by hard-money donors to political parties or by

special interest groups.” RNC Br. at 65. Since I find Title I consistent with the First

Amendment guarantees of speech and association, I am required to reach Plaintiffs’

arguments on these points. After considering the parties’ arguments and the relevant

caselaw, I find Plaintiffs’ contentions on these points to be without merit.

Assuming that Plaintiffs’ equal protection arguments are even viable after my

discussion of Plaintiffs’ First Amendment issues, see 3 Ronald D. Rotunda and John E.

Nowak, Treatise on Constitutional Law–Substance & Procedure § 18.40 (3d ed. 1999), I find

their arguments unpersuasive.

180 It is a well-worn tenet of equal protection analysis “that all
180(...continued)

been found to represent the promotion of government values which override

the individual interest in exercising the specific right. . . .

If the Court examines the classification under the First Amendment and finds

that the classification does not violate any First Amendment right, the Court

is unlikely to invalidate that classification under equal protection principles.

3 Ronald D. Rotunda and John E. Nowak, Treatise on Constitutional Law–Substance &

Procedure § 18.40 (3d ed. 1999).

595

persons similarly situated should be treated alike.” City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr.,

473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). It is well understood, therefore, that the “Constitution does not

require things which are different in fact or opinion to be treated in law as though they were

the same.” Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982) (internal citation and quotation marks

omitted). In this case, the record and prior precedent demonstrate that political parties are

not “similarly situated” to special interest organizations. The law does not treat political

parties “better or worse” than special interest organizations. It only treats them differently

because they have different interests that need to be accommodated, and they have a different

role in the campaign system and in the government than do special interest organizations.

The record in this case establishes the unique situation of political parties in the

political process. As Plaintiffs’ expert La Raja concludes, “[m]ost interest groups, in contrast

[to political parties], seek to build relationships with officeholders as a way of improving

access to the legislative process and lobbying their position. . . . Political parties . . . allocate

resources for electoral strategies, meaning they contribute money to a party candidate who

is in a potentially close election.” Findings ¶ 1.16.2; see also id. ¶ 1.46 (discussing the

special relationship between political parties and their candidates/officeholders).
596

Furthermore, an RNC official agrees that interest groups can never replace political parties.

Id. ¶ 1.89. As Senator McCain testifies,“[t]he entire function and history of political parties

in our system is to get their candidates elected, and that is particularly true after the primary

campaign has ended and the party’s candidate has been selected.” Id. ¶ 1.48. In fact, FECA

recognizes this difference when it defines a political party as “an association, committee, or

organization which nominates a candidate for election to any Federal office whose name

appears on the election ballot as the candidate of such association, committee, or

organization.” 2 U.S.C 431(16). Interest groups are simply not connected to candidates in

the same manner. See Colorado II, 533 U.S. at 449 (“[t]here is no question about the

closeness of candidates to parties”). 

It is therefore the case that BCRA treats political parties differently than special

interest organizations. For example, political parties are permitted to receive greater

contributions from individuals than are interest groups. Compare BCRA § 307(a); FECA

§ 315(a)(1)(B); 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1)(B) with 2 U.S.C. § 441a(1)(C). The political parties

are permitted to make greater coordinated expenditures in support of federal candidates than

special interest organizations. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(d). Moreover, the national political parties

and the national Senate committees may make greater contributions to Senate candidates than

special interest groups. BCRA § 307(c); FECA § 315(h); 2 U.S.C. § 441a(h). Finally,

BCRA permits national political parties to transfer federal money (in any amount) to other

party committees without being subject to the contribution limits that apply to such transfers
597

by nonparty committees. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(4). At the same time, special interest

organizations set up as nonprofit corporations, will have to comply with the electioneering

communication provisions in Title II. See supra. BCRA presents a symmetrical approach

to the problems plaguing the campaign finance system: national political party fundraising

of nonfederal funds and interest organizations using general treasury funds to influence a

federal election. The law simply recognizes the unique nature of these organizations in the

political process and accommodates them in different ways. Cf. California Med. Ass’n, 453

U.S. at 201 (“The differing restrictions placed on individuals and unincorporated

associations, on the one hand, and on unions and corporations, on the other, reflect a

judgment by Congress that these entities have differing structures and purposes, and that they

therefore may require different forms of regulation in order to protect the integrity of the

electoral process.”). Accordingly, I find that Title I does not violate the Fifth Amendment

guarantees of equal protection.

As a corollary of their Fifth Amendment arguments, Plaintiffs also contend that Title

I is underinclusive because it does not subject interest groups to the same restrictions on

nonfederal money applicable to political party committees. McConnell Br. at 41-43; RNC

Br. at 57-58, 65. As the Court of Appeals has held, “a regulation is not fatally underinclusive

simply because an alternative regulation, which would restrict more speech or the speech of

more people, could be more effective. The First Amendment does not require the

government to curtail as much speech as may conceivably serve its goals.” Blount v. SEC,
181 As part of this argument, Plaintiffs present evidence attempting to show that under

BCRA, interest group activity will escalate and supplant those activities traditionally done

by political parties. Findings ¶¶ 1.87-1.88, 1.91-1.93. This change would be a negative

development, Plaintiffs attempt to show, because interest groups do not operate as

transparently as political parties. Id. ¶¶ 1.90, 1.91. A review of the facts leads to the

conclusion that none of them sheds much light on what BCRA’s impact will be on the

activities of interest groups. Id. ¶ 1.95. Furthermore, the evidence regarding the lack of

disclosure required of interest group political activity does not take into account BCRA’s

new disclosure requirements. Id. 

598

61 F.3d 938, 946 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (emphasis in original). As “the primary purpose of

underinclusiveness analysis is simply to ‘ensure that the proffered state interest actually

underlies the law,’ Austin, 494 U.S. at 677 (Brennan, J., concurring), a rule is struck for

underinclusiveness only if it cannot ‘fairly be said to advance any genuinely substantial

governmental interest,’ FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 396 (1984).” Id.

As I have shown above, the record in this case significantly demonstrates that Title I is

carefully tailored to address the problem that was before Congress–nonfederal funds raised

by the national committees of the political parties. The rationale underlying Title I simply

does not apply with equal force to entities not covered by Title I. Accordingly, an

underinclusive challenge is without merit.

I also agree with Defendants when they state that Plaintiffs make a policy argument

better suited for the legislature than the judiciary when Plaintiffs argue that “Title I’s

differential treatment of parties and special interest groups will make matters worse, not

better.” RNC Br. at 67 (capitalization altered).181 Def. Opp’n at 52; Cf. Colorado II, 533 US.

at 454 n.15 (“[Wle do not mean to take a position on the wisdom of policies that promote one
182 Plaintiffs also cite to a series of newspaper articles for the fact that interest groups

are now “gearing up” to supplant political party committees with respect to nonfederal

fundraising. McConnell Br. at 42 (emphasis added). This evidence is highly speculative and

since it would not form a basis for congressional action in the first instance, I am not

persuaded that Congress needed to grapple with this problem; particularly when expert

evidence is largely divided over whether special interest groups will even supplant political

party committees in nonfederal funds fundraising.

599

source of campaign funding or another.”). The problem that Congress sought to solve related

to the fundraising abuses and access given to large nonfederal money contributors to political

parties. Title I accomplishes this goal in a narrowly tailored fashion.

Moreover, the evidence in the record is at best inconclusive as to whether nonfederal

funds will suddenly flow to special interest groups. While there is some evidence in the

record that interest groups are expected to receive nonfederal funds donations, there is equal

evidence in the record that nonfederal funds will not flow to special interest groups since

these groups cannot deliver “the special favors that only a political party can deliver by dint

of its ubiquitous role in all levels of government.” Findings ¶ 1.87.182 As the Findings

demonstrate, the experts are divided on this question. Accordingly, it is the choice of

Congress as to whether it should refrain from offering legislation at this time directed at

special interest organizations. If special interest groups create problems of corruption worthy

of congressional attention, that is always the prerogative of Congress; but such an

amendment to campaign finance laws would require a compelling record– a record not

present here. Cf. NRWC, 459 U.S. at 209 (“This careful legislative adjustment of the federal

electoral laws, in a cautious advance, step by step, to account for the particular legal and
183 Judge Henderson rejects Plaintiffs’ federalism challenge to Section 323(e).

Henderson Op. Part IV.D.4, while Judge Leon rejects Plaintiffs’ federalism challenge with

regard to Section 301(20)(A)(iii) activities. Leon Op. Part I.B.2. Neither of my colleagues,

however, address the question of whether Plaintiffs have standing to present his argument.

184 When I refer to standing in this context, I am specifically referring to rules of

prudential standing which act as self-imposed limitations on the jurisdiction of Article III

courts. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church &

State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 474-75 (1982) (“Beyond the constitutional requirements, the

federal judiciary has also adhered to a set of prudential principles that bear on the question

of standing. Thus, this Court has held that ‘the plaintiff generally must assert his own legal

rights and interests, and cannot rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third

parties.’ Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. [490, 499 (1975)].”). It is my view, therefore, that

Plaintiffs lack “third-party standing” to assert the constitutional rights of the States.

600

economic attributes of corporations and labor organizations warrants considerable

deference.”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Accordingly, in my judgment,

Plaintiffs’ underbreadth challenge fails.

D. Plaintiffs’ Federalism Challenge

My colleagues, with two exceptions, do not specifically address Plaintiffs’ claims that

Title I violates Article I, Section 4, and the Tenth Amendment of the Constitution by

“usurping the right of states to regulate their own elections.” McConnell Br. at 9

(capitalization altered).183 Given that I find Title I constitutional in keeping with Buckley and

the First Amendment, I am also required to reach Plaintiffs’ federalism arguments. However,

after serious reflection, particularly in regard to the parties’ answers to my questions at oral

argument, I do not find that any of the Plaintiffs before this three-judge panel have standing

to raise a Tenth Amendment challenge to Title I.184

It is true that standing for private parties challenging acts of Congress has been found
601

when a plaintiff asserts that Congress has acted in excess of its Article I powers. Most of

these cases have focused on situations where Congress plainly exceeded its power under the

Commerce Clause and the statutes were declared unconstitutional. United States v. Lopez,

514 U.S. 549 (1995) (holding that the Gun-Free School Zones Act, making it a federal

offense for any individual knowingly to possess a firearm at a place that an individual knows

or has reasonable cause to believe is school zone, exceeded Congress’s commerce clause

authority); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (holding that the Commerce

Clause did not provide Congress with authority to enact civil remedy provision of Violence

Against Women Act). On the other hand, courts have been reluctant to provide private

parties with standing when they are asserting the rights of a State. Tennessee Elec. Power

Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118, 144 (1939) (“As we have seen there is no objection to the

Authority’s operations by the states, and, if this were not so, the appellants, absent the states

or their officers, have no standing in this suit to raise any question under the amendment.”)

(emphasis added); Mountain States Legal Found. v. Costle, 630 F.2d 754, 761 (10th Cir.

1980) (“Only the State has standing to press claims aimed at protecting its sovereign powers

under the Tenth Amendment.”).

In New York v. United States, the Supreme Court articulated this distinction in the

context of a State bringing suit:

In some cases the Court has inquired whether an Act of Congress is authorized

by one of the powers delegated to Congress in Article I of the Constitution

See, e.g., Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971); McCulloch v. Maryland,

4 Wheat. 316 (1819). In other cases the Court has sought to determine
602

whether an Act of Congress invades the province of state sovereignty reserved

by the Tenth Amendment. See, e.g., Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan

Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985); Lane County v. Oregon, 7 Wall. 71

(1869). In a case like these, involving the division of authority between federal

and state governments, the two inquiries are mirror images of each other. If

a power is delegated to Congress in the Constitution, the Tenth Amendment

expressly disclaims any reservation of that power to the States; if a power is

an attribute of state sovereignty reserved by the Tenth Amendment, it is

necessarily a power the Constitution has not conferred on Congress. See

United States v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 643, 649 (1961); Case v. Bowles, 327 U.S.

92, 102 (1946); Oklahoma ex rel. Phillips v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 313 U.S.

508, 534 (1941).

New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 155-56 (1992) (emphasis in original). In the

context of a State bringing suit, the Supreme Court concluded that the distinction was

practically irrelevant. Id. at 159 (“In the end, just as a cup may be half empty or half full, it

makes no difference whether one views the question at issue in these cases as one of

ascertaining the limits of the power delegated to the Federal Government under the

affirmative provisions of the Constitution or one of discerning the core of sovereignty

retained by the States under the Tenth Amendment.”). The Supreme Court has not, however,

addressed whether this distinction is of no practical difference when a private party

challenges a law of Congress and indirectly asserts the Tenth Amendment as a basis for

finding the law unconstitutional. Indeed, given Lopez and TVA, it would appear that this

distinction is relevant when someone other than the State or the State’s officials are bringing

the challenge.

This distinction is the reason Plaintiffs claim at places in their briefing that their

federalism challenge involves the argument that Congress lacks the affirmative power to
185 I would observe, that the D.C. Circuit in the Lomont case recently discussed the

issue of private party standing under the Tenth Amendment in a footnote. Lomont v. O’Neill,

285 F.3d 9, 13 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 2002). While the D.C. Circuit did not rule on this issue, it

certainly hinted that the Supreme Court should be the tribunal to overrule TVA and not the

lower courts. Accordingly, to the extent Plaintiffs are claiming that they fit into the latter

category of cases, I find that Lomont cautions against this three-judge panel finding standing.

See City of Roseville v. Norton, 219 F. Supp. 2d 130, 148 (D.D.C. 2002) (“This Court is

(continued...)

603

have enacted BCRA under the Elections Clause. See, e.g., McConnell Reply at 4 n.2

(“[P]rivate parties are routinely allowed to bring suit where they are claiming that Congress

acted outside its delegated powers, rather than merely asserting that Congress violated state

sovereignty in acting under its delegated powers.”) (emphasis in original) (citing Lopez). 

Despite what Plaintiffs state, their briefing shifts between these two poles and is often not

clear as to whether they are making a “Tenth Amendment” argument that Congress is

transgressing “the province of state authority reserved by the Tenth Amendment,” New York,

505 U.S. at 155, or are simply arguing that Congress had exceeded its delegated authority,

id. See, e.g., CDP/CRP Br. at 21 (“In this case, plaintiffs’ [sic] believe that the two inquiries

[identified in New York] do indeed converge, but that under either inquiry, BCRA oversteps

the boundary between federal and state authority.”) (internal citation and quotation marks

omitted). 

The ease with which Plaintiffs move between these two arguments is problematic.

If it is the case that Plaintiffs are making a Tenth Amendment argument that Congress, in

enacting BCRA, was transgressing the province of state authority reserved by the Tenth

Amendment, then TVA holds that Plaintiffs do not have standing to bring such a challenge.185
185(...continued)

bound to apply Circuit precedent. Lomont implicitly recognizes that the Seventh Circuit’s

reasoning in Gillespie [a case finding private party standing under the Tenth Amendment]

cannot be squared with TVA’s holding.”).

604

However if, Plaintiffs are arguing that Congress lacks the affirmative authority to enact Title

I, then presumably Lopez and that line of cases recognizes private parties do have standing

to assert such a challenge at least in the context of the Commerce Clause.

In order to make an argument that Congress has acted outside its power under the

Elections Clause in enacting Title I of BCRA, Plaintiffs are forced to contend that Congress

is intruding on the ability of States to regulate their own elections. See, e.g., McConnell Br.

at 9 (“For the first time in the relatively short history of campaign finance regulation,

Congress has enacted legislation that systematically restricts political activity not only in

federal elections, but also in state and local elections. This massive intrusion into a core area

of state sovereignty–the ability of States to regulate their own elections–violates basic

principles of federalism.”) (emphasis added). To the Plaintiffs in these consolidated cases,

therefore, BCRA violates state sovereignty and the focus of their arguments are on the injury

to the States.

This result is different from the Supreme Court striking down a law in the Commerce

Clause context, like Lopez, where the argument is that the legislature focused on a problem

unrelated to interstate commerce. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567 (“The possession of a gun in a local

school zone is in no sense an economic activity that might, through repetition elsewhere,

substantially affect any sort of interstate commerce.”). However, given the nature of Title
186 In another context, therefore, Plaintiffs might have private party standing to assert

that Congress exceeded its authority under the Elections Clause. However, in the context of

BCRA, the parties are actually asserting the rights of their individual States in this litigation.

605

I, and the Elections Clause, Plaintiffs are really contending that Congress was not simply

regulating federal elections, but was impermissibly legislating state elections. See, e.g.,

McConnell Br. at 17 (“By imposing federal limits on these activities, BCRA effectively

overrides the laws of numerous States. . . .”). The injury in this context is not held by an

individual plaintiff, but rather the injury is only held by the State, who organizes the elections

pursuant to state law. Since Title I operates as a contribution restriction, the injury to the

Plaintiffs in this case rests on an interference with funds specifically regulated or not

regulated by their individual States. Premising a Tenth Amendment argument based on the

Elections Clause, in the context of BCRA, therefore compels Plaintiffs to present an

argument that specifically rests on the rights of their individual States, who have chosen to

regulate or not regulate these funds.186 

At oral argument, CDP Plaintiffs’ counsel had difficulty explaining this nuanced

difference in relation to their legal positions. See Tr. at 29-30. RNC Plaintiffs’ counsel

proffered that under Oregon v. Mitchell, Plaintiffs had standing because the Supreme Court

decided that case based on “Congress’s overreach.” Tr. at 43. In Oregon v. Mitchell, the

Court considered, inter alia, amendments to the Voting Rights Act that would have given 18

year-olds the right to vote. The Court upheld the amendments as applied to federal elections,

but struck them down as applied to state and local elections. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S.
606

112, 118 (1970) (opinion of Black, J.). Justice Black, in striking down that portion of the Act

that applied to state elections, stated that “[n]o function is more essential to the separate and

independent existence of the States and their governments than the power to determine

within the limits of the Constitution the qualifications of their own voters for state, county,

and municipal offices and the nature of their own machinery for filling local public offices.”

Id. at 125 (emphasis added); see also id. at 124-25 (observing that “the Framers of the

Constitution intended the States to keep for themselves, as provided in the Tenth

Amendment, the power to regulate elections”) (emphasis added). 

It is correct that Mitchell found that Congress had acted in excess of its statutory

authority, but Mitchell involved an original action in the Supreme Court brought by a number

of States who resisted compliance with the Voting Rights Act. Id. at 117; see also id. at 117

n.1 (“No question has been raised concerning the standing of the parties or the jurisdiction

of this Court.”). Accordingly, in Mitchell, there was no question that the plaintiffs in that

case were able to argue that Congress exceeded its power under the Elections Clause because

the plaintiffs in that action were either the States themselves or the United States, who had

each invoked the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the United States. The

question in this case is whether a private party can assert that right on behalf of the State. As

no States are among the 77 plaintiffs to this case, and as none of the Plaintiffs bring suit as

representatives of the States, I find that Plaintiffs’ Tenth Amendment challenge to Title I is

nonjusticiable.
187 Beside Kentucky, 18 States, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and the Territory

of the United States Virgin Islands support BCRA, although they take no position on the

standing issue. See Am. and Substituted Br. of Amici Curiae–The States of Iowa and

Vermont et al.; Utah and seven other states oppose BCRA and do not address the standing

issue. Br. of Amici Curiae Utah, et al. The Utah Amici point out in a footnote that Alabama

did not join the amici brief because Alabama’s Attorney General William Pryor was a named

Plaintiff in the McConnell action. Id. at 2 n.1. The footnote is silent on whether Pryor

brought suit in his official capacity representing the State of Alabama. However, it is clear

from the entire record in this case that Pryor did not bring this suit in his official capacity.

See McConnell Second Am. Compl. ¶ 18. At oral argument, Judge Henderson raised the

question with Defendant-Intervenors’ counsel whether Attorney General Pryor brought suit

in his official capacity on behalf of Alabama. The colloquy was:

JUDGE HENDERSON: Isn’t the Alabama Attorney General, Bill Pryor, a

plaintiff in the McConnell?

COUNSEL: Yes, he is.

JUDGE HENDERSON: Why isn’t he, to the extent that that standing is

needed, why doesn’t he fill that?

COUNSEL: Because I don’t believe he’s bringing the action in his capacity

as a representative of the state.

JUDGE HENDERSON: All right. I don’t remember in the complaint.

COUNSEL: I don’t think the State of Alabama is a party in this case.

(continued...)

607

The issue of third-party standing is particularly weighty in this case, where for

example, the State of Kentucky has joined an amicus brief in support of BCRA, while

Plaintiff Mitch McConnell, who represents Kentucky in the Senate, is a lead Plaintiff

challenging BCRA. Moreover, this situation represents a question that the Supreme Court

has not definitively addressed. See Pierce County v. Guillen, 123 S. Ct. 720, 732 n.10 (2003)

(“[I]n light of our disposition . . ., we need not address the second question on which we

granted certiorari: whether private plaintiffs have standing to assert ‘states’ rights’ under the

Tenth Amendment where their States’ legislative and executive branches expressly approve

and accept the benefits and terms of the federal statute in question.”).187
187(...continued)

JUDGE HENDERSON: Well, the state isn’t, but he’s not representing the

State of Alabama.

COUNSEL: I don’t believe so, no.

JUDGE HENDERSON: All right.

Tr. at 124-25. Plaintiffs registered no objection to this discussion and, therefore, the only

conclusion to be drawn is that Mr. Pryor is not bringing suit in his official capacity on behalf

of the State of Alabama.

608

Since I have found that Plaintiffs lack standing to raise claims under the Elections

Clause and Tenth Amendment, I do not proceed further. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better

Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 101-02 (1998) (“For a court to pronounce upon the meaning or the

constitutionality of a state or federal law when it has no jurisdiction to do so is, by very

definition, for a court to act ultra vires.”).

E. Conclusion

In my judgment Title I in its entirety is constitutional. The evidence put forward in

the record provides ample justification for Congress enacting the contribution restrictions at

issue in the case. The record demonstrates that FECA’s entire contribution structure has been

completely gutted by political actors willing to test the limits of the law in a manner that has

returned the campaign finance system to a regime equaling the troubling aspects of the 1972

regime. In response, Plaintiffs argue that “BCRA simply goes too far.” CDP/CRP Br. at 46.

However, reading Plaintiffs’ briefing in this case, I am not sure if Plaintiffs would accept any

restrictions whatsoever on nonfederal funds. Indeed, Plaintiffs’ view of corruption is so

incompatible with the Buckley Court’s understanding of the term, that under Plaintiffs’
609

governing rationale, FECA’s contribution limitations upheld in Buckley would be struck

down.

The Supreme Court has long recognized Congress’ broad authority to enact measures

to protect the integrity of federal elections. Title I accomplishes its purpose without unduly

transgressing the rights of individuals to engage in the political process. While there may be

future challenges which test some of the regulations at issue in this case, at this facial

challenge stage, Title I survives constitutional attack.
610

III. Title III: MISCELLANEOUS

Sections 304, 305, 307, 316, and 319

I concur with Judge Henderson’s with regard to: BCRA Section 305, the condition

on the lowest broadcast unit charged; BCRA Section 307, regarding increased contribution

limitations; and BCRA Sections 304, 316 and 319, special provisions dealing with financing

campaigns against wealthy opponents (also known as the “Millionaire Provisions”).

Section 318: Prohibition of Contributions by Minors

Section 318 adds Section 324 to FECA, providing that:

An individual who is 17 years old or younger shall not make a contribution to

a candidate or a contribution or donation to a committee of a political party.

BCRA § 318; FECA § 324; 2 U.S.C. § 441k. Section 318 is challenged by the McConnell

Plaintiffs.

The Government maintains that this provision is subject to Buckley’s “closely drawn”

scrutiny standard. Gov’t Br. at 199. According to the Government, Section 318 serves the

important governmental interest of preventing circumvention of contribution limits and is

closely drawn to avoid unnecessary infringement of constitutional rights. Id. at 200-08.

Plaintiffs disagree, arguing that since the provision works as a complete ban on contributions

by minors to candidates and political party committees, it is subject to strict scrutiny.

McConnell Pls.’ Br. at 92. Plaintiffs maintain that even if exacting scrutiny is the appropriate

standard, preventing circumvention is not a cognizable government interest in the campaign

finance context, and that even if it were, Defendants have failed to show that Section 318 is
188 This reason necessarily precludes discussion of whether the provision is narrowly

tailored to meet an important governmental interest.

189 The record also demonstrates that not all contributions to political campaigns made

by minors are done by their parents in circumvention of campaign finance laws. See, e.g.,

Findings ¶ 3.7.

190 The regulations provide that contributions by minors that do not violate FECA’s

other provisions are permitted so long as

(i)The decision to contribute is made knowingly and voluntarily by the minor

child;

(ii) The funds, goods, or services contributed are owned or controlled

exclusively by the minor child, such as in-come earned by the child, the

(continued...)

611

tailored to serve that interest. Id. at 93. 

Given the evidence presented in this case, I need not decide the appropriate standard

of review, for even if exacting scrutiny were applied to the present situation, Defendants have

failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that parents’ use of minors to circumvent

campaign finance laws serves an important governmental interest.188 Although it is clear that

the FEC and Congress have been concerned for many years with the potential for campaign

finance abuses through the use of minors’ contributions,189 Findings ¶¶ 3.1, 3.2, the evidence

presented is insufficient to support government action that abridges constitutional freedoms.

Campaign finance laws prohibit anyone from making “a contribution in the name of

another person or knowingly permit[ting] his name to be used to effect such a contribution,”

or “knowingly accept[ing] a contribution made by one person in the name of another person.”

2 U.S.C. 441f. Donations made by minor children are specifically addressed in FEC

regulations. See 11 C.F.R. 110.1(i)(2) (2002 revised ed.).190 However, enforcing these
190(...continued)

proceeds of a trust for which the child is the beneficiary, or a savings account

opened and maintained exclusively in the child’s name; and

(iii) The contribution is not made from the proceeds of a gift, the purpose of

which was to provide funds to be contributed, or is not in any other way

controlled by another individual.

11 C.F.R. 110.1(i)(2) (2002 revised ed.).

612

provisions with respect to contributions by minors has been difficult due to the fact that

FECA does not require reporting of a donor’s age. Id. ¶ 3.9. The evidence also shows that

when the FEC has discovered donations given by young children which raised suspicions,

their investigations were stymied by the refusal of parents to allow interviews, constitutional

privacy concerns, and parental and legal counsel influence. Id. ¶ 3.10. 

Perhaps due to these difficulties, the Government was able to provide the Court with

only four instances where the FEC found contributions were made by parents in the name of

their minor children in violation of existing campaign finance laws. Id. ¶ 3.8-3.8.4. Some

of these investigations have been prompted by newspaper articles discussing contributions

made by parents in their young children’s names. Id. ¶ 3.5, 3.6. Therefore, although the

record shows that the threat of circumvention in this manner exists, including statements

from lawmakers that fundraising appeals include appeals for contributions from family

members, id. ¶¶ 3.3, 3.4, the minimal evidence presented does not establish that

circumvention of campaign finance laws by parents of minors supports the required

governmental interest. If the Government had proffered a more robust record establishing

that such corruption exists it likely would have succeeded in establishing this element of the
613

analysis, given that all members of the Supreme Court agree “that circumvention is a valid

theory of corruption.” Colorado II, 533 U.S. at 456. The Government’s failure to do so,

however, dooms their arguments and Section 318 of BCRA.
614

IV. Title V: ADDITIONAL DISCLOSURE PROVISIONS

Section 504

For the reasons stated in Judge Leon’s opinion, I concur that Section 504 is

unconstitutional.
615

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth in this Memorandum Opinion, I find Title I in its entirety

consistent with the Constitution. Moreover, I conclude that BCRA’s restrictions on

electioneering communication as set out in Sections 201, 203, and 204 are constitutional.

I also find Section 301 of BCRA constitutional. I further determine that Sections 213, 318,

and 504 are unconstitutional. I concur with Judge Henderson’s discussion of Plaintiffs’

standing with regard to BCRA’s condition on the lowest broadcast unit charged, BCRA’s

increased contribution limitations, and BCRA’s “Millionaire’s Provisions.”

For anyone who has great faith in the purity of this country’s democracy, the factual

record amassed in this case is bound to depress. The pre-BCRA campaign finance regime

saw wealthy individuals, corporations, and labor unions routinely providing donations, far

surpassing legal limitations, to the national party committees to influence federal elections.

In some instances, this system compelled corporate entities to give massive amounts of

nonfederal funds to the national party committees merely to stay on par with their

competitors. Of greater concern, corporations and labor unions poured massive amounts of

general treasury funds into electioneering communications designed to influence federal

elections, despite longstanding federal policy against corporate and labor union general

treasury funds being used for these purposes.

Judge Henderson criticizes my reasoning and conclusions as “treat[ing] a First

Amendment with which [she is] not familiar.” Henderson Op. at 5. My response is that my
616

approach to adjudicating these cases and the constitutional challenges presented therein has

been grounded in a textual analysis of Buckley and its progeny. My view of the First

Amendment emanates from Buckley’s teachings and in resolving these cases I have

continually returned to Buckley for insight and guidance. 

Having spent much time reviewing the record submitted in this case, one thing is very

clear: evidence of the wholesale evasion of FECA is not “anecdotal” or “beside the point.”

Rather, it is evidence of a regulatory regime in disarray. Without BCRA, the major

provisions of the Federal Election Campaign Act designed to reduce the corrupting influence

of large sums of money channeled into the political process are decimated. The clock will

be turned back to close to 100 years of incremental and balanced campaign finance

regulation.

Congress, which has concentrated on enacting a law that is true to Buckley to address

these abuses, should not be left impotent to correct these glaring problems. In reading much

of the legislative debate surrounding BCRA’s passage, I am struck by the concern of

Congress to abide by Buckley’s teachings. In my judgment, the fact that Congress was so

cognizant of Buckley should give this three-judge panel great pause before reaching out to

strike down wholesale provisions of BCRA. In declaring much of BCRA’s core tenets

facially unconstitutional, it is my belief that this panel’s approach has strayed from the

conservative, measured, and customary approach to adjudicating facial challenges that is

demanded by the dictates of our constitutional tradition. Simply put, on the basis of the
617

record assembled, the Constitution does not act as an impermissible barrier to the changes

sought by our coordinate branches to improve the democratic process.

With the record firmly before it, the Supreme Court will review this three-judge

panel’s legal conclusions de novo. Cf. Colorado II, 533 U.S. at 458 n.21. The constitutional

rights of those who participate in the election of federal officeholders are unquestionably of

the highest order, but so too is the sanctity of the process that produces those public officials

who participate in the governance of our democratic society.

May 1, 2003

/s/ 

COLLEEN KOLLAR-KOTELLY

United States District Judge
618

APPENDIX

I. Expert Reports on BCRA’s Effect on Political Advertisements

Defendants have provided a number of expert reports to address the issue of whether

BCRA is overbroad in terms of the types of advertisements it affects. See, e.g., Jonathan S.

Krasno & Daniel E. Seltz, Buying Time: Television Advertising in the 1998 Congressional

Elections (2000) (“BT 1998”) [DEV 47]; Craig B. Holman & Luke P. McLoughlin, Buying

Time 2000: Television Advertising in the 2000 Federal Elections (2001) (“BT 2000”) [DEV

46]; Goldstein Amended Expert Report (Oct. 2, 2002) (“Goldstein Expert Report”) [DEV 3-

Tab 7]; Jonathan S. Krasno & Frank J. Sorauf, Evaluating the Bipartisan Campaign Reform

Act (BCRA) [DEV 1-Tab 2] (“Krasno & Sorauf Expert Report”). These studies have been

subject to various criticisms, which have been responded to, and I set forth these arguments

below.

A. The CMAG Data Set

1. All of these studies relied on data from the Campaign Media Analysis Group

(“CMAG”), and for that reason, the Court considers it useful to discuss their

underlying data source which becomes a point of criticism for Plaintiffs’ expert,

Dr. James L. Gibson, before discussing the studies’ themselves. Dr. Gibson,

Plaintiffs’ expert witness, produced “An Analysis of the 1998 and 2000 Buying

Time Reports,” criticizing both Buying Time studies. James L. Gibson, Expert

Report, An Analysis of the 1998 and 2000 Buying Time Reports (Sept. 30, 2002)
619

(“Gibson Expert Report”) [1 PCS].

2. CMAG tracks political television advertising in the top 75 media markets,

containing more than 80 percent of U.S. residents. BT 1998 at 6-7 [DEV 47]; BT

2000 [DEV 46] at 18; Gibson Expert Report at 7 [1 PCS]; see also Goldstein Dep.

(Vol. 1) at 47-49 [JDT Vol. 8] (describing how CMAG compiles its data). These

75 markets are geographically dispersed. Goldstein Rebuttal Report at 23 [DEV

5-Tab 4]; see also Goldstein Expert Report App. G at 1-2 [DEV 3-Tab 7] (listing

the 75 markets monitored by CMAG). In 1998-1999 New York was the largest

media market with 6,812,540 television households representing 6.854 percent of

all television households. See Dr. James L. Gibson’s Rebuttal to the Expert

Reports of Kenneth M. Goldstein and Jonathan S. Krasno and Frank J. Sorauf

(Oct. 7, 2002) (“Gibson Rebuttal Report”) Ex. 2 at 1 [2 PCS] (listing 1998-1999

Nielson estimates of media markets in order of size). Shreveport was the seventyfifth largest media market, with 370,990 television households, or 0.373 percent

of all television households. Id. at 2. For each market, CMAG monitors the four

major broadcast networks (ABC, CBS, NBC, and Fox), as well as 42 national

cable networks. Goldstein Expert Report App. G at 2-3 [DEV 3-Tab 7]. The

CMAG data sets include two types of data. First, for every political advertisement

aired, CMAG provides a transcript of the audio portion of the advertisement and

a storyboard consisting of a still capture of every fourth second of the video
620

portion of the advertisement. Goldstein Expert Report at 6 [DEV 3-Tab 7].

Second, CMAG provides data on each airing of an advertisement, including time,

length, station, show and estimated cost. Id. 

3. The CMAG data set has some “gaps.” Goldstein Dep. (Vol. 1) at 52 & Ex. 9 at

16. The CMAG does not monitor local cable advertising in the 75 markets it

covers. Gibson Expert Report at 8 [1 PCS]; Gibson Rebuttal Report at 24 [2

PCS]. The 1998 and 2000 CMAG data sets did not cover advertisements

broadcast in the nation’s 140 smallest media markets, which are more rural than

the 75 captured by CMAG. Goldstein Dep. (Vol. 2) at 9-10 & Ex. 9 at 16 [JDT

Vol. 8]. For those markets covered, the evidence shows not all advertisements are

captured by CMAG. Dr. Goldstein participated in a validity study of the CMAG

data by comparing the CMAG data with a sampling of invoices from eight

television stations. Id. Ex. 9 at 16. The results show that for seven of the stations,

97 percent or more of the advertisements listed on their invoices correlated with

the CMAG data. Id. at 16-17 and 28 (Tbl. 2). For one station, however, 20

percent of the advertisements accounted for in the station’s invoices could not be

found in the CMAG data. Id. Dr. Goldstein surmises that this could be the result

of inadequate record keeping by the station as well as CMAG omissions. Id. at 17

n.3. Dr. Gibson, for the first time in his rebuttal report, finds this to be a major

shortcoming of the CMAG data. Gibson Rebuttal Report at 5-6 [2 PCS]. He
191 CMAG gets [its] data from Competitive Media Reporting, a company that tracked

advertising in the top 75 markets in 1998 and 2000, but now tracks advertising in the top 100

markets. Goldstein Dep. (Vol. 1) at 47

621

deduces from these missed advertisements that CMAG “likely missed 1,764 ads,”

or 5.04 percent of these eight stations’ airings, and using these figures estimates

“that 48,864 airings that in fact were broadcast [nationwide] . . . were not captured

by the CMAG methodology.” Id. (applying the 5.04 percent figure to the total

number of advertisements captured by CMAG). Dr. Gibson assumes, without any

factual support, that CMAG has missed the same percentage of advertisements in

all the covered media markets. Moreover, although Dr. Gibson acknowledges that

“we do not know any of the characteristics of these . . . missing airings,” he

nonetheless hypothesizes, without any factual research or support, that the

advertisements missed are most likely those that “did not have a clear ‘political

purpose’ that could be discerned by the CMAG analysts.” Id. at 6; but see

Goldstein Dep. (Vol. 2) at 12 [JDT Vol. 8] (stating that commercials provided to

CMAG by Competitive Media Reporting (“CMR”)191 is “overly inclusive,”

including “ads for the Red Cross, [and] ads for electric companies”). Another

shortcoming of the CMAG data is that although it provides 100 percent of the

advertisements’ audio, it only provides snapshots at four second intervals of the

advertisements’ video. As such, twenty-five percent of the advertisement

storyboards for the 1998 data set do not display the name of the group sponsoring
622

the advertisement. Goldstein Dep. (Vol. 2) at 21 [JDT Vol. 8]; Gibson Expert

Report at 8 [1 PCS]. Another perceived shortcoming of CMAG is that it tracks

markets not electoral districts, and is unable to distinguish between different

versions of advertisements that are identical with the exception of the candidate

or officeholder’s name (also known as “cookie cutter” advertisements). Gibson

Expert Report at 7 [1 PCS]; Gibson Rebuttal Report at 7 [2 PCS]; Goldstein Dep.

(Vol. 2) at 113 [JDT Vol. 8].

4. In terms of CMAG’s underinclusiveness, Plaintiffs’ expert, Dr. Gibson, “presents

no evidence or reason to believe that . . . including advertisements from the

markets not covered would change [the] results [of studies based on the data].”

Rebuttal Report of Dr. Arthur Lupia (Oct. 14, 2002) (“Lupia Expert Report”) at

28 [DEV 5-Tab 5]; see also Goldstein Rebuttal Report at 24 [DEV 5-Tab 4]

(“Moreover, Professor Gibson does not offer any reason to believe that the ads run

on local cable advertising are significantly different than the broadcast ads

captured by CMAG.”). Dr. Gibson did not suggest that “CMAG’s inability to

capture local cable spots introduced any systematic bias into the data.” Goldstein

Rebuttal Report at 24 [DEV 5-Tab 4]. Most importantly, there is no evidence that

Dr. Goldstein’s efforts to identify the appropriate electoral district for

advertisements in general or for “cookie cutter” advertisements in particular were

flawed or failed to correct these CMAG deficiencies. Goldstein Rebuttal Report
623

at 25-27 [DEV 5-Tab 4]; see also Goldstein Expert Report App. E at 3 [DEV 3-

Tab 7] (detailing the process of pairing “cookie cutter” advertisements with the

appropriate electoral district); Seltz Dep. at 80-84 [JDT Vol. 28] (detailing how

the Buying Time 1998 authors dealt with the “cookie cutter” issue, including

consulting political contacts, experts, newspaper articles, and geographic airing

of the advertisements). One of Defendants’ experts characterized the filling in of

this missing data as “a straightforward– though admittedly tedious–exercise to

systematically compare the added data in the Buying Time/Goldstein

database–against available records.” Lupia Expert Report at 30 [DEV 5-Tab 5].

According to Dr. Goldstein, the “snapshot” style of the CMAG storyboards does

not compromise the “ability to accurately analyze the content of ads, especially

because CMAG provides a complete transcription of the audio portion of the ad

along with the video captures.” Goldstein Rebuttal Report at 24-25 [DEV 5-Tab

4]. Furthermore, Dr. Goldstein states, “there is no reason to believe that there in

[sic] any systematic bias associated with the CMAG terminology capturing only

one video frame every four seconds.” Id. at 25. As for the 25 percent of 1998

storyboards which did not indicate the advertisement’s sponsor, the Buying Time

1998 authors were able to remedy this problem by referring to the “CMAG’s

original coding (which accurately provides the sponsor of the ad in well over 95

percent of cases), examining the content of the ad, and, in a few cases, by phoning
624

television stations.” BT 1998 [DEV 47] at 8.

5. Defendants’ expert Goldstein explains that CMAG data is relied on by

“[c]andidates and political parties interested in monitoring elections across the

nation ( including both the Democratic and Republican Executive Committees, not

to mention several of the plaintiffs in this litigation).” Goldstein Rebuttal Report

at 23-24 [DEV 5-Tab 4]. Dr. Goldstein states that CMAG data has served as the

basis for a number of his articles, “which have been published in the top-rank of

peer-reviewed political science journals.” Id. at 39. Dr. Goldstein also states that

“[d]uring the peer-review process for these articles, none of the academic

reviewers shared Professor Gibson’s concerns about the validity or reliability of

the CMAG databases,” which include reviews conducted by two of “the three

most prestigious journals in [the political science] discipline.” Id. at 39 & n.21

(quoting Gibson Expert Report at 2 [1 PCS]). Furthermore, Dr. Goldstein notes

that during the 2000 and 2002 election cycles, the Wisconsin Advertising Project,

which he heads, has provided CMAG data to journalists covering political

advertising in real time. Id. Although “[m]uch of the data we report can cast the

election strategies of particular candidates, parties or interest groups in an

unfavorable light . . . . at no time have we been challenged on the accuracy of the

factual data we have reported on the content and targeting of political

advertising.” Id. at 39-40. Dr. Gibson does not contest these statements in his
625

rebuttal report, and does not suggest a better source of data for this type of study.

See Gibson Expert Report at 6-9 [1 PCS]; Gibson Rebuttal Report at 3-7 [2 PCS].

B. The Annenberg Public Policy Center Reports

1. The Annenberg Public Policy Center (“Annenberg Center”) “was established by

publisher and philanthropist Walter Annenberg in 1994 to create a community of

scholars within the University of Pennsylvania that would address public policy

issues.” Annenberg Report 1997 at 2 [DEV 38-Tab 21].

2. “For much of the last decade the Annenberg Center has been tracking the growth

of broadcast issue advocacy advertising.” Annenberg Report 2001 at 1 [DEV 38

Tab-22]. The Annenberg Center notes that to “the naked eye, these issue

advocacy ads are often indistinguishable from ads run by candidates. But in a

number of key respects, they are different. Unlike candidates, issue advocacy

groups face no contribution limits or disclosure requirements. Nor can they be

held accountable by the voters on election day.” Annenberg Report 1997 at 3

[DEV 38 Tab-21]. 

3. The Annenberg Report 1997 reported that more than two-dozen organizations,

including “political parties, labor unions, trade associations and business,

ideological and single-issue groups” spent an estimated $135 million to $150

million worth of issue advertisements during the 1995-1996 campaign, compared

to the $400 million spent on advertising by the federal candidates running for
626

office. Annenberg Report 1997 at 3 [DEV 38 Tab-21]. Almost 86.9 percent of

these advertisements mentioned a candidate for office or public official by name.

Id. at 8. “Most” of the groups running these advertisements “declined to make

known the identities of their donors.” Id. at 4. 

4. The Annenberg Center’s 1998 report estimates that at least 77 groups ran issue

advertisements during the 1997-1998 election cycle costing between $275 and

$340 million.” Annenberg Report 1998 at 1 [DEV 66-Tab 6]. Overall, 53.4

percent of these advertisements mentioned candidates by name, although 80.1

percent of those advertisements run in the final two months of the campaign

mentioned candidates. Id. 

5. As also discussed supra, the Annenberg Report 2001 finds that during the 1999-

2000 election cycle 130 groups aired 1,100 distinct advertisements, at an estimated

cost of over $500 million. Annenberg Report 2001 at 1 [DEV 38-Tab 22]. The

report found that 60 percent of distinct radio and television issue advertisements

(689 out of 1,139) aired from January 1, 1999 to November 7, 2000, were

broadcast for the first time during the final two months of the election cycle. Id.

at 12. In addition, 73 percent of all the distinct advertisements mentioned a

candidate. Id. at 14. In terms of television advertisements, the closer the

advertisement was aired to election day, the more likely it contained a candidate

mention. Id. at 15. Between March 8 and August 31, 2000, candidates were
627

mentioned in 72 percent of the television issue advertisements aired. Id. After

August, 95 percent of the television commercials broadcast mentioned a

candidate. Id. The report found that during the 2000 election cycle, 89 percent

of unique advertisements were “candidate-centered,” meaning they made “a case

for or against a candidate” without using express advocacy. Id. at 13, 14. 

6. The Annenberg Center reports were relied on by Members of Congress, cited to

during the Senate debate, and are relied on by Plaintiffs in this litigation. See, e.g.,

147 Cong. Rec. S2456 (daily ed. March 19, 2001) (statement of Sen. Snowe)

(citing Annenberg Report 2001); Findings ¶ 2.2.1 (Lupia)

C. The Goldstein Expert Report

Dr. Goldstein, who was involved in assembling the data sets used in both Buying

Time studies, produced his own expert report for the purpose of this litigation. See

generally Goldstein Expert Report. Since Dr. Goldstein did not participate in the

writing of either Buying Time studies or play a role in “selecting the conclusions that

the authors of these reports chose to draw from the database,” Goldstein Rebuttal

Report at 3-4 [DEV 5-Tab 4], his report constitutes a separate assessment of the data

collected. Furthermore, the database he works from differs from that provided to the

Buying Time 2000 authors, as it has corrected omissions and errors discovered after

Buying Time 2000 was completed. Id. at 4-5. Dr. Goldstein’s study produces nine

principal conclusions. Other than his problems with the CMAG database which
192 Dr. Goldstein notes “[t]hese figures . . . underestimate television expenditures

because CMAG estimates only cover markets serving 80 percent of the nation’s population

and make no attempt to measure the increased cost of advertising during the peak seasons

of political campaigns when the demand for television advertising time pushes up spot

prices.” Goldstein Expert Report at 8 [DEV 3-Tab 7]. 

628

underlies the study, see supra App. ¶ I.A, Dr. Gibson leaves most, but not all, of the

conclusions in Dr. Goldstein’s Expert Report unchallenged. See Gibson Rebuttal

Report [2 PCS]. Dr. Goldstein’s conclusions and Dr. Gibson’s criticisms are

discussed infra.

1. Scope of Political Advertising. The following conclusions are not rebutted, except

to the extent that they rely on CMAG data. See supra, App. ¶ I.A. In the 2000

election cycle (from January 1, 2000 through election day), interest groups

accounted for 16 percent of all political television advertisements at an estimated

cost of $93 million.192 Goldstein Expert Report at 8. Political parties accounted

for 27 percent of the political commercials at an estimated cost of $162 million,

while candidates accounted for the remaining 52 percent of advertisements at an

estimated cost of $338 million. Id. Compared to the 1998 campaign, the increase

in interest group spending was the most dramatic, “rising from approximately $11

million in 1998 to an estimated $93 million in 2000.” Id. at 9; see also id. at 10

(Tbls. 1A-B) (showing the increase in candidate spending (from approximately

$136.6 million to approximately $338.4 million) and in political party spending

(from approximately $25.6 million to $162.3 million)). The majority of interest
193 Dr. Goldstein determined what states constituted “battleground states” “based on

a professional review of various media sources,” such as CNN.com. Goldstein Expert Report

at 12 n.12 [DEV 3-Tab 7]. 

629

group advertising in 2000 was “not sponsored by PACs, and fell outside FECA

regulation.” Id. at 8. According to Dr. Goldstein’s figures, interest group PACs

spent roughly $2 million on 3,688 political advertisements in federal races in

2000, while interest group non-PAC expenditures constituted $90 million spent

on 129,647 commercials. Id. at 10 (Tbl. 1B). 

2. The Role of Interest Groups and Political Parties in Political Television

Advertising for the 2000 Presidential Campaign: The following conclusions are

not rebutted, except to the extent that they rely on CMAG data. See supra, App.

¶ I.A. In terms of the presidential campaign, political parties purchased 41 percent

of television advertisements aimed at the 2000 presidential race, while candidates

accounted for 38 percent of the commercials, and interest groups eight percent.

Goldstein Expert Report at 11 & n.11 [DEV 3-Tab 7] (the remaining

advertisements were coordinated expenditures). Interest group advertising in

certain “battleground” states,193 however, “rivaled that of the candidates or

parties.” Id.; see also id. at 12 (Tbl. 2). For example, in Missouri, during the last

60 days of the election, “interest groups ran almost three-quarters as many ads”

identifying a candidate as did the actual candidates. Id. at 11. In House elections,

interest group advertisements identifying a candidate and running in the last 60
194 This assessment does not include the “tag lines” included in most advertisements

identifying the commercial’s sponsor that can include the political party’s name. Goldstein

Expert Report at 13 n.14 [DEV 3-Tab 7]. 

195 This result only reflects the 80 percent of households covered by CMAG, and

according to Dr. Goldstein “[n]o comprehensive information is available for the balance of

the markets or for ads airing on local cable stations.” Goldstein Expert Report at 14 n.15

[DEV 3-Tab 7]. 

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days of the campaign accounted “for 17 percent of total House ad broadcasts

during the 2000 election cycle,” while political parties provided 22 percent of

advertisements in these races, and candidates 60.6 percent. Id. at 13. Dr.

Goldstein finds that 99.8 percent of political party-financed television advertising

mentioned or depicted a candidate, while only 1.8 percent of the ads “even

mentioned the name of the party and many fewer promoted the candidate by virtue

of his or her party affiliation.” Id.

194

3. The BCRA Universe of Interest Group Electioneering: The following conclusions

are unrebutted, except to the extent that they rely on CMAG data. See supra, App.

¶ I.A. Dr. Goldstein finds that 35 interest groups broadcast commercials on

television during the last 60 days of the 2000 election that mentioned a candidate.

Goldstein Expert Report at 13 [DEV 3-Tab 7]. These electioneering

advertisements were aired 59,632 times at an estimated cost of approximately

$40.5 million. Id. at 14; see also id. at 14-15 (Tbl. 3).195 The top ten of these

groups accounted for 87 percent of these expenditures. Id. at 13. 

4. The “Magic Words” Test: The following findings are not rebutted, except to the
631

extent that they rely on CMAG data. See supra, App. ¶ I.A. The so-called “magic

words” test derives from Buckley’s legal standard for determining whether an

advertisement is designed to persuade citizens to vote for or against a particular

candidate. Such advertisements were termed “express advocacy” by the Supreme

Court, and defined as containing words such as “elect,” “defeat” or “support.” See

supra at 211. Dr. Goldstein notes that all candidate-sponsored advertisements

must be paid for with federal funds and are considered to be electioneering,

regardless of whether they meet the express advocacy test. Therefore, if the use

of express advocacy terminology is “an accurate way to classify an ad, then

advertisements clearly and obviously created and aired to influence elections

would be expected to employ such magic words.” Goldstein Expert Report at 16

[DEV 3-Tab 7]. Dr. Goldstein finds, however, that 11.4 percent of the 433,811

advertisements aired by candidates met the express advocacy test. Id. Conversely,

88.6 percent of candidate advertisements in 2000 “were technically undetected by

the Buckley magic words test.” Id. This result demonstrates to Dr. Goldstein “that

magic words are not an effective way of distinguishing between political ads that

have the main purpose of persuading citizens to vote for or against a particular

candidate and ads that have the purpose of seeking support for or urging some

action on a particular policy or legislative issue.” Id. 

5. Temporal Distribution of Interest Group-Financed Television Advertisements
632

Which Mention a Candidate: The following conclusions are unrebutted, except

to the extent that they rely on CMAG data. See supra, App. ¶ I.A. Dr. Goldstein

determines that the “CMAG database provides empirical evidence of a strong

positive correlation between [advertisements’ reference to a candidate and the

proximity in time of their broadcast to the election] and consequently of their

validity as a test for identifying political television advertisements with the

purpose or effect of supporting or opposing a candidate for public office.”

Goldstein Expert Report at 17 [DEV 3-Tab 7]. He finds that interest group

advertisements that “mention or depict a candidate tend to be broadcast within 60

days of the election,” while those which do not “tend to be spread more evenly

over the year.” Id. Specifically, his calculations show 78 percent of interest group

advertisements mentioning a candidate for federal office aired within 60 days of

the election, while 18 percent of those that did not mention a candidate were aired

during that time. Id. (also finding 85 percent of advertisements mentioning a

presidential candidate and 76 percent of commercials mentioning a House

candidate aired within 60 days of the election). In addition, Dr. Goldstein finds

the distribution of those advertisements mentioning candidates for federal office

to be “closely correlated to the distribution of electioneering communications

broadcast by candidates and political parties.” Id. For example, 76 percent of

interest group advertisements mentioning a House candidate were broadcast
633

within 60 days of the election, as compared to 79 percent of such advertisements

run by candidates, and 94 percent of those purchased by political parties. Id. For

Senate elections, 74 percent of interest group advertisements that mentioned a

candidate were run within 60 days of the election, as were 67 percent of candidate

and 81 percent of political party-sponsored commercials. Id. at 17-18; see also id.

at 19 (Tbl 4). 

6. Geographic Distribution of Interest Group-Sponsored Advertisements Which

Mention a Candidate and are Aired within 60 Days of an Election: The following

conclusions are unrebutted, except to the extent that they rely on CMAG data. See

supra, App. ¶ I.A. Dr. Goldstein finds that interest group advertisements that

mentioned a candidate and were broadcast within 60 days of the 2000 election

“were highly concentrated in states and congressional districts with competitive

races.” Goldstein Expert Report at 20 [DEV 3-Tab 7]. For Senate races, 89.2

percent of these commercials ran in competitive races, including Michigan where

interest groups accounted for “22 percent of the total ads broadcast in the race.”

Id. Political parties were similarly focused, running 90.6 percent of their ads in

the competitive states. Id. at 21. Four states (Michigan, Virginia, Washington,

and Florida) attracted “77 percent of the ads broadcast by interest groups [aimed

at Senate races]; political parties broadcast 65 percent of their ads in these four

states.” Id. at 20; see also id. at 21 (Table 5). House races demonstrated the same
634

pattern, with 85.3 percent of interest group “electioneering” advertisements, and

98.2 percent of political party “electioneering” advertisements broadcast in

competitive districts. Id. at 21; see also id. at 22-23 (Table 6). In some

competitive congressional districts, interest groups ran more advertisements than

the candidates or their parties. Id. at 22. Therefore, concludes Dr. Goldstein, the

“CMAG database provides strong evidence that the interest group ads covered by

BCRA are targeted at competitive electoral contests and closely parallel political

party ads in their geographic distribution.” Id. at 24. 

7. Coders’ Perceptions of Interest Group Television Advertisements: Dr. Goldstein

had students code each interest group political television advertisement aired in

the 2000 campaign. They could code the commercials’ purpose as either to

“‘generate support or opposition for candidate,’ or to ‘provide information or urge

action,’” and “were also given the option of ‘unsure/unclear.’” Goldstein Expert

Report at 24 & n.20 [DEV 3-Tab 7]. Dr. Goldstein finds that “[t]he coders’

perceptions provide evidence that BCRA’s definition of Electioneering

Communication accurately captures those ads that have the purpose or effect of

supporting candidates for election to public office.” Id. at 26. The coders found

97.7 percent of the 60,623 interest group sponsored television advertisements that

mentioned a candidate and were broadcast within 60 days of an election as

“electioneering,” or supporting or opposing a candidate. Id; see also id. at 25
196 Dr. Goldstein contends that this “percentage overstates the proportion of all

Genuine Issue Ads covered by BCRA, because it does not take into account the unregulated

ads run in non-election years during a single Congressional Term, such as 1999.” Goldstein

Expert Report at 27 n.22 [DEV 3-Tab 7]. 

635

(Tbl. 7). Dr. Goldstein finds this result particularly persuasive given the fact that

the students coded one-third of all interest group television advertisements run

over the course of the 2000 campaign to be genuine issue advertisements. Id. at

26. Of the 45,001 advertisements deemed to be “genuine issue advertisements”

by the coders, 3.1 percent would have been covered by BCRA in that they were

run within 60 days of the election and identified a candidate. Id. at 27.196 Dr.

Goldstein acknowledges that in Buying Time 2000, and an article he co-authored

with Dr. Jonathan Krasno, fewer than six advertisements were said to be unfairly

captured by BCRA. Id. at 26 n.21. In those other publications, “certain of these

six ads–particularly those as to which there was disagreement among the student

coders–were ultimately treated as electioneering. In fact, [Dr. Goldstein’s] own

judgment is that five of these six ads were clearly intended to support or oppose

the election of a candidate . . . . However, in this report, [Dr. Goldstein] chose[]

to take the most conservative approach and count all six as Genuine Issue Ads.”

Id. However, Dr. Goldstein now acknowledges that a “most conservative”

estimate would include 6 more advertisements listed in footnote 8 of his Rebuttal

Report. Goldstein Dep. (Vol. 2) at 160 [JDT Vol. 8]. Adding these six

advertisements results in the finding that 17 percent of the advertisements run
197 This revelation casts doubts on some of Dr. Goldstein’s other conclusions which

are therefore not recounted here.

636

during the last 60 days of the 2000 campaign identifying candidates were genuine

issue advertisements. Id. at 169; see also infra App. ¶ I.D.8.c (discussing these

advertisements in more detail).197 Dr. Gibson finds fault with the fact that this

conclusion relies on a methodology he finds problematic. He insists the

conclusion is flawed by focusing “on the highly subjective coding” of the student

coders to determine the purpose of the issue advertisements (i.e. to promote a

candidate or to urge action on an issue). Gibson Rebuttal Report at 20 [2 PCS];

see also Holman Dep. at 73 [JDT Vol. 10] (noting that the question asks for a

subjective assessment). As discussed infra in connection with the Buying Time

studies, Dr. Gibson also believes that the data shows that a large majority of the

advertisements barred by BCRA “have policy matters as their primary focus,”

thereby destroying the distinction he draws between electioneering and genuine

issue advocacy. Gibson Rebuttal Report at 20 [2 PCS]; see also infra App. ¶

I.D.8.e. 

8. The Effectiveness of Broadcasting Issue Ads Close to an Election: Dr. Goldstein’s

final conclusion is that if an interest group is genuinely interested in promoting an

issue, the least desirable time to air such an advertisement is in the final 60 days

of an electoral campaign. Goldstein Expert Report at 32 [DEV 3-Tab 7]. This

finding runs counter to Plaintiffs’ argument that BCRA “may harm interest groups
637

by preventing them from advertising on their issues at a time when citizens are

supposedly paying the most attention to politics.” Id. Dr. Goldstein first

comments that “while there is evidence that interest in politics and elections rises

as Election Day approaches, there is absolutely no evidence to support the position

that interest in public policy issues rises as well during that time.” Id. (emphasis

in original). Second, he notes that “communication theory has concluded that

advertising is likely to be most effective (at informing or persuading) when

viewers are exposed to one-sided flows of information in isolation from other

advertising.” Id. (citing William McGuire, The Myth of Massive Media Impact:

Savagings and Salvagings, 1 Public Communication and Behavior 173 (1986);

John Zaller, The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion (1992)). Dr. Goldstein

notes that since the last two months of an election campaign is when most political

advertisements are aired (64.2 percent of all political advertisements run in 2000

were run in the campaign’s final 60 days), “an individual interest group’s message

on a public policy issue is likely to become lost” if aired during that period. Id.

Dr. Goldstein also posits that “partisan attachments . . . harden during the last two

months of a campaign” which makes it “more difficult to persuade otherwise

open-minded viewers of the merits of an interest group’s policy stance.” Id. at 32-

33 (citing John Zaller, Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion (1992)). Finally,

running issue advertisements close to an election, besides being less effective at
638

conveying their messages, is “also less cost-effective, since the price of scarce

television and radio air time is higher near an election than during the rest of the

year.” Id. at 33. Dr. Goldstein argues his theory is bolstered by the data from his

study. Interest group advertisements not mentioning a candidate are spread over

the course of the calendar year and are not concentrated within the last two months

of a campaign. In 2000, 17.7 percent of such advertisements were aired in the

final 60 days of the election campaign, slightly more than the 16.4 percent “which

would have run if the ads had been equally distributed throughout the year.” Id.

at 33; see also id. at 31 (Table 9). In contrast, during the months of April through

June 2000, 45 percent of such issue advertisements were aired, “as against an

expected 25 percent if the ads were spread evenly throughout the year.” Id. Dr.

Goldstein believes this concentration is “a likely result of groups turning on the

heat to pass or defeat bills before Congress adjourned for the summer.” Id.

Therefore, Dr. Goldstein finds that the data confirms his theory that the final two

months of an election campaign “is probably the worst time for an interest group

to educate the public on its particular issue.” Id. However, Dr. Gibson is critical

of this conclusion. Gibson Rebuttal Report at 26 [2 PCS]. According to Dr.

Gibson, political psychologists, like William McGuire (whose work Dr. Goldstein

cites), have concluded “that to persuade someone involves two steps. First, one

must get the attention of the person one is attempting to persuade. Second, one
639

must overcome the strength of existing attitudes if the attempt at persuasive

communication is to result in attitude change.” Id. Given that “those with strong

attitudes tend to pay attention to political communications while those with weak

political attitudes tend to ignore them. . . . [t]hose most easily reached are least

easily changed; those most easily changed are those most difficult to reach.” Id.

Since those with “weak attitudes” tend to pay attention during “the most extreme

circumstances,” the period leading up to the election provides the window in

which to communication with these difficult to reach, but easily persuaded

individuals. Id. at 27. Dr. Gibson also rejects the argument that issue advertising

close to an election is unproductive because partisan allegiances harden as

elections approach. Id. He states that this line of reasoning leads to the strange

conclusion that “candidates should abandon advertising as the election approaches

since these hardened attitudes are difficult to convert.” Id. Dr. Gibson points out

that “that does not happen, since, as the election approaches, candidates try to

reach an even greater percentage of marginal voters, who have little interest in

politics, and relatively pliable issue views.” Id. 

D. Buying Time Studies

1. The Brennan Center for Justice at New York University Law School (“Brennan

Center”) produced two studies examining television advertising in election

campaigns. See BT 1998 [DEV 47]; BT 2000 [DEV 46]. The Brennan Center is
640

“primarily a law firm that also does a great deal of research in a variety of social

science issues that includes campaign finance along with criminal justice and other

electoral issues and poverty issues.” Holman Dep. at 10 [JDT Vol. 10]. The

Brennan Center was involved in the crafting of BCRA and provided analysis of

issues being debated in Congress to legislators, the media and the public. Id. at

11. The Center also put together a letter signed by 88 First Amendment scholars,

concluding that the McCain-Feingold bill was constitutional. Id. at 19 & Ex. 3.

Representatives of the Brennan Center testified in favor of the McCain-Feingold

bill, id. at 22, and during Senate debate on the legislation, Senators cited to Buying

Time data and Brennan Center analyses. Holman Dep. Ex. 3 at 2 [JDT Vol. 10].

2. The Pew Charitable Trust funded both Buying Time studies. See BT 1998 [DEV

47]; BT 2000 [DEV 46]. The Brennan Center’s funding proposal for Buying Time

1998 states that the study had an academic purpose, but would also be used “to

fuel a continuous and multi-faceted campaign to propel reform forward.” Holman

Dep. Ex. 4 at 2 [JDT Vol. 10]. The proposal painted the study as part of a strategy

to overcome the “obstacles to reform,” and noted that the first step in achieving

the goal was “to develop a reliable source of information on the nature of the

problem.” Id. at 7. The Brennan Center proposed a two-phased research plan for

Buying Time 1998. Krasno Dep. Ex. 4 at 1 [JDT Vol. 14]. The first phase,

proposed to cost $200,000, entailed acquiring data from CMAG, “adapt[ing] it so
641

that it might be easily used, and us[ing] it to develop a strategy for responding to

the threat posed by issue advocacy.” Id. at 1, 3. The second phase, estimated to

require $800,000 to complete, would “focus on convening a formidable group of

scholars and activists to create policy recommendations and reports, as well as .

. . publiciz[ing] these activities on Capitol Hill and beyond.” Id. at 3. Whether or

not the study would proceed to the second phase, according to the proposal, would

“depend on the judgment of whether the data provide[d] a sufficiently powerful

boost to the reform movement.” Id. at 6. In April or May of 2000, Dr. Kenneth

Goldstein of the University of Wisconsin, who had worked on the data set for

Buying Time 1998 petitioned the Pew Center for another grant. Goldstein Dep.

(Vol. 1) at 29 [JDT Vol. 8]. His request stated that he was “happy to work with

others in the policy community to make sure that our study is designed and

executed in ways that help move the reform ball forward.” Goldstein Dep. (Vol.

1) at 37 & Ex. 6 at 5 [JDT Vol. 8].

3. Mr. Seltz, co-author of Buying Time 1998, states that there were a number of

purposes behind the study, but that “the primary purpose was to contribute to the

body of knowledge about campaign finance reform and specifically issue

advocacy . . . and to fill what we viewed to be an empirical void in the literature

about issue advocacy. Seltz Dep. at 22 [JDT Vol. 28]. “An independent but

related purpose . . . was indeed to provide information to . . . proponents of
642

campaign finance reform to help them fashion new and better arguments for

reform, but arguments that would be based on research that was verifiable,

checkable, transparent, reproducible.” Id. Mr. Holman, a principal co-author of

Buying Time 2000, did not approach the project with the purpose of producing

results that would support campaign reform and had never seen the grant proposal

submitted to the Pew Charitable Trust. Holman Dep. at 25-26 [JDT Vol. 10]; see

also id. at 29-30 (“I was mostly excited about the political science aspect of [the

study] . . . . It was not clear at any point and never explained to me exactly what

sort of policy direction that would go in.”).

4. Dr. Kenneth Goldstein provided assistance in processing and coding data for the

Buying Time studies. Goldstein Rebuttal Report at 6 [DEV 5-Tab 4]. As part of

this effort, he merged CMAG’s two data sets to produce “a single, comprehensive

data set.” Id. He also had university students (at the University of Arizona for

Buying Time 1998 and the University of Wisconsin for Buying Time 2000)

“assess[] . . . the content, tone, issues addressed, whether the ads mentioned a

political candidate or provided a toll-free number to call, etc. . . . In addition to

collecting certain specific information concerning each storyboard reviewed, the

study also asked coders: ‘In your opinion, is the purpose of the ad to provide

information about or urge action on a bill or issue, or is it to generate support or

opposition for a particular candidate?’” Goldstein Expert Report at 7 [DEV 3-Tab
643

7]. Advertisements that provided information or urged action on a bill or issue

were labeled “genuine issue ads” in both studies, whereas those communications

that generated support or opposition for a particular candidate were referred to as

“sham issue ads” in Buying Time 1998, see, e.g., BT 1998 [DEV 47] at 87, and

“electioneering issue ad” in Buying Time 2000, see, e.g., BT 2000 [DEV 46] at 30.

Each Buying Time database consists of 40 million data points. Id. at 37. 

5. As noted supra, App. ¶ I.A, Dr. Gibson criticizes the CMAG data underlying both

reports. Dr. Arthur Lupia was asked by the Brennan Center to evaluate Dr.

Gibson’s Expert Report and provided a report detailing his findings. See

generally Lupia Expert Report.

6. Buying Time Findings

a. Buying Time 1998 drew a number of conclusions with regard to the nature and

effect of political advertising in the United States. The study’s main findings

include:

• Four percent of candidate advertisements used “express advocacy” terms.

BT 1998 [DEV 47] at 9. 

• The proportion of issue advertisements mentioning a candidate rises as the

date of the election approaches. In July and August 1998, 61 percent of

issue advertisements mentioned a candidate. By September, the percentage

reached 82 percent and for the remainder of the campaign remained at 82
644

percent or higher, reaching a peak of 97 percent in the first half of October.

Id. at 87, 103 (Figure 4.15). 

• Forty-one percent of issue advertisements that provided information or

urged action appeared within 60 days of the election, but only two of those

advertisements, or seven percent, referred to a candidate. Id. at 109. 

b. Buying Time 2000’s key findings from the 2000 election cycle included:

• Seven percent of all political advertisements contained express advocacy

terms. BT 2000 [DEV 46] at 73. Candidates used express advocacy

terminology in 10 percent of their ads, id. at 15, 29, while political parties

and interest groups used such terms approximately two percent of the time,

id. at 73. 

• “Genuine issue ads” (those urging action on a public policy or legislative

bill) were “rather evenly dispersed throughout the year, while groupsponsored electioneering ads [which promote the election or defeat of a

federal candidate] make a sudden and overwhelming appearance

immediately before elections.” Id. at 56.

• The study found that if BCRA had applied to the 2000 campaign, three

genuine issue ads (which aired 331 times) would have fallen within the

Act’s definition of “electioneering communication.” Id. at 73. Put another

way, of the advertisements run within 60 days of the 2000 election which
645

also depicted a candidate, 99.4 percent constituted electioneering

advertisements, while 0.6 percent were genuine issue advertisements. Id.

at 72 (Figure 8-2). 

7. Criticism of Buying Time 1998

a. Plaintiffs’ expert, Dr. James L. Gibson, while leveling various criticism at both

Buying Time studies, does not dispute that express advocacy words “are rarely

used in political advertising, or that group sponsored ads that mention

candidates tended to be concentrated before an election.” Goldstein Expert

Report at 38-39 [DEV 3-Tab 7]; see also Lupia Expert Report at 9 [DEV 5-

Tab 5]; Gibson Expert Report at 11 [1 PCS] (“Entirely objective characteristics

of the ads . . . present few threats to reliability.”). Neither does he challenge

the conclusions that advertisements sponsored by political parties and interest

groups comprise a significant and increasing portion of political advertising

broadcast in federal races. Lupia Expert Report at 9 [DEV 5-Tab 5]. 

b. Dr. Gibson states that “Buying Time 1998 should not be accepted as the

product of scientific inquiry, but is instead policy advocacy written by people

with a strong ideological commitment to a particular position on campaign

finance reform.” Gibson Expert Report at 3 & n.3 [1 PCS] (citing the research

proposal and co-author Daniel Seltz’s deposition testimony); see also supra

App. ¶ I.D.2. Dr. Gibson suggests that “[t]he strong policy and ideological
646

commitments of the investigators are not compatible with the conventional

cannons of scientific objectivity and may have undermined the integrity of the

data collection and analysis.” Gibson Expert Report. at 3 n.3 [1 PCS]. He

applies this criticism to Buying Time 2000 as well. Id. at 45. Dr. Krasno

confirms that Buying Time 1998 is an advocacy document. Krasno Rebuttal

Report at 2 [DEV 5-Tab3]. He admits that he believed that groups and

political parties were sponsoring “thinly-veiled campaign ads masquerading

as issue advocacy.” Id. However, Dr. Krasno suggests that “[t]he fact that we

expected certain results (and those expectations were largely realized) loads

the issue emotionally, but misses the point. Scholars rarely embark upon

research without some expectations as to its results. But more than most

scholars, we had a compelling reason to insure that our results could withstand

allegations of bias.” Id. Dr. Krasno also notes that Daniel Seltz’s

responsibilities with regard to Buying Time 1998 did not include data analysis.

Id. at 3. Dr. Lupia comments that a “person’s political or ideological beliefs

need not prevent them from being an effective scientist,” and that Dr. Gibson’s

allegation that “Buying Time cannot be the product of scientific inquiry

because its authors have an ideological commitment” is erroneous. Id. Dr.

Lupia also states that he knows of no “conventional canons of scientific

objectivity,” and that Dr. Gibson fails to produce one. Id. Lastly, Dr. Lupia
647

observes that Dr. Gibson’s claim that the policy perspective of the Buying

Time 1998 authors “may have undermined the integrity” of the study, “is pure

speculation,” and Dr. Gibson’s report “presents no direct evidence on this

point.” Id. at 11. Dr. Goldstein rejects the charge that he or anyone under his

supervision “perverted” the results of the databases, or that his approach to the

project was based on anything other than “the spirit of scientific inquiry and

objectivity.” Goldstein Rebuttal Report at 8 [DEV 5-Tab 4]. He also claims

that his “interest in creating a scientifically valid and reliable database was

based on more than just abstract notions of professionalism and objectivity, as

important as they were. I always intended to use–and, in fact, have

used–CMAG databases in a wide variety of other scholarly studies having

nothing to do with campaign finance reform.” Id. at 8-9.

c. Dr. Gibson states that Buying Time 1998 was not part of a peer-review process

prior to its publication, meaning it “was not vetted in any way whatsoever prior

to its publication, and consequently the normal process of explication of the

project methodology, error correction, and review of substantive conclusions

prior to publication did not take place.” Gibson Expert Report at 4 [1 PCS].

Dr. Gibson maintains that this “seriously limits the confidence one can place

in the Report.” Id. Dr. Gibson makes the same criticism of Buying Time 2000.

Id. at 45. Dr. Krasno states that this fact was the result of time constraints
648

dictated by the political calendar, the funders of the study, and policymakers,

and notes that “subsequent publications by myself and by Professor Goldstein

have withstood the peer review process.” Jonathan S. Krasno, Rebuttal to

Professor James L. Gibson at 3-4 & n.3 (citing to Jonathan Krasno & Kenneth

Goldstein, “The Facts About Television Advertising and the McCain-Feingold

Bill,” 35 Political Science 207 (2002)). Dr. Lupia finds the significance of the

lack of peer-review “doubtful . . . at best.” Lupia Expert Report at 13 [DEV

5-Tab 5]. He notes that Dr. Gibson “displays no apparent knowledge of

whether scholars or experts had opportunities to comment on critical aspects

of the Buying Time reports.” Id. at 14. 

d. Dr. Gibson maintains that “[n]o data base has been (nor can be, it appears)

produced that will generate the specific numbers found in [Buying Time 1998].

. . . In the social sciences, we demand that statistical analysis be replicable . .

. . This report is not replicable, and that undermines tremendously any

confidence one should place in the findings produced.” Gibson Expert Report

at 5 [1 PCS]; see also id. at 23-26; Seltz Dep. at 52 [JDT Vol. 28] (stating that

the Buying Time 1998 authors did not “track the evolution of all the changes”

or corrections they made to the data set). Dr. Gibson levels the same charges

at Buying Time 2000. Gibson Expert Report at 47-48 [1 PCS]. Dr. Krasno

agrees that “replication is a core precept of science,” but states that Dr. Gibson
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“overstates the case by insisting on ‘exact’ replication.” Krasno Rebuttal

Report at 6 [DEV 5-Tab 3]. According to Dr. Krasno, perfect replication “of

the results of others, even with their help, is often impossible.” Id. (quoting

Gary King, Replication, Replication, 28 Political Science 444 (1995)). Dr.

Gibson was not able to consult with Dr. Krasno in order to discover “the

original command files used to produce the numbers in Buying Time 1998,”

which Dr. Krasno maintains replicate the Buying Time 1998 results. Id. at 6-7

& n. 6; see also id. at 8 n.10 (“[I]t appears that Professor Gibson worked with

a slightly different version of the data set than that used to create Buying Time

1998.”); Lupia Expert Report at 18 n.3 [DEV 5-Tab 5]. Despite using the

incorrect data set, Dr. Krasno notes that where Dr. Gibson provides examples

of the discrepancies between his findings and those of Buying Time 1998, the

differences are statistically insignificant. Id. at 7-8 (referring to Gibson Expert

Report at 24 [1 PCS]); see also Goldstein Expert Report at 18 n.10 [DEV 3-

Tab 7] (stating that the variances in Dr. Gibson’s results “are so small as to

suggest their own triviality”); Lupia Expert Report at 43 [DEV 5-Tab 5]

(stating “the demonstrated discrepancies are small” and the Gibson Expert

Report “provides no evidence that such changes affect any of Buying Time’s

major claims”). Dr. Goldstein contends that the reason Dr. Gibson could not

replicate the results of Buying Time 2000 was because he was using the wrong
198 The result of this confusion is that instead of the experts arguing from the same

data set, each produces conclusions from a different set of numbers. The source of the

divergence in data relied upon appears to be the result of the number of data sets provided

to the Plaintiffs by Defendants’ experts and the late production of additional data sets. See

Gibson Supplement to Rebuttal Expert Report of October 7, 2002: 1998 Data (“Gibson

Supplemental Report”) [2 PCS]. Furthermore, since the analysis of the studies occurred in

the context of litigation, the two sides’ experts could not confer and resolve the resulting

confusion regarding the data sets. This fact has made the duel between the parties’ experts

more confusing, and therefore less helpful to the Court.

650

data set. Goldstein Rebuttal Report at 18, 19-20 [DEV 5-Tab 4].198 Using the

“federal.sav” data set produced by the Brennan Center, Dr. Goldstein was

“able to replicate key findings of the Buying Time [2000] study,” and correlate

others “within a fraction of a percentage point.” Id. at 20. Dr. Goldstein

comments that Dr. Gibson had all the information to “replicate the Buying

Time studies in the most direct fashion–that is, by re-coding all (or even a

sample) of the captured advertisements and comparing the results of his coding

exercise with the results of mine. Because Dr. Gibson never attempted to test

the conclusions implicit in the database by replicating the coding exercise,

most of his assertions about the reliability and validity of the conclusions

drawn from the databases are necessarily speculative.” Id. at 19; see also

Lupia Expert Report at 17 [DEV 5-Tab 5] (“It is also worth noting that the

Plaintiffs and their experts passed up the opportunity to resolve their concerns

by replicating the data collection procedure itself.”). Dr. Lupia comments that

just because “a particular scientist fails in her attempt to replicate a study does
651

not show that the study is not replicable. . . . The claim that ‘the report is not

replicable’ is not proved in the [Gibson] report.” Lupia Expert Report at 17

[DEV 5-Tab 5] (emphasis in original); see also id. at 44.

e. Dr. Gibson charges that the Buying Time 1998 report “is filled with

questionable statistical techniques and applications.” Gibson Expert Report

at 5 [1 PCS]. Dr. Lupia observes that nowhere in his report does Dr. Gibson

identify mistakes in the application of statistical procedure. Lupia Expert

Report at 18-19 [DEV 5-Tab 5]. Dr. Lupia characterizes Dr. Gibson’s critique

as a “difference in point-of-view on how to categorize certain events that has

nothing to do with statistical techniques per se.” Id. at 19. 

f. Dr. Gibson suggests that CMAG’s shortcomings, detailed supra App. ¶ I.A,

affect the level of credence one may give the Buying Time reports; however,

he advances no hypotheses demonstrating why any of CMAG’s shortcomings

affect the results of Buying Time. Gibson Expert Report at 7-9 [1 PCS] (noting

that there are “many limitations to the CMAG data,” but not suggesting the

impact the limitations have on the results of Buying Time studies); Gibson

Rebuttal Report at 5-7 [2 PCS] (stating he has no basis for verifying that the

CMAG data base is accurate, that there is no way of knowing the

characteristics of the missing airings, but concluding that the “apparent[]”

errors caution against relying on the CMAG data for drawing conclusions on
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the nature of political communications); see also Goldstein Rebuttal Report at

23 [DEV 5-Tab 4] (stating that Dr. Gibson “does not even attempt to explain

how these alleged limitations undermine the validity of the conclusions set

forth in Buying Time”); Krasno Rebuttal Report at 5 [DEV 5-Tab 3]. 

g. The division of tasks between the authors of Buying Time 1998 and Dr.

