UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

) 

READY FOR RON ) Judge Randolph D. Moss 

66 W. Flagler Street ) 

Suite 900, #6781 ) No. 1:22-cv-3282-RDM

Miami, FL 33130, ) 

) 

Plaintiff, ) 

) 

v. ) 

 ) 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION ) 

1050 First Street, NE ) 

Washington, DC 20463, ) 

 ) 

Defendant. ) 

_______________________________________ ) 

PLAINTIFF READY FOR RON’S 

POST-ARGUMENT SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF 

Dan Backer, Esq. (D.C. Bar No. 996641) 

Chalmers, Adams, Backer & Kaufman LLC

441 N. Lee Street, Suite 300 

Alexandria, VA 22314

(202) 210-5431 

dbacker@ChalmersAdams.com 

Lilian Rodriguez-Baz, Esq.* 

Chief Legal Counsel, Ready for Ron 

66 W Flagler Street, Suite 900 

Miami, FL 33130 

(561) 291-9897 

Lilian@ReadyForRon.com 

*Admitted pro hac vice 

Attorneys for Plaintiff

Case 1:22-cv-03282-RDM Document 25 Filed 03/14/23 Page 1 of 41
i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES........................................................................................................iii

ARGUMENT ................................................................................................................................1

I. THIS COURT SHOULD NOT TREAT THE PETITION AS A 

“CONTRIBUTION” UNDER THE FEDERAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN ACT...........3

A. The FEC’s Explanation as to Why the Signed Petition Qualifies

as a “Contribution” from RFR Does Not Survive Serious Consideration ............4

1. RFR’s independent expenditures to solicit signatures for its 

Petition are not contributions to Governor DeSantis, and do not 

cause any of the signatures it gathers to be deemed contributions............4

2. Each signatory’s submission of their name and contact 

information to RFR to incorporate into the petition and transmit

to Governor DeSantis should not be regarded as a contribution ...............7

3. The aggregation of signatories’ contact information incorporated 

into the petition does not somehow give rise to a contribution ..............11

B. The FEC Admits the Term “Contribution” is Ambiguous.

This Court Should Not Strain to Construe the Term Broadly 

to Include RFR’s Signed Political Petition..........................................................14

II. THE FIRST AMENDMENT BARS THE FEC FROM APPLYING THE 

FECA’S CONTRIBUTION LIMITS TO PROHIBIT RFR FROM PROVIDING 

ITS SIGNED POLITICAL PETITION TO GOVERNOR DESANTIS .........................17

A. The Signatories’ Contact Information is an Integral Part of the 

Petition’s Expressive Content and the Means Through Which the 

Signatories Associate with Each Other and Governor DeSantis.........................18

B. The FEC’s Prohibition on RFR Providing Its Signed 

Political Petition to Governor DeSantis is a ContentBased Prohibition Triggering Strict Scrutiny ...................................................... 22

C. RFR’s Signed Petition Would Be a Wasteful, Overpriced, TimeConsuming, and Ridiculously Inefficient Way of Attempting to 

Circumvent Contribution Limits and Engage in Quid Pro Quo Corruption .......24

D. The FEC’s Arguments Undermine Its Asserted 

Anti-Corruption and Anti-Circumvention Interests ............................................26

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E. The Supreme Court’s Reasoning Upholding the Constitutionality of 

Contribution Limits is Inapplicable to a Signed Political Petition......................27

III. AT THE VERY LEAST, THE CONTACT INFORMATION

INCORPORATED INTO THE PETITION SHOULD BE DEEMED

CONDUIT CONTRIBUTIONS FROM EACH SIGNATORY.

ACCEPTING THE PETITION WOULD NOT AUTOMATICALLY 

TRIGGER “CANDIDATE” STATUS FOR GOVERNOR DESANTIS........................28

CONCLUSION............................................................................................................................32

NOTICE OF ERRATA................................................................................................................33

Case 1:22-cv-03282-RDM Document 25 Filed 03/14/23 Page 3 of 41
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

AFL-CIO v. FEC, 

 333 F.3d 168 (D.C. Cir. 2003) ......................................................................................... 15 

Ams. for Prosperity Found. v. Bonta, 

 141 S. Ct. 2373 (2021) ............................................................................................... 26, 30 

Barr v. Am. Ass’n of Political Consultants, 

 140 S. Ct. 2335 (2020) ..................................................................................................... 22 

Brayshaw v. City of Tallahassee, 

 709 F. Supp. 2d 1244 (N.D. Fla. 2010)............................................................................ 19 

Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass’n, 

 564 U.S. 786 (2011) ......................................................................................................... 24 

Brown v. Glines, 

 444 U.S. 348 (1980) ................................................................................................... 17, 28 

Buckley v. Valeo, 

 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam) ................................................................................. passim 

Chamber of Commerce v. FEC, 

 69 F.3d 600 (D.C. Cir. 1995) ........................................................................................... 15

Citizens Against Rent Cont./Coalition for Fair Hous. v. Berkeley, 

 454 U.S. 290 (1981) ..................................................................................................... 1, 17 

City of Austin v. Reagan Nat’l Adver. of Austin, LLC, 

 142 S. Ct. 1464 (2022) ..................................................................................................... 23 

Cox v. Louisiana, 

 379 U.S. 559 (1965) ......................................................................................................... 17 

DePierre v. United States, 

 564 U.S. 70 (2011) ........................................................................................................... 15 

District of Columbia v. Heller, 

 554 U.S. 570 (2008) ........................................................................................................... 2 

FEC v. Akins, 

 524 U.S. 11 (1998) ........................................................................................................... 21 

Case 1:22-cv-03282-RDM Document 25 Filed 03/14/23 Page 4 of 41
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FEC v. GOPAC, Inc., 

917 F. Supp. 851 (D.D.C. 1996)......................................................................................15

FEC v. Machinists Non-Partisan Political League, 

655 F.2d 380 (D.C. Cir. 1981)...................................................................................15, 16

FEC v. Nat’l Conservative Political Action Comm., 

470 U.S. 480 (1985).......................................................................................................5, 6

FEC v. Sailors’ Union of Pac. Political Fund, 

624 F. Supp. 492 (N.D. Cal. 1986)..................................................................................15

FEC v. Sailors’ Union of Pac. Political Fund,

828 F.2d 502 (9th Cir. 1987) ...........................................................................................16

Lamont v. Postmaster General, 

381 U.S. 301 (1965).....................................................................................................2, 21

Leocal v. Ashcroft, 

543 U.S. 1 (2004).............................................................................................................15

McCutcheon v. FEC, 

572 U.S. 185 (2014).....................................................................................................3, 25

McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 

514 U.S. 334 (1995).....................................................................................................2, 21

NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 

357 U.S. 449 (1958).........................................................................................................30

Org. for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 

402 U.S. 415 (1971).........................................................................................................20

Ostergren v. Cuccinelli, 

615 F.3d 263 (4th Cir. 2010) .....................................................................................19, 20

Publius v. Boyer-Vine, 

237 F. Supp. 3d 997 (E.D. Cal. 2017)..............................................................................20

Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 

576 U.S. 155 (2015).........................................................................................................23

Richmond Co. v. United States, 

275 U.S. 331 (1928).........................................................................................................15

Case 1:22-cv-03282-RDM Document 25 Filed 03/14/23 Page 5 of 41
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Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 

 469 U.S. 609 (1984) ......................................................................................................... 21 

Sec’y of State of Md. v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 

 467 U.S. 947 (1984) ......................................................................................................... 30 

Sheehan v. Gregoire, 

 272 F. Supp. 2d 1135 (W.D. Wash. 2003) ....................................................................... 19 

Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 

 394 U.S. 147 (1969) ......................................................................................................... 10 

Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 

 502 U.S. 105 (1991) .................................................................................................... 22-23 

United States v. Congress of Indus. Orgs., 

 335 U.S. 106 (1948) ......................................................................................................... 21 

W. Va. v. EPA, 

 142 S. Ct. 2587 (2022) ..................................................................................................... 15 

Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc. v. Village of Stratton, 

 536 U.S. 150 (2002) ......................................................................................................... 24 

Statutes and Regulations 

11 C.F.R. § 100.12 ....................................................................................................................... 19 

11 C.F.R. § 100.52 ......................................................................................................................... 4 

11 C.F.R. § 100.72 ....................................................................................................................... 32 

11 C.F.R. § 102.8 .................................................................................................................. passim

11 C.F.R. § 104.3 ......................................................................................................................... 30 

11 C.F.R. § 110.1 ......................................................................................................................... 10 

11 C.F.R. § 110.6 .................................................................................................................. passim

52 U.S.C. § 30101 ................................................................................................................. passim 

52 U.S.C. § 30116 ................................................................................................................. passim 

52 U.S.C. § 30118 .......................................................................................................................... 7 

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FEC Issuances

ActBlue, A.O. 2006-30 (Nov. 9, 2006) .......................................................................... 6, 9, 29, 30 

ActBlue, A.O. 2007-27 (Dec. 17, 2007) ......................................................................................... 9 

ActBlue, A.O. 2014-19 (Jan. 15, 2015) ......................................................................... 6, 29-30, 33 

Associated Builders and Contractors, Inc., A.O. 1984-23 (June 22, 1984) .................................. 7 

Brunswick Corp., A.O. 1984-43 (Sept. 14, 1984) .................................................................... 7, 17 

FEC, Legislative Recommendations—1987, reprinted in House Subcomm. 

