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STRATEGIC

STUDIES

INSTITUTE

The Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) is part of the U.S. Army War 

College and is the strategic-level study agent for issues related to 

national security and military strategy with emphasis on geostrategic analysis.

The mission of SSI is to use independent analysis to conduct strategic 

studies that develop policy recommendations on:

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The Institute provides a valuable analytical capability within the 

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External Research Associates Program Monograph

PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION SCENARIOS 

IN EGYPT AND THEIR IMPACT

ON U.S.-EGYPTIAN STRATEGIC RELATIONS

Gregory Aftandilian

September 2011

The views expressed in this report are those of the author and do 

not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. Authors of Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) publications 

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to offer new and sometimes controversial perspectives in the interest of furthering debate on key issues. This report is cleared for 

public release; distribution is unlimited.

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ii

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War College, 632 Wright Ave, Carlisle, PA 17013-5046. 

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External Research Associates Program. Information on this program is available on our website, www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.

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ISBN 1-58487-506-2
iii

FOREWORD

The momentous events in Egypt since January 25, 

2011, have focused the world’s attention on that critical country. Mostly young, pro-democracy activists 

appear to have successfully challenged Egypt’s authoritarian government and its long-time leader. President Hosni Mubarak has been driven from office and 

is reportedly in poor health. Hence, regime change is 

virtually certain. The Egyptian military, long a major power broker, gained popular support for its restrained reaction to the uprisings of January-February 

2011 and currently (July 2011) the Supreme Council 

of the Armed Forces, headed by Field Marshall Hussein Tantawi, leads the nation pending promised elections in the autumn. However, recent events suggest 

that the military may be reluctant to relinquish power 

fully, and popular unrest against it is rising. Thus, 

most scenarios discussed in this paper, or variations 

thereof, are still very possible.

Egypt has been a close ally of the United States 

since the late 1970s when the late President Anwar Sadat changed sides in the Cold War and embarked on a 

peace process with Israel that led to the Camp David 

Accords in 1978 and the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty 

in 1979. In return, Egypt became one of the largest recipients of U.S. aid, receiving $1.3 billion in military 

assistance, plus substantial amounts of civilian assistance each year. Since that time, the Egyptian military 

has developed close ties with their U.S. counterparts, 

exemplified by joint military exercises, the training of 

Egyptian officers in U.S. military schools, and Egypt’s 

purchases of U.S. military equipment. This close mil-
iv

itary-to-military cooperation has assisted U.S. strategic objectives in the volatile Middle East region, with 

the United States receiving expedited transit for its 

naval ships through the Suez Canal as well as overflight rights for U.S. military aircraft. In addition, the 

Egyptian and U.S. Governments cooperate closely on 

anti-terrorism issues. Suffice it to say that the United 

States has relied on Egypt for strategic cooperation 

for more than 3 decades, including vital assistance on 

Arab-Israeli peace process issues.

Prior to the events of January 25, 2011, most of the 

attention on Egypt was focused on the presidential 

succession issue, given that President Mubarak had 

achieved an advanced age, had several medical operations that put his health in doubt, and had steadfastly 

refused to appoint a vice president. There was also 

widespread speculation that he was grooming his son, 

Gamal Mubarak, to succeed him despite rumors that 

the Egyptian military establishment had strong doubts 

about Gamal’s qualifications, in part because he had 

not done military service. Although the developments 

of January and February 2011 seemed to have overtaken events as they were known in 2010, the issue of 

presidential succession remains both highly relevant 

and timely. Whatever type of successor government 

comes to power in Egypt, it is likely that, given Egyptian history, the post-Mubarak president will have 

strong powers (though probably not to the extent of 

President Mubarak), to include remaining the head of 

the Egyptian military establishment.

Gregory Aftandilian, a consultant, academic, and 

a former State Department Egypt analyst, wrote this 

monograph for the U.S. Army War College as part of 
v

its External Associates Program, which encourages 

scholars to write studies on critical, strategic issues 

facing the United States in different regions of the 

world. He completed this study in December 2010, 

prior to the outbreak of pro-democracy demonstrations in Egypt the following month. In this monograph, he clearly examines Egypt’s partnership with 

the United States, its importance to U.S. strategic objectives in the region, the power structure in Egypt, 

and several possible presidential succession scenarios. 

He also examines how each of these scenarios would 

impact U.S. strategic relations with Egypt, and gives 

clear recommendations for U.S. policymakers.

Although some of the scenarios outlined in this 

monograph are no longer viable—for example, it 

is hard to conceive that Mubarak would be able to 

move back into power, and highly unlikely that his 

son, Gamal Murarak, would be a presidential contender—other scenarios remain plausible, particularly 

given what we see as the more prominent role of the 

Egyptian military in this fluid political situation. In 

addition, some of the possible presidential successors 

that Aftandilian mentions have now risen to higher 

positions in the Egyptian government. Aftandilian 

also discusses the sensitive issue of the Muslim Brotherhood, Egypt’s most organized opposition group 

that is opposed to many U.S. policies. He examines a 

scenario of a Muslim Brotherhood-dominated government, but notes that this is unlikely to occur unless 

both the Brotherhood and the Egyptian military split 

apart.
We hope this study will be of assistance to U.S. 

policymakers as they deal with a critical ally during a 

very sensitive and tumultuous period.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

Director

Strategic Studies Institute

vi
vii

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

GREGORY AFTANDILIAN is an independent 

consultant, writer, and lecturer, having spent over 21 

years in government service, most recently on Capitol 

Hill. He was foreign policy advisor to Congressman 

Chris Van Hollen (2007-08), professional staff member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and 

foreign policy adviser to Senator Paul Sarbanes (2000-

04), and foreign policy fellow to Senator Edward Kennedy (1999). Prior to these positions, Mr. Aftandilian 

worked for 13 years as a Middle East analyst at the 

U.S. Department of State where he was a recipient 

of the Department’s Superior Honor Award for his 

analyses on Egypt. His other government experiences 

include analytical work for the U.S. Department of 

Defense and the Library of Congress. He was also a 

research fellow at the Kennedy School of Government 

at Harvard University (2006-07) and an International 

Affairs Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations in 

New York (1991-92). In addition, Mr. Aftandilian has 

worked as a consultant on Egyptian affairs for the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, 

and is an adjunct faculty member at Boston University 

and Northeastern University. Mr. Aftandilian is the 

author of Egypt’s Bid for Arab Leadership: Implications 

for U.S. Policy (1993); and Looking Forward: An Integrated Strategy for Supporting Democracy and Human Rights 

in Egypt (2009). Mr. Aftandilian holds a B.A. in history 

from Dartmouth College, an M.A. in Middle Eastern 

studies from the University of Chicago, and an M.S. 

in international relations from the London School of 

Economics. 

ix

SUMMARY

Although this monograph was written before the 

pro-democracy demonstrations in Egypt in January 

2011, it examines the important question as to who 

might succeed President Hosni Mubarak by analyzing 

several possible scenarios and what they would mean 

for U.S. strategic relations with Egypt. The monograph 

first describes the importance of Egypt in the Middle 

East region and gives an overview of the U.S.-

Egyptian strategic relationship. It then examines the 

power structure in Egypt to include the presidency, 

the military, and the ruling party. The monograph 

next explores various succession scenarios. Although 

some of these scenarios have been overtaken by events 

because President Mubarak has been driven from office 

and his son, Gamal Mubarak, is no longer a viable 

candidate given the popular anger against the Mubarak 

family, the other scenarios are still plausible. Scenarios 

envisioning a short-term take-over by Omar Soliman, 

Ahmed Shafiq, or other members of the current or 

former military establishment would likely preserve 

U.S strategic interests, provided such take-overs are of 

short duration and result in a transition to democratic 

civilian rule. However, if the military does not return 

to the barracks, then U.S.-Egyptian strategic relations 

would be adversely affected because it is unlikely that 

the U.S. Congress and the U.S. administration would 

continue to provide aid to what would be a military 

dictatorship. An immediate transition to a civilian 

president, such as opposition leader Mohammad ElBaradei or former foreign minister Amre Moussa would 

not adversely affect the substance of the overall U.S.-

Egyptian relationship because both are establishment 
x

figures, though the United States should expect 

some distancing by either one of them in the bilateral 

relationship over some U.S. policies in the region. The 

worst-case scenario for the United States would be a 

Muslim Brotherhood-dominated government, but for 

this to occur, both the Brotherhood and the Egyptian 

military would each have to split, with radical elements 

collaborating to form a new government; this is not a 

very likely scenario. During a presidential succession 

period, U.S. policymakers should understand that the 

transition will happen based on events and processes 

inside of Egypt, not those in Washington. U.S. officials 

should avoid backing a particular Egyptian presidential 

candidate and instead speak about adherence to the 

rule of law and the Egyptian Constitution. In the case 

of a military take-over, even one of short duration, 

U.S. officials should emphasize the need to return to 

civilian rule as soon as possible.
1

PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION SCENARIOS 

IN EGYPT AND THEIR IMPACT

ON U.S.-EGYPTIAN STRATEGIC RELATIONS

INTRODUCTION

Egypt is a critical country for the U.S. military and 

strategic interests. Its location—straddling the African 

and Asian continents on the west-to-east air corridor 

route to the oil-rich Persian Gulf region, possessing 

the important Suez Canal waterway, and next door 

to the volatile Israeli/Palestinian situation—make it a 

vital partner for the United States. In addition, as the 

most populous country in the Arab world, and home 

to long-standing centers of learning in the Muslim 

world, what happens in Egypt is often a bellwether for 

developments in other parts of the region. Perhaps not 

surprisingly, President Barack Obama chose Egypt as 

the venue to deliver a major outreach speech to the 

Muslim world in June 2009.