Goldstein also calls into question the results of the study according to Dr.

Gibson. Dr. Gibson posits that since the study’s authors engaged in secondary

analysis of the data provided by Dr. Goldstein their “understanding of the

nuances and peculiarities of the data base” was “most likely limit[ed].”

Gibson Expert Report at 6 [1 PCS]. Given the size of the database and

“various data infirmities,” Dr. Gibson finds it “extremely worrisome that the

results [of Buying Time 1998] are so heavily dependent upon the limited skills

of an author [Mr. Seltz] who is a novice analyst.” Id. Dr. Krasno, as noted

supra, explains that Mr. Seltz did not engage in data analysis, making

“Professor Gibson’s fear that he contributed findings to Buying Time 1998 . .

. unfounded.” Krasno Rebuttal Report at 3 [DEV 5-Tab 3]. Dr. Lupia points

out that “secondary analysis of data collected by others” is common in the

political science discipline, and has been undertaken by Dr. Gibson himself.

Lupia Expert Report at 19-20 [DEV 5-Tab 5] (citing two articles authored by

Dr. Gibson which use “country-level electoral data” from a “historical archive”
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and a study conducted in 1954). 

h. Criticism was raised that both studies relied on coding of advertisements

conducted by university students. Gibson Expert Report at 9 [1 PCS]; see also

supra App. ¶ I.D.4 (explaining the coders’ role). Dr. Gibson finds troubling

the following unanswered questions: “how the students were recruited, what

expertise they had prior to being employed for the project, whether the

students had been exposed to Dr. Goldstein’s classes, whether the students had

ideological and/or policy commitments to a particular outcome in the project,

etc.” Id. He also believes the fact the student coders were not trained “is a

flaw of considerable proportion.” Id. at 10. This is due to the fact that they

were asked to make subjective judgments, and without training it is unknown

whether or not they were competent to make such judgments. Id. at 18; but see

id. (“[C]oding these advertisements is often simply difficult, irrespective of

one’s training and experience.”); see also Holman Dep. at 73, 80 [JDT Vol.

10] (acknowledging the subjective nature of determining the purpose of a

political advertisement). Dr. Gibson also notes that undergraduate students at

Arizona State University or the University of Wisconsin are “not a

representative sample of the ‘average viewer,’ and in the absence of training,

the students were apparently free to exercise unstructured discretion in coding

the ads. . . . [W]ithout training, practice coding, and discussion of coding rules
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based on the results of the practice coding . . . I do not believe that

undergraduate student coders can make accurate assessments on highly

subjective characteristics of these ads.” Gibson Expert Report at 10 [1 PCS].

Dr. Krasno responds, stating that 

it is likely a training program would have caused complaints that Dr.

Goldstein and I were attempting to impose our standards on the coders.

Given the alternatives, I felt [foregoing formal training] was preferable,

especially since we were hoping for a (reasonably informed) ordinary

viewer’s impression of the ads. Limited pre-testing of the coding

instrument showed that training was unnecessary because coders were

apparently able to understand and answer the questions without further

explanation. 

Krasno Rebuttal Report at 5 n.4 [DEV 5-Tab 3]. Dr. Goldstein notes that Dr.

Gibson’s criticism in this regard is speculative, especially given the fact “he

chose not to conduct his own survey, using his own coders and his own

training techniques, and compare it to the results reached by the undergraduate

coders.” Goldstein Rebuttal Report at 31 [DEV 5-Tab 4]; see also Lupia

Expert Report at 33 [DEV 5-Tab 5] (“In this case, such a replication would

have been relatively simple to conduct . . . and would have allowed the

[Gibson] report to rely less on speculation when alleging that measurable

attributes of Goldstein’s coders affected the data collection or analysis.”). Dr.

Goldstein states the lack of training was “a deliberate choice that is wellsupported by social science principles . . . . aimed at getting the untutored

common-sense impression of the coders, while minimizing the possibility of
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biasing coders with any preconceived notions that might have been implicit in

a set of instructions.” Goldstein Rebuttal Report at 32 [DEV 5-Tab 4]. Formal

training, Dr. Goldstein asserts, “would only undermine the independence of the

coders’ assessments and possibly introduce systematic bias into the survey.”

Id. The lack of training also made it easier to “simulate . . . the experience of

a typical viewer watching the ads at home.” Id. In terms of the

representativeness of the coders, Dr. Goldstein comments that “the use of

undergraduate subjects in studies measuring subjective perceptions of external

stimuli is well-established and accepted social science procedure.” Id. at 33.

The students who coded the 1998 data were undergraduate honors students at

Arizona State University, while six undergraduate students enrolled in Dr.

Goldstein’s upper-level Interest Group course at the University of Wisconsin

coded the 2000 data. Id. According to Dr. Goldstein, the coders were not

informed that the Brennan Center would be using their data to study the effects

of campaign finance legislation, and he does not believe he “ever expressed to

them any policy preference as to the desirability or undesirability of campaign

finance legislation, either in the classroom or during the coding process.” Id.

at 34. Dr. Goldstein notes that if his involvement in the project suggested

anything to the coders, it would have been that the project was about the tone

of political advertising, one of his primary scholarly interests. Id. In terms of
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the representativeness of the coders, Dr. Lupia states that “only if we had

evidence that the way in which the undergraduates were unrepresentative

caused Buying Time’s claims to differ from what a representative population

would have produced” would there be a basis to believe the coders’

unrepresentativeness threatened the quality of the data, but the Gibson “report

presents no such evidence.” Lupia Expert Report at 35 [DEV 5-Tab 5]. Lupia

also notes that “in the field of psychology . . . important discoveries about

mental states such as attitudes are often generated from studies that ask

undergraduates to answer opinion questions after viewing paper-based stimuli.

This practice has wide acceptance in social science and is the source of many

important and socially valuable discoveries.” Id. at 36; see also Holman Dep.

at 241-42 [JDT Vol. 10] (noting “it’s common practice to use students as

survey respondents especially in political work”).

i. Dr. Gibson challenges the reliability, or accuracy, of the coded data. Gibson

Expert Report at 11 [1 PCS]. Dr. Gibson appears not to be concerned about

the coding of objective characteristics of the advertisements. Id. (“Entirely

objective characteristics of the ads (e.g., whether a telephone number is

mentioned in the text of the ad) present few threats to reliability.”) (footnote

omitted). His main concern is over the coding of “subjective and judgmental”

characteristics. Id. at 12. He provides Question 6 as an example:
657

6. In your opinion is the purpose of this ad to provide information about

or urge action on a bill or issue, or is it to generate support or

opposition for a particular candidate?

1. Provide information or urge action 

(If so, skip to Question #19)

2. Generate support/opposition for candidate

3. Unsure/unclear

Id. at 12 (citing BT 1998 [DEV 47]) (emphasis in original). This question

appears in Buying Time 2000 as Question 11 except that the Buying Time 2000

version does not bold “particular candidate” and does not ask the coder to skip

Questions. See Goldstein Expert Report App. F [DEV 3-Tab 7]. Dr. Gibson

notes that it is not always readily apparent who the sponsor of the

advertisement is, making it difficult for the coder to know whose purpose he

or she is supposed to be evaluating. Gibson Expert Report at 12 [1 PCS]. This

problem is exacerbated by the lack of “explicit guidelines for how to ascertain

an ‘ad’s purpose.’” Id. To demonstrate the subjectivity of the question, Dr.

Gibson points to an advertisement run in Wisconsin which highlights Senators

Herb Kohl and Russell Feingold’s positions on partial birth abortion and asks

the viewer to call them. Id. at 12-13. To Dr. Gibson “it seems obvious that the

central focus of the ad is on the policy issue of whether to ban partial birth

abortions. . . . One might reasonably conclude that one purpose of the ad was

to elicit support for the National Pro-Life Alliance. The most reasonable

overall assessment of this ad is that it is an example of issue advocacy by an
199 Dr. Goldstein’s explanation for this divergence in treatment is discussed, supra

App. ¶ I.C.7; see also infra App. ¶ I.D.8.c.

658

interest group.” Id. at 13-14. Holman, in an email, wrote that the ad “reads to

me like a genuine issue ad,” id. at 14 (citing Holman Dep. Ex. 14), but he

concludes that it is an electioneering advertisement, Holman Dep. at 67 [JDT

Vol. 10]. Both Buying Time studies treat the advertisement as an

electioneering advertisement, but Dr. Goldstein in his expert report treats the

broadcast of the advertisement in 2000 as a genuine issue advertisement.199

Gibson Expert Report at 14 & n.13 [1 PCS]; see also Shays Dep. at 121 [JDT

Vol. 29] (noting he finds the advertisement to be “powerful” and that “it

should be run, but it was clearly designed to influence an election”);

McLoughlin Dep. at 42 [JDT Vol. 20] (stating his personal view is that the

advertisement is a “genuine issue ad”). Given the subjective nature of this

task, Dr. Gibson states that “certain procedures are essential so that the

reliability of the data collected can be assessed.” Gibson Expert Report at 16

[1 PCS]. According to Dr. Gibson, there is “no assessment whatsoever of

intercoder reliability [for Buying Time 1998]. Thus, unlike academic research

based on subjective coding, no empirical evidence exists to indicate that the

coders’ subjective assessments of these ads were accurate.” Id. at 18. Dr.

Gibson finds this to be a “serious flaw.” Id. Dr. Lupia responds arguing that

the “practice of treating answers to opinion questions as objective phenomena
659

is common in science.” Lupia Expert Report at 38 [DEV 5-Tab 5] (describing

an article co-authored by Dr. Gibson, the main conclusion of which is based

on a survey where participants were asked about how they described their own

identities). He notes that Question 6 begins with “In your opinion,” and seeks

to understand how the advertisements are perceived. Id. at 37. In addition,

Lupia questions the basis for Dr. Gibson’s claim that “the most reasonable

overall assessment” of the Wisconsin partial birth abortion advertisement is

that it is pure issue advocacy, because Dr. Gibson gives no clear explanation

of this judgment. Id. at 40. 

j. Dr. Gibson explains the importance of reliability in the Buying Time context.

He maintains that the miscoding of a single advertisement could have “quite

large consequences for the statistical results.” Gibson Expert Report at 22-23

[1 PCS]. He proposes that if Advertisement #11 was coded as promoting

issues rather than a candidate, the percentage of pure issue advertisements in

the Buying Time 1998 data set would rise six percentage points. Id. This, Dr.

Gibson argues, demonstrates the volatility of the data set. Id. at 23. As Dr.

Gibson notes, he is not claiming for purposes of this argument that

Advertisement #11 was coded in error; he is merely showing how one

hypothetical error could affect the data. Id. at 22 n.24.

k. Dr. Gibson also challenges the validity of the Buying Time 1998 data. Gibson
660

Expert Report at 17 [1 PCS]. By this, Dr. Gibson means that coders may be

consistent in their coding, but their coding may be incorrect. Id. Specifically,

he suggests that: 

coders must seek easily discernable ‘cues’ in the advertisements as a

means of making the required judgment. Since the presence of a

political figure who seems to be a candidate is a readily accessible cue,

the coders then develop an implicit decision rule that says: ‘when a

political figure is depicted in the ad, the ad involves electioneering.’

Using this rule, the variable might be reliably coded. But this does not

mean that the data are valid, since political figures appearing in ads

could well be doing something other than electioneering.

Id. (emphasis in original). Dr. Lupia counters that Dr. Gibson’s argument

misrepresents what the coders were asked to do. Lupia Expert Report at 39

[DEV 5-Tab 5]. He argues that the question seeks the coders’ perceptions of

the purpose of the advertisements, not the advertisements’ true purpose. Id.

Just because coders’ perceptions may not comport with reality does not

threaten the validity of the data, because the survey seeks the coders’ mental

impressions. Id. However, when codings were changed on Question 6, the

mental impressions of the coders, which were sought by the question, were

overruled. Goldstein Dep. (Vol 2) at 208-209 [JDT Vol. 8]. 

l. Dr. Gibson puts forth the theory that “the confusion in the instructions

regarding Questions 7 through 18 may have introduced a degree of bias into

how the students coded Question 6 by suggesting that any advertisement that

included the name of a candidate should be coded as having a purpose of
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promoting or opposing a candidate.” Gibson Expert Report at 30 [1 PCS]. Dr.

Gibson states that 

analysis reveals that fully 97.7% of [group-sponsored airings having a

‘purpose’ of generating support or opposition to a candidate] were also

coded as mentioning candidates. The most important conclusion I

draw from this analysis is that mentioning a candidate and promoting

a candidate are virtually the same thing, as these data were coded by the

undergraduate students (and/or Professor Goldstein). It seems highly

likely to me that the student coders coded these three questions (6, 7,

and 8) virtually simultaneously: A candidate (or what the coder thought

was a candidate) was observed in the ad, and then Question 6 was

coded as electioneering (in part because the coders knew that the

presence of a candidate was not coded if Question 6 was coded as

providing information), and then the student made the determination of

whether the candidate was ‘the favored candidate’ (Question 7) or the

‘favored candidate’s opponent’ (Question 8). Thus, the entire

relationship – empirical and logical – between Questions 6 and

Questions 7, [sic] and 8 renders the data set of little utility for

answering important questions about these ads and airings.

Gibson Expert Report at 30 [1 PCS]; but see id. at 55-56 (characterizing his

own argument as “indirect evidence or conjecture”). Dr. Krasno responds to

Dr. Gibson’s finding that 97.7 percent of advertisements found to be

electioneering commercials mentioned candidates by observing “[g]iven their

goal of helping candidates, it would be surprising to discover that

electioneering ads do not identify candidates.” Krasno Rebuttal Report at 10

n.13 [DEV 5-Tab 3]; see also Goldstein Rebuttal Report at 27 [DEV 5-Tab 4]

(stating that “it is difficult to imagine an ad intended to promote or oppose a

candidate that did not mention that candidate”) (emphasis in original). He also
662

states that Dr. Gibson’s theory that the two items were “cognitively connected

. . . . ignores the fact that candidate mentions are coded after the purpose of the

ad, and that coders did score a number of ads that mentioned actual and

apparent candidates in reasonably neutral ways as genuine issue advocacy.”

Krasno Rebuttal Report at 10 n.13 [DEV 5-Tab 3] (emphasis in original). Dr.

Lupia finds Dr. Gibson’s theory to be a “wild guess. It has no apparent

scientific basis, which matters because the claim in question includes a very

detailed statement about an exact sequence in coders’ cognitive processes. . .

. Moreover, I am quite familiar with the current scientific literature on the

psychology of responses to opinion questions and this claim follows nowhere

from it.” Lupia Expert Report at 45 [DEV 5-Tab 5]; see also Goldstein

Rebuttal Report at 28 [DEV 5-Tab 4]. He also comments that Dr. Gibson

could have easily tested his theory by showing “one set of coders with the

instructions regarding questions 7 through 18 visible while showing another

set of coders Question 6 without the instructions or subsequent questions.”

Lupia Expert Report at 44 [DEV 5-Tab 5]. I observe that Question 6 on the

Buying Time 1998 coding sheets is the last question on the first page of the

survey, with Questions 7 and 8 appearing on the following page. See, e.g.,

Gibson Expert Report Ex. 7 [1 PCS]. The coding sheets provided by Dr.

Gibson do not indicate coders changed (i.e. crossed out) their coding of
663

Question 6 for advertisements from issue advocacy to electioneering after

seeing Questions 7 and 8 on the following page. 

m. Plaintiffs challenge other aspects of Question 6 of Buying Time 1998. They

note that the words “particular candidate” are printed in bold type, which Dr.

Krasno states was done because he wanted the coders “to be thinking of

candidates” when answering the question. Krasno Dep. at 123 [JDT Vol. 14].

Dr. Krasno explains that the bold type was meant to “make certain that the

coders paid special attention to the appearance of candidates in these ads, so

that they answered the question with respect to candidates, not with respect to

something else.” Id. at 122-23. The corresponding question used for Buying

Time 2000 did not include the bold type. 

n. Dr. Gibson states that “it is apparent to me that no single Buying Time 1998

Data Set exists. This is in part due to the fact that Dr. Goldstein was (and may

still be) continuously making changes in the codes assigned to individual ads

and airings.” Gibson Expert Report at 11 [1 PCS]; see also id. at 5 (“[T]he

data set is continuously being manipulated and changed. . .”). Dr. Gibson

suggests that the only codes altered were those “undermining the preferred

conclusions,” introducing “asymmetrical bias . . . in the data set.” Id. Dr.

Gibson makes the same allegation with regard to the Buying Time 2000 data

set. Id. at 50 (“[T]his data set, like the 1998 data, is continuously being
664

changed.”). Dr. Krasno explains that the short time frame of the study

“inevitably meant that small changes to the data set would continue even after

the release of Buying Time 1998.” Krasno Rebuttal Report at 4 [DEV 5-Tab

3]. He claims that such changes are quite typical, and that “[v]irtually every

provider of large data sets, from the National Election Studies to the

Commerce Department, prepares versions of their data and continues to fix

problems in subsequent releases.” Id. The changes, Dr. Krasno maintains,

reflect “the gradual filling in of missing data and the discovery of internal

contradictions. There is no evidence at all in Dr. Gibson’s report that any of

the changes in the successive versions of the data that he examined had more

than a trivial impact on his results or on those reported in Buying Time 1998.”

Id; but see Goldstein Dep. Ex. 17 (email authored by Holman stating that the

“missing data category is uncomfortably large in the 1998 database”). Dr.

Goldstein also notes that each Buying Time database consists of 40 million

data points, and that “errors are inevitable in any database of this size.”

Goldstein Rebuttal Report at 37 [DEV 5-Tab 4]. He claims that Dr. Gibson’s

suggestion that these errors invalidate the database fails to make the distinction

between random error and non-random error (or “systematic” bias). Id. Dr.

Goldstein claims that it is “universally recognized that random error does not

undermine the validity of a data set because random error, by definition, occurs
665

in all directions,” and that such errors “are expected to cancel each other out.”

Id. Therefore while random errors “may make the coding of a particular data

point inaccurate, their aggregate effect over the whole data set is not expected

to undermine conclusions.” Id. According to Dr. Goldstein, Dr. Gibson

“typically does not specify whether . . . alleged errors were random or

systematic,” and concludes that “the great majority of the errors that Dr.

Gibson alleges are, at most, the result of random ‘noise’ which would not have

systematically biased the study’s results or undermined its validity.” Id. at 38.

Dr. Goldstein states that the production of several versions of the Buying Time

databases is explained by the fact that “social science researchers, like all

prudent people, periodically back up their work when using computers.”

Goldstein Rebuttal Report at 9 [DEV 5-Tab 4]. Dr. Goldstein provides two

explanations for the variances in data between the two data sets. First, some

differences may be the result of “routine ‘cleaning’ of the data sets.” Id. at 10.

Dr. Goldstein says that it is “standard social science practice to clean a data set

by correcting apparent errors after the codes have been entered into the

database.” Id. (citing Herbert F. Weisberg, Jon A. Krosnick & Bruce D.

Bowen, An Introduction to Survey Research, Polling, and Data Analysis (3d

ed. 1996)). Corrections were made to “wild codes– that is, entries for which

no corresponding code existed in our codebook.” Id. at 11. Dr. Goldstein and
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his assistants also “corrected logically inconsistent answers . . . [and] also

filled in missing data for some ads on a number of objective questions, such

as candidate mention, in both the 1998 and 2000 databases.” Id. More

substantial differences can be attributed to the fact that Dr. Goldstein

“continued updating and revising [his] own copy of the database as part of

[his] continuing scholarly work.” Id. at 11-12. Subsequent discoveries of

miscodes of mostly contextual errors and 100 missing advertisements from the

CMAG data set were added to Dr. Goldstein’s version of the 2000 database.

Id. at 12. Dr. Lupia reviewed the multiple databases and concludes that the

changes are transparent and he finds no reason to conclude that Dr. Goldstein

has attempted to hide anything. Lupia Expert Report at 22 [DEV 5-Tab 5].

Lupia agrees that Dr. Gibson’s concern is a legitimate one; however, “[l]arge

academic databases change for legitimate reasons, so the mere existence of the

relative small changes cited in the [Gibson] report provide no basis to negate

the project’s credibility.” Id. at 23. To Lupia, the important question is “why

and how the changes were made,” and Dr. Gibson’s suggestions of

illegitimacy are, in Lupia’s opinion, “of varying and questionable credibility.”

Id. 

o. Dr. Gibson examined “the actual student coding sheeting for 25 of the 1998

storyboards and . . . compared them to the ‘final’ version of the 1998 data set.”
667

Gibson Expert Report at 15 [1 PCS]. Focusing on Question 6, he found that

the original student codings of eight advertisements as “genuine issue

advertisements” had been changed to electioneering advertisements. Id.

These eight advertisements were aired over 2,400 times, significantly changing

the results of the survey. Id. Dr. Gibson is troubled by the fact that the

changes were “entirely asymmetrical: In not a single instance in these

storyboards was a change made on an ad originally coded as having candidate

support or opposition as its ‘purpose.’” Id. He asks: “[s]ince no documentation

of how individual ads were selected for reconsideration by Professor Goldstein

has apparently been produced, one is left wondering why all of these changes

could have the same effect.” Id. Dr. Krasno’s explanation of the changes to

the advertisements is detailed infra, App. ¶ I.D.7.r.(3). Dr. Lupia states that

Dr. Gibson’s Report is subject to the same criticism with regard to his analysis

of this matter. Lupia asks:

why 25 storyboards and not more or less were examined. We are not

told how these 25 cases were selected. Were they selected at random,

were they given to Dr. Gibson by counsel (as is true in an analogous

replication attempt . . .), or were they chosen by some other procedure?

. . . Indeed, the [Gibson] report provides no basis for rejecting the

hypothesis that the ‘asymmetry’ claim is an artifact of the cases being

selected in a way that is biased toward this [sic] generating this

particular result.

Lupia Expert Report at 41 [DEV 5-Tab 5]. 

p. In his report, Dr. Gibson discusses Question 22 on the coding sheet. The
668

Question reads:

22. In your judgement, is the primary focus of this ad on the personal

characteristics of either candidate or on policy matters?

1. Personal characteristics

2. Policy matters

3. Both

4. Neither

Gibson Expert Report at 31-32 [1 PCS]. Dr. Gibson observes that 98.1 percent

of the advertisements aired within 60 days of the election were found to focus

on policy matters, which means that “many ads were coded in Question 6 as

promoting candidates but also as being ‘primarily’ focused on policy matters

in Question 22.” Id. at 32-33. Dr. Gibson finds this result contrary to what

one might expect. Id. at 32. He then analyzes both questions and finds

Question 22 to be more valid and reliable. Question 6, reproduced supra, App.

¶ I.D.7.i, does not provide coders the option of finding that the advertisement

promotes both issues and candidates, forcing coders “to make a dichotomous

judgment about the ad’s ‘purpose.’” Id. at 33-34. Dr. Gibson also observes

that “Question 6 does not ask the coder to discern the ‘primary’ purpose of the

ad [it asks coders to provide their opinion on the advertisement’s ‘purpose’].

Indeed, the question provides no guidance whatsoever as to how to code

mixed-content ads.” Id. at 34. For Dr. Gibson, the structure of Question 22

is superior to that of Question 6 because it provides the options of “both” and

“neither,” not “forcing a choice between different parts of the manifest content
669

of the ad . . . by allowing a coding of ‘mixed’ content.” Id. Furthermore, he

finds Question 22’s request for the advertisements’ “primary purpose,” as

opposed to Question 6’s request for the commercials’ “purpose,” “provides at

least some guidance for how to make the judgment required.” Id. Dr. Gibson

concludes that “Question 22 is structured in such a way as to provide more

reliable information than Question 6.” Id. Dr. Gibson also observes that the

advertisements coded as supporting or opposing candidates have “quite a

number of characteristics of what the authors of Buying Time 1998 refer to as

‘genuine issue ads.’” Id. at 35. He finds that:

95.6 percent of advertisements supporting or opposing candidates urged

the viewer to take some action; 74.3 percent of these were coded as

providing a toll-free telephone number and only 2.9 percent were coded

as providing no telephone number

45.7 percent were coded as addressing health care issues; 30.1 percent

addressed taxes; 27.8 percent addressed Social Security.

Id. at 34-35. Based on these findings, Dr. Gibson concludes that: “1) The

coding in Question 6 is deeply flawed; 2) When Question 6 and Question 22

clash (i.e., the coding attributes differ), the coding of Question 22 should be

considered more valid and reliable; 3) According to the coding, the vast and

overwhelming majority of the ads said to be examples of illegitimate

electioneering (by virtue of promoting candidates) in fact were judged by their

own coders to have ‘policy matters’ as their ‘primary focus.’” Id. at 35. Dr.
670

Krasno disputes Dr. Gibson’s conclusion that Question 6 is deeply flawed,

noting that “coders rated 99 percent of candidate ads (and 93 percent of party

ads) as generating support or opposition for a candidate.” Krasno Rebuttal

Report at 10 [DEV 5-Tab 3] (citing BT 1998 [DEV 47] at 41). This conclusion

is bolstered in Dr. Krasno’s opinion by the fact the coders were not asked to

determine the sponsor of the advertisement and that the disclaimers on the

storyboards provided to the coders were often difficult to read. Id. at 10 n.14.

Dr. Krasno contends that an electioneering advertisement does not have to

focus primarily on personal characteristics of a candidate. He notes that

“political scientists routinely take the view that politiciansfrequently adopt and

advertise policy positions in order to appeal to voters. Id. at 11 (citing as an

example Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (1957)); see

also Goldstein Rebuttal Report at 29 n.16 [DEV 5-Tab 4] (citing four articles

for the proposition that “policy issues in electioneering ads is widely noted in

the political science literature”); Seltz Dep. at 188 [JDT Vol. 28]. Dr. Krasno

stated that the: 

best illustration of this point [is the fact that] coders rated 11 percent of

candidate[-sponsored] ads as focused on the personal characteristics of

the candidates, 64 percent as policy-related, and the remaining 25

percent as neither or both. If one assumes, as both common sense and

FECA indicate, that candidates are wholly motivated by their desire to

win election, then the problem with using q22 as Dr. Gibson would use

it becomes obvious: it miscategorizes at least two thirds of candidate

ads as not being electioneering. This is the same criticism that both
671

editions of Buying Time level at the magic words test, that it does not

work for the one group of ads whose purpose and category are already

known, regardless of their language or style.

Id. at 11. Dr. Lupia comments that an advertisement’s primary purpose (the

question posed in Question 6) and its primary focus (the question posed in

Question 22) do not have to be the same. To illustrate his point he notes that

many beer commercials do not focus on the product, but rather people

“engaged in a range of activities that we can call ‘wild nights out.’” Lupia

Expert Report. at 47 [DEV 5-Tab 5]. It would not be unreasonable to

“perceive that the purpose of the ad is to get” the viewer to buy the beer, “but

to judge its primary focus as wild times.” Id. at 48. Dr. Lupia argues that,

contrary to Dr. Gibson’s assumption, individuals can make the same

distinction for campaign advertisements, i.e. that their purpose is to get the

person to vote for candidate X, but their focus is on issue Y. Id. Lupia also

challenges the idea that the qualifier “primary” clarifies matters for the coders.

He cites a study co-authored by Dr. Gibson based on a survey question on

social identity that did not mention the word “primary,” but concluded that the

initial responses given revealed primary social identities. Lupia Expert Report

at 51 [DEV 5-Tab 5] (quoting James L. Gibson & Amanda Gouws, Social

Identities and Political Intolerance: Linkages within the South African Mass

Public, American Journal of Political Science 278-92 (2000)). This, Lupia
672

states, is “standard practice” and the Dr. Gibson “report provides no tangible

evidence or scholarly reference that Question 6 is inconsistent with standard

scientific practice.” Id. at 52. In terms of Dr. Gibson’s determination that

Question 22 is superior to Question 6, Lupia notes that Question 6 does

provide the coder with a third option of “unsure/unclear” and the Gibson

Expert Report “offers no direct evidence on how answers to the questions

would have changed had we allowed the responses ‘both’ and ‘neither’ in

Question 6 or the response ‘unsure/unclear’ in Question 22.” Id. at 48, 50.

Lupia posits in response to the criticism that Question 6 failed to provide

guidance to the coders that providing instructions would open the study up to

charges that the instructions themselves biased the coders’ responses. Id. at

49.

q. Dr. Gibson observes, for the first time in his rebuttal report, that “[m]issing

from the entire discussion of ads and airings in the expert reports submitted is

any consideration of the people who consume these ads.” Gibson Rebuttal

Report at 24 [2 PCS]. He uses the “Gross Rating Points” variable in the

Buying Time databases to assess the impact of BCRA on “the people who

consume these ads.” “Gross rating points are the sum of ratings for a

particular time: if the local news is watched by ten percent of viewers with

televisions, an ad run during the program represents ten gross rating points.”
673

Id. at 25 (quoting BT 1998 [DEV 47] at 6). Starting with Krasno and Sorauf’s

Expert Report’s finding that there were 713 “genuine issue advertisement”

airings during the last sixty days of the 1998 campaign which depicted a

candidate, Dr. Gibson found gross rating points for 707 of the airings. He

found:

that these 707 airings represent communications with a staggering

number of household – 30,108,857. Thus, were these ads (just the

ads accepted by Dr. Krasno and Professor Goldstein as ‘genuine

issue ads’) prohibited, over 30 million group-citizen political

communications would be affected (and this figure is based on the

quite conservative assumption that each household only has a single

person viewing television). 

Id. Dr. Gibson does not make a similar argument in relation to Buying Time

2000. For further discussion on this point see Findings ¶ 2.12.13.

r. Buying Time 1998’s Seven Percent Figure

Buying Time 1998’s claim that only seven percent of “genuine issue ads”

in the 1998 campaign would constitute electioneering communications under

BCRA is disputed. 

(1) According to Dr. Jonathan Krasno, author of Buying Time 1998, the

question he sought to answer was “what is BCRA’s impact on pure

issue ads?” Krasno Rebuttal Report at 12 [DEV 5-Tab 3]. Dr. Krasno

aimed to determine if BCRA’s framers’ attempts to minimize the

impact of BCRA on pure issue ads through timing and identification of
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candidates worked. Id. Buying Time 1998 found that seven percent of

all pure issue advertisements aired in 1998 identified a federal

candidate and appeared within sixty days of the campaign. Id. at 13.

This figure was determined by dividing the number of airings of

genuine issue advertisements mentioning a federal candidate within 60

days of the election by the total number of genuine issue advertisements

run in 1998. Id.; see also Seltz Dep. at 115-16 [JDT Vol. 28]. The

Brennan Center stands by the seven percent figure, although for a

period of time in 2001 it had questioned its accuracy. Holman Dep. at

142-43 [JDT Vol. 10]. During that period of time, the Brennan Center

ran additional analyses and determined that seven percent of “unique

issue ads– or in other words, . . . special interest groups placing issue

ads” produced in 1998 would be captured unfairly by BCRA, id. at

123, 144, and that 13.8 percent of all issue advertisement airings

mentioning a candidate and broadcast within 60 days of the 1998

election were genuine issue advertisements, id. at 154-55.

(2) Plaintiffs object to the use of this denominator. Dr. Gibson finds:

using a denominator of all issue ads broadcast in 1998 for these

calculations is arbitrary and makes little sense. Why use January

1, 1998, as the starting date for the total pool of issue ads (i.e.,

the denominator)? Why not include ads from December 1997,

or even the entire election cycle beginning in November 1996?

Why not limit the denominator to ads shown in the last half of
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1998? The . . . selected . . . denominator . . . has no theoretical

meaning.

Gibson Expert Report at 38 [1 PCS]; see also id. at 41 (“I can see no

justification for making the denominator equal to all issue ads aired in

1998.”). Furthermore, he argues that given his conclusion that more

people are concentrating on political issues as elections draw near,

discussed supra App. ¶ I.C.8, Buying Time 1998’s denominator, by

using all issue advertisements run during the course of the year, makes

“the assumption that ads aired anytime throughout the year are equally

as valuable as ads aired in proximity to the election.” Gibson Rebuttal

Report at 27 [2 PCS]. He concludes that the “damage of prohibiting an

ad within 60 days of an election cannot be ameliorated by allowing that

ad to be broadcast at some other point throughout the year.” Id. at 27-

28. Dr. Krasno explains that the denominator reflects only

advertisements run in 1998 because “we had no data from 1997 or the

last weeks of 1996 to include in the denominator.” Krasno Rebuttal

Report at 14 [DEV 5-Tab 3]. He notes that the addition of such data

into the denominator would simply “decrease the percentage of pure

issue ads affected by BCRA” because all of those advertisements would

have aired more than 60 days before the election and would therefore

not increase the size of the numerator. Id. at 14-15 (emphasis in
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original); see also Krasno & Sorauf Expert Report at 62 [DEV 1-Tab

2] (“The data from which these estimates are derived cover

broadcasting only during the 1998 and 2000 calendar years, not the

thirteen-plus months preceding them. Were we able to factor in the

total number of pure issue ads that appeared between elections, the

percentage of pure issue ads affected by BCRA would decline.”). Dr.

Gibson also suggests the better denominator, and one that is not

arbitrary, is that used in Buying Time 2000; namely, all airings of issue

advertisements during the last sixty days of the campaign which also

depict a candidate. Gibson Expert Report at 39 [1 PCS]. The formula

answers the question: If one were to assume all issue advertisements

mentioning a candidate in the last 60 days of an election campaign had

an electioneering purpose, what percentage of the time would this

assumption be erroneous? Id. at 38-39. By contrast, the Buying Time

1998 formula answers the question: “What percentage of total ads run

throughout the year that mentioned a candidate by name and were

coded as providing information or urging action appeared within 60

days of the election, rather than earlier than 60 days before the

election?” Id. at 39 (emphasis in original). Dr. Krasno believes that

Dr. Gibson’s denominator would vary in size “with the amount of
200 Dr. Gibson, using a different data set than Dr. Krasno, found that by taking Buying

Time 1998’s “flawed numerator and using the Brennan Center’s own figures for calculating

the proper denominator (airings within 60 days [of the election]), 16.5 % of the group ads

were ‘genuine issue ads’ (as defined by the Brennan Center). . . .” Gibson Expert Report at

42 [1 PCS]. He goes on to reject this figure because he “does not accept the numerator.” Id.

He also finds that by using the data set he believed was the “final” version 25.7 percent of

issue advertisements aired during 1998 mentioned a candidate and were broadcast within 60

days of the election were “genuine” issue advertisements. Id. at 37. Dr. Krasno states that

this figure is incorrect because the data set used is incorrect, resulting in a numerator “four

times too large,” and that based on his study with Sorauf, he now calculates the correct figure

to be 6.1 percent. Krasno Rebuttal Report at 19 & App. [DEV 5-Tab 3]; see also Krasno &

Sorauf Expert Report at 60 [DEV 1-Tab 2]. Dr. Gibson’s problems with the numerator are

discussed infra, App. I.D.7.r.(3). 

677

candidate-oriented issue advertising before an election. This is

particularly relevant because of the volume of candidate-oriented issue

ads devoted to presidential campaigns. The result, of course, is highly

unstable estimates of BCRA’s impact from year to year.” Krasno

Rebuttal Report at 15 [DEV 5-Tab 3]. The effect of using the Buying

Time 1998 denominator is that the percentage is affected not only by

the amount of genuine issue advertisements run within 60 days of the

election, but also the number of electioneering advertisements run

during that time. Id. at 16 n. 26. When Dr. Krasno applied Dr.

Gibson’s denominator to the Buying Time 1998 data he found 14.7

percent of genuine issue advertisements would be unfairly captured.200

Id.; see also Krasno & Sorauf Report at 60 n.143 [DEV 1-Tab 2]; id.

App. at 3 (providing the calculation: 713 airings of three distinct
201 One of these advertisements, “HMO said No” was aired a total of 455 times (118

times in Greensboro, 126 times in Raleigh-Durham, and 211 times in St. Louis). Krasno &

Sorauf Expert Report App. at 3, 20 [DEV 1-Tab 2]. We were unable to find additional

information about the other two advertisements, “CCS/No Matter Who” and

“CENT/Breaux.” Id. In 1998, St. Louis had 1,110,290 television households, RaleighDurham had 834,260, and Greensboro had 584,900. Gibson Rebuttal Report Ex. 2 [2 PCS].

678

genuine issue advertisements201 mentioning a candidate and aired

within 60 days of an election constitutes the numerator; the

denominator is the 4847 airings of issue advertisements mentioning a

candidate within 60 days of the election). Dr. Krasno also notes that

Dr. Gibson’s calculations, finding 44.4 percent or more of genuine

issue advertisements unfairly captured by BCRA to be, by Dr. Gibson’s

own report, a result of his changes to the numerator as well as to the

denominator. Id. at 16; see also Gibson Expert Report at 40 [1 PCS].

Dr. Gibson notes that the discrepancy between his figures and that of

Buying Time 1998 “is due in part to the use of different denominators,”

but does not indicate the extent to which the change to the denominator,

as opposed to his changes to the numerator, explains the discrepancy.

Gibson Expert Report at 40 [1 PCS]. Dr. Lupia observes that both

denominators answer questions that are different but finds both to be

reasonable. “If I were asked to assess the proposed regulation’s

restrictiveness, the [Gibson] report’s fraction could provide information
679

about the impact during a particular time period, while Buying Time

1998’s fraction could provide a better measure of the regulation’s

impact on issue advocacy more generally.” Lupia Expert Report at 25

[DEV 5-Tab 5]. Lupia states that Dr. Gibson’s denominator is no less

arbitrary than that of Buying Time 1998. Id. at 26. Holman comments

that the Buying Time 1998 denominator is “a justifiable way” of

determining the impact of BCRA on genuine issue advertisements,

although he did not use the same one for Buying Time 2000. Holman

Dep. at 140 [JDT Vol. 10]. For Holman, the Buying Time 1998

calculation is “not incorrect. It’s a different way of assigning a number

to measure a phenomenon.” Id; but see id. at 153-54 (stating that the

text of Buying Time 1998 relating to the seven percent figure is

“[m]isleading” and “ambiguous” in that it did not identify clearly to

what it referred).

(3) Plaintiffs’ and Defendants’ experts also disagree as to what the

appropriate numerator should be. Dr. Gibson rejected the Buying Time

1998 numerator because based on the data he was provided he

concluded that eight advertisements aired 2,405 times in the last 60

days of the campaign were originally coded as promoting an issue or

urging action (genuine issue advertisements) but were overruled by Dr.
680

Goldstein and recoded as electioneering advertisements. Gibson Expert

Report at 42 [1 PCS]. When Dr. Gibson added in these advertisements

he found that “nearly two-thirds of the group ads that aired within 60

days of the 1998 election were coded by the students as ‘genuine issue

ads.’” Id. at 43. Dr. Gibson in his Rebuttal Report revises this figure

based on information provided during the course of the litigation,

which indicated that over a quarter of the advertisements he added to

the numerator did mention candidates, resulting in a figure of 50.5

percent. Gibson Rebuttal Report at 23 [2 PCS]; see also Krasno

Rebuttal Report at 17-18 [DEV 5-Tab 3] (describing this error). Dr.

