[Cite as In re S.A. , 2012-Ohio-3394.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT GREENE COUNTY IN THE MATTER OF: : : Appellate Case No. 2011-CA-66 S.A. : : Trial Court Case No. S38598 : : (Juvenile Appeal from Greene County : Juvenile Court) : :

. . . . . . . . . . . O P I N I O N Rendered on the 27 th day of July, 2012.

. . . . . . . . . . . STEPHEN K. HALLER, Atty. Reg. #0009172, by NATHANIEL R. LUKEN, Atty. Reg. #0087864, Greene County Prosecutor’s Office, 61 Greene Street, Xenia, Ohio 45385 Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee JENNIFER S. GETTY, Atty. Reg. #0074317, Getty Law Office, L.L.C., 46 East Franklin Street, Centerville, Ohio 45459 Attorney for Defendant-Appellant

. . . . . . . . . . . . . HALL, J. {¶ 1} A.M. (“Mother”) appeals from the trial court’s judgment entry adjudicating her minor child S.A. dependent a nd awarding legal custody to the child’s paternal aunt, T.M. (“Paternal Aunt”). 2

 {¶ 2} Mother advances three assignments of error on appeal. First, she contends the trial court erred in adjudica ting S.A. dependent under R.C. 2151.04. Second, she asserts that the trial court erred in awarding Paternal Aunt legal custody. Third, she claims the trial court erred in finding that her drug use renders her unable to provide adequa te and consistent care for S.A. {¶ 3} The record reflects that Greene County Children Services (“GCCS”) filed a complaint in July 2011, alleging that five-yea r-old S.A. was a neglected child under R.C. 2151.03 and a dependent child under R.C 2151.04. (Doc . #2). The basis for the complaint was Mother’s repeated drug use and a lack of s upervision. The complaint included a request for permanent custody or, alternatively, for te mporary custody. Thereafter, in September 2011, Paternal Aunt moved for legal custody of S.A. (Doc. #49). That same month, a guardian ad litem filed a report that r ecommended granting legal cust ody to GCCS. (Doc. #54). {¶ 4} The case proceeded to an Octobe r 5, 2011 adjudicatory hearing. GCCS presented four witnesses. The first was Tessa Zimmer, a Montgomery County Children Services (“MCCS”) investigat or. Zimmer testified that she had received a referral about Mother on May 10, 2011, when Mother was residi ng in Montgomery County. The complaint involved allegations that Mother was pulling S.A.’s hair, hitting the child, and caring for her children “while under the influence.” (Tr. Vol. I at 13). Zimmer met with Mother several times and also spoke to Mother’s children. Mother’s home was clean, she was bonded with her four children, and the allegations were not substantiated. ( Id .). At that time, Mother failed to comply with a request for a urine screen. ( Id. ). {¶ 5} MCCS received another referral on or about June 23, 2011. That complaint 3

 involved five-year-old S.A. and another one of mother’s child ren, two-year-old A.G., being found unsupervised two and one-half blocks down the street riding a tricycle. ( Id. at 13-14). When questioned, Mother claimed the children were staying with grandparents at the time. Zimmer determined that Mother’s claim was untrue. The children had been returned home several days before the incident. ( Id. at 15). As a result, Zimmer substantiated an instance of neglect. {¶ 6} MCCS received a third referral on Ju ly 1, 2011. The complaint involved D.T., a former foster parent for A.G., bringing the child to the hospital with a “MRSA” bacterial infection. ( Id. at 16). Hospital employees reported that Mother appeared intoxicated while at the hospital. ( Id. ). In the days after the incident, D.T. tried to contact Mother several times. She discovered, however, that Mother had moved to Greene County. ( Id. at 18). As a result, the referral was transferred to GCCS. ( Id. at 19). {¶ 7} The next witness was L.I., an “off and on” foster parent for S.A. since the child’s infancy. ( Id. at 31). L.I. testified that S.A. ha d been placed in her home several times when children services obtained temporary custody of the child. Each time, Mother successfully regained custody after battling drug addiction. Mother conti nued to allow S.A. to have regular visitation with L.I., even afte r regaining custody, because of the strong bond between L.I. and the child. ( Id. at 32). {¶ 8} L.I. testified that in June 2011 Moth er admitted to her that she was using heroin again. ( Id. at 36). Mother asked L.I. to keep S.A. for a couple of weeks so she could try to break the addiction on her own. ( Id. at 36-37). L.I. testified th at she saw Mother under the apparent influence of drugs while in S.A.’s presence in early July 2011. ( Id. at 38-39, 52). Mother was “fading in and out of the conversa tion,” she was “swaying,” and her “eyes were 4

