49–010 

Calendar No. 625 

109TH CONGRESS REPORT " ! SENATE 2d Session 109–345 

WASTEWATER TREATMENT WORKS SECURITY 

ACT OF 2006 

SEPTEMBER 21, 2006.—Ordered to be printed 

Mr. INHOFE, from the Committee on Environment and Public 

Works, submitted the following 

R E P O R T 

together with 

ADDITIONAL VIEWS 

[To accompany S. 2781] 

[Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office] 

The Committee on Environment and Public Works, to which was 

referred a bill (S. 2781) to amend the Federal Water Pollution Control Act to enhance the security of wastewater treatment works, 

having considered the same reports favorably thereon with an 

amendment and recommends that the bill, as amended, do pass. 

GENERAL STATEMENT AND BACKGROUND

The nation’s 16,000 publicly owned treatment works (POTWs) 

serve more than 200 million people, or 70 percent of the U.S. population. POTWs consist of not just the treatment plant but 100,000 

major pumping stations, 600,000 sanitary sewers and more than 

200,000 miles of storm sewers. The sewer systems could provide an 

underground network through which terrorists could access and 

damage the business and population centers of most of the nation’s 

major cities. A terrorist could also impair the wastewater treatment process possibly resulting in the release of toxic chemicals including chlorine gas as well as cause harm to the computerized 

control systems, pump stations and other parts of the facility. Damage to a wastewater treatment plant could result in significant loss 


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of life, environmental damage, and the contamination of surface 

and groundwater/drinking water supplies. 

In 1998, President Bill Clinton issued Presidential Directive 63 

designating the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) as the 

lead agency responsible for overseeing the security of POTWs. Following the tragic events of September 11, 2001, much more focus 

was placed on securing the nation’s infrastructure from a terrorist 

attack. Congress created the Department of Homeland Security in 

2002 and in December 2003, President Bush issued Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 reiterating that the EPA is the lead 

Agency for the drinking water and wastewater sector. In this capacity, the EPA has provided $10 million since 2002 to 

address the security needs of the wastewater sector. These funds 

were used to fund the development and dissemination of several 

risk assessment methodologies to assist treatment works in assessing their vulnerabilities, including the VSAT developed by the National Association of Clean Water Agencies. In addition, EPA 

worked with Sandia National Laboratories and the Water Environment Federation to provide training to the owners and operators of 

wastewater utilities on vulnerability assessments and how to mitigate those vulnerabilities. The Water Environment Federation and 

the American Society of Civil Engineers are working with EPA to 

carry out the Water Security Enhancement project which is a series of security guidance documents and voluntary security design 

standards. In 2003, EPA established the Water Security Division 

to focus on security at water and wastewater utilities. 

EPA assisted in the creation of the Water Information Sharing 

and Analysis Center (WaterISAC) which is operated by the Association of Metropolitan Water Agencies (AMWA). The Agency has 

provided $6 million for the operation of the WaterISAC through 

which security related information is provided to water and wastewater utilities for a nominal fee. The WaterISAC can send urgent 

threat information to utilities and is available 24 hours per day. 

Further, EPA and the DHS use the Water Security Channel to provide free information to utilities through a password-protected 

website. Another means of sharing information developed after 

9/11 is the Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN). HSIN 

critical sector is intended to enhance the protection, preparedness 

and crisis communication and coordination capabilities of the nation’s 17 critical information sectors, including wastewater utilities. 

DHS is in the process of developing an HSIN for water and water 

utilities. 

DHS has several initiatives underway through which it has addressed security of wastewater utilities. Through its Buffer Zone 

Protection program, DHS provides grants to reduce specific 

vulnerabilities at critical infrastructure or key resources by assisting local law enforcement to develop a plan for preventative and 

protective measures to make an attack by terrorists more difficult. 

As of October 2005, DHS had reviewed the security at 14 wastewater facilities. Further, DHS has visited several wastewater utilities under its Site Assistance Visits program during which it identifies vulnerabilities and reviews mitigation options. 

In August 2005, the Nation was challenged by the Hurricanes 

Rita and Katrina. Hundreds of wastewater utilities incurred significant damage during the hurricanes. In 2006, the Water EnviVerDate Aug 31 2005 07:39 Oct 06, 2006 Jkt 049010 PO 00000 Frm 00002 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\SR345.XXX SR345

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1Government Accountability Office. ‘‘Wastewater Facilities Experts’ Views on How Federal 

Funds should be Spent to Improve Security,’’ January, 2005. Page 25. 2Government Accountability Office. ‘‘Securing Wastewater Facilities, Utilities Have Made Important Upgrades But Further Improvements to Key System Components May be limited by 

Costs and Other Constraints.’’ March 2006. page 14 3GAO, 2006. Appendix II, page 33 et seq. 

4GAO, 2006. page 18. 

ronment Federation (WEF) released a report entitled, ‘‘Assessment 

of Reconstruction Costs and Debt Management for Wastewater 

Utilities Affected by Hurricane Katrina.’’ This report found that the 

effects of Hurricane Katrina on wastewater facilities in Alabama, 

Louisiana and Mississippi approaches $1.4 billion, and the cost to 

repair and rebuild is estimated to be $1.2 billion. The report also 

estimated a reduction in revenue for affected utilities at about $163 

million. In February 2006, several national water associations 

issued a statement in which they committed to promoting mutual 

aid agreements which proved critical in assisting some utilities 

after the Gulf Coast hurricanes. The State of Florida has used mutual aid agreements with great success to help utilities immediately impacted by natural disasters. 

The Government Accountability Office has released two reports 

regarding security at POTWs. In its January 2005 report, GAO 

asked experts in the water profession to identify key vulnerabilities 

at POTWs and where Federal funds should be spent if such funds 

were made available to POTWs to secure their facilities. Ranking 

the key vulnerabilities from highest to lowest, the experts found 

the treatment works’ collection systems network of sewers; the 

treatment chemicals; certain key components of the main treatment facility; pumping stations; and the control systems (SCADA) 1

to be the most at-risk. Those areas identified as needing Federal 

funds if such funds are made available include alternative treatment approaches, improved collaboration among States and cities, 

completing vulnerability assessments, expanded training opportunities for POTW operators, improving national communication efforts between utilities and key entities responsible for homeland security and hardening of physical assets, among others. 

In March 2006, the Government Accountability Office issued a 

report on security measures taken by wastewater utilities. The 

GAO’s survey of the largest 206 facilities found that many had 

made significant security improvements. According to the survey, 

74 percent of the facilities completed a vulnerability assessment, 

were in the process of completing a survey or had one underway.2

Of the 206 who responded, 149 had vehicle gates; 174 had security 

fences; 160 had redundant power sources; 133 had redundant 

pumping devices or collection bypass systems, [the following numbers reflect changes made before and after Sept 11] 138 facilities 

have instituted safeguards for onsite delivery of materials and 112 

have additional site lighting.3 The GAO report clearly indicates 

that much progress has been made at the nation’s largest treatment works. However, the Office also found an area very much in 

need of assistance. Most of the large utilities had not taken steps 

to secure their collection systems from intruders or harmful substances. There are significant obstacles to securing these systems 

that can extend for miles underneath major cities.4


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OBJECTIVES OF THE LEGISLATION

S. 2781 provides a financial incentive to POTWs that have not 

completed a vulnerability assessment to move forward with development and implementation of an assessment, and provides resources to those who have completed their assessments to address 

needs identified in those assessments. It authorizes EPA to continue working with nonprofit organizations to improve and distribute vulnerability assessment tools and provide technical assistance to small utilities as they seek to identify and meet their security needs. The bill also authorizes research for the potential 

threats to a POTW’s collection system and how best to protect 

against those threats. 

SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS

Section 1. Short title 

This section provides that the Act may be cited as the ‘‘Wastewater Treatment Works Security Act of 2006’’. 

Sec. 2. Wastewater Treatment Works Security 

(a) Definition of Vulnerability Assessment 

SUMMARY

Creates a new section 222 of the Federal Water Pollution Control 

Act and defines several terms including a disruption of service 

event, emergency response plan, site security plan and vulnerability assessment. A disruption of service event (DSE) means a 

natural disaster or event, or a terrorist attack or other intentional 

act that substantially disrupts the ability of a treatment works to 

provide safe and reliable conveyance and treatment of wastewater; 

disposal of effluent or storage of any potentially hazardous chemical used to treat wastewater; damages critical treatment works infrastructure; results in a substantial harmful effect on the environment; or otherwise poses a significant threat to the public health 

or safety as a result of damage to the treatment works. 

An Emergency Response Plan (ERP) is defined as a plan or set 

of plans developed by or in cooperation with a treatment works 

that may include the procedures the treatment works will use 

when a disruption of service event occurs including procedures for 

ensuring continued service and protection of the public health and 

environment. The plan may include a discussion of the means by 

which the POTW will provide information to the surrounding affected communities as well as the means by which the POTW will 

limit contamination of public water supplies; address contaminants 

entering the treatment works or its collection system; secure 

backup power generation; and any additional means of collecting or 

treating wastewater. The ERP may include plans conducted in accordance with other Federal statutes that address the elements of 

an ERP under this statute, or ones that are in existence on the 

date of enactment that are modified to fit the requirements of this 

statute. 

