U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Gasoline Tanker Incidents 

in Chicago, Illinois and 

Fairfax County, Virginia

Case Studies in Hazardous Materials Planning

USFA-TR-032/March/May 1989

U.S. Fire Administration Fire Investigations Program

T

he U.S. Fire Administration develops reports on selected major fires throughout the country. 

The fires usually involve multiple deaths or a large loss of property. But the primary criterion 

for deciding to do a report is whether it will result in significant “lessons learned.” In some 

cases these lessons bring to light new knowledge about fire--the effect of building construction or 

contents, human behavior in fire, etc. In other cases, the lessons are not new but are serious enough 

to highlight once again, with yet another fire tragedy report. In some cases, special reports are developed to discuss events, drills, or new technologies which are of interest to the fire service.

The reports are sent to fire magazines and are distributed at National and Regional fire meetings. The 

International Association of Fire Chiefs assists the USFA in disseminating the findings throughout the 

fire service. On a continuing basis the reports are available on request from the USFA; announcements of their availability are published widely in fire journals and newsletters.

This body of work provides detailed information on the nature of the fire problem for policymakers 

who must decide on allocations of resources between fire and other pressing problems, and within 

the fire service to improve codes and code enforcement, training, public fire education, building 

technology, and other related areas.

The Fire Administration, which has no regulatory authority, sends an experienced fire investigator 

into a community after a major incident only after having conferred with the local fire authorities 

to insure that the assistance and presence of the USFA would be supportive and would in no way 

interfere with any review of the incident they are themselves conducting. The intent is not to arrive 

during the event or even immediately after, but rather after the dust settles, so that a complete and 

objective review of all the important aspects of the incident can be made. Local authorities review 

the USFA’s report while it is in draft. The USFA investigator or team is available to local authorities 

should they wish to request technical assistance for their own investigation.

This report and its recommendations were developed by USFA staff and by TriData Corporation, 

Arlington, Virginia, its staff and consultants, who are under contract to assist the Fire Administration 

in carrying out the Fire Reports Program.

The U.S. Fire Administration greatly appreciates the cooperation received from the Florida Highway 

Patrol; Collier County offices of the Sheriff, Emergency Medical Services, and Emergency Management; 

and the Golden Gate Fire Control and Rescue District.

For additional copies of this report write to the U.S. Fire Administration, 16825 South Seton Avenue, 

Emmitsburg, Maryland 21727. The report is available on the Administration’s Web site at http://

www.usfa.dhs.gov/

Gasoline Tanker Incidents in Chicago, Illinois

and Fairfax County, Virginia

Case Studies in Hazardous Materials Planning

Investigated by: Charles Jennings

This is Report 032 of the Major Fires Investigation Project conducted

by TriData Corporation under contract EMW-88-C-2649 to the United

States Fire Administration, Federal Emergency Management Agency.

Department of Homeland Security

United States Fire Administration

National Fire Data Center

U.S. Fire Administration

Mission Statement

As an entity of the Department of Homeland 

Security, the mission of the USFA is to reduce life and economic losses due to fire 

and related emergencies, through leadership, advocacy, coordination, and support. 

We serve the Nation independently, in coordination with other Federal agencies, 

and in partnership with fire protection and 

emergency service communities. With a 

commitment to excellence, we provide public education, training, technology, and data 

initiatives.

Table of Contents

INTRODUCTION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

INCIDENT #1: OVERVIEW. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

SUMMARY OF KEY ISSUES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

BACKGROUND. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

THE INCIDENT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

INCIDENT COMMAND. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

CONCLUSION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

LESSONS LEARNED. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Appendices. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

APPENDIX A: Northern Virginia Freeway Incident Management Team Overview. . . . . . . . . 9

Appendix B: Fairfax County Police Accident Report. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Appendix C: ICS Tactical Worksheet Showing Units Operating on the Accident. . . . . . . . . 18

Appendix D: Hazardous Materials Response Team Manual, Fairfax County, Virginia. . . . . 19

Appendix E: Fairfax County SOP on Hazmat Clean-up Cost Recovery. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

APPENDIX F: Photographs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

INCIDENT #2: OVERVIEW. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

SUMMARY OF KEY ISSUES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

BACKGROUND. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

THE INCIDENT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

INCIDENT COMMAND. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

DAMAGE AND ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

ANALYSIS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

LESSONS LEARNED. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

CONCLUSION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

Appendices. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

Appendix G: Diagram of Fire Scene, Shows Location of Photographs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

Appendix H: Chicago Fire Department Consolidated Incident Report. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

Appendix I: Chicago Fire Department Guidelines and Procedures for Hazardous 

 Materials Incidents. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56

Appendix J: Inventory of 5-1-1, Chicago’s Hazmat Response Team primary vehicle. . . . . 64

Appendix K: Chicago Fire Department Hazardous Incident Team Activity Report. . . . . . . 70

Appendix L: Photographs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73

1

Gasoline Tanker Incidents in 

Chicago, Illinois, and Fairfax County, Virginia

(March 30, 1989 and May 29, 1989)

INTRODUCTION

This report summarizes two gasoline tanker incidents, one in Fairfax County, Virginia, involving a 

tanker overturned on a ramp between an interstate highway and a major commuter route, and the 

other in Chicago, which resulted in a fire in a residential neighborhood. They were selected for 

investigation because they demonstrate good planning that helped lead to successful outcomes.

The emergence of hazardous materials (Hazmat) incidents as a major area of concern for the fire 

service has found many departments scrambling to meet increasing training needs and to purchase 

equipment and supplies necessary for the safe handling of these incidents. While training in the 

hands-on techniques and skills required for response to such incidents is essential for safe operations, an equally important underlying aspect of Hazmat response is planning. A large commitment 

and a thorough assessment of a community’s needs, resources, and facilities must be undertaken to 

support Hazmat response.

Fire departments must forge liaisons with diverse agencies such as transportation departments, public works, and police for concerns such as traffic management, scene control, responsibility, and, 

ultimately, liability for decisions made in Hazmat response.

Planning, a behind-the-scenes and unglamorous task, may be unappreciated for its essential nature 

in Hazmat response. It is hoped that these two examples will help stimulate fire service leaders and 

those considering starting a Hazmat response team to commit adequate resources to the planning 

mission.

3

Incident #1

Gasoline Tanker Overturns, 

Leaks on Ramp from Interstate Highway

Fairfax County, Virginia

Investigated by: Charles Jennings

Local Contacts: Chief Warren E. Isman

Battalion Chief Edward G. Wine

Fairfax County Fire and Rescue Department

4031 University Drive

Fairfax, Virginia 22030

(703) 246-2546

OVERVIEW

At approximately 0328, Thursday, March 30, 1989, a fully loaded 8,800-gallon gasoline tanker overturned on an exit ramp from I-495, the Washington, DC, beltway. Approximately 150-180 gallons 

of gasoline leaked from the tanker’s dome covers. The driver suffered minor injuries. Fairfax County 

Fire and Rescue Department units responded, stabilized the scene, contained the product, and supervised the off-loading operation. One major route to the beltway was partially closed for 12 hours; 

the beltway remained open throughout the incident. There were no additional injuries.

A group known as the Freeway Incident Management Team (FIMT) was activated and coordinated 

response among several agencies to minimize the disruption of traffic for the morning rush hour. 

The FIMT includes representatives of county and State police, the State highway department, and fire 

departments who respond to incidents that can be disruptive to the flow of traffic (see Appendix 

A). The FIMT agreement establishes responsibility for incident command and defines the duties of 

each organization for particular types of incidents. Traffic problems as a result of this incident were 

minimal thanks to the effectiveness of that coordination.
4

SUMMARY OF KEY ISSUES

Issues Comments

Incident 8,800-gallon gasoline tanker overturned on ramp from I-495, the major commuter route for the 

Washington, DC metropolitan area. 150-180 gallons were released. No ignition occurred.

Incident Command Well-developed Incident Command and Hazmat training and procedures were instrumental in 

successful outcome. Needed resources had been identified in planning for incidents of this type.

Traffic Management FIMT mobilized and was successful in preventing significant traffic problems.

Casualties Driver received minor injuries when tanker overturned. No other injuries resulted.

Time of Day Accident occurred prior to morning rush hour, allowing diversion of traffic before flow patterns 

became established.

Environmental Impact None.

BACKGROUND

The Fairfax County, Virginia, Fire and Rescue Department protect the 680,000 residents of Fairfax 

County, which is located west of Washington, DC. The department operates 31 engines, 12 truck, 

7 rescue squads, 35 ambulances, 2 fire boats, a Hazmat response unit, and other equipment. The 

department protects 399 square miles from 31 stations with 1,002 career uniformed personnel and 

450 active and certified volunteers. Its Chief, Warren Isman, is a Nationally-known authority of 

Hazmat response and has authored numerous publications on the subject.

The Hazmat response team, which cross-staffs an engine company, is run with five personnel around 

the clock. The Hazmat team makes about 380 responses per year. All Hazmat personnel are Level III 

certified. Fairfax County’s Hazmat team went into service in October 1983.

Three of seven rescue squads in Fairfax County are designated as support units for the Hazmat team. 

(Three others are cave-in units, and the remaining squad is for standard duty.) The Hazmat support 

rescue squads are staffed with three Hazmat-qualified personnel and are equipped to handle minor 

spills and leaks.

A Hazmat response thus is handled by the Hazmat response unit and one of the rescue squads designated for Hazmat support. Other equipment dispatched includes two engines, a ladder, and an 

ambulance. For major incidents, additional Hazmat personnel can be obtained through the other 

Hazmat support squads or by recalling off-duty members.

Fairfax County makes a strong effort to recover costs associated with Hazmat incidents from the 

owners or other responsible parties. Costs recovered include overtime, damaged equipment, or 

supplies used at the incident. This is accomplished with the County’s Attorney’s office. (A copy of 

Fairfax County’s cost recovery Standard Operating Procedures [SOP] is included in appendix E.)

THE INCIDENT

At approximately 0328 on Thursday, March 30, 1989, a fully loaded 8,800-gallon gasoline tanker 

overturned on an exit ramp from Interstate 495, the Capital Beltway, to Route 7 in Fairfax County, 

Virginia. (See Appendix B for police accident report.) The driver of the tanker received minor injuries in the crash but was able to remove himself from the vehicle. Approximately 150-180 gallons of 
USFA-TR-032/May 1989 5

gasoline started to leak from the dome covers. The accident occurred on sloping property, as Route 7 

crosses below Interstate 495 (see Appendix F). On notification at 0329, the Fairfax County Fire and 

Rescue Department dispatched a Hazmat assignment consisting of two engines, one ladder company, 

the Hazmat unit, a heavy rescue squad Hazmat support unit, an ambulance, a battalion chief, and a 

foam unit (see Appendix C). On arrival five minutes later the first due engine officer requested an 

additional foam unit and a battalion chief.

It was quickly ascertained that the driver of the vehicle had escaped and there was no immediate 

threat to life.

Following Fairfax County’s SOP, the officer of the first arriving engine isolated the area and confirmed that the product involved was indeed gasoline (see Appendix D).

At 0352 the water supply was established and the Hazmat team arrived on the scene. At approximately 0410 the company that owned the tank truck was notified and their response team was 

requested.

Because the incident occurred on sloping terrain, firefighters first covered the nearest downhill 

storm sewer grate. A protective foam blanket was applied to the spill and the tanker was secured in 

its overturned position. Much of the leaking gasoline was absorbed into the soil, as the tanker was 

physically off the road. The foam blanket was maintained throughout the incident.

Because of the position of the tanker and the fact the dome covers were damaged, it was decided that 

the best way to remove the product would be by cutting a hole in the side of the tank (see Fairfax 

County Hazmat Response Team Manual, Appendix D).

The second tanker arrived at 0628. It was decided at that time that the off-loading operation would 

be delayed until after morning rush hour, due to proximity of the accident to the beltway. State 

police officers were positioned and standing by throughout the incident to close the Capital Beltway 

if the tanker did ignite.

At approximately 0933, the Incident Commander announced that drilling would start. Using an 

air-powered drill, contractor personnel drilled a three-inch diameter hole in the side of the tanker. 

Drilling was completed in five minutes. The off-loading process began shortly thereafter. The product from the overturned tanker was pumped into an adjacent tanker brought to the scene by the 

tanker owner. Because the pump was powered by the recovery tanker’s engine, a hose stream was 

placed on its exhaust pipe to reduce the chance of igniting the spill. Off-loading was completed 

without incident at 1311. The tanker was up righted and the command post was broken down 

about 30 minutes later. Units started being released from this incident at 1350. The last units went 

in service at 1510.

INCIDENT COMMAND

Fairfax County uses the Incident Command System (ICS). This incident was commanded by Chief 

of the Department Warren Isman. Other ICS functions used in this incident were a public information officer, safety officer, and an aide, in addition to an operations section which consisted of a 

suppression officer and the emergency medical services (EMS) officer. The suppression operation 

consisted of three sectors: the west side of the incident, the east side, and the foam sector. The duty 

apparatus officer also responded to the incident. At one point he made repairs that were critical to 

the operation of one of the foam units. In addition to the apparatus already listed, an aid station, 
6

a command unit, a lighting unit, and a canteen operated on this incident. The incident command 

chart is included in Appendix C.

Because of the location of the incident at the junction of two commuter routes and its potential duration, the FIMT was activated. Responding agencies formed a single command post, made arrangements for alternate routes, and prepared information for the media.

When decisions were made as to rerouting traffic for the morning rush hour, contacts were made 

with the media to ensure these were announced on morning radio and television shows. Each 

responding agency notified its dispatch center of the detour routes so that they could respond to 

inquiries from the media and the public. Chief Isman gave “live” television interviews during the 

incident. State police assigned officers to stand by to close I-495 if the tanker ignited. The highway 

department moved signs into place and lifted rules requiring a maximum number of vehicle occupants along a parallel highway. Fairfax County Police assisted with traffic control and conducted the 

accident investigation.

CONCLUSION

The multitude of considerations and agencies involved in a highway Hazmat response makes it 

imperative that high-level planning be done to coordinate response to these incidents. A system such 

as that used in Fairfax County was capable of marshalling resources and providing a degree of coordination that was well beyond a simple agreement to respond and operate at the fire department’s 

request. Under the FIMT, the senior fire department official is in charge of the incident. This clarifies many of the difficulties in working with agencies such as the highway department, who may be 

unsure of who to report to or whose orders to follow.

LESSONS LEARNED

1. The impetus for multi-agency planning must often come from the highest political levels.

Chief Isman decried the traffic management response to highway Hazmat incidents in an August 

1985 television interview following a similar incident in Fairfax County. He stated, “It’s going 

to take a major spill to get the public to say stop.” Public outcry after a number of Hazmat incidents over several years led elected officials to call for the FIMT through the regional council of 

governments in 1988.

2. Agreements on jurisdictions and command should be worked out in advance.

The agreements in-place in Fairfax County and their planning prevented any undue delays in 

obtaining necessary equipment and communicating with other agencies. There was no quarrelling with police or highway officials over who was in charge.

3. Even “routine” Hazmat incidents, because of their requirements for outside equipment and 

expertise, and their duration necessitate thorough planning.

Resources needed for handling highway Hazmat incidents should be identified in advance. 

Typical of Fairfax County’s planning is the use of the county school system to provide meals at 

emergency scenes. This arrangement provides hot or cold meals with a one and one-half hour 

response time.
USFA-TR-032/May 1989 7

4. Avoiding undue traffic congestion is a key aspect of incident management at highway 

incidents.

Delays in traffic can slow the arrival of equipment and personnel responding to an incident. 

They also waste thousands of staff hours in local businesses, waste fuel, and aggravate the public. Arrangements should be made for prompt notification of responsible police agencies, and 

agreements should be formalized ahead of time for determining authority for road closings and 

traffic diversion, particularly where an incident could potentially affect interchanges remote 

from the incident.

5. Having a Hazmat team does not mean that your team will handle every situation without 

outside help.

Fairfax County maintains a list of contractors who specialize in the removal and recovery of 

Hazmat. In this incident, fire department personnel secured the scene and supervised contractor 

personnel who actually drilled the hole in the tanker and pumped the gasoline out. Chief Isman 

states that his team performs hands-on work of this type only as a “last resort.”
8

Appendices

A. Northern Virginia Freeway Incident Management Team Overview

B. Fairfax County Police Accident Report

C. ICS Tactical Worksheet Showing Units Operating on the Accident

D. Hazardous Materials Response Team Manual, Fairfax County, Virginia

(excerpts) pp. 10-20, 26, 27

E. Fairfax County SOP on Hazmat Clean-up Cost Recovery

F. Photographs
9

APPENDIX A

NORTHERN VIRGINIA FREEWAY INCIDENT 

MANAGEMENT TEAM OVERVIEW

1. GENERAL INFORMATION

1.1 BACKGROUND

This manual is a product of the Northern Virginia Freeway Management Team. The Freeway 

Management Team is a group comprised of a number of local and State transportation and 

emergency service agencies studying ways in which the day-to-day operation of the freeway 

system in the Northern Virginia area can be improved. The freeway system includes I-66 (to 

the western border of Prince William County), I-95 (to the southern border of Prince William 

County) I-495 on the Virginia side of the Potomac River, and the Dulles Toll Road. Figure 1-1 

presents a map of the major roadways in Northern Virginia.

The purpose of this manual is to document an operational plan and certain traffic management 

procedures for use by agency personnel at the scene of accidents, breakdowns, spills and hazardous materials incidents that occur on the freeway. These include both the major and minor 

incidents. The manual is intended to inform agency personnel (especially those who are new 

to the area or to their responsibilities) about interagency policies and procedures so that good 

coordination and communication can be maintained during freeway incident situations and 

other emergencies. It is the hope of the Freeway Management Team that these procedures will 

both help to prevent further loss of life and property and help to minimize the impact of freeway incidents on the flow of traffic in the Northern Virginia area.

Although building new roadways and freeways is important, we also need to manage the transportation facilities we already have. Millions of dollars have been invested in the highway system. To obtain the most out of taxpayer investment in that system, attention needs to be given 

to keeping the lanes open to carry traffic as much as possible. This is the essence of freeway 

management. The policies and procedures outlined in this manual build on the past and current efforts in traffic management by Northern Virginia’s transportation and emergency service 

agencies.

This effort was initiated by the Virginia Department of Transportation (VDOT) in the spring 

of 1988 in response to the continually worsening traffic congestion on the freeway systems in 

Northern Virginia. Staff from various police, highway and fire departments have been meeting 

to discuss ideas for improved freeway management. This manual is one of the results of those 

discussions.
10 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

1.2 WHAT IS FREEWAY MANAGEMENT?

Freeway management looks at the highway system as a resource which can be used either efficiently or inefficiently. It is an activity which should be applied to any freeway, whether new or 

old, to assure that the taxpayer receives the full benefit of the many millions of dollars invested 

in the highway infrastructure.

