U.S. DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

) 

COMMITTEE TO DEFEND THE ) 

PRESIDENT, )

) No. 18-888 (RDM) 

Plaintiff, )

)

v. )

)

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, )

)

Defendant, ) 

_______________________________________) 

PLAINTIFF COMMITTEE TO DEFEND THE PRESIDENT’S

MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO DISMISS

Dan Backer

POLITICAL.LAW PLLC

441 N. Lee Street, Suite 300 

Alexandria, VA 22314 

(202) 210-5431 

dan@political.law

Counsel for Plaintiff Committee

to Defend the President 

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

BACKGROUND .........................................................................................................................1

A. Federal Campaign Finance Law ...........................................................................1

1. Contribution Limits...................................................................................1

2. Reporting Requirements ...........................................................................2

3. Joint Fundraising Committees ..................................................................2

4. Anticircumvention Provisions ..................................................................3

B. Administrative Complaint Process .......................................................................4

C. CDP’s Administrative Complaint.........................................................................6

D. CDP’s Challenge to the FEC’s Failure 

to Timely Adjudicate Its Complaint ...................................................................10

ARGUMENT.............................................................................................................................11

I. UNDER SPOKEO, INC. V. ROBINS, THE FEC’S DELAY ITSELF IS

SUFFICIENT TO CONSTITUTE AN INJURY-IN-FACT TO CDP .....................13

II. CDP HAS COMPETITIVE STANDING TO SEEK 

ENFORCEMENT OF FEDERAL CAMPAIGN FINANCE 

RESTRICTIONS AGAINST THE DNC AND ITS ALLEGED 

CO-CONSPIRATORS IN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS.....................................16

A. CDP Suffered Injury From Having to Compete 

in an Illegally Structured Environment...............................................................18

B. CDP Suffered Injury Because the FEC is Allowing the DNC to

Relatively Diminish CDP’s Voice Concerning Presidential Elections...............20

C. CDP Suffered Injury Because, By Refusing to Enforce Campaign Finance 

Restrictions, the FEC Is Conferring Benefits on CDP’s Competitors................22

III. CDP HAS INFORMATIONAL STANDING TO SEEK ACCURATE

INFORMATION THE DNC AND ITS ALLEGED CO-CONSPIRATORS 

ARE STATUTORILY OBLIGATED TO DISCLOSE.............................................24

A. CDP Has Informational Standing 

Solely By Virtue of Seeking Information ...........................................................24

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B. CDP Has Informational Standing Based On 

Its Intended Uses of the Information It Seeks.....................................................29

IV. CDP HAS ORGANIZATIONAL STANDING TO SEEK 

ENFORCEMENT OF FEDERAL CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAW.........................30

V. CDP HAS PROCEDURAL STANDING TO COMPEL THE FEC TO 

ADJUDICATE ITS COMPLAINT WITHOUT UNLAWFUL DELAY.................32

CONCLUSION .........................................................................................................................34

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Devel. Drugs v. Eschenbach, 

469 F.3d 129 (D.C. Cir. 2006)......................................................................................... 30

Alliance for Democracy v. FEC, 

335 F. Supp. 39 (D.D.C. 2004)........................................................................................ 29

Alliance for Democracy v. FEC, 

362 F. Supp. 2d 138 (D.D.C. 2005)................................................................................. 29

ASPCA v. Feld Entm’t, Inc., 

659 F.3d 13 (D.C. Cir. 2011)........................................................................................... 31

Banneker Ventures, LLC v. Graham, 

798 F.3d 1119 (D.C. Cir. 2015)......................................................................................... 6

Buchanan v. FEC, 

112 F. Supp. 2d 58 (D.D.C. 2000)................................................................................... 25

Campaign Legal Ctr. (“CLC”) v. FEC, 

245 F. Supp. 3d 119 (D.D.C. 2017)............................................................................. 3, 28

Chamber of Commerce v. FEC, 

69 F.3d 600 (D.C. Cir. 1995)........................................................................................... 19

Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Wash. (“CREW”) v. FEC, 

799 F. Supp. 2d 78 (D.D.C. 2011)................................................................................... 29

City of Waukesha v. EPA, 

320 F.3d 228 (D.C. Cir. 2003)................................................................................... 12, 33

Claybrook v. Slater, 

111 F.3d 904 (D.C. Cir. 1997)......................................................................................... 11

Common Cause v. FEC,

108 F.3d 413 (D.C. Cir. 1997 .......................................................................................... 19

CREW v. FEC, 

799 F. Supp. 2d 78 (D.D.C. 2011)................................................................................... 27

Ctr. for Law & Educ. v. Dep’t of Educ., 

396 F.3d 1152 (D.C. Cir. 2005)....................................................................................... 33

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Cutler v. U.S. HHS, 

797 F.3d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 2015)....................................................................................... 12

DSCC v. FEC, 

Nos. 96-2184 & 96-0349 (JHG), 

1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23375 (D.D.C. Oct. 18, 1999)........................................ 22, 30, 34

Elec. Privacy Info Ctr. v. Pres. Adv. Comm’n on Election Integrity, 

266 F. Supp. 3d 297 (D.D.C. 2017)........................................................................... 14, 30

Equal Rights Ctr. v. Post Props., 

633 F.3d 1136 (D.C. Cir. 2011)....................................................................................... 31

FEC v. Akins, 

524 U.S. 11 (1998)................................................................................................. 2, 14, 24

FEC v. NRA Political Victory Fund, 

6 F.3d 821 (D.C. Cir. 1993)............................................................................................. 16

Fla. Audubon Soc’y v. Bentsen, 

94 F.3d 658 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (en banc)........................................................................... 33

Fulani v. Brady, 

935 F.2d 1324 (D.C. Cir. 1991)....................................................................................... 23

Gottlieb v. FEC, 

143 F.3d 618 (D.C. Cir. 1998)......................................................................................... 21

Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 

455 U.S. 363 (1982)......................................................................................................... 31

Herbert v. Nat’l Academy of Scis., 

974 F.2d 192 (D.C. Cir. 1992)......................................................................................... 12

Herron v. FEC, 

903 F. Supp. 2d 9 (D.D.C. 2012)..................................................................................... 20

In re Thornburgh, 

869 F.2d 1503 (D.C. Cir. 1989)....................................................................................... 12

Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. FEC, 

678 F.2d 1092 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (en banc)................................................................. 21, 22

Jerome Stevens Pharms., Inc. v. FDA, 

402 F.3d 1249 (D.C. Cir. 2005)....................................................................................... 12

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Judicial Watch v. FEC, 

180 F.3d 277 (D.C. Cir. 1999)......................................................................................... 24

Judicial Watch, Inc. v. FEC, 

293 F. Supp. 2d 41 (D.D.C. 2003)................................................................................... 29

Kean for Congress Comm. v. FEC, 

398 F. Supp. 2d 26 (D.D.C. 2005)............................................................................. 25, 29

La. Energy & Power Auth. v. FERC, 

141 F.3d 364 (D.C. Cir. 1998)................................................................................... 12, 23

LaRoque v. Holder, 

650 F.3d 777 (D.C. Cir. 2011)......................................................................................... 20

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 

504 U.S. 555 (1992)................................................................................................... 11, 33

Marbury v. Madison, 

5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803)........................................................................................... 15

McConnell v. FEC, 

540 U.S. 93 (2003)....................................................................................................... 9, 20

Nader v. FEC, 

725 F.3d 226 (D.C. Cir. 2013)................................................................................... 18, 20

Nat’l Treas. Empls. Union v. United States, 

101 F.3d 1423 (D.C. Cir. 1996)....................................................................................... 31

Natural Law Party of the United States v. FEC, 

111 F. Supp. 2d 33 (D.D.C. 2000)............................................................................. 15, 19

Raines v. Byrd, 

521 U.S. 811 (1997)......................................................................................................... 13

Rose v. FEC, 

608 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1984).......................................................................................... 16

Shays v. FEC, 

337 F. Supp. 2d 28 (D.D.C. 2004)............................................................................. 18, 19

Shays v. FEC, 

414 F.3d 76 (D.C. Cir. 2005)............................................................................... 18, 19, 20

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Shays v. FEC, 

528 F.3d 914 (D.C. Cir. 2008)............................................................................. 25, 26, 27

Sierra Club v. EPA, 

129 F.3d 137 (D.C. Cir. 1997)......................................................................................... 34

Spokeo, Inc. v. Robbins, 

136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016).................................................................................. 13, 14, 15, 16

United States v. Emor, 

785 F.3d 671 (D.C. Cir. 2015)......................................................................................... 12

United States v. Marion, 

404 U.S. 307 (1971)......................................................................................................... 33

United States v. O’Donnell, 

608 F.3d 546 (9th Cir. 2010) ............................................................................................. 3

Vroom v. FEC, 

951 F. Supp. 2d 175 (D.D.C. 2013)................................................................................. 29

Vt. Agency of Nat’l Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 

529 U.S. 765 (2000)......................................................................................................... 14

Ward v. D.C. Dep’t of Youth Rehab Servs., 

768 F. Supp. 2d 117 (D.D.C. 2011)................................................................................... 6

Wertheimer v. FEC, 

268 F.3d 1070 (D.C. Cir. 2001)....................................................................................... 29

Zivotofsky v. Sec’y of State, 

444 F.3d 614 (D.C. Cir. 2006)......................................................................................... 25

Statutes and Regulations

52 U.S.C. § 30104.............................................................................................................. 2, 23, 35

52 U.S.C. § 30109.................................................................................................................passim

52 U.S.C. § 30116.............................................................................................................. 1, 23, 26

