Strategic Studies Institute

U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA

THE AFGHANISTAN QUESTION

AND THE RESET IN 

U.S.-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

Richard J. Krickus

Letort The

Papers

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Letort Paper

THE AFGHANISTAN QUESTION

AND THE RESET IN U.S.-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

Richard J. Krickus

October 2011

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ISBN 1-58487-513-5
iii

FOREWORD

Defense Secretary Robert Gates has observed that 

the ability of the United States and Russia to cooperate in Afghanistan represents a solid test of their reset in relations. Skeptics in Washington and Moscow, 

however, scoff at the idea. In the first case, critics cite 

the awesome value gap that separates the two sides as 

well as compelling evidence that the Kremlin is bent 

on a course of confrontation and not cooperation with 

the West—witness the 2008 Russian-Georgian War. In 

the second one, Russian critics claim that there is no 

justification for Moscow to help Washington in what 

many Kremlin overlords believe is a losing cause. 

Moreover, Obama says the right things but, like his 

predecessor, he ignores Russian concerns about the 

Afghanistan Question—such as curtailing the flow of 

deadly heroin to the cities of Russia.

Without dismissing the barriers to cooperation, 

American statesmen like Henry Kissinger and George 

Shultz claim that Russia’s help should be welcomed in 

dealing with the global jihadist threat, nuclear proliferation, and climate change. In keeping with efforts on 

the part of past administrations to advance common 

interests with regimes that may adhere to different 

values, the Obama administration has pursued limited 

security cooperation with Russia much as Presidents 

Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan did decades ago. 

In turn, Russian strategists fear that should the 

Americans fail in Afghanistan, their former Central 

Asian Republics will fall to militant Islamists. At the 

same time, emboldened by the West’s setback in Afghanistan, al-Qaeda and affiliated terrorist organizations will support their brethren in the Northern Caucasus who are waging war against the Russian infidels 
and launching terrorist attacks within Russia proper. 

Taken together, these actions threaten the Kremlin’s 

“20-20 Modernization” drive that Prime Minister 

Vladimir Putin deems to be Russia’s greatest security 

priority.

In this monograph, Dr. Richard Krickus provides 

the historical background to the Afghanistan Question and assesses current events in the Afghan war 

with three objectives in mind:

1. To determine whether Russian-American cooperation in Afghanistan has been successful. Toward 

this end, he revisits the rationale behind the Soviet 

invasion of Afghanistan 30 years ago; shows how it 

and the civil war that followed it helped give rise to 

al-Qaeda and the Taliban; and assesses the failure of 

authorities in Washington and Moscow to prevent an 

evil partnership that led to September 11, 2001 (9/11).

2. To identify and evaluate the successes and failures of the counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy as the 

transition from U.S. to Afghanistan authority gains 

traction in the 2011-14 time frame. Among other things, 

he considers three scenarios that characterize current 

operations in Afghanistan and assesses two plausible 

alternative outcomes. He claims that while the goals 

of COIN have not been fully realized, the capacity of 

al-Qaeda in Afghanistan has been dismantled for all 

intents and purposes, and, through our counterterrorist operations, the Taliban have experienced serious 

reversals. Successes against the Taliban, however, remain fragile, and the road ahead is a difficult one.

3. To provide conclusions and recommendations 

bearing on developments in Afghanistan, Dr. Krickus 

submits a number of provocative observations and 

policy preferences in anticipating the difficult withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan. Among other 

iv
v

things, he proposes that the road to a successful resolution of the Afghanistan conflict must include political 

reconciliation with the Taliban through a diplomatic 

initiative—Bonn II—that enlists the support of all major stakeholders in the region. At the same time, Pakistan must be put on notice that it cannot continue to 

provide sanctuaries to jihadists that are killing Americans without consequences. Looking forward, the U.S. 

military must maintain its capacity to address jihadist 

threats to American and allied security by adopting 

appropriate counterterrorist policies. Furthermore, 

given dramatic changes in the international security 

environment—as exemplified by new influential actors like Brazil, China, and India—and its own daunting domestic economic problems, the United States 

must reduce its profile in the Greater Middle East. 

In sum, he concludes that, while modest, Russia’s 

help in advancing the goals of the United States in the 

Afghan War has been important. Today, for example, 

with Moscow’s assistance, more than 50 percent of the 

cargo that is provided to U.S. fighting forces transits 

through the Northern Distribution Network (NDN). 

As U.S. troops exit from the country, the NDN will 

acquire even greater logistical significance. 

Given the record of modest success in Afghanistan, the United States should expand its joint ventures with Moscow in a common front against jihadist 

terrorist groups. They should continue as long as the 

vital interests of the United States are served.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

Director

Strategic Studies Institute 

vii

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

RICHARD J. KRICKUS is a Distinguished Professor Emeritus at the University of Mary Washington 

and has held the Oppenheimer Chair for Warfighting 

Strategy at the U.S. Marine Corps University. Previously he cofounded The National Center for Urban 

Ethnic Affairs in Washington, DC, and in the early 

1970s began conducting research on the Union of 

Soviet Socialist Republics’ “nationalities question.” 

In this connection, he began to write about popular 

unrest among the people of Lithuania. In 1990, Sajudis, the Lithuanian popular front movement, invited 

him to serve as an international monitor for the first 

democratic election conducted in Soviet Lithuania. 

Dr. Krickus has offered testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and has lectured at the U.S. 

Foreign Service Institute, the Polish Foreign Ministry, 

the European Commission, and other domestic and 

foreign venues on the Soviet Union/Russia, the Baltic 

countries, NATO, and Kaliningrad. He has published 

widely on these issues for academic and policy-oriented journals as well as various newspapers, including 

The Washington Post, The Chicago Sun-Times, The Los 

Angeles Times, and The Wall Street Journal Europe. For 

8 years Dr. Krickus wrote a column on world affairs 

for Lietuvos Rytas, Lithuania’s leading national daily. 

He has appeared as a commentator on Soviet-Russian 

affairs on U.S. radio and television on numerous occasions. He is the author of a number of books, including: Pursuing the American Dream; The Superpowers 

in Crisis; Showdown: The Lithuanian Rebellion and the 

Break-Up of the Soviet Empire; The Kaliningrad Question; 

Iron Troikas: The New Threat from the East; and Medvedev’s Plan: Giving Russia a Voice but Not a Veto in a New 

European Security System. Dr. Krickus holds a B.A. in 
viii

government from the College of William and Mary, 

an M.A. in international affairs from the University 

of Massachusetts, and a Ph.D. in comparative politics 

from Georgetown University.
ix

SUMMARY

U.S. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates has said 

that the ability of the United States and Russia to cooperate in Afghanistan will be a solid test of their reset in relations. That proposition is the thesis of this 

monograph. Many analysts in both countries would 

agree with this assessment, but a significant number 

of them believe a fruitful reset is implausible.

American skeptics argue that under Vladimir Putin, Russia has reversed the timid efforts that Boris 

Yeltsin embraced to safeguard political pluralism in 

Russia. But in addition to the awesome value gap that 

compromises cooperation, Russia has demonstrated 

that it favors confrontation and not cooperation with 

the West; witness the 2008 Russia-Georgian War. 

From the Russian perspective, one finds similar arguments against cooperation. For example, the Americans are looking to exit from a military engagement 

that is not going well for them, and all metrics suggest things will get worse instead of better. Why, then, 

should Russia become involved in a lost cause? The 

Americans want Russia’s help because the U.S. population has turned against the war in Afghanistan and 

in 2012 most European troops will leave Afghanistan.

Without discounting the many roadblocks, leaders 

in both countries believe that even limited security cooperation is in their vital interest. In this connection, 

both Washington and Moscow deem a return of the 

Taliban in Afghanistan as detrimental to their respective security priorities.

In the U.S. case, should terrorist bases be resurrected in Afghanistan, American citizens run the risk 

of becoming victims in a repeat of September 11, 2001 

(9/11). To prevent this ominous outcome, the United 
x

States has embarked upon military operations in cooperation with North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

(NATO) and Afghan forces. The coalition has received 

limited but significant assistance from Russia in the 

areas of arms, diplomacy, intelligence, logistics, and 

training.

Likewise, Russia has a number of incentives to 

help the U.S.-led coalition in Afghanistan: curtailing 

the flow of drugs from that country to Russia; protecting the Central Asian states that are integral to Russia’s economic prosperity; and denying jihadists the 

opportunity to conduct terrorist operations in the 

North Caucasus and Russia proper. In truth, Russia 

has more to lose than the United States should the coalition stumble in Afghanistan. 

It is the purpose of this paper to evaluate the existing status of U.S.-Russian cooperation and the prospects for future joint security ventures in the region. In 

the process, a second related major rationale will be to 

assess the coalition’s successes and failures in meeting 

the jihadist threat in Afghanistan.

To put the Afghanistan Question in perspective, 

the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan will be assessed along with the U.S. reaction to it, and subsequent events like the civil war that followed the collapse of the communist government in Kabul, the rise 

of the Taliban, and its association with al-Qaeda that 

led to the 9/11 strikes on the Twin Towers and the 

Pentagon.

Special attention will be devoted to the support 

that Russia provided the United States in the wake 

of 9/11 and, more recently, its role in advancing U.S. 

goals in America’s “longest war.” Toward this end, 

the performance of the Obama administration’s counterinsurgency (COIN) operations will be explored 

through three scenarios.
xi

The first (Plan A) involves current facts on the 

ground followed by two plausible alternative scenarios: Partition of Afghanistan (Plan B, popularized by 

the former U.S. Ambassador to India, Robert Blackwill), and the third or worst-case scenario I (Plan C), 

involves returning the Taliban to power. 

It is against this backdrop that conclusions and recommendations bearing on the future of U.S. activities 

in Afghanistan will be considered. For example:

• The time has come to acknowledge that what 

has been mislabeled the “global war on terrorism” may better be labeled a “civil war within 

Islam.” The United States can influence that 

monumental historical development only at 

the margins.

• Given the changing international environment 

and profound economic challenges at home, 

U.S. authorities should advance existing efforts 

to reconcile with the Taliban. This undertaking will be a component of a larger diplomatic 

effort (Bonn II) that includes stakeholders in 

the region such as China, India, Pakistan, and 

perhaps even Iran along with the Central Asian 

states, Russia, and Saudi Arabia.

• As concern about personnel security surges, so 

will pressure from the American public to significantly reduce the military budget and reassess U.S. priorities in the Greater Middle East.

• Many strategists believe the current level of military operations is unsustainable and is not justified by the jihadist threat. It can be adequately 

met through counterterrorist operations that 

have proven to be successful in marginalizing 

the jihadists in Afghanistan.
xii

• As the U.S. presidential election approaches, 

public concern about the duplicity of allies like 

Pakistan will compel U.S. leaders to demand 

that Islamabad deny sanctuary to jihadists who 

are killing Americans or face the consequences.

• The United States will be required to engage in 

multilateral security efforts with countries that 

may not share its values—such as Russia—but 

have common security problems. This enterprise has been characterized by some analysts 

as the “Obama Doctrine.”

• Russian cooperation in Afghanistan, although 

limited, has been significant as exemplified by 

the fact that by the end of 2011, more than 50 

percent of the cargo required by our fighting 

forces there will transit through the Northern 

Distribution Network—made possible by Russia’s cooperation.

The U.S.-Russian reset will continue to face challenges; for example, it could be subverted by a new 

round of Russia-Georgia enmity, and differences over 

the U.S. missile defense system in Europe could result 

in a split between the two sides. But as long as security 

cooperation promotes U.S. national interests, it should 

continue. Finally, in considering what may be deemed 

controversial conclusions and recommendations, the 

words of Defense Secretary Gates come to mind. In his 

last policy speech before his counterparts at the June 

2011 NATO Summit, he said, “. . . true friends occasionally must speak bluntly with one another for the 

sake of those greater interests and values that bind us 

together.”
1

THE AFGHANISTAN QUESTION

AND THE RESET IN U.S.-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

INTRODUCTION

Former U.S. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates 

has suggested that the ability of the United States 

and Russia to cooperate in Afghanistan will be a solid 

test of their reset in relations. That is the thesis of this 

monograph. Many analysts in both countries would 

agree with this assessment, but a significant number 

of them believe a fruitful reset is implausible.

The American Skeptics.

U.S. critics assert that a prominent value gap diminishes significant long-term cooperation. Under 

Vladimir Putin’s rule, the tepid steps toward democracy taken by Boris Yeltsin have been reversed. Political opponents have been silenced or arrested, there is 

no widespread news media freedom, the courts have 

been compromised, and the government has been 

complicit in allowing corrupt officials and criminal 

organizations to flourish. In sum, the fine words of 

President Dmitry Medvedev aside, autocracy, not 

pluralism, has been the hallmark of Putin’s Russia 

ever since he and his colleagues in the Russian secret 

police (KGB) entered the Kremlin. 

Internationally, Putin has matched his tough 

rhetoric with harsh actions. Moscow has exploited 

its hydrocarbon wealth to punish governments in the 

former Soviet space that resist its aggressive efforts to 

influence their economic and political affairs. In the 

process, the Kremlin has exploited gas and oil price 

spikes, pipeline disruptions, down-stream invest-
2

ments, and even cyber-attacks. What is more, neighbors have been unsettled by military doctrine that 

pledges to defend Russians living abroad. Worst of all, 

the 2008 Russian invasion of Georgia and the wresting 

of territory from the Tbilisi government demonstrate 

that the Kremlin overlords will use brute force to accomplish their objectives. Russia’s invasion of Georgia 

signifies the Kremlin’s true intentions and suggests 

confrontation, not cooperation.

Initiatives like Medvedev’s call for a new European 

security system are designed to undermine the North 

Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and to divide 

its members. At times, the Kremlin may engage in ad 

hoc security cooperation such as in Afghanistan, but 

on its terms. Whatever short-term tactical advantages 

are secured through the reset campaign will ultimately result in a strategic liability for the United States 

and its allies.

Russian Skeptics.

From the Russian perspective, one finds similar arguments against cooperation. For example, the 

Americans are looking to exit from a military engagement that is not going well for them, and all metrics 

suggest things will get worse instead of better. Why, 

then, should Russia become involved in a lost cause? 

The Americans want Russia’s help because their own 

population has turned against the war in Afghanistan, 

and most European troops will be out of the country 

by late 2012. As a consequence, they are desperately 

reaching out for helpmates. But while Washington 

welcomes Moscow’s assistance in arms transfers, 

development, diplomacy, intelligence, logistics, and 

training, it has categorically refused to end poppy pro-
3

duction and the shipment of heroin to Russia. In sum, 

it refuses to acknowledge one of Russia’s major incentives for denying the Taliban a victory in Afghanistan. 

As is typically the case, the Americans ask for concessions but in turn are grudging in giving anything back 

to Russia. Rhetoric aside, Barack Obama, like George 

Bush, has demonstrated that it is “his way or the highway.” Clearly, American hubris is alive and well no 

matter who occupies the White House.

One more thing: in the improbable event of a U.S. 

victory in Afghanistan, Washington will seek permanent bases in Greater Central Asia. This outcome fits 

perfectly with the intent of Pentagon planners to encircle Russia and impose upon it a geo-strategic environment favorable to the United States. 

While there are ample reasons to view a reset in 

U.S.-Russian relations with skepticism, there are likewise compelling reasons for both sides to seek fruitful 

security cooperation, and Afghanistan is a good place 

to start.

The American Rationale.

The fanatics responsible for September 11, 2001 

(9/11), must be brought to justice, and their successors must be denied bases from which U.S. and allied 

targets can be struck. Osama bin Laden’s death is a 

start, but there is a lot more work to be done to deter further jihadist attacks. The Taliban continues to 

harbor al-Qaeda, and a Kabul government under its 

control would be intolerable. If the American-led campaign to destroy al-Qaeda and neutralize the Taliban 

in Afghanistan fails, U.S. and allied security will be 

placed at grave risk:

• The United States may once again be struck by 

jihadists operating from a Taliban-controlled 
4

Afghanistan, only this time with weapons of 

mass destruction (WMD).

• Emboldened, the jihadists will try to topple 

moderate and pro-American governments 

throughout the Greater Middle East including 

Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia.

• A jihadist victory in Afghanistan will encourage their counterparts in Pakistan to overthrow 

the government or foment upheaval that ignites 

a nuclear showdown with India.

• A campaign to create an Islamic Caliphate is 

far-fetched, but the chaos and violence that it 

will spawn will disrupt the production and 

flow of hydrocarbons to the world market.

• Central Asia, which is strategically linked to 

Afghanistan and is a region vital to the world’s 

energy market, is vulnerable to jihadist movements. They will be emboldened to subvert the 

region should the West’s venture in Afghanistan fail.

The Russian Rationale.

Russian strategists cite a number of reasons why 

a Taliban victory in Afghanistan will place Russia’s 

security at risk:

• About 90 percent of the heroin that is consumed 

by drug addicts in Russia comes from Afghanistan’s fields and laboratories. It is no surprise, 

then, that the Russian public deems drug abuse 

to be their society’s gravest social problem and 

the major rationale for cooperating with the 

West in Afghanistan.

• If the jihadists are successful in Afghanistan, 

they will mount a campaign to topple pro-Rus-
5

sian governments throughout Central Asia and 

deny Moscow strategic space.

• Jihadists who have been supporting the North 

Caucasus insurgents will be emboldened and 

provide arms and fighters to further inflame 

violent insurrection in the region and deeper 

into Russia proper.

• Under these circumstances, Putin and Medvedev’s campaign to restore Russia’s power 

through a modernization drive will be placed 

in peril.

The Study’s Objectives.

It is the purpose of this paper to address a series 

of questions that consider the existing status of U.S.-

Russian cooperation and the prospects for future joint 

security ventures in the region. A second major objective will be to take stock of U.S. accomplishments and 

failures to date as it prepares for the 2014 exit from 

Afghanistan. It will set in motion a host of reactions 

from stakeholders who have been functioning as bystanders but henceforth will become more actively engaged in finding a resolution to the conflict. Pertinent 

questions that need to be asked include the following:

• How did the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan 

and the U.S.-led response to it conspire to create both al-Qaeda and the Taliban?

• Could a civil war have been avoided had the 

Cold War superpowers collaborated and replaced a communist government in Kabul with 

one that represented a broad cross-section of 

Afghan society?

• How has Russia assisted the American-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) 
6

mission in its campaign to destroy al-Qaeda 

and to dismantle the Taliban, thereby denying 

the jihadists a return to power in Kabul?

• What are the prospects that the U.S. counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy will succeed and, if it 

fails, what are the alternatives?

• How might Moscow assist Washington under 

a medley of possible outcomes as the starting point for the transition to Afghan security 

forces approaches? To properly address this 

question, we must explore Russia’s activities in 

Afghanistan over the past several decades.

• Who are the other major players in the Afghanistan Question, and have we properly identified 

the enemy? In this last connection, what has 

been labeled “global terrorism” may be understood more appropriately as a civil war within 

the Islamic community. If so, what changes 

should be made in our response to it?

• What impact will the U.S. public opposition to 

the war in Afghanistan—and mounting concerns about America’s economic plight—have 

upon a COIN strategy that rests on two major 

variables: time and, in essence, nation-building?

• Why has the time come to negotiate with the 

Taliban, and what are the prospects of a successful outcome? Why do reconciliation with 

the Taliban and the stabilization of Afghanistan 

necessitate a broad diplomatic approach to the 

Afghanistan Question?

• With the approach of the U.S. 2012 presidential 

elections, why must the United States reassess 

its relations with Pakistan? How can both sides 

work toward a successful outcome in Afghanistan in spite of their strained relations?
7

• Against the backdrop of a changing international strategic environment and malaise at 

home, has the time come for the United States 

to reduce its military profile in the Greater Middle East?

• Why can it be argued that the U.S. military has 

accomplished its mission in Afghanistan but 

henceforth must address the jihadist threat 

through counterterrorism (CT) and not COIN 

operations?

• Finally, readers of this paper should recall 

the words of Secretary Gates in his last policy 

speech as U.S. Defense Secretary in Brussels, 

Belgium, on June 10, 2011: “. . . true friends occasionally must speak bluntly with one another 

for the sake of those greater interests and values that bind us together.” 

9

CHAPTER 1

THE SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN

THE DECISION TO INVADE

On December 12, 1979, three old men in the Politburo gave a green light to invade Afghanistan. The 

troika included the foreign minister, Andrei Gromyko; 

the Committee for State Security (KGB) director, Yuri 

Andropov; and the minister of defense, Dmitri Ustinov. They would serve on the Politburo’s Afghanistan Commission and encourage the aging General 

Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist 

Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), Leonid Brezhnev, 

to endorse the first use of the Red Army outside of 

the Soviet empire since World War II. They were responding to the Kabul government’s request to save 

the communist revolution in Afghanistan. 

In the process, the Soviet overlords ignored those 

in the military high command who deemed the operation ill-advised. In their assessment, Afghanistan was 

of no strategic value, and for centuries the primitive 

people living there had demonstrated that they were 

resolute fighters who skillfully exploited their homeland’s rough terrain to defeat invaders, even those 

with superior arms and resources.1

 Some Western 

analysts saw the invasion as a Soviet drive toward the 

Indian Ocean in keeping with the Czars’ dream of a 

warm water port, but the truth was that the Kremlin 

oligarchs discounted the high command’s advice in 

order to save a pro-Soviet government in Kabul and to 

prevent the United States from securing a foothold in 

the region. After their expulsion from Iran, the Americans were looking for bases in Central Asia to encircle 
10

the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). From 

Afghanistan, they could destabilize the Central Asia 

Republics and, in turn, place the Soviet regime at risk. 

Some in the Kremlin feared the United States would 

deploy missiles that were programmed to hit targets 

in the Soviet Union.2

The Afghan drama began in April 1978 in what became known as the Saur (April) Revolution when proSoviet elements gained power upon the assassination 

of President Mohammed Daoud. He had assumed 

political authority in a July 1973 military coup amid 

charges of corruption and misrule associated with his 

cousin Zahir Shah. The latter’s downfall would spell 

the end of the Afghanistan monarchy and spawn decades of warfare in one of the world’s most remote 

and backward countries. Ironically, the Soviet-trained 

commandos who killed Daoud were from the same 

unit that had helped him achieve power 5 years earlier. He had angered Moscow when he loosened his 

ties with the Kremlin and removed communists from 

his cabinet. He made a huge blunder when he arrested the communist leader Nur Mohammed Taraki, 

but only placed his associate, Hafizullah Amin, under 

house arrest. With the help of friendly members of 

the military, Amin launched a coup that resulted in 

Daoud’s murder.

Taraki was an intellectual like most members of 

the Marxist People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), and this would inform his conduct as 

prime minister. He openly expressed admiration for 

Lenin’s brutal suppression of his enemies and, once 

in power, would follow a similar course. He belonged 

to the Khalq (Masses) faction of the party which competed for power with a second communist faction, 

the Parcham (Banner), controlled by Babrak Karmal. 
11

Ideological and ethnic differences divided the two organizations, and these fissures would prove to be destabilizing. Khalq was largely comprised of “Pashtun” 

and Parcham “non-Pashtun” members. 

Once in control, Taraki subverted Islamic influence 

in the country and imposed strict Marxist rule upon it. 

Initially, his benefactors in Moscow failed to appreciate that in his open hostility toward Islam, Taraki was 

engaging in a disastrous enterprise. They suffered 

from the same myopia about religion that afflicted 

the Shah of Iran’s Washington supporters. The mullahs of Iran toppled him earlier in the year. Indeed, 

there were advisers who counseled President Carter 

to launch a military campaign to oust the Islamic rulers—an option that we know now would have been 

disastrous and almost certain to fail.3

The Soviets “failed initially to detect the virus of 

Islamist militancy spreading north and east from Tehran through informal and underground networks.”4

Moscow’s Middle East allies were ruled by secular regimes like those in Syria, Iraq, and Central Asia, so the 

Russians did not fully appreciate the power of religion 

in backward Afghanistan. “Like the Americans, the 

Soviets had directed most of their resources and talent 

toward the ideological battlefields of Europe and Asia 

during the previous 2 decades.”5

ESCALATION

After a traumatic March 1979 uprising in Herat, 

Taraki pleaded with Moscow for Soviet troops to save 

the Marxist government in Kabul. The Iranians had 

spread their Islamic revolution to the Farsi-speaking 

Afghan city because the Shiite residents were emboldened by the success of the Islamic Shiite revolutionar-
12

ies living across their western border. Devout leaders 

in Herat were outraged when the pro-Soviet government embarked upon an education program for girls, 

usurped tribal lands, and waged a war on Islamic religious practices. Encouraged by their Iranian neighbors, Islamic radicals in Herat took up arms against 

the Soviet advisors, and many Russians, including 

women and children, were slaughtered in the uprising.

After the Herat atrocities, the Soviets provided 

the Afghan army with more weapons and additional 

military advisers to assist them in meeting mounting 

resistance. If there were any doubts in Moscow about 

growing instability, they vanished when an entire Afghan division later mutinied and the troops moved on 

Kabul. They were crushed, but Soviet military commanders, who anticipated an early exit from Afghanistan with the creation of a loyal local army, had to accept a disconcerting truth: the Red Army was headed 

for a fight with the resolute mujahedeen and would 

remain in Afghanistan for many years. Meanwhile, 

some members of the Soviet political elite feared that, 

in his march toward a Soviet Afghanistan, Afghan 

communist party boss Taraki was moving too quickly. They were in a minority, but events would prove 

them right. 

The Herat uprising lost Taraki friends in Moscow, 

and, worse yet, it poisoned relations with his Afghan 

comrades. The split among the communists resulted 

in his September assassination. He was replaced by 

Hafizullah Amin who at one time attended Columbia 

University but left disgruntled when he was denied 

his degree. He would not be around for long either. 

His fate was sealed, in part, as a result of a KGB 

“blowback” operation whereby he was accused of being a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) agent. Soviet 
13

intelligence at one time had made that charge possibly 

because of his American education. Also, after Amin’s 

fall meeting with U.S. diplomats in Kabul, some in the 

Kremlin feared that their man was moving toward an 

alliance with the Americans and their “Pakistani puppets.”

Out of desperation, Moscow replaced him with 

Babrak Karmal and settled the crisis in Afghanistan 

by invading the country. Some in the Kremlin were 

aiming less to save a Marxist brother than to create 

a firewall between the aroused Muslim fanatics to 

their south, and Soviet citizens of the Islamic faith. 

The most obvious targets were the five Soviet Central 

Asian Republics (the “Stans”) where most of the inhabitants were Muslims. For these pragmatic strategists, the issue of internal Soviet security transcended 

that of international solidarity. Karmal was a gifted 

speaker but would prove to be a weak leader, and he 

spent much of his time savaging his opponents in the 

PDPA. For him, the playing field was Kabul and Afghanistan’s larger cities; like his comrades, he avoided 

the countryside where the party had little influence 

and its Marxist policies fostered much hostility.

The Kremlin leaders did not think the Red Army 

would be in Afghanistan for long and this was the 

consensus of the international community. Many in 

the West believed that the Soviet planners reached 

this conclusion as a result of their quick suppression 

of the Czech Spring in 1968. However, later Russian 

commenters have rejected that facile notion and provided another one instead. Namely, the mujahedeen 

were poorly armed, illiterate peasants without modern means of transport or communications. How 

could they possibility resist World War II’s most powerful fighting force and one of the Cold War’s premier 

military powers?
14

Throughout the conflict, the Soviets and their Afghan allies controlled the major towns while the countryside was dominated by the mujahedeen. The communists enjoyed a huge advantage in fire power; in 

addition to tanks and artillery, they dominated the air 

with helicopters, bombers, and fighter aircraft. They 

also had modern communication equipment that gave 

them an edge in battle. Although logistics were difficult, their grunts did not have to worry about counting their ammunition as the enemy did.

Their strategy was a simple one; deny the insurgent’s access to the people by brutally punishing 

ordinary folk. The Red Army went about its bloody 

business with artillery, airstrikes, and massive armor attacks. To deny the mujahedeen access to roads 

and other transportation nodes, they laid millions of 

mines, often by air. As a consequence, more than one 

million Afghans died in the war, and millions more 

would flee the country to Iran and Pakistan. Many of 

the three million that sought refuge in Pakistan would 

be transformed into dedicated Islamic warriors after 

occupying refugee camps and attending madrassas 

operated by radical Islamists. Here they would combine their nationalistic sensibilities with a new messianic religious impulse and embrace a narrative that 

the Arab Islamists were crafting for them and Muslims throughout the world—Global Jihad.

