Faith and Hope in a 

War-Torn Land: The 

US Army Chaplaincy 

in the Balkans,

1995–2005

CH (LTC) Kenneth E. Lawson

Combat Studies Institute Press

Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027
Cover photo by Gary N. Cassidy, “Peacekeepers on the Princip Bridge,” 

courtesy of The Bosnia Art Project, Center for Military History.
Faith and Hope in a 

War-Torn Land: The 

US Army Chaplaincy 

in the Balkans,

1995–2005

CH (LTC) Kenneth E. Lawson

Combat Studies Institute Press

Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Lawson, Kenneth E., 1961-

 Faith and hope in a war-torn land : the U.S. Army chaplaincy in the 

Balkans, 1995-2005 / by Kenneth E. Lawson.

 p. cm.

 Includes bibliographical references and index.

 1. Bosnia and Hercegovina--History--1992- 2. Peacekeeping forces-

-Bosnia and Hercegovina. 3. Kosovo (Serbia)--History--1980- 4. 

Peacekeeping forces--Serbia and Montenegro--Kosovo (Serbia) 5. United 

States. Army. Chaplain Corps--History--20th century. 6. United States. 

Army. Chaplain Corps--History--21st century. 7. Lawson, Kenneth E., 

1961- I. Title. 

 DR1750.L39 2006

 949.703--dc22

 [B]

 2006021509

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, US Government Printing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; DC area (202) 512-1800

Fax: (202) 512-2250 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402-0001

ISBN 0-16-076436-X
iii

Foreword

In Faith and Hope in a War-Torn Land: The US Army Chaplaincy in 

the Balkans, 1995–2005, Chaplain (Lieutenant Colonel) Ken Lawson has 

provided the Army with an unusual and much needed perspective on its 

history. The Combat Studies Institute is proud to add this study from the 

US Army Chaplain Corps to our Special Studies series of publications.

The Chaplain Corps, with justifiable pride, has demonstrated in this 

study the key role played by the Reserve components (Army National 

Guard and Army Reserve) in providing religious support to the Army. 

While this has become routine today, it was certainly not the case in 1995. 

This is yet another step forward in the integration of the Active and Reserve 

components in the Army.

This study analyzes the planning, command and control, and operations 

of the Chaplain Corps, but its target audience should be much larger. 

Commanders and staff officers alike will gain a better appreciation for 

what it takes to implement an effective ministry program for their units by 

reading this study. They will also gain insights about the operational role 

that chaplains can play in the accomplishment of the Army’s objectives in 

a theater of operations.

We believe this work will be a valuable addition to the Army’s history. 

CSI—The Past is Prologue!

Timothy R. Reese

Colonel, Armor

Director, Combat Studies Institute

v

Foreword

Chaplain (Lieutenant Colonel) Ken Lawson has added a significant 

body of research to the Army Chaplaincy history with Faith and Hope in 

a War-Torn Land: The US Army Chaplaincy in the Balkans, 1995–2005.

Thorough research with a blend of names and stories from those who 

served there provides a historical sketch that will enable interested parties 

to examine this oft-neglected period of chaplain history.

Chaplain Lawson’s initial historical review of the Balkans provides 

the setting to help one understand what led to America’s involvement in 

the region. He deftly works his way through the key points of a confusing 

history that ultimately leads to US and international engagement in the 

area. Later in the book, he provides an excellent summary of the Bosnia and 

Kosovo regions and the consequent US presence there. This background 

information is very helpful in understanding the crucial nature of chaplain 

ministry, because much of the Balkans conflict is related to religious 

issues.

Chaplain Lawson’s use of personal Army chaplain and chaplain assistant 

accounts makes up the bulk of the work. His use of quotes, stories, written 

accounts, and personal observations provides a broad look at religious 

ministry in this relatively new Army environment—an environment of 

peacekeeping and multinational, joint-service coordination. He points out 

that the religious support in the Balkans conflict was also a period in which 

the Army had to use the Reserve components (Army National Guard and 

Army Reserve) in a significant way.

This excellent book provides a wealth of practical and timely 

information that will serve the Army chaplaincy well into the future. It 

should also prove to be a valuable addition to any study of this region and 

this period of history.

Chaplain (BG) Douglas E. Lee

Assistant Chief of Chaplains for

 Mobilization and Readiness
vii

Preface

This study of United States (US) Army chaplains and chaplain assistants serving in the Balkans would not have been possible without the support and cooperation of many of the Unit Ministry Team (UMT) members 

who were there and were willing to tell their stories. On completion, a 

tour of duty in the Balkans was almost universally considered inglorious 

duty. For those US Army troops who arrived in Bosnia in late 1995 and 

1996, accommodations were miserable. Undeveloped base camps, miserable traveling conditions, inhospitable weather, and the ever-present 

threat from land mines and snipers made the early years of the US Army 

in Bosnia quite challenging. In 1999, Kosovo repeated the same scenario.

Initially, the US military involvement in the Balkans was predicted 

to last about 1 year. At the time of this writing, the US military has been 

in the Balkans for more than 10 years. Much of the US military presence 

in that region faded once missions were accomplished. Large numbers of 

base camps have closed or been turned over to European allies. Currently, 

the US Army has approximately 2,500 troops in Kosovo and about 250 in 

Bosnia,1 these numbers being a fraction of the Army soldiers stationed in 

the Balkans several years earlier. 

The entry of the US military into the Balkans in 1995 was not an 

attack on a nation that threatened the vital interests or national security of 

the United States. Essentially, the US military was sent to the Balkans on 

a humanitarian, peacemaking, and peacekeeping mission. As Yugoslavia 

imploded and civil tensions developed into ethnic cleansing (genocide), 

President Bill Clinton, for moral and humanitarian reasons, committed US 

troops to the area. This was a mission against an aggressive and illusive 

foe. The Army of Serbia was formidable for their region, but nowhere near 

the class of the juggernaut US military. As one author stated, “America has 

long been more powerful than all but a handful of countries, so the cost of 

intervention in small states has always been low. Or so it appeared before 

virtually every conflict; it did not always work out that way.”2

Providing religious support to US soldiers in the Balkans was a challenge to Army chaplains. Beginning with minimal resources or supplies, 

chaplains met the religious needs of soldiers in both formal and informal 

settings. Chaplains conducted religious services, counseling, prayer meetings, family reunion meetings, and morale enhancing lectures in often 

austere and humble situations and circumstances. As the years went on, 

more and better chapels were constructed in the Balkans; these buildings 

became the focal point for religious activities for soldiers. Chaplains also 

led or participated in humanitarian or nation-building missions related to 
viii

developing friendships with the local populations. Army chaplains delivered huge amounts of donated supplies from religious and other groups in 

the United States to the destitute of the Balkans. Further, Army chaplains 

led the way in creating opportunities for discussion of religious and social 

issues with indigenous clergy, these groups often composed of Muslim, 

Roman Catholic, and Orthodox Christian groups that have been antagonists for centuries.3

My personal experiences in the Balkans were in the years 2002 and 

2003. While assigned as an Army chaplain with the 7th Army Reserve 

Command (ARCOM) in Heidelberg, Germany, I was able to make five 

short ministry trips to various sites in the Balkans. Small numbers of soldiers from my Army Reserve unit mobilized and deployed to locations 

in Bosnia, Kosovo, Hungary, and Macedonia. I also went to the Balkans 

with the approval of the US Army Europe (USAREUR) chaplain and my 

commander at the 7th ARCOM, Brigadier General (BG) David Zabecki, 

to troubleshoot integration issues between Reserve component chaplains 

and Active Duty chaplains.

These trips, 5 to 10 days each, were to soldiers stationed far away 

from home. It was a rewarding experience for me. By 2002–2003, the 

major security risk for US soldiers in the Balkans was past. Nevertheless, 

the physical destruction was still evident in many places. Burned out and 

bombed buildings were common, while in small villages and in cities like 

Pristina there were still bullet holes in numerous buildings, demolished 

structures, and bomb craters. Driving in a small convoy from Sarajevo to 

Tuzla in Bosnia revealed numerous signs of military destruction. The road 

from Pristina Airport near Camp Bondsteel in Kosovo south to Camp Able 

Sentry near Skopje in Macedonia was treacherous itself, even without the 

malicious looks from the local populous. In Bosnia, I stood and prayed 

at the killing fields in Srebrenica, where Serbian troops murdered several 

thousand Muslim men and boys while people in nearby villages heard 

random gunfire at night.

I will always have fond memories of ministering to soldiers in the 

Balkans as they performed their missions in a hostile fire zone. Although 

there were no US casualties as a direct result of combat with enemy forces, 

there were numerous fatalities from land mines, malfunctioning or mishandled weapons, traffic accidents, aircraft crashes, and suicides. In these 

instances of death, grief, loss, frustration, and pain, there were Army 

chaplains to minister to those in need of spiritual or emotional strength. 

Chaplains also conducted more routine chapel-based ministries such as 

religious services, holiday celebrations, family reunion lectures, Bible 
ix

studies, tours of local religious sites, and similar things. Chaplain David 

Zalis recalled:

I was the first KFOR Chaplain. There was always a sense 

of danger in Kosovo in 1999. We had good military intelligence that told us when civilian riots were happening 

and we avoided those areas at those times. There was a 

lot of hate in the people’s faces, toward each other and 

toward the NATO troops in their country. The US and 

NATO troops did a remarkable job of peacekeeping and 

were very restrained in dealing with the ethnic and religious hatred in the region.4

I wish to express my appreciation to Dr. John Brinsfield, US Army 

Chaplain Corps Historian, for his encouragement and guidance throughout 

this project. The librarians at the US Army Chaplain Center and School 

provided me invaluable assistance in gathering resources for this work. I 

take full responsibility for any mistakes in the text.

Chaplain (LTC) Kenneth E. Lawson

US Army, 2006
x

Notes

1. Army Times, 17 October 2005, 7.

2. Max Boot, The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of 

American Power (New York: Perseus Books, 2002), xx. 

3. Ronald L. Cobb, Memories of Bosnia: The 35th Division’s SFOR 13 

NATO Peacekeeping Mission (Bloomington, IN: AuthorHouse Publishers, 2004), 

183–279. While in Bosnia, Chaplain (COL) Cobb was the Command Chaplain for 

the 35th Infantry Division, Kansas Army National Guard.

4. Chaplain (BG) David Zalis, interview by author, 4 May 2005.
xi

Contents

Page

Foreword

Colonel Timothy R. Reese, Director, Combat Studies Institute .......iii

Chaplain (BG) Douglas E. Lee, Assistant Chief of Chaplains 

for Mobilization and Readiness ......................................................v

Preface ...................................................................................................vii

Chapter 1. Introduction .........................................................................1

2. Background: A War-torn Region of the World.....................7

3. The Bosnia Theater of Operations ....................................23

 Events Leading to US Military Activity in Bosnia ............23

Preparations for the First US Army Chaplains to 

Arrive in Bosnia, 1995 ................................................27

Initial Chaplain Activities and Ministries in Bosnia, 1996 ....34

Developing Chaplain Ministries in Bosnia, 1996 .............42

Expanding Chaplain Ministries in Bosnia and Surrounding Areas, 1996–97 ............................................48

Chaplain Accounts of Ministry in Bosnia, 1997................56

Diverse Chaplain Ministries in Peacekeeping in 

Bosnia, 1998................................................................65

Chaplain Duties in Maintaining the Peace in Bosnia, 

1999–2000...................................................................74

Army Chaplain Ministries in Bosnia, 2001–2002 .............83

Chaplain Activities During Military Downsizing in 

Bosnia, 2003–2005......................................................93

4. The Kosovo Theater of Operations .................................109

Background to Contemporary Hostilities in Kosovo .....109

Preparations for the First US Army Chaplains to 

Arrive in Kosovo.......................................................115

Initial Chaplain Activities and Ministries in Kosovo, 1999..122

Ministry to Displaced Kosovar Refugees........................130

Developing Chaplain Issues in Kosovo, 2000–2001.......137
xii

Page

Chaplain Duties in Maintaining the Peace in Kosovo, 

2002–2004................................................................ 144

The US Army Chaplaincy and Downsizing in Kosovo, 

2004–2005................................................................ 153

Chapter 5. Conclusion ...................................................................... 169

About the Author ................................................................................. 177

Glossary .............................................................................................. 179

Bibliography ....................................................................................... 183

Appendix, US Army Deaths and Serious Injuries in the Balkans ....... 191

Index of Chaplains and Chaplain Assistants........................................ 193

Maps

1. The Balkans....................................................................................... 1 

2. Disintegration of Austria-Hungary, 1918 ....................................... 15

3. Administrative Divisions of Yugoslavia, 1990 ............................... 18

4. Divisions of Bosnia in sectors led by the British, French, and 

United States ................................................................................... 27

5. A 2000 map of Kosovo ................................................................. 113

6. A 2000 map of the former Yugoslavia with province of Kosovo 

highlighted .................................................................................... 125

Figures

1. UMT members (left to right) MSG Paul Wanshon, CH (CPT) 

Jamie MacLean, and CH (LTC) Scott McChrystal, Eagle Base, 

Bosnia, 1995–96 ............................................................................. 28

2. USAREUR CH (COL) Henry Wake (far right) visits UMTs in 

Bosnia ............................................................................................. 31

3. Engineering Excellence, a painting by Christopher Thiel 

showing the US Army crossing the Sava River ............................. 33

4. Sketch by Gary N. Cassidy of US Army staging base in Taszar, 

Hungary .......................................................................................... 35

5. Army Chief of Chaplains (MG) Donald Shea visits with Task 

Force Eagle soldiers in Bosnia, 1996 ............................................. 39
xiii

Page

6. Winter/spring 1996 home of CH (CPT) Yarmen and CA SPC 

McAniff in Bosnia ...........................................................................43

7. General Wesley Clark, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe .........66

8. CH (MAJ) Al Shrum presides at a memorial service for a soldier 

who died in Bosnia from a heart attack while exercising ................91

9. CH (LTC) F. Douglas Hudson and CA SFC Margarita Brunke at 

the Grab Potok Refugee Camp, Bosnia ...........................................97

10. CH (LTC) Eric Ebb greets parishioners after a service at Eagle 

Base, Bosnia, 2004 ........................................................................100

11. Ethnic Albanians wave on arrival at New Jersey’s McGuire Air 

Force Base .....................................................................................132

12. CH (CPT) Mohammed Khan ministers to the religious needs of 

Muslim ethnic Albanians at Fort Dix, NJ ......................................136

13. US Army Chief of Chaplains (MG) David Hicks (center) and 

his CA CSM Robert Bush (second from left) meet with US and 

NATO chaplains in Kosovo, February 2002 .................................146

14. CH (LTC) Gregg Drew with residents of a mental health 

hospital in Kosovo .........................................................................153

15. SGT Jasmine Yates (rear) with children from the Kamenica 

area ................................................................................................161



Chapter 1

Introduction

At the time of this writing, the US Army operations in the Balkans 

are only a fraction of what they were 10 years ago. The term “Balkans” 

is a common way of describing the geographic region composed of the 

peninsula-shaped land mass between Italy and Turkey in Eastern Europe. 

The etymology of the word “Balkan” comes from the Turkish word for 

mountain or a highland slope.1 Noting the divisive and fragmented civil 

history of this region, in the English language the word “balkanize” has 

come to mean “to divide (a country, territory, etc.) into small, often quarrelsome states.”2

 Modern nations that fall in the geographic region of the 

Balkans are Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Rumania, and European Turkey; 

and the states spawned from the collapsed nation of Yugoslavia, namely 

Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, and Slovenia. What is left of 

the former Yugoslavia is now called the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 

(Serbia and Montenegro). Sometimes Hungary is considered a Balkans 

nation and sometimes it is excluded.

Map 1. The Balkans.

Department of Defense
President Bill Clinton’s administration was initially reluctant to fully 

engage and confront the civil, military, and cultural turmoil of this region. 

Many perceived the internal strife of the Balkans as a black hole, a hopeless 

religious and cultural quagmire best avoided by the US military. Clinton 

remarked in 1992 that he was 100 days into office and was frustrated 

over the US policy in the Balkans. Clinton criticized his predecessor’s 

role in allowing Bosnia to dissolve into a civil war, stating that peace 

in the Balkans was “a long way from a solution.” He further described 

the handling of the situation by the United Nations (UN) and the North 

Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as a “long, torturous process.”3

Initially, there were many reasons the United States expressed reluctance 

to get involved in a Balkans war. The three basic reasons were:

● The long and desperate history of warfare and ethnic hatred in 

that region.

● The confusion related to the rules of engagement and chain of 

command between NATO, the US military, the European Union (EU), and 

the role of the US president in tactical decisions.

● The reluctance of the Clinton administration to commit ground 

troops into a military quagmire reminiscent of Vietnam. 

Understanding what was going on in the US government and in the 

military in the 1980s and 1990s helps to explain why the United States 

was slow to respond militarily in the Balkans. Perhaps no other person was 

more qualified to speak about the diverse political and military strains on 

the United States during this period than former Ambassador to the United 

Nations and later Secretary of State Madeline Albright. Before Secretary 

Albright was in office in the 1980s, there were the successful United States 

military operations in Grenada and Panama. In 1990–91, the United States 

was at war with Iraq, a quick-ending conflict that resulted in a decisive 

US victory. Albright was quite perceptive in her comments related to the 

pressures on the US government in the 1990s and the final decision to 

commit the use of military force in the Balkans. 

Early critics of the Clinton administration’s foreign policy 

questioned the president’s wisdom in focusing so much 

attention on parts of the world that were not central to 

America’s strategic interests, but this was unfair and 

hardly his choice. The new administration was deeply 

involved in strengthening ties to our European and Asian 

allies, fashioning a new relationship with Russia, seeking peace in the Middle East, winning support for a freetrade agreement with Canada and Mexico, and dealing 
with other ‘big ticket’ items. The Clinton team could 

hardly overlook the fact that, early in his term, a civil war 

was under way in Bosnia, more than 20,000 US troops 

were busy saving lives in Somalia, ethnic tensions would 

explode in the Central African nation of Rwanda, and 

thousands of desperate migrants were fleeing a cruel and 

illegitimate regime in Haiti. . . . In Rwanda, we did too 

little. In Haiti and Bosnia, after false starts, we eventually 

got it right.4

While serving at the United Nations in 1994, Albright commented on 

the world situation: 

At the time, there were clashes or extreme tensions in 

Bosnia, Somalia, Haiti, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, 

Angola, Liberia, Mozambique, Sudan, Cambodia, 

Afghanistan, and Tajikistan, as well as ongoing defiance 

of Security Council resolutions by Saddam Hussein’s 

Iraq. . . . Since 1994, new and frightening dangers have 

arisen that also compete for their [the UN’s] attention. 

There are no grounds for confidence that the next intimations of genocide will be detected in time or that there 

would be volunteers for the job of preventing wide-scale 

killing once it got under way.5

Religiously, the Balkans has been an area of tension for many centuries. Located at the junction of Asia and Europe, the Balkans has served 

as a buffer zone and a place of tension between various and alien cultures, 

languages, and beliefs. It is not as simple as stating that the Balkans is a 

Muslim versus Christian region of the world. Each religion has militant 

and nonmilitant followers. Each group has those who are belligerent and 

those who seek reconciliation with their neighbors. Some Muslims are 

mostly secular while others are devout. For those with Christian traditions, 

there have been centuries of rivalry and tension between Roman Catholics 

and Eastern Orthodox or Serbian Orthodox adherents. In this capacity, 

US Army chaplains would provide invaluable service to their commanders and to other soldiers related to the religious issues that still divide the 

Balkans today. 

General John M. Shalikashvili served from June 1992 through October 

1993 as Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR) and Commander 

of the US European Command (EUCOM). As pressure for US military 

involvement in the volatile Balkans was increasing, Shalikashvili retained 

the Clinton administration’s attitude of passive US and international 
pressure to encourage the cessation of hostilities. Commenting on the 

behavior of the Serbians as the enemy, the general remarked that if 

humanitarian aid could be brought to the suffering and if water, electricity, 

and other modern necessities could be returned to the people, the United 

States would not intervene militarily. Shalikashvili commented that the 

US intent toward the Serbians was “to persuade them to modify their 

behavior.” Seemingly unconcerned with the power of centuries of ethnic 

and religious hatred, the United States’ passive and nonmilitary persuasion 

efforts failed. Shalikashvili further showed the naïve perspective of the US 

senior leadership toward the Balkan powder keg when he remarked that 

the civil war within the former Yugoslavia was a “senseless struggle.”6

Certainly the centuries of religious and ethnic hatred made sense to the 

Balkans population. As inhumane and cruel as they were to each other, the 

issues related to ethnic and religious hatred were historically verifiable.

The delicate balance of religion, politics, and ethnicity in the Balkans 

is vital to peace in Europe and elsewhere. As was predicted by Serbian 

Orthodox Priest Father Sava Janjic in the late 1990s, civil war in the 

Balkans could easily engulf the entire region, including Greece and Turkey, 

and could develop into a contest between European Christendom and the 

Muslim world.7 Thankfully that did not happen, in part because NATO 

and the United States became involved at a point where military intervention produced a cease-fire and ongoing peacekeeping and nation-building 

operations have been successful. As the delicate balance of peace in the 

Balkans became unsettled in the early 1990s, Albright assessed the world 

situation and the role of the United States as peacekeepers as follows:

The early 1990s were a time of experimenting and learning hard lessons about the potential and limits of multilateral peacekeeping. One of the most basic lessons taught 

by our experience in Somalia, Rwanda, and Haiti was that 

an arbitrarily rigid or cookie cutter approach would not 

work. Each situation was different, with a unique blend of 

history, personality, culture, and politics. To me, however, 

the overriding lesson was clear. The international community, through the UN or other means, had a responsibility 

to help societies endangered by natural or human caused 

catastrophe. It was in America’s interest to ensure that 

this responsibility was fulfilled because it would make 

the world more stable and peaceful, and because it was 

right.8
Notes

1. Andrew Wheatcroft, Infidels: A History of the Conflict Between 

Christendom and Islam (New York: Random House Publishers, 2003), 214.

2. Webster’s Random House Dictionary (1999 edition), 102.

3. Bill Clinton, My Life (New York: Alfred A. Knopf Publisher, 2005), 424, 

508, 510, 513, 534.

4. Madeline Albright, Madam Secretary: A Memoir (New York: Miramax 

Books, 2003), 177–178.

5. Ibid., 187, 195.

6. “Announcement by President Clinton of His Nomination of General John 

M. Shalikashvili to be Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the White House, 

Washington, DC, 11 August 1993.” Quoted from John M. Shalikashvili, Selected 

Speeches, Testimony and Interviews by General John M. Shalikashvili, Chairman 

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 

1998), 1–2.

7. Michael A. Sells, The Bridge Betrayed: Religion and Genocide in Bosnia

(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), xvii–xviii.

8. Albright, Madam Secretary, 202–203.



Chapter 2

Background: A War-torn Region of the World

The Balkans has a tortured history. The ancient Greeks attempted to 

spread civilization north into the Balkans region by force and were largely 

successful. When the Romans came, the region was still volatile, a haven 

for Asian nomads and Slavic peasants who resisted Roman rule. At the 

beginning of the Christian era, the Apostle Paul and others attempted 

numerous missionary trips into this area, achieving various degrees of success. During the decline of the Roman Empire, hordes of so-called barbarians came through the Balkans area to attack the declining power of Rome. 

Throughout later church history, this region became a point of contention 

between Roman Catholic and Eastern Orthodox missions. Then, with the 

intervention of Islam in the region, hatred of various religious and ethnic 

groups intensified. Simply stated, this part of the world has been politically unstable for millenniums.

The turmoil in the Balkans is a direct result of centuries of religious 

and political unrest. Contemporary atrocities are the result of past prejudices and violence coming to fruition. People of the Balkans have long 

memories, and events that took place years or centuries ago are considered 

modern injustices to be rectified with a vengeance. As one author stated, 

“Today, it is a war fanned by vivid religious memories of the past and a 

desire to get revenge at any cost. This is evident in the population cleansing that is currently taking place. It is not just ethnic cleansing; it is religious and the intent is to inflict as much pain and suffering as possible.”1 

It is inappropriate solely to base the cause of unrest in the Balkans 

on the introduction of Islam. Certainly, the spread of Islam exasperated 

an already tense political and cultural region of the world. From 700 to 

1100, Islam was a distant threat to the Balkans; from 1100 to 1300, Islam 

became a severe threat. By 1300 to 1500, Islam was an urgent threat, with 

the fall of Constantinople in 1453 signaling the defeat of the Christian 

Byzantine Empire and the triumph of the Muslim world. Nevertheless, 

within the Balkans themselves, while still under the Christian Byzantine 

Empire, ethnic tensions and political rivalries severely fractured social and 

civil harmony in the region. The introduction of Islam into the Balkans 

only further divided the territory.

Religion has always played a major role in Yugoslavian cultural and 

ethnic identity and has been, on many occasions, the cause for major or 

local conflicts. From the earliest Christian times, the southern part of this 

region was thoroughly evangelized. Yet the penetration of the Christian 


faith into the more northern Balkan states did not occur until centuries 

later. At the rise of the bishopric of Rome in the sixth century, there was 

little support in the Balkans for this Latin prelate. Allegiance for Eastern European Christians was toward Alexandria, Antioch, Jerusalem, and 

Constantinople. When the first three of these cities fell early to Muslims, 

Constantinople became the sole location for the senior bishop of Eastern European Christianity. The Balkans region was on the border between 

Roman Catholic Latin Christianity and primarily Greek speaking Eastern 

Orthodox Christianity. A unified Christian voice has never sounded from 

the Balkans. The three major religious groups in the Balkans have been 

Eastern Orthodox Christianity, Roman Catholic Christianity, and Islam.

The most severe threat by Islam to the Balkans came under the expanding Ottoman Empire. From the 13th through the 18th centuries, Ottoman 

Muslims made an attempt at regional if not world supremacy. Muslim 

armies expanded their influence across the Bosporus into the Balkans, ultimately desiring to bring all of Europe under Islam. When initially Constantinople would not fall, the Muslims simply bypassed the fortified city 

and pillaged throughout the Balkan Peninsula. In 1389, Serbian, Albanian, 

Montenegrin, and Bosnian armies under the command of Serbian Prince 

Lazar were defeated at the Battle of Kosovo. This was the beginning of 

the Muslim Ottoman rule and Christian persecution in what would become 

Yugoslavia. Ruthless vengeance by Muslims on infidel Christians resulted 

in a Balkans bloodbath, as complete Christian villages were systematically 

massacred, enslaved, tortured, and looted. Common practices of death on 

the Christian Balkans people were impaling, beheading, and dismembering of men, women, and children. Every 4 years the most talented and 

athletic Christian boys were taken from their parents, coerced to convert 

to Islam, and forced into service for the Ottoman Empire as special combat 

troops.2

During the subsequent few hundred years of direct Muslim control, 

various ethnic groups under Ottoman rule had diverse experiences in the 

Balkans. In the northern Balkans regions, which would eventually become 

the countries of Hungary, Romania, Czechoslovakia, and Moldavia, total 

Muslim control was fleeting. Local Christian armies from these regions 

resisted domination by the Ottomans and became only vassal states. Muslim control above the Danube River was always tenuous. By the 1600s, 

Muslim influence in the northern Balkans region was in rapid decline.

Bosnia and Herzegovina had a large-scale conversion to Islam both in 

the rural and urban populations. Those who converted received free land. 

Christians and others who did not convert were either killed or subjected 
to oppressive rule. From 1463 through 1878, Bosnia and Herzegovina 

were under Ottoman rule. While many converted to Islam, many did not, 

with one account stating that about 50 percent of the Bosnian population 

remained Christians.3 Christians were harassed, persecuted, and murdered. 

It was these Christians and their continual rebellion against Muslim rulers that for centuries irritated the Ottoman rulers and eventually led, with 

European help, to the expulsion of Ottoman Muslims from the region. 

Local converts to Islam remained behind at their own peril.

Muslim rule in Serbia was not so oppressive. As long as the Christians 

paid taxes and did not proselytize, they were permitted to live according 

to Serbian customs and to govern their own local affairs. Most Muslims 

in Serbia from the 14th through the 18th centuries were tolerant of their 

Christian subjects. However, the wealth and the hierarchy of the Serbian 

Orthodox Church were particularly dismantled by the Ottomans, with the 

clergy assuming more local civil responsibilities. Tension was always present. The clergy are credited with preserving the Serbian culture through 

Muslim rule, thus elevating them in the minds of the people.4 Nationalistic 

pride became synonymous with the Serbian Orthodox Church. In the late 

17th century, Serb peasants, encouraged by Serb clergy, supported several 

attempts by the Roman Catholic European Hapsburg armies to overthrow 

the Muslims, all unsuccessfully.

Montenegro, a tiny region located between Bosnia-Herzegovina and 

Albania, through evasion and guerrilla warfare was able to avoid being 

conquered by the Ottomans. Using the inhospitable mountainous terrain 

to their advantage, the overextended Muslim armies could not defeat the 

Montenegrin forces in open combat. While their neighboring kingdoms 

fell to the Muslims, Montenegrin Prince Ivan Crnojevic moved his capital 

from Zabljak on Lake Skadar into the highland valley of Lovcenski Dolac 

(precursor to the capital Cetinje) under Mount Lovcen in 1482. This event 

conventionally marks the beginning of the history of Montenegro and its 

capital, Cetinje, built around the Cetinje monastery. As the influence of the 

Ottoman Muslims waned in the 19th century, Montenegrin troops often 

assisted their neighbors in expelling the Muslims.

The Croats along the Dalmatian coast joined with the Hungarians in 

fighting the Turks for about 60 years after the fall of Bosnia in 1463. The 

defeat of the Hungarian army in 1526 forced the Croats to turn to the 

Roman Catholic Hapsburg emperors for protection. By the end of the 16th 

century, the Muslims had conquered most of Croatia, their main years of 

domination being from 1526 to 1699. The Austrian armies of the Hapsburg 

emperors continually fought small skirmishes with Ottoman forces west 
10

of the Drina River. After the Muslims lost control of Croatia around 1700, 

the Hapsburg armies shared the gains with the Roman Catholic Austrian 

soldiers as spoils of war, to the neglect and frustration of the Croatian 

people.

Albania was captured relatively late by Ottoman armies as they controlled the Albanian region from 1482 through 1912. Conversion of the 

Albanians to Islam was widespread, so much so that the predominate religion today in Albania is a Balkan-style form of Islam. Feuding Albanian 

armies were no match for the Ottoman Empire. Five centuries of Ottoman 

rule fractured the Albanian people along religious, tribal, and regional 

lines, with even the Muslim converts dividing into rival sects. Both 

Roman Catholic and Eastern Orthodox Albanians converted to Islam, with 

many only outwardly professing faith in Islam. During the centuries of 

Ottoman rule, the Albanian region remained one of Europe’s most backward areas.5

During the 15th through the 18th centuries, Christian Orthodox Russia 

was a major player in the religious and political tensions in the Balkans. 

Expanding Russian influences consistently threatened Ottoman control 

above the Danube River and around the Black Sea. Religiously, the Russian 

Orthodox Church and the Serbian Orthodox Church were similar in liturgy 

and Slavic culture and developed a close bond. Russia was very interested 

in stopping the Ottoman influence along its southern borders. Beginning in 

the late 1400s, Russian armies fought Ottoman Muslims along the northern and northwestern shores of the Black Sea. By 1475, the lands directly 

above the Black Sea became an Ottoman vassal area, while 50 years later 

the region of the modern nation of Moldavia came under direct Ottoman 

control. By 1800, Russia had mostly expelled the Ottoman Muslims from 

these regions north and northwest of the Black Sea. The Russian royal 

family longed for the fall of Istanbul and the restarting of orthodoxy in 

what was Constantinople—a goal they never were able to achieve.6

The collapse of the Ottoman Empire created chaos in the Balkans. 

Orthodox and Roman Catholic Christians persecuted those who sided 

with the Ottoman Muslims. Large groups of Muslims migrated to regions 

within the Balkans where they were tolerated, primarily Kosovo and 

Albania. Fighting and atrocities between villages were common. By the 

late 1800s, as the Ottomans departed the Balkan Peninsula, the Austrian 

Hapsburg Empire and the Russians sought greater influence. This outside 

desire for expansion and influence in the Balkans was often resisted with as 

much local vigor and passion as the Muslim Ottomans had been resisted. 

Having survived centuries of Ottoman rule, ethnic principalities of Serbs, 

Montenegrins, Kosovars, Bulgars, Slavs, Croats, and others did not want 
11

another foreign sovereign to rule over them. Muslims who remained in 

their villages were often harassed and persecuted, but in many cases, they 

simply were left alone resulting in a tense peace between neighbors.

The departure of the Ottomans from the Balkans left a political vacuum in the region. From the early 19th century on, the Balkan wars of 

liberation have been complex mixtures of emancipation from Ottoman 

rule, manifestation of Balkan unity, and rebellion against outside Christian 

and Muslim administrators.7This political vacuum was first evident in the 

Macedonian Struggle, which lasted from the late 1870s until the Balkan 

Wars of 1912–13.

In the Macedonian Struggle, there was a competition for the region of 

Macedonia between Greek, Serbian, and Bulgarian interests, with an element of native Macedonians calling for independent nation status. Later, 

Romanian and Ottoman military forces added confusion to this scenario. 

That which began as a propaganda campaign between rival factions, developed into roving bands of paramilitary thugs creating violence and deprecations throughout the region. The Balkan Wars of 1912–13 absorbed 

this military and political unrest. These wars were fought primarily in 

Thrace (in the east) and in Macedonia (in the west) and were major armed 

conflicts between the remnants of the Ottoman Empire against primarily Bulgarian, Serbian, Montenegrin, and Greek forces. Armies on each 

side numbered in the hundreds of thousands. Balkan armies had a decided 

artillery advantage over the less sophisticated artillery of the Ottoman 

Turks. As the Ottomans were withdrawing, the Bulgarians, sensing a possibility to acquire more land and influence, fought against Serbian and 

Greek forces. Romania then declared war against Bulgaria. In the midst 

of another escalating Balkans civil war, a sudden cease-fire was called on 

30 July 1913.

On 28 June 1914, Archduke Francis Ferdinand, heir to the Austrian 

throne, was assassinated as he and his wife drove through the streets of 

Sarajevo, Bosnia. His assassin was a student from a secret terrorist organization in Serbia, which had protested against Austria’s annexation of 

Bosnia and Herzegovina. At first, the European powers hoped this conflict of interests would not escalate. On 28 July 1914, Austria rejected an 

attempt at reconciliation with Belgrade, the capital of Serbia, and declared 

war. Russia, concerned for the welfare of fellow Slavs and their Christian 

Orthodox brethren, began a large mobilization of its military. On 1 August 

Germany, closely allied with Austria, declared war on Russia. France 

entered the war against Germany on 3 August. Germany invaded Belgium, 

forcing Great Britain into the war. Thus began, as one author stated, “one 

of the greatest catastrophes that have ever befallen the human race.”8
12

During the early 20th century, Islam had declined in the Balkans to 

the point that Muslims were the recipients of the pain and persecution they 

had imposed on Christians under Islamic Ottoman rule. Muslims that did 

not congregate in larger groups remained rural, uneducated, and impoverished. Others were segregated into Muslim neighborhoods and remained 

isolated from non-Muslims. Muslims in the Balkans never regained their 

status in the upper echelons of Balkan society. At the turn of the century, Serbs perceived the Muslims as the chief impediment to creating a 

dominant Serbian culture in the reinvigorated and independent nation of 

Serbia.

During World War I, compared to central Europe the Balkans region 

was mostly an afterthought. The largest battles were fought far away 

in central Europe. Within the Balkans, there were divided loyalties and 

allegiances with some considerable but infrequent military activities. In 

1914, the Austrians undertook three invasions of Serbia, all of which were 

repulsed. This front then remained inactive until 1915. After Bulgaria 

declared war on Serbia in October 1915, Allied troops advanced into Serbia. 

Bulgarian forces defeated a combined Serbian-British-French force, while 

the Germans launched a separate successful attack into Serbia through 

Austria-Hungary. By the end of 1915, the Central Powers had conquered 

all of Serbia and defeated the Serbian army. The surviving Serbian forces 

took refuge in Albania, Montenegro, and the Greek island of Corfu, with 

their British and French Allies taking refuge in the eastern Greek city of 

Salonika (Thessaloniki).9

Two periods of fighting took place in the Balkans in 1916. In August, 

a reconstituted Serbian army advanced with Russian and Italian allies 

against the Germans and Bulgarians near Salonika. After some initial success, a strong counterattack forced them back. On the other side of the 

Balkan Peninsula in October 1916, Allied forces began a large and successful offensive in Macedonia. On 19 November, the Allied troops captured Monastir and by the middle of December reached Lake Ohrid, on the 

border of Albania and Macedonia. Meanwhile, Austrian forces employed 

extensive repressive measures against the Bosnia Serbs. Over 5,000 Serbs 

were interred in horrific detention and torture camps where many starved 

to death. To cope with the almost continuous state of rebellion in the central Balkans, the Austrians deported or relocated thousands in a final futile 

effort to pacify the area.10

The years 1917 and 1918 saw the collapse of the German-AustrianHungarian-Bulgarian influence in the Balkans. In 1917, there were several 

inconclusive engagements between Serbian and Allied forces against the 

Central Powers near Monastir, at Lake Presba, and on the Vardar River. 
13

The fighting in 1918 was disastrous for the Central Powers. In September, 

a huge force of about 700,000 troops consisting of French, British, Greeks, 

Italians, and the remnants of the Serbian army began a large-scale offensive against the German, Austrian, and Bulgarian troops in Serbia. The 

Allied offensive was so successful that the thoroughly defeated Bulgarians 

initiated an armistice with the Allies. Romania was invaded by the Allies 

and subsequently switched allegiance to the Allied cause, the Italians 

occupied Albania, and Serbian troops reoccupied much of their former 

territory and Belgrade. 

The defeat of the Central Powers in the Balkans in 1918 led to 

the quick creation of a nation-state for the Czechs and Slovaks called 

Czechoslovakia. Shortly thereafter, the Slavic peoples in the region 

banded together to create what would eventually become Yugoslavia. In 

November 1918, the Hungarians established an independent government, 

while the last Hapsburg Emperor, Charles I, abdicated the throne as the 

Austrian Republic was formed.

As a tenuous peace settled over the post-World War I Balkans, deprecations by neighboring villages on each other were common. Those who 

fled their homes or were forcefully relocated returned to find their properties destroyed, looted, or occupied by strangers. One interesting result of 

World War I in the Balkans was the high esteem granted the Serbian people by Western nations. Seen as heroic resistors to outside aggressors, the 

Bosnian people proved a valuable friend to Allied forces.11 What Western 

leaders did not notice was that Serbians were as guilty as the others were in 

their postwar revenge on civilians who supported the German, Bulgarian, 

or Austrian armies.

World War I devastated large sections of Serbia, Kosovo, Bosnia, 

Herzegovina, Albania, and Macedonia. There were dramatic consequences 

for the post-World War I Balkans. Serbia gained historic lands it had not 

possessed since medieval times. After the war, fear of an expansionist 

Italy inspired Serbian, Croatian, and Slovenian leaders to form the 

new federation known as Yugoslavia, “the land of the South Slavs.” As 

early as July 1917 a vision for a united Serbian state was acknowledged 

in the Declaration of Corfu, which called for a union of Serbs, Croats, 

and Slovenes in one nation with a single democratic, constitutional, 

parliamentary system. Ethnic hatred, religious rivalry, language barriers, 

and cultural conflicts plagued the fledgling Kingdom of Yugoslavia. The 

question of centralization versus federalism bitterly divided the Serbs and 

Croats, democratic solutions were blocked, and a dictatorship appeared 

inevitable. Territorial disputes with Yugoslavia’s neighbors complicated 

an already tense existence. Many people regarded the new attempts at 
14

self-government as alien, exploitative, and secondary to kinship loyalties, 

religious beliefs, and cultural traditions.12 In deep respect for the courage 

and suffering of the Serbian people, President Woodrow Wilson on 28 July 

1918 ordered the Serbian flag raised over the White House.

As World War II approached, the Balkans was essentially a rural, 

undeveloped region in a politically unstable situation. World War II 

began officially on 1 September 1939. The animosity from World War I 

toward Germany by Serbians, Kosovars, Bosnians, and others meant that 

Yugoslavia would naturally oppose Germany in the war. Almost immediately after the war started, Italy and Germany were active in the Balkan 

Peninsula. Berlin pressed the Balkan countries to sign the Tripartite Pact 

and align themselves with the Axis powers—Germany, Italy, and Japan. 

Romania signed in November 1940 and Bulgaria in March 1941. Italy and 

Germany became active in Greece. Now virtually surrounded by enemies, 

neutral Yugoslavia desperately sought allies, signing a nonaggression pact 

with the Soviet Union in 1941. Convinced that their situation was hopeless, 

Yugoslavia reluctantly signed a “protocol of adherence” to the Tripartite 

Pact on 25 March 1941. In return, Hitler guaranteed that Germany would 

not invade Yugoslavia or ask for military assistance. Two days later, the 

Yugoslavian military, with huge popular support, overthrew their compromising government in euphoria of anti-German sentiment. In response, 

on 6 April the German Luftwaffe bombed Belgrade, killing thousands of 

civilians. Axis forces then invaded, with Yugoslavia unconditionally surrendering on 17 April 1941.13

During World War II, Germany, Italy, and Bulgaria dismembered Yugoslavia. Germany occupied Serbia and the northern region 

of Vojvodina and created a puppet government in Croatia that included 

Bosnia-Herzegovina. Germany and Italy divided Slovenia while Italy 

focused its expansionist ideas on the Dalmatian coastline, Kosovo, and 

Albania. Hungary grabbed Yugoslavian territories along its border while 

Bulgaria took Macedonia and part of southern Serbia. Germany and Italy 

then began to exploit the natural resources of the region while unleashing 

a reign of terror.14 In defiance of the cultural and religious sensitivities of 

the region, the Germans did mass deportations, looted and robbed civilians, and practiced genocide. German sponsored Croatian paramilitary 

forces, called the Ustase, eliminated two million Serbs, Jews, and Gypsies 

through concentration camps, deportations, forced conversions, torture, 

and murder. The Ustase were so vicious toward their Balkan neighbors 

that Germany and Italy had to introduce measures to minimize their horrific violence toward civilians. 
15

Map 2. Disintegration of Austria-Hungary, 1918.

, Library of Congress Czechoslovakia: A Country Study
16

Resistance in Yugoslavia to the Axis Powers came from two groups. 

One group was called Cetnic, from the Serbian word meaning detachment. 

The Cetnic were composed of fragments of the Yugoslavian army and 

Serbians fleeing genocide.15 The second group to oppose the Axis forces in 

the Balkans was the communist-led Partisans. The leader of the Partisans 

was the dynamic Josip Broz Tito, a longtime communist who opposed the 

Tripartite Pact and sought to unify fragments of the old Yugoslavia against 

the Axis occupation forces. Tito’s motto, “Death to Fascism, Freedom to 

the People” rallied various ethnic and religious groups to join his resistance movement. Beginning in July 1941, the Cetnic and Partisans fought 

a guerrilla war primarily against the occupying Germans. The multitude 

of skirmishes and small battles fought throughout the Balkans were savage encounters between hated enemies. Civilians on each side were massacred in the thousands. Then Cetnic forces and Partisans began fighting 

each other as the Balkans degenerated into total chaos, with the Partisans 

becoming the force supported by the western Allies. 

Some sense of order came to the Balkans after the September 1944 

arrival of the Soviet Union army at the Romanian-Yugoslavian border. It 

was clear who was fighting whom at this point. Soviet troops crossed the 

border on 1 October and a joint Soviet-Partisan force liberated Belgrade on 

20 October. The Partisans with Allied support then concentrated on crushing the remaining German, Ustase, and Cetnic forces. When the Partisans 

entered Croatia, some of the most ruthless and savage fighting of the entire 

war developed. Meanwhile, Muslims in Albania and Kosovo made a brief 

attempt at a nationalistic revolt, but were crushed by the Partisans.16

World War II claimed 1.7 million Yugoslav lives, about 11 percent of 

the entire prewar population. The survival of the Serbian people within 

Yugoslavia was considered heroic and courageous against overwhelming 

odds. Fellow Yugoslavians killed about 1 million of the Yugoslav dead, 

an example of the horrid effects of historic ethnic and religious hatreds 

resurfacing in brutal form. The country’s major cities, production centers, 

and communication and transportation systems were in shambles, with 

starvation widespread.17

Organized Muslim forces played only a minor role in the World 

War II Balkans. With the earlier unification of Yugoslavia in 1918–19, 

there emerged three distinct Muslim communities in Serbia, Bosnia, and 

Albania. These three communities under Yugoslav control had political 

unity but religious and cultural diversity. It was not until 1930 that all three 

branches of Yugoslavian Islam accepted the authority of a single Ulama. 

The Ulama was a religious leader who was responsible for enforcing the 
17

Islamic religious and cultural code and administering the affairs of the 

Muslim community. While individuals or small groups of Muslims occasionally acted with great cruelty toward their Roman Catholic or Eastern 

Orthodox neighbors, this was typically in response to deprecation performed on Muslims. The Ulama and most Muslims kept a low profile during World War II. During the war, authorities tried and sentenced to death 

a local Muslim religious leader in Zagreb on charges of inciting Muslims 

to riot and murder Serbs. Aside from this incident, Muslims did not have 

nearly the amount of clergy moral scandals for wartime deviant behavior 

as did Roman Catholic or Serbian Orthodox clergy.

In the ruins of post-World War II, Tito (1892–1980) became predominant. Tito was born in northwestern Croatia and left school as a teenager 

to work. He soon became aware of communist labor movements and in 

1910, at the age of 18, joined the Social Democratic Party of Croatia and 

Slavonia. He was a veteran of World War I and a former prisoner of war in 

a Russian prison camp. He then enlisted in the Soviet army in Siberia and 

in 1918 applied for membership in the Russian Communist Party. In 1920, 

he returned to the Balkans and became a member of the Communist Party 

of Yugoslavia, rising in leadership positions through the 1930s. After Axis 

forces invaded Yugoslavia in April 1941, the communists were among the 

first to organize a resistance movement. Tito was quickly named Chief 

of the Military Committee and a few weeks later became the Supreme 

Commander of the People’s Liberation Army of Yugoslavia and Partisan 

Detachments. As Tito’s guerrilla forces liberated villages, he imposed his 

communist agenda to willing recipients. As early as November 1942, Tito 

became head of the post-World War II Yugoslavian government.18

The post-World War II rise of communist Tito ended the dream of 

a unified Serb homeland. In 1945, the state headed by Tito proclaimed 

that Yugoslavia was to display the “brotherhood and unity of the peoples 

of Yugoslavia.” Macedonians and Bosnians were recognized as national 

groups within the country. Serbs had to share their political identity with 

Croats, Slovenes, Macedonians, Bosnians, Kosovars, and others. As one 

writer stated, “Tito’s answer to the problems of majorities and minorities was to abolish the very concept. All were equal within a people’s 

democracy.”19 Initially, life under Tito’s communist leadership was brutal, 

as Cetnic and Ustase remnants were put on mock trial and executed en 

mass. All resistance to this totalitarian communist rule was mercilessly 

squashed through espionage and assassinations. For the next few decades, 

Yugoslavia became stable and calm, as a ruthless but efficient dictator 

forced the diverse ethnic and religious groups to live together peacefully. 
18

Longstanding nationalistic tendencies within the diverse Yugoslav people 

were suppressed by the higher goal of national Yugoslav unity.20

This supranational Yugoslav identity did not survive for long after 

Tito’s death in 1980. A committee composed of the presidents of the 

six republics and two autonomous regions, with members taking turns 

as federal president, ruled for the next decade as Yugoslavia unsuccessfully attempted to govern itself. By the end of the 1980s, communism as 

an ideology and state system was coming undone throughout the entire 

region. Nationalism was resurrected to fill the ideological void, as each 

of Yugoslavia’s member republics sought to make its own way. The first 

breakaway territory was Slovenia, which after a brief period of conflict 

broke away from Yugoslavia in June 1991. 

Macedonia followed its other federation partners and declared independence from Yugoslavia in late 1991. The new Macedonian constitution 

Map 3. The Administrative Divisions of Yugoslavia, 1990.

Yugoslavia: A Country Study, Library of Congress
19

took effect on 20 November 1991 and called for a system of government 

based on a parliamentary democracy. Prime Minister Branko Crvenkovski 

led the first democratically elected coalition government of the Social 

Democratic Union of Macedonia (SDSM) and included the ethnic Albanian 

Party for Democratic Prosperity (PDP). Kiro Gligorov became the first 

president of an independent Macedonia.

The 1991 secession of Macedonia from the former Yugoslavia was 

not clouded by ethnic or other armed conflict. During the Yugoslav period, 

Macedonian ethnic identity exhibited itself. Most of Macedonia’s Slavic 

population identified themselves as Macedonians, while several minority 

groups, in particular ethnic Albanians, sought to retain their own distinct 

political culture and language. Although interethnic tensions simmered 

under Yugoslav authority and during the first decade of its independence, 

the country avoided ethnically motivated conflict incited by Serbia until 

several years after its independence.

In 1990, Croatia held its first multiparty elections since World War II. 

Long-time Croatian nationalist Franjo Tudjman was elected president, and 

1 year later, Croatians declared independence from Yugoslavia. Savage 

fighting ensued. Conflict between Serbs and Croats in Croatia escalated, 

and 1 month after Croatia declared independence, war erupted between 

Croatia and Yugoslavia. Yugoslav Serbians practiced what would later be 

called “ethnic cleansing” on Croats in conquered areas. Genocide of entire 

villages was common. Serbian brutality toward Croats was justified in 

their minds from political and ethnic tensions from World War II, but such 

tension was prevalent since the time of the Ottomans.21

The United Nations mediated a cease-fire in January 1992; hostilities resumed the next year when Croatia fought to regain one-third of the 

territory lost the previous year. A second cease-fire was enacted in May 

1993, followed by a joint declaration the next January between Croatia 

and Yugoslavia. However, in September 1993, the Croatian army led an 

offensive against the Serb-held Republic of Krajina. A third cease-fire was 

called in March 1994, but it, too, was broken in May and August 1995 after 

Croatian forces regained large portions of Krajina, prompting an exodus 

of Serbs from this area. In November 1995, Croatia agreed to reintegrate 

Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Dirmium peacefully under terms 

of the Erdut Agreement. In December 1995, Croatia signed the Dayton 

Peace Accords, committing itself to a permanent cease-fire and the return 

of all refugees.

