```

[House Report 109-435]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

109th Congress                                                   Report
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
 2d Session                                                     109-435
_______________________________________________________________________

                                     

                                     

                                     

                                                 Union Calendar No. 242
 
  UPDATING NUCLEAR SECURITY STANDARDS: HOW LONG CAN THE DEPARTMENT OF 
                         ENERGY AFFORD TO WAIT?

                               __________

                             SEVENTH REPORT

                                 by the

                     COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM

                                     

                                     

  Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/
                               index.html
                      http://www.house.gov/reform

 April 25, 2006.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the 
              State of the Union and ordered to be printed

                    U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
49-006                      WASHINGTON : 2006
_____________________________________________________________________________
For Sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov  Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; (202) 512�091800  
Fax: (202) 512�092250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402�090001

                     COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM

                     TOM DAVIS, Virginia, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut       HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
DAN BURTON, Indiana                  TOM LANTOS, California
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida         MAJOR R. OWENS, New York
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York             EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
JOHN L. MICA, Florida                PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania
GIL GUTKNECHT, Minnesota             CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana              ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio           DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania    DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois
CHRIS CANNON, Utah                   WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri
JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee       DIANE E. WATSON, California
CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan          STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio              CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland
DARRELL E. ISSA, California          LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California
JON C. PORTER, Nevada                C.A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland
KENNY MARCHANT, Texas                BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia        ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 
PATRICK T. McHENRY, North Carolina       Columbia
CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania                    ------
VIRGINIA FOXX, North Carolina        BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont 
JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio                       (Independent)
------ ------

                      David Marin, Staff Director
                     Keith Ausbrook, Chief Counsel
                       Teresa Austin, Chief Clerk
          Phil Barnett, Minority Chief of Staff/Chief Counsel

Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International 
                               Relations

                CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut, Chairman
KENNY MARCHANT, Texas                DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
DAN BURTON, Indiana                  TOM LANTOS, California
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida         BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York             CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio           CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland
TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania    LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California
JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee       C.A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio              STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts
JON C. PORTER, Nevada                BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania

                               Ex Officio

TOM DAVIS, Virginia                  HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
            Lawrence J. Halloran, Staff Director and Counsel
              J. Vincent Chase, Professional Staff Member
                        Robert A. Briggs, Clerk
             Andrew Su, Minority Professional Staff Member
?

                         LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

                              ----------                              

                                  House of Representatives,
                                    Washington, DC, April 25, 2006.
Hon. J. Dennis Hastert,
Speaker of the House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.
    Dear Mr. Speaker: By direction of the Committee on 
Government Reform, I submit herewith the committee's seventh 
report to the 109th Congress. The committee's report is based 
on a study conducted by its Subcommittee on National Security, 
Emerging Threats, and International Relations.
                                                 Tom Davis,
                                                          Chairman.

                                 (iii)

                                     
                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page
  I. Summary..........................................................1
      A. Findings................................................     4
      B. Recommendations.........................................     4
 II. Background.......................................................4
      A. The National Nuclear Security Administration [NNSA].....     6
      B. The Office of Energy, Science and Environment [ESE].....     8
      C. Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance 
          [SSA]..................................................    10
      D. NNSA AND ESE Security Offices...........................    11
      E. Design Basis Threat.....................................    12
III. Discussion......................................................15
      A. Findings................................................    15
      B. Recommendations.........................................    22
  
                                                 Union Calendar No. 242
109th Congress                                                   Report
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
 2d Session                                                     109-435

======================================================================

  UPDATING NUCLEAR SECURITY STANDARDS: HOW LONG CAN THE DEPARTMENT OF 
                         ENERGY AFFORD TO WAIT?