During the course of the war, 620,000 Soviet soldiers served in Afghanistan. At their peak, there were 

120,000 Soviet troops in country, and officially they 

suffered almost 15,000 deaths, while 60,000 were injured and hospitalized for physical and psychological 

reasons.6

 In contrast to the insurgents, the Soviet casualties were modest. Nonetheless, the Red Army did 

not have the appropriate doctrine to crush its enemies, 
15

and its reliance upon heavy tanks and large columns 

of infantry proved to be disastrous. As their casualties 

mounted and their sacrifices produced paltry results, 

the morale of Soviet soldiers took a nosedive. It did 

not help that they often did not have faith in their officers who brutally mistreated them. In response, the 

soldiers sought solace in alcohol and drugs. When 

they did not have the money to purchase these diversions, they sold their weapons and ammunition. Soviet 

commanders were tormented by this behavior and appalled by reports that many troops from Central Asia 

were finding common cause with their ethnic brethren. Military planners had assumed that in the initial 

stages of the invasion, it made sense to deploy soldiers 

who shared common cultural, lingual, and religious 

bonds with the Afghans. To their dismay, however, 

they got reports that these troops sympathized with 

the rebels and, in some cases, joined them on the battlefield or travelled to Pakistan where they were introduced to radical jihadist ideas. Consequently, 

less than 4 months after the beginning of the conflict, 

in March 1980, Moscow had to recall a large part of 

the Central Asian reservists deployed in Kabul. At 

the same time there were anti-war demonstrations in 

Tajik, Turkmen and Uzbek communities within the 

USSR. Defense analysts were especially alarmed by 

reports of mujahedeen military forays into Soviet territory where these people lived.7

Of course, things turned decidedly worse for the 

Soviet soldiers when the mujahedeen received modern 

arms, artillery, heavy machine guns, rockets, and antiaircraft systems from the Americans, Chinese, Iranians, Pakistanis, and Saudis. They also were joined by 

fanatical and tough Islamic warriors from the Middle
16

East, Southeast Asia, and even Russia itself. The “foreigners,” however, never provided the number of 

fighters that the “locals” did.

Simultaneously, while some of the Soviet’s Afghan 

allies fought effectively, others did not. Many of them 

left their units and returned home or even joined the 

mujahedeen when the going got rough. Throughout 

their history, fighters in Afghanistan often changed 

sides for a variety of reasons and did much the same 

thing during the Soviet war. 

 Although outgunned, the rebels were familiar 

with the difficult terrain, and large numbers of them 

shared a common language and culture. Even if they 

belonged to disparate ethnic communities, they all 

resented Soviet troops in their country. The common 

bond of religion was one of their most powerful assets, and they were often protected by their neighbors who forewarned them when a larger advancing 

Soviet force threatened their units. The mujahedeen 

had been reared in a martial culture, and most knew 

how to use firearms; besides that, they were brave and 

motivated by a deep hatred of their occupiers. They 

had endured hardships that their Soviet counterparts 

had not encountered in private life, and they did not 

need the massive supplies that helped sustain the enemy. Unlike the Soviet soldiers, they were fighting for 

their country and Allah, and were prepared to outwait their enemies. When faced with a superior force, 

they vanished from the battlefield and only returned 

to ambush surprised opponents. In sum, following 

the dictates of Mao, they fought only when they had 

an advantage and avoided contact with their enemy 

when it was comprised of a larger fighting force.

 After a period of failed operations, the Soviet 

military adopted new tactics that relied primarily 
17

upon rapid strikes by jets and helicopters, along with 

small-unit operations spearheaded by bold airborne 

ambushes. They sought to seal off the border with 

Pakistan, and on occasion Soviet planes overflew its 

territory. The Soviet leaders, however, never contemplated major incursions in Pakistan—the only effective way to halt the flow of fighters and their equipment into Afghanistan. The sanctuaries and the ability 

of the mujahedeen to duck into elaborate tunnel networks or vanish in rugged mountain terrain denied 

the Red Army the set-piece battles at which they excelled.

Among the more successful Soviet operations in late 

1981 was a series of offensives in Nangrahar Province near the Pakistan border and a winter offensive 

in Parwan, where Soviet and Afghan forces crushed 

much of the resistance activity in the province. Recounting these successes, Mark Urban, a perceptive 

British historian of war, observed that “they gave the 

Soviet army a new operational confidence.” It was this 

upbeat mood, Urban said, that led to more aggressive 

tactics during 1982, symbolized, in particular, by the 

climactic Panjshir offensives of May and August—the 

biggest battles of the entire war.8

The Panjshir Valley was territory controlled by the 

Tajik commander Ahmed Shah Massoud, but while 

the Soviets could clear territory, they could never hold 

it. That drove the generals to distraction, but their civilian masters in Moscow had calculated that more 

troops meant more casualties, and that clearly was out 

of the question. The Kremlin leaders did not have to 

pay the same heed to public opinion that their democratic counterparts did, but they could not ignore it 

altogether.
18

Over the next several years, the enemy continued 

to suffer heavy casualties, but in the spring of 1985, 

Soviet planners faced two powerful barriers to victory. First, after Mikhail Gorbachev became General 

Secretary of the CPSU, he concluded that the war was 

a lost cause, speaking of it as a “bleeding wound.” 

Things were getting so bad that Soviet authorities, in 

a campaign to assuage public opposition, minimized 

the casualties that the Army endured. Second, there 

was reason to believe that the war could be won but 

only with a massive infusion of Soviet troops; one 

American analyst spoke in terms of 500,000. It was 

not altogether clear whether Moscow had the logistical capability to provide for a larger force, even if it 

was available. Simultaneously, the Kremlin was not 

prepared to accept the certain subsequent rise in casualties. 

BRINGING THE RED ARMY HOME

In a November 1986 meeting of the Politburo, Gorbachev told his comrades, “The strategic goal is to finish the war in 1, maximum 2, years and withdraw the 

troops. We have set a clear goal: Help speed up the 

process so we have a friendly neutral country, and get 

out of there.”9

 He assumed that he could convince the 

Americans that it was in their interest to establish a 

moderate regime in Kabul—but he would have little 

success in making his case with them. They smelled 

blood and were in no mood to allow the Soviets to 

find a painless exit from Afghanistan. 

From the very outset of the Afghan war, all of the 

Soviet leaders, including some hardliners who wholeheartedly supported it, worried about the war harming relations with Washington. They felt obligated to 
19

help their comrades in the Third World but not at the 

expense of détente with the United States, the only 

country with the capacity to defeat the USSR in a nuclear exchange. 

Still, Gorbachev was slow in bringing the Red 

Army home because he believed that Moscow’s National Reconciliation Program might stabilize Afghanistan and, in the final analysis, keep a pro-Soviet government in Kabul. In a word, it was nothing less than 

a nation-building campaign that rested on improving 

the lives of the Afghans so that they would turn away 

from the jihadists and embrace the communist government instead. Simultaneously, Gorbachev lectured 

the Afghan elite upon the imperatives of reaching out 

to the peasants, and even to political opponents, and 

not being too harsh on Islam. As a consequence of his 

dalliance, more people died on all sides. Indeed, like 

his predecessors, Gorbachev delayed the pullout for 

the simple reason that while the status quo was hardly 

encouraging, the USSR was not suffering too much on 

the diplomatic front and the costs in lives and treasure were acceptable. Jimmy Carter imposed a grain 

embargo upon the USSR, but Canada and Australia 

did not honor it, and Moscow could live with the casualties, given the huge size of the Red Army along 

with war-related expenses. For example, over a 4-year 

period in the late 1980s, the war cost $7.5 billion, but 

the Soviet defense budget in 1989 was $128 billion.10

A Soviet military solution to the Afghan insurgency became even more unlikely as the supply of new 

fighters from Pakistan entered the country. The Arabs 

among them who were bankrolled by Saudi Arabia, 

and Osama bin Laden himself, were dedicated warriors although their numbers were small. In addition, sophisticated arms from friendly supporters had 
20

helped reduce the hardware advantage that the Red 

Army had earlier enjoyed. For example, Stinger antiaircraft missiles forced the Soviets to reconfigure their 

helicopter and fixed-wing aircraft operations and 

clearly emboldened the mujahedeen while demoralizing their enemies. Perhaps the Stingers’ impact upon 

the war have been exaggerated, but they, and other 

arms provided the Afghan fighters, encouraged the 

enemy to leave their country.11

That said, after changing tactics the Soviet military’s performance in Afghanistan improved dramatically, prompting Mark Katz to observe: “Had it not 

been for the weapons, training, and other support 

provided to the guerrillas by the United States, Saudi 

Arabia, China, and Pakistan, Soviet troops undoubtedly would have been able to crush the resistance and 

achieve an outright victory.”12

That conclusion reflected unwarranted confidence 

in the ability of outside conventional forces to defeat 

a resolute army of indigenous insurgents who have 

the option of fighting when they choose to; warriors, 

one might add, that in contrast to the enemy relied 

upon a smaller amount of equipment and food and 

medicine to sustain themselves. What is more, insurgents have an enormous advantage when facing foreign troops who simply do not understand the strong 

cultural factors that thrive in any social system. As a 

consequence, locals do not need intelligence briefings 

to separate their neighbors from the foreign invaders. 

Then, too, ordinary Afghans had more in common 

with the jihadists—even if strangers—than they did 

with “alien infidels.”

In the final analysis, when in trouble the weary 

Russian invaders resorted to the application of brute 

force with little regard for civilian casualties that char-
21

acterized their operations in other places, like Grozny 

years later. In measuring the Red Army’s failure to 

defeat the insurgents by brutalizing the civilian population, one analyst underscores the method’s pitfalls: 

• It could not “overcome the mujahedeen determination to resist the Soviet occupation based 

on the insurgents’ religious and nationalistic 

beliefs.”

• ”Instead of pacifying the population, these actions incited even greater resistance.”

• The Soviets could not compel people to support 

a regime viewed as illegitimate by the majority 

of the Afghan population.

At the same time, when commenting on why the 

Soviets failed to impose military defeat upon the mujahedeen, the analyst makes the following observations:

• The insurgents enjoyed the protection of sanctuaries.

• Their minimal logistical requirements were an 

asset.

• The Soviets did not have sufficient troops, especially those with counterinsurgency training, 

to defeat the mujahedeen.

• The Soviets lacked appropriate counterinsurgency doctrine.

• The introduction of effective man-portable 

surface-to-air missile (SAM) technology dramatically negated Soviet air supremacy.13

In short, these lessons underscore the natural advantages enjoyed by local insurgents who are protecting their turf and are prepared to endure unimaginable costs for the simple reason that they have nowhere 
22

else to go. At the same time, the Afghans had been 

fighting for decades, were skilled in small-unit operations, and, fortified by their religious convictions, ignored overwhelming odds against victory. As a consequence of fighting alongside more sophisticated Arab 

comrades, many of these simple folk became infused 

with a new brand of religious zeal, one that presented 

them with the prospect of joining the international jihadi movement.

For the Arab jihadists, the Afghan battlefield was 

preparing them for a showdown with the corrupt and 

faithless leaders that ruled over them back home and 

eventually with the Americans who stood in the way 

of the Caliphate that many of them dreamed about. 

It puzzled Western analysts that in scanning the bios 

of many of these young fighters, it was discovered 

that they were often better educated than their brethren back home and did not necessarily come from the 

ranks of the economically and socially deprived. In 

other words, they represented a force for modernization, not reaction. 

WHAT WAS HAPPENING? 

One possible key to this puzzle was revealed decades ago when Western political scientists first began 

studying the newly independent nations of Africa, 

Asia, and Latin America—the less developed countries (LDCs)—and made a surprising discovery. Those 

migrants who were leaving the traditional countryside for the city—that is, the most “modern” elements 

of their communities—rediscovered their ethnic, religious, and tribal roots in the harsh crucible of urban 

life. In short, they found a safe harbor in traditional 

associations, identities, and values that they had 
23

scorned back in the village.14 This link between the old 

and new has become a toxic brew in many areas of 

the Islamic world and is the basis for revolutionary 

upheaval throughout it.

THE U.S. REACTION

The American intelligence community failed to 

anticipate the Soviet invasion in what was seen as a 

backwater region in a remote part of the world and 

of scant strategic value. Various intelligence agencies 

detected the Soviet military buildup north of Afghanistan before the invasion, but there was no consensus 

as to its significance.

In mid-December 1978, additional Soviet units 

joined the small number of units already in Afghanistan. This revelation compelled U.S. intelligence to 

conclude that an invasion was in the works, but its 

magnitude and longevity remained uncertain. After 

the Soviets expelled Amin, it was clear that a fullfledged invasion was about to begin.

Meanwhile, President Carter indicated that he 

would welcome harmonious relations with Moscow, 

following the road to détente blazed by the Richard 

Nixon administration. But if the Kremlin expected him 

to accept the invasion without a response, it was sadly 

mistaken. Carter proclaimed that “the Soviet invasion 

of Afghanistan is the greatest threat to peace since the 

Second World War. It’s a sharp escalation in the aggressive history of the Soviet Union.”15 He cancelled 

grain exports to the USSR, blocked the sale of hi-tech 

items, boycotted the 1980 Olympics, and pulled the 

Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) II Treaty from 

Senate consideration. 

In February 1979, relations between Washington 

and Kabul plunged further when the U.S. Ambassa-
24

dor, Adolph Dubs, was kidnapped by radicals and 

later killed when Afghan government troops tried to 

free him. Several months later, upon the advice of his 

national security advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Carter 

ordered the CIA to provide the mujahedeen with a 

modest supply of arms, finances, and training. When 

Ronald Reagan succeeded Carter, the United States 

continued that practice and raised the costs that the 

Soviets were enduring in a fight that was being characterized as “their Vietnam.” “By 1984, CIA funding 

was approaching $350 million annually and peaked in 

1987 and 1988 at close to $400 million.”16 At the same 

time, Washington provided Pakistan with a huge civilian and military aid package resulting in its becoming the third leading recipient of U.S. largess. Here, 

we see an American administration setting aside its 

values in favor of its interests. Not only was Pakistan 

a dictatorship, it was striving, in opposition to U.S. 

policy, to become a nuclear power. That effort had 

prompted the passage of the Pressler amendment that 

conditioned U.S. economic aid to Pakistan on its willingness to give up its quest for nukes. With the Red 

Army in Afghanistan, relations between the United 

States and Pakistan moved in a harmonious direction. 

It was through the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI) that U.S. aid was delivered, and 

the Pakistani security services in the process secured 

close ties with the mujahedeen. Meanwhile, Pakistani 

General Muhammad ul-Haq Zia was alarmed by the 

Iran revolution, and when the Red Army entered Afghanistan, he feared his country might be next. All 

of his associates expressed concern about the SovietIndian connection and feared that a pro-Indian government in Afghanistan represented a serious threat 

to Pakistan. 
25

The Pakistanis therefore were happy to provide 

the anti-Soviet fighters with a safe haven that enabled 

them to rest, train, and recruit for a surging resistance 

movement in Afghanistan. One might observe that as 

long as that circumstance obtained, a Soviet military 

victory was implausible. With the help of Pakistan’s 

ISI, the CIA coordinated the delivery of arms, food, 

equipment, and medicine to the mujahedeen. The ISI 

played much the same role in delivering Saudi Arabia’s money to the mujahedeen. In the process, it not 

only developed close relations with the fighters, it became apparent that, should they be victorious, Pakistan could use them to advance its own interests in 

a post-Soviet Afghanistan and help wrest control of 

Kashmir from India—one of the few major countries 

not to condemn the Soviet invasion. Toward this end, 

it supported Hafez Saeed who, along with Abdallah 

Azzam, had founded Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, the jihadist 

organization that was committed to that goal.

At the same time, fundamentalist mullahs inculcated young Afghan men with the most radical interpretation of the Koran and mesmerized them with the 

prospect of an Islamic movement that someday would 

create a Caliphate uniting Muslims worldwide. This 

noble ideal would be fed by hatred of indigenous 

infidels and the Westerners who had subjugated the 

faithful for centuries. 

The conflicting strategic perspectives of Washington and Islamabad were ignored by American officials 

as they focused on the immediate objective of expelling the Soviets from Afghanistan. Preoccupied with 

the short term, U.S. analysts did not ask a fundamental question: “Whose side would the mujahedeen be 

on after the Soviets left the country?” What is more, it 

must have been unnerving for those Americans who 
26

had followed developments there to acknowledge 

that there was a direct correlation between the most 

effective fighters and hostility toward the infidels, domestic and foreign. U.S. officials then had reason to 

anticipate the Soviet Union’s exit from Afghanistan 

with some trepidation. But they were taking such satisfaction in the USSR’s obvious foreign policy disaster 

that they did not give much thought to what would 

happen next. 

On December 4, 1987, Robert Gates, then acting 

CIA director, broke bread at a Washington restaurant 

with Vladimir Kryuchkov, his KGB counterpart. The 

latter observed that the Soviets were preparing to leave 

Afghanistan, but they would need U.S. help in finding 

a political solution to the conflict. This had been the 

message of his boss who was saying the same thing 

to Reagan. Among other things, Gorbachev wanted 

Washington to halt aiding the Afghan rebels when the 

Soviets withdrew. Indeed, this was Moscow’s bottom 

line but in a subsequent meeting with Reagan, Gorbachev was informed that the United States could not 

honor his request. Reagan and his advisers knew that 

Gorbachev was desperate to get out, and the Americans held the high hand.

In his meeting with Gates, Vladimir Kryuchkov 

indicated that the Kremlin feared radical Islamists 

might gain power in Kabul. Then he noted, “You seem 

fully occupied in trying to deal with just one fundamentalist Islamic state,”17 meaning that there was a 

host of “bad guys” who were prepared to destabilize 

Afghanistan after the Soviets left, in the hope of securing control of Kabul. There was substance to this 

observation, for while the Reagan administration was 

clear about wanting the Soviets out, it had no welldefined policy regarding the new government other 
27

than that the radical jihadists had to be denied power. 

All available evidence, however, indicated that without outside intervention, facts on the ground dictated 

a radical Islamist victory in Afghanistan.

THE END

On February 8, 1988, the world was shocked to 

learn that Gorbachev had decided to withdraw Soviet 

forces from Afghanistan. The formal terms of a Soviet withdrawal were ratified on April 14 at Geneva, 

Switzerland. In addition to the Afghan communist 

government, the document was signed by Pakistan, 

the Soviet Union, and the United States. The rebels 

were excluded from the negotiations, but Washington 

would continue to supply them with military material. 

Reagan, in response to Gorbachev’s assertion that 

the United States had to halt arms transfers to the mujahedeen, answered that that would be impossible as 

long as the Kremlin continued to render similar support to Najibullah, the former head of the Afghan 

State Information Service or secret police. Najibullah 

had been chosen to replace Karmal because, unlike the 

latter, he was competent and strong physically and 

mentally. Consequently, Gorbachev believed he could 

survive a Soviet exit from Afghanistan—at least long 

enough to find a settlement that did not humiliate the 

USSR. In hoping to achieve this goal, he looked expectantly toward Washington.

Those in Moscow who believed the Kremlin could 

develop harmonious relations with Washington were 

heartened by the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear 

Force (INF) Treaty outlawing intermediate-range ballistic missiles. After all, that deal was made possible 
28

by Reagan, the man who many Soviet hardliners reviled since he was the captive of “unrepentant Cold 

Warriors” in the United States. The former movie actor, who would help develop a narrative for America’s 

future that even the Democrats would have to accept, 

had come to the conclusion that it was in the nation’s 

vital interest to cooperate with the USSR in making 

the world a safer place through arms control. In so doing, he shocked many of his admirers who believed 

in absolute security through nuclear dominance and 

rejected joint ventures of any kind with the Soviets.

Many of the people around Gorbachev, like his 

Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, bitterly opposed a deal that compromised Najibullah’s prospects 

for surviving a Soviet withdrawal and deemed the Geneva Agreement as tilted against him. Gorbachev ignored the advice because a diplomatic settlement was 

in keeping with his New Thinking on domestic and 

international affairs. In his mind, they were interconnected since liberal policies at home and a new positive relationship with the United States abroad would 

set the Soviet Union on a new track—one that would 

lead it out of the morass that his predecessors had bequeathed to him. 

On February 15 the following year, the commander of the 40th Army, General Boris Gromov, led his 

troops over the Termez Bridge to Uzbekistan, and the 

Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan were 

history. In the eyes of the world, the Red Army had 

suffered a massive defeat, even though there was justification for Gromov’s claim that no “Soviet garrison or 

major outpost” had ever been overrun by the enemy. 

In every set-piece battle with the Soviets, their enemy 

lost.18 But no matter how sugar-coatedly the military 

high command sought to characterize their exit from 
29

Afghanistan, the Red Army’s reputation suffered a 

huge setback. For disgruntled and restive people in 

the “Outer Soviet Empire”—the satellites in Eastern 

Europe—and the “Inner-Empire”—the non-Russian 

Republics—the luster of the mighty Red Army was 

profoundly tarnished. Unquestionably, the setback 

in Afghanistan emboldened opponents of the Soviet 

regime throughout the empire and contributed to its 

eventual demise in December 1991. But, 

while many expected the departure of the Soviet army 

in February 1989 to mark the end of the war, it did 

not. The Najibullah regime—aided by Soviet security 

assistance—was clever and built alliances around 

the country. With a 65,000-man army, an air force of 

nearly 200 planes and helicopters, and many well-paid 

militia units, Afghan government forces were able to 

hold off the mujahideen. This fact became clear in May 

1989, when a number of mujahideen groups attacked, 

but failed to seize, the city of Jalalabad in eastern Afghanistan.19

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 1

1. For an American depiction of the war, see Gregory Feifer, 

The Great Gamble: The Soviet War in Afghanistan, New York: Harper 

Perennial, 2009, p. 11. A Soviet perspective is provided by Artyom 

Borovik, The Hidden War, New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1990.

2. Feifer, p. 3. Artemy M. Kalinovsky explains why, in spite 

of fears in the Kremlin about American strategic interests in the 

area, the Soviet leaders were reluctant to invade Afghanistan. See 

his A Long Goodbye, Boston, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011. 

This book relies upon Russian material that heretofore has not 

been released.

3. In this connection, see Patrick Tyler, A World of Trouble, 

New York: Farrar Straus and Giroux, 2009, p. 233.
30

4. Diego Cordovez and Selig S. Harrison, Out of Afghanistan, 

New York: Oxford University Press, 1995.

5. Ibid.

6. Marlene Laruelle, Beyond the Afghan Trauma: Russia’s Return 

to Afghanistan, Washington, DC: The Jamestown Foundation, August 2009, p. 22.

7. Ibid. Also, as a consequence of serving in Afghanistan, 

thousands of Central Asians were introduced to radical versions 

of Islam and, upon returning home, became proponents of religious notions that did not sit well with the Kremlin. See Ahmed 

Rashid, Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia, New Haven, 

CT: Yale University Press, 2002. 

8. Cordovez and Harrison, p. 71.

9. Steve Coll, Ghost Wars, New York: Penguin Books, 2004, p. 

158.

10. Kalinovsky, p. 42.

11. Ibid., p. 43.

12. Mark Katz, “The Soviet Military Experience in Afghanistan: A Precedent of Dubious Relevance,” PONARS Policy Memo 

202, October 2001, p. 1.

13. Edward B. Westermann, “The Limits of Soviet Airpower: 

The Failure of Military Coercion in Afghanistan, 1979-89,” Thesis, 

Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Montgomery, AL, 1997, 

pp. 15-16.

14. I observed this when I wrote a doctoral dissertation for 

Georgetown University that assessed the relationship between 

urbanization and political development in the Third World.

15. Robert M. Gates, From The Shadows: The Ultimate Insider’s 

Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War, New York: 

Simon & Schuster, 1996, p. 425.
31

16. Major James T. McGhee, “The Soviet Experience in Afghanistan: Lessons Learned,” MilitaryHistoryOnline.com, June 14, 

2008, p. 1.

17. Bruce Riedel, Deadly Embrace, Washington, DC: Brookings 

Institution Press, 2011, p. 27.

18. Steve Galster, “Volume II: Lessons from the Last War,” 

The National Security Archive, October 9, 2001, p. 25. For a comprehensive treatment of the diplomacy leading up to the Soviet 

exit from Afghanistan, see Cordovez and Harrison.

19. Joseph J. Collins, Understanding War in Afghanistan, Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2010, p. 35. 

33

CHAPTER 2

THE FAILURE TO CREATE 

A STABLE POST-SOVIET GOVERNMENT

AND CIVIL WAR

THE UNITED NATIONS PROPOSAL

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan had been 

roundly condemned internationally, so Gorbachev’s 

diplomatic leverage was minimal. In particular, his 

effort to sustain the Najibullah regime in Kabul was 

a hard sell. His reputation as a brutal torturer hardly 

burnished his image before the international community.

On January 14, 1980, the United Nations (UN) by 

a margin of 144 to 18, with 18 abstentions, called for 

the withdrawal of “foreign troops” from Afghanistan. 

Years later, under the direction of Diego Cordovez, 

the Ecuadorian diplomat, the UN explored a path to 

a cease-fire that was acceptable to all parties to the 

dispute. The proposal that he crafted rested on three 

major propositions:

1. Najibullah’s regime was unacceptable to most 

Afghans and had to be replaced by a provisional government. 

2. It would be broad-based and include communists, the resistance fighters, and the émigrés that over 

the decades of fighting had fled the country. A pivotal 

figure in this connection was the former elderly King 

who Cordovez believed was the only person who was 

acceptable to both sides. 

3. Progress would not occur as long as both the Soviet Union and the United States continued to provide 

the combatants with arms.1
34

On September 13, 1991, U.S. Secretary of State 

James Baker and his Soviet counterpart Boris Pankin 

agreed to cut off aid to their Afghan clients. It was at 

this point that the fate of Najibullah was sealed. As he 

contemplated his imminent demise, he told reporters, 

“If fundamentalism comes to Afghanistan, war will 

continue for many years. Afghanistan will turn into a 

center of world smuggling for narcotic drugs. Afghanistan will be turned into a center for terrorism.”2

 At the 

behest of the UN representative in Kabul, he agreed to 

forfeit power in favor of a government formed under 

the international body.

Najibullah survived the Soviet withdrawal for 

several years, in no small part because he skillfully 

arranged deals with disparate warlords. But in September 1991 just weeks after the anti-Gorbachev coup, 

the UN campaign to arrange a peaceful settlement 

between Najibullah and his opponents collapsed. Najibullah’s fortunes took a further turn for the worse 

when his Uzbek ally, Aburrashid Dostum, joined one 

of the most gifted anti-Soviet leaders, Ahmed Shah 

Massoud, and provided the Tajik with an additional 

fighting force of 40,000 men, along with tanks, artillery, and aircraft. A third major mujahedeen commander, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, joined them as well. 

A Pashtun, he was a favorite of the Pakistani Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and would 

become a close associate of Osama bin Laden, with 

whom he shared profound anti-American sentiments. 

This troika of warlords would overwhelm Najibullah’s demoralized units and, in the face of certain defeat, he sought refuge in the UN compound where he 

lived until he was killed by the Taliban. His life would 

have been spared had he accepted Massoud’s advice 

to leave Kabul before the Taliban attacked the city.
35

WHY THE PROPOSAL FAILED

In the final analysis, UN-inspired efforts to accomplish a peaceful transition of power in Afghanistan 

failed. There were simply too many hurdles. As the 

transition of security to Karzai’s forces commences today, U.S. analysts searching for a solution to the present conflict in Afghanistan would be well-advised to 

consider all of those hurdles.

• The Kremlin persisted in the claim that Najibullah’s government could serve as an interim 

authority, but that proposal was a non-starter 

for all the other players in the drama. Not only 

was his regime deemed illegitimate by most 

Afghans, it was riven by conflict. It also was 

incapable of functioning effectively without extensive outside help, and that dependency hobbled the Afghan communists in their campaign 

to survive the Soviets’ exit from the country. 

“The presence of Soviet troops and advisers 

seemed to cause paralysis among Afghan politicians. This may have been due to a sense that 

the Soviet advisers could do the job better, or 

it may have been a response to the generally 

imperial attitude adopted by some advisers.”3

• The resistance leaders in Afghanistan—known 

as the “Peshawar Seven,” a group of powerful opponents that included the country’s future president, Burhanuddin Rabbani—were 

at odds with one another. Moreover, one of 

the most dominant commanders in opposition 

to the UN proposal was Hekmatyar. He complained, “Cordovez has always been trying 

to prove that the Afghan crisis is indigenous 
36

while we have been fighting against foreign 

aggression. As soon as the foreign intervention 

ends, peace will be restored in Afghanistan.”4

• Pakistan would not accept a provisional government that it considered to be unfavorable to 

its strategic concerns, and it could count upon 

the support of Saudi Arabia to follow its lead 

on these matters. What is more, the ISI had a 

virtual veto in its hands, given its close relations with some of the most powerful AfghanPashtun commanders. One of them was Jallaladin Haqqani, a man who had attracted the 

attention of Washington: “He was seen by CIA 

officers in Islamabad and others as perhaps the 

most impressive Pashtun battlefield commander in the war. He sponsored some of the first 

Arab fighters who faced Soviet forces in 1987.”5

He was a real warrior who was wounded in 

combat, not a virtual commander who resided 

in the comforts of Quetta, Baluchistan. He enjoyed close ties with Pakistan’s ISI and staunch 

Islamists in that country, as well as wealthy 

Saudi sheiks. He operated in the Parrot Beak’s 

area of Afghanistan, close to where bin Laden 

had his base. Although he was a bitter enemy 

of America, Washington provided him with a 

generous supply of arms and ammunition because he was such an accomplished commander.