on Elections, Comm. on House Admin., Hearings on Campaign Finance, 

100th Cong., 1st Sess. (May 21, June 2, June 16, June 30, and July 14, 1987); .......................... 16 

FEC, Price Index Adjustments for Contribution and Expenditure 

Limitations and Lobbying Bundling Disclosure Threshold, 

88 Fed. Reg. 7088 (Feb. 2, 2023) ................................................................................................ 31 

FEC, Priority Legislative Recommendations (2001), 

https://www.fec.gov/resources/cms-content/documents/legrec2001.pdf .................................... 16 

Hon. Cecil Heftel, A.O. 1977-51 (Nov. 16, 1977) ................................................................... 7, 30 

Skimmerhat, FEC A.O. 2012-22 (Aug. 2, 2012) ........................................................................... 9 

Statement of Reasons of Vice Chair Allen Dickerson and 

Commissioners Sean J. Cooksey and James E. “Trey” Trainor, III, 

In re Joaquin Castro, MUR 7635 (Dec. 3, 2021) ........................................................................ 27 

WE LEAD, A.O. 2003-23 (Nov. 7, 2003). ............................................................................ passim

Assorted Other Sources and Authorities

D.C. L. Cv. R. 5.1 ........................................................................................................................ 19 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 ......................................................................................................................... 19 

Emily Hall, Romney Fundraising Organization: 

“C. Moore Bacon” is Real Deal, 

WASH. POST (Sept. 18, 2013), 

https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/in-the-loop/wp/2013/09/18/ romney-fundraisingorganization-c-moore-bacon-is-real-deal/ .................................................................................... 20 

Case 1:22-cv-03282-RDM Document 25 Filed 03/14/23 Page 7 of 41
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https://www.adamschiff.com/ ........................................................................................................ 8 

https://katieporter.com/ .................................................................................................................. 8 

https://nikkihaley.com/home/......................................................................................................... 8 

www.readyforron.com ................................................................................................................. 13 

Case 1:22-cv-03282-RDM Document 25 Filed 03/14/23 Page 8 of 41
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ARGUMENT

If an individual wrote to Governor DeSantis to encourage him to run for President, neither 

the First Amendment nor FECA would empower the FEC to prohibit it. 

If that same individual encouraged a crowd of people to individually write letters to 

Governor DeSantis containing their contact information to encourage him to run for President, 

neither the First Amendment nor FECA would empower the FEC to prohibit it. 

If that individual – or in this case RFR - spent millions of dollars persuading millions of 

people throughout the nation to each download an identical letter – from RFR’s website - 

encouraging Governor DeSantis to run for President, fill it out with their name and signature, and 

mail it to hm, neither the First Amendment nor FECA would empower the FEC to prohibit it. 

Yet because RFR has instead encouraged people to engage in “collective action” by joining 

together in a single petition to ensure their voices are not “faint or lost,” Citizens Against Rent 

Cont./Coalition for Fair Hous. v. Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 294 (1981), the FEC claims authority to 

quash the political expression and association of both RFR and the petition’s signatories. Neither 

the First Amendment nor FECA allows such an unreasonable result. 

The FEC argues RFR and the petition’s signatories may send their petition to Governor 

DeSantis only if it is effectively anonymous—omitting the signatories’ contact information. See 

Transcript of Motion Hearing at 38 (Feb. 28, 2023) (hereinafter, “Tr.”) (arguing RFR should be 

permitted to include “just a list of names without contact information” with its petition). In the 

FEC’s view, RFR may transmit the petition only if it is impossible for Governor DeSantis to

determine who actually associated together to join the petition (i.e., “John Smith,” without any 

further information, is completely uninformative); confirm the signatures’ authenticity; and, most 

importantly, respond to the signatories and engage in political dialogue with them. Political speech 

Case 1:22-cv-03282-RDM Document 25 Filed 03/14/23 Page 9 of 41
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should not be, and need not be, a one-way street. See Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301, 

305-06 (1965) (stating the First Amendment protects the right to both make and receive 

communications). Neither the FECA nor the First Amendment allow the Government to require 

speakers to remain effectively anonymous as a condition for engaging in speech—particularly 

political communications. Cf. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 342 (1995)

(suggesting people engaged in political expression have a First Amendment to decide for 

themselves whether to remain anonymous). 

The power of a petition comes precisely from the collective action it embodies. District of 

Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 645 (2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[I]f they are to be 

effective, petitions must involve groups of individuals acting in concert.”). By signing the petition, 

the signatories expressly requested that their names and contact information be added, aggregated, 

and transmitted to Governor DeSantis. Declaration of Gabriel Llanes, ¶¶ 14-17 [hereinafter, 

“Llanes Decl.”]. Those signatories wish to associate together meaningfully, fully identify 

themselves to Governor DeSantis, and facilitate return communications by him. FECA does not 

authorize, and the First Amendment does not tolerate, a prohibition on such political expression 

and interaction.

In addition, compiling a political petition would be a ridiculously poor, extravagantly 

wasteful, inefficient, and time-consuming method of attempting to circumvent contribution limits.

See infra Section II.D. As discussed later, the gaping disparity between RFR’s solicitation costs 

(approaching $1 million) and the estimated market value of the petition’s signatures (based on the 

evidence in the record, currently as little as $13,000); the time it has taken RFR to amass those 

signatures (nearly a year); and the inherent risk of being unable to identify or generate sufficient

public support makes petition-gathering incredibly unrealistic as a potential backdoor method of 

Case 1:22-cv-03282-RDM Document 25 Filed 03/14/23 Page 10 of 41
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smuggling excessive campaign contributions to a candidate or potential candidate. See

McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. 185, 213-14 (2014) (invalidating aggregate contribution limits in 

part because “no rational actor” would contribute a tremendous amount of money to scores of 

political committees in order to ultimately funnel $26,000 in contributions to a candidate). 

As this Memorandum summarizes, in light of the oral arguments this Court held, RFR’s 

petition should not be regarded as a “contribution.” In the event this Court concludes the petition 

is a contribution due to the signatory contact information it contains, it should be regarded as a 

conduit contribution from each signatory to Governor DeSantis. Attempting to shoehorn the 

petition into FECA’s contribution framework in this manner, however, leads to a range of bizarre 

results which simply underscores the statute’s inapplicability here. And the First Amendment bars 

the FEC from wielding FECA to either prohibit RFR from providing its signed petition to 

Governor DeSantis, or require RFR to modify its speech, effectively anonymize the petition’s 

signatories, undermine their efforts to associate with Governor DeSantis, and make it impossible 

for him to respond to them by stripping their contact information. 

RFR’s petition isn’t a sham. It isn’t a way to smuggle a mailing list to Governor DeSantis.

It is a legitimate and potentially powerful form of political expression and association, which the 

U.S. Constitution protects from the reach of overzealous regulatory agencies. 

I. THIS COURT SHOULD NOT TREAT THE PETITION AS A 

“CONTRIBUTION” UNDER THE FEDERAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN ACT 

RFR’s petition incorporates the names and contact information of the petition’s signatories 

as part of their respective signature blocks at the express request and direction of each individual 

signatory. This Court should decline to consider the signed petition incorporating signatories’ 

Case 1:22-cv-03282-RDM Document 25 Filed 03/14/23 Page 11 of 41
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contact information to be a “contribution” under 52 U.S.C. § 30101(8)(A)(i) and 11 C.F.R. 

§ 100.52(a), (d). 

A. The FEC’s Explanation as to Why the Signed Petition Qualifies

as a “Contribution” from RFR Does Not Survive Serious Consideration 

The FEC argues the petition should be treated as a contribution from RFR to Governor 

DeSantis because it is simply a mailing list in disguise. See Transcript of Motion Hearing at 31 

(Feb. 28, 2023) (hereinafter, “Tr.”). Putting aside the severe constitutional problems with this 

argument, see infra Part III, the FEC is playing too fast and loose with the law. There are three 

possible answers as to what constitutes the purported “contribution” in this case. None is correct. 

1. RFR’s independent expenditures to solicit signatures for its 

Petition are not contributions to Governor DeSantis, and do not 

cause any of the signatures it gathers to be deemed contributions.

First, this Court might conclude RFR’s extensive expenditures on advertisements, 

solicitations, and other aspects of its petition-gathering process constitute a “contribution” to 

Governor DeSantis. The FEC claimed at oral argument the petition should be deemed a 

contribution “specifically because of the money and other labor invested by Ready for Ron.” Tr. 

at 32. Such a remarkable conclusion would run flatly afoul of Buckley v. Valeo’s fundamental 

distinction between “contributions,” which are provided to candidates, and “independent 

expenditures,” which are spending decisions regarding political speech and other election-related 

activities over which candidates lack any influence, input, or control. 424 U.S. 1, 44-45, 47 (1976) 

(per curiam) (explaining why expenditures are entitled to greater constitutional protection than 

contributions). RFR’s spending decisions have been made completely independently of Governor 

DeSantis—who, in any event, is not even presently a presidential candidate. And none of the funds 

RFR spent was provided to Governor DeSantis. Accordingly, the money RFR has spent to solicit 

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petition signatures cannot be deemed a contribution to Governor DeSantis. See WE LEAD, 

A.O. 2003-23, at 5 (Nov. 7, 2003).

