alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
§ 158.270 Effect of rebate payments on solvency. ( a ) If a State's insurance commissioner, superintendent, or other responsible official determines that the payment of rebates by a domestic issuer in that State will cause the issuer's risk based capital (RBC) level to fall below the Company Action Level RBC, as defined in the NAIC's Risk Based Capital (RBC) for Insurers Model Act, the commissioner, superintendent, or other responsible official must notify the Secretary. In such a circumstance, the commissioner, superintendent, or other responsible official may request that the Secretary defer all or a portion of the rebate payments owed by the issuer.
( b ) In the event an insurance commissioner, superintendent, or other responsible official makes the request set forth in paragraph (a) of this section, the following should be provided to the Secretary along with the notification: ( 1 ) The domestic issuer's RBC reports for the current calendar year and the 2 preceding calendar years; and
( 2 ) A calculation of the amount of rebates that would be owed by the domestic issuer pursuant to this part.
( c ) Upon receipt of the notification under paragraph (a), the Secretary will examine the information provided by the insurance commissioner, superintendent, or other responsible official along with any other information the Secretary may request from the issuer, and determine whether the payment of rebates by the issuer will cause its RBC level to fall below the Company Action Level RBC.
( d ) When the Secretary determines that the payment of rebates by an issuer will cause its RBC level to fall below the Company Action Level RBC, the Secretary may permit a deferral of all or a portion of the rebates owed, but only for a period determined by the Secretary in consultation with the State. The Secretary will require that the issuer must pay these rebates with interest in a future year in which payment of the rebates would not cause the issuer's RBC level to fall below the Company Action Level RBC.
UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

NATIONAL VEHICLE AND FUEL EMISSIONS LABORATORY 

2565 PLYMOUTH ROAD 

ANN ARBOR, MICHIGAN 48105-2498

 

 

MEMORANDUM

 

SUBJECT: November 6, 2009 meeting with Chrysler at NVFEL 

FROM: Antonio Fernandez 

TO: Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2009-0472 

DATE: November 6, 2010 

______________________________________________________________________________ 

This memorandum documents a meeting held on Friday, November 6, 2009 between 

Tony Fernandez, Tad Wysor and Ed Nam of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and 

the following Chrysler representatives: 

-Gary Oshnock 

-Mike Renaldi 

-Pete Mueller 

-Mike Hartrick 

Also participating via phone were representatives for NHTSA including: 

-Rebecca Yoon 

-Greg Powel 

-Kevin Green 

The discussion centered around additional clarification of the proposed air conditioning credits, 

both direct and indirect. Additionally, Chrysler representatives suggested additional detail in the 

descriptions of indirect emissions technology descriptions. 

OFFICE OF 

AIR AND RADIATION
§ 1174.9 Answer to a complaint. ( a ) A defendant may file an answer with the reviewing official within thirty days of service of the complaint. An answer will be considered a request for an oral hearing.
( b ) In the answer, the defendant— ( 1 ) Must admit or deny each allegation of liability contained in the complaint (a failure to deny an allegation is considered an admission);
( 2 ) Must state any defense on which the defendant intends to rely;
( 3 ) May state any reasons why the penalties, assessments, or both should be less than the statutory maximum; and
( 4 ) Must state the name, address, and telephone number of the person the defendant authorized to act as the defendant's representative, if any.
( c ) If the defendant is unable to file a timely answer which meets the requirements set forth in paragraph (b) of this section, the defendant may file with the reviewing official a general answer denying liability, requesting a hearing, and requesting an extension of time in which to file a complete answer. The defendant must file a general answer within thirty days of service of the complaint.
( d ) If the defendant initially files a general answer requesting an extension of time, the reviewing official must promptly file with the ALJ the complaint, the general answer, and the request for an extension of time.
( e ) For good cause shown, the ALJ may grant the defendant up to thirty additional days within which to file an answer that meets the requirements of paragraph (b) of this section. The defendant must file such an answer with the ALJ and must serve a copy on the reviewing official.
Exhibit
32.1




Certification


Pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350,


As
Adopted


Pursuant
to Section 906 of the


Sarbanes
- Oxley Act of 2002




In
connection with the Annual Report of Yanglin Soybean, Inc. (the “Company”), on
Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2009 as filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission (“SEC”) on the date hereof (the “Report”), each of the
undersigned of the Company, certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350, as adopted
pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:




(1)
            the Report fully complies, in all
      material respects, with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
      Securities Exchange Act of 1934;
and





(2)
            the information contained in the
      Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition
      and results of operations of the
Company.




