THE EAGLE'S TALONS

The American Experience

at War

by

COL DENNIS M. DREW

Airpower Research Institute

Air University

DR DONALD M. SNOW

Department of Political Science

University of Alabama

Air University Press

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 36112-5532

December 1988
Library of Congress Cataloglag-In-Publication Data

Drew, Dennis M.

The eagle's talons: the American experience at war/by Dennis M. Drew,

Donald M. Snow.

p. cm.

"December 1988."

Bibliography: p.

Includes index.

1 . Sociology, Military-United States . 2. Military science-United StatesHistory. 3. United States-History, Military . 4. Civil-military relationsUnited States-History. I . Snow, Donald M., 1943-.11 . Title .

UA23.D685 1988

355'.00973-dcl9 88-7720

CIP

First Printing December 1988

Second Printing April 1990

Third Printing June 1992

Fourth Printing February 2003

DISCLAIMER

This publication was produced in the Department of Defense school environment in the interest of academic freedom and the advancement of national

defense-related concepts . The views expressed in this publication are those of

the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of

Defense or the United States government.

This publication has been reviewed by security and policy review authorities

and is cleared for public release .

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents

US Government Printing Office

Washington, D.C. 20402
CONTENTS

Chapter Page

DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii

FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii

ABOUT THE AUTHORS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

PREFACE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

INTRODUCTION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

ix

xi

xiii

1 WAR AND POLITICAL PURPOSE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Issues and Events . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Political Objective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Military Objectives and Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Political Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

Military Technology and Technique . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

Military Conduct. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

Better State of the Peace. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

2 AMERICAN REVOLUTION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

Issues and Events . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

Political Objective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48

Military Objectives and Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50

Political Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54

Military Technology and Technique . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59

Military Conduct. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63

Better State of the Peace. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78

3 CIVIL WAR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81

Issues and Events . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83

Political Objective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91

Military Objectives and Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94

Political Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102

Military Technology and Technique . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109

Military Conduct . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113

Better State of the Peace. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
iv

Chapter Page

4 WORLD WAR I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135

Issues and Events . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140

Political Objective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146

Military Objectives and Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149

Political Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153

Military Technology and Technique . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157

Military Conduct. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162

Better State of the Peace. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166

5 WORLD WAR II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173

Issues and Events . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176

Political Objective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184

Military Objectives and Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188

Political Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195

Military Technology and Technique . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199

Military Conduct . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 206

Better State of the Peace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 216

6 KOREAN WAR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 225

Issues and Events . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 232

Political Objective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 235

Military Objectives and Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 239

Political Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 243

Military Technology and Technique . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 245

Military Conduct . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 248

Better State of the Peace. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 256

7 VIETNAM WAR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 261

Issues and Events . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 265

Political Objective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , 278

Military Objectives and Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 285

Political Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 298

Military Technology and Technique . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 301

Military Conduct . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 310

Better State of the Peace. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 320

8 AMERICA'S MINOR WARS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 327

War of 1812 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 330

Issues and Events . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 330
Chapter

9

Page

Political Objective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 332

Military Objectives and Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 333

Political Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 335

Military Technology and Technique. . . . . . . . . . . . 336

Military Conduct . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 338

Better State of the Peace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 342

Mexican War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 344

Issues and Events . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 344

Political Objective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 346

Military Objectives and Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 346

Political Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 348

Military Technology and Technique. . . . . . . . . . . . 349

Military Conduct . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 351

Better State of the Peace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 354

Spanish-American War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 355

Issues and Events . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 356

Political Objective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 359

Military Objectives and Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 360

Political Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 361

Military Technology and Technique. . . . . . . . . . . . 362

Military Conduct . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 364

Better State of the Peace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 367

THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 369

Issues and Events . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 373

Political Objective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 375

Military Objectives and Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 381

Political Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 384

Military Technology and Technique . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 390

Military Conduct . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 396

Better State of the Peace. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 398

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 403

INDEX. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 409

FOREWORD

Americans have traditionally viewed war as an aberration

in the normal course of events. Although paying lip service

to the Clausewitzian dictum that war and politics are two

parts of a tightly knit whole, we have traditionally waged

wars as great crusades divorced from political realities.

Thus we have been nonplussed in the last half of the twentieth century by our involvement in limited wars waged for

limited objectives . America's responsibilities as a superpower with worldwide interests forced upon us the unpleasant notion of using our armed forces as practical

instruments of political policy. The reality of this notion

has been difficult for many Americans to understand and

accept.

Col Dennis M. Drew and Dr Donald M. Snow have performed a significant service by producing a volume that

places the American experience at war in its proper political

context . Going further, they have also placed the American

experience in a technological context and analyzed how political and technological factors influenced the conduct of

American wars . In addition, they have combined all of these

factors and analyzed their influences on the outcomes of

our wars, what Sir Basil Liddell Hart called "the better state

of peace," which is the fundamental objective of warfare.

One can find a number of military, political, and technological histories that address the American experience at

war. However, I know of no other single volume that addresses all of these aspects in such a concise and readable

fashion. ButEagle's Talons is much more than just a history

of the American experience. Ifgaining insights about where

we are going requires an understanding of where we have

been, Colonel Drew and Dr Snow provide a key to under-
standing how and why the United States might employ its

military power in the future .

SIDNFY J. WISE

Colonel, USAF

Commander

Center for Aerospace Doctrine,

Research, and Education
ABOUT THE

AUTHORS

Col Dennis M. Drew is the director, Airpower Research Institute, at the Air University Center

for Aerospace Doctrine, Research,

and Education (AUCADRE). A

veteran of more than 24 years of

service, he has been on extended

faculty appointment at the Air

University since 1978 . He is a

member ofthe Section on Military

Studies of the International Studies Association and a fellow of the

Inter-University Seminar on

Armed Forces and Society. He

holds a BA from Willamette University, an MS from the University

of Wyoming, and an MA from the

University of Alabama. He is also

a graduate ofthe Air Force Squadron Officer School, Air Command

and StaffCollege, and Air WarCollege . He has authored, coauthored,

or edited several books and book

chapters, as well as numerous presentation papers and journal articles dealing with military history,

theory, and strategy.

Dr Donald M. Snow is a professor of political science at the University of Alabama where he is also

the director of the International

Studies Program . He is a past

chairman of the Section on Military Studies of the International

Studies Association and a fellow of

the Inter-University Seminar on

Armed Forces and Society. He

Col Dennis M. Drew

Dr Donald M. Snow
holds a BA and MA from the University of Colorado and a PhD from

Indiana University. Additionally, he has been a visiting distinguished

professor at both Air University and the Naval War College . He is

one of the most widely published authors in the fields of defense and

nuclear issues having authored, coauthored, or edited several books

and book chapters, a number of presentation papers, and numerous

articles for the leading professional journals.
PREFACE

This volume surveys the American experience in warwith

emphasis on the complex interactions between political and

military affairs. We know of no other single volume that

systematically addresses the interwoven political and military factors that comprise the American experience. The

specialist will find little that is new here as the authors have

relied exclusively on reputable published sources. What is

new is the amalgamation of so many diverse factors in an

attempt to portray the totality of the American experience.

The intended primary audience for this work is threefold.

First, we believe that civilian decisionmakers with a limited

background in military affairs could profit from reading

this volume. Second, we believe that military leaders with

a limited background in political affairs could find this volume valuable. Finally, all who are concerned with national

security affairs but who are unfamiliar with the complex

relationships that bind together war and political activity

should form an interested audience.

The authors have been the beneficiaries of a great deal

of expert and indispensable help in developing this volume.

The entire staff of the Air University Press has treated us

with great kindness and patience and has provided the technical expertise without which this book would not exist.

We hesitate to specify those involved for fear of omitting

any of the true professionals within the Press who had a

hand in this undertaking. However, we must draw the reader's attention to our editor, John Jordan. John labored for

months over several revisions, continually converting our

scribblings into a coherent whole. His dedication, patience,

and professional expertise were of enormous help. Well

done, John!

We also owe a debt of gratitude to Dr David Maclsaac

for reading the manuscript . Doctor Maclsaac is one of
America's foremost military historians, and his thorough

examination saved the authors considerable embarrassment at several points in the text . His opinion concerning

the value of this volume provided our litmus test for

publication.

Finally, we must acknowledge the encouragement and

support of two very patient wives and neglected families .

We have struggled with this volume for more than five

years. Many evenings and weekends were devoted to research and writing that perhaps should have been devoted

to our families. They never wavered in their support and

for that we express our deepest gratitude.

Dennis M. Drew, Col, USAF

Director

Airpower Research Institute

Dr Donald M. Snow

Professor of

Political Science

University of Alabama
INTRODUCTION

As the end of the twentieth century approaches, the

United States finds itself at a crossroads of sorts concerning

the appropriate role of military force as an instrument of

power to support the objectives of foreign policy. The debate over military power is a part of a much larger disagreement over America's place in the world. The basis for

the larger controversy is the undeniable fact that American

power has diminished relatively, if not absolutely, compared to the rest of the world. The poles of the larger debate

range from passive acceptance of diminished stature to near

jingoism aimed at returning the United States to its

"proper" place at the top of the heap.

Future applications of American military might are

clearly important elements of the larger controversy because

military force is, and has been throughout history, a prominent means societies have used to settle their differences.

One can decry or celebrate that observation, but one can

ignore it only by the considerable application of selective

perception. The overriding questions for Americans are

where, if anywhere, and over what should they be willing

to shed their blood and expend their treasure .

Consensus about the future use of military force has been

especially difficult to achieve. The difficulty stems from

uncertainty caused by the confluence of three long-standing

and related concerns: nuclear weapons, limited warfare, and

the Vietnam experience. The oldest of these concerns has

to do with the practical military role of nuclear weapons.

Since the leveling ofHiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, there

has been general agreement that nuclear weapons are special

and unique, representing a quantum change in weaponry.

Nuclear weapons represent a qualitative change in the physical principles used to produce an explosion. For example,

the fusion process, which releases explosive energy in such
vast quantities, emulates the manner in which the sun produces its energy, thereby endowing the entire nuclear enterprise with an aura of "playing God."

Since nuclear weapons are clearly special, one has to ask

what is their utility? For what purposes does one possess

them? In what circumstances might one use them? With

the United States and the Soviet Union each in possession

of thousands of nuclear weapons aimed at each other's territory, the question of utility is both compelling and

problematical.

Through what some consider convoluted logic, the utility

of nuclear weapons has become deterrence: we have nuclear

weapons to keep our adversaries from using their nuclear

weapons against us. The idea of maintaining a force to

dissuade enemies from attacking is certainly nothing new.

What sets nuclear weapons apart from so-called conventional weapons is the question of whether they have any

utility beyond their deterrent role . Force generally has the

dual purposes of deterring force employment by adversaries

and, failing in that, actually fighting to defend or promote

interests. The question about nuclear weapons, particularly

given their plenitude and possession by several parties, is

whether their actual use could serve any sensible purpose.

In American thinking, there has been considerable skepticism that the use of nuclear weapons could serve any sensible purpose. Their deterrent value is clearly supreme; for

many it is exclusive.

Contemplation of the use of nuclear weapons is further

beclouded by the realization that we do not know what a

nuclear war would be like, but at its worst, it would almost

certainly be globally disastrous . The reason for the uncertainty, of course, is that nuclear weapons have never been

used when more than one belligerent possessed them. All

the elaborate scenarios analysts project about the dynamics

and outcomes of nuclear conflict are no more than

conjecture.

The impact of nuclear weapons extends to how we view

the use of force generally. No matter how remote the prospect might be, any conflict in which a nuclear power beXiv
comes engaged has within it the possibility of escalating to

a thermonuclear confrontation. This prospect is enhanced

if the superpowers stand on opposite sides, which they generally do.

The prospect of escalation to nuclear confrontation is at

the heart of the second major concern in the military debate. Since the late 1940s, the world has been dominated

by two competing alliance systems, each dominated by a

nuclear superpower with both superpowers determined to

extend and/or preserve their influence in the nonaligned

world and both suspicious of the other side's intentions .

The results of this situation have been twofold. First, the

superpowers have, with rare exceptions, avoided direct military confrontations in which the threat of escalation would

be exacerbated. Both the United States and the Soviet

Union have chosen to use their military power in areas and

over issues that have not directly threatened the other's vital

interests. But even in indirect confrontation, superpower

interests have clashed and the fear of escalation has remained. Second, because of the continuing fear of escalation, even in indirect confrontations, the superpowers have

kept a tight rein on their use of military power even when

employing military force. Ironically, neither has been willing to risk waging unlimited war, the mastery ofwhich made

both superpowers in the first place.

The very idea of "limited war" has been particularly galling to Americans. This was illustrated most notably by General of the Army Douglas MacArthur's dictum, "There is

no substitute for victory," a remark uttered in frustration

over the limitations placed on the American military during

the Korean War (and echoed by many others during the

Vietnam War). It is ironic that, after having spent most of

its history on the sidelines of international power politics,

the United States emerged from World WarII as the leading

military power only to find much of its power apparently

unusable. As a superpower, the United States has fought

two major but limited wars that have resulted in one stalemate and one loss, and this has been a continuing source

of anger andbewilderment for many Americans. Even more
frustrating, the opponent in each case was, at best, a fourthrate military power. Knowledge that the Soviets have suffered similar difficulties in their only major postwar conflict

(Afghanistan) has provided little comfort to Americans.

Thethird concern is a product ofthe limited-war problem

in general, and more specifically, the American experience

in Vietnam. The war in Southeast Asia was a national

trauma which, in many important ways, triggered the entire

debate over the American role in the world and the utility

of military force.

The Vietnam War was bewildering. The US effort inundated Indochina with a flood of American equipment,

advisers, technology, and combat troops. Applied American

military power dwarfed the physical efforts of the Vietcong

and the North Vietnamese. Militarily, the American battlefield effort yielded an almost unbroken string of victories. American forces commanded the air and sea and could

operate in any area with ground forces. On the one occasion

in which the enemy stood and fought American forces in

a conventional style, the Tet offensive in 1968, the enemy

was so badly mauled that it could not launch another major

offensive for four years. But despite all this "success," the

United States could not prevail.

The Vietnam War was the first war in which none of the

American political objectives were attained . Despite an

enormous military effort, continual success on the battlefield, and the sacrifice of more than 50,000 American lives,

the United States was unable to translate apparent military

success into success in the larger war. Perhaps worse, the

controversy that eventuated over American participation in

the war ripped apart the fabric of American society as private passions about the war erupted into massive demonstrations and occasional violence . Many became

disillusioned with American military and political leadership. In addition, the fiscal consequences of the war were

still being felt in the American economy more than a decade

after the end of US involvement. Finally, the struggle's end

was as difficult as its conduct. According to one point of

view, the United States shamefully abandoned its South

Xvi
Vietnamese ally, thus making a mockery of the American

effort and of those who were sacrificed in that effort.

That the Vietnam experience was traumatic is unquestionable; the question that remains is what can be usefully

learned from the experience-and again, Americans have

not achieved consensus. Purported lessons have included

simplistic cries for "no more Vietnams" to equally simplistic pleas demanding that the military be unfettered

when prosecuting such struggles . Other "lessons" span the

gamut from geopolitical to technical and have been equally

diverse and contradictory. In short, the passions caused by

the Vietnam trauma have generated considerable heat but

little light by which Americans can guide future actions.

Confusion, bewilderment, anger, and simplistic solutions

are symptomatic of the vague and often myopic historical

view of most Americans including, unfortunately, many civilian and military leaders charged with important national

security responsibilities . The authors contend that current

concerns about nuclear weapons, limited war, and the Vietnam experience are but threads in the much larger historical

tapestry of American politico-military experience. We believe that just as individual threads should only be viewed

as part of a whole tapestry, current politico-military concerns can be evaluated accurately only if viewed in their

historical context.

Simplistic approaches to politico-military problems are

also indications that Americans have not been forced to

deal comprehensively with the role of force. History, and

especially military history, has treated the United States

kindly. Few nations share the American experience of carving a new nation from a vast wilderness only sparsely populated by aboriginal tribes and of transforming that

bountiful wilderness into a great democratic experiment .

As a result, Americans have had a legacy of optimism: despite obstacles, Americans have expected to achieve their

goals. The spirit of "can do" has been an indelible element

in their collective psyche.

Much of this American optimism has stemmed from a

reprieve from history's darker side, but history has shown
another face to Europeans. Plowshares have been beaten

into swords as often as the reverse and conquerors have

regularly scourged the land. The result has been to breed

caution, reserve, suspicion, and abeliefthat peace and prosperity may be only temporary interludes. In short, Europeans have a long tradition in which war is an integral, if

not central, part of political activity.

The luxury of long isolation from the internecine struggles of Europe has molded the American view that war is

an aberration, an unfortunate diversion from the normal

course of events. Rather than a political instrument, war

represents to Americans the failure of political policy-the

failure to deal successfully with a direct threat to the essential virtue of the American experiment . When forced to

arms, Americans view warfare as a great crusade to overcome a well-defined evil.

If war has touched Americans with less frequency and

effect than others, it has also left Americans with a legacy

of military success. That this legacy is partly mythology

built on selective memory is almost beside the point. Thus

Americans cherish the tradition that the United States is

not only "slow to anger" and enters into war only with

great reluctance but also wins when the crusade is mounted.

Despite such contrary evidence as the American military

performance in the War of 1812 and some isolated unseemly or embarrassing episodes, applied force and victory

have been inextricably linked in the American recollection.

Because Americans believed in their infallibility, the tarnish

from recent experience (whether Vietnam or lesser debacles) is all the uglier.

Because fortune has shielded Americans from some of

the nastier realities of military force, most Americans have

been able to avoid coming to grips with the central role

military force has had and continues to play in an international setting where the recourse to force remains the

"court of last resort" for achieving national ends. More

specifically, American innocence has allowed us to avoid

confronting war as a political act and learning the often

harsh relationship between politics and military force. In a
relatively uncomplicated world in which the United States

was not a central player that innocence was affordable . In

a world of increasing mutual dependency in which the

United States is center stage that innocence is a too expensive luxury.

That it is now time to decide when, where, and why the

United States should be willing or unwilling to use force in

the future is obvious and compelling. The debate has been

joined but remains jaundiced by proximate concerns and

exacerbated by historical myopia. We believe significant

insights into why and how the United States could and

should use force in the future lie in understanding why and

how America has done so in the past . At a minimum, an

excursion into American military history may dilute the

tendencies to separate political and military affairs and to

treat all events as unique and discrete .

Given the complexity and breadth of the subject, the

organization of this volume takes on considerable importance. Following an introductory chapter to provide the

framework for our analysis, we have devoted an entire chapter to each of America's major wars-the exceptions being

the War of 1812, the war with Mexico, and the SpanishAmerican War, which are combined in one chapter. Each

of these chapters is divided into sections titled (in order):

Issues and Events, Political Objective, Military Objectives

and Strategy, Political Considerations, Military Technology

and Techniques, Military Conduct, and Better State of the

Peace. We have attempted to write each chapter so that it

can stand alone and, at the same time, flow together with

other chapters to form an integrated whole. Within each

chapter, each section is written to stand alone and yet contribute to a coherent chapter. These objectives are somewhat mutually exclusive and could only be accomplished

by a limited degree of repetition in the text. The result is

a survey history of the American experience in war and

individual surveys of political objectives, military strategies, military technology, and the other subjects that are

treated discretely in each chapter and successively from

chapter to chapter. The final chapter draws conclusions and
delineates important trends evident in the broad sweep of

the American experience.
CHAPTER 1

WAR AND POLITICAL PURPOSE

"War is a continuation of political activity by other

means," the great Prussian strategist Carl von Clausewitz

wrote over a century and a half ago. His famous dictum,

so disarmingly simple and straightforward, is mimicked

constantly in discussions about the role of military force in

accomplishing the goals of groups and nation-states . Despite its obvious truth and power, it is a statement shallowly

comprehended and constantly forgotten .

What Clausewitz meant, and what is at the very heart of

understanding why nations go to war, is that military force

is a tool, one among many, by which nation-states (or

groups of nation-states or groups within nation-states) seek

to accomplish their ends. Those ends are defined politically

in terms of imposing the policies of one group on another.

Force is certainly not the only means by which nations seek

to accomplish their political ends, but because it inevitably

involves the taking of human life, it is the most extreme of

the so-called instruments of national power. Other instruments of power are conventionally described as the economic and diplomatic instruments: the use of various forms

of economic reward or deprivation and of persuasion to

achieve ends. What should never be forgotten is that the

instruments of power are ultimately judged and gain their

entire meaning by the extent to which they serve national

policies.

Despite its bestial and grotesque nature, war continues

to be a tool of national policy. Americans must understand

war and its purposes as clearly as possible to choose most

intelligently when to use and when not to use the military

instrument of. power. That is our purpose in this volume.
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The bulk of our concern is why Americans go to war. We

must begin by looking at why people generally have gone

to war as context for looking at why Americans have found

and will find the use of military force necessary. To begin

to unravel that relationship, one must begin with two general questions. The first deals with the environment in

which we find ourselves: How and why does the international system permit circumstances in which opposing

states determine that only the use of armed violence will

allow them to settle their differences? Once that question

has been answered, the second question can be addressed:

What is the role of military force in solving political

differences?

The key concept in understanding how and why the structure of the international system permits and even sometimes encourages the use of armed force is sovereignty.

Sovereignty means supreme and independent political authority, and it is a quality possessed not by the system itself

but by its constituent members, the nation-states . What this

means in practice is that within the territorial boundaries

of a nation, the authority of the national government is

supreme and knows no superior source of authority. In the

relations among states, the implication is that there is no

higher source of authority to regulate those relations and

to resolve policy differences when they arise.

This situation is utterly unlike the relations among individuals and groups within states (at least where national

political authority is effective), because in that instance

there is an arbiter, the state. All states have rules established

to regulate internal conflicts of interest and, in the ultimate,

the mechanisms of state (e.g ., the judicial and legislative

systems) provide forums for the authoritative settlement of

policy disagreements short of the use of violence (which is

uniformly proscribed in word if not in deed). A sovereign

exists as the ultimate settler of differences.

There is no equivalent in the relations among nations

because the members of the international system are them-
WAR AND POLITICAL PURPOSE

selves the sovereigns. There is no authority superior to the

state that can be called on to resolve the differences between

the states. When states come into disagreement over policy,

they cannot take the matter to court to gain a resolution,

simply because there is no court with that kind of authority.

Why is this the case? The answer flows from the notion

of sovereignty and finds expression in the idea of "vital

national interests ." Vital national interests are those interests about which the state is unwilling to compromise, will

not submit to arbitration, and hence will seek to protect by

all available means. The most basic of those interests is the

territorial integrity of the state itself and the maintenance

of sovereign control over that territory.

Should, for instance, Mexico decide to reassert its claims

to the American Southwest, the United States would be

unwilling to take the matter to the World Court (which gains

authority over cases only when the states who are party to

a dispute specifically give it jurisdiction for that particular

matter). Why? The answer is simple in a world of sovereign

states. The Southwest is a vital interest of the United States,

and we would clearly be unwilling to relinquish sovereign

control over it . If we went to court, we might lose. Since

we would not honor the verdict, the simplest way to handle

the situation is to avoid having a mechanism capable of

rendering unfavorable authoritative judgments. And that is

the way the system is .

In such a system, given that disagreements over policy

will inevitably arise, how are policy differences resolved?

The answer, once again, is straightforward: states can favorably resolve policy differences to the extent that they

can impose their will on others. The principle is known as

self-help, and it means that international politics are fundamentally an exercise in power. Power, in turn, can be

defined as the ability to get people to do something they

would not otherwise do, in this case to accept policies in

opposition to those preferred .

Take the hypothetical case of Mexican irredentist claims
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on the Southwest as an example . Should such claims exist,

there would be a clear policy disagreement between the

United States and Mexico, with American policy based in

continued sovereign control of the Southwest and Mexican

policy demanding its return. The policy disagreement is

total: only the United States or Mexico can exercise sovereign control over the territory. Since the current situation

reflects American policy, the problem for Mexico is how to

get the United States to change its policy. In the absence

of authoritative mechanisms to resolve the dispute, the

problem for Mexico thus becomes one of self-help, the effective exercise of power to achieve its political ends. This

brings us back to the question ofthe instruments of national

power and the ability to apply them effectively.

As stated earlier the instruments of power are conventionally divided into the three categories of diplomatic, economic, and military power. Diplomatically, the Mexican

government might seek to engage in negotiations, using its

most persuasive diplomats and framing its argument in historical or demographic terms, to convince us voluntarily to

cede the territory because of a superior Mexican claim.

Failing in that, the Mexicans might threaten or carry out

economic sanctions or promise rewards if we would agree

to the cession of the Southwest. They could, for instance,

threaten to deny American access to Mexican oil reserves

or, using a more positive approach, they could offer unlimited access to those reserves in return for the territory. The

degree to which such a strategy might be effective depends

on American dependence on Mexican oil. Ifwe were highly

dependent, the Mexican government might have an effective lever that would compel us to accept its policy. If not,

the economic instrument of power would be ineffectual.

Should all else fail there is always the military instrument

of power. Should Mexican claims be serious enough (considered a vital national interest) and should other instruments fail to achieve the purpose, then Mexicans might

consider the use of military force to seize and control the
WAR AND POLITICAL PURPOSE

Southwest. That may not be the way we like to think of

things, but it is sometimes the way things are.

Force is thus a tool of political authority, and its purpose

is either to guarantee that the inimical policies of others

are not imposed on the political unit or to impose one's

own policies on a recalcitrant adversary. Seen this way,

military power gains its meaning as an agent for realizing

the political purposes and objectives of the state (or whatever designation the political unit has). Unless this subjugation of military force to the political authority from which

it flows is fully comprehended, the role of force cannot be

adequately understood. Unless policy is made for military

force starting from this ordering, the result is likely to be

inappropriate policy and unnecessary friction between political authority and the military. Their roles may be distinct, but the military is an agent that implements the

decisions of political authority.

Interestingly, it was Clausewitz who best understood this

relationship . One level of this understanding is the Prussian

dictum with which this chapter began: "War is a continuation of political activity by other means." The dictum is

not an advocacy for using force to resolve political differences. Clausewitz, as a military man, understood that the

decision to use force resides with political authorities; his

role was to implement those decisions should that determination be made. The dictum merely states the relationship between war and politics. When the policies of two or

more states become so incompatible that they cannot be

pursued simultaneously, some means to resolve those differences must be found. Military force is one means to resolve those differences-it is another means to continue

the political process of conflict resolution.

The relationship can be seen in another light captured

by Clausewitz in an equally true but less-cited observation

that war has its own grammar but not its own logic. What

he meant was that once the decision to go to war has been

reached, the nature of conducting warfare-the so-called
EAGLE'S TALONS

military art and science-dictates howwar should be fought

on the battlefield (the grammar, or as most people would

say today, the language of war). The reason for going to war

and the political objectives for which war is fought do not

flow from that language, but derive from the overall political objectives (the logic of war) to which they are subordinate. In the heat of campaign that subordination is often

blurred by the passion of the moment, but the Prussian was

quite explicit that one should never lose sight of the

relationship .

The language of war, quite clearly, is written in blood,

and it is man's most extreme means of resolving differences.

Because its consequences include the expenditure ofhuman

life and the destruction of the things people value, it is a

political remedy in extremis. The use of force is the means

chosen when the objective is vital and where other, nonviolent instruments of power have been ineffective in resolving political differences.

The purpose of force, thus, is to exercise power. "War

is," as Clausewitz notes, "an act of force to compel our

adversary to do our will." Doing "our will" is, however, a

more complex matter than the quotation may suggest. A

good deal of the misunderstanding about the role of force

arises from oversimplifying how political and military aspects of war contribute to achieving the imposition of will.

In more contemporary terms observers often refer to the

objectives of overcoming hostile will and ability. Hostile

will contains at least two distinct parts. On one hand, hostile

will consists of the willingness to continue to resist the imposition of hostile policies . What levels of cost, in terms of

deprivation and suffering, are a people willing to endure,

and at what point is the price of accepting the adversary's

policies less than the cost of continuing to resist? Hostile

will as willingness to continue to resist is well captured in

the term cost-tolerance: what levels of cost are you willing

to accept? On the other hand, hostile will also, and ultimately, is defined in terms of the willing acceptance or
WAR AND POLITICAL PURPOSE

embrace of the originally objectionable policies . How does

one go about convincing an adversary that the policies one

seeks to impose are right and to the benefit of those who

opposed them? The notion of hostile ability is more

straightforward, referring to the physical ability of an adversary's armed forces and society to continue resistance .

Many practitioners and theorists have underemphasized

the distinction between the two forms of hostile will and

have consequently distorted the degree to which political

authority and the military instrument contribute to achieving the ends of overcoming hostile will and ability. The

assumption, implicit or explicit, has been that once the

decision to use force has been made, it is the appropriate

task ofthe military instrument to overcome hostile will and

ability. We contend that it is more complicated than that .

Because hostile ability is represented by an adversary's

armed forces, the military instrument is most clearly useful

in removing that source of opposition . The classic method

of defeating an enemy is to destroy his army, which is to

say his hostile ability, although this is a realistic objective

only part of the time. If one's armed forces are inferior to

those of the enemy, then destroying those forces is usually

an impossible way to achieve one's goals. In that case one

may be forced to attack hostile will (cost-tolerance) by forcing the enemy to endure more suffering than his goals are

worth. Sometimes one can pursue both objectives simultaneously, that is, break the enemy's will while destroying

his army.

Overcoming hostile ability is clearly a military imperative

and hostile willingness an ambiguous military or political

goal. Overcoming hostile will (defined as acceptance oforiginally odious policies) is a political problem solvable only

in the peace that follows hostilities . Obviously, the military

aspect plays a part and there is a sequential relationship :

until either hostile will or ability is overcome, one can neither impose nor convince the adversary to accept one's

policies. At the same time, military victory does not ensure
EAGLE'S TALONS

the later psychological acceptance of the outcome by the

vanquished. Military victory may allow one to "compel our

adversary to do our will," but in the long run, it is acceptance at the psychological level that renders the outcome

totally successful .

This is a subtle but very important and often overlooked

point. Victory or defeat in war has two distinct definitions.

The most obvious is military victory because that aspect is

easiest to view. The other, and ultimately more important,

definition is the achievement of the political purposes for

which war is fought in the first place, and that means acceptance by the adversary of the political objectives for

which the war was fought. In turn adversaries must be convinced that the objectives for which they fought were wrong

and that those for which you fought were correct. Military

force may be able to enforce the terms of peace, but convincing the enemy population to embrace the peace is a

political task of persuasion for which military force may be

irrelevant or counterproductive. It is indeed possible to

"win the war and lose the peace" if one assumes that once

hostilities are concluded victory is complete. The lesson of

World War I, where a punitive peace virtually assured that

the German people would not embrace the peace treaty, is

only the most obvious example.

The purpose ofthis discussion is to establish the intimate,

complex relationships between war and its political purposes. Americans tend to think of war primarily in its military aspects, but that is clearly not enough if we are to

comprehend fully the dynamics of military conflict and

where military force can and cannot be applied intelligently

and effectively. Rather, the complex interaction between

military and political affairs needs to be viewed systematically, and it is our purpose in the rest of this chapter to

lay out a framework for organizing that relationship, which

we will then apply to the American military experience in

subsequent chapters .

The first element in that framework is what is often re-
WAR AND POLITICAL PURPOSE

ferred to as the causes of wars: those underlying issues that

make the recourse to war an apparent solution and the

proximate events which lead to the decision to go to war.

The political objective that directs the war effort and gives

it meaning emerges from these issues and events. Political

objectives, in turn, lead to the determination of military

objectives to achieve the political objective and military

strategies that will accomplish the military task. We will

then turn to the purely political considerations that affect

the conduct and outcome of hostilities and in that context

examine selectively the actual conduct of each conflict . Because technology has been such an enormous influence on

the evolution of war, we will look at technological innovations-howthey were or were not applied effectively, and

how they affected the conduct and outcomes of wars. Finally, we will examine whether or how the political purposes

were achieved, using Sir Basil Liddell Hart's "better state

of the peace" and the notions of overcoming hostile will

and ability as yardsticks.

Issues and Events

The decision to go to war is seldom a casual matter. The

road to war is generally a long one, and with the considerable assistance of hindsight, one can normally detect a

gradual deterioration in the relations between what became

warring units over underlying issues or sets of issues that

were not resolved peacefully. Those underlying issues were

transformed into events that served as lightning rods that

made the end result seem inevitable .

A caveat is in order here. One of the important concerns

of historians and other social scientists is to speculate on

the true "causes" of war and to devise elaborate theories

about why there is war. We do not propose to add to that

body ofthought in the sense of proposing any grand scheme

or overarching grand design to explain why men go to war.
EAGLE'S TALONS

Our concern is more limited and descriptive . Webegin from

the more modest premise, supportable by evidence, that

Americans from time to time make the political decision

that armed violence is the way they must settle disputes.

From that premise, it is our purpose to look at those instances and to see if there was commonality and to see how

the decision chain led to and directed the political and

military objectives. The decisions to make war will in all

likelihood be made again. It is our hope that those determinations will be made wisely and will be translated into

appropriate, supportable, and achievable political and military aims and objectives .

With that context, one can divide the road to war into

two analytical distinctions . The first deals with the underlying issues (or causes) in the preceding peace that eventually led to war. What kinds of incompatibilities in policy

fester to the point that differences appear solvable only by

the sword? How did these come about, and were they resolvable by other forms of action? Were the issues fundamental, or did they simply devolve because of inattention

or the inability of men to resolve them? How did these

issues evolve into the political objectives for which the war

would be fought (which is really the most important question of all)?

The second distinction arising from those underlying issues is the specific events (or proximate causes) that normally emerge to hasten the process toward war. Clearly, one

is not always in control of these events because they can be

precipitated by either antagonist . It is, however, those proximate events that either galvanize popular opinion behind

the decision to go to war or fail to create that support. The

important factor is the dynamic relationship between the

underlying issues and the proximate events.

The distinction may best be demonstrated by example,

contrasting two conflicts from the American experiencethe Civil War and Vietnam. As we will argue in chapter 3,

the underlying issue from which the Civil War arose was a

1 0
WAR AND POLITICAL PURPOSE

fundamental clash of cultures. The North had gradually

evolved from an agrarian to an industrial society while the

South remained an agricultural society based around the

plantation and the cultivation of cotton. The United States

had become not a society but two distinct societies . The

issue was fundamental and pervasive; two distinct socioeconomic systems could not coexist within one political

framework indefinitely, and the differences gradually consumed more and more of the social and political fabric of

the country.

The specific events that led to war flowed from this underlying incompatibility. Whether it was the debate over

protectionist tariffs, the extension of slavery to the territories, or the election ofAbraham Lincoln in 1860, all these

events can be seen as reflections of the underlying issues.

Within that context, the nation could not survive as it was

evolving. There were only two solutions available : either

disunion that would allow each society to be represented

by its own political system or union wherein one society

triumphed and imposed its will.

Contrast the clarity and profundity of the issues and

events leading to the Civil War with the parallels that led

to American involvement in Southeast Asia. If there was a

clear underlying issue (a point that remains contentious),

it only indirectly involved the United States and North

Vietnam. Rather, there were asymmetric issues: the American commitment to the policy of containment and the

North Vietnamese desire to unite the country, by force if

necessary. Ho Chi Minh cared little about the American

policy, and the United States had little direct stake in the

North Vietnamese objective. Rather, the Southeast Asian

peninsula simply became a forum wherein quite different

concerns would clash. Moreover, the underlying issues were

of a different nature: the US policy was abstract (containing

Communist expansion), whereas the adversary's goal was

concrete (unification of a divided nation).

If the underlying issue was vague and less than pervasive
EAGLE'S TALONS

from an American standpoint, the translation into specific

events was also less than crystalline. At the beginning the

events that would lead to American combat involvement

had relatively little to do with Vietnam per se, but were

instead part of a generalized response precipitated by North

Korea's invasion of South Korea and a concern that the

French economy was not recovering adequately due to the

drain of the war against the Vietminh. Moreover, the road

to war had an incremental flavor : relatively discrete decisions by a series of American presidents eventuated in a

war they all hoped to avoid.

Political Objective

The basic reason for war, which should provide the definitive guide for its conduct, is to attain its political objective. The definition of the political objective is normally

framed in terms of the peace that ensues after war is complete, and is well captured in Basil H. Liddell Hart's concept

that the object of war is to produce a better state of the

peace. (The better state being defined in the victor's terms.)

Broadly speaking, those political objectives can be either

total or limited, depending on the extent of policy incompatibility between the antagonists. Although the instigator

of war may have a clearer vision of the better state of the

peace at the outset, both (or all) parties in a war ultimately

justify their efforts in terms of what is and is not a satisfactory ensuing condition of peace.

The political objective serves two basic functions, at least

in a democratic society such as the United States. The first

function, to which allusion has already been made, is to

provide a framework for directing the war effort. The political objective provides guidance for the proper conduct

of hostilities, which should be aimed at attaining the political objective . The second function is to provide a rallying

cry for public support of the war. Because modern war

1 2
WAR AND POLITICAL PURPOSE

involves, to some extent, societal commitment and sacrifice, war can be conducted by democratic societies only if

it has explicit and continuing support . The failure adequately to galvanize support through the political objective

almost inevitably leads to a lagging willingness to continue

the effort (or the exceeding of cost-tolerance).

This critical role of the political objective suggests some

criteria for how the objective must be framed if it is to have

broad support . At the risk of some oversimplification, a

"good" political objective should have all or most of four

characteristics. The more of these that are met, the more

strongly supported the war is likely to be. Conversely, the

more they are violated, the more unpopular (and hence

unsustainable) the effort is likely to be.

The first characteristic of a good political objective is

that it is simple, straightforward, and unambiguous. Given

that war is an inherently complex business, the public needs

a readily understood reason for supporting it . At best the

objective should be reducible to a catchphrase that is widely

acceptable . "Independence" (the political objective of the

American Revolution) or "destroying the Hitler monster"

met that criterion.

Second, the objective should be morally and politically

lofty. This need is particularly important to Americans, who

have always considered themselves a special, even morally

superior, people . In the American experience support has

always been most unwavering when the purpose resembled

a crusade. "Making the world safe for democracy" had the

kind of loftiness that gained broad American support ; restoring the status quo in Korea did not .

The third and fourth criteria overlap somewhat. The

third is that attaining the objective must be seen as vital

to the interests of the United States . This, of course, is a

difficult criterion to get a precise grasp upon and is difficult

partially because of the subjective nature of what is vital

to the United States . For instance, was the ending of impressment (War of 1812) vital enough to go too war over?

13
EAGLE'S TALONS

The War Hawks thought so; others disagreed. Moreover,

the expeditionary nature of American military adventures

invariably creates a debate about whether vital interests are

involved. Precisely which overseas threats are threats to

core American interests will always be a point of debate .

The fourth criterion is that the interests of most Americans must appear to be served by the decision to go to war.

This criterion was most problematical in the wars of the

nineteenth century when sectionalism was an important

concern. Support for the War of 1812, for instance, was far

greater in some parts of the country than it was in others,

and the Mexican War had very little appeal in either New

England or the South.

Although wars of limited-political purpose have been by

far the more frequent through history, Americans have

tended to show the greatest support for unlimited wars.

Partly this is the case because total war most obviously

meets the criteria for a "good" political objective: total

defeat of the foe is a simple and unambiguous goal; total

defeat must be necessary because an inherent evil requires

eradication (loftiness) ; the vital interests of the United

States must be threatened or a total effort would not be

necessary; and most Americans can agree that the outcome

is necessary. The destruction of fascism and its symbols in

World War II is the most obvious case.

Limited political objectives, on the other hand, are more

likely to violate one or more of the criteria. The objectives

may not be simple and understandable, as was the objective

ofcontainment in Vietnam. There may be moral ambiguity

in the cause (seizing the Southwest United States can be

viewed as either manifest destiny of the American people

or as naked imperialism) . In a limited action vital interests

of the United States may or may not be involved. (If they

are, why would we not go all out to win?) Limited ends can

divide the American people (regionally as it did in the nineteenth century, or as the limited political objectives in Ko1 4
WAR AND POLITICAL PURPOSE

rea or Vietnam have done in the second halfofthe twentieth

century) .

A final point about the limited-total distinction should

be made. Clearly, both sides in war have their own political

objectives, which are in opposition (both cannot be

achieved). That does not mean, however, that the objectives

are necessarily symmetrical in limited-total terms. It can

and does happen that one side may have limited-political

objectives while the other has total objectives. In the American case two examples come to mind . In the American

Revolution, the purpose of independence was total and indivisible: you cannot be partly independent. The British

objective of restoring control was, as it evolved, not total.

Ultimately, the restoration of British authority wasjustified

as exemplary to other parts of the empire (if the Americans

won, other parts of the empire might get seditious ideas) .

The even clearer case is Vietnam. The American objective

of containing Communist expansion and thus allowing the

South Vietnamese to engage in self-determination was

clearly a limited one. We did not seek the overthrow of the

North Vietnamese government (although we would not

have objected to that outcome). North Vietnam had the

total objective of overthrowing the government of the Republic of Vietnam and of uniting the country by force.

Military Objectives and Strategy

If war is politics carried on by other means, then the

fundamental objective of all military operations in wartime

is quite simple and straightforward. The military's basic

task is to overcome the enemy's ability to resist our policies

militarily. Although straightforward, this fundamental objective is so broad that it provides little practical meaning

or useful guidance for military planners. It is, however, instructive to keep this fundamental objective in mind for

two different reasons.

1 5
EAGLE'S TALONS

First, the fundamental military objective excludes certain

specific objectives as legitimate pursuits for armed forces.

For example, the battle for the "hearts and minds" of an

enemy population would be an inappropriate undertaking

for military forces. Such a battle is better reserved for civilian authorities who can make political, economic, and

other nonmilitary policy decisions that will have a direct

impact on the perceptions and attitudes of hostile populations. This is not to deny that successful military operations are often necessary prerequisites to winning "hearts

and minds ." Such was certainly the case in World War II .

Complete military victory allowed the imposition of nonmilitary policies that resulted in nearly 40 years of friendship and support from our former enemies. Nor does this

deny that the military can often be the executive agent to

implement these nonmilitary policies. Perhaps the most

memorable instance of the military functioning as the executive agent is found in Japan following World War II .

General of the Army Douglas MacArthur was the de facto

dictator of occupied Japan responsible for imposing the

enlightened nonmilitary policy decisions that resulted in a

resurgent Japan friendly to American policy objectives.

Second, the enemy's ability to resist militarily is directly

affected by the enemy's will to resist . Thus victory on the

battlefield does not necessarily translate into victory in the

war. Defeat on the battlefield does not necessarily mean

that the cause is lost. America's experience in the Vietnam

conflict provides conclusive evidence that one belligerent

can win virtually all of the significant military engagements

and yet lose the war. Conversely, America's enemies in the

Vietnam conflict demonstrated that there are occasions

when simply avoiding catastrophic defeat while exacting a

high price in blood from the enemy can make a decisive

contribution to the destruction of the enemy's will (and thus

his ability) to resist militarily .

The objective of war is not military victory. Rather, the

objective of war is to attain the political objectives which

1 6
WAR AND POLITICAL PURPOSE

spawned the war. Military victory is merely one means to

political ends.

One might assume that specific military objectives would

flow naturally from political objectives, but such is not always the case. Although what follows is not an encyclopedic

list, four situations have commonly caused conflict between

political and military objectives .

First, one can confuse means and ends, particularly when

deeply mired in bloody conflict. Such was the case for the

belligerents in World War I, particularly those struggling in

the trenches on the Western Front. As the casualties

mounted along with the frustrations of a stalemated war,

the declared objectives on all sides disappeared into the

mud ofVerdun and Flanders and were replaced with simple

hatred and the desire for retribution . In many respects, the

object of war became the war itself rather than the peace

that followed. The result was unsatisfactory to all sides and

formed the breeding ground for an even greater

conflagration .

Second, political objectives can clash with military expediency. Sherman's famous march from Atlanta to the sea

was a military expedient that surely shortened the American

Civil War. The wanton destruction caused by his rampaging

troops gutted the heart of the Confederacy and led to serious morale problems among Confederate troops. On the

other hand, it led to long-lasting and deep-seated bitterness

among the vanquished and postponed true reunion between

the North and the South. This drives home the point that

the manner in which a war is fought can have a significant

effect on the peace that follows. Moreover, political objectives can frustrate prudent military operations . In the Vietnam conflict military operations were banned in certain

areas for political reasons. These sanctuaries, however, ensured that the military security required to win the "hearts

and minds" of the civilian population could never be

1 7
EAGLE'S TALONS

achieved. In a sense, political objectives were hoisted by

their own petard.

Third, political objectives can be so abstract that the military is left with little on which to base its objectives . For

Americans, the political objectives for most wars have been

concrete (although they may also have been simplistic and

shortsighted) and military objectives followed easily. Such

was the case in the Civil War and both world wars. Each

was a great crusade against a clearly defined "evil." In Korea the political objectives were more obscure but were still

definable because ofan overt invasion. In Vietnam political

objectives remained abstract and the resulting military objectives were nebulous and muddled. As a result, military

strategy was often confused and inappropriate, interservice

rivalry flourished as parochial interests came to the fore,

and morale crumbled. The specter of nuclear war reinforces

the point. What would be the political objective of a fullscale nuclear exchange? American "thinking about the unthinkable" has rarely progressed beyond the concept of deterrence ofnuclear attack. What happens ifdeterrence fails?

What then, and for what purpose?

Finally, the military may be given the task of accomplishing political objectives that are inappropriate for military means. The Vietnam experience may be the classic

case. Given the unrest in third world areas and the importance of those areas to the industrialited nations, this situation may be more common in the future. As will be

described in later chapters, the principal American problem

in Vietnam was not military. Rather, the problem was one

of nation building, an objective that requires vigorous nonmilitary action. Military actions in such a situation could

only provide the security needed for other actions to succeed. And yet the military was the principal power instrument used by both the South Vietnamese and the

Americans, while nonmilitary actions were given far less

attention . The result was predictable. The South Vietnamese nation was never built and, ironically, the proximate

1 8
WAR AND POLITICAL PURPOSE

cause of its downfall was the failure of the South Vietnamese military .

Although the most fundamental military task in war has

remained relatively constant (at least in nonnuclear war),

specific military strategy-the technique of developing, deploying, and employing military forces-has evolved. The

two centuries of the American experience have witnessed

rapid and fundamental changes in military strategy. The

eighteenth century was the era of limited war, limited by

the nature of the political objectives sought by the interrelated absolute monarchies that dominated all of Europe

(the exception being Great Britain) . They waged war for a

province here, a city there, or control over royal succession

in another kingdom, but rarely to overthrow a brother monarch. There was little passion involved, the objectives being

of royal rather than popular interest. The armies that fought

for these objectives were composed of the dregs of society

and mercenary soldiers recruited from throughout Europe.

In essence, the bulk of the population was isolated from

both the objectives of war and those who waged it .

The linear tactics developed to use the limited-firepower

technology of the day led to bloody but indecisive battles.

Rather than risk their expensive and hard-to-replace armies

in pitched battle, eighteenth-century generals sought to gain

advantage through maneuver to cut the enemy's line of

supply. The elaborate depot and magazine system required

to support an army in the field presented a convenient

vulnerability that could decide a campaign with minimum

risk of pitched battle.

Near the end of the eighteenth century, the idealism of

the American Revolution returned ideology to warfare. The

common man had a political objective for which he would

voluntarily fight and die. The trend continued during the

French Revolution and Napoleonic Wars. Ideological objectives and the democratization of war eventually paved

the way for mass popular armies, more flexible tactics and

supply systems, and, finally, wars fought for unlimited ob1 9
EAGLE'S TALONS

jectives . By the time of the American Civil War, this drift

toward total war was well under way.

In many ways, the American Civil War was America's

first total war. For the Union, at least, the political objectives were unlimited. No compromise could be accepted;

militarily, the Confederacy itself had to be crushed and

forced back into the Union fold . Confederate political objectives were also unlimited (independence). However its

military objectives were limited as it sought only to repel

Union invaders and maintain its independence . From these

objectives flowed the strategy of each side . For the Union

an annihilation strategy was in order: it needed to destroy

the Confederate armies and overthrow the Confederacy's

government to achieve reunion. Confederate strategy remained largely that of attrition, seeking not to destroy the

Union Army and overthrow the Northern government, but

to defend the Confederacy and inflict enough pain on the

Union forces to discourage further attacks on the new Confederate nation. The North had to destroy Confederate hostile ability; the South's objective was to exceed Northern

cost-tolerance .

The Civil War was also a war of unlimited means. Mass

armies took to the field. Maneuver was critically important

but bloody battle was the decisive factor. Both sides attempted to mobilize their civilian populations and industrial bases for war. Finally, civilian populations and

economies became military targets, at least for the Union

forces. Thus the Union blockaded Southern ports in an

attempt to shatter the Confederate economy and starve the

Rebel population. The rationale for Gen William T. Sherman's march through Georgia and Gen Franz Sigel's less

well-known but equally devastating attacks in the Shenandoah Valley were directed to the same end.

The Civil War also demonstrated for the first time the

importance of mechanization in warfare. It was the first

American war in which railroads played a major role . Mass

armies were transported over vast distances with great

20
WAR AND POLITICAL PURPOSE

speed and were kept well supplied. Rail transportation expanded the scope of the war, which was conducted simultaneously in widely separated theaters of operation. But

with the opportunities of mechanization came limiting factors. Much of the military strategy revolved around rail

lines themselves. Cutting the enemy's rail lines or protecting

one's own became a major preoccupation of Civil War

generals.

As the trend toward mechanization continued into the

twentieth century, changes in military strategy continued

apace. The internal combustion engine added greatly to

military flexibility and the speed of maneuver. Combined

with other technological gadgets, the internal combustion

engine gave rise to armored war on land, undersea warfare,

and war in the air. Each of these developments provided

new opportunities for the military strategist, particularly

when combined with the unlimited objectives of modern

total war. Rapid and fluid maneuver, deep penetration, and

increased firepower characterized modern warfare, culminating in the campaigns of World War 11.

But increased mechanization presented vulnerabilities as

well as opportunities. Supply lines became even more important (one cannot forage for spare parts and fuel) and

thus were a prime target for attack. The same was true for

the industrial base that supported mechanized forces in the

field. Traditional naval blockade (and blockade by submarine) remained an exceptionally important tactic. The

airplane offered the opportunity to attack the civilian industrial base directly and with more immediate effect than

blockade. Thus direct combat operations ranged from the

front lines to the skies over civilian industrial centers. Total

war was all-encompassing, sweeping up civilian and soldier

alike.

The nuclear weapons developed and used at the end of

World War 11 significantly changed the way we think about

war, particularly after other nations also developed nuclear

weapons. Even the incredible cost of total war could, until

2 1
EAGLE'S TALONS

then, be justified by unlimited objectives that seemed to be

of greater value . But the advent of nuclear weapons raised

the specter of total war involving total cost-the possible

annihilation of civilization itself. Surely no political objective could be worth the all too real risk of mankind's extinction. Thus the concept of deterrence came to the fore

along with its arcane language and arabesque logic.

The Clausewitzian dictum, it seemed, no longer applied,

or at least it did not apply to nuclear war. Nuclear war, it

appeared, could not be an extension of politics because the

possible death of civilization served no rational political

purpose. The fundamental objective of deterrence is to ensure that nuclear war never will serve any rational political

purpose, that no one would ever risk the possible catastrophic consequences. And thus the paradoxical situation

came about where incredibly powerful weapons are developed and fielded, their sole purpose being to ensure that

neither they nor similar weapons possessed by any enemy

will ever be used. Whether by design or good fortune nuclear war has been avoided.

The nuclear stalemate has not been matched at lower and

less-threatening levels of warfare. Although both superpowers have carefully avoided any direct military confrontation,

even at lower levels of conflict, both have fought lesser foes

at these lower levels . Additionally, many nations in the third

world have taken up arms against one another, often supported by one or the other of the superpowers. What has

happened, in effect, is that we have returned to eighteenthcentury limited war-but with two significant differences.

First, the political objectives of these conflicts are ideologically based . They tend to arouse impassioned support and

a considerable degree of fanaticism.

Second, and as mentioned earlier, at least when the

United States has been involved in these conflicts, the political objectives of the belligerents have been asymmetrical.

While America has waged limited war in these instances

(limited objectives, limited means), its smaller opponents

22
WAR AND POLITICAL PURPOSE

have waged unlimited war. Their objectives were unlimited

in the sense they dealt with perceived vital interests that

could not be compromised, and they used all means at their

disposal to conduct the war. Such a situation places the

United States at a distinct disadvantage .

American strategy has been only partially successful in

this new situation. The Korean War was little more than a

World War II-style conflict on a limited scale. American

objectives at the time we intervened were clear and understandable. American attitudes were helped by the fact that

this war involved an outright invasion without provocation .

Although Americans (both military and civilian) chafed at

fighting a war with less than the total means available, the

war was brought to a conclusion that achieved our originally

stated national objectives. The same cannot be said for the

American venture into Southeast Asia. Protracted insurgent

warfare using guerrilla-style tactics continues to frustrate

American political and military strategists, and since guerrillas assume military inferiority, it would seem impossible

to deter such conflicts.

Total war was more the product of unlimited objectives

than the product of modern weaponry. In fact, it has been

the terrible impact of modern weapons of mass destruction

that forced a return to limited war by the superpowers. The

limited wars of the post-World War II era, despite the availability of modern weapons of mass destruction, prove the

point . American political objectives have been limited during this period, and the means by which America has fought

have been constrained . Clearly, the primary influence on

military objectives and strategy is the political objective,

which is as it should be. It is also true that military technology and technique have also strongly influenced military

strategy. In truth, military strategy is the result of the interplay of numerous factors. All of these interrelated factors

play a significant role in determining how a war is fought

and in doing so affect the peace that follows.

2 3
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Political Considerations

Just as political concerns lead to war and the political

objective defines its scope and purpose, there is a dynamic

relationship between military and political considerations

before and during the conduct of hostilities . Both domestic

and international political concerns affect the way war is

fought and, conversely, the ebb and flow of warfare influence political forces at each level.

Especially in a democratic society, when the use of the

military instrument is contemplated, a major consideration

must be the likely level ofpublic support for the enterprise.

In some cases, of course, the decision may be thrust upon

one, as with Pearl Harbor. For a nation whose primary

military engagements are expeditionary, however, there will

generally be some meaningful opportunity to consider the

question. In the wake of public reaction to the Vietnam

affair, the tendency has been to view the answer as paralytic.

The question of public support has become increasingly

problematical. While not attempting to exhaust all confounding influences on public support for American military adventures, at least four can be mentioned, each of

which will arise as the odyssey through the American experience at war unfolds. They are presented in no particular

order of importance.

The first, and perhaps least well-understood, restraint is

the impact of the media, and especially the electronic media. At the most obvious level, the electronic revolution

permits coverage of military operations at a speed and with

an intimacy heretofore impossible. Certainly, media coverage ofthe battlefield is not particularly new. In the American experience, close and rapid coverage of war go back

to the Civil War and the introduction of the telegraph,

which allowed next-day reportage of engagements. What is

unique about the electronic media, however, is that they

bring a vivid, visual quality to coverage.

One obvious effect has been to deglamorize war. The

24
WAR AND POLITICAL PURPOSE

blood, maimed bodies, and corpses that constitute the tribute of combat cannot be hidden from the camera's eye. It

is an image difficult to ignore. Moreover, the television

camera is most effectively used in capturing the discrete

and dramatic event. Television coverage does not focus effectively on the long lulls between combat that make up

the vast majority of war; instead, it trains on the spectacular-the maimed child, the firefight, the exploding bombs.

The result is, at least for many, revulsion with war and its

consequences and erosion of support for military efforts.

The question, inadequately dealt with to this point, is how

much of a constraint the media place 'on contemplated actions and how this constraint can be dealt with.

Asecond factor is the burgeoning expense ofwar. Largely

this expense is due to the increased sophistication of weaponry that makes equipment both more costly and more

deadly, a phenomenon discussed in the section on technology. The result is that even fairly minor military involvements place great burdens on resource bases on which

there are multiple competing claims. The Vietnam War,

while certainly not a minor engagement, is estimated to

have cost the United States $150 billion. Similarly, the British Falkland Islands engagement cost nearly $3 billion, and

someone has to pay for it . The question is just what economic sacrifices will people be willing to make in the future?

A third problem is that, with the possible exception of a

major war in Europe, likely future scenarios involve conflicts for limited-political objectives. As discussed earlier

and as will be amplified in the pages that follow, developing

and sustaining support for these kinds of wars is often difficult. The ramifications of that observation are explored

in the final chapter.

Fourth and finally, there is the historic American aversion to things military-and particularly to the costs of

military forces-that goes back to the birth of the country.

Part of the American Anglo-Saxon heritage is to suspect

military force and to look toward other instruments of

25
EAGLE'S TALONS

power to solve problems. When the dollar ruled supreme

in the world during roughly the quarter century after the

end of World War II, the economic instrument could be

used effectively to achieve American ends. That relative

advantage has eroded, however, and Americans must contemplate the use of alternate instruments, one of which is

military power.

The interplay of politics and military force does not end

once the decision to go to war has been reached. Rather,

in some ways that relationship intensifies at essentially two

levels, what one may call the high politics and low politics

of war.

The high politics of war refers to the direction of military

efforts to achieve political objectives and to assure that the

application of force does not alter the objectives beyond

politically acceptable bounds. This latter problem is particularly acute in wars of limited political objective because

purely military imperatives and political objectives most

often come into conflict in these situations .

Clausewitz, once again, recognized the problem. The

tendency in war, he observed, is to intensify and broaden

the scope of action; a dynamic against which he warned

political authorities to be constantly vigilant. The dynamic

can occur whether one is winning or losing. If one is successful in achieving the objective through military means,

there is a powerful temptation to broaden the objective and

attempt to achieve even more. The decision to cross the

38th parallel in Korea in late 1950 exemplifies the point.

At the same time, losing may cause one to intensify the

effort, to up the ante, to avoid defeat. The gradual buildup

in Vietnam and Gen William C. Westmoreland's ceaseless

pleas for more troops represent this case.

The low politics of war refers to the direction and exploitation of military situations for personal political or

other gain. In its seamier aspect, it may be the use of military activity to serve the ends ofpolitical figures . The image

ofPresident James Polk diligently watching the Washington

26
WAR AND POLITICAL PURPOSE

press to see if either of his military commanders (both of

whom were potential political opponents in the 1848 presidential election) was gaining too many headlines and then

directing their campaigns to minimize such publicity comes

to mind. Conversely, military victory or defeat can influence political outcomes. Lincoln, for instance, might well

have lost the 1864 election had Atlanta not fallen to Sherman in the nick of time, just as stalemates in Korea and

Vietnam helped drive two presidents into retirement.

The conduct of war affects and is affected by international concerns as well. Although there is really no such

thing as international public opinion, the general opposition of America's NATO allies (largely reflecting public

opinion in Europe) to our involvement in Vietnam weighed

heavily on US decisionmakers. Likewise, military events

may influence foreign powers in ways that can alter the

situation. For instance, the American victory at Saratoga

in 1777 (our first significant battlefield success) convinced

the French to intervene openly and probably allowed the

success of the American Revolution .

It is this dynamic interaction between military and political affairs during wartime that is most nettlesome to the

military, and forms the basis for charges of political interference or derogations about political wars. Once again, the

problem is greatest in limited-war situations, where concerns about remaining within the limited-political objective

may call for limitations on military actions that impede the

effective application of force. Military art and science teach

the virtue of maximum force to achieve the destruction of

enemy forces wherever they may be. Within the confines

of limited objectives, it may not be possible to unleash the

full fury of military capability without running the risk of

broadening the war and, implicitly, its political objectives .

The granting of sanctuaries in Korea and Vietnam are examples, and they are the kinds of constraints under which

the military is likely to be forced to labor in any future

conflict .

27
EAGLE'S TALONS

Military Technology and Technique

Military technology is only one of many factors that influence the conduct and the character of war. However, it

is the primary factor that determines how battles within a

war are fought. The history of battle is, to a great extent,

the story ofmilitary men struggling to cope with technology.

The outcome of battle is often determined by the ability of

one antagonist or the other to make the best use of available

military technology. Thus to the extent that it actually influences the outcome of battles, technology directly influences the course of war and, more indirectly, the peace

which follows.

Since the ancients first took up arms, one clearly identifiable trend has been constant. The power and destructive

efficiency of weapons have become ever greater, as reflected

in their explosive power, accuracy, and range. In the twentieth century, man may have reached the ultimate extension

of this trend with thermonuclear weapons riding atop intercontinental ballistic missiles. Today weapons of previously unimagined power are only minutes away from any

spot on the face of the earth. In essence, it has been changes

in power, accuracy, and range of weapons that have caused

the nature and technique of war to change over the 200-

odd years of the American experience. These changes are

reflected in the scale, intensity, tempo, organization, scope,

and cost of battle.

The first change has been to increase the physical scale

of conflict. The size of the individual battlefield began to

expand in the eighteenth century as generals attempted to

maximize smoothbore musket firepower by packing more

men armed with these weapons onto the battlefield. However, instead of the densely packed formations of earlier

ages, eighteenth-century warfare was characterized by linear

formations. Formations spread laterally and were generally

only three ranks deep. This allowed for fire by all three

ranks while minimizing the possibility of muzzle-blast dam28
WAR AND POLITICAL PURPOSE

age to one's own troops. Thus the frontage of individual

units was vastly expanded as was the size of the battlefield.

In the nineteenth century, advances in transportation and

communications technology expanded warfare far beyond

the already swollen eighteenth-century battlefield. The railroad allowed mass armies to be transported rapidly over

great distances and permitted the efficient resupply of these

far-flung armies. The importance of rail transport first became obvious during the American Civil War. In that conflict separate armies operated throughout different theaters

of war and yet did so with considerable coordination. Railroads made it possible to operate effectively in distant theaters and the telegraph made coordination of these

operations both possible and practical.

In the twentieth century, globe-girdling warfare has become the norm. All modes of land and water transportation

increased in both speed and carrying capacity, making overseas force deployments relatively commonplace. By midcentury, air transport added a new dimension to deployment speed while the advent of radio provided instantaneous communications without reliance on fragile wires. In

addition to the worldwide breadth of twentieth-century military operations, the development of the airplane and the

submarine expanded the battlefield vertically-beneath the

sea and into the sky.

In essence, technology expanded the battlefield to proportions unimagined in the eighteenth century. Advances

in transportation and communication solved the twin problems of logistic support and coordinated command. Modern military commanders have been forced to expand their

horizons far beyond the confines of the immediate battlefield. During the same time period, however, technology

also brought about rapid increases in the intensity of warfare and the speed ofmaneuver on and between battlefields .

In the eighteenth century, warfare was conducted at a

rather leisurely pace . Military campaigning seasons-when

the weather was good and gunpowder could be kept dry29
EAGLE'S TALONS

were relatively short, and armies regularly went into winter

quarters during the cold and wet months of the year. Even

during the campaigning seasons, little fighting or maneuvering occurred during hours of darkness. By the twentieth

century, keeping one's powder dry was no longer a significant problem because of cartridge ammunition. The incandescent lamp facilitated night operations, as did

electronic marvels such as radar and light amplification

equipment. Thus, by the last half of the twentieth century,

war had become an intense activity waged around the clock

throughout the year.

The tempo of war increased along with its year-round

intensity. In the twentieth century, wheeled and tracked

self-propelled vehicles speed the maneuver of men and guns

on the battlefield, just as railroads, fast ships, and even

faster aircraft speed the transport of men and weapons to

the battlefield.

The organization and scope of combat has multiplied as

well. At the same time that technology expanded the scale,

intensity, and tempo of military operations, it also created

significant problems. First, it complicated the structure of

armed forces and placed a premium on quality staff work.

The infrastructure required to command, control, and support a technologically sophisticated military force has expanded at a geometric rate and the logistic support required

has assumed momentous proportions . Second, the coordination of ground, air, and sea forces in modern threedimensional war requires large, complex, multiservice staff

structures . These factors have combined to change radically

the ratio of combat to noncombat troops in modern armed

forces over the last 200 years.

However, it is more significant for our purpose to realize

that technological sophistication has made the industrial

base that supports armed forces in the battlefield vitally

important. The production of modern military weapons,

vehicles, aircraft, and ships requires a robust industrial base

(or access to one). Naturally, this same industrial base has

30
WAR AND POLITICAL PURPOSE

become an important target for military operations. Civilian populations that support a nation's industrial base have

also become targets for attack either directly (physical attack, psychological operations, and deprivation) or as a byproduct of attacks on industrial plants (so-called collateral

damage). As technology made the home front an important

target, that same technology also made it possible to attack

home-front targets without first defeating armies and

navies.

Last, but not least, is the economic cost factor, which is

both a military and political concern. The cost of war has

dramatically escalated during the American experience in

terms of both blood and treasure. Although the ratio of

killed and wounded to the total in uniform during a war

has decreased since the eighteenth century, the absolute

number of casualties has vastly increased . This is a natural

product of larger armed forces and far more lethal weapons.

At the same time, the survival and complete recovery rate

for those wounded in action has increased dramatically because of rapid advances in medical science and military

efforts to bring medical care to soldiers on the front line.

The treasure expended in war has escalated to mindboggling proportions . In the eighteenth century, the village

smithy could produce most of the kinds of weapons required by an army and could do so at a relatively low cost.

Modern armies require weapons of great complexity and

incredible cost. The lethality of these weapons means that

battlefield attrition and consequent replacement demands

add enormously to the total cost ofa modern high-intensity

war.

In essence, technology expanded the battlefield horizontally, vertically, and finally in depth to include the home

front. Modern total war increased in intensity, in tempo,

and in scope to include everyone, not just the soldiers on

the front lines. Armed forces that had originally protected

the home front can no longer do so. Factory workers have

essentially become frontline soldiers without guns . Thus in

3 1
EAGLE'S TALONS

many ways the unlimited involvement characteristic of

modern total war has matched the unlimited objectives of

ideologically based modern war.

The most recent development in warfare flies in the face

of the trend of developments since the eighteenth century.

In the face of total war with totally destructive nuclear

weapons, the second half of the twentieth century has seen

a resurgence of limited warfare reminiscent of the eighteenth century. Protracted insurgent and partisan warfare

using guerrilla tactics allow the weak to compete on the

battlefield with the strong. Forces using guerrilla tactics pick

the time and place of battle, refuse to stand and fight unless

they desire to do so, and melt away into a friendly (or at

least neutral) civilian population when they do not . Guerrilla forces make no pretense of protecting civilian populations on which they depend for their survival . Rather, the

guerrilla reverses the relationship and uses the civilian population as a shield to hide from the enemy. As a result, the

terrible destructiveness of modern weaponry has only limited utility in combating the guerrilla. Where success in

"conventional" warfare depends on the ability to kill people, success in combating guerrilla forces depends on the

control of people . Only if the population is controlled and

secure can guerrillas be ferreted out of the general population they use for protection .

Military Conduct

Much has already been said during the discussions of

military objectives, strategy, technology, and technique

about how wars have been and are fought. In the eighteenth

century, war was, in effect, a battle of masses. Although the

American Revolution was an exception, war in that era

often held to Voltaire's observation that "God is always for

the big battalions ." By the time of the American Civil War,

however, the situation began to change. More complex

32
WAR AND POLITICAL PURPOSE

weapons and the use of mechanically powered transportation systems put a premium on industrial capability and

capacity. By the time of the two world wars, this trend

matured and war became a battle of factories. Industrial

plants were so important that the factories themselves became military targets rivaling deployed forces in importance . Finally, the technological explosion during the last

half of the twentieth century made warfare a battle of

brains. It would seem that Voltaire has been turned on his

ear as God now seems to favor the best technology. The

exception to the modern trend, protracted warfare using

guerrilla tactics makes much modern military technology

irrelevant . Perhaps God is on the side of the smart

battalions.

Although the evolution of warfare from a battle of masses

to a battle of brains encapsulates the evolution of warfighting during the American experience, one important point

remains to be made if one is to understand the nature of

modern warfare and if one is to understand the difficulties

of winning the peace.

Viewed broadly, warfare has become a progressively

more desperate undertaking during the nineteenth and

twentieth centuries. War has always been a desperate affair

for the individual warrior. However, the increasingly ideological basis of warfare and its consequently unlimited political objectives have turned much of modern warfare into

a death struggle between rival societies. Failure in such a

war is catastrophic, and as a result, the struggle is fought

with bitterness and desperation. War is no longer the glorious adventure to which men march with bands playing

and flags waving. The glorification of war was a tradition

buried beneath the mud of Flanders fields if not earlier.

Any sense of chivalry has all but disappeared from battle

as the unlimited ends sought seem to justify unlimited

means. Naval blockades indiscriminately starve civilian

and soldier alike. Civilian population centers have been

routinely attacked and weapons of mass destruction have

3 3
EAGLE'S TALONS

been used. Defenders have often used scorched-earth tactics

and one finds many instances of fierce fighting when all

hope of victory has clearly been lost .

One might be led to believe that the "limited" and "lowintensity" wars characteristic of the nuclear age would have

a less-desperate nature. However, one must remember that

such terms as limited and low intensity are given meaning

by one's perspective. For those on the battlefield, no war

is limited and all wars are intense. On a larger scale, all of

America's opponents in these types of conflicts (North Korea, China, and North Vietnam) were essentially waging

unlimited wars. Only their relative military weakness (when

compared with a superpower) and the secondary importance of our objectives in these conflicts have allowed us

to characterize these conflicts as limited or low intensity.

The modern desperation in war produces a bitter legacy.

Few, ifany, are untouched by the horror of modern warfare .

All sides harbor bitter feelings because of widespread death

and destruction. The losing side agonizes over how much

it gave and how much it lost. The winner resents the suffering endured in relation to the objectives achieved, which

often seem hollow in the harsh light ofwar's aftermath. The

bitter legacy makes the task of the peacemaker far more

difficult than in any other age. Winning a better state of

peace after a modern war may be the most difficult of all

tasks.

Better State of the Peace

"There is no substitute for victory," Gen Douglas

MacArthur said in testimony about American conduct of

the Korean War. It is a beguiling statement and so straightforward as to appear unimpeachable. But what does it

mean? What exactly constitutes victory in war?

The most obvious answer, and the one to which Americans (including General MacArthur) are drawn, is that win34
WAR AND POLITICAL PURPOSE

ning the war means military victory, but that is an

incomplete answer. Military victory is only a part of winning wars, and although one tends to associate military

triumph with victory, such is not always the case. Victory

has another, more profound meaning. The other, ultimately

more important, sense of victory is the attainment of the

political objectives for which war is fought in the first place .

These two aspects of victory should not be confused .

Although military victory on the battlefield is usually prerequisite to "imposing our will" on the adversary, such is

not always the case . It is possible, for instance, to fight to

a militarily inconclusive ending but still accomplish the

political objective of war, as the American colonies did in

the Revolution . At the same time, one can actually lose the

military campaign and achieve at least part of the political

objective, as the United States did in the War of 1812.

Finally, it is also possible to win all the military campaigns

in war and yet lose politically, a distinction demonstrated

by the the American experience in Vietnam.

To comprehend the two senses of victory, we need to

return to the notions of hostile will and ability. As was

argued earlier, the distinct task of the military is to overcome hostile ability, and military victory (or its absence) is

normally determined on that basis. Overcoming hostile

ability in the American experience has usually been equated

(at least since the campaigns of Grant and Sherman in the

Civil War) with the destruction of the enemy's armed forces

and that is the most obvious, measurable, and observable

outcome of war. The most vivid expression was the unconditional surrender of Axis armed forces at the end of

World War II . But there is more to victory than that. One

may also win wars militarily by overcoming hostile will,

defined as exceeding cost-tolerance, which is the way the

colonies defeated Great Britain and the North Vietnamese

overcame the United States.

Victory in a political sense, however, is best equated with

the notion of political will defined as acceptance by the

35
EAGLE'S TALONS

vanquished of the political objectives of the victors. The

political objective includes imposition and acceptance of

policies and that forms the reason for going to war in the

first place . Clearly at the outset, the visions of a better state

of the peace are diametrically opposed, or there would be

inadequate reasons to engage in war. In the end, one vision

of the better state of the peace must prevail and the other

must vanish (unless, of course, they are modified or

compromised) .

The question is how the better state of the peace is accomplished. The answer must begin with the realization

that acceptance of policies is itself a political process, and

one that must be accomplished by political authorities during the ensuing peace. It is a political, not a military, task.

Broadly speaking, there are two ways of implementing

desired policies. The first way is through the simple imposition of the victor's vision of the better state on the

vanquished in the form of a punitive peace. The terms of

the peace can simply be imposed, and if the former enemy

objects or tries to alter those terms, coercive means can be

used to guarantee continued compliance. Punitive peace

was the model for the settlement of World War I and, to a

lesser degree, the American Civil War.

The other means is to engage in active efforts to convince

former foes that one's policies are more enlightened than

theirs were and that they are better offembracing this vision

of the better state of the peace. This form is known as a

reconciliatory peace and requires intense political and psychological efforts to overcome the residue of hostile feelings.

The process of reconciliation is inherently political and can

be accomplished only by political authorities through political processes (although the military may serve as the

agents for political authorities, as in the postwar occupation

of Japan). The clearest case of a reconciliatory peace accomplishing the political objective occurred in Germany

and Japan after World War II, and it was the path that

36
WAR AND POLITICAL PURPOSE

Abraham Lincoln had charted for the Confederacy before

his assassination.

As a general rule, a reconciliatory peace is preferable to

a punitive peace because it involves acceptance and embracing ofpolitical objectives rather than sullen acceptance

of imposition. As a result, the residue of hostile will (resistance to policies) is more likely to be overcome. Unfortunately, a reconciliatory peace is the most difficult to attain

for at least two reasons.

First, the nature of war itself makes reconciliation difficult. War leaves physical and emotional scars in the forms

of death, maiming, and the destruction of property. The

result is a natural inclination, on the victorious side, toward

vindictiveness as the caskets and maimed veterans come

home and the rubble is sorted through. In those circumstances the impulse to punish is a powerful feeling that is

difficult to overcome. The carnage and physical destruction

of World War I had a powerful influence on French attitudes toward the peace negotiations . At the same time, the

way war is fought may exacerbate the hostile feelings of the

vanquished . Sherman's march to the sea and through the

Carolinas, while militarily justifiable, undoubtedly inflamed lingering bitterness in the defeated South . The expanded nature and lethality of modern war exacerbates

these problems.

Second, and this is particularly true in the American experience, there is a tendency to ignore (or at least inadequately consider) the task that remains after physical

hostilities have concluded. This tendency is part of the classic American mobilization-demobilization pattern that says

once the war is won (militarily), it is time to return as

quickly as possible to the more normal condition of peace.

It is a tendency against which one needs to guard. The

physical conduct of war, as Clausewitz correctly noted, is

instrumental, a means toward an end. The end is attainment of the political objective and that is a "battle" that

can be won only in the ensuing peace. If we are to avoid

37
EAGLE'S TALONS

winning the war but losing the peace in the future, that is

a lesson that must be well learned.
CHAPTER 2

AMERICAN REVOLUTION

The American Revolution was this country's great formative act. Alongwith the Civil War, the Revolution stands

as the most influential military event in American history

in terms of its political purposes and political impact. Although it was not particularly recognized at the time it was

being fought, the Revolution also marked an important

turning point in international politics: it was both the first

major war of independence against European colonial domination and the conflict that reintroduced ideology into the

underlying causes and sustainers of warfare.

In purely military terms, the Revolution pales in comparison to the great struggles that began with the Civil War

and continued into the twentieth century. The armies that

contested the war were tiny by modern standards; at its

apex, the British had a force numbering about 32,000 on

colonial soil, and George Washington's Continental Army

never numbered more than 20,000. Battles were relatively

few and comparatively bloodless, reflecting the eighteenthcentury style ofwarfare. In the climactic Battle ofYorktown

(which is more properly the Siege at Yorktown) an army of

16,000 Continentals and French marines in about equal

numbers faced a British force of about 7,500 under Lord

Cornwallis. When the British surrendered, the battlefield

toll was slightly more than 200 killed, of whom only 20

were American.

The Revolution also continued the American mythology

about the American military tradition begun in the French

and Indian War. Yorktown, Saratoga, Trenton, Princeton,

King's Mountain, and other fields of battle have become

symbols of the tradition of military prowess and the Amer39
EAGLE'S TALONS

ican self-image as winners. That most of these battles were

not as successful as we remember them, nor as militarily

significant, and that they were admixed with a series of

military reverses that were nearly decisive (e.g., the battles

of New York and Brandywine Creek) have faded from the

popular mind. An objective evaluation of the war itself

shows that militarily it was no better than a draw for the

Americans, who were aided by mediocre British

generalship .

In addition, the revolutionary experience did much to

create the myth of the militia tradition in America. When

the war began almost accidentally at Lexington and Concord, the only military forces available to the rebellion were

militia units. Throughout the war's conduct, militia units

played an important role (especially the so-called revolutionary militia, about which more will be said later). Colonial success created the myth that militia was effective

against regular troops and that the United States did not

need a standing armed force of any size. The militia could

be quickly mobilized and hold their own until a regular

army could be fielded to carry the day. Once the war was

over, demobilization could be rapidly accomplished (in

1784, a year after the peace treaty was signed, the standing

army consisted of 80 regulars whose sole purpose was to

guard military supplies). The performance of militia units

in the Revolution, viewed carefully, hardly justifies that

level offaith, but it created a tradition that still leaves Americans at least slightly uneasy about maintaining a large

standing force during peacetime.

That the war was not exactly what we choose to remember does not depreciate the importance of the struggle. Although the American Revolution may not have been a

major military struggle, it was a major political event. There

were military lessons to be learned. Europeans would again

be faced with the problem of attempting to retain control

of colonial empires against determined indigenous resis40
AMERICAN REVOLUTION

tance, and Americans would be confronted with parallel

difficulties in Southeast Asia.

In some ways, our revolution was the harbinger of things

to come for the European powers, first the Spanish and

Portuguese in Central and South America and later other

European powers in Asia and Africa. The British military

problem of snuffing out a determined rebellion fought by

unconventional methods far from home was one of those

precursors . The cost and political unpopularity of such endeavors which, as much as the success of the Continental

Army, drove the British from the field would be revisited

by the French in Indochina and Algeria. That the parallel

was well appreciated and the lesson well learned is doubtful .

The great irony and tragedy of the revolutionary experience is in its parallel with the American morass in Southeast Asia 190 years later . As one sifts through the

Revolution, the parallels draw closer and closer, and the

reader is encouraged to look for them. Great Britain was

attempting to quell a rebellion far from home against a force

and population largely hostile to them, just as the United

States did in Vietnam. The war was fought by an enemy

who usually refused to stand and fight in the accepted manner, preferring instead guerrilla tactics. Moreover, the British had to fight two Nyars, one against the revolutionary

militia guerrillas who attacked from ambush and who suppressed loyalist support (leading one British commander to

refer to the activity as "the dirty little war of terror and

murder") and the other against Washington's regular army.

The parallels with the Vietcong and the North Vietnamese

army are striking. Finally, public opinion turned against

the British cause at home as success eluded them, just as

American support waned for the struggle in Vietnam. The

British problem in America was the American problem in

Vietnam. That the outcome for Britain in the Revolution

and for the United States in Southeast Asia should have

been the same is less than surprising. That the parallel was

not seen nor the analogy drawn is tragic.

41
EAGLE'S TALONS

Issues and Events

Like most momentous political events, the underlying

issues that led to the first great modern revolution built up

over a period of time. At heart the underlying issues were

relatively moderate by comparison to a contemporary

world that thinks in terms of the Iranian revolution of Ayatollah Khomeini or the Nigerian-Biafran bloodbath of the

1960s. Many historians view the American Revolution as

an essentially conservative revolt.

The most pervasive issue was the relationship between

the Crown in London and the citizens of the colonies . The

heart of the matter was the standing of the colonials: virtually all Americans of the 1760s and early 1770s considered themselves loyal British subjects . (With the exception

of inhabitants of enclaves like formerly Dutch New York

and settlements of persecuted religious groups from the European continent, most Americans were of British stock.)

Because they viewed themselves as coequal British subjects,

they believed they should have the same political rights as

other English citizens . The core of their grievance was not

that most wanted to be treated distinctly as Americans nor

that they desired autonomy; rather, most aggrieved Americans (and by no means did all Americans feel aggrieved)

simply wanted to be treated more like any other Britisher.

The matter boiled down to a disagreement over rights

versus obligations. From the colonial viewpoint, the basic

issue was the political rights adhering to them as British

subjects from which obligations logically flowed. Most

Americans did not so much mind obligations in the form

oftaxes and the like so long as they went hand-in-hand with the full rights of English citizenry. It was the imposition of

duties without parallel rights that troubled them.

