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U.S. DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

)

GREAT AMERICA PAC )

107 S. West Street, Suite 555 )

Alexandria, VA 22314, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. )

)

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, )

999 E Street, NW )

Washington, DC 20463, )

)

Defendant, )

_______________________________________)

VERIFIED COMPLAINT

Plaintiff GREAT AMERICA PAC brings this action for injunctive and declaratory relief 

and alleges as follows:

1. This lawsuit seeks to compel the Federal Election Commission (“FEC”) to take 

action on an administrative complaint Great America PAC (“GAP”) filed with the FEC over three

years ago. GAP’s complaint challenges billionaire Michael Bloomberg’s unprecedented violation 

of campaign finance law in which he laundered over $18 million of his personal funds through his 

short-lived presidential campaign account to the DNC—effectively contributing over 500 times 

the legal limit to a national political party committee and quite possibly tipping the balance of the 

2020 presidential election.

2. Despite the fact Bloomberg has publicly admitted the material facts of his illegal 

scheme, the FEC has remained characteristically inert for the past three years, failing to initiate 

enforcement action against Bloomberg or the DNC.

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3. In light of the magnitude of Bloomberg’s scheme to flout federal campaign finance 

law to illegally funnel millions of dollars to the DNC, this Court must ensure the FEC takes 

appropriate enforcement action in a timely manner pursuant to 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(8). In 

particular, the FEC’s failure to find probable cause federal campaign finance law has been violated, 

despite the clear evidence set forth in GAP’s administrative complaint and Bloomberg’s own 

public admissions is arbitrary, capricious, and contrary to law.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

4. This Court has jurisdiction over this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 2201, 

because it arises under a federal statute and seeks, in part, declaratory relief. 

5. Venue is proper in this Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) because Defendant is an 

entity of the U.S. Government. 

PARTIES

6. Plaintiff GREAT AMERICA PAC (“GAP”) is an unauthorized, non-connected 

Carey1 PAC headquartered in Alexandria, Virginia.

7. Defendant FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION (“FEC”) is the federal agency 

charged with enforcement of the Federal Election Campaign Act (“FECA”) and is located in 

Washington, D.C.

THE ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLAINT PROCEDURE

8. 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(1) authorizes any person to file a written, signed, sworn, and 

notarized complaint with the FEC alleging a violation of federal campaign finance law. 

9. Within 5 days of receiving the administrative complaint, the FEC must notify “any 

person alleged in the complaint to have committed such a violation.” 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(1). 

1 Carey v. FEC, 791 F. Supp. 2d 121 (D.D.C. 2011). 

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Any such person “shall have the opportunity to demonstrate, in writing, to the Commission within 

15 days after notification that no action should be taken” pursuant to the Complaint, id., though 

the Commission will generally agree to extend this deadline. 

10. After the respondents have been given an opportunity to submit a responsive filing, 

the Commission must vote on whether “it has reason to believe” a person violated federal 

campaign finance law. It takes the votes of four Commissioners to approve such a “reason to 

believe” (“RTB”) finding. The RTB vote is based solely on the administrative complaint, any 

responsive filings, and potentially public FEC records; the Commission is not permitted to 

undertake any investigation of the complaint or its allegations prior to an RTB finding. Id. 

§ 30109(a)(2). 

11. Upon making an RTB finding, the Commission must notify the person alleged to 

have violated the law, and “make an investigation of such alleged violation, which may include a 

field investigation or audit.” Id. 

12. At the conclusion of the Commission’s investigation, OGC must prepare a report 

setting forth “the legal and factual issues of the case.” A copy of the report is provided to each 

respondent, and they have an opportunity to submit a responsive filing. Id. § 30109(a)(3). 

13. In most cases, upon receiving OGC’s report of the investigation, the Commission 

must vote whether “probable cause” exists to believe federal campaign finance law was violated. 

It takes the votes of four Commissioners to make such a probable cause determination. Id. 

§ 30109(a)(3), (a)(4)(A)(i).

14. After the Commission makes a probable cause determination, it must attempt to 

enter into a conciliation agreement with the respondents for a period of 30-90 days. It takes the 

votes of four Commissioners to approve any such conciliation agreement. Id. § 30109(a)(4)(A)(i).

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15. If the Commission is unable to reach a conciliation agreement with the respondent, 

then upon a vote of four Commissioners it may seek monetary or injunctive relief in U.S. District 

Court. Id. § 30109(a)(6)(A).

THE FEC’S FAILURE TO TAKE ACTION

ON GAP’S ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLAINT

16. On March 24, 2020 - well over three years ago - GAP filed an administrative 

complaint with the FEC against Michael Bloomberg; his authorized candidate committee, Mike 

Bloomberg 2020, Inc. (“MB2020”); and DNC Services Corp./Democratic National Committee

(“DNC”).

17. The administrative complaint was written, signed, notarized and verified under 

penalty of perjury as required by 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(1). Exhibit 1 to the administrative 

complaint was a copy of a memorandum from MB2020 to DNC Chair Tom Perez.

18. A true and complete copy of GAP’s administrative complaint and accompanying 

exhibit is appended to this Complaint as Exhibit 1.

19. On March 26, 2020, the FEC acknowledged it had received the administrative 

complaint on March 24. A true and complete copy of the FEC’s acknowledgement is attached to 

this Complaint as Exhibit 2.

20. On or about March 26, 2020, the Enforcement Division of the FEC's Office of 

General Counsel ("OGC") assigned Matter Under Review ("MUR") number 7722 to the 

Administrative Complaint. 

21. On information and belief, the FEC notified the respondents of the Administrative 

Complaint within five days of its receipt, pursuant to 11 C.F.R. § 111.5(a), and provided them with 

an opportunity to submit a response within 15 days, pursuant to 11 C.F.R. § 111.6(a). On 

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information and belief, the Commission has not yet held a vote to determine whether “probable 

cause” exists Respondents violated federal law.

THE ALLEGATIONS IN GAP’S ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLAINT

22. The administrative complaint GAP filed with the FEC alleges the existence of a 

conspiracy to funnel—effectively launder—well over $18 million of Michael Bloomberg’s 

personal funds through his abortive presidential candidate committee to the DNC.

23. The administrative complaint alleges, based on MB2020’s publicly available 

campaign finance disclosure reports, Michael Bloomberg transferred more than $935,000,000 of 

his personal funds to MB2020 from late 2019 through February 2020. He transferred additional 

personal funds to MB2020 after that date, as well. Administrative Complaint, Exh. 1, ¶¶ 6, 8. The 

administrative complaint further explained Bloomberg was effectively the sole source of funding 

for MB2020. Id. ¶ 7.

24. The administrative complaint notes on or about March 4, 2020, Bloomberg 

suspended his campaign for the Democratic nomination for President after winning only 58 out of 

3,979 pledged delegates to the 2020 Democratic National Convention. Id. ¶¶ 9-10. 

25. The administrative complaint detailed a memo MB2020 issued to DNC Chair Tom 

Perez shortly after Bloomberg dropped out of the Presidential race. Id. ¶ 11. The Memo stated 

MB2020 was transferring $18 million of the funds it had received from Bloomberg to the DNC to 

“dramatically expand the DNC’s Battleground Build-Up 2020 efforts across battleground states, 

drawing in part from [MB2020’s] own incredibly experienced and talented organizing staff.” Id. 

¶ 15, 20. The Memo further declared MB2020 “will also transfer several of its former field offices 

to state parties and help accelerate the hiring pace for important positions in organizing, data, and 

operations across key battleground states.” Id. ¶ 17.

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26. The administrative complaint explained Bloomberg controlled the personal funds 

he had transferred to MB2020, even while they were in that authorized candidate committee’s 

account and could have refunded the money to his personal account at any time. Id. ¶¶ 15, 19, 27.

27. The administrative complaint declared:

Under the unique circumstances of this case, where BLOOMBERG is the source 

of all the funds in [MB2020’s] account; BLOOMBERG controls the funds in that 

account; and [BLOOMBERG] may completely refund to his personal account all 

of those funds at any time, a contribution from [MB2020] to the DNC must be 

treated as a contribution from BLOOMBERG himself to the DNC. Allowing 

BLOOMBERG to contribute $18 million of his own funds to the DNC by 

laundering them through his now-defunct presidential campaign account would 

facilitate circumvention of the Federal Election Campaign Act’s (“FECA”) 

contribution limits.

Id. ¶ 28-29.

THE COUNTS IN GAP’S ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLAINT

28. Count I, against Bloomberg, alleged he violated 52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(1)(B) and 11 

C.F.R. § 110.1(c)(1) by making an excessive $18 million contribution of his own personal funds, 

through MB2020, to the DNC. At the time, those provisions (as adjusted for inflation) permitted 

an individual to contribute no more than $35,500 annually to the general treasury account of a 

national political party committee such as the DNC. See FEC, Price Index Adjustments for 

Contribution and Expenditure Limitations and Lobbyist Bundling Disclosure Threshold, 84 Fed. 

Reg. 2504 (Feb. 7, 2019). Federal law also allowed a person to contribute a maximum of $106,500 

to each of a national political party committee’s three special segregated McCutcheon2 accounts.

52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(1)(B), (a)(9), for a total of $355,000. Because all of MB2020’s funds had 

come from Bloomberg, and Bloomberg had complete and exclusive control over them (including 

2 See McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. 185 (2014). 

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the authority to refund that money to his personal account), the transfer from MB2020 to the DNC 

constitutes a transfer from Bloomberg himself to the DNC.

29. Count II, against the DNC, alleged it violated 52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(1)(B), (f), and 

11 C.F.R. §§ 110.1(c)(1)(i), 110.9, by receiving the illegal excessive contribution of $18 million 

from Bloomberg.

30. Count III, against Bloomberg, MB2020, and the DNC, alleged they violated 52 

U.S.C. § 30122 and 11 C.F.R. § 110.4(b)(i), (iv), by illegally making and receiving contributions 

made in the name of another. Bloomberg contributed his personal funds, over which he had 

complete and exclusive control, from MB2020’s account to the DNC, while reporting the 

transaction as a transfer from MB2020 to the DNC. By using MB2020 as a vehicle through which 

to contribute his personal funds to the DNC, Bloomberg made a contribution in the name of 

another.

31. Count IV, against Bloomberg, alleged he violated 52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(1)(D) and 

11 C.F.R. § 110.1(c)(5) by making an excessive in-kind contribution to state political party 

committees in “key battleground states.” At the time, federal law permitted an individual to 

contribute no more than $10,000 annually to a state political party committee. MB2020 

nevertheless transferred several “former field offices to state parties and help accelerate the hiring 

pace for important positionks in organizing, data, and operations across key battlegrounds states.”

Those field offices had been paid for exclusively with Bloomberg’s personal funds which he had 

transferred to MB2020, and Bloomberg retained complete and exclusive control over those offices.

The transfers should be treated as excessive and illegal in-kind contributions from Bloomberg to 

the state party recipients.

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32. Count V, against MB2020, alleged—in the alternative to Counts I through IV, in 

the event the Commission rejected them—MB2020 violated 52 U.S.C. §§ 30114(a)(4), 

30116(a)(1)(B), and 11 C.F.R. §§ 110.1(c)(1), 113.2(c), by making an illegal excessive 

contribution to the DNC. Federal law specifies “[a] contribution accepted by a candidate . . . may 

be used by a candidate . . . for transfers, without limitation, to a national, State, or local committee 

of a political party.” 52 U.S.C. § 30114(a)(4); 11 C.F.R. § 113.2(c). A candidate’s expenditures of 

his or her personal funds, including contributions to his or her campaign account, do not qualify 

as “a contribution accepted by a candidate” for purposes of those provisions. Thus, Bloomberg did 

not “accept” any contributions that fell within those special “unlimited transfer” provisions. The 

personal funds Bloomberg transferred to his campaign account were subject to the ordinary limits 

on contributions from a political committee to a national political party committee of $35,500 

annually to the general account and $106,500 to each of the three special segregated McCutcheon

accounts. 52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(1)(B), (a)(9); 11 C.F.R. § 110.1(c)(1); 84 Fed. Reg. at 2504. 

33. Count VI, against the DNC, alleged—in the alternative to Counts I through IV, in 

the event the Commission rejected them—the DNC violated 52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(1)(B), (f), and 

11 C.F.R. §§ 110.1(c)(1)(i), 110.9, by receiving the illegal excessive contribution of $18 million 

from MB2020.

THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE FEC’S FAILURE TO ACT

34. The FEC’s failure to act on GAP’s administrative complaint in over three years has 

violated GAP’s rights under 52 U.S.C. § 30109(8)(A). 

35. The FEC’s failure to act on GAP’s administrative complaint placed GAP at a 

competitive disadvantage relative to the DNC. During the 2020 election cycle, GAP devoted itself 

to making expenditures and engaging in a range of political activities opposing the Democratic 

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candidate for President who Bloomberg, MB2020, and the DNC were promoting, and supporting 

the Republican candidate, President Donald J. Trump.

a. GAP had complied with campaign finance restrictions in promoting the 

2020 Republican candidate and opposing the Democratic candidate for President.

b. In the 2020 election cycle, the DNC was able to unfairly oppose, dilute, and 

undermine GAP’s efforts by funding the Democratic candidate with illegally excessive 

contributions, placing GAP at a strategic and competitive disadvantage.

c. GAP intends to again expend substantial time, effort, and resources in 

opposing the Democratic candidate for President in the 2024 election who the DNC will be 

publicly aiding and in support of whom the DNC will be making substantial expenditures. To the 

extent the DNC was never forced to disgorge $18 million – nearly 4% of the gross funds raised by 

the DNC in that cycle - to reflect the illegal excessive contributions it received, is allowed to 

engage in massive violations of campaign finance law without consequence, and continues to 

operate free of any injunction barring it from continuing to violate federal campaign finance law, 

GAP will remain at a competitive disadvantage in its political efforts concerning the 2024 

presidential election and face an unlevel playing field. 

36. The FEC’s failure to act on GAP’s administrative complaint hindered GAP’s 

organizational interests by allowing the DNC to spend up to an additional $18 million in illegally 

obtained funds in opposition to GAP’s message in support of Republican presidential candidates, 

and potentially unlimited amounts in the future through similar illegal conspiracies.

37. The FEC’s failure to act on GAP’s administrative complaint has harmed GAP by 

undermining one of GAP’s primary missions of facilitating free and fair elections held in 

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compliance with applicable legal requirements such as the FECA. See Campaign Legal Ctr. v. 

FEC, 466 F. Supp. 3d 141 (D.D.C. 2020).

38. GAP seeks information which must be publicly disclosed pursuant to a statute, It 

has not received information which the respondents who were identified in its administrative 

complaint were required to publicly disclose. The FECA requires the disclosure of the information 

GAP seeks, and there is no reason to doubt the information would help GAP. See Campaign Legal 

Ctr. & Democracy 21 v. FEC, 952 F.3d 352, 356 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (per curiam). 

39. GAP requires the information it seeks to be able to know, and disclose to the public, 

whether the contributions at issue to the DNC and state parties were made by Bloomberg himself 

or instead MB2020. This information – whether a billionaire personally and unlawfully tilted the 

outcome of a presidential election – will remain unavailable to GAP (at least via FECA disclosure) 

without a favorable ruling in this case.

40. GAP has used a combination of research, litigation, advocacy, and public education 

through its website to disseminate information to the public about candidates, officials, and their 

actions. GAP’s work on campaign finance-related issues, including public education through its 

website, litigation, and administrative proceedings depends on accurate campaign finance reports 

as required by statute. See Campaign Legal Ctr. v. FEC, No. 20-0809 (ABJ), 2021 U.S. Dist. 

LEXIS 215687, at *11 (D.D.C. Nov. 8, 2021). It is hindered in those core programmatic activities 

when those individuals are able to keep their actions hidden. See Citizens for Responsibility & 

Ethics v. FEC, 243 F. Supp. 3d 91, 102 n.5 (D.D.C. 2017). GAP has concrete plans to disseminate 

through its website, and to its email list, information concerning Bloomberg, MB2020, the DNC, 

and state parties it obtains as a result of this lawsuit. 

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COUNT I – FAILURE TO ACT UNDER 52 U.S.C. § 30109(8)(A)

41. GAP hereby realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations set forth in 

Paragraphs 1 to 39 as if fully set forth herein. 

42. GAP filed its Administrative Complaint alleging violations of federal campaign 

finance law with the FEC on March 24, 2020.

43. Over 120 days have elapsed since GAP filed its administrative complaint, and the 

FEC has failed to act. In particular, on information and belief, the FEC has not voted on whether 

to pursue civil litigation based on the administrative complaint.

44. GAP is aggrieved by the Commissions’ failure to act on its Administrative 

Complaint. 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(8)(A) provides, “Any party aggrieved . . . by a failure of the 

Commission to act” on an Administrative Complaint “during the 120-day period beginning on the 

date the complaint is filed, may file a petition with the United States District Court for the District 

of Columbia.” The Court may rule the Commission’s “failure to act is contrary to law, and may 

direct the Commission to conform with such declaration within 30 days.”

45. The Commission’s failure to act on GAP’s Administrative Complaint is arbitrary, 

capricious, contrary to law, and an abuse of discretion. 

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff GAP is entitled to relief under 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(8). 

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PRAYER FOR RELIEF

Plaintiff GAP prays for the following relief:

1. A declaratory judgment GAP is entitled to relief under 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(8)(A),

(C) and the FEC’s failure to act on its administrative complaint is arbitrary, capricious, contrary to

law, or an abuse of discretion. 

2. An injunction compelling the Commission, pursuant to 52 U.S.C.

§ 30109(a)(8)(C), to vote no more than thirty (30) days from the date of this Court’s order on such

matters as this Court deems appropriate, including but not limited to whether:

a. reason to believe exists one or more respondents to the administrative

complaint violated federal law; 

b. probable cause exists to believe one or more respondents violated federal

law; and/or 

c. to initiate civil proceedings in connection with the administrative complaint.

3. Costs and attorneys’ fees pursuant to any applicable statute or authority, including

but not limited to the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412; and 

4. Such other relief as this Court deems just and appropriate.

Respectfully submitted, 

Dated April 12, 2023 ___________________________ /s/

Dan Backer, Esq. (D.C. Bar # 996641)

CHALMERS, ADAMS, BACKER & KAUFMAN LLC

441 N. Lee Street, Suite 300 

Alexandria, VA 22314 

(202) 210-5431 (telephone)

(202) 478-0750 (facsimile)

dbacker@chalmersadams.com

Counsel for Plaintiff Great America PAC

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