J. S20011/15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA :

:

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

v. :

:

ROBERT E. QUICK, : No. 554 WDA 2014

:

 Appellant :

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence, March 6, 2014,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County

Criminal Division at No. CP-25-CR-0001668-2013

BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., SHOGAN AND WECHT, JJ. 

MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED APRIL 15, 2015

Appellant, Robert E. Quick, appeals from the judgment of sentence 

entered on March 6, 2014, in the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County. 

Appointed counsel, John H. Moore, Esq., has filed a petition to withdraw 

accompanied by an Anders brief.1 We grant counsel’s withdrawal petition 

and affirm.

The facts of this matter, as aptly summarized by the trial court, are as 

follows:

This case involves the murder of Aderian Page, 

which occurred on February 22, 2013, inside 

Appellant’s apartment. Police recovered the victim’s 

body on February 28, 2013, in a yard near 

Appellant’s apartment. N.T. Degree Hearing 

(Day 1), 1/13/14, at 72. Police subsequently served 

 

1 See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and Commonwealth v. 

McClendon, 434 A.2d 1185 (Pa. 1981).
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a search warrant at Appellant’s residence and found 

the victim’s blood on Appellant’s living room table 

and clothing. Id., at 78-79, 85. After treating the 

living room with Lumiscene,[Footnote 2] police 

uncovered blood evidence in the center of the room, 

drag marks across the floor and through the front 

door, casting on a television and wall, and wipe 

marks on a wall. Id., at 80-83. Police also 

recovered a baseball bat with the victim’s blood on it 

and paperwork indicating that Appellant was in 

arrears on his financial obligations. Id., at 84-91.

[Footnote 2] Lumiscene is a substance 

that emits a glow when it reacts to the 

presence of blood. Id., at 79.

Trial court opinion, 7/8/14 at 1-2.

On January 8, 2014, appellant pled guilty to a general charge of 

criminal homicide, possessing instruments of crime, theft by unlawful taking, 

and abuse of corpse. In exchange for his plea, the Commonwealth 

nolle prossed the charges of aggravated assault, recklessly endangering 

another person, robbery, and tampering with evidence. Appellant admitted 

to killing the victim by striking him multiple times about the head and body 

with an aluminum baseball bat; unlawfully taking $500 from the victim; 

removing the victim’s body from his apartment; disposing of the body in an 

adjacent yard; and exposing the body to the outdoor elements. (See notes 

of testimony, Plea, 1/8/14 at 6-7, 11-14, 15-17.) Appellant agreed that the 

trial court would determine the degree of guilt for homicide, either first 

degree or third degree, at a subsequent proceeding. (Id., at 21.)
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On January 13, 2014, appellant’s degree of guilt hearing commenced; 

and on January 14, 2014, the trial court found appellant guilty of 

first-degree murder. On March 6, 2014, appellant was sentenced as follows: 

a mandatory term of life imprisonment without parole at Count 1, first 

degree murder; a concurrent term of 1 to 60 months’ imprisonment at 

Count 4, possessing instruments of crime; a concurrent term of 6 to 

60 months’ imprisonment at Count 5, theft by unlawful taking; and a 

consecutive term of 1 to 24 months’ imprisonment at Count 8, abuse of 

corpse. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal on April 4, 2014. 

Thereafter, counsel complied with the trial court’s order to file a concise 

statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P., 

Rule 1925(b), 42 Pa.C.S.A., and the trial court has filed an opinion.

Appellant has raised the following issue for this court’s review:

Whether there was insufficient evidence to find 

Appellant guilty of First Degree Murder[?]

Appellant’s brief at 4.

Counsel having filed a petition to withdraw, we reiterate that “[w]hen 

presented with an Anders brief, this court may not review the merits of the 

underlying issues without first passing on the request to withdraw.” 

Commonwealth v. Daniels, 999 A.2d 590, 593 (Pa.Super. 2010), citing 

Commonwealth v. Goodwin, 928 A.2d 287, 290 (Pa.Super. 2007) 

(en banc) (citation omitted).
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In order for counsel to withdraw from an appeal 

pursuant to Anders, certain requirements must be 

met, and counsel must:

(1) provide a summary of the procedural 

history and facts, with citations to the 

record;

(2) refer to anything in the record that 

counsel believes arguably supports the 

appeal;

(3) set forth counsel’s conclusion that the 

appeal is frivolous; and

(4) state counsel’s reasons for concluding 

that the appeal is frivolous. Counsel 

should articulate the relevant facts of 

record, controlling case law, and/or 

statutes on point that have led to the 

conclusion that the appeal is frivolous.

Id., quoting Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978 A.2d 349, 361 (Pa. 2009).

Upon review, we find that Attorney Moore has complied with all of the 

above requirements. In addition, Attorney Moore served appellant a copy of 

the Anders brief, and advised him of his right to proceed pro se or hire a 

private attorney to raise any additional points he deemed worthy of this 

court’s review. Appellant has not responded to counsel’s motion to 

withdraw. As we find the requirements of Anders and Santiago are met, 

we will proceed to the issue on appeal.

Our standard of review for sufficiency is clear. We 

must determine whether the evidence admitted at 

trial, and all reasonable inferences derived 

therefrom, when viewed in the light most favorable 

to the Commonwealth as verdict winner, supports all 

of the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable 
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doubt. Commonwealth v. Bomar, 573 Pa. 426, 

826 A.2d 831, 840 (2003). In making this 

determination, we consider both direct and 

circumstantial evidence, cognizant that 

circumstantial evidence alone can be sufficient to 

prove every element of an offense. 

Commonwealth v. Gorby, 527 Pa. 98, 588 A.2d 

902, 906 (1991). We may not substitute our own 

judgment for the jury’s, as it is the fact finder’s 

province to weigh the evidence, determine the 

credibility of witnesses, and believe all, part, or none 

of the evidence submitted. Commonwealth v. 

Hawkins, 549 Pa. 352, 701 A.2d 492, 501 (1997).

Commonwealth v. Cooper, 941 A.2d 655, 662 (Pa. 2007).

Evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction of 

first-degree murder where the Commonwealth 

establishes that a human being was unlawfully killed, 

that the person accused did the killing, and that the 

accused acted with a specific intent to kill. 

Commonwealth v. May, 584 Pa. 640, 887 A.2d 

750, 753 (2005). An intentional killing is one that is 

willful, deliberate, and premeditated. 18 Pa.C.S. 

§ 2502(d).

Id. “Specific intent to kill can be proven where the defendant knowingly 

applies deadly force to the person of another.” Commonwealth v. 

Hawkins, 701 A.2d 492, 500 (Pa. 1997) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 

523 U.S. 1083 (1998).

As previously stated, after entering a guilty plea to a general charge of 

criminal homicide, appellant agreed that the trial court would determine 

whether he committed first-degree or third-degree murder. As such, the 

issue before the trial court was whether the Commonwealth’s evidence was 

sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that “the accused acted with 
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malice and a specific intent to kill.” Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 36 A.3d 

24, 37 (Pa. 2011). Appellant argues he only intended to drive the victim out 

of his apartment. (Appellant’s brief at 7.)

Dr. Eric Vey, a forensic pathologist with the Erie County Coroner’s 

Office, performed an autopsy of the victim on March 2, 2013. Dr. Vey 

testified at the degree of guilt hearing regarding the injuries he observed. 

Dr. Vey acknowledged there were five or six strikes with a baseball bat, with 

a majority hitting the victim’s head. (Notes of testimony, Degree of Guilt 

hearing, Day 1, 1/13/14 at 64.) In particular, Dr. Vey discussed two 

lacerations to the back of the victim’s head caused by either one or two 

blows from the baseball bat. Dr. Vey testified that while not fatal, those 

blows definitely had a severe effect; i.e., either rendering the victim 

unconscious, or at the very least, “woozy” from getting hit in the head. (Id.

at 21-22.) Dr. Vey concluded the victim’s cause of death was due to blunt 

force trauma to the head. (Id. at 12.)

Appellant testified that he let the victim, his drug dealer, into his 

house on the night in question. (Id. at 106.) Appellant stated that when he 

admitted he owed another drug dealer $60, the victim walked up, pointed 

his finger at appellant, and then with a fist “got [appellant] in the lip.” (Id.) 

Appellant called the victim a “MF” and told him he should not hit his clients. 

(Id.) According to appellant, he thought the victim may have a gun so 

when the victim turned, appellant picked up the baseball bat. (Id. at 
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106-107.) Appellant stated he thought he would knock the victim out and 

get him out of the house because appellant did not want his house trashed 

and he was scared. (Id. at 107.) Appellant claimed to have hit the victim 

once, but the victim “came at him like a football player.” (Id. at 109.) 

When asked how many times he hit the victim, appellant stated: “I can’t 

even answer that to be honest with you. It was so fast. It was like it was in 

slow -- like a dream. I can’t even answer that for you.” (Id. at 109.) Later 

in his testimony, appellant acknowledged that he hit the victim “at least 

three times.” (Id. at 110.) Appellant admitted he never saw the victim pull 

out a gun. (Id. at 109-110.)

Appellant’s own testimony is certainly damning in that he first struck 

the victim after he turned away. See Commonwealth v. Cruz, 919 A.2d 

279, 281 (Pa.Super. 2007) (finding that evidence that the defendant shot 

the victim in the back with a firearm was sufficient to support an inference of 

malice and specific intent to kill). The forensic evidence that indicated 

appellant repeatedly struck the victim’s head with a baseball bat causing 

numerous injuries was sufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that 

appellant acted with malice and specific intent to kill. Commonwealth v. 

Nichols, 692 A.2d 181 (Pa.Super. 1992) (finding that a baseball bat, when 

swung at a victim’s head, constitutes a deadly weapon).

Instantly, when viewed in the light most favorable to the 

Commonwealth, the evidence refutes appellant’s claim that he only intended 
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to knock the victim out, but rather inflicted a series of blows that ultimately 

resulted in the victim’s death. Additionally, we observe the trial court did 

not find appellant’s testimony credible. See trial court opinion, 7/8/14 at 6. 

Having determined that the instant appeal is wholly frivolous, and, 

after our own independent review, that there are no issues of arguable merit 

apparent from the record, we will grant Attorney Moore’s petition to 

withdraw and affirm the judgment of sentence.

Petition to withdraw granted. Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 4/15/2015