IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

CAMPAIGN LEGAL CENTER and

DEMOCRACY 21,

 Plaintiffs,

v. 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION,

 Defendant,

RIGHT TO RISE SUPER PAC, INC. 

 Intervenor-Defendant.

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Case No. 1:20-cv-00730 

Hon. Christopher R. Cooper 

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RIGHT TO RISE SUPER PAC, INC.’S RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO

PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ......................................................................................................... ii

I. INTRODUCTION...................................................................................................................... 1

II. BACKGROUND....................................................................................................................... 1

A. Plaintiffs’ Administrative Complaints................................................................... 1

B. Plaintiffs Commence this Action........................................................................... 2

C. The Court’s February 19, 2021 Memorandum Opinion and Order ....................... 2

D. The Court’s December 30, 2021 Memorandum Opinion and Order ..................... 3

III. LEGAL STANDARD.............................................................................................................. 5

IV. ARGUMENT........................................................................................................................... 6

A. Plaintiffs are required to show Article III standing regardless of their

standing theory....................................................................................................... 6

B. Plaintiffs have not suffered a legally cognizable injury sufficient to show

organizational standing. ......................................................................................... 6

C. The injury alleged by Plaintiffs cannot be redressed by this Court. .................... 13

V. CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................................... 16

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Action All. of Senior Citizens of Greater Philadelphia v. Heckler, 789 F.2d 931 (D.C. Cir. 

1986) ........................................................................................................................................ 9 

Alabama Power Co. v. Gorsuch, 672 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1982) .................................................... 14 

* Common Cause v. FEC, 108 F.3d 413 (D.C. Cir. 1997) ....................................................passim

Competitive Enter. Inst. v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 901 F.2d 107 (D.C. Cir. 

1990) ........................................................................................................................................ 9 

Douglas v. D.C. Hous. Auth., 306 F.R.D. 1 ................................................................................... 5 

Found. on Econ. Trends v. Watkins, 794 F. Supp. 395 (D.D.C. 1992).......................................... 8 

Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167 (2000) ............... 13 

Green v. AFL CIO, 811 F. Supp. 2d 250 (D.D.C. 2011) ............................................................... 5 

Hall v. CIA, 437 F.3d 94 (D.C. Cir. 2006) ..................................................................................... 5 

Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 (1982)) ............................................................... 6 

In re Sealed Case, 237 F.3d 657 (D.C. Cir. 2001) ....................................................................... 15 

* Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992)) ........................................................passim

* People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 797 F.3d 1087 (D.C.

Cir. 2015) ................................................................................................................................. 9 

Pub. Citizen, Inc. v. FERC, 839 F.3d 1165 (D.C. Cir. 2016) ...................................................... 10 

S. Pac. Commc’ns Co. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 740 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ........................... 5 

Schmidt v. U.S. Capitol Police Bd., 826 F. Supp. 2d 59 (D.D.C. 2011) ........................................ 6 

Webb v. D.C., 146 F.3d 964 (D.C. Cir. 1998).......................................................................... 6, 13 

* Wertheimer v. FEC, 268 F.3d 1070 (D.C. Cir. 2001) ............................................................3, 11 

Rules

Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1) and (6) ..................................................................................................... 5 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 61 ........................................................................................................................... 5 

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Statutes and Regulations

11 C.F.R. § 111.21(a)................................................................................................................... 15

52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(12) ....................................................................................................... 14, 15

52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(8)(A) ........................................................................................................... 2 

52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(8)(C) ................................................................................................... 14 - 16 

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I. INTRODUCTION

The Court dismissed Plaintiffs’ case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because 

Plaintiffs failed to demonstrate an informational injury sufficient to establish Article III standing. 

Plaintiffs now seek reconsideration claiming that they have standing under a different theory: 

organizational standing. But this theory also fails, for both old reasons and new. 

As for the old, Plaintiffs claim an organizational injury based on allegedly insufficient 

disclosures made by the respondents under FECA—the same theory that the Court already rejected 

because Plaintiffs’ contentions as to missing disclosures were “unsupported inferences”

insufficient to satisfy Plaintiffs’ burden to show standing. ECF No. 33, at 10. While that conclusion 

was made in the context of Plaintiffs’ informational-injury theory, it applies equally to Plaintiffs’ 

organizational-standing theory, too. 