                                _______
                                

 April 25, 2006.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the 
              State of the Union and ordered to be printed

                                _______
                                

 Mr. Tom Davis, from the Committee on Government Reform submitted the 
                               following

                             SEVENTH REPORT

    On April 6, 2006, the Committee on Government Reform 
approved and adopted a report entitled, ``Updating Nuclear 
Security Standards: How Long Can the Department of Energy 
Afford to Wait?'' The chairman was directed to transmit a copy 
to the Speaker of the House.

                               I. Summary

    The Government Reform Committee, National Security, 
Emerging Threats, and International Relations [NSETIR] 
Subcommittee conducted an oversight investigation of Department 
of Energy [DOE] efforts to improve nuclear facility security. 
The subcommittee examined the DOE National Nuclear Security 
Administration [NNSA] and the Office of Energy, Science and 
Environment [ESE] to determine the reasons behind persistent 
reports of facility security lapses.\1\ The Department of 
Energy is the Nation's custodian for the protection of nuclear 
weapons, components and special nuclear material.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Pre 9/11 reports include: NUCLEAR SECURITY: Improvements Needed 
in DOE's Safeguards and Security Oversight, GAO/RCED-00-62, Report to 
the Chairman, Committee on Commerce, Feb. 24, 2000; Prepared testimony 
of Gary L. Jones, Associate Director, Government Accountability Office, 
NUCLEAR SECURITY: Security Issues at DOE and Its Newly Created National 
Nuclear Security Administration, GAO/T-RCED-00-123, before the 
Subcommittee on Energy and Power and the Subcommittee on Oversight and 
Investigations, Committee on Commerce, Mar. 14, 2000; NUCLEAR SECURITY: 
Lessons to Be Learned from Implementing NNSA's Security Enhancements, 
GAO-02-358, Report to the Committee on Armed Services, Special 
Oversight Panel on Department of Energy Reorganization, Mar. 29, 2002; 
U.S. Nuclear Weapons Complex: Security at Risk, Project on Government 
Oversight, Washington, DC, 20001, September 2001.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The oversight investigation conducted by the subcommittee 
attempted to identify systemic problems within the structure 
and management of DOE. The investigation sought to make sure 
risk management policies are threat-based, not artificially 
constrained by the question, ``How much security can we 
afford?'' in the effort to formulate and implement a new, post-
9/11 security standard or Design Basis Threat [DBT].
    Without question, DOE nuclear warhead production plants, 
test facilities, research labs, storage locations and 
decommissioned sites are attractive targets for terrorists 
determined to turn modern technology against us, and willing to 
die while doing so. The highly enriched uranium [HEU] and 
plutonium [PU] held at various locations could be used as the 
core of an improvised nuclear device or dispersed as a 
radiological weapon.
    At the subcommittee's request, the Government 
Accountability Office [GAO] undertook a review of DOE nuclear 
material security resulting in the release of a series of 
reports entitled, ``Nuclear Security: NNSA Needs to Better 
Manage Its Safeguards and Security Program, (May 30, 2003, GAO-
03-471); Nuclear Security: DOE Needs To Resolve Significant 
Issues Before It Fully Meets the New Design Basis Threat, 
(April 27, 2004, GAO-04-623); and Nuclear Security: DOE's 
Office of the Under Secretary for Energy, Science and 
Environment Needs to Take Prompt Action to Meet the New Design 
Basis Threat, (July 15, 2005, GAO-05-611).
    GAO found that DOE was not aggressively confronting the 
many challenges posed by the need to secure a sprawling, aging 
infrastructure against post-9/11 threats. In general, the DOE 
management structure may not reflect current security 
imperatives. The oversight investigation found substantial 
institutional, technical and fiscal challenges faced by efforts 
to develop and implement a strengthened DBT within a reasonable 
timeframe.
    GAO examined the timeline for DBT implementation and found 
it unrealistic. After September 11th, it took DOE too long to 
formulate the May 2003 DBT and the resulting DBT failed to 
capture some elements of the threat. In significant respects, 
threats anticipated in the 2003 DBT did not parallel those 
identified in the intelligence community's Postulated Threat. 
