Present: All the Justices 

JASON H. SHEPPARD, JR. 

 OPINION BY 

v. Record No. 130971 JUSTICE LEROY F. MILLETTE, JR.

 April 17, 2014 

LINDA JUNES, ADMINISTRATOR OF 

THE ESTATE OF JOHN WARREN SHEPPERD 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ARLINGTON COUNTY 

William T. Newman, Jr., Judge 

In this appeal we consider the impact of a half-blood 

relative on the distribution of the paternal side of an 

intestate estate when all of the heirs are collaterals1

 and the 

estate must be separated into paternal and maternal parts. 

I. Facts and Proceedings 

John Warren Shepperd died without having executed a will. 

In life, John never married and had no children. At the time 

of his death, John's parents and older sister had predeceased 

him. John's older sister had no children. 

Linda Junes was appointed administrator of John's estate. 

Linda identified fourteen second cousins from John's maternal 

side, including Linda herself, who survived John's death. 

These fourteen second cousins stand in equal relation to John, 

and they do not dispute that, among themselves, they are 

 1

 A "collateral heir" is "[o]ne who is neither a direct 

descendant nor an ancestor of the decedent, but whose kinship 

is through a collateral line, such as a brother, sister, uncle, 

aunt, nephew, niece, or cousin." Black's Law Dictionary 791 

(9th ed. 2009). 
2

entitled to equal 1/14 shares of whatever interest they 

collectively have in John's estate. After certification by a 

genealogical research firm, Linda also accepted Jason H. 

Sheppard, Jr., as John's half-uncle from John's paternal side 

who survived John's death. 

Linda, in her capacity as administrator, filed a motion 

for aid and direction in the Circuit Court of Arlington County. 

Linda sought judicial assistance to determine the proper 

distribution proportions of John's estate according to 

Virginia's statutory scheme governing intestate succession 

because Jason's half-blood status complicated the task. In 

particular, Linda sought assistance to determine whether either 

(1) Jason could take the entirety of John's estate that was to 

pass to John's paternal side, because Jason was the only 

relative on John's paternal side, or (2) Jason could only take 

one-half of John's estate that was to pass to John's paternal 

side, and the remainder was to be distributed to the fourteen 

second cousins, because half-bloods can only take half of the 

inheritance of whole-bloods. 

After a hearing on the issue, the circuit court held that, 

because of Jason's half-blood status, Jason could only take a 

one-half share of John's estate that was to pass to John's 

paternal side, and the remainder of John's entire estate was to 

go to the fourteen maternal second cousins. The court then 
3

entered a final order memorializing that ruling, citing Code 

§§ 64.2-202(B) and 64.2-203(B) in support of its decision. 

Jason timely filed a petition for appeal with this Court. 

We granted two assignments of error: 

1. The trial court erred when it held that the sole 

collateral heir on the paternal side of an intestate 

estate is limited to only one-half of the paternal 

share because he is a half-blood relative of the 

decedent, and that the other half of the paternal 

share shall be distributed to all other heirs on the 

maternal side. 

2. The trial court erred when it applied Virginia 

Code Section 64.2-203(B), which prohibits "double 

inheritance" by an heir who is related to the 

decedent on both the maternal and paternal side, to a 

situation where a half-blood heir is only related to 

the decedent on the paternal side. 

II. Discussion 

A. Standard of Review 

This appeal requires us to construe statutory language. 

That task requires a de novo review because it involves a 

purely legal issue. L.F. v. Breit, 285 Va. 163, 176, 736 

S.E.2d 711, 718 (2013). 

B. Virginia Law Governing Intestate Succession 

Well established principles guide our analysis. We 

construe statutes to "ascertain and give effect to the 

intention" of the General Assembly. Rutter v. Oakwood Living 

Ctrs. of Va., Inc., 282 Va. 4, 9, 710 S.E.2d 460, 462 (2011) 

(internal quotation marks omitted). Typically, this only 
4

requires applying the plain meaning of the words used in the 

statute because the General Assembly's intent "is usually selfevident from the statutory language." Id. (internal quotation 

marks omitted); see also Boynton v. Kilgore, 271 Va. 220, 227, 

623 S.E.2d 922, 925-26 (2006). However, we look beyond the 

words of the statute to help ascertain what those words mean if 

the statutory language is ambiguous. Virginia Broad. Corp. v. 

Commonwealth, 286 Va. 239, 249, 749 S.E.2d 313, 318 (2013). 

