NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION

File Name: 22a0348n.06

Case No. 21-2896

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

LE CHEN,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

CITY OF LANSING, MICHIGAN; LANSING 

POLICE DEPARTMENT; JIMMY GARCIA; 

SAMUEL FEARNOW,

Defendants-Appellees.

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED 

STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR 

THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF 

MICHIGAN

OPINION

Before: KETHLEDGE, BUSH, and NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judges. 

NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judge. In June 2016, Le Chen and Donald Elton Bierer, III, ended 

their relationship. Tensions ran high between the two men, but they boiled over as the former 

couple debated who would retain custody over Simon, their cat. At various points, both Chen and 

Bierer called in the police. By night’s end, the police arrested Chen for battery and assault with a 

deadly weapon. 

A few months later, prosecutors dropped the charges. Three years later, Chen brought this

lawsuit. He sued two police officers, the City of Lansing, and the Lansing Police Department for 

malicious prosecution, unlawful arrest, unlawful seizure, fabrication of evidence, and equalprotection violations. The district court dismissed his claims. We affirm. 
No. 21-2896, Chen v. City of Lansing, Mich., et al.

2

I.

Chen and Bierer, two residents of Lansing, Michigan, married and moved in together 

around 2013. Their domestic bliss proved short lived. After three years, the two decided to separate 

one evening in June 2016. That night, Bierer “got drunk as usual” and began to “attack” Chen 

“verbally and emotionally.” (R. 31, PageID 253.) By midnight, Chen had enough of Bierer’s 

berating and decided to call the police for help. Three officers arrived about 30 minutes later. But 

they left without taking any protective action. 

With the police gone, Chen told Bierer he wanted a divorce and “suggested that it was time 

to discuss [] custody of their pet cat Simon.” (Id. at 254.) The two argued about Simon for a while, 

with Bierer eventually telling Chen “if you want Simon, you need to go to court.” (Id. at 253.)

Bierer’s ultimatum ended the conversation. After that, he went to bed and Chen started to pack for 

a trip. 

To Chen’s surprise, the police showed up again around 1:45 AM. He soon learned that 

Bierer had called 911 and accused Chen of “cut[ting] him with a piece of plastic.” (Id. at 258.)

Officers Jimmy Garcia and Samuel Fearnow questioned both Bierer and Chen about the incident. 

Although Bierer refused to answer questions or produce the piece of plastic, the officers arrested 

Chen for battery and assault with a deadly weapon. 

Chen spent the rest of the night in jail. The next morning, he attended an arraignment and

a domestic-violence-counseling session before his release on bond. With a trial date set for August

2016, Chen attended multiple pretrial conferences over the next month. But the charges didn’t 

stick. The prosecutor’s office dropped the case for “lack of evidence” not long before the trial. (Id.

at 255.)
No. 21-2896, Chen v. City of Lansing, Mich., et al.

3

The story didn’t end there. Two years later—in April 2018—Chen filed a citizen complaint 

against Garcia. Although the Lansing Police Department investigated Chen’s accusation, its final 

report “exonerated” Garcia of all wrongdoing and explained Garcia’s behavior fell “within” the 

Lansing Police Department’s “established policies and procedures.” (Id.) After he received the 

report, Chen waited until October to make his next move. This time, he filed a domestic-violence 

complaint against Bierer. Detective Christopher Baldwin handled this complaint. After an 

interview with Chen, Baldwin closed the case. A few months later, the Ingham County 

Prosecutor’s Office informed Chen it wouldn’t press charges. 

Another year and a half went by before Chen brought this action. He sued the City of 

Lansing, the Lansing Police Department, Garcia, and Fearnow for unlawful arrest, malicious 

prosecution, unlawful seizure, fabrication of evidence, and equal-protection violations. The 

defendants filed a Rule 12(c) motion for a judgment on the pleadings. A magistrate judge 

recommended that the district court grant the motion. And the district court took that advice. It 

dismissed one of Chen’s claims (unlawful arrest) as time-barred under the statute of limitations 

and the others (malicious prosecution, unlawful seizure, fabrication of evidence, and equal 

protection violations) for failure to state a claim. In closing, the district court warned that “any 

appeal would be frivolous and would not be taken in good faith.” (R. 47, PageID 413.)

Chen appealed anyway. 