Reduced threat levels, called ``dumming down the DBT'' by one 
witness,\2\ were not adequately justified. As a result, the May 
2003 DBT was reviewed again in response to GAO findings and 
congressional criticism. DOE issued a revised DBT in October 
2004. The 2004 DBT identified a larger terrorist threat for DOE 
sites. However, DOE does not require full compliance until 
October 2008.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ Testimony of Danielle Brian, executive director, Project on 
Government Oversight, Emerging Threats: Assessing Nuclear Weapons 
Complex Facility Security before the Subcommittee on National Security, 
Emerging Threats, and International Relations, House Committee on 
Government Reform, Serial No. 108-62, p. 151, June 24, 2003.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    During a subcommittee hearing in the summer of 2005, 
internal Department divisions erupted publicly concerning the 
2004 DBT levels. The subcommittee learned ESE officials 
believed that the DBT was too demanding. Mr. Walsh, ESE 
Director of Security stated, `` I am not totally convinced that 
the current intelligence foundation that really does go into 
developing a design basis threat supports where we are right 
now.'' \3\ On June 22, 2005, ESE Environmental Management [EM] 
directed sites not to comply with some aspects of the DBT.\4\ 
The following week, the Office of Security and Safety 
Performance Assurance [SSA] informed ESE that any deviations 
from the DBT would have to be approved by the Secretary of 
Energy.\5\ In November 2005, DOE announced revisions \6\ to the 
2004 DBT. According to GAO, the 2005 DBT revisions maintain the 
threat level found in the 2004 DBT for NNSA sites protecting 
nuclear weapons, test devices, and completed nuclear 
assemblies. However, the 2005 DBT revisions did reduce the 
threat level for ESE and NNSA sites protecting Category I 
special nuclear material [SNM] such as nuclear weapon 
components, metals, and oxides. The reduced threat level, 
however, is within the lower range of adversaries contained in 
the Postulated Threat.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ Testimony of Robert Walsh, ESE Director of Security, Department 
of Energy, DOE/ESE Security: How Ready is the Protective Force? before 
the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and 
International Relations, House Committee on Government Reform, Serial 
No. 109-104, p. 104, July 26, 2005.
    \4\ Memorandum from Maurice Daugherty, Director of Safeguards and 
Security Emergency Management to Ronald Bartholomew, Director, 
Safeguards and Security Savannah River Operations Office, June 22, 2005 
(in subcommittee files).
    \5\ Memorandum from Marshall O. Combs, Director, Office of 
Security, SSA to Maurice Daugherty, Director, Safeguards and Security/ 
ESE Environmental Management, July 1, 2005 (in subcommittee files).
    \6\ Nov. 29, 2005 memo concerning DBT revisions from Deputy DOE 
Secretary Clay Sell to Linton F. Brooks, Under Secretary for Nuclear 
Security/Administrator for the National Nuclear Security Administration 
[NNSA], David K. Garman, Under Secretary for Energy, Science and 
Environment [ESE], and Glenn Podonsky, Director-Office of Security and 
Safety Performance Assurance [SSA] (in subcommittee files).
    \7\ Email correspondence from Jonathan Gill, Senior Analyst, 
Government Accountability Office to subcommittee staff, Mar. 28, 2006 
(in subcommittee files).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Still, the stringent requirements of the 2004 DBT appear to 
have transformed possession of special nuclear material from a 
prestigious credential to a serious institutional liability. 
Facilities now have a powerful incentive to blend down or 
consolidate dangerous stocks.