Also, we construe the statute's plain language in a manner that 

avoids absurdity. See Cook v. Commonwealth, 268 Va. 111, 116, 

597 S.E.2d 84, 87 (2004). 

Further, "we do not read statutes in isolation." L.F., 

285 Va. at 180, 736 S.E.2d at 720. Thus, we must consider "a 

statute in its entirety, rather than by isolating particular 

words or phrases." Small v. Fannie Mae, 286 Va. 119, 127, 747 

S.E.2d 817, 821 (2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Similarly, "statutes dealing with a specific subject must be 

construed together in order to arrive at the object sought to 

be accomplished." Alston v. Commonwealth, 274 Va. 759, 769, 

652 S.E.2d 456, 462 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

1. Code § 64.2-200 

We start with Code § 64.2-200(A), which states: "The real 

estate of any decedent not effectively disposed of by will 

descends and passes by intestate succession in the following 
5

course." If a decedent fails to effectively dispose of his 

personal estate by will, the decedent's personal estate, "after 

payment of funeral expenses, charges of administration, and 

debts, and subject to the provisions of Article 2 . . . of 

Chapter 3," is distributed in the same manner as set forth in 

Code § 64.2-200. Code § 64.2-201(A). Code § 64.2-200 

therefore governs to whom a decedent's estate passes if that 

decedent failed to execute a will and therefore died intestate. 

Code § 64.2-200 provides a sequential list of hierarchical 

classes of people to whom the decedent's estate may pass, set 

up by the General Assembly in descending priority. Each class 

on the list is defined by that class's relationship with the 

decedent, and the further down the list one goes the more 

distant the relation becomes. It is clear from the sequential 

nature of Code § 64.2-200's plain language that each subsection 

of that statute must be assessed in the order listed. Only if 

a subsection does not apply because no person qualifies as a 

member of that particular class may the next subsection be 

considered. 

Accordingly, because John had no surviving spouse, no 

children, no surviving parents, and neither a surviving brother 

or sister nor a brother or sister who had descendants, the 

first subsection of the statute applicable to John's estate is 

Code § 64.2-200(A)(5). 
6

The preamble to Code § 64.2-200(A)(5) states that "[i]f 

there is none of the foregoing, then one-half of the estate 

descends and passes to the paternal kindred and one-half 

descends and passes to the maternal kindred of the decedent in 

the following course." When a decedent's estate is separated 

in this manner, each separate portion of the estate is commonly 

referred to as a "moiety." See Black's Law Dictionary 1096 

(9th ed. 2009). We have previously explained, in the context 

of the predecessor to Code § 64.2-200(A)(5), what effect this 

separation has on the distribution of a decedent's estate: 

[After a decedent's estate is separated into 

moieties], each moiety goes to the proper kindred as 

a class, on the paternal and maternal side 

respectively, and there is no further division into 

moieties as between the branches of paternal and 

maternal kindred. And each moiety keeps on its own 

side, regardless of the other, so long as there are 

any kindred, however remote, on that side. 

Williams v. Knowles, 178 Va. 84, 99, 16 S.E.2d 316, 322 (1941) 

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (emphasis 

omitted). 

Given that Code § 64.2-200(A)(5) applies in this case, 

John's estate must be divided into two different, but equally 

valued, moieties. One moiety passes to John's paternal kindred 

and the other moiety passes to John's maternal kindred. These 

moieties are treated as entirely separate so long as each 
7

passes to statutorily-identified kindred. See Code § 64.2-

200(B); Williams, 178 Va. at 99, 16 S.E.2d at 322-23. 

We now turn to the subsections of Code § 64.2-200(A)(5), 

and address those subsections in sequential order. For each 

moiety, the statutory provisions in Code § 64.2-200(A)(5)(a) 

through (e) are applied separately and independently. See, 

e.g., Williams, 178 Va. at 99, 16 S.E.2d at 322-23. 

John's paternal side moiety does not pass under Code 

§ 64.2-200(A)(5)(a) because John had no surviving grandparent 

on his paternal side. Code § 64.2-200(A)(5)(b) states that 

"[i]f there is none of the foregoing, then to the decedent's 

uncles and aunts, and their descendants." Jason was an uncle 

on John's paternal side, and therefore John's paternal side 

moiety passes to Jason pursuant to Code § 64.2-200(A)(5)(b). 

Linda sought judicial aid and direction only for the 

proper distribution of John's paternal side moiety. Thus, we 

would typically not address to what class John's maternal side

moiety passes. However, Code § 64.2-200 requires a 

determination as to how John's maternal side moiety passes 

because if no maternal side kindred survived John's death, the 

moieties are rejoined and treated once again as a single 

estate. See Code § 64.2-200(B); Williams, 178 Va. at 99, 16 

S.E.2d at 322-23. Neither moiety would independently exist if 
8

the moieties are rejoined, and instead the entire estate would 

pass according to the terms of Code § 64.2-200(B) or (C). 

For this limited purpose, we recognize that fourteen 

maternal second cousins survived John's death. The record is 

unclear how these fourteen second cousins are related to John. 

These second cousins may be descendants of John's maternal side 

uncles or aunts, or they may be descendants of the brothers or 

sisters of John's maternal side grandparents. For purposes of 

this appeal, we need not discern how these second cousins are 

related to John. Instead, because John had no surviving 

grandparents or great-grandparents on John's maternal side, we 

recognize that John's maternal side moiety passes to the 

fourteen second cousins under Code § 64.2-200(A)(5)(b) or Code 

§ 64.2-200(A)(5)(d). 

Thus, Code § 64.2-200(A)(5) requires John's estate to be 

divided into two separate, equally valued moieties. Code 

§ 64.2-200(A)(5)(b) establishes that John's paternal side 

moiety passes to Jason. Code § 64.2-200(A)(5)(b) or Code 

§ 64.2-200(A)(5)(d) establishes that John's maternal side 

moiety passes to John's fourteen second cousins. 

2. Code § 64.2-202 

We now turn to Code § 64.2-202, which governs the 

distribution of a decedent's estate among all persons who 

qualify as part of the class to whom the decedent's estate 
9

passes under Code § 64.2-200,2 and addresses when persons take 

per capita,3 when persons take per stirpes,4 and the treatment 

of collaterals of the half blood. In particular, under Code 

§ 64.2-202(A) the decedent's estate must be divided into equal 

shares based on the number of "heirs and distributees" who 

qualify as part of the relevant class, so long as such persons 

either survive the decedent's death, or, if they did not 

survive the decedent's death, such persons left descendants who 

did survive the decedent's death. Once the number of shares is 

calculated, one share is distributed to each "such heir and 

distributee" on a per capita basis and to "such descendants" on 

a per stirpes basis. See also Ball v. Ball, 68 Va. (27 Gratt.) 

325, 327 (1876) ("Whenever those entitled to partition are in 

the same degree of kindred to the intestate, they shall take 

per capita or by persons; and where a part of them being dead 

and a part living, the issue of those dead shall take per 

stirpes."). 

 2

 Code § 64.2-202(A) expressly exempts Code § 64.2-

200(A)(1) from its distribution scheme because Code § 64.2-

200(A)(1) sets forth its own distribution scheme if a 

decedent's estate passes to a surviving spouse. 

3

 "Per capita" means to "[d]ivide[] equally among all 

individuals . . . in the same class" and to "tak[e] as an 

individual and not as a representative of an ancestor." 

Black's Law Dictionary at 1250. 

4

 "Per stirpes" means "[p]roportionately divided between 

beneficiaries according to their deceased ancestor's share." 

Black's Law Dictionary at 1260. 
10

Code § 64.2-202(A) states clearly that this division of 

the estate among equally positioned relatives applies either to 

the decedent's entire estate, or to "each half portion of such 

estate when division is required by subdivision A 5 of § 64.2-

200." (Emphasis added.) Therefore, the provisions of Code 

§ 64.2-202(A) independently apply to each moiety of John's 

estate created pursuant to Code § 64.2-200(A)(5). Code § 64.2-

202(A); see also Williams, 178 Va. at 99, 16 S.E.2d at 322-23. 

Jason, who is the only member of the class to which John's 

paternal side moiety passes under Code § 64.2-200, takes the 

entirety of John's paternal side moiety. Code § 64.2-202(A). 

Because that paternal side moiety is one-half of John's entire 

estate, Jason takes one-half of John's estate.5

This concludes our review of the applicable statutory 

provisions that properly determine how John's paternal side 

moiety should be distributed. The circuit court erred to the 

extent it held otherwise. 

 5

 Although we are required to determine to what class 

John's maternal side moiety passed under Code § 64.2-200, 

determining how John's maternal side moiety is distributed 

proportionally among members of that class under Code § 64.2-

202(A) is not in dispute and, therefore, unnecessary for 

purposes of this appeal. 
11

3. Other Statutory Provisions 

We now address those statutory provisions which Linda 

argues require a different result, or which the circuit court 

cited in support of its incorrect application of law. 

Citing Code § 64.2-202(B), Linda argues that, because 

Jason is a half-blood collateral, he can only take half of 

John's paternal side moiety that he would otherwise be entitled 

to receive. Citing Code § 64.2-200(B), Linda argues that the 

portion of John's paternal side moiety that Jason is deprived 

of should instead pass to the maternal heirs. We disagree. 

a. Code § 64.2-200(B) 

Code § 64.2-200(B) applies if "there are either no 

surviving paternal kindred or no surviving maternal kindred, 

[or] there are neither maternal nor paternal kindred." As 

already established, Code § 64.2-200 is a sequential listing of 

potential, legislatively prioritized classes to whom a 

decedent's estate passes. When reviewing the Code § 64.2-200 

categories in sequential order, if a subsection applies because 

a member of the identified class exists, a court must conclude 

its analysis at that point in applying Code § 64.2-200. 

John's paternal side moiety passed to the class identified 

in Code § 64.2-200(A)(5)(b). John's maternal side moiety 

passed to the class identified in Code § 64.2-200(A)(5)(b) or 

Code § 64.2-200(A)(5)(d). Code § 64.2-200(B) is listed 
12

subsequent to Code § 64.2-200(A)(5)(a) through (e) and, by its 

terms, only applies if Code § 64.2-200(A)(5)(a) through (e) are 

inapplicable to either or both moieties. Thus, Code § 64.2-

200(B) does not apply and cannot affect distribution of John's 

paternal side moiety under Code § 64.2-202(A). 

b. Code § 64.2-202(B) 

Code § 64.2-202(B) provides that "collaterals of the half 

blood shall inherit only half as much as those of the whole 

blood." Code § 64.2-202(B) begins with the phrase 

"[n]otwithstanding the provisions of subsection A." This 

phrase indicates that the half-blood rule of Code § 64.2-202(B) 

operates to modify only the application of Code § 64.2-202(A). 

Moreover, by its terms, Code § 64.2-202(B) does not alter the 

division of the moieties required by Code § 64.2-200(A)(5). 

Thus, once the application of Code § 64.2-202(A) to each moiety 

is separately established, the extent to which Code § 64.2-

202(B) modifies the Code § 64.2-202(A) distribution of John's 

paternal side moiety must be determined. 

It is clear that Code § 64.2-202(B) does not modify the 

Code § 64.2-202(A) distribution in this case. John's paternal 

side moiety passes to a class comprised of only one heir: 

Jason. Even though Jason is a half-blood collateral heir, no 

whole-blood collateral heir exists as part of that class to 

which John's paternal side moiety passes. See Code § 64.2-
13

200(A)(5)(b). Without such a whole-blood collateral, no wholeblood inheritance exists to provide a statutory basis for 

applying Code § 64.2-202(B) to reduce John's inheritance. 

Thus, Code § 64.2-202(B) does not affect distribution of John's 

paternal side moiety as provided under Code § 64.2-202(A). 

Moreover, it is of no consequence that John's fourteen 

second cousins are whole-blood collaterals. These fourteen 

second cousins take pursuant to John's maternal side moiety, 

and have no interest in John's paternal side moiety. Code 

§ 64.2-200(A)(5). Their existence does not affect the class to 

which John's paternal side moiety passes, they are not a part 

of that class, and they do not alter the distribution of shares 

among the heirs within that class. Code §§ 64.2-200(A)(5); 

64.2-202(A); Williams, 178 Va. at 99, 16 S.E.2d at 322-23. 

c. Code § 64.2-203(B) 

Code § 64.2-203(B) provides that "[a] person who is 

related to the decedent through two lines of relationship is 

entitled to only a single share based on the relationship that 

would entitle him to the larger share." The circuit court 

cited this provision as limiting Jason's distribution to onehalf of John's paternal side moiety. This was error. 

Code § 64.2-203(B) is implicated when an individual is 

related to a decedent in more than one way. The record 

reflects that Jason is related to John by only one line of 
14

relationship. That is, Jason relates to John only by being 

John's half-uncle on John's paternal side. Thus, Code § 64.2-

203(B) is not implicated and cannot affect distribution of 

John's paternal side moiety under Code § 64.2-202(A). 

III. Conclusion 

The circuit court erred in distributing John's estate so 

that Jason took only a one-half share of John's paternal side 

moiety and therefore received only 1/4 of John's total estate. 

A correct application of the relevant statutory provisions 

requires a different result. 

Code § 64.2-200(A)(5) requires separation of John's entire 

estate into two moieties, each valued at one-half of John's 

estate. One moiety passes to John's maternal kindred, and Code 

§ 64.2-200(A)(5)(b) or Code § 64.2-200(A)(5)(d) requires that 

maternal side moiety to pass to John's fourteen second cousins. 

The other moiety passes to John's paternal kindred, and Code 

§ 64.2-200(A)(5)(b) requires that paternal side moiety to pass 

to Jason. Further, Code § 64.2-202(A) requires John's paternal 

side moiety to be distributed entirely to Jason, and neither 

Code §§ 64.2-200(B), 64.2-202(B), nor 64.2-203(B) affects that 

distribution. We will therefore reverse the judgment of the 

circuit court and enter final judgment in favor of Jason. 

Reversed and final judgment.