Ever since the late President Anwar Sadat switched 

sides in the Cold War in the 1970s, Egypt has been a 

valuable, though sometimes prickly, partner of the 

United States, assisting it with military and political 

support, especially during times of crisis, as in the 

first Gulf War of 1990-91. A glimpse of some of this 

support was made public in 2006 when the U.S. Government Accounting Office, in a report to Congress, 

revealed that between 2001 and 2005, Egypt provided 

over-flight permission to 36,553 U.S. military aircraft 

and granted expedited transit of 861 U.S. naval ships 

through the Suez Canal.1

 Since the late 1970s, U.S. military assistance to Egypt has held steady at $1.3 billion 

a year, much of it for Cairo’s purchase of U.S. weapons and other military equipment. It is estimated that 
2

this assistance comprises about 80 percent of Egypt’s 

military procurement budget. U.S. military aid, as well 

as joint training exercises, most notably the biennial 

Bright Star, have helped to foster close military ties, 

including efforts to achieve interoperability of forces.2

President Sadat’s successor, Hosni Mubarak, when 

in power, oversaw this cooperation from the Egyptian side since 1981. A former air force commander, 

Mubarak carefully nurtured close U.S.-Egyptian strategic ties because he saw them as being in Egypt’s national interests, even when the two countries did not 

see eye-to-eye on some important political issues, like 

the Iraq War of 2003. Mubarak also maintained the 

Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty despite several flare-ups 

and small wars that have occurred between Israel and 

some of its neighbors between 1982 and 2006, which 

inflamed public opinion inside Egypt. Maintaining relations with Israel, even though it has been characterized as a “cold peace,” has diminished the possibility 

of a general Arab-Israeli war which otherwise could 

jeopardize vital U.S. interests in the region.

President Mubarak ruled Egypt in an authoritarian manner, similar to that of his predecessors, Anwar Sadat and Gamal Abdel Nasser. Although he allowed some political dissent as well as independent 

media outlets, the general authoritarian nature of 

the Egyptian regime has not changed fundamentally 

since the Free Officer coup or revolution of 1952. Under Mubarak, presidential power was overwhelming, 

backed by strong military and security establishments, 

with parliament as a weak institution. In contrast to 

his predecessors, however, Mubarak refused to appoint a vice president. The reasons for this unwillingness was the subject of much speculation inside Egypt, 

and may have had to do with his concern that such 
3

a person might overshadow him. Regardless, given 

Mubarak’s advanced age (82 years old), and persistent health problems (he had several major medical 

operations in Europe in the past few years),3 the question of presidential succession loomed large over the 

Egyptian political horizon. Even now, after Mubaraks’ 

overthrow, this succession could have profound implications for U.S.-Egyptian strategic relations. This 

monograph addresses various succession scenarios in 

Egypt and speculates on how they will impact strategic ties between our two countries. It will also provide 

policy recommendations of how U.S. officials should 

conduct themselves during what will likely be a very 

sensitive and potentially volatile period in Egypt’s political development.

THE POWER STRUCTURE IN EGYPT

Egypt’s political system has been described as 

“authoritarian” and indeed, “pharoanic.”4

 In 1952, a 

group of military officers from middle class and lower 

middle class backgrounds, called the ”Free Officers,” 

without a clear ideology except for nationalism and 

anti-imperialism, staged a coup against the unpopular 

monarch. Soon after, they dissolved the monarchy and 

political parties and established a military-dominated 

regime with a charismatic military officer, Gamal Abdel Nasser, at its helm. Nasser embarked on a socialist 

economic policy, replete with an expansion of the bureaucracy and nationalization of industries. Although 

he later became a civilian prime minister and president, Nasser relied heavily on his fellow military officers to become members of his cabinet, administrators 

of the nationalized businesses, and even ambassadors 

to foreign countries.5

 The social transformation was 
4

profound. By 1965, the public sector accounted for 95 

percent of all investment and controlled 85 percent of 

production, while the bureaucracy increased by 161 

percent in size between 1961 and 1971. As one scholar 

put it: “Socially, the regime set out to transform Egyptian society.”6

 Nationalization of businesses and land 

reform policies destroyed the old commercial and 

land-owning elite. Political and economic changes 

“created their own dynamic and allowed the regime 

to depend on a new lower middle class composed of 

peasants, clerks, small bureaucrats, teachers, nurses, etc.”7

 But throughout this transformation under 

Nasser, “the Egyptian military was there to protect 

the regime and participate in governing.”8 Most of the 

cabinets between 1952 and 1970 were controlled and 

dominated by the military. Nasser created a political 

organization to support this system, first called the 

Liberation Rally and later the Arab Socialist Union, 

but these institutions were clearly subordinate to the 

president and the military. Indeed, in 1962, for example, about three-fourths of the General Secretariat 

of the Arab Socialist Union were military officers.9

 Up 

until his death, Nasser was the unrivaled leader of this 

authoritarian and praetorian system.

The military’s role in governing declined under 

Nasser’s successor, Anwar Sadat, himself one of the 

Free Officers. Although Sadat, like Nasser, used the 

military as a base of power, he feared certain centers of 

power within the military establishment and purged 

and reshuffled many officers until he made the military “subordinate to the civilianized leadership of the 

president” that resulted in a “more professional military dedicated to external defense.”10 Sadat’s decision 

in 1973 to embark on a surprise attack on Israeli forces 

in the Sinai, which was lost in Egypt’s disastrous 1967 
5

war against Israel, boosted his reputation at home, as 

did later peace overtures to Israel which, while initially controversial, eventually led to direct U.S. involvement in the peace process, the Camp David Accords, 

the subsequent Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty (which 

led to the restoration of Egyptian sovereignty over 

the Sinai), and an economically beneficial relationship 

with the United States. In the economic sphere, Sadat 

pursued a more free enterprise economic program, 

characterized by an open-door policy of attracting 

foreign investment, and he even allowed some former 

members of the rural elite to reclaim their confiscated 

lands. Under Sadat a new economic elite emerged 

who were tied to the regime, often cited as an example 

of “crony capitalism.” Politically, Sadat transformed 

the Arab Socialist Union into the National Democratic 

Party and allowed some other parties to emerge, but 

he did not want the parliament to dominate the system. Toward the end of his rule (and shortly before 

his assassination), Sadat became increasingly dictatorial, arresting hundreds of his opponents as well as 

his former allies. It should also be noted that while the 

military’s role in the political system declined under 

Sadat, and he relied on a younger generation of officers, notably the leaders of the 1973 war, to head the 

military establishment, he was compelled to rely on 

the military to restore order when widespread riots 

broke out in January 1977 over food price rises and the 

police were unable to put down the riots.11

Sadat’s vice president at the time of his assassination was Hosni Mubarak, the former air force commander and a hero of the 1973 war. After surviving 

the shock of the assassination (the assassins were 

radical Islamists in the military) and putting down 

a related uprising in Upper Egypt, Mubarak liberal-
6

ized the political system somewhat to boost his own 

legitimacy. In late 1981, he freed most of the political prisoners who were arrested under Sadat’s orders 

and allowed fairly free parliamentary elections to take 

place in 1984. On the economic front, he pursued a 

gradual economic liberalization policy, lifting subsidies on certain commodities in a slow and deliberate 

manner and downsizing (through early retirements) 

and privatizing a number of state-own industries. 

Like Sadat, Mubarak also had to rely on the military 

to put down a major domestic crisis—the 1986 riots by 

poorly-paid conscripts in the Central Security Forces 

who had heard a false rumor that their length of service would be extended from 2 to 3 years.12

The military under Mubarak has played even less 

of a role in governing than it did under Sadat. Indeed, 

in the current cabinet, outside of the Defense Minister, 

there is only one former high-ranking military officer, 

Ahmed Shafiq, head of the civil aviation ministry. 

Military officers have been content to serve under a civilian president (though himself a former career military officer) because Mubarak has allowed them to 

maintain their autonomy, perquisites, and economic 

interests.

In addition to serving the national defense, Egypt’s 

military establishment today can be described as a vast 

economic conglomerate. It has control over various industries ranging from the production of armaments to 

washing machines and pharmaceuticals, and is nearly 

self-sufficient in agriculture. It has even branched into 

such sectors as “road and housing construction, consumer goods, and resort management.”13 One scholar 

has estimated that the military’s economic activity 

contributes $500 million of Egypt’s gross domestic 

product (GDP).14 Although in theory the military’s 

budget is subject to parliamentary review,
7

. . . no actual oversight ever takes place. Egypt’s minister of defense makes an annual presentation to the 

assembly’s standing committee on Defense, National 

Security, and Mobilization and is obliged to answer 

parliamentary questions, but such questions are rare. 

As one military informant explained, ‘The minister of 

defense may brief the parliament but there is no real 

dialogue, the members are not culturally inclined to 

question the military’.15

Although the pay of a military officer is not high, it 

is generally better than that of civilian civil servants of 

equivalent rank, and the military has access to special 

food stores, hospitals, vacation condominiums, and 

foreign travel that are denied to other members of the 

bureaucracy. In retirement, many military officers become high-paid consultants for the defense industries 

and foreign firms, managers of defense plants, and appointees of governorships and other state institutions. 

Because the Egyptian military (with the exception 

of the 1967 war debacle) has a positive reputation as 

the defender of Egypt’s national sovereignty, has a 

large force level (believed to be around 400,000)16 and 

depends on conscription, it is generally well-regarded 

by the population. Moreover, as one scholar has explained, Egyptian citizens do not resent the benefits 

given to the military because each family has, at one 

time or another, at least one member serving in it.17

The other center of power in Egypt is what has been 

called the “businessmen-politicians”—those members 

of the ruling National Democratic party who have 

risen to prominence under the president’s son, Gamal 

Mubarak, a deputy leader of the party who was also 

head of the party’s powerful Policies Secretariat.18 Gamal and his businessmen allies used their positions 
8

to remove socialist language from the Constitution 

(passed by a referendum), liberalize foreign trade, and 

make Egypt more business-friendly. However, these 

policies did not level the economic playing field, as 

some of these businessmen-politician have retained 

their strangleholds on certain industries. Ahmed Ezz, 

whose company has a monopoly on steel imports to 

Egypt, is chairman of the parliament’s planning and 

budgetary committee, while Mohammed Abu El-Enein, chairman of the private sector Cleopatra Group, 

is the chairman of parliament’s committee for industry and energy.19 These and other businessmen, some 

analysts say, not only went into politics to make sure 

that their businesses were protected, but to ensure 

that they themselves would not be arrested on corruption charges, as parliamentary members are generally 

immune from prosecution.