 fading down.” Mother’s “head fell over to the si de and she started droo ling out of her mouth.” ( Id. at 38). S.A. witnessed Mother’s behavior and began crying. ( Id. at 62). Concerned for S.A.’s well-being, L.I. obtained Mother’s pe rmission to take the child home with her. ( Id. at 39). On that occasion, one of Mother’s friends , T.P., was present in the home and got A.G. ready for bed. ( Id. at 39, 42). T.P. also cooked S.A. and A.G. dinner around 10:00 p.m before L.I. took S.A. away. ( Id. at 42). {¶ 9} L.I. additionally testifie d about taking S.A. to the hospital when A.G. was being treated for the MRSA infection. L.I. conti nued to be concerned a bout Mother’s drug use at that time because she saw “track lines everywhere” on Mother’s arms. ( Id. at 41-42). Mother admitted to L.I. that she was struggling “to get off the drugs.” ( Id. at 42). {¶ 10} L.I. recalled that on another occasion in the same time pe riod someone called her “to come and get [S.A.] for a couple of weeks so that [Mother] could get clean.” ( Id. at 43). When she arrived at Mother’s home, L. I. found A.G., S.A., and Mother’s two older children home alone. ( Id. ). A.G. and S.A. were inside the house in bathing suits, while the two older children, the oldest of whom was 12 year s old, were playing on a slip-and-slide in the backyard. ( Id. at 44, 55). Mother didn’t arrive home until twenty to thirty minutes later. She admitted to L.I. “that she had been using and that she wasn’t happy; she wanted to get off of the drugs and just needed to get * * * some help.” ( Id. at 45). At that point, Mother agreed to let L.I. keep S.A. until mother “got well.” ( Id. ). Mother later contacted L.I. and asked for S.A. to be returned. ( Id. at 56). {¶ 11} The next witness at the adjudicatory hearing was D.T., who previously had served as a foster parent for two-year-old A.G. D.T. testified that Mother called on June 1, 2011, and asked her to take A.G. for two weeks because Mother had relapsed on heroin and 5

 needed time to stabilize. ( Id. at 70). D.T. returned A.G. to Mother’s care on June 17, 2011, but did not see Mother when she dropped the child o ff. D.T. believed Moth er was avoiding her. ( Id. at 71). D.T. subsequently received another call to pick up A.G. on June 22 or June 23, 2011, and she kept the child for the rest of that month. ( Id. at 73). {¶ 12} Around the end of June 2011, D.T. took A.G. to the hospital because the child was having severe stomach pains. During an examination, doctors discovered that the child had a MRSA infection. ( Id. at 74). D.T. had A.G. admitted to the hospital on July 1, 2011. D.T. was unable to reach Mother until later th at day, however, and had some trouble admitting the child herself. D.T. eventually reached Mo ther, who arrived at the hospital that night. ( Id. at 75-76). Mother was dressed in long sleeves a nd sweat pants, despite the warm temperature. She also was acting oddly, making “quick m ovements, not really focused, kind of not finishing sentences.” ( Id. at 76). D.T. returned to the hospital a day or two later to visit A.G. Upon arriving, D.T. saw Mother outside the hosp ital with a friend. D.T. proceeded to A.G.’s room and found Mother’s four children there unsupervised. ( Id. at 78). {¶ 13} D.T. received another call to pick up A.G. on July 11, 2011. ( Id. at 79). With Mother’s permission, D.T. kept the child un til returning from a family vacation on July 22, 2011. ( Id. at 80-81). At that time, GCCS received temporary custody because a dependency action had been filed. ( Id. at 81). {¶ 14} The final witness for GCCS was Amy Amburn, an assessment supervisor for the agency. Amburn testified that she recei ved a referral in July 2011, and the case was transferred to her from MCCS. ( Id. at 121-122). Amburn had c oncerns about Mother’s reported drug use and her ability to care for her children. Amburn explained: “The concerns were based on information th at was provided from Montgome ry County Children Services, 6