The Crown disagreed. From the royal viewpoint, the subjects of the colonies were, after all, colonial subjects, and

the primary role and purposes of colonial subjects were to

support the Crown. The fact that these particular colonials

42
AMERICAN REVOLUTION

were of British descent might make one more sympathetic

with them than with subjects one had conquered, but the

fact did not alter the basic relationship between colony and

mother country. Colonies had, in a word, obligations, not

rights .

Constructed this way, the whole matter has the abstract

quality of a debate over political philosophy, and through

a good bit of colonial history the matter remained at that

level . Political rights might have symbolic importance but

were not basic as long as the mother country was in essence

leaving the colonies alone, thus failing to impose obligations

and granting rights indirectly . The debate became concrete

and lively when the Crown began to impose obligations on

colonial subjects without granting matching rights . The precipitating event was the French and Indian War and the

debts that Great Britain ran up prosecuting it . The lightning

rods after 1763 became the dual and interrelated issues of

taxation of colonials and the permanent stationing of British troops on colonial soil.

Fairness dictates that one look at the issues from both

sides. The Crown's position was straightforward . The British Crown had contributed heavily both in terms of manpower and treasure to defending the colonies during the

French and Indian War (as well, of course, as kicking the

French out of Canada and adding Canada to the British

Empire). Moreover, after the war Great Britain was forced

to maintain a garrison ofabout 6,000 troops along the frontier to protect against the Indians (who were often Frenchinspired). All of that cost money and someone had to pay

the bills. From the royal vantage point, it seemed entirely

logical that those who were benefiting (the citizens of the

colonies) should help pick up the tab .

In the Crown's view there were two ways that the colonials could contribute . The first, and most generally vexing

to the colonials, was through taxation. Originally, most of

the tax revenues were to be generated through import and

export taxes (the taxes on tea and sugar), but other forms

43
EAGLE'S TALONS

of taxation like the stamp tax were also included. Second,

since the colonies were British colonies, it seemed entirely

reasonable to the Crown that the home islands should have

a special trading relationship with the colonies from which

British private enterprise, and ultimately governmental coffers, would be beneficiaries . The result was restrictions on

whom and with what the colonies could trade. The restrictions excluded colonial trade in some items with anyone

but Britain (rum was an example), gave preferential access

and treatment for goods produced in the colonies to the

British, and required that a great deal of commerce be

shipped on British ships.

Those colonial subjects who would ultimately lead the

Revolution disagreed with this logic and the consequences

it produced. The colonials neither appreciated the idea of

permanent garrisons of British troops on their soil, nor the

idea of being taxed without their explicit consent. Obviously, the two issues were related since the costs of maintaining the troops both created the perceived need and

rationalization for taxation. Despite this linkage one can

separate the two for analytical purposes.

The problem with having British troops on American soil

in peacetime was twofold. First, it was an imposition that

British subjects on the home islands would themselves not

have tolerated, and hence was a reminder that the Crown

did not consider the colonials as equals. Second, part of the

Anglo-Saxon tradition is a deep and abiding suspicion of

standing armed forces in peacetime, because British history

had taught that such forces could be used for political

repression . The Glorious Revolution of the seventeenth

century had had as one of its major outcomes a specific

banning of standing armies during times of peace. Despite

the threat of Indian attacks, most colonials chafed at the

idea of having these troops around. There was a suspicion

that potential political repression was the real reason that

the troops were there. The colonial militia, after all, was

44
AMERICAN REVOLUTION

capable of defending against the Indians, so why were the

Redcoats there? To many the question was rhetorical.

The second issue was the imposition of the various sets

of taxes upon the colonials to help defray the costs associated with defense of the frontier. The colonials were unfavorably disposed to taxation in any form and for any

reason, partially because they were unused to the idea and

partly because it hit them in the pocketbook. The taxes

added to the cost of goods, and restrictions on trade forced

them to buy from British suppliers, generally at a higher

price than they could obtain elsewhere . More specifically,

however, they objected to the imposition of those taxes in

an arbitrary manner without being consulted. Taxation, the

imposition of burden, became the lightning rod that enlivened the debate about rights and obligations, and the rallying cry became "no taxation without representation ."

As causes that would eventuate in revolution, these issues

were relatively mild. The colonists were not crying "offwith

their heads," as the truly radical French revolutionaries

would do more than a decade later. Rather, the heart of

the matter was the request to be treated as British citizens.

Had there been even nominal direct colonial representation

in London (possibly even nonvoting observers in the Parliament) and had British troops not been called in from the

frontier, there likely would not have been a revolution of

any consequence.

It should be added that the disgruntlement of Americans

with the Crown's acts was largely regional and that it affected different groups within the society differently. Ob

jections were strongest in New England because that region

was the most strongly affected. Most of the British soldiers

on the continent were stationed in New England, and the

merchant class most disadvantaged by the trade restrictions

was largely based in that region, especially around Boston.

As one moved farther south through the middle Atlantic

and southern colonies, there was considerably less British

military presence and a smaller trading class as well . Al45
EAGLE'S TALONS

though the British restrictions were generally disadvantageous to colonies, they were more onerous to some than

others, and some sectors, such as the indigo plantations in

South Carolina, actually benefited from the Intolerable

Acts. These differentiations in grievance would affect the

general appeal of the Revolution regionally, as well as helping to dictate the strategies of the combatants once the

Revolution entered its military phase.

Thus the underlying causes of the Revolution were less

than what we would now think of as radical, and the proximate events that led to the first shots at Lexington and

Concord were gradual and more nearly accidental than

carefully preplanned. The situation basically accumulated

until a comparatively minor event triggered "the shot heard

'round the world." The evolution of each underlying cause

reflects this gradual nature of the accumulation of events.

The various tax measures imposed on the colonies included the Sugar Act of 1764, the Stamp Act of 1765, and

a new Tea Act in 1772. The taxes were levied sequentially

and became a gradually irritating factor. The reason that

new taxes had to be added was that each tax, which was

supposed to meet British revenue needs, failed to produce

the amount anticipated. The reason for the shortfalls was

colonial resistance to paying the taxes.

The inefficiency of tax collection created, in the minds

of the British monarchy, the need for more effective means

for royal tax collection. The instruments selected were the

very British forces the taxes were supposed to underwrite,

and gradually those forces (who, it will be remembered,

were there to protect the frontiers against the Indians) were

moved from the frontier to the urban areas. Their presence,

previously realized but unseen, became visible, particularly

when troop contingents were moved into the urban areas,

notably Boston. Matters were made even worse when the

Quartering Act of June 1765 required that citizens open

their homes to these troops. Now the Redcoats were not

only in town, they were in private homes, and the cry

46
AMERICAN REVOLUTION

against "quartering" of soldiers was heard across New

England.

Tensions gradually increased and there were instances of

hostility on both sides. As early as the winter of 1770, a

group of Boston youths pelted a contingent of British troops

with rock-filled snowballs. TheRedcoats panicked and fired

into the crowd, and the result was the famous Boston Massacre . In 1773 a group of the Sons of Liberty, disguised as

Indians, sneaked aboard a British merchant ship in Boston

Harbor and dumped its cargo in defiance of the Tea Act

(the Boston Tea Party).

As acts of hostility and sedition increased and relations

between colonial authorities and the citizenry became more

strained, the Crown and its representatives became increasingly more concerned about the possibility of open rebellion. As these thoughts emerged, the size of the colonial

militia, the only organized armed forces that could oppose

the Crown, increased as well . Although the fighting capabilities of the militias were suspect, they did have considerable stores ofarms in their armories without which armed

resistance would be impossible . Disarming the militias became an appealing way to nip a potentially nasty problem

in the bud.

It was this motivation that caused the British governor

of Massachusetts to order British troops to march out of

Boston to seize arms caches at Lexington and Concord. As

word spread (carried by people like Paul Revere in his famous ride) of what the British were up to, militia units

began to form along the road as the British column marched

toward its destination. Tempers flared, names were called,

and someone (no one knows on which side) fired the shots

that signaled the beginning of the American Revolution . In

the fighting that ensued, the British retreated into Boston,

and the militia units, almost instinctively, followed them

and took up posts at Bunker (Breed's) Hill on the Charlestown Neck, overlooking Boston. The British counterattacked at what is usually called the Battle of Bunker Hill,

47
EAGLE'S TALONS

and the militia (which was gradually reinforced by units

from adjacent areas) retreated and began the siege of Boston. The Revolution was joined, with very few having any

real idea of what would follow.

Political Objective

Largely because of the semiaccidental way in which it

began, the American Revolution belies the neat depiction

of a clear political objective defining the reasons for the

outbreak of war and then determining how the war will be

fought. Rather, the Revolution began without a clear notion

of a political objective shared by the majority who initiated

it, and nearly a year of violence occurred before the larger

purpose for which the Revolution was fought emerged.

At the time of the skirmishes at Lexington and Concord

and the subsequent siege of Boston, the idea of political

independence was not a widely shared vision. Indeed, even

after the siege was laid, the Continental Congress was unwilling to make independence the goal of the colonies .

Rather, in August 1775, four months after the initial battles,

the Congress instead sent the so-called Olive Branch petition to King George III asking him to intervene in the

colonials' behalfto protect them from the "tyrannies" (represented by the Intolerable Acts) of the Parliament. The

Crown, however, rejected this offer of conciliation, instead

declaring the colonies to be in a rebellion that would be

put down . It is at least arguable that had the king responded

favorably to the Continental Congress's request, the Revolution would have either died or become a small, isolated

movement.

The military situation forced a defining of political purpose, rather than the other way around. The key event was

the evacuation of British forces from Boston on 17 March

1776 to Halifax, New Brunswick. When the British garrison

left Boston, there remained no British military presence in

48
AMERICAN REVOLUTION

the colonies. De facto political independence had been

achieved, and it was then a matter of declaring formally

that independence was the goal of the revolution .

Even with independence militarily asserted, translating

that circumstance into a formal political purpose was no

easy task. Three months elapsed between the evacuation of

Boston and the formal promulgation of the Declaration of

Independence on 4 July 1776 . At that, the Declaration, as

an ideological statement, was a comparatively mild document that had as its basic features statements of grievance

directed at violations of rights by the king and the assertion

of largely commercial, mercantile rights. Once again, had

the British monarchy embraced those principles and agreed

that the colonials were entitled to them, it is questionable

whether broad-based support for the objective would have

been forthcoming.

Once political independence had been asserted as the goal

and that purpose had been rejected by the Crown, the issue

was joined and was central to the objectives for both sides

in the following seven years before a peace treaty was

signed. Political independence within a context of a free

and, by the standards of the time, democratic polity became

the objective of the revolutionary cause, reintroducing political ideology into warfare for the first time in over a

century and setting the precedent for ideologically based

warfare ever since. The objective was not embraced by all

or even a majority of Americans. The Declaration did, however, galvanize enough support to recruit an army and to

sustain the military effort to its conclusion .

The major feature of the Declaration of Independence as

a political objective was that it placed an absolute purpose

on hostilities . The issue of independence was indivisible :

it is impossible to be partially independent. With the issue

so defined, compromise was unlikely; the rebellion either

had to succeed or be crushed. There were no alternatives.

The British objective, of course, was the obverse of the

American purpose. Initially, the Crown viewed the purpose

49
EAGLE'S TALONS

as a discrete matter of quelling a rebellion and reasserting

British authority in the colonies. This objective did not

meet with great popular or parliamentary support, as there

were sizable numbers of Britons who felt that the colonials'

demands were either reasonable or at least not worth fighting over. Given this lack of enthusiasm, the Crown eventually evolved its own version of the "domino theory" by

asserting that resistance to rebellion was a matter of precedent. If the Crown did not forcefully react to sedition in

the American colonies, other parts of the empire would try

the same thing.

Military Objectives and Strategy

In the simplest terms, the fundamental British objective

during the American Revolution was to regain sovereignty

over the American colonies . Again, in the broadest terms,

the British military objective was to provide the circumstances in which that sovereignty could be reclaimed. The

problem was how to do this.

By July 1776 British authority had been effectively removed from the rebellious colonies, although Canada remained firmly under British control. Looking at the

situation at hand, the British saw the colonies as divided

over the issue of independence and believed (rightly) that

strong loyalist sentiment remained. They saw a rebel military force comprised of ragtag militia, officered by a group

of men with limited-military experience and training . They

viewed the colonies as a long, thin, disconnected string of

outposts clinging to the edge of a great wilderness and, as

such, vulnerable at innumerable points to dominant British

sea power. The British also realized they could not occupy

all of the colonies . Britain's traditionally small land army

was not designed for such a task, especially considering that

the American colonies were not Britain's only responsibility-or even her most important colonial possession.

50
AMERICAN REVOLUTION

What options did the British have? Three options presented themselves, to be used individually or in combination. The first was to destroy the rebel military force,

which would eliminate the instrument of the rebellionthe means of military resistance. The second option was to

occupy the decisive places that were the bases of the rebellion and thus to choke the rebellion to death. The third

was to win over the "hearts and minds" of the uncommitted

colonists who, combined with the Tory loyalists, would

themselves put an end to the revolt . Any resemblance to

American military objectives nearly 200 years later in Vietnam is less than coincidental.

The British results were also less than coincidental. Gen

William Howe, leading the first British counterthrust at

New York, attempted to combine all three possibilities. He

desired to defeat Washington's small army while attempting

to negotiate, since he was empowered to make concessions

to the rebels. At the same time he would seize New York,

which the British assumed to be a vital center, and was

prepared to launch a two-pronged campaign to separate

New England from the rest of the colonies . Unfortunately

for Howe, he quickly discovered that Washington would

not stand and fight a decisive battle . Rather, Washington

fought and then retreated to preserve his army to fight another day. Howe also found the American rebels totally

unwilling to negotiate; and although New York made an

excellent base of operations, it was anything but a vital

center in the European tradition.

This pattern was to repeat itself throughout the war. Rebels would not negotiate, Tory sympathizers were kept in

check by revolutionary militias, British victories came often

but were indecisive, and there were no vital centers to

capture.

American military objectives were much more complex.

As Dave R. Palmer pointed out in his brilliant exposition

on the subject, American military objectives were time de5 1
EAGLE'S TALONS

pendent.* The Revolution was actually in four phases, each

with its own military objectives . Phase one, lasting from

the battles at Lexington and Concord in April 1775 until

July 1776, was the Revolution itself. The military objective

was quite simple-throw the British out. Even if the longterm political objective was some sort ofpolitical settlement

with the British retaining sovereignty, the rebels could not

negotiate with the British in control or occupying a threatening position . The rebels could only negotiate from a position of strength . Such an objective dictated an offensive

military strategy. Thus came the capture of Fort Ticonderoga (with its cannons), the siege of Boston, and the invasion

of Canada in hopes of sparking an uprising by French

Canadians.

The invasion of Canada was a failure, but by the summer

of 1776 the Revolution was complete. The British had been

thrown out of the 13 rebellious colonies . Now the rebels

were almost prisoners of their own success. The revolt had

been so successful and so complete that some sort of precipitous political action was a foregone conclusion . Thus

came the decision by the Continental Congress for complete

political independence.

The Declaration of Independence marked the beginning

of phase two of the war and a new military objective. The

rebel army now had to defend its newly won independence

against the invasion by the British that was sure to come.

With independence declared but not yet won, the Americans suddenly had everything to lose . It was clear at this

point that Washington could not defeat a determined

professional British army in a decisive battle . Thus Washington had two objectives . The first, and more important,

was to prevent a decisive defeat. As long as he could preserve his army and keep it in the field, the Revolution

'Lt Col (later Lt Gen) Dave R. Palmer, "American Strategy Reconsidered," Military

History ofthe American Revolution, ed. S. J. Underdal (Washington, D.C.: Government

Printing Office, 1976). The remainder of this section on strategy is based on Palmer's

thesis.

52
AMERICAN REVOLUTION

probably could remain alive. The second objective was to

make the British pay a high price for their invasion of the

newly independent colonies . He must wage a war of attrition, hoping to wear the British down, hoping they would

tire, and hoping the cost of imperialism would become too

high. Then, too, there was always the hope that Britain's

enemies would come to the aid of the struggling rebels .

Phase three began in February 1778 with the signing of

a treaty between the rebels and the French. With the French

as allies more troops and arms became available. More important, the French navy challenged British control of the

American coast. The British navy no longer had a free hand

in moving troops from one point to another. Washington

could afford to take more risks. With new troops and newfound sea power he might, with luck, actually inflict a decisive defeat upon the British. Clearly, phase three called

for an offensive strategy just as the circumstances of phase

two had dictated a defensive strategy. The siege and surrender of Yorktown ended phase three with the decisive

victory Washington sought.

Phase four lasted from the victory at Yorktown until the

signing of the peace treaty recognizing American independence. Although the focus of the war shifted away from

the colonies to a wider theater, Washington had to concentrate on a better state of peace. His objective was to keep

his victorious army intact despite great pressures to disband

the force. The Americans had everything to lose once again.

Washington was successful and the favorable terms of the

peace treaty were due in no small part to the fact that the

Continental Army was still in being and was still a force of

significant ability.

The success of the American Revolution was in large part

due to Washington's accurate reading of the proper military

objective at the proper time. Reckless offensive action during phase two would surely have led to decisive defeat and

the probable collapse of the rebellion. Lack of aggressiveness in phase three might have left the British with a threat53
EAGLE'S TALONS

ening position to exploit at their leisure. Disbanding the

army to conform to the popular will in phase four might

have had disastrous consequences for the treaty negotiations in Paris.

Political Considerations

Throughout the Revolution purely political concerns

helped to influence what happened on the battlefield. At

the level of domestic politics within the colonies, there was

a continual contest to nurture and sustain public support

for the rebellion, and the war effort was hampered by the

lack of formal legitimacy of the Continental Congress until

the Articles of Confederation were ratified in 1781 . Internationally, the need for outside support for the Revolution

was a pressing concern until the alliance with France was

completed in 1778, and significant effort was always directed at the prospect of turning British public and parliamentary opinion against the war.

As the first ideologically motivated war of the modern

era, the American Revolution had to win the hearts and

minds of the American people if it were to succeed. As

stated earlier, the cause was not universally embraced. A

sizable portion of the population remained loyal to the

Crown (the Tories), and many of these people emigrated to

Canada and elsewhere after independence was achieved. At

the same time, a large portion of the population was indifferent to the whole affair, especially in the South (before

the war moved to the southern theater) and on the frontier.

Public support was absolutely necessary in raising and

sustaining the army that stood as the principal obstacle to

British reassertion ofpolitical control. As apractical matter,

this created two problems for the revolutionary cause: The

Revolution had to appear to have a reasonable prospect of

success and Tory sentiment had to be suppressed . The con54
AMERICAN REVOLUTION

duct of hostilities can be understood only with these considerations in mind.

First, Washington faced the not inconsiderable task of

projecting revolutionary forces as a winner. The problem

was greatest when British forces arrived in 1776 and the

Continental Army was routed in the battles around New

York. It has been argued that had General Howe pursued

and destroyed what was left of that army-about 2,500

effectives at the low point-the British could have crushed

the organized rebellion. Howe did not, apparently believing

that the Continental Army would dissolve on its own and

that he could mop up what was left of the rebellion in the

spring. Faced with the real prospect that the army would

simply vanish, Washington was motivated to attack the isolated garrisons at Trenton and Princeton, not because of

their military significance but to show the American people

that he could in fact win.

These same kinds of symbolic concerns forced Washington to engage in two battles that he could not win. As noted,

Washington opposed the British occupation of New York

and was soundly defeated (at least partially because he overestimated the fighting abilities of his troops, based on their

successes around Boston). The reason for the engagement,

simply put, was to show that the army was of consequence:

if it would not defend the nation's major port city, what

good was it? For the same reason, Washington positioned

his army in front of the British force moving to occupy the

colonial capital of Philadelphia in 1777, and the army only

narrowly avoided envelopment and destruction at Brandywine Creek. The defense of Philadelphia was not ofgreat

military importance, but defending the seat of the Continental Congress was of great symbolic importance . In both

cases, the destruction of the Continental Army, the vital

force ofthe Revolution, nearly occurred, but political rather

than military considerations forced the risk.

The second problem, the job of suppressing Tory support,

fell to the revolutionary militias . These militias were irreg55
EAGLE'S TALONS

ular, locally based forces who occasionally engaged in direct

combat with the British (as at Saratoga), but who served

the additional purposes of maintaining revolutionary control of areas not occupied by the British and of providing

a recruitment base for Washington's army.

The methods of the militias in these additional roles were

those of classical guerrilla fighters. When they fought, they

surprised their adversaries, engaged in hit-and-run engagements, and then faded away (techniques which, at the time,

were considered cowardly in the European military tradition). To suppress Tory sentiment in local communities,

they harassed and intimidated the loyalists, including burning their property.

The other domestic political problem was the status of

the Continental Congress which, until the Articles of Confederation were ratified in 1781, had a dubious legal status .

Although the body convened regularly and made policy affecting the operation of the war, it was little more than an

advisory committee since it was empowered by no legal

constitutional act. Rather, its members were representatives

of the various state legislatures, and any and all authority

the Congress had arose from those legislatures agreeing to

carry out congressional policies .

At least part of the reason the Continental Congress was

given no authority was the colonial distrust of strong central

government . Many in colonial legislatures feared that endowing the Congress with independent and superior authority would result in the same kind of tyranny against

which they were revolting. Even when the Articles of Confederation came into force, the powers of Congress derived

strictly from the state legislatures (members of Congress

were representatives of the legislatures and received their

instructions from those bodies), and the powers to implement policy (for example, imposing taxes) came from the

state governments and not the central government .

This kind ofinstitutional arrangement, which would later

plague the Davis administration during the American Civil

56
AMERICAN REVOLUTION

War, greatly impeded the war effort. The Continental Congress did not have the authority to conscript or otherwise

raise troops; rather, the Congress established quotas for

each colony, which the legislatures were free to meet or not.

The degree of compliance is indicated by the fact that the

Congress "authorized" an army of 76,000 but the fighting

strength of the Continental Army never exceeded 20,000

and was generally smaller than that. Provision of such basic

supplies as food, clothing, and weaponry was a perpetual

problem since the Congress could not levy taxes to pay for

these items, having instead to rely on the largesse of the

colonies . Agreat deal ofWashington's time was spent trying

to cajole the Congress to support him more adequately, but

a combination of congressional impotence and suspicion of

the army itself (the fear it might be used to suppress the

Congress) meant there were continuing problems.

There were international political concerns as well. The

greatest concern was securing foreign support to counter

obvious British advantages in military equipment (the colonies had no organized armaments industry), in control of

the oceans, and in military manpower.

There were several candidates for the assistance role . The

most obvious was France, seething over her defeat in the

Seven Years' War, which had removed all French colonies

from North America. Less likely candidates were Spain,

which could always be relied on to oppose Britain's design

in the new world, and such commercial rivals as the Dutch

Republic and Russia. All four countries, directly or indirectly, contributed to the establishment of American

independence.

None ofthem did so, however, out ofany sense of affinity

with the American cause. The Spanish, who refused

throughout the war to receive American emissaries, hoped

the colonials would eventually lose the struggle because they

feared an independent North American state would cast a

possessive eye on Spanish holdings in North America. The

Dutch cast their lot with the League of Armed Neutrality

57
EAGLE'S TALONS

in retribution for the British seizure of the islands of Saint

Eustatius and Saint Martin in the Caribbean, which had

been transfer points for Dutch military contraband being

shipped to the colonials. The common thread in foreign

motivation was, in a word, revenge against Great Britain.

For these countries creation of an independent United

States was at most a by-product of European power politics

and not necessarily a desirable outcome at that.

The problem for the colonials was that no foreign power

was about to come to the aid of the Americans unless it

could be made to believe that the colonials had a chance

ofwinning. The French were particularly interested in helping, but supporting a losing cause would not produce the

desired retribution. The problem was made more difficult

by the early lack of success of the Continental Army. Following the successful siege at Boston, the army had suffered

a string of defeats during 1776 and 1777 that came close

to breaking the back of the rebellion and its minor military

successes at Trenton and Princeton did not compensate for

them.

The victory that tipped the scales was Saratoga, where

Gen Sir John "Gentleman Johnny" Burgoyne surrendered

his army to Gen Horatio Gates. In a matter of months a

formal alliance was signed between the colonies and France.

With that agreement more adequate supplies of war materiel became available to the revolutionary cause, the

French navy became available, at least part of the time, to

menace and harass the Royal Navy, and, in time, French

forces would fight alongside the Continentals . French assistance was particularly crucial at the final colonial military victory of the war, the Siege of Yorktown, where almost

equal numbers of Continentals and French marines formed

the siege lines and the French Caribbean fleet blockaded

the coast.

The other, and ultimately pivotal, international concern

was the battle for British public opinion. The Americans

knew from the beginning that there was considerable op58
AMERICAN REVOLUTION

position to the war, led by William Pitt the Elder, Edmund

Burke, and others. Realizing he lacked the military muscle

to defeat a determined British army, Washington chose a

strategy of attrition aimed at increasing British war-weariness (the fact that Britain had been involved in a series

of expensive wars in the years preceding the Revolution

contributed to war opposition). If the war dragged on long

enough in an inconclusive way, British opinion might become a factor that would lead to independence. It was a

matter of hanging on long enough to exceed Britain's "costtolerance," and, aided by the stunning victory at Yorktown,

the strategy worked in the end.

Military Technology and Technique

The character of battle in the late eighteenth century was

largely determined by the basic infantry weapon available

at the time. The standard weapon was a large smoothbore

musket that was difficult to load and had a short range.

The British infantry weapon, nicknamed the Brown Bess,

was typical of the muskets of the various European armies.

Brown Bess was over five feet in length, weighed 12 pounds,

and had a 3/4-inch diameter muzzle. Although 250 yards

was its maximum range, it was extremely inaccurate .

Against man-sized targets, 50 yards was considered the

maximum effective range, and its rate of fire was about two

rounds per minute.

A key to success on the battlefield was to increase firepower, but how does one increase firepower using such

weapons? The standard solution was to put more muskets

on the battlefield and pack the troops tightly together. This

practice, however, led to additional difficulties. The muzzle

blast from the large caliber weapons could easily rupture

eardrums unless troops were placed in proper formation.

The answer was rigid linear formations with the men placed

shoulder to shoulder in long lines, generally three ranks

59
EAGLE'S TALONS

deep. After one rank fired, a second stepped forward (or

the first rank retired to the rear) and fired while the first

rank began to reload. After the second rank fired, the third

took its place and fired. If all went well, the first rank would

have reloaded its muskets and be ready to fire when the

third rank had discharged its weapons . To increase the

shock effect of the weapons, each line would fire in volleys

on the command of its officers. The effect was a curtain of

lead, smoke, and noise, certain to terrify all but the most

highly disciplined soldiers.

As frightening as such massed volley fire was, the real

terror may have been in waiting for the enemy to come

within range. When attacking, a linear formation had to

march with great precision to maintain its rigid alignment.

(Prussian officers were known to stop their troops in order

to realign them.) Slowly the distance to the enemy, also

drawn up in a packed linear formation, closed. Finally,

when the two sides were very close, one side or the other

fired a volley that would shatter the other's line. The volley

was quickly followed by a bayonet charge, which most generals believed would actually decide the battle.

Such rigid tactics, terrifying even to think about, required

enormous discipline. Many European generals followed the

maxim of Frederick the Great, who observed that soldiers

had to fear their own officers even more than the enemy;

otherwise, the ordinary soldier would break in battle very

quickly. Training for such rigid tactics was long and involved. If more than one volley was to be fired, reloading

had to be mastered and conducted in unison. Troops had

to march with exacting cadence and pace to keep their formation properly aligned.

Both linear techniques and the available technology made

eighteenth-century warfare leisurely by modern standards.

It took considerable time for commanders to arrange their

formations for battle, and, in effect, both opponents had

60
AMERICAN REVOLUTION

to agree tacitly to give battle before a battle could commence. Because the flintlock weapons of the era were extremely unreliable when wet, few battles were fought in

winter when rain and snow were common. The general

result was limited warfare at a leisurely pace, but warfare

that was deadly once joined.

The British brought to their American colonies a professional army with a heavy concentration of mercenaries

hired from other countries, a common practice in the eighteenth century. They were skilled in the exactions of linear

warfare and ready to do battle with the best European armies. Doing battle with the Americans, however, led to peculiar problems for which their training provided few

answers.

The Americans had the same basic weaponry as the British, except that they lacked artillery in the early stages of

the war. Sufficient artillery was quickly captured and later

supplied by overseas allies . At the beginning of hostilities

the Americans also did not have a well-trained force, professional or otherwise. To defend the colonies, the British had

relied on a small contingent of regular army troops supplemented by militias raised and trained by each colony.

The quality of these militia units varied widely; for example, the Massachusetts militia required only four days

of drill per year, hardly enough to engage a well-trained

enemy in linear warfare.

The American solution to these disadvantages was threefold . First, Washington built a small professional army that,

by the end of the war, could acquit itself favorably. Help

from various European professional soldiers who fought

with the Americans was invaluable in this effort.

Second, because the Continental Army was never large

enough to be a decisive force by itself, relatively untrained

militia were used either as skirmishers or to expand the

Continental "line." As skirmishers the militia could harass

61
EAGLE'S TALONS

the British line and inflict considerable casualties while presenting fleeting targets inappropriate for massed British volley fire . When used to expand the Continental line,

untrained militia units often broke, but they could initially

increase the firepower available.

Third, militia were used effectively on the defense by

"going to ground" behind strong breastworks. This technique was demonstrated at Breed's Hill, where militia units

behind strong breastworks inflicted grievous casualties on

British regulars advancing in linear formation. In the best

European tradition, the Americans held their fire "until

they could see the whites of their eyes," which meant the

British were within effective range. Meanwhile the British

were frustrated because the Americans were hiding in relative safety from British volley fire instead of standing up

and fighting . The technique of going to ground would not

be limited to militia armies in the future; as weapons became even more deadly, an infantryman's best method of

survival was to take cover, whether he was a professional

or an amateur.

Some analysts have argued that the Americans actually

had a technological advantage because some of the rebels

used rifles that had much longer range and far more accuracy than British smoothbore muskets. This, however, is

a misconception. Relatively few rifled weapons were used,

and certainly not enough were employed to make a decisive

difference. Although rifles had advantages in range and accuracy, they also had two telling disadvantages. First, they

had a much slower rate of fire because they were much

more difficult to load. Second, rifled weapons were not

equipped with a bayonet. This lack led to a disaster at the

battle of Brooklyn Heights where American riflemen were

bayoneted by charging British troops before they could get

their weapons reloaded. Even Daniel Morgan (whose troops

used rifled weapons) admitted that the rifle was effective

only when supported by muskets with bayonets.

62
Military Conduct

AMERICAN REVOLUTION

As has been pointed out, the decisive revolutionary act

occurred almost by accident. The spark that set the tinder

aflame was a British expedition from Boston to seize militia

arms stored at Concord. Aroused local militiamen met the

British troops on Lexington Green where someone fired the

"shot heard 'round the world." Neither the gunfire at Lexington nor the running battle with the British forces during

their return to Boston was the decisive revolutionary act,

however. For years many of the colonists had resisted British policies and attempts to enforce those policies. The real

revolutionary act came when the irate Americans sealed the

British in Boston and put the city under siege. The shots

fired at Lexington, Concord, and en route to Boston could

be considered the acts ofoverwrought subjects. The "army"

surrounding Boston was a clear challenge to the authority

of the Crown-the makings of a true revolution.

Army is a charitable term. The besiegers were a motley

group of militia; ill-trained, poorly led, ill-disciplined, and

with no real legal standing. But events quickly transpired

to begin the process of turning this group into what would

eventually become an effective fighting force. On 14 June

1775 the Continental Congress moved to take advantage

of the situation by "adopting" the force surrounding Boston

and appointing George Washington, a Virginian with some

military experience, as the army's commander. Meanwhile

another rebel group captured the small British garrison at

Fort Ticonderoga (along the river-lakes route to Canada).

The booty from this victory included artillery pieces which,

when hauled to Boston, would eventually convince the British to evacuate.

There was little real fighting during the siege. The only

serious confrontation took place on Breed's Hill. The British sought to oust the Americans from the hill because from

that position the Americans could bring the British forces

under direct artillery fire. Anticipating a British counter6 3
EAGLE'S TALONS

move, American forces built a considerable redoubt on the

hill where they hid waiting for the approach of the scarletclad British. After an unsuccessful attempt to turn the

American flank, the British launched a frontal assault on

the redoubt in the finest tradition of eighteenth-century

warfare. The Americans waited in relative safety behind

their breastworks. American volley fire took a terrible toll,

but the British tried three times to break the American line.

The Americans were finally forced to withdraw when their

ammunition ran low. When the smoke cleared, the British

held the field but had suffered a staggering 40-percent casualty rate .

Meanwhile the Americans launched a two-pronged attack

toward Canada in an attempt to eliminate Canada as a base

for British operations. The rebel leaders hoped the appearance of an American army would spark an uprising of

French Canadians against their British overlords. One

prong of the attack proceeded up the river-lakes route in

good order and defeated the small British garrison at Montreal. The second column was to proceed to Maine and up

the Kennebec and Chaudiere rivers, then down the Saint

Lawrence to Quebec. Unfortunately, poor planning caused

by faulty intelligence doomed the expedition. Travel took

twice as long as expected, only 30 percent of those who set

out from New England actually arrived at Quebec, and

those who did arrive were in deplorable physical condition.

Somehow the Americans mustered an assault on the city

but were repulsed . The remnants of this pitiful force remained before the city throughout the winter of 1775-76.

Their hopes of sparking a revolt were dashed, however, as

the French Canadians were uninterested in the entire affair.

Washington was having much greater success before Boston. In the spring of 1776, he was able to mount the heavy

artillery pieces seized at Ticonderoga on Dorchester

Heights and directly threaten the city and its British garrison. Sir William Howe, the British commander, saw dis64
AMERICAN REVOLUTION

cretion as the better part of valor, evacuated the city, and

retired to Halifax to regroup and refit.

To this point the almost accidental rebellion had been a

surprising success. The rebels had won a series of offensive

victories. Even their setback in Canada had been on an

ambitious offensive expedition. The militia had defeated

the Redcoats; the British troops had been thrown out of

the rebellious colonies along with the authority of the

Crown. The first phase of the Revolutionary War was over.

Now would come phase two of the Revolution . Independence had been declared and the rebels would have to defend their gains against an opponent who would no longer

be caught unaware and unprepared.

During the first phase the advantage had been with the

rebels. Only one sizable contingent of British soldiers was

in the colonies (at Boston). In spite of the makeshift nature

of the American army, it outnumbered the Redcoats and

was nearly as well armed. Now, however, Washington faced

a fundamentally different situation. He had to defend a long

coastline that was highly vulnerable to attack along its entire

length. Washington's victorious militia suddenly looked totally inadequate for the job. British sea power could transport troops to any of a hundred invasion points. Even with

prior knowledge of a British landing point, ships could

probably reach that point faster than could Washington's

troops marching overland.

Clearly, the initiative had passed to the British and they

seemed to have all of the advantages, but the British also

faced many disadvantages. First, they would be fighting at

the end of a very long line of communication, supply, and

reinforcement. Second, political sentiment at home was

anything but united ; the American colonists had many sympathizers in the home islands. Third, fighting such a war

would be an expensive proposition, one not easily supported. Finally, the American colonies were but one colonial responsibility ofthe British. The Union Jack flew around

65
EAGLE'S TALONS

the world and with it went responsibilities for support and

protection.

Just as the British strategy had to be offensive at this

point, so did Washington's strategy have to be defensive.

Above all he had to prevent the destruction of his fledgling

army. Decisive defeat of the Continental Army meant the

death of the Revolution, for it was the only means of resistance . Washington knew he had no reasonable hope of

victory against the British army in open battle . At best he

could wage defensive battles, judiciously withdraw after inflicting casualties, and wait to fight again another day. With

some good fortune (and poor British tactics) Washington

might be able to fall upon isolated portions of the British

force and inflict small defeats. Washington's objective had

to be to buy time, raise the cost of the war to the British,

and hope they would tire of the whole affair. The other

American hope was for foreign help from France, Britain's

traditional enemy and colonial rival.

The British strategy for 1776 was complex. First, a twopronged attack was planned to isolate New England from

the rest of the colonies . Sir Guy Carlton was to drive the

remaining American forces from Canada, pursue them

down the river-lakes route, and then turn into New England. Sir William Howe was to land at New York (clearly

an important target and excellent base of operations), drive

up the river-lakes route and also turn into New England.

Meanwhile Henry Clinton would lead an amphibious expedition to the southern colonies where he had been assured

that thousands of Tories would rise up and subdue the

rebels .

For the British few things went as planned . Clinton's

effort in the south failed because of a lack of military coordination. Tory uprisings failed to materialize as the rebel

militia kept those loyal to the Crown in check. In Canada

Carlton had considerable success as he chased the Americans all the way back to Ticonderoga, but he failed to press

66
his advantage after a naval victory at Valcour Island. Carlton's lethargy and the approach of cold weather put the

victorious British forces into winter quarters.

Howe's position at New York was particularly interesting.

He came to wage peace as well as war. He was empowered

to negotiate with the rebels and offer concessions. The rebels, still flushed with the success of their revolution, were

in no mood for serious negotiations . Howe was left no

choice but to wage war. To do this he_brought 32,000 professional troops and a considerable naval armada to New

THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION

Major British Offensive Campaigns

67

AMERICAN REVOLUTION
EAGLE'S TALONS

York. Washington was able to assemble about 20,000 men,

most of them ill-trained .

New York would have been difficult to defend in any

case, but the task was nearly impossible since the enemy

possessed control of the waterways that surrounded and

divided the city. Washington was determined to offer a

significant defense for political and moral reasons, if no

other. If the Continental Army would not defend such an

important place, what would it defend? What good is an

army that defends nothing? These questions would plague

Americans if Washington let New York fall without a struggle. Refusal to try to defend such an important target could

be as dangerous to the Revolution as a decisive military

defeat. Thus Washington had to offer resistance and then

retreat to fight another day.

New York was lost, but not without a series of bloody

battles. At Brooklyn Heights, Washington barely escaped

total defeat . After additional defeats at Fort Washington

and White Plains, Washington retreated across New Jersey

as his army slowly disintegrated around him. Finally, Washington crossed into Pennsylvania as winter fell . Howe assumed the campaign was over, that Washington was beaten,

and that the rebel army had disintegrated . He ordered his

deputy, Cornwallis, to post detachments across New Jersey

and then go into winter quarters. Howe would wait comfortably for spring. If the Americans had not sued for peace

by then, he could leisurely reestablish British sovereignty

in pleasant weather without having to worry about the defunct American army.

Howe's lack of aggressiveness provided the breathing

room Washington needed. When Howe had Cornwallis post

detachments across New Jersey, he provided Washington

the opportunity to achieve the victory the Americans desperately needed. Had Howe pressed his advantage and

chased the remnants of Washington's army or pressed on

to the rebel capital at Philadelphia, the American Revolution might have come to a quick and inglorious end. But

68
AMERICAN REVOLUTION

winter campaigning was no easy task in that era, particularly in the primitive conditions in the colonies.

By going into winter quarters, Howe was following the

rather leisurely tradition of eighteenth-century European

warfare . He seemed unaware that this would be a very different kind of war. Moreover, Howe failed to realize that

the American Revolution was an ideological conflict with

its attendant passions.

From Howe's perspective organized resistance seemed at

an end. Any disorganized or passive resistance remaining

was a job for the diplomats and politicians to resolve, with

the help of the army. This task could be left safely for spring

when the government in London would have its policy toward the rebels worked out, and when the weather would

make implementation of that policy easier. Howe's lack of

appreciation for the kind of war in which he was involved

led him to miss his best opportunity to put down the

Revolution.

Washington was in such a desperate situation that he was

forced to seize aggressively every opportunity presented. He

had been badly defeated in New York and driven in headlong retreat across New Jersey. His army was disintegrating

around him as terms of enlistment expired or as the dispirited simply quit. Enlistments lagged as few were willing

to risk their lives for a cause that appeared doomed. Washington needed a victory to boost the morale of his little

army, keep the men in camp, and boost enlistments.

Washington could now concentrate his force against one

of Cornwallis's isolated detachments rather than facing the

bulk of the British army. The object of his attack would be

the Hessian garrison at Trenton. On Christmas night Washington took a force of more than 2,000 Continental Army

regulars across the Delaware River (the incident portrayed

in the famous painting of Washington crossing the Delaware) and surprised the defenders who, after a brief fight,

surrendered . Washington then retreated back across the

river. His success so shocked the British that they withdrew

69
EAGLE'S TALONS

their detachments back from the river to Princeton. Washington was then able to recross the river into New Jersey.

Cornwallis reacted by coming south from New York, gathering up British forces as he proceeded toward Washington's New Jersey encampment. On the night of 2 January

1777, Washington slipped around Cornwallis's camp and

struck Princeton. Cornwallis turned about to advance on

Princeton and upon his approach Washington led his army

toward Morristown in the rugged New Jersey highlands.

From there Washington could easily fend off British attacks

and threaten the British line of communication to their

posts in southern New Jersey. Howe, recognizing the threat

to his posts, withdrew them to the area immediately around

New York to await spring.

In strictly military terms, the American victories at Trenton and Princeton were anything but decisive . They were

hit-and-run raids, the classic method of war of a much

weaker adversary hoping for little more than to wear down

a stronger opponent. In the broader sense, however, these

two small victories were nearly as decisive as the later victories at Saratoga and Yorktown. Washington had served

notice to the British that subduing the Revolution would

be no easy task and could not be accomplished quickly.

More important, these victories served notice to the American people that victory was possible in spite of seemingly

insurmountable difficulties . Victory was an elixir for the

Continental Army that cured many of the ills brought on

by the defeats in New York. As both armies licked their

wounds in winter quarters, 1777 promised to be a decisive

year.

The British campaign plans for 1777 were a picture of

confusion. Howe, previously entrusted with the capture of

New York, was again about to set off to capture a city,

Philadelphia . It is unclear what Howe intended to do with

Philadelphia once it was in his hands. He mayhave believed

that the Tories would flock to him and that the seizure of

the capital would dispirit the revolutionaries. He may have

70
AMERICAN REVOLUTION

believed that Washington would have to defend the capital,

presenting an opportunity to inflict a decisive defeat on the

Americans. Perhaps Howe still believed the rebel army was

of little consequence. After all, the American victories at

Trenton and Princeton were, at best, small raids of little

military consequence.

While Howe planned to seize Philadelphia, Gentleman

Johnny Burgoyne had a London-approved plan to split the

rebel colonies by moving down the river-lakes route from

Canada to isolate the New England colonies . Under this

plan Howe's forces in New York were to aid Burgoyne by

moving north on the river-lakes route . Unfortunately for

Burgoyne, Howe was on his way to Philadelphia .

Howe's campaign against Philadelphia took advantage of

British sea power. His troops embarked from New York,

put to sea, sailed up the Chesapeake Bay, and landed at

Head of Elk in Maryland. This route was, as Washington

said, a strange choice. Overland from New York the distance was but 60 miles. By sea the journey took 33 days

and the expedition landed at a point still 50 miles distant

from the rebel capital. As Howe advanced on Philadelphia,

Washington rallied an army of more than 15,000 for the

city's defense.

Philadelphia was not an important target in military

terms. Certainly it was the seat of government, but a government can move and it eventually did. Washington's need

to defend the city had the same basis as his defense of New

York. Thus Washington felt compelled to lead his army to

Chadd's Ford on Brandywine Creek south of the capital.

There on 11 September 1777, Washington was outmaneuvered, badly defeated, and nearly surrounded and destroyed. Again, as at New York, the head-on confrontation

with major professional forces led to defeat and near

disaster.

Washington retreated to Warwick while Howe advanced

and seized Philadelphia . Washington resorted to the tactics

of the previous winter as he led his army to Germantown,

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a community just north of Philadelphia, where he fell upon

an isolated British garrison. Washington was narrowly defeated, but Germantown was an impressive performance

for a recently defeated army that many had written off.

Following the battle at Germantown on 4 October 1777,

Washington again led his army into winter quarters, this

time at Valley Forge, Pennsylvania. While the Americans

froze and starved at Valley Forge, Howe wintered comfortably, enjoying the pleasures of the former rebel capital.

Two weeks after the battle of Germantown, the Americans achieved a victory whose impact went far beyond the

confines of the battlefield . At Saratoga, New York, Burgoyne surrendered his entire command to an American militia army led by General Gates and Maj Gen Benedict

Arnold. Burgoyne's surrender was positive proof that the

British were not invincible and that the American rebels

could win. The news of the American victory convinced

the French to enter the conflict on the side of the Americans, and this intervention ultimately made victory possible

for the rebels.

Burgoyne had begun his trek down the river-lakes route

from Fort Saint John, north ofLake Champlain, with 8,000

professional troops. He had easily moved to Fort Ticonderoga, which quickly fell after a token defense. Rather than

taking the water route down Lake George to Fort George,

Burgoyne pursued the Americans retreating from Ticonderoga on an overland route. His men hacked a 23-mile

road through rough, heavily wooded country, overcoming

numerous obstacles placed in his path by the retreating

rebels. The head of Burgoyne's column took three weeks to

complete the trip, and his heavy artillery lagged well behind

the column. Gentleman Johnny knew little about the countryside, and he had taken far too few horses, oxen, mules,

and carts to supply his army at the end of an overextended

supply line. His base of operations was 185 miles away in

Canada. His choices were to retreat to Canada and admit

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defeat or to press on to Albany where he could obtain

succor.

Burgoyne tried to relieve his problem by sending a Hessian foraging party to Bennington, Vermont, where it was

reported that a large number of horses were available. At

Bennington the Hessians were virtually destroyed by a militia group commanded by Gen John Stark, and a British

relief column arrived just in time to also be destroyed by

the Americans. Burgoyne lost 900 of his best professional

troops and achieved nothing except to bolster the confidence of the American militia army, which was swelling

rapidly with the arrival of more militia units.

Burgoyne finally decided to move to Albany even though

he knew this would be an extremely difficult task. The

Americans had cut his supply lines and blocked the path

to Albany by entrenching themselves along Bemis Heights.

Gentleman Johnny's hungry and demoralized troops would

have to attack a fortified position . On 19 September Burgoyne's attack was repulsed with heavy losses, and his situation was nearly hopeless. Surrounded by an army that

outnumbered his own almost two to one, Burgoyne had

nearly exhausted his food supplies . He made one last desperate effort to break the American lines on 7 October and

again was repulsed. Burgoyne retired to Saratoga to consider his limited options, and ten days later surrendered his

entire command. Included in the booty were 7 generals,

300 officers, and 5,600 soldiers . A considerable array of

artillery plus a large stock ofpowder and shell also fell into

American hands.

Four months after the American victory at Saratoga,

France and the American government signed a military alliance. The surprising American performance at Germantown and the smashing victory at Saratoga provided the

grease for the diplomatic wheels. The alliance was the pivotal political act of the war.

With the French in the war, Washington's situation was

entirely different. In the past Washington had to concen73
EAGLE'S TALONS

trate on keeping his army intact and on avoiding serious

defeat. He could attack only isolated portions of the British

army. His military objective had been to survive to buy

time, to tire the British, and to raise the cost of the war to

a level unacceptable in London. Nowthe French fleet could

challenge and perhaps defeat British sea power, so that the

British would not have the luxury of unlimited mobility.

With a strong ally Washington could afford to take risks;

he had more than his own meager resources to fall back on

should those risks lead to defeat. Perhaps more important

in the long run, the British were seriously distracted because

the war had suddenly broadened in scope, and other British

possessions were threatened. Finally, the hard work of

Washington and his officers, particularly such foreign advisers as Baron Friedrich Wilhelm von Steuben, produced

a trained core of Continental soldiers capable of acquitting

themselves well on the open battlefield. Not only could

Washington take risks, he had the tools to make success

possible .

The British, meanwhile, were thrown into great turmoil

by the new situation. Clearly, they would have to retrench

their forces in the American colonies and be prepared to

embark to other destinations that might be threatened by

the French. The first move was to relieve the lethargic

Howe, who was still in Philadelphia, and replace him with

Gen Sir Henry Clinton. After some confusion Clinton was

ordered to evacuate Philadelphia and consolidate his forces

in New York, where they could easily embark for other

ports.

Washington struck hard at Clinton as he retreated toward

New York. Deploying nearly half of his total force of Continentals against the bulk of the British army in the colonies,

Washington attacked Clinton at Monmouth, New Jersey,

on 27 June 1778. The two armies fought for several hours

and the Continentals acquitted themselves with distinction.

Clinton, however, was able to escape to New York. The

British, rebuffed at every turn, virtually abandoned their

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hope of recapturing the northern colonies . They remained

in New York, closely guarded by Washington and his

Continentals .

The British still hoped to take advantage of assumed Tory

sentiment in the southern colonies. To this end London

dispatched Lord Cornwallis in 1780. The British won a

great victory at Charleston and moved into the interior and

established a line of posts reminiscent of those in New Jersey during 1776. Meanwhile the American Congress appointed Gen Horatio Gates, the self-proclaimed "Hero of

Saratoga" (Benedict Arnold is believed to have been equally

if not more responsible for the American victory), as commander of the southern armies over the objection of Washington. The British soundly defeated Gates at Camden,

South Carolina, on 16 August 1780. Although the Continental contingent fought well, militia units broke and fled

from the field along with a panicked Gates, giving the British one of their most complete victories of the war. Only

about 700 of the nearly 4,000 Americans involved escaped.

Following that debacle Congress bowed to Washington's

wishes and appointed Nathanael Greene as army commander in the southern colonies .

Greene fought a classic guerrilla-style war against the

frustrated Cornwallis . Greene led Cornwallis on a gruelling

chase and turned and fought only when British forces were

spread out, tired, and ill supplied. Along with Francis Marion, another brilliant tactician of partisan warfare, Greene

harassed the British, wore them out, and occasionally defeated them. Finally, the frustrated Cornwallis broke away

from the chase and retreated to the coast at Wilmington,

North Carolina, to refit. Greene quickly headed back into

South Carolina to attack the posts that Cornwallis had earlier established and now could not defend .

Disgusted that he could not destroy the rebel forces once

and for all, Cornwallis headed north into Virginia hoping

for better luck. He had little success there, again chasing

elusive American forces about the countryside. Clinton,

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who was still in New York watching Cornwallis's campaign

with great concern and a degree of disbelief, ordered Cornwallis to the coast at Yorktown to meet with the British

fleet for refitting and possible embarkation. The fleet Cornwallis found at Yorktown, however, was not British.

Cornwallis's retreat into Yorktown presented Washington with a rare opportunity for a complete and politically

decisive victory. Cooperating with the French, Washington

quickly made his plan; speed was necessitated by knowledge

that the French fleet in the area around Yorktown would

soon be returning to the Caribbean. Washington had to

mass a superior army to besiege the British from the land

side. Washington and the French army commander, Comte

de Rochambeau, marched a mixed army from New York

(where they left forces demonstrating for Clinton's benefit)

to Yorktown. The movement took just over a month, a

considerable feat in eighteenth-century conditions . Washington managed to mass 16,000 troops while the French

fleet of 30 ships blocked a British escape by sea. Siege operations began under direction of the French engineers. Less

than a month after the siege began, Cornwallis surrendered

his entire army of 8,000 to Washington on 19 October 1781

after his plan to escape across the James River was foiled

by a storm that destroyed his boats.

After five years of hard fighting, the British had suffered

two crushing defeats at Saratoga and Yorktown and were

worse off than they had been in 1776. They still held New

York and Charleston (both closely watched by the Americans), which would be good bases for further operations.

Also the British faced a global war against powerful enemies, and an American army that could stand and fight in

the best European tradition. Worse yet, political opinion at

home was badly divided .

For all practial purposes, the war was over for the Americans. Although some fighting still occurred in the south

and west and the British had to be guarded at New York

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and Charleston, the real war was over and the Americans

were victorious .

The Revolutionary Warreintroduced ideological conflict,

a trend brought to fruition by the wars of the French Revolution. The reintroduction of ideology into warfare was a

significant step in the democratization of war. One unfortunate result was that, led by the memories of Breed's Hill

and Saratoga, for the next 160 years many Americans believed that they did not need a professional army of any

size and could instead rely on militia units. Although this

had disastrous consequences in 1812, in the Civil War, and

in the early battles of two world wars, the legend of the

minutemen died hard. Only after 1945, when America entered the world of international power politics as the leader

of the Western democracies, would the United States establish a sizable professional military force.

The question that remains concerns the performance of

Washington and his several British counterparts relative to

their unfamiliar circumstances and the political objectives

for which they fought. Both sides can, in hindsight, have

their judgment questioned.

It is clear that in 1776 the British squandered their best

opportunity to end the rebellion. Had Howe pressed his

advantage after defeating Washington in New York, the war

might have ended quickly. The American Revolution was,

in effect, a civil war. As clearly demonstrated later in the

American Civil War, rebel momentum and morale grow if

they are not quickly checked . Time was clearly on the side

of the Americans. Not only did American confidence grow,

but British will declined at home. The Americans were

aided and abetted by poor British planning (Howe going to

Philadelphia instead of aiding Burgoyne in 1777) and military blunders (Burgoyne's disaster and Cornwallis's entrapment at Yorktown).

Although ultimately successful, Washington's strategy

can also be questioned. Washington played for time well

and did an excellent job of keeping his fledgling army to77
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gether. He recognized the proper time to take the offensive

and to take the necessary risks to achieve decisive victory.

However, one can question his campaign in New York in

1776 and Philadelphia in 1777. On one hand, the failure

to at least attempt a defense of those two vital points might

have been a serious blow to American morale. On the other

hand, Washington's army was nearly trapped and destroyed

both in New York and at Brandywine Creek. The question

remains, however, were the benefits worth the possible

consequences?

Overall, Washington, the amateur soldier, must receive

higher marks than his professional British opponents. Although the British had a clear political objective, none of

the British commanders seemed to have a clear conception

of how to reach that objective. Washington, however,

seemed to have had a much clearer picture ofhow to achieve

his objective. His immediate objectives accurately changed

with changing circumstances and each objective was geared

toward the ultimate goal. The proof of this contention is

in the outcome.

Better State of the Peace

The American Revolution achieved its political objective

of independence with the signing of the Treaty of Paris in

1783, ending eight years of formal hostilities between Great

Britain and her former colonies. Just as de facto independence was achieved in 1775 when the British evacuated

Boston, so was permanent and legal independence a fact

when the British sailed out of New York, Charleston, and

Savannah in 1783 .

Unlike most wars, and certainly the major conflicts of

the twentieth century, American objectives were not truly

won on the battlefield. The yardstick that suggests that the

defeat of the enemy's armed forces is prefatory to imposing

those peace terms by which the victor defines the better

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AMERICAN REVOLUTION

state of the peace simply did not apply in the American

Revolution . The British army was certainly not destroyed

as a fighting force: in fact, it won most of the battles, and

with the exception of some inept generalship, it acquitted

itself well. If a goal in war is to overcome hostile ability,

the Revolution was at best a draw.

The reasons the war could be won in the absence of decisive military success can be boiled down to two factors.

The first was the nature of warfare as practiced in the eighteenth century. Unlike modern wars, it was fought by limited

means (basically because of technological limitations) and

with relatively small forces (largely because of budgetary

limits on raising and supporting large forces). The size and

kinds of armies available might be capable of decisive action in the comparatively confined space of continental Europe where the capture of a critical city would lead to peace .

The American colonies, however, were not well suited to

this kind of war; the territorial expanses were simply too

great for control by 30,000 British troops, and there were

no geographical points critical to the revolutionary cause.

Washington could not have eluded the British had the war

been fought in Belgium, but the British could not corner

him in America.

The second factor that made the war militarily inconclusive was the contrast in objectives and military strategies

adopted by the combatants . The European tradition called

for the open, frontal confrontation of standard, stand-up

fighting forces, but this was not what the British faced. The

Continental Army was simply neither large enough nor

good enough to take on the British in that manner. Given

the military balance, a strategy of attrition, featuring generous doses of what we now call unconventional warfare,

was the only available means. It was, moreover, a style of

warfare that better suited the rugged, heavily wooded American topography.

This style of warfare both confused and frustrated the

British, who never did devise an effective means for dealing

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with an enemy who hid behind trees in ambush and simply

melted away into the vast countryside when confronted by

a superior force .

If the rebels failed to overcome British hostile ability,

they did succeed in overcoming that element of British hostile will defined as the willingness to continue to bear the

costs of fighting . British cost-tolerance was, in the end, exceeded, and that was what proved conclusive. The lesson

was, or should have been, instructive for future generations.

The British were forced to fight an unfamiliar kind of war

on unfamiliar and hostile territory. The war was fought far

from home, straining supply capacities and raising economic costs (in more contemporary terms, the British had

a very long logistics tail). Moreover, the war dragged on

and on with apparently inconclusive results as casualties

continued to mount. The longer it lasted, the stronger the

protests became, and ultimately those who had opposed the

war all along gained the upper hand. Finally, a lack of support forced the British to pack up and go home, undefeated

militarily but with their will to continue shattered. So constructed, the parallels with Southeast Asia are stark and

painful.

The question of overcoming hostile British will (defined

as acceptance of American policy preferences-independence) is more difficult to assess. At one level, the British

clearly did accede to the American objective by signing the

peace treaty that formally created the new independent nation-state . At the same time, the British resented deeply

what had happened to them and showed disregard for the

American nation, as evidenced by their cavalier treatment

of former British sailors (impressment) who had been

granted asylum by the US government . That arrogance had

a great deal to do with leading the two nations to their

second conflict, the War of 1812 . Many observers maintain

that it was not until that conflict was resolved that British

hostile will toward the American state finally ended.

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CHAPTER 3

CIVIL WAR

The American Civil War represents the greatest American national trauma. It was the first conflict in the American experience that clearly and unambiguously met the

dual criteria of total war. The issue of union or disunion

of the nation was all-encompassing and could be resolved

only on the field of battle, and the war became a match

between totally mobilized societies . The result was the

bloodiest war in American history. When the last gunpowder haze rose and Robert E. Lee and Joseph E. Johnston

surrendered the remnants of their armies, more than

600,000 had died and nearly another 500,000 had been

wounded. And it had all been done at our own hand.

In many ways the Civil War was warfare in transition, a

junction between the classical conflicts of the eighteenth

century and the massive carnage of the twentieth century.

Tactically, battles were organized and fought along the lines

of the Napoleonic campaigns by armies led by officers who

had learned to fight that way at West Point, and both sides

(especially Lee's) were obsessed with the "decisive battle"

concept integral to Napoleon's success. There was even

room for some of the chivalry and good nature of earlier

wars. Whether it was Union soldiers trading coffee to their

Confederate foes for tobacco or Confederate Gen George

Henry Gordon escorting the wife of wounded Union Gen

Francis C. Barlow through the lines at Gettysburg to minister to her husband, some of the flavor of earlier warfare

remained. But in the end those characteristics faded, and

it was the precursors ofthe twentieth century-Grant, Sherman, and Sheridan-who prevailed .

At the time no one really appreciated how the face of war

8 1
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was changing. Partly this was the case because it was a war

fought and led by men who were largely inexperienced in

combat when it began. The soldiers available were largely

untrained militia (in the American tradition) who could

neither drill nor, in many cases, fire a gun. The only general

available to either side who had ever commanded anything

resembling an army was Winfield Scott, who was 75 years

old and who was promptly shunted aside for suggesting that

the war would be long and costly.

Those who believed the war would be short, decisive,

and glorious (and many on both sides did) were quickly

disabused of that notion. The war's first major battle, First

Manassas (Bull Run), showed both sides how poorly prepared they were for the war and how difficult the task would

be. After First Manassas both sides mobilized their societies, and in the following spring when the real fighting began, war machines of unprecedented size were ready to

grind against one another and produce equally unprecedented carnage.

Another reason most contemporary observers did not

recognize that the Civil War presaged the new face of war

was that the armies that fought never resembled the highly

drilled and disciplined troops of Europe. This led to the

conclusion that they and the war were aberrational . One

foreign military observer, the Prussian Helmuth von

Moltke, typified the war as "two armed mobs chasing each

other around the country, from which nothing can be

learned ." Missed were such harbingers of the future as the

elaborate entrenchments around Petersburg, Virginia, that

foreshadowed the awful trench warfare in France a half

century later.

The Civil War was our bloodiest conflict, and it is also

the war we best remember and most romanticize. Possibly

the reason is that it is the most personal of our wars; it is

certainly the biggest war fought on American soil. It is a

war we are constantly refighting in print and conversation,

and we never seem to tire of reconsidering it . Hardly a

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skirmish line is unmarked, virtually every major battlefield

has been commemorated as a national military park (one

wonders what citizens of Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, would

do for a livelihood if the climactic battle of the war had

been fought elsewhere, as both commanders intended). The

heroes of the defeated South adorn the side of Stone Mountain, Georgia, and we continue vicarious reenactments in

athletic contests called Blue-Gray or North-South. Clearly

this nostalgic sentiment is strongest in the South, which

both lost and supplied almost all the battlegrounds, but it

is a part of the heritage of all Americans.

Certainly alarge part of our obsession is deserved because

the Civil War, in terms of its effect on American society,

stands with the American Revolution as one of the two

most important events in our history. It was a major event

in the American experience in both a political and military

sense . Only the Revolution rivals this great conflict as a

political event; no war before or since comes close to matching it in terms of American blood expended. It is also the

great American tragedy; Americans turned the weapons of

war on their fellow Americans. Why and how it all happened occupies the pages that follow.

Issues and Events

Analyzing what caused the Civil War has occupied as

much thought and generated as much ink as have discussions of how it was fought and how it could have been

fought differently. For a long time, it was not even universally called the Civil War. Certainly at the time it was fought

that was not its popular name; in the North it was the War

ofthe Rebellion and in the South it was the WarofNorthern

(or Yankee) Aggression. It also has widely been known as

the War between the States (mostly in the South) and the

Brothers' War.

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If it has been difficult to agree on what to name the war,

it has been even harder to achieve anything resembling consensus about its causes . Slavery, the imposition of the

Northern industrial system on the South, and states' rights

have all been argued as the basic issue. No attempt is made

here to add to that debate or resolve the question ofwhether

the war was inevitable based on which root cause one picks.

Rather, our perspective is that there is truth in each of the

ways of looking at the issues and that each contributed to

the final result . Moreover, the issues leading to the war can

usefully be organized as a clash between what had evolved

as two distinct cultures that manifested themselves in progressively diverging political, economic, and social systems .

In this view issues like slavery or states' rights are significant

symptoms of the deeper incompatibility between two distinctly regional cultures and the values they represented.

The American culture of 1860 was in fact two very different

cultures . In the long run, those differences had to be resolved before there could be a truly United States of America. Whether these differences could have been reconciled

differently than they were is one of history's moot points.

The fact is that the tool for resolving the question was the

sword.

Northern industrialization was at the heart of the divergence between the sections, particularly because the South

did not follow the North's lead. By the eve of the Civil War,

Northern society was undergoing the pervasive change that

attended the industrial revolution, but there was no parallel

transformation in the South, which remained an agrarian

society. When both sections had been agricultural, the differences between the free-holding farm pattern ofthe North

and the slave-based plantation organization of Southern

agriculture were not critical. When Northern society moved

from an agrarian to an industrial base, the differences between the sections became more pronounced and vexing.

The issue of labor was at the heart of the friction. Although the majority of white Southerners owned no slaves,

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the plantation system that sustained the Southern economy

depended upon chattel slavery to supply its labor base. Cotton production was the core of this system, and slave labor

was appealing to the culture of cotton for several reasons.

First, growing cotton was a labor-intensive enterprise, but

it did not require highly trained workers or great efficiency.

Cotton was planted, cultivated, and harvested by hand. Little skill was involved, but a large work force was. A wagedbased labor system would have been too expensive to allow

cotton production to be economical. Unpaid labor in the

form of slaves kept costs low enough to turn a profit.

Second, the planters perpetually suffered from what we

would now call a "cash-flow" problem. Cotton did not produce a steady flow of income; rather, it produced revenue

in spurts when crops were sold. In addition there were frequently substantial lag times between harvest and payment.

The typical planter consigned his crop to a commodities

dealer, who transported the cotton to port and sold it for

a commission. Only then would the planter receive his payment. This process could take months, but the slaves never

knew the difference.

There were prices for this convenience that made slave

labor unattractive in the industrializing North. The major

cost was inefficiency. Slaves, because they were not paid

for their labor, had essentially no incentive to work harder

than necessary to avoid punishment. Hence, slaves were

not efficient which, while tolerable in agrarian labor, was

intolerable in an industrial setting. Industry, after all, has

efficient production as its ultimate measure of success .

This is, of course, a very pragmatic way to look at the

slavery question, but it is closer to how the average Yankee

viewed the issue than can be found in abolitionist literature.

The abolitionists were noisy but few in number and marginal in political clout (although many Southerners overestimated their influence) . To average Northerners slavery

was at worst an unfortunate institution that they could not

actively support. This attitude is much different than being

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morally repelled by slavery or offavoring its abolition where

it existed. To most Northerners who thought at all about

such matters, slavery was not so much evil as it was

inappropriate.

The two cultures were diverging in other ways as well.

Southern plantation society had become highly stratified

and stagnant, while Northern society was becoming progressively egalitarian and fluid. With slaves as their basis

of strength and the plantation as their domain, the planters

were an elite who dominated the South politically, economically, and socially. In that position the planters were natural

conservatives, seeking to preserve a position from which

they benefited. Beneath them were merchants and artisans

who benefited from the planters' largesse . Beneath the merchants and artisans was the larger population of poor whites

who toiled on rented land at subsistence agriculture, but

who, at least, had the slaves to look down on.

Slaves were the glue in all this; they provided labor for

the planter and a modicum of self-esteem for the tenant

farmer. At the same time, the existence of the slave system

effectively precluded change and development because slavery was custom made for the cotton plantation system but

was of dubious economic viability otherwise. The plantation needed slaves, and the institution of slavery needed

the plantation. The consequences of breaking the circle and

freeing the slaves were something few Southerners were willing to face.

The North was evolving very differently. Unfettered by

slaves and nurtured by waves of European immigrants and

foreign investment, the North was on its way to becoming

a modern industrial state. With industrialization came social change including the emergence of an urban working

class, a merchant class, and industrial entrepreneurs, groups

largely absent in the plantation South. The result was great

social fluidity and social and economic leavening. The

North was becoming a society of workers and shopkeepers;

the South remained a society of aristocrats and farmers.

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Coexistence became more difficult as the differences

magnified . At one level lines hardened regionally over legislation in Congress. Northerners argued for such things as

high tariffs on foreign industrial and consumer goods to

protect their new industries from competition and to create

markets for Northern products in the South . Southerners

resisted because they preferred European goods and lower

prices. Northerners pushed for legislation to require Southern cotton to be sent to Europe on American (which meant

New England) ships. Southerners resisted because such

shipping was more expensive and made their cotton less

competitive on international markets. Dual cultures were

increasingly coming into conflict in practical ways; something had to give.

The issue that broke the camel's back and that, combined

with the election of Abraham Lincoln, provided the proximate events leading to secession and the war was the extension of slavery to the territories. It was an issue that had

been brewing for some time. The Missouri Compromise of

1820 had defused it for a short time, but it returned in the

protracted fight over admitting slave-holding Texas to the

Union. The Great Compromise of 1850 attempted to settle

the problem, but the compromise was followed rapidly by

such unsettling events as the Dred Scott decision, Bloody

Kansas, and John Brown's raid at Harper's Ferry.

The issue was not the abolition of slavery in those states

where it existed ; only the abolitionists wanted to see that

happen and, as pointed out, they were politically inconsequential . Most Northerners, whatever their personal feelings about the slavery, were politically opposed to abolition

(Lincoln, ironically, was a leading spokesman of this position, although he personally found slavery morally repugnant). The question was whether slavery should be allowed

to exist in the territories yet to become states. Most Northerners opposed extension; most Southerners favored it .

On the pragmatic, political level, if slavery were allowed

in a territory, that territory would ultimately enter the

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Union as a slave state and the converse was also true. In

turn, a new slave-holding state would elect proslavery representatives to Congress who would generally support

Southern positions, just as free states would elect antislavery representatives of the opposite bent. In a system where

there was a rough balance between slave-holding and nonslave-holding representatives (especially in the Senate), additions on either side would tip the balance.

The question of the extension of slavery also created

problems at the deeper level of competing cultures. Extension was particularly vital to the South, because cotton cultivation rapidly depleted the soil. If the cotton and hence

the plantation system was to prosper, it had to be able to

move from depleted soil westward to fertile soil. Hemmed

in, the cotton culture would die; thus, the absence of extension amounted to slow strangulation . In the North the

extension of slavery was opposed because slavery was an

anachronism that had no place in the kind of society that

Northerners wanted and expected to build in the new lands.

In this light the extension issue emerges as a lightning rod

for the entire clash of cultures, and it boiled down to a zerosum game: if one side was to win, the other had to lose.

This irresolvable, irresistible conflict came to a head with

the election of Abraham Lincoln in 1860 . That his election

precipitated the secession of South Carolina and eventually

the ten other states that constituted the Confederacy speaks

to the intractability and high emotional level of the issues

dividing the country. As noted, Lincoln was not politically

an abolitionist, but his candidacy had been supported by

the more radical abolitionists . Lincoln's stated position (he

found slavery personally offensive but specifically protected

by the Constitution and hence not an item on the political

menu) was lost in guilt by association in the minds of many

Southerners.

When the calls for secession came, states' rights was the

rallying cry. This issue was not new; debate over the power

of the central government in relation to the states had per88
CIVIL WAR

vaded American history, and the politics preceding the

Civil War increasingly had a sectional basis. In the South

particularly, there was great sentiment for a weak central

government and primary investment of political authority

in the states. This position, of course, was more than abstract and academic. The South had its "peculiar institution" and social system to protect. The closer to home

political authority lay, the more compatible public policy

would be with maintaining that system. In the North the

development of a modern industrial state required a comparatively strong central government that could adopt national policies conducive to continued growth (protective

tariffs are a good example). The South generally did not

benefit from these policies and sometimes suffered from

them. At the heart of Southern opposition, however, was

the lingering fear that a strong central government might

adopt legislation directly attacking Southern institutions.

The election of a president believed to be actively sympathetic to abolitionism produced a greater strain than could

be borne.

Southern distrust of central government was not dissimilar to the spirit that helped give rise to the American Revolution. The government policies that made the distrust

something worth fighting about were, of course, different :

taxation and the quartering of soldiers in 1775 and the

prospect, rightly or wrongly perceived, of abolition in 1860.

The result, in both cases, was rebellion against what was

deemed tyranny.

There was another shared legacy of the resistance to

strong central government . If the critical political issue was

the supremacy of the rights of the states and central governance was equated with tyranny, then the new, alternative

government had to reflect those beliefs. Just as the Continental Congress, when it finally got around to writing a

constitutive document, produced a system in which all powers of central government flowed directly from the states

(the Articles of Confederation), so too did the Confederate

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States of America choose a confederal format. The result

was a state-dominated political system that conformed

nicely to philosophical predispositions but which featured

a central government with limited authority to make wartime decisions, a political problem that dogged the Davis

administration and the Confederate military command

throughout the war. Ironically, the very principles for which

Southerners fought hampered their ability to fight.

Once the South Carolina legislature voted unanimously

to dissolve the union between itself and the federal government on 20 December 1860 (an action quickly duplicated by six additional states and later by four others), the

question was how the rest of the country should react to

secession. The answer was not as clear then as it may appear

today. There was, for instance, considerable disagreement,

mostly in the North, about whether states had the right to

secede, and both those who said they did and those who

said they did not based their arguments on the Constitution.

In the South there was much less debate on the subject

because the rights of the states were viewed as supreme.

Even at that, there were isolated pockets of pro-Union sentiment in the South (mainly in places like eastern Tennessee

where there were few slaves) and, in one extreme case, an

Alabama county seceded from the Confederacy and declared itself the Free State of Winston.

The argument boiled down to the states' rights versus

strong central government debate. Those advocating the

legality of secession were in fact arguing states' rights, and

those who maintained that the states could not secede were

arguing the supremacy of the Union over its constituent

parts. The latter belief formed the basis for Lincoln's famous statement that "a house divided against itself cannot

stand," which clearly reflected how the president-elect felt

about the matter. When South Carolina seceded, however,

James J. Buchanan was a lame duck president, and he reacted officially to the secession by ignoring it . When Lincoln

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was sworn in as the nation's sixteenth president, some action would be necessary.

Political Objective

Lincoln determined that the Northern political objective

was to reestablish the Union, by force if necessary. As a

statement ofpurpose, this was disarmingly simple, but there

were powerful politico-military problems confronting its

realization.

The first and most obvious problem was that the South

did not intend to return to the Union voluntarily. The

North would have to fight for reunion and that led directly

to Lincoln's second problem. The objective was not popular

in the North. As suggested above, there was a sizable body

of opinion in the North that either believed secession was

a state's right or that the issue was constitutionally ambiguous, so that action to force reunion was itself constitutionally dubious. Some viewed the South's action with a

sense of relief, seeing an opportunity to do away with the

political divisiveness of the past decades, to foreclose the

extension issue, and to make slavery a non-American issue.

Still others opposed secession but did not consider it important enough to fight over.

As a political objective, in other words, reunification

lacked the moral power and persuasiveness to galvanize

Northern public opinion sufficiently to embrace the sacrifices ofwar, and public support would be a major problem

for Lincoln throughout the war. A more morally lofty objective was necessary to gather and sustain support .

Lincoln realized his problems, and part ofhis answer was

the Emancipation Proclamation, which added the end of

slavery to reunion as the political objective. This goal was

announced in September 1862 and took effect in January

1863, but emancipation had to overcome two obstacles before it could become part of the objective. The first was

9 1
EAGLE'S TALONS

Lincoln's own attitude, for he initially believed that the

South had to be readmitted to the Union with slavery intact

because the Constitution protected the institution . The necessities of the war effort changed his view. The other problem was timing: throughout 1862 the Union suffered a

succession of defeats in the Eastern theater that riveted

public attention . To change the objective in the midst of

calamity would have appeared an act of desperation that

could backfire and diminish rather than increase support .

What Lincoln needed was a military victory to precede his

announcement. He got his wish when Lee forayed into

Maryland and was stopped by George B. McClellan at Antietam (Sharpsburg). The battle itself was a draw, but it

forced Lee to retreat back into Virginia and thus looked

enough like a win to serve the purpose.

The effects of adding the abolition of slavery to the political purpose of the war were mixed. In the South the

reaction was mortification, reinforcing the citizenry's worst

fears about Lincoln and increasing their will to resist . In

the North the result was a sort of backhanded success.

The basic negative was that freeing the slaves was not an

overwhelmingly popular objective to most Northerners,

who were about as racist in their attitudes toward blacks

as were Southerners. With the exception ofthe abolitionists,

most Northerners shared Southern beliefs in the inherent

inferiority of the Negro, and even if they found slavery

repulsive in the abstract, many did not think the destruction

of the institution worth dying for. Evidences of Northern

racism continued throughout the war but were probably

most dramatically shown during the New York City draft

riot of 1863, when many free Negroes were lynched as part

of a violent reaction against federal conscription .

Making emancipation a major objective did, however,

add moral weight to the Union cause in at least two important ways. First, it cast the issue of support or opposition

to the war in the moral terms of antislavery versus proslavery . So framed, the constitutional ambiguities about the

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right to secede were sidestepped and the war became a

moral crusade wherein opposition to the war became tantamount to being proslavery, a position that relatively few

in the North held or at least were willing to admit. Overt

opposition to the war thus became morally difficult. Second, this moral elevation of the objective effectively ended

anypossibility that the Confederacy would gain recognition

by the European powers, notably Britain and France, which

had been primary prewar markets for Southern cotton.

Whatever else Europeans might think about the war, none

could politically align themselves with human chattel slavery. The proclamation thus ended the possibility of foreign

support for the Confederacy.

If the Union political objective was to restore the Union

and free the slaves, the Confederate objective was just the

opposite: to maintain its independence by whatever means

necessary and to avoid the emancipation of the slaves . As

long as the South maintained control over its territory and

had a functioning government, military forces, and a loyal

population, the Union could not achieve its political objective. Independence meant the freedom to pursue a way

of life increasingly threatened, as well as the more abstract

notion of states' rights .

Unlike the situation in the North, the Southern political

objective was overwhelmingly popular and sustained citizen

support for the war effort until nearly the end. The Southern

cause was to defend their homeland and their society from

a foreign enemy who could accomplish his purpose only

through physical invasion, subjugation, and occupation . In

a sense the objective for the Confederacy was analogous to

that of the Continentals during the Revolution, while King

George and Lincoln shared similar objectives . Just as King

George could not extinguish the American Revolution and

its goal of independent statehood as long as the Continental

Congress and Army continued to exist, President Lincoln

faced the same problem as he confronted the Confederate

government and armies. (It might be noted that, for both

9 3
EAGLE'S TALONS

sides, capture of the other's capital city was an obsession

throughout the warbecause the capital seemed to symbolize

the government . The fact that the two capitals were only

90 miles apart added to this fixation and dictated a great

deal of the military strategy in the Virginia theater of

operations .)

The popularity of defending home and loved ones from

an invading force added greatly to Southern political support for the war, and the Confederate political objective

was never seriously challenged from within. Support for the

objective and its translation into military activity was one

of the great advantages the South had (other primary ones

being fighting on the defensive and on familiar ground and

having generally superior military leaders), and this advantage was particularly obvious in contrast to the marked

ambivalence about the objective in the North. In turn these

political objectives translated into military objectives and

strategies for waging the conflict . As we shall see, the political objectives sometimes became blurred or distorted in

the process, but political concerns and considerations were

never far from the field of combat.

Military Objectives and Strategy

For the Union, that part of its political objective involving restoring the Union was simple and straightforward. It

required that the Rebel government be disbanded. Although

the basic Union objective was unambiguous, military objectives did not flow smoothly from it .

How does one destroy a rival government? Clearly, the

armed force that defends and supports the government

must be overcome, neutralized, or destroyed. But the very

act of destroying an enemy armed force and then the government that it supports can so alienate the defeated population that true union, in the unique sense of the United

States Constitution, can be ruined for decades after the

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immediate issue is settled. Political and military objectives

can be mutually exclusive if the actions taken to achieve

military objectives are improperly conducted. With this caveat in mind, the Union military objective was also unambiguous: overcome the Confederate military so that the

Rebel government could be disbanded.

With this said, however, the difficult question of how to

overcome the Confederate army remained. An offensive

strategy was certainly required, but it needed to be a strategy for a very rapid and decisive offensive. If the fighting

lasted for a lengthy period, the suffering and destruction

might be such that full union could be impossible to achieve

for generations. Quick victory was also an imperative because of the political situation within the Union states. A

drawn-out struggle would breed war weariness and undermine the Union war effort. Additionally, the Union victory

had to be decisive, because this was a war for unlimited

objectives. Lincoln could settle for no less than complete

victory. There could be no compromise with the supremacy

of the Constitution and the illegality ofvoluntary secession.

If either of these principles were not maintained, the concept of a United States would be in constant danger from

recalcitrant states. Union forces had to demand unconditional Confederate surrender to federal authority.

The Union's situation was not favorable for achieving

either a quick or a decisive victory. The regular Army was

pitifully small and better equipped to fight frontier Indians

than to engage in pitched battles against their erstwhile

brothers to the south . Reflecting the dissension ofthe times,

many of the Army's most capable officers resigned to serve

their home states in opposition to the Union. Thus the

Army was far too small, it was ill-equipped, and the quality

of its officer corps was questionable . It would take time to

expand, train, arm, and organize a great army that could

conquer the Confederacy. Burdened with these difficulties,

Union forces had to take the offensive, but how?

Winfield Scott, veteran of the War of 1812, hero -of the

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EAGLE'S TALONS

Mexican War, and general in chief of the United States

Army, had a plan. Scott's plan would exploit the Union's

crushing superiority in manpower, resources, and industrial

power and attack the Confederacy's weaknesses in those

same areas . Scott envisioned a tight naval blockade of the

Confederacy's long coastline and seizure of the Mississippi

River. This would cripple the South's economy by cutting

off exports of cotton and imports of finished goods and

hard currency. The blockade, combined with the limited

industrial capabilities of the Southern states, would deny

the Confederate army the wherewithal to wage war effectively. The Confederate army would slowly deteriorate as

would the entire Rebel economic situation. The consequences of rebellion would be brought home to average

Southerners in terms of empty stomachs and pocketbooks .

