FEDERAL ELECTION COM’N v. AKINS 1777

Cite as 118 S.Ct. 1777 (1998)

524 U.S. 11

U.S., at 363, 32 S.Ct., at 800–801. By contrast, the counts at issue in this case allege

no conspiracy. They describe activity in

which Cabrales alone, untied to others, engaged.

S9In re Palliser concerned a man who sent

letters from New York to postmasters in

Connecticut, attempting to gain postage on

credit, in violation of then-applicable law.

The Court held that the defendant could be

prosecuted in Connecticut, where the mail he

addressed and dispatched was received. 136

U.S., at 266–268, 10 S.Ct., at 1036–1037. The

Palliser opinion simply recognizes that a

mailing to Connecticut is properly ranked as

an act completed in that State. Cf. 18 U.S.C.

§ 3237(a) (‘‘Any offense involving the use of

the mails TTT is a continuing offense and TTT

may be TTT prosecuted in any district from,

through, or into which such TTT mail matter

TTT moves.’’); United States v. Johnson, 323

U.S. 273, 275, 65 S.Ct. 249, 250, 89 L.Ed. 236

(1944) (consistent with the Constitution ‘‘an

illegal use of the mails TTT may subject the

user to prosecution in the district where he

sent the goods, or in the district of their

arrival, or in any intervening district’’). Cabrales, however, dispatched no missive from

one State into another. The counts before us

portray her and the money she deposited and

withdrew as moving inside Florida only.

Finally, the Government urges the efficiency of trying Cabrales in Missouri, because

evidence in that State, and not in Florida,

shows that the money Cabrales allegedly

laundered derived from unlawful activity.

Although recognizing that the venue requirement is principally a protection for the defendant, Reply Brief 10, the Government further

maintains that its convenience, and the interests of the community victimized by drug

dealers, merit consideration.

But if Cabrales is in fact linked to the

drug-trafficking activity, the Government is

not disarmed from showing that is the case.

She can be, and indeed has been, charged

with conspiring with the drug dealers in Missouri. If the Government can prove the

agreement it has alleged, Cabrales can be

prosecuted in Missouri for that confederacy,

and her money laundering in Florida could

be shown as overt acts in furtherance of the

conspiracy. See 18 U.S.C. § 371 (requiring

proof of an ‘‘act to effect the object of the

conspiracy’’). S10As the Government acknowledged, the difference in the end result

‘‘probably TTT would be negligible.’’ Tr. of

Oral Arg. 52; see United States Sentencing

Commission, Guidelines Manual § 1B1.3

(Nov. 1995) (providing for consideration of

‘‘Relevant Conduct’’ in determining sentence).

* * *

We hold that Missouri is not a place of

proper venue for the money-laundering offenses with which Cabrales is charged. For

the reasons stated, the judgment of the

Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit is

Affirmed.

,

524 U.S. 11, 141 L.Ed.2d 10

S11FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION,

Petitioner,

v.

James E. AKINS, Richard Curtiss, Paul

Findley, Robert J. Hanks, Andrew

Killgore, and Orin Parker.

No. 96–1590.

Argued Jan. 14, 1998.

Decided June 1, 1998.

A group of voters sought review of the

Federal Election Commission’s (FEC) decision dismissing their administrative complaint, which alleged that an organization was

a ‘‘political committee’’ under the Federal

Election Campaign Act (FECA), and thus,

should have been subject to registration and

reporting requirements. The United States

District Court for the District of Columbia,

June L. Green, J., granted summary judgment for the FEC, and the voters appealed.

After remanding for clarification, 1992 WL

183209, the Court of Appeals, District of
1778 118 SUPREME COURT REPORTER 524 U.S. 11

Columbia Circuit, en banc, 101 F.3d 731,

vacating an earlier panel decision, 66 F.3d

348, reversed. Certiorari was granted. The

Supreme Court, Justice Breyer, held that the

voters had standing to bring the suit.

Vacated and remanded.

Justice Scalia filed a dissenting opinion,

in which Justices O’Connor and Thomas

joined.

1. Elections O317.5

A group of voters satisfied prudential

standing requirements in an action in which

the voters alleged that an organization was a

‘‘political committee’’ under the Federal

Election Campaign Act (FECA), and thus,

subject to registration and reporting requirements; the injury of which the voters complained, their failure to obtain relevant information, was injury of a kind that FECA

sought to address. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, § 309(a)(1), (8)(A), as

amended, 2 U.S.C.A. § 437g(a)(1), (8)(A).

2. Federal Civil Procedure O103.2

The word ‘‘aggrieved’’ is historically associated with a congressional intent to cast

the standing net broadly—beyond the common-law interests and substantive statutory

rights upon which ‘‘prudential’’ standing traditionally rested.

 See publication Words and Phrases

for other judicial constructions and definitions.

3. Federal Civil Procedure O103.2

Prudential standing is satisfied when the

injury asserted by a plaintiff arguably falls

within the zone of interests to be protected

or regulated by the statute in question.

4. Elections O317.5

The inability of a group of voters to

obtain information, specifically, lists of donors to an organization and campaign-related

contributions and expenditures that the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) allegedly required the organization to make public,

satisfied the ‘‘injury in fact’’ requirement for

Article III standing, despite a claim that the

action involved only a ‘‘generalized grievance’’; there was no reason to doubt the

voters’ claim that the information would help

them and others to evaluate candidates for

public office, especially candidates who received assistance from the organization, and

to evaluate the role that the organization’s

financial assistance might play in a specific

election. U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 3, § 2, cl. 1;

Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971,

§ 309(a)(1), (8)(A), as amended, 2 U.S.C.A.

§ 437g(a)(1), (8)(A).

 See publication Words and Phrases

for other judicial constructions and definitions.

5. Federal Courts O12.1

Article III limits Congress’ grant of judicial power to ‘‘cases’’ or ‘‘controversies,’’

which means that a party asserting a claim

must show, inter alia, an injury in fact; this

requirement helps assure that courts will not

pass upon abstract, intellectual problems, but

will adjudicate concrete, living contests between adversaries. U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 3,

§ 2, cl. 1.

6. Federal Civil Procedure O103.2

The fact that a political forum may be

more readily available where an injury is

widely shared, while counseling against interpreting a statute as conferring standing, does

not, by itself, automatically disqualify an interest for purposes of Article III standing;

such an interest, where sufficiently concrete,

may count as an ‘‘injury in fact.’’ U.S.C.A.

Const. Art. 3, § 2, cl. 1.

7. Elections O317.5

The harm asserted by a group of voters,

an inability to obtain information that the

Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) allegedly required an organization to make

public, was fairly traceable to the Federal

Election Commission’s (FEC) decision that

the organization was not a ‘‘political committee’’ subject to the disclosure requirements of

the FECA, and the voters’ action could redress that injury, thus satisfying the traceability and redressability requirements for the

voters to have Article III standing to challenge the FEC’s decision, even though the

FEC may have decided, in the exercise of its

discretion, not to require the organization to

produce the information even if the FEC had

agreed with the voters’ view of the law.
FEDERAL ELECTION COM’N v. AKINS 1779

Cite as 118 S.Ct. 1777 (1998)

524 U.S. 12

U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 3, § 2, cl. 1; Federal

Election Campaign Act of 1971, § 309(a)(1),

(8)(A), as amended, 2 U.S.C.A. § 437g(a)(1),

(8)(A).

8. Administrative Law and Procedure

O668, 753

Although agencies often have discretion

about whether to take a particular action,

those adversely affected by a discretionary

agency decision generally have standing to

complain that the agency based its decision

upon an improper legal ground; if a reviewing court agrees that the agency misinterpreted the law, it will set aside the agency’s

action and remand the case, even though the

agency, like a new jury after a mistrial,

might later, in the exercise of its lawful

discretion, reach the same result for a different reason. U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 3, § 2, cl. 1.