The bill defines a Site Security Plan as a plan to implement, to 

the maximum extent practicable, changes at a treatment works 

based on information contained in the vulnerability assessment. 


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Finally, this section defines a vulnerability assessment (VA) as 

an assessment of the vulnerability of a treatment works to a disruption of service event. The VA may include a characterization of 

the treatment works, including its mission and objective, its customer base, the facilities that comprise the treatment works, including the collection system, the pumping station, the power supply, electronic and computer systems, and chemical containers. It 

further includes any processes at the treatment works and the assets necessary to achieve the treatment works’ objectives. The VA 

may also include an identification and prioritization of adverse consequences to avoid at the treatment works, including substantial 

disruptions of service; economic impacts; loss of life; and negative 

health consequences for staff at the treatment works. The VA may 

include an identification of adverse consequences to the public 

health and safety and the environment and natural resources and 

a determination of critical assets of the treatment works that may 

be subject to a disruption of service event, including pumping stations, power sources, electronic and computer systems and disinfection processes. Finally, the VA may include an analysis of the qualitative probability of a disruption of service event, whether the disruption of service event is the result of a natural or an intentional 

occurrence, an evaluation of existing countermeasures relating to 

the treatment works, and an analysis of current risk relating to the 

treatment works and the development of a prioritized plan for risk 

reduction at the treatment works. 

DISCUSSION

A disruption of service event is intended to cover both intentional 

acts of harm and natural disasters. In order to protect a facility 

against a disruption of service event, a POTW would begin with a 

vulnerability assessment designed to identify those aspects of the 

facility most likely to suffer harm during an event and most likely 

to cause harm to the surrounding community. The POTW could 

also develop a site security plan which implements the findings of 

the vulnerability assessment including how the POTW will address 

the vulnerabilities identified in the VA. An ERP is a critical element the importance of which was highlighted after the Gulf Coast 

Hurricanes. An ERP details how a POTW will respond to an event, 

including how the surrounding community would be notified of 

such an event and how to respond to any harm caused by it. 

(b) Grants for Vulnerability Assessments and Security Enhancements 

SUMMARY

Authorizes the Administrator to provide grants to a State, municipality, intermunicipal or interstate agency, or privately owned 

utility that principally treats municipal wastewater to conduct a 

vulnerability assessment of a publicly owned treatment works; to 

implement security enhancements described in subsection (c)(1); for 

the development, expansion, or upgrading of emergency response 

plans and for the voluntary creation or membership in a mutual 

aid and emergency preparedness agreement; and for the voluntary 

creation by a State or network of treatment works of, or voluntary 

participation by a treatment works in, a mutual aid and emergency 


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5 American Water Works Association. ‘‘Utilities Helping Utilities: An Act Plan for Mutual Aid 

and Assistance Networks for Water and Wastewater Utilities,’’ March 2006. Page 1. 

network preparedness agreement developed in accordance with the 

National Incident Management System established pursuant to 

Presidential directive number 5 of the Department of Homeland 

Security. 

DISCUSSION

Authorizes grants to conduct vulnerability assessments and address a need identified in the assessment. Grants can also be used 

for the development, expansion or upgrading of an emergency response plan and site security plan as well as for the voluntary creation or membership in a mutual aid and emergency preparedness 

agreement. More attention became focused on mutual aid agreements after the Gulf Coast Hurricanes. Florida has had mutual aid 

agreements in place for years. These are agreements between 

water and wastewater utilities to assist each other in the event of 

a natural disaster or terrorist event.5 Fellow utility operators are 

among those best qualified to assist another POTW in restoring 

service and responding to a crisis at the facility after a disruption 

of service event. While these are locally and State driven agreements, S. 2781 would make eligible for funding the creation of such 

agreements if the local or State stakeholders determine these 

agreements are in their best interest. 

(c) Grants for Security Enhancements 

SUMMARY

Paragraph (1) requires an applicant to certify to the EPA that it 

has conducted a vulnerability assessment and that the need for 

which it is seeking funding was identified in the assessment. Upon 

receiving this certification, the EPA may provide grants to the applicant for specific purposes listed in paragraph (2). 

Paragraph (2) establishes a list of security needs for which an 

applicant may receive funding. 

Paragraph (3) prohibits funds from being used for personnel costs 

and the operation and maintenance of facilities, equipment or systems. It further prohibits the Administrator from requiring an applicant to provide the Administrator with a copy of a vulnerability 

assessment as a condition of applying for or receiving a grant 

under this section. This section establishes procedures by which the 

Administrator can ensure that the POTW is in full compliance with 

all applicable Federal grant requirements. The Administrator shall 

work with appropriate law enforcement personnel to incorporate 

protection of sensitive information into existing protocols for protection of such information. It establishes penalties under the Act if 

the Administrator or his designee knowingly or recklessly reveals 

the contents of a vulnerability assessment. 

Paragraph (4) reiterates that it is a Federal crime under Section 

309(c)(4) of the Clean Water Act to falsely certify information to 

the Federal Government. 

Paragraph (5) protects vulnerability assessments certified to the 

Administrator under this Act from disclosure under Federal, State 

and local Freedom of Information Acts or similar statutes. 


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DISCUSSION

A treatment works must certify to EPA that it has conducted an 

assessment and that one of the enhancements listed in Paragraph 

(2) is included in the assessment. The bill provides several provisions to ensure that the information contained in an assessment is 

secure while also providing the Federal Government with the ability to ensure full compliance with applicable Federal laws. In order 

to minimize access to and exposure of the assessments, the bill prohibits the Administrator from requesting a copy of the document. 

However, the Administrator may visit the facility to view the assessment to ensure that it has been done and that the POTW is 

in full compliance with Federal rules applicable to grant recipients. 

If the POTW certified that it had completed an assessment and in 

fact did not, the owner or operator can be charged with falsely certifying information and subject to penalties under the criminal code 

(18 USC 1001) and the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (33 

USC 1319). Further, EPA must work with the appropriate law enforcement agencies to incorporate into existing protocols the protection of sensitive information obtained by viewing an assessment. It 

also establishes penalties if the Administrator or his designees 

recklessly or knowingly reveals information obtained through the 

inspection of an assessment. However, nothing in this section 

would impose any penalties on a POTW operator who shares information with appropriate local and State officials. 

This section also exempts the information contained in a vulnerability assessment from the Federal Freedom of Information Act 

(FOIA) as well as relevant State and local laws. The committee recognizes that information pertaining to the vulnerability of a source 

to terrorism, and the countermeasures adopted to reduce that vulnerability, is among the most sensitive that any facility can generate. The committee also recognizes the need for the public to 

know whether a local facility has complied with the law; therefore, 

the FOIA exemption does not apply to the information in a certification filed under this Act. This subsection also respects the needs 

of State and local governments to obtain information that they 

need to coordinate with the Federal Government and facilities, by 

enabling State and local officials designated by the Secretary to obtain protected information, without concern that they might have 

to disclose it under their own laws or ordinances. 

Most security enhancements not related to personnel or operations and maintenance can be funded through this section, including those identified by the GAO as priorities such as hardening facilities like collection systems, securing pumping stations and 

switching treatment technologies. A 2005 GAO report indicated the 

need for Federal funds to assist those treatment works interested 

in switching technologies. Chlorine is by far the most effective disinfectant available and it is the least expensive. During these times 

of aging systems, growing Federal regulations and limited resources, cost is an important consideration. While utilities have reported a broad range of costs associated with the change from chlorine to liquid bleach or other approaches, the GAO reported that 

Washington, DC.’s treatment works, Blue Plains, spent $12.5 milVerDate Aug 31 2005 07:39 Oct 06, 2006 Jkt 049010 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\SR345.XXX SR345

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6GAO, 2005. page 40. 

7GAO, 2006. page 47. 

lion to change technologies.6 Officials with Blue Plains confirmed 

the numbers in the GAO report. San Jose, CA spent $5 million to 

switch from gaseous chlorine to sodium hypochlorite. A utility may 

also identify means to secure chlorine tanks and reduce the amount 

of material stored onsite, thereby reducing potential threats. It is 

worth noting that wastewater treatment utilities are often owned 

and operated by municipal governments. These costs are not insignificant particularly if a utility identifies through the Vulnerability 

assessment and site security plan the means to secure chlorine 

tanks and reduce the amount stored onsite sufficient that the facility, determines any threat has been mitigated. The decision to 

switch is made at the local level with full consideration of all factors including the costs, risks posed by transporting alternative 

substances and the vicinity of manufacturing facilities. POTWs are 

already undergoing these evaluations. Currently, 116 of the 206 

largest POTWs do not use gaseous chlorine. According to the GAO 

report, another 20 plan to switch to a technology other than chlorine. Those who continue to use chlorine have taken steps to ensure the chlorine is secure.7

(d) Grant Amounts 

SUMMARY

Paragraph (1) establishes a Federal-local cost share of 75 percent—25 percent. 