While the South deteriorated under the pressure of the

blockade, the Union Army would expand to the proportions

required. Northern factories would provide the finest

equipment and most sophisticated weapons. Time would

be available for proper training and the selection of capable

officers. Finally, using river lines of approach, particularly

from the west, the Union Army would crush the demoralized and ill-equipped Rebels. However, Scott believed this

last step might not be needed; the blockade alone would

probably bring the Confederates to their senses, lead to

negotiations, and restore the Union with a minimum of

rancor on both sides.

Lincoln rejected Scott's plan for several reasons. The

president desired action and a quick end to the war since

not seeking a quick victory would play into Confederate

hands . Neither Lincoln nor the Union could afford a long

and costly war. Such a situation would encourage the Copperheads (Northerners who sympathized with the Confederate cause) and spell political doom for the president .

Scott's "Anaconda Plan" aimed at a militarily efficient victory, but it would not be a speedy victory. Scott's hope for

a negotiated solution conflicted with the Union's need for

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a complete and decisive victory. One does not negotiate an

unconditional surrender.

Lincoln, a man with no military experience, wanted a

cordon offense, that is, simultaneous offensive pressure

around the periphery of the Confederacy. Such an offensive

would make maximum use of vastly superior Union resources andpresent the Rebels with the impossible situation

of trying to be militarily strong everywhere with inferior

resources. The result, he believed, would be rapid Confederate disintegration. If such a plan could be executed, the

Union victory would be both quick and decisive .

The actual differences between Scott and Lincoln had

more to do with time than concept. Both sought to bring

pressure upon the South from several directions, with Lincoln's concept being slightly more comprehensive. However, Scott realized that the Union Army was simply not

capable of such a massive undertaking and had to be greatly

expanded. Proper equipment had to be provided and capable officers found . Finally, raw recruits had to be trained

and disciplined if the Army was not to be a mob. Scott

realized that time was needed, but Lincoln demanded immediate action. At the same time, Scott's plan was unrealistic in the sense that the naval blockade, so vital to

weakening the Confederate armies and attacking the Rebel

will to fight, was not possible at the beginning of hostilities .

The Union Navy was not nearly large enough to impose an

effective and comprehensive blockade ofthe extensive Confederate coastline.

What eventually evolved was a strategy similar in concept

to Scott's plan but compressed in time to suit an impatient

Lincoln. However, this amalgamation was further modified

by the predilections of the Union generals and the temptations of Confederate targets close at hand.

Rather than a fully coordinated cordon offensive, the

Union effort was, in the beginning, two separate wars on

two different fronts. West of the Appalachian Mountains,

Union generals (the most successful being an obscure man

9 7
EAGLE'S TALONS

by the name ofUlysses Simpson Grant) struggled to capture

the length of the Mississippi River. The plan was to cut the

Confederacy in two from north to south. From this base

of operations, the forces in the west could then attack to

the east, particularly toward the vital rail centers at Chattanooga and Atlanta. A successful Chattanooga-Atlanta

campaign would subdivide the Confederacy, leaving the

Rebel states in "bite-size" pieces that could be individually

overwhelmed by superior Union forces. As important as

the Western theater was to eventual Union victory, it was

the poor relation when compared to Union operations east

of the Appalachian Mountains.

In the Eastern theater, the Union high command was

both threatened and beguiled. Lincoln and many others in

the government believed that Washington was seriously

threatened with a Confederate attack because the capital

was, in effect, on the front lines. Such an attack would not

only cause panic and destruction, but would damage Union

credibility with foreign governments and perhaps add fuel

to the fire fanned by the Copperhead movement. The fear

that the Confederate army would march on Washington

caused Lincoln to insist that significant forces guard the

city at all times. As a result, inordinate attention was paid

to Lt Gen Thomas J. "Stonewall" Jackson's Shenandoah

Valley campaign in 1862, which was only a Confederate

diversionary movement . The demand for troops to protect

Washington also frustrated Maj Gen George B. McClellan

as Lincoln withheld troops that McClellan had designated

for the Peninsular campaign against Richmond. Although

the withheld troops wouldlikely have made little difference,

Lincoln's action provided McClellan with a convenient rationalization for his failure to capture the Confederate

capital.

The Confederate capital beguiled the Union leaders. It,

too, was on the front lines, barely 100 miles from Washington. Union planners envisioned a drive toward Richmond which, they believed, wouldbe fiercely defended. The

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decisive battle that would destroy the Confederate army

would be fought in front of the city, and the war would

quickly be over. Such a plan had much to offer as long as

the purpose was to draw the Rebel army into decisive battle .

However, as time wore on, Richmond itself became the

objective. Union commanders seemed much more interested in capturing the Confederate capital than in fighting

the Confederate army. Richmond itself had limited strategic importance, certainly not enough importance to warrant the attention and sacrifice it received in the early years

of the war.

Union plans in the Eastern theater have been heavily

criticized by military historians. Particular wrath has been

directed toward the Union campaigns in northern Virginia

and the bloody Union defeats that were their result.

Such criticism is probably far less justified than many

believe. The basic idea of a decisive battle fought for the

Rebel capital had considerable merit when considered in

light of Union political objectives. Lincoln's desire that the

war be short and decisive was wholly appropriate and a

campaign toward Richmond offered the opportunity for a

quick and decisive victory. Execution of the plan rather

than the plan itself was the problem. In this respect, some

of the blame must be laid at Lincoln's feet for forcing the

action before the Union Army was fully prepared. The most

serious deficiency was in senior leadership . The Army suffered defeat after defeat as George McClellan, Gen John

Pope, Ambrose Burnside, and Gen Joseph Hooker successively tried to lead the blue-clad troops to Richmond. Had

Lincoln taken the time to ensure that the Army was well

trained and well officered, the traumatic defeats at Manassas, Fredericksburg, and Chancellorsville, to name but

a few, might have been avoided. The instant action Lincoln

desired would have been delayed by some months, but in

the long run the course of the war might have been significantly shortened .

The Confederates faced far different problems and had

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far different objectives from those of the Union. The Confederate objective was also simple and straightforward-to

defend itself from "foreign" invasion and thus protect the

sovereignty of the Rebel states. Such objectives clearly dictated a defensive strategy making it possible for the Confederates to fight, in Clausewitzian terms, the strongest

form of war. Despite the military advantages peculiar to a

defensive strategy and the moral advantage of fighting to

defend hearth and home, the Confederacy was in a disadvantageous position.

Economically the Rebel states were the poor cousins of

the Union, particularly in terms of those heavy industries

important to a war effort . Northern factories produced 97

percent of the nation's firearms and 96 percent of the nation's railroad equipment. The North was agriculturally independent as well as industrially self-sufficient . In the

South, the economy revolved around the production of cotton and tobacco for export. Perhaps most important, the

North had a comprehensive rail system, while the South

had a series of independent railroads built primarily to get

plantation products to port cities. Only one trunk rail line

connected the far-flung eastern and western Rebel states.

Manpower and political organization were also areas of

Rebel weakness. Many figures have been used to estimate

Northern and Southern manpower ratios. Some authorities

count the slave population and others do not . Still others

treat slaves as less than a full person available for combat,

but still count them an advantage because of the work they

accomplished on the home front. All things considered, the

best estimate of relative combat potential seems about five

to two . Added to the South's manpower problem was its

fragmented command of available manpower. The Confederacy was built on the concept of states' rights. The Rebel

government never achieved the required centralized control

over Confederate assets and never achieved an effective

centralized command structure for its military forces.

The Confederate problem was to defend a vast territory

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despite the disadvantages of an inferior economic base and

lesser manpower. Union forces could attack from many

directions (Lincoln's strategy) and the Rebels could not be

strong everywhere. One solution to the dilemma was to

obtain foreign allies much in the manner of the rebels during the American Revolution. Cotton, needed by the factories in Europe, offered an economic bargaining chip .

However, Europeans would not back a sure loser on the

battlefield. Thus it was incumbent upon Southern armies

to demonstrate their viability .

Robert E. Lee, first as the military adviser to Confederate

President Jefferson Davis and later as commander of the

Army of Northern Virginia, settled upon an offensive-defensive strategy. Although strategically on the defensive, the

Rebel armies would often be tactically on the offensive . By

taking the offensive, Lee hoped to dictate the time and place

of battle. By controlling the flow of events, Lee hoped to

offset Union advantages in manpower and materiel. Additionally, tactical victories, particularly successful forays

into Union territory, could set the stage for intervention by

sympathetic foreign governments.

As a result, after fending off Union attacks toward Richmond, Lee invaded the Union, first Maryland and later

Pennsylvania . Both expeditions ended in disastrous losses

for both sides, but losses that the Confederacy could afford

less considering its manpower disadvantage. Meanwhile, in

the West, the Union captured the length of the Mississippi

River and began a methodical campaign to seize Chattanooga and Atlanta.

Lee has also been criticized for a Richmond or Virginia

fixation. While he concentrated his attention on this area,

the Confederacy was destroyed from another direction .

Such a fixation would be normal for Lee as he was a Virginian. He resigned from a senior post in the US Army to

offer his services to his state, not to the Confederacy. Such

a fixation was a consequence of the concept of states' rights.

It must be said in Lee's defense, however, that the aban-
EAGLE'S TALONS

donment of the Confederate capital without a spirited defense would have been looked upon unfavorably by possible

foreign allies and certainly would have demoralized the

home front. Virginia was the most important and most

prosperous of the Confederate states and its return to the

Union had it not been defended would have been a political

and military disaster of the first magnitude.

Lee's offensive-defensive strategy led to terrible and irreplaceable losses during his forays into the North. Thus the

battlefield execution of these plans left much to be desired,

but the basic strategy was probably correct considering the

circumstances. Lee had to make some attempt to control

the pace and place of the action or risk being overwhelmed

and outmaneuvered by vastly superior resources.

Political Considerations

As the previous discussion indicates, the line between

purely military and purely political considerations was vague and shifting . The result was inevitably some level of

tension between political and military leadership on both

sides and a certain amount of what one might call the "low

politics" of war (marked by petty bickering, political posturing, and the like). At the same time, the "high politics"

of war that influences the selection of appropriate military

strategies can be seen in the major campaigns and battles

of the war.

Low politics, which military people refer to derisively as

political interference in military operations and which is

generally what the military means when it talks about "political wars," was an integral part ofthe conflict . The Union

side probably had the more severe problem, partly because

President Lincoln was not himself a military man and did

not fully comprehend the military mind (a problem so severe that he had to appoint Gen Henry Wager Halleck as

his chief of staff to translate messages to and from his field

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commanders). This lack of communications was most obvious during the Peninsular campaign when McClellan

either misunderstood or ignored Lincoln's instructions

about how many troops to keep in front ofWashington and

then fretted over and demanded more troops. Meanwhile

the president was directing those reinforcements to protect

the capital.

At the same time, President Lincoln had extraordinary

difficulty finding military leadership willing or able to carry

out the types of operations that would achieve the political

objective, especially in the Virginia theater. The Union record was abysmal until Grant was transferred from the West

(where, with little publicity, he had been doing quite well).

Before Grant's elevation the war effort was hampered by

petty squabbling between military and civilian commands

and marred by such unfortunate efforts as Gen John Alexander McClernand privately raising an army and marching

to Vicksburg, expecting to usurp Grant's command. Tactically, Grant made his share of mistakes (as anyone who

has stood on the Confederate redoubts and redans at Vicksburg and looked down the hills that Union troops tried to

assail on 19 and 22 May 1863 can attest) ; but he understood

the strategic objective of the war and with the considerable

assistance of William T. Sherman and Philip H. Sheridan,

he was able to translate the political objective into a successful military objective where others had failed .

In the Southern case, President Davis had graduated

from West Point, seen service in the Mexican War, and

been secretary of war in the James Buchanan administration. As a result, he considered himself well qualified to

direct the military effort and did so personally. He acted

as commander ofall Confederate forces until the war's waning months when that title was given to Lee. Although the

overall effect of Davis's personal level of involvement is

still contested by historians, in one case it proved disastrous. Because of mutual antagonism (each thought himself

the other's intellectual superior), Davis relieved Gen Joseph

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E. Johnston of his command as Sherman was preparing to

assault Atlanta, replacing him with the mercurial Gen John

B. Hood. Hood promptly attacked Sherman and was decisively defeated, paving the way for Sherman's march to

the sea. Before Lee was given command of all Confederate

forces and could reinstate Johnston, Hood had largely destroyed the Army of Tennessee in futile attacks at Franklin

and Nashville, Tennessee, a loss from which the South could

not recover.

Despite these kinds of political diversion, the war was

fought with more important political considerations in

mind. Domestically, a major concern throughout the war

was influencing public opinion in the North. Since the war

was not particularly popular and there was a sizable peace

movement in the North, a prime Southern purpose in following a strategy of attrition was to drag out the war to the

point that Northern cost-tolerance, always a fragile commodity, would be exceeded and the Union would simply

quit the contest (a strategy closely paralleling that of Washington during the Revolution and subsequently used against

the United States by North Vietnam). In other words, the

South did not need to win the war to achieve its independence; rather, it needed to avoid losing only long enough

for Northern public opinion to turn decisively against the

war. Had it not been for the succession of Southern military

reverses beginning at Gettysburg and Vicksburg and culminating with the fall of Atlanta (which all observers consider to have been pivotal to Lincoln's defeat of the peace

candidate, General McClellan, in the 1864 election), the

strategy might well have succeeded .

Even if the political objective had not suggested a war of

attrition aimed at undermining the Union's willingness to

persevere, the South's physical circumstances made such an

approach the most reasonable way to fight. Fighting on the

defensive meant the North, which hadto attack and destroy

the Confederate armies to win, would be fighting away from

home in hostile, unfamiliar territory, which was bound to

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create military and morale problems. At the same time,

fighting on both the strategic and tactical defensive was

likely to eventuate in low casualties for the manpower-poor

South, especially given the emphasis on frontal assaults at

the tactical level. The Battle of Fredericksburg and Joe

Johnston's delaying campaign between Chattanooga and

Atlanta were classic instances of this philosophy in action.

There were, of course, variant opinions about how to

achieve the political objective, most notably Lee's concept

of the offensive-defensive. Beyond its sheerly military aspects as already described, this strategy sought to have a

political impact as well, attacking Northern morale by demonstrating Northern vulnerability to attack. The purpose of

invading the North was, of course, not conquest, an objective clearly beyond the Confederacy's political aim as well

as its military ability. Rather, part of the purpose was demonstration : in the 1862 invasion of Maryland to show foreign governments the Confederacy was a military force

worthy of recognition; in the 1863 Pennsylvania campaign

to put a major federal city (Philadelphia, Baltimore, or even

Washington) in danger and hence to stir antiwar sentiment;

or in Jubal Early's dash to within five and a half miles of

the Capitol to shock the North. With the perfect vision of

hindsight one can, of course, question the wisdom of this

approach since each venture was militarily thwarted, failed

in its demoralizing mission, and cost the South irreplaceable troops.

If the South's purpose was to exceed Union cost-tolerance, Lincoln's problem was how to avoid that fate . As

suggested already, he was hampered early in the contest by

the absence of a compelling political objective around

which to unite his population and the inability to identify

competent commanders. The ideal solution would have

been a quick and decisive victory that would nominally test

popular will, and it was this hope that gave rise to cries of

"On to Richmond" and that eventuated in Irvin McDowell's humiliating rout at First Manassas. Once that con105
EAGLE'S TALONS

frontation convinced both sides they would need to

organize real armies for a protracted war, Lincoln's major

need was for victories that would show progress toward the

desired end, but for the first two years of combat, the only

successes were in the western theater, whereas the Army of

the Potomac faced a seemingly invincible force in Lee's

Army of Northern Virginia.

The differing levels of support for the war in the North

and South and the delicacy of Lincoln's problem in maintaining public willingness to continue are well illustrated

by the two sides' approach to conscription. In the South

where the war was very popular, a universal conscription

system was quickly adopted and effectively enforced, with

the result that approximately 80 percent of eligible males

either volunteered or were drafted into the service . By contrast the Lincoln government was reluctant to institute any

kind of draft early in the war for fear of antiwar backlash.

Instead it relied on appeals to governors to raise volunteer

militia units to meet manpower needs. This system had

serious military disadvantages . Usually the units were organized by local politicians who had no military experience,

but who were elected as commanders. At the same time,

since these troops arrived as units, they could not be integrated into existing veteran units, meaning the Union was

constantly fighting with inexperienced units and veteran

units were perpetually undermanned. When a conscription

system was finally introduced, political necessity (the draft's

unpopularity) required that it be easy to avoid. Thus the

system featured multiple sources ofexemption and a draftee

could meet his commitment by hiring someone to take his

place. Only about 6 percent of Union forces in the war were

conscripts, yet even this limited form of draft resulted in

numerous riots .

International politics was also a concern. The major issue

was recognition of the Confederacy by the European powers, and it was important for both symbolic and material

106
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reasons. Symbolically, recognition would create legitimacy

for the Confederate government as the representative of a

sovereign nation-state, meaning that, in international legal

terms, reunion could only be achieved by aggression across

an international border. The US government's legal justification for the war rested on refusal to recognize the right

to secede, meaning that its military action was legally no

more than restoration of order within territory still part of

the nation. Recognition of the South by third parties would

have brought that rationalization into question and

strengthened the case for the Northern peace movement.

Materially, the Confederacy needed recognition to ensure

continuing trading relations with Britain and France, the

traditional consumers of Southern cotton. Both countries

were major processors of cotton, but more important, they

were potential suppliers of armaments Southern industry

could not produce in adequate supply. Recognizing this

weakness of the Southern economy, the Union blockaded

Southern ports, both to deny the Confederacy access to

outside supply and to ensure that European ships would be

subject to seizure in the event they tried to trade with the

South.

There were, at the outset, considerable temptations for

the British and French to offer recognition. Both countries

were heavily dependent on Southern cotton for their textile

industries and the plantation system provided a good market for European goods, especially luxury items . Freedom

from protective tariffs erected for the benefit of Northern

industry and from having to ship cotton to market on American ships would mean lower cotton prices . Thus trade

could be expected to expand. Moreover, there was growing

recognition that an expanding United States would become

a power to be reckoned with sometime in the future . Fragmenting that developing giant into two smaller and weaker

states had its own independent appeal.

The Confederate leadership tried to push the British and

107
EAGLE'S TALONS

French governments to grant recognition, and a lively competition between Union and Confederate diplomats in European capitals ensued. The Southern strategy for forcing

positive decisions revolved around using "King Cotton" as

a weapon, but the strategy proved disastrous . To create

pressure in London and Paris, the Confederacy decided to

withhold the 1861 cotton crop from the market, letting it

pile up on Southern wharves until diplomatic recognition

occurred. Although getting that crop past the Union "paper

blockade" would have been relatively easy in 1861 (thus

gaining needed foreign capital to buy weapons), by 1862

the blockade was real and cotton's commercial potential

was greatly reduced. In effect the South squandered a year's

crop and the profits it could have brought. As the blockade

tightened, Britain turned to and nurtured cotton production

in its colonies (especially Egypt and India) so that by war's

end, dependency on Southern cotton had largely evaporated. At the same time, the Union expanded its midwestern grain trade with Europe. King Corn replaced King

Cotton.

The Confederacy also had to establish its political viability before European nations would recognize the young

government. To do so required demonstrating the ability

to resist reunion, which translated into appearing to be a

military winner. It is generally conceded that demonstrating

that capacity was a major reason that Lee decided to extend

his unsuccessful 1862 campaign into the North. If Confederate armies could successfully forge their way into Union

territory, it was reasoned, their prowess would be established and European qualms would be overcome. When

McClellan stopped the Confederate advance at Antietam

and forced the Army of Northern Virginia to retreat back

across the Potomac, that hope went aglimmering, as did

the chances of European recognition of the Confederacy.

Lincoln's declaration of the Emancipation Proclamation

provided the final coffin nails for those hopes.

108
Military Technology and Technique

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Civil War armies were the first to benefit significantly

from the fruits of the industrial revolution. Although often

called the first modern war because of the nature of the

implements used, in truth the war served as bloody transition from the limited wars of the eighteenth century to

the mechanized wars of the twentieth century. The contrasts

between the old and the new were particularly stark. Steam

power, particularly the railroads, was one of the ingredients

critical to victory, but reliance on muscle power remained

pervasive. Impersonal and unseen military staff work was

critically important to the successful operation ofmass armies and yet so was the personal leadership and bravery of

frontline commanders. The "indirect approach" exemplified by deft maneuvering of troops was common and yet

so were old-fashioned and bloody frontal assaults. The Civil

War was warfare in transition .

The most influential technological development was not

a weapon but a means of transportation . Railroads changed

the face of warfare. For the first time mass armies could

be rapidly transported over vast distances and could be kept

well supplied over those same distances . Armies could

quickly concentrate for attack or quickly reinforce for defense. For example, at First Manassas (Bull Run) a Southern

railroad brought fresh troops to the battlefield from the

Shenandoah Valley to save the day for the Rebel forces.

Railroads made possible a vast expansion in the scope

of war. Unlike the individual small battlefields of the past,

the Civil War featured separate and far-flung theaters of

war, each populated by mass armies transported and supplied by rail . The addition of the telegraph meant that not

only could mass armies fight across vast areas, they could

also be centrally controlled in a common coordinated effort .

Railroads offered considerable advantages in mobility and

speed, but with these advantages came considerable "baggage." Because of their importance to both sides, strategy

109
EAGLE'S TALONS

began to revolve around rail lines. Armies in the field became tied to rail lifelines and thus had to protect those

lifelines at all costs. Often offensive maneuvers were aimed

at seizing or cutting vital enemy rail links while defensive

maneuvers were often aimed at protecting those same lifelines. Thus such relatively insignificant (at the time) settlements as Chattanooga, Atlanta, and Petersburg became

vitally important because they were major railroad junctions. Although railroads may have been the most important technological advance, the industrial revolution did not

overlook improvements in the tools of war themselves .

The standard infantry weapon remained the single-shot,

muzzle-loaded weapon . However, the Civil War weapon

had a rifled barrel giving it much greater accuracy over a

much longer range than smoothbore weapons used previously. The most common rifle had a .58-caliber bore and

was fired using a percussion cap. Although it had a 1,500-

yard range, it was most effective and quite accurate at 500

yards, a tenfold increase over Revolutionary War smoothbore weapons. Until the invention of the so-called minie

ball, muzzle-loading rifles had a very slow rate of fire because ofthe difficulty in forcing the tight-fitting bullet down

the rifled barrel when reloading. But the hollow-based minie

ball was made 1/100 of an inch narrower than the bore

since the base would expand to fit the barrel when the powder charge exploded . Thus the minie ball could be loaded

into a rifle as quickly as a musket ball could be loaded into

a smoothbore weapon.

Both breech- and magazine-loaded weapons had come

into use before the Civil War. The Sharps and early Winchester rifles and the Hall and Spencer carbines were all in

private use. They were also used to a limited extent by the

contending Blue and Gray armies. However, neither government chose to make them a standard weapon because

of the extensive retooling time and expense required to

convert government production facilities .

The standard artillery pieces of the Civil War were the
CIVIL WAR

6-pounder bronze gun and the 12-pounder howitzer. Although really effective only at close range (less than half a

mile), these smoothbore guns remained effective anti-infantry weapons using grapeshot. Rifled artillery pieces were

also used but in far fewer numbers. Although they were

much more accurate at longer ranges, they could not be

sighted accurately against distant targets. More important,

the rifled shell had a relatively small explosive charge, an

important factor when the enemy is well dug in.

The Civil War saw numerous other advances in the technology of war. The first rapid-fire weapons (based on Richard Jordan Gatling's concept of revolving barrels) saw

limited service during this conflict, as did a primitive submarine. Neither had a significant impact upon the war's

prosecution or outcome.

However, the use of armored ships not only had considerable impact but also foreshadowed the all-steel fleets that

would become standard by the end of the century. Armor

more than proved its worth in combat and made unprotected wooden-hulled vessels obsolete for close combat. The

design of the Northern ironclad "monitors" with their revolving gun turrets was the first attempt at a design that,

in modified form, would become standard in the age of the

great battleships.

The technology placed in service on the battlefield during

the Civil War significantly changed the techniques used in

battle, the results achieved, and the overall strategies of

armies. More important, perhaps, the importance of the

economic base of the successful prosecution of war became

clearly evident.

The use of rifled infantry weapons with their highly accurate fire at long range meant that the linear infantry tactics of the eighteenth century and the Napoleonic era would

have to change. In that earlier era, accurate fire extended

only to about 50 yards, meaning that attacking formations

could move close to the defenders with some degree of

impunity. Now, however, infantry was under constant and
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accurate fire while still hundreds of yards distant from the

intended goal. The close-order formations of the previous

age were suicidal and quickly disappeared. Officers still

attempted to align the looser formations to a certain degree

in both offensive and defensive modes. On the offensive,

a reasonably straight wave of attackers would increase the

shock effect when the attackers struck the defender's lines

and allow the defender little opportunity to reinforce points

of breakthrough. On the defensive, aligned troops could

increase the effectiveness of volley fire.

Infantry, whether attacking or defending, went to ground

to avoid the accurate long-range fire of opponents . On the

defensive, breastworks became the order of the day. On the

offensive, "attack by rushes" eventually became a common

practice . Infantry would charge forward and then fall to the

ground after a short rush. They would regain their feet for

another short rush and then again seek cover. The objective

was, of course, to reduce exposure to hostile fire.

In the Civil War firepower dominated the battlefield.

Casualty rates increased dramatically with instances of 80-

percent casualties in a given unit during a single engagement. Today such a casualty rate would be shocking. The

impact during the Civil War was even greater considering

the primitive medical treatment available. Aserious wound

in the trunk of the body was likely to be fatal. Serious

wounds in the limbs usually resulted in amputation. To

make matters worse, the causes of infection had not been

discovered. Surgeons typically did not clean their instruments before or between operations, and the result was

added suffering and death. The army of survivors maimed

by the surgeon's knife were an embittering postwar legacy

that hindered the process of reunification .

All of these factors led to the inescapable conclusion that

"modern war," as practiced during this period, depended

upon a strong economic base. Mass armies required massive amounts of weapons, munitions, and other supplies .

(Munitions were required in previously undreamed of
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quantities because of the size of armies and because longer

range weapons were fired more often both on the offensive

and on the defensive .) Such massive amounts of weapons

and munitions could not be provided by cottage industry.

Moreover, the armor of ships and the heavy equipment

required to operate railroads could be provided only by an

industrialized economy.

Because of these factors, the Confederacy was in an almost untenable position. The South had almost no heavy

industry (the exception being the Tredegar Iron Works in

Richmond), and perhaps worse, it did not have a first-class

rail system. The South trailed in even such mundane requirements as the production ofuniforms. Although blessed

with an abundance of the raw material (cotton), Southern

uniforms were handmade. In the North, the Howe sewing

machine and the McKay shoe-stitcher manufactured uniforms in great quantity. Considering the Confederate disadvantages, it is amazing that the Southerners were able to

resist as long as they did.

Military Conduct

Tradition has it that one Edmund Ruflin, a Confederate

firebrand from Virginia, fired the first shell at Fort Sumter

in Charleston Harbor and thus the first shot in the Civil

War. The time was 4:30 A.M. on Friday, 12 April 1861 .

Federal authority was physically challenged, shot and shell

were used against Union soldiers; there was no turning

back. The Confederate commissioners sent to Washington

by Jefferson Davis to negotiate a settlement short of war

had been rebuffed and departed from the Union capital on

the day before the guns fired upon the beleaguered fortress

in Charleston Harbor.

That first battle was not much of a contest and not much

of a battle. Despite 34 hours of bombardment, not a single

soldier was killed. Fires threatened the powder magazine
EAGLE'S TALONS

in the fort and forced the garrison's commander to surrender. The first battle was over quickly and almost painlessly,

a clear victory for the Rebel forces.

Lincoln moved rapidly to prepare the Union for war. On

15 April he declared that an insurrection existed and called

out 75,000 militia from the various Northern states. On

the 19th he declared a naval blockade of the Confederacy.

In May Winfield Scott proposed his Anaconda Plan, and

federal troops began massing in the Washington area. By

July an impatient Lincoln was more than ready for his army

to move south. "On to Richmond" was the cry. The Confederate legislature was due to meet in Richmond on 20

July, and Union patriots wanted to overrun the new Rebel

capital before the meeting took place.

General McDowell and his Union Army departed their

base on the Potomac on 16 July and proceeded toward

Manassas, Virginia, to face the first obstacle on the road

to Richmond, Gen P. G. T. Beauregard and his Rebel army

(at that time called the Army of the Potomac-a name

quickly discarded and, ironically, adopted by the Union).

McDowell outnumbered Beauregard 35,000 to 20,000, but

west of Manassas in the Shenandoah Valley, Gen Joseph

E. Johnston had 12,000 Confederates ready. Leaving a

small covering force to demonstrate and deceive the local

Union commander, Johnston's forces boarded trains on the

Manassas Gap Railroad and arrived at Manassas in time

to tip the scales in favor of the Confederates. Among those

who came with Johnston was one Thomas J . Jackson, who

during this battle earned the nickname "Stonewall" for his

fortitude under heavy fire as he rallied retreating Confederate units.

The battle was fought on 12 July 1861 . Initially, McDowell's forces were successful and the Rebel forces fell

back (it was Jackson's famous action of standing fast "like

a stone wall" that helped to stop the retreat). Regrouping,

Beauregard and Johnston counterattacked, and the Union

forces began to fall back. Green Union troops turned an
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orderly retreat into a disorganized rout as they fled toward

Washington amid bag, baggage, and the many spectators

from the capital who had come to see the expected great

victory. Had the Southern forces been able to mount an

organized pursuit, it is entirely possible they could have

swept into the Union capital. McDowell's forces were certainly in no condition to offer an effective resistance .

This first Battle of Manassas (also called Bull Run after

the creek running through the area) foreshadowed much of

what was to come. It was the first indicator that Union

victory would be difficult and lengthy. McDowell's rout

highlighted the need for training, discipline, and better leadership. First Manassas (there would be another battle in

this same area) also indicated how costly the war would be.

In this brief battle, the combined casualties numbered

nearly 5,000 and both sides ended where they started.

McDowell's forces licked their wounds (physical and mental) on the Potomac while the victorious Rebels remained

in northern Virginia.

Few major battles were fought in the eastern theater until

the spring of 1862, as Lincoln and his generals argued over

what course of action they should follow. In February 1862,

however, the focus of the struggle shifted to the western

theater. There, Union Brig Gen Ulysses S. Grant moved

boldly to seize Confederate Forts Henry and Donelson on

the Cumberland and Tennessee rivers and thus began clearing the upper reaches of the Mississippi River and its tributaries. Grant's victories were the opening salvos in the

campaign that would seal the Confederacy's doom.

Although the battles for Forts Henry and Donelson were

important steps in clearing the upper Mississippi, their

principal importance was in raising Grant to prominence .

While better known Union generals struggled in northern

Virginia and met defeat, Grant accumulated victories in

the West. However, Grant's next major engagement would

be a questionable victory at a place known as "bloody

Shiloh."
EAGLE'S TALONS

Grant moved south from Fort Donelson as part of a

three-pronged Union offensive . Grant moved down the

Tennessee River toward the northern borders ofMississippi

and Alabama, and Brig Gen Don Carlos Buell and his Army

of the Ohio moved south from Kentucky to Nashville (vacated by Confederate Gen Albert Sidney Johnston after the

fall of Fort Donelson). Buell was to continue his southwestward movement andjoin forces with Grant at Pittsburg

Landing on the Tennessee River. Meanwhile Gen John

Pope proceeded down the Mississippi River from Cairo,

THE CIVIL WAR

Major Union Offensive Campaigns
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Illinois, clearing the river of Rebels as far south as Memphis

by June.

Confederate General Johnston faced a serious situation.

Rebel forces were scattered throughout the western portion

of the Confederacy and the Union forces were concentrated

in a well-coordinated offensive that threatened to divide

the Confederacy from north to south. Johnston's first move

was thus to begin concentrating his forces, bringing General

Beauregard, erstwhile hero at First Manassas, from Mississippi and Gen Braxton Bragg from Alabama. Johnston

concentrated about 40,000 men at Corinth, Mississippi,

just south of gathering Union formations encamped at

Pittsburg Landing and around nearby Shiloh Church.

Johnston attacked early on the morning of 6 April and

surprised Grant's ill-prepared forces . The Union forces

were steadily forced back toward the banks ofthe Tennessee

River, and only Grant's personal efforts on the battlefield

finally established a defensive position that held the Rebels

as the day drew to a close. The next morning Grant counterattacked. After hard and bloody fighting, the Rebels were

forced from the field in a disorganized retreat. Shiloh was

a terrible defeat for the Southerners, who suffered 11,000

casualties, including Gen A. S. Johnston, but Grant's victory was none too sweet. He had underestimated the enemy,

had been caught unprepared, had nearly been badly defeated, and had lost about 14,000 men.

For the Confederates in the West, the situation now approached desperation. In addition to the defeats in Kentucky, Mississippi, and Tennessee, Adm David Farragut

forced the mouth of the Mississippi River in April. In May

he sailed upriver and occupied both New Orleans and Baton

Rouge. The Union admiral also had the audacity to sail

farther up the river and bombard Vicksburg, the last major

Rebel river stronghold. But Vicksburg was not New Orleans

(which fell without a shot). Vicksburg would require all the

talent and power that Grant could muster.

While the situation in the West became ominous for the
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Rebels during the first six months of 1862, events in the

Eastern theater were totally different. As the idle armies sat

facing each other after First Manassas, George B. McClellan, the new Union commander, devised a bold plan

to outflank the Rebel forces of Joseph E. Johnston that

blocked the route from Washington to Richmond. McClellan planned to sail down the Potomac and the Chesapeake Bay and land at Fort Monroe on the Virginia coast.

From there he would quickly march up the peninsula between the York and James rivers and take Richmond "from

the rear" before Johnston could react.

Thanks to Confederate sympathizers in the Washington

area, Johnston was soon aware of McClellan's plan. While

McClellan waited until 17 March to move, Johnston withdrew his army from Centreville and marched toward the

same area. Thus the real purpose ofMcClellan's giant flanking maneuver-surprise-was lost.

By early April McClellan had landed 50,000 troops at

Fort Monroe and had begun to move up the peninsula. A

skillful defense by Confederate Maj Gen John B. Magruder

delayed the advance to the surprise of McClellan, who did

not expect resistance. Union forces did not come into position near Richmond until 24 May, having advanced at an

average rate of only two miles per day.

Johnston was outnumbered almost two to one (although

faulty Union intelligence convinced McClellan that Union

forces were badly outnumbered) and preparations were under way to remove the government from Richmond. Near

Centreville were General McDowell and 40,000 more

Union troops, who sat guarding the route to Washington.

These forces were to move overland and join McClellan to

add the final crushing weight to Union forces . Johnston

and General Lee, then military adviser to Confederate President Davis, realized a successful Union linkage would seal

the fate of Richmond. To prevent this situation they

planned a large-scale diversionary action in the Shenandoah
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Valley by the brilliant and reclusive Gen Stonewall Jackson

to attract McDowell's attention.

The Shenandoah Valley was a natural invasion route

from western Virginia into Maryland that threatened both

Washington and Baltimore. For defensive purposes, the

Union had stationed Gen Nathaniel Prentiss Banks with

23,000 men near the head of the valley . Jackson's mission

was to prevent any of Banks's troops from joining McDowell and to prevent McDowell from joining McClellan

at Richmond. Jackson began his campaign in the valley with

fewer than 4,000 effectives .

Jackson's campaign was one of brilliant rapid maneuver,

in which he isolated elements of the superior Union forces

in the valley and defeated them. At one point, Jackson had

totally routed Banks and chased the Union forces from the

valley and across the Potomac in complete disarray . Lincoln, fearing for the safety of the capital, ordered Gen John

C. Fremont into the valley from the west and McDowell

into the valley from the east (and away from Richmond)

in an effort to trap Jackson. Jackson escaped the trap and

defeated the forces of Fremont and McDowell in separate

battles.

Jackson was entirely successful in preventing McDowell

from joining McClellan. After his final battle in the valley,

Jackson added insult to Union injury by slipping away undetected and joining Confederate forces in front of Richmond. Lee was now in command of the forces around

Richmond (Johnston had been wounded in the battle at

Fair Oaks or Seven Pines), and he massed his army to attack

an isolated portion of McClellan's army on the north side

of the Chickahominy River. Although the attack was badly

handled, the Union forces were defeated and began a skillful

withdrawal. Finally, McClellan yielded to fears that he was

badly outnumbered and ordered a general withdrawal to

Harrison's Landing, a base of operations on the peninsula.

Desperately trying to turn the retreat into a rout and a

decisive Rebel victory, Lee attacked the retreating Union
EAGLE'S TALONS

Army again and again in a series of engagements known as

the Seven Days' Battle. But the Union troops would not be

routed and Lee's cherished decisive victory escaped his

grasp.

The Seven Days' Battle from 25 June to 1 July effectively

ended McClellan's daringly conceived but timidly executed

attempt to capture Richmond. McClellan's reputation was

greatly diminished and serious doubts about his ability began to appear in Washington . At the same time, the legend

of Lee was building and Jackson was regarded as a genius.

Thus by July 1862, the status of the contending armies

depended upon the theater considered . In the West the Confederate situation was rapidly deteriorating . Only Vicksburg remained as a major bastion on the Mississippi River,

and the vital rail junction at Chattanooga would soon be

threatened . Major action for the remainder of the year

would continue in the eastern theater where the South had

been more successful.

In mid-July, while McClellan and his army huddled in

Harrison's Landing, Jackson was sent north toward Gordonsville to deal with the reorganized forces that had earlier

opposed him in the Shenandoah Valley. The Union commander, Maj Gen John Pope, had collected 47,000 troops

previously commanded in separate entities by Banks, Fremont, and McDowell. This formidable force posed a serious

threat to Lee's flank, particularly when combined with

McClellan's force of 90,000 at Harrison's Landing.

On 6 August Jackson attacked Pope at Cedar Mountain

but achieved only a tactical draw. Later, however, Jackson

withdrew and moved his forces around the Bull Run Mountains to a position near Manassas, behind and directly

across Pope's communication and supply line . Pope reversed course, advanced on Manassas, and on 29 August

attacked Jackson. The result was another disaster for Union

forces and Pope withdrew into Washington . Second Manassas was a defeat every bit as bitter as the first battle on

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that bloody ground. In general the Union cause in the Eastern theater was in shambles.

To this point Lee had reacted to Union initiatives-and

with great success. He now seized the opportunity provided

by federal disarray and took the offensive. On 7 September

Lee and his army crossed the Potomac River near Leesburg

and plunged into Maryland. Although strategically on the

defensive, Lee had several objectives for this tactical offensive . First, he still sought a decisive Napoleonic-style victory over the Union Army that might spell permanent

success for the Rebel cause. Second, the Confederates desperately needed to get both sides' armies out of northern

Virginia because they had stripped the area of food and

forage. Third, an invasion of Union territory might cause

Maryland to secede (Maryland's status had always been

questionable) and might also impress the British and

French governments enough to bring recognition and badly

needed help to the Confederacy.

After considerable maneuvering, Lee and McClellan

(who was still in command of the Army of the Potomac in

spite of losing Lincoln's confidence) met near Sharpsburg

on Antietam Creek. McClellan had an opportunity to inflict

a decisive defeat on Lee because he had come into possession of Lee's campaign plans, but squandered the opportunity by delaying the movement of his forces. As Lincoln

would later comment, McClellan was afflicted by "the

slows." Finally, on 17 September McClellan attacked. Although McClellan outnumbered his Confederate foe nearly

two to one, the battle was a draw. However, in the face of

a continuing influx of Union reinforcements, Lee began

withdrawing to Virginia on 18 September. Antietam was

the bloodiest single day of the war with more than 22,000

casualties .

Lee's foray into the North had disastrous consequences

for the Confederate cause. He did not transfer the fighting

out ofnorthern Virginia for long, he did not win his decisive

victory, he suffered a large number of casualties, Maryland
EAGLE'S TALONS

did not secede, and foreign recognition was now little more

than a forlorn hope. On a personal level, however, Lee's

reputation as a commander was enhanced as was the reputation of the Rebel army. Lee and his army had carried

the war to the enemy and had beaten back a Union army

nearly twice the size of the Confederate force.

McClellan, with a typical lack of aggressiveness, failed to

follow up on his "victory" as Lee slipped back into Virginia .

In fact McClellan did little but rest and resupply his army.

Lee made use of the respite to do the same. Finally, on 7

November Lincoln had had enough of inaction and relieved

McClellan of command in favor of one of McClellan's lieutenants, Ambrose Burnside. Burnside presented, and Lincoln approved, a complex plan to move on Fredericksburg,

Virginia, and to use this important road and rail junction

as a base of operations against Richmond. The plan required an assault across the Rappahannock River to seize

both Fredericksburg and Marye's Heights just beyond the

town. Again, speed might have led to easy success, but the

Union Army was slowed by the delayed arrival of pontoon

bridging equipment without which Burnside would not attempt the river crossing.

By the time Burnside had finally forced a crossing on 12

December, Lee was well entrenched on Marye's Heights.

On 13 December Burnside ordered a disastrous frontal assault on the heights. At the base of the heights, the Union

troops had to attack a sunken road bordered by a stout

stone wall. As the Union troops advanced, long-range rifle

fire from behind the wall and artillery fire from the heights

shattered their ranks. The fire was so withering that no

Union soldier ever got to within 25 yards of the wall. It

was not for want of effort. Union soldiers surged forward

toward the wall 14 times, and the field in front of the wall

became a killing ground littered with 6,000 blue-clad casualties. The battle in front of the stone wall at Marye's

Heights was, perhaps, the worst example of outmoded

eighteenth-century tactics applied in a more deadly era.

122
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On the following day a truce was arranged to tend the

wounded and bury the dead. That night Burnside withdrew

his entire army back across the Rappahannock River. The

war in the eastern theater was over for 1862 . It ended as

it began with Union blundering, Union defeat, and Union

retreat. In the West, however, the Union continued to fare

well in the last half of 1862.

Following his narrow victory at Shiloh, Grant proceeded

west to begin his campaign against Vicksburg. Meanwhile

Buell advanced east toward Chattanooga. The defeated

Confederate forces under Gen Braxton Bragg regrouped

and, by a circuitous route, marched north through Chattanooga, across Tennessee, and into Kentucky. Buell was

obliged to follow and finally forced a fight at Perryville,

Kentucky. The result was a draw, but Bragg withdrew south

to Chattanooga. Buell retraced his steps back to Nashville,

where he was relieved by Gen W. S. Rosecrans. Bragg and

Rosecrans met at Murfreesboro, Tennessee, in a savage battle in which Bragg was forced to retreat south to Tullahoma,

Tennessee. Both armies, exhausted after lengthy marching

and savage fighting, spent the next six months resting and

refitting.

As 1863 opened in the eastern theater, Lee's army remained in winter quarters on Marye's Heights and Lincoln

had relieved Burnside in favor of Gen Joseph "Fighting

Joe" Hooker (whose nickname was more self-designated

than earned). Like McClellan, Hooker had a well-conceived

and audacious plan to defeat Lee decisively. Hooker's plan

called for small demonstrations in front of Lee's position

at Fredericksburg to "fix" the Confederate army while he

moved the bulk of his forces up and across the Rappahannock and Rapidan rivers to descend on Lee's rear. Trapped

between this giant "right hook" and the two corps that

remained in front, the Army of Northern Virginia would

be destroyed . Hooker began his maneuver on 27 April 1863

and by 30 April had consolidated his forces at Chancel123
EAGLE'S TALONS

lorsville, a crossroads in Lee's rear just nine miles from

Fredericksburg. And then Hooker stopped!

Hooker's sudden timidity (a recurring malady among

Union commanders) gave Lee a chance to react with a plan

even more audacious than Hooker's. First, he divided his

forces, leaving only about 10,000 men on Marye's Heights,

and moved his remaining 43,000 troops toward Chancellorsville . He split his forces again by sending Jackson and

26,000 men on a flanking march across Hooker's front,

while he faced Hooker with only 17,000 men. Jackson was

in position by 6:00 P.M. on 2 May and attacked the Union

right flank, which quickly broke and retreated toward the

center of the Union position. Only darkness and exhaustion

halted Jackson's drive from collapsing the entire Union

line. That night, while scouting ahead, Jackson was mortally

wounded by one of his men, a loss from which the Confederacy never recovered. Jackson was, perhaps, the most

talented commander in either army.

The following day Lee continued to attack and Hooker

continued to withdraw slowly. Meanwhile Gen John Sedgwick and his two Union corps attacked the thin Confederate

forces on Marye's Heights and drove the Rebels back toward Lee's main forces. On 4 May Lee left Maj Gen J. E.

B. Stuart (Jackson's successor) with 25,000 men to watch

Hooker and turned the bulk of his army against Sedgwick.

Hard fighting finally forced Sedgwick back across the Rappahannock, and Hooker joined him on 6 May.

Lee had won the battle that is now remembered as his

most brilliant victory. Other battles in the war were more

costly and more militarily decisive (Lee's army suffered

more casualties than the Union Army), but Chancellorsville

best illustrated Union weakness and Confederate

strength-generalship .

Although shaken by the loss of Jackson, Lee's total confidence in his army led to his second foray into the north.

Lee moved westward into the Shenandoah Valley and north

across the Potomac, through Maryland and into Pennsyl124
CIVIL WAR

vania. Hooker shadowed this thrust, remaining between

Lee and Washington. En route Hooker was relieved by Gen

George Gordon Meade.

The two armies met at Gettysburg more by accident than

by design on 1 July 1963 . Minor skirmishes occurred during

the first day as both armies hurried to concentrate their

scattered forces. On the second day Lee attacked and a

vicious battle raged, but the Union line held in hand-tohand fighting . On 3 July Lee made his famous assault on

the Union positions along Cemetery Ridge. After a lengthy

Confederate artillery barrage, 12,000 infantrymen under

Gen George Pickett advanced toward the distant federal

lines. Pickett's charge collapsed under the weight of Union

shot, shell, and bayonet, and the next evening Lee and his

battered army withdrew during a driving rainstorm. The

Rebels had suffered an estimated 28,000 casualties, which

proved nearly impossible to replace. The tide had finally

turned in the eastern theater, and the following day disaster

befell the Rebels again.

Vicksburg, Mississippi, was a natural fortress blessed

with a commanding view of the great river from high atop

sheer bluffs . It . remained the last major impediment to

opening the Mississippi to Union use and was the final link

between the eastern and western portions of the Confederacy. After Grant's victory at Shiloh, Vicksburg had to be

the next major objective.

Grant's task was not easy. Assault directly from the river

was out of the question because of the high bluffs, and

interlaced rivers, bayous, and lakes limited the dry ground

upon which armies could maneuver. Finally, scattered

throughout Mississippi were 35,000 Confederate troops under the command of Lt Gen John C. Pemberton, who was

bent on keeping Vicksburg in Southern hands.

Grant needed to get his troops on solid ground on the

Vicksburg side of the river. Attempts to establish a base of

operations north of the city had failed. Solid ground was

available south and west of the city, but the problem was

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EAGLE'S TALONS

how to move his army downriver past the guns of the fortress. After several schemes failed, Grant marched his army

down the western river bank through muddy swampland

and forced a crossing south of the fortress, aided by Union

gunboats and transports that had run past the city.

On 30 April 1863 Union troops began crossing to the

eastern shore at Bruinsburg and embarked on one of the

most brilliant daring campaigns of the war. Grant, remembered as the relentless "butcher" for his later northern Virginia campaigns, wielded a rapier rather than a cleaver at

Vicksburg. In the 18 days that followed his crossing, Grant

moved his army more than 200 miles, fought five major

battles (all of which he won), and bottled up Pemberton's

army in Vicksburg. After twice unsuccessfully attempting

to force his way into Vicksburg, he lay siege to the city.

More than a month passed before the Rebels finally surrendered on 4 July 1863 . During this siege Grant shelled

the city constantly and starved its beleaguered inhabitants.

The city's citizens were driven from their homes by the

shelling and into caves carved into the hillsides. Rations

were reduced and then reduced again, causing malnutrition

to become a serious problem. Without hope of relief Pemberton had no choice but to surrender.

Disaster had struck the Confederates in both Pennsylvania and Mississippi. While these victories were in the

making, General Rosecrans began moving his army, idle

since the battle at Murfreesboro the previous January, toward Chattanooga. Rosecrans cleverly maneuvered against

Bragg and forced his withdrawal from the city without a

fight on 7 September. The Confederates reinforced Bragg

with Gen James Longstreet's corps, which was transferred

rapidly to the area by rail from northern Virginia. After

some clumsy maneuvering by both sides, Bragg narrowly

defeated Rosecrans at Chickamauga Creek just southeast

of Chattanooga and forced the Federals back into the city.

Now it was the Union's turn to rush in reinforcements .

After securing an adequate supply line into Chattanooga,

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Grant assaulted Confederate positions overlooking the city

on Lookout Mountain on 24 November and successfully

assaulted the main Confederate forces on Missionary Ridge

the next day. The broken Rebel army retreated southward

into Georgia. The vital gateway into the heart of the deep

South was open. In the long run, the fall of Chattanooga

with its opening of the deep South was as decisive as Gettysburg or Vicksburg. The tide had turned, and the collapse

of the Confederacy was only a matter of time .

Grant's reward was to be named general in chief of all

Union armies. In the Eastern theater, he ordered Meade to

attack Lee's army continuously, using the overwhelming

resources of the Union Army and allowing Lee no time to

recuperate. Additionally, he ordered Maj Gen Franz Sigel

(and later General Sheridan) to attack in the Shenandoah

Valley and to destroy Confederate war resources. Meade

engaged Lee in a continuous series of bloody battles from

early May through the end of June 1864. Beginning near

Chancellorsville, both armies sidestepped to the south and

east, fighting the major battles of the Wilderness, Spotsylvania Court House, North Anna, and Cold Harbor. Finally,

they arrived at Petersburg, another vital rail center that

serviced Richmond. Petersburg had been heavily fortified

and there the federal campaign bogged down until March

1865 .

In the west Grant placed General Sherman in command

and directed him to destroy the forces ofJoseph E. Johnston

(who now commanded the forces in northern Georgia that

had retreated from Chattanooga) and to destroy Confederate war resources to the maximum extent possible . Sherman set out from Chattanooga toward Atlanta. Johnston

fought a skillful delaying campaign hoping to hold off Sherman until the Union presidential elections in the fall of

1864. If a major Union victory could be avoided, growing

antiwar sentiment might sweep Lincoln out of office . Jefferson Davis, seeking a victory rather than a skillful retreat,

replaced Johnston with Gen John B. Hood in front of At12 7
EAGLE'S TALONS

lanta. Hood attacked Sherman unsuccessfully three times

in late July and was forced to withdraw from Atlanta on 2

September. Hood retreated and then set out northward,

tempting Sherman to follow him away from the Georgia

heartland, but Sherman would not be tempted. Hood continued north into Tennessee and reached Nashville where

his army was destroyed by Gen George Henry Thomas on

15 and 16 December 1864.

On 15 November 1864 Sherman's 62,000 men departed

for Savannah . Leaving the railroads in Atlanta in ruins and

the city's public buildings and warehouses in flames, the

Union Army systematically burned and plundered its way

across Georgia on a 60-mile front. On 21 December Sherman entered Savannah and, after resting and replenishing

his supplies from Union ships, turned north into the Carolinas . On 17 February he entered Columbia, South Carolina, and then pressed on toward North Carolina. Joseph

E. Johnston was restored to command, but he had only

ragtag forces and Sherman brushed him aside first at

Averysboro and then at Bentonville.

Meanwhile Grant finally broke through Lee's defensive

positions at Petersburg on 1 April 1865 at the battle ofFive

Forks. Lee retreated west and Grant pursued, sending General Sheridan's mounted forces to cut the Confederate commander's line of retreat. Within a week, all hope for the

Rebel army was lost and Lee surrendered on 9 April 1865

at Appomattox Court House. On 26 April Johnston surrendered his forces near Raleigh, North Carolina. The war

was effectively over.

Better State of the Peace

The fighting ended after nearly four years of bloody conflict that produced more than a million dead and wounded.

The hostilities formally ended when Gen Kirby Smith surrendered Confederate forces west of the Mississippi River

12 8
CIVIL WAR

on 26 May 1865 . The North had won the war on the battlefield and was hence able to impose its political objectives

of reunion and emancipation of the slaves .

In the terms we developed earlier, the Union had overcome two of the three aspects of Southern hostile will and

ability. Lee surrendered his army because he believed that

it no longer had the ability to continue to contest successfully. By the time the Army of Northern Virginia reached

Appomattox, a combination of Grant's hammer blows and

desertion had reduced Lee's force to a shadow (about

15,000 effectives) of its former size. Lee faced the Army of

the Potomac that had more than 100,000 effectives . Given

those odds and the physical and material condition of his

forces, Lee concluded further resistance could result only

in needless, futile carnage. At the entreaties of such leaders

as Lee and Davis, the soldiers went home in peace, rather

than continuing the fight through guerrilla warfare (the outcome that Lincoln feared most). When the last Rebel army

surrendered, Confederate hostile ability ceased.

By the end, Southern hostile will measured by willingness

to continue the war (morale) had eroded badly as well. Until

the winter of 1864-65 public support had never wavered,

but the effects of bringing the war directly to the Southern

people were beginning to take their toll . The chief architects

were Sherman, Sigel, and Sheridan through their scorchedearth campaigns. Sherman's unopposed march through

Georgia and the Carolinas and Sigel and Sheridan's rampage through the Shenandoah Valley reduced the Confederacy's chief sources of food to ashes. The result was largescale hunger and starvation in the Confederate armies and

civilian population .

In these circumstances desertion became a major Southern problem for the first time in the war (it was a problem

for the North throughout the conflict). Many Confederate

soldiers, hearing of the plight of family and loved ones,

simply laid down their weapons and went home to try to

alleviate the suffering. This manpower drain contributed to

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EAGLE'S TALONS

the depletion of troop strength and the diminished ability

to resist.

The question of whether the war could have turned out

any other way continues to obsess students of the great

fratricide to this day. By most standard measures of military

capability and potential, the result seems inevitable, simply

a matter of time until the Union's superior resources could

be brought to bear. But the biggest and strongest do not

always win; if they did, the United States would still be a

British colony, and the United States would have prevailed

in Vietnam. The problem, of course, was that time was and

was not on the Northern side . Given enough time to bring

its weight to bear, the North would almost surely win; the

question was whether the Northern public would make sacrifices for that long. In that light, the Southern decision to

abandon periodically a pure strategy of attrition and to go

on the offensive (in the process depleting its manpower

pool) can be and is still hotly debated.

These kinds of debates may be beguiling, but they are

also largely academic. In that aspect of the political objectives for which military force is most clearly applicable, the

Union had prevailed and the Confederacy, which in a military sense had only to avoid defeat to be successful, had

failed. The question that remained was how or whether the

Union would overcome hostile will defined as resistance to

the policies (political objectives) the South had opposed.

As is usually the case, overcoming hostile ability on the

field was a necessary precursor to imposing political will.

The US government then needed to bring about compliance

with and acceptance of politics that had led to secession in

the first place and that had provided fuel to continued resistance for four bloody years.

The question was fundamental because the issues that

led to warwere fundamental. At issue, after all, waswhether

two distinct ways of life (societies) could continue to coexist

in America, and the answer that made war inevitable was

that they could not. Since the solution of separation into

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two sovereign nation-states had failed in combat, ultimately

the peace could be won only by creating a national societal

structure in which the regions would become compatible .

That meant the transformation of Southern society from

its plantation basis into something that resembled the rest

of the country.

The direct political objectives of the war were symptoms

of this basic issue. The goal of reunion had been accomplished militarily . Politically (partially through the counsel

of Confederate leaders who beseeched their population to

accept reunification), it ceased to be an issue shortly after

the fighting ended. Emancipation, on the other hand, remained contentious because of its social effects . If, as argued earlier, slave labor was the key to the Southern

economy and hence social system, then the destruction of

this form of labor was the key to changing the Southern

way of life . Military victory made the political emancipation of the slaves a reality. The problem was to gain the

acceptance of the white population of the former Confederacy for the new status of blacks. The solution required

transformation of the racial attitudes that had justified

holding blacks in bondage and adjustment to the consequences of a new economy in which everyone was a wage

earner. For the peace truly to be won, the citizens of the

South not only had to accept the implications of emancipation, they had to embrace them as right.

Forthose whowould direct the reintegration ofa slaveless

South into the Union, there were two broad options. One

approach was conciliatory, a peace settlement wherein the

Southern states would be readmitted into the Union with

a minimum of fanfare or conditions, wherein efforts would

be made to lessen the ravages of war, and wherein physical

coercion would be minimized. This was the solution that

Lincoln desired, but an assassin's bullet ended his ability

to pursue it five days after Lee surrendered.

The alternative was a punitive peace, and with President

Lincoln dead, the forces who felt the South should be pun-
EAGLE'S TALONS

ished for its attempted secession prevailed. Led by a group

aptly called the Irreconcilables (the Radical Republicans),

the Union imposed punitive policies on a prostrate South

with little attention to convincing the former Rebels that

these policies were proper. The South was not asked to

accept reunion or abolition of slavery; instead, these policies were dictated by the Irreconcilables, enforced by an

army of occupation, and administered by legions of "carpetbagging" Northern politicians.

How much the punitive peace contributed to a residue

of hostile will toward accepting Union political objectives

is, of course, conjectural. What is certain is that hostile will,

particularly toward the emancipated slaves, remained, and

it is at least arguable that some of it is still with us today

in the vestiges of racism that continue as part of our social

fabric. Certainly "reconstruction" and the harshness by

which it was imposed contributed to nurturing hostile will

in such visible ways as formation ofthe Ku Klux Klan under

the leadership of the brilliant Confederate cavalry general

Nathan Bedford Forrest. The North, itself largely indifferent and even hostile to the freed slaves, did little to ameliorate the conditions of the Negro beyond the formal grant

of freedom. White Southerners were punished for their misdeeds, but little was done to rebuild Southern society on

the Northern model or to create prosperity in which all

could find substance.

Could reconciliation have occurred in another way? Was

there an alternative better state of the peace that would

have removed hostile will more quickly and with less resistance? Removed as we are by more than a century from

the suffering of the war that gave rise to the spirit of vindictiveness, it is easier for us to see that a reconciliatory

peace might have healed the national wounds far faster than

was the case. Had Lincoln lived, reconstruction might have

been different, or if the war had been shorter and less

bloody, there might have been less cause for bitterness. For

better or worse, the model of a punitive peace was imposed

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CIVIL WAR

and would be repeated after the next major conflict in which

the United States would participate, World War 1.

CHAPTER 4

WORLD WAR I

They called it the Great War. For many it was the "war

fought to end all wars" and, for the United States, it became

a war "to make the world safe for democracy." Battle after

battle, campaign after campaign, and year after year passed

inconclusively amid unprecedented carnage, suffering, and

destruction. It was the largest, bloodiest war in human history to that time. Literally millions were mobilized to fight

it, and millions died in the no-man's lands between the

opposing trenches that scarred the Western Front in virtually unbroken lines from the Alps to the North Sea. According to demographers, France would need 66 years

merely to recoup the young men who died during the war.

The war's bloodiest battle claimed 650,000 lives and when

it was over, the lines had scarcely moved. That outcome

symbolized the futility of the fighting generally and helped

create an enormous cynicism in those ordered to fight and

die for no apparent reason or effect.

World War I changed the face of Europe and the face of

war. The decline of Europe as the center of Western civilization began during this time and would be completed 20

years later in the second world conflagration. The once

dominant countries of Europe bled themselves dry of manpower and treasure and thereby lost the physical wherewithal to control international politics after 1945 .

Militarily, the Great War carried the logic of total war previewed in the American Civil War forward toward its grisly

fulfillment in World War II .

Although the United States was eventually drawn into

the awful fray, it was not really an American war. Certainly

the issues that gave birth to the war were, at most, periph135
EAGLE'S TALONS

eral to American concerns. Moreover, the United States

entered the fighting at an extremely late date. Our contribution to pushing an exhausted Germany over the brink to

defeat, while psychologically important, was minor compared to that of the other combatants.

Political scientists, historians, and others have struggled

ever since to understand how and why this great human

tragedy happened, and there are nearly as many explanations as there are explainers . Because our primary concern

is with America at war, it is neither necessary nor fruitful

to add to the mountainous literature on what ignited "the

guns ofAugust ." Rather, we will look briefly at some of the

common themes that run through that literature to show

some of the flavor of the times that made it all possible .

As the vital center of the international system, Europe

had been at relative peace with itself for the century following the Napoleonic Wars. Certainly there had been conflicts . Modern Germany and Italy had been forged on the

anvil ofwar, and Russia had been restrained in the Crimea,

but these were relatively short and isolated breakdowns in

the structure of international peace. The major themes of

European politics had instead been internal, adjusting both

politically and economically to the impact of the industrial

revolution, coping with nationalism, and witnessing the

birth of the German Empire and Italy. This process itself

was wrenching and consuming of energy and effort. Such

foreign adventurism as occurred centered around colonialism, the subjugation of much of Africa and Asia, where

colonial territory was relatively abundant and clashes between aspiring colonialists were infrequent and comparatively mild .

This tranquillity between states began to break down

around the turn of the twentieth century, and one of the

major themes underlying the war emerged. This theme was

a more contentious struggle for influence. One reason for

the growing contentiousness was that the process of colonizing Africa and Asia was largely complete by the 1890s.

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WORLD WAR I

After northern Africa fell under European control, there

was essentially no place left where a European power could

gain influence or control without challenging other powers.

Closely related to this struggle for influence, the map of

Europe was beginning to redraw itself. Two of the major

empires ofEurope, the Austro-Hungarian and the Ottoman,

were disintegrating under the dual weights of atrophy and

resurgent nationalism that had their roots earlier in the

nineteenth century. As these empires crumbled, the other

powers scrambled for influence in the newly emerging

states. The competition focused particularly in the volatile

Balkan States, and that area provided the spark that started

the war when the Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife

were assassinated by Serbian extremists at Sarajevo,

Bosnia.

A second theme relates to the unwillingness of the major

powers to prevent war once its possibility loomed on the

horizon. Some Europeans actually relished the prospect,

believing that war would be beneficial and that it would

recreate a spirit of discipline in a generation that had not

known war and that had grown soft and decadent as a result.

While this purifying, martial view may not have been dominant, it was present. Despite the sentiment of those people

and others, the issues that underlay the road to war were

clearly inadequate to justify what followed . Yet no one acted

decisively to keep it from occurring. When it began, young

men rallied willingly to the banner and marched off to war.

An embittered generation of widows and veterans, as well

as countless analysts, would later ask why.

A large part of the answer was that no one understood

the kind of war it would be. There were two visions of

modern war available, and the Europeans chose to believe

in the wrong one. One model was the quick, decisive, highly

mobile warfare of the Franco-Prussian War. The other was

the long-protracted and bloody American Civil War. For

reasons of ethnocentrism that suggested the inherent superiority of the highly disciplined European soldier, they

13 7
EAGLE'S TALONS

rejected the model of warfare based on Helmuth von

Moltke's image of the "two armed mobs chasing one another across the countryside" and instead believed the 1866

and 1870 European models more appropriate. Moreover,

Germany and France (the two major Western Front antagonists) each believed they could win quickly. In the process,

they overestimated their own capabilities and underestimated those of their adversaries.

As the first troops left Berlin in the summer of 1914, the

Kaiser promised them that they would be home amidst

glory before the first leaves fell from the trees. Instead, the

war quickly stalemated, the trenches were dug, and four

years were spent in futile frontal assaults against heavy entrenchment, a tactic long since obsolete but all the generals

could think to do . To make such tactics all the more futile,

machine guns, barbed wire, and poison gas had been added

to the defensive advantage. Had the leaders and people on

either sides possessed a premonition of these horrors, the

war might have been prevented. We will, of course, never

know.

A final theme that runs through the web of causation is

the mediocrity of the political leadership when the war began. The institutional arrangements by which the European

powers had moderated their conflicts through much of the

nineteenth century, the so-called Concert of Europe, had

fallen into disrepair after the Franco-Prussian War (some

would argue earlier than that). Diplomatic relations had

become personalized around such leaders as the German

Kaiser and the Russian Tsar. As the Serbian crisis eventuated in the mobilizations and countermobilizations that

greased the slide toward war, what was needed was the

leadership, statecraft, and diplomacy of a Metternich, Talleyrand, Castlereagh, or Bismarck, but none was available.

The war happened partly because the leaders could not

figure out how to avoid it .

Americans watched these events from the sidelines. Although the United States had evolved after the Civil War

138
WORLD WAR I

into the world's largest industrial power (Germany was second), the United States seemed to be only peripherally involved in the European-centered international political

system. Separated from Europe by a broad ocean, the issues

and problems that led to war did not appear greatly to affect

American interests, nor did the Europeans have much of a

sense that a totally unmobilized United States could make

any differences in the quick and decisive war they anticipated. Only when the war had dragged on for some time

did Europeans peer across the Atlantic and ponder the contribution Americans might make to breaking the stalemate.

The initial American response to the European war was

remarkably similar to our early attitudes toward the wars

of the French Revolution and Napoleonic Empire a century

before. That response was to declare American neutrality,

a posture we maintained officially through the election of

1916 (President Woodrow Wilson campaigned vigorously

and won largely on the promise of continued American

noninvolvement). Also reflecting our reaction a century earlier, we adopted the policy of trading with both sides. As

time went by, our trade with the Western Allies increased

while trade with the Central Powers declined, but up until

the eve of American entrance, the president was still calling

for a negotiated settlement based on "peace without

victory."

Formal American entrance into the conflict did not come

until April 1917 when the hostilities were well into their

third year. Other than the psychological lift it may have

given the Allies, the declaration of war at that point had

little practical effect on the fighting . As had been the case

before, the United States entered the wartotally unprepared

to fight. We had essentially no standing armed forces, and

it would take over a year to recruit and train the American

Expeditionary Force that took part in the final push to

Allied victory. America raised a 1 .75-million-man army, but

it was not declared fit for nor did it begin to engage in large139
EAGLE'S TALONS

scale combat until the summer of 1918, about six months

before the armistice.

Issues and Events

When the war began in Europe, the initial American response was that it was none of our business. Reflecting wellentrenched attitudes and beliefs, most Americans agreed

that we should remain aloof from the intramural European

struggle and that sentiment prevailed during the early years

of combat. This urge to neutrality in part reflected traditional American preferences that dated back to the formation of the republic. Both George Washington in his

Farewell Address and Thomas Jefferson in his First Inaugural had echoed the theme that American interests were

best served by remaining separate from and uninvolved in

the tainted power politics of the old world. "Friendly relations with all but entangling alliances with none" had been

US foreign policy for a century. At the same time, America

contained sizable populations of both English and German

extraction . It was therefore difficult to ascertain conclusively on which side popular sentiment lay at the outset.

Neutrality was a convenient way to skirt the issue, while

simultaneously providing the rationale for trading with

both sides.

The American attitude was based on a myth (and it can

only be described as such) that American destiny can somehow be fulfilled in isolation from the affairs ofEurope. This

belief was pervasive and did not really disappear until after

World War II . Unfortunately, it was a myth based on a

historical accident that never had much to sustain it for at

least two reasons .

First, the myth was nurtured during an atypical time in

European history, a period from the end of the War of 1812

until the First World War. This was a period when there

were few major European upheavals. The idea took hold,

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WORLD WAR I

however, that since the United States had remained above

European power politics for nearly 100 years, this was a

normal and preferable condition that was also a matter of

American choice. Certainly, aloofness made a great deal of

sense during the period of nation-building that dominated

nineteenth-century American history. Such a period lends

itself to turning inward and that is what we did. What was

missed, however, was that the same processes were occurring in Europe with the same effects. We did not perceive

a need for Europe, and the feeling was mutual. However,

at each end of the period, the United States became involved in the major European struggles that did occur. The

War of 1812 was really only an extension of the Napoleonic

Wars, and we eventually became involved in World War 1.

When the affairs of Europe have affected us and required

our participation, we have not been able to avoid the call

to arms. The myth could be nurtured only because Europe

did not need us for a century.

The second reason was largely economic. As the United

States moved to become a major industrial and commercial

nation during the nineteenth century, our prosperity increasingly required extensive trade with the world. The

world's significant markets, of course, were in Europe and

access to those markets was vital. As well, the immigrant

waves that provided the manpower for industrial expansion

came from Europe, and a great deal of the developmental

capital that financed industrial growth came from private

European banks. Without those sources, our pattern of development would have been quite different, but it has always been a curious aspect of the American worldview that

economics and politics can be separated . The two in fact

are cut from the same cloth.

The mythology of and desire for political aloofness while

retaining commercial ties made neutrality appear attractive. Despite the illusion that the war was none of our concern, there were in fact economic and political issues that

would eventually impel the United States into the war.
EAGLE'S TALONS

The economic issue had two essential aspects, one of

which was the already-mentioned desire to maintain normal commercial patterns with the belligerents. Such a posture was understandable from a sheerly economic

viewpoint, but it was untenable politically. The reason, of

course, was that both the Central Powers and the Triple

Entente wanted trade with them to the exclusion of trade

with the other. Although there was some US attempt to be

evenhanded in the flow oftrade early in the war, the pattern

gradually shifted to a much closer relationship with the

Western Allies, especially Great Britain. Germany eventually found this pattern intolerable, which helped create

the proximate events leading to the American declaration

of war. In many ways, the situation was a replay of the

problems that had drawn the United States into the War

of 1812, except that Germany and not Great Britain would

be the enemy.

The other side ofthe economic coin arose from the prospect of a German victory that looked increasingly probable

as German troops previously committed to the Eastern

Front began to move to France in 1917 after Russia withdrew from the war. America's prosperity required trade

with Europe . The security of that trade, in turn, rested on

guaranteed access to European markets and safe, reliable

means to get American goods to those markets. A German

victory threatened to alter both of those conditions .

A German victory over France would, in all likelihood,

ensure that continental Europe would be dominated by Imperial Germany. Since Germany was the chief industrial

rival to the United States in many important areas of trade,

such an outcome offered the reasonable prospect that Germany would exclude or sharply restrict American access to

continental markets.

The defeat of Great Britain would also allow German

naval domination in the Atlantic Ocean, and thus posed a

threat to open and secure access to the sea lanes between

North America and Europe (as well as presenting a possible

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WORLD WAR I

future menace to the US homeland). Gradually during the

nineteenth century, the United States and Great Britain had

reached a condominium assuring the freedom of the high

seas for commercial purposes. By the end of the century,

the informal arrangement was that Great Britain enforced

that policy in the North Atlantic and the United States

enforced it in the Caribbean Sea.

The policy was to the clear advantage of both nations.

Both were commercial, mercantile states, and Great Britain

had the additional requirement for secure access via the

oceans to her far-flung colonial empire. The commonality

of interest between the United States and Germany, however, was not so obvious; commercial competition could

easily spill over into naval competition for control of the

trading routes.

There was an underlying political issue that Americans

sought to avoid but could not. After the fall of the Tsar in

early 1917 (and especially after the Bolshevik Revolution

resulted in the removal of the new Soviet Union from the

war), the contest did, after all, pit the world's major democracies, Britain and France, against the world's major

autocracies, Imperial Germany, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and the Ottoman Empire. In the long run, a democratic United States could scarcely avoid greater sympathy

for those who shared our political form over those whose

political philosophy was diametrically opposed to our own.

Each of these underlying economic and political factors

manifested itself in proximate events that made neutrality

progressively less tenable. The economic issue came to a

head over German attempts to interrupt the lucrative flow

of American war materiel to the Western Allies and specifically focused on the question of unrestricted submarine

warfare. The political issue gradually emerged in the depiction of the war as a moral crusade between democracy

and autocracy.

The issue of German submarine attacks on Allied shipping, especially on ships carrying American passengers (for

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example, the Lusitania), became the most volatile issue between the United States and Germany. It was an issue,

however, not entirely lacking in irony. That irony involves

both the restrictions that were supposed to be placed on

submarines in war and the reasons the German navy failed

to stress the submarine more in her naval competition with

Great Britain.

Anticipating the introduction of this new weapon system

to naval arsenals at the turn of the century, the participants

at the Hague Convention had attempted to devise and include in the rules of warpermissible and impermissible uses

of the submarine. The provisions that came into force included requirements that virtually ruled out effective employment of the submarine: before attacking any vessel, the

submarine had first to surface, announce its intention to

attack, and be prepared to take aboard anyand all survivors

after an attack.

These were, of course, totally unrealistic requirements

that, if adhered to, would destroy the usefulness of the submarine as a naval weapon. One advantage the submarine

possesses is the element of surprise, which surfacing takes

away. When on the surface, submarines are especially vulnerable to attack, since they carry no effective surface armament . Moreover, they are too small to take aboard more

than a few survivors after an attack. Thus the only way to

use them effectively was in direct violation of the Hague

Convention, and that is precisely what the Germans did.

When they did so, they were loudly condemned in the

United States for barbaric activity in violation of the laws

of war. The result for Germany was thus a classic catch-22 .

They could use submarines legally but ineffectively, or they

could use them effectively but illegally . It was clearly a nowin situation. To make the irony deeper, the Germans were

prepared to back down to American objections on the eve

of our entrance into the war, in effect offering to suspend

as a matter ofpolicy (it had already been suspended in fact)

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unrestricted submarine warfare in return for continued

American nonbelligerency.

The irony is made even greater because the U-boat was

the most effective weapon (actually about the only one)

Germany possessed for the naval competition with the British. Because of the influence of an American naval strategist, however, they entered the war with too few of them

for decisive effect.

In 1890 the American strategist Alfred Thayer Mahan

had published his seminal The Influence ofSea Power upon

History, which argued the critical importance of control of

the seas in warfare, and the book was widely read in Europe

as well as America. Acentral tenet of Mahan's analysis was

the need for a large navy with heavy capital ships as the

crucial element in naval control and the consequent deprecation ofnaval strategies emphasizing what he called "commerce raiders," lone marauding vessels whose purpose was

disrupting commercial trade routes through the capture or

sinking of individual ships . The submarine, of course, perfectly fit Mahan's definition of a commerce raider, and one

of Mahan's most ardent students was Kaiser Wilhelm. As

a result, German naval development concentrated on the

construction of heavy capital ships (in the extreme, the

dreadnoughts). Germany was never able during the course

of the war to get its fleet of these large ships out of the

North Sea. At the same time, the Germans neglected the

construction of submarines, which were able to escape the

British blockade and which were quite effective against Allied shipping until the convoy became common practice .

Politically, the road to war was paved by the gradual

conversion of American popular opinion away from neutrality and disdain for the entire war to a black-and-white

depiction of the valiant democracies fighting desperately

against evil autocracies. British propagandists were particularly influential in this effort, whereby the issues were simplified into terms of good and evil, so that, when the

declaration of war occurred, the full support of the Amer145
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ican people could be rallied behind the Allies and support

for the "Huns" was equated with treason. The German

submarine campaign, which enraged the American public,

and devious actions like the Zimmermann note to Mexico,

which proposed that Mexico declare war on the United

States, simply added fuel to a growing anti-German fire.

Political Objective

World War I was, of course, an allied operation and as

is usually the case within coalitions, each of the allies had

its own distinct political objective and its own vision of the

better state of the peace. When the war broke out, it is fair

to say that none of the original combatants had particularly

clear objectives beyond a generalized belief in the need to

honor alliance agreements that committed various states to

one another. This lack of clarity was not entirely surprising

because none of them had any clear idea about what the

war would be like.

In some ways similar to the way the colonial side's objectives were formed in the American Revolution, political

objectives flowed from the military state of affairs rather

than the other way around. The major influences of the

battlefield were to produce tremendous frustration, bitterness, and hatred. The result was an increasing impulse toward vindictiveness. Total warfare produced total political

objectives . One side or another had to be defeated completely and the loser would be forced to pay. No one had

talked this way as the troops were rallied in the summer of

1914, but after futile years in the trenches, revenge became

a common desire.

These feelings were held with varying levels of intensity

by the individual Allies, depending on the amount of suffering that they had endured. Among the Western Allies,

the feeling was definitely strongest in France . Most of the

war was fought in France; hence French territory bore the

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deepest physical scars of war, and French blood had flowed

freely.

In this context, French objectives came to dominate Allied political aims. In its simplest form, the objective was

to create a structure of the postwar peace wherein the war

could not be repeated. Stated as an aim to make the Great

War "the war to end all wars," there was substantial agreement among the Allies . There was disagreement, however,

about what kind of structure would best ensure a peaceful

world in the future. Determining what was necessary to

guarantee the peace was partly a matter of determining who

was responsible for the war in the first place.

In the French view, Germany bore special and unique

guilt for the war and for French suffering. From the French

premise, which was debatable (as we shall see in the final

section), it followed that the structure of the peace must

include a Germany incapable of instigating another war,

and that meant a disarmed German state and a pastoral

German society. Everyone wanted peace. France wanted

peace and revenge. The disagreement over whether both

should be objectives would dog the Versailles peace talks

at the end of the war.

American wartime political objectives are what most concern us here . The figure of President Woodrow Wilson was

of overarching importance in framing American objectives

and engineering the process of change from neutrality to

belligerency. As a result, one cannot understand fully American objectives without some insight into the character of

the American leader.

At least three characteristics of Wilson are relevant in

understanding his view of the war. The first is that Wilson

was an academic and an intellectual . He had gained early

fame within the academic community by writing Constitutional Government (a study of political democracies first

published in 1885, and one of the most respected works in

the field we now call comparative politics). He later served

as the president of Princeton University. Wilson's intellec147
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tual background predisposed him to democracies which,

the prevailing view in political science argued, were inherently superior systems. Second, Wilson was a deeply religious man and a lay Presbyterian minister. This aspect of

his background predisposed him to see matters in moral

terms and would assist him in framing the war's objectives

in the terms of a moral crusade. Third and finally, Wilson

was a Southerner. He had been born and reared in Virginia

during Reconstruction and had witnessed the embitterment

and suffering that the punitive peace created in a defeated

Southern people. As a student of and participant in the

aftermath of a particularly bloody, total war, Wilson sought

consistently to avoid seeing the same mistakes made in

Europe .

American objectives toward the war necessarily changed

from the period of neutrality to that of military participation. When the United States was neutral, Wilson's hope

was to act as a peacemaker . The operative phrase forming

that objective was "peace without victory." This approach

flowed naturally from Wilson's boyhood experiences and

consequent conviction that a punitive peace settlement imposed by a victor would unnecessarily slow healing of the

war's wounds. This theme, although later abandoned by the

United States, had great appeal within Germany after

American entrance into the war. Those who led the movement that overthrew the Kaiser and then sued for peace

cited Wilson's statement as hope for a reasonable negotiated peace.

Fighting a war not to win, as peace without victory implied, was not the kind of cry that would rally the nation

to the banner, and it had to give way once the nation decided to join the hostilities. Military victory replaced military stalemate as the objective and, in a manner reflecting

both Wilson's religiosity and the prevalent American worldview, had to be phrased in appropriately moral, lofty tones.

Aided by the efforts of those British propagandists who had

painted the issues in black and white, a rallying cry emerged

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to form the basis for the crusade. American purpose became

an effort "to make the world safe for democracy." The

moral tone is well captured in Wilson's war declaration to

the Congress: "The day has come when America is privileged to spend her blood and her might for the principles

that gave her birth and happiness. God helping her, she can

do no other." So armed, the United States began to prepare

for its entrance into the Great War.

Military Objectives and Strategy

Each belligerent evolved specific political objectives as

the war went on. Each objective required the defeat of enemy armed forces and in some cases their destruction.

Events quickly showed, however, that victory would not be

quick and clear-cut. Military victory could only be achieved

by enemy exhaustion, and thus the war wore on endlessly.

In a sense, the war itself became the objective.

No one dreamed the conflict would be so long and senseless. The general consensus at the time it began was that

no nation could wage a long war because of the incredible

costs in blood and treasure . Modern wars, so the experts

said, would be short and sharp, their brevity ensured by

the perceived dominance of the offense over the defense.

The side which could muster and mobilize huge modern

armies first and put them on the offensive would have an

overwhelming advantage. Attackers would smash into and

crush ill-prepared defenders who would be unable to maneuver swiftly their own massive forces. In France, the cult

of the offensive reached its zenith in the teachings of Ferdinand Foch at the Ecole Superieure de Guerre (i .e., French

War College) . According to Foch, the essence of war was

to attack and any improvement in firepower ultimately benefited the attacker. To attack successfully morale was critically important. No battle was lost, Foch reasoned, until

the soldiers believed it was lost. With the proper elan, the

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French soldier was irresistible in the attack. And thus was

born the rigid French doctrine of offensive a outrance-the

offensive to the extreme. The birth of the French offensive

doctrine brought death to a generation of Frenchmen.

