FFDERAI. KLIICTION COMMISSION 

WASI llNCJION. D.C. 

IVfEMORANDUM 

TO: 

FROM: 

Patricia C. Orrock 

Chief Compliance Officer 

Tliomas E. Hintermister 

Assistant Staff Director 

Adav Noti ^ 

Associate General Counsel 

Policy Division 

-it 

JAN 1 0 2017 

L,oi-enzo Holloway 

Assistant General Com 

for Compliance Advice 

Joshua Blume •JF> 

Attorney 

SUBJECT: Resubmitted Dral^ Final Audit Report - Ted Cruz for Senate (LRA # 976) 

I. INTRODUCTION 

The Office of General Counsel has reviewed this resubmitted Draft Final Audit Report 

("DFAR") on the Ted Cruz for Senate committee (the "Committee"). The DFAR contains one 

finding, Reporting and Disclosure of Candidate Loans, upon which we comment. We also 

comment upon the Audit Division's decision to revise and resubmit the DFAR, with which we 

agree. If you have any questions, please contact Joshua Blume, the attorney assigned to this 

audit. 

II. RESUBMISSION OF DFAR 

Before addressing the substantive legal issues presented by the DFAR, we address a 

procedural issue raised by the submission of this DFAR, which is actually a revised version of a 

previous DFAR. The Audit Division revised the DFAR to include new infonnation received at 

the Audit Division Recommendation Memorandum ("ADRM") stage of the audit. The ADRM 

is specifically designed, pursuant to Directive 70, as a vehicle fiir the Audit Division to make 

recommendations regarding any new legal or factual issues that are raised after the DFAR has 
Comments on the Draft Final Audit Repoil 

Ted Cruz for Senate (LRA 976) 

Page 2 

been prepared and served upon the audited comtnltiee. Here, however, new factual issues were 

raised by the Committee following its receipt of the original DFAR, and, as discussed below, 

these factual issues in turn raise new legal questions. In light of this unusual po.sture, the 

procedural issue we address is whether the. next step of the audit should be to proceed 

immediately to the ADRM stage of the audit, or whether, given the number and complexity of 

the issues raised, the Committee ought to be provided with a copy of the revised DFAR and an 

opportunity to respond to it. Wc believe that the appropriate course of action is to revise the 

DFAR and allow the Committee to respond to it. 

The prior version of the DFAR, which the Committee received, concluded that Senator 

Cruz (the "Candidate") failed to convert the balance of certain outstanding loans exceeding 

$250,000 that he made to his authorized committee to contributions in accordance with 11 C.F.R. 

§ 1 J6.11(c). The Audit Division has now revised this version and expanded the finding to 

include a failure-io-report aspect because the Committee revealed for the first lime that a portion 

of the Candidate's loans that had been reported as loans from personal funds were not in fkct 

derived from personal funds, but instead derived from borrowing from financial institutions. 

While Directive 70 is silent on the issue of whether the Committee should be given an 

opportunity to respond to the revised DFAR, allowing the Committee to respond is consistent 

with the directive's underlying principle of providing full and fair notice to audited committees 

of potential findings.' Furthermore, because Directive 70 contemplates that any significant 

factual or legal issues that arise from the DFAR will be addressed at the subsequent ADRM stage 

-- in which the audited committee does not participate — the DFAR represents the final 

opportunity for the Commission to obtain the Committee's views on the new information prior to 

considering the ADRM. See Commission Directive No. 70, Apr. 26,2011, at 3. 

' in two previous audits, those of the Los Angeles County Democratic Central Committee ("LACDCC") and 

of the Canseco for Congress ("Canseco") committee, the Audit Division, either at the Commission's behest, in the 

former case, or upon its own initiative, in the latter case, revised its audit report in the light of new information. In 

the(|asec£theLACDCCj^B|^B^B^^H||^H^H^B^BHBpH||||BViHIHHViH 

changes to the findings in the raorl. 

fhc LACDCC also submitted comments in response to the Proposed Final 

Audit Report ("PFAR"). See Comments in Response to [PFARJ on [I.,ACDCC] (A09/07) from Stephen J. Kaufman, 

dated Oct. 17.2012. In the Canseco matter, the Audit Division resubmitted the DFAR after correcting certain 

factual errors and revising its calculations but, again, did not alter the substance of the findings or present any new 
Comtnenis on ilic Draft Final Audit Report 

Ted Cruz for Senate (LRA 976) 

Page 3 

HI. REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE OF CANDIDATE LOANS 

This finding pertains (o loans totaling SI,430,000 that Candidate made to the .Committee. 