Paragraph (2) limits the size of any one applicant to $100,000 per 

facility. 

DISCUSSION

Because securing our Nation’s infrastructure against terrorism is 

a partnership between Federal, State and local Government, this 

section authorizes a Federal-local cost share. In order to ensure 

that funds are widely distributed and not absorbed by a few large 

systems, grants are limited to $100,000. 

(e) Technical Assistance for Small Publicly Owned Treatment 

Works 

SUMMARY

Paragraph (1) defines a small publicly owned treatment works as 

a population of fewer than 10,000 individuals. 

Paragraph (2) authorizes the Administrator to, in coordination 

with the States, provide technical assistance to small treatment 

works in assessing and addressing their security needs. 

Paragraph (3) allows the Administrator to provide grants to nonprofit organizations to assist in accomplishing the purposes of this 

section. 

DISCUSSION

It is critical that small systems, which often have fewer resources 

at their disposal, have the same level of protection as large systems. Subsection (e) authorizes a technical assistance program for 


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treatment works serving less than 10,000 people. Technical guidance may include the conduct of a vulnerability assessment, emergency response plan, or site security plan, training, technical assistance programs and preliminary engineering evaluations. The 

Administrator may provide grants to nonprofit organizations with 

expertise in assisting small systems. 

(f) Refinement of Vulnerability Assessment Methodology for 

Publicly Owned Treatment Works 

SUMMARY

Authorizes grants to nonprofit organizations to improve vulnerability assessment methodologies and tools for publicly owned 

treatment works at no cost to the treatment works. 

DISCUSSION

Authorizes the Administrator to provide grants to nonprofit organizations to improve vulnerability assessment methodologies and 

tools for publicly owned treatment works, including those that are 

part of a combined public wastewater treatment and water supply 

system. The grants may be used to develop and distribute assessment software upgrades, improve and enhance critical technical 

and user support functions, expand libraries of information addressing threats and countermeasures, and implementing user 

training initiatives. These services are to be provided at no cost to 

the participants/recipients. 

(g) Training Grants 

SUMMARY

Paragraph (1) authorizes the Administrator to provide grants to 

nonprofit organizations to be used in accordance with paragraph (2) 

to implement a comprehensive training program for treatment 

works or privately owned utilities that principally treat municipal 

wastewater. 

Paragraph (2) provides for the eligible activities that a grant may 

be used for including development and implementation of a training program that will assist treatment works in conducting vulnerability assessments, developing emergency response plans, and 

identifying security enhancements. A grant may also be used to develop and disseminate to treatment works information on best 

practices for emergency response plans and security enhancements, 

including operational adjustments and design practices. 

Paragraph (3) states that this training and technical assistance 

provided pursuant to a grant under paragraph (1) shall be provided 

at no cost to the recipients of the assistance. 

DISCUSSION

This section authorizes the Administrator to provide grants to 

non-profit organizations to develop and implement training programs for wastewater treatment works to help them conduct vulnerability assessments and develop emergency response plans. It 

would also support training designed to help wastewater treatment 

plants identify needed security enhancements based on their vulnerability assessments and emergency response plans. 


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Training programs currently offered by non-profit organizations 

that assist wastewater treatment plants in assessing their 

vulnerabilities and developing emergency response plans have been 

effective in helping many utilities address security and emergency 

preparedness issues. As part of comprehensive legislation aimed at 

providing wastewater utilities the financial resources necessary to 

undertake security and emergency preparedness, a strong training 

component gives further incentive for wastewater utilities to move 

forward in this area. 

(h) Authorization of Appropriations 

SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION

Authorizes $200 million for use in making grants to conduct vulnerability assessments and implement security enhancements 

under subsection (b); $15 million for technical assistance for small 

systems; and $1 million annually over 5 years for refinement of 

vulnerability assessment methodology. 

Sec. 3. Research and review 

Creates a new section 223 of the Federal Water Pollution Control 

Act (FWPCA). 

(a) Definition of Collection System 

SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION

Amends title II of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act by 

adding a definition of ‘‘collection system’’ as meaning the underground network of sewers, including sanitary and storm water collection lines. 

(b) Research and Review 

SUMMARY

Authorizes the Administrator, in consultation with appropriate 

Federal agencies, to research and review, or enter into a contract 

or cooperative agreement for the conduct of research and review, 

into (1) the means of providing alternative processes to convey, 

treat, and dispose of wastewater if a disruption of service event occurs; (2) the means by which the collection system of a treatment 

works could be used to convey hazardous chemicals or substances 

(including explosive devices) including a comprehensive analysis of 

the types of hazardous chemicals, substances, and explosive devices 

that could be placed in the collection system; and how the system 

could be secured in response to an intentional harmful act; (3) 

methods of monitoring the collection system of a treatment works 

for hazardous chemicals or substances, including explosive devices, 

and unauthorized entry into the collection system of a treatment 

works; and (4) treatment technologies, including the affordability, 

effectiveness, and limitations of each treatment technology. 

DISCUSSION

Each POTW has a collection system that consists of the pipes 

used to carry wastewater from homes and businesses to the treatment works. These pipes are often large enough for an individual 


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to stand in and they provide an underground roadway beneath 

most major cities. In its January 2005 report, 42 of the 50 experts 

on GAO’s panel identified the collection system as the most vulnerable asset of a POTW. However, there remain many questions and 

obstacles on how to effectively secure a collection system. This bill 

authorizes a research program to identify how a collection system 

could be used in a terrorist attack, how to identify potential chemicals or explosives that could be placed in a collection system, and 

how best to mitigate against these risks. It also directs EPA to examine the various POTW treatment technologies to determine their 

affordability and effectiveness. 

(c) Authorization of Appropriations 

SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION

Authorization of appropriations—authorizes $5 million a year for 

fiscal years 2007 through 2011. 

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

During the 107th Congress, Senators Robert Smith and James 

Jeffords introduced S. 1608, which sought to provide grants to 

drinking water and wastewater facilities to meet immediate security needs. Senators Jeffords and Smith also introduced S. 1593 

which authorized the EPA to provide funds to research institutions 

to research technologies and processes that address physical and 

cyber threats to water supply systems, including POTWs. The committee reported the bills on December 10, 2001 and modified 

versions were incorporated into H.R. 3448, the Public Health and 

Bioterrorism Preparedness Response Act of 2002 (P.L. 107–188), 

which was signed into law on June 12, 2002. 

During the 107th Congress, the House passed by voice vote, H.R. 

5169, the Wastewater Treatment Works Security and Safety Act. 

During the 108th Congress, on February 2, 2003, Congressmen 

Don Young, James Oberstar, Jerry Costello and John Duncan reintroduced H.R. 5169 as H.R. 866, the Wastewater Treatment 

Works Security Act. The House Committee on Transportation and 

Infrastructure reported the bill on March 11, 2003 by voice vote. 

The House of Representatives then passed the bill on May 8, 2003, 

by a vote of 413–2. 

Senator Inhofe and Senator Crapo introduced the Senate companion to H.R. 866 on May 12, 2003. The Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works reported S. 1039 by a vote of 13 to 

6 on May 15, 2003. 

On May 10, 2006, Senator Inhofe introduced S. 2781, which was 

cosponsored by Senators Chafee and Murkowski. The bill was read 

twice and referred to the Senate Committee on Environment and 

Public Works. S. 2781 included S. 1039 from the 108th Congress 

with modifications. The committee met on May 23, 2006 to consider 

the bill. S. 2781 was ordered favorably reported, as amended, by 

voice vote. 

ROLLCALL VOTES

The Committee on Environment and Public Works met to consider S. 2781 on May 23, 2006. An amendment was offered by SenVerDate Aug 31 2005 07:39 Oct 06, 2006 Jkt 049010 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\SR345.XXX SR345

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ator Inhofe to add a definition of site security plan, add a training 

program for POTWs, and combine two eligibilities under subsection 

(c). The amendment was approved by voice vote. Senator Jeffords 

offered a complete substitute amendment. Senator Voinovich made 

a motion to table the Jeffords amendment. The motion passed by 

a rollcall vote of 10 to 8, with Senators Inhofe, Warner, Bond, 

Voinovich, Chafee, Murkowski, Thune, DeMint, Isakson, and Vitter 

voting aye and Jeffords, Baucus, Lieberman, Boxer, Carper, Clinton, Lautenberg, and Obama voting nay. 

Senator Boxer then made a motion to table S. 2781. The motion 

failed by a roll call vote of 8 to 10 with Senators Jeffords, Baucus, 

Lieberman, Boxer, Carper, Clinton, Lautenberg, and Obama voting 

aye and Senators Inhofe, Warner, Bond, Voinovich, Chafee, Murkowski, Thune, DeMint, Isakson, and Vitter voting nay. S. 2781 

was passed by a voice vote. 