Of the major combatants, the Germans faced the most

difficult military problem. Situated in central Europe, they

faced potential enemies on opposite fronts . In the east, massive Russian armies threatened to overrun East Prussia and

crush the Germans. In the west, the French waited to avenge

the humiliation of 1870. The only solution was to take

advantage of the interior lines afforded by their central

position, to mobilize more rapidly and efficiently, to eliminate one or the other of the opponents quickly, and then

to concentrate on the remaining enemy.

The original plan to accomplish this complex task was

devised years before the war and modified several times.

Its original author, Chief of the German General Staff

Count Alfred von Schlieffen, assumed that the great masses

of the Russian army could not be fully mobilized for at least

six weeks after the commencement of hostilities . Thus the

Germans must concentrate their forces in the west and

knock out France with one quick crushing blow. The blow

would be a giant "right hook" of German armies marching

through the low countries into France along the English

Channel coast. The invasion would wheel inward, envelop

Paris, roll up the French armies, and crush them back

against the German border. Schlieffen expected the decisive

battle to occur east of Paris within the six weeks "grace"

period while Russia mobilized. With the demise of France,

the Kaiser's troops could be transferred to the east to dispose of the Russians. It was a bold plan and it was nearly

successful.

When the war began, the Germans mobilized quickly in

accordance with their elaborate plans and the offensive got

under way. It moved through the low countries at a steady

pace, pausing only to reduce the fortifications at Liege with

giant siege mortars. On into France the Germans marched

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as the French and British forces fell back, all going according to the master plan. Unexpectedly, however, the German

armies on the right flank began wheeling toward the German border before they enveloped the French capital city.

Thus the German right flank was exposed to an attack from

the garrison of Paris. Additionally, because of a breakdown

in communications, a gap developed between two of the

wheeling German armies, and this mistake presented an

opportunity for the Allies . The result was a successful counterattack and the retreat of the German armies away from

Paris.

Both sides dug in. Both quickly began a series of attempts

to outflank the enemy's position-the so-called Race to the

Sea-that resulted in the extension of defensive positions

on both sides. These positions eventually stretched from

the English Channel to Switzerland. The seeds of stalemate

were sown. There were no longer any flanks to turn and

both sides continued to improve their already formidable

defensive positions. Thus the trench war that dominated

the Western Front began within weeks of the outbreak of

hostilities . The next four years saw a series of massive offensives, each yielding thousands of casualties but precious

little progress . The war became one of physical attrition,

and the loser was determined by exhaustion, not military

skill.

Schlieffen's plan was boldly conceived, and its failure can

be traced to many causes. First, the younger von Moltke,

the chief of staff in 1914 and nephew of the victor of 1866

and 1871, weakened the right hook by shifting some troops

to the east to meet a surprisingly rapid Russian thrust into

East Prussia. Second, German communication and supply

lines on the right flank became extremely long because of

the rapid German advance. Third, German soldiers were

exhausted by their long march while the Allies fell back on

shorter and shorter supply lines. Fourth, the French high

command did not collapse under pressure as it had done

in 1870, and as the Germans suspected it might in 1914.
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Finally and most important, the plan assumed victory at

every juncture, and that everything would go well and

smoothly. There was little room for error or successful enemy counteractions . In other words, the plan was arrogant.

It paid scant attention to the capabilities of Allied armies

or their commanders.

By 2 April 1917, when the United States entered the war,

it seemed that the Germans and their allies might finally

win. They controlled a rich portion of northern France, as

well as most of Belgium and Holland. At sea, German submarines threatened to starve Britain out of the war. Moreover, revolt was brewing in Russia. Ifthe Russians dropped

out of the war, the Germans could shift large formations

to the Western Front. The question was whether or not

fresh American troops could get to the front in time. The

American Army was minuscule, with an authorized

strength of only 100,000. Men had to be inducted, trained,

equipped, and sent across the Atlantic. Despite the enormity of the task, more than one million American soldiers

landed in France by the summer of 1918 .

The United States entered the war late and pursued no

innovative strategy of its own. Essentially, American troops

were fresh blood with which to continue the war in the

established manner. American numbers tipped the balance

scale toward victory for the Allies as the exhausted Germans

could not compensate for the fresh and numerous American

soldiers.

The commander of the American Expeditionary Force,

Gen John J. "Black Jack" Pershing, found his principal

strategic battles to be with other Allied commanders who

wished to use American soldiers as piecemeal replacements

in their battered formations. Pershing resisted with President Wilson's support. Wilson, however, eventually bowed

to Allied pressure and intervened on their behalf. Pershing

recognized the authority of the civilian commander in chief

and placed American units, rather than individuals, at the

disposal of Allied commanders. However, after tactical

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training in France was complete and the American Army

was fully ready to take to the field, Pershing managed to

get back the units that had been amalgamated into the Allied armies.

Pershing has been praised as a leader, organizer, and

manager. He has been criticized as a less than innovative

strategist and technician . The praise is certainly justified

as the task of building, equipping, and transporting a massive army overseas in a short period oftime was formidable.

The criticism also may be justified . Pershing offered little

in the way of new strategic thought to the Allies and produced no novel tactical ideas. However, one must remember

Pershing's circumstances. The war was four years old and

the die was cast in terms of a strategy to exhaust and defeat

the enemy. There was little room and no time for new strategic visions. Tactically, it is no wonder that American tactics mimicked those of our European allies . The rigors of

trench warfare were newto the Americans (Petersburg being

long forgotten) and, upon their arrival in Europe, the American units were often trained for combat by European

veterans.

Political Considerations

World War I was one of America's most popular wars.

Public support for American intervention was high when

Woodrow Wilson made his war declaration and that support never wavered. Given that neutrality had enjoyed overwhelming support only a year before, this was a remarkable

turnaround. Only years after the war would the United

States develop some degree of cynicism over having plucked

European "chestnuts from the coals." Yet, once the fighting

was over, the American urge to withdraw, to return to "normalcy," was overwhelming. It was a curious domestic situation, at least partially the result offactors in the American

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culture and, more specifically, the ways Americans go to

war.

One reason that Americans rallied to arms and then recoiled quickly from their efforts is traceable to the American missionary zeal . The war was advertised as a moral

crusade, and, as such, it appealed to that part of our national character that flows from a feeling of America as a

special, morally superior place. Our goal was to "save" Europe from itself, and when that end was accomplished, we

packed up and returned to the more normal state of affairs.

When it became clear in the 1920s that Europe had not

been cleansed as we had hoped, we turned inward once

again, seeking to isolate ourselves from the vagaries of European power politics, but at the time support for the war

was unquestioned.

Another reason for the high level of support was that the

American part of the war was so short. As stated earlier,

the United States was a formal belligerent for a year and a

half, but engagement in combat was limited to the war's

final six months. We began the war entirely unprepared to

fight (a common theme in American military history) and

set about mobilization in what our Allies found an irritatingly languid manner. The legislation to create a means to

induct armed forces had passed at President Wilson's request in 1916, but our standing military was no more than

a shadow in April 1917 when war was declared. Building

the apparatus to induct, equip, and train a force that could

be placed responsibly into combat required time. Starting

from scratch with mechanisms and personnel inadequate

to a task of such proportions further lengthened the process.

The effect was to romanticize the war. It was a time of

parades, of soldiers coming home for leave from the training camps (most of which had had to be built for the occasion) in impressive uniforms. There was little mud and

no blood and dying. The American Expeditionary Force

did not arrive in Europe in mass until June 1918, and General Pershing was reluctant to throw it into combat even

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then. Instead, he maintained that the force required a period of orientation and further preparation for fighting in

a new and strange environment.

The leisurely pace of American preparation and commitment created political tensions within the alliance, especially between the Allied military command and the

American command . Reflecting the nature of the war and

where it was being fought, the Allied general staff was dominated by France and the supreme commander was Marshal

Ferdinand Foch. The Allied command had a very different

viewpoint of the American role than did its American

counterpart.

From the vantage point of the Allied command, the chief

contribution of the Americans should have been to provide

fresh manpower to British, French, and other forces badly

depleted and exhausted by the long years in the trenches .

With France particularly near the brink of physical exhaustion and collapse, fresh bodies were the requirement

against Central Powers forces that appeared increasingly

menacing after the fall of Russia. To that end, the Allies

argued long and loud, ifwith little effect, for the Americans

to speed the process of building their army and for getting

that army in the field .

Pershing resisted these efforts successfully . He viewed

these requests, probably correctly, as no more than an attempt to make cannon fodder of the American forces in

the futile fighting, a usage that would have been unpopular

at home . Moreover, he, like most observers, was less than

overwhelmed with the tactical brilliance that had thus far

marked the war effort on both sides. As a result, he insisted

that Americans not be integrated into existing units and

that, instead, there be created a distinctly American place

on the lines. Foch resisted, but Pershing insisted, refusing

to commit the Americans at less than the unit level until

his end was achieved. Ultimately, the Allies' need for the

American troops exceeded their feelings about how they

15 5
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should be used, and the Americans were given their own

front for the final offensive.

There were, moreover, important political differences between the leaders of the principal Allied nations that simmered beneath the surface but which would surface when

it was time to settle accounts in the peace negotiations. The

major disagreements were between American President

Woodrow Wilson and French Premier Georges Clemenceau. The heart of these disagreements centered on why the

war was being fought and what its outcome should be.

As we have said before, the First World War was a total

war. However, the war was more total for some than for

others . For France and Britain, it was a total effort being

fought for national survival, and both nations totally mobilized to fight it . For the United States, national survival

was never a problem, and although we raised the largest

army in our history to fight it, it was not a war of total

mobilization for us. As an example of the contrast, the

United States did not develop an armaments industry to

support the effort; instead the United States relied largely

on arms purchased from the British and the French.

The different levels of desperation with which the war's

outcome was viewed translated into discordant views about

what would constitute a satisfactory peace. While the fighting continued, these divergences were hidden behind the

veil of common effort. When the guns were stilled, the

discord came to the fore . The United States was disadvantaged by the combination of a lack of experience at coalition

decisionmaking (the only previous war in which we had

allies was the American Revolution) and the intensity of

French claims based in greater experience, sacrifice, and

proximity.

The basis of disagreement was over the question of a

punitive or a reconciliatory peace. Reflecting his background as a Southerner and an academic, Wilson wanted

a reconciliatory peace that would feature self-determination

for all nations (or at least those in Europe). He wanted a

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postwar world founded around the Fourteen Points, which

declared these ideals and featured the League of Nations

as its centerpiece to guarantee the peace. The Wilsonian

vision was lofty and idealistic; Clemenceau viewed it as

naive in the real world of European politics. Rather than

seeking reconciliation, Clemenceau sought punishment of

Germany and the reduction of the German state to impotency. During the war Clemenceau humored Wilson because he needed American help. When it came time to

restructure the world, the gloves came off and the disagreements were laid on the table. The results of those interactions are discussed in the final section of this chapter.

Military Technology and Technique

World War I has often been characterized as history's

most senseless and poorly contested war. Given the objectives of the belligerents, particularly as the war progressed,

the unending stalemate on the Western Front, and the incredible casualties caused by endless frontal assaults against

enemy lines, it is difficult to argue against this unfavorable

judgment. At the same time, however, World War I was a

watershed in the evolution of modern warfare because of

the technological innovations first demonstrated during the

conflict. Two technological developments were of primary

importance, either having a direct impact on the conduct

of the war itself or foreshadowing the nature of warfare in

the future.

The development that had the most immediate impact

was the widespread use of rapid-fire weapons. Key to this

development was the perfection of smokeless powder that

did not obscure the field offire or foul weaponsto the extent

previously common. Although rapid-fire weapons were

used experimentally in the American Civil War (the Gatling

gun, for example), it was not until 1882 that Sir Hiram

Maxim designed the first machine gun widely adopted by

15 7
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military forces. By World War I, reliable designs permitted

rates of fire from 200 to 400 rounds per minute. The weight

of such a machine gun was approximately 100 pounds including its mount, which made it a defensive rather than

an offensive weapon. Weapons carried by individuals (machine guns had a crew) also improved greatly by World War

I . Modern military rifles could fire up to 20 rounds per

minute and their effective range was limited primarily by

the vision of the soldier.

Field artillery followed the rapid-fire trend of smaller

weapons . Without question, the finest field artillery piece

in the world in 1914 was the 1897 model French 75 mm.

It could fire 6 to 10 rounds per minute with great accuracy.

Other excellent field pieces were the US model 1902 field

gun and the Austrian 88 mm developed and produced by

the Skoda works. In the years leading up to World War I,

heavy artillery became much heavier. Large caliber guns

were common, including huge siege mortars. For example,

the Germans possessed 420-mm mortars that delivered a

one-ton projectile.

The development of rapid-fire weapons and heavy artillery pieces significantly affected the way in which World

War I was fought . The most obvious effect was in the number of casualties. The human toll of the war dwarfed all

previous experience. The second major effect was to give

the advantage to the defense, a phenomenon which thoroughly surprised most military planners . Their failure to

cope with superior defense added to the human carnage.

Against rapid-fire weapons and heavy artillery, the techniques of previous wars led only to failure and casualties

of unprecedented proportions . Finally, rapid-fire weapons

used prodigious amounts of munitions. As a result, industrial capacity on the home front became of paramount importance in determining success or failure on the battlefield.

Although the development of rapid-fire weapons had a

significant impact on the war itself, a revolution in transportation would portend the nature of wars to come, even

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if its impact on World War I was less than decisive . The

transportation revolution was caused by the invention and

application of the internal combustion engine, which led to

the development not only of cars and trucks but also to the

tank, the submarine, and heavier-than-air aircraft. These

weapons would eventually change the face of warfare.

Although mules and horses continued in common use,

all belligerents used trucks extensively during the war to

overcome the inherent weaknesses of railroads. Railroads

had revolutionized military transportation, but they also

brought with them some unwanted baggage. First, they were

relatively inflexible, since a great deal of preparation and

construction was required to establish a rail line, particularly one that would be used heavily. Second, because they

were both important and inflexible, they tended to dominate strategy. During the Civil War, campaigns revolved

around rail lines as opponents sought to protect their own

and cut those of the enemy. Trucks, on the other hand,

provided flexibility. They required no ties and rails. Troops

and materials could be hauled rapidly from railheads to farflung battlefields . Large-scale battles could now be fought

wherever there were roads. Railroads did not, however, lose

their military importance. In World War I (as well as in

later wars) they remained critical to military success because of the quantity of men and materiel they could carry.

The tank was first introduced by the British in 1916 . Its

purpose was to break through enemy trench lines and clear

the way for infantry to advance. Some visionaries thought

that tanks could not only break through enemy lines but

could also range far to the enemy rear and capture command centers, disrupt communications and supply lines,

and spread panic. The World War I vintage tank did, however, have severe limitations. Although impervious to small

arms fire, their slow speed, especially when used as infantry

support weapons, made them tempting artillery targets.

Near the end of the war, Allied planners (the Germans paid

scant attention to the use oftanks) began to recognize better

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uses for tanks. In the last offensive thrusts of the war, the

Allies massed tanks for attack rather than using them in

small concentrations . In the interwar years, the relationship

between tanks and infantry began to reverse, and infantry

would be used for the support of armor. With this change

of tactics and improved tank design, armored warfare

would come of age in World War II .

The internal combustion engine was also important to

the development of submarines. An undersea craft that

could attack enemy warships and merchantmen had long

been a dream of naval designers . The internal combustion

engine provided a compact means ofsurface propulsion and

a means to recharge the batteries used for submerged operations. Designs improved rapidly in the years preceding

the war, and submarine warfare became an important part

ofoverall German strategy as the Germans sought to starve

Britain out of the war by cutting her sea lanes .

With the development ofthe airplane, war entered a third

dimension . Initially, the airplane was intended only for observation of enemy movements and artillery spotting. By

the end of the war aerial photography of enemy trench lines

was an indispensable tool of military planners. Of course,

such a valuable tool had to be denied to the enemy, and as

a result aerial combat began shortly after the war commenced. By the war's end, airplanes were conducting extensive air-to-air combat with sophisticated machine guns

that fired directly through the propeller by the use of an

ingenious interrupter gear. Airplanes also strafed enemy

troops at the front and conducted bombing raids in rear

areas. Finally, both sides made tentative attempts at strategic bombing. However, aircraft were not an overly important weapon in the Great War, primarily because aircraft

and engine design were still primitive arts . But aerial visionaries of the war, such as America's William "Billy"

Mitchell and Britain's Hugh Trenchard, saw possibilities for

a much greater role for the airplane in the future. Between

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the two world wars they pressed for better designs and for

the development of air power doctrine that they believed

would make air power a decisive factor in modern warfare.

The development of weapon systems based on the internal combustion engine represented a watershed in the evolution of modern warfare, and yet these weapons had only

a limited impact on the techniques ofwarfare in World War

I . Military tactics remained rooted in the past. The tactical

problem on the Western Front, once the trench lines were

firmly in place, was to achieve a breakthrough in the enemy's linear defenses and then exploit that breakthrough to

bring a degree of mobility back to the war. The trench lines

for both sides had no tactical flanks, and thus the only

attack possible was a frontal assault .

Generals on both sides used several techniques in an attempt to achieve a decisive breakthrough. The most common method was to conduct a massive artillery barrage

(some lasted for weeks) calculated to obliterate the enemy

trenches. Once a gap was created, the infantry was supposed

to pour through and exploit the advantage. Unfortunately,

such a tactic sacrificed all surprise. Defending troops simply

withdrew to deep dugouts during the barrage, waited for it

to end, and emerged ready to fight . In addition, the barrage

was often counterproductive for the attackers because it

turned the no-man's land between the opposing trenches

into a cratered, muddy moonscape through which the attackers wallowed at a snail's pace. With no surprise and

slow movement, reinforcements could fill any gap in the

defender's line. At that, even if an enemy trench was seized,

no real breakthrough was achieved because the trench

"line" generally consisted of three trenches separated by

some distance. Thus the exhausted attackers, having captured the initial objective, still faced fresh troops and fresh

defensive works just ahead. It is no wonder the front lines

moved so little during the war.

Another innovative method was gas warfare. When first
EAGLE'S TALONS

used on both the Eastern and Western Fronts, it had considerable success. However, its effects often depended on

the weather (especially which way the wind was blowing),

and the introduction of protective equipment made gas a

progressively less effective weapon.

The most innovative tactics (aside from the use of tanks

discussed earlier) to achieve breakthrough were developed

by the German Gen Oskar von Hutier. He employed a very

short barrage combined with infiltration by specially

trained assault troops who avoided strong points. Regular

infantry, who reduced the bypassed strong points, followed

the assault troops. The Germans used these tactics extensively during their final offensive in 1918 and had considerable success in achieving deep breakthroughs quickly.

However, they could not move artillery and supplies forward fast enough to sustain the attacks. Hutier's tactics

foreshadowed the blitzkrieg tactics of World War II.

For the most part, the tactics of World War I resembled

the worst displayed in the American Civil War. Time after

time masses of men lunged across open ground to assault

well-entrenched defenders and were slaughtered at an incredible rate . It seemed the generals had learned nothing

from experience . World War I tactics were not a tribute to

human wisdom .

Military Conduct

The Allies were exhausted after the hard fighting of 1917,

and a revolt of the soldiers in the French army had further

shaken their leaders. In these circumstances, they were content to sit on the defensive and await the arrival of the fresh

American troops. The same was not true for the Germans.

With the collapse of the Russians, the Germans moved

massive numbers of troops to the west and, so reinforced,

hoped to strike a decisive blow before the Americans turned

the tide .

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WORLD WAR I

Gen Erich Ludendorff planned a series of German offensives all along the Allied lines in 1918. In addition to

the new troops from the Eastern Front, he planned to incorporate the new tactics developed by Hutier. The first

German attack came in March and was aimed at the British

at the Somme River. The attack achieved astonishing success, advancing 40 miles in eight days, before it slowed. In

early April the Germans struck the British again, this time

at the Lys River, and again achieved some success. This

was followed in late May by an attack on the French at the

Chemin des Dames, an important ridge line northeast of

the French capital. Once again the Germans were astonishingly successful by the standards of trench warfare. By

the end of May they again threatened Paris from newly won

positions on the Marne River at Chateau-Thierry.

At Chateau-Thierry the Americans were first sent into

heavy combat. When the Germans attempted to cross the

Marne, they were thrown back by the newly arrived American troops. Ludendorff attempted to renew his stalled offensive during the summer months, but the effort failed.

The Germans had spent themselves and the Americans

were now pouring into the lines. In all, ten American divisions took part in the summer operations, and their presence was crucial to Allied success in stopping the German

drive.

Allied counterattacks began as early as mid-July and were

aimed at retaking the vast salients created by the surprising

successes of the earlier German offensives . On 8 August

the Allies massed several hundred tanks for an attack on

the salient around Amiens . German resistance collapsed in

front of the armoredassault andthe Allies penetrated nearly

ten miles into German-held territory. Ludendorff seemed

to realize that the game was up as he referred to 8 August

as the "Black Day" of the German army.

The final salient to be erased was at Saint-Mihiel and the

task was entrusted exclusively to the Americans. Pershing

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EAGLE'S TALONS

massed half a million troops and support equipment for a

difficult fight. However, the Germans offered little resistance as they evacuated their men and equipment from the

exposed salient. With the salients erased and the Americans

blooded, it was time for the final grand offensive that would

end the war.

The grand offensive wasjust that, grand . Troops all along

the front were expected to advance and place intolerable

pressure on the German line . The American sector in the

offensive was surrounded by the Meuse River and the difficult Argonne Forest . The fighting was bitter and extended,

WORD w .AR s

?daior American Nattie Locations

164
WORLD WAR I

particularly in the Argonne, but by 10 October the Germans

had been driven from the forest . By 5 November the Americans forced a crossing of the Meuse. The grand offensive

rolled on, not just in the American sector but all along the

front as the exhausted German defense finally

disintegrated .

Germany would not be the master of Europe, at least not

for two decades. But neither would the French or British,

both of whom had suffered grievously. Nor would the Soviets reign supreme, as they sought to consolidate their internal position after the revolution . Austria-Hungary

simply disappeared as a political unit. Europe would have

to wait 22 years for a master to proclaim himself.

The United States entered the war late, but American

participation was vital to the eventual Allied success . Fresh

American troops stopped the final German offensive in

1918, and they broke the back of German resistance thereafter. American troops and their leaders acquitted themselves well on the battlefield, and the lessons learned about

massive mobilization, training, and deployment would

prove valuable in the future. The cost, in human terms,

was staggering . During approximately six months ofcombat

operations, 50,000 Americans died in battle, while 75,000

more died from nonbattle-related causes. But the cost in

American lives paled in comparison to the losses sustained

by the other Allies. Nearly one and one-half million Frenchmen died in combat, as did nearly one million British and

nearly two million Russians. The small price America paid

in its short war affected the amount ofinfluence the United

States had in the peace treaty negotiations that followed

the war. The United States also was spared the incredible

casualties suffered by civilian populations during the war.

Some estimates put the civilian death toll at over 15 million.

Perhaps the price would have seemed a bargain if this war

had been the war that ended all wars.

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EAGLE'S TALONS

Better State of the Peace

The armistice that took effect on 11 November 1918

ended the formal hostilities that had raged for more than

four years. When the victorious Allies gathered at Versailles,

the palace of the Bourbon kings located outside Paris, their

purpose was to recreate the peace that had preceded the

outbreak of the Great War, to make a better state of the

peace.

In essence, the Allies had three tasks facing them in their

collective quest to ensure that the conflict had indeed been

the war to end all wars. These were dealing with the enemy,

restructuring the peace, and redrawing the political map.

The first task was how to deal with the vanquished Central

Powers. German hostile ability had been finally overcome

through exhaustion of German resources in its Summer

1918 offensive and the Allied counteroffensive . The coup

that overthrew the Kaiser and resulted in a suit for peace

by the new German government demonstrated that German cost-tolerance had been exceeded as well . What remained to be decided was how to integrate Germany back

into the international system. This was a question of fashioning a peace that Germany could or would accept and

embrace for reordering a peaceful world. Two alternative

visions were laid on the negotiating table.

As suggested earlier, the two chief protagonists in this

debate were Wilson and Clemenceau. Harking back to his

own childhood experience and his earlier call for a peace

without victory, Wilson preferred a reconciliatory settlement toward Germany that would reintegrate the German

nation into the international system with a minimum of

recrimination and punishment . He believed this to be the

best way to overcome those vestiges of German hostile will

that might resist acceptance of the policies governing the

peace. Clemenceau, representing an embittered France, had

other ideas. Given the suffering and privation France endured (admixed with some long-smoldering resentment

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WORLD WAR I

arising from the settlement of the Franco-Prussian War 48

years earlier), France insisted upon a punitive peace. French

insistence prevailed and Germany was punished for the

war.

In essence, France had two preferred outcomes to the

peace talks. The first was to recover the enormous physical

and economic costs of the war (the French national treasury

as well as those of virtually all the major combatants had

been drained). The second objective was to destroy what

they viewed as the cause of the war, which was an expansionist, militaristic Germany. The solution to the first problem was to make Germany pay for France's war expenses;

the answer to the second was to transform Germany into

a pastoral, permanently weakened state that could pose no

future military threat to France.

The key to achieving those goals within the framework

of the peace settlement was the infamous Article 231 of the

Versailles Accords, the war guilt clause. That article, which

the new German government was forced to accept, placed

sole and complete blame for starting the war on Germany,

and it served as the necessary justification and underpinning for the other punitive parts of the settlement. With

German cupidity and responsibility formally established,

France could justify exacting retribution, including a severe

schedule of reparations aimed at compensating France for

its wartime costs (a provision, one might add, in which a

number of the victorious allies, notably Great Britain, rapaciouslyjoined). Germanywould pay for the war, although

the effects of those payments would prove ruinous to the

German economy. At the same time, provisions were included that substantially disarmed the German state and

reduced its territory to ensure against a militarily resurgent

Germany.

A prostrate Germany had no choice but to accept these

humiliating conditions, but the leaders who did so would

later be vilified as traitors for their actions. The conditions

were so severe and humbling that the German people could

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EAGLE'S TALONS

not possibly embrace these policies and hence have their

hostile will (resistance to policies) permanently overcome.

There were several factors that made acceptance impossible. The first was the war guilt clause. That provision was,

at best, questionable . As one tries to unravel who was to

blame for the war in the first place, Germany emerges as

but one candidate among several . There was too much guilt

and stupidity to lay on a single doorstep.

Another factor that ensured the survival of German hostile will was the size of the reparations payments. These

virtually ensured that Germany would not recover fully

from the war economically (as some observers such as Lord

John Maynard Keynes prophetically but futilely pointed out

at the time). The result would be enormous inflation in

Germany during the 1920s with which the democratic Weimar regime could not deal effectively and economic devastation when the Great Depression took hold. At the same

time, the demilitarization of Germany left the German nation at the mercy of the rest of the international system and

perpetuated German enmity. Suddenly, Germany was back

where it started before unification, at the military mercy

of the system. The seeds for the emergence of a Hitler-like

figure could not have been more skillfully sown had that

been the purpose of the peace treaty.

Although he objected to these aspects of the settlement,

Wilson finally acceded, because his attention was focused

on the second task which confronted the conferees, the establishment of a mechanism to ensure the future peace. The

essential question was what had gone wrong with the Concert of Europe that had allowed the war to occur.

When it had operated properly, the Concert had served

as a collective security arrangement: all the major states

were members, and each agreed that a threat to or breach

of the peace threatened their own interests and must be

resisted . With that principle established, a potential aggressor knew that the community of nations, and hence

overwhelming power, opposed his action, making it futile

16 8
WORLD WAR I

and thus deterring aggression. The Concert appeared to

work for a time, but ultimately the system failed. What had

gone wrong?

The answer Wilson and others (rightly or wrongly) devised was that the Concert system (actually a series of irregularly scheduled meetings of the major nations called

when the need arose) was inadequately institutionalized.

What the system lacked, they reasoned, was a formal mechanism, an institution that would always be available whenever crises arose and which consequently could act in a

timely and authoritative manner. That mechanism was to

be the League of Nations, which would serve as guarantor

of the peace. Unfortunately, that noble institution never

had a chance to perform its role .

Acollective security arrangement requires twoconditions

for effective operation. The first is that the mechanism must

have at its disposal obviously overwhelming power to deter

transgressors . Meeting that standard requires that all major

powers be represented in the arrangement. This condition

was never met. The United States never joined the League

(to Wilson's bitter and debilitating disappointment), the

Soviet Union was not permitted to join the organization

until the 1930s, and the countries that formed the Axis in

World War 11 resigned in the 1930s. The second condition

for success is the willingness of the major powers to enforce

the peace and that translates into accepting the justice of

the peace system that one is upholding. For reasons imbedded in the third task facing the negotiators, this condition

was also unmet.

The third task was redrawing the political map of the

world. Theoperative principle, as part of Wilson's Fourteen

Points, was to be self-determination, the right ofall nations

freely to determine their status as states. The principle in

truth applied only to Europe (nationalists in several Asian

colonial states would discover this truth to their dismay) .

Although the principle was applied with reasonable effectiveness in central Europe, there remained another part of

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EAGLE'S TALONS

the agenda, which consisted of territorial rewards for the

victors and penalties for the losers .

The Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires collapsed

and disappeared as a result of the war. The European sectors

of those empires were allowed to engage in self-determination, resulting in such new states in eastern and central

Europe as Czechoslovakia, while the Ottoman Middle East

was placed largely under the trusteeship of Britain and

France. The German Empire was dismantled and apportioned among the victorious allies, and Germany's prewar

boundaries were reduced through transfer of territory to

France (the return of Alsace-Lorraine) and through the recreation of a Polish nation-state . Some of these territorial

adjustments placed German populations under non-Germanic rule (for example, the Sudetenland), but Germany

had no choice but to accept its dismemberment--at least

for the time being.

At the same time, some members of the victorious coalition, notably Italy and Japan, had territorial claims that

were not honored by the dominant members of the alliance

(Britain, France, and the United States). Italy had claims,

for instance, in the Balkan region and Japan expected to

receive the bulk of the former German dependencies in the

Pacific, but most ofthese were placed under American stewardship instead. Germany simmered under the loss of empire and territory it considered rightfully a part ofGermany,

and Japan and Italy resented the rejection of "rightful"

rewards for their contributions to the war effort. None of

the three could be expected enthusiastically to endorse or

enforce the territorial status quo, as participation in the

League of Nations collective security system required. Ultimately, of course, none of them did.

All of this is to say that the better state of the peace was

doomed from the beginning. The victor's policies were punitive and viewed as unjust by the vanquished and even

by members of the victorious coalition. From an American

vantage point, the irony was redoubled because, when Wil170
WORLD WAR I

son returned with the peace treaty in hand, it was rejected

after an acrimonious national debate by a resentful Senate.

The official argument that led to the failure to ratify was

the commitment to the League, which would tie the United

States irrevocably to the affairs of Europe. Such a commitment, which Wilson felt was the linchpin to an enduring

peace, was unacceptable to those Americans who continued

to believe in the myth of American aloofness from European affairs. Underlying the failure, however, was a tactical

blunder on Wilson's part; he had failed to take any senators

to the Versailles conference, and hence they had no stake

in the outcome (a mistake no subsequent president has

made).

The outcomeof the settlement of World War I is generally

considered the classic case of winning the war and losing

the peace. The war had been won militarily ; German and

other Central Powers hostile ability and willingness to continue (cost-tolerance) had been broken on the battlefield.

But that was not enough. Adversary hostile will, defined as

resistance to the victor's policies, not only was not overcome, the terms of the peace were almost guaranteed to

increase that hostile will . Resistance to accepting these policies was, of course, most strongly felt in a humiliated Germany. Given the circumstances and conditions imposed

upon the German state, it is hard to envision how the German people could have reacted otherwise. For policies to

be embraced, they must be accepted as just, and the peace

terms could hardly have been looked upon that way in Germany. In the end, shortsightedness and vindictiveness ruled

the day. In the long run, the peace was lost. The manifestation of that loss was the need to fight World War II to

resolve the differences that had been dealt with so abysmally in the peace ending the war to end all wars.

CHAPTER 5

WORLD WAR II

The Great War had been the largest and bloodiest conflict

to date in human history, but it was in many ways only a

preview of that whichwould follow. Approximately 20 years

later World War II erupted and became the largest military

event in history. It was a conflict that was total in all senses

of that term and a world war in which virtually every corner

of the globe served as a theater of action at one time or

another. Although records are inadequate, the best guesses

are that about 80 million people were in military service

at one point or another. Ofthese, between 15 and 20 million

were killed and probably about the same number of noncombatants perished . There were around 10 million combatant casualties and almost that many additional civilian

casualties in the Soviet Union alone. Even more than the

First World War, World War II was a war between whole

societies, a war of factories. The entire resources of the

major combatants were dedicated to the war's conduct, and

whole populations were mobilized for one aspect or another

of the effort .

America's role in World War II was unique in at least

two ways. World War II was almost two distinct conflicts,

one in Europe where the Western Allies (including the Soviet Union) faced Germany and her European allies and

the other in the Pacific where Imperial Japan was the major

antagonist. The US position was unique in that only the

United States had major responsibilities in both theaters .

In Europe the Allied effort was dominated by the triumvirate of the United States, the Soviet Union, and Great

Britain, but American presence was of vital importance:

the British depended heavily on the United States for the

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EAGLE'S TALONS

materiel and manpower necessary to open the Western

Front, and the Soviets relied to some degree on American

lend-lease. In the Pacific the war was essentially a conflict

between the Americans and the Japanese. Certainly others

were part of the Pacific campaign: the British on the peripheries (e.g ., Burma) and Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang

Chinese (who occupied a million-man Japanese army that

could not be used elsewhere) . The task of defeating the

military might of the Japanese Empire, however, was clearly

an American task. As we shall see later in the chapter, this

unique position created some friction within the government and with our Allies over which enemy should receive

the greatest attention and even some interservice rivalries

about resource allocations (the war in Europe was basically

an Army enterprise, whereas the Navy dominated the Pacific war).

The other unique aspect from an American perspective

is that the United States was the only Allied power that

emerged from the war stronger than it entered . When the

United States entered the fray following the attack on Pearl

Harbor, the vast (and, thanks to the lingering effects of the

Great Depression, underutilized) American industrial base

was turned into the "arsenal for democracy." The conversion and the stimulation it provided the economy ended

the Depression and allowed the United States to emerge in

1945 as the unquestioned economic colossus of the world.

The other Allies were "winners" in the sense of being on

the prevailing side, but all the other Allies were wounded

seriously by the effort. Britain's expenditure in blood and

national treasure accelerated its gradual decline from great

power status, a circumstance with which British governments continue to grapple today. The other major ally, the

Soviet Union, arguably emerged more politically unified

because of the enormity of effort necessitated by the Great

Patriotic War (as the war is officially known in that

country), but her land was scourged by the Nazi invasion

that left two-thirds of her industry destroyed, countless

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WORLD WAR II

towns, villages, and buildings reduced to rubble, and nearly

20 million citizens dead.

The United States avoided those disasters. After the surprise attack at Pearl Harbor, American continental soil was

never seriously attacked during the war, so that there was

no physical reconstruction to deal with after the war's end.

Our material contribution to the war had been enormous

(the war cost the United States more than $500 billion in

the dollars of the day), but our 300,000 casualties were

comparatively light ; the war did not bleed us dry in the

literal sense of that phrase. Moreover, the war effort revitalized an American industrial plant gone flabby during the

hard years of the depression. American industry was more

productive at war's end than at the beginning.

The major effect of World War II was to alter critically

the power map of the world. In the broadest sense, the

roughly 150 years of European history from the onslaught

of the French Revolution through World War II was a contest between France and Germany to dominate the continent and hence to dominate the international system.

Ironically, World War II ensured that neither of them

would. France had been defeated, humiliated, and occupied, and even though it rode to "victory" on the coattails

of the victorious Allies, France clearly emerged from the

war diminished in spirit and power. For Germany the outcome was even more disastrous. Her armed forces were

decimated, she was occupied by her former enemies, she

bore the unique moral stigma ofNazi excesses, and she was

once again physically divided. Division was the cruelest

blow of all, both because it returned the German people to

the weakened status of a divided state and because the

shadow of the Nazi past raised serious question of when,

if ever, the international system would allow a German

resurgence .

The other actors were not in materially better shape.

Great Britain was a member of the victorious coalition and

hence technically a winner, but the British economy lay in

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ruins. The war would force Britain through the agony of

gradual reduction from a global to a regional power. The

British Empire, like that ofher principal rival France, would

wither under nationalist demands for independence, setting

in motion a whole new series of dynamics that are yet unfolding. Japan, like Germany, was defeated and occupied,

and her reemergence would require massive assistance and

nearly two decades to accomplish . The other major combatant, China, simply resumed the civil war that had raged

between the Communists and Kuomintang in the 1930s.

The warended with only two states possessing significant

power, the United States and the Soviet Union. Of the two,

the United States was clearly the more powerful. Although

allied against the Nazi and Japanese menaces, the Soviets

and the Americans moved into the postwar power vacuum

with very different worldviews and motives that almost

guaranteed a clash as they sought to reorder the power map.

Issues and Events

There are, of course, various ways to look at the question

of what caused World War II, and numerous explanations

have been put forward. In essence, however, there were two

interactive underlying issues: Franco-German competition

for dominance of the European continent that went back

over a century, and the failure of the peacemakers at Versailles to create a structure for the interwar peace that could

be embraced and supported by the participants in the Great

War.

Competition between modern France and Germany is

historical and longstanding, and treating it in its breadth

and richness would only divert us from present concerns.

In the modern era, however, one can usefully date it back

to the Napoleonic campaigns, where Prussia, the precursor

to and leader in the unification of the German state, was

soundly defeated by the French levee en masse. From that

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WORLD WAR II

humiliation arose the Prussian determination to unify Germany and to produce a strong, militarized state that would

no longer be forced to suffer such indignities. The process

of unification took nearly a half-century and was climaxed

by Prussia's easy victory over Louis Napoleon in the

Franco-Prussian War of 1870. A critical outcome of that

conflict was the reannexation of Alsace-Lorraine to Germany, which in turn was an important element in forming

the static alliance systems that contested World War I.

The Great War, round three in the competition, left Germany in essence back where it had started: politically dismembered, territorially reduced, and economically and

militarily debilitated and vulnerable. Germany was once

again reduced to being the "weak sister" of Europe, and

the history of the German states had taught that this condition was intolerable. Moreover, the economic system that

the Second Reich erected was saddled by reparations ensuring that economic recovery was virtually impossible. It

was also burdened with a democratic political system that

was both alien to the German political tradition and, by

virtue of signing the Versailles peace treaty, held responsible

for German humiliation by sizable parts of the population

(a vulnerability that Hitler used to form the basis of his

assault on democratic elements in Weimar Germany).

Given this unacceptable outcome of the third round of

Franco-German rivalry, the Versailles peace was doomed

from the beginning. Its centerpiece, the League of Nations,

never had a realistic chance to organize the peace effectively: too many of its members were unwilling to defend

a status quo they viewed as unjust, and others excluded

themselves (the United States) or were excluded (the Soviet

Union, on the premise that the way to arrest the spread of

the "cancer" of bolshevism was through isolation) .

Proximate events of the 1930s would transform these

underlying issues into the bloodiest conflagration in human

history. These events, in turn, can be traced to two related

sources reflecting dissatisfaction with the peace ending

17 7
EAGLE'S TALONS

World War I : economic nationalism and the effects of the

Great Depression, and the rise of fascist regimes that would

become increasingly aggressive and expansionist in the face

of tepid responses from the Western democracies.

Economic nationalism and the depression are related

events. The core of economic nationalism, which was to

manifest itself in unprecedented protectionism of national

industrial plants, can be found in the attempts of the

drained countries of Europe to recover and recuperate from

the ruinous economic effects of the First World War. National coffers had been emptied, industries had been turned

to the war effort and had to be reconverted, and there were

widespread scars of war (especially in France) that required

rebuilding, all at considerable cost . Governments were

forced to foot these bills, and one of their strategies for

recovery (especially ofthe industrial plant) was to erect high

protective tariffs against goods and services from elsewhere.

Combined with the artificial flow of wealth resulting from

reparations, the economic base of Europe became increasingly shaky.

The Great Depression represented the final blow to the

international economic system. As businesses failed, banks

defaulted, and the jobless lines increased throughout the

Continent, commerce between nations came to a virtual

standstill . The result was even more protectionism and an

economic maelstrom that continued to get worse . As the

times worsened, so did the political situation. In this climate, the rise of regimes that promised an end to the economic chaos, even if through escapism and adventurism,

became progressively stronger. In no place was the cry

louder and more inexorable than in Germany.

Fascism was not, of course, entirely a phenomenon of

the 1930s. Mussolini came to power in Italy in the early

1920s, and the Japanese imperial monarchy predated the

Great War. The factors that made fascism different in the

1930s and that led to war were the coming to power of

fascism in its most virulent form through the National So-
WORLD WAR 11

cialist (Nazi) party in Germany and the progressively expansionistic form that the various fascist regimes exhibited

as the decade progressed .

The rise of nazism was the key factor, because only a

resurgent Germany had the potential to mount a major

threat to the peace; Japan and Italy could also engage in

mischief, but their reaches were limited. The German nation, particularly when expanded to something resembling

its pre-1919 borders, could pose a threat to the whole of

Europe, as had been the case in the Great War.

Hitlerian Germany and its Fiihrer have been and continue to be the source ofenormous, if macabre, fascination,

and there is little we can add to the voluminous literature

that surrounds the Nazi era. A few points can, however, be

made that are germane to our general theme.

The first is that the terms of Versailles virtually guaranteed that something like nazism would emerge in interwar Germany. Although the monstrous directions that

Hitler's policies took were not preordained by the Paris

peacemakers, the combination of humiliation and degradation that Germany suffered, the artificial nature of the

political system imposed on Germany, and a German political culture that associated authoritarian rule with prosperity (many Germans even today consider the Kaiser's

Second Reich the golden age of German history) certainly

made a militaristic, authoritarian movement seem quite

appealing.

Second and significantly, the appeal of nazism was inadequate to gain power in the relatively affluent 1920s but

was inexorable in the depression-plagued 1930s. When Hitler began to organize his political movement and made his

first clumsy attempt to seize power (the "Beer Hall

Putsch"), he was ridiculed, rejected, and thrown in jail. A

little less than a decade later, with Germany in the depths

ofthe depression, his simplistic analyses ofGermany's woes

and his grandiose solutions met a more responsive audience. Granting that many of the power brokers who helped

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him come to power viewed him as a comic figure they could

manipulate and control, nonetheless Hitler had enough

popular appeal to be elected chancellor.

The pattern of unchecked aggression provided the proximate events on the road to war. Each of the three major

powers in what became the Axis participated in this process,

and in each case timid responses (when there was any response at all) not only did not deter future actions but

almost gave them tacit approval.

Some observers maintain that World War II really began

in 1931 . In that year Japan made its first major expansionist

move, invading the Chinese province of Manchuria (the

industrial heart of the country). In fighting of enormous

ferocity punctuated by numerous atrocities against the civilian population, the Japanese succeeded in establishing

their domain and installing a puppet on the throne of the

country they called Manchukuo. The West stood idly by.

The strongest condemnation came from the United States,

which promulgated the so-called Stimson Doctrine of NonRecognition . This doctrine stated that it was American policy not to recognize governments that came to power by

force (a tenet that has been selectively applied ever since) .

The practical effect was that the United States did not recognize the government ofManchukuo but continued to deal

with Japan virtually on a business-as-usual basis . So encouraged, the Japanese Sphere of Co-Equality continued to

expand through the decade. By 1941 the proximity of that

empire and American interests meant that something had

to give.

The Fascist government of Benito Mussolini also got into

the act, albeit in a more modest way. The major adventurism in which Italy engaged was the 1935 campaign

against Ethiopia. Using the Italian colony of Eritrea as his

base of operation, Mussolini unleashed his mechanized

army against the pitifully underarmed Ethiopian tribesmen

(some of them actually confronted tanks and other armored

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vehicles with spears). The world was shocked but not

enough to act.

When the attack began, the Ethiopian Emperor Haile

Selassie, the "Lion of Judah," went to the League ofNations

and appealed to that organization to invoke the collective

security provisions of the covenant and to come to Ethiopia's defense. After long debate, the league voted voluntary

sanctions against the Italian regime and omitted petroleum,

oil, and lubricants (on which Italy was particularly dependent) from the list of proscribed materials. Of the major

powers, only the Soviet Union (which had been admitted

to the league after Germany withdrew) argued strongly for

effective, mandatory sanctions to reverse the situation. Britain and France, unwilling to risk war over that barren corner

of the Horn ofAfrica, wavered . In the wake of the Ethiopian

affair, league collective security was effectively a dead letter.

Center stage in the tragedy was, of course, reserved for

Nazi Germany. Using the dual assertions of the "destiny

and right" of all German peoples (broadly defined) to be

ruled together and the need for lebensraum (living space)

as his justifications, Hitler began his campaign of expansionism in 1935 . Initially, the reaction of the majorWestern

democracies was weak and ineffectual. When they finally

determined to react, it was too late.

Hitler's first and riskiest action was the remilitarization

of the Rhineland. Sharing a long common border with

France, the Rhineland had been demilitarized by the Versailles accords to assuage French fears of a new German

onslaught. Timing his move to coincide with one of the

frequent crises in the French Third Republic (one coalition

government had collapsed and a successor had not been

organized), Hitler moved his forces into the area . It was a

gamble because at that time the armed forces of France

were clearly superior to his own (almost all his military

advisers opposed the plan) and could have forced him to

back down. Hitler, however, counted on the paralysis

caused by the French political crisis to preclude effective
EAGLE'S TALONS

action. He proved correct; neither France nor Britain reacted and he was able to present the world with a fait accompli . So emboldened, Hitler turned his attention to

bigger things .

The list of Hitler's aggressions is familiar enough and

need not be treated in detail here. Under the guise of the

"Greater Germany," Hitler annexed the Sudetenland area

of Czechoslovakia (which had a majority German population) and in the Anschluss, German troops occupied Austria as well . Confused and irresolute, the Western powers

refused to respond forcefully, instead believing Hitler's assurances that each expansion would be the last or believing

that domestic public opinion would not support a forceful

response. The nadir of the process was British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain's return from Munich and his

announcement of "peace in our time ."

Not everyone, of course, was deceived by Hitler's designs.

In England Winston Churchill led the cry to prepare for a

war he knew would come, but citizens still war-weary from

the Great War turned a largely deaf ear. Only when Hitler

launched the blitzkrieg against Poland in September 1939

did the situation change. Because of treaty obligations with

the Polish nation, Great Britain and France were forced to

the declaration of war that marks the formal beginning of

World War II . That declaration and the period that followed

it, symbolically enough, was known as the "phony war":

no fighting occurred because neither Britain nor France was

mobilized to fight. Only when Hitler turned his war machine against France the following June did these two nations become directly involved.

America's role and reactions to this chain of events

should be noted . Except in the Pacific, the chain of Axis

advances did not directly involve American interests nor

have much of an impact on the American people. Isolated

by the Atlantic and Pacific oceans from the gathering war

clouds, Americans could and did largely ignore these events,

instead concentrating their energies and emotions on cop18 2
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ing with the debilitating effects of the Great Depression.

The rumblings in Europe were Europe's problem, and there

was little sentiment for plucking European "chestnuts from

the fire" yet another time.

This was, after all, the era of splendid isolationism in

American foreign policy, a period when the lessons of the

inextricable link between the destinies ofEurope and North

America were still not realized nor appreciated. During the

rise of the fascist movements, there was even some support

for the emerging regimes and particularly for the Nazis.

Because Americans generally opposed the idea that these

events affected them, or ignored the situation altogether,

there were adverse consequences as the "winds of war"

approached. On one hand, those Americans like President

Franklin D. Roosevelt who realized that our participation

would eventually be necessary were greatly hampered in

their efforts to prepare the nation for war. Because of legislation enforcing American neutrality, aid for the Western

Allies had to be supplied surreptitiously. The American armaments industry could only be developed slowly, and authorization for even a standby draft (i .e., preparing the

mechanisms for a draft) passed only in 1940. In the American tradition, we entered the waralmost totally unprepared

to fight it . As a consequence, it was not until 1943 that the

full brunt of American military power could be brought to

bear.

On the other hand, the ostrich-like attitude that the war

did not concern us affected our reactions when the conflict

was finally forced upon us. Active and hot war had been

going on in Europe for a year and a half before the attack

on Pearl Harbor, and the forces of geopolitics, if closely

watched, suggested that American involvement was, in the

long run, inevitable. Moreover, many US leaders believed

that in all likelihood Japan would be one of our opponents.

Yet, the average American did not see the war coming. The

"perfidy" of the Japanese attack was accentuated and

American outrage was all the greater for the surprise . In

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our reaction to the shock, our objectives were shaped by

and pursued with a moral indignation that they might not

have had if we had been better prepared.

Political Objective

The American declaration of war against Japan the day

after Pearl Harbor, followed by the German counterdeclaration, threw the United States into its second coalition

war of the twentieth century. As had been the case in the

Great War, not all who fought together shared the same

political and military objectives. The Allies were united in

a joint desire to defeat the Axis (especially Germany) militarily, but there were differences of opinion about what

constituted that military victory. Their most serious differences were political and largely focused on the postwar

map . The greatest divisions among the major Allies were

between the Soviet Union and her two major English-speaking partners, but there were some items of disagreement

between Great Britain and the United States.

The Americans and the British had many common objectives. Probably the clearest statement of agreed goals was

articulated well before America's entrance into the hostilities when Prime Minister Churchill and President Roosevelt met off the Canadian coast and announced the

Atlantic Charter. That document, setting forth eight points,

had essentially two thrusts . The first was a statement about

how the postwar world should be organized . As a statement

of the better state of the peace, the charter emphasized such

things as abjuring territorial gains, promoting self-determination as the basis for the postwar political map, and

protecting free access to trade and resources for all nations.

The other thrust called for the disarmament of the aggressors and a peace that would ensure the physical security of

all nations.

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The first thrust was primarily political and the second

military. Where the two allies disagreed was the relative

emphasis that should be placed on each, and their positions

largely reflected national attitudes toward war and politics .

From the American perspective, the primary purpose of the

war was to rid the world of the absolute evil posed by fascism. This was a highly moralistic goal, reflecting the American tendency (so well illustrated in other conflicts) to view

issues in terms of good and evil. Defining the purpose once

again as a moral crusade naturally emphasized the second

thrust of the Atlantic Charter rather than the underlying

political purposes that made the violence necessary. Defining the better state of the peace would have to wait for the

end of violence .

The British view, epitomized by Churchill, placed greater

emphasis on the postwar map. Recognizing the mortal peril

represented by Hitler and the consequent need to vanquish

the Nazi opponent, the British view was more geopolitical,

placing emphasis both on the the military task at hand and

the shape of the postwar map. In Churchill's mind, the

primary problem for postwar Europe would be the power

vacuum created in eastern and central Europe by the defeat

of Germany and how to blunt and contain Soviet aggressive,

imperialistic designs on those areas. The Americans downplayed this problem, initially because Roosevelt thought he

could contain Stalin's ambitions. This disagreement produced friction among the Western Allies throughout the war

and became particularly evident at the time of the final

offensive against Germany in 1945.

The Soviet objective was quite different and considerably

more desperate. After the failure of the Soviet initiative to

re-create the Triple Entente of World War I, Stalin entered

into the notorious Molotov-Ribbentrop (Nazi-Soviet) NonAggression Treaty in 1939. The Soviet purpose, beyond the

partitioning ofPoland in the secret protocol, was to provide

breathing space to mobilize and rebuild its military capa185
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bility, which had been ravaged by the purges of the 1930s.

When the Nazi onslaught (Operation Barbarossa) began on

22 June 1941, the initial Soviet objective became survival

of the fatherland. This was not an easy chore as German

armies spread farther and farther into Soviet territory. The

Soviets came within a hair's breadth of losing the war(some

have argued that had the invasion not been delayed for six

weeks because of disturbances in the Balkans, Hitler might

well have succeeded) .

After the infamous Russian winter bogged down the German advance, the political objectives of the Great Patriotic

War became twofold and sequential . The first objective was

to assure the territorial integrity of the Soviet homeland,

and its primary imperative was the physical removal of the

German army. This was, of course, an objective with which

the Western Allies could scarcely disagree, although there

was considerable disagreement between Stalin and his allies

about the strength, location, and timing of American and

British efforts to alleviate pressure on the Soviets and hence

to facilitate accomplishing the task.

Disagreement was fundamental on the second Soviet objective, which was to create a physical circumstance in Europe that would preclude arepeat ofBarbarossa . One aspect

of this objective was to create a buffer zone between Russia

and Germany to ensure that a future thrust toward Russia

could be confronted in eastern Europe. A buffer zone required states in eastern Europe at least not unfriendly (preferably sympathetic) to the Soviet Union, and it was this

aspect that troubled Churchill most as he contemplated the

postwar European map. The second aspect was the disposition ofpostwar Germany. In a manner ofreasoning not

dissimilar to France's after World War I, Stalin wanted a

permanently weakened Germany that would not be capable

of again posing the menace already twice visited on the

homeland during the century. This desire came to mean a

permanently partitioned Germany, neither part of which

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would be strong enough to threaten Soviet security.

Because the Pacific theater of the war was essentially a

conflict between the United States and Japan (albeit with

a major theater in China and other more minor theaters

elsewhere in Asia), American political objectives against

Japan were neither complicated nor compromised by the

problem of coalition policymaking to the degree they were

in Europe. In the Pacific, Allied and American objectives

were essentially the same (at least until the Soviets entered

the conflict in 1945 with the apparent-now if not thenpurposes of gaining a buffer zone in North Korea and a

voice in the future of Japan).

The American political objective was straightforward andwas heavily influenced by the Japanese sneak attack on

Pearl Harbor. The purpose was the destruction of the Japanese Empire and the abdication of the Japanese emperor,

whom most Americans identified-probably erroneously-as the instigator of the Pearl Harbor raid. Roosevelt's description of that attack as a "day of infamy" set

the moral tone for a crusade against the perpetrators. Nothing less than the total defeat of the enemy could create

atonement; and because the emperor was, in the popular

mind, the embodiment of Japan, the emperor had to go.

As we shall see in a later section, this absolute requirement

may well have lengthened the war in the Pacific and may

even be loosely related to the later fighting in Korea.

The final consideration regarding the objective was the

relative importance of attaining the political objectives of

overthrowing German nazism or Japanese imperialism: to

which end should primary attention be focused? From the

viewpoint of the European allies, nazism represented the

greater threat and should be dealt with first. On this point

there was agreement within the alliance : Hitler should be

defeated first and then attention should be shifted to Japan.

In practice military objectives and strategy only imperfectly

reflected this agreement.

18 7
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Military Objectives and Strategy

The military situation upon the entrance of the United

States into World War II was fundamentally different from

the situation faced . by Americans when they entered the

Great War in 1917. In World War I the United States entered on the side ofviable allies and tipped the scales toward

victory. On 7 December 1941 Americans had many allies,

but few were in a position to shoulder a significant portion

of the burden. The United States was suddenly thrust center

stage in a war for which it was ill-prepared.

Most of Europe had been overrun by the Nazi war machine. France, the low countries, Norway, and the Balkans

were all controlled by the Germans. The Soviet Union was

reeling from the lightning-war blows ofthe Wehrmacht and

was in the painful process of trading its vast spaces for time

to recover and counterattack. Britain had survived the German air assault and dissuaded a Nazi invasion, but its survival was still in doubt. German submarines were taking a

fearful toll on British shipping, and the British army was

heavily engaged in North Africa against a superb German

general bent on seizing Egypt. Besieged as they were, the

Soviet Union and Great Britain were America's only significant allies in Europe .

In the Pacific and Far East, China continued to survive

despite the heavy blows of the Japanese but could offer

little help to the United States other than to tie down a

large portion of the Japanese army. Japan was running

rampant across the Pacific . By the end of December 1941,

Wake Island and Hong Kong had fallen and Japanese forces

had invaded Malaya, the Philippines, and the Gilbert Islands. By mid-March 1942, Malaya, Singapore, Rabaul, and

Java had all fallen, the remnants ofan Allied fleet had been

destroyed in the Battle of the Java Sea, and General

MacArthur had been evacuated from the Philippines . The

European colonial powers were besieged in Europe and

could do little to stem the Japanese tide . Help was available

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from Australia and New Zealand, but it was clear the

United States would have to shoulder the majority of the

load.

If the world situation was bad, the condition ofthe American military was worse. Most of the Pacific fleet's firepower

rested on the bottom of Pearl Harbor. The American Army

was still building and was untested in combat. American

air power was still a paper force. Although first-class heavy

bombers were coming off the assembly lines, no US fighter

could match those fielded by Germany or Japan. In sum

the situation at the end of 1941 was dismal.

The overall Allied strategy for the war was actually

mapped out well before the United States entered the war.

In the winter and spring of 1941, American-British-Canadian (ABC) staff conversations produced a generalized military strategy should the United States enter the war. The

plan's first priority was to stop the enemy onslaught . The

first American objective was to preserve a secure operating

base in the Western Hemisphere. For the British the essential task was clearly to maintain the integrity of the British

Isles and, if possible, its dominions in the Far East (particularly India). The second British priority was to maintain

control of its sea lines of communication, without which

all else would crumble.

The most important agreement reached during the ABC

talks had to do with overall Allied priorities. Germany was

considered the predominant member of the enemy camp.

Thus the staffs agreed that the European theater was the

decisive theater and the area for the initial concentration

of effort . These priorities dictated that in the Far East the

military strategy would have to be defensive at the outset.

Later during the war, however, this agreement would cause

considerable consternation (particularly in the US Navy,

which considered the naval war against Japan to be at least

equally important to the war in Europe) .

The offensive campaign against Germany and Italy was

envisioned in stages. The first stage was to bring to bear

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economic pressure, including the denial of raw materials.

The second stage was a sustained heavy air offensive against

the German homeland. The third stage was to eliminate

Italy from the war, since it was considered the most fragile

of the three Axis partners . Raids and minor offensives

against the enemy were envisioned at every opportunity

while forces for the major offensive were built . The fourth

and last stage was a major offensive against the Germans

on the European continent itself.

In the European theater, the most lasting and vexing

questions were where and when to invade the continent in

force. The British were wary of a cross-channel invasion.

The ghosts of a generation of youth lost on Flanders fields

during the Great War haunted the British . They feared that

they would again be bogged down in a stalemated war of

attrition that they could not afford . They also feared attacking before they were fully prepared and again being

thrown off the continent. The memory of Dunkirk died

hard.

The Americans desired a cross-channel invasion as soon

as possible and argued hard for such an undertaking as early

as 1942. The situation was complicated by the need to keep

the Soviet Union in the war. The Soviets badly needed a

second front, and Stalin used every opportunity to press

for an invasion at the earliest possible moment .

The cross-channel invasion controversy would continue

throughout the war. The Americans and Soviets pressed for

early invasion . The British constantly suggested such alternative (and presumably safer) invasion sites as Italy,

Greece, and the Balkans.

Churchill won the first round of the controversy by posing

a series of difficult questions that emphasized the enormous

problems involved in mounting a cross-channel invasion in

1942 . Roosevelt, however, was convinced that the Allies,

particularly the Americans, must take dramatic offensive

action as soon as possible . With the invasion of France put

in the "too-difficult-at-present" category, he agreed to an

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invasion of North Africa. The object was to trap the German and Italian forces between British forces advancing

from Egypt and Anglo-American invasion forces advancing

from Morocco and Algeria.

North Africa offered many advantages over a cross-channel invasion. First, and most important, the landings would

not be directly opposed by seasoned German troops.

Rather, the invading troops would land on shores controlled

by the Vichy French. Although the French would probably

oppose the landings, there was the possibility that there

would be no resistance and, in any case, resistance should

be far less severe than could be expected on the coast of

France' itself. Success in North Africa would yield several

significant benefits . Victory would help to open the Mediterranean shipping lanes, facilitate the flow of supplies to

the Soviet Union through the Persian Gulf, and might draw

German strength away from the Soviet front. Given available resources, the operation posed significant benefits at

minimum risk.

The landings and the campaign as a whole were successful, and in January 1943 Roosevelt and Churchill met

in Casablanca to map out the next Allied moves. Although

a cross-channel invasion was discussed for the fall of 1943,

Churchill won round two by convincing Roosevelt that the

next step should be Operation Husky, the invasion of Sicily.

Churchill argued that seizing Sicily would facilitate clearing

the Mediterranean sea lanes and would put pressure on the

shaky Italians. The invasion ofFrance was again postponed,

this time until the spring of 1944. Stalin's reaction to the

postponement was bitter and helped plant the seeds of disunion that would tear the Allies apart in the aftermath of

the war.

The Casablanca conference is best known for two other

strategic decisions. The first reaffirmed the importance of

the massive bombingoffensive against Germany, which was

just getting under way in earnest. The air offensive had

been plagued by diversions from strategic to tactical targets
EAGLE'S TALONS

(support for the North African landings, for example) and

controversy between British and American airmen over the

advisability of the daylight, precision-bombing attacks preferred by the Americans. At Casablanca plans were laid for

the combined bomber offensive in which the Americans

would bomb by day using precision techniques and the British would use area-bombing techniques at night. The idea

was to give German defenders and the civilian population

no rest .

The other, and more famous, decision was announced at

the concluding news conference, when Roosevelt stated that

the Allied goal was "unconditional surrender" of the Axis

powers. Ever since that news conference, the effects of that

phrase have been matters of considerable debate. Critics

have pointed out that such an objective probably prolonged

the war because it gave the Axis powers a propaganda advantage by imbuing the enemy population with the courage

of desperation. Churchill maintained that the specific retribution demanded by the Allies seemed so severe when

set down on paper that unconditional surrender paled in

comparison. Both Roosevelt and Churchill made significant

efforts throughout the remainder of the war to explain unconditional surrender as something that the enemy population should not view with fear. Their efforts, however,

had limited success.

The invasion of Sicily yielded quick success and the invasion of the Italian mainland quickly followed. By early

September 1943 the Italian government surrendered, although German troops in Italy maintained strong defensive

positions. Thus most of the steps in the general Allied strategy had been accomplished. The German-Italian advance

had been stopped, pressure had been applied whenever possible on land and at sea, the bombing offensive against the

German nation was picking up momentum, and Italy had

been knocked out of the war. Planning nowbegan in earnest

for the cross-channel invasion.

In early 1944 Allied air forces stepped up their strategic

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attacks and made their first priority the Luftwaffe itself.

During the spring, the Allies seized command of the air

over western Europe and began to have a serious impact

on German ability to operate effectively on the ground.

Control ofthe air was an essential ingredient in a successful

invasion, and the Allies had almost total control, particularly over the channel coast.

Meanwhile the resurgent Soviet army took a terrible toll

of German military power. Even though a majority of German military power was concentrated on the eastern front,

the Soviet army had begun to roll toward the borders of

the Reich. So great were the Soviet victories that the AngloAmerican forces made plans for an "emergency" crosschannel invasion should Germany collapse and "invite"

them ashore to prevent the Soviets from overrunning all of

western Europe.

The successful Allied lodgement on the the shores ofNormandy and subsequent breakout from the hedgerow country sealed the fate of Nazi Germany. Unfortunately, many

Germans fought on to the bitter end with fatalistic determination. Whether or not it was inspired by the prospect

of unconditional surrender, the prolonged German resistance did little but cause more death, suffering, and postwar

bitterness .

In the Pacific, the war against Japan progressed much

faster than originally anticipated by Allied planners, thanks

primarily to the incredible industrial output of the United

States. The first order of business was to stop the Japanese

advances. The Japanese had other ideas, including knocking

the United States out of the Pacific altogether .

Thus Adm Isoroku Yamamoto sought to destroy the remnants of the American Pacific Fleet, and the Japanese appeared to have the chance for the final decisive battle when

Adm Chester Nimitz offered battle at Midway in June 1942.

Nimitz was in possession of Japanese war plans, thanks to

important code-breaking operations (see the section on military conduct) and thus surprised and defeated the Japanese

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fleet . The Battle of Midway ended the eastward expansion

of the Japanese. In the south, the Americans invaded the

islands of Guadalcanal, Gavutu, and Tulagi in the Solomons. The objective was to blunt the Japanese offensive,

which appeared to threaten Australia. After bitter fighting

the US operation was successful, and the southern expansion of the Japanese was halted. With the Japanese stopped,

it was time to take the offensive.

The basic offensive strategy had four steps. The first required cutting off the Japanese home islands from sources

of raw materials and thus to take advantage of a major

Japanese vulnerability. In the second part of the strategy,

the Allies were to keep up constant military pressure to

force the Japanese to use their war reserve stockpiles . The

third step was to get within range of the home islands and

initiate a heavy bombing offensive to pave the way for an

invasion. (Originally, Allied planners envisioned the use of

Chinese air bases for the air campaign. However, Chinese

setbacks in 1944 made it necessary to use island bases for

the final aerial onslaught.) The fourth and last step was to

invade the home islands.

Controversy arose over the best route for getting within

range ofthe home islands. General MacArthur in the southwest Pacific argued for an advance on the Philippines from

the south (his command area). The Philippines could then

be used as a jumping-off point against the home islands

and as the place from which to interdict the flow of raw

materials from the south . To some observers, MacArthur

seemed obsessed with his pledge to return and liberate the

Philippines, but he had an advantage: as a former Army

chiefof staff, he had been the superior of those officers now

running the war.

Admiral Nimitz favored a far different route. He recommended a naval assault across the central Pacific aimed

at the Philippine-Formosa area to cut the Japanese Empire

in two and separate the home islands from their resource

base. Naval strategists also leaned toward Formosa as the

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base of operations for the final assault on Japan. In a classic

compromise, the Joint Chiefs of Staff authorized the "nondecision" that both approaches were the best method of

placing intolerable pressure on the Japanese.

After the Americans seized island bases in the Marianas

(part of the Nimitz plan), the aerial campaign against Japan

began in earnest. The Japanese merchant marine had been

virtually destroyed by naval action and the lines of supply

from the south were cut. American airmen believed bombing would destroy remaining Japanese war production and

directly attack the will of the people. In a turnabout, the

daylight precision-bombing concept that the American airmen had fought so hard to preserve in the European theater

was quickly abandoned in the Pacific. Bad weather, problems with the jet stream, long flight distances, the distribution of Japanese industry, and Japanese opposition

convinced the airmen that night low-level attacks using incendiary munitions against highly flammable Japanese cities would be the most effective strategy.

Plans for the invasion progressed. The bitter experiences

on Iwo Jima and Okinawa demonstrated that an invasion

of the home islands would be a costly affair . However, the

city-leveling bombing attack took its toll . The use of atomic

bombs at Hiroshima and Nagasaki was the straw that broke

the back of resistance and Japan sued for peace before the

invasion occurred.

Political Considerations

As in all wars, parts of World War II gain their full meaning only when viewed within a domestic and international

framework where politics affects the battlefield and vice

versa. From an American viewpoint, the major political

concerns were international rather than domestic because

the war enjoyed broadbased internal support. At the same

19 5
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time, the exigencies of alliance decisionmaking created

some strains that were primarily political in character.

American participation in World War II may have been

the most popular of any US military excursion . Certainly

it was the most strongly supported long war in US history.It

was the most purely total war in the American experience,

and this factor may well have contributed to America's embrace of its purposes and conduct.

Although we have described other wars as total within

their contexts, the Second World War more closely meets

the criteria of total war. It was a war of mass mobilization

wherein the entire American population was called upon

to become involved in one way or another. More than 12

million Americans were brought directly under arms for its

conduct, the American industrial plant was revived and

converted to become the arsenal of democracy, and an unprecedented amount of American treasure was committed

to its successful conclusion. Millions, including aheretofore

inconceivable number of women and minorities, were recruited to work in factories supporting the war (many have

argued that this was the crucial underpinning of later women's and civil rights movements) and everyone was encouraged to contribute in some way, if only by growing

victory gardens or making do with ration coupons. Thus

for Americans (other than Southerners in the Civil War)

World War II demanded a depth and breadth of involvement never seen before-or since.

Fortunately, the purposes for which the war was being

fought seemed adequate for the sacrifice. The enemy was

an unmitigated evil: the monster Hitler and the infamous

Hirohito and Mussolini. The elimination of such evils rang

a responsive chord in the traditional American moral sense,

an emotion heightened by the way America was forced into

the fray . When President Roosevelt, advertently or inadvertently, proclaimed the unconditional surrender of the

various enemies as the primary military objectives to ensure

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the eradication of fascism, he announced a moral purpose

adequate to sustain American support.

If America was firmly united behind the purposes of the

war, the same cannot be said of the other Allies. The most

prominent of disagreements within the alliance dealt, as

suggested earlier, with how to treat the Soviet Union and

what the balance should be between attaining political and

military objectives when these came into conflict. These

problems were interactive and were the subject of considerable discussion between the Americans and the British .

Great Britain, with its greater experience in power politics generally and its longer history of dealing with Russians, was a great deal more suspicious of the Soviets than

was the United States. Churchill viewed Soviet motives

within the context of the expansive tendencies of the Russian Empire by whatever name. Americans, largely naive

in European politics (by choice) and painfully ignorant of

the Soviet Union, were more ready to embrace the Soviets

and to believe in their political reasonableness . To America,

all the Allies were part of the common cause, and Soviet

leader Stalin was extolled by the American propaganda network as "Uncle Joe."

This difference in attitude had practical applications regarding both elements in the disagreement. Because the

British believed the ultimate Soviet purpose was to extend

its domain over as much of Europe as possible, they were

more content to see the Soviet and Nazi armies slug it out

on the Eastern Front. The Americans wished to get onto

the Continent, confront the Germans in classic American

style, and grind the Nazi armies between themselves and

the Red Army. The British demurred from this "direct"

approach to the problem, preferring the more "indirect"

approach of attacking at the periphery. As discussed earlier,

the British approach prevailed until June 1944 while Stalin

fumed that the Western Allies' real desire was to see the

Nazis and the Soviets physically destroy one another so that

the Western Allies could pick up the pieces (an idea put

19 7
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forward early in the war by a then-obscure senator from

Missouri, Harry S Truman).

One result of these disagreements was the ongoing annual

debate between the British and the Americans about when

and where to open the second front . Certainly part of that

debate represented a philosophical disagreement between

Americans, whose heritage was the direct approach inherited from Grant, and the British belief in the Anacondalike plan that made up the indirect approach. At the same

time, the question of how to deal with the Soviets, which

translated into the question of how fast and where to come

to their aid, had something to do with the debate.

The balance between adherence to the military and political solutions was also subject to disagreement as exemplified by the final campaigns of the war in Europe. After

the final German offensive in the west was broken at the

Battle of the Bulge in the winter of 1944-45, Germany lay

largely prostrate. The Americans and the British were approaching from the west, and the Red Army was moving

in from the east .

The American command, supported by Roosevelt,

wanted to concentrate on the purely military task of engaging and destroying the German army's ability to resist.

Such an approach required operating over a broad front,

was time-consuming, and brought relatively small amounts

ofterritory under control. The British preferred a blitzkriegstyle movement on a narrow front, worrying about knocking

out pockets of resistance later. Their motive was simple

and straightforward: Churchill maintained that a lightninglike movement could capture Berlin and thus reap considerable political and military prestige that would be important in the postwar world. The Americans, however, insisted

on the broad front as militarily more effective, and because

of our military predominance, we prevailed .

Another political concern was how to induce the Axis

powers to capitulate once the end was in sight. The goal of

unconditional surrender became a problem in much the

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same way that the Emancipation Proclamation undoubtedly stiffened the Southern desire to resist during the Civil

War. Unconditional surrender's requirements meant the

physical invasion and occupation of Germany that hadbeen

avoided in the Great War, and such a prospect tended to

increase the Axis will to resist. Allied armed forces were

gradually grinding down hostile ability, but overcoming

cost-tolerance (hostile will) was a more difficult matter in

the face of Allied objectives .

The primary tool used in each theater to bring about the

destruction of hostile will was strategic bombardment, followed, if necessary, as in the German case, by invasion. In

the case of Japan, because of the horrible prospects of having to mount history's largest and undoubtedly bloodiest

amphibious assault on those islands, the United States

sought help for the final invasion. Thus the United States

induced the Soviet Union to declare war on Japan in 1945

to assist in the invasion (and hence to endure some of the

estimated one million casualties that the effort would exact). The dropping of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and

Nagasaki, however, obviated the problem.

Military Technology and Technique

Defensive capabilities dominated World War I. On the

Western Front, unimaginative and almost constant frontal

assaults on strongly entrenched enemies led to incredible

carnage and negligible progress . In World War II, the offense dominated lygely as the result of technological advances and because of new and inventive ways of using

weapons first developed in earlier wars. Rather than a

grinding stalemate, World War II saw sweeping, high-speed

maneuver that revolutionized war on land, at sea, and in

the air.

Mechanized armored formations fundamentally changed

land warfare. Although the tank had some successes in the

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latter stages of World War I, its effectiveness was limited .

Proponents of armored warfare between the two wars believed the tank's somewhat disappointing performance had

been the result of transient problems. For instance, World

War I tanks were plagued with mechanical difficulties that

could be solved with better designs and materials. World

War I tanks were primitive compared to those used in the

second war. World War II tanks had heavier armor plating,

much greater speed (up to 25 mph for even the heaviest

tanks), heavier guns (up to 122 mm on the Soviet JS III),

turret-mounted guns for greater firing flexibility, and far

more reliable designs. In all, the World War 11 tank was a

far more potent weapon than its lumbering predecessor.

More important, armor enthusiasts believed that they had

learned the best method of armored employment and that

World War I had ended before the truly decisive nature of

tank warfare could be demonstrated.

Theleading interwar theoreticians ofmechanized warfare

were two Englishmen. Gen J. F. C. Fuller had been the

author of "Plan 1919," the blueprint for a massive and

presumably final tank offensive against the Germans. (The

plan was not put into effect because of the German surrender in 1918 .) Fuller remained a leading proponent and

theoretician of armored warfare after the war and long after

his retirement from active service. Basil Liddell Hart, a

medically retired army captain, was the second leading proponent ofarmored warfare. A prolific writer, Liddell Hart's

fame, along with that of Fuller, spread around the world.

However, they were prophets with little honor in their own

land. (In the mid-1930s, the British wmy spent far more

on fodder for cavalry horses than on fuel for its armored

forces .) The leading practitioner of armored warfare, building on the theories of Fuller and Liddell Hart, was Heinz

Guderian, who built the German panzer divisions and

trained his forces in the concepts of blitzkrieg (lightning

war). Meanwhile, the French, British, Americans, and Soviets fell behind in both theory and practice .

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In the Second World War, as forecast by Fuller and Liddell Hart and practiced by Guderian and his disciples, the

armor-infantry relationship of World War I was reversed.

Now infantry supported tank operations and tanks moved

at their own pace rather than at the pace of the infantry .

It was the infantry's problem to keep pace with the tanks

and general land force mechanization resulted . Thus modern armored warfare emphasized rapid and sustained

movement. The objective was to penetrate deep to the enemy's rear, disrupt his command, control, and communication capabilities, and surround his fighting formations.

Strong defensive formations were bypassed and left for reduction by the mechanized infantry formations that followed. The flanks of armored columns slashing deep into

enemy areas were long and exposed. But with enough speed

and movement, the flanks would take care of themselves

as befuddled enemies fell back in total disarray. The pace

of movement in World War II was thus much greater than

in the first war. Mechanized battle was not only a battle of

rapid movement, but it also required the use of massive

numbers of tanks and supporting vehicles .

Although modern mechanized warfare depended on the

development of dependable armored vehicles, another key

element in "lightning" war was the development of tactical

air power. When carefully coordinated with ground operations, tactical air power provided the long-range disruptive

effect provided by heavy artillery in World War 1. Unlike

the big guns of the first war, however, tactical air power

moved easily with rapidly advancing armored columns and

ranged ahead of them to disrupt enemy efforts to organize

an effective defense. Although tactical air forces developed

in the armed forces of all the major powers, the Germans

carried their development to the extreme. The Luftwaffe

was nominally an independent military organization, but

in reality was atool of the German army. Luftwaffe aircraft

were designed to assist the Wehrmacht directly almost to

the exclusion of other air power missions.

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Not all campaigns in World War II were lightning campaigns, but nearly all displayed the combined arms operations that, if conditions were favorable, could develop into

campaigns of rapid movement and deep penetration. There

were, however, numerous examples oflightning war in textbook form. The German invasion of Poland was the first

example, although the battle for France in 1940 remains

the classic example of blitzkrieg . The largest examples were

in the German offensives against the Soviets. In the summer

and fall of 1941 panzer columns slashed deep to the rear

of Soviet positions and trapped huge numbers of Soviet

soldiers and incredible quantities of equipment. Despite

setbacks in the winter of 1941-42, the Germans again

achieved significant success in the summer and early fall

of 1942 against the Soviets . Late in 1942, however, the

Germans became seriously overextended and got bogged

down in positional "slugging matches," most notably at

Stalingrad . The lack of rapid movement made extended

German flanks much more vulnerable, and the Soviets were

able to turn the tables on the German Sixth Army with

flanking attacks north and south of Stalingrad . Soviet forces

linked in the German rear and trapped an entire German

field army, a major turning point in the Great Patriotic

War.

The foremost American practitioner of armored warfare

was the colorful general, George S. Patton . At heart Patton

was a cavalryman of the old school, but he adapted well

and studied the successes and failures of others. He imitated

his tutors and generally improved upon their techniques.

Patton's dash across France after the Allied breakout from

the hedgerows of Normandy is a superb example of armored warfare at its best . Patton's use of tactical air power

ahead of his columns is an excellent example of the air-toground coordination required in highly mobile warfare.

The value of air power was primitively demonstrated in

World War I . Tactical missions (i .e ., reconnaissance, battlefield interdiction, and limited close air support) played

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some major roles in the success of ground operations. Air

to ground cooperation and coordination was improved in

the second war, thanks to the development of reliable radio

equipment. As a result of improved coordination and the

inherent speed and mobility of air power, it became critically important to successful ground operations, particularly highly mobile ground operations. But in World War

11, air power also played a much different role as it was

used to attack the ability of an enemy society to wage war.

The concept of strategic bombing flowed from the ideas

of the Italian airman Giulio Douhet and the American soldier-airman Billy Mitchell. Both of these iconoclasts believed that bombing the enemy's "vital centers" could

destroy the enemy's will and ability to wage war. Both were

visionaries, for although they based their theories on the

experiences of the first war, they envisioned war waged with

equipment (long-range, heavy bombers) that did not exist.

In the United States the ideas of Mitchell, who was forced

out of service, were carried to fruition by his disciples at

the Air Corps Tactical School . They promulgated a doctrine

of strategic bombing to destroy the enemy's industrial centers and thus destroy his ability to support warfare. The

"true believers" at the school thought that strategic bombing by itself could be decisive and that surface forces would

become pass&. The initial American plan for the air war in

Europe indicated that, if correctly executed, a strategicbombing campaign could make an invasion of the Continent unnecessary.

Two key elements were required for a successful strategic

bombing campaign. The first was equipment capable of

striking the enemy's vital centers. After several unsuccessful

attempts to produce a heavy bomber, success was finally

achieved with the development of the B-10 in 1932. However, it was the famous B-17 and later the B-24 that formed

the backbone of the American bombing effort during the

European campaign in the second war. In the Pacific theater, the much larger, heavier, and longer range B-29 was

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the aircraft that ranged across vast distances and struck at

the Japanese home islands .

The second key element was the identification of the vital

centers or the key elements of the industrial web, the destruction of which would bring down the enemy. During

the bombing campaign in the European theater, campaign

plans were continually revised in a search for these key

elements. Electric power plants, ball bearings factories, and

other "vital" industrial elements were attacked with significant success, and yet the German war machine fought

on. Finally, the American airmen struck at German synthetic oil production and found the key. The destruction of

these facilities significantly degraded the capabilities of

German ground and air forces by causing acute shortages

of petroleum products essential for mechanized warfare.

The effectiveness of strategic bombing is still a subject

of considerable controversy. Clearly, strategic bombing was

oversold by zealous airmen before World War 11 . Armies

and navies did not become obsolete as some had predicted .

Europe had to be invaded and many bloody battles fought

before the Nazis surrendered. In the Pacific, however, the

destructiveness of firebombing raids on Japanese cities and

the devastation caused by two atomic bombs convinced the

Japanese to surrender without an invasion . The Japanese

navy had been destroyed, but much of the Japanese army

remained in the field undefeated . The airmen believed they

had been vindicated, but the land and naval battles required

to get the airmen within range of the Japanese home islands

cast at least some doubt on their claims. Although the controversy over the value of strategic bombing in World War

11 continues, it is safe to say that it was "a" decisive element

in the conduct of modern warfare if not "the" decisive

element.

