UNITED STAT ES COURT OF AP P EALS FOR VETERANS CLAIMS

N O
. 04-181
B EN J AMI N F. K E NT , A PP EL L ANT ,

V
. R. J A M ES N I C HOL S ON , S EC RE T A RY O F V ET ER A N S A FF A I RS , A PPEL L EE
.

On Ap pe a l f ro m th e B oa

rd of Ve te ra ns ' Ap pe a ls
(De cided Ma

rch 31, 2006 )

Sean A. Rav in , o f Was hin g ton , D .C. , w a s o n th e br ie f f or the a pp e lla nt.
Tim S. Mc Cla in , G e ne ra l Co un se l; R. Ra nd all Cam pb e ll , As si st ant Ge ne ra l Co un se l; R i c h ar d Maye rick, Deputy

Assistant Gener al Counsel; and Ba rb ara J . F ins ne ss , al l of Washington, D.C., wer e on the br ief for

the appe llee.
Be fore HAGEL , L ANCE, and SCHOEL EN, Judge s. S C HOEL EN, Judge : T h e a p p e ll an t, B e n

ja mi n F

. K e n t, thr o u g h c o u n s e l, a p p e a ls a n October 8, 2003, Boa

rd of Veter ans' Appea ls (Boa rd or B VA) de cision that determined that he had not presente d new a

nd materia l evidence to reope n his previously an d fi nally denied c laims for service connec tion for psy chog enic g astrointestinal rea ction and psoriasis. Rec ord (R.) at 1-13. The appellant a

nd the Secre tary

eac h filed a br ief. This appe al is timely , and the Court has jurisdiction

ov e r t he c a se purs ua

nt t o 3 8 U .S. C. § § 7 25 2( a ) a nd 72 66

. F or the re a so ns that f oll ow , th e Court

wi ll

vacate the Oc tober 8, 2003, B oard de cision and re mand the mat te r s f o r f u rther pr ocee dings c onsistent with this opi nion.

I. BACKG ROUND Th e a pp e lla nt se rv e d on ac tiv e du ty in the U. S. M ari ne Cor ps fr om S e pte mbe r 1 6, 19 50 , to J anuar y 20, 1 9 5 1 , wh en h e re ce ived a medic al dischar g e as a result of a

disability . R. at 17. The repor t from his entra

nce medical examination re flec ts no mental or phy sical abnor malities. Id . On2

October 3 0 , 1 9 5 0 , he visited sick bay with complaints of stomach pain a nd vomiting of blood. R. at 21. At that time, he repor ted that three y ear s befor e he ente red se rvice he had ha d an " ulcer " wi th p a in, na

us e a , a nd vo mit ingof

blo od . R at 21

. He st ate d that he wa s tr e a te d b y his midwife-g randmother . R. at 22. He repor ted that he had done well on a diet of soft food, and had experience d no further s y m p t o m s u n t i l four day s prior to his visit to sick bay . R. at 21. He wa s diag nosed with a cute g astroente ritis, a nd he was transfe rre d to a naval hospital fo r t reatment. Id

. Af te r a se ri e s o f m e dic a l te sts we re pe rf or me d, the a

pp e lla nt w a s d ia g no se d w ith" he mate me sis , c a us e un kn ow n. " R. at 23 -2 4. I n D e c e mbe r 1 95 0, aft er a sec on d h os pit a lizatio n f or the same sy mptoms, t he m ed i ca l diag nosis was cha ng ed to " psy chog enic g astrointestinal rea ction." R. at 25, 33. The appellant was a lso diag nosed as having " sy mmetrical a cne" on his face and bac k. R. at 28

. I n Ja nu ar

y 1 9 5 1 , th e B o ar d o f M e d ic a l Sur v e y d e te r mi n e d th a t th e a

p p e ll an t w a s not

me dic a lly fi t f or du ty be c a us e of his ps y c ho g e nic g a str oin te sti na l r e a c tio n, and that th e dis a

bil ity pree x isted service and wa s not ag g ravated by service . R. at 33. I n Fe bruar

y 1951, the appe llant filed a c laim f o r d i s ability

compensation for an " ulcer ated sto ma c h. " R. at 36 -3 9. On Ap ri l 24 , 1 95 1, a

VAre g ion a l of

fi c e (R O) de nie d the c la im (a s a c la im fo r p sy c ho g e nic g a str oin te sti na l r e a c tio n) . R. a t 44 . T he RO g a ve the fol lo wi ng rea so ns fo r i ts de nia l: Five w eeks afte r induction into service , claimant was e x amined and

found to have psy chog enic g astro-intestinal re action. In view of the short term of service , the nature and extent of the condit i o n when dis c ov e re d, the fa ilure of the re c or ds to re fl e c t pe rm ane nt i nc re a se in se ve ri ty du e to i nju

ry , d ise a se , p a tho log ic a l c h a n g e s , e m o t i o n a l stre ss, strain, or other

adver se influence s peculiar to service [si c] is rebutted by clea r and unmistakable evidenc e of rec ord, including e stablished and ac cepte d medical pr inciples. R. at 44. The appe llant did not appea l that de cision. I n 1958, he attempted unsuc cessf ully to reope n his claim. R. at 52-60. I n May 1996, he filed a

claim for disa

bility compensation for malar ia, psoriasis, ulcer s, and

anxie ty . R. a t 62 . Po sts e rv ic e me dic a l tr e a tme nt r e c or ds , o bta ine d in c onnec tio n w iththe c la im,

reve aled that the a

ppellant had be en t re at ed for skin conditions that were dia g nosed, inter a lia, as seborr heic lesions, psoriasis, ac tinic keratosis, and acne rosac ea. R. at 67, 326, 397-99, 404-05, 412, 415-18, 424-28, 430. In a J uly 1996 decision, the RO denie d entitlement to service connec tion for3

ps or ia sis on

the ba sis that th e a

pp e lla nt' s ser vic e me dic a l re c or ds we re ne g a tiv e fo r a ny tr e a tme nt, finding s, or diag nosis of psoriasis. R. at 68-69. The a ppellant' s claim fo r s ervice conne ction for

u lc ers wa s denied be cause the RO deter mined that the servic e medica l rec ords (SMRs) were neg ative for " any definite diag nosis of a chr onic g astrointestinal disability during servi ce or within the one[-]y ear

presumptive per iod." R. at 68. The RO al s o d et ermined that the appellant ha d not

su bmi tte d n e w a

nd mate ri a l e vid e nc e to r e op e n h is c la im f or se rv ic e c onne c tio n f

or ps y c ho g e nic g astrointestinal rea ction. R. at 67. I n Dec ember 1997, the appe llant filed a Notice of Disag ree ment that was untimely

beca use it was not filed within the one- y ear appea l period. R. at 74. The a ppellant attempted to re open the se rvice -conne ction claims for psor iasis and psy chog enic g astrointestinal rea ction in J uly 1999. R. at 95. I n support of hi s claims, he submitted copies of his ser

vice medic al re cords. R. at 97. On Aug ust 4, 1999, the R O determined that no new and mater ial evidenc e had be en submitted. Id

