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*********************************************** 
L. L. v. M. B.*

(AC 45141)

Alvord, Seeley and Sheldon, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiff appealed from the judgment of the trial court dismissing her

application filed pursuant to statute (§ 46b-15) on behalf of her minor

daughter for a domestic violence restraining order against the defendant.

At the time of the hearing on the application, the parties were seniors

attending the same high school. Evidence submitted at the hearing

showed that the parties last dated for a short period when they were

sophomores, two years prior. In dismissing the plaintiff’s application,

the court found that the relationship between the parties did not meet

the requirement for relief from abuse in accordance with § 46b-15 (a),

which requires that the applicant be a family or household member as

defined in the applicable statute (§ 46b-38a (2)). The court concluded

that the relationship between the parties did satisfy the requirement of

§ 46b-38a (2) (F), namely, ‘‘persons in, or who have recently been in, a

dating relationship.’’ On the plaintiff’s appeal to this court, held:

1. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the plaintiff’s appeal

should have been dismissed as moot because practical relief could not

be afforded to the plaintiff: this court concluded that, if it were to

determine that the trial court improperly determined that the plaintiff

did not satisfy the statutory requirement of being a family or household

member, relief in the form of a new hearing would be available to the

plaintiff, which was sufficient to demonstrate that a successful appeal

would benefit her; moreover, the defendant’s proposed grounds for a

determination of mootness, that the parties would no longer be in the

same school by the time the appeal was heard and that the events that

led to the filing of the application would be so remote in time that there

would be no continuing threat of present physical pain or injury, instead

reflected arguments as to the merits of what would be decided at a

potential new hearing, the outcome of which was undetermined.

2. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding, based on the

facts presented, that the plaintiff did not meet the definition of a family

or household member as required for relief under § 46b-15, as the parties

did not have a recent dating relationship: the court held a full evidentiary

hearing on the application, during which both parties testified and had

the opportunity to proffer evidence, the court found that the parties

last had dated for a short period when the parties, now seniors, were

sophomores, and that such dating had ceased almost two years prior

to the filing of the application, and the plaintiff did not direct this court’s

attention to any factual findings of the trial court or any evidence in

the record that would suggest that the court could not have reasonably

concluded as it did based on the facts presented; moreover, the term

‘‘recently’’ as set forth in § 46b-38a (2) (F) was interpreted in conformity

with commonly approved definitions of the term, and this court was

satisfied that the plain meaning of the statute did not yield an unworkable

or absurd result, such that the plaintiff’s asserted considerations under

the guise of absurd results were instead more appropriately considerations of broader public policy that typically follow a determination of

textual ambiguity; furthermore, the trial court’s determination that the

plaintiff’s daughter did not fall within the definition of a family or household member did not implicate the subject matter jurisdiction of the

court, and, accordingly, the court should have denied rather than dismissed the application.

Argued October 27—officially released November 29, 2022

Procedural History

Application for a domestic violence restraining order,

brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of

Stamford-Norwalk, where the court, McLaughlin, J.,

rendered judgment dismissing the application, from
which the plaintiff appealed to this court. Improper

form of judgment; reversed; judgment directed.

Alexander J. Cuda, for the appellant (plaintiff).

Philip Russell, with whom, on the brief, was Catherine Keenan, for the appellee (defendant).
Opinion

ALVORD, J. The plaintiff, L. L., on behalf of her minor

daughter, N. R.,1 appeals from the judgment of the trial

court dismissing her application for a domestic violence

restraining order pursuant to General Statutes (Rev. to

2021) § 46b-15, as amended by Public Acts 2021, No.

21-78.2 On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the trial court

improperly dismissed her application on the basis that

she was not eligible for relief because she did not fall

within the definition of ‘‘[f]amily or household member’’

as set forth in General Statutes § 46b-38a (2).3 We reject

the plaintiff’s claim that the court improperly determined that she did not fall within the definition of family

or household member but conclude that the form of

the judgment is improper and, therefore, remand this

case with direction to deny the plaintiff’s application.

The following facts and procedural background are

relevant to the plaintiff’s claim. On October 1, 2021,

the plaintiff filed an application for relief from abuse

pursuant to § 46b-15, seeking a restraining order against

the defendant, M. B. On that same day, the court, Kowalski, J., issued an ex parte restraining order against the

defendant and scheduled a hearing for October 14, 2021.