 information that we had in the past, inform ation that was provided through [Mother] in regards that she was using, and that our concern was that she can pick up the children at any time and if she was using they would be at risk.” ( Id. at 123). {¶ 15} Amburn explained that GCCS had b een involved with Mother and her children since 2000. Amburn personally had been i nvolved with Mother a nd with the removal of children from her home twice since 2004. ( Id. ). Among other things, Amburn mentioned two referrals involving allega tions of sexual activity between Mother’s children. Those allegations were not substantiated. ( Id. at 124). {¶ 16} Amburn admitted that Mother did an “excellent” job taking care of her children when she was not using drugs. ( Id. at 126). Amburn did not believe Mother could care for her children, however, when she was using drugs. ( Id. ). Amburn expressed concern about the children seeing Mother use drugs. ( Id. ). Following Amburn’s testimony, GCCS rested its case in the adjudicatory phase. {¶ 17} Mother then presented testimony from her boyfriend, A.H. He denied that S.A. and A.G. were le ft unattended down the street from their home. ( Id. at 144-145). He also testified that he neve r found Mother alone with the childre n while she was under the influence of drugs. ( Id. at 148). A.H. explained that he and Moth er had arranged for the children to stay elsewhere while she attempted to deal with her addiction. ( Id. ). A.H. admitted finding some needles in a house he had shared with Moth er and the children. He did not know, however, whether the needles were Mother’s or whether they had been left by the prior resident. ( Id. at 151). Before even moving in, he had found the n eedles under a box that belonged to the prior resident. ( Id. ). After moving in, he found more needles in a box in the garage. ( Id. at 152). A.H. admitted seeing Mother with needles around August 21, 2011. On that occasion, the 7

 police were called and she went to jail. ( Id. at 153). That incident o ccurred after GCCS already had removed the children from her home. ( Id. ). {¶ 18} On cross examination, A.H. admitted th at Mother had relapsed on heroin while she had custody of her children. ( Id. at 159). He never saw her use heroin in front of the children, however, and he was unaware of any heroin be ing kept in the home. ( Id. ). {¶ 19} The final witness at the adjudicatory hearing was Mother. She testified that she had regained custody of her children by May 2010 after working on a case plan. ( Id. at 167-168). Mother admitted relapsing on heroin in the summer of 2011. ( Id. at 179-180). She testified, however, that her child ren never saw her use drugs. ( Id. at 180). Mother explained that following her relapse in the summer of 2011, she and A.H. made arrangements for her children to spend time with other people, including L.I. and D.T. ( Id. at 181). {¶ 20} On cross examination, Mother admitted th at she started using heroin every day in 2005. ( Id . at 203). She claimed that she “got cl ean” in November 2005 and did not touch heroin again until the summer of 2011. ( Id .). Mother then admitted that she had “relapsed” in 2009, using heroin then too. ( Id . at 203-204). Mother added that she twice successfully had completed a relapse-prevention program. ( Id . at 205). She also had completed three drug-rehab programs. ( Id . at 208). {¶ 21} Based on the testimony presented at the adjudicatory hearing, the trial court dismissed the neglect allegation but found S.A. to be a dependent child. (Doc. #55). In support, the trial court rule d from the bench as follows: The Appellate Courts have he ld that adequate parental care can be provided by a non-pare nt, and throughout the course 8

 of this case and the Agency’s involvement, [Mother] did make arrangements for other people to meet the needs of her children and provide appropr iate care, so the Court is finding that there is not clear and convincing evid ence that the children are neglected. However, [Mother] has, the evidence is clear, [Mother] has relapsed on drugs. There is evidence about her physical condition when she’s on drugs; nodding off, somewhat incoherent. The testimony of the foster parents about their concerns, ongoing concerns about how the children will be being returned at any period of time for the la st couple of months under the temporary care of [Mother] ba sed upon what they had observed in terms of her condition and her acknowledged use again of drugs, and so that evidence establishes that the condition in [Mother’s] household is not stable ; the condition that they could be exposed to under her relapse stat e is not in their best interest or safety and, therefore, the Cour t is finding they are dependent. Because of their condition of environment, does warrant the State, in the interest of the children, in becoming involved in this family. So I am finding they are dependent. (Tr. Vol. I at 226-227). {¶ 22} After taking additional testimony at a dispositional hearing, the trial court 9

 granted Paternal Aunt legal custody of S.A ., awarded GCCS protective supervision of the child, and gave Mother parentin g time. (Doc. #62). In a written judg ment entry, the trial court made the following findings, which are supporte d by the record, concerning Paternal Aunt being awarded legal custody: * * * The agency completed a home study on [Paternal Aunt] and found the placement to be suitable. [Paterna l Aunt] is employed full-time and has adequate financial resources to meet [S.A.’s] needs. [Paternal Aunt] has health insurance coverage and could place [S .A.] on her plan. The home has three bedrooms; [S.A.] would have her own bedroom. [Paternal Aunt] had regular contact with [S.A.] during the first three years of the child’s life, after which the involvement dissipated. For at least a year prior to the filing of this action, [Paternal Aunt] had no contact with [S.A .]. The first visitation was awkward; all remaining visits have gone well and [S.A.] enjoys spending time with [Paternal Aunt]. [Mother] is opposed to [Paternal Aunt] getting legal custody because she feels that [Paternal Aunt] might impede [Mother’s] contact with [S.A.], but [Mother] acknowledges that [S.A.] would be safe in [Paternal Aunt’s] care. [S.A.’s imprisoned father] is in favor of [Paternal Aunt] getting custody. [Paternal Aunt] is willing to cooperate with CSB to ensure that [S.A.’s] needs are met. It is in [S.A.’s] best interest to be in the legal custody of [Paternal Aunt], and that the agency have protective supervision. (Doc. #62 at 2-3). {¶ 23} In her first assignment of error, Mother challenges the trial court’s finding that 10

