[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 23-13909

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

RAFAEL DANIEL DE LA CRUZ JIMENEZ, 

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 0:02-cr-60176-WPD-1

____________________

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2 Opinion of the Court 23-13909

Before ROSENBAUM,GRANT, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Rafael De La Cruz Jimenez appeals the district court’s decision not to reduce his sentence, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) 

after considering a recent amendment to the Sentencing Guidelines. De La Cruz, proceeding pro se, contends that the district 

court failed to consider relevant 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors that 

were due significant weight and therefore abused its discretion in 

denying its own sua sponte motion to reduce De La Cruz’s sentence.

In response, the government moves for summary affirmance, 

which we grant.

I . BACKGROUND 

In 2002, De La Cruz piloted a plane from Santo Domingo, 

Dominican Republic, to an airport in Fort Lauderdale, Florida, 

with one passenger and more than 450 kilograms of cocaine 

onboard. Upon his arrival, De La Cruz attempted to pass through 

Customs. Inspectors conducted a routine inspection of the aircraft 

and discovered “taped brick-type items,” one of which the inspectors field tested and positively identified for cocaine. The inspectors arrested De La Cruz and the passenger and seized $2,719 from 

De La Cruz. 

A federal grand jury indicted De La Cruz on one count of 

conspiracy to import at least five kilograms of a mixture containing 

cocaine, one count of importation of at least five kilograms of a 

mixture containing cocaine, one count of conspiracy to possess at 

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least five kilograms of a mixture containing cocaine, and one count 

of possession with intent to distribute at least five kilograms of a 

mixture containing cocaine. De La Cruz pled guilty to all four 

counts without a plea agreement.

Under the 2002 Sentencing Guidelines Manual, the district 

court applied, among other enhancements, a two-level special-offense-characteristic enhancement for obstruction of justice based 

on his false testimony at a codefendant’s trial. Because of the obstruction enhancement, De La Cruz did not receive downward adjustments for acceptance and super-acceptance of responsibility. 

As a result, his total offense level was 42.

De La Cruz had no criminal-history points, so his criminalhistory category was I. His corresponding guidelines range was 

360 months to life. The district court sentenced De La Cruz to 360 

months in prison.

Last year, the Sentencing Commission revised the Sentencing Guidelines with Amendment 821, which provides a two-level 

reduction for certain offenders who have no criminal history. 

U.S.S.G. § 4C1.1(a) (amended Nov. 1, 2023). Amendment 821 is retroactively applicable. See id. De La Cruz is eligible for a reduction

under that Amendment, and his updated sentencing range is 292–

365 months, rather than the 360 months-to-life range under which 

he was sentenced in 2003.

The district court recognized this sua sponte and requested

that the government respond as to whether the court should reduce De La Cruz’s sentence, pursuant to § 3582(c)(2). Although it 

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agreed that De La Cruz was eligible for relief, the government argued that a reduction was not warranted upon consideration of the 

relevant § 3553(a) factors. The district court decided against reducing De La Cruz’s sentence, explaining that it “agree[d] with the 

Government’s response.” De La Cruz first filed a motion for reconsideration, which the district court denied, and then this appeal.

The government now moves for summary affirmance.

In his appeal, De La Cruz argues that the district court 

abused its discretion in denying a sentence reduction by failing to 

conduct a new analysis of the relevant § 3553(a) factors. The district court, De La Cruz asserts, failed to properly weigh or consider 

relevant factors and instead relied on its prior postconviction-motion analyses. De La Cruz further contends that the district court 

neglected both his post-sentencing rehabilitative conduct and the 

policy reasons underlying Amendment 821. For its part, the government argues that the district court did not clearly abuse its discretion because it weighed the relevant § 3553(a) factors and was 

not required to consider De La Cruz’s post-sentencing conduct.

II. DISCUSSION

Summary disposition, including summary affirmance, is appropriate when time is of the essence, “the position of one of the 

parties is clearly right as a matter of law so that there can be no 

substantial question as to the outcome of the case, or . . . the appeal 

is frivolous.” Groendyke Transp., Inc. v. Davis, 406 F.2d 1158, 1161-62 

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(5th Cir. 1969).1 We conclude that the government’s position here 

“is clearly right as a matter of law so that there can be no substantial 

question as to the outcome of the case.”

We review de novo the district court’s conclusions about the 

scope of its legal authority under § 3582(c)(2), United States v. Colon, 

707 F.3d 1255, 1258 (11th Cir. 2013), but we review for abuse of 

discretion the district court’s decision not to grant a sentence reduction under § 3582(c)(2), United States v. Smith, 568 F.3d 923, 926 

(11th Cir. 2009). “A district court abuses its discretion when it (1) 

fails to afford consideration to relevant factors that were due significant weight, (2) gives significant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor, or (3) commits a clear error of judgment in considering 

the proper factors.” United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1189 (11th 

Cir. 2010) (en banc) (internal quotations omitted). 

A district court may modify a defendant’s term of imprisonment if the defendant was sentenced based on a sentencing range 

that the Sentencing Commission has later lowered and that modification is retroactively applicable. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). Any reduction must be consistent with the Commission’s policy statements. Id.

When a district court considers a motion under § 3582(c)(2), 

the court must first recalculate the defendant’s sentencing range 

1 This Court adopted as binding precedent all Fifth Circuit decisions prior to 

October 1, 1981. Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) 

(en banc). 

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under the amended Guidelines and then decide whether to exercise 

its discretion to impose the newly calculated sentence or retain the 

original sentence. United States v. Bravo, 203 F.3d 778, 780–81. The 

district court must consider all relevant § 3553(a) factors,2 as well as 

the nature and severity of danger to any that a sentence reduction

poses, and it may consider the defendant’s post-sentencing conduct. Smith, 568 F.3d at 927.

While courts must consider all applicable § 3553(a) sentencing factors, “the weight given to each factor is committed to the 

sound discretion of the district court” and “a district court may attach great weight to one § 3553(a) factor over others.” United States 

v. Butler, 39 F.4th 1349, 1355 (11th Cir. 2022). We will not secondguess the weight the district court gives to a factor “so long as the 

sentence is reasonable under the circumstances.” Id. The district 

court need not explicitly state how each factor applies to the defendant’s case if the record shows it considered the pertinent factors. Smith, 568 F.3d at 927. 

2 The § 3553(a) factors include the following: (1) “the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant;” (2) 

the need for the sentence “to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote 

respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense;” (3) the 

need for the sentence “to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;” (4) 

the need for the sentence “to protect the public from further crimes of the 

defendant;” (5) the applicable sentencing range; (6) “any pertinent policy statement” by the Sentencing Commission; and (7) “the need to avoid unwarranted 

sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been 

found guilty of similar conduct.” 18 U.S.C. 3553(a).

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We agree with the district court and the parties that Amendment 821 applies to De La Cruz and that it gave the district court 

the discretion to reduce De La Cruz’s sentence. Part B of Amendment 821, which is applied retroactively as of February, added 

U.S.S.G. § 4C1.1, the “zero-point offender adjustment.” U.S.S.G. 

amends. 821, 825 (2023). That guideline provides for a decrease in 

a defendant’s offense level if the defendant satisfies ten criteria. 

De La Cruz, who was a first-time offender and committed a 

non-violent crime without possessing a dangerous weapon or committing a sex offense, satisfies all ten criteria, so the decreased offense level is therefore applicable. See 18 U.S.S.G. § 4C1.1. At the 

decreased offense level, a guideline range of 292-365 applies to De 

La Cruz, rather than the 360 months-to-life range that applied

when the district court originally sentenced him in 2003.