On October 14, the parties appeared before the court,

McLaughlin, J., and jointly requested that the matter

be continued on the grounds that a motion to seal the

courtroom had been filed and the parties were awaiting

documents that had been subpoenaed. The court continued the matter until October 28, 2021, and ordered,

without objection by the defendant’s counsel, that the

restraining order remain in place until that date.

The hearing on the restraining order application was

held over two dates, October 28 and November 12, 2021.

The court heard the testimony of the plaintiff and the

defendant, who were seniors attending the same high

school. The court also heard the testimony of Kristina

Colmenares, the assistant principal of the high school;

the plaintiff’s mother; and a mutual friend of the parties,

who was called by the defendant. The parties also

entered exhibits into evidence.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the court stated in

relevant part: ‘‘The court found this case very troubling,

but I note that the question before me is a limited one,

which is under [§] 46b-15 of our statutes, whether or

not, as we sit here together [the plaintiff] has been

subjected to a continuous threat of present physical

pain or injury, stalking or a pattern of threatening from

[the defendant]. If [the defendant] satisfies the definition of family or household member. Family or household member, under our laws, the relevant part, is persons who have recently been in a dating relationship.

* * *

‘‘Here, the evidence to the court establishes that, at

best, these parties had a dating relationship in 2019,
when they were sophomores. Prior to that point in time,

was when they were in eighth grade.

‘‘So, from the court and the evidence, the court finds

that the parties do not satisfy the family or household

member portion of the statute, which requires a recent

dating relationship.’’

On November 15, 2021, the court issued a written

order dismissing the plaintiff’s application. The order

stated: ‘‘Based on a preponderance of the credible evidence, the parties last dated for a short period in 2019.

Thereafter, the parties interacted socially but were not

dating. [Section] 46b-15 provides for the filing of an

application for relief from abuse under specific circumstances. The statute, in relevant part, requires the parties to be in an existing dating relationship or to have

recently been in a dating relationship. General Statutes

§ 46b-38a (2) (F). Here, the relationship between the

parties does not satisfy the requirement for relief from

abuse in accordance with . . . § 46b-15 (a) because

it ended almost two years prior to the filing of the

application for relief from abuse. As such, this matter

is dismissed.’’ This appeal followed.

Before addressing the merits of the plaintiff’s appeal,

we turn to the defendant’s contention that the appeal

should be dismissed as moot. First, he represents that

‘‘the events immediately preceding the plaintiff’s filing

of the application . . . occurred on a school bus and

in school.’’ Because the parties were seniors in high

school for the 2021-2022 academic year, he contends

that, ‘‘[b]y the time this appeal is heard, the parties will

no longer be in the same school and no practical relief

will be available.’’ Second, he argues that ‘‘by the time

this appeal is heard, the events leading up to the filing

of the application . . . will be remote in time and there

is no evidence of a continuing threat of present physical

pain or physical injury. Thus, [the] plaintiff cannot be

said to have been subjected to a continuous threat of

present physical pain or physical injury by the defendant, as required by § 46b-15 (a).’’ We disagree with the

defendant.

‘‘Mootness is a question of justiciability that must be

determined as a threshold matter because it implicates

[this] court’s subject matter jurisdiction . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Putman v. Kennedy, 279

Conn. 162, 168, 900 A.2d 1256 (2006). ‘‘[A]n actual controversy must exist not only at the time the appeal is

taken, but also throughout the pendency of the appeal.

. . . When, during the pendency of an appeal, events

have occurred that preclude an appellate court from

granting any practical relief through its disposition of

the merits, a case has become moot. . . . In determining mootness, the dispositive question is whether a successful appeal would benefit the plaintiff or defendant

in any way.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks

omitted.) Wendy V. v. Santiago, 319 Conn. 540, 544–45,
125 A.3d 983 (2015).