According to Artemy Kalinovsky, the Kremlin had 

considered the prospects for a coalition government: 

“In the summer of 1988, President Zia told Vorontsov, 

Moscow’s ambassador to Kabul, that he would support 

a solution in which a third of the government would 
37

be PDPA, a third would be the ‘moderate’ opposition, 

including royalists, and a third would be from the ‘Peshawar Seven’.”6

 That prospect, however, faded with 

Zia’s death and also delayed an agreement, because 

without the steady hand of the Pakistani dictator, the 

opposition became an even more unruly entity. 

• The United States continued to provide arms 

to the resistance movement long after the UN 

diplomatic undertaking lost steam. Washington would not accept a proposal that allowed 

the communists to have real influence in Kabul 

since they were the ones that encouraged the 

Soviet invasion in the first place. The United 

States continued to seek close ties with Pashtun commanders like Haqqani even though he 

was vocal in his hatred of America. Simultaneously, some in Washington considered Massoud, the charismatic Tajik commander who 

was Rabbani’s defense minister, a more likely 

ally. From his base in Panjshir, he had the capacity, with Uzbek commanders, to control 

much of the Northern tier of the country. Like 

his Pashtun competitors, he too had friends 

among the Arabs, most notably Abdullah Assam, the Palestinian who taught bin Laden in 

Jeddah and whose motto was, “Jihad and the 

rifle alone; no negotiations, no conferences, no 

dialogues.”7

 Given Massoud’s association with 

drug dealing, however, he was suspect in the 

eyes of many in official Washington circles.

• There were serious divisions between the Afghan émigrés and the resistance fighters. Some 

of the most militant members of the mujahedeen 

resented individuals who had left Afghanistan 

and had only returned after the war. Others, 
38

like Harmid Karzai, were held suspect. Even 

though he was a royalist because he had lived 

in Quetta, some of his critics deemed him an 

ISI agent, while others later resented his initial 

support of the Taliban. He was deputy foreign 

minister when he was interrogated and beaten 

by members of the government. Afterwards he 

left the country and did not return for 7 years.8

• King Zahir Shah’s advanced age denied him 

the mental and physical capacity to play a 

leading role in reconciliation; besides, he was 

deemed unacceptable by Pakistan because he 

endorsed the creation of a single Pashtun state 

that would have united Pashtuns living on both 

sides of the Durand Line.

WASHINGTON’S AND MOSCOW’S FAILURE

In anticipation of Najibullah’s imminent demise, it 

was apparent that Washington and Moscow had good 

cause to back moderates like Massoud and join forces in opposing the Pashtun jihadists and their Arab 

mentors. Indeed, one of the factors that attracted the 

Kremlin’s attention was Massoud’s success in building schools and hospitals in his area of control. But 

the government in Kabul would not work with him 

unless he surrendered his arms, and he, of course, refused to do so.9

 In the final analysis, Cold War enmity 

prevailed, and there was scant hope of fruitful American-Soviet cooperation on this critical matter. Fixated 

upon the past, the leaders in both capitals missed opportunities for future cooperation that served the vital 

interests of both Moscow and Washington.

It should be underlined that while the Americans 

had provided arms and funds to the mujahedeen, 
39

this help went through the ISI. Brigadier Mohammad 

Yousaf coordinated it during the war, and there was 

no direct American contact with the insurgents.10 As 

a consequence, given this fact and the anti-American 

enmity among the mujahedeen, Washington might 

have found it difficult to influence the jihadists in this 

critical period, even if it had tried to do so.

Rabbani was proclaimed president in 1993, but his 

administration was faced with a mixture of warlords, 

tribal chiefs, and criminal organizations that sought 

power in Kabul or deemed the instability that ravaged 

the country in their vital interests. The civil war that 

tormented Afghanistan for several years cost many innocent lives. For example, in 1993 an estimated 10,000 

civilians were killed as a result of fighting between 

Rabbani’s forces and those of Hekmetyar. A year later, 

much of Kabul was destroyed as fighters associated 

with the Uzbek warlord, General Dostum, clashed 

with those of Hekmetyar. There were many other battles where the casualties were high, and atrocities on 

both sides were numerous. 

It was in the crucible of this mayhem that a further 

step was taken toward the creation of a global Islamic 

terrorist movement. In a word, Afghan nationalism 

was fused with messianic Arab fundamentalist dogma to give rise to a movement with globalist ambitions. For example, Afghan warlord Haqqani developed close ties with the Muslim Brotherhood, and his 

militant brand of jihadism attracted most of the Arab 

fighters in Afghanistan to his side. With the exit of the 

Soviet forces, the Arabs would play a more important 

role in shaping developments within Afghanistan as 

would the mujahedeen and their supporters and other 

anti-Soviet elements from several Pakistani cities. In 

the Pakistani Islamic coffee shops, the Arabs would 
40

provide the intellectual framework for creating an Islamic government in Afghanistan that would adhere 

to fundamentalist Islamic law and practices. They 

also would turn their enmity away from the Union of 

Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) toward the United 

States. In addition, Washington’s support for Israel, 

its invasion of Iraq, and the deployment of troops on 

holy Islamic soil in Saudi Arabia, elevated Americans 

to the avant-garde of modernist values, thus threatening Islam in every corner of the globe. At the same 

time, Afghanistan provided a template for the Arab 

radicals who dreamed about creating an Islamic Caliphate throughout the Muslim world, and a strategic 

base from which they would wage war against those 

Muslim leaders that were deemed infidels or western 

puppets. 

It is against this backdrop of events that there is 

some justification for the claim that, had the American 

and the Soviet/Russian leaders in the early 1990s cooperated in Afghanistan, it is conceivable that September 

11, 2001 (9/11) might have been avoided. The alliance 

between the Afghan mujahedeen and Arab jihadists 

would not have borne fruit. It is with this thought in 

mind that many observers in both Washington and 

Moscow today favor a reset in relations and close cooperation in preventing the Taliban’s return to power 

in Afghanistan. 

Speculation of this nature aside, what we know is 

that the United States closed its embassy in Kabul as 

Afghanistan was wracked by civil war. The United 

States, in effect, was closing the door on the Afghan 

Question, but radical jihadists would soon reopen it.
41

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 2

1. Diego Cordovez and Selig S. Harrison, Out of Afghanistan, 

New York: Oxford University Press, 1995, pp. 368-370.

2. Steve Coll, Ghost Wars, New York: Penguin Books, 2004, p. 

235.

3. Artemy Kalinovsky, A Long Goodby, Boston, MA: Harvard 

University Press, 2011, p. 34.

4. Cordovez and Harrison, p. 381. Cordovez, who was the 

UN negotiator, indicates that if Pakistan’s President Mohammed 

ul-Haq Zia had not been killed in a mysterious plane crash, he 

would have had the heft to secure an agreement among the disparate players in the Afghan drama, p. 378.

5. Coll, p. 202. Haqqani’s deadliest enemy was Massoud, the 

Tajik, who also had displayed great courage and military acumen during his struggles with the Soviets and their Afghan allies. Perhaps the respect that he earned on the part of the Soviet 

commanders would pave the way for Moscow later becoming a 

strong supporter of the Northern Alliance. Wright, p. 95. Abullah 

Azzam, the Palestinian who was on good terms with the Tajik 

leader, sought, but without success, to resolve the dispute between Massoud and Haqqani. While they were bitter rivals, they 

both were devout Islamists who were strong opponents of both 

capitalism and communism and harbored dreams about creating 

a pristine Islamic state in Afghanistan. 

6. Kalinovsky, p. 155.

7. Wright, p. 95.

8. Coll, pp. 286-287.

9. Kalinovsky, p. 104.

10. Peter Bergen, “Myths about Osama bin Laden,” Washington Post, May 8, 2011. 

43

CHAPTER 3

THE TALIBAN AND OSAMA BIN LADEN

THE ORIGINS OF THE TALIBAN

The Afghan civil war provided the strategic environment within which the Taliban emerged. It was a 

partnership of government deserters, former anti-Soviet mujahedeen, and young Pashtun men who were 

products of religious schools and Islamic grass-roots 

organizations that inculcated the faithful with radical 

jihadist dogma. These zealots gained notoriety among 

ordinary folk when they turned their guns against 

brutal criminal gangs and grasping warlords in and 

around the city of Kandahar. Their ranks swelled as 

they co-opted warlords and attracted Islamic militants 

to their cause as they demonstrated the capacity to 

crush their enemies.

They also attracted resolute support from abroad—

primarily from Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. The Taliban were adherents of Wahhabism, an orthodox Sunni 

sect that imposed strict fundamentalist religious practices on the part of the faithful, so they were favored 

by religious allies in Saudi Arabia. In addition to generous funding to construct and operate madrassas and 

mosques, the Saudis provided the military equipment 

required to enhance the Taliban’s prospects for victory 

in the civil war. The Saudis likewise deemed them an 

asset in halting the Shiite revolution that had erupted 

in Iran and threatened Sunni governments throughout the Islamic community. That threat had arisen 

after the Americans destroyed Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq and disrupted the balance of power in 
44

the Arab Middle East. Saddam was a military threat, 

but so were the Islamic mullahs in Iran and, what is 

more, they were resolute enemies backed by the largest population in the Persian Gulf.

The key Saudi player in the Afghanistan Question 

was Prince Nur Mohammed Taraki, the Americaneducated director of Saudi Arabia’s security service. 

Like other Saudi leaders, he feared that with the Soviet Union’s collapse, the Shiite revolutionaries in 

Iran would spread their teachings throughout the 

Persian Gulf and in Central Asia. With generous assistance and sage advice from Riyadh, the pious young 

radicals in Taliban would sustain Sunni domination 

of Afghanistan. They were simple, poorly educated 

fanatics who might not always make wise decisions, 

but they would mellow over time and adopt prudent 

fundamentalist policies much like those that prevailed 

in his country. 

Taraki’s counterparts in Washington embraced disparate views of the Taliban; in some circles, they were 

deemed a positive force that could bring security to a 

society that had been riven by conflict for decades. In 

other ones, their human rights violations were a cause 

for alarm, e.g., their brutal mistreatment of women 

suggested that they were a Sunni analogue to the Shiite fanatics that ruled Iran. If anything, they were even 

more stringent in imposing what they claimed to be 

Sharia law upon the faithful. 

For Pakistan, the Taliban provided the opportunity to end the Afghan civil war in a manner favorable to it. And with a friendly government in Kabul, 

Islamabad enjoyed strategic space that protected it 

against a range of enemies foreign and domestic. This 

meant defeating the Uzbek and Tajik warlords in the 

North who were receiving support from Iran, India, 
45

and Russia. Of utmost urgency, it meant installing 

a strong government in Kabul that was beholden to 

Pakistan, not to India. Likewise, the Taliban could 

serve as a counterweight to the Iranian Shiites that 

had considerable influence in Western Afghanistan, 

and who could make trouble for Islamabad in Baluchistan where separatists were active. 

Afghanistan under Taliban control was an asset 

in Pakistan’s campaign to pacify the unruly Pashtun 

tribal lands that ran along the Afghanistan-Pakistan 

border. One of the greatest fears harbored by Pakistani strategists was the prospect that at some point 

the millions of Pashtuns who lived on both sides of 

the Durand Line might press for an independent state 

of their own. The hardliners in Islamabad could not 

forget that because of their own ham-handed policies, 

they had prompted their brethren in Eastern Pakistan 

to break with them and create Bangladesh.

For the most part, the U.S. foreign policy community remained indifferent to the developments 

that were unfolding in Afghanistan. The only official 

American-Taliban meeting that took place occurred 

in April 1998. Bill Richardson, the U.S. Ambassador 

to the UN, flew to Kabul with the intention of meeting with Mullah Omar in an effort to persuade him 

to hand over bin Laden to the Saudis in keeping with 

a UN resolution that had condemned the al-Qaeda 

leader. Richardson neither met with Omar nor did he 

succeed in getting the Taliban to return bin Laden to 

Saudi Arabia.1

Halting Soviet aggression was the original rationale for U.S. involvement in Afghanistan, which 

proved to be a disaster for Moscow, helping expedite 

the implosion of the Soviet regime. Consequently, the 

George H. W. Bush, Bill Clinton, and George W. Bush 
46

administrations lost interest in the country, failing to 

develop a coherent response to the stormy events that 

were unfolding in Afghanistan. Among other things, 

President George H. W. Bush closed the U.S. Embassy 

in Kabul.2

Meanwhile, within Afghanistan the educated 

middle class was alarmed by the Taliban’s zeal and 

puritanical policies. After all, it was monstrous that 

girls no longer could attend school while men had to 

grow beards and adhere to puritanical behavior that 

was both irrational and demeaning, not to mention 

the Taliban’s barbaric acts of punishment. A Taliban victory meant Afghanistan was returning to the 

Middle Ages. Something else of significance was occurring: as religious zealots gained power, the influence of the tribes and their leaders was marginalized. 

This worked in behalf of the radical jihadists that soon 

would embrace the fantasies of their Arab benefactors.

For ordinary folk, the Taliban’s harsh policies were 

often deemed excessive, but after years of turmoil, 

many Afghans looked upon the religious zealots with 

favor. Where they ruled, people could enjoy both order and peace, and they relished the Taliban’s making 

quick work of thieves and rapacious warlords who 

had brutalized them for years. And in most instances, 

if one did not challenge them, the Taliban would leave 

him or her alone.

Steve Coll provides another reason for their favorable reception among Pashtun leaders. In the crucible 

of war, Afghan nationalism and Islamic piety were 

forged into a powerful weapon. More to the point, 

by combining Islamic piety with Pashtun political 

heft, the Taliban provided the Pashtun tribes with the 

potential to end the civil war and gain control of the 

government in Kabul.3

 This is why many prominent 
47

Pashtun elders and tribal chiefs, including those associated with the royalist Karzai family, supported the 

radical jihadists.

After several years of civil war, powerful religious 

and secular Pashtun leaders and commercial oligarchs 

lost patience with the marauding warlords that had 

torn the country asunder. They sought an end to the 

violence that not only devastated their pocketbooks, 

but at times even cost them their lives. As a consequence, a growing number of them threw their weight 

behind a cabal of young mullahs who led the Taliban. 

Under the leadership of a cleric called Mullah Mohammed Omar, the Taliban became a capable fighting force and a social-political reform movement that 

was committed to a peaceful and unified Afghanistan. 

Omar was something of a recluse who avoided publicity, but he had lost an eye fighting the Soviets and 

was no stranger to organized violence. He was born 

in 1950 in a village outside of Kandahar, with that ancient Pashtun city, which he rarely left, becoming his 

base. After the Soviet War, he returned to his religious 

studies and characterized his associates as “a simple 

band of dedicated youths determined to establish the 

laws of God on Earth and prepared to sacrifice everything in pursuit of that goal.”4

After capturing Kandahar in 1994, the Taliban secured a growing number of provinces where they were 

greeted as saviors by a war-weary, largely Pashtun 

population. Confident of gaining control of the entire 

country, Omar refused to negotiate with his enemies 

or did so only for tactical reasons. When asked what 

he would do with his enemies, he answered bluntly, 

“Kill them.”

In September 1994, Herat fell to the Taliban and, 

with that victory, Omar’s fighters occupied the entire 
48

southern tier of Afghanistan from the east to the west. 

The Hazara Shiite population, however, suffered under the fanatical rule of their Sunni masters who committed numerous atrocities. After every success, they 

attracted a steady stream of students from Pakistan’s 

madrassas to replenish their ranks but, as they entered 

the Northern half of the country, they encountered 

stiff resistance from Uzbek and Tajik militias and Shiite fighters. Nonetheless, in May 1997 they secured 

control of Mazar-i-Sharif, the largest city in Northern 

Afghanistan. It had a reputation of urbane secularism 

and was controlled by Dostum, “a former communist 

general who wore his religion lightly.”5

Soon after the Taliban expelled his forces and occupied the city, the local population rebelled and killed 

many of the occupiers. Here was further evidence that 

the Taliban’s enemies in the North would prove to be 

tough and resourceful fighters. In turn, the Taliban engaged in awful human rights crimes, indiscriminately 

killing civilians and warriors alike in the conviction 

that anyone who resisted them or who did not join 

them was an enemy of God, of Islam.

The Taliban’s victory in Mazar had international 

implications because it provided Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates with the rationale 

for extending diplomatic recognition to them. The 

Taliban, however, were rejected by most of the international community.

One rationale for withholding diplomatic recognition was that a northern tier of Afghanistan remained 

outside of the Taliban’s control. The major reason for 

this was the existence of fighters who were led by the 

Tajik warlord, Massoud, by far their most gifted opponent. His fighters represented the last source of significant military opposition to the Taliban, and his re-
49

sistance was made possible by arms, equipment, and 

money received from India, Iran, and Russia. According to one report, since the Taliban had indicated that 

the Central Asian countries and Russia itself would 

be a target of their Islamic crusade, the Kremlin had 

deployed 28,000 Russian troops to outposts in Central 

Asia. It was from these areas that most of the equipment that sustained Massoud’s fighters originated.

His Russian benefactors, however, had to know 

that Massoud bankrolled his movement by dealing in 

heroin, most of which was used by addicts in Russia.6

Moscow had no alternative since he was the last remaining military barrier standing between the Taliban 

and Central Asia. With help from foreign sources, he 

maintained a force that became known as the Northern Alliance and that would provide the United States 

with the boots on the ground in 2001 to expel the Taliban from Afghanistan. 

It would take some time before Massoud felt comfortable with the United States, and Washington with 

him. He concluded that the Americans were allied 

with Pakistan and had endorsed the ISI’s pro-Taliban 

tilt. What is more, he saw the U.S. energy company 

Unocal’s campaign to build a pipeline from Turkmenistan through Afghanistan to Pakistan as evidence that 

powerful oil interests in America were lobbying their 

government to court the Taliban.

OSAMA BIN LADEN

Meanwhile, American intelligence noted with dismay that the Taliban had secured a close relationship 

with foreign fighters associated with a Saudi millionaire called Osama bin Laden. In their drive toward Kabul in 1996, they captured Jalalabad where bin Laden 
50

had grown roots since he left Sudan. He would develop a close personal relationship with Mullah Omar 

and marry one of his daughters. Like some of the other Arabs in his circle, bin Laden was filling Omar with 

grand notions about global jihad. The Taliban’s link 

with him was one of the factors that would eventually 

result in the United States looking to Massoud with 

greater favor. 

The Taliban would never defeat Massoud on the 

battlefield, but it captured Kabul in 1996 and took control of the government. With the Taliban victory, we 

see a clear path between the 1979 Soviet invasion of 

Afghanistan, the civil war that followed the USSR’s 

humiliating exit, and the U.S. intervention 21 years 

later that was precipitated by September 11, 2001 

(9/11). The connecting link between the Taliban victory and that monstrous event, of course, was bin Laden 

himself.

After working for Aramco as a carpenter, Osama 

bin Laden’s Yemini father, Muhammed, evenually 

became owner and operator of the largest construction company in Saudi Arabia. Much of Aramco’s infrastructure would be built by his companies. In the 

process, he became a close associate of the King and a 

significant force in Saudi society. Osama, one of his father’s many children, would become a devout Muslim 

and in high school joined the Muslim Brothers, a radical underground organization that hoped someday 

to establish an Islamic state. He attended King Abdul 

Aziz University in Jeddah where many of his instructors were Islamists. 

After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, bin Laden was enthralled by the accounts of the mujahedeen 

provided by one of his mentors, Sheikh Abdullah 

Azzam. The Palestinian cleric was a prominent per-
51

sonality in his own right among Islamic radicals, for, 

among other things, he ordered a fatwa that obliged 

Muslims to fight the Soviet infidels in Afghanistan. He 

would later be assassinated under mysterious circumstances, and some would say his death was a result 

of internal upheaval among the jihadists. Many Arabs had been attracted to Azzam’s fatwa—Defense of 

Muslim Lands—stating that Muslims were obligated 

to fight for their Islamic brothers against the infidels in 

Afghanistan. No more than 3,000 Arab fighters were 

recruited through the Afghan Services Bureau that 

Azzam created and bin Laden bankrolled; indeed, 

many of them never entered the war zone.7

Eventually, bin Laden led Arabs in a number of 

battles and, as a consequence, earned the reputation 

of being a warrior as well as a generous financial 

benefactor of the mujahedeen. After Soviet forces left 

Afghanistan in humiliation, he returned to his homeland in 1989, and Turki asked for his help in organizing “a fundamentalist religion-based resistance to the 

Communist-style regime in South Yemen.” But by this 

time, bin Laden was enthralled with the idea of striking the United States, Islam’s most powerful enemy.8

He had not, however, altogether forgotten the “near 

enemy.” For example, he told the Saudi leaders, “I 

want to fight Saddam, an infidel. I want to establish a 

guerrilla war against Iraq.”9

Relations between bin Laden and the Saudi government would decline when, in a meeting with Dick 

Cheney, the King agreed to deploy a large number of 

U.S. troops and weapon systems in the kingdom to 

expel Saddam from Kuwait. The King feared that the 

Iraqi dictator, if not punished for his invasion and occupation of Kuwait, might decide to cross the border 

and remove the Saudi leadership from power. Bin 
52

Laden did not immediately break with the King, even 

though he was outraged that Americans were treading on holy Saudi soil and feared that, once deployed, 

they would never leave the country. He sustained his 

Afghanistan Services Bureau, a front for maintaining 

the network of Algerians, Chechens, Egyptians, and 

other Muslims who had fought in Afghanistan. After 

the Soviet Union collapsed, many of these fighters 

would join their brethren to fight in Chechnya and the 

Balkans. In 1990, he founded an organization that in a 

decade would become a household name, al-Qaeda.10

As late as 1993, however, neither bin Laden nor 

his new organization were broached in conversations 

conducted by the CIA and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in their investigations of the World 

Trade Center bombing that year. This was true even 

though one of the individuals arrested for this attack, El Sayyid Nosair, had materials in his New York 

apartment connecting him to the Afghan Services 

Bureau. It was not realized at the time, but he would 

be the first al-Qaeda terrorist arrested in the United 

States. He and several other plotters, including the 

blind Egyptian cleric, Omar Abdel Rahman, would 

be apprehended as well; but the leader of the terrorist 

crew, Ramzi Yousef, would flee the country. In 1995, 

he was foiled in a plot to place bombs on U.S. airliners flying from Asia. Soon afterwards, he was spotted 

in Pakistan and was snatched by a team of American 

intelligence operatives with the help of Pakistani colleagues and returned to the United States.

Bin Laden’s incessant criticism of the Saudi government and anti-American vitriol resulted in mounting pressure upon him at home, so he relocated to Sudan where he was welcomed by Hasan al-Turabi, the 

radical Islamist leader. In Sudan, bin Laden continued 
53

to pursue his jihadist activities and, as a consequence 

of them and his blistering rhetorical attacks upon the 

Saudi leaders and their American friends, he was 

asked to leave the country.11

By late 1994, the CIA concluded that he was a direct threat to the United States, and not just a financier of terrorist organizations.12 He left Sudan for 

Afghanistan, proclaiming that the United States was 

responsible for his deportation. It is believed that he 

was introduced to Omar by ISI agents, although bin 

Laden obviously had many contacts of his own in 

Afghanistan and perhaps the first meeting was just 

one of happenstance. But one thing is clear—he became a generous benefactor of the Taliban, along with 

other wealthy Arabs. He also became a close associate of Omar, although earlier the Taliban leader had 

promised Tareki that he would hand over bin Laden 

if the Saudis made the request. Omar later denied 

ever doing so. It was from a cave in Afghanistan in 

1996 that bin Laden would declare war on the United 

States through a fatwa prompted by American forces 

remaining in Saudi Arabia, 5 years after the First Gulf 

War ended.13

THE UNITED STATES ACKNOWLEDGES BIN 

LADEN AS A THREAT

By this time, Richard Clarke, the White House terrorist expert, and his colleagues knew a lot about bin 

Laden and his close relationship with the Taliban. On 

February 23, 1998, bin Laden announced the formation 

of a coalition, the International Islamic Front for Jihad 

Against Jews and Crusaders.14 Henceforth, he would 

recruit fighters from throughout the Umma with the 

explicit purpose in mind of punishing Islam’s greatest 

enemy, the United States of America.
54

Upon his return to Afghanistan, he developed a 

close relationship with Ayman Zawahiri, an Egyptian 

physician who had been arrested and tortured by his 

captors in his home country for his subversive activities. The leader of a group called Islamic Jihad, Zawahiri sought a sanctuary to continue his revolutionary 

activities in Afghanistan and to secure financial support for his movement. Some presumed that this led 

him to befriend bin Laden since the Saudi had the cash 

to help Zawahiri bankroll his flagging organization.

In the 1980s, Zawahiri served the jihadist cause in 

Afghanistan where he had worked for the Red Crescent. But his agenda was global in scope, for he saw 

the struggle in Afghanistan as “a training course of 

the utmost importance to prepare the Muslim mujahedeen to wage their awaited battle against the superpower that now has sole dominance over the globe, 

namely, the United States.”15

At the same time, Zawahiri was an exponent of 

takfir, the Arab word for excommunication. In the 

eyes of modern advocates of this doctrine, anyone 

who adheres to anti-Islamic ideas like democracy is 

an infidel. “Democracy . . .was against Islam because 

it placed in the hands of people authority that properly belonged to God.”16 Takfir was interpreted by the 

radicals who formed al-Qaeda as giving license to the 

killing of anyone who aided or abetted infidels. It was 

with just such venomous thoughts in mind that those 

Muslim leaders who were allied with the West, the 

hated Americans in particular, would become targets 

of jihadists. They were deemed the “near enemy.” 

They had to be destroyed by the jihadists along with 

the “far enemy,” the Americans.

It is noteworthy, however, that such callous attitudes towards the murder of fellow human beings 
55

had resulted in a significant reversal for Zawahiri and 

his radical followers in Egypt. On November 17, 1997, 

they massacred 58 tourists and 4 Egyptians at the resort city of Luxor in an attempt to strike at the country’s prized tourist industry and to advance violence 

as a legitimate jihadist tool.17 The people of Egypt 

were shocked, and the attack proved to be a devastating setback for Zawahiri and his fanatical followers.

The Egyptian physician and the Saudi millionaire 

had something else in common; they were both admirers of Sayyid Qutb, the Egyptian jihadist thinker who 

was one of the first to turn Islamic jihadism against 

the disruptions and values embedded in a modern 

world that has its roots in Western civilization. The 

reserved bookish man spent time in the United States 

after World War II and became radicalized as a result 

of the experience. Qutb’s

central concern was modernity. Modern values—

secularism, rationality, democracy, subjectivity, individualism, mixing of the sexes, tolerance, and materialism—had infected Islam through the agency of 

Western colonialism. America now stood for all that. 

Qutb’s polemic was directed at Egyptians who wanted 

to bend Islam around the modern world. He intended 

to show that Islam and modernity were completely 

incompatible.

What is more, “Separation of the sacred and the 

secular state and religion, science and theology, mind 

and spirit—these were the hallmarks of modernity, 

which had captured the West. But Islam could not 

abide such divisions.”18

All of bin Laden’s mentors were familiar with 

Qutb’s writings and lamented his execution by Egyptian authorities for revolting against the government. 
56

As he had hoped, his death catapulted him into the 

Pantheon of Islamic martyrs. Bin Laden never met the 

man but in developing a close personal relationship 

with Zawahiri, he found a fellow admirer of Qutb. In 

keeping with Qutb’s worldview, Zawahiri deemed 

the Western-dominated global system a cancer that 

imperiled Muslims everywhere; therefore, it had to be 

excised by any means necessary. Of course, America 

was the system’s dominant actor and like bin Laden, 

Zawahiri pondered how the United States—as with 

the USSR—could be enticed into the killing fields of 

Afghanistan.

According to Lawrence Wright, this was the rationale for the October 12, 2000, bombing of the USS Cole

anchored in Aden Harbor. Afterward, bin Laden became the premier leader in the eyes of those jihadists 

who travelled to his training camp in Afghanistan in 

the hope of becoming martyrs. But the expected retaliation did not come, as the Clinton administration was 

preoccupied with the Israeli-Palestinian peace talks 

and a presidential election. 

Bin Laden was angry and disappointed. He hoped to 

lure America into the same trap the Soviets had fallen 

into: Afghanistan. His strategy was to continually attack until the U.S. forces invaded; then the mujahedeen would swarm upon them and bleed them until 

the entire American empire fell from its wounds.