REGULATORY IMPACT STATEMENT

In compliance with section 11(b) of rule XXVI of the Standing 

Rules of the Senate, the committee finds that S. 2781 does not create any additional regulatory burdens, nor will it cause any adverse impact on the personal privacy of individuals. 

MANDATES ASSESSMENT

In compliance with the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 

(Public Law 104–4), the committee finds that S. 2781 would not impose Federal intergovernmental unfunded mandates on State, local, 

or tribal governments. 

COST OF LEGISLATION

Section 403 of the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act requires that a statement of the cost of the reported bill, 

prepared by the Congressional Budget Office, be included in the report. That statement follows: 

S. 2781, Wastewater Treatment Works Security Act of 2006, As ordered reported by the Senate Committee on Environment and 

Public Works on May 23, 2006 

Summary 

CBO estimates that implementing S. 2781 would cost about $245 

million over the next 5 years, assuming appropriation of the authorized amounts. The funds would be used by the Environmental 

Protection Agency (EPA) to make grants to States, municipalities, 

or intermunicipal or interstate agencies to conduct vulnerability assessments at publicly owned wastewater treatment facilities and to 

undertake security enhancements at such facilities. In addition, the 

funds would be used by EPA to provide technical assistance to 

small publicly owned treatment facilities, such as training and engineering evaluations of security measures, and to make grants to 

nonprofit organizations to conduct self-assessments of security 

vulnerabilities. This legislation also would authorize funding to 

support EPA’s research related to alternative processes to treat and 

dispose of wastewater in the event of a disaster. 


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Enacting S. 2781 could affect direct spending and receipts because the bill would provide for penalties against any individual 

who recklessly reveals information contained in vulnerability assessments of wastewater treatment facilities. CBO expects that 

penalties collected under the bill would not be significant because 

violations of this provision would be rare. 

S. 2781 contains an intergovernmental mandate as defined in the 

Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA); CBO estimates, however, 

that the costs of complying with that mandate would not exceed 

the threshold established in that act ($64 million, adjusted annually for inflation). S. 2781 contains no new private-sector mandates 

as defined in UMRA. 

Estimated Cost to the Federal Government 

For this estimate, CBO assumes that the bill will be enacted 

near the end of 2006. CBO estimates that implementing the bill 

would cost $245 million over the 2007–2011 period, assuming appropriation of the amounts authorized for each year. Those estimated outlays are based on historical patterns for similar activities. The estimated budgetary impact of S. 2781 is shown in the following table. The costs of this legislation fall within budget function 300 (natural resources and environment). 

By Fiscal Year, in Millions of Dollars 

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 

CHANGES IN SPENDING SUBJECT TO APPROPRIATION 

Grants for Wastewater Treatment Security.

Authorization Level ................................................................................ 200 0 0 0 0 

Estimated Outlays ................................................................................. 10 100 55 30 5 

EPA Technical Assistance.

Authorization Level ................................................................................ 15 0 0 0 0 

Estimated Outlays ................................................................................. 3 8 4 0 0 

Grants for Small Publicly Owned Treatment Facilities.

Authorization Level ................................................................................ 1 1 1 1 1 

Estimated Outlays ................................................................................. 1 1 1 1 1 

EPA Research on Wastewater Treatment.

Authorization Level ................................................................................ 5 5 5 5 5 

Estimated Outlays ................................................................................. 5 5 5 5 5 

Total Proposed Changes.

Authorization Level ................................................................................ 221 6 6 6 6 

Estimated Outlays ................................................................................. 19 114 65 36 11 

Estimated Impact On State, Local, And Tribal Governments 

S. 2781 contains an intergovernmental mandates as defined in 

UMRA because it would preempt the application of State and local 

laws providing for public access to information from vulnerability 

assessments of wastewater treatment facilities. That preemption 

constitutes an intergovernmental mandate as defined in UMRA, 

however, CBO estimates that complying with the mandate would 

not impose significant costs on State, local, or tribal governments; 

any costs would be well below the threshold established in that act 

($64 million, adjusted annually for inflation). 

The bill also would authorize grants that would benefit State and 

local governments that conduct vulnerability assessments and implement security enhancements of wastewater treatment facilities. 


hmoore on PROD1PC68 with HMRPT
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Any costs they might incur, including matching funds, would result 

from complying with conditions for receiving Federal assistance. 

Estimated Impact On The Private Sector 

S. 2781 contains no new private sector mandates as defined in 

UMRA. 

Estimate Prepared By: Federal Costs: Susanne S. Mehlman; Impact on State, Local, and Tribal Governments: Lisa RamirezBranum; Impact on the Private Sector: Amy Petz. 

Estimate Approved By: Peter H. Fontaine, Deputy Assistant Director for Budget Analysis. 


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1Planning Scenarios Executive Summaries. The Homeland Security Council. July 2004 

2Government Accountability Office. ‘‘Wastewater Facilities: Experts Views On How Federal 

Funds Should Be Spent To Improve Security’’ (GAO–05–165) January 2005. 

ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF SENATORS JEFFORDS, BAUCUS, 

LIEBERMAN, BOXER, CARPER, CLINTON, LAUTENBERG 

AND OBAMA 

General Statement 

In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, 

it is crucial that we as a Nation take every reasonable action we 

can to prevent terrorism, create effective response and recovery 

mechanisms, and find ways to minimize any impacts should an 

event occur. The Congress has a key role in facilitating these actions by establishing authorities for government agencies, establishing the legal framework in which homeland security improvements will occur, and appropriating adequate funding for the 

homeland security mission. Protecting our Nation’s critical infrastructure is a major piece of our homeland security strategy. 

The water sector has been identified as an element in our nation’s critical infrastructure since the issuance of Presidential Decision Directive 63 (PDD–63), issued by President Clinton in May 

1998, which was the first major governmental action focused on reducing the vulnerability of our nation’s critical infrastructure. 

The security needs are significant in the water and wastewater 

sectors. There are over 16,000 publicly owned treatment works in 

the United States, serving more than 200 million people or 70 percent of the U.S. population. Approximately 1,600 are located near 

large metropolitan areas. These industrial facilities use large quantities of toxic chemicals, such as chlorine, in their treatment and 

disinfection processes, and their collection systems run beneath 

every city and town in America. Chlorine is the most commonly 

used method of disinfection for wastewater treatment. Chlorine is 

a very corrosive, hazardous chemical that is fatal in large concentrations. It can also burn the eyes, lungs, and skin. It is stored 

as a liquid after being cooled. When released, it quickly turns to 

gas, stays close to the ground, and spreads rapidly. One Department of Homeland Security planning scenario estimates that a 

chlorine tank explosion could result in 17,500 deaths, 10,000 severe 

injuries, and 100,000 hospitalizations.1 In addition, a January 2005 

report by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) determined 

that the release of chlorine is the second highest security risk at 

wastewater facilities after damage to sewer collection systems.2

There are also serious public health risks associated with a disruption or service failure at a wastewater treatment plant. Treatment works clean wastewater that comes from our toilets, showers, 

and sewers and send it back into our rivers, streams, lakes, and 

oceans. Those same bodies of water are our drinking water sources. 


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Without proper treatment, we could see the public health effects of 

the same type of water-borne disease outbreaks such as cholera 

that we saw in Iraq in 2003 due to the failure of wastewater treatment plants. 

In recent years in this country, we have seen firsthand the impact that a cessation of operations at a drinking water or wastewater plant can have. In Cleveland, Ohio, after the August 2003 

blackout, several sewage treatment plants discharged at least 60 

million gallons of sewage into the Cuyahoga River, Lake Erie, and 

their tributaries after the power outage caused the plants pumps 

and blowers to cease operations. Raw sewage bypassed the treatment process and entered receiving waters untreated. The plants 

have no back-up power systems. Five Cleveland beaches were 

closed to swimming to protect against water-borne disease. Cleveland’s water system also suffered a hit when 1.5 million customers 

lost water or water pressure due to power failures at four water 

plants. The city was under a boil water notice for 4 days. In Detroit, Michigan, after the blackout in August 2003 caused the city’s 

water treatment plants to cease operations, the city was under a 

boil-water advisory for almost a week. 

More recently, we saw the impact of a natural disaster on water 

infrastructure. A couple of days after Hurricane Katrina in August 

2005, EPA estimated that more than 1,220 drinking water and 200 

wastewater facilities in Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama were 

affected by flooding. One third of the sewage treatment systems in 

Mississippi were destroyed or very severely damaged and a month 

following the event, 22 sewage plants in Louisiana, serving more 

than a half a million customers, were not operating or operating 

with difficulty. In 2006, the Water Environment Federation (WEF) 

released a report entitled, ‘‘Assessment of Reconstruction Costs and 

Debt Management for Wastewater Utilities Affected by Hurricane 

Katrina.’’ This report found that the effects of Hurricane Katrina 

on wastewater facilities in Alabama, Louisiana and Mississippi approaches $1.4 billion, and the cost to repair and rebuild is estimated to be $1.2 billion. The report also estimated a reduction in 

revenue for affected utilities at about $163 million. In the aftermath of Katrina, we believe that a vulnerability assessment, site 

security plan and emergency response plan would be extremely 

useful to the Federal Government and local authorities in evaluating a wastewater plant’s ability to provide the required level of 

treatment and the scope of repairs necessary to restore the plant. 