    In the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks, DOE 
took immediate steps to improve physical security by increasing 
the level of security readiness from Security Condition [SECON] 
level 4 to SECON 2.\8\ The Secretary of Energy also established 
a set of 14 security initiatives, and took additional steps, to 
enhance short and long-term security. DOE has prepared 
implementation plans for each of the ESE sites possessing 
Category I special nuclear material. A multi-discipline team 
has been created to review the DBT and reassess divergence 
between DBT threat levels and the intelligence community 
analysis. A Consolidation of Materials Task Force has been 
formed and has compiled a list of excess material in the effort 
to reduce the number of facilities housing special nuclear 
materials but as of the task force had not yet released a 
report identifying short-term and long-term options for 
consolidation and relocation, something the task force had 
promised to do in 2004.\9\ Finally, the Cyber Security 
Oversight Office under DOE has been working toward assessing 
and securing information assets and systems.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \8\ DOE Notice 473.6 established Department security condition 
[SECON] levels.
    \9\ Testimony of Glenn Podonsky, Director, Office of Independent 
Oversight and Performance Assurance, Department of Energy, Nuclear 
Security: Can DOE Meet Facility Security Requirements? (II) before the 
Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International 
Relations, House Committee on Government Reform, Serial No. 108-237, p. 
64, June 22, 2004.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Charged by law to sustain the Nation's nuclear deterrent 
capabilities, DOE and NNSA have the unenviable task of 
balancing the demands of that mission against the risks and 
costs of meeting security threats in a new and dangerous era. 
That balance must be struck as openly and as effectively as 
possible so that nuclear security, homeland security and 
national security will be protected.

                              A. FINDINGS

    1. The Department of Energy lacks an overarching, 
coordinated security policy to ensure effective safeguards are 
in place to protect nuclear weapons assemblies, components, 
designs and special nuclear material.
    2. Design Basis Threat [DBT] revisions are taking too long 
to implement.
    3. The Design Basis Threat has not been applied 
consistently throughout Department of Energy facilities.
    4. Maintaining the current far-flung Department of Energy 
nuclear complex of facilities housing special nuclear materials 
is not cost effective and increases security risks.
    5. Protective forces are experiencing reduced readiness, 
retention problems, and fewer force-on-force performance tests.

                           B. RECOMMENDATIONS

    1. The Secretary of Energy should designate an office 
responsible for Department-wide security policies and should 
clarify the roles and responsibilities of site offices and 
headquarters for conducting security oversight.
    2. The Secretary of Energy should develop and implement a 
coordinated department-wide, multiyear, fully funded 
implementation plan for meeting new DBT requirements.
    3. The Secretary of Energy should report regularly to 
relevant congressional oversight committees on the status of 
DBT implementation plans including which sites and facilities 
are currently considered to be high risk and what steps are 
being taken to mitigate those risks to acceptable levels.
    4. The Secretary of Energy should develop a plan, timeline 
and budget for the consolidation of special nuclear material.
    5. The Secretary of Energy should develop and implement a 
comprehensive management plan to improve training, 
qualifications, and technology available to security protective 
forces.

                             II. Background

    The Department of Energy [DOE] was created in 1977 \10\ to 
deal with the oil price shocks caused by the Organization of 
Petroleum Export Countries [OPEC]. The department was formed 
from the consolidation of a number of agencies with energy-
related missions. These agencies included the Energy Research 
and Development Administration [ERDA], the former Atomic Energy 
Commission [AEC], the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, the 
Federal Energy Administration, and several programs from the 
Department of Interior.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \10\ The Department of Energy Organization Act, Public Law 95-91. 
The Department of Energy officially began operations on Oct. 1, 1977. 