The attack on the U.S. embassies in Africa had 

failed, and now the same thing happened with the 

insult to the USS Cole. “He would have to create an 

irresistible outrage.”19

By this time, bin Laden was no longer perceived 

merely as a Taliban moneyman but as their active ally 

in jihadist violence. He was the man responsible for 
57

the first attack against the twin towers in Manhattan 

and other terrorist strikes such as the killing of CIA 

personnel outside its Northern Virginia headquarters 

and the bombings of two U.S. embassies in Kenya and 

Tanzania, as well as the killing of 17 sailors on the USS 

Cole. 

After the African attacks, the Taliban pledged to 

protect him, prompting a U.S. cruise missile strike 

on camps in Jalalabad and Khost. They resulted in 21 

people killed and 30 wounded. The Clinton administration resisted subsequent opportunities to kill bin 

Laden, concluding that too many civilians would be 

put at risk in the contemplated strikes. For the U.S. 

national security community at large, the issue of terrorism remained a side show.

Bin Laden was training thousands of terrorists, 

and the Taliban’s refusal to hand him over to an international tribunal indicated that they were complicit 

in the global jihadist movement. After the U.S. 2000 

election, the outgoing security officials in the Clinton 

administration warned the incoming government that 

terrorism would represent the greatest threat to U.S. 

security. Even more to the point, these warnings from 

Richard Clarke, the White House terrorist expert, and 

George Tenet, the CIA director, asserted that an alQaeda attack against the United States was imminent. 

Their warnings were dismissed.

The Bush White House would not preoccupy itself 

with “global terrorism” until after the deadly strikes 

on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on that 

fateful 9/11 day. Peter Bergen described the situation 

as follows:

Over the course of the coming weeks and months, the 

Bush administration would set the course of policies 
58

that would have unforeseen consequences for many 

years into the future: a “light footprint” operation in 

Afghanistan, which would succeed brilliantly at toppling the Taliban, but leave many of the top leaders of 

al-Qaeda at liberty following the failure to capture or 

kill them at the battle of Tora Bora in December 2001, 

and would also fail to secure Afghanistan for the long 

term. Bush also launched the nation on an ambiguous and open-ended conflict against a tactic, termed 

the “war on terror,” which would warp U.S. foreign 

policy and distort key American ideals about the rule 

of law, while his administration’s obsession with Iraq 

would lead the United States into fighting two wars 

in the Muslim world simultaneously, seeming to confirm one of bin Laden’s key claims—“the West, led by 

America, was at war with Islam.”20

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 3

1. For a discussion of the Richardson trip, see Bruce Riedel, 

Deadly Embrace, Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 2011, 

p. 45.

2. Steve Coll, in his masterful book, Ghost Wars, blames both 

Clinton and his Republican predecessors for lacking the political 

vision to take decisive action in Afghanistan to subvert the Taliban. Those who were associated with Massoud, like Karzai, were 

deemed bit players or inept self-promoters like Abdul Haq, while 

the Taliban had the support of Jallaldin Haqqani, who was a favorite of the CIA during the war against the Soviets. At the same 

time, many Afghan watchers in the government deemed the antiTaliban Pashtun groups disorganized and incapable of mounting serious opposition to Mullah Omar and his supporters. The 

knowledge that Massoud was running drugs, of course, hardly 

burnished his image among American officials, either.

3. Ibid., p. 283.

4. Ibid., p. 289.

5. Ibid., p. 348.
59

6. Ibid., p. 345.

7. Lawrence Wright described the Arab suicide bombers in 

the following terms:

The lure of an illustrious and meaningful death was especially powerful in cases where the pleasures and rewards of life were crushed by government oppression 

and economic deprivation. From Iraq to Morocco, Arab 

governments had stifled freedom and signally failed to 

create wealth at the very time when democracy and personal income were sharply climbing in virtually all other 

parts of the globe . . . if one subtracted the oil revenues in 

the Gulf countries, 260 million Arabs exported less than 

the 5 million Finns.

See his The Looming Tower, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2006, 

p. 107.

8. Richard A. Clarke, Against All Enemies: Inside America’s War 

on Terror, New York: Free Press, 2004, p. 59.

9. Coll, p. 222.

10. Al-Qaeda’s efforts to lend assistance to fellow Muslims in 

the Balkans began early in 1992, and the Arab fighters proved to 

be brutal and effective in engaging the Serbs. 

11. What is more, there were radical jihadists in Sudan that 

questioned bin Laden’s religious piety. On one occasion during 

1994, an attempt was made to assassinate him in a Khartoum 

mosque. See Coll, p. 269.

12. In a message to the Americans, bin Laden warned, “Terrorizing you, while you are carrying arms in our land, is a legitimate 

right and a moral obligation.” Then addressing the U.S. Secretary 

of Defense William Perry, he continued, “I say to you, William, 

that these youths [al-Qaeda fighters] love death as you love life. 

These youths will not ask for explanations. They will sing out that 

there is nothing between us that needs to be explained, there is 

only killing and neck-smiting.” See Wright, p. 4.
60

13. Coll, p. 380. The group stated that the United States had 

declared war on Allah and the signatories of the document “hereby give all Muslims the following judgment: The judgment to kill 

and fight Americans and their allies, whether civilians or military, is an obligation for every Muslim who is able to do so in any 

country.” 

14. Wright, p. 46.

15. Ibid., p. 124. For a more recent discussion of bin Laden, see 

Peter L. Bergen, The Longest War, New York: Free Press, 2011.

16. Wright, pp. 256-257.

17. Ibid., p. 24. In the aftermath of bin Laden’s death, close 

watchers of al-Qaeda assumed, correctly, that Zawahiri would fill 

the leader’s shoes.

18. Ibid., p. 331.

19. Ibid.

20. Bergen, p. 52. 
61

CHAPTER 4

9/11 AND WAR AGAINST THE TALIBAN AND 

AL-QAEDA

THE SEPTEMBER 2001 TERRORIST ATTACKS 

On the morning of September 12, 2001, Richard 

Clarke, the manager of the NSC’s Counterterrorism 

Security Group, spoke to Paul Wolfowitz regarding 

who was to blame for September 11, 2001 (9/11). Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld’s second in command was not convinced that al-Qaeda was behind the 

attacks since it was too sophisticated to be conducted 

by a cabal of terrorists. A state had to be responsible 

for them, and that state was Iraq. Rumsfeld was of the 

same opinion, and he consistently talked about “getting Iraq.” In an evening conversation with the President at the White House situation room, Bush said to 

Clarke, “Look, I know you have a lot to do and all . . 

. but I want you, as soon as you can, to go back over 

everything. See if Saddam did this. See if he’s linked 

in any way. . . .” Clarke was “taken aback” and said, 

“But, Mr. President, al-Qaeda did this.” He added 

that the anti-terrorist analysts in the government had 

looked and found no connection between bin Laden 

and Iraq or any other state. “‘Look into Iraq, Saddam,’ 

the President said testily and left us.”1

A week later, Clarke sent a memo to the National 

Security Council (NSC) Director Condoleezza Rice titled, “Survey of International Information of Any Iraqi 

Involvement in the September 11 Attack.” It concluded there was “no complicity” on Iraq’s part.2

 The next 

day, Rumsfeld gave orders for a plan to be devised to 

invade the southern oil fields of Iraq. They were is-
62

sued even before we as a nation had decided what to 

do about Afghanistan!3 In Peter Bergen’s words that 

deserve to be repeated, this was a fateful error, for 

Bush . . . launched the nation on an ambiguous and 

open-ended conflict against a tactic, termed the ‘war 

on terror,’ which would warp U.S. foreign policy and 

distort key American ideals about the rule of law, 

while his administration’s obsession with Iraq would 

lead the United States into fighting two wars in the 

Muslim world simultaneously, seeming to confirm 

one of bin Laden’s key claims—that the West, led by 

America, was at war with Islam.4

In sum, the administration had been contemplating 

regime change in Iraq for some time, and Afghanistan, 

however justified, was a mere sideshow. 

Of course, those responsible for 9/11 in Afghanistan had to be brought to justice and, toward this end, 

the Bush administration demanded that the Taliban 

hand over bin Laden for prosecution (the Iraq invasion, therefore, had to be put on hold). Initially bin 

Laden told Mullah Omar that he was innocent of the 

charge, but later he proudly conceded that he was responsible for the attack. When the truth was revealed 

and the U.S. retaliatory strike began, many members of 

the Taliban leadership “were outraged at bin Laden’s 

abuse of their hospitality and his blatant disregard 

for their government.” But, “the combative international stance towards the Taliban, the polarization of 

the Islamic world, and the fear of Mohammad Omar 

and others of losing the few allies they believed they 

had left, pushed them into a de facto defense of bin 

Laden.”5

 Thus when Omar’s colleagues urged him to 

hand over bin Laden to the international community 

to be tried, he said no. 
63

It is alleged that when contemplating the U.S. military response—what would become known as Operation ENDURING FREEDOM—“Pakistani security 

officials assured the inexperienced leader [i.e., Omar] 

that the United States would react in a limited way, as 

in 1998 following the African bombings of U.S. embassies.”6

 Ignorant of the world outside of Afghanistan, 

Omar and his associates were once again manipulated 

by foreigners—previously by al-Qaeda and at this 

point in time by the ISI. Bergen asserts that there was 

no evidence that bin Laden anticipated that the United 

States would respond by invading Afghanistan. Here 

was a further example of the al-Qaeda leader’s wishful thinking and flawed understanding.7

On September 12, 2001, the UN Security Council 

passed a resolution authorizing the use of force against 

terrorists, and that same day NATO invoked Article 

Five in a demonstration of solidarity with the United 

States. Two days later, the U.S. Congress endorsed an 

Authorization for Use of Military Force against “those 

nations, organization, or persons” that planned or 

committed terrorist attacks against the United States.8

President Bush addressed the American people on 

September 20 and shared with them his interpretation 

of the rationale behind the attacks and how he would 

respond to them. He stated that those responsible for 

9/11 hated us and our freedom. As a consequence, we 

would wage war against al-Qaeda but, “It will not end 

until every terrorist group of global reach has been defeated.”9

ROUTING THE JIHADISTS

After it became clear that Saddam neither had nuclear weapons nor had he collaborated with al-Qaeda, 
64

some supporters of the invasion portrayed the jihadists as 21st century analogues of Hitler and Stalin. But 

both these men had truly awesome military forces at 

their command and were responsible for the death of 

tens of millions of people and horrendous physical 

destruction. By contrast, “the war on terrorism” today 

has caused deaths in the thousands and modest material damage.

In an attempt to justify the Iraq War, the President 

and influential analysts outside of the government 

grossly distorted the capacity of the enemy. Consequently, they failed to answer the most elementary 

question facing military strategists: “What is the nature of the enemy?” That question became entangled 

in the Bush administration’s campaign to justify a 

war of choice, not necessity. In the process, discourse 

bearing on critical national security issues became entangled in an Orwellian universe of deceit, deception, 

and disinformation. Under these circumstances, it became extremely difficult to conduct an objective discussion of the war in Iraq. That environment persists 

to this day in some circles and has diminished serious 

discourse bearing on our operations in Afghanistan.

Meanwhile, in the enemy camp, and in keeping 

with their illusions of grandeur, the Taliban were illprepared to resist the military tsunami that was coming their way. They and their allies thought they would 

defeat the Americans just as they did the Soviets. Their 

morale, however, plunged after being crushed by the 

joint American-Northern Federation onslaught. 

With its air power monopoly, the United States 

struck any and all Taliban targets that could provide 

its fighters with the infrastructure for combat. That 

included its small air force and airfields, anti-aircraft 

units, and other communications and logistical targets 
65

of any significance. The trouble was that Pentagon 

planners found very little to strike. On the ground, 

the Special Forces, with our British cousins and the 

Northern Alliance troops, proved superior to their adversaries and made quick work of the enemy. Those 

that were not captured or killed, returned home or 

fled to Pakistan. In the end, a significant number of the 

“Arab-Afghans” that did not seek a safe harbor there 

left the region altogether and sought jihad in Bosnia, 

Somalia, Russia, and Yemen.

In addition to evoking Article Five of the Rome 

Treaty, the NATO-led International Assistance Force 

(ISAF) was created under UN auspices. Some units 

were deployed only to support NATO combat troops 

or engage in humanitarian operations. For example, 

the German units were deployed in the north where 

it was assumed the local Tajiks and Uzbeks would 

continue to reject the largely Pashtun Taliban. There 

would be little fighting, then, in their areas.

The Northern Alliance would provide the lion’s 

share of the boots on the ground, but their successes 

against the Taliban and al-Qaeda were substantially 

bolstered by U.S. airpower and the skillful leadership 

of the combined CIA-Pentagon special forces teams—

the Jawbreakers—that infiltrated into Afghanistan 

from Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Access to the country 

from the south was still exceedingly difficult, given 

the local population’s hostility, the presence of jihadist fighters, and the absence of significant anti-Taliban 

allies.

The Northern Alliance forces that controlled about 

15 percent of Afghanistan were under the command 

of General Mohammad Fahim who replaced Massoud 

after he was assassinated by al-Qaeda agents posing 

as TV journalists. Massoud, on the eve of 9/11 and in 
66

a replay of his 1980s recovery against the Soviets, had 

designed a plan to defeat the Taliban.10 He intended 

to avoid direct confrontation with the main Taliban 

force and to leap-frog over them, and through rapid 

strikes divide and demoralize them as he joined forces 

with his allies in disparate parts of the country. They 

would emerge as the fortunes of the Taliban declined. 

In 2001, the course of events would be in keeping with 

his expectations.

Estimates of the Northern Alliance troops ranged 

from a low of 10,000 to a high of 30,000, although 

Condoleezza Rice had accepted a total of 20,000 as 

likely.11 They faced an enemy that numbered an estimated 40,000 to 50,000; approximately 8,000 to 12,000 

of that number were foreign—mostly Arab fighters. 

U.S. planners assumed that the Taliban would continue to rely upon recruits from Pakistan to bolster 

their ranks, but it was believed that after the Afghan 

insurgents experienced the hammer blows of U.S. airpower, many would return home. Other pro-Taliban 

warlords or those sitting on the sidelines would join 

the Northern Alliance and its American allies.

For the most part, and in contrast to the war 

against the Soviets, the Taliban defenders displayed 

poor morale and failed to perform as well as their 

Arab brethren. In keeping with the practice of warriors in Afghanistan, when the odds began to shift in 

the adversary’s favor, many tough but pragmatic mujahedeen changed sides. This happened on a number 

of occasions during the 2001 war, but the foreign fighters were not among this group. They fought well and 

were not afraid to close with their enemies, including 

the American troops; on the contrary, they welcomed 

such confrontations. In most instances, however, these 

showdowns did not work in their behalf because the 
67

Americans enjoyed air superiority and possessed lethal precision-guided munitions that slaughtered the 

Taliban and Arab fighters alike. It is estimated that 

about 5,000 Taliban and their allies died, mostly from 

air strikes.12

In recognition of their superior fighting skills and 

blasé attitude toward death, the Arab jihadists were 

assigned to the most critical fronts in the war. Unlike 

their Afghan comrades, they had received military 

training and comported themselves as professional 

soldiers. Indeed, they had eagerly anticipated the day 

that they could kill Americans. 

In Operation ANACONDA [designed to capture or 

kill bin Laden, Zawahiri, and Omar], al Qaeda defenders not only stood their ground against overwhelming American firepower, they actually reinforced their 

positions in the midst of the battle: their fighters were 

willing to advance into the teeth of a fierce bombardment to enter the Shah-i-kot Valley from safer positions elsewhere and seek battle with our forces.13

After the allies achieved victories in the north, including Kabul, they moved south and, in the process, 

the peasant-warriors associated with the Taliban demonstrated greater resolve on the battlefield. Since most 

of them were Pashtun, they were now fighting under 

the watchful eyes of family, neighbors, and kinfolk. 

Still they remained vulnerable to airpower directed at 

them from a small number of American/allied spotters, and their ranks were devastated with powerful 

precision-guided munitions.

Once the war planners turned their attention to 

destroying the Taliban government that harbored alQaeda, victory occurred in a matter of weeks. At the 

same time, under pressure from Washington, Pakistan 
68

president Pervez Musharraf withdrew both his diplomatic and military support from them, even though it 

was apparent that the ISI provided the Taliban help 

up until the final days of the fighting. 

Within the war zone, the Americans faced a serious 

problem of balancing ethnic frictions among its allies. 

The Tajiks and Uzbeks were a dominant force in the 

Northern Alliance, and the Hazara Shiites were similarly ascendant in Western Afghanistan around the 

ancient city of Herat. In the south, Pashtun leader Hamid Karzai would organize a fighting force from that 

dominant ethnic group. Clearly, there were profound 

concerns in Washington about sectarian fissures that 

had led to chaos in the past. In this connection, it was 

hoped that the disparate tribes would join Karzai, but 

they remained independent entities whose behavior 

was unpredictable.

With the outcome obvious, some Taliban leaders considered the prospect of reconciliation with 

the Karzai government but those who had inflicted a 

crushing defeat on them had little interest in working with such a spent radical force. “Similarly in 2002, 

Jalaluddin Haqqani’s brother, Ibrahim, came to Kabul 

to meet with American and Afghan government officials to inquire about this possibility.” According to 

Van Linschoten and Kuehn: “He was detained and allegedly mistreated.”14 One would be hard pressed to 

weep over his treatment, but perhaps an opportunity 

to secure the support of some jihadists for the new 

government had been missed.

According to two close observers of the Taliban, 

this was unfortunate because if they had been given 

the opportunity to reconcile with Karzai, the war that 

the United States is fighting in Afghanistan today 

might have been avoided. “The political process es-
69

tablished by the Bonn Agreement of December 2001 

was intended, at least by its UN sponsors, to provide 

a mechanism for integrating Taliban who agreed to 

become lawful participations.” While hiding in Pakistan, the Taliban discussed the prospects of “joining 

the political process” but “these discussions came [to] 

too little.”15

In spite of the brilliant U.S. military victory in Afghanistan, critics confronted the administration with 

the question: “Why did we fail to get bin Laden?” Bergen provides a number of answers: bin Laden and his 

people knew the area very well, and we did not; our 

Afghan allies were incompetent and corrupt; the Pakistanis did not provide any help; and General Franks 

pointed out among other things that military operations would have been interrupted had we pursued 

such a quarry. Furthermore, it was unclear where he 

was located.16 Equally important, the local people had 

been devastated by U.S. air attacks, and many of them 

admired their al-Qaeda brethren and deemed them 

“holy warriors.” Consequently, in keeping with Mao’s 

metaphor, the Pashtun peasants provided an ocean 

within which the jihadists could escape their enemies.

Some of them could be “rented” by plying them 

with development dollars, but they could not be 

“bought” for long. Even Afghans who found the Taliban’s rule excessively harsh could not ignore the trenchant fact that “the Taliban are our people, these are 

our boys fighting the latest wave of infidels that are 

entering our villages and forcing us to bow to them 

and to adopt alien ideas and practices.” The Taliban 

aside, many of the people who fought the “foreigners” 

were men adhering to powerful tribal loyalties, and 

traditional notions about manhood that had nothing 

to do with the preaching of the Arabs who had come 

to fight with them.
70

Preoccupied with deposing Saddam Hussein, the 

Bush administration ignored developments in Afghanistan soon after the Taliban were routed. Washington continued to devote considerable resources to 

achieving bin Laden’s capture or death, but he and 

Mullah Omar found a refuge in Pakistan’s Federally 

Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), and so did many 

of their followers. There, they licked their wounds 

and prepared to resume jihad. They could do so in 

relative peace since some elements in the ISI provided 

them with protection and the resources to restore their 

fighting capability. 

THE KARZAI GOVERNMENT 

With the allied victory in sight, there was the 

matter of creating a new Afghan government. Some 

Northern Alliance commanders who would have 

played a key part in doing so no longer were available—most notably Ahmad Shah Massoud. Consequently, the man who would play a pivotal role in 

the new government was Hamid Karzai, a Pashtun 

from a prominent Afghani family whose father had 

been assassinated in 1999. A favorite of Washington, 

he had entered the country with the help of U.S. special forces, and attracted a number of Pashtun fighters 

to his side when Karzai’s fellow Pashtuns concluded 

that the Americans not only supported him but would 

use their military prowess to crush the Taliban. He escaped death during a friendly fire mishap—the first 

of many occasions when he did so—and on December 

22, 2001, he was sworn in as the head of the 30-member interim government. In June 2002, a Loya Jirga, 

or grand council, chose him as the head of state. He 

would function in that capacity until 2004 when an 
71

election to select the country’s future leaders would 

be conducted. After a new constitution was crafted in 

October-November 2004, he was elected president by 

55 percent of the electorate.17

At this point, the U.S. Government could take 

some comfort in the fact that while developments in 

Iraq had become problematic, they were looking up in 

Afghanistan. Some observers noted that by the crushing of the Taliban, the country that benefited most 

was Iran. Later, the mullahs would receive a second 

gift from Bush when he deposed their most feared enemy—Saddam Hussein.

In October 2001, members of the NSC and State Department met covertly with Iranian representatives in 

Paris and Geneva in discussions sponsored by Lakhdar Brahimi, who headed the UN Assistance Mission 

in Afghanistan. James Dobbins, the U.S. special envoy 

to Afghanistan, quarterbacked the American team. As 

Trita Parsai reveals, 

The talks progressed better than expected. The discussions focused on “how to effectively unseat the Taliban and once the Taliban was gone, how to stand up 

an Afghanistan government.”The Iranian diplomats 

impressed their American and European counterparts 

tremendously with their knowledge and expertise 

about Afghanistan and the Taliban. And Iran’s help 

was not negligible. The Iranians offered their air bases 

to the United States, they offered to perform search 

and rescue missions for downed American pilots, they 

served as a bridge between the Northern Alliance and 

the United States, in the fight against the Taliban, and 

on occasion they even used U.S. information to find 

and kill fleeing al-Qaeda leaders.18

Recognizing the value of cooperating with the 

Tehran, the U.S. State Department took the initiative. 

Secretary Colin Powell 
72

had prepared a secret comprehensive package of carrots on a stick to offer the Iranians. Unlike the Pentagon, the State Department favored a strategic opening 

to Iran, not just tactical discussions. The American 

diplomats realized that the cooperation over Afghanistan could be extended to cover al-Qaeda and other 

terrorist organizations. The United States and Iran 

could expand their intelligence-sharing cooperation 

and coordinate more robust border sweeps to capture 

al-Qaeda fighters who were fleeing into Pakistan and 

Iran.19

However, according to Colonel Lawrence Wilkerson, 

Powell’s chief of staff, President Bush was dissuaded 

by Vice-President Dick Cheney and Defense Secretary 

Rumsfeld from supporting the idea.20

Tehran’s diplomats were very active in the Bonn 

Conference of December 2001 when Karzai was selected under UN auspices. When the Iranian Deputy 

Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif was asked 

about him, he responded, “He lived in Iran for a while 

and we think well of him.”21 At the same time, “Iran’s 

political clout with the various warring Afghan groups 

proved to be crucial; it was Iran’s influence over the 

Afghans and not America’s threats and promises that 

moved the negotiations forward.” One of the roadblocks to an agreement emerged when representatives 

of the Northern Alliance refused to budge on their demand that they be given 18 of the 24 ministry posts in 

the new government, even though they represented 

only 40 percent of the country. It was only after the 

Iranian lead negotiator, Javad Zarif, intervened with 

Yunus Qanooni—the Alliance’s lead representative—

that he was induced to modify his demands.22
73

In addition to their diplomatic help, the Iranians 

had provided money and military hardware to the 

Northern Alliance which was especially critical in 

Western Afghanistan in the area surrounding Herat 

where Shiites lived in great numbers. Their man in 

Western Afghanistan was Ismail Khan, who was an 

ethnic Tajik and Shite. While most officials in Washington did not want to admit it, without Iran’s help the 

stabilization of Afghanistan would have been far more 

difficult. Further cooperation with Iran was foreclosed 

when the leaders in Tehran and Washington proved 

incapable of setting aside their mutual animosity and 

fears to reestablish a relationship, even if imperfect, 

that could have been useful in the years ahead.

OSAMA BIN LADEN AND AL-QAEDA: AN 

ASSESSMENT

In taking stock of Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda, 

the pivotal question that must be answered is, “Were 

9/11 and the subsequent events associated with it a 

victory or a defeat for al-Qaeda?” Bergen, an astute 

analyst of the al-Qaeda leader over the years, provides 

both a positive and negative answer to that question.

In the first case, 9/11 thrust bin Laden and al-Qaeda 

before a global audience that witnessed in real time 

the most celebrated terrorist attack in modern history. 

The 9/11 attacks were an enormous tactical success 

for al-Qaeda. They involved well-coordinated strikes 

on multiple targets in the heart of the enemy, magnified through their global broadcasts. The 9/11 ‘propaganda of the deed’ took place in the media capital 

of the world, which ensured the ‘widest possible coverage of the event’ . . . al-Qaeda had been a largely 

unknown organization before 9/11, [but] in the days 

after it became a household name.23
74

Furthermore, 9/11 became a recruiting tool for alQaeda and other jihadist organizations, not to mention helping fill the depleted coffers of bin Laden’s 

organization. Another plus for him was that the strike 

cost his organization only $500,000, while the United 

States was left with a bill of $500 billion.24

On the other side of the ledger, however, 9/11 was 

a strategic disaster for bin Laden and the Taliban. In 

the latter’s case, the only jihadist-dominated country 

in the world—if one does not include Iran in that category—was crushed as a consequence of bin Laden’s 

folly. In striking the United States, he failed to achieve 

his objective of dealing a deadly blow to the apostate 

Islamic regimes that were close to Washington. His 

“call did not resonate with the planet’s more than one 

billion Muslims. Instead of mass outpourings of support for bin Laden, in the cities of Karachi and Jakarta 

there were demonstrations against the United States 

that only numbered in the low tens of thousands.”25

At the same time, Islamic governments rallied around 

the Americans in their anti-terrorist campaign and, 

perhaps of most significance, they did not expel Americans from Muslim lands but rather consolidated the 

U.S. military presence in many of them.

In conclusion, Bergen writes, “as the strategic leader of al-Qaeda, bin Laden has been an abject failure. 

His total dominance of al-Qaeda meant it was hostage 

to his strategic vision, and that became a problem for 

the organization because bin Laden’s cult-like control 

over his group was not matched by any depth of strategic insight.”26

Soon after the routing of the Taliban and al-Qaeda, 

a number of positive outcomes for the West materialized in Afghanistan:
75

• By the end of 2003, there was a dramatic decline in U.S. casualties; only 48 American military personnel were killed.

• Two million Afghans returned from exile, primarily from Pakistan and Iran.

• By 2005, most of the warlords were disarmed.

• Karzai proved to be an adept politician as he 

outmaneuvered his most potent competitors—

people like the Uzbek General Dostum. In October 2004, he was elected president, and voter 

turnout was 70 percent—a result exceeding that 

of most similar elections in the United States.27

A PARTIAL VICTORY

Of course, Afghanistan had been beset for decades 

by wars that produced monstrous atrocities and material destruction. It was one of the world’s poorest 

countries, where 7 out of 10 of its citizens were illiterate and knew little or nothing about the internet, email, and other modern wonders that people in most 

corners of the world had taken for granted.

Consequently, the failure to provide significant development assistance guaranteed a gloomy future for 

Afghanistan. 

The 6,000 U.S. soldiers there in 2002 had one mission: 

to hunt the Taliban and al-Qaeda—not to secure the 

population or help in reconstruction, the classical 

tasks of a successful counterinsurgency campaign. In 

the words of the official U.S. military history of the Afghan War, ‘the strong antipathy towards large-scale 

reconstruction and governance efforts at high levels in 

the US government persisted through 2002 and into 

2003’.28
76

One might add that had the troops and resources 

devoted to the invasion of Iraq and its aftermath been 

deployed in Afghanistan, it is likely that the nation’s 

“longest war” would have been successfully terminated years ago.29 Arguably, the Taliban would have been 

dealt a lethal blow had the funds devoted to Iraq been 

spent on development and stabilization programs in 

Afghanistan.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 4

1. Richard A. Clarke, Against All Enemies: Inside America’s War 

on Terror, New York: Free Press, 2004, p. 32.

2. Peter L. Bergen, The Longest War, New York: Free Press, 

2011, p.52.

3. Ibid., p. 54.

4. Ibid., p. 52.

5. Alex Strick van Linschoten and Felix Kuehn, Separating 

the Taliban from Al-Qaeda: The Core of Success in Afghanistan, New 

York: Center on International Cooperation, February 2011, p. 5.

6. Ibid.

7. Bergen, p. 90.

8. Ibid., p. 59.

9. Ibid., p. 57.

10. While the Taliban remained a formidable enemy, Massoud 

was counting on help from tough allies such as Ismail Kahn who 

escaped from a Kandahar prison in February 2000. He also had 

the support of the brutal Uzbek General Dostum and, although 

suspicious of anti-Taliban leaders like Hamid Karzai, he was prepared to join them in dismantling the Pashtun Islamists who had 

expelled him from Kabul. Karzai had served as a Massoud depu-
77

ty in the Rabbanni government, but since he once supported the 

Taliban and lived in Pakistan under the watchful eye of the ISI, 

his loyalty was suspect. See Coll, who devotes significant space to

Massoud’s exploits.