We believe that the Congress should take the risk to wastewater 

treatment plants seriously. Unfortunately, we believe that S. 2781, 

the Wastewater Treatment Works Security Act, as reported out of 

committee, provides security for our nation’s wastewater infrastructure in name only. 

Background 

Almost immediately after September 11, 2001, the Committee on 

Environment and Public Works began working with the water and 

wastewater industries and the EPA to ensure that the nation’s 

water infrastructure was adequately protected. The committee met 

with key members of the EPA’s security team to review the status 

of our nation’s water infrastructure. Several short-term actions had 


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already been taken. Based on the recommendations of PDD–63, the 

EPA and its industry partner, the Association of Metropolitan 

Water Agencies (AMWA), had already established a communication 

system: the water infrastructure Information Sharing and Analysis 

Center (ISAC), designed to provide real-time threat assessment 

data to water utilities throughout the Nation. 

Through this partnership, the EPA and AMWA, in cooperation 

with Sandia National Laboratory, developed an assessment tool 

that individual water utilities can use to assess their facilities for 

potential physical and cyber threats. The committee endorsed the 

concept of vulnerability assessments with bi-partisan action early 

in the debate on homeland security. On October 11, 2001, Senators 

Jeffords (I–VT), Smith (R–NH), Graham (D–FL), and Crapo (R–ID) 

sent a letter to the President with Representatives Tauzin (R–LA), 

Dingell (D–MI), Gillmor (R–OH), and Pallone (D–NJ) requesting 

that the President use a portion of discretionary funds to provide 

assistance for these assessments to water utilities. No response 

was received. 

Legislative action quickly followed. During the 107th Congress, 

Senator Jeffords (I–VT) and Senator Smith (R–NH), at that time 

the chair and ranking member of the committee, introduced S. 

1593, the Water Infrastructure Security and Research Development 

Act, which authorized the U.S. EPA to provide funding to support 

research projects on critical infrastructure protection for water supply systems. The two leaders of the committee also introduced S. 

1608, which sought to provide grants to drinking water and wastewater facilities to meet immediate security needs. 

S. 1593, the Water Infrastructure Security and Research Development Act, sought to complement the ongoing work at EPA and 

in the water industry by focusing on mid- to long-term actions designed to enhance our current water security capabilities. The bill 

authorized $12 million over 5 years to continue ongoing work called 

for by PDD–63, conduct research to assess potential threats to our 

water supply system, and develop solutions to safeguard our water 

systems against those threats. Projects were intended to address 

both water and wastewater security needs. S. 1608 focused on 

short term security needs such as re-keying of doors and locks or 

installation and maintenance of fencing, gating, or lighting. The 

committee reported both bills on December 10, 2001. 

The provisions of S. 1593 and S. 1608 were modified and incorporated into H.R. 3448, the Public Health and Bioterrorism Preparedness Response Act of 2002 (P.L. 107–188), which was signed 

into law on June 12, 2002. This Act requires that all community 

water systems serving a population greater than 3,300 people conduct a vulnerability assessment and prepare an emergency response plan that incorporates the results of the vulnerability assessment. The Act establishes specific deadlines and requires that 

the vulnerability assessments be submitted to the EPA. It includes 

extensive information protection requirements at the Agency. The 

Act authorizes $160 million for fiscal year 2002 and such sums as 

necessary for fiscal years 2003 through 2005 for these purposes and 

to address basic security enhancements. Finally, the Act requires 

the Administrator to review and disseminate information to the 

drinking water industry on current and future methods of prevenVerDate Aug 31 2005 07:39 Oct 06, 2006 Jkt 049010 PO 00000 Frm 00017 Fmt 6604 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\SR345.XXX SR345

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tion of, detection of, and response to contaminant and supply disruption. Despite the fact that the original Senate bills addressed 

both water and wastewater needs, the provisions of H.R. 3448 were 

modified to address drinking water facilities only due to jurisdictional concerns raised by a House committee. 

Under the authorities provided by P.L. 107–188, EPA continued 

its work with AMWA to refine and operate the ISAC. EPA provided 

$51 million in funding to water utilities in fiscal year 2002, and the 

Agency partnered with numerous industry associations to develop 

vulnerability assessment and emergency response plan tools and 

training tailored for specific applications. EPA has also worked to 

protect wastewater treatment works in accordance with the EPA 

Strategic Plan for Homeland Security, issued in September 2002. 

Since September 11, 2001, EPA has provided $1.1 million to the 

Association of Metropolitan Sewerage Agencies (AMSA) to develop 

a wastewater security vulnerability assessment tool. That tool is 

now available to individual treatment works. 

After the Public Health and Bioterrorism Preparedness Response 

Act of 2002 was enacted without addressing wastewater security, 

Senator Jeffords introduced S. 3037, the Wastewater Treatment 

Works Security and Safety Act, on October 3, 2002. S. 3037 mirrors 

the original provisions of S. 1593 and S. 1608 as well as the modified provisions for drinking water in H.R. 3448. The legislation requires all wastewater utilities to conduct vulnerability assessments 

and to develop or modify emergency response plans to incorporate 

the results of the vulnerability assessments. It requires that these 

documents be presented to the EPA for review, and it includes significant security measures designed to protect this information 

from unauthorized disclosure. It authorizes $185 million for assistance in completing vulnerability assessments, for immediate security improvements, and for assistance to small treatment works. It 

authorizes $15 million for research to identify threats, detection 

methods, and response actions. AMSA endorsed S. 3037 on October 

1, 2002. During the 107th Congress, the House passed a wastewater security bill, H.R. 5169, the Wastewater Treatment Works 

Security and Safety Act. Due to significant differences over the 

treatment of vulnerability assessments in each bill, the House and 

the Senate were unable to reach agreement on this issue during 

the 107th Congress. 

In the 108th Congress, on April 3, 2003, Senators Jeffords (I–

VT), Graham (D–FL), Lieberman (D–CT), and Lautenberg (D–NJ) 

introduced the Wastewater Treatment Works Security and Safety 

Act, S. 779. On May 12, 2003, Senators James Inhofe (R–OK) and 

Mike Crapo (R–ID) introduced S. 1039, also entitled the Wastewater Treatment Works Security and Safety Act. The committee 

considered and passed S. 1039 on May 15, 2003. 

In the 109th Congress, on November 10, 2005, Senators Jeffords 

(I–VT), Lautenberg (D–NJ), Boxer (D–CA) and Obama (D–IL) introduced S. 1995, the Wastewater Treatment Works Security Act 

of 2005. The bill requires all wastewater facilities to conduct vulnerability assessments and to develop or modify site security and 

emergency response plans to incorporate the results of the vulnerability assessments. Treatment works must certify that alternative 

approaches, such as using smaller quantities or replacing subVerDate Aug 31 2005 07:39 Oct 06, 2006 Jkt 049010 PO 00000 Frm 00018 Fmt 6604 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\SR345.XXX SR345

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stances of concern, were considered in preparing their site security 

plans. It requires that these documents be submitted to EPA for review and approval and it includes significant security measures to 

protect this information from unauthorized disclosure. Additionally, 

the bill authorizes $225 million for assistance in completing vulnerability assessments, site security plans, and emergency response 

plans; for implementing these plans and security enhancements; 

for immediate security improvements; and for technical assistance 

in carrying out these activities. The bill also authorizes $5 million 

in grants for technical assistance to small treatment works and $5 

million in grants for improving vulnerability assessments and tools. 

Finally, it authorizes $15 million for research and review to identify threats, detection methods and response actions at treatment 

works. 

On May 19, 2006, Senator Biden (D–DE) with Senators Jeffords 

(I–VT) and Boxer (D–CA) introduced S. 2855, the Community 

Water Treatment Hazards Reduction Act. This bill would significantly reduce the threat of attack on our nation’s wastewater and 

drinking water facilities. In introducing the bill, Senator Biden 

cited the fact that there are about 100 facilities that store sufficient 

quantities of chlorine and other toxic chemicals to threaten between 100,000 and 1,000,000 citizens. The bill would cost about 

$125 million per year, over 5 years, and would require the EPA to 

prioritize these facilities on the basis of risk. Upon notification of 

designation as a high risk water facility, such facilities that serve 

more than 10,000 people will conduct an options feasibility study 

of the costs and benefits related to inherently safer technologies 

(IST) and select an IST where feasible. Beginning with the first 

tier of high risk facilities, the EPA will award grants, and subject 

to grant availability, issue orders to facilitate the transition to the 

selected IST. Facilities that transition to the use of one or more 

IST after September 11, 2001 but before enactment of this legislation, and would qualify as a high consequence water facility under 

this bill, would be allowed to participate in the grant program. 