When accidents occur on the freeway, a major part of its capacity is lost. Engineers have estimated that 50 to 60 percent of the delay on freeways is due to accidents, spills and breakdowns blocking traffic. 

Freeway management is aimed at reducing the impact of these incidents and applying other 

strategies to help the freeway system operate more efficiently, while at the same time preserving 

life and property. A major theme of freeway management is “keep the traffic moving.” When 

blockages occur, they need to be cleared quickly to keep ordinary delays from becoming inordinately long.

Statistics have indicated that on a typical heavily traveled 6-lane urban freeway one can expect 

some 400 lane-blocking incidents (accidents, spills or breakdowns) each year for each 10 miles 

of freeway. When these incidents occur, they not only delay traffic, but create additional safety 

hazards as drivers unexpectedly approach slow or stopped traffic. Unfortunately, incident occurrences on the freeway system cannot be completely prevented. However, their impact on traffic 

can be controlled through incident management.

When traffic flow is heavy, even small savings in incident clearance time can mean a great deal 

in reducing traffic congestion. A typical freeway lane can carry 2,000 vehicles per hour. An 

incident blocking one lane of a three-lane freeway reduces flow capacity by approximately 50 

percent, from almost 6,000 vehicles per hour to only 3,000 per hour. If the freeway was already 

running at capacity before the incident occurred, in just 20 minutes the traffic backup could 

extend 2-1/2 miles or more. It is likely that traffic congestion resulting from such an incident 

would continue for the remainder of the peak period, even if the incident was cleared after 

20 minutes. Figure 1-2 illustrates how quickly congestion can build. When a major incident 

occurs, many hours of time and gallons of gasoline are wasted, and motorists experience the 

frustrations of being late for work, missing appointments, and just sitting in traffic.

Figure 1-3 indicates some of the costs of traffic incidents. These costs are more significant than 

most people realize. The figure illustrates what happens if an incident is allowed to block one 

lane of traffic on a three-lane freeway for certain periods of time. It assumes that the freeway is 

running at capacity when the incident occurs. If the incident lasts just 20 minutes, the amount 

of delay caused to motorists would be over 1,200 vehicle-hours. If the delays are valued at 

$4.00 per hour (a conservative value compared to what is used in most engineering studies), 

the cost of the incident due to delay alone would total about $5,000.

In addition to preserving life and property, one of the goals of incident management is to minimize the impact of incidents on traffic congestion and to reduce the probability of secondary 

incidents. Once an incident does occur, its impact on traffic can be minimized by:

• Reducing the time for incident detection and verification

• Reducing response time (the time for response personnel and equipment to arrive at the 

scene)

• Exercising proper on-scene management of personnel and traffic
USFA-TR-032/May 1989 11

APPENDIX A (cont'd)

1.2.2

Figure 1-1. Northern Virginia Road Network

Figure 1-1. Northern Virginia Road Network
12 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series ASSUMPTIONS: 3 AVAILABLE LANES 1 LANE BLOCKED 50% LOSS OF CAPACITY TRAFFIC DEMAND NEAR CAPACITY NO DIVERSION $4/ VEHICLE-HOUR 

EFFECT OF A RUSH-HOUR LANE BLOCKAGE ON VEHICLE DELAY 

FIGURE 1-2. Figure 1-2. Effect of a Rush-Hour Lane Blockage on Vehicle Delay
USFA-TR-032/May 1989 13Figure 1-3. Effect of a Rush-Hour Lane Blockage on Maximum Queue Length

ASSUMPTIONS: 3 AVAlLABLE LANES 

1 LANE BLOCKED 

50% LOSS OF CAPACITY 

TRAFFIC DEMAND NEAR CAPACITY 

NO DIVERSION 

EFFECT OF A RUSH-HOUR LANE BLOCKAGE ON MAXIMUM QUEUE LENGTH
14 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

• Reducing the clearance time (the time required for the incident to be removed from the 

roadway)

• Providing timely, accurate information to the public

Restoring conditions back to normal as soon as practical makes everyone’s job easier, and 

improves the public’s perception of each of the agencies involved. Much of this manual is 

devoted to methods for speeding the restoration of freeway traffic flow while giving due priority to preserving life, preventing injury, and protecting property.

2. INTERAGENCY RESPONSIBILITIES AND AGREEMENTS

2.1 GENERAL AGENCY RESPONSIBILITIES FOR FREEWAY INCIDENTS

Incidents range from minor stalls and fender benders to major accidents with many agencies 

involved. The question often arises “Who is in charge?” The real question, however, is not 

“Who is in charge?” but “Who is in charge of what?”. Managing an incident and related traffic 

problems is a team effort and each agency present has a part to play. Although the responsibilities may vary from one incident to the next, listed below are the normal practices for agencies 

in the Northern Virginia area.

General Responsibilities

Virginia State Police – The State Police are the responsible agency for responding to traffic 

incidents on the interstate system. However, they can turn over authority to the respective 

county or city police departments depending on the circumstances in each situation. The 

ranking VSP officer is in charge of the incident scene, unless a fire or hazardous material 

spill is involved, in which case the ranking fire official is in charge. As stated earlier, each 

agency has their own areas of expertise, and responsibilities need to be shared on the basis 

of that expertise.

Virginia Department of Transportation – Provides traffic management support, when needed, 

at an incident scene. The police often rely on VDOT for equipment and personnel for 

incident clean-up, special signing, and related activities. Usually, this is needed only for 

the major incidents. The VDOT safety service patrol, consisting of roving pickup trucks on 

I-95, I-395, and I-495, provides emergency help for stranded motorists, as well as assistance at the scenes of incidents, where necessary. VDOT also operates the I-395/I-66 Traffic 

Management System (TMS). More information about both these services is provided in 

Section 3.

City and County Police – The city and county police departments may respond to incidents on 

the interstate system, depending on the proximity of their officers to the incident, availability of State police personnel and the nature of the incident. For incidents occurring on 

State roads, VDOT may be asked to assist. For incidents on other roads, the city or county 

public works and transportation departments would be relied upon for support.

Fire and Rescue Agencies – The determination of the need for fire and rescue services is normally made by the ranking police officer at the scene, unless fire or rescue has been summoned to the scene already. Fire trucks are often requested as a precautionary measure even 

though there is no fire at the time. For incidents involving fire or hazardous materials, the 

fire agency is in charge of activities at the scene.
USFA-TR-032/May 1989 15

City and County Public Works and Transportation Agencies – These agencies are not normally 

involved in incidents on State roadways, but may provide traffic management support at 

incidents on city or county roadways or where traffic seriously spills over from incidents 

on State roadways. They may also be involved in signal operations to accommodate detours 

from the interstate system.

Agencies in Maryland and the District of Columbia – Coordination is maintained between Virginia, 

Maryland, and the District on incidents at the borders between jurisdictions.

Media Representatives – The media, especially commercial radio stations, play an important 

role in disseminating traffic information to the public. While there is no formal coordinating mechanism between local or State agencies and the media, the local police agencies 

relay emergency traffic information to the stations that report on traffic. Likewise, incidents 

spotted by radio traffic reporters are normally relayed to the appropriate agency. Public 

relations staff from each agency normally coordinate the dissemination of information to 

the media, particularly during major incidents.

2.2 OVERVIEW OF THE NORTHERN VIRGINIA FREEWAY OPERATIONAL PLAN

The operating plan for Northern Virginia freeways can be summed up simply as “keep the traffic 

moving.” As stated earlier, a large portion of the congestion and delay on the freeway system is 

due to incident occurrences, including accidents, spills, and breakdowns. The operating plan is 

oriented toward detecting, responding to and clearing incidents as rapidly as possible to minimize their impacts.

The operating plan has many facets and cannot be summarized neatly into a simple diagram or 

flow chart. It consists of agencies working together, doing their respective part of mitigating 

the congestion-causing effects of incidents and planning to address other operational problems 

that occur. It means carrying out the policies and procedures set forth in this Manual. A key 

component of the plan is the Northern Virginia District Operational Plan for Establishment of an 

Incident Command and Control Center, presented in Section 2.3. The plan should be improved 

and expanded over time as new and better ideas and procedures are put forward.
16

Appendix B
USFA-TR-032/May 1989 17

Appendix B (continued)
18

Appendix C
19

Appendix D

Hazardous Materials Response Team Manual

Fairfax County, Virginia

II. OPERATIONS

A. Duties and Responsibilities for First Arriving Companies on a Hazardous Materials Incident

All Fire and Rescue Department members are members of the Hazardous Materials Response 

Team, in that it is the duty and responsibility of each department member to conserve life 

and property and minimize damage to the environment. The successful management of 

a hazardous materials incident depends on a team effort of all divisions of the Fire and 

Rescue Department. The following procedures are to be followed by first arriving units at 

a dispatched or discovered hazardous materials incident:

When a full hazardous materials incident response is dispatched, E.O.C. will provide all 

pertinent information received to the first due company, Battalion Chief and Hazardous 

Materials 34.

Hazardous materials incident response will be initiated by E.O.C. on any incident involving any hazardous material, placarded vehicle or location, or known target hazard. This 

is to include pesticides, PCBs, biohazards, large natural gas or propane leaks or fires.

(Large scale incidents will be any natural gas incident greater than single domestic service and propane installation larger than 100 lb. cylinder.)

As soon as arriving units discover that an incident involves hazardous materials, they 

will immediately notify E.O.C. and the responding battalion chief. A full hazardous 

materials incident response will then be initiated.

Units will approach the scene from the upwind and uphill side if at all possible. Units 

will avoid driving past the incident or locations in smoke, visible vapor cloud or locations near visible or potential liquid run-off.

Units will locate not closer than 300 feet from the point of the incident if nothing is 

visible.

Only the first arriving units (usually one function in addition to the first arriving 

engine) will approach the scene directly unless needed for immediate life saving rescue 

operations.

The first arriving units will establish a control zone or “Hot” area past which only those 

members wearing full and proper protective gear will be allowed entry.

The scene will be controlled and stabilized as soon as possible and command 

established. 
20 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

All personnel at or approaching the hot zone will wear and use all elements of the protective clothing ensemble including SCBA on positive pressure mode.

Number of personnel operating in or near the hot zone will be kept to a minimum.

Entry will be restricted and those leaving the scene should be detained for medical treatment and monitoring, providing information and possible decontamination.

Except for immediate life-saving rescue, no major fire suppression or control operation 

will be initiated until the materials involved and its hazards are identified.

The first arriving units will designate a staging area at which incoming apparatus will 

assemble. A staging officer, (2nd due engine, unless otherwise stated) will coordinate 

further apparatus movements.

First arriving units will obtain as much information as possible from as many sources 

as possible (driver, plant managers, witnesses, etc.).

Attempts will be made to identify the product by using labels, placards, shipping papers 

or whatever other means are available. This will be done only if it is possible to do so 

without undue risk to Fire and Rescue crews.

All information concerning the materials and situation will be relayed to responding 

Hazardous Materials Team units.

Hazardous Materials Response Team units will relay initial action considerations to 

Incident Commander based on information received and after consulting on-board 

references.

In a spill, leak or other product release, units will use tools or resources at hand to control spill or shut off leak if product properties and/or situation dictates.

Evacuation may be initiated by the Incident Commander depending on the situation.

Explosimeter readings will be taken as soon as possible.

B. Incident Operations

On incidents involving hazardous materials or when the Hazardous Materials unit is dispatched, the Incident Commander and the senior Hazardous Materials Response Team officer will work in close coordination, cooperation and communication.

As soon as possible, the Incident Commander will give the alternate senior Hazardous 

Materials Response Team officer a brief situation report on an alternate radio channel. As 

soon as the Hazardous Materials unit (or squad) arrives on the scene, the senior Hazardous 

Materials Response Team officer will report to the Incident Commander and the Incident 

Commander will brief the senior Hazardous Materials Response Team officer of the situation. They will discuss the situation, potentials, variable, etc., and mutually decide on the 

proper course of action. The Incident Commander (senior fire officer overall) retains command and responsibility for the entire incident.

As in any function unit, the Hazardous Materials Response Team personnel will follow the 

chain of their functional command up to the senior Hazardous Materials Response Team 

officer, who will answer to the Incident Commander.
USFA-TR-032/May 1989 21

Conversely, requests, orders, tasks, etc., from the Incident Commander for Hazardous Materials 

Response Team personnel will follow chain of command from Incident Commander to 

Hazardous Materials Response Team Officer in charge.

1. Managing the Hazardous Materials Incident

Based on the situation and information, an incident will be managed by the following 

guidelines:

a. The initial officer in charge with the approval of Hazardous Materials Response 

Team and battalion chief, may decide no further service or response is necessary.

b. Further evaluation on scene by Hazardous Materials Response Team units may be 

needed.

c. The incident needs the service of the Hazardous Materials Response Team in the 

form of a 3 stage response.

STAGE I – Incident is handled by Fairfax County Fire and Rescue Units only.

Level 1 – Incident is handled by first non-hazardous materials responders.

Level 2 – Incident requires service of Hazardous Materials Rescue Squad.

Level 3 – Incident requires full response of Fairfax County Fire and Rescue 

 Department Hazardous Materials Response Team.

STAGE II – Incident requires services of other county agencies.

STAGE III – Incident requires multi-jurisdictional and agency response.

The Fairfax County Hazardous Materials Response Team utilizes an Incident Command 

System for the systematic management of a hazardous materials incident.

The Hazardous Materials Response Team officer in charge, in conjunction with the 

Incident Commander, will use any or all parts of the Incident Command System as the 

incident indicates.

Incident Command System

The Incident Command System assists the Hazardous Materials Response Team to safely 

and efficiently manage a Hazardous Materials incident by establishing incident functions and duties and responsibilities of those functions.

The incident functions or positions will be assigned based on incident situation needs 

and priorities balanced with availability of trained personnel. The list of functions in 

general but not binding priority is:

• Hazardous Materials Response Team O.I.C.

• Research

• Safety Sectors

• Decontamination or Warm Zone Sector

• Entry Team Leader

• Incident Recorder (Aide)
22 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

• EMS Liaison

• Press/P.I.O Liaison

Incident Command System function personnel will be appropriately identified on the 

scene.

2. Restricted Entry

As soon in operation as possible, areas of restricted entry (zones) will be established. 

These zones shall be termed:

a. Area of maximum hazard (exclusion or Hot)

b. Decontamination area (Warm)

c. Clean area (Cold) (restricted to public access)

The first arriving units will establish an initial hot zone. The Hazardous Materials 

Response Team officer in charge and the safety sector officer* will establish restricted 

entry areas. Boundaries of zones may be adjusted as conditions dictate. The following 

guidelines will apply:

Topography, weather conditions, building layout, properties and state of product involved and other varying factors will influence boundaries of restricted 

entry areas.

Only those properties protected will be allowed into the hot zone and warm zone 

AT ANY TIME.

Persons exiting the hot zone must pass through controlled access points and undergo 

proper decontamination in warm zone and medical evaluation.

Zone boundaries and controlled access points will be clearly marked.

All command posts, canteens, triage, staging areas, etc., must be located out of the 

hot or warm zones. Press areas will be located out of cold zone.

Boundaries of hot/warm zone will be monitored by explosimeters, radiation detectors and air sampling devices.

All entries into warm and hot zones will be recorded and monitored by the Safety 

Sector.

Zone boundaries will be marked by traffic cones or other suitable markers. The 

hot zone will be marked by red banner guard and the warm zone by yellow banner guard.

3. General Safety Procedures

The safe outcome of all operations is the goal of all members of the Fire and Rescue 

department. In order to insure the safety of all operating personnel at a hazardous 

materials incident, the following procedures will be followed:

*Safety Sector Officer will be site specific.
USFA-TR-032/May 1989 23

Unsafe acts, potentially dangerous situation, improper protective clothing, or a failure 

to follow established procedures will be brought to the members’ attention immediately. This does not relieve the officer of responsibility of his/her crew, but does place 

safety awareness and responsibility on every member of the HMRT.

Levels of protective clothing, operational priorities and tactics, decontamination and 

many other operations will depend on the nature and state of the product involved. 

Therefore, product identification is a prime objective in any Hazardous Materials 

Incident.

Until product identification is positively completed, the maximum level of protective 

clothing available will be utilized.

Controlled access areas (zones) will be set up as soon as possible.

A safety sector officer will be appointed as soon as possible whose duties are outlined 

in the HMRT Incident Command System.

Explosimeter readings will be taken around the complete perimeter, especially downhill 

and downwind.

A protective hoseline and a 15 lb. dry chemical extinguisher will be in position, charged, 

staffed by at least Level 1 personnel in the warm/hot entry point whenever entry or 

approach is made into hot zone.

The entry team will utilize 15 lb. dry chemical extinguishers and protective hoselines 

with them.

Stationary explosimeters will be placed to monitor boundaries of the hot/warm zone.

Avoid contamination at all time (walking or stationing self in vapor cloud, liquid runoff, 

dust, smoke and other products, leaning on or kneeling in contaminated objects/areas, 

or positioning too close to the affected areas).

Consideration will be given to covering spilled product with foam blanket to suppress 

vapors or use of emulsifying agent to break down the product.

Any product transfer or handling will be preceded by proper grounding and bonding 

of the containers.

Sustained foam and/or water supply will be provided.

Any and all entries will be done in pairs of properly clad workers with an equal number 

of equally clad members in back-up mode.

All situations will be treated as worst case potential scenarios.

Apparatus positioning will be considered.

Avoid driving past incident area or through vapor cloud, visible spill or flow of 

product.

In general, the safest position is uphill and upwind from the incident scene.

Consider backing apparatus the final approach to the scene to allow quick exit if 

needed.
24 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

THESE SAFETY PROCEDURES WILL BE USED IN CONJUNCTION WITH 

PROCEDURES FOR HAZARD CLASS AND SITUATIONS

4. General Considerations for Managing a Hazardous Materials Incident

Life safety of all parties is the #1 priority. Lives will not be risked to save property.

Immediate Considerations:

• What is the potential of the situation?

• Is aggressive action called for?

• What form of aggressive action?

• Is withdrawal of personnel and evacuation of area called for?

• How extensive evacuation?

• Safe identification of product is of high priority.

• Follow guidelines in HMRT Procedures, DOT Guidebook, and other references (at 

least 3 others).

• If no I.D. number is available, use General Hazard Class Guidelines.

• Consider product properties and its effects on the following:

– Persons exposed

– Extinguishing agents

– Protective clothing requirements

– Compatibility/reactivity

– Containment methods

– Decontamination

– Effect on personal and commercial property and business loss

• Consider secondary product properties other than placard/label.

• Notify/consult industry/government response groups.

• State Water Control Board will be notified in case of any spill of any type exceeding 

50-gallons or if critical threat to natural water system.

5. Specific Action Guides for Hazard Class and Situations

SITUATIONS

General Considerations for all Chemicals and Situations

These guidelines should be used in conjunction with the Department of Transportation 

(DOT) guidebook and other references.
USFA-TR-032/May 1989 25

• Full protective clothing as available shall be worn and used

• Isolate area, deny entry, and set up control zones

• Check evacuation charts

• Explosimeter readings will be taken

• Consult at least three sources of reference in addition to DOT Guidebook

• Avoid contamination

• Multiple hazards of chemicals will be considered

• Eliminate ignition sources (do not rely on water streams to prevent ignition)

• Standby hoselines, dry chemical extinguishers, and sustained water supply will be 

provided

• Patch or control leaks if can be done without undue risk

• Compatibility with patching materials, protective clothing, and absorbents will be 

referenced

• If product is transferred or handled, bonding and grounding will be done to eliminate static electrical discharge

ROLL-OVER OF TANK VEHICLES

• Control and isolate area.

• Check areas with explosimeters immediately; then regularly.

• Completely research product before attempting to patch, perform off-loading or 

otherwise modify leak or situation.

• Ground vehicle.

• Stabilize vehicle (further brace if needed).

• Disconnect air system.

• Disable electrical system using batter switch.

• Perform containment (dikes, basins, etc.).

• If not leaking, anticipate and prepare for product release at any time.

• Contact shipper; utilize their recovery mechanism.

• Prepare to assist and/or provide standby for shipper’s contractor.

General Rules to be Observed

• Loaded vehicles will not be up righted until off-loaded.

• Regular turnout gear should not be used if exposed to splash or contact with product (use nonpermeable over garment).

• If gear is saturated, remove it immediately.
26 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

• Consider foam for vapor suppression, personnel should not disturb foam blanket.

• Treat spill or roll-over as if it were on fire.

• Use full turnout gear including SCBA.

Preferred Order of Product Removal (pump-off)

• Regular discharge lines

• Internal valves

• Vapor recovery line

• Dome boot

• Air drill through tank skin

• Consider use of dome clamp on leaking cone lids (do not over tighten)
27

Appendix E
28 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Appendix E (Continued)

APPENDIX E (cont'd)

3. Under the heading Material/Supplies

Contaminated, list the description and quantity

Of any tools, large patching devices,

protective clothing ensembles (including

breathing apparatus, encapsulated suits,

turnout, etc.), metering devices, and motorized

fire equipment that were contaminated,

destroyed, or left at the scene of the incident.

4. The information required under the heading

Involved Parties shall be provided by the

senior Haz Mat officer, since he has greater

access to it through the research process that

is carried out during the incident.

a. The CARRIER shall be the transporter

(truck line, railroad, etc.) involved in

the incident.

b. The SUPPLIER shall be the manufacturer or

owner (DUPONT, UNION CARBIDE, etc.) of the

product involved in the incident. In an

incident at fixed facility

(manufacturing plant sewage treatment

plant, etc.) the SUPPLIER shall be the

organization that owned or operated the

facility (TRANS CIRCUIT, PAR GAS, etc.).

5. Under the heading Additional Information, it is

important to note any corporate contacts,

insurance companies or any other information

the officer feels is pertinent to cost recovery.

B. Completing the Addendum

The officer filling out the FSA-180 shall also be

responsible for completing the addendum. This shall

be done in the regular department memorandum format.

1. Under a heading Fire and Rescue Department

Staff Utilized, the officer shall list the name.

rank, pay grade and step of every department

employee on overtime involved with the

incident. This shall include all suppression,
USFA-TR-032/May 1989 29

Appendix E (Continued)

APPENDIX E (cont'd)

Haz Mat, EMS and other staff personnel that

took part. The amount of overtime hours each

individual was committed to the incident shall

be calculated and noted next to his/her name.

2. Under a heading Miscellaneous Resources

Utilized, the staff officer shall account for

any other resources used that were not

previously listed. This might include any

private contractors called in for clean-up and

decontamination who would be expected to bill

Fairfax County for their services. Materials

and equipment that were commandeered during the

course of an incident shall also be recorded

here.

C. Routing the Report

Once the report is complete, copies shall be sent to

the Deputy Chief for Operations, the duty assistant

chief and to Fire Station 34. It shall be the

responsibility of the assistant chief to ensure that

the report is forwarded to the Resource Management

Section for cost recovery processing.
30

APPENDIX F

Photographs

1. Overturned tanker showing dome covers.

2. Tanker, sprawled on roadway; Hazmat unit is in background.
USFA-TR-032/May 1989 313. Aerial view of accident scene. I-495 across center of photograph, Route 7 runs vertical in center of photograph.
32 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

4. Second tanker pumping fuel from the overturned tanker.

5. Contractor personnel complete off-loading operation. Firefighters atop tank are at position 

of hole that was drilled. Note water spray directed at exhaust pipe of the recovery tanker.
33

Incident #2

Heavy Streams, Foam Attack Save Exposures in Chicago 

Gasoline Tanker Fire

Investigated by: Charles Jennings

Contacts: Deputy Fire Commissioner Patrick W. Kehoe

Deputy District Chief Frank Moriarty

District Chief John Sterling

Chicago Fire Department

R. J. Quinn Fire Academy

558 West De Koven Street

Chicago, Illinois 60607

(312) 744-4737

OVERVIEW

On May 29, 1989, Memorial Day, the Chicago Fire Department responded to a fire involving a 8,800-

gallon gasoline tanker. The gasoline tanker had struck a dumpster, which resulted in a puncture and 

spill fire that engulfed the tanker. The incident occurred in a residential neighborhood in proximity 

to several exposures including a three-story apartment building, a two-story building under renovation, and elevated railroad tracks. First arriving companies put numerous heavy streams into service. 

Foam was used as a holding action on the spill portion of the fire until adequate resources allowed 

a well coordinated and executed foam attack on the tanker. The tanker was extinguished without 

loss of any exposed buildings and, though it was engulfed in flames, with minimal damage to the 

tanker itself. The tractor section of the tank truck was driven away from the scene undamaged and 

approximately 5,000-gallons of gasoline were recovered from the burned tank trailer.

There were no injuries as a result of this incident and dollar loss beyond the tanker itself was estimated at $6,000. This incident demonstrated a combination of strong incident command good 

firefighting skills, and effective planning. Also highlighted in this incident was the use of engine 

companies that had pre-piped foam capabilities and on-board foam tanks.
34 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

SUMMARY OF KEY ISSUES

Issues Comments

Incident 8,800-gallon gasoline tanker struck a construction dumpster, started leaking, and ignited immediately. Flaming product flowed into sewer and down residential street.

Damage Minor damage to exterior of exposure. Tank trailer and car parked in spill fire received moderate 

damage.

Incident Command Strong Incident Command System (ICS) marshaled three alarms of resources, and coordinated a 

holding action until adequate foam supplies were on-scene to effect extinguishment.

Traffic Light vehicle traffic due to the holiday reduced the chance of injuries to civilians and permitted 

unobstructed access by firefighters.

Casualties None

Initial Tactics Excellent tactical decision-making by first-due company officers kept fire from extending to the 

exposure.

The skillful deployment of numerous heavy streams, including ladder pipes helped prevent a 

general failure of the tank trailer, and prevented further damage.

Environmental Impact None.

BACKGROUND

The Chicago Fire Department, like many departments across the United States, relies on a decentralized foam deployment strategy. Many engine companies carry the standard four to five 5-gallon 

containers of foam along with a foam eductor and nozzle combination. A recent acquisition has 

been self-educting nozzle sets capable of flowing up to 350-gallons per minute. These nozzles are 

used on master stream devices and can also be hand held on a large line. They eliminate the need for 

a separate eductor and simplify foam operations.

Chicago makes an effort to deploy recently-purchased engines with pre-piped foam capabilities 

throughout the city, with priority given to areas adjacent to interstate highways and to companies 

that would be second-due to fires occurring at Chicago airports.

Of Chicago’s 102 engine companies, 38 have foam capabilities ranging from possession of a selfeducting nozzle to presence of an on-board foam tank and built-in proportioning. One engine 

company is equipped with up to 150 gallons in an on-board foam tank and the hazardous materials 

(Hazmat) team also carries 500 gallons of foam and a foam nozzle. Chicago firefighters regularly 

receive training in the use of and the theories of foam and water fire attack operations. Fixed hazards, such as tank foams, have on-site foam stockpiles.

Hazmat response in Chicago is handled by members of the Hazardous Incident Team (HIT). Five 

firefighters and an officer respond with a dedicated two-piece company. The first piece (511) is similar in appearance to a heavy rescue squad and is equipped with the standard complement of identification and mitigation equipment. The second piece (511A) is a standard inner city freight truck 

converted to haul extra quantities of foam, absorbent, lime, and other bulky items. Interestingly, 

several HIT members are certified divers. Chicago reports that this combination has been very successful in coping with waterfront incidents. Diving operations are coordinated with members of 

Chicago’s Snorkel Squads, which also perform all heavy and special rescue-related functions in addition to fire suppression duties.
USFA-TR-032/May 1989 35

In addition, Chicago has an incident command system (ICS). Supporting the incident commander 

in Hazmat situations is the Hazmat team coordinator. This chief-level assignment oversees operation 

of the HIT, and is responsible for much of the planning for response to Hazmat incidents. In addition to the Hazmat coordinator there is also a chief officer responsible for emergency management 

planning. Chicago’s high level commitment of personnel to these functions has contributed to their 

handling of complex incidents within the framework of the ICS. The department regularly critiques 

operations and makes improvements to their standard operating procedures (SOP) accordingly.

THE INCIDENT

A light rain fell on Memorial Day, May 29, 1989, as a fully-loaded gasoline tanker drove along 

Fullerton Street. The tanker swerved to avoid a car and slid into a construction dumpster which was 

against the curb. The impact ripped the tanker trailer about three feet from the rear and just below 

the midline. Ignition occurred immediately and flames shot up as the spilling gasoline burned and 

flowed onto the street around the tanker. The time was 0740. (See Appendix G.)

The Chicago Fire Department received the alarm by telephone and dispatched a “still” assignment of 

two engines, two trucks, and a battalion chief. Because a working fire was anticipated by dispatchers, 

a Snorkel Squad was also dispatched according to standard procedure. On arrival at 0743 Engine 

43 observed flames involving the rear three-fifths of the trailer with flames 30 to 40 feet high and 

burning gasoline flowing along the curbline. Plywood boards covering the first-floor windows 

of a two-story building (exposure #1) located about 20 feet from the tanker were smoking from 

exposure to radiant heat. Burning gasoline had engulfed a car and was approaching elevated railroad 

tracks carrying Chicago Transit trains. A three-story apartment building across the street was fully 

occupied.

The officer on Engine 43 called for a “box alarm,” which brought the total number of apparatus 

responding to four engines, three trucks, a snorkel squad, an ambulance, and two battalion chiefs.

Engine 43 positioned their apparatus so that their deck pipe could be played on both the exposure 

building and the tank truck. They also pulled a 1 3⁄4-inch handline which they used on the running 

spill fire.

The second district chief arrived at 0746 and requested a second alarm. As other units arrived, they 

placed heavy streams and numerous handlines into service to protect the exposure building and cool 

the tank trailer where it was being exposed to fire.

Most units coming into the scene were directed to place streams and handlines in-service. At the 

same time, a search was conducted of the primary exposure building, a one-story store with a 

smaller, second floor section housing an apartment. The first floor of this exposure was being renovated and the first floor windows were covered with plywood.

The second exposure, located approximately 50 feet from the tanker, was a three-story apartment 

building. Occupants of this building had already initiated an evacuation upon fire department arrival. 

Firefighters on the box alarm had to enter this building to evacuate remaining occupants. Truck 

companies were split between ladder pipe operations, assisting in movement of foam containers, 

evacuation of civilians, and assisting engine companies with ladders and staff power.

A third alarm was requested at 0811 by the deputy fire commissioner, with a special call for two 

engines equipped with 40-gallon foam tanks. Approximately 14 streams were in use at the height 

of the operation.
36 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Since the tank was punctured about halfway up its height, gasoline poured out of the tanker throughout the incident. Companies placed heavy streams on the exposure building and the tank itself. The 

spill fire extended over the course of the incident due to the continued addition of fresh product and 

the runoff from the hose streams being used. Because of the topography and the dynamic nature 

of the spill, the spill ultimately extended about half a block east in Fullerton Avenue and around the 

corner to Sacramento Street to just beyond the far edge of exposure #1.

Companies equipped with foam controlled the spill fire. Because the spill encircled several vehicles, 

the foam blanket broke at some point and handlines were used on a fog pattern to product exposed 

vehicles.

Once adequate foam was on site, the Incident Commander prepared for extinguishment. Companies 

had stretched lines to the roof and second floor of exposure #1 and were using them to absorb the 

heat coming from the fire. On orders from the Incident Commander, selected hoselines were chosen 

for the extinguishment operation. Personnel from third alarm companies without foam capabilities 

primarily operated to carry foam containers to supply foam streams selected for extinguishment. 

When each foam line had an adequate supply of concentrate, water streams were shut down or 

diverted and the foam attack began. The actual extinguishment effort took about three minutes. The 

fire was declared under control at 0948.

The foam blanket was maintained while the tanker was off-loaded through normal means using 

the intact piping below the tank trailer. The aluminum over the three sections of the tank trailer 

had burned away in the fire. The rear tires on the side of the tanker that was ripped open were also 

burned, but the other set of rear tires remained intact.

INCIDENT COMMAND

Under the direction of the Incident Commander, sectors were set up on all sides of the burning 

tanker. Each sector was commanded by a battalion chief. In addition, a command post was established in the gas station parking lot across the street from the incident. Other positions used in the 

ICS included a plans chief and a public information officer. Fire Commissioner Raymond Orozco 

spoke on “live” television broadcasts from the scene.

In addition to engine and truck companies, the Hazmat unit, a snorkel squad, and a mobile command post vehicle operated at the incident. A dry chemical unit was called to the scene to stand by 

but was not used.

DAMAGE AND ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT

Total damage was placed at 91,000 dollars of which 85,000 dollars was to the tank trailer, 5,000 

dollars to the exterior of the two-story exposure building, and 1,000 dollars to a parked car. Fire did 

not extend to the interior of the exposure building. There was no environmental impact from this 

incident. Approximately 5,000 gallons of gasoline were recovered. The tractor section of the tanker 

was driven from the scene. There were no injuries to civilians or firefighters.

Sewers in the area were checked for explosive vapors, but none were found. As a precaution, fire 

hydrants in the area were opened to flush the sewers.
USFA-TR-032/May 1989 37

ANALYSIS

This incident demonstrates graphically the results that can be achieved when planning, incident 

command, and firefighter skills combine. The Chicago Fire Department had in-place a planned foam 

capability. A well developed ICS with adequate inputs for Hazmat expertise allowed the Incident 

Commander to effectively control and command three alarms worth of apparatus operating in a 

fairly confined area. Finally, the regular training of firefighters in the use of foam and well-established procedures for handling basic Hazmat incidents such as this one made the positive outcome 

possible.

The potential for greater damage was evident in this incident. The fact that damage was mainly confined to the tank trailer itself and some vehicles that were parked inside the spill fire is extraordinary 

and not just good luck. Damage associated with gasoline tanker fires in habitated areas is usually 

much more severe, but the capability of the Chicago Fire Department to muster resources rapidly and 

to deploy hose streams effectively and aggressively was instrumental in minimizing damage.

LESSONS LEARNED

1. Training in the use of master stream devices is critical.

One of the keys to the success of this incident was the rapid and effective deployment of numerous master streams to protect exposure and cool the fire-exposed portions of the tank trailer, 

particularly the undercarriage. In many fire departments, training in master stream devices is 

often neglected, usually because they are not used very often. A less effective attack might have 

allowed the tank to fail, which would have resulted in the probable loss of the primary exposure 

building and widespread damage.

2. Placement of apparatus should anticipate likely progress of the incident.

The expanding spill fire had the potential to threaten apparatus operating at the incident. At 

one point, a handline was used to protect an exposed unit parked near the curb on Sacramento 

Street. Although the unit assumed an excellent position to attack the tanker and protect exposures, hindsight revealed that the unit was in the path of the spill fire when it extended around 

the corner. A balance must be struck between mounting an aggressive attack in an urban neighborhood and writing off exposures in the name of absolute security of operating apparatus.

3. ICS are essential.

The Chicago Fire Department’s ICS was key to the control of personnel and mustering of foam 

supplies. The excellent coordination of the switch from the water to the foam attack highlights 

the effectiveness of the system and the discipline of the firefighters.

4. Training in the use of foam pays off.

The intelligent use of foam on the spill fire and the coordination with hose streams demonstrated an understanding of foam operations on the part of rank and file firefighters. This effective use of foam conserved concentrate for the extinguishment operation and the disciplined use 

of hoselines permitted the foam to do its job.
38 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

CONCLUSION

The Chicago and Fairfax County Fire Departments demonstrated in the two Hazmat incidents 

described above the favorable results possible when effective planning, incident command, and firefighting skill come together.
USFA-TR-032/May 1989 39

Appendices

G. Diagram of Fire Scene, Shows Location of Photographs

H. Chicago Fire Department Consolidated Incident Report

I. Chicago Fire Department Guidelines and Procedures for Hazardous Materials Incidents

J. Inventory of 5-1-1, Chicago’s Hazmat Response Team primary vehicle

K. Chicago Fire Department Hazardous Incident Team Activity Report

L. Photographs (1-15 by Chicago Fire Department, 16-18 by author)
40

Appendix G

APPENDIX G 

SCENE DIAGRAM 

LOCATION OF PHOTOGRAPHS 

2958 W. FULLERTON, CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

GASOLINE TANKER FIRE

MAY 29, 1989

1688-8-11-89-4

R9-18-89
41

Appendix H
42 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Appendix H (Continued)
USFA-TR-032/May 1989 43

Appendix H (Continued)
44 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Appendix H (Continued)
USFA-TR-032/May 1989 45

Appendix H (Continued)
46 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Appendix H (Continued)
USFA-TR-032/May 1989 47

Appendix H (Continued)
48 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Appendix H (Continued)
USFA-TR-032/May 1989 49

Appendix H (Continued)
50 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Appendix H (Continued)
USFA-TR-032/May 1989 51

Appendix H (Continued)

APENDIX H (cont'd) Write a Narrative Covering Points Where They Apply: 

1. Discovery of fire

2. Delay in response

3. Delay in reporting

4. Cause of failure in fire protection

5. Points of interest

6. Condition of building after fire

7. Recommendations

8. Other reports included:
52 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Appendix H (Continued)

APPENDIX H (cont'd)

CHICAGO FIRE DEPARTMENT

BUREAU OF FIRE SUPPRESSION & RESCUE

HAZARDOUS MATERIALS INCIDENT CRITQUE

INCIDENT NUMBER 225006 INCIDENT ADDRESS 2958 W. Fullerton

DATE OF INCIDENT 5-29-89 TIME OF INCIDENT 0750' TYPE OF ALARM 3-11

DDC SUBMITTING REPORT Daniel Moll DISTRICT No. 2

DATE OF CRITIQUE 6-l-89 LOCATION OF CRITIQUE E-106 quarters

OFFICERS AND COMPANIES IN ATTENDANCE:

OFFICERS NAME COMPANY NUMBER

2-l-10 J. Moriarty, 2-1-15 P. Kehoe, Commander Moriarty H.R.T.

Batt. 3 Rickert, Batt. 5 Minch

Batt. 6 Brelie, Batt. 7 Fleischhacker, Batt. 10 Garrity

Lt. Lynch E-43

Lt. Davis E-76

Lt. Ruhnke E-91

Capt. Gollogly E-106

Lt. Bassett T-13

Capt. Kasprzyk T-28

Lt. Boyd Sq.2 Capt. Dougherty 5-l-l

INCIDENT WEATHER CONDITIONS

CONDITIONS AT TIME OF ARRIVAL AT SCENE Tanker trailer in street with burning 

gasoline.

CHANGE OF CONDITIONS DURING INCIDENT YES- NO x

IF CHANGE OCCURED DESCRIBE

WIND

WHEN

DIRECTION SW WIND VELOCITY 5-10 mph

INCIDENT DEVELOPMENT

WAS HAZMAT RESPONSE REQUESTED with 2-11 REQUESTED BY 2-2-2

DESCRIBE SITUATION FOUND BY INITIAL ARRIVING UNITS:

Tanker trailer with hole on right side leakinq gasoline, rear 3/5s of

trailer burning, flames 30 - 40 feet hiqh and burninq qasoline flowinq

along curb into sewer.

DECCRIBE ACTIONS OF INITIAL RESPONSE UNITS:

Set up master streams to cool remainder of tank and protect exposed

building at 2958 W. Fullerton.
USFA-TR-032/May 1989 53

Appendix H (Continued

APPENDIX H (cont'd)

WAS THE DEPARTMENTS'S HAZARDOUS MATERIALS PROTOCOL PLACED INTO EFFECT?

YES X NO REMARKS: Called for Haz-mat response with 2-11,

asked for 6-2-4 and 6-2-6 along with 2 foam engines. Called for 3-11 and

2 additional foam engines.

EVACUATION PROCEDURES

WAS AN EVACUATION NECESSARY? YES x NO

WHO GAVE THE ORDER TO EVACUATE? 2-2-2

HOW WAS EVACUATION DISTANCES DETERMINED? Proximity to tanker. Evacuated

apartments in buildings directly north and south of tanker.

IF EVACUATION WAS NECESSARY, WHO CARRIED IT OUT? Truck 35, T/L 21 and Squad 2.

EVALUATE EVACUATION IMPLEMENTATION Effective because occupants could see

the fire, hear the equipment and sense impending danger.

DESCRIBE AND EVALUATE HOW THE INCIDENT WAS ULTIMATELY HANDLED (e.g. was

material allowed to dissipate by itself, diluted, placed in containment

drums, etc.)

Tanker was cooled with master streams until sufficient foam lines

were in place at which time master streams were diverted and foam application

begun to extinguish fire. Remaining product was pumped into another tanker

after fire was extinguished. Damaged tanker trailer was hoisted on flatbed

trailer and removed from scene.
54 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Appendix H (Continued)

APPENDIX H (cont'd)

T ALL OUTSIDE AGENCIES NOTIFIED AND IF THEY-RESPONDED WHAT ROLE DID THEY

PERFORM. (e.g. State EPA, Federal EPA, Metropolitan Sanitary District, etc.)

Metropolitan Sanitary District checked sewers and basements for vanors.

Red Cross stood by to assist.

State and Federal EPA were notified.

PROTECTIVE CLOTHING

WHAT LEVEL OF PROTECTIVE CLOTHING WAS NECESSARY AT THIS INCIDENT?

(see current incident command manual)

LEVEL A LEVEL B LEVEL C LEVEL D x

MATERIAL OF CHEMICAL SUITS USED Structural firefiqhtinq turnout clothes used.

I N J U R I E S / C A S U A L T I E S

WERE THERE CASULTIES/INJURIES AT THIS INCIDENT? YES NO X

2. DEAD CIVILIAN 0 NO. INJURED CIVILIAN 0

FIREFIGHTER 0 FIREFIGHTER 0

WAS AN EMS PLAN 1 or 2 IMPLEMENTED? YES NO X

DESCRIBE AN EVALUATE TREATMENT PROVIDEDVICTIMS N.A.

SCENE DESCRIPTION 2-7-2

WAS A COMMAND POST SET UP? YES X NO WHERE SW corner Fullerton & Sacrament<

WAS A (STAGING AREA DESIGNATED? YES X NO WHERE Fullerton and Kedzie

A HOT AREA DEFINED? YES NO X HOW LARGE

WAS AN ISOLATED AREA DEFINED? YES NO X HOW LARGE

WAS A RESTRICTED AREA DEFINED? YES X N O HOW LARGE 150' radius

WAS A TRIAGE/TREATMENT AREA NECESSARY? YES N O X
USFA-TR-032/May 1989 55

Appendix H (Continued)

APPENDIX H (cont'd)

WAS A DECONTAMINATION AREA SET UP? YES NO X

DESCRIBE AND EVALUATE DECONTAMINATION PROCEDURES UTILIZED NA

WHAT WAS DECONED? NO. CIVILIANS 0 NO. FIREFIGHTERS 0

NO. VEHICLES 0 NO. TOOLS' 0

IF OTHER DESCRIBE 

WHO CONDUCTED DECONTAMINATION? NA

WHO DIRECTED DECONTAMINATION? N A

ANY ADDITIONAL REMARKS OR SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPROVING EFFICIENCY OF OPERATIONS?

ATTACH TO THIS CRITIQUE ANY ADDITIONAL DOCUMENTS YOU FEEL ARE PERTINENT TO

THE CRITIQUE. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHMENTS

OFFICER SUBMITTING THIS CRITIQUE:

DISTRICT 2 DATE June 1, 1989
56

Appendix I

Appendix I

GUIDELINES AND PROCEDURES 

FOR

HAZARDOUS MATERIALS INCIDENTS 

The mission of the Chicago Fire Department, in a hazardous

materials incident, is to isolate, contain and stabilize hazardous

materials until such time as the proper officials require the owner of

the product to properly dispose of the material.

Hazardous materials shall be defined as: any explosive,

flammable, oxidizer, poison, etiologic agent,radioactive, corrosive, or

other substance or material, in a quantity or form that may pose an

unreasonable risk to health, safety and the environment.

Although no two hazardous materials incidents are the same,

the following Standard Operating Procedure shall be placed into

effect when any hazardous material is involved:

1.1 Upon receiving notification of a suspected or potential

hazardous materials incident, either from a citizen, other public

agency or the first responding emergency company, the Fire Alarm

Office shall initiate a Level 1 Hazardous Material Incident Response.

1.2 Level 1 --- Minimum initial response to any suspected or

potential hazardous materials incident. This

level is primarily for investigative activities

and/or to mitigate incidents involving small

quantities or low potential materials.

1.3 A Level 1 Hazardous Material Response shall

consist of:

1 - Battalion Chief

1 - Engine

1 - Truck

1 - HIT Task Force consisting of:

1 - Squad

1 - 5-l-l

1 - 5-l-l-A (If incident involves the

potential of bulk quantities.)

1 - Ambulance
USFA-TR-032/May 1989 57

Appendix I (Continued)

APPENDIX I (cont'd)

1.4 Level 2 --- A confirmed incident involving a moderate or

high potential and/or a large quantity of

material; or an incident requiring protective

clothing above Level D (structural firefighting

clothes); or an incident requiring the need to

initiate an evacuation.

1.5 A Level 2 Hazardous Material Response shall

consist of the additional following units:

1 - Deputy District Chief

1 - HIT Task Force Team Engine

1 - HIT Task Force Team Truck

1 - Hazardous Materials Coordinator

1 - Safety Officer

1 - EMS Field Officer

1 - Air Mask Support Vehicle

1 - Command Van

1.6 Level 3 --- An extensive incident which may require

additional manpower, more supplies than are

normally carried by the HIT Task Force, an

expanded evacuation area, etc.

1.7 A Level 3 Hazardous Material Response shall

consist of the additional following units:

1- District Chief

Any additional Fire Department units and/or

other agencies as requested by the Incident

Commander.

INCIDENT COMMAND PROCEDURES;

2.1 It must be remembered that a hazardous materials incident

may present a number of problems that are not present in

most fire ground operations, i.e. large populated areas

affected by toxic gases or reactive materials which could

require evacuation procedures.

2.2 The Incident Command Procedure, as adopted by our

department, shall be used at hazardous materials incidents.
58 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Appendix I (Continued) APPENDIX I (cont'd)

2.3

2.4

2.5

2.5.1

2.5.2

2.5.3

2.5.4

The Incident Commander shall cause a Command Post to be

established, taking into consideration the physical properties

of the hazardous material(s) involved. The upwind side of the

incident shall be designated as Sector #1 and the Command

Post located within this sector.

While operating at a hazardous material incident, the

Hazardous Incident Team Officer shall advise the Incident

Commander of the level of response needed and/or other

agencies, units, equipment, etc. that will be required in order

to safely mitigate the incident. The Hazardous Incident Team

Officer will remain continually available to the Incident

Commander for advise and consultation.

The Incident Commander shall designate and cause the

following areas to be established:

Hot Zone - That area which immediately involves a hazardous

material release. This area shall

be considered immediately dangerous to life and health due

to toxic atmosphere, adverse reactions, etc. Only personnel

who have a definite need and the proper protective clothing

will be allowed in this zone.

Restricted Zone - That area which immediately surrounds the

Hot Zone. This zone is a safety area which

has the potential of contamination. Only needed emergency

personnel shall be allowed in the Restricted Zone. The up

wind side of the Restricted Zone shall be used for the

Decontamination and Isolated Areas.

Safe Area - That area which immediately surrounds the

Restricted Zone and is believed to be free of

contamination.

Isolated Area - That area, located in the up wind side of the

Restricted Zone, for the exclusive use of the

Hazardous Incident Team to set up and prepare for mitigation

of the incident.
USFA-TR-032/May 1989 59

Appendix I (Continued)

APPENDIX I (cont'd)

2.5.5 Decontamination Area - That area, usually located within the

Restricted Zone and on the up wind

side, which is used to physically remove or neutralize

contaminants from victims, Department personnel, apparatus

and equipment.

2.5.6 Triage Area - That area in which all persons exiting the

Decontamination Area are medically evaluated

by Emergency Medical Services personnel.

2.5.7 Staging Area - That area which is used as a stand-by location

for companies not actually committed to the

incident. Normally a location close the incident, but enough

removed so as not to interfere with the operations at the

incident. Special care must be used to insure that this area is

upwind.

2.6 Personnel, apparatus and equipment not actively engaged in

the mitigation procedures shall be kept in the staging area.

2.7 An access route shall be clearly defined and kept open for

egress and exit of emergency vehicles. This route will be

used for emergency evacuation in the event that the incident

escalates.

2.8 The Chicago Police Department shall be called upon to

maintain the exterior perimeters, effect evacuation, etc.

Additional outside agencies, such as the Department of Human

Services and the Red Cross will be notified to assist in the

relocation of those affected.

2.9 The Incident Commander shall insure that the incident is

continually monitored to detect any change which would

necessitate additional evacuation or other measures to

effectively handle the incident.

2.10 The Incident Commander shall insure that all proper

notifications are made to the respective Local, State and

Federal agencies as necessary.
60 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Appendix I (Continued) APPENDIX I (cont'd)

2.11 When the specific properties and/or methods of handling the

material(s) involved is not absolutely certain, the Hazardous

Incident Team shall communicate directly with Chemtrec,

manufacturers, other agencies or knowledgeable persons,as

necessary, to obtain needed accurate information.

UNIT RESPONSES: 

3.2

3.3

3.3.1

3.3.2

3.3.3

3.3.4

3.3.5

3.3.6

3.3.7

The Fire Alarm Office will notify the responding companies of

the wind direction and velocity. This information will be

obtained from the U.S. Weather Bureau.

Responding companies are to approach the scene from the

upwind side.

First arriving units shall:

Not enter a vapor cloud or otherwise contaminated area or

place themselves in a hazardous position or situation.

They shall isolate the area and deny entry to all persons.

Locate any available shipping papers or facility documents,

such as chemical inventory lists, Material Safety Data Sheets,

etc. and supply this information to the Incident Commander.

Identify the hazardous material(s) involved. Determine the

quantity of product involved, type of container.

Transmit the product information, via radio, to the Hazardous

Incident Team if they are not yet on the scene.

Reference the DOT Emergency Response Guidebook and any

other available response documents to determine the proper

immediate actions to be taken.

Until such time as the material(s) are positively identified and

the proper procedures are established, extreme caution and

full protective measures shall be implemented.

3.1
USFA-TR-032/May 1989 61

Appendix I (Continued) APPENDIX I (cont'd)

3.4 No hazardous material, or suspected hazardous material, is to

be washed away or in any other manner, improperly disposed

of. All current Environmental Protection Agency regulations

will be adhered to and their recommendations will be

followed.

3.5 The primary mitigation team will be comprised of members

from 5-1-1 and the Squad.

3.6 The Team Engine and Team Truck will perform duties such as:

back up to the primary mitigations team, decontamination,

diking, equipment set up, etc.

3.7 A minimum number of HIT Team personnel, as needed, but

not less than two shall make up the Mitigation Team. A back

up team of at least two personnel, with the appropriate level

of protective clothing, shall be ready at all times for relief or

emergency rescue.

3.8 After reporting to the Incident Commander, the first arriving

Ambulance company shall take the necessary actions to treat

any victims, after these victims have been properly

decontaminated.

3.8 If there are no victims, the Ambulance company will proceed

to the Isolated Area to take necessary vitals of all members

prior to these members donning chemical protective clothing.

3.9 Upon completion of taking pre-entry vitals, the Ambulance

personnel will then move to the exit side of the

Decontamination Area and at that point shall establish a post

operation triage area.

3.10 If the first Ambulance is occupied with victims, the Incident

Commander will a immediately request that a second

Ambulance be dispatched to perform the necessary

activities in the Isolated Area and the Triage Area.

3.11 Any injured civilian or department personnel shall be

decontaminated by the Hazardous Incident Team as

expeditiously as possible and then removed to the triage area

for treatment and transportation by EMS personnel if

necessary.
62 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Appendix I (Continued)

APPENDIX I (cont'd)

LEVELS OF PROTECTIVE CLOTHING: 

4.1 After the proper identification of the material(s) involved has

been made, the Hazardous Incident Team will then determine

the required level of protective clothing.

4.2 The levels of protective clothing will be:

4.2.1 Level A - Total encapsulating suits made of materials which

are compatible to the chemicals involved.

4.2.2 Level B - Approved disposable encapsulating suit with SCBA.

4.2.3 Level C - Approved disposable suit with SCBA.

4.2.4 Level D - Structural fire fighting clothing with SCBA.

DECONTAMINATION:

5.1 Special attention will be given to personnel and equipment

during all Hazardous Materials operations.

5.2 Efforts will be made to minimize the number of personnel and

the amount of equipment needed in the hot area.

5.3 Prior to any fire department personnel, entering a

contaminated area, the Incident Commander shall cause a

Decontamination Area to be established.

5.4 Careful determination will be made as to the specific type of

decontamination procedures necessary to handle the

particular hazardous material(s) involved in the incident.

5.5 Due to inclement weather or other pertinent factors,

decontamination at the scene may not always be possible. In

this situation, the nearest suitable fire house or other

designated structure may be used as the decontamination

station for personnel apparatus and equipment.
USFA-TR-032/May 1989 63

Appendix I (Continued)

APPENDIX I (cont’d)

GENERAL GUIDELINES:

6.1 Extreme caution shall be exercised by all Fire Department

personnel to ensure minimum exposure to the Hazardous

Materials.

6.2 All available specialized tools, equipment and apparatus, shall

be used to provide maximum protection and efficiency.

6.3 Normally, the personnel from the Hazardous Incident Team

Task Force will operate as the mitigation team.

6.4 Only those persons specifically trained shall use the

specialized equipment.
64

Appendix J
USFA-TR-032/May 1989 65

Appendix J (Continued)
66 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Appendix J (Continued)
USFA-TR-032/May 1989 67

Appendix J (Continued)
68 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Appendix J (Continued)
USFA-TR-032/May 1989 69

Appendix J (Continued)
70

Appendix K
USFA-TR-032/May 1989 71

Appendix K (Continued)
72 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Appendix K (Continued)
73

Appendix L

Photographs

1. Fire conditions along Fullerton Street between tanker and “el” tracks.

2. First streams (arrow) in operation on tanker; two-story 

exposure building is obscured by fire and smoke.
74 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

3. Another view of the tanker; Snorkel Squad 2 is visible at upper right.

4. Firefighters operate foam handline to control spill fire. Note streams directed at exposure 

and tanker, including from second floor of exposure.
USFA-TR-032/May 1989 75

5. Tanker surrounded by streams.

6. View of incident from Fullerton Street. Tanker is on other 

side of railroad overpass.
76 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

7. Spill fire flares up as it flows around parked car. Note runoff in foreground.

8. Foam attack in progress, elevated water streams are 

standing by. Note vantage point for foam 

handline in use on roof of exposure.
USFA-TR-032/May 1989 77

9. Knockdown complete, foam lines are going for the rest of the spill.

10. Fire out, but product continues pouring from tank trailer.
78 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

11. Firefighters flood debris in dumpster to prevent re-ignition of gasoline.

12. Damage to rear of tank trailer; gasoline still pours from puncture.
USFA-TR-032/May 1989 79

13. Rear of tanker, left side are intact.

14. Fire out, units standing by.
80 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

15. Off-loading in progress, water department employees 

check manhole for explosive vapors.
USFA-TR-032/May 1989 8116. Primary exposure building weeks after the incident. Note reflection of dumpster in windows on right hand side.
82 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

17. Rear of primary exposure building showing proximity to “el” and access to second floor/roof.
USFA-TR-032/May 1989 83ious supplies, ar bsorbent, v ies ar This unit car eam. T s second piece of the Hazmat and foam concentrate. Chicago’ 511A,18.