52 U.S.C. § 30122.............................................................................................................. 3, 23, 26

11 C.F.R. § 102.17......................................................................................................................... 2

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11 C.F.R. § 110.4........................................................................................................................... 3

11 C.F.R. § 110.6..................................................................................................................... 3, 26

11 C.F.R. § 111.4........................................................................................................................... 4

11 C.F.R. § 111.5........................................................................................................................... 4

11 C.F.R. § 111.6........................................................................................................................... 4

11 C.F.R. § 111.9................................................................................................................. 4, 5, 10

11 C.F.R. § 111.16......................................................................................................................... 5

11 C.F.R. § 111.17................................................................................................................... 5, 10

11 C.F.R. § 111.18................................................................................................................... 5, 10

11 C.F.R. § 111.19................................................................................................................... 5, 10

FED. R. CIV. P. 10........................................................................................................................... 6

FED. R. CIV. P. 12......................................................................................................................... 12

FED. R. CIV. P. 15......................................................................................................................... 34

Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, 

Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (Feb. 7, 1972).................................................................. 16

Other Authorities and Sources

Donna Brazile, Inside Hillary Clinton’s Secret Takeover of the DNC, 

POLITICO (Nov. 2, 2017), at 

https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/11/ 

02/clinton-brazile-hacks-2016-215774............................................................................. 8

FEC, Price Index Adjustments for Contribution and Expenditure 

Limitations and Lobbyist Bundling Disclosure Threshold, 

80 FED. REG. 5,750 (Feb. 3, 2015)..................................................................................... 1

H. Rpt. No. 94-1057 (Apr. 28, 1976)........................................................................................... 15

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In re Hillary Rodham Clinton for US Senate 

Exploratory Comm., Statement of Reasons,

MUR 4960 (Dec. 21, 2000) ............................................................................................... 4

Kenneth P. Vogel & Isaac Arnsdorf, 

Clinton Fundraising Leaves Little for State Parties, 

POLITICO (May 2, 2016, 5:21 A.M.)

https://www.politico.com/story/2016/04/ 

clinton-fundraising-leaves-little-for-state-parties-222670................................................. 8

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INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Committee to Defend the President (“CDP”) filed this lawsuit based on Defendant 

Federal Election Commission’s (“FEC”) unexplained delay—now exceeding well over half a 

year—in making even an initial determination of whether the administrative complaint CDP filed 

with the FEC provides “reason to believe” federal campaign finance law had been violated. 52 

U.S.C. § 30109(a)(2). Because CDP has standing to challenge the FEC’s refusal to timely 

adjudicate its administrative complaint, see 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(8)(A), this Court should deny 

the FEC’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction.

BACKGROUND

A. Federal Campaign Finance Law

The Federal Election Campaign Act “seeks to remedy any actual or perceived corruption 

of the political process through contribution and expenditure limitations as well as recordkeeping 

and disclosure requirements.” Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Wash. (“CREW”) v. FEC, 

799 F. Supp. 2d 78, 80 (D.D.C. 2011).

1. Contribution Limits—Federal law limits the amount a person may 

contribute to a political committee and, by extension, the amount a political committee may accept.

In 2016, a person could contribute a total of up to $2,700 per election (adjusted for inflation) to a 

candidate or candidate committee, 52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(1)(A); $10,000 to a state political party 

committee, id. § 30116(a)(1)(D); and $33,400 in unrestricted funds to the general treasury of a 

national political party committee, id. § 30116(a)(1)(B); see FEC, Price Index Adjustments for 

Contribution and Expenditure Limitations and Lobbyist Bundling Disclosure Threshold, 80 FED.

REG. 5,750, 5,752 (Feb. 3, 2015). 

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2. Reporting Requirements—All political committees are required to file 

periodic, publicly accessible reports with the FEC disclosing their finances. Every political 

committee is required to disclose contributions it receives from any individual who contributes a 

total of more than $200 to it during a calendar year, 52 U.S.C. § 30104(b)(3)(A), or another 

political committee, id. § 30104(b)(3)(B)-(C), as well as any transfers it receives from affiliated 

committees, id. § 30104(b)(3)(D). A political committee is likewise required to disclose its 

disbursements, id. § 30104(b)(4), including transfers to affiliated committees, id. 

§ 30104(b)(4)(C); political party committees are required to disclose transfers to any other political 

party committees. Id. § 30104(b)(4)(C). The Commission is required to make every statutorily 

required “statement, report, or notification” filed by a political committee “accessible to the public 

on the Internet” within 24 hours for electronic filings and 48 hours for paper filings. Id. 

§ 30104(a)(11)(B). The Supreme Court has recognized this statutory scheme confers upon each 

member of the general public an individual, and individually enforceable, statutory right to receive 

and review accurate information from every political committee. See FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 

21 (1998).

3. Joint Fundraising Committees—A joint fundraising committee (“JFC”) 

is a political committee formed by two or more other political committees (“participants”) to raise 

funds more easily. See 11 C.F.R. § 102.17(a). The participant committees enter into a written 

agreement containing a formula for allocating contributions to the JFC among them. Id. 

§ 102.17(c)(1). The agreement must be provided to the FEC upon request, and the formula must 

appear in any fundraising solicitations from the JFC. Id. When a person contributes to a JFC, it is 

treated as a series of contributions from that person directly to each of the JFC’s participants, in 

amounts determined by the allocation formula. Id. § 102.17(c)(6)(i). A person who contributes, 

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through a JFC, to its participants is bound by the same contribution limits that would apply if she 

contributed directly to those participants. Id. § 102.17(c)(4)(i). Thus, a JFC essentially acts as a 

pass-through entity, allowing a contributor to write a single check (to the JFC) to contribute to 

multiple different entities (the JFC’s participants).

4. Anticircumvention Provisions—To prevent committees from 

circumventing these restrictions, depriving the public of the accurate information to which it is 

statutorily entitled, or disseminating misleading reports to the public, federal law imposes 

additional restrictions. See Campaign Legal Ctr. (“CLC”) v. FEC, 245 F. Supp. 3d 119, 122-23 

(D.D.C. 2017) (citing United States v. O’Donnell, 608 F.3d 546, 553 (9th Cir. 2010)). 

All contributions made by a person, “either directly or indirectly, on behalf of a particular 

candidate,” including contributions earmarked for a candidate or “directed through an intermediary 

or conduit to such candidate,” are deemed to be contributions directly from that person to the 

candidate. 52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(8); accord 11 C.F.R. § 110.6(a). The intermediary must report 

both the “original source” and the “intended recipient” to the FEC. 52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(8); 

accord 11 C.F.R. § 110.6(c)(1)(i)-(ii), (iv)(A)-(C). The recipient candidate must likewise report 

each intermediary or conduit who provides more than $200 in earmarked contributions in an 

election cycle. 11 C.F.R. § 110.6(c)(2)(i). A contribution is deemed “earmarked” if there is any 

“direct or indirect, express or implied, oral or written” designation or instruction which results in 

all or part of a contribution being transmitted to a certain candidate. 11 C.F.R. § 110.6(b)(1).

Federal law also prohibits a person from “mak[ing] a contribution in the name of another 

person,” “knowingly permit[ing] his name to be used to effect such a contribution,” or “help[ing] 

or assist[ing]” such conduct. 52 U.S.C. § 30122; 11 C.F.R. § 110.4(b)(1)(i)-(iii). A political 

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committee may not accept a contribution made in violation of these provisions. 52 U.S.C. § 30122; 

11 C.F.R. § 110.4(b)(1)(iv).

B. Administrative Complaint Process

Federal law allows any person who believes a violation of campaign finance law has 

occurred to file an administrative complaint with the FEC. 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(1); 11 C.F.R. 

§ 111.4(a). The complaint must be in writing, signed, sworn under penalty of perjury, and 

notarized; it may not be submitted anonymously. 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(1); 11 C.F.R. § 111.4(a)-

(c). If the complaint satisfies all “technical requirements,” the FEC must notify any person it 

alleges violated a relevant statute within five (5) days. 11 C.F.R. § 111.5(a)(1); 52 U.S.C. 

§ 30109(a)(1). Such respondents have fifteen (15) days to file a response, explaining why “no 

action should be taken against [them].” 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(1); 11 C.F.R. § 111.6.

Based solely on the administrative complaint and any response, 11 C.F.R. § 111.9(a)—and 

prior to performing an investigation, see id. § 111.10(a)—the Commission must vote on whether 

there exists “reason to believe” any person has violated federal campaign finance law. 52 U.S.C. 

§ 30109(a)(2); 11 C.F.R. § 111.9(a).

1 “Reason to believe” exists if a “complaint sets forth 

sufficient specific facts, which, if proven, true, would constitute a violation of the FECA.”

Comm’rs Mason, Sandstrom, Smith, and Thomas, In re Hillary Rodham Clinton for US Senate 

Exploratory Comm., Statement of Reasons, MUR 4960, at 1 (Dec. 21, 2000). To meet this 

standard, an administrative complaint must either be based on “personal knowledge” or “identify 

a source of information that reasonably gives rise to a belief in the truth of the allegations 

presented.” Id. Moreover, the allegations must be sufficiently “specific . . . so as to warrant a 

 1 As demonstrated by the contrast between 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(2), requiring the FEC to make a 

“reason to believe” finding, and § 30109(a)(3), which requires it to later make a “probable cause” 

finding. 

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focused investigation that can prove or disprove the charge.” Id. at 3. If four (4) Commissioners 

vote to make a reason-to-believe finding, the Commission must notify the respondents involved

and then “make an investigation of such alleged violation, which may include a field investigation 

or audit.” 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(2); 11 C.F.R. § 111.9(a). 