While Gamal and his businessmen allies represented the so-called “new-guard” in the party, the socalled “old guard”—those who began their political 

careers under the old Arab Socialist Union—are still 

around but in lesser numbers and with less influence. 

Nonetheless, the old guard has not been entirely sidelined, until the recent rebellion they had allies in the 

bureaucracy and among those in the party who were 

opposed to Gamal Mubarak.

As for the opposition, the largest and most important group is the Muslim Brotherhood, which 

had been hampered by regime policies. Persecuted 

by Nasser, the Brotherhood was allowed to resurface 

under Sadat, but neither he, nor his successor, Hosni 

Mubarak, gave it legal status. Mubarak initially was 

tolerant of the Brotherhood, which developed an extensive social-welfare apparatus (alleviating some 

economic burdens of the state), but when the Brother-
9

hood’s reach extended to traditional institutions (winning control of the Bar Association in 1992 as well as 

other professional syndicates and university faculty 

clubs), the regime moved against it.20 Moreover, in the 

1990s when Egypt was racked by violent attacks by 

more extremist elements, such as those by the Egyptian Islamic Jihad and the Islamic Group, the Mubarak 

government sought to lump all Islamist groups together (even though there was no evidence that the 

Brotherhood took part in this violence), arrested a 

number of Brotherhood second-echelon leaders, and 

prosecuted them before special military courts which 

were established to handle terrorism cases. For reasons that will be explained later in this monograph, 

the Brotherhood rebounded for a time, and in 2005, 

running as independents, won 20 percent of parliamentary seats. However, since that time, the regime 

has gone to great lengths to weaken the Brotherhood 

and hinder its ability to achieve electoral successes. In 

the November 2010 parliamentary elections, only one 

Brotherhood candidate (out of about 130 running) won 

a seat, prompting the organization to join other opposition groups—which, together only won a handful 

of seats—in boycotting the run-off session as well as 

the new parliament altogether. This led to a situation 

where the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP) 

controlled 90 percent of the seats in parliament.21

 The other opposition parties in Egypt have had legal status but are small and ineffective. Some analysts 

have described them as little more than debating societies for Egyptian intellectuals. The most prominent 

of these parties is the Wafd, a liberal-nationalist party 

that has a storied past (leading the country to nominal 

independence against the British in 1922), but is now 

only a figment of its former self. Others include the 

liberal Ghad party, led by political dissident Ayman 
10

Nour; the Tagammu party, which espouses a Marxisttype philosophy; and even a Nasserist party, which 

harkens back to the bygone days of the 1950s and 

1960s. The Egyptian government did all it could to 

keep these parties weak and off-balance. It fomented 

divisions within these parties22 and prevented them 

from boosting their following through certain laws 

(emergency and otherwise).23 The government did allow these parties and the Brotherhood to vent publicly, but this was done largely as a safety-valve (letting them blow off steam) and to show Egyptians and 

the outside world that the country has a semblance of 

democracy. 

The real power in Egypt rested with the presidency, backed by a military and security establishment, 

and supported by a ruling political party dominated 

by business interests. The prime minister, Ahmed Nazif, was a U.S.-trained technocrat and an ally of Gamal 

Mubarak, but he had no independent power base of 

his own and could be dismissed at any juncture by the 

president. 

CONSTITUTIONAL RULES, CHANGES, AND 

PROCEDURES

Under the Egyptian Constitution, there must be 

presidential elections every 6 years. Prior to 2005, 

Egypt’s lower house of parliament, the People’s Assembly, would meet to select a candidate by a twothirds majority, and that candidate would then go before the people in a public referendum (in a yes or no 

vote) to decide the president. Given the authoritarian 

nature of the Egyptian regime, with the ruling party 

beholden to the president and this party in charge of 

parliament, there was never any doubt that the sitting 
11

president, running for another term in office, would 

be re-elected. In the spring of 2005, bowing to pressure from Egyptian democracy activists and the Bush 

administration, President Mubarak decided to amend 

the constitution (which was subsequently passed by 

a public referendum) that would allow the presidential election to be contested between leaders of legal 

political parties, provided that such parties have representation in parliament. The latter provision was 

waved in 2005 because only a handful of opposition 

parties had seats in parliament. Under the amended 

Constitution, an independent candidate could also 

run if he received 250 signatures from parliamentary 

and local council members.24 Given the ruling party’s 

dominance of the Egyptian political system, it is highly 

unlikely that an independent candidate would be able 

to muster the necessary signatures to become a candidate. In any event, presidential elections in September 2005 were the first “multi-candidate” elections in 

Egypt’s history. President Hosni Mubarak won with 

88 percent of the vote, and political dissident Ayman 

Nour, head of the Ghad (Tomorrow) party, came in 

second with 7.6 percent of the vote. Other candidates 

received lesser percentages.

Prior to the revolution in January and February 

2011, many questions had arisen regarding the September 2011 presidential election: Would President 

Hosni Mubarak run for re-election? Would he step 

down and allow the ruling NDP to field another candidate? Would this NDP candidate be the president’s 

son, Gamal Mubarak, the Deputy Secretary General of 

the party and head of the party’s influential Policies 

Secretariat? Would another leader emerge within the 

party and be the NDP’s candidate? And what about 

the legal opposition parties? The decision of most of 
12

these parties to withdraw from parliament (claiming 

the parliamentary elections of November-December 

2010 were rigged) means that, under the Constitution, 

they would not be able to field a presidential candidate. Would there be another constitutional amendment to allow for broader political contestation of the 

presidential election, such as allowing candidates of 

political parties not represented in parliament to run 

in the election?

SUCCESSION SCENARIOS THROUGH LEGAL 

MECHANISMS

Scenario #1—Hosni Mubarak decides not to run 

for re-election and the NDP chooses Gamal Mubarak 

as its candidate who wins handily in a presidential 

election.

Many Egyptian political analysts believed this was 

the most likely scenario, given the former political 

landscape and Hosni Mubarak’s advancing age. For 

many years, it seemed that Hosni Mubarak had been 

grooming his second son, Gamal Mubarak, to replace 

him. Gamal, age 47, an investment banker by profession, has made his mark as a leader within the ruling 

party. He assumed leadership of the NDP’s new Policies Secretariat in 2002, the main policymaking body 

within the party, and has used this position to modernize the party, shed its socialist legacy, and adopt 

a more free-market orientation.25 Gamal has placed 

many of his allies in the party in the Policies Secretariat, including multi-millionaires like Ahmed Ezz, 

a steel magnate, and Mohamed Kamal, a U.S.-trained 

political scientist. President Mubarak has also taken 

Gamal on official trips with him abroad, including to 
13

Washington, adding fuel to the speculation that a father-to-son transition is in the works. Although Gamal 

has denied that he was seeking the presidency as late 

as November 2010,26 few in Egypt believe him. There 

were also unofficial campaigns within the NDP for 

Gamal to run for president, as well as a poster campaign (with supporters plastering his image on walls 

in Cairo) for the same purpose.27 Given the authoritarian nature of the Egyptian regime, such an “unofficial” campaign could not have taken place without the 

president’s approval. With the NDP having a virtual 

monopoly on politics in Egypt and with the regime’s 

security apparatus behind him (as directed by the father), there would have been little doubt that Gamal 

would have won a presidential election under those 

circumstances.

There are, however, some political observers who 

say that such a presidential succession was not a foregone conclusion. They point to some liabilities on Gamal’s part. For one, outside of his coterie of political 

allies and businessmen, Gamal was not well-liked by 

the majority of Egyptian citizens who are struggling 

to make ends meet amidst growing economic hardships, such as the rise in food prices. In late September 

2010, for example, hundreds of demonstrators gathered in Abdeen Square in Cairo to protest against a 

possible succession of Gamal to the presidency before 

being cracked down upon by security police.28 Although the demonstration was organized by opposition groups like the April 6 Youth Movement and 

Kifaya (Enough), which had an axe to grind, they may 

have reflected broader public sentiment. And while 

Gamal has the ability to make good speeches on the 

need to boost Egyptian incomes, many Egyptians see 

him and his millionaire-politician allies as being di-
14

vorced from their own harsh economic realities. Second, there apparently was a leadership rivalry within 

the NDP, between the old guard (many of whom are 

in their 70s) who grew up under the socialist policies 

of Gamal Abdel Nasser and who favor the public sector, and the new guard who want to shrink the public 

sector and make Egypt even more business-friendly 

than it currently is. The old guard remained influential 

within the party, though not as much as it once was. 

They realized that they could not mount an effective 

campaign against Gamal as long as Hosni Mubarak 

remained president, and if the latter had decided not 

to run for re-election and gave the nod to his son to be 

his successor, then they would have had to swallow 

what they saw as a bitter pill. On the other hand, if Gamal’s popularity had remained low with the Egyptian 

people and Hosni Mubarak equivocated about Gamal’s political future, then the old guard might have 

believed they had a chance to sideline Gamal. Third, 

and perhaps most importantly, rumors were rife in 

Cairo that Gamal was not well-liked by the military, 

not helped by the fact that he never did military service 

and hence is not considered “one of them.”29 Some retired military officers even circulated an open letter in 

August 2010 criticizing Gamal’s potential candidacy 

for president, and several retired military officers told 

a New York Times correspondent that they were skeptical of “hereditary succession.”30 There were also rumors that, because of this sentiment, Hosni Mubarak 

cashiered or moved around military officers known to 

harbor negative views toward his son, and that Gamal 

himself cultivated some influential officers.31 Without 

the military’s support, Gamal would have had a difficult time governing the country.

These important liabilities notwithstanding, if 

Hosni Mubarak had decided that Gamal should be his 
15

successor, and he had been healthy enough in office to 

orchestrate this scenario, then the military establishment and the ruling party would have, in all likelihood, 

supported his decision. To do otherwise would have 

jeopardized their own careers and those of their families. Gamal was probably politically-attuned enough 

to realize that if he had become the NDP’s presidential 

candidate, he would have needed to reach out to the 

military (assuring them that he would protect their 

perquisites, economic interests, and autonomy), and 

to reassure those dependent on the public sector that 

their social safety net would not be abandoned while 

he favored his free-market allies.

