A TTORNEY FOR A PPELLANT A TTORNEY FOR A PPELLEE George C. Patrick Sharon Funcheon Murphy Crown Point, IN Indianapolis, IN

______________________________________________________________________________ 

# In the 

# Indiana Supreme Court

_________________________________ No. 93S02-0511-EX-605

K RSTE P RENTOSKI , Appellant (Plaintiff below),

v.

F IVE S TAR P AINTING , I NC ., Appellee (Defendant below)

.

_________________________________ Appeal from the Full Worker’s Compensation Board, No. C-144134

_________________________________ On Petition To Transfer from the Indian a Court of Appeals, No. 93A02-0410-EX-815

_________________________________ November 23, 2005

Per curiam.

A Single Hearing Member of the Worker’s Compensation Board dismissed Krste Prentoski’s second application for adjustment of be nefits after finding it un timely under Indiana Code Section 22-3-3-27(c). That subsection provides, “[A] pplications for increased permanent partial impairment are barred unless filed within one (1) year from the last day for which compensation was paid[.]” Ind. Code § 22- 3-3-27(c) (emphasis added). The Full Board affirmed. Later, the Court of Appeals affirmed afte r agreeing the application was untimely because it was not filed within one year after the last date for which compensation was paid, even though it was filedwithin one year after the date on which Prentoski received a lump-sum payment from his employer’s insurance carrier for permanent partial impairment benefits that the Board determined were owed to him. Prentoski v. Five Star Painting, Inc. , 827 N.E.2d 98, 102-03 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). Prentoski petitioned to transfer.

A long line of Court of Appeals opinions has interpreted the language in Indiana Code Section 22-3-3-27(c) and similarly worded predece ssor statutes to mean that the limitations period begins running on the last date “for which” compensation was paid rather than on some other date. See, e.g. , Gibson v. Indus. Bd. , 176 Ind. App. 489, 376 N.E.2d 502, 504 (1978) (“[T] he Legislature did not choose a specified period of time after the date of the injury, or after the date of the award, or after the last paymen t of compensation. . . . Rather, the Legislature chose the last day for which compensation was paid.”); Lambert v. Powers , 76 Ind. App. 77, 131 N.E. 420, 421 (1921) (“Time for filing such applica tion does not run from the date of the award . . . but from the end of the compensation period fixed by the award.”). However, a s Judge Sullivan notes in his concurring opinion, a few opini ons have initially quoted the statute correctly but then referred imprecisely to “the last date that [the employee] received” benefits under an earlier award, Luz v. Hart Schaffner & Marx , 771 N.E.2d 1230, 1234 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied ; or “‘the last day on which compensation was paid[.]’” Halteman Swim Club v. Duguid , 757 N.E.2d 1017, 1020 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (quoting Gregg v. Sun Oil Co. , 180 Ind. App. 379, 388 N.E.2d 588, 590 (1979); Berry v. Anaconda Corp. , 534 N.E.2d 250, 253 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989) (same).

To clarify, we agree the Court of Appeals’ analysis of the st atute of limitations in the present case correctly focused on the last date “for which” compensation was paid rather than the last date “on which” compensation was paid. We therefore grant transfer, adopt that portion of the opinion of the Court of Appeals that addresse s the statute of limitations, and incorporate it by reference. See Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A)(1). We summar ily affirm the part of the opinion of the Court of Appeals that addresses whether a hearing was required on Five Star’s motion to dismiss. See App. R. 58(A)(2).

All Justices concur.

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