After the investigation concludes, the FEC’s General Counsel must prepare a brief advising 

the Commission whether “probable cause” exists to believe the respondents violated federal 

campaign finance law. 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(3); 11 C.F.R. § 111.16(a). Respondents are entitled 

to receive a copy of the brief and respond to it. 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(3); 11 C.F.R. § 111.16(b)-

(c). With certain exceptions not relevant here, the Commission then votes on whether to accept the 

General Counsel’s recommendation. 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(4)(A)(i). If four (4) Commissioners 

vote probable cause exists to believe campaign finance law has been violated, it must attempt to 

resolve the matter through conciliation with the respondents. 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(4)(A)(i); 11 

C.F.R. §§ 111.17(a), 111.18(a). If conciliation fails, the General Counsel must then decide whether 

to recommend the Commission commence litigation in federal court. 11 C.F.R. § 111.19(a)-(b). 

“Upon recommendation of the General Counsel, the Commission may, by an affirmative vote of 

four (4) of its members, authorize the General Counsel” to sue the respondents in federal court. 11 

C.F.R. § 111.19(b); see also 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(6)(A). The Commission may seek a civil 

penalty or injunction against the respondents. 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(6)(A).

If the Commission either dismissed an administrative complaint, or “fail[s] . . . to act” on 

a complaint within 120 days of its filing, any “aggrieved” party may sue in this Court. Id. 

§ 30109(a)(8)(A). The Court may declare the Commission’s dismissal or failure to act is “contrary 

to law” and “direct the Commission to conform with such declaration within 30 days.” Id.

§ 30109(a)(8)(C). In the event the Commission fails to comply with this Court’s order, “the 

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complainant may bring, in the name of such complainant, a civil action to remedy the violation 

involved in the [administrative] complaint.” Id. 

C. CDP’s Administrative Complaint 

On December 15, 2017, CDP filed an administrative complaint with the FEC. A true and 

complete copy of the administrative complaint is attached to the Complaint in this case as 

Exhibit 1. See Compl. ¶¶ 12, 14 & Exh. 1 (hereinafter, “Admin. Compl.”). This court may therefore 

treat the administrative complaint as incorporated by reference into the Complaint and consider it 

when adjudicating the instant motion. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c) (“A copy of a written instrument 

that is an exhibit to a pleading is a part of the pleading for all purposes.”); see, e.g., Banneker 

Ventures, LLC v. Graham, 798 F.3d 1119, 1133 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (“Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

10(c) permits a plaintiff to attach an exhibit to the complaint, rendering the exhibit ‘part of the 

pleading for all purposes.’”); see also Ward v. D.C. Dep’t of Youth Rehab Servs., 768 F. Supp. 2d 

117, 119 (D.D.C. 2011). “The Administrative Complaint was written, signed, notarized and 

verified under penalty of perjury as required by 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(1).” Compl. ¶ 13.

The administrative complaint arose from a series of what appear to be illegal transactions 

and inaccurate or incomplete FEC reports involving Hillary Victory Fund (“the Fund”), a joint 

fundraising committee (“JFC”) comprised of the Democratic National Committee (“DNC”); 

Hillary for America, Hillary Clinton’s authorized candidate committee (“Clinton Campaign”); and 

dozens of state Democratic party committees. Individuals made contributions sometimes totaling 

more than a half million dollars to the Fund. Based on the Fund’s FEC filings, 538 people made 

contributions exceeding $100,000 each, and an additional 1,012 people made contributions of 

between $40,000 and $100,000. Mangini Decl. ¶ 7. From October 2015 through November 8, 2016 

(Election Day), the Fund received a total of approximately $84 million in contributions. Admin. 

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Compl. ¶ 50. CDP does not know whether the Fund’s contributors were assured most or all of their 

contributions to the Fund would be funneled to either the DNC or Clinton Campaign, or whether 

they were otherwise assured their substantial contributions to the Fund would be used to benefit 

Hillary Clinton. Cf. id. ¶ 116. 

CDP also does not know what happened to the contributions the Fund received. According 

to many FEC reports, the Fund distributed funds it received to its participant committees, including 

the DNC, Clinton Campaign, and dozens of state party committees, virtually all of whom reported 

receiving the transfers the same day. Admin. Compl. ¶ 51. On virtually every such occasion, the 

very same day, every single state political party committee then purportedly independently decided 

to re-transfer all of the money it had just received from the Fund to the DNC; the funds were 

reportedly sent to, and received by, the DNC the same day (or, occasionally, the next day). Id. The 

administrative complaint was accompanied by a spreadsheet detailing over 400 instances where 

the Fund reportedly transferred funds to a state party, which reported receiving and immediately 

retransmitting them to the DNC. See id. ¶ 101; see also id. ¶¶ 58-100.

The administrative complaint alleged, “[E]very single disbursement [from the Fund] to a 

state party resulted in an immediate transfer of the same amount of funds from the state party to 

the DNC. Over 99% of funds transferred through [the Fund] to state parties wound up at the DNC.”

Id. ¶ 52. It further asserted, “The uniformity, regularity, magnitude, immediacy, and extent of these 

reported transfers—every single state party transferring every single disbursement it received from 

[the Fund], in its entirety, exclusively to the DNC, immediately upon receipt—unavoidably implies 

[the Fund]’s members had an understanding or agreement they would automatically funnel funds 

they received through [the Fund] to the DNC.” Id. ¶ 53. Throughout this period, the DNC 

contributed funds to the Clinton Campaign, id. ¶¶ 104-05; made coordinated expenditures with the 

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Clinton Campaign, id. ¶ 107; and spent its money subject, illegally, to the direct control of the 

Clinton Campaign, id. ¶¶ 110-15. Former DNC Chair Donna Brazile confessed most state 

Democratic parties “funneled” money they reportedly received from the Fund “to the DNC, which 

quickly transferred the money to Brooklyn.” Donna Brazile, Inside Hillary Clinton’s Secret 

Takeover of the DNC, POLITICO (Nov. 2, 2017), at 

https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/11/02/clinton-brazile-hacks-2016-215774

CDP does not know, however, whether the contributions the Fund received were actually 

transferred through the participant state Democratic parties at all. On multiple occasions, the Fund 

reported transferring funds to state parties, and the DNC reported receiving funds from the state 

parties, but the state parties did not report either receiving them from the Fund or re-transferring 

them to the DNC. Id. ¶¶ 55, 56. As the Administrative Complaint explains, it is “reasonably 

possible the alleged transfers of [the Fund’s revenues] to state parties never actually occurred, and 

all of the funds at issue were actually transferred directly from [the Fund] to the DNC, rendering 

all FEC reports concerning these alleged transactions fraudulent.” Id. ¶ 56.

Even if the transfers did occur as reported, CDP does not know whether the state parties 

ever had custody or control of such funds, or instead whether the Fund and/or Clinton Campaign

transferred funds, without the state parties’ knowledge or permission, into and out of accounts 

opened in the state parties’ names, thus never actually devolving custody or control of the funds 

to the state parties. See id. ¶ 56 (citing Kenneth P. Vogel & Isaac Arnsdorf, Clinton Fundraising 

Leaves Little for State Parties, POLITICO (May 2, 2016, 5:21 A.M.) (“While state party officials 

were made aware that Clinton's campaign would control the movement of the funds between 

participating committees, one operative who has relationships with multiple state parties said that 

some of their officials have complained that they weren't notified of the transfers into and out of 

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9

their accounts until after the fact.”), at https://www.politico.com/story/2016/04/clintonfundraising-leaves-little-for-state-parties-222670).

And CDP does not know whether the individuals reported as making contributions to the 

Fund were assured their money would wind up with the DNC and/or the Clinton Campaign. As 

the administrative complaint alleges, over 99% of the contributions the Fund reported receiving, 

totaling approximately $84 million, were ultimately funneled to the DNC and/or the Clinton 

Campaign. Admin. Compl. ¶ 52. If some or all of those contributors had been solicited with the 

assurance their five- and six-figure contributions to the Fund would go to the DNC and/or Clinton 

Campaign, see id. p. 9, ¶ 116, then those payments must be deemed contributions to the DNC 

and/or Clinton Campaign, and not the Fund or state Democratic parties, see 52 U.S.C. 

§ 30116(a)(8); 11 C.F.R. § 110.6(b)(1); cf. id. § 30122.

The administrative complaint contained seven counts against the Fund and the DNC, their 

treasurers, the Clinton Campaign, and the state Democratic parties that participated in the Fund.

Counts IV, V, and VII alleged the respondents filed false, inaccurate, and/or incomplete reports in 

violation of 52 U.S.C. § 30104 that deprived CDP of complete, accurate information to which CDP 

is statutorily entitled. Counts I and II allege the respondents violated anticircumvention measures, 

52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(8) (earmarking) and 52 U.S.C. § 30122 (contributions in the name of 

another), causing several of the reports to which CDP is statutorily entitled to be materially false, 

inaccurate, and/or incomplete. Finally, Counts III and VI allege violations of contribution limits 

that give the DNC an illegal advantage over CDP in raising hard money2 to spend in connection 

with presidential elections.

 2 “Hard money” refers to funds that may be used for certain election-related purposes, such as political contributions, 

and must be raised subject to contribution limits. See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 227 (2003).