The FEC’s advisory opinion in WE LEAD confirms this conclusion. In WE LEAD, a 

political committee solicited contributions which it would provide to the Democratic Party’s 

eventual nominee for President, who had not yet been identified. Id. at 1. The Commission 

considered whether the committee’s “direct costs of solicitation should be treated as in-kind 

contributions or independent expenditures.” Id. The Commission concluded if the conduit 

committee’s “solicitations in this earmarking program were made independent of any 

candidate . . . by virtue of this independence the direct costs of solicitation incurred by [the 

committee] would constitute independent expenditures.” Id. The Commission went so far as to 

reverse an earlier advisory opinion which had treated a political committee’s costs of soliciting 

contributions to a candidate as “an in-kind contribution to the candidate’s campaign merely on 

account of a candidate’s subsequent acceptance of earmarked contributions.” Id. (overruling A.O. 

1980-46); see also FEC v. Nat’l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 496 (1985) 

(invalidating limits on independent expenditures by PACs because such expenditures “are entitled 

to full First Amendment protection”).

Moreover, the fact the political committee made such expenditures to solicit conduit 

contributions from the public to a candidate neither undermined the legal status of the resulting 

conduit contributions, nor allowed the Commission to treat those conduit contributions as 

originating from the committee itself. See id. at 3 (recognizing a conduit contribution from a 

person, through a conduit committee, to a candidate, is a contribution from that person to the 

candidate (citing 52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(8); 11 C.F.R. § 110.6(a)).

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The FEC made a desultory attempt to distinguish WE LEAD during oral argument based 

on a legally irrelevant criterion its own advisory opinions have rejected. Tr. at 32. The Commission 

argued WE LEAD is inapplicable because that opinion involved conduit contributions to the 

Democratic Party’s eventual nominee, who had not yet been identified, rather than to a designated 

person (i.e., Governor DeSantis) who had not yet become a candidate. Id. Nothing in WE LEAD’s 

reasoning, however, suggested that the conduit committee was permitted to make unlimited 

expenditures only because the candidate for whom it was soliciting and collecting contributions 

had not yet been named. See A.O. 2003-23, at 5 (“If WE LEAD’s solicitations in this earmarking 

program were made independent of any candidate . . . by virtue of this independence the direct 

costs of solicitation incurred by WE LEAD would constitute independent expenditures”). To the 

contrary, that conduit committee—like RFR itself—had a fundamental constitutional right to make 

unlimited independent expenditures. See Nat’l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. at 

496.

And as the FEC is well aware, however, its own advisory opinions apply the exact same 

legal analysis to conduit committees regardless of whether they solicit and collect funds on behalf 

of a nominee to be identified in the future, or instead on behalf of a designated person (such as 

Governor DeSantis) who has not yet become a candidate. Compare ActBlue, A.O. 2014-19 (Jan.

15, 2015) (approving establishing of conduit fund to be provided to the eventual nominee if that 

person is female), with ActBlue, A.O. 2006-30, at 4-5 (Nov. 9, 2006) (approving establishing of a 

conduit fund to be provided to a specifically identified prospective candidate in the event that 

person decides to run for office). Thus, contrary to the FEC’s surprising protestations, WE LEAD 

is squarely on point.

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Accordingly, RFR’s petition-related spending neither constitute a contribution to Governor 

DeSantis nor allow its petition to be deemed a contribution from RFR to him. 

2. Each signatory’s submission of their name and contact 

information to RFR to incorporate into the petition and transmit 

to Governor DeSantis should not be regarded as a contribution. 

Second, this Court might instead conclude each signatory’s provision of their own contact 

information to RFR to include within the petition and transmit to Governor DeSantis constitutes a 

conduit contribution from that signatory to the Governor. See Tr. at 45 (“[E]ach one of these 

individual pieces of contact information actually is valuable . . . .”). As discussed later, if this Court 

concludes the information contained within the petition constitutes a “contribution,” then this 

Court should treat it as a series of conduit contributions in this manner. See infra Part III. But even 

this framing is ultimately incorrect. Notwithstanding the language of the Federal Election 

Campaign Act (“FECA”), the FEC has not historically treated every single thing of value as a 

“contribution,” particularly where the “thing” at issue involved political expression. 

The FECA defines “contribution” as “any gift . . . of money or anything of value made . . . 

for the purpose of influencing any election for Federal office.” 52 U.S.C. § 30101(8)(A)(i). Despite 

that seemingly sweeping definition, the FEC has not treated endorsements of candidates as 

“contributions,” regardless of how valuable they may be. The FECA generally prohibits 

corporations from making contributions to federal candidates. 52 U.S.C. § 30118(a). In Associated 

Builders and Contractors, Inc., A.O. 1984-23, at 2 (June 22, 1984), however, the Commission 

nevertheless concluded “a corporation or labor organization may endorse a candidate . . . .” See 

also Brunswick Corp., A.O. 1984-43, at 2 (Sept. 14, 1984) (“[E]ndorsement of a candidate by a 

corporation does not by itself constitute a prohibited contribution . . . .”). Likewise, in Hon. Cecil 

Heftel, A.O. 1977-51, at 2 (Nov. 16, 1977), the Commission concluded a Member of Congress’ 

Case 1:22-cv-03282-RDM Document 25 Filed 03/14/23 Page 15 of 41
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“receipt of macadamia nuts from corporations, trade associations, [or] individuals” does not 

constitute a “contribution,” in part because they “appear to be of minimal value.” An individual’s 

name and contact information is not of greater value than a box of macadamia nuts. 

Moreover, the FEC has not historically treated a person’s provision of their own contact 

information directly to a candidate as a “contribution.” Virtually every federal candidate’s 

webpage has an online form inviting people to submit their names and various pieces of contact 

information such as e-mail addresses, telephone numbers, see, e.g., https://nikkihaley.com/home/; 

zip codes, see, e.g., https://katieporter.com/; https://www.adamschiff.com/; and other such 

information. No one thinks they are making a political contribution when they submit their name 

and contact information through such forms. The FEC can point to no previous advisory opinion, 

enforcement matter, or case in which the Commission has regarded an individual’s voluntary 

provision of their contact information to a candidate, political party, or political committee as a 

contribution—even if the recipient aggregates that information into a list with potential market 

value. The FEC has never counted a person’s provision of such contact information to a candidate 

against that person’s contribution limit. And the FEC cannot transmute a person’s provision of 

their own contact information into a contribution simply because that person chooses to band 

together with a potential candidate’s other supporters to transmit their contact information 

collectively through a conduit draft committee’s petition. Cf. 52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(8). 

In other words, designation of something as a “contribution” cannot hinge on whether a 

person provides that underlying “thing” directly to a candidate, or instead provides it indirectly 

through a conduit committee. If a person’s provision of their name and contact information to a 

conduit committee to transmit to a candidate constitutes a “contribution” to that candidate, then 

that person’s provision of the same information directly to the candidate must likewise be deemed 

Case 1:22-cv-03282-RDM Document 25 Filed 03/14/23 Page 16 of 41
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a ”contribution” to that candidate (who may have spent even more money than RFR soliciting such 

support). No one seriously believes the latter scenario involves a “contribution.” Accordingly, a 

contribution similarly cannot arise simply because a person transmits their contact information 

through a conduit committee such as RFR to a candidate or potential candidate. 

ActBlue and WinRed are the large conduit committees at the heart of our political system. 

Together they have processed billions of dollars in monetary conduit contributions from millions 

of people to candidates, political parties, and other entities. For decades, ActBlue and WinRed 

have openly, notoriously, and systematically solicited, collected, and compiled phone numbers and 

e-mail addresses from contributors on a national scale to provide to their respective recipient 

candidates and political parties. See ActBlue, Does ActBlue Share My Personal Information, 

Including Email Address and Phone Number? (“We also pass along your e-mail address, as well 

as your phone number if you choose to provide it, to the group you gave to—and no one else—so 

they can stay in touch.”), https://support.actblue.com/donors/about-actblue/does-actblue-sharemy-personal-information-including-email-address-and-phone-number/; WinRed, Privacy 

Policy—Your Privacy Rights (July 13, 2020), https://winred.com/privacy/. 

These platforms have done so with the FEC’s knowledge and apparent permission, or at 

least intentional acquiescence. See ActBlue, FEC A.O. 2006-30, at 6-7; see also Skimmerhat, FEC 

A.O. 2012-22, at 3, 5 (Aug. 2, 2012); ActBlue, A.O. 2007-27, at 7 (Dec. 17, 2007). The FECA 

does not distinguish among different types of unauthorized conduit committees; a single statutory 

provision and regulation apply equally to all of them. See 52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(8); 11 C.F.R. § 

110.6. RFR should not be subject to greater legal restrictions on its ability to convey contact 

information from members of the public to a candidate or potential candidate, simply because it 

Case 1:22-cv-03282-RDM Document 25 Filed 03/14/23 Page 17 of 41
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solicited their signatures rather than asking for monetary conduit contributions.1 Subjecting 

political organizing to harsher restrictions than monetary fundraising gets campaign finance law 

exactly backwards.