Naval warfare was also drastically altered by the advent

of air power. The age of the battleship as queen of the fleet

ended decisively at Pearl Harbor. The aircraft carrier

quickly became the centerpiece of the naval battle force.

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Often during the Pacific campaigns, fleets fought at ranges

so great that opposing ships were never in sight of one

another. Aircraft ranged out from their carriers hundreds

of miles to attack enemy fleets and island strongholds. Although surface engagements did occasionally occur, for the

most part naval war in the Pacific was an air war. Naval

guns were used to protect vulnerable aircraft carriers or to

support amphibious landing and ground operations .

Other technological developments before and during

World War II were less dramatic but equally important in

changing the face of warfare. Of particular importance was

the use of electronic warfare. Radar was an indispensable

warning device against attacking aircraft, as was well demonstrated in the Battle of Britain . Counterradar devices

thus became important as did radio direction finding and

guidance techniques (demonstrated in the Battle of the

Beams during the Battle of Britain). Radar was also important at sea both for air defense and for surface operations . Electronic eavesdropping, the gathering of

intelligence by electronic message interception, became a

fine art that led directly to success on the battlefield. Perhaps the best example of this was the electronic intelligence

gathered prior to the Japanese assault on Midway in 1942.

Not only were radio transmissions intercepted, but the Japanese code was broken, revealing Admiral Yamamoto's

plan. As a result, a ragged force built around the three surviving US aircraft carriers was able to ambush the Japanese

invasion fleet and turn the tide in the Pacific. Equally important was the electronic intelligence gathered from the

Germans. The ability to read German codes provided a

singular advantage to the Allies .

Many would argue that the most significant technological

development of World War II was the atomic bomb. However significant its development may have been, its primary

influence lies in the postwar world, and thus is discussed

in a later chapter. In World War II the development and

use of atomic bombs were little more than the crowning

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blow that convinced the Japanese that they must surrender

or face total destruction .

World War II saw the mechanization of war begun in the

Civil War and advanced through World War I come to

fruition. Although mechanization changed the face of war

on the battlefield, the most significant change it wrought

was to change the very nature of war. War, which had been

a battle of masses since the time of Napoleon, became a

battle of factories . The industrial base of the antagonists

was increasingly important as were lines of communication,

sources of raw materials, and complex logistical networks.

As a result, the home front became a target of critical importance, and a target that could be struck directly because

of the mechanization of war. The home front was now on

the front lines.

Military Conduct

Both Germany and Japan achieved stunning successes

before the United States entered the war. The Italians

achieved some limited success in Ethiopia but were for the

most part embarrassed by the results of their military ventures. Japan invaded China proper in 1937, and on 1 September 1939 Germany invaded Poland. By the end of

December 1941, these three unlikely partners had overrun

most of Europe, much of North Africa, most of European

Russia, the richest portions of China, and many of the island complexes in the East, Central, and South Pacific .

Their setbacks had been few in number and minor in nature. And yet, by the end of 1942, just one year after the

entry of the United States into the war, the tide of conquest

was reversed and the Axis powers began long and painful

retreats .

Although the Allies agreed that attention would be focused on the European war first, the tide first turned in the

Pacific. Admiral Yamamoto, the architect ofJapanese naval

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WORLD WAR II

victories in the Pacific, attempted to lure the remainder of

the American Pacific Fleet-primarily the aircraft carriers

not caught in the Pearl Harbor attack-into a final climactic

battle . Yamamoto planned to seize Midway Island in early

June 1942 to bait the trap. When the American carriers

arrived to counterattack, he would overwhelm them with

an incredible assemblage ofships and planes. Unfortunately

for the Japanese, the Americans were reading the most secret Japanese naval codes and knew Yamamoto's plan . As

a result, the aircraft from three American carriers were able

to ambush Yamamoto's carrier force north of Midway. The

island base remained in American hands, but more important, US aviators sunk four Japanese fleet carriers and

Japan lost the best of its naval aviators . The cost to the

Americans was many good aviators, one destroyer, and one

carrier. The tide had turned in the Pacific only six months

after the United States entered the war.

In North Africa, the seesaw war that raged back and forth

across the desert finally turned for good against the German-Italian forces on 23 October 1942 when British Gen

Bernard L. Montgomery launched the second battle of El

Alamein. In a well-prepared set-piece battle, Montgomery

sent the Axis forces under the command of Gen (later Field

Marshal) Erwin Rommel reeling back out of Egypt and

across Libya. On 8 November, with the Germans and Italians in headlong retreat, Anglo-American landings took

place near Casablanca in Morocco, as well as near Oran

and Algiers in Algeria. Vichy French forces controlling these

areas offered some resistance but were quickly overcome,

and the Allied troops began moving east to trap the Axis

forces retreating in front of Montgomery.

The Germans rapidly poured troops into Tunisia under

the command of Gen Jurgen von Arnim. The invading Allies were plagued by long supply lines and an inadequate

North African transportation network, as well as stiff resistance from the newly arrived Germans, who occupied

favorable defensive positions. The attack slowed and es207
EAGLE'S TALONS

sentially halted while the Allies consolidated their position .

In February von Arnim and Rommel counterattacked at

Kasserine Pass, where they defeated thinly spread and inexperienced American troops. Although a terrible setback

for the Americans, the defeat provided good experience and

training . The two-pronged Allied offensive soon resumed,

and after much hard fighting and the evacuation of Rommel, nearly a quarter million German and Italian soldiers

trapped in Tunisia surrendered on 12 May 1943 .

The tide turned in the European war on 19 November

1942, north and south of the shattered city of Stalingrad

on the Volga River. In August of that year, the German

Sixth Army had reached the outskirts of Stalingrad. This

advance was the high water mark of the German offensive

in southern Russia. The city that bore Stalin's name held

a special fascination for Hitler, and Soviet troops defended

the city with great tenacity for perhaps the same reason.

EUROPEAN-MEDITERRANEAN THIATER

Major Ameri"n C*mpligns

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WORLD WAR II

The Germans abandoned the mobile, armored warfare that

had given them great success and became bogged down in

house-to-house fighting in which their superior armored

forces offered no advantage. Meanwhile the Soviets massed

forces north and south of the city to strike the exposed Axis

flanks. On 19 November the Red Army attacked and by

22 November had trapped Gen (later Field Marshal) Friedrich von Paulus and the German Sixth Army. Despite attempts to relieve the army and to supply it by air, the

shattered German army surrendered at the end of January

1943.

The Allied counterattack continued in 1943 . In the Mediterranean the Allies invaded Sicily on 10 July and liberated

the island by 17 August . In September Anglo-American

forces leaped the Strait of Messina and invaded Italy. Although the Italian government and forces surrendered, the

Germans under the command of Field Marshal Albert Kesselring waged a tenacious defense of the peninsula that

lasted until nearly the end of the war. In the Pacific limited

Allied offensive action began. Operations on Guadalcanal

were completed in early February. New Georgia, New Britain, Makin, and Tarawa all fell ; Bougainville was invaded

and counterattacks liberated much of New Guinea. Ofparticular importance was the death of Admiral Yamamoto,

whose plane was shot down by American pilots flying from

Guadalcanal. American signals intelligence code breakers

discovered that the admiral would be visiting forward bases

in the Solomons and the timing of his itinerary. American

P-38 twin-engine fighters ambushed the admiral's aircraft

and the chief strategist of the Japanese navy was lost, another victim of poor Japanese security and superior American signals intelligence .

Meanwhile the long awaited Allied heavy bombing offensive against Germany began in earnest. British bombers

had raided deep into Europe under the cover of darkness

almost since the beginning of hostilities. The Americans

entered the war with excellent heavy bombers (B-17s and

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EAGLE'S TALONS

B-24s), an accurate bombsight (the Norden), and a different

bombardment theory. While the British bombed large areas

at night to avoid heavy losses to enemy air defenses, the

Americans advocated precision bombing during daylight

hours. They believed that heavily armed bombers flying in

tight formations to provide mutually supporting fire could

adequately defend themselves against Luftwaffe fighters.

Although the British thought this idea was foolhardy, the

Casablanca conference allowed the Americans to operate

in their preferred mode in the combined bomber offensive.

During 1942 and early 1943, the American bomber force

slowly increased in Europe. Equipment arrived with green

crews and training was intense . Short missions over the

Continent began on 17 August 1942. But the missions were

primarily against targets at such short distances that fighter

protection was available for the bomber formations. After

diversions to support the war at sea (attacks on submarine

21 0
WORLD WAR 11

bases) and the North African campaign, the long-range

American bombing effort began in earnest late in the summer of 1943, first against the Romanian oil refineries at

Ploesti and then against Germany itself.

The first high-altitude, daylight bombing raid deep into

Germany occurred on 17 August. The mission had two

targets, the Messerschmitt aircraft factory at Regensburg,

and, more important, the ball bearing works at Schweinfurt.

No escort was available because the targets were far beyond

the range of Allied fighters. This would be a true test of

American strategic bombing doctrine, a mass daylight raid

by 376 B-17s at high altitude against vital targets.

The plan was complex and things went awry. Poor

weather over England separated the bomber formations by

three hours instead of the 10 minutes called for in the plan,

allowing German fighters to attack the first formation and

then to refuel and engage following formations in force.

Despite this difficulty, the bombing was excellent, causing

significant damage to important targets, but 60 bombers

were lost to enemy defenses. The losses were far heavier

than could be tolerated over an extended period of time.

Although the bombing went well, the targets were not

destroyed. Thus on 14 October, "Black Thursday," American airmen went back to the ball bearing works at Schweinfurt and suffered even heavier losses . A total of 82 aircraft

were lost or damaged beyond repair out of 291 launched.

Loss rates approaching 30 percent could not be sustained

if the American bomber force was to continue to exist. As

a result, the Americans curtailed deep bombing missions

until long-range escort fighters were available. Equipping

P-47s and P-51s with drop tanks extended their range and

set the stage for the massive air offensive that beganin early

1944.

The strategic bombing campaign reached a thundering

climax during 1944. During "Big Week," which began on

20 February, armadas of Allied aircraft bombed German

aircraft plants and challenged the Luftwaffe to fight. Al-
EAGLE'S TALONS

though the bombing raids did significant damage, the telling

blow was in air-to-air combat, as Allied escort fighters directly battled hard-pressed German fighters. In mid-May

some bomber missions were allocated to attacks on German

synthetic oil production, the source of much aviation fuel

for the Luftwaffe. Although the results were not apparent

for several months, synthetic oil was the key to total air

supremacy for the Allies . Without fuel, the Luftwaffe could

not defend against the Allied air offensive, and the destructiveness of the bombing raids mounted rapidly. The vital

center had been found, the air battle was won, and the stage

was set for the invasion of the Continent.

The Germans believed the invasion would be launched

directly across the Channel at the Pas de Calais . The Allies

nurtured this notion through elaborate deception schemes

while preparing to invade across the beaches of Normandy.

Although some difficulties were encountered, particularly

on Omaha Beach, the invasion went well and a lodgement

was quickly achieved. However, it soon became obvious

that the planners had worried more about securing a beachhead than they had worried about subsequent operations .

It is difficult to imagine fighting territory more unsuited to

mobile warfare than the Normandy hedgerow country. The

Allies could not take advantage of their superior mobility

and quickly became involved in a heavy slugging match

that yielded slow progress.

Finally, after a climactic battle in July near Saint-Lo, the

Americans breached the German line and poured through

the gap into more open country. General Patton's newly

created Third Army led the charge across the breadth of

France in an armored dash reminiscent of the German

blitzkriegs of earlier years. Suddenly, the front was far more

fluid and a general Allied advance quickly began. By 19

August American elements were across the River Seine, and

Paris was liberated on 25 August. Meanwhile on 15 August,

the Allies launched a second invasion, this time on the

southern French coast near Saint-Tropez. The troops were

21 2
WORLD WAR II

quickly ashore and moved north. German resistance in

France was in shambles.

Eventually the rapid Allied advance slowed. The Germans fell back on shorter supply lines (although the supply

lines were far from full) and, as they neared the Rhine, they

were defending the homeland itself. Meanwhile the rapid

Allied advance outdistanced its supplies . Gen Dwight D.

Eisenhower had planned a broad advance into Germany,

with emphasis on the forces in the north, commanded by

British Field Marshal Montgomery, because the northern

route was the shortest way to the German industrial heartland. However, supply shortages tempted Eisenhower to

give in to Montgomery's pleas for a divergence of all available supplies to his forces for a quick bold thrust across the

Rhine into Germany. The result was Operation MarketGarden, a combined airborne and land assault on a narrow

front aimed at the Rhine River bridge at Arnhem in Holland. Launched on 17 September, it was the largest airborne

assault in history. Unfortunately, although the airdrops

were successful and the bridge at Arnhem was seized and

held temporarily, the ground attack could not relieve the

paratroopers and the operation failed.

The advance on a broad front resumed as the supply

situation eased, but the going was much more difficult. In

December the Germans launched a last-ditch counterattack

from the Ardennes area, the objectives of which were to

split Allied forces, seize Antwerp, and trap British, Canadian, and American forces. In the resulting Battle of the

Bulge, the Germans scored significant early victories, but

their advance literally ran out of gas. The subsequent Allied

counterattack was adisaster for the Germans. The Germans

lost approximately 100,000 men and 800 tanks and replacements were nonexistent.

In March 1945 the Allies were across the Rhine in force,

and the victorious armies fanned out across Germany. Resistance to the Soviet advance continued to the bitter end

21 3
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while resistance in the west rapidly disintegrated . The Germans capitulated on 7 May 1945 .

In the Pacific 1944 was a year of relentless Allied advance. American troops seized Kwajalein, Eniwetok, and

Saipan by midyear. Allied operations continued successfully on New Guinea, and a Japanese thrust from Burma

into India was defeated . By year's end, American bombers

were within range of the Japanese home islands, and the

stage was set for the destruction of the Japanese will and

ability to continue the war.

Although the Allied advance rolled on (more accurately,

sailed on), Japanese resistance was fierce . In an attempt to

prevent the American seizure of Saipan, the Japanese fleet

attacked the American fleet screening the operation. The

result of this final carrier-versus-carrier set-to was the Battle

of the Philippine Sea, often called the Great Marianas Turkey Shoot. The Japanese had neither enough planes nor

enough experienced pilots to attack the massive American

carrier forces successfully. The costs to the Japanese were

more than 300 aircraft lost, three carriers sunk (two by

submarines), two other carriers severely damaged, two other

ships sunk, and two more severely damaged. The costs to

the Americans were light ship damage and the loss of 130

aircraft, 80 of which crashed attempting night landings

aboard American carriers .

After midyear Guam and Tinian quickly fell . Finally, on

20 October, General MacArthur fulfilled his promise and

returned to the Philippines . The US Sixth Army landed on

the island of Leyte and began a long struggle to liberate the

islands. The landings provoked the remnants of the Japanese navy to an almost suicidal mission to destroy the

American fleet supporting the landing and thus to isolate

the troops ashore. The Japanese attack surprised the American forces in Leyte Gulf and caused considerable damage

and confusion . However, the Battle of Leyte Gulf was the

gasp of a dying fleet and a disaster for the Japanese. In

widely separated actions, the Japanese lost 4 carriers, 3

21 4
WORLD WAR II

battleships, 6 cruisers, and 14 destroyers. For all practical

purposes, the Japanese fleet ceased to exist.

While the campaign for the Philippines continued, another facet of the war began. On 24 November 1944 the

first B-29 raid against the Japanese home islands was

launched. Using bases in the Marianas, the pace of attack

began to build but with mixed results . The new aircraft

caused some problems as did the long flight times. Additionally, finding good weather over Japan was difficult . Precision bombing was made difficult because of the jet stream

encountered over Japan and because much of the Japanese

industrial base resembled a cottage industry-dispersed

and difficult to find. As a result, on 9 March 1945 Gen

Curtis LeMay stripped down his B-29s, loaded them with

incendiary bombs, and ordered them on a low-level night

bombing mission over Tokyo. The results were spectacular.

The raid destroyed nearly 16 square miles of the city, killed

84,000, and injured 40,000 others. Nearly one million people were made homeless. American losses were negligible.

The die was cast; low-level firebombing would be the principal aerial tactic. By war's end 178 square miles of Japanese cities had been completely destroyed in firebombing

raids.

As the B-29s bombed the heart out of Japan, the ground

and naval offensives continued, culminating in the campaigns for Iwo Jima and Okinawa. In spite of suicide attacks

by Japanese planes, the islands were secured. The jumpingoff points for the invasion of Japan were in American

hands. Meanwhile the campaign against Japanese shipping,

the naval blockade of the islands, and the firebombing had

taken their toll . Finally, atomic bombs were dropped on

Hiroshima (6 August 1945) and Nagasaki (9 August 1945).

On 8 August the Soviets declared war on the Japanese and

invaded Japanese-held Manchuria the following day. Even

the most die-hard Japanese saw that continued resistance

might mean the death of Japanese civilization . On 14 August 1945 Japan surrendered. The only invasion required

21 5
EAGLE'S TALONS

was peaceful as occupation forces entered the Land of the

Rising Sun.

Better State of the Peace

When the war finally came to an end with the formal

capitulation of Germany in May 1945 and Japan in August

of the same year, the victorious Allies were faced with the

task of recreating the peace. Mindful of the failure of the

Versailles conferees to reach a solution guaranteeing an enduring peace, the three major victorious Allies faced the

same essential tasks that had confronted the preceding generation. What to do with the losers? How to build an international structure that would allow peace to last? How

to restructure a political map torn asunder in the world's

greatest bloodletting?

The prerequisites to forming a better state of the peace

had been achieved. German and Japanese hostile ability

and willingness to continue had been overcome, although

in different ways. In the case of Germany, her armies had

been effectively destroyed and her industrial web lay in

ruins; hostile ability had been decisively overcome. As the

Allied armies marched inexorably toward one another in

central Germany, hostile willingness (cost-tolerance) evaporated as well. In the end, Germany lay prostrate, more

physically defeated and vulnerable than had been the case

in 1918 .

Japan was a somewhat different proposition . Because of

the way the island-hopping campaign against the Japanese

Empire was conducted, Japan still retained significant military power even at the end of the war. Certainly Japan's

navy lay mostly at the bottom of the ocean and its air force

had been reduced to nonexistence; but the Japanese army

remained, though scattered at garrisons throughout eastern

Asia. Japan's hostile ability was tottering, dispersed, and

incapable of being linked together because of the destruc21 6
WORLD WAR 11

tion of her naval and air assets, but the Japanese armed

forces were not decimated in the way that Germany's were.

What broke decisively for the Japanese was the willingness to continue to resist . Air power, so widely acclaimed

as the solution to the European problem, proved the key

element in convincing the Japanese leadership that going

on was futile. With its navy and air force destroyed, Japan's

home islands had been subjected to a merciless pounding,

particularly through the use of incendiary bombs. The dropping of atomic devices on Nagasaki and Hiroshima was the

coup de grace of the strategic bomber's art that finally

brought about capitulation.

Two comments need to be made about this process of

overcoming hostile will and ability. The first has to do with

the Allies' stated policy (at least the American policy) of

unconditional surrender. Although it can never be proved

conclusively, this goal and its likely concomitant of physical

invasion and occupation undoubtedly stiffened hostile will

and prolonged the war against both adversaries. In Germany the major fear was the advancing Red Army and the

likely retribution the Soviets would exact. In Japan unconditional surrender resulted in the nonnegotiable US demand that the emperorabdicate. The evidence now suggests

that had the United States recanted on that one demand,

agreeing in effect to leave the emperor as a figurehead like

the British monarch, Japan might have surrendered earlier.

Once unconditional surrender became the goal, however, it

was politically impossible to reverse gears without appearing to change the goals that had activated sacrifice in the

first place.

The second comment has to do with the unique contributions of strategic bombing to overcoming Axis hostile

will and ability. World War II was, after all, the test case

for the strategic bombardment theories that had been developed in the interwar period, and it was also the only

instance where those theories have been tested against de21 7
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veloped societies possessing the "vital centers" and industrial web for which the ideas were formed .

In some ways the air power enthusiasts' hopes and claims

were clearly excessive . As pointed out, strategic bombardment. did not make naval and ground operations obsolete

or ancillary. Instead air, land, and sea power were interactive. Naval and ground operations in the Pacific provided

staging grounds for the bombers that could not have been

secured otherwise, for instance. That the most extreme

prior claims for strategic bombardment were overdrawn

does not, however, necessarily belittle air power's overall

contribution .

There remains controversy about how important strategic bombardment was, and the controversy has been intensified by the apparent "failure" of strategic

bombardment to produce decisive results in such conflicts

as Korea and Vietnam. Partly this debate is the result of

the excesses (or at least lack of understanding) of the air

power enthusiasts about the ability of bombardment to destroy hostile will and ability. At the same time, the expectations were put forward overenthusiastically in a context

of total war against mobilized, industrial societies that had

a suitable "target list" for the bombers.

Attacks on hostile ability and will (cost-tolerance) involve

very different goals and operations . As pointed out in earlier

discussions, military power is most clearly suitable to destroying enemy hostile ability, which requires (or may require, depending on the nature of the conflict) destroying

the enemy's armed forces and the industrial and social base

that supports the war effort . (The inclusion of the industrial

web, the home front, is the clearest mark of total war and

the area where the contributions of strategic bombardment

are most obviously applicable.) In this regard, strategic

bombardment against both Japan and Germany was undoubtedly a major contributory factor in bringing the Axis

to its knees.

The difficulty arises when one extends, as the enthusiasts

21 8
WORLD WAR 11

did, the role to include overcoming hostile willingness to

continue. The Allied bombing campaign may have exhausted the German people and destroyed their ability for

self-sustenance, but it is questionable whether strategic

bombingdestroyed the German will to persevere (especially

in combination with the consequences of unconditional surrender). In the end, air power in the form of nuclear munitions convinced the Japanese that continuation was futile,

but the unique properties of atomic explosions make that

a special case.

The important role that strategic bombardment played

in the war emboldened its proponents and probably caused

them to overextrapolate from the experience. Because bombardment had worked against Germanyand Japan, it would

work elsewhere. What was lost in the process was an appreciation of the unique characteristics of the two countries:

both were highly industrialized nations with peculiar vulnerabilities and dependencies. When faced by opponents

that have not shared these characteristics, strategic bombardment has not been so clearly applicable, and the controversy over strategic air power continues to swirl partly

as a result.

If hostile ability and cost-tolerance had been overcome,

the crucial remaining task was how to structure the peace.

That task in turn meant having to deal with the three questions posed at the beginning of this section. The Allies'

answers would determine if the failures of Versailles would

be revisited in the wake of World War II.

The first question to be answered was how the vanquished powers would be treated. The answer in 1919 had

been to impose a vindictive peace, and it had been a failure.

In 1945 the Allies' ability to impose was even greater, since

both Germany and Japan were occupied. Fortunately, lessons had been at least partially learned.

In both Japan and Germany, democratic political systems

were installed (except in the Soviet occupation zone in Germany), a reminder of post-World War I Germany. The dif21 9
EAGLE'S TALONS

ference was that in 1919 the new political system was

burdened with a settlement that virtually ensured economic

chaos. That chaos was blamed on the fledgling republic and

undermined any likelihood that the people would embrace

the system. The installation of democracy after 1945 was

accompanied by generous programs of economic rehabilitation and development. These programs nurtured recovery

and generated support for the imposed political regimes,

thereby removing the vestiges of resistance to victor

policies .

The Soviet Union did not share in this process. In the

Soviet's occupation zone, an essentially vindictive peace

was imposed through a harsh military occupation, the imposition ofa Communist regime, transformation ofthe East

German economy into a feeder for the Soviet Union and

punitive reparations (even to the extent of literally transporting German industries to the USSR to replace destroyed Soviet factories) . This spirit of vengeance was not

unlike that of France after the Great War. Given its parallel

suffering, the Soviet Union's urge to vindictiveness should

not be entirely surprising (although there were additional

Soviet motivations as well).

The second question was how to fashion a postwar order

that would prevent a recurrence of war. This task largely

fell to a working group in the US State Department that

began its work before formal American entrance into the

war. The State Department personnel began their job by

examining what there was about the mechanism erected in

1919 that had caused its failure. Their answer was that the

League of Nations had inadequately institutionalized the

process of responding to threats to or actual breaches of the

peace, a deficiency they sought to remedy in the new United

Nations Charter. Under the League of Nations Covenant,

no nation had a specific obligation to respond to any crisis,

and the league had no permanent armed forces assigned to

its jurisdiction . As a result, the league could only issue a

call to its membership to respond to a crisis and hope the

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members would rise to the occasion. If, as happened during

the 1930s, the membership did not heed the call, the league

was powerless to stop aggression .

The framers of the UN Charter sought to overcome this

problem. In drafting the collective security provisions of

the charter, they proposed a radical solution . The permanent members of the new Security Council, the majorAllies

(the United States, Soviet Union, United Kingdom, France,

and China) would jointly take on the role of policemen of

the world. Only they would retain significant military force,

while all other nations would be disarmed to the level required for maintaining internal order. These disarmed

states would simply act as bases for UN troops from the

major powers. Thus overwhelming military force would always be available to confront a potential aggressor.

Given the way the world has evolved, these provisions

now seem terribly unrealistic and utopian. Those who

framed the charter have been accused of being naive and

visionary, but the accusation is ill-founded. The framers

recognized the possibility, even probability, that the United

States and Soviet Union would come into conflict after the

war, which is why the UN Charter also contains provision

(Article 51) for the formation of collective defense, or alliance, mechanisms. Thus the framers constructed an internal system that could provide for the peace ifthe major

powers could cooperate to make it work, and they mapped

out an external alternative if the major Allies could not.

The victorious Allies had limited success in dealing with

the second question, but it was the third that ultimately

proved most vexing: the shape of the postwar political map.

At this point Anglo-American visions (slightly altered) embodied in the Atlantic Charter clashed directly with Soviet

security and hegemonic interests. The inability to resolve

these differences satisfactorily has provided much of the

basis of conflict in the international system ever since.

The operative American, and to a lesser extent British,

idea was self-determination for all peoples, although this

22 1
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ideal was occasionally compromised in practice in the third

world-for example, as in acquiescence in French reimposition of colonial rule in Indochina. The Soviets, obsessed

with physical security and the spread of their ideology, insisted on forming a cordon sanitaire (buffer zone) of friendly

(Communist) governments in the east European countries

they occupied . The Soviet position flew in the face ofAngloAmerican desires but, given the Soviet occupation of the

affected countries, the Western Allies were in little position

to do anything about Soviet actions.

Where there was joint occupation, matters were even

worse . Germany was divided originally among the three

combatants (France was later given its own zone carved out

of the American and British sectors) and cooperation

quickly broke down. Western policy was to push for normalization and economic revitalization as quickly as possible, a preference best served by reintegration of the zones

in a united Germany. The Soviets, however, desired (as the

French had before them) a permanently weakened Germany, and their best bet in this regard was a divided Germany. Ultimately, division became effectively permanent

over the issue of currency reforms in the western zones that

precipitated a Soviet response in the form of the Berlin

blockade. The Berlin Wall and the miles upon miles of noman's land separating West and East Germany are grim

reminders of the inability to resolve the issue.

Korea was the other divided country. In return for the

Soviet pledge to assist in the invasion of the Japanese home

islands in 1945, the Soviet Union received an occupation

zone in the formerly Japanese-controlled nation. According

to agreements reached during the war, the purpose of the

occupation was to disarm remaining Japanese troops, to

establish civil order, and to prepare both sections for free,

unifying elections in 1948 . Instead a Communist regime

was installed in the north and an anti-Communist regime

in the south.

Was a better state of the peace achieved? If one uses the

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WORLD WAR II

Versailles yardstick for comparison, the answer is that this

peace has certainly been overwhelmingly more successful

than that following 1919. There has been no military resurgence of the defeated powers and a third worldwide conflagration has been avoided. In Europe, the center of

international violence for the centuries preceding, bloodshed has been limited to Soviet actions in east Europe for

more than 40 years. In that sense the peace has been a

notable success .

It was not, however, a perfect peace (if such is possible).

The formal mechanism for regulating the peace died stillborn as a collective security instrument when the wartime

Allies fell out, and the inability of East and West to redraw

the political map in a mutually satisfactory manner sowed

the seeds for future conflict . The ongoing series of controversies over Berlin are a direct legacy of World War II's

better state of the peace, and so are the histories of Korea

and Vietnam, to which the discussion now moves.

CHAPTER 6

KOREAN WAR

If World War II had been the ultimate example of total

war (short, of course, of the nuclear holocaust that might

be World War III), the Korean conflict began the trend back

to limited engagement. Begun a mere five years after the

conclusion of the Second World War, Korea began aprocess

of adjustment for American military and political leaders.

It is a process of understanding and interaction that still

continues.

The Korean War was a new experience for the United

States and for the international order that emerged from

the ashes of World War II . For the United States, the experience was unique in at least three ways. First, it was our

first limited war in modern (twentieth-century) times. As

such, it represented a discontinuity in experience that required painful learning and adjustment . Second, it was the

first significant cold war confrontation and represented a

novel challenge to the emerging American role in the world .

Third, it was the first major American military engagement

not preceded by a formal declaration of military intent by

the Congress of the United States, and it began a constitutional and political process that culminated in the War

Powers Act of 1973 . For the international system, Korea

was the first and only instance of the application of the

collective security provisions of the United Nations

Charter, although not an application as envisaged by its

framers. Each of these points is of sufficient importance to

merit elaboration.

Although the United States had fought wars that were

limited in terms of the severity with which they were fought

(e.g., the War of 1812) or the ease of their accomplishment

22 5
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(e .g., the Spanish-American War), the Korean conflict was

the first time the modern US military, developed and prepared for total war and led by an officer corps steeped in

the total wars of the twentieth century, was thrust into a

situation in which the political objectives were limited . The

result was to create friction between the military and political leaderships. It was a disagreement for which neither

group was especially well prepared, and the result was probably unnecessary ill will and inefficiency in the conduct of

the hostilities .

A large part of the conflict came straight from the pages

of Clausewitz. The Prussian had warned a century and a

half earlier that there is a natural tension between military

and political leaders. To the military leader, the military

goal is to prevail over the enemy in combat, and the result

is a tendency to intensify the level of combat. The military

naturally concentrates on a concerted effort to destroy the

enemy's armed forces to overcome hostile ability. Such was

the appropriate military objective in the total war environments of the world wars, and it was a military tendency

that a leadership trained in the traditional American military style and blooded in total wars could embrace.

The problem was whether such an approach was appropriate to the politico-military task at hand in Korea. Clausewitz had warned that when the military tendency to expand

a war overruns the war's political objectives, political leaders must be especially vigilant to ensure that the political

objectives remain supreme. To make matters somewhat

more perverse, the tendency to intensify seems to operate

regardless of whether one is winning or losing; raising the

ante appears the universal reaction. The United States had

not, at least in living memory, encountered a situation

where military and political objectives clashed, but it did

in Korea.

An example may help to clarify this point, because it

represents a particularly bedeviling phenomenon. The best

example surrounds that tragic figure of the Korean conflict,

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KOREAN WAR

Gen Douglas MacArthur, and the politico-military role that

ultimately led to his dismissal from command.

MacArthur was very much a product of the American

military tradition (it can be argued that he was its epitome) .

He came from the West Point tradition that taught warfare

Ulysses S. Grant style (he was even superintendent of West

Point between the world wars), and his most significant

service had been in the total war milieu of World War II.

When he came to command the United Nations forces in

Korea, he brought that experience with him. His consistent

position and predilection throughout his tenure was to expand the action. When he routed the North Koreans following the Inchon landing and chased them back across the

38th parallel (thus fulfilling the original mandate to rid the

south of its foreign invaders), his counsel was to continue

onward and to destroy what was left of the Korean People's

Army (KPA). When he was allowed to do so and was met

by the Chinese intervention that sent his forces reeling

south, his advice was to up the ante significantly, taking

the war directly to the People's Republic of China (PRC).

That such an act, discussed more fully later in the chapter,

would have altered substantially the nature of the war did

not seem troublesome to someone so thoroughly imbued

in the American military tradition of apoliticism. The

"American Caesar" exemplified how to violate most of

Clausewitz's maxims.

The United States encountered another aspect of limited

war in Korea that it did not recognize at the time and that

it would also have difficulty spotting when that aspect reappeared in Vietnam. That phenomenon was an asymmetry

in the political purposes of the adversaries that translated

into different military approaches as well.

For the United States, the original purposes in Korea

were strictly limited: remove North Korean forces from

South Korea and ensure they could not return. Accomplishing the goal of liberating South Korea required neither the

destruction ofthe enemy's armed forces (although doing so

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might aid in ensuring they did not come back) nor the

surrender of the enemy and occupation of his territory.

The situation was quite different for the North Koreans.

Within their more limited physical resource base, their purpose was total: the occupation of South Korea, the overthrow of the South Korean government, and the forceful

uniting of the country. Thus, a form of contrast arose that

made the war seem all the more perverse. The United States

had the physical wherewithal to wage a total war, but the

nature of our political objectives made the use of all those

resources undesirable. Had our purposes been total, we

might, for instance, have used the atomic bomb . In this

circumstance such action was deemed inappropriate for a

variety of reasons, including the nature of the objective

(Korea was not important enough to warrant the expenditure of part of a scarce resource) . On the other hand, the

North Koreans had total purposes in mind, but they lacked

the manpower and physical resources to achieve those goals

after the United States and other United Nations members

entered the fray.

Korea was also the first major military confrontation in

the developing cold war competition between the Communist and non-Communist worlds. Certainly the two sides

had confronted one another earlier, as in the Berlin blockade and airlift, but Korea was the first instance of actual,

bloody conflict. It represented the first real test of the American policy of containment that had been articulated by the

Truman administration during the 1940s.

The Korean War was viewed initially as the first opportunity to confront and arrest the spread of communism

beyond the Sino-Soviet periphery. In the light of the "fall"

of China to Mao Tse-tung and the Communists in 1949

and a rising anticommunism in the United States that was

moving toward the excesses of McCarthyism, the idea of

stopping communism through the resort to force was initially quite popular, both within the United States and else228
KOREAN WAR

where in the non-Communist world . There would be no

Munichs for the masters in the Kremlin.

Korea was important because of its own geopolitical importance (especially in regard to Japanese security) and as

a test of wills. For Americans the real enemy in Korea was

not the North Koreans, even if it was they and the Chinese

whom one was fighting . The real enemy was the Soviet

Union, since Americans assumed that the North Koreans

were acting as surrogates for the leaders in the Kremlin who

directed and orchestrated Communist activity everywhere

as part of a closely coordinated international conspiracy.

We will probably never know for sure exactly what the

Soviet role in the North Korean attack was. Many assume

that the decision process goes back to Secretary of State

Dean Acheson's speech in early 1950 in which he outlined

the containment line in East Asia and omitted all mention

of South Korea (some allege that the omission emboldened

the Soviets to authorize the attack on the assumption the

United States would not react) . Evidence for this position

is adduced from the absence of the Soviets from the UN

Security Council when the vote was taken to make intervention in Korea a UN enterprise. (The Soviets were boycotting the United Nations because of Western refusal to

seat Communist China in place of Chiang Kai-shek's

Chinese Nationalists . As a member of the Security Council,

the Soviet Union had the right to veto the intervention

motion had it been present at the meeting.)

It is likely that the Soviets did at a minimum authorize

the North Koreans, possibly at North Korean initiation, to

make the invasion. Such a minimal interpretation is justified by the heavy dependence of North Korea on the Soviets for war supplies . The North Koreans simply could not

have sustained much of an effort without resupply from

their benefactors.

Whatever the nature of the relationship, the North Korean invasion was clearly viewed in the United States as

part of the East-West, cold war confrontation. At one level,

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such a challenge could not go unheeded lest the Soviet

Union be emboldened to believe American commitments

were meaningless; in that sense Korea was a symbol of the

whole evolving shape of postwar international politics. At

the same time, many in this country and in Europe firmly

believed that the Korean action was a feint to divert American attention away from an impending invasion ofwestern

Europe . Such was the prevailing military view during the

early months of the conflict, and this belief dissipated only

slowly as the Soviet invasion failed to occur.

As noted earlier, Korea was the first major commitment

of American forces to combat that was not preceded by a

formal declaration of war by the US Congress. Certainly

there were precedents for sending Americans into combat

without such authorization. These included most of the

western Indian wars and the campaign against the Barbary

pirates, but all the previous actions had been minor and

peripheral. When President Truman went before the American people on 27 June 1950 to announce that American

assistance would flow to Korea (as well as to Indochina),

there was little concern about the constitutional impact of

the action. Only as the war dragged on did such concern

arise.

The debate that developed is by now familiar. The Constitution, of course, provides that the Congress has the prerogative to raise and maintain armed forces and to declare

war, whereas the president is designated as commander in

chief of the armed forces . The problem that arose in the

heat of Koreawas how much control the Congress exercised

in how those forces were used. The framers of the Constitution clearly envisaged that all wars would be declared,

thereby giving Congress veto power over the commitment

of forces. The Korean War was not formally declared, and,

therefore, there was no constitutional (as opposed to practical political) need to get congressional approval. The debate as to whether Congress should have a voice in

committing troops to such actions wasjoined only as public

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KOREAN WAR

support for the war soured. In the aftermath of Korea, the

debate continued inconclusively and was not raised again

until another American president used the precedent in

Vietnam.

Korea was also the first real test of the fledgling United

Nations and the collective security system by which it was

supposed to assure the peace . By virtue of the Soviet boycott

mentioned earlier, the US government was able to go before

the world body and have the action it would have taken

anyway sanctioned as a UN operation. Although the vast

majority of the fighting in the war was waged by the United

States and the Republic of Korea (ROK), technically the

forces combating the North Koreans and the Chinese were

those of the United Nations.

The Korean War was as close to a real collective security

application as the United Nations has ever mounted, but

it was a far cry from the kind of action envisaged in the

UN Charter. The charter, attempting to overcome weaknesses in the peacekeeping provisions of the League of Nations Covenant, called for a permanent United Nations

force composed of the armed forces of the permanent members of the Security Council (the United States, Soviet

Union, Britain, France, and China-the victorious Allies

in World War II). In this scheme, all other nations were to

be substantially disarmed, providing only basing for the

forces of the permanent members, who collectively would

police the world and put down threats to or actual breaches

of the peace. United States-Soviet enmity had, of course,

torpedoed the scheme by 1950.

Clearly, the UN force that fought in Korea did not meet

the criteria set forth in the charter. A number of nations

did respond to the call of the United Nations and did commit troops, but in most cases the contribution was more

symbolic than significant . General MacArthur and his successor, Gen Matthew B. Ridgway, were technically UN

commanders first and American commanders second, but

it was always clearly understood that their orders and au23 1
EAGLE'S TALONS

thority came from the White House and not the "glass

house" on Manhattan's East Side (UN headquarters). Certainly the charter never contemplated a UN action in which

a permanent member of the Security Council would be the

major supplier and supporter of the force opposing the

United Nations.

Issues and Events

From an American perspective, the North Korean invasion of South Korea came as an almost total surprise,

making it somewhat difficult to track underlying causes for

the action . Certainly the gradual deterioration of US-USSR

relations in Europe had produced strain in the international

system and had led many to expect overt conflict between

the two giants; that such a confrontation would occur on

the Korean peninsula, where the United States had no

clearly defined interests, was a nearly complete surprise .

If there was a basic, underlying issue that defined the

American position in and interest about Korea, it was embodied in the nature of cold war competition and the question of implementing the new American national strategy

of containment. The Korean invasion was the first overt

test of the new strategy, the first time that the Communist

world stepped across the containment line and threw down

the gauntlet .

Seen in that light, the situation in Korea took on a symbolic importance well beyond its objective, discrete value

to the United States. When the invasion occurred, the ma

jority of Americans had probably never heard of Korea and

most of those who had could not have explained why it was

in the American interest to defend that harsh land. After

American leaders explained the Korean intervention in the

context of the crusade against godless communism and as

a symbol of American will to compete, the US action had

considerable initial popularity (the effort was actually quite

23 2
KOREAN WAR

popular until the middle of 1951 when the lines stagnated

at the 38th parallel) .

Korea was both the first test of containment and the

opening event in a debate about the nature of American

commitment arising from that doctrine that continues to

this day. As the KPA poured south across the border and

routed a ROK force pitifully underequipped to meet the

onslaught, the question of what containment meant had to

be answered. The failure to respond effectively could mean

the policy was a hollow shell and invite further Soviet-inspired actions. A direct response would mean the expenditure of American blood and treasure less than five years

after the end of the Second World War.

The United States determined that it had no choice but

to respond militarily, and despite the rapidity with which

it did so, the response came barely in time to turn the

situation around. At the same time, the debate was begun

about how the United States should respond to probings

of the containment line in the future. One side to that debate (generally associated with Democratic presidents) has

argued our commitment is encompassing and the United

States must be prepared to assist the beleaguered with

armed force wherever there is an attempt to breach the line.

The other side (historically associated with Republican

presidents) has maintained such a commitment is too expensive and instead, we should be prepared militarily to

defend only those strategic places clearly vital to our interests (e.g., western Europe and Japan). In this view the

United States should grant materiel aid but leave the defense of other areas to indigenous hands.

The proximate events leading to the crisis can be traced

back to the latter stages of World War II . As mentioned in

the last chapter, the United States induced the Soviet Union

to declare war on Japan in 1945 so that Soviet forces would

be available to participate in the anticipated invasion of

the Japanese home islands . A significant measure of the

cost that the United States was willing to pay for that com23 3
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mitment was the agreement that the Soviet Union would

be given an occupation zone in a liberated Korea.

Under the formal terms of agreement, the Americans

occupied the territory south of the 38th parallel and the

Soviets occupied the area north of that line. The stated

purposes of the occupation were to disarm Japanese troops,

to restore domestic order, and to prepare each zone for

unifying elections scheduled for 1948. Clearly, things did

not go according to plan. Instead the Soviets installed Kim

11 Sung and the Korean Communist Party in the north and

trained and equipped the formidable KPA to a size and

equipment level far in excess of agreed-upon standards. The

United States, meanwhile, helped bring to power the proAmerican Dr Syngman Rhee in the south and established

a military force at a constabulary level as the wartime agreements called for.

When 1948 arrived the United States pulled out of Korea

as agreed, but the Soviet Union did not. The elections to

unify the country (to be supervised by the United Nations)

similarly did not come about, as both sides refused to allow

UN observers in their zones and each accused the other

(both probably quite correctly) with trying to rig the returns.

Korea was a de facto divided state. The only way it could

be returned to its historic unified status (there is no strong

historical or cultural basis for a division) was through an

act of violence.

The North Korean invasion was the major precipitant,

of course, of US action. The invasion caught the Americans

and the South Koreans by surprise . Because of deficiencies

in intelligence collection, both were unaware of a massing

of the KPA until the day before the invasion began. When

the North Korean forces streamed across the border on 25

June 1950, they quickly routed the unprepared and illequipped South Korean forces. (The KPA attack was, for

instance, spearheaded by Russian T-34 tanks; ROK forces

did not have a single antitank weapon.) As the KPA threatened to overrun the south completely and thus present a

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KOREAN WAR

fait accompli that would be extremely difficult to counteract, the United States was forced to act quickly if it was to

react at all.

President Harry S Truman's reaction was indeed swift

and decisive . With information on the nature of the attack

still pouring in, the president requested UN action and on

27 June 1950 announced the American intention to come

to South Korea's aid. The first American combat troops

arrived in South Korea from Japan on 1 July. Unfortunately, these initial forces were garrison troops accustomed

to the relative tranquillity of occupation duty rather than

the rigors of combat, and they fared little better than the

ROKtroops they had been sent to assist . By the time frontline American troops arrived on the scene, the forces opposing the KPA were cornered with their backs to the sea

at Pusan.

Political Objective

As the first modern limited war in the American experience, Korea was the first instance in living American

memory of war fought for less than total purposes. From

the Civil War forward, Americans had come to regard war

as an enterprise whose purpose was to excise some overwhelming evil. Thus war required the enemy's total defeat

and capitulation, and Americans were comfortable with

that concept. Korea, however, was not that kind of war and

because it was not, Americans ultimately became uncomfortable with it and turned against the experience.

A large part of the problem from the American vantage

point was that not only was our purpose limited, but it kept

changing. The changes that occurred related directly to the

state of the battlefield, recalling Clausewitz's useful admonition mentioned earlier. Had there been constancy in

the objective being pursued, much of the American bitterness associated with the Korean experience might not exist.

23 5
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In fact, had the United Nations not strayed from its original

statement of purpose, the Korean War would have been a

briefand successful enterprise that we might well remember

today with a sense of considerable pride .

This assertion runs counter to prevailing wisdom about

our three-year campaign on the Korean peninsula, and thus

requires some explanation and justification. To provide

such a rationale requires looking at the question from two

angles. The first vantage point is exactly what the objective

was, or rather what alternative objectives were available.

The second vantage point is examining how and when the

objective changed and how those changes affected popular

perceptions of the war.

The major source for determining the political objective

is the UN mandate given to the forces that went to Korea.

Unfortunately, from the original statement and subsequent

debate, two not entirely compatible objectives emerge. The

first and most basic was to repel the North Korean invasion,

to rid South Korea of those invaders, and to allow reinstitution of South Korean control of its territory. The second

objective that can be discerned is tied to the earlier UN

role in Korea, supervision of the unifying elections. The

first objective translated militarily into the need simply to

push the invaders out of the country and to establish some

reasonable assurance they would not return. Realizing the

second objective required pursuing the KPA into North

Korea, destroying it as a fighting force, and occupying the

north as prerequisites for holding the elections. Clearly, one

objective was much more ambitious than the other. (One

might add that General MacArthur, after the Chinese "volunteers" intervened, suggested attacking Chinese territory,

which would at least implicitly have expanded the political

objective even more.)

When United Nations forces were first committed to

combat, the situation in Korea was desperate. The South

Koreans and their American allies were pinned down within

the Pusan perimeter, and the question was whether suffi236
KOREAN WAR

cient force could be brought to bear quickly enough to keep

them from being pushed into the sea. In that circumstance,

initial objectives were modest: the goal was to relieve the

situation and to rid the Republic of Korea of its invaders

(the first objective).

The battlefield situation, however, soon provided the impetus for change . MacArthur's brilliant and unanticipated

landing at the port of Inchon, combined with a breakout

from the Pusan perimeter, caught the KPA in a classic hammer and anvil maneuver, crushed its ability to resist, and

sent it reeling in disarray back across the border. United

Nations forces followed the KPA to the border, paused, and

weighed their options.

The major question was whether to pursue the North

Koreans into their country and totally destroy them. From

amilitary point ofview, as MacArthur continuously argued,

the task appeared a mere mopping up exercise, and the

original UN mandate on unification provided the justification for the counterinvasion. Moreover, MacArthur dismissed as idle bombast repeated warnings by Chinese

Foreign Minister Chou En-lai that the new People's Republic would not stand idle should the Americans press

toward Chinese territory. MacArthur reasoned that China

was still too weak from its recently concluded civil war to

field an army of any size or capability.

In the end President Truman agreed to broaden the objective, and he authorized the invasion of the north. With

the perfect vision of hindsight, the decision was a monumental mistake that doomed the war effort to historical

ignominy in the popular mind . The reason for this, of

course, was MacArthur's miscalculation about the Chinese

and their impact on the military situation. When the

Chinese "snuck" more than 200,000 troops across the border, ambushed the UN troops, and sent them reeling back

south of Seoul, the situation changed radically. In January

1951 a regrouped UN force counterattacked, broke the

combined KPA and Chinese force and sent it fleeing back

23 7
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into the north. This time, however, the UN stopped at the

38th parallel, and appeals to go north again (which was

militarily possible) fell on the deaf ears of political leaders

who had become deeply suspicious of the military advice

they were receiving. (Some observers have argued that,

given the disarray of the enemy, the decision not to invade

in 1951 was as disastrous as the decision to invade in 1950.)

With the decision made not to go north, the KPA and

Chinese were able to regroup and the war became a static

engagement along the 38th parallel that dragged on for two

more years until President Eisenhower's threat to use nuclear weapons brought the enemy to the negotiating table.

In the end the result exactly met the original objective.

North Korea's political goal of uniting the country by force

hadbeen thwarted, andthe UNpolitical objective of freeing

the Republic of Korea had been achieved. The irony was

that the goal had been achieved before in September 1950

when the KPA had been routed and sent fleeing home. At

that point the United Nations had considerable leverage,

in the form of the threat to invade, to force the Kim 11 Sung

regime to negotiate the same settlement . The warcould have

been over rapidly, Americans would have won quickly and

decisively, and the bulk of the forces might have been home

by Christmas to be greeted by a hero's welcome. The Korean conflict then might have been remembered as one of

America's finer hours, perhaps equatable with the SpanishAmerican War in terms of length and success.

The decision to expand the purpose destroyed that possibility. When the liberation of the North and unification

became the goal, then the act of liberating the South no

longer constituted victory in a military or a political sense.

When circumstances forced the United Nations to readopt

the original goal as the objective, the American public no

longer accepted accomplishment of this objective as the

definition of winning. Moreover, when negotiations began

in 1951 with the KPA and China safe and regrouped behind

the 38th parallel, the United Nations no longer had the

238
KOREAN WAR

leverage to force a favorable peace settlement . China and

North Korea were able to stall coming to terms for two

years while casualties continued and American frustration

heightened . Thetragedy is that it was all unnecessary; Korea

is the story of opportunity lost because of inconstancy in

pursuing the objective.

Military Objectives and Strategy

The Korean War is a nearly perfect case study in the

relationship of military objectives to the fortunes of battle .

The war also illustrates the difficulty of trying to set obtainable and supportable military objectives in a limited

conflict, difficulties not found when prosecuting unlimited

war. The nature of total war makes the military objective

obvious; the enemy's ability to resist must be destroyed.

Hence the Allied objective in World War II was total military defeat resulting in unconditional Axis surrender.

America's first limited war in the nuclear age presented a

far more complex and frustrating situation.

United Nations' military objectives in Korea fluctuated

directly with the fortunes of the war itself. In the early days

of the conflict as the disorganized and surprised South Korean andAmerican forces reeled back under heavy pressure

from the invading North Korean army, the immediate military objective was simple survival . The invaders had to be

slowed to buy time for the buildup ofAmerican forces. Had

the defenders not been able to maintain a foothold on the

peninsula, an invasion to liberate the overrun territory

would have been much more difficult. Without the Allied

foothold at Pusan, the North Koreans might have consolidated their conquest, regrouped and resupplied their army,

and prepared effective defensive positions. The psychological blow to the South Koreans might also have had an

immense impact.

Fortunately, the defensive perimeter at Pusan held, and

239
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the UN command could move on to the first real military

objective, a counteroffensive to drive the invading forces

from South Korea. This UN military objective was limited,

circumspect, and geographic and aimed at the political objective of liberating South Korean territory. No mention

was made by the United Nations of punishing North Korea,

destroying the North Korean army, or forcing North Korean surrender. At the time the United Nations established

this objective, no one was sure that enemy troops could be

driven out of South Korea. The picture was bleak. Clearly,

this limited objective was meant to be nonthreatening to

the Chinese and Soviet mentors of the North Koreans. The

specter of a wider war and the fear of escalation formed

the background for decisions about military objectives .

Success, however, tends to increase expectations and

open new possibilities . After MacArthur's masterstroke at

Inchon and the breakout from the Pusan pocket, the North

Koreans fled north in total disarray. The time seemed ripe

to clear Communist forces from the entire peninsula. After

some deliberation this mission was ordered, encouraged by

MacArthur's assurances that the Chinese would not dare

enter the war, and that if they dared, he would destroy their

intervening forces. Thus the ease and speed with which UN

forces achieved their original military objective gave rise to

new and expanded military objectives in support of expanded political objectives. In the game of international

military poker, the holder of the high hand had just raised

the bet.

It seemed to be a good bet. The North Korean army

quickly ceased to be an effective fighting force as it fled

north in confusion toward China. MacArthur's troops followed, advancing so rapidly that their own organizational

and logistic structure began to deteriorate . When the

Chinese called the US/UN bet by striking in surprising

force, these factors contributed to the subsequent UN

retreat.

240
KOREAN WAR

As UN forces streamed back south in reasonably good

order, the immediate objective changed again to survival.

Some wondered whether any positions could be held on

the peninsula because of the overwhelming numerical superiority ofthe Chinese forces. The Chinese were, of course,

stopped, but not before they had invaded South Korea,

captured Seoul, and inflicted grievous losses on UN forces.

In this new situation it appeared that UN forces would

find it very difficult to clear the peninsula of the numerically

superior enemy without significantly widening and escalating the war. As a result, the military objective again

changed. The objective reverted to the original purpose of

driving the invaders out of the south, and then holding on

to the status quo ante bellum. To some this was merely a

return to the original objective that, given the original conditions, constituted a significant (if limited) military victory. To many, however, such a limited objective seemed

an unconscionable compromise. The rallying cry of the discontented was General MacArthur's statement that "There

is no substitute for victory."

UN forces regrouped, fought their way north, reliberated

Seoul, and inflicted murderous losses on the Communist

forces. Communist forces were in disarray, but because the

limited objective of restoring South Korean territorial integrity was met by driving the Communists north of the

38th parallel, the UN advance halted along that line. There

both sides dug in and the war settled into a bloody stalemate. The combatants were either unwilling or unable to

escalate the war in an attempt to achieve complete military

victory.

The strategy to achieve the objectives sought was very

familiar. Military strategy mimicked World War II . Tactics

on the ground were very similar to those of that war, particularly those used in fighting in the "narrow places" of

World War II . A military strategist in the Italian campaign

241
EAGLE'S TALONS

would have found himself at home with the military strategy used in Korea. For example, MacArthur staged his version of the Anzio landing at Inchon, only with much greater

success .

American airmen attempted to conduct strategic bombing against North Korea as they had in World War II. However, since North Korea had only a limited industrial base,

strategic targets were quickly exhausted, and air assets

turned to more profitable tactical targets . Rather than being

a producer of war materiel and thus vulnerable to strategic

bombing, North Korea was a funnel for war materiel produced elsewhere. Such a situation led to enormous frustration because the sources of enemy war supplies and

manpower were in China and the Soviet Union, both of

which were off limits to US bombers . American pilots attacking the bridges spanning the Yalu River (the boundary

between North Korea and China across which Chinese

troops and supplies flowed) were instructed to attack only

the southern (North Korean) halves of the spans . If there

was any danger of hitting the northern (Chinese) halves,

they were told to abort their missions. And thus was born

the idea that "we fought with one hand tied behind our

back."

The limitations placed on UN military activities caused

significant rancor. To one degree or another, the issue and

its debate led to the downfall of General MacArthur and

to the downfall of the man who fired him, President Truman. But the crux of the matter was that the United States

and the United Nations wanted to risk no wider war.

MacArthur's counterinvasion of the north (with US/UN

approval, of course) had widened the war significantly and

led to the Chinese intervention. Further widening the war

to attack targets in China could have led to a Soviet-American confrontation and the possibility of nuclear war. Such

a circumstance had to be avoided, much to the frustration

of those who sought traditional military victory.

242
Political Considerations

KOREAN WAR

There were two major sets of political concerns that affected the conduct of the Korean conflict. The first was

American and centered around continuing public support

for the effort . The second had to do with the international

scene and specifically focused on the Soviet Union and its

role in the Korean adventure.

Domestically there were two distinct phases of public

opinion toward the action. The initial phase, which roughly

equates with the period when the war was mobile and fluid,

was marked by a high level of public support. Motivated

by the high level of domestic anticommunism and a crusader's zeal for freeing a beleaguered people from the yoke

of"godless communism," Americans endorsed the decision

to enter the Korean fray. Their support remained constant

throughout the early phases ofthe war as the armies chased

one another up and down the peninsula, and it did not

seem to influence that support much whether the United

Nations appeared to be winning or losing at any given point .

The beginnings of erosion more or less coincided with

the 1951 decision not to pursue the enemy back across the

38th parallel and that erosion was progressive during the

remainder of the conflict. In large measure the war lost

support because it appeared to lose meaning. Overshadowed by the notion of uniting the country, the original

objective no longer seemed like winning; the United States

had apparently abandoned winning as its purpose. At the

same time, there was the spectre of the intransigent North

Koreans and Chinese engaging in seemingly endless and

pointless negotiations while some of the heaviest fighting

of the war raged over barren hills that had numbers rather

than names. Casualties continued to mount with no end in

sight and for no visible effect. As part of American antiCommunist xenophobia, which was moving toward its crescendo in the Army-McCarthy hearings, the failure to lib243
EAGLE'S TALONS

erate the north became ignominious and equatable with the

"sellout" of Nationalist China in 1949.

Since the war's continuation appeared pointless, it took

its domestic political toll . MacArthur, rightfully relieved of

command for disobeying his commander in chief, was lionized as a hero and became a serious, if unsuccessful, contender for the 1952 Republican presidential nomination.

President Truman, who had planned to run for reelection,

concluded that the war had made him too unpopular to

stand a reasonable chance of winning and withdrew from

consideration. The military hero of World War II, Dwight

D. Eisenhower, meanwhile swept into the White House in

a landslide, with much of his popularity based on his promise that "I will go to Korea" and end American

involvement .

The adverse public reaction to the Korean War was, or

should have been, a harbinger regarding public attitudes

toward American engagement in limited wars. If such was

the case, however, it was not evident in public assessments

after the fact . Rather, postmortems tended to focus on the

failure of American arms and on the inadvisability of becoming involved in future land wars on the Asian continent.

With the debate so directed, the problem of whether the

American public could or would support a long military

engagement for limited political purpose was avoided . Even

the admonition to avoid Asian land wars was forgotten a

little over a decade later.

The major international political consideration during

the Korean War was the Soviet Union. This concern took

two forms. On the one hand, there was the question ofwhat

the Soviet role had been in authorizing or ordering the

invasion, to which allusion has earlier been made. Gathering anti-Communist hysteria tended to place the most

sinister interpretation on that question.

If one started from the assumption, as most Westerners

did, that the Soviets directed the operation, the second

question was what they were up to, and there were two

244
KOREAN WAR

possible interpretations. One was that the Korean invasion

was simply a probing action intended to test Western, and

more specifically American, resolve. In that case reaction

was warranted to avoid setting the wrong precedent, but

the situation was not otherwise terribly ominous.

The other interpretation of Soviet motivation was indeed

ominous. In this view, shared widely on both sides of the

Atlantic Ocean, the invasion was the first move toward

general war, a diversionary tactic to draw American attention and forces away from Europe in preparation for a Soviet thrust westward. Throughout the early months of the

conflict, this interpretation was widely believed, and it receded only grudgingly in the obvious absence of a Soviet

aggression. The sway of the argument, however, is evident

in the American reluctance to use nuclear weapons against

the North Koreans and Chinese; it was assumed that the

arsenal, limited as it was to around 300 bombs, needed to

be reserved for use against the Soviets.

Military Technology and Technique

At the time of the North Korean invasion, the American

military establishment was in considerable disarray induced

partially by postwar demobilization and partially by reorganization of our military establishment under the Department of Defense. But the major cause for confusion

was the advent of nuclear weapons. No one knew exactly

what to do with them or what their impact would be. To

the air power enthusiasts, somewhat perplexed by the mixed

results of strategic bombing in World War II, nuclear weapons seemed to bring the bombing theories of Douhet and

Mitchell to maturity. At last the decisive destruction of

enemy sources of power could be accomplished in a swift

and short air campaign.

Air power theorists quickly gained the upper hand in the

American military establishment, for few could dispute the

245
EAGLE'S TALONS

decisiveness of the nuclear destruction rained down on the

Japanese in World War II . As a result, in the reduced military budgets of the postwar years, the scarce developmental

monies available went to the fledgling Air Force. The general American consensus at that time was that air power

using nuclear weapons would prevent aggression or, failing

in that, would end the aggression through destruction of

the offender. As a result, when the North Korean army

crossed the 38th parallel, American ground and sea forces

were equipped with World War II vintage weapons. And

although nuclear weapons were never used in the struggle,

the war was fought in the shadow of the mushroom-shaped

cloud.

The fear of starting World War III and letting the nuclear

genie out of the bottle influenced nearly every decision concerning the conduct of the war. Thus the full potential of

American military power was never unleashed, to the anguish of those who saw no substitute for total military victory. The enemy was granted sanctuaries well within range

of American air power. Although military commanders

pleaded for permission to attack these sanctuaries beyond

the Yalu River, permission never came because of the fear

of escalation to nuclear confrontation with the Soviets.

The threat to use nuclear weapons may have had a significant impact on bringing the conflict to an end. After

his election to the presidency, Eisenhower let it be known

through several channels that if the armistice negotiations

did not quickly reach fruition, he would seriously consider

unleashing America's nuclear might. Such a threat seemed

credible, because of Eisenhower's military background and

because the American Air Force had the means to deliver

the weapons. Whether due to Eisenhower's nuclear threats

or not (some observers maintain the Chinese never received

the threats), the truce negotiators reached agreement six

months after the new president took office.

The monies spent on the improvement of American air

power changed the nature of the air war in Korea. The

246
KOREAN WAR

Korean conflict saw the first use of large numbers of jetpowered aircraft in battle . American flyers, using the sweptwing F-86 Sabre jet, quickly won air superiority over Korea

although the threat of Chinese air power, operating from

sanctuaries, was ever present. UN air superiority was so

complete that UN ground forces were never seriously hampered from the air, and UN air power attacked enemy

ground targets on the peninsula almost at will.

The Korean War also saw the first large-scale use of helicopters. Under development for years, their principal use

was in medical evacuation (with significantly improved survival rate for wounded soldiers), but they also saw duty in

a variety of transport roles. Such use only vaguely foreshadowed their eventual use in a variety of important roles

in the Vietnam conflict .

The fear of escalating a relatively small war was not the

only factor that affected the military techniques used in

Korea. Perhaps the dominant factor controlling the conduct

of the warwas geography. The rugged, mountainous terrain

and narrow coastal plains prevented the large-scale armored

maneuver warfare often seen during World War II. Korea

was an infantryman's war, a slogging, slugging match up

and down the ridges of the Korean peninsula.

On the other hand, the fact that Korea was a peninsula

presented several military opportunities. Naval power

could be brought to bear, particularly naval air power and

amphibious assault techniques . MacArthur saw this clearly

and used the amphibious approach to deal the North Koreans their terrible setback at Inchon when they appeared

to be on the verge of complete victory.

The peninsular shape of Korea also brought air power

into great play, particularly in terms of interdicting the enemy's logistical lifeline. The most concentrated effort to cut

the enemy supply lines was entitled Operation Strangle, the

same name applied to a similar effort in the Italian campaign in World War II. Strangle was sufficiently effective

to affect seriously the enemy's ability to conduct offensive

247
EAGLE'S TALONS

actions . Time after time enemy offensives could not be

sustained for lack of materiel. But air power could not cut

completely the flow of supplies to the front. When the enemy controlled the tempo of conflict, as he often did when

the fighting became a stalemate along the 38th parallel in

late 1951, supplies could be slowly stockpiled from those

that successfully ran the gauntlet of American air power.

Thus the enemy could launch serious offensive actions even

though they could not be sustained for long periods.

Military Conduct

Although two-thirds of the population of Korea lived

south of the 38th parallel, by 1950 North Korea had a

larger, better-equipped, and better-trained military establishment than South Korea, thanks to the considerable aid

furnished, by China and the Soviet Union. The North Korean army numbered nearly 130,000 (augmented by a politically reliable border constabulary of nearly 20,000) and

was reasonably well equipped with World War 11 vintage

Soviet equipment, including some 150 T-34 medium tanks

and a considerable amount of light artillery. The South

Korean army numbered just under 100,000 and possessed

no armored forces and a small amount of artillery. Neither

North nor South Korea possessed naval forces other than

a few patrol boats. The North Koreans boasted a small air

force that included just over 100 combat aircraft of various

types, while the South Korean Air Force was virtually nonexistent . Thus when the war began, neither side could boast

a large, modern military establishment, but the north had

a considerable advantage in both numbers and equipment.

When the invasion began in the early morning hours of

25 June 1950, the North Korean plan was to make a quick

thrust south through the Uijongbu Gap to seize Seoul (a

communications and transportation hub as well as the capital city) and then quickly overrun the remainder of the

248
south. The plan was nearly successful. The ill-prepared and

ill-equipped South Koreans fell back in total disarray . Seoul

fell in just three days. To meet the emergency, General

MacArthur, the American theater commander, sent the

American 24th Division directly into the fighting from its

relatively sedate garrison duty in Japan. After arriving on

the peninsula, units of the division fought a series of desperate delaying actions as they attempted to slow the enemy

advance south from Osan to Taejon .

By 5 August UN forces had been forced back into a rectangular pocket, its front roughly following the line of the

THE KOREAN WAR

25 June - 14 Sep 1950

CHINA

249

')E.' X

KOREAN WAR
EAGLE'S TALONS

Naktong River. Although UN forces had their backs to the

sea, the pocket included the major port of Pusan through

which reinforcements could be landed or, if the need arose,

through which UN forces could be evacuated. However, as

the North Koreans began their assaults on the pocket (the

Pusan perimeter), actions elsewhere were beginning to take

their toll on the invading forces.

The UN air forces (almost exclusively American forces)

quickly seized control of the sky over Korea and by 10 July

had destroyed the North Korean Air Force. With total air

superiority, UN air forces turned to the aid of the beleaguered troops within the Pusan perimeter. Close air support

missions blunted enemy attacks on the fragile defenses.

More important, UN air forces put severe and continuous

pressure on enemy lines of communication beginning well

above the 38th parallel. The rapidity ofthe North Korean's

advance had severely strained their logistical capabilities as

did the increasing length of their supply lines. Air power

administered telling blows and the North Korean logistic

system quickly began to crumble. As a result, the vigor of

the attacks around Pusan began to dissipate.

The perimeter held, thanks largely to the often brilliant

leadership of Lt Gen Walton H. Walker. The American

general used the shorter interior lines within the pocket to

shift his meager forces to meet enemy attacks at various

points on the perimeter. Meanwhile as the battle for the

Pusan perimeter raged, MacArthur gathered his forces in

Japan and planned the UN counteroffensive .

Several factors influenced MacArthur's thinking. First,

Korea was a peninsula and thus vulnerable to amphibious

assault at many points along its extensive coastline. Second,

North Korean supply lines had followed the general route

of advance to the south, converging at Seoul before fanning

out across South Korea. Third, North Korean forces were

concentrated around the Pusan perimeter with only light

forces protecting their flanks and rear. If UN forces could

stage an amphibious landing and quickly seize Seoul, North

250
KOREAN WAR

Korean supply lines would be severed and the bulk of the

enemy army would be trapped. If this action was combined

with a major push from the Pusan perimeter, the North

Koreans would be trapped between the "hammer" of the

Eighth Army advancing out of the Pusan perimeter and the

"anvil" of the UN amphibious invaders. From these considerations, the plan for the Inchon landing was born.

Inchon was far from an ideal invasion point . Treacherous

tides and confined approaches made the area particularly

inhospitable to a seaborne invasion. On the other hand,

these same factors increased the probability of surprise . On

15 September 1950 MacArthur successfully put ashore the

newly activated X Corps commanded by Maj Gen Edward

M. Almond. The landing and subsequent rapid advance

were models of military efficiency and testified to the complete surprise fostered by MacArthur's choice of a landing

point. On 16 September the Eighth Army began its offensive from the Pusan perimeter. By that time, the North

Korean forces around the perimeter were a hollow shell that

cracked quickly. On 26 September the first elements of the

hammer and the anvil joined forces near Osan and

MacArthur announced the liberation of Seoul. By then the

North Koreans were fleeing north . South Korea was quickly

cleared of enemy forces except for those who took to the

mountains to wage guerrilla warfare.

UN military success raised the possibility of complete

military victory and the accomplishment of much more

significant political objectives than those originally sought.

On 6 October the UN General Assembly approved

MacArthur's proposed advance into North Korea to destroy the remnants of the North Korean army and reunite

the two Koreas. On 9 October UN forces crossed the 38th

parallel. Although it met some stout resistance, the UN

advance was extremely rapid as the North Korean army

continued to disintegrate . On 20 October Pyongyang, the

North Korean capital, fell, and on 26 October some elements of the South Korean army reached the Yalu River.

25 1
EAGLE'S TALONS

The Communist Chinese had given several warnings

through back channel diplomatic sources that they would

intervene in Korea if United Nations troops entered North

Korea. Apparently the Chinese decision to intervene was

based on whether or not UN (rather than South Korean)

troops crossed the 38th parallel. MacArthur was convinced

that the Chinese were bluffing, because he believed China

remained in considerable turmoil in the wake of its civil

war. Moreover, MacArthur had complete command of the

air over Korea, total control of the surrounding seas, and

a victorious army that hadjust smashed the North Koreans

TFIE KOREAN WAR

15 Sep - 25 Nov 1950

252
KOREAN WAR

in a matter of weeks. These factors seemed to make Chinese

intervention both difficult and foolhardy. Yet when UN

troops advanced into the north, Chinese troops began moving into North Korea .

The Chinese move into North Korea was undetected by

UN forces .* This remains one of the great feats of military

security in modern warfare and one of the most prominent

failures of American intelligence . By 15 October 1950,

while MacArthur was assuring President Truman that the

Chinese would not intervene, 150,000 Chinese troops were

already in Korea. By November 300,000 Chinese troops

had crossed the Yalu River and were ready to fight . Still,

UN forces did not expect a Chinese attack.

The Chinese remained in the rugged central mountains

away from the bulk of UN forces. Moving only by night

and employing superb camouflage techniques, the Chinese

covered signs of their presence and remained hidden from

aerial reconnaissance . It is difficult to fathom how nearly

one-third of a million Chinese soldiers could go almost undetected and ignored for a considerable period of time. Part

of the answer is found in the clever Chinese strategy and

in their movement and camouflage discipline while another

part is that UN forces were not really looking for the

Chinese (when examining aerial photography, one tends to

see only what one expects to find). Moreover, aerial reconnaissance technology was relatively primitive at the time,

and the UN forces had limited reconnaissance equipment

available. Finally, one suspects that no one, particularly at

MacArthur's headquarters, wanted to find any Chinese

forces. Whatever the reasons, the American and UN intelligence failure was complete and led to near catastrophic

results.

The Chinese counteroffensive began on 25 November

'To say that the Chinese were totally undetected actually overstates the case. Chinese

prisoners were captured . Reports of prisoner interrogations were forwarded to

MacArthur but were dismissed as isolated instances not indicating a general Chinese

offensive . MacArthur had convinced himself that the Chinese were bluffing.

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1950. The Chinese planned to turn the interior flanks of

UN forces (which were split into eastern and western forces

by the mountainous terrain) and then trap each of the isolated forces in pockets against the seacoast . With this accomplished, the Chinese forces could quickly sweep south

and clear the remainder of the peninsula.

In the west some Marine Corps elements ofX Corps were

quickly surrounded near the Choshin Reservoir, while other

elements were simply overrun . MacArthur realized that the

scattered units of X Corps were in danger of defeat in detail

and ordered the evacuation of the corps by sea, a feat acTHE KOREAN WAR

26 Nov 1950 -. 24 Jan 1951

VF/ i [iW SEA

CHINA

254
KOREAN WAR

complished with great skill by 24 December. The remainder

of UN forces fought a delaying retreat and by year's end

occupied stable defensive positions along the 38th parallel.

The Chinese offensive slowed and finally ground to a halt

because of logistic difficulties exacerbated by concentrated

UN air attacks.

By New Year's Day 1951 Chinese forces were resupplied

and reinforced to a strength of about one-half million men,

and they resumed their offensive all along the front . General

Ridgway was now in command of all forces in Korea under

the overall theater command of MacArthur in Japan. Ridgway's tired forces slowly retreated south. Seoul fell again to

the Communists on 4 January. The Chinese advance continued, but growing logistic difficulties quickly slowed its

momentum as UN resistance increased. Finally, the

Chinese attack stalled along a line running roughly from

Pyongtaek in the west to Smachok in the east.

To this point the war had been characterized by rapid

movement. Injust seven months the contending armies had

covered the length of Korea nearly three times. First, the

North Koreans streamed south, then UN forces advanced

north to the Chinese border, and then the Chinese advanced

south past Seoul. In each case the rapid advances had

stretched the attacker's supply lines and logistic systems to

the limit. In each case the defenders had fallen back on

shorter supply lines and waited for the opportune moment

to counterattack. The first seven months of the Korean War

markedly resembled the ebb and flow of battle in North

Africa during the early years of World War II.

On 25 January 1951 Ridgway began a methodical counteroffensive that met with considerable success. In spite of

occasional savage counterattacks, Ridgway pushed the

Chinese north and by 19 April had established a strong

defensive line slightly north of the 38th parallel. In the

meantime, MacArthur had clashed with President Truman

over the conduct of the war and the limitations placed on

UN military operations. The result was the sacking of

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EAGLE'S TALONS

MacArthur and his replacement by Ridgway. In turn, Ridgway's vacant position of commander in Korea was filled

by Lt Gen James A. Van Fleet.

For the remainder of 1951, the contending forces fought

a series of bitter struggles with limited success. The front

lines moved back and forth a few miles either side of the

38th parallel with neither side gaining decisive advantage.

Both sides had dug in across the peninsula and the war took

on the stalemate characteristics of the Western Front in

World War I. In a sense, there were no flanks to turn and

both sides could only resort to bloody frontal assaults . Although the seacoast provided inviting open flanks, the

Chinese were not capable of major amphibious operations .

On the UN side, the return to the limited political objective

of restoring the original status quo obviated the need for

amphibious operations in the north.

By late October truce negotiations (under way since early

July but used primarily as apropaganda forum) were moved

to Panmunjom and resumed with more seriousness. In light

of the negotiations and the fact that UN forces occupied

positions satisfactory both in terms of the political and military situation, Ridgway ordered Van Fleet to cease all offensive operations and assume an active defensive.

While the negotiators argued, blood continued to flow in

constant but minor fighting . The war was a stalemate, punctuated by patrol actions, outpost skirmishes, and occasional

large-scale, but largely unsuccessful, Communist attacks.

Finally, after 18 months of fruitless and bloody stalemate,

the negotiators at Panmunjom reached bitter agreement.

The fighting officially ended on 17 July 1953.

Better State of the Peace

In the popular mind, the Korean War is generally considered either a failure or, more charitably, the absence of

a "victory." In Korea the United States did not bring its

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KOREAN WAR

adversaries to their knees and force their capitulation, an

outcome that Americans had come to expect. Rather than

an imposed peace, the conflict ended at the negotiating

table between unvanquished opponents. The outcome was

not like the Japanese surrendering aboard the USS Missouri, and it was nowhere near as satisfying.

Judging whether a better state of the peace was achieved

is a matter of deciding whether the political objectives of

the United States were realized. The difficulty of making

that assessment in the case of Korea is that, as noted earlier,

the objectives changed. In turn, the contrasting political

objectives translated into different military objectives in

terms of enemy hostile ability and will . By one set of objectives, we won. By the other, we did not. However, we

can say the North Koreans lost. They failed to unite South

Korea under their leadership, and they paid a terrible price

for their attempt to do so.

Although UN forces twice came close to overcoming

North Korean (and the second time Chinese) hostile ability,

in the end that ability was not destroyed. The main reason

for this, of course, arises from the fact that the United

Nations did not pursue the adversary back across the 38th

parallel the second time, when the enemy probably could

have been broken. This failure has been widely criticized,

but its effect was to allow the KPA and Chinese to regroup

and replenish their forces, which were intact at the war's

end.

Adversary hostile will was largely overcome in the end.

President Eisenhower's threat to use nuclear weapons if the

opponent did not agree to an armistice effectively overcame

hostile will defined as the willingness to continue (costtolerance) . The prospect of nuclear devastation was a larger

price than either China or North Korea was willing to pay.

Similarly, the terms of the peace, which included a divided

Korea, forced the North Koreans, however grudgingly, to

relinquish the political purpose for which they had initiated

25 7
EAGLE'S TALONS

violence in the first place, the forceful uniting of the Korean

peninsula under Communist rule.

Whether this outcome represents fulfillment of American

political purpose or not depends on what that purpose was.

If the purpose was the original aim simply of reestablishing

the status quo wherein South Korea remained a sovereign

and independent state, then the political objective was

clearly met . To achieve that goal did not require overcoming

hostile ability, although doing so might help ensure the longterm viability of the Republic of Korea. All that was truly

required was to force the KPA out of South Korea and to

get the North Koreans to agree not to come back, and that

was done.

The political objective was not achieved if that purpose

was the goal set during the invasion ofNorth Korea: uniting

the country and holding elections under UN auspices. To

accomplish that end did in fact require the overcoming of

enemy hostile ability, since an extant KPA could be expected to oppose such elections on the grounds that they

would eventuate in an anti-Communist Korean peninsula.

Such a goal was symmetrical with the North Korean aim,

and if that was the objective, it can be said that both sides

lost.

One can, quite obviously, disagree about whether a better

state of the peace was accomplished depending on what the

objective was. In the process, however, one must also raise

a question about what kind of political objective is satisfying to the American people. Americans do not generally

look back upon the outcome of that clash with pride, even

though it is possible to argue that it was a success. A reason

for this attitude may be that although the goal was achieved,

it was not an adequate goal in American eyes. It was not

the kind of political objective for which the American public

is willing to make a sustained sacrifice . One can debate the

proposition put forward earlier that Americans would remember Korea positively, in much the same way we are

likely to remember Grenada, if the goal of liberating the

25 8
KOREAN WAR

South had been accomplished in a few months with minimal sacrifice in terms of blood or treasure . It may also be

that Americans are willing to support a sustained conflict

only if the ends appear grand enough, something like the

second objective.

CHAPTER 7

VIETNAM WAR

The Vietnam War was and is one of America's greatest

military traumas. It was a bewildering affair from start to

finish, and we are still trying to understand what happened

to us in that corner of the world. Analysis has evolved; while

the war was going on and shortly after our involvement

ended, commentary was highly subjective and mostly vituperative, seeking to lay blame for blunders made. That

tone has changed somewhat as a second generation of analyses, more removed from the passion of the occasion, has

begun to attempt to present a more balanced, less emotional

treatment of the events.

Self-analysis is more difficult than it has been for other

American wars. At one level, the problem is the extent and

quality of the materials we have to examine. Many of the

important American documents are still classified and will

remain so for some time. In addition, we have no access

to enemy archives so that we might grasp exactly what our

opponents did and why they did it . The fact that the Vietnam War is the only war in our history in whichwe achieved

none of our objectives makes analysis all the more wrenching and complicated.

The Vietnam War was unique in several ways that color

our recollections. It was America's longest war, it was our

least popular military adventure, and it was the first major

conflict in which the United States confronted an opponent

who by and large refused to fight in the manner of European-style warfare on which the American military tradition is based. Each of these sources of uniqueness must be

understood if the whole of the experience is to be

comprehended.

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The beginning ofAmerican involvement in the Southeast

Asian conflict is difficult to establish. Our first formal commitment to the fighting there came on 27 June 1950, when

President Harry S Truman included assistance to the

French in Southeast Asia as part of his message dispatching

American fighting forces to Korea. The beginnings of our

involvement could be dated earlier. We could choose 1945

when Ho Chi Minh declared the independence of Vietnam,

and members of the American military delegation in Hanoi

saluted the new republic. We could go back even further to

the actual conduct of World War II, when the American

Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the predecessor of the

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), collaborated with Ho

and his embryonic forces to subvert the Japanese occupation. Thus, there are many possible choices for the date of

the start of American involvement.

The choice for an ending date is far more limited. Regardless of when one says our involvement began, it came

to a halt with two events. In March 1973 the last American

combat troops left the country, leaving behind only a skeletal military advisory presence. Even that presence ended

when the last Americans scrambled aboard helicopters at

the embassy in Saigon on 30 April 1975, as the capital fell

to the advancing North Vietnamese army (NVA) amidst

panic and confusion. In total, involvement spanned a

quarter of a century (1950-75) or 30 years (1945-75), depending on one's perspective.

American commitment of combat troops to the war's

prosecution was also the longest in our experience. Military

advisers entered the country officially in 1961 (nonuniformed personnel preceded them in the late 1950s), and by

1963 the number of advisers had climbed to more than

17,000. Officially they were noncombatants, but many performed combat roles. In terms of formal fighting commitment, our part of the war spanned eight years, from the

introduction of the first Marine brigade in early 1965 until

the final withdrawal of the last combat units in 1973 . This

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VIETNAM WAR

length of engagement compares to our second longest war,

the American Revolution, which lasted in terms of real

warfare for about six years (not counting the military standstill from the Siege of Yorktown until the peace treaty was

signed).

