BACKGROUND PAPER

U.S. Naval Forces:

The Peacetime

Presence Mission

December 1978

Congress of the United States

Congressional Budget Office

Washington, D.C.
U.S. NAVAL FORCES:

THE PEACETIME PRESENCE MISSION

The Congress of the United States

Congressional Budget Office

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Washington, D.C. 20402

PREFACE

As the Congress debates the First Concurrent Resolution

on the Budget for Fiscal Year 1980, the Navy budget will be

one of the important issues that it addresses. Decisions about

the size, location, and equipment of naval forces will be tied to

assumptions about how and where they should be used, both in

wartime and in peacetime.

While wartime missions have been widely discussed both within

and outside the Congress, far less attention has been devoted to

the demand that the Navy's peacetime mission—overseas presence—

places upon naval forces and budgets. The presence mission is

extremely important, however, for it is a key aspect of U.S.

political relationships with many of its overseas allies.

Responding to a joint request from Senator Edmund Muskie, Chairman

of the Senate Budget Committee, and Senator John Glenn, Chairman

of the Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs of the

Senate Foreign Relations Committee, this paper examines demands of

the Navy's peacetime mission, with special reference to its

operations in the Pacific region. The paper is intended to serve

as background for a companion CBO budget issue paper that will

address both the Navy's wartime and peacetime missions.

This paper was prepared by Dov S. Zakheim and Andrew Hamilton

of the National Security and International Affairs Division of the

Congressional Budget Office, under the supervision of David S.C.

Chu. The authors gratefully acknowledge the contributions of John

Shewmaker, who was responsible for early work on ship rotation

factors, and Edward Swoboda of CBO's Budget Analysis Division,

who prepared the cost estimates. Helpful comments on earlier

drafts were provided by Patrick Renehan, Robert Schafer, John

Ellwood, Marshall Hoyler, Jane D'Arista, and Nancy Swope of the

CBO staff; Professor Edward N. Luttwak of Georgetown University;

and Admiral Noel Gayler, USN (Ret.). (The assistance of these

reviewers implies no responsibility for the final product, which

rests solely with the Congressional Budget Office.) Patricia H.

Johnston edited the manuscript; Janet Stafford typed the several

drafts; and Connie Leonard prepared the paper for publication.

Alice M. Rivlin

Director

December 1978

iii

CONTENTS

PREFACE ill

SUMMARY xi

CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION 1

CHAPTER II. NAVAL PRESENCE: ITS MEANING AND PURPOSE ... 5

The Impact of Overseas Carrier Presence

Requirements upon Naval Force Levels .... 9

Forces for the Presence Mission:

A Function of Deployment Patterns

and Carrier Requirements 13

CHAPTER III. CURRENT FORWARD DEPLOYMENTS

AND REGIONAL BALANCES 15

Missions of the Navy's Pacific Forces 15

Operating Areas of the Seventh Fleet 20

Missions of the Navy's Mediterranean Forces . . 33

Historical Aspects of Current Deployments ... 37

CHAPTER IV. REEVALUATING CURRENT U.S. NAVAL POSTURE .... 39

Soviet Naval Presence Mission:

A Multimode Approach 42

CHAPTER V. ALTERNATIVE FORWARD DEPLOYMENT SYSTEMS

AND CONCEPTS 45

Considerations in Choosing Alternatives

to Current Deployment Posture 45

Alternative Naval Presence Postures 48

Land-Based Alternatives 64

CHAPTER VI. CONCLUSIONS: TOWARD A MORE EFFECTIVE

STRATEGY FOR OVERSEAS PRESENCE 69

v

CONTENTS (Continued)

APPENDIX A. FORWARD DEPLOYMENTS AND

SHIP ROTATION FACTORS .

APPENDIX B. THE EFFECT OF CARRIERS ON •

OVERALL FORCE LEVELS . . .

GLOSSARY AND ABBREVIATIONS

vil

TABLES

Page

TABLE 1. SOUTHWEST PACIFIC REGIONAL POWERS, 1978 .... 28

TABLE 2. INDIAN OCEAN REGIONAL POWERS, 1978 32

TABLE 3. UNIT ACQUISITION COSTS OF SELECTED

V/STOL-CAPABLE SHIPS 59

TABLE 4. COSTS OF TASK GROUPS WITH EQUAL

V/STOL CAPABILITY 63

TABLE 5. MARGINAL COSTS OF ALTERNATIVE

PRESENCE POSTURES 64

APPENDIX TABLE

TABLE B-l. CARRIER-RELATED NAVAL UNITS 81

FIGURES

FIGURE 1. REPRESENTATIVE CARRIER SERVICE-LIFE

EXTENSION PROGRAM 12

FIGURE 2. NORTHEAST ASIA AND THE NORTH PACIFIC 19

FIGURE 3. SOUTHEAST ASIA AND THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC ... 24

FIGURE 4. THE INDIAN OCEAN REGION 30

ix

SUMMARY

The size and structure of the U.S. Navy have been the

subject of lengthy and unresolved debate, both within and outside

the Congress, over the past five years. Much of that debate

has concerned the force levels and types of ships required to

meet the Navy's wartime missions of sea control and power projection. An important consideration in the debate, however,

concerns the forces needed to support the Navy's peacetime

presence mission—specifically, whether that mission justifies

procurement of an additional aircraft carrier.

The Navy's currently approved force levels will include

11 operational carriers during the 1980s and early 1990s. A

twelfth carrier, scheduled to undergo extended overhaul as part of

the planned Service-Life Extension Program (SLEP), will not be

operational. Whether 11 is an appropriate number of operational

carriers for wartime requirements remains an open question.

Differing views on the effective wartime use of naval forces

produce different "required" force levels. These will be discussed in a forthcoming companion CBO budget issue paper. But

recently the argument has been advanced that, whatever the wartime

need, a minimum of 12 operational carriers is required to meet the

Navy's peacetime missions. To achieve this force level would

necessitate constructing an additional large carrier at a cost

ranging from $1.6 billion for a non-nuclear ship (CW) to $2.6

billion for a Nimitz-class, nuclear-powered carrier (CVN).

This argument is based on the current requirement to maintain four carriers overseas at all times, along with their

supporting ships. Two carriers are deployed in the Mediterranean, and two are in Asian waters ranging from Japan to the

Indian Ocean. The Navy argues that a total of 12 operational

carriers is needed to support these forward-deployed forces in

peacetime, since ships must have adequate amounts of time in port

for major maintenance and crews need time in port for training and

home leave.

This paper reviews current deployments in the context of

alternative approaches to the Navy's peacetime missions and operating methods. It finds that a range of alternative measures that

xi
are less costly than procurement of an additional large carrier

could be implemented to maintain, and even increase, the Navy's

capabilities to perform current peacetime missions. These could

include changes in deployment patterns and/or changes in naval

systems.

U.S. NAVAL PRESENCE MISSIONS; CURRENT POSTURE AND THE CASE FOR

ALTERNATIVES

The United States has maintained a permanent military presence overseas since the end of World War II. Ground forces have

been the prime components of that presence in Central Europe and

Korea. Presence outside those areas, however, has been viewed

primarily in naval terms, and has involved activities ranging

from port calls and goodwill visits ("showing the flag") to

deterring military aggression with the threat that force would

be applied rapidly if such aggression materialized ("crisis

control").

The U.S. overseas naval posture has emphasized the use of

large aggregations of firepower, centered on the aircraft carrier. These units combine peacetime naval presence and crisiscontrol functions with the capability to move immediately to

wartime power projection.

Current U.S. naval peacetime deployments are as much a

product of historical precedent as of current military necessity

or requirements. While recognizing that requirements may change

again over a longer period of time, this paper discusses peacetime

missions in terms of the current situation and the immediate

future.

For both political and military reasons, today's distribution

of forward-deployed carrier resources may not be optimal for U.S.

peacetime missions. The effectiveness of U.S. naval presence

might be enhanced by alternative deployment postures that more

closely reflect current U.S. interests.

U.S. political aims in the northwest Pacific are to reassure

Japan, Korea, and even the People's Republic of China of the

American commitment to maintain stability and contain Soviet

expansion in the region. It is unclear that the deployment of a

single carrier task force in the face of a large and growing

xii
Soviet air, surface, and submarine capability is sufficient to

provide such assurances.

On the other hand, U.S. aims of maintaining regional stability in the southwest Pacific and Indian Ocean and of ensuring the

free flow of Middle East oil to East Asia might be met with

lower-value forces less capable than the carrier task force that

now divides its time between the two regions. The People's

Republic of China is not currently considered a hostile adversary

and therefore is not now a target of the U.S. naval deterrent.

Furthermore, local forces cannot threaten U.S. naval units

with anything other than temporary damage by patrol boat missiles.

Such damage would have greater political than military ramifications, and the political ramifications might be more limited

if a lower-value unit, rather than a high-value carrier, were

involved. Lastly, the Soviet navy, as currently deployed, also

cannot threaten U.S. forces on a sustained basis. For these

reasons, the carrier deploying to the Indian Ocean and southwest

Pacific might be better employed elsewhere.

U.S. naval missions in the Mediterranean are geared to

reassuring southern NATO allies, as well as Israel and moderate

Arab states, of U.S. support in either a NATO war or a non-NATO

Middle East crisis. (Sixth Fleet carrier forces no longer are

critical elements in the U.S. strategic deterrent, as they were in

the 1950s.) The proximity of the eastern Mediterranean to bomber

bases in the Soviet Union and the permanent deployment of a

powerful Soviet naval squadron in that sea pose a serious threat

to Sixth Fleet carrier forces, however. This situation could put

the Sixth Fleet at a disadvantage in the early stages of a NATO/

Warsaw Pact war and limit its political and military effectiveness

in crises involving U.S.-Soviet confrontation. It could be

argued, therefore, that the interests of U.S. friends and allies

in the Mediterranean might be better met if the United States did

not permanently deploy its Sixth Fleet carriers in the eastern

Mediterranean.

Thus, U.S. presence requirements may not uniformly call

for carrier forces in all regions in which they now are deployed.

In this regard, it is noteworthy that Soviet overseas naval

presence differs markedly from that of the United States. Soviet

naval forces tend to lack the firepower of their U.S. counterparts

and frequently operate in combination with land-based air and

ground units. While Soviet naval strategy and requirements differ

xiii
markedly from those of the United States, recent Soviet use of

ground forces to support operations in Africa points to the

possibility of maintaining a capable "presence" without relying

solely on the aircraft carrier.

ALTERNATE CONCEPTS AND SYSTEMS AND THEIR COSTS

Continuation of the current U.S. naval peacetime posture

during the 1980s would require procurement of an additional

carrier to maintain an operational force of 12 carriers. Alternatives to the current posture could involve homeporting an

additional carrier overseas (thus reducing the number of carriers

required to support forward deployments); moving to a flexible,

as opposed to a permanent, deployment pattern; using lowervalue systems in place of carriers in certain locations; or

using land-based aircraft to perform certain naval missions. The

following tables illustrate the effect of these alternatives

on carrier force levels and summarize the cost of the alternatives.

ALTERNATIVE PEACETIME POSTURES: OPERATIONAL CARRIER REQUIREMENTS

Active Operational

Alternatives Carriers Carriers

Maintain Current

Active Carrier

Level and Posture:

Buy Added Carrier 13 12

Homeport Carrier at Guam 12 11

Flexible Deployments 12 11

Substitute Small

Air-Capable Ship

for Carrier 12 11

NOTE: Active carriers include all carriers in the active force.

Operational carriers include only those units that are not

undergoing long-term, service-life extension.

xiv
COSTS OF ALTERNATIVE PEACETIME POSTURES:

YEAR 1980 DOLLARS

BY FISCAL YEAR, IN MILLIONS OF FISCAL

Option

Maintain Current

Carrier Level

and Posture

Homeport

Carrier

at Guam

Flexible

Deployments

Substitute

Small Air- Capable

Ship for Carrier

Systems Costs I

Procured 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984

CW 1,575 — or

CVN 2,565

Military

Construction: Guam 250

__

1 LHA 820 —

or 2 LPH/1 LHA 45/— — /820 45/— — /— — /—

or 2 DDV 810 — 625 —

,ife-Cycle Costs

4,920

6,750

250

—

2,250

2, 700

3,090

Homeporting

One less costly approach that would maintain the integrity of

the forward-deployed carrier force would be to homeport an additional carrier task force overseas. (A carrier is already homeported in Japan.) This approach would reduce by at least one the

number of operational carriers required to support the forwarddeployed fleets; thus, it would not be necessary to build an

additional carrier to meet peacetime needs. The firepower of the

operational carrier forces would also be reduced by one unit,

however.

Homeporting would incur a variety of costs, notably those of

military construction and port dredging. It also could entail

political problems with the host state. A homeporting arrangement

in Guam, which is a U.S. territory, would minimize these political

problems, however. The initial military construction costs

associated with homeporting a carrier task force at Guam could

amount to about $250 million, which compares favorably to the $1.6

billion minimum procurement cost of a single carrier.

xv
Flexible Deployments

It may be felt, however, that periodic naval peacetime visits

could have the same political benefit as permanent stations. The

Navy could then adopt a "flexible deployment" posture, which would

vary the duration and locale of each deployment. For example,

carriers could be deployed for a few months to different regions

of the Pacific rather than being maintained on one year-round

Pacific station. Flexible deployments would permit a larger

number of carriers to be maintained in "ready" status nearer the

United States. These carriers could then be used to reinforce

deployed units in a crisis. Flexible deployments would also allow

shorter total overseas deployments on the part of the fleet as

a whole. As a result, fewer carriers would be needed to support

the presence mission, and a thirteenth carrier would not have to

be procured simply to support peacetime presence requirements. It

should be noted, however, that states in regions where carrier

task forces are currently deployed might object to their removal

for even part of a year and could interpret such a move as a

signal of waning U.S. interest in that region.

V/STOL Ships

A third broad alternative would maintain the Navy's current

level of peacetime presence but would substitute one or more

units carrying vertical/short take-off and landing (V/STOL)

aircraft for a carrier in the fiscal year 1980 shipbuilding

program. The V/STOL ship would replace a carrier in support

of one of the four major forward naval deployments—logically, the

one now deployed largely to the southwest Pacific and Indian

Ocean, where the threat to U.S. forces is relatively low. No

additional escort ships would have to be procured, since the

V/STOL ship would simply take the place in the force structure of

the carrier in SLEP.

At least three choices of V/STOL ships are available.

They include the LHA, a general purpose amphibious warfare ship

that, at 39,000 tons, is as large as a World War II aircraft

carrier; the LPH, an amphibious warfare ship that is larger than

any cruiser; and the DDV, a destroyer converted to carry aircraft. The LHA is the most survivable of the three ships and can

carry twice as many V/STOL aircraft as the others. The LPH would

require only minor conversion and is the most readily available

for V/STOL use. The DDV, a new class of ship less costly than the

xvi
LHA, represents the greatest potential for Increasing the number

of fleet air platforms but has relatively poor ability to operate

in rough seas. Examples of the procurement costs of various task

forces employing each of these platforms and carrying 20 V/STOL

AV-8B aircraft in each task force appear in the cost table above.

The procurement cost of these options, ranging from $0.8 billion

for an LHA to $1.4 billion for two DDVs, is less than the procurement cost of any large aircraft carrier variant. The military

capability of each force is less than the capability provided by a

large carrier, however. JY

Land-Based Aviation

The last alternative involves the substitution of land-based

aviation for forward-deployed naval air forces. For example,

a squadron of Air Force F-lll fighters deploying from the U.S.

air base on Diego Garcia could be used to patrol sea-lanes in

the Indian Ocean. This operation could take the place of the

periodic U.S. carrier deployment to the Indian Ocean. In that

case, the Navy could more easily support the Sixth and Seventh

Fleets with only 11 carriers. Without additional overseas homeporting, however, an 11-carrier force would still not be capable

of supporting four continuously deployed task forces. Initial

outlays for this alternative would amount to about $50 million.

ENHANCING U.S. OVERSEAS PRESENCE; A MORE FLEXIBLE APPROACH

The options outlined above are not mutually exclusive. Most

are complementary. For instance, homeporting an LHA instead of

a large carrier in Guam could produce several benefits. This

approach would permit the Navy to provide additional presence

in the northwest Pacific with large carriers. Meanwhile, the

LHA would be available for nearly full-time presence in the

southwest Pacific and Indian Ocean areas. Thus, U.S. naval

presence could be increased in the areas where the threat is

largest and maintained, at an effective level of force, in

other areas.

\J Costs and capabilities would change if another V/STOL aircraft

were chosen.

xvii

36-473 O - 78 - 2
Taken in concert, elements of these options would provide

the United States with a more flexible approach to presence

and crisis-response requirements than is currently available.

What currently may be excessive U.S. reliance upon, and preoccupation with, the carrier force tends to obscure the potential

of other systems, particularly for operations in less threatening

environments. To the extent that lower-value naval and groundbased units impart credibility of U.S. purpose, their presence

would provide a useful tool for policymakers.

xviii
CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION

Much of the recent Congressional debate about the appropriate

size and mix of U.S. naval forces for the 1980s and 1990s, and

about budgets to support those forces, has focused on the nature

and demands of the Navy's missions in wartime. Although clearly

important to the determination of future naval construction

programs, these wartime missions are only one facet of the Navy's

activities. The Navy conducts peacetime operations that also

produce demands for various types and numbers of naval units.

While the wartime and peacetime demands might be congruent, they

need not be so; indeed, it is possible that peacetime demands

actually could exceed wartime requirements. In that case, it

would be the Navy's peacetime role that was critical to the

ultimate determination of naval shipbuilding programs.

This paper addresses the U.S. Navy's peacetime mission:

supporting U.S. worldwide presence. Peacetime presence is a broad

term connoting a wide variety of activities that are as much

political as they are military. The presence mission itself

is not limited to naval forces; U.S. ground forces have been

deployed in Central Europe and South Korea for nearly three

decades. Nevertheless, far-flung U.S. overseas commitments,

particularly in the Mediterranean Sea and the western Pacific

Ocean, have given special significance to the Navy's role in

performing the worldwide U.S. presence mission. The Navy's

importance in the Pacific has been enhanced by the withdrawal of

U.S. ground forces from Southeast Asia following the Vietnam war

and the scheduled additional withdrawals from Korea.

Naval presence activities range from port calls and goodwill

visits by secondary fleet units (termed "showing the flag") to

demonstrations during crises by one or more major carrier task

forces (termed "crisis control"). Of course, not all crises can

be "controlled," and one virtue of the Navy is its ability to

undertake military operations immediately upon the outbreak of

hostilities.

The Navy's flexibility also enhances its importance to the

presence mission. Unlike forward-deployed ground forces, which

face particular threats in specific locales (for example, the

Warsaw Pact in Europe and North Korea along the 38th Parallel),
naval units can meet a variety of possible foes in a variety of

locales. Other forces, particularly air forces, have come to

possess a similar capability, however. Aircraft now have far

greater effective ranges than they did in the past and can transit

long distances carrying bombs, missiles, and personnel.

Nevertheless, U.S. presence outside continental Europe

continues to be viewed primarily in naval terms by both the

Department of Defense (DoD) _!/ and the public at large. Furthermore, naval presence has been synonymous with carrier presence.