The breakup of the Yugoslav federation after 1989 left Montenegro 

in a precarious position. The first multiparty elections in 1990 showed 
20

public support for the League of Communists, confirming Montenegrin 

support for the federation. Montenegro joined Serbian efforts to preserve the federation in the form of a Third Yugoslavia in 1992. Though 

Montenegro reaffirmed its political attachment to Serbia, a sense of a 

distinct Montenegrin identity continued to thrive. Outspoken criticism of 

Serbian conduct of the 1992–95 war in Bosnia and Herzegovina boosted 

the continuing strength of Montenegrin distinctiveness. Both the people 

and the government of Montenegro were critical of Yugoslav President 

Slobodan Milosevic’s 1998–99 campaign in Kosovo, and the ruling coalition parties boycotted the September 2000 federal elections, which led to 

the eventual overthrow of Milosevic’s regime. The Belgrade Agreement 

of March 2002, signed by the heads of the federal and republican governments, set forth the parameters for a redefinition of Montenegro’s relationship with Serbia in a joint state. On 4 February 2003, the parliament of the 

Federal Republic of Yugoslavia ratified the Constitutional Charter, which 

established a new state union and changed the name of the country from 

Yugoslavia to Serbia and Montenegro.

The rise to power of Milosevic as president of the Serbian Republic 

and his embrace of an extreme Serb nationalist agenda hastened the dissolution of federal Yugoslavia. That agenda called for a solution of the 

“national question” by the creation of a Greater Serbia, uniting all Serbs in 

a single state; in 1986, it was endorsed by the Serbian Academy of Arts and 

Sciences. The following year, Milosevic and his hard-line faction gained 

power within the Serbian League of Communists, in large part by playing 

the nationalist card—appealing to the Serbian sense of grievance at having 

been deprived of a leadership role in Tito’s Yugoslavia and at being outstripped by some other republics economically. Under Milosevic’s leadership, the Serb possession of Bosnia-Herzegovina meant the forceful and 

often brutal elimination of all who would be dissidents in the new Serbian 

state.22

In 1989, seizing on the patriotic fervor surrounding a historic anniversary, Milosevic initiated a crackdown on Serbia’s ethnic Albanians who 

formed 90 percent of the population in the country’s southern autonomous 

province of Kosovo. In the romantic imagery of Serbian nationalism, 

Kosovo represents both Serbia’s past greatness and its humiliation at the 

hands of Muslims. The continued presence of a large and politically assertive Muslim Albanian population in Kosovo was perceived as an intolerable affront to this nationalist vision of Serbia. Expressing violent ethno 

nationalism—the pursuit of ethnic national superiority to the disdain of 

all others—Serbian forces destabilized Bosnia-Herzegovina, attempting 
21

to force all non-Serbs out of the region by persuasion or by gunpoint, with 

numerous accounts of vicious brutality toward civilians.23

Following international recognition of Croatian and Slovene independence (January 1992) and news that Macedonia’s secession was imminent, 

the elected government of Bosnia-Herzegovina found itself faced with an 

impossible choice. The prospect of remaining part of a rump Yugoslavia 

dominated by Milosevic was clearly unacceptable to the majority of 

Bosnia’s population, while Bosnian independence was anathema to Serb 

nationalists both in Bosnia and in Serbia. In February 1992, 70 percent of 

Bosnian voters (including many Bosnian Serbs) turned out to cast their 

votes for independence.

On 5 April 1992, following the declaration of independence by Bosnia’s 

parliament, there was a mass multiethnic demonstration by citizens of 

Sarajevo calling for peace among Bosnia’s three major communities 

(Eastern Orthodox Serbs, Roman Catholic Croats, and Muslims). Yugoslav 

national army snipers and Serb nationalist militants hidden on surrounding 

rooftops opened fire on the crowd killing and wounding scores of unarmed 

citizens. The following day, Serbian units began to shell Sarajevo from 

prepared positions on the hillsides overlooking the city, and columns of 

troops and tanks crossed the Drina River from Serbia into eastern Bosnia. 

Initially armed only with police side arms and hunting rifles, later with 

captured and smuggled weapons, Bosnians tried to defend their newly 

independent country against the onslaught of the Serb nationalist forces 

unleashed by Milosevic. 
22

Notes

1. David Peterson, “Memorandum on Religious Conflict in Yugoslavia,” 30 

December 1994, 1.

2. Lord Kindross, The Ottoman Centuries: The Rise and Fall of the Turkish 

Empire (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2002), 53–60.

3. Ninian Smart, ed., Atlas of the World’s Religions (Oxford: Oxford 

University Press, 1999), 183.

4. Peterson, “Memorandum on Religious Conflict,” 3.

5. Raymond Zickel and Walter R. Iwaskiw, eds., Albania: A Country Study

(Washington, DC: GPO for the Library of Congress, 1992), 9–15.

6. Andrew Wheatcroft, Infidels: A History of the Conflict Between 

Christendom and Islam (New York: Random House Publishers, 2003), 217–218.

7. Andre Gerolymatos, The Balkan Wars (New York: Basic Books, 2002), 

132.

8. Kindross, The Ottoman Centuries, 602–603.

9. Tim Judah, The Serbs: History, Myth, and the Destruction of Yugoslavia

(New London: Yale University Press, 2000), 97–104.

10. Robert J. Donia and John V.A. Fine, Jr., Bosnia and Herzegovina: A 

Tradition Betrayed (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 117–119.

11. Judah, The Serbs, 90.

12. Glenn E. Curtis, ed., Yugoslavia: A Country Study (Washington, DC: 

GPO for the Library of Congress, 1992), 26–30.

13. Ibid., 36–37.

14. Donia and Fine, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 11.

15. Judah, The Serbs, 117.

16. Curtis, Yugoslavia, 42.

17. Ibid., 42–43.

18. Phyllis Auty, Tito: A Biography (New York: McGraw-Hill Book 

Company, 1970), 217–234.

19. Wheatcroft, Infidels, 251.

20. Josef Korbel, Tito’s Communism (Denver: University of Denver Press, 

1951), 159–171.

21. Alek N. Dragnich, Serbs and Croats: The Struggle for Yugoslavia (San 

Diego: Harvest Books, 1992), 170–172.

22. Stella Gresham, The Bosnia Files: An Intimate Portrait of Life Behind 

the Lines (Bristol, IN: Wyndham Hall Press, 1996), 1.

23. Francine Friedman, The Bosnian Muslims (Boulder, CO: Westview 

Press, 1996), 206.
23

Chapter 3

The Bosnia Theater of Operations

Events Leading to US Military Activity in Bosnia

By 7 April 1992, the United States and most European countries officially recognized Bosnia-Herzegovina’s independence. On 22 May 1992, 

the United Nations admitted Bosnia-Herzegovina as a full member. An 

arms embargo, imposed on all of the former Yugoslavia by the United 

Nations in 1991 (requested by the Belgrade government and maintained 

at the insistence of the United States and its Western European Allies), 

had in effect barred the internationally recognized Bosnian government 

from acquiring the means to exercise its right to self-defense guaranteed 

under the UN Charter. In the summer of 1992, President Clinton stated 

that the United States would take an active military role in Bosnia. The 

United States began to airdrop supplies to beleaguered civilians under 

attack by the Serbs while simultaneously enforcing a no-fly zone. The nofly zone helped to prevent the Yugoslav and Serb forces from massacring 

civilians.1

Meanwhile, Milosevic and Serb nationalist forces in Bosnia had at 

their disposal the resources of the Yugoslav national army, including the 

fourth largest arsenal in Cold War Europe. They used these weapons to 

lethal effect in their assault on Bosnia’s cities, towns, and villages. Over 

a million people were bombed and driven from their homes; hundreds of 

thousands of civilians were killed and wounded. Serb nationalist forces 

overran 70 percent of Bosnia’s territory, “cleansing” conquered areas by 

driving out or killing the non-Serb inhabitants in acts of genocide. As US 

Ambassador Albright stated, “Day after day the world witnessed the murder of civilians, the burning of villages, the shelling of apartments, the 

destruction of churches and mosques, and reports of mass rape.”2 Among 

the methods of “ethnic cleansing” employed by the Serb forces were the 

selective killing of the non-Serb community’s civic, religious, and intellectual leaders; the confinement of all males of military age in concentration camps; and the use of mass rape as a weapon of terror and abasement. 

Nationalist forces throughout the area torched, dynamited, and bulldozed 

historic mosques, churches, and synagogues as well as national libraries, 

archives, and museums.

In anticipation of the coming flood of Bosnian refugees, ministers 

of Western European countries held a meeting at the beginning of June 

1993 to coordinate tighter restrictions on asylum and immigration. Later 

the siege of the city of Sarajevo outraged many Western leaders, as Serb 
24

artillery stationed at elevated positions around the city cut off escape routes 

and began indiscriminately shelling the city. As Albright summarized, the 

United States sought to lift the UN arms embargo but did not initially have 

enough votes in the Security Council to do so. Endorsing a permanent 

cease-fire was also not an issue because such an agreement would be 

condescension to Serbian ethnic cleansing and resettlement of captured 

areas. Finally, a sudden military assault by US forces and NATO troops 

would inevitably result in a massive hostage-taking maneuver by Serbs 

against UN peacekeepers throughout the area.3

Throughout 1994, tension and random violence remained constant 

within Bosnia-Herzegovina. During the winter of 1994–95, a tenuous ceasefire was agreed on, and a tense peace permeated the Balkans. Seemingly 

endless and unproductive bureaucratic negotiations that winter appeared 

to go nowhere. In the spring of 1995, horrific violence was unleashed in 

numerous areas throughout Bosnia. The Bosnian Serbs celebrated the end 

of the winter cease-fire by unleashing the worst shelling Sarajevo had 

received in months. The UN peacekeeping force requested air strikes, a 

request that was initially refused based on the clumsy “dual-key” system 

that required both UN and NATO approval. After a second request for air 

strikes was approved, NATO planes successfully bombed Serbian targets, 

with many US pilots flying their F-16 aircraft under NATO control. The 

Serbs responded to the bombing campaign by shelling Muslim safe havens 

in Bosnia and taking about 300 UN peacekeepers hostage. Meanwhile, as 

General Wesley Clark, then working as Director for Strategic Plans and 

Policy for the Joint Staff at the Pentagon, remarked, “We held our breaths 

on Srebrenica. Then Srebrenica fell. There were rumors and then confirmation of a huge massacre, and international outrage grew.”4

The United Nations created six safe areas in 1993, including Srebrenica. 

The intention was to stabilize the map of Bosnia, pursuant to a negotiated peace that would determine the layout of postwar Bosnia. However, 

in agreeing to protect the Srebrenica enclave, the United Nations established a fatal contradiction that would doom the safe areas. The UN mandate in Bosnia required its troops to act with neutrality. In reality, the UN 

Protection Force (UNPROFOR) was protecting aid deliveries, not local 

residents. Its freedom of movement was at the mercy of the stronger belligerent, and in eastern Bosnia, this meant the Serb forces. As a result, 

the Dutch battalion’s ability to protect, or at least feed, the inhabitants of 

Srebrenica depended on the cooperation of the Serbs. This cooperation 

was generally bought with bribes, usually consisting of aid intended for 

the enclave. Whenever it suited the strategic needs of the Serb forces, the 

cooperation disappeared. The final offensive on Srebrenica began in early 
25

July 1995 with a troop buildup around the enclave and the heaviest bombing in 2 years. By 7 July the Serbs were disarming Dutch observation posts 

and forcing them to withdraw, giving them the choice of either going into 

Srebrenica or leaving the area altogether via the nearby Serb-controlled 

Bratunac. The Serbs then captured approximately 30 Dutch soldiers from 

one outpost and held them hostage.

In Potocari, thousands of refugees who had fled Srebrenica entered 

the UN base. When approximately 5,000 had entered, the Dutch declared 

the base full and halted entrance. Around 20,000 more people gathered 

outside the base, sitting down in streets and nearby fields. The next day 

Serb soldiers began the evacuation of Potocari. The Dutch forces did not 

intervene. In some cases, they even helped the Serbs load people onto the 

buses in an orderly way. During the evacuation, Serbs were secretly taking men into the woods near the UN base and shooting them. Hundreds of 

Serbs were involved in the final “cleansing” of Srebrenica. Many of these 

men were from neighboring towns between Visegrad and Zvornik, but 

others were from deep within Serbia. As thousands of Srebrenicans fled to 

Potocari, another column of people was heading for the woods. Serb soldiers claimed to have killed between 10,000 to 15,000 military-age men. 

However, the number of missing Srebrenicans reported by the Red Cross 

is approximately 7,500.5

The massacre at Srebrenica moved Clinton to support increased air 

strikes in Bosnia; to endorse negotiations between Bosnian, Serbian, and 

Croatian leaders; and to make a decisive commitment to send US ground 

troops to fight the Serbians.

Srebrenica was the most extensive post-World War II genocide incident and helped to awaken the Western community. Clark was actively 

involved in planning a potential US and NATO invasion of Bosnia to subdue forcefully the Serbian army and its vicious paramilitary supporters. 

An offer to NATO of 25,000 US ground forces was developed.6 While 

the air campaign against Serbian interests and troops was ongoing and 

successful, months of negotiations continued between Bosnia’s neighbors, NATO, and US representatives. Throughout the summer and fall of 

1995, negotiations continued while Serbian forces sought to avoid NATO 

bombings and at the same time continued to abuse non-Serbian civilians 

in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Finally, on 5 October 1995, all parties agreed to a 

nationwide cease-fire with peace talks to begin in Dayton, Ohio.

The warring factions flew their representatives to Wright Patterson 

Air Force Base near Dayton, Ohio, and started their main negotiations 

on 1 November 1995. The peace talks almost broke down several times 
26

as old animosities evidenced themselves through last minute attempts at 

land grabbing by each party. Nevertheless, US Secretary of State Warren 

Christopher and his team pushed through a compromise the Serbs, Croats, 

and Bosnians could all agree to sign. This document, commonly called 

the Dayton Peace Accords, was signed on 21 November. Needing verification from each party’s political leadership, the peace accords called 

for a NATO-led political and military effort to stop the bloodshed in the 

former Yugoslavia. A diverse military force called the Implementation 

Force (IFOR) was the main thrust of the plan. According to US Secretary 

of Defense William J. Perry, military aspects of the peace agreement 

included the “cessation of hostilities, withdrawal to agreed lines, creation 

of a zone of separation, return of troops and weapons to cantonments, and, 

of course, IFOR will be responsible for its own self-defense and freedom 

of movement.”7

Albright clearly stated the reasons why the Serbian aggression in Bosnia 

ultimately failed and why the Dayton Peace Accords was successful.

Three factors ended the Bosnian War. The first was overreaching on the part of the Bosnian Serbs. For years, they 

had bet successfully on the fecklessness of the West, but 

they didn’t know when to fold their hands. The second was 

the changing military situation. In early August, Croatia 

launched an offensive to reclaim territory seized by ethnic Serbs. The offense quickly succeeded, sending a message to the Bosnian Serbs that they weren’t invincible and 

could not, in a crisis, count on help from Milosevic. The 

third factor was Bill Clinton’s willingness to lead. . . . After 

Srebrenica, the President’s frustration had boiled over.8

The December 1995 Dayton Peace Accords called for 60,000 NATO 

troops (20,000 Americans) to be stationed throughout Bosnia and adjoining areas. The IFOR was an armed peacemaking and peacekeeping force. 

Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR was the United States’ part of IFOR. 

Numerous problems confronted the first US troops to land on the ground 

in the Balkans. Peacekeepers would be deployed in six republics with five 

languages. About 25,000 Bosnians were missing and presumed dead. There 

remained over 4,000 minefields with a combined million or so landmines. 

Ethnic hatreds were seething throughout the region, and the ravages of war 

created huge unemployment. In many cases, Serbs would not move out, 

destroyed the homes, or reluctantly departed homes owned by Muslims. 

The same tensions existed between Croats and Serbs in the north. 

Looking at this chaotic and potentially escalating situation, Clark stated 
27

that he wanted to minimize the US involvement in what could be another 

Vietnam-type quagmire. He spoke of Bosnia as a “seemingly intractable 

problem” and was reluctant to project the image of the United States as 

policemen of the world. Further, Clark made some tough remarks that 

could not be readily answered. He stated, “It seemed difficult to define the 

objectives, strategies, and means of Bosnia policy. Of course, we wanted 

the fighting stopped. But on what conditions, and at what price?”9

Preparations for the First US Army Chaplains to Arrive in 

Bosnia, 1995 

Throughout 1995, NATO air assets bombed Serbian troops, munitions, 

and supply elements. UN peacekeepers were in consistently vulnerable 

positions, as their presence on the ground did nothing to deter Serb aggression. NATO troops replaced UN peacekeepers in Bosnia, and the arms 

embargo against the Bosnians was lifted allowing them to fight for themselves against Serb aggressors. A humanitarian disaster of epic proportions was developing with tens of thousands of homeless and unemployed 

refugees seeking vengeance on their Serbian antagonists. Atrocities were 

Map 4. Divisions of Bosnia in sectors led by the British, French, 

and United States.

Department of Defense
28

performed by both sides, with it difficult at times to identify the good guy 

from the bad guy. US Ambassador Albright remarked that parts of Bosnia 

had become “a shooting gallery”; mass graves were being discovered, and 

those responsible for the murders should be held responsible.10 Three and 

a half years of civil war in Bosnia and surrounding areas produced 3 million homeless people; there were 12,000 dead in Sarajevo alone with about 

200,000 total dead in Bosnia. There was an estimate of 20,000 reported 

“policy rapes,” the intentional forced impregnation of non-Serbian women 

by Serbs to sway the population demographics.

Exhaustive and detailed planning throughout 1995 called for an IFOR 

of 60,000 personnel, more than double the strength the UNPROFOR had 

in Bosnia in 1993–94. The American component of IFOR included 20,000 

ground troops in Bosnia-Herzegovina, composed mostly of the US Army’s 

1st Armored Division. Chaplains from the 1st Armored Division would be 

busy meeting the religious needs of soldiers in a hostile fire zone while 

providing their commanders religious and cultural guidance on the volatile ethnic divisions in the area. Other IFOR participants came from NATO 

and non-NATO countries, with 27 total nations represented in the IFOR. 

The USAREUR set up support elements in the countries adjoining Bosnia 

to facilitate supply and transportation missions. For example, 5,000 soldiers were sent to Croatia while 7,000 more were deployed to Hungary and 

Italy. Eventually smaller numbers of US troops would be sent to Albania, 

Macedonia, and a few other temporary locations.11

Figure 1. UMT members (left to right) MSG Paul Wanshon, CH (CPT) Jamie 

MacLean, and CH (LTC) Scott McChrystal, Eagle Base, Bosnia, 1995–96.

US Army
29

One of the senior Army chaplains in Europe in 1995 was Chaplain 

(Colonel [COL]) Henry Wake, assigned as the USAREUR chaplain. Wake 

served in this position from 1994 to 1997 and was a key player in coordinating chaplain support for US troops preparing to deploy to the Balkans. 

Following the chain of command, Wake worked closely with the V Corps 

chaplain, Chaplain (COL) Barry Lonigan, and the 1st Armored Division 

chaplain, Chaplain (Lieutenant Colonel [LTC]) Scott McChrystal. The 1st 

Armored Division would be the major unit deploying to the Balkans, having been assigned this mission from the USAREUR headquarters, then 

through the V Corps. Wake spoke of the training before deployment as 

follows: “When we started the buildup for Bosnia we did a lot of MOPP 

[mission oriented protective posture] drills, a lot of stuff, set up in parking lots, and lived out there . . . we had staff meetings every morning and 

every night . . . and we’re on video teleconferencing with all these people 

downrange. . . .”12

The deployment of US ground troops to the Balkans was no surprise. 

Ongoing training with Army units in Germany lasted for months before 

the deployment. Chaplain Assistant Sergeant (SGT) Deborah Peek of the 

16th Corps Support Group, Hanau, Germany, recalled that the time leading up to their deployment to the Balkans consisted of “long training days 

and an increase in the stress level.”13 Chaplain (Captain [CPT]) Marvin 

Luckie arrived in Bosnia in December 1995. Having served in Operation 

DESERT STORM and in Somalia, he was intently watching the news 

when the Dayton Peace Accords were signed, knowing that he would be 

deployed. While working in Bosnia in a US and NATO Joint Psychological 

Operations Task Force, Luckie bemoaned the fact that prior to his deployment he had not received any training in joint operations.14

In summary of the extensive preparations for deploying into Bosnia, 

McChrystal of the 1st Armored Division stated:

There are ways to plan deployment and ways not to. We 

did it the hard way. Nothing we could do to control it. . . . 

Most of the train up lasted from the spring, early summer 

1995 well into October. And you remember what vacillating was going on. We couldn’t decode as a nation whether 

we were going in or not. The UN wasn’t doing anything. . . . 

Going through those times of training tends to be harder 

than the exercise, the real thing itself, because there is so 

much uncertainty built into it. So, then, back and forth. 

1st Armored Division back and forth to Grafenwehr. . . . 

So, once it was determined that I was going to be the 1st 
30

AD chaplain, and I probably knew 2 months prior to taking over, I arranged to go down to Grafenwehr and meet 

[Division Commander] William Nash where he made an 

official offer.15

While Army units and their chaplains prepared to deploy to the 

Balkans, the American news media was relentless in its questioning of 

the validity of this mission and speculating that sending US troops on the 

ground in the Balkans could have catastrophic consequences. In the 27 

November 1995 edition of TIME Magazine, statements were made about 

the US “fecklessness on foreign policy” and that the American people, 

“are actively hostile to the notion of American leadership [in the Balkans] 

if it requires risking American lives. . . . They are not convinced that their 

sons and daughters should die for the sake of Sarajevo.”16 In speaking of 

the Dayton Peace Accords, one media outlet stated that unity and reconciliation in the Balkans would be “largely in vain,” stating “The accord 

calls for reconciliation—fat chance.” The article also stated that only 38 

percent of Americans believed sending US troops to the Balkans was the 

right thing to do.17

After several months of intense training, the 40th Engineer Group with 

Chaplain (CPT) Jeff Giannola arrived on 3 January 1996 in Bosnia. The 

preparation for the deployment was a rich time of ministry, Giannola stated, 

with many soldiers and family members becoming serious about their relationship with God.18 Others were not able to train with their units before 

deployment. For example, Chaplain Assistant Private First Class (PFC) Dae 

Lee was straight out of training when he joined the 47th Forward Support 

Battalion in Baumholder, Germany. When he arrived, the unit had already 

trained and deployed, it taking him a month to join his unit in Bosnia.19 A 

similar situation occurred with Chaplain (CPT) Brent Causey of the 212th 

Mobile Army Surgical Hospital (MASH), who came from another assignment and met the unit and other UMT members in Bosnia.20 

Preparations for the Army Reserve and its chaplains to support missions in the Balkans began in the summer of 1995. Specifically, chaplain 

backfill by mostly US Army Reserve chaplains and chaplain assistants was 

necessary so Active Duty chaplains could deploy to the Balkans with their 

units. The Office of the Chief of Chaplains contacted USAREUR Chaplain 

Wake and asked what type of chaplain backfill would be necessary once 

Active Army units deployed to the Balkans. Wake anticipated the need 

for 20 to 25 Reserve chaplains to backfill, mostly in Germany. Standing 

operating procedures for this type of mission were that Army Personnel 

Center (ARPERCEN) would solicit volunteer Reserve chaplains to meet 
31

this requirement. The Chief, Army Reserve had another plan in mind. He 

ordered the US Army Reserve Command (USARC) to create an overstrength derivative unit to fulfill this backfill requirement. This mission 

was assigned to the Army Reserve 131st Chaplain Support Team (CST) 

out of Fort Belvoir, Virginia. In the coming months, this two-person unit 

would expand to 40 chaplains and chaplain assistants 21

Throughout the fall of 1995 and beyond, Chaplain (COL) James Hoke 

of the 7th ARCOM in Germany functioned in two capacities. The 7th 

ARCOM became the USAREUR Mobilization Station, meaning that US 

Army Reserve units from Europe and some from the United States inprocessed through this headquarters. In this capacity, Hoke provided pastoral 

care and counseling to incoming soldiers, their chaplains, and the inprocessing personnel team. Hoke also functioned as a chaplain to the soldiers 

of the 7th ARCOM who were mobilizing and deploying with their parent 1st Armored Division headquarters to such diverse Balkans locations 

as Kaposvar, Hungary; Zagreb, Croatia; and Zupanja, Croatia. The 7th 

ARCOM units deployed to these remote locations contained small numbers of soldiers. In addition to his other duties, Hoke made periodic visits 

to these soldiers deployed throughout the Balkans.

The Dayton Peace Accords brought a momentary peace to most of 

Bosnia. In late December 1995, advanced units of the US and NATO 

peacekeeping force were deployed throughout Bosnia and surrounding 

areas, familiarizing themselves with Bosnia’s physical and political 

distinctiveness. Although not opposed by military force, these initial 

peacekeepers faced a potentially volatile situation while furious and 

frustrated people of various ethnic groups adjusted to their presence. 

Demonstrations arose where flags from the United States were trampled 

Figure 2. USAREUR CH (COL) Henry Wake (far right) visits UMTs in Bosnia.

US Army
32

and burned, revealing that the implementation of the Dayton Peace Accords 

would be a difficult task.22

Chaplain (Major [MAJ]) Chester H. Lanious was assigned as the 

Division Support Command (DISCOM) chaplain attached to the 1st 

Armored Division. He recalled his training in Germany before deploying 

to Bosnia as a series of false starts, slow downs, then restarts. In the 

late fall of 1995, his unit had the mission of organizing and transporting 

huge amounts of equipment to staging areas throughout the Balkans. 

Lanious remarked, “Our mission was to conquer a logistical nightmare. 

In December, we had to deal with poor roads, antique railways, swollen 

rivers, underdeveloped airfields, and horrible weather. The cold, damp, 

foggy weather with almost daily snow and poor visibility made our 

transportation missions both grueling and dangerous.”23

The initial major thrust of the US military in Bosnia came with the 

construction and the 31 December 1995 crossing of the Sava River Bridge. 

To enter the country, the 1st Armored Division had to bridge the Sava 

River, which marked the border with Croatia. Army engineers under 

difficult weather conditions conducted this mission—the construction 

of the longest assault bridge in modern history—with no casualties or 

serious injuries. Melting snow caused deep mud and flooded the river. 

Nevertheless, the construction of the bridge was completed, the bridging 

of the Sava River being the first of a number of successful operations by 

US troops and NATO personnel.24

Before crossing the Sava River Bridge into Bosnia, Peek and her 16th 

Corps Support Group languished in Croatia. She stated, “Facilities in 

Croatia were very dumpy. We lived in freezing cold train cars that sat in 

the mud. For the first 30 days, there were no showers, and then we were 

able to get showers twice a week about 30 miles away. We could hear 

rounds going off at night very close by. We were on constant alert. Lots of 

guard duty. There were civilian buildings on fire or smoldering in our area. 

We were happy to leave Croatia and enter Bosnia.”25

On 14 December 1995, the 1st Armored Division was ordered to 

Bosnia-Herzegovina as part of Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR. This task 

force, known as Task Force Eagle, did a 20 December transfer of authority 

ceremony with UN forces at Eagle Base, Tuzla. After the historic crossing 

of the Sava River on 31 December, the 1st Armored Division, with supporting Army units from V Corps and Army Reserve units from the 7th 

ARCOM, was joined by Nordic-Polish, Turkish, and Russian brigades. 

McChrystal, the first Task Force Eagle chaplain, described his view of the 

US Army’s entrance into Bosnia:
33

So, as we came down most of us came by rail from 

Germany down through Hungary. Well, I flew . . . a lot of 

people came down. They went to Slavonski Brod and then 

we just started infiltrating into this whole sector, and the 

first people in country flew down to Tuzla, Bosnia. That 

was an old Yugoslavian Air Base and believe me, there 

were few buildings, a lot of land mines, and an airfield. 

And so, we started from there with the advanced party of 

about 20 people. . . .

It wasn’t like we were getting in an assembly line and 

it was really going to be, I think, probably the hardest 

thing a division equivalent chaplain has had to do, and 

I’m including everything up to the day because we didn’t 

know what we were wanting to do. Six million unexploded land mines, we just didn’t know if we could keep 

the factions separated . . . a preponderance of the population of military folks in the task force were going to drive 

across the Sava River and infiltrate south. . . .26

Those US soldiers who flew or drove into Bosnia in late December 

1995 as well as those Special Forces soldiers who were already in the 

Figure 3. Engineering Excellence, a painting by Christopher 

Thiel showing the US Army crossing the Sava River.

Army Art Collection, National Museum of the US Army 
34

area were about to observe the Christian holiday of Christmas. Organizing 

Christmas church services for these newly deployed and widely scattered 

soldiers throughout Bosnia was not an easy task. These few thousand 

soldiers received Christmas Eve and Christmas Day religious services 

from two Air Force Protestant chaplains and a Roman Catholic chaplain 

who were earlier deployed to the region. McChrystal coordinated the 

efforts of these chaplains, saying that clear-cut planning was essential and 

only performing denominational services for a select group of people at 

this point in the mission was not an option.27

Chaplain (CPT) David Brown of the 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry 

arrived in the Balkans shortly after Christmas 1995. The months prior to 

deployment were spent in the field doing gunnery training at Hoensfels 

and Grafenwehr, Germany. In mid-December, his unit was bused from 

Germany to Taszar, Hungary, to organize and inventory new equipment. 

David Brown commented, “The unit was in an intense training mode, as 

our mission was changed at the last minute from a peacekeeping mission to a peace-enforcement mission. Apprehension grew as we knew we 

were going into a potentially volatile area.” David Brown and his unit 

then drove military vehicles from Taszar to a final staging area in Croatia. 

In describing Croatia, David Brown stated, “There were select areas that 

were decimated. It was obvious that a very select targeting of certain areas 

has occurred.” He further recalled, “My unit and I traveled from Croatia 

and crossed the Sava River Bridge in the last days of December 1995. The 

weather was cold, snowy, and foggy. We could hear gunfire in the distance, 

some of it from automatic weapons. We never got off the main roads since 

we all knew that there were millions of land mines throughout the area. As 

we drove over the Sava River Bridge listening to gunfire I thought, what 

in the world are we getting into?”28

Initial Chaplain Activities and Ministries in Bosnia, 1996

Chaplains who deployed into Bosnia and other Balkans sites in 1996 

were part of a 12-nation peacemaking and peacekeeping force divided into 

three brigades from the nations of Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Iceland, 

Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Russia, Sweden, Turkey, and the 

United States. Task Force Eagle enforced the cease-fire, supervised the 

marking of boundaries and the zone of separation between the former warring factions, enforced withdrawal of the combatants, and coordinated the 

movement of heavy weapons to designated storage sites. Task Force Eagle

also supported the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
35

(OSCE) in their efforts to administer the country’s first-ever democratic 

national elections.

On 9 January 1996, Chaplain Lanious of the 1st Armored Division 

departed Germany by bus with elements of his unit for a staging area at 

Figure 4. Sketch by Gary N. Cassidy of the US Army staging 

base in Taszar, Hungary.

Center for Military History
36

Taszar, Hungary. They stayed at this austere location for 6 days while 

matching specific units with predelivered equipment. This area, over the 

course of a few days, became a bustling but crude US Army staging area. 

Living conditions were miserable in the middle of a Balkan winter, causing 

numerous vehicle crashes and other accidents. Soldiers shivered in tents, 

ate in filth, and worked in mud. Lanious’ unit then moved to an unnamed 

rural pasture in Croatia and for 3 days awaited orders for permission to 

deploy in convoy to Bosnia.

In convoy, Lanious and his chaplain assistant drove the 6-to-8-hour 

trip from their location in Croatia to the border of Bosnia. While he noticed 

minimal signs of war destruction during this convoy, the evidence of war 

drastically changed once they entered Bosnia. He stated:

We saw minimal war damage from artillery in Croatia. 

When we entered Bosnia territory that all changed. 

Burned and demolished buildings were everywhere. Then 

we reached the Sava River. We crossed on the US Army 

bridge just built by the Engineers. It was very narrow and 

hazardous. My chaplain assistant was driving and she 

was noticeably nervous about driving on this bridge. The 

weather was terrible and visibility was poor. But at that 

time I was able to sense the historic nature of this river 

crossing, as we entered Bosnia as peacekeepers or peace 

enforcers.29

US Army soldiers entering Bosnia for the first time had various impressions of their surroundings. Chaplain Assistant PFC Dae Lee arrived in 

Bosnia in January 1996 as part of the 47th Forward Support Battalion. 

Dae Lee stated, “Civilian destruction was very evident due to lots of ruins 

around the villages and the town I saw. Many homes and buildings were 

torn apart or had significant signs of battle around their homes. I had seen 

many bullet holes and structure of their homes broken off.”30 On entering Bosnia in early January 1996, Lanious recalled, “Our destination 

was Lukvac. In this area, we saw lots of decommissioned soldiers sitting 

around with nothing to do. They sat around all day drinking coffee and 

smoking cigarettes and looking at us menacingly. They wore their military uniforms since it was winter and that clothing was warm.” Lanious 

further commented, “Since the Dayton Peace Accords were signed and 

we entered this area, the military forces in the region were either decommissioned or began covert training operations. We saw men in fields with 

no weapons rehearsing military squad level tactics, they waited for us to 

depart so they could continue their rage.” In noticing the large number 
37

of children in the area, Lanious remarked, “The children were all over 

us, very friendly, some spoke English. They were curious, begging, and 

seemed to be relieved that we were there. It was easy to see the natural 

physical beauty of this place in spite of the ravages of war.”31

As 1996 began, extensive news reports covered the deployment of 

American soldiers throughout Bosnia and neighboring nations and raised 

political and policy issues for Americans to consider. In a 1 January 1996 

interview in the Army Times, Clinton stated he deployed US troops to 

Bosnia “to stop slaughter,” and that the Bosnia mission is “the first significant military test of Cold War policy” in which the US military joins 

with allies to try to prevent wars and “stand against chaos.” Clinton further 

commented, “Our leadership in NATO and our ability to lead the world 

toward peace and democracy are very much tied to our willingness to 

assume a leadership role in the Bosnia mission.”32 A few weeks earlier in a 

speech to the 1st Armored Division, Secretary of Defense Perry stated:

For the first time in nearly 4 years, we face the promise of lasting peace in Bosnia. It is clear from my discussions with the negotiators in Dayton, and my talks with 

the leaders throughout Europe—including Russia—that 

this peace agreement could not have been reached without American leadership, nor can it be implemented without American participation in the peace Implementation 

Force (IFOR). The alternative to peace is clear: more killing, beyond the 200,000 already dead; more ethnic cleansing; more refugees beyond the more than two million who 

have already fled their homes flooding nearby countries; 

and more instability in Europe.33

Soldiers deploying into Bosnia in winter conditions and in a hostile fire 

zone would inevitably suffer injuries or casualties. In the extensive 1995 

buildup for deployment in the Balkans, the US Army Combat Readiness 

Center (USACRC) reported only one aviation injury (a soldier was hurt 

from shifting cargo as a plane landed in Hungary) and eight various accidents that caused injuries. These eight 1995 injuries all occurred at or near 

staging areas in Hungary and were either traffic related or occurred while 

setting up equipment. One of these soldiers received a permanent partial 

disability. In 1996, the numbers of injured US Army personnel increased, 

as 20 recorded incidents resulted in various injuries to soldiers. For example, these 1996 injuries were received from operating vehicles, handling 

heavy equipment, traffic accidents, or from horseplay.34 In 1996 there was 

a death of a US soldier. As one report stated:
38

A US soldier from Houston [was] killed in a truck crash in 

Bosnia-Herzegovina. . . . Pfc. Floyd E. Bright, Jr., 19, was 

killed and another soldier injured when their truck ran off 

a temporary bridge and overturned while on a supply run 

Friday night. Bright was the passenger. . . . Bright was 

sent to Bosnia in January. . . .

Clouds gathered and a chill filled the air Saturday as 

Bright’s comrades in Bosnia-Herzegovina bid him farewell on his final journey home. Bright was the second 

American soldier killed in Bosnia during the NATO-led 

mission to safeguard peace.

Soldiers from Russia, Poland, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, 

Turkey, and Britain, as well as the United States, were 

among those forming a 22-person honor guard for Bright’s 

casket. An Army Humvee carrying the body drove slowly 

to the flight line at Tuzla Air Base, the headquarters of the 

US forces in Bosnia. Six pallbearers lifted the container 

case and stood for just a few moments at the head of the 

honor guard.

The chaplain, LTC Scott McChrystal, read from the 23d 

Psalm. The commander of the US peacekeepers, Maj. 

Gen. William L. Nash, stood at attention in front of the 

honor guard. The pallbearers then marched through the 

two-column honor guard. The soldiers presented their 

arms in tribute as the container passed and was loaded on 

a plane that would take the body to Ramstein, Germany, 

before heading home.

Pfc. Bright was assigned to the headquarters of the Army’s 

2/678 Armored Battalion. . . . The first American GI killed 

in the mission was Army Sgt. Donald A. Dugan, who died 

in a land mine accident on Feb 3.35 

Chaplains arriving in Bosnia in early 1996 had initial issues related to 

coordination with other chaplains and reporting to supervisory chaplains. 

Simply put, the lack of infrastructure and inaccessibility of many locations combined with the rapid buildup of US forces made chaplain coordination and cooperation an initial challenge. As the task force chaplain, 

McChrystal explained, “I learned that in attempting to lead chaplains a collegial approach works fine.” He asked chaplains as they came to Bosnia or 

neighboring countries to report to him for coordination, accountability, and 

resourcing. He stated to incoming chaplains, “Just let me know where you 
39

were so we got everybody’s name and UMTs . . . they did all I asked. They 

called in and told me where they were and of course, we had none of these 

base camps. Everyone was living in mud; it was cold and miserable. And of 

course, there was a lot of area in our sector that we were just so careful not 

to get off the main roads because we did not know the safety factor.”36

Chaplains assigned to Special Forces units in Bosnia in 1996 had 

diverse and challenging ministries to soldiers in small groups who were 

often in potential danger in isolated communities. The mission of the US 

Army Special Forces in Bosnia was to find weapons storage areas and confiscate or destroy them; to gather intelligence related to armed or potentially armed factions that would not support the Dayton Peace Accords; to 

locate and apprehend those accused of war crimes; and to enforce peace 

by separating belligerent factions within Bosnia. Chaplain (MAJ) Jay 

Hartranft of the 10th Special Forces was in Bosnia at this time. He stated, 

“I had soldiers scattered in 25 locations around Bosnia. They were working with Romanian, Russian, Hungarian, and other international military 

units as advisors. My colonel wanted me to be a circuit preacher. So, I 

traveled as best I could from site to site, all by ground transportation. I sure 

saw a lot of that war-torn country.”37 Hartranft elaborated, “I served specifically as the JSOTF [Joint Special Operations Task Force] chaplain and 

worked almost exclusively with Special Forces chaplains. They included 

Chaplain Mark Jones . . . and Chaplain Mike Brainerd. . . . Since only one 

SF battalion was employed at a time, we did not work together but rotated 

in and out as the battalions did.”38

Figure 5. Army Chief of Chaplains (MG) Donald Shea visits with Task 

Force Eagle soldiers in Bosnia, 1996.

US Army
40

As crude living conditions slowly improved into what would become 

base camps, the construction of chapels in locations throughout Bosnia 

became a high priority for chaplains. Soldiers leaving the relative safety 

of the fledgling base camps for missions in dangerous areas needed a place 

of spiritual and emotional support. McChrystal stated that the chaplains 

made a “great effort” to get chapels constructed. He stated that by mid1996 there were 21 chapels built in Bosnia, with construction of several 

chapels at one time in various base camps being common. McChrystal 

stated, “You talk about the chapel building program . . . it really took well 

into May to dig ourselves out of the mud, get up and running, and it was 

interesting to see.”39

While the vast majority of religious services performed by Army 

chaplains in Bosnia in 1996 were in small groups in outside areas, the 

rapid construction of chapels helped to provide a quiet, dignified setting 

for spiritual and emotional renewal. Two interesting stories related to the 

construction of chapels in Bosnia in 1996 deserve special attention.

The first chapel construction story relates to an advanced party of 

soldiers entering Bosnia and, with the supervision of two Air Force chaplains, 

renovating a building to be a chapel. The problem was the location was poor 

and they did not receive prior permission from the officer in charge (OIC) 

of that area. The Air Force chaplains did not support the decision to move 

the chapel they had renovated, and they did not appreciate McChrystal as 

the task force chaplain telling them the chapel had to be moved. One of 

the Air Force chaplains spoke to the media about this scenario and there 

quickly appeared headlines in newspapers throughout the United States 

and Europe that “Jesus had been kicked out of Tuzla.” Seeking to avoid 

a public relations nightmare, the Commander, General William Nash, 

publicly invited Jesus back to Tuzla. McChrystal remembered these events 

as follows:

Within a week of me getting there [Bosnia], it was in 

the headlines in major papers across the world that we’d 

kicked Jesus out of Tuzla. That’s exactly what the headline 

said. . . . So we kicked Jesus out of Tuzla and General Nash 

showed some, not only sense of humor, but some wisdom 

that was just incredible. He invited me up to this big battle update brief where we had routinely 150—sometimes 

more than that—all of these people because there were five 

brigade sectors. . . . So we had all these people and he told 

me to get up there and say a prayer and invite Jesus back to 

Tuzla. And that was one time, knowing who was out there 
41

[in the audience] I said . . . I’m going to say this prayer in 

Jesus’ name, with your permission. And we did and that 

was the end of it. So that was an interesting start.40

The second unique chapel construction story related to the interdenominational use of all military chapels. As explained by USAREUR 

Chaplain Wake, civilian construction workers were happy and eager to 

build military chapels in Bosnia. In one case, the enthusiastic construction 

workers wanted to erect a large wooden cross in front of the new chapel. This seemingly innocuous gesture did not take into consideration that 

Jewish and Muslim soldiers and others would be sharing the chapel schedule with Protestant and Roman Catholic services. Some soldiers, Wake 

stated, would feel like the Christian symbol of the cross did not represent 

their faith traditions and was showing favoritism. While Wake suggested 

that the cross be mounted on some type of mobile apparatus, the civilian 

construction workers were uninformed about the religious sensitivities of 

the Balkans and the diverse religious composition of the NATO forces.41

Wake stated that there was to be no favoritism toward Christians and that 

in the construction of all chapels in the Balkans there should be an emphasis on the religious neutrality of the building, which could be decorated by 

various religious groups to their own preferences.

US troops in the early months of 1996 in Bosnia had a wide array of 

considerations that formed the parameters of their peacekeeping mission. 

Within the anarchy and chaos of the collapsed former Yugoslavia there 

remained strong ethnic identities, weak political institutions, fervent 

nationalism, failed economics, volatile local fiefdoms, bands of vigilantes, 

and religious hatred. The IFOR intended to do four major things: to create 

self-determination, to enforce peace, to provide justice, and to restore 

territorial integrity. The key factor in this ambitious agenda was to create 

and enforce the zone of separation (ZOS) and then to monitor and enforce 

compliance. Then the IFOR would conduct peacekeeping or peaceenforcing missions while assisting UN humanitarian efforts in the area. 

While American and other NATO leaders wondered if Serbian leader 

Slobodan Milosevic and his cronies would obey the Dayton Peace Accords 

and cooperate with NATO troops in Bosnia, the US troops and their allies 

were authorized to take such actions as required to fulfill their orders, 

including the use of necessary force. As McChrystal stated of these tense 

early months, “We basically postured ourselves, establishing the ZOS, the 

zone of separation, and so basically we just occupied and, throughout the 

whole time I was there, we were just gradually sort of crawling out as we 

were able to clear the roads, clear the land, and make sure we were not 
42

going to lose people.” In speaking of peacekeeping and then nation-building 

missions, McChrystal remarked, “That did not kick in for 6 months. In that 

time there was still hostile fire. Drive-by shootings, mines on roads, there 

was definitely that and there was always the threat we would have these 

joint military commission meetings and you just haven’t lived until you’ve 

sat around or shaken hands with some of those thugs.”42

On 12 February 1997, Shalikashvili, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff, summarized the 1996 US and NATO entry into Bosnia and their 

initial successes as follows:

Fifteen months ago in many Bosnian towns and cities, 

artillery fire was killing men and women in their homes 

and snipers shot children playing in the streets. Atrocities 

were nearly a daily occurrence. US forces went into Bosnia 

with the Implementation Force (IFOR), the NATO force 

tasked to accomplish the military tasks assigned in the 

Dayton Accords. It was a heavy force, involving nearly 

20,000 US military members who participated in keeping 

the factions separated, demobilizing forces, and achieving the other military goals of the Dayton Accords.

The situation has changed dramatically since then. Today 

there are no weapons firing into towns, and children once 

again play in the streets. The absence of war brought by 

IFOR offers a ray of hope for the future. . . .43

Developing Chaplain Ministries in Bosnia, 1996

The US and NATO forces that sought to stabilize Bosnia throughout 

1996 faced numerous obstacles and setbacks. The US news media extensively covered the attempts at peace enforcement and peacekeeping by the 

newly arrived US troops. A Washington Post front page story stated, “The 

Bosnia Serbs’ military commander [General Ratko Mladic] announced 

today that he has ordered his troops to suspend contacts with NATO peacekeeping forces in retaliation for the Bosnian government’s detention of 

eight Serb soldiers and officers suspected of war crimes.”44 An article in 

the 9 February 1996 European Stars & Stripes reported a weather related 

vehicle accident in which three soldiers were injured, one seriously and 

the others with bruises and small cuts. The accident occurred near Tuzla 

with the soldiers evacuated to a nearby field hospital.45 An editorial in 

the Wall Street Journal tersely stated, “Why does Clinton seem prepared 
43

to risk the lives of 20,000 American soldiers and to make a deal with the 

devil (i.e., Slobodan Milosevic . . . who could perhaps drag US officials 

down with them if they told the whole truth)?”46 Clearly in 1996 there was 

no unanimity from the United States related to the validity of the peacekeeping mission in Bosnia, its chances of success, or the role of the United 

States in the internal affairs of the sovereign nation of Yugoslavia. 

The peacemaking and peacekeeping missions of the US forces in 

Bosnia were missions unfamiliar to most of the Army’s leadership at that 

time. Senior soldiers used to training on large and deadly weapon systems 

on an open battlefield found themselves in urban areas or rural villages 

interacting with locals who may or may not be hostile to the United States 

and NATO. Friend from foe could not be readily determined. Skills of 

diplomacy took priority over combative skills. As one news report stated:

Long schooled in the traditional art of fighting war, 

American commanders now find themselves grappling 

with political, diplomatic and military demands that go 

far beyond the martial skills they were taught.

They are warriors without a war, and, for many, the soldiering business has never been more difficult or more 

removed from their orthodox notions of command. Yet 

Figure 6. Winter/spring 1996 home of CH (CPT) Yarmen and 

CA SPC McAniff in Bosnia.

US Army
44

Bosnia is recognized as a likely paradigm for future 

military actions: a multinational peacekeeping deployment to a place that is neither benign nor wholly hostile, 

under circumstances in which vital American interests are 

peripheral at best.

Commanders are expected to retain their prowess for 

the brand of high intensity warfare unleashed during 

the Persian Gulf War, but also to become masters of 

negotiation, arbitration, bluff and restraint—all within 

a framework of a shrinking US military that has gone 

through the most radical restructuring in a generation.

‘I’ve trained for 30 years to read a battlefield. Now you’re 

asking me to read a peace field,’ said Maj. Gen. William 

L. Nash, Commander of US forces in Bosnia. ‘It doesn’t 

come easy. It ain’t natural; it ain’t intuitive. They don’t 

teach this stuff at Fort Leavenworth. . . . It’s an inner ear 

problem. No one feels completely balanced.’47

In this scenario of uncertainty, danger, and political turmoil, US Army 

chaplains placed themselves in harm’s way to minister to soldiers. An 

example of ministry in 1996 in Bosnia is provided by Chaplain (CPT) Jeff 

Giannola assigned to the 40th Engineer Group. When Giannola arrived 

in Bosnia on 3 January 1996, there was no infrastructure to support the 

troops. They had to sleep in or under vehicles, eat unpopular meals, ready 

to eat (MREs), and build their own housing compound. Giannola was 

located near Vlasenica for most of his tour. He recalled, “Life was primarily lived behind barbed wire. Soldiers were always heavily armed. Mines 

were always on everyone’s mind. One soldier in my unit lost his foot on 

a mine. Another soldier from a nearby unit was killed by one.” Giannola 

remembered his first church service in Bosnia as “a time of prayer and 

preaching outside behind a vehicle.” He stated, “Most services were held 

in a dining tent. I preached firmly to soldiers of all religious backgrounds 

and was well accepted. I built a relationship with them so each company I 

visited provided a tent for services.”48

For the 10 plus months that Giannola was in Bosnia, life was a constant 

series of adjustments. Initial rumors of snipers, minefields, and ambushes 

gave way to the monotony of living humbly in the mud and snow. He 

stated, “After we got all set up, we were taken care of well—food, housing, 

a real bed, and heat in our tents. It was a big improvement.” Ministry for 

Giannola consisted primarily of providing religious services and counseling 

to the widely scattered Engineer company soldiers within his battalion. He 
45

recalled, “We always had to travel according to the four-vehicle convoy 

rule. The men were always heavily armed. These were special times from 

the Lord. A sovereign God blessed me with a supportive commander and 

the full support of the men. How many became Christians I do not know. 

It was a blessing to preach and be so well received.” Giannola admitted, 

“An actual combat zone ministry was an exhilarating experience, doing 

real ministry under pressure.” He recalled how proud he was of his soldiers 

when “they showed an awesome amount of self-discipline when spit on by a 

mob during a riot control mission. They were great.” He further stated, “My 

wife and I grew closer through the deployment. I appreciated my family 

more. Even though I was away, it was an opportunity for God to bless.”49 

Chaplains who remained in the rear while small elements of their 

units deployed to the Balkans had viable and rewarding ministries. 

Massachusetts Army National Guard Chaplain (CPT) Kenneth Lawson 

of the 42d Infantry Division Artillery serves as an example of providing 

chaplain support to small numbers of separated soldiers and family members from the rear area while loved ones were deployed to Bosnia. From 

April to July 1996, Lawson ministered to 45 Fire Support Team (FIST) 

soldiers and their families through a number of premobilization briefings, 

family activities, and church services. Lawson had many private prayer 

and counseling sessions that were less visible than the public rallies and 

departure ceremonies. On 11 July 1996, Lawson led a gathering of several 

hundred supporters in public prayer as 45 soldiers prepared to get on buses 

and begin their deployment.

By February 1997, the 45 FIST soldiers from Lawson’s unit were due 

home in a few months. As he maintained contact with family members and 

continued to support them through counseling, family support group meetings, and crisis intervention, another element of his 42d Division Artillery 

unit received orders for a 180-day tour in Bosnia. The 87 men that composed the target acquisition battery (TAB) had a few months before they 

were due to rotate into Bosnia. One unit prepared to return home while 

another was preparing to deploy, making this an extremely busy time for 

Lawson, who had to balance his full-time civilian ministry with his everdemanding part-time military ministry. As one report stated, “February 

through April 1997 was an extremely busy time for Chaplain Lawson, 

as he counseled soldiers and their families both as they were returning 

home from deployment and as others prepared to leave. Hundreds of gospel tracts were given out, in addition to the Bibles that he made available 

to every single soldier who had deployed or redeployed home.”50

Chaplains and chaplain assistants serving in Bosnia and in neighboring 
46

regions in 1996 and 1997 had numerous unique and challenging ministry 

experiences. From January through May 1996, Chaplain (CPT) Marvin 

Luckie of the 4th Psychological Operations (PSYOP) Battalion was 

on the road often visiting 4th PSYOPs soldiers throughout the area of 

operations. In this itinerant ministry capacity, he conducted numerous 

religious services for isolated soldiers and counseled soldiers dealing with 

low intensity combat fatigue. After any major incident, Luckie performed 

serious incident stress debriefings, allowing the soldiers to speak of their 

experiences and feelings in a safe and structured atmosphere. Luckie 

stated, “While in convoys our peacekeepers faced some RPGs [rocket 

propelled grenades] and AK-47 rifle fire. Some Serbs were still shooting, 

and there was the constant threat of snipers and landmines. We saw many 

civilian men who would drink alcohol or coffee or both all day that looked 

dangerous. They had nothing to do since they were disarmed and we were 

now in the area. We always traveled in teams to be safe.” Luckie further 

remarked, “It was profitable to work with the United Methodist Committee 

on Relief, and we worked well with multinational chaplains for Christmas 

and Easter services.”51

Chaplain Assistant Peek departed Bosnia in September 1996. Assigned 

to the 16th Corps Support Group, she observed the local civilians who 

still feared for their lives—the horrors of ethnic cleansing deeply affecting them. She commented on the terrible destruction throughout Bosnia 

and the uncertainty as to who was friend or foe: “Conditions were very 

primitive. It was like the local people were living in the Stone Age. All 

their facilities were destroyed.” Peek further commented, “We adopted 

a bombed-out school nearby. We got school supplies donated from our 

unit back in Germany. There was a great response to this, and we enjoyed 

delivering the school supplies to the local children.” As far as ministries 

to soldiers at Camp Dallas, she stated that interest in religious services 

was good. There was a minor problem, she recalled, in that there was no 

wine for communion, making the Lutheran and Roman Catholic chaplains 

unhappy. One program that worked very well was the gospel service choir 

the unit sponsored back in Germany that was reassembled in Bosnia.52

The political situation in Bosnia in 1996 was unsettled. The year began 

with reports of Serbian slave-labor camps being hidden from NATO forces, 

with up to 1,000 Muslim prisoners enslaved and brutalized by their Serbian 

captors. Reports also stated that mass grave locations, sites where thousands 

of Muslims were massacred by Serbs, were being hidden.53 American and 

NATO forces appeared to quickly side with the Bosnian Muslims against 

the Eastern Orthodox Serbs. Yet, further investigation showed that the 

Bosnian Muslims were themselves guilty of anti-Americanism, receiving 
47

funds and weapons and mercenaries from extremist Muslim countries. A 

report in the US House of Representatives by Ike Skelton of Missouri 

stated of Bosnia: “There is the enduring presence of Muslim extremists 

in that country.” The report further said, “Recently the Washington Post

reported that the United States had threatened to halt military and financial aid to the Muslim-led Bosnian government unless it expels Iranian 

guerrilla fighters who remain in the country in violation of the Dayton 

Accords.” Some US officials accused Muslim leaders in Bosnia of playing 

a “double game by attempting to continue a military relationship with Iran 

even as they receive support from the United States.”54

While politically Bosnia was in turmoil, life for US soldiers throughout 1996 began to settle into some semblance of routine. Base camps rose 

out of the mud and squalor and became humble but reasonably comfortable 

places to live. For most soldiers, sleeping conditions and bathing facilities 

remained basic, with even the simplest facilities being an improvement 

over conditions experienced on their arrival in Bosnia. Military chapels 

appeared on all major NATO facilities, and recreational activities sponsored by numerous organizations became popular. One unpopular decision 

hotly debated in the Pentagon was not to allow US soldiers in Bosnia to 

drink alcohol. Stating traditional Muslim sensitivities against alcohol use, 

US troops in Bosnia would not be allowed to drink alcohol at all, except 

when on leave in Hungary or Germany. Senior political and military leaders stated they were worried about Muslim sensitivities to Americans 

drinking alcohol and were concerned about mixing alcohol use with the 

heavy firepower and the permissive rules of engagement in place for US 

forces.55

Knowing that US and NATO troops had ample spare time in base 

camps between missions, McChrystal became concerned about the dayto-day spiritual and moral climate within each compound. As the senior 

chaplain for Task Force Eagle, McChrystal saw that the combination 

of high stress missions outside the camps combined with the boredom 

within the camps was a combination that could lead to deviant behavior, 

spiritual lethargy, and an overall melancholia within each base camp. At 

that time, a Christian musical group who desired to perform at numerous 

base camps throughout the region contacted McChrystal. After gaining 

the approval of the Task Force Eagle commander, McChrystal and the US 

Army Europe (Forward) Staff Chaplain (LTC) Daniel Paul coordinated 

with the music group to arrive in Hungary and then be sent to Bosnia. 

Becoming an official Department of Defense Overseas Touring Show, 

the musicians traveled throughout Bosnia according to the armed 

four-convoy rule, with gaining chaplains at each location doing the 
48

coordination. As one report stated, “Over the course of their 12 days 

on tour, the group performed at 20 different bases, making 28 separate 

appearances at concerts, worship services, and unit prayer breakfasts, 

to well over 1,500 IFOR personnel. . . . Inevitably after each concert, 

a cluster of soldiers would engulf the two singers with questions about 

their music and their Christian faith. . . . This ministry tour proved to be 

of great value within the command.”56

Expanding Chaplain Ministries in Bosnia and Surrounding 

Areas, 1996–97

While life at base camps became more stable and comfortable, chaplain 

missions both within and outside the wire further developed. What began as 

a makeshift attempt at providing chaplain support developed quickly into 

an organized pattern of meeting the religious needs of soldiers in Bosnia. 

Some of the frustrations or growing pains experienced by chaplains or 

chaplain assistants during these initial months in Bosnia are evident in the 

experiences of chaplain assistant PFC Dae Lee. Dae Lee was assigned to 

the 47th Forward Support Battalion (FSB) and was in Bosnia from January 

through October 1996. Dae Lee and Chaplain (CPT) Jerry Sieg were both 

new to the Army chaplaincy, and, as Dae Lee stated, “We were a little 

unsure of our roles but eventually got along excellently.” Dae Lee also 

mentioned, “Once I arrived in Bosnia it took me several months to really 

understand why we were there.” Dae Lee commented, “It took us a very 

long time to build our chapel. . . . Overall, we had a very hard time fitting 

into our unit. The unit at many times isolated the chaplain section. We had 

to make a double effort to fit in.” A main reason they had difficulty fitting, 

according to Dae Lee, was the nonstop working conditions and the intense 

pace of operation in their FSB. The intense work environment produced 

exhaustion, low morale, and little interest in spiritual things. Dae Lee 

remarked, “My 10 months in Bosnia were very tough and hard working. I 

wish I and my chaplain would have been better prepared.”57

Chaplain Assistant Specialist (SPC) Wyman Loveless of the 1st 

Squadron, 4th Cavalry Brigade had a positive experience in Bosnia. 

Serving in Bosnia from April through July 1996, he described his job 

as “Personal security for the battalion chaplain and battalion chaplain 

assistant.” Loveless remarked that he and his chaplain, CPT David Brown, 

were well connected with the mental health professionals and the chain of 

command and that they participated in or attended many unit activities. 
49

In commenting about the dangers that he and David Brown experienced, 

Loveless stated:

We felt danger nightly as this was the time when aggressors 

would try to breach our perimeter or fire at patrols or at the 

base camp. Nationals would occasionally come in front of 

the gate and beg for food and shelter. They would also 

block convoys by standing in the road or by harassing 

drivers or passengers in vehicles.58

Jewish soldiers in Bosnia in 1996 experienced their holy days away 

from home. Seeing this need, USAREUR Chaplain Wake coordinated with 

the European Command (EUCOM) to allow a rabbi, Chaplain (COL) David 

Zalis, to go to Bosnia and meet the religious needs of Jewish soldiers, both 

American and others. Zalis’ account of his ministry in Bosnia is as follows:

In 1996 I served for 6 months as the EUCOM rear chaplain 

in Germany. My main job was to coordinate chaplains 

from various US forces as well as NATO chaplains. Our 

main focus was on Bosnia. I coordinated and administrated 

chaplains from numerous countries going to and coming 

from Bosnia.

For 2 weeks during the 1996 Passover season I was sent to 

the Balkans to perform Jewish religious services. We flew 

by helicopter from Germany to Taszar, Hungary. After 

spending time there with soldiers and seeking out Jewish 

soldiers we flew by helicopter to Bosnia. While I traveled 

around Bosnia a lot to conduct Jewish religious services, 

I centered my activities out of Camp Bondsteel, Kosovo. 

Chaplain McChrystal was the senior chaplain there. I was 

assigned a driver and a bodyguard. There were signs of 

destruction all over the place. It was very tense. There 

was so much hatred in the faces of the people.

I brought with me a large number of kosher MREs to 

distribute to Jewish soldiers during this holiday season. 

At Camp Bondsteel we had a large Passover celebration 

that was well attended and very popular. This was the time 

that US Secretary of Commerce Ron Brown was killed in 

a helicopter accident. My experience in Bosnia was very 

fulfilling. I was glad to meet the religious needs of Jewish 

soldiers in harms way as they performed a difficult and 

often thankless mission.59
50

Throughout 1996 and into 1997 the effectiveness of the United 

States and NATO intervention became apparent. A tense peace prevailed 

throughout Bosnia. Refugees returned to their looted homes, war criminals 

were pursued, relief agencies operated without interruption throughout 

Bosnia, and a gradual rebuilding program commenced. Many US troops 

rarely went outside the base perimeter, and with the no alcohol use policy 

for US troops, soldiers were safer, healthier, and less likely to be killed.60

For the first 6 months in Bosnia there were only three US soldiers 

killed—one by a landmine, one in a kitchen fire, and one in a truck accident. 

The number of US soldiers injured in accidents was also lower than the 

number of injuries in the Army as a whole, that being from the strict safety 

guidelines enforced throughout Bosnia. Throughout this same period, there 

were 62 pregnancies among the 2,000 or so US women stationed in Bosnia, 

a rate comparable to Army pregnancies worldwide. Nonserious injuries 

were frequent, caused mostly from vehicle maintenance, transportation 

accidents, sports injuries, or other routine factors. Serious injuries were so 

low that the large number of medical personnel deployed to Bosnia became 

obviously unnecessary, so doctors rotated from Bosnia back to Germany 

to keep their surgical skills sharp and then returned to Bosnia. This is not 

to say that duty in Bosnia was comfortable or hazard-free. What was most 

likely to injure a soldier was a road accident, and by mid-1996 there were 

13 soldiers seriously injured in road accidents. Another cause for injuries 

was land mines, with two soldiers seriously wounded in mid-1996 from 

land mines. About the same time, there was a report that snipers wounded 

two US soldiers, with another soldier shot but not seriously wounded by 

someone trying to sneak into a base camp.61

Causey had an interesting and diverse ministry in Bosnia from June 

1996 through January 1997. Assigned to the 212th Mobile Army Surgical 

Hospital (MASH) at Camp Bedrock, Bosnia, Causey was the base camp 

senior chaplain supervising two other chaplains. He described his job as 

follows:

Provide religious support to MASH staff, soldiers, and 

patients. Provide worship services to the base camp, which 

were six weekly worship services and three Bible Studies. 

Member of the Critical Incident Stress Management 

Team. Advise the commander on local religious holidays 

and on the impact of moral, ethical, emotional, and spiritual issues.62

Causey further stated that he and his chaplain assistant were part of 

the first response team when injured or wounded soldiers came into their 
51

hospital. They would split up to provide religious support to as many 

soldiers at once as possible, with Causey being briefed by his chaplain 

assistant about those patients who needed to or requested to see the 

chaplain.63

Causey’s medical unit performed various ministries outside their base 

camp at Camp Bedrock. He recalled: 

We did MEDFLAGs [medical training exercises] to local 

villages. This was a hospital mission and not a chaplain 

mission, although I went along to provide religious support 

to our soldiers and did some counseling when needed. 

Many of the main supply routes and alternative supply 

routes were mined. This caused a problem once when a 

convoy we were in got off the main road. We identified 

that the road we were on was mined.64

Chaplains, like Causey, and their assistants typically stated that their 

most harrowing experiences were from driving on pitiful roads in terrible 

weather conditions amidst a local populous in which antagonists of the 

United States were hidden. Chaplain Assistant SPC James Nelson summed 

up the view of chaplains and chaplain assistants in traveling on dangerous 

roads when he stated, “Most of the time when we would go on convoys we 

knew that there were numerous mines everywhere.”65

Chaplain Assistant Nelson served with Chaplain (CPT) Glen McFarland 

with the 519th Military Police Battalion at Camp Colt, Bosnia. Nelson 

arrived in July 1996 and served through June 1997. Nelson remarked, “In 

addition to my other duties I assisted the Catholic priest, Chaplain Flock, 

when he did Catholic services for our unit. We worked directly together. I 

was an authorized 71M [chaplain assistant] providing religious assistance 

to my chaplain for the 519th MP Battalion.” Nelson further stated, “With 

Chaplain McFarland we had prayer breakfasts every month and we would 

go out to different checkpoints where our MPs were. I did not notice anything that did not work well. We made sure that we were always where the 

soldiers were and I think that made the difference.” Nelson recalled, “I was 

fairly new to the job and the Army so I had very little experience. But I was 

fortunate to have a chaplain who wasn’t new and had a wealth of experience. We worked closely with Civil Affairs so we would take clothes and 

school supplies that had been donated to the local schools in our area.”66

The fall of 1996 saw huge civilian political unrest in Bosnia. In late 

November, a crowd of 100,000 protestors gathered in Belgrade to oppose 

the policies of Serbian President Milosevic. What remained of the fractured Yugoslavia, namely Serbia and Montenegro, were ruled by Milosevic 
52

from Belgrade. Milosevic outmaneuvered his political opponents and 

maintained control despite economic ills and volatile ethnic tensions. He 

maintained his government with the reserved approval of NATO and the 

US. One news report stated:

BELGRADE, Yugoslavia—In the largest protest ever 

against Slobodan Milosevic, more than 100,000 people 

marched through the capital yesterday, hurling eggs at 

government buildings and accusing the Serbian president 

of stealing municipal elections.

People cheered from balconies as protesters coated the 

facades and windows of Milosevic’s downtown office, 

City Hall, the state-run TV and the Politika newspaper 

in yellow. Huge columns of demonstrators stamped their 

feet and chanted, ‘We will not give up our victory!’

In the past, Milosevic has cracked down on such protests. . . . Milosevic, accused of instigating the Bosnian 

and Croatian wars, has used his control of the media and 

an ability to outmaneuver the fractured opposition. . . . 

He since has turned peacemaker, and the United States 

depends on him to keep far-right Bosnian Serbs from 

completely rejecting the year-old Dayton peace pact.67

While US and NATO troops in Bosnia performed their missions well, 

there was political and military disunity within the Clinton administration. This discord is especially evident in the memoirs of General Clark. 

Clark served as director of strategic plans and policy for the Joint Staff 

at the Pentagon from 1994 to 1996, then as the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR) from 1997 through 2000. Clark recalled the 

unpopular decision by the Clinton administration to allow homosexuals 

to serve in the military and an atmosphere in the administration that did 

not want people in uniform in the White House unless absolutely necessary. Further, Clark was repeatedly frustrated that Clinton made remarks 

to the media about troop movements and strength in the Balkans without 

consulting with his senior military advisers. The tension in the Clinton 

administration over strategy and policy in the Balkans is further illustrated 

in Clark’s statement that he had “almost 2 years of tension” with Secretary of Defense William Cohen and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff, Shalikashvili. As Clark stated, “the central problem [was] . . . trying 

to manage a limited war that wasn’t the top Pentagon planning priority 

and hadn’t received full national commitment and support.” On a positive 

note, Clark did commend Clinton for his public remarks about removing 
53

Milosevic from power and that the mission in the Balkans would be supported until complete.68

The disunity of the US position in the Balkans was even more 

complicated by the friction between the policies of the US government 

and the UN. US Ambassador Albright did not support the lackadaisical 

position on Bosnia held by Secretary General of the UN Boutros BoutrosGhali. Albright called Secretary Boutros-Ghali’s views on Bosnia 

“indefensible” while she was determined “to eliminate any danger of 

Bosnia erupting once again into flames.” While Albright was perplexed by 

the Clinton administration’s comments about the troops in Bosnia all being 

home within a year, she was fully impressed by the smooth deployment of 

troops into Bosnia and that “children reclaimed the streets from snipers, 

and reconstruction began.” Like Clark, Albright was confused by the 

contradictory statements from the White House by Cohen and Clinton, 

making her job representing the United States at the United Nations that 

much more difficult.69

Chaplains serving soldiers in Bosnia were far removed from the political squabbles in Washington. Supporting chaplains in Bosnia from Germany was USAREUR Chaplain Wake. Wake spoke of the USAREUR 

Commander, General William W. Crouch, as a leader who had a high 

level of professionalism, commending Crouch for his seriousness in getting troops prepared to deploy to Bosnia in spite of political uncertainties 

at home. In speaking of the senior chaplain in Bosnia, Task Force Eagle

Chaplain McChrystal, Wake remarked that anything McChrystal or his 

chaplains needed they would be sure to get. Speaking of the Reserve component chaplains who came to Europe for backfill to support deployed 

units, Wake stated that they were “unbelievably helpful” and “really great 

folks.”70 Wake visited Bosnia in the summer of 1996. He and his staff at 

USAREUR established a chaplain rotation policy, set guidelines for the 

distribution of donated supplies to charitable groups in Bosnia, provided 

UMT senior leadership, and resourced all chaplain missions in Bosnia.

Beginning in the late summer of 1996, Chaplain (COL) David Hicks 

was the V Corps Chaplain and was the senior chaplain between USAREUR 

Chaplain Wake and Task Force Eagle Chaplain McChrystal in Bosnia. In 

1996 and 1997, many of the V Corps subordinate units were deployed to 

Hungary to administer the deployment, rest and recreation, and redeployment back to Germany for thousands of soldiers. Hicks balanced his time 

between Germany and Hungary with occasional visits to Bosnia. Most of 

the V Corps soldiers were stationed in Hungary at Slavgrad, Kasavar, or 

Taszar, sites frequently visited by Hicks. Traveling throughout the Balkans 
54

with his chaplain assistant, Sergeant Major (SGM) Mike Pukansky, Hicks 

encouraged UMTs, solved problems, inspected chapel programs, and lived 

for numerous brief periods in the mud of the Balkans. After May 1997, the 

deputy V Corps chaplain was LTC Phil Hill. Hill, like Hicks, was frequently 

on the road in Hungary and Bosnia, performing Roman Catholic services at 

key locations and times. In speaking of the living conditions in Bosnia in 

1997, Hill said, “we were still up to our ankles in mud,” living conditions 

were still terrible, and the chapels were humble but very adequate.71

As troop levels in Bosnia continued to rise, various short-lived US 

facilities appeared and then closed throughout the Balkans. These temporary 

facilities were used for transportation support and supply missions to 

facilitate the inflow of personnel, hardware, supplies, and weapons into 

Bosnia. One chaplain who visited several of these temporary locations 

was Chaplain (MAJ) Charles Howell. He stated,

I was the 29th Support Group Brigade Chaplain (21st 

TAACOM) [Theater Army Area Command] from 24 June 

1996 to August 1999.

I deployed twice from Kaiserslautern to Taszar, Hungary, 

4 July—30 August and 20 November—20 December 

1996.

From 1 February to 8 April 1999, I deployed to Rijeka, 

Croatia. My unit opened a sea port of embarkation (SPOE) 

to receive and send units in and out of the Balkans.

From 20 June to 8 August 1999, I was deployed to 

Thessaloniki, Greece, to open a SPOE to receive and send 

units to Camp Bondsteel, Kosovo.72

While in Croatia, Howell was able to develop a close relationship 

with a Roman Catholic Croatian priest; this relationship provided Howell 

with valuable cultural, religious, and social-political information about his 

unit’s local area of operation. Howell visited many places in the Balkans. 

He stated, “I was a brigade chaplain meaning at the time I had six battalions to cover in a host of countries. . . . I had overlapping coverage in 

Bosnia, Croatia, and Hungary, and so I had to be kind of a circuit rider. 

Each week I would move by helicopter from Bosnia to Croatia and then 

back to Hungary and then get in my hummer [military vehicle] and drive 

back to the support area.” At the completion of the unit mission, a few company level units remained in Bosnia, Croatia, and Hungary, which allowed 

Howell to make additional visits to encourage and counsel soldiers.73

In his itinerant ministry, Howell addressed a large number of counseling 
55

issues with soldiers in diverse locations. Months away from home began to 

wear on families and soldiers, the emotional drain of separations creating 

numerous problems with deployed soldiers and their family members 

back home. Howell recalled, “Families were concerned and letters began 

to come up through the chain of command saying some of your soldiers 

are having problems, can you send somebody down to visit, and so my 

brigade commander said, ‘Chaplain Howell, you’re the guy.’ So I went 

back down to see them.” Howell faced numerous counseling issues. Some 

of the families from his unit lived in Germany while others returned to the 

United States for the length of the deployment, making family counseling 

difficult. The typical feelings of isolation and loneliness in the Balkans 

led to cases of marital infidelity in Army units. Spouses in Germany or 

in the United States had the same feelings of isolation and loneliness and 

some succumbed to the same type of temptations. US troops in Bosnia 

were not allowed alcohol, but soldiers stationed in Croatia or Hungary 

or other nearby places had easy access to alcohol. This meant that some 

soldiers drank heavily and lost inhibitions, resulting in a diverse number of 

discipline and moral problems that the command and the chaplain needed 

to address.74

One of the areas near Bosnia that was a key location for 1996–97 support missions in the Balkans was in nearby Hungary. As one news report 

stated, “The Hungarian towns of Taszar and Kaposvar are the major staging areas for 20,000 US troops heading for Bosnia. Hungary is contributing a 400-man contingent.”75 The vast majority of US soldiers in Hungary 

were very happy to be contributing to the greater cause of peace in the 

Balkans. Taszar became the most prominent US military facility, a virtual 

beehive of activity as new soldiers entered the Balkans and prepared for 

other missions, came to Taszar for rest and relaxation or to catch a flight 

back to Germany, or came to Taszar as a stop on their redeployment process at the end of their tour of duty. 

In early 1997, about 25 percent of US troops in Hungary were from 

Reserve component units. Army National Guard Sergeant First Class 

(SFC) Melinda Early of Alabama looked at this peacekeeping mission as an 

opportunity to alleviate real suffering, saying, “When we came down here 

[to Tuzla] in that long convoy, there were elderly women along the street 

holding their hands up in peace signs. . . . I only wish we were here sooner.” 

As one report stated, “Many Reservists consider Bosnia a good assignment. 

It’s a humanitarian cause and it has been well received by most of the 

locals they’ve met.” Army National Guard Chaplain (CPT) Steven Szasz 

of Idaho conducted numerous family reunion type briefings for soldiers 

stopping in Hungary on their way back home. Szasz commented that even 
56

though such briefings are not essential to the technical performance of 

the unit mission, these reunion briefings are something the Army does to 

help soldiers and their families. While the briefings are mandatory, Szasz 

stated the soldiers seem to appreciate that these briefings will help them 

reintegrate with their loved ones at home.76

Chaplain (CPT) Scott Sterling was assigned to the Taszar Airfield 

from 1 October through December 1996. Assigned to the 69th Air Defense 

Artillery, he did not deploy to Hungary with his battalion but rather in support of the larger brigade. Sterling was assigned as an OIC of a personnel 

verification team, a nontraditional chaplain assignment that he questioned 

through both command and chaplain channels. Because Sterling was given 

freedom to do hospital ministry, counseling, and other ministries as he 

wished, he decided to make the best of a difficult situation and complete 

his 90-day tour in this unique assignment. He stated, “I was encouraged 

to minister as creatively as I could under the circumstances. I was happy 

to be there with the troops, so I stayed the entire time.”77 Overlapping 

with Sterling in Taszar was Chaplain Assistant Loveless. Assigned to the 

USAREUR HQ but attached for duty in Hungary, Loveless was in Taszar 

from November 1996 through April 1997. Loveless enjoyed being a part 

of the numerous family reunion and reintegration briefings sponsored by 

the chaplains and was happy to be active in a “coffee house” ministry, as 

he and others provided a safe and wholesome place for soldiers to unwind 

and for chaplains to talk casually with the troops. The only time Loveless 

felt unsafe was when he was traveling on hazardous roads in war-torn 

areas with a Roman Catholic chaplain, going from Hungary to various 

locations in Croatia and then back, as he assisted the chaplain in Roman 

Catholic services.78

Chaplain Accounts of Ministry in Bosnia, 1997

In 1997, the US Army in Bosnia, past its initial growth pains of 

deployment, was settling down into its peacekeeping and nation-building 

missions. Structurally, the old IFOR was significantly downsized and was 

replaced by the Stabilization Force (SFOR). More than just a symbolic 

change of titles, the name change designated that stabilization of the area 

was the key concept and that NATO and the United States were determined 

to prevent a resurgence of violence in the Balkans. The senior Army 

chaplain in Bosnia had been McChrystal, Task Force Eagle chaplain. He 

was replaced in November 1996 by Chaplain (LTC) Donna Weddle of 
57

the 1st Infantry Division, the new Task Force Eagle chaplain. Hicks went 

from the V Corps chaplain position to the USAREUR chaplain assignment, 

replacing Wake. Other chaplains rotated in and out of assignments in 

Bosnia and throughout the Balkans. New chaplains throughout 1997 

built on the initial ministries begun by their predecessors and continued 

to provide quality chaplain and chaplain assistant support to soldiers 

deployed throughout the Balkans.

The year 1997 began with Army news reports that troops in Europe 

were already feeling the strain from the Balkans rotations. Few soldiers 

who had seen the chaos in Bosnia took comfort in Secretary of Defense 

Cohen’s comment that the United States would complete its mission and be 

out of Bosnia by 30 June 1998. Unquestionably, there was a strain placed 

on US Army troops because of the large-scale rotations into the Balkans. 

The Clinton administration was committed to downsizing the military. 

Debates waged about the US policy in the Balkans. As one writer stated, 

“On one issue, however, there is complete consensus; the Army in Europe 

is stretched thin by constant deployments to Bosnia and Macedonia and on 

numerous ‘Partnership for Peace’ missions in Eastern Europe.” The article 

told of the more than 10,000 US troops in the Balkans in 1997 and that 

questions had arisen about the combat readiness of infantry and armor units 

sent to the Balkans for humanitarian and peacekeeping missions and not 

for conventional combat missions. Soldiers were not using the high power 

weapons they had trained on, and the fear was that combat skills would 

deteriorate. This fear, coupled with the strain on families from Balkans 

rotations and from fewer units available to deploy because of downsizing, 

created a pessimistic outlook for the US Army.79

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Shalikashvili, addressed the 

status of the US military in a 12 February 1997 speech to Congress. 

Shalikashvili spoke of the strain on soldiers from reductions in force and 

from deployments, and then addressed the good work he saw soldiers 

performing in the Balkans.

One of the strategic consequences of the post-Cold War 

period is that the US has been able to reduce military force 

levels. Since 1989, the active all-volunteer force has been 

reduced by 700,000 people—about a third of the active 

force. . . . The force drawdown these past few years has 

not been an easy experience for military members. . . . 

America’s military today is performing more missions, in 

more places than it did during the Cold War, and is doing so 

with significantly fewer personnel. Yet our men and women 
58

have performed brilliantly from one end of the world to the 

other, with Bosnia standing as a prime example. . . .

SFOR continues to build on the successes of IFOR by 

providing time and an environment that will permit civilian initiatives to proceed. Up to approximately 8,500 US 

personnel in Bosnia and an additional 5,000 in neighboring countries are supporting the Stabilization Force. 

SFOR is a mobile force that will concentrate on providing 

a safe and secure environment for civilian implementation of Dayton Accords. The Commander, Stabilization 

Force (COMSFOR), is supported by an air operation built 

on the foundation of the successful Operation DENY 

FLIGHT; 1,800 US personnel are involved in this facet 

of operations.

Our forces will be in place for 18 months. Every 6 months, 

a review of the security situation and civil initiatives will 

be conducted with the goal of moving to a deterrent force 

of reduced size.

Equally important to regional stability in the Balkans 

was Operation ABLE SENTRY. ABLE SENTRY is 

the US contribution to the United Nations Preventative 

Deployment operation in Macedonia. 500 US personnel 

joined 500 troops from other nations to ensure containment of the crisis in Bosnia.80

The organization of chaplains coming and going into the Balkans and 

assigning them to the areas they were most needed was a complicated 

job. In 1997, much of the UMT coordination in the Balkans came from 

Chaplain (LTC) Hank Steinhilber of the USAREUR Chaplain’s Office 

in Heidelberg, Germany. Steinhilber served briefly in the Balkans before 

becoming the assistant operations officer for the USAREUR chaplain. He 

stated, “I was assistant head of operations which meant we were in charge 

of the religious support for all of the down-range areas. We were to make 

sure coverage would come about either from organic units that flowed 

down or from Reserve units that came from the states. And also I had the 

responsibility to make sure that [rear area] religious coverage was still in 

Europe at the time.” In 1997, Steinhilber had numerous opportunities to 

visit chaplains in the Balkans, observing that soldiers almost never went 

outside the base camp except on patrols. He said chaplains became essentially base camp ministers with little contact with locals outside the gate. 

This would change as the civilian areas stabilized, but early on in the IFOR 
59

and now the SFOR missions, soldiers mostly did their jobs inside the 

perimeter. Steinhilber concluded, “So they had a pretty good base camp 

ministry. I went to some of the base camps but I did a lot out of Tuzla. It 

was a base camp ministry, Bible Studies, the same that they did. Worship 

services, seeing the people, and a ministry of presence.”81

From the summer of 1996 through the spring of 1997, Szasz was 

stationed briefly in Schweinfurt, Germany, and then at Taszar, Hungary. 

Later he would be stationed at Slavonski Brod, Croatia, near the Sava 

River. Born in Hungary and speaking the language, Szasz was thrilled at 

the opportunity to minister in his native land. Initially stationed at Taszar, 

Hungary, Szasz remarked:

Taszar is a small town of about 1,200 people. But it’s 

really known for the Hungarian Army Airfield. This 

is still an active airfield for the Hungarian military. . . . 

Within Taszar Air Base are several other work areas for 

our Armed Forces—IFOR/SFOR units. Our forces consist 

of Air Force, Army, Navy, and Marines numbering about 

6,000. . . . I live and work in the Life Support Area (LSA). 

This LSA is really a glorified tent city or like an RV camp 

in the states. . . . I live in a tent with two others in our ministry team. We each have an 8’x8’ section, enough room 

for a cot, a field desk or whatever one can creatively come 

up with. . . . I, along with our chaplain assistants conduct 

redeployment/reunion briefings. . . . The other half of my 

time is spent in leading Bible Studies and preaching on a 

rotating basis.82

Szasz elaborated on his ministries as they developed in Taszar. First, 

he stated that the reunion briefings were given to every soldier, sailor, airman, and Marine that departed his area. “The material we cover ranges 

from issues such as changes in one’s self, challenges on arrival back home, 

marital issues, parental concerns and alcohol abuse.” The second area 

Szasz narrated was his religious ministry. In this capacity, Szasz preached 

Sunday morning sermons, led Bible Studies, and performed ministerial 

counseling. The third aspect of his ministry in Taszar concerned translating. He stated, “This has been an unplanned blessing on two accounts. 

My Hungarian has improved immensely. Whereas when I arrived, I stumbled around mixing Hungarian and English. Now I can carry on a complete conversation in Hungarian. The Hungarians are truly amazed at my 

improvement. This has also benefited the chaplain corps here at Taszar. 

I have had numerous occasions for liaison with local clergy, Hungarian 
60

military chaplains, and assisting in the everyday ongoings of the ministry 

teams.83 He further stated, “When the USAREUR Chaplain (COL) David 

Hicks spent time in Hungary I traveled with him as an unofficial translator. 

It was a fulfilling and interesting ministry.”84

In March 1997, three chaplains reported for duty in Bosnia. Chaplain 

(MAJ) Michael Metcalf of the New York Army National Guard arrived on 

7 March and was assigned to Camp Demi, Bosnia-Herzegovina. Around 

the same time Chaplain (CPT) Keith Belz of the 601st Aviation Support 

Battalion was assigned to Comanche Base near Tuzla. Joining Belz at 

Comanche Base was Chaplain (CPT) Patrick Appleget of the 1st Squadron, 

229th Aviation Regiment. These three chaplains are representative of the 

several dozen chaplains that were in the Balkans throughout 1997, and 

their specific experiences are examples of the diverse and comprehensive 

religious support provided to soldiers in Bosnia.

Metcalf was assigned to the New York Army National Guard before 

he was mobilized and deployed to Bosnia. He was cross-leveled to fill a 

vacant chaplain position at Camp Demi. Metcalf stated, “I had limited 

contact with other chaplains due to the remoteness of my location. I had 

weekly contact with a Roman Catholic priest who flew or drove in for 

Sunday Mass. . . .” Stating that he did get periodic visits from supervisory 

chaplains, Metcalf continued: “I was a base camp chaplain serving as a 

type of installation chaplain for 750 to 1,200 US and coalition troops and 

Department of Defense civilians.” He described his typical activities at 

Camp Demi as performing weekly worship services, scheduling biweekly 

chaplain visits to see soldiers at remote communication sites, and maintaining a Christian men’s support group called Promise Keepers. Metcalf 

also performed ministry outside the fence of Camp Demi. He assisted the 

Civil Affairs soldiers in distributing school supplies to local children and 

advised a Civil Affairs team chief concerning interaction with the Serbian 

Orthodox priest of Srebrenica. While stating that he did not feel safe in 

convoy operations around local election times and during inspections of 

arms storage sites, Metcalf stated, “This was some of the most rewarding 

ministry of my chaplaincy career.”85

Belz arrived at Comanche Base in March 1997. Sleeping on an Army 

cot in a sleeping bag in a tent with 20 other men, Belz used an Air Force 

tent for a chapel and built some offices and storage areas in the back of 

the tent. He was able to get a humble steeple to place in front of the tent 

and acquired hundreds of books to use as a lending library for the troops. 

Belz stated, “I conducted chapel services, Bible Studies, a Christian movie 

night, prayer breakfasts, a tract ministry, and a lot of counseling with soldiers. I also taught a lot of family reunion type classes.” Belz remembered 
61

the time that an old hidden mine detonated within the camp, thankfully 

with no one injured, and that there were areas within the camp that still 

had active mines and were off limits to all personnel. As the chaplain, he 

addressed ethical and moral issues within the unit, like the fight he won 

not to house male and female soldiers in the same tents, and like his counseling related to six pregnant soldiers within the unit in the first 2 months 

of the deployment. He commented, “I had a great relationship with the 1st 

Armored Division chaplain who said we were the only other base that she 

never had to visit or worry about.”86

Chaplain Appleget, like Metcalf and Belz, arrived in Bosnia in March 

1997. While serving at Comanche Base as chaplain for the 1st Battalion, 

229th Aviation Regiment, Appleget stated that as a battalion chaplain and 

as pastor of the Lutheran service he had a good relationship with other 

chaplains during the deployment. As far as his personal safety, Appleget 

commented, “Sometimes we would hear shots outside the camp. Once I 

found a dud rocket outside a tent that did not explode.” At Camp Comanche 

there were traveling restrictions, meaning that Appleget maintained a base 

camp ministry and did not frequently travel outside the gate. He described 

his ministry as “visits to hangers, outposts, and later on firing ranges,” and 

that he worked with Civil Affairs to locate volunteers through the chapel program to see if soldiers would be willing to volunteer their time at 

local orphanages near Tuzla. Appleget summarized, “We all were pretty 

restricted to the camps. Most of the ministry was with soldiers away from 

home with family issues. Some chapel programs grew.”87

Politically, Bosnia in 1997 was unstable. On 10 February a procession 

of several hundred mostly middle-aged and elderly Muslims were attacked 

in Mostar, southern Bosnia. Animosity in Mostar between Muslims and 

Croatian Roman Catholics had kept the city divided since the 1995 ceasefire agreement. As one news report stated, “International investigators 

reported that the Croat police, in and out of uniform, first beat the marchers, 

then fired repeatedly at their backs as they tried to flee for safety. . . . 

Animosity between Muslims and Croats periodically bedevils efforts to 

reunify the city. . . . Although the Muslims and Croats were allies against 

the Serbs as the Bosnian war began, they started fighting each other in 

1993.” The specific incident on 10 February was related to Muslim 

mourners marching unarmed and peacefully to a cemetery to pay their 

respects to deceased loved ones. Croatian police and civilians attacked 

the crowd, killing at least one person and wounding many others. As a 

result, international police investigators condemned local Croat police and 

charged them with violations of international law in using “excessive force 

in beating marchers” and “unnecessary and disproportionate lethal force.” 
62

Fears spread throughout the Balkans that this incident could escalate and 

force NATO peacekeepers to become more involved in that region.88

The 28 August civilian assaults on US troops near McGovern Base, 

Bosnia, also illustrated the political instability in Bosnia in 1997. As US 

troops moved into an area at 0300 to secure a position, a civilian alarm 

was sounded. The media reported, “Hundreds of Bosnia Serb townspeople 

roused from their sleep by air-raid sirens pelted US peacekeeping troops 

with rocks early today, forcing them to retreat from positions around a 

police station. The incident represented one of the most serious challenges 

to NATO-led Stabilization Force troops since they took over peacekeeping in Bosnia in December [1995] under the terms of the Dayton Peace 

Accords.”89 Another news account provided more details stating, “AntiNATO mobs . . . destroyed cars and wounded at least two US soldiers,” 

and that “US soldiers in the NATO force fired tear gas and warning shots to 

fend off rock-hurling Serb mobs.” Foreign media and international officials 

were also roughed up in this incident.90 Having orders to use force if necessary to disperse the crowds, 18 American soldiers received recognition for 

their restraint because they did not fire on the mob even though they were 

injured by flying debris and physically assaulted.91

US Army chaplain assistants in Bosnia worked with their chaplains 

both outside the gate in the civilian community and inside the perimeter 

with US and NATO soldiers. In 1997, SFC Pamela Neal was the 1st Infantry 

Division chaplain assistant noncommissioned officer in charge (NCOIC). 

She served in Bosnia from 1 August through 30 October. She commented 

that she enjoyed being part of a UMT that provided assistance to wounded 

or distressed Serbians, the injured being victims of the ongoing tensions in 

Bosnia. She also enjoyed being part of a puppet ministry for local children, 

but stated that she did feel there was danger when she was part of convoys 

visiting other UMTs or civilian charitable groups throughout Bosnia. As 

a more senior chaplain assistant, she described her job responsibilities as 

“coordinating transportation via helicopter and convoy” and, “As the 1st 

Infantry Division NCOIC with temporary duty to Bosnia, I trained brigade 

and battalion chaplain assistants. I also coordinated religious activities in 

the area of operations.”92 Neal had additional duties related to ordering 

UMT supplies, information management, and coordinating security missions with other chaplain assistants. Her tour in Bosnia was successful and 

provided her a basis of knowledge for future missions.

In August 1997, Chaplain Assistant Sergeant (SGT) Yolanda Jackson 

came to Comanche Base as a member of the 2d Armored Calvary Regiment. 

In this capacity she worked with several chaplains, most notable for her 
63

were Chaplain (CPT) Dean Bonura and Chaplain (CPT) Timothy Vakoc. 

Yolanda Jackson assisted Bonura with coordinating weekly marriage and 

family classes for the soldiers, establishing a cycle of prayer breakfasts, 

and managing a chapel. She stated, “The special services and caroling 

and unique events we planned for Thanksgiving and Christmas in 1997 

worked very well.” Jackson also assisted the itinerant Roman Catholic 

chaplain in her area, Vakoc. With Vakoc she traveled by helicopter to various base camps in Bosnia to assist the chaplain in the set up, security, and 

recovery tasks related to conducting various Roman Catholic Masses in 

diverse locations. Jackson stated, “This was an interesting tour, to see how 

people in another part of the world lived. I saw a lot of the country by traveling on convoys. This was a highlight of my military career.”93

Senior chaplains in Europe remained engaged with UMT activities 

in the Balkans. Chaplain (COL) Janet Horton followed Hicks as V Corps 

chaplain, based in Heidelberg, Germany. After beginning her new assignment at V Corps in June 1997, Janet Horton quickly went to the Balkans to 

see the structure of chaplain support and to meet the people on the ground. 

She stated that the Balkans mission at that time had succeeded in stopping 

the genocide and had transitioned to the sustainment phase. Janet Horton 

gave guidance as to how chaplains could relate to local indigenous religious leaders and helped set some standards about the role of the UMT in 

humanitarian operations. For example, as UMTs were overwhelmed with 

school supplies and clothing donations from the United States, it became 

apparent to Janet Horton that “We can’t have the Unit Ministry Team being 

dedicated to the humanitarian operation at the expense of not getting the 

religious support mission done.”94 Chaplains thereafter had more guidance 

on how to balance their primary role as a chaplain to soldiers with other 

potential duties in humanitarian missions to the local population.

The year 1997 saw the further development and strengthening of chaplain missions throughout Bosnia and nearby areas. For example, as the year 

began Szasz saw his responsibilities in Hungary expand: he provided chaplain support to units as far north as the Hungarian Tank Gunnery Range 

at Taborfalva and as far south as Zagreb, Croatia.95 In September 1997, 

Chaplain (CPT) Steven Firtko arrived at Camp Bedrock near Tuzla, Bosnia. 

Firtko was the only chaplain for the 2,000 personnel assigned at Camp 

Bedrock, a situation that meant he worked or was on call day and night for 

his 6-month tour in Bosnia. The highlights of his Bosnia tour, Firtko stated, 

were the Thanksgiving and Christmas 1997 services he performed. The 

Army Chief of Chaplains, Chaplain (MG) Donald Shea, did the Roman 

Catholic Christmas services and Firtko performed the Protestant services. 
64

As far as dangerous situations, Firtko remarked, “I did a religious service 

on Hill 562—a radio tower taken by force and still disputed.” Although the 

threat of Serbian snipers was real, the service was uninterrupted.96 Firtko 

was an example of a stable base camp chaplain providing religious support 

to troops within his area of responsibility, a ministry in which he preached 

regularly and had daily contact with soldiers, this providing numerous 

counseling and one-on-one ministry opportunities.

The US Army Special Forces were active and engaged throughout Bosnia in 1997. One of the Special Forces chaplains who rotated in and out 

of Bosnia was Hartranft of the 10th Special Forces Group. Hartranft was 

deployed to Bosnia in December 1997 through April 1998. His Special 

Forces soldiers were divided into A-Teams and deployed to 26 locations 

throughout Bosnia for the purpose of enforcing peace, monitoring weapons 

turned in by various belligerents, gathering intelligence on small militant 

factions not supportive of the Dayton Peace Accords, and maintaining the 

cease-fire in potentially volatile areas. Hartranft stated, “As the chaplain, I 

traveled and did a service, or Bible Study (the choice of the A-Team), and 

did a lot of individual counseling. As far as facilities I used for religious 

services, I just used the A-Team’s house. I traveled to each team house in a 

contracted local vehicle, a four wheeled Jeep-looking type vehicle.” While 

conducting the 1997 Christmas services for Special Forces soldiers was a 

highlight of his ministry, he stated, “Counseling opportunities were endless. Since there were about 25 locations I got to every A-Team house only 

once a month. Every house had soldiers that wanted to speak to me. . . . I 

had several opportunities to counsel one on one. Other nonprivate conversations developed into impromptu Bible Studies.”97

Overall, the year 1997 for the US Army in the Balkans was a time of 

stabilization, construction, and adjustments. Considered a hostile fire zone 

and not a combat zone, soldiers outside their base camps were still in constant danger from landmines, snipers, or angry mobs of civilians. Soldiers 

away from home for the holidays received religious support from UMTs, 

while thousands of schoolchildren wrote letters of encouragement and 

support to soldiers they had never met who were serving far from home.98

Clinton spent the 1997 Christmas holiday in Bosnia. His bipartisan trip 

to support soldiers was very successful. Speaking to a large gathering of 

troops in Tuzla, Clinton stated:

I don’t think many Americans understand exactly how deep 

the burdens are on our men and women in uniform today. 

Because we have downsized the military in the aftermath 

of the Cold War, when we take on these responsibilities it 
65

is very hard for a lot of people. We rotate these missions 

a little more rapidly than we would like to. We draw out 

Reservists and Guardsmen more often than we would like 

to. But you have always done what you were asked to do, 

and you have always delivered for America.

So, on this Christmas season, I ask the American 

people . . . to remember what we owe to the soldiers, the 

sailors, the airmen, the Marines of the Armed Forces at 

home and around the world, in the Persian Gulf, on the 

DMZ in Korea, here in Bosnia. . . .

I think that one of the things that you may wonder is 

whether people back home know you’re here and appreciate what you’re doing, since you’ve done it so well there 

aren’t any visible problems, and you made it look easy.

I want you to know that, at this Christmas, you are in the 

hearts of the American people.99

Diverse Chaplain Ministries in Peacekeeping in Bosnia, 1998

The year 1998 began with the NATO and US mission in Bosnia coming under growing criticism. The 1995 promise of US troops being out of 

Bosnia in a year had obviously not come true. There was no end in sight 

to an often thankless and uneventful mission. While peace did prevail 

throughout the Balkans, there was a widespread assumption that as soon 

as the United States and NATO left the area, the fighting would resume. A 

large number of war criminals were still wandering and hiding throughout Bosnia, and the US and NATO policy of apprehending such criminals 

fueling this pessimistic attitude was seemingly ineffective. According to 

one account:

The number of indicted war criminals wandering with 

impunity through Serb-controlled areas stands as a major 

barrier to a lasting peace that would allow the United 

States to complete its mission in Bosnia. . . .

NATO’s inaction on this front has stifled the reconstruction process, leaving precious little to show for 2 years 

and billions of dollars.

Until war criminals are arrested and tried, refugees will 

feel unsafe in attempting to return home. Without the 
66

return of refugees, the prospects for economic reconstruction will remain limited.100

As the mission in Bosnia and surrounding countries continued, the 

United States and NATO came to the conviction that much of the ongoing 

tension and uncertainty in Bosnia could be directly blamed on Milosevic. 

Secretary of State Albright saw Milosevic as a cunning and dishonest negotiator who, for example, in May 1998 posed for cameras during a peace 

conference while simultaneously having his troops wreck havoc in Kosovo 

and pillage Albanian villages. Albright spoke of Milosevic as a manipulator 

who ruthlessly played various Bosnian political and ethnic factions against 

each other to solidify his power. Albright bluntly stated, “I never trusted 

him. His ambitions were not the kind that could be satisfied except at great 

cost to others,” and that Milosevic “invited destruction” and “was wrecking 

their [Bosnian] hopes for a peaceful and prosperous future.”101

As far back as August 1997, reports stated Milosevic was meddling in 

the power struggle that has kept Bosnian Serbs divided.102 Milosevic, as 

President of Yugoslavia, only had the territories of Serbia and Montenegro 

under his control, having lost Bosnia-Herzegovina as a result of the 1995 

Dayton Peace Accords. Nevertheless, in 1998 cronies of Milosevic were 

still active in Bosnia disrupting the peace process, inciting Serbs to rebel, 

and hindering NATO and US efforts in the area, all the while seeking to 

gain further influence and power. Clark, the Supreme Allied Commander 

in Europe from 1997 to 2000, called Milosevic “a supremely manipulative 

liar and a bully,” and one who was full of “self-interest and corruption” 

and “unscrupulous.”103

Army chaplains and 

chaplain assistants in the 

Balkans in 1998 were 

fully engaged in religious 

support to their peacekeeping soldiers. A variety 

of religious and morale 

enhancing programs were 

developed that supported 

the religious and emotional needs of soldiers 

far away from home. 

Staff Sergeant (SSG) 

James Johnson of the 1st 

Battalion, 26th Infantry 

Figure 7. General Wesley Clark, Supreme Allied 

Commander, Europe.

US Army
67

served at Camp Able Sentry, Macedonia, from February through July 1998. 

This facility, built in 1992 during the Bosnian War, functioned as a major 

logistical base for various Balkan, NATO, and US troops. James Johnson 

was active in supporting soldiers at Camp Able Sentry, Macedonia, by 

assisting chaplains with redeployment briefings; serving as a point of contact for the unit rear detachment; and participating in Bible Studies, worship services, and orphanage visits. James Johnson stated: “The only times 

I did not feel safe was when we went on chaplain visits to small observation posts close to the border.” He helped coordinate a ministry retreat to 

Greece, and contracted with a local Roman Catholic Macedonian priest to 

help meet the needs of US and NATO Roman Catholic troops.104

Chaplain (MAJ) Jerry Moates was deployed to Taszar, Hungary, from 

March to July 1998 as an individual replacement and not with his unit 

from Germany. He commented:

I took over for Chaplain JoAnne Knight, coordinated 

with her and with Chaplain Steinhilber at the USAREUR 

Chaplain’s Office. I was responsible for coordinating and 

supervising four or five chaplains at one time, though 

other chaplains would come through Taszar on their way 

to Croatia or Bosnia. My position title was ‘USAREUR 

Chaplain Forward.’ The mission of our base in Taszar was 

to serve as a forward staging area and receiving area for 

missions in and out of Croatia and Bosnia. Vehicle convoys 

from Germany would stop here to load or unload supplies. 

Trains came and went loaded with equipment. And the 

airfield was busy with planes landing and taking off all the 

time. There were lots of ministry opportunities to soldiers 

who were awaiting transportation, and to soldiers who 

were loading or unloading equipment. Some were going 

to Bosnia or Croatia, and some were returning.

The soldiers were very receptive to my ministry. We had 

three chapel locations in the Taszar area. One was at the 

main camp, another was at the LSA (Life Support Area) 

and one we opened while I was there, which was located 

at the airstrip. My predecessor, Chaplain JoAnne Knight, 

did most of the groundwork for opening this chapel and 

I was able to conduct a dedication ceremony with the 

USAREUR Chaplain (COL) David Hicks presiding.

All troops coming through our area had to stop at the 

LSA for medical and personnel records updates. Here we 
68

maintained a chapel tent, which was well used as a rest 

area, reading location, and a place for soldiers to watch 

videos and just relax. At the Jewish Passover celebration, 

I took three vans full of soldiers to a civilian synagogue in 

Budapest to celebrate Passover. Chapel services were regularly scheduled and as chaplains went on leave or TDY, 

I rotated the chaplains to the various chapels. We had a 

Roman Catholic priest who I made sure traveled around to 

conduct his denominational ministry. We Protestant chaplains frequently covered each other’s chapels as needed. 

As soldiers arrived, we did chaplain orientation briefings. 

As soldiers redeployed out of Croatia and Bosnia, we 

conducted family reunion briefings.

While in Hungary I never felt I was in personal danger. 

But when we went on chaplain visits to see subordinate 

chaplains in units located in Croatia and Bosnia, it was 

different. There were many tense moments as we drove 

through areas with blown up buildings. Seeing structures 

covered with bullet holes was disturbing. In a few areas, 

you could still see the blood stained on the outside walls 

of dilapidated buildings. I traveled through these areas to 

attend civil events with the Hungarians as well as to do 

chaplain visits to subordinate units and to chaplains under 

my supervision.105

By 1998, the US Army’s role as peacekeeper was under scrutiny. The 

initial Bosnian mission of stopping genocide and separating belligerent 

parties was a success. Rival factions were disarmed, arms cachets were 

destroyed, humanitarian aid poured into the area, and a tense calm pervaded the region. Yet many questions remained as to what exactly the role 

of the UN peacekeeping force was and how involved the United States 

should be with the United Nations, with NATO, and in the internal conflicts within Europe. These questions were more noticeable with the October 1998 celebration of the United Nations completing 50 years of global 

peacekeeping missions. Skeptics of the United Nations noted that the need 

for global peacekeeping operations has dramatically increased since 1998, 

primarily from the fallout of numerous failed states. The role of the United 

Nations to prevent the need for peacekeeping missions had not succeeded. 

While the United Nations improved at conducting peacekeeping missions, 

it nevertheless became in many parts of the world a token force, as one 

writer stated, “to provide a cloak of legitimacy and limited political oversight through small numbers of observers.”106 This was clearly the case in 
69

Bosnia. Without question, the United States was the lead force in the Balkans, with significant contributions from Great Britain, France, Germany, 

Russia, and dozens of other nations.

In 1998, Steinhilber was serving under Hicks at the USAREUR Chaplain’s Office, Heidelberg, Germany. Steinhilber was responsible for finding the right locations in the Balkans to deploy Reserve component and 

Active Army chaplains and for coordinating their comings and goings 

with the needs and locations of numerous units. When the need for an O6 

chaplain opened at Sarajevo, Bosnia, Army Chief of Chaplains (MG) Don 

Shea selected Steinhilber to fill that assignment. Steinhilber recalled:

We lived in a compound in Sarajevo. We had three old 

hotels that were down there. . . . The rooms of the hotel 

were all shot up. I could sit on my balcony and you could 

see the bullet holes where they went right across the top of 

it. But they got the lights going and the heat on and things 

were fine. . . . So I went down and spent 6 months. . . . I 

was primarily chaplain to the staff, although I did coordinate across the Balkans with the different chaplains. I was 

very fortunate; they gave me an assistant. . . .

We had a vehicle; we had freedom to go wherever we 

wanted within the theater. We had no problems whatsoever, so we visited all the chaplains. I had over 50 chaplains when I started, representing 38 nations. They were 

broken up into what was called MD, multinational divisions. There were three of them: MD North, which had 

the Americans in charge, out of Tuzla; the Brits had MD 

Northwest, out of their headquarters; and then the French 

had MD Southeast, which was out of Sarajevo. So we had 

the French in charge of us. I had a bunch of chaplains in 

Sarajevo. There was a German hospital, which had two 

German chaplains. The head German chaplain, I found 

out, was also the assistant S4 chaplain, so he was in for 3 

months and then another one came in. And they were great. 

When I was on the road, he took care of things there. In 

Sarajevo was the headquarters contingency, so there was 

a Dutch contingency of soldiers to take care of the Dutch 

soldiers out in the field, and all the supplies came through 

Sarajevo, and so there was a Dutch chaplain there. A variety of things made it pleasurable to be around. I traveled 

all over. We were out on the road almost all the time, visiting and coordinating. . . .
70

There were a lot of thugs and thievery and black marketing and you could be taunted by a crowd. . . . It was really 

more bandits and thugs and black marketers that caused 

more problems than anything else.107

Civil Affairs (CA) units of the US Army Reserve were active and 

engaged with various missions throughout Bosnia. The 1993 version 

of FM 41-10, Civil Affairs Operations, stated that “the CA mission 

is to support the commander’s relationship with civil authorities and 

civilian populace, promote mission legitimacy and enhance military 

effectiveness.”108 Operations in Bosnia showed that the CA mission was 

critical to the success of the overall mission and that CA must be an integral 

part of peacekeeping operations.109 In Bosnia a typical CA unit performed 

missions related to humanitarian assistance, military to civil coordination, 

support to civil administrators, cooperation with NATO administrators, 

and various benevolent projects. One chaplain assigned to a CA unit was 

Chaplain (LTC) Frank Wismer.

Wismer of the US Army Reserve served with a Civil Affairs Special 

Function Team in Bosnia from June 1998 through February 1999. He 

stated:

I served as OIC [Officer in Charge] for a CA Special 

Functions Team. On this team were a Slovakian major, 

Frank Debnar, a US NCOIC, and a linguist, Besmir 

Fedahic. We were to deal with issues throughout the country that involved Civil Military Operations. Occasionally 

we did deal with some Military-to-Military Operations. 

We conducted a seminar in CIMIC (Civil Military 

Coordination) for the Turkish Brigade and once had an 

interaction with the Federation [Yugoslavian] Military. 

On Sundays, I assisted with the religious support program 

at Eagle Base, Tuzla, Bosnia.

I did have the opportunity to work with civilians near 

Eagle Base. Our team worked with Mustafa Turzic in the 

institution and opening of the Tuzla International Airport; 

with the Mayor of Dubrave in establishing sites for wells; 

and with local beekeepers whose bee populations were 

decreasing. We also assisted the British at Banja Luka 

during the elections of October 1998. We also assisted 

with providing toys and clothing to an orphanage in Tuzla 

at Christmas.110

Wismer pointed out that technically chaplains do not serve as chaplains 
71

in Civil Affairs units, but as cultural affairs officers. In this capacity, chaplains perform religious worship services but their primary function is to serve 

as a CA officer while still advising the commander on any religious issues 

that may affect the mission of the larger unit. As Wismer remarked, “Even 

though I served as a CA officer, I did enjoy a healthy relationship with the 

chaplains at Eagle Base. We had good cooperation in conducting services 

and had a good working relationship with the Air Force chaplains who were 

stationed with the Air Force contingent at the airfield. I did have occasion to 

take services for the Air Force at their chapel at the airfield.” On a negative 

note, Wismer stated, “Our unit was split between Sarajevo and Tuzla. The 

higher HQ lost all control over those of us assigned to MD North. Although 

they rated us, they had no command of us. And, although MD North commanded us, they did not rate us. . . . We also had some unit members at Camp 

McGovern. This created tension and a sense of ‘us’ and ‘them.’”111

In May 1998, Chaplain (CPT) Lonnie Locke III arrived at Comanche 

Base near Tuzla as a member of the 485th Corps Support Battalion. He 

recalled, “There were three chaplains on Comanche Base, two Protestants 

and one Catholic. We all worked together great. I was the newest (youngest, rank-wise) chaplain of the three.” He stated, “We were there at a time 

of transition from tents to hard-shelter dwellings. Everything worked well; 

it was just muddy and dirty most of the time.” Locke mentioned, “My 

chaplain assistant SPC Dialetta Taylor and I worked very well as a ministry team,” and that he ministered mostly at the flight line, the motor pool, 

and the chapel.112 A chaplain who overlapped with Locke in Bosnia was 

Chaplain (CPT) Philip Smiley of the 2d Battalion, 5th Cavalry Regiment. 

Stationed at Camp Dobol and Camp Demi in Bosnia, Smiley coordinated 

or conducted numerous church services each week and especially enjoyed, 

as he stated, “special events, celebrating communion, Christmas tree lighting, Thanksgiving, Christmas song fest, and interaction with local clergy.” 

He had difficulty with his chaplain assistant, who he stated “was not a selfstarter, and just floated through his Army assignment.”113

Throughout 1998, Taszar, Hungary, continued to be a key logistical 

and coordination center for United States and NATO forces in Bosnia and 

Croatia. Chaplain Assistant SFC Chris Patterson was assigned to the National 

Support Element (NSE) Tuzla from 1 June through 4 November. He commented, “The chaplains that I worked with were from the Army Reserve 

and the Army National Guard, while the chaplain assistants were from the 

Active component. This was a big benefit to all members of the UMT. . . .” 

Patterson described his daily responsibilities in Taszar as follows: 

Job Description: Coordinates comprehensive religious 

logistical support for four (4) Unit Ministry Teams (UMTs) 
72

in Taszar, Hungary, and two (2) forward deployed UMTs, 

one in Zagreb, Croatia, and one in Sarajevo, Bosnia; 

supervises two Army chaplain assistants, one Air Force 

Chapel Programmer, and two Hungarian interpreters; 

manages training, rosters, local and USAREUR reports, 

property, appropriated and nonappropriated funds; organizes multi-faceted religious retreats; coordinates with 

NSE staff, DOD [Department of Defense] personnel, and 

civilian contractors.114

Patterson further stated that the only times he felt in danger was when 

a vehicle in a convoy he was in had an accident and a large local mob came 

on the scene. A second time of potential danger was when his convoy 

was diverted at night by local construction into the town of Banja Luka, a 

college town that overflowed with drunken young people. In both cases, 

violence was averted.115

Throughout 1998, chaplains from the Special Forces continued to 

rotate in and out of Bosnia in support of their soldiers. Chaplain Hartranft, 

in Bosnia from December 1997 through April 1998, described his unique 

ministry to Special Forces soldiers and their families as follows:

The command sent me home about 4 weeks prior to the 

redeployment of the soldiers. I conducted three reunion/

homecoming briefings; one day, one night, and one weekend. Then I deployed again into theater and conducted 

redeployment briefings with each Team in their houses. 

I was able not only to give them the reunion brief, but 

inform them of some of the issues their spouses were 

experiencing and the trouble spots the soldiers should be 

prepared to face. The then Inspector General, LTG Jordan, 

was informed of this initiative by the Fort Carson installation chaplain, Chaplain (COL) Herb Kitchens, and wrote 

commendations about it to the Army Chief of Staff.116

Special Forces Chaplain (CPT) Steven Mark Jones also spent time 

in Bosnia in 1998. Specifically for that year, Jones deployed to Bosnia 

in September and then in November and December for holiday chaplain 

coverage. He remarked:

I had a very positive relationship with other chaplains 

during my 1998 deployments to Bosnia. Chaplain (CPT) 

Eric Albertson was a RC priest assigned to Eagle Base, 

and he supported my soldiers when I was not there. I had 

no problems coordinating religious support, both for the 
73

HQ personnel at Eagle Base and for my Special Forces 

soldiers scattered in remote areas. Our SF soldiers in the 

field were in Team houses, such as A-Team, B-Team, etc. 

The SF soldiers in forward areas only wanted SF chaplains to visit them, as they were very picky as to whom 

they would welcome.

To visit my SF soldiers in remote locations I had to travel 

in an armed small convoy. At the Team houses, I did a lot 

of one-on-one ministry, conducted redeployment family 

briefings, and performed church services. I carried with 

me a flexible collection of relationship building type literature, which I would pick and choose from as needed. 

At each Team house, I also distributed religious literature, 

like daily devotional reading materials. . . .

When I held a religious service at a Team house, about 

60 to 70 percent of the soldiers would attend. One Team 

house I visited during the day had an attack that evening, 

as they received small arms fire and a brief mortar attack. 

None of my troops were injured but they were shaken up. 

This was the only time in Bosnia that my soldiers took 

direct enemy fire. I returned to spend the next day with 

them and it was a profitable time of ministry. . . .

Anything I needed in Bosnia I got. The commander and 

other chaplains were very supportive. No problem getting 

religious supply items. I was always able to get where I 

needed to go, but our ground transportation had to follow 

the applicable convoy and weapons guidelines.117

Administratively, successive rotations of US soldiers into Bosnia 

received the designation of SFOR, with a numerical designation showing 

the specific rotation of US troops. For example, SFOR-1 was followed by 

SFOR-2 and then SFOR-3. In the summer of 1998, the SFOR-4 rotation 

entered Bosnia. Some of the challenges facing UMTs in SFOR-4 were as 

follows: 

The chaplains and assistants experienced a new paradigm 

for ministry during OJF (Operation JOINT FORGE). 

Normal unit integrity was replaced by the “base camp” 

model. The Unit Ministry Teams (UMTs) quickly 

adapted to this model as they were required to provide 

religious support to all soldiers in the base camp, not 

just soldiers within their unit. Religious support includes 
74

religious services, Bible Studies, special events, holiday 

observances, counseling, and visitation. The battalion 

chaplain’s challenge to work the varied chains of command 

for units represented in their respective areas of operation 

as well as the rear detachment at times took considerable 

effort. . . . Poor road or flying conditions often hampered 

religious support to remote sites. . . .

The overall theme for the SFOR-4 mission was “Poke 

Holes in the Darkness.” Whether the loneliness of deployment, the personal crisis’ in soldier’s lives, or the long, 

cold nights in Bosnia brought darkness into soldier’s 

lives, the ministry teams were to take every chance to lift 

the spirits of our soldiers through caring, visiting, worshiping, and supporting.118

As 1998 ended, there were various reports of military activity in 

nearby Kosovo, south of Bosnia. Rumors of ethnic cleansing in Kosovo 

were common. Having failed to unite Bosnia-Herzegovina under his control, it appeared that Milosevic was now focusing his territorial ambitions 

against the Kosovar people. Meanwhile, Bosnia enjoyed a relative peace.

Chaplain Duties in Maintaining the Peace in Bosnia, 1999–2000

In Bosnia 1999 began on a somber note. While trying to arrest Dragon 

Gagovic, a former Bosnian Serb police chief in Foca accused of raping 

and torturing Muslim women, NATO troops fatally shot him. Hundreds of 

Yugoslavian civilians daily stood in line at Western embassies in Sarajevo 

in hopes of obtaining a visa to depart their war-torn homeland. As tensions 

in nearby Kosovo developed into armed NATO intervention, the NATO 

and American focus on Bosnia depreciated. The Bosnian people in 1999 

faced three enormous hurdles in their recovery effort: the problem of 

thousands of displaced refugees, the economic and political chaos that 

resulted in the decline of Milosevic’s power, and the uncertainty of longterm humanitarian assistance from European and other allies.119 In July 

1999 there were 75,000 known refugees in Bosnia. The ethnic diversity 

of these despairing refugees created tensions to the point that they had to 

create ethnically specific refugee centers throughout the land. The Bosnian 

economy as a whole was in shambles. Infrastructures were destroyed or 

damaged, homes were looted or ruined, families were separated, and 

NATO investigators discovered evidence of war crimes and mass grave 

sites throughout Bosnia.
75

Chaplain (CPT) Alva R. Bennett was in Bosnia from September 1998 

through March 1999. Assigned to the 20th Engineer Battalion under the 1st 

Cavalry Division, Bennett was stationed at Eagle Base, Bosnia. In referring 

to the devastation on the civilian population of Bosnia, he commented, 

“We delivered some humanitarian aid and took toys to an orphanage. 

My Engineer unit did several building projects to include constructing a 

bridge.” On the danger of traveling throughout Bosnia, Bennett stated, 

“We always traveled in two-vehicle armed convoys. In the spring of 1999, 

we had tension raised in Bosnia from the pending NATO air campaign in 

nearby Kosovo. When my tour was over in March 1999, our airplane was 

the last to leave Sarajevo before the bombings in Kosovo began.”120

In the summer of 1999, US Secretary of the Army Louis Caldera 

visited Eagle Base and predicted the Bosnian mission could exceed 5 more 

years in duration. A few days later, Clinton and 40 other world leaders met 

in Sarajevo to pledge for economic and political reforms throughout the 

Balkans. By 27 August, officials at Eagle Base reported it would take 250 

years to rid Bosnia of its millions of land mines. On a more positive note, 

the fall of 1999 initiative to allow Bosnians voluntarily to disarm was in 

progress with favorable results.

American and NATO soldiers stationed in Bosnia in 1999 experienced 

both a downsizing of force structure and facilities while the remaining 

physical structures on NATO bases were improving. For example, in 

February a 10,000-square foot main exchange opened at Eagle Base, 

providing many of the comforts of home for shoppers. A few weeks later, 

Camp Bedrock in Bosnia closed and troops were realigned or redeployed. 

By the end of the year, Camp Demi also closed, while Eagle Base 

continued to develop as a huge and reasonably comfortable facility with a 

brand new movie theater. Also in 1999, the new Army Chief of Chaplains, 

Major General (MG) Gaylord Gunhus, made his first of several trips to the 

Balkans.

In March 1999, Chaplain (CPT) Peter Strong and SPC Phillip Fortner 

departed the closing Camp Demi, Bosnia. Before departing Bosnia, Strong 

wrote an after action review (AAR) of his tour. Excerpts from the lessons 

learned portion of that AAR are:

a. Purchase of religious materials for deployment. 

We were allotted $1,500 less than 2 weeks before the 

loading of the military vans. This could have been planned 

out much sooner. The amount of money was just right for 

the development of outstanding ministry programs. 

b. Communication with unit in Bosnia. This was 
76

very helpful. We did not know all the questions to ask but 

were given good ‘heads up’ in many areas. It would have 

been great to go on a recon mission prior to deployment 

but this was not seen as a priority. 

c. Battle Book. The more you think ahead, the better. Bring only what you need for this mission. Find out 

about the history of Bosnia, know the camps in your 

AOR [Area of Responsibility], know the differences in 

the religious groups in Bosnia (Catholic Croats, Orthodox 

Serbs, Bosnian Muslims). Rough out a 6-month CMRP 

[Command Master Religious Program]. Bring phone 

numbers for POCs [points of contact] in the rear. Keep 

files from the rear on MASCAL [mass casualties], critical 

event debriefings, memorial services, suicide awareness, 

stress management, etc. 

d. Humanitarian Aid. This is a very important part 

of the mission at the base camps. It gradually grew in 

importance. It is very important to know the relationship 

between Civil Affairs and the chaplain in this area. 

e. Wholesome Spiritual Activities. This was accomplished by such events as distributing clothing and toys 

at refugee centers, allowing troops to get outside the wire 

and meet the local people. We also did a work project at 

a monastery, giving the soldiers a break out of the routine 

so they could do something different and worthwhile. 

f. Transfer of Authority. Seven to 10 days is more 

than enough. The present chaplain should bow out as 

quickly as possible and let the new chaplain take over. . . . 

Get the new chaplain trained up as quickly as possible and 

let him/her start their program.121

The AAR of the Task Force Eagle chaplain, dated 15 May 1999, is 

a detailed eight page summary of UMT activities throughout Bosnia. 

Chaplain (MAJ) Erik Erkkinen narrated the religious activities at Eagle 

Base, as well as from Camp Comanche, Camp Demi, Camp Bedrock, Camp 

Dobol, and Camp McGovern. This report is interesting in how it describes 

the ongoing mission in Bosnia with the new name of Operation JOINT 

FORGE and with the US presence remaining focused on peacekeeping 

and nation building. Excerpts from this AAR are as follows:

a. Peacekeeping. Battalion, Brigade, and Division 

level: As the base camps settled into routines, the 
77

peacekeeping mission allowed ample opportunity for the 

battalion, brigade, and division level ministry teams to 

participate. When possible, the UMT would participate 

in various operations. Some ministry teams frequently 

assisted with humanitarian aid missions. Others visited 

orphanages and schools or accompanied routine patrols. 

Still others provided support for grave-site exhumations. 

b. Thanksgiving/Christmas/Hanukkah: The Red 

Cross and MWR [Morale, Welfare, and Recreation] 

also supported holiday operations by providing assorted 

Thanksgiving and Christmas decorations, Christmas trees, 

and arranging special holiday functions and activities. 

Holiday worship schedules were planned and published 

well ahead of the holidays. . . . The Division UMT also 

arranged . . . to construct a large Menorah for a Hanukkah 

candle lighting ceremony. This was very much appreciated by Chaplain (MAJ) Ben Romer, a Rabbi and sponsor 

of the Jewish worshiping community.

Ramadan—A small population of Muslims was 

present as part of SFOR-4. As needed, a worship facility 

was made available for Muslim soldiers. An announcement was made for sensitivity to Muslim needs during 

Ramadan.

Easter/Passover—Celebration of these holidays 

were planned by SFOR-4 and revised and executed by 

SFOR-5 since the dates coincided with redeployment. 

Chaplain Rabbi Romer and Chaplain (CPT) Peter Baktis 

(Eastern Orthodox priest) from Central Region (Germany) 

came to Eagle Base to celebrate the holy days. 

c. Chaplain (MG) Donald Shea: The Army Chief 

of Chaplains made one visit with the Army Chief of 

Staff, General Reimer. The Division UMT coordinated 

with USAREUR to establish an itinerary for his visit 

in December. . . . The Chief desired to conduct several 

Roman Catholic masses and visit soldiers of Task Force 

Eagle. Chaplain Shea was briefed on ministry operations 

of TF Eagle and flown to several base camps to meet with 

UMTs and soldiers. Chaplain (LTC) Dwight Jennings, the 

1st Cavalry Division Chaplain, escorted Chaplain Shea.

d. Administration: many administrative actions 
78

were required of the Division Ministry Team on a daily 

basis. Tracking and managing information, receiving 

weekly reports, coordinating religious support, and other 

significant staff actions were duties shared by the task 

force chaplain, the operations chaplain, and the NCOIC. 

Sharing information was critical to the success of the staff. 

Though infrequent, some of the issues that arose were: 

missed link-ups, schedule changes, Reserve component 

issues, lack of coordination, communication equipment 

failures, and time/manpower constraints.

e. Summary: Overall, the ministry teams performed 

magnificently during SFOR-4’s mission. Highlights 

included worship and holiday activities, visits by senior 

leadership of the Army and the Army Chaplaincy, visits 

and shows by popular entertainers, opportunities for 

humanitarian assistance, interaction with partner nations, 

and many other great ministry opportunities. The UMTs, 

without exception, believed that we made a difference. 

Morale of the ministry teams was kept high through 

intentional monitoring and scheduling of events that would 

build team cohesiveness and esprit. Though visitation 

to base camps was hindered by poor visibility and road 

conditions, the Division UMT was able to keep in close 

contact with all the base camps and ministry teams.122

Chaplain (CPT) Brad Baumann of the 1st Battalion 10th Aviation 

Regiment from Fort Drum, New York, was assigned to Comanche Base, 

Bosnia, from September 1999 through March 2000. Before deployment, 

Baumann stated, “Morale was very good and soldiers were excited about 

the opportunity to experience a real-world mission.” He elaborated, 

“During the deployment I was the Aviation Battalion Chaplain and also 

served as the Gospel Service Senior pastor. . . . My relationships with my 

battalion and brigade commanders were excellent.” Baumann performed 

or provided some type of religious activity 6 nights a week at Comanche 

Base, and stated, “The only time I felt even remotely in danger was during 

our Staff Ride to Srebrenica. The male population made obscene gestures 

and acted as if they were shooting us. Other than that time I felt no danger 

at all.”123

Inevitably, chaplains might experience friction or tension with other 

chaplains. Baumann stated, “The only ‘slight’ problem I had was with my 

brigade chaplain who was a Catholic priest. I felt he was jealous of my 
79

relationship with the brigade commander. The commander was Protestant 

and looked heavily to me for feedback. This caused some tension.” One 

way to alleviate friction between UMTs was to have them participate in 

benevolent-type projects to the local civilians. Baumann remarked, “The 

battalion sponsored a small school in Tuzla, Bosnia. I was the project officer. We raised the money from the States and rebuilt the school (new roof, 

desks, floor, wood stove, chalkboard, paint, and we completely cleaned 

and cleared out the building being used). We also distributed clothing 

to a local orphanage throughout the rotation.” In reflecting back several 

years later on his experience in Bosnia in 1999–2000, Baumann recalled, 

“My UMT experience was almost exclusively in a chapel setting. . . . God 

blessed my time during the rotation. We experienced growth each month 

with all of the programs we ran through both the unit and the base camp 

services. . . . I had a wonderful experience during my deployment with the 

battalion, Gospel congregation, and the Bosnians.”124

The year 2000 began with Chaplain (CPT) Terrance Kesling already 

assigned to Camp McGovern, Bosnia. As a member of the 2d Battalion, 

87th Infantry Regiment under the 10th Mountain Division, Kesling was 

the only chaplain at Camp McGovern. Kesling worked directly for the 

commander at Camp McGovern and was under the supervision of the 10th 

Mountain Division chaplain. The isolation of Camp McGovern meant that 

Kesling had little contact with other chaplains outside of preplanned UMT 

meetings. He stated, “My focus was on a base camp ministry. I operated a 

garrison-type chapel program.” In addition to preaching and counseling at 

Camp McGovern, Kesling was able through the robust help of volunteers 

to renovate their chapel with fresh paint, new furniture, and new flooring. Due to guidance from the division chaplain, he did not engage in any 

humanitarian projects with the Bosnians.125

Roman Catholic chaplains in the US Army are frequently asked to 

develop an itinerant ministry, conducting services in numerous locations. 

The Bosnia ministry of Catholic Chaplain Rajmund Kopec was no 

exception. Kopec was in Bosnia from March through September 2000. 

He stated:

I went to Bosnia with a lot of questions. I’m now speaking from a very personal perspective, because we’d been 

in Bosnia for a little while, and there was the discussion, 

well, maybe Europeans should make more effort to take 

care of that. Why do we have to go, it’s a peacekeeping 

operation, so on and so. But over all, very quickly in that 

rotation I came to an understanding of why we were there, 
80

that our soldiers were doing great jobs, good positive 

things happening in Bosnia, but even if we don’t make 

any difference, by being involved with local communities 

and so on, there’s one very important difference we make, 

by the fact that we are up there, those people don’t kill 

each other. We stopped them from killing, and that’s what 

I tried to relate to our soldiers. Yes, you wake up and every 

day is the same . . . even if this whole thing doesn’t make 

sense to them, they need to keep in mind that the fact that 

we are here, those people don’t kill each other. And how 

did I learn that? That’s where knowing languages comes 

handy, because in the meantime I learned, in Bosnia and 

Croatia they are similar languages, and being from Poland 

and having a last name which some people thought I was 

Bosnian, I had an opportunity to talk to local people on a 

different level, I prefer to think. Several of them would 

say to me, you are one of ours. . . .126

Chaplain Assistant Neal, assigned to HQ EUCOM, deployed to Bosnia 

for specific missions in October 1999 and November 2000. In Bosnia, she 

acted as the NCOIC for the joint command chaplain, assigned to train US 

chaplain assistants from various service components on providing religious support. In this capacity, Neal served as primary trainer to chaplain 

assistants, organized an international chaplain’s conference, and helped to 

provide religious support to troops in war-torn Sarajevo. One of the highlights of her Bosnia experiences was in helping other nations develop a 

chaplain assistant NCO corps. Difficulties in her Bosnian tours were from 

“language barriers and the translation of all classroom instruction” as well 

as from traveling on the unsafe roads around Sarajevo, Bosnia.127

In 2000, the chaplain for the 4th Squadron of the 3d Armored Cavalry 

Regiment (ACR) from Fort Carson, Colorado, was Chaplain (CPT) 

Joseph Blay. Deployed to Comanche Base, Tuzla, Bosnia, from February 

through September 2000, Blay stated that his unit was well prepared for 

the deployment and Family Support Groups were active and involved. In 

Bosnia, Blay served as chaplain to his unit as well as chaplain of the Gospel 

Congregation at Comanche Base. He also served as a liaison between his 

battalion and the Civil Affairs soldiers related to religious issues and interaction with the local Orthodox Church. Blay remarked that he never felt 

unsafe in Bosnia, preaching to soldiers was his greatest joy, and working 

with multinational chaplains did not work well because of language barriers and denominational constraints. A memorable experience for Blay was 

his ministry with local refugees. He stated:
81

We had a great opportunity for ministry to our soldiers 

and to local Bosnian nationals at nearby refugee camps. 

This camp was two buildings in the Tuzla suburbs in the 

woods. The people planted crops and raised chickens by a 

river. All the refugees were Muslims but they were secular. The soldiers adopted this refugee camp and distributed donated goods from US school children to these very 

needy people of all ages.128

Chaplain (MAJ) David Crary commented, “My deployment to Bosnia 

was one of the highlights of my military career.” Crary was assigned to the 

2d Brigade of the 3d Infantry Division, stationed at Eagle Base, Bosnia, 

from September 2000 through April 2001. He remarked, “My relationship 

with the commander was good. He was a strong supporter of chapel activities and attended chapel regularly.” Crary continued, “One of the many 

positive experiences while in Bosnia was my relationship with two Air 

Force chaplains, both of whom were assigned to Eagle Base for 90 days 

consecutively. There was a great spirit of cooperation with never a hint of 

competition or rivalry.”129

Crary spoke of his working relationship with Chaplain Assistant 

Veronica Todd:

During one visit to a predominantly Croat city we were 

briefed to be on guard because they were not particularly 

friendly to American forces. It was the first time I saw 

the chaplain assistant in action, as a bodyguard. I was 

impressed with their training and professionalism. . . . 

SSG Veronica Todd, now retired, was my chaplain assistant. She did a wonderful job of managing the chapel, 

supervising several junior chaplain assistants, and taking 

care of any and all that ventured through the chapel. The 

chapel was a real hub of the community, remaining open 

24 hours a day. She was as much a mother to young soldiers as an NCO.130

As the year 2000 ended, the Pentagon announced a major shift in policy 

toward Bosnia. In a news headline stating “Army Will Give National Guard 

the Entire U.S. Role in Bosnia,” the Pentagon announced the following:

WASHINGTON, Dec 4—The Army announced today 

that it would effectively turn over its mission in Bosnia to 

part-time National Guard soldiers, including troops from 

Kansas, Minnesota, Indiana, and New York, over the next 

two years.
82

The Army, like the other armed services, is increasingly 

relying on the Guard to supplement active-duty soldiers 

in military operations like the one in Bosnia. But the 

announcement today significantly expands the reliance 

upon the citizen soldiers.

Beginning this year, the Army has rotated command of the 

Bosnian mission between Active and Guard units, including the 49th Armor Division of the Texas National Guard. 

That unit oversaw the American sector in Bosnia for seven 

months, until the 3d Infantry Division, an Active Duty 

unit from Fort Stewart, Georgia, took over in October.

By late 2002, the peacekeeping mission is to be commanded exclusively in six-month rotations by troops 

from eight National Guard divisions. They include the 

28th Infantry from Pennsylvania, the 35th from Kansas, 

the 34th from Minnesota, the 38th from Indiana, and the 

42d from New York.131

Meanwhile, Active Duty Army UMTs in 2001 continued missions 

in Bosnia. Chaplain (CPT) Ronald Cooper of the 64th Armor Battalion, 

3d Infantry Division, departed Bosnia in April 2001. Stationed at Camp 

Dobol, Cooper remarked, “I was a battalion chaplain with a base camp 

ministry for a community consisting of a BN TF [Battalion Task Force] 

plus contractors. The ministry was a base camp ministry. I oversaw the 

Gospel Congregation as well as leading the General Protestant service.” 

Although “Bible Studies were a challenge due to patrols going out at various times of the day and night,” Cooper had a unique and successful ministry to senior leaders at Camp Dobol. He explained: “We developed a 

‘Top Gun Leaders’ ministry to commanders and staff officers. We studied 

together a leadership book each month. Then we met for dinner and discussed the book. Then I would teach a 1-hour class on leadership. We did 

this for the 6 months we were in Bosnia.” Cooper stated he frequently 

did not feel safe when he was in downtown areas, and that his briefings 

on local Islam were well received and distributed via training throughout 

the task force. In speaking of his 2001 ministry at Camp Dobol in Bosnia, 

Cooper summarized, “Base camp ministry is an excellent way to know 

soldiers and do great ministry.”132

Various US chaplains brought to Bosnia diverse talents and abilities. 

For Lutheran Chaplain (MAJ) Michael Lembke of the 3d Infantry Division, 

his talents appeared in his ability to bring together chaplains from various 

Balkan groups for communication and bridge building. Lembke met 
83

regularly with civilian clergy from Croatian, Serbian, and Bosnian Muslim 

communities. These local clergy were amazed that American military 

chaplains share chapels that serve all religions. While Lembke performed 

his routine 0815 Sunday Lutheran service and participated in scheduled 

bomb threat drills by entering bunkers, he was also able to meet regularly 

with fellow NATO chaplains from Denmark, Turkey, and the Netherlands. 

Lembke thrived on building relationships with clergy, whether Jewish, 

Eastern Orthodox, Muslim, or Roman Catholic. For example, Lembke’s 

visits to nearby Orthodox monasteries allowed him to network with 

Orthodox priests and learn the Serbian version of the history of tensions 

in Bosnia. Local civilian clergy from various faith traditions in Bosnia 

applauded the role of the United States and NATO in attempting to bring 

peace to their war-torn land. Clearly one of the highlights of Lembke’s tour 

in Bosnia was the large clergy conference he was able to help coordinate. 

As Lembke explained: 

24 March 2001—We conducted the first ever Armed Forces 

in Bosnia-Herzegovina Religious Support Conference. 

This conference brought together 40 participants from the 

Bosnian military, civilian clergy to include two bishops 

(one Orthodox and one Roman Catholic), 4 multinational 

chaplains (Polish, Danish, Dutch, and Turkish), and 12 

American Forces chaplains. It was a great day and capitalized on the desire of the Bosnians to learn more about 

military chaplaincies. The spirit was positive and the mood 

upbeat. All present committed to meet again. . . . It was a 

great day and a wonderful culminating experience.133

Army Chaplain Ministries in Bosnia, 2001–2002

By 2001, it became apparent to many observers that the Dayton Peace 

Accords for Bosnia were not working—at least the agreement was not 

working very well. Six years had elapsed on a mission that was initially to 

last only a year; yet at the 6-year mark, Bosnia was completely dependent 

on outside assistance for its tenuous survival. Ethnic clashes still occurred 

on a small local scale, and many thought the moment the United States 

and NATO leave, the killing and ethnic cleansing would resume. Bosnia 

was slow to rebuild, with the marks of military devastation, namely buildings ridden with bullet holes, bombed out structures, and mass grave sites 

still noticeable. Factories and ammunition sites bombed by NATO several 

years earlier still lay in ruins. Unemployment was a plague on the people. 
84

Hopelessness abounded in the lives of the younger generation, many of 

whom were raised partially in orphanages, their parents the victims of 

ethnic cleansing and hatred. Crime abounded, prostitution was prevalent, 

alcohol abuse was rampant, and only a total dependence on outside humanitarian aid and NATO peacekeepers prevented the region from descending 

into total chaos.

American military leaders in 2001 began to question openly the wisdom of the current policy in Bosnia. US Army Reserve Colonel Alexander 

A.C. Gerry, fluent in the Serbo-Croatian language, worked in the former 

Yugoslavia. After touring Bosnia, he made an extensive report to the 

Reserve Officer’s Association. Excerpts from Gerry’s report follow: 

Almost 6 years after the beginning of the Dayton 

Agreement, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina is 

still on life support, wholly dependent on the international 

community and foreign aid. . . .

The country now has two parts, the Muslim-Croat 

Federation and the Republika Srpska under the administration of the Stabilization Force (SFOR) based on the 

Dayton Accords. The integration of predominately Croat 

Bosnia and Muslim Herzegovina with the Serb Republic 

has proven a massively difficult task that will require an 

outside military presence for an extended period. . . .

In the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, nominally 

multiethnic institutions are in fact split into separate 

Bosniac (Muslim) and Croat (Roman Catholic) components with little interaction between the two. At the state 

level, elected officials often work to keep the state from 

effective political action.

As long as the basic administrative structures remain 

weak, elections can do little to foster responsible government. In Serb and Croat dominated areas, the electorate 

continues to return wartime nationalistic parties to power. 

For Bosnians, the electoral base is mainly at the municipal and canton level and dependent upon an extremely 

weak and fractured administrative apparatus. 

The failure of national institutions has forced the international mission, out of necessity, to assume a direct role 

in the affairs of the Federation of Bosnia. . . . Clearly, 

this is not a role envisaged in the Dayton Accords nor one 
85

that the international mission ever wanted to play. Bosnia 

and Herzegovina is not a self-sustaining structure and the 

consequences of a premature withdrawal could be catastrophic not just for Bosnia but for the entire region.134

Army chaplains and chaplain assistants in 2001 continued their 

diverse ministries in and around Bosnia. Army Reserve Chaplain (LTC) 

Vernon Chandler and Chaplain Assistant SSG Lucinda Flowers were 

in Taszar, Hungary, for about 6 months, in direct support of missions 

in Bosnia. Chandler explained his job: “I was the USASET (US Army 

Support Element Taszar) chaplain. I supervised the Camp Butmir, Bosnia, 

BSB [Base Support Battalion] chaplain; I coordinated chaplain support 

for soldiers at small remote locations in Croatia; I counseled soldiers on 6-

month deployments; I conducted reunion briefings and suicide prevention 

classes; I performed Sunday church services at Taszar; and I coordinated 

4-day spiritual retreats in Taszar or Budapest for soldiers coming from 

Bosnia.” In speaking of times he felt in danger, Chandler stated, “One 

time a vehicle we were in convoy with got in an accident. This was on one 

of my chaplain visits to Camp Butmir. The area around us had landmines 

so we had to be very careful where we stood. There were no signs of war 

that I saw in Hungary or Croatia, but in Bosnia, the ravages of war were 

quite visible. When we traveled through the Serbian area of Bosnia it was 

tense, as the harsh stares from the people reminded us that the Christian 

Orthodox Serbians thought the United States was siding too heavily with 

the Bosnian Muslims.”135

Working with Chandler in Hungary was Flowers. As an Active Duty 

chaplain assistant, Flowers was assigned to the 20th Area Support Group. 

Located at Taszar from April through October 2001, Flowers stated that 

she enjoyed setting up the worship services on Sundays, found the Bible 

Studies and retreats helpful, and ran the daily functions of the chapel. She 

concluded, “My tour was all in all a great learning experience.”136 Chandler 

explained the Army mission at Taszar as follows:

While I was there the base was downsizing. It was still 

a busy place but not like it had been a few years prior. 

This was a transition base for the loading and unloading 

of supplies for other locations in the Balkans. People were 

always coming or going through our base. C-130 airplanes 

regularly landed moving troops and equipment in and 

out of the Balkans. The soldiers who were permanently 

assigned to Taszar while I was there were mostly from 

MP units. They did a lot of convoy security missions 
86

as supplies went in and out of our base. They also did 

our security missions. When I did my chaplain visits, an 

armed MP would come with us. These soldiers were a 

mix of AD/RC soldiers and they blended well.137

Chandler and Flowers in Taszar had diverse ministry experiences with 

soldiers coming and going from their location, either going into Bosnia for 

a tour, departing Bosnia at the end of their tour, or having a time of military leave in the midst of their tour. Some examples of ministry provided 

to these transient soldiers by Chandler and Flowers are as follows: 

a. Soldiers who got a 4-day pass out of Bosnia would 

come to our area and either explore the city of Taszar or be 

bused to Budapest for a religious and cultural tour of that 

historic city. As the troops came in to Taszar I met them 

as a chaplain and briefed them and provided chaplain 

support as needed. In two cases, I had to deliver Red 

Cross messages of severe problems at home to soldiers 

that were in my area.

b. Counseling issues related to the expected marriage 

and family issues. The longer we were into the 6-month 

deployment, the more numerous the counseling opportunities. Marriages were strained, and soldiers were disturbed 

about things changing at home while they were away. 

c. At first, we conducted two Sunday morning 

services at Camp Butmir, one traditional Protestant service and one more contemporary gospel service. Once a 

month an Army chaplain Roman Catholic priest would 

rotate through the camp and conduct a Mass. We adjusted 

the two Sunday morning worship services into one combined Sunday evening service. This was a good move and 

attendance increased. We made this adjustment to accommodate the religious and cultural tours that were offered 

on weekends. Soldiers had to choose between going on a 

Saturday–Sunday local tour or coming to Sunday morning 

church. By moving the church services to one combined 

Sunday evening meeting all were able to attend, since the 

tours were completed by that time.138

The 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States by 

Muslim extremists in the al-Qaeda network killed thousands in New 

York City and hundreds more at the Pentagon and in Pennsylvania. Using 

hijacked airplanes filled with innocent civilians, these terrorists slammed 
87

two airplanes into New York City and one airplane into the Pentagon. A 

fourth airplane, having failed to reach its intended target, crashed into a 

field in Pennsylvania, killing all on board. Special Forces soldiers continued their covert operations in Bosnia with renewed intensity, searching for 

any link between Bosnian Muslims and the al-Qaeda terrorist network. 

One article stated:

It was a few hours before dawn when four rented SUVs 

[suburban utility vehicles] came to a halt outside the threestory gray stucco building in a leafy Sarajevo suburb. Six 

Green Berets in full battle-rattle jumped from the SUVs 

and rushed the front door of the Hotel Hollywood, M4s 

[small rifles] and shotguns at the ready.

They raced up the stairs to the second floor, where they 

splintered two hotel room doors with sledge hammers. In 

the rooms, they found their quarry—two Middle Eastern 

men, bleary eyed but very much aware they were in big 

trouble.

As some of the Special Forces troops hustled out of the 

hotel and into their idling vehicles, others swept the rooms 

scooping up documents.

It was 3:30 am and the counterterrorism campaign in 

Bosnia had just begun.

Nine hours later, the same 10th Special Forces Group soldiers repeated the operation, this time at the nondescript 

building that houses a Saudi Arabian relief agency. On 

this occasion they were joined by a handful of Italian 

Carabinieri from an elite military task force. This raid 

yielded two more suspects—who were later released—

and another gold mine of intelligence.

The raids were the first blows of a counterterrorism campaign in Bosnia that US and NATO officers say has netted more than a dozen Arab terrorist suspects, most with 

links to Osama bin Laden’s al-Qaeda organization. The 

US government blames al-Qaeda for the September 11th 

attacks that killed thousands in the United States.139

Chaplain (CPT) Sean Wead arrived in Bosnia on 11 September 2001. 

While he stated, “I participated in combat Operation MARNE DRAGNET 

against suspected al-Qaeda targets,” his primary ministry was to the people stationed at Camp McGovern, Bosnia. Wead was assigned to the 2d 
88

Battalion, 22d Infantry Regiment, a regular Army unit associated with the 

10th Mountain Division of Fort Drum, New York. His unit in Bosnia was 

attached to the 29th Infantry Division, a Texas Army National Guard unit. 

With responsibilities at Camp McGovern and a few other nearby locations, Wead stated, “I really liked the Army National Guard chaplains of 

the 29th Infantry Division. They were great chaplains, but a little weak on 

the Army expectations for procedure. They were easier to work for than 

many regular Army chaplains.”140 Wead was able to counsel and advise his 

commander through the unit’s reluctance to be subservient to a National 

Guard unit. Wead described his ministry in Bosnia as follows:

At night I visited my troops on perimeter guard at Camp 

McGovern, Eagle Base, and FOB Morgan. I made weekly 

trips and trained with each company. I did regular services and Bible Studies at Camp McGovern and FOB 

Morgan. . . . Being present and available worked well. 

Our UMT road-marched once a month with our soldiers. 

We made our rounds to the guards during the day and 

night operations. We were always with soldiers, which 

paid great dividends.

Services were attended by only a fraction of the soldiers, 

only about 30 on a Sunday (there were 500 stationed at 

McGovern). What really worked were one-on-one visits 

I made. My ministry was personal and seemed to reach 

more through the week than corporate Sunday worship.

I got to design the chapel at Camp McGovern from ‘the 

shoebox’ [a small metal container with no windows] into 

the nice chapel that now exists. Chaplain (COL) Habereck 

from USAREUR made the discretionary funds available. 

The chapel was transformed in 2 weeks.141

Chaplain Kopec provides a good summary of chaplain activities and 

life in general in Bosnia at the end of 2001 and the beginning of 2002. In 

speaking of the improvement of facilities and the decrease in ethnic tensions, Kopec remarked:

At SFOR-7 [2000] the way our base camps were set 

out was pretty much close to a separation zone, because 

Bosnia is divided into Bosnia and Serbia. Basically, when 

we got into Bosnia we as Americans did not go into Serbia 

because that’s where there was a disagreement. So our 

base camps were built by the zones that separated Bosnia 

from Serbia, and our job was to make sure that the zones 
89

are clear and there is no killing going on and nothing 

nasty going on. Eighteen months later [2002] I go back 

to Bosnia and we already moved within the territory of 

Serbia, a couple of forward observation bases were built, 

FOB Conner and FOB Morgan, which were inside Serbia. 

The purpose of that was to protect resettlements. Bosnians 

who decided they wanted to go back to their homes, they 

got money. I guess the international community was supporting them, pretty much they were going back to where 

they originally came from, which was within Serbia, 

rebuilding their houses. And our soldiers were in those 

areas to protect them from any hostilities from Serbs. So 

just the simple fact that we moved our bases within the 

territory of Serbia was a huge improvement.142

Throughout 2002 chaplain ministries in Bosnia became predictable 

and routine. While life in a hostile fire zone was no vacation, the UMTs in 

Bosnia in 2002 were essentially pastors to congregations confined within 

the parameters of various base camps. Hazards could be anticipated when 

chaplains traveled from one base camp to another, but essentially Bosnia 

in 2002 was in a tenuous peace. Chaplain (MAJ) Al Shrum deployed to 

Bosnia with the 25th Infantry Division in March 2002. Assigned as the 

task force chaplain operating out of Eagle Base, Shrum stated that he was 

“the SFOR-11 chaplain responsible for religious support for the task force 

and supervision of six chaplains and seven chaplain assistants,” and that 

he “coordinated religious support for the multinational task force and provided direct religious support to the task force staff.” In this leadership 

position, Shrum recalled, “With the five chaplains from the 25th Infantry 

Division, my relationship was ideal: professional, respectful, supportive, 

personal, and responsive. However, with the one Indiana Army National 

Guard chaplain under my supervision, my relationship could not have 

been any more unprofessional and insubordinate. . . . The Indiana National 

Guard UMTs were ‘lone rangers.’”143

Army chaplain ministries in Bosnia in 2002 were fully developed and 

appreciated. Chaplain Shrum stated, “Worship services went well. Movie 

nights at the chapel (religious-based movies) were a big hit. Religious 

retreats to Budapest and Medjugorje went well.”144 Chaplain Assistant 

David Lee of the 25th Infantry Division was in Bosnia from April through 

September 2002, assigned primarily to travel and work with Roman Catholic 

Chaplain Kopec. David Lee remarked, “Chaplain Kopec and I traveled to 

many locations. We were off base 4 days a week. We had an outstanding 

working relationship.”145 Working with Shrum and David Lee was Chaplain 
90

(CPT) William Wehlage, also with the 25th Infantry Division. Wehlage was 

the Plans and Operations Chaplain that coordinated, planned, and helped 

execute numerous chaplain missions. He recalled, “Trips to Medjugorje 

were great. We had several prayer breakfasts. We visited an orphanage and 

distributed humanitarian goods, a great time.” As far as being in personal 

danger, Wehlage said, “No—I was out of the wire several times, and nothing was troubling. Some of the local drivers were reckless. Our division 

averaged one traffic accident per day while we were deployed.” In summary, Wehlage reflected, “I had wonderful and lasting relationships with all 

chaplains. All chaplains got along extremely well.”146

Lawson of the 7th Army Reserve Command in Germany, made a 5-

day trip to mentor and instruct Reserve component chaplains in Bosnia in 

May 2002. Brief excerpts from his journal follow:

Day One (8 May 2002)—Flew on an Air Force C-130 

from Ramstein to Tuzla. Met by my host Chaplain (COL) 

Matthew Horne. Got acclimated to Camp Eagle. More 

trees and developed than I guessed. . . . A large, active 

camp. Land mine signs are at the tree lines. . . . Everyone 

except the chaplains carry weapons at all times.

Day Two (9 May 2002)—Began mentoring chaplains 

on Reserve/Active Duty chaplain integration of forces. I 

handed out lots of religious literature. . . . Sleeping and 

bathing arrangements humble. Constant traffic from 

armed vehicles returning from patrols. A tense cease-fire 

currently exists. Stayed within the fence today.

Day Three (10 May 2002)—Traveled with Chaplain Horne, 

a Bosnian translator, and a bodyguard to Camp Connor, 

then Camp Butmir, Sarajevo. Driving took much of the 

day. Scenes of warfare, destruction, and evil are in stark 

contrast to the natural beauty of this war-ravaged country. Bullet holes cover thousands of buildings. Hundreds 

of homes still stand in ruins. So few men of middle age 

exist, as many fled or were killed in the genocide a few 

years ago. Chaplain Horne and I stood at Srebrenica, the 

killing fields where thousands of Muslim civilians were 

murdered and buried in shallow graves. . . . The translator 

said that as soon as the US and NATO leave the killings 

will again begin. Brought supplies to an orphanage. Too 

many orphans in this violent place. More religious literature distributed, to both US and allied troops.
91

Day Four (11 May 2002)—More interviews and mentoring 

with chaplains on Reserve/Active Duty UMT integration 

of forces issues. A lot of religious literature passed out 

today. I had a detailed conversation with a French soldier 

who had many questions about what is true religion. . . . 

This afternoon we spent at an orphanage in Sarajevo. A 

nearby gunshot from a suspected sniper had us soldiers 

looking for cover, while the children ignored the sound. 

They have all seen so much death and guns that a sniper 

gunshot did not even make them blink. . . . Sarajevo was a 

beautiful city now in ruins. Large abandoned skyscrapers 

stand full of holes from artillery shells, standing like 

skeletons. Bullet ridden buildings all around. The 

consequences of human sin are readily apparent. I did not 

feel safe in Sarajevo but the Lord protected me. 

Day Five (12 May 2002)—Slept well. Drove with Chaplain 

Horne, a bodyguard, and a translator from Sarajevo to 

Tuzla. Total destruction and despair all along this 2-hour 

route. Did more Reserve/Active Duty chaplain mentoring 

on integration of forces. . . . There are too many orphans in 

Bosnia. It is an unnatural feeling to see so many orphans, 

their parents dead. A lot of religious pamphlets and tracts 

Figure 8. CH (MAJ) Al Shrum presides at a memorial service for a soldier 

who died in Bosnia from a heart attack while exercising.

US Army
92

handed out today. . . . Uneventful flight on an Air Force 

C-130 from Tuzla to Ramstein AFB, Germany.147

While Army UMTs in Bosnia experienced minimal danger in 2002, 

the region as a whole remained unsafe. An August 2002 civilian travel 

advisory warned visitors to Bosnia of attacks against returning refugees, 

unexploded mine-clearing operations, random mob violence, and the 

occasional closing of the US Embassy in Sarajevo for brief periods.148

Frequently traveling as an itinerant UMT throughout Bosnia at this time 

was Kopec and David Lee. Kopec stated, “I was the only Roman Catholic 

priest and that meant that I had one big parish throughout Bosnia. I had 

five or six base camps to go to so I was on the road pretty much all week 

long.” Kopec described a typical ministry experience as follows:

My Sunday would begin on Friday, because I didn’t 

have my own unit, I just served purely as the division 

Catholic priest. During SFOR-7, I had my squadron and 

I was a Catholic priest. But during SFOR-11, my Sunday 

would start on Friday. I would drive with my assistant and 

another soldier, or a translator, and drive to FOB Morgan, 

do the Catholic Mass up there for the soldiers, one of the 

infantry companies in that base camp, then drive to Camp 

McGovern, I would do an evening Mass and stay overnight, and I would have another Mass on Saturday at noon. 

Right after that I would leave and go back to Camp Eagle, 

and have Mass on Sunday at 1030, and then at 1900. On 

Monday, I would convoy with Chaplain [Anthony] Flores 

and his assistant, to FOB Conner, and spend the whole day 

with the soldiers there, just doing counseling and hanging around. In the evening, I would do Catholic Mass and 

he would do Protestant service and then convoy back on 

the same day to Camp Eagle. Then, Tuesday would be a 

quiet day, and on Wednesday, again with Chaplain Flores, 

we would fly by helicopter or convoy to Hill 1326. And 

the difference was that the ride by helicopter was about 

7 or 8 minutes to fly, but convoy was almost 2 hours. So, 

obviously we always tried to take the helicopter, and the 

reason is that it was high in the mountains and the roads 

were treacherous and very slow movement.149

Throughout 2002, doubts still lingered about the validity of US 

troops still in Bosnia. As one author stated, “The Balkans no longer 

constitute a primary foreign policy challenge. . . . The region itself is in 
93

a period of difficult, painful transition, and stands the chance of rapidly 

succumbing to transnational criminal influences and becoming a ‘black 

hole’ of terrorism . . . international corruption, black-market activities, 

and illegal arms shipments threaten the stability of the region.”150 No 

reasonable assessment could call for a full withdrawal of international 

aid and military forces in 2002. The issue for Americans was whether 

the United States should be involved in an ongoing European squabble. 

While Horne supervised UMT issues at Eagle Base in Bosnia, and as 

Chaplain (CPT) Brian Van Dyke completed a 45-day summer tour as 

chaplain in Taszar, Hungary, the US military continued a huge drawdown 

of troops in Bosnia.

Chaplain Activities During Military Downsizing in Bosnia, 

2003–2005

By 2003 the role of the US military in Bosnia was only a fraction of 

what it was in 1995–96. This was the case for two main reasons. First, 

the Balkans as a whole had stabilized: humanitarian missions were being 

conducted uninterrupted; European nations were aggressively involved 

in nation building in the Balkans; economic conditions slowly began to 

improve; and resettlement of refugees was proceeding though not without 

minor local incidents. The second reason the United States was deemphasizing missions in the Balkans was due to the Global War on Terrorism. 

This global war resulted from the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001, 

after which large numbers of US forces were deployed first to Afghanistan 

and later to Iraq. While world media attention was riveted on the Middle 

East, the American military presence in the Balkans became almost an 

afterthought. 

Soldiers sent to Bosnia in 2002–2003 remained focused on humanitarian, peacekeeping, and nation-building missions. Soldiers stated they were 

surprised that their peacekeeping duties were much calmer than expected, 

yet they expressed concern that a premature American departure could 

wreak havoc in the Balkans. The US troop strength in Bosnia originally 

peaked at 20,000, but by the start of 2003 the total number was around 

1,700. As Colonel Mark Milley of the 25th Infantry Division stated, 

“That’s a 10-fold decrease in 6 years, and that speaks for itself. We don’t 

need this overwhelming power anymore.” American troops now patrolled 

among local civilians, something avoided years earlier. US soldiers also 

stopped wearing their flack vests and Kevlar helmets in public, showing a 
94

more relaxed appearance to locals. Hostilities had decreased to the point 

where US troops were going door-to-door to ask locals to hand over their 

weapons and were successful in doing so.151

Chaplain (LTC) F. Douglas Hudson arrived at Eagle Base, Bosnia, on 

2 November 2002, to serve as the Area Support Group (ASG) chaplain. 

Hudson stated:

As the ASG chaplain, I was responsible for the base 

operation needs of the task force UMTs, as well as 

supervision of the BSB chaplain in Sarajevo, and the ASTs 

[Area Support Teams] at Taszar and Camp McGovern. 

I have about $80,000 worth of equipment disbursed 

throughout the SFOR area for which I am responsible. In 

addition to what is on hand, if the Task Force UMT has 

legitimate needs, it is my responsibility to secure those 

needs. . . . One of the highlights of my rotation has been 

working with the USAREUR Chaplain’s Office to establish 

a solid library, both Christian books and videos, for the 

Peacekeeper Chapel located on Eagle Base in Bosnia.152

Serving in Bosnia at the same time as Hudson was Chaplain (CPT) 

Matthew Huisjen. Both Hudson and Huisjen were assigned to the 7th 

ARCOM in Germany, but were mobilized and deployed to Bosnia as individual soldiers. Huisjen was stationed at NATO HQ in Sarajevo from 1 

December 2002 through 1 June 2003. As the BSB chaplain in Sarajevo 

having additional ministerial duties at Camp Butmir, Huisjen stated, “The 

two Sunday morning services grew. A new Tuesday evening Bible Study 

also grew to almost 20 as well, which I co-led with an Air Force chaplain 

who has become a dear friend. I was thankful to enjoy playing the guitar 

and singing as this proved to be a valuable asset. I had numerous opportunities to talk through the gospel with people.”153 Huisjen was able to 

perform a lot of formal and informal marriage counseling. He remarked:

My personal experience here in Sarajevo has been much 

richer than I expected. I was confident there would be lots 

of opportunities for ministry, but I didn’t expect the personal growth I’ve been able to enjoy. I typically strive 

to help others realize that life is all about relationships—

first, our relationship to God through Christ; second, our 

relationships with those we are closest to; and third, our 

interaction with the rest of humanity. . . . Personally, I am 

more thankful for my faith, for my wife, for my friends, 

for my country, etc., than I have been in a long time. . . .
95

As I interact more and more with men who’ve come to 

discuss struggles in their marriages, I’m reminded again 

how critical relationships are. At the root of all problems 

in human relationships is a problem in our relationship 

with God. As recently as yesterday, I again witnessed the 

transformation that takes place in a person’s heart and 

marriage as they commit to following God’s blueprint for 

this central area in our lives. It is truly a long, long road 

to complete healing, but I love the privilege of presenting 

God’s hope to those in pain. I am so thankful to know this 

hope myself and to model it as a Christian chaplain. 154

The only Army chaplain or chaplain assistant to write a full-length 

book on experiences in the Balkans was Chaplain (COL) Ronald Cobb. 

Serving as the senior chaplain in Bosnia in 2003 allowed Cobb to develop 

many interesting relationships with both Balkan clergy and NATO chaplains. Assigned to the 35th Infantry Division, Army National Guard, Cobb 

stated that when he arrived in Bosnia he found the ugly results of religious 

persecution of the Bosnian Islamic faith, the Croatian Roman Catholic 

faith, and the Serbian Orthodox faith. Cobb desired to serve US soldiers 

first, but also to serve the people of Bosnia through interacting with indigenous clergy and humanitarian projects.155

The year 2003 was a time of gruesome discoveries of mass grave sites 

in Bosnia. In the early and mid-1990s, mostly Serbian Orthodox soldiers 

imposed a genocide-type operation on Muslims. Cobb witnessed the discovery of hidden execution sites and mass graves and made the following 

comments related to the Potocari Cemetery:

The stench of death will never leave my mind when I 

think of all the mass graves whose bodies made up this 

large cemetery. Individual graves scattered throughout 

the Srebrenica, Bratunac, and Zvornik hills will never all 

be found. . . . Pictures of hundreds of bodies in the unrefrigerated morgue in Sarajevo waiting to be identified are 

permanently etched in my soul. I think of the many thousands of friends, children, spouses, parents, and grandparents waiting for someone who will never come home.156

Although Bosnia in 2003 was peaceful, the US military still considered 

the region a hostile fire zone. As with any deployment, soldiers away from 

loved ones will experience various crises and be in need of chaplain support. Adding to these normal stressors was the discovery of mass graves, 

creating a gloomy atmosphere for all. Throughout 2003, Cobb spoke about 
96

these stressors, taught classes to remedy the situation, and began developing plans for reunion and reintegration of soldiers to families at the end of 

the deployment. As Cobb said, 

The bottom line for me in Bosnia was focusing on the 

welfare of every single United States soldier for religious 

support, emotional support, counseling support, family 

support, and morale support. In Bosnia I saw significant 

soldier struggles and problems. There were depression 

and stress in the lives particularly of those soldiers doing 

heavy, dangerous tasks. . . . You can imagine the wide 

variety and many different mental and behavioral areas 

that young adults, within the confines of concertina wire, 

in a military cantonment area, can get into which could 

potentially harm themselves, other soldiers, and the general morale of the entire command.157

The focus of chaplains in Bosnia was always religious support. 

Hudson spoke of his spring 2003 ministry in Bosnia as “providing worship 

services at a number of locations in Bosnia and Hungary to include Taszar, 

Hungary, Eagle Base near Tuzla, and FOB Connor.” Hudson elaborated, “I 

was thrust into a more prophetic ministry at Eagle Base and FOB Connor 

when several task force chaplains were taken ill and had to be returned to 

the States. . . . With their departure I became the pastor for the General 

Protestant service at both Eagle Base and FOB Connor.” Reciting some 

of the religious support activities Hudson performed, he remarked, “I also 

conducted a Wednesday night Bible Study at Eagle Base and a Tuesday 

night Bible Study at FOB Connor. In addition I have held a weekly Tuesday 

lunchtime Bible Study at Eagle Base for the ASG and ASG-wide prayer 

breakfasts.”158

Benevolent-type humanitarian missions were normal expectations 

of chaplains in Bosnia. Huisjen at Camp Butmir near Sarajevo said he 

only occasionally did such missions, while Hudson remarked, “Our ASG 

adopted several refugee camps nearby. We collected and distributed articles that the people needed. We collected supplies for two schools . . . 

and some recreational supplies for the students. . . . We have also been 

involved with two orphanages.”159

Cobb participated in a memorial service for a US soldier who was 

killed in Bosnia in a traffic accident. In seeking to avoid a reckless speeding 

driver on a slick road, SPC Blake C. Kelly was killed and four others were 

slightly injured. Chaplain (CPT) Douglas Ball was the unit chaplain and 

quickly responded to the accident scene with medics and others. Kelly 
97

was a Roman Catholic lay Eucharistic minister and actively supported the 

chapel programs. Memorial services were held at Eagle Base and Camp 

McGovern, with a tearful Cobb stating that “nothing could fill the gap in 

the hearts of his friends and fellow soldiers from Nebraska.”160

In early 2003, the ASG chaplain in Bosnia, Hudson, summarized much 

of his ministry activities as being available to soldiers in an informal basis, 

being visible, available, and approachable. This meant he could develop 

helpful conversations in any number of situations, including before and 

after patrols. Hudson stated, “Since I spend quite a bit of time traveling around, primarily by NTV [nontactical vehicle], but occasionally by 

Blackhawk helicopter, I also saw these times as opportunities to bring the 

presence of Christ to bear in these situations.” Hudson was able to develop 

friendships with his translators and was happy to state that many soldiers 

who came to him for counseling did improve their situations.161

Cobb had an especially favorable experience in Bosnia. The chaplains 

that worked with him were the recipients of his praise. For example, he 

spoke of the Gospel Service Chaplain (MAJ) James Messer as an inspiring chaplain; he considered the Protestant service conducted by Ball as 

Figure 9. CH (LTC) F. Douglas Hudson and CA SFC Margarita Brunke

at the Grab Potok Refugee Camp, Bosnia.

7th ARCOM Public Affairs Office
98

outstanding; he appreciated the Latter Day Saint (LDS) (Mormon) lay 

leader, MAJ Lee Lacy, and supported the LDS activities; and he was especially thankful for his deputy command chaplain, LTC Donald Davidson. 

In reflecting back on working with these chaplains, it was not surprising 

for Cobb to state that he was blessed to know these chaplains and to serve 

with them far away from home. As far as Jewish services, Cobb stated:

Jewish religious support and worship was led twice on 

Eagle Base by Chaplain (COL) Ken Leinwand from the 

USAREUR. First Ken had a delightful Passover Seder 

Service where he explained in detail how the songs and 

events of that service were focused on Jewish children so 

that they would be more emotionally connected to their 

heritage. Later he returned for a luncheon with Jewish 

soldiers where his message was how Jews had been refugees for centuries in the context that SFOR-13 soldiers 

could understand because they were working in a land 

with many displaced persons.162

In 2004, United States involvement in Bosnia continued to downsize. 

FOBs were closed, task forces were minimized, bases were closed, and 

troops from all NATO countries were reduced. By late September 2004, 

there were 1,500 US troops in Bosnia, Croatia, and Hungary, a mere pittance of prior troop strength.163 The numbers of US troops in Bosnia continued to plummet, and by October 2005, there were only 250 US troops 

in Bosnia with two chaplains.164 The UMTs in Bosnia in 2004 and into 

2005 were Chaplain (LTC) William Stang, Chaplain (LTC) Eric Ebb, and 

chaplain assistants SFC James Lee and SSG Jason Brown. All were with 

the Army National Guard.

Stang, a Roman Catholic chaplain, arrived at Eagle Base, Tuzla, on 15 

March 2004 and served there until March 2005. Stang was present when 

the final SFOR mission was completed. Chaplain strength during 2004–

2005 was drastically cut in sequence to the rapidly declining numbers of 

soldiers stationed in Bosnia. As Stang stated, “I was blessed with a commander and staff that understood the need for religious support to soldiers. 

The commander’s emphasis removed many roadblocks. The commander 

also regularly attended religious services and promoted chaplain participation at all levels.” Ebb served as the deputy to Stang, creating a relationship that worked. Stang remarked, “My deputy chaplain [Ebb] did a fine 

job. He was put into his job 1 week before deployment. Besides being 

a very competent minister, he worked hard to learn his job, catch up on 

training, and respond to the tasks the command assigned. I appreciated his 
99

willingness to be part of a team, because that was the only way we could 

cover all of the tasks with just two chaplains.”165

Stang and Ebb were responsible for chaplain activities related to the 

closing of many chapels throughout SFOR and creating the job description for what replaced the SFOR missions, namely the new ENDURING 

MISSION chaplain position. Stang and Ebb were essentially responsible 

for working themselves out of their jobs, to facilitate a smooth transition 

as many US chaplain activities were passed to NATO chaplains or civilian 

agencies. Stang stated, “Part of our stated mission was to wind down our 

participation in nation building in order to promote the locals in performing these tasks. Soldiers did support several nongovernment agencies, 

schools, and orphanages. We also continued to advise local organizations 

on how they could function without our help.”166

The rapid downsizing of US involvement in Bosnia did not mean that 

soldiers still stationed in Bosnia lacked chaplain support. While Stang and 

Ebb were turning in chapel equipment and supplies and closing chapels, 

they also maintained an active ministry to the troops. There were religious 

retreats to Medjugorje, Srebrenica, and Sarajevo; briefings on suicide prevention and family reunions; contracting for Imams and Rabbis to meet 

specific religious needs; and maintaining the last religious services at the 

Eagle Base Chapel.

American enthusiasm surrounded the rapid downsizing of US troops 

in Bosnia.167 Yet doubts still lingered as to whether or not the Europeans 

could maintain the peace and rebuild nations in this war-torn region. 

Muslim extremists had infiltrated Bosnia, especially after the 11 September 

2001 attacks on America. Sarajevo had become a gathering place for Saudi 

Arabian Wahhabi missionaries, promoting an ultraradical Islam and antiWest extremism.168 Episodes of violence were minor and few. American 

leaders knew there was still work to do to bring peace to Bosnia, but it 

was no longer US work—the European Union (EU) was now in control. 

At the 24 November 2004 disestablishment ceremony for Task Force 

Eagle, General B.B. Bell, Commander of the US Army in Europe, said, 

“It’s appropriate now for the Army. That’s why we’re here today, as the 

last vestige of this great joint and combined force under NATO and under 

EUCOM, to finally disestablish the Army component of this joint, combined, magnificent team.”169

At one point, there were tens of thousands of US troops in Bosnia. 

The closing of base camps and consolidation of other facilities meant that 

by the spring of 2005 the entire former SFOR mission was reduced first 

to a downsized Eagle Base, two FOBs, and six widely scattered liaison 
100

houses. The SFOR designation was gone, having served as the nomenclature for 15 US troop rotations over a 10-year period. The now designated 

ENDURING MISSION was composed of only a few hundred US troops. 

The vast majority of chaplains who served in Bosnia from 1995 to 2005 

could repeat the summary comments of Stang, the last senior chaplain in 

Bosnia. He concluded:

I deployed to serve the soldiers and there were many 

opportunities to minister. This encouraged me because I 

could see the value of my efforts. I grew spiritually from 

working with such fine soldiers and learning so much 

more about two of the world’s major religions [Eastern 

Orthodoxy and Islam]. I became a better chaplain and 

Christian. . . . Several of our staff officers and NCOs 

commented that they didn’t realize that the Unit Ministry 

Teams could be so helpful to their missions. I hope to use 

my increased knowledge in training our next generation 

of . . . chaplains.170

After the conclusion of the SFOR mission and the subsequent decrease 

of US troops in Bosnia, only a minimal chaplain presence remained. Ebb 

and Stang had already departed when Chaplain (CPT) Stanley Allen 

arrived at Eagle Base, Bosnia. With no overlap with his predecessors, 

Figure 10. CH (LTC) Eric Ebb greets parishioners after a service at 

Eagle Base, Bosnia, 2004.

Eric Ebb
101

Allen came to Bosnia on 14 September and was scheduled to leave on 2 

December 2005. Assigned to the 101st Military Intelligence Battalion in 

Germany, Allen was attached to Eagle Base in Bosnia to fill the chaplain 

vacancy. Allen stated, “The only chapel still open in Bosnia is the one here 

at Eagle Base near Tuzla.” With no US Army chaplains to provide specific 

denominational religious services to assist Allen, he filled that vacancy 

with military chaplains from other nations. Allen commented, “I have a 

general Protestant service Sunday at 1000 hours, the chaplain from Finland 

has a Lutheran service on Sunday at 1800, and the Polish Catholic priest 

has Mass on Sunday at 1200 hours.” As the year 2005 concluded, Allen 

was the only US Army chaplain in Bosnia. He had no chaplain assistant 

support.171
102

Notes

1. Bill Clinton, My Life (New York: Alfred A. Knopf Publisher, 2005), 

510–512.

2. Madeline Albright, Madam Secretary: A Memoir (New York: Miramax 

Books, 2003), 226.

3. Ibid., 233.

4. Wesley Clark, Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Future of 

Conflict (New York: PublicAffairs Books, 2001), 50.

5. For an exhaustive study on Srebrenica, see Jan W. Honig and Norbert 

Both, Srebrenica: Record of a War Crime (New York: Penguin Books, 1997). 

6. Clark, Waging Modern War, 51.

7. Statement by Secretary of Defense William J. Perry. “On the Deployment 

of U.S. Troops with the Bosnia Peace Implantation Force.” Delivered to the House 

Committee on International Relations, 30 November 1995.

8. Albright, Madam Secretary, 239.

9. Clark, Waging Modern War, 33, 35, 37.

10. Albright, Madam Secretary, 234–237.

11. Michael A. Warren, The United States Army Reserve in Operation Joint 

Endeavor: Mobilization and Deployment (Atlanta: US Army Reserve Command 

Historian, June 1996), vol. I, 12.

12. Chaplain (COL) Henry Wake (Retired), interview by Dr. John Brinsfield, 

4 March 2004.

13. Questionnaire by SFC Deborah Peek, 20 May 2005.

14. Questionnaire by Chaplain (CPT) Marvin Luckie, 13 April 2005.

15. Chaplain (LTC) Scott McChrystal, interview by Dr. John Brinsfield, 3 

March 2004.

16. J.F.O. McAllister, “Uncertain Beacon,” TIME Magazine, 27 November 

1995, 39. 

17. George J. Church, “Divided by Hate,” TIME Magazine, 18 December 

1995, 3, 52, 54.

18. Chaplain (CPT) Jeff Giannola, interview by author, 5 August 1997.

19. Questionnaire by SSG Dae Lee, 27 January 2005.

20. Questionnaire by Chaplain (CPT) Brent Causey, 13 April 2005.

21. Warren, The US Army Reserve in Operation Joint Endeavor, 20.

22. Paul Glasters, “In the Twilight Zone,” U.S. News & World Report, 18 

December 1995, 44–45.

23. Chaplain (MAJ) Chet Lanious, interview by author, 27 July 2005.

24. William W. Hartzog, American Military Heritage (Washington, DC: 

Center of Military History, 2001), 244–245.

25. Peek questionnaire.

26. McChrystal interview, 2–3.

27. Ibid., 4.

28. Chaplain (CPT) David Brown, interview by author, 27 July 2005.

29. Lanious interview.
103

30. Dae J. Lee questionnaire.

31. Lanious interview.

32. William Matthews, “Clinton: Bosnia a Defining Moment,” Army Times, 

1 January 1996, 3. 

33. William J. Perry, “U.S. in Bosnia,” The Officer, January 1996, 17.

34. Statistics provided by the US Army Combat Readiness Center, 18 May 

2005.

35. “Dead GI was Grad of Lamar High,” Houston Chronicle, www.chron.

com, 23 March 1996.

36. McChrystal interview, 3.

37. Chaplain (MAJ) Jay Hartranft, interview by author, 6 August 1997.

38. Chaplain Jay Hartranft, correspondence with author, 7 June 2004.

39. McChrystal interview, 6.

40. Ibid., 3.

41. Wake interview, 8. 

42. McChrystal interview, 7. 

43. John M. Shalikashvili, “Initial Posture Statement, 12 February 1997,” 

Selected Speeches, Testimony, and Interviews by General John M. Shalikashvili, 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Washington, DC: US Government Printing 

Office, 1998), 188.

44. Stacy Sullivan, “Serb Forces Cut Contacts with NATO,” Washington 

Post, 9 February 1996, 1.

45. Kevin Dougherty, “Three Soldiers Injured in Snowy Tuzla Area,” 

European Stars & Stripes, 9 February 1996, 1.

46. Bob Djurdjevic, “Bosnia: What’s the Full Truth,” Wall Street Journal, 9 

February 1996, 15.

47. Rick Atkinson, “Warriors Without a War: U.S. Peacekeepers in Bosnia 

Adjusting to New Tasks: Arbitration, Bluff, Restraint,” The Washington Post, 14 

April 1996, A-1. 

48. Giannola interview.

49. Ibid.

50. Kenneth Lawson, AGC Chaplains in Operations Other Than War

(Taylors, SC: Associated Gospel Churches, 1998), 30–31.

51. Luckie questionnaire.

52. Peek questionnaire.

53. Gregory Katz, “Bosnians Say Serbs Must Free Slave Labor Camps,” The 

Patriot News [Harrisburg, PA], 18 January 1996, A-9. 

54. Harry Summers, “Storm Clouds Over Two Bosnian Fronts,” Washington 

Times, 1 February 1996, 17.

55. Jim Hoagland, “On the Wagon in Bosnia,” Washington Post, 1 February 

1996, 18.

56. Scott McChrystal and Marv Wooten, “How a Rock Band Saved Task 

Force Eagle (Well, Sort Of),” The Army Chaplaincy, Spring 1999, 43–44. 

57. Dae J. Lee questionnaire.

58. Questionnaire by SFC Wyman Loveless, 13 October 2004.
104

59. Chaplain David Zalis, interview by author, 4 May 2005.

60. Mike O’Connor, “For U.S. Troops, Bosnia Seems to be a Healthy Place,” 

The New York Times, 3 July 1996, 1. 

61. Ibid.

62. Causey questionnaire.

63. Ibid.

64. Ibid.

65. Questionnaire by SSG James Nelson, 16 August 2005. 

66. Ibid.

67. Dusan Stojanovic, “100,000 Protest Milosevic’s Rule,” The Patriot News

[Harrisburg, PA], 26 November 1996, A-7.

68. Clark, Waging Modern War, 27, 206, 220, 263, 265, 292.

69. Albright, Madam Secretary, 262, 317, 335–338.

70. Wake interview.

71. Chaplain David Hicks and Chaplain Phil Hill, interview by Dr. John 

Brinsfield, 3 March 2004.

72. Chaplain Charles Howell, correspondence with author, 7 June 2004.

73. Chaplain Charles Howell, interview by Dr. John Brinsfield, 10 December 

2003.

74. Ibid.

75. “U.S. Troops in Hungary,” Washington Times, 30 January 1996, 16.

76. Greg Spencer, “No Reservations,” The Budapest Sun, 28 November–4 

December 1996, 1.

77. Questionnaire by Chaplain (CPT) Scott Sterling, 15 March 2005.

78. Loveless questionnaire.

79. Sean D. Taylor, “Readiness is in the Eye of the Beholder,” Army Times, 

17 February 1997, 18, 30.

80. Shalikashvili, “Initial Posture Statement, 12 February 1997.” Selected 

Speeches, 187–188. 

81. Chaplain Hank Steinhilber, interview by Dr. John Brinsfield, 9 December 

2003.

82. Steve Szasz, “The Chaplain’s Chapters: A Monthly Letter Containing 

Information and Inspiration for Family and Friends,” 27 September 1996.

83. Ibid., 16 November 1996.

84. Chaplain Steve Szasz, interview by author, 29 August 2005.

85. Questionnaire by Chaplain (MAJ) Michael Metcalf, 13 April 2005.

86. Questionnaire by Chaplain (CPT) Keith Belz, 6 August 1999.

87. Questionnaire by Chaplain (CPT) Patrick Appleget, 16 August 2005.

88. “Croat Police Blamed in Attack on Muslims,” Washington Post, 27 

February 1997, A-24.

89. “Bosnia Civilians Rain Stones on American Troops,” Rocky Mountain 

News, 28 August 1997, 46A.

90. “Rock-Hurling Serbs End Their Anti-NATO Rampage,” The Deseret 

News (Utah), 29 August 1997, A-4.
105

91. “Eighteen U.S. Soldiers Decorated for Restraint Facing Mobs,” The 

Record (New Jersey), 30 August 1997, A-12.

92. Questionnaire by SGM Pamela Neal, 15 June 2004.

93. Questionnaire by SSG Yolanda Jackson, 15 June 2004. 

94. Chaplain (COL) Janet Horton, interview by Dr. John Brinsfield, 3 March 

2004.

95. Szasz, “The Chaplain’s Chapters,” 28 December 1996.

96. Questionnaire by Chaplain (CPT) Steve Firtko, 15 August 1999.

97. Questionnaire by Chaplain (MAJ) Jay Hartranft, 10 August 2000.

98. “Dear GI: Letters will Brighten Christmas in Bosnia,” St. Louis PostDispatch, 15 December 1997, 2.

99. “On Bosnia: Messages in Clinton Visit Should be Heeded,” Houston 

Chronicle, 24 December 1997, 18.

100. “Dealing with Bosnia War Criminals,” Washington Post, 24 December 

1997, A-12.

101. Albright, Madam Secretary, 489, 493.

102. “Milosevic May Intervene in Bosnia,” Chicago Tribune, 28 August 

1997, 24.

103. Clark, Waging Modern War, 66, 68.

104. Questionnaire by SSG James Johnson, 22 October 2004.

105. Chaplain (MAJ) Jerry Moates, interview by author, 14 June 2004.

106. Robert L. McClure and Morton Orlov II, “Is the UN Peacekeeping Role 

in Eclipse?” Parameters, Autumn 1999, 98, 101.

107. Steinhilber interview.

108. US Army Field Manual (FM) 41-10, Civil Affairs Operations

(Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1993), 1-1.

109. Jeffery A. Jacobs, “Civil Affairs in Peace Operations,” Military Review, 

July–August 1998, 11.

110. Questionnaire by Chaplain (LTC) Frank Wismer, 4 October 2004.

111. Ibid.

112. Questionnaire by Chaplain (CPT) Lonnie L. Locke III, 25 July 2004.

113. Questionnaire by Chaplain (CPT) Philip Smiley, 10 June 2004.

114. Questionnaire by MSG Chris Patterson, 16 August 2004.

115. Ibid.

116. Hartranft questionnaire.

117. Chaplain (CPT) Steven Mark Jones, interview by author, 21 June 2004.

118. Chaplain (MAJ) Erik Erkkinen, “After Action Report for SFOR-4,” 15 

May 1999.

119. James L. Cairns, “Meanwhile in Bosnia: The Region was Forgotten 

during the NATO-Yugoslavian Conflict, 1999,” Christian Century, 14 July 1999, 

www.findarticles.com. 

120. Questionnaire by Chaplain (CPT) Alva R. Bennett, 20 May 2005.

121. Chaplain (CPT) Peter Strong and SPC Phillip Fortner, “After Action 

Report—Camp Demi,” 18 March 1999.
106

122. Erkkinen, “After Action Report.”

123. Questionnaire by Chaplain (CPT) Brad Baumann, 25 July 2005.

124. Ibid.

125. Questionnaire by Chaplain (CPT) Terrance Kesling, 11 February 2005. 

126. Chaplain Rajmund Kopec, interview by Dr. John Brinsfield, 9 December 

2003.

127. Neal questionnaire. 

128. Questionnaire by Chaplain (CPT) Joseph Blay, 5 August 2004.

129. Questionnaire by Chaplain (MAJ) David Crary, 9 June 2004.

130. Ibid.

131. Steven Lee Myers, “Army Will Give National Guard the Entire U.S. 

Role in Bosnia,” The New York Times, 5 December, 2000, 1.

132. Questionnaire by Chaplain (CPT) Ronald Cooper, 19 May 2005.

133. Chaplain Michael Lembke, Greetings from Bosnia, Family and Friends

(self-published, 2001), 65. 

134. Alexander A.C. Gerry, “Bosnia and Herzegovina: Questioning the 

Dayton Agreement,” The Officer, June 2001, www.findarticles.com.

135. Chaplain (LTC) Vernon Chandler, interview by author, 29 July 2004.

136. Questionnaire by SFC Lucinda Flowers, 29 July 2004.

137. Chandler interview.

138. Ibid.

139. Sean D. Naylor, “Routing out Terrorism in Bosnia,” The Army Times,

10 December 2001, 12.

140. Questionnaire by Chaplain (CPT) Sean Wead, 20 July 2005.

141. Ibid.

142. Kopec interview.

143. Questionnaire by Chaplain (MAJ) Alvin Shrum, 9 September 2004. 

The lack of ministry integration by the Indiana Army National Guard UMT was 

indicative of the tension between this particular National Guard unit and the 

larger task force. Simply stated, the commander of this Indiana National Guard 

unit wanted his soldiers under his supervision on his compound, and any outside 

activities were discouraged. This was the exception, as most National Guard units 

fully and successfully integrated with their Active Duty partners. 

144. Ibid.

145. Questionnaire by SGT David Lee, 5 August 2005.

146. Questionnaire by Chaplain (CPT) William Wehlage, 25 July 2005.

147. Chaplain Kenneth Lawson, unpublished diary, notations from 8–12 May 

2002. A copy is available at the US Army Chaplain Center and School Library, 

Fort Jackson, SC.

148. “Risks Remain in Bosnia-Herzegovina—News Watch,” International 

Travel News, August 2002.

149. Kopec interview.

150. P.H. Liotta and Cindy R. Jebb, “Macedonia: End of the Beginning or 

Beginning of the End?” Parameters, Spring 2002, 96.
107

151. Vince Crawley, “Should we Stay or Should we Go?” Army Times, 22 

July 2002, 10. 

152. Correspondence from Chaplain F. Doug Hudson to Chaplain Gregg 

Drew, 16 March 2003. 

153. Questionnaire by Chaplain (CPT) Matthew Huisjen, 1 November 

2003.

154. Ibid.

155. Ronald L. Cobb, Memories of Bosnia: The 35th Division’s SFOR13 

NATO Peacekeeping Mission (Bloomington, IN: AuthorHouse Publishers, 2004), 

vii–viii.

156. Ibid., 57–58.

157. Ibid., 81–84.

158. Correspondence, Hudson to Drew.

159. Jon Dahms, “7th Army Reserve Command Chaplains Complete Historic 

Ministry,” US Army Reserve News Service, 5 May 2003. 

160. Cobb, Memories of Bosnia, 114.

161. Correspondence, Hudson to Drew.

162. Cobb, Memories of Bosnia, 92. 

163. Army Times, 27 September 2004, 5.

164. Ibid., 17 October 2005, 7.

165. Questionnaire by Chaplain William J. Stang, 2 February 2005.

166. Ibid.

167. “U.S. Troops End Mission in Bosnia,” The State [Columbia, SC], 25 

November 2004, A-20.

168. Stephen Swartz, “The Failure of Europe in Bosnia and the Continuing 

Infiltration of Islamic Extremists,” The Weekly Standard, 20 June 2005, 17. 

169. Jason Austin, “Task Force Eagle Leaving Bosnia,” Army Public Affairs

Press Release, 23 November 2004, 1.

170. Stang questionnaire.

171. Questionnaire by Chaplain (CPT) Stanley Allen, 1 November 2005.

109

Chapter 4

The Kosovo Theater of Operations

Background to Contemporary Hostilities in Kosovo

Since the time of the NATO and United States invasion of Bosnia 

in 1995–96, the nearby region of Kosovo had been a hotspot for rising 

Balkan tensions. Several hours drive from the closest point in Bosnia, 

Kosovo has maintained its own ethnic uniqueness and cultural autonomy. 

Kosovo has for centuries desired to be its own independent nation, free 

from Yugoslavian or Serbian influence. With an Albanian Muslim heritage, 

Kosovars see themselves as the historic people of the land of Kosovo.1

Like Bosnia, Kosovo has a tortured history dating from at least medieval 

times in the era of Muslim–Byzantine warfare.

Modern Kosovo has only existed as a political or territorial entity since 

1945. Before then, Italian-occupied Albania, Serbia, Montenegro, the 

Ottoman Empire, the Byzantine Empire, Bulgaria, and the Roman Empire 

partially or entirely ruled Kosovo territory. Some have suggested that 

Kosovo has been a single distinctive region since ancient times, but this 

is strongly contradicted by archaeological findings and historic records.2

Nor has Kosovo’s population been ethnically consistent over the years: 

the province’s complex ethnic map has included Latinos, Turks, Roma, 

Gorani (Slavic Muslims), Circassians, and Jews in addition to Serbs and 

Albanians.

The Kosovo region lay on the outer fringes of the Byzantine Empire 

and directly in the path of Slav expansion. From the 850s until about 1014, 

Bulgaria ruled Kosovo. The forceful emperor Basil, the Bulgar Slayer, subsequently reasserted Byzantine control. Serbia at this time did not exist; a 

number of small Slav kingdoms lay to the north and west of Kosovo, of 

which Raška (Rascia, central modern Serbia) and Dioclea (Montenegro

and northern Albania) were the strongest. In the 1180s, the Serbian ruler 

Stefan Nemanja seized control of Dioclea and parts of Kosovo. His successor (also called Stefan) took control of the rest of Kosovo by 1216, 

creating a state that incorporated most of modern Serbia-Montenegro. 

This was a period when Greek Orthodox bishops greatly influenced the 

local populations, with a type of Hellenization occurring throughout the 

region.3

During the rule of the Nemanjić dynasty, many Serbian Orthodox

churches and monasteries were built throughout Serbian territory, particularly Kosovo, which became the economic, demographic, religious, and 
110

political heartland. The Nemanjić rulers alternatively used both Prizren 

and Pristina as their capitals. Large estates were given to Serbian monasteries in Metohia (which included parts of Albania and Montenegro), for 

which the area earned the designation Metohia or “monastic land.” The 

most prominent churches in Kosovo—the Patriarchate at Pec, the church 

at Gračanica, and the monastery at Visoki Dečani near Dečani—were all 

founded during this period. Kosovo was economically important, as the 

modern Kosovo capital of Pristina was a major trading center on routes 

leading to ports on the Adriatic Sea.

4

Ethnic identity in the Middle Ages was somewhat fluid throughout 

Europe and people at that time did not appear to have defined themselves 

rigidly by ethnic group. About all that can be said for sure is that Serbs 

appear to have been the dominant population culturally, and were probably a demographic majority as well. In 1355, the Serbian state fell apart 

on the death of Tsar Stefan Dušan and dissolved into squabbling fiefdoms. 

The Ottoman Empire took the opportunity to exploit Serbian weakness 

and invaded, meeting the Serbian army on the field of Kosovo Polje on 

28 June 1389. The Battle of Kosovo ended in the deaths of both Serbian 

Prince Lazar and Ottoman Sultan Murad I. Although the battle has been 

mythologized as a great Serbian defeat, at that time opinion was divided as 

to whether it was a Serbian defeat, a stalemate, or even a Serbian victory. 

For centuries, the battle of Kosovo has been a source of patriotic passion 

for Serbs against Muslims.5 Serbia maintained its independence and sporadic control of Kosovo until a final defeat in 1455, when it became part 

of the Ottoman Empire.

The territory of today’s Kosovo Province was for centuries ruled by 

the Ottoman Empire. Despite the imposition of Muslim rule, large numbers of Christians continued to live and sometimes even prosper under 

the Ottomans. A process of Islamization began shortly after the beginning of Ottoman rule, but it took a considerable amount of time—at least 

a century—and was concentrated at first on rural towns. It appears that 

many Christian inhabitants converted directly to Islam rather than being 

replaced by Muslims from outside Kosovo. A large part of the reason for 

the conversion was probably economic and social, as Muslims had considerably more rights and privileges than Christians. Christian religious life 

nonetheless continued with churches largely left alone by the Ottomans, 

but both the Orthodox and Catholic churches and their congregations suffered from high levels of taxation.

In 1689, the Ottoman-Habsburg war (1683–99)—one of the pivotal 

events in Serbian national mythology—greatly disrupted Kosovo. In 

October 1689, a small Austrian force under Margrave Ludwig of Baden
111

breached into Turkish territory and reached as far as Kosovo, following 

their earlier capture of Belgrade. Many Serbs and Albanians pledged their 

loyalty to the Austrians, some joining Ludwig’s army. This was by no means 

a universal reaction; many other Serbs and Albanians fought alongside the 

Ottomans to resist the Austrian advance. A massive Ottoman counterattack 

the following summer drove the Austrians back to their fortress at Nis, 

then back to Belgrade, and finally back across the Danube to Austria.

6

 This 

incident produced numerous refugees, brought atrocities against civilians 

by their neighbors, and caused great disruption with the already fragile 

Ottoman control of the Balkans.7 The Ottoman offensive was accompanied by savage reprisals and looting, prompting many Serbs—including 

Arsenije III, Patriarch of the Serbian Orthodox Church—to flee along 

with the Austrians. This event has been immortalized in Serbian history 

as the Velika Seoba or “Great Migration.” It is traditionally said to have 

accounted for a huge exodus of hundreds of thousands of Serbian refugees 

from Kosovo and Serbia proper, which left a vacuum filled by a flood of 

Albanian immigrants. Arsenije himself wrote of 30,000 souls (i.e., individuals) who fled with him to Austria, a figure confirmed by other sources.8

In the late 19th century, with the weakening of the Ottoman Empire 

independence movements arose within Kosovo. In 1878, one of the four 

vilayets (provinces) with Albanian inhabitants that formed the League of 

Prizren was the Vilayet of Kosovo. The League’s purpose was to resist 

both Ottoman rule and incursions by the newly emerging Balkan nations. 

In 1910, an Albanian organized insurrection broke out in Pristina and soon 

spread to the entire vilayet of Kosovo, lasting for 3 months. The Ottoman 

Sultan visited Kosovo in June 1911 during peace settlement talks covering 

all Albanian-inhabited areas. Following the First Balkan War of 1912, the 

Treaty of London in May 1913 internationally recognized Kosovo as part 

of Serbia and Metohia. In 1918, Serbia became part of the newly formed 

Kingdom of Yugoslavia. The influence of the Ottoman Turks was gone, 

allowing lands lost to Serbs since medieval times to be regained.9

Between the two world wars, the Yugoslavian government tried to 

evacuate the Albanian population from Kosovo and Macedonia. Albanian 

Kosovars were sent to Turkey and Albania with Serbs transplanted 

to colonize Kosovo with a Serbian population. On 7 March 1937, a 

memorandum titled “Expulsion of the Albanians” was presented to the 

Yugoslavian government from the Serbian Academy. The 1941 and 1945 

partitions of Yugoslavia by the Axis Powers awarded most of Kosovo to 

the Italian-occupied Greater Albania, and smaller parts of it to Germanoccupied Serbia and Bulgaria. During the occupation, armed Albanian 

groups, notably the Vulnetari militia, expelled thousands of Kosovo 
112

Serbs. It is still not known exactly how many fell victim to this forced 

displacement, but Serbian estimates put the figures at 10,000 to 40,000 

killed with 70,000 to 100,000 expelled.10

Following the end of World War II and the establishment of Tito’s 

communist regime, in 1946 Kosovo was granted the status of an autonomous region of Serbia and in 1963 became an autonomous province. 

The communist government did not permit the return of many of the Serb 

refugees. With the passing of the 1974 Yugoslavia constitution, Kosovo 

gained virtual self-government. The province’s government then applied 

Albanian curriculum to Kosovo’s schools; they obtained and used surplus 

and obsolete non-communist textbooks. Life in Kosovo under communism had an emphasis on brotherhood and unity, with the objections by 

Serbs to gaining Kosovar influence being suppressed by Tito’s demand 

for unity within Yugoslavia.11

Throughout the 1980s, tensions between the Albanian and Serb communities in the Kosovo province escalated. The Muslim Albanian community favored greater autonomy for Kosovo, while Eastern Orthodox Serbs 

favored closer ties with the rest of Serbia. There was little appetite for 

unification with Albania itself, which was still ruled by a Stalinist government and had considerably worse living standards than Kosovo. Serbs living in Kosovo complained of being discriminated against by the provincial 

government, notably by the local law enforcement authorities failing to 

punish reported crimes against Serbs. The increasingly bitter atmosphere 

in Kosovo meant that even minor frictions could become major incidents. 

Perhaps the most politically explosive complaint leveled by the Kosovo 

Serbs was that the communist authorities in Belgrade were neglecting 

them. Adding fuel to the fire of tensions at this time was the so-called 

Paracin Massacre where an apparently deranged soldier from their unit 

killed several Serb soldiers, an incident that Belgrade widely misreported 

as a large-scale attack by Albanians against Serbs.12

In August 1987, during the dying days of Yugoslavia’s communist 

regime, Milosevic visited Kosovo.13 He appealed to Serb nationalism to 

further his career. Having drawn huge crowds to a rally commemorating 

the Battle of Kosovo, he pledged to Kosovo Serbs, “No one should dare to 

beat you.” He became an instant hero. By the end of the year, Milosevic 

was in legitimate control of the expanding Serbian government.

In 1989, a Serbia-wide referendum drastically reduced the autonomy 

of Kosovo and the northern province of Vojvodina. The referendum implemented a new constitution that allowed a multiparty system, introduced 

freedom of speech, and supposedly promoted human rights. In practice, it 
113

was subverted by Milosevic’s government, which resorted to rigging elections, controlling much of the news media, and was accused of abusing 

the human rights of its opponents and national minorities. Civilian protests 

against government corruption led to dozens of deaths. The referendum 

significantly reduced the provinces’ rights, permitting the government of 

Serbia to exert direct control over many previously autonomous areas of 

governance, including Kosovo. In particular, the constitutional changes 

handed control of the police, the court system, the economy, the education 

system, and the language policies to the Serbian government.14

Map 5. A 2000 map of Kosovo.

US Central Intelligence Agency
114

Many of Serbia’s national minorities, who saw it as a means of imposing ethnically based centralized rule on the provinces, strongly opposed 

the new constitution. Kosovo’s Albanians refused to participate in the referendum, portraying it as illegitimate. As it was a Serbia-wide referendum 

and Albanians were a minority in Serbia, their participation would not 

have changed the outcome of the referendum. The provincial governments 

also opposed the new constitution. It had to be ratified by their assemblies, 

which effectively meant voting for their dissolution. Kosovo’s assembly 

initially opposed the constitution but in March 1989, when the assembly 

met to discuss the proposals, Yugoslavian tanks and armored cars surrounded the meeting place, forcing the delegates to accept the amendments. By the end of the month, over 20 people were killed and a curfew 

was imposed.

The constitutional changes dissolved the parliaments of all Yugoslavian 

republics and provinces, which until then had leaders only from the 

Communist Party of Yugoslavia, and held multiparty elections. Kosovo 

Albanians refused to participate in the elections and instead held their own 

unsanctioned elections. Because election laws required turnout higher 

than 50 percent, the parliament of Kosovo was not established. The new 

Serbian constitution abolished the individual provinces’ official media, 

integrating them with the official media of Serbia while retaining some programs in the Albanian language; suppressed the Albanian-language media 

in Kosovo; withdrew funding from state-owned media, including that in 

the Albanian language in Kosovo; and banned state-owned Albanian language television or radio from broadcasting from Kosovo. Serbian secret 

police intimidated the people. Kosovar Albanian police were ineffective as 

Yugoslavian-Serbian security forces imposed conformity amidst various 

incidents of abuse and harassment.15

The new Serbian constitution also transferred control of state-owned 

Kosovar companies to the Serbian government. In September 1990, up to 

123,000 Albanian workers were fired from their positions in government 

and the media, as were teachers, doctors, and workers in governmentcontrolled industries. This provoked a general strike and mass unrest. 

Some of those not fired quit in sympathy, refusing to work for the Serbian 

government. Although the government claimed it was simply getting rid 

of old communist directors, the firings were widely seen as a purge of 

ethnic Albanians. The old Albanian educational curriculum and textbooks 

were revoked and new ones were created. The curriculum was (and still 

is, as that is the curriculum used for Albanians in Serbia outside Kosovo) 

the same as the Serbian curriculum and that of all other nationalities in 

Serbia except that it contained education on and in the Albanian language. 
115

Education in Albanian was withdrawn in 1992 and reestablished in 1994. 

Pristina University, the center of Kosovo Albanian cultural identity, 

abolished education in the Albanian language and fired Albanian teachers 

en masse. Albanians responded by boycotting state schools and setting up 

an unofficial parallel system of Albanian-language education.16

What they saw as an attack on their rights outraged Kosovar Albanians. 

There was mass rioting and unrest from Albanians as well as outbreaks 

of intercommunal violence. In February 1990, a state of emergency was 

declared, and the presence of the Yugoslav army and police was significantly increased to quell the unrest. Unsanctioned elections were held 

in 1992, which overwhelmingly elected Ibrahim Rugova as president of 

a self-declared Republic of Kosovo. However, these elections were not 

recognized by the Serbian government or by any foreign government. In 

1995, thousands of Serb refugees from Croatia settled in Kosovo, which 

further worsened relations between the two communities.

Historic Albanian opposition to the sovereignty of Yugoslavia and 

especially Serbia had previously surfaced in rioting (1968 and March 

1981) in the capital Pristina. In 1995, Ibrahim Rugova advocated nonviolent resistance. Later when it became apparent that this was not working, opposition took the form of separatist agitation by political opposition 

groups and after 1996 armed action by the clandestine Kosovo liberation 

army. By this time, the former nation of Yugoslavia was in chaos. Years of 

ethnic tensions and religious antagonism had degenerated into local acts of 

intimidation, violence, and even genocide, forcing the United States and 

NATO into military action.

From 1996 through 1999 the United States, the United Nations, 

NATO, and the European community were unable to create an acceptable 

intervention plan for Kosovo. Meanwhile, thousands of ethnic Albanian 

Muslims were victims of widespread and increasing atrocities.

Preparations for the First US Army Chaplains to Arrive in Kosovo

The United States’ commitment to military intervention in Kosovo 

was slow to develop. By 1998, the momentum to send US troops to the 

region became virtually irresistible. Nevertheless, recent lessons learned in 

Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia created a passive resistance to deploying more 

US troops into another internal Balkans dispute. The mission in nearby 

Bosnia, stated in 1995 to last only 1 year, was nowhere near completion. 

In 1998, US Secretary of State Albright attributed the eventual US military 
116

intervention in Kosovo to one source—the familiar adversary Slobodan 

Milosevic. Having previously considered Milosevic a brute, a ruthless 

opportunist, and a man of great cruelty, his agenda of terror in Kosovo 

infuriated Albright.17 In her memoirs, Albright states that the primary mistake made by Milosevic that prompted the United States toward military 

intervention in Kosovo was the massacre in and around the small town of 

Prekaz. Albright stated:

Kosovo was extremely tense but not at war. After the 

1995 Dayton Accords were signed, however, the situation began to heat up further. Kosovo’s Albanians looked 

around and saw that the Bosnians, Croats, Slovenes, and 

Macedonians had all left Yugoslavia to form independent 

states. The Albanians shared the same ambitions, but the 

Dayton Accords did nothing for them. Many grew inpatient with the denial of their rights and appeals for patience 

from civilian leaders. . . . From sources in the region, we 

received word in January 1998 that Milosevic was preparing to respond with a crackdown. . . .

In late February and early March [1998] around the small 

town of Prekaz, in the Yugoslavian province of Kosovo, 

Serb paramilitary units stormed through ethnic Albanian 

villages, killing scores of people. Whole families were 

burned alive in their homes. Women, children, and the 

elderly were among the victims; thousands of people fled. 

It was the worst violence in the province since World War 

II. . . .

Prior to the Prekaz massacre, Yugoslav authorities had 

assured our chief Balkans negotiator, Ambassador Robert 

Gelbard that they would respond with restraint to any 

attacks. Obviously they had lied. . . .18

As far back as Christmas 1992, President George H.W. Bush informed 

Milosevic that the United States would be prepared militarily if the Serbs 

initiated an armed conflict in Kosovo. Three weeks after Clinton took 

office in 1993, he reaffirmed that warning. As US attention in the Balkans 

in the 1990s focused on Bosnia, Albright warned that rising tensions in 

Kosovo had implications for all of Europe. She stated, “We had to approve 

concrete measures that would expand our leverage over Belgrade. That 

was how Milosevic had been brought to the table at Dayton, and that was 

the only language he would respond to now.”19 In contrast, the Defense 

Department was initially resisting another Balkans mission. In late spring 
117

1998, when Milosevic stepped up helicopter strikes and ordered the burning of villages in Kosovo, the United States went to NATO looking for 

military support. Meanwhile, the United States and NATO sent troops to 

Macedonia and Albania to discourage the spread of violence. Aggressive 

military planning began with the threefold intention of keeping the conflict from spreading, planning air strikes in case Serb atrocities would not 

cease, and coordinating a potential peace implementation force to enter 

Kosovo after a political settlement was reached.20

The senior US military officer with knowledge of Kosovo was Clark. 

As the NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Clark was the top military 

officer over NATO and US forces in Europe. All plans of potential military 

intervention in Kosovo went through Clark for refinement or approval. In 

1998, as war in Kosovo seemed likely, Clark outlined his goals as follows: 

“Get Milosevic to agree to a cease-fire; to halt the fighting; and to comply 

with the terms of the Security Council Resolution 1199. In this resolution 

was the requirement that the Serbs withdraw the additional forces that had 

moved into Kosovo after February 1998.”21

Clark had the difficult job of balancing all the unique concerns of individual NATO countries with a vacillating US policy in the Balkans. In addition, he had to manage the legitimate concerns of Kosovo’s neighbors who 

feared an escalation of hostilities could overflow into their countries, namely 

Macedonia and Albania. Through late 1998, Serbian troops under Milosevic 

infiltrated Kosovo and continued a campaign of terror, ethnic cleansing, and 

stabilization of military fortifications with Serbian soldiers and paramilitary 

forces committing violent deprecations on Kosovar civilians.

A deadly chess game ensued between Serbian forces and the small 

number of NATO peacekeeping troops and civilian UN observers sent to 

Kosovo. Peace negotiators met in Rambouillet, France, on 23 February 

1999. At the end of more than 2 weeks of intense efforts, they attempted to 

reach an agreement on substantial autonomy for Kosovo while respecting 

the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of 

Yugoslavia. As peace negotiations proceeded, Serbian troops repositioned 

themselves to deceive NATO representatives, only to continue their campaign of terror in other locations. Deceit and manipulation by Milosevic’s 

forces dragged negotiations into early 1999. By 20 March 1999, international television networks were reporting live media coverage of Albanian 

refugees streaming barefoot in the mud and snow from the recently looted 

village of Srbica. On 24 March 1999, NATO forces under the command 

of Clark began an extensive bombing campaign against Serbian forces in 

and around Kosovo.
118

Much of the world watched in amazement and trepidation as the 

first-ever use of a combative military force by NATO was unleashed on 

Kosovo. Designated as Operation ALLIED FORCE, the NATO goals of 

the air strikes were explicit. Air strikes would be pursued until President 

Milosevic:

● Ensures a verifiable stop to all military action and 

the immediate ending of violence and oppression.

● Ensures the withdrawal from Kosovo of the military, police, and paramilitary forces.

● Agrees to the stationing in Kosovo of an international military presence.

● Agrees to the unconditional and safe return of all 

refugees and displaced persons and unhindered access to 

them by humanitarian aid organizations.

● Provides credible assurance of his willingness to 

work on the basis of the Rambouillet Accords in the establishment of a political framework agreement for Kosovo 

in conformity with international law and the Charter of 

the United Nations.22

The bombing campaign against Serb forces lasted from 24 March 

through 20 June 1999. A few temporary lulls in the bombing were 

achieved during that time based on the work of negotiators, none of which 

produced lasting peace. On 15 April 1999, US Secretary of Defense 

William Cohen stated the objectives of Operation ALLIED FORCE as 

follows: “Our military objective is to degrade and damage the military and 

security structure that President Milosevic (Yugoslav President) has used 

to depopulate and destroy the Albanian majority in Kosovo.”23 As far as 

the actual military tactics employed by NATO and US forces involved in 

the bombing, Clark stated:

In the first place, we were going to execute two operations 

plans simultaneously, the first of which was the Phased 

Air Operation and the second of which was the Limited 

Air Operation. Both plans had been approved through the 

NATO approval process. While the Phased Air Operation 

called for a first phase limited to the enemy’s air defense 

system and any deployed forces in Kosovo, it also provided authority to strike the air defense system throughout 

Yugoslavia. There were no off-limits areas. The Limited 

Air Operation, on the other hand, gave us the authority to 

strike headquarters, forces, and facilities in and around 
119

Kosovo that were connected to the forces that had perpetrated the ethnic cleansing or some other incident.24

As the 24 March 1999 air strikes were about to begin, Clark developed 

some “measures of merit” to help him and his staff evaluate the success of 

the bombing campaign. “The first measure of merit,” Clark stated, “is not to 

lose aircraft, minimize the loss of aircraft. . . . The second measure of merit 

is to impact the Yugoslavian military and police activities on the ground as 

rapidly and as effectively as possible. We had to attack and disrupt—destroy 

if possible—the actual elements doing the ethnic cleansing. . . . The third 

measure of merit is to protect our ground forces. . . .”25 Adding to these three 

measures of merit were the larger strategic international issues that Clark 

addressed, namely, enforcing the ongoing peacekeeping mission in Bosnia, 

maintaining the support of front-line states Macedonia and Albania, and 

providing humanitarian assistance to the Kosovar people.26 Later a fourth 

measure of merit was added, maintaining the NATO military alliance. All 

this was to be accomplished while maintaining the sometimes strained and 

fickle political alliances within the NATO cooperative structure.

The NATO bombing campaign against Serbs in Kosovo lasted just 

under 90 days. Serb facilities, troops, equipment, and supply depots were 

quickly destroyed all over Yugoslavia. Using NATO and US fighter jets, a 

variety of bombers including the B-52s, A-10 Warthog antiarmor aircraft, 

and US Navy cruise missiles and Tomahawk missiles, Serbian positions 

were plummeted. The command bunker of Milosevic was destroyed, the 

command and control communication assets of the Serbians were decimated, and the Serbian troops not hiding below ground were destroyed. 

During the air strikes, some air-to-air combat between Americans and 

Serbian pilots flying Russian-made jets did occur to the demise of the 

Serbians. Throughout the air campaign, one American pilot was shot down 

and rescued the next day; three American soldiers on the MacedonianSerbian border were captured and later released; and on 26 April, two US 

pilots were killed in an Apache helicopter accident in a support mission in 

Albania.27

NATO contributions to the air campaign were substantial. France 

provided almost 100 aircraft, second only to the United States. Germany, 

France, Greece, the United Kingdom, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and 

later Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Turkey provided air bases. While 

the United States provided all of the stealth aircraft and most of the refueling and electronic warfare assets, the Allies flew some 40 percent of the 

air strikes.28 All 19 NATO countries contributed in some way to Operation 

ALLIED FORCE, including countries with minimal military assets such 
120

as Iceland, Portugal, and Luxembourg.29 The rising refugee population 

on roadways throughout the region was an unforeseen factor that greatly 

complicated the NATO air campaign against Serbs in Kosovo. In a frantic last-minute attempt to impose as much ethnic relocation in Kosovo as 

possible, Serbs herded thousands of Albanian Muslims out of Kosovo so 

that at the end of hostilities Serbians could easily relocate into this area. 

Other Kosovars fled their ravaged province for Albania, further adding 

congestion to an already complicated war zone. Early in the air campaign, 

intentionally displaced refugees were estimated at 540,000, with 100,000 

more in Albania and 50,000 relocated in Macedonia. Toward the end of 

the air campaign, the displaced Kosovars ethnically cleansed from their 

homes and scattered throughout was estimated at 800,000.30

The bombing campaign ended on 20 June 1999. Milosevic agreed 

to the cease-fire principles: the expulsion of remaining Serb military 

and paramilitary forces from Kosovo, the acceptance of an international 

NATO-led military ground force in Kosovo, the full return and resettlement of all refugees, and participation in a later political agreement to 

determine the final political status of Kosovo.31 The Allied ground forces 

to enter Kosovo would be called the Kosovo Force (KFOR). Clark created 

four new “measures of merit” to guide the KFOR ground forces entering 

Kosovo: deploy troops smoothly and quickly; avoid anarchy—get all Serb 

forces out, stop crimes of revenge with full support of the International 

Criminal Tribunal; provide humanitarian assistance as much as possible; 

and protect the KFOR personnel, especially from minefields.32

During the preparation and execution of the air campaign, Army 

chaplains were training with their units for potential deployment to 

Kosovo. Some of the senior chaplains in Europe at that time were Hicks at 

USAREUR and Janet Horton at V Corps. Hicks was at USAREUR from 

June 1997 through July 1999 and was a senior chaplain in Europe during 

the air campaign and the initial deployment of KFOR into Kosovo. Hicks 

supervised, supplied, and coordinated chaplains for the KFOR mission, 

administering UMT assets throughout Europe. Janet Horton of V Corps 

in Heidelberg served in that capacity from June 1997 through June 2000. 

She stated that Milosevic was more sophisticated in his ethnic cleansing in 

Kosovo than he had been a few years earlier in Bosnia. US Army preparations for the Kosovo mission were conducted simultaneously with other 

missions, so between 1800 and into the morning of the next day detailed 

Kosovo and Albania planning was conducted. In comparing preparations 

for the Kosovo mission to the ongoing mission in Bosnia, Janet Horton 

stated:
121

I think what we learned was that we had to be more flexible. We had to understand each sector, because there was 

such a difference. People wanted immediately to compare 

Bosnia to Albania, and the Kosovo mission, and each one 

of them was quite different. Even though they were in the 

same region, and some of the same factions, there was 

still a difference between where we set up, what the infrastructures were, what the needs were, how long the mission was going to be. You had to get to the point where 

you realized that a specific religious support analysis was 

necessary. You can’t necessarily take what works even a 

year ago and say that it is going to work the same.33

Chaplains training for deployment to Kosovo during the bombing 

campaign understood that they and their soldiers could soon be placed in 

danger. Chaplain Howell of the 21st Theater Support Command (TSC) 

was extensively involved in supporting his soldiers who were preparing 

supplies and logistics for the invasion force into Kosovo. As the bombing 

campaign in Kosovo was proceeding, Howell’s unit was bringing huge 

amounts of supplies to Croatia and Greece. From February through April 

1999, his unit unloaded supplies destined for Kosovo in the port of Rijeka, 

Croatia. Their headquarters in Rijeka was never really completed, as the 

short duration of the air campaign meant supplies needed to be pushed forward quickly to units entering Kosovo. As the bombing campaign ended 

and troops poured into Kosovo, Howell’s unit developed a supporting 

operation in Greece. He stated:

At the last minute, our President announced that now 

ground troops would fight. As soon as he announced that, 

within 72 hours Slobodan Milosevic and his forces we were 

fighting decided to withdraw. . . . So with that announcement we opened up a port in Greece, and the USS Bob 

Hope was the ship that we used to bring in the equipment 

from Fort Hood. We brought the troops and equipment in 

as a safeguard, loaded them up in June, July, and August, 

and moved them into Kosovo as a ground force.34

Chaplains preparing to enter Kosovo in 1999 had various experiences 

during their preparation period. Chaplain (CPT) Scott Jones of the 67th 

Combat Support Hospital stated that his unit had good briefings for the 

soldiers about to deploy,35 while Chaplain (CPT) Darin Powers of the 

2d Battalion, 18th Field Artillery remarked that he had positive ministry opportunities working with spouses and children of soldiers who were 
122

about to deploy, and that unit morale was high.36 Chaplain Causey of 

the 3d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division listed his preparation activities for 

Kosovo as follows: “Deployment briefings for both families and soldiers, 

marriage retreats, deployment briefings for children, local cultural and 

religious assessment and training, personal force protection training for 

the chaplain assistants, and worship rites and religious assessment training 

for UMTs.”37

Chaplain Assistant SSG Craig Gardner was assigned to the 3d Brigade 

Combat Team (BCT) under the 1st Infantry Division. The extensive training his unit completed in Germany while the air bombing campaign was 

expanding in Kosovo is an interesting glimpse from a sergeant in this 

stressful time of predeployment preparations.

I got a call from the Division Chaplain, Chaplain (LTC) 

Jack Pendergrass. He explained to me that 3d Brigade 

was in the chute to deploy to Kosovo and their 56M30 

[senior chaplain assistant] was not deployable due to a 

profile from a motorcycle accident. They needed me to 

cross-level over to 3d BCT to deploy. I did one MRE 

(Mission Readiness Exercise) with Chaplain (MAJ) Brent 

Causey at Hoenfels, Germany. I also prior to that did a 

CPX (Command Post Exercise) with him at Grafenwehr, 

Germany. . . . The US was in talks with Serbs about the 

deployment so the deployment date kept changing. The 

3d BCT did three different MREs getting ready. We were 

wrapping up the last one when word came to deploy as 

soon as possible.38

Initial Chaplain Activities and Ministries in Kosovo, 1999

Basic chaplain organization and activities in Kosovo had similarities 

to those in Bosnia. The USAREUR chaplain in early 1999 was Hicks, 

replaced later that year by Haberek. The largest combatant command in 

Europe, V Corps, in 1999 had Janet Horton as their senior chaplain. Since 

many of the deployed units in Kosovo came under the V Corps command 

structure, Janet Horton and her USARUER counterparts were intimately 

involved in higher-level planning for all chaplain operations in the Balkans. 

The senior chaplain on the ground in Kosovo was designated as the KFOR 

chaplain, the first one being Zalis. Under Zalis in Kosovo was a task force 

chaplain. With the designation of Task Force Falcon, the first chaplain to 

serve in this capacity was Chaplain (MAJ) Allen Kovach. 
123

After coordination with the USAREUR and V Corps chaplain offices, 

Zalis, a Rabbi, arrived in Kosovo in the spring of 1999. Much of the onthe-ground chaplain coordination with diverse US forces and with NATO 

chaplains would come through Zalis. Several years after his Kosovo 

adventures, Zalis reflected on his experiences:

I was in Kosovo for several months in 1999. I was the first 

KFOR chaplain. I supervised directly or indirectly about 

60 chaplains from various countries. I visited these chaplains at their units all over Kosovo. I really got to know 

the geography of the region from all these trips. I had a 

German deputy KFOR chaplain that worked for me. I think 

I might have been the only Army chaplain in history who 

worked directly for a foreign general officer. The commander was a four-star general at the NATO headquarters 

in Pristina. There was always a sense of danger in Kosovo 

in 1999. We had good military intelligence that told us 

when civilian riots were happening and we avoided those 

areas at those times. There was a lot of hate in the people’s 

faces, toward each other and toward the NATO troops in 

their country. The US and NATO troops did a remarkable 

job of peacekeeping and were very restrained in dealing 

with the ethnic and religious hatred in the region.39

Zalis mentioned, “I frequently conducted Jewish religious services, 

several at Camp Bondsteel and many more at other remote locations. 

We lived humbly in NATO tents; it was very cold and the bases were 

underdeveloped. Rosh Hashana services were a special blessing to 

perform.” In elaborating on his experiences in traveling throughout 

Kosovo on supervisory chaplain visits, Zalis stated, “Personally, I felt in 

danger every time I went out on civilian roads, which was all the time. 

Traffic in the small villages slowed down to a crawl and the driver and 

guards were very vigilant to ensure nothing happened to us.” In his 

capacity as the senior chaplain in Kosovo, Zalis organized some nationbuilding chaplain events. He commented, “While in Kosovo I organized 

two special chaplain meetings, where all the NATO and other chaplains 

in Kosovo came together for conferences.” When a US soldier died in an 

accident in Kosovo, Zalis recalled, “I spent time with the corpse and the 

unit chaplain and the unit. I then accompanied the body to the mortuary 

affairs unit at Landsthul Hospital in Germany where the remains were 

prepared for shipment to the United States.”40

Janet Horton, of V Corps, used her skills as a religious adviser to assist 
124

her commander, Lieutenant General (LTG) Jay Hendricks, in understanding the manipulative use of religion by Serbians and others in Kosovo. 

Realizing that Milosevic and his followers had never been religious people, 

Janet Horton provided research that showed religious issues were becoming a propaganda tool to incite nationalistic and pietistic fervor among a 

people who had mostly been irreligious for almost 70 years of communist 

rule. Calling Milosevic and his cabinet “the people of the propaganda,” 

Janet Horton warned that religious manipulation was being used to persuade people to achieve secular goals and militancy against the US and 

NATO peacekeeping forces.41

In her capacity at V Corps HQ in Germany, Janet Horton helped to 

coordinate the response to tons of donated items sent from the United 

States to the people of Kosovo. Commanders of units in Kosovo naturally 

looked to their chaplains to distribute these humanitarian supplies. The 

chaplains in units were so busy distributing donated items to Kosovars 

that they could potentially neglect the primary religious support mission 

to US soldiers. In coordination with Chaplain (LTC) James Goodwill 

in Kosovo, Janet Horton recommended a policy where chaplains would 

keep track of how many hours they spent on humanitarian missions, with 

primary emphasis being on the religious support mission. When 8,000 

pounds of school supplies were donated to Kosovar children, Goodwill 

and Janet Horton ensured that benevolent missions to the civilian community, though important to win the hearts and minds of the local population, 

were secondary to meeting the religious needs of US troops in a hostile 

fire zone in Kosovo.42

The role of the task force chaplain in Kosovo was essentially like a 

typical brigade chaplain position in the US Army. While most of the chaplains in Kosovo fell under the task force structure, many did not. Kovach 

supervised those who were under the task force hierarchy, while KFOR 

Chaplain Zalis supervised those chaplains in Kosovo not under the task 

force. Serving with the 2d Brigade under the 1st Infantry Division, Kovach 

arrived at Camp Bondsteel, Kosovo, as the task force chaplain in July 

1999. He was assigned to the 2d Brigade only a few weeks before deploying to Kosovo. Arriving first at Camp Able Sentry in Macedonia, Kovach 

spent the majority of his Balkans tour working out of Camp Bondsteel, 

Kosovo. In speaking of his role as task force chaplain, Kovach stated, “My 

main job was to ensure quality religious support throughout the task force. 

Initially this meant I had to do a lot of traveling in convoys of three armed 

vehicles in order to visit my Unit Ministry Teams (UMTs). As the Task 

Force Falcon chaplain, I directly supervised seven UMTs.”43
125

Kovach remarked that living conditions in Kosovo in 1999 were 

humble. He commented, “The camp was very austere. We lived in tents Map 6. A 2000 map of the former Yugoslavia with the province of Kosovo highlighted.

US State Department
126

and worshiped any place we could get out of the weather. First, we held 

religious services in tents but later on we had a chapel constructed. The 

region outside the camp was sparsely populated, as this area suffered ethnic cleansing and the local people were reluctant at first to move back into 

their homes.” As far as types of ministries Kovach performed or coordinated, they consisted of religious services of numerous denominations, 

counseling, ministering to the injured at the hospital, coordinating subordinate chaplain activities, and interacting with local indigenous clergy. 

Kovach praised Chaplain Assistant SSG Edwardo Apodaca, who kept the 

office running smoothly and supervised force protection. When asked if 

there were times in Kosovo that he did not feel safe, Kovach stated, “Yes. 

Initially when we first arrived, we were part of the teams that went to 

mosques and churches to look for stashed weapons. We knew from place to 

place that angry locals had rifles, mortars, hand grenades, and placed land 

mines in many areas. But the longer we were there the less intimidated we 

were about these things.” He somewhat jokingly remembered an eccentric 

Serbian who randomly harassed Camp Bondsteel, calling him “the mad 

mortar man” who occasionally lobbed mortars toward the camp.44

In October 1999, Causey replaced Kovach in Kosovo as the Task 

Force Eagle chaplain. Assigned to the 3d Brigade under the 1st Infantry 

Division, Causey stated, “I worked for two commanders, the task force 

commander and the brigade commander. I was very close to both of them 

as a pastor, adviser, and special staff member.” The expanding mission 

throughout 1999 and into 2000 meant that Causey supervised 15 UMTs 

assigned to base camps scattered throughout Kosovo. Causey commented 

that some of the things that worked well during his tour in Kosovo were the 

moving of chaplains to various areas to provide comprehensive religious 

support, the worship services, the force protection provided by chaplain 

assistants for chaplains, and the bringing together of local religious leaders 

to promote peace. As far as being in personal danger, Causey stated, “We 

took direct fire only one time on a convoy. No one was injured.”45

One of the chaplain assistants that worked in Kosovo in the fall of 

1999 was SSG Elbert Jackson of the 3d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division. As 

the senior Task Force Eagle chaplain assistant, Elbert Jackson was responsible for chaplain assistant issues at Camp Bondsteel and Camp Montief, 

Kosovo, and Camp Able Sentry, Macedonia. He also managed supplies 

and chaplain assistant personnel issues for the 12 chaplain assistants in the 

task force. Elbert Jackson stated that he enjoyed administrating “prayer 

night, choir, holiday services, prayer breakfasts, and movie nights” and 

that he enjoyed the working harmony between chaplains of different faiths. 

He also remarked that he found it interesting to meet religious leaders 
127

from the local communities as well as chaplains from other NATO nations. 

When asked if he ever felt like he was in danger, he responded “Once or 

twice. These were times we were asked to join elements looking for mass 

grave sites as well as weapons stored in religious structures in the area.”46

Chaplains experienced diverse ministries, challenges, and opportunities in Kosovo. Traditionally the chaplain assigned to a unit deploys with 

that unit. Some chaplains serve in field units, others in administrative 

headquarters, and others in hospitals, at airfields, or have itinerant ministries. For example, Chaplain Powers of the 2-18th Field Artillery was 

assigned to an airfield in Albania from June through July 1999 in support 

of operations in Kosovo. He remarked that he had a good relationship with 

the commander, made many friends, and enjoyed being a chaplain to his 

soldiers.47 Chaplain Scott Jones was assigned to the 67th Combat Support 

Hospital, a unit that took over and ran the hospital at Camp Bondsteel. 

Arriving in July 1999, Scott Jones recalled that he “provided religious 

services and Bible Studies for staff and patients” and had a challenging 

ministry working with the 120 trauma victims that came through the hospital while he was there.48

Special Forces Chaplain (CPT) Steven Mark Jones performed a unique 

and challenging ministry in Kosovo at this time. Serving with the 10th 

Special Forces (SF), Mark Jones was in Kosovo in April–May and again 

in December 1999. In the events leading up to deployment, Mark Jones 

stated, “1999 was a volatile time in Kosovo. When we got our orders, 

the stress level raised. FRG [Family Readiness Group] meetings were all 

well attended. My unit had the best FRG I ever saw in the Army, as the 

SF community sticks together.” In speaking of his relationship with other 

chaplains during his deployments, he recalled, “I always knew a chaplain 

I could refer people to. The SF chaplains had a good relationship with the 

troops. If I was in a remote location and a chaplain was needed in another 

area, I knew who to contact.” Mark Jones related an interesting ministry 

experience as follows:

I participated in a worship service with a Polish Army 

chaplain who was an Orthodox priest. The service was 

conducted on the Polish compound. Some of my soldiers 

and I attended. I participated by singing a solo, doing a 

Bible reading, and leading in public prayer. The local 

Serbian Orthodox choir sang. The service was in three 

languages, Polish, English, and Serbian. It was a unique 

experience for me and I thoroughly enjoyed it.49

Kosovo in 1999 was not a safe place. The NATO bombing campaign 
128

forced the warring Serbian factions to come to peace. Tensions were seething between Christian Orthodox Serbians and Muslims of mostly Albanian 

descent in Kosovo. Serbian military and paramilitary forces still roamed 

the countryside, first seeking to evade NATO air strikes then attempting to 

evade NATO troops on the ground in Kosovo. Then, with NATO peacekeepers separating rival factions, some deprecation by Muslims toward 

Serbians reciprocated in kind. As Mark Jones recalled: 

During my April–May 1999 trip to Kosovo there were 

frequent small arms fire fights between US troops and 

Kosovar bandits. On one patrol my men found a cave 

with lots of ammunition inside. Within the cave were side 

chambers, one of which was piled high with decomposed 

human corpses. The dead were mostly men with some 

women and children. This was the results of an ethnic 

cleansing event. I was there to reinforce a reverence for 

the dead and to minister to soldiers. This was nasty duty, as 

the bodies were in a horrible state of decay and had a horrid stench. Our unit respectfully loaded the corpses onto 

trucks and transported them to civilian Serbian officials 

so they could be identified and properly buried. I spent a 

lot of time talking and in prayer with individual soldiers 

to help them get through this gruesome experience.50

Chaplain Assistant SFC Craig Gardner was assigned to Camp 

Bondsteel, Kosovo, in 1999 to work primarily with Chaplain (MAJ) 

Robert Loring. He experienced the danger still prevalent in Kosovo during 

his first night:

The first night at Bondsteel [August 1999] I was in the 

Engineer Brigade TOC [Tactical Operations Center] 

walking with other soldiers and sergeants. Someone 

yelled for everyone to be quiet and everyone gathered 

around the radio. The task force was operating off one 

radio frequency. The Serbs would try to creep through 

the wire at night. The OP/LP [Observation Post/Listening 

Post] would see them and report it. Then the commander 

would send out a tank and a Bradley squad to intercept 

them and the soldiers in the TOC would listen to the 

whole exchange. It reminded me that there were people 

outside the wire that wanted to hurt us.51

Mark Jones remembered the following dangerous incident from his 

December 1999 ministry in Kosovo. 
129

In December 1999 my SF unit had a memorable experience. We were planning a convoy operation, so the day 

before one vehicle with a few well armed soldiers did a 

recon of the proposed route. There was a Russian convoy about to use this route, and the route was mined and 

ready for an ambush. Our one vehicle inadvertently drove 

into this ambush before the Russian convoy arrived. The 

vehicle hit a mine and flipped over. When the enemy 

forces saw that it was a US vehicle that was hit they disbursed. The Russian convoy then arrived and rescued the 

men, even though the area was loaded with antipersonnel 

mines. One soldier died and another had a broken arm. 

Four of the Russian soldiers who rescued our men were 

awarded medals by our two-star commander, certainly a 

unique thing to observe. I spent most of December with 

this US Army SF unit.52

Gardner related the following harrowing experience while he was on a 

routine patrol mission. After leaving Loring at a secure location,

I met up with the Engineer platoon leader and an Infantry 

platoon leader. They asked if I wanted to go on a walking patrol with them. We had just left the camp and were 

walking through the barricades when somebody threw a 

grenade and popped off three rounds about 80 meters in 

front of us. I wasn’t scared then. I got down behind a basket full of rock and started looking for targets. It was later 

on as we continued to patrol through the dark alleys that I 

began to become fearful, crossing lit areas and main roads. 

I started to come to grips with what had happened.53

At the close of 1999, chaplain ministries in Kosovo were developing 

from initial and temporary attempts at providing religious support to soldiers 

in a hostile fire zone to more established routines and better facilities. At 

first, chaplains and chaplain assistants conducted religious services on the 

hoods of vehicles or in a clearing in the woods or in tents within the wire. 

Logistically, UMTs in Kosovo had fantastic support from Germany. Janet 

Horton helped commanders realize that for a temporary mission an itinerant 

chaplain ministry is fine. However, for a sustained mission in a developing 

theater of operations, more structure and stability were needed to maximize 

chaplain support to soldiers. In speaking to her commanders, Janet Horton 

remarked, “We needed a planned, cleared, designated worship space by 

asking, how long do you want our chaplains to do gypsy ministry?” The 
130

commanders got the point and chaplains began to get designated chapel 

and office tents. Then a containerized chapel was sent to Kosovo, and 

plans were developed to build wood chapels throughout Kosovo for US 

troops. Although chaplains still enjoyed performing religious services 

on the hoods of vehicles when necessary, much had changed in Kosovo 

throughout 1999 for Army chaplain ministries.

A unique ministry related to Kosovo in 1999 actually occurred in 

Germany. In the late summer, enemy prisoners of war (EPW) from Serbia 

were transferred to Manheim, Germany, for holding and interrogation. 

Chaplain Baktis, already stationed in that area with an aviation battalion, 

was put on special orders for 6 weeks to serve as a chaplain to the 

detainees. Baktis was selected for this mission because he was an Eastern 

Orthodox priest and able to relate to the culture of the Balkans people. 

There were only two prisoners at this incarceration center, one Eastern 

Orthodox and one Muslim in name but not in practice. Because of media, 

military, and Red Cross interest, Baktis commented, “I frequently had 

to brief the V Corps [Chaplain Janet] Horton and USAREUR Chaplain 

David Hicks. This was a highly visible and scrutinized ministry, the most 

ever in my career.” Baktis stated it was hard to get religious supplies in 

the Serbian language on short notice for these detainees, and he provided 

pastoral counseling through a translator for both prisoners and shared the 

sacrament with the Eastern Orthodox prisoner. “I visited them weekly,” 

Baktis recalled, “and I got the Muslim prisoner a Koran and a prayer rug 

and I shared the sacrament weekly with the other prisoner.”54 Not to be 

overlooked was the ministry to the prison guards on this special highvisibility assignment in Manheim. Baktis stated, “There was a lot of 

pressure on these special project soldiers assigned to a separate building 

that few knew existed. I counseled with the guards.” Baktis elaborated, 

“I did some debriefing mostly having to do with stress caused by phone 

calls from the Defense Department in Washington. The commander and 

soldiers guarding the EPWs were held to confidentiality, so they could not 

even speak to their family or friends. I became their only vent.”55

Ministry to Displaced Kosovar Refugees

Aggressive Serbian military and paramilitary activities in Kosovo 

in 1999 created a catastrophic refugee crisis. As negotiations for peace 

dragged from 1998 to 1999, Serbians who stalled and delayed at the negotiating table made allowances for their Serbian brethren in Kosovo to 

conduct extensive and vicious ethnic cleansing. After the NATO bombing 
131

campaign began, Serbs were very active in vindictive and brutal offenses 

against Albanians or those of Muslim descent in Kosovo. US Secretary of 

State Albright narrated this scenario as follows:

Before NATO bombing began, the Serb offensive had 

already driven a hundred thousand Kosovars from their 

homes. This figure grew rapidly in subsequent days. . . . 

Homes in hundreds of villages were burned. Scholars, 

journalists, and political leaders who had advocated independence were tracked down and killed. Tens of thousands 

of people were made to board trains, which were then 

sealed from the outside and sent to the Albanian border. 

Thousands of others were herded along the same route by 

car or on foot. Serb security forces stripped the departing 

Kosovars of birth certificates, driver’s licenses, car registrations, and other proof of identification. Their message to 

the Albanians was clear: ‘You must leave and we will not 

let you back.’56

On 21 April 1999, Vice President Al Gore announced US plans to 

relocate up to 20,000 Kosovar refugees. He said those with family ties 

in America and those in vulnerable circumstances, such as single mothers or people with medical conditions, would be given priority. The first 

Kosovar refugees reached America in early May. Those with relatives in 

the United States arrived on commercial flights to meet family members 

at New York’s John F. Kennedy Airport. Those to be linked with sponsors 

arrived at McGuire Air Force Base in New Jersey on charter flights. From 

there, they boarded buses bound for Fort Dix’s Doughboy Gymnasium 

where an interagency task force welcomed them. The Department of 

Health and Human Services headed the effort, supported by the Defense 

Department, Immigration and Naturalization Service, State Department, 

American Red Cross, New Jersey National Guard, and nongovernmental resettlement agencies. When each refugee family finished processing, 

soldiers and Immigration and Naturalization Service interpreters escorted 

them to assigned dormitories. Army chaplains made up a valuable part of 

this team.57

The Kosovars entered the United States with the legal status of refugees 

according to immigration officials. As such, they could work in the United 

States and could decide to stay. They could apply for permanent residency 

after 1 year and for citizenship after 5 years. US officials, however, said 

they expected most of the refugees will want to return to Kosovo, and the 

US government is committed to helping them return once it is safe to do 
132

so. The flow of refugees to Fort Dix stopped at the end of May 1999. US 

officials said future refugees bound for the United States would complete 

processing overseas and go directly to relatives or sponsors.58

Figure 11. Ethnic Albanians wave to military and civilian officials on arrival 

at New Jersey’s McGuire Air Force Base. The refugees traveled from 

Macedonia to reach temporary safe haven in America.

US Army
133

Throughout the spring and early summer of 1999, Fort Dix, New 

Jersey, was the site for a huge refugee relocation program entitled Operation 

PROVIDE REFUGE. This joint task force (JTF) was responsible for the 

safe and professional inprocessing of Kosovar Albanians into the United 

States. Over 4,000 ethnic Albanian refugees processed through Fort Dix, 

arriving there after a 13-hour flight from Macedonia. Men and women of 

all ages arrived exhausted and frightened, but were quickly greeted at Fort 

Dix by reception teams of military and civilian professionals.

Army Chaplain (LTC) Eric Wester was the JTF chaplain for Operation 

PROVIDE REFUGE. From the very beginning of this mission, it was 

imperative that the religious needs of the refugees be respected while 

not overlooking the religious needs of the task force workers. Wester 

outlined the responsibilities of chaplains involved in Operation PROVIDE 

REFUGE as follows:

a. Provide for religious services and related chaplain 

activities for the JTF.

b. Advise the command on matters of morals, religion, 

and morale.

c. Prepare a daily SITREP [Situational Report].

d. Maintain Chapel 5, Bldg 5959 (Hope Chapel).

e. Track religious census of refugees arriving at the 

Welcome Center.

f. Provide information about religion, customs and 

courtesies to the JTF.

g. Respond to critical incidents involving JTF 

personnel.

h. Maintain records related to chaplaincy activities.

i. Establish a baseline of religious supplies and equipment for the JTF.

j. Coordinate with interagency personnel and nongovernment agencies.

k. Operate safely and integrate risk management to the 

daily operations.59

Chaplains with the JTF Operation PROVIDE REFUGE mission coordinated all activities with Wester. The refugees stayed in an area of Fort 

Dix called The Village, with Chaplain (MAJ) John Stepp and Chaplain 

(CPT) Mohammad Khan assigned directly to provide religious support to 
134

The Village military personnel. Religious support to the Albanian Muslims 

was contracted out to Albanian speaking Muslims or other Muslim Imams 

who used Albanian translators to communicate. Organizationally, the Joint 

Task Force Unit Ministry Team (JTFUMT) was responsible for supervision of all UMT activities; supervising religious volunteers; contracting 

with civilian clergy; consulting with commanders on religious, moral, and 

morale issues; and serving as an initial point of contact for all chaplain 

or religious issues. The Village UMTs had the mission of direct religious 

support to the soldiers who worked in The Village and advised the JTF 

chaplain on any major issues. The Village UMTs also conducted a religious census of each arriving refugee as part of their inprocessing. With 

all of these activities related to the refugee mission, the religious support 

mission of the entire Fort Dix community was not to be neglected. The 

installation UMTs provided administrative, budget planning, and funds 

distribution to the JTFUMTs through the JTF chaplain; served as a central 

location for all outside religious visitors; and provided for the religious 

needs of the larger Fort Dix community.

During the short duration of this mission, among the Kosovar refugees’ 

there was one wedding, five or six births, and two deaths. Wester, Stepp, 

and Donald Holdridge coauthored an article describing their experiences 

with Operation PROVIDE REFUGE. They stated:

We had the privilege of working with the ethnic Albanian 

Kosovar refugees as part of Joint Task Force Operation 

PROVIDE REFUGE at Fort Dix, New Jersey, in the 

spring and summer of 1999. Refugees were inprocessed 

and medically cleared before joining sponsoring congregations or communities throughout the United States.

All but 6 of the 4,200 refugees who came through Fort 

Dix were Muslim. These six were Roman Catholics. Our 

advice to the commander and our recommendation to the 

Department of Health and Human Services was to use 

Albanian-speaking Imams and Roman Catholic clergy to 

enable the refugees to practice their faith.

In the weeks prior to arriving at Fort Dix, many of the 

refugees we met had their land stripped away, their homes 

torched, their legal documents destroyed, and family 

members raped and killed. All they brought with them 

were a few hand-carried items and their faith. Respecting 

their faith and encouraging hope were two cornerstones 

of our religious support planning.
135

As Army chaplains, our primary missions were to minister 

to soldiers working as part of the task force and to advise 

the command about the importance of religion in this 

humanitarian mission. But we also spent many evening 

hours trying to get to know the refugee families. They 

loved being around American soldiers, and we loved them. 

This mission gave us the chance to practice our constitutional duty of protecting and respecting everyone’s right 

to freedom of religion, whether they were a US soldier or 

an ethnic Albanian refugee.60

At the time of the Kosovar refugee mission, Holdridge was in the Army 

Reserve, assigned to the 365th Engineer Battalion, Pennsylvania. Assigned 

to Task Force Operation PROVIDE REFUGE, Holdridge recalled:

I was excited to be able to interact with another culture 

and try to help these displaced people through a difficult 

time in their lives. . . . Chaplain Stepp and I spend every 

evening talking with the refugees, kicking the soccer 

ball around with the kids, pushing them on the swings, 

and trying to learn their language (The children were 

picking up English much faster than we were picking up 

Albanian!). . . . I remember hearing their ethnic music 

being played out of the chapel steeple loudspeakers in 

the evenings. Yet, at 2155 every night, Kate Smith’s “God 

Bless America” was played.

As chaplains, we wanted to show these predominatelyMuslim people that there are Christians who cared for 

them. Some refugees did say that some Eastern Orthodox 

neighbors warned them of Milosevic’s troops coming, 

or helped hide them. America can’t help everyone, but 

we can do something where we are at. The charity of the 

American public ought to be commended by the media 

more than it is.61

Stepp stated: “My ministry was the same as all chaplains—perform 

or provide for the free exercise of religion of each soldier in the task force 

and to advise the commander on how to meet the religious needs of the 

refugees.” He elaborated, “To begin, we always put the spiritual needs 

of the soldiers first. Worship for soldiers was conducted at the Fort Dix 

post chapel. The ministry to the refugees was to show by actions to these 

Kosovar Muslims that true Christians can be trusted. We demonstrated that 

through providing for their spiritual needs.”62 Six years after his ministry 
136

as The Village chaplain for Operation PROVIDE REFUGE, Stepp had the 

following reflections:

I believe that the soldiers and refugees went away knowing 

that spiritual freedom is alive in America, and the refugees 

left knowing that true Christians know the meaning of love 

and can be trusted. We deliberately chose not to shoot them 

with the gospel, but instead to plant seeds of Christ’s love 

through our relationships with them. Then, we trust God 

to send someone to water that seed and help it to grow. I 

believe it is Christian to remove barriers from other’s lives 

that prevent them from having a personal relationship with 

Jesus Christ. Each person we meet should be closer to God 

from knowing us. We, UMTs, helped remove the barrier of 

hate and prejudice toward the Christians (hate and prejudice 

created by the war) that permeated the refugees lives. I 

believe we successfully accomplished that mission.63

The only Muslim US 

Army chaplain assigned to JTF 

Operation PROVIDE REFUGE 

was Khan of the 519th Military 

Intelligence Battalion, Fort Bragg, 

North Carolina. Khan served at 

the refugee camp in May and June 

1999, after being ordered to report 

immediately to Fort Dix from Fort 

Bragg. Because of the immediate 

need to have a Muslim chaplain at 

the refugee center, Khan received 

no preliminary briefings or training. Khan stated, “Being the only 

Imam and Islamic faith chaplain, 

I was very welcomed by the commander and I had a very cordial 

relationship with the staff and all 

NCOs.” On meeting the mostly 

Muslim refugees, Kahn recalled 

the human tragedy of Kosovo in 

the faces of the very young and the 

very old, as well as those pregnant or injured in various ways. Khan stated: 

“This was a very draining human drama,” and “the other chaplains in this 

task force were friendly and cooperative.”64

Figure 12. CH (CPT) Mohammed 

Khan ministers to the religious needs 

of Muslim ethnic Albanians at Fort 

Dix, NJ.

MAJ Ronald Kopp, USAR
137

As a Muslim chaplain, Khan served as a religious adviser to the commander and to JTF Chaplain Wester. Khan stated, “I was advising the 

commander and the UMTs regarding dietary needs of Kosovar Muslim refugees and helped establish worship places for them and arranged Albanian 

speaking Imams for their Jumma [Friday evening] services.” Being unable 

to speak Albanian, Khan used Albanian-speaking civilian volunteers from 

New York City, Department of the Army linguists, and Albanian speakers 

from the US Department of Immigration. One of the many duties of Khan 

and the other chaplains on this mission was to screen civilian religious 

groups who wanted to influence, proselytize, or in some way influence 

the refugees. Khan remarked it was an emotional and disturbing event to 

listen to the refugees’ stories of their persecution in Kosovo. While referring the refugees to the appropriate aid agencies, Khan stated that most 

refugees were more concerned about the welfare of their loved ones left 

behind than their own well being. Khan stated, “The Kosovar refugee 

resettlement mission at Fort Dix, New Jersey, was overwhelming as well 

as challenging to all chaplains who worked with them. . . . We had only 

one chaplain assistant [SPC James T. Mack]. He helped all us chaplains all 

the time. This 30-day experience with the refugees I will remember for a 

very long time.”65

Developing Chaplain Issues in Kosovo, 2000–2001

Kosovo in 2000 was a region in chaos. The rebuilding necessary after 

the NATO bombing campaign, which ended 9 June 1999, was only beginning. Approximately 45,000 NATO troops, including a large US force, 

entered a seething Kosovo. United Nations Security Council Resolution 

1244 established the UN mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) to administer and 

help rebuild the shattered region with the cooperation of the European 

Union. Both would share responsibility for humanitarian affairs, institution building, and reconstruction.66 Militarily the mission in Kosovo was 

maintained with a combination of NATO, European Union, and United 

Nations support. For civilians, sanitation in Kosovo was deplorable. An 

outbreak of tularemia became a scourge to the Kosovars. Tularemia is a 

bacterial disease found in humans and animals that develops from water 

contaminated by decaying carcasses. Often spread by rats, the disease 

affects humans in their eyes and throats and may produce ulcers. As one 

news report stated:

A large outbreak of tularemia occurred in Kosovo in the 

early postwar period, 1999–2000. Epidemiologic and 
138

environmental investigations were conducted to identify 

sources of infection, modes of transmission, and household risk factors. Case and control status was verified 

by enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay, Western blot, 

and microagglutination assay. A total of 327 serologically confirmed cases of tularemia pharyngitis and cervical lymphadenitis were identified in 21 of 29 Kosovo 

municipalities. Matched analysis of 46 case households 

and 76 control households suggested that infection was 

transmitted through contaminated food or water and that 

the source of infection was rodents. Environmental circumstances in war-torn Kosovo led to epizootic rodent 

tularemia and its spread to resettled rural populations living under circumstances of substandard housing, hygiene, 

and sanitation.67

US troops deploying to Kosovo in 2000 lived at a higher quality of 

life than the majority of the Kosovo people. Although the initial US and 

NATO base camps constructed in 1999 were quite humble, they quickly 

became safe and sanitary locations for soldiers to live and for chaplains 

to minister. As a Roman Catholic priest with the 82d Airborne Division, 

Chaplain (CPT) John McLain arrived in April 2002 on a specific tasker 

and not with his unit. First stationed at Camp Able Sentry in Macedonia, 

he thereafter moved north into Kosovo and rotated his ministry with Camp 

Montieth, Camp Bondsteel, and various checkpoints. The Task Force 

Falcon chaplain at that time was Causey; McLain served as the deputy 

task force chaplain. While describing his relationship with Causey as 

tense, McLain stated that he spent a lot of time visiting troops, including 

the Special Forces soldiers at various A-Team locations. McLain recalled 

that there was a slight anti-American sentiment, but he experienced no 

violence while traveling around Kosovo with a Special Forces soldier for 

protection.68

US Army chaplains served in Kosovo for various lengths of time. 

Chaplain Firtko of the 1st Battalion, 36th Infantry Regiment was in 

Kosovo from 15 May through 15 July 2000. Stationed at Camp Montieth, 

Firtko served as the installation chaplain and chapel manager at Montieth. 

Soldiers at that time at Camp Montieth lived in dome-shaped metal sea 

huts with plywood floors and electricity, with separate common use male 

and female bathrooms. Firtko stated there was an ongoing dangerous 

situation because his battalion was stationed along the Serbian border at a 

time when Serbs were forming for an attack into Kosovo—an attack that 

never materialized. Firtko stated that providing field services at the Serbian 
139

border for his soldiers was a memorable event, and that he did “much 

counseling to homesick soldiers and those with marital problems.” Firtko 

recalled the time when Wiccan soldiers asked him to designate for them a 

place of worship, with the commander allowing them a location outdoors 

under the moonlight. Firtko stated, “Morale was generally good,” and that 

he had little contact with family support groups back home.69

Eastern Orthodox Chaplain Baktis had a longstanding ministry in 

Kosovo. Baktis thoroughly enjoyed being in this land steeped with Eastern 

Orthodox history, and he frequently networked with indigenous Orthodox 

clergy in a variety of capacities. Baktis stated, “I was in Kosovo from May 

through July 2000. Then I went on a monthly basis to hold Eastern Orthodox 

church services and to help the IO [Information Operations] cell with religious and cultural issues, to try and help the Serbian population in Kosovo.” 

As far as his best memories of ministry in Kosovo, Baktis recalled that 

he enjoyed fellowship with another Eastern Orthodox American priest, he 

happily visited numerous Eastern Orthodox religious sites, he was thrilled 

to concelebrate at the ordination of a local priest at a nearby monastery, and 

he was delighted to concelebrate an Eastern Orthodox church service with 

a Russian Army chaplain.70 Baktis remarked, “Destruction was horrible. 

Churches were destroyed for no military reason. . . . This was a bittersweet 

experience. As a US Army chaplain, ministry was good. Relationships to 

local clergy and NATO allies were satisfying. It was sad to see the suffering of innocent children. Seeing tanks parked next to churches was a weird 

experience.” Assigned to an Engineer unit, Baktis stated:

Our unit had a mission of uncovering mass graves. Our 

Engineers took booby traps from graves, whether it was 

one grave or a mass grave site. Then an international team 

did the recovery of corpses. A lot of Finnish civilians did 

the forensic work. My troops also secured the area so 

shallow grave sites could be identified. I saw the corpses 

and it reminded me that war is an ugly business.71

Chaplain (CPT) Steven Simpson and Chaplain Kenneth Hubbs had 

occasions for complaint in their summer and fall 2000 tours in Kosovo. 

Simpson, assigned to the 2d Battalion, 37th Armored Regiment, claimed 

that an “inexperienced brigade chaplain caused much turmoil among the 

UMTs,” further stating that there was “no UMT cohesion, only conflict.”72

Hubbs of the 141st Signal Battalion lamented the fact that even though his 

widely dispersed soldiers were often in the area of other chaplains, those 

chaplains did not visit his soldiers. The Army chaplaincy calls this area 

coverage, meaning chaplains in a geographic area minister to soldiers in 

that area even though the soldiers are from other units. Hubbs stated, “For 
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the vast majority of my soldiers, I was the only chaplain who saw them . . . 

even though there were chaplains in their immediate area.”73

The experiences of Chaplain (CPT) William Horton in Kosovo show 

how aggressive planning and training can make for a successful deployment. William Horton was assigned to the 2-327th Infantry Battalion, 

stationed in Kosovo from August 2000 through February 2001. William 

Horton stated that “morale was very high” for the Kosovo mission, and 

that his chaplain-to-commander relationship was “very strong.” As a battalion chaplain located near Vitina, Kosovo, William Horton found that 

“weekly training and fellowship with the other task force chaplains kept 

communication lines open and allowed time to reflect spiritually.”74

With soldiers spread in three main locations in Kosovo, including along 

the tense Albanian border, William Horton was able to encourage soldier 

participation in religious services by arriving at each forward observation 

base (FOB) at least 1 hour before the scheduled religious service. By designating unit religious coordinators at each FOB, William Horton was able 

to publicize and encourage soldiers to attend chapel services. In a unique 

ministry experience, William Horton was able to minister to a grieving 

Kosovar family. He recalled, “The US paid to relocate a family, which 

had their daughter killed by a US trooper. I made monthly chaplain visits 

to this grieving family with a translator and others. The family was very 

forgiving and received us well. We played with the other kids in the family 

and brought gifts. They were very accepting.”75

Two chaplains who found themselves in dangerous situations around 

this time were William Horton and Steven Mark Jones. For William Horton 

an incident occurred in February 2001 as his unit was transitioning with 

their replacement unit. In the village of Vitina there was a house blown up 

next to the FOB where some of his soldiers were stationed. The explosion 

shook the building where William Horton and the troops were located, 

but none of the shocked, dust-covered soldiers were injured.76 Mark Jones 

of the 10th Special Forces Group related his dangerous experience as 

follows: 

I had an interesting experience in October 2000 in Kosovo. 

The battalion commander, sergeant major, and I joined an 

A-Team for a routine SF mission. The patrol came upon 

a typical humble shepherd’s dwelling in a field, but our 

troops discovered booby traps around it. The men did a 

probe of the area and assaulted this 20’x 40’ building, 

which contained three rooms and a separate shed. The 

US troops were so professional that they captured the 
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two Kosovar Muslims inside without firing a shot, and 

discovered six to seven rifles and thousands of rounds of 

ammunition. On this same mission later on we took fire 

from some smugglers near the northern border of Kosovo, 

mortar and rifle fire. My SF troops dismounted, assaulted 

the enemy positions, killed two enemy thugs, suffering no 

injuries to my men.77

As the Kosovo mission transitioned from 2000 to 2001, concerns were 

raised about the trauma of combat or semicombat experiences on the soldiers rotating home. Chaplains and mental health workers briefed soldiers 

returning from a 6-month rotation in the hostile fire zone of Kosovo on 

how to smoothly transition back to family life. Soldiers received mandatory briefings in Kosovo as part of their outprocessing, while family 

members back home were invited to voluntary reintegration and reunion 

meetings in their local areas. As one news report stated:

CAMP BONDSTEEL, Kosovo (December 15, 2000)—

As more than 3,000 soldiers prepare to leave Kosovo 

this week, officials want to make sure the transition back 

home is as stress-free as possible. The vast majority of 

troops have no problems returning home, but a few can 

run into difficulties, including alcohol-related incidents 

and domestic violence.

Commanders, chaplains, and doctors have worked since 

September to give reunion briefs to homeward bound 

troops, talking to spouses in Germany and handing out 

mental health surveys to combat some problems. . . .

Officials are fanning across the US sector of Kosovo, 

giving the reunion briefs unit by unit. First, soldiers are 

given the mental health survey, and then chaplains tell 

them what to expect. . . . Besides the survey, religious 

leaders are meeting with soldiers, said Chaplain (MAJ) 

Tim Bledsole.78

Kosovo in 2001was a potentially volatile place struggling with rebuilding and autonomy. The US and NATO forces had been in the country since 

1999. The intention was to terminate military and paramilitary aggression 

in Kosovo by signing a peace treaty and temporarily inserting NATO-led 

peacekeepers. Difficulties developed in determining when to turn over 

NATO and US operations to legitimate Kosovar civilians or government 

entities. Questions arose as to what the desired end state in Kosovo really 

was, and how to achieve it. As one article mentioned, “It is critical to 
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articulate the desired end state for an ethnic conflict before establishing 

conditions for successfully transferring control from military to civilian 

agencies. . . . The greatest concern continues to be restoring some form of 

normalcy with limited resources and dealing with competing demands that 

are usually associated with functions outside of military jurisdiction.”79

Complicating the NATO military handover of responsibilities to qualified Kosovars was the friction between the military and nongovernmental 

organizations (NGOs). Although there were over 300 civilian aid agencies from throughout the world operating in Kosovo in 2001, the relationship of these NGOs to the military and to military chaplains was poorly 

structured.80

Chaplain (MAJ) Robert Land arrived in Kosovo in December 2000 as 

the Task Force Falcon chaplain, serving at Camp Bondsteel through June 

2001. Assigned with the 2d Brigade Combat Team under the 1st Armored 

Division, Land supervised 12 chaplains who were scattered throughout Kosovo and Macedonia. In reflecting on his time in Kosovo, Land 

remarked:

When we arrived Camp Bondsteel was pretty well 

developed. There were two new beautiful chapels, so we 

had the temporary containerized chapels redeployed to 

Germany. I had a good team of 12 chaplains. There were 

only a few times that I had to get firm with them. We 

laid out the ground rules early and there were no major 

issues. We had good support reacting to crisis situations. 

My team was mostly Active Duty with some Reserve 

component UMTs.81

As the Task Force Falcon chaplain, there were many unique duties 

placed on Land. For example, at times there was a need for specific 

religious faith group coverage, these being occasions for Roman Catholic 

Chaplain Habereck or Jewish Chaplain Leinwand to come from Germany 

to Kosovo to minister. When the need for a Muslim chaplain arose, Land 

arranged for Chaplain (CPT) Muhammad Shabazz to come and help. 

The Army Chief of Chaplains, Chaplain (MG) Gaylord Gunhus, came to 

Kosovo at Christmas 2000 to celebrate and worship. Problems arose when 

chaplains came temporarily to visit troops in Kosovo without coordinating 

with Land’s office. Land stated, “There were visiting chaplains from 

USAREUR that did not coordinate well. Some came to visit small numbers 

of soldiers and did not coordinate with me. This was awkward and took 

a lot of my time to coordinate with these visiting chaplains.”82 While in 

Kosovo, Land mentioned, “There were a few flare-ups of hostilities. One 

event was when tensions arose with the border conflict with Macedonia, 
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when a civilian bus blew up nearby with casualties. At another time, we 

were traveling on narrow dirt roads to attend a funeral for a local girl and 

we heard artillery rounds going off nearby, but we were unhurt. Further, 

when we first arrived a lieutenant stepped on a mine and was seriously 

injured.” In summarizing his tour in Kosovo, Land commented, “It was 

very rewarding to meet chaplains from other nations. I was thankful we 

had no fatalities in our unit. This tour was a highlight of my ministry. It 

was a real world experience. Overall, the mission was very successful. We 

worked as a team. I held them to a high standard and they did great, with 

God’s providence over all.”83

The relationship between the commander and the chaplain is a crucial 

relationship that must be enhanced for the chaplain to succeed. Chaplain 

(CPT) Martin Kendrick of the 2-502d Infantry Regiment said that, “I had 

a very close relationship with my commander. He relied on me heavily to 

provide necessary spiritual guidance. I also did research on the religious 

nature of Kosovo and then briefed the commander.”84 Chaplain (CPT) 

Steven Cantrell of the 716th Military Police Battalion said of his relationship with his commander, “We met a week before we flew into Sophia, 

Bulgaria. We traveled by bus convoy to Camp Able Sentry, Macedonia. 

Once we had inprocessed, we convoyed to Camp Bondsteel. LTC Gyrisko 

was ecstatic to receive a chaplain. He and I were as close as brothers.”85

Having the full support of their commanders allowed Kendrick and 

Cantrell to have full freedom of ministry, to have access to supplies and 

transportation, to have cooperation on local benevolent projects, and to 

network with indigenous clergy to encourage peacekeeping.

An example of a chaplain making the transition in Kosovo from 2001 

to 2002 is Chandler. Serving at Camp Bondsteel from December 2001 

through November 2002, Chandler was the first ASG chaplain for Task 

Force Falcon. During this tour, he was promoted to colonel. Chandler 

stated: 

As the ASG chaplain, I was the senior chaplain in theater. I worked with but did not supervise or rate the task 

force chaplain or his staff. In my ASG, there were usually 

about 12 chaplains and 12 chaplain assistants. I would 

help them with their training and occasionally teach them 

classes. But my main ministry was to the ASG HQ staff. 

I also supervised the Camp Able Sentry [CAS] Chaplain 

in Macedonia. At first it was Chaplain David White. Then 

there was a gap for a few months where I preached in the 

CAS chapel until Chaplain (MAJ) Steve Jerles arrived. 
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I had an excellent chaplain assistant named SFC Tracy 

Williams. She was proactive, professional, and fun to be 

with. She did her job very well and was quite capable and 

competent. She supported and complemented my ministry, a real ministry multiplier. 

I conducted a Bible Study once a week in Pristina. A small 

group would meet with me for prayer, Bible Study, fellowship, singing, and sometimes refreshments. We met in 

a small metal trailer-type building which was redesigned 

as a nice air conditioned chapel that could hold about 20 

people comfortably. 

I made frequent chaplain visits to small numbers of US 

troops stationed in Albania. There must have been a US 

Army chaplain there previously, as there were at one time 

a large number of US troops there. There was a former 

US Army chapel, a small humble building made out of 

a concrete bunker. There was an Italian RC priest there 

who said the Mass regularly for the international military 

population. When I visited, I would conduct Protestant 

services. I would go there either by helicopter, which I 

preferred, or by a long vehicle ride in convoy. 

Albania was not safe after dark. Trucks were often 

ambushed along the road by criminals or paramilitary 

groups. We were told never to stop any place in Albania 

except at a US facility. Drug smuggling, prostitution, and 

crime were epidemic in Albania. Although I met a few 

very nice Albanian people, the country was poor, filthy, 

and unsafe. . . . The Muslims in mostly Eastern Orthodox 

Kosovo want to be aligned with the mostly Muslim nation 

of Albania. But the Albanians look to Italy for much of 

their culture, as they share ancient roots that go back to 

the old Roman Empire. Albanians like Italian food, music, 

language, and culture.86

Chaplain Duties in Maintaining the Peace in Kosovo, 2002–2004

By 2002, there were serious doubts as to the wisdom of the US policy 

in the Balkans. Bosnia was at a tense peace with thousands of US peacekeepers still deployed to that area. In Kosovo, tensions were still apparent 
145

as refugees resettled into homes, war criminals were pursued, and ethnic 

tensions seethed beneath the NATO attempt at rebuilding the region. In 

2002, the United States considered Kosovo a trouble spot that could produce future threats to US security. Peacekeepers in Kosovo attempted to 

break the cycle of impunity for criminals while training local Kosovars 

to provide their own security, stability, and safety.87 By 2002, advances 

in these areas were minimal. Because the fighting had ceased in Kosovo, 

there were many cries to bring the US troops home. With a tense peace 

prevailing in Kosovo, the number of US troops began to decrease. As one 

news source reported:

The United States and its allies continue to gradually reduce 

the number of peacekeepers in the Balkans, but US commanders in the region say their work is far from done.

‘It’s still quite early, at the 3-year mark . . . to figure out 

the endgame,’ Army Brig. Gen. Douglas Lute said at his 

headquarters at Kosovo’s Camp Bondsteel. ‘And that’s 

the fundamental question: What’s the future of Kosovo 

look like?’

The US-led air war in Kosovo ended in 1999. . . . Three 

years later, US troops . . . still provide 24-hour security 

at Serb Orthodox churches. They still wear helmets and 

don’t mix as closely with the locals as their counterparts 

in Bosnia. . . .

More than 5,000 US peacekeepers remain in Kosovo. In 

June, NATO agreed to a 25-percent reduction by June 

2003, with the US force to shrink by 1,300 troops.

But it is still unclear how long US troops will stay. . . .88

Chaplain (CPT) Brian Chepey and Chaplain Assistant SPC De-Angelo 

Coatie deployed together to Kosovo as a UMT with the 2d Aviation 

Battalion under the 1st Infantry Division. Serving in Kosovo at Camp 

Bondsteel from April through November 2002, Coatie said, “My chaplain 

and I were in synch. We shared the same vision and were able to implement 

some good ministry.” Coatie also stated that he enjoyed helping provide 

wholesome entertainment for the troops, he liked the Bible Studies, he was 

happy to visit local religious sites, and he enjoyed coordinating the two to 

four baptisms held per week for the soldiers. Coatie successfully did all 

that was expected of a chaplain assistant and more. He administered the 

chapel, arranged local religious tours, coordinated helicopter transportation 

for himself and Chepey, helped rebuild and paint local schools, protected 
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the chaplain while on convoys, and worked as a liaison for US Army 

chaplains to meet indigenous clergy in Kosovo. Coatie was promoted to 

sergeant E5 while in Kosovo. Coatie had a very positive experience in 

Kosovo, and while admitting there were stressors, he stated, “Kosovo was 

a really good deployment.”89

Camp Bondsteel in 2002 was a bustling community supported by 

several chaplains. Both Chaplain Chepey and Chaplain Yoon of the 1-

7th Battalion Field Artillery were at Bondsteel throughout the summer of 

2002. Chepey was the worship leader for the South Chapel on Sunday 

mornings and the pastor for the evening service at the South Chapel. Yoon 

led a Bible Study on Tuesday evenings at the South Chapel and provided 

weekly church services for the US and NATO forces at Pristina. Chepey 

saw as a highlight of his deployment the fact that he was able to baptize 

dozens of soldiers and Marines at a natural lake some 7,000 feet high on 

the nearby mountain affectionately called “Big Duke” by the Americans. 

Figure 13. US Army Chief of Chaplains (MG) David Hicks (center) and CA CSM 

Robert Bush (second from left) meet with US and NATO chaplains in Kosovo, 

February 2002.

CSM Robert Bush
147

Yoon rejoiced in that he had “freedom of ministry,” and stated, “The task 

force chaplain gave each UMT full support—minimum micromanagement. Because of him, there was a spiritual revival in Kosovo and record 

high chapel attendance.”90

Army chaplain ministries in Kosovo were an example of the integration of Reserve component chaplains and chaplain assistants with their 

Active Duty peers. At any location or time in Kosovo there could be any 

combination of Reserve and Active Duty chaplains and chaplain assistants working together as UMTs. Senior chaplains in the United States and 

in Europe were concerned that this integration went smoothly. Chaplain 

(MAJ) Kenneth Lawson of the 7th ARCOM in Germany made a 15 to 

19 July 2002 trip to Kosovo to check on the integration issues, provide 

training, and assess the Reserve component to Active Duty UMT status 

and report back to the USAREUR chaplain, the National Guard Bureau 

chaplain, and the USARC chaplain. Excerpts from his unpublished journal 

follow:

15 July 02—I am now on the bus from Pristina to Camp 

Bondsteel, Kosovo. Terrible road. Pockets of destruction 

are all around, ruined buildings and twisted steel everywhere. . . . Culture appears poor and agricultural, some 

new buildings and industry. . . . On the bus we have to wear 

body armor and our Kevlar helmets. There is an armed 

guard on board. . . . Arid rolling hills and a huge valley 

ideal for the airport, about a 3⁄4-hour ride to Bondsteel. 

16 July 02—A good night sleep in humble housing conditions. Hundreds of churches in this area have been blown 

up by Muslims, mostly of Albanian descent. . . . The senior 

chaplain at Bondsteel wondered why the US was here to 

protect the Muslims from the Serbs when the Muslims 

abuse the Serb Christians at every opportunity. . . . 

Bondsteel has a small prison in which five or six Serbian 

suspected killers are held awaiting trials. . . . Participated 

in a Bible Study at Pristina at 1900. There were riots in 

Pristina but not near us. . . . Had a small class on Reserve 

to Active Duty chaplain integration issues.

17 July 02—UN police are removing gruesome posters 

made from a real photograph of a Serbian soldier cutting 

the throat of a teenage Muslim. The caption of the poster 

read in Albanian and English, ‘Do not let criminals come 

back to Kosova.’ The posters were placed in locations to 
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incite riots. . . . Spent the afternoon in UMT training at the 

North Chapel, Bondsteel. Taught a large class on UMT 

issues with Reserve and Active Duty integration. . . . This 

evening had an especially beautiful sunset, as the clouds 

reflected a golden color upon the mountains. Truly God 

the creator of the universe is awesome. Yet how tragic are 

the sinful acts of humanity in contrast. I had to view the 

beauty of God’s creation through a barbed wire fence.

18 July 02—This morning I had a small class with two 

chaplains on chaplain integration issues. . . . The rest of 

the day I was on my own, exploring Camp Bondsteel. . . . 

I was late to bed this evening. On the way to my room I 

could hear civilian small mortars being fired. The ethnic 

hatred still goes on in isolated areas. One village will fire 

a mortar into another village at night, and then hide in the 

hills while the US or an allied force seeks them out. Small 

scale killings still go on. . . . Sometimes these events make 

the newspapers but mostly they do not.

19 July 02—Went for an early morning jog within the 

fence around Camp Bondsteel. The fog was very thick, 

poor visibility. The sounds of small arms fire was easy to 

hear, a few miles west of camp. The Serbians (Muslims) 

use every advantage (the fog) to commit atrocities then 

flee into hiding. As soon as the gunshots began, a US helicopter took off after the assailants, but they will never find 

the shooters because of the fog. . . . Flight delays and an 

exhausting day before I arrived back in Germany.91

Army Reserve Chaplain Assistant SPC Kelli Overturf served with the 

KFOR first at Camp Able Sentry, Macedonia, and then at Camp Bondsteel, 

Kosovo. Camp Able Sentry was a small NATO compound with one chapel and one American UMT, namely Chaplain (MAJ) Steven Jerles and 

Overturf. Overturf maintained the chapel, did administrative and office 

automation work, coordinated all religious activities, and was responsible 

for the security of all chapel equipment. Overturf and Jerles provided religious services for US and NATO troops as well as civilians from various countries who worked at Camp Able Sentry. A highlight of Overturf’s 

time at Camp Able Sentry was the spiritual retreats to Greece visiting the 

Bible sites associated with the Apostle Paul that she and Jerles coordinated 

and conducted. In December 2002, Camp Able Sentry began to downsize 

drastically and the chapel closed. Overturf then went to Camp Bondsteel, 
149

Kosovo, where she worked with Chaplain Assistant SGT Darnell Rambert 

and Chaplain (LTC) Gregg Drew. The newly married Overturf stated 

that the only downside to this deployment was being away from her 

husband.92

In August 2002, Lawson of the 7th ARCOM made a quick 5-day trip 

to Kosovo and Macedonia to visit soldiers from his unit. In his journal, 

Lawson recorded: 

19 Aug 02—Uneventful flight from Germany to 

Kosovo. . . . The bus ride from Pristina to Camp Bondsteel 

showed continued rebuilding after their civil war. A new 

huge mosque was under construction in a new town which 

just appeared in a field recently cleared of land mines. 

The distinct Muslim attire is evident among the people. 

One young Muslim man pointed his finger like a gun 

and pretended to shoot us on the bus. Slept at Bondsteel 

tonight. . . .

20 Aug 02—Departed Bondsteel after breakfast for Camp 

Able Sentry (CAS), Macedonia. The border between 

Kosovo and Macedonia was heavily guarded by UN soldiers. Both countries require that all vehicles entering 

their countries drive through a manmade shallow river, 

a symbol of spite in washing the dirt off of one country 

before entering the other. . . . Driving through Skopje was 

dangerous, as cows, people, bicycles, and vendors all clog 

the roadways, and anti-American sentiments run strong 

among the Serbians. . . . Minarets from mosques are a 

common sight. No Eastern Orthodox Church buildings 

anywhere, they were all destroyed. CAS is located next to 

the Skopje airport, which is not very busy. . . .

21 Aug 02—Today was relaxing. . . . I saw the soldiers I needed 

to see from my home unit, they are all doing fine. . . . One was 

on guard duty in a tower. . . . we talked and he gladly took 

Christian literature. . . . The chapel here at CAS is brand new, 

in pristine condition, seating about 90 people comfortably.

22 Aug 02—I went with Chaplain (MAJ) Steve Jerles 

and soldiers from my unit and others to visit the mental 

hospital at Demijkapj, about 90 minutes on the bus. This 

mental hospital/orphanage was very sad. Terrible living 

conditions, horrid smell, lots of flies in the eyes, noses, and 
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mouths of the mentally ill patients. These are the forgotten 

victims of war in the Balkans. Most are mentally disturbed 

from seeing their parents raped and murdered. It was built 

by the British and Macedonian governments. . . .

23 Aug 02—Spent all day waiting to travel or traveling. . . . I 

continued a long conversation with a sergeant from Florida 

that I had [started] with him on my way here 5 days ago. He 

was all mixed up theologically and had a lot of questions. . . . 

While waiting at the Tuzla airport an E4 who had a death in 

the family asked me to pray for him as he was going home 

on emergency leave. I was glad to do so. . . . An exhausting 

day but arrived safely home late at night Germany time.93

Drew, an Army Reserve chaplain of the 7th ARCOM, replaced 

Chandler as the ASG chaplain for Kosovo. Simultaneous to this, the senior 

ASG chaplain in Bosnia was Chaplain F. Douglas Hudson, also of the 7th 

ARCOM. That meant that both senior chaplains in theaters of operations 

Bosnia and Kosovo were from the same unit at the same time. This was the 

first and only time this has happened. As one news report stated:

This marked the first time in the history of the US Army 

in the Balkans that the senior SFOR and KFOR chaplain 

positions were held by chaplains from the same unit at the 

same time. . . . The fact that the unit is an Army Reserve 

unit stationed in Europe makes this distinction even more 

significant. . . . ‘Folks here are hungry to hear the word of 

God,’ said Chaplain Drew, who took part in more than 50 

worship services and about 100 small group Bible Studies 

at Camp Bondsteel, Kosovo. . . . Chaplain Hudson also 

provided worship services for troops in Hungary, in Bosnia 

at Eagle Base near Tuzla, and Forward Observation Base 

(FOB) Connor, near Srebrenica. ‘I spent a lot of time 

there [Taszar, Hungary] during the first couple of months,’ 

Hudson said. ‘I especially enjoyed the Christmas season 

with the soldiers.’94

As 2002 came to a close, Drew and the other UMT members had time 

to reflect on the holiday season and what the new year might bring. Clearly, 

ministries throughout Kosovo were going well. Chaplains throughout the 

region were having active and engaging ministries not only with US troops, 

but also with international peacekeepers and with civilians assigned to 

work on the installations. The downsizing of facilities and reductions in 

troop strength were an optimistic sign. In a somewhat reflective mood as 
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Christmas 2002 approached, Drew wrote the following summary of his 

prior months in Kosovo: 

The blessings for a chaplain serving soldiers in the 

Balkans are endless. Working with exceptional chaplain 

colleagues, gifted chaplain assistants, having fellowship 

with multinational soldiers and chaplains, and of course 

humanitarian activities in orphanages and schools. Yet 

there are two additional blessings for this chaplain that 

would cause any military leader a measure of pride. 

First, I’ve lost count now of the times civilians, contractors, soldiers from other nations, and those in the Active 

component have said, ‘We can’t tell the difference anymore between Active Duty, Reserve, or National Guard.’ 

The fact that we are now viewed as equal in ability, even 

though we have much less training time, is a testament 

to the commitment and excellence of today’s Reserve 

and National Guard. Second, when you hear the Active 

Component USAREUR and Regular Army UMT SGMs 

[Sergeant Majors] tell your very own chaplain assistants, 

that they have heard time and again, how well they are 

doing, while rewarding them with coins and praises; you 

stand 10 inches taller, and in the evening times of prayer, 

you thank God, for allowing you the privilege to work 

with such gifted young soldiers.95

Chaplain (CPT) Richard Brown of the 2d Battalion, 2d Infantry 

Regiment served through July of 2003 at Camp Montieth, Kosovo. Richard 

Brown commented, “I was the only chaplain on the camp. Nearest camp 

was 45 minutes to 1 hour away. Due to vehicle movement rules, I was 

unable to get there often. I did have the priest visit for Roman Catholic 

services once a week.” Richard Brown summed up his job description 

succinctly, saying, “I was responsible for the spiritual care of all soldiers 

and civilians on camp.” He believed that at this time in Kosovo there were 

only slight differences in ministry compared to a typical garrison ministry 

on any Army facility. Never sensing that he was in any personal danger, 

Richard Brown stated that he enjoyed distributing clothing, candy, and 

school supplies to local orphanages and schools, and that he tried to bring 

some understanding related to local Orthodox and Muslim traditions.96

Chaplain assistants in Kosovo in 2003 were enablers and coordinators 

for chaplains. They needed abilities in resource management, 

administration, military customs and courtesies, computer technology, 
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vehicle maintenance, force protection, hospitality, and initial counseling. 

The ASG chaplain assistant in Kosovo in early 2003 was SGT Darnell 

Rambert. As the ASG chaplain assistant, Rambert essentially was an 

enabler, a facilitator for other UMTs in Kosovo. As Rambert stated, “The 

easiest word to explain what we do is ‘support.’ We support the task force 

in all ways possible.” Rambert elaborated, “The Field Fund is probably the 

most visible thing we manage. This fund is currently in excess of $8,000, 

and all of the monies collected go back to the soldiers. . . . We also order 

ecclesiastical supplies for the task force UMTs, and manage the facilities, 

to ensure that all is working and any problems are taken care of.”97

Lawson made two short-term trips to Kosovo in 2003, the first from 6 

to 10 January and the second from 3 to 11 June. As with his previous short 

visits in Kosovo, the purpose of these visits was to resolve any Reserve 

to Active Duty integration issues and to minister to soldiers from his unit, 

the 7th ARCOM. The January visit to Camp Bondsteel consisted of several meetings with chaplains to discuss integration issues. Another briefing 

was with Drew, Rambert, and Overturf of the 7th ARCOM. This briefing consisted of informing Drew, Rambert, and Overturf about the 7th 

ARCOM’s operations related to sending troops to Afghanistan in retaliation to the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on America. Essentially, 

Drew, Rambert, and Overturf were told that when they returned from their 

deployment to Kosovo, the 7th ARCOM will be operating at an aggressive 

pace and will need their services right away. The weather on this January 

2003 visit to Kosovo was cold but not very snowy. Lawson’s June visit 

to Kosovo was to see 7th ARCOM troops at Camp Bondsteel, Pristina, 

and Camp Montieth. There were many opportunities on this June visit to 

minister in a hospital, to counsel those with marital problems, to distribute 

religious literature, to discuss theological issues with interested soldiers, 

and to dialogue with various UMTs on Reserve to Active Duty integration 

issues.98

On completion of his tour in Kosovo, Drew commented that he had 

many unique and rewarding ministry experiences from the Balkans. He 

stated, “We participated in the KFOR chaplain’s meetings and hosted one 

meeting here at Camp Bondsteel with 40 chaplains representing 16 countries. We provided countless suicide prevention briefs and reunion briefs, 

not to mention the many, many counseling sessions. Perhaps our greatest form of ministry though has been that of presence, and relationships.” 

Drew continued, “In Kosovo we delivered close to 300 boxes of donated 

items to schools, a hospital for the handicapped, an orphanage, and other 

charity organizations.”99 In conclusion, Drew reflected, “This level of ministry (working with an Active Duty task force), has caused all of us to grow 
153

and mature incredibly in our profession, and in our dependence on God to 

carry us through. We have learned to lean on one another, and take care of 

each other, and to keep each other accountable. All in all, this has been a 

truly remarkable experience.”100

The US Army Chaplaincy and Downsizing in Kosovo, 2004–2005

In 2004, Kosovo suffered from the pains of achieving more autonomy while the United States and NATO lowered their troop strength. 

Meanwhile, the United Nations had no clear plan for the future peaceful administration of Kosovo, whether the region would become an independent nation, an autonomous state within Serbia, or somehow joined 

to Albania. Disgruntled Kosovars of both Muslim and Eastern Orthodox 

beliefs took advantage of this transition period to settle old grudges or 

inflict anguish on their enemies. In the spring of 2004, sections of Kosovo 

were at peace while other sections were rife with tension and disturbances. 

Riots by both Muslims and Orthodox protestors forced NATO and US 

peacekeepers to use armed force when necessary to squelch the uprisings. 

For example, as one news report stated:

Figure 14. CH (LTC) Gregg Drew with residents of a mental health 

hospital in Kosovo.

US Army Reserve
154

PRISTINA, Serbia-Montenegro—Ethnic Albanians 

torched Serb homes and churches Thursday as Kosovo 

convulsed in a second day of rioting. The worst violence 

since the province’s war ended in 1999 has killed at least 

31 people and injured hundreds.

Serbian nationalists set mosques elsewhere on fire and 

threatened to retaliate with ‘slaughter and death.’ NATO 

sent reinforcements to quell tensions in the UN run province and ease the threat of renewed conflict in the volatile 

Balkans. . . .

Some peacekeepers were already carrying out the orders, 

shooting and wounding protesters who used violence in 

clashes Thursday, said Col. Horst Pieper, the chief NATO 

spokesman in Kosovo. The number of injured peacekeepers rose to 51 since clashes began Wednesday. . . .

The bloodshed underscored the bitter divisions that have 

polarized Kosovo’s mostly Muslim ethnic Albanians, who 

want independence from Serbia, and Orthodox Christian 

Serbs, a minority in Kosovo who consider the province 

their ancient homeland.

The violence . . . dealt the Bush administration a potential 

setback in efforts to reduce the number of peacekeepers in 

the Balkans and redeploy them to Iraq, Afghanistan, and 

other hotspots. About 2,000 Americans now serve with 

the force, down from 5,000 after the war, and the entire 

force has shrunk from 50,000 to 18,500. . . .

Serbia–Montenegro’s military raised the combat readiness of some units to their highest level, and Kosovo’s 

ethnic Albanian Prime Minister, Bajram Rexhepi, warned 

that the situation was not under control. The US Embassy 

in Belgrade closed to the public temporarily as a precaution. . . .101

Balkan tensions and hostilities in the spring of 2004 were not confined to the province of Kosovo. Within Serbia itself, riots by Orthodox 

Serbs against Muslim Albanians grew in prominence. One report stated, 

“Angered by ethnic clashes in Kosovo that targeted their kin, Serb nationalists rampaged Thursday in Serbia, torching mosques and threatening Kosovo’s ethnic Albanians with ‘slaughter and death.’” This article 

lamented the fact that “The protests in Belgrade and other Serbian towns 
155

were reminiscent of similar nationalistic outbursts at the start of the Balkan 

wars in the early 1990s, when former President Slobodan Milosevic’s propaganda deliberately incited hatred toward other ethnic groups then living in the former Yugoslavia.” In mentioning a specific example of ethnic 

hatred and violence, the report stated, “In Nis, Serbia’s second largest city, 

5,000 extremists gathered midmorning on the square, chanting ‘Slaughter, 

death to all’ Kosovar Albanians, and ‘Let’s all go to Kosovo.’”102

The US Army troop levels in Kosovo were around 2,000 in the spring 

of 2004, elevating quickly to 2,500 and remaining at that level throughout 

the year.103 From February through August, Army National Guard Chaplain 

(LTC) Timothy Peterson of the 34th Infantry Division of Minnesota was 

the senior Army chaplain in Kosovo. While soldiers on patrol in Kosovo 

experienced a temporary elevation of tension and danger from sporadic 

civilian riots, life in base camps for US troops remained stable and safe. 

Peterson commented:

I was the senior chaplain in the deployment KFOR 5B. 

The other chaplains were Bill Klavetter, Joel Steverson, 

Tom Jensen, and Eric Feig. All were from the Minnesota 

National Guard. . . . I was the staff chaplain, serving on 

the general’s personal staff and supervising the religious 

program for the whole task force. I was also the senior 

US chaplain in Kosovo and provided religious support 

to other US personnel and US civilians working for the 

United Nations.104

Peterson said of his relationship to his commander, “We had a 1⁄2-hour 

weekly scheduled meeting and talked many other times each week. He 

fully supported our ministry and urged us to be creative in finding ways to 

minister to soldiers and families.” Peterson elaborated on his relationship 

with his commander: “I accompanied the commanding general in his visits 

with religious leaders. I had input into the plans regarding the religious 

impact upon operations.” In speaking of his interaction with other chaplains in Kosovo, Peterson stated, “The US chaplains and chaplain assistants meet weekly for encouragement, coordination, and training. We also 

met once a month for training with the other chaplains involved in KFOR. 

All the US chaplains worked together to provide a comprehensive plan of 

worship and religious education.”105

In 2004, the future of Kosovo was uncertain. Before considering an 

independent Kosovo, UN officials insisted the province have a firmly established democracy, a respect for human rights and the rule of law, and a viable reconstruction program in place. The US and other world leaders took 
156

a cautious approach on Kosovo independence, fearing that any redrawing 

of borders in the Balkans could lead to new conflicts. Specifically of concern was Macedonia, where ethnic Albanians want statehood, and Bosnia, 

whose Serbs have also pressed for statehood.

Flare-ups of violence in Kosovo in 2004 were common. Homesteaders 

who refused to leave confronted resettling refugees returning to their 

homes. Threats, random violence, and ethnic tensions were evident. 

Skeptics could state that this was normal for Kosovo and, in fact, a sense 

of prewar normalcy had returned to the region. What was not normal was 

the 18 April prison shootout in the city of Kosovska Mitrovica. A press 

report stated:

KOSOVSKA MITROVICA, Serbia-Montenegro—A 

Jordanian policeman fired on a group of fellow UN police 

officers in a prison compound in Kosovo, killing two 

Americans before being shot and killed in the ensuing 

gunbattle. Eleven others, including ten Americans, were 

wounded.

A group of 21 American correctional officers, along with 

two Turks and an Austrian officer, were leaving the detention center after a day of training in northern Kosovo on 

Saturday when they came under fire from at least one 

member of a group of Jordanians on guard at the prison, 

said Neeraj Singh, a UN spokesman.

The officers shot back. In the 10-minute gunbattle, the 

attacker and two American officers were killed, while 10 

more Americans and one Austrian were wounded.

It was not clear what touched off the violence. Four 

Jordanian police officers were arrested, a NATO source 

told the Associated Press on condition of anonymity. . . .

The shooting took place in Kosovska Mitrovica, a city 

that has long been the scene of ethnic violence between 

Serbs and ethnic Albanians, including riots that broke out 

a month ago, killing 19 and injuring 900.106

By the end of 2004, Kosovo appeared to be on the mend. One report 

stated Kosovo “has the international community tied in knots,” and that 

Kosovo “has become a showplace for the difficulties and dangers of trying to heal a fractured society through a lumbering international bureaucracy,” there were signs that Kosovo was beginning to heal.107 Seeking to 

remedy the short supply of fresh water and inconsistent electricity along 
157

with addressing the huge unemployment rate in Kosovo, the UN created 

two agencies that made an immediate difference. One agency, the UN 

Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, addressed police, utilities, and 

economic issues. The other new agency was the Kosovo Trust Agency, a 

group of economists and bankers who administrated real estate, privatization of businesses, and financially sponsored redevelopment projects. 

Progress was noticeable throughout Kosovo.108

As 2004 transitioned into 2005, US Army chaplains continued to minister to about 2,500 US troops in Kosovo, NATO soldiers, and authorized 

civilians. Serving these US soldiers were five chaplains and four chaplain 

assistants. Chaplain (LTC) Lawrence Hendel was the Task Force Eagle

chaplain and Chaplain (LTC) Daniel Viveros was the deputy staff chaplain. Working with Hendel and Viveros in the task force were Chaplain 

Assistants SSG Frank Tsai, SGT Oscar Guerrero, and SGT Jasmine Yates. 

UMT members not in the Task Force Eagle structure but also in Kosovo 

were Chaplain (MAJ) Oran Roberts, Chaplain (MAJ) Douglas Compton, 

and Chaplain (CPT) Chris Guadiz, along with Chaplain Assistant SSG 

Richard Johnson. Hendel, a Roman Catholic priest with the California 

Army National Guard, described his position in Kosovo:

I am the brigade chaplain, or staff chaplain for 

Multinational Brigade East in Kosovo. I am responsible 

for supervising, mentoring, and guiding the four other 

UMTs within the task force. I am responsible to brief the 

commander weekly, attend weekly staff calls, attend the 

update brief and commanding general’s calendar scrub 

along with the weekly commander’s brief. We conduct 

weekly UMT meetings and bi-monthly training sessions. 

As the sole US Roman Catholic priest, I am responsible 

for the welfare of all the Catholics in the task force at both 

Camp Bondsteel and Camp Montieth. Per guidance from 

the USAREUR chaplain, I support Task Force Orion in 

Bosnia with Catholic support once a month. I oversee the 

bi-monthly 4-day spiritual retreat trips to Greece but the 

chaplain OIC [officer in charge] and his chaplain assistant 

do all of the work. Like any other chaplain, there are pastoral counseling sessions, many reports, and coordination 

that must go on. I also coordinate with the international 

theater chaplain as the need arises.

Principally I work with my deputy chaplain, Chaplain 

Daniel Viveros, who is the OIC of one of two chapels on 
158

Bondsteel and collaborate with the other chaplains serving on this mission and in particular as we prepare and 

plan for redeployment. I believe we have a reasonably 

cohesive team as we share responsibilities for the Greece 

retreats, participate in the international activities and task 

force religious and pastoral support.109

Chaplain Roberts and Chaplain Assistant Yates made up the UMT at 

Camp Montieth, Kosovo. Roberts, affectionately called the “Bishop of 

Montieth” since he was the only chaplain at that installation, worked with 

Yates to provide religious support, suicide prevention classes, reunion briefings, and other lectures to improve the morale and welfare of the troops. When 

asked if he ever felt in personal danger in Kosovo, Roberts responded:

Even though we are receiving hostile fire pay, I have 

never felt in danger due to threat of arms. The majority 

of the population, Kosovo-Albanians, seems to love us 

and refer to us as their liberators and allies. The Imams 

that I have met refer to us as their ‘miku im,’ beloved 

friends. The children are constantly waiving at us and 

saying hello. The reception has not been quite so warm by 

Kosovo-Serbians, but they have been friendly as well. The 

Serbian Orthodox priests have been quick to point out the 

injustices that have occurred during the NATO occupation; 

nevertheless, they have remained civil. Driving on the 

narrow Kosovo roads is probably the most dangerous 

thing we do, especially during the wintertime. The roads 

are traveled by livestock, pedestrians, horse-drawn 

wagons, tractors, and suicidal drivers in automobiles that 

attempt to pass on blind hills and curves. We have seen 

plenty of accidents and have had multiple near misses. 

Mirror strikes are common. There are no sidewalks in the 

country, so pedestrians tend to walk in the car lanes when 

snow is covering the shoulders of the road.110

One of the issues that chaplains and chaplain assistants had to deal 

with in Kosovo in 2005 was boredom. Soldiers were performing routine 

missions, Kosovo was no longer very dangerous, soldiers had idle time, 

and morale could potentially plummet. Yates recalled:

This is a very long deployment in which basically nothing 

happens the entire time you are here. It is very important (especially on an infantry post) to keep the morale of 

the soldiers up by keeping them busy. This is not Iraq or 
159

Afghanistan, and things get boring and morale gets low. It 

is, however, very safe and I feel very content here.

I work with Chaplain Roberts as the only UMT on Camp 

Montieth, an infantry post with over 400 male soldiers. 

We balance our time between missions with spiritual leaders outside of the camp, NGO leaders, and most importantly soldier care. On a good day I work 0900–1700 and 

have time to work out, eat dinner with friends and watch 

a movie. On a normal day my hours vary greatly and we 

spend many of those hours outside the wire visiting the 

leaders in our community. I provide security for the chaplain outside the wire and make sure all maintenance is 

taken care of. Although he has an open door policy, when 

possible, I make appointments for soldiers to meet with 

Chaplain Roberts.111

The US and NATO presence in Kosovo was contributing to peace 

and the rebuilding of the nation. When various incidents of local violence erupted in Kosovo in 2005, no escalation of hostilities occurred and 

Kosovars resolved the conflicts with little NATO assistance. The province was starting to stand on its own. For example, on 15 March 2005 

a bomb blew up near the convoy of Kosovo President Ibrahim Rugova 

in Pristina, injuring a bystander and some property. Kosovar police, with 

Italian peacekeepers in support handled the situation with no escalation.112

On 2 July 2005, three almost simultaneous explosions in Pristina produced 

no casualties and no escalation of hostilities.113 The discontented were still 

randomly violent, but Kosovo was well on its way to recovery. 

An integral part of the ongoing healing of ethnic tensions within 

Kosovo can be credited to US and NATO chaplains working in local communities on humanitarian, benevolence, and religious dialogue activities. 

From the moment NATO and US chaplains arrived in Kosovo, they began 

to build bridges of communication, understanding, tolerance, and respect 

between local antagonistic religious and civil leaders. By 2005, the results 

of these efforts were obvious. Chaplain Assistant Tsai succinctly stated, 

“The UMTs in Kosovo continually interact with nongovernmental organizations and a few individual families to provide spiritual and financial 

support.”114 Hendel elaborated on the American UMTs working outside 

the wire to locals in need:

We provide monies through designated offerings to a few 

NGOs that function here in Kosovo. The Mother Teresa 

Society has an office in every major municipality, but we 
160

focus on the one in Vitina within our AOR. The director serves 216 households, the poorest of the poor. The 

soldier’s offerings are the primary source of funding for 

their carefully documented work. Chaplain Guadiz and 

his assistant, SPC Aaron Stevens, see the director regularly and we were taken on a tour once to see some of 

the households the Mother Teresa Society helps. It was 

a profound experience, seeing the poorest of the poor in 

person. We provide assistance to a women’s shelter in 

Gjilane, named Liria, and Chaplain Oran Roberts in that 

area visits the center regularly with his chaplain assistant, SGT Jasmine Yates. The Aviation chaplain, Chaplain 

Doug Compton, visits an orphanage in Pristina with his 

chaplain assistant, SSG Richard Johnson, and we have 

provided some funding for that NGO. Other than that 

we don’t directly minister to the local population. Our 

responsibility is to minister to the soldiers and provide 

for the spiritual needs of the contractors who work at the 

installations. We have to be careful to be consistent and 

impartial in our efforts when and if we reach out to the 

local communities. I recently had the experience of meeting with a local Catholic priest and learned about the challenges he faces as priest and pastor.115

Roberts and Yates found working with local Kosovars to be a rewarding 

experience. Such ministries were refreshing to the UMT members as well 

as to the soldiers who accompanied them on these local humanitarian 

assistance visits. Such benevolent activities let soldiers see the people of 

Kosovo and the ravages of civil war, and allowed the troops to feel like 

they were contributing to the welfare of others. Roberts stated:

My UMT has continued the work started by the previous UMT. We provide humanitarian assistance with the 

approval of our S5 [Civil Affairs] to the Liria Center for 

the Protection of Women and Children in Gjilan and to the 

Kamenica Red Cross. We take designated chapel offerings for these NGOs and provide donated clothing, food, 

and other supplies. The Liria Center is a women’s shelter that shelters and educates women and children who 

have been traumatized by the war, domestic violence, and 

human trafficking. I have done radio and TV interviews 

with them to advertise their services that are available to 

all ethnic groups in Kosovo. The Kamenica Red Cross is a 
161

local NGO that provides basic necessities and emergency 

aid to the poorest families in the Kamenica area. Recently, 

Chaplain (LTC) Daniel Viveros and I have taken on the 

Soup Kitchen in Novo Brdo. As the deputy staff chaplain, 

Dan performs a Protestant worship service at the chapel 

in Film City that takes a designated offering for the soup 

kitchen. Novo Brdo is primarily a Serbian area, but the 

kitchen serves all ethnic groups in their area. We have 

tried to limit our efforts to the most worthy NGOs, but we 

have also helped individuals, such as baby Albert, who 

needed surgery for a cleft palate.116

The people of Kosovo have a deep respect for their religious leaders. 

Whether Muslim, Eastern Orthodox, or Roman Catholic, these religious 

leaders are often the most important people in the community. Kosovar 

civil leaders look for religious endorsement of their plans and policies. 

Average residents in rural Kosovo venerate clerics, even if they personally are mostly secular in disposition. Simply stated, to achieve emotional 

and spiritual healing in Kosovo after centuries of tension and hatred, the 

Figure 15. SGT Jasmine Yates (rear) with children from the Kamenica area.

SGT Jasmine Yates
162

diverse clergy of Kosovo must support peace. US and NATO chaplains 

since entering Kosovo in 1999 have always sought and usually succeeded 

in bringing rival indigenous clergy together for conferences to promote 

peace and unity. Roberts continued the routine of his predecessors by consistently networking with local clergy. Roberts recalled:

I have met with and formed friendships with the key 

Muslim, Orthodox, Catholic, and Protestant religious 

leaders in my sector. I have been their escort to various 

KFOR events, and I have served as a liaison between my 

task force and them. I do not participate in IO targeting, but 

my relationship with these religious leaders has given me 

a better understanding of how to advise my commander 

on the influence of religion on our peace-enforcement 

mission and as to the religious perspective on the current 

situation.117

No emotional or civil reconstruction was possible in Kosovo without imposing justice on those who committed heinous war crimes against 

civilians. In early March 2005, Kosovo’s former Prime Minister Ramush 

Haradinaj surrendered to the UN War Crimes Tribunal following a special 

flight from Pristina to The Hague, Netherlands.118 Haradinaj pleaded not 

guilty to 37 charges of war crimes including murder, rape, and deportation 

of Serbs during the 1998–99 war between ethnic Albanians and Serb forces 

and was in confinement.119 In 2005, the war crimes trial of former Serbian 

President Slobodan Milosevic was in session at The Hague. Milosevic was 

charged with a multitude of war crimes including genocide. 

Meanwhile, US military operations in the region were ongoing, with 

one tragedy. On 1 April 2005 a C-130 aircraft took off from an airport in 

Tirana, Albania, on a routine training mission in conjunction with Albanian 

forces. A news report stated:

TIRANA, Albania—Search teams recovered all nine bodies Friday from the wreckage of a US military aircraft that 

crashed in mountainous southern Albania during a joint 

exercise, authorities said.

A US military C-130 airplane crashed in bad weather late 

Thursday near the remote village of Rovie, in the Drizez 

Mountains, about 100 kilometers (60 miles) southeast of 

the capital, Tirana, officials said. The exact cause was 

unclear. . . . The military transport was assigned to the 

352d Special Operations Group based in Mildenhall, 

England. . . .120
163

As this tragedy was on an Air Force mission, an Air Force chaplain 

was the lead in providing memorial services and counseling. However, 

Army Chaplain Hendel stated he did speak to two liaison officers who 

went to Albania from Kosovo and remarked that they were doing fine.121

Army Chaplain Compton remarked that his aviation unit helped support 

the Air Force with Black Hawk helicopter operations, but the Air Force 

chaplain ministered to those involved and did memorial services.122

While US and NATO forces still maintained their potentially dangerous peacekeeping missions, in 2005 Kosovo politically experienced the 

growth pains of a fledgling democracy. The Christian Serb minority in 

Kosovo resisted the efforts of the majority Muslim Albanians in developing a power-sharing plan. Serbs wanted more self-government in their 

enclaves throughout Kosovo. The Albanian majority, desiring complete 

independence from Serbia, was under international pressure to accommodate these desires of the Serbs. Quibbling continued over the details of this 

power-sharing plan throughout 2005.123

In the fall of 2005, Hendel was the senior chaplain in Kosovo. There 

were three US Army chapels still operating in Kosovo, two chapels at 

Camp Bondsteel, and one chapel at Camp Montieth. Hendel’s reflections 

on his prior 12 months of service in Kosovo bear repeating:

Serving in Kosovo is not glamorous or headline news, but 

I believe the efforts of all Kosovo Forces, being part of 

this multinational effort is the opportunity to make a difference to implement the spirit of UN Resolution 1244. 

We are a small part of an international effort to afford a 

region the opportunity to maintain peace, have a safe and 

secure environment, and restore confidence in the population’s efforts to engage in the self-governing process. 

There are many more issues for the people of Kosovo to 

resolve and work through, but they are on the way. I have 

been proud to serve with all the soldiers in this peacekeeping mission, US and multinational. . . .124
164

Notes

1. Frank Columbus, ed., Kosovo-Serbia: A Just War? (Commack, NY: 

Nova Science Publishers, 1999), 5.

2. Wikipedia contributors, “History of Kosovo,” Wikipedia: The Free 

Encyclopedia, www.en.wikipedia.org/wiki/history_of_kosovo. Much of the following narrative is based on this insightful article.

3. Noel Malcolm, Kosovo: A Short History (New York: New York University 

Press, 1998), 41–44.

4. “History of Kosovo,” Wikipedia.

5. Tim Judah, Kosovo: War and Revenge (New Haven: Yale University 

Press, 2000), 4–7.

6. “History of Kosovo,” Wikipedia.

7. Malcolm, Kosovo: A Short History, 139–141.

8. “History of Kosovo,” Wikipedia.

9. Glen E. Curtis, ed., Yugoslavia: A Country Study (Washington, DC: GPO 

for the Library of Congress, 1992), 26.

10. “History of Kosovo,” Wikipedia.

11. Josef Korbel, Tito’s Communism (Denver: University of Denver Press, 

1951), 53.

12. Julie A. Mertus, Kosovo: How Myths and Truths Started a War (Berkeley: 

University of California Press, 1999), 141–143.

13. Ibid., 145.

14. “History of Kosovo,” Wikipedia.

15. Mertus, Kosovo: How Myths and Truths Started a War, 182–187.

16. “History of Kosovo,” Wikipedia.

17. Madeline Albright, Madame Secretary: A Memoir (New York: Miramax 

Books, 2003), 225, 481.

18. Ibid., 483–484, 481.

19. Ibid., 485.

20. Ibid., 488–489.

21. Wesley Clark, Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Future of 

Conflict (New York: PublicAffairs Books, 2001), 137.

22. “Operation Allied Force,” www.defenselink.mil/specials/kosovo.

23. Ibid. 

24. Clark, Waging Modern War, 176.

25. Ibid., 183.

26. Ibid., 187–189.

27. Ibid., 214, 219, 281, 286.

28. Ibid., 426–427.

29. “Operation Allied Force,” www.defenselink.mil/specials/Kosovo.

30. Clark, Waging Modern War, 234, 267.

31. Ibid., 326.

32. Ibid., 371.
165

33. Chaplain (COL) Janet Horton, interview by Dr. John Brinsfield, 3 March 

2004.

34. Chaplain Charles Howell, interview by Dr. John Brinsfield, 10 December 

2003.

35. Questionnaire by Chaplain (CPT) Scott Jones, 9 August 2005.

36. Questionnaire by Chaplain (CPT) Darin Powers, 11 August 2005.

37. Questionnaire by Chaplain (CPT) Brent Causey, 13 April 2005. 

38. Questionnaire by SFC Craig Gardner, 25 March 2005. 

39. Chaplain (BG) David Zalis, interview by author, 4 May 2005.

40. Ibid.

41. Janet Horton interview.

42. Ibid.

43. Chaplain (MAJ) Allen Kovach, interview by author, 17 August 2005.

44. Ibid.

45. Causey questionnaire.

46. Questionnaire by SFC Elbert Jackson, 20 September 2004.

47. Powers questionnaire.

48. Scott Jones questionnaire.

49. Chaplain (CPT) Steven Mark Jones, interview by author, 21 June 2004.

50. Ibid.

51. Gardner questionnaire.

52. Steven Mark Jones interview.

53. Gardner questionnaire.

54. Chaplain Peter Baktis, interview by author, 13 August 2004.

55. Chaplain Peter Baktis, correspondence with author, 4 October 2005.

56. Albright, Madame Secretary, 520.

57. Linda D. Kozaryn, “U.S. Offers Kosovar Albanians Safe Haven,” Armed 

Forces Press Service, n.d. Accessed on 3 October 2005 at www.defenselink.mil/

specials/provide_refuge/2background.html.

58. Ibid.

59. “Standing Operating Procedures/Chaplain,” Joint Task Force Operation 

PROVIDE REFUGE, 10 May 1999. 

60. Eric Wester, John Stepp, Donald Holdridge, “Initial Ministry to 

Persecuted People,” The Army Chaplaincy, Winter–Spring 2000, 36–37.

61. Chaplain Donald Holdridge, correspondence with author, 4 October 2005.

62. Chaplain John Stepp, correspondence with author, 4 October 2005.

63. Ibid.

64. Questionnaire by Chaplain (CPT) Mohammad Khan, 25 July 2005.

65. Ibid.

66. “Disaster Response: Efforts of Interaction Agencies in Kosovo,” 

InterAction, May 2001, located at www.interaction.org/kosovo. 

67. Ralph Reinties, ed., “Tularemia Outbreak Investigation in Kosovo: Case 

Control and Environmental Studies Research, Emerging Infectious Diseases, 

January 2002. Accessed at www.findarticles.com. 
166

68. Questionnaire by Chaplain (CPT) John McLain, 10 July 2004.

69. Questionnaire by Chaplain (CPT) Steve Firtko, 6 August 2000.

70. Baktis interview.

71. Ibid.

72. Questionnaire by Chaplain (CPT) Steven Simpson, 4 November 2004. 

73. Questionnaire by Chaplain Kenneth Hubbs, 10 July 2004.

74. Questionnaire by Chaplain (CPT) William Horton, 5 August 2004.

75. Ibid.

76. Ibid. 

77. Steven Mark Jones interview. 

78. Gary J. Kunich, “Soldiers Prepare to Leave Kosovo by Preparing for 

Transition Back into Home Life,” European Stars & Stripes, 15 December 

2000, 3. 

79. Joseph Anderson, “Military Operational Measures of Effectiveness for 

Peacekeeping Operations,” Military Review, September/October 2001, 36.

80. Ibid., 37.

81. Chaplain (MAJ) Robert Land, interview by author, 9 July 2004.

82. Ibid.

83. Ibid.

84. Questionnaire from Chaplain (CPT) Martin Kendrick, 31 January 2005.

85. Questionnaire from Chaplain (CPT) Steven E. Cantrell, 31 January 

2005.

86. Chaplain (LTC) Vernon Chandler, interview by author, 29 July 2004.

87. Kimberly C. Field and Robert M. Perito, “Creating a Force for Peace 

Operations: Ensuring Stability with Justice,” Parameters, Winter 2002–2003, 

77–78.

88. Vince Crawley, “Despite Drawdown, Endgame’s Unclear,” Army Times, 

22 July 2002, 10–11.

89. Questionnaire by SGT De-Angelo Coatie, 8 August 2005.

90. Questionnaire by Chaplain Paul Yoon, 19 July 2004.

91. Unpublished diary of Chaplain Kenneth Lawson, 15–19 July 2002. A 

copy is on file at the US Army Chaplain Center and School Library, Fort Jackson, 

SC.

92. SPC Kelli Overturf, correspondence with author, 6 December 2002.

93. Lawson unpublished diary, 19–23 August 2002.

94. Jon Dahms, “7th Army Reserve Command Chaplains Complete Historic 

Ministry,” US Army Reserve News Service, 5 May 2003.

95. Chaplain Gregg Drew, correspondence with author, 19 December 2002.

96. Questionnaire from Chaplain (CPT) Richard E. Brown, 24 July 2004.

97. SGT Darnell Rambert, correspondence with author, 2 February 2003.

98. Lawson unpublished diary, 6–10 January, 3–11 June 2002, and August 

2002.

99. Dahms, “7th Army Reserve Command Chaplains Complete Historic 

Mission,” 1–2.

100. Chaplain Gregg Drew, correspondence with author, 16 March 2003.
167

101. “NATO Sends Troops Into Strife-Torn Kosovo,” Associated Press, 18 

March 2004.

102. “Serb Mobs Target Muslims, Albanians,” Associated Press, 18 March 

2004.

103. The Army Times placed the troop levels on 16 September 2004 at 2,500 

in Kosovo and repeated that figure on 6 December 2004.

104. Questionnaire by Chaplain Timothy Peterson, 13 April 2005.

105. Ibid.

106. “Three U.N. Officers Die in Kosovo Prison Shootout,” Associated 

Press, 18 April 2004.

107. Andrew Higgins, “Could U.N. Fix Iraq? Word from Kosovo Isn’t 

Encouraging,” Wall Street Journal, 2 August 2004, 1.

108. Ibid., 2.

109. Questionnaire by Chaplain (LTC) Lawrence Hendel, 25 October 2005.

110. Questionnaire by Chaplain (CPT) Oran Roberts, 26 October 2004.

111. Questionnaire by SGT Jasmine Yates, 27 October 2005.

112. “Bomb Near Kosovo Presidential Convoy,” Associated Press, 15 March 

2005.

113. “Blast Hits U.N. HQ in Kosovo,” Associated Press, 2 July 2005. 

114. Questionnaire by SSG Frank Tsai, 29 October 2005.

115. Hendel questionnaire.

116. Roberts questionnaire.

117. Ibid.

118. Anthony Deutsch, “Kosovo’s Ex-Premier Surrenders to UN,” WORLD 

Magazine, 9 March 2005, 6.

119. “Kosovo ex-PM Denies 37 War Charges,” CNN.com, 14 March 2005.

120. “Bodies found after C-130 Crash,” CNN.com, 1 April 2005. 

121. Chaplain Lawrence Hendel, correspondence with author, 3 November 

2005. 

122. Chaplain Douglas Compton, correspondence with author, 3 November 

2005.

123. “Serbs Reject Kosovo Power-Sharing Plan,” USA Today, 11 August 

2005, 5A. 

124. Hendel questionnaire.

169

Chapter 5

Conclusion

After 10 years of military involvement in the Balkans, the US military 

can rightly be satisfied that they have saved lives and maintained peace. 

Considering the volatile and tortured history of this region, the calm presently experienced throughout the Balkans is remarkable. In the early 

1990s, Bosnia was a killing zone—a place of genocide and vile atrocities. 

After the intervention of the United States and NATO in 1995, the killings 

stopped and a tentative but growing peace surrounded the region. Having 

failed in his political and military objectives in Bosnia, the Serbian tyrant 

Slobodan Milosevic turned his frightful ambitions toward Kosovo. Serbians 

in Kosovo resisted more firmly than they did in Bosnia. An air bombing campaign followed by an invasion of NATO and US troops quickly 

squashed Serbian resistance, and the occupation of Kosovo began. 

In the Balkans, the United States and NATO have been active and 

successful in peacekeeping and nation-building activities. At the same 

time, war criminals from throughout the Balkans have been arrested and 

placed on trial. At the time of this writing, Slobodan Milosevic was on 

trial in an international court at The Hague in the Netherlands, accused of 

crimes against humanity. Others accused of crimes in the Balkans are also 

awaiting trial. For example, as one news report stated, “Nebojsa Pavkovik, 

Yugoslavia’s former Army chief, surrendered to a United Nations tribunal in The Hague, Netherlands, to face charges of war crimes during the 

1998–99 civil war in the southern Serbian province of Kosovo. The former 

general was indicted in 2003 on five charges related to the forced deportation of 800,000 Kosovo Albanian civilians and the murder of hundreds 

of them.”1 Near the end of 2005, many suspected war crime trials at The 

Hague were concluding, notably the sentencing of Haradin Bala to 13 

years in prison for executing 9 unarmed civilian prisoners in July 1999.2

While international courts of law sorted out the innocence or guilt of 

numerous Serbians, Bosnians, or Kosovars, the common people of the 

Balkans attempted to locate missing relatives or identify the remains of the 

dead. The following news report states progress in this area:

SARAJEVO, Bosnia-Herzegovina—A Bosnian based 

international agency for missing persons said Friday it 

had identified 2,000 victims of the Srebrenica massacre 

whose bodies were found in mass graves in Bosnia.

The International Commission on Missing Persons has a 

list of 7,800 persons who disappeared in the worst massacre 
170

of civilians in Europe since World War II. Bosnian Serb 

forces overran the Muslim enclave of Srebrenica in July 

1995 and executed thousands of men and boys.

Rifat Kesetovic, chief pathologist of the organization, 

signed the 2,000th Srebrenican-related death certificate at 

a morgue in the northern city of Tuzla.

‘We are proud to have passed this landmark, but there are 

still around 6,000 missing victims from Srebrenica and 

we are working hard to find them, to identify them and 

return them to their families,’ Kesetovic said. . . . 

Also Friday, Serbian police arrested a fifth suspect incriminated in the Srebrenica killings in a 1995 execution video 

of Muslim prisoners, Belgrade media reported.3

Public memorial services to honor the dead throughout Bosnia were 

an indication that peace was prevailing and emotional scars were beginning to heal. The memorial service at Vuk Karadzic in May 2002 allowed 

family members to return to the site where they were separated from their 

loved ones, never to be reunited. Other smaller ceremonies, such as the 

one in the spring of 2002 at the Drina River, allowed loved ones to morn, 

pray, and grieve at the location where the corpses of their loved ones were 

thrown in the river. An eyewitness stated, “This is the first time people 

were able to gather together in the city of Bratunac for the observance 

without violence. This was a major step toward reconciliation in BiH 

[Bosnia-Herzegovina].”4

Nevertheless, factions within Bosnia were resistant to change. Just 

before the 10th anniversary memorial service at Srebrenica in 2005, explosives were found and disarmed at the memorial service location. No injuries 

occurred and the 50,000 people expected to attend the event were able to 

eulogize and grieve in peace.5 Others resistant to change were the Bosnian 

Serbian Parliament that, after years of haggling over details, accepted the 

European Union’s (EU) demand for reform of Bosnia’s ethnically divided 

police force, fulfilling the last condition for an agreement to bring the 

country closer to membership. The Bosnian Serb Parliament adopted by 

an overwhelming majority the EU guidelines for the police reform a day 

before the deadline was to expire. Bosnian Serbs had initially rejected the 

EU guidelines for reform, while the Muslim-Croat federation accepted the 

reforms months before. By October 2005, all major factions within Bosnia 

had agreed to the reforms that would diminish corruption, provide more 

accountability, and ethnically diversify regional police forces.6

While Bosnia restructured and instituted reforms with the goal of 
171

recognition in the EU, Kosovo remained farther behind in its reforms. At the 

end of 2005, Kosovo languished in a 6-year governmental limbo as a UN 

administered province of Serbia. As UN Envoy Martti Ahtisarri lamented, 

“Everybody’s fed up with these transitional periods. Nobody wants to see 

Kosovo as a failed state.”7 Determining the final status of Kosovo is seen 

as the key to wider stability throughout the Balkans. While the fighting 

stopped in 1999, fears of extremists set to disrupt the peace process have 

forced NATO to maintain an 18,000-strong military presence in Kosovo, 

of which about 2,000 are from the United States. Ethnic tensions remain in 

Kosovo, as those of Albanian Muslim descent look to Pristina for leadership 

while Serbian Christians see their leadership in Belgrade. Civilians who 

travel from Serbia in and out of Kosovo frequently stop on the side of the 

road and change license plates to avoid any regional animosities. Kosovo 

is also troubled by constant power outages, an unemployment rate of up to 

60 percent, and estimated monthly wages of about 150 to 200 euros, that 

being equivalent to 100 to 150 US dollars. The main hindrance to stability 

in Kosovo remains the Bosnian Serbs in Belgrade, who are reluctant to 

concede that their dream of a Serbian Christian Kosovo at the expense of 

Muslim Kosovars will not be a reality.

US Army chaplains serving throughout the Balkans from 1995 to 2005 

were essential in the reconciliation process for the diverse religious populations. Clearly, the role of the chaplain as a religious adviser to commanders, long an expectation in the military, was solidified and enhanced by 

Army chaplains serving in the Balkans. Army commanders in the Balkans 

did not face a forceful and well-armed professional Army, but rather 

regional militias and paramilitary forces that thrived off ethnic racism and 

religious hatred. Army chaplains networked with local clergy and political 

leaders, brought rival religious factions to clergy events, promoted harmony among rival groups, and encouraged forgiveness and acceptance by 

long-standing belligerents. Chaplain Chandler stated:

I attended a meeting at Eagle Base in Bosnia [2001] to help 

the Bosnian military develop a chaplaincy. Both Bosnian 

Muslims and Bosnian Eastern Orthodox Christians 

attended. Through translators we showed how an interdenominational and pluralistic chaplaincy can function. 

The whole concept of a military chaplaincy was foreign 

to them, even more so when they learned about how chaplains of all faiths [serve] in the US military chaplaincy.8

While in Bosnia in 1996, Chaplain (CPT) David Brown made numerous visits to local clergy to get a better understanding of the religious and 

ethnic tensions in Bosnia. His frequent visits to Eastern Orthodox churches 
172

and his discussions with Orthodox priests allowed him to make friends and 

to help build a level of credibility among local clergy for the US presence 

in Bosnia. The following article mentions the role of chaplains as spiritual 

diplomats and promoters of reconciliation:

Efforts to regain peace in war-torn Bosnia and Herzegovina 

continue, and the United States Army chaplains in the 

region are assuming the role of spiritual diplomats. The 

Army chaplains are teaching local military leaders the 

benefits of creating a chaplaincy within the Bosnian military to teach harmony and tolerance. Military clergy from 

Britain, Denmark, Poland and Turkey are joining the US 

Army chaplains in this spiritual diplomatic initiative. . . .

‘Who better than a chaplain to talk about healing and 

reconciliation in a peacekeeping environment,’ said 

Chaplain (MAJ) Mike Lembke, who helped organize the 

discussions.

Chaplain Lembke served as the Plans and Operations 

Chaplain during Operation JOINT FORGE, Stabilization 

Force 8, in Bosnia-Herzegovina for Task Force Eagle. 

He coordinated with the Joint Military Commission and 

the Civil Military Cooperation Cell, a series of meetings 

with local military advisers and Muslim, Orthodox, and 

Catholic clergy from Bosnia. These meetings resulted in 

convening the first Armed Forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina 

Religious Support Conference.

‘It has been very meaningful to me to be able to employ 

chaplain doctrine in providing advice to our commander 

and to participate in ongoing discussions with local 

Orthodox, Muslim, and Roman Catholic clergy as part of 

my work and ministry in Bosnia,’ said Lembke.9

Chaplain Wead provides an example of a chaplain having direct positive input into a tactical situation. The chaplain’s voice of compassion and 

reason helped to avoid a potential disaster in Bosnia in the fall of 2001.

Our unit was going to raid a suspected al-Qaeda terrorist 

hideout. Our commander suggested using CS gas [tear 

gas]. He asked for input. I pointed out that our mission 

stated we were to gather papers, and if we used CS gas 

it could ignite the building and destroy intelligence 

materials. I also suggested that our own intelligence had 
173

been very inaccurate before. It was possible that they 

were wrong about this being a terrorist cell location. We 

did not use the CS gas. It turned out the house we took 

down contained an 80 year old woman, her daughter of 

35, and grandchild of 11. I believe my role as chaplain 

gave me a different way of looking at these operations 

than the other officers. This assisted the Commander in 

making a prudent decision that showed compassion and 

restraint.10

The role of the US Army chaplain in the Balkans peace process varied 

based on time and personalities. The initial US presence in the Balkans 

was reluctant to engage with local clergy, there being no standing operating procedures for such activities. As US troops rotated in and out of 

Bosnia and later Kosovo, there was more willingness for chaplains to 

engage with local clergy to facilitate peacekeeping and reconciliation. As 

Chaplain Steinhilber recalled: 

We’re a stabilization force; it’s been stabilized. We’re 

religious leaders. Why can’t we go out and meet with the 

local clergy and help out and meet with our neighbors? 

For instance, Chaplain Michael Hoyt had very much of an 

‘Oh, no, we don’t go out of our compound; we take care of 

our own,’ attitude. Chaplain Jim Goodwill had more of an 

openness but was hampered on that. Later chaplains were 

more open to moving about the countryside and working 

with orphanages, etc.11 

By 1998 Army Chaplain Baktis was able to travel throughout Bosnia 

in an itinerant ministry capacity, he being in high demand as an Eastern 

Orthodox priest. One way Baktis was able to facilitate harmony and reconciliation in Bosnia was with his frequent meetings with indigenous Eastern 

Orthodox clergy. In this capacity, Baktis was able to present the US and 

NATO peacekeepers as those who respected the religious traditions of 

Bosniacs and friends who desired to enhance and encourage wholesome 

religious expressions among the people. Baktis was also able to be a peacemaker with the US allies in the Balkans. For example, the Russian army 

had a heavy presence in Bosnia. As an Eastern Orthodox priest, Baktis 

had immediate legitimacy with Russian Orthodox soldiers and chaplains. 

Baktis was able to communicate, coordinate, and fellowship with his fellow Eastern Orthodox clergy within the Russian army chaplaincy, helping 

to establish trust and appreciation for Russians toward Americans as allies 

in the Balkans.12
174

Balkans ministries enhanced the role of the chaplain as a religious 

adviser for the commander. Another consequence of the US Army in the 

Balkans from 1995 to 2005 was the full integration and coordination 

of chaplains from the Regular Army, the Army Reserve, and the Army 

National Guard. Not since World War II had the Army been so fully integrated with its Active Duty and Reserve components. Chaplains and chaplain assistants could be from either one of the three Army components 

with any variation of supervisory responsibilities. Culturally, the Active 

Army, the Army National Guard, and the Army Reserve have unique traditions, experiences, and ways of doing business. Initially some of these 

distinct cultural traits caused some examples of UMT uncooperativeness, 

but this was the exception and quickly faded away through subsequent 

Balkans troop rotations. The popular expression at the time of “One 

Army—One Fight” was a reality among chaplains and chaplain assistants 

in the Balkans. Distinctions quickly faded away amidst the pressures of 

ministry in a hostile fire zone far away from home.

The civil unrest and destruction throughout the Balkans forced UMT 

members to re-identify their ministry related to humanitarian operations. 

Orphanages abounded, mental health facilities were overcrowded, and 

schoolchildren were educated in ramshackle buildings with few if any 

school supplies. Some chaplains, deeply moved by the despair of local 

civilians, poured themselves into the local civilian population. Other 

chaplains adopted a nearby school, orphanage, or hospital and kept their 

benevolent ministry to only one facility. Some chaplains saw themselves 

as ministers to the US military only and did little if any ministry toward the 

local population. Ultimately the decision whether or not a chaplain would 

be involved in a benevolent ministry to the local population depended on 

the approval of the commander. Chaplains sold the idea of humanitarian 

missions to their commanders and got approval, then developed a relationship with an indigenous facility based on the guidance of the commander 

and the personal goals of the chaplain.

Army chaplain ministries in the Balkans were for most chaplains the 

first time they had ministered in a JTF NATO-sponsored organization. 

This was an enriching educational and practical experience for US Army 

chaplains. Being collocated on isolated military facilities with troops from 

various countries meant the US chaplain had many opportunities to minister and fellowship with chaplains and soldiers from other nations. This 

allowed for a greater respect for the religious and cultural norms from various countries and created friendships across denominational lines between 

chaplains. Chaplains from various countries exchanged ideas for ministry, 

and religious events were often co-celebrated. This interaction between 
175

chaplains from allied nations built unity and camaraderie between clergy 

and soldiers and helped solidify the resolve of allied troops toward the 

ultimate goal of peace in the Balkans. 

Unknown to US Army chaplains who served in the Balkans before 11 

September 2001, their experiences in Bosnia and Kosovo were a preamble 

to a much larger American military operation throughout the world, the 

Global War on Terrorism. It is a fact that a large number of chaplains who 

served in the Balkans were soon after asked or ordered to join the US 

Global War on Terrorism effort in such remote places as Iraq, Afghanistan, 

eastern Africa, Cuba, and other places. This is a reoccurring pattern in 

American history. As the Mexican War prepared soldiers for the Civil War, 

as the Mexican Border Conflict prepared the military for World War I, and 

as the Korean War prepared a whole generation of soldiers for fighting in 

Vietnam, so the peacekeeping operations in the Balkans prepared the US 

Army for similar humanitarian and nation-building missions in Iraq and 

other parts of the world. These experiences were invaluable for both Active 

Duty and Reserve component units. Lessons learned in the Balkans would 

be implemented throughout the world in the Global War on Terrorism.

In the fall and early winter of 2005, Chaplain (1LT) Chris Guadiz was 

assigned to Camp Bondsteel, Kosovo. Working under the supervision of 

Chaplain (LTC) Doug Compton, Guadiz regularly preached on Saturday 

and Sunday evenings. The everyday ministry experiences of Guadiz were 

typical of numerous Army chaplains throughout the Balkans. He listed his 

most significant events as counseling soldiers, performing chapel and field 

services, hospital visitation, Red Cross responses, suicide interventions, 

and advising the commander on ethical, religious, and moral issues within 

the command. Specifically, Guadiz enjoyed dialogue with local civilian 

religious leaders in the Vitina area on issues of ethnic, religious, and cultural significance. He further remarked that he was happy to network with 

NATO chaplains and learn about the chaplaincies from allied countries. 

Guadiz stated, “I would just like to say that this has been an incredible 

opportunity to hone my skills as a chaplain. I see God working miracles 

in the lives of soldiers everyday and I am amazed at how he has sustained 

us.”13
176

Notes

1. “Ex-Yugoslav Army Chief Surrenders to U.N. Court,” USA Today, 26 

April 2005, 11A.

2. “Kosovo Separatist Acquitted of War Crimes,” USA Today, 1 December 

2005, 5A.

3. “Two Thousand Bosnian Massacre Victims Identified,” Associated Press, 

10 June 2005.

4. “Vuk Karadzic Memorial Ceremony,” TALON, 17 May 2002, 12.

5. “Explosives Found at Srebrenica Memorial,” Associated Press, 5 July 

2005.

6. “Bosnian Serbs Give in on Police,” CBS News, 5 October 2005.

7. Beth Kampschror, “Six Years in Transition, Kosovo Eyes Final Status 

Talks,” The Christian Science Monitor, 23 November 2005, 4.

8. Questionnaire by Chaplain (CPT) Vernon Chandler, 29 July 2004.

9. “U.S. Army Chaplains Assume the Role of Spiritual Diplomats,” The 

Military Chaplain, September/October 2001, 4.

10. Questionnaire by Chaplain (CPT) Sean Wead, 20 July 2005.

11. Chaplain Hank Steinhilber, interview by Dr. John Brinsfield, 9 December 

2003.

12. Chaplain Peter Baktis, interview by Dr. John Brinsfield, 11 December 

2003.

13. Questionnaire by Chaplain Christopher Guadiz, 5 November 2005.
177

About the Author

Chaplain (LTC) Kenneth E. Lawson served as an enlisted soldier from 

1979–85. He entered the chaplain candidate program through the Ohio 

Army National Guard in 1989, and served as a National Guard chaplain 

and a civilian pastor for 10 years. In 1999, Ken went on Active Duty in the 

Active Guard and Reserve (AGR) program. His Active Duty assignments 

include Fort Devens, Massachusetts (1999–2001); Heidelberg, Germany 

(2001–2004); and the US Army Chaplain School (2004–present). Ken also 

has 8 years teaching experience as an adjunct Bible College instructor. 

While assigned in Germany, Ken spent extensive time in Bosnia, Kosovo, 

and Macedonia as part of the NATO peacekeeping mission.

Ken was born in Lawrence, Massachusetts, in 1961. He received a 

Bachelor of Science from Salem State College, a Master of Arts from Bob 

Jones University, a Master of Divinity from Cincinnati Bible Seminary, a 

Doctorate of Sacred Theology from Bethany Theological Seminary, and 

a Doctor of Philosophy from Preston University. His military education 

includes Basic Training and Advanced Individual Training at Fort Gordon, 

Georgia (1979–80); Chaplain Officer Basic Course (1990); Chaplain 

Officer Advanced Course (1996); US Army Command and General 

Staff College (2000); and the Installation Chaplain (O5) Course (2002). 

Ken is endorsed by the Associated Gospel Churches and serves on their 

Cooperating Board. He is the author of five books, the most recent being 

Religion and the U.S. Army Chaplaincy in the Florida Seminole Wars, 

1817–1858.

Ken and Vera Lawson were married in 1986. They are the parents of 

four children, and reside in Columbia, SC.

179

Glossary

1LT first lieutenant

AAR after action review

ACR armored cavalry regiment

AD armored division; Active Duty

AFB Air Force Base

AOR area of responsibility

ARCOM Army Reserve Command

ARPERCEN Army Personnel Center

ASG area support group

AST area support team

BCT brigade combat team

bde brigade

BG brigadier general

bldg building

bn battalion

BSB base support battalion

CA chaplain assistant; Civil Affairs

CAS Camp Able Sentry

CH chaplain

CIMIC Civil Military Cooperation

CMRP Command Master Religious Program

COL colonel

COMSFOR Commander, Stabilization Force

CPT captain

CPX command post exercise

CSM command sergeant major

CST chaplain support team

DISCOM division support command

DMZ demilitarized zone

DOD Department of Defense

EPW enemy prisoner of war

etc. and so forth

EU European Union

EUCOM European Command

FIST fire support team

FM field manual

FOB forward observation base

FRG family readiness group

FSB forward support battalion

GA Georgia

GI Government Issue

HQ headquarters

ID infantry division
180

IFOR Implementation Force

IN Indiana

IO information operations

JSOTF Joint Special Operations Task Force

JTF joint task force

JTFUMT joint task force unit ministry team

KFOR Kosovo Force

LDS Latter Day Saint

LP listening post

LSA Life Support Area

LTC lieutenant colonel

LTG lieutenant general

MAJ major

MASCAL mass casualties

MASH Mobile Army Surgical Hospital

MD multinational divisions

MG major general

MOPP mission oriented protective posture

MP military police

MRE meals, ready to eat; mission readiness exercise

MSG master sergeant

MWR Morale, Welfare, Recreation

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NCO noncommissioned officer

NCOIC noncommissioned officer in charge

NGO nongovernmental organization

NSE National Support Element

NTV nontactical vehicle

OIC officer in charge

OJF Operation JOINT FORGE

OP observation post

OSCE Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

PA Pennsylvania

PDP Party for Democratic Prosperity

PFC private first class

POC point of contact

PSYOP psychological operations

RC Reserve component

RPG rocket propelled grenade

RV recreational vehicle

SACEUR Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

SC South Carolina

SDSM Social Democratic Union of Macedonia

SF Special Forces

SFC sergeant first class
181

SFOR Stabilization Force

SGM sergeant major

SGT sergeant

SITREP situation report

SPC specialist

SPOE sea port of embarkation

SSG staff sergeant

SUV suburban utility vehicle

TAACOM Theater Army Area Command

TAB target acquisition battery

TDY temporary duty

TF task force

TOC tactical operations center

TSC theater support command

TV television

UMT Unit Ministry Team

UN United Nations

UNMIK UN mission in Kosovo

UNPROFOR UN Protection Force

US United States

USACRC United States Army Combat Readiness Center

USARC US Army Reserve Command

USAREUR United States Army, Europe

USASET US Army Support Element Taszar

ZOS zone of separation

183

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Books

Albright, Madeline. Madam Secretary: A Memoir. New York: Miramax Books, 

2003.

Auty, Phyllis. Tito: A Biography. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1970.

Boot, Max. The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American 

Power. New York: Perseus Books, 2002.

Clark, Wesley. Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Future of Conflict. 

New York: PublicAffairs Books, 2001.

Clinton, Bill. My Life. New York: Alfred A. Knopf Publisher, 2005.

Cobb, Ronald L. Memories of Bosnia: The 35th Division’s SFOR 13 NATO 

Peacekeeping Mission. Bloomington, IN: AuthorHouse Publishers, 2004.

Columbus, Frank, ed. Kosovo-Serbia: A Just War? Commack, NY: Nova Science 

Publishers, 1999.

Curtis, Glenn E., ed. Yugoslavia: A Country Study. Washington, DC: GPO for the 

Library of Congress, 1992.

Donia, Robert J. and John V.A. Fine, Jr. Bosnia and Herzegovina: A Tradition 

Betrayed. New York: Columbia University Press, 1994.

Dragnich, Alek N. Serbs and Croats: The Struggle for Yugoslavia. San Diego: 

Harvest Books, 1992.

Friedman, Francine. The Bosnian Muslims, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996.

Gerolymatos, Andre. The Balkan Wars. New York: Basic Books, 2002.

Gresham, Stella. The Bosnia Files: An Intimate Portrait of Life Behind the Lines. 

Bristol, IN: Wyndham Hall Press, 1996.

Hartzog, William W. American Military Heritage. Washington, DC: Center of 

Military History, 2001.

Honig, Jan W. and Norbert Both. Srebrenica: Record of a War Crime. New York: 

Penguin Books, 1997.

Judah, Tim. Kosovo: War and Revenge. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000.

________. The Serbs: History, Myth, and the Destruction of Yugoslavia. New 

London: Yale University Press, 2000.
187

Kindross, Lord. The Ottoman Centuries: The Rise and Fall of the Turkish Empire. 

New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2002.

Korbel, Josef. Tito’s Communism. Denver: University of Denver Press, 1951.

Lawson, Kenneth. AGC Chaplains in Operations Other Than War. Taylors, SC: 

Associated Gospel Churches, 1998.

Lembke, Chaplain Michael. Greetings from Bosnia, Family and Friends. Selfpublished, 2001.

Malcolm, Noel. Kosovo: A Short History. New York: New York University Press, 

1998.

Mertus, Julie A. Kosovo: How Myths and Truths Started a War. Berkeley: 

University of California Press, 1999.

Sells, Michael A. The Bridge Betrayed: Religion and Genocide in Bosnia.

Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998.

Smart, Ninian, ed. Atlas of the World’s Religions. Oxford: Oxford University 

Press, 1999.

US Army Field Manual (FM) 41-10, Civil Affairs Operations. Washington, DC: 

US Government Printing Office, 1993.

Warren, Michael A. The United States Army Reserve in Operation Joint 

Endeavor: Mobilization and Deployment. Atlanta: US Army Reserve 

Command Historian, June 1996.

Wheatcroft, Andrew. Infidels: A History of the Conflict Between Christendom 

and Islam. New York: Random House Publishers, 2003.

Zickel, Raymond and Walter R. Iwaskiw, eds. Albania: A Country Study. 

Washington, DC: GPO for the Library of Congress, 1992.

Questionnaires, Interviews, and Correspondence

Questionnaires

Allen, Chaplain (CPT) Stanley. Questionnaire. 1 November 2005.

Appleget, Chaplain (CPT) Patrick. Questionnaire. 16 August 2005.

Baumann, Chaplain (CPT) Brad. Questionnaire. 25 July 2005.

Belz, Chaplain Keith. Questionnaire. 6 August 1999.

Bennett, Chaplain (CPT) Alva R. Questionnaire. 20 May 2005.

Blay, Chaplain (CPT) Joseph. Questionnaire. 5 August 2004.

Brown, Chaplain (CPT) Richard E. Questionnaire. 24 July 2004.

Cantrell, Chaplain (CPT) Steven E. Questionnaire. 31 January 2005.

Causey, Chaplain (CPT) Brent. Questionnaire. 13 April 2005. 

Chandler, Chaplain (CPT) Vernon. Questionnaire. 29 July 2004.

Coatie, SGT De-Angelo. Questionnaire. 8 August 2005. . Questionnaire. 8 August 2005.

Cooper, Chaplain (CPT) Ronald. Questionnaire. 19 May 2005.

Crary, Chaplain (MAJ) David. Questionnaire. 9 June 2004.

Firtko, Chaplain (CPT) Steven. Questionnaire. 15 August 1999.

Flowers, SFC Lucinda. Questionnaire. 29 July 2004.
188

Gardner, SFC Craig. Questionnaire. 25 March 2005. 

Guadiz, Chaplain (1LT) Christopher. Questionnaire. 5 November 2005.

Hartranft, Chaplain (MAJ) Jay. Questionnaire. 10 August 2000.

Hendel, Chaplain (LTC) Lawrence. Questionnaire. 25 October 2005.

Horton, Chaplain (CPT) William. Questionnaire. 5 August 2004.

Hubbs, Chaplain Kenneth. Questionnaire. 10 July 2004.

Huisjen, Chaplain (CPT) Matthew. Questionnaire. 1 November 2003.

Jackson, SFC Elbert. Questionnaire. 20 September 2004.

Jackson, SSG Yolanda. Questionnaire. 15 June 2004. 

Johnson, SSG James. Questionnaire. 22 October 2004.

Jones, Chaplain (CPT) Scott. Questionnaire. 9 August 2005.

Kendrick, Chaplain (CPT) Martin. Questionnaire. 31 January 2005.

Kesling, Chaplain (CPT) Terrance. Questionnaire. 11 February 2005. 

Khan, Chaplain (CPT) Mohammad. Questionnaire. 25 July 2005.

Lee, SSG Dae J. Questionnaire. 27 January 2005.

Lee, SGT David. Questionnaire. 5 August 2005.

Locke, Chaplain (CPT) Lonnie L., III. Questionnaire. 25 July 2004.

Loveless, SFC Wyman. Questionnaire. 13 October 2004.

Luckie, Chaplain (CPT) Marvin. Questionnaire 13 April 2005.

McLain, Chaplain (CPT) John. Questionnaire. 10 July 2004.

Metcalf, Chaplain (MAJ) Michael. Questionnaire. 13 April 2005.

Neal, SGM Pamela. Questionnaire. 15 and 16 June 2004. 

Nelson, SSG James. Questionnaire. 16 August 2005. 

Patterson, MSG Chris. Questionnaire. 16 August 2004.

Peek, SFC Deborah. Questionnaire. 20 May 2005.

Peterson, Chaplain Timothy. Questionnaire. 13 April 2005.

Powers, Chaplain (CPT) Darin. Questionnaire. 11 August 2005.

Roberts, Chaplain (CPT) Oran. Questionnaire. 26 October 2004.

Shrum, Chaplain (MAJ) Alvin. Questionnaire. 9 September 2004.

Simpson, Chaplain (CPT) Steven. Questionnaire. 4 November 2004. 

Smiley, Chaplain (CPT) Philip. Questionnaire. 10 June 2004.

Stang, Chaplain William J. Questionnaire. 2 February 2005.

Sterling, Chaplain (CPT) Scott. Questionnaire. 15 March 2005.

Tsai, SSG Frank. Questionnaire. 29 October 2005.

Wead, Chaplain (CPT) Sean. Questionnaire. 20 July 2005.

Wehlage, Chaplain (CPT) William. Questionnaire. 25 July 2005.

Wismer, Chaplain (LTC) Frank. Questionnaire. 4 October 2004.

Yates, SGT Jasmine. Questionnaire. 27 October 2005.

Yoon, Chaplain Paul. Questionnaire. 19 July 2004.

Interviews

Baktis, Chaplain Peter, interview by Dr. John Brinsfield, 11 December 2003.

Baktis, Chaplain Peter, interview by author, 13 August 2004.
189

Brown, Chaplain (CPT) David, interview by author, 27 July 2005.

Chandler, Chaplain (LTC) Vernon, interview by author, 29 July 2004.

Giannola, Chaplain (CPT) Jeff, interview by author, 5 August 1997.

Hartranft, Chaplain (MAJ) Jay, interview by author, 6 August 1997.

Hicks, Chaplain David, and Chaplain Phil Hill interview by Dr. John Brinsfield, 

3 March 2004.

Horton, Chaplain (COL) Janet, interview by Dr. John Brinsfield, 3 March 2004.

Howell, Chaplain Charles, interview by Dr. John Brinsfield, 10 December 2003.

Jones, Chaplain (CPT) Steven Mark, interview by author, 21 June 2004.

Kopec, Chaplain Rajmund, interview by Dr. John Brinsfield, 9 December 2003.

Kovach, Chaplain (MAJ) Allen, interview by author, 17 August 2005.

Land, Chaplain (MAJ) Robert, interview by author, 9 July 2004.

Lanious, Chaplain (MAJ) Chet, interview by author, 27 July 2005.

McChrystal, Chaplain (LTC) Scott, interview by Dr. John Brinsfield, 3 March 

2004.

Moates, Chaplain (MAJ) Jerry, interview by author, 14 June 2004.

Steinhilber, Chaplain Hank, interview by Dr. John Brinsfield, 9 December 2003.

Szasz, Chaplain Steve, interview by author, 29 August 2005.

Wake, Chaplain (COL) Henry (Retired), interview by Dr. John Brinsfield, 4 

March 2004.

Zalis, Chaplain (BG) David, interview by author, 4 May 2005.

Correspondence

Baktis, Chaplain Peter, correspondence with author, 4 October 2005.

Compton, Chaplain Douglas, correspondence with author, 3 November 2005.

Drew, Chaplain Gregg, correspondence with author, 19 December 2002; 16 

March 2003.

Hartranft, Chaplain Jay, correspondence with author, 7 June 2004.

Hendel, Chaplain Lawrence, correspondence with author, 3 November 2005. 

Holdridge, Chaplain Donald, correspondence with author, 4 October 2005.

Howell, Chaplain Charles, correspondence with author, 7 June 2004.

Hudson, Chaplain F. Douglas, correspondence with Chaplain Gregg Drew, 16 

March 2003. 

Overturf, SPC Kelli, correspondence with author, 6 December 2002.

Rambert, SGT Darnell, correspondence with author, 2 February 2003.

Stepp, Chaplain John, correspondence with author, 4 October 2005.

191

Appendix

US Army Deaths and Serious Injuries in the Balkans

From 1995 through 2005 in the Balkans there were several hundred 

incidents of injured US soldiers; only the most serious of these injuries 

were reported. Officially, there were 113 serious injuries to US soldiers 

reported to the US Army Combat Readiness Center. The huge majority 

of these injuries were from transportation accidents. A combination of 

austere weather, poor quality roads, and aggressive civilian drivers all 

contributed to the high number of US military traffic accidents and related 

injuries. The next major factors causing injuries to US troops were related 

to the operation and maintenance of military equipment. There were also 

numerous accidents caused by land mines, carelessness with firearms, 

horseplay, athletic injuries, or malfunctioning equipment.

Nine US Army soldiers died while stationed somewhere in the 

Balkans: five were from ground accidents and four were from aviation 

accidents. The five ground fatalities were the 1 August 1999 death by 

electrocution, the 30 December 2000 death by the accidental discharge 

of a weapon, the 1 June 2001 death in a traffic accident, the 29 July 2003 

death in a traffic collision, and the 20 September 2003 death by a heart 

attack while exercising. The four Army aviation fatalities include the 5 

May 1999 aircraft accident that killed two Army pilots in Albania and the 

8 June 2003 helicopter wire strike, causing the aircraft to crash, that killed 

two Army pilots in Serbia. These figures do not take into account the few 

civilian American contractors who were injured or killed in the Balkans.

The worst incident that caused fatalities in the Balkans was the 1 

April 2005 crash of an Air Force C-130 that resulted in the deaths of nine 

Air Force personnel. Although Army chaplains supported the Air Force 

chaplain in this mission, the fatalities were from the Air Force and do 

not show up on statistics from the US Army Combat Readiness Center. 

The US Army does not maintain statistics on Navy, Marine, or Air Force 

personnel that were injured or killed between 1995 and 2005.

*Statistics are from the US Army Combat Readiness Center.

193

Index of Chaplains and Chaplain Assistants

Chaplains

Albertson, Eric, 72

Allen, Stanley, 100, 101, 107, 187

Appleget, Patrick, 60, 61, 104, 187

Ball, Douglas, 96, 97

Baktis, Peter, 77, 130, 139, 165, 166, 173, 176, 188, 189

Baumann, Brad, 78, 79, 106, 187

Belz, Keith, 60, 61, 104, 187

Bennett, Alva, 75, 105, 187

Blay, Joseph, 80, 106, 187

Bonura, Dean, 63

Brainerd, Michael, 39

Brown, David, 34, 48, 49, 101, 102, 171, 189

Brown, Richard E., 151, 166, 187

Cantrell, Steven, 143, 166, 187

Causey, Brent, 30, 50, 51, 102, 104, 122, 126, 138, 165, 187

Chandler, Vernon, 85, 86, 106, 143, 150, 166, 171, 176, 187, 189

Chepey, Brian, 145, 146

Cobb, Ronald, 95, 96, 97, 98, 107, 186

Compton, Douglas, 157, 160, 163, 167, 175, 189

Cooper, Ronald, 82, 106, 187

Crary, David, 81, 106, 187

Davidson, Donald, 98

Drew, Gregg, 107, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 166, 189

Ebb, Eric, 98, 99, 100

Erkkinen, Erik, 76, 105, 106, 183

Feig, Eric, 155

Firtko, Steven, 63, 64, 105, 138, 139, 166, 187

Flores, Anthony, 92

Giannola, Jeff, 30, 44, 45, 102, 103, 189

Goodwill, James, 124, 173

Guadiz, Christropher, 157, 160, 175, 176, 188

Gunhus, Gaylord, 75, 142

Habereck, Jerry, 88, 142

Hartranft, Jay, 39, 64, 72, 103, 105, 188, 189

Hendel, Lawrence, 157, 159, 163, 167, 188, 189

Hicks, David, 53, 54, 57, 60, 63, 67, 69, 104, 120, 122, 130, 146, 189

Hill, Phil, 54, 64, 92, 104, 189

Hoke, James, 31

Holdridge, Donald, 134, 135, 165, 186, 189

Horne, Matthew, 90, 91, 93

Horton, Janet, 63, 105, 120, 122, 123, 124, 129, 130, 165, 189
194

Horton, William, 140, 166, 188

Howell, Charles, 54, 55, 104, 121, 165, 189

Hubbs, Kenneth, 139, 166, 188

Hudson, F. Douglas, 94, 96, 97, 107, 150, 189

Huisjen, Matthew, 94, 96, 107, 188

Kitchens, Herb, 72

Jennings, Dwight, 77

Jensen, Thomas, 155

Jerles, Steven, 143, 148, 149

Jones, Scott, 121, 127, 165, 188

Jones, Steven Mark, 39, 72, 105, 127, 128, 140, 165, 166, 189

Kendrick, Martin, 143, 166, 188

Kesling, Terrance, 79, 106, 188

Khan, Mohammad, 133, 136, 137, 165, 188

Klavetter, William, 155

Knight, JoAnne, 67

Kopec, Rajmund, 79, 88, 89, 92, 106, 189

Kovach, Allan, 122, 124, 125, 126, 165, 189

Land, Robert, 142, 143, 166, 189

Lanious, Chet, 32, 35, 36, 37, 102, 103, 189

Lawson, Kenneth, 45, 90, 103, 106, 147, 149, 152, 166, 177, 186, 187

Leinwand, Kenneth, 98, 142

Lembke, Michael, 82, 83, 106, 172, 187

Locke, Lonnie L., 71, 105, 188

Lonigan, Barry, 29

Loring, Robert, 128, 129

Luckie, Marvin, 29, 46, 102, 103, 188

MacLean, Jamie, 28

McChrystal, Scott, 29, 32, 34, 38, 40, 41, 42, 47, 49, 53, 56, 102, 103, 184, 189

McFarland, Glen, 51

McLain, John, 138, 166, 188

Messer, James, 97

Metcalf, Michael, 60, 61, 104, 188

Moates, Jerry, 67, 105, 189

Paul, Daniel, 47

Pendergrass, Jack, 122

Peterson, Timothy, 155, 167, 188

Powers, Darin, 121, 127, 165, 188

Roberts, Oran, 157, 158, 159, 160, 162, 167, 188

Romer, Benjamin, 77

Sieg, Jerry, 48

Shabazz, Muhammad, 142

Shea, Donald, 39, 63, 69, 77

Shrum, Alvin, 89, 91, 106, 188

Simpson, Steven, 139, 166, 188
195

Smiley, Philip, 71, 105, 188

Stang, William J., 98, 99, 100, 107, 188

Steinhilber, Hank, 58, 59, 67, 69, 104, 105, 173, 176, 189

Stepp, John, 133, 134, 135, 136, 165, 186, 189

Sterling, Scott, 56, 104, 188

Strong, Peter, 75, 105, 185

Szasz, Steve, 55, 56, 59, 63, 104, 105, 185, 189

Vakoc, Timothy, 63

Van Dyke, Brian, 93

Viveros, Daniel, 157, 161

Wake, Henry, 29, 30, 31, 41, 49, 53, 57, 102, 103, 104, 189

Wead, Sean, 87, 88, 106, 172, 176, 188

Weddle, Donna, 56

Wehlage, William, 90, 106, 188

Wester, Eric, 133, 134, 137, 165, 186

White, David, 143

Wismer, Frank, 70, 71, 105, 188

Yoon, Paul, 146, 147, 166, 188

Zalis, David, 49, 104, 122, 123, 124, 165, 189

Chaplain Assistants

Apodaca, Edwardo, 126

Brown, Jason, 98

Brunke, Margarita, 97

Coatie, De-Angelo, 145, 146, 166, 187

Early, Melinda, 55

Flowers, Lucinda, 85, 86, 106, 187

Fortner, Phillip, 75, 105, 185

Gardner, Craig, 122, 128, 129, 165, 188

Guerrero, Oscar, 157

Jackson, Elbert, 126, 165, 188

Jackson, Yolanda, 62, 63, 105, 188

Johnson, James, 66, 67, 105, 188

Johnson, Richard, 157, 160

Lee, Dae, 30, 36, 48, 102, 103, 188

Lee, David, 89, 92, 106, 188

Lee, James, 98

Loveless, Wyman, 48, 49, 56, 103, 104, 188

Mack, James, 137

Neal, Pamela, 62, 80, 105, 106, 188

Nelson, James, 51, 104, 188

Overturf, Kelli, 148, 149, 152, 166, 189
196

Patterson, Chris, 71, 72, 105, 188

Peek, Deborah, 29, 32, 46, 102, 103, 188

Pukansky, Michael, 54

Rambert, Darnell, 149, 152, 166, 189

Stevens, Aaron, 160

Taylor, Dialetta, 71

Todd, Veronica, 81

Tsai, Frank, 157, 159, 167, 188

Wanshon, Paul, 28

Williams, Tracy, 144

Yates, Jasmine, 157, 158, 160, 161, 167, 188