Scenario #2—Hosni Mubarak decides to run for 

re-election in 2011, wins handily, but dies in office before he completes his new term.

This scenario stood as good a chance of occurring 

as the previous scenario. Leading figures in the NDP, 

as recently as October 2010, have stated that, indeed, 

Hosni Mubarak would run again in 2011. Whether 

this comment was made to dampen speculation and 

controversy about Gamal’s potential bid for the presidency or whether it reflected Hosni Mubarak’s own 

inclination is unclear. The elder Mubarak did state 

publicly a few years ago that he planned to remain 

president “until his dying breath.”32

Given his health problems and his advanced age, 

why would Hosni Mubarak have wanted to run again 

for president? One reason was that he may have believed the political landscape in Egypt was not ready 

for a father-to-son transition, especially given the uncertainty about the military’s attitude toward Gamal 

as well as that of the old guard within the NDP. He 

also may have believed that Gamal himself was not 
16

ready to take on the presidency. It is one thing to be in 

a leadership position of a political party; it is another 

to be the ruler of a country of some 85 million people. 

Hosni Mubarak may also have been concerned about 

his legacy. He was very sensitive to the charges that 

Egypt was returning to a monarchy—put forth by his 

and Gamal’s detractors—and he threw a prominent 

dissident, Saad Eddin Ibrahim, in jail for suggesting 

in an article that Egypt was becoming another Syria 

(meaning that Hosni Mubarak, like Hafez Asad of 

Syria, was grooming his son to take over in a “republican” regime). Furthermore, continuing in office 

might have been considered the least risky path to 

follow. The Egyptian people, while disgruntled, saw 

Hosni Mubarak as a known leader who is backed by 

strong security services. Toying with the unknown, 

especially at a time of economic unrest—there were 

hundreds of strikes by workers and professionals over 

the past few years33—might have plunged Egypt and 

its elite down a path that is full of uncertainties. Hosni 

Mubarak knows, of course, that his time on earth is 

limited, but putting off what could be a difficult decision (whether or not to give the nod to Gamal) might 

have been the least risky decision in his mind over the 

short term. It should also be remembered that Hosni 

Mubarak has always been risk averse, a stark contrast 

to his predecessor, Anwar Sadat, who once famously 

quipped, “I prefer action to reaction.”34

In this scenario, after easily winning re-election, 

Hosni Mubarak would be 83 years old. Given his 

health problems, there is a strong likelihood that he 

would die in office because it is difficult to see him 

lasting until age 89. If succession followed Constitutional procedures in case of the death of the president, 

the speaker of Egypt’s parliament would rule for 60 

days, during which presidential candidates from the 
17

legal parties and those with representation in parliament would campaign, and a leader would be chosen 

by the people in a popular vote. Under this scenario, 

the military and security services would not intervene 

directly in the political system but their leaders would 

probably meet behind closed doors with the leaders of 

the NDP to choose the NDP’s presidential candidate. 

It is unlikely that the military and security services 

would be bystanders in the NDP’s candidate selection 

process, but for the sake of supporting the Egyptian 

Constitution and legal mechanisms, they would allow 

the NDP leaders to “formally” choose their leader under party rules after the anointed candidate was selected in a “smoke-filled room.”

In this scenario, the military would have an unofficial veto power over the NDP candidate. Given their 

reported lukewarm or uneasy feelings about Gamal, 

it is possible, under this scenario, that they would opt 

for another leader within the NDP to be the presidential candidate. A name that was sometimes floated 

is 69-year old Ahmed Shafiq, a former air force commander and a hero of the 1973 war, who has been minister of civil aviation since 2002. He was close to Hosni 

Mubarak (indeed, was a fighter pilot under Mubarak’s 

command when Mubarak was air force commander 

in 1973) and retired from the military with the rank 

of lieutenant general.35 Although he is technically not 

a leader or a member of a “higher committee” of the 

NDP, the powers-that-be could have used the fact that 

he was a cabinet minister to stretch the Constitution a 

bit to claim that, as a minister, he meets the constitutional requirements. If, in the confines of the closeddoor room, the Egyptian military insisted on a particular candidate like Shafiq, it is hard to imagine that 

NDP leaders would oppose them, since the military 

has the coercive power in society. The military might 
18

also have figured that it could count on the NDP old 

guard for support since this faction of the party would 

oppose a Gamal presidency. Given that the presumed 

candidate would have had the support of the NDP 

party apparatus and the military, it is likely that this 

candidate (or another of similar background) would 

have won easily in a presidential election. The military 

would have been content that “one of their own”—

though now a civilian—would be in charge. Shafiq 

has the reputation as a no-nonsense administrator. He 

has been known as a tough boss and was quoted in the 

Egyptian press in 2005 as stating, “I used to hear my 

colleagues say this about me, but I am not angry with 

them. I have lots of friends, and they know that I do 

not tolerate mistakes for the sake of friendship.”36

EXTRA-LEGAL SCENARIO SUCCESSIONS

Egyptians pride themselves by living in a country 

where the rule of law is generally adhered to (even 

though the law is sometimes not applied in the interest of the ruling apparatus), and thus following Constitutional requirements gives the political system 

a semblance of legitimacy. Because of this, the legal 

succession scenarios are more likely than extra-legal 

ones. Nonetheless, one can envision several scenarios 

where the powers-that-be in Egypt would sidestep or 

set aside the Constitution (even if only for a short period of time) in order to preserve what they would see 

as social stability and the preservation of their perquisites.

Scenario #3—President Hosni Mubarak dies in office and Director of General Intelligence, Omar Soliman, takes over as an interim president for a year. 
19

This scenario would have been unprecedented in 

Egypt—no Egyptian president has come out of the intelligence services—but it has been the subject of much 

discussion among the Egyptian intelligentsia. Omar 

Soliman is considered one of President Mubarak’s 

most trusted advisors. A career military officer, he 

became head of the powerful Egyptian General Intelligence (EGI) service in 1994 and has remained in this 

position ever since. EGI played a prominent role in 

foreign and domestic intelligence, and Mubarak used 

Soliman on a number of sensitive foreign assignments, 

such as being an intermediary at times between the 

Israelis and the Palestinian leadership and as a mediator between the Palestinian factions of Fatah and 

Hamas.37 Mubarak also sent Soliman on many trips to 

Africa and Washington, DC, where he is a well-known 

interlocutor to the U.S. intelligence community.

Soliman, as an active military officer, could not be 

a member of the ruling NDP because the Constitution 

prohibits military officers from being members of political parties. Hence, if Mubarak suddenly died in office, and this scenario played out, Soliman would have 

had to assume power by extra-legal means.

One subset of this scenario envisions an Omar 

Soliman-Gamal Mubarak alliance, with the former assuming the role of president while the latter becomes 

prime minister. This would have given time for Gamal 

to consolidate his power and reassure the Egyptian 

military establishment that he would have protected 

their autonomy, perquisites, and economic interests. 

The older Soliman (born in 1935 and has some health 

problems) would then have stepped down after about 

a year, handing the presidency to Gamal. Shortly before this hand-over, the Constitution would then have 

been amended to allow for an election by popular vote 

to give the handover a semblance of legitimacy.
20

Another subset of this scenario is that Omar Soliman would become president with the backing of the 

military establishment, effectively sidelining Gamal 

Mubarak. Soliman would rule for a year and then 

arrange for other political candidates (not Gamal) to 

run for president. The preferred presidential candidate would have been an NDP figure who had the 

support of the military or it could have even been a 

legal opposition leader (such as from the liberal Wafd 

party) who reached a modus vivendi with the military. 

Interestingly, some Egyptian political reformers and 

dissidents were said to favor this scenario because 

they believed it would be preferable to a dynastic succession of Hosni Mubarak passing power to his son. 

One Egyptian political liberal stated in the press that 

she hoped a “patriotic figure from the army will see 

the unfairness of the system and set things right.”38

Even though it is not clear that the extra-legal scenario 

of having Soliman at the helm would have led to a 

democratic Egypt, some members of the intelligentsia 

were so strongly opposed to dynastic succession that 

they were presumably willing to take this risk. Curiously, in the summer of 2010, when posters of Gamal 

Mubarak began appearing on walls and billboards in 

Cairo touting his credentials as a possible president, 

posters (though fewer in number) of Omar Soliman 

also began appearing but were then removed after a 

few days.39 Given Soliman’s sharp political instincts, 

it is doubtful that he himself was behind the poster 

campaign. More likely, the Soliman posters may have 

been put up by those within the NDP (or others) who 

are opposed to Gamal’s possible presidential ambitions.

Scenario #4—Hosni Mubarak dies in office with 

no vice president, the NDP is split, rioting takes place 
21

in the streets over economic issues, and the military 

establishment takes over temporarily to restore order, 

led by Defense Minister Mohammed Tantawi.

This scenario envisions a military coup, albeit one 

that would eventually hand power back to civilians. 

Although the military is not eager to rule directly, circumstances might arise where they would see such a 

temporary take over as being in Egypt’s national interests, especially if the social order breaks down or 

is severely threatened. While Egypt has long been a 

stable country, there have been times in its recent history, as mentioned earlier, where social strains threatened the stability of the country—most notably the 

bread riots of 1977 and the police conscript riots of 

1986—and the military was called in to restore order 

when the police proved to be ineffective. A succession 

crisis by itself would not have necessarily led the military to intervene, but given the economic strains faced 

by average Egyptian families, some unforeseen event 

during such a succession crisis might trigger a public 

uprising or widespread rioting. If the military leaders 

believe that the country is faced with chaos, they will 

feel compelled to intervene.

Tantawi, by virtue of his position as Minister of 

Defense and Field Marshal, is the top military official 

in the country. As such, he could not be ruled out as 

a possible successor to Hosni Mubarak during such a 

scenario, especially if there was no clearly designated 

successor, such as a vice president. Tantawi commands the entire defense establishment (his full title 

is Minister of Defense and Military Production and 

Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces). In the rumor mills of Cairo, however, he was usually not mentioned as one of the top contenders for the presidency. 

