COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Benton, Willis and Elder 

Argued at Richmond, Virginia 

ROBERT THRIFT, BARBARA THRIFT 

 AND NANCY ANN THRIFT 

 OPINION BY 

v. Record No. 0015-96-2 JUDGE JERE M. H. WILLIS, JR. 

 AUGUST 6, 1996 

ALAN BALDWIN AND CHARON BALDWIN 

 FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF NORTHUMBERLAND COUNTY 

Joseph E. Spruill, Jr., Judge 

 George W. Townsend, III, for appellants. 

 Charles J. McKerns, Jr. (McKerns & McKerns, 

on brief), for appellees. 

 Dale and Nancy Thrift were the parents of five children: 

Nancy Ann, Dale, Christy, Brenda, and Kelly. The eldest child, 

Nancy Ann, was adopted by her paternal grandparents, Robert and 

Barbara Thrift. On January 10, 1990, the Department of Social 

Services removed the four younger children from their parents' 

home. Dale, Christy, and Brenda were adopted by Alan and Charon 

Baldwin. The youngest child, Kelly, was adopted by another 

family and is not involved in this appeal. 

 Robert and Barbara Thrift, biological paternal grandparents, 

and Nancy Ann Thrift, biological sibling, (hereinafter referred 

to collectively as the Thrifts) petitioned the juvenile and 

domestic relations district court for visitation with the three 

children adopted by the Baldwins (the children). The juvenile 

and domestic relations district court granted visitation and the 

Baldwins appealed to the trial court, which concluded "that the 
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adoption proceedings which severed the tie between parent and 

child also severed the tie between grandparent and grandchild. 

. . . [The children's] legal ties to Mr. and Mrs. Thrift were 

dissolved. Therefore, the petitioners do not have standing to 

maintain this proceeding." The trial court did not consider the 

case on the merits, but dismissed the Thrifts' petition for lack 

of standing. We hold that this ruling was erroneous and reverse 

the judgment of the trial court. 

 Code § 16.1-241(A) provides, in pertinent part: 

 The authority of the juvenile court to adjudicate 

matters involving the . . . visitation . . . of a child 

shall not be limited to the consideration of petitions 

filed by a mother, father or legal guardian but shall 

include petitions filed at any time by any party with a 

legitimate interest therein. A party with a legitimate 

interest shall be broadly construed and shall include, 

but not be limited to, grandparents and other blood 

relatives and family members. 

 The statute enjoins a broad construction of the term "[a] 

party with a legitimate interest." We hold that this term means 

not only a party possessed of legal rights with respect to the 

child, but also any party having a cognizable and reasonable 

interest in maintaining a close relationship with the child. The 

statute expressly provides that the term shall include 

"grandparents and other blood relatives." Although the adoption 

of the children by the Baldwins extinguished the Thrifts' legal 

grandparental and sibling relationship, see Code § 63.1-233; see

also Cage v. Harrisonburg Dep't of Social Services, 13 Va. App. 

246, 410 S.E.2d 405 (1991), the blood relationship continues. 
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Code § 16.1-241(A) expressly confers standing to seek visitation. 

 This holding addresses only standing to seek visitation, not 

the right to enjoy visitation. The determination of visitation 

must be made by a properly constituted court, upon a hearing on 

the merits, in accordance with well-established standards. 

 We hold that the trial court erred in ruling that the 

Thrifts lacked standing to seek visitation and in dismissing 

their petition on that ground without a hearing on the merits. 

Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and 

remand the case to it with direction to reinstate the petition 

and to consider the matter on its merits. 

 Reversed and remanded.