The remainder of Plaintiffs’ arguments fail, albeit for different reasons. While Plaintiffs

also claim organizational injury based on lack of access to the FEC’s MUR file, they fail to show 

they have a right to that information, or even that the lack of that information renders their activities 

infeasible. Further, Plaintiffs fail to even address the redressability element of their organizationalstanding theory, a theory that also fails on redressability grounds because the claimed injury—

deprivation of information in the FEC’s MUR file—cannot be redressed by this Court in this case.

Accordingly, to the extent the Court dismissed Plaintiffs’ case without expressly 

addressing their organizational-standing theory, such inadvertence was harmless and this Court 

should deny Plaintiffs’ motion. 

II. BACKGROUND

A. Plaintiffs’ Administrative Complaints

In March 2015, Plaintiffs filed an administrative complaint with the FEC alleging that 

Governor Bush and “Right to Rise PAC” violated FECA by failing to comply with FECA’s 

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“testing-the-waters” disclosure requirements, candidate-contribution limits, and candidate 

registration and reporting requirements. Compl. Ex. B. Mar. Admin. Compl., ECF No. 1-2. Two 

months later, Plaintiffs filed a second administrative complaint, this time alleging that Governor 

Bush and Right to Rise violated FECA by failing to comply with the “testing-the-waters” 

restrictions, candidate-contribution limits, and so-called “soft money” prohibitions. Plaintiffs also 

alleged that Governor Bush established, financed, maintained, and controlled Right to Rise in 

violation of FECA. Compl. Ex. A., May Admin. Compl. ECF No. 1-1. Plaintiffs’ two FEC 

complaints were collectively designated by the FEC as Matter Under Review (“MUR”) 6927.

B. Plaintiffs Commence this Action

Plaintiffs then filed the present action, seeking injunctive and declaratory relief to compel 

the FEC to take up their complaints under 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(8)(A). Compl. ¶ 2. Specifically, 

Plaintiffs alleged the FEC’s inaction had deprived them of information regarding the extent of 

coordination between Right to Rise and the Bush campaign, id. ¶ 9, and the extent of Governor 

Bush’s campaign spending, id. ¶ 10. Plaintiffs also alleged organizational injury from the inaction, 

claiming the allegedly inadequate disclosure of those same campaign finance activities caused 

Plaintiffs to divert funds and resources from other organizational needs. Id. ¶¶ 19, 22. 

The FEC has not publicly acted on MUR 6927 and never appeared in this action. Right to 

Rise moved to intervene in June 2020, which this Court promptly allowed. Right to Rise then 

moved to dismiss Plaintiffs’ complaint for lack of standing under Rule 12(b)(1) and, with respect 

to Plaintiffs’ Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) claim, for failure to state a claim upon which 

relief can be granted under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

C. The Court’s February 19, 2021 Memorandum Opinion and Order

On February 19, 2021, this Court issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order granting most 

of Right to Rise’s motion to dismiss. ECF No. 17. Specifically, the Court concluded Plaintiffs’ 

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complaint failed to state a claim under the APA. Id. 18-19. As for Plaintiffs’ FECA claims, the 

Court held that Wertheimer v. FEC, 268 F.3d 1070, 1075 (D.C. Cir. 2001), precluded holding that 

Plaintiffs had standing to pursue their FECA claim as it relates to any alleged coordinated spending 

between Governor Bush and Right to Rise. Id. 12-15.

The Court reached a different conclusion regarding Plaintiffs’ claim that Governor Bush 

“failed to disclose months of spending stemming from the testing-the-waters period of his nascent 

candidacy.” Id. 10-12. There, the Court said that Plaintiffs did have Article III standing due to 

informational injury sustained during the five-month period from January 2015 to June 2015, while 

Governor Bush was testing-the-waters. The Court reasoned that “[w]hether Bush did, in fact, begin 

testing the waters in January 2015 is a merits issue,” and that “[d]eprivation of the disclosures that 

FECA requires for that disputed period constitutes an informational injury to sustain Article III 

standing.” Id. 11 (emphasis added).

D. The Court’s December 30, 2021 Memorandum Opinion and Order

Two weeks later, Right to Rise sought reconsideration of that aspect of the Court’s 

February 19, 2021 decision finding that Plaintiffs had standing to pursue their claim. ECF No. 19.