/s/
      Shulin LiuName:
                  Shulin
      LiuTitle:
                  Chief
      Executive OfficerApril
      15, 2010/s/
      Shaocheng XuName:
                  Shaocheng
      XuTitle:
                  Chief
      Financial OfficerApril
      15, 2010




A signed
original of this written statement required by Section 906 of the Sarbanes Oxley
Act of 2002 has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company
and will be furnished to the SEC or its staff upon request. This exhibit is not
“filed” for purposes of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 but is
instead furnished as provided by applicable rules of the SEC.
#### Peter F. McLaurin, Appellant, *v.*The Cuba Company, Respondent.

*McLaurin*v. *Cuba Co.,*113 App. Div. 896, affirmed.

(Argued October 22, 1907;

decided November 19, 1907.)

Appeal from a judgment of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the second judicial department, entered May 11, 1906, affirming a judgment in favor of defendant entered upon a verdict directed by the court in an action to__ recover for an alleged breach of contract.

*George B. Covington*for appellant.

*Howard Mansfield*and *Herbert C. Lakin*for respondent.

Judgment affirmed, with costs ; no opinion.

Concur: Cullen, Ch. J., Gray, O’Brien, Vann, Werner and Chase, JJ. Not sitting: Willard Bartlett, J.
EXHIBIT 32

CERTIFICATIONS OF JOSEPH R. ROZELLE, PRINCIPAL EXECUTIVE OFFICER
           AND PRINCIPAL FINANCIAL OFFICER, PURSUANT
                   TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350

       In connection with the Annual Report on Form 10-K of Emerald
Acquisition Corporation (the "Company") for the period ended
December 31, 2006, as filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, the undersigned
officer of the Company, certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section
1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, that to the best of my knowledge:

       1.  The Report fully complies with the requirements of
section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

       2.  The information contained in the Report fairly
presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and
results of operations of the Company.


Date:  March 30, 2007              /s/    JOSEPH R. ROZELLE
                                   ---------------------------------
                                   JOSEPH R. ROZELLE
                                   Principal Executive Officer
                                   and Principal Financial Officer


The foregoing certification is being furnished as an exhibit to
the Form 10-K pursuant to Item 601(b)(32) of Regulation S-K and
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (subsections (a)
and (b) of Section 1350, Chapter 63 of Title 18, United States
Code) and, accordingly, is not being filed as part of the Form
10-K for purposes of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, as amended, and is not incorporated by reference into any
filings of the Company, whether made before or after the date
hereof, regardless of any general incorporation language in such
filing.
No. 5180.

#### Dan Murphy *v.*The State.

Obstructing Public Road—Pact Case.—The gravamen of the offense of obstructing a public road is that the act was *willfully*done by the accused. See the opinion and the statement of the case for the effect *334and substance of evidence *held*insufficient to support a conviction for ■ ■willfully obstructing a public road, inasmuch as the evidence leaves the true location or route of the road in doubt and uncertainty.

Appeal from the County Court of Williamson. Tried below before the Hon. W. M. Key, County Judge.

This conviction was for the willful obstruction of a public road, and the penalty assessed by the jury was a fine of twenty-five dollars.

The evidence in this case disclosed that the road alleged to have been obstructed was located in 1881; that it ran over an open, unfenced prairie country, and that the road bed, as the country became populated and fenced, shifted according to the fancy or convenience of the traveling public. It was shown that, when the defendant built his fence, the road nearly divided his land in halves, having at different periods traversed it at different angles. Defendant sought information from neighbors, when he built his fence, as to whether the road was a public or private road, and was informed by more than one that it was not a public road. In short, the evidence fails to show that the defendant knew the meanderings of the road, or that he knew it to be a public road, when he built his fence across it.