Pursuant to section 901 of the act, President Jimmy Carter issued 
Executive Order 12009, prescribing Oct. 1, 1977 as the effective date 
of the act.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    DOE manages the Nation's nuclear weapons production 
complex, cleans up the environmental legacy from the production 
of nuclear weapons, and conducts research and development on 
both energy and basic science. The relative emphasis given to 
these missions has changed over time. Early emphasis by the 
department on research and initiatives to cope with the global 
energy crisis quickly shifted to accelerated nuclear weapons 
production. However, by the late 1980s, DOE funding priorities 
again shifted to cleaning up the legacy of waste generated by 
the weapons complex. Since then, DOE has placed increased 
emphasis on basic scientific research. DOE also has a role in 
helping to ensure the security of the Nation's energy 
infrastructure. The result is a department with complex and 
diverse missions. These diverse missions are largely 
implemented by contractors to carry out the DOE program and 
project activities at government-owned facilities and sites 
across the country.\11\ The department contracts out more than 
90 percent of its budget \12\ and has established an extensive 
network of field offices to directly oversee the work of these 
contractors and address other departmental responsibilities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \11\ DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY: Fundamental Reassessment Needed to 
Address Major Mission, Structure, and Accountability Problems, 
Government Accountability Office, GAO-02-51, December 2001.
    \12\ Response to email inquiry from subcommittee staff to the 
Department of Energy (in subcommittee files).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Department of Energy is responsible for developing the 
national energy plan by coordinating and administering the 
energy functions of the Federal Government. In addition, DOE is 
responsible for long-term, high-risk research and development 
of energy technology, Federal power marketing, energy 
conservation, and the nuclear weapons program. In carrying out 
this multifaceted mission, the department employs a workforce 
of approximately 120,000 Federal and contractor employees and 
manages assets valued at more than $128 billion, including a 
complex of national laboratories, nuclear weapon production 
facilities, and other research facilities.\13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \13\ Special Report: Management Challenges at the Department of 
Energy, DOE Office of the Inspector General DOE/IG-0712, December 2005.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Department of Energy's overarching mission is to 
advance the national, economic, and energy security of the 
United States; to promote scientific and technological 
innovation in support of that mission; and to ensure the 
environmental cleanup of the national nuclear weapons complex. 
The Department has four strategic goals toward achieving the 
mission:

          Defense Strategic Goal: To protect the 
        national security by applying advanced science and 
        nuclear technology to the Nation's defense.

          Energy Strategic Goal: To protect national 
        and economic security by promoting a diverse supply and 
        delivery of reliable, affordable, and environmentally 
        sound energy.

          Science Strategic Goal: To protect national 
        and economic security by providing world-class 
        scientific research capacity and advancing scientific 
        knowledge.

          Environment Strategic Goal: To protect the 
        environment by providing a responsible resolution to 
        the environmental legacy of the Cold War and by 
        providing for the permanent disposal of the Nation's 
        high-level radioactive waste.\14\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \14\ Department of Energy, About DOE, http://www.doe.gov/about/
index.htm (accessed Feb. 28, 2006).

    The Department of Energy has two major program offices. The 
National Nuclear Security Administration and the Office of 
Energy, Science and Environment have the day-to-day 
responsibility for all DOE programs under their jurisdiction. 
NNSA is responsible for developing, producing, and maintaining 
nuclear weapons, and insuring the security of those weapons, 
components, and special nuclear material while ESE is 
responsible for Federal energy-related programs and 
environmental clean-up of former NNSA nuclear weapon sites.
    The Department of Energy has requested a budget of $23.5 
billion for fiscal year 2007.\15\ The budget request includes 
$1.498 billion for NNSA, ESE, SSA and Information Management 
Security, a decrease of approximately 1.3 percent over fiscal 
year 2006, for security programs and implementation of 
safeguard requirements identified in the Design Basis 
Threat.\16\ The security funding will support DOE efforts to 
protect nuclear material, conduct performance assurance 
testing, and support programs to ensure security systems are 
operational and functioning.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \15\ Fiscal Year 2007, Budget of the Department of Energy, Office 
of the Chief Financial Officer, Washington, DC.
    \16\ Department of Energy, Fiscal Year 2007 Congressional Budget 
Request, Budget Highlights, Office of Management, Budget and 
Evaluation/CFO, February 2006.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

         A. THE NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION [NNSA]

    In 2000, the National Nuclear Security Administration \17\ 
was established within the Department of Energy as a semi-
autonomous agency with a mandate in a variety of security-
related domains. The NNSA is responsible for the research and 
development, production, maintenance, storage, and 
transportation of the Nation's nuclear weapons arsenal. 