This is because he lacks the charisma and shrewdness 
22

of an Omar Soliman, was chosen as defense minister 

probably because he lacks political ambitions, and was 

never one to outshine the president. Mubarak clearly 

wanted someone to lead the military who was the opposite of charismatic Field Marshal Abu Ghazala, a 

rival of Mubarak’s who was forced to retire in 1989.40

(There was a short-term minister of defense, Lieutenant General Abu Taleb, from 1989 to 1991, at which 

time Tantawi was named to that position). Tantawi, 

born in 1935, is a career military officer who served 

in the 1956, 1967, and 1973 wars, as well as the Gulf 

War of 1991. Except for certain ceremonial functions, 

Tantawi has not been in the public eye. If he were to 

take over in a military coup, he would probably not 

want to rule for long, and given his age (75), there 

would be a good possibility that he would move fairly 

quickly to reestablish civilian rule by choosing or acquiescing to a political leader who would safeguard 

the military’s interests. He would not likely be the sole 

decisionmaker in this process.

The Egyptian military has the coercive power to 

bring order to the country (putting tanks and troops 

into the streets of Cairo and other cities), but the 

question arises as to what they would do next. The 

military had no experience in governing for many 

decades—the Nasser period was more than 40 years 

ago—and given Egypt’s myriad of economic problems 

would see such a takeover as bringing it numerous 

headaches and heartaches. 41 Furthermore, given the 

Egyptian people’s preference for the rule of law, the 

military would not want to be tarnished with taking 

what would undoubtedly be seen as an undemocratic 

move. Moreover, a military coup would likely bring 

criticism from certain circles in the United States and 

the European Union, possibly jeopardizing military 

assistance and arms sales. Hence, for a variety of rea-
23

sons, a military take-over would likely be of relatively 

short duration.

Scenario #5—Hosni Mubarak dies in office, the 

NDP cannot decide on a candidate, and the Constitution is set aside to allow Amre Moussa, the former 

Egyptian foreign minister and current Secretary-General of the Arab League, to run for president with the 

backing of the military establishment.

Although this scenario may have seemed implausible, given the fact that Moussa is not a politician nor 

a military officer, in October 2009, he did suggest publicly that he might be interested in running for president some day. He was quoted as saying in an interview with the independent Shorouk daily that it was 

still too soon to decide about standing as a candidate 

for the presidential election in 2011 but said he appreciated the “trust expressed by many citizens when 

they talk of my nomination for the presidency . . . and 

it is a message that has reached me.” He added that he 

was “among the firmest believers in the need to awaken a project for an Egyptian renaissance.”42 Moussa is 

a charismatic figure who was a very popular foreign 

minister in the 1990s—so popular, in fact that, as the 

rumor went, President Mubarak decided to “kick him 

upstairs” to the position of Secretary-General of the 

Arab League because, as a cabinet minister, he was 

overshadowing the president. As foreign minister, 

Moussa often stood up to Israel and the United States 

and emphasized Egypt’s leadership in the Arab world, 

positions that won him a supportive following not just 

in Egypt, but in the larger region. Indicative of his charisma, when Moussa would walk into hotel lobbies in 

Cairo in the 1990s, the people—mostly a mixture of 

Egyptians and other Arabs—would start applauding 

spontaneously.43
24

Moussa is a career diplomat and not a military 

man, but he is likely to have earned the respect of the 

Egyptian military establishment when he was foreign 

minister. In particular, his focus on Israel’s reported 

nuclear arsenal and the perceived threat it posed to 

Egyptian and regional security was probably appreciated by Egypt’s military which, while not wanting 

to scuttle the peace treaty with Israel, has been traditionally uneasy with the fact that the United States has 

strongly backed Israel’s position of military superiority in the region. While Moussa may still retain the 

goodwill of the Egyptian military establishment, some 

high-ranking military officers may fear that he would 

be too willing to distance Egypt from the United States 

to the point of jeopardizing critical U.S. military assistance. At the same time, some elements of the Egyptian military, like President Mubarak, might be jealous of Moussa’s popularity with the intelligentsia and 

the masses, and not want such a person as president 

who would derive his power not from the military establishment but from the public, thus making him less 

beholden to the military and perhaps less willing to 

protect their economic interests.

Moussa had not commented publicly about his 

presumed presidential ambitions since the autumn 

of 2009 (perhaps not wanting to appear to be too ambitious or not wanting to anger the Mubarak family, 

which still controls the power in Egypt), but his popularity and his nationalist credentials would have made 

him a viable contender if the NDP and the military 

could not decide on an immediate successor. Because 

Moussa, as Secretary General of the Arab League, does 

not meet the presidential candidate requirements (being in the leadership of a legal party for at least a year), 

the Constitution would have had to be amended or set 

aside for him to have run for office.
25

Scenario #6—Hosni Mubarak dies in office, the 

NDP is split, widespread rioting occurs against the regime, the people demand that Muhammad El-Baradei 

(the former chairman of the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA]) become president, the military 

agrees to allow new elections (with El-Baradei on the 

ballot), and El-Baradei wins the presidency.

Mohammad El-Baradei, a career Egyptian diplomat, made his mark on the world stage as chairman of 

the IAEA, especially during the time frame leading up 

to the Iraq War of 2003 when he defied the Bush administration’s assessment of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in Iraq. After leaving the IAEA El-Baradei 

returned to Egypt in late 2009 as a national hero but, 

much to the chagrin of the Egyptian regime, called for 

the establishment of specific democratic reforms in 

February 2010. Seeing him as a threat, the Egyptian regime, mainly through its establishment press, sought 

to malign El-Baradei, but that did not stop him from 

creating an organization called the National Association for Change. In cooperation with some oppositionists, including members of the Muslim Brotherhood, 

El-Baradei’s followers, as of December 2010, were able 

to muster close to 1 million Egyptian citizens to sign a 

petition demanding these democratic changes. Many 

young Egyptian intellectuals in particular flocked to 

El-Baradei for a time, seeing him as a sort of savior.44

El-Baradei, however, has spent much of his time in 

recent months outside of Egypt, causing some members of the intelligentsia to question his sincerity and 

seriousness. He urged his followers to boycott the 

November 2010 parliamentary elections, saying they 

were going to be a sham because the government had 

not taken any actions to implement his called-for democratic reforms. Given that the elections turned out as 
26

El-Baradei had predicted, and that most of the opposition parties are boycotting parliament (and even setting up a makeshift shadow parliament), El-Baradei’s 

popularity may be rising again.45

What is unclear in this scenario is the military’s attitude toward El-Baradei. Some high-ranking military 

officers may see him as a man of stature who would 

be more acceptable than Gamal Mubarak, while others may view him warily because of his tacit alliance 

with the Muslim Brotherhood, even though El-Baradei himself is a secular-liberal. Because El-Baradei is 

not a leader of a legal political party, he would not 

have been able to run for president in September 2011 

under the Constitution. But, if Hosni Mubarak had 

died in office and there was no clear successor and if 

social instability had occurred, the military and security forces might have allowed presidential elections 

to occur with El-Baradei on the ballot as a way of 

calming the population. If the NDP split and elections 

were free and fair, there is a good chance that, under 

these conditions, El-Baradei might win. However, as 

the price for allowing him to participate in presidential elections, El Baradei would have had to come to 

an understanding with the military that if he were to 

win, he would protect their autonomy, perquisites, 

and economic interests.

This scenario would have been unlikely because so 

many events would have had to occur before El-Baradei could have gotten his name on the presidential 

ballot, but it would not have been beyond the realm 

of possibility. 

Scenario #7—Hosni Mubarak dies in office, the 

NDP and the military establishment is split, rioting 

takes place in the streets over economic issues, and the 

Muslim Brotherhood makes a bid for power and takes 

over with the support of some military elements. 
27

This would have been the most alarming scenario 

for the United States (and for countries like Israel) because a Brotherhood-dominated government might 

scuttle Egypt’s peace treaty with Israel, open up the 

border with Gaza, allow arms to flow to its ideological 

cousin, Hamas, and spur on other radical fundamentalist movements in the region. The only way this scenario would have occurred is if the Egyptian military, 

not just the NDP, factionalized, and some elements of 

the military threw their weight to the Brotherhood. 

While the Egyptian military is seen as a bastion of the 

establishment (supporting the nationalist-republican 

regime that was founded in 1952), and most of its elements are opposed to the Brotherhood—one retired 

army general said recently that the army would step 

in with force to prevent the Brotherhood from gaining 

power—it has not been so obsessed with preserving 

secularism as has the Turkish military since the time 

of Kemal Ataturk. Indeed, one of the original Free Officers, Anwar Sadat, outwardly displayed his religiosity as president, released Muslim Brotherhood leaders 

and activists from prison, and encouraged the formation of Islamic student groups on university campuses 

as a counterweight to the secular-leftists. In addition, 

the Egyptian military officer corps in many respects 

reflects the ideological currents of the Egyptian middle class, which has become more religiously observant and conservative over the past several decades. 

For example, many wives and daughters of Egyptian 

military officers wear the hegab or headscarf.46 The 

military also has built mosques at Egyptian military 

bases primarily to inculcate conscripts with moderate, 

establishment Islam as opposed to a more radicalized 

version of the militant and fundamentalist groups, but 
28

in doing so has signaled that religious observance is to 

be encouraged.47 Indeed, many, if not most, Egyptian 

military officers observe the daylight hours of fasting 

during the month of Ramadan.

There also have been instances where the Egyptian 

military has even been infiltrated by radical Islamists. 

President Sadat was assassinated by radical Egyptian 

Islamic Jihad operatives who were members of the 

Egyptian military. Although since that time (1981) 

there have been great efforts to weed out Islamist elements from the military, it is conceivable that some 

junior officers may harbor sympathetic sentiments toward nonviolent but fundamentalist groups like the 

Muslim Brotherhood. 