Applying this standard, we determine that the present

appeal is not moot because practical relief can be

afforded to the plaintiff. The question presented by the

plaintiff’s appeal is whether the court properly determined that she was not eligible to obtain a domestic

violence restraining order because she did not fall

within the definition of ‘‘[f]amily or household member’’

as set forth in § 46b-38a (2). Were this court to determine that the trial court improperly determined that

she did not satisfy that statutory requirement, relief in

the form of a new hearing4 would be available to the

plaintiff. That potential relief is sufficient to demonstrate that a successful appeal would benefit the plaintiff. The defendant’s two proposed grounds for a determination of mootness do not implicate mootness but

instead reflect arguments as to the merits of what would

be decided at the potential new hearing, the outcome

of which is undetermined. Because this court could

grant practical relief to the plaintiff, we conclude that

her appeal is not moot.

Our conclusion that the present appeal is not moot

is supported by our Supreme Court’s decision in Wendy

V. v. Santiago, supra, 319 Conn. 540. In that case, the

plaintiff filed an ex parte restraining order application,

and the court denied the application as well as the

plaintiff’s request for a full hearing on the application.

Id., 542–43. The plaintiff appealed and requested as

relief a hearing on her application. Id., 543. While her

appeal was pending, the trial court held a hearing on

her original application, and a second application she

had filed, and then denied the applications. Id., 544. On

appeal, our Supreme Court concluded that the fact that

the trial court had held a hearing on the plaintiff’s applications had rendered the plaintiff’s appeals moot. Id.

Our Supreme Court then turned to the ‘‘capable of

repetition, yet evading review’’ exception to the mootness doctrine. Id., 545. The first requirement to qualify

under the exception is that ‘‘the challenged action, or

the effect of the challenged action, by its very nature

must be of a limited duration so that there is a strong

likelihood that the substantial majority of cases raising

a question about its validity will become moot before

appellate litigation can be concluded.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. Our Supreme Court determined

that the plaintiff’s case failed to meet the first prong,

explaining that ‘‘[t]he effect of the challenged action,

namely, the denial of a hearing after an application

under § 46b-15, is not, by its very nature, of limited

duration. Rather, the effects of a denied hearing generally will persist indefinitely. Therefore, in cases in

which a hearing is denied, the case would not become

moot before appellate litigation that ensues can be concluded. Anomalously, this case became moot only

because the trial court ultimately did provide the hear-
ing that the plaintiff had requested.’’ (Emphasis in original; footnote omitted.) Id., 546–47. In a footnote, the

court rejected the plaintiff’s contention that the effect

of the denial of a hearing is of limited duration,

explaining that, ‘‘[u]nlike the effect of an order granting

a restraining order, however, which generally expires

after one year, the effect of the denial of such an order

continues indefinitely.’’ Id., 547 n.7.

Although the relevant analysis in Wendy V. pertained

to the ‘‘capable of repetition, yet evading review’’ exception, and the case uniquely involved the denial of a

hearing, the discussion contained therein further supports our conclusion that the present appeal is not

moot. Our Supreme Court recognized that in cases in

which a hearing is denied, the case would not become

moot before appellate litigation could be concluded and

further recognized that the effect of the denial of an

application is not of limited duration. Id. The guidance

from Wendy V., although pertaining to the denial of a

hearing and not the denial of an application after a

hearing, is instructive in our analysis with respect to

mootness.

Having concluded that this appeal is not moot, we

turn to the plaintiff’s claim that the trial court improperly dismissed her application on the basis that she was

not eligible for relief because she did not fall within

the definition of ‘‘[f]amily or household member’’ as set

forth in § 46b-38a (2). Specifically, she contends that

she and the defendant are included within the category

of ‘‘persons . . . who have recently been in, a dating

relationship.’’ General Statutes § 46b-38a (2) (F). The

defendant responds, inter alia, that ‘‘[t]he trial court

reasonably concluded, based on the facts presented,

that the parties did not have a recent dating relationship.’’ We agree with the defendant.

We first set forth our standard of review. ‘‘[T]he standard of review in family matters is well settled. An

appellate court will not disturb a trial court’s orders in

domestic relations cases unless the court has abused

its discretion or it is found that it could not reasonably

conclude as it did, based on the facts presented. . . .

In determining whether a trial court has abused its

broad discretion in domestic relations matters, we

allow every reasonable presumption in favor of the

correctness of its action. . . . Appellate review of a

trial court’s findings of fact is governed by the clearly

erroneous standard of review. . . . A finding of fact is

clearly erroneous when there is no evidence in the

record to support it . . . or when although there is

evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire

evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction

that a mistake has been committed. . . . Our deferential standard of review, however, does not extend to

the court’s interpretation of and application of the law

to the facts. It is axiomatic that a matter of law is
entitled to plenary review on appeal. . . .

