TED CRUZ FOR SENATE, et al., Plaintiffs 

v. 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, et al., 

Defendants. 

Civil No. 19-cv-908 (NJR) (APM) (TJK). 

United States District Court, District of Columbia 

June 3, 2021. 

Charles J. Cooper, John D. Ohlendorf, J. Joel Alicea, 

Cooper & Kirk, PLLC, and Chris Gober, The Gober Group 

PLLC, for Plaintiffs. 

 Lisa J. Stevenson, Kevin Deeley, Harry J. Summers, Seth 

Nesin, and Tanya Senanayake, Federal Election Commission, 

Washington, DC, for Defendants. 

Before: RAO, Circuit Judge, MEHTA and KELLY, District 

Judges. 

MEMORANDUM OPINION

 RAO, Circuit Judge: 

In our constitutional democracy, elections are the primary 

way for the people to express their political will. Political 

speech promotes the free exchange of ideas about principles of 

government, pressing policy matters, and the relative merits of 

candidates for office. In recognition of the centrality of free 

speech to our democracy, the Supreme Court has consistently 

held that “the First Amendment ‘has its fullest and most urgent 

application’ to speech uttered during a campaign for political 

office.” Eu v. San Fran. Cnty. Dem. Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 

214, 223 (1989) (quoting Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 

265, 272 (1971)). Protections for political speech extend to 

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campaign financing because effective speech requires 

spending money. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19–23 

(1976) (per curiam). 

This case raises a constitutional challenge to a somewhat 

obscure campaign finance restriction that limits the amount of 

post-election contributions that may be used to repay a 

candidate’s pre-election loans. Section 304 of the Bipartisan 

Campaign Reform Act of 2002 prohibits candidates from using 

post-election contributions to repay personal loans over 

$250,000. See 52 U.S.C. § 30116(j) (the “loan-repayment 

limit”). Senator Rafael Edward “Ted” Cruz and his campaign 

committee Ted Cruz for Senate brought this suit to invalidate 

and enjoin the enforcement of Section 304 and its 

implementing regulation. We find that the loan-repayment 

limit burdens political speech and thus implicates the 

protection of the First Amendment. Because the government 

has failed to demonstrate that the loan-repayment limit serves 

an interest in preventing quid pro quo corruption, or that the 

limit is sufficiently tailored to serve this purpose, the loanrepayment limit runs afoul of the First Amendment. We 

therefore grant summary judgment for Senator Cruz and his 

campaign. 

I. 

A. 

 Candidates for federal office require substantial funds to 

support their campaigns. Funding may come from individual 

contributions, which are subject to a per-election cap.1 See 

1

 The current base limit is set at $2,900 per election. See 86 Fed. Reg. 

7,867, 7,869 (Feb. 2, 2021). A primary election, general election, 

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Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (“FECA”), Pub. L. No. 

92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (codified as amended at 52 U.S.C. § 30116); 

see also 52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(1)(A) & (c). Candidates may 

also self-finance their campaigns without monetary limits. See 

11 C.F.R. § 110.10; see also Buckley, 424 U.S. at 51–54. Selffinancing often takes the form of loans, either from a 

candidate’s personal funds or through a third-party lender. A 

campaign may repay a candidate’s loans using contributions 

received both before and after the election. Under Section 304 

of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (“BCRA”), 

however, a campaign may repay only $250,000 of a 

candidate’s pre-election loans with post-election contributions. 

See Pub. L. No. 107-155, § 304, 116 Stat. 81 (codified at 52 

U.S.C. § 30116(j)). 

The loan-repayment limit intersects with other restrictions 

on the use of campaign contributions promulgated by the 

Federal Election Commission (“FEC” or “Commission”). For 

instance, an individual may designate a contribution for a 

particular election, including a previous election. See 11 C.F.R. 

§ 110.1(b)(2)(i). If designated for a previous election, a 

contribution may be accepted “only to the extent that [it] does 

not exceed net debts outstanding” from that election. See id. 

§ 110.1(b)(3)(i). A campaign’s “net debts outstanding” for an 

election equals the “total amount of unpaid debts and 

obligations” minus its total available resources. Id.

§ 110.1(b)(3)(ii)(A)–(C). A campaign may accept postelection contributions only to the extent necessary to pay down 

a net shortfall. To effectuate the loan-repayment limit in 

Section 304, the calculation of “net debts outstanding” 

excludes the amount of any candidate loans “that in the 

runoff election, and special election are treated as separate elections. 

See 52 U.S.C. § 30101(1)(A).

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aggregate exceed $250,000 per election.” Id.

§ 110.1(b)(3)(ii)(C). The $250,000 limit applies to third-party 

loans secured by the candidate and also to loans from the 

candidate’s personal funds. See id. § 116.11(a). 

A campaign has two options to pay back a candidate’s 

personal loans. First, a campaign “[m]ay repay the entire 

amount of the personal loans using contributions” made before 

the election. Id. § 116.11(b)(1). If the campaign chooses to use 

pre-election contributions, “it must do so within 20 days of the 

election.” Id. § 116.11(c)(1). Second, pursuant to Section 304, 

a campaign may repay up to $250,000 of the personal loans 

with post-election contributions. After the election, any 

balance of the personal loan that exceeds $250,000 will be 

treated “as a contribution by the candidate.” Id. § 116.11(c)(2). 

B. 

This case arose from Senator Cruz’s 2018 campaign for 

reelection to the United States Senate. The day before the 

general election, Senator Cruz made two loans totaling 

$260,000 to his campaign: $5,000 from his personal bank 

account and $255,000 from a third-party lender secured with his 

personal assets. Senator Cruz won reelection. 

After the election, Senator Cruz’s campaign had almost 

$2.5 million in debt against approximately $2.2 million in cash 

on hand. The campaign “used the funds it had on hand to pay 

vendors and meet other obligations instead of repaying [Senator 

Cruz’s] loans.” Compl. ¶ 29, ECF No. 1. The campaign did not 

use any pre-election funds within twenty days of the election to 

repay the Senator’s loans, as Section 304’s implementing 

regulation would have permitted. Instead, the campaign repaid 

Senator Cruz the maximum $250,000 with post-election 

contributions but Section 304 prevented the campaign from 

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paying back the final $10,000. The $10,000 balance of those 

loans was subsequently deemed a campaign contribution from 

Senator Cruz. 