 S.A. is a dependent child. She argues that such a finding is contrary to law and against the weight of the evidence. {¶ 24} GCCS’s complaint alleges that S. A. is a dependent child under R.C. 2151.04(B) and (C). The former subdivision defi nes a dependent child as one “[w]ho lacks adequate parental care or suppor t by reason of the mental or physical condition of the child’s parents, guardian, or custodi an.” The latter subdivision defi nes a dependent child as one “[w]hose condition or environment is such as to warrant the state, in the interests of the child, in assuming the child’s guardianship.” {¶ 25} The trial court’s oral ruling makes clear that it found S.A. dependent under R.C. 2151.04(C). A trial court’ s dependency finding must be supported by clear and convincing evidence. In re P. G ., 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 22706, 2008-Ohio-4015, ¶ 11. This court’s review is limited to determining whether the record contains sufficient credible evidence to support the trial court’s decision. Id. {¶ 26} On appeal, Mother contends the evidence does not support a dependency finding under R.C. 2151.04(C). She argues that a finding of dependency under this subsection “requires evidence that the parent’s supervisi on of her children or the environment of her children has been affected in some negative way by the behavior of th e parent.” (Appellant’s brief at 4). Although Mother admits relapsing on heroin, she contends GCCS presented no evidence that S.A. was adversely affected by her drug use. According to Mother, the only evidence “even remotely on this topic” involve d L.I. observing her under the influence of drugs one night while S.A. and A.G. were hom e. Mother stresses that on this occasion, her friend T.P. was present caring for the children and getting A.G. ready for bed. In her reply brief, Mother contends she or her boyfriend al ways made arrangements for someone to care 11

 for the children when she was dealing with her he roin addiction. Therefore, she asserts that the evidence does not support a depende ncy finding under R.C. 2151.04(C). {¶ 27} Upon review, we agree with Mother that there is not strong evidence that her drug addiction resulted in S.A. receiving inadequate care. The trial court reached the same conclusion, recognizing that Moth er made “arrangements for othe r people to meet the needs of her children and provide appr opriate care[.]” (Tr. Vol. I at 226-227). The trial court nevertheless found S.A. dependent based on its concern that the child would return to Mother’s house and be placed in an environment th at, in Mother’s relapsed state, was not “in [S.A.’s] best intere st or safety.” ( Id. ). The issue thus presented is whether the trial court properly made a dependenc y finding based, in large part, on a prospective determination that S.A. would be in an unstable and harmful environment if placed in Mother’s home. {¶ 28} Mother cites In re Riddle , 79 Ohio St.3d 259, 262, 1997-Ohio-391, 680 N.E.2d 1227, wherein the Ohio Supreme Court r ecognized that “a child who is receiving proper care pursuant to an arrangement initiated by the parent with a caregiver is not a dependent child under R.C. 2151.04(A).” She also cites, inter alia, In re O.H. , 9th Dist. Summit No. 25761, 2011-Ohio-5632, wherein the appella te court noted that an “adjudication under R.C. 2151.04(C) requires evidence that the parent’s conduct is having ‘an adverse impact upon the child sufficiently to warrant state intervention.’” Id. at ¶ 8, quoting In re Burrell , 58 Ohio St.2d 37, 39, 388 N.E.2d 738 (1979). Th e Ninth District also recognized that “[a] dependency finding based on a parent’s use of an illegal substance or the abuse of a legal substance under either R.C. 2151.04(B) or (C) requires ‘some evidence that [the parent’s] supervision of her child ren or the environment of her children has been affected in some negative way’ by the behavior of the parent.” Id. at ¶ 9 (citations omitted). 12

