United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Testimony 

Before the Committee on Finance, 

U.S. Senate

BORDER SECURITY

Continued Weaknesses in 

Screening Entrants into the 

United States 

Statement of Gregory D. Kutz, Managing Director 

Forensic Audits and Special Investigations 

For Release on Delivery

Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT 

Wednesday, August 2, 2006

 

GAO-06-976T 
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: 

Thank you for the opportunity to be here today to discuss our 

investigation of the effectiveness of U.S. Customs and Border Protection 

(CBP) in screening entrants into the United States at land border 

crossings. Currently, U.S. citizens are not required to present a passport 

when entering the United States from countries in the Western 

Hemisphere.1

 However, U.S. citizens are required to establish citizenship 

to a CBP officer’s satisfaction.2

 On its Web site, CBP advises U.S. citizens 

that an officer may ask for identification documents as proof of 

citizenship, including birth certificates or baptismal records and a photo 

identification document.3

In 2003, we testified that CBP officers were not readily capable of 

identifying whether individuals seeking entry into the United States were 

using counterfeit identification to prove citizenship. Specifically, our 

agents were able to easily enter the United States from Canada and Mexico 

using fictitious names and counterfeit driver’s licenses and birth 

certificates.4

 Later in 2003 and 2004, we continued to be able to 

successfully enter the United States using counterfeit identification at land

border crossings, but were denied entry on one occasion. 

Specifically, agents entered the United States using counterfeit driver’s 

licenses at two land crossings in Washington, one in New York, one in 

California, and one in Texas. One agent was also able to enter the United 

States through both the California and Texas border crossings using an 

expired, altered U.S diplomatic passport. At no time did CBP officers 

question the authenticity of any of these agents’ identification.

Furthermore, at one of the Washington crossings, agents were able to walk 

across the border without passing through any security checkpoints and 

without presenting identification. However, at the New York crossing, one 

agent was not allowed entry into the United States after presenting as 

identification an expired, altered U.S. tourist passport and a counterfeit 

 1

 22 C.F.R. § 53.2(b). 

2

 8 C.F.R. § 235.1(b). 

3

 See http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/travel/vacation/documentary_requirements.xml.

4

 We also testified in 2003 that agents successfully entered Florida from Jamaica via air. 

GAO, Weaknesses in Screening Entrants into the United States, GAO-03-438T 

(Washington, D.C.: Jan. 30, 2003). 

Page 1 GAO-06-976T 
driver’s license. CBP officers detained this agent for further screening until 

he identified himself as a GAO employee conducting undercover tests. 5

Because of your concerns that these weaknesses could possibly be 

exploited by terrorists or others involved in criminal activity, you 

requested that we assess the current status of security at the nation’s 

borders. Specifically, you requested that we conduct a follow-up 

investigation to determine whether the vulnerabilities exposed in our prior 

work continue to exist. 

To perform our 2006 follow-up investigation, we created a fictitious 

driver’s license and birth certificate with the same name that we used in

the tests conducted for the work we did in 2003. We also created another 

fictitious license and birth certificate. To create all these documents, we 

used commercial software that is available to the public. As agreed with 

your offices, we chose to test a nonrepresentative selection of nine land

crossings at both the northern and southern borders, including one in 

California, one in Texas, two in Arizona, one in Michigan, two in New 

York, one in Idaho, and one in Washington. We conducted our work from

February 2006 through June 2006 in accordance with the President’s 

Council on Integrity and Efficiency Quality Standards for Investigations. 

Agents successfully entered the United States using fictitious driver’s 

licenses and other bogus documentation through nine land ports of entry 

on the northern and southern borders. CBP officers never questioned the

authenticity of the counterfeit documents presented at any of the nine 

crossings. On three occasions—in California, Texas, and Arizona—agents

crossed the border on foot. At two of these locations—Texas and 

Arizona—CBP allowed the agents entry into the United States without 

asking for or inspecting any identification documents. 

Summary 

After completing our investigation, we briefed officials from CBP on June 

9, 2006. CBP agreed that its officers are not able to identify all forms of 

counterfeit identification presented at land border crossings and fully 

supports a new initiative that will require all travelers to present a 

 5

 As part of this investigation, agents also attempted to enter the Unites States via air. 

Agents successfully entered the United States from the Bahamas using counterfeit driver’s

licenses and birth certificates. However, agents were not successful when attempting to 

enter the United States from Jamaica; CBP officers detained four agents in Florida until 

they identified themselves as GAO employees conducting tests. 

