UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

TIMOTHY DOYLE YOUNG, 

 Petitioner - Appellant, 

v. 

WARDEN, USP-MAX-ADX, 

 Respondent - Appellee. 

––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 

TIMOTHY DOYLE YOUNG, 

 Petitioner - Appellant, 

v. 

BABCOCK, Judge; WARDEN, USPMAX-ADX, 

 Respondents - Appellees. 

No. 18-1466 

(D.C. No. 1:18-CV-02959-LTB) 

(D. Colo.) 

No. 18-1485 

(D.C. No. 1:18-CV-03105-CMA) 

(D. Colo.) 

_________________________________ 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

_________________________________ 

 

* Oral argument would not materially help us to decide this appeal. We 

have thus decided the appeal based on the appellate briefs and the record 

on appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). 

 This order and judgment does not constitute binding precedent except 

under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. 

But the order and judgment may be cited for its persuasive value if 

otherwise appropriate. Fed. R. App. P. 32.1(a); 10th Cir. R. 32.1(A). 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

June 12, 2019

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court
2 

Before BRISCOE, BALDOCK, and BACHARACH, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

 In these cases, the district court ordered dismissal based on a failure 

to comply with filing restrictions. We affirm. 

I. Background

 Mr. Timothy Young is a pro se litigant who incurred filing 

restrictions in the District Court for the District of Colorado. See Young v. 

United States, No. 14-cv-00073-LTB (D. Colo. June 13, 2014) (ECF No. 

24).1

 Without complying with these restrictions, Mr. Young brought two 

cases in district court. In these cases, he alleged that the district court, our 

court, and the Tenth Circuit Judicial Council are blocking his access to the 

courts, violating the Constitution, and committing wire and mail fraud. See 

Appeal No. 18-1466, R. at 3–5; Appeal No. 18-1485, R. at 3–5. In both 

cases, the district court ordered that the actions be stricken for failure to 

comply with the filing restrictions. And in one of the actions (the one 

underlying Appeal No. 18-1466), the court sanctioned Mr. Young $400. 

 

1

 As of 2014, Mr. Young had apparently brought 184 cases in district 

court and 98 appeals. See Young v. United States, No. 14-cv-00073-LTB, 

slip op. at 4–5 (D. Colo. Apr. 22, 2014) (ECF No. 20) (directing 

Mr. Young to show cause why filing restrictions should not be imposed 

given his initiation of 184 cases and 98 appeals). 
3 

Mr. Young has appealed the orders striking both cases,2

 arguing that 

the district court had committed crimes, falsified orders and facts, and 

refused to send necessary forms. He also moved for leave to proceed 

without prepaying the filing fees in the two appeals. We affirm the orders 

striking both actions and deny the motions to avoid prepayment of the 

filing fees. 

II. Striking the Two Cases

 In reviewing the underlying orders, we apply the abuse-of-discretion 

standard. See Gripe v. City of Enid, 312 F.3d 1184, 1188 (10th Cir. 2002) 

(reviewing a sanction of dismissal for an abuse of discretion). We affirm 

under this standard. The restrictions warned Mr. Young that continued 

noncompliance would result in a $400 sanction and an order striking all 

non-compliant filings. See Young v. United States, No. 14-cv-00073-LTB, 

slip op. at 5-6 (D. Colo. June 13, 2014) (ECF No. 24). Given the warning, 

the district court could reasonably enforce the filing restrictions. We thus 

affirm the dismissals. 

 The filing restrictions required Mr. Young to 

 file a motion seeking leave to file a pro se action, 

 attach a copy of the order with the filing restrictions, 

 

2

 In Appeal No. 18-1466, the court clerk directed Mr. Young to show 

cause why the appeal should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. We 

conclude that we have jurisdiction in Appeal No. 18-1466. 
4 

 attach a complaint or habeas form and pay the filing fee or 

move for leave to proceed in forma pauperis [IFP] (with the 

required inmate account statement), 

 attach a list of his prisoner complaints and habeas actions that 

are pending or that he had previously filed in federal court, and 

 attach an affidavit stating that the claims are not frivolous, 

aren’t asserted in bad faith or for an improper purpose, and 

have not been presented in another federal court. 

Mr. Young didn’t comply with these restrictions, so the district court 

dismissed both cases.3

 Mr. Young does not give any excuse for failing to comply with the 

filing restrictions. He instead argues that they had been unjustified. The 

court had imposed these restrictions in 2014 (Young v. United States, 

 

3

 In these appeals, Mr. Young asserts that Magistrate Judge Boland 

refused to furnish the required forms. Mr. Young previously lodged similar 

allegations against the Bureau of Prisons, claiming that it refused to send 

him the forms for prisoner complaints and a certified copy of his account 

statement. Given these allegations, Magistrate Judge Boland directed the 

warden to respond. Mr. Young then voluntarily dismissed the complaint. 

 Though the case had been dismissed, two Bureau of Prisons’ 

employees stated under oath that (1) a legal assistant had delivered the 

complaint form, the filing instructions, an IFP form, and a certified copy of 

Mr. Young’s account statement and (2) Mr. Young had not requested a 

copy of his account statements. Mr. Young had fourteen days to reply, but 

he didn’t. Despite this history, Mr. Young accuses Magistrate Judge 

Boland of refusing to furnish the required forms. Mr. Young has not 

provided any support for this accusation. 
5 

No. 14-cv-00073-LTB (D. Colo. June 13, 2014) (ECF No. 24)). This order 

is not among the rulings that Mr. Young has appealed. 

 To challenge the filing restrictions, he needed to appeal the 2014 

order. See Werner v. Utah, 32 F.3d 1446, 1448 (10th Cir. 1994) 

(per curiam) (“[I]f petitioner disagrees with the district court’s filing 

restrictions, his avenue for review is an appeal from the order establishing 

the restrictions.”). But he didn’t appeal the 2014 order. 

 Nor do the present appeals encompass the 2014 order. Nonetheless, 

Mr. Young is arguing that the district court shouldn’t have enforced the 

filing restrictions because they shouldn’t have been entered in the first 

place. This argument constitutes a collateral challenge to the filing 

restrictions, which is improper. See Stine v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 

506 F. App’x 846, 848 (10th Cir. 2013) (unpublished) (“[T]o the extent 

Plaintiff is challenging the terms or scope of the filing restrictions, he 

cannot collaterally attack those restrictions in this proceeding.”); accord 

Schildhaus v. Moe, 335 F.2d 529, 530 (2d Cir. 1964) (“The injunction, 

whether right or wrong, is not subject to impeachment in its application to 

the conditions that existed at its making.” (internal quotation marks 

omitted)). We thus affirm the orders striking the two actions for 

noncompliance with the filing restrictions. 
6 

III. Relief from Prepayment of the Filing Fees

 We also deny the motions to proceed on appeal without prepayment 

of the filing fees. To proceed without prepayment, Mr. Young “must show 

a financial inability to pay the required filing fees, as well as the existence 

of a reasoned, nonfrivolous argument on the law and facts in support of the 

issues raised in the action.” Lister v. Dep’t of Treasury, 408 F.3d 1309, 

1312 (10th Cir. 2005). Although Mr. Young is indigent, his challenge to 

the reasoning is frivolous. We thus deny his motions to be relieved of 

prepayment of the filing fees. 

IV. Disposition 

 We affirm the orders striking the two cases and deny Mr. Young’s 

motions to proceed without prepayment of the filing fees. 

Entered for the Court 

Robert E. Bacharach 

Circuit Judge