 {¶ 29} Although Riddle addressed dependenc y under R.C. 2151.04(A), the principle that a child is not “dependent” if she is receiving adequate care from an alternate caregiver has been extended to cases arising under R.C. 2151.04(C). In In re Stoll , 165 Ohio App.3d 226, 2006-Ohio-346, 845 N.E.2d 581 (3d Dist.), for exampl e, the Third District Court of Appeals reasoned: The Supreme Court of Ohio has specifically approved the Tenth District’s rationale “at least insofar as R.C. 2151.04(A) is concerned.” In re Riddle , 79 Ohio St.3d at 263, 680 N.E.2d 1227. In Riddle , the court stated, “A child who is receiving proper care pursuan t to an arrangement initiated by the parent with a caregiver is not a dependent child unde r R.C. 2151.04(A).” Id. Since the court’s determination in Riddle is limited to 2151.04(A), the court has not specifically determined whether th e Tenth District’s rationale should be applied with respect to R.C. 2151.04(B) through (D). Finding the Tenth District’s rationale persua sive, we apply that rationa le to the case before us. Here, Caldwell voluntarily relinquished control of the children to her parents prior to entering drug reha bilitation. At that point and up until now, both Khonner and Khyler have been receiving proper care, support, and custody from their maternal grandparents. In fact, both the trial court and DJFS found that the grandparents have been ab le to provide a stable environment where the children feel safe and have been receiving proper care. And as the Tenth District has stated, “[T]he state’s interest under Section 2151.04, Revised Code, arises only if there is no one who is meeting the obligations of care, support and custody, which are owed by the parent.” In re Darst , 117 13

 Ohio App. at 379, 24 O.O.2d 144, 192 N.E.2d 287. * * * [W]hen determining dependency under R.C. 2151.04(C), “[ T]he children’s condition or environment must be such as to warrant interference by the state.” In re Darst , 117 Ohio App. at 379, 24 O.O.2d 144, 192 N.E.2d 287. The condition at the time of the hearing was and had been adequate, and their environment was equally adequate, because of the Lamb s’ care. Accordingly, R.C. 2151.04(C) has no application. Id. at ¶ 24-25. {¶ 30} A dissenting judge in Stoll disagreed with the foregoing analysis. Specifically, Judge Stephen Shaw rejected the notion that placing a child with an alternate caregiver who provides for the child precludes a dependency finding under R.C. 2151.04(C). He reasoned, in part: Neither R.C. 2151.04 nor R.C. 2151.03 a ddress whether a child who is receiving proper care from relatives to whom the parent entrusted the child’s care is deemed not to be a de pendent or neglected child. In In re Riddle , 79 Ohio St.3d 259, 680 N.E.2d 1227, a children’s services board caseworker mediated an agreement to address the child’s care when the father acknowledged that he was not providing proper care for his son. A contract was signed by the mother, the father, the pa ternal grandparents, and the caseworker, explaining the parents’ problems regarding their care for their son. Id. Specifically, the Supreme Court held that the child was receiving proper care pursuant to an arrangement initiated by the parent with another person. Id. In so holding, the court stated that “the pare nt’s voluntary act of temporarily placing 14

 the child with a responsible relative is an indicator of proper parental care, and does not support a finding that the parent is at fault. Therefore, the care furnished by the relative can be imputed to the parent.” Id. at 263, 680 N.E.2d 1227. (Emphasis added.) The Supreme Cour t did not determine whether this doctrine should be applied to R.C. 2151.04(B) through (D). In the case at hand, none of the factors relied upon in Riddle are present. First, Kara Stoll did not initiate any arrangement to have her children, Khyler and Khonner, stay with the maternal gra ndparents. On the contrary, the record reveals that Rick Lamb, Kara’s fath er, came into the home regarding a phone call he received from his son, who was living with Kara, regarding broken water pipes. When he arrived, he shut the water off and entered Kara’s home, where he found the house in disarray and smelled a very strong odor near the refrigerator. Once he walked into the living room, he started talking to his son about the smell, and he was told that Ka ra wanted to go to drug rehabilitation. Rick replied that they were leav ing the house and he was taking the grandchildren, because he was concerned about their health due to the smell that was emanating from the refrigerator. Kara and Rick argued, with Rick stating that he was taking the kids and Ka ra stating that she was not going. Rick then removed the children from the home and informed Kara that if she didn’t want to go, then he was going to call the police, because he felt that somebody was going to get hurt in the house. While Kara eventually acquiesced in her parents’ taking the children, she did not voluntarily initiate this circumstance. In fact, it is the Department of Job and Family Services that first requested an 15