Although at an earlier stage of this audit, the Candidate averred that all of the loans derived from 

his personal funds as that term is defined in 11 C.F.R. § 100.33, in fact $1,064,000 of the 

.$1,430,000 in loans derived instead from the proceeds of funds that the Candidate borrowed 

from two financial institutions. Specitlcally, to finance his campaign the Candidate borrowed 

approximately $800,000 from Goldman Sachs in the form of a "margin loan"^ and approximately 

$264,000 from Citibank in the form of revolving credit. The remaining $366,000 came from the 

Candidate's personal funds. 

The Audit Division concludes that the Candidate and the Committee breached two 

regulations connected with the Candidate's loans. First, the Candidate and the Committee failed 

to convert the amount of the loans exceeding $250,000 that remained unpaid more than twenty 

days after the general election to contributions and to report them as such. See 11 C.F.R. 

§ 116.11(c). Second, the Audit Division concludes that the Candidate and the Committee failed 

to report properly that portion of the loans derived from the aforementioned borrowing from 

financial institutions, which, based on the Candidate's prior representation, had previously been 

disclosed as personal. See 11 C.F.R. § 104.3(d) (prescribing rules for reporting loans from 

financial institutions). 

Our comments below address three issues: (I) whether the new loan information affects 

the Audit Division's previous conclusion that the Candidate should have converted his personal 

loans to contributions and disclosed them as such; (2) whether the loans from Goldman Sachs 

and Citibank were impermissible contributions; and (3) whether the Candidate's spouse made a 

contribution because the assets used to secure one of the loans were jointly held by the Candidate 

and his spouse. 

A. The New Loan Information Does Not Affect the Prior Finding Made Under 

n C.F.R. § 116.11 

First, the requirement that a Candidate convert outstanding loan balances exceeding 

$250,000 to contributions applies only to the Candidate's "personal loans," which are defined in 

the applicable regulation to include loans made by candidates to their committees with personal 

funds as that term is defined in 11 C.F.R. § 100.33, as well as loans made by other entities to a 

candidate's authorized committee that are endorsed or guaranteed by the candidate, or are 

otherwise secured by the candidate's personal funds. 11 C.F.R. § 116.11 (a). Given that the 

- Sue Office of Investor Education and Advocacy, U.S. Securities Exchange Commission, SEC Pub. No. 156, 

Investor Bulletin: Understanding Margin Accounts I, 3 ("A "margin account" is a type of brokerage account in 

which the broker-dealer lcnd.s the investor cash, using the account as collateral, to purchase securities... In addition 

10 purchasing securities, some brokers may allow you to use margin loans for a variety of personal or business 

financial purposes, such as buying real estate, paying off personal credit, or providing capital. Using margin loans 

for non-securities purposes DOES NOT change the way these loans work. These loans are still secured by the 

securities in your margin account and thus subject to the same risks associated with purchasing securities on margin 

described above.") (emphasis in original). 
Cornitienls on the DraH Final Audit Report 

Ted (?niz for Senate (LRA 976) 

Page A 

candidate borrowed some of the funds that he loaned to the Committee, this raises a question as 

to whether these portions of the Candidate's loans to the Committee may still be deemed the 

"personal loans" of the Candidate and therefore subject to the rule. 

We conclude that the Candidate's loans to the Committee were "personal loans" of the 

Candidate tor the purpose of applying section 116.11(c). The relevant part of the definition of 

"personal loans" in section 116.11(a) includes two elements: (1) loans made by other entities to 

a candidate's authorized committee; (2) that are either endorsed or guaranteed by the candidate 

or are secured with or by the candidate's personal funds. 

The Candidate's loan from Goldman Sachs satisfied these two elements. First, the 

Committee received the loan. Although Goldman Sachs loaned funds directly to the Candidate 

rather than to the Committee, the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, as amended ("FECA") 

and Commission regulations provide that candidates who accept loans of funds from third parties 

for use in connection with their elections accept such loans as agents of their authorized 

committees. See 52 U.S.C. § 30102(e)(2); 11 C.F.R. § 102.7(d). See also Advisory Opinion 

1985-33 (Collins) (receipt by candidate of loans from third party for use in campaign reportable 

by authorized committee and itemized as loans from lender to committee rather than from 

candidate to committee). Second, the Goldman Sachs loan was secured by the Candidate's 

personal property in the form of his investment assets, for this is the nature of the margin loan. 