The crux of Right to Rise’s argument was that the Court had applied the incorrect legal standard 

to its motion, and that the decision reached the wrong result on standing because all the information 

required to be disclosed under FECA had been disclosed either in Bush’s reports or Right to Rise’s 

own reports; as a result, Plaintiffs had not suffered an informational injury because they had not 

been deprived of any legally-mandated disclosures. Id. See also ECF No. 28.

Around the same time, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Default Judgment against the FEC, 

claiming that the FEC “failed to appear, answer, plead, or otherwise defend this action as required 

by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” ECF No. 23, at 1. Right to Rise responded in opposition 

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to Plaintiffs’ motion, arguing that default judgment was not appropriate because Plaintiffs lacked 

standing and therefore failed to establish subject matter jurisdiction. ECF No. 24, at 1. 

On December 30, 2021, after holding a hearing on the reconsideration motion and 

considering the parties’ supplemental briefing, this Court issued a Memorandum Opinion and 

Order granting Right to Rise’s Motion for Reconsideration, finding that Plaintiffs lacked standing, 

and dismissing the case for want of subject matter jurisdiction. ECF No. 33. As a result, the Court 

denied Plaintiffs’ Motion for Default Judgment. Id. 

Considering the parties’ supplemental briefing, the Court held that Right to Rise “explains, 

in significantly more detail than it did previously, where the spending for each of the instances of 

travel that plaintiffs list can be found in [Right to Rise’s] own reports.” Id., at 8. That being so, the 

Court agreed with Right to Rise that the spending related to the campaign events identified by 

Plaintiffs had either been fully disclosed, or, in one instance, Plaintiffs failed to provide any 

evidence rebutting the proofs submitted by Right to Rise showing that an entity other than Right 

to Rise sponsored the activities in question, which strongly suggested that someone other than 

Bush or Right to Rise paid for and disclosed the relevant expenses. Id. at 8-9. 

As a result, the Court was “convinced—with the benefit of [Right to Rise’s] belated 

explanation of both its and Jeb 2016’s reports—that the expenses for Bush’s travel and lodging in 

connection with the events [identified by Plaintiffs] have been disclosed.” Id. at 10. Because 

“Plaintiffs ha[d] not identified any other pre-candidacy events, travel, or speaking engagements 

from which the Court could infer the existence of still-undisclosed spending,” the Court concluded 

that the complaint “does not contain more than the ‘unsupported inference’ that there is more 

spending to be disclosed,” and therefore held that Plaintiffs “lack standing to advance their claim 

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under FECA.” Id. The Court also denied Plaintiffs’ Motion for Default Judgment due to lack of 

jurisdiction. ECF No. 33, at 10.

Plaintiffs now seek reconsideration, arguing that the Court is yet to rule on their “distinct 

claim to standing based on organizational injuries caused by the FEC’s delay and inaction in this 

matter.” ECF No. 34. Plaintiffs complain that “in denying the Plaintiffs’ informational standing, 

the Court did not address the separate question it had previously deferred as to whether Plaintiffs 

have organizational standing based on the deleterious effects of FEC delay on their programmatic 

activities.” Id. at 3-4. But as explained below, Plaintiff’s organizational standing theory was so 

intertwined with the informational-injury theory of non-disclosure which the Court rejected that

reconsideration is not justified, and any “inadvertence” was harmless.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

Plaintiffs seek reconsideration under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1) and (6) on the grounds of 

“mistake,” “inadvertence,” or “any other reason that justifies relief.” ECF No. 34, at 4. “It is wellsettled that the party seeking relief from a judgment bears the burden of demonstrating that he 

satisfies the perquisites for such relief.” Green v. AFL CIO, 811 F. Supp. 2d 250, 254 (D.D.C. 

2011). “Relief under Rule 60(b)(1) motions is rare,” Hall v. CIA, 437 F.3d 94, 99 (D.C. Cir. 2006), 

and should only be granted when the moving party shows the Court’s order contains a clear or 

obvious error, Douglas v. D.C. Hous. Auth., 306 F.R.D. 1, 5 (D.D.C. 2014.

The Court need not grant reconsideration on the mere presence of mistake or inadvertence

if that mistake or inadvertence was harmless. S. Pac. Commc’ns Co. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 740 

F.2d 1011, 1022 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (affirming district court’s denial of Rule 60(b)(6) motion on the 

ground that any error was harmless). See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 61 (no error or defect in any ruling 

or order is grounds for vacating or modifying a judgment or order unless the error affects a party’s 

substantial rights).

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IV. ARGUMENT

A. Plaintiffs are required to show Article III standing regardless of their standing

theory.

While Plaintiffs characterize organizational standing as “analytically distinct” from other 

Article III standing inquiries, the traditional three-part standing inquiry applies “with no less force 

to suits brought by organizational plaintiffs” such as Plaintiffs in this case. Common Cause v. FEC, 

108 F.3d 413, 417 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (citing Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 378 

(1982)). Accordingly, Plaintiffs must demonstrate Article III standing and can do so only by 

establishing that they “have suffered an (1) injury in fact—an invasion of a legally protected 

interest which is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or 

hypothetical, (2) which is fairly traceable to the challenged act, and (3) likely to be redressed by a 

favorable decision.” Common Cause, 108 F.3d at 417 (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 

U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992)). 

In cases where, as here, Plaintiffs’ “asserted injury arises from the government’s allegedly 

unlawful regulation (or lack of regulation) of someone else, it is substantially more difficult to 

establish injury in fact.” Common Cause, 108 F.3d at 417 (cleaned up). As with the prior 

proceedings in this matter, Plaintiffs “bear[] the burden of proving by a preponderance of the 

evidence that the Court has subject-matter jurisdiction over [their] claims.” Schmidt v. U.S. Capitol 

Police Bd., 826 F. Supp. 2d 59, 69 (D.D.C. 2011) (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561). 

B. Plaintiffs have not suffered a legally cognizable injury sufficient to show

organizational standing.

Because the organizational Plaintiffs sue on their own behalf, they may only satisfy the 

first element of Article III standing—injury in fact—by establishing “concrete and demonstrable 

injury to the organization’s activities—with [a] consequent drain on the organization’s resources—

constitut[ing] . . . more than simply a setback to the organization’s abstract social interests.” 

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Common Cause, 108 F.3d at 417 (cleaned up). Likewise, “[t]he organization must allege that 

discrete programmatic concerns are being directly and adversely affected by the challenged 

action.” Id.

Plaintiffs fail to show the sort of injury in fact sufficient to demonstrate organizational 

standing. In fact, for much of this litigation, Plaintiffs claimed an organizational injury based on 

allegedly insufficient disclosures made by the respondents under FECA—essentially claiming the 

same injury as they did for their standing theory based on informational injury. E.g., Pls.’ MTD 

Opp’n, ECF No. 13 at 39 (claiming organization injury where “[t]he FEC’s protracted delay 

deprives [Plaintiffs] of required FECA disclosure information that both plaintiffs need to inform 

the public about candidates’ financial support and relationships with donors.”); Pls.’ Opp’n to 

RTR’s Mot. for Recons., ECF No 21, at 17 (“[P]laintiffs have had to divert resources from other 

planned organizational needs to research, fill in the gaps in the Bush campaign’s and RTR’s 

disclosure reports, and explain to reporters and partner organizations how they might attempt to 

find information not properly reported by Bush and RTR.”); Pls.’ Mot. for Default J., ECF No. 23, 

at 10-11 (claiming organizational standing where “Plaintiffs’ public education, legislative policy, 

and regulatory reform programs depend on access to FECA-required campaign disclosures....”).

But this Court has already concluded that these statements alleging undisclosed spending are 

nothing more than “unsupported inferences” that are insufficient to satisfy Plaintiffs’ burden to 

show standing. ECF No. 33, at 10. While that conclusion was made in the context of Plaintiffs’ 

informational-injury theory, it applies equally to Plaintiffs’ organization-standing theory, too. 

Plaintiffs have failed to show there is more spending to be disclosed, and they cannot rely on those 

contentions for the sake of demonstrating standing.

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Further, in responding to Plaintiffs’ organizational standing argument, Right to Rise does 

not concede that a claimant may proceed upon organizational standing where the plaintiff’s 

claimed injury in fact is based on the deprivation of information. Indeed, it appears that the 

jurisprudential basis for organizational standing based on deprivation of information traces its 

roots to the same source as informational injury. See Found. on Econ. Trends v. Watkins, 794 F. 