*Cochran & Parker,*for the appellant.

*W. L. Davidson,*Assistant Attorney General, for the State.

Hurt, Judge.

Appellant was convicted for unlawfully and willfully obstructing a public road.

After proving that the road obstructed was legally established, etc., the State, to sustain the charge that appellant was guilty of willfully obstructing the same, introduced several witnesses to show that appellant obstructed the road by building a new fence across the same. But it was also shown that the said road had no definitely settled route, the line of travel varying over a breadth of several hundred yards, rendering it reasonable that appellant was mistaken as to its true location.

After a careful examination of the statement of facts, we are left in doubt as to the location of the road. Without noticing all the questions presented in the able brief of appellant’s counsel, we hold that the conviction should not stand; for the reason *335that, if appellant did obstruct the road as charged, it does not appear from the record that it was “willfully” done.

Opinion delivered May 7, 1887.

The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.

*Beversed and remanded.*
kld-ex107_14.htm



 

Exhibit 10.7

 

 

 

April 23, 2020

 

Krystina Jones

 

Dear Ms. Jones:

 

You were previously granted an award (the “RSU Award”) of 40,000 restricted stock units (“RSUs”) pursuant to the terms of the KLDiscovery Inc. 2019 Incentive Award Plan (the “Plan”) and an award agreement thereunder (the “RSU Agreement”).  As discussed, set forth below are the terms of our mutual agreement regarding changes in certain terms of the RSUs granted to you.

 

Effective as of the date hereof, you agree to forfeit, for no compensation, 6,667 of the RSUs subject to the RSU Award (the “Forfeited RSUs”) so that the shares otherwise subject to the Forfeited RSUs may be allocated to other participants in the Plan.  You will cease to have any rights with respect to the Forfeited RSUs as of the date hereof.  The RSU Agreement is hereby amended so that the “Number of RSUs” set forth therein shall equal 33,333 (the “Retained RSUs”) which shall be reduced ratably from each vesting tranche. 

 

Except as expressly set forth in this letter agreement, the RSU Agreement and the terms of your other contracts and compensatory arrangements with the Company remain unchanged and continue in full force and effect in accordance with and subject to their terms.  For the avoidance of doubt, the Retained RSUs will continue to be subject to the terms of the Plan and the RSU Agreement.

 

This letter agreement will be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of the State of Delaware, without giving effect to any choice or conflict of laws provision or rule that would cause the application of the laws of any other jurisdiction.

 

Please indicate your agreement to the foregoing by returning a countersigned copy of this letter to me.  

 

Sincerely,

 

/s/ Andy Southam 

 

Andy Southam 

General Counsel 

 

 

Accepted and agreed:

 

 

/s/ Krystina Jones

Krystina Jones

 

KLDiscovery Inc

8201 Greensboro Drive, Suite 300kldiscovery.com

McLean, VA 22102
#### § 2400.61 Postponement of award.

Upon application to the Foundation, a Fellow may seek postponement of his or her fellowship because of ill health or other mitigating circumstances, such as military duty, temporary disability, necessary care of an immediate family member, or unemployment as a teacher. Substantiation of the reasons for the requested postponement of study will be required. All postponements are given at the Foundation's discretion and will normally not extend for more than one year.

[61 FR 46734, Sept. 5, 1996, as amended at 69 FR 11815, Mar. 12, 2004]
Exhibit 32.2

Certification of Principal Financial Officer  Pursuant to  Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (18 U.S.C. 1350)

In connection with the Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ended June 30, 2007 (the "Report") of Tailwind
Financial Inc. (the "Registrant"), as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof, I, John Anderson, Chief Financial Officer of the Registrant, hereby certify,
to the best of my knowledge, that:



|Date: September 25, 2007 | /s/JOHN ANDERSONName:  John Anderson
Title:    Chief Financial Officer
(principal financial officer)
|------------------------ | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

---



QuickLinks
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

DANNY GARCIA, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

TSENG, Dr., 

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 19-15252 

D.C. No. 2:14-cv-00093-TLNDMC 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of California

Troy L. Nunley, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted June 2, 2020**

Before: LEAVY, PAEZ, and BENNETT, Circuit Judges.

California state prisoner Danny Garcia appeals pro se from the district 

court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging deliberate 

indifference to his serious medical needs. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1291. We review de novo cross-motions for summary judgment. Guatay 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

JUN 5 2020

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 19-15252

Christian Fellowship v. County of San Diego, 670 F.3d 957, 970 (9th Cir. 2011). 

We affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment for Tseng because

Garcia failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Tseng was 

deliberately indifferent to Garcia’s leg-length discrepancy and his back and 

shoulder pain. See Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1056-60 (9th Cir. 2004) (a 

prison official is deliberately indifferent only if he or she knows of and disregards 

an excessive risk to inmate health; medical malpractice, negligence, or a difference 

of opinion concerning the course of treatment does not amount to deliberate 

indifference); see also Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 107 (1976) (“A medical 

decision not to order an X-ray, or like measures, does not represent cruel and 

unusual punishment. At most it is medical malpractice”).

We do not consider Garcia’s arguments regarding his First Amendment 

claim because it was not properly presented to the district court. See Navajo 

Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 535 F.3d 1058, 1080 (9th Cir. 2008) (explaining that 

“[w]here . . . the complaint does not include the necessary factual allegations to 

state a claim, raising such claim in a summary judgment motion is insufficient to 

present the claim to the district court”).

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued 

in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal 
3 19-15252

or in the reply brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

We do not consider documents not presented to the district court. See 

United States v. Elias, 921 F.2d 870, 874 (9th Cir. 1990).

Garcia’s requests for miscellaneous relief, set forth in the reply brief, are 

denied.

AFFIRMED.
MJ001361

MEMORANDUM

TO:

FROM:

SUBJECT:

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION

September 28, 1990

FRED EILAND

CHIEF, PRESS OFFICE

ROBERT J. COSTA ,--~~­ ASSISTANT STAFF DIRtC~R AUDIT DIVISION

PUBLIC ISSUANCE OF FINAL AUDIT REPORT -

THE ATLANTA '88 COMMITTEE, INC.

Attached please find a copy of the final audit report on The

Atlanta '88 Committee, Inc., which was approved by the Commission

on September 25, 1990.

Informational copies of the report have been received by all

parties involved and the report may be released to the public.

o

Attachment as stated

..::J cc: FEe Library

Reports Analysis Division

Public Disclosure

~, Office of General Counsel
o

C)

:1J000834

-EDE RAL ELECTIO~ (O""i\115SI0~

......... It, ... , - .., ... l\

REPORT OF THE AUDIT DIVISION

ON

THE ATLANTA '88 COMMITTEE, INC.

r Backaround d

A. Overview

This report is based on an audit of The Atlanta '88 :ommitte~, Inc. ("the Committee") to determine whether there has

=een compliance with the provisions of the Federal Election

-: amcaian Act of : 971, as amended (.t t:he Act U ~. 7he audi t 'Has

:~nducted pursuant to 11 C.F.R. S 9008.9 which states that the

:~mmlssion shall conduct an examination and audit of each host

:ommlttee registered under 11 C.F.R. 9008.12{a)(1).

The Committee reaistered with the Federal Election

Commlssion on February 20, -1987, as the Host Committee for the

1988 Democratic ~ational Convention. The Committee maintains its

headquarters in Atlanta, Georgia.

The audit covered the period from the Committee's

inception, February 20, 1987, through June 30, 1989. During this

perlod, the Committee reported an opening cash balance of SO,

:otal receipts of $22,587,169.47, total disbursements of S22,~46,436.77, and a closina cash balance of $40,732.70.

:n addition, :ertain activity was reviewed through September 30,

~?89.

This report is based on documents and ~orkpapers which

support each of ~tS factual statements. They form part of the

:eccrd upon WhlCh the Commlssion based its decisions on the ~atters in the :eport and were available to Commissioners and

appropriate staff for review.

3. Key Personnel

!he treasurers of :he Committee during the period

:evlewed ~ere Mr. 3regory C. Ellison from February 20, :987 to ~arch 11, 1987 and Mr. ~ichael L. :omax from March 12, :987 to

present.

Scoce

The audit included such tests as verification of total ~eported receipts, disbursements and individual transactions~

~eVlew of required supporting documentation; analysis of Committee

,

\

\
debts and obliqations; review of contribution and expenditure

limitations; and such other audit procedures as deemed necessary

under the circumstances.

II. Finding and Recommendation

Matters Referred to the Office of General Counsel

Certain matters noted during the audit have been referred to

the Commission's Office of General Counsel.
_________________________________________ 

 

 

 

Order Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan 

October 31, 2006 Clifford W. Taylor,

 Chief Justice 

131383 Michael F. Cavanagh 

Elizabeth A. Weaver 

Marilyn Kelly 

Maura D. Corrigan 

LAMAR COLEMAN,

Petitioner-Appellant, 

Robert P. Young, Jr. 

Stephen J. Markman,

 Justices 

v SC: 131383 

 COA: 268607 

Oakland CC: 1988-085201-FC 

OAKLAND CIRCUIT JUDGE,

Respondent-Appellee. 

_________________________________________/ 

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the May 17, 2006 order 

of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded 

that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court. 

l1023 

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the 

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court. 

October 31, 2006 

 Clerk
Exhibit 10.7



December 22, 2000

AT&T Wireless PCS, LLC
7277 164th Avenue, N.E.
Redmond, WA 98052

          Re:  Amendment No. 1 to Letter Agreement Dated November 13, 2000
               Regarding Sale of Subject Shares

Ladies and Gentlemen:

          Reference is made to that certain letter agreement, dated November 13,
2000 (the "Letter Agreement"), between AT&T Wireless PCS, LLC ("AT&T PCS"), and
Thomas H. Sullivan (the "Management Stockholder"), setting forth certain rights
and obligations with respect to the shares of Voting Preference Stock, par value
$0.01 per share, Class C Common Stock, par value $0.01 per share, and Class D
Common Stock, par value $0.01 per share, (collectively, the "Subject Stock") of
TeleCorp PCS, Inc. (the "Company") held by the Management Stockholders. Defined
terms used herein and not otherwise defined shall have the meanings assigned in
the Letter Agreement.

          1. Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in the Letter
Agreement or in any Notice delivered pursuant thereto, in the event AT&T
exercises its rights and option under Section 2 of the Letter Agreement to
purchase (or designate another party to purchase) Subject Shares, the purchase
price per share payable by AT&T PCS (or such designee) for any such Subject
Shares shall be equal to the lesser of (i) the purchase price per share set
forth in the Notice, and (ii) the average closing price per share for the
Company's Class A Common Stock for the five (5) trading days ending two (2) days
prior to the date of execution of the Sale Offer. Section 13 of the Letter
Agreement is hereby deleted in its entirety and the Letter Agreement shall have
no expiration date.

          2. This letter shall be deemed to be an amendment to the Letter
Agreement. All references to the Letter Agreement in any other agreements or
documents shall on and after the date hereof be deemed to refer to the Letter
Agreement as amended hereby. except as amended hereby, the Letter Agreement
shall remain in full force and effect and is hereby ratified, adopted and
confirmed in all respects.

          3. This letter may be executed in counterparts, each of which shall
be deemed an original, but all of which together shall constitute one and the
same instrument.


                                        1


<PAGE>


          If you are in agreement with the terms of this letter, please sign two
copies in the space provided below and return it to the undersigned.

                                   Very truly yours,

                                    AT&T WIRELESS SERVICES, INC.


                                    By:
                                        ------------------------
                                    Title:
                                           ---------------------

Agreed and accepted as of the date hereof:




-------------------------------------------
THOMAS H. SULLIVAN