Congress established the NNSA to correct longstanding 
management and security problems including ineffective controls 
over foreign visitors, weaknesses in efforts to control and 
protect classified and sensitive information, lax physical 
security controls, ineffective management of personnel security 
clearance programs, and weaknesses in tracking and controlling 
nuclear materials.\18\ NNSA was established to be distinct from 
DOE. To clearly show the separation of NNSA management from the 
DOE organization, Congress laid out chains of command in both 
DOE and NNSA that would insulate NNSA from DOE management and 
decision-making, except at the level of the NNSA Administrator.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \17\ National Security Administration Act, Public Law 106-65, Oct. 
5, 1999.
    \18\ Department of Energy, Views on DOE's Plan to Establish the 
National Nuclear Security Administration, Testimony of Gary L. Jones, 
Associate Director, Government Accountability Office, GAO/T-RCED-00-
113, Mar. 2, 2000.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The nuclear weapons program is a multifaceted and hazardous 
operation. The Department of Energy must maintain in readiness 
a nuclear arsenal, maintain aging facilities, dismantle surplus 
weapons, dispose of excess radioactive materials, clean up 
surplus facilities, and construct new facilities.\19\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \19\ Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, Sixteenth Annual 
Report to Congress, February 2006.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The National Nuclear Security Administration maintains the 
safety, security, and reliability of the Nation's nuclear 
stockpile, manages nuclear non-proliferation efforts to reduce 
the threats from weapons of mass destruction [WMD], and 
provides the U.S. Navy with nuclear propulsion plants. The 
United States last produced a new nuclear weapon in 1990 and 
last conducted a nuclear test in 1992.
    The mission of the National Nuclear Security Administration 
is:

          To enhance U.S. national security through the 
        military application of nuclear energy.

          To maintain and enhance the safety, 
        reliability, and performance of the U.S. nuclear 
        weapons stockpile, including the ability to design, 
        produce, and test, in order to meet national security 
        requirements.

          To provide the U.S. Navy with safe, 
        militarily effective nuclear propulsion plants and to 
        ensure the safe and reliable operation of those plants.

          To promote international nuclear safety and 
        nonproliferation.

          To reduce global danger from weapons of mass 
        destruction.

          To support U.S. leadership in science and 
        technology.\20\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \20\ Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security 
Administration, About NNSA, Mission Statement, http://www.nnsa.doe.gov/
aboutnnsa.htm (accessed (Feb. 27, 2006).

    Nuclear weapons research, development, and production are 
conducted at eight NNSA facilities,\21\ operated and maintained 
by outside contractors. Because the facilities house special 
nuclear materials used in the making of nuclear weapons and 
nuclear weapons components, DOE and the NNSA administer 
security programs to protect (1) against theft, sabotage, 
espionage, terrorism, or other risks to national security and 
(2) the safety and health of DOE employees and the public.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \21\ DOE, National Nuclear Security Administration, Briefing Slide, 
DOE/NNSA Nuclear Weapons Facilities (in subcommittee files).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Currently, the nuclear weapons complex has four production 
sites:

          The Pantex Plant, Amarillo, Texas;

          The Y-12 Plant, Oak Ridge, Tennessee;

          The Kansas City Plant, Kansas City, 
        Missouri;\22\ and
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \22\ The Department of Energy, NNSA, Kansas City, Missouri 
facility, http://www.nnsa.doe.gov/siteoffices.htm (accessed Mar. 6, 
2006).

          The Savannah River Site, Aiken, South 
        Carolina.\23\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \23\ DOE, National Nuclear Security Administration, Briefing Slide, 
DOE/NNSA Nuclear Weapons Facilities (in subcommittee files).

