UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

)

PURSUING AMERICA’S GREATNESS, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 15-cv-1217 (TSC)

)

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, )

)

Defendant. )

)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

On March 21, 2019, this court granted summary judgment to Plaintiff Pursuing 

America’s Greatness (PAG) on its claim against the Federal Election Commission, finding a

content-based regulation governing use of candidate names in unauthorized political committees

was not narrowly tailored to promote a compelling governmental interest. (ECF Nos. 48 & 49.) 

PAG moved for attorneys’ fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412. (ECF 

No. 50.) Having considered the parties’ briefing, and for the reasons that follow, the court will 

GRANT in part and DENY in part PAG’s motion for fees.

I. BACKGROUND1

PAG challenged a regulation, 11 C.F.R. § 102.14, governing the use of candidate names 

in unauthorized committees. (ECF No. 1, Compl.) Section 102.14(a) prohibited unauthorized 

 

1 Most of the relevant background is contained in Pursuing America’s Greatness v. FEC, 132 F. 

Supp. 3d 23, 26–31 (D.D.C. 2015) (PAG I), Pursuing America’s Greatness v. FEC, 831 F.3d 

500, 503–04 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (PAG II), Pursuing America’s Greatness v. FEC, 363 F. Supp. 3d 

94, 97–100 (D.D.C. 2019) (PAG III) and will not be repeated here.

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political committees from using the names of federal candidates in any name under which the 

political committee conducts activities, including the titles of websites and social media pages. 

11 CFR § 102.14(a). Subsection (b)(3) created an exception allowing an unauthorized 

committee to use a candidate’s name in its special project name if “the title clearly and 

unambiguously shows opposition to the named candidate.” 11 CFR § 102.14(b)(3). PAG 

brought three challenges to this regulation: 1) an Administrative Procedure Act (APA) challenge 

to an advisory opinion that applied the regulation to PAG’s conduct, 2) a First Amendment 

challenge that the regulation impermissibly restricted speech based on content, and 3) a First 

Amendment challenge that the regulation was a prior restraint. (Compl. at 10–18.) 

PAG initially moved for a preliminary injunction, which this court denied. PAG I, 132 F. 

Supp. 3d at 23. The court found that the regulation was neither a prior restraint on speech nor a 

content-based speech regulation, but a permissible component of “FECA’s disclosure regime,” 

imposing a limited burden on speech. Id. at 37–39. This court also rejected PAG’s argument 

that the regulation violated the APA. Id. at 36. On appeal, the D.C. Circuit reversed and 

remanded, finding that the regulation was a content-based speech ban that must be assessed 

under a strict scrutiny standard. PAG II, 831 F.3d at 510–512. The Court further found that the 

regulation would likely fail the second strict scrutiny requirement—that it be narrowly tailored—

because there was “a substantial likelihood that section 102.14 [was] not the least restrictive 

means to achieve the government’s interest.” Id. at 510.

PAG then moved for summary judgment on the grounds that the regulation was an 

impermissible content-based restriction. PAG III, 363 F. Supp. 3d at 99–100. It did not pursue 

either its prior restraint or APA claims. Id. Therefore, the only question before this court on 

summary judgment was whether the FEC had met its burden of proving that section 102.14(a) is 

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narrowly tailored to promote a compelling governmental interest. Id. The court found it had not, 

holding that while the FEC had shown a compelling government interest (avoiding voter 

confusion), it had not mustered non-speculative evidence that the regulation’s speech ban was 

narrowly tailored, particularly given available alternative means of disclosure. Id. at 100–105. 

PAG now moves for attorneys’ fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 

which permits a court to award reasonable attorney’s fees to prevailing parties. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2412(d)(1)(A). 

II. ANALYSIS

A. SUBSTANTIAL JUSTIFICATION

The EAJA establishes several criteria, such as timeliness and net worth, that a party must 

meet in order to be entitled to fees. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1). The FEC concedes that PAG meets 

the statutory criteria, but contends PAG cannot recover fees because the FEC’s legal position 

was substantially justified. (ECF No. 53, FEC Opp., at 5, 15.)