 order of temporary custody with the ma ternal grandparents in its complaint filed on December 22, 2004. In addition, there is no evidence as to the alleged “arrangement” for the proper care of the children in this case. On the contrary, and in marked contrast to the contract noted in Riddle , the record here demonstrates little more than a spur-of-the-moment, involuntary reli nquishment of the children to the grandparents’ care due to the insistence of the grandparents during an ongoing crisis. The fact that the relinquishment wa s eventually agreed to by the parent does not make it rise to the level of a contract or pla n, or even to the level of the informal arrangement noted in Riddle and the appellate decisions addressing this issue. This matter is important because a proper “arrangement” of this nature implies at a minimum some written permission from the parent in order to enable the alternative caregiver to make appropriate decisions—medical, school or otherwise—regarding the child ren. Thus, a formal guardianship or other form of contract, stating the terms of the arrangement by which the parent was relinquishing her rights to her parent s for a certain period of time and for a particular reason, could be important to the proper care of the children and to the appropriate monitoring of the plan by the children’s services agency where
necessary. However, even assuming that some kind of informal arrangement could be construed in this case, such an agr eement should be merely one factor, or as noted in Riddle , an indicator for the trial court to consider when determining 16

 whether sufficient alternative care was provided for the children by the parent, so as to defeat a complaint for dependency and neglect. In the circumstances before us, it is my opinion that this c ourt should give greater deference to the resolution of this question by the trial court—especially in view of the fact that Kara agreed to a finding of dependency. Id. at ¶ 34-38 (Shaw, J., dissenting). {¶ 31} With the exception of Judge Shaw’s dissent, the cases cited above lend support to Mother’s argument. But those cases al so are in some tension with another line of cases holding that a trial court need not allow a child to be placed in a potentially harmful environment. Indeed, this court has recognized “that a trial c ourt can properly make a finding of dependence based upon a pros pective determination, pursuant to R.C. 2151.04, that the child will be dependent[.]” In the Matter of Lewis , 2d Dist. Clark No. 95-CA-115, 1996 WL 748260, *3 (Dec. 27, 1996). “‘The underlying reasoning * * * appears to be that as a dependency hearing focuses on th e total environment, a court should look not only to the child’s present condition but also to the child ’s potential future environment. * * * By focusing on the environment, which can be view ed and evaluated with or without the child, the legislature has chosen to permit the state to intercede in familial affairs at [an] early stage.’” Id . at *4, quoting In the Matter of Likens , 2d Dist. Greene No. 85-CA-80, 1986 WL 11910 (Oct. 24, 1986). {¶ 32} We note, however, that in both Likens and Lewis there was evidence that the children were about to be placed in the challenged environment. In Likens , the biological father, David Likens, was attempting to regain custody of his child, Kelli Likens, from the child’s step-mother, Beverly Likens. We upheld a finding that the child was “dependent” 17

 under R.C. 2151.04, despite the fact that Beverl y was providing good care. We reasoned: “[A]lthough it appears that Kelli’s physical needs were being met at the time of the hearing, there was evidence to show that her psychologi cal development would suffer were she to be placed in the care of David Likens.” Likens at *9. {¶ 33} In Lewis , the child at issue had been placed in temporary foster care due to the mother’s poor care for the child. Mother subsequently sought to have the child returned to her. This court upheld a finding of dependency, however, based on a prospective determination that the child would be “dependent” under R.C. 2151.04 if she were returned to mother’s care. In so ruling, we noted that findings of de pendency had been upheld in cases involving newborn infants based on their pot ential future environment if they were allowed to go home.
Lewis at *3-5; see also In re Reese , 12th Dist. Butler No. CA98-08-169, 1999 WL 225149, *4 (April 19, 1999) (“The State need not subject a child to a potentia lly detrimental environment. Ohio courts have held that ne wborn infants can be dependent ev en before they have been in their parents’ custody. * * * Similarly, the trial court could find that D’Anna was dependent before subjecting her to the risk that appellant would allow Reese to return to her home while D’Anna was present.”). {¶ 34} In a more recent case, In re P.G. , 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 22706, 2008-Ohio-4015, this court upheld a dependency finding under R.C. 2151.04(C) based on the mother’s history of mental h ealth and substance abuse issues , her past inc onsistencies in obtaining treatment, and her prev ious loss of custody of four other children. In that case, MCCS had obtained permanent custody of the mother’s four children in 2006 based on her homelessness, mental-health issues, substance- abuse problems, unemployment, and failure to complete a case plan. Id. at ¶ 2. Another child, P.G., was bor n in June 2007. Two months later, 18