9. Elections O317.5

A group of voters challenging the Federal Election Commission’s (FEC) decision that

an organization was not a ‘‘political committee’’ subject to the disclosure requirements of

the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA)

had standing despite a claim that the case

involved an agency’s decision not to undertake an enforcement action, an area generally not subject to judicial review. U.S.C.A.

Const. Art. 3, § 2, cl. 1; Federal Election

Campaign Act of 1971, § 309(a)(1), (8)(A), as

amended, 2 U.S.C.A. § 437g(a)(1), (8)(A).

Syllabus *

The Federal Election Campaign Act of

1971 (FECA) seeks to remedy corruption of

the political process. As relevant here, it

imposes extensive recordkeeping and disclosure requirements upon ‘‘political committee[s],’’ which include ‘‘any committee, club,

association or other group of persons which

receives’’ more than $1,000 in ‘‘contributions’’

or ‘‘which makes’’ more than $1,000 in ‘‘expenditures’’ in any given year, 2 U.S.C.

§ 431(4)(A) (emphasis added), ‘‘for the purpose of influencing any election for Federal

office,’’ §§ 431(8)(A)(i), (9)(A)(i). Assistance

given to help a particular candidate will not

count toward the $1,000 ‘‘expenditure’’ ceiling if it takes the form of a ‘‘communication’’

by a ‘‘membership organization or corporation’’ ‘‘to its members’’—as long as the organization is not ‘‘organized primarily for the

purpose of influencing [any individual’s]

nomination TTT or election.’’ § 431(9)(B)(iii).

Respondents, voters with views often opposed to those of the American Israel Public

Affairs Committee (AIPAC), filed a compliant with petitioner Federal Election Commission (FEC), asking the FEC to find that

AIPAC had violated FECA and, among other things, to order AIPAC to make public

the information that FECA demands of political committees. In dismissing the complaint, the FEC found that AIPAC’s communications fell outside FECA’s membership

communications exception. Nonetheless, it

concluded, AIPAC was not a ‘‘political committee’’ because, as an issue-oriented lobbying organization, its major purpose was not

the nomination or election of candidates.

The District Court granted the FEC summary judgment when it reviewed the determination, but the en banc Court of Appeals

reversed on the ground that the FEC’s major purpose test improperly interpreted

FECA’s definition of a political committee.

The case presents this Court with two questions: (1) whether respondents had standing

to challenge the FEC’s decision, and (2)

whether an organization falls outside

FECA’s definition of a ‘‘political committee’’

because ‘‘its major purpose’’ is not ‘‘the nomination or election of candidates.’’

Held:

1. Respondents, as voters seeking information to which they believe FECA entitles them, have standing to challenge the

FEC’s decision not to bring an enforcement

action. Pp. 1783–1787.

S12(a) Respondents satisfy prudential

standing requirements. FECA specifically

provides that ‘‘[a]ny person’’ who believes

FECA has been violated may file a complaint

with the FEC, § 437g(a)(1), and that ‘‘[a]ny

party aggrieved’’ by an FEC order dismiss-

* The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of

the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter

of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co.,

200 U.S. 321, 337, 26 S.Ct. 282, 287, 50 L.Ed.

499.
1780 118 SUPREME COURT REPORTER 524 U.S. 12

ing such party’s complaint may seek district

court review of the dismissal,

§ 437g(a)(8)(A). History associates the word

‘‘aggrieved’’ with a congressional intent to

cast the standing net broadly—beyond the

common-law interests and substantive statutory rights upon which ‘‘prudential’’ standing

traditionally rested. E.g., FCC v. Sanders

Brothers Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 60

S.Ct. 693, 84 L.Ed. 869. Moreover, respondents’ asserted injury—their failure to obtain

relevant information—is injury of a kind that

FECA seeks to address. Pp. 1783–1784.

(b) Respondents also satisfy constitutional standing requirements. Their inability

to obtain information that, they claim, FECA

requires AIPAC to make public meets the

genuine ‘‘injury in fact’’ requirement that

helps assure that the court will adjudicate

‘‘[a] concrete, living contest between adversaries.’’ Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433,

460, 59 S.Ct. 972, 985, 83 L.Ed. 1385 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). United States v.

Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 94 S.Ct. 2940, 41

L.Ed.2d 678, distinguished. The fact that

the harm at issue is widely shared does not

deprive Congress of constitutional power to

authorize its vindication in the federal courts

where the harm is concrete. See Public

Citizen v. Department of Justice, 491 U.S.

440, 449–450, 109 S.Ct. 2558, 2564–2565, 105

L.Ed.2d 377. The informational injury here,

directly related to voting, the most basic of

political rights, is sufficiently concrete. Respondents have also satisfied the remaining

two constitutional standing requirements:

The harm asserted is ‘‘fairly traceable’’ to the

FEC’s decision not to issue its complaint, and

the courts in this case can ‘‘redress’’ that

injury. Pp. 1784–1787.

(c) Finally, FECA explicitly indicates a

congressional intent to alter the traditional

view that agency enforcement decisions are

not subject to judicial review. Heckler v.

Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832, 105 S.Ct. 1649,

1656, 84 L.Ed.2d 714, distinguished. P. 1787.

2. Because of the unusual and complex

circumstances in which the case arises, the

second question presented cannot be addressed here, and the case must be remanded. After the FEC determined that many

persons belonging to AIPAC were not ‘‘members’’ under FEC regulations, the Court of

Appeals overturned those regulations in another case, in part because it thought they

defined membership organizations too narrowly in light of an organization’s First

Amendment right to communicate with its

members. The FEC’s new ‘‘membership organization’’ rules could significantly affect the

interpretative issue presented by Question

Two. Thus, the FEC should proceed to determine whether or not AIPAC’s expenditures qualify as ‘‘membership communications’’ under the new rules, and thereby fall

outside the scope of ‘‘expendiStures’’13 that

could qualify it as a ‘‘political committee.’’ If

it decides that the communications here do

not qualify, then the lower courts can still

evaluate the significance of the communicative context in which the case arises. If, on

the other hand, it decides that they do qualify, the matter will become moot. Pp. 1787–

1788.

101 F.3d 731, vacated and remanded.

BREYER, J., delivered the opinion of

the Court, in which REHNQUIST, C. J., and

STEVENS, KENNEDY, SOUTER, and

GINSBURG, JJ., joined. SCALIA, J., filed

a dissenting opinion, in which O’CONNOR

and THOMAS, JJ., joined, post, p. 1788.

Seth P. Waxman, Washington, DC, for petitioner.

Daniel M. Schember, Washington, DC, for

respondents.

For U.S. Supreme Court briefs, see:

1997 WL 523890 (Pet.Brief)

1997 WL 675443 (Reply.Brief)

Justice BREYER delivered the opinion of

the Court.

The Federal Election Commission (FEC)

has determined that the American Israel

Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) is not a

‘‘political committee’’ as defined by the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA

or Act), 86 Stat. 11, as amended, 2 U.S.C.

§ 431(4), and, for that reason, the FEC has

refused to require AIPAC to make disclosures regarding its membership, contribu-
FEDERAL ELECTION COM’N v. AKINS 1781

Cite as 118 S.Ct. 1777 (1998)

524 U.S. 15

tions, and expenditures that FECA would

otherwise require. We hold that respondents, a group of voters, have standing to

challenge the S14Commission’s determination

in court, and we remand this case for further

proceedings.

I

In light of our disposition of this case, we

believe it necessary to describe its procedural

background in some detail. As commonly

understood, the FECA seeks to remedy any

actual or perceived corruption of the political

process in several important ways. The Act

imposes limits upon the amounts that individuals, corporations, ‘‘political committees’’ (including political action committees), and political parties can contribute to a candidate

for federal political office. §§ 441a(a),

441a(b), 441b. The Act also imposes limits

on the amount these individuals or entities

can spend in coordination with a candidate.

(It treats these expenditures as ‘‘contributions to’’ a candidate for purposes of the Act.)

§ 441a(a)(7)(B)(i). As originally written, the

Act set limits upon the total amount that a

candidate could spend of his own money, and

upon the amounts that other individuals, corporations, and ‘‘political committees’’ could

spend independent of a candidate—though

the Court found that certain of these lastmentioned limitations violated the First

Amendment. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,

39–59, 96 S.Ct. 612, 644–654, 46 L.Ed.2d 659

(1976) (per curiam); Federal Election

Comm’n v. National Conservative Political

Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 497, 105 S.Ct.

1459, 1468–1469, 84 L.Ed.2d 455 (1985); cf.

Colorado Republican Federal Campaign

Comm. v. Federal Election Comm’n, 518

U.S. 604, 613–619, 116 S.Ct. 2309, 2314–2318,

135 L.Ed.2d 795 (1996) (opinion of BREYER,

J.).

This case concerns requirements in the Act

that extend beyond these better-known contribution and expenditure limitations. In

particular, the Act imposes extensive recordkeeping and disclosure requirements upon

groups that fall within the Act’s definition of

a ‘‘political committee.’’ Those groups must

register with the FEC, appoint a treasurer,

keep names and addresses of contributors,

track the amount and purpose of disbursements, and file complex FEC S15reports that

include lists of donors giving in excess of

$200 per year (often, these donors may be

the group’s members), contributions, expenditures, and any other disbursements irrespective of their purposes. §§ 432–434.

The Act’s use of the word ‘‘political committee’’ calls to mind the term ‘‘political action committee,’’ or ‘‘PAC,’’ a term that

normally refers to organizations that corporations or trade unions might establish for

the purpose of making contributions or expenditures that the Act would otherwise

prohibit. See §§ 431(4)(B), 441b. But, in

fact, the Act’s term ‘‘political committee’’

has a much broader scope. The Act states

that a ‘‘political committee’’ includes ‘‘any

committee, club, association or other group

of persons which receives’’ more than

$1,000 in ‘‘contributions’’ or ‘‘which makes’’

more than $1,000 in ‘‘expenditures’’ in any

given year. § 431(4)(A) (emphasis added).

This broad definition, however, is less universally encompassing than at first it may

seem, for later definitional subsections limit

its scope. The Act defines the key terms

‘‘contribution’’ and ‘‘expenditure’’ as covering

only those contributions and expenditures

that are made ‘‘for the purpose of influencing

any election for Federal office.’’

§§ 431(8)(A)(i), (9)(A)(i). Moreover, the Act

sets forth detailed categories of disbursements, loans, and assistance-in-kind that do

not count as a ‘‘contribution’’ or an ‘‘expenditure,’’ even when made for election-related

purposes. §§ 431(8)(B), (9)(B). In particular, assistance given to help a candidate will

not count toward the $1,000 ‘‘expenditure’’

ceiling that qualifies an organization as a

‘‘political committee’’ if it takes the form of a

‘‘communication’’ by an organization ‘‘to its

members’’—as long as the organization at

issue is a ‘‘membership organization or corporation’’ and it is not ‘‘organized primarily

for the purpose of influencing the nomination

TTT or electio[n] of any individual.’’

§ 431(9)(B)(iii).

This case arises out of an effort by respondents, a group of voters with views often
1782 118 SUPREME COURT REPORTER 524 U.S. 15

opposed to those of AIPAC, to S16persuade

the FEC to treat AIPAC as a ‘‘political committee.’’ Respondents filed a complaint with

the FEC, stating that AIPAC had made

more than $1,000 in qualifying ‘‘expenditures’’ per year, and thereby became a ‘‘political committee.’’ 1 Record, Exh. B, p. 4.

They added that AIPAC had violated the

FEC provisions requiring ‘‘political committee[s]’’ to register and to make public the

information about members, contributions,

and expenditures to which we have just referred. Id., at 2, 9–17. Respondents also

claimed that AIPAC had violated § 441b of

FECA, which prohibits corporate campaign

‘‘contribution[s]’’ and ‘‘expenditure[s].’’ Id.,

at 2, 16–17. They asked the FEC to find

that AIPAC had violated the Act, and, among

other things, to order AIPAC to make public

the information that FECA demands of a

‘‘political committee.’’ Id., at 33–34.

AIPAC asked the FEC to dismiss the complaint. AIPAC described itself as an issueoriented organization that seeks to maintain

friendship and promote goodwill between the

United States and Israel. App. 120; see also

Brief for AIPAC as Amicus Curiae (AIPAC

Brief) 1, 3. AIPAC conceded that it lobbies

elected officials and disseminates information

about candidates for public office. App. 43,

120; see also AIPAC Brief 6. But in responding to the § 441b charge, AIPAC denied that it had made the kinds of ‘‘expenditures’’ that matter for FECA purposes (i.e.,

the kinds of election-related expenditures

that corporations cannot make, and which

count as the kind of expenditures that, when

they exceed $1,000, qualify a group as a

‘‘political committee’’).

To put the matter more specifically: AIPAC focused on certain ‘‘expenditures’’ that

respondents had claimed were election related, such as the costs of meetings with candidates, the introduction of AIPAC members to

candidates, and the distribution of candidate

position papers. AIPAC said that its spending on such activities, even if election related,

fell within a relevant exception. They

amounted, said AIPAC, S17to communications

by a membership organization with its members, App. 164–166, which the Act exempts

from its definition of ‘‘expenditures,’’

§ 431(9)(B)(iii). In AIPAC’s view, these

communications therefore did not violate

§ 441b’s corporate expenditure prohibition.

2 Record, Doc. No. 19, pp. 2–6. (And, if

AIPAC was right, those expenditures would

not count towards the $1,000 ceiling on ‘‘expenditures’’ that might transform an ordinary issue-related group into a ‘‘political

committee.’’ § 431(4).)

The FEC’s General Counsel concluded

that, between 1983 and 1988, AIPAC had

indeed funded communications of the sort

described. The General Counsel said that

those expenditures were campaign related, in

that they amounted to advocating the election or defeat of particular candidates. App.

106–108. He added that these expenditures

were ‘‘likely to have crossed the $1,000

threshold.’’ Id., at 146. At the same time,

the FEC closed the door to AIPAC’s invocation of the ‘‘communications’’ exception. The

FEC said that, although it was a ‘‘close question,’’ these expenditures were not membership communications, because that exception

applies to a membership organization’s communications with its members, and most of

the persons who belonged to AIPAC did not

qualify as ‘‘members’’ for purposes of the

Act. App. to Pet. for Cert. 97a–98a; see also

App. 170–173. Still, given the closeness of

the issue, the FEC exercised its discretion

and decided not to proceed further with respect to the claimed ‘‘corporate contribution’’

violation. App. to Pet. for Cert. 98a.

The FEC’s determination that many of the

persons who belonged to AIPAC were not

‘‘members’’ effectively foreclosed any claim

that AIPAC’s communications did not count

as ‘‘expenditures’’ for purposes of determining whether it was a ‘‘political committee.’’

Since AIPAC’s activities fell outside the

‘‘membership communications’’ exception, AIPAC could not invoke that exception as a

way of escaping S18the scope of the Act’s term

‘‘political committee’’ and the Act’s disclosure

provisions, which that definition triggers.

