ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE

George C. Patrick Sharon Funcheon Murphy 

Crown Point, IN Indianapolis, IN 

______________________________________________________________________________ 

In the 

Indiana Supreme Court 

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No. 93S02-0511-EX-605 

KRSTE PRENTOSKI, 

 Appellant (Plaintiff below), 

v. 

FIVE STAR PAINTING, INC., 

 Appellee (Defendant below). 

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Appeal from the Full Worker’s Compensation Board, No. C-144134 

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On Petition To Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 93A02-0410-EX-815 

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November 23, 2005 

Per curiam. 

 A Single Hearing Member of the Worker’s Compensation Board dismissed Krste Prentoski’s second application for adjustment of benefits after finding it untimely under Indiana Code 

Section 22-3-3-27(c). That subsection provides, “[A]pplications for increased permanent partial 

impairment are barred unless filed within one (1) year from the last day for which compensation 

was paid[.]” Ind. Code § 22-3-3-27(c) (emphasis added). The Full Board affirmed. Later, the 

Court of Appeals affirmed after agreeing the application was untimely because it was not filed 

within one year after the last date for which compensation was paid, even though it was filed 
within one year after the date on which Prentoski received a lump-sum payment from his employer’s insurance carrier for permanent partial impairment benefits that the Board determined 

were owed to him. Prentoski v. Five Star Painting, Inc., 827 N.E.2d 98, 102-03 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2005). Prentoski petitioned to transfer. 

A long line of Court of Appeals opinions has interpreted the language in Indiana Code 

Section 22-3-3-27(c) and similarly worded predecessor statutes to mean that the limitations period begins running on the last date “for which” compensation was paid rather than on some 

other date. See, e.g., Gibson v. Indus. Bd., 176 Ind. App. 489, 376 N.E.2d 502, 504 (1978) 

(“[T]he Legislature did not choose a specified period of time after the date of the injury, or after 

the date of the award, or after the last payment of compensation. . . . Rather, the Legislature 

chose the last day for which compensation was paid.”); Lambert v. Powers, 76 Ind. App. 77, 131 

N.E. 420, 421 (1921) (“Time for filing such application does not run from the date of the award 

. . . but from the end of the compensation period fixed by the award.”). However, as Judge Sullivan notes in his concurring opinion, a few opinions have initially quoted the statute correctly 

but then referred imprecisely to “the last date that [the employee] received” benefits under an 

earlier award, Luz v. Hart Schaffner & Marx, 771 N.E.2d 1230, 1234 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. 

denied; or “‘the last day on which compensation was paid[.]’” Halteman Swim Club v. Duguid, 

757 N.E.2d 1017, 1020 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (quoting Gregg v. Sun Oil Co., 180 Ind. App. 379, 

388 N.E.2d 588, 590 (1979); Berry v. Anaconda Corp., 534 N.E.2d 250, 253 (Ind. Ct. App. 

1989) (same). 

To clarify, we agree the Court of Appeals’ analysis of the statute of limitations in the present case correctly focused on the last date “for which” compensation was paid rather than the 

last date “on which” compensation was paid. We therefore grant transfer, adopt that portion of 

the opinion of the Court of Appeals that addresses the statute of limitations, and incorporate it by 

reference. See Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A)(1). We summarily affirm the part of the opinion of the 

Court of Appeals that addresses whether a hearing was required on Five Star’s motion to dismiss. 

See App. R. 58(A)(2). 

All Justices concur. 

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