July 2000 DEFENSE 

ACQUISITIONS

Comprehensive 

Strategy Needed to 

Improve Ship Cruise 

Missile Defense

GAO/NSIAD-00-149

Page 1 GAO/NSIAD-00-149 Defense Acquisitions

Letter 3

Appendixes Appendix I: Planned Self-Defense Capabilities for Amphibious

Transport Dock Ships 26

Appendix II: Current and Planned Ship Self-Defense Equipment 27

Appendix III: Completed, Ongoing, and Planned Improvements in 

Self-Defense Capability by Ship Class 41

Appendix IV: Comments From the Department of Defense 51

Tables Table 1: Anti-ship Cruise Missile Threats 5

Table 2: Planned Equipment Additions or Improvements, as of

June 2000 11

Table 3: Existing Cruise Missile Defense Capability by Ship Class, 

as of October 1998 13

Table 4: Projected Cruise Missile Defense Capability as of Program 

Objective Memorandum 2000, as of October 1998 13

Table 5: Availability Rates of Selected Ship Self-Defense Equipment 16

Figures Figure 1: U.S.S. Stark, 1987 6

Figure 2: Navy Layered Defense Concept 8

Figure 3: Total Ship Self-Defense Funding 20

Figure 4: Ship Self-Defense Research, Development, Test, and

Evaluation Funding 21
Page 2 GAO/NSIAD-00-149 Defense Acquisitions

Abbreviations

ACDS Advanced Combat Direction System

AIEWS Advanced Integrated Electronic Warfare System

AOE fast combat support ship

CC&D Common Command and Decision 

CEC Cooperative Engagement Capability

DOD Department of Defense

ESSM Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile

GMFCS Guided Missile Fire Control System

GMLS Guided Missile Launching System

HAS helicopter/aircraft/surface craft

IRST Infrared Search and Track

LHA Landing Helicopter Assault Ship

LPD Amphibious Transport Dock Ship

LSD Dock-Landing Ship

MFR Multi-function Radar

MPU Medium Pulse Repetition Upgrade

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NSSMS NATO Sea Sparrow Surface Missile System

NULKA Offboard Active Decoy

RAIDS Rapid Anti 

ship Cruise Missile Integrated Defense System

RAM Rolling Airframe Missile

RNSSMS Rearchitectured NATO Sea Sparrow Surface Missile System

SM Standard Missile

SSDS Ship Self Defense System

TISS Thermal Imaging Sensor System

VSR Volume Search Radar
Page 3 GAO/NSIAD-00-149 Defense Acquisitions

United States General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-283202 Letr

July 11, 2000

The Honorable Curt Weldon

Chairman

The Honorable Owen B. Pickett

Ranking Minority Member

Subcommittee on Military

 Research and Development

Committee on Armed Services

House of Representatives

Since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. Navy has shifted its focus from 

preparing for warfare on the open ocean to developing operational 

concepts and capabilities for conducting combat operations in the coastal 

waters of the world. However, the proliferation of increasingly 

sophisticated anti-ship cruise missiles threatens the ability of Navy ships to 

operate and survive close to hostile shores. In response to this threat, the 

Chief of Naval Operations directed a comprehensive review of ship selfdefense requirements. Completed in fiscal year 1996, this study formally 

identified the capabilities needed by each ship class1

 to defend against 

cruise missile threats in the near, mid-, and far term.2 Since then, the Navy 

has spent $3.8 billion to improve its ship self-defense capabilities against 

cruise missile attacks, and it plans to spend another $5.1 billion over the 

next 6 years.

This report responds to your request that we (1) assess the Navy’s progress 

since 1996 in improving the self-defense capability of surface ships against 

cruise missiles and (2) evaluate Navy plans for meeting future anti-cruise 

missile self-defense requirements. Appendix I contains the specific 

information you requested on the planned defensive suite for the San 

Antonio class of amphibious ships now in development.

1

The ship classes for which self-defense performance requirements were established include 

aircraft carriers (CV and CVN); Aegis cruisers and destroyers (CG-47 and DDG-51 classes); 

Spruance destroyers (DD-963 class); frigates (FFG); amphibious ships (LHA, LHD, LPD-17, 

and LSD 41/49); and fast combat support ships (AOE).

2

The Navy study defined the near term as 1998-2005, the mid-term as 2006-2011, and the far 

term as 2012 and beyond.
Page 4 GAO/NSIAD-00-149 Defense Acquisitions

Results in Brief Although the Navy has made some progress in improving surface ship selfdefense capabilities, most ships continue to have only limited capabilities 

against cruise missile threats. A Navy assessment of current surface ship 

self-defense capabilities conducted in 1998 concluded that only the 

12 Whidbey Island and Harpers Ferry class amphibious ships have or will 

be equipped with defensive systems that can provide measurable 

improvement against near- and mid-term cruise missile threats. The 

assessment projected that none of the improvements the Navy plans to 

make in the future would provide any ship class a high level of self-defense 

capability against far-term threats. In projecting ship self-defense capability 

improvement, the assessment assumed, among other things, that all 

planned improvements would be developed and fielded as scheduled. We 

believe that the Navy assessment overstates the actual and projected 

capabilities of surface ships to protect themselves from cruise missiles 

because the models used in the assessment to determine capabilities 

include a number of optimistic assumptions that may not reflect the reality 

of normal fleet operations. Among these assumptions are perfect weather, 

uninterrupted equipment availability, and perfect crew and equipment 

performance at all times. Further, inadequate funding, maintenance, and 

repair parts support continue to limit the availability of existing selfdefense equipment.

Plans for meeting ship self-defense requirements are not promising 

because the Navy still does not have a comprehensive and consistent 

strategy for improving its capabilities. Previous plans have not included all 

affected ship classes, have not always established priorities among ship 

classes, have not consistently used a baseline from which to measure 

progress, and have not provided timelines for achieving the desired 

improvements. Although Navy leaders express concern about the 

vulnerability of surface ships, that concern may not be reflected in the 

budget for ship self-defense programs. From fiscal years 1997 to 2005, 

spending is relatively flat (fluctuating between $719 million and $1 billion) 

and associated research and development funding is projected to decline 

from about $517 million to about $218 million.

This report contains a recommendation to the Secretary of Defense to 

direct the Secretary of the Navy to develop a comprehensive strategy for 

self-defense improvements for surface ships that clearly articulates 

priorities, establishes baselines, provides timelines, and defines resource 

requirements for achieving needed improvements. The Department has 

agreed with the recommendation and plans to request that the Navy 
Page 5 GAO/NSIAD-00-149 Defense Acquisitions

develop a comprehensive strategy within 30 days after the release of the 

our report.

Background The threat to surface ships from sophisticated anti-ship cruise missiles is 

increasing. Nearly 70 nations have deployed sea- and land-launched cruise 

missiles, and 20 nations have air-launched cruise missiles. There are over 

100 existing and projected missile varieties (including subsonic3

 and 

supersonic,4

 high and low altitude, and sea-skimming models) with ranges 

up to about 185 miles. Table 1 shows some of the current and projected 

missile threats.

Table 1: Anti-ship Cruise Missile Threats

Source: Defense Intelligence Agency and Office of Naval Intelligence.

3

Subsonic is less than the speed of sound (i.e. around 742 miles per hour).

4

Supersonic is greater than the speed of sound.

Missile type

Producing 

country

Approximate

range in

miles Speed

Existing and near-term threats (1999-2005) 

C801 China 25 Subsonic

C802 China 65 Subsonic

Enhanced 

Harpoon

Israel 75 Subsonic

Exocet France 45 Subsonic

Moskit Russia 

China

55−75 Supersonic

Uran Russia 80 Subsonic

Yakhont Russia 185 Supersonic 

Novator Alpha Russia 125 Subsonic missile with supersonic 

terminal phase

Projected mid- and far-term threats (2006 and beyond)

C701 China 10 Subsonic

Teseo 3 Italy 185 Subsonic
Page 6 GAO/NSIAD-00-149 Defense Acquisitions

Current anti-ship cruise missiles are faster, stealthier, and can fly at lower 

altitudes than the missiles that hit the U.S.S. Stark in 1987, killing 37 sailors 

(see fig. 1). The next generation of anti-ship cruise missiles—most of which 

are now expected to be fielded by 2007—will be equipped with advanced 

target seekers and stealthy design. These features will make them even 

more difficult to detect and defeat.

Figure 1: U.S.S. Stark, 1987

Source: Department of Defense.

Defeating modern cruise missiles involves three distinct phases: detection, 

control, and engagement. In the detection phase, sensors aboard ships and 

aircraft attempt to detect and track incoming cruise missiles. In the control 
Page 7 GAO/NSIAD-00-149 Defense Acquisitions

phase, ships’ computers and software identify and evaluate approaching 

threat missiles. In the engagement phase, threat missiles are further 

evaluated, prioritized, and assigned to an appropriate weapon system for 

destruction. Decoys or electronic countermeasures may be employed first, 

with missiles and guns fired against the threat missiles when they come 

within range.

For operations involving a large number of ships, such as a carrier battle 

group, the Navy intends to use a layered defense to defeat hostile cruise 

missiles, as illustrated in figure 2 below. In high-threat situations, where 

multiple, simultaneously launched missile threats are expected, fighter 

aircraft, cruisers, and destroyers are responsible for providing the 

outermost defenses. The Navy assumes that these assets will be able to 

significantly reduce the number of missiles directed against a battle group, 

but it recognizes that some missiles could be fired and get through the 

outer defenses. Therefore, individual ships must have an autonomous 

capability to defend themselves. In peacetime presence or interdiction 

operations, individual ships are often required to operate independently, 

without the protection of the layered defenses provided by a battle group. 

Consequently, they must be able to rely on their own self-defense 

capabilities.
Page 8 GAO/NSIAD-00-149 Defense Acquisitions

Figure 2: Navy Layered Defense Concept

Source: U.S. Navy.
Page 9 GAO/NSIAD-00-149 Defense Acquisitions

In 1995, the Chief of Naval Operations directed a comprehensive review of 

ship self-defense requirements. In conducting this analysis, the Navy 

defined requirements for three basic operational situations—contested, 

uncertain, and controlled5

—that its surface ships may encounter in the 

post-Cold War era. The review also assessed the expected threat levels and 

the degree to which layered defense assets contributed to an individual 

ship’s self-defense capabilities. The review defined the level of defenses 

needed by individual ship classes in the three operational environments 

using the Probability of Raid Annihilation (PRA) model.6

 The Chief of Naval 

Operations approved the identified levels of needed capability and the 

Navy formalized them in the Self-Defense Capstone Requirements 

document in February 1996. Since then, the Navy has been attempting to 

develop and field defensive systems that would enable each ship class to 

achieve the required level of self-protection.

Existing and Projected 

Defense Capabilities 

Are Limited

The Navy has made modest improvements to its surface ship self-defense 

capabilities since 1996. Its 1998 assessment of self-defense capabilities 

shows only limited measurable improvement toward defeating the far-term 

threat (2012 and beyond). Even if all of its planned additional 

improvements can be realized, the Navy projected that four ship classes 

will have moderate capability in defeating the far-term threat. We believe 

that the Navy projections are overstated because (1) the assessment is 

based on Navy assumptions that are optimistic and (2) the Office of Naval 

Intelligence now projects that the next generation of anti-ship cruise 

missile threats will become operational much sooner than the Navy 

projected at the time of the assessment. Moreover, existing capabilities 

have been reduced by funding, maintenance, and spare parts problems that 

are reducing the availability of a number of important self-defense systems.

5

The Navy defined a contested environment as one in which the degree of violence 

approaches that of a global war or a major regional conflict, requiring the commitment of a 

large number of ships that would be placed at risk; an uncertain environment as one 

involving lesser regional and low intensity conflict in which fewer surface combatants, but a 

larger number of amphibious ships, would be placed at risk; and a controlled environment 

as one in which a mix of individual ships would conduct presence operations during 

peacetime, at a low level of risk.

6

The PRA model is a method for assessing the defensive capability of each ship class against 

specific threats. The PRA value is an expression of the degree of probability that no antiship cruise missiles in a particular raid will hit a targeted ship. For example, a ship class that 

can generate a PRA of 0.9 has a 90-percent probability of defeating cruise missiles directed 

against it. 
Page 10 GAO/NSIAD-00-149 Defense Acquisitions

Some Improvements Have 

Been Made

The Navy has spent $3.8 billion on ship self-defense efforts since 1996, 

largely focusing on research and procurement activities related to anticruise missile systems such as the Rolling Airframe Missile, the Phalanx 

Close-in Weapon System, the Rearchitectured North Atlantic Treaty 

Organization (NATO) Sea Sparrow Surface Missile, the Cooperative 

Engagement Capability system, the Ship Self Defense System, electronic 

countermeasure systems, and radar improvements. However, from 1996 

through 1998, only one amphibious ship class—the Whidbey Island and 

Harpers Ferry class of dock landing ships—received equipment that 

provides measurable improvement against near- and mid-term cruise 

missiles. This class accounts for only 12 of 150 surface ships having cruise 

missile self-defense requirements. These 12 ships have received, or are 

scheduled to receive, an improved version of the SPS-49 radar, the Ship Self 

Defense control system, the Rolling Airframe Missile system, and the 

Phalanx Block 1A. The Navy estimates that these improvements, when 

completed, will more than double the assessed capability of these ships to 

defeat near- and mid-term threats. However, they will provide only low 

capability against far-term threats.

Though not reflected in measurable improved self-defense capabilities, the 

Navy has also installed improved self-defense equipment on some of its 

other surface ships. For example, it installed (1) the Rolling Airframe 

Missile on landing helicopter assault and dock ships and on Spruance class 

destroyers; (2) upgraded versions of the Phalanx Close-in Weapon System 

on frigates, Aegis7

 destroyers, and landing helicopter dock and dock 

landing ships; and (3) radar upgrades on carriers, frigates, dock landing 

ships, and landing helicopter dock ships. A list and description of the 

Navy’s current and planned ship self-defense equipment for surface ships 

are in appendix II.

Additional Improvements 

Are Planned

The key to defeating future cruise missile threats is in gaining additional 

reaction time for defending ships to detect, divert, or engage them. As 

future missiles will be much faster and have more range, Navy surface 

ships must be able to detect them sooner. Once the hostile missiles are 

detected, a ship’s combat system must be able to rapidly process 

7

Aegis combat system is an integrated shipboard weapon system that combines computers, 

radar, and missiles to provide a defense umbrella for surface ships. The system is capable of 

automatically detecting, tracking, and destroying airborne, seaborne, and land-launched 

weapons.
Page 11 GAO/NSIAD-00-149 Defense Acquisitions

information about them and generate recommendations to counter them. 

Finally, the ship’s weapon systems must be able to engage threat missiles 

quickly and accurately and to overcome the incoming missiles’ 

countermeasures.

The Navy plans to spend about $5.1 billion over the next 6 years to upgrade 

the detection, control, and engagement components of the self-defense 

capability of selected ship classes. These plans are summarized in table 2. 

In responding to the Department of Defense (DOD) technical comments, 

we have revised table 2 to reflect the Navy’s current plans to improve the 

defensive systems of these ship classes. The revised table 2 reflects Navy 

plans as of June 2000. The original table 2 reflected Navy’s planned 

improvements as of October 1998. Table 4 contains the projected capability 

associated with the Navy’s planned improvements as of October 1998. The 

Navy did not provide us with revised projected capability values to 

associate with its June 2000 plans.

Table 2: Planned Equipment Additions or Improvements, as of June 2000

Source: Navy planning documents and DOD technical comment updates.

Ship class Detection Control Engagement

Aircraft carriers Horizon search radar Ship Self Defense System 

and Cooperative 

 Engagement Capability

Upgraded Rolling Airframe Missile, Rearchitectured 

NATO Sea Sparrow Surface Missile, Evolved Sea 

Sparrow Missile

Landing helicopter 

assault ships

MK 23 TAS Upgrade No plans Upgraded Rolling Airframe Missile (not funded)

Landing helicopter 

dock ships 

Horizon search radar Advanced Combat Direction 

System and Ship Self 

Defense System

Upgraded Rolling Airframe Missile, Rearchitectured 

NATO Sea Sparrow Surface Missile

Amphibious 

transport dock ships

 Horizon search radar Ship Self Defense System Upgraded Rolling Airframe Missile and NULKA 

Dock landing ships No plans Ship Self Defense System Upgraded Rolling Airframe Missile and NULKA 

Spruance class 

destroyers

MK 23 TAS upgrade No plans Upgraded Rolling Airframe Missile and NULKA 

Aegis destroyers Enhanced Aegis phased 

array radar 

Enhanced Aegis Combat 

System

Upgraded Standard Missile, Evolved Sea Sparrow 

Missile, NULKA, and electronic warfare system

Aegis cruisers Enhanced Aegis phased 

array and horizon search 

radars 

Enhanced Aegis Combat 

System

Upgraded Rolling Airframe Missile, Evolved Sea 

Sparrow Missile, NULKA, and electronic warfare system

Frigates No plans No plans Phalanx Block 1B (12 CORT ships only)

Fast combat 

support ships

No plans No plans No plans
Page 12 GAO/NSIAD-00-149 Defense Acquisitions

Planned research and development funding is largely concentrated on 

developing Cooperative Engagement Capability integration, a 

multifunction radar, and a new electronic warfare system. Planned 

procurement funding is concentrated on the Cooperative Engagement 

Capability, Ship Self-Defense System MK I, Rolling Airframe Missile, 

NULKA, Rearchitectured NATO Sea Sparrow Surface Missile, and Evolved 

Sea Sparrow Missile systems.

The Navy expects these improvements to increase the self-defense 

capability of most surface ship classes against near- and mid-term threats. 

However, when it modeled the projected improvements, the Navy 

concluded that none of the 10 ship classes would gain a high capability to 

defeat far-term threats.

Current Surface Ship SelfDefense Capabilities

In October 1998, the Navy assessed both the current and projected selfdefense capability of the affected nine ship classes, as part of its budget 

planning for fiscal year 2000. The assessment of current capability 

concluded that only Landing Helicopter Dock and cruiser class ships would 

have a moderate to high capability against the near-term threats and no 

class would have an equivalent capability against the mid- or far-term 

threats (see table 3). Aegis cruisers and destroyers can be assigned an area 

air-defense role and are equipped with the most advanced combat system 

in the world, yet the Aegis destroyers were assessed at having a moderate 

capability against the near-term threats and a low to moderate capability 

against the mid-term threats. The ship classes least able to counter nearterm threats are aircraft carriers, support ships, and frigates. The risk that 

these ship classes can be successfully attacked by hostile cruise missiles 

remains high.
Page 13 GAO/NSIAD-00-149 Defense Acquisitions

Table 3: Existing Cruise Missile Defense Capability by Ship Class, as of October 1998

Source: GAO analysis of October 1998 Navy assessment.

The assessment of projected capability, summarized in table 4, showed that 

four classes of Navy surface ships are expected to receive improvements 

that would provide a moderate defensive capability against the far-term 

threat missiles and no ship class would have a high capability against this 

threat.

Table 4: Projected Cruise Missile Defense Capability as of Program Objective Memorandum 2000, as of October 1998

Source: GAO analysis of October 1998 Navy assessment.

Level of Capability by Threat Time Period

Ship class

Near-term threat 

(1998-2005)

Mid-term threat 

(2006-2011)

Far-term threat

(2012 and beyond)

Nuclear carriers Low Low Low

Landing helicopter assault ships Low to moderate Low Low

Landing helicopter dock ships Moderate to high Low Low

Dock landing ships Moderate Low Low

Spruance class destroyers Moderate Low Low

Aegis destroyers Moderate Low to moderate Low

Aegis cruisers Moderate to high Moderate Low

Fast combat support ships Low Low Low

Frigates Low Low Low

Level of Capability by Threat Time Period

Ship class

Near-term threat 

(1998-2005)

Mid-term threat 

(2006-2011)

Far-term threat

(2012 and beyond)

Nuclear carriers Moderate to high Moderate to high Low to moderate

Landing helicopter assault ships Low to moderate Low Low

Landing helicopter dock ships High High Moderate

Amphibious transport dock ships High High Moderate

Dock landing ships High Moderate to high Low

Spruance class destroyers Moderate to high Moderate N/A

Aegis destroyers High High Moderate

Aegis cruisers High High Moderate

Fast combat support ships Low Low N/A

Frigates Low Low N/A
Page 14 GAO/NSIAD-00-149 Defense Acquisitions

The projected capability improvements shown in table 4 are Navy 

estimates as of October 1998. They are based on an assumption that all the 

ships in each class will have been fitted with all of the planned self-defense 

equipment in time to deal with emerging threats. However, some threat 

missiles that were projected to become operational in the far-term are 

emerging more rapidly than previously forecast. 

The frigate and fast combat support ship classes have the least self-defense 

capability. The Navy plans to upgrade the self-defense capability of the 

12 CORT Oliver Hazard Perry class frigates by installing the Phalanx 

Block 1B. However, the Navy is not planning to upgrade the defense 

capability of fast combat support class ships because it has been 

considering the possibility of transferring these ships to the Military Sealift 

Command since at least 1997. 

Ship Self-Defense 

Capabilities Based on 

Optimistic Assumptions

Optimistic assumptions used by the Navy in its assessment models have led 

it to overstate existing and projected ship self-defense capabilities. The 

models used in the assessment to determine capabilities include a number 

of optimistic assumptions that may not reflect the reality of normal fleet 

operations. Among these assumptions are perfect weather, uninterrupted 

equipment availability, and perfect crew and equipment performance at all 

times. In commenting on our report, the Navy added that the optimistic 

assumptions have repeatedly resulted in understated requirements for 

multispectral detection capability in littoral regions and the need for 

infrared sensors to provide anti-ship cruise missile detection when radar 

performance is degraded by natural or man-made conditions. Further, the 

models assumed that all the ships of an assessed class have the planned 

improvements already installed. We collected information on the 

equipment actually installed on each ship in the affected classes as of 

September 30, 1999. This information showed that not all of the 12 ships in 

the two Dock landing ship classes had received the equipment on which the 

Navy’s assessment is based. For example, only 7 of the 12 ships had 

received the improved Ship Self-Defense System MK-1 system. Further, the 

Navy’s assessment of the self-defense capability of Spruance class 

destroyers is based on the inclusion of the Rolling Airframe Missile (RAM) 

Block 0 in the equipment suite. However, we found that only 6 of the 24 

ships in this class had actually received this missile system.
Page 15 GAO/NSIAD-00-149 Defense Acquisitions

Inadequate Funding, 

Maintenance, and Parts 

Support Reduce Equipment 

Availability

Some of the existing ship self-defense systems have not met the Navy’s own 

standards for availability because the Navy has not adequately funded 

needed overhaul, spare parts, and technological upgrades. For example, 

while the fleet availability standard for equipment is 80 percent, the 

availability rate for some versions of the SLQ-32 electronic warfare system 

has been as low as 35 percent. According to Navy officials, the low 

availability rate resulted because the Navy funded the development of a 

replacement system instead of funding needed spare parts and available 

upgrades.

According to the Navy’s Material Readiness Database for fiscal years 1997 

through 1999, the SLQ-32 electronic warfare system, NATO Sea Sparrow 

Surface Missile System (NSSMS), Phalanx Close-in Weapon System, and 

the SPS-48E radar system were among the ship self-defense systems with 

the lowest availability rates. Table 5 presents data on the average 

availability of these systems and impediments to their availability.
Page 16 GAO/NSIAD-00-149 Defense Acquisitions

Table 5: Availability Rates of Selected Ship Self-Defense Equipment

a

Rates reported in the 1999 CINCPACFLT/CINCLANTFLT Combat Systems Troubled Systems 

Process Report before remedial action was taken. The Navy’s measure of effectiveness for Equipment 

Operational Capability (availability) is classified in the following manner: Operable = Greater than 0.8; 

Minor problems = 0.7 - 0.8; Limited capability = 0.5 - 0.6; Major problems = 0.3 - 0.4; Inoperative = 0 - 

0.2.

Source: Navy Material Readiness Database.

Atlantic and Pacific Fleet commanders and maintenance officials we 

interviewed said that the Navy is not placing adequate emphasis and 

funding priority on the maintenance of existing systems because it would 

rather focus on developing new systems. However, the present systems will 

remain in the fleet for a number of years before replacement systems are 

fielded. For example, the Navy will continue to have versions of the SLQ-32 

on some of its ships for at least another 10-20 years. However, the 

30-year-old technology of the SLQ-32 cannot be upgraded or modified to 

provide the full capability needed by the fleet to deal with the modern 

missile threat. A similar situation exists with the NSSMS. The NSSMS on 

Equipment type and version Availability ratea Impediments to availability

FY 97 FY 98 FY 99

SLQ-32 Electronic Warfare System

 V2 0.72 0.70 0.69 High cost of parts, lack of funding for parts and 

upgrades, parts failure, lack of technician experience, 

and training.

 V3 0.76 0.55 0.45

 V5 0.41 0.53 0.35

NSSMS

 Mark 57 Bl 1R/mods2/3 0.79 0.84 0.78 Failure and high cost of components, excessive parts 

usage, nonavailability of parts onboard, excessive 

operational tempo, and maintenance requirements.

Phalanx Close-in Weapon System

 Block 0 0.71 0.82 0.68 Lack of funds for timely overhaul, hydraulic problems, 

limited parts commonality, excessive parts usage, lack 

of onboard spare parts, lack of onboard repair and 

preventive maintenance, crew inexperience, and 

inadequate manning for maintenance.

 Block 1 Bl0 0.80 0.78 0.81

 Block 1 Bl1/2/1A 0.72 0.77 0.73

SPS-48E Radar System

0.73 0.81 0.77 Inadequate training of shipboard technicians, lack of 

technical schematics, and no parts support for submodules.
Page 17 GAO/NSIAD-00-149 Defense Acquisitions

nuclear carriers and landing helicopter dock ships are slated for upgrade to 

a very high availability, local area network integrated configuration, the 

Rearchitectured NATO Sea Sparrow Surface Missile System. This program 

has been extended beyond the initial requirement time frame, resulting in 

continued low availability rates for the NSSMS remaining on ships in the 

fleet for another 7-10 years.

Since 1996, the Navy increased annual ship self-defense related operations 

and maintenance funding from about $75 million to about $112 million in 

fiscal year 2000. Moreover, almost $128 million is projected for fiscal 

year 2005. Officials responsible for maintenance and overhaul said that 

additional resources would be needed to improve availability of systems. 

However, according to these officials, even if the Navy provided additional 

resources, improvement would take many years because ships are 

frequently not available for installation of upgrades due to operational 

commitments. In commenting on our report, the Navy also noted the 

importance of recognizing the impact on funding from extended 

maintenance of both legacy and upgraded systems due to protracted 

procurement and installation plans.

Self-Defense Efforts 

Lack Comprehensive 

Plans and Face 

Declining Budgets

The Navy lacks a comprehensive strategy for acquiring and installing selfdefense systems on its surface ships. Plans for developing and fielding 

improved self-defense equipment are incomplete and inconsistent, do not 

measure progress against a baseline, and do not provide clear timelines for 

the achievement of needed capabilities. Navy leaders express concern 

about the vulnerability of surface ships and say they are placing a priority 

on improving surface ship self-defense capabilities, but they have not 

directed any significant funding increases to these efforts. Research and 

development spending related to ship self-defense has declined about 

9.4 percent over the last 5 years and is projected to decline more than 

44 percent over the next 6 years. This trend may limit Navy efforts to 

develop technological solutions needed to defeat projected future threats.

Navy Lacks Comprehensive 

Strategy

The Navy lacks a comprehensive strategy for improving its surface ship 

self-defense capabilities. Plans presented in the reports it has prepared 

since 1996 are incomplete because they (1) do not cover all affected ship 

classes, (2) do not consistently contain stated priorities, (3) do not 

consistently reference a baseline from which to measure progress, and 

(4) do not address time frames for achieving required capabilities. Instead, 

these reports largely detail the status of individual systems.
Page 18 GAO/NSIAD-00-149 Defense Acquisitions

For the period 1996-99, we examined a series of congressionally mandated 

Navy reports on ship self-defense plans, objectives, schedules, and funding 

requirements8

 as well as several internal Navy documents dealing with 

investment alternatives. We found that the Navy’s plans did not cover all 

affected ship classes and lacked consistent improvement priorities. For 

example, the ship classes covered by these reports varied from one year to 

another and excluded coverage of ship self-defense for Aegis destroyers 

and cruisers in all but its most recent investment briefing. Our analysis also 

showed that the Navy did not consistently articulate its priorities for 

improving self-defense capabilities among the affected ship classes. The 

Navy’s 1997 report to Congress described improving carriers and some 

amphibious ship classes (landing helicopter dock ships, and dock landing 

ships) as a priority, but it offered no rationale for selecting these classes. 

Subsequent reports focused on these same ship classes and added the 

planned amphibious transport dock ship class, but they did not prioritize 

improvements for the remaining six ship classes. 

We also found that established baselines for measuring progress on ship 

self-defense have not been used on a consistent basis. Navy reports to 

Congress in 1996 and 1997 contained ship class baselines9

 that spelled out 

the planned self-defense equipment configuration by the various ship 

classes. Later reports and briefings made no mention of progress toward 

meeting these baselines. Instead, the reports and briefings measured 

current equipment configurations against short-term program goals rather 

than baselines. Further evidence of the use of fluctuating short-term 

program goals arose when we reviewed the Navy’s installation plans for the 

horizon search radar (the SPQ-9B) as depicted in its budget justification 

documents for fiscal years 1997-2001. These documents reflected three 

changes in 5 years as to which ship classes and how many ships within 

each class would received this radar. In addition, installation plans for this 

system had been continually stretched out. While some degree of change in 

program plans and budgets is to be expected over time, Navy ship selfdefense program plans seem to be in a fluid state from one year to the next. 

8

House Committee on Armed Services report on the National Defense Authorization Act for 

Fiscal Year 1995 (H.R. Rep.103-499 at 106-107) required the Navy to submit annual updates 

up through fiscal year 1999 on program objectives, plans, schedules, and funding 

requirements for anti-air warfare programs.

9

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996 Conference report (H.R. Rep. 

104-450 at 668) required the Navy to include an assessment of progress in establishing and 

meeting baselines in the above mentioned annual updates.
Page 19 GAO/NSIAD-00-149 Defense Acquisitions

Using a succession of short-term goals as the reference point for measuring 

progress instead of using a stable baseline makes it difficult to determine 

how much progress the Navy is making toward meeting the Self-Defense 

Capstone Requirements.

Finally, only the 1997 report to Congress provided a timeline for achieving 

the self-defense requirements by ship class. This timeline is neither 

repeated nor expanded upon in subsequent reports or investment briefings. 

Without a timeline by ship class, it is not possible to know if the Navy will 

be able to achieve planned improvements in time to defeat evolving cruise 

missile threats.

Ship Self-Defense Funding Although the Navy says it places a high priority on improving ship selfdefense, it has not dedicated any significant funding increases to these 

efforts. From fiscal years 1997 to 2005, projected annual spending for ship 

self-defense programs will fluctuate between $719 million and $1 billion 

(see fig. 3), and research and development funding is projected to decline 

from about $517 million to about $218 million (see fig. 4). If the decline in 

ship self-defense related research and development resources continues, 

the Navy may not be able to develop the technological solutions it needs to 

defeat projected threats. Navy officials acknowledged that technologies 

that are required to defeat far-term cruise missile threats have yet to be 

developed. In commenting on our report, DOD noted that a comprehensive 

strategy that communicates priorities and defines required resources 

would serve as a useful tool for better aligning available resources.
Page 20 GAO/NSIAD-00-149 Defense Acquisitions

Figure 3: Total Ship Self-Defense Funding

Note: Funding does not include costs of ship construction.

Source: Fiscal year 1999 and 2000 President’s budgets.
Page 21 GAO/NSIAD-00-149 Defense Acquisitions

Figure 4: Ship Self-Defense Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation Funding

Note: Includes science and technology funding for ship self-defense related projects identified by the 

Office of Naval Research staff.

Source: Fiscal year 1999 and 2000 President’s budgets.

Conclusion Unless the Navy can improve the self-defense capabilities of its surface 

ships, these ships will be increasingly vulnerable to cruise missile threats 

when they operate in coastal waters. The Navy lacks a comprehensive 

strategy for improving their self-defense capabilities, making it difficult to 

measure progress and to predict future capabilities. Program planning 

documents and reports prepared by the Navy since 1996 have not covered 

all affected ship classes, consistently addressed stated priorities, 

consistently employed baselines to measure progress, or addressed time 

frames for achieving required capabilities. Instead, they have only provided 

a status of individual systems. A comprehensive approach would articulate 

the Navy’s ship self-defense improvement plans for the various systems and 

their application to all the affected ship classes in terms of baselines, with 

associated funding and timelines for meeting the required capability levels. 
Page 22 GAO/NSIAD-00-149 Defense Acquisitions

In its 1996 report to Congress, the Navy recognized the importance of 

stability and a long-term view. “A fundamental requirement for the success 

of these current and future initiatives, however, is adequate and stable 

funding and long-term commitment for the future.” Without such a 

comprehensive approach, the Navy’s effectiveness in improving ship selfdefense capability may suffer because (1) needed improvements may not 

be properly defined and prioritized, (2) needed resources to develop and 

sustain improved capabilities may not be properly identified and applied, 

and (3) the achievement of required improvement will continue to be 

difficult to measure.

Recommendation To provide a complete framework the Navy can use to identify and 

prioritize needed improvements to ship self-defense capabilities and to 

provide a baseline to measure and track its progress toward achieving 

these goals, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the 

Secretary of the Navy to develop a comprehensive strategy that clearly 

articulates priorities, establishes baselines, provides timelines, and defines 

resource requirements for achieving required capabilities.

Agency Comments In written comments on this report, DOD agreed with our recommendation 

that the Navy needs to develop a comprehensive strategy for improving 

ship self-defense capabilities, and it stated that it would request the 

Secretary of the Navy to prepare such a plan. DOD indicated that it would 

also request the Secretary of the Navy to re-evaluate whether assumptions 

used in performance assessment models reflect the reality of fleet 

operations. The Navy has formed a new modeling and simulation test group 

with the charter of introducing variables to make the performance 

assessments more realistic.

We incorporated in this report a number of technical comments provided 

by DOD. Table 2 originally reflected Navy plans as of 1998. We revised this 

table to include current Navy plans for improving the ship self-defense 

capabilities of various ship classes. As the Navy did not provide us with 

revised projected capability values for its current plans, we were not able 

to reflect the impact of these plans in table 4. 

DOD’s written comments are reprinted in appendix IV.
Page 23 GAO/NSIAD-00-149 Defense Acquisitions

Scope and 

Methodology

To determine requirements, plans, and cost of self-defense improvement 

efforts for the Navy’s surface ship, we interviewed officials and obtained 

documentation from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary 

of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations, the Office of Naval Research, 

and the Commanders in Chief of the U.S. Atlantic and Pacific Fleets. As 

part of our discussions, we asked officials of the Offices of the Chief of 

Naval Operations and Naval Research to identify ship self-defense related 

programs. We received briefings on and reviewed Navy self-defense 

planning and investment strategy documents. We then determined the 

Navy’s funding projections applicable to those programs over the fiscal 

year 1995 to 2005 period as contained in the fiscal year 1997 through 2000 

President’s budgets. We excluded the Navy’s Standard Missile program 

from our funding analysis, because we were unable to determine which 

parts are chargeable to ship self-defense functions. 

To gain an understanding of how the Navy conducted its assessments of 

ship self-defense capabilities, we reviewed modeling and simulation data 

prepared by officials from Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren 

Division, and discussed the data with officials of the Johns Hopkins 

University. We also received cruise missile threat briefings from officials 

from the Office of Naval Intelligence, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and 

the Central Intelligence Agency.

To assess the Navy’s current ship self-defense capabilities, we visited the 

U.S.S. Comstock, U.S.S. Fitzgerald, U.S.S. Hue City, U.S.S. George

Washington, U.S.S. Harpers Ferry, U.S.S. Kaufmann, U.S.S. San Jacinto, and 

U.S.S. Wasp. We examined their self-defense systems and interviewed 

crewmembers responsible for operating and maintaining them.

To assess the availability of the Navy’s existing self-defense systems, we 

interviewed commanders, crewmembers, and other officials, and obtained 

historical information from the Naval Warfare Assessment Station, Corona, 

California. We reviewed equipment installation data maintained in a Navy 

database and verified our analysis with Navy officials.

To assess the Navy’s plans and progress in developing improved 

capabilities, we interviewed officials from the Deputy Assistant Secretary 

of the Navy for Theater Combat Systems, the Program Executive Offices 

for Theater Surface Warfare and Expeditionary Warfare, and the Naval Sea 

Systems Command and its surface warfare centers at Dahlgren, Virginia; 

Crane, Indiana; and Port Hueneme, California. In addition, we visited a 
Page 24 GAO/NSIAD-00-149 Defense Acquisitions

detachment of the Port Hueneme facility located in Louisville, Kentucky. 

We also obtained information on selected programs from officials from the 

Naval Air Systems Command.

We conducted our review from July 1999 through May 2000 in accordance 

with generally accepted government auditing standards.

We are sending copies of this report to the Honorable William S. Cohen, 

Secretary of Defense; the Honorable Richard Danzig, Secretary of the Navy; 

General James L. Jones, Commandant of the Marine Corps; the Honorable 

Jacob J. Lew, Director, Office of Management and Budget; and other 

interested congressional committees. Copies will be made available to 

others upon request. 

Please contact me at (202) 512-4841 or Mr. Richard Price at (202) 512-3630 

if you or your staff have any questions concerning this report. Key 

contributors to this report were Anton Blieberger, Martha Dey, and

John Heere.

James F. Wiggins

Associate Director

Defense Acquisitions Issues
Page 25 GAO/NSIAD-00-149 Defense Acquisitions
Page 26 GAO/NSIAD-00-149 Defense Acquisitions

This appendix contains the information you requested on the status of 

planned ship self-defense capabilities of the next generation of amphibious 

transport dock ships (the LPD-17 class) currently in development. The 

Navy plans to procure 12 of these ships between fiscal years 2003 and 2009 

to replace a larger number of existing amphibious transport ships that are 

nearing the end of their useful life. The LPD-17 program is currently in the 

engineering and manufacturing development phase.

In June 1996, the Navy received Milestone II approval for the baseline 

design of the LPD-17 ship class. The design included a self-defense suite 

consisting of a SPS-48E radar, a SPQ-9B radar, a SLQ-32(V2) electronic 

warfare system or its successor, a Ship Self Defense System MK-2, a 

Cooperative Engagement Capability node for sensor fusion, two Rolling 

Airframe Missile launchers, an Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile (ESSM) 

vertical launcher and associated target illuminators, and a decoy launcher. 

At that time, the Navy realized that the ESSM program schedule would not 

mesh with the production schedule of the first two ships in the class and 

decided to reserve space and weight in the ship design for the missile 

system and launcher. However, the Navy still planned to build the 

remaining 10 ships in the class with the ESSM and its launcher.

During internal deliberations on the Navy’s fiscal year 1999 budget, the 

Navy decided to remove projected funding for the ESSM and its launcher 

from the LPD-17 budget in order to fund the cruiser conversion program 

and other shipbuilding and conversion efforts. However, the Navy directed 

Avondale Industries to reserve space and weight for the ESSM in the design 

of all 12 LPD-17 class ships.

In 1998, various congressional committees directed the Navy to prepare an 

analysis of alternatives to the LPD-17 baseline design, including an 

evaluation of the AN/SPY-1 radar and its associated Aegis combat system, 

multifunction radar, and the ESSM. The March 1999 results of the Navy 

analysis confirmed that the baseline design without the ESSM could meet 

the near- and mid-term threat at the least cost. As a result of this 

assessment, the Navy does not plan to equip the LPD-17 class ships with 

the ESSM. However, if the threat materializes as currently predicted, the 

Navy could later add improved variants of the ESSM and the Rolling 

Airframe Missile as weapon modifications on these ships. These improved 

variants are yet to be developed. In addition, if the threat warrants it, the 

Navy could also back-fit multifunction and volume search radar on the 

LPD-17, when they become available.
Page 27 GAO/NSIAD-00-149 Defense Acquisitions

Detection Elements AN/SPS-48 Air Search Radar: The AN/SPS-48 is a medium-range, threedimensional (height, range, and bearing) air search radar whose primary 

function is to provide target position data to a weapon system and a ship 

command and control system. It provides for detection of targets as high as 

100,000 feet and over a distance of 2 to 200 miles. At the present time, only 

the AN/SPS-48E version can be found in the fleet. Specifically, the 

48E version is installed in the following ship classes: CV/CVN, LHA, and 

LHD. Also, the Navy plans to install the 48E version in the LPD-17 ship 

class. 

AN/SPS-49 Air Search Radar: The AN/SPS-49 radar is a long-range, twodimensional (range, bearing) air search radar whose primary function is to 

provide target position data to a ship command and control system. It 

provides for detection of targets as high as 100,000 feet and over a distance 

of 2 to 300 miles. The current version, AN/SPS-49V, is installed in the 

following ship classes: CV/CVN,CG-47, FFG-7, LSD 41/49, and LHD. 

AN/SPS-49 Medium Pulse Repetition Frequency Upgrade (MPU): The MPU 

incorporates key ship defense enhancements to the Navy’s AN/SPS-49 air 

search radar. Specifically, it provides for increased detection of lowobservable targets, reduces reaction time through internal firm track 

criteria changes, and enhances performance against electronic 

countermeasures and naturally occurring clutter. The AN/SPS-49 MPU is or 

is planned to be installed on the following ship classes: CV/CVN, FFG-7, 

LSD 41/49, and LHD. 

AN/SPQ-9A Low-Search Radar: The AN/SPQ-9A radar provides for 

detection of surface targets. It is currently installed on CG 47 class cruisers 

and DD 963 class destroyers. The AN/SPQ-9A radar interfaces with the 

MK-86 Gun Fire Control System on DD-963 class ships. 

AN/SPQ-9B Upgrade Horizon Search Radar: The AN/SPQ-9B represents a 

product improvement to the AN/SPQ-9A radar that will enhance its ability 

to detect and track high-speed, low-radar cross section sea-skimming 

targets in high-clutter coastal environments. The AN/SPQ-9B uses a high 

resolution, track-while-scan, pulse-Doppler radar to provide rapid 

acquisition and automatic tracking of multiple targets. The AN/SPQ-9B is to 

be interfaced with either the MK-86 Gun Fire Control System, the Ship Self 

Defense System, or the Aegis Combat Direction System. 
Page 28 GAO/NSIAD-00-149 Defense Acquisitions

In October 1994, the Navy awarded an engineering and manufacturing 

development contract for two AN/SPQ-9B prototypes—one to be used as a 

contractor test set and one to support land-based testing at Port Hueneme, 

California. Following land-based tests, the Navy exercised three options to 

produce six low-rate initial production units to meet ship delivery 

schedules and to support developmental and operational testing aboard the 

U.S.S. Oldendorf (DD 972). Although early development tests were 

successful, a change in program policy called for the AN/SPQ-9B radar to 

be installed on ship classes that could not carry the weight of the 

development (heavyweight) antenna. As a result, the Navy developed a 

prototype lightweight antenna assembly. The prototype is currently being 

maintained by the contractor for use as a test set. A modification to the 

existing contract enabled the Navy to procure two lightweight antenna 

radar sets, as well as three lightweight antenna backfit sets. 

During November 1999 shipboard developmental testing with a 

heavyweight antenna, the Navy encountered an unexpected interference 

problem with the AN/SLQ-32 electronic warfare system. According to Navy 

officials, the problem is of an electromagnetic nature and would have 

occurred even if a lightweight antenna had been used. The problem is 

currently being investigated and will likely delay the system’s operational 

evaluation. According to Navy officials, the delay of the operational 

evaluation will not impact the planned procurement contract for three SCN 

radar sets in fiscal year 2000. 

The Navy plans to install the lightweight AN/SPQ-9B radar on LPD 17, CVN, 

and LHD ship classes and on selected CG ships through fiscal year 2007. 

AN/SLQ-32 Electronic Warfare System: The AN/SLQ-32 is a family of 

electronic warfare systems comprising five modular variants with varying 

levels of capability. The SLQ-32A(V)1 provides for early warning, 

identification, and direction-finding of incoming radar-guided anti-ship 

cruise missiles. The A(V)2 variant provides early warning, increased 

frequency range, identification, and direction-finding of missile targeting 

radars, and the A(V)3 variant adds a jamming capability. The A(V)4 is a 

modified (V)3 variant specifically for aircraft carrier installation. The 

(V)5 variant is a modified (V)2 for FFG-7 class ships, which adds jamming 

capability. One or more versions of the AN/SLQ-32 electronic warfare 

system are installed in each ship class discussed in this report. 

Advanced Integrated Electronic Warfare System (AIEWS): AIEWS is 

currently under development as the next generation shipboard electronic 
Page 29 GAO/NSIAD-00-149 Defense Acquisitions

warfare system. Increment I of the two-increment program is to include an 

advanced display, improved emitter processing, enhanced combat system 

integration, and a new receiver package. Increment II is to include an 

advanced electronic attack subsystem and advanced off-board 

countermeasures. AIEWS is being designed for employment of layered 

countermeasures in the coastal operating environment, with specific 

emphasis on the full integration of all soft kill elements into the ship’s 

control system. 

Infrared Search and Track (IRST): Currently in development, IRST is a 

shipboard, lightweight, passive infrared sensor that scans the horizon to 

automatically detect and declare both subsonic and supersonic threat 

missiles that fly at low altitudes. In April 1999, the IRST prototype 

successfully detected and tracked Exocet missiles while installed on the 

U.S.S. O’Bannon (DD 987). In August 1999, the IRST contractor 

successfully linked the only existing IRST prototype scanner to two 

separate computer interfaces—CEC baseline 1 and Aegis. In June 1999, the 

Navy exercised a contract option to upgrade the prototype’s signal 

processing and control unit to provide for enhanced reliability and 

incorporate other minor improvements into the only prototype unit. The 

upgraded unit is to be delivered on May 21, 2002. Though Navy officials 

would like to have acquired additional IRST prototype units for further risk 

reduction efforts and to participate in a joint U.S./foreign navy exercise in 

fiscal year 2001, there are no funds in the Future Years Defense Program to 

do so. 

Thermal Imaging Sensor System (TISS): TISS, a stand-alone shipboard 

sensor used primarily for situational awareness, was designed to detect 

floating mines, small surface craft, and low flying aircraft. It consists of a 

thermal imaging (infrared) sensor, two television cameras, and a laser 

range finder. Though not developed to detect incoming cruise missiles, 

TISS has a limited ship self-defense application. Specifically, its sensors can 

be used to monitor land-based cruise missile launching sites in places such 

as the Straits of Hormutz and the Persian Gulf, if a line of sight to the 

launch site is available. 

In October 1995, the Navy awarded an engineering and manufacturing 

development contract for a single engineering test unit. The test unit was 

successfully tested aboard the Self Defense Test Ship in May 1996. In April 

1997, the Navy awarded a production contract for 24 units. In April 1999, 

during development of the Navy’s fiscal year 2000 budget submission, the 

Navy reprogrammed nearly all outyear TISS procurement funding 
Page 30 GAO/NSIAD-00-149 Defense Acquisitions

($50.2 million) to higher priority programs. As of March 2000, the Navy had 

installed 6 of 11 delivered production units on selected frigates and 

amphibious class ships most likely to be deployed to the Persian Gulf. Due 

to quality control problems at sub-vendor facilities, delivery of the 

remaining 13 production units has been delayed until October 2000. 

AN/SPY-1A, 1B, and 1D Radars: The SPY radar is the multi-function, 

phased-array radar that conducts search, automatic detection, and tracking 

of air and surface targets aboard Aegis cruisers and destroyers. The 

SPY-1A, installed on CG-47 through CG-58, uses a digital signal processor 

and a four-bay AN/UYK-7 control computer. The SPY-1B radar, installed in 

CG-59 through CG-73 cruisers, also uses a digital signal processor and 

either a four-bay AN/UYK-7 or upgraded AN/UYK-43 control computer. The 

SPY-1D, installed on DDG-51 through DDG-78, is a variant of the SPY-1B 

radar. The SPY-1D provides better performance against targets than the 

earlier SPY versions. 

Multi-function Radar (MFR): In June 1999, the Navy awarded a contract to 

develop an MFR prototype. The Navy expects the radar to perform such 

functions as horizon search, limited above-the-horizon search, and fire 

control track and illumination. One of the most significant design features 

of the radar is to provide automatic detection, tracking, and illumination of 

low-altitude threat missiles in adverse environmental conditions routinely 

found in coastal waters. Based on current program plans, the initial MFR 

prototype will be available in fiscal year 2002 to support land-based and 

sea-based testing. 

The Navy intends for the MFR to replace legacy radars currently found on 

CVN 68 class carriers including the SPS-67, Mk 23 TAS with Mk 95 

illuminator or SPQ-9B, and the SPN-41/46 radars, which provide glide slope 

for approach control on aircraft carriers. Current Navy plans call for 

inclusion of the MFR on CVN 77, which is expected to enter service in 

December 2007, and the DD 21 ship class. Other installation candidates are 

LHD 8, CVN 70−76 (as a backfit), and CVN(X) and LH(X) future ship 

classes. 

Additionally, the Navy will review the LPD 17 combat system in 2001 to 

determine if changes in configuration are warranted. The costs and 

benefits of including the MFR/VSR suite in the LPD 17 combat system suite 

will be considered in this review. 
Page 31 GAO/NSIAD-00-149 Defense Acquisitions

Volume Search Radar (VSR): According to requirements for the DD 21 ship 

class, the Navy intends to have an integrated radar suite that will comprise 

both the multi-function radar and VSR. The Navy expects the VSR to 

perform long-range detection and tracking of airborne traffic above-thehorizon and high flying cruise missile threats as well as to provide cueing 

data to the multifunction radar. During deliberation of the Navy’s fiscal year 

2000 budget request, Congress provided the Navy with a $12-million plusup to begin VSR development. Based on current program plans, the initial 

VSR prototype will be available during fiscal year 2002 to coincide with 

MFR development testing. 

Both DD 21 Industry Teams will develop a VSR capability in the context of 

the design competition for that ship class. It is the Navy’s intent that the 

MFR/VSR radar suite will be the radar suite for the CVN 77, and will replace 

the SPS-48E, SPS-49, and SPN-43 (air traffic control) radars currently on 

CVN-68 class ships. VSR is also a candidate for installation in LHD 8, 

CVN 70−76 (as a backfit), CVN(X), and LH(X). 

Additionally, the Navy will review the LPD 17 combat system in 2001 to 

determine if changes in configuration are warranted. The costs and 

benefits of including the MFR/VSR suite in the LPD 17 combat system suite 

will be considered in this review. 

Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC): The objective of the CEC 

program is to develop a means of integrating all of the radar detection 

sensors of a battle force’s ships and aircraft and for transmitting the 

resulting common composite radar track data directly into the combat 

systems of the ships on the CEC network. Currently, no two ships within a 

battle force can currently “see” the same radar picture. Consequently, the 

engagement capability of each ship is limited, in part, by the quality of the 

data its own radar sensors are able to provide to its combat system. If the 

CEC network can be made to work as envisioned, individual ships would 

be able see and use composite radar tracks developed by all of the ships of 

a battle force and some aircraft in a single-integrated-air picture. The 

composite track data could be frequently updated and fed directly into the 

combat system of each ship of the battle force. This composite track data 

would be of “fire-control” quality, and would allow all of the battle force’s 

ships to engage targets without any additional processing or human 

intervention. 

The Navy fielded the first CEC system in 1998. The Department of Defense 

supported the Navy’s fiscal year 2001 budget submission to procure a total 
Page 32 GAO/NSIAD-00-149 Defense Acquisitions

of 220 CEC systems by the end of fiscal year 2012. Seventy-nine of these 

systems are to be integrated with the Aegis combat systems of cruisers and 

destroyers. The remaining CEC systems will be placed on other ships and 

aircraft, but will not necessarily be integrated with their combat systems. In 

response to congressional direction, efforts are also underway to fully 

integrate CEC into some Navy E-2C aircraft, an Air Force E-3 aircraft, and 

the Army Patriot Air Defense Guided Missile System.

Because of a lack of progress in integrating CEC on Aegis ships, in the 

Fiscal Year 1999 Defense Authorization Conference Report 105-736, 

Congress directed the Navy to report at least quarterly to the Congressional 

Defense Committees on Cooperative Engagement Capability/combat 

direction system interoperability problems and planned solutions. The 

Navy has provided six such reports through March 2000.

The Navy has made some progress toward demonstrating a CEC capability 

on two Aegis cruisers in the spring of fiscal year 2001. Many of the 

problems standing in the way of Aegis and CEC interoperability have been 

identified and are being fixed. However, a single-integrated-air-picture 

display capability on a single console is not expected to be available until 

the Aegis weapons system baseline 6 Phase 3 computer programs become 

available, after the scheduled follow-on test and evaluation in fiscal year 

2002.

Control Elements Aegis Combat System: The Aegis combat system was designed as a total 

weapon system, from detection to kill. The heart of the system is the 

advanced, automatic detect and track, multi-function phased-array radar, 

the AN/SPY-1. It can detect and track hundreds of targets at ranges in the 

hundreds of miles. The core of the Aegis combat system is its computerbased command and decision element. This interface makes the Aegis 

combat system capable of simultaneous operation against a multi-mission 

threat, anti-air, anti-surface, and anti-submarine. The Aegis combat system 

is or will be installed on all CG-47 cruisers and all DDG-51 destroyers.

Rapid Anti-Ship Cruise Missile Integrated Defense System (RAIDS): RAIDS 

is a tactical decision aid for a ship’s Commanding Officer/Tactical Action 

Officer providing automatic display of anti-ship cruise missile threats, 

depicting active and passive sensor display and showing status of existing 

ship engagement systems. A multiple microprocessor-based system, RAIDS 

considers threat capabilities, environmental data, ship-unique 

characteristics, and approved tactical doctrine in determining appropriate 
Page 33 GAO/NSIAD-00-149 Defense Acquisitions

recommendations. RAIDS was developed as an interim system in the 

approved incremental acquisition of the SSDS MK I system. RAIDS is 

installed on 12 Oliver Hazard Perry class frigates and 24 Spruance class 

destroyers. 

Advanced Combat Direction System (ACDS): ACDS is a centralized, 

automated command and control system for aircraft carriers and 

amphibious warfare ships that communicates engagement and other orders 

to combat system components and units throughout a battle group. The 

program has been divided into Block 0, an initial system, and Block 1, the 

follow-on system. Currently, ACDS Block 0 is installed on nine aircraft 

carriers and eight amphibious ships. 

ACDS Block I focused on developing a new advanced tactical computer 

program with significant improvements in tactical data link 

interoperability, automated engagement doctrine, increased range and 

track capacity, and other improvements. In February 1998, the Commander, 

Operational Test and Evaluation Force, determined that ACDS Block I was 

not operationally suitable or effective for deployment. As a result, the Navy 

decided to (1) make minimal enhancements to the ACDS Block 1 software 

and (2) limit installation to five ships (three aircraft carriers and two 

amphibious ships). The functionality of the ACDS Block I command and 

control system will be integrated into the Navy’s Ship Self Defense System 

MK II development effort. 

Ship Self Defense System (SSDS) MK I: SSDS MK I consists of a computer 

network, special software, microprocessors, and operator displays and 

workstations. The SSDS MK I is designed to integrate both individual 

sensors and weapon systems and automate the tracking, assessment, 

prioritization, and engagement of threat anti-ship cruise missiles to 

enhance ship survivability. 

The SSDS MK I completed development testing in May 1997 and 

operational testing in June 1997 onboard U.S.S. Ashland (LSD 48). During 

operational testing, every one of more than 200 targets presented to the 

ship were detected and tracked by the system. In September 1997, the 

Commander, Operational Test and Evaluation Force, declared the system 

to be operationally effective and suitable, and he recommended fleet 

introduction. As a result, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, 

Development and Acquisition approved the SSDS program for full-rate 

production in March 1998. To date, SSDS MK I installations have been 

completed on five LSD 41 and two LSD 49 class ships. The Navy plans to 
Page 34 GAO/NSIAD-00-149 Defense Acquisitions

complete installation of the SSDS MK I on the remaining LSD 41/49 class 

ships by December 2001. 

SSDS MK II: SSDS MK II is the evolutionary development of the SSDS MK I 

expanded to include the integration of sensors and weapons. SSDS MK II is 

planned for installation on CV/CVN, LHD, and LPD 17 ship classes.

The Navy issued a letter contract for three SSDS MK II hardware sets in 

December 1998 and awarded a software development contract in April 

1999. Developmental testing is currently scheduled to begin in March 2002. 

Common Command and Decision (CC&D) Program: CC&D represents the 

Navy’s future ship self-defense control solution. CC&D is a preplanned 

product improvement to the Aegis weapon system and the Ship Self 

Defense System MK II that would replace the major command and decision 

capability in these systems with a common computer architecture. The 

Navy is funded for an initial delivery around 2010, but has identified fiscal 

years 2006-08 as the optimal delivery time frame. 

Engagement Elements Standard Missile (SM): The SM is a ship-launched, medium- to long-range 

missile system family that provides advanced air defense for an entire fleet 

area. The first generation, SM-1, is essentially a home-all-the-way missile in 

medium- and extended-range versions. Oliver Hazard Perry-class frigates 

use the SM-1 missile both in area defense roles and to defend themselves 

against incoming cruise missiles. 

The latest generation of the SM is the SM-2. The SM-2’s primary role is to 

provide area defense against enemy aircraft and anti-ship cruise missiles. 

The SM-2 capitalizes on communication techniques, advanced signal 

processing and propulsion improvements to substantially increase 

intercept range, high- and low-altitude intercept capability, and 

performance against advanced threats. The SM-2 Block IIIB is the latest 

version to enter the fleet, and incorporates a side-mounted infrared seeker 

for terminal guidance against a known fielded threat. The SM-2 Block IV is 

the latest version to enter production and deployment, and it provides an 

extended-range capability with the addition of a MK 72 booster. Aegis 

cruisers and destroyers use these and other SM-2 versions in area defense 

roles as well as to defend themselves against incoming cruise missiles. 

The SM-2 Block IVA, currently under development, will utilize a sidemounted imaging infrared seeker to detect and track incoming ballistic 
Page 35 GAO/NSIAD-00-149 Defense Acquisitions

missiles and guide to a lethal intercept, while retaining previous SM-2 

Block IV capabilities. In January 1997, a prototype test vehicle successfully 

intercepted a representative Theater Ballistic Missile target. In September 

1997, the Navy awarded an Engineering and Manufacturing Development 

contract to build 46 test vehicles required for developmental and 

operational testing. During fiscal year 1999, however, the program began 

encountering problems that directly impacted the start of the flight-test 

program. The problems included vibration-induced test failures, less than 

anticipated software code reuse, technical challenges associated with 

design and integration of multiple sensors, and various schedule and cost 

impacts related to contractor business consolidation decisions. 

Collectively, the problems resulted in a 6-month delay of the first control 

test vehicle flight and program cost growth of $55 million. According to 

program officials, the problems have been addressed and a fix for the 

vibration anomaly has been incorporated into the missile design. The first 

control test vehicle flight was successfully completed in June 2000. 

NATO Sea Sparrow Surface Missile System (NSSMS): NSSMS is a mediumrange missile weapon system that provides the capability of destroying 

hostile aircraft, anti-ship missiles, and airborne and surface missile 

platforms. Thirteen nations fund the NSSMS program cooperatively and 

utilize the system in various configurations aboard many ships. The 

U.S. NSSMS consists of a MK 91 Guided Missile Fire Control System 

(GMFCS) and a MK 29 Guided Missile Launching System (GMLS). The 

GMFCS is a computer-operated fire control system that provides automatic 

acquisition and tracking of a designated target, generates launcher and 

missile orders, and in the automatic mode initiates the firing command 

when the target becomes engageable. The GMLS is a lightweight launching 

system that provides on-mount stowage and launch capability of up to eight 

missiles. The NSSMS employs RIM-7 surface-to-air/surface-to-surface semiactive homing missiles. The missile utilizes the energy reflected from the 

target and from radio frequencies transmitted from its director system for 

developing missile wing movement orders enabling target intercept. 

NSSMS is currently installed on DD 963, LHD, AOE, and CV/CVN class 

ships. 

Rearchitectured NATO Sea Sparrow Surface Missile System (RNSSMS): In 

July 1995, the Navy awarded a contract to develop the necessary software 

and hardware for a RNSSMS. When fully developed and tested, the 

RNSSMS will replace the legacy NSSMS closed architecture design and 

unique display consoles with an open, distributed processing architecture 

and Navy standard display consoles. Specific features of the new design 
Page 36 GAO/NSIAD-00-149 Defense Acquisitions

include, but are not limited to, cross utilization of launchers and directors, 

reduced manning requirements, and interoperability with SSDS MK II. 

Collectively, these features will improve system operational availability, 

reliability, and mission effectiveness. They will also improve a ship’s ability 

to meet its capstone requirements. 

As of late April 2000, initial RNSSMS production systems were delivered for 

installation aboard LHD 7 and CVN 68. In May 2000, the system’s software 

began LHD class configuration combat system level testing at the Navy’s 

Integrated Combat System Test Facility in Point Loma, California, to be 

completed by October 2000. The current RNSSMS program schedule, 

which includes integration testing with SSDS MK II, provides the first fully 

operational systems on LHD 7 in April 2001 and on CVN 68 in December 

2001. RNSSMS hardware installations in CVN 76 and 69 are planned during 

fiscal years 2000 through 2002. The Navy also plans to install the system on 

the entire LHD ship class, all remaining CVN ships, and one conventional 

carrier (CV 67) between 2003 and 2006. The RNSSMS is intended to help 

pave the way for the next generation of self-defense systems. 

Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile (ESSM): ESSM is an improved version of the 

RIM-7 missile with a new rocket motor, associated tail control section, new 

warhead, and guidance upgrades. A faster missile with an improved 

payload and range, the ESSM will have enhanced capability to destroy next 

generation anti-ship cruise missiles. The ESSM is an international 

cooperative effort being designed to operate with current and future fire 

control systems and with the capability of being fired from three existing 

missile launchers. 

In December 1997, an ESSM blast test vehicle was successfully fired from 

an industry developed prototype that utilized a MK 41 Vertical Launching 

System Quad Pack cannister. In March 1998, a test firing that utilized a 

MK 48 Guided Vertical Launching System was successfully conducted. In 

mid-1998, however, the program began experiencing technical problems. 

The technical problems involved the new digital autopilot software and the 

control actuator assembly in the missile. The autopilot software had to be 

redesigned causing a program delay of about nine months. Concurrently, 

efforts were expended to modify the control actuator assembly. 

Collectively, both problems resulted in a program delay of 13 months and a 

U.S. cost growth of about $22 million. 

In November 1999, the ESSM program conducted a test firing that did not 

achieve all required objectives. Upon investigation, the program office 
Page 37 GAO/NSIAD-00-149 Defense Acquisitions

learned that a control actuator assembly was missing a critical component. 

During the next scheduled test firing in March 2000, the test firing was 

successful, accomplishing all remaining controlled test vehicle objectives 

and initial guided test vehicle objectives. A test firing for the guided test 

vehicle is scheduled for July 2000. The next major milestone is a Program 

Management Review for low rate initial production, scheduled for 

September 2000. 

Rolling Airframe Missile (RAM) Block 0: RAM is a NATO cooperative 

program with Germany. Memorandums of Understanding between the 

United States and Germany have been signed for the development and 

production of the RAM Block 0 as well as for the development of RAM 

Block I. The RAM Block 0 weapon system consists of a 21-round missile 

launcher, below-deck electronics, and a guided missile round pack. The 

round pack consists of a 5-inch, supersonic missile and launching canister, 

which interfaces the missile and the launcher. The Block 0 missile is a dual 

mode, radio frequency/infrared seeking autonomous homing missile that 

initially guides on the threat missile’s radar signature prior to transitioning 

to infrared guidance. In May 1993, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for 

Research, Development, and Acquisition approved RAM Block 0 for 

production. Subsequently, the missile has had successful intercepts in 

127 of 132 production proofing and ship qualification test flights in both the 

U.S. and German navies. 

Since 1993, the RAM Block 0 has been installed on all five LHA ships, eight 

DD 963 ships, six LHD ships, and eight LSD class ships. Navy installation 

plans call for RAM Block 0 installations in one DD 963 class ship and on 

LHD 7 (currently under construction). All other planned RAM installations 

call for the RAM Block I configuration. 

Rolling Airframe Missile Block 1: The Block I upgrade provides the RAM 

missile with an increased capability to intercept cruise missiles by means 

of an infrared only acquisition technique. Based on the results of 

operational testing conducted aboard the U.S.S. Gunston Hall (LSD 44) in 

January 1999 and the Self-Defense Test Ship between March and August 

1999, the Commander, Operational Test and Evaluation Force, declared the 

RAM Block I to be operationally effective against a variety of cruise missile 

threats and recommended fleet introduction. The Block I missile had 

successful intercepts in 23 of 24 development test firings. A full-rate 

production decision occurred in January 2000. 
Page 38 GAO/NSIAD-00-149 Defense Acquisitions

As of March 2000, RAM Block I has been installed on two LSD class ships 

and is pending installation on two LSD 41 class ships, LHD 7, and CVN 76. 

Navy installation plans call for Block I installations or upgrades on 8 LSD 

41/49, 3 DD 963, 12 CV/CVN, 7 LHD, and 12 LPD 17 (new construction) 

ships between 2001 and 2006. Though not yet funded, the Navy also plans 

to install RAM Block I upgrades on all five LHA class ships during fiscal 

year 2007. 

In November 1998, the United States and Germany amended the Block I 

development Memorandum of Understanding to include scope and funding 

for the development of a helicopter/aircraft/surface craft (HAS) upgrade of 

the RAM missile. Requiring only software changes to the RAM Block I 

missile, the HAS upgrade will extend RAM targets to include helicopters, 

aircraft, and surface ships. Navy plans indicate that all RAM installations on 

LSDs, LHDs, LPDs, and CV/CVNs will be the HAS configuration by 2009. 

Also, the Navy is developing an 11-round guided missile launcher in the 

HAS mode configuration for installation on CG 52 through 73 between 2004 

and 2009. 

Phalanx Close-in Weapon System: The Phalanx Close-in Weapon System is 

a high-fire rate system that automatically acquires, tracks, and destroys 

enemy cruise missile threats that have penetrated all other ships’ defenses. 

The original Block 0 configuration incorporated on-mount search and track 

radars, the M61A1 gatling gun capable of firing at a rate of 3,000 rounds per 

minute, and a 980-round magazine. Subsequent Block 1 baseline 0 upgrades 

included a larger magazine (1,500 rounds), a multiple pulse repetition 

frequency search radar, an expanded radar search envelope to counter 

diving targets as well as reliability and maintainability improvements. 

Block 1 baseline 1 replaced the hydraulic gun drive with a pneumatic

(air-driven) gun drive system that increased the rate of fire to 4,500 rounds 

per minute. Search radar sensitivity was also improved in the baseline 1 

upgrade. Block I baseline 2 introduced further reliability upgrades and a 

muzzle restraint to decrease dispersion. Installed on multiple non-Aegis 

and Aegis ships, neither the original Phalanx Block 0 nor the subsequent 

Block 1 baseline 0, 1, or 2 upgrades are integrated with a ship self-defense 

system. 

The Phalanx Block 1A incorporates a high-order language computer and 

provides improved performance against maneuvering targets. Block 1A 

also provides for basic integration with the Ship Self Defense System and 

enables RAM missile engagement through the Phalanx detection and track 

function. As of mid-March 2000, Block 1A installations have been 
Page 39 GAO/NSIAD-00-149 Defense Acquisitions

completed on 20 DDG (Aegis) destroyers, 2 LHD, 2 FFG-7, and 9 LSD 41/49 

class ships. In addition, LHD-7 (currently under construction) will 

commission with Block 1A. A January 1992 Chief of Naval Operations 

decision requires replacement of Phalanx with the new ESSM system in 

new construction DDG ships. Though it initially appeared that DDG-79 

would be the first new construction DDG to receive Evolved Sea Sparrow 

Missile in lieu of Phalanx, it now appears that, due to a slippage in the 

ESSM development program, DDG-85 will be the first. The Navy plans to 

install the Phalanx Block 1 baseline 2 configuration as temporary 

installations on DDG-79 through 84 until ESSM is produced. 

The Phalanx Block 1B upgrade allows engagement of small, high-speed, 

maneuvering surface craft and low, slow aircraft. This upgrade 

incorporates a thermal imager, an automatic acquisition video tracker, and 

a stabilization system for the imager, providing both day and night 

detection of threats. The thermal imager also improves the system’s ability 

to engage anti-ship cruise missiles by providing more accurate angle 

tracking information to the fire control computer. Operational evaluation 

of Block 1B, conducted aboard U.S.S. Underwood (FFG-36) and the SelfDefense Test Ship, was completed in August 1999. According to Phalanx 

Program Office plans, Block 1B will be installed in 11 other FFG-7 CORT 

ships between June 2000 and July 2002.

Decoys: Decoys are an integral component of current ship self-defense 

efforts. Deployed in conjunction with electronic warfare systems and 

passive countermeasures, chaff and infrared distraction decoys are an 

effective adjunct to hard kill weapons. Used to launch both chaff and 

infrared decoys, the MK 36 decoy launching system is the primary decoy 

launcher in the fleet today. The MK 36 decoy launching system is found on 

the following ship classes: LSD 41/49, LHD, LPD 4, LHA, FFG 7, DD 963, 

DDG 47, CG 47, and AOE 1/6. 

The Offboard Active Decoy (NULKA): NULKA is a joint cooperative 

program between the U.S. and Australia to develop an active, off-board, 

ship-launched decoy. The NULKA decoy uses a broadband radio frequency 

repeater mounted on a hovering rocket platform to defeat advanced seaskimming/high diving anti-ship cruise missiles. After launch, the decoy 

radiates a large, ship-like radar cross-section signal while flying a trajectory 

that lures the attacking missile away from the ship. In September 1996, the 

Navy modified its existing Mk 36 decoy launching system to a new MK 53 

system that is capable of launching NULKA decoys. 
Page 40 GAO/NSIAD-00-149 Defense Acquisitions

In May 1995 the U.S. Navy, on behalf of the Joint Project Office, awarded an 

engineering and manufacturing development contract to build 13 prototype 

NULKA decoys. Based on successful contractor qualification tests, the 

U.S. Navy authorized the Royal Australian Navy to award an initial 

production contract in June 1997 that included 52 NULKA decoys for U.S. 

Navy use. During October 1997 development tests aboard the U.S.S. Stump

(DD 978), the program encountered technical problems with two of three 

launched decoys. In response, the Joint Project Office officials initiated an 

in-depth analysis of the contractor’s production facilities. Upon finding 

quality control and production management problems, the contractor 

corrected the problems. During the summer of 1998, successful 

developmental and operational tests were conducted aboard the U.S.S 

Peterson (DD 969). 

In January 1999, the Commander, Operational Test and Evaluation Force, 

assessed NULKA and the MK 53 decoy launching system as potentially 

effective and suitable, and he recommended limited fleet introduction with 

additional follow-on test and evaluation requirements. As a result, a 

production contract for 11 MK 53 launch systems was awarded in February 

1999. As of January 2000, four systems had been installed on Ticonderoga 

class cruisers. The remaining seven systems are to be installed in fiscal 

year 2000 on four other Ticonderoga class cruisers and two Arleigh Burke 

class destroyers. One system is designated for use as a trainer. 

Under Navy installation plans dated January 2000, an additional 47 

launching systems will be installed on 14 Ticonderoga class cruisers, 

29 Arleigh Burke class destroyers, and 4 LSD 41/49 class ships between 

fiscal years 2001 and 2006. Also during this period, an additional 20 NULKA 

systems will be delivered for new construction installations on 9 LPD 17 

and 11 Arleigh Burke class ships. NULKA development efforts are ongoing 

to integrate NULKA with the Navy’s future SSDS MK II and AIEWS systems.
Page 41 GAO/NSIAD-00-149 Defense Acquisitions

Ship Class ApendxiI

Ticonderoga (CG-47) 

Class Cruisers 

There are 27 ships in this class, and each has a crew of 364. These ships can 

be used to provide area air defenses for carrier battle groups or amphibious 

ready groups. They can operate independently and serve as flagships of 

surface action groups. They are equipped with the Aegis weapon system 

that integrates their SPY radar system with the Standard and Tomahawk 

missiles they normally carry. The Aegis system allows them to detect and 

engage multiple air targets nearly simultaneously. The earliest planned 

decommission date for any ship of this class is approximately 2019.

In 1994, the detection systems aboard these ships included a SPS-49 twodimensional air search radar, a SPY-1A or SPY-1B radar, and the SLQ-32 

electronic warfare system. The control function was performed by the 

Aegis combat direction system. Engagement systems consisted of the 

Standard Missile II variant and the Phalanx Blocks 0 or 1.

Since 1994, ship self-defense capability improvements have been limited to 

the installation of the Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) system on 

four ships. In 1999, the Navy had assessed the ship self-defense capability 

of this class as having moderate to high capability against the near-term 

threat requirement, moderately capability against the mid-term threat 

requirement, and low capability against the far-term threat requirement. 

The Navy’s representation of the ship self-defense capability of this class 

may be overstated as it is based on the assumption that the class is being 

equipped with the Phalanx Block 1A, but as of September 30, 1999, none of 

these cruisers has this variant. In addition, the assessment was based on 

these ships being equipped with the SPY-1B. However, only 15 of the 

27 cruisers have this radar variant.

The Navy expects to modernize this cruiser class initially with the SPQ-9B 

radar, the AIEWS, CEC, the baseline 6 version of the Aegis combat system, 

an upgraded RAM, and NULKA. The procurements of these self-defense 

systems are scheduled to occur in fiscal year 2002, and the installations are 

scheduled for fiscal year 2004. The Navy has determined that these 

additions would provide high self-defense capability against both the nearand mid-term threat requirements, and moderate capability against the farterm threat requirement.

Arleigh Burke (DDG51) Class Destroyers

These warships conduct anti-submarine, anti-air, and anti-surface 

operations in support of carrier battle groups, surface action groups, 

amphibious groups, and replenishment groups. They are equipped with the 
Page 42 GAO/NSIAD-00-149 Defense Acquisitions

Aegis combat direction system that integrates the SPY-1 radar with the 

Standard, Tomahawk, and Harpoon Missiles; torpedoes; and Phalanx. The 

Navy has 28 of these ships and plans to build 30 more. Each ship has a crew 

of about 323. The earliest planned decommission date for any ship in this 

class is approximately 2026.

In 1994, the self-defense configuration for these destroyers included the 

SPY-1D radar and the SLQ-32 electronic warfare system. The control 

function was performed by the Aegis combat system. Engagement systems 

consisted of the Standard Missile II variant and the Phalanx Block 1.

Since 1994, the ship self-defense capability on this class of destroyers has 

been limited. In 1999, the Navy had assessed the ship self-defense 

capability of this class as having moderate capability against the near-term 

threat requirement, low to moderate capability against the mid-term threat 

requirement, and low capability against the far-term threat requirement. 

The Navy’s representation of the ship self-defense capability of this class 

may be overstated with regard to its weapon systems. The assessment is 

based on the assumption that the class has been equipped with the Phalanx 

Block 1A, but as of September 30, 1999, only 13 of the 28 destroyers in the 

fleet have this variant. Alternatively, the assessment assumed that the 

destroyers were equipped with only the electronic support version of

SLQ-32, when in fact 11 of the 28 destroyers in the fleet are equipped with 

the upgraded electronic warfare version of SLQ-32. 

The Navy expects to upgrade DDG 51-78 with CEC, the baseline 6 version 

of the Aegis weapon system, an upgraded Standard Missile II variant, and 

NULKA. The Navy plans to install the ESSM on DDG 79 and subsequent 

ships. The Navy expects these upgrades to give these ships a high 

capability against both the near- and mid-term threat requirements and 

moderate capability against the far-term threat requirement.

Oliver Hazard Perry 

(FFG-7) Class Frigates

These ships operate primarily as anti-submarine warfare combatants for 

protecting amphibious expeditionary forces, underway replenishment 

groups, and merchant convoys. They also have a limited anti-air warfare 

capability. These ships cost less than cruisers and destroyers, but lack the 

multi-mission capability needed by modern surface combatants against 

multiple, high-technology threats. They also offer limited capacity for 

growth. Despite their limitations, they are capable of withstanding 

considerable damage. The ship’s survivability was demonstrated when the 

U.S.S. Stark was hit by two Exocet cruise missiles in 1987. The ship 
Page 43 GAO/NSIAD-00-149 Defense Acquisitions

survived, was repaired, and returned to the fleet. Frigates carry helicopters, 

missiles, torpedoes, a gun, and Phalanx. There are 36 ships in this class and 

each has a crew of about 300. Seven of the 36 ships in this class are planned 

for decommissioning by fiscal year 2003.

In 1994, the self-defense configuration for the Oliver Hazard Perry class 

frigates included the SPS-49 radar, the STIR/CAS system, and the SLQ-32 

electronic support system. The MK 92 performed the control function. 

Engagement systems consisted of the Standard Missile I variant and the 

Phalanx Block 0 or 1.

Since 1994, ship self-defense capability improvements have consisted of 

the installation of RAIDS. In 1998, the Navy had assessed the ship selfdefense capability of this class as having low capability against the nearand mid-term threat requirements. Although there are 36 ships in this class, 

the Navy has focused its attention for ship self-defense improvements on 

the 12 CORT1

 ships. Accordingly, only the 12 CORT ships received the 

RAIDS system. Additionally, some of the CORT ships have received radar 

and electronic warfare upgrades. Additionally, the Navy plans to add 

Phalanx Block 1B to the 12 CORT ships by July 2002. The non-CORT ships 

were not assessed because of their short remaining service life.2

 The Navy 

projected the self-defense capability of frigate class ships to be low against 

the near- and mid-term threats.

Spruance (DD-963) 

Class Destroyers

The primary mission of these ships is anti-submarine warfare. They are 

completing a long-term modernization program during which they will have 

received SH-60B helicopters, Tomahawk missiles, and Phalanx. Adding the 

Tomahawk has greatly expanded their role in strike warfare. There are 24 

ships in this class, and each has a crew of 382. The Navy plans to 

decommission 11 ships in this class between 2001 and 2005 and the 

remaining 13 ships between 2006 and 2009.

1

CORT stands for Coherent Receiver and Transmitter and refers to the Mk 92 Mod 6 

weapons control system. The Navy upgraded the Mk 92 Mod 2 system to the Mod 6 system, 

along with upgrades to radars and processors on 12 frigates. These 12 CORT frigates have 

improved detection and tracking capability.

2

P. L. 105-56, section 8053, found at 10 USC 2241, note prohibits the Navy from modifying 

ships that are within 5 years of retirement, unless the Secretary of the Navy waives the 

prohibition.
Page 44 GAO/NSIAD-00-149 Defense Acquisitions

In 1994, the self-defense configuration for these destroyers included the 

MK-23 target acquisition system, the SPS-40 two-dimensional air search 

radar, and the SLQ-32 electronic support system. The SWY-1 integrator 

performed the control function by interfacing the MK-23 target acquisition 

radar with the NATO Sea Sparrow Surface Missile system. The engagement 

systems consisted of the NATO Sea Sparrow Surface Missile and Phalanx 

Block 0 or 1.

Since 1994, ship self-defense capability improvements have consisted of 

the installation of the SWY-3 integrator with RAIDS and the RAM Block 0. 

In 1998, the Navy had assessed the ship self-defense capability of this class 

as being moderate relative to meeting the near-term threat requirement and 

low relative to meeting the mid-term threat requirement. The Navy’s 

representation of the ship self-defense capability of this class may be 

overstated as it is based on the assumption that the class has been 

equipped with the RAM Block 0, but as of September 30, 1999, only 7 of the 

24 ships had this missile. According to its future upgrade plans, the Navy 

expects to add the NULKA to the entire ship class and RAM Block 1 to 

three ships in this class, thus providing them with a moderate to high 

capability to meet the near-term threat requirement and a moderate 

capability to meet the mid-term missile threat requirement.

Nimitz Class Nuclear 

Aircraft Carriers 

The Navy’s 8 Nimitz class nuclear powered aircraft carriers provide 

sustainable, independent forward presence and conventional deterrence in 

peacetime; operate as the cornerstone of joint/allied maritime 

expeditionary forces in times of crisis; operate and support aircraft attacks 

on enemies; and protect friendly forces and engage in sustained 

independent operations in war. Carriers support and operate aircraft that 

engage in attack on airborne, afloat, and ashore targets that threaten free 

use of the sea and engage in sustained operations in support of other 

forces. They are the largest warships in the world, are powered by two 

nuclear reactors, and carry 85 aircraft. The crew consists of a ship’s 

company of 3,200 and an air wing of 2,480. 

In 1994, the self-defense configuration for Nimitz class carriers included 

the SPS-49 two-dimensional radar, the SPS-48E three-dimensional radar, 

MK-23 target acquisition system, and the SLQ-32 electronic warfare system. 

The SWY-1 integrator performed the control function by interfacing the 

MK-23 target acquisition radar with the NATO Sea Sparrow Surface Missile.
Page 45 GAO/NSIAD-00-149 Defense Acquisitions

Engagement systems consisted of the NATO Sea Sparrow Surface Missile 

and the Phalanx Block 1.

Since 1994, ship self-defense capability improvements have consisted of 

the installation of Advanced Combat Direction System (ACDS). This 

system integrates with the SWY-1 in performing the control function. In 

1998, the Navy had assessed the ship self-defense capability of this class as 

being low against the near-, mid-, and far-term threat requirements. The 

Navy’s representation of the ship self-defense capability is based on the 

assumption that the ships in the class had been equipped with the ACDS 

Block 1. As of September 30, 1999, only one of the eight ships had ACDS 

Block 1, six ships had Block 0, and one ship was being overhauled. When 

the overhaul of this ship is complete, it will have both SSDS MK II and 

ACDS Block 1. 

According to its future plans, the Navy expects to upgrade the detect 

systems to include the SPQ-9B and the Cooperative Engagement Capability, 

the control system to include the SSDS MK II, and the weapon systems to 

include the RAM Block 1 and the Rearchitectured NATO Sea Sparrow 

Surface Missile System. This upgrade is planned for CVN 76; however, the 

capability of CVN 77 is being negotiated. By adding these systems, the Navy 

believes that the ship self-defense capability of these carriers will be 

moderate to high in meeting the near- and mid-term threat requirements 

and low to moderate in meeting the far-term threat requirement.

Whidbey Island and 

Harpers Ferry Dock 

Landing Ships

Dock Landing Ships (LSD) have the ability to flood a well deck to make 

possible the loading at sea of various types of amphibious craft and 

vehicles and their cargoes. The LSD 41 class, designed specifically to 

handle four Landing Craft Air Cushion (LCAC), can also accommodate 

22 officers, 391 enlisted sailors, and 402 Marine Corps troops. 

Commissioned in 1985, the U.S.S. Whidbey Island became the first ship of 

this class. Between 1986 and 1992, the Navy added seven ships to this class. 

In 1987, the Navy requested funding for a cargo variant that differed from 

the original LSD 41 by reducing its number of landing air cushion craft to 

two in favor of additional cargo capacity. The first cargo variant, the U.S.S. 

Harpers Ferry (LSD 49), was delivered in 1994. The remaining three LSD 

49 class ships were delivered between 1995 and 1998. The LSD 49 class has 

the same crew capacity, as does the LSD 41 class. 

As of October 1994, self-defense configurations for the combined LSD 41/49 

class included the SPS-49 air search radar and the SLQ-32 electronic 
Page 46 GAO/NSIAD-00-149 Defense Acquisitions

warfare system. Though the control function was being performed 

manually throughout the class, the Navy completed operational testing of 

an automated control system (SSDS MK I) in June 1997 aboard the U.S.S. 

Ashland (LSD 48). Engagement relied primarily upon Phalanx Block 0 or 1 

and the Mk 36 decoy launching system. As measured by the Navy’s 

performance assessment model, this configuration produced a 

performance result that was far below the threat requirements for the 

class. 

Since October 1994, the Navy has taken several actions to enhance the 

LSD 41/49 class’s ability to defeat cruise missiles. The Navy enhanced 

detection capabilities by adding a medium pulse repetition frequency 

upgrade to the SPS-49 radar and integrating the Phalanx radar with the 

control system. To improve the control function, the Navy installed SSDS 

MK I on four LSD 41 and two LSD 49 class ships. In addition, to improve 

engagement capabilities, the Navy completed installations of the Phalanx 

Block 1A upgrade on six LSD 41 and two LSD 49 class ships. In addition, 

RAM Block 0 was installed on five LSD 41 and three LSD 49 class ships. 

With these installations, the Navy more than doubled the class’s ability to 

counter current and future missile threats since requirements were 

adopted in February 1996. However, additional improvements in capability 

are needed to meet requirements for near-, mid-, and far-term threats. 

Two recent development efforts, RAM Block 1 and NULKA, are planned for 

future installation in the LSD 41/49 ship class. Once installed, the Navy 

expects that these improvements will provide these ships with a high 

capability against the near-term threat, moderate to high capability against 

the mid-term threat, but a low capability against the far term threat. 

Landing Helicopter 

Assault Ships

Landing Helicopter Assault (LHA) ships serve as primary landing ships for 

assault operations of Marine expeditionary units. These ships use 

conventional landing craft and helicopters to move Marine assault forces 

ashore. In a secondary role, these ships also use AV-8B Harrier aircraft and 

anti-submarine warfare helicopters to perform sea control and limited 

power projection missions. Commissioned in 1976, the U.S.S. Tarawa

(LHA 1) became the first ship of this amphibious class. Between 1977 and 

1980, the Navy added four more ships to this class. LHA class ships can 

accommodate 82 officers, 882 enlisted sailors, and 1,900 Marine Corps 

troops. 
Page 47 GAO/NSIAD-00-149 Defense Acquisitions

As of October 1994, LHA class ships were outfitted with the SPS-40E air 

search radar, the MK 23 target acquisition system, and the SLQ-32 

electronic warfare system as detection elements. Also, installation of the 

SPS-48E radar was complete on three ships. Control functions were 

performed by the SWY-2 integrator, which interfaced the MK 23 target 

acquisition radar with the RAM Block 0 weapon system. Engagement 

elements included RAM Block 0, Phalanx Block 0, and the MK 36 decoy 

launching system. This defense configuration produced a performance 

result that was below the capstone requirements for the class. 

Since October 1994, Navy staff made only a few defensive improvements to 

the LHA class. Specifically, they completed installations of the SPS-48E 

radar and the Phalanx Block 1 on all five LHA ships. In addition, they 

installed the Advanced Combat Direction System Block 0 on three ships. 

These improvements, however, provided little overall improvement in the 

class’s ability to meet the capstone requirements. 

In October 1998, the Navy considered implementing a Service Life 

Extension Program to this class; however, there are no current plans to do 

so. Beginning in fiscal year 2001, the Navy plans to conduct an analysis of 

alternatives study to determine the preferred choice between a 

modification to the LHD class design or a brand new hull configuration, 

currently known as the LH(X) class. 

Landing Helicopter 

Dock Ships

Landing Helicopter Dock (LHD) ships are the Navy’s new class of 

amphibious assault ships to support a Marine landing force. These ships 

can accommodate three landing craft, AV-8B Harrier aircraft, and the full 

range of Navy and Marine Corps helicopters. Commissioned in 1989, the 

U.S.S. Wasp (LHD 1) is the lead ship of this new class of multipurpose 

amphibious assault ships. Between 1992 and 1998, the Navy added five 

more LHD ships to its fleet. LHD class ships can accommodate 104 officers; 

1,004 enlisted sailors; and 1,894 Marine Corps troops. 

As of October 1994, three LHD class ships had been delivered to the fleet. 

The fourth LHD ship was commissioned in February 1995. These first four 

LHD ships were outfitted with the SPS-48E and SPS-49 air search radars, 

the MK 23 target acquisition system, and the SLQ-32 electronic warfare 

system as detection elements. The ACDS integrated with the AN/SWY-1 

performs threat assessment and weapons control. Engagement elements 

included the NATO Sea Sparrow Surface Missile, Phalanx Block 1, and the 
Page 48 GAO/NSIAD-00-149 Defense Acquisitions

MK 36 decoy launching system. This defense configuration produced a 

performance result that was below the capstone requirements for the class. 

Two additional LHD class ships were delivered to the fleet in 1997 and 1998. 

These ships were delivered with ACDS and the AN/SWY-3 control 

configuration. This integrated capability/configuration included the MK 23 

Target Acquisition System and multiple NATO Sea Sparrow Surface and 

RAM missile systems. No LHDs are slated to receive RAM Block 1 until late 

fiscal year 2002, with LHD 5 and 6 slated for fiscal year 2006 and 2007, 

respectively. The Navy assessed that this improvement provided the ship 

class with a high capability against the near- and mid-term threat and a 

moderate capability against the far-term threat. 

The U.S.S. Iwo Jima (LHD 7), currently in production, is being outfitted 

with the AN/SPS-48E and the AN/SPS-49 MPU radar, MK 23 Target 

Acquisition System, ACDS, an AN/SWY-3 configuration, and Phalanx 

Block 1A. The Navy plans to improve the AN/SWY-3 capability in late fiscal 

year 2002 by an upgrade of the MK 23 Target Acquisition System and 

incorporation of RAM Block 1. These improvements should enable the 

U.S.S. Iwo Jima to have moderate to high capability against near- and midterm threats. The U.S.S. Iwo Jima is also slated to receive a Mission Force 

Protection upgrade in the 2006-2009 time frame.

Amphibious Transport 

Dock Ships

Amphibious Transport Dock (LPD) ships serve primarily to transport and 

land Marines, their equipment, and supplies for amphibious operations. 

The Navy currently has 11 LPD class ships in commission, but the ships are 

nearing the end of their service life. For example, the oldest ship, the U.S.S. 

Austin (LPD 4) turned 35 in February 2000. Moreover, these ships are 

especially vulnerable to cruise missile attack as their defensive capabilities 

consist of only two Phalanx weapon systems. The Navy plans to replace its 

current LPD fleet, as well as other old amphibious ships, with its newest 

class of amphibious ship—the LPD 17. The new LPD 17class ship is being 

designed to accommodate 32 officers, 463 enlisted sailors, and 720 Marine 

Corps troops. 

In June 1996, the Navy received approval to enter into the engineering and 

manufacturing development phase of its LPD 17 program and to produce 

the first three of a low-rate initial production quantity of 12 ships. The 

baseline design included the following configuration—SPS-48E, SPQ-9B, 

and SLQ-32 or AIEWS (if matured for production) as detection elements; 

CEC and SSDS MK 2 as control element; and RAM Block 1, NULKA, and the 
Page 49 GAO/NSIAD-00-149 Defense Acquisitions

new Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile (ESSM) with a vertical launch system as 

engagement elements. As projected by the Navy’s performance assessment 

model, this configuration would have high capability against the near- and 

mid-term threat and moderate capability against far-term threat. 

The Navy realized that the ESSM program schedule would not coincide 

with the production schedule of the first two ships in the class and decided 

to reserve space and weight in the ship design for the missile system and 

launcher for subsequent installation in these two ships. However, the Navy 

planned to equip the remaining 10 ships in the class with the ESSM system 

during their production. In 1998, various congressional committees 

directed the Navy to prepare an analysis of alternatives to the LPD 17 

baseline design, including an evaluation of the AN/SPY-1 radar and its 

associated Aegis combat system, multifunction radar, and the ESSM. The 

March 1999 results of the Navy analysis confirmed that the baseline design 

without the ESSM could meet the near- and mid-term threat at the least 

cost. As a result of this assessment, the Navy withdrew funding for the 

ESSM system from the LPD 17 budget for fiscal years 2000−2003, and 

applied those funds to its cruiser conversion program and other 

shipbuilding and conversion activities. This action resulted in deletion of 

the ESSM and its vertical launching system from the remaining 10 ships, 

with only a space and weight reservation for an eventual backfit. 

The Navy will review the LPD 17 combat system in 2001 to determine if 

changes in configuration are warranted. The costs and benefits of including 

a multi-function and volume search radar in the LPD 17 combat system 

suite will be considered in this review. 

Fast Combat Support 

Ships

The fast combat support ship (AOE) is the Navy’s largest combat logistics 

ship. Its mission is to receive ammunition, provisions, stores, and 

petroleum products from shuttle ships, and to distribute them to carrier 

battle groups while underway. Commissioned in 1964, the U.S.S. 

Sacramento (AOE 1) became the first ship of this class. Between 1967 and 

1970, the Navy added three more AOE 1 class ships to its fleet. In 1987, 

Congress appropriated funds for the next generation AOE class ship. The 

lead ship, U.S.S. Supply (AOE 6), was commissioned in 1994. Three more 

AOE 6 ships were delivered between 1995 and 1998. AOE 6 class ships can 

accommodate 40 officers and 627 enlisted sailors. 

As of October 1994, self-defense configurations for the combined AOE 1/6 

class included the MK 23 target acquisition system and the SLQ-32 
Page 50 GAO/NSIAD-00-149 Defense Acquisitions

electronic warfare system. Control functions were performed manually. 

Engagement elements included NATO Sea Sparrow Missile system, the 

Phalanx Block 0 or 1, and the MK 36 decoy launching system. This defense 

configuration produced low capability against all threat requirements. With 

the exception of minor technical changes, Navy staff has made no ship selfdefense improvements to either AOE ship class since October 1994. 

Staff of the Chief of Naval Operations and fleet commanders are currently 

weighing alternatives for the future of the AOE 1 and AOE 6 class ships. In 

December 1996, the Navy estimated that it would cost $450 million to 

extend the service life of the four AOE 1 ships to the year 2010. In February 

1997, the Chief of Naval Operations tasked Navy program staff to identify 

the minimum requirements needed to keep the AOE 1 class operational 

until the year 2010. In response, type and group commander staff, 

engineers, ship commanding officers, and members of the Navy Sea 

Systems Command technical community reached consensus on what came 

to be called the AOE 1 Class Sustainability Program, with an estimated cost 

of $103 million. A teaming effort among the Naval Sea Systems Command 

and Navy type commanders has, to date, accomplished many of the work 

items associated with the Sustainability Program. Of the remaining 

program balance of 

$60.6 million, $9.6 million is currently funded in the future years defense 

plan, leaving an unfunded balance of $51 million. However, none of the 

work items included in the AOE 1 Class Sustainability Program will 

improve the class’s level of ship self-defense. 

Since at least 1997, the Navy has been considering the possibility of 

transferring its AOE 6 ship class to the Military Sealift Command. At the 

present time, no ship self-defense upgrades are being planned or 

recommended, according to Navy officials. 
Page 51 GAO/NSIAD-00-149 Defense Acquisitions
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