The FEC nonetheless held that AIPAC

was not subject to the disclosure requirements, but for a different reason. In the

FEC’s view, the Act’s definition of ‘‘political

committee’’ includes only those organizations
FEDERAL ELECTION COM’N v. AKINS 1783

Cite as 118 S.Ct. 1777 (1998)

524 U.S. 20

that have as a ‘‘major purpose’’ the nomination or election of candidates. Cf. Buckley v.

Valeo, 424 U.S., at 79, 96 S.Ct., at 663. AIPAC, it added, was fundamentally an issueoriented lobbying organization, not a campaign-related organization, and hence AIPAC

fell outside the definition of a ‘‘political committee’’ regardless. App. 146. The FEC

consequently dismissed respondents’ complaint.

Respondents filed a petition in Federal

District Court seeking review of the FEC’s

determination dismissing their complaint.

See §§ 437g(a)(8)(A), 437g(a)(8)(C). The

District Court granted summary judgment

for the FEC, and a divided panel of the

Court of Appeals affirmed. 66 F.3d 348

(C.A.D.C.1995). The en banc Court of Appeals reversed, however, on the ground that

the FEC’s ‘‘major purpose’’ test improperly

interpreted the Act’s definition of a ‘‘political

committee.’’ 101 F.3d 731 (C.A.D.C.1996).

We granted the FEC’s petition for certiorari,

which contained the following two questions:

‘‘1. Whether respondents had standing to

challenge the Federal Election Commission’s decision not to bring an enforcement

action in this case.

‘‘2. Whether an organization that spends

more than $1,000 on contributions or coordinated expenditures in a calendar year,

but is neither controlled by a candidate nor

has its major purpose the nomination or

election of candidates, is a ‘political committee’ within the meaning of the [Act].’’

Brief for Petitioner I.

We shall answer the first of these questions,

but not the second.

S19II

[1] The Solicitor General argues that respondents lack standing to challenge the

FEC’s decision not to proceed against AIPAC. He claims that they have failed to

satisfy the ‘‘prudential’’ standing requirements upon which this Court has insisted.

See, e.g., National Credit Union Admin. v.

First Nat. Bank & Trust Co., 522 U.S. 479,

488, 118 S.Ct. 927, 933, 140 L.Ed.2d 1 (1998)

(NCUA ); Association of Data Processing

Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397

U.S. 150, 153, 90 S.Ct. 827, 829–830, 25

L.Ed.2d 184 (1970) (Data Processing ). He

adds that respondents have not shown that

they ‘‘suffe[r] injury in fact,’’ that their injury

is ‘‘fairly traceable’’ to the FEC’s decision, or

that a judicial decision in their favor would

‘‘redres[s]’’ the injury. E.g., Bennett v.

Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 162, 117 S.Ct. 1154,

1161, 137 L.Ed.2d 281 (1997) (internal quotation marks omitted); Lujan v. Defenders of

Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–561, 112 S.Ct.

2130, 2136–2137, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). In

his view, respondents’ District Court petition

consequently failed to meet Article III’s demand for a ‘‘case’’ or ‘‘controversy.’’

[2] We do not agree with the FEC’s

‘‘prudential standing’’ claim. Congress has

specifically provided in FECA that ‘‘[a]ny

person who believes a violation of this Act

TTT has occurred, may file a complaint with

the Commission.’’ § 437g(a)(1). It has added

that ‘‘[a]ny party aggrieved by an order of

the Commission dismissing a complaint filed

by such party TTT may file a petition’’ in

district court seeking review of that dismissal. § 437g(a)(8)(A). History associates the

word ‘‘aggrieved’’ with a congressional intent

to cast the standing net broadly—beyond the

common-law interests and substantive statutory rights upon which ‘‘prudential’’ standing

traditionally rested. Scripps–Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4, 62 S.Ct. 875, 86

L.Ed. 1229 (1942); FCC v. Sanders Brothers

Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 60 S.Ct. 693, 84

L.Ed. 869 (1940); Office of Communication

of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359

F.2d 994 (C.A.D.C.1966) (Burger, J.); Associated Industries of New York State v. Ickes,

134 F.2d 694 (C.A.2 1943) (Frank, J.). Cf.

Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.

§ 702 (stating that those ‘‘sufSfering20 legal

wrong’’ or ‘‘adversely affected or aggrieved

TTT within the meaning of a relevant statute’’

may seek judicial review of agency action).

[3] Moreover, prudential standing is satisfied when the injury asserted by a plaintiff

‘‘ ‘arguably [falls] within the zone of interests

to be protected or regulated by the statute

TTT in question.’ ’’ NCUA, supra, at 488, 118

S.Ct., at 933 (quoting Data Processing, su-
1784 118 SUPREME COURT REPORTER 524 U.S. 20

pra, at 153, 90 S.Ct., at 829–830). The injury

of which respondents complain—their failure

to obtain relevant information—is injury of a

kind that FECA seeks to address. Buckley,

supra, at 66–67, 96 S.Ct., at 657–658 (‘‘political committees’’ must disclose contributors

and disbursements to help voters understand

who provides which candidates with financial

support). We have found nothing in the Act

that suggests Congress intended to exclude

voters from the benefits of these provisions,

or otherwise to restrict standing, say, to political parties, candidates, or their committees.

Given the language of the statute and the

nature of the injury, we conclude that Congress, intending to protect voters such as

respondents from suffering the kind of injury

here at issue, intended to authorize this kind

of suit. Consequently, respondents satisfy

‘‘prudential’’ standing requirements. Cf.

Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 820, n. 3, 117

S.Ct. 2312, 2318, n. 3, 138 L.Ed.2d 849 (1997)

(explicit grant of authority to bring suit

‘‘eliminates any prudential standing limitations and significantly lessens the risk of

unwanted conflict with the Legislative

Branch’’).

[4, 5] Nor do we agree with the FEC or

the dissent that Congress lacks the constitutional power to authorize federal courts to

adjudicate this lawsuit. Article III, of

course, limits Congress’ grant of judicial

power to ‘‘cases’’ or ‘‘controversies.’’ That

limitation means that respondents must

show, among other things, an ‘‘injury in

fact’’—a requirement that helps assure that

courts will not ‘‘pass upon TTT abstract, intellectual problems,’’ but adjudicate ‘‘concrete,

living contest[s] between adversaries.’’ Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 460, 59 S.Ct.

972, 985, 83 L.Ed. 1385 (1939) (Frankfurter,

J., dissenting); see also Bennett, S21supra, at

167, 117 S.Ct., at 1163; Lujan, supra, at 560–

561, 112 S.Ct., at 2136–2137. In our view,

respondents here have suffered a genuine

‘‘injury in fact.’’

The ‘‘injury in fact’’ that respondents have

suffered consists of their inability to obtain

information—lists of AIPAC donors (who

are, according to AIPAC, its members), and

campaign-related contributions and expenditures—that, on respondents’ view of the law,

the statute requires that AIPAC make public. There is no reason to doubt their claim

that the information would help them (and

others to whom they would communicate it)

to evaluate candidates for public office, especially candidates who received assistance

from AIPAC, and to evaluate the role that

AIPAC’s financial assistance might play in a

specific election. Respondents’ injury consequently seems concrete and particular. Indeed, this Court has previously held that a

plaintiff suffers an ‘‘injury in fact’’ when the

plaintiff fails to obtain information which

must be publicly disclosed pursuant to a statute. Public Citizen v. Department of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 449, 109 S.Ct. 2558, 2564,

105 L.Ed.2d 377 (1989) (failure to obtain

information subject to disclosure under Federal Advisory Committee Act ‘‘constitutes a

sufficiently distinct injury to provide standing to sue’’). See also Havens Realty Corp.

v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 373–374, 102 S.Ct.

1114, 1121–1122, 71 L.Ed.2d 214 (1982) (deprivation of information about housing availability constitutes ‘‘specific injury’’ permitting standing).

The dissent refers to United States v.

Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 94 S.Ct. 2940, 41

L.Ed.2d 678 (1974), a case in which a plaintiff

sought information (details of Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) expenditures) to which,

he said, the Constitution’s Accounts Clause,

Art. I, § 9, cl. 7, entitled him. The Court

held that the plaintiff there lacked Article III

standing. 418 U.S., at 179–180, 94 S.Ct., at

2947–2948. The dissent says that Richardson and this case are ‘‘indistinguishable.’’

Post, at 1791. But as the parties’ briefs

suggest—for they do not mention Richardson—that case does not control the outcome

here.

Richardson ’s plaintiff claimed that a statute permitting the CIA to keep its expenditures nonpublic violated the AcScounts22

Clause, which requires that ‘‘a regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from time to time.’’ 418 U.S., at 167–

169, 94 S.Ct., at 2942–2943. The Court held

that the plaintiff lacked standing because

there was ‘‘no ‘logical nexus’ between the
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524 U.S. 23

[plaintiff’s] asserted status of taxpayer and

the claimed failure of the Congress to require the Executive to supply a more detailed report of the [CIA’s] expenditures.’’

Id., at 175, 94 S.Ct., at 2946; see also id., at

174, 94 S.Ct., at 2945 (quoting Flast v. Cohen,

392 U.S. 83, 102, 88 S.Ct. 1942, 1953, 20

L.Ed.2d 947 (1968), for the proposition that

in ‘‘taxpayer standing’’ cases, there must be

‘‘ ‘a logical nexus between the status asserted

and the claim sought to be adjudicated’ ’’).

In this case, however, the ‘‘logical nexus’’

inquiry is not relevant. Here, there is no

constitutional provision requiring the demonstration of the ‘‘nexus’’ the Court believed

must be shown in Richardson and Flast.

Rather, there is a statute which, as we previously pointed out, supra, at 1783, does seek

to protect individuals such as respondents

from the kind of harm they say they have

suffered, i.e., failing to receive particular information about campaign-related activities.

Cf. Richardson, 418 U.S., at 178, n. 11, 94

S.Ct., at 2947, n. 11.

The fact that the Court in Richardson

focused upon taxpayer standing, id., at 171–

178, 94 S.Ct., at 2943–2947, not voter standing, places that case at still a greater distance from the case before us. We are not

suggesting, as the dissent implies, post, at

1791, that Richardson would have come out

differently if only the plaintiff had asserted

his standing to sue as a voter, rather than as

a taxpayer. Faced with such an assertion,

the Richardson Court would simply have had

to consider whether ‘‘the Framers TTT ever

imagined that general directives [of the Constitution] TTT would be subject to enforcement by an individual citizen.’’ 418 U.S., at

178, n. 11, 94 S.Ct., at 2947, n. 11 (emphasis

added). But since that answer (like the answer to whether there was taxpayer standing

in Richardson ) would have rested in significant part upon the Court’s view of the Accounts Clause, it still would not control our

answer in this case. All this is S23to say that

the legal logic which critically determined

Richardson ’s outcome is beside the point

here.

The FEC’s strongest argument is its contention that this lawsuit involves only a ‘‘generalized grievance.’’ (Indeed, if Richardson

is relevant at all, it is because of its broad

discussion of this matter, see id., at 176–178,

94 S.Ct., at 2946–2947, not its basic rationale.) The FEC points out that respondents’

asserted harm (their failure to obtain information) is one which is ‘‘ ‘shared in substantially equal measure by all or a large class of

citizens.’ ’’ Brief for Petitioner 28 (quoting

Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499, 95 S.Ct.

2197, 2205, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975)). This

Court, the FEC adds, has often said that

‘‘generalized grievance[s]’’ are not the kinds

of harms that confer standing. Brief for

Petitioner 28; see also Lujan, 504 U.S., at

573–574, 112 S.Ct., at 2143–2144; Allen v.

Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 755–756, 104 S.Ct.

3315, 3326–3327, 82 L.Ed.2d 556 (1984); Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans

United for Separation of Church and State,

Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 475–479, 102 S.Ct. 752,

760–762, 70 L.Ed.2d 700 (1982); Richardson,

supra, at 176–178, 94 S.Ct., at 2946–2947;

Frothingham v. Mellon, decided with Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 487, 43 S.Ct.

597, 601, 67 L.Ed. 1078 (1923); Ex parte

Levitt, 302 U.S. 633, 634, 58 S.Ct. 1, 1, 82

L.Ed. 493 (1937) (per curiam). Whether

styled as a constitutional or prudential limit

on standing, the Court has sometimes determined that where large numbers of Americans suffer alike, the political process, rather

than the judicial process, may provide the

more appropriate remedy for a widely shared

grievance. Warth, supra, at 500, 95 S.Ct., at

2205–2206; Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm.

to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 222, 94 S.Ct.

2925, 2932–2933, 41 L.Ed.2d 706 (1974);

Richardson, 418 U.S., at 179, 94 S.Ct., at

2947–2948; id., at 188–189, 94 S.Ct., at 2952–

2953 (Powell, J., concurring); see also Flast,

supra, at 131, 88 S.Ct., at 1968–1969 (Harlan,

J., dissenting).

The kind of judicial language to which the

FEC points, however, invariably appears in

cases where the harm at issue is not only

widely shared, but is also of an abstract and

indefinite nature—for example, harm to the

‘‘common concern for obedience to law.’’ L.

Singer & Sons v. Union Pacific R. Co., 311

U.S. 295, 303, 61 S.Ct. 254, 258, 85 L.Ed. 198

(1940); see also Allen, supra, at 754, 104

S.Ct., at 3326; Schlesinger, supra, at 217, 94
1786 118 SUPREME COURT REPORTER 524 U.S. 23

S.Ct., at 2930. Cf. Lujan, supra, at 572–578,

112 S.Ct., at 2142–2146 (injury to interest in

seeing that certain procedures are folSlowed24

not normally sufficient by itself to confer

standing); Frothingham, supra, at 488, 43

S.Ct., at 601 (party may not merely assert

that ‘‘he suffers in some indefinite way in

common with people generally’’); Perkins v.

Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113, 125, 60 S.Ct.

869, 876, 84 L.Ed. 1108 (1940) (plaintiffs lack

standing because they have failed to show

injury to ‘‘a particular right of their own, as

distinguished from the public’s interest in the

administration of the law’’). The abstract

nature of the harm—for example, injury to

the interest in seeing that the law is

obeyed—deprives the case of the concrete

specificity that characterized those controversies which were ‘‘the traditional concern

of the courts at Westminster,’’ Coleman, 307

U.S., at 460, 59 S.Ct., at 985 (Frankfurter, J.,

dissenting); and which today prevents a

plaintiff from obtaining what would, in effect,

amount to an advisory opinion. Cf. Aetna

Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240–

241, 57 S.Ct. 461, 463–464, 81 L.Ed. 617

(1937).

[6] Often the fact that an interest is abstract and the fact that it is widely shared go

hand in hand. But their association is not

invariable, and where a harm is concrete,

though widely shared, the Court has found

‘‘injury in fact.’’ See Public Citizen, 491

U.S., at 449–450, 109 S.Ct., at 2564–2565

(‘‘The fact that other citizens or groups of

citizens might make the same complaint after

unsuccessfully demanding disclosure TTT

does not lessen [their] asserted injury’’).

Thus the fact that a political forum may be

more readily available where an injury is

widely shared (while counseling against, say,

interpreting a statute as conferring standing)

does not, by itself, automatically disqualify an

interest for Article III purposes. Such an

interest, where sufficiently concrete, may

count as an ‘‘injury in fact.’’ This conclusion

seems particularly obvious where (to use a

hypothetical example) large numbers of individuals suffer the same common-law injury

(say, a widespread mass tort), or where large

numbers of voters suffer interference with

voting rights conferred by law. Cf. Lujan,

supra, at 572, 112 S.Ct., at 2142–2143; Shaw

v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 905, 116 S.Ct. 1894,

1900–1901, 135 L.Ed.2d 207 (1996). We conclude that, similarly, the informational injury

at issue here, diSrectly25 related to voting, the

most basic of political rights, is sufficiently

concrete and specific such that the fact that

it is widely shared does not deprive Congress

of constitutional power to authorize its vindication in the federal courts.

[7, 8] Respondents have also satisfied the

remaining two constitutional standing requirements. The harm asserted is ‘‘fairly

traceable’’ to the FEC’s decision about which

respondents complain. Of course, as the

FEC points out, Brief for Petitioner 29–31, it

is possible that even had the FEC agreed

with respondents’ view of the law, it would

still have decided in the exercise of its discretion not to require AIPAC to produce the

information. Cf. App. to Pet. for Cert. 98a

(deciding to exercise prosecutorial discretion,

see Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 105

S.Ct. 1649, 84 L.Ed.2d 714 (1985), and ‘‘take

no further action’’ on § 441b allegation

against AIPAC). But that fact does not

destroy Article III ‘‘causation,’’ for we cannot

know that the FEC would have exercised its

prosecutorial discretion in this way. Agencies often have discretion about whether or

not to take a particular action. Yet those

adversely affected by a discretionary agency

decision generally have standing to complain

that the agency based its decision upon an

improper legal ground. See, e.g., Abbott

Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140,

87 S.Ct. 1507, 1510–1511, 18 L.Ed.2d 681

(1967) (discussing presumption of reviewability of agency action); Citizens to Preserve

Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402,

410, 91 S.Ct. 814, 820–821, 28 L.Ed.2d 136

(1971). If a reviewing court agrees that the

agency misinterpreted the law, it will set

aside the agency’s action and remand the

case—even though the agency (like a new

jury after a mistrial) might later, in the

exercise of its lawful discretion, reach the

same result for a different reason. SEC v.

Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 63 S.Ct. 454, 87

L.Ed. 626 (1943). Thus respondents’ ‘‘injury

in fact’’ is ‘‘fairly traceable’’ to the FEC’s

decision not to issue its complaint, even
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524 U.S. 28

though the FEC might reach the same result

exercising its discretionary powers lawfully.

For similar reasons, the courts in this case

can ‘‘redress’’ respondents’ ‘‘injury in fact.’’

[9] S26Finally, the FEC argues that we

should deny respondents standing because

this case involves an agency’s decision not to

undertake an enforcement action—an area

generally not subject to judicial review.

Brief for Petitioner 23, 29. In Heckler, this

Court noted that agency enforcement decisions ‘‘ha[ve] traditionally been ‘committed to

agency discretion,’ ’’ and concluded that Congress did not intend to alter that tradition in

enacting the APA. 470 U.S., at 832, 105

S.Ct., at 1656; cf. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (courts

will not review agency actions where ‘‘statutes preclude judicial review,’’ or where the

‘‘agency action is committed to agency discretion by law’’). We deal here with a statute that explicitly indicates the contrary.

In sum, respondents, as voters, have satisfied both prudential and constitutional

standing requirements. They may bring

this petition for a declaration that the FEC’s

dismissal of their complaint was unlawful.

See 2 U.S.C. § 437g(a)(8)(A).

III

The second question presented in the

FEC’s petition for certiorari is whether an

organization that otherwise satisfies the Act’s

definition of a ‘‘political committee,’’ and thus

is subject to its disclosure requirements,

nonetheless falls outside that definition because ‘‘its major purpose’’ is not ‘‘the nomination or election of candidates.’’ The question

arises because this Court, in Buckley, said:

‘‘To fulfill the purposes of the Act [the

term ‘political committee’] need only encompass organizations that are under the

control of a candidate or the major purpose of which is the nomination or election

of a candidate.’’ 424 U.S., at 79, 96 S.Ct.,

at 663.

The Court reiterated in Federal Election

Comm’n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life,

Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 252, n. 6, 107 S.Ct. 616,

625, n. 6, 93 L.Ed.2d 539 (1986):

‘‘[A]n entity subject to regulation as a ‘political committee’ under the Act is one that

is either ‘under the control S27of a candidate or the major purpose of which is the

nomination or election of a candidate.’ ’’

The FEC here interpreted this language as

narrowing the scope of the statutory term

‘‘political committee,’’ wherever applied.

And, as we have said, the FEC’s General

Counsel found that AIPAC fell outside that

definition because the nomination or election

of a candidate was not AIPAC’s ‘‘major purpose.’’ App. 146.

The en banc Court of Appeals disagreed

with the FEC. It read this Court’s narrowing construction of the term ‘‘political committee’’ as turning on the First Amendment

problems presented by regulation of ‘‘independent expenditures’’ (i.e., ‘‘an expenditure

by a person expressly advocating the election

or defeat of a clearly identified candidate

which is made without cooperation or consultation with any candidate,’’ § 431(17)). 101

F.3d, at 741. The Court of Appeals concluded that the language in this Court’s prior

decisions narrowing the definition of ‘‘political committee’’ did not apply where the special First Amendment ‘‘independent expenditure’’ problem did not exist. Id., at 742–743.

The Solicitor General argues that this

Court’s narrowing definition of ‘‘political

committee’’ applies not simply in the context

of independent expenditures, but across the

board. We cannot squarely address that

matter, however, because of the unusual and

complex circumstances in which this case

arises. As we previously mentioned, supra,

at 1782, the FEC considered a related question, namely, whether AIPAC was exempt

from § 441b’s prohibition of corporate campaign expenditures, on the grounds that the

so-called ‘‘expenditures’’ involved only AIPAC’s communications with its members.

The FEC held that the statute’s exception to

the ‘‘expenditure’’ definition for communications by a ‘‘membership organization’’ did not

apply because many of the persons who belonged to AIPAC were not ‘‘members’’ as

defined by FEC regulation. The FEC acknowledged, however, that this was a ‘‘close

question.’’ App. to Pet. for Cert. 98a; see

also App. S28144–146, 170–171. In particular,

the FEC thought that many of the persons
1788 118 SUPREME COURT REPORTER 524 U.S. 28

who belonged to AIPAC lacked sufficient

control of the organization’s policies to qualify as ‘‘members’’ for purposes of the Act.

A few months later, however, the Court of

Appeals overturned the FEC’s regulations

defining ‘‘members,’’ in part because that

court thought the regulations defined membership organizations too narrowly in light of

an organization’s ‘‘First Amendment right to

communicate with its ‘members.’ ’’ Chamber

of Commerce v. Federal Election Comm’n, 69

F.3d 600, 605 (C.A.D.C.1995). The FEC has

subsequently issued proposed rules redefining ‘‘members.’’ Under these rules, it is

quite possible that many of the persons who

belong to AIPAC would be considered ‘‘members.’’ If so, the communications here at

issue apparently would not count as the kind

of ‘‘expenditures’’ that can turn an organization into a ‘‘political committee,’’ and AIPAC

would fall outside the definition for that reason, rather than because of the ‘‘major purpose’’ test. 62 Fed.Reg. 66832 (1997) (proposed 11 CFR pts. 100 and 114).

The consequence for our consideration of

Question Two now is that the FEC’s new

rules defining ‘‘membership organization’’

could significantly affect the interpretive issue presented by this question. If the Court

of Appeals is right in saying that this Court’s

narrowing interpretation of ‘‘political committee’’ in Buckley reflected First Amendment

concerns, 101 F.3d, at 741, then whether the

‘‘membership communications’’ exception is

interpreted broadly or narrowly could affect

our evaluation of the Court of Appeals’ claim

that there is no constitutionally driven need

to apply Buckley ’s narrowing interpretation

in this context. The scope of the ‘‘membership communications’’ exception could also

affect our evaluation of the Solicitor General’s related argument that First Amendment

concerns (reflected in Buckley ’s narrowing

interpretation) are present whenever the Act

requires disclosure. In any event, it is difficult to decide the S29basic issue that Question

Two presents without considering the special

communicative nature of the ‘‘expenditures’’

here at issue, cf. United States v. CIO, 335

U.S. 106, 121, 68 S.Ct. 1349, 1356–1357, 92

L.Ed. 1849 (1948) (describing relation between membership communications and constitutionally protected rights of association).

And, a considered determination of the scope

of the statutory exemption that Congress

enacted to address membership communications would helpfully inform our consideration of the ‘‘major purpose’’ test.

The upshot, in our view, is that we should

permit the FEC to address, in the first instance, the issue presented by Question Two.

We can thereby take advantage of the relevant agency’s expertise, by allowing it to

develop a more precise rule that may dispose

of this case, or at a minimum, will aid the

Court in reaching a more informed conclusion. In our view, the FEC should proceed

to determine whether or not AIPAC’s expenditures qualify as ‘‘membership communications,’’ and thereby fall outside the scope of

‘‘expenditures’’ that could qualify it as a ‘‘political committee.’’ If the FEC decides that

despite its new rules, the communications

here do not qualify for this exception, then

the lower courts, in reconsidering respondents’ arguments, can still evaluate the significance of the communicative context in

which the case arises. If, on the other hand,

the FEC decides that AIPAC’s activities fall

within the ‘‘membership communications’’ exception, the matter will become moot.

For these reasons, the judgment of the

Court of Appeals is vacated, and the case is

remanded for further proceedings consistent

with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

Justice SCALIA, with whom Justice

O’CONNOR and Justice THOMAS join,

dissenting.

The provision of law at issue in this case is

an extraordinary one, conferring upon a private person the ability to bring an Executive

agency into court to compel its enforceSment30

of the law against a third party. Despite its

liberality, the Administrative Procedure Act

does not allow such suits, since enforcement

action is traditionally deemed ‘‘committed to

agency discretion by law.’’ 5 U.S.C.

§ 701(a)(2); Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821,

827–835, 105 S.Ct. 1649, 1653–1658, 84

L.Ed.2d 714 (1985). If provisions such as the

present one were commonplace, the role of
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the Executive Branch in our system of separated and equilibrated powers would be

greatly reduced, and that of the Judiciary

greatly expanded.

Because this provision is so extraordinary,

we should be particularly careful not to expand it beyond its fair meaning. In my view

the Court’s opinion does that. Indeed, it

expands the meaning beyond what the Constitution permits.

I

It is clear that the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA or Act) does not

intend that all persons filing complaints with

the Federal Election Commission have the

right to seek judicial review of the rejection

of their complaints. This is evident from the

fact that the Act permits a complaint to be

filed by ‘‘[a]ny person who believes a violation of this Act TTT has occurred,’’ 2 U.S.C.

§ 437g(a)(1) (emphasis added), but accords a

right to judicial relief only to ‘‘[a]ny party

aggrieved by an order of the Commission

dismissing a complaint filed by such party,’’

§ 437g(a)(8)(A) (emphasis added). The interpretation that the Court gives the latter

provision deprives it of almost all its limiting

force. Any voter can sue to compel the

agency to require registration of an entity as

a political committee, even though the ‘‘aggrievement’’ consists of nothing more than

the deprivation of access to information

whose public availability would have been

one of the consequences of registration.

This seems to me too much of a stretch.

It should be borne in mind that the agency

action complained of here is not the refusal

to make available information in its possession that the Act requires to be disclosed. A

person deSmanding31 provision of information

that the law requires the agency to furnish—

one demanding compliance with the Freedom

of Information Act or the Federal Advisory

Committee Act, for example—can reasonably

be described as being ‘‘aggrieved’’ by the

agency’s refusal to provide it. What the

respondents complain of in this suit, however, is not the refusal to provide information,

but the refusal (for an allegedly improper

reason) to commence an agency enforcement

action against a third person. That refusal

itself plainly does not render respondents

‘‘aggrieved’’ within the meaning of the Act,

for in that case there would have been no

reason for the Act to differentiate between

‘‘person’’ in subsection (a)(1) and ‘‘party aggrieved’’ in subsection (a)(8). Respondents

claim that each of them is elevated to the

special status of a ‘‘party aggrieved’’ by the

fact that the requested enforcement action (if

it was successful) would have had the effect,

among others, of placing certain information

in the agency’s possession, where respondents, along with everyone else in the world,

would have had access to it. It seems to me

most unlikely that the failure to produce that

effect—both a secondary consequence of

what respondents immediately seek, and a

consequence that affects respondents no

more and with no greater particularity than

it affects virtually the entire population—

would have been meant to set apart each

respondent as a ‘‘party aggrieved’’ (as opposed to just a rejected complainant) within

the meaning of the statute.

This conclusion is strengthened by the fact

that this citizen-suit provision was enacted

two years after this Court’s decision in United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 94

S.Ct. 2940, 41 L.Ed.2d 678 (1974), which, as I

shall discuss at greater length below, gave

Congress every reason to believe that a voter’s interest in information helpful to his

exercise of the franchise was constitutionally

inadequate to confer standing. Richardson

had said that a plaintiff’s complaint that the

Government was unlawfully depriving him of

information he needed to S32‘‘properly fulfill

his obligations as a member of the electorate

in voting’’ was ‘‘surely the kind of a generalized grievance’’ that does not state an Article

III case or controversy. Id., at 176, 94 S.Ct.,

at 2946.

And finally, a narrower reading of ‘‘party

aggrieved’’ is supported by the doctrine of

constitutional doubt, which counsels us to

interpret statutes, if possible, in such fashion

as to avoid grave constitutional questions.

See United States ex rel. Attorney General v.

Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366, 408,

29 S.Ct. 527, 535–536, 53 L.Ed. 836 (1909);

Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf
1790 118 SUPREME COURT REPORTER 524 U.S. 32

Coast Building & Constr. Trades Council,

485 U.S. 568, 575, 108 S.Ct. 1392, 1397–1398,

99 L.Ed.2d 645 (1988). As I proceed to

discuss, it is my view that the Court’s entertainment of the present suit violates Article

III. Even if one disagrees with that judgment, however, it is clear from Richardson

that the question is a close one, so that the

statute ought not be interpreted to present

it.

II

In Richardson, we dismissed for lack of

standing a suit whose ‘‘aggrievement’’ was

precisely the ‘‘aggrievement’’ respondents assert here: the Government’s unlawful refusal

to place information within the public domain. The only difference, in fact, is that the

aggrievement there was more direct, since

the Government already had the information

within its possession, whereas here respondents seek enforcement action that will bring

information within the Government’s possession and then require the information to be

made public. The plaintiff in Richardson

challenged the Government’s failure to disclose the expenditures of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), in alleged violation of

the constitutional requirement, Art. I, § 9, cl.

7, that ‘‘a regular Statement and Account of

the Receipts and Expenditures of all public

Money shall be published from time to time.’’

We held that such a claim was a nonjusticiable ‘‘generalized grievance’’ because ‘‘the impact on [plaintiff] is plainly undifSferentiated33

and common to all members of the public.’’

418 U.S., at 176–177, 94 S.Ct., at 2946 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

It was alleged in Richardson that the Government had denied a right conferred by the

Constitution, whereas respondents here assert a right conferred by statute—but of

course ‘‘there is absolutely no basis for making the Article III inquiry turn on the source

of the asserted right.’’ Lujan v. Defenders

of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 576, 112 S.Ct. 2130,

2144, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). The Court

today distinguishes Richardson on a different basis—a basis that reduces it from a

landmark constitutional holding to a curio.

