******************************************************

The ‘‘officially released’’ date that appears near the

beginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will

be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the

date it was released as a slip opinion. The operative

date for the beginning of all time periods for filing

postopinion motions and petitions for certification is

the ‘‘officially released’’ date appearing in the opinion.

In no event will any such motions be accepted before

the ‘‘officially released’’ date.

All opinions are subject to modification and technical

correction prior to official publication in the Connecticut Reports and Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the

event of discrepancies between the electronic version

of an opinion and the print version appearing in the

Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the

latest print version is to be considered authoritative.

The syllabus and procedural history accompanying

the opinion as it appears on the Commission on Official

Legal Publications Electronic Bulletin Board Service

and in the Connecticut Law Journal and bound volumes

of official reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of

the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced and distributed without the express written permission of the Commission on Official Legal

Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut.

******************************************************
STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. LORENZO ADAMS

(AC 36704)

Lavine, Beach and Sheldon, Js.

Argued September 18, 2015—officially released March 22, 2016

(Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of

Danbury, Roraback, J.)

Deren Manasevit, assigned counsel, for the appellant (defendant).

Sarah Hanna, assistant state’s attorney, with whom,

on the brief, were Stephen J. Sedensky III, state’s attorney, and Colleen P. Zingaro, assistant state’s attorney,

for the appellee (state).
Opinion

SHELDON, J. The defendant, Lorenzo Adams,

appeals from the judgment of conviction for conspiracy

to commit larceny in the sixth degree, in violation of

General Statutes §§ 53a-481 and 53a-125b,2 which was

rendered against him by the trial court on February 10,

2014, on the basis of his alleged conduct at a Microsoft

store in Danbury with a named coconspirator, one Stacey Rossman, on December 13, 2012. The trial court

found that on that date, the defendant conspired with

another person to steal Beats by Dre (Beats) headphones from the Microsoft store in Danbury and that

one of them committed the overt act of stealing at

least one pair of such headphones from the store in

furtherance of that conspiracy. Following the trial, at

which the court also acquitted the defendant, inter alia,

of larceny in the sixth degree in connection with that

same alleged course of conduct, the court sentenced

the defendant on the conspiracy charge to a term of

ninety days in jail. This appeal followed.

The defendant claims on appeal that the evidence

before the trial court was insufficient to support his

conviction for conspiracy to commit larceny in the sixth

degree. He claims, more particularly, that the evidence

admitted against him was insufficient to prove beyond

a reasonable doubt that (1) he conspired with anyone

to commit the offense of larceny in the sixth degree on

December 13, 2012; (2) he had the intent to commit the

crime of larceny in the sixth degree on that date; or (3)

while acting with that intent, he or Rossman stole Beats

headphones on that date in furtherance of their alleged

conspiracy. We agree with the defendant that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for

conspiracy to commit larceny in the sixth degree, and

thus remand this case to the trial court with direction

to vacate his conspiracy conviction and enter a judgment of acquittal on that charge.

The following facts are relevant to this appeal. This

case was tried on a three count long form information

charging the defendant as follows: (1) with larceny in

the sixth degree (‘‘on or about December 13, 2012 . . .

[the defendant] did take the property of Microsoft to

wit: headphones in violation of [§] 53a-125b’’); (2) with

conspiracy to commit larceny in the sixth degree (‘‘on

or about December 13, 2012 . . . [the defendant] with

the intent to commit a larceny in the sixth degree, did

agree with Stacey Rossman to commit larceny in the

sixth degree by taking the property of Microsoft to wit:

headphones in violation of [§§] 53a-48 and 53a-125b’’);

and (3) with attempted larceny in the sixth degree (‘‘on

or about December 14, 2012 . . . [the defendant]

attempted to take headphones from the Microsoft store

in violation of [§§] 53a-49 and 53a-125b’’). After the

defendant waived his right to trial by jury and elected

to be tried by the court, trial commenced on January
16, 2014.

The state presented two witnesses in its case-in-chief

at trial. Only one of them offered any testimony concerning the events of December 13, 2012, upon which

the defendant’s challenged conspiracy conviction was

based. The sufficiency of the state’s evidence to support

that conviction thus depends directly upon the nature

and substance of that witness’s testimony and of the

inferences that can be reasonably drawn from it.