    In addition to the production sites, the complex includes 
the Nevada Test Site and three national laboratories that 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
design nuclear weapons:

          Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, 
        Livermore California

          Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, 
        New Mexico, and

          Sandia National Laboratory, Albuquerque, New 
        Mexico and Livermore, California.\24\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \24\ Ibid.

    NNSA relies on site contractors for implementation of 
safeguards and security programs. The contractors are 
responsible for conducting day-to-day security activities and 
adhering to DOE policies for operation of production and 
laboratory facilities.
    Many of the sites contain substantial quantities of 
Category I special nuclear material.\25\ Category I material 
includes plutonium and uranium in the following forms:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \25\ Nuclear Security: DOE's Office of the Under Secretary for 
Energy, Science and Environment Needs to Take Prompt Action to Meet the 
New Design Basis Threat, p. 2, Government Accountability Office, GAO-
05-611, July 15, 2005.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          Assembled nuclear weapons and test devices;

          Products containing high concentrations of 
        plutonium or uranium, such as major nuclear components, 
        and recastable metal; and

          High-grade materials, such as carbides, 
        oxides, solutions, and nitrates.\26\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \26\ Nuclear Security: NNSA Needs to Better Manage Its Safeguards 
and Security Program, Government Accountability Office, GAO-03-471, p. 
2, May 2003.

    The risks this radioactive material poses vary, but include 
the potential for sabotage, or theft for illegal use in a 
nuclear device. Because these materials pose such risks, NNSA 
management of the safeguards and security program, which 
includes overseeing contractor activities, is essential to 
prevent an unacceptable, adverse impact on national security.

         B. THE OFFICE OF ENERGY, SCIENCE AND ENVIRONMENT [ESE]

    The Office of Energy, Science and Environment is 
responsible for the day-to-day management oversight of energy 
programs, science and technology programs and environmental 
programs. The program offices are:

         Office of Science--Department of Energy science 
        programs provide through public-private partnerships, 
        the technology capable of developing abundant, 
        reliable, affordable and environmentally sound energy 
        supplies. This includes enhancing the Nation's energy 
        supply by conducting R&D in renewable energy, oil, gas, 
        coal, and nuclear energy. The mission of the Office of 
        Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy [EERE] is to 
        strengthen energy security, environmental quality, and 
        economic vitality in public-private partnerships that: 
        (1) enhance energy efficiency and productivity; (2) 
        bring clean, reliable and affordable energy 
        technologies to the marketplace; and (3) make a 
        difference in the everyday lives of Americans by 
        enhancing their energy choices and their quality of 
        life.\27\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \27\ The Department of Energy, Energy Programs, http://
www.energy.gov/energysources/index.htm (accessed Feb. 28, 2006); http:/
/www.energy.gov/energyefficiency/index.htm (accessed Feb. 28, 2006).

         Office of Nuclear Energy, Science and Technology--The 
        Department of Energy is the single largest Federal 
        Government supporter of basic research in physical 
        sciences in the United States, providing more than 40 
        percent of total Federal funding for this area. DOE has 
        the oversight and is the principal Federal funding 
        agency for research programs in nuclear physics, and 
        fusion energy sciences.\28\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \28\ The Department of Energy, Science and Technology Programs, 
http://www.energy.gov/sciencetech/index.htm (accessed Feb. 28, 2006).

         Environmental Management--The Department of Energy is 
        responsible for cleaning up contaminated sites and 
        disposing of radioactive waste left behind as a 
        byproduct of nuclear weapons production, nuclear 
        powered naval vessels and commercial nuclear energy 
        production. DOE must mitigate the risks and hazards 
        posed by the legacy of nuclear weapons production and 
        research.\29\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \29\ The Department of Energy, Environmental Programs, http://
www.energy.gov/environment/index.htm (accessed Feb. 28, 2006).