Gibson concludes that “this 50.5 % figure represents the statistical floor

. . . the 64 % figure cited in my report . . . provides the ceiling.” Gibson

Rebuttal Report at 24 [2 PCS]. Dr. Gibson, in his Supplement Report,

states that Dr. Krasno had produced additional data files which

included an earlier version of the data set upon which he had relied.

Gibson Supplement to Rebuttal Expert Report of October 7, 2002: 1998

Data (“Gibson Supplemental Report”) at 1 [2 PCS]. The data showed

that one of the eight advertisements Dr. Gibson alleged had been

recoded (from “genuine issue” to “electioneering”) had originally been

coded as promoting the election or defeat of a candidate, and that
681

another was missing data as to the nature of the commercial. Id. at 4.

As a result of excluding the airings of these two commercials, Dr.

Gibson calculates that his “ceiling” fell to 60 percent, and his “floor”

remained unchanged. Id. at 5-6. Dr. Krasno rejects the inclusion of

any of the airings of these eight advertisements in the numerator. See

Krasno Response to Professor Gibson’s Supplemental Rebuttal (Nov.

13, 2002) (“Krasno Response”). He objects to the notion that the

recoding “reflects a deliberate effort to manipulate some of the results

reported in Buying Time 1998,” stating that the recoding aimed to

“make the data set as sensible and accurate as possible.” Id. at 1, 2. Dr.

Krasno explains that the decision to recode five of the advertisements

was based on their contradictory codings. Id. at 2. The survey was

constructed so that when a coder found that an advertisement’s purpose

was to “provide information or urge action” (in other words, was a

genuine issue advertisement) in Question 6, the coder was supposed to

skip the next 12 questions. Id. at 2; Gibson Supplemental Report Ex.

7 [2 PCS]. For five of these advertisements, student coders found the

advertisement provided information or urged action, but went on to

answer the next 12 questions. Krasno Response at 2. In addition, Dr.

Krasno states that “all of these ads were scored in a parallel process on
682

another variable, ‘favcan,’ as favoring a Democratic or Republican

candidate. Again, the potential conflict between question 6 and favcan

should have attracted attention as the data set was being prepared.” Id.

Dr. Krasno argues that a review of the storyboards for these five

advertisements, as well as other contextual factors such as where and

when they were aired, makes it clear that they should be coded as

“electioneering.” Id. at 2-4. As for the final advertisement concerning

Senators Herb Kohl and Russell Feingold’s positions on partial birth

abortion, Dr. Krasno admits that whether or not it is a genuine issue or

electioneering advertisement is a “close call,” but the fact that it

appeared only six times in 1998 means its coding has “no real effect on

any calculations of BCRA’s impact.” Id. at 3; see also supra App. ¶¶

I.D.7.i, I.D.8.c (discussing the advertisement). Dr. Krasno believes that

the “notion that a small handful of mistakes must be perpetuated

because they were once made is both ludicrous and an extraordinary

departure from the usual practice of compiling data sets. Dr. Gibson’s

argument would be more credible if he offered any explanation for why

these commercials really are pure issue ads.” Krasno Response at 5.

(4) Dr. Lupia weighs in on the fraction debate, contending that the Gibson

and Buying Time reports “are reasonable conceptualizations of the
683

question about how the proposed regulations will affect groups in the

present and future if groups act exactly as they did in the past. If,

however, we want to evaluate the regulations’ likely future impact we

should consider the possibility that groups will adapt to the new

regulations in different ways.” Lupia Expert Report at 26 [DEV 5-Tab

5]. Both sides seek to predict the impact BCRA will have if no one

alters their behavior. Lupia concludes that to “the extent that affected

groups are able to choose [to alter their behavior], both estimates in the

denomination debate may exaggerate the extent to which this aspect of

the new regulation will restrict the groups’ abilities to express

themselves in the future. . . . To the extent that we agree that such

groups will adapt in various ways, the credibility of the high-percentage

estimates of the likely future impact of the proposed regulations on

interest groups is severely undermined.” Id. at 27. 

8. Criticism of Buying Time 2000

a. Many of Dr. Gibson’s criticisms of Buying Time 2000 are similar to those

made of Buying Time 1998 and are addressed supra, App. ¶ I.D.7.

b. Dr. Gibson states that the Buying Time 2000 data base “has numerous errors

and inconsistencies in it,” and comments that these changes preclude him from

replicating the findings of Buying Time 2000. Gibson Expert Report at 46, 47-
202 Dr. Goldstein testifies that he does not have the original student coding for this

study, explaining that his “political science department . . . mistakenly deleted a big chunk

of out files, including our access database.” Goldstein Dep. (Vol. 2) at 129 [JDT Vol. 8]. 

684

48 [1 PCS].202 He is troubled by the fact that Dr. Goldstein changed the coded

“purpose” of 62 out of 338 advertisements, id. at 52, questions the motivation

behind the changes, and asks what standards Dr. Goldstein employed in

making the changes, id. at 53; see also id. at 47 n.43, 64 (concluding from a

review of email correspondence between Buying Time 2000 researchers that

they “were committed to drawing a particular set of substantive conclusions

from the data. When the conclusions were not forthcoming, the data was

scrutinized further and alterations were made in the data base.”). Dr.

Goldstein states that “most of the 62 ‘changes’ [Gibson] identifies in the 2000

database are not changes at all, but rather original student coding of additional

CMAG storyboards that had not previously been coded at all, and were not

part of the database used by the authors of Buying Time 2000.” Goldstein

Rebuttal Report at 4 [DEV 5-Tab 4]. The problem stems from Dr. Gibson’s

use of the wrong database; he does not analyze the Buying Time 2000

database, but rather “a later iteration of [Dr. Goldstein’s] own version of the

database containing [his] own after-the-fact updates and re-codes, including

additional ads later received from CMAG. . . . [N]one of this re-coding ever
203 For example, Dr. Gibson challenges the Buying Time 2000 finding that “[o]f all the

group-sponsored issue ads that depicted a candidate within 60 days of the election, 99.4 %

were found to be electioneering issue ads. In absolute numbers, only three genuine issue ads

(which aired a total of 331 times in the 2000 elections) would have been defined as

electioneering communications . . . .” Gibson Expert Report at 61 [1 PCS] (quoting BT 2000

[DEV 46] at 73 (emphasis in original)). Dr. Gibson finds that according to the database the

three advertisements were only aired nine times, but the Buying Time authors reported 331

airings and a different data base that Dr. Gibson determines is the “original, student coded

version” of Question 11 shows 1,082 airings.. Id. at 61-62. He declares that he “has

confidence in none of these” figures. Id. at 62. Dr. Goldstein claims that if Dr. Gibson had

used the correct database, “federal.sav,” he would have been able to identify the three

advertisements which comprise 331 airings. Goldstein Rebuttal Report at 21 [DEV 5-Tab

4] (finding advertisements #627 (172 airings), #1389 (81 airings), and #2862 (78 airings)).

He also used the database to identify “all ads run by interest groups that mentioned a

candidate and aired within 60 days of the election,” and using that as the denominator arrived

at the same percentage as Buying Time 2000. Id. (dividing 331 by 53,840).

685

made its way into the Buying Time 2000 report.”203

 Id. at 14-15. Dr. Goldstein

also takes exception to the charge that he deliberately changed the data in order

to decrease the number of pure issue advertisements, calling it “baseless.” Id.

at 4. In addition, Dr. Goldstein notes that he reevaluated the coding of 30

advertisements in the 2000 database in his post-Buying Time 2000 academic

research having nothing to do with campaign finance or the Buying Time

studies and “[i]n 26 of these instances, [] changed the coding from

electioneering to genuine issue.” Id. at 5, 14-15, App. A (listing

advertisements changed or added to the database and the changes made to

each). Dr. Goldstein claims that for the Buying Time 2000 database, he “did

not change any of the student coders’ responses to Question 11 in the data

cleaning process.” Id. at 16; see also Goldstein Dep. (Vol.2) at 57-59, 147-50
686

[JDT Vol. 8] (detailing cell phone conference call from the West Palm Beach

Airport asking for his assessment of three advertisements which were

subsequently changed from genuine issue to electioneering advertisements

based on Dr. Goldstein’s assessments). Dr. Lupia comments that Dr. Gibson

fails to connect his bias concerns with actual changes in the database or

demonstrate the effects directly. Lupia Expert Report at 58 [DEV 5-Tab 5].

As such, Lupia finds the charge that the investigators were committed to

reaching a particular outcome to be “at best, premature and, with certainty, not

proven in the [Gibson] report. Id. 

c. Dr. Goldstein does find that three advertisements in the Buying Time 2000

database “were re-coded on Question 11 from ‘promoting a candidate’ to

‘providing information or urging action on an issue.’” Goldstein Expert Report

at 16 [DEV 3-Tab 7]. One was a version of a “cookie cutter” advertisement

run by CBM (numbered 1269), which was “extremely similar” to a number of

other CBM-sponsored advertisements that (Goldstein thought) had all been

coded as “electioneering.” Id. This fact was brought to Dr. Goldstein’s

attention by the Buying Time authors and, concluding that it was not

“meaningfully distinguishable from the other CBM ads, . . . [he] recoded it as

electioneering.” Id. The second was the National Pro-Life Alliance

advertisement (numbered 2107) which mentioned Wisconsin Senators Kohl
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and Feingold. Again, the Buying Time authors told Dr. Goldstein that the

advertisement was “virtually identical” to another advertisement run in

Virginia mentioning then-Senator Charles Robb. Id. at 17. Dr. Goldstein

reviewed the storyboards of the two advertisements and found them “not

meaningfully distinguishable, and resolved the inconsistency by re-coding [the

commercial] as electioneering.” Id. The final advertisement changed was

sponsored by the Rhode Island Women Voters (numbered 1367). The

advertisement was originally coded as a “genuine issue advertisement” but

changed by Dr. Goldstein after the Buying Time authors disagreed with the

coding. Id. Dr. Goldstein believes that the advertisement “is clearly

electioneering.” Id. As noted supra, App. ¶ I.D.8.c, Dr. Goldstein recently

discovered that the six corresponding versions of Advertisement #1269 were

originally coded as “genuine issue advertisements” by the students and later

changed by the Buying Time 2000 authors to “electioneering” commercials.

Goldstein Dep. (Vol. 2) at 158-59 [JDT Vol. 8]. When these six

advertisements are added to the analysis, which Dr. Goldstein terms “the most

conservative standard estimate,” one finds that 17 percent of the

advertisements aired within 60 days of the election which identified a

candidate were “genuine issue advertisements.” Id. at 169. Defendants’

experts personally disagree that all of these commercials are “genuine issue
688

advertisements.” See Holman Dep. at 82-83 [JDT Vol. 10] (stating he

considers Advertisement #1367 to be his “poster child of sham issue

advocacy”); Goldstein Expert Report at 26 n.21 [DEV 3-Tab 7] (noting that

he considers all the commercials with the exception of Advertisement #2107

“were clearly intended to support or oppose the election of a candidate”).

d. Dr. Gibson raises essentially the same concerns about Question 11 in Buying

Time 2000 as he does for the practically identical Question 6 in Buying Time

1998, discussed supra App. ¶ I.D.7.i. Gibson Expert Report at 54-55 [1 PCS].

Many of the rebuttal arguments posted in paragraph I.D.7.i, supra, are aimed

at this charge as well. See supra App. ¶ I.D.7.i. In addition, Dr. Goldstein

argues that data from the 2000 election shows that coders “were [not]

systematically biased toward coding ads mentioning candidates as

electioneering as opposed to issue ads.” Goldstein Rebuttal Report at 29

[DEV 5-Tab 4]. Dr. Goldstein states that “79.8 percent of the group-sponsored

ads classified as electioneering were coded as having run within 60 days of the

election, compared to only 18.7 percent of non-electioneering ads.” Id. at 28.

As one “would expect . . . that ads designed to promote or oppose a candidate

would air relatively close to Election Day,” this objective data, in Dr.

Goldstein’s opinion, corroborates the coding in Question 11 and demonstrates

that Dr. Gibson’s theory is incorrect. Id. at 28-29. 
689

e. Dr. Gibson also makes the argument that Buying Time 2000’s Question 27,

identical to Buying Time 1998’s Question 22, is superior to Question 11, for

much the same reasons he posits for the superiority of Buying Time 1998’s

Question 22 over the same study’s Question 6. Gibson Expert Report at 56-61

[1 PCS]; see also App. ¶ I.D.7.p. He also claims that Question 27 is more

reliable “because it does not seem to have been subject to the post-coding

manipulations inflicted on Question 11.” Gibson Rebuttal Report at 16 [2

PCS]. The coders found 78.8 percent of the group-sponsored advertisements

had policy matters as their primary focus, and 17.6 percent had both policy

matters and personal characteristics as their primary focus. Gibson Expert

Report at 57 [1 PCS]; see also Gibson Rebuttal Report at 16 [2 PCS] (applying

the denominator used in Dr. Goldstein’s Expert Report to conclude 84.4

percent of “electioneering” advertisements had policy matters as their primary

focus.) Many of the arguments made in App. ¶ I.D.7.p, supra, are directed at

this charge as well. In addition, Dr. Goldstein responds by stating that “most

electioneering ads seek to influence votes by portraying the favored candidate

as espousing reasonable policy positions on hot-button issues like taxes . . .,

and the opponent as having unreasonable or even dangerous positions on the

same issues.” Goldstein Rebuttal Report at 30 [DEV 5-Tab 4]. The data from

the 2000 election shows that “53.3 percent of candidate-sponsored ads focused
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on policy issues rather than personal characteristics; an additional 35 percent

focused on both policy and personal issues. Only 10.8 percent focused just on

personal issues.” Id. Furthermore, in 2000, 47.4 percent of advertisements

using express advocacy terminology were coded as having a policy focus, 34.5

percent focused on both policy and personal issues, and 16.5 percent focused

only on personal issues. Id. at 30-31. Dr. Goldstein concludes that Dr.

Gibson’s theory is “disproved by the fact that both candidate ads and express

advocacy ads, which everyone agrees are electioneering, themselves focus

primarily on policy issues.” Id. at 31. 

f. Dr. Gibson attempts to demonstrate “the extent to which changes in a

relatively small number of highly subjective codings can affect the results

reported and the conclusions reached.” Gibson Expert Report at 62 [1 PCS].

He does so by looking at 30 advertisements produced by counsel and assumes

that they each “could fairly be coded as ‘providing information.’” Id at 62-63.

By treating them as such and adding them to the Brennan Center’s 331 figure

(which he rejects) he concludes that the so-called “genuine” airings constitute

24.1 percent of all the airings within 60 days of the election, which did not use

express advocacy and mentioned a candidate. Id. at 63. He then comments

that “if one assumed that airings presented within 60 days of the 2000 election,

which mentioned candidates, but which did not mention ‘magic words,’ were
204

 In his rebuttal report, Dr. Gibson adds to his 30 advertisement data set four

additional commercials deemed by Goldstein’s Expert Report to be genuine issue

advertisements (Dr. Goldstein found six genuine issue advertisements run in 2000, and two

were already in the 30 commercials chosen). Gibson Rebuttal Report at 15 [2 PCS]. By

running a similar analysis, Dr. Gibson concludes that Dr. Goldstein’s “estimates of the

impact of the three criteria [60 days before the election, candidate mention, not supporting

or opposing a candidate] are wholly dependent on subjective assessments of the ‘purpose’

of individual ads, assessments that are reasonably subject to debate.” Id. 

691

intended to promote candidates . . ., one would be wrong, under this scenario,

approximately 24% of the time.” Id. (emphasis added); see also Gibson Dep.

at 179-80 [JDT Vol. 7](confirming that he made no determination about how

the advertisements should be coded); id. at 181 (stating he never looked at the

storyboards for the 30 advertisements). This exercise leads Dr. Gibson to

conclude that “changes in the coding of very small numbers of ads can change

the results dramatically,” “the current version of the 2000 data base supports

many possible estimates of the number of ads with these characteristics,” and

“given all of the deficiencies of the data base and the coding on which it is

based, the wisest course is to draw no conclusions whatsoever about these ads

on the basis of the empirical evidence in the data base.” Gibson Expert Report

at 63 [1 PCS].204 Dr. Goldstein finds Dr. Gibson’s exercise with the 30

counsel-chosen advertisements to be “a remarkably bizarre manipulation of the

data in order to artificially inflate Buying Time 2000’s ‘false positive’ count.”

Id. at 22. Dr. Goldstein notes that “if we ‘assumed,’” as Dr. Gibson did for the

30 advertisements, “that 100 percent of the BCRA-related group ads were
205 The procedures and results of the inter-coder reliability test are produced as

Appendix I to the Goldstein Expert Report.

692

genuine issue ads, then we could arrive at a false positive percentage of 100

percent.” Id. Dr. Lupia questions the credibility of this argument given that

it is based on 30 advertisements chosen by Plaintiffs’ counsel, and Dr. Gibson

does not reveal the method behind their selection. Lupia Expert Report at 57

[DEV 5-Tab 5]; see also Gibson Dep. at 180 [JDT Vol. 7](confirming he has

no understanding of how the advertisements were selected); Goldstein Expert

Report at 22 [DEV 3-Tab 7] (“[W]here–as here–such assumptions are based

on nothing more than the self-serving conjecture of plaintiffs’ counsel, any

such percentage is meaningless.”). 

g. Dr. Gibson notes that unlike the Buying Time 1998 study, “it appears that the

2000 project made some serious attempt to assess the reliability of the data

collected by the student coders.” Gibson Expert Report at 49 [1 PCS]. He

evaluates reliability testing as detailed in an article published by Drs. Krasno

and Goldstein, where they found that the recoders differed from the original

coders on the Question 11 “purpose” inquiry in only one instance. Id. (citing

Jonathan Krasno & Kenneth Goldstein, The Facts about Television

Advertising and the McCain-Feingold Bill,” 35 PS: Political Science and

Politics 207 (Jun. 2002).205 The procedure involved the recoding of 250

advertisements, but Dr. Gibson questions “how these ads were sampled (e.g.,
206 He later had to drop four because “their codes were missing from the original

dataset.” Goldstein Rebuttal Report at 35 [DEV 5-Tab 4].

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random versus non-random selection) and who the coders were (e.g., expert

versus novice),” and notes that “variable-by-variable reliability results for the

full ad coding data set are not presented.” Id. Without this information, Dr.

Gibson cannot assess whether the “inter-coder reliability methods can be

accepted as producing any useful information.” Id. Dr. Goldstein discusses

his efforts to assess inter-coder reliability which appear to be different from

that discussed by Dr. Gibson. See Gibson Rebuttal Report at 9 n.14 [2 PCS]

(“It is unclear how [this test] relates to” the one described in the article

published by Drs. Krasno and Goldstein). Dr. Goldstein describes a procedure

whereby he randomly chose 150 unique advertisements, had them coded by

five undergraduate students and “[i]n general, [] found inter-coder reliability

to be extremely high.” Goldstein Rebuttal Report at 34 [DEV 5-Tab 4]. Dr.