. On Marc h 16, 2000, the appe llant submit ted evidenc e fr om private phy sicians indicating that he wa s being treated for g astroesopha g eal r eflux disease and psor iasis. R. at 104-08. I n April 2000, the RO de te rmin ed th a t th e a pp e lla nt h a d n ot s ub mitte d n e w a nd mate ri a l e vid e nc e to r e op e n h is claims for service connec tion for psoriasis and psy chog enic ga strointestinal rea ction. R. at 110-12. T h e a p p e ll an t a

p p e a le d th a t d e c is io n to th e B o ar d

. R. a t 1 2 6

. I n A p r il 2 0 0 1 , th e RO sent the appellant a

letter to advise him of the Veter ans Claims A ssistance Act. R. at 143. The Apr il 2001 letter a dvised the appe llant that in order to " establish entitlem en t for se rvice [-] connec ted compensat i o n b en ef

i ts," the e vidence must show an injury or disease that beg an in or wa s made worse dur ing military

service , a curr ent phy sical or mental disability , and a r elationship betwee n the appellant' s curr ent medica l disabilit y and an injury , disease, or

event in ser

vice. Id . The Apr il 2001 le tte r d i d n o ta dv i s e t h e a

p p e l l an tt h a th e n e e d e d

n e w an d m a t e r i a l e v i d e n c e t o r e o p e nh i s c la ims

. On Octobe r 8, 2003, in the decision here on appea l, the B oard c oncluded that the a ppellant had not submitt ed new

and mater ial evidenc e to re open his claims for service connec tion for psoria sis and g astrointestinal psy chog enic r eac tion. R. at 1-13. I n his brief, the a

ppellant asser

ts that the Boa

rd did not provide an a deq u at e s t atement of

re a so ns or

ba se s f or its de c isi on

be c a us e it f a ile d to c on sid e r and dis c us s w he the r r e c e nt c ha ng e s in the interpre tation of law pe rtaining to the pres u mption of soundness entitled him to a de novo

rea djudicati o n of his claim for se rvice connec tion for psy chog enic g astrointestinal rea ction. Appellant' s Br ief (B r.) at 6-10. Alternatively , he ar g ues that cha ng es in the interpre tation of the law4

surr ound ingthe pr e su

m p t i o n o f s o un dn e ss c on sti tut e d n e w a nd mate ri a l e vid e nc e to r e op e n h is c la im for psychog enic g astrointestinal rea ction. Id . at 10-11. He also argues that VA violate d 38 U.S.C. § 5103(a) whe n it failed to g ive him adequate notice of th e i n fo rm ati on or evide nce
nece ssary to substantiate his claims. Id

. at 11-14. The appellant a sks the Court to vacate the B oard decision and r emand the matter. Id . at 14. I n his brief, the Secre tary

argues that there was a

plausible basis for the Boa rd' s finding that there was no ne w and materia l evidence to reope n the appe llant's se rvice -conne ction claims, that the Boa rd provided a

n adequate statement of r easons or bases f or its d ec i sion, and that VA c omplied with its dut y

to notify pursuant to 38 U.S.C. § 5103(a). Sec reta ry ' s Br ief (B r.) at 8-15. He a sks that the Court aff

irm the Boa

rd' s decision. Id . at 21-22.

II. AN AL YSI S A. R ea d j u d i ca t i o no f aFi n al C l ai m P u rs u an tt o 3 8 U. S

. C

. § 5 1 1 0 (g) Once a cla im has been f

inally decide d and disallowed, it m ay not be re opened in the a bsence of ne w a nd mate ri a l e vid e nc e . 3 8 U .S. C. § § 5 10 8; 7 10 4( b) (1 ). Th e a pp e lla nt, c iti ngto Sp e nc e r v . B ro wn , 4 Vet.App. 283 ( 1993), aff' d, 17 F .3 d 3 68 (F e d. Cir . 199 4) , a rgue s th a t be c a

us e of " chang es in the interpr etation of law" surrounding the presumption of sound condition came about afte r the RO in April 1951 denied his claim for ser vice c onnection for

psy chog enic g astrointestinal

rea ction in 1951, "the Secre tary is require d to conduct a de novo revie w of the pr eviously denied

c la im" ir re sp e c tiv e of

wh e the r t he a pp e lla nt h a s su bmi tte d ne w an d mate ri a l e vid e nc e to r e op e n h is claim. Appellant' s Br . at 7. I n Spence r , the Court rec og nized that when there has bee n an in t erve ning liber alization of law that cr eate s a new basis of entitlement to a benef it, an otherwise pr eviously and fina lly

denied

c la im m ay

be re a dju dic a te d d e no vo on the same fa c tua l ba sis a s th e pr e vio us ly de nie d c la im. Spence r , 4 Ve t. App

. at 28 8. Th e a uth or ity fo r s uc h r e a dju dic a tio n is 38 U. S.C. § 5 11 0( g ) a nd its implementing r egulation, 38 C.F.R § 3.114 (2005). Section 5110(g) p ro v ides that " wher e compensation . . . is awarde d or incre ased pur suant to a ny Act or a dminist rative issue, the eff ective date of such aw ard sha ll be fix ed in ac corda nce with the facts found but shall not be ea rlier than the

e ff e c tiv e date of the Ac t or ad min istrativ e iss ue ." Th is statut or y pr ov isi on pr e su pp os e s th e ri g ht t o
a de no vo a dju dic a tio n o f a pr e vio us ly and fi na lly de nie d cla im be c a us e of an in te rv e nin g c ha

ng e in law that cr eate s a newbasis of entitlement to a be nefit. Spence r , 4 Vet.App. at 288.5

Ha rm on izin g the pr ov isi on s o f s e c tio n 5 11 0( g ) a nd the pr oh ibi tio n in sec tio n 7 10 4( b) a g a ins t reope ning a finally

denied c laim in the absenc e of ne w and mate rial evide nce, the Court in Spence r found that whe n a " provision of law or r egulation cre ates a new ba sis of entitlement to benef its, an applicant' s claim of entitlement under such law or

regulation is a claim separ ate a nd distinct from a cla im prev i o u s ly

and fina lly

denied pr ior to the liberalizing law or re g ulation." Spence r , 4 Ve t.A

pp . at 28 9. I n s uc h a

c a se , th e re is n o atte mpt to r e op e n th e fi na lly de nie d c la im; rathe r, a diff

ere nt claim is presente d for a djudication. Id. The a ppellant points to two "cha ng es i n the i nterpre tation of l aw" that, he arg ues, trig g ere d de novo adjudication of his claim for ser vice c onnection for

psy chog enic g astrointestinal rea ction. First, he a rg ues that the Court' s holding in Cro we v . B ro wn , 7 Vet.App. 238, 245 (1994), c onstitut es a cha ng e in interve ning la w. T h e ap pellant' s argument fails bec ause Cro we do e s n ot r e pr e se nt a

c ha ng e in law. I nd e e d, the re ha s bee n no inte rv e nin g c ha ng e in l aw s inc e his c la im w a s d e nie d in 1951. I n Cro we , th e Court he ld t hat th e pr e sumpt ion

of so un d c on dit ion

a tta c he s to a

dis a bil ity unless the condition is detecte d at the time of a veter an' s entranc e examination. The Court's holding in Cro we is essentially

a litera l application of the pla in meaning o f t h e cl ear and unambiguous statut or y langua g e , w hic h h a s b e e n in e ff e c t, w ith ou t su

bs tanti ve c ha

nge, for mo re tha

n 6 0 y e ars
. Mo re sp e c if

ic a lly , s inc e 19 43 , th e e xpre ss s tatut or y lan gu a g e of

se c tio n 1 11 1 h a s p ro vid e d th a t a veter an is presume d to be in sound condition ex cept a s to pree x isting conditi ons that are noted upon entry into service. See 38 U.S.C. § 1111 ("[E]very veter an shall b e t ak en t o h ave been in sound condition when examined, ac cepte d, and enr olled for s er v i ce, except as to defe cts, infirmities, or d i s o r d e r s n o t e d

a tt h e t i m e o f

t h e e xam i n a t i o n , a c c e p t an c e , an d e n r o l l m e n t

. . . . " ); se e als o Pub. L . No. 78-144 § 9(b) , 57 Stat. 554-560 (1943) (cod i fi ed as 38 U .S.C. app. ch. 12); W agner v. Princ ipi, 370 F.3d 1089, 1094- 96 (F ed. Cir. 2004) (discussing leg islative history of 38 U.S.C. § 1111); Jordan v. Princ ipi , 17 Ve t.A pp
. 26 1, 27 6- 77 (2 00 3) (S te inb e rg , J., se pa rate vie ws ) (discussing same), aff'