‘‘To the extent that the defendant’s claims raise issues

of statutory interpretation, we note that [i]ssues of statutory construction raise questions of law, over which

we exercise plenary review. . . . When construing a

statute, [o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and

give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature. . . .

In other words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned

manner, the meaning of the statutory language as

applied to the facts of [the] case, including the question

of whether the language actually does apply. . . . General Statutes § 1-2z directs this court to first consider

the text of the statute and its relationship to other

statutes to determine its meaning. If, after such consideration, the meaning is plain and unambiguous and does

not yield absurd or unworkable results, we shall not

consider extratextual evidence of the meaning of the

statute. . . . Only if we determine that the statute is not

plain and unambiguous or yields absurd or unworkable

results may we consider extratextual evidence of its

meaning such as the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment . . . the legislative

policy it was designed to implement . . . its relationship to existing legislation and common law principles

governing the same general subject matter . . . . The

test to determine ambiguity is whether the statute, when

read in context, is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation. . . . We presume that the legislature did not intend to enact meaningless provisions.

. . . [S]tatutes must be construed, if possible, such that

no clause, sentence or word shall be superfluous, void

or insignificant . . . .

‘‘Furthermore, [i]n the construction of the statutes,

words and phrases shall be construed according to the

commonly approved usage of the language; and technical words and phrases, and such as have acquired a

peculiar and appropriate meaning in the law, shall be

construed and understood accordingly. . . . If a statute or regulation does not sufficiently define a term, it

is appropriate to look to the common understanding

of the term as expressed in a dictionary.’’ (Citations

omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks

omitted.) Princess Q. H. v. Robert H., 150 Conn. App.

105, 111–13, 89 A.3d 896 (2014).

We begin our analysis with the language of § 46b-15

(a), which governs this case. It provides in relevant

part: ‘‘Any family or household member, as defined in

section 46b-38a, who is the victim of domestic violence,

as defined in section 46b-1, by another family or household member may make an application to the Superior

Court for relief under this section. . . .’’ General Statutes (Rev. to 2021) § 46b-15 (a), as amended by Public

Acts 2021, No. 21-78, § 2. General Statutes (Rev. to 2021)

§ 46b-1 (b), as amended by Public Acts 2021, No. 21-

78, § 1, defines ‘‘domestic violence’’ in relevant part as:
‘‘(1) A continuous threat of present physical pain or

physical injury against a family or household member,

as defined in section 46b-38a; (2) stalking, including,

but not limited to, stalking as described in section 53a181d, of such family or household member; (3) a pattern

of threatening, including, but not limited to, a pattern

of threatening as described in section 53a-62, of such

family or household member or a third party that intimidates such family or household member; or (4) coercive

control of such family or household member, which is

a pattern of behavior that in purpose or effect unreasonably interferes with a person’s free will and personal

liberty. . . .’’5 Section 46b-38a (2) defines a ‘‘[f]amily

or household member’’ to include, among other categories of persons, ‘‘persons in, or who have recently been

in, a dating relationship.’’

Because the word ‘‘recently’’ is not defined in § 46b38a (2), we begin by looking to the dictionary definition

of the word ‘‘recently’’ in order to understand its ordinary meaning. See, e.g., Seramonte Associates, LLC v.

Hamden, 345 Conn. 76, 84, 282 A.3d 1253 (2022); see

also General Statutes § 1-1 (a) (‘‘[i]n the construction

of the statutes, words and phrases shall be construed

according to the commonly approved usage of the language; and technical words and phrases, and such as

have acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in the

law, shall be construed and understood accordingly’’).