Finally, treating signatories’ provision of their contact information as conduit contributions 

would make it impossible for RFR or any other entity to actually compile a political petition. FEC 

regulations require a conduit committee to forward each conduit contribution to the designated 

recipient within ten days of receipt. 11 C.F.R. § 102.8(a). This provision would require RFR to 

forward each signatory’s name and contact information to Governor DeSantis within ten days of 

receiving it once be becomes a candidate (and potentially when he begins testing the waters). RFR 

would be prohibited from gathering a substantial number of signatures over an extended period of 

time to present to Governor DeSantis as part of an integrated political petition at the time when it 

may have the greatest impact. See Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 163 (1969) 

(Harlan, J., concurring) (“Timing is of the essence in politics.”). Rather, RFR would have to 

1 FEC regulations governing conduit committees’ disclosure obligations further underscore the 

incoherence of attempting to treat each signatory’s contact information within the petition as a 

“contribution.” Had RFR solicited and accepted monetary conduit contributions for Governor 

DeSantis, it would have been legally required to solicit, collect, and convey to him the name and 

address of each person who contributed any funds at all, see 11 C.F.R. § 110.6(c)(1)(iii)-(iv)(A), 

if for no other reason than to ensure the recipient candidate did not accept any contributions from 

a person that, combined with that person’s other contributions to the candidate, violated FECA’s 

contribution limits. See Tr. at 41 (“[W]e do require enough information so that we can verify who 

the [contributor to the conduit committee] is so that they’re not making multiple contributions to 

a single person.”); see also 11 C.F.R. § 110.1(b)(1) (providing for aggregation of a person’s 

contributions to a candidate to determine if they violate contribution limits). Needless to say, a 

conduit committee’s provision of that legally required identifying information about each 

contributor to the recipient candidate does not constitute an additional in-kind contribution to that 

candidate, either by those original contributors or the conduit committee itself. Thus, the FEC’s 

own regulations do not regard identifying information about a contributor provided to a candidate 

as a contribution. Though the regulation expressly mentions only names and physical addresses, 

this regulatory scheme does not suggest different logic would apply to additional, closely related 

contact information such as a phone number or e-mail address.

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11 

repeatedly forward signatories’ contact information to Governor DeSantis in drips and drabs on an 

ongoing basis, turning a potential petition into repeated spam. 

For these reasons, an individual’s provision of their name and contact information to a 

candidate, whether directly or indirectly as part of an intermediary committee’s political petition, 

should not be deemed a “contribution.” 

3. The aggregation of signatories’ contact information incorporated 

into the petition does not somehow give rise to a contribution 

So what is left to constitute the alleged “contribution”? RFR’s expenditure of funds to 

solicit signatures is not a contribution and does not cause the signatures it collects to be deemed 

contributions. See supra Subsection I.A.1. Each signatory’s provision of their name and contact 

information to RFR to incorporate into the petition and transmit to Governor DeSantis should not 

be deemed a contribution. See supra Subsection I.A.2. The third, and only remaining, possibility 

is that the aggregation of signatures in RFR’s petition somehow collectively gives rise to an 

overarching contribution by RFR. 

This vague, amorphous “whole is greater than the sum of its parts” logic finds no basis in 

either First Amendment or campaign finance law. In attempting to defend this position in court, 

the FEC repeatedly fell back on the notion that the signed petition should be deemed a contribution 

because RFR spent so much money to collect the signatures and compile it. See, e.g., Tr. at 32 

(arguing the signed petition is a contribution “specifically because of the money and other labor 

invested by Ready for Ron”); id. at 36 (arguing, after some verbal dodging, RFR’s “using these 

funds to create a thing of value”); see also id. at 13 (reiterating the FEC’s argument the signed 

petition is a contribution from RFR because it is “a project on which RFR plans to expend 

considerable resources of its own”). As noted earlier, however, when a committee makes 

independent expenditures to solicit conduit contributions for a candidate, those expenditures are 

Case 1:22-cv-03282-RDM Document 25 Filed 03/14/23 Page 19 of 41
12

not deemed contributions to that candidate. And they do not cause conduit contributions from the 

public made in response to those solicitations to instead be deemed contributions from the 

intermediary committee. See generally WE LEAD, A.O. 2003-23, at 4-6 (Nov. 7, 2003).

At oral argument, this Court discussed the FEC’s contention the conduit statute is somehow 

inapplicable because RFR’s petition “does not consist solely, or even primarily, of any individual 

signatory’s name or contact information.” Tr. at 13.2 Rather, RFR’s petition involves the 

“collection and compilation of information from tens of thousands, if not millions, of individuals 

nationwide.” Id. Far from rendering the conduit provisions inapplicable, this argument simply 

points out the very nature of conduit contributions. If RFR had solicited and successfully collected 

one dollar from each of the petition’s 225,000 signatories, it would have amassed a total of nearly 

a quarter million dollars.

RFR aggregation of so many small monetary contributions into a single, large, impressive 

figure would not affect the underlying nature of those contributions, however. Each transaction 

would remain a conduit contribution from the person who originally contributed that dollar, 

through RFR, to Governor DeSantis. The FEC could not conclude RFR had exceeded its 

contribution limits by forwarding $225,000 in conduit contributions to Governor DeSantis, since 

RFR would not be deemed the contributor of any of those funds, notwithstanding their aggregation.

See 11 C.F.R. § 110.6(d)(1) (“A conduit’s or intermediary’s contribution limits are not affected by 

the forwarding of an earmarked contribution . . . .”). To the contrary, RFR would be legally 

obligated to convey all of those funds to him. See id. § 102.8(c) (discussing the obligation of 

intermediaries and conduits to forward earmarked contributions to the designated recipients). And 

2 Of course, if RFR’s communication to Governor DeSantis contained only a single person’s name 

and contact information, it would be a letter or postcard, not a political petition.

Case 1:22-cv-03282-RDM Document 25 Filed 03/14/23 Page 20 of 41
13 

this reasoning does not change even if RFR made substantial expenditures to solicit and collect 

those funds. See WE LEAD, A.O. 2003-23, at 5-6 (Nov. 7, 2003) (recognizing the right of conduit 

committees to make expenditures without having those expenditures be deemed contributions or 

change the legal status of the underlying conduit contributions). 

The same analysis applies when dealing with in-kind, rather than monetary, conduit 

contributions. See 52 U.S.C. § 30101(8)(A)(i) (defining “contribution” to include both monetary 

and in-kind contributions). RFR’s solicitation, collection, and aggregation of 225,000 signatures 

with contact information, each worth a small amount of money, does not affect the underlying 

nature of each of those in-kind contributions. Each transaction remains a conduit contribution from 

each person who originally signed the petition and provided their contact information, through 

RFR, to Governor DeSantis. Llanes Decl. ¶¶ 14-17. The FEC may not conclude RFR exceeds its 

contribution limits by forwarding a petition containing $225,000 worth of signatory contact 

information to Governor DeSantis, since RFR is not deemed the contributor of any of those 

individual signatures or accompanying contact information. See 11 C.F.R. § 110.6(d)(1). And, 

again, RFR would be legally obligated to provide the signatories’ contact information to Governor 

DeSantis. See id. § 102.8(c). 

The FEC’s aggregation argument also suffers from another fatal flaw. Imagine that instead 

of soliciting signatures for a political petition, RFR had spent the same amount of money 

encouraging people to cut and paste the petition message from its website, see 

www.readyforron.com, and e-mail it together with their name and contact information to Governor 

DeSantis. RFR might even invite supporters to add a subject line such as “ANOTHER 

SIGNATURE FOR READY FOR RON’S PETITION!” If RFR’s solicitations and advertisements 

successfully convinced 225,000 people to transmit the requested message and contact information 

Case 1:22-cv-03282-RDM Document 25 Filed 03/14/23 Page 21 of 41
14 

to Governor DeSantis, the FEC would presumably not contend RFR had somehow made a 

contribution to Governor DeSantis. And the 225,000 e-mails containing supporters’ names and 

contact information would not transform into a contribution if Governor DeSantis decided to 

aggregate them together into a single document or file. Thus, particularly in light of the FECA’s 

provisions governing conduit contributions, there is no reasonable basis for concluding the 

provision of such contact information to Governor DeSantis somehow becomes a contribution 

simply because RFR allows it to accumulate as part of its petition and provides it to Governor 

DeSantis at one time, rather than having the Governor accumulate a quarter million identical emails from his supporters. 

For these reasons, the FEC may not manufacture a “contribution” from RFR simply by 

aggregating together the value of all the signatory contact information RFR collects. 

* * * 

Since the signed petition containing signatories’ contact information cannot be deemed a 

“contribution” from any perspective, the FECA’s contribution limits are inapplicable to it. RFR 

may therefore provide the signed petition to Governor DeSantis regardless of whether he is testing 

the waters or has become a candidate. 

B. The FEC Admits the Term “Contribution” is Ambiguous. 

This Court Should Not Strain to Construe the Term Broadly 

to Include RFR’s Signed Political Petition

At the very least, it is far from clear whether the term “contribution” includes contact 

information embedded within people’s signature blocks on a political petition. See supra Section 

I.A.1. The FEC itself has argued the term “contribution” is ambiguous, attempting to use that 

ambiguity as a springboard from which to claim Chevron deference for its broad interpretation. 

See FEC’s Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction, D.E. #16, at 24 (Feb. 1, 

Case 1:22-cv-03282-RDM Document 25 Filed 03/14/23 Page 22 of 41
15

2023) [hereinafter, “FEC Opp.”]. To the contrary, such ambiguity counsels in favor of a narrower 

construction. “In this delicate first amendment area, there is no imperative to stretch the statutory 

language” of the definition of contribution, “or read into it oblique inferences of Congressional 

intent” to include a signed political petition containing its signatories’ contact information. FEC 

v. Machinists Non-Partisan Political League, 655 F.2d 380, 392-94 (D.C. Cir. 1981).