d sub. nom Jordan v. Nicholson , 401 F.3 d 1 2 9 6 (F ed. C ir. 2005); Cotant v. Principi , 17 Vet.App. 116, 123- 26 (2003) ( discussing same). I n s ho rt , th e law a s it

c ur re ntl y e xists wa s in e ff

e c t a t the tim e that the RO de nie d the a pp e lla nt' s se rv ic e -c onne c tio n c la im in 1951. Fur thermore , there is n o i n d i cation that when the RO denied the appellant' s claim in 1951 it did so on t he basis that he was not e ntitled to the pre sumption of soundness. I ndeed, it appe ars that the RO c on c lud e d that th e pr e sumpt ion of so un dn e ss w a s r e bu tte d b y c le ar a nd un mis taka

ble6

evidenc e that the a

pp el l an t 's psy chog enic g astrointestinal rea ction pree x isted service and wa s not ag g ravated by

service

. The sec ond alleg ed interve ning c hang e in law is the 2004 holding of the United St ates Court of Appea ls f

or the Fe dera l Circ uit ( Fe der al C i rc u i t ) i n W ag ne r, su pra . I n W

agner , the Fe dera l Circuit held that to overc ome the pre sumption of s oundness for w artime ve tera ns under 38 U.S.C. § 1111, VA must show clea r and unmistakable evidenc e of both a pree x isting condition and a lac k of in-ser

vice a g g ravation. W

ag ner , su pra; se e als o VA Ge n. Coun. Prec. 3-2003 ( Ju ly 1 6 , 2 0 0 3 )

. Pr io r to th e Co u rt' s holding in W agner , VA wa s require d to show only clea r and

un mis ta ka ble e vid e nc e of

a pr e e xistin g c on dit ion

to o ve rc ome the pr e sumpt ion of so un dn e ss. See Cro we , 7 V e t

. A p p a t2 4 5 ; 3 8 C

. F

. R

. § 3

. 3 0 4 ( b ) ( 2 0 04 ); cf. Presumption of Sound Conditi on : A g g r a v a ti o n o f a D is a b il it y b y A c ti v e Se r

v ic e , 7 0 F e d

. Re g
. 2 3 , 0 2 7 , 2 3 , 0 2 9 ( M ay 4, 2005) (amending § 3.304(b) to conf orm to W agner h o l d i n g). T h u s , t h e ef

fe ct o f t h e F ed er al C i rc u i t 's decision in W

agner wa s to inc re a se VA ' s bur de n to re bu t the pr e sumpt ion of so un dn e ss f or wa rt ime

ve te ra ns
. I t is clear that the Fe dera l Circuit's holding in W agner repr esents a c hang e in interpre tation of law. H oweve r, the Court does not ag ree t h at this constitutes a liberalizing cha ng e in law

wa rr anti nga de no vo a dju dic a tio n o f t he a pp e lla nt' s cla im fo r se rv ic e c onne c tio n f or a ps y c ho g e nic g astrointestinal disorder. A chang e in la w that is merely

proce dural doe s not create new r ights to VA benef its. See Spe ncer , 4 Vet.App. at 289. I n Ro ute n v . W est , 1 4 2 F. 3 d 1434, 1439-41 (F ed. Cir. 1988), the F eder al Circuit held that a c hang e in the law that raised the evidentiar y burden require d of VA to re but the statuto ry p re s u m p t ion of ag g ravation available to pea cetime ve tera ns from " competent" evidence to "clea r and unmistakable " e vidence was proc edura l, and not substantive in nature. Id

. Th e F e de ra l Cir c uit state d that the c ha ng e in the e vid e nti ary sta

nd ard did not cre ate a new cause of action since no new basis of entitlement to the under ly ing V A bene fit was

cre ated. Id . at 1442. Her e, as in Routen , th e c ha ng e in l aw b ro ug ht a

bo ut b y the F e de ral Ci rcui t's op ini on in W agner is pr ocedur al, and not substantive, in nature. He nce, the Court concludes that the Fe dera l Circuit's de cision in W

agner did not provide a new basis for establishing entitl ement to benefits that

wo uld wa rr ant a dju dic a tin g de no vo the a pp e lla nt' s c la im fo r se rv ic e c onne c ti on for psy c ho g e nic g a str oin te sti na l di so rd e r. I n lig ht o f t his ho ldi ng , a

ny fa ilure by

the B oa rd to d isc us s th e c ha

ng e in law surr ounding the presumption of soundness is nonprejudicia l beca use t he C ourt ca

n still car ry out7

a prope r re view. See 38 U.S.C. § 7261(b) ; May field v. Nicholson , 19 Vet.App. 103, 129 (2005) (holding that the Court's r eview w as " not hindered by any rea sons-or-ba ses def

iciency in the Boa

rd decision, and a rema

nd would be of no be nefit to [the appellant] and would theref ore be pointless"), appeal dock

eted , No. 05-7157 (F ed. Cir. J une 14, 2005) ; Soyini v. De rwinski , 1 Vet.App. 540, 546 (1991) ( holding that "stri ct ad here nce" to rea sons-or-ba ses re quirement whe re e vidence was "ove r w h e lm in g ly " a g a in s t th e c la im w o u ld u n n e c e s s ar il y im p o s e a d d it io n a l b u r d e n s o n th e B VA wi th no be ne fi t fl ow ing to the ve ter an) ; see also Valiao v. Principi , 17 Vet.App. 229, 232 ( 2003) (holding that "[w]here the fac ts averr ed by a claimant cannot conceiva bly result i n any

dispositi on of the a ppeal other

than af firmanc e of the Boa

rd dec ision, the case should not b e re manded f or development that c ould not possibl y chang e the outcome of the de cision")

. B . M isa pp lic a tio n o f L aw a s N e w a nd Mate ri a l E vid e nc e to R e op e n a Cla im The a ppellant does not take issue with the Boa rd' s deter mination that the evidenc e submitted since the claim was last disallowed was not new and materia l evidenc e. I nstead, he argues, in the

a lte rn a tiv e , th a t th e c ha

ng e s in int e rp re tatio n o f l aw s ur ro un din g the pr e sumpt ion of so un dn e ss constitute new a

nd materia l evidence to reope n his c la im f or se rv ic e con nectionfo r p sy c ho g e nic g astrointestinal rea ction. App el l an t 's Br . at 7. The a ppellant' s argument is without m erit. The Fe dera l Circuit held unequivocally in Routen that " mis a

pp lic a tio n of, or failure to apply , a statutory

or re g ulatory

burden- shifting pr esumption . . . does not constitute 'ne w and materia l evidenc e' for the pu rpo se o f reo pen in g a clai m u nd er 38 U.S .C . § 51 08 ." Routen , 142 F.3d at 1440. Al t h o u gh presumptions are rules of law for ha ndling e vidence , they

are not themselves consider ed evide nce. Id

. Ac c or din g ly , a cha

ng e that r a ise s the g overnme nt's evidentiar y burden to re but the presumption of so un d c on dit ion

may no t c on sti tut e ne w a

nd mate ri a l e vid e nc e to r e op e n a fi na lly de c ide d c la im. C. V A C omp lia

nc e wi th N oti c e Re qu ir e me nts The a ppellant ar g ues that VA fai l ed t o ful fill its dut y to notify under 38 U .S.C. § 5103(a). As amende d by

the Vete rans Claims Assistance A ct (VCAA) , 38 U.S.C. § 5103(a) re quires that VA inf or m th e c la ima

nt o f t he inf or matio n a nd e vid e nc e no t of

re c or d ( 1) that is ne c e ssa

ry to s ub sta nti a te the claim; (2) that VA will seek to obt ai n ; an d (3) that the c laimant is ex pecte d to provide. 38 U.S.C. § 5103(a). I n addition, 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b)( 1) (2005) imposes a fourth r equire ment that VA " reque st that the claimant provide a ny evidenc e in the claimant's possession that per tains to the cla im ." See P elegrini v. Principi , 18 Vet.App. 112, 121 (2004). These are ref err ed to as the " four VC AA n ot ice requ ir eme nt s. " Se e Ma y fie ld , 19 Vet.App. at 122. Th e pr ov isi on s o f t he VC AAa

pp ly8

to c laims to re open. See Q uartuccio v. Princ ipi , 16 Vet.App. 183, 186 ( 2002). F a ilure to c omp ly with an y o f th e f

o u r V CA A r e q u ir e me n ts ma y c o n s ti tu te re mandable e rror
. See P elegrini