With the new applicable range determined, the district court 

had the discretion to decide whether to impose a new sentence or 

retain the current one. See Bravo, 203 F.3d at 780–81. Here, the 

district court afforded sufficient consideration to relevant factors 

and did not give significant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor. See Irey, 612 F.3d at 1189. The district court also made its decision within the broad range of options it had available in arriving

at a sentence that achieves the purposes of sentencing stated in § 

3553(a). Id.

First, the district court explicitly stated that it considered the 

§ 3553(a) factors in its decision to deny relief. And second, the court 

explained that it agreed with the government’s response to the 

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court’s sua sponte motion and that it was denying relief for the reasons that filing set forth. The government’s response, in turn, went 

through the § 3553(a) factors, showing how the government (and 

the court ultimately) thought they bore on an appropriate sentence 

for De La Cruz. See United States v. Eersdorf, 126 F.3d 1318, 1322-

23 (11th Cir. 1997) (concluding that a district court’s reference to 

the government’s response served as an explanation for a decision 

to deny resentencing when the response cited specific § 3553(a) factors). 

Third, the district judge sentenced De La Cruz originally, 

and over the years, in addressing motions for sentencing relief, he 

has consistently explained why he has not thought it appropriate to 

reduce De La Cruz’s sentence under the § 3553(a) factors. See id.

(concluding that the court properly considered the § 3553(a) factors 

where “the same district court judge who sentenced Defendant 

originally was the one who declined to resentence him”).

In 2015, for instance, the district court denied De La Cruz’s 

motion for a reduction of sentence based on Amendment 782 of 

the Sentencing Guidelines, see U.S. Sent’g Guidelines Manual 

amend. 782 (U.S. Sent’g Comm’n 2014). The court determined 

that “a reduction is still not appropriate” because the court “found 

that perjured testimony was presented at the co-defendant’s trial 

by De la Cruz” and the court “imposed a fair sentence in 2003.” 

Then, in 2021, the district court, in denying De La Cruz’s motion 

for compassionate relief, determined that “the requested release 

would not promote respect for the law or act as a deterrent,” both 

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because of the amount of cocaine seized and De La Cruz’s perjured testimony. The facts of the offense have remain unchanged, 

so the district court did not err in retaining its view of those facts.

De La Cruz argues that the district court acted improperly 

by failing to consider “any pertinent policy statement issued by the 

Sentencing Commission” and “the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have 

been found guilty of similar conduct.” See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). But 

the court did not need to explicitly discuss every factor, as long as 

the record indicates it considered all relevant factors. See United 

States v. Johnson, 877 F.3d 993, 997 (11th Cir. 2017). And here, for 

the reasons we’ve noted, it does. As for De La Cruz’s complaint 

that the court didn’t address “the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities,” the record shows that the district court did

consider that factor. The judge explained that “[t]he fact that other 

district judges may have exercised discretion to grant relief under 

18 U.S.C. § 3582 is not controlling.”

We also cannot conclude that the district court made a clear 

error of judgment by balancing the sentencing factors unreasonably. Irey, 612 F.3d at 1189. The district court considered the history 

and characteristics of the defendant, the seriousness of De La 

Cruz’s drug-importation offense and perjured testimony, and the 

amended applicable sentencing range, and determined that those 

considerations outweighed any Sentencing Commission’s policy 

statements and the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities, 

see 18 U.S.C. 3553(a). The weight attached to each factor in 

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determining a sentence falls within the sound discretion of the district court, and we are not left with the definite and firm conviction 

that the district court committed a clear error of judgment. See 

Irey, 612 F.3d at 1190.

Finally, a district court may consider a defendant’s post-sentencing behavior, but it is not required to do so. United States v. 

Caraballo-Martinez, 866 F.3d 1233, 1249 (11th Cir. 2017). For that 

reason, even if the district court did not give any weight to De La 

Cruz’s post-sentencing behavior, we cannot say that the district 

court abused its discretion. See id.

For the foregoing reasons, we grant summary affirmance of

the district court’s denial of De La Cruz’s §3582(c)(2) motion.

AFFIRMED.

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