Supp. 395 (D.D.C. 1992). In Watkins, the district court considered a plaintiff-organization’s 

standing based on “information dissemination activities” in the context of inaction by a federal 

agency. Id. at 398. There, the court noted that plaintiff actually relied “on a line of cases within 

this circuit going back to a footnote in a 1973 opinion” suggesting that, “where an organization 

asserts a plausible link between the agency’s action, the informational injury, and the 

organization’s activities,” and “the organization can point to concrete ways in which their 

programmatic activities have been harmed by an infringement on the right to information,” the 

organization’s right to judicial review may be sustained on informational standing ground.” Id. 

(cleaned up). In other words, organizational standing in which the claimed injury is the alleged

“infringement on the right to information” is subject to the same limitations as other standing 

theories relying on the same informational injury. And for that reason, Plaintiffs may not end-run 

their failure to prove an informational injury by proceeding instead on the theory of organizational 

standing but based on an injury to their “information dissemination activities.” Plaintiffs’ motion 

should be denied.

Attempting to plead around the lack of informational injury, Plaintiffs also base their 

organizational-standing theory on the premise that “the FEC’s failure to act on their administrative 

complaints has inflicted concrete organizational injury on Plaintiffs by depriving them of access 

to key information they need to effectuate their missions as campaign finance reform 

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organizations.” ECF No. 34, at 4. Specifically, Plaintiffs claim that the FEC’s delay “ensures that 

information in the MUR file about the complaints cannot now—and may never—be provided to 

Plaintiffs or the public, including any legal conclusions, factual findings, or vote records generated 

by the Commission or its Office of General Counsel in processing the complaints.” ECF No. 34, 

at 6. As Plaintiffs would have it, their lack of access to this “key information” injures Plaintiffs

because without it they cannot “effectively play their role as regulatory watchdogs, educate the 

public and partner organizations with informed policy analysis, or identify and prioritize necessary 

campaign finance reforms.” Id. at 9.

But not just any injury will suffice for organizational standing—this is, after all, an Article 

III standing analysis. The D.C. Circuit’s decision in People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals 

v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 797 F.3d 1087 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (“PETA”), heavily cited in Plaintiffs’

motion, is instructive in that regard. There, the Court reasoned that the “key issue is whether [the 

organization] has suffered a concrete and demonstrable injury to [its] activities, mindful that, under 

our precedent, a mere setback to [the organization’s] abstract social interests is not sufficient.” Id. 

at 1093 (cleaned up). As for the facts of that case, the circuit court affirmed the district court’s 

conclusion that, because the defendant USDA’s inaction “perceptibly impaired” PETA’s mission 

by, among other things, “preclud[ing] PETA from preventing cruelty and inhumane treatment” of 

animals, PETA had shown that the USDA’s inaction had injured its interests. Id. at 1094. The 

circuit court reasoned that the injury sustained by PETA was similar to other cases where, “[u]nlike 

the mere interest in a problem or [an] ideological injury, the plaintiffs had alleged inhibition of 

their daily operations . . . .” Id. (citing Action All. of Senior Citizens of Greater Philadelphia v. 

Heckler, 789 F.2d 931, 937-38 (D.C. Cir. 1986)) (cleaned up). Accord Competitive Enter. Inst. v. 

Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 901 F.2d 107, 122 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (“Allegations of injury 

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to an organization’s ability to disseminate information may be deemed sufficiently particular for 

standing purposes where that information is essential to the injured organization’s activities, and 

where the lack of the information will render those activities infeasible.”) (emphasis added).

In other words, the plaintiffs in those cases had shown an organizational injury for standing 

purposes not because they disagreed with the promulgation of a rule or the outcome of a 

proceeding, but because the defendant’s conduct literally restrained or prevented plaintiff from 

carrying out its mission such that plaintiff’s activities were not feasible.

The organizational injuries Plaintiffs allege here fall far short of that mark. For example, 

Plaintiffs’ claim—that they cannot “educate the public and partner organizations with informed 

policy analysis, or identify and prioritize necessary campaign finance reforms” without access to 

the FEC’s file in the underlying MUR—does not demonstrate that those same activities are now 

infeasible. In fact, they show just the opposite. As Right to Rise explained in its motion to dismiss, 

there are instances where, presumably like the underlying MUR in this case, the Commissioners 

vote in such a way that the FEC deadlocks—meaning that there are not four votes to find reason 

to believe that a violation occurred, and likewise there are not four votes to dismiss the matter, 

either. Among the reasons for such an impasse: Commissioners might not believe that a 

respondent’s actions violate FECA, Commissioners may believe a gray area of law is best resolved 

with a prospective policy statement, or Commissioners may believe that the questioned conduct is 

not an enforcement priority.