According to the Court, ‘‘Richardson focused

upon taxpayer standing, TTT not voter standing.’’ Ante, at 1785. In addition to being a

silly distinction, given the weighty governmental purpose underlying the ‘‘generalized

grievance’’ prohibition—viz., to avoid ‘‘something in the nature of an Athenian democracy

or a New England town meeting to oversee

the conduct of the National Government by

means of lawsuits in federal courts,’’ 418

U.S., at 179, 94 S.Ct., at 2947—this is also a

distinction that the Court in Richardson

went out of its way explicitly to eliminate. It

is true enough that the narrow question presented in Richardson was ‘‘ ‘[w]hether a federal taxpayer has standing,’ ’’ id., at 167, n. 1,

94 S.Ct., at 2942, n. 1. But the Richardson

Court did not hold only, as the Court today

suggests, that the plaintiff failed to qualify

for the exception to the rule of no taxpayer

standing established by the ‘‘logical nexus’’

test of Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 88 S.Ct.

1942, 20 L.Ed.2d 947 (1968).* The plaintiff’s

complaint in Richardson had also alleged

that he was ‘‘ ‘a member of the electorate,’ ’’

418 U.S., at 167, n. 1, 94 S.Ct., at 2942, n. 1,

and he asserted injury in that capacity as

well. S34The Richardson opinion treated that

as fairly included within the taxpayer-standing question, or at least as plainly indistinguishable from it:

‘‘The respondent’s claim is that without

detailed information on CIA expenditures—and hence its activities—he cannot

intelligently follow the actions of Congress

or the Executive, nor can he properly fulfill his obligations as a member of the

electorate in voting for candidates seeking

national office.

‘‘This is surely the kind of a generalized

grievance described in both Frothingham

and Flast since the impact on him is plainly undifferentiated and common to all

members of the public.’’ Id., at 176–177,

* That holding was inescapable since, as the Court

made clear in another case handed down the

same day, ‘‘the Flast nexus test is not applicable

where the taxing and spending power is not

challenged’’ (as in Richardson it was not).

Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War,

418 U.S. 208, 225, n. 15, 94 S.Ct. 2925, 2934, n.

15, 41 L.Ed.2d 706 (1974).
FEDERAL ELECTION COM’N v. AKINS 1791

Cite as 118 S.Ct. 1777 (1998)

524 U.S. 36

94 S.Ct., at 2946 (citations and internal

quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added).

If Richardson left voter standing unaffected,

one must marvel at the unaccustomed ineptitude of the American Civil Liberties Union

Foundation, which litigated Richardson, in

not immediately refiling with an explicit voter-standing allegation. Fairly read, and applying a fair understanding of its important

purposes, Richardson is indistinguishable

from the present case.

The Court’s opinion asserts that our language disapproving generalized grievances

‘‘invariably appears in cases where the harm

at issue is not only widely shared, but is also

of an abstract and indefinite nature.’’ Ante,

at 1785. ‘‘Often,’’ the Court says, ‘‘the fact

that an interest is abstract and the fact that

it is widely shared go hand in hand. But

their association is not invariable, and where

a harm is concrete, though widely shared, the

Court has found ‘injury in fact.’ ’’ Ibid. If

that is so—if concrete generalized grievances

(like concrete particularized grievances) are

OK, and abstract generalized grievances (like

abstract particularized grievances) are bad—

one must wonder why we ever developed the

superfluous distinction between generalized

and particularized grievances at all. But of

course the Court is S35wrong to think that

generalized grievances have only concerned

us when they are abstract. One need go no

further than Richardson to prove that—unless the Court believes that deprivation of

information is an abstract injury, in which

event this case could be disposed of on that

much broader ground.

What is noticeably lacking in the Court’s

discussion of our generalized-grievance jurisprudence is all reference to two words that

have figured in it prominently: ‘‘particularized’’ and ‘‘undifferentiated.’’ See Richardson, supra, at 177, 94 S.Ct., at 2946–2947;

Lujan, 504 U.S., at 560, and n. 1, 112 S.Ct.,

at 2136, and n. 1. ‘‘Particularized’’ means

that ‘‘the injury must affect the plaintiff in a

personal and individual way.’’ Id., at 560, n.

1, 112 S.Ct., at 2136, n. 1. If the effect is

‘‘undifferentiated and common to all members of the public,’’ Richardson, supra, at

177, 94 S.Ct., at 2946 (internal quotation

marks and citations omitted), the plaintiff has

a ‘‘generalized grievance’’ that must be pursued by political, rather than judicial, means.

These terms explain why it is a gross oversimplification to reduce the concept of a generalized grievance to nothing more than ‘‘the

fact that [the grievance] is widely shared,’’

ante, at 1786, thereby enabling the concept to

be dismissed as a standing principle by such

examples as ‘‘large numbers of individuals

suffer[ing] the same common-law injury (say,

a widespread mass tort), or TTT large numbers of voters suffer[ing] interference with

voting rights conferred by law,’’ ibid. The

exemplified injuries are widely shared, to be

sure, but each individual suffers a particularized and differentiated harm. One tort victim suffers a burnt leg, another a burnt

arm—or even if both suffer burnt arms they

are different arms. One voter suffers the

deprivation of his franchise, another the deprivation of hers. With the generalized

grievance, on the other hand, the injury or

deprivation is not only widely shared but it is

undifferentiated. The harm caused to Mr.

Richardson by the alleged disregard of the

Statement-of-Accounts Clause was precisely

the same as the harm caused to everyone

else: unavailability of a deSscription36 of CIA

expenditures. Just as the (more indirect)

harm caused to Mr. Akins by the allegedly

unlawful failure to enforce FECA is precisely

the same as the harm caused to everyone

else: unavailability of a description of AIPAC’s activities.

The Constitution’s line of demarcation between the Executive power and the judicial

power presupposes a common understanding

of the type of interest needed to sustain a

‘‘case or controversy’’ against the Executive

in the courts. A system in which the citizenry at large could sue to compel Executive

compliance with the law would be a system in

which the courts, rather than the President,

are given the primary responsibility to ‘‘take

Care that the Laws be faithfully executed,’’

Art. II, § 3. We do not have such a system

because the common understanding of the

interest necessary to sustain suit has included the requirement, affirmed in Richardson,

that the complained-of injury be particularized and differentiated, rather than common

to all the electorate. When the Executive
1792 118 SUPREME COURT REPORTER 524 U.S. 36

can be directed by the courts, at the instance

of any voter, to remedy a deprivation that

affects the entire electorate in precisely the

same way—and particularly when that deprivation (here, the unavailability of information) is one inseverable part of a larger enforcement scheme—there has occurred a

shift of political responsibility to a branch

designed not to protect the public at large

but to protect individual rights. ‘‘To permit

Congress to convert the undifferentiated

public interest in executive officers’ compliance with the law into an ‘individual right’

vindicable in the courts is to permit Congress

to transfer from the President to the courts

the Chief Executive’s most important constitutional dutyTTTT’’ Lujan, supra, at 577, 112

S.Ct., at 2145. If today’s decision is correct,

it is within the power of Congress to authorize any interested person to manage

(through the courts) the Executive’s enforcement of any law that includes a requirement

for the filing and public availability of a piece

of paper. S37This is not the system we have

had, and is not the system we should desire.

 * * *

Because this statute should not be interpreted to confer upon the entire electorate

the power to invoke judicial direction of prosecutions, and because if it is so interpreted

the statute unconstitutionally transfers from

the Executive to the courts the responsibility

to ‘‘take Care that the Laws be faithfully

executed,’’ Art. II, § 3, I respectfully dissent.

,