United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted December 11, 2014

Decided December 12, 2014

Before

DIANE P. WOOD, Chief Judge

JOEL M. FLAUM, Circuit Judge

ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge

No. 14‐1423

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff‐Appellee,

v.

DEMETRIUS HARRIS,

Defendant‐Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Northern District of

Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 13 CR 181‐1

Thomas M. Durkin,

Judge.

O R D E R

Demetrius Harris sold a total of 281 grams of heroin to a confidential informant

over the course of seven occasions. He pleaded guilty to distributing 100 or more grams

of a mixture containing heroin. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B)(i). Prior drug

convictions made him a career offender, see U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a), and the district court

sentenced him below the guidelines range to 204 months’ imprisonment. Harris filed a

notice of appeal, but his appointed lawyer asserts that the appeal is frivolous and seeks

to withdraw. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). Harris has not accepted our

invitation to respond to counsel’s motion. See CIR. R. 51(b). Counsel has submitted a brief

that explains the nature of the case and addresses the issues that an appeal of this kind

might be expected to involve. Because counsel’s analysis appears to be thorough, we

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
No. 14‐1423    Page 2

limit our review to the subjects that counsel has discussed. See United States v. Bey, 748

F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir. 2014); United States v. Wagner, 103 F.3d 551, 553 (7th Cir. 1996).

Counsel tells us that Harris does not wish to challenge his guilty plea and thus

appropriately forgoes discussing the voluntariness of the plea or the adequacy of the

plea colloquy. See United States v. Konczak, 683 F.3d 348, 349 (7th Cir. 2012); United States

v. Knox, 287 F.3d 667, 670–71 (7th Cir. 2002).

Counsel next considers whether Harris could challenge his designation as a career

offender, see U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1, but properly concludes that such a challenge would be

frivolous. Harris already had been convicted of two felony controlled‐substance offenses

(delivery of .2 grams of heroin in 2000, 720 ILCS § 570/401(d) (2000), and delivery of 2

grams of crack cocaine in 2003, id. § 570/401(c)(2) (2002)), as well as aggravated fleeing in

2012, a crime of violence, see United States v. Smith, 721 F.3d 904, 906 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,

134 S. Ct. 660 (2013); Welch v. United States, 604 F.3d 408 (7th Cir. 2010).   

Counsel also considers whether Harris could argue that his 204‐month sentence

(below the 262–327 month calculated range) is unreasonable and correctly concludes

that such a challenge would be frivolous. A below‐guidelines sentence is presumptively

reasonable. Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 347 (2007); United States v. Martinez, 650

F.3d 667, 671 (7th Cir. 2011). Counsel has not identified a reason to disturb that

presumption, nor can we. The court considered the relevant 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors,

highlighting Harris’s history of “continuous criminal conduct,” see id. § 3553(a)(1), and

the need both for specific deterrence because of Harris’s long criminal past and for

general deterrence because of the prevalence of drug dealing in his community, see id.

§ 3553(a)(2)(B).   

Counsel’s motion to withdraw is GRANTED, and the appeal is DISMISSED.