Page 2 GAO-06-976T 
passport before entering the United States. We did not assess whether this 

initiative would be effective in preventing terrorists from entering the 

United States or whether it would fully address the vulnerabilites shown 

by our work. 

The following information provides details about our agents’ experiences 

and observations entering the United States from Mexico at border 

crossings in California and Texas and at two crossings in Arizona. 

Southern Border 

Crossings 

California: On February 9, 2006, two agents entered California from 

Mexico on foot. One of the agents presented as identification a counterfeit

West Virginia driver’s license and the other presented a counterfeit 

Virginia driver’s license. The CBP officers on duty asked both agents if 

they were U.S. citizens and both responded that they were. The officers 

also asked the agents if they were bringing anything into the United States

from Mexico and both answered that they were not. The CBP officers did 

not request any other documents to prove citizenship, and allowed both 

agents to enter the United States. 

Texas: On February 23, 2006, two agents crossed the border from Mexico 

into Texas on foot. When the first agent arrived at the checkpoint, a CBP 

officer asked him for his citizenship information; the agent responded that 

he was from the United States. The officer also asked if the agent had 

brought back anything from Mexico. The agent responded that he had not,

and the officer told him that he could enter the Unites States. At this point, 

the agent asked the CBP officer if he wished to see any identification. The 

officer replied “OK, that would be good.” The agent began to remove his 

counterfeit Virginia driver’s license from his wallet and the inspector said 

“That’s fine, you can go.” The CBP officer never looked at the driver’s 

license. 

When the second agent reached the checkpoint, another CBP officer asked 

him for his citizenship information and he responded that he was from the 

United States. The CBP officer asked the agent if he had purchased 

anything in Mexico and the agent replied that he had not. He was then 

asked to show some form of identification and he produced a counterfeit

West Virginia driver’s license. The CBP inspector briefly looked at the

driver’s license and then told the agent he could enter the United States. 

Arizona, first crossing: On March 14, 2006, two agents arrived at the

border crossing between Mexico and Arizona in a rental vehicle. Upon 

request, the agents gave the CBP officer a counterfeit West Virginia 

Page 3 GAO-06-976T 
driver’s license and counterfeit Virginia driver’s license as identification. 

As the CBP officer reviewed the licenses, he asked the agents if they were 

U.S. citizens and they responded that they were. The officer also asked if 

the agents had purchased anything in Mexico and they said they had not.

The CBP officer then requested that agents open the trunk of their vehicle. 

The agents heard the inspector tap on several parts of the side of the 

vehicle first with his hand and again with what appeared to be a wand. The 

officer closed the trunk of the vehicle, returned the agents’ driver’s 

licenses, and allowed them to enter the United States. 

Arizona, second crossing: On March 15, 2006, two agents again entered

Arizona from Mexico on foot at a different location than the previous day. 

One of the agents carried a counterfeit West Virginia driver’s license and a 

counterfeit West Virginia birth certificate. The other carried a counterfeit 

Virginia driver’s license and a counterfeit New York birth certificate. As 

the agents were about to cross the border, another agent who had crossed 

the border earlier using his genuine identification phoned to inform them 

that the CBP officer on duty had swiped his Virginia driver’s license 

through a scanner. Because the counterfeit driver’s licenses the agents 

were carrying had fake magnetic strips, the agents decided that in the 

event they were questioned about their licenses, they would tell the CBP 

officers that the strips had become demagnetized.

When the agents entered the checkpoint area, they saw that they were the 

only people crossing the border at that time. The agents observed three 

CBP officers on duty; one was manning the checkpoint and the other two 

were standing a short distance away. The officer manning the checkpoint 

was sitting at a cubicle with a computer and what appeared to be a card 

scanner. The agents engaged this officer in conversation to distract him 

from scanning their driver’s licenses. After a few moments, the CBP officer 

asked the agents if they were both U.S. citizens and they said that they 

were. He then asked if they had purchased anything in Mexico and they

said no. He then told them to have a nice day and allowed them to enter 

the United States. He never asked for any form of identification. 

The following information provides details about our agents’ experiences 

and observations entering the United States from Canada at Michigan,

New York, Idaho, and Washington border crossings. 

Northern Border 

Crossings 

Michigan: On May 1, 2006, two agents drove in a rental vehicle to a border 

crossing in Michigan. When asked for identification by the CBP officer on

duty, the agents presented a counterfeit West Virginia driver’s license and 

Page 4 GAO-06-976T 
a counterfeit Virginia driver’s license. As the CBP officer examined the 

licenses, he asked the agents if they were U.S. citizens and they responded 

that they were. The CBP officer then asked if the agents had birth 

certificates. One agent presented a counterfeit New York birth certificate 

and the other presented a counterfeit West Virginia birth certificate. The 

agents observed that the CBP officer checked the birth certificates against 

the driver’s licenses to see if the dates and names matched. The CBP 

officer then asked the agents if they had purchased anything in Canada 

and they responded that they had not. The officer also asked what the 

agents were doing in Canada and they responded that they had been 

visiting a casino in Canada. The CBP officer then returned the agents’ 

documentation and allowed them to enter the United States.

New York, first crossing: On May 3, 2006, two agents entered New York 

in a rental vehicle from Canada. The agents handed the CBP officer on 

duty counterfeit driver’s licenses from West Virginia and Virginia. The CBP 

officer asked for the agents’ country of citizenship and the agents 

responded that they were from the United States. The CBP officer also 

asked the agents why they had visited Canada. The agents responded that 

they had been gambling in the casinos. The CBP officer told the agents to 

have a nice day and allowed them to enter the United States.

New York, second crossing: On the same date, the same two agents 

crossed back into Canada and re-entered New York at a different location. 

The agents handed the CBP officer at the checkpoint the same two 

counterfeit driver’s licenses from West Virginia and Virginia. The officer 

asked the agents what they were doing in Canada and they replied that

they been gambling at a casino. The officer then asked the agents how 

much money they were bringing back into the country and they told him 

they had approximately $325, combined. The officer next asked the agent

driving the car to step out of the vehicle and open the trunk. As the agent

complied, he noticed that the officer placed the two driver’s licenses on 

the counter in his booth. The officer asked the agent whose car they were 

driving and the agent told him that it was a rental. A second officer then 

asked the agent to stand away from the vehicle and take his hands out of

his pockets. The first officer inspected the trunk of the vehicle, which was 

empty. At this point, the officer handed back the two driver’s licenses and

told the agents to proceed into the United States. 

Idaho: On May 23, 2006, two agents drove in a rental vehicle to a border 

crossing in Idaho. The agents handed the CBP officer on duty a counterfeit

West Virginia driver’s license and a counterfeit Virginia driver’s license. As

the CBP officer examined the licenses, he asked the agents if they were 

Page 5 GAO-06-976T 
U.S. citizens and they responded that they were. The CBP officer then 

asked if the agents had birth certificates. One agent presented a 

counterfeit New York birth certificate and the other presented a 

counterfeit West Virginia birth certificate. The agents observed that the 

CBP officer checked the birth certificates against the driver’s licenses to 

see if the dates and names matched. The officer also asked what the 

agents were doing in Canada and they responded that they had been 

sightseeing. The CBP officer then returned the agents’ documentation and

allowed them to enter the United States. 

Washington: On May 24, 2006, two agents drove in a rental vehicle to a 

border crossing checkpoint in Washington. When the agents arrived at the

border, they noticed that no one was at the checkpoint booth at the side of

the road. Shortly thereafter, a CBP officer emerged from a building near 

the checkpoint booth and asked the agents to state their nationality. The 

agents responded that they were Americans. The CBP officer next asked 

the agents where they were born, and they responded New York and West

Virginia. The agents then handed the CBP officers their counterfeit West 

Virginia and Virginia driver’s licenses. The officer looked at the licenses 

briefly and asked the agents why they had visited Canada. The agents 

responded that they had a day off from a conference that they were 

attending in Washington and decided to do some sightseeing. The CBP 

officer returned the agents’ identification and allowed them to enter the 

United States. 

Corrective Action Briefing 

We conducted a corrective action briefing with officials from CBP on June 

9, 2006, about the results of our investigation. CBP agreed its officers are 

not able to identify all forms of counterfeit identification presented at land

border crossings. CBP officials also stated that they fully support the 

newly promulgated Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative,6

 which will 

require all travelers, including U.S. citizens, within the Western 

Hemisphere to have a passport or other secure identification deemed 

 6

 See Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative, 70 Fed Reg. 52037. 

Page 6 GAO-06-976T 
sufficient by the Secretary of Homeland Security7

 to enter or reenter the 

United States. The current timeline proposes that the new requirements 

will apply to all land border crossings beginning on December 31, 2007.

The proposed timeline was developed pursuant to the Intelligence Reform

and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. The act requires the Secretary of 

Homeland Security, in consultation with the Secretary of State, to 

implement a plan no later than January 1, 2008, to strengthen the border 

screening process through the use of passports and other secure 

documentation in recognition of the fact that additional safeguards are 

needed to ensure that terrorists cannot enter the United States.8

 However, 

the Senate recently passed a bill to extend the implementation deadline 

from January 1, 2008, to June 1, 2009. Additionally, the Senate bill would 

also authorize the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of 

Homeland Security, to develop a travel document known as a Passport 

Card to facilitate travel of U.S. citizens to Canada, Mexico, the countries 

located in the Caribbean, and Bermuda.9

 We did not assess whether this 

initiative would be fully implemented by either the January 2008 or June 

2009 deadline or whether it would be effective in preventing terrorists 

from entering the United States. 

The results of our current work indicate that (1) CBP officers at the nine

land border crossings tested did not detect the counterfeit identification 

we used and (2) people who enter the United States via land crossings are 

not always asked to present identification. Furthermore, our periodic tests 

since 2002 clearly show that CBP officers are unable to effectively identify

counterfeit driver’s licenses, birth certificates, and other documents. This 

vulnerability potentially allows terrorists or others involved in criminal 

activity to pass freely into the United States from Canada or Mexico with 

Conclusion 

 7

 Although a passport will be the preferred form of identification for entry into the United 

States, the Department of State and CBP anticipate that other acceptable forms of

identification will be the Border Crossing Card (BCC or laser visa), the Customs and 

Border Protection Secure Electronic Network for Travelers Rapid Inspection (SENTRI), 

NEXUS, and Free and Secure Trade (FAST) program cards. BCC cards have a photo and 

machine-readable biometric information; SENTRI cards are used for the automated 

commuter lanes at the United States/Mexico border crossings; NEXUS cards are issued to 

low-risk travelers for travel between Canada and the United States; and FAST cards are

used by low-risk truck drivers, carriers, and importers at the United States/Canada border 

crossings.

8

 Pub. L. No. 108-458, § 7209, 118 Stat. 3638, 3823 (2004). 

9

 Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2006, S. 2611, 109th Cong. §135. 

Page 7 GAO-06-976T 
little or no chance of being detected. It will be critical that the new 

initiative requiring travelers within the Western Hemisphere to present 

passports or other accepted documents to enter the United States address 

the vulnerabilities shown by our work. 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, this concludes my 

statement. I would be pleased to answer any questions that you may have

at this time. 

For further information about this testimony, please contact Gregory D. 

Kutz at (202) 512-7455 or kutzg@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of 

Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page 

of this testimony. 

Page 8 GAO-06-976T 

Contact 

(192198) 
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further 

permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or 

other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to 

reproduce this material separately. 
GAO’s Mission The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation and 

investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting its 

constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance and 

accountability of the federal government for the American people. GAO 

examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and policies; 

and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance to help

Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions. GAO’s 

commitment to good government is reflected in its core values of 

accountability, integrity, and reliability. 

The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no cost

is through GAO’s Web site (www.gao.gov). Each weekday, GAO posts 

newly released reports, testimony, and correspondence on its Web site. To

have GAO e-mail you a list of newly posted products every afternoon, go 

to www.gao.gov and select “Subscribe to Updates.” 

The first copy of each printed report is free. Additional copies are $2 each. 

A check or money order should be made out to the Superintendent of 

Documents. GAO also accepts VISA and Mastercard. Orders for 100 or 

more copies mailed to a single address are discounted 25 percent. Orders 

should be sent to: 

U.S. Government Accountability Office 

441 G Street NW, Room LM 

Washington, D.C. 20548 

To order by Phone: Voice: (202) 512-6000 

TDD: (202) 512-2537 

Fax: (202) 512-6061 

Contact: 

Web site: www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm

E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov

Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470 

Gloria Jarmon, Managing Director, JarmonG@gao.gov (202) 512-4400 

U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7125 

Washington, D.C. 20548 

Paul Anderson, Managing Director, AndersonP1@gao.gov (202) 512-4800

U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7149 

Washington, D.C. 20548 

Obtaining Copies of 

GAO Reports and 

Testimony

Order by Mail or Phone 

To Report Fraud,

Waste, and Abuse in 

Federal Programs 

Congressional 

Relations 

Public Affairs 

PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER