07- 0090- bk

I n r e: Shayna H

. Zar nel 1 UNITED STATE S COURT OF AP PEALS 2 FO R T HE SE CO ND CI RC UI T 3 4 August Term 2008 5 6 7 Argued: October 14, 2008 Decided: August 26, 2010 8 9 10 Do ck et N os . 0 7-0 09 0-b k(L ); 0 7-0 09 1-b k(C on ); 0 7-0 09 2-b k(C on ); 11 07-0097-bk(Con); 07- 0098-bk(Con); 07-0099- bk(Con) 12 13

_____________________________________ 14 15 In r e: S hayn a H . Z arn el, Di an a M. Fi nlay, Le na M. El m en do rf 16 17 DI AN A G . A DA MS , Unit ed St ate s T rus tee 18 19 Petitione r-Appellant , 20 21 -v.- 22 23 SHAYN A H. ZAR NEL, DIANAM. FINLAY, LEN A M. ELMENDO RF, 24 25 Resp on de nts -A pp ellees . 26

_____________________________________ 27 28 Before: LEVAL, K ATZMANN , and LIVINGSTON, Ci rcu it J ud ges . 29 30 On appeal from the N ovember 8, 2006 final judgm ent of the United States Dist rict Courtfor 31 the Southern Dist rict of New York (Brieant , J. ), p eti tio ne r-a pp ell ant D ian a G . A dam s, Un ite d S tat es 32 Tr

us tee , argu es t

hat sh e h as s tan din g to ap pe al b ankru ptc y c ourt o rde rs s tri kin g th e b ankrupt cy 33 petiti ons of respondents-appellees and tha t, under the s trictures of the Bankruptcy Code, t he 34 bank

rup tcy co urt wa s com pe lle d to di sm iss the cas es o f t he se d eb tor s u

po n f ind ingthat th eywe re 35 in e l i g i b l e forba nkrupt cy du e t o t he irfai lu re to co mpl y wi th cr ed itco un se li ng re qu ir eme nt s. We 36 conclude thatthe Trustee has standing t o bring the appe al; thatthe appeal is not m oot; and that the 37 fi lin g o f a

bank rup tcy peti tio n bya debt or who ha s f ail ed to s ati sf y c red it c ouns eli ng req

uir em ents2 1 comm ences a bankrupt cy case and invoke s the automatic sta y. 2 VACAT ED and REMAND ED. 3 ST E P H A N IE R

. M A R C U S , U

. S

. D e p artm e n t o f Ju s ti c e, 4 Civil Divisi on, Appellate Sta ff (Peter D. Keisler, Assis tant 5 Attorney General , Michael J. Garcia, United States Att orney, 6 Dann a D ror i, A s s ist ant U .S . A tto rne y, Ro be rta A. De An ge lis , 7 Acting General Counsel , P. Ma tt hew Sutko, Lisa A. Trac y, 8 Sean E. Martin, Office of the G ene ra l Counsel , of c ou ns el , 9 W illia m K anter, U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Divis ion, 10 Appellate Sta ff, on thebr ief ), for Petit ioner-Appell ant

. 11 12 SANFOR D I. W EISBURST (W illia m B . Adam s, on the 13 br ief ), Quinn Em anuel Urquhart & Sull ivan, LLP, New York, 14 NY, Court-Appointed Amicus Curi ae on Behalf of Pro Se 15 De bto rs . 16 17 LIVINGSTON , Circuit Judge : 18 Th is c ase req uir es u s to int erp ret

the int erp lay

of pro vis ion s o f t

he Bank rup tcy Co de that 19 ari ses wh enanin div idu al or entity fi les a p eti tio n fo r bank

rup tcy wi tho ut c om

ply ingwi th t

he cre dit 20 co un sel ing req

uir em ents c reated

bythe Bank

rup tcy Ab us e P rev entio n and

Co ns um er P rot ect ion

Ac t 21 of

20 05 (“B AP CP A” ), P ub . L . N o. 10 9-8 , 1 19 St at. 23 . In the co urs e of

our an aly sis , w e inter

pre t 22 the credi t counseli ng requirement, 11 U.S.C. § 1 09 (h ), th e p ro vi si on s t ha t g ov ern t he co mmencement 23 of

bank rup tcy cas es, 11 U. S. C. §§ 30 1, 3 02 , an d 30 3, and th e statut ory

s ect ion go ve rni ng autom ati c 24 stays, 11 U.S.C. § 362. 25 Pe tit ion er- ap pe llant D ian a G . A dam s, Un ite d S tat es T ru s te e (“ T ru s te e ” ), a p p e a ls f ro m a f in al 26 judgment entered November 8, 2006 in the United Stat es Distri ct Court for the Southern District of 27 New York (Brieant, J. ) dismissing her appea l for lack of standing and i n the alte rnative a ffirm ing 28 the b ankru

ptc y co urt ’s de cis ion

to s tri ke th e bank

rup tcy p eti tio ns f

ile d byrespon de nts -ap pe lle es3 1 (“debtors ”) rathe r than to dismiss their cases. W e determine that the Trustee has standing to bring 2 this appeal ; that the appeal is notmoot; and t hat the fili ng of a bankruptcy peti tion by a debtorwho 3 has failed to sa tisfy creditcounseling r equirements comm ences a bankruptcy case and invokes the 4 autom ati c st ay . W e d o n ot, ho we ve r, p ron ounc e o n th e qu est ion o f wh at a cti on

a b ankru ptc y c ourt 5 may take with respect t o such a petit ion given thes e determinations. 6 7 BACKGROUND 8 The appeal before thi s Court is of a c onsolidate d matter, gener ated by thre e unrelat ed filings 9 of bankruptcy i n the United St ates Bankruptcy Court for the Sout hern Dis trictof New York. As the 10 facts are not i n dispute, we take the m l ar gely from the bankruptcy c ourt’s opi nion. Se e In re 11 El

me nd or f , 345 B.R. 486 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006). 12 Le na

El m en do rf

, re pre sented

bycouns el, fil ed

a voluntary C ha

pte r 7 p eti tio n o n N ov em

be r 13 29 , 2 00 5. Al tho ug h th is p roc eed ing wa s h er f irs t bank rup tcy fi lin g and

he r pe tit ion

wa s 14 accompanied by the correct schedules, she neither filed a credit-counse ling cert ificate, see11 U.S.C. 15 § 521(b), nor soughtan extension of ti me to do so, see id. § 1 09 (h) (3) (A ). T he Un ite d S tat es 16 Trustee’s Of

fice (“Trustee”) m oved to dismiss the case on February 1, 2006. In re E lm en do rf , 345 17 B.R. at 491. 18 Di an a F inl ayfi led a C ha pte r 13 pe tit ion

on Ap ril 3, 20 06 , a s a pro s e debtor, att aching none 19 of

the req uis ite sch ed

ule s. Sh e so ug ht an ex ten sio n of tim e to f ile he r cr ed it- co un sel ing cer tif icate, 20 which the bankruptcy court denied for failure to state that the de btor sought counseli ng within five 21 days of filing. Id. at 492 . Fin lay had rece ntl y f

ile d tw o p rio r C ha

pte r 13 pe tit ion s: o ne on

Au gu st4 1 31 , 2005, and o ne on No ve m be r 28 , 2 00 5. Bo th w ere dis m iss ed fo r f ail ure to f ile the ap pro pri ate 2 bankruptcy sche dules. Id. The Trustee filed a motion to dismiss the case on May 3, 2006. 3 Shayna Zarnel, the third re levant debt or, filed a Chapte r 13 p et it ion on Ma rch 13, 2006. 4 Although this was Zarnel’s firstbankruptcy fili ng, her husband had filed five ba nkruptcy peti tions 5 with the courtsince Januar y 2004. Id. She sought an extens ion of time to file her credi t counseli ng 6 cer

tif icate b ut f

ail ed to a lle ge ex ige nt c irc um stances m eri tin g a wa ive r; the bank

rup tcy co urt 7 therefore deni ed the extens ion. Id. at 4 93

. O n Ap ril 3 , 20 06 , no ne the les s, Z arn el fi led a credit 8 co un sel ing cer

tif icate atte sti ng that sh e ha d rec eiv ed c ouns eli ng on

Mar ch21 , 2 00 6. Th e T rus tee 9 then moved to dismiss the case. 10 After holding a hear ing on the motions in the Elmendorf and Zar ne l pr oc ee dings, and 11 reservi ng decision on t he motions in all thr ee cases, the bankruptcy court determined in a July 18, 12 2006 opinion to “st rike” the case of each debtor rather than t o dismiss each c ase a s re quested by the 13 Trustee. Id. at 504-05. It arrived at this decision by exa mining the credit- counseling r equirement 14 co dif

ied at 1 1 U .S .C . § 10 9(h ). T he co urt ob ser ve d th at the pro vis ion , whic h it sai d “w as i nte nd ed 15 to provide debt ors with educat ion as to al l of their options when experiencing financi al difficulty, 16 be

fore a resortto bankruptcy pr otection was ne cessary,” ha d as a policy ma tt er“ not proven to be 17 of

assi stanc e to d eb tor s in

see kin g re lie f o uts ide of

the bank rup tcy co nte xt. ” Id. at 4 90 . T he co urt 18 no ne the les s co nc lud ed th at co m

pli an ce wi th § 10 9(h )’s re qu ire m ent t hat a d eb tor s eek credit 19 co un sel ing be fo re o bta ini ng bank rup tcy rel ief wa s “an a

bs olute p re- req

uis ite to i nd ivi du al 20 bank

rup tcy eli gibility.” Id. at 4 95 . T he cou rt a ck no wl ed ge d th at d eb tor s m ayin c ert ain 21 cir cum stanc es o bta in an e xte ns ion of ti m e to re cei ve couns eli ng und er § 10 9(h )(3 )(A ). T he co urtThe court noted t hat before an exte nsion of time to receive cr edit counsel ing may be 1 granted, “a de btor must submit to the court (1) a certi fication (2) describi ng exigent cir cum stanc es t

hat (3 ) m eri t a w aiv er o f t he req uir em ent, ( 4) s tat es t

hat th e d eb tor

req ue ste d cre dit co un sel ingfr om

anap pro ve d n on

pro fi t bu dg et and

cre dit co un sel ingag en cy , b ut w as unable to obta in servic es during the five day period begi nning on the date that debtormade the req ue st and (5) wh ich

is s ati sf act ory to t he Co urt .” Id. at 4 96 (f

oo tno tes om itt ed ). 11 U. S. C. § 1 05 (a) pro vid es a s f oll ow s: 2 The court may issue any order , process, or j udgment that is necessa ry or ap pro pri ate to c arr

y o ut t he pro vis ion s o f t

his tit le. No pro vis ion

of thi s ti tle pro vid ingfo r th e ra isi ng of aniss ue bya p arty in

int ere st s ha ll b e co ns tru ed to preclude t he court from, sua sponte, taking a ny action or making any determination neces sary or appr opriate t o enforce or implement court orders or rul es, or t o p rev ent an

ab us e o f p roc ess . 5 1 no ted , h ow ev er, that th e d if fi cu lti es o f s ati sf

yin g e ach of the statut ory

fa cto rs n ece ssary t o h av e a 2 req

ue st f or e xte ns ion

grante d are s ub stanti al, parti cu lar ly f or a pro s e de bto r. Id. at 496. 1 3 Relying on its r easoning in a pr evious case, In re Rios , 336 B.R

. 17 7 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 4 20 05 ), t

he bankrup tcy

co urt fo un d th at the statut ory

lan gu ag e o f § 10 9(h ), whic h p rov ide s th at an 5 individual “may not be a debt or” wit hout pr ior credit counseling, bar s such filers from comm encing 6 a case under 11 U.S.C. § 301. In re E lm en do rf , 345 B.R. at 497. Moreover , if a c as e is not 7 comm enced, the cour t determined, the aut omatic stay againstcreditoractions p ro vi de d for in 11 8 U.S.C. § 362 does not operate to pr otect the ineligi ble filer. Id. at 4 97 -98 . N on eth ele ss, it f ound that 9 it still had jur isdicti on over the matter even i f a case was not proper ly comm enced by the fili ng. Id. 10 at 4 99 . T he ref

ore , und er the e qu ita

ble p ow ers g ranted

b y 11 U .S .C . § 10 5(a ), t

he bank rup tcy co urt 11 de ter

m ine d th at b eca

us e C on gress h ad

no t expli cit ly d ire cte d th e ac tio n a co urt sh ou ld t ak e in 12 response to a bankruptcy pet ition faili ng to comm ence a case, i t had the power t o strike t he petiti ons 13 be fo re it rathe r than to di sm iss the c ase s, as u rge d b y th e T rus tee

. Id. at 5 03 . T he co urt no ted that 26 1 in i ts v iewdis m iss al, whic h ha s the p ote nti al ef fe ct of li m iti ng a cce ss to or the durat ion of § 3 62 ’s 2 autom ati c st ayin a su bs eq ue nt f ili ng , is fo r th e m os t part “ anina pp rop riate r em ed

y f or a de bto r’s 3 inn oc uo us fa ilure t o o bta in c ouns eli ng , p rio r to fi lin g a bank rup tcy pe tit ion ,” id. at 491, an d it 4 co nc lud ed

that it co uld alw ay s st rik e a c ase wi th p rej ud ice to f utu re f ili ng s if it f ound su cha m eas ure 5 to be warrant ed by a filer’s bad faith or othersuch circumstances, id. at 504. 6 Be cau s e E lm e n d o rf h a d n o t f il e d anyp re v io u s b an kru

p tc yp e ti ti o n s n o r w e re th e re o th er 7 indicati on s of bad faith, the c ourt order ed her case s tricken wit hout prejudi ce. Id. In the case of 8 Fi nlay, the bank

rup tcy co urt no ted that th e d eb tor

ha d f ile d “ three bac k-t o-b ack bank rup tcy 9 petiti ons,” and that s he “sought, and ob ta in ed , an e xtens ion of time to file her credi t counseli ng 10 cer

tif icate in her pr ior cas e, ” an d w as t

hu s “n ot i gn orant o f t

he req uir em ent.” Id. Noting that “[t]he 11 circumstances in Ms . Finlay’s fi li ng s are indicati ve of a pattern of delay a nd an abuse of the 12 pro vis ion s o f S ect ion 36 2, ” re lat ingto the auto m ati c stay, the c ourt s ug ge ste d th at i t m ight have be en 13 “incline d to grant some sort of precl usive rel ief,” but because t he Trustee had notrequested a ny 14 relief otherth an d ismissal, the courtmerely struck the ca se without pre judice. Id. at 504-05. 15 Fi na lly , it

als o s tru ck

Zarne l’s cas e wi tho ut pre jud ice o n the g rou

nd that, a lth ou ghhe r hu sb an d h ad 16 repeatedl y filed f or bankruptcy, t his was Zarnel’ s first filing. Id. at 505. Acting on it s own volition, 17 the bankruptc y court then c ertified i ts orders for direct appe al to th is Co urtunder 28 U.S.C. § 18 15 8(d )(2 ). O n N ov em be r 17 , 2 00 6, w e co ns oli dated an d d ism iss ed

tho se a pp eal s b eca

us e n o p arty 19 had filed a peti tion for permission to appea l under Federa l Rule of Appellate Proc edure 5(a)

. 20 Th e Tru ste e app eal ed the bank rup tcy co urt ’s d eci sio n in

eac h in stanc e to the dis tri ct c ourt7 1 on the iss ue of

wh eth er the bank

rup tcy co urt ha d e rre d in

rul ing that th e p eti tio ns of ine lig ibl e 2 debtors had notcomm enced cases a nd that the petit ions could thus be struck ra ther than di smissed. 3 Adams v. Finlay , No. 06 civ. 6039, 2006 WL3240522 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 3, 2006). In i ts opi nion of 4 No ve m

be r 3, 20 06 , th e d istric t co urt su a s po nterai sed

the is su e of

th e T rus tee ’s s tan din g to ap pe al 5 the de nia ls o f i ts m oti on s to dis m iss . App lying th e b ankru ptc y s tan din g te st o f t

his Co urt that 6 req

uir es an a pp ell ant to be a “p ers on

ag gri ev ed ,” m ean ing“a p ers on ‘di rec tlyan d adve rse ly a ff ect ed 7 pe cuniaril y b y’ the chal leng ed ord er o f t

he bank rup tcy co urt ,’” Int ’l T

ra deAd mi n. v. Re ns sel

ae r 8 Po lytech nic Ins t. , 936 F.2d 744, 747 (2d Cir. 1991) (quoting In re Cosmopolitan Aviation Corp. , 763 9 F. 2d

5 07 , 51 3 (2d

Ci r. 1 98 5)) , th e d istric t co urt fo un d th at the Tr

us tee wa s n ot a gg rie ve d b eca us e 10 no cre dit or’ s ri gh ts w ere af fe cte d b y th ese de cis ions and no substanti ve act ion s h ad be entak en 11 be tw een

the fi lin g and

the str iki ng of

the cas es. Th erefore, i t he ld, the Tr us tee lac ke d s tan din g to 12 ap pe al. It n on eth ele ss p roc eed ed to d eci de the m eri ts i n the a lte rnativ e af ter co nf ess ing that it

ha d 13 “no great confidenc e” in its standing det ermination. Finlay , 2006 W L 3240522, at *4. 14 Th e dis tri ct co urt c on clu de d that t

he b ankru

ptc y co urt ’s int erp ret ati on o f the interplay 15 between §§ 109(h), 301, and 362( a) was the correctone – that a cas e is not comm enced nor does t he 16 autom ati c st ayco m e into e xis ten ce whe n a bank rup tcy pe tit ion is f ile d b y an indiv idu al who fa ils 17 to f

ulf ill the cre dit -co un sel ingreq uir em ent. I t th en

expoun de d o n th e co urt ’s e qu ita ble po we rs, 18 no tin g th at m oti on s to strik e ple ad ing s, alth ou ghfal len fro m favo r, w ere on ce c om

m on in t he fe de ral 1 9 co urt s and

hav e n o t s in c e th a t t im e b e e np ro h ib it e d

. F urt h e rm o re , it

a d d e d , F e d e ra l R

u le o f Ci vil 20 Procedur e 12 (f

) p erm its a

c ourt to str ike a

p lea din g, a s do B ankru

ptc y Ru les 7 01 2(b ) and 9011. 21 Given the lat itude provi ded the bankrupt cy court under § 105(a) , the di strictcourt found it was not8 1 be yo nd

the bank rup tcy co urt ’s jud ici al po we rs to str ike th e pe tit ion o f a de bto r who ha s n ot s ati sf ied 2 the credi t counseli ng requirement and thus has not commenced a case. Therefore, in the a lternat ive 3 to d ism iss ing the ap pe als fo r w ant of stand ing , it