1. Legal Standard

The EAJA authorizes an award of fees to the prevailing party unless the other party’s 

legal position was “substantially justified.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). The government must 

be “substantially justified” in both its litigating position in court and “the action . . . by the 

agency upon which the civil action is based.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(D); see also Role Models 

Am., Inc. v. Brownlee, 353 F.3d 962, 967 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (“The government . . . must 

demonstrate the reasonableness not only of its litigation position, but also of the agency’s 

actions.” (emphasis omitted)). The court reviews the two “as an inclusive whole” and makes 

“only one threshold determination for the entire civil action.” Comm’r, INS v. Jean, 496 U.S. 

154, 159, 162 (1990). 

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In order to meet this standard, the government must show that its position was “justified 

to a degree that could satisfy a reasonable person or otherwise having a reasonable basis both in 

law and fact.’” Taucher v. Brown-Hruska, 396 F.3d 1168, 1172 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (internal 

citations and quotations omitted). The “hallmark of the substantial justification test is 

reasonableness.” Role Models, 353 F.3d at 967. However, “the government need not establish 

that it was correct—indeed, since the movant is established as a prevailing party it could never 

do so.” Air Transp. Ass’n of Can. v. FAA, 156 F.3d 1329, 1332 (D.C. Cir. 1998). Nor must it 

show “that its decision to litigate was based on a substantial probability of prevailing.’”

Taucher, 396 F.3d at 1173 (quoting Spencer v. NLRB, 712 F.2d 539, 557 (D.C. Cir. 1983)) 

(internal quotation marks omitted). 

In determining whether a position was substantially justified, the court must “do more 

than explain, repeat, characterize, and describe the merits . . . decision.” Taucher, 396 F.3d at

1174 (quoting Halverson v. Slater, 206 F.3d 1205, 1209 (D.C. Cir. 2000)) (internal quotation 

mark omitted). Instead, a court must “analyze why the government’s position failed in court.” 

Id. But the court must “guard against being ‘subtly influenced by the familiar shortcomings of 

hindsight judgment.’” Id. at 1173 (quoting Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96 (1964)).

2. The FEC Was Not Substantially Justified

In opposing PAG’s motion for preliminary injunction, the FEC argued that the 

challenged regulation was a disclosure provision subject to exacting scrutiny, and that the 

regulation enforced the statute’s requirement that unauthorized committees disclose that the 

candidate did not authorize the communications. Id. The D.C. Circuit rejected this argument, 

finding that the regulation was not a disclosure provision because it did not require PAG to say 

anything and instead “‘prevent[ed]’ PAG from ‘conveying information to the public.’” PAG II, 

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831 F.3d at 507 (quoting Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of 

Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 650 (1985)). Instead, the Court found the regulation was a content-based 

ban on speech subject to strict scrutiny. Id. at 510. It reached this conclusion applying Zauderer

and two other seminal Supreme Court cases in the political speech context. See id. at 507–08

(citing Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 366 (2010); McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 201

(2003)). Thus, the FEC lost because its argument was contrary to Supreme Court precedent

regarding the level of scrutiny applicable to disclosure provisions and bans on political speech. 

The FEC’s main support for its exacting scrutiny argument was two prior decisions,

Common Cause v. FEC, 842 F.2d 436 (D.C. Cir. 1988), and Galliano v. U.S. Postal Service, 836 

F.2d 1362 (D.C. Cir. 1988), which involved a prior version of the regulation. (FEC Opp. at 7.) 

The Circuit disposed of these cases in a footnote, explaining they were inapplicable because 

“[a]lthough those cases characterized FECA’s naming restrictions . . . as part of a disclosure 

regime, they did not assess the constitutionality of section 102.14.” PAG II, 831 F.3d at 508 n.4. 