Senator Cruz and his campaign (collectively, the “Cruz 

campaign”) brought suit against the FEC, alleging that 

Section 304 of BCRA and its implementing regulation, 11 

C.F.R. § 116.11, violate the First Amendment. The complaint 

contends that the loan-repayment limit unconstitutionally 

infringes the First Amendment rights of Senator Cruz, his 

campaign, other candidates, and any individuals who might 

seek to make post-election contributions. Because the 

complaint concerned a constitutional challenge to a provision 

of BCRA, the Cruz campaign also applied for a three-judge 

district court pursuant to Section 403 of BCRA and 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2284. The FEC moved to dismiss for lack of standing and also 

argued that a three-judge court would not have subject matter 

jurisdiction. The one-judge district court denied the FEC’s 

motion to dismiss, held the Cruz campaign had standing to 

challenge the loan-repayment limit, and granted the Cruz 

campaign’s application for a three-judge district court. See Ted 

Cruz for Senate v. FEC, 2019 WL 8272774, at *5–8 (D.D.C. 

Dec. 24, 2019). We convened to hear and decide the case. 

Following additional preliminary proceedings,2

 the Cruz 

campaign and the FEC both moved for summary judgment. 

2

 We assumed supplemental jurisdiction over the Cruz campaign’s 

constitutional and Administrative Procedure Act claims against the 

implementing regulation. See Ted Cruz for Senate v. FEC, 451 F. 

Supp. 3d 92, 100 (D.D.C. 2020). We held these claims in abeyance 

pending resolution of the constitutional challenge to Section 304. 

Order, Ted Cruz for Senate v. FEC, No. 1:19-cv-00908 (D.D.C. Apr. 

15, 2020), ECF No. 49. Our holding that Section 304 cannot pass 

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Summary judgment is warranted if “there is no genuine dispute 

as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment 

as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). “[I]n ruling on crossmotions for summary judgment, the court shall grant summary 

judgment only if one of the moving parties is entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law upon material facts that are not 

genuinely disputed.” Shays v. FEC, 424 F. Supp. 2d 100, 109 

(D.D.C. 2006). Because the Cruz campaign and the FEC agree 

that there is no genuine dispute of material fact, we resolve this 

case by summary judgment. 

II. 

To determine whether the loan-repayment limit abridges 

First Amendment rights we follow the approach taken in 

McCutcheon v. FEC, the Supreme Court’s most recent foray 

into the constitutionality of a campaign finance regulation. 572 

U.S. 185 (2014) (plurality opinion). First, we assess whether 

the loan-repayment limit burdens political speech and thus 

implicates the protection of the First Amendment. Second, 

because we conclude that the limit burdens political speech, we 

must carefully scrutinize the government’s interests and the fit 

between that interest and the regulatory means chosen to 

effectuate it. Even under the less exacting test of closely drawn 

scrutiny, we find the government fails to demonstrate that the 

loan-repayment limit serves an interest in preventing quid pro 

quo corruption or its appearance. Moreover, the loanrepayment limit has only a tenuous connection to the asserted 

government interest in preventing corruption and thus lacks the 

close tailoring necessary under the First Amendment. 

constitutional muster moots the Cruz campaign’s regulatory 

challenges. 

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A. 

When presented with a less familiar type of campaign 

finance regulation, we must determine at the outset whether the 

restriction burdens the exercise of political speech. See id. at 

203–06; Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. 

Bennett, 564 U.S. 721, 736–47 (2011); Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 

724, 738–40 (2008). The Cruz campaign argues the loanrepayment limit burdens speech by limiting campaign 

expenditures and contributions. The FEC maintains the limit 

does not burden speech at all. We find the loan-repayment limit 

burdens political speech and thus implicates the protection of 

the First Amendment. 

The First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make 

no law ... abridging the freedom of speech.” U.S. CONST. 

amend. I. This Amendment “is designed and intended to 

remove governmental restraints from the arena of public 

discussion, putting the decision as to what views shall be 

voiced largely into the hands of each of us, in the belief that no 

other approach would comport with the premise of individual 

dignity and choice upon which our political system rests.” 

McCutcheon, 572 U.S. at 203 (cleaned up). Robust and free 

political discussion is essential to the republican form of 

government established by our Constitution. Given the 

fundamental interests at stake, the First Amendment 

“safeguards an individual’s right to participate in the public 

debate through political expression and political association.” 

Id. Because financing for political campaigns implicates the 

freedom to speak and to associate, the Supreme Court has long 

recognized that limitations on campaign spending “necessarily 

reduce[] the quantity of expression by restricting the number 

of issues discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the size 

of the audience reached.” Buckley, 424 U.S. at 19. 

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Since Buckley, the Court’s decisions have focused on 

identifying whether a restriction on campaign finance burdens 

expenditures or contributions, in part because the distinction 

can affect the standard of review.3 See id. at 25, 44–45. But it 

is well established that both expenditures and contributions 

implicate “fundamental First Amendment activities.” Id. at 14. 

When a candidate makes expenditures on behalf of her 

campaign, she exercises her right to speak; and when a 

contributor donates to that campaign, he exercises the right to 

associate with the candidate and to express his support. The 

contributions to a campaign in turn promote more expenditures 

and political speech by the candidate. 

In recent decisions, the Court has declined to eliminate the 

distinction between expenditures and contributions even as it 

has focused on speech interests more generally. See, e.g., 

McCutcheon, 572 U.S. at 199; id. at 228 (Thomas, J., 

concurring in the judgment) (suggesting that the distinction 

between expenditures and contributions “has only continued to 

erode in the intervening years”) (cleaned up). The Court has 

emphasized the central question of whether and how a 

challenged regulation burdens political speech. For example, 

in McCutcheon, the Court explained that Buckley’s distinction 

between expenditure and contribution limits stemmed from the 

“the degree to which each encroaches upon protected First 

Amendment interests.” Id. at 197. The Court assessed the 

burden on expressive and associational rights imposed by the 

aggregate contribution limits challenged in that case. See id. at 

204–05. In Davis, the Court found that a regulation burdened a 

3

 While burdens on expenditures must withstand strict scrutiny, the 

Court has assessed burdens on contributions under a less demanding, 

“but still ‘rigorous standard of review.’” McCutcheon, 572 U.S. at 

197 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 29). 

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candidate’s expenditures because it raised contribution limits 

asymmetrically, that is, only for the opponents of a candidate 

who spent over a certain amount of his own money. See 554 

U.S. at 738–40. The Court focused on how the regulation 

functioned to analyze the burden that it imposed. See id.; see 

also Bennett, 564 U.S. at 736–47 (evaluating the specific 

operation of Arizona’s matching funds provision and holding 

that it substantially burdened speech). In a political campaign, 

expenditures and contributions are part of a connected cycle of 

speech and association protected by the First Amendment. 

We find that the loan-repayment limit restricts political 

expression and association for candidates and their 

contributors. To begin with, the loan-repayment limit burdens 

candidates who wish to make expenditures through personal 

loans because the limit constrains the repayment options 

available to the candidate.4 Whereas other campaign debts may 

be repaid by post-election contributions, candidate loans above 

$250,000 do not receive the same treatment. That the candidate 

makes a choice to finance his campaign with personal loans, 

rather than through other forms of debt, does not minimize the 

First Amendment harm. Cf. Davis, 554 U.S. at 739 (“The 

4

 In general, a loan from a candidate to his campaign is treated as an 

expenditure. Both FECA and its regulations define the term 

“expenditure” to include loans. See 52 U.S.C. § 30101(9)(A)(i) 

(“The term ‘expenditure’ includes ... any ... loan, ... made by any 

person for the purpose of influencing any election for Federal 

office[.]”); 11 C.F.R. § 100.111(a) (“A ... loan ... made by any 

person for the purpose of influencing any election for Federal office 

is an expenditure.”); 11 C.F.R. § 100.111(b) (“For purposes of this 

section, the term payment includes ... any guarantee or endorsement 

of a loan by a candidate or a political committee.”); see also

Anderson v. Spear, 356 F.3d 651, 672 (6th Cir. 2004) (“[L]oans are 

candidate expenditures, unless and until they are repaid.”). 

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resulting drag on First Amendment rights is not constitutional 

simply because it attaches as a consequence of a statutorily 

imposed choice.”). Candidate loans comprise the majority of 

campaign debt, and personal loans will sometimes be the only 

way for a candidate to raise enough money for an effective 

campaign in the short term. The limit places a particular burden 

on relatively unknown challengers who may require more 

financing up front in order to wage an effective campaign 

against a better funded incumbent. See Anderson v. Spear, 356 

F.3d 651, 673 (6th Cir. 2004) (“[A] candidate may need to 

speak early in order to establish her position and garner 

contributions.”). 

We also note that since the enactment of BCRA and the 

loan-repayment limit, “there is a clear clustering of loans right 

at the $250,000 threshold.” Alexei Ovtchinnikov & Philip 

Valta, Debt in Political Campaigns 24 (HEC Paris Research 

Paper No. FIN-2016-1165, May 2020). During this same time 

period, the percentage of candidate loans above $250,000 has 

remained roughly the same while spending on Senate and 

House campaigns has more than doubled, indicating that the 

loan-repayment limit constricts candidate lending. 

We find the burden imposed by Section 304 “is evident 

and inherent in the choice that confronts” candidates who wish 

to use personal loans to finance their campaigns. Bennett, 564 

U.S. at 745 (citing Davis, 554 U.S. at 738–40). The limit 

imposes a “drag” on the candidate’s First Amendment activity 

by discouraging the personal financing of campaign speech. 

Davis, 554 U.S. at 739. 

The FEC defends the constitutionality of the loanrepayment limit by maintaining that it does not burden political 

speech at all, because “[m]oney that repays a candidate’s 

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personal loan after an election effectively goes into the 

candidate’s pocket, and not to fund speech or speech-related 

activities.” FEC Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. (“FEC 

Mot.”) 20, ECF No. 65. The Commission highlights that the 

loan-repayment limit does not cap the amount of candidate 

financing or prohibit a candidate from loaning his campaign 

more than $250,000, and the candidate remains free to repay 

the full amount of the loan with pre-election contributions. 

While it is true that the loan-repayment limit is not a ban 

on personal financing, the First Amendment’s protection has 

never been limited to direct restrictions on expenditures, 

because “[t]he First Amendment would ... be a hollow 

promise if it left government free to destroy or erode its 

guarantees by indirect restraints.” United Mine Workers of Am. 

v. Ill. State Bar Ass’n, 389 U.S. 217, 222 (1967). Laws that 

regulate in the First Amendment arena must be scrutinized 

even when the “deterrent effect on [speech] arises, not through 

direct government action, but indirectly as an unintended but 

inevitable result of the government’s conduct.” Buckley, 424 

U.S. at 65. 

Even indirect regulations of speech may run afoul of the 

First Amendment, because they can “abridg[e] the freedom of 

speech.” U.S. CONST. amend. I. The word “abridge” means “to 

contract, to diminish, to cut short.” 1 SAMUEL JOHNSON, A

DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (6th ed. 1785); see 

also OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 43 (2d ed. 1989) 

(“abridge”: “To curtail, to lessen, to diminish (rights, 

privileges, advantages, or authority)”). At the time of the 

enactment of the First Amendment, as well as today, the plain 

meaning of “abridge” is to diminish or to curtail the freedom 

of speech. Consistent with this meaning, the First Amendment 

protects individuals not only from direct and outright bans on 

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speech, but also indirect actions the government might take to 

“abridge” the central freedom to speak freely in the democratic 

process. 

Following these general principles, the Supreme Court has 

found a First Amendment burden even absent an outright ban 

or cap, when the regulation acted as a “drag” on speech—

which is to say an “abridgment” of speech. Davis, 554 U.S. at 

739–40. In Davis, the Supreme Court held unconstitutional a 

provision of BCRA that relaxed the base contribution limits for 

a candidate’s opponents if the candidate spent more than 

$350,000 of his own funds. The provision burdened free 

speech rights even though it “d[id] not impose a cap on a 

candidate’s expenditure of personal funds.” Id. at 738–39. 

Instead, the challenged provision “impose[d] an unprecedented 

penalty” on candidates who chose to “robustly exercise[] 

[their] First Amendment right[s].” Id. at 739. Similarly, in

Bennett, the Court held unconstitutional an Arizona law that 

gave matching funds to publicly financed candidates if 

privately financed candidates—or independent expenditure 

groups—spent over a set amount. See 564 U.S. at 728. The

Court concluded that the Arizona law “plainly force[d] the 

privately financed candidate to ‘shoulder a special and 

potentially significant burden’ when choosing to exercise his 

First Amendment right to spend funds on behalf of his 

candidacy.” Id. at 737 (quoting Davis, 554 U.S. at 739). If the 

law curtails a candidate’s ability to speak on his behalf, it runs 

afoul of the First Amendment even when the law is not an 

outright ban. 

The FEC seeks to distinguish Davis and Bennett because 

those cases involved a penalty for candidate speech above a 

certain threshold, whereas the loan-repayment limit has no 

similar penalty—by loaning his campaign more than $250,000 

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a candidate does not indirectly fund his opponent through 

either liberalized, asymmetrical contribution limits (Davis) or 

matching funds (Bennett). First Amendment burdens, however, 

are not limited to prescribed forms. Our review must scrutinize 

regulatory burdens in order to vigorously protect the freedom 

of speech. While not identical to previously challenged 

regulations, the loan-repayment limit restricts a candidate’s 

campaign expenditures by circumscribing the repayment 

options for candidate loans over $250,000.5

 

The FEC’s insistence that the loan-repayment limit does 

not burden political speech overlooks the reality of how the 

limit functions. The FEC narrowly focuses on the repayment 

of the loan and through this lens notes that the loan-repayment 

limit does not restrict expenditures because the candidate 

remains free to loan or contribute as much money as he wishes 

to his campaign.6

 The FEC’s cramped understanding of the 

5

 On the flip side, the loan-repayment limit may also impact 

contributors. Candidate loans over $250,000 are singled out and 

excluded from the “net debts outstanding” that a campaign may pay 

off with post-election contributions. The FEC’s regulations permit 

contributors to designate their contributions for a prior election. An 

individual who wanted to contribute to Senator Cruz after the 2018 

election could not have contributed to—and thus expressed his 

support for—Senator Cruz’s 2018 election campaign if the only debt 

remaining was the Senator’s loan in excess of $250,000. 

6

 The FEC suggests there is no restriction on political speech in this 

case, relying on FEC v. O’Donnell, 209 F. Supp. 3d 727 (D. Del. 

2016). That case is inapposite, however, because it concerned 

FECA’s ban on the use of contributions to pay a candidate’s personal

expenses. The court held such contributions did not “facilitate 

political expression.” Id. at 739. By contrast, the loan-repayment 

limit restricts political expression and implicates the First 

Amendment in a way that personal expenses for a new outfit and a 

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First Amendment fails to provide adequate protection to the 

important free speech interests at stake. The FEC would isolate 

the transactions at issue until they no longer resemble 

campaign expenditures or contributions. 

In determining whether First Amendment interests are 

implicated, however, we must focus on whether a statute 

burdens political speech, not whether a particular regulatory 

label is a perfect fit. The relative novelty of a campaign finance 

regulation cannot insulate it from judicial scrutiny because 

“political speech must prevail against laws that would suppress 

it, whether by design or inadvertence.” Citizens United v. FEC, 

558 U.S. 310, 340 (2010). Legislators may try different 

regulatory approaches to protect against quid pro quo 

corruption; however, any such regulation of campaigns must 

comport with the First Amendment. 

The loan-repayment limit implicates First Amendment 

interests. A candidate’s loan to his campaign is an expenditure 

that may be used for expressive acts. Such expressive acts are 

burdened when a candidate is inhibited from making a personal 

loan, or incurring one, out of concern that she will be left 

holding the bag on any unpaid campaign debt. 

This case illustrates the reality that contributions and 

expenditures are often “two sides of the same First Amendment 

coin.” Buckley, 424 U.S. at 241 (Burger, C.J., concurring in 

part and dissenting in part). Contributions allow a candidate to 

make further expenditures, reflecting the practical link between 

the associational and expressive activity of the candidate and 

contributor. By limiting the amount of post-election 

contributions that can be used to retire candidate loans, the 

gym membership arguably do not. See 52 U.S.C. § 30114(b)(2)(B) 

& (I). 

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loan-repayment limit abridges political speech and implicates 

the protection of the First Amendment. 

B. 

Because the loan-repayment limit encumbers political 

speech, the government has “the burden of proving the 

constitutionality of its actions.” McCutcheon, 572 U.S. at 210 

(cleaned up). The parties dispute the relevant standard of 

review. The Cruz campaign maintains we should apply either 

the strict scrutiny applicable to expenditure limits or the closely 

drawn scrutiny applied to contribution limits. By contrast, the 

FEC suggests the loan-repayment limit must be analyzed under 

deferential rational basis review because the limit burdens no 

First Amendment interests. Because we find the loanrepayment limit restricts expressive and associational interests 

in political campaigns, we must apply a form of heightened 

scrutiny, either strict or closely drawn. 

Under either form of heightened scrutiny, we assess the 

government’s asserted interest in restricting speech and the fit 

between that interest and the means the government has chosen 

to fulfill it. See id. at 199. Applying strict scrutiny, a regulation 

will be upheld only if it furthers a compelling government 

interest and the government uses the least restrictive means of 

furthering that interest; whereas under closely drawn scrutiny 

a regulation will be upheld “if the State demonstrates a 

sufficiently important interest and employs means closely 

drawn to avoid” abridging First Amendment freedoms. See id.

at 197. 

The loan-repayment limit fails under even the less 

exacting test of closely drawn scrutiny and so, as in 

McCutcheon, we have no need to “parse the differences” 

between the standards of scrutiny. Id. at 199. The government 

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fails to demonstrate that the loan-repayment limit serves an 

interest in addressing quid pro quo corruption. In addition, we 

find “a substantial mismatch,” id., between the government’s 

asserted interest and the loan-repayment limit. 

1. 

The government bears the burden of demonstrating that 

the loan-repayment limit serves a sufficiently important 

interest that justifies the burden on political speech. The 

Supreme Court has made clear that the only recognized 

government interest in restraining political speech is 

“preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption.” Id. at 

206–07. The Court has considered—and rejected—other 

government justifications such as “reduc[ing] the amount of 

money in politics,” id. at 191; “level[ing] electoral 

opportunities by equalizing candidate resources and 

influence,” Bennett, 564 U.S. at 748 (cleaned up); reducing 

“[i]ngratiation and access,” Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 360; 

or equalizing viewpoints among individuals and groups, 

Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48–49. The government’s interest in 

eliminating corruption is limited to quid pro quo corruption, in 

other words, “dollars for political favors.” McCutcheon, 572 

U.S. at 192 (quoting FEC v. Nat’l Conserv. PAC, 470 U.S. 480, 

497 (1985)). To comport with the First Amendment, a 

regulation of political speech must target only this particular 

form of corruption, which means “the Government may not 

seek to limit the appearance of mere influence or access.” Id.

at 208. 

In addition, it is not sufficient for the FEC merely to assert

an interest in preventing quid pro quo corruption. The 

government must demonstrate the validity of its interest by 

more than “mere conjecture.” Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 

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528 U.S. 377, 392 (2000). “When the Government defends a 

regulation on speech as a means to ... prevent anticipated 

harms, it must do more than simply posit the existence of the 

disease sought to be cured.” Colo. Repub. Fed. Campaign 

Comm. v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604, 618 (1996) (cleaned up). 

Moreover, “[t]he quantum of empirical evidence needed to 

satisfy heightened judicial scrutiny of legislative judgments 

will vary up or down with the novelty and plausibility of the 

justification raised.” Shrink Mo., 528 U.S. at 391; see also

Zimmerman v. City of Austin, 881 F.3d 378, 392–93 (5th Cir. 

2018) (discussing cases). We assess the FEC’s asserted 

interests in light of these standards. 

The FEC maintains that the loan-repayment limit 

addresses the heightened risk and appearance of quid pro quo 

corruption that results from elected officeholders soliciting 

contributions that will be used to repay their personal loans. 

The Commission posits that “[m]oney given after the 

election ... provides the contributor with even more influence 

over the candidate since the candidate is benefiting personally 

from the contribution.” FEC Statement of Material Facts 

(“FEC SMF”) ¶ 73, ECF No. 65 (cleaned up). The Commission 

repeatedly characterizes post-election contributions used to 

repay candidate loans as going into the candidate’s pocket. The 

FEC also points to media reports of debt retirement parties as 

giving rise “to at least the appearance of federal candidates 

trading dollars for favors in the context of repayment of 

candidate loans.” FEC Mot. 33. The Commission maintains 

there is a public perception that individuals who contribute to 

candidates after an election are likely to expect a political favor 

in return. 

Despite these assertions, the Commission fails to 

demonstrate that quid pro quo corruption or its appearance 

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arises from post-election contributions to retire a candidate’s 

personal debt. We first observe that the FEC has not identified 

a single case of actual quid pro quo corruption in this context. 

This is particularly notable given that many states impose no 

restriction on using post-election contributions to repay 

candidate loans,7

 and the Commission fails to identify any 

problems with quid pro corruption or its appearance in these 

states. Cf. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 357 (finding it 

significant that the government failed to claim that 

“independent expenditures by for-profit 

corporations ... corrupted the political process” in the twentysix states that did not restrict such expenditures). Here the 

FEC’s few state examples involve only concerns that 

candidates will be too responsive to the influence of special 

7

 The Cruz campaign identifies ten states that cap candidate loans or 

restrict candidate loan repayment in some fashion. See Cruz Mem. 

in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. 28 & n.4, ECF No. 61-1. Georgia and 

South Carolina cap the repayment of candidate loans with postelection contributions, similar to BCRA’s loan-repayment limit. See

GA. CODE ANN. § 21-5-41(h); S.C. CODE ANN. § 8-13-1328. 

Although Florida permits candidate loans and their repayment with 

pre-election contributions, it bans all post-election contributions. See 

FLA. STAT. § 106.08(3)(b). Alaska, Rhode Island, Texas, and 

Washington cap the repayment of candidate loans with either pre- or 

post-election contributions. See ALASKA STAT. § 15.13.078(b)(1); 

17 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 17-25-7.4; TEX. ELEC. CODE § 253.042(a); 

WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17A.445(3). California, Massachusetts, and 

Nebraska place no limit on the repayment of candidate loans but 

instead cap the amount that candidates may loan their campaigns. 

See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 85307(b); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 55, § 7; 

NEB. REV. STAT. § 49-1446.04; 4 NEB. ADMIN. CODE ch. 10, 

§ 004(02). The Commission does not contest that “only a minority 

of states” restrict candidate campaign loans in some way. FEC Mot. 

34. 

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interests or concerns about contributions unrelated to the 

repayment of candidate loans. See, e.g., FEC SMF ¶¶ 76, 79. 

By contrast, in cases that have found a sufficient 

anticorruption interest, the record has been robust. In Buckley, 

the Court cited “the deeply disturbing examples surfacing after 

the 1972 election” as demonstrating that the problem of quid 

pro quo corruption was “not an illusory one.” 424 U.S. at 27 & 

n.28; see also Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, 838–40 & 

nn.26–38 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (en banc) (describing extensive 

factual record before Congress). In McConnell v. FEC, the 

omnibus challenge to BCRA, the record before the court 

consisted of more than 100,000 pages, including “576 pages of 

proposed findings of fact” and “the testimony and declarations 

of over 200 fact and expert witnesses.” 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 

208–09 (D.D.C. 2003). In Bluman v. FEC, the court pointed to 

“public controversy and an extensive investigation by the 

Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs,” including 

specific examples of foreign governments attempting “to 

‘influence U.S. policies and elections through, among other 

means, financing election campaigns,’” as justification for 

BCRA’s ban on expenditures and contributions by foreign 

nationals. 800 F. Supp. 2d 281, 283 (D.D.C. 2011) (quoting S.

REP. NO. 105–67, at 47 (1998)). 

A lengthy record may not be sufficient to demonstrate 

corruption, but the absence of any record of such corruption 

undermines the government’s proffered interest. The FEC 

cannot carry its substantial burden by simply asserting that 

post-election contributions to repay a candidate’s loans may 

come with expectations of a political favor. 

In the absence of any evidence of actual corruption, the 

FEC turns elsewhere. For instance, the Commission relies 

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heavily on an academic article that concluded “[i]ndebted 

politicians ... exhibit a heightened sensitivity in their voting 

decisions to political contributions received from special 

interest groups.” Ovtchinnikov & Valta, Debt in Political 

Campaigns 29. The article, however, does not distinguish 

between voting pattern changes as a consequence of donor 

influence or access and voting pattern changes as part of quid 

pro quo corruption. In a representative democracy, mere 

influence or access is not the type of quid pro quo corruption 

that justifies infringements on political speech. A “generic 

favoritism or influence theory ... is at odds with standard First 

Amendment analyses because it is unbounded and susceptible 

to no limiting principle.” McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 296 

(2003) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and 

dissenting in part). “The line between quid pro quo corruption 

and general influence may seem vague at times, but the 

distinction must be respected in order to safeguard basic First 

Amendment rights.” McCutcheon, 572 U.S. at 209. 

The Commission also places great weight on a selective 

legislative history of the loan-repayment limit, arguing that 

lawmakers intended to “mitigate the heightened risk of quid 

pro quo corruption and its appearance resulting from alreadyelected officeholders soliciting contributions for their own 

personal benefit.”8

 FEC Mot. 6. Even on the doubtful 

8 See, e.g., 147 CONG. REC. S2,462 (Mar. 19, 2001) (statement of 

Sen. Domenici) (“In fact, it should be a condition to your putting up 

your own money, knowing right up front you are not going to get it 

back from your constituents under fundraising events that you would 

hold and then ask them: How would you like me to vote now that I 

am a Senator?”); 147 CONG. REC. S2,541 (Mar. 20, 2001) (statement 

of Sen. Hutchison) (“[Candidates] have a constitutional right to try 

to buy the office, but they do not have a constitutional right to resell 

it.”). 

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proposition that assertions in legislative debates could carry the 

government’s burden, these statements from the legislative 

history amount to mere suppositions about the appearance of 

corruption. Moreover, the Cruz campaign proffers other tidbits 

of legislative history, including numerous statements 

suggesting that some legislators thought the loan-repayment 

limit would protect incumbents from wealthy challengers.9

 The 

competing statements in the legislative history of BCRA 

establish no clear emphasis on eradicating quid pro quo 

corruption as opposed to the impermissible purpose of leveling 

the playing field. 

In addition, the loan-repayment limit, Section 304 of 

BCRA, was enacted at the same time as Section 319, the socalled “Millionaire’s Amendment,” which the Supreme Court 

held unconstitutional in part because it was intended to “level 

electoral opportunities for candidates of different personal 

wealth.” Davis, 554 U.S. at 741 (cleaned up). While 

9 See, e.g., 147 CONG. REC. S2,541 (Mar. 20, 2001) (statement of 

Sen. Hutchison) (“Our purpose is to level the playing field so that 

one candidate who has millions, if not billions, of dollars to spend on 

a campaign will not be at such a significant advantage over another 

candidate who does not have such means as to create an unlevel 

playing field.”); 147 CONG. REC. S2,465 (Mar. 19, 2001) (statement 

of Sen. Sessions) (“It also prohibits wealthy candidates, who incur 

personal loans in connection with their campaign that exceed 

$250,000, from repaying those loans from any contributions made to 

the candidate. ... I know there were large contributions in this last 

Senate campaign from candidates of $10 million, $60 million, and 

other amounts of money that the winning candidates in this body 

contributed from their own funds. I tell you, I am glad I didn’t face 

a person who could write a check for $60 million, $10 million—or 

$5 million, for that matter. If so, I would like to be able to have a 

level playing field so I could stay in the ball game.”). 

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Section 304 may serve a different purpose from Section 319, 

the text of BCRA, as well as the legislative debates, linked the 

two provisions, which suggests that the loan-repayment limit 

may also “further the impermissible objective of simply 

limiting the amount of money in political campaigns.” 

McCutcheon, 572 U.S. at 218. At a minimum, the connection 

between the provisions casts further doubt on the government’s 

asserted anticorruption interest. 

Finally, the FEC relies on media reports and a YouGov 

poll, but these similarly fail to establish that restrictions like the 

loan-repayment limit serve the purpose of preventing quid pro 

quo corruption. The media reports merely hypothesize that 

individuals who contribute after the election to help retire a 

candidate’s debt might have greater influence with or access to 

the candidate. Yet this is not evidence of quid pro quo 

corruption, and minimizing influence and access is not a proper 

goal for campaign finance regulation. The YouGov poll was 

conducted at the FEC’s behest for this litigation to demonstrate 

that the loan-repayment limit addresses the appearance of 

corruption. The poll first asked respondents whether they were 

aware that candidates could loan their campaigns money and 

then be paid back with post-election contributions. FEC Mot. 

Ex. 16, ECF No. 65-16 (Decl. of Ashley Grosse, Ex. A). In the 

poll’s only two follow-up questions, 81 percent of respondents 

thought it “very likely” or “likely” that individuals who donate 

money to a federal candidate’s campaign after an election 

“expect a political favor in return,” and 67 percent of 

respondents thought donors would “be more likely to expect 

political favors” if there were no limit on repaying a candidate 

loan with post-election contributions. Id. The FEC relies on 

these responses as evidence that the loan-repayment limit 

addresses “at least the appearance of quid pro quo corruption.” 

FEC Mot. 32. 

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We disagree. Such generic questions do not get at the 

specific problem of quid pro quo corruption the government 

asserts this statute combats. On the government’s reasoning, 

the poll answers would raise doubts about any contributions to 

incumbents (i.e. winning candidates) who use post-election 

contributions to retire any type of campaign debt. Even if 

contributors who donate to retire a candidate’s debt expect 

political favors, that hardly demonstrates that the (now elected) 

official is more likely to grant such political favors. Moreover, 

the poll did not define the term “political favor,” so the poll’s 

responses are not evidence that the public associates such 

contributions with quid pro quo corruption, which Congress 

may regulate, or simply increased influence and access, which 

Congress may not. See McCutcheon, 572 U.S. at 208. Finally, 

the poll failed to mention that the individual contribution limit 

applies to post-election contributions just as it does to preelection contributions. That omission renders the poll an 

ineffective measure of public perception of possible corruption 

in this context. At most, the poll suggests that some members 

of the public distrust or are skeptical about using contributions 

to repay candidate loans, but the “tendency to demonstrate 

distrust” is insufficient to establish corruption or its 

appearance. Nat’l Conserv. PAC, 470 U.S. at 499. We conclude 

the FEC fails to demonstrate that the loan-repayment limit 

serves an interest in preventing quid pro quo corruption. 

The FEC also maintains that the loan-repayment limit 

prevents the circumvention of base contribution limits because 

without the limit a candidate could keep outstanding loans 

from past campaigns, which would allow individuals to stack 

up maximum contributions for each election for which the 

candidate had open loans. The problem with the FEC’s 

position, however, is that contributors are permitted to make 

multiple contributions at a single time—they can contribute to 

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retire debt from a previous election (subject to the loanrepayment limit) and they can contribute to any ongoing 

campaign for a future election. Each of these separate perelection contributions, however, is limited by the base 

contribution limit. Nothing about the potential for stacking 

circumvents the base limits. What the FEC terms 

“circumvention” is in fact a lawful contribution under existing 

campaign finance laws. 

The government suggests it is dissatisfied with the 

possibility of large one-time contributions, which the FEC 

treats as a kind of legal loophole. Yet the loan-repayment limit 

does little to close the ostensible loophole, because the limit 

applies only to a candidate’s personal loans, not to other 

campaign debt. Also, the FEC fails to identify a plausible 

financial incentive for a candidate to carry significant personal 

campaign debt over many years simply to keep open the 

possibility of soliciting larger stacked donations in the future. 

In sum, the FEC’s position amounts to speculation that 

contributions to pay off a candidate’s personal loans carry a 

danger of quid pro quo corruption, but the Supreme Court has 

“never accepted mere conjecture as adequate to carry a First 

Amendment burden.” Shrink Mo., 528 U.S. at 392. The 

government has failed to demonstrate that its interest in the 

loan-repayment limit is sufficiently important, because the 

limit serves no additional purpose in preventing quid pro quo 

corruption or the circumvention of base contribution limits. 

With little connection to any actual or perceived quid pro quo 

corruption interest, the FEC’s asserted rationale boils down to 

a general concern about money in politics and campaign 

contributions to incumbents—but such general concerns about 

influence or access cannot justify government regulation in the 

vital area of political speech. 

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2. 

Even if the government had shown that the limit was 

justified by an important government interest, the loanrepayment limit is not “closely drawn” to protect expressive 

and associational freedoms. McCutcheon, 572 U.S. at 218 

(quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25). “In the First Amendment 

context, fit matters.” Id. The government’s rationale for the 

loan-repayment limit fits about as well as a pair of pandemic 

sweatpants. The First Amendment requires a better fit than that. 

When assessing fit even under standards short of strict 

scrutiny, we “require a fit that is not necessarily perfect, but 

reasonable; that represents not necessarily the single best 

disposition but one whose scope is in proportion to the interest 

served, that employs not necessarily the least restrictive means 

but a means narrowly tailored to achieve the desired objective.” 

Id. (cleaned up). As part of the inquiry we consider “whether 

experience under the present law confirms a serious threat of 

abuse,” and whether there are less burdensome alternatives 

available to the government in securing its interests. Id. at 219 

(quoting FEC v. Colo. Repub. Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 

U.S. 431, 457 (2001)). 

In arguing for a close fit, the FEC maintains “[t]he Loan 

Repayment Limit is tailored to apply in situations when the 

strength of the government’s important anti-corruption 

interests are at their peak,” because “the candidate will be in a 

position to grant political favors to [post-election] 

contributors.” FEC Mot. 40. Moreover, the FEC asserts, the 

limit is well tailored because it applies only to situations in 

which “the candidate or officeholder is directly, personally 

benefiting from the contributions,” and it does not prevent 

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campaigns from repaying the loans in full with pre-election 

funds. Id. at 41. 

Contrary to the government’s assertions, the loanrepayment limit is not sufficiently tailored to achieve the 

objective of preventing quid pro quo corruption or its 

appearance. To begin with, the loan-repayment limit is over 

inclusive. It applies across the board to winning and losing 

candidates, although any purported anticorruption rationale 

applies only to winning candidates. The FEC’s primary 

defense of the regulation is that post-election contributions 

used to retire a candidate’s personal campaign loans are 

particularly susceptible to quid pro quo corruption or its 

appearance. This justification, however, does not apply to 

candidates who lose an election and therefore have no way to 

provide improper benefits to contributors who donate to retire 

election debt. Losing candidates are less likely to receive postelection contributions and, in any event, contributions made to 

a losing candidate pose essentially no risk of corruption or its 

appearance. See Anderson, 356 F.3d at 673 (invalidating a state 

cap on candidate loans and explaining that “the risk of quid pro 

quo is virtually non-existent where the contribution is made to 

a losing candidate who seeks to recoup some of his debt”). 

When a campaign finance regulation sweeps in conduct well 

beyond the government’s asserted rationale, it does not provide 

the close fit required by the First Amendment. 

The loan-repayment limit is also substantially 

underinclusive as to the government’s asserted interests. 

Although “the First Amendment imposes no freestanding 

underinclusiveness limitation,” a law’s underinclusiveness can 

indicate a poor fit and can raise doubts about whether the law 

advances the interests invoked by the government. WilliamsYulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1668 (2015) (cleaned up). 

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Here, aside from the loan-repayment and base contribution 

limits, there are no restrictions on post-election contributions 

made to retire other types of campaign debt. A person may 

contribute to retire any outstanding campaign debt, with the 

exception of a candidate’s personal loans over $250,000. The 

FEC argues that a candidate who makes a loan to his campaign 

that he expects will be repaid is more dependent on outside 

contributions than a candidate who simply gives the money to 

his campaign. Yet not all candidates can afford to just give 

money to their campaigns—and there is nothing inherently 

corrupting about receiving campaign contributions after an 

election. 

The FEC’s concerns regarding post-election contributions 

to retire candidate loans seem to apply equally to any 

contribution made to an incumbent, because all incumbents are 

in a position to grant favors. But Congress does not restrict preelection contributions to incumbents except through the base 

contribution limit. The government has advanced no reason 

why a contribution made to an incumbent before the election 

poses no risk of corruption, but the same contribution made 

after the election to a winning candidate (now incumbent) and 

applied to pre-election debt poses a unique and heightened 

concern of quid pro quo corruption. 

The government’s fit rationale also cannot explain why 

post-election contributions to retire pre-election debt are 

permissible up to the $250,000 cap. This cap means that in the 

current election cycle, a campaign committee can accept just 

over eighty-six maximum contributions after the election to 

repay a candidate loan (eighty-six contributions of $2,900 

aggregates to $249,400, just shy of the $250,000 ceiling). It is 

hardly clear why the eighty-seventh or eighty-eighth 

contributor poses a particular danger of quid pro corruption. Cf. 

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McCutcheon, 572 U.S. at 210. Instead, the $250,000 cap 

operates to limit or disincentivize the total amount of campaign 

expenditure a candidate makes through personal loans. 

The loan-repayment limit also imposes an additional 

regulatory requirement on top of the existing base limits. The 

loan-repayment limit is exactly the sort of “prophylaxis-uponprophylaxis approach” that demands “we be particularly 

diligent in scrutinizing the law’s fit.” Id. at 221 (cleaned up). 

As the D.C. Circuit has explained, “an additional constraint 

layered on top of the base limits ... separately need[s] to serve 

the interest in preventing the appearance or actuality of 

corruption.”10 Holmes v. FEC, 875 F.3d 1153, 1161 (D.C. Cir. 

2017) (en banc) (cleaned up). Post-election contributions, like 

contributions made before an election, are subject to the base 

limits, which serve to prevent the dangers of quid pro quo 

corruption. Layered on top of the base limits, the loanrepayment limit places an additional restriction on pre-election 

expenditures and post-election contributions, but the 

government has failed to demonstrate that the limit provides 

additional protection against quid pro quo corruption or its 

appearance.

10 Other circuit courts have similarly interpreted McCutcheon as 

requiring the government to make an additional showing to justify 

campaign finance restrictions that operate on top of base limits. See, 

e.g., Jones v. Jegley, 947 F.3d 1100, 1106 (8th Cir. 2020) (“Just as 

in McCutcheon, Arkansas’s failure here to provide any evidence that 

its blackout period accomplishes anything more than the $2,700 base 

limits alone means that it cannot survive exacting scrutiny.”); 

Zimmerman v. City of Austin, 881 F.3d 378, 392 (5th Cir. 2018) 

(holding restrictions in addition to the base limit “must be justified 

by evidence that the additional limit serves a distinct interest in 

preventing corruption that is not already served by the base limit”). 

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The Commission next tries to demonstrate fit by 

minimizing the burden of the loan-repayment limit. For 

instance, the Commission maintains that the loan-repayment 

limit “increase[s] the funds available to campaign 

committees,” and so does not “prevent[] campaigns from 

‘amassing the resources necessary for effective advocacy.’” 

FEC Mot. 41 (quoting Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 247 

(2006) (plurality opinion)). The FEC overreads Randall, which 

noted that if a contribution limit prevents a campaign from 

amassing the necessary resources, it cannot survive under the 

First Amendment. See Randall, 548 U.S. at 248. It does not 

logically follow, however, that if a campaign can manage to 

amass necessary resources, the regulation survives First 

Amendment scrutiny. Preventing candidates from amassing 

resources is only one of the reasons a regulation of political 

speech may fail under the First Amendment, and therefore it 

cannot serve as an independent basis for upholding a 

regulation. Cf. Libertarian Nat’l Comm. v. FEC, 924 F.3d 533, 

558–59 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (en banc) (Katsas, J., concurring in 

part, concurring in the judgment, and dissenting in part). 

Moreover, the determination of what resources are “necessary” 

for effective speech must be left to individual speakers, not the 

FEC.

Finally, the Commission urges this court to defer to 

Congress’s judgment that the loan-repayment limit is 

necessary for combatting corruption. While we must respect 

the legislative choices of Congress acting within its 

constitutional sphere, we cannot defer on the question of 

whether a particular legislative choice is in fact constitutional. 

“We must give weight to attempts by Congress to seek to dispel 

either the appearance or the reality of [corruptive] influences. 

The remedies enacted by law, however, must comply with the 

First Amendment; and it is our law and our tradition that more 

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speech, not less, is the governing rule.” Citizens United, 558 

U.S. at 361; see also Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 161 

(1939) (explaining that legislative judgments may be 

“insufficient to justify” a restriction that “diminishes the 

exercise of rights so vital to the maintenance of democratic 

institutions”). Courts cannot rubber stamp congressional 

preferences when important First Amendment interests are at 

stake. 

 In sum, we hold that the government failed to meet its 

burden of demonstrating that the loan-repayment limit serves 

an interest in combatting quid pro quo corruption or its 

appearance and that in any event the loan-repayment limit is 

insufficiently tailored to meet this objective. 

* * * 

When it comes to campaign finance regulation, the foxes 

are effectively in charge of the political henhouse, because 

elected officials set the rules for future elections. The 

Constitution, however, does not leave our liberties to the foxes. 

Laws regulating political speech implicate First Amendment 

rights essential to a free democracy, and courts have an 

independent duty to scrutinize the government’s interest as 

well as the means chosen to realize it. To protect “the political 

responsiveness at the heart of the democratic process,” 

McCutcheon, 572 U.S. at 227, Congress may regulate political 

speech only to prevent the specific problem of quid pro quo 

corruption. The loan-repayment limit does not serve that 

interest, and the government’s arguments to the contrary boil 

down to hypothetical concerns about influence and access to 

incumbents. Such justifications are not sufficient under the 

First Amendment to uphold a statute that burdens political 

speech. The loan-repayment limit intrudes on fundamental 

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rights of speech and association without serving a substantial 

government interest. 

For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the loanrepayment limit, Section 304 of BCRA, is unconstitutional 

because it violates the First Amendment. Thus, the court denies 

the Commission’s motion for summary judgment and grants 

the Cruz campaign’s motion for summary judgment. A 

separate order accompanies this memorandum opinion. 

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