Vietnam became America's most unpopular war as well.

Its unpopularity was not instant but grew gradually. From

the time American assistance began to flow to the French

until US combat troops were introduced, Southeast Asia

constantly concerned presidents and administrations, but

it was virtually unknown to the American public . Even after

large-scale American fighting and dying began, early opposition was isolated to college campuses and the political

left. It is worthwhile to remember that the Gulf of Tonkin

Resolution, which President Lyndon B. Johnson used to

justify the war's prosecution, passed in 1964 with only two

senators in opposition, and both (Ernest Gruening of Alaska

and Wayne Morse of Oregon) were defeated in bids for

reelection in 1966.

The state of American public opinion about Vietnam can

be divided into two phases punctuated by the Tet offensive

of 1968 . Between the introduction of combat forces in 1965

and that event, opinion was divided, with no clear-cut majority either in support or opposition (except for such specific demographic groups as 18 to 24 year olds, a majority

ofwhom opposed). During this period, however, the United

States appeared to be making military progress in the war,

as measured by the "body counts" reported on the evening

network news and optimistic statements from government

officials and even newsmen. As noted, organized opposition

tended to be limited to large universities and to center

around activities such as the Vietnam teach-ins.

Tet dramatically changed opinion. The reason was simple

enough: The Vietcong and the North Vietnamese army

launched a major offensive throughout the country (including action within eyesight of the hotels in Saigon where

most of the American press corps resided) that belied the

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EAGLE'S TALONS

optimistic reports and supposed enemy losses . The initial

American reaction was shock and was probably best depicted by television news anchorman Walter Cronkite's purported response to the first film of the attack: "Just what

the hell is going on here?"

Shock quickly gave way to disillusionment and cynicism.

The media in particular believed they had been deceived

and came to suspect most favorable information. When the

"Five O'Clock Follies" (the daily news briefings by the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam-MACV) reported

the rout of the NVA in the Tet counteroffensive, US reporters failed to relay the story, believing it to be more

official duplicity.

The result of Tet was politically and militarily ruinous to

continued public support for the war effort. Gen William

C. Westmoreland was succeeded as commander of American forces by Gen Creighton W. Abrams. By the end of

March, President Johnson had announced his intention not

to run for a second term, obstensibly so that he could devote

his total attention to resolving the war.

Realistically, the only political goal that could be espoused in that presidential year was to get the United States

out, and all candidates jumped on the bandwagon of disengagement in one form or another. The tragedies that occurred at the 1968 Democratic national convention and

later at Kent State and Jackson State Universities only

punctuated the pathos.

The third unique aspect of Vietnam was more strictly

military in nature: the war was the first major conflict in

which the United States confronted a highly dedicated, nationalistic force employing unconventional, guerrilla warfare strategies and tactics. The tables were turned on the

American Revolution, where the British faced a parallel

problem . Just as Great Britain returned to American soil

in 1776 with a standard European-style army and without

an adequate appreciation of the nationalistic movement it

opposed, so did the Americans arrive in Southeast Asia.

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VIETNAM WAR

The British never fully comprehended the problem they

faced and ultimately they failed . So did the Americans in

Vietnam.

That the United States was basically unprepared to fight

the kind of war we encountered was ironic, and it speaks

poorly of our collective memory. Certainly Vietnam was

not the first guerrilla war in which we engaged. As argued

earlier, American adoption of unconventional warfare techniques, especially by the revolutionary militia, helped lead

to our independence . In the nineteenth century, the US

military was confronted on several occasions with these

kinds of operations, notably the Seminole War, several of

the western Indian wars (e.g ., the campaigns against the

Apaches), and the Filipino Insurgency. In the twentieth century, Gen John J. Pershing encountered the same kind of

foes in Pancho Villa and his supporters.

There was a common theme in prior American experiences with unconventional warfare which was the United

States did not fight those kinds of wars very well . The US

Army needed two years to dislodge about a thousand Indians armed with bows and arrows in the Seminole War

and three years to subdue a ragtag rebellion in the Philippines. It chased Villa around northern Mexico with little

effect. The lessons that these experiences might have suggested were largely ignored as our European-style armed

forces hit the beaches of Vietnam.

Issues and Events

As a backdrop to the issues and events that paved the

road to commitment of US combat forces to the war in

Vietnam after the Gulf ofTonkin incident in 1964, a review

of the history of Vietnamese nationalism is required. Vietnam's strong tradition of nationalism is both ancient and

finely tempered in the flames ofcenturies of combat against

foreign invaders. The history of Vietnam's struggles can be

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EAGLE'S TALONS

tracked back to the Trung sisters' insurrection against the

Chinese, the ancient enemies of Vietnamese nationalism,

in A.D. 40. Struggles against Chinese influence continued

intermittently through the centuries along with internal

power struggles within Vietnam. Finally in 1802, Nguyen

Anh, who took the name Gia Long, united the nation,

moved the capital to Hue, and proclaimed himselfemperor.

Long's dynasty ended with the abdication of Bao Dai in

1945.

The modern history of the struggle for Vietnam begins

in the 1860s when the French colonized the region. Napoleon III authorized military expeditions to Vietnam to

protect French Catholic missionaries. In 1861 the French

captured Saigon. By 1883 the French controlled all of Vietnam and in 1887 established the Indochinese Union, which

included both Vietnam (divided into three parts) and Cambodia (Laos was incorporated into the Indochinese Union

in 1893). Vietnamese efforts to cast the French out began

almost immediately after the French arrived and continued

to greater or lesser degrees throughout the remainder of the

nineteenth century and into the twentieth.

French rule spread the seeds of its own downfall. In many

respects French rule in Vietnam was colonialism at its

worst. However, one change the French brought about

stands above all others as the majorreason for unrest among

the Vietnamese. When the French came on the scene, they

found a society dominated by small landowning peasants.

When they were forced to depart less than a century later,

they left behind a society of landless peasants dominated

by an absentee landlord oligarchy.

Ho Chi Minh, who would become the leader of the

Vietnamese independence movement, departed Vietnam as

a young man in 1911 and did not return until World War

II was under way. In the meantime, he gained fame as a

leader, in exile, of the nationalist movement. Ho first appeared on the political scene when he attempted to petition

the Versailles Peace Conference for Vietnamese indepen266
VIETNAM WAR

dence in 1919 . Later Ho joined the French Communist

Party, became a party functionary in Moscow, and in 1930

formed the Indochinese Communist Party.

When Ho returned in 1941, Vietnam had been occupied

by the victorious Japanese who had, for convenience, left

the Vichy French colonial administration in power. Ho's

task was to fight both the Japanese and the French. As the

war drew to a close, the political situation quickly became

even more muddled. In March of 1945 the Japanese attempted to gain public support in Vietnam by ousting the

(III . kIEFN:,M WAR

267
EAGLE'S TALONS

French administration and having Bao Dai (the figurehead

emperor of Vietnam who had served under French and

Japanese supervision since 1932) declare the independence

of Vietnam under the auspices of the Japanese. However,

the war was quickly ending and on 18 August 1945, the

Japanese turned over governmental powerto their principal

adversaries in Vietnam, Ho's Vietminh forces. Bao Dai

abdicated shortly thereafter and Ho declared his version of

Vietnamese independence on 2 September 1945.

In the meantime, Allied leaders at the Potsdam Conference (July 1945) had agreed that the Japanese in Vietnam

should be disarmed by the British (in the south) and the

Nationalist Chinese (in the north). Ho feared the presence

of Chinese troops might lead to permanent Chinese control,

yet he had insufficient power to oust them. Thus, he was

forced to reach an accommodation with the French to replace Chinese troops with French forces, a most difficult

choice between the lesser oftwo evils in Ho's eyes. In return,

the French were to recognize Vietnam as a free state within

the French Union and to negotiate about Vietnam's future.

The Chinese left Vietnam and the French returned in

accordance with the agreement. However, the Paris negotiations over Vietnam's future quickly broke down because

once the French regained control, they had no intention of

granting Vietnamese independence. The United States, to

whom Ho turned for support on the basis of President

Franklin D. Roosevelt's commitment to the Atlantic

Charter, stood by ambivalently; we deplored the French

return as a violation of self-determination, but recognized

that Ho was a Communist as well as a Vietnamese patriot.

After French warships bombarded Ho's supporters in

Haiphong, Ho withdrew his forces to the countryside in

December 1946 and established a rural guerrilla resistance

base. The French controlled the major cities and some of

their environs while the Vietminh expanded and consolidated their control of the countryside. On the Vietminh

side it was a war of ambush and avoidance of decisive

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VIETNAM WAR

defeat. For the French, punitive expeditions to search for

and destroy the enemy in the countryside seemed either to

hit only thin air or to be ambushed with tragic results.

During this period (1946 to 1950), the war did not attract

much attention in the United States. That changed with

the fall of China, the North Korean invasion of South Korea, and the appearance along the Vietnamese border of

Mao's Communist Chinese forces. Ho's logistical problems

were simplified by a steady supply of modern weapons and

munitions from the victorious Communist Chinese. The

French, still desperately weak after World War II and suffering from considerable political disarray at home, were

in real difficulty .

Suddenly, Indochina looked to Americans to be part of

a coordinated worldwide Communist effort that had to be

opposed. President Truman thus included aid to the French

in his message committing US troops to Korea. The French

then attempted to fight a modern mobile war on an American shoestring. The shoestring grew (by 1954, the United

States was footing three-quarters of the tab for the war),

and US leadership increasingly viewed Ho as no more than

a front for the worldwide Communist effort. American recognition that the war in Vietnam was at least partially an

anticolonialist struggle to create a unified Vietnamese nation was lost in the tumultuous aftermath of Mao's victory

in China, the Korean War, and the strident anticommunism

of the McCarthy era.

Eventually, as the war spilled over into Laos, the French

attempted a bold but ill-conceived plan. They established

a strongly fortified position at Dien Bien Phu, a remote

crossroads on the Laotian border. By posing a barrier to

Vietminh movement between the two countries, French

Gen Henri Navarre hoped to lure Ho's military commander, Vo Nguyen Giap, and his elusive forces into conventional "meat-grinder" battles that would destroy Giap's

army. Unfortunately for the French, the site was poorly

chosen, neither sufficient men nor equipment were avail269
EAGLE'S TALONS

able for adequate defense, and the isolated garrison could

not be adequately supplied by air. Thus, the French forces

were in the grinder when Giap took the high ground around

the valley fortress, and by great effort brought in more than

200 large artillery pieces to pound the garrison . After an

heroic two-month defense, the French were finally overrun

on 7 May 1954. Extensive press coverage of the siege had

made Dien Bien Phu the symbol of the entire war for the

French, and when it fell, so did the little remaining support

among the French public.

French military and economic exhaustion coupled with

political instability led eventually to the 1954 Geneva Accords that halted hostilities, divided Vietnam at the 17th

parallel, and called for elections within two years to determine the form of government for a reunited Vietnam. Ho

was in control of the north while the ever available and

compliant Bao Dai, who had been returned as a figurehead

by the French as an alternative to Ho in 1949, became chief

of state in the south . With American assistance, Bao Dai

chose as his prime minister an anti-Communist Catholic

nationalist, Ngo Dinh Diem.

Both Ho and Diem began consolidating their power bases

as refugees flowed north and south to their governments of

choice . A vast majority of the refugees, nearly one million,

fled south. Many of them were Catholics who feared the

antireligious Communists. Many Vietminh in the south

moved to the north to be with their leader, but significantly,

many remained in their southern homeland. These southern Vietminh would form an important part of the forces

that would eventually revolt against the Diem government .

Two de facto states were emerging in Vietnam and for

Americans it was difficult not to draw an analogy with

Korea.

Both new nations turned to their natural allies for aid

and received it . Ho negotiated aid agreements with both

China and the Soviet Union in 1955 . Late that same year

he instituted a massive land reform program in which for270
VIETNAM WAR

mer landlords were put on trial, often for their lives. Revolutionary cadres fanned out through the countryside to

indoctrinate the people and drum up support for Ho's government. Ho's success in mobilizing support and achieving

unity was remarkable . Put to a severe test by the United

States in the 1960s, North Vietnamese unity of purpose

and determination to prevail remained inviolate.

In the south the United States, which had refused to sign

the Geneva Accords (on the grounds that the accords appeared to be another sellout of territory to the Communists), added Vietnam as a protocol state to the new

Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). America

moved quickly to supplant France and became the chief

supporter of South Vietnam. Thus, the United States almost immediately began supplying aid to Diem and agreed

to train the South Vietnamese army while Diem moved

quickly to suppress various dissident sects that threatened

his control. In July 1955 Diem (with full US support) rejected the notion of a national referendum because he

feared that Ho, as a national hero, would surely triumph.

In October Diem defeated Bao Dai in a popular referendum

in the south and thus became chief of state of the newly

declared Republic of Vietnam. Diem continued to consolidate his power by cracking down on dissident groups, particularly former Vietminh and their supporters.

By 1957, with the encouragement of Hanoi, Vietminhled insurgent activity against the Diem regime had begun

in the south. As the years passed, the guerrilla activity increased as Hanoi supplied arms and equipment. Many of

the southern Vietminh who had resettled in the north infiltrated back into the south to assist the insurrection.

American involvement expanded gradually. President

Dwight D. Eisenhower authorized the first military assistance programs, including the sending of military advisers

to the country, and President John F. Kennedy expanded

that commitment, including the dispatch of the American

Special Forces (Green Berets) to the country. The military

27 1
EAGLE'S TALONS

situation was not going well. Increasingly, the reason attributed for the deteriorating military situation was President Diem, and he certainly deserved much of the blame.

Although Diem had done a remarkable job in consolidating his power, he still did not enjoy a broad popular base

of support. Aloof and distant, he had difficulty forming

strong bonds with the people. Effective land reform was

not accomplished (it was often thwarted by corrupt officials

in Diem's regime), which tended to alienate the landless

peasants. Diem's Catholic faith alienated the majority

Buddhist population. Diem's government, centered on his

family and close Catholic associates, was riddled with corruption. He was petitioned for reform but either ignored

the requests or responded with further repression. As a result, the insurrection gained support and momentum, particularly in the countryside.

American aid continued to flow and military advisers

continued to arrive. In February 1962 the United States

formed the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, to

command and coordinate US military efforts. Meanwhile,

in the central highlands, the Vietcong (a derisive name applied to the insurgents by the Saigon government) were

forming into battalion-size units as the insurgent momentum accelerated. By the end of 1962, the American commitment had deepened and more than 11,000 advisers were

"in-country" and were often participating in combat

operations .

In spite of US aid, training, and advisers, the military

situation continued to deteriorate. Diem's army was led by

an officer corps often promoted on the basis of loyalty to

Diem rather than ability. Senior officers often suffered from

a warlord mentality-using their troops for personal gain

and avoiding too much success in the field for fear that such

success would cast them as threats to Diem. As the army

became more politicized, it was often more interested in

Saigon political intrigues than in combating the enemy.

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VIETNAM WAR

When the army did take to the field, it was often beaten

by numerically inferior enemy forces.

By the middle of 1963, the situation was becoming desperate. Buddhist demonstrations against the Catholic-dominated government grew in size, frequency, and intensity.

Diem countered with more repression and bloody attacks

on the Buddhist temples. The United States tried to induce

reforms as a price for continuing aid, but Diem, recognizing

that deepened American involvement made withdrawal difficult, ignored these entreaties . American frustration built

and many in the White House concluded that the situation

could not improve as long as Diem remained in power.

In the face of the deteriorating situation both in the field

and in Saigon, a group of South Vietnamese army generals

staged a coup and killed Diem .* However, rather than relieving the situation, the assassination brought on a period

of political instability lasting until mid-1965 . Coups and

countercoups were the order of the day as the generals argued over who would captain the rapidly sinking ship of

state. In 1964 alone, seven different governments were in

power in Saigon .

With the political scene in disarray, the military situation

continued to deteriorate. With a large contingent (about

17,000) of Americans in the country and more than 100

US military deaths by the end of 1963, the United States

became more and more deeply involved in what was apparently a losing proposition . The political map of Vietnam, with the government in control of the major cities

*The exact level and nature of American complicity in the coup has never been fully

revealed, but some facts are well established. The White House was fully aware that

the South Vietnamese generals were talking about an overthrow, and there had been a

dialogue between the plotting group and the US embassy in Saigon . Moreover, when

the coup occurred, Diem's CIA-paid Chinese bodyguards were nowhere to be found,

apparently because they had not been paid in several months . Growing American determination that a change had to be made had advanced to the proposition that the

military was probably the only institution capable of bringing order to the country. At

a minimum, we hoped that the fall of Diem would result in more-efficient, less-corrupt

government in the country and a better coordination between the political and military

leaderships. We got neither.

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but the countryside under the sway of the enemy, looked

increasingly like the map of China just before the final fall

of Chiang Kai-shek. Although many American decisionmakers harbored suspicions that success was not terribly

likely under any circumstances, the United States decided

to increase its actions once again.

The United States and South Vietnam began small-scale

operations against North Vietnam in 1964 to bring the war

home to the North Vietnamese and to convince them to

cease and desist . South Vietnamese commando teams harassed enemy coastal installations, and American ships

cruised in the Gulf of Tonkin (but outside North Vietnamese territorial waters). On 2 August 1964 North Vietnamese

patrol boats attacked the USS Maddox, a destroyer on an

intelligence-gathering mission, and two days later a second

attack allegedly occurred against the USS C. Turner Joy

(whether that attack actually occurred is hotly contested).

In response, President Johnson ordered retaliatory air raids

against North Vietnamese naval bases on 5 August. On 7

August Congress approved the so-called Gulf of Tonkin

Resolution giving the president broad powers to act in Vietnam. The resolution set the stage for direct US combat

involvement, the retaliation was the first overt American

military act in the war, and the precedent was set for the

future .

As the preceding discussion was intended to convey, the

road leading to direct US military action in Vietnam was

long, contorted, and tortuous. That road had no milestones

of the drama of a Lexington and Concord, Fort Sumter, or

Pearl Harbor that could capture and galvanize the American public (although the Tonkin Gulf incident served, for

awhile, a similar purpose). Instead the United States gradually moved from opposing an extension of communism

by supporting a World War II Ally to direct combat operations without the American public or leadership quite

realizing what had happened.

This strange nature of American involvement makes gen274
VIETNAM WAR

eralization about themes and purposes more difficult than

in other US wars. Decisions that had an impact on American commitment span more than a quarter century and

were made by five different US presidents. Each of these

men viewed the situation in a slightly different way, faced

somewhat altered problems (usually because of decisions

made by his predecessors), and altered the character of the

American commitment by the decisions he reached.

If there was an underlying, pervasive issue common to

the entire sweep of US involvement in Vietnam, it was the

containment of communism: the determination not to allow the expansion of another Communist regime. Different

presidents expressed this commitment in different ways.

Eisenhower, for instance, believed that the failure of the

United States to stop Communist expansion in Vietnam

would lead to the fall of all Southeast Asia to communism

(the domino theory). Truman and Johnson placed more

emphasis on the consequences of not stopping an aggressor

early, for fear that the failure to do so would encourage

further aggression (the analogy with Britain and France at

Munich in 1938). Richard Nixon and his vocal national

security adviser Henry Kissinger later emphasized the importance of honoring commitments so that future as well

as current victims of aggression would accept American

constancy.

The common thread running through these rationales

was the containment of Communist expansion. The dominos would be pushed over by Red China or the Soviet

Union or both, Soviet leadership was clearly the Hitler figure in the Munich analogy, and the commitments to be

honored were to anti-Communists and were aimed at the

Communists. Containment was not always the overt basis

of policy and concern, but it always lay barely beneath the

surface.

To be sure, the emphasis on containment as a basic issue

changed over time, as American foreign policy changed toward the world generally and especially toward our adver27 5
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saries . In the early period of involvement when

anticommunism was at its zenith in this country, containment was astrong, broadly supported policy. When Truman

included support for the French in Indochina (a part of the

world of which most Americans had heard only vaguely)

in his speech on Korea, it was accepted without a raised

eyebrow. But times change and so does policy. By the middle 1960s (and certainly by the end of the decade), American policy toward the Soviet Union had shifted in rhetoric

(if less in substance) away from the confrontational tenor

of containment to the more cooperative language of

detente.

Dealing with the proximate events leading to the Vietnam

War is equally compromised by the long period over which

American involvement built . Unlike other American military experiences, there simply is no single, dramatic event

that drew us into the war, no grand casus belli (the closest

candidate is the Gulf of Tonkin incident, which is hardly

equivalent, for example, to the North Korean invasion of

South Korea). Rather, the theme ofevents in Southeast Asia

is one of gradualism and incrementalism, with decisionmakers trapped in a maelstrom of ever widening and deepening involvement by bits and pieces. It is a story not of

duplicity nor stupidity (as is sometimes portrayed), but of

individuals caught in circumstances in which the individual

decisions they reached, each of which seemed the best alternative at the time, had the unintended cumulative effect

of slowly and gradually dragging the United States deeper

and deeper into the fray.

The entire situation is not without irony. Five presidents

and their advisers wrestled with the problem of Vietnam,

and each was baffled by it . In each case, there were alternative approaches that could be taken, but none seemed

attractive . In most instances, there were three things that

could be done when crisis emerged (as it regularly did). One

alternative was to cut our losses and get out. The universally

recognized consequence of this approach was the quick de276
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mise of the Republic of Vietnam, an outcome that each

president deemed to be ideologically and politically unacceptable . At the other extreme, each crisis could be met

with direct insertion of American combat forces, an alternative deemed equally unacceptable until Johnson finally

succumbed to it (although in a gradual, incremental way) .

The third alternative, and the one deemed least worst most

of the time, was the incremental way, doing just a little bit

more . The irony is that most of the time, those who made

the incremental decisions had very little hope that their

choices would prove effective or decisive ; the other alternatives just seemed worse.

The irony of incremental decisionmaking worked in another way as well. After the initial decision to support the

French, the decisions that each president made would have

been impossible or unnecessary had it not been for those

of his predecessors . In turn, each president's choice of the

incremental alternative meant that subsequent presidents

were likely to be placed in the same position. The effect of

each decision was cumulative, with two results. Since each

decision enlarged the American investment in the Vietnam

outcome, it became increasingly difficult to cut losses . Our

South Vietnamese "clients" recognized this American selfentrapment and realized the great difficulty we would have

extricating ourselves (which we periodically threatened to

do). As a result, US leverage over the South Vietnamese

did not expand and in some cases contracted as our efforts

grew.

With these general comments in mind, we can turn briefly

to the critical but incremental decision path. The first decisions, of course, were made by Truman: the promise to

grant and the gradual enlargement ofeconomic and military

assistance to the French fighting the Vietminh. Eisenhower,

building on this initial investment, came next . His official

rejection of the Geneva Accords laid the groundwork for

American military and economic support for the Diem government. Kennedy followed the lead by increasing the vol277
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ume of aid to the beleaguered Diem regime and by

introducing the first uniformed combat advisers into the

country. Johnson made the big plunge by introducing combat units into the country and, with the agreement of the

military, gradually increasing their numbers. Nixonbrought

the process full circle through Vietnamization, which allowed the United States slowly to extricate itself, but at the

cost of geographic expansion of the conflict into Cambodia

(Kampuchea) and the intensification of the conflict in Laos.

These are, of course, only the largest and most obvious

links in the decision chain, but they relate to and reinforce

one another. Truman's decision created an interest on

which Eisenhower could build, which in turn made it easier

for Kennedy to expand that aid, and so on. At the same

time, the failure to make any of the decisions would have

made it unnecessary to reach further ones: Kennedy could

not have expanded a nonexistent aid program and would

not have needed to start one of his own because without

an existing program South Vietnam would have already

fallen. The final irony of the quarter century of events is

that, in one sense, America accomplished its purpose of

keeping South Vietnam independent so long as we remained active and involved; not until we left did the South

Vietnamese succumb.

Political Objective

Making sense of Vietnam is difficult because the war was

at a minimum a three-actor event (if one does not ascribe

an independent purpose to the Vietcong, which one can do

certainly after the early 1960s), wherein each player had

different purposes. For the United States, the war was limited in terms of US purposes, if not always in firepower.

For the North Vietnamese, the war was one oftotal political

purpose that commanded the complete resources of the

people, and the purpose was hardly less desperate for the

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leadership (if not necessarily the total population) of South

Vietnam. Vietnam was, in other words, a war of asymmetrical purpose: the outcome was clearly more important

to America's adversaries than it was to Americans.

The political objective of the Democratic Republic of

Vietnam (DRV), embodied in Ho Chi Minh, was the unification of Vietnam under its rule, by force if necessary. As

such, it was a total and indivisible goal, just as American

independence had been in the eighteenth century. Moreover, it was an objective that was maintained constantly

from 1945 until its final achievement in 1975 .

Given the levels of sacrifice that different parts of the

Vietnamese population endured for 30 years, this was obviously a popular objective, and one that left the United

States in something of a quandary. When Ho announced

Vietnamese independence in 1945, he preempted the mantle of Vietnamese nationalism, a potent force in a country

that had known millennia of existence and that had a long

history of repelling foreign invaders. The problem for the

United States, of course, was that Ho was also a Communist. During the 1940s and 1950s, Americans could support a nationalist, but they would not support a

Communist, nationalist or not. The result, well recognized

in at least some policy circles, was that the United States

found itself identified with those who would thwart Vietnamese nationalism. To many Vietnamese, the Americans

were nothing more nor less than the most recent foreign

invaders.

The goal of the various governments of South Vietnam

was to avoid being absorbed by the North. Because overarching Vietnamese nationalism (where it existed) was identified with Ho Chi Minh, the leaders in the South could

not embrace the idea of unification under their own control;

the support base was not there. Instead, their objective was

defensive. As noted in our discussion of the American Civil

War, such an objective could be politically and militarily

popular. It entails, after all, the defense of hearth and home

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against an aggressor and meant the war would be fought

on South Vietnamese territory, providing military advantage. Unfortunately, the objective was not overwhelmingly

popular nor compelling amongst the South Vietnamese .

Partly this was because the war was more than a simple

invasion; it was also an internal insurgency (that part of

the war, especially in its early going, conducted by the Vietcong). There were at least four other reasons why the South

Vietnamese objective was never accepted .

The first reason was that maintaining the freedom of

South Vietnamwas a defense of artificiality. The agreement

that divided the country at the 17th parallel was an arbitrary

matter of convenience, not a reflection of prior political

reality. Certainly, there was historic rivalry and even animosity between the primarily rural, agricultural southerners

and the more urbanized and industrialized northerners.

However, nationalism was not North or South Vietnamese;

it was Vietnamese.

Second, the government whose enslavement the RVN

sought to avoid was headed by the one Vietnamese politician who had widespread support throughout the country.

Ho was the embodiment of Vietnamese independence, the

George Washington of his country, because of his role in

ridding the land of the French colonialists . No one in South

Vietnam had that kind of reputation or popularity .

Third and relatedly, those who ruled the government of

the South were less than inspiring. The corruption and

repression of the Diem regime had a great deal to do with

the original formation of the National Liberation Front,

and Diem tenaciously resisted attempts by Americans to

institute reforms that might have brought support to his

regime. The string of incompetent generals who followed

Diem into the presidential palace were no more inspiring.

Fourth and finally, South Vietnam's association with the

Americans was a problem. To the average Vietnamese,

northerner and Southerner, the Americans were not a particularly welcome sight, especially when they began arriving
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in large numbers. Rather, they were viewed by many as just

another group of foreign invaders taking the place of the

French and thus to be resisted in the same manner. The

fact that US forces and the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) rarely conducted joint operations (the US

command did not trust the fighting ability of the ARVN)

simply added to this image. One of the cruelties of the war

resulted from this identification; most American fighting

men viewed their role in Vietnam as that of liberator of a

suppressed population from communism, and they did not

understand why the Vietnamese appeared ungrateful for

their effort .

The exact nature of the American political objective is

considerably more complex than the objectives of the indigenous combatants. As noted, the common thread linking

American purpose over time was the extension of the containment idea to Vietnam and, by further extension, to the

rest of Southeast Asia. In translation from the central tenet

of American foreign policy to specific actions, containment

meant the United States had the political objective of ensuring that the South Vietnamese political system was not

overthrown by force (at least after 1956). Over time, the

underlying purpose (containment) was used in different

ways to explain why the objective was worth pursuing. The

problem with each of the various containment rationales

was that each had a counterargument either in factual content or interpretation.

For Truman and Johnson, the Munich analogy and the

path to World War II justified holding the containment line

in Vietnam; if we did not hold steadfast there, our enemies

would challenge the containment line elsewhere. The

counter to this argument was the analogy of World War I,

where less confrontation and inflexibility might have prevented the Great War. For Eisenhower, the domino theory

justified actions; if the containment line was breached in

South Vietnam, the rest of Southeast Asia would fall . The

counterargument was that the United States had no sub28 1
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stantial interests in Southeast Asia, so even if the domino

theory were true, the fall of other nations in the region was

irrelevant to us.

A further thread running throughout these justifications

was the question of who was really being contained in Vietnam. There were always four possibilities, and their plausibility was inversely related to the importance of

containing them. The most plausible enemy was North

Vietnam and its National Liberation Front collaborators;

they were all Vietnamese, they were proximate, and unification was their goal. The problem for Americans who

wished to use containment of the North Vietnamese as the

justification for aiding South Vietnam was that even if

North Vietnam became a regional power, its ambitions

could only be limited, posing no great threat to vital US

interests. The second candidate was China (a particular

fixation with Secretary of State Dean Rusk). China aspired

to superpower status, certainly wanted to be recognized as

a primary power in Asia, and hence was worth containing.

The problem was that if we were containing China, North

Vietnam's role was that of proxy. Such an assumption flew

in the face of literally thousands ofyears ofbitter animosity

between the two neighbors. Third, some argued that the

United States was really containing Soviet expansion in

Indochina. The Soviets were the most worth containing,

but their lack of proximity or obvious interests in the area

made them the least plausible. Finally, monolithic communism that must be opposed everywhere was a candidate.

This basis is countered by the Sino-Soviet split that began

in the 1950s.

This description of the problems associated with various

translations of containment into a concrete political objective is, of course, brief and does little justice to the voluminous debate that occurred over each (and other

variations not mentioned) . They are offered as examples,

because they point to the nature and character of the objective and, in our view, are the reason that support for the

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war was never complete and eventually dissipated. That

reason is that public embrace of the American objective

was debilitated by several difficulties that made developing

a consensus impossible. First, there was ambiguity about

exactly how containment translated into the objective

among policymakers, the military, and the citizenry (both

within and between all three groups) that led to confusion

about why we were there. Second, there was considerable

disagreement about whether the purpose was adequate to

justify our presence and sacrifice. This questioning related

both to the presence of sufficient American interests to support sustained commitment and to the morality of supporting a tottering, inefficient, and corrupt regime in the

Republic of Vietnam.

The American political purpose in Vietnam was never

entirely clear to sizable portions of the population. Until

American involvement in the country became overt in

terms of an American military presence, the lack of understanding wastolerable. As first advisers and then combat

personnel entered the country, the lack of knowledge of the

situation (and even the country; a survey in 1966 demonstrated that more than half the American population did

not know where Vietnam was) began to be felt . The American people began to ask exactly what the purpose was.

The second problem was whether Vietnam was important

enough to justify an American commitment . In the early

days, when involvement was limited to economic and military assistance, the question was relatively unimportant

because the sacrifice was minimal and unnoticed by most

Americans anyway. When the war began to consume larger

portions of American treasure and blood, then it became

important to determine whether the objective matched the

sacrifice .

This part of the debate had several aspects . The first

regarded the nature of American interests in Vietnam per

se. Onthe political left, an economic interpretation emerged

that attempted to paint American motives in terms of eco283
EAGLE'S TALONS

nomic exploitation, but that explanation foundered on an

absence of supporting evidence. Others looked for geopolitical importance: What would be the consequences to

American national security should South Vietnam fall? The

geopolitical explanation depended very much on who we

were really containing. If it wasjust North Vietnam, clearly

San Diego Harbor was well beyond the last domino. If we

were containing China or the Soviet Union, then the objective might be worth the cost.

The worthiness of the objective could be justified only

in geopolitical terms since there was no plausible historical

or economic basis for the commitment. Thus, the debate

centered on containment but in a different context than the

Korean War. In 1950 there was no question about whether

halting monolithic communism was worthwhile, but by

1964 perceptions had changed. Communism was no longer

viewed as monolithic because the Sino-Soviet split had

demonstrated it was not. Moreover, a newer, probably more

permissive and less sacrifice-oriented group was entering

the American adult population, and its response to calls

based purely on patriotism was not so certain as that of a

previous age. An objective of arguable vitality was inadequate to appeal to all the population, and especially to that

portion who would be forced to fight for it .

As time went by, the question increasingly framed by

segments of the American public was whether the United

States had any substantial interests in Southeast Asia that

could be translated into political objectives that demanded

protection. As time went by and casualties increased, the

public progressively answered the question negatively, and

the political leadership in Washington seemed unable to

devise a compelling argument that vital American interests

were at stake (unless, as some have cynically argued, the

vital interests were the political futures of the American

presidents prosecuting the war) .

South Vietnamese leadership did not make matters any

easier. The succession of leaders who paraded across the

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television screen lacked the broad-based support of their

people and instances of corruption and inefficiency were

rampant. The image created was one wherein the side we

were supporting did not appear to be much, if any, better

than those we opposed, and many of our memories of Vietnam are of those demeaning characteristics. Who can forget

stunning images of Vietnamese Col Nguyen Ngoc Loan executing a Vietcong on the street in Saigon? Or President

Nguyen Cao Ky in his black jumpsuit and lavender ascot

(which earned him the nickname "Captain Marvel") preening before the cameras? Or the infamous tiger cages used

to incarcerate political enemies?

In these murky circumstances, devising a political objective that would galvanize the American people to the task

at hand proved impossible in the long run. Those characteristics of a "good" political objective discussed earlier

(e.g ., simplicity and moral loftiness) were never successfully

attained . More to the point, the objective never translated

clearly into a military objective to guide strategy .

Military Objectives and Strategy

The central problem the United States never adequately

solved was the translation of the political objective into

workable and effective plans of action (strategy) . In other

words, to keep South Vietnam free from the domination

of North Vietnam, what were the appropriate roles for the

military, economic, political, and other instruments of national power? Roles and missions were assigned (even ifnot

well coordinated) but they proved to be, in the final analysis, unsuccessful.

Over the course of the war, US policymakers were influenced by several factors in their use of the instruments of

power, and particularly military power. Workable military

strategies depended, first and foremost, upon understanding the nature of the war itself. Second, American military

28 5
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strategy depended upon what the United States was willing

and able to attempt in Vietnam, which varied over time .

Third, US military strategy depended to a considerable degree upon the actions of the enemy. Finally, American military strategy was partly dependent upon what the South

Vietnamese were willing and able to undertake in their own

behalf.

The American understanding of the nature of the war

posed the first major obstacle in formulating an effective

military strategy. The United States viewed the Vietnam

conflict as a limited war, a conflict fought with limited

means for limited political objectives. Although viewed as

part of the larger struggle against the aggressive Communist

threat to the free world, Vietnam was at the outer periphery

of US national interests. The United States could not allow

itself to become overly involved because the important

struggle would come in western Europe. Like Korea, Vietnam was a sideshow that could easily divert attention and

weaken America's ability to resist at the critical points. No

matter what other issues were involved, US policymakers

viewed the conflict in Vietnam as one more confrontation

with the Communists.

Such a view was at best overly simplistic and at worst so

far from the truth that our efforts could not help but fail

in the long run. The important enemy motivation was nationalism rather than communism. This is perhaps best

illustrated by the events that took place after the North

Vietnamese had seized control of all Vietnam. Rather than

a great victory for monolithic communism, fragile Communist alliances quickly disintegrated as Vietnam invaded

Cambodia (ruled by the Communist Khmer Rouge) in December 1978, which in turn led to the Chinese invasion of

northern Vietnam in February 1979. Even the Asian Communist "monolith" proved to be little more than a figment

of American imagination.

Spurred on by nationalistic fervor, the enemy waged an

unlimited rather than a limited struggle . Their objective,

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to overthrow the government of South Vietnam and to impose their own control, was unlimited. Although compromise might be accepted in the short term, it would be only

a pause in the ultimate struggle . There could be no compromise with the long-term nationalist goal . Populations

were mobilized for the effort and every means of battle at

the enemy's disposal was used. Only the limitations on the

resources available to the enemy preserved the American

illusion that this was a limited war.

The American misunderstanding about the basic nature

of the war directly influenced the strategy used and its ultimate failure. As will be discussed later, the American strategy made use oflimited means applied in measured fashion

to bring about specific results at a reasonable cost. Such a

strategy had little impact on an enemy willing to use all

available means in every possible way at any cost .

American understanding of the war was further confused

by the complexity of the struggle . In essence, the war was

fought at three levels. The first level, at which the American

military focused its efforts, was the war against enemy main

force units, both Vietcong units and units of the regular

North Vietnamese army. The second level was the shadow

war against the enemy guerrilla fighters. The third level was

the war for the loyalty of the population, perhaps the most

important part of the entire struggle .

All three levels were intertwined. Although enemy main

force units were somewhat dependent on supplies from

North Vietnam, they also depended on the cooperation, or

at least the neutrality, of the South Vietnamese population

for succor, recruits, and intelligence . This was particularly

true of Vietcong main force units. Guerrilla units were almost totally dependent upon the cooperation or neutrality

of the population. Without the aid of the people, the guerrillas would have been exposed, resisted, and starved of

supplies, and thus could not have operated. All of this

points out the importance of the struggle for the loyalty of

the population . But to win over the population, it had to

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be protected from enemy main force units and guerrillas .

Thus, US forces faced somewhat of a "chicken-or-egg"

problem. If efforts were concentrated on the main forces,

the enemy's infrastructure within the population would be

left alone to spread, gain support, and supply troops and

materials to the main force and guerrilla units. If efforts

were concentrated against the infrastructure, enemy forces

in the field might be able to consolidate their positions and

further intimidate the people and embarrass the

government .

The American position and perception of the war was

further complicated and confused by three other factors.

First, US forces could not be a decisive factor in the struggle

for the loyalty of the population . Actions to win the hearts

and minds of the people had to be performed by South

Vietnamese to be fully effective. The United States could

help with organizational skills, expertise (if there was any

real expertise in such a task), and money. But the struggle

for the loyalty of the peasants in the countryside required

government-sponsored reforms, particularly land reforms

in addition to face-to-face action in the field. Unfortunately,

as the United States became more deeply committed to the

war, it lost its leverage over the South Vietnamese government . In the end, effective land reform did not begin until

after mid-1970. A second complication was the difficulty

American forces had combating guerrilla fighters on their

own terms. The average US soldier was trained and

equipped to move and fight in large units and to make use

of overwhelming firepower. Few were trained to operate

alone or in small groups, to operate with great stealth, and

to fight effectively at very close quarters . A third problem

was that the American style of war made it difficult to fight

enemy main force units and achieve decisive victories. The

enemy stood and fought only on its own terms. Seemingly

trapped enemy forces were often able to melt away into the

mountains and jungles, avoiding decisive defeat because

their mobility was based on the footpower of the individual

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soldier rather than the mechanization typical of large American units.

American strategy was thus heavily influenced by our

perception of the war and the multitude of factors that

influenced that perception. However, US strategy was also

dominated by what the nation, as represented by our political leadership, was willing and able to do in Vietnam, a

factor that varied over time. From 1954 until 1964, the

United States was willing to send large amounts of aid to

bolster the South Vietnamese government and growing

numbers of military advisers to train its army.

From 1965 through 1968, American political leadership

was willing not only to engage in large-scale combat operations, but to carry the major portion of the warmaking

burden. But the United States did not leap precipitously

into large-scale combat . The American response to the challenge in South Vietnam was gradual and graduated. Rather

than being bent on a full-scale war, American political leadership continually sought compromise solutions and attempted to use the gradual escalation of its efforts as a

bargaining tool, with very limited success.

From the latter part of 1968 through the end of 1972,

US leadership was unwilling to continue its large-scale prosecution of the war. Disillusioned with a long war without

apparent progress, Americans wanted out. The most the

United States was willing to do was to scale down its participation gradually, to withdraw its troops, and through

provision of training and equipment to attempt to leave

South Vietnam in such a position that it could defend itself.

However, the United States was willing to fight at arms

length through the use of air power. The final chapter, 1972

through 1975, witnessed the total collapse of American will

to aid a faltering ally under heavy attack.

American strategy was, of course, affected by the actions

of the enemy. The struggle against the Saigon government

began as an indigenous insurgency. The Vietcong insurgents

were quickly aided by North Vietnamese arms and equip289
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ment. In 1964 regular North Vietnamese army units began

appearing in South Vietnam, and the situation became desperate as the Vietcong and North Vietnamese prepared to

administer the decisive blows . Later, in 1968, the enemy

risked a frontal assault on South Vietnam's cities in an

attempt to foment a national uprising and failed . Eventually, as the Americans withdrew in 1972, the North Vietnamese launched a conventional invasion of the South only

to be bloodily rebuffed. Finally in 1975, another conventional invasion by the North Vietnamese led to the rapid

collapse of South Vietnamese resistance.

It did not become clear to Americans until well after the

war that North Vietnam was constantly willing to increase

its efforts in the South because the North was fighting an

unlimited war. While American willingness to fight rose and

fell over time, North Vietnamese willingness never wavered.

During the period from 1965 through 1968, the United

States believed it was escalating the war, hopefully to a point

at which the North Vietnamese would realize that their

objective was not worth the cost. From the North Vietnamese viewpoint, the war was already escalated because

North Vietnam was engaged in a total war for an invaluable

objective.

Finally, American strategy was influenced by the willingness and ability of the South Vietnamese to prosecute

the war. In the struggle for the loyalty of the peasants, the

pacification efforts of the South Vietnamese were often

poorly conceived, badly organized, and haphazardly executed. The government resisted the sweeping political reforms required for success (particularly land reform) until

late in the war. In the military struggle, the South Vietnamese displayed varying capabilities . In the early years, a

warlord mentality sapped the leadership of the army. Later,

as political upheavals shook the South, the coups and countercoups of the highly politicized army diverted attention

from the military struggle in the field. By 1965 the South

Vietnamese army was on the ropes and ripe for defeat. The

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American entrance into the war saved the day and gave the

South Vietnamese army time to regroup and reorganize .

By 1968 the South Vietnamese army had developed a number of first-class fighting units that conducted themselves

well during the Tet offensive . Improvement continued

through the departure of the American troops.

In the long run, however, the American training and

equipment that turned the South Vietnamese army into a

credible force contributed to its final undoing. US advisers

trained the South Vietnamese to fight in the American style

relying on heavy firepower, unlimited air support, and the

logistical system to make it all work. When the Americans

left and the logistical pipeline dried up, the South Vietnamese found themselves at a fatal disadvantage.

With all of the foregoing as background, what were the

strategies used by US forces? As one would suspect, the

strategies changed over time and must be dealt with by time

periods. The period from 1954 through 1964, the advisory

years, can be dealt with quickly. The objective was to help

the South Vietnamese help themselves by equipping and

training their forces . It was also a time for testing the various theories of counterinsurgency being touted in the

United States. Army Special Forces units were sent to Vietnam and operated extensively in areas far from the political

intrigues of Saigon. Other members of the ever expanding

advisory force trained South Vietnamese forces and accompanied them on operations in the field . American airmen

trained their South Vietnamese counterparts and often flew

with them on combat missions. In 1962 American planes

and crews also began spraying herbicides to defoliate the

jungle hiding places of the insurgents and, within certain

areas, to destroy the crops the insurgents used.

The arrival of large numbers of American ground combat

troops in 1965 led to a considerable debate over the appropriate strategy for their use . The original rationale for

the insertion of American troops was to protect American

air bases in the wake of several inordinately destructive

29 1
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raids by enemy troops. Some officials argued that the American role should be limited to protecting these enclaves

rather than becoming deeply involved in a war on the Asian

mainland. Others argued that limiting the American role

to guard duty was a waste of superior military capability

and went against the "aggressive nature" of the American

soldier. By mid-1965 the enclave strategy had been discarded and America became fully involved in a ground war

in Asia, thus ignoring a long held Western military phobia.

And, as had been predicted by some, the Americans began

to take over the ground war, a role quickly and easily relinquished by the South Vietnamese.

A major factor in the decision to widen the American

involvement in the war was the military situation in South

Vietnam in 1965. The Vietcong were massing in large units,

and an increasing number of regular North Vietnamese

units were operating in the south. Both enemy forces were

on the offensive and the South Vietnamese army was rapidly disintegrating as it lost nearly a battalion per week

through battle and desertion . As the enemy offensive gained

momentum, district capitals fell at the rate of one per week.

In the language of protracted war, the guerrilla war had

advanced to the third or large unit maneuver phase.

Without direct American intervention, an American enclave strategy might have been pointless as South Vietnam

collapsed under the enemy onslaught . Thus, as more American troops poured into South Vietnam with a fighting mission, General Westmoreland, commander, US Military

Assistance Command, Vietnam (COMUSMACV), mapped

out his master plan. The first step was to halt the losing

trend and to stop the enemy initiative. Once the crisis had

passed, Westmoreland would move on to step two, which

envisioned aggressive offensive action to seize the military

initiative and destroy enemy forces. Once enemy main force

units had been defeated, US forces would enter phase three,

in which they would mop up the remaining guerrilla force

structure and clean out any enemy units in remote base

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areas. Meanwhile the American air campaign against the

North, named Rolling Thunder, would continue in an effort

to persuade the North that it should end its support of the

battle in the South. Air power would also play a significant

role in the South by providing interdiction and close air

support for ground troops.

By the end of 1965 the crisis had passed. The major

enemy thrust aimed at cutting the South in half from the

mountains to the sea had been defeated. Two major American operations (Starlight and Silver Bayonet) had tested

American troops, blunted the enemy offensive, and demonstrated the concept of air cavalry in the Ia Drang Valley.

It was now time to move on to the second step of Westmoreland's plan and aggressively seize the offensive.

The enemy, its ambitious large unit offensive blunted,

became less aggressive and operated in smaller tactical

units. American troops initiated a series of spoiling attacks

and "search-and-destroy" sweeps through the countryside,

but they occupied no land for any length of time. In the

purely military sense there were no strategic points to occupy, yet every point was strategic because a significant

portion of the war was waged for the loyalty of the people.

Although the Americans could "sweep" an area clear of

enemy forces, when they moved on the enemy returned,

forcing the peasants into some kind of accommodation.

Although South Vietnamese pacification personnel often

followed in the wake of American sweeps, their mission

was made doubly difficult when US forces moved on to

other operations, leaving the Vietnamese to defend themselves against enemy forces that might return.

Westmoreland's strategy was to keep the enemy off balance with spoiling attacks and to inflict the maximum number of casualties. In other words, Westmoreland's was a

strategy of attrition as he attempted to exhaust the enemy's

manpower and will to fight through superior American firepower. If overwhelming US firepower could kill the enemy

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fast enough, North Vietnam would not be able to sustain

its support of the war in the south, or so the idea went.

Ironically, the enemy strategy for defeating the American

forces was also based on attrition. The Vietcong and North

Vietnamese had been on the verge of administering the

coup de grace to the hapless South Vietnamese forces before

the American forces arrived on the scene. However, they

could not hope to inflict decisive battlefield defeats on the

well-trained and superbly equipped US forces. They fell

back on the concepts of protracted warfare, a kind of warfare unsuited to democracies in general and anathema to

impatient Americans. Their strategy was to avoid defeat,

harass the Americans (and their allies, of course), prolong

the war, and cause as many American casualties as possible .

Combined with a well-orchestrated propaganda campaign,

the bodies of dead American soldiers returning home would

have a devastating effect on the American will to continue

the struggle (cost-tolerance) .

Thus both sides pursued an attrition strategy, but there

were differences. US attrition was aimed at killing a maximum number of enemy soldiers on the battlefield, which

became an end in itself. The enemy strategy of attrition

was aimed at the morale of the American people. The enemy considered the war a struggle between entire societies

while American strategic interests concentrated on the narrower confines of the battlefield.

The American problem was to bring its massive firepower

to bear on an elusive enemy that stood and fought only on

its own terms . Although elusive, the enemy suffered greatly

at the hands of the Americans and South Vietnamese. A

full accounting of enemy casualties will probably never be

made, but for the period 1965 through 1974 a postwar

Department of Defense estimate put enemy military casualties at nearly one million. Even if one assumes a significant inflation in reported body count figures, the enemy

suffered great losses. But the enemy avoided decisive defeat

and the war continued in spite of the suffering. Antiwar

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sentiment in the United States grew stronger as more Americans died with no end in sight.

In early 1968 the enemy attempted to speed up the process of American and allied defeat by fomenting a national

uprising among the people of South Vietnam. The tool to

accomplish this end was a major offensive against South

Vietnam's cities beginning during the Tet holidays. After

some initial setbacks under the massive onslaught, US and

South Vietnamese forces soundly defeated the enemy. The

Tet offensive failed to start an uprising and resulted in a

crushing military defeat for the enemy, but it provided the

straw that broke the back of American will to continue the

struggle .

In the wake of Tet, the American objective in the war

clearly changed. Rather than a military solution, the United

States sought a way out of the war with minimum damage

to its prestige . Strategy quickly changed to accommodate

this new goal. The United States started the process ofVietnamization-turning the war back over to the South

Vietnamese-and reducing US troop levels (although for a

while troop numbers increased, reaching their zenith in

early 1969). As American troops departed, efforts were

made to bolster the South Vietnamese army's ability to

stand on its own by providing both training and equipment.

American forces continued combat operations on the

ground but at a reduced level . Many of these operations,

including an incursion into enemy sanctuaries in Cambodia, were aimed at protecting the withdrawal of US

forces .

The defeat of the enemy in its Tet offensive also offered

a great opportunity for the United States and South Vietnam. The offensive was led by Vietcong forces, and their

destruction left a power void in the countryside. In effect,

the Vietcong, who had avoided defeat against superior

American forces for years, had been destroyed by the enemy's decision to make them the shock troops for Tet. The

Saigon government quickly moved to fill the void with mas295
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sive new pacification programs. In essence, the guerrilla war

was won (or more accurately, lost by the Vietcong when

they abandoned guerrilla tactics during Tet) and the war

for peasant loyalty was being won. But the Americans continued to withdraw.

After a conventional invasion by North Vietnamese

forces in the spring of 1972 and its defeat by the South

Vietnamese with the assistance of American air power, the

North Vietnamese and remnants of the Vietcong signed a

cease-fire in early 1973, but only after a final massive US

bombing offensive in North Vietnam centered on Hanoi

and Haiphong. The cease-fire allowed the United States to

leave with some arguable degree of honor. In 1975 the

North Vietnamese again invaded andthe South Vietnamese

army, without the massive ground firepower, air power, and

logistical support of the United States, quickly crumbled.

Having discussed the factors that influenced US strategy

in Vietnam and traced the changes in strategy over time,

it is appropriate to evaluate the strategic choices made by

the United States. Many have criticized the American military effort as being unrealistic and unimaginative . They

have argued that the American strategy was born of arrogance and failed to heed the lessons of the French experience from 1946 to 1954. The American strategy seemed to

be little more than the French strategy with the addition

of greater firepower and mobility. This criticism may be

accurate, but American strategic choices were limited by

the factors discussed earlier.

Clearly, had the United States not taken to the field in

1965 to battle directly with the enemy, any subsequent strategic decisions would have been academic as the enemy

would have overrun the South. The situation in 1965 was

desperate. The strategic choices made after the crisis passed

are more legitimately questionable .

Perhaps the biggest error made by American strategists

was not realizing that the enemy was fighting an unlimited

war. In a sense, the enemy turned President John F. Ken296
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nedy's famous inauguration speech on its head. It was the

enemy who would "pay any price, bear any burden, meet

any hardship" to attain their objective of a united Vietnamese nation. Given such total commitment, a policy of

gradualism-slowly increasing the pressure-had little effect except to strengthen enemy resolve and slow their progress to the ultimate goal.

Gradual escalation of the American effort severely reduced General Westmoreland's strategic choices. As the

American buildup slowly progressed, he did not believe he

had enough combat forces or the political backing to launch

an overwhelming attack against the enemy (either in the

south or the north), or to seize and hold an ever-expanding

area that could be effectively and permanently pacified.

Short of withdrawing, an attrition strategy seemed to be

one of his few choices. And from the standpoint of superior

American firepower and mobility, it seemed to be a logical

choice.

Unfortunately for the Americans, the choice of an attrition strategy ignored several critical factors . First, it ignored

the commitment of the enemy to the cause . Attrition would

have to have been of incredible proportions to dent the

enemy's resolve . Second, adopting an attrition strategy assumed that we could inflict the appropriate casualties upon

the enemy. Time and again, the enemy slipped from the

grasp of elaborate operations and eluded the overwhelming

American firepower. Although enemy forces suffered enormous casualties, they never approached the attrition level

required to bring American victory. Third, by its very nature, a war of attrition is a long and drawn-out affair. This

factor played against the American penchant for quick and

decisive results . America's characteristic impatience had a

great deal to do with its ultimate undoing in Vietnam.

As events transpired, the guerrilla insurgency defeated

itself during the 1968 Tet offensive . One still wonders how

to deal with guerrilla insurgents in such a war. On the political side of this question, how could the Americans have

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brought effective pressure on the South Vietnamese government to effect the reforms required to win the loyalty

of the population? On the military side of the question,

how could American forces effectively fight the guerrillas?

Neither of these problems was solved by the Americans

during the conflict .

General Westmoreland's big unit tactics are most criticized in relation to the last question. Rather than grappling

with enemy guerrilla forces, Westmoreland concentrated on

large operations involving thousands of men, aimed at enemy main force units. However, one must remember that

the US armed forces were not trained and equipped, for

the most part, to combat guerrilla forces effectively. They

were trained and equipped for high-intensity warfare in

western Europe . This leads to a final puzzling question for

the future. Should American forces be trained and equipped

for the "worst-case" war in Europe against the Soviet

Union, or for the "least cases," those conflicts against lesser

adversaries that may occur nearly anywhere in the world?

Clearly, the Vietnam conflict demonstrated that being prepared for the worst case does not automatically prepare one

for the lesser case.

Political Considerations

If the United States had a difficult time translating the

political objective in Vietnam into a working military strategy that could achieve American purposes, our government

had an even more difficult time devising a translation of

those ends into terms the American people could support

and sustain. The central reality of the Vietnam experience

politically was its growing unpopularity, and both the Johnson and Nixon administrations labored diligently if unsuccessfully to develop a positive consensus around the war

effort.

As we have already noted, it was not the clarity of the

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political objective that was the problem, as some earlier

observers have maintained. The principle of containment

rather precisely defined American involvement, and this

objective remained the rationale at least until the Tet offensive and counteroffensive . The real problem was that for

segments of the population, this purpose was not an adequate reason for sustained sacrifice. Partly this may have

been because the containment policy was not obviously applicable to the kind of struggle going on in Vietnam. Containment was, after all, devised to blunt aggressive,

presumably Soviet-inspired expansion, and although the

North Vietnamese and Vietcong were Communists, they

were also nationalists. At the same time, overt national

support for containment, which had been high in the antiCommunist atmosphere of the 1940s and 1950s, had

flagged by the latter 1960s. This was, after all, the period

of dawning detente with the Soviet Union, and the fact that

we conducted business as usual with the Soviets throughout

the war certainly did not contribute to containment-based

fervor (all of SALT I, for instance, was negotiated while

American soldiers were fighting and dying in Vietnam).

In this atmosphere, the government labored hard and

long to produce adequate justifications for our sacrifice,

and a series of explanations was "run up the flagpole" to

see if they would prove convincing. At one point, it was

the Munich analogy that underpinned our commitment,

while at another it was the threat of falling dominos in

Southeast Asia. If the worth of containing a minor power

like North Vietnam was questioned, American leadership

argued that it was really the Soviet Union or the People's

Republic of China that we were combating. The longer and

harder government officials tried, the more their efforts

fanned an increasingly large and cynical antiwar movement.

Tet was the straw that broke the camel's back in terms

of popular support. Before the television extravaganza that

the Tet offensive provided, opposition was significant but

limited. When Tet appeared to reveal that the progress re299
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ported in the war was illusion, overall public opinion turned

decisively against the warand forced the objective to change

to extrication from the war. Vietnamization was directly

attributable to public pressures surrounding the 1968 presidential election .

There were international political considerations as well.

One major category of those concerns, similar to the same

phenomenon in the Korean War, was Soviet and Chinese

commitments to the DRV Both countries were openly supporting and supplying our adversary, and both had mutual

defense arrangements with North Vietnam. The problem

from an American vantage point was to keep the hostilities

at such a level that those commitments would not force a

direct confrontation between the United States and China,

or even worse the Soviet Union. These worries caused the

United States to impose limits on the levels of violence,

especially in the air war over North Vietnam and particularly on target restrictions for American bombers. The

result was detailed instruction and control of military operations by civilian authorities, motivated by political

rather than military considerations . In this circumstance

was born much of the resentment of the political authorities

by the military and the basis for typification of the effort

as a "political war."

At the same time, the United States had to be concerned

with international opinion about the war. Because we were

fighting against another third world country, much of the

Afro-Asian world opposed our participation and voiced

their objections loudly in such forums as the United Nations. While these were relatively minor irritations, there

was also fairly widespread opposition to our participation

among our major allies . Whether motivated by basic opposition to the enterprise, a belief in the futility of the entire

effort, or the debilitating effects Vietnam was having on

the level and quality of our participation in NATO, America's principal allies showed considerable disgruntlement

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with our efforts . American diplomats were forced to expend

a fair level of energy attempting to justify our case.

The net result of these influences, and especially those

internal to the country, was to make the war a political

debacle on an unprecedented scale. In the wake of America's longest and least successful war, national consensus

lay in shreds and would take nearly a decade to weave back

together. The resolve of the country was severely questioned, and the rallying cry of the "me generation" was "no

more Vietnams." The purely political aspects and impacts

of Vietnam were virtually unprecedented in the American

experience . The lessons they provide are assessed in the

final chapter.

Military Technology and Technique

Because of the extraordinary length of the Vietnam conflict, the military technology available changed significantly

over its course. As weapons and equipment changed on the

battlefield, military techniques also changed as the antagonists struggled either to take full advantage of new technology or to avoid its lethal impact .

During the 1950s and early 1960s, the United States had

prepared for a major war against a sophisticated adversary

in Europe. The American military establishment started

from the premise that the only enemy of consequence was

the Soviet Union, and that the role of the US military must

be to deter or counter the Soviet threat at both the nuclear

and conventional levels. With some sidelong glances toward

Korea, the American military focused most of its attention

on the Soviet threat to western Europe . Even the vaunted

Special Forces were originally designed and trained to foment insurgent activities behind Soviet lines in eastern Europe. The Special Forces' eventual use came in the very

different terrain of Southeast Asia with the very different

mission of countering an insurgency. As to the rest of the

30 1
EAGLE'S TALONS

world, the American military assumed that being prepared

for the worse case in Europe was sufficient to counter a

least case in another part of the world . But in Vietnam, the

American military found that many of its techniques and

weapons were of limited value against a very different kind

of enemy in a very different kind of war in a very different

part of the world.

During the Vietnam War, the vast technological capabilities of the United States were harnessed to develop and

produce an array of highly sophisticated equipment and

weapon systems to find and target the elusive enemy, and

then to deliver large amounts of firepower on the target

with great accuracy. But it was a more mundane piece of

equipment-the helicopter-that shaped the character of

the American ground war effort. The helicopter became

nearly as ubiquitous and certainly as versatile in Vietnam

as the jeep had been during World War 11 .

The introduction of the helicopter as a basic means of

transportation for the ground soldier essentially completed

the military transportation revolution begun in the nineteenth century. No longer limited by rails or roads, major

battles could be fought anywhere helicopters could land or

hover. To a great degree, helicopter mobility defined the

qualitative difference between the American effort in Vietnam and the effort of the French between 1945 and 1954.

For the most part, the French had been tied to hazardous

ground transportation . A decade later, US forces often

moved in relative safety by helicopter directly to the battlefield and arrived fresh and ready to fight. Not only did

helicopters move men to battle, they became all-purpose

workhorses . They evacuated the wounded, hauled supplies

and munitions, and lifted field artillery directly to fire bases.

Helicopters became potent weapons platforms armed with

an incredible array of machine guns, rocket launchers, grenade launchers, and other weapons used to attack ground

targets. With its ability to hover motionless, loiter near its

targets, and fly close to the troops on the ground, the heli302
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copter became an important means of providing close air

support to troops in contact with the enemy.

When American advisory personnel first introduced large

numbers of combat helicopters into the conflict during the

early 1960s, they proved to be highly effective. In many

instances during these early encounters, enemy guerrilla

troops broke and ran at the approach of heliborne forces .

Before long the panic faded, cooler heads prevailed, and

the enemy developed tactics to counter the helicopter. Although helicopters offered tremendous mobility and flexibility, they were noisy, relatively fragile, and quite slow.

The enemy could hear their approach at a considerable

distance and either take evasive action or prepare active

defenses. Thin-skinned helicopters moving slowly or hovering at low altitudes were vulnerable to ground fire and

even small caliber weapons had considerable effect. During

the course of the war, the United States lost nearly 5,000

helicopters.

In spite of their vulnerabilities, helicopters offered advantages to ground troops that simply could not be ignored.

And so it was that the United States brought to the war a

totally new kind of fighting organization, the air cavalry.

Such units were designed and structured from the ground

up for rapid movement by their own helicopters. Troop

transport, artillery transport, supply, medical evacuation,

close air support, and reconnaissance were all accomplished

by organic assets . The effectiveness of the air cavalry concept was first demonstrated in October 1965 against North

Vietnamese regular army units in the Ia Drang Valley. Moving in coordinated "packages" of infantry supported by

mobile fire bases (each emplaced and then displaced by

helicopter as the battle moved on), the air cavalry successfully countered the foot mobility of the enemy and soundly

defeated the NVA forces .

The American infantry forces that the helicopters delivered to the battlefield were the most potent in the history

of warfare thanks to their new standard weapon, the M-16

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automatic rifle . In the early months of its use, the M-16

was the subject of considerable controversy concerning its

reliability in difficult combat situations . Overall, however,

the M-16 gave the individual infantryman much more firepower than hadpreviously been available. It was lightweight

(8.4 pounds loaded), which meant that the individual soldier could carry more ammunition than ever before without

increasing the overall weight of his pack. Because of the

very high muzzle velocity of its 5 .56-mm (approximately

.22-caliber) bullet, the weapon had superior "killing

power," particularly at ranges of 100 yards or less. Finally,

if needed, the M-16 could spew out fire at the rate of 700

rounds per minute in automatic operation.

As significant as they were in terms of infantry fighting

power, the change in standard infantry armament was minor compared with other sophisticated equipment developed and used during the war. Since guerrillas operated at

night, light amplification devices came into widespread use .

Other detection devices tracked enemy movement through

the seismic shocks of their steps as they walked down jungle

paths. Once the enemy was found, he could be struck with

numerous new weapons including cluster bombs (small

bomblets dispensed from a larger bomb to give larger area

coverage) or smart bombs that could be guided to their

target with pinpoint precision. Guerrillas were robbed of

their hiding areas through the use of defoliants dispensed

from aircraft that destroyed jungle foliage. Guerrilla areas

were saturated with bullets from transport aircraft modified

to carry electrically driven Gatling guns that fired over

6,000 rounds per minute as the gunship relentlessly circled

the target .

In the air war, the United States used its most sophisticated aircraft and the enemy countered with sophisticated

antiaircraft artillery and thousands of antiaircraft missiles

imported from Communist-bloc countries. In turn, US

forces countered the antiaircraft threat with electronic jamming devices to foil enemy aiming and guidance systems

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and with air-to-ground antiradiation missiles that homed

in on the transmissions of enemy radar sights. Success in

the electronic war often spelled the difference between victory and defeat in the air.

Vietnam was also the first war to incorporate the largescale use of computers. Computers were particularly important to the American logistical effort . The massive planning and control problems of moving mountains of supplies

and munitions for both American and allied troops 10,000

miles across the Pacific were ready made for solution by

computers. The fact that US troops were lavishly supplied

with both combat essentials and creature comforts speaks

well for the logisticians and their computers.

But the obvious advantages of computers, particularly in

the task of managing logistics and other supporting elements, presented a two-edged sword . The ability to process

and analyze vast amounts of data prompted attempts to

quantify and analyze data that would allow the Department

of Defense to manage the war itself to an efficient and

favorable conclusion. Pentagon computers quantified, massaged, manipulated, and analyzed huge amounts of data in

futile attempts to measure progress in a war with no front

lines. From this effort was born the emphasis on body

counts and other statistical measures of success that, in the

final analysis, were either erroneous measures of merit or

were so unreliably reported that the analytical results were

of dubious value. Additionally, the power of the computer

combined with space age communication systems to reinforce the natural desire of civilian authorities to control the

war. As a result, much of the decisionmaking authority was

centralized in Washington (especially the direction of the

bombing campaign over North Vietnam).

For the most part, the bombing campaign in North Vietnam was intended to persuade the North Vietnamese to

desist in their war efforts. This objective of persuasion was

in stark contrast to the homeland bombing conducted in

World War 11 and Korea that sought to destroy enemy ca305
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pabilities to wage war. Civilian authorities attempted to fine

tune the air attack, to orchestrate the violence and at the

same time keep the destruction at the lowest possible level.

In their memoirs, military commanders protested that the

level of interference by civilians in military affairs was unprecedented in American history. In reality, of course,

American political leaders have often sought to control

events on the war front. The fear of escalation in the nuclear

age increased the desire to be in control, and the era of

computers and space age communication systems provided

a practical means to do so.

The traditional weapons of the guerrillas stood in sharp

contrast to the wizardry of smart bombs, light amplification

devices, and computers. Although many guerrillas used

modem weapons (infiltrated into the country or captured

from their enemy), they continued to rely on more primitive

but no less effective weapons. Punji stakes (sharpened bamboo shafts dipped in excrement or other infectious substances) hidden along jungle trails penetrated many a

soldier's boot with particularly nasty consequences. Guerrillas commonly remanufactured captured or unexploded

munitions into ingenious booby traps that killed or

wounded the unwary and unlucky. The guerrilla aspect of

the war remained a technologically primitive affair.

As in every war, the military technology available affected

the way the war was fought. The American position was

simple. American lives should be spared by the effective

exploitation of modern technology. This very reasonable

outlook translated into substitution of American firepower

for American bloodshed. US forces relied on overwhelming

firepower to aid and save the infantryman on the battlefield.

Whether it came from artillery or air power, whether it was

used directly on the battlefield or behind the lines to interdict the flow of enemy forces and materiel, Americans

became incredible spendthrifts with firepower. US artillery

fired an average of 10,000 rounds every day. American air306
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craft dropped eight million tons of bombs (four times the

total tonnage dropped in World War II) . Never had firepower been so one-sided and so lavishly used to save American lives.

Such great firepower requires targets or it is wasted. The

objective of American tactics on the ground was to find

targets for firepower and then to destroy those targets, if

possible at "arm's length." Large-scale sweeps through the

countryside, called search-and-destroy missions, had as

their object finding the enemy, fixing the enemy in place

by cutting off escape routes, and then bringing overwhelming firepower to bear from the air and from supporting

artillery fire bases .

The problem was finding the enemy. It was difficult and

often impossible to tell friend from foe unless the enemy

was ready to fight. Thus, in spite of the offensive nature of

the American search and destroy tactics, Pentagon analysts

estimated that in 90 percent of the ground combat with the

enemy, the enemy opened fire first. In other words, the

enemy forces initiated the combat and fought only when

they wanted to fight. Thus, a major difficulty for the American military was in finding the enemy so that overwhelming firepower could be brought to bear.

Air power was also used to destroy and harass enemy

logistics in South Vietnam, in North Vietnam, and along

the enemy lines of communication through Laos and Cambodia (the Ho Chi Minh Trail). The effectiveness of these

interdiction efforts remains a matter of conjecture . There

is no question that air power made the North Vietnamese

logistical efforts extremely difficult and vastly increased the

cost of supporting enemy troops in the field. On the other

hand, some supplies always got through, and this was the

crux of the American problem. An enemy that was difficult

and often impossible to find and who would stand and fight

only on his own terms controlled the tempo of the fighting .

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As a result, interdiction efforts had minimal effects because,

when short of supplies, the enemy lowered the tempo of

combat and built stockpiles from the trickle of supplies that

survived the air power gauntlet .

The interdictive effort was also hindered by supplies

transshipped from Sihanoukville (Kompong Som), a port

in "neutral" Cambodia, to Vietcong and North Vietnamese

forces in the southern portion of South Vietnam. Weather

also played a role as the monsoons limited air operations

during long portions of each year. The relatively primitive

North Vietnamese logistic system in itself helped to lessen

the impact of American air power. Tons of supplies were

transported on the backs of porters or pushed on bicycles

along narrow footpaths through the jungle. Such transportation methods were largely immune to the application of

air power.

Perhaps the greatest hindrance to the interdiction effort

was the inability to strike at the sources of the supplies .

Strategic targets, those parts of the industrial web of a nation that produce the wherewithal of modem warfare, simply did not exist to any significant extent in North Vietnam.

The "reservoir" of strategic targets lay outside North Vietnam and were off limits to American bombers. Since the

reservoir was out of bounds the next most effective way to

interdict the flow would have been to turn off the "spigot";

that is, to mine the North Vietnamese harbors through

which the supplies were imported. Such action was politically unacceptable (for fear of sinking Soviet or Chinese

ships and escalating the war) until 1972 . Thus, massive

American air power could only poke holes in the enemy's

logistic "hose," and the enemy was largely able to compensate for such losses by increasing the flow of supplies

through the spigot.

The American substitution of technology for bloodshed

was natural. When one possesses overwhelming technological and materiel superiority, one should use it, particularly

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if it saves the lives of one's soldiers . This is the rich man's

technique. Conversely, the Vietcong and the North Vietnamese fought apoor man's war. Guerrilla techniques, used

throughout the war but most in evidence before the slaughter of the Vietcong during the Tet offensive in 1968, were

the classic techniques of the weak. Guerrillas strike by surprise at isolated elements of the enemy and then melt away

into the jungle or mix with the noncombatant population .

As a result, guerrillas are difficult to find and target, and

must remain so if they are to survive. The purpose of guerrilla techniques is to negate the superiority of the enemy

by not giving the enemya target . The political infrastructure

that recruits and supports the guerrillas is virtually immune

to firepower because it lives among the "friendly" population . AVietcong cell in Saigon, for example, was not subject to destruction by overwhelming American or South

Vietnamese firepower.

North Vietnamese regular army units at times stood and

fought against American forces, and each time they did they

were soundly defeated. For the most part, however, the

North Vietnamese satisfied themselves with protracted war

techniques. Operating from sanctuaries in Cambodia and

Laos, they struck at US forces with the purpose of inflicting

casualties rather than gaining decisive victories and then

melted away into their sanctuaries to prevent their own

defeat. The North Vietnamese technique changed to a considerably bolder approach as US combat troops withdrew

from the war. In 1972 the North Vietnamese launched a

conventional invasion across the demilitarized zone that

the South Vietnamese army defeated only with the massive

use ofthe still available American air power. In 1975 American air power was no longer available, and another massive

invasion from the north quickly resulted in the fall of South

Vietnam. With the Americans and their superior firepower

no longer on the scene, the North Vietnamese no longer

had to fight a poor man's war.

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Military Conduct

As discussed earlier in this chapter, enemy military activity had grown larger and bolder over a number of years,

as had the size of the American commitment to South Vietnam. American actions had not reached the point of overt

combat intervention by 1964, but it was clear a military

crisis was fast approaching. The 2 August 1964 attack on

the destroyer Maddox (and the disputed attack on the destroyer C. Turner Joy) resulted in the near unanimous passage of the so-called Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, which gave

the president nearly carte blanche authority to employ

American military forces. The United States clearly had

unsheathed its sword, and it was obvious that American

patience was in short supply.

However, the enemy forces were not deterred by the

threat of American responses to their attacks. On 30 October 1964 the Vietcong attacked the Bien Hoa Air Base

killing five Americans and destroying six American aircraft.

On 24 December the Vietcong planted abomb in the Brinks

Hotel, an American military billet in Saigon . The explosion

killed two and injured nearly 60 others. On 6 February 1965

the Vietcong attacked the American base at Pleiku, killing

eight and wounding more than 100. Fed up with enemy

actions and armed with the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution,

President Johnson ordered a reprisal air raid into North

Vietnam, an operation called Flaming Dart . As the enemy

attacks continued, so did the Flaming Dart reprisals . Finally

on 2 March 1965, reprisal raids ceased and a continuous

bombing campaign (Rolling Thunder) began. Closely controlled by the president, Rolling Thunder was designed to

display American determination, to persuade the North

Vietnamese to stop their support of the war in the South,

andto disrupt North Vietnamese military capabilities . Rolling Thunder continued for three years, the longest and largest (in terms of bomb tonnage) aerial bombing campaign

in history.

31 0
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The fact that Lyndon Johnson thought Rolling Thunder

could cause the North to stop its efforts probably displays

more vividly than any other event how little we understood

the nationalist resolve underlying the North Vietnamese

war effort. At the same time, this step up in American

involvement meant US air facilities became important targets for the enemy and would henceforth require greatly

heightened security that we did not trust the ARVN to

provide. To that end, on 8 March 1965 Marine Corps Battalion Landing Team 3/9 set foot on the sandy beaches

north of Da Nang and became the first US ground combat

unit committed to the war. Its mission was to protect the

American installation at Da Nang, the most important base

in northern South Vietnam. More Marine combat troops

followed as well as logistical support troops.

The decision to insert American ground troops into the

situation reflected the way the entire war was conducted

from Washington . As noted earlier, President Johnson was

faced with three alternatives in early 1965, none of which

was particularly palatable. The first was to wash our hands

of the entire affair, admitting that the situation was hopeless. The consequence of following that path, of course, was

surely the rapid fall of the Republic of Vietnam and hence

the loss of the American investment of over a decade. The

second option was to continue doing what we had been

doing, providing aid and training . Since that approach had

failed in the past, there was little hope that it would work

in the future. That left the option the president chose, which

was to escalate our involvement, albeit in a measured and

limited manner. Johnson felt no great optimism that a limited insertion of American forces would materially change

the situation, but at least it might keep the situation from

getting any worse.

Although a considerable debate ensued about the use of

US troops, the president sided with General Westmoreland,

the MACV commander, who stressed that the best defense

was found in offensive actions. Once the precedent of put-
EAGLE'S TALONS

ting Americans in the field was established, it became easier

to add more in the same incremental manner. As the South

Vietnamese position continued to deteriorate, the deployment of American troops increased. By the end of 1965,

there were nearly 200,000 American troops in Vietnam; at

the war's zenith in early 1969 that number was well over

a half million.

The military problem for the United States was how to

fight this kind of war. The immediate problem as Americans entered the country in large numbers was how to turn

the military tide, which had been running consistently in

favor of the enemy. By mid-1965 the crisis point had been

reached . The Vietcong large-unit offensive was in full swing

and regular North Vietnamese army units were in evidence

on the offensive in the south. To alleviate the crisis, American troops began large-scale offensive operations. In midAugust the Marines launched Operation Starlight to destroy

a Vietcong stronghold on the Van Tuong Peninsula south

of Da Nang; after seven days of bitter fighting among fortified villages with extensive protective tunnel complexes,

the Marines reported nearly 700 enemy dead.

In late October General Westmoreland sent units of the

First Air Cavalry Division to search out and destroy regular

North Vietnamese units in the highlands ofPleiku province.

The North Vietnamese objective was to cut South Vietnam

in half from the Cambodian border to the sea. Using their

helicopters for total mobility of troops, artillery, and logistics, the Air Cavalry searched for the elusive enemy. Heavy

contact was made in the Ia Drang Valley in mid-November,

and fierce close-quarter fighting lasted from 14 to 18 November. For the first time, Strategic Air Command B-52

heavy bombers loaded with conventional iron bombs were

called upon to provide tactical support to the ground troops.

The North Vietnamese units were badly mauled and limped

back across the Cambodian border, leaving more than 1,300

dead comrades behind.

American troops had been blooded successfully. By the

31 2
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end of 1965, the immediate crisis had passed. American

offensive actions had blunted enemy momentum. The Rolling Thunder bombing campaign continued until 25 December when President Johnson temporarily halted the

campaign as a conciliatory gesture to induce the North

Vietnamese to sit down at the negotiating table. The effort

was unsuccessful and Rolling Thunder resumed on 31 January 1966.

The problem was what to do next. If the enemy had lost

the initiative, he had not quit the field. The question was

how to bring about the defeat of the North Vietnamese,

which meant bringing enough pressure to bear to convince

them to abandon their objective of forcefully uniting the

country. This effort was hampered, of course, by our lack

of understanding of the North Vietnamese objective (from

their perspective the war was a civil war) and the tenacity

with which it was held. The US effort would be twopronged. On the ground, the method (one is reluctant to

call it a strategy) was search and destroy. In the air, it was

the continuation and intensification ofthe Rolling Thunder

bombing campaign.

With enemy momentum stopped, General Westmoreland's search-and-destroy method was an attempt to seize

the military initiative by going out aggressively after the

enemy, locating him, and destroying him. Westmoreland

planned to inflict such enormous casualties on the enemy

that he would not be able to sustain the war effort in the

south. During 1966 and 1967 the Americans mounted a

multitude of large-scale search-and-destroy operations with

such names as Masher, White Wing, Thayer, Irving, Double

Eagle, Lanikai, Fairfax, Cedar Falls, Attleboro, Junction

City, Malheur, and Pershing. Many of these were massive

and complex operations. Operation Junction City, for example, involved 26 battalions (22 American and 4 South

Vietnamese) in a complex mission using armor, parachute

drops, and helicopters.

The missions were largely unsuccessful for a number of

31 3
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reasons. First, when the enemy was confronted with such

an operation (about which his intelligence organs had usually given him advance knowledge), he reverted to guerrilla

tactics, breaking up his units and disappearing. Westmoreland's strategy forced him to send his troops where the

enemy was (or where he thought the enemy was). All too

often, many ifnot most ofthe enemy escaped, only to return

to the area after the Americans moved on. As a result, other

operations at later dates took place over the same ground

in pursuit of the same enemy.

Second, this method did not translate into a military

pattern that was easy for politicians or the public to follow.

American battle maps (and newspaper maps for the home

front) portrayed a series of separate and seemingly unconnected operations rather than cohesive campaigns. In a

sense, the large-scale operations were not part of a strategy.

The objective was attrition, and the operations themselves

became the strategy.

Third, it was difficult to measure real success. Throughout this phase, progress in terms of the body count was

reported at the "Five O'Clock Follies" and on American

television, but where was the end? Body counts became the

standard measure of success (since careers were made and

broken on the body count, inflation was almost inevitable),

and taking and holding territory had no meaning. It is unclear how many of the enemywere killed by American largeunit operations, but the enemy casualty rate was significantly higher than the rate of American casualties . By our

standards, it was hard to imagine that the North Vietnamese would or could continue to accept the casualties we were

inflicting . They, however, placed a different importance on

the objective, making their cost-tolerance much higher than

we realized . The ground strategy, in other words, was not

going to work as long as there were able-bodied North

Vietnamese who could be put in the field.

The other part of the strategy was Rolling Thunder. As

originally proposed by the military, Rolling Thunder was

31 4
VIETNAM WAR

to be a short intensive bombardment campaign to cripple

the North Vietnamese lines of communication to the south

and virtually seal off North Vietnam from outside aid. Instead, Rolling Thunder was implemented gradually in an

attempt to limit its violence . Thus, although Rolling Thunder was originally designed to achieve specific military objectives, it was implemented in a fashion designed to

persuade the North Vietnamese to negotiate rather than to

destroy their capabilities . In the final analysis, Rolling

Thunder had only limited success in achieving either

objective.

Rolling Thunder was at first concentrated in the area

immediately north of the demilitarized zone at the 17th

parallel and limited to a small number of the targets proposed in the original campaign plan. Between its inception

in 1965 and its termination in 1968, the attacks gradually

expanded northward, and the target list grew longer. Airmen took great pains to avoid unnecessary civilian casualties and to avoid provoking a strong reaction from the

Chinese. The campaign was also halted several times in

attempts to get the North Vietnamese to the negotiating

table.