We look to definitions contemporaneous with the

statute’s amendment in 1999, which added subsection

(2) (F). See Public Acts 1999, No. 99-186. Dictionaries

consistently have defined the relevant term from at least

1985 through 2014. ‘‘[R]ecently’’ is defined as ‘‘during

a recent period of time,’’ and ‘‘recent’’ is defined as ‘‘of

or relating to a time not long past’’ and ‘‘having lately

come into existence.’’ Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate

Dictionary (1985) p. 982; see also Merriam-Webster’s

Collegiate Dictionary (11th Ed. 2014) p. 1038 (providing

same definitions).6 Ballentine’s Law Dictionary concordantly defines ‘‘recently’’ as ‘‘[l]ately’’ and ‘‘recent’’ as

‘‘[n]ew or fairly new,’’ ‘‘[c]haracterizing the period of

time immediately preceding the present moment.’’ Ballentine’s Law Dictionary (3d Ed. 1969) p. 1065. We interpret the statute in conformity with these commonly

approved definitions, and we are satisfied that the plain

meaning of the statute does not yield an unworkable

or absurd result.7 See Princess Q. H. v. Robert H., supra,

150 Conn. App. 115.

In so construing the statute, we are mindful that the

legislature added the limiting term ‘‘recently,’’ expressly

specifying that, in the context of former dating partners,

the protections of § 46b-15 extend only to ‘‘persons

. . . who have recently been in, a dating relationship.’’

(Emphasis added.) General Statutes § 46b-38a (2) (F).

Had the legislature intended to extend the reach of

§ 46b-15 to parties who had been in a dating relationship
at any time, it would have used that broader language.8

See Perry v. Perry, 312 Conn. 600, 624, 95 A.3d 500

(2014) (noting ‘‘well settled principle of statutory construction that the legislature knows how to convey its

intent expressly . . . or to use broader or limiting

terms when it chooses to do so’’ (citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted)).

In accordance with § 1-2z, we continue our analysis

by looking to the relationship of the statute to other

statutes. ‘‘There are a number of statutory provisions

granting the court the authority to issue protective or

restraining orders. See, e.g., General Statutes § 46b-15

(family violence restraining orders); General Statutes

§ 46b-16a (civil protection orders); General Statutes

§ 46b-38c (family violence protective orders); General

Statutes § 53a-40e (standing criminal protective

orders);9 General Statutes § 54-1k (criminal protective

orders); General Statutes § 54-82q (temporary

restraining order regarding witnesses); General Statutes § 54-82r (protective orders for witnesses). Each

provision contains its own set of specific requirements

and procedures.’’ (Footnote added.) S. A. v. D. G., 198

Conn. App. 170, 186, 232 A.3d 1110 (2020).

As the plaintiff recognizes in her brief, with respect

to the categories of relationships set forth in § 46b-38a,

only the former dating partner category contains a time

limitation. The definition of ‘‘[f]amily or household

member’’ includes ‘‘any of the following persons,

regardless of the age of such person: (A) Spouses or

former spouses; (B) parents or their children; (C) persons related by blood or marriage; (D) persons other

than those persons described in subparagraph (C) of

this subdivision presently residing together or who have

resided together; (E) persons who have a child in common regardless of whether they are or have been married or have lived together at any time; and (F) persons

in, or who have recently been in, a dating relationship.’’

General Statutes § 46b-38a (2). We cannot ignore the

legislature’s addition of the limiting word ‘‘recently’’

in the context of persons who have been in a dating

relationship, when the legislature did not include such

a limitation on the remaining categories of relationships. See Lopa v. Brinker International, Inc., 296

Conn. 426, 433, 994 A.2d 1265 (2010) (‘‘[b]ecause [e]very

word and phrase [of a statute] is presumed to have

meaning . . . [a statute] must be construed, if possible,

such that no clause, sentence or word shall be superfluous, void or insignificant’’ (internal quotation marks

omitted)).

We next turn to a consideration of whether the court

properly determined that the plaintiff did not fall within

the definition of ‘‘[f]amily or household member’’

because the parties were not ‘‘persons . . . who have

recently been in, a dating relationship.’’ General Statutes § 46b-38a (2) (F). The plaintiff argues that ‘‘the
connection between the parties as recent ex-boyfriend/

girlfriend remains intact given the factual context and

the ongoing actions of the defendant arising out of that

relationship, not to mention their continuing proximity

in the same high school. The underlying emotions which

drive domestic violence remain in play unabated, with

the parties still in the same high school and overlapping

social circles.’’ The plaintiff maintains that the COVID19 pandemic ‘‘create[d] an artificial social buffer’’ during much of the intervening time, and states that the

‘‘resumption of in-school activity gave a renewed opportunity for the defendant to continue his pattern of inappropriate conduct which relates back to the dating relationship . . . .’’ The defendant contends that, ‘‘[w]hen

looking at the issue of whether a dating relationship

was ‘recent’ in this case, the trial court was well within

[its] discretion to find that a dating relationship which

occurred two years prior to the filing of the application

was not ‘recent.’ ’’

Before making its determination, the court held a full

evidentiary hearing on the application, during which

both parties testified and had the opportunity to proffer

evidence. Considering all of the evidence before it, the

court found that the parties last had dated ‘‘for a short

period in 2019’’ when the parties, now seniors, were

sophomores, and that such dating had ceased almost

‘‘two years prior to the filing of the application . . . .’’