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D. CDP’s Challenge to the FEC’s Failure to Timely Adjudicate Its Complaint

The FEC was required to notify the respondents identified in CDP’s administrative 

complaint within five (5) days of receiving it. See 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(1); Compl. ¶ 17. On or 

about December 21, 2017, the FEC acknowledged receiving the administrative complaint and the 

Enforcement Division of its Office of General Counsel assigned it Matter Under Review (“MUR”) 

number 7302. Compl. ¶¶ 15-16. CDP alleges the FEC has not yet even voted on whether the 

administrative complaint, along with any responsive submission from the respondents, provides 

“reason to believe” one or more federal campaign finance statutes or regulations have been 

violated. Id. ¶ 17. Because the FEC has failed to take even this initial step nearly seven (7) months 

after the administrative complaint was filed, it cannot yet have commenced an investigation into 

the complaint’s allegations, 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(2); 11 C.F.R. §§ 111.9(a), 111.10(a); determined 

whether probable cause exists to believe the respondents violated any campaign finance laws or 

regulations, 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(4)(A)(i); attempted to enter into a negotiated resolution with the 

respondents, id.; 11 C.F.R. §§ 111.17(a), 111.18(a); or decide whether to seek judicial relief, 52 

U.S.C. § 30109(a)(6)(A); 11 C.F.R. § 111.19(b).

In short, more than 200 days after the administrative complaint was filed, the FEC quite 

literally has not yet even reached square one. The 2020 presidential campaign cycle will be well 

underway before the FEC even begins delving into whether the Democratic Party illegally 

funneled over $84 million dollars to the DNC and Clinton campaign during the previous 

presidential election and attempted to camouflage their money laundering scheme in an avalanche 

of fraudulent, incorrect, or otherwise illegal reports.

CDP challenges the FEC’s unreasonable delay to enforce federal campaign finance law 

and obtain protection against future violations. The delay is even more inexplicable because CDP 

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provided a spreadsheet identifying, by page number, line number, and report, every reported step 

of every challenged transaction through which the $84 million was funneled to the DNC and 

Clinton Campaign. If the FEC determines “probable cause” exists the DNC or its alleged coconspirators violated federal law, it may enter into a “conciliation agreement” with them “to 

correct or prevent such violation[s]” in the future, 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(4)(A)(i), and CDP would 

be entitled to review it, id. § 30109(a)(4)(B)(ii). In the event the FEC is unable to reach such a 

settlement, it may obtain an injunction prohibiting such future violations. Id. § 30109(a)(6)(A).

Should the FEC instead choose to dismiss CDP’s complaint rather than seeking such relief, CDP 

would have the right to seek a court order either compelling the FEC to do so, or authorizing CDP 

itself to seek injunctive and other relief directly against the DNC and the state Democratic parties.

Id. § 30109(a)(8)(A), (C). The FEC’s 200-plus-day delay in even making an initial threshold 

reason-to-believe determination precludes this process from even commencing.

ARGUMENT

This Court should deny the FEC’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject-Matter 

Jurisdiction. The FEC’s only argument is that CDP lacks Article III standing to pursue the statutory 

cause of action, 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(8)(A), that Congress specifically created for litigants in 

CDP’s position to challenge the FEC’s failure to act on an administrative complaint within 120 

days after its filing. Memorandum in Support of Defendant Federal Election Commission’s Motion 

to Dismiss, D.E. #10, at 1 (June 22, 2018) (hereafter, “FEC Mem.”).

To establish standing, CDP must show it has suffered or will suffer an “injury in fact,” the 

injury is “fairly traceable” to the FEC’s “challenged action,” and a “favorable decision” is “likely” 

to “redress[]” the injury. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992). The FEC 

challenges only CDP’s injury-in-fact; it does not contest the causation or redressability elements 

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for standing. FEC Mem. at 1. CDP may demonstrate injury-in-fact by showing it has suffered a 

“concrete” and “particularized” injury as a result of the FEC’s inordinate delay in taking action 

against respondents to compel their disclosure of truthful, accurate, complete reports and prevent 

them from exceeding contribution limits and violating anticircumvention restrictions in the 2020 

presidential election. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61. CDP easily satisfies this requirement in several 

independently sufficient ways.

For purposes of this motion to dismiss, this Court must assume the truth of CDP’s 

allegations, Jerome Stevens Pharms., Inc. v. FDA, 402 F.3d 1249, 1253 (D.C. Cir. 2005), and the 

merit of its claims, Cutler v. U.S. HHS, 797 F.3d 1173, 1179-80 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (holding that, at 

the motion to dismiss stage, the court “must assume that the party asserting federal jurisdiction is 

correct on the legal merits of his claim, ‘that a decision on the merits would be favorable and that 

the requested relief would be granted’” (quoting In re Thornburgh, 869 F.2d 1503, 1511 (D.C. Cir. 

1989)); City of Waukesha v. EPA, 320 F.3d 228, 235 (D.C. Cir. 2003). CDP need not show, at this 

stage, its underlying lawsuit will be successful or the FEC’s delay actually is unlawful. La. Energy 

& Power Auth. v. FERC, 141 F.3d 364, 368 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (“A party need not prove that the 

agency action it attacks is unlawful, however, in order to have standing to level that attack.”); see 

also Claybrook v. Slater, 111 F.3d 904, 907 (D.C. Cir. 1997).

Because the FEC moves to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), this Court may consider 

not only the allegations in the Complaint, but other outside materials, as well, including the parties’ 

representations. United States v. Emor, 785 F.3d 671, 677 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (“A district court 

deciding a motion to dismiss on jurisdictional grounds, such as standing, may consider evidence 

outside the complaint.”); see also Herbert v. Nat’l Academy of Scis., 974 F.2d 192, 197 (D.C. Cir. 

1992) (holding, in adjudicating a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, “the court may consider the complaint 

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13

supplemented by undisputed facts evidenced in the record, or the complaint supplemented by 

undisputed facts plus the court's resolution of disputed facts”). 

Part I explains that, under the Supreme Court’s recent ruling in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robbins, 

136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016), the FEC’s delay in adjudicating CDP’s administrative complaint itself 

constitutes a constitutionally cognizable injury under Article III. Part II demonstrates CDP has 

competitive standing to challenge the DNC and its alleged co-conspirators’ past violations of 

campaign finance law and prevent them from continuing to violate the law during the 2020 

presidential election cycle. The very reason for CDP’s existence is to support President Donald J. 

Trump, and it is entitled to do so on a legally balanced playing field—both in 2016 and the 

forthcoming 2020 presidential election—without suffering a relative diminution of its message by 

illegal funds raised by the DNC, state Democratic parties, and other entities opposing Trump’s 

candidacy. 

Part III shows CDP has informational standing to challenge the FEC’s delay because it is 

challenging the failure of the DNC and its alleged co-conspirators to truthfully, accurately, and 

completely provide all information to which CDP is statutorily entitled. Part IV establishes CDP 

has organizational standing to maintain this lawsuit, because the FEC’s delay is impairing its 

ability to fund its desired public political communications and prevent it from exercising its 

statutory right to adjudicate the validity of the FEC’s ultimate determination and, if necessary, 

pursue the DNC and its alleged co-conspirators itself. Finally, Part V confirms CDP has procedural 

standing to enforce the procedural rights 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(8) creates for it.

I. UNDER SPOKEO, INC. V. ROBINS, THE FEC’S DELAY ITSELF IS

SUFFICIENT TO CONSTITUTE AN INJURY-IN-FACT TO CDP

CDP has standing to challenge the FEC’s delay in adjudicating its administrative complaint 

under the Supreme Court’s recent ruling in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robbins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016). The 

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Court reaffirmed that, even when Congress creates a statutory cause of action such as 52 U.S.C. 

§ 30109(a)(8)(A) and a plaintiff can state a valid claim, the plaintiff still must satisfy Article III’s 

requirements for standing. Id. at 1547-48, 1549 (“‘Congress cannot erase Article III’s standing 

requirements by statutorily granting the right to sue to a plaintiff who would not otherwise have 

standing.’ . . . Article III standing requires a concrete injury even in the context of a statutory 

violation.” (quoting Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 820 n.3 (1997))). Spokeo further reiterated the 

plaintiff’s injury must be “actual or imminent,” “concrete,” and “particularized.” Id. at 1548 

(quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560). 

Congress has constitutional power to “elevat[e] to the status of legally cognizable injuries 

concrete, de facto injuries that were previously inadequate in law.” Id. at 1549 (quoting Lujan, 504 

U.S. at 578). Congress may create new statutory causes of action to redress injuries, even if they 

are not “tangible.” Id. “In determining whether an intangible harm constitutes injury in fact, both 

history and the judgment of Congress play important roles.” Id. A court must begin by 

“consider[ing] whether an alleged intangible harm has a close relationship to a harm that has 

traditionally been regarded as providing a basis for a lawsuit in English or American courts.” Id. 

(citing Vt. Agency of Nat’l Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 775-77 (2000)). It 

must also defer to Congress’ judgment, which the Court emphasized is “instructive and important,” 

because “Congress is well positioned to identify intangible harms that meet minimum Article III 

requirements.” Id.

Even violations of an intangible, purely “procedural right granted by statute can be 

sufficient in some circumstances to constitute injury in fact.” Id. The Court declared, “[A] plaintiff 

in such a case need not allege any additional harm beyond the one Congress has identified.” Id. 

(emphasis added) (citing FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 20-25 (1998)); accord Elec. Privacy Info Ctr. 

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v. Pres. Adv. Comm’n on Election Integrity, 266 F. Supp. 3d 297, 309 (D.D.C. 2017). In this case, 

Congress created a statutory cause of action, see 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(8)(A), allowing a person to 

challenge the FEC’s delay in adjudicating his or her administrative complaint as “contrary to law”

after 120 days. Id. § 30109(a)(8)(C). The statute itself recognizes the FEC’s unlawful delay in 

adjudicating a complaint may “aggrieve[]” the “party” that filed it. Id. § 30109(a)(8)(A).