Rolling Thunder unquestionably inflicted terrible damage upon the North Vietnamese war effort. The bombing

destroyed numerous ammunition depots, oil storage facilities, power plants, and railroad shops. Road and rail rolling

stock were decimated. The small North Vietnamese industrial base was virtually destroyed, and over 500,000 North

Vietnamese had to be mobilized for repair, dispersal, and

transportation duties. Many more were mobilized for air

defense efforts.

Although the Rolling Thunder campaign undoubtedly

hampered the North Vietnamese war effort, ultimately it

was of limited effect. Certainly it never had the decisive

results that were hoped for. At least four reasons underlie

this failure. First, the manner of implementation almost

guaranteed minimal results. Piecemeal attacks on impor31 5
EAGLE'S TALONS

tant targets allowed the enemy to make repairs or find alternate means to accomplish ends. Second, North Vietnam

was a developing nation with no particular industrial base

and thus no significant "industrial web" that could be attacked and destroyed . Third, the only way to attack the

basis of enemy supply was to go to its sources, which were

the Soviet Union and Red China, or at least to interdict

the supply of materiel coming from those sources. For fear

of widening the war, targets near the Chinese border were

off limits, as were the ports of Haiphong in North Vietnam

and Sihanoukville in Cambodia through which supplies

flowed . Finally, the North Vietnamese effort was nowhere

near as dependent on outside supply as the American effort

anyway, so that it was questionable how much effect any

aerial bombardment campaign could have . North Vietnam

was not World War 11 Germany.

As the Americans pursued North Vietnamese and Vietcong main force units on the ground and bombed the North

Vietnamese at home and on the infiltration routes into

South Vietnam, the war in the villages to win the support

of the people continued but with little success. South

Vietnamese troops and officials were supposed to follow

the victorious American troops on their massive sweeps of

the countryside, and "pacify" the population . These efforts

were hampered by insufficient forces, inefficient management, poor leadership, corruption, and a host of other

factors.

The temporary nature of American successes in the big

unit war, the limited success of bombing in the north and

on the infiltration routes, and the failure of the pacification

campaign were all revealed in the enemy's 1968 Tet offensive . The tone of Americans reporting on the war through

the end of 1967 had generally been one of progress and

success. For that reason the Tet offensive of January 1968

was a tremendous shock to the American public. During

these Buddhist holidays, an estimated 80,000 Vietcong

troops launched an all-out offensive against South Viet31 6
VIETNAM WAR

namese population centers. Hue was virtually overrun and

even the American embassy grounds in Saigon were penetrated. Three dozen provincial capitals, several autonomous cities, and more than 60 district capitals came under

heavy attack. The official object of the attack was to foment

a massive uprising (a peculiar Vietnamese twist to traditional protracted war theory) by the South Vietnamese people to throw out both the Saigon government and the

Americans.

Militarily, the attack was a disaster for the Vietcong. After

some striking initial successes, the attacks were driven back

with heavy losses . By the end of February, General Westmoreland claimed that his forces had killed 45,000 of the

enemy. The Vietcong, who had spearheaded the attack,

were destroyed as a fighting force and were never again a

major military factor in the war. Enemy hostile ability was

crippled, but American cost-tolerance was broken.

The Tet offensive had a devastating effect domestically

in the United States. The scenes of fighting in the streets

of Saigon and the virtual devastation of Hue as Americans

and ARVN fought door-to-door to dislodge the enemy contradicted the reports about American success and about

victory being in sight. An enemy who had been attrited

systematically for three years was not supposed to be capable of such an action, and commentators in the print and

electronic media were left to speculate about the futility of

three years of combat and (to that point) 20,000 American

battle deaths. When MACV requested an additional

206,000 troops for the final, climactic push against the enemy, internal debate revealed that such an action was no

longer possible. The antiwar movement, long isolated on

college campuses, spread throughout the land. On 31 March

Lyndon Johnson appeared on national television to announce that he would not seek reelection .

Ironically, the Tet offensive also presented the Americans

and the South Vietnamese with an unparalleled opportunity. In essence, the Vietcong had destroyed themselves,

31 7
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and a power vacuum existed in the countryside. In the

months and years following Tet, the allies took quick advantage with a well-coordinated pacification program developed and organized in 1967. Civil Operations and

Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) made all

parts of the pacification program integral parts of the military command. Combined with the controversial Phoenix

program (which sought to destroy the enemy's rural political infrastructure), CORDS largely pacified the countryside by 1972 .

For the Americans, the die had already been cast . From

the 1968 Tet offensive onward, the American objective was

withdrawal with honor while still attempting to preserve an

independent South Vietnam. In mid-1968 General Westmoreland was promoted to chief of staff of the Army and

replaced in Vietnam by Gen Creighton Abrams. Abrams

was less sanguine about big unit actions, although they often

still occurred. Vietnamization, the gradual process of turning the war over to the South Vietnamese, became the

American strategy . Given the tide ofAmerican public opinion, Vietnamization seemed the only possible option for

the United States.

From 1969 through 1972 the war continued but with a

different tone. The enemy, badly weakened by Tet, reverted

to the tactics of protracted war, launching operations out

of sanctuaries in Cambodia to inflict casualties but avoiding

decisive battles. The allies launched operations against the

enemy, but now Vietnamese code names reflected the

steady withdrawal of American troops . Training the South

Vietnamese army became a top priority, as did providing

the new equipment and supplies needed to let the South

Vietnamese stand alone. At the end of April 1970, allied

forces launched a short campaign against enemy sanctuaries

in Cambodia, which touched off additional antiwar demonstrations in the United States. By the end of 1970, American troop strength had been virtually cut in half from its

peak in early 1969 . In February 1971 South Vietnamese

31 8
VIETNAM WAR

troops struck into Laos to cut the Ho Chi Minh Trail . After

some initial success, however, the North Vietnamese counterattacked and routed the South Vietnamese. Training and

equipping the South Vietnamese continued, and by the end

of 1971, American strength was down to only 140,000, half

the level of a year earlier.

The first real test of the newly trained and equipped

South Vietnamese occurred in the spring of 1972 when the

North launched a major conventional offensive across the

demilitarized zone. Although the northerners achieved

some initial success, the South Vietnamese forces performed relatively well, and with the help of massive American air power, drove the invaders back. Included in the

bombing effort was a massive campaign against North Vietnam code-named Linebacker during which many of the

bombing restrictions were lifted . Targets close to Hanoi and

Haiphong were attacked and North Vietnamese harbors

were closed by mining. New smart bombs made short work

of important railroad bridges that had survived many Rolling Thunder attacks .

Meanwhile negotiations that had been continuing since

1968 in Paris took a favorable turn. Secret negotiations

between the North Vietnamese and the Americans finally

yielded results in the late fall of 1972 . However, the Saigon

government opposed the agreement since it provided for

an in-place cease-fire that did not require the withdrawal

of enemy troops. Negotiations broke down over changes

proposed by the South Vietnamese.

On 18 December 1972 President Nixon ordered a new

bombing campaign against the North, Linebacker 11, to convince the North Vietnamese to sign the cease-fire agreement. In a campaign featuring massive B-52 bombing raids,

remaining military targets around Hanoi and Haiphong

were systematically destroyed. Although enemy air defenses

were initially very robust, the North Vietnamese quickly

ran out of sophisticated ground-to-air missiles and were, by

the end of the campaign, essentially helpless. Finally, after

31 9
EAGLE'S TALONS

11 days of pounding, the North agreed to resume talks. The

final cease-fire agreement was initialed on 23 January 1973.

The American war in Vietnam was over. On 29 March

the last American combat troops left the country, and on

1 April the final American prisoner of war was returned.

In the aftermath, the US public learned American bombers

had continued to attack enemy sanctuaries in Cambodia,

a practice halted by Congress on 14 August. However, the

war was far from over for the South Vietnamese. Enemy

troops were still in place in the south . Villages within sight

of one another flew opposing flags. By January 1974 the

Saigon government declared that the war had begun again

and South Vietnamese troops took the offensive against

enemy positions.

In early 1975 the North launched another invasion of the

South. After some early setbacks, southern military leaders

attempted to consolidate their positions by withdrawing

troops from the northern provinces of South Vietnam. The

withdrawal turned into a panic and the South Vietnamese

army fled south in total disarray. Meanwhile Americans

debated whether to aid the South Vietnamese. Although

promises had been made at the highest executive level, Congress prohibited all support, and the rout in Vietnam continued. Finally on 30 April 1975, Saigon fell to North

Vietnamese troops.

Better State of the Peace

As has been mentioned, the main distinguishing feature

about Vietnam was that it was the first and only occasion

when the use of US military force did not accomplish any

of America's purposes. Enemy hostile ability was not overcome, nor was enemy willingness to continue . Rather, for

the first time an adversary accomplished its political goals

against us; and if North Vietnam did not defeat the United

States on the battlefield, it most certainly overcame our

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VIETNAM WAR

cost-tolerance and thus our willingness to continue. By so

doing, North Vietnam was able to impose its will on the

Republic of Vietnam and force us to accept its policies.

The agony of Vietnam is that we "lost," although it has

been the burden of much of our analysis to try to frame

what is meant by losing. Vietnam was not a military defeat

for the armed forces of the United States, but it was certainly not a military victory either. At the tactical level of

individual engagements, superior American firepower consistently carried the day against an enemy willing to endure

staggering losses. At the strategic level ofovercoming hostile

ability, the United States was unable to prevail . In retrospect, a major reason for this was that the North Vietnamese clearly found their cause to be more important than we

found ours. For the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, the

war was a total contest with unlimited objectives (at least

within its means), and it was willing to pursue those objectives with all its energies. For the United States the purposes of the war, to the extent they can clearly be stated,

were limited and bounded, and that limitation was eventually reflected in the vigor and resolve with which Americans pursued those ends. This asymmetry of purpose

certainly had something to do with our ultimate failure .

But was there more to the US failure than that? The

answer is that there clearly was, and that the failure has

both political and military dimensions. Examining those

failures is incumbent upon us because all possible uses of

military force by the United States are still measured

against the Vietnam experience. The political and military

elements of our failure are so intertwined that it is difficult

to separate them in any other than a very artificial way.

The reason, of course, is that the Vietnam War, fought the

way it was, more heavily mixed political and military elements than other wars, and it was part of our failure that

we often did not know which was which. Nonetheless, and

recognizing the potential for distortion, the separation must

be attempted .

32 1
EAGLE'S TALONS

There were at least two major political failings in our

handling of the Southeast Asian situation. The first and

possibly most basic was our failure adequately to comprehend the situation. As several recent accounts of Vietnam

have shown, American presidents from Truman forward

had Indochina as a constant concern, but most of the series

of incremental decisions they reached were made in ignorance of the situation in the country or because other influences, generally domestic in nature, were more

important.

Early policy toward the area well illustrates the point. In

1945, when Ho Chi Minh declared the independence of the

country, the American attitude was generally supportive.

Ho had, after all, collaborated with the United States during

the war, and President Roosevelt had been explicit in his

determination that the area would be allowed to determine

its own future.

Ho Chi Minh did not change between 1945 and beginnings of American aid to the French in 1950. He had been

both a patriot and a Communist in 1945 and he still was

in 1950. What was different, of course, was the international situation and the way the United States viewed itself

in its changed environment. Wartime cooperation between

the United States and the Soviet Union had been transformed into an all-encompassing confrontation, and this

altered environment was dramatically demonstrated by the

North Korean invasion of South Korea in June 1950. In

that light, Americans could not countenance dealing positively with a Communist of any ilk. Thus, if Ho was viewed

as more patriot than Communist in 1945, in 1950 the perception was just the opposite and that meant he was the

enemy. That he also represented the nationalistic sentiment

of a large portion of the Vietnamese population was almost

beside the point. Moreover, the situation in Europe had

also changed. In 1945 the United States was not overly

concerned about alienating a prostrate France (especially

given President Roosevelt's well-known animosity toward

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VIETNAM WAR

Charles de Gaulle). By 1950, however, France was an important NATO ally, faced a difficult internal political dilemma in the form of a popular Communist party, and

appeared both in need of and worthy of American assistance in the worldwide fight against communism.

The important point to note about all this is how little

any of these circumstances had to do with the situation in

Vietnam itself. This lack of correspondence between the

objective situation and the bases on which American decisions were made haunted the United States throughout

its Vietnam involvement. Certainly there were those both

within and outside the government who had expertise and

understanding, and many within the government recognized that the prospects for decisive success were remote.

Nonetheless, those who saw the situation as either hopeless

or not amenable to a military solution and who early on

counseled disengagement were not heeded . One wonders

and can only speculate what the nature of American involvement in Vietnam might have been had the sole criterion for decisionmaking been an accurate assessment of

the politico-military situation.

The second political element in our failure, which contains a military component as well, was in deciding what

parts of the problem were amenable to political as opposed

to military solutions. A war fought on the model of Mao

Tse-tung's war of national liberation strategy is as much, if

not more, a contest for the hearts and minds of men as it

is a military struggle . A war for the hearts and minds of

men is a contest over loyalty, and it is primarily a political

contest in which the adversaries, through deed or promise,

seek to gain those loyalties.

While this seems obvious enough, it is not at all clear

that American policy recognized or appreciated this distinction and translated it into action. The task of winning

hearts and minds is not something for which military force

is especially well suited. Military force may provide the

necessary shield behind which political conversion occurs,

32 3
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but the military itself has no unique capabilities to perform

this role. And yet, that is exactly the way the military was

used repeatedly during the war, while the South Vietnamese

governmental officials who were the only ones who possibly

could engage in civic action too often remained on the sidelines. The failure of the South Vietnamese to win the hearts

and minds of the population may have made any American

success impossible.

In understanding this failure, the military cannot be totally exempted from blame. If the war did not result in a

conventional military defeat, it certainly did not result in

a military victory (even ifwe came close to such an outcome

during the Tet counteroffensive). Moreover, the professional military did not exactly distinguish itself in its ability

to recognize its lack of progress and to innovate appropriately in the face of this quagmire. Why was this so?

The most obvious answer is that our military as an institution simply did not understand the nature of the war

or how to fight it . At one level, this may have been the result

of our enemy's successful mixture of guerrilla insurgency

and conventional war tactics as prescribed by Maoist doctrine. At another level, however, it may have been that the

military did not comprehend how to fight against the kind

of mixed guerrilla and mobile warfare with which we were

faced.

The latter point should come as no great surprise to anyone familiar with American military history. Despite the

use of guerrilla tactics by the revolutionary militias during

the American Revolution, the US Army has never shown

particular talent or enthusiasm for unconventional forces.

Our history of combating irregular, unconventional forces

has never been particularly distinguished. Moreover, the

military has always resisted preparing for this kind of conflict. Possibly the greatest failure of the United States military in Vietnam was in not recognizing and admitting this

frailty to political authorities. Had the services said "we're

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VIETNAM WAR

not sure" rather than "can do," different decisions might

well have been made.

The United States failed miserably in Vietnam. There

was a better state of the peace after the North Vietnamese

captured Saigon in May 1975, but it was their better state

and not ours. That is the unique and bitter legacy of Vietnam. What lessons may be learned from that tragic outcome

and how those lessons can be applied to the future are

discussed and assessed in the final chapter.

CHAPTER 8

AMERICA'S MINOR WARS

In addition to its major military conflicts, the United

States has fought a number of smaller wars. Some, like

subduing the Barbary pirates, many of the Indian campaigns, and more recently the action in Grenada, were of

such minor extent as not to warrant individual attention

here. Three, however, stand out as being of sufficient significance to merit some detailed discussion. These three

conflicts are the War of 1812, the Mexican War, and the

Spanish-American War.

Although each was a unique event, these wars shared

some common characteristics. The first and most overarching commonality was that they lacked the polarity of

moral crusades, and this made them limited, both in terms

of the political purposes for which they were fought and

the means available and/or necessary to prosecute them.

Because they were not moral crusades, each had within it

the seeds of potential unpopularity, and the War of 1812

and the Mexican War were, at best, limited in their popularity. The apparent exception was the Spanish-American

War. The public was solidly behind the war when it began

and that support never wavered because it was over too

quickly and successfully for opinion to turn against it .

The second and third commonalities, which are related,

represent common themes in American military history

through World War 11. These threads are that the United

States was unprepared to fight any of these conflicts and,

as a result, had to raise and put in the field amateur armies

that succeeded almost despite themselves. The militia tradition was alive and, if not well, at least prominent in each

case. Of all America's wars, the nation was least prepared

32 7
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for that theater of the Napoleonic Wars we call the War of

1812. The period between the end of the American Revolution and the outbreak of war in 1812 was marked by an

almost immediate dismantling of the Continental Army

(total active duty strength in 1784 was 80 soldiers protecting

military stores) . A national security debate dominated by

Jeffersonians suspicious of the military had resulted in virtually no expenditure for military preparedness . Similarly,

an army had to be raised almost from scratch to fight the

Mexican War, although the young West Point system had

at least provided the country with a professional officer

corps. To fight Spain, an armed force of 275,000 was mustered into service, but the war was over so quickly that only

about 35,000 ever saw combat.

Because the United States had no real standing force with

which to prosecute any of these conflicts, it had to rely on

the traditional recruitment methods of appealing to the

state militias and making exhortations to individuals to

volunteer (conscription was unthinkable in any of these

wars). Because at least some of the political purposes for

which the United States entered combat were served in each

case, the myth persisted that this was an effective and efficient way to field an armed force capable of prosecuting

the full range of military operations. The myth is just that

and does not hold up under scrutiny. In fact, the military

forces raised in this manner, although competent at some

defensive tasks, were generally ineffective and succeeded,

when they did, thanks to overwhelming odds or the incompetence of the adversary. Since Americans did not critically

scrutinize this myth, it persisted well into the twentieth

century, guaranteeing the United States would enter the

world wars unprepared as well.

The fourth and final source of commonality was that

American territorial expansion was an underlying cause of

each . In the War of 1812, a major issue that united the

"War Hawks" was the annexation of Canada. The Mexican

War was fought for and succeeded in fulfilling America's

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AMERICAS MINOR WARS

"manifest destiny" to control the continent from ocean to

ocean. The Spanish-American War had as part of its motivation and as a large part of its outcome the creation of

an American Empire.

If there were common themes in these three wars, there

were unique aspects to each as well. The War of 1812 has

the distinction, ifthat is the proper term, of being the closest

thing to a decisive military defeat the United States has

ever suffered . In that conflict, the most notable American

victory in a land battle (and one of very few victories), the

Battle of New Orleans, was fought three weeks after the

peace treaty ending hostilities had been signed and was the

only occasion when the British attacked strong fortifications. As the result of unpreparedness and an amateur military leadership, the conduct of the land portion of the war

was almost a national disgrace . The reason the United

States avoided a decisive military defeat and achieved at

least part of its objectives was that the British were too tied

down and war-weary from their campaigns against Napoleon to administer the whipping that was physically theirs

to give.

The Mexican War has the distinction of being the first

US war that was overtly political in the sense that purely

political considerations intruded into the way military operations were conducted. President James K. Polk intruded

into military action to an extent previously unheard of. The

reason was that the two major commanders in the field,

Gens Winfield Scott and Zachary Taylor, were considered

the leading contenders for the Whig presidential nomination in 1848 and were hence potential opponents of the

incumbent president . Polk is said to have directed his generals so as to minimize their headlines rather than maximize military advantage.

The war with Spain had at least two distinguishing aspects. First, it was the shortest andleast bloody ofAmerica's

wars. The invasion of Cuba was a walkover hardly more

difficult than the 1983 assault on Grenada, and the major

32 9
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naval engagement at Manila Bay resulted in one American

death, acoaler who died ofnatural causes. Second and more

important, the war was the most openly imperialistic American military adventure. Many American citizens were

moved to support the war out of humanitarian concern for

the plight of the citizens of Cuba, but there was more. That

additional motivation was imperialistic and manifested itself in the belief that American manifest destiny could be

fully served only through the acquisition ofempire. To some

empire was the symbol of great power status . To others,

such as Alfred Thayer Mahan, the United States needed an

island empire in the Pacific Ocean to secure American access to Asian markets. In the end, of course, America acquired its island empire by stripping Spain of its

possessions.

In many ways, the largely unnecessary War of 1812 was

the final episode of America's fight for independence and

recognition within the family of nations. At the same time,

the fact that the United States found reason to declare war

on Great Britain provided evidence, if unrecognized at the

time, of the de facto bond between the fate of the United

States and the affairs of Europe. The two themes come

together because it was British harassment of American

attempts to trade with both sides in the Napoleonic Wars

that created the passions that resulted in an American theater of that conflict .

Issues and Events

War of 1812

Although the United States had won formal independence from England in 1783, it was a freedom that did not

carry with it much British respect. Apparent British disrespect took two major forms. The first and most important

330
AMERICA'S MINOR WARS

was British treatment of a burgeoning American maritime

enterprise . The United States, after independence had been

won, rapidly blossomed as a major trading nation with a

large merchant marine but without a navy of any note. The

decision not to build a "blue-water" navy reflected traditional American distrust of military force in peacetime, but

also was based on an assessment that we could not compete

with the Royal Navy under any circumstances. As a result,

American trade was reliant on the goodwill of the Royal

Navy. When the Napoleonic Wars broke out and the United

States attempted to engage in trade with both sides (a phenomenon that would be repeated a century later), the British understandably were much more enthusiastic about

promoting and protecting trade with themselves than with

their enemies, a sentiment the French reciprocated in regard to American trade with Britain. Lacking the means

for self-protection, the United States was in a position of

intolerable vulnerability.

The other form of disrespect was supposed British activities along the American Frontier. From its territories in

Canada, the British dispatched traders and agents along the

western boundaries of the United States. Their purported

purpose was to engage in trade with Indian tribes who lived

along those western reaches, but Americans believed they

did more than that, notably fomenting harassment and attacks by the Indians against the settlers as a way to retard

American westward expansion.

The issue that provided the proximate cause of war was

the British policy and practice of impressment of sailors

from American ships into the Royal Navy. This practice

was part of the general British harassment of American

shipping. It took the form ofhalting and boarding American

merchant vessels and impressing deserters from the Royal

Navy who had been granted protection by the United

States. Although the problem of desertion was vexatious

for the British, impressment was clearly in violation of international law. Having been granted protection and, in

33 1
EAGLE'S TALONS

some cases, citizenship, these sailors were Americans. Their

forceable removal was thus an act of war, and British defense of the action based in the idea of "indefeasible nationality" (that the sailors could not renounce their British

nationality as a way to avoid service) was at best a shaky

argument. What the practice really demonstrated was the

disdain with which the British regarded American independence and sovereignty. Between 1809 and 1812, the annual rate of impressment ran between 750 and 1,000, and

nearly 6,000 sailors had been impressed by the time war

was declared.

Political Objective

At heart, the war came about because of US frustration

over its inability to resolve satisfactorily those matters that

irritated British-American relations. From the point at

which commercial desires had come into conflict over trade

with France, the United States had tried a number of political methods to deal with the problem, but none of them

worked. Of all those measures, the Embargo Act of 1807

probably best demonstrated American frustration. This act

forbade any American ship to sail from any American port

to any foreign port, and thereby guaranteed that the price

for American security would be the loss of trade on which

much of American prosperity rested.

Growing frustration created a mood in at least part of

the American public that led to the election in 1810 of a

group in Congress whom the Federalists dubbed the "War

Hawks" because of their determination to build up and

possibly to employ military force. By 1812 parts of the

United States were simply itching for a fight.

That fight had to have a political purpose, and the stated

objective was the ending of impressment as a symbol of the

British practice of naval harassment. As an objective, ending impressment could hardly have been more ironic : crop

332
AMERICAS MINOR WARS

failures during the winter of 1811-12 had forced the British

government to move to reinstate trade with the United

States, and on 16 June 1812 the orders allowing impressment were formally rescinded. The US declaration of war

passed Congress two days later. Because of the slow speed

of contemporary communications, Congress was unaware

ofthe rescission when it voted, but Congress did not reverse

the declaration when it learned the stated objective was no

longer at issue.

There was a secondary goal as well. That goal was the

conquest of Canada, although there was disagreement on

why that purpose was to be undertaken . In the view of the

more radical elements within the country, the purpose of

conquest was annexation . The North American continent

was to be rid of the British once and for all, removing a

major barrier to American expansion. To less ambitious

individuals, the purpose ofthe invasion and occupation was

to create leverage with the British, a "bargaining chip" to

gain concessions from Great Britain on the more fundamental issue of naval harassment.

Military Objectives and Strategy

Put in the most simple terms, the American military objective was to seize Canada. How the seizure of Canada

would protect neutral rights, guarantee freedom of the seas,

or secure the other objectives for which the United States

went to war was never clearly established. Canada was the

nearest British target that the Americans could strike, and

its capture became the rallying cry for the War Hawks.

The fundamental problem was to determine how to defeat the British forces and drive them from Canada. The

seat of British power north of the border was the city of

Quebec, which was the most obvious American target.

However, as long as the British navy controlled the Saint

Lawrence River, the city was virtually impregnable. R

333
EAGLE'S TALONS

The second choice was Montreal, a city that could easily

be reached by the river-lakes invasion route used by both

sides during the Revolution . In retrospect, it appears that

a strong concentrated thrust against Montreal by the small

American Army might well have succeeded. However,

American planners cast their eyes on several other targets

as well.

On the northern shore of Lake Ontario, Kingston and

York presented tempting targets as did the British forts

between Lake Ontario and Lake Erie in the area known as

the Niagara Frontier. Finally, Fort Malden opposite Detroit

seemed to be a fine target . Attacking these places could

have provided excellent diversions to complicate British

defense problems. Unfortunately, as planning progressed,

these targets became less diversionary and were transformed into major military objectives that seriously diluted

the American effort . Given the poor state of American

forces, a concentrated thrust against Montreal was a reasonable strategy, although far from a guaranteed success.

Dividing the small American forces over several objectives

virtually guaranteed failure on all fronts.

The final campaign plan called for three simultaneous

thrusts into Canada. The first, composed of the main regular Army, was to advance from Plattsburg, New York, by

the river-lakes route against Montreal. The other two

thrusts, composed mostly of militia, were to cross the Niagara River to attack British forts on the other side, and

to advance from Detroit on Fort Malden. The limited

American skill in military planning and staff work was revealed in the lack of a coordinated start time for the three

offensives.

The British plan was simply to hold on. The difficulties

with the United States were a minor affair compared with

the struggle in Europe. The British gave almost complete

discretion to their generals on the scene, even though they

did not represent the cream of the British army. By 1814

all of this would change as the British were able to con334
AMERICAS MINOR WARS

centrate far greater forces in North America and undertake

an offensive strategy.

At sea the American Navy wrestled with the problem of

confronting the mighty British fleet. Commodore John

Rodgers experimented with battle squadrons formed

around the few heavy American frigates, but had little success . American captains preferred single-ship sorties to prey

on English commerce and engage single English warships.

They achieved some success with this tactic, but their impact was of little consequence to the outcome of the war.

The Navy was unable to lift the British blockade of American ports and could not prevent the destructive and embarrassing British raids in Chesapeake Bay.

Political Considerations

The War of 1812 was, until the Vietnam experience,

America's least popular war, and the major political consideration during its conduct was how to gain enough support to continue it . Lack of popular support was largely

sectional, but grew because of the incompetent manner in

which the war wasconducted and the debilitating economic

consequences of its dragging on.

Such support as the war had at its onset was regional .

The War Hawks, by and large, came from the South and

the Western Frontier, and these were the areas where support was greatest. Their interests were in subduing the Indian "allies" of the British and opening up the continent

for expansion . Sentiment for invading Canada was, consequently, greatest in these regions as well. Ironically, the

part of the country that would have benefited most from

ending naval harassment was commercial, maritime New

England, where opposition was greatest . In New England,

there was widespread belief that the United States had no

real military chance against Great Britain and that the only

335
EAGLE'S TALONS

possible outcome was a military defeat that would destroy

what little was left of American commerce with Europe.

If public opinion was a problem at the beginning of the

war, it increased as the war continued. Part of the growing

opposition was fueled by the incompetence of the military

effort and the obvious fact that no military progress was

being made. The dreary outcome of the Canadian campaigns reinforced New Englanders' skepticism of the enterprise, and the fact that the United States had few

victories in land battles until New Orleans meant the government had few glories with which to rally support. Moreover, paying for the warthreatened to bankrupt the treasury

by 1814, American overseas trade was reduced to a trickle

by the Royal Navy's blockade, and the combination of these

economic factors produced a runaway inflation. Lack of

public support was a bad problem that got worse, and only

the American victory at New Orleans served to assuage the

bitter memories and allow some positive reconstruction of

support for the government after the war ended.

Internationally, the war has to be considered within the

context of the overall struggle in Europe. European issues

created the conditions that brought the war about, and the

conclusion of the titanic struggle against Napoleon set the

stage for its conclusion. As a part of that great struggle, the

North American theater was militarily little more than a

minor irritant to Great Britain that warranted a minimum

military holding action (fortunately for the Americans) . In

the end, Britain agreed to a cessation of hostilities not because of any negative assessment of the military situation,

but because the British people were war-weary at the end

of the Napoleonic Wars and wanted peace.

Military Technology and Technique

The War of 1812 was fought only three decades after the

final battles of the American Revolution . The military tech336
AMERICAS MINOR WARS

nology available to the antagonists was nearly identical to

that available in the Revolution. The standard infantry

weapon remained the smoothbore flintlock musket. Its slow

rate of fire and its limited range and accuracy put a premium on linear formations using massed volley fire. Such

tactics, as discussed in the chapter on the Revolution, put

a premium on continuous drill and training. Iron discipline

was required if opposing lines of infantry were to march

toward one another properly aligned for volley fire and to

get within effective range of the smoothbore muskets.

Discipline and training were the weak points of the American Army. Virtually disbanded after the Revolution, the

regular Army had a total strength of only about 11,000 men

by 1812, and nearly half of them were recent recruits

brought into service for the conflict. These forces were augmented by militiamen, many of whom served only short

tours of duty lasting from one to six months. Although their

intentions were good, these forces appeared as rabble compared to their well-trained and disciplined British opponents. The saving grace was that there were few British

professionals available to defend Canada because the British were occupied in Europe with the Napoleonic Wars.

Only 6,000 British regulars were stationed in Canada in

1812, augmented by several thousand militia and Indians.

American troops were inexperienced and so were the officers who led them. Nearly 30 years had passed since the

Revolution, and only the most senior American officers had

any experience fighting a modern European army. At lower

levels, officers were almost wholly deficient in the technical

skills of warfare . Few realized the benefits of constant drill,

and those who did had to rely on copies of European drill

manuals. The only bright spot in this otherwise dismal picture was the presence ofsome graduates of the United States

Military Academy at West Point, which had been founded

in 1802. However, only 89 officers had been graduated by

1812 and all were junior in grade.

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EAGLE'S TALONS

At sea the Americans faced the world's greatest naval

power with a fleet of between 15 and 20 vessels. (Fortunately, the British fleet had considerable obligations

throughout the world in opposing Napoleon's forces.) At

the heart of the American naval forces were seven frigates,

three of which were classified as heavy frigates. These three

ships, each of which mounted 44 guns, were the most powerful of their type in the world. Larger and more heavily

gunned than comparable British frigates, the American

ships were constructed of fir rather than oak.* Unlike the

Army, naval training was excellent, with particular emphasis on gunnery. American naval gunners were among the

most proficient anywhere.

One major change from the days of the Revolution was

in the availability of arms. The American government had

encouraged a significant arms industry and had established

two government arsenals, one at Harper's Ferry, Virginia,

and the other at Springfield, Massachusetts. Although arms

were available in plentiful numbers, getting them to the

troops in the field along with the other wherewithal of war

was a difficult task. The logistical capabilities of the American military had been all but ignored in the period since

the Revolution .

Military Conduct

The ill-conceived American offensive into Canada got off

to a poor start when the three prongs of the planned offensive failed to begin at or near the same time. The first

prong to start was led by William Hull, governor of the

Michigan Territory, who sought to capture Fort Malden

across the Detroit River from Fort Detroit. Hull marched

from Dayton and had to cut 200 miles of road through the

*Fir construction had the advantage of increased resistance to cannon shot. Tough fir

sides gave the USS Constitution its nickname "Old Ironsides."

33 8
AMERICA'S MINOR WARS

wilderness over which to haul supplies. He crossed the Detroit River on 12 July 1812 with a force of roughly 2,000

(about 1,500 of whom were Ohio militiamen) . Meanwhile,

Fort Malden had been reinforced by a small British force

led by Gen Isaac Brock. The elderly Hull suddenly became

worried about his supply lines, which were vulnerable to

raiding parties that could be landed across British-controlled Lake Erie or to attacks by Britain's Indian allies.

Giving in to his fears, Hull retreated across the river into

Fort Detroit on 7 August. Brock quickly followed, and

bluffed Hull into surrendering his entire command on 16

August . Brock's victorious forces numbered only 730 Canadians and about 600 Indians. Thus, the first American

offensive ended in total disgrace with hardly a shot fired

in anger.

The second prong was on the Niagara Frontier where

Stephen Van Rensselaer, a major general in the New York

militia, led a force of more than 3,000 (including 900 regulars) across the Niagara River against Queenston. On 13

October 1812 the regulars crossed the river and quickly

captured the heights above Queenston. However, the militia

refused to follow the regulars and would not leave American

territory . They stood idly by while forces led again by Isaac

Brock, who had rushed to Queenston after his victory at

Detroit, destroyed the American forces on the heights .

Thus, the second American offensive also ended in disgrace

and defeat.

The third prong had Montreal as its target and was originally planned as the main thrust into Canada. In midNovember, Maj Gen Henry Dearborn led his 5,000 troops

from Plattsburg to within two miles of the Canadian border,

but again the militia portion of his force refused to cross

into Canada. As a result, Dearborn returned to Plattsburg

and went into winter quarters. Thus, the third American

offensive aborted, and the American ground strategy was

in total disarray.

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EAGLE'S TALONS

At sea the Navy had considerably greater success. Facing

overwhelming odds, American ships engaged in several brilliant single-ship actions. However, the British blockade was

beginning to strangle commerce along the Eastern Seaboard . By the end of 1812, nearly 100 British naval vessels

were participating in the blockade, including 11 ships of

the line that the American Navy could not match.

Early in 1813 Brig Gen William Henry Harrison was

given command of a large, mostly militia, force with orders

to recapture Detroit. Moving forward toward the mouth of

the Maumee River in January, an advanced unit of his force

was destroyed while attempting to relieve the beleagured

residents of Frenchtown . Harrison was subsequently ordered to bide his time until the Americans could seize naval

WAR OF 1812

Great I .akes Theater of Operations

340
AMERICAS MINOR WARS

control of Lakes Erie and Ontario. While Harrison waited

Oliver Hazard Perry was building ships at Presque Isle on

Lake Erie. By the fall Perry was ready and totally defeated

the British squadron at Put-in-Bay . Harrison then pressed

his advance; the British evacuated both Detroit and Malden, and were decisively defeated at Moravian Town on

the Thames River.

Meanwhile on Lake Ontario, General Dearborn attacked

and burned York in April, sailed to Fort Niagara, and in

May attacked and captured Fort George . However, the British contingent was allowed to escape, and Dearborn was

replaced by Maj Gen James Wilkinson. By October Wilkinson had stripped most of the troops from the Niagara

area to launch a campaign down the Saint Lawrence River

against Montreal. The campaign aborted after a defeat en

route at Christler's Farm. Worse, the British quickly captured the almost defenseless Forts George and Niagara . In

all, 1813 was not a sterling year for American arms.

Action wasrenewed in March 1814, when Wilkinson took

to the offensive but was defeated by a smaller British force

at La Colle Mill on 30 March. Wilkinson fell back on Plattsburg and was replaced by Maj Gen Jacob Brown. On 2 July

Brown crossed the Niagara River and quickly seized Fort

Erie. Pressing on to the north, the Americans defeated the

British at Chippawa on 5 July. At Lundy's Lane on 25 July,

the Americans fought to a draw with the advance units of

British reinforcements from Europe. Brown retired to Fort

Erie and the British followed and laid siege to the Americans. On 17 September Brown's successful sortie from the

fort broke the siege.

Meanwhile more British reinforcements arrived from Europe after the fall of Napoleon in April 1814. Sir George

Prevost led a veteran army of 11,000 south along the riverlakes route to confront a much smaller force of Americans

entrenched at Plattsburg. However, a brilliant naval victory

by Commodore Thomas Macdonough at Plattsburg Bay

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EAGLE'S TALONS

defeated the supporting English fleet on the lake and Prevost quickly returned to Canada.

Along the Eastern Seaboard, the British planned raids

against both Washington and Baltimore. In August Maj

Gen Robert Ross's British troops arrived on the Patuxent

River supported by a fleet commanded by Adm Sir Alexander Cochrane . After defeating the Americans at Bladensburg, the British burned most of official Washington .

When the British moved on Baltimore, they were heavily

engaged at Godly Wood, and then determined that Fort

McHenry and the hastily erected defenses around Baltimore presented too difficult a challenge. The entire British

force subsequently sailed away.

In the South, the British launched a campaign to capture

New Orleans . Maj Gen Andrew Jackson rushed to the

scene, mobilized all available forces, which were mostly

militia, and established a defensive line along the Rodriguez

Canal. On 8 January 1815 Sir Edward Pakenham launched

an infantry attack against Jackson's well-fortified position .

The attack was repulsed and the British suffered 2,100 casualties plus an additional 500 captured. Jackson lost 7killed

and 6 wounded. On 18 January the British withdrew. Neither side realized that the Peace of Ghent, which officially

ended the war, had been signed on 24 December 1814.

Better State of the Peace

In the end, something resembling the attainment of

American basic political interests occurred, although in

small measure as the result of American military activity.

The War of 1812 is a war that the United States lost by

most military measures one might apply. Unlike Vietnam,

however, a better state of the peace for both Great Britain

and the United States did come to pass.

If the basic issue was an end to British naval harassment,

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AMERICAS MINOR WARS

the objective was achieved before the war began, and the

American war effort had nothing to do with a British decision based in domestic considerations . As it worked out,

freedom of the high seas and British-American trade served

the interest of both nations. Once the Napoleonic Wars

were finally concluded in 1815 and the conflict between the

two nations was resolved, that mutual advantage came to

be recognized. The best statement of British recognition is

that through the rest of the nineteenth century the same

navy that had been the prime tormentor of American commercial maritime activity acted as its primary shield and

protector.

The other political objective, the conquest of Canada,

quite obviously wasnot attained, and was in fact abandoned

after 1813 . Given the resources available to the United

States and the sheer size of Canada, it was probably an

unattainable objective anyway (as a military matter the objective created problems not unlike those facing the British

in the Revolution). Moreover, had the United States pursued that objective with greater rigor and especially if we

hadhad any success, the British might well have been forced

to turn full force against the United States after Napoleon

was defeated rather than agreeing to the Peace of Ghent.

The primary American objective (the end of impressment) was achieved by indirection, but it was achieved. The

question that must be asked is whether anything was

learned from the experience. The answer, especially from

a military standpoint, is mixed. Americans quickly forgot

about the ignominy of the war, and thus the method of

recruiting armies to fight for America, the militia tradition,

was not amended. On the other hand, the extreme deficiencies in military leadership evident throughout the war

did lead to the invigoration of the US Military Academy

at West Point to train a professional officer corps to fight

in America's next war. The fruit of that lesson would first

be demonstrated in the Mexican War.

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EAGLE'S TALONS

Mexican War

The war between the United States and its neighbor to

the south was a clash between expansionist American nationalism and a protective Mexican nationalism that sought

to preserve control over a vast stretch of the western portion

of the North American continent. From the American perspective, the war was a struggle to fulfill the sense of what

Americans had come to view as their "manifest destiny"

to control the continent from the Atlantic to the Pacific.

Equally virulent Mexican nationalists sought continued

control of lands that were part of Mexican independence

from Spain .

Issues and Events

The issue of manifest destiny had grown in the years after

the War of 1812 as Americans forged westward . In that

period, the territories of the Louisiana Purchase received

their first large-scale settlement, Florida was wrested from

Spain, and the location ofthe northern border of the Oregon

Territory was fixed after we had nearly gone to war with

Great Britain over the issue ("54-40 or fight"). When that

latter dispute was resolved with the border along the Washington-British Columbian boundary, the United States

spanned the continent. All that was left were the territories

of the Southwest, especially after Texas was annexed in

1845 .

These territories were, of course, parts of Mexico that

had been colonized originally by the Spanish and that became part of sovereign Mexican land after Mexican independence. The Mexicans had not, however, done much to

settle any of the affected lands, which were largely populated by Indians and a few missionaries before the Americans began to arrive in numbers. The largest number of

Americans came to California, and the American claim to

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AMERICA'S MINOR WARS

the land rested largely in the fact that the majority of the

population was American and desired to be part of the

United States rather than Mexico.

Complicating the entire situation was growing American

sectionalism and the resultant tendency to view any attempt

at expansion in the context of the balance between slave

and nonslave states. The desire to annex southern territories

as diverse as Cuba and the Yucatan had been squelched

because either would have tilted the balance of power in

Congress toward the slave-holding states, and the same issue had been the major factor in delaying the entrance of

the Texas Republic into the Union. Ironically, there was

also opposition to the war in the southern United States

because the lands of the Southwest were poorly suited for

the plantation culture.

The proximate event that made war between the two

countries inevitable was the admission of Texas into the

United Sates, and it did so in two ways. First, although

Mexican authority over Texas had been ended by the military defeat of Mexican forces in 1837, Mexico did not

accept the independence of the Texas Republic. Rather, the

government of Mexico maintained that it retained sovereign authority and that the Texas Republic was a rump state

with no legitimate authority. The recognition of Texas by

the United States and the consequent decision to admit

Texas into the Union was, in the Mexican view, a simple

act of imperialism.

Regardless of the international legal niceties involved,

American authority in fact was being exercised in Texas,

which raised the second problem. That problem, which ultimately led to the start of the war, was in determining

exactly where the boundary between Texas and Mexico was.

In the American view, the border was the Rio Grande.

Mexico maintained that the Nueces River formed the

boundary. Although the disputed territory was largely unpopulated, American accession to the Mexican claim would

have ceded most ofwest Texas to Mexico. When Gen Zach345
EAGLE'S TALONS

ary Taylor endeavored to settle the matter by occupation

and encountered Mexican forces, war was the result.

Political Objective

The political purposes for which the two nations fought

the Mexican War were clear, concise, and symmetrical, as

well as being limited. For the United States, the objective

was the annexation of the territories of New Mexico, Arizona, and California to the United States and the accession

of Texas south of the Nueces River. For Mexico, the objective was to keep those same territories as part of Mexico.

The objectives were limited in that neither required the

physical conquest and overthrow of the opposing government (although that was the ultimate means the United

States used to accomplish the task).

The major question was how to go about resolving the

issue. Both Mexican and US nationalisms were too strong

to allow a diplomatic compromise, and Mexican realization

that a majority of the population in the pivotal territory,

California, was American meant Mexico could not accede

to decision by majority will. At the same time, the lands

under question were vast and mostly unpopulated except

for indigenous Indian tribes . Hence de facto control in the

form of occupation was impractical . The only way left for

settling the issue was the sword.

Military Objectives and Strategy

The Mexican War was a new experience for Americans

in two major respects . First, it was the first American war

in which the United States was the more powerful antagonist. Although the regular Mexican army was larger than

the American Army, the United States could mobilize and

field a far larger force. The American industrial economy

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AMERICAS MINOR WARS

was vastly superior to the primitive Mexican economy and

far more self-sufficient. In every measurable respect, Mexico was the weaker of the two powers.

The Mexican War was also a new experience because it

was America's first offensive war. Although the war hawks

had attempted to turn the War of 1812 into an aggressive

seizure ofCanada, the Mexican adventure was the first truly

offensive war. Offensive wars require offensive military objectives, which caused President James Polk a certain

amount of concern.

The problem was how to make the Mexican government

give up its claims to the disputed territories. Polk was determined to act as the commander in chief, and he played

a significant role in the determination of offensive plans,

in the supervision of the military staff, and in the selection

of key personnel to lead the war effort. Polk was also concerned that the war be over quickly. He was particularly

concerned that a long war might become so unpopular that

the Democratic party would suffer at the ballot box in the

next election. However, he also believed that the Mexicans

could be easily and quickly beaten if attacked with enough

vigor.

The Americans' general plan was for an expedition into

the northern Mexican provinces to seize and hold them

until the Mexican government came to terms. In addition,

the Navy's Gulf Squadron was ordered to blockade the eastern coast of Mexico and to seize Tampico as a logistics

base. The blockade was particularly significant because the

Mexicans had no arms industry and imported nearly all of

their armaments. The blockade meant that the Mexicans

could rely only on the stock they had on hand. At the same

time, the Pacific Squadron was to seize San Francisco and

blockade the California coast .

Zachary Taylor was given command of the main effort

in northern Mexico (after command had been offered to

and refused by Winfield Scott) . Taylor achieved considerable success in northern Mexico as he captured Monterey

347
EAGLE'S TALONS

and Victoria and then soundly defeated the Mexicans at

Buena Vista. But despite these American victories and the

tightening American blockade, the Mexicans refused to give

in. Finally, Polk approved of Scott's plan for landing a major force at Vera Cruz, followed by a direct march on the

capital at Mexico City. This campaign, conducted brilliantly under adverse conditions, finally broke the back of

the Mexican resistance 16 months after the outbreak of

hostilities .

Political Considerations

"Mr Polk's War," as its opponents labeled it, was not a

terribly popular event. As with the War of 1812, its popularity varied considerably by section of the country. At

the same time, domestic, partisan politics affected the war's

conduct in a waypreviously unknown in American military

affairs.

Because the war's successful completion meant that the

extension of slavery issue could not be avoided, the war

had significant opposition in those parts of the country

where the issue produced the most passion. In New England, a large part of the population viewed the whole endeavor, coming as it did on the heels of the admission of

slave-holding Texas to the Union, as little more than a

Southern plot to add more slave territories to the Union.

Southerners, on the other hand, believed the arid climate

of the Southwest was inhospitable to the cotton agriculture

that underlay plantation society, and they were equally suspicious of Northern intentions . Beyond those Americans in

the Southwest, support for the enterprise came from people

in the Mississippi Valley and the Northwest who, as pioneers themselves, were most infected by the notion of

manifest destiny.

As stated earlier, the Mexican War was, to that time, the

most blatantly political war (in terms of its conduct) in

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AMERICAS MINOR WARS

American history, and Polk's role in directing the military

effort was the most active that a president had ever undertaken. Partly, this phenomenon resulted from the fact

that Polk was an activist president. At the same time, the

partisan issue of who would be his opponent in an expected

reelection bid in 1848 always loomed in the background

and influenced military decisions . Had the war been a more

difficult military undertaking and had the outcome been in

substantial doubt, this intrusion might have created the

kinds ofhowls about political interference that plagued later

American military endeavors . As it was, controversy over

the conflict was a large factor in Polk's subsequent decision

to retire at the end of his first term in office.

Military Technology and Technique

Several improvements in military technology took place

between the War of 1812 and the Mexican War. However,

most military tactical techniques remained almost unchanged because most of the basic limitations of the principal weapons remained unchanged. The standard infantry

weapon was still the smoothbore musket with its limited

range and poor accuracy. The standard artillery piece was

still the smoothbore muzzle4oading cannon. Both of these

weapons, however, had undergone significant improvements that increased their reliability.

The standard flintlock musket was being replaced both

in the United States and in Europe by the percussion musket. The development ofthe percussion cap, although it did

not appreciably change infantry tactics, did have a significant impact on war itself. Unlike flintlock weapons, percussion weapons operated reliably regardless of rain or

snow. Thus, one of the reasons for seasonal campaigning

and standing down in "winter quarters" in past wars was

eliminated.

The standard artillery piece had also undergone a sig349
EAGLE'S TALONS

nificant change. Field artillery had become far more mobile

and now could be dragged into battle by horses at a rapid

pace and swung into action quickly. In this particular war,

American "flying artillery" was superior in both speed of

manuever and in numbers to its Mexican counterpart .

The distances to the Mexican battlefields presented significant logistical problems . Much of the logistic load was

carried by sea, and although steamships were available, few

were used in the ocean-going transportation effort. However, steam-powered riverboats were used extensively to

transport men and supplies to ports of embarkation. River

transport was particularly important because few rail lines

had extended far enough west and south to be of significant

assistance in the logistics effort. Within the theater of operations, supply still depended on horses and wagons, and

the American effort was so large that a shortage of wagons

hindered some of the early operations.

The Mexican War also witnessed significant American

amphibious operations. General Scott's landing at Vera

Cruz was exceptionally well done and was the result of

considerable planning. Much was learned about amphibious combat techniques that would prove useful during the

Civil War. As will be seen later in this chapter, these lessons

were, for the most part, long forgotten by 1898.

Although several American general officers acquitted

themselves well, Scott came away with a reputation as a

great military tactician that remains untarnished today. He

won and won consistently, with limited casualties to both

sides. He preferred to defeat the enemy by superior maneuver, thus forcing the enemy to retreat . His campaign

from Vera Cruz to Mexico City was a model of eighteenthcentury maneuver warfare.

West Point educated officers also built their initial reputation during this war. None of the American generals had

any formal military education. As a group, however, they

made good use of the skills of the West Point graduates on

their staffs. Scott, in particular, was impressed and claimed

350
AMERICA'S MINOR WARS

that the war might have lasted far longer had it not been

for the skilled work of the West Point officers, including

many future Union and Confederate generals in the Civil

War.

Military Conduct

The Mexican War was not declared until 13 May 1846,

but several important battles were fought before that date.

Following orders from President Polk, General Taylor with

most of the regular American Army (about 3,500 men) advanced south from Corpus Christi to the Rio Grande and

established a camp opposite Matamoros on 24 March 1846 .

Additionally, he established a supply depot at Point Isabel

some 45 miles to the northeast on the Gulf Coast. The

Mexicans reacted by concentrating nearly 6,000 troops at

Matamoros.

Both sides glared at each other for a month. Finally on

25 April, the Mexicans mounted a strong cavalry sweep

north of the river and overwhelmed a small American reconnaissance force. Taylor reported to the president that

hostilities had begun and took part ofhis command to Point

Isabel to protect the depot from the marauding Mexican

cavalry. Meanwhile, Mexican Gen Mariano Arista led his

6,000 troops across the river against Taylor's base camp,

which was under the command of Maj Jacob Brown. Arista

laid siege to the camp from 3 to 8 May, but Brown's defense

was successful, although he died in the action.

Arista then moved to place his force between the camp

and Taylor's force, which was returning from Point Isabel.

The two forces met at Palo Alto on 8 May and the Mexicans

were forced to retire primarily because of superior American artillery . The following day, 9 May 1846, Taylor attacked a strong Mexican position a few miles to the south

at Resaca de la Palma. The Mexican forces broke after a

brief but fierce fight, and Arista withdrew across the Rio

35 1
EAGLE'S TALONS

Grande and retreated nearly 100 miles to Linares. Four

days later, the United States declared war on Mexico.

Taylor crossed the Rio Grande and entered Matamoros

on 18 May, but was forced to delay further operations while

he awaited the transportation (wagons) and reinforcements

needed for offensive operations. By August Taylor had the

wagons and men he needed and moved south on Monterey

with a force of 6,000. The city was well fortified and defended by Gen Pedro de Ampudia with a force of about

10,000. On 24 September, after a fierce three-day fight,

Ampudia offered surrender of the city and an eight-week

armistice, which Taylor accepted . Polk repudiated the

agreement, but the news did not reach Taylor until seven

weeks had elapsed. In the meantime, the Mexicans had

fallen back to San Luis Potosi where the new Mexican president, Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna, was reorganizing his

forces . Taylor, in the meantime, moved slightly south of

Monterey and occupied Saltillo.

THE WAR WITH MEXICO

352

Or ?AXXO
AMERICA'S MINOR WARS

To this point, the Mexicans had met with consistent failure. Taylor had marched into northern Mexico and defeated

two different Mexican generals, each of whom commanded

a larger force than Taylor's . Elsewhere, Brig Gen Stephen

Kearny had seized New Mexico and advanced into California. Monterey, California, had been occupied by American naval forces in July, and it was clear that Kearny and

the naval forces would force a climactic battle with the

Mexicans in California .

Despite these grim circumstances, the Mexicans would

not accede to American demands. Polk was left with little

choice but to follow Scott's plan to attack the seat of Mexican political power, Mexico City. Scott left Washington on

24 November, and after gathering many of Taylor's troops

at Point Isabel, sailed to Tampico and established his

headquarters.

Meanwhile Santa Anna learned of Scott's plan and resolved to crush the weakened forces of Taylor before Scott

could strike. Moving north from San Luis Potosi, Santa

Anna arrived at Buena Vista, having lost nearly 20 percent

of his force on the grueling march. On 23 February 1847

Santa Anna launched his attack. In a wild and confused

battle, he was repulsed with 500 dead and about 1,000

wounded, and fell back across the desert to San Luis Potosi .

On 9 March Scott arrived with 10,000 troops near Vera

Cruz, landed unopposed, and laid siege to the city. After a

five-day artillery bombardment, the city's garrison surrendered with little bloodshed on either side . Scott moved inland quickly to get away from the disease infested coastal

plain. On 18 April Scott found Santa Anna with 12,000

men at Cerro Gordo. Thanks to his West Point trained

engineers (including then Capt Robert E. Lee), Scott was

able to flank Santa Anna's position and rout the Mexicans

after a sharp fight . The Mexicans lost 1,000 killed and

wounded with 3,000 captured while Scott suffered about

400 total casualties .

In May Scott was forced to pause in his advance until

35 3
EAGLE'S TALONS

those volunteers whose 12-month enlistments had expired

were replaced with new enlistees. Finally on 7 August, Scott

set out for Mexico City, severing his lines of communication

with the coast since he did not have sufficient troops to

defend them. Circling south of Lakes Chalco and Xochimilco, Scott met Santa Anna's defenders on 20 August in

the Battles ofContreras and Churubusco, in which the Mexicans were defeated and forced to retreat within Mexico

City's walls.

Peace negotiations ensued as Santa Anna attempted to

reorganize his battered forces. Finally, negotiations broke

down and on 8 September 1847, Scott attacked and defeated the Mexicans at Molino del Rey. Five days later on

13 September, the Americans stormed the last bastion outside the city itself in the Battle of Chapultepec. It was here

that 100 cadets from the Mexican Military College made

their gallant but hopeless stand. The next morning, the remaining garrison in Mexico City surrendered, Santa Anna

having left during the night.

Following the capture of Mexico City, peace negotiations

began in earnest at Guadalupe Hidalgo and an agreement

was reached on 2 February 1848. The last American troops

left Mexico City in June and evacuated Vera Cruz in

August.

Better State of the Peace

After the US Army had compelled the toppling of a hostile Mexican government and seen it replaced by a regime

more amenable to negotiating a settlement on the basis of

American objectives, the war ended. The terms ofthe peace

were negotiated in the form of the Treaty of Guadalupe

Hidalgo in February 1848 . The United States acquired the

territories it had desired in the beginning (the disputed

Texas, California, New Mexico, and Arizona territories) in

return for a $15-million payment to the government ofMex354
AMERICA'S MINOR WARS

ico. After the Gadsden Purchase of 1853 added remaining

sections of New Mexico and Arizona to the Union, the

territorial boundaries of the 48 contiguous states took on

their final shape; manifest destiny was served.

The settlement was certainly imposed . Militarily, the

forces of the United States had all but destroyed Mexico's

ability to resist the imposition of our policies, and the occupation of Mexico City exceeded Mexico's cost-tolerance,

the factor that proved pivotal in the end . At the same time,

Mexican hostile will (defined as acceptance and embracing

of our policy) was not overcome, and no serious efforts were

made to convince the Mexicans of the virtues of manifest

destiny. Instead, we sought to buy the Mexicans off in the

peace treaty and the Gadsden Purchase. Much of the antiAmericanism that still exists in Mexico surely has its roots

in our failure to overcome that aspect of hostile will.

The warhad its consequences and its lessons. It provided,

among other things, a training ground for the officer corps

that would lead the forces (especially Southern) in the Civil

War a little over a decade later; virtually all of the major

military leaders of the fratricidal conflict received their first

major blooding in Mexico . Moreover, the performance of

that portion of the officer corps who had attended the academy proved to be a vindication for the West Point system.

At the same time, the soldiers who fought under those leaders were, by and large, the same sort of citizen-soldiers who

had fought all of America's wars, apparently supporting

once again the virtues of the militia system. Manifest destiny was served and, for the time, sated. It would return

again a half century later, and the result would be the Spanish-American War.

Spanish-American War

The conflict between the United States and Spain in 1898

was labeled by its most prominent war hero, Theodore Roo355
EAGLE'S TALONS

sevelt, "the splendid little war" and in many ways it was.

The war lasted only a little more than three months, and

all of America's objectives were achieved at the cost of less

than 300 combatants killed in action. In the process, the

United States established itself among the world's powers,

a force that would have to be reckoned with in the future.

Issues and Events

The underlying, pervasive issue that gave rise to war with

Spain was the question of manifest destiny, and it was an

issue that had both humanitarian and imperialistic aspects.

As a humanitarian concern, there was a rising missionary

zeal in the country that reviled repression and sought to

share the American political and social experiment . This

concern was focused most explicitly on the island of Cuba

and the fate of its citizens under Spanish rule . In addition,

there had grown in the 1890s the first strong imperialist

sentiment in US history (if one does not consider the settlement of the continent an act of imperialism). This sentiment argued that for the United States to achieve the

status of a major power, it must have colonies (colonies

bestowed great power status in a way not unlike nuclear

weapons do today). Since the Afro-Asian world had been

thoroughly carved up into European empires, the only way

to acquire an empire was to take one away from someone

else.

The resurgence of manifest destiny followed the lapse

after the Mexican War. During the interim, of course, the

nation was convulsed by the Civil War and the process of

bitter reconstruction that followed, and national energies

not trained on that trauma were focused on the settlement

of the American West. It was a time for introspection and

not external expansion. By the 1890s, the worst of reconstruction was past, the West was largely settled, and the

country had emerged as a commercial and industrial giant.

356
AMERICA'S MINOR WARS

It was time to assert America's place in the community of

nations and to protect its position in the international economic system. The average citizen might be more moved

by America's mission to save a savage world, but its leaders

marched increasingly to the drum of geopolitics.

The proximate events that led Americans into war focused on Cuba. That island so close to the Florida coast

had held a special place in the American conscience for half

a century. At one time many Americans had considered

colonizing Cuba, and its fate was seen as intertwined with

ours. Americans had watched with compassion during the

"Ten Years' War" Cubans had waged unsuccessfully against

Spanish colonial rule between 1868 and 1878, and had

watched the Cubans revolt again in 1895 . Cuba held a special fascination.

Adding fuel to this fascination and concern was the "yellow journalism" of the New York press . The two giants of

the newspaper world, Joseph Pulitzer of the New York

World and William Randolph Hearst of the rival New York

Journal were locked in a titanic circulation war, and coverage of the situation in Cuba became the primary weapon

for selling newspapers . To increase circulation, events in

Cuba were pictured in especially lurid and sensational terms

that undoubtedly magnified and distorted Spanish suppression and acts of terror . Americans who had these sources

as their primary basis of knowledge, however, looked on

with increasing horror that led to a growing sentiment for

war.

The situation in Cuba was also bad for business, and the

American business community had a special concern with

evolving events. Before the 1895 revolt, Americans had invested more than $50 million in Cuban plantations, transportation projects, and business establishments, and all

those investments were threatened by the revolution . Moreover, trade between the island nation and the United States

was severely hampered.

The movement toward intervention in Cuba grew stead357
EAGLE'S TALONS

ily and inexorably. When William McKinley was elected

president in 1896, he sought to avoid war, telling outgoing

President Grover Cleveland that he hoped he could avoid

American involvement in "this terrible calamity." Events

would, however, not allow this to happen . The event that

led directly to war was the sinking of the USS Maine in

Havana Harbor.

The sinking of the Maine is shrouded in controversy. The

battleship had been summoned to Cuba by American Consul Fitzhugh Lee (who had been given that authority by

President McKinley) on a purported courtesy call that was

in fact a response to the storming of Havana newspaper

offices by Spanish officers in retaliation for negative articles

written about the military. The vessel sat at anchor for three

weeks under heavy security, but on the night of 15 February

1898 a massive explosion ripped the ship, causing the death

of 260 crewmen out of a total crew of 350.

No one knows for sure who sank the Maine or why. We

will never know because the ship was raised from the bottom of Havana Harbor in 1911, towed to deep sea in the

Atlantic, and sunk without detailed inspection, leaving the

mystery intact . If the facts were in dispute, however, the

apportionment of blame at the time was not. Americans

learned of the tragedy in the New York Journal on 17 February. The paper's banner proclaimed that "The War Ship

Maine Was Split in Two by an Enemy's Infernal Machine."

That enemy, of course, was Spain, and the incident fanned

the flames lit by the revelation of the famous de Lome letter

earlier that year (a missive written by the Spanish ambassador in Washington describing the president in especially

derisive terms).

The combination of events greatly increased pressure on

McKinley to declare the war he sought to avoid . He demanded and received an apology over the de Lome incident. He also received Spanish assurances that the violence

in Cuba would end and that they would institute economic

reforms. These assurances were too little too late . American

35 8
AMERICA'S MINOR WARS

war fever could be sated only by fire, and on 11 April 1898,

a reluctant President McKinley issued his war message.

After 3 3 years of peace, America was once more at war.

Political Objective

As framed in President McKinley's war message to the

Congress the American political objective in the war with

Spain dealt exclusively with alleviating the situation in

Cuba. In the process of the war's conduct, however, the

United States came into possession of other Spanish territory, creating the empire that was an objective of many

Americans but which had not been a stated goal of the

administration .

Exactly what was to become of Cuba was not stated in

the message. Rather, McKinley said American military intervention was rooted in four concerns : a humanitarian concern over the devastation occurring on the island,

protection of American citizens and rights on the island,

an end to threats to Cuban-American commerce, and a

guarantee that American strategic interests in the area

would be honored. In time, this objective translated into

Cuban political independence coupled with heavy American economic penetration and control .

The acquisition of empire occurred almost by accident.

On 1 May 1898, Commodore George Dewey engaged the

Spanish fleet in the "battle" of Manila Bay, sunk it in its

entirety, and thereby ended Spanish political dominion

over the Philippines. The American flag flew over Manila,

and it was only after some considerable debate that we

decided it should stay there. Likewise, a force was sent to

Puerto Rico after the fall of Cuba to overcome the Spanish

garrison there, and once that was accomplished, McKinley

simply decided to keep the island as a war indemnity.

359
EAGLE'S TALONS

Military Objectives and Strategy

American military strategy was controlled by President

McKinley. Rather than having a well-thought-out plan,

strategy and objectives unfolded with events, threats, and

opportunities. The essential military problem was that no

one knew exactly what McKinley sought as political objectives when the war began. Was it to aid the Cuban rebels

or to seize Cuba? Questions remained concerning other

such Spanish colonies as Puerto Rico and the Philippine

Islands.

The Navy had the fewest problems making its plans. As

early as 1896, officers at the Naval War College had developed a plan for fighting Spain. The plan called for a

blockade of Cuba to starve the Spanish troops followed by

the occupation of the island by a small American force

aided by the Cuban rebels. Simultaneously, the Americans

would attack the Spanish Pacific Squadron at Manila Bay

to safeguard American commerce in the Pacific. This general plan was quickly approved.

The commanding general of the Army, Nelson A. Miles,

proposed a full-scale invasion of Cuba by an 80,000-man

regular Army to take place in the fall after the rainy season

had passed. McKinley thought such a delay would be intolerable . Miles then suggested that Puerto Rico should be

the main focus of American operations .

The first approved and coordinated plan relied on naval

action to bring the Spanish to heel. In addition to the Cuban

blockade and the attack on the Spanish Pacific Squadron,

the plan called for a small Army force of 5,000 to land on

the Cuban coast and to funnel supplies to the rebels. This

plan changed quickly for two reasons. First, on 29 April

1898, news arrived that a Spanish fleet had set sail under

the command of Adm Pascual Cervera. American ships

were quickly detached from the blockade to form a "flying

squadron" to protect the Atlantic Seaboard and to find the

Spanish fleet. Second, a cable confirmed that Commodore

360
AMERICA'S MINOR WARS

Dewey's Asiatic Squadron had smashed the Spanish Pacific

Squadron at Manila Bay and asked for 5,000 troops to seize

Manila.

McKinley became much more aggressive with the good

news from the Pacific. Additionally, the blockade seemed

to be having only a limited effect on the Spanish, but it

was taking its toll on American ships and men. The plan

changed and the target became Havana. Army troops would

land near the city and then march on the seat of Spanish

power. However, it was soon learned that Cervera's small

fleet had arrived and entered Santiago Harbor. The target

of the ground attack was quickly changed to Santiago. A

force of 17,000 men sailed for Cuba with more to follow

as training was completed and shipping became available.

The American force seemed small for the job as the Spanish army had 150,000 troops in Cuba. However, tropical

disease had taken its toll of the Spanish and perhaps only

half that number were effective. Worse, the soldiers were

scattered throughout the island in an attempt to withhold

ground from the rebels. The Spanish army could not quickly

concentrate because of the primitive transportation system

on the island.

Political Considerations

In some senses, the Spanish-American War was a model

event, a prototype for America's wars of the second half of

the twentieth century. This may seem an odd statement,

since the resemblance between the war with Spain and say,

Vietnam or Korea is, to say the least, tenuous. The Spanish

conflict is not a model for how the United States has fought

wars in the contemporary period, but the analogy has meaning when the conflict is seen as a model for the kinds of

limited wars the United States can successfully sustain. The

measure of sustenance in America, as in any democracy, is

36 1
EAGLE'S TALONS

continuing popular support for military action to its

conclusion.

Public support for the campaign against Spain not only

nurtured the endeavor, it virtually forced it . The war with

Spain was the first instance in American history wherein

the news media played a crucial initiating role and, as

pointed out earlier, the New York circulation war was a

critical element in forcing President McKinley to declare

war. America's desire for war was strong, and it was sustained throughout the campaign.

The critical question is why this was the case. At least

three factors come to mind that distinguish the war with

Spain from Vietnam and Korea, but which bear similarity

to more recent adventures such as the US invasion of Grenada and the British war with Argentina over the Falkland

(Malvinas) Islands. First, the war's stated aim of relieving

Cuba was clear, unambiguous, and popular. The liberation

of Cuba as the major goal was well known, had overwhelming popular support, and translated readily into military

requirements the accomplishment of which were clear and

easily measurable. Only when the war spread to empire did

the objective become muddy. Second, the war was short

and relatively bloodless. The military campaign took only

three months and caused modest casualties . Such criticism

of the war as did occur was raised after its end and centered

on the abysmal medical support conditions that resulted in

many needless noncombat deaths among American servicemen. Third, the war was an easily achieved military

victory. San Juan Hill and the Battle of Manila Bay were

the crowning blows, and they were both walkovers against

an overmatched foe. There was plenty of glory and little

bloodshed.

Military Technology and Technique

The "splendid little war" was a joint Army-Navy operation, and both services bore little resemblance to their

362
AMERICA'S MINOR WARS

forebearers from the Civil War. In many respects, the Spanish-American War was a modern conflict in that most of

the weapons and techniques used were much more like

those of the twentieth century than those of the Civil War.

The Standard American infantry weapon was the .30-

caliber Krag-Jorgensen rifle. Unlike its immediate predecessor the so-called Trap-Door Springfield, the Krag-Jorgensen was a five-shot repeater that used smokeless

cartridges. Unfortunately, by 1898, only the regular Army

had been equipped with the Krag-Jorgensens, and national

guardsmen mobilized for the war were forced to use the

obsolete single-shot Springfields .

American artillery was plentiful, but technical development had lagged, and the quality of the artillery had fallen

far behind that of most European armies. Many pieces still

required slow and dangerous muzzle loading and all fired

black powder. The smoke from the black powder instantly

gave away artillery positions and made the gunners' situation dangerous against a first-class adversary. Perhaps

more important, American gunners still had no method of

sighting for indirect fire, which meant that they could engage the enemy only at ranges not much longer than those

of the Civil War.

The American Navy had made significant technological

strides since the Civil War. Spurred on by Mahan and

others who argued for a first-class navy and overseas possessions, the Navy had embarked on a large building program that had produced, by 1898, the sixth largest navy in

the world. The Navy had five battleships, four of which

were of the most modern types and listed as "First Class."

For example, the USS Oregon, which fought in both the

Pacific and Atlantic, displaced 10,000 tons, mounted a total

of four 13-inch guns on turrets fore and aft as well as eight

8-inch guns, and had a top steaming speed of nearly 17

knots. The Navy also had 30 cruisers such as the USS Olympia, Dewey's flagship, which displaced 6,000 tons, mounted

363
EAGLE'S TALONS

four 8-inch guns as well as ten 5-inch guns, and could steam

at nearly 22 knots.

Although well armed, American forces were not well prepared for a war of any size. The regular Army of just over

28,000 was well trained and experienced in the frontier

Indian wars. However, it was skilled only in small unit

actions. The largest regular formation was the regiment and

few officers had ever seen larger formations. Likewise, the

Navy was inexperienced in fleet operations .

Perhaps the greatest shortcomings were in joint operations and in amphibious operations. Coordination between

the services during the conflict was appalling . The embarkation at Tampa of Army forces bound for Cuba was a

scene of mass confusion, including the last-minute discovery that there were not enough ships to carry the troops.

At the end of the voyage, the landing operations were also

chaotic: there were not enough small boats to get the troops

and supplies ashore quickly. The landing took four days, in

sharp contrast to Scott's landing at Vera Cruz a halfcentury

earlier. That operation, which involved an equally large

force, was accomplished in one day.

The Spanish-American War also exhibited the continued

growth of modern centralized command and control. President McKinley established a "war room" in the White

House complete with detailed maps and markers, and

equipped with 25 telegraph lines. These lines connected

him with the various military departments and with officers

occupying important posts in other cities. McKinley did

not hesitate to use his communications capability in directing the efforts of the military staffs.

Military Conduct

The first military action of the war was not an engagement, but the destruction ofthe American battleship Maine,

which was officially on a goodwill visit to Havana. As noted,

364
AMERICAS MINOR WARS

the circumstances of the explosion that sank the ship on

15 February 1898 are a matter of some debate. Regardless

of how it happened and who was responsible, the sinking

led more or less directly to the American declaration of war

on 25 April. At the same time, the regular establishment

of the Army was increased from 28,000 to 60,000, and

President McKinley called for 125,000 volunteers. Amonth

later McKinley called for an additional 75,000 volunteers.

The Navy was ready for immediate action and quickly

clamped a blockade on Cuba. On 25 April Commodore

Dewey sailed his Asiatic Squadron to Manila Bay. He entered Manila Bay on the night of 30 April, and on 1 May

engaged the Spanish squadron commanded by Adm Patricio Montojo. The engagement was less a battle than an

execution. Montojo's fleet was outclassed and outgunned.

Dewey's force totally destroyed the Spanish force while losing only one dead (via heatstroke) and eight wounded.

Dewey then waited for the arrival of sufficient troops to

seize Manila.

In the Atlantic, the Americans learned on 29 April that

Admiral Cervera had sailed with the main Spanish fleet

from the Cape Verde Islands. A small flying squadron was

detached from the blockading force to protect the Eastern

Seaboard and intercept the Spanish fleet. Surprisingly,

Cervera avoided the American forces and slipped into Santiago Harbor on 19 May. Rear Adm William T. Sampson,

who commanded US naval forces in Cuban waters, immediately blockaded the harbor.

By mid-June, despite tremendous logistical snarls and a

lack of planning for almost everything needed by a large

modern army, Maj Gen William R. Shafter was ready to

sail to Cuba with 17,000 men. Shafter's forces arrived off

the Cuban coast on 22 June and commenced landing at

Daiquiri. The landing was unopposed, but confusion

reigned, and it was not until 25 June that the full force was

ashore. Had the Spanish been able to oppose the landing,

the story of the war might have had a far different ending.

36 5
EAGLE'S TALONS

After some minor skirmishes, and great difficulties in

unloading supplies from the poorly loaded ships, Shafter

moved on Santiago. On 1 July he assaulted the San Juan

Heights that protected the eastern approaches to Santiago.

By nightfall, after confused maneuvering, several sharp setbacks from the Spanish, and the Rough Riders' "charge up

San Juan Hill" led by Lt Col Theodore Roosevelt, the positions were in American hands. The Spanish fell back to

their inner defense line.

On 3 July Cervera led his trapped fleet out of Santiago

Harbor in a valiant but doomed attempt to escape the

American blockade. As was Dewey's triumph at Manila

Bay, the Battle of Santiago Bay was one-sided. Running

along the coast, the Spanish ships were overwhelmed with

heavy fire and forced aground as burning hulks. All six of

the Spanish ships were lost. Incredibly, total American

losses were one killed and one wounded .

Faced with insurmountable odds, the Spanish commander in Santiago, Gen Jose Toral, surrendered the city

on 17 July. The surrender included all Spanish forces in

eastern Cuba. Toral was unaware that tropical diseases were

taking their first toll of American forces and that Shafter's

supply problem remained difficult.

On 25 July General Miles landed on Puerto Rico, and

after being reinforced pushed inland. He met almost no

opposition as Spanish forces fell back into San Juan. Before

Miles attacked San Juan, word arrived that Spain had asked

for peace.

Meanwhile, on 25 May 1898, Gen Wesley Merritt departed San Francisco with the vanguard of troops bound

for Manila. He arrived at Manila on 30 June with a force

that would eventually total 15,000 . The situation was delicate because the Philippine rebel leader, Emilio Aguinaldo,

had Manila under siege and had declared a Philippine Republic. While the American political leadership pondered

what to do with the Philippines, Merritt and Dewey wanted

to take the city as soon as possible . Squadrons from some

366
of the great powers were beginning to appear in Manila

Bay, and Merritt and Dewey feared serious problems if

American control was not quickly established .

The Spanish commander in Manila, Fermin Juadenes,

was willing to surrender but not to the rebels, whom he

feared would seek retribution against the Spanish. After

secret negotiations, a sham battle was staged on 13 August,

and the Americans entered the city. The Spanish were therefore able to surrender to the Americans, and Merritt took

control of the city. Neither Juadenes nor Merritt was aware

that the war had ended two days earlier.

Better State of the Peace

AMERICAS MINOR WARS

Because the war was such a military mismatch, achieving

the stated political goals forced upon McKinley was relatively easy. Spanish hostile ability was minimal to begin

with, and once the United States had sunk the Spanish fleets

and thus left the island garrisons isolated, overcoming the

vestiges of hostile ability was simple and straightforward.

Moreover, the Spanish, fully aware that they stood no reasonable military chance against the Americans, possessed

little hostile will, so that both their cost-tolerance and unwillingness to accept our policies were quickly overcome as

well.

American objectives were achieved, at least in the short

run. Cuba was relieved of the Spanish yoke, but the full

independence they expected was only questionably theirs.

McKinley's war message had not guaranteed independent

status, and although political independence was granted,

economic penetration by the Americans left the island nation in a position of dependency that many Cubans believe

was broken only by Fidel Castro's revolution 60 years later.

At the same time, the United States acquired an empire in

the form of Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines. Those

imperialist ambitions were not clearly defined when we en367
EAGLE'S TALONS

tered the war but evolved. Filippino insurgents, for example, first viewed us as liberators and made common

cause with us in helping remove the hated Spanish . They

began to oppose us when they recognized that the Yankees

had no intention of leaving either . The result was a bloody

counterinsurgent campaign and, once that was concluded,

an exposed empire that stuck out like a sore thumb in the

way of Japanese expansion in the western Pacific.
CHAPTER 9

THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE

The American experience with the use of military force

is unique, shaped by history, geography, and a host of other

factors, many of which have been discussed in previous

chapters. Our task now is to sort through that experience

to see what patterns may emerge and what may be learned

that can enrich our understanding of the present and guide

our encounters with the future. What, in other words, does

examination of America's experience with military force

tell us about the present and future prospects of employing

military force to achieve national ends?

Certain general comments can be made as preface to a

systematic review of the framework that has been employed. The first is the great degree to which our understanding of American military history is enshrouded in

mythology, partially as the result of our ahistoricism. Part

of this mythology, is our notion of Americans as a pacific

people for whom peace is the norm andwar is the exception.

Rather than seeing peace as an interlude between wars (an

attitude held by many Europeans whose history reflects

such a view), we tend to look at war as a transgression of

our normal circumstance .

The record, of course, does not fully support such a view.

As the preceding chapters demonstrate, the United States

has been involved in six major wars during its existence

(including every major European conflict during our history), as well as three categorized in this work as minor.

Even that listing is not inclusive, as it omits actions like

the taming of the Barbary pirates (Colonel Qadhafi is not

the first Libyan with whom we have tangled), the Seminole

War, unconventional engagements against Philippine in369
EAGLE'S TALONS

surgents, and the various campaigns against both the eastern and western Indians. An inventory of the number of

years in which Americans have been at war all or part of

the year is a lengthy list that does not comport with any

sense of passivity. Yet partially as a result of this myth,

Americans tend to treat war as a dirty business (which, of

course, in significant ways it is) . Americans believe war,

when it is thrust upon us, is to be gotten over with as quickly

as possible so that we can get back to the more normal

business of peace.

There is a second element in the American mythology

and that is the myth of our military invincibility. Americans

may be slow to anger, so goes the myth, but when we are

aroused we are winners. The watchword of the American

military is "can do ." When called to arms, Americans respond and prevail. The truth is, that although we have usually been militarily successful in the long run and have

generally achieved those political purposes for which we

have entered hostilities, our record is not unblemished. The

United States has not always prevailed militarily (for example, the War of 1812) . Realizing the falsity of this myth

would help, among other things, to put the Vietnam experience into proper perspective .

Another part of the myth of invincibility is the belief that

not only has the United States fought successfully, but that

we have fought well in the process. Once again, this assertion does not bear up well under close examination. Rather,

at least until the post-World War II period, we have entered

wars unprepared to fight them and have either taken a long

time to prepare to fight (World War I) or we have fought

poorly early in the war while our green troops gained combat experience (the early North African campaign in World

War II). Moreover, the American experience can hardly be

described as one of great tactical or strategic brilliance .

America has produced, after all, no universally recognized

great strategist of land warfare, and our style usually has

been that of using our superior manpower and weaponry

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to grind down our enemies' ability to resist. Although our

style of warfare has not been pretty or subtle, it has been

effective, at least against enemies who played by the same

rules. To say these things is not to denigrate the tradition

of the American military, it is simply to put it in proper

perspective.

There is a second general strand that runs through the

American experience, and it is a basic, underlying antimilitary bias. This antimilitarism expresses itself in a suspicion about military solutions to problems, a negative

attitude toward maintaining military forces during peacetime, and an aversion to military spending when the nation

is not at war. The signs that one can occasionally find in

New England antique shops that read "no dogs or soldiers

allowed" are a part of our heritage .

Antimilitarism was born in the nation's formative days.

As argued earlier, the stationing of British troops on American soil was an important link in the chain that led to the

American Revolution, and the Continental Congress

watched the Army suspiciously throughout the war, fearing

it might be used to usurp congressional authority. (This led

a frustrated George Washington to remark that he could

understand why the Congress might worry about the existence of the Army during peace but not during war.) That

fear and suspicion led to a quick disarmament immediately

following the Revolution and the virtual absence of any

military preparedness until the War of 1812.

The result, through most of American history, has been

a pattern ofa small professional military establishment during peacetime and rapid mobilization of forces when war

occurs. Until World War 1, this generally meant the calling

ofthe militia, based on the notion that the "citizen-soldier,"

valued because he was more citizen than soldier, was an

effective fighting man. The evidence, of course, does little

to support this notion, which should have died conclusively

on the battleground of First Manassas in 1861 . The net

37 1
EAGLE'S TALONS

effect has been that we have entered wars with neither the

trained personnel nor equipment to begin hostilities rapidly

and successfully.

This particular pattern has, of course, disappeared to

some degree since World War 11 and especially the Korean

conflict. For the past 30 years or so, the United States has

maintained a substantial "force in being" prepared to assert

itself in a timely fashion when called upon. This state of

perpetual preparedness, in addition to being considerably

more expensive than the earlier pattern, does represent a

discontinuity from America's past.

Our suspicion of the military has influenced the American military as an institution as well. The implicit fear that

the military might insert itself into politics has produced a

military establishment that is apolitical and even antipolitical in some respects. The apolitical orientation has both

its beneficial and unfortunate consequences. On the positive side of the ledger, civil-military relations are based on

the principle of civilian dominance of the military and that

tenet is firmly and fully accepted by the military. Members

of the professional military can and often do question the

competence of their civilian masters, but they almost never

question their authority.