The aircraft carrier forms the core of the Navy's firepower

capabilities and provides the sole truly offensive unit in

forward-deployed task forces.

The carrier cannot be forward deployed, however, unless it is

supported by escort, support, and replenishment ships that provide

for its defense and resupply. Further, each forward-deployed

carrier requires one or more backup units, with their own supporting ships. This would permit year-round deployment while

the carrier is overhauled, maintained, and employed in training

exercises, and permit crew rotation, training, arid leave time.

As a result, forward deployments generate a large part of the

demand for Navy general purpose forces. For this reason, peacetime deployments will be a key consideration in any Administration

decision to request an additional carrier in fiscal year 1980.

Indeed, while carriers have a wartime role, the case for another

carrier is being made on the basis of the need to maintain the

current peacetime deployment posture. J2/

The increasing ability of the Soviet fleet to threaten

carrier forces worldwide, the spread of antiship missile technology to even smaller navies, and political realignments among

Third World countries have created uncertainty about the carrier's

usefulness to certain presence missions outside Europe and

_!/ Department of Defense, Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1979,

pp. 86-87, 91.

2^1 See testimony of Secretary of Defense Harold Brown in Military

Posture and H.R. 10929 (Department of Defense Authorization

for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1979), Hearings before the

House Committee on Armed Services, 95:2 (February, March, and

April 1978), Part 4, p. 1135. See also "USN Aircraft Carrier

Programs: Topical Questions and Answers," pp. 413-14.
Northeast Asia, however. As the Congress debates the fiscal year

i960 shipbuilding budget, it may wish to consider whether technological and political changes of recent years might justify

the use of alternative systems and deployment concepts in place of

the current carrier-oriented presence requirements.

Alternative concepts could include additional overseas

homeporting arrangements or deployments that do not require

carriers to operate in particular locales for extended periods

("flexible deployments"). Either change would reduce the peacetime (though not necessarily the wartime) requirement for carrier

force levels to support the U.S. overseas posture. Alternative

systems could include smaller ships capable of carrying vertical/

short take-off and landing (V/STOL) aircraft. These ships are

less costly per unit, though considerably less capable, than

large-deck carriers. They might be used to augment current

carrier forces. They could also be procured in conjunction with

changes in deployment concepts to replace carriers in performing

primarily peacetime tasks. Lastly, the Congress might wish to

consider alternatives that go beyond naval presence—for example,

the use of long-range aircraft for carrying out part of the U.S.

overseas presence requirement. Again, this alternative might

serve to complement, or substitute for, elements of the carrier

force.

This paper reviews these alternatives in the context of a

broader examination of the importance of the naval presence

mission to U.S. Navy force levels and planning. Given the Navy's

current primacy as the embodiment of U.S. presence outside Europe

and Northeast Asia, this paper first addresses in detail the

meaning, purpose, and varieties of presence as it is understood in naval terms. It examines the effect of current U.S.

forward deployments on naval force levels and capabilities. The

paper then outlines the political and military implications of

altering the current U.S. forward naval deployment posture and

concludes with an examination of alternative deployment systems

and concepts, both naval and non-naval, as substitutes for

elements of the current posture.

It should be emphasized that, while the considerations

raised in this paper could affect the peacetime demand for

naval systems, they may not in themselves justify action on

Administration requests for naval units, including an additional

carrier. Rather, these considerations are intended to provide

a background for Congressional assessment of those requests.

Indeed, a key factor in future decisions on carrier procurement
will be whether the demand for an additional carrier is based

on peacetime or wartime needs. Congressional action on Administration proposals must take account of wartime needs as well

as peacetime requirements. The question of wartime needs and

the interplay between those needs and peacetime demands will

form the basis of a separate, forthcoming CBO budget issue paper.
CHAPTER II. NAVAL PRESENCE: ITS MEANING AND PURPOSE

Naval presence is as much a political as a military activity.

As noted in Chapter I, it comprises functions ranging from

port calls and goodwill visits ("showing the flag") to attempts

to deter hostile military operations or to compel other states,

both unfriendly and friendly, to act in a certain way ("crisis

control"). _!/ Depending on the specific demands of the task

at hand, a variety of forces can be employed for these activities.

For example, a single guided-missile destroyer visited the

South Pacific port of Funafuti, Tuvalu, in the summer of 1978

to symbolize U.S. participation in that country's independence

celebration. 2^/ A small task force group, centered around

a helicopter-carrying amphibious assault ship (LHA), conducted

a successful goodwill tour of West African ports in December

1977. I/

An example of the crisis-control mission was the "routine"

visit of the carrier Ranger and its escorts to the Kenyan port

of Mombasa in July 1976. That visit may have deterred Uganda

from carrying out its threats to attack Kenya in the aftermath of

the Entebbe raid, kj The deployment of three carrier task forces

in the Mediterranean Sea contributed to the stand-off between

the U.S. Sixth Fleet and a large Soviet naval squadron during

the October 1973 Middle East war. It also provided a secure

protective air route for the resupply of materiel to Israel by sea

_!_/ See Edward Luttwak, The Political. Uses of Sea Power (Baltimore:

Johns Hopkins, 1974), pp. 3-11, passim.

7J U.S. Navy information, provided to the Congressional Budget

Office (CBO), October 31, 1978.

3/ Ibid.

47 "War of Words Over a Tense Border," Time (July 26, 1976),

p. 41; "Mounting Dangers for Latest U.S. 'Ally' in Africa,"

U.S. News and World Report (August 2, 1976), p. 49.
and air. _5_/ Lastly, the deployment of four carriers off the coast

of Cuba in 1962 was a critical (though not the sole) factor

contributing to the success of the U.S. blockade during the Cuban

missile crisis. _6/ These four examples reveal that underlying

the effectiveness of naval presence—indeed of all forms of

military presence—is the implied threat of the use of force by

the power that "shows the flag."

Naval forces traditionally have been employed for the

presence mission because they do not depend on land bases or

infringe upon the sovereignty of other states. Nevertheless,

their presence embodies the threat that some level of force might

be used against other states ("projection"). Their ability

to use that force can often render a nonactive presence sufficient

to achieve political ends.

The linkage between presence and projection tends to become

more pronounced as more powerful force levels are employed. Since

World War II, the United States has tended to deploy powerful

naval forces centered on carrier task forces, thereby making the

linkage between presence and projection highly explicit. Two

such forces are forward deployed on fixed stations in the western

Pacific _7/ and form the core of the Navy's Seventh Fleet. Two

other task forces, deployed on fixed station in the Mediterranean,

are the key units of the Sixth Fleet.

U.S. emphasis on carrier firepower derives from the carrier's

unchallenged naval role in the late 1940s and early 1950s. During

that period, no other navy could mount a threat to the aircraft

_5_/ See Robert G. Weinland, Superpower Naval Diplomacy in the

October 1973 Arab-Israeli War (Arlington, Va.: Center for

Naval Analyses, 1978), pp. 32-34. See also testimony of

Professor F.W. West, Department of Defense Authorization for

Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1979 (S. 2571), Hearings before

the Senate Committee on Armed Services, 95:2 (March and April

1978), Part 5, p. 4196.

bj Information provided to CBO by Navy Historical Research

Center, Archives Branch, December 1, 1978.

Tj One of the carriers in fact is deployed annually from its

"permanent" Pacific station to the Indian Ocean for a threemonth tour.
carrier, both for broad political reasons and because of military

limitations. As a result, its air wing—the sole source of a

carrier task force's firepower—could be devoted almost entirely

to overland offensive operations. Carrier aircraft could conduct

deep penetration bombing raids and drop hundreds of tons of

ordnance daily over long periods of time. The sea-based carrier

thus represented a critical element in land-based force balances:

not only could its force be rapidly applied ashore, but it could

be applied selectively as the situation warranted.

Over the past decades, two developments—with seemingly

contradictory implications for carrier warfare—have added to

the importance of carriers to the U.S. overseas naval presence

mission: improvements in antiship cruise-missile technology _8/

and the seeming permanence of U.S. carrier stations overseas.

The development of cruise-missile technology has decreased

the likelihood that a carrier could operate as a safe haven, as

it did during the 1950s and 1960s. The Soviet Union has deployed

antiship cruise missiles aboard new, longer-range warships and

can now threaten U.S. forces in most of the world's oceans, _9/

though it might not do so for political reasons. Once a relatively unsophisticated coastal defense force, the Soviet navy now

has in its inventory at least 45 nuclear submarines with unlimited

range, capable of firing cruise missiles at U.S. ships, including

carriers. In addition, it has another 40 torpedo-carrying,

nuclear-powered submarines and about 160 conventional submarines

(of which about 40 carry antiship missiles), as well as a small

aircraft carrier and about a dozen major surface ships carrying

antiship missiles. 10/ Even smaller states now have access to

these missiles and, as a result, could seriously threaten carrier

JJ/ Cruise missiles are guided missiles that use aerodynamic

lift to offset gravity and propulsion to counteract drag.

Their flight path remains within the earth's atmosphere.

9J Testimony of Rear Admiral Donald P. Harvey, USN, Military

Posture and H^R. 10929 (Department of Defense Authorization

for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1979), Hearings before the

House Committee on Armed Services, 95:2 (February, March, and

April 1978), Part 4, pp. 10-11.

10/ International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military

Balance. 1978-79 (London, 1978), p. 9.
forces unless confronted by capable defenses. Thus, the availability of antiship cruise missiles to both the Soviet navy and

smaller navies has increased the likelihood that, as was the case

until the middle of World War II, the carrier would have to fight

for its own existence before it could project power ashore.

At first glance, it would appear logical for the Navy

to have dispersed its offensive capabilities among a larger

number of ships, so as to make it less worthwhile for potential

enemies to target only the small carrier force. In fact, however, the Navy has elected to retain the carrier as its chief

offensive ship and to strengthen both on-deck carrier defenses—

primarily air-wing capabilities, but also shipborne defenses—

and the capabilities of carrier escorts. Carrier escorts have

become purely defensive systems, geared to conduct antisubmarine, anti-air, and antisurface ship operations in defense of

the carrier. 11/

The carrier's air wing—a combination of interceptor,

attack, early warning, reconnaissance, tanker, and electronic

warfare aircraft—is structured to permit the carrier to control

the skies above its immediate waters, and thus the waters themselves, before launching attacks ashore. The air wing embodies

a key element of the carrier's defenses as well as its offensive

potential. In crises in which threats to carriers have been

imminent, the Navy has tended to operate carriers in groups

of two or more. Under these circumstances, the air wings combine

to provide round-the-clock aerial protection and early warning

for the entire task group.

ll/ A few examples: The DDG-2 class will undergo a major modernization to provide each ship with, among other systems,

improved, more jam-resistant search radar (SPS-40); quickreaction, short-range radar (SPS-65); and improved sonar

(SQS-23). The AN/SQS-26 sonar program is improving the

active and passive capabilities of the SQS-26 sonars installed on FF-1052 frigates and SQS-52 sonars installed

on the DD-963 class and on some of the CGNs. Current modifications to SPS-48 radars will significantly enhance the

anti-air warfare (AAW) capabilities of cruisers and guidedmissile destroyers. See testimony of Rear Admiral Stanley S.

Fine, USN, Military Posture and H.R.10929. Hearings, Part 4,

pp. 57-58; see also testimony of Vice Admiral James H.

Doyle, USN, pp. 222-23.
Carriers have thus remained important for peacetime presence

because only they can sustain powerful strikes ashore. 12/

In addition, they have remained important to the U.S. presence

mission because of the inertial force of history—in other words,

because they have been important to that mission in the past.

Carriers have become a symbol of U.S. presence, not merely in

U.S. eyes, but in the eyes of allies, neutral governments, and

potential adversaries alike who closely observe the worldwide

U.S./Soviet military balance. The growth of the Soviet navy

has led to calculations of regional maritime balances in which

U.S. carriers figure prominently. Their removal after years on

permanent station might appear to some states as a crucial

alteration of those balances in favor of the Soviet Union. The

continuous forward deployment of carriers has, in fact, further

reinforced a reluctance on the part of U.S. policymakers to alter

those deployments.

THE IMPACT OF OVERSEAS CARRIER PRESENCE REQUIREMENTS UPON NAVAL

FORCE LEVELS

Despite growing Soviet and Third World countermeasures

against it, the carrier remains, in the Navy's view, "the heart

of U.S. naval capabilities." 13/ It is also a key factor in most

force-sizing calculations. The number of carriers in the fleet

directly affects the number of escorts, underway replenishment

ships, and tenders that must be procured. Indirectly, it may

influence submarine force levels as well, since submarines are

lj/ Escorts may be outfitted in the future with sea-launched

cruise missiles, giving them a significant offensive capability. Forward-deployed Marine battalion-sized amphibious

assault units tend to embody relatively little capability.

They have few tanks and only some helicopter support, and

have always depended upon carrier-based aviation for initial

firepower support in a sea-based assault. There remain

serious questions about the realistic capabilities of these

units to sustain operations in light of the worldwide spread

of missile technology. See Jeffrey Record and Martin Binkin,

Where Does the Marine Corps Go From Here? (Washington, B.C.:

The Brookings Institution, 1976), pp. 31-33.

13/ U.S. Department of the Navy, Sea Plan 2000, Unclassified

Executive Summary (March 28, 1978), p. 8.
now programmed to serve as carrier escorts. In addition, the

carrier force level totally dominates the sizing of Navy aircraft force levels, with the exception of land-based patrol

aircraft.

It is significant, therefore, that peacetime presence

requirements, rather than wartime needs, may be the prime determinants of the currently programmed carrier force level. To

be sure, estimated wartime requirements, as expressed in terms

of demands for "prudent risk" forces put forth by fleet commanders , have tended to exceed the programmed forces in recent

years. Currently, the "prudent risk" force is estimated to

be 16 carriers. 14/ Nevertheless, statements by both Navy

and Department of Defense officials appear to confirm that

a lower programmed force level—12 large carriers—would be

adequate to meet wartime needs. _15_/ Further, while Administration spokesmen have not addressed the adequacy of still

lower carrier force levels for wartime requirements, they have

clearly indicated that 12 operational carriers are critical

to maintaining current peacetime forward deployments. 16/

It should be noted that the Navy's requirement for 12 carriers is cast in terms of operational carriers, as opposed to

active units. Operational carriers are those that actually can be

deployed overseas. Active units, on the other hand, include the

carriers undergoing long-term, service-life extension. In the

14/ The difference between the peacetime level generated by

presence deployments and the most demanding wartime need

(for a worldwide war with the Soviet Union) is considered

to be met by the "mothball" fleet, that is, the fleet of

"air-capable" ships (ships capable of launching aircraft)

currently not in operation. See Alva M. Bowen and Ray Frank

Bessette, Aircraft Carrier Force Levelj, Congressional

Research Service (1978), pp. 7-11. This fleet is obsolescent, however, and would not be immediately available for

operations at the outset of a war.

lj/ See statement of Vice Admiral F.C. Turner, USN, in Military

Posture and H.R. 10929, Hearings, Part 4, pp. 354, 356.

1.6/ See "U.S. Navy Information," in Military Posture and H.R.

10929, Hearings, Part 4, pp. 413-14.

10
1980s and 1990s, the effect of the Service Life Extension Program (SLEP) will be to reduce the programmed operational force

to 11 carriers, with 12 units in the active fleet. 17/ The

Navy has, therefore, requested procurement of an additional

carrier—a thirteenth active unit—to maintain the operational

force of 12 carriers that is now required to support its forward

deployments (see Figure 1).

The formula for sizing the carrier force on the basis of

overseas deployments is quite complex, involving a calculation

of the overhaul, training, operation, transit, and leave periods

required to support each forward deployment, j.8/ Carriers shift

from forward deployments in the Sixth and Seventh Fleets to

overhaul or maintenance, and then undertake primarily training

operations as part of the Second (western Atlantic) or Third

(eastern Pacific) Fleets. The critical factor in the force-sizing

calculation, however, is the Navy's programmed requirement that

the time that crew members spend on overseas deployments amounts

to no more than one-third of a given deployment cycle and extends

no more than six months for each deployment. Thus, to the extent

that Navy requirements will permit, each carrier will have a

crew of its own to operate on station for only one-third of any

given cycle.

17/ Thirteen carriers are currently in the fleet. All are

active and operational. Initiation of a service-life

extension program for the eight Forrestal-class carriers

in fiscal year 1981 will involve the removal of one operational carrier for eight successive 28-month periods—the

length of each service-life extension—or 17 years for

the entire program. The force will thus stand at 13 active,

but 12 operational, units. While the transfer of the Coral

Sea to contingency status in fiscal year 1981 will be offset by the entry of the Vinson into the fleet that year,

no carrier will offset the transfer of the Midway to contingency status in 1985. The force will then drop to 12

active and 11 operational units unless another carrier is

procured (see Ibid.). Future references in the text will

be to operational carrier levels, while SLEP is assumed

implemented in accordance with the current five-year defense

program.

18/ This formula is discussed at length in Appendix A.

11
Figure 1.

Representative Carrier Service-Life Extension Program

FISCAL YEAR

1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000

| I I I I | I I I I | I I I I | I I I I | I I I I | I I I I | I I I I | I I I I | I II I |

CV-43 CORAL SEA\ \

CV-41 MIDWAY \ \

CV-59 FORRESTALRS^

CV-60 SARATOGA R^sl

CV-61 RANGER R^

CV-62 INDEPENDENCE |^|

CV-63 KITTY HAWK bs^l

CV-64 CONSTE L L AT I ON R^|

CV-65 ENTERPRISE b^s

CV -66 AMERICA

CV-67 KENNEDY

ICVN-68 NIMITZ

ICVN-69 EISENHOWER

ICVN-70VINSON

I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I

.

shipyard period of notional

\ Dotted portion indicates

\

\

\

\

4 \

b^l \

r^Sl \

r^ \

r^l {

Kfl (

I I 1 I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I

1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000

FISCAL YEAR

The Navy sets its requirements for 12 carriers by adjusting

its basic calculation to reflect the distance of each station from

home port and summing calculated fractional carrier requirements

to support the stations. For example, the Navy requires "1.2"

units to support the carrier that is homeported in Japan. 19/ In

this case, sailors can be "at home" at the same time as the

carrier is nominally considered to be forward deployed. At the

other extreme, long transit times result in a requirement of "3.4"

units to support one of the forward-deployed Pacific carriers.

19/ See Appendix A.

12
When summed, however, the total Navy requirement falls neatly

into the one-in-three mold: 12 operational carriers are required

to support the four forward deployments. 20/

Escort, replenishment, and tender requirements are derived

from the required carrier force level. Of the 156 major escorts

currently in the fleet, about 114 are linked directly to carriers. All underway replenishment groups—about 46 ships in

all—support the carrier force. These ships provide ammunition,

supplies, and fuel to deployed forces. Lastly, seven of the

fleet's ten destroyer tenders are linked directly to the carrier

force. In total, the carrier force currently accounts directly

for at least 179 of the 411 general purpose ships in the U.S.

Navy. 21/

FORCES FOR THE PRESENCE MISSION: A FUNCTION OF DEPLOYMENT

PATTERNS AND CARRIER REQUIREMENTS

Two distinct, but interrelated, elements have characterized U.S. naval presence activities since the end of World

War II: the practice of maintaining fixed overseas deployments and the centrality of the carrier to most of those deployments. The interaction between these factors has been

a primary determinant of the overall naval force requirement.