Common Cause held that it was reasonable to prohibit an unauthorized committee from using a 

candidate’s name not only in the committee name but “any title” a committee uses for 

“solicitation or propagandizing purposes.” 842 F.2d at 441. But Common Cause did not address

whether the FEC could draw a distinction between unauthorized committees that support or 

oppose a candidate. See id. Indeed, the Court of Appeals decided Common Cause four years 

before the FEC promulgated the regulation at issue here. PAG III, 363 F. Supp. 3d at 98. And 

while Common Cause noted that extending the naming prohibition to project names and titles 

was not an “implausible interpretation,” it did not endorse the content-based regime the FEC 

later developed. 842 F.2d at 441, 448.

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During both the preliminary injunction stage and at summary judgment, the FEC argued

that the regulation survived strict scrutiny. PAG I, 132 F. Supp 3d at 38; PAG III, 363 F. Supp. 

3d at 100, n.3. The D.C. Circuit assumed combating voter confusion was a compelling 

governmental interest, PAG II, 831 F.3d at 510; and at summary judgment, this court found that 

it was. PAG III, 363 F. Supp. 3d at 100–04. The FEC contended the regulation was narrowly 

tailored because banning speech was less burdensome than requiring large disclaimers; 

moreover, the court in Common Cause had observed that disclaimers might not reduce voter 

confusion. (FEC Opp. at 9–10.) The D.C. Circuit found the FEC was unlikely to prevail on this 

argument because large disclaimers could reduce confusion and the FEC offered no evidence 

that such disclaimers would be less effective than banning speech. PAG II, 831 F.3d at 510–11. 

On summary judgment, this court found the FEC still had not adduced sufficient evidence 

because it offered only anecdotal concerns (from a national committee, a commissioner, and a 

staff member) about disclaimers’ effectiveness. PAG III, 363 F. Supp. 3d at 104–06. The FEC’s 

arguments that the regulation was narrowly tailored relied on outdated caselaw and the record 

contained only three anecdotal statements about whether disclaimers would be effective.2

Making “one threshold determination” for the whole litigation, Jean, 496 U.S. at 159, the

court finds the FEC’s legal position was not substantially justified. The key issue in this case 

 

2 PAG also contends that the FEC could not have had a reasonable factual basis because the 

court decided the case on summary judgment. (ECF No. 50-1, Pl. Br., at 4.) But an agency is 

not per se unjustified when it loses at summary judgment. See F.J. Vollmer Co., Inc. v. Magaw, 

102 F.3d 591, 595 (D.C. Cir. 1996). Indeed, that an agency “fail[s] to provide an adequate 

explanation or fail[s] to consider some relevant factor in reaching a decision ‘may not warrant a 

finding that [the] agency’s action lacked substantial justification.’” Id. at 595 (quoting Wilkett v. 

ICC, 844 F.2d 867, 871 (D.C. Cir. 1988)). Here, the FEC did produce a substantial, albeit 

insufficient, record. Its error was failing to adequately weigh the burden imposed by the ban 

against the lesser burden from the disclaimers. 

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was whether to apply exacting or strict scrutiny to the challenged regulation, and the D.C. Circuit 

disposed of that question easily based on longstanding Supreme Court precedent. PAG II, 831 

F.3d at 507–08. The FEC relied heavily on the 1988 Common Cause decision that, while 

endorsing the statutory disclosure regime, did not address the regulation at issue or content-based 

bans on speech in disclosure regimes. 842 F.2d at 441, 448. And on summary judgment, it was 

not a close question that the FEC’s record failed to show narrow tailoring. PAG III, 363 F. Supp.

3d at 100–106. Further, while there was no directly controlling precedent on the regulation’s 

constitutionality, no party was called upon to analyze murky caselaw or split decisions on how to 

handle a content-based ban on speech. Taucher, 396 F.3d at 1178 (government substantially 

justified where no controlling precedent applied and the parties had to interpret dueling 

concurrences to determine the standard).3

 Therefore, the court finds that the FEC’s legal 

position was not substantially justified and PAG is entitled to attorneys’ fees under the EAJA. 