Apoliticism, however, has a price. To be certain that we

will have no scheming "man on a white horse," our system

produces a professional officer corps whose background is

in engineering (all three of the major service academies are

essentially engineering schools). These technicians mechanically learn the so-called science of war (the tactical aspects

of conducting combat). That training, however, underemphasizes instruction in military history and international

politics that provides the context for military operations

(the so-called art of war). The result is a lack ofappreciation

of the relationship between politics and war that makes the

military a poor adviser to political authority on anything

other than the technical side of military activity and fails

to provide the base for dialogue between military and ci372
AMERICAN EXPERIENCE

vilian authorities. (The latter, it might be added, usually

have a corresponding ignorance of the science of war.)

Issues and Events

In attempting to generalize from the American experience at war, the central question that must be asked is :

What kinds of issues have most and least galvanized the

American people as they moved down the road to war?

Although any generalization runs the risk of oversimplification and hence of raising the ire of the historian, American military history does suggest a criterion that divides

the wars that have had great support from those that have

not. That criterion is have not. That criterion is the high

moral character that could (or could not) be attached to the

issues leading us toward war.

The most popular American military adventures have

sprung from issues that were perceived as both absolute

and moral in nature. Although there was division within

the body politic, the issues of British tyranny and independence had an absolute and moral character, as did the

protection ofhearth, home, and way of life for Confederates

during the Civil War. The other American wars that were

unfailingly popular, the two world wars, were also of this

nature. World War 1, the "war to end all wars," was fought

by Americans to make the world safe for democracy, thus

serving the dual interests of ridding the earth of the scourge

of war and promoting a morally superior political form.

Destroying the total evil of Hitlerian fascism in World War

II had a similarly lofty ring that was irresistible once Pearl

Harbor had propelled us into that fray .

By contrast, where issues were perceived as less important or of a lower moral content, there have been divisions

in the public that have lessened support for wars. America's first unpopular conflict, the War of 1812, had impressment and de facto independence from Britain as

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underlying issues, and these issues were of marginal enough

appeal that New England, which would have benefited from

the ending of impressment, actually opposed going to war.

Territorial expansion in the Mexican War, tied as it was to

the extension of slavery issue, generated support only in

the West, and Lincoln was burdened throughout the Civil

War (as well as the period leading to the war) by Northern

apathy about union and emancipation. America's major

adventures in Korea and Vietnam, where the issue was the

containment (but not rollback and eradication) of communism, similarly had limited appeal.

This moral sense spills over when it comes to proximate

events that bring about war. Although it is an arguably

accurate self-depiction, we Americans view ourselves as a

peace-loving, pacific people who cannot, by our nature, be

the initiators of war. Thegovernment of Mexico and a number of Indian tribes might well take exception to such a

characterization, but this perception does create a need to

be attacked to produce the sense of moral outrage necessary

to push the American people to war. In some cases, our

leaders have recognized and even exploited this fact.

A quick review of the American past reinforces this typification. The British march out of Boston to Lexington

and Concord (even if no one knows who shot first) became

a rallying cry to begin the Revolution. President Lincoln,

anxious to quell the rebellion but unwilling to appear to be

engaging in aggressive action that would legitimize secession, was forced to wait patiently for the South Carolina

militia to fire on Fort Sumter. Despite the war hysteria

whipped by the yellow press, it took the sinking of the USS

Maine (by persons unknown) to engender the rallying cry

in the war against Spain. The German sinking of the Lusitania provided impetus in 1916, and there is no better

example than the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. In more

contemporary times, the North Korean invasion of South

Korea compelled the United States to enter that conflict,

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and President Johnson used the Gulf of Tonkin incident as

the excuse to prosecute the Vietnam War.

Political Objective

The role of the political objective is absolutely critical in

the conduct of war by a democracy, because the objective

provides the rallying cry to generate and sustain the public

support without which a democracy cannot long fight. The

sweep of the American experience suggests that there are

four criteria that define a "good" political objective, that

is an objective Americans will support. To the extent that

an objective meets all these criteria, it is likely to develop

and sustain public support. To the extent an objective violates one or more criteria, it is likely to lead to erosion of

public support. The four criteria are: the objective must be

simple, straightforward, and unambiguous; it must be morally and politically lofty; it must be overwhelmingly important; and it must be seen to be in the best interest of

most Americans.

The first criterion says that a good political objective can

be easily understood by everyone. Ideally, the objective

should be reducible to a catchphrase or slogan that both

captures the essence ofthe objective and serves as a rallying

cry ("Remember the Maine" as a way to simplify assumed

Spanish perfidy) . The second criterion, following on the

earlier discussion, suggests that a good objective can be

turned into crusade that appeals to our moral sense ("Make

the world safe for democracy"). The third criterion means

that the attainment of the objective must be vital to the

United States and failure to attain it disastrous . This criterion would be best exemplified in the situation where

losing a war would physically endanger the integrity of

American soil, and the only example in our history was the

Southern side in the Civil War (the British threat in 1814

was more limited) . The fourth criterion, ofmost importance

37 5
EAGLE'S TALONS

when there were still great sectional differences between

Americans, refers to the need for a majority of groups to

view the objective as important. In contemporary times,

the third and fourth criteria can be merged into a single

criterion of perceived self-interest.

The critical importance of an appropriate objective can

be demonstrated by looking at which American wars violated which criteria. The criterion of simplicity is rather

clearly violated in three instances: Vietnam, Korea, and the

War of 1812 . As argued earlier, the problem of the objective

in Vietnam was, at least partially, that average Americans

did not understand why their nation was at war, and the

various means that were used to try to convince them (the

Munich analogy and the domino theory) provided neither

clarity nor simplicity to aid understanding. In Korea, the

problem was not in understanding objectives but in knowing which was operative at any point in time. Freeing South

Korea was straightforward enough, as was liberating the

entire Korean peninsula. What was not so clear was why

and when the objectives changed . In the War of 1812, the

agendas of impressment (an issue, ofcourse, resolved before

war was declared) and of annexing Canada (either as a "bargaining chip" to end naval harassment or to expand the

United States) were similarly confusing.

The criterion of moral loftiness has been even more often

abused, with at least five instances where one could question the moral force of the objective. The first instance was

the War of 1812, where the morality of seizing Canada was

particularly questionable . In the Mexican War, manifest

destiny was but a thin disguise for naked American aggression and seizure of sovereign Mexican territory. One of

Lincoln's recurring difficulties was convincing his countrymen that forceful union and then union plus abolition were

worthy of their support and blood. In the twentieth century,

the principle has arguably been violated twice: in the Korean and Vietnam wars. In Korea, the problem was not

associated with the original and eventual objective of con376
AMERICAN EXPERIENCE

taining North Korea but with not liberating it from "godless

communism." If the evil was sufficiently dire to require the

sacrifices of war, then it should be exorcised, not simply

contained. In Vietnam, this sort of dilemma was combined

with our support for a succession of either venal or incompetent South Vietnamese governments.

The third criterion reflects the importance (worth) to national security of attaining the objective. As pointed out,

this kind of objective is always somewhat difficult for a

government that fights primarily in an expeditionary manner, where the physical security of hearth and home is not

directly in jeopardy and where threats to the homeland are

abstract extrapolations from the situation at hand. In fact,

the only war in the American experience in which territorial

integrity was really at issue was the Confederate side in the

Civil War. Support for the Rebel cause was quite high

among Southerners throughout the long conflict .

The question of worth has been raised as a significant

concern in four American wars, two in the nineteenth century and two in the twentieth. In the nineteenth century,

the question was raised in both the War of 1812 and the

Union conduct of the Civil War. Whatever its feasibility,

annexing Canada was not a major priority for most Americans, and the naval harassment issue affected only a small

slice of the population, mainly in New England. Much of

Lincoln's problem in maintaining support for his war effort

arose from the fact that many Northerners did not care

whether the South seceded or not, or at least did not think

preventing secession was worth fighting over.

The necessity of achieving the objective has been questioned significantly in the twentieth century during both

the Korean and Vietnam wars. In the case of Korea, the

importance of "merely" ridding South Korea of its North

Korean invaders was widely questioned, but only the second time this objective was adopted. At that point, the war

had become a static contest of attrition about the 38th

parallel, and the war seemed increasingly pointless and

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worthless. In Vietnam, a principal burden of American officials was trying to convince the American people that

there was something about the outcome worth our involvement and our sacrifice. Those attempts were ultimately unsuccessful, and it may be one of the ironies of Vietnam that

our participation was truly not worthwhile, since it can be

argued that US vital interests were hardly affected by the

outcome.

The final criterion is the perceived vitality of the objective to most Americans. In the nineteenth century when

this most often was a problem, the divisions of Americans

tended to be along sectional lines that have largely disappeared as an important factor in US foreign policy. During

the twentieth century Americans have been more divided

by political philosophies, demographic classifications, or

socioeconomic factors. Extended to cover these newer divisions, the fourth criterion is still valid.

Using this slightly extended definition, three wars immediately come to mind as violating the criterion. The first

two were in the nineteenth century and involved sectional

differences. In the War of 1812, the war was opposed by

New Englanders because they feared the result would be to

destroy New England's commerce with Europe. Support

was greatest, ironically, in the South and along the frontier.

These sections would not have benefited directly from the

achievement of the war's objectives, but they nonetheless

produced most of the War Hawks. Similarly, the Mexican

War was popular only in the Midwest and the West . It was

opposed in New England on the grounds that it was a ploy

by Tennessean Polk to extend slave territories, and it was

opposed in the South on the grounds that the additional

territories were unsuited for the plantation system. The

Vietnam War similarly divided Americans along political

lines (liberals in general opposition, conservatives in support) and along demographic lines (the young, college-aged

middle and upper-middle class in greater opposition to the

war than the lower, less-educated classes).

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A pattern of the kinds of political objectives that the

American people will and will not support for a sustained

period of time emerges, especially if one adds two considerations, the limited or total nature of the objective and the

physical duration of active fighting (and hence dying) by

Americans. This latter distinction is made because the period of combat is a better indication of sacrifice and deprivation than is overall length of a war. World War I, when

we were technically at war for over a year and a half but

engaged in combat for less than six months, illustrates this

point most dramatically.

These two criteria are added to make more explicit a

hypothesis about the objective that has until now been

somewhat implicit : political democracies support long wars

entailing sacrifice better if they are total in purpose rather

than limited. Hence if a limited purpose is to be pursued,

the war should be relatively short and painless .

The reasons for this assertion follow from the statement

of criteria for a good objective. Total objectives aimed at

removing an evil regime (a Hitler) easily meet the criteria

of simplicity, moral loftiness, worth, and general interest.

Limited wars, on the other hand, do not seek to exorcise

some overwhelming evil (hence being questionably lofty) .

They are generally fought for some geopolitical reason that

is questionably important or straightforward (hence violating worth and simplicity) or which affects the average

American about to the extent that the dynastic wars of the

eighteenth century affected the average French peasant (violating general interest).

These concerns suggest some observations about the role

of the political objective. The first thing one notices is the

sharp contrast between the wars of total and limited purpose. With the exception of the Union side in the Civil

War, all of the violations of the criteria occur in the justification of limited wars. Moreover, in general there appears to be no particular relationship between total and

limited wars in terms of duration. In terms of actual com379
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bat, the total wars average out to a little over three years

in duration, but so do the limited wars. Where duration is

of interest is within the category of limited wars; the only

one that violated none of the criteria (or at least where the

salience of it all was not raised) was Teddy Roosevelt's

splendid little waragainst Spain, the active military conduct

of which spanned barely three months and which resulted

in minor American casualties .

What is particularly striking about grouping the wars this

way is the relationship ofthe criteria to the wars' popularity .

The most popular of America's wars have been total, with

the exception of the war with Spain. Certainly the world

wars were the most popular in American history, followed

closely by the Confederate side in the Civil War. One can

argue that the majority of Americans were not steadfast in

their support of the Revolution, but revolutions rarely have

anything like majority support. There was opposition in the

Union to the Civil War, but that may be at least partially

the result of the shock of the consequences of modern total

war and the ineptitude of early Union military leadership.

By contrast, America's least popular wars have been limited in purpose. The two most unpopular clearly were Vietnam and 1812, which also share the distinction of violating

all the criteria for a successful objective. The Korean conflict comes in third on the list of violations, but it may also

best illustrate the point about what kinds ofwars the American public will and will not sustain.

As was argued at the time, the problem in Korea was the

way the objective changed. The Korean adventure could,

however, have been popular in one of two circumstances.

The first, as already argued, would have been if UN forces

had stopped at the 38th parallel the first time (in September

1950), dictated peace terms to a North Korea that would

have had little choice but to accept them, declared the mission accomplished, and come home. Most troops (except

for garrison defenders) would have been home by Christmas, and the war would have been short. and victorious, to

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be remembered as something like the war with Spain. The

other way would have been not to return to the original

objective when the United Nations drove the North Koreans and Chinese back to the 38th parallel in disarray the

second time. In that case, the objective would have been

the total one of uniting the peninsula. Presuming that uniting the peninsula would not have aroused a further Chinese

or a Soviet military response, it might have been

accomplished.

These two possible outcomes point to the kinds of wars

Americans like to fight: either wars of total purpose or limited wars that are bounded in time and the sacrifices associated with their conduct. If this is the case and

Americans have had and will continue to have difficulty

sustaining support for other kinds of wars, this has important implications for the future application of American

military force .

Military Objectives and Strategy

Over the course of the American experience, war has

expanded to vast proportions. In the eighteenth century,

the spectrum of warfare was usually limited to the stylized

linear wars fought by small, professional European armies.

By the late twentieth century, that spectrum ranges from

the tensions and threats of cold war up through the possibility of total nuclear conflict . At the same time, war has

become exceedingly complex . Cold war tensions combined

with worldwide American interests and commitments have

placed a premium on large and well-equipped standing

forces. At the other end of the spectrum, total nuclear war

causes fear for the survival of humanity itself and raises

serious questions about whether any rational political and

military objectives could be achieved in such a

conflagration.

The large area between those extremes has caused the

38 1
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most numerous practical problems for American military

strategists . Even at the level of conventional warfare, the

nuclear age has had a significant impact. With interlocking

allegiances and conflicting interests, even the smallest conflict involving a superpower presents the threat ofescalation

and possible nuclear confrontation . In both the Korean and

Vietnam wars, fear of escalation had a significant impact

on American objectives, strategy, and conduct .

Military objectives shape military strategy, and in the

American experience military objectives have come full circle as have the strategies used to achieve those objectives.

For example, Revolutionary War military objectives were

limited. The military task was simply to raise the cost of

the war to the point that the British would cease their military operations and recognize American independence. To

achieve this, George Washington pursued an attrition strategy in which he sought to avoid decisive defeat, inflict casualties on the British, and when possible inflict defeat upon

portions of the British forces. The strategy had a twofold

effect . First, it frustrated the British attempts to achieve

decisive military victory and made it appear that no end

to the war was in sight. Second, the attrition strategy continuously raised the cost of a war for the frustrated British .

Moving forward in time, the Civil War and the two world

wars were militarily unlimited wars for the United States.

The military objective in each case was to destroy the enemy's ability to resist . The military strategy in each case

was to annihilate the enemy's military forces. Since 1864

the favored American military strategy has followed the

tradition of Ulysses S. Grant in his campaign in Northern

Virginia. Grant's method was to overwhelm the Army of

Northern Virginia with superior resources of every kind .

The strategy was to attack and attack again, giving Robert

E . Lee no rest and replacing Union losses from a vast manpower pool for which the depleted South had no equivalent.

Since Grant's campaign, the resources of the United States

have allowed the American military to overwhelm its op382
AMERICAN EXPERIENCE

ponents. America has drowned its enemies in a sea of men,

firepower, and logistics . This trend reached its peak in

World War II when US industry shocked even Americans

with an overwhelming output of war materiel that supplied

our allies as well as our own forces and dwarfed the output

of our enemies.

The Grant tradition worked well, particularly in unlimited wars in which the strategy of annihilation was employed. But in the post-World War II era, the United States

has fought only politically and militarily limited wars. Unlimited war now poses the threat of destroying civilization

itself, certainly a self-defeating possibility. The specter of

escalation and nuclear confrontation has resulted in both

superpowers studiously avoiding direct confrontations.

Thus, American combat has occurred on the periphery of

our national interests and has been waged to achieve less

than vital objectives . The tradition of U. S. Grant does not

fit well into these situations and, as one might suspect, this

has caused a great deal of frustration within the American

military. The frustrations came to a head in Vietnam as the

United States attempted to fight a war using an attrition

strategy designed to raise the cost of waging war beyond

the tolerance of our enemies, and thus persuade them to

conform to our wishes. But the costs of the war were a

minor consideration to our enemies because they perceived

their objectives in the war to be priceless.

Nuclear weapons produced a new set of strategy issues

at the opposite end of the conflict spectrum. Issues concerning the deterrence of nuclear war have been the focal

point of much heated debate since the end of World War

II . The essence of the problem and the core of the dilemma

is that in issues concerning nuclear deterrence no one can

be certain of the correct path.

Concerns over what happens if deterrence fails raise

equally frustrating questions. Although the United States

used two nuclear weapons in World War II, we have no

empirical evidence to indicate how a nuclear war between

38 3
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the superpowers might be fought. As technology has produced more sophisticated and capable weapons, delivery

vehicles, and command and control equipment, our general

trend has been to provide national command authorities

with a variety of strategies in an attempt to prepare for the

uncertainties of a nuclear conflict. However, the central

questions broached earlier still remain unanswered. What

would be the political and military objectives of a nuclear

war? Is "victory" possible in any rational sense? If so, what

kind of strategy can best achieve that victory? Because of

the risks involved, these unanswered questions have become the central issues of the modern era.

Political Considerations

As the discussions in each chapter have tried to demonstrate, domestic and international concerns, which are

primarily political in character, inevitably affect and are

affected by the conduct of war. Although this statement is

unexceptional and even self-evident, American military and

civilian officials have often acted as if this Clausewitzian

dictum did not exist. The problem is much more severe in

limited-war situations than it is in instances of total war.

Total war tends to lessen the friction between the military

and civilian authorities. This is so to some measure because

a total war calls for maximum military effort, thereby lessening the politically defined shackles on the conduct of

hostilities . At that, political considerations enter even into

total-war situations. Grant, during the climactic 1864-65

campaign against Lee's Army of Northern Virginia, tried

to obscure the reportage of the large number of casualties

he was incurring for fear that public opinion would be adversely affected. In World War II, a central disagreement

between the Americans and the British was whether the war

should be fought against Germany primarily with an eye

on the earliest possible destruction of the Nazi armies or

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whether the shape of the postwar political map should be

the overriding concern.

These kinds of considerations are mild compared to military-civilian frictions during limited wars, and especially

the limited wars of the second half of the twentieth century.

As Clausewitz pointed out, war tends to feed on itself and

thus expand and intensify. Where military objectives, strategy, and resulting combat are constrained because political

objectives are limited, the basis for friction exists. To some

extent, a limited objective inevitably means that the military will fight with less than its total capacity, with "one

arm tied behind its back." This is especially true as technology has increased the lethality of war machines. Political

constraints against the military using all that it has are generally motivated by a fear of widening the war and transforming its objectives in the process. In a world where the

ultimate transformation could be to total war with thermonuclear weapons, constraints are likely to be tight

indeed.

Aspects of both Korea and Vietnam illustrate this problem and the frustration and friction that inevitably emerge.

In retrospect the problem has at times been almost comical.

An extreme instance is the instruction to US pilots during

the Korean War to bomb only the southern half of bridges

spanning the Yalu River to avoid attacking Chinese territory and consequently altering fundamentally the nature of

the war. The instruction created an impossible task for the

military, which became frustrated and angry because of this

political "interference."

A more general and vexing problem that arose in both

Korea and Vietnam was sanctuary. Sanctuaries were areas

to which enemy forces could retire without danger of attack

because the areas were off limits to American military efforts. In the Korean War, the People's Republic of China

was the sanctuary. It was not attacked for fear of starting

a general Asiatic war that military wisdom said should be

avoided and which would have tied down so many Amer385
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ican forces as to invite Soviet activity in Europe. In the

Vietnam War, the most important sanctuaries were those

parts of North Vietnam on the proscribed list for American

bombers during most of the struggle, especially Hanoi and

Haiphong. The reason for making sanctuaries of Haiphong

and Hanoi was to avoid sinking Soviet or Chinese ships

and thus to avoid drawing either or both into the war. At

the same time, placing these areas off limits made it impossible to attack the conduit of war materiel that substituted for an industrial web in North Vietnam.

What these examples show is that political restrictions

placed upon the military in limited wars make the effective

prosecution of hostilities more difficult. Politically motivated constraints probably make such wars last longer and

reduce the likelihood of winning by some degree, but one

of the lessons of the American contemporary experience is

that such dynamics are a fact of life .

Interference (if that is the proper term) of this kind is

absolutely predictable. Anyone surprised that political authorities imposed limitations on the military in Vietnam

was ignoring the Korean experience (which the military as

an institution largely did, a process generally being replicated over Vietnam). The sanctuary example may best

make the point. Some observers ofVietnam have concluded

that the American military should not allow itself to be

placed in another combat situation where the enemy is unilaterally granted a sanctuary because the military task is

too greatly compromised. From a military viewpoint, such

a conclusion makes perfect sense . At the same time, a look

at a world mapdoes not reveal many places where American

military assertion would not raise the possibility that sanctuaries would be granted for fear of broadening the war.

The other largely domestic political consideration, to

which allusion was made in a previous section, is the question of public support for hostilities . Public support is absolutely necessary if a democracy is to conduct war. The

problem is that there are influences that almost automat386
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ically erode the support for a war. Two of these are worth

raising and considering.

The first has to do with the distinction between wars of

total and limited purpose. As noted in the section on the

political objective, wars oftotal purpose have been generally

more popular than limited wars because they arouse our

moral zeal and seem to provide adequate reason for the

sacrifices that war entails. The problem, of course, is that

there is only one total war the United States can fight, and

that is undoubtedly nuclear World War III against the Soviet Union. Such a war rather clearly would be unacceptable, and future US wars are thus likely to be limited.

Limited wars, on the other hand, are often ambiguous and

debatable in merit and tend to lose support as they lengthen.

Does that mean we can fight no more wars (is that the

meaning of "no more Vietnams")? Or does it mean that

future wars will have to be so short and decisive that the

public will not have time to turn against them?

The second influence is the news media, especially the

electronic medium (television) . The major effect of television was first felt in the Vietnam War, which was transformed into a "living-room war" that simply could not be

avoided because it covered the screen every evening. Television, by bringing pictures into our living rooms, personalizes war in a way the printed word cannot. It is one thing,

for instance, to read about how many casualties there were

in a firefight; it is quite another to have the maimed bodies

flashed on your television screen. Moreover, television specializes in the dramatic visual impression rather in contemplative, in-depth analysis (the ideal television spot is about

45 seconds long). Thus, television has difficulty depicting

the complexity of what is going on in war. What it emphasizes is the dramatic aspects, especially acts of violence .

The impact of all this on the conduct of war is not well

known, and sadly, there is little research in this area. At

one level, at least, the effect is to deglamorize war by showing its rawest and most destructive manifestations. The re387
EAGLE'S TALONS

sult, we think, is to make electronic coverage of war at least

implicitly pacifistic . War has always been most glamorous

to those who have never seen it, and the television camera

guarantees that everyone-not just the participants-sees

what war looks like. The almost inevitable result is that

television coverage erodes support for physical hostilities

to the extent it is allowed unfettered coverage of combat .

If causing repulsion is the intent of the media, they need

to be explicit about it . If that is not their intent, they need

better to understand the phenomenon and how (or for that

matter, whether) it occurs. Fora military establishment that

will never have the luxury of something like the British

Official Secrets Act to screen out coverage of the gory, understanding of and adapting to the relentless eye is an important imperative .

If domestically based political considerations are of importance, so are international political concerns. One category of these includes concern about the adversary and,

in the contemporary world where superpower surrogates

often provide the opposition, the motivations and likely

action of the sponsoring power. As pointed out, such considerations weighed heavily in American actions in Korea

and Vietnam, and they are likely to be matters of concern

in the future.

Two other international considerations emerge from the

American experience. The first of these is the interdependence of America with the rest of the world, especially Europe. Although Americans have thought of themselves as

independent and aloof from the affairs of Europe, such

clearly has not been the case. A critical element in the birth

of the nation was the direct alliance with France and the

indirect alliance with Spain, the Netherlands, and Tsarist

Russia (the latter two through the League of Armed Neutrality). In the case of each "ally," the motivation to aid

the revolutionary cause was solely geopolitical in nature,

an attempt to get even with Britain because of the outcome

of the Seven Years' War. For that matter, the issue of tax38 8
AMERICAN EXPERIENCE

ation, which had its roots in the stationing of British troops

in the colonies after the French and Indian wars, was but

an outgrowth of the war in Europe that had strained the

British economy and forced Lord Richard Grenville to look

for alternate sources of revenue.

American interdependence was also demonstrated during

the Civil War. Until the battle ofAntietam, the Confederacy

conducted a lively courtship of Britain and France that was

opposed by the US government, and the failure of the Confederate States of America to gain European recognition

and succor may have been critical to the eventual Southern

failure. Likewise, the government of the United States, despite its best efforts at neutrality, became involved in the

European wars that punctuated the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Our War of 1812 was nothing more than

the New World theater of the Napoleonic Wars, and US

involvement was made necessary by our commercial interests. Similarly, recognition that a German-dominated Europe would be intolerable for American commercial efforts

made our attempts to remain neutral in World War I futile.

When the second great conflagration came about, our instinct toward aloofness was rapidly drowned in the necessity

of avoiding a permanent German victory on the continent.

After World War II, the United States recognized this

interdependence by the longest, most extensive and expensive peacetime military commitment in our history, the

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). NATO remains the keystone of American defense posture, but the

relationship is Damoclean. Maintaining the independence

of Western Europe is clearly America's most vital defense

interest after the defense of the American homeland. The

problem, of course, is that the two interests may not be

compatible in certain circumstances. ASoviet-Warsaw Pact

invasion of NATO Europe could quickly escalate to the

nuclear level, which could include an attack on the United

States . An alternative US strategy would be to disengage

rapidly from the western front, thereby abandoning one

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goal (defense of Europe) for another (protection of the

American homeland). The only other possible alternative

would be a beefed-up conventional defense of Europe that

would allow blunting of an attack short of escalation to the

nuclear level. Such a response, in turn, creates two difficulties. First, it would be terribly expensive (certainly with

much higher costs than are now incurred) for both the

United States and our allies. Second, the forces that we

would build for that use might not be particularly adept at

fighting elsewhere-in the third world for example.

The problems of the alliance point to the third international political concern that has arisen in the twentieth century, the problem of coalition warfare. The United States

has fought two real coalition wars, the world wars, in which

there were significant contributions by several nations, each

of which had somewhat different political objectives . (Although Vietnam and Korea were technically coalition wars,

the United States dominated to such an extent that our

objectives were those of the coalition.) In both cases, objectives have been at least partially compromised. In World

War I, Wilson's vision of the peace lost to Georges Clemenceau's punitive vision, with the detrimental effect of

paving the way to the second global war. In World War II,

the Americans overrode Churchill's greater concern for the

postwar map, which allowed the Soviets to capture more

territory than they might have otherwise . Both cases point

to the historical deficiencies ofAmericans as geopoliticians.

If these instances are a guide, one might hope for a more

geopolitical orientation by Americans in the future.

Military Technology and Technique

A constant trend throughout military history has been

the increasing power and destructive efficiency ofweapons.

The change over 200 years of American history is stark,

ranging from inaccurate and unreliable smoothbore mus390
AMERICAN EXPERIENCE

kets to highly accurate nuclear-tipped intercontinental ballistic missiles. Although these two weapons represent

extremes of the spectrum, advances in firepower, accuracy,

and range can be found in every category of weapons.

The impact of increased lethality has been both dramatic

and multifaceted. The most obvious and dramatic impact

has been in the general destructiveness ofwar. In the American Revolution, damage was limited to the immediate battlefield and total casualties to both sides were minimal. By

World War II, casualties numbered in the tens of millions,

many of whom were noncombatants killed and injured as

whole cities were laid waste.

The fact that cities were destroyed in wholesale lots brings

home the fact that traditional "home fronts" are now on

the front lines because of the range and distinctiveness of

modern weapons. Worse, perhaps, the home front has been

rationalized as a legitimate military target because of the

importance of industrial production to the prosecution of

modern warfare. Although naval blockades have indirectly

attacked the home front for centuries as a method of producing strife and inconvenience, modern strategists can directly target home front industrial capacity as a central part

of the overall war effort.

Bombs falling from the sky, whether they fall on industrial plants or troops in the field, typify the impersonal

nature of modern war caused by the increased range and

firepower of weapons. Modern warfare is a far cry from

battles of mounted knights in the middle ages. Modern

warfare is also far different from eighteenth-century warfare

in which linear formations often fired one volley and then

pressed the battle home with the bayonet. Hand-to-hand

fighting still takes place in modern war, but the range and

accuracy of modern weapons places most of the killing at

a distance. Technology has eliminated "waiting until you

see the whites of their eyes"; so also it has eliminated some

of the perceived glory of combat. Unlike previous eras, few

39 1
EAGLE'S TALONS

now cheer when war breaks out, for it is well recognized as

a deadly and costly business.

Although further increases in the range and accuracy of

weapons can be expected, we may be near the end of useful

increases in firepower, at least in terms of the largest and

most dangerous of man's weapons. Many would argue that

the firepower of thermonuclear weapons is so great that

they are, in effect, unusable. Man's inventive genius may

turn its attention to weapons whose energies are far more

adaptable to precise and concentrated application, thus

eliminating the unwanted "collateral damage" and dangerous side effects of multimegaton thermonuclear devices.

Whatever the future of weapons development, the increased lethality of today's weapons has been accompanied

by several technological trends. The first is that increases

in range, accuracy, and firepower have been paid for by

increased complexity. Even today's most common weapon

is an engineering marvel compared with earlier versions of

the same type of weapon. As examples, compare the Revolutionary War musket with the modern infantry assault

carbine or the biplane of World War I with the modern

supersonic jet fighter.

Second, complex weapons are generally much more costly

to produce than simple weapons. They are more expensive

both in terms of absolute cost and in terms of the time

required to design, perfect, and produce them. Combined

with economic limitations, these cost factors result in a

dilemma known in the United States as the "quality-versusquantity" quandary. In short, the dilemma deals with the

issue of whether it is more prudent to buy a small number

of highly lethal but expensive weapons or a large number

of less effective but cheaper weapons .

A third major technological trend in American military

history has been the steady mechanization ofwarfare. Until

the Civil War, the American military was powered by muscle and wind. In that great struggle, steam power began to

replace both muscle and wind, and the trend in mechani392
AMERICAN EXPERIENCE

zation accelerated from that time to the present. The impact

of mechanization has been staggering. Perhaps the greatest

single effect has been to make warfare three dimensional.

The development of the internal combustion engine and its

subsequent application to aircraft added a new dimension

to warfare. The airplane added mobility and flexibility to

armed forces, shrunk distances, brought the home front to

the front lines, and vastly complicated the problems of and

increased the possibilities for military commanders.

Mechanization has also speeded the pace and scope of

war. Armies on wheels and tracks move many miles a day

and arrive ready for combat. Often the secret to survival

in battle, whether on land, on the sea, or in the air is speed

of movement. Thus, modern tanks can travel and shoot at

30 to 40 miles per hour, modern submarines travel submerged at speeds as fast as World War II surface combatants, and modern aircraft fly and fight at supersonic speeds.

Mechanization has meant that military power can be projected within minutes over great ranges.

The fourth major technological trend is the most recent.

The electronic age has come to the battlefield, a trend that

gathered speed in the Vietnam War and has reached the

point where weapon systems now rely on miniaturized

solid-state electronics. "Smart" bombs, laser designators,

infrared homing devices, beam-riding missiles, computerized fire control systems, and other sophisticated electronic

devices have become commonplace in the arsenals of modern military powers. Computer-aided management systems

have become the standard in personnel and logistic systems.

Sophisticated computer-driven training devices allow realistic training even with the most expensive weapon systems, and computer-driven wargames are used to educate

and train military officers. In addition, electronic warfare

in the form of intelligence gathering and communications

jamming has become an important area of conflict .

What conclusions can be drawn from advances in the

technology ofwarduring the American experience? Perhaps

393
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the most obvious conclusion is that modern warfare has

become a very complex and expensive undertaking . War

now emphasizes the importance of the economic base to

national defense and, within the economy, the importance

of the heavy industrial base and the technological base.

However, in spite of the importance of technological innovation in the conduct of America's wars, superior technology has never been the decisive factor in any American

war. The struggle to use technology effectively and to cope

with enemy technology has been much more important.

Superior technology on the battlefield has rarely been the

decisive factor in war for at least four reasons. First, technological advantage is incremental, affecting the margins

of combat capability. The technological gap between contending forces tends to be small and, although the gap can

be important in a battle, it is generally not large enough to

be the decisive factor in the outcome of a war. The gaps

are also often quickly filled. Technological advances are

based on known physical properties that can often be duplicated quickly by the enemy. As a result, any given technological advantage tends to be short lived.

Second, how technology is used is as important as the

technology itself. Possession of superior technology does

not mean that its advantages will be exploited effectively .

The story of military technique is the story of attempting

to use technology in the most effective manner. The rifled

weapons of the Civil War caused significant changes in infantry tactics, but not until bloody lessons had been learned

at such places as Fredericksburg. In World War I, it took

more than two years to determine how to use the tank

effectively. In World War II, the effectiveness of strategic

bombing was hindered by our search for the vital industrial

targets whose destruction would cripple Germany and by

diversions of strategic bombing forces to nonstrategic roles.

Third, the side with the less-developed technology seeks

methods to negate the advantage of superior technology by

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AMERICAN EXPERIENCE

obtaining weapons ofequal power, by constructing effective

defenses, and by using superior strategy and tactics . Perhaps

this was best demonstrated in the Vietnam conflict. Guerrilla tactics tended to negate the effects of superior American firepower by eliminating lucrative targets for that

firepower. At a different level, the North Vietnamese were

able to obtain the ground-to-air missiles and antiaircraft

artillery necessary to produce an effective defense against

American air power. Finally, our Vietnamese enemies were

able to obtain weapons equal to our own at least at the level

of the combat infantryman.

The fourth reason that superior technology is often not

decisive is that for political reasons it is not used to its full

extent. This has become evident in the post-World War II

era as American political leadership has attempted to prevent the spread and escalation of American wars. For example, in Korea and Vietnam we did not use all the

weapons at our disposal, nuclear weapons being the most

obvious example . For the same sorts of political reasons,

the use of weapons that were employed has been circumscribed. In Korea and Vietnam, the enemy was provided

sanctuary areas immune from the effects of our superior

technology.

The ability to produce and field sophisticated weapons

that provide great firepower combined with the tradition

of overwhelming our enemies has produced a significant

trend in twentieth-century American military technique.

Modern American strategists and tacticians have sought to

substitute fire and steel for American blood. Strategic

bombing in World War II was an attempt to find a way to

victory that would minimize American bloodshed . Harry

Truman's rationale for using nuclear weapons against Japan

was based, at least in part, on the desire to save lives that

would have been lost had American forces invaded the Japanese home islands . In Korea, and particularly in Vietnam,

fire delivered by artillery and aircraft was constantly used

to reduce our casualties in infantry operations. "Indirect

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fires" were used so extensively that some military analysts

worry that the US Army became overly dependent on such

capability, capability that may not be present in future wars

fought against different enemies under far different

circumstances.

Military Conduct

Numerous factors, the most important of which have

been discussed in earlier sections of this chapter, affect the

conduct of war. However, there are several subjects that

should be addressed in terms of synthesizing the American

experience in military conduct . The most recent American

experiences in war-Korea and Vietnam-have brought to

light two major misconceptions about the American military experience and have led to considerable frustration and

debate. The first of these misconceptions concerns the types

of wars Americans have fought.

In both Korea and Vietnam, heated debate arose over

political limitations placed on the military conduct of those

wars. There was much hue and cry over forcing the military

to "fight with one hand tied behind its back" and demands

to "turn the military loose." Critics pointed to World War

II as the traditional and proper model for American military

conduct. However, part of the American tradition is one

of war fought with limited means. Of the nine wars covered

in this volume, only three, the Civil War and the two world

wars, were conflicts in which the nation was mobilized and

the military was "turned loose."

The second misconception centers on the involvement

of civilian authorities in conducting warfare . Many critics

have decried the tendency of the American civilian leadership to become directly involved in the details of conducting military campaigns, rather than leaving the conduct

of the war to the military professionals. The most famous

incident ofthis type was the confrontation between General

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AMERICAN EXPERIENCE

MacArthur and President Truman during the Korean conflict . The debate reached its peak during the Vietnam War

and centered around control of the aerial bombardment

campaign by the White House.

To a large extent, the protests over civilian control are

made in ignorance of American military tradition. As has

been pointed out in this book, civilian control over military

campaigns has been the rule rather than the exception in

American military history. In the Mexican War, Polk ordered his field commanders to start and stop their campaigns based on personal political motives. In the Civil War,

Lincoln played musical chairs with his generals and at one

time took responsibility for the defense of Washington,

D.C., during the Peninsular Campaign. In 1898 William

McKinley took a personal hand in directing preparations

for war from a newly installed White House "war room."

Of course, Korea and the confrontation between MacArthur and Truman provided an immediate foretaste of the

close political control exercised in Vietnam. Only the two

world wars seem to offer exception to the general trend.

But even in World War II, political considerations determined the overall shape of the military effort and often

overruled the desires of military leaders.

The trend toward close civilian control has accelerated

in the nuclear age. This acceleration is a product of traditional civilian control, the fear of escalation to nuclear

war, and the increased capacity for close control provided

by instantaneous worldwide communications . Indeed, the

trend has been so clear that it is somewhat surprising that

the protests over civilian control in Vietnam occurred.

There is no reason to believe that the trend toward tighter

civilian control will cease.

The unsuccessful American effort in Vietnam illuminated two other important subjects . The first has to do with

the "overwhelming" tradition of U. S. Grant and the American fascination with technology . In a sense, Americans

have come to view the conduct of war as a vast engineering

397
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project and a resource management problem. The secret to

success, in American eyes, is to apply overwhelming resources efficiently.

The engineering approach to war served the United States

well when our enemies were modern military powers who

fought in the same style. But in Vietnam the enemy did

not fight in our style, at least for the most part. Guerrillas

know from the outset that they are outmanned and outgunned, otherwise they would have no reason for adopting

guerrilla tactics. Guerrillas seek victory through tactics that

negate the superior firepower and technology of those who

take an engineering approach to war. In a sense, the Vietnam War demonstrated that efficiency does not necessarily

equal effectiveness.

Second, the United States learned from the Vietnam experience that victory on the battlefield does not necessarily

translate to victory in war. Although American arms were

nearly always victorious in battle, the outcome of the war

was determined by a myriad of other factors, particularly

the impact of the war on home front morale. We learned

that war is a vast struggle between rival societies and battle

is only its most obvious and deadly manifestation. War is

affected by events far beyond the battlefield just as those

same events determine whether or not the war achieves a

better state of peace.

Better State of the Peace

The period since the end of World War II and especially

since the end of our involvement in Southeast Asia has been

wrenching for Americans in terms of their relationship to

armed violence . We entered the second world conflict as a

geopolitical babe in arms and emerged as the world's most

powerful nation with international responsibilities that simply could not be shirked. The United States was a superpower and had to learn to act like one. Part of the

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responsibility was learning to employ the military instrument ofpower in a way that would serve American national

interests. We are still struggling with the problem .

Part of the reason for this difficulty, of course, is America's relative inexperience in the "game of nations." Historically buffered from the realities of international power

politics and having the luxury of never having to develop

a tradition wherein the military played a prominent part,

we have considered military force something of a novelty.

For Americans war has been an abnormality that occasionally intruded on the more normal condition of peace,

and it has not been viewed as just another instrument of

political power.

Our learning process has been made more wrenching and

difficult because of at least two other factors. On one hand,

there is the radical transformation of the political power

map of the world since 1945 . The traditional European

world powers have been relegated to regional status, and in

their place only two military superpowers-the United

States and the Soviet Union-have arisen. The fact that

both operate from a position of inexperience has only made

managing international relations harder. At the same time,

the introversion of Europe has accelerated the processes of

nationalism in former colonies in Africa and Asia. The international system of 1945 that consisted of about 60 nation-states now encompasses more than 160, and many of

these new states are sources of instability and competition

between the East and the West.

On the other hand, technology-which has steadily expanded the range, accuracy, and firepower of weapons since

the early nineteenth century-has transformed the means

of war to the point that the ends may have been changed

fundamentally as well. Nuclear weapons are the obvious

apex of this process and raise the basic question of whether

any political objective can be achieved by military means

when nuclear weapons might be used. At a somewhat less

dramatic level, so-called conventional weaponry has also

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changed so that making nonnuclear war is both considerably more dangerous (there are, for instance, chemical explosives whose effects are indistinguishable from a nuclear

blast except for the absence of radiation) and more expensive to conduct .

The result of all of this may be to transform the kinds

of political objectives for which military force can be employed, forcing us back to an age of limited warfare and

hence better states ofthe peace defined on a different model

than that of the world wars. Warfare fought for total political purposes and employing total means may simply have

gotten too dangerous and too expensive to wage.

There is a certain irony in all this. In earlier eras, political

purposes had to be limited because the means available for

conducting war were too modest for anything else. It may

be that now the tables are turned : war may have to be

limited in its purposes because the means are too great to

be sensibly employed for anything but circumscribed ends.

There will probably never be another amphibious assault

of the nature and grandeur of Normandy, partly because

the firepower available to the defenders would make the

attempt suicidal but also partially because the objectives

that would give rise to such an effort would probably result

in escalation beyond any controllable and politically meaningful level.

There, of course, is the rub . We have, over the nearly

four decades since the end of World War II, done a splendid

job of preparing to fight the next total war, but our preparations have been so thorough and complete that we can

no longer contemplate fighting that for which we are ready.

Countless millions of dollars have gone into the preparation, but conducting the war would probably mean the end

of civilization as we know it . The reemergence of ideology

as the cause of war that began with the American Revolution has given us the motivation and issues for World

War III; our means have gotten so far beyond those ends

as to render the prospect meaningless .

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Since it is difficult to envisage a better state of the peace

after a future total war, one is faced with two possibilities.

One is that the United States will not involve itself in future

wars because those wars are unaffordable. Certainly there

was, in the immediate wake of Vietnam, sentiment to this

effect, but there is little evidence to suggest that the millennium is about to occur. And that leaves the second possibility: the military instrument of power will continue to

be employed, but serving limited political objectives and

involving the controlled application of violence. Limited

war, in other words, is the only likely military possibility

for gaining a better state of the peace.

Such a prospect affects the way we think of better states

of the peace and their attainment. Wars fought for limited

purposes are not, by and large, wars of societies pitting their

total resources against one another, although in cases such

as Vietnam where polarity was lacking, war may be total

for one side but not the other (a possibility that American

decisionmakers must clearly discern before committing

forces in the future). In those circumstances, the questions

of hostile ability and will are somewhat different than in

previous times. In the case of combating an opponent seeking to achieve total political objectives, it may be necessary

to overcome hostile ability. If both sides are fighting for

limited objectives, destroying the enemy's armed forces

(hostile ability) may not only be inappropriate, it might

cause nature of the war to change and expand, possibly

beyond tolerable limits . Rather, the limited wars of the future may be fought with the purpose of overcoming hostile

willingness to continue (cost-tolerance) .

If one assumes (which we feel is entirely reasonable) that

a major objective and constraint on the future use of force

will be avoiding situations that could devolve into World

War III, future wars will be very different from the World

War 11-style conflicts with which Americans identify . Future wars are likely to occur on the periphery of the East

and West, which is to say in the developing world, and are

40 1
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most likely in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. They are

likely to be limited in scope and purpose.

If this characterization is accurate, it will also be somewhat discomforting for Americans because wars so defined

do not fit well into the American military self-image. What

we are speaking of are potential uses of military force that

bear some resemblance to Vietnam. We are not envisioning

great crusades against some monstrous Hitler figure ; rather

we are looking at carefully measured applications of force

to accomplish a limited goal. Moreover, we are likely to be

looking at situations where our adversaries view the whole

thing as considerably more important than we do.

If this is the future, it will require some very real adjustments. Those charged with applying the military instrument, the professional military, will have to recognize

these sorts of problems and plan for them, something that

does not have high priority now. Part of that planning has

to include a greater understanding of the international and

domestic politics surrounding the types of situations in

which the military might be asked to participate. The failure

to do so is virtually to guarantee repeating the worst of

Vietnam. Another aspect of that preparation is recognizing

that such involvements, if they last long at all, will tend to

become unpopular. (This recognition includes gaining some

understanding of how the media affect support.) From the

civilian side, there will have to be a massive education of

the public about how, when, and why military force is applied. The Pollyannaish notions that Americans have of

military force will simply not serve in a complex and

changed world . We must become geopoliticians, whether it

fits our predispositions or not.
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World War II. Reprinted edition. Washington, D.C. : Office of Air

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Davis, Burke. Gray Fox: Robert E. Lee and the Civil War. New York:

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Gerland P. Stadler. The American Civil War. West Point, N.Y. : Department of History, United States Military Academy, 1980.

Dupuy, R. Ernest, and Trevor N. Dupuy. The Encyclopedia ofMilitary

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Eisenhower, Dwight D. Crusade in Europe. New York: Doubleday and

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Esposito, Vincent J. The West PointAtlas ofAmerican Wars. NewYork:

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Falls, Cyril. The Great War. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1959.

Farrell, Robert H. American Diplomacy: A History. New York: W. W.

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Foote, Shelby . The Civil War: A Narrative. New York: Random House,

Inc., 1958.

Freeman, Douglas S. Lee's Lieutenants. New York: Charles Scribner's

Sons, 1942.

Fromkin, David. The Independence of Nations. New York: Praeger

Publishers, 1981 .

Fuller, J. F. C. The Conduct of War. New Brunswick, N.J. : Rutgers

University Press, 1961 .

Futrell, Robert F. Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine: A History ofBasic Thinking in the United States Air Force, 1907-1964. Maxwell Air Force

Base, Ala. : Air University, 1972.

. The United States Air Force in Korea, 1950-1953. Revised

edition. Washington, D.C. : Office of Air Force History, 1983.

Gaddis, John Lewis. Strategies ofContainment: A Critical Appraisal of

Postwar American National Security Policy. Oxford, U.K. : Oxford

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Gold, Gerald, et al ., eds. The Pentagon Papers. New York Times Edition . New York: Bantam Books, Inc., 1971.

Gray, Edwyn A. The Killing Time. NewYork: Charles Scribner's Sons,

1972.

Guernsey, Alfred H., and Henry M. Alden. Harper's Pictorial History

of the Civil War. New York: Fairfax Press (originally published in

1866).

Gurr, Ted Robert . Why Men Rebel. Princeton, N.J . :Princeton University Press, 1970.

Hansell, Haywood S., Jr. The Air Plan That Defeated Hitler. Atlanta:

Higgins-McArthur/Longido and Porter, Inc., 1972 .

404
BIBLIOGRAPHY

Hartmann, Frederick H. The Relations ofNations. 6th ed. New York:

Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1983.

Hassler, Warren W., Jr. With Shield and Sword: American Military

Affairs, Colonial Times to the Present. Ames, Iowa: Iowa State University Press, 1984.

Kahin, G. M., and John W. Lewis. The United States in Vietnam. New

York: Dell Publishing Co., 1969.

Karnow, Stanley. Vietnam: A History. New York: Viking Press, 1983 .

Kattenburg, Paul M. The Vietnam Trauma in American Foreign Policy,

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Keegan, John, and Andrew Wheatcroft . Who's Who in Military History. New York: William Morrow and Co., 1976 .

Koenig, William J. Americans at War: From the Colonial Wars to Vietnam. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1980.

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Mao Tse-tung. Mao Tse-tung on Guerrilla Warfare. Translated by Samuel B. Griffith . New York: Praeger Publishers, 1961 .

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Millis, Walter . Arms and Men. New York: Capricorn Books, 1967.

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405
EAGLE'S TALONS

Parrish, Thomas, ed. The Simon and Schuster Encyclopedia of World

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Pike, Douglas. PAVN. People's Army of Vietnam . Novato, Calif. : Presidio Press, 1986 .

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Preston, Richard A., and Sydney F. Wise . Men in Arms. New York:

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1974.

Schelling, Thomas C. Arms and Influence. New Haven, Conn . : Yale

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Sharp, U. S. G. Strategy for Defeat: Vietnam in Retrospect. San Rafael,

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Singletary, Otis A. The Mexican War. Chicago: University of Chicago

Press, 1964.

Spector, Ronald H. Advice and Support: The Early Years ofthe United

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Stoessinger, John, G. Why Nations Go to War. 5th ed. New York: St.

Martin's Press, 1987.

Stokesbury, James L. A Short History of World War I. New York:

William Morrow and Co., Inc., 1981 .

Summers, Harry G., Jr. On Strategy:A Critical Analysis ofthe Vietnam

War. Novato, Calif. : Presidio Press, 1982.

Tanner, Robert G. Stonewall in the Valley: Thomas J. Stonewall Jackson's Shenandoah Valley Campaign Spring 1862. Garden City, N.Y. :

Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1976.

Trassok, Leonid, and Claude Blaiz, eds. The Complete Encyclopedia

ofArms and Weapons. New York: Simon and Schuster, Inc., 1982.

Ulanoff, Stanley M., ed. American Wars and Heroes : Revolutionary

War Through Vietnam. New York: Arco Publishing, Inc., 1985 .

United States-Vietnam Relations 1945-1967. Washington, D.C. : Government Printing Office, 1971 .

Ward, Christopher. The War ofthe Revolution . New York: Macmillan

Publishing Co., Inc., 1952 .

Weigley, Russell F. The American Way of War. New York: Macmillan

Publishing Co., 1973.

Westmoreland, William C. A Soldier Reports. New York: Dell Publishing Co ., 1980 .

Williams, T. Harry. A History ofAmerican Wars: From Colonial Times

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406
BIBLIOGRAPHY

Wright, Quincy. A Study of War: An Analysis of the Causes, Nature,

and Control of War. Abridged edition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964.

Young, Peter. Atlas ofthe Second World War. New York: Berkley Publishing Corporation, 1977.

Zook, David H., Jr., and Robin Higham. A Short History of Warfare.

New York: Twayne Publishers, 1966.

ABC Conversations: 189

Abrams, Creighton W. : 264,

318

Acheson, Dean: 229

Aguinaldo, Emilio : 366

Air Cavalry: 303, 312

Air Corps Tactical School : 203

Algiers: 207

Almond, Edward M. : 251

Alsace-Lorraine: 170, 177

American Expeditionary Force:

139, 152, 154

American Revolution : 13, 15,

19, 27, 32, 35, 39-80, 83,

89, 93, 104, 110, 146, 156,

263-64,324,328,334,336-

337, 338, 343, 371, 374, 380,

382,391-92,400

Amiens: 163

Ampudia, Pedro de: 352

Anaconda Plan: 96, 114, 198

Anschluss: 182

Antietam (Sharpsburg) : 92,

108, 121, 389

Antwerp: 213

Anzio: 242

Appalachian Mountains: 97

Appomattox: 128, 129

Ardennes: 213

Argonne Forest : 164

Arista, Mariano: 351

Army-McCarthy Hearings : 243

Army of Northern Virginia:

101, 106, 108, 123, 129, 382,

384

Army of Tennessee: 104

INDEX

409

Army of the Ohio: 116

Army of the Potomac: 106,

114, 121, 129

Army of the Republic of

Vietnam (ARVN): 281, 311,

317

Arnhem: 213

Arnim, Jurgen von: 207-8

Arnold, Benedict : 72, 75

Articles of Confederation: 54,

56, 89

Atlanta: 17, 27, 98, 101, 104,

105,110,127-128

Atlantic Charter: 184-85, 221,

268

Attleboro Operation: 313

Averysboro : 128

Axis: 169, 180, 182, 184, 190,

192,198,199,206-7,209,

217, 218, 239

Baltimore: 105, 119, 342

Banks, Nathaniel Prentiss :

119-20

Bao Dai: 266, 268, 270-71

Barbarossa Operation: 186

Barbary Pirates: 230, 327, 369

Barlow, Francis C. : 81

Baton Rouge: 117

Battle of Britain: 205

Battle of Leyte Gulf. 214

Battle of New Orleans: 329,

336, 342

Battle of the Beams: 205

Battle of the Bulge : 198, 213

Battle of the Java Sea: 188
EAGLE'S TALONS

Battle of the Philippine Sea:

214

Beams, Battle of the: 205

Beauregard, P. G. T. : 114, 117

Beer Hall Putsch : 179

Bemis Heights: 73

Bennington : 73

Bentonville: 128

Berlin : 138, 198, 223, 228

Berlin Wall: 222

Bien Hoa: 310

Big Week: 211

Bismarck: 138

Black Day of the German

Army: 163

Black Thursday: 211

Bladensburg: 342

Bloody Kansas: 87

Body Count: 314

Bolshevik Revolution : 143

Boston : 45-49, 52, 55, 58, 63-

65, 374

Boston Massacre: 47

Boston Tea Party: 47

Bougainville : 209

Bragg, Braxton: 117, 123, 126

Brandywine Creek: 40, 55, 71,

78

Breed's Hill : 47, 62-63, 77

Brinks Hotel: 310

Britain, Battle of: 205

Brock, Isaac: 339

Brooklyn Heights: 62, 68

Brothers' War: 83

Brown, Bess: 59

Brown, Gen Jacob: 341

Brown, Maj Jacob: 351

Brown, John. 87

Bruinsburg: 126

Buchanan, James J. : 90, 103

Buell, Don Carlos : 116, 123

Buena Vista: 348, 353

Bulge, Battle of the: 198, 213

41 0

Bull Run (Manassas) : 82, 99,

105, 109, 114-15, 117-18,

120, 371

Bull Run Mountains: 120

Bunker Hill : 47

Burgoyne, John "Gentleman

Johnny": 58, 71-73, 77

Burke, Edmund: 59

Burnside, Ambrose: 99, 122-

23

Cairo, Ill. : 116-17

Camden: 75

Cape Verde Islands: 365

"Captain Marvel": 285

Carlton, Guy: 66-67

Casablanca : 191-92, 207, 210

Castlereagh: 138

Castro, Fidel: 367

Cedar Falls Operation: 313

Cedar Mountain: 120

Cemetery Ridge: 125

Central Intelligence Agency:

262,273

Central Powers : 139, 142, 155,

166, 171

Centreville: 118

Cerro Gordo: 353

Cervera, Pascual: 360, 361,

365

Chadd's Ford: 71

Chalco Lake: 354

Chamberlain, Neville: 182

Chancellorsville : 99, 123-24,

127

Chapultepec: 354

Charleston: 75-77, 78, 113

Charlestown Neck: 47

Chateau-Thierry: 163

Chattanooga: 98, 101, 110,

120,123,126-27

Chaudiere River: 64

Chemin des Dames: 163
Chesapeake Bay: 118, 335

Chiang Kai-shek : 174, 229, 274

Chickahominy River: 119

Chickamauga: 126

Chippawa: 341

Choshin Reservoir: 254

Chou En-lai : 237

Christler's Farm: 341

Churchill, Winston: 182, 184-

86,191-92,197-98,390

Churubusco: 354

Civil Operations and

Revolutionary Development

Support (CORDS): 318

INDEX

Continental Line: 61-62

Contreras: 354

Copperheads: 96, 98

Corinth: 117

Cornwallis, Charles: 39, 68-70,

75-77

Corpus Christi: 351

Cronkite, Walter: 264

C. Turner Joy, USS: 274, 310

Cumberland River: 115

Daiquiri : 365

Da Nang: 311-12

Davis, Jefferson: 56, 90, 101,

Civil War: 10, 11, 17-18, 20, 103, 113, 118, 127, 129

21, 24, 29, 32, 35-36, 39, Dayton: 338

56-57,77,81-133,135, Dearborn, Henry: 339, 341

137-38,157,159,162,196, Declaration of Independence :

199, 206, 235, 279, 350, 351, 49, 52

355-56,363,373-75,377, de Gaulle, Charles: 323

379-80,382,389,392,394, Delaware River: 69

396-97 de Lome: 358

Clausewitz, Carl von: 1, 5, 6, Democratic National

22, 26, 37, 100, 226, 227, Convention (1968) : 264

235,384-85 Detroit, Fort: 334, 338-41

Clemenceau, Georges: 156-57, Detroit River: 338-39

166,390 Dewey, George: 359, 361, 365,

Cleveland, Grover: 358 366, 367

Clinton, Henry: 66, 74-76 Diem, Ngo Dinh: See Ngo

Cochrane, Alexander: 342 Dinh Diem

Cold Harbor : 127 Dien Bien Phu: 269-70

Columbia, S.C. : 128 Donelson, Fort: 115-16

Concert of Europe: 138, 168- Dorchester Heights: 64

69 Double Eagle Operation: 313

Concord: 40, 46-48, 52, 63, Douhet, Giulio : 203, 245

274,374 Draft Riot of 1863: 92

Constitutional Government: 147 Dred Scott : 87

Constitution, USS: 338n Dunkirk: 190

Continental Army: 39, 41, 53,

55, 57-58, 61, 66, 68, 69, Early, Jubal: 105

70,74-75,79,93,328 Eastern Front: 142, 161, 162,

Continental Congress : 48, 52, 163

54-57, 63, 89, 93, 371 East Prussia: 151
EAGLE'S TALONS

Ecole Superieure de Guerre :

149

Eisenhower, Dwight D. : 213,

238, 244, 246, 257, 271, 275,

277-78,281

El Alamein: 207

ban: 149

Emancipation Proclamation :

91, 108, 199

Embargo Act: 332

Eniwetok: 214

Erie, Fort: 341

Eritrea: 180

41 2

Fort Ticonderoga: 52, 63-64,

67, 72

Fort Washington: 68

Fourteen Points : 157, 169

Franco-Prussian War: 137-38,

167, 177

Franklin, Tenn. : 104

Fredericksburg: 99, 105, 122-

24, 394

Frederick the Great: 60

Free State of Winston: 90

Fremont, John C. : 119-20

French and Indian War: 39,

Fairfax Operation: 313

Fair Oaks (Seven Pines) : 119

Falkland Islands (Malvinas):

25, 362

43, 389

French Revolution : 19, 139,

175

Frenchtown: 340

Fiihrer: 179

Farragut, David: 117 Fuller, J. F. C. : 200-1

Fascism: 14, 178, 180

Federalists: 126, 332 Gadsden Purchase : 354

Ferdinand, Archduke Franz:

Gates, Horatio: 58, 72, 75

137 Gatling, Richard Jordan : 111,

Filipino Insurgency: 265 157, 304

Five Forks: 128 Gavutu: 194

Five O'Clock Follies: 264, 314 General Assembly (UN): 251

Flaming Dart Operation: 310 Geneva Accords (1954) : 270-

Flanders: 17, 33, 190 71, 277

George, Fort: 72, 341 Foch, Ferdinand: 149, 155 George 111: 48, 93 Formosa: 194 Germantown: 71-72, 73 Forrest, Nathan Bedford: 132 Gettysburg: 81, 83, 104, 125 Fort Detroit: 334, 338-41 Ghent, Peace of: 342-43 Fort Donelson: 115-16 Gia Long: 266

Fort Erie : 341 Giap, Vo Nguyen: See Vo

Fort George: 72, 341 Nguyen Giap

Fort Henry: 115 Gilbert Islands: 188

Fort Malden-. 334, 338-39, 341 Glorious Revolution: 44

Fort McHenry: 342 Godly Wood: 342

Fort Monroe: 118 Gordon, George Henry: 81

Fort Niagara: 341 Gordonsville : 120

Fort Saint John: 72 Grant, Ulysses Simpson: 35,

Fort Sumter: 113, 274, 374 81, 98, 103, 115-17, 123,
125-29,198,227,382-84,

397

Great Compromise of 1850: 87

Great Depression : 168, 174,

178,183

Great Marianas Turkey Shoot:

214

Great Patriotic War: 174, 186,

202

Great War: 135-71, 172, 176-

79, 182, 184, 188, 190, 199,

220,281

Greene, Nathanael: 75

Grenada: 258, 327, 329, 362

Grenville, Richard: 389

Gruening, Ernest : 263

Guadalcanal: 194, 209

Guadalupe Hidalgo: 354

Guam: 214, 367

Guderian, Heinz: 200-1

Gulf of Tonkin : 274, 375

Gulf of Tonkin Incident: 265,

274,276

Gulf of Tonkin Resolution:

263, 274, 310

Hague Convention: 144

Haiphong: 268, 296, 316, 319,

386

Halifax, New Brunswick: 48,

65

Hall Carbine: 110

Halleck, Henry Wager: 102

Hanoi: 262, 271, 296, 319, 386

Harper's Ferry: 87, 338

Harrison's Landing: 119-20

Harrison, William Henry: 340-

41

Hart, Basil Liddell: See Liddell

Hart, Basil

Havana: 358, 361, 364

Head of Elk, Md. : 71

41 3

INDEX

Hearst, William Randolph:

357

Henry, Fort: 115

Hessian: 69, 73

Hirohito: 196

Hiroshima: xiii, 195, 199, 215,

217

Hitler, Adolph: 13, 168, 177,

179-82,185-87,196,208,

373, 379, 402

Ho Chi Minh: 11, 262, 266-

71,279,322

Ho Chi Minh Trail: 307, 319

Hong Kong: 188

Hood, John B. : 104, 127-128

Hooker, Joseph "Fighting

Joe": 99, 123-25

Horn of Africa : 181

Howe Sewing Machine: 113

Howe, William: 51, 55, 64,

66-71,74,77

Hue: 266, 317

Hull, William: 338-39

Husky Operation: 191

Hutier, Oskar von: 162-63

la Drang Valley : 293, 303, 312

Impression : 80, 331-33

Inchon : 227, 237, 240, 247,

251

Indian Wars: 230, 265, 364

Indochinese Union: 266

Influence of Sea Power upon

History. 145

Intolerable Acts: 46, 48

Iranian Revolution: 42

Irreconcilables: 132

Irving Operation: 313

Iwo Jima: 195, 215

Jackson, Andrew: 342

Jackson State University: 264
EAGLE'S TALONS

Jackson, Thomas J.

"Stonewall": 98, 114, 119-

20, 124

James River: 76, 118

Java Sea, Battle of the: 188

Jefferson, Thomas: 140

Johnson, Lyndon B. : 263-64,

274-75,277-78,281,298,

310-11, 313, 317, 375

Johnston, Albert Sidney : 116-

17

41 4

Kwajalein: 214

Ky, Nguyen Cao: See Nguyen

Cao Ky

La Colle Mill: 341

Lake Chalco : 354

Lake Erie : 334, 339, 341

Lake Ontario: 334, 341

Lake Xochimilco : 354

Lanikai Operation: 313

League of Armed Neutrality :

Johnston, Joseph E. : 81, 103-

5, 114, 118, 127-28

Juadenes, Fermin: 367

Junction City Operation: 313

Kaiser: 138, 145, 148, 150,

57, 388

League of Nations: 157, 169,

171, 177, 181, 220, 231

Lebensraum: 181

Lee, Fitzhugh : 358

Lee, Robert E. : 81, 92, 101-6,

166, 179 108, 118-25, 127-29, 131,

Kasserine Pass: 208 353, 382, 384

Kearny, Stephen: 353 Leesburg : 121

Kennebec River: 64 LeMay, Curtis E. : 176

Kennedy, John F. : 271, 277- Levee en Masse: 176

278,296-297 Lexington: 40, 46-48, 52, 63,

Kent State University: 264 274,374

Kesselring, Albert : 209 Leyte Gulf, Battle of. 214

Keynes, John Maynard: 168 Liddell Hart, Basil: vii, 9, 12,

Khmer Rouge: 286 200,201

Khomeini: 42 Liege: 150

Kim 11 Sung: 234, 238 Linares: 352

King's Mountain: 39 Lincoln, Abraham: 11, 27, 37,

Kingston: 334 87-88,90-93,95-99,101-3,

Kissinger, Henry: 275 105-6, 108, 114-15, 119,

Kompong Som (Sihanoukville) : 121-23,127,129,131-32,

308, 316 374,376-77,397

Korean War: xv, 12-15, 18, 23, Linear Tactics: 19, 28, 59, 60

26-27,34,218,223,225-59, Linebacker : 319

269-70, 284, 286, 300, 305, Linebacker 11 : 319

322, 361-62, 372, 374, 376, Loan, Nguyen Ngoc: See

377, 380, 382, 385, 386, Nguyen Ngoc Loan

388,390,395-97 Longstreet, James: 126

Krag-Jorgensen Rifle: 363 Lookout Mountain: 127

Ku Klux Klan: 132 Louisiana Purchase: 344

Kuomintang: 174, 176 Ludendorff, Erich: 163
Luftwaffe: 193, 201, 210-12

Lundy's Lane: 341

Lusitania: 144, 374

Lys River: 163

MacArthur, Douglas: xv, 16,

34-35, 188, 194, 214, 227,

231,236-37,240-42,244,

247,249-56,397

Macdonough, Thomas: 341

Maddox, USS: 274, 310

Magruder, John B. : 118

Mahan, Alfred Thayer: 145,

330,363

Maine, USS: 358, 364, 374-75

Makin: 209

Malaya : 188

Malden, Fort: 334, 338-39,

341

Malheur Operation: 313

Malvinas Islands (Falklands):

25,362

Manassas (Bull Run): 82, 99,

105, 109, 114-15, 117-18,

120,371

Manassas Gap Railroad : 114

Manchukuo: 180

Manchuria: 180, 215

Manila Bay: 330, 359-62,

365-67

Mao Tse-tung: 228, 269, 323,

324

Mariana Islands: 195, 215

Marion, Francis: 75

Market-Garden Operation: 213

Marne River: 163

Marye's Heights: 122-24

Masher Operation: 313

Matamoros: 351-52

Maumee River: 340

Maxim, Hiram: 157

McCarthyism: 228

McCarthy, Joseph : 243, 269

41 5

INDEX

McClellan, George B. : 92, 98-

99,103-4,108,118-22

McClernand, John Alexander:

103

McDowell, Irvin: 105, 114-15,

118-20

McHenry, Fort: 342

McKay Shoe-Stitcher : 113

McKinley, William: 358-62,

364-65,367,397

Meade, George Gordon: 125,

127

Memphis: 117

Merritt, Wesley : 366-67

Messerschmitt: 211

Messina, Strait of: 209

Metternich : 138

Meuse River: 165

Mexican Military College: 354

Mexican War: xix, 14, 96, 103,

327-29,343,344-56,374,

376, 378, 397

Mexico City: 348, 350, 353-55

Midway: 193-94, 205, 207

Miles, Nelson A. : 360, 366

Military Assistance Command,

Vietnam (MACV): 264, 272,

292, 311, 317

Manie Ball : 110

Missionary Ridge: 127

Mississippi River: 96, 98, 101,

115-17,120,128

Missouri Compromise: 87

Missouri, USS: 257

Mitchell, William "Billy": 160,

203,245

Molino del Rey: 354

Molotov: 185

Moltke, Helmuth von (the

elder) : 82, 138

Moltke, Helmuth von (the

younger) : 151

Monmouth: 74
EAGLE'S TALONS

Monroe, Fort: 118

Monterey, Calif. : 353

Monterey, Mexico: 347, 352

Montgomery, Bernard L. : 207,

213

Montojo, Patricio : 365

Montreal: 64, 334, 339, 341

Moravian Town: 341

Morgan, Daniel : 62

Morristown: 70

Morse, Wayne: 263

Munich: 182, 229, 275, 281,

41 6

New Orleans: 117, 329, 336,

342

New York: 40, 42, 51, 55, 67-

68, 70, 74, 76, 78, 92, 362

New York Journal: 357

New York World: 357

Ngo Dinh Diem: 270-73, 277-

78, 280

Nguyen Anh: 266

Nguyen Cao Ky: 285

Nguyen Ngoc Loan: 285

Niagara, Fort: 341

299, 376

Murfreesboro : 123, 126

Mussolini, Benito: 178, 180,

196

Niagara Frontier: 334, 339

Niagara River: 334, 339, 341

Nigerian-Biafran War: 42

Nimitz, Chester: 193-95

Nixon, Richard M. : 275, 278,

Nagasaki: xiii, 195, 199, 215, 298, 319

217 Non-Aggression Treaty (NaziNaktong River: 250 Soviet): 185

Napoleon: 19, 81, 111, 121, Norden Bombsight: 210

136, 139, 141, 176, 206, Normandy: 193, 202, 212, 400

328-31,336-38,341,343, North Africa : 188, 191-92,

389 206-7, 211, 255, 370

Napoleon, Louis (III): 177, 266 North Anna: 127

Nashville: 104, 116, 128 North Atlantic Treaty

National Liberation Front: Organization (NATO): 27,

280,282 300, 323, 389

National Socialism: 178-79 Nueces River: 345-46

NATO (North Atlantic Treaty

Organization): 27, 300, 323, Offensive a Outrance: 150

389 Office of Strategic Services

Naval War College: 360 (OSS): 262

Navarre, Henri: 269 Official Secrets Act: 388

Nazi: 174-76, 179, 181, 183, Okinawa: 195, 215

185-86, 187, 188, 193, 197, Old Ironsides: 338n Olive

204,384 Branch Petition : 48

New Britain: 209 Olympia, USS: 363

New England: 14, 45-47, 51, Omaha Beach: 212

64, 66, 87, 335-36, 348, 371, Operation Attleboro: 313

374,377-78 Operation Barbarossa: 186

New Georgia: 209 Operation Cedar Falls: 313

New Guinea: 209, 214 Operation Double Eagle: 313
Operation Fairfax: 313

Operation Flaming Dart: 310

Operation Husky: 191

Operation Irving 313

Operation Junction City: 313

Operation Lanikai: 313

Operation Malheur: 313

Operation Market-Garden: 213

Operation Masher: 313

Operation Pershing : 313

Operation Silver Bayonet: 293

Operation Starlight: 293, 312

Operation Strangle: 247

Operation Thayer : 313

Operation White Wing: 313

Oran: 207

Oregon, USS: 363

Osan: 249, 251

Pakenham, Edward: 342

Palmer, Dave R. : 51, 52n

Palo Alto: 351

Panmunjom: 256

Paris: 150-51, 166, 179, 212,

268, 319

Pas de Calais : 212

Patton, George S. : 202, 212

Patuxent River: 342

Paulus, Friedrich von: 209

Peace of Ghent: 342-43

Pearl Harbor : 24, 174-75,

183-84,186,189,204,207,

274, 373, 374

Pemberton, John C. : 125-26

Peninsular Campaign: 98, 103,

397

Perry, Oliver Hazard: 341

Perryville : 123

Pershing, John J. "Black Jack"

152-55,163,265

Pershing, Operation: 313

Petersburg : 82, 110, 127-28,

153

41 7

INDEX

Philadelphia : 55, 68, 70-72,

78, 105

Philippine Islands: 188, 194,

214-15, 360, 367, 369

Philippine Sea, Battle of the:

214

Phoenix Program: 318

Phony War: 182

Pickett, George: 125

Pittsburg Landing: 116-17

Pitt, William the Elder: 59

Plan 1919: 200

Plattsburg : 334, 339, 341

Plattsburg Bay: 341

Pleiku : 310, 312

Ploesti: 211

Point Isabel : 351, 353

Polk, James: 26, 329, 347-49,

351-53,378,397

Pope, John: 99, 116, 120

Potomac River: 108, 115, 118-

19, 121, 124

Potsdam Conference : 268

Presque Isle : 341

Prevost, George: 341-42

Princeton: 39, 55, 58, 70-71

Princeton University : 147

Puerto Rico: 359-60, 366-67

Pulitzer, Joseph : 357

Punitive Peace: 36

Punju Stakes : 306

Pusan: 235-37, 239-40, 250-

51

Put-in-Bay: 341

Pyongtaek: 255

Pyongyang: 251

Qadhafi: 369

Quartering Act: 46

Quebec: 64, 333

Queenston: 339

Rabaul : 188
41 8

EAGLE'S TALONS

Race to the Sea: 151 Saigon : 262, 263, 266, 272-73,

Radical Republicans: 132 285, 295, 309-10, 317, 330,

Raleigh: 128 325

Rapidan River: 123 Saint Eustatius: 58

Rappahannock River: 122-24 Saint John, Fort; 72

Reconciliatory Peace: 36 Saint Lawrence River. 64, 333,

Reconstruction : 132, 148 341

Regensburg : 211 Saint-L& 212

Resaca de la Palma: 351 Saint Martin : 58

Revere, Paul: 47 Saint-Mihiel : 163

Revolutionary War: 13, 15, 19, Saint-Tropez : 212

27, 32, 35, 39-80, 83, 89, Saipan : 214

93, 104, 110, 146, 156, 263- SALT 1: 299

64,324,328,334,336-337, Saltillo : 352

338, 343, 371, 374, 380, Sampson, William T. : 365

382,391-92,400 San Diego: 284

Rhee, Syngman: See Syngman San Francisco: 347

Rhee San Juan: 366

Rhineland: 181 San Juan Heights: 366

Rhine River: 213 San Juan Hill : 362, 366

Ribbentrop: 185 San Luis Potosi : 352-53

Richmond: 98-99, 101, 105, Santa Anna, Antonio Lopez

113-14, 118-20, 122, 127 de: 352-54

Ridgway, Matthew B. : 231, Santiago Harbor: 361, 365-66

255-56 Sarajevo : 137

Rio Grande: 345, 351-52 Saratoga : 27, 39, 56, 58, 70,

Rochambeau, Comte de: 76 72-73,75-77

Rodgers, John: 335 Savannah: 78, 128

Rodriguez Canal: 342 Schlieffen, Count Alfred von:

Rolling Thunder: 293, 310-11, 150-51

313-15,319 Schweinfurt: 211

Rommel, Erwin: 207-8 Scott, Dred: 87

Roosevelt, Franklin D. : 183- Scott, Winfield : 82, 95-97,

85,187,190-92,196,198, 114,329,347-48,350,353-

268,322 54,364

Roosevelt, Theodore: 355, 366, SEATO (Southeast Asia Treaty

380 Organization): 271

Rosecrans, W. S. : 123, 126 Second Reich: 177, 179

Ross, Robert : 342 Security Council (UN): 221,

Rough Riders : 366 229, 231, 232

Ruffin, Edmund: 113 Sedgwick, John: 124

Rusk, Dean: 282 Seine River: 212

Selassie, Haile: 181
Seminole War: 265, 369

Seoul: 237, 241, 248-51, 255

Seven Days' Battle : 120

Seven Pines (Fair Oaks): 119

Seven Years' War: 57, 388

Shafter, William R. : 365-66

Sharpsburg (Antietam): 92,

108, 121, 389

Sharps Rifle: 110

Shenandoah Valley : 20, 98,

109, 114, 118-20, 124, 127,

129

Sheridan, Philip H. : 81, 103,

127-29

Sherman, William T. : 17, 20,

27, 35, 37, 81, 103-4, 127-

29

Shiloh : 115, 117, 123, 125

Sicily : 191-92

Sigel, Franz: 20, 127, 129

Sihanoukville (Kompong Som):

308, 316

Silver Bayonet Operation: 293

Singapore: 188

Skoda Works: 158

Smachok: 255

Smith, Kirby: 128

Solomon Islands: 194, 209

Somme River: 163

Sons of Liberty: 47

Southeast Asia Treaty

Organization (SEATO): 271

Spanish-American War: xix,

226, 238, 327, 329, 355-68,

381

Special Forces : 271, 291, 301

Spencer Carbine: 110

Sphere of Co-Equality: 180

Spotsylvania : 127

Springfield, Mass. : 338

Springfield, Trap-Door Rifle:

363

Stalingrad : 202, 208

41 9

INDEX

Stalin, Joseph : 185-86, 190,

191, 197, 208

Stamp Act: 46

Stamp Tax: 44

Stark, John: 73

Starlight Operation: 293, 312

Steuben, Friedrich Wilhelm

von: 74

Stimson Doctrine : 180

Stone Mountain: 83

Strait of Messina: 209

Strangle Operation: 247

Strategic Air Command (SAC):

312

Stuart, J . E. B. : 124

Sudentenland : 170, 182

Sugar Act: 46

Sumter, Fort: 113, 274, 374

Syngman Rhee: 234

Taejon : 249

Talleyrand: 138

Tampa: 364

Tampico: 347, 353

Tarawa: 209

Taylor, Zachary: 329, 345-47,

351-53

Tea Act: 46-47

Tennessee River: 115-17

Ten Years' War: 357

Tet Offensive: xvi, 263-64,

291,295-96,297,299,309,

316-18, 324

Thames River: 341

Thayer Operation: 313

Third Republic: 181

Thomas, George Henry: 128

Ticonderoga: 52, 63-64, 66, 72

Tiger Cages: 285

Tinian :214

Tokyo:215

Tonkin Gulf. 274, 375
EAGLE'S TALONS

Tonkin Gulf Incident: 265,

274,276

Tonkin Gulf Resolution: 263,

274, 310

Toral, Jose: 366

Treaty of Paris: 78

Tredegar Iron Works: 113

Trenchard, Hugh: 160

Trenton: 39, 55, 58, 69-71

Triple Entente: 142, 185

Truman, Harry S: 198, 228,

230, 235, 237, 242, 244, 253,

255,262,269,275-78,281,

322, 395, 397

Trung Sisters: 266

Tsar: 138, 143

Tulagi : 194

Tullahoma: 123

Uijongbu Gap: 248

United Nations: 220-21, 225,

227-29,231-32,234,235,

236-41,242-43,247,249-

56,257-58,380-81

United States Military

Academy (West Point) : 81,

103, 227, 328, 337, 343,

350-51,353,355

Valcour Island : 67

Valley Forge: 72

Van Fleet, James A. : 256

Van Renesselaer, Stephen: 339

Van Tuong Peninsula: 312

Vera Cruz: 348-50, 353-54,

364

Verdun : 17

Versailles : 147, 166-67, 171,

176-77, 179, 181, 216, 219,

223,266

Vichy: 191, 207, 267

Vicksburg: 103-4, 117, 120,

123, 125-27

420

Victoria, Mexico: 348

Vietnam War: xiii, xv, xvi,

xvii, xviii, 10-12, 14-18,

23-27, 35, 41, 51, 130, 218,

223, 227, 261-325, 335, 342,

361-62, 370, 374-78, 380,

382-83,385-88,390,393,

395-98,401-2

Villa, Pancho: 265

Volga River: 208

Voltaire : 32-33

Vo Nguyen Giap: 269, 270

Wake Island : 188

Walker, Walton H. : 250

War between the States : 83

War Hawks: 14, 328, 332-33,

335, 378

War of Northern (Yankee)

Aggression: 83

War of the Rebellion: 83

War of 1812: xviii, xix, 13-14,

35, 77, 80, 95, 140-42, 225,

327-44,347-49,370-71,

373,376-78,380,389

War Powers Act: 225

Warsaw Pact: 389

Warwick: 71

Washington, D.C. : 98, 103,

105,113,115,118-20,125,

284, 311, 342, 353, 358, 397

Washington, Fort: 68

Washington, George : 39, 41,

51-53, 55-57, 59, 61, 63-79,

104, 140, 280, 371, 382

Wehrmacht: 188, 201

Weimar: 168, 177

Western Front: 17, 135, 138,

151-52,157,161,162,174,

199,256

Westmoreland, William C. : 26,

264,292-93,297-98,311-

14,317-18
86,199-200,202,206,219,

256, 281, 370, 371, 373, 379,

389-90,394

World War 11 : 14, 16, 18, 21,

76-77, 263

Zimmermann: 146

INDEX

West Point (US Military 23, 26, 35-36, 135, 140, 160,

Academy): 81, 103, 227, 328, 162,169,171,173-223,225,

337,343,350-51,353,355 227,231,233,239,241-42,

Whig: 329 245-48,255,262,266,269,

White House: 232, 273, 364, 274, 281, 302, 305, 307, 316,

397 327,370,372-73,383-84,

White Plains : 68 389-91,393-98,400-1

White Wing Operation: 313

Wilderness: 127 Xochimilco Lake: 354

Wilkinson, James: 341

Wilson, Woodrow: 139,147- Yalu River: 242, 246, 251-53,

49,152-54,156-57,166, 385

168-71,390 Yamamoto, Isoroku: 193, 205-

Winchester Rifle: 110 7,209

World Court: 3 York: 334, 341

World War I: 17-18, 36-37, York River: 118

135-71,173,177-78,185- Yorktown: 39, 53, 55-59, 70,