 MCCS filed a dependency compla int. A subsequent hearing revealed that the mother’s circumstances had improved significantly since 2006. Id. at ¶ 3-5. She had been treated successfully for a mental disorder and substa nce abuse. She had obtained proper housing and had ended a troubled pers onal relationship. She was living with P.G.’s father and had obtained employment. MCCS had no specific con cerns about P.G., who was healthy. Id. Despite these positive facts, this court upheld a dependency finding, reasoning: The trial court’s decision discusse s both R.C. 2151.04(C) and(D), but it is unclear whether the court found one or both of these sections to be satisfied. It is clear, however, that the court f ound P.G. to be a dependent child under R.C. 2151.04 based on Melissa’s mental hea lth and substance abuse issues, her past inconsistency in addressing those issues, and the resulting loss of custody of four other children. In our view, the tr ial court did not abus e its discretion in concluding that these ci rcumstances justified a fi nding of dependency under either R.C. 2151.04(C) or (D). Id. at ¶ 25. {¶ 35} In light of our decision upholding a dependency finding in In re P.G. , we cannot say the trial cour t erred in finding S.A. dependent here. The dependency finding in In re P.G. was based on nothing more than mother’s past problems and a concern that she might relapse. We upheld the dependency, finding an ab sence of evidence of an y current deficiencies in the child’s condition or environment. {¶ 36} The facts of the present case presen t an even stronger argument for a dependency finding. As set forth a bove, Mother was in the midst of a drug relapse for at least the third time. She admitted at the adjudicatory hearing that she was addicted to heroin. S.A. 19

 had been removed from her care multiple times before, and mother previously had completed various drug- and relapse-prev ention programs only to relapse again. She had track lines everywhere, was fading in and out, and even a ppeared to avoid her temporary caregivers. In addition, the record contains some evidence th at Mother’s drug use had an impact on her children. Foster mother L.I. testified that she had seen S.A. in Mother’s presence while Mother was under the influence of drugs. The record al so supports a reasonable inference that Mother either used or kept heroin needles at he r home. If the mother’s prior history in In re P.G. supported a finding of dependency, the facts in the present case are even more compelling. {¶ 37} Finally, we agree with Judge Shaw’s dissenting opinion in Stoll that a parent’s reliance on an alternate caregiver doe s not necessarily preclude a dependency finding under R.C. 2151.04(C). In the present case, it is not clear that Mother alwa ys arranged for an alternate caregiver to look after S.A. But even if she did, the “arrangement” that existed was informal. With little notice or planning, L.I. would pick up S.A. for an ill-defined period of time until Mother decided she wanted the child back. Foster mother D.T. engaged in the same process with A.G. L.I. testified that she feared returning S.A. to Mother’s care while mother was in the midst of fighting her drug addic tion. This fear was not unfounded given the number of times S.A. had been shuttled between Mother and L.I. at Mother’s sole discretion. {¶ 38} As Judge Shaw noted in his Stoll dissent, “a proper ‘arrangement’ * * * implies at a minimum some written permission from the parent in order to enable the alternative caregiver to make appropriate decisions—medical, school or otherwise—regarding the children. Thus, a formal guardianship or othe r form of contract, stating the terms of the arrangement by which the parent was relinquishing her rights to her parents for a certain period of time and for a partic ular reason, could be important to the proper care of the 20

 children[.]” Stoll at ¶ 37 (Shaw, J., dissenting). No such formal arrangement existed here, and its absence created a problem when D.T. atte mpted to have A.G. treated for her MRSA infection and admitted to the hospital. {¶ 39} Finally, as Judge Shaw correctly observed, arranging for an alternate caregiver is merely one factor or “ an indicator for the trial court to consider when determining whether sufficient alternative care was provided for the children by the parent, so as to defeat a complaint for depende ncy and neglect.” Id. at ¶ 38. When viewed in conjunction with the other evidence in the record, Mother’s periodic reliance on L.I. to help care for S.A. did not preclude the trial court from finding the child dependent under R.C. 2151.04(C). Having reviewed the evidence presented at the adjudi catory hearing, we find sufficient credible evidence to support the trial court’s dependency finding. A ccordingly, Mother’s first assignment of error is overruled. {¶ 40} In her second assignment of error, Mo ther claims the tr ial court erred in awarding legal custody of S.A. to Paternal A unt. Mother contends this disposition was not in S.A.’s best interest and was unreasonable in light of other available options. Specifically, Mother asserts that Paternal Aunt lacked a significant relationship with S.A. and was not well bonded with the child. Mother argues that the trial court should have continued temporary custody with GCCS and placed S.A. in foster care with L.I. {¶ 41} A juvenile court has br oad discretion in the di sposition of an abused, neglected, or dependent child. See R.C. 2151.353(A) and Juv.R. 29(D). The dispositional options include, among other things, granting a children-services agency temporary custody, committing the child to the permanent custody of a children-services agency, or awarding legal custody to a relative or any other person. R.C. 2151.353(A). “In choosing among the 21