Water facilities that serve less than 10,000 individuals can opt in 

if they desire and be eligible for grant funding to transition to the 

use of one or more ISTs. 

On May 10, 2006, Senators Inhofe (R–OK), Chafee (R–RI) and 

Murkowski (R–AK) introduced S. 2781, the Wastewater Treatment 

Works Security Act. The committee considered and passed S. 2781 

on May 23, 2006. We believe that S. 2781, as it passed the committee, does not fulfill our responsibility to provide the American 

people with the level of security that is required for our wastewater 

treatment works. 

Discussion 

On May 23, 2006, the Committee on Environment and Public 

Works met to consider S. 2781. Senator Jeffords (I–VT) offered an 

amendment to S. 2781 that would have required wastewater facilities to conduct a vulnerability assessment, prepare or modify an 

emergency response plan and site security plan incorporating the 

results of the vulnerability assessment, and submit these documents to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency for review and 

approval. The amendment includes significant security measures to 


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protect this information from unauthorized disclosure. The amendment authorizes $225 million for assistance in completing vulnerability assessments, site security plans, and emergency response 

plans; for implementing these plans and security enhancements; 

for immediate security improvements; and for technical assistance 

in carrying out these activities. The amendment also authorizes $5 

million in grants for technical assistance to small treatment works 

and $5 million in grants for improving vulnerability assessments 

and tools. Finally, it authorizes $15 million for research and review 

to identify threats, detection methods and response actions at 

treatment works. The amendment also incorporates the provisions 

of S. 2855 discussed above. Specifically, the amendment would also 

require EPA to prioritize wastewater and drinking water facilities 

on the basis of risk. Upon notification of designation as a high risk 

water facility, such facilities that serve more than 10,000 people 

will conduct an options feasibility study of the costs and benefits 

related to inherently safer technologies (IST) and select an IST 

where feasible. Beginning with the first tier of high risk facilities, 

the EPA will award grants, and subject to grant availability, issue 

orders to facilitate the transition to the selected IST. Facilities that 

transition to the use of one or more IST after September 11, 2001 

but before enactment of this legislation, and would qualify as a 

high consequence water facility under this amendment, would be 

allowed to participate in the grant program. Water facilities that 

serve less than 10,000 individuals can opt in if they desire and be 

eligible for grant funding to transition to the use of one or more 

ISTs. Grant funding in the amount of $125 million, over 5 years, 

is authorized for the amendment’s IST provisions. 

Senator Voinovich (R–OH) offered a motion to table the amendment and it passed by roll call vote with Senators Inhofe (R–OK), 

Warner (R–VA), Thune (R–SD), Murkowski (R–AK), Isakson (R– GA), Vitter (R–LA), Voinovich (R–OH), Bond (R–MO), Chafee (R– RI), and DeMint (R–SC) voting aye, and Senators Jeffords (I–VT), 

Boxer (D–CA), Lieberman (D–CT), Obama (D–IL), Clinton (D–NY), 

Baucus (D–MT), Lautenberg (D–NJ), and Carper (D–DE) voting 

nay. Senator Boxer then made a motion to table S. 2781 which 

failed by roll call vote, with 10 Republicans voting nay, 1 Independent voting aye, and 7 Democrats voting aye. S. 2781 was 

passed by voice vote and reported out of committee. 

Without the modifications that were included in the Jeffords 

amendment, we believe that S. 2781 as passed by the committee 

provides security to wastewater treatment works in name only. 

First, S. 2781 does not require the completion of vulnerability assessments, site security plans or emergency response plans. We believe that conducting a vulnerability assessment, addressing the security needs it identifies, and incorporating the results into a facility’s emergency response plan and preparing a site security plan are 

the most basic actions that must be taken in each sector of our nation’s critical infrastructure. The need for these mandatory security 

plans is supported by the findings of two recent GAO reports on 

wastewater security. In January 2005, GAO released a report 

(‘‘Wastewater Facilities: Experts’ Views on How Federal Funds 

Should Be Spent to Improve Security,’’ GAO–05–165) that highlights the vulnerability of our nation’s wastewater systems and recVerDate Aug 31 2005 07:39 Oct 06, 2006 Jkt 049010 PO 00000 Frm 00020 Fmt 6604 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\SR345.XXX SR345

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ommends that we take action to protect them now. The report 

ranks the release of chlorine as the second highest security risk 

after damage to sewer collection systems. In March 2006, GAO 

issued another report on security measures taken by wastewater 

facilities (‘‘Securing Wastewater Facilities: Utilities Have Made Important Upgrades but Further Improvements to Key System Components May Be Limited by Costs and Other Constraints,’’ GAO– 06–390). GAO surveyed 206 large wastewater facilities to determine how many facilities have completed vulnerability assessments 

and made security improvements. The Majority’s Report discusses 

this GAO report and states that 74 percent of the facilities surveyed have completed a vulnerability assessment, were in the process of completing some type of security assessment, or had one underway. However, it fails to mention that GAO found that 41 percent of the facilities still use chlorine gas for water disinfection and 

only half have actually completed vulnerability assessments. GAO’s 

most troubling finding is that few wastewater facilities have addressed the number one vulnerability identified by the GAO in 

2005-collection systems security. 

Even if facilities complete their assessments and plans, S. 2781 

does not require that these documents be submitted to the EPA for 

review and approval, or that they be available to the Department 

of Homeland Security (DHS) for purposes of prioritizing and coordinating infrastructure protection efforts. We believe that this is a 

serious obstacle in the DHS’s ability to perform its mission. We believe that providing the results of a facility’s vulnerability assessment and its site security and emergency response plans to the 

Federal Government is a vital step both to ensure that such assessments are completed and implemented in critical infrastructure 

sectors and to ensure that the Federal Government has all of the 

information it requires to secure the Nation against a potential terrorist attack. In addition, elected officials in Congress have a Constitutional oversight role over Federal agencies and the laws they 

implement. Under S. 2781, Congress will not be accountable to the 

public for the purpose or implementation of this law—Congress will 

not be able to request or access information from the Federal agencies because the agencies will not have such information. 

Under S. 2781 as reported, it is unclear where DHS will get the 

information they require to complete its national vulnerability assessment and make resource allocation decisions that will increase 

the level of security in our Nation. It is clear that DHS is likely 

to receive partial information covering only the subset of the wastewater treatment industry that voluntarily chooses to complete a 

vulnerability assessment and that voluntarily chooses to share the 

information they collect with DHS. In fact, under the bill, the EPA 

is prohibited from requesting a copy of the vulnerability assessment from the wastewater facility, but may visit the facility to view 

the assessment and ensure that one has been completed. This is 

likely to make it extremely difficult for the Federal Government, 

including DHS, to seek this information for any purpose. Without 

the best, most up-to-date, accurate information available, DHS will 

be unable to fully perform its mission. 

We also disagree with the treatment of information that could be 

submitted under S. 2781. While we agree that vulnerability assessVerDate Aug 31 2005 07:39 Oct 06, 2006 Jkt 049010 PO 00000 Frm 00021 Fmt 6604 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\SR345.XXX SR345

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3Paul Orum, Center for American Progress. Preventing Toxic Terrorism How Some Chemical 

Facilities are Removing Danger to American Communities (April 2006). 4 Carol Andress, Environmental Defense. Eliminating Hometown Hazards Cutting Chemical 

Risks at Wastewater Treatment Facilities (2003) 

ments and security plans are likely to contain some sensitive information that merits special protection against public disclosure, S. 

2781 goes too far and would prevent disclosure of even general documents that contain any information derived from these plans, 

even if they do not reference any particular facility or vulnerability, 

and even if they do not contain any information that is actually 

sensitive. The result would be to impose secrecy on many of the 

agency’s general administrative and policy documents relating to 

wastewater security, seriously impeding oversight and accountability of the program. 

Second, S. 2781 does not require the consideration of, or transition to, safer technologies. In our view, this is irresponsible given 

what we know about available alternatives. In April 2006, the Center for American Progress conducted a survey of 1,800 chemical 

plants, including wastewater plants, that no longer report using extremely hazardous substances under the Federal Risk Management 

Planning program.3 The survey determined that facilities across 

the country have switched to safer alternatives from a variety of 

hazardous chemicals, producing dramatic security and safety benefits at a reasonable cost. Some of the report’s findings regarding 

wastewater facilities include: 114 wastewater facilities reported 

switching to less acutely hazardous treatment chemicals. These facilities generally replaced chlorine gas with liquid chlorine bleach 

or ultraviolet light and, as a result of these changes, millions of 

people are no longer at risk of being exposed to toxic gas from these 

facilities. For example, the following wastewater plants switched 

from chlorine gas to liquid bleach and prevented the risk of exposure to toxic gas to the following populations: Blue Plains Wastewater Treatment Plant, Washington, DC, 1.7 million people; Mill 

Creek Wastewater Treatment Plant, Cincinnati, Ohio, 860,000 people; City of Wilmington Water Pollution Control, Wilmington, Delaware, 560,000 people; and Middlesex County Utilities Authority, 

Sayreville, New Jersey, 10.7 million people. 

