COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Willis, Annunziata and Bumgardner 

Argued at Alexandria, Virginia 

SAMMY D. SULEIMAN 

 OPINION BY 

v. Record No. 3130-96-4 JUDGE ROSEMARIE ANNUNZIATA 

 FEBRUARY 3, 1998 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY 

Jane Marum Roush, Judge 

 William B. Reichhardt (Elizabeth D. Teare; 

William B. Reichhardt & Associates; Surovell, 

Jackson, Colten & Dugan, P.C., on briefs), 

for appellant. 

 John K. Byrum, Jr., Assistant Attorney 

General (Richard Cullen, Attorney General; 

Marla Graff Decker, Assistant Attorney 

General, on brief), for appellee. 

 Sammy D. Suleiman (appellant), a juvenile, appeals the 

sentence imposed by the circuit court after his conviction for 

robbery. He contends the court did not sentence him in 

accordance with the requirements of Code § 16.1-285.1, which 

govern the sentencing of serious juvenile offenders. Finding no 

error, we affirm. 

 This case is before us on an agreed statement of facts. 

Appellant and two codefendants robbed a 7-11 store in Fairfax 

County after evaluating various commercial establishments to 

determine which to rob. One of appellant's codefendants went 

into the store, brandished a handgun at the 7-11 cashier, and 

demanded money. Appellant entered the store and told the cashier 

to do as his codefendant instructed. Appellant then removed cash 
2 

and cigarettes from the countertop. Appellant and his 

codefendants were arrested approximately five minutes after the 

robbery as they attempted to flee from the 7-11. After his 

arrest, appellant admitted that he had participated in the 

robbery and stated that the robbery was his idea. 

 The Commonwealth filed a petition against appellant in the 

juvenile and domestic relations district court on March 25, 1996, 

alleging that he robbed a 7-11 store in Fairfax, Virginia, on 

March 24, 1996. The Commonwealth sought to try appellant as an 

adult, but the juvenile court declined to release its 

jurisdiction over the case to the circuit court. Appellant 

entered a plea of nolo contendere and filed an appeal to the 

circuit court. At trial, contrary to his earlier admissions, 

appellant maintained that he did not know that a robbery was in 

progress as he entered the store. One of appellant's 

codefendants testified that appellant was the "mastermind" behind 

the robbery. The codefendant also testified that two weeks 

earlier he and appellant had stolen the weapons used in the 

robbery from a Walmart. A jury convicted appellant of robbery. 

 At a sentencing hearing on November 22, 1996, the trial 

court received and reviewed a court report from the probation 

office. In the court report, a probation officer recited details 

of the robbery taken from the police report and stated that the 

7-11 clerk had been in fear of being seriously injured or killed 

during the robbery while "the defendants were making demands." 
3 

The probation officer also reported that appellant had one prior 

arrest for assault, which had been continued and dismissed 

following a period of supervised probation and community service. 

 In an interview with probation officials, appellant denied the 

assault. 

 Appellant's former probation officer reported "very minimal 

concerns" with appellant and his family during appellant's period 

of probation. The report described as generally good appellant's 

family, neighborhood, and school experiences. The probation 

officer explained that, although appellant "was in relatively 

good standing" at his school, he had received three in-school 

suspensions for disciplinary violations, such as skipping class 

or disobeying teachers. The report described appellant as "being 

very immature, impulsive, and easily influenced by other peers." 

 The probation officer concluded as follows: 

 It has become evident to this reporter that 

Sammy David Suleiman has failed to accept 

responsibility for his actions on the night 

in question, and has continued to minimize 

his involvement in this crime. Furthermore, 

it is the feeling of this officer that Sammy 

Suleiman does not understand the seriousness 

of this type of criminal behavior, nor has he 

shown an appropriate amount of remorse for 

his actions. 

The probation officer recommended that appellant be committed to 

the Department of Juvenile Justice until his twenty-first 

birthday. 