The Citibank loan, unlike the Goldman Sachs loan, does not appear to have been secured 

by the Candidate's personal property. Nevertheless, the candidate as the borrower is, according 

to his contract with Citibank, personally liable for the loan. As a matter of law, he promised to 

repay the loan in exchange tor the bank's promise to pay him the loan proceeds. The 

Commission's intent in promulgating section 116.11(a) was to ensure that loans for which the 

candidate is personally liable are subject to the regulation.^ Thus neither the new information 

about the true nature of the Goldman Sachs loan nor that about the Citibank loan requires the 

Audit Division to revise its conclusion regarding the Committee's compliance with the terms of 

11 C.F.R. § 116.11. 

B. The Audit Division Should Apply 11 C.F.R. § 100.83 to Determine Whether 

Goldman Sachs and Citibank Made Impermissible Contributions 

Since Goldman Sachs and Citibank were the actual sources for a portion of the loans, the 

second question raised is whether the loans were impermissible contributions from Goldman 

' See Explanation and Justiricatiun for Interim Final Rules on Increa-sed Contribution and Coordinated Party 

Expenditure Limits for Candidates Opposing Self-Financed Candidates, 68 Fed. Reg. 3970, 3973 (Jan. 27, 2003) 

("This definition (of "personal funds" in section 116.11(a)] ensures that loans to authorized committees that are used 

in connection with the candidate's campaign for election, for which the candidate is personally liable, are subject to 

the provisions of 11 C.F.R. 116.11."). See also E&.J, discussion at 3974 (.slating "[t]he definition of "personal loans' 

in new 11 CFR 116.11(a) is based on a broad interpretation of the opening phrase "[ajny candidate who incurs 

personal loans" in [S2 U.S.C. 30116(i)] to mean loans made by candidates to their authorized committees" and 

rejecting alternative interpretation of definition to mean loans made lo candidates.). 
Comments on the Draft Final Audit Report 

Ted Cruz for Senate (LRA 976) 

Pages 

Sachs and Citibank. The FECA and Commission regulations define the term "contribution" to 

include loans to catididates or committees. See 52 U.S.C. § 30101(8)(A)(i); 11 C.F.R. 

§ 100.52(b). As the FECA and CommLssion iiegulations also prohibit corporations from making 

contributions, 52 U.S.C. § 30118(a); 11 C.F.R. § 114.2(b), the loans to the Candidate would 

therefore be impermissible, unless an exception were to apply. Here, FECA and Commission 

regulations exempt from the definition of "contribution" loans by banks and certain other types 

of financial institutions to candidates or Ihcir authorized committees when the loans meet certain 

criteria. .9ee52 U.S.C. § 30101(8)(B)(vii); 11 C.F.R. §§ 100.82. 100.83. 

The exemption criteria that apply to traditional bank loans differ from, and are more 

stringent than, the criteria that apply to brokerage loans and lines of credit to candidates. 

Compare 11 C.F.R. § 100.82(a), wUh § 100.83(a); see also Brokerage Loans and Lines of Credit, 

67 Fed. Reg. 38353 (June 4,2002) (noting that "conventional bank loans" are subject to § 100.82 

and lines of credit are subject to § 100.83).'' Accordingly, it is necessary to determine which 

regulation applies to each loan. Based upon our review of the terms of the loan agreements in 

each case, we conclude that both the Goldman Sachs margin loan and the Citibank revolving 

credit loan are best viewed as lines of credit. That a margin loan appears to function in this 

manner is indicated by the definition of "margin account," a type of account.used in connection 

with margin loans. The margin account is "[a] brokerage account that allows an investor to buy 

or sell securities on credit, with the securities usu[ally] serving as collateral for the broker's 

loan."'' Account -- margin account. Black's Law Dictionary (10"' ed. 2014). The terms of the 

Account Agreement indicate that when a margin loan is used to pay for securities,^ the securities 

purchased serve as the collateral. 

VncfThe CitibankTevoiving line ot credit is a "line of 

credit" because it allowed the Candidate to borrow amounts needed at any lime, 

amount. 