Nancy John, the manager of the Microsoft store in

the Danbury Fair Mall, testified that the store was busy

with holiday customers on December 13 and was staffed

with about fifteen employees. John noticed a male and

a female customer enterthe store and walk to the accessory area at the back of the store. The accessory area

contained small merchandise items and accessories for

electronic equipment. John noticed these particular

customers because one ofthem was carrying a shopping

bag from H&M, a store that was no longer in the mall,

a fact to which she had been trained to be alert. A few

minutes afterthe two customers left the accessory area,

a store associate went over to the area and noticed that

‘‘a few’’ Beats headphones were missing. John testified

that it would have been easy to determine that headphones were missing because the store only put one

or two pieces of that type of merchandise out on the

floor at a time. After the store associate informed John

of the missing merchandise, she pulled up security footage on her laptop. John testified as follows as to what

she saw on the security footage, which was not produced for or introduced as evidence at trial: ‘‘I saw that

the Beats had been . . . picked up, moved around, held

in hand, put back, and then one was pulled off and the

one toward the back was pulled forward . . . to make

it look like there wasn’t one missing at the time.’’

John later testified that Beats headphones had been

stolen on December 13.3 Although John testified on

cross-examination that she was able to track what specific items from the store’s inventory had been placed

on the floor on December 13, and claimed that the store

had given the numbers of those items to the police, the

state never offered any such numbers or any other

inventory records concerning the missing items into

evidence.4

John admitted that, although a store

employee had reported the headphones missing on

December 13, it was possible that someone else was

carrying them around the store at the time of the

employee’s observation. Moreover, individual pairs of

headphones did not have security devices on them that

would have sounded an alarm or otherwise alerted store

employees if someone were attempting to remove them

from the store without paying for them.

John also testified briefly as to events that allegedly

occurred on two subsequent days, December 14 and

18. On December 14, she stated, the defendant again
came into the store along with the same female companion who was carrying the same H&M shopping bag

and another female. They headed once again to the

accessory area of the store, where they looked at headphones. After they left the store, store employees found

that ‘‘items were missing once again.’’ John called the

police and filed a report after the disappearance of the

missing merchandise was discovered on December 14.

Later, on December 18, the defendant came to the store

a third time, along with the same female companion

who had accompanied him on December 13, and were

in the accessory area of the store. After this visit as

well, Beats headphones were reported to be missing.

John immediately reported the events of December 18

to the police, who thereafter apprehended the defendant and his companion in the mall and arranged a

showup to have John view them. John identified them

as the same individuals who had come into her store

on December 13, 14, and 18.

At trial, John was shown a still photograph taken

from the store’s security footage on December 13, in

which she pointed out the man and the woman whom

she claimed to have stolen Beats headphones on that

date. She specifically identified the defendant as the

male customer depicted in the photograph. The state

also introduced a still photograph taken from the store’s

security footage on December 14, which John claimed

to show the defendant’s two female companions on

that date but not the defendant.

Keith Leggiadro, a police officer with the Danbury

Police Department, also testified for the state. He had

responded to a larceny complaint at the Microsoft store

on December 14 and received two still photographs of

the suspects from John, which had been taken from

the store’s surveillance video on December 13 and 14.

In addition, John showed him the security footage from

those two days. As a result of this complaint, Leggiadro

began to investigate the alleged incidents on December

13 and 14.5 Leggiadro responded to the Danbury Fair

Mall again on December 18 to assist with an arrest.

Upon his arrival, he saw the two individuals in custody,

whom he recognized as the male suspect and one of

the female suspects shown in the photographs he had

been given from the store’s security footage on December 13 and 14. The male suspect shown in the photograph from December 13 was the defendant. Upon

conducting a search incident to arrest of the defendant’s

clothing, the police found and seized a pair of pliers

and a set of car keys. Officer Leggiadro used the keys

to find the associated vehicle. In the vehicle, which the

police then searched, they found an H&M shopping bag

resembling the one reportedly carried by one of the

suspects in the incidents on December 13, 14, and 18.

Other than the two still photographs, which did not

show the defendant or either of his companions in pos-
session of Beats headphones or other Microsoft merchandise, the state never introduced any security

footage from the Microsoft store into evidence.

After John completed her testimony and the court

returned from a lunch break, it announced that it had

decided to exclude all of John’s testimony as to what

she had seen on the unproduced security footage. The

state objected to the exclusion of this evidence, and

repeated the same objection the following day. The

court, however,restated its ruling as follows: ‘‘There are

three bases under which the evidence is being excluded.