Goldstein also conducted a more recent inquiry into the reliability of the

coding of Question 11. He took all 350 advertisements in the data set that

were sponsored by interest groups, “randomly selected 50206 and asked 10

undergraduate students to code them on three attributes[:] . . . 1) whether the

ads ‘generate support or opposition for a particular candidate’ or ‘provide

information or urge action’; 2) their tone (attack, contrast, or promote); and 3)

their focus (a candidate’s personal attributes or policy).” Id. at 34-35. The
694

original coders had found 64 percent of the sampled advertisements to

generate candidate support, 26 percent to provide information or urge action,

and for two percent of the advertisements they were unsure or unclear about

the commercial’s purpose. Id. at 35. The recoders agreed with the original

codes 75 percent of the time, regardless of whether the original coding was

“support or oppose a candidate” or “provide information or urge action.” Id.

at 35-36. The fact “that the coders agreed with the original code in 75 percent

of the cases, regardless of what that original code was,” Dr. Goldstein asserts,

means that “there is no hint of systematic bias in the original coding.” Id. at

36. Dr. Gibson, in his rebuttal report, challenges this test. Since Dr. Goldstein

was unable to discover the original coding database used in Buying Time 2000,

Dr. Gibson questions whether or not the reliability exercise tested correlation

between the recoders and the original coders, or the recoders and a

manipulated data set. Gibson Rebuttal Report at 9 [2 PCS]. Next, Dr. Gibson

challenges the sample used by Dr. Goldstein. He notes that the pool from

which Dr. Goldstein selected the advertisements was “highly skewed” in that

very few were coded as genuine issue advertisements. Id. at 10. Dr. Gibson

finds that “any conclusions about whether this sort of ad [group-sponsored]

was in fact reliably coded cannot be accepted on the basis of an examination

of such a small number of ads.” Id. He also posits that since genuine issue
695

advertisements were “exceedingly rare” in the sample set that “it seems quite

likely that even after coding only a few ads, the coders developed a strong

expectation, implicit or explicit, that the next ad they coded would be an

electioneering ad. It is very difficult to make subjective assessments of

infrequently occurring events. Once a coder discerns a pattern in the responses

to a subjective variable, it becomes difficult indeed for the coder to ‘break the

habit.’” Id.

h. The NRA criticizes the Buying Time 2000 study for not including two 30-

minute “news magazines” in the data which it claims are “genuine issue

advertisements.” Proposed Findings of Fact of the NRA and the NRA PVF ¶

9. “If these airings had been considered, 34 % of the total volume of speech

that BCRA in 2000 would have covered in the 60 days prior to the general

election would have been genuine issue advertisements.” Id. One of these

“news magazines” was titled “California.” LaPierre Decl. ¶12 [NRA App. at

5]. “California” was aired 800 times in California from August 29, 2002 to

November 5, 2000. Id. ¶14. “During the entirety of the 30-minute program,

there was only one fleeting reference to a federal candidate for office.

Specifically, during a short segment urging viewers to join the NRA and

describing the benefits of membership, a cover of an issue of the NRA’s

magazine ‘First Freedom’ depicting Vice President Gore’s image, then a
207 Ms. Mitchell provides with her declaration as Exhibit 1 a chart listing all of the

(continued...)

696

presidential candidate, flashed on the screen for several seconds.” Id. ¶13.

One other NRA 30 minute “news magazine” would similarly would be

“captured” by BCRA due to the inclusion of the “First Freedom” cover. NRA

App. 917, 920, 924, 929 (“It Can’t Happen Here) (also referring once to the

“Clinton-Gore assault weapons ban”). The NRA does not allege that the study

included other 30 minute advertisements, or that the CMAG monitors such

commercial broadcasts. It does not indicate how other 30 minute “news

magazines” it ran during 2000 would have affected the results of Buying Time.

See Proposed Findings of Fact of the NRA and the NRA PVF ¶¶ 3-7.

II. AFL-CIO Advertisements Run Within 30 Days of a Primary Election

A. Plaintiff AFL-CIO has put forth a number of examples of what they claim are

“genuine issue advertisements” relating to pending legislation that BCRA would

capture because the commercials ran on television and radio within 30 days of a

primary election. AFL-CIO Br. at 10-11 (citing Mitchell Decl. ¶¶ 32, 34-36, 37-39,

40, 50, 58-59). The advertisements cited to by the AFL-CIO ran in “flights,” aimed

at particular legislation pending at the time. Practically all of these flights consisted

of a variety of “cookie-cutter” advertisements, meaning advertisements that are

virtually identical except that they reference different candidates. See generally

Mitchell Decl. Ex. 1 [6 PCS].207 Ms. Mitchell describes advertising campaigns
207(...continued)

advertisements purchased by the AFL-CIO since 1995, which includes the advertisement’s

title, district where it aired, the candidate or officeholder mentioned, whether it was a radio

or television advertisement, the issue(s) discussed, the commercial’s audio and visual “call

to action,” the dates it was broadcast, the dates of the mentioned candidate/officeholder’s

primary and general election, and whether the advertisement was aired within 30 of the

primary, or 60 days of the election date. See Mitchell Decl. Ex. 1 [6 PCS]; Mitchell Decl.

¶ 4 [6 PCS] (with some caveats, attesting that “Exhibit 1 is a substantially accurate list of the

ads run by the AFL-CIO between 1995 and 2001.”). Since the AFL-CIO brief cites to

paragraphs from Ms. Mitchell’s declaration, and Ms. Mitchell’s declaration relies on the

information contained in Exhibit 1, I look to both sources for information about these

advertisements. In the event of inconsistency between Ms. Mitchell’s testimony and the data

in Exhibit 1, I rely on Exhibit 1 as its information is far more detailed and forms the basis for

Ms. Mitchell’s testimony. For example, in Paragraph 34 of her declaration, Ms. Mitchell

states that “1991” ran in 28 media markets, identifying 3 candidates within 30 days of their

primaries and cites to Exhibit 1 for support. Id. ¶ 34. However, Exhibit 1 shows

advertisements aired in only 19 markets identifying one such candidate. Id. Ex. 1. I give

credence to the information in Exhibit 1. In addition, in some cases two forms of the same

advertisement were run in the same district against the same candidate. Unless the

advertisements were identical, I have treated them as two separate cookie-cutter

advertisements. See e.g. id. Ex. 1 at 33-34 (listing two “Couples” advertisements run in

fourth Congressional district of North Carolina identifying Congressman Fred Heineman, but

differing in that one pictured the Congressman and provided a 1-800 number while the other

did not).

208 The advertisements are: “Too Far,” Mitchell Decl. ¶ 32 & Ex. 31 [6 PCS]; “1991,”

id. ¶ 34 & Ex. 33; “Raise,” id. ¶ 35 & Ex. 35; “Votes,” id. ¶ 35 & Ex. 36; “People,” id. ¶ 35

& Ex. 38; “No,” id. ¶ 35 & Ex. 39; “Minimum Wage,” id. ¶ 36 & Ex. 42; “$5.15,” id. ¶ 36

& Ex. 44; “Couple,” id. ¶ 37 & Ex. 47; “Lady,” id. ¶ 37 & Ex. 48; “Peace,” id. ¶ 37 & Ex.

49; “Whither,” id. ¶ 37 & Ex. 50; “Another,” id. ¶ 38 & Ex. 53; “Edith,” id. ¶ 40 & Ex. 58;

“Pass,” id. ¶ 50 & Ex. 94; “Support,” id. ¶ 50 & Ex. 95; “Call,” id. ¶ 50 & Ex. 98; “Failed,”

id. ¶ 50 & Ex. 99; “Liable,” id. ¶ 50 & Ex. 100; “Soon,” id. ¶ 50 & Ex. 100; “Basic,” id. ¶

50 & Ex. 102; “Label,” id. ¶ 57 & Ex. 127; “Trust,” id. ¶ 57 & Ex. 128; “Endure,” id. ¶ 57

(continued...)

697

comprising 29 different sets of cookie-cutter advertisements, some of which were run

within 30 days of a named candidate’s primary election. Mitchell Decl. ¶¶ 32, 34-36,

37-39, 40, 50, 58-59 [6 PCS].208 In addition, Exhibit 1 shows that four more
208(...continued)

& Ex. 129; “Stand,” id. ¶ 57 & Ex. 130; “Block,” id. ¶ 58 & Ex. 137; “Help,” id. ¶ 58 & Ex.

138; “Sky,” id. ¶ 59 & Ex. 139; and “Protect,” id. ¶ 59 & Ex. 140.

209 These four advertisements are: “Job,” Mitchell Decl. ¶ 61 & Exs. 1 (at 102), 141

[6 PCS] (All airings of “Job” took place within 60 days of the 2000 general election);

“Barker,” id. ¶ 53 & Ex. 116 (All airings of “Barker” took place within 60 days of the 2000

general election); “No Two Way,” id. ¶ 41 & Ex. 59 (All airings of “No Two Way” took

place within 60 days of the 2000 general election); and “Raiders,” id. Ex. 1 at 36, 38-39, Ex.

58 at 10. Since the “Job,” “Barker,” and “No Two Way” airings would have been captured

by BCRA’s 60-day window, they are not addressed here but in Findings ¶¶ 2.11.3.2, 2.11.8.2.

698

advertisements would have been captured by BCRA due to their airing within 30 days

of the identified candidate’s primary, but since all of the airings of three of these

commercials would have been captured by BCRA’s 60 day-window as well, I address

only one of these advertisements in this Finding.209 

1. “Too Far” was an advertisement which aired nationally on cable television and

identified President William J. Clinton within 30 days of the Iowa primary in

1996. Mitchell Decl. ¶ 32, Ex. 1 at 17 [6 PCS]. 

2. During April 1996, the AFL-CIO ran a flight of advertisements entitled “1991”

aimed at increasing the national minimum wage. Id. ¶ 34. Exhibit 1 shows

that the AFL-CIO produced 19 versions of “1991,” three of which ran within

30 days of an identified candidate’s primary contest. Id. Ex. 1 at 17-20. In

May 1996, the AFL-CIO ran four more flights of cookie-cutter advertisements

related to legislation that would raise the minimum wage entitled “Raise,”

“Votes,” “People,” and “No.” Id. ¶ 35. According to Exhibit 1, two versions
699

of “Raise” were aired, one of which was aired within 30 days of the named

candidate’s primary, and 19 versions of “People” were run, two of which

mentioned a candidate within 30 days of the candidate’s primary. Id. Ex. 1 at

21-25. The AFL-CIO’s data shows that five versions of “No” were aired, none

during the 30 days prior to the primary of an identified candidate, and Exhibit

1 shows no airings of “Votes.” Id. Ex. 1 at 22. In late June and July of 1996,

the AFL-CIO ran two more flights of advertisements entitled “Minimum

Wage” and “$5.15” on the same issue. Id. ¶ 36. Nine versions of “Minimum

Wage” were aired, none of which implicated candidates within 30 days of their

primary, while 14 versions of “$5.15” were aired, one which named a

candidate within 30 days of the candidate’s primary. Id. Ex. 1 at 17, 19, 21-22,

32-35. 

3. Between late June and early August 1996, the AFL-CIO ran four flights of

advertisements entitled “Couple,” “Lady,” “Peace,” and “Whither,” “intended

to defeat the continuing efforts of the Republican Congress to reduce

Medicare/Medicaid benefits as part of the FY 1997 federal budget legislation.”

Id. ¶ 37. The group ran 34 versions of “Couple,” two of which mentioned

candidates within 30 days of their primaries, and 27 versions of “Whither”

were run, four of which fell within 30 days of a named candidate’s primary

contest. Id. Ex. 1 at 25-36. Five versions of “Lady,” and four versions of
700

“Peace” were run, but none of these advertisements ran within 30 days of an

identified candidate’s primary. Id. Ex. 1 at 29-34. 

4. In late August and early September 1996, “the AFL-CIO sponsored another

flight of advertisements entitled ‘Another’ in response to a series of

advertisements run by business interest groups that called into question the

AFL-CIO’s Medicare ads by claiming that the Republican budget would

increase, rather than decrease, Medicare budgets.” Id. ¶ 38. The group ran 26

versions of “Another,” six of which ran within 30 days of a named candidate’s

primary contest. Id. Ex. 1 at 39-42. 

5. In August of 1996, the AFL-CIO “sponsored a television and radio

advertisement entitled “Edith” which was intended to gain support for

legislation to protect the retirement savings of working families by applying

the same protections to 401(k) plans as already applied to traditional defined

benefit plans.” Id. ¶ 40. Forty versions of “Edith” were broadcast, 12 of

which identified candidates within 30 days of their primaries. Id. Ex. 1 at 36-

39. Four versions of a radio advertisement on the same topic entitled

“Raiders” were aired by the AFL-CIO, one of which would have been captured

by BCRA’s 30-day rule. Id. Ex. 1 at 36, 38-39. 

6. In July 1998, the AFL-CIO “sponsored several flights of television and radio

advertisements designed to generate support for HMO reform legislation.” Id.
701

¶ 50. These advertisements were entitled “Pass,” “Support,” “Call,” “Failed,”

“Liable,” “Soon,” and “Basic.” Id. The group ran two versions of “Pass,” six

versions of “Support,” three versions of “Failed,” three versions of “Liable,”

and seven versions of “Basic.” Id. Ex. 1 at 78-82. None of these

advertisements was run within 30 days of a named candidate’s primary. Id.

Seventeen versions of “Call” were broadcast, two of which named federal

candidates within 30 days of their primary, as did one of the three versions of

“Soon.” Id. Ex. 1 at 80-82. 

7. From February through June 2000, the “AFL-CIO ran several flights of ads

entitled ‘Label,’ ‘Trust,’ ‘Endure,’ and ‘Stand’ in opposition to President

Clinton’s proposal to provide permanent normal trade relations to China.” Id.

¶ 57. The group ran 14 versions of “Label,” two within 30 days of a named

candidate’s primary. Id. Ex. 1 at 92-93. Sixteen versions of “Trust” were

aired, three during the 30 days before a named candidate’s primary. Id. Ex. 1

at 93-97. Eighteen versions of “Endure” were broadcast, three of which aired

within 30 days of the named candidate’s primary. Id. Ex. 1 at 94-97. Neither

of the two versions of “Stand” aired by the AFL-CIO named candidates within

30 days of their primary elections. Id. Ex. 1 at 97. 

8. In June and July of 2000, the AFL-CIO “paid for a flight of radio

advertisements entitled ‘Block’ aimed at pressuring the Senate to approve the
702

Norwood-Dingell version of the Patient’s Bill of Rights.” Id. ¶ 58. Exhibit 1

shows one version of “Block” was aired, but not during the 30 days before a

named candidate’s primary. Id. Ex. 1 at 86. “In August and September, with

the bill still stalled in Congress, [the AFL-CIO] ran several flights of television

advertisements entitled ‘Help’ targeting Republican Representatives who had

voted against the [bill] when it passed the House in October, 1999, urging

viewers to contact each of these Members and ‘tell him he’s on the wrong

side.’ . . . One of the flights of ‘Help’ ran between August 18 and September

6, 2000.” Id. ¶ 58. Nine versions of “Help” were aired during this flight, two

of which aired within 30 days of a named candidate’s primary. Id. Ex. 1 at

100. 

9. Finally, during July and August of 2000, “the AFL-CIO ran television

advertisements entitled “Sky” and “Protect” naming approximately twelve

different Representatives who had voted at the end of June to pass prescription

drug legislation that failed to guarantee drug benefits under Medicare.” Id. ¶

59. Twelve versions of “Sky” were aired, one of which was broadcast during

the 30 days before a named candidate’s primary. Id. Ex. 1 at 97-98. Fourteen

versions of “Protect” aired, three of which aired within 30 days of a named

candidate’s primary. Id. Ex. 1 at 98-99. 

10. These examples constitute 336 cookie-cutter advertisements, 50 of which
703

would have been affected by BCRA.

III. Empirical Studies on Corruption

In my Title I Findings, I briefly summarize the state of the empirical studies cited to

by experts which attempt to demonstrate a link between political donations and political

corruption. A more detailed analysis of these studies is presented below.

A. Some studies have attempted to show that PAC donations influence roll call votes.

Defense expert Donald Green testifies that he knows of no statistically valid study

conducted since 1990 correlating federally-regulated PAC contributions to candidates

and roll call votes. Green Cross Exam. at 58 [JDT Vol. 9]; see also id. at 54-55

(noting that “the picture of evidence over a range of studies does not suggest a

consistent relationship” between contributions and roll call votes); Bok Cross Exam.

at 18-19 [JDT Vol. 3] (studies are “flawed”). Green also testifies that some studies

have even found a negative correlation between contributions and roll call votes. Id.

at 55. Defense expert Thomas Mann comments that these studies are 

often used to buttress the argument that political contributions do not corrupt

the policy process. This is an odd inference, since it is based on studies of

contributions that are limited as to source and size for the very purpose of

preventing corruption or its appearance. PAC contributions are capped at

$5,000 per election, an amount whose real value has shrunk by two-thirds

since it was enacted in 1974. Are we to assume that studies of contributions

of $50,000 or $500,000 or $5 million from corporations, unions and

individuals would produce the same generally negative findings?

Mann Expert Report at 33. [DEV 1-Tab 1]. 

The experts testify that part of the reason the existing studies linking contributions
210 Richard Hall & Frank Wayman, Buying Time: Moneyed Interests and the

Mobilization of Bias in Congressional Committees, 84 American Political Science Review

(continued...)

704

to roll call votes are flawed is that “political scientists lack the means by which to

observe and determine [quid pro quo bribery].” Sorauf Cross Exam. at 132 [JDT Vol.

31]; see also Green Cross Exam. at 67-68 [JDT Vol. 9] (“[T]he literature on the

relationship between roll call votes and money is murky because the problem is an

extremely difficult one to solve, statistically.”). Plaintiffs’ expert David Primo

summarizes the studies linking contributions to roll call votes:

[I]t is well established that PAC contributions flow disproportionately to

incumbent office holders, majority party members, members of powerful

committees and to members on committees with jurisdictions relative to the

PAC sponsor. . . . -- and you could say oh, it must be bribes. But in fact, once

you get deeper in it, it just can’t possibly be a fact that such little money is

affecting the political process.

Primo Cross Exam. at 143-44 [JDT Vol. 27].

B. Other studies have attempted to link donations to other forms of legislative activity,

such as committee voting, offering amendments, or filibustering. Defendants’ expert

Mann notes that there are “a myriad of ways in which groups receive or are denied

favors beyond roll-call votes. Members can express public support or opposition in

various legislative venues, offer amendments, mobilize support, help place items on

or off the agenda, speed or delay action, and provide special access to lobbyists. They

can also decline each of these requests.” Mann Expert Report. at 33 [DEV 1-Tab 1].

One of these studies in particular,210 which examines PAC contributions and
210(...continued)

797 (1990).

705

legislative activity, has been found to be statistically unsound. See Green Cross Exam

at 55 [JDT Vol. 9]; see also id. at 68-72 (noting the study does not account for

lobbying activities); Primo Cross Exam. at 136-37 [JDT Vol. 27] (“I am not

convinced by their paper. . .”); Snyder Rebuttal Report at 7-9 [2 PCS] (noting that

Hall and Wayman’s study “has three notable flaws”). Plaintiffs’ expert David Primo

concludes that “there is no clear, consistent and systematic evidence that contributions

play a major role in the legislative process.” Primo Cross Exam. at 142 [JDT Vol.

27]. Defendants’ expert Derek Bok explains that “[t]he difficulty is, of course, that

the ability of researchers to get at the behavior prior to a vote is severely limited since

a lot of that is not public, and therefore, it’s . . . inherently difficult to prove one way

or another what effect PAC contributions would have on prevoting behavior.” Bok

Cross Exam. at 21 [JDT Vol. 3].

C. Other studies have attempted to establish empirically a link between donations and

access to legislators. Plaintiffs’ expert Primo finds “scant evidence in the political

science literature that money secures access.” Primo Rebuttal Report ¶ 13 [2 PCS];

see also FEC expert Herrnson Dep. in RNC v. FEC at 300 (testifying that existing

studies on “access” are “kind of weak and wishy washy”) [DEV 64-Tab 3]; Bok Cross

Exam. at 35-37 [JDT Vol. 3] (noting that researchers studying PAC donations have

failed to show that access has a significant impact on policy decisions); Green Cross
706

Exam. at 93-95 [JDT Vol. 9] (unable to identify a study that shows PAC contributions

lead to access to federal lawmakers). Defendants’ experts Krasno and Sorauf note

that “the absence of systematic data on access . . . prevents political scientists from

searching for relationships between access and policy-makers’ behavior.” Krasno &

Sorauf Expert Report at 5 [DEV 1-Tab 2].