Third, S. 2781 also sets up a distinct, and vastly different set of 

rules for wastewater facilities than drinking water facilities, 40 

percent of which are co-located, according to GAO. This simply does 

not make sense. Congress has a duty to provide for the security of 

our Nation. S. 2781 simply does not. Five years after the terrorist 

attacks of September 11, 2001 this gap in our nation’s security is 

reckless. The Majority Report notes that cost is an important consideration in switching technologies and states the costs expended 

by two wastewater plants to switch from chlorine to sodium hypochlorite: the Blue Plains treatment plant in Washington, D.C., 

spent $12.5 million and a facility in San Jose, California, spent $5 

million. The cost of switching to a safer treatment chemical or technology is not prohibitive. We disagree with the Majority regarding 

the conversion cost at the Blue Plains plant. According to the report, ‘‘Eliminating Hometown Hazards Cutting Chemical Risks at 

Wastewater Treatment Facilities’’ by Environmental Defense, the Blue Plains facility spent $500,000 in construction costs to switch.4


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5—Cong. Rec. S4805 (daily ed. May 18, 2006) (statement of Sen. Joseph Biden). 

This information was provided by Mike Marcotte, chief engineer at 

the plant at the time of the conversion. Additional capital expenditures were made at this plant that included upgrades to the liquid 

bleach facilities. Half of the respondents, that responded and provided cost estimates, to the survey conducted by the Center for 

American Progress reported spending less than $100,000 to switch 

to safer alternatives and 87 percent spent less than $1 million. For 

instance, the City of Wilmington, Delaware Water Pollution Control facility spent $160,000 to switch from chlorine gas to liquid 

bleach.5 We believe that the wastewater industry should not be exempt from taking basic precautions to evaluate and address its security needs. Therefore, we believe that S. 2781 as reported from 

committee fails to ensure that even the most basic steps toward a 

higher level of security in the nation’s critical infrastructure sectors 

are taken. 

We believe that the Federal Government has a responsibility to 

protect the American people. Without the provisions in the Jeffords 

amendment, we believe that S. 2781 does not fulfill this responsibility. If S. 2781 is implemented as it passed the committee, the 

Federal Government will not know if wastewater facilities will voluntarily conduct a vulnerability assessment, if they will voluntarily 

implement the security needs identified, if the most vulnerable facilities will switch to less hazardous materials for use in treatment, 

or if they will incorporate the results into their emergency response 

plans, and there will be no way of finding out. We believe that S. 

2781 fails to take responsible, basic steps to protect our wastewater 

infrastructure security from terrorist attack, putting Americans at 

risk. 

JIM JEFFORDS. 

JOE LIEBERMAN. 

FRANK R. LAUTENBERG. BARBARA BOXER. 

TOM CARPER. HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON. 

MAX BAUCUS. BARACK OBAMA. 


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CHANGES IN EXISTING LAW

In compliance with section 12 of rule XXVI of the Standing Rules 

of the Senate, changes in existing law made by the bill as reported 

are shown as follows: Existing law proposed to be omitted is enclosed in øblack brackets¿, new matter is printed in italic, existing 

law in which no change is proposed is shown in roman: 

FEDERAL WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT 

* * * * * * * 

TITLE II—GRANTS FOR CONSTRUCTION OF TREATMENT 

WORKS 

SEC. 201. (a) * * * 

* * * * * * * 

SEC. 221. SEWER OVERFLOW CONTROL GRANTS. 

(a) * * * 

* * * * * * * 

SEC. 222. WASTEWATER TREATMENT WORKS SECURITY. 

(a) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 

(1) DISRUPTION OF SERVICE EVENT.—The term ‘disruption of 

service event’ means a natural disaster or event, or a terrorist 

attack or other intentional act, that— 

(A) substantially disrupts the ability of a treatment 

works to provide safe and reliable— 

(i) conveyance and treatment of wastewater; 

(ii) disposal of effluent; or 

(iii) storage of any potentially hazardous chemical 

used to treat wastewater; 

(B) damages critical infrastructure associated with a 

treatment works; 

(C) has a substantial adverse effect on the environment 

as a result of harm caused to a treatment works; or 

(D) otherwise poses a significant threat to public health 

or safety as a result of harm caused to a treatment works. 

(2) EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN.— (A) IN GENERAL.—The term ‘emergency response plan’ 

means a plan or set of plans developed by or in cooperation 

with a treatment works that may include the procedures 

the treatment works will use when a disruption of service 

event occurs, including procedures for ensuring continued 

service and protection of the public health and environment. 


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(B) INCLUSIONS.—The term ‘emergency response plan’ includes a plan or set of plans that may describe, for a case 

in which a disruption of service event occurs— (i) the means by which a publicly owned treatment 

works will provide information regarding risks to— (I) the media; 

(II) municipal emergency personnel; 

(III) health officials; 

(IV) the general public; 

(V) Federal and State environmental authorities; 

and 

(VI) other potentially impacted water utilities; 

(ii) the means by which a publicly owned treatment 

works will limit contamination of public water supplies, including temporary treatment and other mitigation measures; 

(iii) the means by which a publicly owned treatment 

works will address contaminants entering the treatment works or its collection system, including any contaminants added by emergency response personnel in 

responding to a natural disaster or terrorist event; 

(iv) the means by which a publicly owned treatment 

works will secure backup generation if a loss of power 

accompanies the disruption of service event; or 

(v) any additional means of collecting or treating 

wastewater. 

(C) CERTAIN OTHER PLANS.—The term ‘emergency response plan’ may include— (i) an emergency response plan conducted in accordance with a Federal statute that addresses each element identified under subparagraphs (A) and (B); and 

(ii) an emergency response plan in existence on the 

date of enactment of this section that is modified to include each element identified under subparagraphs (A) 

and (B). 

(3) SITE SECURITY PLAN.—The term ‘site security plan’ means 

a plan to implement, to the maximum extent practicable, 

changes at a treatment works based on information in a vulnerability assessment to address risks posed by a disruption of 

service event. 

(4) VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—The term ‘vulnerability assessment’

means an assessment of the vulnerability of a treatment 

works to a disruption of service event. 

(B) INCLUSIONS.—The term ‘vulnerability assessment’

may include—

(i) a characterization of the treatment works, including, with respect to the treatment works—

(I) mission and objective; 

(II) customer base; 

(III) the facilities that comprise the treatment 

works, including— (aa) the collection system; 

(bb) the pumping station; 


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(cc) the power supply; 

(dd) electronic and computer systems; and 

(ee) chemical containers; 

(IV) processes; and 

(V) assets for achieving treatment works objectives; 

(ii) an identification and prioritization of adverse 

consequences to avoid at the treatment works, including— (I) substantial disruptions of service; 

(II) economic impacts; 

(III) loss of life; and 

(IV) negative health consequences for staff at the 

treatment works; 

(iii) an identification of adverse consequences to the 

public health and safety and the environment and natural resources; 

(iv) a determination of critical assets of the treatment 

works that may be subject to a disruption of service 

event, including— (I) pumping stations; 

(II) power sources; 

(III) electronic and computer systems; and 

(IV) disinfection processes; 

(v) an assessment of— (I) the qualitative probability of a disruption of 

service event; and 

(II) whether the disruption of service event is the 

result of a natural or an intentional occurrence; 

(vi) an evaluation of existing countermeasures relating to the treatment works; and 

(vii) an analysis of current risk relating to the treatment works and the development of a prioritized plan 

for risk reduction at the treatment works. 

(b) GRANTS FOR VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENTS AND SECURITY EN- HANCEMENTS.—The Administrator may provide grants to any State, 

municipality, intermunicipal or interstate agency, or privately 

owned utility that principally treats municipal wastewater— (1) to conduct a vulnerability assessment of a publicly owned 

treatment works; 

(2) to implement security enhancements described in subsection (c)(1) and other security enhancements to reduce 

vulnerabilities identified in a vulnerability assessment; 

(3) for the development, expansion, or upgrading of an emergency response plan and site security plan; and 

(4) for the voluntary creation by a State or network of treatment works of, or voluntary participation by a treatment works 

in, a mutual aid and emergency network preparedness agreement developed in accordance with the National Incident Management System established pursuant to presidential directive 

number 5 of the Department of Homeland Security. 