The bottom line for this inquiry is not the current, temporary absence of the MUR file, but 

deadlock. The “FEC will regularly deadlock as part of its modus operandi. Pub. Citizen, Inc. v. 

FERC, 839 F.3d 1165, 1171 (D.C. Cir. 2016). It simply means the Commission is split as to how 

to handle the underlying MUR, and knowledge of that split is everything Plaintiffs need to know 

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to educate the public about the state of campaign finance law, and to advocate policymakers for 

change. The fact that the FEC has deadlocked on this MUR signals to Plaintiffs that the 

Commission disagrees on how to interpret the law here, and/or on the priority of this MUR, which 

should actually help Plaintiffs’ mission to the extent they disagree with the status quo. They are 

free to educate the public as to their disagreement with the current state of affairs, and to make 

their case to the public and policymakers alike that the underlying rules or laws ought to be 

changed. For that reason alone, Plaintiffs’ public education and policy advocacy activities remain 

wholly intact and are no less feasible today than if they received the MUR file tomorrow. 

As for the remaining alleged organizational injury—Plaintiffs’ claim that they cannot 

effectively play the role as regulatory watchdogs without the MUR file—that, too, is insufficient 

for standing purposes. While Plaintiffs are free to fancy themselves as “work[ing] to ensure that 

the Federal Election Commission enforces current campaign finance laws,”1 a grandiose and selfserving mission statement does not create an otherwise unrecognized interest for standing 

purposes. Setting aside the fact that Plaintiffs’ alleging the inability to enforce laws is an admission 

that what Plaintiffs really seek here is “a legal conclusion that carries certain law enforcement 

consequences” in which they have “no legally cognizable interest,” Wertheimer v. FEC, 268 F.3d 

1070, 1075 (D.C. Cir. 2001), their claimed injury is nothing more than the sort of bare procedural 

injury precluded by Lujan and its progeny. 

This is further evidenced by Plaintiffs’ attempt to buttress their alleged injury, explaining 

that, “even at the reason-to-believe stage, it is not uncommon for a MUR file to contain materials 

that illuminate or confirm the factual allegations in a complaint, such as a sworn affidavit from a 

1 Campaign Legal Center, “Campaign Finance,” available at

https://campaignlegal.org/issues/campaign-finance (last visited Feb. 15, 2022).

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respondent,” ECF No. 34 at 8 (emphasis added). But it is well-settled in the D.C. Circuit that a 

plaintiff may not “establish injury in fact merely by alleging that he has been deprived of the 

knowledge as to whether a violation of the law has occurred,” as that “would be tantamount to 

recognizing a justiciable interest in the enforcement of the law.” Common Cause, 108 F.3d at 418 

(D.C. Cir. 1997). Simply put, “[n]othing in FECA requires that information concerning a violation 

of the Act as such be disclosed to the public,” and “even if FECA did require such disclosure,” the 

D.C. Circuit has expressed “doubt whether this requirement could create standing.” Id. For those

reasons, Plaintiffs failed to show a concrete injury to sustain organizational standing, and their 

motion should be denied. 

Finally, while Plaintiffs’ failure to show a “concrete and demonstrable injury to [their] 

organization’s activities” is dispositive, they have also failed to show a “consequent drain on [their] 

organization’s resources” that “constitut[es] more than simply a setback to the organization’s 

abstract social interests.” Id. at 417 (cleaned up). Indeed, under the second step of the 

organizational injury standard, Plaintiffs must also prove they diverted resources and undertook 

expenditures “in response to, and to counteract, the effects of the [defendant’s] alleged unlawful 

acts.” PETA, 797 F.3d at 1097 (cleaned up). Here, Plaintiffs vaguely claim that “FEC inaction has 

forced [them] to divert resources from other planned organizational needs in various ways, 

including, for example, explaining to reporters how to find information not properly disclosed 

under FECA.” ECF No. 34, at 10. In fact, all of Plaintiffs’ allegations pertaining to the diversion 

of resources stem from allegations of improper or inadequate disclosures under FECA. E.g., ECF 

No. 1, ¶ 19 (Plaintiff CLC alleging diversion of resources due to inadequate FECA disclosures); 

id. ¶ 22 (Plaintiff Democracy 21 alleging diversion of resources where “disclosure information is 

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unavailable, inadequate, or inaccurate”). But those allegedly diverted resources are not remotely 

sufficient to show standing, for several reasons. 

First, they focus entirely on the alleged failure to disclose campaign finance information in 

compliance with FECA. But the Court already rejected Plaintiffs’ inadequate disclosure theory,

ECF No. 33, at 10, and because the absence of inadequate disclosures vitiated Plaintiffs’ 

informational injury standing theory, it likewise defeats this aspect of Plaintiff’s organizational 

standing theory, too. Second, those alleged actions were not taken “in response to, and to 

counteract, the effects of the [FEC’s] alleged unlawful acts,” PETA, 797 F.3d at 1097 (cleaned 

up). Rather, they were instead necessary due to the manner in which the disclosures were made by 

someone other than the FEC. For these reasons, Plaintiffs cannot establish organizational standing, 

and the Court should deny Plaintiffs’ motion.2

C. The injury alleged by Plaintiffs cannot be redressed by this Court.

Even assuming Plaintiffs can establish injury in fact, their organizational standing theory 

falters on redressability grounds. To satisfy the redressability element of Article III standing, 

Plaintiffs must establish that “it is likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be 

redressed by a favorable decision.” Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 

528 U.S. 167, 180–81 (2000) (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61). But Plaintiffs have failed to do 

so by a preponderance of the evidence. 

As an initial matter, Plaintiffs failed to even address the element of redressability as it 

pertains to their organizational-standing injury. For example, in Plaintiffs’ Response to Right to 

2 In its Reply in support of its Motion to Dismiss, Right to Rise argued that Plaintiffs cannot claim 

organizational standing when the claimed injury is based on the deprivation of information to 

which Plaintiffs have no legal right. See ECF No. 15, at 13-16. That same argument precludes 

Plaintiffs’ organizational standing in this instance, too, because Plaintiffs have no legal right to the 

information in the MUR file they now claim to seek. That argument is therefore incorporated here 

by reference.

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Rise’s Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiffs simply stated that their “organizational injuries flow directly 

from the FEC’s failure to act on their administrative complaints, and this Court is empowered 

under 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(8)(C) to redress that failure.” ECF No. 13, at 43. But Plaintiffs do not 

explain how it is that their claimed organizational injury would be redressed by an order from this 

Court. Nor do Plaintiffs explain how it is this Court might redress their claimed organizational 

injuries in their Response to Right to Rise’s Motion for Reconsideration, ECF No. 21, at 17 (simply 

stating that “[a]n order of this Court directing the FEC to act within 30 days pursuant to 52 U.S.C. 

§ 30109(a)(8)(C) would plainly redress plaintiffs’ Article III injuries.”), or even in their instant

motion. See generally ECF No. 34. 

In other words, nothing in the record explains how a favorable ruling from this Court would 

provide Plaintiffs with the information on which they now rest their standing theory—information 

in the FEC’s MUR file such as “legal conclusions, factual findings, or vote records generated by 

the Commission or its Office of General Counsel in processing the complaints,” or even “the 

factual record generated by the proceedings” such as “any responses or other submissions by the 

respondents.” ECF No. 34, at 6. When the FEC deadlocks, no one can compel that internal 

proceedings, factual findings, and legal conclusions be disclosed. To the contrary, these are all 

required by statute to be kept confidential. 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(12). And the time for Plaintiffs 

to address redressability has long since passed; to do so now in the context of a motion for 

reconsideration would be inappropriate. For that reason alone, Plaintiffs have failed to satisfy their 

burden of showing organizational standing by a preponderance of the evidence, and this Court 

should deny Plaintiffs’ motion. See Alabama Power Co. v. Gorsuch, 672 F.2d 1, 6-7 (D.C. Cir. 

1982) (declining to address undeveloped argument and collecting cases in which courts decline to 

consider issues not addressed by the parties). 