Congress’ decision to recognize unlawful delay in adjudicating administrative complaints 

as an actionable harm for the complainant is within Article III. First, plaintiffs have “traditionally” 

been permitted to seek relief “in English or American courts” against government entities that 

unlawfully refuse to fulfill their legally mandated responsibilities. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549. As 

early as Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 168-69 (1803) (Marshall, C.J.), the Supreme 

Court—citing Blackstone and Lord Mansfield—recognized that, when a government official fails 

or refuses to perform a legally required act, a court may issue a writ of mandamus to compel 

performance. Section 30109(a)(8)(C) offers the same protection against governmental 

nonfeasance of (allegedly) legally required duties which English and American courts have 

traditionally granted.

Second, this court must defer to Congress’ decision to designate the intangible harm 

resulting from the FEC’s delay as “meet[ing] minimum Article III requirements.” Id.; see Natural 

Law Party of the United States v. FEC, 111 F. Supp. 2d 33, 47 (D.D.C. 2000) (holding plaintiffs 

had standing to challenge FEC’s dismissal of their administrative complaint in part because 

“FECA specifically authorizes any party aggrieved by a violation of its provisions to file a 

complaint with the FEC and to bring suit in federal court”). As the Conference Report to the 

Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976 attests, H. Rpt. No. 94-1057 (Apr. 28, 1976), 

the current statutory scheme reflects a compromise, id. at 49-50, between competing approaches 

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adopted by the House, id. at 49, and Senate, id. at 46, and overhauled an earlier system for judicial 

review directly in the circuit court, see Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-

225, § 308(d)(1), 86 Stat. 3, 18 (Feb. 7, 1972). Particularly since the FEC is an independent 

commission insulated from the President’s control, see FEC v. NRA Political Victory Fund, 6 F.3d 

821, 826 (D.C. Cir. 1993), this Court should defer to Congress’ decision to allow a complainant to 

act as a “private attorneys general” to ensure timely consideration of its complaint, Rose v. FEC, 

608 F. Supp. 1, 8 (D.D.C. 1984). Thus, “both history and the judgment of Congress,” Spokeo, 136 

S. Ct. at 1549, confirm a complainant such as CDP has Article III standing to invoke its statutory 

right under 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(8)(A) to challenge the FEC’s unlawful delay in adjudicating its 

administrative complaint.

II. CDP HAS COMPETITIVE STANDING TO SEEK 

ENFORCEMENT OF FEDERAL CAMPAIGN FINANCE 

RESTRICTIONS AGAINST THE DNC AND ITS ALLEGED 

CO-CONSPIRATORS IN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 

CDP has competitive standing to maintain its challenge to the FEC’s alleged failure to 

timely adjudicate its administrative complaint. As its name implies, CDP’s mission is to defend 

President Donald J. Trump and secure his re-election. Publicly available FEC filings confirm CDP 

spent over three million dollars and engaged in a wide range of activities during the 2016 

presidential race to support Donald Trump’s candidacy and oppose Hillary Clinton. Stop Hillary 

PAC, Report of Receipts and Disbursements, period 10/20/2016 – 11/20/2016, Page 4, Lines 24, 

29 (June 5, 2017), at 

http://docquery.fec.gov/pdf/195/201706059055301195/201706059055301195.pdf (attached to 

Harvey Decl. as Exh. 1; see Harvey Decl. ¶ 13) (hereafter, “SHP Report”). Indeed, CDP’s name 

during the 2016 presidential election cycle was “Stop Hillary PAC.” See Committee to Defend the 

President, Statement of Organization, Page 5 (Jan. 28, 2017), at 

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http://docquery.fec.gov/pdf/619/201701289041532619/201701289041532619.pdf (attached to 

Harvey Decl. as Exh. 2; see Harvey Decl. ¶ 14).

Among other things, CDP (operating as Stop Hillary PAC) disseminated e-mails; ran radio, 

television, and Internet advertisements; engaged in litigation; maintained websites; mobilized 

volunteers, and engaged in numerous other activities in support of Trump’s candidacy. See Harvey 

Decl. ¶ 7; see also SHP Report, Page 4, Lines 24, 29 (attached to Harvey Decl. as Exh. 1). It 

already has begun engaging in similar activities concerning the 2020 presidential election and will 

continue to do so. See Harvey Decl. ¶ 8; see also Committee to Defend the President, Report of 

Receipts and Disbursements, period 5/1/2018 – 5/31/2018, Page 4, Lines 24, 29 (June 20, 2018), 

at http://docquery.fec.gov/pdf/259/201806209113918259/201806209113918259.pdf (attached to 

Harvey Decl. as Exh. 3; see Harvey Decl. ¶ 15). President Trump already has filed his Statement 

of Candidacy for President in the 2020 election. See Donald J. Trump for President, Inc., 

Miscellaneous Text (FEC Form 99) (Jan. 20, 2017), at 

http://docquery.fec.gov/pdf/569/201701209041436569/201701209041436569.pdf. 

CDP may assert competitive standing for three reasons. First, due to the FEC’s failure to 

timely enforce federal law against the DNC, state Democratic parties, and their alleged coconspirators, CDP faced not only an illegally structured electoral environment during the 2016 

election cycle, but also the substantial likelihood of similar harm during the forthcoming 2020 

election cycle. Second, the FEC’s failure to timely enforce the law against the DNC, state 

Democratic parties, and their alleged co-conspirators has caused a relative diminution of CDP’s 

voice supporting President Trump and opposing Hillary Clinton during the 2016 election cycle, 

and threatens to do so again during the next presidential election. Third, by failing to timely enforce 

the law against the DNC, state Democratic parties, and their alleged co-conspirators, the FEC 

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caused injury-in-fact to CDP by subjecting it to more onerous fundraising and reporting restrictions 

than its competitors.

A. CDP Suffered Injury From Having to Compete 

in an Illegally Structured Environment.

First, CDP has standing to challenge the FEC’s allegedly illegal delay in adjudicating its 

administrative complaint because the FEC’s failure to enforce federal campaign finance law causes 

CDP to face, and compete in, an illegally structured environment. This Court—in a ruling affirmed 

by the D.C. Circuit—has held a “participant[] in the federal campaign finance system” may 

challenge FEC decisions, including the agency’s failure to act, that “shape the environment in 

which [that participant] must operate.” Shays v. FEC, 337 F. Supp. 2d 28, 42, 44 (D.D.C. 2004), 

aff’d 414 F.3d 76, 85 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (affirming plaintiffs may challenge “illegal structuring of a 

competitive environment” as a result of the FEC’s inactivity); accord Nader v. FEC, 725 F.3d 226, 

228 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (“Injury from an ‘illegally structured’ competitive environment can give rise 

to competitor standing.”).

The FEC’s refusal to timely—if at all—enforce various campaign finance restrictions 

against the DNC, state Democratic parties, and other entities placed CDP at a competitive 

disadvantage in the 2016 presidential election and threatens to place it at a similar disadvantage in 

the 2020 presidential election. CDP’s main goal, both in the 2016 and 2020 election cycles, is to 

secure the election of President Donald J. Trump. Harvey Decl. ¶ 5. Having raised and spent 

millions of dollars on an ongoing basis furthering these goals, it is a “participant[] in the federal 

campaign finance system.” Shays 337 F. Supp. 2d at 42-43. As such, it has a concrete, 

particularized interest in ensuring “BCRA-compliant” presidential elections.” Shays, 414 F.3d at 

84.

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CDP is harmed by “having to anticipate other actors” such as the DNC, state Democratic 

parties, and their alleged co-conspirators “engag[ing] in activities that otherwise would be barred” 

by the FEC. Shays, 337 F. Supp. 2d at 42. It is further harmed because it is, and will be, faced with 

opposing “groups seeking to evade contribution limits . . . and disclosure requirements imposed 

by Congress.” Shays, 414 F.3d at 84. CDP “must anticipate and respond to a broader range of 

competitive tactics than federal law would otherwise allow” from the DNC, state Democratic 

parties, Democratic presidential campaigns, and their alleged co-conspirators. Id. at 86; see also 

id. at 90 (holding the “need to account for additional practices” by political competitors “supports 

Article III standing”). The competition CDP will face in pursuing its goals in the political system 

will be “intensified by BCRA-banned practices.” Id. at 87. “By tolerating what the law 

condemn[s], the government caused [CDP’s] injury.” Id. at 93. 

CDP may assert competitive standing to challenge the FEC’s alleged failure to timely 

enforce federal campaign finance restrictions, despite the fact it is a political committee dedicated 

to supporting a particular presidential candidate, and not a candidate or candidate committee itself.

See Common Cause v. FEC, 108 F.3d 413, 419 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (suggesting that, if the 

plaintiff, Common Cause, had not been a “‘non-partisan’ organization,” it could have been a 

“political competitor” of the NRSC or Montana Republican Party); see also Chamber of 

Commerce v. FEC, 69 F.3d 600, 603 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (holding that, if the FEC fails to take action 

against an organization such as the Chamber of Commerce for violating federal regulations, any 

“political competitor” of the Chamber’s “could challenge the Commission’s dismissal” of its 

complaint). 

CDP has standing to seek to prevent the DNC, state Democratic parties, and their alleged 

co-conspirators from breaking campaign finance law without apparent legal impediment or 

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consequence in the 2020 presidential election cycle, even before those entities “seize” the 

opportunity and actually “disadvantage” CDP again. Shays, 414 F.3d at 90, 91. It is sufficient CDP 

demonstrate a “distinct risk” its “political rivals will exploit the challenged rules to [CDP’s] 

disadvantage.” Id. at 92 (quotation marks omitted); Herron v. FEC, 903 F. Supp. 2d 9, 17 (D.D.C. 