3

In Machinists, the Court construed a broad, ambiguous term (“political committee”) 

narrowly under the constitutional avoidance principle. Id. at 394 (“It is our duty in the 

interpretation of federal statutes to reach a conclusion which will avoid serious doubt of their 

constitutionality.” (quoting Richmond Co. v. United States, 275 U.S. 331, 346 (1928))). This 

doctrine has led the D.C. Circuit to reject the FEC’s broad interpretation of other provisions of the 

FECA, as well. See, e.g., Chamber of Commerce v. FEC, 69 F.3d 600 (D.C. Cir. 1995) 

(invalidating FEC’s interpretation of the statutory term “member” in part on constitutional 

avoidance grounds); see also AFL-CIO v. FEC, 333 F.3d 168, 178-80 (D.C. Cir. 2003) 

(invalidating FEC policy concerning release of evidence obtained in administrative 

investigations); FEC v. GOPAC, Inc., 917 F. Supp. 851, 861 (D.D.C. 1996) (applying 

constitutional avoidance canon to reject the FEC’s proposed standard for determining whether an 

entity is a “political committee,” and instead mandating “an appropriate ‘bright-line’ rule”); FEC 

v. Sailors’ Union of Pac. Political Fund, 624 F. Supp. 492, 496 (N.D. Cal. 1986) (applying 

3 Prohibiting Americans from providing signed political petitions to candidates or potential 

candidates—or requiring such petitions be effectively anonymous by omitting signatories’ names 

or contact information—would also likely be the sort of important unexpected departure from 

American political traditions and substantial expansion of agency authority that would trigger the 

“major questions” doctrine. W. Va. v. EPA, 142 S. Ct. 2587, 2614 (2022). And due to the FECA’s 

potential criminal applications, RFR is entitled to have any remaining ambiguity resolved in its 

favor under the rule of lenity. Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 11 n.8 (2004); see also DePierre v. 

United States, 564 U.S. 70, 88 (2011).

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constitutional avoidance canon to “avoid[]” an interpretation of the FECA “under which 

contributions independently made by voluntarily associated labor organizations are aggregated, 

thereby severely restricting the exercise of first amendment rights.”), aff’d, 828 F.2d 502 (9th Cir. 

1987). 

Here, the FEC seeks to apply the term “contribution” to a signed political petition 

containing its signatories’ contact information. At the very least, such an approach raises serious 

constitutional questions concerning the First Amendment rights to freedom of expression and 

association, see infra Part II, that this Court can readily construe the FECA to avoid. Moreover, 

for at least a decade and a half, Congress consistently rejected the FEC’s repeated attempts to 

expand the definition of “contribution” to include funds provided “for the purpose of influencing 

a clearly identified individual to seek nomination for election or election to Federal office . . . .”

E.g., FEC, Priority Legislative Recommendations, at 5 (2001), 

https://www.fec.gov/resources/cms-content/documents/legrec2001.pdf; FEC, Legislative 

Recommendations—1987, reprinted in House Subcomm. on Elections, Comm. on House Admin., 

Hearings on Campaign Finance, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., at 869 (May 21, June 2, June 16, June 30, 

and July 14, 1987); see Plaintiff Ready for Ron’s Reply Memorandum of Law in Support of 

Motion for Preliminary Injunction, at 10-11 n.3. The FEC’s interpretation acts as if this rejected 

language were in the statute. Machinists itself cautions against construing FECA broadly to 

unnecessarily encompass draft efforts. 655 F.3d at 394 (holding attempts to encourage people to 

become candidates raise no “potential for corruption” that has “been specifically identified by 

Congress”). In short, there is a range of persuasive reasons why this Court should conclude 

ambiguities in the definition of “contribution” must be resolved by construing the term narrowly

Case 1:22-cv-03282-RDM Document 25 Filed 03/14/23 Page 24 of 41
17 

to exclude signed political petitions. Cf. Brunswick Corp., A.O. 1984-43, at 2 (Sept. 14, 1984) 

(construing the term “contribution” narrowly to exclude political endorsements). 

II. THE FIRST AMENDMENT BARS THE FEC FROM APPLYING THE 

FECA’S CONTRIBUTION LIMITS TO PROHIBIT RFR FROM PROVIDING 

ITS SIGNED POLITICAL PETITION TO GOVERNOR DESANTIS

This Court should not underestimate the important First Amendment issues that pervade 

this case. The FEC minimizes RFR’s First Amendment claims, claiming its signed political 

petition involves merely some unspecified “threshold level of expressive activity.” Tr. at 39; see 

also id. at 48. To the contrary, the signed petition itself is a literal embodiment of pure written 

political expression and political association. It contains an explicit political message, cf. Cox v. 

Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 563-64 (1965) (declaring a “telegram by a citizen to a public official” is 

“a pure form of expression”), and specifically identifies each of the people who wished to join 

together in a “collective effort” to “make their views known,” Citizens Against Rent Cont., 454 

U.S. at 294. 

As Justice Brennan explained:

Petitioning involves a bundle of related First Amendment rights: the right to express 

ideas, the right to be exposed to ideas expressed by others, . . . and the right to 

associate with others in the expression of opinion. 

The petition is especially suited for the exercise of all these rights: It serves as a 

vehicle of communication; as a classic means of individual affiliation with ideas or 

opinions; and as a peaceful yet effective method of amplifying the views of the 

individual signers. Indeed, the petition is a traditionally favored method of political 

expression and participation. 

Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 363 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 

The FEC argues RFR may provide its petition to Governor DeSantis only if it 

fundamentally changes its intended communication by stripping signatories’ contact information 

so the petition does not meaningfully identify them to Governor DeSantis. Tr. at 38; see also Tr. 

Case 1:22-cv-03282-RDM Document 25 Filed 03/14/23 Page 25 of 41
18 

at 40 (arguing the FEC is not barring RFR from conveying its message to Governor DeSantis, as 

long as it does not provide “contact information” to identify anyone who chose to associate 

together to join in the message). The FEC has failed to cite even a single case for the proposition 

that the Government may prohibit people from engaging in political expression unless they are 

effectively anonymous. 

This Part begins by explaining RFR’s and the signatories’ strong, constitutionally protected 

interest in including signatories’ contact information in the petition. It then shows how applying 

the FECA in this context is a direct content-based restriction on pure political speech that cannot 

survive strict scrutiny. Perhaps most importantly, it then goes on to show RFR’s signed political 

petition would be a horrendously wasteful, inefficient, expensive, and unrealistic means of 

attempting to engage in quid pro quo corruption. Next, this Part shows the FEC’s asserted interest 

here does not even rise to the level of “important,” much less “compelling.” Finally, this Part 

concludes by briefly reiterating how the Supreme Court’s reasoning upholding the constitutionality 

of contribution limits is inapplicable to a signed political petition. 

A. The Signatories’ Contact Information is an Integral Part of the 

 Petition’s Expressive Content and the Means Through Which the 

 Signatories Associate with Each Other and Governor DeSantis

Both RFR and the petition’s signatories have strong First Amendment interests in including 

their contact information in the signed petition. First, merely including a person’s name on its 

own, such as “John Smith,” without any further identifying information, is completely 

uninformative. Without more, “John Smith” might as well be an “X.” It carries no credibility. It 

completely precludes a signatory from distinguishing him- or herself in any way from potentially 

millions of other Americans with the same name. If Sylvester Stallone were to sign RFR’s petition, 

he might be easy enough to specifically identify. But many other Americans wouldn’t be. During 

Case 1:22-cv-03282-RDM Document 25 Filed 03/14/23 Page 26 of 41
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oral argument, the Court suggested it might not be especially important to Governor DeSantis 

which particular “Dan Backer” supports him. Tr. at 21. Even if that is correct, it still is meaningful 

to the signatory himself to be able to fully identify himself as part of his political expression.4

Second, excluding signatories’ contact information from the petition directly bars part of 

their (and RFR’s) political expression by excluding part of the message they wish to convey to 

Governor DeSantis. By signing the petition, each signatory specifically requested their name and 

contact information be incorporated into the petition and provided to Governor DeSantis. Courts 

in other contexts have recognized that, in matters of public concern, the First Amendment protects 

the right of people to include contact information, such as phone numbers and e-mail addresses, in 

their political communications. See, e.g., Brayshaw v. City of Tallahassee, 709 F. Supp. 2d 1244, 

1247, 1249 (N.D. Fla. 2010) (holding a statute prohibiting a person from maliciously disseminating 

a police officer’s home address or telephone number violated the First Amendment); Sheehan v. 

Gregoire, 272 F. Supp. 2d 1135, 1139, 1150 (W.D. Wash. 2003) (holding a statute prohibiting 

publication of a police officer’s address, telephone number, birthday, or social security number 

“with the intent to harm or intimidate” violated the First Amendment because it prohibited 

constitutionally protected “pure speech”); see also Ostergren v. Cuccinelli, 615 F.3d 263, 271 n.8, 

272 (4th Cir. 2010) (holding the First Amendment protects a person’s right to post land records 

containing unredacted social security numbers as a form of political protest, in part because the 

4 Even the FEC’s definition of the term “identification” embraces not only an individual’s name, 

but also contact and other information further specifying who exactly the person is. 52 U.S.C. 

§ 30101(13)(A); 11 C.F.R. § 100.12. This Court likewise requires attorneys to sign their filings 

not only with their name, but contact information including an address and telephone number to 

both help in identifying filers and facilitate communication with them. See D.C. L. Cv. R. 

