In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________

No. 02-3190

MARGARET M. LEIBFORTH,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

BELVIDERE NATIONAL BANK and JAMES METZ,

Defendants-Appellees.

__________

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Northern District of Illinois, Western Division.

No. 99 C 50381—Philip G. Reinhard, Judge.

__________

ARGUED JUNE 3, 2003—DECIDED JULY 25, 2003

__________

Before FLAUM, Chief Judge, and BAUER and EVANS,

Circuit Judges.

FLAUM, Chief Judge. Plaintiff Margaret Leibforth appeals

the district court’s grant of summary judgment for the

Belvidere National Bank (“Bank”) and its Chief Executive

Officer, James Metz, in this suit under Title VII and the

Age Discrimination Employment Act. We affirm. 

I. BACKGROUND

Leibforth began working for the Bank in 1980 as a

teller/secretary and in December 1997 was promoted to the

position of Branch Manager/Assistant Vice President. She
2 No. 02-3190

was terminated a year later, when she was 55-years old.

The parties agree that Leibforth was performing her job in

a satisfactory manner, but the Bank says that it decided to

discharge her when it learned that she had imminent plans

to retire. More specifically, the Bank claims that on May 28,

1998, Leibforth met with Metz and Senior Vice President

Kim Larson to inform them that she was selling her house.

Metz and Larson understood Leibforth to be saying that, as

soon as her house was sold, she was going to retire and

move to Tucson, Arizona. Leibforth, however, denies ever

stating that she had any immediate plans to retire. Instead,

according to her witness John Murphy, who claims to have

been present at the May 28 meeting, Leibforth told Metz

and Larson that her husband “was thinking of retiring,”

that they had put their home up for sale, and that she

“would not be retiring until her house sold.”

Metz announced Leibforth’s planned retirement to Tucson

during a June 1998 officers’ meeting. Leibforth did not

attend the meeting, but Metz’s announcement was reflected

in the minutes, which were sent to Leibforth among others.

The following month, the Bank distributed a memorandum

announcing its hiring of Scott Drexler, a 33-year-old male,

as Leibforth’s replacement. At the same time, Leibforth’s

title was changed from Branch Manager/Assistant Vice

President to Assistant Branch Manager/Assistant Vice

President. Leibforth claims that it was not until she read

this memorandum that she became aware of the Bank’s

belief that she was planning to retire. 

On August 25, 1998, Metz and Larson asked Leibforth to

specify a date for her anticipated retirement. Metz told

Leibforth that she would otherwise be terminated on

December 31, 1998, because the Bank did not want to

continue paying two Branch Manager salaries for an

indefinite period of time. In response Leibforth sent Metz a

letter stating, “[a]t this time . . . I will not be setting a

retirement date but will give you one month’s notice when
No. 02-3190 3

my home is sold of my last day of work.” The Bank, however, true to its word, terminated Leibforth’s employment

on December 31, and two months later hired Rose Sollinger,

a 40-year-old female, to serve as its new Assistant Branch

Manager. Leibforth, meanwhile, ended up selling her house

in May 1999, and the next month she and her husband

moved to Tucson.

Leibforth then filed this suit under Title VII and the

ADEA, alleging that the Bank “terminated Plaintiff’s

employment, and demoted and/or failed to promote the

Plaintiff and/or forced the Plaintiff to retire” because of her

age and sex, and engaged in a pattern and practice of age

and sex discrimination by forcing females “nearing retirement age” to retire. Later in the proceedings, Leibforth

raised two additional claims—that the Bank retaliated

against her and that it discriminated against her by giving

her less pay than her replacement, Drexler. The district

court granted summary judgment for the Bank on all these

claims. It found that Leibforth (1) failed to present direct

evidence of discrimination; (2) failed to establish a prima

facie case of discriminatory demotion; (3) established a

prima facie case of discriminatory discharge but failed to

show that the Bank’s proffered nondiscriminatory reason

was pretextual; (4) presented no admissible evidence

showing a pattern or practice of discrimination; (5) failed

to rebut the Bank’s nondiscriminatory reason regarding

unequal pay; and (6) failed to present any evidence that the

Bank’s actions were retaliatory. Leibforth filed a timely

notice of appeal. 

II. DISCUSSION

Though Leibforth raised numerous claims below, we

conclude that she has waived all but two of them—those

regarding discriminatory demotion and discriminatory discharge—for lack of development in her appeal brief. United
4 No. 02-3190

1 Though Leibforth now contests this factual point, she did not

dispute it in response to the Bank’s Statement of Material Facts

under Local Rule 56.1(a). Nonetheless, at oral argument Leibforth

maintained that the fact should not be deemed admitted because

she made some sort of “general” denial of the allegations contained in the Bank’s 56.1(a) Statement. We disagree with her

position. The Local Rules require that a party opposing summary

judgment file “a concise response to the movant’s statement that

shall contain . . . a response to each numbered paragraph in the

(continued...)

States v. Hook, 195 F.3d 299, 310 (7th Cir. 1999). As for

the two remaining claims, the Bank maintains that we

can affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment

on any number of grounds. For instance it argues that

Leibforth’s claim of discriminatory termination is barred

because she failed to raise it in her administrative charge

before the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, see

Noreuil v. Peabody Coal Co., 96 F.3d 254, 258 (7th Cir.

1996), and that Leibforth failed to establish a prima facie

case of discriminatory demotion because her alleged “demotion” was not a materially adverse employment action, see

generally Williams v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 85 F.3d 270,

274 (7th Cir. 1996). We need not address these issues since

we can dispose of both claims with dispatch on the ground

that Leibforth failed to establish pretext. The Bank alleged

that it hired Drexler (and at the same time “demoted”

Leibforth) because it thought that Leibforth’s retirement

was imminent. Though Leibforth now asserts that she

never had any intention of retiring, the relevant question

for purposes of our pretext analysis is whether the Bank

honestly believed that she did, and Leibforth presented no

evidence showing that that was not the case. In fact it is

undisputed that Metz told Leibforth during the May 28

meeting that he intended to hire a replacement for her

position due to her plan to leave the Bank once her house

sold.1

 The Bank may have been wrong in its belief that
No. 02-3190 5

1 (...continued)

moving party’s statement, including, in the case of any disagreement, specific references to the affidavits, parts of the record, and

other supporting materials relied upon.” Northern District of

Illinois, Local Rule 56.1(b). Generalized denials do not suffice

under this Rule. 

2 Leibforth in fact stated in her administrative charge that “[o]n

May 28th, 1998, I met with James Metz . . . who informed me of

his plans to hire someone for my position of Assistant Vice

President, Branch Manager, due to my plan to leave Respondent

when my house sold.”

Leibforth was going to retire (though the evidence overwhelmingly shows that it was not),2

 but to establish pretext

Leibforth had to prove that the Bank’s proffered reason was

a lie, Peters v. Renaissance Hotel Operating Co., 307 F.3d

535, 545 (7th Cir. 2002), which she failed to do.

Leibforth’s claim of discriminatory discharge fails for

similar reasons. The Bank alleged that it terminated

Leibforth’s employment because it did not want to continue

paying her indefinitely while she tried to sell her home.

Leibforth counters that the Bank’s hiring of Rose Sollinger

proved this proffered reason to be pretextual, but we

disagree. First of all, Leibforth’s only evidence fails to

establish whether Sollinger was hired into the exact same

position that Leibforth had held, nor does it give any

indication whether Sollinger was receiving the same pay.

Further, Leibforth’s argument fails to address the real

point—that the Bank did not want to keep her on for an

indefinite period of time, knowing that she would immediately leave upon the sale of her house. 

Finally, Leibforth’s claim that she has direct evidence of

discrimination is frivolous. She points to a statement by the

Bank that the position eventually filled by Drexler was not

offered to any female applicants and to a statement from
6 No. 02-3190

Larson that “it was in the Bank’s best interest to set

Leibforth’s retirement date because she refused to do so.”

These statements do not approach being admissions that

the Bank’s actions were based on a prohibited animus,

Radue v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 219 F.3d 612, 616 (7th Cir.

2000), and so cannot be characterized as direct evidence of

discrimination. 

III. CONCLUSION

The district court’s grant of summary judgment for the

Bank is AFFIRMED.

A true Copy:

Teste: 

 ________________________________

Clerk of the United States Court of

Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 

USCA-02-C-0072—7-25-03