2012) (holding the plaintiff could establish competitive standing by showing a “demonstrable 

probability that [it] will be subjected to an illegally structured campaign environment in the 

future”). Although the Supreme Court has declined to grant competitive standing to plaintiffs 

challenging illegal environments for elections “over four years away,” see Shays, 414 F.3d at 92 

(citing McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 224-26 (2003) (Rehnquist, C.J.), the D.C. Circuit has held 

plaintiffs had standing to bring such challenges for elections that were 19 months away, LaRoque 

v. Holder, 650 F.3d 777, 788 (D.C. Cir. 2011), and this Court has allowed plaintiffs to challenge 

FEC decisions likely to harm them in the next presidential election, Nat’l Law Party of the United 

States v. FEC, 111 F. Supp. 2d 33, 45 (D.D.C. 2000); cf. Nader, 725 F.3d at 229 (“Nader might 

have been able to establish standing as a competitor if he had shown that the FEC’s determination 

injured his ability to fight the next election.”).

In short, if the FEC continues refusing to take action on CDP’s administrative complaint, 

and does not obtain a conciliation agreement, injunction, or other similar relief against similar 

violations of campaign finance law in the future, CDP faces a reasonable likelihood it will be 

forced to advocate for its preferred presidential candidate against the DNC, aided by state 

Democratic parties, and other alleged co-conspirators in an illegally structured environment.

B. CDP Suffered Injury Because the FEC is Allowing the DNC to

Relatively Diminish CDP’s Voice Concerning Presidential Elections. 

Independently, CDP has suffered injury from the FEC’s refusal to timely adjudicate its 

administrative complaint because the DNC’s allegedly illegal scheme gives the DNC an artificially 

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amplified voice—thereby relatively diminishing CDP’s voice—concerning presidential elections.

The D.C. Circuit has held a plaintiff may assert competitive standing to challenge a competitor’s 

illegal actions that give the competitor a relatively greater voice in an election than the plaintiff.

When a competitor’s violations of campaign finance law allow it to engage in more election-related 

speech, the plaintiff’s speech concerning that election is, by comparison, relatively diminished.

Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. FEC, 678 F.2d 1092, 1098 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (en 

banc) (holding “plaintiffs have Article III standing” because they “allege that they suffer a relative 

diminution in their political voices—their influence in federal elections—as a direct result of the 

discriminatory imbalance Congress is alleged to have ordered in the 1976 FECA amendments”);

see also Gottlieb v. FEC, 143 F.3d 618, 622 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (reiterating that competitive standing 

exists where the plaintiff’s “influence has been diminished ‘relative’ to” certain PACs’ influence); 

cf. Natural Law Party, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 45 (holding plaintiffs had standing because their 

exclusion from presidential debates “caused a ‘relative diminution’ of their political voices and an 

injury to their ability to influence the political process”).

CDP’s administrative complaint alleged the DNC funneled $84 million from the Fund, its 

joint fundraising committee, either directly or through state Democratic parties, back to the DNC

itself. Admin Compl. ¶¶ 50-56. The DNC then contributed those funds to the Clinton Campaign, 

used them in coordination with the Clinton Campaign, and spent them subject to the direction and 

control of the Clinton Campaign to further Clinton’s candidacy and oppose President Trump. Id. 

¶¶ 104-16. The administrative complaint contends that, by funneling money through the Fund and, 

reportedly, dozens of state Democratic parties, the DNC and Clinton Campaign violated 

anticircumvention measures (Counts I and II) and received funds in excess of contribution limits, 

id. (Counts III and VI). Those illegally obtained hard-money funds allowed the DNC and Clinton 

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Campaign to participate to an improperly greater extent in the 2016 presidential election in support 

of Clinton’s candidacy, thereby relatively diminishing CDP’s voice in support of Trump. See 

Gottlieb, 143 F.3d at 621 (noting illegal transfers “directly infuse[d] the Clinton-Gore general 

election campaign with funds with which to influence public opinion in Clinton’s favor”). If the 

FEC fails to enforce campaign finance law, or to obtain a conciliation agreement, injunction, or 

other measure to prevent such violations from continuing in the 2020 election, CDP will suffer 

continued “relative diminution” of its voice. Int’l Ass’n of Machinists, 678 F.2d at 1098; Gottlieb, 

143 F.3d at 622. Thus, CDP has standing to challenge the FEC’s unmitigated delay in adjudicating 

its administrative complaint. 

C. CDP Suffered Injury Because, By Refusing to Enforce Campaign Finance 

Restrictions, the FEC Is Conferring Benefits on CDP’s Competitors

Finally, CDP has competitive standing because, through its inordinate delay and inaction, 

the FEC is allowing the DNC and its alleged co-conspirators to violate federal laws, including 

contribution limits and reporting requirements, to which CDP is subject and by which it must 

abide. This Court has held a plaintiff may assert competitive standing when the government allows 

competitors to engage in illegal conduct which the plaintiff itself is barred from performing. In 

DSCC v. FEC, Nos. 96-2184 & 96-0349 (JHG), 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23375, at *11 (D.D.C. 

Oct. 18, 1999), this Court held the DSCC had standing to challenge the FEC’s delay in adjudicating 

its administrative complaint. It explained, “[I]t is assumed that FEC has conferred a benefit on 

NRSC by failing to investigate and potentially seeking to punish NRSC's circumvention of its 

reporting obligations. That is a benefit that FEC also could confer on DSCC.” Id. at 10. By refusing 

to investigate the NRSC for violating campaign finance laws to which the DSCC was subject, or 

otherwise taking timely action to prevent further violations by NRSC, the FEC had given it a 

competitive advantage over the DSCC which the DSCC had standing to challenge. See also Fulani 

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v. Brady, 935 F.2d 1324, 1328 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (holding a plaintiff may be able to assert 

competitive standing by showing the FEC is depriving it of an allegedly illegal “benefit that [the 

FEC] afforded to other similarly placed”).

The same is true here. CDP’s administrative complaint alleges the DNC and its alleged coconspirators violated anticircumvention measures (Counts I and II), 52 U.S.C. §§ 30116(a)(8), 

30122; reporting requirements, id. § 30104(b); and contribution limits, id. § 30116(a)(1). CDP 

prudently raised funds subject to BCRA’s limits for its hard-money general account to fund 

activities in support of President Trump, properly disclosed all contributors and the amounts they 

contributed (and amended its filings when any inadvertent errors were discovered), and complied 

with other restrictions, such as earmarking requirements, 52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(8) and prohibitions 

on contributions in the name of another, id. § 30122. Harvey Decl. ¶ 6. With regard to these 

statutory provisions, CDP is in the same position as the DNC; it has standing to complain about 

the FEC’s tolerance of the DNC’s alleged lawbreaking because it, too, is “in a position to receive” 

excessive contributions, contributions in the name of another, and contributions funneled through 

other PACs. Gottlieb, 143 F.3d at 621; cf. La. Energy & Power Auth. v. FERC, 141 F.3d 364, 367 

(D.C. Cir. 1998) (“[P]arties suffer constitutional injury in fact when agencies lift regulatory 

restrictions on their competitors or otherwise allow increased competition.”).

In short, the FEC has failed to timely enforce federal contribution limits, reporting 

requirements, and anti-circumvention provisions against the DNC and its alleged co-conspirators.

It has likewise failed to prevent such violations from continuing in the 2020 election. CDP is 

therefore at a competitive disadvantage relative to the DNC and its alleged co-conspirators in 

supporting and assisting its preferred candidate. CDP therefore has standing to challenge the FEC’s 

inertness.

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III. CDP HAS INFORMATIONAL STANDING TO SEEK ACCURATE

INFORMATION THE DNC AND ITS ALLEGED CONSPIRATORS 

ARE STATUTORILY OBLIGATED TO DISCLOSE

CDP has informational standing to request FEC adjudication of its administrative 

complaint because the complaint seeks information the DNC, state Democratic parties, and the 

Clinton campaign were statutorily required to disclose. Three of the counts in the administrative 

complaint expressly allege the respondents filed false, inaccurate, or incomplete reports. See 

Admin. Compl. ¶¶ 149 (Count IV), 153 (Count V; false reports); ¶ 162 (Count VII; inaccurate or 

incomplete reports). Two of the other counts in the administrative complaint, Count I, id. ¶ 130 

(violations of earmarking provisions), and Count II, id. ¶ 138 (accepting contributions in the name 

of another), allege additional reporting violations stemming from violations of other substantive 

statutory requirements. Cf. Judicial Watch v. FEC, 180 F.3d 277, 278 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (“Nowhere 

in its administrative or civil complaint did Judicial Watch mention disclosure requirements or 

suggest that it desired documents that the alleged violators were required to disclose.”). Article III 

allows CDP to challenge the FEC’s delay in ensuring CDP receives the information to which it is 

entitled.

Section A demonstrates CDP may assert informational standing, regardless of its specific 

uses for the information at issue. Section B shows, in the alternative, CDP is entitled to seek that 

information because it intends to use it to develop its political strategies and further its political 

communications.

