United States Court of Appeals

For the First Circuit

No. 22-1837

GIBSON FOUNDATION, INC.,

Plaintiff, Appellant,

v.

ROB NORRIS; PIANO MILL GROUP, LLC,

Defendants, Appellees.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

[Hon. Indira Talwani, U.S. District Judge]

Before

Barron, Chief Judge,

Lynch and Howard, Circuit Judges.

Kurt Schuettinger, with whom Andrea Bates, Bates & Bates LLC, 

Steven D. Howen, and Law Offices of Steven Howen, were on brief,

for appellant. 

Daniel J. Gibson, with whom SKB, Attorneys was on brief, for 

appellees. 

December 4, 2023
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BARRON, Chief Judge. This case involves a rhinestoneadorned piano, the now-deceased entertainer Liberace, a massive 

snowstorm, and a collapsed roof. But the appeal that is before us 

turns on something far less dramatic: the ins and outs of 

Massachusetts bailment and contract law. For the reasons set forth 

below, we conclude that this body of law requires that we reverse 

the grant of summary judgment to the defendants on the plaintiff's 

claims that concern the piano but affirm the denial of summary 

judgment to the plaintiff on those same claims.

I.

The plaintiff is Gibson Foundation, Inc. ("Gibson 

Foundation"), which is based in Nashville, Tennessee, and is the 

charitable arm of Gibson Brands, Inc. ("Gibson Brands").1 Gibson 

Brands sells several lines of musical instruments and accessories, 

including a line of pianos that Baldwin Piano & Organ Company 

("Baldwin") manufactures.

Baldwin is an American piano manufacturer that has been 

a subsidiary of Gibson Brands since 2001. That year, Baldwin filed 

for bankruptcy and was subsequently purchased by General Electric 

Capital Corp. ("GE"). GE then assigned its rights, title, and 

interest in the asset purchase agreement to Gibson Piano Ventures, 

Inc. ("Gibson Piano Ventures") and designated Gibson Piano 

1 Unless otherwise specified, the facts set forth are not in 

dispute.
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Ventures as the buyer of Baldwin and "substantially all" its 

assets.2

The defendants are Rob Norris and The Piano Mill Group, 

LLC ("Piano Mill"). Norris owns and operates Piano Mill, which is 

based in Gloucester, Massachusetts, and sells pianos on a retail 

basis, services pianos, and offers a location for piano lessons.

At all relevant times, Norris and Piano Mill were authorized retail 

sellers of Baldwin pianos.

Gibson Foundation filed suit against Norris and Piano 

Mill on December 16, 2019, in the United States District Court for 

the Middle District of Tennessee, based on diversity of 

citizenship. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332. The complaint alleged claims

under Tennessee law for breach of contract, breach of bailment, 

and conversion. The complaint alleged that Norris and Piano Mill 

had breached a warehousing agreement and bailment with Gibson 

Foundation when they refused to return to Gibson Foundation -- upon 

Gibson Foundation's request -- a piano that Liberace had used in 

his performances.3

The Tennessee district court concluded that there was no 

personal jurisdiction over Norris and Piano Mill and that venue 

2 The record contains no evidence explaining the relationship 

between Gibson Brands and Gibson Piano Ventures.

3 Gibson Brands filed for bankruptcy in 2018 and subsequently 

conveyed its rights in the piano at issue in this appeal to Gibson 

Foundation. 
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was improper. The case was then transferred to the United States 

District Court for the District of Massachusetts. Gibson 

Foundation's amended -- and now operative -- complaint in the 

United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts 

sets forth several claims against Norris and Piano Mill, all of 

which are brought under Massachusetts law. This appeal concerns 

two of those claims, which are for breach of bailment and breach 

of contract.

The breach-of-bailment claim alleges, as did Gibson 

Foundation's earlier breach-of-bailment claim under Tennessee law,

that the transfer of the Liberace piano from Gibson Brands to 

Norris and Piano Mill was a bailment and that Norris and Piano 

Mill are liable for breach of bailment because they refused to 

return the piano to Gibson Foundation when they were requested to 

do so. The breach-of-contract claim alleges, as did Gibson 

Foundation's earlier breach-of-contract claim under Tennessee law, 

that the transfer of the same piano from Gibson Brands to Norris 

and Piano Mill was made pursuant to a warehousing agreement between 

Gibson Brands and Norris and Piano Mill, and that Norris and Piano 

Mill breached the agreement by not returning the piano to Gibson 

Foundation when they were requested to do so.

Norris and Piano Mill answered the complaint while also 

filing counterclaims, though none of the District Court's rulings 

on the counterclaims are at issue in this appeal. In answering 
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Gibson Foundation's complaint, Norris and Piano Mill asserted that 

Gibson Brands had no ownership interest in the piano at the time 

of Gibson Brands's initial request that the piano be returned. 

Norris and Piano Mill further asserted in answering the complaint 

that Gibson Brands sent the e-mail request to return the piano

only after there had been widespread media coverage of Piano Mill 

having a Liberace piano and the roof of one of the company's 

buildings having collapsed during a massive snowstorm.

The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment on 

January 28, 2022. Norris and Piano Mill sought summary judgment 

on, among other claims, Gibson Foundation's breach-of-bailment and 

breach-of-contract claims under Massachusetts law. Norris's and 

Piano Mill's motion included as an exhibit an appraisal of the 

piano that contained pictures of it, approximated its value, and 

estimated that 10,000 rhinestones originally adorned it. Gibson 

Foundation sought summary judgment as to all its claims and 

Norris's and Piano Mill's counterclaims.

On the breach-of-bailment claim, the District Court

granted Norris and Piano Mill summary judgment and denied Gibson 

Foundation summary judgment on the ground that Gibson Foundation's 

claim for breach of bailment is time-barred under the relevant 

statute of limitations. On the breach-of-contract claim, the 

District Court granted Norris and Piano Mill summary judgment and 

denied Gibson Foundation summary judgment on the ground that 
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"[Gibson] Foundation has not produced sufficient evidence from 

which a jury could find an agreement on the material terms of a 

contract." Gibson Foundation appeals both the grants of summary 

judgment to Norris and Piano Mill on its breach-of-bailment and 

breach-of-contract claims and the denials of its motion for summary 

judgment on those same claims.

II.

We review the District Court's summary-judgment rulings 

de novo and draw all inferences in favor of the party against whom 

summary judgment was entered. Pleasantdale Condos., LLC v. 

Wakefield, 37 F.4th 728, 732-33 (1st Cir. 2022). Summary judgment 

is appropriate if, based on the record, there remains no dispute 

of material fact -- that is, if, based on the record, there is no 

factual determination which a "rational factfinder" could make as 

to the "existence or nonexistence" of a fact that "has the 

potential to change the outcome of the suit" -- such that "the 

moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Borges 

ex rel. S.M.B.W. v. Serrano-Isern, 605 F.3d 1, 4-5 (1st Cir. 2010).

The fact that the parties have filed cross motions and 

appealed those cross motions does not alter these general 

standards. See Wightman v. Springfield Terminal Ry. Co., 100 F.3d 

228, 230 (1st Cir. 1996). Rather, we review each party's motion 

independently, viewing the facts and drawing inferences as 
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required by the applicable standard, and we determine, for each 

side, the appropriate ruling. See id.

III.

We start with the challenge to the District Court's grant

of summary judgment on the breach-of-bailment claim to Norris and 

Piano Mill. The District Court relied for that ruling on the 

ground that the claim is time-barred. The question of whether the 

claim is time-barred is one of Massachusetts law. See West v. 

Conrail, 481 U.S. 35, 39 n.4 (1987) ("When the underlying cause of 

action is based on state law, and federal jurisdiction is based on 

diversity of citizenship, state law . . . provides the appropriate 

period of limitations . . . .").

Our analysis begins with a review of the relevant legal 

background, which reveals that the key precedent for us to consider

is a decision of the Massachusetts Appeals Court ("MAC"), Aimtek, 

Inc. v. Norton Co., 870 N.E.2d 1114 (Mass. App. Ct. 2007). We 

then explain why, given that precedent, we must reverse the grant 

of summary judgment. We make clear, however, that Aimtek does not 

affect resolution of Norris's and Piano Mill's alternate argument 

that Gibson Brands never had ownership of the piano, which we 

address in Part IV. 

A.

The parties do not dispute that Gibson Foundation's 

breach-of-bailment claim is timely if the six-year limitations
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period that Massachusetts sets forth for certain contract claims 

applies, see Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 260, § 2, or that the claim is 

time-barred if, as the District Court held, the three-year 

limitations period that Massachusetts sets forth for tort claims 

applies instead, see Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 260, § 2A. The parties'

dispute concerns only whether the District Court was right to hold 

that, on this record, it is indisputable that Gibson Foundation's 

breach-of-bailment claim is in effect no different from a claim 

for conversion and replevin and so for that reason is subject to 

the three-year limitations period for tort claims. Gibson 

Foundation contends that the District Court erred in so ruling 

because a reasonable juror could find based on the record that the 

claim is subject to the six-year limitations period that applies 

to certain contract claims. 

We assume for present purposes that there is a genuine 

issue of material fact in dispute as to whether, as Gibson 

Foundation alleges, there was both a valid bailment and a breach 

of that bailment, such that the breach-of-bailment claim would 

survive summary judgment if it were timely. After all, if there 

were no such genuine issue of material fact in dispute, then there

would be no reason for us to address the timeliness issue at all, 

as in that case the grant of summary judgment to Norris and Piano 

Mill could be affirmed even if the claim were timely. See John G. 

Danielson, Inc. v. Winchester-Conant Props. Inc., 322 F.3d 26, 37 
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(1st Cir. 2003) (explaining that a judgment may be affirmed on any 

ground manifest in the record).

No Massachusetts statute sets forth the limitations 

period that applies specifically to a breach-of-bailment claim. 

Thus, under Massachusetts law, we must look "to the 'gist of the 

action' or the essential nature of the plaintiff's claim," 

Hendrickson v. Sears, 310 N.E.2d 131, 132 (Mass. 1974), to 

determine the applicable limitations period.

The District Court appears to have undertaken this 

inquiry and reasoned that, under Massachusetts law, the "essential 

nature" of all breach-of-bailment claims makes any such claim a 

species of a claim for replevin and conversion, both of which are

claims that sound in tort. The District Court then appears to 

have concluded on that basis that Gibson Foundation's breach-ofbailment claim is subject to a three-year limitations period, as 

that claim was in its nature a tort claim just as surely as is a 

claim for replevin or conversion.

In Aimtek, however, the MAC explained that "no hard and 

fast rule has emerged to dictate the applicable limitations period 

for claims arising from bailments" based on their "essential 

nature." 870 N.E.2d at 1118. Rather, the MAC concluded that 

while, under Massachusetts law, some breach-of-bailment claims are 

properly subject to the three-year limitations period for tort 

claims, others are properly subjected to the six-year limitations 
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period for certain contract claims. Id. at 1117-20. The MAC then 

proceeded in Aimtek to assess whether the "essential nature, or 

gist" of the plaintiff's breach-of-bailment claim in that specific 

case made it subject to the three-year or the six-year limitations 

period, id. at 1119-20, and concluded that the claim's contractual 

nature made the longer limitations period applicable, id. at 1120. 

Of course, a decision by the MAC does not necessarily 

bind us here, as our task is to determine how the highest court of 

Massachusetts, which is the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court,

would rule on the timeliness issue. See Showtime Ent., LLC v. 

Town of Mendon, 769 F.3d 61, 79 (1st Cir. 2014). But we see no 

basis for engaging in a different inquiry to determine the 

applicable limitations period for this breach-of-bailment claim

than the one in which the MAC engaged in Aimtek. Indeed, the 

District Court's analysis supplies no reason for our doing so, as

the District Court appeared to be relying, in part, on Aimtek

itself in concluding that this claim was subject to the limitations 

period for tort claims. Moreover, on appeal, the parties appear 

to agree that if the reasons that Aimtek gave for determining that 

the "essential nature, or gist," 870 N.E.2d at 1119, of the breachof-bailment claim at issue there was contractual in nature equally 

support the conclusion that the breach-of-bailment claim at issue 

here is also contractual in nature, then the six-year limitations 

period would apply to this claim just as the MAC held it applied 
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to that claim. As a result, assuming that this breach-of-bailment

claim otherwise can survive summary judgment, we must decide 

whether a reasonable juror could find based on the record that the 

claim at issue here is in all relevant respects the same as the 

claim in Aimtek. Reviewing de novo, Pleasantdale Condos., 37 F.4th 

at 732-33, we conclude, for the reasons that we will next explain,

that a reasonable juror could so find.

B.

In Aimtek, a Massachusetts company, Aimtek, Inc.

("Aimtek"), entered into a contract in 1984 with another 

Massachusetts-based business, Norton Company ("Norton"), to 

provide liquid nitrogen and argon gases to Norton. Under that

contract, Norton had a lease with Aimtek to store two 1,500-gallon 

tanks, owned by Aimtek, at Norton's Worcester, Massachusetts,

facility to hold such gas products. Aimtek, 870 N.E.2d at 1116.

Roughly a decade later, in 1994, Norton notified Aimtek

that it was terminating the contract. Id. After the contract was 

terminated, however, Aimtek left the tanks with Norton, at Norton's 

request, in the event that Norton wished to resume purchasing gas 

for those tanks from Aimtek in the future. Id. at 1116-17. 

Norton later scrapped the tanks, and more than three but 

less than six years after Aimtek learned that the tanks had been 

scrapped, Aimtek filed a claim against Norton in Massachusetts 

state court that alleged that Norton was in breach of a bailment
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with respect to the tanks. Id. Following a jury verdict in 

Aimtek's favor on the claim, Norton moved for judgment 

notwithstanding the verdict on the ground that the three-year 

limitations period for tort claims applied to Aimtek's breach-ofbailment claim and thus that the claim was time-barred. Id. at 

1117. The trial court denied the motion after determining that 

the six-year limitations period for certain contracts claims 

applied instead, Aimtek, Inc. v. Norton Co., No. 01-0709C, 2005 WL 

4924656 (Mass. Supp. Sept. 7, 2005), and the MAC then affirmed 

that ruling on appeal, Aimtek, 870 N.E.2d at 1120.

The MAC reasoned that the six-year limitations period

for certain contract claims applied because the record supportably 

showed that the underlying bailment stemmed from "a consensual 

arrangement between the parties that the two 1,500-gallon tanks 

would remain at Norton's facility after the written rental 

agreement expired, in case Norton wished to resume gas deliveries 

in the future." Id. at 1119 (emphasis added). Moreover, the MAC 

emphasized that the record sufficed to show that the bailment 

established by this consensual arrangement was for the "mutual 

benefit" of the parties and so was not a gratuitous bailment in 

which Norton received "no benefit or compensation from the tanks 

left behind at its facility." Id. The MAC based this latter 

determination on the ground that the record sufficed to show that, 

under the consensual arrangement that resulted in the bailment, 
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Aimtek benefitted by avoiding the expense of removing the tanks

while Norton benefitted because "the tanks were left in Norton's 

possession at Norton's request, to facilitate possible future gas 

deliveries." Id.

The MAC did make a point of explaining that the 

determination of whether a bailment was gratuitous or for the 

mutual benefit of the bailor and the bailee does not necessarily 

determine whether a breach-of-bailment claim is subject to the 

three-year limitations period for tort actions or the six-year 

limitations period for certain contract actions. Id. at 1119 n.5.

The MAC concluded that "[t]he cases do not lend themselves to such 

a convenient dichotomy." Id. But the MAC still ruled that the 

bailment in question was subject to that latter contract-based 

limitations period because the underlying bailment was the result 

of a "consensual arrangement . . . for the parties' mutual 

benefit." Id. at 1119-20 (emphasis added).

We see nothing in the record to distinguish the case at 

hand from Aimtek. Rather, we conclude that a reasonable juror

could find based on the record that the breach-of-bailment claim

here, like the breach-of-bailment claim in Aimtek, stems from a 

consensual arrangement between the parties that mutually 

benefitted them and not from a merely gratuitous bailment, as 

Norris and Piano Mill contended is the case for the first time at 
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oral argument. In this regard, we conclude that, based on the 

record, a reasonable juror could find as follows.

On June 20, 2011, Baldwin's business-development 

manager, Tom Dorn, e-mailed several people, including Norris, 

about the immediate availability of two new model BD275/BH275 

concert grand pianos from Baldwin Dongbei. Norris then responded 

by e-mail that "Piano Mill would still very much like to have a 

Baldwin concert grand to use for symphony rentals and promotional 

opportunities" but that he was "not currently in a position to 

shell out the 30k to purchase one outright." In addition, Norris

mentioned in the e-mail that his business partner was connected to 

several touring acts and wondered whether Dorn might be able to 

come up with a "creative arrangement" to help both Piano Mill and 

Baldwin gain exposure.

Dorn responded, in turn, with an e-mail that stated that 

such an arrangement was "beyond [his] scope" but that he would 

forward Norris's e-mail to someone in Gibson Brands's 

entertainment-relations department. Norris sent Dorn an e-mail in 

response in which Norris thanked Dorn and added as "just another 

thought" that Piano Mill had a full-service restoration shop and 

that, "[i]f there was a road worn concert grand in Baldwin[']s 

stable," Norris would be able to do any restoration required "to 

get it to concert level play and back on the road."
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After this e-mail exchange, Norris had several phone 

calls with Dorn and Jim Felber, an employee in Gibson Brands's 

entertainment-relations department, about a Baldwin model SD-10 in 

which Norris might be interested. That model was the Liberace 

piano that is now at the center of this dispute.

During one phone call between Norris and Felber about 

the piano, Felber told Norris that it was on the seventh floor of 

the Manhattan Center in the Hammerstein ballroom, which was being 

renovated. Felber further told Norris in the phone call that the 

piano would be "all yours" if Norris could remove it by the end of 

the week.

Subsequently, on July 11, 2011, Norris's contractors 

moved the piano from the Hammerstein ballroom to Norris's 

restoration shop in Hampton, Massachusetts. After picking up the 

piano, Norris e-mailed Dorn and Felber to "[t]hank [them] both for 

[the] opportunity," and Norris asked whether he could "make some 

cosmetic repairs as well as . . . do some fine regulation" on the 

piano. Felber responded that he was "OK with repairs and aware of 

missing pieces."

In the years following, the piano stayed in Norris's and 

Piano Mill's possession, and the piano was used as a promotional 

tool, including in connection with a Liberace biopic. It was not 

until years later, after Gibson Brands and Gibson Foundation 

executed a bill of sale purporting to transfer ownership of a 
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"Baldwin Liberace SD-10" to Gibson Foundation, that Gibson 

Foundation sued Norris and Piano Mill over the Liberace piano at 

the center of this dispute.

Based on the above communications and events, a 

factfinder could reasonably determine that, insofar as there was 

a bailment of the piano at all, it was a "consensual arrangement,"

id. at 1119, between Gibson Brands and Norris and Piano Mill, as 

Gibson Brands requested that Norris and Piano Mill take possession 

of the piano, and Norris and Piano Mill agreed to do so. Moreover, 

a factfinder could also reasonably determine from these 

communications and events that Gibson Brands as bailor and Norris 

and Piano Mill as bailees each benefitted from this consensual 

arrangement, as a reasonable jury could find based on the record 

that Gibson Brands obtained storage for a valuable asset and 

avoided the costs of moving the piano while Norris and Piano Mill

obtained substantial publicity and marketing opportunities from 

having possession of the piano.

Norris and Piano Mill do make one further argument in 

defense of the District Court's statute-of-limitations ruling, 

although they advanced this argument, too, for the first time at 

oral argument. They contend that because there was a contract 

between the bailor and the bailee in Aimtek, there was a basis 

there that is not present here for treating that breach-of-bailment 

claim as contractual in nature. But the contract in Aimtek that 
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Norris and Piano Mill identify was a rental agreement that had 

expired prior to the bailment. Id. at 1116. We thus do not see 

how Aimtek may be distinguished on this ground. Accordingly, we 

hold that Norris and Piano Mill are not entitled to summary 

judgment on Gibson Foundation's breach-of-bailment claim on the 

ground that the claim is time-barred.

IV.

Norris and Piano Mill argue, as a fallback, that they 

are entitled to summary judgment on the breach-of-bailment claim 

even if the claim is not time-barred because, as a matter of law, 

the claim is without merit. See John G. Danielson, 322 F.3d at 37

(explaining that a judgment may be affirmed on any ground manifest

in the record). They point out that a bailment "is the delivery 

of goods by their owner to another for a specific purpose, and the 

acceptance of those goods by the other, with the express or implied 

promise that the goods will be returned after the purpose of the 

delivery has been fulfilled." Goudy & Stevens, Inc. v. Cable 

Marine, Inc., 924 F.2d 16, 18 (1st Cir. 1991) (emphasis added); 

see Nash v. Lang, 167 N.E. 762, 765 (Mass. 1929). Thus, they 

explain, one of the essential elements of a bailment is that the 

bailor owns, or holds title to, the property in question, see

Goudy, 924 F.2d at 18, and they stress that the burden of proving 

the existence of a bailment under Massachusetts law rests with the 

party that alleges the breach of a bailment, see Orient Overseas 
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Container Line v. John T. Clark & Sons of Bos., Inc., 229 F. Supp. 

2d 4, 15 (D. Mass. 2002). They then contend that Gibson Foundation

has failed to meet its burden to show that there is a supportable

basis for finding that it has proved the element of ownership

because "[Gibson] Foundation [has] provided nothing more than 

unsupported, conclusory statements and vague documentation in 

support of its claim that [its] alleged predecessor in interest, 

Gibson Brands, Inc., owned the piano during the timeframe up to 

and including July 2011" -- the month in which Norris and Piano 

Mill picked up the piano and transferred it to their restoration 

shop in Hampton, Massachusetts.4

To back up this argument, Norris and Piano Mill point to 

the fact that Cesar Gueikian, Brand President of Gibson Brands, 

testified that, although he believed Gibson Brands acquired the 

piano through the 2001 asset purchase agreement of Baldwin, he was 

unaware of the existence or location of any inventory documents 

that show the piano coming into Gibson Brands's possession. 

Moreover, we note that the record does show that, while the asset 

4 Norris and Piano Mill also contend that Gibson Foundation's 

breach-of-bailment claim fails as a matter of law because Gibson 

Foundation cannot show that a reasonable juror could find based on 

the record that the material terms -- whether express or 

implied -- of the alleged bailment agreement are sufficiently 

definite to create an enforceable agreement. Because this

contention mirrors Norris's and Piano Mill's contention as to why 

Gibson Foundation's breach-of-contract claim fails, we address 

this argument in Part V, where we discuss the claim for breach of 

contract.
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purchase agreement did contemplate the sale of Baldwin's "personal 

property" and specified that certain categories of personal 

property would be excluded from the sale, the agreement did not 

identify whether any pianos were included among the personal 

property being sold.

In addition, Norris and Piano Mill point to the fact 

that, when Gibson Brands filed for bankruptcy in 2018, Gibson 

Brands did not disclose the piano as one of its assets in its 

filings. Norris and Piano Mill argue that because Gibson 

Foundation cannot point to any evidence in the record of Gibson 

Brands having title or ownership of the piano, there is no 

supportable basis in the record for finding that Gibson Foundation 

can meet its burden to show that there was a bailment. The 

contention is that, to meet that burden, Gibson Foundation must 

show that a reasonable juror could find based on the record that

Gibson Brands owned the piano at the time that Norris and Piano 

Mill took possession of it. Therefore, Norris's and Piano Mill's 

argument goes, Gibson Foundation's breach-of-bailment claim fails 

as a matter of law given that Piano Mill cannot breach a bailment 

that does not exist.

Under Massachusetts law, however, the burden to prove 

the ownership element for a bailment may be satisfied with proof 

of the bailor's possession of the property at issue at the time

that the claimed bailment was established, given that "possession 
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[of personal property] is prima facie evidence of title, good 

against everybody but one proving property; that is, against any 

one but the right owner." Magee v. Scott, 63 Mass. (9 Cush.) 148, 

150 (1851); see Hurley v. Noone, 196 N.E.2d 905, 908 (Mass. 1964). 

And it is undisputed that Gibson Brands physically possessed the 

piano before Gibson Brands transferred it to Norris and Piano Mill. 

Thus, as Norris and Piano Mill identify no evidence that anyone 

other than Gibson Brands owned the piano before or during the time 

of the piano transfer, we see no basis for affirming the District 

Court's grant of summary judgment to Norris and Piano Mill on the 

ground that, as a matter of law, Gibson Foundation cannot show 

that a reasonable juror could find based on the record that Gibson 

Brands owned the piano at the relevant times.5 See Magee, 63 Mass. 

at 150. 

Our determination on this score does not mean, however, 

that there is merit to the related contention by Gibson Foundation

that we must reverse the District Court's denial of Gibson 

Foundation's own summary-judgment motion on the claim. To be sure,

as we have explained, Norris and Piano Mill have not conclusively 

rebutted Gibson Foundation's prima facie case for ownership of the 

piano because they have not indisputably established that a party 

5 Norris and Piano Mill do not argue that, if there was a 

bailment, it was between them and Gibson Brands, not them and 

Gibson Foundation -- the current plaintiff. We thus do not address 

that contention.
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other than Gibson Brands was the rightful owner when the piano was 

in Gibson Brands's possession. Id. But it remains the case that 

the record contains no inventory documents that show how the piano 

came into Gibson Brands's possession and that the record shows 

that Gibson Brands failed to include the piano as one of its assets 

in its 2018 bankruptcy filings. A reasonable factfinder could 

conclude on this record, therefore, that Gibson Brands did not own 

the piano at the relevant times. Thus, because there is a genuine 

dispute of material fact as to the ownership issue, we affirm the 

denial of the grant of summary judgment to Gibson Foundation on 

this claim.

V.

We turn our attention now to Gibson Foundation's breachof-contract claim. "To prove a breach of contract under 

Massachusetts law, a plaintiff must show 'that there was a valid 

contract, that the defendant breached its duties under the 

contractual agreement, and that the breach caused the plaintiff 

damage.'" Shaulis v. Nordstrom Inc., 120 F. Supp. 3d 40, 54 (D. 

Mass. 2015) (quoting Guckenberger v. Boston Univ., 957 F. Supp. 

306, 316 (D. Mass. 1997)). 

As we have explained, a reasonable juror could find based 

on the record both that the bailment at issue here was a consensual 

arrangement between Gibson Brands and Norris and Piano Mill and 

that this arrangement was for the "mutual benefit" of the parties 
- 22 -

to it, Aimtek, 870 N.E.2d at 1119. Our question with regard to 

the breach-of-contract claim, however, is whether, Massachusetts 

bailment law aside, a reasonable juror could find based on the 

record that there was a warehousing agreement6 between the parties 

as to this piano such that there was a valid contract between them. 

For, if a reasonable juror could not so find, then there could be 

no breach-of-contract claim that could survive summary judgment.

Under Massachusetts law, "[i]t is axiomatic that to 

create an enforceable contract, there must be agreement between 

the parties on the material terms of that contract, and the parties 

must have a present intention to be bound by that agreement." 

Situation Mgmt. Sys., Inc. v. Malouf, Inc., 724 N.E.2d 699, 703 

(Mass. 2000). And while "[i]t is not required that all terms of 

the agreement be precisely specified, and the presence of undefined 

or unspecified terms will not necessarily preclude the formation 

of a binding contract[,] . . . [t]he parties must . . . have 

progressed beyond the stage of 'imperfect negotiation.'" Id. 

(citation omitted). Moreover, although an exchange of e-mail 

communications can constitute a contract under Massachusetts law, 

see Fecteau Benefits Grp., Inc. v. Knox, 890 N.E.2d 138, 145 (Mass. 

App. Ct. 2008), "[a]ll the essential terms of a contract must be 

definite and certain so that the intention of the parties may be 

6 Gibson Foundation sometimes refers to this warehousing 

agreement in its briefing to us as a "loan agreement."
- 23 -

discovered, the nature and extent of their obligations 

ascertained, and their rights determined," Cygan v. Megathlin, 96 

N.E.2d 702, 703 (Mass. 1951). 

The District Court ruled that Norris and Piano Mill were 

entitled to summary judgment on Gibson Foundation's breach-ofcontract claim because a reasonable juror could not find based on 

the record that all the essential terms of the alleged contract 

were definite and certain. Gibson Foundation disagrees.

According to Gibson Foundation, the record suffices to 

show that Gibson Brands offered for Norris and Piano Mill to take 

possession of the piano on the condition that they would have to 

return it to Gibson Brands if and when Gibson Brands asked for it. 

Gibson Foundation then goes on to argue that a reasonable juror

could find based on the record that Norris and Piano Mill accepted 

this offer by taking possession of the piano.7 Accordingly, Gibson 

7 Gibson Foundation also contends that the agreement that 

Norris and Piano Mill themselves posit as having been struck is 

just as simple -- the offer was that Norris and Piano Mill could 

have the piano, so long as they bore the expense of moving it, and 

the acceptance occurred when Norris and Piano Mill picked up the 

piano and stored it. Gibson Foundation then argues that under 

that view of the agreement, there is "everything needed to be a 

contract [--] mutual assent through offer and acceptance and 

consideration for each party." But this contention does little to 

support Gibson Foundation's position on appeal. As Gibson 

Foundation concedes, Norris and Piano Mill accepted Gibson 

Brands's offer that Norris and Piano Mill could have the piano so 

long as they bore the expense of moving it by taking possession of 

the piano. Thus, if the simple contract at issue were only the 

one that Gibson Foundation argues even Norris and Piano Mill accept 
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Foundation argues, a reasonable juror could find based on the 

record that the claimed warehousing agreement with respect to the 

piano has "everything needed to be a contract [--] mutual assent 

through offer and acceptance and consideration for each party."

Gibson Foundation describes the consideration as Gibson Brands

being able to avoid storage costs and Norris and Piano Mill 

benefitting from having a promotional item to use until Gibson 

Brands (and now Gibson Foundation) were to ask for the piano to be 

returned. Reviewing de novo, Pleasantdale Condos., 37 F.4th at 

732-33, we agree with Gibson Foundation.

As we have previously explained, a reasonable juror 

could find on this record that Gibson Brands owned the piano before

and when Norris and Piano Mill picked it up. Gibson Foundation 

also points to several facts in the summary-judgment record that 

supportably show that Gibson Brands did not transfer ownership of

the piano to Norris and Piano Mill. In that regard, the record 

supportably shows that Norris, via an e-mail to Dorn, asked to 

use -- not buy -- a piano from Gibson Brands for promotional 

opportunities and that Norris, after picking up the piano from the 

existed, then there would appear to be no basis in the record for 

finding that the breach-of-contract claim could survive summary 

judgment, because, in that event, there would appear to be no basis 

in the record for finding that the contract had been breached. 
- 25 -

Hammerstein ballroom, then asked for permission via e-mail to

Gibson Brands to conduct repairs on it.8

In concluding that a reasonable factfinder could find on 

this record that the "simple" contract posited by Gibson Foundation

exists, we emphasize that the aspects of the record just described

supportably show that both parties understood which piano was to 

be picked up from the Hammerstein ballroom and that this piano was

the one that grounds this claim. Moreover, although the District 

Court emphasized to the parties in the final pretrial conference 

on October 14, 2022, that there was no "price" specified for this 

simple contract, the contract that is being alleged here is not 

for the sale of goods. Cf. Jacobson v. Perman, 131 N.E. 174, 175 

(Mass. 1921) ("[T]he memorandum was sufficient evidence of [a] 

contract . . . [because] it contains all the essential elements of 

the contract . . . [including] the quantity sold and the price to 

be paid therefor . . . ."). Rather, the consideration that Gibson 

Brands allegedly received took the form of avoiding storage 

costs -- in consequence of Norris and Piano Mill having taken 

possession of the piano -- and not a payment. Thus, we do not 

8 Gibson Foundation also raises on appeal the issue of whether 

the District Court improperly disregarded, as hearsay, evidence of 

internal e-mails between Gibson Brands employees that tended to 

show the existence of a warehousing agreement between Gibson 

Foundation and Piano Mill. Because we find, even without these emails, a genuine issue of material fact as to whether a contract 

exists between Gibson Foundation and Norris and Piano Mill, we do 

not address this contention. 
- 26 -

see, and Norris and Piano Mill do not explain, why there must be 

a price for a contract of this nature to be valid. And, finally, 

while the District Court also suggested at the final pretrial 

conference that there was no agreement between the parties as to 

duration, a reasonable juror could find on this record that the 

parties agreed that Norris and Piano Mill would retain possession 

of the piano until Gibson Brands requested that it be returned. 

Thus, because we conclude that a reasonable juror could find on 

this record that the alleged contract's "essential terms" were 

"definite and certain" such that the "intention of the parties 

could be discovered, the nature and extent of their obligations 

ascertained, and their rights determined," Cygan, 96 N.E.2d at 

703, we must reverse the District Court's grant of summary judgment 

to Norris and Piano Mill on the breach-of-contract claim.9 

At the same time, we also must reject Gibson Foundation's 

contention that it is entitled to summary judgment on the claim 

and thus that we may not uphold the District Court's ruling to the 

contrary. As discussed in Part IV, there is a genuine issue of 

material fact as to whether Gibson Foundation or its purported 

predecessor in title, Gibson Brands, owned the piano in question. 

And that is significant because if Gibson Foundation or Gibson 

9 Norris and Piano Mill do not argue that, if there was a 

warehousing agreement, it was between them and Gibson Brands, not 

them and Gibson Foundation -- the current plaintiff. We thus do 

not address that contention.
- 27 -

Brands never owned or held title to the piano in question, then

there would be no basis in this record for finding that there was

a warehousing agreement between the parties. 

Moreover, Norris and Piano Mill contend that, in any 

event, even if a reasonable juror could find based on the record 

that Gibson Brands did own the piano before Norris and Piano Mill 

took possession of it, a reasonable juror also could find on this

record that, insofar as Gibson Brands owned the piano, Gibson 

Brands then gave it away to Norris and Piano Mill as a gift.10 

They point to the evidence in the record that supportably shows 

that Felber, an employee in Gibson Brands's entertainmentrelations department, told Norris and Piano Mill that the piano 

would be "all yours" if Norris and Piano Mill could remove the 

piano by the end of the week, which they did. Thus, because we 

conclude that Norris and Piano Mill are right that the record 

evidence would permit a rational factfinder to determine that the 

piano was given to them as a gift, we must reject, for this reason, 

too, Gibson Foundation's challenge to the District Court's denial 

of its summary-judgment motion. 

10 Of course, should this case proceed to trial, the parties 

would be able to introduce evidence in addition to what is in the 

summary-judgment record. 
- 28 -

VI.

The District Court's award of summary judgment to Norris 

and Piano Mill for the breach-of-bailment claim is reversed, while 

the District Court's denial of summary judgment to Gibson 

Foundation for the breach-of-bailment claim on alternative grounds

is affirmed. In addition, the District Court's award of summary 

judgment to Norris and Piano Mill for the breach-of-contract claim

is reversed, while its denial of summary judgment to Gibson 

Foundation for the breach-of-contract claim is affirmed. Costs 

are taxed in favor of Gibson Foundation.