Under this scenario, the Brotherhood itself would 

have had to change its position and tactics. Although 

it once had a violent and secret wing (especially in the 

1940s and 1950s—assassinating some regime figures 

such as Prime Minister Al-Nuqrashi Pasha in 1948), 

since the 1970s it has renounced violence and sought to 

participate in the political process.48 It has also concentrated on pursuing the gradual Islamization of Egyptian society, abetted by its extensive social-charitable 

network. The Egyptian government, especially under 

Hosni Mubarak, has not trusted the Brotherhood, and 

has steadfastly kept the Brotherhood in legal limbo. 

Although the Brotherhood has been able to field parliamentary candidates in recent elections, running as 

independents, the fact that the Brotherhood remains 

an illegal organization allowed the government to 

conduct periodic roundups of hundreds of Brotherhood activists and keep them in prison, sometimes for 

months, if not years, at a time. Despite this continual 

harassment and persecution, the leadership of the 

Brotherhood instructed its followers not to resist and 
29

to be patient, most likely under the philosophy that 

politics would follow society—in other words, what 

is important is for Egyptian society to become more 

devout and follow Islamic precepts. When Islamization of society reaches a critical mass, then a truly Islamic state, led by leaders devoted to implementing 

the sharia (Islamic law), could be achieved.49

At the same time, the Brotherhood, as the largest 

opposition group in Egypt, has come to believe that 

they can spur the Islamization process along by getting some of their members elected to parliament. The 

apex of this “political process” strategy was in 2005 

when, for reasons aimed largely at frightening the 

United States (which put significant pressure on the 

Egyptian government to democratize), the Egyptian 

government adopted a liberal policy toward the Brotherhood, releasing members from prison, allowing the 

organization to campaign openly using religious slogans (which were banned by the Constitution), and 

even affording the Supreme Guide of the Brotherhood an interview in the semi-official newspaper, 

Al-Ahram. The aim of the Egyptian government was 

to squeeze the secular-liberal opposition and allow 

some Brotherhood gains to present the United States 

with a picture of either “us” (meaning the Mubarak 

government and the ruling NDP) or “them” (meaning 

the fundamentalist Brotherhood). Things did not go 

exactly as planned because the Brotherhood did better 

than expected in the first round of the elections (parliamentary elections then were held in three rounds 

and run-offs during a 6-week period), and the NDP 

did more poorly than expected. The Brotherhood then 

mobilized its members to score even bigger gains, 

which sent the government into panic mode. Thereafter, the government tried its best to rig subsequent 
30

rounds of the election and suppress the vote, but the 

Brotherhood wound up capturing 20 percent of parliamentary seats, the largest ever recorded by the organization in Egypt. 

Although the Brotherhood’s significant gains in 

Egypt between 2000 and 2005 (going from 17 to 88 

seats), along with the Hamas victory in the Palestinian territories, appeared to have dampened the Bush 

administration’s push for democratization in the Arab 

world,50 the Egyptian government signaled that it 

would not allow a repeat of such a Brotherhood victory. In the days up to the 2010 parliamentary elections, 

it arrested hundreds of Brotherhood activists and 

ensured that most Brotherhood candidates were not 

elected; indeed, only one Brotherhood candidate (out 

of about 130 who ran) won a seat in the first round 

of the elections, prompting the Brotherhood, along 

with most of the other opposition parties, to boycott 

the run-off round and refuse to participate in the new 

parliament.51

The Brotherhood’s experiment with political participation thus has proven to be a tough row to hoe. Although there is no evidence that the Brotherhood has 

given up on its nonviolent strategy, it is not a monolithic organization. Indeed, its decision to participate 

in the 2010 parliamentary elections was highly controversial within the organization itself, with a substantial minority opposing the decision.52 The Brotherhood 

has its moderate and more hard-line wings as well 

as generational differences. Although it would have 

much to lose if it were to change strategies and revert 

to a militant role (as it did in the 1940s and 1950s), it 

is not inconceivable that some members of its more 

hard-line faction may have opted for such a change, 

especially if they believed that dissatisfaction with the 
31

government by the people was so profound that they 

believed violent change was coming and they might 

as well take advantage of the situation.

This scenario envisions widespread rioting and 

violence by the people over economic conditions (perhaps because of price increases) and a breakdown of 

order. Hard-line elements of the Brotherhood come 

to believe that the moment is ripe to make a bid for 

power, essentially giving up on the gradual approach 

of the past few decades. These hard-line elements 

take leadership of the rioters and make overtures to 

the military, which believes it can only restore order 

if it bows to the will of the people. The Brotherhood 

is allowed to take power with the support of key factions of the military who assure the people that this 

will be a popular regime that is not only Islamic in its 

orientation but geared toward improving the lot of the 

poor. The military senses that its own interests would 

be threatened if it did not back such a movement. A 

modus vivendi of sorts is established, where a more 

outwardly Islamist-oriented military rules behind 

the scenes, while the Brotherhood declares Egypt an 

Islamic republic. Elections are held to legitimize the 

Brotherhood in power. The Brotherhood then takes 

the political decision to end Egypt’s peace treaty with 

Israel, ends the close security cooperation with the 

United States, and reaches out to other Islamist groups 

in the Middle East like Hamas and Hezbollah (even 

though the latter is a Shiite organization). The United 

States loses its military cooperation with the Egyptian 

government as more Islamic-oriented officers take 

over the leadership of the military and pro-Western 

military officers are purged from the ranks. Although 

this new Egyptian regime would not likely initiate a 

war against Israel (unsure of the outcome), it could 
32

pursue certain policies that might trigger an Israeli 

military response. For example, it could send large 

numbers of troops and military equipment into the 

Sinai in violation of the peace treaty with Israel and 

provide military assistance to Hamas. Israel, believing 

its national security is at stake, would then reoccupy 

the Gaza Strip and invade the Sinai, leading to a new 

Arab-Israeli war.

HOW WOULD THESE SCENARIOS IMPACT 

U.S.-EGYPTIAN RELATIONS?

Legal Succession Scenarios.

Scenario #1—If Hosni Mubarak decided not to 

run in 2011 and Gamal Mubarak ran and won the 

presidential election, the substance of U.S.-Egyptian 

strategic ties would have been largely unaffected. To 

bolster his own legitimacy, however, Gamal might 

have taken certain steps to show that he is a nationalist leader and not simply a toady of the United States. 

He might have outwardly taken some positions in the 

Arab-Israeli peace process or on regional issues (like 

Iran) that would appear to be counter to U.S. policy 

goals. But as the son of Hosni Mubarak and from the 

Westernized elite of the country, Gamal would likely 

continue the close political and strategic relationship 

with the United States. Moreover, as someone who 

did not do military service, and given his problematic 

standing (at best) with the Egyptian military establishment, Gamal would also not want to harm the U.S. 

military aid spigot that the Egyptian military has relied on for decades.

Scenario #2—Hosni Mubarak dies in office before 

he designates a successor, and the NDP and the military and security services meet behind closed doors to 
33

chose a presidential candidate who would be acceptable to the power structure in the country. Under this 

scenario, the basic structure of the regime remains in 

place, with the speaker of parliament ruling temporarily for 60 days before a presidential election can take 

place. The NDP and military elite decide on a candidate behind closed doors. Whether it would have been 

a former military officer and current cabinet minister 

like Ahmed Shafik, Gamal Mubarak, or another NDP 

figure, the regime would remain in charge. Any of 

these possible candidates from the NDP would likely 

win a presidential election, given the NDP’s near monopoly of politics in the country, and U.S-Egyptian 

strategic relations would likely be unaffected in any 

major way. In some respects, having another establishment NDP figure other than Hosni Mubarak at 

the helm in Egypt might actually improve the chances for stability because any new leader, even Gamal 

Mubarak, would see the pursuit of some democratic 

reforms as important for his own legitimacy,53 even 

if these reforms are not very dramatic. Such reforms 

would likely be welcomed by the U.S. administration 

and Congress, and could even lead to a warming of 

the bilateral relationship. On December 18, 2010, U.S. 

Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human 

Rights, and Labor Michael Posner wrote: “It is the 

[Obama] administration’s firm view that progress in 

political and economic reform in Egypt is essential to 

the country’s long-term strength and success as a regional leader as well as to sustaining a strong foundation for our valued strategic partnership.”54

Extra-Legal Scenarios.

Scenario #3—Under this scenario, Hosni Mubarak

dies in office and Egyptian General Intelligence 
34

Director Omar Soliman takes power for a year—the 

U.S.-Egyptian strategic partnership would also be 

maintained. Soliman, as a well-known interlocutor 

with U.S. military and intelligence agencies, understands the importance of maintaining close security 

ties with the United States for Egypt’s own national 

security and will probably keep these ties on an even 

keel. However, if this scenario had come to pass, Soliman would be sidestepping the Egyptian Constitution 

because he would assume the presidency in extralegal ways. This might elicit criticism within the human rights and democracy advocate communities not 

only in Egypt, but in Washington and other western 

capitals—even though some Egyptian democracy activists claim they would favor this outcome because 

it would forestall a Gamal presidency.55 Hence, there 

would likely have been calls from some U.S. Congress members to cut aid to Egypt if civilian rule via 

presidential elections, and all aspects of the Egyptian 

Constitution, were not restored in a short period of 

time. Much would depend on how Soliman mitigated 

this criticism by emphasizing the temporary nature 

of his rule and outlining his plans for elections of a 

civilian president. If skeptics in Congress can be convinced that he is sincere about the temporary nature of 

the coup and believe that an alternative at that point 

might have produced a shakier outcome, then punitive measures—like cutting U.S. military aid—would 

be minimized. On the other hand, should Soliman not 

step down after a year and not move forward to restore Constitutional mechanisms, events could be set 

in motion that could harm U.S.-Egyptian strategic ties. 