B. FEE CALCULATION

PAG is entitled to “reasonable” attorney’s fees and expenses. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A). 

To determine the “amount of a reasonable fee” the court multiplies “the number of hours 

reasonably expended on the litigation . . . by a reasonable hourly rate.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 

461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983), abrogated on other grounds by Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 

 

3 PAG also challenged the FEC’s advisory opinion applying the regulation to websites and social 

media pages that do not involve fundraising, and argued that it amounted to a prior restraint. The 

Court of Appeals found the APA claim was unlikely to be successful, PAG II, 831 F.3d at 506, 

and this court found the prior restraint claim was unlikely to be successful, PAG I, 132 F. Supp. 

3d at 38–39. While the court must examine the agency’s reasonableness as a whole, the 

prevailing party can recover even when they win on only one issue. Air Transport Ass’n. of 

Canada v. FAA, 156 F.3d 1329, 1332–33 (D.C. Cir. 1998). The primary issue in this case was 

the regulation’s constitutionality, and the FEC’s position on that issue forms the basis for 

determining substantial justification. 

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795 (2002). PAG has the burden to establish the reasonableness of its request, and supporting

documentation must be sufficiently detailed to permit the court to determine whether the hours 

were reasonable. See Role Models, 353 F.3d at 970. 

PAG submitted detailed records of its attorneys’ and staff’s hours, costs, and expenses. 

(ECF No. 3, Billing Entries; ECF No. 4, Torchinsky Decl.) Based on these records, it requests

payment for 1,122.7 attorney hours, for a total award of $228,682.22 in fees, plus $6,168.85 in 

costs and expenses. (Torchinsky Decl. ¶ 6.) The FEC does not contest PAG’s costs or requested 

rates, but does contest the numbers of hours for which PAG requests reimbursement. (FEC Opp. 

at 12–20.)

1. Unsuccessful Claims

The FEC contends that PAG cannot recover fees for its unsuccessful claim that the 

regulation was a prior restraint. (FEC. Opp. at 13–14.) But PAG’s prior restraint argument was 

an alternative ground for its ultimately successful claim that the regulation violated the First 

Amendment. “[N]o fee may be granted for work done on claims on which the party did not 

prevail, unless the unsuccessful claims were submitted as alternative grounds for a successful 

outcome that the plaintiff did actually achieve.” Anthony v. Sullivan, 982 F.2d 586, 589 (D.C. 

Cir. 1993). Therefore, the court will allow PAG to recover for time spent on its prior restraint 

arguments. 

The FEC also contends that PAG cannot recover for its unsuccessful APA challenge of 

the Advisory Opinion. (Id. at 13–15.) For partially prevailing parties, “the degree of the 

plaintiff’s overall success goes to the reasonableness of the award.” Tex. State Teachers Ass’n v. 

Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 793 (1989). The court has the discretion to reduce the 

overall fee award to reflect that degree of success, regardless of whether the total number of 

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hours expended was reasonable. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 436 (fee-shifting statute does not authorize 

award whenever “conscientious counsel tried the case with devotion and skill” but rather “the 

most critical factor is the degree of success obtained”). Here, PAG was ultimately successful in 

advancing its First Amendment claim. Indeed, the relief it obtained encompassed and surpassed 

that which it could have obtained based on the narrow issue presented in the APA claim. 

Therefore, the court declines to reduce the amount of the award based on partial success. 

Moreover, only five billing entries specifically relate to the Advisory Opinion. (Billing Entries 

at 1–2.) And while it is PAG’s burden to show its fee request is reasonable, the FEC has not 

suggested a reasonable reduction for PAG’s unsuccessful arguments on the Advisory Opinion. 

(See FEC Opp. 6, 13–14.)

