UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

WESTERN DIVISION

NATIONAL REPUBLICAN 

SENATORIAL COMMITTEE, et al.,

Plaintiffs, 

v.

FEDERAL ELECTION 

COMMISSION, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 1:22-cv-639

JUDGE DOUGLAS R. COLE

OPINION AND ORDER

The National Republican Senatorial Committee, along with the National 

Republican Congressional Committee, Senator J.D. Vance, and former 

Representative Steve Chabot, have sued the Federal Election Commission and each 

of its Commissioners in their official capacities (collectively “the FEC”). The FEC 

moved to dismiss or transfer for improper venue under Fed R. Civ. P. 12(b)(3). 

Because venue is proper, the Court DENIES the FEC’s Motion to Dismiss for 

Improper Venue or, in the Alternative, Transfer (Doc. 10).

BACKGROUND

A. The Complaint

Plaintiffs seek to enjoin the FEC from enforcing a provision of the Federal 

Election Campaign Act (“FECA”) which limits party committees’ expenditures made 

in coordination with candidates—a limit that Plaintiffs argue is an unconstitutional 

abridgement of their First Amendment rights. (See generally Doc. 1). They seek 

judicial review under 52 U.S.C. § 30110, which provides that:

Case: 1:22-cv-00639-DRC Doc #: 18 Filed: 05/09/23 Page: 1 of 19 PAGEID #: 151
2

The [Federal Election] Commission, the national committee of any 

political party, or any individual eligible to vote in any election for the 

office of President may institute such actions in the appropriate district 

court of the United States, including actions for declaratory judgment, 

as may be appropriate to construe the constitutionality of any provision 

of this Act. The district court immediately shall certify all questions of 

constitutionality of this Act to the United States court of appeals for the 

circuit involved, which shall hear the matter sitting en banc.

52 U.S.C. § 30110.

In their Complaint, Plaintiffs assert that venue is proper, both under that 

statute and § 1391(e)(1) of the general venue statute, which provides the venue rule 

when the United States, its agencies, or its officers are a defendant. (Doc. 1, #5). 

B. The FEC’s Motion

After Plaintiffs filed their Complaint, the FEC moved to dismiss or transfer 

the case for improper venue. To begin, the FEC contends that by authorizing “actions 

in the appropriate district court,” § 30110 “call[s] for an independent determination” 

beyond § 1391’s general venue requirements. (Doc. 10, #90). And, it says, the District 

Court for the District of Columbia is the appropriate court here, because, “[v]irtually 

all parties have their sole or primary place of business in that district” and “plaintiffs 

fail to offer any reason why this District has more significance to the issues the NRSC 

and NRCC seek to litigate than all the other many districts throughout the country 

in which they routinely transact business.” (Id. at #91 (citation omitted)). Taken 

together, these facts apparently mean that the “plaintiffs’ selected venue [is] 

inappropriate.” (Id.). Thus, the FEC says, “this Court should dismiss this proceeding 

pursuant to Rule 12(b)(3).” (Id. at #92).

Case: 1:22-cv-00639-DRC Doc #: 18 Filed: 05/09/23 Page: 2 of 19 PAGEID #: 152
3

In the alternative, the FEC argues that the Court should transfer the case to 

the D.C. District Court under the change of venue statute (Doc. 10, #82), which 

provides that:

For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, 

a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or 

division where it might have been brought or to any district or division 

to which all parties have consented.

28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). The FEC offers several reasons for that transfer, some familiar 

and some new:

Virtually every party in this matter resides in or at least does business 

in Washington, D.C. ...

While plaintiff J.D. Vance may maintain a residence in this district, 

following his 2022 Senate campaign his principal place of business with 

regular in-person requirements will be in Washington, D.C., for the next 

six years. ...

Plaintiff Steve Chabot did not prevail in his 2022 campaign, and 

thereafter he announced that he would retire and not run for public 

office again. The effect is that he lacks standing as a candidate because 

any purported injury cannot be redressed and, even if he could satisfy 

the requirements for standing, his claims are now moot. ...

[J]udges in the District of Columbia are uniquely qualified to consider 

constitutional challenges to broadly applicable federal legislation. ...