A. CDP Has Informational Standing Solely By Virtue of Seeking Information

CDP may assert informational standing without regard to its uses for the information it 

seeks. “[A] plaintiff suffers an ‘injury in fact’ when the plaintiff fails to obtain information which 

must be publicly disclosed pursuant to a statute.” FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 21 (1998). CDP’s 

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“injury in fact is the denial of information [it] believes the law entitles [it] to.” Shays v. FEC, 528 

F.3d 914, 923 (D.C. Cir. 2008); accord Kean for Congress Comm. v. FEC, 398 F. Supp. 2d 26, 36 

(D.D.C. 2005) (“[T]he injury-in-fact [i]s the failure to obtain information that, by statute, [CDP] 

has the right to have.”); see also Zivotofsky v. Sec’y of State, 444 F.3d 614, 617-18 (D.C. Cir. 2006) 

(holding a plaintiff denied information that federal law requires be disclosed “is injured-in-fact for 

standing purposes because he does not get what the statute entitles him to receive”). CDP is not 

required to show “an additional injury, beyond a statutory right to information, to establish 

standing.” Kean for Congress Comm., 398 F. Supp. 2d at 36. Rather, CDP has been “harmed 

simply by the FEC’s purportedly unlawful failure to require” the DNC, Clinton Campaign, and 

state Democratic parties report their financial transactions correctly. Buchanan v. FEC, 112 F. 

Supp. 2d 58, 68 (D.D.C. 2000).

CDP has alleged it did not receive accurate and complete disclosures from the DNC and 

other respondents as required by 52 U.S.C. § 30104(b). There are at least three main deficiencies 

and omissions in the respondents’ disclosures. First, it is unclear from the respondents’ public 

FEC filings whether the Fund’s purported contributors actually contributed to the Fund itself, as 

the Fund reported, or instead engaged in transactions that qualify as contributions to the DNC 

and/or Clinton Campaign. The Fund reported receiving more than 1,500 contributions, some 

totaling hundreds of thousands of dollars, from individual contributors. See Mangini Decl. ¶ 7.

Over 99% of those contributions, totaling approximately $84 million, were ultimately funneled to 

the DNC and/or the Clinton Campaign. Admin. Compl. ¶ 52. These circumstances provide reason 

to believe some contributors may have been assured their five- and six-figure contributions to the 

Fund would not simply be divvied up among dozens of state Democratic parties; rather, 

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contributors may have been guaranteed the full amount of their contributions would go to the DNC 

and/or Clinton Campaign. See id. p. 9, ¶ 116.

People who provided money to the Fund in response to such solicitations containing such 

assurances would have been actually making their contributions directly to the DNC and/or Clinton 

Campaign, see 52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(8); 11 C.F.R. § 110.6(b)(1); cf. id. § 30122. Counts I, II, and 

IV point out neither the DNC nor Clinton Campaign reported any payments to the Fund as direct 

contributions to themselves. Id. ¶¶ 130, 138, 148-49. CDP has informational standing to know 

whether ostensible contributions to the Fund were actually contributions to the DNC and/or 

Clinton Campaign, which the DNC and/or Clinton Campaign were statutorily required to disclose 

as such, 52 U.S.C. §§ 30104(b)(3)(A), 30116(a)(8). See Shays, 528 F.3d at 923 (holding plaintiff 

had informational standing to challenge FEC regulations which allowed presidential candidates to 

report certain contributions they had received as expenditures, thereby precluding the public from 

learning the contributors’ identities).

Second, it is unclear from the respondents’ public FEC filings whether the state Democratic 

parties involved in the Fund had agreed in advance to act as “strawman” intermediaries, 

automatically shuttling virtually all payments they receive through the Fund to the DNC (which in 

turn would contribute those funds to the Clinton Campaign; make coordinated expenditures which 

the law treats as contributions to the Clinton Campaign, 52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(7)(B)(i); or spend 

those funds subject to the Clinton Campaign’s control, see Admin. Compl. p. 8, ¶¶ 50, 102-15.

The administrative complaint alleges:

The uniformity, regularity, magnitude, immediacy, and extent of these reported 

transfers—every single state party transferring every single disbursement it 

received from [the Fund], in its entirety, exclusively to the DNC, immediately upon 

receipt—unavoidable implies [the Fund’s participants] had an understanding or 

agreement they would automatically funnel funds they received through [the Fund]

to the DNC.

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Id. ¶ 53; see also id. ¶¶ 125, 135, 141, 147, 152.

Had the state Democratic parties agreed to act as automatic conduits between the Fund and 

the DNC and/or Clinton Campaign, any money they received through the Fund would have to be 

reported as contributions to the DNC and/or Clinton Campaign, rather than the state parties 

themselves. See 52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(8); 11 C.F.R. § 110.6(b)(1); cf. id. § 30122. Counts I, II, 

and IV point out the respondents generally reported payments to the Fund as being disbursed to 

the state Democratic parties, which in turn re-contributed them to the DNC; neither the DNC nor 

Clinton Campaign reported any disbursements to the state Democratic parties as direct 

contributions to themselves. Id. ¶¶ 130, 138, 148-49. CDP has informational standing to know 

whether money was actually disbursed from the Fund to state Democratic parties, which then 

repeatedly independently decided to make true contributions to the DNC and/or Clinton Campaign, 

or such disbursements were, in reality, transfers through “strawman” conduits directly to the DNC.

52 U.S.C. § 30104(b)(3)(B)-(D). See Shays, 528 F.3d at 923.

Third, and perhaps even more compellingly, it is unclear whether the reported transfers 

from the Fund to the state Democratic parties to the DNC even occurred, or if instead the Fund 

transferred its revenues directly to the DNC. Admin. Compl. ¶¶ 59, 61, 63, 65, 67, 68, 72, 75, 77, 

79, 83, 86, 88, 90, 92, 94, 96, 99. (“It is reasonably possible [the Fund] never actually transferred 

funds to these or any other state parties on or about [the specific date], but rather transferred those 

funds directly to the DNC . . . .”); see also id. ¶ 153 (alleging the respondents filed false reports in 

violation of § 30104 if the Fund transferred its revenues directly to the DNC, rather than to the 

individual state Democratic parties).

The administrative complaint points out there are numerous occasions where the Fund 

reported transferring funds to a state Democratic party and the DNC reported receiving a transfer 

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from that party, but the alleged intermediary state Democratic party itself did not report either 

receiving any transfer from the Fund or making any transfer to the DNC. Disregarding state parties 

which have subsequently amended their reports, numerous such inconsistencies remain, including:

● Admin. Compl. ¶¶ 163(b), 164(b) ($24,000 involving the Utah Democratic Party);

● id. ¶¶ 165(b), 166(b) ($19,500 involving the Democratic Party of South Carolina); 

● id. ¶¶ 165(c), 166(c) ($43,500 involving the Tennessee Democratic Party); 

● id. ¶¶ 165(d), 166(d) ($19,500 involving the Utah Democratic Party); 

● id. ¶¶ 167(b) ($20,600 involving the Massachusetts Democratic State Comm.); 

● id. ¶¶ 169-70 ($100,000 involving the Idaho Democratic Party); 

● id. ¶¶ 171-72 ($350,000 involving the WV State Democratic Executive Comm.); 

● id. ¶¶ 173-74 ($300,000 involving the Mississippi Democratic Party); 

● id. ¶¶ 175-76 ($900,000 involving the Kansas Democratic Party); and 

● id. ¶¶ 179-84, 186-89, 190(b), 191(a), 192(c), 193(a) (a total of $1,176,000 

involving the Arkansas Democratic Party). 

It is literally impossible from these reports to tell which of the conflicting accounts of these 

transactions, totaling nearly $3 million, is accurate. Either the Fund’s and DNC’s reports are 

accurate, and these funds actually passed through state Democratic parties, or these state 

Democratic parties’ reports are accurate, and the funds never passed through the state parties.

Based on these conflicting reports, it is impossible for CDP to determine what actually happened, 

or which inconsistent account is accurate. The Fund, the DNC, and the state Democratic parties 

were statutorily required to file complete and accurate disclosures, and the CDP is statutorily 

entitled to know the truth. See CLC, 245 F. Supp. 3d at 127 (holding informational standing exists 

because the plaintiffs “espouse[d] a view of the law under which entities regulated by the 

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Commission are ‘obligated to disclose certain information’ that plaintiffs have not received but 

have a right to obtain” (quotation marks omitted)).

CDP may assert informational standing because it is seeking information the DNC and its 

alleged co-conspirators are required to disclose concerning the substance of their financial 

dealings. Vroom v. FEC, 951 F. Supp. 2d 175, 179 (D.D.C. 2013); CREW v. FEC, 799 F. Supp. 

2d 78, 89 (D.D.C. 2011). The information at issue is not already in its possession, cf. Wertheimer

v. FEC, 268 F.3d 1070, 1075 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Alliance for Democracy v. FEC, 335 F. Supp. 39, 

48 (D.D.C. 2004), and has not already been disclosed, Alliance for Democracy v. FEC, 362 F. 

Supp. 2d 138, 147 (D.D.C. 2005). And CDP is not seeking simply a declaration by the FEC that 

their conduct was illegal. Cf. Judicial Watch, Inc. v. FEC, 293 F. Supp. 2d 41, 47 (D.D.C. 2003); 

Wertheimer, 268 F.3d at 1075. Thus, this Court should deny the motion to dismiss.

B. CDP Has Informational Standing Based On 

Its Intended Uses of the Information It Seeks

The FEC argues the Complaint should be dismissed because CDP has not shown it will use 

the information it seeks to determine how to cast its (non-existent) vote. See FEC Motion to 

Dismiss at 16-18 (arguing CDP “cannot show injury” because it “cannot vote” and “the complaint 

lacks any claim that CDP has members who vote”). The FEC did not mention this Court rejected 

precisely the same argument when the FEC raised it in Kean for Congress Comm. v. FEC, 398 F. 