2. Number of Hours

To support a fee award, “documentation must be of sufficient detail and probative value 

to enable the court to determine with a high degree of certainty that such hours were actually and 

reasonably expended.” Role Models, 353 F.3d at 970 (quoting In re Olson, 884 F.2d 1415, 1428 

(D.C. Cir. 1989) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). Where the documentation 

does “not adequately describe the legal work for which the client is being billed,” a court cannot 

“verify the reasonableness of the billings, either as to the necessity of the particular service or the 

amount of time expended on a given legal task.” In re Sealed Case, 890 F.2d 451, 455 (D.C. Cir. 

1989). For example, billing entries for meetings and telephone conferences where “no mention 

[was] made of the subject matter” are insufficient. In re Meese, 907 F.2d 1192, 1204 (D.C. Cir. 

1990); see also Cobell v. Norton, 407 F. Supp. 2d 140, 158 (D.D.C. 2005) (finding vague entries 

included: “meet with attys,” “prepare for trial,” and “trial preparation”). By contrast, the D.C. 

Circuit has found entries like “[r]esearch and drafting of FOIA part of complaint” and “[c]ourt 

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appearance on plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction” to be “entirely adequate.” Nat’l 

Ass’n of Concerned Veterans v. Sec’y of Def., 675 F.2d 1319, 1332 (D.C. Cir. 1982). 

The FEC objects to PAG’s block-billing, i.e., describing multiple tasks in one entry. 

Block-billing is disfavored because, if some tasks are not reimbursable, the court cannot “verify[ 

] that [the party] deducted the proper amount of time.” Role Models, 353 F.3d at 971. However, 

a party can recover for block-billed tasks if there is “sufficient detail” to “evaluate what the 

lawyers were doing and the reasonableness of the number of hours spent on those tasks.” Smith 

v. District of Columbia, 466 F. Supp. 2d 151, 158 (D.D.C. 2006). 

The court’s review of the challenged block-billing finds that over thirty billing entries

describe simply “research” or “related research,” without specifying what research was 

conducted. (See, e.g., Billing Entries at entry dated 07/16/2015 by Jason Torchinsky for 

“Research”; entry dated 11/19/2015 by Michael Bayes for “Conference with JT and SS; related 

research.”) These limited descriptions are inadequate and do not permit the court to determine 

whether that research was reasonable. See Role Models, 353 F.3d at 971 (explaining “numerous 

entries in which attorneys billed simply for ‘research’” were “inadequate”). Similarly, there are

over sixty entries for calls and correspondence that do not indicate their subject matter or relation 

to the case. (See, e.g., Billing Entries at entry dated 07/16/2015 by Michael Bayes 

“correspondence with JT”; entry dated 7/17/15 by Jason Torchinsky for “Correspondence.”) 

These descriptions are similarly inadequate, and the court cannot determine whether the purpose 

of the correspondence or call was reasonable. See Role Models, 353 F.3d at 971 (finding 

inadequate entries “for time spent in teleconferences or meetings—over one hundred in total—

the purposes of which are not provided.”); see also Michigan v. EPA, 254 F.3d 1087, 1093 (D.C. 

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Cir. 2001) (finding “numerous deficient entries, such as those listed only as ‘conference calls’ 

with no indication of who these calls were with or what they concerned”). 

PAG does not respond to FEC’s specific challenges to the block-billed descriptions, 

arguing instead that the court should focus on whether the total time is reasonable. It emphasizes

that “if [lawyers] have to document in great detail every quarter hour or half hour of how they 

spend their time on civil rights cases, two undesirable results will follow: their fee petitions will 

be higher, and the lawyers will simply waste precious time doing menial clerical tasks.” (ECF 

No. 54, Pl. Reply, at 12 (quoting Smith, 466 F. Supp. 2d at 158).) However, the D.C. Circuit has 

cautioned that when a billing entry lacks sufficient detail, such as the who and what of a 

conference call, the “‘description fails to provide the court with any basis to determine with a 

high degree of certainty that the hours billed were reasonable,’ and thus cannot be charged to the 

taxpayers.” Michigan v. EPA, 254 F.3d at 1093 (quoting In re Donovan, 877 F.2d 982, 995 

(D.C. Cir. 1989)). Therefore, the court will reduce the fee award, in the amount discussed 

below, to account for the inadequate descriptions regarding research, calls, conferences, and 

correspondence in the challenged block-billing entries. 

