1 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

_____________ No. 10

- 1172

_____________ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v. LORENZO HARDWICK,

Appellant

_____________ No. 10

- 1280

_____________ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v. ALLEN RESTO, a/k/a Tito Allen,

Appellant

_____________ Appeal from the United States District Court for

the District of New Jersey District Court Judge Robert B. Kugler Criminal Nos. 02

- CR

- 684

- 0 0 5 and 02

- CR

- 684

- 003 Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

October 3, 2011 Before: McKEE, Chief Judge , FUENTES and COWEN, Circuit Judges

(Filed: November 21, 2011 )2

Brian S. O‟Malley, Esq. P. O. Box 183 Haddon Heights, New Jersey 08035 Attorney for Allen Resto
P aul A. Sarmousakis, Esq. 454

- 24 th Street P.O. Box 2 Avalon, New Jersey 08220

- 0002 Attorney for Lorenzo Hardwick Paul J. Fishman, Esq. John E. Clabby, Esq. United States Attorneys ‟ Office 970 Broad Street Newark, New Jersey 07102

- 2535 Attorney s for Appel lee

____________ OPINION

_____________ McKEE, Chief Judge
Lorenzo Hardwick and Allen Resto each appeal the ir convict ions and the sentences imposed following our remand. We previously affirmed their convictions, but
remanded for limi ted resentencing. See United States v. Hardwick , 544 F.3d 565 (3d Cir. 2008). For the reasons that follow, we will affirm the district court‟s refusal to broaden the scope of the remand as requested by Hardwick and Resto at the resentencing, and we
will also affirm the s entences that the court imposed

. 1
I.

1 We have jurisdiction to review a challenge to sentencing pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).3

In rejecting the majority of claims Appellants raised in t heir initial appeal, we explained that we would nevertheless remand for re
- sentencing on only one of the Counts
of conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), consisten t with the Justice Department‟s policy
memorandum

. Id. at 574

- 75. Despite that limitation, Har dwick and Resto insisted on making numerous arguments that clearly exceeded t he scope of the limited remand. 2 However, the district court correctly interprete d our judgment and limited the proceedings to resent enc ing for a single violation of § 924(c) for both Hardwick and Resto.
Hardwick now argues that th e district court erred by limiting the resentencing to Count V, by imposing a consec u tive sentence on Cou nt V, by using U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(D)(1) and applying the first degree murder cross

- over under U.S.S.G. §2A1.1 , and thereby imposing an unreasonable sentence. 3

Resto argues that the district court erred by not resentencing him on Count I , and by applying the enhancements found in U.S.S.G. §§ 2A 1.1, and 2D1.1 . He also argues

2 In challenging their conviction s, Hardwick claim s a double jeopardy violation and a nonunanimous jury, and Resto argues lack of jurisdiction pertaining to Count IV. T hose claims are clearly beyond the scope of the remand . The district court correctly ignored them, and we will not add ress them either.

3 Hardwick also attempted to present an ineffective assista nce of counsel claim. I t is well established that claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are not entertained on direct appeal, absent a narrow exception when the record i s sufficient to allow a determination of ineffective assistance of counsel. U nited States v. Haywood , 155 F.3d 674, 678 (3d Cir. 1998). Although Hardwick argues that we can decide this question as a matter of law on the record before us, that is clearly not the case. Accordingly, we refuse to address claims of ineffective assistance of counsel here.4

that the court erroneously calculated the amount of drugs attributable to him , erred in calculating his criminal history , and i mpos ed an unreasonable sentence.
II.
It is well

- estab li shed that the district courts do not have authority to deviate from
the specific mandate of an appellate court

. See Briggs v. Pennsylvania R. Co. , 334 U.S. 304, 306 (1948). T he “ trial court must „implement both t he letter and the spirit of the mandate, t aking into account the appellate court‟s opinion and the circumstances it
embraces. ‟ ” United States v. Kikumura , 947 F.2d 72, 76 (3d Cir. 19 9 1). Absent change of controlling law, new evidence, or error, the prior decision should continue to govern
the sa me issues in subsequent stages of the same case. Scheafnocker v. C.I.R. , 642 F.3d 428, 433 (3d Cir. 2011). In addition, Appellants may not litigate issues that could have
been raised but were not raised on a prior appeal. Skretvedt v. E. I. DuPont De N emours , 372 F. 3d 193, 203 (3d Cir. 2004). We have reviewed the sentencing he aring and find no error in the sentencing procedure on remand. Moreover, the sentence that was imposed is certainly reasonable given the seriousness of the criminal conduct and all of the other factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). See 18 U.S.C. § 3553 ( “A district court to which a case is remanded . . . shall resentence a defendant in accordance with section 3553.”). We also reject Hardwick‟s attempt to derive some benefit from the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010

. That Act may not be “applied retroactively to authorize the District Court to impose a sentence below the prescribed mandatory minimum prison5

term in effect at the time” of original sentencing. U nited States v. Reeve y , 631 F.3d 110, 111 (3d Cir. 2010). For the reasons stated above, we affirm the district court‟s Judgments on Re

Sentencing.