(c) GRANTS FOR SECURITY ENHANCEMENTS.— (1) PREAPPROVED SECURITY ENHANCEMENTS.—On certification by a State, municipality, intermunicipal or interstate 


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agency, or privately owned utility that principally treats municipal wastewater that a vulnerability assessment has been completed for a treatment works, and that the security enhancement 

for which assistance is sought is for the purpose of reducing 

vulnerabilities of the treatment works identified in the vulnerability assessment, the Administrator may provide grants to the 

State, municipality, intermunicipal or interstate agency, or privately owned utility under subsection (b)(2) for 1 or more of the 

uses described in paragraph (2). 

(2) USES OF GRANT FUNDS.—The uses referred to in paragraph (1) include—

(A) the purchase and installation of equipment for materials and activities relating to access control, intrusion prevention and delay, and detection of intruders and hazardous or dangerous substances, including—

(i) barriers, fencing, and gates; 

(ii) security lighting and cameras; 

(iii) metal grates, wire mesh, and outfall entry barriers; 

(iv) securing of manhole covers and fill and vent 

pipes; 

(v) installation and rekeying of doors and locks; and 

(vi) smoke, chemical, and explosive mixture detection 

systems; 

(B) the conduct of an activity to improve the security for 

electronic, computer, or other automated systems and remote security systems, including—

(i) controlling access to those systems; 

(ii) intrusion detection and prevention; and 

(iii) system backup; 

(C) participation in a training program, and the purchase of training manuals and guidance material, relating 

to security; and 

(D) the conduct of security screening of employees or contractor support services. 

(3) LIMITATIONS.—

(A) USE OF FUNDS.—A grant provided under subsection 

(b) shall not be used for—

(i) payment of personnel costs; or 

(ii) operation or maintenance of facilities, equipment, 

or systems. 

(B) DISCLOSURE OF VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT.—

(i) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided in clause (ii), as 

a condition of applying for or receiving a grant under 

this subsection, the Administrator may not require an 

applicant to provide the Administrator with a copy of 

a vulnerability assessment. 

(ii) EXCEPTION.—To ensure compliance with any applicable Federal grant requirement, the Administrator 

or a designee of the Administrator—

(I) may request and view a copy of a vulnerability assessment associated with a grant under 

this section; but 


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(II) shall not take possession or control of the 

copy. 

(C) RESPONSIBILITY OF ADMINISTRATOR.—Not later than 

December 31, 2006, the Administrator, in consultation with 

appropriate Federal law enforcement and intelligence officials, shall incorporate into existing protocols for protection 

of sensitive information a method by which the Administrator will protect from unauthorized disclosure vulnerability assessment information viewed by the Administrator 

or a designee of the Administrator pursuant to subparagraph (B)(ii). 

(D) PENALTIES.—

(i) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided in clause (ii), 

any individual who views a vulnerability assessment, 

a reproduction of a vulnerability assessment, or any information derived from a vulnerability assessment, 

pursuant to subparagraph (B)(ii) and who knowingly 

or recklessly reveals the vulnerability assessment, reproduction, or information other than to the Administrator or an individual designated by the Administrator, or for use in an administrative or judicial proceeding to impose a penalty for failure to comply with 

this section, shall, on conviction—

(I) be imprisoned for not more than 1 year or 

fined in accordance with chapter 227 of title 18, 

United States Code, as applicable to class A misdemeanors, or both; and 

(II) be removed from Federal office or employment. 

(ii) EXCEPTION.—Notwithstanding clause (i), a designee of the Administrator who is an officer or employee of the United States may discuss with any State 

or local government official the contents of a vulnerability assessment viewed under this paragraph. 

(E) EFFECT OF PARAGRAPH.—Nothing in this paragraph 

authorizes any person to withhold any information from 

Congress or any committee or subcommittee of Congress. 

(4) FALSE CERTIFICATIONS.—An applicant that knowingly 

submits to the Administrator a false certification or material 

statement under this subsection shall be subject to a criminal 

penalty under section 309(c)(4). 

(5) EXEMPTION UNDER FOIA AND RELATED LAWS.—Except for 

information in a certification under this subsection identifying 

the system for which the certification is submitted and the date 

of certification of the system, all information contained in a vulnerability assessment certified by an applicant or derived from 

a vulnerability assessment under this section shall be exempt 

from the disclosure requirements under—

(A) section 552 of title 5, United States Code (commonly 

known as the ‘Freedom of Information Act’); and 

(B) any State or local law providing for public access to 

information. 

(d) GRANT AMOUNTS.—


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(1) FEDERAL SHARE.—The Federal share of the cost of an activity funded by a grant under subsection (b) shall not exceed 

50 percent, as determined by the Administrator. 

(2) MAXIMUM AMOUNT.—The total amount of grants made 

under subsection (b) for any publicly owned treatment works 

shall not exceed $100,000, as determined by the Administrator. 

(e) TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE FOR SMALL PUBLICLY OWNED TREAT- MENT WORKS.— (1) DEFINITION OF SMALL PUBLICLY OWNED TREATMENT

WORKS.—In this subsection, the term ‘small publicly owned 

treatment works’ means a publicly owned treatment works that 

services a population of fewer than 10,000 individuals. 

(2) SECURITY ASSESSMENT AND PLANNING ASSISTANCE.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—The Administrator, in coordination 

with the States, may provide technical guidance and assistance to small publicly owned treatment works for—

(i) the conduct of a vulnerability assessment, emergency response plan, or site security plan; and 

(ii) the implementation of security enhancements to 

reduce vulnerabilities identified in a vulnerability assessment. 

(B) INCLUSIONS.—Technical guidance and assistance provided under subparagraph (A) may include technical assistance programs, training, and preliminary engineering 

evaluations. 

(3) PARTICIPATION BY NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS.—The Administrator may provide grants to nonprofit organizations to 

assist in accomplishing the purposes of this subsection. 

(f) REFINEMENT OF VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY

FOR PUBLICLY OWNED TREATMENT WORKS.—

(1) GRANTS.—The Administrator may provide to nonprofit organizations 1 or more grants to be used in improving vulnerability self-assessment methodologies and tools for publicly 

owned treatment works, including publicly owned treatment 

works that are part of a combined public wastewater treatment 

and water supply system. 

(2) ELIGIBLE ACTIVITIES.—A grant provided under this subsection may be used— (A) to develop and distribute vulnerability self-assessment methodology software upgrades; 

(B) to improve and enhance critical technical and user 

support functions; 

(C) to expand libraries of information addressing threats 

and countermeasures; and 

(D) to implement user training initiatives. 

(3) COST.—A service described in paragraph (2) that is funded by a grant under this subsection shall be provided at no cost 

to the recipients of the service. 

(g) TRAINING GRANTS.— (1) IN GENERAL.—The Administrator may provide grants to 

nonprofit organizations to be used in accordance with paragraph (2) to implement a comprehensive training program for 

treatment works or privately owned utilities that principally 

treat municipal wastewater. 


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(2) ELIGIBLE ACTIVITIES.—A grant provided under paragraph 

(1) may be used—

(A) to develop and implement a training program to assist treatment works in—

(i) conducting vulnerability assessments using vulnerability self-assessment methodology software; 

(ii) developing emergency response plans; and 

(iii) identifying security enhancements, including 

operational adjustments and design practices; and 

(B) to develop and disseminate to treatment works information on best practices for emergency response plans and 

security enhancements, including operational adjustments 

and design practices. 

(3) COST.—Training and technical assistance provided pursuant to a grant under paragraph (1) shall be provided at no cost 

to the recipients of the assistance. 

(h) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is authorized to 

be appropriated—

(1) $200,000,000 for use in making grants under subsection 

(b), to remain available until expended; 

(2) $15,000,000 for use in providing assistance under subsections (e) and (g); and 

(3) to carry out subsection (f), $1,000,000 for each of fiscal 

years 2007 through 2011. 

SEC. 223. RESEARCH AND REVIEW OF COLLECTION SYSTEMS AND 

TREATMENT WORKS. 

(a) DEFINITION OF COLLECTION SYSTEM.—In this section, the term 

‘collection system’ means the underground network of sewers, including sanitary and storm water collection lines. 

(b) RESEARCH AND REVIEW.—The Administrator, in consultation 

with appropriate Federal agencies, shall conduct research and a review, or enter into a contract or cooperative agreement for the conduct of research and a review, of—

(1) means of providing alternative processes to convey, treat, 

and dispose of wastewater if a disruption of service event (as 

defined in section 222) occurs; 

(2) the means by which the collection system of a treatment 

works could—

(A) be used to convey hazardous chemicals or substances 

(including explosive devices), including a comprehensive 

analysis of the types of hazardous chemicals, substances, 

and explosive devices that could be placed in the collection 

system; and 

(B) be secured in response to an intentional harmful act; 

(3) methods for monitoring—

(A) the collection system of a treatment works for hazardous chemicals or substances, including explosive devices; and 

(B) unauthorized entry into the collection system of a 

treatment works; and 

(4) treatment technologies, including the affordability, effectiveness, and limitations of each treatment technology. 


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(c) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is authorized to 

be appropriated to carry out this section $5,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2007 through 2011. 

* * * * * * * 

Æ 


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