 alternatives, the best interest of the ch ild is the court’s pr imary consideration.” In re L.C. , 2d Dist. Clark No. 2010 CA 90, 2011-Ohio-2066, ¶ 13. {¶ 42} Upon review, we see no abuse of discre tion in the trial court’s decision to award Paternal Aunt legal custody. 1 The dispositional-hearing transcript reflects that Paternal Aunt had four grown children in college. (Tr. Vo l. I at 245). Paternal Aunt had enjoyed some involvement in S.A.’s life early on. ( Id. at 244). She began seeing S.A. less frequently, however, when the child’s father (Paternal A unt’s brother) went to prison. Paternal Aunt received visitation time with S.A. when the proceedings below commenced. Her time with S.A. increased to overnight visitation before she was awarded legal custody. (Tr. Vol. II at 326). The record reflects that the overnight visits were “really good” and that S.A. enjoys her time with Paternal Aunt. ( Id. at 326, 352). For her part, foster mother L.I. acknowledged that Paternal Aunt loves S.A. ( Id . at 259). Mother testified that sh e did not believe S.A. should live with Paternal Aunt because she wanted the child to live with her. ( Id . at 398). Mother did not express any specific concerns, however, about S.A. ’s safety or care if Paternal Aunt obtained legal custody. ( Id .). Finally, GCCS expresse d no concerns about S.A. living with Paternal Aunt, and a home study was approved. ( Id. at 329-330). GCCS also did not oppose the trial court awarding Paternal Aunt legal custody. ( Id. at 331). GCCS did request an order of protective supervision, however, wh ich the trial court granted. (Tr. Vol. II at 331; Doc. #62 at 3). {¶ 43} Although Mother favored granting GCCS temporary custody and placing S.A.

1 Parenthetically, we note that a grant of “legal custody” is not “permanent custody.” Legal custody does not divest a parent of residual parental rights, privileges, and responsibilities. In re C.R. , 108 Ohio St.3d 369, 2006-Ohio-119 1, 843 N.E.2d 1188, ¶ 17. Because Mother’s parental rights have not been terminated, she still may regain custody of S.A. in the future. Id. 22

 in foster care with L.I., we cannot say the tria l court abused its discre tion in awarding legal custody to Paternal Aunt. An “abuse of disc retion” is exhibited in a ruling that is unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. In re M.P. , 2d Dist. Greene No. 2011 CA 71, 2012-Ohio-2334, ¶ 10. It is not enough that a revi ewing court might have reached a different conclusion if it were deciding the issue de novo. Id. Although the trial c ourt reasonably could have elected to grant GCCS temporary custody and to place S.A. in foster care, the record does not support a finding that it abused its disc retion by awarding legal custody to Paternal Aunt. Accordingly, Mother’s second assignment of error is overruled. {¶ 44} In her third assignment of error, Mother claims the trial court erred in finding that drug use rendered her unable to provide ad equate, consistent care for S.A. Mother notes that she has admitted her drug problem and has sought treatment. She points out that she is a good mother when not under the influence of he roin. She also stresses that she placed S.A. with alternate caregivers when she experienced a dr ug relapse. In light of these facts, Mother contends there is no evidence that S.A. lacked proper care. {¶ 45} Having reviewed Mother’s third assign ment of error, we find that it is, in essence, a rehash of portions of her first assignment of error. Her arguments about being able to care for S.A. when not under the influence of heroin and about providing alternate care when she relapses are pertinent to the trial c ourt’s dependency adjudica tion, an issue we fully addressed above. {¶ 46} In light of our determin ation, supra, that the tria l court did not err in (1) adjudicating S.A. dependent and (2) awarding le gal custody to Paternal Aunt, nothing remains for us to decide. In our analysis above, we r ecognized that Mother was a good caregiver when not under the influence of heroin. We also recognized that she placed S.A. with an alternate 23

 caregiver when she relapsed. Mother’s third assignment of error is overruled because it essentially repeats arguments rela ted to the dependency issue. {¶ 47} Based on the reasoning set forth above , the judgment of the Greene County Common Pleas Court, Juvenile Division, is affirmed.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . FAIN and DONOVAN, JJ., concur.

Copies mailed to: Stephen K. Haller Nathaniel R. Luken Jennifer S. Getty Hon. Robert W. Hutcheson