[Accordingly, the Audit Division 

I criteria set forth in 11 C.F.R. § 100.83(a) to determine whether the loans were 

impermissible contributions. See 11 C.F.R. § 100.82(f) (providing that § 100.82 does not apply 

to loans governed by § 100.83). 

* SpccificBlly, whereas traditional bank loan.s must bear the usual and customary Interest rate of the lending 

institution for the category of loan involved; be made on a basis that assures repayment; be evidenced by a written 

instrument; and be subject to a due date or amortization schedule, 11 C.F.R. § 100.82(a), a brokerage loan or line of 

credit need only be made in accordance with applicable law and under commercially reasonable terms by a person 

who makes such loans in the normal course of thai person's business, 11 C.F.R. 1; 100.83(a). 

' See also IS U.S.C. § 78g(a) (requiring Board of Governors of Federal Reserve System to promulgate rules 

and regulations governing the exten.sion of credit in connection with margin accounts). 

' As noted in footnote 2, supra, some brokerage firms may permit borrowers to borrow on margin for a 

purpose not related to the purchasing of securities. This appears to have been the case here. While the language of 

the agreement speaks of using the margin loan to purchase securities, we arc assuming, in the absence of 

information indicating otherwise, that the securities in the investment account served as the collateral even if the 

loan was not used to purchase additional securities. 
Comnienis on the DraH Final Audit Report 

Ted Cruz for Senate (LRA 976) 

Page 6 

C. We Lack SulTicieiit Information at This Time to Determine Whether the 

Candidate's Spouse Made a Contribution Through the Use of the Goldman 

Sachs Account 

The final issue is whether the Candidate's spouse contributed to the campaign because 

the spouse jointly held the securities that were used as collateral for the margin loan. 

See 11 C.F.R. § 100.S2(b)(4) (spouse not considered contributor to campaign if value of 

candidate's share of jointly owned property equals or exceeds amount of loan used for 

campaign). The candidate's share of assets that a candidate jointly owns with his or her spouse 

is normally determined by the instrument of conveyance or ownership of the asset; however, if 

the instrument or conveyance or ownership does not allocate a specific share of the asset to the 

candidate, then a value equivalent to one-half of the value of the asset is imputed to the candidate 

as his or her share.' See 11 C.F.R. § 100.33(c). In the context of a joint bank account, however, 

the Commission deems all of the funds in an account held jointly with a spouse to be the 

candidate's personal funds if the state law governing such accounts provides that both spouses 

owning the account have equal and complete access to its funds." See Addendum to Legal 

Analysis on Proposed Interim Audit Report on Friends for Menor (LRA 732) - Contributions 

from Personal Funds in Jointly Held Bank Accounts (July 2,2008) ("Joint bank account 

exception"). See also OGC Comments on Bauer for President 2000, Inc. - Proposed Audit 

Report (LRA #543), May 6,2002, at 5-6. 

This issue presents a number of legal and factual issues that we are not able to resolve at 

this time.^ Having said this, wc are also aware of the time-sensitivity of this audit. Given its age 

' We asked the Audit Division whether the Candidate in tact used more than SO percent of the value ot the 

margin account as collateral Tor the margin loan. Our understanding from the auditors is that for most of the lime 

the Candidate's use of the margin account for this purpose did not exceed SO percent, but that it did exceed SO 

percent once for a period of two to three days. On this occasion, the Candidate used 76 percent. If the general rule 

imputing one-half of the value of the joint asset to each spouse were to be applied to these lacl.s, then the spouse 

would have made a contribution on this one occasion. 11 C.F.R. § 100.33(c)(2). This result would obtain regardless 

of the fact that Texas is a community property jurisdiction. See Candidate's Use of Property in which Spouse has an 

Interest, 48 Fed. Reg. 19019, 19020 (Apr. 27, 1983) ("This 50% rule would apply in community property states, as 

well as in non-community property states."). But see infra, n.9. 

' I'he distinction between joint bank accounts and other assets jointly held has been made for many years. 

See OGC Memorandum to Commission on Revision of Regulations Pertaining to Candidate's Use of Property in 

Which Spouse Has an Interest, Agenda Doc. " 81-181, Oct. 30, 1981, at 7 n.3. The Commission has continued to 

apply this distinction in enforcement and audit matters. See MURs 2292 and 3505. See aho OGC Comments on 

Bauer for-President 2000, Inc. - Proposed Audit Report (LRA //543), May 6,2002, at 6 (discussing history of joint 

bank account exception). 