In other words, if Soliman were to overstay his leadership, and the United States were to show its displeasure by threatening or indeed cutting aid, then U.S.-

Egyptian relations would likely suffer.
35

Scenario #4—This scenario—the Egyptian military takes power temporarily in response to widespread social unrest, with Defense Minister Tantawi 

in charge—is similar to the previous scenario, but it 

might actually have been more palatable to the Egyptian intelligentsia and to Washington because the 

coup could be seen as a necessary measure to forestall 

chaos. The Egyptian military could mitigate the political fallout by reassuring both audiences that it wants 

to hand back authority to civilians, by scheduling a 

presidential election as soon as possible, and by crafting democratic reforms to allow for freer and fairer 

elections than have occurred so far in Egypt. Tantawi 

and other members of the Egyptian military hierarchy 

would probably see the continuation of U.S.-Egyptian 

strategic ties as important for their country’s stability, 

but if social unrest were not to end and the Egyptian 

military were to use U.S. military armaments to cause 

bloodshed on the streets for a considerable period of 

time, there would likely be calls from the U.S. Congress and parts of the U.S. administration to cut military aid to Egypt, thus jeopardizing the security relationship. Hence, much would depend on how quickly 

the Egyptian military would be able to restore order 

and how quickly they would be able to hold civilian 

elections and make the transition back to civilian rule.

Scenario #5—If the NDP were to split and the 

military agreed to sidestep the Constitution to allow 

Amre Moussa to run and win the presidency, the regime might initially have more legitimacy and popularity because Moussa would play to Egyptian nationalist sentiments and might allow for some democratic 

reforms. Moussa would be more willing to challenge 

U.S. policies in the region, particularly over Arab-Israeli issues and possibly over Iran, but as a longtime 
36

member of the Egyptian establishment, he would not 

want to alienate the Egyptian military by causing severe tensions with the United States to the point where 

the United States starts to question Egypt as a strategic 

partner. One could expect Moussa, despite wanting to 

show differences with the United States over some 

foreign policy issues, to continue close U.S.-Egyptian 

military and security ties, especially as those are largely out of the public spotlight.

Scenario #6—Under this scenario—where ElBaradei would be elected president through splits in 

the NDP and the military agreeing to set aside parts of 

the Constitution—U.S.-Egyptian strategic ties would 

likely follow a pattern similar to that of Scenario #4. 

El Baradei would probably take some foreign policy 

positions at variance with the United States not only 

because of his own troubled history with U.S. policy, 

but because doing so would bolster his legitimacy at 

home. At the same time, understanding that he could 

not have been allowed to run for president without 

the support of the military establishment, he would be 

mindful not to make his differences with the United 

States so profound that they would wind up hurting 

U.S.-Egyptian military and security ties. Hence, like 

the Amre Moussa scenario, El Baradei would likely 

continue the close U.S.-Egyptian strategic ties, especially since they are mostly out of the public spotlight.

Scenario #7—This scenario would be the most 

alarming for U.S.-Egyptian strategic relations because 

a Brotherhood-dominated regime would likely scuttle the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, aid Hamas, and 

lessen, if not end, military ties with the United States. 

Although there may be more moderate elements of 

the Brotherhood who would want to take a measured 
37

approach to these issues, this scenario envisions hard 

line elements of the organization taking over. The 

United States military would likely lose its over-flight 

and transit rights through the Suez Canal, and joint 

military exercises would end. In addition, cooperation 

on anti-terrorism would end because the Brotherhood 

would not want to be seen aiding the U.S. fight against 

Islamists, even though the Brotherhood would likely 

remain opposed to Al Qaeda. One mitigating factor 

would be the Egyptian military. Although this scenario envisions a purging of the military, the Brotherhood 

would not want to emasculate it because the Brotherhood would see the military as important for a possible confrontation with Israel. Some of the remaining 

elements of the Egyptian military, even those with Islamist sympathies, would be wary of ending the U.S. 

military assistance program entirely, especially since 

the Egyptian military relies heavily on U.S. military 

equipment. However, certain dynamics would likely 

come into play if a Brotherhood-dominated regime 

were to come to power in Egypt, namely that the U.S. 

Congress would be hard-pressed to continue funding 

military aid to Egypt if the Brotherhood were to take 

power. 

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

How Should U.S. Officials Conduct Themselves in 

These Scenarios?

As the events of the past few months have shown 

us, the transtition of Egyptian leadership happened 

based on events and processes inside Egypt, and the 

United States and other powers (Isreal, Saudi Arabia, 

and others) had little influence over the outcome.56 

Nonetheless, based on these scenarios, there are some 
38

things U.S. policymakers should and should not do 

during what is currently a very sensitive time in modern Egyptian history.

First, the United States should not signal that it 

prefers one leader over another. While this monograph has suggested that the end result of certain 

regime changes would more likely preserve U.S.-

Egyptian strategic ties than others, the United States 

should refrain from speaking publicly about them. 

The reasons are two-fold. First, with their history of 

Western domination, Egyptians would react angrily 

to any perception that the United States was “pulling the strings” about who should lead Egypt. In an 

episode well-known to educated Egyptians, in February 1942, British tanks surrounded King Farouk’s 

palace and the British Ambassador threatened to start 

shooting if the king did not appoint a pro-Allied Wafd 

government. The king relented in what was seen by 

most Egyptians as an act of national humiliation.57

Although the British justified their actions because 

they had their backs to the wall—German and Italian 

armies were in Egypt’s western desert, threatening the 

major cities of Alexandria and Cairo and the vital Suez 

Canal—to Egyptians this was an egregious example 

of foreign and imperial domination. Any suggestion 

by the United States that it would prefer a particular 

candidate would likely backfire.

Second, U.S. officials should be mindful that longterm U.S.-Egyptian interests require not only the assent of the political-military establishment but the 

population as well, or more specifically, at least the 

educated strata in Egyptian society who want their 

country to be more democratic. U.S. officials should 

speak not only about the desirability of the Egyptian 

government adhering to Egyptian Constitutional 

procedures during any period of regime change, but 
39

allowing more freedoms and rights for political parties to contest elections in a more democratic manner. 

Indeed, this approach has already begun with an oped piece in the Washington Post by a senior State Department official (the Assistant Secretary of State for 

Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor), who wrote on 

December 18, 2010:

Free and fair elections require free and vibrant media; that includes bloggers and international coverage. The Egyptian government could also do more to 

encourage a broader array of political parties and to 

support citizens who want to form non-governmental 

organizations to contribute to the country’s future. 

It will also be important for Egypt to welcome both 

international and domestic election monitors and allow them to carry out their work freely throughout the 

campaign period and on [Presidential] Election Day 

next September [2011].58

Even though Hosni Mubarak is no longer in office, 

similar promouncements can still be made by highranking officials to underscore that they come from 

the top of the U.S. administration.

But now that we face a situation in some ways 

similar to Scenarios #3 and #4, how should U.S. officials conduct themselves if the Egyptian military takes 

power, even if only for a short period of time? This is 

a delicate matter than needs to be handled with some 

dexterity and much depends on the situation on the 

ground. If the military steps in to allow popular candidates—who are not in leadership positions of political parties—to run in a contested presidential election and allows such elections to take place in a free 

and fair manner, then Washington should show some 

leniency to the sidestepping of the Egyptian Consti-
40

tution, especially since this Constitution is heavily 

skewed toward the ruling party. If a popular leader 

is elected and undertakes reforms that benefit the 

people and lead to long-term stability, that would be 

in both countries’ strategic interests. And even if such 

a leader would be more critical of U.S. policies than 

Hosni Mubarak has been, the new leader would, in all 

likelihood, want to maintain U.S.-Egyptian strategic 

ties not only to please the Egyptian military establishment, but to enhance Egypt’s national security.

A military coup that would put the military in 

charge of the country for a period of time would be 

more problematic because it could lead the relationship down a slippery slope where the U.S. administration would not want to be seen aiding an undemocratic 

process and the U.S. Congress might feel compelled to 

apply punitive measures, such as cutting military aid. 

Indeed, several years ago, Congress withheld $100 

million in military aid to Egypt largely because of its 

undemocratic practices, but it supplied a “national security waiver” to this legislation that was exercised by 

Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice 2 months later.59

A military coup would likely lead to even more punitive measures. Nonetheless, if a military coup took 

place to end widespread civil strife in Egypt, and 

Egyptian military leaders pledged to restore civilian 

rule and bring about democratic changes, then U.S. 

officials should resist punishing Egypt. At the same 

time, U.S. officials should hold the Egyptian military 

accountable, and if they do not return to the barracks 

and restore civilian rule as they promised, then the 

U.S. administration should take the lead in pressuring 

the regime with punitive measures. Although such a 

policy on the part of the United States may seem counterproductive from a strategic point of view, as the 
41

Egypt military might react angrily to such measures, 

Egyptian military officers would understand that they 

would be hurting their own security interests if they 

were to indefinitely postpone civilian elections. While 

the U.S.-Egyptian strategic relationship would suffer 

a setback, most likely it would be temporary. U.S. military officers who interact with their Egyptian counterparts would also have a role to play under these 

scenarios, informing them that the return to civilian 

rule would be not only desirable from a political point 

of view but be in the long-term interest of preserving 

the bilateral security relationship and military assistance levels.

With the exception of a Muslim Brotherhood takeover, whoever becomes the new president of Egypt 

will likely want to establish a good relationship with 

Washington. As this new president or leader takes the 

helm in Cairo, the United States has the opportunity 

to impress upon him the need to pursue reforms in 

the interests of the long-term stability of the country. 

Washington should assure the new leader of its support by pledging that the bilateral security relationship that has been built up over the past 3 decades will 

continue, and that politically, Washington will also 

support him, provided that domestic political reforms 

will indeed be carried out. Washington should also 

emphasize that rigging of elections, cracking down 

on opposition media, and arrests of nonviolent opponents not only hurts the country’s image overseas but 

is counterproductive to preserving Egypt’s long-term 

stability.

Finally, if the Muslim Brotherhood takes over and 

pursues policies that not only weaken or end U.S.-

Egyptian strategic ties but assist violent groups in the 

region, (Scenario #7), the United States should seek 
42

to isolate the government and suspend aid to it, hoping that more moderate elements would eventually 

emerge in Egypt. At the same time, the United States 

should counsel Israel not to take aggressive policies 

against Egypt unless it truly believes its national security is directly threatened, as an Israeli-Egyptian war 

could lead to untold consequences and embolden radicals in the region. Although the prospect of a hostile 

regime in Egypt would certainly set back U.S. strategic 

interests in the region, including the chances to achieve 

an Israeli-Palestinian peace deal as well as a broader 

Arab-Israeli peace, a hostile Egyptian government 

would not end the U.S. standing in the region, as the 

United States would have the option of strengthening 

its ties to other countries in the area. Losing Egypt as 

a partner and an ally would undoubtedly be a severe 

setback for U.S. national security interests, but such a 

loss would not necessarily be of long duration. Some 

elements of the Egyptian military, even those who 

would profess loyalty to a Brotherhood-dominated 

government, would not want to cut off U.S. ties completely, especially since so much of Egypt’s military 

equipment is U.S.-made, and the Westernized elite of 

the country would not want to see it move to a sort 

of pariah status in the international community like 

that of Iran. U.S. officials, while putting pressure on a 

Brotherhood-dominated government, should also understand that not all elements of such a government 

would be inherently hostile to the United States, and 

while it would be difficult to return to the present era 

of close U.S.-Egyptian strategic relations, there might 

be a chance to at least contain such a regime’s more 

hostile ambitions. It should be remembered that the 

United States had cool-to-hostile relations with Egypt 

for most of the Nasser period, but eventually a new 
43

leader, Sadat, from the same regime, emerged and 

pursued certain polices that warmed the relationship. 

In any event, of all the scenarios outlined in this monograph, the radical Brotherhood regime scenario stands 

the least chance of succeeding because the Egyptian 

military is likely to hold firm and not split apart, precluding a Brotherhood take-over.

ENDNOTES

1. “Security Assistance: State and DOD Need to Assess How 

Foreign Military Financing Program for Egypt Achieves U.S. Foreign Policy and Security Goals,” Report to the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, Washington, DC: U.S. 

Government Accountability Office, April 2006, p. 17.

2. Ibid., pp. 2-18. On Bright Star, see www.globalsecurity.org/

military/ops/bright-star.htm.

3. Jeffrey Fleishman, “For Egypt, Mubarak’s Health and Successor are Guessing Games,” Los Angeles Times, August 24, 2010.

4. See Michele Dunne, “A Post-Pharaonic Egypt?” American 

Interest, September-October 2008.

5. Roger Owen, State, Power, and Politics in the Making of the 

Modern Middle East, London, UK, and New York: Routledge, 2008, 

pp. 178-185.

6. Imad Harb, “The Egyptian Military in Politics: Disengagement or Accommodation?” The Middle East Journal, Vol. 52, No. 2, 

Spring 2003, p. 278.

7. Ibid.

8. Ibid.

9. Ibid., p. 279.

10. Ibid., p. 282.
44

11. Steven A. Cook, Ruling But Not Governing: The Military and 

Political Development in Egypt, Algeria, and Turkey, Baltimore, MD: 

Johns Hopkins University Press, 2007, pp. 73-74.

12. Joseph Kechichian and Jeanne Nazimek, “Challenges to 

the Military in Egypt,” Middle East Policy, Vol. V, No. 3, September 1997, p. 128. See also Raymond Hinnebusch, “The Formation 

of the Contemporary Egyptian State from Nasser and Sadat to 

Mubarak,” in Ibrahim Oweiss, ed., The Political Economy of Contemporary Egypt, Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 

1990, pp. 204-209.

13. Thanassis Cambinis, “Succession Gives Army a Stiff Test 

in Egypt,” New York Times, September 11, 2010.

14. Harb, p. 285.

15. Cook, p. 74.

16. Cambinis.

17. Afaf Marsot, “Democratization in Egypt,” in Oweiss, ed., 

p. 292.

18. Stephen Roll, “Gamal Mubarak and the Discord in Egypt’s 

Ruling Elite,” Arab Reform Bulletin, September 1, 2010. See also 

Magdi Abdelhadi, “Egyptians look to military ‘savior,’“ BBC 

News, June 23, 2009.

19. Marwa Hussein, “Businessmen gain more leverage in parliament,” Al-Ahram Online, December 22, 2010.

20. Cook, pp. 88-92.

21. Michael Slackman, “Egypt’s Critics Have a Voice, but 

Never the Last Word,” New York Times, February 18, 2009.

22. Amr Hamzawy, “Egypt’s Legitimacy Crisis in the Aftermath of Flawed Elections,” Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, December 5, 2010, available from 

carnegie-mec.org/publications/?fa=42067&lang=en.
45

23. Gregory L. Aftandilian, “Looking Forward. An Integrated 

Strategy for Supporting Democracy and Human Rights in Egypt,” 

Project on Middle East Democracy, May 2009, p. 10, available from 

www.pomed.org/aftandilian-egypt-may-2009. See also Mona El-Nahas, “Pointless Parties,” Al-Ahram Weekly, January 1-6, 2009; and 

Slackman, February 19, 2009.

24. See “Egypt’s Elections: The Constitutional and Legal

Framework,” Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for

International Peace, available from carnegie-mec.orgpublications/?f

a=42067&lang=en.

25. Stephen Glain, “Egypt After Mubarak,” The Nation, April 

27, 2009.

26. “Gamal Mubarak: I Know Nothing About Campaigns 

Supporting Me as a Presidential Candidate and I’m not Interested 

in Them,” Al Shorouk (in Arabic), November 12, 2010.

27. Available from www.haaretz.com/news/international/

new-poster-campaign-backs-gamal-mubarak-for-egyptian-presidency-1.309522.

28. Jack Shenker, “Protests in Egypt against Gamal succession 

plans,” The Guardian, September 21, 2010. See also Heba Fahmy, 

“Police clamp down on anti-Gamal Mubarak protestors,” September 22, 2010, available from thedailynewsegypt.com.

29. Jeffrey Azarva, “Obama and Egypt’s Coming Succession 

Crisis, Middle East Review of International Affairs,” December 1, 

2008; and Amin Elmasry, “The Myth of Gamal Mubarak,” June 

26, 2010, available from aminelmasry.wordpress.com/2010/06/27/themyth-of-gamal-mubarak/.

30. Cambinis.

31. Interview with an Egyptian intellectual, March 24, 2010.

32. Adam Shatz, “Mubarak’s Last Breath,” London Review of 

Books, Vol. 32, No. 20, May 27, 2010.
46

33. Abigail Hauslohner, “As Egypt’s Mubarak Comes to 

Washington, Labor Unrest Surges,” Time, August 17, 2009.

34. As quoted in Ali E. Hillal Dessouki, “The Primacy of Economics: the Foreign Policy of Egypt,” Baghat Korany and Ali E. 

Hillal Dessouki, eds., The Foreign Policies of Arab States, Boulder, 

CO, and London, UK: Westview Press, 1984, p. 133.

35. Available from weekly.ahram.org/eg/print/2005/759/profile.

htm.

36. Ibid.

37. Shatz. See also Webster Brooks, “Egypt’s Succession Crisis: Mohamed El Baradei and Omar Suleiman Hold the Keys to 

the Presidency,” Booker Rising, April 3, 2010.

38. As quoted in Abdelhadi.

39. Available from www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east11169725.

40. Cook, p. 73.

41. See the comments by one of the few living Free Officers, 

Tharwat Okasha, in Abdelhadi. See also Tarek Masoud, “Is Gamal Mubarak the best hope for Egyptian democracy?” Foreign 

Policy, September 23, 2010.

42. As quoted in “Egypt needs a renaissance: Arab League 

chief,” Agence-France Press, October 20, 2009.

43. Interview with an Egyptian intellectual, February 9, 2007.

44. Available from egyptianchronicles.blogspot.com/2010/12/

elbaradei-in-upper-egypt-day-1.html.

45. Asharf Khalil, “Interview: El Baradei on quiet revolution, 

reform tactics, and religion,” Al Masry Al Youm, December 23, 

2010. See also Amr El-Shobaki, “Parties, Movements, and Prospects for Change in Egypt,” Arab Reform Bulletin, May 20, 2010.
47

46. In the 1980s, for example, even the wife of Defense Minister and Field Marshal Abu Ghazala wore the hegab. See Cook, p. 

87.

47. Stephen Gotowicki, “The Military In Egyptian Society,” in 

Phebe Marr, ed., Egypt at the Crossroads: Domestic Stability and Regional Role, Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 

1997, pp. 106-116.

48. Ana Belen Soage and Jorge Fuentelsaz Franganillo, “The 

Muslim Brothers in Egypt,” in Barry Rubin, ed., The Muslim Brotherhood. The Organization and Policies of a Global Islamist Movement, 

New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010, pp. 40-41.

49. Gilles Keppel, Muslim Extremism in Egypt: The Prophet and 

the Pharaoh, Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 2003, p. 93.

50. Aftandilian, pp. 6-9.

51. Michele Dunne and Amr Hamzawy, “From Too Much 

Egyptian Opposition to Too Little—and Legal Worries Besides,” 

Carnegie Commentary, December 13, 2010. See also “Egyptians 

Riot, Burn Cars, Claiming Vote Fraud,” Associated Press, November 29, 2010.

52. Amr Hamzawy and Michele Dunne, “Brotherhood Enters 

Elections in a Weakened State,” Carnegie Commentary, November 

15, 2010.

53. See the interesting argument put forward by Tarek 

Masoud, “Is Gamal Mubarak the best hope for Egyptian democracy?” Foreign Policy, September 23, 2010.

54. Michael Posner, “A chance for democracy in Egypt,” 

Washington Post op-ed, December 18, 2010.

55. Larbi Sadiki, “Eid Mubarak, Egypt! As Gamal Mubarak 

seeks his father’s throne, will hereditary succession again restrict democratization in an Arab state?” AlJazeera.net, November 25, 2010, available from english.aljazeera.net/indepth/opinion/2010/2010/11/201011237457181880.html.
48

56. See Chuck Freilich, “Inscrutable face of Egypt’s future,” 

Washington Times op-ed, July 23, 2010.

57. P. J. Vatikiotis, The Modern History of Egypt, London, UK: 

Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1969, pp. 315-411.

58. Posner.

59. “Ms. Rice’s Retreat,” Washington Post editorial, March 11, 

2008.
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