, 18 Ve t.A

pp . at 12 1- 22 ; Qu ar tuc c io , 16 Vet.App. at 188. I n addition, a B oard f ailure to p ro vid e an a de qu a te state me nt of re a so ns or ba se s a s to V CA A c omp lia nc e may a lso c on sti tut e
rema ndable e rror
. See 3 8 U

. S

. C

. § 7 1 0 4 ( a ) , ( d ) ( 1 ); C h a r l es v. Principi , 16 Vet.App. 370, 374 (2002). Th e a pp e lla nt b e ars the burd e n of ide nti fy ing , w ithsp e c if

ic ity , h owthe no tic e do c ume nt( s)

are noncompliant with the VCAA notice r equire ments. Se e Ma y fie ld , 1 9 V e t.A

pp . at 111. When revie wing a VA notice letter, the le tter is rea d as a w hole for c ompliance with the VCAA

. Ma y fie ld , 19 Vet.App. at 124. I n the event that the Court f inds e rror , it must "take due acc ount of the ru le of

pr e jud ic ia l e rr or." 38 U. S.C. § 7 26 1( b) (2 ); se e Ma y fie ld , 19 Vet.App. at 112-21 (explaining how the Court "take [s] due ac count of the r ule of pre judicial err or" both in ge nera l, and in the context of VCAA notice). E s t a b l i s h i n g s e r

v i c e c o n n e c t i o ng e n e r a l l y r e qu i r e s m e d i c a l e v i d e n c e o f a c u r r e n td i s a b i l i t y;
me dic a l or , in

c e rt a in c ir c ums tanc e s, lay e vid e nc e of

in- se rv ic e i n c u

r r e n c e or a g g ra vatio n o f a

dis e a se or injury ; and medica l evidence of a ne x us betwee n the claimed in-servic e dis ease or injury and the prese nt disease or

injury

. Se e Caluz a v . B ro wn , 7 Vet.App. 498, 506 ( 1995), aff' d percuriam , 78 F.3d 604 ( Fe d. Cir. 1996). Upon re ceipt of an application for a service -conne ction claim, sec tion 5103(a) and § 3.159(b) require VA to r eview the information and the e vidence prese nted with the

c la im a nd to prov ide the c la ima nt w ithno tic e of

wh a t in fo rm a tio n a

nd e vid e nc e no t pr e vio us ly pr ov ide d, if any , w ill a ssi st i n s ub sta nti a tin g or

is n e c e ssa

ry to s ub sta nti a te e a c h o f t

he fi ve e le me nts of the c la im, inc lud ing no tic e of wh a t is re qu ir e d to e sta bli sh se rv ic e c onne c tio n a nd that a dis a bil ity

rating an d a

n e ff e c tiv e date fo r t

he awa rd of be ne fi ts w ill be a ssi g ne d if se rv ic e c onne c tio n is

awa rded. Dingess v. Nicholdson , _ _Vet. Ap p.

__ , N o. 01 -1 91 7 ( Ma r. 3, 20 06 ); se e als o Col lar o v . W

est , 136 F.3d 1304, 1308 (F ed. Cir. 1998) (stating that a service -conne ction claim that provides for

disability -compe nsation benef its consists of the foll owing five elements: "( 1) Ve tera n
s t a tu s ; ( 2 ) e x i s t e n c e o f

a d i s a b i l i t y; ( 3 ) a

c o n n e c t i o nb e t w e e nt h e v e t e r an ' s s e r v i c e an d t h e d i s a b i l i t y; (4 ) d e g re e of

dis a bil ity ; and

(5 ) e ff e c tiv e date of

the dis a bil ity " ); Fe nders on v . W

est , 12 Vet.App. 119, 125 (1999) ( stating same). I n this case , we deal wit h VA' s obligation in the contex t of cla ims to reopen pre viously and fi na lly dis a llo we d c la ims . In o rd e r t o s uc c e ssf ull y re op e n a pr e vio us ly

and fi na lly dis a llo we d c la im,9

the law r e qu ir e s th e p r e s e n tati o n o f a s p e c ia l ty p e o f e v id e n c e

– e v id e n c e th a t is b o th new a nd

ma te ri a l. Th e te rm s " ne w" and " mate ri a l" have sp e c if ic , te c hn ic a l me anin g s th a t are no t c omm on ly k nown to VA cla imants. B e c a u s e th e s e r e qu ir e me n ts d e f in e p arti c u la

r ty p e s o f e v id e n ce, w hen provid i n g t h e n o t i ce r equire d by the VCAA, it is nece ssary , in most cases, for VA to inform claimants see king to r eopen a previously

and fina lly

disallowed cla im of the unique cha rac ter of evidenc e that must be pre sented. This notice oblig ation does not modify the re quirement that VA must p ro v i d e a c laimant notice of what is require d to substantiate eac h element of a service -conne ction claim. I n other wor ds, VA must notify a cla imant o f t h e evidenc e and information t hat i s nece ssary to reope n the claim and V A must notify the claimant of

the evidenc e
and inf or matio n that is ne c e ssa

ry to es ta bli sh his e nti tle me nt t o th e un de rl yingc la im f or the be ne fi t

so ug ht b y the c la ima

nt. VA' s obligation to provide a cla imant with notice of what con s t i tutes new a nd materia l evidenc e to re open a service -conne ction claim may be aff ecte d by the evidenc e that was of r ecor d at the time that the prior c laim was finally denied. The ne w-a

nd-mater ial-evide nce r egulation that was in ef fec t at the time of the Apr il 200 0 R O d ecision defined " new" to mean evide nce " not previously

sub m itted to ag ency

decisionmake rs . . . [that] is neither cumulative nor redunda nt." 38 C.F .R. § 3 .1 56 (a ) ( 19 99 ). " Mate ri a l e vid e nc e " wa s d e fi ne d to me an e vid e nc e that " be ars dir e c tly and substantially

upon the spec ific matter unde r consider ation" a nd "is so signific ant t hat i t must be

con si dere d in ord er to fairl y deci de the mer it s of the cl aim ." Id

. Ge ne ra lly , a c la ima nt i s se e kin g to reope n a finally denied claim for service connec tion beca use t here is either no evidenc e on one or more of the three Caluz a elements to establish ser vice c onnection or insuff icient e v i dence on one or more of these e lements. Ther efor e, materia l evidenc e would be (1) evidenc e on an e lement wher e the claimant initially

failed to submit any competent evidence ; (2) evidence on an element wher e the previously

submitt ed evide nce w as found to be insufficient; (3) evidenc e on an e lement wher e the appellant d id n o t h av e to s u b mi t e v id e n c e u n ti l a d e c is io n o f th e Se c r e ta r y d e te r mi n e d th a t an evidentiar y presumption had bee n rebutted; or some combination or var iation of t h e above three situations. Th e le g isl a tiv e int e re st und e rl ying the VC AA no tic e re qu ir e me nt is the int e nt of Con g re ss to p ro vid e c la ima

nts a me anin g fu l op po rt

un ity to p art ic ipate in th e adj udic a tio n o f c la ims

. Se e Ma y fie ld , 1 9 V e t.A

pp . at 12 0- 21 (s tatin g that se c tio n 5 10 3a no tic e re qu ir e me nt " a ssume s a fu nd a me nta l r ole in f

ur the ri ngan in te re st t

hat g oes to th e ve ry

e sse nc e of

the no na dv e rs ari a l,10

pro-c laimant nature of the VA adjudication sy stem

. . . that is, to assist claimants in the development of the ir c la ims ); Qu ar tuc c io , 16 Vet.App. at 186-87 (noting that the intent of Cong ress in ena cting the VC AA was to expand the S ecr etar y ' s duty to notify). To satisfy this intent, in the conte x t of a claim to reope n a previously denied c laim for ser vice c onnection, the VCAArequire s the Secre tary to look at the bases f

or the de nial in the prior dec ision and to respond with a notice letter that de sc ri be s w h a t e v i d e n c e w o u l d b e n e c e s s ar y t o s u b s t an t i a t e t h a t e l e m e n t o r e l e m e n t s r e qu i re d to

e sta bli shse rv ic e c on ne c tio n t hat we re fo un d in su ff ic ie nt i n th e pr e vio us de nia l. There fore , the question of what c onstitut es mater ial evidenc e to re open a c laim for service connection depends on the basis on which the pr ior claim wa s denied. Se e Ev an s v . B ro wn , 9 Vet.App. 27 3 , 2 8 3 (1 9 9 6) (h old inge vid e nc e is m a te ri a l if it i s r e le va

nt to and pr ob a tiv e of an iss ue that wa s a sp e c if ie d b a sis for the la st final disallowance ), o v e r r u le d , in p a r t, o n other grounds by Ho dge v . W est , 155 F.3d 1356 (F ed. Cir. 1998) ; An gli n v . W est , 203 F .3 d 134 3, 13 47 (F e d. Cir . 2 00 0) (s tatin g that Hodge left int a c t th e re qu ir e me nt that the e vid e nc e mus t be re le va nt t o a nd pr ob a tiv e of

an is su e tha

t w a s a specifie d basis for the la st final disallowance ). The Sec reta ry can de termine the basis for the denial in the prior dec ision from the fac e of that decision. The fa ilure to provide notice of what constitutes material evide nce w ould ge nerally be the ty pe of e rror

that has the natural ef

fec t of producing prejudice beca use i t would constitute a fa ilure to provide a c laimant notice of a key el em en t o f what it takes to substantiate a claim to reope n. See M ayfield, 19 Vet.App. at 122 . Wit hout such notice, a claimant ef fec tively would be depr ived of an opportunity

to participate in the adjudication proc ess bec ause he would not know what evide nce
wa s n e e de d to re op e n h is c la im. Whil e the fa ilure to p ro vid e a c la ima nt n oti c e of

wh a t c on sti tut e s mate ri a l e vid e nc e wi ll almost alway s be pre

judicial, this is not ne cessa rily the ca se whe re V A fa ils to i nform the c laimant of the ne c e ssi ty

to s ub mit ne w e vid e nc e
. Whe n a c la im fo r se rv ic e c onne c tio n wa s d e nie d b e c a us e the evidenc e (a s to one eleme nt of the cla im) was insuffi ci en t , t h en it is incumbent upon the Secre tary to expl ain that re submitt ing the previously submitt ed evide nce w ill not consti tute "ne w" evidenc e that will result i n reope ning the claim. Thus, t he Secr etar y ' s failure to notify

the claimant of the n e e d to s u

b mi t " n e w " e v id e n c e w o u ld g e n e r a ll y b e p r e ju d ic ia l b e c a

u s e it w o u ld d e f

eat the fundame ntal purpose of

the notice by

failin g to inform the claimant of critica l information on an

e sse nti a l r e qu ir e me nt n e e de d to re op e n th e c la im. On the oth e r han d, if th e e vid e nc e ne e de d to

re op e n a c la im p e rt a ins to a

n e le me nt o f t

he c la im f

or wh ic h n o e vid e nc e has b e e n p re vio us ly11

su bmi tte d, the n a

ny e vid e nc e pe rt a ini ngto t

hat ele men t will, pe r s e , b e ne w. Thus , und e r t he se
c ir c ums tanc e s, if VApr ov ide s a c la ima nt w ithno tic e of

wh a t c on sti tut e s mate ri a l e vid e nc e bu t f a ils to inform him of what would constitute new evidence , the failure t o inform t he claimant of t he " new" require ment is not prejudicial bec ause the n o t i ce on materiality eff ectively provides the e ssential information to the claimant r eg arding what is neede d to substantiate the claim. The ref ore, the failure to tell a claimant who has not submitt ed any evidenc e on a Caluza- service -conne ction element that the evidenc e must be newwould n o t d ef eat the fundamenta l purpose of the notice and w ould not aff ect the e ssential fairne ss of the proc eeding s. See M ayfield, 19 Vet.App. at 115

. Her e , th e B o ar d c o n c lu d e d th a t th e a p p e ll an t w a s g iv e n a d e qu a te n o ti c e u n d e r the VCAA with respec t to his attempts t o reope n both of hi s service -conne ction claims. R. at 4-5. The B VA identified three documents that it conclude d provided the appellant wit h adequate notice unde r the VC AA : 1) An

Ap ri l 20 01 le tte r f

ro m th e RO to t

he ve te ra n; 2) a Janu ary

20 03 State me nt o f t

he Ca se (SOC); and 3) a

n April 2003 Supplemental Statement o f t h e C as e (SSOC). R. at 4-5. For the

re a so ns dis c us se d b e low , th e Court fi nd s th a t th e Se c re tary did no t f ulf ill his no tic e ob lig a tio ns wi th

re sp e c t to inf

or min g the a

pp e lla nt of the e vid e nc e a

nd inf or matio n th a t w a s n e e de d to su bs tanti a te his attempts to reopen his claims for service connec tion for psy chog enic g a s tr o intestinal disorder and psoriasis. Be cause the Court f inds that the Secre tary failed to pr ovide the appellant a dequate notice of what evidence was ne eded to r eopen his c laims, the Court need not dec ide whether t he Secr etar y fulfilled his notice obligation with respe ct to inf orming the appellant of the information and e vidence that was ne eded to substantiate his e ntitlement to the underlying c ompensation bene fits. 1. Adequac

y of VCAA Notice W

ith Regard to Appellant'

s Attempt to Reopen H

is Clai m for Servic e Connec tion for a Psychogenic D isorder
W i t h re gard to the a

ppellant' s application to reope n h is c la im f o r s e r v ic e c o n n e c ti o nfor ps y c ho g e nic g a str oin te sti na l di so rd e r, the a pp e lla nt a rgue s th a t th e no tic e pr ov ide d to him fa ile d to satisfy the first, sec ond, and third VCAA r equire ments (r ega rdi ng the information and e vidence

nece ssary to s u b s t an t i at e the c laim and who would be r esponsible for obta ining the e vidence ). Ap pe lla nt' s B r. at 11 -13 . N on e of the do c ume nts ide nti fi e d b y the B VAsatis fi e d th e fi rs t require ment of the VCAA. T he Apr il 2001 letter, which purported to a dvise the appe llant of the evidenc e or infor

mation that he nee ded to substantiate his claim to reope n, did not inform him that he ne e de d n e w a

nd mate ri a l e vid e nc e to re op e n his c la im fo r se rv ic e c onne c tio n f or his ps y c ho g e nic12

disorder. Mor eover , the April 2001 letter did not inform the a ppellant what would c onstitut e new and mater ial evidenc e to re open the psychog enic disorde r cla im. a. Notice on Materia l Evidence Th e Ap ri l 20 01 le tte r d oe s n ot i nf or m th e a pp e lla nt what w ou ld c on sti tut e " mate ri a l" evidenc e to re open the psy chog enic disorde r cla im. Unde r 38 U.S.C. § 5103(a ), VA w as re quired to n oti fy the a pp e lla nt o f wh a t c on sti tut e d " mate ri a l" e vid e nc e in the c on te xt o f h is p art ic ula r c la im to reope n. The a

ppellant' s under ly ing c laim had bee n denied pr eviously on the basis that the appellant' s psy chog enic disorde r was not inc urre d in se rvice

. The RO conclude d that the disorder pree x isted service and was not ag g ravated by service . I n order

for the a ppellant to substantiate the claim to reope n with evidence that is material, he is re quired to submit evidenc e that indicate s that the psy chog enic disorde r either (1) did not pre exis t service and wa s incurre d there in or (2) wa s ag g ravated by service

. Consequently , in order to satisfy its obli g ation under the VCAA to notify the appellant of

any "in fo rm at ion[ ] an d .