5.1(c)(1); cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(A) (requiring each party to automatically disclose “the name 

and, if known, the address and telephone number of each individual likely to have discoverable 

information”). Neither the FEC nor this Court as an institution believes the name “John Smith,”

alone, is sufficient to meaningfully identify a person.

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plaintiff has “freedom to decide how her message should be communicated,” and “partial redaction 

would diminish the documents’ shock value and make [the plaintiff] less credible”); Publius v. 

Boyer-Vine, 237 F. Supp. 3d 997, 1004 (E.D. Cal. 2017) (“At its core, Plaintiffs’ speech is a form 

of political protest. . . . [T]he legislators’ home address and telephone number touch on matters of 

public concern in the context of Plaintiffs’ speech.”); Org. for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 

415, 417, 419-20 (1971) (overturning injunction prohibiting dissemination of pamphlets 

containing the name and phone number of a realtor along with a request to “call [him] at his home 

phone number” to protest his “blockbusting” business practices). 

Governor DeSantis’ potential candidacy is a matter of public concern. The fact the 

signatories’ audience is specifically Governor DeSantis, rather than the public at large, does not 

reduce their First Amendment interests. Accordingly, the petition’s signatories should have a First 

Amendment right to “decide how [their] message should be communicated,” Ostergren, 615 F.3d 

at 271 n.8, by including their contact information in their petition to him. 

Third, the inclusion of contact information enhances the petition’s legitimacy by increasing 

the likelihood each signature is real and allowing them to be authenticated. Should a name such as 

“C. Moore Bacon” pop up on the petition, without contact information it would be difficult to tell 

whether the signature was legitimate or a prank. See Emily Hall, Romney Fundraising 

Organization: “C. Moore Bacon” is Real Deal, WASH. POST (Sept. 18, 2013), 

https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/in-the-loop/wp/2013/09/18/romney-fundraisingorganization-c-moore-bacon-is-real-deal/. 

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, including signatories’ contact information helps 

them associate with Governor DeSantis by enabling him to respond specifically to the signatories 

or otherwise engage with them. Cf. Buckley, 424 U.S. at People have a fundamental constitutional 

Case 1:22-cv-03282-RDM Document 25 Filed 03/14/23 Page 28 of 41
21 

right to associate with each other to engage in political expression and promote their political goals.

See Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 469 U.S. 609, 618 (1984). The First Amendment protects reciprocal 

political communications. See Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301, 305-06 (1965) 

(stating the First Amendment protects the right to both make and receive communications).

Hindering a person’s ability to make or receive political communications substantially burdens 

their ability to associate. See FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 29 (1998) (recognizing “communications” 

as a fundamental component of the “constitutionally protected rights of association” (citing United 

States v. Congress of Indus. Orgs., 335 U.S. 106, 121 (1948) (holding it would raise “the gravest” 

constitutional doubt to interpret a statute to prohibit unions or corporations from communicating 

with their members, stockholders, or customers))). It is Kafakaesque to conclude RFR may provide 

its petition to Governor DeSantis only if RFR censors contact information provided by the 

petition’s signatories that would otherwise allow the Governor to respond to some or all of them. 

Accordingly, the signatories’ self-provided contact information is an integral part of RFR’s 

petition and the signatories’ speech, and is entitled to First Amendment protection. This Court 

should not accept the FEC’s framing of the petition as essentially a letter accompanied by a 

completely unrelated and easily severable mailing list. Omission of the signatories’ contact 

information substantially impacts the petition’s expressive content and associational effect.

Signatories have a First Amendment right to decide whether to engage in anonymous political 

speech, McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 342, or instead meaningfully identify themselves with more than a 

potentially fabricated, duplicative, or unverifiable name unaccompanied by any means of response. 

B. The FEC’s Prohibition on RFR Providing Its Signed Political Petition to 

 Governor DeSantis is a Content-Based Prohibition Triggering Strict Scrutiny

Case 1:22-cv-03282-RDM Document 25 Filed 03/14/23 Page 29 of 41
22

This Court should conclude the FECA’s contribution limits, as applied in the unique 

context of RFR’s signed political petition, are subject to strict scrutiny and unconstitutional. The 

FEC argues RFR’s petition should be seen as a letter to Governor DeSantis accompanied by a 

completely separate, unrelated, easily severable mailing list. It essentially contends the letter is the 

“tail wagging the dog” of the accompanying mailing list. Not so. To the contrary, the text of the 

letter appears to be the only reason the FEC claims authority to prohibit RFR from providing its 

signed petition to Governor DeSantis.

Assume RFR compiled a petition urging Governor DeSantis to support a particular piece 

of legislation or encouraging him to leave government and become head of the Walt Disney 

Corporation. The FEC presumably would not contend FECA either applies to such petitions or 

requires omission of the signatories’ contact information, even if Governor DeSantis were testing 

the waters or had become a federal candidate. The gravamen of the FEC’s concern actually isn’t 

Governor DeSantis’ receipt of the ostensibly valuable contact information incorporated within the 

petition. To the contrary, the FEC claims authority to censor RFR’s political communications—

and that of the petition’s 225,000 signatories—only because the petition’s text encourages 

Governor DeSantis to run for federal office. See 52 U.S.C. § 30101(8)(A)(i) (defining 

“contribution” as “any gift . . . of money or anything of value . . . for the purpose of influencing 

any election for Federal office”) (emphasis added).

The Supreme Court has held content-based restrictions on speech are subject to strict 

scrutiny. See, e.g., Barr v. Am. Ass’n of Political Consultants, 140 S. Ct. 2335, 2346 (2020). Strict 

scrutiny applies to such restrictions even if they were enacted with for unrelated innocuous 

purposes, Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 

117 (1991), and “do[] not discriminate among viewpoints within that subject matter,” City of 

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23

Austin v. Reagan Nat’l Adver. of Austin, LLC, 142 S. Ct. 1464, 1472 (2022) (quoting Reed v. Town 

of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 169 (2015)). In Reed, 576 U.S. at 160, the Court applied strict scrutiny 

to an ordinance that subjected temporary signs to special prohibitions if they were “designed to 

influence the outcome of an election.” The Court recognized the applicability of these restrictions 

“depend[ed] entirely on the communicative content of the sign.” Id. at 164. According, the 

ordinance was a “content-based regulation of speech,” id., subject to strict scrutiny, id. at 171, and 

unconstitutional, id. at 172.

The same is true here—the only reason the FEC seeks to regulate RFR’s petition is because 

its text seeks to persuade Governor DeSantis to run for office. See Tr. at 45 (“[I]t is the purpose of 

the donation and the receipt of that donation for the purpose of at least exploring a candidacy or 

actually running for office that makes this within FECA.”). Accordingly, in the unique context of 

this case, this Court should apply strict scrutiny to the FEC’s application of contribution limits to 

prohibit RFR from providing its signed petition to him. This reasoning is consistent with Buckley’s 

general approval of political contribution limits. Typical monetary and in-kind contributions entail 

only a “marginal” amount of communication. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 20-21. The contributions to 

which such limits typically apply are money and in-kind goods that lack any inherent expressive 

content. Consequently, contribution limits are generally subject only to intermediate scrutiny. Id. 

at 25. As applied in this case, however, the FEC invokes FECA’s contribution limits specifically 

due to the content of RFR’s pure political speech: the petition’s encouragement of Governor 

DeSantis to run for President. Such a content-based restriction is an impermissibly overbroad 

method of attempting to prevent quid pro quo corruption, and is therefore unconstitutional.

Moreover, as mentioned earlier, a person may convey a virtually identical list of signatories 

with accompanying contact information to Governor DeSantis, so long as the petition addresses

Case 1:22-cv-03282-RDM Document 25 Filed 03/14/23 Page 31 of 41
24 

just about any public policy issue imaginable. The ability of speakers on virtually any other policy 

topic to convey such information to Governor DeSantis, severely undercuts the FEC’s claim it has 

an important—much less a compelling—interest in preventing RFR from providing its petition to 

him. See Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 805 (2011) (holding laws 

“affect[ing] First Amendment rights . . . must be pursued by means that are neither seriously 

underinclusive nor seriously overinclusive”); see, e.g., Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y., 

Inc. v. Village of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 169 (2002). RFR’s petition does not pose any greater risk 

of potential quid pro quo corruption than contact information embedded within petitions on any 

other issue, simply because RFR wishes to encourage Governor DeSantis to run for President. 

Thus, both the discriminatory nature of the FEC’s prohibition, as well as its severe 

underinclusiveness in this context, further undermine the constitutionality of the FEC’s position.

Buckley, 424 U.S. at 45 (invalidating limits on independent expenditures and explaining they 

served “no substantial societal interest” because they were narrow and too easily circumvented to 

achieve the government’s anti-corruption goals). 

 C. RFR’s Signed Petition Would Be a Wasteful, Overpriced, Time-Consuming, 

 and Ridiculously Inefficient Way of Attempting to Circumvent Contribution 

 Limits and Engage in Quid Pro Quo Corruption 

 

This Court should not view RFR’s efforts as a potential bad-faith way to circumvent 

contribution limits. RFR’s petition-gathering process would be a terrible way of attempting to 

make an excessive in-kind contribution to a candidate or potential candidate. RFR has been 

gathering signatures for nearly a year. As of the end of 2021, as RFR’s FEC filings demonstrate, 

RFR has spent a total of approximately $783,000 in connection with its petition, which has been 

Case 1:22-cv-03282-RDM Document 25 Filed 03/14/23 Page 32 of 41
25 

RFR’s only activity.5 RFR’s next FEC filing will show RFR has spent a total of at least $1 million 

to compile its petition. See also Llanes Decl. ¶ 25 (explaining RFR’s ongoing spending). 

Undersigned counsel represents to the Court the petition presently contains approximately 

225,000 signatures (up from approximately 100,000 signatures at the time of the original Llanes 

declaration, see Llanes Dec. ¶ 18). Under the FEC’s approach, at the market rate of 0.05 cents per 

entry (as specified in the record), see Llanes Decl. ¶ 27, the value of the signatory contact 

information embedded within the petition would be $11,250. Even if the price per entry were 

twenty times as much—$1 each—the list’s value would still be under a quarter-million dollars.

Spending over a million dollars over more than a year in order to eventually, hopefully be able to 

funnel something worth a small fraction of that cost to a candidate or potential candidate would be 

an extraordinarily poor investment and does not pose a sufficiently realistic risk of corruption to 

justify a prohibition. See McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. 185, 213-14 (2014) (invalidating aggregate 

contribution limits, in part because it is “hard to believe that a rational actor would engage in . . . 

machinations” by spending $500,000 “to add just $26,000 to [a candidate’s] campaign coffers”).

To the extent RFR were seeking to enrich Governor DeSantis, it would have spent its million 

dollars soliciting monetary conduit contributions (which also would have enabled it to provide 

those actual contributors’ contact information to Governor DeSantis, see 11 C.F.R. §§ 102.8(b)(1); 

110.6(c)(1)(iii)-(iv)(A)). In short, a critical point that may have been obscured at oral argument is 

RFR’s activities make almost no sense as some sort of nefarious circumvention scheme.

5 https://www.fec.gov/data/committee/C00815928/?cycle=2022. RFR has made $281,000 in 

disbursements and taken out an additional $502,000 in loans for petition-related expenses. Id. 

Case 1:22-cv-03282-RDM Document 25 Filed 03/14/23 Page 33 of 41
26 

D. The FEC’s Arguments Undermine Its Asserted 

 Anti-Corruption and Anti-Circumvention Interests 

The FEC contends RFR can easily avoid any burdens on its rights by simply posting its 

signed petition, including signatories’ contact information, on the Internet. At oral argument, the 

FEC declared, “[I]t would alleviate a lot of our concerns if the list that Ready for Ron wants to 

provide were just published online, and Governor DeSantis, along with other people, were able to 

look at that list and contact who they wanted to.” Tr. at 39; see also Tr. at 46 (arguing RFR “could 

do it publicly,” apparently referring to providing Governor DeSantis the signed petition by posting 

it with signatories’ contact information on the Internet). 

This argument appears to give away the ballgame. The FEC contends it must prohibit RFR 

from providing the signed petition to Governor DeSantis because the signatories’ information is 

valuable and it creates a risk of quid pro quo corruption. The FEC offers no explanation as to how 

the purported risk of corruption is any less if RFR posts the signed petition on the Internet (thereby 

violating its signatories’ privacy rights and exposing them to harassment and violence, see Ams. 

for Prosperity Found. v. Bonta, 141 S. Ct. 2373, 2388 (2021)) rather than simply e-mailing or 

delivering it to Governor DeSantis. 

 In either case, RFR has used its “funds to create a thing of value.” Tr. at 36; see also id. at 

13 (discussing RFR’s “plans to expend considerable resources on the petition”); id. at 32 

(emphasizing arguing the signed petition is a contribution “specifically because of the money and 

other labor invested by Ready for Ron”). And in either case, the petition involves the “collection 

and compilation of information from tens of thousands, if not millions, of individuals nationwide.”

Id. at 13. Applying the FECA’s contribution limits to RFR’s signed petition cannot seriously 

further the FEC’s claimed anticorruption and anticircumvention interests if RFR can provide the 

information at issue to Governor DeSantis by posting it on the Internet. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 

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27 

45 (invalidating easily circumvented restrictions on independent expenditures in substantial part 

because the provision would not “sufficiently relate[] to the elimination” of “actual or apparent

quid pro quo arrangements”). And RFR should not have to subject the petition’s signatories—who 

never consented to public disclosure of their names or contact information—to the possibility of 

harassment or violence to ensure Governor DeSantis receives the complete petition. See Statement 

of Reasons of Vice Chair Allen Dickerson and Commissioners Sean J. Cooksey and James E. 

“Trey” Trainor, III, In re Joaquin Castro, MUR 7635, at 2-3 (Dec. 3, 2021) (explaining how 

Congressman Joaquin Castro tweeted the names, pictures, and employer information for President 

Trump’s top donors from the San Antonio area, blaming them for a race-related shooting at a 

nearby Walmart, subjecting them to a risk of intimidation, harassment, and violence). 

 E. The Supreme Court’s Reasoning Upholding the Constitutionality of 

 Contribution Limits is Inapplicable to a Signed Political Petition 

The preceding analysis ultimately leads back to RFR’s fundamental point. When the 

Buckley Supreme Court rejected a facial challenge to contribution limits, it did not view them as 

applying to actual political speech in mind. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 20-21 (holding contribution 

limits “entail[] only a marginal restriction upon the contributor’s ability to engage in free 

communication” because “[a] contribution serves as a general expression of support for the 

candidate and his views, but does not communicate the underlying basis”); see also id at 21 (“A 

limitation on the amount of money a person may give to a candidate or campaign organization thus 

involves little direct restraint on his political communication . . . .”). The Court noted any 

“expression rests solely on the undifferentiated, symbolic act of contributing.” Id. at 21; see also 

id. (“At most, the size of a contribution provides a very rough index of the intensity of the 

contributor’s support for the candidate.”); id. (characterizing a contribution as only a “symbolic 

expression of support”). The Court further emphasized, “While contributions may result in 

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28 

political expression if spent by a candidate or an association to present views to the voters, the 

transformation of contributions into political debate involves speech by someone other than the 

contributor.” Id. 

Unlike most applications of contribution limits, the FEC’s attempt to extend FECA to 

RFR’s signed petition is a “direct restraint” on the ability of both RFR and its contributors “to 

engage in free communication” to, and with, their desired candidate, Governor DeSantis. Id. at 20-

21. The information conveyed by RFR’s signed petition is far more than a “general expression of 

support” or an “undifferentiated, symbolic act.” Id. Moreover, RFR’s petition is political speech 

by RFR and the signatories themselves, and does not depend on any “transformation . . . by a 

candidate or . . . association.” Id. at 21. Thus, the Court’s rationales for subjecting contribution 

limits only to intermediate scrutiny are inapplicable to RFR’s signed political petition, which is 

both core political expression and an important, time-honored form of political association. Brown, 

444 U.S. at 363 (Brennan, J., dissenting). As with other restrictions on pure speech, the Court 

should apply strict scrutiny to the FECA’s contribution limits as they apply to RFR’s petition, and 

invalidate them on the grounds they neither further the Government’s asserted interests nor are 

narrowly tailored to doing so. See supra Section II.C-II.D. 

III. AT THE VERY LEAST, THE CONTACT INFORMATION 

INCORPORATED INTO THE PETITION SHOULD BE DEEMED 

CONDUIT CONTRIBUTIONS FROM EACH SIGNATORY. 

ACCEPTING THE PETITION WOULD NOT AUTOMATICALLY 

TRIGGER “CANDIDATE” STATUS FOR GOVERNOR DESANTIS

If this Court concludes that RFR’s signed petition constitutes or includes a contribution, 

and that the First Amendment allows the FEC to apply contribution limits to the petition, then this 

Court should treat the petition as incorporating a series of individually miniscule in-kind conduit 

Case 1:22-cv-03282-RDM Document 25 Filed 03/14/23 Page 36 of 41
29

contributions under 52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(8) and 11 C.F.R. § 110.6. See supra Subsections I.A.2-

I.A.3.

The FEC contends the petition constitutes a contribution because the signatory contact 

information incorporated into it is something of “value.” 52 U.S.C. § 30101(8)(A)(i). The 

ostensibly valuable contact information in the petition did not originate with RFR, however.

Rather, each of the petition’s signatories voluntarily decided for themselves whether to sign the 

petition and provide their contact information. RFR’s solicitations invite people to sign by 

notifying them that, by joining the petition, they are requesting RFR to provide their name and 

contact information to Governor DeSantis. Llanes Decl. ¶¶ 14-17. RFR has not and will not add 

anyone to its petition, or otherwise incorporate their contact information, without their express 

request and consent. Id. If this Court enables RFR to provide the signed petition to Governor 

DeSantis, RFR will be conveying the incorporated signatory contact information at each 

signatory’s express direction and on their behalf.

Accordingly, RFR is acting as a mere conduit or intermediary for a potential candidate. 52 

U.S.C. § 30116(a)(8); 11 C.F.R. § 110.6; see, e.g., ActBlue, A.O. 2006-30, at 1, 4-5 (Nov. 9, 2006) 

(allowing ActBlue to act as a conduit committee for “draft” funds it establishes for “specific 

individuals who may become candidates” for the Democratic party’s 2008 presidential 

nomination); see also ActBlue, A.O. 2014-19, at 4 (Jan. 15, 2015) (authorizing ActBlue to act as 

a conduit committee for “draft” funds it establishes on behalf of particular designated individuals 

to encourage them to become candidates). Each signatory should be regarded as the contributor of 

his or her own contact information, through RFR, to Governor DeSantis. See 52 U.S.C. 