The first is that it’s unduly prejudicial to the defendant

to be defending against evidence which has never been

made available to the defendant to review, that the

defendant hasn’t had an opportunity to see, and it’s not

available. . . . Basis number two is there really is a

best evidence purpose if . . . what’s seen on the videotape is what’s being relied on, the videotape itself ought

to be proffered. . . . And it’s the court’s ruling that it’s

not going to fall under any exception to the hearsay

rule.’’ When the state asked for clarification as to what

evidence had been excluded by virtue of its ruling, the

court responded as follows: ‘‘What’s excluded is any

testimony as to what the witness saw on any videotape

after the fact.’’

In its closing argument, the state described the evidence in the following manner.6 First, it acknowledged

the circumstantial nature of its case, and the fact that all

testimony as to what John had seen on the unproduced

store video had been excluded. Then, however, it

argued that the court should consider the actions taken

by John and Leggiadro as a result of watching the video,

concluding, ‘‘Nancy John as well as Officer Leggiadro

did watch that videotape, and it was based upon that

information . . . as well as other information that they

put forth to verify not only the identification but that

[the defendant] as well as Ms. Rossman took these items

from the store.’’

Thereafter, the court found the defendant guilty of

conspiracy to commit larceny on December 13 but not

guilty of larceny on that date or attempted larceny on

the following day, December 14. In so ruling, the court

specifically stated that the overt act that had been committed in furtherance of the conspiracy was a theft of

merchandise from the Microsoft store. The court ruled

in relevant part as follows:

‘‘I do find . . . that the state has met its burden in

proving beyond a reasonable doubt that [the defendant]

is guilty of conspiracy to commit larceny in the sixth

degree. And I do that because I found that the state

proved beyond a reasonable doubt that [the defendant]

with intent [that] . . . the conduct constituting a crime

be performed, agreed with one or more persons to

engage in or cause the performance of such conduct,

and one of them committed an overt act in pursuance
of that conspiracy.

‘‘And the crime that an overt act that the court thinks

was proved beyond a reasonable doubt that an overt

act was . . . committed in furtherance of is the crime

of violating § 53a-125b, larceny in the sixth degree.

Namely, that [the defendant] or someone working with

[him] with intent to deprive another of property or

to appropriate the same to himself wrongfully took,

obtained or withheld property from an owner.

‘‘And, specifically, larceny as defined in § 53a-119 subsection 9, shoplifting. That [the defendant] and/or someone he was working in concert with was guilty of

shoplifting when they . . . intentionally took possession of any goods, wares or merchandise offered or

exposed for sale by any store or other mercantile establishment with the intention of converting the same to

his own use without paying the purchase price thereof.’’

On the basis of these facts, the defendant claims that

the evidence was insufficient to establish any of the

elements of conspiracy to commit larceny in the sixth

degree on December 13. As to the overt act element,

the defendant argues that the state failed to establish

either that ‘‘Beats headphones were missing from the

Microsoft store’s inventory [or] that defendant or someone working with him took them.’’ We agree that the

evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable

doubt that the defendant or his alleged coconspirator

committed a larceny on December 13. Because we agree

that the evidence was insufficient to establish the overt

act of larceny found by the trial court, we do not address

the other two elements of conspiracy.7

‘‘The standard of review of an insufficiency claim is

twofold. We first review the evidence presented at trial,

construing it in the light most favorable to sustaining

the facts expressly found by the trial court or impliedly

found by the jury. We then decide whether, upon the

facts thus established and the inferences reasonably

drawn therefrom, the trial court or the jury could reasonably have concluded that the cumulative effect of

the evidence established the defendant’s guilt beyond

a reasonable doubt. State v. Milardo, 224 Conn. 397,

402–403, 618 A.2d 1347 (1993) . . . .’’ (Internal quotations omitted.) State v. Reed, 56 Conn. App. 428, 432,

742 A.2d 1285, cert. denied, 252 Conn. 945, 747 A.2d

524 (2000).