The FEC also objects to nineteen billing entries for attorney time spent on administrative 

tasks. (FEC Opp. at 20.) “[P]urely clerical or secretarial tasks should not be billed at a paralegal 

[or attorney] rate regardless of who performs them.” Role Models, 353 F.3d at 973 (alteration in 

original) (quoting Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274, 288 n. 10 (1989)). PAG does not respond 

to this argument. (ECF No. 53-4.) Therefore, the court will reduce the fee, in the amount 

discussed below, to account for billing entries for clerical tasks. 

Finally, the FEC challenges numerous entries for tasks that appear unrelated to this 

litigation. (FEC Opp. at 19–20.) For example, the first appears to relate to PAG’s 48-hour 

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independent expenditure reporting requirement, (Billing Entries at entry dated 7/16/2015 by 

Michael Bayes), and PAG makes no attempt to explain how this relates to this case. (See Pl. 

Reply.) The FEC points to ten other similar entries, (ECF No. 53-3), and PAG responds only to 

three. It argues two are compensable because they reflect discussion of a case in the Eastern 

District of Virginia involving similar issues. (Pl. Reply at 13.) PAG can recover for the limited 

time spent discussing relevant litigation because the amount of time spent appears reasonable. 

PAG also argues that its call with a printing company regarding an application to the Supreme 

Court is compensable, (id.), but that is an administrative task for which PAG cannot recover. 

Having reviewed the other challenged entries, the court agrees with the FEC that it is impossible 

to determine whether the entries are related to the case, and will reduce the fee, in the amount 

discussed below, to account for tasks that appear unrelated to the litigation. 

Where a “large number of entries” are deficient “[a] fixed reduction is appropriate.” Role 

Models, 353 F.3d at 973. Here, the court has found approximately 120 deficient entries; about 

twenty percent of the billing entries. But because PAG block-billed, many of these deficiencies 

are only part of an otherwise adequate time entry. (See Billing Entries.) Moreover, the court 

cannot determine how much of each entry is allocable to the inadequate description, and neither 

party attempted to do so. 

While PAG’s billing entries had numerous deficiencies, the court does not find that the 

hours were so excessive as to warrant the fifty percent reduction the FEC seeks. Cf. Role 

Models, 353 F.3d at 973 (reducing fee by fifty percent for inadequate documentation, failure to 

justify the number of hours sought, inconsistencies, and improper billing entries). PAG’s hours

are not so excessive as those billed in Role Models, in which the Circuit noted that over 1,000 

hours was “overkill” for a case that involved a preliminary injunction, reversal on appeal, and 

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immediate entry of a permanent injunction. Role Models, 353 F.3d at 972. Here, however, the 

parties engaged in discovery and summary judgment briefing, and the FEC does not contend that 

PAG over-billed hours on a specific brief or that it over-staffed the case. 

The court will, however, reduce the fee by fifteen percent to account for the over 100

entries that lack adequate descriptions, but which are lumped together with other compensable

activities. Cf. Michigan v. EPA, 254 F.3d at 1095 (reducing fee award by ten percent where 

“numerous entries” were “devoid of any descriptive rationale for their occurrence”); Bennett v. 

Castro, 74 F. Supp. 3d 382, 406 (D.D.C. 2014) (reducing fee award by ten percent where 

“several dozen” entries “lack[ed] adequate subject-matter descriptions, and a handful more 

[were] lumped together with activities that might not warrant reimbursement”). 

III. CONCLUSION

For the stated reasons, this court will GRANT in part and DENY in part PAG’s motion 

for fees. PAG will be awarded fees in the amount of $194,379.89 and costs and expenses in the 

amount of $6,168.85. A corresponding Order will issue separately. 

Date: June 1, 2020

Tanya S. Chutkan 

TANYA S. CHUTKAN

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