[B]ecause this District has no unique connection to the matter in 

controversy, plaintiffs’ choice of forum is entitled to little deference. ...

Transferring would preempt any public concerns regarding counsel for 

plaintiffs filing in this Division during a time when there were only two 

active judges including this Court, a former partner at their firm.

(Doc. 10, #93–96 (footnote omitted))

C. The Plaintiffs’ Response

Plaintiffs opposed the FEC’s motion. (Doc. 11). First, they argue that “the 

phrase ‘the appropriate district court’ [in § 30110] incorporates rather than 

Case: 1:22-cv-00639-DRC Doc #: 18 Filed: 05/09/23 Page: 3 of 19 PAGEID #: 153
4

invalidates otherwise applicable venue rules.” (Id. at #103 (emphasis omitted)). So 

§ 1391(e) governs here. And under that statute, venue is proper. (Id.)

Then, they argue that the Court should not transfer the case under § 1404(a), 

because: 

[W]hile Senator Vance can conduct official Senate business in both the 

District of Columbia and Ohio, his campaign does its most important 

business—communicating with Ohio voters—in the latter, including in 

this District. ...

[T]he NRSC targeted this forum in 2022 with coordinated advertising 

specific to Ohio’s U.S. senate race, running seven figures worth of ads 

predominately in four cities (Cincinnati, Cleveland, Columbus, and 

Dayton), three of which are in this District. The NRCC similarly spent 

up to the maximum amount of coordinated party expenditure authority 

assigned to it to communicate with voters in the First Congressional 

District in support of Steve Chabot’s 2022 general election campaign.

And both the NRSC and the NRCC intend to make similar and greater 

coordinated expenditures on campaign speech in this District, and 

throughout Ohio, in the future. ...

[E]ven if “some” of the relevant events here “played out in” Washington, 

D.C., the burdened political speech at the heart of this case has “a 

substantial connection to Ohio.” ...

[T]he D.C. District Court is a far less convenient forum for Plaintiffs

for the simple reason that its current docket congestion threatens a 

slower resolution of this case than in this Court. ...

[The FEC] does not claim that litigating this case here would result in 

any meaningful burden. ...

“‘[A]ll federal courts are presumed to be equally familiar with federal 

law.’”

(Id. at #109–115 (citations omitted) (emphasis original)).

D. The FEC’s Reply

The FEC replied in support of their motion. (Doc. 15). It reiterated that § 30110

“entails an independent determination as to which district is ‘the appropriate’ one” 

Case: 1:22-cv-00639-DRC Doc #: 18 Filed: 05/09/23 Page: 4 of 19 PAGEID #: 154
5

beyond § 1391’s general venue requirements. (Id. at #130–33). And it offered both 

familiar and new points in rebutting Plaintiffs’ response: 

Because this litigation has only an incidental relationship to this 

District, plaintiffs’ choice of forum is entitled to little deference. ...

District of Columbia is the most convenient forum for resolving this 

action. ...

Statistics compiled by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts ... 

show considerably greater docket congestion in this District [compared 

to D.C.]. ...

Courts in this District have specifically noted the appropriateness of 

making transfers due to other jurisdictions having greater “familiarity” 

with “the controlling law.” ...

[This] challenge in this Division with a smaller number of judges in 

active service is the sort of filing that has raised judge-shopping 

concerns. ...

(Id. at #134–42). With the motion fully briefed, it is now ripe for review.

LEGAL STANDARD

The legal standard that applies in this Circuit regarding challenges to venue 

is a bit murky about the burden of proof, but generally clear otherwise:

“There is a split of authority among district courts in the Sixth Circuit 

regarding who bears the burden of proof when venue is challenged as 

improper.” Reilly v. Meffe, 6 F. Supp. 3d 760, 765 (S.D. Ohio 2014).

Nevertheless, “[r]egardless of who bears the burden of proof, under Rule

12(b)(3), a plaintiff’s well-pled allegations pertaining to venue issue[s] 

are taken as true, unless contradicted by a defendant’s affidavits.” Id.

Moreover, “[i]n resolving venue questions, courts ‘may examine facts 

outside the complaint but must draw all reasonable inferences and 

resolve factual conflicts in favor of the plaintiff.’” Id. (quoting Audi AG 

& Volkswagen of Am. v. Izumi, 204 F. Supp. 2d 1014, 1017 (E.D. Mich. 

2002)).

Case: 1:22-cv-00639-DRC Doc #: 18 Filed: 05/09/23 Page: 5 of 19 PAGEID #: 155
6

Olin-Marquez v. Arrow Senior Living Mgmt., LLC, 586 F. Supp. 3d 759, 775 (S.D. 

Ohio 2022).1

The legal standard for considering discretionary transfer under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1404 is somewhat clearer:

[A] standard § 1404(a) analysis hinges on an “individualized, case-bycase consideration of convenience and fairness” which seeks to 

determine whether, based on various private and public interests, 

litigating the plaintiff’s action in her chosen forum would be 

“unnecessarily burdensome.” Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 

22, 29 (1988) (quoting Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 622 (1964));

Hefferan v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery Inc., 828 F.3d 488, 492 (6th Cir. 2016). 

Throughout the analysis, “the onus of showing that a plaintiff’s choice 

of forum is unnecessarily burdensome falls on the defendant.” See

Sacklow v. Saks Inc., 377 F. Supp. 3d 870, 876 (M.D. Tenn. 2019) 

(quoting Hefferan, 828 F.3d at 498). “Unless the balance is strongly in 

favor of defendant, a plaintiff’s choice of forum should rarely be 

disturbed.” Id. (citing Reese v. CNH Am. LLC, 574 F.3d 315, 320 (6th 

Cir. 2009)).

Id.

LAW AND ANALYSIS

A. Venue is proper. 

“When venue is challenged, the court must determine whether the case falls 

within [§ 1391]. If it does, venue is proper; if it does not, venue is improper, and the 

case must be dismissed or transferred.” Atl. Marine Const. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for W. 

Dist. of Tex., 571 U.S. 49, 56 (2013).2 Section 1391(e)(1) provides that:

1 While Olin-Marquez applies this standard in the context of improper venue under 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1406(a) and 1631, Reilly applies it in the § 1391 context, which is what the Court faces 

here.

2 This case refers to § 1391(b), but there is no reason to think the same principles do not apply 

to § 1391(e).

Case: 1:22-cv-00639-DRC Doc #: 18 Filed: 05/09/23 Page: 6 of 19 PAGEID #: 156
7

A civil action in which a defendant is an officer or employee of the United 

States or any agency thereof acting in his official capacity or under color 

of legal authority, or an agency of the United States, or the United 

States, may, except as otherwise provided by law, be brought in any 

judicial district in which

(A) a defendant in the action resides, 

(B) a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the 

claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the 

subject of the action is situated, or 

(C) the plaintiff resides if no real property is involved in the action. 

28 U.S.C. § 1391(e)(1) (emphasis added). Here, no one disputes that this case meets 

§ 1391(e)(1)’s general strictures. Rather, the FEC focuses on the “except as otherwise 

provided by law” provision, and it argues that § 30110 is one such exception. In sum, 

the FEC claims that § 30110 essentially displaces § 1391 for claims like the one here.

The Court disagrees and thus concludes venue is proper.

1. This action satisfies § 1391(e)(1).

Let’s start with the easy part. As Plaintiffs note, “there is no dispute” that this 

case satisfies § 1391(e)(1). “[T]he FEC is ‘an agency of the United States,’ ‘no real 

property is involved in the action,’ and two Plaintiffs ‘reside[]’ in this District.” (Doc. 

11, #103 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e)(1)(C))). And as Plaintiffs correctly point out, 

“§ 1391(e)’s residency requirement is satisfied as long as ‘at least one plaintiff resides 

in the district in which the action has been brought.’” (Id. (quoting Sidney Coal Co. v. 

Soc. Sec. Admin., 427 F.3d 336, 343–44 (6th Cir. 2005)). So long as no other venue 

statute trumps, venue is appropriate in this District. 

Case: 1:22-cv-00639-DRC Doc #: 18 Filed: 05/09/23 Page: 7 of 19 PAGEID #: 157
8

2. § 30110 incorporates § 1391’s venue requirements.

But the FEC asserts that a different provision controls the venue analysis 

here—§ 30110. The FEC observes that § 30110 provides that plaintiffs can bring 

actions like the one here “in the appropriate district court of the United States.” (Doc. 

10, #90). And the FEC claims that this is a different standard than the one § 1391

adopts, meaning that § 30110 “otherwise provides by law.” (Id. at #91). The Court 

disagrees. 

In construing the meaning of “appropriate district court” in § 30110, this Court 

starts with the following proposition: “it is a cardinal rule of statutory construction”

that, when Congress employs a legal term of art, it “adopts the cluster of ideas that 

were attached” to that term in the legal profession. Fed. Aviation Admin. v. Cooper, 

566 U.S. 284, 291–92 (2012) (cleaned up) (interpreting “actual damages” according to

common understanding in legal profession); Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. 

W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 615–16 (2001) (Scalia, J., 

concurring) (interpreting “prevailing party” that same way). “Appropriate district 

court” is one such legal term of art. The legal profession has long understood the 

phrase “appropriate district court” to refer generally to those courts in which venue 

lies. Indeed, 28 U.S.C. § 1390 defines venue to mean “the geographic specification of 

the proper court or courts for the litigation of a civil action”—i.e., the appropriate 

district court. Courts, both before and after Congress added this language to FECA 

reflect that same understanding of the phrase “appropriate district court.” See, e.g.,

Taylor v. Love, 415 F.2d 1118, 1119 (6th Cir. 1969) (using “the appropriate District 

Case: 1:22-cv-00639-DRC Doc #: 18 Filed: 05/09/23 Page: 8 of 19 PAGEID #: 158
9

Court” to refer any court where venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1406, the statute 

governing venue transfers). 

And unless a given statute says otherwise, the “time-proven” understanding in 

the legal profession is that § 1391 provides the manner of determining the 

“appropriate district court.” Milliken & Co. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 565 F. Supp. 511, 

513 (D.S.C. 1983) (holding that statute which provides, among other things, that 

“[a]ny person receiving such notification may file with the appropriate district court 

or court of appeals of the United States” is not “sufficient or intended to overrule the 

time-proven provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) or 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)” (footnote 

omitted)); see also Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 108 & n.10 (1972) (citing 

28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) and 28 U.S.C. § 1407 as the basis for determining “an appropriate 

district court”), disapproved on other grounds in later proceedings sub nom. City of 

Milwaukee v. Illinois & Michigan, 451 U.S. 304 (1981) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) and 

28 U.S.C. § 1407 as the basis for determining “an appropriate district court”); Horizon 

Coal Corp. v. United States, 43 F.3d 234, 240 n.5 (6th Cir. 1994) (noting that “a finding 

that the United States Claims Court has exclusive jurisdiction over operator 

reimbursement actions would work a hardship against operators by requiring them 

to litigate their claims in Washington, D.C., rather than in the appropriate district 

court”); NLRB v. Line, 50 F.3d 311, 314 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that “[v]enue is 

necessarily defined as the appropriate district court to file an action”). Indeed, even 

in the context of § 30110, some courts, including the District of Columbia courts that 

the FEC touts as more authoritative on FECA matters, have cited § 1391(e) when 

Case: 1:22-cv-00639-DRC Doc #: 18 Filed: 05/09/23 Page: 9 of 19 PAGEID #: 159
10

determining whether venue lies. See, e.g., Holmes v. FEC, 99 F. Supp. 3d 123, 138 

(D.D.C. 2015), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, and remanded 823 F.3d 69 (D.C. Cir. 2016).

In short, unless a statute specifically provides a different mechanism for selecting 

“the appropriate district court,” § 1391 serves as the default rule.

The FEC argues otherwise, claiming that § 30110 adopts an alternative 

framework. Troublingly, though, the FEC declines to explain in any detail what that

purported framework is. As best the Court can tell, the FEC’s proposed framework 

focuses on the location of the “principal plaintiffs in interest” (with no description of 

what renders a given plaintiff “principal”), where the “evidence necessary to resolve 

[the] challenge” lies, where “expert witnesses” are likely to be found, and “where 

Congress is located.” (Doc. 10, #91–92). Then, having suggested multiple factors, the

FEC offers little insight on how these factors should be balanced, just noting that 

here all point to D.C. (Id.).

The FEC’s proposed interpretation of § 30110 suffers from a few problems. To 

start, the FEC fails to locate the above factors anywhere in the statutory text or 

context. Rather, the FEC merely notes that district courts play a “critical role” in 

§ 30110 challenges, and then suggests that this “critical role” requires a special venue 

analysis. (Id. at #90). But the FEC does little to tie the nature of that “critical role” to 

the venue framework it proposes. 

Beyond that, in most cases under the FECA, the FEC’s venue framework would 

point to the district court in D.C. After all, Congress is located there, the FEC 

contends that the relevant expert witnesses tend to cluster there, the FEC is located 

Case: 1:22-cv-00639-DRC Doc #: 18 Filed: 05/09/23 Page: 10 of 19 PAGEID #: 160
11

there, and if “principal parties in interest” refers to national committees, the national 

committees for the two largest political parties (and the documents maintained at 

party headquarters, which the FEC contends is a big chunk of the necessary evidence)

are also there. (Doc. 10, #92). But if the FEC is indirectly suggesting that venue under 

§ 30110 is presumptively the district court in D.C., that runs headlong into another 

canon of statutory interpretation. Courts “presume differences in language [within a 

statute] ... convey differences in meaning.” Henson v. Santander Consumer USA Inc., 

582 U.S. 79, 86 (2017) (citing Loughrin v. United States, 573 U.S. 351, 359 (2014)). 

Here, as the FEC acknowledges, the FECA makes the district court in D.C. the 

exclusive forum for “challenges to the Commission’s enforcement proceedings.” See

52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(8)(A) (“Any party aggrieved by an order of the Commission 

dismissing a complaint ... may file a petition with the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia.”). When Congress wants to specify a particular venue for 

FECA challenges, it knows how to do so. Congress did so for one class of cases, but 

declined to do so for the challenge here.3

Comparing the venue language in § 30110 to the other statutes that the FEC 

cites in its briefing reinforces this result. The FEC points, for example, to the 

Rehabilitation Act, habeas corpus, and the Uniformed Services Employment and 

Reemployment Rights Act. (Doc. 10, #91, n.2). Look at each. Far from just referring 

to “the appropriate district court,” each statute offers detailed venue instructions. The 

3 Moreover, 52 U.S.C. § 30110 itself notes that appeals shall go “to the United States court of 

appeals for the circuit involved,” again implying the possibility of actions under the statute 

occcurring in various circuits across the country. This provides further textual support for 

the notion that § 1391’s general venue provisions control. 

Case: 1:22-cv-00639-DRC Doc #: 18 Filed: 05/09/23 Page: 11 of 19 PAGEID #: 161
12

Rehabilitation Act venue provision (which is the Title VII venue provision), for 

example, provides that: 

[A]n action may be brought in any judicial district in the State in which 

the unlawful employment practice is alleged to have been committed, in 

the judicial district in which the employment records relevant to such 

practice are maintained and administered, or in the judicial district in 

which the aggrieved person would have worked but for the alleged 

unlawful employment practice, but if the respondent is not found within 

any such district, such an action may be brought within the judicial 

district in which the respondent has his principal office.

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3). And the habeas statute limits courts in issuing writs of 

habeas to “their respective jurisdictions,” again a different substantive standard than 

§ 1391. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a). Finally, the USERRA venue provision expressly limits 

venue to “any district in which the private employer ... maintains a place of business.” 

38 U.S.C. § 4323(c)(2). These statutes, then, do not help the FEC. Instead, they 

reaffirm that when Congress wants to specify a venue framework different from 

§ 1391, it knows how. 

In short, the FECA’s plain language, read in context, shows that Congress 

elected not to overturn the default venue rule for constitutional challenges to that 

statute. This Court must respect that choice. The Court thus reads “the appropriate 

district” in § 30110 to refer to any district that satisfies § 1391’s general venue 

standards. Here, as noted above, all agree those are met. Thus the Court DENIES

the FEC’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 10).

B. § 1404(a) favors retaining the case.

Even when venue is proper, defendants can seek transfer to another district 

court under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). The statute says:

Case: 1:22-cv-00639-DRC Doc #: 18 Filed: 05/09/23 Page: 12 of 19 PAGEID #: 162
13

For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, 

a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or 

division where it might have been brought or to any district or division 

to which all parties have consented.

28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). In resolving motions to transfer under § 1404(a), courts consider 

the private interests of the parties, including their convenience and the 

convenience of potential witnesses, as well as other public-interest 

concerns, such as systemic integrity and fairness, which come under the 

rubric of “interests of justice.”

Moses v. Bus. Card Exp., Inc., 929 F.2d 1131, 1137 (6th Cir. 1991) (citing Stewart 

Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 30 (1988)). In requesting such a transfer, 

though, a defendant confronts an uphill climb. “[U]nless the balance is strongly in 

favor of the defendant, the plaintiff’s choice of forum should rarely be disturbed.”4 See

Reese v. CNH Am. LLC, 574 F.3d 315, 320 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Dowling v. 

Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 727 F.2d 608, 612 (6th Cir. 1984)). Here, the factors do not 

“strongly favor” transfer. To the contrary, they favor this Court retaining the case. 

1. Private interests of the parties favor retaining the case.

The private interests of the parties include

[t]he relative ease of access to sources of proof; availability of compulsory 

process for attendance of unwilling, and the cost of obtaining attendance 

of willing witnesses; ... and all other practical problems that make trial 

of the case easy, expeditious, and inexpensive.

4 The FEC, though, tries to carve an exception into this settled rule. Citing a case from the 

Nothern District of Ohio, the FEC says that “plaintiffs’ choice of this District is entitled to 

little deference where ‘the vast majority of operative facts giving rise to the lawsuit took place 

outside of Ohio.’” (Doc. 10, #92–93 (citing U.S. ex rel. Kairos Scientia, Inc. v. Zinsser Co., No. 

5:10-cv-383, 2011 WL 127852, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 14, 2011))). Even assuming that 

exception exists, a question the Court does not reach, it would not carry the day for the FEC 

here. That is because, as explained below, the vast majority of facts alleged here did not occur 

outside Ohio.

Case: 1:22-cv-00639-DRC Doc #: 18 Filed: 05/09/23 Page: 13 of 19 PAGEID #: 163
14

Jamhour v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., 211 F. Supp. 2d 941, 945 (S.D. Ohio 2002) (quoting 

Gulf Oil v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947)). Beyond that, courts in this district have

also considered additional factors when evaluating whether transfer is 

appropriate ... includ[ing] “the nature of the suit; the place of the events 

involved; ... and the residences of the parties.” 

Id. at 946 (quoting Sky Techs. Partners, LLC v. Midwest Rsch. Inst., 125 F. Supp. 2d 

286, 291 (S.D. Ohio 2000), and citing Midwest Motor Supply Co., Inc. v. Kimball, 761 

F. Supp. 1316, 1318 (S.D. Ohio 1991), and Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 634 F.

Supp. 587, 589 (S.D. Ohio 1986)).

Some of the first factors are not that relevant. Given that this looks to be a lawheavy rather than fact-heavy case, any advantage D.C. might have over this Court 

regarding witnesses and evidence seems minimal at best. And as for the lawyers—

“convenience of counsel is not a factor to be considered when ruling on [a] motion for 

transfer.” Tanyike v. United States, 603 F. Supp. 3d 572, 583 (S.D. Ohio 2022)

(internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Sanhua Int’l, Inc. v. Riggle, No. 2:17-cv368, 2019 WL 2088431, at *6 (S.D. Ohio May 13, 2019)).

And factors like “the nature of the suit; the place of the events involved; ... and 

the residences of the parties” all favor retaining the case. The relevant facts alleged 

here concern Ohio. Two of the plaintiffs live here and campaigned here—as a result,

much of the alleged censorship at issue (if it is fairly called “censorship”) occurred 

here. (Doc. 11, #108–10). Thus any First Amendment chilling, again if such chilling 

occurred, likewise happened here. 

Case: 1:22-cv-00639-DRC Doc #: 18 Filed: 05/09/23 Page: 14 of 19 PAGEID #: 164
15

The FEC counters that this is illusory—because the national parties are 

affected elsewhere by this statute and because they seek nationwide remedies, the 

vast majority of operative facts, the FEC says, occurred outside Ohio. (See Doc. 15, 

#134–35). But Senator Vance and (former) Representative Chabot are plaintiffs too. 

The censorship (again, if it is censorship) affected them both as well, and almost 

exclusively in their home districts. Even if the FEC thinks they’ve been joined as “pro 

forma plaintiffs,” the Court still has an obligation to take their interests seriously.

2. Public-interest concerns favor retaining the case.

Public-interest concerns include

[d]ocket congestion, the burden of trial to a jurisdiction with no relation 

to the cause of action, the value of holding trial in a community where 

the public affected live, and the familiarity of the court with controlling 

law.

Jamhour, 211 F. Supp. 2d at 945 (quoting Gulf Oil, 330 U.S. at 508). That last factor 

can be put more precisely as “the appropriateness of having diversity cases tried in a 

forum which is familiar with the governing law.” Sirak v. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., 

No. 5:08-cv-169, 2008 WL 4845950, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 5, 2008) (citing Gulf Oil,

330 U.S. at 508).

To start, as explained above, this District has a relation to the cause of action. 

And any alleged “censorship” affected the public that Vance and Chabot were trying 

to reach, many of whom live in this District.

Next, the FEC argues that the D.C. District Court has greater familiarity with 

the controlling law than this Court. (Doc. 10, #96). Not so. In an “action aris[ing]

under ... a federal statute, both courts are equally familiar with the controlling law 

Case: 1:22-cv-00639-DRC Doc #: 18 Filed: 05/09/23 Page: 15 of 19 PAGEID #: 165
16

and each would be competent to adjudicate that claim.” Kay v. Nat’l City Mortg. Co., 

494 F. Supp. 2d 845, 857 (S.D. Ohio 2007). And in any event, as noted above, the 

controlling law factor typically applies in diversity jurisdiction cases and generally 

refers to a federal trial court’s familiarity with applicable state law. See Sirak, 2008 

WL 4845950, at *2; One Ethanol, LLC v. BOX BioScience, LLC, No. 1:21-cv-874, 2022 

WL 16636449, at *7 (W.D. Mich. Aug. 22, 2022); Sacklow v. Saks Inc., 377 F. Supp. 

3d 870, 877 (M.D. Tenn. 2019). So this does not favor transfer.

Third, the FEC says that the Court has recognized, “‘where ‘[p]laintiffs are 

challenging the constitutionality of federal legislation[,]’ the District of Columbia 

‘would appear to be an obvious choice.’” (Doc. 10, #97 (citing Dearth v. Gonzales, No. 

2:06-cv-1012, 2007 WL 1100426, at *5 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 10, 2007))). That over-reads 

Dearth. Here is what the Court actually said:

Even if the Court is mistaken in this regard, dismissal is still warranted.

Defendants have requested, alternatively, that the Court transfer this 

action to the District Court of the District of Columbia. The Court 

recognizes that venue as to Defendant Gonzales would be proper in the 

District of Columbia because the Attorney General resides in that 

judicial district for venue purposes. The District of Columbia would also 

serve as a proper venue under § 1391(e)(2) because Plaintiffs are 

challenging the constitutionality of federal legislation and the District 

of Columbia would appear to be an obvious choice. The District of 

Minnesota would arguably also serve as an appropriate venue under

§ 1391(e)(2) because Plaintiff Dearth alleges that he attempted to 

purchase a firearm at a sporting good store located in Minnesota. 

Setting aside speculative issues of potential forum shopping by both 

sides, the interests of justice dictate that either forum would serve as a 

more proper and convenient forum than the Southern District of Ohio.

Dearth, 2007 WL 1100426, at *5 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

Case: 1:22-cv-00639-DRC Doc #: 18 Filed: 05/09/23 Page: 16 of 19 PAGEID #: 166
17

There is a gulf between FEC’s reading of Dearth and the real Dearth. The court 

there held that the Southern District of Ohio was not a proper venue either under 

§ 1391(e)(1)(A) or (B). Id. at *2–5. After explaining why, the court justified the 

outcome (denying venue) by turning to the motion for transfer. The court noted that 

the proposed alternatives, unlike the Southern District, had proper venue—D.C. had 

proper venue because “the Attorney General resides” there and “Plaintiffs are 

challenging the constitutionality of federal legislation.” Id. at *5. Minnesota 

“arguably” had proper venue because the plaintiff “attempted to purchase a firearm 

at a sporting good store located in Minnesota.” Id. For those reasons “either forum 

would serve as a more proper and convenient forum than the Southern District of 

Ohio.” Id. Nowhere did the court say that D.C. is the superior choice to any other 

forum when a court faces a constitutional challenge—merely that it was one of at 

least two good options in Dearth. And because venue was not proper in Dearth, the 

court wanted to find other choices where venue did appropriately lie.

Here, venue is proper under § 1391(e)(1)(C). No authority states that, despite 

venue being proper in this district, this Court should transfer the case to D.C. just 

because it involves a constitutional challenge. Indeed, if the Court were to do so, it 

would violate a basic rule to the contrary—that all federal courts are considered 

equally familiar with federal law. Kay, 494 F. Supp. 2d at 857.

Grasping at straws, the FEC also suggests that the public might think the 

Court partial to Plaintiffs because the Court was formerly a partner at the law firm 

representing them. (Doc. 10, #96 n.4). That does not fly. (See Doc. 11, #108 n.3 

Case: 1:22-cv-00639-DRC Doc #: 18 Filed: 05/09/23 Page: 17 of 19 PAGEID #: 167
18

(“[Federal law] requir[es] disqualification of a judge who, while ‘in private practice,’ 

‘served as lawyer in the matter in controversy, or a lawyer with whom he previously 

practiced law served during such association as a lawyer concerning the matter.’”) 

(emphases original) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(2)))). The Court was last a partner at 

the firm at issue some twelve years ago. Indeed, of the eight counsel listed on the 

docket, it appears only two were even at the firm during the undersigned’s tenure 

there. While the Court knows some of Plaintiffs’ counsel, the same could be said for 

many cases on this Court’s (and likely most courts’) docket. And importantly, the 

undersigned never worked with any of these counsel “concerning this matter,” or on 

anything relating to this matter. Given these facts, no reasonable person could 

conclude the Court is partial to either party. In any event, the Court plays a minor 

role in this case—managing the discovery process, making findings of fact, and 

certifying “all questions of constitutionality” for review by the en banc Sixth Circuit.

See 52 U.S.C. § 30110.

Finally, the parties debate the docket congestion factor. Plaintiffs say it favors 

this Court, because D.C. has so many cases. (Doc. 11, #111–12). The FEC says this 

Court is even more congested. (Doc. 15, #139–141). The Court agrees with the FEC 

here—the Administrative Office’s data suggests that the Southern District is more 

congested than D.C. But this factor alone cannot outweigh a plaintiff’s choice of 

forum—after all “unless the balance is strongly in favor of the defendant, the 

plaintiff’s choice of forum should rarely be disturbed.” Reese, 574 F.3d at 320

(emphasis added). So the Court DENIES the FEC’s Motion to Transfer (Doc. 10). 

Case: 1:22-cv-00639-DRC Doc #: 18 Filed: 05/09/23 Page: 18 of 19 PAGEID #: 168
19

CONCLUSION

For the above reasons, the Court DENIES the FEC’s Motion to Dismiss for 

Improper Venue or, in the Alternative, Transfer (Doc. 10).

SO ORDERED.

May 9, 2023

DATE DOUGLAS R. COLE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case: 1:22-cv-00639-DRC Doc #: 18 Filed: 05/09/23 Page: 19 of 19 PAGEID #: 169