af fi rm ed the bank rup tcy co urt ’s o rde rs i n a ll 4 respects

. 5 Th e T rus tee tim ely ap pe ale d th e d ist

ric t co urt ’s d eci sio n to thi s C ourt. In o rde r t o ass ist

in 6 the development of arguments on appeal, this Court app oi nt edSanford I. Weisburst, Esq. amicus 7 curiae on beha lf of the pro se debtors (“Amicus”). The debtor s have not appear ed in this appeal. 8 9 DI SC US SI ON 10 Before reaching the m erits of this appeal, we must first determine wheth erwe have 11 jur isd ict ion . Is su es aris e b oth fr om the Tr us tee ’s s tan din g to tak e th is a pp eal an d it s p otential 12 m oo tne ss. W e rev iew the se l eg al i ssu es deno vo . N.Y. Civil Liberti es Union v. Grandeau , 528 F.3d 13 12 2, 12 8 (2 d C ir. 20 08 ); Ce nt. Sta tes Se. & Sw . A rea s H ea lth & We lfa re F

un d v . Me rck

-Me dc o 14 Managed Care, L.L.C. , 433 F.3d 181, 197 (2d Cir. 2005). 15 16 I. Standing 17 Section 307 of the Bankruptc y Act authoriz es the Trust ee to “rai se and [ ] a pp ea r and be 18 he ard

on any is su e in

any c ase or p roc eed ingun de r th is t itl e. ” 1 1 U .S .C . § 30 7. Des pit e th at b roa d 19 au th or iz at ion, cf. In re C olu mb ia G as Sy

s. , 3 3 F .3 d 2 94 , 2 96 (3d

Ci r. 1 99 4) ( “[ i] t is dif

fi cu lt t o 20 co nc eiv e o f a

statut e that m ore cle arl y s ign if ies Co ng res s’s int ent to co nf er s tan din g” ), t

he dis tri ct 21 co urt

co nc lud ed

that th e T rus tee did

no t have stand ing to a

pp eal the de nia l of

its m oti on s to dis m iss

.9 1 W e disagree with that det ermination. 2 As the dis tri ct c ourt c orr ect ly n ote d, in d ete rm ini ng wh eth er a partyhas s tan din g to ap pe al 3 from

a partic ular rul ing of a bankruptcy cour t, we have frequently l ooked to whether an appellant 4 is a “pers on a ggrieved” t hat is, “a pe rson ‘dir ectly and adve rsely affected pecuni arily by’ the 5 ch all en ge d o rde r of the bank rup tcy co urt .” Int ’l Trade Admin. , 936 F.2d at 747 (quoting In re 6 Cosmopolitan Aviati on Corp. , 7 63 F. 2d at 5 13 ); seeals o 11 U.S.C. § 67(c) (1976) (re pealed 1978) 7 (permitting appeal by a “person aggr eived by an orderof a referee”). Applying that standar d, the 8 dis tri ct c ourt d ete rm ine d th at the Tr us tee ha d n o d ire ct p ecu

niary interes t in

the outco m e o f t

his 9 litiga tion and accor dingly lacke d standing. We disagree. 10 While the “pecunia ry interest” form ulation is an often used and of ten useful test of standing 11 in t

he bank rup tcy co nte xt, it “ is n ot t

he on ly t est .” In re R evc o D .S ., Inc

. , 8 98 F. 2d

49 8, 49 9 (6 th 12 Ci r. 1 99 0). Ins tea d, even abse nt a di rec t pec un iar

y int ere st i n th e li tig ati on , “ a pu bli c int ere st m ay 13 als o giv e a su ff

ici ent s tak e in the o utc om e of a b ankru ptc y c ase to c on fe r ap pe llate s tan din g. ” Id. 14 (em

ph asi s in ori gin al) ; seea lso In r e C lar k , 92 7 F. 2d

793 , 79 6 (4t

h Ci r. 19 91 ) (“[ S] tan din g to ap pe al 1 5 un de r t

h e B an kru

p tc yA c t a s a‘p art

ya g g ri e v e d ’ m ayari s e f

ro m ap art y ’s o f f ic ia l d u ty to e n fo rce 16 the bank

rup tcy lawin t he pu bli c inter est ”). Th e Su

pre m e Co urt

h as thu s de ter

m ine d, fo r in stanc e, 17 that th e S ecu

rit ies an d E x c h an g e C o m

m is s io n ’s inte re s t i n

“ th e m ainten an ce o f i ts s tat uto ry a uth ori ty 18 and the performance of its public dut ies” was sufficient to give the Com mission standing to pursue 19 a bankruptcy appe al. SEC v. U.S. Realty & Improvement Co. , 310 U.S. 434, 459-60 (1940). 20 Applying U. S. Re alt yand the “ public interes t” s tandard, several of our sistercircuit s have 21 co nc lud ed

that the U. S. Tr

us tee ha s ju st s uc h an inter est an d th us stand ing to p urs ue bank rup tcy10 1 appeals. As the Sixth Circuit explai ned in reasoning adopted by the First and Third C ircuit s, “the 2 U. S. tru ste es ar e res po ns ibl e fo r ‘pr ote cti ng the pu bli c int ere st an d en surin g th at b ankru ptc y c ase s 3 are conducte d according t o law.’ That i s the int erest the U.S. trustee has pursued in t his c ase, and 4 that inter est

giv es h im

stand ingto a

pp eal .” In re R evc o D .S

., Inc

. , 898 F.2d at 499 ( internal citati on 5 om itt ed ); see also In re United Artist s Theatre Co. , 3 15 F. 3d

21 7, 22 5 (3 d C ir. 20 03 ) (“ U. S. Tr us tee s 6 are of

fi cer s o f t he De partm ent of

Ju sti ce who prot ect

the pu bli c int ere st b y a idi ng bank rup tcy jud ge s 7 in m on ito rin g c ert ain asp ect s o f b ankru

ptc y p roc eed ing s. ”); In re P laz a d e D iego S ho pp ing Ce nte r, 8 Inc

. , 9 11 F .2 d 82 0, 82 4 (1 st C ir 1 99 0) ( stand ingde riv es f rom “th e U .S . T rus tee ’s i nte res t f rom his 9 statut ory

res po ns ibilityto r ep res ent an d p rot ect the pu bli c”) . T he Fo urt

h C irc uit sim ilarly 10 concluded, in r eliance on U. S. Re alt y , that the U. S. Tr

us tee ha d s tan din g in

the m att er b ef

ore that 11 court becaus e the “trustee [was] attempting, as was the SEC in Un ite d S tates R ea lty , to enforce the 12 law in the public intere st–in thi s case the i nterestof the public in avoi ding substant ial abuse of the 13 bank

rup tcy pro ces s. ” In re C

lar k , 927 F.2d at 796. 14 W e fi nd

the re aso nin g of

tho se c ourts to b e p ers ua siv e an d c on clu de that th e U .S . T rus tee ’s 15 re sp on si bi li ty to repr esent and prot ect the publ ic inter est affords it a subs tantial interes t in, and 16 the ref

ore stand ingto p roc eed

wi th, thi s ap pe al. 17 18 II. Mo otn ess 19 Mo otn ess is a do ctr ina l re str ict ion

ste mm ingfromthe Arti cle III req uir em ent th at f

ed era l 20 co urt s d eci de on ly l ive cas es o r co ntr ov ers ies ; a c ase is m oo t if “th e parti es lac k a le ga llyco gn iza ble 21 interes t i n the out come” of the case. Fox v. Bd. of Trustees of State Univ. of N.Y. , 42 F.3d 135, 140W ithreg ard to b oth of the se p rov isi on s, the de bto r m aysee k re lie f f rom the bank rup tcy 3 court, which is authorize d to insti tute or ext end an automatic stay, as appropriat e, if the debtor demonstrates that t he filing of the lat er case was i n good faith as to the creditor s to be staye d. 11 11 1 (2d Cir. 1994) (quot ing Co un ty o f L .A . v . D av is , 440 U.S. 625, 631 (1979)) (int ernal quota tion marks 2 om itt ed ). T his occu rs “whe n int eri m

relie f or ev ents h av e er ad icated

the ef fe cts of the de fe nd ant’s 3 act

or om iss ion , an d the re is no rea so na ble expe ctatio n th at the all eg ed vio lat ion wi ll r ecu r.” Iri sh 4 Lesbian & Gay Org. v. Giuliani , 143 F.3d 638, 647 (2d Cir. 1998). A bankrupt cy case may also be 5 m oo ted

ba sed on “ju ris dic tio na l an d e qu ita

ble considerations” r elated t o difficulty in fashion ing“f air 6 an d e ff

ect ive jud ici al r eli ef

.” AmeriCredit Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Tompkins , 60 4 F. 3d 753 , 7 55 (2d

Ci r. 7 2010) (quoting In re S as so , 409 B.R. 251, 254 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2009)) (inte rnal q uo ta ti on marks 8 omitted). 9 The debtors, by faili ng to appeal t he bankruptc y co urt’s or der stri king theircases, have 10 waived an y argument that t hey have sati sfied the credi t counseli ng requirements of 11 U.S.C. 11 § 1 09 (h) and

s ho uld h av e be ena llo we d to pro cee d wi th the ir bank rup tci es. Th ere fo re, n eithe r party 12 ha s a l eg all y c og niz ab le i nte res t in thi s ap pe al r elated

to its ef fe ct o n th e p roc eed ing s th at i nit iat ed 13 the cas e. Ho we ve r, t he eff ect s of the bank rup tcy court’ s dec isi on

to st rik e th e p eti tio ns rathe r th an 14 dis m iss ing the cas es, the qu est ion o n ap pe al, e xte nd

be yo nd the m att er i mm ed iat ely

at h an d. Un de r 15 11 U. S. C. § 362(c)(3) , the automatic stay pr otecting t he debtor’s assets, which c omes into being 16 when a petiti on is filed, ter minates after thirt y days if “a s in gl e or joint[bankruptcy] case of the 17 debtor was pending within the pr eceding 1-year period but was di smissed.” Similarly, if the debtor 18 ha s h ad

tw o b ankru

ptc y cas es pe nd ingwi thi n th e p rec ed ing ye ar that w ere dis m iss ed , th e autom ati c 19 stay does notgo into effect upon a third fili ng. Id. § 362(c)(4)

. Because, under the plain langua ge 3U. S. C. § 3 62 (c) (3) (B ), ( c)( 4)( B)

. 12 1 of § 3 62 (c) (3) and

(c )(4 ), on ly the “ dis m iss [a l] ” of a p rio r b ankru

ptc y cas e trigger s the se 2 pro vis ion s, ” th e m anne r in wh ich the bank rup tcy court d isp os es o f t

he m att er a

pp ear s li ke ly t o a ff

ect 3 wh eth er the lim itatio ns on the auto m ati c stay fo r sub seq ue nt p roc eed ing s take ef

fe ct. W ith in a

ye ar 4 of the striki ng of their peti tions, ther efore, the debtor s cl early had a l egally cogni zable int erest i n the 5 outcome of this appeal, as did t he Trustee, whose duty t o protect t he public int erest i s affected by 6 debtors avoi ding what it al leges are the appropri ate legal consequences of thei r actions

. 7 Th e bank

rup tcy c ourt str uc k the pe tit ion s at

iss ue he re o n July

28 , 2 00 6. Mo re than a

ye ar 8 has passed si nce that dec ision. Both the Trustee and Am icus argue t hat the cas e is nonethel ess not 9 moot, but provide different r easons. The Trustee suggests that the word “pending” in § 362( c)(3) 10 and (c)(4) encompasses the time during which the case is on appeal, and hence that t he year peri od 11 giv enin t

he statut e h as n ot y et e ve n be gun. Th e deb tor s an d th e T rus tee wo uld the ref ore m aintai n 12 the ir l eg all y c og niz ab le i nte res ts i n th e o utc om e f or t he durat ion

of the ap pe al. Am icu s, ho we ve r, 13 arg ue s th at “ pe nd ing ” co ve rs o nly the pe rio d in whic h the case is pe nd ingin t he bank rup tcy co urt 14 an d th at the autom ati c stay repercussio ns fo r a d eb tor en d a ye ar a ft er the cas e is dis m iss ed , e ve n 15 if that dismissal is appealed. Itinvokes the exception to mootness for cases “capable of repe tition, 16 ye t ev ad ing rev iew .” Va n Wi e v. Pa tak i , 267 F.3d 109, 113 (2d Cir. 2001) (quot ing Kn au st v . C ity 17 of Kingston , 157 F.3d 86, 88 (2d Cir. 1998)) ( internal quotation mark s omi tt ed). Thi s exception 18 ap pli es whe n “ (1) the ch all en ge d a cti on [ is] in it s durat ion

to o sh ort to b e fu lly

lit igated pri or t o it s 19 ces sat ion

or e xp iratio n, an d (2 ) the re [ is] a reas on ab le expe ctatio n th at the sam e co m pla ini ng party 20 [w ill ] b e su

bje cte d to the sam e ac tio n a ga in. ” Id. at 114 (alterations in origina l) (quoti ng Wei ns tei n13 1 v. Brad

for d , 423 U.S. 147, 149 (1975)) (int ernal quota tion marks omitted). 2 W e conclude tha t we need not int erpret § 362( c) at the pres ent t ime. The parties pres ent the 3 on ly t

wo log ica l po ssi bil iti es f

or t he me an ing of t

he wo rd “ pe nd ing ” in

thi s co nte xt, an d w e ag ree 4 with each part y that under i ts interpretati on of the statute the case is not moot. If a case is pending 5 fo r th e purpo se of

§ 3 62 (c) (3) an d (c )(4 ) du rin g th e p eri od

on ap pe al, the n e ach

partyco nti nu es t o 6 have a l egally cognizable interes t bec ause t he manner i n which the ba nkruptcy courtdisposed of the 7 de bto rs’ cas es i s li ke ly t o a ff ect any s ub seq

ue nt proceedings in

wh ich the y m aybe inv olv ed

fo r a 8 ye ar a fter t

his ap pe al i s co nc lud ed . If , o n th e o the r hand , th e y ear pe rio d d eli ne ate d in

the statut e 9 has alrea dy expired, the n we conclude thatthe “capabl e of repetiti on, yet e vading revie w” doctrine 10 ap pli es. Th e f

irs t ele m ent is cle arl y f

ulf ill ed un de r th is i nte rpr etatio n, be cau se a ye ar i s to o s ho rt t o 11 pursu e an

ap pe al t o it s co nc lus ion . T he sec on d e lem ent is als o s ati sf ied be cau se t

he bank rup tcy 12 court will apply its i nterpret ation of the relevantsta tutory provisions i n future cases. Se e Sto rer v. 13 Brown , 415 U.S. 724, 737 n.8 (1974) (“[T]his case is notmoot, since the issues pr operly pres ented, 14 an d th eir

ef fe cts on ind ep en dent candidaci es, wi ll p ers ist as t he Ca lif orn ia s tat ute s ar e ap pli ed

in 15 future elect ions.”) Thus, the bankruptcy cour t will persistin striking petitions ra ther than di smissing 16 cas es, cau sin g re pe ate d injury to th e T rus tee ’s i nte res t. T his ind icates that un de r A m icu s’s 17 interpr etation of the statute, the appeal is not moot. Because we need only ass ure oursel ves that we 18 are de cid inga li ve cas e o r co ntr ov ers y, an d b eca us e A rti cle III jur isd iction exists un de r bo th 19 interpr etations of the statute , we pass on to the merits of the appe al before us. 20 21 III . W he th er aCa se i s C omm en ced14 1 The question before us a rises pr imarily from the interplay of two statut ory se ct io ns of the 2 Bank

rup tcy Co de : 11 U. S. C. § 3 01 an d 1 1 U. S. C. § 109 (h) . Sec tio n 30 1(a ), part of the s ub ch ap ter 3 en tit led

“C om m en cem ent of

a C ase ,” rea ds as f

oll ow s: “Av olu

ntary cas e un de r a

ch ap ter of thi s ti tle 4 is c om

m en ced bythe fi lin g w iththe bank rup tcy co urt of a p eti tio n und er s uc h c ha pte r by anentity 5 that m aybe a d eb tor un de r su chch ap ter .” Section 109 , ti tle d “ Who m aybe a d eb tor ,” co nta ins a 6 lis t of

req uirem ents that mus t be sat isf ied be fo re a n e nti ty o r in div idu al, as t he cas e m aybe , is 7 eligibl e for bankruptcy. As part of B APCPA, Congress am ended § 109 to add subsection (h). Pub. 8 L

. N o . 1 0 9 -8 , § 1 0 6 , 1 1 9 S tat. 2 3 , 3 7 ( 2 0 0 5 ). S u b s e c ti o n( h ) b e g in s a s f

o ll o w s : “ S u

b jec t to 9 parag rap hs (2) an d (3 ), and no tw ith stand ingany o the r pr ov isi on of thi s se cti on , anind ivi du al m ay 10 not be a debtor under [the B ankruptcy Code] unless such individual has, during the 180-day period 11 preceding t he dat e of filing of the petiti on by such individua l, recei ved [credit counse ling].” 11 12 U. S. C. § 1 09 (h) (1) . T he rem ain ingparag rap hs pro vid e exc ep tio ns for de bto rs who res ide in area s 13 where there i s no such avail able credi t counseli ng, for debtors who can cer tify that the y have exigent 14 circumstances and have made appropri ate efforts to obta in counseli ng, and for those incapa citate d, 15 disabled, oron active militar y duty in a combat zone. Id. § 109(h)(2)- (4). 16 As the bank rup tcy co urt ’s d eci sio n n ote d, thes e tw o pro vis ion s m aybe rea d to su gg est that, 17 sin ce an in div idu al “ m ayno t be a d eb tor ” un les s he h as rec eiv ed cre dit co un sel ing co ng rue nt w ith 1 8 the req

u ir e m e n ts o f

§ 1 0 9 (h ) an d

un d e r § 3 0 1 h e m ayn o t c o mm e n c e a c a s e un le s s h e “ m aybe a 19 debtor,” a debt or who fails t o obtai n pre- petiti on cre dit counseling and ye t files a bankruptcy petit ion 20 has notactuall y comm enced a case. In re E lm en do rf , 345 B.R. at 497. Inform ed by this concl usion, 21 the bank

rup tcy co urt rea so ne d f

urt he r th at s triking the peti tio n w as t he ap pro pri ate pro ced

ura lSe cti on 70 7 p rov ide s th at a

bank rup tcy co urt “m aydis m iss a ca se” fo r ca us e af ter no tic e 4 an d a he ari ng . 1 1 U .S .C . § 70 7(a ). 15 1 methodt o dispose of the filing, r ather tha n “dismiss[ing] the case” as provi ded for in 11 U.S.C. § 2 70 7. Am icu s ar gu es f or t his int erp ret ati on

on ap pe al; the Tr

us tee co nte nds inst ead

that a c ase is 4 3 comm enced when an ineli gible indi vidual files for bankruptcy, and thatthe case must be dismissed. 4 An additional t wist aris es from the automatic stay provi sion. Section 362( a) of the Code 5 states th at “a pe tit ion f ile d un de r s ect ion

3 01 , 30 2, o r 3 03 o f [t

he B ankru

ptc y Co de ]

. . . op erates as 6 a stay.” Section

36 2(c )(3 )-( 4), in t

urn , s ets fo rthlim itatio ns on the autom ati c st ayap pli cab le t o 7 su bs eq ue nt c ase s b y th e sam e p eti tio ne r. Und er § 36 2(c )(3 ), whe re a “ca se o f t

he debt or w as 8 pending 9 within the preceding 1-year period but w as dismissed,” the automatic stay is lim ite d t o 3 0 days 10 un les s th e d eb tor

is a ble b y cle ar an d co nv inc ing e vid en ce to reb ut a pre sum pti on that th e later

cas e 11 was not filed in good faith. M oreover, § 362(c )(4) st ates that“if 2 or more . . . cases of the debtor 12 we re p en din g w ith in the p rev iou s ye ar but w ere d ism iss ed , . . . th e st ay. . . s ha ll n ot g o into e ff ect 13 up on

the fi lin g o f the later

cas e, ” an d th e d eb tor

m ayob tai n a

stay o nly if he is a ble to d em on str ate 14 that th e f

ili ng of the lat er c ase is i n good faith. T he bank rup tcy co urt , inter

pre tin g th e inter

play 15 am on g § § 1 09 (h), 301, and 3 62 (a) , c on clu de d “ that th e autom ati c st ayco m es i nto ex ist en ce o nly 16 wh ena

cas e is fi led

in a cco rdanc e w ith§§ 30 1, 30 2, or 3 03 of the [C od e] .” In re E lm en do rf , 345 17 B. R. at 4 98 . Und er this rea din g, wh ena p eti tio n is f

ile d b ut n o c ase is c om

m en ced , th e autom ati c 18 stay does not c ome into effect. Am icus urges us to rejectthis interpretat ion and instead find that the 19 filing of the petit ion, not the commencing of a case, is sufficient to ins titute the automatic stay.16 1 Of the bankruptcy and di strictcourts to c onsider thi s statut ory tangle s o far, a majority have 2 sid ed

wi th t he Tr us tee an d f

ound that de bto rs s uc h as th e on es in the ca se at bar sh ou ld h av e th eir 3 cases dismi ssed. See, e.g. , In re C ra wf or d , 420 B.R. 833, 838 & n.7 (Bankr. D.N.M. 2009) 4 (co lle cti ng cas es) ; In re Jo nes , 3 52 B. R. 81 3, 82 1 (B ankr. S .D . T ex . 2 00 6) ( sam e); In re Seaman , 5 340 B.R. 698, 703, 706 n.3 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 200 6)

. Of t he minority of courts that r ecognize the 6 op tio n o f s tri kin g th e p eti tio n o f a de bto r in eli gib le un de r § 109 (h) , so m e agr ee w iththe bank rup tcy 7 co urt

in th is cas e that s uc h a p eti tio n “ do es n ot t rig ge r th e p rot ect ion s o f t he autom ati c st ay ” und er 8 § 362(a), In re E lm en do rf , 345 B.R. at 498-502. See, e.g. , In re S alazar , 339 B.R. 622, 632-33 9 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2006). F inally, some courts have ruled in line with Amicus’s conclus ion that t he 10 petiti on’s filing does trigger an autom atic stay but does not comm ence a dismissible case when the 11 petiti oner is ine ligible under § 109(h). See In re Thompson , 344 B.R . 899, 905-08 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 12 2006), vacated as moot by 249 F. App’x 475 (7th Cir. 2007). 13 In c on str

uc tin g it s ar gum ent, Amicus place s em ph asi s o n th e lang ua ge of § 3 01 , whic h 14 provides tha t a “ voluntary case under a chapt er of [the Bankruptc y Code] is comm enced by the fili ng 15 wi th th e bankru

ptc y co urt

of a pe tit ion

und er su chchap ter

by anentity th at may be a debtor un de r 16 su chch ap ter .” 11 U .S .C

. § 30 1(a ) ( em ph asi s ad de d). Am icu s su gg est s that th e p hra se “ m aybe a 17 debtor” should be interpreted as barring a debtor ineligibl e for bankruptcy under § 1 09 (h ) from 18 co mm en cin g a

“ca se. ” T he Tr

us tee , cit ing a

uth ori ty rej ect ingth is po sit ion , co unter s that “ the wo rd 19 ‘m ay ’ as us ed

in t he § 3 01 of

the Bank

rup tcy Co de m ean s ‘m ight’ o r is m eant to expre ss a 20 ‘po ssi bil ity .’” In re T om co , 339 B.R. 145, 159 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2006). W e conclude tha t § 301, 21 as w ell as § § 30 2 an d 30 3 (“V olu ntary c ase s, ” “J oint ca ses ,” an d “ Inv olu ntary c ase s, ” re sp ect ive ly) ,17 1 define the prer equisite s for rel ief under particul ar c hapters of the Bankrupt cy Code, rather t han the 2 existence in a juri sdictiona l sense of a volunta ry, joint, orinvoluntary c as e. We t hu s rejectthe 3 po sit ion

of Am icu s that a deb tor

inel igi ble for

bankru ptc y p urs uant t o § 10 9(h ) do es n ot c om m en ce 4 a case by filing a petiti on pursuant to § 301. 5 Ea chof

the thr ee p ara lle l se cti on s im pli cat ed here co nta ins lim iti ng lan gu ag e in dic ati ng that 6 it i s re f

e re n c in g a

p art ic u lar ty

p e o f c a s e , wh e th e r v o lu

n tary , j o int, o r inv o lu

n tary , th a t in

turn i s 7 treate d in a separa te chapterof the Bankruptcy Code. Sections 301, 302 and 303 thus each pr ovide 8 that a c ase un de r a g ive n c ha pte r is co mm en ced

bythe fi lin g of

a p eti tio n bya

p eti tio ne r “that m ay 9 be a d eb tor un de r su ch ch ap ter .” Se e 11 U.S.C. §§ 301-03 (emph as is a dd ed ). This limiting 10 language in al l three s ections sugge sts thatthe secti ons are not conc erned with det ermining the 11 existence of a “case” in the broader sens e — i.e

. , “[a] civil or criminal proceeding, action, suit, or 12 co ntr ov ers y at law o r in eq uit y. ” B LACK ’ S L A W D I CTI ONA RY 24 3 (9 th e d. 20 09 ) (d ef ini ng “ca se” ). 13 Rathe r, t

he y c lar if y th at, wh ena d eb tor

co mm en ces a cas e, th e de bto r i s n ot e lig ibl e f or r eli ef un de r 14 a p art icu lar

ch ap ter of the Bank rup tcy Co de un les s it

m eet s th e re qu ire m ents to be a d eb tor un de r 15 that chapt er. Othe r pr ov isi on s in the Co de pla ce s im ilar em ph asi s o n th e ex ist en ce o f c ha pte r16 specific requi rements for debtors. See, e.g. , 1 1 U .S .C . § § 7 06 (d) , 1 11 2(f ), 1 30 7(g ) (“ [A ] c ase m ay 17 no t be co nv ert ed

to a cas e und er an oth er ch ap ter o f thi s tit le un les s the d eb tor m ayb e a d eb tor

un de r 18 su chch ap ter .” ); seeals o H.R. Rep. 95-595, at 380, 406, 428 (Sept. 8, 197 7) , 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 19 59 63 , 6 33 6, 636 2, 638 4 (pr ov idi ng that the lim itatio ns on co nv ers ion are m eant to rei nf

orc e § 10 9). 20 The reading of § 301 proposed by Amicus, m oreover, is inconsist ent with otherprovisions 21 of

the Bank

rup tcy Co de . Whil e cla im ing that th e inter pre tat ion of § 3 01 pe rm itt ing dis m iss al18 1 “ig no res the dis tin cti on be tw een ‘ca se’ an d ‘p eti tio n, ’” Am icu s it sel f i g n o re s th e Bank rup tcy Co de ’s 2 definition of petit ion: “The te rm ‘petition’ means petit ion filed under se ction 301, 302, 303, or 304 3 of this titl e, as the cas e may be, co mm en cing a ca se u nd er t his tit le .” 11 U. S. C. § 101 (42 ) (e m ph asi s 4 ad de d). Thus , a

pe tit ion fi led und er §§ 301 , 30 2, or 3 03 bo th “ op erates as a stay, ” id. § 362(a), and 5 comm ences a bankrupt cy case, id. § 101(42). Se e, e.g. , Michael Newman, Comment, BA PC PA ’s 6 New Section 109(h) Credit Counseling Requirement: Is It Having the Effect Congres s Intended? , 7 2007 U TA H L. REV . 48 9, 511 . And whi le A m icu s’s theo ry th at th e aut om ati c stay m ayco m e into 8 ef fe ct u po n the f ili ng o f a p eti tio n, ev entho ug h a cas e is no t co mm en ced , is su pe rf ici all y p lau sib le 9 pursuant to t he language of § 362(a) ( providing tha t “a peti tion filed undersect ion 301, 302, or303 10 . . . operates a s a stay”), this theory falls apa rt when one att empts to determine the date tha t such a 11 stay ter minates. Under § 362(c)(2) , most actions remain stayed under § 362(a) “until the earl iest of 12 (A ) th e ti m e th e ca se i s clos ed ; (B ) th e ti m e th e ca se i s d ism iss ed ; or

(C ) if t heca se i s a ca se u nd

er 13 ch ap ter

7 of th is t itl e co nc ern inganind ivi du al or a case under chapter 9, 11, 12, or 13 of thi s ti tle , 14 the tim e a d isc harge is grante d or de nie d. ” 11 U. S. C. § 362 (c) (2) (em ph asi s add ed ). W e d ete rm ine , 15 therefore, tha t although an i ndividual may be ineligi ble to be a debtor underthe Bankruptcy Code 16 for failure to sat isfy the stri ctures of § 109(h) , the language of § 301 does notbar that de btor from 17 commencing

a ca se b y f

ili ng a p eti tio n; i t on ly b ars the cas e f rom be ingm aintai ne d a s a p rop er 18 voluntary ca se under the c hapter spec ified in the pet ition. 19 Al tho ug h o ur c on clu sio n in thi s re sp ect

co m es i nto co nf

lic t w iththe rea so nin g in

thi s C ourt’ s 20 decision i n In re BDC 56 LLC , 3 30 F. 3d 11 1 (2 d C ir. 20 03), which he ld that t he eli gib ili ty 21 re qu ir eme nt s o f § 3 03 we re ju ri sd ic ti on al in n atur e, we c on cl ud e th ata s are su ltof r ec en t S up re me19 1 Co urt

pre ced ent, t

hat ca se i s n o lo ng er g oo d law. S ect ion 3 03 p rov ide s, in

re lev ant p art , as f

oll ow s: 2 (a) An inv olu ntary case may be co mm en ced

. . . o nly

ag ain st a 3 pe rso n, ex cep t a f arm er . . . that m aybe a debt or unde r th e ch ap ter 4 under which such cas e is comm enced. 5 (b) An involunta ry ca se againsta person is c omm enced by the fili ng 6 wi th t he b ankru ptc y co urt

o f a pe tit ion

. . . b y thr ee or m ore entit ies , 7 eac h o f whic h is ei the r a hol de r of a claim agai ns t su chpe rso n th at i s 8 no t co nti ng ent as to l iab ili ty o r th e su bje ct o f a bo na fi de dis pute a s 9 to liabi lity or a mount . . . . 10 (c) Af ter the fil ingof a pe tit ion

un de r th is s ect ion

but be fo re t

he cas e 11 is di smissed or relief is ordere d, a credit or . . . may join in the peti tion 12 with the sam e ef

fe ct a s if su chjoi nin g c red ito r w ere a p eti tio ning 13 creditorunder subsect ion (b) of this s ection. 14

. . . 15 (h) If the pe tit ion

is n ot t im ely

co ntr ov ert ed , th e co urt

sh all ord er 16 rel ief ag ain st the de bto r in

aninv olu

ntary c ase under the ch ap ter 17 under which the pet ition was filed. . . . 18

. . . 19 (j) On ly a ft er n oti ce to all cre dit ors an d a he ari ng m aythe co urt 20 dismiss a petiti on filed under thi s section — ( 1) on the motion of a 21 petiti oner; (2) on consent of all petitioners and the debtor; or (3) for 22 want of prosecution. 23 24 11 U. S. C. § 3 03 . A s d isc us sed ab ov e, un de r th e inter

pre tat ion we gr ant to th e lan gu ag e “m aybe a 25 debtor under t he chapt er unde r which such ca se i s comm enced,” a cas e is comm enced under § 303 26 ev enif

the de bto r is ine lig ibl e b y v irt ue of , f or e xam ple , b ein g a

farm er. Si m ilarly , th e in eli gib ili ty 27 of c red ito rs und er the res tri cti on s in § 3 03 (b) do es n ot p rev ent th e ca se f rom be ingco mm en ced. 28 This reading i s supported, moreover, by the pr ovisions of § 303(c), (h), and (j). Under § 303( c), a 29 creditor

m ayjoi n in

the pe tit ion

af ter it i s f ile d — be fo re t he ca se i s d is m is s e d

— w it hth e ef fe ct 30 be ing as i f t

he cre dit or h ad

be enpart of

th e ini tia l f

ili ng . W ere th ere n o cas e in e xis ten ce b eca us e 31 of

anins uf fi cie nc y o f e lig ibl e cr ed ito rs at t he o uts et, it

w ou ld be im

po ssi ble fo r ne w c red ito rs t o jo in 32 it b y jo ini ng the pe tit ion . M ore ov er, § 3 03 (h) an d (j ) pr ov ide for the bank rup tcy court to orde r re lie f20 1 or dismiss a case base d on whether d eb to rs and cr editors t ake given act ions. Surely r elief cannot 2 be so grante d, or t

he matte r not

dism iss ed

in t he ab sen ce o f a

m oti on to d o s o, if

a ca se d id n ot e xis t 3 in the firstplace. 4 Su

bje ct m att er j uri sd ict ion

un de r ti tle 11 pro cee din gs in t he bank rup tcy c ourts is p rov ide d 5 by 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a), which states that, with some give n except ions, “the di strictcourts shal l have 6 original and exclusive jurisdi ction of all ca ses under ti tle 11.” Dist rict cour ts may, under 28 U.S.C. 7 § 1 57 (a) , “ pro vid e th at anyor a ll c ase s un de r ti tle 11

. . . s ha ll b e re fe rre d to the bank rup tcy jud ge s 8 fo r th e d istric t.” Th e m os t strai gh tf orw ard rea din g of

th ese p rov isi on s is that i f a cas e ex ist s und er 9 tit le 1 1, the dis tri ct c ourt ( an d th e b ankru ptc y c ourt, if so invo ke d by§ 157 (a) ) ha s juris dic tio n o ve r 10 it. Th e co ntr ap os iti ve o f thi s statem ent, the n, is a lso tr ue : i f the c ourt ha s no ju

ris dic tio n, th enthe re 11 is no case underthe Bankruptcy Code. In In re BDC 55 LLC , we stated: 12 At least one c ircuit

. . . has held that the requirement that a petiti oning 13 creditor ’s clai m no t be subject t o a bona fide dispute[, found in § 14 303(b),] is not juris dictional , but is “an el ement that must be 15 est ab lis he d to su sta in an invo luntar y p roc eed ing .” 1 6 W e b e li e v e th e m o re s o un d v ie wis th a t t

h e re qu ir e m e n t i s 17 su bje ct m atter jurisdi cti on al, an d n owso ho ld. Whe the r an all eg ed 18 de bto r is pro pe rlybe fo re th e bankru ptc y c ourt i n an invo luntar y c ase 19 is a thr esh old

de ter m inatio n th at s ho uld

be m ad e at

the earlies t 20 po ssi ble sta ge of the pro cee din gs . O ne of the req uir em ents t o 21 bri ng ingsu cha p eti tio n is that th e p eti tio ning cr ed ito rs’ cla im s ar e 22 free from bona f ide dispute . Any creditor wis hin g to i nvoke the 23 bankruptcy cour t’s jur isdicti on in an involunt ary case shoul d be 24 req uir ed to d em on strate at the ear lie st p rac tic ab le p oint th at i ts 25 petiti on satisfies t his requir ement. Otherwise, cr editors could, on the 26 basis of relat ively untes ted c laims, haul a sol vent de btor with whom 2 7 th e yh a v e l e g it im a te d is p u te s i nto b an kru p tc yc o urt

an d f o rc e it t o 28 de fe nd aninvo luntar

y pro cee din g wh ile the bank rup tcy co urt leave s 2 9 fo r a late r m e ri ts d e te rm in a ti o nw h e th e r t h e d e b to r i s e v e np ro pe rly 30 be fo re i t.In additi on, prior to fil ing this opi nion has been ci rculate d to all t he judges of this Court

. 5 Se e Shipping Corp. of Indi a Ltd. v. Jaldhi Overs eas Pte Ltd. , 5 85 F. 3d 58 , 6 7 & n .9 (2d

Ci r. 20 09 ); United States v. Crosby , 397 F.3d 103, 105 n.1 (2d Cir. 2005).

21 1 2 330 F.3d at 118-19 (quoti ng In re R ub in , 769 F.2d 611, 615 (9th Cir. 1985)) (internal cita tions and 3 footnote omitted). This holdi ng, then, necessa rily indi cates tha t if the requi rements of § 303 are not 4 met, no case exists — nor, pr esumably, was commenced — under title 11. 5 Th is p an el i s “bo un d bythe de cis ion s of prio r pan els unti l suc h tim e as th eyare o ve rru led 6 eit he r by an en banc pan el o f o ur C ourt o r by the Su pre m e C ourt. ” United States v. Wilke rson , 361 7 F.3d 717, 732 (2d Cir. 2004). However, i f “there has been a n interveni ng Supreme Court decision 8 that cast s doubt on our contr olling precedent,” one panel of this Court may overrule a prior dec ision 9 of another panel. Ge lm an v. As hc ro ft , 372 F.3d 495, 499 (2d Cir. 2004) (quot ing Union of 10 Needletrades, I

ndus. & Textil e Employees v. U. S. I.N.S. , 33 6 F. 3d 200 , 21 0 (2 d C ir. 20 03 )) ( int ern al 11 quotation marks omitted). The inte rvening decision need notaddre ss t he precise issue deci ded by 12 th e panel for this exception t o apply. Woj ch ow ski v. Da ine s , 4 9 8 F

. 3 d

9 9 , 1 0 6 ( 2 d

C ir. 20 07 ). 5 13 Since our holdi ng in In re BDC 56 LLC , th e S up rem e C ourt h as c lar if ied the distinct ion

be tw een 14 “tw o s om eti m es c on fu sed or c on fl ate d co nc ep ts: fed era l-c ourt ‘ su bje ct- m att er’ jur isd ict ion

ov er a 15 co ntr ov ers y; an d the esse nti al in gre die nts of a f ed era l cl aim

fo r re lie f. ” Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp. , 546 16 U. S. 5 00 , 50 3 (20 06 ). In a unanim ou s de cis ion , the C ourt he ld t hat a c lear st ate m ent by

Co ng res s 17 was required t o construe a t hreshold limitation on the s cope of a statute as juris dictional

. Id. at 515- 18 16 . “But wh enCon gre ss do es no t rank a st atutor y li m itatio n o n c ov era ge as j uri sd ict ion al, co urt s 19 sh ou ld t

reat th e re str ict ion

as n on jur isd ict ion al i n c harac ter .” Id. at 516. Therefore, a limitation onThe Fifth and Eighth Circui ts held tha t the requi rements of § 303(a) were not 6 jur isd ict ion al p re-

Arbaugh ; the Ninth Cir cuit similarl y so held for § 303(b). Se e In re Marl ar , 43 2 F .3 d 8 13 , 8 14 -15 (8t

h C ir. 20 05 ) (p er c uri am ); In re McCloy , 2 96 F. 3d 37 0, 37 5 (5 th C ir. 20 02 ); In re R ub in , 769 F.2d 611, 615 (9th Cir. 1985). 22 1 Ti tle VI I claims based o n whe the r th e d ef en dant- em

plo ye r ha d a

parti cu lar

num be r of em plo ye es 2 was nonjur isdicti onal be cause the l imitation “ does notspeak in j urisdict ional terms or refer i n any 3 way to the jurisdiction of the district courts,” the sta tute conta ins an expres s jurisdi ctional pr ovision 4 in a

dif fe rent po rti on

fr om the lim itatio n, the re w as n o e vid en ce i n th e st atutor y te xt t hat C on gre ss 5 int en de d th e re qu ire m ent to be sua sp on te monitored by the courts, a nd considerat ion of the 6 limitation after a judgment on the merits would be unfair and waste ful. Id. at 5 14 -16 ; seeals o In 7 re Trusted Net M edia Holdings, LLC , 5 50 F. 3d 10 35 , 1 04 3 (1 1th

Ci r. 2 00 8). This “re ad ily 8 adm ini str ab le b rig ht l ine ,” Arbaugh , 546 U.S. at 516, now guides our conside ration of whether § 303 9 contains r estric tions on the ba nkruptcy court ’s juri sdiction. 10 W e find that, in light of Arbaugh , In re BDC 56 LLC can no lon ge r be co ns ide red

go od law 11 on this point . As the Eleventh Cir cuit noted i n evaluati ng the same question, § 303 “conta ins no 12 expli cit

ref ere nc e to its r equir em ents b ein g ju ris dic tio na l in

natur e an d n ev er u ses the wo rd 13 ‘juris dic tio n. ’” In re Truste d Net Media Holdings , LLC , 550 F.3d at 1043. Nor does the textof the 6 14 statute suggest thatthe bankruptc y court should su a s po nteraise t he issue of whether t he 15 req

uir em en ts o f § 30 3 are s ati sf ied ; in fa ct, § 3 03 (h) pro vid es t he op po sit e, sin ce t

he bankrupt cy 16 court should or der reli ef if the petiti on is not timely controverted. Moreover, the Bankruptcy Code 17 is g ov erned bya se parat e juris dic tio na l pr ov isi on , 2 8 U .S .C . § 13 44 , whic h c ontai ns oth er 18 res tri cti on s an d e xc lus ion s. In s um , th e res tri cti on s of § 3 03 fa ll d eci siv ely

on the no nju ris dic tio na l23 1 side of Arbaugh ’s brightline. 2 Si m ilarly , w e f ind that th e re str ict ion s of

§ 3 01 an d § 10 9(h ) ar e n ot j uri sd ict ion al, but rathe r 3 ele m e nts th at m

us t be est ab lis he d to su sta in a vo luntar y b ankru ptc y p roc eed ing . R est

ric tin g whe the r 4 anind ivi du al m aybe a deb tor eith er un de r the Bankru

ptc y Co de in gen era l or und er a giv ench ap ter 5 do es n ot s pe ak

in j uri sd ict ion al t erm s o r invok e th e juris dic tio n o f t he dis tri ct c ourt, de lin eat ed in 6 28 U. S. C. § 1 34 4 a s d isc us sed ab ov e. Ce rta inl y, co ns ide rat ion of the se l im itatio ns af

ter o the r 7 de cis ion s o n th e m eri ts h av e take n p lac e w ou ld be wast eful an d unf air ; be cau se b ankru

ptc y is a 8 swift-m oving p roc ess inv olv ingm ult ipl e p art ies , “ cre dit ors an d o the r parti es i n inter est have a 9 co ns ide rab le i nte res t in be ingab le t o rely on

the ex ist en ce o f a

cas e, the bank

rup tcy co urt ’s 10 jurisdi ction, and the validit y of actions taken i n the case” i n ord ert o facilitat e asset- preservi ng 11 transact ions. In re R os s , 3 38 B. R. 13 4, 14 0 (B ankr. N. D. Ga . 2 00 6). This decisi on, m ore ov er, is 12 in l ine wi th p re- BA PC PAde cis ion s f rom our si ste r ci rcuits an d in thi s ci rcu it f

ind ingthat ot

he r 13 provisions of § 109 are not juris dictional

. See, e.g. , Ru dd v. La ug hli n , 8 66 F. 2d

10 40 , 1 04 2 (8 th C ir. 14 19 89 ) (“ No r do we be lie ve that 11 U. S. C. § 1 09 is m eant t o res tri ct the ju ris dic tio n g ranted

un de r 15 [2 8 U .S .C . § § 1 33 4, 15 7] .” ); In re Phill ips , 844 F.2d 230, 235 n.2 (5th Cir. 1988) ( finding § 109(g) 16 no nju

ris dic tio na l); In re F

lores , 291 B.R. 44, 52-53 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2003) (same), superseded by 17 BAPCPA , Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 303(b), 119 Stat. at78. 18 So m e ad dit ion al s up po rt f or o ur c on clu sio n that a

c ase h as be enc om

m en ced wh ende bto rs 19 ineligi ble for reli ef under § 109(h) file a ba nkruptcy peti tion may be gleaned from cases interpre ting 20 11 U.S.C. § 342(b), which provides tha t “[b]efore the comm encement of a case under t his tit le by 21 anind ivi du al who se d eb ts are p rim ari ly c on sum er de bts, th e cl erk sh all giv e to su chind ivi du al24 1 written not ice contai ning . . . a brief descr iption of” bankrupt cy pr oc eedi ngs, creditcounseling 2 services , and legal consequences from fraudulent findings. If we were to interpret the la ng ua ge 3 regarding c omm encement of a case in this secti on as the bankruptcy court did the la nguage of § 301 4 an d § 10 9(h ), t

he pro vis ion

wo uld su gg est that a c ase is n ot c om

m en ced if the wo uld -be de bto r is 5 not gi ven the sta tutoril y required not ice. Courts cons idering t he question have not so held. See, e.g. , 6 In re G uth , No . 02 -02 12 1, 200 2 W L 31 94 14 60 , at *4 (Bank r. D . Id ah o N ov . 8 , 2 00 2); In re Bryant , 7 51 B.R. 729, 731-32 (Bankr. N.D. Miss. 1985). 8 9 IV . W he th er t he Au tom ati c S tayis T rig ge red 10 Havin g d ete rm ine d th at a c ase is c om

m en ced , we tu

rn t o th e q ue sti on wh eth er the autom ati c 11 stay take s ef

fe ct whe n a

pe tit ion is f ile d bya de bto r i ne lig ibl e un de r § 1 09 (h)

. W e co nc lud e th at i t 12 do es. Se cti on

36 2, wh ich

outli ne s th e b asi c co mm en cem ent, e ff ect , and term inatio n o f t

he autom ati c 13 stay, provide s significantindicati ons to th at e ffect. As an i nitial matter, the secti on contains 14 lan gu ag e su gg est ingthat th e st ayacc om panie s a c om

m en ced cas e: 15 [A] petiti on f ile d un de r s ect ion

3 01 , 30 2, o r 3 03 o f thi s tit le

. . . 16 operates as a stay .

. . of — (1) the comm encement or continuati on . 17

. . [o f an] act ion or p roc eed ingag ain st the de btor that w as o r co uld 18 have be enco mm en ced be fo re th e co mm en cem ent of the cas e und er 19 this ti tle, or t o recover a c laim against the debtor that arose before the 20 co mm en cem ent of the cas e und er this tit le; (2) the en fo rce m ent, 21 against the debtor . . . , of a judgment obtained bef ore t he 22 co mm en cem ent of the cas e und er this tit le. 23 24 11 U.S.C. § 362(a). Section 362(b) lists c ircumstances under which t he filing of a petition does not 25 operate as a stay, but t he debtor’s ineligi bility i s not among them. Mo re over, none of the 26 mechanism s outlined in t he remainder of the statut e for confirming the existence of a st ay or forSe cti on 10 9(g ) pr ov ide s as fo llo ws : 7 No tw ith stand ingany o the r pr ov isi on of thi s se cti on , n o in div idu al o r f am ily farmer m ay be a debtor unde r this t itle who has bee n a debtor in a case pending under this t itle atany time in the precedi ng 180 days if — (1) the ca se was dismissed by the courtfor willful failure of the debt or to abide by ord ers of the co urt , o r to ap pe ar b ef ore the co urt

in p rop er p ros ecutio n o f t he cas e; or (2) the de bto r re qu est ed

an d o bta ine d th e v olu

ntary d ism iss al o f t

he cas e following the filing of a reque st for reli ef from the automatic stay pr ovided by section 362 of this title

. 25 1 granting r elief from one address anything re lat ed to the ine ligibil ity of a debtor. 2 In a dd iti on , th e b ankru ptc y c ourt’ s inter

pre tat ion of § 3 62 ren de rs a

nu lli ty B AP CP A’ s 3 en actm en t of

§ 3 62 (b)(21 )(A ). S ect ion 36 2(b )(2 1)( A) pro vid es t hat ce rta in a cti on s ag ain st r eal 4 pro pe rtyare no t staye d wh en“the deb tor is ine lig ibl e un de r sec tio n 10 9(g ) to be a debt or i n a cas e 5 un de r th is t itl e. ” As In re R os s note s, if an acti on by a per so n ine lig ibl e und er § 10 9(g ) w ere “v oid 7 6 ab ini tio and did not res ult in an aut omatic stay under exis ting law, such an a mendm ent would not 7 have been

ne ces sar y. ” 3 38 B. R. at 1 39 ; seeals o In re R ac ette , 34 3 B. R. 2 00 , 20 3 (B ankr. E. D. W is. 8 2006). As discu sse d a bo ve , n o s uc h e xc ep tio n is pro vid ed fo r de bto rs i ne lig ibl e und er § 10 9(h ), 9 wh ich

lea ds us to the c on clu sio n that t he a uto m ati c stay co mm en ces in s uc h cas es. Th e b ankru

ptc y 10 co urt

purpo rte d to d ist ing uis h § 10 9(h ) f rom § 10 9(g ) by

ch ara cte riz ing ine lig ibi lity und er the latter 11 provision as a failure tha t may be cured or “waived” by the court, rende ri ng it possibl e that the 12 autom ati c st ayco uld go int o e ff

ect no tw ithstanding su cha f ail ure — and

thu s co nc eiv ab le that a 13 provision spe cifying circumstances i n which it should not would be necessary. Se e In re E lm en do rf , 14 345 B.R. at 499-500. We agree with the Trustee that thi s is not a t enable dist inction. The wordi ng 15 of § 10 9( g) is no les s mandatory that the wordi ng of § 109(h). Moreover, e ven assuming that the26 1 leg isl ati ve his tory cited bythe bank

rup tcy co urt fo r it s d esc rip tio n o f § 10 9(g ) is pro pe rly 2 co ns ide red , it

do es n ot s up po rt the co nc lus ion that th e re qu ire m ents o f t he su bs ect ion are curab le. 3 4 Am icus and the Trust ee bot h corr ectly observe that our dec ision in In re C as se , 198 F.3d 327 5 (2d

Ci r. 1 99 9), do es n ot u

nd erm ine the co nc lus ion

that an ine lig ibl e de bto r’s p eti tio n giv es r ise to 6 an automatic st ay . Un der s eparate butanalogous cir cumstances, Ca sseaf fi rm ed the bank rup tcy 7 co urt ’s d ism iss al of a ca se “ nunc pro tun c” t o th e d ate of fi lin g and

ap pro ve d o f annull inga st aype r 8 § 362(d), id. at 332 , 34 2, ruli ng s that in dic ate Ca ssere co gn ize d th e st ayas h av ingini tia llygo ne int o 9 effect. Se e R os s , 338 B.R. at 137 n.4; In re F lores , 291 B.R. at 57-58; Robert Lefkowitz, Note, The 10 Fi li n g

o f a B a n k r u p tc yP e ti ti o n in V

io la ti o n o f 1 1 U

. S

. C

. § 1 0 9 ( g ) : D o es It

In v o k e th e A uto ma tic 11 Sta

y? , 26 C ARDO ZO L. REV . 297, 309 (2004). 12 Finally, we note t hat having the automatic stay comm ence e ven when a debt or fail s to sati sfy 13 the credi t-counsel ing requir ements both fits into the ove rall purpose and fram ework of the stay and 14 en sures that eli gible deb tor s re cei ve pro tec tio n f rom the bank rup tcy sy ste m . T he autom ati c st ay 15 ser

ve s a num be r of purp os es: “pro vid ingdeb tor s wi th a f res h start, prot ect ing the ass ets of the est ate , 16 an d a llo wi ng the bankru ptc y co urt

to centra liz e dis putes co nc ern ingthe est ate .” MB NA Am . B an k, 17 N. A. v. Hi ll , 4 36 F. 3d 10 4, 10 9 (2 d C ir. 200 6). Mu chof th e val ue of th e stay is in the c lar ityof

its 18 im

plementatio n; o nc e a d eb tor fi les fo r bank

rup tcy an d th e st ayis i n e ff

ect , c red ito rs m

us t ce ase 19 the ir i nd ivi du al atte m pts to g ain

repaym ent an d o pe rat e o nly thr ou ghthe bank

rup tcy co urt . T his 20 centra liz ati on

en sures a f

air dis tri butio n o f a sse ts i f t

he de bto r pr oc eed s throu ghbankruptcy. If it 21 were unclearwhether the st ay was in place i mm ediatel y following a debt or’s filing for bankruptcy,27 1 cre dit ors wo uld

lik ely co nti nu e th eir coll ectionef fo rts “in ho pe s th at t

he bank rup tcy co urt wo uld 2 fi nd

no m eri t in

the de bto r’s pe tit ion . T hu s, rat he r th anpro vid ing t he d eb tor wi th a uto m ati c 3 bre ath ing sp ace , th e C od e w ou ld p res sure the debtorto fi le c orr ect ly i n th e f irs t in stanc e o r ri sk 4 los ing the pro tec tio ns of Ti tle 11 du e to the act ion s o f s ev eral unscrupulou s cr ed ito rs. ” Sh aw v. 5 Eh rli ch , 2 94 B. R. 26 0, 2 68 (B ankr. W .D

. Va . 2 00 3). Ev ena d eb tor wh o f ile d c orr ect ly m ight f

ace 6 challenges outside the bankruptcy cour t from particula rly aggres sive credi tors hoping t hat a filing 7 correcton its face had an under lying flaw that would r edound to theiradvanta ge . Construing a 8 debtor’s i neligibi lity purs uant to § 109(h) as creat ing an exception to the automatic stay provi sion, 9 th er efor e, is a tenuous propositi on given the st atutory framework provided by Congress. Our 10 interpr etation, i n contrast , we believe suppor ts and furthers that framework. 11 12 V. Wh eth er t he Ba nkr up tcyCo ur t Mu st D ism iss th e C as es 13 Havin g c on clu de d th at n o c ase had comm en ced an d n o a uto m ati c st ayha d b een

tri gg ere d 14 in the case s of th e thr ee debtors he re, the bankruptcy court c hose as the appr opriate method of 15 disposin g o f t

he m att ers to e xe rci se i ts e qu ita ble po we rs und er 1 1 U .S .C . § 10 5(a ) an d s tri ke the 16 debtors’ pe titions

. Se e In re E lm en do rf , 3 45 B. R. at 50 3-0 5. The Tr us tee urg es u s to de ter

m ine that 17 the on ly p rop er m eth od of d isp os ingo f the m att er o f a de bto r in eli gib le und er § 10 9(h ) is dis m iss al. 18 At

thi s ti m e, we ne ed

not, and do no t, de ter

m ine what act ion s th e b ankru ptc y c ourt m ayhave tak en 19 on

the pe tit ion s. Rathe r, w e re m an d to the bankruptcyco urt fo r it to c on sid er i n th e f

irs t in stanc e 20 the ramifications of our dete rmination in the ci rcumstances p resented he re that c ases have 21 comm enced. The ba nkruptcy court ’s deter mination that its equitable powers included s triking t he28 1 pe tit ion s w as p rem ise d o n th e b eli ef that th ere we re n o c ase s to dis m iss . Whil e w e n ote that we are 2 un aw are of

anyc ase s im ilar t o th is o ne in whic h a co urt ha s d ete rm ine d th at a

cas e h as c om

m en ced 3 an d y et t ak enanact ion oth er than d ism iss al, the bank rup tcy co urt did not add res s whe the r ot

he r 4 actions, i ncluding str iking a peti tion, might be appropria te in thes e circumstances. W e th us co nc lude 5 that thi s is a quest ion for the bankrupt cy court to a ddress ini tiall y. Se e In re Morgan , 182 F.3d 775, 6 780 (11th Cir. 1999) ( “Since the appl icabili ty and use of § 105(a) is a decis ion that i s typical ly left 7 to the bankrupt cy court, we lea ve the decis ion to the bankruptcy court i n this case .”). 8 9 CO NC LU SI ON 10 Fo r al l of

the fo reg oin g re aso ns , the judg m ent of the di str ict

co urt is VACAT ED an d th e ca se 11 is REMAND ED to the distric t court wi th in str uc tio ns to rem an d to th e bankru ptc y c ourt f

or f urt he r 12 proceedings c onsistentwith this opi nion. We thank am icus counsel , Sanford I. Weisburst and 13 W ill iam

B. Ad am s o f Q uinn E m anue l U rquhar t & S ull ivan, LL P, fo r th eir he lpf ul b rie f and

ora l 14 argument.