UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

JACK and RENEE BEAM,

Plaintiffs, Civil Action No. 07-cv-1227

Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer

vs.

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION,

Defendant.

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PLAINTIFFS’ RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S

SECOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

In its second motion for summary judgment, Defendant FEC contends that this Court lacks

subject matter jurisdiction over this matter because, it claims, Plaintiffs’ financial institution at issue,

Merrill Lynch, does not fall within the protections of the Right to Financial Privacy Act. The Court

should flatly reject Defendant’s motion for the following reasons.

The Right to Financial Privacy Act prohibits the disclosure and/or transfer of certain financial

records. Title 12 U.S.C. § 3401 defines financial institution as “any office of a bank, savings bank,

card issuer as defined in section 103 of the Consumers Credit Protection At, industrial loan company,

trust company, savings association, building and loan, or homestead association (including

cooperative banks), credit union, or consumer finance institution, located in any State or territory of

the United States . . . .” 

Based on a plain reading of the statute, Plaintiffs’ financial institution, Merrill Lynch, is

covered by the RFPA. In fact, according to its website, “Merrill Lynch is one of the world’s premier

providers of wealth management, securities trading and sales, corporate finance and investment

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banking services.” See Exhibit A. Indeed, Plaintiffs deposited money into their Merrill Lynch

money market checking account (interest bearing) and received deposit notices and financial

statements just like any other bank. There is no reason that Merrill Lynch is exempted from the

protections of the RFPA. The RFPA defines a financial institution as “any office of a bank.” Merrill

Lynch, a self-described investment bank, falls within the purview of the statute. See also Merrill

Lynch v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71 (2006)(describing Merrill Lynch as an investment banking firm). 

Defendant’s attempt to exempt Merrill Lynch from the protections afforded under the RFPA

are both unavailing and untimely. The Court should deny Defendant Federal Election Commission’s

Second Motion for Summary Judgment.

Respectfully submitted,

FIEGER, FIEGER, KENNEY, JOHNSON & GIROUX, P.C.

s/ Michael R. Dezsi 

Michael R. Dezsi (P64530)

 Attorney for Plaintiff

 19390 W. Ten Mile Road

 Southfield, Michigan 48075

 (248) 355-5555

m.dezsi@fiegerlaw.com

Dated: May 4, 2010

Case 1:07-cv-01227 Document 178 Filed 05/04/10 Page 2 of 3
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on May 4, 2010, I electronically filed the foregoing paper with the Clerk

of the Court using the CM/ECF system, which will send notification of such filing to all counsel of

record in this matter.

s/ Michael R. Dezsi 

Michael R. Dezsi (P64530)

Fieger, Fieger, Kenney, Johnson & Giroux, P.C.

19390 W. Ten Mile Road

Southfield, Michigan 48075

(248) 355-5555

m.dezsi@fiegerlaw.com

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