TaiWilEVIE11111111NM I BEINNEERMIKM! - 

Second, appellant claims that the district court abused its 

discretion at the sentencing hearing by basing its sentencing decision on 

an emotional reaction to the case and appellant. Specifically, appellant 

argues that the district court's comments demonstrate that the imposed 

sentence was based upon the judge's own discomfort and disgust and the 

fact that the judge was offended by appellant. Appellant did not object 

below, therefore we review the district court's conduct for plain error 

affecting appellant's substantial rights. See Green v. State, 119 Nev. 542, 

545, 80 P.3d 93, 95 (2003). "A judge is presumed to be impartial." Rippo 

v. State, 113 Nev. 1239, 1248, 946 P.2d 1017, 1023 (1997). In reviewing 

the record, we conclude that the district court's comments show that the 

district judge was offended by the facts of the crime committed, and, while 

harsh, the comments do not demonstrate that the district court judge had 

closed his mind to the presentation of all the evidence and do not rise to 

the level of "actual bias or prejudice" under NRS 1.230(1). See Cameron v. 

State, 114 Nev. 1281, 1283, 968 P.2d 1169, 1171 (1998) ("[R]emarks of a 

judge made in the context of a court proceeding are not considered 

indicative of improper bias or prejudice unless they show that the judge 

has closed his or her mind to the presentation of all the evidence."). 

Therefore, we conclude that appellant failed to demonstrate plain error. 

Third, appellant contends that his sentence of life 

imprisonment without the possibility of parole is unconstitutionally 

excessive and an abuse of discretion given his lack of significant criminal 

history. We have consistently afforded the district court wide discretion in 

its sentencing decision, see, e.g., Houk v. State, 103 Nev. 659, 664, 747 P.2d 

1376, 1379 (1987), and will refrain from interfering with the sentence 

imposed by the district court "[s]o long as the record does not demonstrate 

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prejudice resulting from consideration of information or accusations 

founded on facts supported only by impalpable or highly suspect evidence," 

Silks v. State, 92 Nev. 91, 94, 545 P.2d 1159, 1161 (1976). And, regardless 

of its severity, a sentence that is within the statutory limits is not "'cruel 

and unusual punishment unless the statute fixing punishment is 

unconstitutional or the sentence is so unreasonably disproportionate to 

the offense as to shock the conscience." Blume v. State, 112 Nev. 472, 475, 

915 P.2d 282, 284 (1996) (quoting CuIverson v. State, 95 Nev. 433, 435, 596 

P.2d 220, 221-22 (1979)); see also Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 

1000-01 (1991) (plurality opinion) (explaining that Eighth Amendment 

does not require strict proportionality between crime and sentence; it 

forbids only an extreme sentence that is grossly disproportionate to the 

crime). 

We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion 

at sentencing and the sentence imposed is not unconstitutionally excessive 

or disproportionate to the crime. The sentence imposed is within the 

• statutory parameters, see NRS 200.030(4), and appellant does not allege 

that the statute is unconstitutional. We are not convinced by appellant's 

argument that the district court relied on impalpable or highly suspect 

evidence when it noticed and commented on appellant's actions in 

response to a question, and appellant's sentence is not so grossly 

disproportionate to his crime as to constitute cruel and unusual 

punishment. 

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MIIMMUEZIES 
J. 

Having considered appellant's claims and concluded that no 

relief is warranted, we 

ORDER the judgment of conviction AFFIRMED. 

Hardesty 

Parraguirre 

Cherry 

cc: Hon. David A. Hardy, District Judge 

Washoe County Public Defender 

Attorney General/Carson City 

Washoe County District Attorney 

Washoe District Court Clerk 

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