## I L L I N O I S 

## O F F I C I A L 

## R E P O R T S Appellate Court

In re Latoya C. , 2013 IL App (1st) 121477

Appellate Court Caption In re L ATOYA C., Alleg ed to be a Person Subject to I nvoluntary Treatment (The People of the State of I llinois
, Petitioner-Appel l ee , v. L atoy a C., Respondent-Appe llant).

District & N o. First District, F ifth Division Docke t No. 1-12-1477

Filed J uly 26, 2013

Held (Note : T

his syl lab us

con st it ute s n o par t of the opi nio n of the cour t but has bee n pre

par ed by the Rep o rt er of D e c i s i o n s f

o r t h e

c o n v e n i e n c e o

f t h e

rea der

. ) An order authorizing the involuntary administration of psy chotropic medication to responde nt was reve rsed on appea l due to the trial court’s failure to comply with s ec t i o n 3-816(a ) of the Mental Hea lth Code by makin g a written statement in the rec ord of its finding s of fac t and conclusions of law

.

Dec ision Under
Review Appea l from the Circuit Court of Cook County
, No. 12-COMH-1064; the Hon. Paul A. Kar

kula, J udg e, pre siding.

J udg ment Reverse d.Counsel on

Appea l Ver onique Ba ker, of Guar dianship and Advoca cy Commi ssio n, of Chicag o, and Andre as L iewald and L aure l Spahn, both of Guar dianship and Advoc acy

Commi ssion, of Hines, for a ppellant.

Anita M. Alvare z , State’s Attorney
, of Chicag o (Alan J

. Spellberg and Peter Maltese , Assistant St ate’ s Attorney s, of counse l), for the People.

Panel J USTI CE TAYL OR delivere d the judg ment of the c ourt, with opinion. Presiding J ustice McB ride and J ustice Palmer concur red in the judgme nt and opinion.

OP INION

¶ 1 Following a hear ing on April 17, 2012, the circ uit court enter ed an order authorizing the administration of involuntary psy chotropic medication to responde nt, L atoy a C., for 90 day s. On appea l, responde nt contends that the order should be reve rsed beca use the trial court failed to make either or al or written finding s of fact, as re quired by section 3-816( a) of

the Mental Hea lth and Deve lopmental Disabilities Code (Code) (405 I L CS 5/3 -8 1 6 (a ) (West 201 2 )) ; the State failed to prove that she was provided information about alterna tive
treatment options, as re quired by section 2-102(a -5) of the Code (405 I L CS 5/2-102(a- 5) (West 2012)); and the S tate failed to establish eac h element of the i nvolu n t ary medication
statute (405 I L CS 5/2-107.1(a -5 ) (West 2012)). Respondent also contends that this appea l falls within three r ecog nized ex ceptions to the mootness doctrine. We r ever se. ¶ 2 On Marc h 30, 2012, 24-y ear -old responde nt was admitted to a mental health fac ility afte r

an appar ent dispute with her cousin over money

. On April 12, 2012, one of her treating phy sicians, Dr. Vesna Pirec, fi l ed a petition reque sting a court order authorizing the administration of involuntary treatment, specific ally
, the administration of an antipsy chotic medication known a s haloperidol (H aldol) for up to 90 day s. ¶ 3 At the hear ing on the petition, three witnesses testified. L atasha C., responde nt’s sister, testified that responde nt was diag nosed as schizoph renic and bipolar in 2005. They lived toge ther for a time prior to responde nt’s admission to the hospital in Marc h 2012. During the time they lived toge ther, responde nt told her that the television and radio wer e talking to her. When responde nt started taking medi ca t i o n , i.e.
, Z y prexa, she was no longe r delusional. Howeve r, she discontinued taking the medication, and, in O c to b e r 2 0 1 1
, responde nt and their mother got into an arg ument, which resulted i n re s p o n d ent being admitt ed to the hos pital. She was rele ased the following night and went to a shelter. On Fe bruar y 9, 2012, responde nt had a baby and subsequently moved i n with her cousin. When re s p o n d en t was in the final stag es of her pregnancy , she beca me incre asing ly irritable and would y ell at her family

. She

-2-was not taking her me dication at that time.

¶ 4 Dr. Vesna Pirec, a psy chiatrist, testified that she treated responde nt in October 2011 for five day s, but did not presc ribe psy chotropic medicatio n fo r her at that time. On April 2, 2012, she beg an treating responde nt during her most rec ent h ospitaliz ation on Marc h 30, 2012. Pirec diagnosed respondent with schizoaffe ctive dis order
, and testi fied that she was
sy mptomatic at the time of the hea ri n g. R espondent told Pirec that she was a cele brity
, Obama came to the hospital, and she had an aura around her. Respondent also acte d
provocatively in the hospital and was para noid. Pirec was conce rn ed t hat responde nt’s
sy mptoms would aff

ect her ability to car e for her child. Pirec administered two doses of Ha ldol to responde nt on or about April 4, 2012. Howeve r, afte r taking the tw o d o s es , responde nt ref

used to take more medication. Pirec then soug ht authorit y t o involuntarily medicate responde nt, primarily with Haldol, for 90 day s. Pirec wanted to use Haldol to treat responden t ’s p s y chosis, and she believed the benef its of t he drug would outweig h the risk of harm for responde nt. Alternatively
, Pirec testified that she would seek to treat responde nt with other medications. Although responde nt told Pi r e c that she did not want any medication, Pirec be lieved that re spondent lacke d an under standing of her sy mptoms. ¶ 5 Respondent t estified that immediately befor e sh e was admitted to the hos pital she wa s living with her cousin and supporting her s el f wi t h s ocial secur ity

. She did not make any phy sical threats to harm herse lf or any one else, and her most rec ent admission to the hospital in Ma rch occur red beca use she had a dispute with her c ousin over money . During her time i n t h e h ospital, she took four doses of Haldol, but was unsure if she rec eived any benef i t s from the medication. The side ef fec ts f rom the medication included dizz iness, drowsiness,

an incre ase in appetite, and blurred vision. Although responde nt did not have a problem with blurred vision prior to taking Haldol, the problem persisted afte r she stopped taking the medication. Respondent started seeing Dr. Pirec afte r she ref used to take Haldol. She did not fee l that Pirec knew her well beca use Pirec only saw her for about five minutes pe r day

. At the time of trial, responde nt indicated that she would not consent to taking medication from Pirec beca

use taking Haldol was the hospital’s choice
, and Pirec never offe red her any other ty pes of medication. She noted that hospital personne l kept telling her that the drug worke d, but it did not

. ¶ 6 Following closing arguments, the trial court announce d its decision g ranting the petition. I n doing so, the court stated, “[t] he doctor’s testimony as an expert witness was e x tremely

cre dible; there fore
, causing me t o cer tainly see tha t the State has m et t heir burden by clea r and convincing evidenc e.” The court also enter ed a written order stating, in part, that “[t] he

rec ipient has a serious mental illness/developmental disability ” and “[t] he rec ipient exhibi ts deter ioration of his/her ability to function, suffe ring or threatening or disruptive behavior .” This appea l followed. ¶ 7 There is no dispute that the case u n d er l y i n g the instant appea l is moot, as the circ uit court’s 90-day involuntary medication order expired on J uly 16, 2012. Howeve r, responde nt contends that her appea l falls within sever al rec og nized exceptions to the mootness doctrine. I n particula

r, responde nt argues that three exceptions apply : the collater al conseque nces exception, the public interest exception, and the exception for issues capa ble of repe tition y et avoiding revie w.

-3-¶ 8 The collater al conseque nces exception allows a revie wing court to consider an otherwise

moot case wher e an order for involuntary trea tment “ ‘could return to plag ue the responde nt in some future proce eding s or could aff ect other aspec ts of the responde nt’s life.’ ” In re Rita P.
, 2013 I L App (1st) 112837, ¶ 10 (quoting In re Val Q.
, 396 I ll. App. 3d 155, 159 (2009))
, appeal allowed
, No. 115798 (May 29, 2013); see also In re Dawn H.
, 2012 I L App (2d) 111013, ¶ 13. For instance, reve rsal of an involuntary treatment order could provide a basis for a motion in limine in a future proce eding that wou l d p ro h ibit any mention of the prior
treatment. In re Alfred H.H.
, 233 I ll. 2d 345, 362 (2009 ). T h e ex ception applies to a first involuntary

trea tment order. In re Linda K. , 407 I ll. App. 3d 1146, 1150 (2011). Howe ver, it does not apply wher e the responde nt has previously been subject to involuntary treatment beca use any collater al consequence s would have alrea dy attache d. Alfred H.H.
, 233 I ll. 2d at 362-63. ¶ 9 Her e, t h e p arties corr ectly ag ree that responde nt has not been previously subject to an involuntary administration of medication or other involuntary treatment. I n addition, g iven her diag nosis, it is likely responde nt may be subject to future proce eding s that would be adver sely impacted by past involun t ar y t re atm ent. We thus conclude that the collater al
conseque nces e x ception to the mootness doctrine applies. ¶ 10 The State’s argument that co l l at er al co n sequenc es have alre ady attache d due to her mental illness and hospitaliz ation h as been reje cted by this court. I n Rita P.
, 2013 I L App (1st) 112837, ¶ 12, this court distinguished In re Jame s H.
, 4 05 I ll. App. 3d 897 (2010), which the State r elies on her e, noting that the cour t in that case pr imarily

relied on the fac t that the responde nt had a rec ord with the Secre t Servi ce i n fi n ding that collater al
conseque nces had alre ady attache d. Simi larly to the responde nt in Rita P.
, responde nt in this

case had no such background. I n light of our deter mination, we need not addre ss the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine or the exception for issues capa ble of repe tition
y et avoiding revie w. See In re Vane ssa K. , 2011 I L

App (3d) 100545, ¶

16. ¶ 11 Turning to the u n derly ing merits of the instant appea l, responde nt contends that by failing
to make oral or wr i t t en fi n d i ng s of fact on the record, the trial court failed t o comply with section 3-816(a ) of the Code, which provides that courts order ing involuntary treatment shall
state on the rec ord their finding s of fac t and conclusions of law. 405 I L CS 5/3-816(a) (West 2012). Relying on Rita P.
, 2013 I L App (1st) 112837, ¶ 17, and In re Jame s S.
, 388 I ll. App. 3d 1102, 1105 (2009), responde nt asser ts that absent written or oral finding s of fac t, the trial court’s or der must be r ever sed for statutory noncompliance

. ¶ 12 I n Rita P. and Jame s S.
, the ci rc u i t co u rt enter ed orders for involuntary administration of psy chotropic medication. Rita P.
, 2013 I L App (1st) 112837, ¶ 1; Jame s S.
, 388 I ll. App. 3d at 1103. I n both instanc es, this c ourt reve rsed, finding that the circ uit courts’ statements

wer e insufficient to satisfy section 3-816(a ) of the Code beca use they essentially contained

no fac tual finding s. I n Jame s S.
, 388 I ll. App. 3d at 1105, the trial court only stated that afte r hear ing the testimony and observing the witnesses, it found by clea r and convincing evidenc e that the responde nt was subject to involunt ar y m ed i cation. I n Rita P.
, 2013 I L App (1st) 112837, ¶ 17, the court only stated “ ‘[t] he testimony here is overw helming in support of the State’s petition. All three witnesses and all the observations of the Court made in open court today so I am g oing to g rant the petition.’ ” Moreove r, the court’s written finding s in Rita P.

-4-wer e conclusory
, not tailored to the specific fac ts of the responde nt, and trac ked the lang uag e

of section 2-107.1 of the Code (405 I L CS 5/2-107.1 (West 2010)), near ly verbatim. Rita P.
, 2013 I L App (1st) 112837, ¶ 17; see also In re Aaron L.
, 2013 I L App (1st) 122808, ¶ 26 (holding that the order terminating war dship and g uardia nship and discharg ing the case was ineffe ctive under section 2-31(2) of the J uvenile Court Act of 1987 (705 I L CS 405/2-31(2) (West 2010 ))
, wher e the circ uit court enter ed a written form order and made no specific finding s of fa ct). ¶ 13 He re , i n d el i v er i n g its ruling
, the trial court’s sole statement was, “[t] he doc t o r’ s testimony as an expert witness was extremely cre dible; there fore
, causing me to cer tainly see the State has m et t heir burden by clea r and convincing evidenc e.” This statement is as lacking in fac tual detail as the statements at issue in Rita P. and Jame s S. I n our view, it does
not meet the require ment of section 3-816(a ) of the Code that an order for inv o l untary treatment shall be ac companied by a stateme nt on the rec ord of the c ourt’s finding s of fa ct and conc lusions of law. Fur thermore , the written orde r memorializing the trial court’s or al decision is a for

m order that contains no specific finding s of fa ct. Acc ording ly , we r ever se the order authorizing the administration of i n voluntary medication. Rita P.
, 2013 I L App (1st) 112837, ¶ 22; see also In re Ma d i s o n H.
, 2 1 5 I ll. 2d 364, 378 (2005) (af firming the appellate court’s rema

nd to the trial court for the limit ed purpose of allowing it to enter more specific finding s beca

use t he trial co u rt ’s preprinted di spositional order
, as well as i ts oral statements, lacke d a fac tual basis for the court’s decision); In re Joseph M.
, 405 I ll. App. 3d 1167, 1183 (2010) (re versing wher e the circ uit court made no express fac tual finding s related to whether

the re spondent met the statutory criter ia for involuntar

y admission). ¶ 14 I n rea ching this conclusion, we find unpersua sive the State’s argum en t t h at t h e trial court’s failure to comply with section 3-816(a) does not require reve rsal because althoug h that section states a trial court’s order shall be in writing and acc ompanied by a statement on the rec ord of the court’s finding s of fac t and conclusions of law, I l l i n ois law is well established t h at such statutory lang uag e is mere ly direc tory rathe r than mandatory

. See People v. Porter
, 122 I ll. 2d 64, 82-83 (1988); People v. Davis
, 93 I ll. 2d 155, 162 (1982) (construing sections of the Code of Criminal P ro ce du re of 1963 and the Unified Code of Correc tions as discretionar y rathe r than mandatory

). ¶ 15 The State acknow ledg es this court rec ently reje cted the argument that Porter and Davis support the conclusion that the statutory languag e of section 3-816(a ) is mere ly direc tory rathe r than mandatory . See Rita P. , 2013 I LApp (1st) 112837, ¶¶ 20-22. Neve rtheless, the State maintains that Rita P. failed to ex p l ai n wh y the direc tory nature of the provisions at issue i n P o r t er and Davis did not violate a criminal defe ndant’s liberty interest, while a ruling that section 3-816 of the Code was direc tory instead of mandatory wou l d v iolate a responde nt’s liberty interest. Fur thermore
, the State maintains that Rita P. failed to explain how a responde nt’s liberty interest is aff orded less protec tion by

a cir cuit court’s harmless failure to express its fac tual finding s. Despite the State’s contentions to the contra ry , Rita P. addre ssed the State ’s co n cer ns by stating that the responde nt had a “sig nificant liberty interest in rema ining fre e from unwanted treatment,” and “strict compliance with the Code’s
proce d u ra l safe g uards is require d to insure that the m ental health sy stem does not become a tool to oppress rather than serve society . [C itation.] ” (I nterna l quotation marks omi tted.)

-5-R i t a P

. , 2 0 13 I L App (1st) 112837, ¶ 21 (re ly ing on In re Alaka W

. , 379 I ll. App. 3 d 2 5 1
, 274-75 (2008), and Jame s S

. , 388 I ll. App. 3d at 1107.). We thus find no rea son to depar t from the we ll-rea soned holding in Rita P

. ¶ 16 I n l i g ht of our dispositi on, we need not addre ss responde nt’s rema ining c on t en t i o n s reg arding whether the State failed to prove that responde nt was provided information about alternative treatment options, or failed to establish eac h element of the involuntary medication statute. ¶ 17 For

the fore g oing r easons, we reve rse the judg ment of the c ircuit court.

¶ 18 Reverse d.

-6-