The plaintiff does not contest the trial court’s findings,

which are supported by the testimony of the plaintiff

that the parties last had dated for ‘‘[a] month’’ in 2019,

when the parties were sophomores in high school. In

conducting this fact sensitive inquiry, the court appropriately considered that the relationship, the duration

of which the court described as ‘‘short,’’ had ended

almost two years prior to the filing of the application.10

The plaintiff has not directed our attention to any factual findings of the court or any evidence in the record

that would suggest that the court could not have reasonably concluded as it did based on the facts presented.11

See Princess Q. H. v. Robert H., supra, 150 Conn. App.

111. Accordingly, we conclude that the court did not

abuse its discretion in determining that the month long,

two year old relationship was not recent.

The plaintiff raises, among other concerns,12 potential

uncertainty an applicant may face in determining which

type of protective or restraining order the applicant

should seek. Specifically, she notes that § 46b-16a

authorizes the court to grant a civil protective order, and

that statute does not contain a relationship requirement.

Section 46b-16a (a) does specify, however, that relief

under that section is only available to a plaintiff who

‘‘does not qualify to seek relief under section 46b-15.’’13

The plaintiff questions: ‘‘If an applicant has previously

dated the respondent, how is the applicant to know

whether that relationship is recent or not? If the applicant were to file pursuant to [§] 46b-16a, if the relation-
ship were considered recent it could very well disqualify

the applicant from relief under [§] 46b-16a.’’ She additionally raises a concern that, in the case of a former

dating partner continuing a pattern of conduct over a

period of years, the plaintiff ‘‘should not be penalized

[for trying] other alternatives’’ before seeking a

restraining order.

The plaintiff asserts these and other considerations;

see footnote 12 of this opinion; under the guise of

‘‘absurd results’’ illustrated by a determination like that

made in this case that a period of almost two years was

not recent. We disagree that the concerns identified

by the plaintiff demonstrate ‘‘absurd or unworkable’’

results, and we instead view the plaintiff’s arguments

as more appropriately constituting the considerations

of broader public policy that typically follow a determination of textual ambiguity. The argument that a better

public policy, in the plaintiff’s view, exists does not

mean that the plain and unambiguous language of the

statute yields absurd results. ‘‘[I]t is the legislature, and

not [our courts], that is responsible for formulating and

implementing public policy. . . . The legislature

speaks on matters of public policy through legislative

enactments and through the promulgation of regulations by state agencies as authorized by statute. . . .

When there is no ambiguity in the legislative commandment, this court cannot, in the interest of public policy,

engraft amendments onto the statutory language.’’

(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)

Hasychak v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 296 Conn. 434,

441 n.8, 994 A.2d 1270 (2010); see also Seramonte Associates, LLC v. Hamden, supra, 345 Conn. 91 n.11 (noting

that ‘‘the question of whether the plaintiff’s reading of

the relevant statutory text ‘yield[s] absurd or unworkable results’ is analytically distinct from the examination of extratextual sources, such as expressions of

legislative intent and considerations of broader public

policy, that typically follows a determination of textual

ambiguity’’).

Last, we note that the trial court’s determination that

the plaintiff did not fall within the definition of ‘‘[f]amily

or household member’’ as set forth in § 46b-38a (2),

did not implicate the subject matter jurisdiction of the

court. Accordingly, the trial court should have denied

rather than dismissed the application.14 See Board of

Education v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities, 344 Conn. 603, 633, 280 A.3d 424 (2022) (‘‘Once

it is determined that a tribunal has authority or competence to decide the class of cases to which the action

belongs, the issue of subject matter jurisdiction is

resolved in favor of entertaining the action. . . . [T]he

question of whether the action belongs to the class

of cases that the tribunal has authority to decide is

[s]eparate and distinct from . . . the question of

whether a [tribunal] . . . properly exercises its statutory authority to act.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quota-
tion marks omitted.)); see also State v. Clark, 137 Conn.

App. 203, 215, 48 A.3d 135 (2012) (holding that trial

court lacked statutory authority, under § 53a-40e, to

issue standing criminal restraining order where victim

and defendant were not family or household members

with one another), aff’d, 314 Conn. 511, 103 A.3d 507

(2014).

The form of the judgment is improper, the judgment

dismissing the plaintiff’s application is reversed and the

case is remanded with direction to render judgment

denying the plaintiff’s application.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

* In accordance with federal law; see 18 U.S.C. § 2265 (d) (3) (2018), as

amended by the Violence Against Women Act Reauthorization Act of 2022,

Pub. L. No. 117-103, § 106, 136 Stat. 49; we decline to identify any person

protected or sought to be protected under a protection order, protective

order, or a restraining order that was issued or applied for, or others through

whom that party’s identity may be ascertained.

1

In the interest of simplicity, we refer to N. R. as the plaintiff in this opinion.

2 All references herein to § 46b-15 are to the 2021 revision as amended.

3 The plaintiff raises a second claim on appeal that the court applied

incorrect legal standards when, after dismissing the plaintiff’s application,

the court additionally stated on the record that the credible evidence presented ‘‘did not give rise to granting a restraining order.’’ Because we conclude that the court properly determined that the plaintiff was not eligible

for relief, in that she did not fall within the definition of ‘‘[f]amily or household

member’’ as set forth in § 46b-38a (2), we decline to address the plaintiff’s

second claim.

4 The proper remedy, in the event this court were to agree with the

plaintiff’s claim on appeal, would be to remand the case for a new hearing

on the plaintiff’s application, not, as the plaintiff requests, a direction for

the trial court to ‘‘render judgment for the plaintiff and reinstate the

restraining order against the defendant which was originally entered on an

ex parte basis.’’

5

‘‘ ‘Coercive control’ includes, but is not limited to, unreasonably engaging

in any of the following:

‘‘(A) Isolating the family or household member from friends, relatives or

other sources of support;

‘‘(B) Depriving the family or household member of basic necessities;

‘‘(C) Controlling, regulating or monitoring the family or household member’s movements, communications, daily behavior, finances, economic

resources or access to services;

‘‘(D) Compelling the family or household member by force, threat or

intimidation, including, but not limited to, threats based on actual or suspected immigration status, to (i) engage in conduct from which such family

or household member has a right to abstain, or (ii) abstain from conduct

that such family or household member has a right to pursue;

‘‘(E) Committing or threatening to commit cruelty to animals that intimidates the family or household member; or

‘‘(F) Forced sex acts, or threats of a sexual nature, including, but not

limited to, threatened acts of sexual conduct, threats based on a person’s

sexuality or threats to release sexual images.’’ General Statutes (Rev. to

2021) § 46b-1 (b), as amended by Public Acts 2021, No. 21-78, § 1.

6 The plaintiff sets forth these same definitions in her appellate brief and

does not propose any alternative definitions.

7 The plaintiff argues that the term ‘‘recently’’ is ambiguous and, thus, this

court should review the legislative history of the statute to ascertain its

meaning. Because we conclude that the text of the statute is unambiguous,

we do not consider the legislative history. See Mandable v. Planning &

Zoning Commission, 173 Conn. App. 256, 263 n.8, 163 A.3d 69 (2017).

8

In arguing that the term recently ‘‘extends to a period well in excess of

two years,’’ the plaintiff cites a decision of our Supreme Court in which the

court described cases as having been ‘‘recently’’ decided. We disagree that

the court’s reference to cases as having been ‘‘recently’’ decided is persuasive

evidence of the meaning of the word ‘‘recently’’ in the context of a dating

relationship.
9 Notably, § 53a-40e incorporates the same definition of family or household member as § 46b-15. Section 53a-40e authorizes the court to issue a

standing criminal protective order following a defendant’s conviction of

certain crimes against a family or household member.

10 The plaintiff points to certain remarks that the trial court made while

issuing evidentiary rulings during the hearing and argues that ‘‘[t]he record

demonstrates that the trial court was conflating an improper imminence

requirement with the time period for dating, so that by doing so it resulted

in the trial judge [applying] too narrow and strict a consideration of what

‘recently’ meant in this context.’’ The plaintiff refers to the following colloquy

between the court, her counsel, Attorney Alexander Cuda, and the defendant’s counsel, Attorney Philip Russell, which concerned an incident that

occurred on the school bus in 2019, in support of her argument:

‘‘[The Defendant’s Counsel]: I’m going to object at this point, we’re talking

about an infraction that might [have] occurred in 2019 on a hearing involving

imminent threat or stalking.

‘‘The Court: So, Attorney Cuda.

‘‘[The Plaintiff’s Counsel]: Your Honor, this, this is not just involv[ing]

imminent threat, and in fact, stalking has a very broad definition in terms

of a pattern of incidents that can include, you know, going back years,

including, you know, more recent incidents. In terms of issues of coercive

control, you know, there is a very broad set of circumstances that the court

can consider, indeed, and there is not, for either stalking or coercive control

issues, the imminence requirement that Attorney Russell is trying to, to add

to this.

‘‘The Court: Well, under either scenario, there still needs to be a risk

associated with that. There needs to be something for the court to determine

that someone’s safety is at risk, that there’s a need to enter a restraining

order against an individual. So, I disagree with your assessment that coercive

control or, or stalking doesn’t need to also present an imminent risk to the

moving party.’’

In considering the plaintiff’s argument, we first note that she does not

claim on appeal any error in the evidentiary rulings made by the trial court.

Rather, she argues that the court ‘‘applied an incorrect standard of ‘imminence,’ ’’ which, she contends, ‘‘improperly influenced the trial court’s determination of what ‘recently’ means.’’

We disagree that the trial court’s remarks regarding ‘‘imminence’’ impacted

the trial court’s determination as to the recency of the dating relationship.

Viewing the record as a whole, it is clear the trial court determined that

the plaintiff was not a ‘‘[f]amily or household member’’ because the parties

were not ‘‘persons . . . who have recently been in, a dating relationship.’’

General Statutes § 46b-38a (2) (F). We are not persuaded by the plaintiff’s

arguments that the court’s determination on that issue was related to, or

affected by, any remarks regarding the evidence required to support issuance

of a restraining order.

11 See S. B-R. v. J. D., 208 Conn. App. 342, 351, 266 A.3d 148 (2021) (court

abused its discretion in issuing order of civil protection where court could

not reasonably find that continuing conduct element of § 46b-16a was

proven); C. A. v. G. L., 201 Conn. App. 734, 746, 243 A.3d 807 (2020) (court

did not abuse its discretion in deciding that defendant had stalked plaintiff).

12 Those other concerns are as follows. The plaintiff contends that ‘‘[i]t is

inconsistent for a self-represented party to be granted an ex parte restraining

order in this case, noting her prior dating relationship, and then be denied

a restraining order after a hearing which finds that there was an insufficient

dating relationship for application of the statute.’’ She further contends that

application of the recent requirement is unfair to teenage victims of domestic

violence, who are less likely to fall within the remaining relationship categories set forth in § 46b-38a, because they are far less likely to be married,

living with a partner, or having children. Last, she contends that ‘‘[t]he only

way an applicant would know for sure that the relationship is ‘recent’ enough

is to stay in the relationship as close as possible to applying for the restraining

order, because if they dump their abuser and wait then it may not be recent

enough for the court.’’

13 General Statutes § 46b-16a (a) provides in relevant part: ‘‘Any person

who has been the victim of sexual abuse, sexual assault or stalking may

make an application to the Superior Court for relief under this section,

provided such person has not obtained any other court order of protection

arising out of such abuse, assault or stalking and does not qualify to seek

relief under section 46b-15. . . .’’

14 In her principal brief before this court, the plaintiff states that ‘‘[t]he
trial court also erroneously issued an order of dismissal pursuant to Practice

Book § 14-3, ‘Dismissal for Lack of Diligence’ . . . .’’ Our review of the case

detail reveals that the judgment of dismissal notice stated incorrectly that

the court dismissed the action for ‘‘failure to prosecute said action with

reasonable diligence, (P.B. 14-3).’’ Because we determine that the form of

the judgment was improper and remand with direction to render judgment

denying the application, we need not discuss this apparent clerical error further.