We begin by setting forth the elements of the crime of

conspiracy to commitlarceny. General Statutes § 53a-48

(a) defines conspiracy as follows: ‘‘A person is guilty

of conspiracy when, with intent that conduct constituting a crime be performed, he agrees with one or more

persons to engage in or cause the performance of such

conduct, and any one of them commits an overt act in

pursuance of such conspiracy.’’ Larceny, the alleged

object of the conspiracy in this case, requires proof
that the defendant committed a larceny in violation of

General Statutes § 53a-119. The elements of larceny are

‘‘(1) the wrongful taking or carrying away of the personal property of another; (2) the existence of a felonious intent in the taker to deprive the owner of [the

property] permanently; and (3) the lack of consent of

the owner.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State

v. Saez, 115 Conn. App. 295, 302, 972 A.2d 277, cert.

denied, 293 Conn. 909, 978 A.2d 1113 (2009). Larceny

by shoplifting under § 53a-119 (9)8

requires thatthe state

additionally establish that the property taken by the

defendant was goods, wares or merchandise exposed

for sale within the store. Id. Accordingly, to obtain a

conviction for conspiracy to commit larceny in the sixth

degree, the state was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the following three elements: (1) that the

defendant intended to and did agree with one or more

other person to engage in larceny;(2)that the defendant

specifically intended that every element of the crime

of larceny be committed; see State v. Pond, 315 Conn.

451, 467–71, 108 A.3d 1083 (2015); and (3) that the

defendant or a coconspirator committed the overt act

of larceny pursuant to such agreement to commit the

crime of larceny. Here, the trial court, sitting as the

fact finder, specifically found that the overt act was a

larceny—‘‘[n]amely, that [the defendant] or someone

working with [the defendant] with intent to deprive

another of property or to appropriate the same to himself wrongfully took, obtained or [withheld] property

from an owner.’’9

After the trial court excluded the evidence of what

John saw on the security footage, only the following

evidence remained for the court’s consideration as to

the defendant’s alleged commission of conspiracy to

commit larceny in the sixth degree on December 13,

2012. John saw two individuals, one of whom was carrying a bag from a store no longer in the mall, walk

into the store and head toward the accessory area.

Within a few minutes of these individuals leaving the

store, a store employee noticed that an unspecified

number of Beats headphones were missing from the

accessory area. After John later checked the store’s

inventory, she concluded that ‘‘the headphones’’ had

been ‘‘stolen.’’

We conclude that the evidence remaining after the

court excluded testimony as to what John had seen on

the security footage was insufficient to prove beyond

a reasonable doubt that the defendant or his alleged

coconspirator stole Beats headphones from the Microsoft store in Danbury on December 13, 2012, either as

the substantive crime of larceny in the sixth degree, of

which the court acquitted him, or as an overt act in

furtherance of the inchoate crime of conspiracy to commit larceny in the sixth degree on that same date. From

John’s testimony, the fact finder reasonably could have

inferred that when she checked the store’s inventory
after the defendant and his alleged coconspirator had

left the store, she was unable to account for an unspecified number of Beats headphones in the store. The fact

finder could not, however, have made an inferential leap

from such evidence that the defendant or his alleged

coconspirator, who had been in an area where some

such headphones were displayed on December 13, but

were never seen in possession of any such headphones,

let alone in possession of the missing headphones, on

that day, had stolen the missing headphones from the

store. ‘‘Although Connecticut law accepts the practice

of allowing inferences based on other inferences . . .

[and] . . . [the fact finder] determines if any reasonable inference in a particular case should be drawn

. . . [the fact finder] accomplishes this function . . .

only where there exists sufficient evidence to support

reasonable inferences.’’ (Citation omitted.) State v.

Estrada, 28 Conn. App. 416, 422, 612 A.2d 110, cert.

denied, 223 Conn. 925, 614 A.2d 828 (1992).

First, the fact finder would have had to infer that

the missing headphones actually had been stolen by

someone and removed from the store, rather than lost

or misplaced within the store or taken into the possession of another customer who had not yet presented

them to a sales clerk to be purchased. However, there

was insufficient evidence to support such an inference

because John’s own testimony established that the

opposite was true. According to John, although she

believed that the headphones had been stolen, it was

possible that another customer was walking around

with them at the time their absence from the accessory

area was first noticed by another store employee.