II.

We review de novo a district court’s grant of judgment on the pleadings under Civil Rule 

12(c). Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757, 761 (6th Cir. 2006). As with our review of a

Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the question is whether the plaintiff’s complaint alleges sufficient 

facts to state a plausible claim for relief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Vickers, 453 
No. 21-2896, Chen v. City of Lansing, Mich., et al.

4

F.3d at 761. Although we review these facts “in the light most favorable to the plaintiff,” we need 

not accept “irrational” or “wholly incredible” allegations. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 

(1992); Wamer v. Univ. of Toledo, 27 F.4th 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2022) (quotation omitted). In the 

same vein, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements” receive no credit. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 

III.

Chen brings several 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against the defendants. He alleges unlawful 

arrest, malicious prosecution, unlawful seizure, fabrication of evidence, and equal-protection 

violations. We address each in turn. 

Unlawful arrest. Chen argues that the “Lansing Police Department, through Garcia and 

Fearnow,” lacked probable cause for his arrest. (R. 31, PageID 257.) The district court found 

Chen’s claim against the individual defendants barred under the statute of limitations. As for the 

municipal defendants, the court determined that Chen failed to allege what “unconstitutional

policy, practice, or custom” caused his injuries. (R. 47, PageID 409–10.) We agree. 

Consider first whether Chen’s unlawful-arrest cause of action is time-barred. We look to 

both state and federal law to determine when the clock begins to run on a § 1983 claim. State law 

decides which statute of limitations applies; federal law controls when the statutory period starts. 

Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 240 (1989) (holding that federal courts should “borrow and apply 

to all § 1983 claims the one most analogous state statute of limitations”); King v. Harwood, 852 

F.3d 568, 578 (6th Cir. 2017) (“[T]he date on which the statute of limitations begins to run . . . is 

a question of federal law.” (cleaned up)). 

Here, those ground rules play out like this. Chen brought his suit in Michigan. So we apply 

Michigan’s three-year statute of limitations for personal-injury actions to Chen’s claim. See Mich. 
No. 21-2896, Chen v. City of Lansing, Mich., et al.

5

Comp. Laws § 600.5805; Wolfe v. Perry, 412 F.3d 707, 714 (6th Cir. 2005). And Chen alleges that 

Garcia and Fearnow injured him when they arrested him without probable cause on June 12, 2016. 

(Chen Br. at 24 (“Chen knew he was injured when he was arrested.”) So the statute of limitations 

started to run then. See Wolfe, 412 F.3d at 714. Counting three years out, Chen’s filing date of 

August 19, 2019, came two months too late. It follows that his unlawful-arrest claim against Garcia 

and Fearnow falls outside the statute of limitations. 

His claim against the municipal defendants fails for a more basic reason. To hold either the 

City of Lansing or the Lansing Police Department liable for Garcia and Fearnow’s actions, Chen 

must show that a “municipal policy or custom directly caused” his constitutional injury. Hadrick 

v. City of Detroit, 876 F.3d 238, 243 (6th Cir. 2017) (citing Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 

U.S. 658, 690–92 (1978)). But Chen doesn’t do so. His two-sentence allegation—already bare 

bones—fails to identify a single municipal policy or custom that led to his arrest. And without an 

unconstitutional municipal policy, practice, or custom, Chen cannot make out a claim against 

either municipal defendant. 

No surprise, Chen sees it differently. Invoking res judicata, collateral estoppel, inapposite 

caselaw, and even the continuing-violations doctrine, Chen focuses his municipal-liability 

arguments on the district court’s misapplication of the statute of limitations. In Chen’s view, his 

claim against the municipalities didn’t start to run until he received the internal investigation 

exonerating Garcia. Like the district court, we find Chen’s many arguments (at best) nonsensical 

and (at worst) frivolous. Besides, even if Chen brought a timely claim, our holding wouldn’t 

change. A searching—even generous—read of Chen’s complaint fails to reveal even one

unconstitutional policy, practice, or custom that might have caused his injuries. Without that
No. 21-2896, Chen v. City of Lansing, Mich., et al.

6

crucial allegation, Chen cannot state a claim in the first place, much less one to which a limitations 

period could apply. 