' One legal Issue involves whether the joint bank account exception, which appears to have been applied in 

the past to traditional checking or savings accounts, also would apply to the funds in the margin account. Based 

upon our review, we arc inclined toward the conclusion that the exception could apply because the funds in the 

account are held by the spouses in a similar manner to the manner in which spouses hold funds in a traditional joint 

bank account - here, as joint tenants with right of survivorship. See OGC Comments on Bauer for President 2000, 

Inc. - Proposed Audit Report (LRA ii 543), May 6,2002, at 6. Further, Texas law defines a "joint account" as an 

account payable on request to one or more of two or more parlies - a factor deemed relevant in the Menor matter. 

See Vernon's Texas Statutes and Codes Annotated ("V.T.C.A."),' Estates Code, § 113.004(2); Addendum to Legal 
Comments 911 the Dral\ Final Audit Repon 

Ted Cruz lor Senate (LRA 976) 

Page? 

and its current procedural posture, we invite the Audit Division to decide, at its discretion, 

whether it wishes to seek the additional information described in footnote 8 from the Committee 

or from other sources to determine whether the Candidate's spouse made a contribution. 

Analysis on Proposed fnterim Audit Report on Friends Ibr Menor (LRA 732), at 2. Neverthele.ss, even if the joint 

bank account exception could theoretically apply to the funds in the margin account, we lack sufTicient factual 

information to resolve the ultimate question. This is because the state nf Texas treats property acquired during the 

lile of a marriage as community property, and, further, provides fur subiype.s of community property, namely, "sole 

management" and "joint management" community property. See, V.T.C.A., Family Code, §§ 3.001-3.003 (defining 

"separate property" specifically; defining "community property" as all property other than separate property 

acquired by either spouse during marriage, and announcing rcbunable presumption that property acquired (luring 

marriage is community property); see o/so V.T.C.A., Family Code, §§3.101-3.102 (providing for sole management 

of separate property, and classifying community property as sole or joint management). At this juncture, we lack 

sufficient information about the specific sources of the funds that compose the margin account that would enable us 

to classify it definitively as sole management or joint management, or some other type of community property, or 

indeed as .separate property. We do not know, for example, whether the funds rcpreseniing investment.s in the 

margin account were funds generated solely by one spouse before or during the marriage, or whether they were 

acquired by the spouses during rhe marriage. Further complicating the matter is that under I'exas law, parties to 

joint accounts do not own the accounts equally, but only in proportion to the net contributions by each party to the 

sums on deposit unless there is clear and convincing evidence otherwise. V.T.C.A., Fstates Code, § 113.102. Wc 

do not know whether the spouses had a dilTcrcnl intent, or whether they purported to alter any putative joint 

community property regime governing the margin account, and, if so, whether such an alteration would have been 

legally cflcctivc. See V.T.C.A, Family Code, § 3.102(c). That the spouses designated the account in the Account 

Agreement as a joint tenancy account with right of survivorship even though a "community property" designation 

was also available may indicate such an intent, however wc are uncertain whether, under Texas law, that would have 

sufficed to nullify any applicable presumption that the account was community prop 
FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION 

WASiiiNC:iifHi).(:.2(MW 

February 24,2017 

MEMORANDUM 

TO; 

FROM: 

SUBJECT: 

Patricia C. Orrock 

Chief Compliance Officer 

Thomas E. Hintermister 

Assistant Staff Director 

Adav Noti 

Associate General Counsel 

Policy Division 

Lorenzo Holloway ^ 

Assistant General C^n^ 

for Compliance Advice 

Joshua Blume ^ 

Attorney " 

Supplemental Comments on Resubmitted Draft Final Audit Report - Ted Cruz tor 

Senate (LRA # 976) 

I. INTRODUCTION 

The Office of General Counsel issued comments on a resubmitted Draft Final Audit 

Report ("DFAR") on the Ted Cruz for Senate committee (the "Committee"). Following the 

submission of those comments, the Audit Division performed an additional analysis relating to 

one issue addressed in our comments and, as a result of this analysis, we are submitting these 

supplemental comments for the Audit Division's consideration. The additional analysis and 

these ensuing supplemental comments relate to the issue of whether the Candidate's spouse 

made a contribution to the Committee when the Candidate utilized part of the value of a 
Supplemental Comments on the Resubmitted Draft'Final Audit Report 

Ted Cruz tor Senate (LRA 976) 

Page 2 

Goldman Sachs margin account jointly owned by the Candidate and his spouse as the basis for a 

loan to the Committee. 