While force levels ultimately must be linked to wartime considerations, it is possible that, consistent with possible

wartime demands, changes in forward deployments or in the composition of task forces could affect both the demand for forwarddeployed carriers and the size and composition of the Navy as a

whole. 22/

20/ The two Mediterranean deployments are supported by "3.3"

carriers each. Thus, the total force amounts to "11.2"

carriers, or 12 actual units.

_2jV At least 74 ships are carrier escorts. Eight ships form two

nuclear task forces; the remainder provides six ships for

each of the 11 conventional carriers. About 46 more ships

support the 10 underway replenishment groups, four per group

with a 15 percent overhaul allowance (see Appendix B).

22/ Wartime requirements and their relation to peacetime needs

are addressed in a forthcoming CBO budget issue paper.

13
The following chapter examines in detail the current pattern

of forward deployments. It also outlines the political and

military contexts in which they function and the degree to

which those contexts may now call for alterations in deployment patterns, task force composition, or both.

14
CHAPTER III. CURRENT FORWARD DEPLOYMENTS AND REGIONAL BALANCES

The U.S. Navy's permanent forward deployments consist

of two powerful fleets—one in the western Pacific, the other

in the Mediterranean—and a small flotilla in the Persian Gulf.

The Seventh Fleet, on station in the western Pacific since

the end of World War II, currently numbers about 40 ships carrying

28,000 men. It consists of two aircraft carriers, two amphibious

ready groups of up to eight ships carrying between one and two

battalions of Marines, 18 to 20 escorts, four to seven replenishment ships, and about six attack submarines. The Sixth Fleet,

which is deployed in the Mediterranean, is composed of about

35 ships, including two carriers, numerous escorts, submarines,

and support ships, and one amphibious ready group. The Middle

East force, which operates primarily in the Persian Gulf and the

Gulf of Aden, consists of a (noncombatant) flagship and two

destroyers. _!/

The continuity of the U.S. naval presence in these regions

manifests the lasting strategic and political importance that the

U.S. government has attached to each of them. A review of current

deployments indicates, however, that they are in several ways

poorly matched to present political and military realities. The

changed requirements are discussed in this chapter; alternative

deployment systems that might better meet today's needs are

discussed in Chapter V. To be sure, future changes in regional

balances might call for a posture similar to that which currently

prevails. It should also be kept in mind that changes inimical to

the U.S. position in one area might be offset by improvements in

another, so that overall requirements might remain stable.

MISSIONS OF THE NAVY'S PACIFIC FORCES

The Seventh Fleet had its origin in U.S. naval deployments to

Japan at the end of World War II. During the 1950s and 1960s, the

.!/ Information provided to CBO by the U.S. Navy, February 27,

1978. See also Department of Defense, Manpower Requirements

Report for Fiscal Year 1979 (February 1978), pp. V-17 to V-19.

15

36-473 O - 78 - 3
Seventh Fleet and other U.S. military forces in the Far East

assisted noncommunist governments (Taiwan, Korea, Vietnam)

that were attacked or threatened by local communist forces

supported by China and the Soviet Union. In the past decade,

however, several factors have altered the role of U.S. military

forces in the Far East. These include the end of the Vietnam war,

the opening of relations with the People's Republic of China,

the emergence of Sino-Soviet rivalry in the Far East, and major

improvements in Soviet naval capabilities in the Far East. In

particular, the missions of the Seventh Fleet have shifted from

containing Chinese-inspired communist expansion on the mainland to

balancing Soviet power, protecting U.S. friends and allies located

on offshore islands (Japan, Philippines, Taiwan), and contributing

to stability along the Asian coast, from Japan to the Persian

Gulf. Paradoxically, the Seventh Fleet now contributes indirectly

to the security of China itself by containing and countering

Soviet military operations in adjacent waters—a role that has

been discreetly welcomed by the Peking government. 2J

One other change in the missions of the Seventh Fleet

since the 1950s needs mention. In the earlier period, carriers

operated as forward bases for nuclear strike aircraft assigned

to strategic targets in the Soviet Union and China. With the

introduction of submarine-launched ballistic missile forces in

the 1960s, carriers no longer were counted as primary strategic

nuclear strike forces. Their wartime missions—sea control

and power projection—are now primarily oriented to the use of

conventional weapons.

A decade ago, the Seventh Fleet regularly operated three

carrier task forces, supported by six additional carriers stationed on the U.S. west coast. As U.S. carrier force levels

have dropped from 15 to 12 in recent years, however, the major

reductions have come from the Pacific force. The Seventh Fleet

now operates two carriers at all times, supported by another

Frederic A. Moritz, "Cold War Busies China's Diplomats,"

Christian Science Monitor (June 15, 1978), p. 1. See also,

for example, Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-Peng's remarks at a

banquet welcoming Thai Premier Khukrit to Peking, June 30,

1975, New China News Agency, quoted in Foreign Broadcast

Information Service Daily Report-People's Republic of China

(July 1, 1975).

16
four on the U.S. west coast. At the same time, the fleet's area

of operations has been extended to the Indian Ocean, where one

of its two forward carrier task forces is deployed periodically.

The strains on fleet operations that might have been occasioned by

the reduction in force levels and increased operating distances

were, however, partially offset by the homeporting of a carrier

in Japan. This homeporting arrangement permits all carrier

operations (other than major overhaul) to be conducted while the

carrier and its air wing remain on forward deployment.

Threats to U.S. and Allied Interests: The Soviet Pacific Fleet

The principal counterpart to the Seventh Fleet in the

Pacific is the Soviet Pacific fleet of 70 attack and cruisemissile submarines (nuclear and conventional) and 55 major

surface combat ships, including five cruisers and 11 guidedmissile destroyers. 3^/ The Soviet Union also deploys about

100 Tu-16 Badgers in Far Eastern units of Soviet Naval Aviation

(SNA) forces and is expected to begin receiving Backfires into

these forces. Badgers are medium-range (1,000 to 1,500 nautical

miles) subsonic aircraft of 20-year-old design. They carry two

supersonic missiles with a range of about 150 nautical miles.

The Backfire is a much more powerful, modern "swing-wing" bomber,

capable of short bursts of supersonic speed and of long unrefueled

flights. _4/ From its Pacific bases, Backfire can operate as far

south as Midway Island. _5_/ In addition to the bombers that

_3/ Robert P. Berman, "Soviet Naval Strength and Deployment," in

Michael MccGwire and John McDonnell, eds., Soviet Naval Influence; Domestic and Foreign Dimensions (New York: Praeger,

1977), pp. 324-25.

_4/ See William D. O'Neil, "Backfire: Long Shadow on the Sea

Lanes," United States Naval Institute Proceedings (March

1977), p. 30; AS-4 and AS-6 missiles can reach speeds of Mach

2.5 to 3.5 at high altitude and are terminally guided. See

also Norman Polmar, "Soviet Naval Aviation," Air Force Magazine (March 1976), p. 70; and Robert P. Berman, Soviet Air

Power in Transition (Washington, B.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1978), pp. 26-27.

_5/ Department of Defense, Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1979,

p. 165.

17
are dedicated to naval aviation missions, Badgers and Backfires

could be drawn from the Far Eastern assets of Soviet Long-Range

Aviation (LRA), the strategic bomber force, as well as from bases

in European Russia. _6/ The total number of Backfires in both

aviation branches—now about 70 to 80 aircraft with air-to-surface

missiles—is expected to increase slowly by 30 to 36 aircraft a

year over the next several years. TJ

The Soviet fleet operates from two ports. The first,

Vladivostok, on the Sea of Japan, is virtually land-locked.

To reach the Pacific Ocean, the fleet must pass through one

or more straits which could be controlled in wartime by Japan.

These are the Straits of Tsushima (between Japan and South Korea),

Tsugaru (between Honshu and Hokkaido Islands), and La Perouse

(between Hokkaido and Sakhalin Islands), shown in Figure 2.

The second Soviet naval base, Petropavlovsk, on the Kamchatka

Peninsula, has open access to the North Pacific, but lacks land

routes to the rest of the Soviet Union and is icebound at least

six months of the year. Some of the Pacific fleet's submarines

are based at Petropavlovsk, from which they can deploy without

passing through straits that facilitate establishment of antisubmarine barriers.

In recent years, the Soviet Union has steadily improved the

strength and capabilities of its naval and naval aviation forces

in the Far East and has increased the tempo of fleet operations

in areas beyond its territorial waters. Soviet forces now could

mount a credible challenge for control of the Sea of Japan with a

combination of submarine, surface, and airborne firepower based

around Vladivostok. _8/ The introduction of Backfires, with their

_6/ Berman, Soviet Air Power in Transition, p. 44.

Tj See report citing "intelligence sources," "Soviets Spur

Production of Backfire Plane," Atlanta Journal (August 10,

1978), p. 1.

_8/ See, for example, testimony of Admiral James L. Holloway, III,

Chief of Naval Operations, in Military Posture and H.R. 11500

(Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for

Fiscal Year 1977), Hearings before the House Committee on

Armed Services, 94:2 (January and February 1976), Part 1,

p. 822.

18
70°N

120°E 135°E 150°E ies°E 165°W

15°N

12O°E 136°E 150°E 165°E 180° 166°W 150°W
long patrol ranges, further reduces the geographical disadvantages

that restrict surface fleet access to the Pacific. Thus, the

Soviet navy will be increasingly capable of conducting sea-denial

operations in the North Pacific region with combinations of submarines and long-range, missile-carrying aircraft. Access to naval bases in Southeast Asia, such as Vietnam's Cam Ranh Bay, could

extend the reach of Soviet sea-denial operations to the South

China, Philippine, and Celebes Seas and the southwest Pacific.

OPERATING AREAS OF THE SEVENTH FLEET

In considering the specific political and military roles

of the Seventh Fleet, it is useful to give separate attention

to three areas of operation: the northwest Pacific, Southeast

Asia (with the southern Pacific), and the Indian Ocean.

Northwest Pacific

The principal U.S. political objectives in the northwest

Pacific (see Figure 2) are to deter war in Korea (in cooperation

with South Korean forces) and to assure the security of Japan

under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security. Japan's

major security concerns are the stability of the Korean Peninsula

(which lies across the Straits of Tsushima from the southernmost

of the major Japanese islands, Kyushu) and the ability of the

Soviet Union to interdict Japan's sea lines of communication in

the Pacific. A related Japanese concern is vulnerability to a

localized invasion (for example, a Soviet campaign to seize some

of the exits from the Sea of Japan in order to release Pacific

fleet elements based at Vladivostok). Lastly, Japan is still

striving to regain the Kurile Islands from the Soviet Union.

U.S. naval forces in the northwest Pacific are components

of a larger complex of forward-based U.S. military forces.

These include a U.S. Army division in Korea, two-thirds of

a Marine division on Okinawa, and 14 fighter/attack squadrons

(ten Air Force, four Marine) in Korea, Japan, and Okinawa,

with more than 200 aircraft. 9/ While forces in Korea are

_9/ Department of Defense, Manpower Requirements Report for

Fiscal Year 1979. pp. V-7, V-8, V-18, V-19. These aircraft are those actually available to units, termed "unit

equipment."

20
committed primarily to the defense of South Korea, the ground

forces on Okinawa, the air forces in Japan and Okinawa, and

the northern elements of the Seventh Fleet are positioned to

project U.S. military power in several directions. They can

respond not only to threats to the security of Korea and Japan,

but also to Soviet or other aggressive moves throughout the

region. Thus, the presence of U.S. forces in Northeast Asia

serves not only to deter both North Korean and Soviet aggression, but also to reassure South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, and the

People's Republic of China that the United States continues to

have a strong interest in maintaining the stability of the

region. At the same time, these forces constitute a hedge

against the forcible settlement of territorial disputes in

adjacent regions.

The principal support to U.S. forces in defending the

sea-lanes to Japan, Japanese territory, and the adjacent straits

would come from Japan's own Self Defense Forces. Japanese

naval and naval air forces are now structured primarily for

antisubmarine warfare. Japanese airspace is defended by the

Self Defense air force, with 250 interceptors, including 160

F-104s and 90 F-4s. The Japanese also plan to acquire F-15

interceptors and an airborne early warning capability. 1.0/

But defense of convoys and naval forces against Soviet naval

air attacks beyond the relatively shallow Japanese air defense

zone would fall upon U.S. naval forces, including the carrier

force, ll/

While one of the two carriers in the Seventh Fleet operates

primarily in the vicinity of Japan, the other carrier is generally

deployed in the vicinity of the Philippines, except for its

ipy Japan Defense Agency, Defense of Japan—1977 (Tokyo: 1977),

pp. 57, 116, 162.

ll/ Japan's ability to survive a Soviet campaign against its seaborne supply lines—or to meet such a campaign at a lower

cost in military forces—would be enhanced by the stockpiling

of petroleum and the wartime suspension of Japanese exports,

thus increasing its ability to meet the urgent demand for raw

materials during the early months of a conflict. David

Shilling, "A Reassessment of Japan's Naval Defense Needs,"

Asian Survey (March 1976), pp. 216-29.

21
periodic visits to the Indian Ocean. A single carrier could

not withstand the combined attack of air, surface, and subsurface forces operating from Soviet bases in East Asia. In

the event of a crisis in Northeast Asia, the second carrier

could, of course, steam to Japanese waters. If that carrier

were nearby, a two-carrier force capable of conducting roundthe-clock air operations could be assembled in less than three

days. At other times, the response time could be as long as two

weeks. In addition, at least two of the four carriers on the U.S.

west coast could deploy overseas on short notice and arrive off

Japan in less than three weeks. Thus, the posture of the U.S.

Pacific fleet allows a graduated response to a Northeast Asian

crisis.

Despite its permanent station in the Pacific, the peacetime

effect of the Seventh Fleet, particularly in Japan, may be lessened by ambiguities about its role during a worldwide NATO/

Warsaw Pact war. Some Japanese commentators fear that, in the

event of such a war, the carrier force would be transferred to

the Atlantic, leaving sea-lanes to Japan, and perhaps Japan

itself, vulnerable to Soviet attack. Such fears affect what one

Japanese commentator has called the "politico-psychological effect

of the balance in peacetime," which, he contends, may be as

important as the wartime balance. 12/ Given continued Japanese

apprehension over the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Korea, 13/ as

well as the symbolism that the Japanese attach to the carrier

12/ Makoto Momoi, "Strategic Environment in the Northeast

Pacific—A Japanese Perception" (paper submitted to a

conference on "Security and Development in the Indo-Pacific

Arena," sponsored by the International Security Studies

Program, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, April 1978; processed), p. 3. Permission for

citation courtesy of the International Security Studies

Program. See also Michael Pillsbury, "Discussion Outline,"

in Paul Y. Hammond, Charles Wolf, Jr., and Peter De Leon,

"Perceptions of the Military Balance: Report of a Workshop,

August 26-27, 1974" (Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation,

1974; processed).

137 See Hideaki Kase, "Northeast Asian Security: A View From

Japan," Comparative Strategy, Vol. 1, Nos. 1 and 2 (1978),

pp. 98-99.

22
force, it may be worthwhile for the United States to realign

its posture, possibly by deploying the second Seventh Fleet

carrier closer to Japan in order to convey greater assurances

of the sincerity of the U.S. wartime commitment. Such assurances

could help strengthen Japanese resolve in the face of peacetime

pressures from the Soviets, dampen any revival of Japanese militarism, and increase the probability of Japanese cooperation in a

NATO/Warsaw Pact war.

Southeast Asia and the South Pacific

The second major operating area for the U.S. Seventh Fleet

is the Philippine, South China, and Celebes Seas, which command the sea and air approaches to the Philippines, Indochina,

Malaysia, Indonesia, and Australia, and the major sea routes

from the Middle East and Europe to Northeast Asia (see Figure 3).

Since the end of the Vietnam war, no single power has dominated

this region. Instead, a power balance appears to be forming among

the United States, China, the Soviet Union, and Vietnam. Within

this balance, the other major states of the region—Thailand,

Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, and the Philippines, aligned with

each other in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)—

have sought to develop diplomatic relations with all external

powers. But all still face to some degree the danger of insurgency supported by external powers. 14/

The major U.S. security interests in the area are to (1)

maintain free navigation through the seven straits now traversed

by ocean traffic traveling to Asia from the Indian Ocean—an

interest shared with the Soviet Union; (2) maintain regional

stability and prevent the outbreak of local conflict; (3) offset

Chinese political pressures on the nations of Southeast Asia and

the South Pacific; and (4) counterbalance the Soviet military

presence.

147 Bruce Grant, The Security of Southeast Asia, Adelphi Paper

No. 142 (London: The International Institute for Strategic

Studies, 1978), pp. 7-10, 18-20. See also Sheldon W. Simon,

Asian Neutralism and U.S. Policy, Foreign Affairs Study

No. 21 (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute,

1975), pp. 91ff.

23
30»

N

90°E 105°

E 120°E 135°

E 1BO°

E 16S°

E

15°N

16°S

30°N

CO 3!

o «=>

^ CD

CD °°

C/3

1S°N

0°

CDCOO

•—t-

CDO

.

o"

90°E 105°E 120°E 13S°

E 150°

E

15°S

165°E
Indonesia claims territorial control over six of the seven

South Pacific straits. Together with Malaysia, it has claimed

jurisdiction over the Straits of Malacca since 1971. The Malaysian and Indonesian claim over navigation in the Straits has

been disputed jointly by Japan and the Soviet Union and, independently, by the United States. lj/ If all the Indonesian

straits were closed to traffic, the alternative route to the south

of Australia would greatly increase the transit time from the

Persian Gulf to Japan, impede the transfer of U.S. naval forces

from the western Pacific to the Indian Ocean, and increase the

costs of transporting oil to Japan.

Another potentially destabilizing factor in the region is

the unsettled territorial claims in and around the South China

Sea, some motivated by a desire to control continental shelf

resources. These claims make the South China Sea a potential area

of conflict among the littoral states, which include the Philippines, Vietnam, Indonesia, China, and Taiwan. The major unsettled

dispute in the region is China's claim to sovereignty over Taiwan,

with which the United States has a mutual defense treaty. In

addition, there are disputes among these states over smaller

islands in the region. 16/

The Soviet naval presence in Southeast Asia and the South

Pacific is limited to periodic courtesy calls, such as at Singapore, by relatively small forces, composed of three to four

combat ships. Soviet surface and naval air threats in the region

15 / The Malaysian and Indonesian policy regarding these straits

is opposed by Singapore and Thailand—fellow members of

ASEAN—and supported by China. Simon, Asian Neutralism and

U.S. Policy, p. 47.

16/ China and Vietnam, for example, dispute rights to the Paracel

Islands, strategically located near the center of the South

China Sea. The Paracels, once claimed by South Vietnam,

were seized in January 1974 by a Chinese amphibious force

backed by MiG fighters from Hainan Island. And all four

littoral states lay claim to the Spratly Islands, where the

Philippines has been granting oil exploration leases since

1970. Philippine troops occupy five of the Spratlys;

Vietnamese, three; and Taiwanese, one. Grant, The Security

of Southeast Asia, p. 20; Simon, Asian Neutralism and U.S.

Policy, pp. 26-27, 48.

25
could well remain negligible unless the Soviet Union established a

base in Vietnam. At present, the major Soviet threat to sea-lanes

in the region is posed by the potential for submarine operations

in the South Pacific. A Soviet effort to establish a shipping

barrier in the South Pacific could well be short-lived, however.

Soviet submarines would have to pass antisubmarine barriers that

U.S. and Japanese forces could establish along the route from the

Soviet Union to the South Pacific. Even if Soviet submarines

avoided these barriers on their outbound journey, they would be

vulnerable to detection both when they attacked ships and when

they returned to port to replenish.

Some observers fear that the Soviet Union might increase

its naval presence—and thus its influence—in the region by

seeking permission from Vietnam to occupy the former U.S. naval

base at Cam Ranh Bay. 1/7.7 This would enable the Soviet Union to

deploy more units in Southeast Asia and the South Pacific and

would provide a base for Soviet naval air operations over the

South China and Philippine Seas. It would also support submarine

resupply efforts, thereby permitting the submarine force to avoid

the allied antisubmarine warfare (ASW) gauntlet on replenishment

voyages to the Soviet Union. Such a base would be vulnerable and

difficult to supply in a conflict, however, and would therefore be

of limited value—assuming U.S. tactical air and naval forces were

available to counter Soviet operations.

The navy of the People's Republic of China, while numerically

large (166 submarines and over 100 escorts and fast missile

boats armed with Styx missiles and 700 shore-based aircraft), is

made up primarily of short-range units and appears to be best

suited for coastal defense. Its amphibious warfare fleet of 45

ships, displacing about 76,000 tons, does not appear to pose a

significant threat to Taiwan or other nearby states. 18/ Its

aircraft include about 60 Badgers and 400 Beagle short-range,

1_7_/ Leslie H. Brown, American Security Policy in Asia, Adelphi

Paper No. 132 (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1977), p. 18.

18/ Jane's Fighting^ Ships, 1977-78, p. 93. By comparison, the

U.S. amphibious warfare fleet of 79 large ships displaces

over 1.1 million tons and is capable of lifting almost oneand-one-third Marine divisions and air wings (see Jane's

Fighting Ships. 1977-78, pp. 610-16).

26
light bombers, including 100 armed with torpedoes. Four hundred

older MiG 15, 17, and 19 fighter/bombers also serve in the

naval air force. The Chinese air forces are not known to possess

air-to-surface missiles and thus pose only a limited threat to

shipping in the South China Sea. 1_9/

Third World navies currently could pose a modest threat in

the South Pacific if they combined to defend one or two straits,

but they probably would be insufficient to provide a sustained

defense of all straits against U.S. and allied naval and Third

World air forces.

Table 1 outlines key elements of the navies of leading

regional powers. Vietnam's forces also include over 160 F-5

and A-37 aircraft, as well as over 45 AC-119 and AC-4 gunships.

This captured equipment may be of limited value, however, because

of a lack of spare parts and insufficient training for operating

U.S. weapons. The Indonesian navy appears impressive but at

present is dominated by obsolescent Soviet units and may also

suffer from a lack of spare parts. The large number of units

on order, however, could signal a determination to improve Indonesia's capabilities for naval warfare.

U.S. treaty allies in the region include Australia, New

Zealand, the Philippines, and Taiwan. Both Australia and New

Zealand have joined Britain in a five-power treaty to defend

Malaysia and Singapore. The major military contribution is

provided by Australia, which deploys an aircraft carrier with a

small number of attack and antisubmarine warfare aircraft on

board, as well as a fleet air arm of 22 combat and antisubmarine

aircraft (A-4s, S-2s). Taiwan is heavily defended by ground

forces (20 divisions, over 750 tanks). Its naval forces include

two submarines, 36 surface combat ships, and 51 landing craft.

Air force units include 255 F-100 and F-5 fighter/attack aircraft

and 44 F-104 interceptors. JO/

19/ Barry Wheeler, "World's Air Forces 1978," Flight International (July 8, 1978), pp. 106, 111. China is not listed

as an operator of Soviet air-to-surface missiles. See Mark

Hewish, "World Missile Directory," Flight International

(June 10, 1978), p. 1768.

20/ International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military

Balance. 1978-1979 (London, 1978), pp. 59-61.

27
TABLE 1. SOUTHWEST PACIFIC REGIONAL POWERS, 1978

Country

Australia b_/

Indonesia

Malaysia

New Zealand b_/

Philippines b/

Singapore

Taiwan b_/

Thailand

Vietnam

Attack Surface

Aircraft Combat

Carriers Ships a/

1 11 (3)

11 (3)

2

4

19

— 36

3 _•» __

Missile

Patrol

Boats Submarines

— 6

9 (4) 3 (2)

4 (4)

— —_

6 —

— (2) 2

3 (3) — 2

SOURCE: International Institute for Strategic Studies, The

Military Balance. 1978-1979 (London, 1978).

NOTE: Units on order in parentheses.

a/ Cruisers, destroyers, frigates, and large corvettes.

b/ U.S. treaty ally.

U.S. naval forces clearly do not face as formidable a

threat in the southwest Pacific as they do further north. The

availability of some degree of allied support further enhances

the U.S. position. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, still

suffers from logistical limitations that could hamper sustained

naval activities during a conflict.

Treaty commitments, as well as a concern to assert and

exercise the right of navigation through the region's straits,

appear to justify some level of continued U.S. naval presence in

the southwest Pacific. Nevertheless, the carrier task force may

be a somewhat more powerful aggregation than the current level

of threat requires.

28
Indian Ocean

U.S. Navy activities in the Indian Ocean include deployment

of a small permanent force, periodic peacetime visits by a carrier

task force from the Seventh Fleet, and planned wartime protection

of Indian Ocean sea-lanes. These lead from the Persian Gulf oil

fields to the western Pacific and, by way of Suez and the Cape of

Good Hope, to Western Europe and the United States.

Major U.S. deployments in the Indian Ocean are of relatively

recent origin, although the United States has maintained a small

three-ship task force in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean since

1948. Until 1968, the British Navy, with its large base at Singapore, was the dominant military presence. With the British decision to withdraw forces stationed "East of Suez," the Soviet Union

began a permanent deployment of ships from its Pacific fleet and

gradually expanded a complex of bases around the Gulf of Aden.

These now include facilities in Aden, South Yemen; the island of

Socotra; and, until 1977, Berbera, Somalia (see Figure 4).

The U.S. response to these Soviet moves and to increased U.S.

vulnerability to interruptions of oil shipments from the Persian

Gulf has taken two forms. Since 1971, the Navy has tripled its

presence in the region as measured in ship days. (A "ship day" is

a measurement of naval presence consisting of one ship at sea for

one day.) A carrier task group deployed from the western Pacific

spends about three months a year in the area. Second, the United

States established a refueling station and airfield on Diego Garcia, an island in the British Indian Ocean Territory some 2,500

miles from the Straits of Hormuz and 1,800 miles from the Gulf of

Aden. U.S. antisubmarine aircraft (P-3s) operate from Diego Garcia and Bandar-Abbas, an Iranian base at the northern end of the

Indian Ocean. 21/ Although the United States and the Soviet Union

have engaged in talks on limiting naval deployments to the Indian

Ocean, these recently have been in abeyance, perhaps, in part,

because of Soviet and Cuban activities in the Horn of Africa. 22/

217 Department of Defense, Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1979,

p. 180.

_22/ See Frank R. Barnett, "Preface," in Alvin J. Cottrell and

Walter F. Hahn, Naval Race or Arms Control in the Indian

Ocean? Some Problems in Negotiating Naval Limitations

(Washington, D.C.: National Strategy Information Center,

1978), p. vii.

29
Figure 4.

The Indian Ocean Region
It is noteworthy that regular Soviet combat ship deployments

in the Indian Ocean remain at a modest level. 23/ The day-to-day

Soviet threat to sea-lanes in the Indian Ocean is posed by only

eight combat ships, including a few submarines. 24/ Soviet naval

reconnaissance (Bear) and antisubmarine warfare (May) aircraft

also operate over the Indian Ocean, mainly from bases in the Gulf

of Aden. No antishipping aircraft (Badgers or Backfires) have

been deployed to the region, however. To carry out strike missions over the Indian Ocean, Badgers and Backfires based in the

Soviet Union would have to overfly Iran and the Arabian Peninsula

or Afghanistan. Even so, their range from Soviet bases would

limit the threat of air attack to the northwest sector of the Indian Ocean unless they staged through bases in the Horn of Africa.

The Soviet Union could augment its Indian Ocean naval squadron in a few days from the Black Sea through Suez. Should it also

decide to base Badgers and Backfires in the Horn, it could

pose a high-level threat, with little warning, to naval forces and

shipping in the Indian Ocean as far south as the Mozambique

Channel and as far east as Sri Lanka.

Other External Forces. France is currently the major external power in the Indian Ocean, where it maintains an active presence. French naval forces, including an aircraft carrier, were

deployed to Djibouti in the Horn in 1978 to protect the former

French colony of the Afars and Issas, which attained independence

at about the same time that the Soviet Union and Cuba began

military operations in support of neighboring Ethiopia. France

has deployed over 20 combat ships in this region since the early

1970s and has bases on Reunion—an island off Madagascar that

remains French territory—and Mayotte. France maintains close

relations with most of its former colonies in Africa and is

concerned about possible external threats to their stability. 25.1

23/ See Richard Haass, "Naval Arms Limitations in the Indian

Ocean," Survival (March /April 1978), p. 52.

^47 Information provided to CBO by U.S. Navy, October 30, 1978.

25y General Mery , "Conference Prononcee par Le General Mery , "

Defence Nationale (June 1978), pp. 21-22. The Somali government has made claims to the territory of the Afars and

Issas, which has ethnic Somalis among its population. See

Dale R. Tahtinen, Arms in the Indian Ocean (Washington, D.C.:

American Enterprise Institute, 1977), pp. 11, 31.

31

36-473 O - 78 - 4
Regional Powers. A number of nations bordering the Indian

Ocean and Persian Gulf have sizable military forces. These

include Australia, India, Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and

South Africa. If allied with an external power, some of these

states could aid significantly in sea denial or sea control

(convoy protection) in the Indian Ocean. Beyond the Persian Gulf,

however, no regional power has the reach to dominate significant

portions of the area as a whole. Table 2 lists the naval capabilities of Indian Ocean nations with significant military forces

or geographical locations.

TABLE 2. INDIAN OCEAN REGIONAL POWERS, 1978

Country

Australia

India

Iran

Iraq

Pakistan

Saudi Arabia

South Africa

Attack

Aircraft

Carriers

1

1

—

—

—

—

— —

Surface

Combat

Ships a/

11 (3)

29 (9)

11 (10)

—8

— (6)

4

Missile

Patrol

Boats

^___

16

5 (7)

14

—— (4)

3 (3)

Submarines

6

8

— (9)

—4

—3

SOURCE: International Institute of Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, 1978-1979 (London, 1978).

NOTE: Units on order in parentheses.

a_l Cruisers, destroyers, frigates, and large corvettes.

Implications of U.S. Presence. Unlike the U.S. presence

in the Pacific region, the presence mission in the Indian Ocean

has historically been geared more to "showing the flag" than

to promoting regional stability or crisis control. The Pacific

carrier force has been the key crisis-response unit in the Indian

32
Ocean. _26/ Although a carrier task force now deploys annually in

the Indian Ocean, it is not clear whether this deployment presages

a further increase in U.S. presence in the region.

It is even less clear whether carrier deployments are best

suited to promoting U.S. interests in the region at all times.

Despite their firepower, carriers could be vulnerable to attack

by a number of regional states. While it is probable that the

outcome of a conflict at sea eventually would favor the United

States, even the temporary loss of a carrier might be an exacting

political price. Just as sending a carrier to the scene of a

crisis could convey a larger commitment of U.S. interests than

sending a less powerful ship, the temporary disabling of a carrier

could inflict a larger blow to U.S. prestige and political effectiveness than the outright loss of a lesser ship. Furthermore,

there appears to be a congruence of French and U.S. interests in

the area* In light of France's commitment to regional stability

and its position as a leading Indian Ocean naval power, a somewhat

less imposing U.S. presence—at a correspondingly lower cost—

might be more appropriate.

MISSIONS OF THE NAVY'S MEDITERRANEAN FORCES

The Sixth Fleet has both NATO and non-NATO missions in the

Mediterranean. The NATO missions, which led to the establishment of the Sixth Fleet 30 years ago, include maintaining the

confidence of allies, such as Turkey, Greece, and Italy, that U.S.

forces would be committed to protecting the NATO southern flank in

the event of a NATO/Warsaw Pact conflict. 2 7/ The United States

26J For example, the carrier Enterprise was deployed during the

1971 Indo-Pakistani war, as was the Ranger in 1976 during

tensions between Kenya and Uganda after the Entebbe rescue.

See David K. Hall, "The Indo-Pakistan War of 1971," in Barry

M. Blechman and Stephen S. Kaplan, "The Use of Armed Forces

as a Political Instrument" (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings

Institution, 1976; processed), p. IX-40; see also U.S. News

and World Report (August 2, 1976), p. 49.

27/ Desmond P. Wilson, Jr., The U.S. Sixth Fleet and the Conventional Defense of Europe (Arlington, Va.: Center for Naval

Analyses, September 1976), pp. 5-6. The Sixth Fleet's

carriers, however, no longer act as forward bases for the

strategic nuclear forces, a principal role in the 1950s.

33
is bound by treaty to provide two carriers to NATO within 48

hours of the start of a European conflict. The Navy asserts

that the Sixth Fleet carriers meet that commitment. 28/ In the

event of such a war, the fleet could attempt to project U.S.

air power and Marine forces into the eastern Mediterranean to

assist Turkey in defending the Turkish Straits. Its principal

defensive mission would be to deny the Soviet navy the use of the

Mediterranean and to protect allied shipping.

The non-NATO missions of the Sixth Fleet are related to U.S.

policy toward the nations to the south of the Mediterranean and,

in particular, to the maintenance of stability between Israel and

the Arab states. This mission is of more recent origin than the

NATO role, but it dates back at least to the 1956 Suez crisis.

The precise missions of the fleet in this context are difficult to

define, however. Any decision to intervene in future conflicts

between Israel and its neighboring Arab states would be complicated by several factors. One is the dependence of Western

Europe and the United States on Arab oil and the U.S. interest in

maintaining friendly relations with Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi

Arabia. Another is the presence of the Soviet Mediterranean

fleet, with its implicit threat to retaliate for any U.S. intervention that threatened Soviet clients in Syria, Iraq, or Libya.

During the October 1973 war, the Sixth Fleet, augmented by a third

carrier and its escorts, stood within striking distance of the

conflict. But the addition of the third carrier represented

something less than an overt commitment to use U.S. force in

direct support of Israel. Moreover, all U.S. carriers were

shadowed during the crisis by Soviet combat ships armed with

antiship missiles. It is unclear whether the threat of a Soviet

attack on the fleet would have deterred the use of carrier

aircraft in support of Israel had the United States wished to do

so, making the Sixth Fleet at best an enigmatic force in the

Middle East balance. 29/

2jt/ Testimony of Vice Admiral Frederick C. Turner, USN, Military

Posture and H.R. 10929. Hearings, Part 4, pp. 358-59.

29/ See Robert G. Weinland, Superpower Naval Diplomacy in the

October 1973 Arab-Israeli War. Professional Paper No. 221

(Arlington: Center for Naval Analyses, 1978; processed),

pp. 39-60. A more explicit commitment, for example, might

have been the stationing of a wing of U.S. combat aircraft in

Israel during the war.

34
Threats to U.S. and Allied Interests; Soviet Forces

The Soviet Union poses the primary threat to the Sixth

Fleet. Its forces in the region include the Mediterranean

Squadron of eight to 10 diesel submarines, one or more nuclearpowered cruise-missile submarines, two to four cruisers, and nine

to 12 frigates and destroyers. In addition, 60 Badgers and about

15 Backfires are assigned to Naval Aviation at Black Sea bases.

The cruisers and destroyers carry surface-to-surface missiles with

ranges of 150 to 250 miles (SSN-3, SSN-12) or 30 miles (SSN-2,

SSN-14); the submarines carry missiles with similar ranges; each

aircraft carries at least one air-to-surface missile with a range

of over 135 miles. 30/

The Soviet Mediterranean Squadron's principal weapon against

carriers, other than Badgers and Backfires, is the "anticarrier

task group," often composed of a small number of guided-missile

cruisers and destroyers and one or more submarines. These

anticarrier groups shadow the U.S. fleet to provide targeting

information to bombers. In addition, each group can bring 20 to

30 cruise missiles to bear on the U.S. ships. 31/

The greatest threat to the Sixth Fleet is that of a coordinated attack by Soviet anticarrier task forces and naval

aviation. In fact, it would be difficult for the Soviet Union

to mount such a large attack without providing prior warning

to the fleet. The carrier force could then augment its air

defenses with added interceptors. In addition, the Soviet

forces would risk losses to Greek and Turkish air defenses

or, if the Soviets overflew Yugoslavia and the Adriatic, to

30/ Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Understanding Soviet

Naval Developments (1978), p. 13; Berman, Soviet Air Power j.n

Transition, pp. 26, 28, 43; Jane's Fighting Ships, 1977-78,

pp. 676-700, 781-82.

31/ See, for example, discussion of Soviet anticarrier operations in the Mediterranean in Weinland, Superpower Naval

Diplomacy in the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War, pp. 56-57;

for firepower of Soviet naval units, see Jane's Fighting

Ships. 1977-78, pp. 676-700.

35
other NATO aircraft. Further, the carriers themselves might

be able to redeploy to more advantageous defensive positions. 32/

In either a NATO or a Middle East conflict, the survival

of Soviet Mediterranean fleet elements after an attack on the

Sixth Fleet would be questionable in view of their vulnerability

to attack by allied land-based aircraft. Moreover, in a NATO

scenario, a Soviet attack on the Sixth Fleet, even if successful,

would likely leave unharmed a large number of allied naval units

in the Mediterranean, including two French aircraft carriers with

80 aircraft, as well as more than 80 allied surface combat ships

and more than 40 submarines. 33/

The threat of a surprise attack cannot be ruled out completely, however. Such an attack could be mounted by anticarrier

groups alone, which could benefit from the stealth and surprise

of diesel-powered submarines. 34/ Were carriers deployed further

west in the Mediterranean, the threat of such an attack would

diminish considerably, as would the possibility of attacks by

longer-range Soviet aircraft and of surprise attacks by antiU.S. states such as Libya and Syria. Nevertheless, it is the

political commitment of the United States to defend its eastern

Mediterranean allies and friends that prompts the deployment of

the carrier forces in close proximity to those states. The

paradox is that, in seeking to reinforce that political commitment, the Navy may incur a high military cost in the event of a

conflict.

327 For a discussion of this point, see Congressional Budget

Office, Planning U.S. General Purpose Forces: The Navy,

Budget Issue Paper (December 1976), pp. 13-14.

337 Jesse W. Lewis, Jr., The Strategic Balance in the Mediterranean (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute,

1976), p. 127ff. The numbers include units from the fleets

of Greece, Italy, Turkey, Spain, and France and assume that

approximately 50 percent of the French and Spanish escorts

and submarines are deployed in the Mediterranean.

^347 These units are not easily detectable in the Mediterranean

when submerged. Wilson, The U.S. Sixth Fleet and the Conventional Defense of Europe, pp. 16-20.

36
HISTORICAL ASPECTS OF CURRENT DEPLOYMENTS

The histories of the Sixth and Seventh Fleets suggest

that there is an inertial aspect to U.S. naval deployments.

The specific military and diplomatic missions of the two fleets

have changed with changes in U.S. foreign policy, such as a

more intense involvement in the Middle East and the rapprochement

with China, as well as with changes in military forces, such

as the introduction of ballistic missiles for strategic missions

and improvements in Soviet military capabilities. But, for the

most part, the fleets are still deployed to locales chosen

for their strategic importance to the United States a generation

ago. The fact that they remain in these locales may be less a

result of the military importance of their current roles than a

consequence of the political importance which the United States

attaches to its diplomacy in the Mediterranean and East Asia.

But in several respects, current deployments seem poorly

matched to diplomatic and military realities. For example,

the Soviet Pacific fleet is far more capable—and more threatening

to the U.S. carrier force—than it was 20 years ago. Deployment

of a single carrier in Northeast Asian waters may not suffice

to promote regional stability in the 1980s, as it did when considerably more U.S. force was stationed on the Northeast Asian

mainland and Soviet naval and air capabilities were confined to

coastal protection. On the other hand, continued deployment of a

carrier in the southwest Pacific may be inefficient for a region

whose patrol boat navies pose no sustained threat to even lesser

naval units. Less capable ships, with lower costs, might maintain

U.S. presence adequately in a region which is currently beyond the

reach of major Soviet military forces and whose leading power—

China—has evolved from a hostile adversary to a sometimes

friendly neutral.

While the number of U.S. ship days in the Indian Ocean has

increased markedly in recent years, primarily in response to

greater Soviet activity in the region, the small size of the

permanently deployed Middle East force continues to reflect U.S.

dependence on pre-1968 British predominance in the region. It is

debatable, however, whether U.S. attempts to increase naval

presence in the area should focus solely on aircraft carrier

groups. Many of the considerations that arise in the southwest

Pacific apply to the Indian Ocean as well. A number of regional

powers whose naval capabilities could not match those of the

United States on a sustained basis could, in isolated instances,

37
inflict at least short-term damage on an aircraft carrier. A

further consideration arises in the Indian Ocean context: when

Britain pulled back west of Suez, it was France, not the Soviet

Union, that became the region's leading external power. As long

as France is determined to play a stabilizing role, the United

States might provide adequate secondary support with something

less than large-deck carrier forces.

In the Mediterranean, the Sixth Fleet has been a major actor

in non-NATO-related crises since the 1950s. Its deployment,

particularly in the eastern Mediterranean, appears to be geared

primarily to containing similar crises in the future.

From a treaty standpoint, deployment of U.S. tactical

carriers in the eastern Atlantic (instead of the Mediterranean)

would permit the 48-hour response time required of the United

States in a NATO war. Moreover, air units deployed to Greece

and Turkey could be at least as effective as carrier-based air

in meeting early Warsaw Pact threats to the southern flank of

NATO. Militarily, the United States Navy becomes a hostage to

surprise attack when it deploys to a fixed station in the eastern

Mediterranean. It is not the military requirements of NATO

scenarios, but the fact that the Sixth Fleet has been in the

Mediterranean since 1950 that makes it appear extremely costly in

political terms to move it elsewhere.

Thus, in the Mediterranean and southwest Pacific, perhaps

more than elsewhere, deployments are more a product of historical

precedent than of military necessity or requirements. Political

contexts change with time, however, as do military capabilities

and national interests. Requirements could, of course, change

again in the future. A greater carrier presence might be needed

in regions that currently do not appear to call for it. By the

same token, however, future requirements for carrier presence in

other regions might diminish, and thereby result in a total force

requirement that would not necessarily be greater than that which

current presence missions demand. The following chapters will

examine a range of alternative approaches to the Navy's peacetime

missions and the degree to which political constraints could

inhibit shifts in U.S. deployments—shifts that might be geared to

reflect the changing nature of U.S. interests and the possible use

of military presence and force to support them.

38
CHAPTER IV. REEVALUATING CURRENT U.S. NAVAL POSTURE

As discussed in Chapter III, forward-deployed naval forces

appear to address two kinds of political/military requirements:

o Demands for signals of continued U.S. commitments to

allies and to stability in overseas regions.

o The need for on-the-scene military capability to control

crises that otherwise might escalate into regional conflicts.

Chapter III also indicated that the nature of perceived

threats to U.S. interests that require a U.S. naval presence has

changed since World War II. These threats may change again during

the remainder of this century, and such changes cannot, of course,

be predicted. Nevertheless, it is questionable whether the Navy's

current deployment posture most efficiently responds to those

threats that can be predicted in the foreseeable future. In particular, there is some reason to doubt the appropriateness of emphasizing carrier task forces for the presence mission in all the

regions of the world where presence might have to be maintained.

The effectiveness of U.S. overseas maritime presence implicitly has been predicated upon the fact that maritime forces

are safe havens for the projection of force ashore. In the past,

carrier forces did indeed ensure that most of the military cards

remained in U.S. hands, and mere presence often appeared to

substitute for the actual use of carrier (or Marine) firepower.

As noted in Chapter III, however, the growth of Soviet naval

capability and technological improvements in antiship systems of

even small navies have increased the risk of naval confrontation

at sea and thereby ended the carrier's previous status as a safe

haven. U.S. maritime forces may still be likely to get the

upper hand in a battle, I/ but they would have to fight for that

Some have argued that even the "upper hand" was in doubt with

respect to the Marines. See Martin Binkin and Jeffrey

Record, Where Does the Marine Corps Go From Here? (Washington, B.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1976), pp. 30-42.

39
upper hand, for their safety is no longer completely assured. The

assistance that would likely be provided by Soviet units to

supplement the antiship capabilities of regional powers would add

to the price of U.S. maritime operations. U.S. decisionmakers

must therefore calculate the risk attached to presence in addition

to the risk associated with operations ashore. 2J Presence no

longer implies sheer projection capability; some force would have

to be reserved for self-defense.

The Navy's long-standing policy of concentrating its offensive power in the carrier, while gearing other surface units to

defensive missions, has aggravated the dilemma that U.S. decisionmakers face. The fact that carriers are the Navy's sole truly

offensive platforms permits an adversary to concentrate his

antiship attacking systems on a very few units. The limited

number of carriers in the fleet means that the loss of even

one—however unlikely--might seriously affect U.S. capabilities in

a worldwide conflict, thus raising the carrier's opportunity cost

in a regional context. Indeed, even the temporary disabling of a

carrier, such as a hit on the flight deck (which would prevent

operations for at least several hours), would have negative

political consequences for the United States in a crisis.

The carrier's significance as the fleet's primary offensive

platform, its vulnerability as the prime target for antiship

missiles, and the need to amass the Navy's defensive systems to

protect it from those missiles have for the first time provided

some political flexibility to regional antagonists. They are now

in a position to assess whether the United States really is

prepared to use force when it deploys maritime units to the scene

of a crisis. If it is serious about employing force ashore, the

United States would not only have to assemble task groups sufficient for projection operations, but also would have to provide

sufficient defensive systems to ensure the carrier's (or Marine

unit's) safety and continued operation at sea. As noted earlier,

"1J Political considerations involving the effect of any confrontation on the worldwide strategic balance may well have been

a major factor in limiting U.S./Soviet naval interaction in

the past and could similarly constrain further interaction.

Nevertheless, greater Soviet capabilities have increased the

potential for confrontation and thereby heightened the risks

that will attach to future carrier presence activities.

40
at least two carriers are needed to support round-the-clock

tactical air operations. The mere dispatch of a single carrier

task force that did not provide protection and projection might

be perceived more as a knee-jerk reaction to a crisis than a

carefully conceived plan of attack. It could appear to indicate

merely U.S. concern, not a readiness to fight.

It is significant that, parallel to the problems of carrier

survivability, _3/ the post-Vietnam reluctance of U.S. policymakers

to engage in overseas military operations, as enunciated in the

Guam Doctrine and evidenced by recent and programmed troop withdrawals from Asia, has led to worldwide perceptions of a loss of

U.S. determination to pursue important interests if the risk of

military involvement and its potential cost appear to be high, kj

Taken together, these factors have resulted in an apparent

decline in the effectiveness of U.S. naval presence as a tool

of political/military policy.

_3/ Some recent statements have posited that the carrier is more

survivable than ever. The analysis supporting this assertion

is far from conclusive, however. It is perhaps more accurate

to state that, in absolute terms, carriers have improved the

quality of their defenses. Relative to potential threats,

however, carriers may be vulnerable to enemy attack, particularly if the enemy fires first. See U.S. Department of

the Navy, Sea Plan 2000, Unclassified Executive Summary (March

28, 1978), p. 13.

k_l For example, the United States was charged with "turning

the other cheek" over Katanga in 1977 and Ethiopia in 1978 (II

Giornale (Milan), May 17, 1978); it has been viewed as adopting a "growing isolationist stand ... in the post-Vietnam

era" (Daily Nation (Nairobi), May 22, 1978); and it has been

accused of "not caring" about Southeast Asia since the Nixon

Doctrine and causing "misgivings" to the Japanese and Korean

governments with its withdrawal policy (interview with Ken

Shirai, Asahi Shimbun (Tokyo) in "Carter's First Year," Atlas

World Press Review (January 1978), p. 14). Nishiyama Takehiko, a senior Japanese Foreign Ministry official, voiced

similar sentiments to a recent delegation of U.S. congressmen.

See Prospects for Regional Stabilityj Asia and the Pacific,

report submitted by a special study commission to the House

Committee on International Relations, Committee Print, 95:2

(June 1978), p. 7.

41
SOVIET NAVAL PRESENCE MISSION; A MULTIMODE APPROACH

The Soviet Union has employed its navy to support multimode and combined-arms operations with some success in the 1970s.

The Soviet combined-arms approach differs significantly from the

traditional U.S. emphasis on self-contained carrier task forces

for projection missions. Soviet naval forces do not have the

sustainability of their U.S. counterparts, nor can they match the

firepower of the carrier. Their lack of a credible sea-based air

superiority capability further limits their flexibility, particularly with respect to resupply efforts. The Soviets apparently

have chosen to employ their navy as part of a combined-forces

operation rather than to develop totally independent projection

capabilities for it. _5/ Thus, the Soviet navy appears to have

conducted a form of sea-denial operation off the coast of West

Africa, while cargo aircraft conducted what former Secretary of

State Kissinger called a "massive" airlift of arms and Cuban

forces into Angola in 1975 and 1976. t>J In what appears to have

been a similar operation, Soviet ships deployed off the Horn of

Africa in 1978, while supplies and Cuban forces were transported

5/ For a discussion of the limitations of Soviet projection

capabilities, see James G. Roche, "The Soviets' Growing

Reach: Implications of Comparative Capabilities to Project

Military Power" (paper presented before the European-American

Workshop, 1977; processed), pp. 7, 11-12; Congressional Budget

Office, U.S. Projection Forces: Requirements, Scenarios, and

Options. Budget Issue Paper (April 1978), pp. 57-60; Dov S.

Zakheim, "Maritime Presence, Projection, and the Constraints

of Parity," (Concept Paper for the National Security Affairs

Conference, Washington, B.C., July 17-19, 1978; processed),

pp. 16-17.

j>/ Testimony of Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger in U.S.

Involvement in Civil War in Angola, Hearings before the

Subcommittee on African Affairs, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 94:2 (January and February 1976), pp. 11-12.

The U.S. Navy has called the Soviet operation off Angola

an "interposition." See testimony of Rear Admiral Donald P.

Harvey, USN, in Military Posture and H.R. 10929 (Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal

Year 1979), Hearings before the House Committee on Armed

Services, 95:2 (February, March, and April 1978), Part 4,

p. 8.

42
by airlift and sealift to Ethiopia. TJ In both cases, combat

operations were conducted by Soviet-surrogate Cuban forces.

The Soviet navy does not appear to have undertaken offensive

operations of a type similar to those a carrier might conduct. J?/

The U.S. and Soviet navies have different missions and

consequently are structured very differently. Nevertheless, the

success with which the Soviets have employed naval force in

conjunction with, and in support of, other air and ground units

indicates that there are ways of successfully carrying out maritime presence missions apart from primary reliance upon aircraft

carriers. Indeed, it might be argued that the Soviet Union's

maritime presence posture appears geared to maximizing the efficiency of its less capable naval forces. On the other hand, the

United States may not be using its own naval units most efficiently for the conduct of maritime presence missions as long

TJ See Raymond W. Copson, Ethiopia and Somalia; International

Conflict in the Horn of Africa, Congressional Research

Service, Issue Brief No. IB78019 (May 4, 1978), p. 6. On

Soviet naval presence in the region, see testimony of Admiral

Harvey, in Military Posture and H.R. 10929, Hearings, Part 4,

p. 15.

_§/ Other examples of the Soviet navy's supportive role in multimode crisis-control operations include the stationing of

forces in Port Said and Alexandria in the late 1960s and early

1970s, while Soviet-flown MiG-21J combat air patrols brought

an end to Israeli deep penetration raids into Egypt in 1970;

the amphibious lift of Moroccan forces into Syria in the

summer of 1973; and the sea-denial mission of the Mediterranean squadron in October 1973 to ensure the continued flow

of airlifted Soviet supplies and to protect resupply units

from Israeli air attacks. See Bradford Dismukes, "Soviet

Employment of Naval Power for Political Purposes, 1967-75,"

in Michael MccGwire and John McDonnell, eds., Soviet Naval

Influence: Domestic and Foreign Dimensions (New York: Praeger,

1977), pp. 485, 491-92; Robert P. Berman, Soviet Air Power

in Transition (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution,

1977), p. 62; and Faith Thompson Campbell, "Uses of Soviet

Armed Forces for Political Objectives," in Barry M. Blechman

and Stephen S. Kaplan, "The Use of Armed Forces as a Political

Instrument" (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution,

1976; processed), pp. XV-44 to XV-46.

43

36-473 O - 78 - 5
as these forces are organized primarily to support permanent

overseas carrier task force stations* Fixed forward deployments

"can invite a range of trouble, as well as be vehicles of opportunity." _9/ Fixed carrier deployments in potentially volatile

Third World areas may foster the continuation of what could be

interpreted as a pattern of "musclebound" responses to crises. 107

To be sure, Soviet successes have been a function of improved

capabilities; those capabilities render it unlikely that the

United States will ever regain the naval dominance it enjoyed in

the 1950s. Nevertheless, to the extent that the U.S. conception

of presence does derive from an era whose conditions no longer

apply, an examination of some alternative forms of maintaining

U.S. presence overseas would perhaps be worthwhile.

Such alternatives should be geared to enhancing the flexibility and responsiveness of U.S. overseas military posture. They

could involve changes in the current pattern of deployments, the

systems deployed, or both. Several illustrative alternatives

are examined in the following chapter.

_9/ Ken Booth, "Warships and Political Influence," in MccGwire

and McDonnell, Soviet Naval Influence: Domestic and Foreign

Dimensions, p. 467.

10/ See, for example, reports of the Administration's decision

not to send a naval task force to the Horn of Africa in early

1978 on the grounds that it could have little effect on the

situation there. James Mayall, "The Battle for the Horn:

Somali Irredentism and International Diplomacy," The World

Today (September 1978), p. 341.

44
CHAPTER V. ALTERNATIVE FORWARD DEPLOYMENT SYSTEMS AND CONCEPTS

Preceding chapters have Indicated that current deployments

may not fully exploit the Navy's capabilities in fulfilling its

peacetime presence mission. This chapter examines alternative

ways of maintaining U.S. maritime presence overseas. It should

again be noted that these alternatives do not in themselves

constitute a justification for procurement decisions in the

upcoming fiscal years. Such decisions must also take account of

wartime Navy requirements. JL/ Nevertheless, should the Congress

determine that the demand for procuring an additional carrier

is primarily motivated by peacetime presence, some of these

alternatives could then be viewed as a basis for procurement

decisions in fiscal year 1980, including a decision to procure

a thirteenth aircraft carrier for the fleet.

CONSIDERATIONS IN CHOOSING ALTERNATIVES TO CURRENT DEPLOYMENT

POSTURE

The current naval forward deployment posture emphasizes

permanent aircraft carrier deployments in specific ocean areas.

Two distinct measures of effectiveness—one military, the other

political—underlie the choice of this posture. In military

terms, the measure is output, and the large aircraft carrier

can generate more conventional offensive firepower, for longer

periods, than other maritime units. 2_f In political terms, the

J7 A forthcoming CBO budget issue paper will address wartime

demands for carrier forces and their interrelationship with

peacetime needs.

2J Because uncertainty characterizes the nature of naval operations, particularly in crisis-control situations, there

are no obvious targets until a crisis materializes. Output,

in terms of aircraft sortie generation rates or bomb or

warhead tonnages, often substitutes as a proxy measure of

firepower effectiveness. The development of precision-guided

munitions may change this measure, making raw output less

45
measure is a combination of the degree and duration of visibility

that a system can maintain overseas. The carrier—together

with its air wing—conveys the image of America's awesome striking

power more successfully than other capable, but less visible,

systems, such as ballistic missile submarines. Additionally,

as noted above, allies and even neutral governments appear to

attach particular importance to the permanence of carrier deployments; they are viewed as symbols of U.S. adherence to treaty

commitments and to regional stability.

As noted in the previous chapter, however, the current

posture and its underlying measures of effectiveness tend to

overlook both the development and implications of new technological threats to the carrier, as well as changing political

environments in the carrier's traditional areas of operation.

Carriers might not be efficient for the presence mission when

enemy threats would be limited, but when an enemy could still

inflict damage that is politically or militarily unacceptable to

U.S. policymakers.

Furthermore, the mechanics of maintaining the current

deployment posture creates its own difficulties. These difficulties arise from a combination of currently planned limits on

the carrier force size, the possible need for additional deployments, and the Navy's self-imposed limitations on deployment

time for its crews.

The Navy seeks to limit the length of an individual's

deployment time to six months and to ensure that crews spend no

more than one-third of any deployment cycle in forward operations.

Additionally, the Navy attempts to provide what it considers

adequate periods for overhaul and maintenance within each longterm deployment cycle. These goals have resulted in a demand for

a 12-carrier force to support four forward deployments. There may

be demands for additional forward deployments in the near future,

however. For example, with the completion of the troop withdrawal

from Korea, Japan may press for the permanent deployment of

two carriers in the Pacific. (At present, one of the two Seventh

important than the combination of tonnage and targeting.

Nevertheless, the carrier with its air wing is likely to

deploy more offensive firepower, including cruise-type

precision-guided missiles, than any other ship.

46
Fleet carriers deploys annually for a three-month tour of the

Indian Ocean.) _3_/ Although such demands could be met by increasing the size of the U.S. carrier force, kj there are no plans

for further carrier procurement beyond the single ship that would

be required to maintain the force at 12 operating units until the

year 2000. Thus, should additional deployments become necessary,

either crews would have to spend more time at sea or less time

would be available for carrier maintenance. A decision to implement the former choice might have a negative effect on crew morale

and efficiency; implementing the latter choice could degrade

systems capabilities. J5/

There are several approaches to coping with all of these

concerns. The first would be to maintain the status quo, on the

basis that deployments could always be shifted if the need arose.

In the meantime, it could be argued, procurement of a thirteenth

carrier would ease any strains on the carrier force that might

arise in the immediate future. This solution does not, however,

address the larger question of the political/military utility of

fixed-carrier deployments.

_3/ There also is sentiment in Norway for an increased carrier

presence in the Norwegian Sea. See Anders C. Sjaastad,

"Norwegian Perceptions of the Changing Northern Strategic

Environment: Security Predicaments" (paper presented to

a conference on "The Nordic Balance In Perspective: The

Changing Military and Political Situation," Center for

Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University,

1978; processed), pp. 14-15.

kj Fourteen carriers, for example, would sustain both current

Indian Ocean deployments and two full-time carrier deployments in the Pacific, as well as Mediterranean deployments.

J5/ Increasing the number of carrier crews and transporting

them by air to forward-deployed units would appear to save

transit time and, consequently, might allow for a slight

reduction in force levels. Such time savings would depend

critically on maintenance intervals for the carriers, however.

If carriers required the same number of maintenance availabilities as they do at present, savings in transit time and,

consequently, savings in force requirements would be quite

small.

47
Alternatives to this approach could address both the possible

need to expand the scope of the current posture and the political/

military problems that arise from it. The following section

outlines three such options. The first—homeporting an additional carrier overseas—merely represents a less costly means of

maintaining current deployments. It tacitly accepts current

measures of the carrier's effectiveness. The second approach—

replacing fixed carrier stations with a more wide-ranging series

of deployments—seeks to maximize the carrier's military might by

increasing its flexibility and reducing its vulnerability. This

approach downplays the political advantages of permanent overseas

deployments, however. The third option—substituting other

air-capable ships for large carriers—stresses the permanence of

deployments as the prime measure of the effectiveness of U.S.

overseas deployments, to the partial exclusion of actual military

output. Finally, this section discusses land-based alternatives.

ALTERNATIVE NAVAL PRESENCE POSTURES

Overseas Homeporting—Maintaining Current Carrier Presence at

Lower Cost

Homeporting ships overseas permits the maintenance of a

given deployed force level with fewer assets than would otherwise

be required. It represents a technical adjustment to standard

Navy calculations of carrier deployment cycles, permitting

fewer carriers to support a given forward station. _6/

The United States currently homeports a carrier and its

supporting units at Yokosuka, Japan. As a result, while four

carriers are required to permit the forward deployment of the

non-homeported Pacific carrier, only two carriers—including

that at Yokosuka—are required to maintain the second forward

deployment. Were a second carrier homeported in either the

Pacific or the Mediterranean, deployments elsewhere could be

maintained or increased. Alternatively, fewer carriers would be

needed to support the four forward peacetime carrier stations, and

procurement of a new carrier specifically to maintain these

stations would not be necessary.

_6/ Homeporting permits all activities other than overhaul

to count as "forward-deployed" time, instead of maintaining a

2:1 ratio in terms of nondeployed (including transit) to

deployed months during the carrier cycle.

48
A number of military, budgetary, and political considerations

significantly affect the prospects for additional carrier homeporting and have thus far precluded any such arrangements. A

successful homeporting arrangement should provide the Navy with a

strategic base from which to deploy. It should have adequate

harbor accommodations, ship repair facilities, urban support, and

be in close proximity to a jet airfield. On the political side,

its establishment should not displease either the citizens of the

host country or those of its neighbors. It should not irrevocably

commit the United States to involvement in the regional disputes

of the host country or create new frictions between the United

States and other states in the area. Finally, from a budgetary

perspective, it should not commit the United States to pay heavy

rental costs to the host country, nor should it incur unreasonable

increases in manpower costs because of the cost of living abroad

and the expense of moving ships' crews and their dependents from

the United States to the overseas home port. TJ

The only recent arrangement, apart from that at Yokosuka,

that initially appeared to meet all of these requirements was

the proposal to homeport a carrier in Greece, either at Elefsis,

near Athens, where six destroyers were already homeported, or

in the Souda Bay complex in northwest Crete. _8/ That agreement

foundered on political difficulties, specifically the reluctance

_7/ On the general considerations underlying a decision to

homeport naval forces overseas, see Herbert Y. Schandler

and Richard M. Preece, "Considerations on Establishing a U.S.

Naval Base at Haifa, Israel," Congressional Research Service

(1975), p. 8; Statement of Admiral James L. Holloway, III,

USN, Chief of Naval Operations, concerning the fiscal year

1979 military posture, in Military Posture and H.R. 10929

(Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for

Fiscal Year 1979), Hearings before the House Committee on

Armed Services, 95:2 (February, March, and April 1978), Part

1, p. 670; and Alva M. Bowen, Jr. and Ray Frank Bessette,

Aircraft Carrier Force Levels. Congressional Research Service

(1978), pp. 33-34.

_8/ For a brief description of the Souda Bay facility, which is

large enough to provide anchorage for almost the entire Sixth

Fleet, see United States Military Installations and Objectives

in the Mediterranean. Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle

49
of the United States to support the former Greek military government, followed by the refusal of the current Karamanlis administration to accommodate U.S. units in the aftermath of the Cyprus

crisis.

Major objections to homeporting arrangements in other foreign

locales have also been political. Homeporting a carrier in Haifa,

Israel has been considered a political risk in terms of the U.S.

effort to seek peace in the Middle East. _9/ Homeporting in

the Philippines might fuel resentment of the U.S. presence in

that country. Similar political problems do not apply, however,

to possible homeporting arrangements in Guam, which is a U.S.

territory.

Homeporting a carrier task force (a carrier and six escorts)

in Guam would provide a number of political, as well as budgetary, advantages. 10/ It would maintain the U.S. posture in the

Pacific, while loosening current U.S. dependence on the goodwill

of the Philippines (though current basing arrangements need in no

way be altered). It would allay local nations' fears of U.S.

withdrawal from the region, since it would symbolize a renewed

U.S. commitment to East Asian stability. 11 / Because such an

East, House Committee on International Relations, Committee

Print, 95:2 (March 1977), p. 32. For a discussion of the

proposal itself, see Jesse W. Lewis, Jr., The Strategic

Balance in the Mediterranean (Washington, D.C.: American

Enterprise Institute, 1976), pp. 26-27.

_9/ This objection may disappear if the Camp David accords are

implemented.

10/ Guam has achieved some notoriety among sailors as a less than

desirable port of call. New naval construction and development of tourist facilities are likely to improve conditions

in the future, however. With its excellent climate, Guam is

already benefiting from tourism, a major industry on the

island. See Department of the Navy, Pacific Division,

Naval Facilities Engineering Command, Guam Land Use; September 1977 (1978), pp. C-8, D-9.

ll./ These considerations make Guam a more attractive possibility

than Hawaii, which is much farther from East Asia.

50
arrangement would not, however, Involve the use of foreign

soil, it would not aggravate any lingering suspicions of U.S.

hegemonial designs that some states in the region might still

harbor.

Homeporting a carrier task force in Guam would yield budgetary savings in several ways, since the Navy requires 3.4

carriers to maintain a forward-deployed Pacific carrier that is

not homeported in Asia but only 1.2 to support a homeported

carrier. If it is felt that the United States must continue

with an annual Indian Ocean deployment of several months while

maintaining its full two-carrier deployment in the Pacific,

the homeporting arrangement would obviate any requirement for

constructing additional air-capable ships. Whereas 14 carriers

might be needed to support such a deployment cycle if only one

were homeported, no more than 11 carriers would be needed if one

carrier were homeported in Guam, in addition to the one already

homeported in Japan. _12/

The savings that could thus be realized from an additional

homeporting arrangement could be significant if the ultimate

result were to obviate the need to construct even one more

carrier. The total costs associated with undertaking a new

homeporting arrangement, including harbor dredging and construction of support and housing facilities on government-owned

land, _137 would amount to about $250 million, considerably less

than the $1.6 billion procurement cost of a conventionally powered

carrier (CVV) and much less than the $2.6 billion cost of a

nuclear carrier (CVN). j.4/ There are no annual manpower and

\2l For further discussion, see Appendix A.

13/ Guam has requested the return of several hundred acres of

U.S. government land. A recent study showed that several

thousand U.S.-owned acres have gone unused. Thus, it appears

that sufficient land is available to support both the demands

of homeporting and the request of the Guam government. See

Department of the Navy, Pacific Division, Naval Facilities

Engineering Command, Guam Land Use; September 1977 (U.S.

Navy, 1978), pp. A-v, A-vi.

14/ CBO's estimate is somewhat lower than a rough Navy estimate of $400 million for facilitating the homeporting

arrangements. Even this higher cost is extremely attractive

51
operating costs attributable to homeporting in Guam. 15/ The

annual operating costs of an additional carrier, on the other

hand, amount to between $85 million and $100 million.

Flexible Deployments—A Change in Deployment Concept

Unlike homeporting, which preserves the current carrier

force deployment posture, a flexible deployment regime would

radically alter the way in which the United States maintains

and supports its overseas presence. The term "flexible deployments" connotes the practice of operating carriers for varying

durations in any number of locales. This posture contrasts

with current Navy practice in that it stresses the value of

transient deployments over permanent stations. It also emphasizes

the flexibility inherent in "ready" task groups that would be

stationed near the United States in order to respond quickly to

crises overseas or to reinforce deployed units.

Flexible deployments offer several advantages, both military

and budgetary. In military terms, they decrease a potential

attacker's ability to plan and coordinate a preemptive strike,

as is possible when task forces operate in fixed and predictable

locales. In addition, they permit wider operating ranges than

are possible with fixed deployments at equal force levels.

Lastly, flexible deployments facilitate a calibrated force

response to crises. Reinforcing groups could be tailored to

the precise nature and capabilities of the regional military

threat. This last advantage is as much political as it is

military. The deployment of forces tailored to the needs of

a given crisis would be an unequivocal statement of U.S. resolve

to bring that crisis to a favorable conclusion. No such message

compared to the cost of a carrier. (Source: U.S. Navy

information provided to CBO, September 28, 1978.) An additional benefit could be realized from the fact that escorts

for the carrier in SLEP could then be attributed to other

missions for the duration of the SLEP program, thereby

reducing possible demands for new construction to meet the

requirements of these other missions during this period.

15/ Any additional costs of basing men in Guam instead of in

the United States would be offset by savings associated with

the lower annual carrier steaming rates resulting from a

homeporting arrangement.

52
could be equally well conveyed by a permanently deployed force

whose station just happened to be near the crisis area.

The budgetary advantages of flexible deployments derive from

the shorter deployments they facilitate. Since the size of the

total force is geared to supporting these deployments, it could be

reduced commensurate with the reduction in operating rates. 16/

Arguments in favor of flexible deployments are consistent

with the view that maximum military effectiveness, as measured

in terms of firepower output and as embodied in the aircraft

carrier, is critical to the success of the U.S. overseas presence mission. On the other hand, these arguments imply that

political effectiveness cannot necessarily be measured in terms

of the permanence of carrier presence. Instead, they support

the notion that less frequent presence might be equally as

effective politically, and that what is critical to the United

States is the fact of presence itself, not its duration.

It can, however, be argued that flexible deployments might

involve a high political cost. East Asian countries, such as

Japan, Korea, and even China, would view a reduction in forwarddeployed carrier force levels with apprehension. Japan in particular might interpret such action as further evidence of

abandonment by the Navy of its vital sea-lanes in the event of a

worldwide war. 17/

1_6/ For example, current deployments do not include transit

time, since carriers are meant to be on station at all

times. Under a system of flexible deployments, the onstation requirement would be lifted and transit time could

be counted as part of a deployment, since the carrier

would be en route to a destination away from home port.

Thus, counting transit time as part of each deployment and

employing Navy calculations, the force required to maintain

the current four forward stations would drop from 14 to 11

carriers (see Appendix A). As in the case of the homeporting

option, a reduced carrier force would result in the release

of several carrier escorts for employment in other missions.

17/ See the comments of Makoto Momoi, "Strategic Environment

in the Northeast Pacific—A Japanese Perception" (paper

submitted to a conference on "Security and Development

53
Similar reactions could be anticipated in the eastern Mediterranean. Although it is widely recognized that carrier deployments in that region render them particularly vulnerable to preemptive Soviet attack, 18/ those deployments are viewed as a

visible token of support for allies in Greece and Turkey. Additionally, the eastern Mediterranean deployments are seen as a

gauge of U.S. concern for the survival of Israel and for peaceful

settlement of Middle East disputes—not only between Israel and

her neighbors, but also between radical, pro-Soviet Arab nations

and moderate and conservative pro-Western ones. The dilemma faced

by the Sixth Fleet is that it must expose itself to the risk of a

crippling Soviet surprise attack in order to provide visible

peacetime assurance to its allies of its intention to honor its

treaty commitments. Although a move to flexible deployments would

partially resolve this dilemma, it would involve potentially great

political costs that could outweigh its military advantages.

Smaller Air-Capable Ships as Alternatives to the Carrier

The option of assigning smaller air-capable ships to presence

missions is based on the assumption that effective presence is

more a function of the permanence of deployments than of the

military capabilities of the systems deployed. To be sure,

whatever systems are deployed must have some offensive capability

if their presence is to demonstrate U.S. commitment and power.

Further, they would be inappropriate in situations that obviously

demand high levels of force. For example, small air-capable

ships would hardly be effective against large concentrations of

sophisticated systems (for example, near the Soviet Union) that

could mount a coordinated air, surface, and submarine attack

against U.S. units. Similarly, these forces would be less

desirable in regions where a need to fight for air superiority,

or to combat sophisticated air defenses, would demand the availability of large multipurpose air wings.

in the Indo-Pacific Arena" sponsored by the International

Security Studies Program, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, April 1978; processed), pp. Iff.

18/ See, for example, testimony by Admiral James Holloway, III,

in Service Chiefs on Defense Missions and Priorities,

seminar conducted by the Task Force on Defense, Senate

Committee on the Budget, Committee Print, 94:2 (September

1975), Volume I, p. 13.

54
Nevertheless, the threshold of sufficiency for projecting

sea-based forces ashore will vary from region to region. Less

capable forces could suffice to convey an image of U.S. power

and concern in areas where threats to those forces are not

great and local military capabilities—both weapons and tactics—

are relatively less sophisticated. Indeed, less obvious demonstrations of force might be highly desirable politically in

some instances.

For example, it is not clear that a large aircraft carrier is

inherently more effective in demonstrating U.S. presence and

capabilities in Southeast Asia than a vertical/short take-off

and landing (V/STOL) carrier would be. The powers of the region—

including the People's Republic of China and Vietnam—all lack

effective means of mounting air attacks against a U.S. fleet.

Furthermore, excessive shows of force in that region, particularly

in the Indonesian straits, might have the effect of initiating

regional arms races and military alliances with other external

powers to the detriment of U.S. objectives.

The need for some recognizable level of offensive capability

tends to limit alternatives to the aircraft carrier to three ship

types: the LHA, a general purpose amphibious assault ship that is

as large as a World War II carrier; the LPH, a smaller assault

ship that displaces more tons than the largest cruiser afloat;

and the DDV, a converted destroyer that can carry about eight

aircraft. Smaller ships would be unlikely to convey an image of

offensive power even remotely related to that associated with the

aircraft carrier.

These three ship types share several characteristics. They

are all inexpensive relative to the carrier. They are all capable

of carrying V/STOL aircraft, which are less expensive than their

conventional counterparts. And, together with their aircraft,

they generate considerably less offensive power than the largedeck carrier and its air wing.

The LHA. Of the three air-capable alternatives, the LHA

most closely approaches the large carrier's capability. To

be sure, there is a vast difference in the output of the LHA's 20

V/STOL AV-8B attack aircraft and that of the carrier air wing's

mix of 70 to 100 (depending on carrier size) interceptors and

attack and support planes. Nevertheless, the new AV-8B—the

55
follow-on to the current Harrier 19/—is a capable plane*

While it cannot match the output of the Navy's newest attack

aircraft, the A-18, the AV-8B can carry 5,000 pounds of ordnance

for over 400 miles if it operates from a short (as opposed to

vertical) take-off from the LHA deck. The AV-8B's ordnance

could include either a combination of bombs and air-to-air

missiles or only bombs. The plane could thus capably conduct

close air support operations over land. In situations in which

air superiority over land or at sea was not at issue, the LHA's

V/STOL attack aircraft could provide a key edge to an ally's

ground forces. Such situations would include instances in

which an ally could achieve air superiority independently,

or in which Soviet maritime forces were limited to surface

naval units (as they tend to be in areas remote from the Soviet

Union).

Unlike the carrier, the LHA does not benefit from the

most comprehensive shipboard active and passive defenses.

Nevertheless, while it is more vulnerable than the carrier

in absolute terms, it is large enough to withstand more than

one hit. 20/ In Third World crises in which there might be

more demand for credibility than for absolute offensive capability, the LHA could have both the appearance and the ability

to survive a surprise attack by antiship missiles. Indeed,

in certain scenarios, it may be politically—and militarily—

more effective than the large-deck carrier. Whereas a hit on

the flight deck of a carrier could immobilize the ship for

several hours—and possibly have highly negative political

repercussions—a similar hit on an LHA deck would only limit its

aircraft to vertical operations. Such operations would still

permit the AV-8B to carry reduced payloads for several hundred

miles.

19/ This plane's limited combat radius and weapons load render

it inappropriate for most maritime missions.

20 / The larger the ship, the greater its survivability. The

LHA currently has some armor around its magazines; it

can withstand damage equivalent to 15 percent of its length.

Information provided to CBO by U.S. Navy, October 24,

1978.

56
The LPH. The LPH option, suggested by the Senate Committee

on Armed Services 21 / and included in the first version of the

fiscal year 1979 defense authorization bill, is attractive for

two reasons. First, the LPH is geared primarily to carrying

aircraft. Although it currently carries only helicopters,

conversion to an AV-8B-capable ship would not be a major undertaking. As a V/STOL ship, most of its below-deck space could be

efficiently employed to support its new role. The LHA, on the

other hand, is a true multipurpose amphibious assault ship. Its

well deck, which is used for debarking assault vehicles, could not

be utilized efficiently if servicing V/STOL units was the ship's

main purpose. Major conversions would be necessary.

The LPH also is readily available. If the Marine Corps

were assured of receiving a sixth LHA, they would immediately

release two LPH ships for conversion to V/STOL carriers. 22/ On

the other hand, if the LHA option were adopted, there would be a

considerable delay before the Navy had its first V/STOL-capable

ship unless an LHA were immediately shifted from the Marines to

the Navy. Such a move is unlikely, however, in view of the

Marines' repeated claims of a shortage in capacity for deploying

battalions overseas. 23/

The DDV. The attractiveness of the converted destroyer (DDV)

lies in the fact that it would be the first surface escort to

carry fixed-wing aircraft—the AV-8B. It could pave the way for

the construction of similar, or smaller, air-capable ships,

thereby expanding the Navy's launch capability and making it more

difficult for potential adversaries to concentrate their antiship

_21_/ Authorizing Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1979 for Military

Procurement, Research and Development, Active Duty, Selected

Reserve, and Civilian Personnel Strengths, Civil Defense and

Other. Purposes. S. Report 95-826, 95:2 (1978), p. 52.

22J See Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations

for Fiscal Year 1979 (S. 2571), Hearings before the Senate

Committee on Armed Services, 95:2 (March and April 1978),

Part 5, p. 4355.

23 / Martin Binkin and Jeffrey Record, Where Does the Marine

Corps Go From Here? (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1977), pp. 33ff.

57
resources on a small number of large air-capable units. The DDV

currently is only a design, however; none has yet been built. Its

costs might be considerably higher than estimates given in recent

Congressional testimony. Further, there is no assurance that a

destroyer-sized unit would have the sea-keeping ability to operate

aircraft in any but the calmest waters.

Escorts for Air-Capable Ships. Small air-capable ships—

whether LHAs, LPHs, or DDVs—would likely be escorted by guidedmissile frigates (FFGs), which are programmed to carry both the

Harpoon antiship missile and the Lamps III antisubmarine helicopter. Both units would provide a credible threat to Third

World, and even Soviet, surface naval and submarine units.

The FFG's Standard missile would provide a modicum of air defense

for the group. Were attack submarines (SSNs) added as escorts,

the antiship and antisubmarine potential of the group would

be further enhanced. Indeed, SSNs, while not a visible presence,

would pose an extremely serious threat to many Third World,

and even Soviet, surface groups. They could free the V/STOL

aircraft to concentrate on operations against aircraft and shore

targets.

Aii—Capable Ships in Battle. It should be noted that the

cost to the Soviet Union of a naval exchange with U.S. V/STOL

ships would likely be higher than the cost to the United States.

While the United States would risk the loss of a lesser-value unit

instead of the loss of a carrier, the Soviets could well lose a

key anticarrier group to the V/STOL aircraft and antiship systems

aboard the LHA or LPH or DDV and its escorts. Additionally, not

only would the surface action group preserve intact the carrier

force for higher-threat operations, but it would also allow the

carrier force to be called in only after a conflict had begun. At

this point, however, the threat to the carrier would be markedly

diminished, since, as noted in preceding sections, a coordinated

surprise attack is the Soviets' most effective way to exploit

carrier vulnerability.

Costs. As noted above, the separate components of an

air-capable task group are less costly than their counterparts

in a carrier task force. As Table 3 indicates, the estimated

procurement cost of an LHA is $820 million; converting an LPH to

make it V/STOL-capable would cost about $45 million; a lead DDV

would cost about $810 million. It should be noted, however, that

some LHAs now serving purely Marine Corps-oriented tasks might

58
TABLE 3. UNIT ACQUISITION COSTS OF SELECTED V/STOL-CAPABLE

SHIPS: IN MILLIONS OF FISCAL YEAR 1980 DOLLARS

Ship

Type

Number of

Aircraft

Type of

Acquisition

Unit

Cost

LHA 20

LPH 10

DDV

(DD-963 variant) 10

New Procurement

Conversion

New Procurement

820

45

870 (lead)

670 (follow)

SOURCE: LHA, LPH: Jane's Fighting Ships. 1977-78. DDV: Military

Posture and H.R. 10929 (Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1979), Hearings

before the House Committee on Armed Services, 95:2 (February, March, and April 1978), Part 4, pp. 555-56. See

also Authorizing Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1979 for

Military Procurement, Research and Development, Active

Duty, Selected Reserve, and Civilian Personnel Strengths,

Civil Defense and other Purposes. S. Report 95-826, 95:2

(1978), p. 52.

usefully be transferred to the presence mission. J4/ Similarly,

no additional escorts beyond those proposed for the current

five-year defense program would have to be bought specifically for

the small air-capable task force mission. By the early 1980s,

there would be about 80 guided-missile frigates (FFGs) in the

fleet, sufficient to support several lower-value surface action

24/ The use of LHAs for presence missions was first suggested

by Secretary of Defense Schlesinger in his fiscal year 1976

posture statement. See Department of Defense, Annual Report,

Fiscal 1976 and Fiscal Year 197T, p. Ill-79.

59

36-473 O - 78 - 6
groups in addition to possible FFG wartime escort duties for

amphibious assault and underway replenishment groups. 25/

In addition, the current DDG-2 guided-missile destroyer

conversion program will provide sufficient destroyer capability to

support the demands both of carrier task forces and up to three

LHA groups. 2,6 / The possible addition of two SSNs to escort these

units could further enhance task force anti-air warfare and ASW

capabilities. Again, however, it is not clear that additional SSN

procurement is necessary to provide this capability. 27/

25/ There is considerable disagreement over the proper force

levels for convoy escort forces for which FFGs have been

designed. The current five-year naval shipbuilding plan

implies a lower requirement than anticipated in recent years.

The current plan calls for procurement of 31 FFGs in fiscal

years 1979 to 1983, with annual procurement levels dropping

from eight ships in 1979 to six in 1982 and then to three in

1983. In contrast, the fiscal year 1978 defense posture

statement called for a total FFG purchase of 45 units for

fiscal years 1979 to 1982 alone, with procurement of at least

10 ships in each of those years. See Department of Defense,

Annual Report. Fiscal Year 1978, p. 190 and Military Posture

and H.R. 10929. Hearings, Part 4, p. 1086. For an evaluation

of possibly higher requirements, see Congressional Budget

Office, The U.S. Sea Control. Miss ion: Forces. Capab ilit ies,

and Requirements. Background Paper (June 1977), pp. 48-54.

26/ A total of 23 DDG-2s are currently programmed for modernization. Thirty-one DD-963s have either been authorized or are in the fleet, as are nine nuclear escorts and

cruisers. (See Jane's Fighting Ships. 1978-79.) The total

number of cruisers and destroyers would more than suffice to

provide two nuclear task forces and six conventional escorts

for each of the 10 remaining carriers. Residual ships could

therefore serve in non-carrier surface action groups.

It should also be noted that additional escorts would be

available to an air-capable ship for about 15 years, given

the expected duration of the SLEP program. This program will

remove a carrier from the fleet, while escorts normally

assigned to it will be freed for other missions.

Congressional Budget Office, The U.S. Sea Control Mission;

Forces, Capabilities^ and Requirements, pp. 40-48.

60
The major uncertainty lies with the cost of aircraft.

The AV-8B costs about the same as an A-18, $10.6 million per

unit for the AV-8B compared to $9.4 million for an A-18. The

AV-8B lacks both a radar and a medium-range, air-to-air missile,

however. This capability would be especially critical for aircraft that sought to intercept Soviet bombers. The British

Sea Harrier, for example, reportedly has such a capability.

The research and development cost of providing AV-8Bs with the

desired radar and missile-carrying capability could amount to

about $1.4 billion, according to Navy estimates. 28/ Other,

more optimistic estimates put the cost at $0.5 billion. 297 If

200 aircraft were procured, the unit cost could range from $2.5

million, at a minimum, to as much as $7 million. 30/ The total

unit cost of an AV-8B would therefore rise to between $13 million

and $18 million.

It is not clear, however, whether the additional capability

the improved AV-8B (AV-8B+) might attain above that of the AV-8B

would be worth the additional cost. It is difficult to imagine a

scenario in which any AV-8 version would be preferred over other

available aircraft for intercepting Soviet Naval Aviation. Either

carrier-based F-14 and F-18 interceptors or land-based F-15s would

more likely be given the task of intercepting Soviet Bears and

Backfires. The AV-8 cannot compare with either the F-14, F-15, or

F-18 in the interceptor role. Its optimum use is as a short-range

attack plane launched from small air-capable units against surface

287 Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for

Fiscal Year 1979, Hearings before the Senate Committee

on Armed Services, 95:2 (March and April 1978), Part 5,

p. 4341.

297 Remarks of Senator Gary Hart, Congressional Record (July 11,

1978), p. S10385.

307 If 20 AV-8B aircraft were required for one ship, the total

number procured for that ship alone would amount to 48

aircraft, assuming 15 percent pipeline, 25 percent training,

and 5 percent annual peacetime attrition. If the LHA is

assumed to be the first of a number of ships, perhaps four,

192 aircraft would have to be procured.

61
targets and in short-range, air-to-air combat against other

less capable sea-based aircraft, such as the Soviet V/STOL

Forger. 3J./

Table 4 indicates that the costs of an LPH group would

vary considerably from those of an LHA group and, indeed, from

a group organized around a DDV. To the LPH's conversion costs

must be added the cost of procuring an LHA in its place to meet

Marine requirements. Operating costs for an LPH are somewhat

lower than for an LHA, $22 million annually compared to $34

million. 32/ On the other hand, operating costs for the aircraft

would be the same if equal numbers of planes were assumed for both

types.

Clearly, the cost of the air-capable V/STOL ship option

is not low. But it would cost considerably less to procure and

operate one, or even two, V/STOL-capable ships than it would to

procure and operate a single large-deck carrier platform (see

Table 5). The option would provide assurance of increased U.S.

task force presence in Third World areas, thus increasing the

flexibility of the large-deck carrier forces. A reduction in

carrier force levels might therefore become possible, without a

loss in visibility of U.S. presence overseas.

31 / The AV-8B, according to Admiral Holloway, generally can

outperform the YAK-36 Forger. See Department of Defense

Authorizatio n for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1979,

Hearings, Part 2, p. 1401. Adding air-to-air missile

capability to the AV-8B without increasing thrust would

result in less costly modification. Whether the additional capability would justify the additional cost depends

on the actual nature of those costs, which as yet are

unavailable.

32/ The annual cost of operating the two LPHs that the Marines

would transfer to the Navy is $44 million. If an LHA were

procured to offset the transfer of the LPHs to the Navy,

its operating costs—chargeable to the Marines—would be

$34 million. The net saving could be allocated to the Navy

mission (see Table 4).

62
TABLE 4. COSTS OF TASK GROUPS WITH EQUAL V/STOL CAPABILITY: IN

MILLIONS OF FISCAL YEAR 1980 DOLLARS

Task Group

Initial Annual

Procurement Operating

Cost Cost

30-Year

Life-Cycle

Cost

(undiscounted) a/

LHA Task Group

1 LHA

48 V/STOL Aircraft

Total

LPH Task Group

2 LPH (modifications)

48 V/STOL Aircraft

1 LHA

Total

DDV Task Group

2 DDV

48 V/STOL Aircraft

Total

820

512

1,332

90

512

820

1,422

1,540

512

2,052

34.0

15.9

49.9

34.0 b/

15.9

49.9

26.0 c/

15.9

41.9

2,250

1,501

3,751

1,875

1,501

820

4,196

3,090

1.501

4,591

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office Defense Resources Model,

a/ Includes mid-life conversion.

b/ Operating costs of two LPHs ($44 million) less savings realized from Marine operations of LHA ($34 million) in place of

two LPHs which they now to operate.

£/ Operating costs as with DD-963.

63
TABLE 5. MARGINAL COSTS OF ALTERNATIVE PRESENCE POSTURES: IN MILLIONS OF

FISCAL YEAR 1980 DOLLARS

Number of Total 30-Year

Active Carriers Systems Other New Initial Life-Cycle

Posture in Fleet a/ Procured Construction Costs Cost

Twelve

Operational

Carriers

Homeporting

at Guam

Flexible

Deployments

Small

Air-Capable

Ship: LHA

Small

Air-Capable

Ship: LPH

Small

Air-Capable

Ship: DDV

13

12

12

12

CW or

CVN

LHA

Military

Construction

2 LPH (Conversion)

12 LHA

1,575

2,565

250

4,920

6,750

250

12 2 DDV

820 2,250

90 1,875

820 820

1,540 3,090

a/ As of the mid-1980s.

LAND-BASED ALTERNATIVES

The Introduction to this paper stressed that U.S. presence—

even outside Europe and Korea—has never been exclusively a

naval mission, although the Navy tends to appropriate this mission to itself. 33^/ Preceding sections of this chapter have

outlined alternative methods of maintaining the Navy's current

33/ See Admiral Holloway's statement in Military Posture and

H.R. 10929. Hearings, Part 1, pp. 664-66.

64
focus on sea-based air power, while easing the degree of reliance

on fixed forward deployments of carriers. Land-based air power

can, of course, also contribute to the maritime presence mission.

This section outlines some considerations that may illuminate

the nature, scope, value, and cost of that contribution.

Land-Based Aircraft for Maritime Operations

The role of land-based aircraft in maritime operations often

has been discussed in the context of a worldwide war. 34/ These

forces can, however, also play a useful role in non-NATO peacetime

contingencies. They can perform "intrusive" functions—such as

reconnaissance—during crises, thereby providing evidence of U.S.

concern. Combat aircraft can fly near hostile forces, applying

the implicit threat of U.S. military operations. The decline in

the number of U.S. bases overseas points to the problems that

attach to any dependence on air bases abroad. Nevertheless, there

remains a network of U.S.-owned and leased bases—such as those

on Guam, Wake Island, and Diego Garcia—that could be exploited by

long-range aviation. For example, land-based P-3 maritime patrol

aircraft flying out of Diego Garcia—and perhaps out of other

bases in friendly Indian Ocean states—and armed with Harpoon

could threaten even the Soviet carrier Kiev were it to operate

in the Indian Ocean. Its V/STOL aircraft could not overtake the

P-3 before they reached the limits of their combat radius.

F-llls and B-52D bombers could be much more effective for

long-range antiship and perhaps maritime reconnaissance missions.

B-52Ds have performed conventional force missions in the recent

past and may not be essential to the strategic mission. Armed

with Harpoon, they could be a formidable threat to Soviet surface forces. F-llls, which have flown in antiship training

exercises, 35/ have sufficient range, with tanker support, to

cover the entire span of the western Indian Ocean, from Diego

Garcia to as far north as the Persian Gulf and as far west as

.34/ See William D. O'Neil, III, "Land-Based Multi-Purpose Naval

Aircraft (LMNA) Concept," Office of the Secretary of Defense

(September 15, 1976; processed); and Congressional Budget

Office, The U.S. Sea Control Mission; Forces, Capabilities^

and Requirements, pp. 21-34.

35/ See David A. Brown, "Air Force Doctrine, Missions Revised,"

Aviation Week (August 8, 1977), p. 49.

65
Uganda. Based on Diego Garcia, a squadron of F-llls could,

therefore, threaten any Soviet surface force in the northwest

quadrant of the Indian Ocean. An F-lll squadron would also

indicate a formidable presence in that area, remote yet quickly

available. Such a presence might be politically unwelcome today,

but that might not be the case in the near future. If a routine

deployment of land-based forces to Diego Garcia were implemented,

it could replace the periodic visits of carrier units from the

Seventh Fleet to the Indian Ocean region.

The cost of providing these aircraft with antiship capabilities would be relatively low. For example, the cost of backfitting Harpoon antiship missiles onto the P-3s currently in

the force is estimated to be $400,000 per aircraft. 36/ Backfitting 50 F-llls with four Harpoons each would cost $73 million,

and providing 20 B-52s with 12 Harpoons each would cost $95

million. 377 The major costs would be associated with expansion

of base facilities at Diego Garcia (particularly to construct

housing for crews), crew rotation, training for antiship warfare

missions, and the possible opportunity cost of foregoing the

F-lll's capability for deep interdiction in a conflict over

land. In addition, the current manpower and operation and maintenance costs for any of these aircraft would be charged to the

maritime warfare mission. A final cost would be political. It

is uncertain whether any further construction on Diego Garcia

would meet with less opposition, both domestically and abroad,

than the current U.S. effort to upgrade the facility approved by

the Congress in fiscal year 1975.

Land-Based Aircraft for Projection Operations

The Air Force long-range aircraft discussed above as candidates for maritime missions could also serve in their bomber/

attack role to supplement or substitute for carrier projection

operations against littoral targets in the Third World. For

example, B-52D bombers stationed at Guam conducted bombing

raids during the Vietnam war. They could equally well carry out

36/ Costs provided to CBO by U.S. Navy, December 4, 1978.

37/ Costs provided to CBO by U.S. Air Force, August 11, 1978.

66
missions as far away as the Kamchatka Peninsula. 38/ The B-52

carries over three times the weapons load of an A-6. A single

sortie by the 12-plane Guam squadron could, therefore, drop at

least as much tonnage as 40 A-6 sorties or, put another way, at

least as much as the single-sortie tonnage of the A-6 squadrons

from three carriers.

The F-lll likewise could play a long-range power projection

role. It has a combat radius of 1,500 miles for attack missions

and can be refueled by KC-135s about 1,150 miles from base. _39/ A

squadron of F-llls based in Diego Garcia, if refueled, could

conduct bombing runs against targets in the Persian Gulf or the

African coast.

The availability of tanker assets and, indeed, of F-llls for

Third World operations would hinge on the absence of crises in

other parts of the world, notably a conflict between NATO and

Warsaw Pact forces in Central Europe. In that case, F-llls

would be dedicated to the European theater (there are no F-llls

currently assigned to the Pacific air force), and KC-135s would

have to support both the strategic and cargo aircraft requirements arising from a major contingency. In a single lesser

crisis, however, both F-llls and KC-135s could be employed

to support U.S. interests outside Europe. Their effectiveness in

long-range attack missions would depend on the adequacy of the

bases from which they took off for long-distance sorties.

Diego Garcia would become critical in this regard. In order to

function efficiently from that island, adequate facilities would

have to be provided for aircraft, air crews, and maintenance

teams, as well as funding for training and rotation of personnel.

The value of these forces for projection missions—and

for possible maritime roles—could well lie in their potential for

3ji/ The B-52 has a combat radius of 3,385 miles with a bomb load

of 60,000 to 70,000 pounds. See John M. Collins, American

and Soviet Military Trends Since the Cuban Missile Crisis

(Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International

Studies, Georgetown University, 1978), p. 107.

39/ See Barry C. Wheeler and Bill Sweetman, "Military Aircraft of

the World," Flight International (March 4, 1976), p. 611;

Jane's All the World's Aircraft. 1966-67.

67
inflicting damage rather than in their actual wartime roles.

Their presence in Third World areas might have a useful deterrent

effect which, as is discussed in Chapter VI, could usefully

supplement the presence of sea-based systems in these areas.

68
CHAPTER VI. CONCLUSIONS: TOWARD A MORE EFFECTIVE STRATEGY

FOR OVERSEAS PRESENCE

Presence is a political and military activity. As Chapter II

indicated, presence embodies the threat that some level of force

might be used against other states. The U.S. practice from World

War II through the Vietnam era was to deploy high levels of naval

forces for both political and military reasons. The major

exception has been the token presence in the Persian Gulf and

Indian Ocean. More recently, however, a reduction in the number

of Navy ships has led to increased interest in exploring alternatives—both naval and non-naval—to the current carrier-oriented

presence requirements.

Much of Chapter V was devoted to a discussion of three broad

sets of naval alternatives. All three share one important policy

implication: they each could justify a reduction in the current

carrier force level. If any of these alternatives were implemented, there would be less urgency to procure a thirteenth

large-deck carrier. In other respects, however, these alternatives represent quite different views about the nature and

demands of U.S. overseas presence.

Choices in favor of any of these options will involve judgments about both the relative value of carrier effectiveness and

the permanence of presence to the U.S. overseas posture. Homeporting essentially adopts the current Navy view stressing that

the most militarily effective ship in terms of output—the

carrier—must be deployed at key overseas stations at all times.

Homeporting is merely a vehicle for maintaining current deployments at considerably less cost. Arguments for flexible deployments accept the importance of maximizing sea-based military

capabilities, but do not propose that carriers be deployed permanently at fixed locations. Lastly, arguments in favor of procuring

smaller air-capable ships instead of more carriers stress the

political importance of maintaining full-time deployments, but

downplay the need to maintain equal military capabilities in all

locales without regard to the specific threats in those areas.

As noted in the preceding chapter, each option has some

drawbacks. The primary disadvantage of the homeporting option

69
applies equally to the others and should again be emphasized.

Homeporting, like the other options, appears to justify a reduction in the carrier force level. To the extent that such a

reduction were made, the Navy would lose an element of its current

firepower capabilities. That loss might not be critical to

successful carrier operations. But an assessment of its effect

must be made, and can only be made in the context of evaluating

the demands of the Navy's most taxing contingency—a worldwide

conflict with the Soviet Union.

None of the options outlined above are mutually exclusive.

Most are complementary. The Congress may wish to choose among

elements of these options, with regard not only to their costs,

but also to the disparate forms of effectiveness that each of them

reflects.

Elements of all the options can be combined in some fashion

to produce still other alternatives to the current U.S. presence

posture. For example, flexible carrier deployments in the Pacific

could be facilitated by homeporting a carrier in Guam. Alternately, homeporting an LHA and five escorts in Guam would facilitate more frequent deployment of these less capable units to the

southwest Pacific, freeing carrier forces for longer-term operations near Japan. This arrangement would involve much lower

military construction costs for berthing, support, and housing

facilities than would homeporting a carrier in Guam. It nevertheless would provide Japan with more visible assurance of U.S.

support than is the case at present.

Similarly, the expansion of base facilities on Diego Garcia

might allow a more active maritime role for Air Force aircraft.

In concert with LHA, LPH, or DDV forces, Air Force units might

provide a sufficiently compelling United States presence in the

Indian Ocean to lessen the need for long carrier deployments

there, thus freeing carrier resources for operations near Japan.

Taken in concert, different mixes of these options would

provide the United States with a more flexible approach to the

demands of the presence mission. Currently, what may be excessive

U.S. preoccupation with the carrier force tends to obscure the

potential contribution of other systems to the presence mission,

especially in less threatening Third World environments. In

particular, land-based aircraft might be the most valuable supplement to, not a substitute for, the Navy's current maritime presence posture, in effect providing the United States with a "combined arms" approach to maritime presence.

70
Land-based aircraft might not yet be capable of carrying

out the full range of crisis-control activities—particularly

implicit coercion of other states—that traditionally have been

undertaken by the aircraft carrier. Unlike aircraft deployed on

carriers, they could not remain offshore for extended periods.

Nevertheless, as noted above, given sufficient range they could

conduct a variety of operations near the shore. These could be

both passive, such as reconnaissance, and active, such as interception of incoming aircraft. In effect, land-based forces could

conduct the types of air power operations for which V/STOL aircraft are less capable. They would enable the Navy to maximize

the military effectiveness of V/STOL carriers, and would also

support the political function of indicating the seriousness of

U.S. purpose to allies, neutral countries, and adversaries. A

combined-arms approach that initially included no large-deck

carriers could thus provide significant capability while allowing

the carrier force to remain unthreatened, intact, and available

for operations in more critical areas of the world. Of course,

the availability of these other systems would not clearly imply

their use, just as their initial presence in a crisis would not

render the carrier unavailable or undesirable for Third World

operations. Nevertheless, to the extent that lower-value naval

and ground-based units impart significant credibility of U.S.

purpose, their presence would provide a useful and flexible policy

tool for the National Command Authority.

71

APPENDIXE S

APPENDIX A. FORWARD DEPLOYMENTS AND SHIP ROTATION FACTORS I/

The Navy determines the total number of carriers required to

support its program of forward deployments on the basis of the

"carrier deployment cycle." The cycle is measured between

major overhauls; _2/ during this period of time, the carrier goes

through a gamut of activities. These include overseas deployments, as well as nondeployment activities such as routine and

special maintenance at shore-based depots (termed "limited availabilities") and training operations for crews prior to deploying

overseas. The Navy usually posits about a 1:2 ratio of deployed

to nondeployed time during the cycle. _3/ This ratio is obviously

critical, since it is the foundation for the multiplier applied to

forward-deployed carriers to compute total carrier requirements.

Besides the need for limited availabilities and training, it is

determined by the desire to provide adequate leave time to the

sailor to be with his family in the home port.

A further critical factor is the length of the overseas

deployments within the cycle. A period longer than six months,

the Navy believes, places undue strain on the crews because of

separation from their families. _4/ This strain will eventually

take its toll on crew morale and capabilities and, in the long

run, could exacerbate personnel retention problems.

Two elements of the deployment cycle are subject to varying

definitions, however, and these variations affect the amount of

time that is allotted for each activity. Assumptions about the

I/ This appendix draws upon the research of John Shewmaker,

formerly with the Congressional Budget Office.

2^1 Whether "between" includes or excludes the overhaul period

itself is a matter of debate, as explained below.

_3/ See Alva M. Bowen, Jr., and Ray Frank Bessette, Aircraft Carrier Force Levels, Congressional Research Service (1978),

p. 21.

y Ibid., pp. 22, 32.

75

36-473 O - 18 - 7
nature of overhaul and leave time will significantly affect the

nature of the cycle, the amount of leave time available to the

crew, the time a carrier spends on station, and, ultimately,

carrier force requirements.

Overhaul may or may not be listed as a separate element

in the deployment cycle. It may be considered part of home

time for the crew, since the carrier is not deployed anywhere.

Funds are provided to pay for the movement of families to the

yard location if the yard is different from the home port and

if the overhaul takes longer than six months, which is usually

the case. Thus, the crew member works near his family and

can be with them at night. If overhaul time is considered

part of leave time, there might be less justification for providing additional nonoverhaul leave periods for the crews.

Reducing nonoverhaul leave time permits a greater number of

deployment periods within a cycle (though not longer deployment

periods). As a result, fewer ships are required to support a

given station.

Conversely, if overhaul is considered a separate entity

in the deployment cycle, additional home time must be provided for

the crew. The Navy tends to view overhaul time as separate from

leave time. The rationale behind this view derives from a number

of factors. To begin with, while it is true that families usually

join the crew member when a ship is in overhaul, they must undergo

the hardship of an additional move. Therefore, they would be

penalized doubly if leave time in home port were reduced. Crew

members often spend part of their overhaul time studying at

service schools away from both home port and yard, so that they

are not truly on leave at all. Lastly, it is argued that since

crew members are often assigned necessary tasks aboard ship during

overhaul, they would be unlikely to consider that period as

leave time.

Considerations about the nature of the overhaul period

affect the way the deployment cycle is organized. If overhaul is

considered part of home time, it becomes part of the calculation.

The cycle is termed the "employment cycle" (C ), namely, the

period between the start of one overhaul and tfte start of the

next. If the overhaul is a separate element of the calculation,

the cycle itself may be calculated on the basis of times between

overhaul, termed the "operating cycle" (C ). The relevant cycle

then serves as the basis for a four-step calculation of force

requirements in the following manner:

76
1. The preferred cycle (C or C ) in months is divided by 3,

reflecting a home to deployed0 ratio of 2:1, to yield total

time deployed, T :

T

d

C or C

e o

2. T is then divided by 6 months, the ideal deployment time,

to yield the maximum number of deployments in a given cycle,

D (which must, of course, be an integer): max

D

max

3. Transit time, T , is calculated to a given station from

the United States, doubled to reflect return trips, multiplied by the number of deployments, D , and subtracted

from T to yield time on station, T :

d s

/ T = T, - (2T x D )

s d t max

4. T is divided into the deployment cycle, C , to yield the

clrrier force requirement for that deployment, F:

C, = C or C + overhaul time d e o

T

s

The following example illustrates the effect of varying

assumptions about overhaul on carrier cycle and force level

requirements.

77
Assuming that the average overhaul requires 12 months,

that the deployment cycle—including overhaul—is 66 months, _5_/

and that transit time to the Pacific is 13 days, _6/ then, if

overhaul time is counted as home time and the employment cycle is

used, C = 66, T, = 22, D = 3. 7, T = 19.3, and F = 3.4. e d ' max s

A total of 3.4 carriers would therefore be required to

maintain a Pacific station. Tj If overhaul time is not counted as

home time and the operating cycle is used, then

C - 54

o

T. = 18 d

D = 3

max

T =15. 4 and

s

F = 4.3

_5_/ Bowen and Bessette, Aircraft Carrier Force Levels, p. 23.

J>/ Based on a 5,000-mile transit, a 20-knot average transit is

about 10.4 days. Since transit is not necessarily at highest

speed and, in fact, is governed by fuel economy and readiness

(training) considerations, 16 knots is a more likely average

and 13 days is a more likely transit time.

TJ In practical terms, the Navy would have to support the illustrative Pacific station with four carriers, three of which

would be allocated full time to support the station, while the

fourth would divide its deployment cycle between the Pacific

station and other missions. As outlined on page 13, the fractional carrier requirement for this station is summed with the

requirements of other stations to achieve the total carrier

force requirement. If that total also includes a fractional

requirement, it is rounded up to the next whole unit. (The

requirement could also be rounded down, however. In that

case, current calculations would result in a requirement for

carriers to spend more time on each individual deployment, or

less time in maintenance or in port during crew leave time.)

78
Thus, 4.3 carriers, each deploying for six months, would be

required to maintain the same Pacific station.

Employing the same factors for Mediterranean stations as

those used above, with nine days' transit time, yields requirements of either 3.3 or A.I carriers for each station, using

employment and operational cycles, respectively.

The Navy would prefer not to consider overhaul as time at

home. Using the operating-cycle calculation, which does not

count overhaul as home time, the required total for four stations

would then be as many as 17 carriers if a carrier were not homeported at Yokosuka. That carrier is counted as "deployed" during

both its home and deployed time. In effect, it is deployable for

all but 12 months of its cycle. With a factor of 1.2 carriers for

that deployment (66 months divided by 54-month deployability), a

total of about 13.8 carriers would be required, which, when

rounded to whole units, amounts to a 14-carrier force. This

force, in fact, is above the current and programmed carrier force

level. Using the employment cycle as a base, however, 11.2

carriers—or 12 units—would be required to maintain the forward

deployments.

Beginning in the early 1980s, the carrier force will drop to

11 operational ships with the retirement of the Coral Sea and

the beginning of the service-life extension of Forrestal-class

carriers. The entry of the CVN-71 into the fleet in the mid-1980s

will be offset by the retirement of the Midway. Additionally, a

four-month annual Indian Ocean deployment must also be maintained.

That deployment, involving transits as long as from the West Coast

to the Pacific, reduces carrier on-station time still further

and thereby adds to carrier force requirements. What is the

implication for force requirements if the Indian Ocean deployment

is viewed as an additional requirement?

If an Indian Ocean deployment is viewed as additional to the

two-carrier Pacific deployment, and is maintained continuously

(rather than just part of the year), then from the previous

formulas (with T = 13 days), this would require 4.3 carriers.

Since the Indian Ocean deployment is maintained on average only

four months a year, however, the requirement is—approximately

calculated—only one-third as great, or 1.4 carriers, on an

operating-cycle basis. Therefore, 5.7 carriers would be required

to support one Pacific station and to allow an annual four-month

deployment in the Indian Ocean (4.3 + 1.4).

79
On the basis of an operating-cycle calculation, 16 carriers

would be required for all four forward deployments plus the Indian

Ocean deployment, _8/ as opposed to the 14 carriers that would be

required if no deployments to the Indian Ocean were contemplated.

The effect of the Indian Ocean deployment would be less

marked if an employment-cycle approach were used; the requirement

would then be 13 carriers. _9/ The strain upon the carrier force—

and the consequent need for more air-capable platforms if both

an Indian Ocean deployment and two Pacific deployments are maintained—clearly depends on how the deployment-cycle calculations

are made.

If the basic assumptions of the two approaches discussed in

this appendix 10/ are accepted, however, then the United States

could not add new deployment requirements to the Navy's current

peacetime operations unless an additional carrier were procured

or new approaches were taken. These new approaches could include

a regime of flexible deployments, a carrier substitute, or additional homeporting of a carrier.

JJ/ Factors are 1.2 for the homeported carrier, 5.7 for the other

Pacific deployment, and 4.1 for each of the Mediterranean

carriers.

_9/ Factors are 1.2 for the homeported carrier, 4.5 for the other

Pacific deployment, and 3.3 for each of the Mediterranean

carriers.

IP/ These assumptions are the 2:1 ratio of home to deployed time

and the 66-month limit for the carrier cycle.

80
APPENDIX B. THE EFFECT OF CARRIERS ON OVERALL FORCE LEVELS

The carrier force directly accounts for at least 179 of

the 411 general purpose ships in the U.S. Navy (see Table B-l).

Indirectly, it may account for an even larger number. Some

carrier task forces require more than the indicated number of

surface escorts; attack submarines are often deployed as part of

the carrier escort force; and a number of the nontender support

auxiliaries, such as repair ships and tugs, probably play a role

in support of carrier operations.

TABLE B-l. CARRIER-RELATED NAVAL UNITS

Type Number

Carriers 12

Escort Ships 114

Underway Replenishment Ships 46

Tenders 7

179

ESCORTS

There are currently 156 major fleet escorts in the U.S.

Navy, _!_/ Carriers and their support ships require approximately

70 percent of these escorts. Traditionally, nuclear-powered

JL/ See posture statement of the Chief of Naval Operations in

Department of Defense Appropriations for 1979, Hearings before

a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, 95:2

(1978), Part 1, p. 559.

81
carriers are said to require four nuclear-powered escorts, all of

them large cruisers carrying both anti-aircraft and antisubmarine

warfare (ASW) systems. Conventionally powered carriers require

a mix of six smaller, oil-powered anti-air and antisubmarine

cruisers and destroyers. _2_/ As the number of nuclear escorts in

the current force is only large enough to provide for two allnuclear escort groups, the remaining carriers have six escorts

each. Thus, 12 carriers directly account for at least 68 major

fleet escorts.

In addition, carrier task forces require sustained underway

replenishment by groups of supply ships, and these underway

replenishment groups (URGs) also need escorts for protection while

at sea. As will be shown below, current force levels indicate

that one underway replenishment group is assigned to each carrier

available for deployment, for a total of 10 URGs. Since the Navy

assigns a minimum of four ASW escorts to each carrier, it can be

assumed that a minimum of four escorts is needed to provide

adequate ASW protection to a group of ships operating together,

such as an URG. Thus, 46 escorts—40 for the URG escorts and six

more (15 percent) _3/ in overhaul—must be added to the escort

level required by carriers, for a total of 114 ships.

UNDERWAY REPLENISHMENT FORCES

Underway replenishment groups generally consist of four

ships: two oilers, an ammunition ship, and a stores ship, kj

2J See Department of Defense, Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1969,

p. 126. The size of the all-nuclear escort force has never

been justified adequately, however. See Alva M. Bowen and

Michael Krepon, AEGIS Weapon System: Ship Selection and

Related Issues, Congressional Research Service (1975),

p. 46.

3^/ Fifteen percent is a long-standing overhaul allowance factor

for escorts. See Arnold M. Kuzmack, Naval Force Levels

and Modernization: An Analysis of Shipbuilding Requirements

(Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1971), p. 125.

A/ There are three major categories of replenishment ships:

oilers, stores, and ammunition ships. A resupply group

would be expected to include at least one ship from each

82
The Navy appears to call for sufficient URGs to support all but

two active carriers, _5/ and it seeks to maintain a 12-carrier

force. _6/ Thus, 46 underway replenishment ships would be required

to support 10 deployable carriers, 40 on active duty and six more

as a 15 percent overhaul allowance.

TENDER FORCES

Destroyer tenders are meant to provide intermediate maintenance capability for deployed surface escorts. There are 10

tenders in the force, _7/ which service the Navy's 156 escorts.

If it is assumed that 114 escorts are directly attributable

to carrier forces, as explained above, seven tenders could be

required to service them. _8/

category. Since the Navy objective, however, is to have

slightly more oilers than the total fleet inventory of the

other two types combined, it can be deduced that each URG

should have at least two oilers.

57 Derived from U.S. Department of the Navy, Sea Plan 2000,

Unclassified Executive Summary (March 28, 1978), p. 18.

Given a 15 percent overhaul allowance, the 38 support ships

in the study's Option 1 (10 carriers) would form eight replenishment groups; the 46 support ships in Option 2 (12 carriers)

could form 10 URGs; and the 55 support ships in Option 3 (14

carriers) would form 12 URGs.

ji/ The Navy expects about 85 percent of its carriers (10 of

12) to be available under full mobilization in a general

conflict—that is, all but the ships in overhaul. See

statement of Admiral James L. Holloway III, USN, Chief

of Naval Operations, in Military Posture and H.R. 10929

(Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for

Fiscal Year 1979), Hearings before the House Committee on

Armed Services, 95:2 (February, March, and April 1978),

Part 1, p. 664.

2J Jane's Fighting Ships, 1978-79. pp. 625-26.

QJ The carrier-related tender requirement is simply calculated

by dividing the 114 escort level by 15.6, the ratio of escorts

to tenders in the'fleet as a whole.

83

GLOSSAR Y AN D ABBREVIATION S

GLOSSARY AND ABBREVIATIONS

A-6: Navy/Marine Corps adverse-weather attack aircraft.

A-18; Attack version of new Navy/Marine Corps multipurpose

aircraft.

ASW: Antisubmarine warfare.

AV-8B; Improved version of Harrier vertical/short take-off

and landing attack plane.

B-52D; Late 1950s variant of B-52 strategic nuclear bomber;

has been employed for conventional long-range bombing

missions.

Backfire; New Soviet long-range bomber; can carry air-to-surface

missiles for antiship operations.

Badger; Medium-range Soviet bomber; can carry air-to-surface

missiles for antiship operations.

CVN; Nuclear-powered multipurpose large aircraft carrier.

CVV; Conventionally powered mid-sized aircraft carrier.

DDG-2; "Adams-class" guided-missile destroyer; will undergo

conversion beginning in 1980.

DDV; Destroyer converted to carry helicopters and vertical/

short take-off and landing aircraft.

F-14; Navy air superiority/fleet air defense fighter and

air-to-ground aircraft.

F-15; Air Force air superiority fighter.

F-18; Fighter variant of new Navy/Marine Corps multipurpose

aircraft.

87
F-lll; Air Force variable-wing ("swing-wing"), long-range,

adverse-weather attack aircraft.

FFG: Guided-missile frigate (formerly patrol frigate).

Harpoon; A tactical antiship cruise missile that can be fired

from surface ships, submarines, or aircraft.

LHA; General purpose amphibious assault ship.

LPH; Amphibious assault ship.

P-3; Land-based antisubmarine patrol aircraft.

SLEP; Service-Life Extension Program.

SSN; Attack submarine (nuclear-powered).

V/STOL; Vertical/short take-off and landing.

88

o