Malicious Prosecution. Chen next alleges a malicious-prosecution claim under § 1983. To 

win, Chen must show that Fearnow and Garcia participated in or influenced the prosecutor’s 

decision to file charges. See Sykes v. Anderson, 625 F.3d 294, 308–09 (6th Cir. 2010). This 

showing requires Chen to allege more than neutral, passive, or negligent conduct. Johnson v. 

Moseley, 790 F.3d 649, 655 (6th Cir. 2015). Rather, Chen must draw a causal line between the 

officers’ active, “blameworthy” conduct and the prosecution. Id. 

Chen fails to do so. His malicious-prosecution allegation begins (and ends) with a single 

sentence: “[The defendants] mishandled evidence and presented the case to the Prosecutor’s Office 

for prosecution even though there was no probable cause.” (R. 31, PageID 257.) What evidence 

did the officers mishandle? Chen’s complaint doesn’t elaborate. What blameworthy conduct might 

have influenced the prosecutor? Once again, the complaint doesn’t say. Without more, Chen’s 

“threadbare recitals” and “conclusory statements” can’t move him across the motion-to-dismiss 

finish line. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

Chen reaches a different conclusion. On appeal, he claims the defendants hid “exculpatory 

evidence,” made “false statements,” and asked a witness “misleading questions.” (Chen Br. at 33–

36.) Not one claim holds water. 

For his first example, Chen revisits his jailhouse meeting with the domestic-violence 

counselor. Chen accuses some defendant (he doesn’t specify who) of setting up the meeting and 

hiding it from the prosecutor. And he frames this meeting as a piece of “exculpatory evidence” 

because it shows this defendant thought of him as a victim, not a perpetrator of domestic violence.

(Id. 33–34.) These scant details, without more, cannot make out a malicious-prosecution claim. At 
No. 21-2896, Chen v. City of Lansing, Mich., et al.

7

minimum, Chen needs to connect this allegation to a named defendant. See Agema v. City of 

Allegan, 826 F.3d 326, 331 (6th Cir. 2016). But he fails to do so. His complaint doesn’t allege that 

either Garcia or Fearnow arranged the meeting or hid the evidence. Nor does he claim that some 

municipal policy resulted in a faulty prosecution. In short, Chen hasn’t “allege[d] enough facts to 

make it plausible that the defendant[s] bear legal liability” for hiding exculpatory evidence. Id.

Chen’s second example fares no better. This time, Chen quotes Garcia’s police report about 

his arrest. That report stated that “no prior incidents of domestic assault” occurred between Chen 

and Bierer. (Chen Br. at 34.) Recall that Chen placed the first call to police that night, complaining 

that Bierer attacked him “verbally and emotionally.” (R. 31, PageID 253.) From Chen’s 

perspective, his first-in-time 911 call proves that Garcia lied when he reported “[t]here have been 

no prior incidents of domestic assault.” (Chen Br. at 34.) This argument runs into two problems. 

The first: Chen didn’t mention Garcia’s statement in his complaint. The second: Even if Chen had 

included it, we are hard pressed to see what’s false about Garcia’s statement. Chen himself admits 

that he accused Bierer of “verbal[] and emotional[]” abuse, not assault. (R. 31, PageID 253.) And 

he doesn’t allege he told the officers otherwise on their first trip to his home.

Chen’s final example returns to Bierer’s 911 call and the officers’ second trip to his 

residence. At some point, Garcia asked Bierer “how [Chen] cut him with the plastic piece.” (Id. at 

258.) In response, Bierer stated only that “[Chen] did,” refusing to elaborate more. Garcia included 

this exchange in his police report. (Id.) Now, Chen claims Garcia’s questioning was misleading. 

Misleading or not, we fail to see how Garcia’s question relates to Chen’s malicious-prosecution

claim. In most cases, a prosecutor’s independent charging decision breaks the causal chain for

malicious-prosecution purposes. Sykes, 625 F.3d at 316. One exception exists: Where an officer’s 

deliberate or reckless falsehoods result in prosecution without probable cause. See id. Here, all 
No. 21-2896, Chen v. City of Lansing, Mich., et al.

8

signs point to an independent decision from the prosecutor. Chen doesn’t allege that Garcia’s 

report included false statements. Nor does he claim that the prosecutor relied on Garcia’s report in 

deciding to bring charges. Without these basic facts, Chen cannot create a causal link between

Garcia’s question and the prosecutor’s decision.