§ 30116(a)(8) (specifying a contribution made by a person through a conduit to a candidate “shall 

be treated as contributions from such person to such candidate”); see, e.g., ActBlue, A.O. 2014-19, 

Case 1:22-cv-03282-RDM Document 25 Filed 03/14/23 Page 37 of 41
30

at 3 (holding contributions a person makes through a conduit committee to a candidate are regarded 

as contributions from that person to the candidate); accord ActBlue, A.O. 2006-30, at 6; WE LEAD, 

A.O. 2003-23, at 3 (Nov. 7, 2003).6

6 In the event this Court chooses to treat RFR’s provision of the signatory contact information 

incorporated into its petition to Governor DeSantis as conduit contributions, it should hold—

whether under the absurdity canon or constitutional avoidance canon—RFR need not publicly 

reveal the identity of each individual signatory on its disclosure forms pursuant to 11 C.F.R. 

§ 110.6(c)(1)(i), (iv)(A). First, such a requirement would be a substantial and unjustified burden 

on RFR or any other substantial petition-gatherer. RFR, for example, would have to manually input 

a minimum of 450,000 individual entries into its FEC report: one reflecting RFR’s receipt of each 

signatory’s contact information, and another reflecting its “expenditure” by forwarding that 

information to Governor DeSantis. Second, such compelled disclosure would violate the right to 

privacy of the petition’s signatories. Cf. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462 

(1958). Unlike financial contributors, they had no reason to believe they were making any sort of 

political contribution or that their identifies would be publicly disclosed, opening them to the 

potential for harassment, embarrassment, or even violence. See Ams. for Prosperity Found v. 

Bonta, 141 S. Ct. 2373, 2388 (2021) (noting the “risks” of politically motivated violence are 

“heightened in the 21st century and seem to grow with each passing year”). Third, such compelled 

disclosure requirements would have a tremendous chilling effect on the willingness of people to 

join and identify themselves in future draft petitions for potential federal candidates. See id. at 

2388 (invalidating disclosure requirement for private groups’ contributors because it “‘creates an 

unnecessary risk of chilling’ in violation of the First Amendment” (quoting Sec’y of State of Md. 

v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 968 (1984)).

Fourth, Buckley’s rationales for generally upholding compelled disclosure are inapplicable here.

Neither the public nor the FEC generally knows the identity of each person who provides their 

contact information to a candidate. The public has no greater informational interest, and the FEC 

has no greater anti-corruption or anti-circumvention interests, in identifying each person who 

signed RFR’s petition simply because they are providing their contact information through a 

conduit committee. Cf. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 66-68 (1976) (rejecting facial challenge to 

reporting requirements for campaign contributions because, “as a general matter, [they] directly 

serve substantial governmental interests”). Fifth, the value of each person’s name and contact 

information, on its own, is so individually de minimis that RFR should be excused from having to 

separately report each such in-kind contribution. Cf. Hon. Cecil Heftel, FEC A.O. 1977-51, at 2

(Nov. 16, 1977) (exempting a box of macadamia nuts from the usual rules governing contributions 

in part because they “appear to be of minimal value”).

Finally, contributions from individuals are generally reported to the FEC only if they exceed 

$200. See, e.g., 11 C.F.R. § 104.3(a)(4)(i). Conduit committees, in contrast, are generally required 

to report all of the contributions they transmit to candidates, id. § 110.6(c)(1)(iv)(A), primarily to 

allow both the FEC and the recipient candidate to ensure the contributor is not exceeding their 

contribution limits, see Tr. at 41 (“[W]e do require enough information so that we can verify who 

the [contributor to the conduit committee] is so that they’re not making multiple contributions to 

a single person.”). These concerns are inapplicable where a person’s in-kind contribution is the 

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RFR, in turn, is therefore legally obligated to transmit to Governor DeSantis the signatory 

contact information it has received to incorporate into its signed petition. See 11 C.F.R. § 102.8(c).

RFR is not deemed to be the contributor of any of these in-kind contributions. See id. § 110.6(d)(1) 

(noting conduit contributions do not count against the conduit’s or intermediary’s contribution 

limits). The value of each of these in-kind contributions—the contact information for each 

signatory—is well below each contributor’s contribution limit of $3,300 per election. 52 U.S.C. 

§ 30116(a)(1)(A); see also FEC, Price Index Adjustments for Contribution and Expenditure 

Limitations and Lobbying Bundling Disclosure Threshold, 88 Fed. Reg. 7088, 7090 (Feb. 2, 2023).

Thus, RFR may provide the signed petition to Governor DeSantis regardless of whether he is 

testing the waters or has become a candidate.

In the event this Court allows RFR to provide its signed petition to Governor DeSantis 

under this approach, his acceptance of the petition would not automatically trigger “candidate” 

status. Cf. Tr. at 7-8, 10, 53-54, 57 (suggesting Governor DeSantis “might just find himself, if he 

accepts [the petition], as a candidate”). As a constitutional matter, it would be a severe burden on 

RFR’s rights of political speech and association to conclude a person automatically becomes a 

candidate simply because they accept RFR’s signed political petition encouraging them to become 

a candidate. In any event, at most, rather than triggering candidacy status, RFR’s provision of its 

signed petition to Governor DeSantis would fall within the FEC’s “testing the waters” regulation, 

11 C.F.R. § 100.72.7

provision of their own name and contact information. Yet again, these issues and difficulties 

simply underscore the fact that, taken as a whole, the FECA simply does not contemplate the term 

“contribution” will be applied to names and contact information that people choose to provide to 

candidates, whether directly, through conduit committees, or as part of political petitions.

7 RFR has challenged the validity of § 100.72 to the extent it imposes contribution limits on noncandidates who are merely considering the possibility of running for office. In the event this Court 

Case 1:22-cv-03282-RDM Document 25 Filed 03/14/23 Page 39 of 41
32 

The FEC has vigorously defended § 100.72 in this case, despite the regulation’s lack of 

clear statutory authorization, on the grounds it “reduce[s] the burdens on prospective candidates 

for federal office, who could otherwise be subject to the automatic thresholds triggering 

‘candidate’ status under FECA.” FEC Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction, 

D.E. #16, at 33 (Feb. 1, 2023). Under the FEC’s own view, § 100.72 provides a safe harbor for 

Governor DeSantis to accept the signed petition without thereby being deemed a candidate. Cf. Tr. 

at 45 (concession by counsel for the FEC that accepting the petition might mean Governor 

DeSantis is “testing the waters,” rather than becoming a candidate). Accordingly, contribution 

limits would not prohibit RFR from providing its signed petition to Governor DeSantis at any time, 

and the Governor may accept it without thereby automatically becoming a candidate. 

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, this Court should grant Plaintiff RFR’s Motion for a Preliminary 

Injunction and grant judgment or summary judgment to RFR on Counts I, II, III, and V. 

March 14, 2023 /s/ Dan Backer 

Dan Backer, Esq. (D.C. Bar No. 996641) 

Chalmers, Adams, Backer & Kaufman LLC

441 N. Lee Street, Suite 300 

Alexandria, VA 22314

(202) 210-5431 

dbacker@ChalmersAdams.com 

concludes RFR’s signed petition does not constitute a “contribution” at all, see supra Part I,

§ 100.72’s contribution limits would be inapplicable to the petition and RFR’s challenge to that 

regulation would be mooted. Similarly, should this Court instead conclude the ostensibly valuable 

information in the petition constitutes conduit contributions from the petition’s signatories to 

Governor DeSantis, see supra Part III, RFR would not be providing an excessive contribution to 

him. Consequently, its challenge to the regulation would again be mooted. 

In any event, § 100.72 may provide a safe harbor for non-candidates’ acceptance of financial and 

other assistance without simultaneously subjecting them to contribution limits. As a policy matter, 

it may make great sense to impose contribution limits on people considering the possibility of 

running for federal office. The plain text of FECA’s contribution limits, however, apply only to 

actual candidates. 52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(1)(A). 

Case 1:22-cv-03282-RDM Document 25 Filed 03/14/23 Page 40 of 41
33 

Lilian Rodriguez-Baz, Esq.* 

Chief Legal Counsel, Ready for Ron 

66 W Flagler Street, Suite 900 

Miami, FL 33130 

(561) 291-9897 

Lilian@ReadyForRon.com 

*Admitted pro hac vice

Attorneys for Plaintiff

NOTICE OF ERRATA

 Some of RFR’s previous filings referred to an FEC advisory opinion with the citation 

ActBlue, A.O. 2008-10 (Jan. 15, 2015). RFR was discussing an opinion in with the Commission 

approved conduit contributions into “draft” funds, to allow people to make contributions 

earmarked for specific women who had not yet become presidential candidates. The correct 

citation for that advisory opinion, utilized in this memorandum, is ActBlue, A.O. 2014-19, at 4-6 

(Jan. 15, 2015). 

Any inadvertent references by RFR to A.O. 2008-10 in previous filings should be 

understood as references to A.O. 2014-19 instead. The actual A.O. 2008-10 appears to be irrelevant 

to this case. RFR respectfully apologizes for any confusion or inconvenience. 

Case 1:22-cv-03282-RDM Document 25 Filed 03/14/23 Page 41 of 41