Case 1:20-cv-00730-CRC Document 35 Filed 02/16/22 Page 18 of 21
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But even looking past Plaintiffs’ failure to develop—or even address—the redressability 

element of the Article III standing inquiry, Plaintiffs’ organizational standing theory fails because 

Plaintiffs’ alleged injury—the deprivation of information in the Commission’s MUR file—cannot 

be redressed by this Court in this case. Even if (1) Plaintiffs were to demonstrate Article III 

standing and prove that the FEC’s “failure to act is contrary to law,” and (2) the Court entered an 

order under section 30109(a)(8)(C) “direct[ing] the Commission to conform” with the Court’s 

order declaring its alleged inaction contrary to law “within 30 days,” 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(8)(C), 

that would not remedy Plaintiffs’ alleged deprivation of information. 

Such an order would not require the FEC to decide and “close” the case. And so long as 

the underlying MUR remains “open,” the Commission is required by law to keep any complaint 

filed with the Commission, any notification sent by the Commission, any investigation conducted 

by the Commission, and any findings made by the Commission, confidential. 52 U.S.C. § 

30109(a)(12); 11 C.F.R. 111.21. This point was conceded by Plaintiff, see ECF No. 34, at 5, and 

is well-settled law. In re Sealed Case, 237 F.3d 657, 666–67 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“We hold that both 

[52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(12)(A) ] and 11 C.F.R. § 111.21(a) plainly prohibit the FEC from disclosing 

information concerning ongoing investigations under any circumstances without the written 

consent of the subject of the investigation.”). And section 30109 does not authorize the Court to 

order the FEC to “close” the MUR such that the aforementioned confidentiality provisions would 

no longer preclude disclosure of the information allegedly sought by Plaintiffs. So long as the 

Commission choses to keep the matter “open,” the Commission is statutorily prohibited from 

providing Plaintiffs with the information on which they now rely for standing purposes. 

In sum, any relief this Court orders would not result in Plaintiffs receiving the information 

from the MUR file they now claim to seek. Rather, the FEC will continue not participating in this 

Case 1:20-cv-00730-CRC Document 35 Filed 02/16/22 Page 19 of 21
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suit—as has been the case since Plaintiffs filed their complaint nearly two years ago on March 13, 

2020—and Plaintiffs would then ask this Court to authorize them to file a private suit against Right 

to Rise and the other respondents under section 30109(a)(8)(C). Make no mistake, that’s Plaintiffs’ 

real goal here, and has been from the outset. But even then, Plaintiffs’ alleged injury of information 

deprivation would remain unredressed. As a result, Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate 

organizational standing, and this Court should deny Plaintiffs’ Motion for Reconsideration. 

To the extent Plaintiffs genuinely wish to receive the information they now claim to seek, 

they are free to pursue that information through more appropriate channels, such as the Freedom 

of Information Act, however dubious that might be in light of the confidentiality provisions under 

FECA. What’s certain is that the injury Plaintiffs claim here will not be redressed under section 

30109(a)(8), and Plaintiffs therefore lack standing to proceed. 

V. CONCLUSION

For these reasons, Right to Rise respectfully requests that the Court deny Plaintiffs’ Motion 

for Reconsideration. 

Dated: February 16, 2022 Respectfully Submitted, 

DICKINSON WRIGHT PLLC

/s/ Charles R. Spies 

Charles R. Spies, Bar ID: 989020 

1825 Eye Street, N.W., Suite 900 

Washington, D.C. 20006 

Telephone: (202) 466-5964 

Facsimile: (844) 670-6009 

cspies@dickinsonwright.com 

Robert L. Avers Bar ID: MI0080

350 S. Main Street, Ste 300 

Ann Arbor, MI 48104 

(734) 623-1672

ravers@dickinsonwright.com

Case 1:20-cv-00730-CRC Document 35 Filed 02/16/22 Page 20 of 21
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John J. Bursch*

Bursch Law PLLC

9339 Cherry Valley Ave. SE, #78

Caledonia, MI 49316

(616) 450-4235

jbursch@burschlaw.com

Attorneys for Defendant-Intervenor

*Pending Admission

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on February 16, 2022, I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing 

document to be served upon all counsel of record registered with the Court’s ECF system by 

electronic service via the Court’s ECF transmission facilities.

/s/ Robert L. Avers

Case 1:20-cv-00730-CRC Document 35 Filed 02/16/22 Page 21 of 21