All in all, Chen failed to allege facts that show either Garcia or Fearnow “influenced or 

participated in” the prosecutor’s decision to bring charges. Id. at 309. So his malicious-prosecution 

claim fails.

Fabrication of evidence. Next, Chen brings a fabrication-of-evidence claim. But this one

falls with his last. Chen alleges three instances of evidence fabrication. But those instances are 

identical to the ones he used to support his malicious-prosecution claim. As we explained above, 

none of Chen’s examples show that any defendant “stated [] deliberate falsehood[s] . . . or omitted 

information [] material to the finding of probable cause.” (R. 31, PageID 258.) So this claim fails 

as well. 

Unlawful seizure. Chen also brings an unlawful-seizure claim. He contends that “the 

onerous types of pretrial, non custodial restrictions, including” his “bond” and the “two pre-trial 

conferences,” resulted in an illegal seizure. (Id. at 257–58.) Aside from this bald statement, Chen’s

complaint says little. None of the defendants prosecuted Chen or influenced that decision; none 

imposed the bond; and none required Chen to attend pretrial conferences. Nowhere does Chen 

allege otherwise. And without such allegations, he cannot state a claim for relief. See Iqbal, 556 

U.S. at 678–79.

Chen replies that “but for” the “Defendants’ fabrication of evidence, he would not have 

been seized.” (Chen Br. at 36–37.) But as we’ve explained, Chen hasn’t alleged facts showing any

fabrication occurred. So this retort can’t fill in the gap and give Chen the causal link he needs. 
No. 21-2896, Chen v. City of Lansing, Mich., et al.

9

Equal-protection violations. Last, Chen contends that the defendants’ conduct violated his 

right to equal protection. The crux of Chen’s argument seems to be that although the police acted

on Bierer’s accusations against him, they “repeatedly refused to investigate” his accusations

against Bierer. (R. 31, PageID 258.) Reading between the lines of his complaint, we understand 

Chen to rely on two specific instances of discrimination. First, that the police arrested him, but not 

Bierer in 2016. Second, that Detective Baldwin refused to act on his 2018 domestic-violence 

complaint against Bierer.

We dispense with Chen’s second allegation first. Chen takes issue with Detective Baldwin 

and the Ingham County Prosecutor’s actions in 2018. He faults those actors for failing to 

investigate or pursue his domestic-violence complaint against Bierer. But Chen didn’t sue Baldwin 

or the Ingham County Prosecutor; he sued Garcia, Fearnow, the City of Lansing, and the Lansing 

Police Department. And his complaint fails to connect the dots between Baldwin’s inaction and 

the named defendants. Without some plausible connection, Chen’s grievances against Detective 

Baldwin and the Ingham County Prosecutor’s Office can’t support his equal-protection claim 

against the defendants. See Agema, 826 F.3d at 331. 

That leaves Chen’s gripe with the events of June 12, 2016. As he sees it, when he called 

the police to report Bierer for “verbal[] and emotional[] attack,” the two officers didn’t investigate 

or arrest Bierer. (R. 31, PageID 253.) But a few hours later, when Bierer called the police to report 

Chen for domestic assault, the police arrested him. These events, says Chen, show the defendants 

“treat[ed] [him] differently from similarly situated persons” and “unequally appl[ied] the laws for 

the purpose of discriminating against [him].” (Chen Br. at 39.)

We disagree. To start, the police responded to both Bierer’s and Chen’s 911 calls. And 

after each call, they traveled to the pair’s home and intervened. So Chen’s assertion that the 
No. 21-2896, Chen v. City of Lansing, Mich., et al.

10

defendants “refused to investigate” doesn’t add up against his own story. What’s more, Chen never 

alleged that he gave Fearnow or Garcia a reason to arrest Bierer during that first trip. He accused 

Bierer of “verbal[] and emotional[] attack”; Bierer accused him of domestic assault. (R. 31, PageID 

253.) Two different accusations. Two different legal consequences. Put simply, Chen and Bierer

were not “similarly situated persons.” Reform Am. v. City of Detroit, Mich., 37 F.4th 1138, 1152 

(6th Cir. 2022). Because Chen doesn’t allege facts that show otherwise, his equal-protection claim

fails along with the rest. 

We affirm.