 In support of his argument that he was amenable to treatment 
4 

through non-incarceration juvenile programs, appellant presented 

the testimony of Dr. Christopher Lane, a clinical psychologist, 

who testified that appellant was remorseful and amenable to 

treatment as an outpatient. Dr. Lane testified that appellant's 

five month incarceration would act as a deterrent to further 

criminal activity and that further incarceration would not be 

helpful and would interfere with appellant's ongoing treatment. 

 Appellant also presented testimony from his school guidance 

counselor to establish that appellant had performed well in 

school and could return to school if allowed by the court. 

A petition signed by members of appellant's community was 

introduced. The petition stated that the signatories had no 

concern for the safety of the community if appellant were 

released. Finally, appellant presented evidence that he had 

responded well to electronic monitoring and probation and that he 

had successfully held a job while on probation. 

 In sentencing appellant, the trial court stated as follows: 

 In consideration, the Court found that the 

Defendant comes within the purview of the 

Juvenile and Domestic Relations District 

Court Law of the 1950 Code of Virginia, as 

amended, pursuant to § 16.1-285.1. The Court 

considered, among other factors, that the 

juvenile is fourteen (14) years of age or 

older and that the commitment under this 

section is necessary to meet the 

rehabilitative needs of the juvenile and 

would best serve the interests of the 

community; and that the felony offense is 

punishable by a term of confinement of 

greater than twenty years if the felony was 

committed by an adult. 
5 

 The court remanded appellant to the Department of Juvenile 

Justice for a period of four years and six months, not to exceed 

his twenty-first birthday. The trial court denied appellant's 

motion for reconsideration of his sentence in which he alleged 

that the trial court had not made the required statutory 

findings. 

 On appeal, appellant contends the trial court erred when it 

failed to determine that appellant was not a proper person to 

receive treatment through juvenile programs other than 

incarceration. Appellant also argues that no evidence supports 

the trial court's determination, if in fact one was made. 

 The proper interpretation of Code § 16.1-285.1 is a question 

of first impression for this Court. "Principles of statutory 

construction mandate that we 'give effect to the legislative 

intent.' While penal statutes must be strictly construed against 

the Commonwealth, '[t]he plain, obvious, and rational meaning of 

a statute is always preferred to any curious, narrow or strained 

construction . . . ." Newton v. Commonwealth, 21 Va. App. 86, 

89, 462 S.E.2d 117, 119 (1995). 

 Code § 16.1-285.1 provides that a serious juvenile offender 

may be committed to the custody of the Department of Juvenile 

Justice for a period of seven years or until the juvenile's 

twenty-first birthday, whichever occurs first. Generally, "when 

the maximum punishment is prescribed by statute, 'and the 

sentence [imposed] does not exceed that maximum, the sentence 
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will not be overturned as being an abuse of discretion.'" 

Valentine v. Commonwealth, 18 Va. App. 334, 339, 443 S.E.2d 445, 

448 (1994) (quoting Abdo v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 473, 479, 237 

S.E.2d 900, 903 (1977)). 

 As appellant contends, however, Code § 16.1-285.1 requires 

the trial court to make certain findings prior to sentencing a 

juvenile as a serious offender. Code § 16.1-285.1(A) allows a 

circuit court to commit a juvenile as a serious offender 

 [i]n the case of a juvenile fourteen years of 

age or older who has been found guilty of an 

offense which would be a felony if committed 

by an adult, and . . . (iii) the felony 

offense is punishable by a term of 

confinement of greater than twenty years if 

the felony was committed by an adult, . . . 

and the circuit court . . . finds that 

commitment under this section is necessary to 

meet the rehabilitative needs of the juvenile 

and would serve the best interests of the 

community . . . . 