II. NO FINDING THAT THE SPOUSE MADE A CONTRIBUTION WOULD BE 

MADE EVEN IF 50 PERCENT RULE WERE TO APPLY 

The Candidate borrowed approximately $800,000 from Goldman Sachs using the value 

of a margin account that he owned Jointly with his spouse. This raises the question whether the 

Candidate's spouse contributed to the campaign because the spouse jointly held the securities 

that were used as collateral for the margin loan. See 11 C.F.R. § 100.S2(b)(4) (spouse not 

considered contributor to campaign if value of candidate's share of jointly owned property 

equals or exceeds amount of loan used for campaign). The candidate's share of assets that a 

candidate jointly owns with his or her spouse is normally determined by the instrument of 

conveyance or ownership of the asset; however, if the instrument or conveyance or ownership 

does not allocate a specific share of the asset to the candidate, then a value equivalent to one-half 

of the value of the asset is imputed to the candidate as his or her share. See 11 C.F.R. 

§ 100.33(c). In the context of a joint bank account, however, the Commission deems all of the 

funds in an account held jointly with a spouse to be the candidate's personal funds if the state 

law governing such accounts provides that both spouses owning the account have equal and 

complete access to its funds.' See Addendum to Legal Analysis on Proposed Interim Audit 

Report on Friends for Menor (LRA 732) - Contributions from Personal Funds in Jointly Held 

Bank Accounts (July 2,2008) ("joint bank account exception"). See also OGC Comments on 

Bauer for President 2000, Inc. - Proposed Audit Report (LRA #543), May 6,2002, at 5-6. 

In our previous comments, we raised a question with the Audit Division concerning 

whether it should obtain additional information from the Committee to resolve the question of 

whether a spousal contribution was made based upon an analysis that assumed that the joint bank 

account exception would apply. Following receipt of our comments, we met with the auditors, at 

which time the auditors advised us of the results of an analysis we had requested that it perform 

under 11 C.F.R. § 100.33(c). This analysis imputed half the value of the account to the candidate 

and to the spouse respectively and compared the candidate's hypothesized 50 percent share of 

the account to the values of the loans obtained using the margin account as collateral. 

11 C.F.R. § 100.52(b)(4). The auditors indicated that there was one occasion during which an 

amount exceeding 50 percent of the value of the account was utilized in this manner, thereby 

potentially resulting in an excessive contribution by the spouse under this analysis. On this 

occasion, however, the Committee apparently repaid the loan amount that might, under the 50 

percent analysis, have included an excessive spousal contribution to the candidate in fewer than 

' The distinction between joint bank accounts and other assets jointly held has been made for many years. 

See OGC Memorandum to Commission on Revision of Regulations Pertaining to Candidate's Use of Property in 

Which Spouse Has an Interest, Agenda Doc. # 81-181, Oct. 30,1981, at 7 n.3. The Commission has continu^ to 

apply this distinction in enforcement and audit matters. See MURs 2292 and 3505. See also OGC Comments on 

Bauer for President 2000, Inc. - Proposed Audit Report (LRA 0543), May 6,2002, at 6 (discussing history of joint 

bank account exception). 
Supplemental Comments on the Resubmitted DraR Final Audit Report 

Ted Cruz for Senate (LRA 976) 

Page 3 

60 days. As a result, the Audit Division would not include a finding on this issue in the DFAR 

based on the SO percent analysis. 

We concur with this approach, because the return of the potentially excessive 

contribution included in the loan occurred within a period of time that, by analogy, is allotted to 

treasurers in receipt of facially excessive contributions to refund contributions pursuant to 

11 C.F.R. § 103.3(b)(3): that is, a period of fewer than 60 days. Thus, any excessive contribution 

that would have resulted from an application of the SO percent rule would not have resulted in a 

Finding that the spouse made a contribution. Because no finding would result even using the 

application of section 100.33 that would be least advantageous to the Committee, we do not 

deem it necessary to consider this issue further.