Supp. 2d 26, 37 (D.D.C. 2005). In that case, the FEC maintained that, under Akins, “FECA 

disclosures are meant only for voters.” Id. Rejected this meritless contention, this Court held Akins 

“does not lend itself to such a narrow construction.” Id. It explained that not only voters, but 

“political committees, candidates, and candidate committees” are “intended to benefit from the 

FECA disclosure requirements.” Id. at 38. FECA protects the right of political committees to 

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“us[e] information obtained as a result of FECA disclosure requirements” however, they wish, and 

a political committee such as CDP consequently has standing to enforce that right. Id. 

Contrary to the FECs assertions, CDP need not seek the information under FECA 

specifically for voting-related purposes. “[T]he Supreme Court, and subsequent D.C. Circuit 

decisions, in making th[e] . . . inquiry into informational injury, have not directed district courts to 

conduct an exhaustive consideration of the possible uses of the requested information and an 

examination of support in the record for those asserted uses.” Id. at 34-35. Rather, the only inquiry 

is whether the information sought would “help” the plaintiff in some way. Id. at 35 (quoting Akins, 

524 U.S. at 21); see also DSCC, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23375, at *12-13 (holding the plaintiff 

had established informational standing because “she would put th[e] information to use”); cf. Elec.

Privacy Info Ctr., 266 F. Supp. 3d at 310 (holding the plaintiff had informational standing because 

it “uses information it obtains from the government to carry out its mission to educate the public 

regarding privacy issues”). Here, CDP already has spent in excess of one hundred thousand dollars 

disseminating information to the public about the Democrats’ scheme. Harvey Decl. ¶ 9. It wishes 

to use the information it obtains from corrected, completed, and updated reports to enhance the 

accuracy, specificity, and utility of its public communications. Id. ¶ 11. These are the types of 

“campaign-finance related activities . . . where the sought-after information would likely prove 

useful.” CLC, 245 F. Supp. 3d at 127. Thus, CDP has informational standing to maintain this 

lawsuit.

IV. CDP HAS ORGANIZATIONAL STANDING TO SEEK 

ENFORCEMENT OF FEDERAL CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAW

CDP has organizational standing to challenge the FEC’s allegedly illegal refusal to timely 

adjudicate its administrative complaint. Article III recognizes organizational standing “in a wide 

range of circumstances.” Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Devel. Drugs v. Eschenbach, 469 

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F.3d 129, 133 (D.C. Cir. 2006). A plaintiff may establish organizational standing by demonstrating 

the defendant caused “concrete and demonstrable injury to [its] activities” by leading the plaintiff 

to “drain [its] . . . resources,” rather than “simply a setback to the organization’s abstract social 

interests.” Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 379 (1982). The D.C. Circuit has 

elaborated that a plaintiff must show a “direct conflict between the defendant’s conduct and the 

organization’s mission,” ASPCA v. Feld Entm’t, Inc., 659 F.3d 13, 25 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (quoting 

Nat’l Treas. Empls. Union v. United States, 101 F.3d 1423, 1430 (D.C. Cir. 1996)), and the 

defendant’s conduct must have made “the organization’s activities more difficult,” Nat’l Treas. 

Empls. Union, 101 F.3d at 1430.

Here, the FEC’s refusal to act undermines CDP’s organizational interests. CDP’s main 

mission is to generate support for the presidency and candidacy of Donald Trump, in part by 

exposing Democrats’ dishonesty and persistent and pervasive illegal conduct. Harvey Decl. ¶ 4.

By refusing to even initiate an investigation into the alleged conspiracy to violate campaign finance 

laws among the DNC, dozens of state Democratic parties, and a Democratic presidential candidate, 

the FEC is undermining CDP’s mission by allowing the DNC to raise essentially unlimited hardmoney funds in support of its presidential candidates and to oppose President Trump.

Independently, the FEC is hindering CDP’s mission by causing CDP to devote additional resources 

to educating the public about the illegality of schemes such as the DNC’s.

The D.C. Circuit has recognized a defendant’s allegedly illegal conduct causes injury-infact where an organizational plaintiff chooses to respond by diverting resources from its other 

programmatic efforts or increasing its public education efforts. See, e.g., Equal Rights Ctr. v. Post 

Props., 633 F.3d 1136, 1140 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (holding a defendant’s conduct causes injury-in-fact 

where it leads the plaintiff organization to voluntarily choose to “increase[] the resources [it] . . . 

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devote[s] to programs independent of its suit”). Here, the FEC’s allegedly illegal delay in 

addressing the DNC’s illegal conduct has caused CDP to redirect its resources. CDP has chosen 

to respond to the FEC’s inexplicable inaction by spending hundreds of thousands of dollars to both 

publicize the DNC’s conduct and educate the public about the illegality of such schemes, to correct 

misimpressions the funneling of $84 million from hundreds of contributors over more than a year 

may cause. Harvey Decl. ¶¶ 9-10.

If the FEC complies with federal law and adjudicated CDP’s administrative complaint in a 

timely manner, CDP could avoid spending additional resources on such public communications.

If the FEC votes to dismiss the administrative complaint and a court upholds that determination, 

the matter would be resolved and further public communications about the illegality of the DNC’s 

conduct (and any similar schemes) unnecessary. If the FEC instead properly takes action against 

the DNC or its alleged co-conspirators, it would be a matter of public record and a highly 

newsworthy development. Cf. 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(4)(B)(i)-(ii), (a)(6)(A), (a)(12)(A) (requiring 

FEC to maintain confidentiality of administrative complaints unless it entered into a conciliation 

agreement or files a lawsuit against the respondents). In either case, CDP would be able to redirect 

resources from educating the public—both about the fact the DNC engaged in such illegal conduct, 

and that such schemes are prohibited by federal law despite the Democratic party’s decision to 

engage in them—to other means of achieving its programmatic goals. Harvey Decl. ¶ 12. Thus, 

CDP has organizational standing to challenge the FEC’s allegedly illegal delay. 

V. CDP HAS PROCEDURAL STANDING TO COMPEL THE FEC TO 

ADJUDICATE ITS COMPLAINT WITHOUT UNLAWFUL DELAY

Finally, CDP has procedural standing to challenge the FEC’s refusal to enforce the 

statutory procedural protections 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(8) affords it. A plaintiff has Article III 

standing to “enforce procedural rights . . . so long as the procedures in question are designed to 

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protect some threatened concrete interest of his.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 

573 n.8 (1992); accord City of Waukesha v. EPA, 320 F.3d 228, 234 (D.C. Cir. 2003). The plaintiff 

may assert that procedural right “without meeting all the normal standards for redressability and 

immediacy.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572 n.7. The D.C. Circuit, sitting en banc, elaborated that a 

“procedural-rights plaintiff” may demonstrate procedural standing by showing two things: (i) “the 

defendant’s acts omitted some procedural requirement,” and (ii) “it is substantially probable that 

the procedural breach will cause the essential injury to the plaintiff’s own interest.” Fla. Audubon 

Soc’y v. Bentsen, 94 F.3d 658, 664-65 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (en banc); accord Ctr. for Law & Educ. v. 

Dep’t of Educ., 396 F.3d 1152, 1157 (D.C. Cir. 2005).

CDP satisfies both of Florida Audobon Society’s requirements for procedural standing.

First, CDP has alleged the FEC has unlawfully delayed in adjudicating its administrative 

complaint. Section 30109(a)(8) requires the FEC to resolve administrative complaints without 

delays that are “contrary to law,” id. § 30109(a)(8)(C), and allows the complainant to sue to 

enforce that right after 120 days, id. § 30109(a)(8)(A). Second, this requirement for timely 

adjudication of administrative complaints protects a complainant’s right to be able to effectively

enforce federal law itself, in the event the FEC unlawfully persists in refusing to do so. Id. §

30109(a)(8)(C) (holding if the FEC fails to pursue an administrative complaint after a court has 

declared its actions unlawful, “the complainant may bring, in the name of such complainant, a civil 

action to remedy the violation involved in the original complaint”). By its very nature, delay erodes 

the ability of a government or plaintiff such as CDP to be able to prove its case. See United States 

v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 325-26 (1971) (discussing “the real possibility of prejudice inherent in 

any extended delay: the memories will dim, witnesses become inaccessible, and evidence be lost”).

Moreover, timely adjudication of CDP’s complaint would more quickly ensure protection from 

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illegally funded competition by the DNC and its alleged co-conspirators. See Sierra Club v. EPA, 

129 F.3d 137, 139 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (holding plaintiff had procedural standing to challenge delay).

Finally, timely adjudication is necessary because federal law requires political committees to retain 

their records for only three years. 52 U.S.C. § 30102(d). A lengthy delay increases the likelihood 

that the DNC and state Democratic parties will destroy the evidence necessary to both determine 

the truth about their filings and confirm their wrongdoing.

Thus, CDP has procedural standing to maintain this lawsuit.

CONCLUSION

CDP “is entitled to an answer” from the FEC concerning its administrative complaint 

“sooner rather than later.” DSCC, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23375, at *14. For these reasons, CDP 

respectfully requests this Court deny FEC’s motion to dismiss with prejudice. In the alternative, 

CDP seeks leave to amend its complaint as necessary to remedy jurisdictional concerns. FED. R.

CIV. P. 15(a)(2).

Respectfully submitted, 

_/s/ Dan Backer____________

Dan Backer

POLITICAL.LAW PLLC

441 N. Lee Street, Suite 300

Alexandria, VA 22314

(202) 210-5431

dan@political.law

Counsel for Plaintiff Committee

to Defend the President

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