 Prior to committing the juvenile as a serious offender, the 

court must consider the age of the juvenile, the "seriousness and 

number of the present offenses," the "previous history of the 

juvenile," and the "Department's estimated length of stay." Code 

§ 16.1-285.1(B). In addition, the court's "commitment order must 

be supported by a determination that the interests of the 

juvenile and community require that the juvenile be placed under 

legal restraint or discipline and that the juvenile is not a 

proper person to receive treatment or rehabilitation through 

other juvenile programs or facilities." Id.
7 

 

 We find that the court's written findings in this case 

satisfy the requirements of the statute and constitute evidence 

that the court made the required determination that the appellant 

"is not a proper person to receive treatment or rehabilitation 

through other juvenile programs or facilities." Code 

§ 16.1-285.1(B).1

 The findings in the court's order track the findings 

required under Code § 16.1-285.1(A): appellant is fourteen years 

of age or older, his commitment is necessary to meet his 

rehabilitation needs and best serve the interests of the 

community, and appellant's felony offense would be punishable by 

incarceration for more than twenty years if committed by an 

adult. While the court's order does not explicitly address the 

question of whether appellant is a proper person to receive 

treatment through other programs, it states that "commitment 

under this section is necessary to meet the rehabilitative needs 

of the juvenile." We find that this statement reflects the 

court's implicit determination that appellant is not a proper 

person for non-incarceration juvenile treatment. If commitment 

 1To the extent appellant's argument encompasses a claimed 

requirement that the court must make detailed findings in 

writing, we disagree, provided the record discloses that all the 

statutory factors have been considered and the required 

determination has been made. While making the required 

determination and findings in writing may agreeably be a sound 

practice, it is apparent from the language of the statute that 

Code § 16.1-285.1(B) does not require that the determination be 

in written form. 
8 

is "necessary" to meet appellant's rehabilitative needs, other, 

less intrusive means of treatment will not fulfill his needs, 

and, therefore, he is not a proper person for the "other 

programs" to which the statute refers. 

 Appellant's second contention, that the evidence does not 

support the court's findings, is fundamentally a question of the 

sufficiency of the evidence. We are required to view the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth. Cotton 

v. Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 596, 597, 459 S.E.2d 527, 528 (1995) 

(en banc) (citing Josephs v. Commonwealth, 10 Va. App. 87, 99, 

390 S.E.2d 491, 497 (1990) (en banc)). Furthermore, whether 

appellant was a proper person to receive treatment or 

rehabilitation through non-incarceration programs is a question 

of fact, and we may not reverse a court's finding of fact unless 

it "'is plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.'" Id.

(quoting Josephs, 10 Va. App. at 99, 390 S.E.2d at 497). 

 The evidence supports the court's findings of fact. 

Appellant was convicted of robbery. The court heard evidence 

that appellant was the "mastermind" behind the robbery and stole 

the weapons used in the crime. These circumstances establish 

that appellant was directly responsible for his crime. 

 The Commonwealth also presented substantial evidence that 

appellant and his parents had not accepted responsibility for 

appellant's acts. At trial, appellant denied his earlier 

admission of guilt. In an interview with the probation office, 
9 

he denied his earlier assault and did not show remorse for his 

crime. The court received evidence that appellant's parents did 

not hold him fully accountable for his crime but instead blamed 

appellant's diabetes. While appellant presented a petition from 

members of his community, the petition does not reflect that the 

signatories were aware of the nature of appellant's crime. Dr. 

Lane testified that appellant was remorseful, but the trial court 

had the discretion to weigh conflicting testimony and conclude 

that appellant did not appreciate the seriousness of his acts 

and, thus, was not likely to benefit from treatment alternatives 

short of incarceration. See Davison v. Commonwealth, 18 Va. App. 

496, 502, 445 S.E.2d 683, 687 (1994) (citing Bridgeman v. 

Commonwealth, 3 Va. App. 523, 528, 351 S.E.2d 598, 601-02 

(1986)). 

 Finding that the court's order rested on a determination 

that appellant was not a proper person for non-incarceration 

juvenile programs and that its sentencing decision was not 

plainly wrong or unsupported by the evidence, we affirm the 

conviction. 

 Affirmed.