11. Bob Woodward, Bush at War, New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002, p. 156.

12. Bergen, p. 91.

13. Stephen Biddle, Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare: Implications for Army and Defense Policy, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2002, p. 14. 

14. Van Linschoten and Kuehn, p. 8. 

15. Ibid., p. 4.

16. Bergen, pp. 73-74.

17. Woodward, p. 150. In 2010 in an election race against 

Abdullah Abdullah, a former foreign minister, Karzai was 

awarded the victory, although many observers in the country and 

abroad deemed the election bogus. After protesting it, Abdullah 

finally halted his campaign for another election. Karzai was the 

subject of much criticism in the American press, but he has complained that his side of the story has not been heard. He had good 

relations with the Bush administration, but it essentially ignored 

Afghanistan in its preoccupation with Iraq, while the Obama administration has compelled him to work with an Ambassador and 

special representative—Lieutenant General Karl Eikenberry and 

Richard Holbrooke—who, he charged, had showered him with 

unsubstantiated claims about his personal foibles and his official 

performance as president. Furthermore, Karzai has charged that 

the Americans have engaged in loose talk that not only humiliates 

him, but suggests that there are no Afghans who are capable of 

running their government. 

18. Trita Parsai, Treacherous Alliance, New Haven, CT: Yale 

University Press, 2007, p. 228.

19. Ibid.
78

20. Ibid.

21. Ibid.

22. Ibid., p. 229.

23. Bergen, p. 91.

24. Ibid., p. 93.

25. Ibid., pp. 175-176.

26. Ibid., p. 94.

27. Ibid., pp. 175-176.

28. Ibid., p. 181. 

29. For insight into the decisionmaking that led up to the Iraq 

War, see Steven Metz, Operation IRAQI FREEDOM: Removing Saddam Hussein by Force, Vol. 1, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Instituite, U.S. Army War College, February 2010. 
79

CHAPTER 5

THREE SCENARIOS

In anticipation of the 2011-14 “transition,” U.S. 

planners must consider a range of plausible outcomes 

that will emerge at the end of that period. They will 

provide insight into a) the daunting challenges ahead, 

b) the prospects for new areas of cooperation with 

Russia in Afghanistan, and c) the conclusions and recommendations bearing on U.S. policy in the Greater 

Middle East. 

THE EXISTING SITUATION OR PLAN A: AN 

UNSTABLE BUT VIABLE AFGHANISTAN 

THROUGH COIN

Early in 2009, after a 60-day assessment of U.S. 

operations in Afghanistan, President Barack Obama 

deployed 30,000 additional troops to the battlefield.1

In a December 2010 report evaluating COIN operations in Afghanistan, the White House was cautiously 

optimistic about developments there. Progress had 

been made in reversing the Taliban’s momentum; in 

denying them control of major communications and 

population centers; in disrupting their activities in the 

countryside; and in denying al-Qaeda sanctuaries in 

Afghanistan. In assessing what we have called Plan A, 

the situation was deemed hopeful, albeit “fragile.” In 

subsequent statements by General Petraeus and Department of Defense (DoD) reports to Congress, much 

the same assessment was provided.2

Although a minority, some outside experts agreed 

with this prognosis. The National Defense University’s 

Paul D. Miller noted that “the stabilization and recon-
80

struction effort in Afghanistan has gone better than is 

widely believed.” He reminded impatient critics that a 

coherent COIN plan was not in place until 2009, many 

years after the war began. “Although serious challenges remain, victory is attainable—if the troops and 

their civilian counterparts are given times to complete 

their mission.”3

 Michael O’Hanlon of the Brookings 

Institution cited another reason for optimism: President Obama’s decision to scrap the ill-conceived July 

2011 exit point and to replace it with a 2014 deadline. 

This extension would give COIN more time to work. 

He also was heartened by a rise in Afghan security 

forces: “20,000 recruits are in training at all times, and 

the force is on pace to reach its interim goals of 134,000 

soldiers by this fall.” The ranks of the officer corps 

had undergone extensive training, with “these innovations having begun to yield results in combat, with 

increasingly positive reports of the performance of Afghan army formations against insurgents in the south 

and east of the country.”4

 Likewise, real progress was 

being made in attacking the country’s corrosive and 

widespread corruption.

In March 2011, General David Petraeus said, “The 

momentum of the Taliban has been halted in much of 

the country and reversed in some important areas.”5

In 2009 Kabul was surrounded by the insurgents, but 

in 2010 it was secure. Looking toward the spring, Petraeus focused on the interdiction of Taliban returning 

from sanctuaries in Pakistan, while negating jihadist 

efforts to regain control of territory that they lost as a 

consequence of the 2010 troop surge. Civilian casualties remained a point of friction with Karzai, but the 

general’s relations with the Afghan President were 

cordial.
81

Generally, analysts outside of government were 

less confident about our chances in Afghanistan, with 

their darker appraisal resting upon the following observations.

The Insurgency. 

According to the Center For American Progress, 

“The insurgency’s ability to carry out operations does 

not appear to have been significantly weakened.”6

 It 

has suffered losses in its leadership, but has the capacity to replace its fallen commanders. Simultaneously, 

in spite of considerable efforts to deny them funds, the 

militants continue to finance their efforts by dealing 

in drugs, stealing U.S. development money, imposing 

tariffs on commercial enterprises, and securing donations from wealthy Gulf State benefactors. It is plausible that some Taliban may be talking with Karzai because they are feeling the pressure, but others oppose 

reconciliation because they believe they are winning. 

Other commentators claimed the insurgency is 

growing stronger, more widespread, more confident, 

and more sophisticated. It has suffered serious losses 

in skilled commanders, but it is unsettling that the 

people replacing them are younger, more militant, 

and infused with religious fervor. 

The Karzai Government. 

Official and expert opinions agree on one critical 

matter: the Karzai government is inefficient and has 

no national outreach. Even though it is autocratic, it 

cannot impose its will upon the provinces that are 

under the control of local business, religious leaders, 

and tribal elites, as well as criminal organizations and 
82

warlords. Then, of course, there is the shadow governments that the Taliban operate. Karzai lacks credibility with the people to no small degree because of 

widespread and pervasive corruption that he has not 

addressed. Worse yet, no one really believes that he 

will or can do so. He refuses to accept outside advice 

because of “his belief that we need him more than he 

needs us.” He stubbornly adheres to this view even 

though more than 70 percent of his budget relies upon 

outside donors.7

Karzai is at odds with the new legislature that was 

elected in 2010, and there is growing evidence of ethnic discord in the country that reminds many of the 

violent friction that led to the post-Soviet civil war. 

Hazara, Tajik, and Uzbek leaders have chided Karzai 

for reneging on promises to give them more representation in the legislature and his cabinet. Since one 

of the basic principles of COIN is that it cannot work 

without good governance, it is difficult to be optimistic about developments in Afghanistan. 

Security Forces. 

Efforts to place more police personnel on the streets 

have been plagued by a number of setbacks: illiteracy, 

drug abuse, desertions, and conflicting loyalties. The 

shortfall of trainers has delayed turning raw recruits 

into functional law enforcement agents. Worse yet, 

when the police are deployed, the local population 

complains that they are corrupt, and allied commanders lament that they are reluctant to take on the insurgents, often turning the other way when the bad guys 

are in the neighborhood.

Reports pertaining to the Army are more upbeat. 

There is evidence that if properly equipped, led, and 
83

trained, it can take on the insurgents without allied 

help. It will be several years, however, before Afghan 

soldiers will have sufficient numbers to operate independently. Likewise, the drive to create a national 

Army has run up against local tribal chiefs who deem 

security their preserve. Those who are Pashtun are 

not pleased seeing heavily-armed Tajiks and Uzbeks 

strolling through their communities. However, though 

Tajiks are over-represented in the officer corps and the 

ranks of the noncommissioned officers (NCOs), they 

report to superiors who are largely Pashtuns.

Finally, in keeping with U.S. success in Iraq, the 

U.S. military is looking toward the creation of local 

paramilitary police units to deter the insurgents until 

regular Army units are prepared to do so. An American officer serving in Afghanistan reports, “They’re 

supposed to be the neighborhood watch with AK-47s. 

But these guys are setting up checkpoints, they’re doing classic militiaman shakedown things.”8

The Civilian-Economic Component. 

There must be an economic component to a successful COIN campaign, and on this score one can 

cite a number of positive developments in Afghanistan. Since 2002, economic and social programs have 

claimed 31 percent of U.S. expenditures in that country. As a consequence, there have been vast improvements, as S. Frederick Starr observed in January 2011:

In public health, “90% of Afghan children under five 

have been vaccinated and 670 clinics opened.” 

Hundreds of schools have been built and equipped 

with textbooks; more Afghan girls were enrolled in 

school than at any other time in the country’s history.
84

Much progress has been made in constructing bridges 

and roads, and over time, efforts to sustain U.S. allied 

forces have provided a framework for the Northern 

Distribution Network. 

And there is more: “Other projects in areas as varied 

as banking reform, small business development, financial services, land titling, business parks, credit support, and the reconstruction of markets have brought 

genuine economic gain.”9

On June 8, 2011, however, the Majority Staff of 

the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee released 

a report indicating that the civilian developmental 

component of the war in Afghanistan was seriously 

flawed. Funds were being provided without “robust 

oversight. Most U.S. aid bypasses the Afghan Government in favor of international firms.” Salaries higher 

than the norm were being paid to workers who refused lesser paid government jobs and “unity of effort” on the part of the U.S. Government was missing.10 Moreover, “high staff turnover, pressure from 

the military, imbalances between military and civilian 

resources, unpredictable funding levels from Congress, and changing political timelines have further 

complicated efforts. Pressure to achieve rapid results 

puts our civilians . . . under enormous strain to spend 

money quickly.”11 In sum, the report indicated that 

the primary goal of the program—“sustainability”—

was not being met.

For many critics this is what they feared; that is, 

when all of the development programs were placed 

in perspective, what was being proposed was nothing 

less than nation-building. This prompted the disconcerting question: was the United States in a position to 
85

capitalize such a massive enterprise, given this country’s own outsized economic difficulties? And would 

the American people continue to devote their tax dollars to a war that seemed to be unending? 

Declining Support for the War within the United 

States. 

The American electorate ignored the war in Afghanistan during the 2010 congressional elections, 

but when asked their opinions, voters were decidedly 

pessimistic. Early in 2011, a national sample of Americans opposed “the U.S. war in Afghanistan” by a 58 to 

40 percent margin. 

• 72 percent of the population favored a “speed 

up” in “the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan.

• By a 51 to 41 percent margin, they said the United States “should not be involved in Afghanistan.”

• Most Americans believed the war was “going 

badly.”

• By a 46 to 45 percent margin, the American 

public said it “disapproved” of the way Obama 

was conducting the war.

• Finally, 60 percent said the war was “not worth 

fighting.”12

Taken together, all of these observations support 

the view of many analysts that Plan A is not working, and its future prospects are slim. But its defenders contend that it can be a success if the following 

circumstances materialize:

• Pakistan resumes its campaign against the jihadists on its border with Afghanistan and denies them sanctuaries.
86

• The Afghan army demonstrates that it can 

fight without direct allied help. Of course, the 

thinned-out U.S. force will continue to provide 

air cover and extensive logistical support until 

2014 and quite possibly for years beyond that 

point.

• The local police/militia ranks are swelling nationwide and demonstrating the resolve to confront the Taliban and their allies.

• The Karzai government has expanded its outreach to a cross section of society and has demonstrated a new resolve in combating corruption.

• As Taliban soldiers leave the battlefield in 

growing numbers, a significant portion of their 

leaders seek reconciliation with the government in Kabul.

• Should all of these events materialize, along 

with more positive economic metrics, public 

support for the government will dramatically 

improve.

Pakistan. 

The Riedel Report underscored the important part 

that Pakistan will play in stabilizing Afghanistan. Today, the White House concedes that relations between 

Washington and Islamabad are problematic. Pakistani 

commentators, in turn, have specifically explained 

why this is the case, in the process assigning the lion’s 

share of the blame to the United States: 

• The jihadist violence that thrives in the region 

is a result of U.S. neglect on the one hand and 

inept policies on the other.
87

• In addition to helping spawn both al-Qaeda 

and the Taliban, U.S. missteps in Afghanistan 

have shredded Pakistan’s social fabric and produced conditions that radical Islamists have 

exploited. Pakistan has suffered the awesome 

burden of caring for Afghan refugees running 

into the millions.

• By suspending assistance as punishment for 

Pakistan’s nuclear program, Washington contributed to Islamabad’s economic difficulties. 

Economic turmoil, in turn, has created conditions that extremists have exploited in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).

• The United States has ignored the enormous 

contribution that Pakistan has made in confronting the common enemy. Since September 

11, 2001 (9/11), Pakistan has devoted $35 billion to the fight and has suffered military casualties exceeding those suffered by allied units. 

At the same time, Pakistani civilians have been 

killed in the thousands.

• By conducting kill-and-capture operations and 

drone strikes against militants residing in Pakistan, the Americans have violated Islamabad’s 

sovereignty. Indeed, the raid that killed bin 

Laden underscores Washington’s contempt for 

Pakistani self-respect.

• The United States has failed to acknowledge 

Pakistan’s specific concerns about Indian mischief in Afghanistan and New Delhi’s refusal to 

reconcile differences over Kashmir, not to mention that India represents an actual military 

threat to its Islamic neighbor.

• Analysts in Islamabad are convinced that the 

Americans are plotting to create conditions 
88

that ultimately result in the de-nuclearization 

of Pakistan.

• It is against this backdrop that 64 percent of the 

Pakistani population has identified the United 

States as “an enemy.”13

This is not the place to engage in a comprehensive 

assessment of these charges; they will be addressed in 

our concluding remarks. But since the charges have 

been made public, U.S.-Pakistani relations have taken 

a turn for the worse, particularly since the Navy Seal 

raid upon bin Laden’s compound located in the heart 

of a city filled with Pakistani military retirees and 

close to the country’s nuclear facilities. 

In conclusion, many critics of COIN do not believe 

that Plan A will succeed and that other options should 

be considered. One that has attracted some attention 

is a plan advocated by Robert Blackwill, the former 

U.S. Ambassador to India. It calls for partition of Afghanistan largely along ethnic lines.

PLAN B: PARTITION

According to Blackwill, “The Unites States and its 

allies are not on course to defeating the Taliban military.” The combat units required are not in keeping 

with troop-to-population ratios. “Nor with an occupying army largely ignorant of local history, tribal 

structures, languages, customs, politics, and values, 

will the alliance win over large numbers of the Afghan 

Pashtuns, as counterinsurgency doctrine demands.” 

What is more, Karzai’s government is “corrupt” and 

will not “significantly improve,” the Afghan army 

cannot “hold its own,” and the public in the United 

States and “allied countries . . . is unlikely to permit 
89

the extension of the intervention for the length of time 

counterinsurgency doctrine says is required for success.”14

In addition, Blackwill dwells upon the ethnic divisions in Afghan society, citing The Economist: 

Less than 3 percent of recruits are from the troublesome Pashtun south, from where the Taliban draw 

most support. Few will sign up, fearing ruthless intimidation against government ‘collaborators’ and 

their families. As a result, northern officers who only 

speak Dari have to use translators when in the Pashtuspeaking south. Northern infantry are reluctant to go 

there at all.15

Pivoting off the fractious ethnic situation, Blackwill has a solution to the Afghanistan Question: “de 

facto partition of the country.” The administration 

should “stop talking about exit strategies and instead 

commit the United States to a long-term combat role 

in Afghanistan of 35,000-50,000 troops.” In doing so, 

it must accept an unpleasant fact: “The Taliban will 

inevitably control most of the Pashtun south and 

east. . . .”16

In the western and northern sectors of Afghanistan, an entity comprised of the three dominant nonPashtun ethnic communities, along with those Pashtuns who deem Taliban rule intolerable, will form 

their own sovereign political community—something 

along the lines of the Northern Alliance. They and 

their foreign supporters will keep the jihadists at bay 

through a counterterrorist strategy. Should the Taliban 

attack the anti-Taliban security zone, they will be met 

with devastating air attacks along with lethal mobile 

ground strikes from bases in the north. At the same 

time, it can be assumed that the Taliban will be preoc-
90

cupied with tribal opposition to its rule and guerrillatype resistance from other sources in Afghanistan’s 

east and south. 

In short, President Obama should announce that the 

United States and its Afghan and foreign partners will 

pursue a comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy in 

Pashtun Afghanistan and a nation-building strategy 

in the rest of the country, committing to both policies 

for at least the next 7 to 10 years. 17

Blackwill’s Plan B has attracted significant and 

on occasion vitriolic criticism. Michael Rubin of the 

American Enterprise Institute (AEI) calls it “ignorant, immoral, and dangerous.”18 It is ignorant because “Afghans” seldom lose wars, they just change 

sides; it is immoral because it assumes “all Pashtun 

must somehow favor the Taliban”; and it is dangerous among other things because, “The idea that the 

Taliban would be satiated with just the Pashtun areas 

is wrong-headed.”19

Lieutenant General David Barno, the former U.S. 

commander in Afghanistan, is equally critical of the 

proposal because it ignores a trenchant fact: “Most Afghans want to remain a unified state of diverse ethnic

groups.”20 At the same time, Blackwill’s plan would 

prove to be devastating for Pakistan. 

Khalid Aziz observes that:

If Blackwill’s policies are implemented, the existentialist threat to Pakistan will increase. The resulting 

chaos and violence may force the 40 million Pashtuns 

who reside in Pakistan to consider the dynamics of 

establishing a separate state. Given Pakistan’s ethnic 

fragility and simmering discontent in Baluchistan, 

Blackwill’s prescription will destabilize Pakistan.21
91

In spite of Plan B’s flaws, U.S. planners must look 

at Blackwill’s proposal in all seriousness. Among other things, partition may occur despite U.S. intentions 

as a consequence of events on the ground, such as the 

eventual unraveling of Plan A or some other catalyst 

to civil war. 

Afghanistan may have functioned as a single nation for centuries but the Soviet invasion, the civil 

war that followed it, Taliban rule, a largely foreignled campaign to crush the Taliban, and a similar effort to deny their return to power have exacerbated 

ethnic enmity. In conflict associated with the 2010 

parliamentary elections and efforts to create a cabinet in the Karzai government, ethnicity was a central 

point of discord. General Dostum, Chief of Staff to the 

Commander in Chief, His Excellency President Hamid Karzai—as well as the head of Uzbek-dominated 

Junbesh-e Milli party—has accused Karzai of “ethnic 

favoritism” in his interpretation of the hotly disputed 

election outcome. Likewise, Hazara politicians associated with the mainly Hazara Hesb-e-Wahdat Party 

have chastised Karzai for reneging on promises to appoint their people to cabinet positions.22

Observers of President Karzai’s personnel reshuffling in the Ministry of Defense and ANA have observed that it has “occurred in the context of increasing 

ethnic factionalism, both in the ANA and in Afghan 

politics in general.”23 The case of Amrullah Saleh, a 

Tajik who was Minister of the National Directorate of 

Security (NDS)—and a close associate of Massoud—is 

cited as an example of Karzai seeking to marginalize non-Pashtun leaders. He was fired by Karzai, but 

foreign observers think highly of him and his name 

comes to mind when one considers who might be one 

of the leaders to rule a rump state in the north, were 
92

partition to become a reality. Another name that surfaces is Abdullah Abdullah, the former close associate of Massoud who almost defeated Karzai in the last 

race for the presidency.

In considering the case for partition, the following 

observations deserve close attention:

• There is ample evidence that ethnic discord 

may have reached the point where the centrifugal forces of fragmentation exceed those that 

promote national unity. Developments in Iraq 

have taken much the same course. As Ayad 

Allawi, the former secular Shiite prime minister of Iraq has indicated, decades of sectarian 

violence in Iraq have fostered similar toxic relations among ethnic communities there.24

• By reducing the field of battle and excluding a 

population that harbors their Pashtun rivals, 

military operations for a reduced Afghanistan 

become more manageable.

• In response to Pakistan’s opposition to partition, two compelling observations are in order. 

First, short of a government under its thumb, 

there are few options that promote stability in 

Afghanistan that are acceptable to Pakistan. 

Second, the prospect of partition may serve as 

an incentive for Islamabad to deny the jihadists 

a safe harbor in Pakistan and to help resolve 

the Afghanistan Question. In this connection, 

the notion that the Pashtuns on both sides of 

the Durand Line might join forces in an attempt 

to create an independent Pashtun state is one of 

Islamabad’s most chilling nightmares.

• As the U.S. 2012 presidential election approaches, it will be difficult for any candidate to claim 

that America’s longest war is cost effective, and 
93

options once considered unthinkable may become plausible.

• Finally, to avoid even bloodier fighting and 

countless atrocities, many Afghans may prefer partition—if endorsed by the international 

community—to civil war or Taliban rule. 

Clearly, there is more than sufficient cause for 

U.S. defense planners to consider partition as 

plausible and deserving of close scrutiny.

A TALIBAN VICTORY

U.S. planners must contemplate Plan C, the unthinkable: the Taliban return to power. It, however, 

could take one of two paths. 

The Global Jihadists Prevail. 

The first involves the emergence of jihadists who 

cling to bin Laden’s dream of creating a 21st century 

Islamic Caliphate that dominates most of the Islamic 

world. Under these circumstances, we can anticipate 

the resumption of the following harsh policies that the 

Taliban championed during their brief rule from 1996 

until 2001:

• The imposition of Sharia law upon the 30 million people living in Afghanistan that previously resulted in international condemnation 

of wholesale human rights violations.

• Diplomatic recognition by Pakistan and Saudi 

Arabia and perhaps several other Islamic-dominated countries as least in initial stages of resuming power.

• A campaign to export their brand of jihad into 

Central Asia and Russia proper.

• Terrorist strikes against the United States.
94

As long as U.S. forces are in Afghanistan, this outcome will not materialize. In response to overt attacks, 

there is no question that the United States would take 

appropriate military action, but the deployment of 

general purpose forces would not be required; counterterrorist strikes along with punishing attacks upon 

the Taliban’s infrastructure could do the job. 

But given the Taliban’s experience in 2001, it is inconceivable that the new generation of leaders would 

support overt attacks of this kind. How could they 

possibly forget the devastating 2001 U.S. response to 

9/11? There are many Taliban observers who contend 

that they have learned their lesson: they realize that, 

if they once again followed the advice of their most 

fanatical jihadist allies, they would be committing suicide. 

After all, trends were moving in their favor by 

2001: Massoud could not have survived much longer, and with him gone, the Taliban would have had 

the entire country under their control. Thus Ahmed 

Rashid believes that if they return to power, the Taliban will not provoke the Americans once again by 

providing al-Qaeda with refuge or adopt their own fanatical anti-American terrorist agenda. Many American commentators are of the same opinion, arguing 

as well that most insurgents in Afghanistan are ethnic 

Pashtuns “who are focused on a local agenda and do 

not have global aspirations or the means to act outside 

their immediate area.”25

The Taliban Return to Power with a National 

Agenda. 

Many Taliban were outraged by bin Laden’s provoking the Americans into a crushing retaliatory blow 

against Afghanistan. Those who currently think in 
95

similar terms are likely to abide by the advice of Pakistani and Saudi supporters that should they return to 

power, they must avoid provocative anti-Western terrorist acts. The same would hold true for the jihadists 

that might live among them.

 Then, too, as they seek to redevelop their country 

after decades of war, it will be prudent for pragmatists 

among them to engage and not confront their neighbors—such as those in Central Asia, China, India, Iran, 

Pakistan, and Russia. Many commentators overlook 

that in the last years of the Taliban rule before 9/11, 

the government and society that it dominated were 

on the cusp of collapse. Why should anyone believe, 

then, that a revitalized Taliban regime has any hope 

of becoming a more viable entity today than it did 

yesterday? The only way that could happen would be 

with massive outside assistance.

Likewise, the Taliban would have to adjust to 

significant changes in the international strategic environment where peaceful roads to regime change, 

and not violence, have succeeded. The younger and 

democratic middle class elements associated with the 

Arab Spring exist in other Islamic communities; for 

them, the jihadists represent all that is reactionary and 

brutal, and thus are an unacceptable model for society. The jihadists then will find that their roadmap for 

reform is welcomed only in countries that are in the 

most advanced stages of economic and political disintegration, such as Yemen and Somalia.

One more observation must be underscored in considering “worst case” scenarios pertaining to Afghanistan. Recall that many U.S. defense commentators 

supported the Vietnam War in no small part because 

it was widely believed that a communist victory there 

would spread the communist contagion throughout 
96

the Far East. That did not happen. Indeed, in the summer of 1979, the communist Chinese government and 

its counterparts in Hanoi fought a brief but bloody war 

along their common border. What is more, our failure 

in Vietnam can be seen as the failure of Washington to 

understand that nationalism, not Marxism, explained 

why the Vietnamese peasants were fighting with such 

valor against the latest Western imperial force that had 

invaded their country. Perhaps just as our exaggerated fear of communism hampered our critical faculties 

during the Cold War, like-minded fears about Islamic 

terrorism are distorting our strategic vision today. For 

example, consider the absurd claim that our society is 

in danger of being subverted by Sharia law.

That said, the most radical and violent jihadists do 

not need Afghanistan or Pakistan to launch terrorists 

attacks against the West and moderate Islamic countries; they can plot their evil deeds in Yemen, Somalia, North Africa, and South East Asia, not to mention 

Hamburg, London, or New York. Moreover, the Arab 

Spring may ultimately create conditions that the jihadists will exploit to their advantage. But note that in 

each of these cases, the proper response to them is not 

COIN but a more limited counterterrorist campaign. 

After all, terrorist experts in the West have indicated 

that the most recent strikes against U.S. and allied targets have been conducted by lone wolves. This is not 

to ignore terrorist strikes capable of producing significant casualties or physical destruction. To burnish his 

image, Zawahiri, the new al-Qaeda leader, would relish a success of this kind but trends appear to support 

those who see more limited attacks as the most likely 

to materialize in the years ahead. We must be vigilant 

but not exaggerate the capacities of the jihadists. 
97

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 5

1. For a comprehensive discussion of the Riedel Report, see 

Bob Woodward, Obama’s Wars, New York: Simon and Schuster, 

2010, pp. 99-110.

2. The White House, Report in Afghanistan and Pakistan, Washington, DC: Executive Office of the President, 2010.

3. Paul Miller, “Finish the Job,” Foreign Affairs, January-February 2011, pp. 51-52.

4. Michael O’ Hanlon, “Staying Power: The U.S. Mission in 

Afghanistan beyond 2011,” Foreign Affairs, September-October, 

2010, p. 71.

5. Carlotta Gall, “Petraeus Sees Military Progress in Afghanistan,” New York Times, March 8, 2011.

6. Caroline Wadhams et al., “Realignment: Managing a Stable 

Transition to Afghan Responsibility,” Americanprogress.org, November 2010, p. 8.

7. Update Briefing, “Afghanistan’s Elections Stalemate,” 

Washington, DC: International Crisis Group, February 23, 2011, 

p. 1. “The prolonged crisis over Afghanistan’s parliamentary elections has further undermined President Hamid Karzai’s credibility. He is now even more isolated politically than he was after his 

dubious re-election in 2009.”

8. Joshua Partlow, “U.S. effort to arm Afghan villagers carries 

some risk,” Washington Post, February 7, 2011.

9. S. Frederick Starr, “Afghanistan Beyond the Fog of Nation 

Building: Giving Economic Strategy a Chance,” Central AsiaCaucasus Institute Silk Road Studies Program, January 2011, pp. 

6-12. Starr went on to claim, however, that the existing economic 

development program for Afghanistan is insufficient because it 

focuses only on agricultural development and exploitation of natural resources. They must be supplemented with the “Silk Road 

strategy” that involves restoration of a commercial transit route 

that existed in antiquity and would serve the economic interests 
98

of the Central Asian countries and China, India, Iran, and Pakistan. In passing, he notes that “the reopening of all these age-old 

transit routes across Afghanistan is the single greatest achievement of U.S. foreign policy in the new millennium.” Ibid., p. 13.

10. “Evaluating U.S. Foreign Assistance To Afghanistan,” A 

Majority Staff Report, Washington, DC: Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate, June 8, 2011, pp. 3-4.

11. Ibid., pp. 13-14.

12. PollingReport.com, January 2011, pp. 1-5. After bin Laden 

was killed, support for the war took an upswing, as did Obama’s 

conduct of the conflict in the eyes of the American people, but the 

major negative trend lines persisted.

13. Malik Zafar Iqbal, “An Appraisal of the Afghanistan-Pakistan Strategy to Counter Terrorism,” Parameters, Summer 2010, 

p. 17.

14. Robert D. Blackwill, “Plan B in Afghanistan,” Foreign Affairs, January/February 2011, pp. 42-43.

15. Ibid., p. 43.

16. Ibid., p. 44.

17. Ibid.

18. Michael Rubin, “A Very Bad Plan For Afghanistan,” The 

National Review Online, September 15, 2010, p. 1.

19. Ibid.

20. Thomas E. Ricks, “Bob Blackwill’s bad bad Afghan Plan B: 

Let’s surrender but then keep fighting!” FinancialTimes.com, January 6, 2011.

21. Khalid Aziz, “A plan for Afghanistan’s partition,” The Express Tribune, November 9, 2010. Also see NATO’s General Secretary Anders Fogh Rasmussen’s critical comments in Pakistan 

Patriot, “Robert Blackwill’s ‘Plan B’ is perpetual mimetic war in 

Afghanistan,” September 16, 2010.
99

22. Pamela Brown, “Analysis Of The Afghan Defense Appointments,” Backgrounder, Institute for the Study of War, July 20, 

2010.

23. Ibid., p. 1.

24. Anthony Shadid, “Iraq’s Last Patriot,” New York Times 

Magazine, February 6, 2011, p. 43.

25. Alex Strick van Linschoten and Felix Kuehn, Separating 

the Taliban from Al-Qaeda: The Core of Success in Afghanistan, New 

York: Center on International Cooperation, February 2011, p. 5.

101

CHAPTER 6

THE RUSSIAN RESPONSE

After the September 11, 2001 (9/11) al-Qaeda attacks, Russian president Putin was one of the first 

world leaders to offer Bush his condolences. The Islamic jihadists provided the two with a common foe 

and an opening for improving relations between their 

two countries. But that would not happen as Putin 

joined Bush’s French and German allies in opposing 

the U.S. invasion of Iraq. 

The Americans and Russians signed the 2002 Moscow Treaty reducing nuclear weapons but by the end 

of Bush’s second term, Putin had concluded that fruitful discussions with him over a range of issues was 

a nonstarter. Moscow reacted favorably to Obama’s 

election to no small degree because he indicated that 

he welcomed warmer relations with Russia and assumed that a John McCain victory would not unfreeze 

American-Russian relations. 

In the spring of 2009, Obama met with Russian 

President Dmitry Medvedev in Europe, and later with 

Prime Minister Putin, indicating that he favored a reset in relations with Russia. In the 2010 U.S. National 

Security Strategy statement, Obama said, “We seek to 

build a stable, substantive, multidimensional relationship with Russia, based on mutual interests.”1

Skeptics in the United States discredited the policy, 

but it was in keeping with one favored by Republican 

statesmen like Henry Kissinger and George Shultz 

who argued that harmonious relations with Russia 

were vital to U.S. security objectives—fighting global terrorism, stemming the proliferation of nuclear 

weapons, and addressing global warming.2
102

The most immediate opportunity for a reset in relations was the ratification of the New Strategic Arms 

Reduction Treaty (START) that Obama and Medvedev endorsed in their spring meeting. From that time 

forward, they would begin the reset campaign in earnest. In November 2010, at the NATO Summit in Lisbon, Portugal, Medvedev reaffirmed and expanded 

upon Russia’s assistance to coalition operations in Afghanistan. Obama, in turn, promised to give Moscow 

a voice in a new European missile defense system that 

replaced the proposal in Eastern Europe that Bush 

had favored but which some in the Kremlin deemed a 

threat to their nuclear strike force. 

Then in 2010, the reset was given a boost from an 

unexpected quarter: a warming in relations between 

Poland and Russia appeared after a tragic plane crash 

in Russia. It resulted in the death of the Polish President, Lech Kaczynski, and many prominent Polish 

civilian and military leaders. Zbigniew Brzezinski, a 

man whose name does not bring smiles to the faces of 

the Kremlin overlords, characterized Putin’s expression of solace as genuine. “I do not think that this is a 

game on the part of Russia,” he wrote in Time Magazine, “this is something sincere and very new.” If it 

endured, “it will be geo-politically . . . equal to the importance of German-Polish reconciliation.”3

Despite a subsequent dispute over who was responsible for the accident, the Poles eventually conceded that their pilot had ignored the advice of Russian air-traffic controllers and landed in fog-shrouded 

Smolensk. It was alleged that the Polish president 

compelled him to land the aircraft in spite of the awful weather conditions.

But to place the American-Russian reset in proper perspective, a closer look at the Russian response 
103

to 9/11 is in order. Soon after the attacks, the State 

Department’s Richard Armitage and the CIA’s Cofer 

Black flew to Moscow to brief the Russians and to 

forewarn them that a U.S. military strike against the 

Taliban was in the works. The response was positive, 

and a Russian team was sent to Washington to share 

information about the major features of Afghanistan’s 

topography and other ground intelligence that they 

had gathered in the 1980s. The American infiltration 

teams relied upon Russian maps to help them navigate Afghanistan’s difficult terrain and to identify areas that should be avoided by the invading forces. It 

also provided cold weather equipment and other gear 

to protect the Americans against the harsh conditions 

they would encounter. 

Moscow encouraged the Northern Alliance to provide an infantry complement to assist the American 

special operation forces and the small U.S. contingent 

of regular soldiers that would confront the Taliban 

and their al-Qaeda allies.4 The Alliance had officers 

and men who knew the area well and had engaged 

the Taliban in deadly firefights over many years. 

Putin said in a telephone conversation with Bush, 

“We are going to support you in the war on terror.” 

But “we can’t put any Russian troops on the ground in 

Afghanistan.” That would have served neither Washington’s nor Moscow’s interest as it would provide 

the Taliban with a powerful propaganda coup. But 

Russia would provide the Northern Alliance troops 

with arms and ammunition—assistance that Moscow 

had made available to Massoud and his men for years. 

On the diplomatic front, Putin agreed to intervene 

with the Central Asian leaders and encouraged them 

to give the Americans access to their territory as long 

as the U.S. war on terror was “temporary and . . . not 

permanent.”5
104

Putin’s offer to help in combat search and air rescue (CSAR) operations was especially welcomed. It 

was standard operating procedure for the Pentagon 

to have CSAR capabilities in place when U.S. aircraft 

were at risk, and President Bush was acutely aware 

of the distasteful prospect of the Taliban exploiting 

captured American personnel for propaganda value. 

Both Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan could testify to 

the wisdom of that concern.

Diplomatically, Russia supported the Bush administration on a number of fronts. With its permanent 

seat in the UN Security Council, Russia provided the 

United States the legal justification for military action 

against the Taliban in Afghanistan. Then it supported 

the Bonn agreement and the selection of a pro-American Afghan as the country’s new leader. Moscow 

would provide additional diplomatic help, although 

at times reluctantly.6

While Russia did not provide troops in Afghanistan, it did play an important role in meeting the coalition’s logistical requirements. For example, from the 

very outset of the war, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) would rely upon the heavy air 

transport capability of Russia and Ukraine. Western 

payments for this service provided badly needed revenue, underscoring the economic advantages of cooperating with the West that even hardline opponents to 

the reset could not ignore. 

Nonetheless, Russian commanders were wary of 

U.S. intentions and opposed Putin’s offers of help. 

They were concerned in particular about Washington 

requesting and receiving assistance from the Uzbek 

and Tajik governments, specifically the use of air bases and land corridors to help facilitate the insertion of 

U.S. special forces and regular troops into Northern 
105

Afghanistan. After all, the Kremlin leadership persisted in its claim that the “Five Stans” were located 

in Moscow’s “sphere of special influence.” Some in 

the security services pressured their old Central Asian 

comrades to reject American bids for basing rights and 

sought ways to break agreements that were already in 

force.

But while Moscow had the capacity to lean on the 

Central Asian leaders, several of them saw benefits in 

cooperation with the Americans. The U.S. Government 

found that Tajikistan was favorable to any request for 

access to its territory. Planners in Washington sought 

a land corridor from there to Northern Afghanistan 

rather than rely upon airlifts alone. It would facilitate 

the delivery of humanitarian as well as military cargo. 

It was through Tajikistan that CIA teams were inserted 

into Afghanistan to join the Northern Alliance forces 

and with the help of regular Army units eventually 

defeat the jihadists.

The Uzbek President Islam Karimov proved to be 

more resistant to complying with Washington’s requests for assistance. He allowed the CIA to fly Predator drones from his territory, but in return he asked 

for generous economic aid, a mutual defense treaty, 

and even NATO membership. Such bold demands 

raised eyebrows in Moscow and did not sit well with 

NATO members who were wary of “out of area” commitments and intimate ties with dictators. He did provide an airfield even though it had limited capacity to 

handle heavy cargo planes like the C-5.7

In taking stock of Russia’s support for the U.S.-led 

military victory over the Taliban and al-Qaeda, it is apparent that Moscow’s help was critical. Without it, the 

United States would have had difficulty securing staging areas and corridors in Central Asia that facilitated 
106

an invasion from the North. Russia’s flow of arms to 

the Northern Alliance was vital as well. Though we 

must not exaggerate Russia’s cooperation, critics of 

joint American-Russian security ventures have been 

remiss in failing to acknowledge its assistance in the 

earliest phase of America’s longest war.

But what about today and the reappearance of 

the Taliban? Some observers have characterized Russian help as “paltry,” but that assessment may be too 

churlish. For example, Russia continues to provide 

intelligence germane to the success of coalition forces 

in Afghanistan; its security services, civilian and military, have considerable outreach throughout Central 

Asia as well as within Afghanistan, and their ability to 

help will surely grow.

The Russians have provided the Afghan security 

forces with small arms and other military equipment—albeit for a price. The Afghans are familiar 

with Russian small arms like the Kalashnikovs, and 

seem to prefer this assault weapon over American alternatives. Most recently, Russia has sold the Afghans 

21 helicopters that are well-suited for both the harsh 

mountainous and dry desert conditions that prevail 

throughout the country. This sale had been facilitated 

through a Russia-NATO Council special program 

making it possible to finance “helicopter packages” 

that not only include the Mi-17 helicopters, but spare 

parts, maintenance, and training.8

 The copters will 

not be provided free of charge, but Moscow will defer 

some of the cost.

Many Afghan pilots are in their mid-40s or older, 

having learned to fly during the Soviet period, while 

others—mechanics and associated ground personnel—are familiar with Russian aircraft. As U.S. forces 

thin out and Afghan troops grow in number, an increasing percentage of them will be provided with 
107

Russian arms and training. Some are already attending schools in Russia.

In judging Russia’s role as security partner in Afghanistan, there are three case studies that can help us 

determine how effective that help has been and may 

be in the future. On the whole, the picture is positive 

but mixed.

COUNTERING AFGHAN NARCOTICS

Public opinion polls consistently show that when 

asked why they should be concerned about Afghanistan, Russians by an overwhelming margin specify 

drugs, not terrorism. There is ample reason why this 

is the case. “In Russia an estimated 30,000 to 40,000 

people die of drug overdoses yearly. This amounts to 

more than the total number of soldiers killed during 

the entire Soviet campaign in Afghanistan between 

1979 and 1989.”9

 Most of the heroin, for example, that 

poisons Russian addicts comes from Afghan fields 

and drug labs. 

At the same time, the importation and sale of drugs 

are facilitated by criminal organizations that exploit 

the corruption that prevails in Russia and its former 

Soviet republics. Those criminal organizations in turn 

are frequently tied to terrorists groups for financial, 

not ideological, reasons, but nonetheless their joint 

ventures help facilitate the arming of terrorists worldwide. It is with this knowledge in mind that Western 

observers rightly point out that corruption in Russia 

is a major reason why addicts there are dying in such 

large numbers.10

But even when conceding their own complicity, 

Russian analysts complain that their Western partners have failed to curtail the harvesting of poppies 
108

in Afghanistan. In 2005, the NATO-Russian Council 

(NRC) created the “NRC Project on Counter-Narcotics Training of Afghan and Central Asian Personnel,” and Washington claims that it and other efforts 

have curtailed the production of poppies. Officials in 

Moscow disagree with this positive assessment of the 

ISAF’s response to the drug crisis, asserting that since 

2001 poppy production has increased. Moreover, the 

Russian Ambassador to the NRC, Dmitry Rogozin, 

has noted that the United States has been successful 

in eradicating drugs in Colombia, in part because the 

ratio of soldiers to hectares is far more favorable there 

than in Afghanistan. Why? Well the narcotics in Colombia are destined for the United States, while in Afghanistan, they are sold in Russia.11

Russian officials have an additional explanation 

for the American’s reluctance to eliminate the drug 

trade: they do not want to risk casualties associated 

with drug interdiction, nor to anger Karzai, whose 

late brother Wali was fingered as a drug lord in the 

city of Kandahar. It is with such observations in mind 

that many Kremlin opponents of cooperation with the 

Americans deem it a bad deal for Russia. It is just the 

latest example of an American president getting concessions from Russia, while he delivers nothing but 

rhetoric in return.

Meanwhile, those in the United States who have a 

dim view of reset cite Moscow’s duplicitous posture 

on the U.S. transit base in Manas, Kyrgyzstan, to support their case.

THE STRUGGLE OVER MANAS

The Manas Air Transit Center is located near 

Kyrgyzstan’s capital of Bishkek. It has been a major 

transit point for ISAF and U.S. personnel and equip-
109

ment going to and from Afghanistan ever since it was 

established in December 2001. From there, coalition 

planes have provided close air support, the shipment 

of cargo, and refueling missions.

Moscow viewed an American base at Manas with 

considerable anxiety, but the government in Bishkek 

welcomed the handsome rent that Washington offered for its use. In 2005, the Russian and Chinese governments sought to have it closed, expressing concern 

that its real function was to compromise their security. 

In Russia’s case, the Tulip Revolution of March 2005 

that deposed the Soviet-era Kyrgyz dictator, Askar 

Akayev, was interpreted as part of the Bush administration’s campaign of “regime change” throughout 

the former USSR. 

Although the Sino-Russian drive to oust the 

Americans failed, 4 years later after a rent-hike dispute, there was a second attempt to do so. That did 

not happen because in June Washington agreed to pay 

$60 million annually for the airfield. This action was 

preceded by an announced deal between Russia and 

Kyrgyzstan whereby the latter would receive a $2 billion loan from Moscow conditional upon the Americans’ expulsion from Manas. Even though that ploy 

failed, Secretary Gates complained that Moscow was 

trying to have it “both ways; simultaneously working 

with and against the U.S. in the fight against the jihadists in Afghanistan.”12

The Kremlin tried to make mischief for the Americans elsewhere in Central Asia. In 2005, when Washington chastised Uzbekistan’s President Karimov for 

human rights abuses, officials in the Kremlin encouraged him to expel the United States from an airbase 

in his country and were successful. Moscow sought 

to compromise U.S. cooperation with Tajikistan by 
110

claiming the Americans were plotting to depose its 

President Emomali Rakmonov. This accusation was 

revealed by Tajikistan’s Ambassador to the United 

States, Homraphon Zaripove, in a conversation with 

the American Ambassador to his country, Richard E. 

Hoagland. Under pressure from Moscow, Tajikistan’s 

pro-Russian Ministry of Security contended “that the 

United States wants to overthrow Rakmonov, kick the 

Russians out of their military base, and expand U.S. 

influence from Afghanistan into Tajikistan as a link 

to ‘U.S.-dominated Kyrgyzstan.’ The U.S. goal in this 

scenario is a ‘string of anti-Russia military bases from 

Baghram to Manas’.”13

American opponents of a reset with Russia cite 

behavior of this nature to support their claim that 

anyone who believes that the Kremlin is serious about 

security cooperation is living in a fantasy land. The 

old guard in Russia’s military community, they note, 

condones security cooperation with the West only if it 

serves Moscow’s purposes. 

THE NORTHERN DISTRIBUTION NETWORK

Whereas Russian critics of the reset cite the failure 

of the American-led coalition to curb the Afghan drug 

trade, and their U.S. counterparts complain about 

Manas, supporters in both countries cite the success 

of the Northern Distribution Network (NDN) as evidence that security cooperation can work. 

It is a commonplace of military planning that logistics is a key to victory. Providing for the needs of 

coalition forces in the Afghan theater is a truly essential, but daunting, enterprise. The distances involved 

are long, and the routes are difficult and dangerous. 

Most of the equipment and supplies required by al-
111

lied forces transit from the port of Karachi through 

the Khyber Pass and then to bases in Afghanistan. 

Over the years, many trucks have been destroyed 

during this transit, and American as well as Afghan 

and Pakistani personnel have been killed. Secretary 

of the Navy Ray Mabus has observed, “A lot of these 

convoys are hit with improvised explosive devices or 

with ambushes, sometimes before they even get to Afghanistan. For every 24 convoys, we lose an American 

killed or wounded. That is too high of a price to pay 

for energy.”14 Furthermore, the government of Pakistan on occasion has halted the flow of material to underline its unhappiness with American drone attacks 

within Pakistan or the infiltration of small units to kill 

or capture Taliban and al-Qaeda commanders seeking 

a safe harbor there. Still, as late as the spring of 2010, 

about 70 percent of the ammunition, food, gasoline, 

water, and other supplies moved through this route. 

This problematic situation provided an incentive for 

Washington to consider another way to provide for 

the troops in Afghanistan; a second route emerged after President Obama endorsed a surge in U.S. troops 

that would raise the number to close to 100,000 by the 

end of 2010.

Logistical experts point out that the difficulties 

encountered in shipping cargo to Afghanistan are 

monumental. In addition to the huge volume of cargo, 

there are many other problems. 

Because Afghanistan offers little in the way of basic 

infrastructure, the military has to build things like 

housing. That means that in addition to moving people and their equipment into the country, it also has 

to bring in construction materials, food, medicine, and 

munitions, along with support contractors and everything else needed to survive in one of the most diffi-
112

cult environments on earth. Then there’s the challenge 

of finding a way to bring all that stuff into the country. 

Afghanistan has only 16 airports with paved runways, 

and only four are capable of handling international 

cargo traffic. There are no seaports—it is a landlocked 

nation. And there are no railroads in.15

Under these circumstances, “the U.S. military has 

been forced to rely mainly on roads to bring supplies 

into Afghanistan. But the situation there is not much 

better. Because the United States is barred from moving goods through Iran, points of entry into Afghanistan by ground are limited to a handful of mountain 

passes.”16 But the Khyber Pass and the crossing point 

through the Hindu Kush at Spin Boldak have been 

interdicted on numerous occasions by the insurgents. 

For example, “in December 2008, l2 percent of the 

Afghan-bound freight crossing Pakistan’s Northwest 

Frontier Province en route to the Khyber Pass disappeared, most of it in flames.”17

The NDN was established in February 2009 to provide coalition forces with an alternative to the perilous 

Pakistan corridors. It was initially comprised of two 

pathways: one in the north that begins at the Baltic Sea 

ports of Latvia—and more recently Klaipeda, Lithuania, as well—through Ukraine, Russia, and Kazakhstan to Afghanistan. “The southern section, known as 

NDN South, starts at the Georgian port of Poti. Cargo 

there is placed on rail cars that travel through Georgia 

and Azerbaijan, then across the Caspian Sea by boat 

into the port of Aktau in Kazakhstan. From there, the 

loads are trucked through Uzbekistan.”18 These two 

NDN corridors provide nonlethal supplies “amounting to 40 percent of what the coalition requires. As 

of the end of March 2010, over 10,000 containers had 

moved through the new set of routes.”19
113

It is apparent that the NDN will expand operations 

as a result of a logistics hub that Korean Air has established at Uzbekistan’s Navoi Airport. Cargo service 

associated with Korean Air carries loads to Delhi and 

Mumbai, India; Bangkok, Thailand; and Frankfurt, 

Germany. New routes to Dubai, United Arab Emirates 

(UAE); Almaty, Kazakhstan; and Dhaka, Bangladesh, 

will be included by the end of 2011. Supplies today are 

also making their way by rail from Siberia.

In addition to Moscow’s cooperation, several Central Asian states have contributed to the logistical 

campaign as well. Unfortunately, on occasion the flow 

of material through the NDN has been disrupted as 

a result of bottlenecks in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, 

and as a consequence of disputes between these two 

countries over the movement of rail carriages. The 

flow of supplies through the airspace, highways, and 

railroads has become especially crucial. They are not 

in the best of shape, and, what is more, U.S. observers note that the human rights practices of President 

Karimov leave much to be desired despite unofficial 

U.S. efforts at the person-to-person level to promote 

Uzbekistan liberalization.

In the late fall of 2010, the United States and 

NATO expanded the NDN through two agreements 

with Russia and another one with Kazakhstan. First, 

Moscow allowed a revision in the category of cargo 

that could be delivered via NDN such as armored vehicles—not tanks, but armored personnel carriers. A 

second agreement permitted the ISAF to move cargo 

from Afghanistan back to Europe. (The cargo costs of 

land shipment was 90 percent lower than air.) Third, 

Kazakhstan gave a green light for U.S. planes to fly 

over the North Pole and cross its territory into Afghanistan.20 Finally, on February 25, 2011, when the 
114

Russian Duma endorsed the new provisions, commentators anticipated that the Kremlin would soon allow 

lethal material to be included in the NDN shipments. 

There appears to be some uncertainty, however, about 

the status of all of these latest agreements. Nonetheless, in assessing the NDN, it is indisputable that it has 

made a significant contribution to the West’s military 

campaign in Afghanistan.21

In addition to these new initiatives, Russia continues to be the source for most of the massive supply 

of gas and jet fuel that are required by the coalition’s 

ground and air units.

CENTRAL ASIA AND THE NORTH CAUCASUS

Some final words on Russia and the three scenarios 

will be provided in the concluding chapter. Here the 

reasons why Moscow has compelling incentives to cooperate with the United States in the struggle against 

the jihadists will be underscored. Even if its contribution is modest, it will remain important as Washington’s NATO allies are finding it ever more difficult to 

secure popular support for the struggle. Moreover, 

plans to draw down NATO are already in place; for 

example, the Europeans will be returning home before 

the 2014 time frame approaches. Russia, then, may be 

able to pick up some of the slack that materializes—although, it will not perform combat operations. 

Central Asia is of major strategic importance to 

Russia for a number of pivotal reasons. The two most 

important are: first, that its hydrocarbon wealth and 

system of pipelines are critical to the success of Putin’s “2020” modernization campaign; second, that if 

jihadists gain control of the five former Soviet Central 

Asian Republics, Russia would face a serious jihadist 

threat on its southern borders.22
115

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Central 

Asian countries cut lose from Moscow, but as a result 

they lost billions of rubles in subsidies, they lost millions of talented Russians who returned home, dictators came to rule with an iron fist, and, in a maelstrom 

of ethnic discord and economic decline, the Islamists 

found much to celebrate. Jihadist movements appeared both in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan and launched 

armed operations against the home-grown dictators 

and/or helped the Taliban and al-Qaeda gain power 

in Afghanistan. As Ahmed Rashid found in his conversations with Tajiks and Uzbeks and other Islamic 

radicals in the region during the Soviet war, they 

were “convinced that an Afghan victory would lead 

to Islamic revolutions throughout Central Asia.”23

They belonged to various radical sects of Sunni Islam; 

whereas Jihad previously had been associated with 

Iranian Shiites, now Sunnis had grasped the sword. 

Although the Soviet anti-religion campaign helped attenuate the influence of Islam in the Central Asian republics, the Muslim faithful went underground much 

as Christians did in the Baltic states. As noted earlier, 

the Soviet leadership during the Afghan War was 

stunned when it received reports that soldiers from 

Central Asia expressed pro-mujahedeen sentiments 

and watched with admiration as the jihadists courageously fought units of the Red Army. Some refused 

to engage their “brothers” on the battlefield and, in 

some instances, joined them. Indeed, many Muslims 

in the USSR were introduced into the wider world of 

Islam by serving in Afghanistan or by closely tracking 

news from the war zone.

Like many of the Afghan Islamists, they were exposed to more sophisticated mentors of global jihad 

in the cities of Pakistan and in the camps in the coun-
116

try’s tribal zones. Under the tutelage of the “Arabs,” 

they learned how to wage war against better armed 

adversaries and to win the support of ordinary folk 

that protected them and alerted them to the enemy’s 

movements.

Many analysts believe that Central Asia is tottering on the abyss of chaos as the region’s governments 

have proven incapable of stabilizing their societies. At 

the same time, they all face huge economic and social 

problems. By any measure, the situation in the region 

will deteriorate further should the Americans fail in 

Afghanistan. (At least this appears to be the assumption of Russian analysts.) Jihadists, local and foreign, 

have been active throughout the region for years, and 

the stark truth is that the coalition’s failure in Afghanistan would represent a far greater threat to Russia and 

Central Asia than to the United States and Europe. 

Even critics of the reset in Moscow have acknowledged this truism.

Strategically, the Fergana Valley is the most valued territory since it knits together Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan and is home to about half of 

their collective populations. Should the Taliban regain 

power in Afghanistan, they are likely to promote insurgencies throughout the valley and compromise 

the security of pro-Russian and secular governments 

there. Needless to say, the resulting mayhem will menace those Russian business enterprises that are linked 

with the development and shipment of the region’s 

hydrocarbon wealth. It is prudent, therefore, for Russia to provide whatever assistance that it can muster 

to promote an outcome in Afghanistan that does not 

place Central Asia at risk. 

Arguably, the most aggressive Central Asia jihadist group is the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan 
117

(IMU), which grew in effectiveness while licking its 

wounds in its sanctuary in Pakistan’s Waziristan region. The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan jihadists 

suffered grievously in the face of the 2001 allied assaults, but they regrouped in Pakistan and have returned to Central Asia with a new élan, even though 

one of their founders, Tahir Yuldash, was killed in a 

U.S. drone attack in South Waziristan. They have been 

held responsible for bombings and violence in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan as the IMU has splintered into 

several groups. One of them, the Islamic Jihad Union 

(IJU), was deemed responsible for a series of attacks in 

Uzbekistan. What is more, it is alleged that they had 

planned Mumbai-style strikes in Europe.24

The appearance of jihadist groups has been linked 

to the dismal living conditions that the people of Central Asia must endure. According to a recent report of 

the International Crisis Group, all five Central Asian 

countries, with the possible exception of Kazakhstan, 

are on the verge of virtual collapse as viable political 

entities. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are in the worst 

condition and may soon be deserving of the label 

“failed states.” Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are 

close behind them. But even Kazakhstan, where the 

regime of Nursultan Nazarbayev has access to vast 

energy wealth, faces a host of economic, political, and 

social problems that are likely to fracture Kazakhstan 

after this leader passes from the political scene.

The factors contributing to this dismal appraisal 

include aging leaders—like Karimov and Nazarbayev, 

who are in their early 70s—who have little legitimacy 

and have no one to succeed them; deteriorating infrastructures; declining health care systems; outmoded 

transportation networks; and hydroelectric and factory equipment that was constructed under Soviet rule 
118

and today is in advanced stages of disrepair. What 

is more, all face a human resource crisis as geriatric 

administrators and experts in a variety of fields are 

reaching retirement without qualified personnel to 

replace them. On the ecological front, Central Asia 

is encountering severe climatic strains, inciting water disputes among the disparate countries. Finally, 

the entire region is challenged by growing economic 

inequality and political polarization. Together, such 

unsettling problems are causing the emigration of society’s most able contributors.

The specter of failed states worries not only Russian strategists, their American counterparts also are 

concerned about stability in the region. As the U.S. 

profile in Afghanistan diminishes, Central Asia will 

acquire greater significance. James Clapper, the Director of National Intelligence, has observed, “As the U.S. 

increases reliance on Central Asia to support operations in Afghanistan, the region’s political and social 

stability is becoming more important.”25 As the U.S. 

withdrawal accelerates and troops and equipment are 

withdrawn from Afghanistan through the NDN, Central Asia will become a vital backstop for those U.S. 

forces that remain in the region.

Of course, it remains to be seen just how close the 

American-Russian partnership will remain. Skeptics 

in Washington will counsel against it as they do when 

joint-ventures of this nature are discussed, and hardliners in the Kremlin are certain to lobby against Russia joining the United States in military joint-ventures 

in what many still deem “their territory.”

There may be some dispute over how to characterize the threat that Russia faces in the North Caucasus—an insurgency on the part of non-Russian peoples who seek their independence or Islamic terrorists 
119

who have openly declared their allegiance to al-Qaeda 

and to Global Jihad.

After two wars in Chechnya and rising violence 

in Ingushetia, Dagestan, and Kabardino-Balkaria, the 

region has become a major security headache for the 

Kremlin. In spite of a spate of economic, military, and 

political initiatives, the security situation in the North 

Caucasus remains dire, and expectations are that it 

will get worse and not better. The assassination of 

public officials is on the rise, along with attacks upon 

military bases and police stations, and the deaths involved have been on the upswing in spite of government attempts to crush the insurgents. At the same 

time, violence from this region has bled into Russia 

proper, as recent attacks on St. Petersburg and Moscow have revealed.

Although subject to debate, many Russian analysts 

see the growing popularity of radical Islam as the most 

important new element in explaining the intensity 

of the fighting in the North Caucasus. Among other 

things, Sayyid Qutb’s writings are widely circulated 

and discussed by Islamic radicals there. Also, some of 

the insurgents have fought in Iraq, Afghanistan, and 

other jihadist struggles. It is noteworthy that members 

of radical Central Asian jihadist movements, such as 

Hizb ut-Tahrir and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, have sought to proselytize in southern Russia. 

Given cultural and ethnic differences, however, they 

have not been hugely successful. Given the fact that 

about 20 percent of Russia’s population is of the Islamic faith, the Kremlin will remain uneasy about any 

effort to turn them against Moscow.

Outside analysts correctly remark that Russia 

must address the growing violent upheaval in the 

region by using a variety of assets, not just military 
120

ones. This means addressing the socio-economic problems that underpin upheaval in the North Caucasus 

such as corruption, economic inequality, poverty, and 

widespread alienation among a public that complains 

that Moscow has treated the locals with contempt. But 

economic and social complaints aside, many of the 

insurgents are inspired by jihad, and they cannot be 

placated by promises of economic prosperity. Those 

who have chosen to be suicide bombers are not blowing themselves to oblivion because they want better 

kitchen appliances. They are fighting for a cause in 

which they are deeply committed, and they will press 

for its success unless they are crushed in battle. This is 

the response of Russian commanders when they are 

urged to seek reconciliation with the jihadists. On this 

matter, they reflect the convictions of American critics 

of COIN who have been urging U.S. military planners 

to acknowledge this disconcerting fact and to take appropriate forcible actions.26

The West cannot be of much help regarding a civil 

war within Russia, but the Kremlin has responded favorably to the U.S. Government’s decision to include 

Doku Umarov, the region’s leading jihadist, on its list 

of terrorists. Indeed, going so far as to put a $5 million bounty on his head has been met with approval 

among Russians who customarily warn about American power.27 At the same time, ethnic insurgents, by 

associating themselves with Islamic jihadists, have 

compromised their movements in the eyes of Americans and European who otherwise might have supported their demands for greater independence from 

Moscow. David Kilcullen has observed, “The use of 

Chechnya as a terrorist haven during its period of selfrule compromised—perhaps fatally—the Chechen 

separatist cause, which is now seen largely as a cover 
121

for Islamist terrorist activity.”28 This, however, is not 

necessarily the opinion of those in the United States, 

who believe the source of the problem in the North 

Caucasus is Russian imperialism and not anti-Russian 

terrorism.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 6

1. U.S. National Security Strategy, Washington, DC: The White 

House, May 2010, p. 44.

2. Henry Kissinger and George Shultz, “Building on Common 

Ground with Russia,” Washington Post, October 8, 2008.

3, Zbigniew Brzezinski, “From Poland’s Tragedy, Hope for 

Better Ties with Russia,” TimeCNNWorld, April 19, 2010.

4. Bob Woodward, Bush at War, New York, Free Press, 2002, 

p. 103.

5. Ibid., p. 118.

6. In March 2011 when the United States and a coalition of the 

willing sought to stop Colonel Muammar Quaddafi from slaughtering his citizens, many American observers cited Russia’s abstention as a defeat for reset. But that conclusion ignores a trenchant fact: by abstaining, Russia made it more difficult for China 

to veto the move. Here, then, was a partial victory for reset.

7. The airstrip that the Uzbeks made available could serve 

only the C-17 transport, not the larger C-5. Woodward, p. 178.

8. “Russia Not to Send Personnel to Afghanistan-Envoy,” 

Itar-Tass, November 18, 2010.

9. Patrick F. P. Nopens, “Countering Afghan narcotics: a litmus test for effective NATO and Russian cooperation?” Security 

Policy Brief, No. 14, September 2010, Brussels, Belgium, EGMONT 

Institute, Royal Institute for International Relations, p. 2.
122

10. Russians, in response, cite the huge profits, corruption, 

and political cowardice that account for legal American arms 

merchants providing the Mexican mafia with weapons that have 

killed thousands of innocent people in that country, and a growing number in the United States as well. 

11. Nopens, p. 6.

12. Mark Thompson, “Obama Loses a Key Base for Afghanistan,” Time Magazine, February 19, 2009. See also Bill Gertz, “Inside the Ring: China in Kyrgyzstan,” Washington Times, February 

12, 2010.

13. Cable Viewer and the Bug Pit/EurasiaNet.Org., February 5, 

2011.

14. John C. K. Daly, “Are ISAF’s Tenuous Supply Lines Sustainable?” Integrated Supply Network (ISN), March 2, 2011.

15. Steve Geary, “Northern Distribution Network to Shore up 

Afghan Supply Chain,” New Breed Logistics: DC Velocity, June 

28, 2010.

16. Ibid., p. 1.

17. Ibid., p. 2.

18. Daly.

19. Geary, p. 3.

20. Muhammad Tahir, “Central Asia Stands to Gain As NATO 

Shifts Supply Lines Away From Pakistan,” RFE/RL, March 22, 

2011. See also “Northern Distribution Network Keeps Growing,” 

eurasianet.org, November 17, 2010.

21. Stephen Fidler and Gregory L. White, “Moscow Expands 

NATO’s Routes,” Wall Street Journal, November 18, 2010. For a 

more recent assessment of NDN, see Craig Whitlock, “For U.S., 

detours in supplying war effort,” Washington Post, July 3, 2011.
123

22. Russian strategists also are concerned about China’s penetration of the region. In public, the Russians speak favorably 

about Sino-Russian relations and taunt their American counterparts with the threat that Washington will have to face a powerful Russian-Chinese tandem in Central Asia and the Far East. In 

private, they concede that sharing a border exceeding 1,000 miles 

with a country whose population is 10 times their size is a daunting prospect. Also, in commenting upon Central Asia, Dmitri 

Trenin and Alexey Malashenko have observed: “Russia fears a 

rise in Islamic radicalism across the region and a revival of rebel 

activity in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. It does not have sufficient 

confidence in the solidity of the Central Asian regimes or in its 

own capacity to insulate the region from the influence of a victorious Taliban,” p. 1. 

23. Ahmed Rashid, p. 44.

24. Abubakar Siddique, “IMU’s Evolution Branches Back to 

Central Asia,” RFE-RL, December 6, 2010.

25. “Tajiskistan: The changing Insurgent Threats,” Asia Report No. 205-24, Washington, DC: International Crisis Group, May 

2011, pp. 9-10.

26. See, for example, Bing West, The Wrong War: Grit, Strategy, 

and the Way Out of Afghanistan, New York: Random House, 2011.

27. Sergey Markedonov, “Radical Islam in the North Caucasus,” Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International 

Studies, November 2010. In the spring of 2011, however, the Russian security forces had great success in killing many high value 

terrorists in the North Caucasus.

28. Lieutenant Colonel David Kilcullen, Countering Global Insurgency, Newport, RI: Naval War College, November 30, 2004, 

p. 7. 

125

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUDING REMARKS AND 

RECOMMENDATIONS

Dramatic changes are unfolding in the international security environment that will have a profound 

impact upon the future of U.S. policies in Afghanistan 

and the Greater Middle East. They likewise will determine the nature of U.S.-Russian cooperation in Afghanistan and the surrounding region. 

IDENTIFYING THE ENEMY: A CIVIL WAR 

WITHIN ISLAM

In an attempt to justify the invasion of Iraq, the 

military capacity of the September 11, 2001 (9/11) jihadists was grossly exaggerated. In the process, one of 

the fundamental principles of warfare was violated—

“Know thine enemy!” 

Al-Qaeda and affiliated jihadist movements have 

committed heinous terrorist acts in many areas of the 

world, and in the process have killed thousands of 

people. In that respect, they represent a global threat, 

but their capacity to achieve a 21st century Caliphate is 

beyond their reach. It is an absurdity to compare them 

with 20th century totalitarian movements. Adolph 

Hitler and Joseph Stalin possessed massive military 

war machines responsible for the death of tens of millions of people and physical destruction of seismic 

proportions. Vast numbers of heavily armed general 

purpose forces were required to crush fascism and to 

meet the threat of Soviet communism. A much smaller force is required to neutralize the jihadists whose 

principal weapon is terrorism. To confront them with 

a larger force only plays into their hands. 
126

A more appropriate description of the turmoil 

roiling within Islam today is “civil war.” The world 

witnessed something similar in August 1914. Then 

European civilization was stricken by a monumental 

eruption when the forces of the old and new order 

clashed within societies fractured by capitalism, industrialization, science, secularism, and urbanization. 

In this century, much the same thing is happening 

within the Islamic Umma as over one billion people 

struggle to strike a balance between traditional, religious-bound impulses and the dynamics of a modern 

secularized world.

While the fanciful campaign to create a 21st century Caliphate through brutal acts of terrorism is one 

manifestation of the Islamic Civil War, a second component is manifested in cultural, economic, political, 

and religious dislocations collectively known as the 

“Arab Spring.” At this point, the course of the popular 

uprisings is difficult to plot, even with Quaddafi’s fall 

in Libya, but it prompts several important observations:

• The potential for protracted and widespread 

violence is exceedingly high, and the repercussions for the international community are 

monumental. To cite just one example, a major disruption in the flow of oil from the ArabPersian Gulf region would devastate a global 

economy still recovering from the greatest recession since the Great Depression.

• Not all areas of the Greater Middle East are of 

the same strategic value, and the United States 

must be selective in projecting its power in this 

vast area of the world.

• Washington can no longer rely on autocrats as 

instruments of stability since the strategic envi-
127

ronment that has sustained them is disintegrating.

• The Arab Spring’s future is uncertain, but unlike their former rulers, the newly empowered 

masses will oppose policies long favored by the 

United States. Among other things, the Arab 

street will demand that Washington adopt a 

more even-handed approach to the PalestinianIsraeli conflict; that U.S. bases be reduced in 

size or shutdown altogether; and that American leaders stop preaching the glories of democracy while supporting dictators.1

As a consequence of these developments, Washington cannot unilaterally deal with the mayhem that 

the Islamic civil war has unleashed, and this reality is 

the basis for what some commentators have called the 

“Obama Doctrine.” It rests on the truism that the United States must enlist allies in multilateral responses to 

jihadist threats. It also means collaborating with countries that may not share our values but are pursuing 

common security interests.

Clearly, when the violence spills over into our society, we must respond with the appropriate force. But 

it is a fantasy to think that even the world’s premier 

military power can decide the outcome of the Islamic civil war. At best, events can be influenced at the 

margins. At times, the most prudent policy may be 

to do nothing at all. Had we fought the “right war” 

in Afghanistan, rather than the “wrong one” in Iraq, 

Afghanistan today might not be a democracy, but the 

odds are good that it would be free of the Taliban, 

though still perhaps a troubled society.
128

MAKING ROOM FOR THE REST

Fareed Zakaria has observed that the United States 

will remain the world’s premier power for many 

years, but it must make room “for the rest.”2

 Henceforth, U.S. foreign policy must be in compliance with 

the dramatic shift in power that is transpiring from the 

West to the East. For example, the countries known by 

the acronym BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) 

are demanding a voice in international institutions 

(those that the United States helped establish in the 

last century) that is commensurate with their massive 

populations and surging economies. 

Both China and India have populations exceeding one billion citizens, and rates of growth that are 

among the highest in the world; Brazil, with almost 

200 million people, has a population larger than any 

country in Europe, and its economy is growing at 

warp speed; Russia has a population in decline, but it 

possesses abundant mineral and hydrocarbon wealth 

and vast territory. In addition to its membership in the 

UN Security Council, it is second only to the United 

States in the capacity to wage a nuclear war.3

Even countries closely aligned with the United 

States no longer will accept its policies carte blanche. 

Turkey has demonstrated both the will and capacity 

to be a major player in Eurasian affairs in general, and 

those that involve Islamic countries in particular. Ever 

since refusing to allow the Americans a pathway into 

Iraq in 2003, the Turks have indicated that the United 

States can no longer take them for granted. Today, Turkey and Brazil have been searching for a settlement to 

the Iranian nuclear crisis independent of Washington 

and both favor an independent Palestine through UN 

intervention.
129

Relations between India and the United States have 

improved immeasurably as testified by Washington’s 

providing New Delhi with help on the nuclear front, 

but India’s support for American policies cannot be 

taken for granted. In April 2011, when the Obama administration wanted to impose harsh sanctions upon 

Syria for its slaughter of peaceful demonstrators, India refused to endorse the action.

It is within this changing international landscape 

that the United States must revise its approaches to 

world affairs. 

The American Malaise.

As the saying goes, “The American people no 

longer want their country to serve as the world’s policemen, answering 911 calls from all corners of the 

globe.” Since the American Dream is beyond the grasp 

of a significant number of our citizens, their primary 

concern is to achieve personal security.

An alarming number are unemployed, while the 

average worker receives a smaller paycheck today 

than his father did 30 years ago. As a consequence, 

home ownership and a college education for the kids 

are beyond the reach of tens of millions of Americans. 

What is more, those facing retirement must contemplate shrunken pensions or none at all.4

 To make matters still worse, tax hikes may be inevitable, while 

states and municipalities cut programs for young and 

old alike. In the face of growing economic inequality, 

it will become politically daunting for congressional 

candidates or presidential aspirants to justify U.S. 

projections of power globally, including interventions 

costing billions that have been the norm since the end 

of World War II. 
130

Unlike the 2010 elections, foreign policy concerns 

will have a bearing on the outcome of the 2012 races 

as an expanding number of voters see a link between 

foreign intervention and their own economic plight. 

Opposition to the Afghan war includes Americans 

on the left and right, and members of Congress are 

receiving mail from constituents demanding justification for spending $1 million annually to keep an 

American soldier on the Afghan battlefield when their 

state reduces health care benefits, emasculates public 

unions, and raises taxes. 

Even prominent conservatives now question the 

rationale for maintaining a massive defense budget 

when the country faces a $14 trillion debt burden. 

According to a spokesman for Senator Tom Colburn, 

there are ideological reasons for conservatives to curb 

defense outlays that exceed U.S. needs. “By subsidizing our allies’ defense budgets, American taxpayers 

are essentially subsidizing France’s 35-hour workweek and Western European socialism.”5

 Meanwhile, 

his liberal opponents, including President Obama, are 

calling for nation-building “at home.”

Since there will be no quick turn-around of our sagging economy, the American military must live with 

what has been unthinkable: significant reductions in 

the defense budget. Toward this end, U.S. military officials have doubled the size of the hit that DoD must 

take in most recent assessments. As of late July 2011, 

it was assumed that the defense budget would be reduced by $800 billion over the next 12 years. Several 

months prior to that time, the estimate was half that 

figure. At the same time, and in contrast to the past, the 

companion notion that the United States must reduce 

its presence abroad no longer faces staunch opposition from the Republican Party (GOP) and its adher-
131

ents. For example, in 2004, most Americans identified 

as “conservative Republicans” said it was “best to be 

active in world affairs,” but 7 years later that majority 

slipped to 39 percent.6

At the same time, foreign policy and military planners cannot be unmindful of serious fissures in our 

society that deny our political leaders a nation united 

around a common narrative. The social compact that 

emerged from the New Deal and provided the vast 

majority of Americans with a stake in our democratic 

polity and free market economy is in peril. A unified 

America defeated fascism during World War II and 

subverted European communism during the Cold 

War. Today, a significant segment of our citizens is 

questioning the loyalty of their fellow Americans, 

while disunity at home and dramatic changes abroad 

represent huge barriers that our leaders must negotiate 

if they are to forge a common foreign policy agenda. 

It is against this backdrop of dramatic shifts at home 

and abroad that the following recommendations bearing on the Afghanistan Question are provided.

Sticking to the 2014 Afghanistan Exit Schedule.

On July 22, 2011, President Obama addressed the 

American people and announced his plans for the 

much anticipated troop withdrawal. He said that 

10,000 troops would return home by the end of the 

year and an additional 23,000 by the close of 2012. The 

next day Admiral Mullen and General Petraeus expressed concern that the announced pullout went too 

far but endorsed Obama’s call when they conceded 

that as President he was preoccupied with a host of 

pressing matters, not only military ones.
132

Critics, however, attacked the decision from the 

left and right alike. In the first case, the pullout was 

deemed too slow; in the second, too fast. Still, many 

military observers were pleased since it essentially 

provided for two more combat seasons to squeeze the 

Taliban. Moreover, some noted that the draw-down 

could start with support and not combat troops. In 

the process, the jihadists who were suffering mounting casualties would find cause to negotiate a settlement with the allied “Core Group”—Afghanistan, the 

United States, and Pakistan.

Meanwhile, close observers of the Afghanistan 

Question agreed on four pivotal points. 

1. Obama’s announcement had supported the view 

of the public and many foreign policy analysts that 

there was ample reason to end America’s longest war. 

The path ahead was strewn with barriers, but the cost 

of remaining in Afghanistan exceeded the rewards.

2. The Counterinsurgency (COIN) versus counterterrorism (CT) debate had been decided in favor of the 

latter, counterterrorism. According to Bing West: 

We can’t afford $100 billion a year. We have been 

waging war with an ATM that has run out of cash. 

We must implement a strategy that matches our reduced means. Being poorer, we have to fight smarter. 

That means cutting back on the unsuccessful missions of population protection and democratic nationbuilding. The Pashtun population has refused to turn 

against the Taliban, and the unreliable Karzai, with 

dictatorial powers and 4 more years in office, has no 

intention of building a democracy. Our conventional 

battalions are exerting too much effort for too little 

return.7

Of far greater significance, Senator Richard Lugar, 

arguably the most respected voice on foreign policy in 
133

the U.S. Senate, noted that “it is exceedingly difficult 

to conclude that our vast expenditures in Afghanistan 

represent a rational allocation of our military and financial assets.”8

These provocative comments were in keeping with 

observations of CT proponents that it took less than 30 

Navy seals to accomplish the bin Laden kill mission. 

Through small-unit operations and drone strikes, the 

leadership ranks of both al-Qaeda and the Taliban 

had been decimated. To maintain a heavy force in Afghanistan was strategically unjustified and served the 

cause of those jihadists who welcomed a heavy U.S. 

military footprint in Afghanistan just as they cherished the presence of Soviet forces there decades ago. 

Of course, COIN proponents could favorably cite 

the testimony of Secretary Clinton before the U.S. 

Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The day after 

Obama’s announcement, she said that COIN successes had provided a launching pad for CT advances, but 

agreed that there was no military rationale for a large 

contingent of U.S. troops to remain in Afghanistan beyond the President’s timetable.9

3. The time had come to transfer the job of security to the Afghans, and now Karzai had been put on 

notice that he could not procrastinate any longer—he 

had to prepare for that outcome. To maintain a significant number of U.S. combat forces beyond 2014 

would only prolong the Afghans’ dependency upon 

the coalition and delay what was required of them. In 

Michael Walker’s words: 

Our men and women in uniform have performed 

heroically in Afghanistan, but it is now time for the 

ANA to be battle-tested on a large scale and to take the 

lead in fighting this war. Without major victories on 

the battlefield, and without seizing and holding battle 
134

space, the ANA will never attain the confidence and 

reliability it needs to be a viable force.10

4. The stakeholder states and the medley of international institutions that would play a crucial role 

bringing a successful conclusion to the Afghanistan 

Question were now alerted that the time had come to 

make preparations for a post-U.S. Afghanistan. 

PREPARING FOR BONN II 

To negotiate a peaceful solution to the Afghanistan 

Question and avoid a wider war in the region, the 

United States must start planning for an international 

initiative similar to the first Bonn gathering—Bonn II. 

China, India, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Russia all have 

indicated that they fear the security consequences 

should a U.S. withdrawal result in a new civil war in 

Afghanistan—most of them see the return of the Taliban in a similar light. Washington, therefore, must not 

waste any time in embarking upon what is clearly a 

monumental diplomatic endeavor.

In the spring of 2011, the news media reported that 

a diplomatic solution to the mayhem in Afghanistan 

was in the works. A series of secret talks had been 

conducted by Michael Steiner, Germany’s former 

special representative to Afghanistan and Pakistan. 

His Afghan Taliban counterpart was Tayyab Agha, 

a close associate of Mullah Omar. Mid-level U.S. officials were involved in the discussions that first began 

in Qatar and then moved to Bonn. These negotiations 

centered on a planned December 2011 meeting in that 

city.11

Indications were that Indian and Pakistani officials—at the highest levels of their respective gov-
135

ernments—had been talking positively about a peace 

settlement. What is more, it was alleged that the talks 

had the full support of the Karzai government.

Some observers argued that battlefield successes 

resulting in heavy Taliban casualties, impatience with 

their Pakistani “minders,” and bin Laden’s death explained why they were prepared to sign a reconciliation accord that endorsed the Afghanistan constitution, denounced al-Qaeda, eschewed violence, and 

acknowledged the legitimacy of the Karzai government. The accounts also mentioned that the U.S. special representative to Afghanistan and Pakistan (Af/

Pak), Mark Grossman, was involved in the enterprise. 

Other accounts indicated that the jihadists remained 

confident about their future prospects, and that perception had hardened their position. In anticipation 

of the December Bonn gathering, then, no deal was 

guaranteed.

According to Der Spiegel, “The current negotiations revolve around the question of how security and 

stability can be guaranteed after Western troops withdraw. The central issue is the possible establishment 

of permanent American military bases in the country, 

a development the Taliban fears and categorically rejects.”12

This is not the place to assess the many difficult issues that must be resolved, but the following observations provide some background to assess the prospects 

for a successful outcome. By far the greatest barrier is 

the Taliban. Even analysts who welcome negotiations 

with them express doubts about their cooperation. 

They fear Obama’s announcement has encouraged 

the jihadists to hang tough. After all, time is on their 

side. This prognosis, however, ignores a compelling 

fact: the individuals fighting U.S. soldiers in Afghanistan include a wide diversity of groups. First and fore-
136

most are those associated with Mullah Omar’s Quetta 

Shura—or leadership council—that most analysts 

associate with the label, “Taliban.” But there are others jihadists that operate independently of the Quetta 

Shura like the Haqqani network and Hekmatyar’s 

Hizb-e Islami, along with tribal entities, criminal organizations, and freelance fighters motivated by nationalistic, personal, or religious motives. In the early 

months of 2011 reports surfaced that many of these 

groups did not march to a single drummer, and some 

were in violent conflict with one another. Just as the 

prospect of a U.S. exit has produced divisions in the 

Karzai camp, the same is holding true for the Taliban.

Assuming Washington encourages most, if not all, 

of the major stakeholders to join the Bonn II gathering, 

the disparate “Taliban” leaders must ask themselves 

whether or not they want to alienate such a powerful 

collection of countries. Consider, in this connection, 

those who really believe that they may find themselves 

once again in power. What are their prospects if they 

alienate potential donors who can provide them economic assistance, training, and diplomatic and political cover; or, conversely, can empower their enemies? 

Once some of their cohorts embrace the peace process, 

others will be under pressure to join them or run the 

risk of being left behind. In short, a broad-based diplomatic undertaking of this kind is a potential game 

changer that may compel even the most radical Taliban to join Bonn II.

As indicated earlier, the bottom line for Washington is that the Taliban must end the violence, eschew 

al-Qaeda, acknowledge the government in Kabul, and 

abide by the Afghanistan constitution. The Taliban, in 

turn, has a bottom line of its own, the most critical being that it will not negotiate a settlement until foreign 

troops leave the country. With this position in mind, 
137

we perceive the following pathways to successful negotiations:

• A cease-fire is arranged that may allow the Taliban to retain their arms, but they are obliged to 

abide by all of the coalition’s conditions.

• In return, the U.S. and ISAF troops leave Pashtun-dominated areas running roughly from the 

south to the eastern part of the country—that 

is from Helmand to Kunar province. International peacekeepers from Turkey join government troops, Taliban fighters, and elements of 

the Pakistani army as a pacifying force.

• To the West and North, U.S. and ISAF forces 

provide security along with the Afghan army 

and local police militias.

• Kabul, free of combat troops excepting law enforcement units, is under government control, 

but the Taliban and international personnel 

will have headquarters there.

• Over the next several years, outstanding differences—e.g., over the status of minority groups, 

women, political representation, and military 

deployments—will be reconciled.

• Meanwhile, donor countries and international 

economic and humanitarian organizations will 

operate in a violence-free environment.

• These activities will take place under the auspices of the UN and operate through a consortium of stakeholder countries while the CORE 

body constitutes the governing council. Potential key players are China, India, Iran, Russia, 

the Central Asian countries, and Saudi Arabia. 

NATO and the European Union (EU) must also 

participate in the endeavor.

• Depending upon how quickly progress is made, 

further troop reductions may transpire. Conse-
138

quently, the number of U.S. troops scheduled 

to be withdrawn may be accelerated even prior 

to Obama’s schedule.

Officials in the Obama administration are of the 

opinion that advances toward reconciliation will not 

occur until sometime late in 2011, that is, after the Taliban lick their wounds and take stock of a problematic 

future. Of course, if the Taliban refuse to participate, 

the Bonn II proceedings will continue without them.

One more point needs to be underlined: all of the 

countries that have a stake in the future of Afghanistan 

have the incentives and capacity to provide the developmental support that can help meet the economic requirements of the country. Another way to look at this 

is to see international developmental assistance as a 

replacement for the civilian components of COIN that 

the United States cannot provide.

PLAN B: PARTITION

With bin Laden’s death, U.S. officials have spoken 

optimistically about including the Taliban in peace 

talks, but events may prove that forecast a nonstarter. 

The Taliban may reject the idea, and it is uncertain 

whether or not Karzai will support or reject the idea. In 

addition to his conflicting remarks on this matter, his 

own future is problematic since he cannot legally run 

for re-election. Then, too, there is uncertainty about 

Pakistan. If the major stakeholders accepted Washington’s invitation, Islamabad would be hard pressed not 

to join them, but then again there are powerful forces 

in Pakistan that are pulling in disparate directions. 

Furthermore, a peace drive may begin and achieve 

some success, but down the road end in a new round 

of violence. 
139

It is thus imperative that the U.S. military ponder 

how it would react to a range of plausible outcomes 

as the 2014 deadline approaches. One of the most 

plausible ones is what we have called Plan B, or partition. It may occur as a result of a number of events. 

For example, in the face of a Taliban return to power, 

Hazaras, Uzbeks, and Tajiks—joined by anti-Taliban 

Pashtuns—resort to armed resistance and re-create an 

entity similar to the Northern Alliance. As an alternative to the Taliban, they will have scant difficulty 

securing funding for their armed forces; India, Iran, 

Russia, and under some circumstances possibly China, 

not to mention the United States, will provide arms, 

equipment, and money to help them protect most of 

western and northern Afghanistan. 

Another catalyst to partition may occur as a consequence of a campaign on the part of the Pashtuns 

on both sides of the Afghan-Pakistan border to create 

some kind of Pashtun state. Not much is said about 

this prospect since most analysts presumably deem 

it unlikely, but no one doubts that as the U.S. withdrawal gains steam, a great deal of turbulence will follow in its wake. Clearly, then, a host of unanticipated 

consequences may materialize.

Without probing further into this admittedly difficult and complex alternative, the U.S. military must 

seriously consider what role it would play were the 

partition of Afghanistan to materialize. Clearly, no-fly 

zones come to mind along with air support and air surveillance operations, as well as the creation of logistical corridors through Russia and Central Asia. Washington might conduct defensive military operations to 

prevent an invasion of the enclave in the North or offensive ones to achieve the same objective. High-value 

targets would become subject to limited drone strikes 
140

and kill-and-capture operations, both conducted with 

the explicit purpose—at the minimum—of sustaining 

the division between the Taliban and Afghans who 

cannot abide living under their rule. 

Preparing for the Worst Case Scenario (Plan C): A 

Taliban Victory.

Partition assumes a limited Taliban conquest, but 

U.S. strategists cannot ignore the worst case scenario, 

a total jihadist victory. As long as U.S. forces are in 

the country that will not happen, but given the huge 

problems that any Afghanistan government will face 

after 2014, all of Afghanistan might fall under Taliban 

control. A Taliban take-over could assume either of 

two forms. 

The first constitutes a Taliban government that adheres to a national and not a global jihadist vision; it 

imposes strict “Islamist” policies upon the nation but 

denies radical jihadists sanctuaries, and proscribes international terrorist strikes of its own making.

Many Taliban leaders of the older generation are still 

potential partners for a negotiated settlement. They 

are not implacably opposed to the U.S. or the West in 

general but to specific actions or policies in Afghanistan. These figures now understand the position of the 

international community much better than they did 

before 2001. They are not seeking a return to the failed 

interactions between the Taliban and the international 

community of the 1990s. At present they still represent 

the movement.13

These are the words of two researchers who have 

spent the last several years observing and interacting 

with Taliban in Kandahar, and they are not alone in 

their prognosis.
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The Taliban leaders cannot forget that it took about 

6 years for them to consolidate power in Afghanistan but only 3 months to lose their Islamic emirate 

as a consequence of a shattering military defeat. It is 

doubtful that they want a similar outcome. Moreover, 

a Western analyst based in Kabul has observed, “Taliban leaders say their agenda is purely regional. Unlike al-Qaida, they don’t want to establish an emirate 

in Washington.”14 What is more, to have any hope of 

creating a viable regime, they must rely upon friends 

such as Pakistan and Saudi Arabia who find global jihadist policies unacceptable, and they must reach an 

accommodation with powerful enemies like Russia, 

the United States, and, perhaps, Iran and China. 

Although its harsh fundamentalist policies, such 

as the mistreatment of women, will not win it many 

friends, a Taliban government that confined its radical 

religious practices to Afghanistan might be acceptable 

to the international community. In the final analysis, 

the same may hold true of most Afghans who prefer 

peace to a new round of fighting. Those who cannot 

abide the Taliban will leave the country or perhaps 

operate as insurgents.

The same would not hold true were a Taliban government to emerge that provided training camps for 

terrorists and orchestrated strikes against the United 

States and its allies. In the event of that outcome, the 

United States would respond militarily, most likely 

in a manner consistent with counterterrorism and not 

COIN doctrine. In this connection, we should take to 

heart some of the observations of old warriors who 

have closely observed operations in Afghanistan and 

younger ones who have served there. Representing 

the first category, Bing West has observed: 
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We didn’t have a war-fighting doctrine for defeating 

the Taliban. Instead, we had a counterinsurgency doctrine for nation building, much like the Peace Corps 

on a giant scale. The new counterinsurgency dogma 

confused the soldiers because it confused roles. . . . 

Colonels insisted on detailed briefings before a single 

patrol could conduct a night ambush. This self-imposed restraint allowed the Taliban to control both its 

casualties and the pace and place of the fighting.15

Press reports indicate that many young soldiers 

who have served in Afghanistan are of the same opinion, thus challenging some of the basic principles of 

COIN. Specifically, they are convinced that the time 

has come to reconsider the rules of engagement when 

fighting an enemy that will place civilians at risk as an 

integral part of their military doctrine. Of course, jihadists who engage in such practices violate the rules 

of war. Consequently, it may be immoral to ask our 

warriors to sacrifice their lives when confronting an 

enemy that has contempt for secular rules of war because they answer to a “higher authority.” When our 

soldiers inadvertently kill civilians because insurgents 

use them as shields, such actions are consistent with 

just war theory; it is the enemy that is engaging in immoral acts.16 Furthermore, COIN practitioners must 

keep in mind that, in some instances, killing the enemy is the road to success and not attempts to win the 

hearts and minds of people who consider any kind of 

cooperation with foreign soldiers to be evil. If commanders or their civil masters consider this course 

unacceptable, perhaps they should not deploy combat 

troops in the first place.

One final observation must be stressed as the 

United States prepares to leave Afghanistan. An infrastructure, overt and covert, must be arranged that 
143

will sustain counterterrorist operations should the 

need arise to employ it in some future timeframe. It 

would include a network of sleeper cells, kill-andcapture teams, and arrangements with tribal leaders 

ready to wage guerrilla warfare against oppressive 

jihadist authorities. It would include drones and other 

technology that no longer allows a small number of 

terrorists to challenge a world class military establishment without fear of retribution. Now a small number 

of American fighters without concern about collateral 

casualties can impose lethal costs upon the insurgents. 

Young boys mesmerized by religious fantasies may 

continue to engage in suicide bombings without fear 

of death, but their elders who are more considerate of 

their own mortality may think twice about ordering 

terrorist strikes when they are the target of proficient 

enemies thousands of miles from their assumed sanctuaries.

Confronting Pakistan.

With the successful campaign against bin Laden, 

the duplicity of Pakistan has become a hot topic even 

among casual foreign policy mavens. Pakistan’s harboring of al-Qaeda and Taliban terrorists that are killing Americans has prompted demands from the public 

and some of the political elite to confront the Pakistani 

civilian and military authorities and demand that they 

hand over individuals who are associated with other 

terrorist organizations that have sanctuaries in the 

country. This would include Mullah Omar, Ayman 

Zawari, Saif al Adel, leaders in the Haqqani network, 

and the Lashkar-e-Tayyiba terrorist group that was responsible for the Mumbai atrocities. If the Pakistanis 

fail to comply, we should stop providing them the 
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billions of dollars in economic and military aid that 

enables them to embrace the status quo. 

Washington-based Pakistan experts strongly oppose such provocative actions, responding first, that 

in spite of Pakistan’s duplicity, there is no positive 

outcome to the Afghanistan crisis without Pakistan’s 

help. Second, they say we must accept business as 

usual with Islamabad because it is a nuclear power, 

and even if its nukes are under the safe control of 

the Army, no one can discount a nuclear show-down 

between India and Pakistan that would envelop the 

region and perhaps much of the world in a nuclear 

conflagration.

This view has strong advocates in both political 

parties, but as we approach the 2012 presidential election, it is clear that existing relations between Washington and Islamabad are in crisis and may no longer 

be sustainable. Growing numbers of Americans feel 

unprecedented economic pain, and they have begun 

to associate it with expensive foreign ventures like the 

wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Consequently, it will 

be difficult for any President to maintain the existing 

level of economic and military aid to a country that is 

harboring terrorists killing Americans. What is more, 

when U.S. voters hear reports that the top military 

brass in Pakistan enjoy lucrative business enterprises 

or have access to funds that conceivably are part of the 

billion dollar aid package that is provided annually by 

American taxpayers, they are bound to raise hell. At 

the same time, Pakistan has been a major, perhaps the 

most significant, source of nuclear weapons proliferation in the world. Libya, Iran, and North Korea have 

been on the receiving end of help from the Pakistan 

scientific proliferator, A. Q. Khan.
145

Moreover, India and Pakistan must on their own 

resolve their disputes over Kashmir and other security-related issues. The United States cannot do so for 

them. In a word, both countries must adopt the same 

triad of measures that prevented a nuclear exchange 

between the United States and the USSR during the 

Cold War: deterrence; arms control; and crisis management. There has been progress of late on stabilizing the nuclear relationship between India and Pakistan, and the United States must do whatever it can to 

facilitate more harmonious relations between the two 

sides. Through Bonn II, they may find a way, with the 

support of the international community, to reduce 

their respective fears about an Afghan settlement. 

In considering U.S.-Pakistani discord, Bruce Riedel 

takes the United States to task for not acknowledging 

the huge problems that confront both Pakistan’s civilian and military leaders. He notes in particular that 

while the George W. Bush administration celebrated 

a commitment to democratization, it worked closely 

with General Pervez Musharraf, a military dictator. 

That act of hypocrisy did not sit well with many Pakistanis and contributed to anti-American resentments. 

He urges Washington to reinforce the civilian authorities in Islamabad, but at the same time he makes the 

case that the military really has the upper hand.

Furthermore, Riedel provides convincing evidence 

that the Pakistani military has been extremely reckless. 

For example, some members of the ISI encouraged attacks on Indian cities such as the Mumbai terrorist 

strike that killed 116 people. He also underscores that 

in an earlier attack on the parliament in New Delhi, 

high-level officials were deemed priority targets. The 

Pakistani officials who were complicit in such rash 

operations recklessly ignored the fact that they were 
146

provoking a country that defeated Pakistan in three 

wars and that possesses a nuclear arsenal equal to or 

even more potent than their own. 

Yes, Indian-Pakistani enmity might be reduced 

if Washington helped resolve their differences over 

Kashmir, but given the refusal of either side to reconcile their differences regarding this conflict, does anyone really believe that United States has the capacity 

to help end it? The time has come to recognize that the 

United States can no longer hope to shape all international events.

On the basis of this evidence, U.S. leaders must ask 

themselves whether they can rely upon their partners 

in Pakistan to change their ways when they have indicated time and again that their pathological fear of 

India makes them not only an unreliable partner, but 

a dangerous one as well. Both the civilian and military 

leaders in Pakistan must be made to understand by 

their American counterparts that the status quo cannot endure, and that the time has come to develop a 

security partnership that is transparent, honest, and 

fruitful. In short, that means that no American President can allow Pakistan to support terrorists who are 

killing our soldiers, and that if this support does not 

end, there will be consequences, including a cut-off of 

funds to Pakistan’s military establishment.17

Both the civilian and military leadership in Islamabad may ignore such threats for the reasons that have 

been cited: namely, that the Americans cannot hope to 

achieve success in Afghanistan without Pakistan and, 

should Washington punish it, the United States may 

destabilize Pakistan and foster a nuclear showdown 

with India. The Americans certainly do not want that 

to happen.
147

The Pakistani elite, however, cannot be unmindful 

of the growing anger on the part of the U.S. public 

when they hear that Pakistan is receiving billions of 

their hard-earned tax dollars while it refuses to deny 

sanctuaries to jihadists that are killing our young soldiers. What is more, many Americans are asking why 

we are arming a flaky ally that is using our military 

aid to threaten the world’s largest democracy—India. 

Observations of this nature resonate across the U.S. 

political spectrum, and they will gain momentum in 

the tempest of the 2012 presidential campaign.

In sum, the future of U.S.-Pakistan relations looks 

bleak, but there is some hope that the anticipated 

Bonn II gathering—or a similar diplomatic initiative—

will force them both to set aside their mutual points of 

conflict in favor of a more significant outcome—a negotiated settlement to the Afghanistan Question that 

may not please them on all counts but goes a long way 

toward promoting their most basic security concerns. 

Before closing the books on Pakistan, it is imperative for the U.S. defense community to think about the 

unthinkable: the implosion of Pakistan. That outcome 

may be remote, but it would constitute a truly monumental threat to regional and perhaps world peace, 

and therefore should not be discounted. Most experts 

believe that in spite of its many problems—ecological, 

economic, ethnic, military, and political—Pakistan 

will endure. Perhaps, but there is mounting evidence 

to the contrary, and it would be a mistake to ignore 

it. Recall that not too long ago the Soviet Union arguably possessed far greater resources to prevent its demise, but nonetheless collapsed. Moreover, Pakistani 

experts say the army would not permit the state to 

collapse, but once again the Red Army and associated 

security services were robust but in the end proved incapable of preventing the Soviet Empire’s implosion.
148

The Time Has Come to Reduce Our Profile in the 

Greater Middle East.

On February 25, 2011, Secretary Gates stunned a 

West Point audience: “In my opinion, any future defense secretary who advises the president to again 

send a big American land army into Asia or into the 

Middle East or Africa should have his head examined.”18 Implicit in the Secretary’s words is the message that the time has come for the United Staes to 

reduce its profile in the Middle East, now roiled by 

the monumental confrontations between the old autocrats and the emerging middle class and the povertystricken masses.

Initially, it was assumed that the Arab Spring 

would promote reforms that resulted in democratic 

governments, more open social systems, and marketdriven economies that would reduce the income inequality that is the hallmark of the Arab and Islamic 

world. But, alas, the struggle may last for years and 

produce widespread violence and the return to power 

of anti-democratic elements. In addition, the fate of 

U.S. allies like Iraq, Israel, Egypt, Jordan, and the Gulf 

sheikdoms, as well as those that are strategically vital to the future of the oil-rich region like Iran, Lebanon, and Syria, are all in question. The Arab Spring, 

then, may presage years of widespread turmoil and 

violence in a region where 70 percent of the world’s 

petroleum is located.

Mindful of such further serious turmoil in the Arab-Iranian lands, and with diminishing assets itself, 

the United States must make a choice: to remain in 

Afghanistan and expand our involvement in Central 

Asia for many years, or to focus primarily on the stra-
149

tegically vital Arab-Iranian arena. Given the facts on 

the ground, it appears that doing both may be beyond 

Washington’s capacity and its vital self-interest. Whatever choice it makes, the United States must urgently 

search for partners. Given the plight of the European 

project, that may mean reaching out to countries that 

have not been closely allied with it, such as China and 

Russia as well as the Central Asian autocracies. Critics 

who claim that a reset with such autocracies is unjustified must provide an answer to those who ask, “But 

what are the alternatives?” For example, should we 

refuse to accept Chinese investments in U.S. Government securities because of Beijing’s less than stellar 

human rights record? Or should we refuse to accept 

pathways into Afghanistan through Uzbekistan because of Karimov’s authoritarian rule?

Above all, in assesssing future military operations in the Greater Middle East, Pentagon planners 

should pay heed to Hamid Fhadil, a political scientist 

at Baghdad University who spoke in response to questions about why there was a spike in terrorist attacks 

in Iraq: “If the Americans leave, Al Qaeda will no longer have an excuse to operate throughout the country. 

Al Qaeda wants Americans to stay here so they will 

have Iraq as a battlefield to fight the Americans.”19

Sustaining and Enlarging Security Cooperation 

with Russia.

U.S.-Russian security cooperation in Afghanistan 

has been limited but successful. By the end of 2011, 

more than 50 percent of the cargo to be delivered to 

coalition forces will travel by way of the NDN.20 It will 

become an even more critical logistical asset as coalition forces begin to exit Afghanistan, and agreements 
150

with Central Asian and Russian authorities permit 

cargo heretofore prohibited—such as lethal equipment—to traverse their land and air space. In addition, help in the way of arms, intelligence, and training from the Russian side has facilitated the coalition’s 

mission in Afghanistan. 

Looking forward, expanding commercial relations 

between Russia and Afghanistan are on the upswing. 

On January 21, 2011, Karzai was the first Afghan president to visit Moscow since Najibullah did so in the 

late 1980s. He, along with a number of prominent Afghans, met with Medvedev and Putin to discuss wider 

economic cooperation. Yevgeny Primakov, the head 

of Russia’s Chamber of Commerce, pointed to upgrading the Afghan infrastructure projects that were 

initially built during the Soviet era, such as a pre-fabricated housing factory, and one that produces cement 

in Jabal Siraj. Both would be funded by the Moscow 

Industrial Bank. 

Karzai, in turn, cited a $500 million rise in bilateral 

trade and Afghanistan’s interest in Russia’s hydrocarbon assets. He also welcomed access to the technical 

expertise that his northern neighbor could provide, as 

well as military assistance such as the 20,000 AK-47 

rifles Russia donated to his forces and its help in training 250 members of the Afghan police force.21

Since opening a trade office in Kabul in 2002, the 

Afghans have eagerly accommodated Russian commercial efforts that are associated with Soviet-era 

development programs like the Naglu hydroelectric 

station and “the Salang tunnel that links Kabul to the 

Northern provinces and was constructed by the Soviets.”22 Simultaneously, Russia is intent on connecting 

its pipelines and rail transit systems running through 

Central Asia to those in Afghanistan. As funding as-
151

sociated with extensive American military operations 

declines, Kabul will look to Russia as an eager economic partner.

On the diplomatic front, Russia through the UN 

can encourage stakeholders to fund economic and 

humanitarian programs that ease Afghanistan’s economic challenges. Russia is in a position likewise to 

advance progress of the international effort to make 

Bonn II a success. It also enjoys close relations with 

China and India and can help encourage both of these 

emerging powers to endorse a diplomatic campaign 

to stabilize the entire region.

In event of partition, Russia’s assistance to the 

Northern Alliance’s success would be critical—most 

specifically in maintaining air and land corridors to 

it and providing arms, ammunition, and supplies required to sustain the non-Taliban entity. Simultaneously, were the worst-case scenario to materialize, the 

Tajik and Uzbek insurgents affiliated with the Taliban 

would become more aggressive throughout Central 

Asia. Under these circumstances, Russia might take 

active military measures to meet the jihadist threat. 

Fearful of their security, those Central Asian leaders 

that were wary of Russian soldiers operating on their 

territory might actually welcome them. 

In the face of a range of plausible scenarios, the 

American defense community must assess the feasibility of joint U.S.-Russian military operations. But a 

broad range of concomitant questions must also be 

addressed. What are the prospects of joint military 

cooperation in meeting a resumed jihadist threat in 

Afghanistan or Central Asia? What would be the character of this military cooperation? Are joint combat 

operations even plausible, given existing reservations 

in both Washington and Moscow about the good will 
152

of the other side? And if they are plausible, what about 

the command structure and from which venue would 

they operate? Finally, what are the prospects of China 

joining Russia and the United States in a range of efforts to develop and stabilize Afghanistan, or, barring 

that, at least Beijing standing aside and not interfering 

in those efforts?23

Critics of the reset in both Washington and Moscow, however, have been unrelenting in derogating 

the reset campaign. But in addition to the sanguine 

prospects engendered by the New START, U.S. critics of the reset overlook the fact that Russia joined the 

Americans and Europeans in sanctioning Tehran for 

failing to comply with UN resolutions regarding its 

drive for nukes. Likewise, Moscow withheld an arms 

sale that amounted to close to a billion dollars. True, 

the Kremlin often uses harsh language in criticizing 

Western foreign policy initiatives, but in the final 

analysis, it rarely backs its caustic words with punishing actions. Russia needs the reset, and this conviction 

encouraged Medvedev in the May 2011 G-8 gathering 

in France to call for Quaddafi’s expulsion from office. 

This was a significant setback for the Libyan dictator 

since he had cited his “close” relationship with Moscow as evidence that he was not a pariah in the eyes of 

the international community.

Of course, Russian critics assert that, aside from 

the American pledge to provide a $5 million reward 

for information leading to the arrest of the North Caucasus terrorist, Umarov, Russia has not gotten much in 

return for the reset. That is categorically untrue, since 

coalition troops have suffered the loss of considerable 

blood and treasure in Afghanistan—in the case of the 

United States, about 1,600 deaths—in order to crush 

the very same jihadists that deem Russia an enemy of 

Islam. 
153

One can make the case that ongoing reset initiatives collectively amount to an expanding network of 

crisis managers, freelance defense analysts, political 

leaders, and key policymakers in both camps who are 

breaking down barriers to cooperation. They are creating a common partnership culture that reminds one 

of the U.S.-Soviet networks of individuals and organizations that thrived during the “Golden Age of Arms 

Control.” For decades, it served as an educational as 

well as a confidence-building mechanism and helped 

prevent the military showdown that haunted leaders 

in both countries. It operated at a time when the participants saw the other as a dangerous and authentic 

security threat. Today, no one in either camp—with 

some rare exceptions—really believes that an American-Russian nuclear exchange is plausible. 

These positive events aside, there are serious roadblocks to expanding joint-security ventures.24 For 

example, as long as concerns about another RussianGeorgian war exist and the future of South Ossetia 

and Abkhazia are unsettled, many in the West will 

reject further cooperation with Moscow. Charges that 

Russia is interfering with the prospects for democracy 

in Belarus are not winning it friends in the West, either. What is more, by exploiting its energy wealth to 

manipulate its former Baltic republics and East European satellites, Moscow is compromising the prospects for reset. Perhaps the most toxic disagreement 

involves the U.S. missile defense system that will be 

deployed in Europe. Some analysts believe that it will 

undermine the reset since Washington simply cannot 

allow Moscow to have a real voice in how the system 

operates. That conclusion may prove erroneous since 

it appears that the Obama administration truly wants 

to reach some kind of agreement with Russia on this 

matter.
154

Notwithstanding the positive signs, U.S. analysts 

cannot be unmindful that Russia’s capacity for jointsecurity operations is limited. In addition to a shrinking population, Russian society is stricken by corruption, lawlessness, a dangerous over-dependency upon 

its hydrocarbon wealth, and a track record of failed 

military reform. The Kremlin overlords continue to 

demand they be treated as equals, but by any measuring stick available—demographic, economic, military, 

and political—Russia is hardly equal to the United 

States, much less to the combined strength of the EU, 

Japan, and South Korea. This is not meant to diminish 

Russia or its people, but rather to hearken to Putin’s 

advice that officials in Washington and Moscow must 

cooperate on the basis of common interests rooted in 

reality. In this connection, some in the West warn that 

Russia has a grand strategy, but the Americans and 

Europeans do not have a similar agenda. But that is 

not the problem here. Rather, it is that Russia has international ambitions that exceed its capabilities, and 

that disconnect could undermine the reset.

In the final analysis, the reset may fail, but in its 

2011 statement on combating terrorism, the United 

States emphasized as a core principle the need to find 

international partners in the fight against terrorists.25

Even if there is successful closure to the Afghanistan 

Question, al-Qaeda and like-minded jihadist groups 

will continue to operate elsewhere—Yemen, Somalia, or some other majority Islamic country where the 

government is weak and society is in turmoil. Indeed, 

they may launch terrorist attacks from somewhere in 

Europe, including Russia, or even the United States. 

In most of these cases, joint efforts to fight jihadist terrorism make sense, even if the payoff is modest.
155

On the basis of American-Russian cooperation in 

Afghanistan, Washington should persist in joint-security cooperation with Moscow. If there is concrete 

evidence that the partnership is no longer viable, then 

it is appropriate to shut it down—but not until that 

point is reached. In keeping with the principles of 

prudent internationalism, all opportunities for multilateral cooperation that safeguard the United States 

should be welcomed.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 7

1. For an early assessment of the Arab Spring, see the series of 

articles published under the rubric “The New Arab Revolt,” in the 

May/June 2011 issue of Foreign Affairs.

2. Fareed Zakaria, The Post American World, New York: W. W. 

Norton & Co., May 2008.

3. For a Chinese commentary on BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, 

and China), see Wang Xiaotian, “BRICS target economic reform,” 

China Watch, The China Daily, May 6, 2011.

4. Joseph Stiglitz, the Noble Prize winner in economics, forecasts slow economic growth and high rates of unemployment for 

many years, and in this forecast he is joined by economists of all 

schools of thought. See his “Alternatives to Austerity,” Project 

Syndicate, December 6, 2010.

5. Carrie Budoff-Brown, “Will New War Nix Big Defense 

Cuts?” Politico, March 28, 2011. 

6. See Craig Whitlock, “Pentagon girds for deeper cuts,” 

Washington Post, July 21, 2011; and “More Conservatives Say 

‘Come Home, America’,” Washington, DC: Pew Research Center 

Publications, June 16, 2011.

7. Bing West, The Wrong War, New York: Random House, 

2011, p. 252. Colonel Gian Gentile is in agreement with this prognosis: “American strategy in Afghanistan currently suffers from a 
156

dysfunctional mismatch between the heavy amount of resources 

committed through a long-term campaign of nation building and 

President Barack Obama’s reasonably limited core political goal 

in the region to ‘disrupt, disable, and defeat’ al-Qaeda.” See his 

“The ‘Condition-Based’ Afghan Loophole,” Washington, DC: 

Council on Foreign Relations, online publication, December 10, 

2010.

8. David A. Fahrenthold and Paul Kane, “On Hill, Renewed 

Calls for Rapid Afghan Pullout,” Washington Post, May 11, 2011. A 

number of GOP presidential aspirants also have called for a U.S. 

pull-out from Afghanistan, and their cohorts in Congress indicate 

that economic prudence favors that outcome as well.

9. Hilary Rodham Clinton, Secretary of State, Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, U.S. Department of 

State, June 23, 2011.

10. Michael F. Walker, “The Afghan Army Needs to Fight,” 

Washington Post, May 1, 2011.

11. Among the press reports treating peace talks, see Mark 

Landler and Helene Cooper, “Qaeda Woes Fuel Talk of Speeding Afghan Pullback,”New York Times, June 2011; David Ignatius, 

“Signs of an Afghan Deal,” Washington Post, May 26, 2011. For a 

comprehensive discussion of a peace plan, see Lakhdar Brahimi 

and Thomas R. Pickering, Task Force Co-Chairs, Afghanistan: Negotiating Peace, New York: The Century Foundation Press, 2011. 

12. Susanne Koelbl and Holger Stark, “Germany Mediates Secret U.S. Taliban Talks,” Spiegel Online, May 24, 2011.

13. Alex van Linschoten and Felix Kuehn, Separating the Taliban from Al-Qaeda: The Core of Success in Afghanistan, New York: 

Center on International Cooperation, February 2011.

14. These are the words of Thomas Ruttig at the Afghanistan 

Analysts Network. See Koelbl and Stark.

15. West, p. 111.
157

16. For a discussion of just war theory, see Richard J. Krickus, 

“On The Morality of Chemical/Biological Warfare,” The Journal of 

Conflict Resolution, Vol. 9, No. 2, 1965, pp. 200-210.

17. For a discussion of U.S.-Pakistani relations by a seasoned 

American official, see Bruce Riedel, Deadly Embrace, Washington, 

DC: The Brookings Institution, 2011.

18. George Friedman, “Never Fight a Land War in Asia,” 

STRATFOR, May 1, 2011.

19. See Michael S. Schmidt, “Threat Resurgence in Deadliest 

Day of Year for Iraq,” New York Times, August 15, 2011.

20. Whitlock. 

21. Aunohita Mojumdar, “Karzai Visits Moscow as Russia 

Eyes Greater Role in Afghanistan,” The Christian Science Monitor, 

January 20, 2011; Owen Matthews and Anna Nemtsova, “Back To 

Afghanistan,” Newsweek, November 3, 2010.

22. Marlene Laurelle, Beyond the Afghan Trauma: Russia’s Return to Afghanistan, Washington, DC: The Jamestown Foundation, 

August 2009, p. 19. 

23. Russian and Chinese troops have participated in joint military exercises, and together they can field a military force capable of engaging jihadists. It remains to be seen, however, whether 

such a force is feasible, given a relationship that has been marked 

by old grievances and current suspicions. Will they use the SRO 

as an instrument for anti-jihadist military operations? And how 

will they interact with the United States? U.S. military planners 

must give serious consideration to all of these questions in exploring the reset’s future, even though at present the prospects of 

China’s playing a positive role in stabilizing Afghanistan appear 

slim. Given its extensive and growing commercial interest in Afghanistan, however, stability in that country is in Beijing’s vital 

interest. This realization may ultimately convince it that cooperation with Washington on this matter is prudent. Up to the present 

time, China has been a free-rider, and its projects in Afghanistan 

have been protected by the American-led coalition. But while it 

has characterized U.S. troops in the region as threatening, like 
158

Moscow, it has expressed concern about the future of Afghanistan after the Americans leave. Meetings between American and 

Chinese officials in Washington in the spring of 2011 have been 

characterized by Obama administration officials as “groundbreaking.” 

24. Looking forward to future reset prospects, most seasoned 

observers are cautious in their assessments. Dmitri Trenin sees 

Russian help in Afghanistan as limited and tactical and does not 

presage extensive American-Russian security cooperation. “Despite some tactical collaboration in Afghanistan, there is virtually 

no potential for serious cooperation between Russia and the United States on Central Asia.” Still, he sees Russia’s interest in a reset 

with the United States as part of a broader strategy of achieving 

good relations with the West to help jump-start Russia’s modernization program. Dmitri Trenin, “Contemporary Issues in International Security: Central Asia,” Stephen J. Blank, ed., Central 

Asian Security Trends: Views From Europe And Russia, Carlisle, PA: 

Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, April 2011, p. 

72.

25. See National Strategy For Counterterrorism, Washington, 

DC: The White House, June 2011. In considering the issue of 

partners, it is evident that, unlike the European countries, Russia has compelling reasons to join the United States in enhancing 

Afghanistan’s security. For most Europeans living in the Western part of the Continent, they see no serious existing threat associated with Afghanistan and lament that their American allies 

are now obsessed with a new cold war, only it is manifested in 

turmoil afflicting the Islamic world. This explains why ever since 

9/11, Europe’s defense outlays have plunged 15 percent, prompting Secretary Gates to complain about the Europeans’ failure to 

carry their fair share of the defense burden. As a consequence, 

he warned, “The blunt reality is that there will be dwindling appetite and patience in the U.S. Congress—and in the American 

body politic writ large—to expend increasingly precious funds 

on behalf of nations that are apparently unwilling to devote the 

necessary resources or make the necessary changes to be serious 

and capable partners in their own defense.” See Transcript of Defense Secretary Gates’ Speech on NATO’s Future, Wall Street Journal, June 10, 2011, available from WSJ.com. These words do not 

resonate since most ordinary Europeans do not care if the United 
159

States reduces its defense budget as personal security is their major concern; that is, security imperiled by national economic difficulties that are a by-product of a massive display of corruption 

and ineptness on the part of their American cousins. That is the 

colossal scam hatched by Wall Street sharpies who exploited the 

dream of home ownership to devastate the U.S. and eventually 

the global financial system. Likewise, the specter of the European 

Project fragmenting into disparate political and economic entities 

and the collapse of the Euro zone is their major “security” nightmare. 
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Gregg F. Martin

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Director

Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of Research

Dr. Antulio J. Echevarria II

Author

Dr. Richard J. Krickus

Director of Publications

Dr. James G. Pierce

Publications Assistant

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition

Mrs. Jennifer E. Nevil
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE