What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

June 2006

OLYMPIC SECURITY

Better Planning Can Enhance U.S. 

Highlights of GAO-06-753, a report to the Support to Future Olympic Games 

Committee on International Relations, 

House of Representatives

The 2006 Winter Games in Turin, 

Italy, were the second Olympic 

Games to take place overseas

since September 11, 2001. The 

United States worked with Italy 

to ensure the security of U.S. 

citizens, and it expects to 

continue such support for future 

Games, including the 2008 Games 

in Beijing, China. 

GAO was asked to (1) discuss the 

U.S. approach for providing 

security support for the 2006

Winter Games and how such 

efforts were coordinated, (2) 

identify the roles of U.S. agencies

in providing security support for 

the Games and how they financed 

their activities, (3) review lessons 

learned in providing security 

support and the application of 

prior lessons learned, and (4) 

identify U.S. efforts under way for 

providing security support to the 

2008 Beijing Games.

What GAO Recommends

GAO is recommending that the 

Secretary of State, in consultation 

with members of the interagency 

working group, (1) develop 

written guidance for providing 

U.S. government security support 

to future Games and (2) develop 

a finance subgroup within the 

interagency working group to 

help agencies plan and prepare 

for future support. State 

concurred with GAO’s findings 

and recommendations and stated 

that it has begun taking steps to 

implement them. 

In 2004, the United States began planning to provide a U.S. security presence

in Italy and security support to the Italian government, and based much of its 

security strategy on its understanding of Italy’s advanced security 

capabilities. The United States provided Italy with some security assistance, 

mostly in the form of crisis management and response support. To 

coordinate U.S. efforts, the U.S. Mission in Italy established an office in 

Turin as a central point for security information and logistics, and to provide 

consular services to U.S. citizens during the Games. The U.S. Ambassador to 

Italy, through the U.S. Consulate in Milan, coordinated and led U.S. efforts 

in-country, while the Department of State-chaired interagency working 

group in Washington, D.C., coordinated domestic efforts. While the 

interagency working group has been a useful forum for coordinating U.S. 

security support to overseas athletic events, State and Department of Justice 

(DOJ) officials have indicated that formal guidance that articulates a charter;

a mission; and agencies’ authorities, roles, and responsibilities would help in 

planning for security support to future Games. 

Nearly 20 entities and offices within several U.S. agencies provided more 

than $16 million for security support activities for the Turin Games. The 

roles of these agencies—which included the Departments of State, Justice,

Homeland Security, Defense, and Energy—included providing crisis 

management and response support through personnel, equipment, and 

training and providing security advice and other assistance to U.S. athletes, 

spectators, and commercial investors. The U.S. Embassy in Rome initially 

paid for lodging and other administrative support needs, which were 

reimbursed by the participating agencies, although it struggled to do so. 

State and DOJ officials indicated that an interagency mechanism for 

identifying costs and addressing potential funding issues would be useful in 

providing U.S. security support to future Games. 

For the Turin Games, agencies applied key lessons learned from the 2004 

Athens Games and identified additional lessons for future Games. Key 

lessons identified from the Turin Games included, the importance of 

establishing an operations center at the location of the Games, establishing

clear roles and responsibilities for agencies in event planning and crisis 

response efforts, and planning early for several years of Olympic-related 

expenditures. These lessons learned were communicated by Washington, 

D.C.- and Italy-based personnel to their counterparts who are preparing for 

the 2008 Summer Olympics in Beijing. The United States is currently taking 

steps to identify the types of security support that agencies may provide to 

support China’s security efforts for the 2008 Summer Games and to ensure 

the safety of U.S. athletes, spectators, and commercial investors.

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-753.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Jess T. Ford at 

(202) 512-4128 or fordj@gao.gov.
Contents 

Letter 1

Results in Brief 2

Background 4

U.S. Security Support Was Based on Italian Security Capabilities, 

Supported by Coordinated U.S. Government Effort 9 

Several U.S. Agencies Contributed to Security Support for 2006 

Winter Games; United States Spent Millions on Security Support 

Activities, but Lacks Formal Mechanism for Coordinating 

Financial Requirements 14 

Security Planning Lessons Learned Were Applied in Turin and 

Additional Lessons Were Identified for the Beijing and Other 

Future Games 20 

Planning Efforts Are Under Way to Identify U.S. Security Support 

for 2008 Beijing Games; Efforts Face Unique Challenges 26 

Conclusions 29

Recommendations 29

Agency Comments 30 

Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 32 

Appendix II Comments from the Department of State 35 

Appendix III GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 38

Table 

Table 1: U.S. Agencies’ Roles and the Activities Provided for the 

2006 Winter Games 15 

Figures 

Figure 1: Venue Locations of 2006 Winter Olympics in Turin, Italy 7 

Figure 2: Timeline of U.S. Security Support Activities for the 2006 

Winter Games 11 

Figure 3: Key Agency Expenditures for the 2004 Summer Games 

and the 2006 Winter Games 19 

Figure 4: Venue Locations for the 2008 Beijing Summer Olympics 28 

Page i GAO-06-753 Olympic Security
Abbreviations 

DCI data collection instrument 

DHS Department of Homeland Security 

DOD Department of Defense 

DOE Department of Energy 

DOJ Department of Justice 

DS Bureau of Diplomatic Security 

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation 

OSAC Overseas Security Advisory Council

TSA Transportation Security Administration 

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further 

permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or 

other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to 

reproduce this material separately. 

Page ii GAO-06-753 Olympic Security

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

June 30, 2006 

The Honorable Henry J. Hyde 

Chairman 

The Honorable Tom Lantos 

Ranking Minority Member 

Committee on International Relations 

House of Representatives 

The 2006 Winter Games1

 in Turin, Italy, were the second Olympic Games 

to take place overseas since September 11, 2001, in a climate of heightened

concerns about international terrorism. A variety of factors created a 

challenging threat environment for the 2006 Winter Games, including 

increased security tension worldwide due to the Iraq war; the known 

presence of Italy-based international terrorist cells; past al-Qaeda threats 

to coalition partners, of which Italy is one; and recent terrorist incidents in

Europe. Despite such security concerns, Italy hosted a safe and secure 

event with no terrorist incidents. Although the host government is 

responsible for the overall security of the Olympic Games, the United 

States worked with the Italian government, in advance of and throughout 

the Games, to ensure the security of U.S. athletes, spectators, and 

commercial investors. The U.S. government expects to continue working 

with host governments to ensure the security of U.S. citizens and interests 

at future Games, including the upcoming 2008 Summer Olympics and 

Paralympics in Beijing, China. 

This report (1) discusses the U.S. approach for providing security support 

for the 2006 Winter Games and how such security efforts were 

coordinated, (2) identifies the roles of U.S. agencies in providing security 

support to the 2006 Winter Games and reviews how they financed their 

activities, (3) reviews lessons learned in providing security support and 

the application of prior lessons learned, and (4) identifies U.S. efforts 

under way for providing security support to the 2008 Beijing Games. 

 1

For the purpose of this report, the term “2006 Winter Games” refers to the 2006 Turin 

Winter Olympic and Paralympic Games. The 2006 Turin Winter Olympic Games were held

February 10 to 26, 2006, and the 2006 Turin Paralympic Games were held March 10 to 19,

2006, in Turin, Italy. 

Page 1 GAO-06-753 Olympic Security
To accomplish our objectives, we obtained and reviewed all available 

interagency and agency-specific operations plans for the 2006 Winter 

Games and documentation on the U.S. support provided for the 2006 

Winter Games. In addition, we interviewed officials at the Departments of 

State (State), Justice (DOJ), Homeland Security (DHS), Defense (DOD), 

and Energy (DOE), and at certain intelligence agencies, and attended 

interagency coordination meetings. Also, we traveled to Italy in November 

2005 to observe U.S. planning efforts for providing security support to the 

2006 Winter Games. While in Italy, we interviewed U.S. officials in Rome, 

Milan, and Turin and met with Italian officials in Rome to obtain their 

perspective on the security support provided by the United States. Lastly, 

we also interviewed an official of a U.S. corporate sponsor of the Olympics 

and participated in a security briefing for corporate sponsors to gain their 

perspectives on the security support provided by the United States. 

Appendix I contains additional details on our objectives, scope, and 

methodology. We conducted our review between September 2005 and May 

2006 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 

standards. 

The U.S. government, led by State, assisted in the protection of U.S. 

athletes, spectators, and commercial investors during the 2006 Winter 

Games in Turin through a U.S. security presence in Italy and security 

support to the Italian government. In October 2004, the United States 

began planning its approach for providing security support to the 2006 

Winter Games. The United States based much of its security strategy on its 

understanding of Italy’s security capabilities, gained through its 

counterterrorism and military partnership with the country. On the basis 

of this understanding, the United States provided the Italian government 

with an offer of security assistance in the spring of 2005, and the Italian 

government accepted some of this assistance—mostly in the form of crisis 

management and response support. To support U.S. efforts at the 2006 

Winter Games, the U.S. government established a coordination office in 

Turin as a central point for security information and logistical support, and 

to provide consular services to U.S. citizens during the Games. Security 

support for the 2006 Winter Games was coordinated by the U.S. Embassy 

in Rome, which delegated the coordination of many interagency efforts 

in-country to the U.S. Consul General in Milan. Moreover, these efforts in 

Italy were supported by a State-chaired interagency working group—the 

International Athletic Events Security Coordinating Group—in 

Washington, D.C., which conducted the domestic side of coordinating 

agencies’ contributions to the U.S. effort. While the interagency working 

group has been a useful forum for coordinating U.S. efforts in providing 

Results in Brief 

Page 2 GAO-06-753 Olympic Security
security support for overseas athletic events, State and DOJ officials have 

indicated that formal guidance that articulates a charter; a mission; and 

agencies’ authorities, roles, and responsibilities would help in planning for 

security support to future Games. 

Approximately 20 entities and offices within several U.S. agencies 

provided more than $16 million in fiscal years 2005 and 2006 for security 

support activities for the 2006 Winter Games. The roles of these 

agencies—which included State, DHS, DOD, DOE, and DOJ—included 

crisis management support through personnel, equipment, and training 

and providing security advice and other assistance to U.S. athletes, 

spectators, and commercial investors. U.S. government agencies identified

specific costs for the Turin Games, including more than $5 million for 

travel and lodging expenses for U.S. personnel who were temporarily 

assigned to Turin and about $720,000 for activities associated with joint 

U.S. agency operations, including the establishment of an interagency

operations center in Turin. Funds providing security support to the 2006 

Winter Games came from agencies’ existing accounts over a 2-year period, 

and agencies did not receive specific Olympic-related appropriations. In 

addition, the reported costs do not capture the entirety of costs for 

supporting the 2006 Winter Games, particularly the salaries of many U.S. 

officials who worked to support the U.S. effort. The U.S. Embassy in Rome 

initially paid for agencies’ shared costs, such as those associated with the 

establishment of a U.S. operations center in Turin, which were later 

reimbursed by the participating agencies. Although the U.S. Embassy in 

Rome paid for lodging and administrative support, it struggled to do so, 

particularly as costs rose due to changing requirements. The interagency 

working group coordinates agencies’ support to U.S. efforts at these 

Games, but the group does not have a mechanism for identifying costs, 

coordinating budget requests, and addressing potential funding issues for 

U.S. security support to future Games. State and DOJ officials indicated 

that an interagency mechanism for identifying costs and addressing 

potential funding issues would be useful in providing U.S. security support 

to future Olympic Games. 

Key lessons learned from the 2004 Athens Summer Games were applied in 

the planning efforts for Turin, and additional lessons were identified for 

future Games. These lessons from Athens included the importance of 

planning early for U.S. security support activities; designating key U.S. 

officials to serve as point persons for political, security, and logistics 

arrangements and for the delivery of unified messages; and establishing a 

colocation of intelligence and interagency operations. Following the 2006

Winter Games, the U.S. agencies involved with providing security support 

Page 3 GAO-06-753 Olympic Security
identified a number of additional lessons learned, such as establishing a 

fully equipped, temporary operations center at the location of the 

Olympics if no embassy or consulate is nearby; establishing clear roles and 

responsibilities for U.S. agencies in event planning and crisis response 

efforts; and planning for Olympic-related costs over several fiscal years. 

Washington, D.C.- and Italy-based personnel communicated these lessons 

learned to their counterparts who are preparing for the 2008 Summer 

Games in Beijing. 

State, through the U.S. Mission in Beijing, is taking steps to identify the 

types of security support that the United States may be able to provide to

support China’s security efforts for the 2008 Beijing Games and to ensure 

the safety of U.S. athletes, spectators, and commercial investors. For 

example, in January 2006, a U.S. official was appointed to the U.S. mission 

in Beijing to serve as a U.S. government point person on Olympic security 

with the Chinese government. As of April 2006, the United States and 

China were discussing a possible joint assessment to identify security 

needs for the 2008 Beijing Games. 

To enhance future planning for U.S. security support for overseas Olympic 

and Paralympic Games, we are recommending in this report that the 

Secretary of State, in consultation with members of the interagency

working group—the International Athletic Events Security Coordinating 

Group, develop written guidance for providing U.S. government security 

support to future Games. We are also recommending that the Secretary of 

State, in consultation with members of the interagency working group, 

develop a finance subgroup within the working group to help agencies 

identify and plan for anticipated resource needs, coordinate their budget 

requests, and address potential funding issues for U.S. security support to 

future Games. 

In commenting on a draft of this report, State agreed with our findings and

recommendations and stated that it is taking steps to begin implementing 

them. State, DOD, and DOJ also provided technical comments, which were 

incorporated where appropriate. 

Since the first Winter Olympic Games in 1924, the event has grown from 

258 athletes representing 16 countries to, in the case of the 2006 Turin 

Olympics, approximately 5,000 athletes and coaches from 85 countries. In

addition, an estimated 1.5 million spectators and 10,000 media personnel 

attended the 2006 Winter Olympic Games. While the stated goal of the 

Olympic movement is “to contribute to building a peaceful and better 

Background 

Page 4 GAO-06-753 Olympic Security
world,” its history includes tragedy and terror as well. At the 1972 Munich 

Games, Palestinian terrorists attacked the Israeli Olympic team, resulting 

in the deaths of 11 Israeli athletes. The 1996 Atlanta Olympic Games were

marred by a pipe-bomb explosion that killed 1 person and injured 110 

others. 

One of the International Olympic Committee requirements for countries 

bidding to host the Games is to ensure the security of the participating 

athletes and spectators, which is an increasingly challenging task in 

today’s environment of terrorist threats. According to State documents, 

Italy spent approximately $110 million on security operations for the 2006 

Winter Games. In addition, the Italian government designated 15,000 law 

enforcement personnel, along with military and intelligence support, to 

provide for overall security for the Winter Games. Italy’s Ministry of 

Interior designated the Prefect of Turin as the local government authority 

responsible for providing security inside the official venues of the Winter 

Games. 

Italy faced the challenge of hosting an Olympics amid a heightened 

terrorist threat environment. Al-Qaeda has made threats to coalition 

partners in Iraq and Afghanistan in the past. Moreover, in March 2004, a 

terrorist attack on commuter trains in Madrid, Spain, killed nearly 200 

people, and, in July 2005, a terrorist attack on commuter trains and a bus

in London, England, killed over 50 people and injured more than 700. In 

addition, there is a known presence of Italy-based international terrorist 

cells and domestic anarchist groups that actively target multinational 

corporations, critical infrastructure, and government facilities. Italy has 

highly advanced antiterrorism capabilities and has recently taken 

additional antiterrorism measures, such as enactment of improved 

antiterrorism laws and increased physical security measures. Since 2001, 

several extremist plots in Milan and Rome have been detected and 

prevented. In addition to these explicit terror threats, Italy has faced 

difficult security challenges at other recent major events, such as the 

meeting of the Group of Eight in Genoa in 2001, at which activists clashed

violently with Italian police forces, and the funeral of Pope John Paul II in 

April 2005. 

In planning for the 2006 Winter Games, winter conditions presented 

another set of challenges. The Winter Games were located in the remote, 

northwest corner of Italy, with venues spread over an extensive land area. 

Although smaller in scale than the 2004 Athens Summer Games, the 2006 

Winter Olympic venues included mountain locations that were as far as 60

miles away from Turin, with limited access routes to these mountain sites. 

Page 5 GAO-06-753 Olympic Security
(See fig. 1 for locations of venues for the 2006 Winter Olympic Games in 

Turin, Italy.) Locating suitable lodging for U.S. security and support 

personnel near key venues was necessary. Furthermore, the distance from

the nearest U.S. presence—the U.S. Consulate in Milan, which is located 

about a 90-minute drive from Turin—required the establishment of a 

temporary U.S. post in Turin to support U.S. security efforts and serve as a 

platform for U.S. activities. 

Page 6 GAO-06-753 Olympic Security
Figure 1: Venue Locations of 2006 Winter Olympics in Turin, Italy 

Page 7 GAO-06-753 Olympic Security

U.S. Consulate in Milan

Site of 2006 Winter Games

Olympic venue sites

Capital city

ITALY

Sources: GAO and MapArt (image).

Turin

Milan

Pragelato

Bardonecchia

Cesana

Pinerolo

Turin

Milan

Rome

Austria

Italy

Germany

France

Hungary

Czech Republic

Slovakia

Liechtenstein

Bosnia

Croatia

Slovenia

Switzerland

France

Switzerland

Sestriere

Sauze d’Oulx
Although the host government has the ultimate responsibility for providing 

security for the Olympics, the United States has a vested interest in 

ensuring the safety of its citizens in all Olympic locations. In 2001, the 

United States began planning its security assistance for the 2004 Athens 

Summer Olympics, responding both to the heightened worldwide anxiety 

following the September 11 attacks and to Greece’s request for 

international advice on its security plan. Despite widespread fears of a 

potential terrorist attack on the Olympics, Greece hosted a safe and secure 

event with no terrorist incidents. With the conclusion of the Athens 

Games, the United States began planning for security support to the 2006 

Turin Winter Olympic and Paralympic Games. This security support is 

provided by the United States under general executive branch policy 

guidance and individual agency authorities. For example, State officials 

cited the use of Presidential Decision Directive 62, which extends the U.S. 

counterterrorism policy in Presidential Decision Directive 39 to the 

protection of Americans overseas. State is the lead agency for ensuring the 

protection of American citizens overseas. According to U.S. officials in 

Italy, up to 20,000 Americans attended the 2006 Turin Olympics daily. 

The next Olympics will be the Summer Games in Beijing, China, August 8 

to 24, 2008; followed by the Paralympics, September 6 to 17, 2008. Venues 

for these Games will be spread out across seven cities in China, presenting 

unique logistical and coordination challenges for security support efforts. 

According to State officials, over 1 million spectators are expected to 

attend the 2008 Beijing Games, including a large number of Americans. 

The next Winter Olympic Games will be held in Vancouver, Canada, 

February 12 to 28, 2010, followed by the Paralympics on March 12 to 21, 

2010. The close proximity of these Games to the United States presents 

distinctive challenges, such as border security issues. In 2012, the United

Kingdom will host the Summer Olympic and Paralympic Games in London. 

Past terrorist incidents in London and an ongoing terrorist threat climate 

are likely to present security challenges for these Games. 

Page 8 GAO-06-753 Olympic Security
The security support that the United States provided for the 2006 Winter 

Games was largely based on an understanding of Italy’s advanced security 

capabilities gained through a long-standing, U.S.-Italian counterterrorism 

and military partnership. The U.S. Embassy in Rome led the coordinated 

governmentwide effort—delegating responsibility for the coordination of

U.S. activities in Turin to the U.S. Consulate in Milan—and was supported 

by a Washington, D.C.-based interagency group.

Following the Athens Games in the summer of 2004, the United States 

began planning for (1) the security support it would provide to the Italian

government and (2) the protection of U.S. citizens who would be 

participating in or attending the 2006 Winter Games. In October 2004, the 

United States held a 3-day interagency conference in Milan for Italy- and 

U.S.-based officials who would be working on the 2006 Winter Games to 

share lessons learned from the U.S. effort in Athens and to begin 

determining U.S. security support for Turin. 

U.S. Security Support 

Was Based on Italian 

Security Capabilities, 

Supported by 

Coordinated U.S. 

Government Effort 

U.S. Security Support 

Informed by an 

Understanding of Italian 

Security Capabilities, but 

without a Formal 

Assessment of Italy’s

Olympic Security Plans 

The United States largely based its security support approach on its 

understanding of Italian security capabilities, gained from long-standing 

counterterrorism and military relationships with Italy. In particular, the 

United States and Italy have an established partnership as members of the 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization and, more recently, as coalition 

partners in Iraq. According to U.S. officials, the Italian government’s 

sensitivities about formally sharing certain information limited the United 

States’ ability to formally assess Italy’s operational plans for providing 

security for the 2006 Winter Games. Agency officials noted that this made 

U.S. efforts to plan security and emergency contingencies during the 

Games more difficult. However, the U.S. Olympic Security Coordinator 

and other key officials were able to use established relationships with 

their Italian counterparts to develop a working knowledge of Italy’s plans

and capabilities for providing security to the 2006 Winter Games and to 

plan U.S. security efforts. For example, U.S. officials met with their Italian 

security and law enforcement counterparts to receive information on 

Italy’s security structure and Olympic security integration plan. 

In addition, over several months in 2005, State reported that more than 20 

technical meetings were held between Italian authorities and U.S. 

representatives from the U.S. Mission in Italy and various federal law 

enforcement and intelligence agencies to coordinate bilateral cooperation

during the Games. Moreover, Italian government representatives held 

Page 9 GAO-06-753 Olympic Security
meetings in 2005 with representatives from the United States and other 

interested governments to discuss Italy’s security plans for the Games. For 

example, in September 2005, the Italian government hosted an

international seminar on security concepts for the management of major 

sporting events, with law enforcement representatives from 11 countries. 

Furthermore, in October 2005, U.S. representatives were invited by the 

Italian government to observe its antiterrorism drills testing the efficiency 

and response capability of the local law enforcement, emergency, and 

rescue systems in four Italian cities. 

On the basis of its understanding of Italy’s security capabilities, the United 

States identified specific training and security support that could be 

provided to support Italy’s security efforts. In March 2005, the Italian 

government requested a consolidated list of the offers of U.S. security 

assistance, and the interagency working group in Washington identified 

the available sources and capabilities among the represented agencies to 

prevent duplication of efforts. In the spring of 2005, this interagency 

working group provided a comprehensive offer of security support for the 

2006 Winter Games, comprising a variety of specific offers from several 

U.S. agencies. Italy accepted a number of these offers, including crisis 

management expertise, an assessment of Turin’s international airport, and 

mapping assistance. 

In addition to direct security assistance to Italy, the United States 

conducted several exercises to test its own strategies for supporting Italy’s 

security efforts and ensuring the protection of U.S. citizens during the 2006 

Winter Games. In November and December 2005, the United States 

conducted several tabletop exercises to test strategies for ensuring the 

protection of U.S. citizens, including a joint crisis management exercise 

that focused on a theoretical terrorist attack in Italy and a crisis 

management exercise held over several days in Rome, Milan, and Turin to

test U.S. crisis planning and execution in preparation for the Games. 

Figure 2 provides a timeline of U.S. security support activities for the 2006

Winter Games. 

Page 10 GAO-06-753 Olympic Security
Figure 2: Timeline of U.S. Security Support Activities for the 2006 Winter Games 

2004

Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. May June July Aug. Sept. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr.

2005 2006

Feb. 10-26

Turin

Winter 

Olympics

Mar. 10-19

Turin

Winter 

Paralympics

Source: GAO.

“Lessons

Learned” 

conference 

in Milan

U.S. Olympic 

Security 

Coordinator 

appointed

FBI liaison 

arrived on 

temporary 

duty

U.S. Olympic 

Coordinator 

arrived

FBI liaison 

full-time in 

Turin

U.S. Olympic 

Coordination 

Office opened 

in Turin

Italy hosted 

seminar on 

security for 

major 

sports

events

U.S. 

operations

center 

initially 

outfitted

U.S. 

operations

planning 

meetings

in Turin

U.S. operations

center 

decommissioned

U.S. 

tabletop 

exercise in 

Rome, 

Milan, and 

Turin

U.S. 

operations

center

24/7 operations

initiated

U.S. 

operations

center ready

U.S. joint 

crisis

management 

exercise

Athletes

began 

arriving 

in Turin

U.S. 

operations

planning 

meetings

in Rome

U.S. Olympic Security 

Support Was Coordinated 

by the U.S. Embassy in 

Rome and Supported by 

Interagency Efforts

The U.S. Embassy in Rome—under the leadership of the U.S. Ambassador 

to Italy—led the coordinated interagency efforts in Italy under one 

centralized U.S. government mission. The U.S. Ambassador delegated the 

responsibility for coordinating and overseeing U.S. interagency efforts in 

Turin to the U.S. Consul General in Milan. Located approximately 

90-minutes away from Turin, the Consulate in Milan oversaw the 

establishment of a temporary U.S. presence in Turin to centralize U.S. 

agency operations and the efforts of key U.S. officials serving as 

designated point persons for coordinating security and logistical 

arrangements. 

To centralize all U.S. activities in Turin leading up to and during the 

Games, the U.S. Mission in Italy established a U.S. Olympic Coordination 

Office in Turin to coordinate U.S. security support activities. Under the 

direction of the U.S. Ambassador and through the U.S. Consul General in 

Page 11 GAO-06-753 Olympic Security
Milan, this office served as the center for U.S. security operations and 

other activities. In particular, during the Games, this office housed a U.S. 

Olympic command group, comprising senior representatives from State, 

DOD, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). The U.S. command 

group was responsible for providing—in the event of a request for 

assistance by the Italian government—specialized expertise in a variety of

areas, including security operations, crisis operations, terrorism 

investigations, consequence management, and intelligence collection and 

dissemination. In addition, this office provided limited consular services to

American citizens and included a public diplomacy office to liaison with 

press and support VIP visits during the Games. 

U.S. efforts in Italy were supported by a Washington, D.C.-based 

interagency working group—the International Athletic Events Security 

Coordinating Group—which included representatives from the 

intelligence community, State, DHS, DOD, DOE, and DOJ, among others.2

Specifically, State’s Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) and Office of the

Coordinator for Counterterrorism serve as cochairs of this interagency 

working group. Chaired by State, the interagency working group facilitated 

and coordinated, on the domestic side, agencies’ contributions for the 

2006 Winter Games. While this interagency working group has been a 

useful forum for coordinating the domestic side of U.S. efforts in providing 

security support to overseas athletic events, it operates without written 

operational guidance and without the authority for tasking participating 

agencies in planning for future Olympic Games, according to State and 

DOJ officials. Specifically, the interagency working group does not have a 

charter or mission statement that establishes the roles and responsibilities 

of this group and its members. 

U.S officials from State and DOJ indicated that, although U.S. support for 

Turin was coordinated through the interagency working group, the group’s 

lack of clear authority presents confusion over what direction and 

guidance it can provide for U.S. operations in support of future Olympic 

Games. This confusion has impacted the efforts of some subgroups 

formed, in late 2004, by the interagency working group to provide 

guidance in several key areas. For example, of the subgroups that focus on 

 2

Established in December 2001, the interagency working group serves to coordinate U.S.

government security support efforts to U.S. embassies and host governments sponsoring

major international sporting events. The interagency working group aims to keep all 

participating agencies informed and prevent duplicative or conflicting efforts by those 

involved. 

Page 12 GAO-06-753 Olympic Security
logistics, transportation security, law enforcement, and intelligence

support, only the intelligence support subgroup meets on a regular basis.

The subgroup for law enforcement support met only a few times, in part 

due to the lack of clearly defined roles and responsibilities of participating 

members. According to a State official from DS, the interagency working 

group relied on U.S. officials in Italy to inform the group of what support 

was needed. The same official indicated that clearly defined authorities 

and responsibilities for the group’s participating agencies may support the 

implementation of effective subgroups in the future. In addition, DS 

established a major events coordination unit after the 2004 Athens 

Summer Games, in part to coordinate U.S. security support for major 

sporting events overseas, according to a State official. However, this unit 

does not have written guidance for implementing coordination

responsibilities for future Olympic events and other major sporting 

events.3

 Without formal guidance, planning for future Olympic events 

could be complicated, as roles and responsibilities will have to be 

redefined on a case-by-case basis. Moreover, given the regular turnover of 

key staff, such written guidance could facilitate the continuity of future 

planning efforts. 

To plan and coordinate U.S. security support operations, State and DOJ 

officials in Turin worked closely with representatives from the interagency

working group. However, these officials in Turin experienced difficulties 

in planning for interagency operations, in part due to problems in 

obtaining timely information and decisions from the agencies. For 

example, State and DOJ officials had difficulty identifying requirements for 

operations, such as space and classification requirements, due to 

communication challenges with the interagency community in 

Washington. According to State officials in Italy and Washington, the lack 

of proper communication capabilities in the U.S. Olympic Coordination 

Office in Turin made it difficult to obtain timely information from the 

agencies. The interagency working group worked to coordinate responses 

to these officials in Turin. However, State and FBI officials in Turin 

indicated that many of the agencies did not fully understand the 

communication infrastructure and logistical requirements until they sent 

representatives to Turin in the fall of 2005. FBI officials have stated that 

although the interagency working group works to support the needs of the 

 3

The major events coordination unit within DS is responsible for drawing on resources

throughout State to coordinate overseas security support provided to foreign governments

and U.S. missions for major events and State’s support provided to domestic events,

according to a State official and agency documents. 

Page 13 GAO-06-753 Olympic Security
U.S. effort overseas, it has no authority to task agencies to meet deadlines,

which leads to confusion over what direction and guidance should be 

followed or given by this group. 

Several U.S. agencies contributed to the U.S. security support effort in 

Turin, identifying more than $16 million in costs—over fiscal years 2005 

and 2006—to arrange and provide for this support. State initially paid for 

agencies’ shared costs, which were reimbursed by funds from the 

participating agencies; however, no formal mechanism exists for 

coordinating financial requirements associated with providing security 

support. 

Approximately 20 U.S. agencies, or their component entities, contributed 

to security efforts for the 2006 Winter Games. These contributions ranged 

from crisis management and investigative expertise to the provision of 

equipment, training, and communications and logistical support. Key 

agencies that contributed to the U.S. effort in Turin included State, DHS, 

DOD, DOE, DOJ, and intelligence agencies. State coordinated the U.S. 

interagency efforts in both Italy and Washington, D.C., and also provided 

security advice and other assistance to U.S. athletes, spectators, and 

commercial investors.4

 See table 1 for key contributions of U.S. agencies 

for the 2006 Winter Games. 

Several U.S. Agencies 

Contributed to 

Security Support for 

2006 Winter Games; 

United States Spent 

Millions on Security 

Support Activities, but 

Lacks Formal 

Mechanism for 

Coordinating 

Financial 

Requirements 

Several U.S. Agencies 

Provided Security Support 

for the 2006 Winter Games 

 4

Other U.S. assistance for U.S. athletes, spectators, and commercial investors included 

protection services, consular and public diplomacy services, and security-related 

information. 

Page 14 GAO-06-753 Olympic Security
Table 1: U.S. Agencies’ Roles and the Activities Provided for the 2006 Winter Games 

Agency/Entity or office Role/Security support activity

Department of State 

Bureau of Diplomatic 

 Security (DS) 

Protects U.S. personnel and missions overseas, advising U.S. ambassadors on all security 

matters and providing a security program against terrorist, espionage, and criminal threats at 

U.S. diplomatic facilities. 

For the Games, DS planned, developed, implemented, and coordinated with the Italian 

government to ensure that the appropriate assistance and protection was provided to U.S. 

athletes and all U.S. interests during the Games. DS assigned agents to serve in a liaison role

at each of the major sporting venues and at each official and nonofficial Olympic site, and

provided a security liaison official to work with the Italian government. 

Office of the Coordinator for

 Counterterrorism 

Heads U.S. government efforts to improve counterterrorism cooperation with foreign 

governments. 

The office led the Foreign Emergency Support Team, which is an interagency rapid-response 

team, to assist the Italian government should it request such support in the event of a terrorist 

attack. 

Consular Affairs Assists American citizens traveling or living abroad. 

Consular Affairs increased its outreach to American spectators attending the Games and 

provided various services, such as replacing lost passports. Consular Affairs also provided

support to Mission Italy’s crisis preparedness measures. 

Overseas Security Advisory

 Council (OSAC) 

Facilitates the timely exchange of information between the U.S. government and the U.S.

private sector on security issues. 

OSAC served as the lead agency for all actions concerning private sector sponsors. During the 

Games, OSAC served as the primary U.S. government point of contact for the U.S. private 

sector on security concerns. 

Department of Justice 

Federal Bureau of 

 Investigation (FBI) 

Conducts investigations and intelligence collection commensurate with the FBI’s roles and

responsibilities to identify and counter the threat posed by domestic and international terrorists 

and their supporters within the United States, and to pursue extraterritorial criminal 

investigations to bring the perpetrators of terrorist acts to justice. 

The FBI provided training, as requested by the Italian government. During the Games, FBI 

agents were prestaged in Turin to provide crisis management assistance in the event of a 

terrorist attack. 

 Criminal Division Provides training and assistance to foreign law enforcement and develops and prosecutes 

cases against perpetrators of extraterritorial terrorist acts. 

The Criminal Division offered training, coordinated with the lead terrorism prosecutor/magistrate 

for the Turin area, and prestaged a prosecutor in Turin during the Games to provide assistance 

and fulfill case development responsibilities in the event of a terrorist act. 

Department of Homeland Security

Transportation Security 

 Administration (TSA) 

Aims to prevent and deter terrorist attacks and protect against and respond to threats and 

hazards to the nation, including safeguarding the American people; their freedoms, critical

infrastructure, and property; and the economy. 

During the Games, TSA ensured compliance to federal aviation security regulations, conducted 

Federal Air Marshal missions, and acted as an advisory body both to the Italian and the U.S. 

governments for transportation security issues. 

Page 15 GAO-06-753 Olympic Security
Agency/Entity or office Role/Security support activity

Federal Air Marshal Service Protects U.S. air carriers and passengers against hostile acts. 

For the Games, the service provided additional air marshals to accompany U.S.-based carriers 

traveling to and from Italy for the Games. 

U.S. Secret Service Provides protection services for its protectees. 

During the Games, the Secret Service provided protection for their protectees that attended. 

Department of Defense

European Command Protects and advances U.S. national interests, such as the safety of U.S. citizens at home and 

abroad and the security and well-being of allies. 

Provided personnel and equipment to support U.S. security efforts in Turin. 

National Geospatial-Intelligence 

 Agency 

Provides imagery, imagery intelligence, and geospatial data and information for planning, 

decision making, and action in support of national security. 

This agency, in collaboration with Italy, provided detailed geospatial information to Italian and 

U.S. government agencies to assist with their security, consequence management, and 

emergency response planning efforts. 

Department of Energy

National Nuclear Security 

 Administration 

Promotes international nuclear safety and nonproliferation to reduce global danger from 

weapons of mass destruction.

Provided personnel in support of the Foreign Emergency Support Team, a State-led 

interagency rapid-response team. 

Other agencies The National Counterterrorism Center, the Central Intelligence Agency, among others, provided 

additional security support for the 2006 Winter Games. 

Source: GAO.

State operated under Presidential Decision Directives 62 and 39, which 

extend U.S. responsibility for protection of Americans overseas and direct 

State as the lead agency to ensure the protection of American citizens 

overseas. Furthermore, the Omnibus and Diplomatic Security and 

Antiterrorism Act of 1986 directs DS to develop and implement policies 

and programs for the security of U.S. government operations, including the 

protection of all U.S. government personnel (other than those under 

military command) on official duty abroad, and the establishment and 

operation of security functions at all U.S. government missions.5

 DS is 

responsible for the establishment and operation of post security and 

protective functions abroad,6

 and for liaisons with host nation officials to 

ensure the safety of official U.S. citizens. The Bureau of Consular Affairs is 

responsible for assisting private Americans traveling and residing abroad.

Under State’s leadership, other agencies’ individual authorities were used 

 5

22 U.S.C. 4802 (a)(1)(2). 

6

Department of State Delegation of Authority No. 214, 59 FR 50790; 1 Foreign Affairs 

Manual (FAM) 261.1 - 261.3; 12 FAM 011, 012. 

Page 16 GAO-06-753 Olympic Security
to provide specific assistance to the Italian government. For example, the 

Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has the authority under the 

Aviation and Transportation Security Act to deploy federal air marshals on 

all select flights from the United States to Italy, and TSA did so for the 

2006 Winter Games. 

United States Spent 

Millions, but Lacks a 

Formal Mechanism for 

Coordinating Financial 

Requirements for Security 

Support 

We surveyed the U.S. agencies identified as contributing security support 

in advance of and during the 2006 Winter Games. These agencies identified

more than $16 million in costs in fiscal years 2005 and 2006 to arrange and 

provide security support activities for the 2006 Winter Games,7

 with funds 

from multiple accounts.8 U.S. agencies did not receive specific Olympicrelated appropriations during this period. Of the $16 million, agencies 

reported to us that they spent more than $5 million in travel costs, 

including airfare, lodging, and per diem costs for staff who traveled 

overseas in 2005 and 2006 to provide security support for the 2006 Winter

Games. The reported costs during this period do not capture the entirety 

of costs for activities in support of the 2006 Winter Games. For example, 

while reported costs include the salaries of key personnel who filled 

Olympic-related coordination roles, they do not capture the salaries and 

benefits of other U.S. officials who worked to support the U.S. effort for 

the Games, as part of their regular duties. 

State paid for lodging and other administrative support needs associated 

with establishing U.S. operations in Turin in advance, often to secure 

limited housing at a lower rate, and these costs were later reimbursed by 

the participating agencies. Specifically, the U.S. Embassy in Rome paid for 

initial deposits on hotels because some agencies in Athens had struggled

to identify available funding—often, several years in advance of the 

Games—for their housing and logistics needs. For Turin, some agencies 

provided funds to State in advance of the Games, particularly for lodging 

deposits, while additional reimbursements were made after the Games. 

According to a State finance official in Rome, State provided $140,000 on

lodging contracts and $720,000 on joint administrative services associated 

 7

This total includes National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency costs for security support 

provided for the 2006 Winter Games, but does not include the costs incurred by other 

entities of the U.S. intelligence community. 

8

Entities within each agency used their program accounts to fund their specific activities. 

Page 17 GAO-06-753 Olympic Security
with U.S. interagency operations in Turin.9

 The U.S. Embassy in Rome was 

later reimbursed by participating agencies, including State, for their 

portion of these joint administrative services. 

According to State officials in Italy, although the U.S. Embassy in Rome 

was able to fund these expenses, it struggled to cover them, particularly as 

costs rose due to the changing requirements of the agencies in outfitting 

suitable space for their operations. These changing requirements made it 

difficult for budget personnel at the U.S. Embassy in Rome to identify total 

joint administrative costs in order to obtain funds from State and other 

agencies in a timely manner. Although the interagency working group 

coordinates the domestic side of agency support for U.S. efforts at major 

international sporting events, it does not have a formal mechanism for 

addressing funding issues associated with providing this support. State 

and DOJ officials told us that it would be easier to plan and budget for 

future Olympic-security support activities overseas, which often begin

several years in advance of the Games, if a framework were available for 

identifying costs and determining how these costs will be funded as early 

as possible. Such a framework would also be useful for anticipating 

resource needs, coordinating budgetary requests, and addressing potential

funding issues associated with providing U.S. security support to future 

overseas Games.10

Agencies have reported their expenditures associated with providing 

security support for both the 2004 Summer Games in Athens and the 2006 

Winter Games in Turin.11 Although the total reported expenditures for 

providing security support to these overseas Games are not directly 

comparable, in part due to the differing sizes of the Games and the 

 9

U.S. joint operations included the following: rental fees, commissioning and

decommissioning of the U.S. operations center, vehicle rentals, facility maintenance 

services, administrative support, communication and other equipment, and medical 

supplies. 

10Pursuant to an annual appropriations restriction enacted by Congress, agencies may not 

contribute to the interagency financing of boards, committees, or similar groups that do not 

have prior and specific statutory approval to receive financial support from multiple 

agencies. See section 810 of Public Law 109-115. This provision, however, would not

preclude agencies from providing reimbursement to State for goods and services provided

to those agencies under the authority of the Economy Act, or other appropriate authority, 

such as section 23 of State’s Basic Authorities Act 22 U.S.C. 2695. 

11GAO, Olympic Security: U.S. Support to Athens Games Provides Lessons for Future 

Olympics, GAO-05-547 (Washington, D.C.: May 31, 2005). 

Page 18 GAO-06-753 Olympic Security
differing nature of U.S. security support, they can be helpful in identifying 

future costs.12 For both Games, State and DOD reported the two largest 

portions of costs associated with providing U.S. security support. For the 

2004 Summer Games, State and DOD spent $15 million and $12.2 million, 

respectively. For the 2006 Winter Games, State and DOD spent $6.9 million 

and $6.6 million, respectively. See figure 3 for key agencies’ reported 

expenditures for security support to the 2004 Summer Games and the 2006 

Winter Games. 

Figure 3: Key Agency Expenditures for the 2004 Summer Games and the 2006 Winter Games 

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16 Federal Agency

State DOD DOJ DOE DHS

Dollars in millions

Source: GAO analysis of agency survey data on costs.

15.0

12.2

3.4

0.9 1.0

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8 Dollars in millions

State DOD DOJ DOE DHS 

Dollars in millions

6.9

6.6

2.1

0.4 0.4

2004 Summer Games 2006 Winter Games

The nature of U.S. security support provided by key agencies differed 

between the 2004 Summer Games in Athens and the 2006 Winter Games in 

Turin. For the Athens Games, the majority of costs identified by the 

agencies were travel costs for U.S. personnel supporting the Games and 

for training programs provided to Greek officials and security personnel. 

Agencies reported that they spent more than $9 million on training 

 12Except for the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, costs from the intelligence 

community entities were not included in the reported costs for U.S. security support to the 

2006 Winter Games. 

Page 19 GAO-06-753 Olympic Security
programs provided to Greek officials and security personnel, including the 

costs for building and executing the consequence management military 

exercises and FBI forensics training as well as for translating training 

materials and providing translators at the training sessions. For the Turin 

Games, U.S. agencies reported that they spent $95,000 on training 

programs for Italian officials and security personnel. As previously 

mentioned, the majority of the Turin Games costs identified by the 

agencies were for U.S. personnel travel and salary, benefits, and related 

expenditures for staff who were hired to fill Olympic-related coordination 

roles. 

Key lessons learned from the 2004 Summer Games were applied in the 

planning efforts for Turin, including (1) planning early for U.S. security 

support, (2) designating key U.S. officials to lead and deliver unified 

messages, and (3) centralizing U.S. resources and interagency operations. 

U.S. agencies are currently collecting lessons learned from the Turin 

Games, for distribution to agencies involved in security planning for the 

Beijing Games and other future Olympic Games. According to U.S. 

officials involved in the Turin Games, these lessons include the 

importance of (1) establishing a fully equipped, temporary operations 

center at the location of the Olympics when a U.S. presence is not nearby; 

(2) establishing clear roles and responsibilities for U.S. agencies in event

planning and crisis response efforts; and (3) planning for Olympic-related

expenditures over several fiscal years. 

As we reported in 2005, key lessons learned from the Athens Games that 

were highlighted in numerous agency after-action reports and in an 

interagency “lessons learned” conference in Milan were applied to the 

security planning for the Turin Games.13 These lessons included the 

importance of (1) planning early for U.S. security support, (2) designating 

key U.S. officials to lead efforts and deliver unified messages, and (3) 

centralizing U.S. agency operations and intelligence activities.

Many agency after-action reports from Athens and U.S. officials’ 

comments indicated the importance of planning early—for providing crisis 

response support, counterterrorism and intelligence support, and other 

capabilities—coupled with an understanding of host country security 

Security Planning 

Lessons Learned Were 

Applied in Turin and 

Additional Lessons 

Were Identified for 

the Beijing and Other 

Future Games 

U.S. Government Agencies 

Applied Key Lessons 

Learned from the Athens 

Games to the Turin Games 

Planning Early for U.S. Security 

Support Activities 

 13GAO-05-547. 

Page 20 GAO-06-753 Olympic Security
capabilities that an existing and cooperative bilateral relationship affords. 

Such early insight enables advance planning of baseline support, including 

logistics as well as training and military exercises to enhance the host 

country’s capabilities. Furthermore, early planning of baseline U.S. 

support enables agencies to coordinate their efforts and plan more 

efficiently and effectively, including arranging accommodations, vehicle

rentals, and communications infrastructure. For example, advance

notification of the expected U.S. agency presence would allow for 

planning of support infrastructure, including the operations and 

intelligence center. U.S. officials planning for the Turin Games identified

the importance of this lesson and began planning immediately after the 

Athens Games, almost 11⁄2 years in advance of the Turin Games. 

This lesson is being applied to the 2008 Beijing Games as the United States 

has already begun its planning efforts over 2 years in advance of the 

Games. According to U.S. officials in Beijing, U.S. officials in Greece; Italy; 

and Washington, D.C., have shared this lesson with their counterparts in 

Beijing. The U.S. Mission in Beijing is taking steps to plan for baseline 

support and identify the types of security support that the United States 

may provide for the Beijing Games. While U.S. agencies are focusing on 

the Beijing Games, they also are beginning to assess potential roles for 

U.S. security support for the 2010 Vancouver Winter Games. These plans 

are still in the early stages, although bilateral U.S.-Canada state and federal 

security and transportation officials have already met to discuss Canada’s

Olympic planning process. The Vancouver Games, located in close 

proximity to the U.S. border, will present new and different challenges for 

U.S. security support, such as cross-border security issues. 

The designation of certain U.S. officials to serve as point persons for U.S. 

security support efforts is another key lesson from Athens that was 

applied in Turin. In Athens, the U.S. Embassy had designated individuals 

to be responsible for political, security, and logistics arrangements, which 

helped to avoid separate requests for assistance from U.S. agencies and 

minimized overlap among and overreach by participating U.S. agencies. 

Athens- and Washington-based officials recommended this strategy for 

future use. In September 2004, the U.S. Ambassador to Italy delegated 

organizational responsibility and overall coordination authority for U.S. 

efforts in Turin to the U.S. Consul General in Milan. In November 2004, 

State appointed an U.S. Olympic Security Coordinator to serve in Turin as

a U.S. focal point for contacts with the host government and to work with 

the Consul General to develop and communicate a coordinated U.S. 

message, specifically on matters related to security support. This 

individual was tasked with crafting and ensuring a consistent message and

Designating Key U.S. Officials 

to Lead Efforts and Present 

Unified Message 

Page 21 GAO-06-753 Olympic Security
setting consistent expectations for the host country and multilateral 

community regarding planned U.S. security support efforts. In addition, in

January 2005, an FBI liaison arrived in Italy to serve as the FBI’s point of 

contact for its security support efforts in Turin. According to State and FBI 

officials, the U.S. Olympic Security Coordinator and FBI liaison worked 

closely together in Turin to plan for and coordinate U.S. security support 

operations in Turin. 

To coordinate the logistical arrangements and needs for U.S. operations in

Turin, State appointed a U.S. Olympic Coordinator who arrived in April 

2005. This individual served as a U.S. focal point for contacts with the host 

government, the Turin Olympic Organizing Committee, and the U.S. 

Olympic Committee and worked with the U.S. Consul General in Milan to

develop and communicate interagency information in a coordinated and

understandable way. In addition, a dedicated Web site was developed as a 

ready source of information for Americans on security matters, while also 

offering helpful advice on other matters, such as how to replace lost 

passports and locate English-speaking pharmacies. 

This lesson is being applied to the 2008 Beijing Games through State’s 

appointment of an Olympic Coordinator in June 2005, a Minister 

Counselor for Olympic Coordination in December 2005, a Deputy Olympic 

Security Coordinator in January 2006, and the U.S. Ambassador’s 

designation of an Olympic Coordination Office at the U.S. Mission in 

Beijing to coordinate all arrangements—including political, security, and 

logistical—for U.S. security support to the 2008 Summer Games. 

According to U.S. officials involved in planning for the 2008 Summer 

Games, providing consistent, clear, and targeted information for Beijing is 

needed to avert possible confusion within the Chinese government 

regarding which U.S. agency to speak with to obtain specific assistance. 

The strategy also will help ensure that U.S. citizens and interests receive 

consistent information on security and other critical issues. 

Many U.S. officials noted that the key lesson from Athens that was applied 

in Turin was the centralization of all U.S. activities in one location. U.S. 

officials involved in the Athens Games recommended that operations and

intelligence centers for future Olympics be colocated to ensure the 

efficient delivery and dissemination of information among U.S. agencies. 

U.S. officials planning for Turin identified the importance of this lesson 

and planned to better centralize resources by colocating all participating 

U.S. agencies and their functions in one facility in Turin, including 

operations and intelligence activities and consular services for U.S. 

citizens. According to U.S. officials who worked on the Turin Games, the 

Centralizing U.S. Activities in 

One Location 

Page 22 GAO-06-753 Olympic Security
colocation of all U.S. agencies and activities in one facility resulted in good 

coordination, and eliminated many planning and operations problems that 

had been experienced in Athens. 

This lesson has been communicated by Washington-, Athens-, and Italybased personnel to their counterparts in China and has been incorporated 

into planning efforts for the Beijing Games. According to U.S. officials in

Beijing, they are following the Turin model of centralizing U.S. resources, 

to coordinate interagency needs that will be specific to the Beijing Games 

and to identify any training or security support that may be provided to the 

Chinese government. By July 2006, U.S. officials in Beijing plan to have 

established a U.S. Olympic Coordination Office outside of the U.S. 

Embassy in Beijing to coordinate U.S. operations leading up to and during 

the Beijing Games. 

U.S. Agencies Identified 

Additional Lessons 

Learned in Turin 

U.S. agencies have begun to collect lessons learned from the Turin Games 

and disseminate them to their Beijing Games counterparts. According to

U.S. officials involved in the Turin Games, key lessons from Turin included 

the importance of (1) establishing a temporary, fully equipped, operations 

center at the location of the Olympics when a U.S. presence is not nearby; 

(2) establishing clear roles and responsibilities for U.S. agencies in event

planning and operations; and (3) planning early for Olympic-related costs. 

Officials at State, DOJ, and other key agencies are currently completing 

after-action reports that are expected to highlight aspects of security 

support that went well and should be replicated in the future, where 

feasible, and what aspects could be improved upon. At the time of our 

review, State and DOJ expected to complete their after-action reports in 

June 2006. In addition, the Washington-based interagency working group is 

completing an after-action report that is expected to discuss issues 

specific to the support provided by this group. According to State, the 

interagency working group’s after-action report is expected to be 

completed later this year. 

The lack of a U.S. presence in Turin demonstrated the importance of 

establishing a fully equipped operations center at the location of the 

Games. Acquiring and outfitting suitable space for an interagency 

operations center require advance planning, particularly when a U.S. 

presence is not nearby. In Turin, which is a 90-minute drive from the 

nearest U.S. Consulate, the U.S. Mission faced unique challenges in 

establishing a temporary but suitable space for centralizing interagency

operations, particularly those related to logistics, communications, and 

resources. For example, the U.S. Consulate in Milan used its staff to 

Establishing a U.S. Operations 

Center at the Location of 

Games 

Page 23 GAO-06-753 Olympic Security
provide logistical support to the U.S. coordinators in Turin, such as the 

establishment of work space and other administrative support services. 

Since the U.S. Olympic Coordination Office was not established until July

2005, the U.S. coordinators in Turin worked from their homes and traveled 

between Milan and Turin to coordinate the U.S. efforts. 

In addition, proper space and classification requirements of participating 

agencies were difficult to identify in early planning efforts, in part due to 

the lack of proper communication capabilities between U.S. officials in 

Turin and U.S. agencies in Washington, D.C. Agency officials in Italy and 

Washington attributed this difficulty, in part, to this being the first time 

that the United States had attempted to establish a temporary U.S. facility 

to coordinate security support provided by all participating U.S. agencies. 

Although these challenges were resolved in time for the Turin Games, U.S. 

officials in Italy and Washington stated that authoritative decision making 

is necessary for budgeting and identifying requirements for setting up an 

interagency operation center. 

Due to the presence of a U.S. Embassy in Beijing and three U.S. 

Consulates near other Olympic venues, U.S. operations in Beijing will not 

require the establishment of a fully equipped U.S. operations center. 

However, shortage of space at the U.S. Mission requires the establishment 

of a U.S. Olympic Coordination Office outside of the U.S. Embassy in 

Beijing. U.S. officials in Beijing and at the interagency working group in 

Washington have begun discussing the communication, infrastructure, and 

other logistical requirements for centralizing and coordinating U.S. agency

security support efforts before and during the Beijing Games. In addition, 

U.S. officials have held preplanning discussions for the 2010 Vancouver 

Games regarding work space and operating requirements. 

The Turin Games and, to some degree, the Athens Games demonstrated 

the importance of establishing clear roles and responsibilities for U.S. 

agencies in the planning and operational stages of U.S. security support 

efforts. While security support for the Turin Games was generally wellcoordinated, U.S. agency officials at State and DOJ have stated that the

overall U.S. effort lacks a clear strategy for security support operations at 

future overseas sporting events. These officials indicated that clear 

guidance for U.S. agencies’ roles and responsibilities would identify 

authorities for decision making and responsibilities during both the 

planning and operational stages of the U.S. efforts. U.S. officials in Turin 

prepared an operational plan that was approved by the U.S. Mission in 

Rome, which outlined the missions of all participating agencies and 

identified reporting authorities for U.S. operations. However, according to

Establishing Clear Roles and 

Responsibilities for U.S. 

Agencies 

Page 24 GAO-06-753 Olympic Security
State and DOJ officials, although State is the lead agency for ensuring the 

protection of American citizens overseas, the United States does not have

a strategy that clearly outlines the authorities responsible for planning 

operations at future Olympic Games. 

U.S. support for the Turin Games demonstrated the importance of 

planning early for Olympic-related costs. In particular, State and DOJ 

officials noted the importance of identifying early funding sources to make 

advance payments on housing and logistical needs. In Turin, State 

struggled to identify funds to secure space, communication, and 

transportation arrangements, among other expenses, for interagency

operations. Although U.S. officials in Italy were able to secure funding for 

housing and space for U.S. operations, they indicated that it was difficult 

to obtain timely decisions from the interagency to budget and identify 

requirements for the establishment of a U.S. presence in Turin. State 

officials in Italy indicated that they were unable to address these issues 

until the fall of 2005, when agency representatives came to Italy for 

operational planning meetings. According to a State finance official in 

Italy, funds for the joint administrative costs were easier to obtain once 

the U.S. coordinators in Turin and the interagency were able to identify 

operational requirements. In addition, several U.S. officials in Italy and 

Washington, D.C., stated that, for future overseas Games, it would be 

easier for agencies to identify and plan for their portion of Olympic-related

expenditures if a framework were available for identifying costs and 

addressing funding issues associated with providing security support. 

Planning Early for Several 

Years of Olympic-Related Costs 

U.S. officials in Italy and Washington, D.C., have shared this lesson with 

their counterparts in Beijing. According to U.S. officials in Beijing, they 

have already begun to address housing and logistics needs, such as 

planning to make initial deposits on hotels early to avoid high costs for 

accommodations as the Games draw nearer. However, these officials 

indicated potential problems with identifying funds early enough to cover

expenditures for this fiscal year. 

Page 25 GAO-06-753 Olympic Security
The United States is currently taking steps to coordinate a U.S. security 

presence and identify the types of security support that the United States 

may provide for the 2008 Beijing Games. U.S.-Chinese counterterrorism 

cooperation is limited, and U.S. officials have stated that they lack 

knowledge of China’s capabilities to handle security for the Olympics. In 

addition, technology transfer and human rights issues present new and 

different challenges for U.S. security support to these Games. 

The U.S. government, led by State, is actively working to identify and 

establish a U.S. security presence to support the interests of its athletes, 

spectators, and commercial investors during the Games. The U.S. 

Ambassador to China has designated a U.S. Olympic Coordination Office 

to be responsible for all arrangements—including political, security, and 

logistical—of U.S. efforts for the Beijing Games. In January 2006, State 

appointed a U.S. Deputy Olympic Security Coordinator to serve—in this 

new office—as a U.S. government point person for U.S. security support 

for the Beijing Games. In addition, the U.S. Olympic Coordinator and the 

Minister Counselor for Olympic Coordination, appointed by State in June

and December 2005, respectively, serve as the point persons for logistic 

arrangements of U.S. efforts. Both the U.S. Deputy Olympic Security 

Coordinator and the U.S. Olympic Coordinator were in Turin to participate 

in U.S. security support for the 2006 Winter Games and to learn from their 

counterparts in Turin. To ensure the safety of U.S. athletes, spectators, and 

commercial investors, State has taken steps to identify and secure 

logistical support. To help identify necessary housing and mitigate high 

prices on accommodations, State has begun to identify housing options for 

U.S. personnel, coordinating through the interagency group for estimates 

of personnel to be temporarily assigned to Beijing during the Games. 

Planning Efforts Are 

Under Way to Identify 

U.S. Security Support 

for 2008 Beijing 

Games; Efforts Face 

Unique Challenges 

While China has not yet requested U.S. security assistance as of May 2006,

State officials have received inquiries from Chinese officials regarding 

Olympic security. As of April 2006, discussions between the United States

and China were under way for an assessment to identify security needs 

and U.S. security support for the Beijing Games, according to U.S. officials

in Beijing and Washington, D.C. In addition, a working group has been 

established between U.S. and Chinese counterparts to discuss issues 

related to the operational and intelligence side of security. U.S. officials 

have stated that the Chinese have recognized the large size of the U.S. 

team and its associated security risks and concerns. 

Although recent steps have been taken, U.S. officials have stated that they 

lack knowledge of China’s advanced capabilities to handle security for the 

2008 Summer Games. In addition, U.S. officials from State and DOJ have 

Page 26 GAO-06-753 Olympic Security
stated that they are uncertain about the extent of assistance China may 

request or permit from outside sources. Moreover, U.S. and Chinese 

counterterrorism cooperation is limited, and military relations have only 

recently resumed. In July 2003, China joined the U.S. Container Security 

Initiative, and, in November 2005, the United States and China signed an

agreement related to the U.S. Megaports Initiative, allowing for the 

installation of special equipment at Chinese ports to detect hidden 

shipments of nuclear and other radioactive materials. The United States 

has recently resumed, under the current administration, military-tomilitary contacts with China. 

In planning for the 2008 Summer Games in Beijing, logistical challenges 

and technology transfers and human rights issues present unique 

challenges for U.S. security support. The location of the Beijing Games 

presents unique logistical challenges in coordinating U.S. security support. 

Whereas past Summer Games have been centered in and around the host

city, the venues for the Beijing Games will be spread across seven Chinese 

cities along the country’s eastern border, presenting potential

communication challenges for interagency operations between the U.S. 

Embassy Beijing and U.S. Consulates located near Olympic venue sites. 

Figure 4 presents the seven venue cities for the Beijing Games—Beijing, 

Qingdao, Hong Kong, Shanghai, Tianjin, Shenyang, and Qinhuangdao—and

the U.S. embassy and three consulates located at Olympic venue cities. 

Unlike the 2004 Summer Games in Athens, U.S. officials have stated the 

Chinese are much further ahead in planning for the 2008 Summer Games, 

and these officials anticipate that the venues will be completed on time or 

ahead of schedule. To prepare for the 2008 Beijing Games, China is 

planning to host several events in 2007 to test its preparations for major 

event operations. 

Page 27 GAO-06-753 Olympic Security
Figure 4: Venue Locations for the 2008 Beijing Summer Olympics 

RUSSIA

KYRGYZSTAN

TAJIKISTAN

INDIA

CHINA

KAZAKHSTAN

MYANMAR

THAILAND

NEPAL

BHUTAN

VIETNAM

LAOS

BANGLADESH

PHILIPPINES

MONGOLIA

SOUTH KOREA

NORTH KOREA

JAPAN PAKISTAN

Qingdao

Hong Kong

Shanghai

Tianjin

Shenyang

Qinhuangdao

Beijing

Capital city and site of 2008 Summer Games

Olympic venue sites

U.S. Consulate in (Hong Kong, Shanghai, and Shenyang)

Sources: GAO and MapArt.

In addition, any requests for equipment or technology to support security 

efforts in China must be addressed under U.S. requirements for the 

protection against sensitive technology transfers, because U.S. sanctions 

deny the export of defense articles/services, crime control equipment, and 

Page 28 GAO-06-753 Olympic Security
satellites to China. A presidential waiver for exports of equipment for 

security of the Beijing Olympics may be considered.14 U.S. policy makers 

and human rights groups have also expressed concern with several human 

rights issues in China, including freedom of information, freedom of 

religion, and protection of ethnic and minority groups. 

In a climate of increased concerns about international terrorism, ensuring 

the protection of U.S. interests at future Olympic Games overseas will 

continue to be a priority for the United States. For such future Games, U.S. 

agencies are likely to continue providing support to host governments in 

identifying potential security threats and developing strategies to protect 

U.S. athletes, spectators, and commercial investors several years in 

advance of and throughout the Olympics. Although each Olympic Games 

has its own set of unique security requirements, future coordination of 

U.S. security support efforts for Games—under the leadership of State—

should efficiently and effectively capture the expertise, knowledge, and 

resource requirements of all U.S. agencies. However, there is currently no

formal framework for guiding the development and implementation of U.S. 

security support for such Games, particularly the coordinated financing of 

U.S. security support and operations.

To enhance planning and preparations for future overseas Olympic and 

Paralympic Games, we recommend that the Secretary of State, in 

consultation with members of the International Athletic Events Security 

Coordinating Group, take the following two actions: 

Conclusions 

Recommendations 

• Develop written guidance for providing U.S. government security support 

to future Games. This guidance should identify key personnel and target 

dates for their assignment and roles and responsibilities, and key steps for 

the U.S. Mission and regional bureau to undertake in preparing for and 

leading the U.S. efforts at future Games. To formalize the process for 

providing security support overseas, we also recommend that State, in 

consultation with members of the International Athletic Events Security 

Coordinating Group, consider establishing a charter and mission 

statement for this group that identifies authorities and responsibilities for 

coordinating and supporting U.S. security efforts at future Games. 

 14The President recently signed a waiver for an one-time shipment of equipment and 

technology for the construction of the new U.S. Embassy in Beijing. 

Page 29 GAO-06-753 Olympic Security
• Develop a finance subgroup as part of the International Athletic Events 

Security Coordinating Group, which would bring together budgetary 

personnel from the various agencies or component entities that contribute 

to security efforts for overseas Games. A formal mechanism, such as a 

finance subgroup with established responsibilities, would help the 

agencies plan for anticipated resources needs, coordinate their budget 

requests, and address potential funding issues for U.S. security support at 

future Games. 

We provided a draft of this report to the Secretaries of Defense, Energy,

Homeland Security, and State and to the Attorney General for their review 

and comment. The Department of State provided written comments on the 

draft report, which are reprinted in appendix II. State said that it agreed

with our findings and recommendations, and that it is working to develop 

a more efficient plan for coordinating the planning and implementation of 

U.S. security support at future major events overseas—including the 

development of written guidance and identified roles and responsibilities 

for interagency working group members—through an after-action review

of the International Athletic Events Security Coordinating Group and by 

working with the National Security Council, Counterterrorism Security 

Group. Furthermore, State said that the interagency working group has 

expanded its working subgroups and is considering the inclusion of a 

budget subgroup to address potential funding issues for U.S. security 

support at future Olympic Games. State also provided technical 

comments, which we incorporated where appropriate. 

The Departments of Defense and Justice did not provide written 

comments on the draft report; however, they provided technical 

comments, which we incorporated where appropriate. The Departments 

of Energy and Homeland Security did not provide written or technical 

comments. 

We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional 

committees, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary

of Homeland Security, the Secretary of Energy, and the Attorney General.

We will also make copies available to others upon request. In addition, the 

report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at 

http://www.gao.gov. 

Agency Comments 

Page 30 GAO-06-753 Olympic Security
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me 

at (202) 512-4128 or ford@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of 

Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page 

of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix III. 

Jess T. Ford

Director, International Affairs and Trade 

Page 31 GAO-06-753 Olympic Security
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 

Methodology 

To fulfill our objectives in identifying U.S. security strategies in providing 

security support for the 2006 Winter Games, the various roles and 

additional costs of the U.S. agencies involved, and the lessons they learned 

in supporting the Games, we specifically obtained and reviewed several 

documents, such as available operations and mission plans, security 

situation reports, and monthly activity reports. In addition, we interviewed

officials at the Departments of State (State), Justice (DOJ), Homeland 

Security (DHS), Defense (DOD), and Energy (DOE) and at certain 

intelligence agencies. We also conducted fieldwork in Rome, Milan, and 

Turin, Italy. 

At State, we interviewed officials in the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, 

Coordinator for Counterterrorism office; Overseas Security Advisory 

Council; Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs; Consular Affairs; and 

Public Affairs. We also interviewed the U.S. Olympic Security Coordinator 

and the U.S. Olympic Coordinator. At DOJ, we interviewed officials in the 

Criminal Division and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 

Counterterrorism Division, including the FBI’s Olympic coordinator who 

served as its liaison in Turin through the operational period of the Games. 

At DHS, we met with officials from the Transportation Security 

Administration, the U.S. Secret Service, and the Federal Air Marshal 

Service. At DOD, we spoke with officials from the Office of the Secretary 

of Defense and European Command. At DOE, we spoke with officials from 

the National Nuclear Security Administration. Finally, we regularly 

attended and met with the interagency working group—the International

Athletic Events Security Coordinating Group—that includes all agencies 

involved in providing support to international sporting events overseas. 

During our fieldwork in Italy in November 2005, we obtained documents 

and interviewed key U.S. officials from the previously mentioned agencies. 

We obtained and reviewed key documents, such as operational and 

mission plans. In Rome, we interviewed U.S. officials, including the 

Deputy Chief of Mission, Regional Security Officer, Minister Counselor for 

Management Affairs, Financial Management Officer, Information 

Management Officer, Legal Attaché, Public Affairs Officer, Immigration 

and Customs Enforcement Attaché, Transportation and Security 

Administration representative, Defense Attaché, and Consular officer. 

Additionally, we attended an interagency operations and capabilities 

presentation for the Chief of Mission. Also, we met with representatives 

from the Italian Ministry of Interior to obtain the Italian government’s 

perspective on the security support provided by the United States. During 

our fieldwork in Milan, we interviewed U.S. officials, including the Consul 

General, Milan; Management Officer; Vice Consul; Public Affairs Officers; 

Page 32 GAO-06-753 Olympic Security
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 

and Consular Officer. In Turin, we interviewed the U.S. Olympic 

Coordinator and the U.S. Olympic Security Coordinator. We also visited 

the U.S. Olympic Coordination Center in Turin and observed preparations

for outfitting the center for the planned operations and intelligence center. 

Additionally, to understand the challenges associated with providing 

security support to the distant Olympic venues, we visited several of the 

Olympics venue sites in Turin, including in Palavela, Pragelato, Sestriere,

and Bardonecchia, Italy.

To determine cost estimates of U.S. security support to the 2006 Winter 

Games, we developed a data collection instrument (DCI), based on the 

previous DCI we used to obtain cost estimates for the 2004 Athens Games, 

to survey agencies identified as contributing to the U.S. effort. A draft DCI 

was pretested on two U.S. government agencies. In November 2005, we 

sent a preliminary DCI to agencies identified by State as being involved in

the U.S. security support effort and obtained 11 responses. In March 2006, 

we sent a final DCI to the agencies previously identified and obtained 20

responses. Except for the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the 

intelligence community entities did not provide a response to our final DCI 

on costs for the 2006 Winter Games. Our DCI requested agencies to 

identify how they collected and tracked the data on costs. We conducted

follow-ups with the agencies to clarify information in their responses. We 

observed that not all agency components collect and track data in a 

consistent manner. Furthermore, the DCI did not attempt to gather 

information on the costs of personnel salaries, which are presumed to be a 

significant outlay for the agency components involved. To assess the 

reliability of the estimates provided, we compared the preliminary results 

with the final results and compared this year’s 2006 results with those for 

2004. In addition, we considered the cost factors cited by the agencies in 

relation to the sums they reported and conducted follow-ups with the 

agencies to clarify any questions that arose. We determined that these data 

were sufficiently reliable to be reported in aggregated form, rounded to 

millions, and attributed to the agencies, as estimated cost outlays and by 

category of expenditure, but not in precise, detailed form. 

To assess how lessons learned in supporting Greece were applied to the 

Turin Games, we gathered information from the various agencies 

previously mentioned; reviewed operations plans; attended meetings of 

the State-chaired interagency working group in Washington, D.C.; and 

conducted fieldwork in Rome, Milan, Turin, and mountain areas of Italy.

To identify lessons learned from the Turin Games, we gathered 

information from the various agencies and attended meetings of the 

interagency working group. Although after-action reports were not 

Page 33 GAO-06-753 Olympic Security
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 

completed and available at the time of our audit, to identify lessons 

learned, we interviewed key officials at State, DOJ, the U.S. Consulate 

Milan, and the U.S. Coordination Center in Turin and attended the 

interagency working group meetings. To identify how lessons learned in 

Turin are being applied to the 2008 Beijing Games, we interviewed U.S. 

officials from State and DOJ and the U.S. Olympic Coordinator and U.S. 

Deputy Olympic Security Coordinator at the U.S. Mission in Beijing. 

To identify efforts under way for providing support to the 2008 Summer 

Games in Beijing, we gathered information from the various agencies 

previously mentioned; reviewed China’s Mission Performance Plan; 

attended meetings of the State-chaired interagency working group in 

Washington, D.C.; and interviewed the Deputy Olympic Security 

Coordinator and Olympic Coordinator at the U.S. Mission in Beijing. 

We conducted our work from September 2005 to May 2006 in accordance 

with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Page 34 GAO-06-753 Olympic Security
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of State Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of State 

Page 35 GAO-06-753 Olympic Security
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of State 

Page 36 GAO-06-753 Olympic Security
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of State 

Page 37 GAO-06-753 Olympic Security
Appendix III: GAO

St

 Contact and 

aff Acknowledgments

Page 38 GAO-06-753 

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

Jess T. Ford, Director, (202) 512-4268

Key contributors to this report included Diana Glod, Monica Brym, and 

Dorian L. Herring. Technical assistance was provided by Jason Bair, Joe 

Carney, Martin de Alteris, Etana Finkler, Ernie Jackson, Jena Sinkfield,

George Taylor, and Mike TenKate. 

Olympic Security

GAO Contact 

Staff 

Acknowledgments 

(320381) 
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