. . e vid e nc e , n ot p re vio us ly pr ov ide d to the Se c re tary that is

nece ssary to substantiate the cla i m " t o re o pen, the a ppellant was e ntitled to noti ce that he nee ded evidenc e that would ref

lect either that his psy chog enic disorde r (1) did not preexist s ervic e and w as incurre d there in or (2) was ag g ravated by service

. 38 U.S.C. § 5103(a)

. Th e Ap ri l 20 01 le tte r d id not inform the appellant that to substantiate his claim to reopen he neede d evidenc e that indicate d that his psy chog enic disorde r did not pree x ist service a nd was incur

red the rein. L ike the April 2001 letter, ne ither the January 2003 SOC (R. at 474-85), nor the A pril 2003 SSO C ( R. at 49 1- 93 ), inf

or me d th e a pp e lla nt of the inf

or matio n o r e vid e nc e ne e de d to su bs tanti a te the claim to re o p en
. Bo t h the SOC and SSOC di scussed the r egulatory definition of " new a

nd materia l evidence ," a s amende d in 2001. R. at 479-80, 491-92 . See Du t y t o As s i s t , 6 6 Fe d

. R eg. 45 ,6 20 , 4 5, 63 0 ( Au g . 2 9, 20 01 ) (c od if ie d a t 38 C.F .R. § 3. 15 6( a ))

. Ho we ve r, a s th e B VAc or re c tly

no te d, thi s v e rs ion

of the re g ulatio n d id n ot a

pp ly to t he a pp e lla nt' s c la im to r e op e n s inc e the c la im was filed be fore Aug ust 21, 2000. R. at 7. The Court notes that the de finition of "ne w and mate rial evidenc e" was c hang ed by the 2001 amendme nts. See Paralyzed Ve terans of Am. v. Se c'y of Ve te ra ns Af

fai rs , 345 F.3d 1334, 1350- 51 (F ed. Cir. 2003) (notingthat the new re gu l at i o n differ s from the old re g ulation in defining"ne w evidenc e" as " exis ting" evidenc e and de fining "material

e v i d e n c e " a s e v i d e n c e t h a t" m u s tr a i s e a r e a s o n a b l e p o s s i b i l i t y

o f s u b s t an t i a t i n g t h e c l a i m " )

. In addition to discussing the wr ong regulatory definition of " new a

nd materia l evidence ," the content of the notice provided by

the SOC and SSOC was otherwise insuffic ient. Both doc uments informed13

the a pp e lla nt t hat he ha d not sub mitte d mate ri a l e vid e nc e to r e op e n h is p sy c ho g e nic dis or de r c la im beca use he ha d not submit ted evidenc e that his condition was ag g ravated i n service

. R. at 481-82, 492. L ike the not i ce pr ovided in the April 2001 letter, the notice provide d in the SOC and SS OC

wa s too narr owin s c op e . N e ith e r t he SOC no r t

he SSO C in fo rm e d th e a pp e lla nt that he c ou ld

su bs tanti a te his c la im t o r e op e n w ithinf or matio n o r e vid e nc e th at in di cate d th a t hi s p sy c ho g e nic disorder did not pre exis t service and wa s incurre d there in. b. Notice on Ne w Evidenc e I n addition to notify ing the appellant of wh at would constitute materia l evidence , VA wa s
a lso ob lig a te d to no tif

y him wh a t w ou ld cons ti tute ne w e vid e nc e to r e op e n th e ps y c ho g e nic g astrointestinal disorder c laim. I n this reg ard, the April 2001 letter is inadequa te. The e vidence at the time VA last denie d the claim included the appellant' s SMR s, which re veale d that he wa s treate d for a condition that was ultimately diag nosed as psychog enic g astrointestinal disorder ( R. at 19-33)

. B e c a us e thi s e vid e nc e wa s r e le va nt as to whethe r the a

ppellant' s psy chog enic disorde r wa s either inc ur re d o r a g g ra

vate d in se rv ic e , V A sho uld have inf or me d the a pp e lla nt t hat he ne e de d to su

bmi t

new e vidence reg ardinghis psy chog enic disorde r cla im

. Ho we v er , nowher e in the letter is the appellant infor

med that evidenc e would be c onsidered ne w only if it had not been submit ted previously

to VA and wa s neither " cumulative nor r edundant" of evide nce a lrea dy in th e re cord. 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(a)

. Th e SOC and

SSO C in fo rm e d th e a

pp e lla nt t hat ne w e vid e nc e wa s r e qu ir e d to re op e n h is

c la im; ho we ve r, the se do c ume nts us e d th e de fi nit ion of " ne w e vid e nc e " fr om t

he 20 01 a me ndme nts to § 3.156. As noted above , the amende d version of § 3.156(a) chang ed the definition of "ne w and materia l evidence ." T he SOC and SSOC provided the appe llant some notice t hat evidence submitted must meet the requir ement to be ne w. Nonethe less, the SOC and the SSOC contained another sig nif ic ant f law that c omp ound e d th is e rr or and pr e ve nte d th e a

pp e lla nt fr om e ff

e c tiv e ly and fu lly participating in the a djudication of his claim. Se e Mayfi e ld, su pra . In th e latte r p art

of the se do c ume nts , th e app ell ant wa s in fo rm e d th a t th e e vid e nc e he ha d s ub mitte d to re op e n h is c la im

satis fied th e "ne w e vid e nc e " re qu ir e me nt. R. at 48 1- 82 , 4 83 -8 4, 49 1- 92 . T hu s, the se do c ume nts contained inf

ormation that was incomplete and co n fusi ng , there by rende ring the VCAA notice inadequate. Se e Ma

y fie ld , 19 Vet.App. at 125 (stating that confusingnotice about what information and evide nce ha d not been pr ev i o u s l y provided may

amount to a notice de ficienc y ); Pelea v . Nicholson , 19 Vet

. Ap p
. 2 9 6 (2005) ( noting that incomplete or af firmatively

misleading14

c or re sp on de nc e mig ht d isc oura g e a re a so na ble pe rson fro m ot

he rw ise su

bmi tti nge vid e nc e to substantiate a c laim), appeal dismissed, No .0 6- 70 19 , 20 05 U. S. Ap p. L EX I S 28 13 8 ( F e de ra l Cir c uit Dec . 1, 2005). c. Prejudicia l Error Having found a failure to f ulfill VA' s section 5103(a ) notice oblig ations, the Court must take into account the r

ule of prejudicia l e rror
. Error is pr ejudicial when it a ffe cts a substantial r ight that the statutory or regulatory provision involved was desig ned to protec t so that the err or af fec ts "the essential fa ir n es s " of

the adjudication. Ma

y fie ld , 1 9 V e t.A

pp . at 115. Once an appe llant demonstrates a

VCAA notice e rror , he has the burden of g oing forwa rd with a plausible showing of how t he essential fairne ss of t he adjudication was a ffe cted by the er ror. Id . at 119. I f the a

ppellant

make s su c h a

sh ow ing , th e burd e n sh if ts to the Se c re tary

to d e mon str a te that th e e rr or wa s c le arl y nonprejudicia l, i.e., that the error did not aff ect the essential fairness of the adjudication. Id. at 120

. Even thoug h the appe llant has not asserte d specific ally how he wa s prejudice d by the VCAA er

ror, the " natura l effe ct" of VA' s failure to give notice as to the f irst re q u i re m en t produce d prejudice be c a u s e i t p r e c l u d e d t h e a

p p e l l an t f r o m p art i c i p a t i n g e f

f e c t i v e l y i n t h e p r o c e s s i n g o f his c la im, "t h er eb y s u b s t an t i al l y d ef ea t [ i n g] t h e v er y p u rpose of section 5103(a ) notice." Ma y fie ld , 19 V e t.A

pp . at 122. Acc ording ly , the burde n shifted to the Secr etar y to demonstrate that there was no c lear

prejudice . The Sec reta

ry argues in his brief that a ny notice er rors we re not prejudicia l beca

use " the outcome wa s not affe cted by VA' s alleg ed fa i l u re t o comply with the 38 U.S.C. §5103(a) notice require ments." Se c re tary 's B r. a t 17 . T his argume nt w a s sp e c if ic a lly reje cted by

the Court in Ma

y fie ld

. See Ma

y fie ld , 19 Vet.App. at 115. The Sec reta ry has not filed a supplemental brief, pursuant to In re: 38 U.S.C. § 7261( b) ( 2) and Mayfield v. Nicholson, 19 Ve t.App. 103 ( 2005) , Misc. No. 3-05 (June 2, 2005) (e n banc or der) [hereinaf ter Ma y fie ld order ], which allowed him an oppor

tunity to meet his burden of

establishing tha

t the re was c lear ly

not prejudice to the appellant in this case

. Be cause the S ecr etar y failed to meet thi s burden, the Court finds that the no tic e e rr or

wa s p re jud ic ia l to the a

pp e lla nt. Th e Court ' s c on c lus ion that the Se c re tary fa ile d to satisfy the first VCAA r equire ment nece ssarily subsumes a conclusion that the Secre tary also failed to s a tis fy the se c on d a

nd thi rd VC AAe le me nts (t

hat is wh o wou ld be re sp on sib le fo r s e e kin g to obtain the information and e vidence require d by the first notice r equire ment).15

2. Adequac

y of VCAA Notice with Regard to Appellant' s Attempt to Reopen H

is Clai m for Se rv ic e Con ne c tio n fo r P so ria sis

Wit h reg ard to the ap p el l an t's a pplication to reope n his claim for ser vice c onnection for psoriasis, he ar g ues that the notice provided to him was inadequate under the first, second, and third VC AA re qu ir e me nts

. Th e a pp e lla nt' s se rv ic e -c onne c tio n c la im f or ps or ia sis wa s d e nie d p re vio us ly on two bases. F irst, the reg ional offic e d et ermined that "[t] here is no recor d of psoriasis showing a chr onic disability

subject to se rvice connec tion." R. at 68. In other wor ds, the RO conclude d that the a pp e lla nt h a d n ot e sta

bli sh e d s e rv ic e c onne c tio n und e r 3 8 C. F .R. § 3 .3 03 (b ) ( 20 05 ). Th is regulation provides two alter native methods of e stablishing ser vice c onnec t i o n –chronic ity and continuity of sy mptomatology . First, chr onicity is established if the appe llant can de monstrate (1) the exist ence of a ch ro n i c d i s ea se in servic e and ( 2) pre sent manifestations of the same disea se. See Savage v . Gober , 1 0 Ve t

. Ap p
. 4 8 8 , 4 9 5 -9 7 (1 9 9 7 ). Al t ern at i v el y , co n t i nu i t y o f s y mp t o m at o l o gy may be esta blished if the appe llant c an demonstrate (1) that a condition was " noted" during service ; (2 ) ev ide nc e of po sts e rv ic e c on tin uit y of the same sy

mpt omatol og y ; and

(3 ) m e dic a l or , in

c e rt a in circ u mstances, lay

evidenc e of a

nexus between the pr esent disability and the postser

vice sy mptomatology

. See 38 C.F .R. § 3 .3 03 (b ); Savage, 10 Vet.App. at 495. The e vidence of re cord at the time that the RO denied the appellant' s claim in 1996 included evidenc e that the a

ppellant was tre ated o n a sing le occ asion for a skin condition diagnose d as "sy mmetrical a cne" on his face and bac k. Additionally , the re cord inc luded p o s tservice medical

e vid e nc e of

tr e a tme nt f

or ps or ia sis . T he RO de nie d se rv ic e c onne c tio n und e r § 3. 30 3( b) be c a us e it

c on c l u d e d

t h a tt h e S M R s o f

" s y m m e t r i c a l a c n e " w e r e i n s u f f i c i e n tt o p r o v e c h r o n i c i t y o f p s o r i a sis in service and that ther e wa s insufficient medica l evidence to establish a nexus between his cur rent condition and the postservic e sy mptomatology . Essentially , when the RO de nied the claim in 1996, it did so on the basis that the appellant had not submitted sufficient evide nce to satisfy § 3.303(b). Thus, to reope n a cla im for a c hronic c ondition base d on § 3.303(b), the a ppellant would nee d new evidenc e, other

than the evidenc e alre ady of rec ord, to de monstrate that his skin condition i n service

was c hronic a

nd the same a s his cu rr ent s kin condition, or the appe llant would need a dditional medical e vidence to establish a nexus between his cur rent disability

and the postser

vice

s ymp t o m a t o l o g y.16

I n addition, the RO considere d direc t service connec tion and con cl uded that ther e wa s no
e vid e nc e that th e app ell ant' s c ur re nt p so ri a sis wa s " c a

us e d b y se rv ic e ." R. at 69 . T hu s, the RO de nie d th e c la im f

or dir e c t se rv ic e c on ne c tio n b e c a us e it c on c lud e d th a t th e a pp e lla nt h a d fa ile d to submit any

nexus evidence linking his curre n t condition to an event, disea se, or injury in service

. To reope n the claim on a dir ect se rvice connec tion basis, the appellant would need medical nexus evidenc e, which he had not pr eviously submitt ed to the RO. In light of the two differ ent re asons for denial of the claim and the tw o d i fferent ba ses for r eopeningthe appe llant's c laim, to determine whether the not ice complied with the VCAA , we turn to the notice that VA provided the a ppellant with reg ard to re opening his psoriasis claim. a. Notice on Materia l Evidence The Apr il 2001 lette r ad vised the appe llant that in order to " establish entitlement for service [-] connec ted compensation be nefits," the evidenc e must show an injury or disease that beg an in or was made wo rs e d u ri ng milit ary service , a cur

rent phy sical or menta l disabilit y , and a

re la tio ns hip be tw e e n th e a pp e llant's cur

re nt m e dic a l di sa

bil ity and an in jur y , d ise a se , o r e ve nt i n service . R. at 143. The letter further explained the i mportance of medica l evidence and sug g ested that the appellant could s end records of the m edica l treatment he had rec eived dating ba ck to servic e, lay statements documentingany observa ble sy mptoms t hat had been witnessed s ince his condition had first be en noticed, a nd medical opinion evidenc e esta blishing a r elat i o n ship betwee n the appellant' s curr ent disability and service. R. at 144. Although the April 2001 letter does not use the statut or y langua g e that su c h e vid e nc e wo uld c on stitu te mate ri a l e vid e nc e to r e op e n th e ps or ia sis claim, the letter ' s discussion of the evidenc e require d to r eopen a claim was sufficie ntly broad so a s to e nc omp a ss b oth

ba se s u po n w hic h th e a

pp e lla nt c ou ld r e op e n h is c la im. Th e le tte r c on ve y e d to the appe llant the essence of what would be material e vidence in the context of his claim to reopen. Se e Ma y fie ld , 1 9 Ve t.A

pp . at 12 6- 27 (s tatin g tha

t " a c omp lying[VCA A] n oti c e ne e d n ot n e c e ssa ri ly use the e x act languag e of the regulation so long a s tha t notice prope rly convey s to a claimant the

essenc e of a

regulation")

. b. Notice on Ne w Evidenc e Ho we ve r, the April 20 01 le tte r d id n ot p ro vid e a de qu a te no tic e re g ard ingwh a t w ou ld constitute new e vidence to reope n the psoriasis claim. VA should have notified the a ppellant that he nee ded to submit evidence that was neither " cumulative nor r edundant" of the e vidence that was previously

submitt ed. While the April 2001 letter indicated what e vidence was a lrea dy in the17

appellant 's fi l e (R . at 144), nothing in the letter indicated how the a ppellant should consider the

ev i d en ce al re ad y s u

b m i t t edwh en t ry i n g t o d et erm i n e w h at fu rt h er ev i d en ce wa s n ee d ed

. Al t h o u gh the April 2001 letter pr ovided the appe llant notice of the e vidence or information that wa s neede d to substantiate the " materia l" e lement of a claim t o reope n, the notice is insufficie nt in light of the le tte r' s fa ilure to no tif

y the a pp e lla nt of wh a t in fo rm a tio n a

nd e vid e nc e wa s n e e de d to su bs tanti a te the " new" element of the claim to reope n. For this rea son, the C ourt holds that the April 2001 letter did no t in fo rm

the a pp e lla nt a dequat ely of the i nf

or matio n a nd e vid e nc e no t of

re c or d th a t is

ne c e ssa ry to s ub sta nti a te the c la im t o r e op e n th e se rv ic e -c onne c tio n c la im f or ps or ia sis

. The B oard a lso relied on the January 2003 SOC (R. at 474-85) and the April 2003 SSOC (R . at 49 1- 93 ) t o c on c lud e that V A h a d s a tis fi e d th e no tic e ob lig a ti on s of the VC AA . T he se documents do not sati sfy VA' s duty

to notify under the VCAA. Althoug h the SOC and SSOC informed the a

ppellant that new e vidence was re quired to reope n his claim, t hese doc uments used the def inition of "ne w evidenc e" from the 2001 amendments to § 3.156. I n addition to providing the appellant with the wr ong definition of " new e vidence ," the SOC and SSOC informed the appe llant that the evide n ce t h at h e had submit ted satisfied the " new" require ment. Be cause these notice documents provided the appellant with information that was incomplete and conf using, the notice

w a s in s u f f icient

. Ma

y fie ld , su pra . There fore , the Court holds that the appellant wa s not provided adequate notice of

the first VCAA r eq u i re m en t . The Sec reta ry ' s failure to satisfy

the first VCAA require ment nece ssar i l y subsumes a conc lusion that he also failed to satisfy the sec ond and third VCAA ele ments. c. Prejudicia l Error Havingfound a f

ailure to fulf

ill the Sec reta

ry ' s section 5103(a) notice oblig ations, the Court must a g ain take into account the r ule of pre judicial err or. Ma

y fie ld , su pra . As indicated a

bove, a failure to expl ain the new -evide nce r equire ment is not ge nera lly prejudicia l where VA has pr ovided ad e qu a te n o ti c e a s to w h a t w o u ld c o n s ti tute mate r ia l e v id e n c e to r e o p e n th e c la im an d th a t a ny mate r ia l e v id e n c e w o u ld

n e c e s s ar il y

b e n e w a s w e ll

. I nth is r e g ar d , th e tw o d if f e r e n t b a s e s upon which the a

ppellant could re open his claim become important. As to the direc t-servic e-c onnection basis for r eopeningthe claim, mater ial evidenc e would be evidence relating to the element, for which he ha d f a ile d to su

bmi t any c omp e te nt e vid e nc e , i. e ., a me dic a l ne xus be tw e e n his c ur re nt p so ri a sis and his in-servic e skin c ondition. As to this basis for r eopening , the fa ilure to explain the conce pt of newevidenc e is not prejudicia l beca use any nexus evidenc e would necessar ily be new evidenc e.18

Howeve r, as to re open i n g of the c laim based on § 3.303(b) , the fa ilure to explain the importance of newevidenc e is prejudicia l. The 1996 RO dec ision co n s i d er ed his SMR s and postservice medical e vidence an d found that the e vidence was insuffic ient to prove ser vice

connec tion under § 3.303(b) . There fore , to r eopen a claim on this ba sis, the appellant neede d new evidenc e where the evidenc e had previously been weig hed and f ound wanting . I n other wor ds, he

ne e de d s ome thi ngoth e r t ha n th e pr e vio us ly

su bmi tte d SM Rs and po sts e rv ic e me dic a l e vid e nc e to support the proposition that his in-se rvice condition w as chronic psoriasis. Howeve r, it was not clea r fr o m t h e A p r i l 2 0 0 1 l e t t e r t h a t c u m u l a t i v e an d r e d u n d an t e v i d e n c e

– s u c h a s t h e d u p l i c a t i v e SMRs submitt ed by

the appe llant (R. at 28)–would not be sufficient to re open the c laim. Moreover , when t h e S OC an d

t h e S S OC p ro v i d edwr o n g an d co n fu s i n g i n fo rm at i o n , t h e "n at u ra l ef fe ct " o f V A's fa ilure to g ive no tic e a s to the re qu ir e me nt t hat th e a pp e lla nt s ub mit " ne w" e vid e nc e e ff

e c tiv e ly deprive d him of an oppo rt u n i t y to participate in the adjudication proc ess bec ause he was not informed of the new evidenc e that was neede d to r eopen his claim. Ma y fie ld , 19 Vet.App. at 122. As wi th a pp e lla nt' s p sy c ho g e nic g a str oin te sti na l c la im, the Se c re tary arg ue s th a t any

no tic e e rr or

is harmless in this case beca use the outcome would not have been diffe rent. Sec reta ry ' s Br . at 17. The Secre tary has chose n not to submi t a supplemental brief on this issue pursuant to t he Ma y fie ld order

. As noted above , this arg ument was spec ifically reje cted by

the Court in M

a y f ie ld

. See Ma y fie ld , 1 9 V e t.A

pp . at 11 5. Thus , th e Se c re tary ha s n ot s us ta ine d h is b ur de n in thi s c a se to demonstrate that there was clearly no prejudice to the appellant ba sed on his failure to give notice as to the first VCAA require ment. Henc e, a rema nd is r equire d for notice that ade quately explains to the appellant wha

t evidence he mu s t s u b m i t i n s upport of his psoriasis claim. As a c laim for service c o n n ec t i o n includes all theorie s under whic h service connec tion may be g rante d, see Bingham v. Principi , 1 8 V e t.A pp
. 47 0, 47 4 (2 00 4) , the Court no te s th a t th is r e mand

do e s n ot l imi t the appe llant to pursuing a theory of service connec tion unde r § 3.303(b) on r emand e ven thoug h the V C A A l e t t e r

w a s p r e j u d i c i a l l y e r

r o n e o u s o n l y a s t o t h a tt h e o r y.

III . C ON CL USI ON After consideration of the appe llant's a nd the Secr etar

y ' s briefs, a

nd a re view of the re cord, the B oard' s October

8, 2003, decision i s VACATED and the m atters a re REMAND ED to the B oard for f urther pr ocee dings c onsistent with thi s decision.