Second, and more importantly, the fact finder would

have had to infer that the defendant or his codefendant

not only took possession of the missing headphones,

butremoved them from the store with the intent to steal

them. Again, however, there was insufficient evidence

upon which to base such a conclusion. All that the

evidence showed was that the defendant and his alleged

coconspirator had engaged in the innocent, ordinary

conduct of going to a public area of a retail establishment where goods were displayed for sale some unspecified period of time before particular goods they had

not handled, much less taken possession of or concealed from view, were reported missing from that location. To draw such an inference, the fact finder would

have had to infer that the innocent, ordinary conduct of

the defendant and his alleged coconspirator—walking

into the store together, going over to the accessory

area, and carrying a shopping bag of a store no longer

in the mall—provided a sufficient evidentiary basis to

make a reasonable inference that they not only took

possession of the headphones but also had stolen headphones once displayed in that location but later found

to be missing therefrom. Such conduct was indistinguishable from that of any other shoppers who passed
through that area of the store on a busy day in the

Christmas season. Moreover, the state did not present

any evidence that anyone saw the defendant or his

coconspirator take any headphones from the store or

that the police later recovered the missing headphones

in their possession or control after the incident.10

In sum, it was too great an inferential step for the

court to take on this evidence to conclude that the

defendant or his alleged coconspirator stole the missing

headphones from the store. Cf. State v. Saracino, 178

Conn. 416, 417–18, 423 A.2d 102 (1979) (testimony of

codefendants established scheme of fencing material

from store and, although no merchandise was ever

recovered, warehouse inventory revealed that merchandise was missing); State v. Saez, supra, 115 Conn. App.

304 (store employees testified that they saw defendant

pushing merchandise out of store). We therefore conclude thatthe evidence was insufficientto prove beyond

a reasonable doubt that the defendant or his alleged

coconspirator committed an overt act of larceny.

Accordingly, construing the evidence in this case in

the light most favorable to the state, and drawing all

reasonable inferences therefrom, the trial court could

not reasonably have concluded that the cumulative

effect of the evidence established the defendant’s guilt

of conspiracy to commit larceny in the sixth degree

beyond a reasonable doubt.

The judgment of conviction is reversed and the case

is remanded with direction to render judgment of

acquittal on the charge of conspiracy to commit larceny

in the sixth degree.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 General Statutes § 53a-48 (a) provides: ‘‘A person is guilty of conspiracy

when, with intent that conduct constituting a crime be performed, he agrees

with one or more persons to engage in or cause the performance of such

conduct, and any one of them commits an overt act in pursuance of such conspiracy.’’

2 General Statutes § 53a-125b (a) provides: ‘‘A person is guilty of larceny

in the sixth degree when he commits larceny as defined in section 53a-119

and the value of the property or service is five hundred dollars or less.’’

3

John testified as follows:

‘‘[The Prosecutor]: And when you checked inventory later, the Beats had

been stolen, correct?

‘‘[John]: Yes. We checked immediately.’’

4

John also testified as follows:

‘‘[Defense Counsel]: What—do you have any inventory control as to what

the specific item is in the front of the store that’s for sale, do you?

‘‘[John]: Yes.

‘‘[Defense Counsel]: And what tracking is that?

‘‘[John]: It’s all through—through our system, through our—our inventory

control systems, and our demo blinders and buckets. Everything is—you

know, has serial numbers so we know—we know what items are out on

our floor.

‘‘[Defense Counsel]: Okay. But you don’t have any—but you—you don’t

know what specific set was taken on the night of the 13th, do you? Or—

Let me withdraw that question. Did you give Danbury police any specific

item numbers that were taken on December 13th?

‘‘[John]: Yes. We were able to determine that.’’

5 Contrary to John’s testimony, Leggiadro testified that John had told him

that her fellow employees had thwarted a larceny on December 14.

6 The state’s closing argument was in relevant part as follows: ‘‘Your
Honor, you did have an opportunity to sit and watch the testimony of both

Nancy John and Officer Leggiadro before this court. They gathered evidence

and put it together, and Officer Leggiadro eventually did put together in a

warrant affidavit for this defendant for larceny in the sixth degree. I think

what’s important to remember is that not all crime solving or detection can

be based upon direct evidence. In fact, 98 percent of the evidence in criminal

courts are circumstantial in nature. And in this case Nancy John did testify

before the court that there w[ere] individuals from Microsoft Store as well

as herself that were watching this defendant and [Rossman] in the area of

these headphones in the back corner of the Microsoft Store. She also indicated in her testimony that this was not a[n] area that had a lot of merchandise stacked around in a confusing set up . . . . She testified that there’s

a very limited amount of stock that’s on the floor in the Microsoft Store.

And so if there is an item missing, it is very obvious that an item is missing.

She testified that [the defendant] as well as Ms. Rossman were in the back

corner of the store, that the merchandise was on the shelf. And they were

watching them because there were some things that drew their attention

including bags that they were carrying and that they made a bee-line to the

area [in the] store that didn’t have larger items, but items that could be

easily concealed and taken out of the store without much detection. . . .

She did testify that the items were on the shelf, that . . . Ms. Rossman and

[the defendant] were by the merchandise, that it was there, and then she

looked back and it was gone. . . . . However, I . . . would indicate to the

court that Nancy John as well as Officer Leggiadro did watch that videotape,

and it was based upon that information as well, as well as other information

that they put forth to verify not only the identification but that[the defendant]

as well as Ms. Rossman took these items from the store. . . . So even

though the direct evidence of the video was not able to be produced for the

court nor referenced by the witnesses here, there is enough circumstantial

evidence to determine that this defendant, in fact, did take these items along

with [Rossman] . . . . That’s persuasive circumstantial evidence, and there

is no doubt that this defendant and [Rossman] took it, and that nobody else

could possibly have taken it based upon the evidence that’s before this

court. I’d ask that the court find the defendant guilty.’’

7 The defendant also claims that the there was insufficient evidence to

prove an agreement between him and the coconspirator identified in the

information, Rossman. To that end, the defendant argues that the state

was required to establish beyond a reasonable doubt the identity of his

coconspirator as Rossman. The state concedes that it failed to prove that

the name of the defendant’s alleged coconspirator was Rossman. The state

argues, however, that even though it named Rossman in the information as

the defendant’s alleged coconspirator, the name of a coconspirator is not an

element of conspiracy that the state is required to prove beyond a reasonable

doubt. The issue, thus, is whether the state is required to establish the

identity of a coconspirator whom it specifically named in the information

when it does not allege that the defendant conspired with any other named

or unnamed coconspirators. Because we have decided that the evidence in

the case was insufficient to establish a conspiracy, we will not address

whether the state was required to establish the identity of a named coconspirator.

8 General Statutes § 53a-119 (9) provides in relevant part: ‘‘A person is

guilty of shoplifting who intentionally takes possession of any goods, wares

or merchandise offered or exposed for sale by any store or other mercantile

establishment with the intention of converting the same to his own use,

without paying the purchase price thereof. . . .’’

9 The state concedes that the trial court was able to convict the defendant

of conspiracy to commit larceny in the sixth degree on the basis of an overt

act of larceny while acquitting him of the substantive crime of larceny in

the sixth degree because the state had not proven whether it was the

defendant or one of his alleged coconspirators who had taken the headphones.

10 The state urges us to consider three additional pieces of evidence, which

we decline to do for the following reasons.

First, the state urges us to rely upon testimony that John noticed the

defendant and his companion lifting ‘‘Beats by Dre’’ headphones off the

shelf, showing them to each other, and talking. This testimony, however,

was excluded as part of what John saw only in the unproduced security

footage. Later, the state asked John questions about the individuals who

had looked at and handled the headphones. Although these questions were

not couched in terms of what John had seen in the security footage, the

record as a whole makes it clear that John only saw the individuals handle
the headphones when viewing the security footage.

Second, the state argues that after the defendant and his companion left

the store, no one else was in the area of the store where the Beats headphones

were displayed. The record, however, does not support this claim. At one

point in her testimony, John described watching on the security footage

that no one else was in the area ofthe Beats headphones before the defendant

and his companion walked away. This testimony was excluded, however,

and so the state directs our attention to an earlier part of John’s testimony,

when she testified as follows:

‘‘[The Prosecutor]: So when you saw—after you saw [the defendant] and

this other individual in the area of the Beats headphones, and you guys

were keeping an eye on them, did you see right after [the defendant] and

this other individual was there, before anybody else gets to the Beats headphones that the Beats were on the shelf?

‘‘[John]: Yes.

‘‘[The Prosecutor]: And just after they walk away from those Beats headphones, are the Beats missing from the shelf?

‘‘[John]: Yes.’’

Even if this part of John’s testimony had not been excluded as part of

what she had seen only on videotape, it would not have supported an

inference that no one entered the area afterthe defendant and his companion

left it but before another employee observed that the headphones previously

displayed there were missing.

Third, the state asks us to consider that the defendant and his alleged

coconspirator returned to the store on December 14 and December 18 and

took Beats headphones. However, no thefts of headphones from the store

were alleged or proved to have occurred on either later date, and evidence

of such later thefts, had it been adduced, would not in any event have proven

a theft by the defendant or his companion on December 13.