ESE is responsible for the management of five sites that 
possess special nuclear material [SNM]. The five sites: \30\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \30\ Nuclear Security: DOE's Office of the Under Secretary for 
Energy, Science and Environment Needs to Take Prompt Action to Meet the 
New Design Basis Threat, p. 8, Government Accountability Office, GAO-
05-611, July 15, 2005.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
   Responsible program office            Site              Location
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Office of Environmental           Savannah River      Aiken, South
 Management.                       Site.               Carolina
Office of Environmental           Hanford Site......  Richland,
 Management.                                           Washington
Office of Nuclear Energy,         Idaho National      Idaho Falls, Idaho
 Science, and Technology.          Laboratory.
Office of Nuclear Energy,         Argonne National    Idaho Falls, Idaho
 Science, and Technology.          Laboratory-West.
Office of Science...............  Oak Ridge National  Oak Ridge,
                                   Laboratory.         Tennessee
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: GAO.

    NNSA and ESE offices are requesting nearly $1.194 billion 
for security for fiscal year 2007.\31\ For the sake of 
comparison, NNSA is requesting $746 million for security versus 
$448 million for ESE security. Security funding requests by ESE 
program office are $296 million for Environmental Management, 
$77 million for Office of Science, and $76 million for the 
Office of Nuclear Energy, Science, and Technology.\32\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \31\ Department of Energy, Fiscal Year Congressional Budget 
Request, Budget Highlights, Office of Management, Budget and 
Evaluation/CFO, February 2006.
    \32\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    ESE relies on site contractors for implementation of 
safeguards and security programs. The contractors are 
responsible for conducting day-to-day security activities and 
adhering to DOE policies for operation of research and 
laboratory facilities and former nuclear weapons sites. The 
sites possess Category I special nuclear material. Category I 
material includes plutonium and uranium in the following forms:

          products containing high concentrations of 
        plutonium or uranium, such as major nuclear components, 
        and recastable metal, and

          high-grade materials, such as carbides, 
        oxides, solutions, and nitrates.\33\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \33\ Nuclear Security: NNSA Needs to Better Manage Its Safeguards 
and Security Program, Government Accountability Office, GAO-03-471, p. 
2, May 2003.

    The risks this radioactive material poses vary, but include 
the potential for sabotage, or theft for illegal use. Because 
these materials pose such risks, ESE management of the 
safeguards and security program, which includes overseeing 
contractor activities, is essential to prevent an unacceptable, 
adverse impact on national security.
    ESE facilities are operated and maintained by outside 
contractors.\34\ Because these facilities house special nuclear 
materials used for research, DOE administers security programs 
to protect (1) against theft, sabotage, espionage, terrorism, 
or other risks to national security and (2) the safety and 
health of DOE employees and the public.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \34\ Nuclear Security: Several Issues Could Impede the Ability of 
DOE's Office of Energy, Science and Environment to Meet the May 2003 
Design Basis Threat, Testimony of Robin M. Nazzaro, Director, 
Government Accountability Office, GAO-04-894T, p. 1, June 22, 2004.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

      C. OFFICE OF SECURITY AND SAFETY PERFORMANCE ASSURANCE [SSA]

    In December 2003, Secretary of Energy Spencer Abraham 
announced the establishment of the new Office of Security and 
Safety Performance Assurance,\35\ combining the Office of 
Security [SO] and the Office of Independent Oversight and 
Performance Assurance [OA], to better coordinate the roles of 
independent oversight and security policy organizations within 
the Department.\36\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \35\ The Department of Energy, Press Release, Washington DC, Dec. 
4, 2003, DOE Establishes Office of Security and Safety Performance 
Assurance for Effective Implementation of Safeguards & Security 
Policies.
    \36\ The Department of Energy, Office of Security and Safety 
Performance Assurance [SSA], http://www.ssa.doe.gov/mission--
functions.html (accessed Feb. 28, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    According to DOE, SSA is responsible for the development, 
implementation and assessment of safeguards and security 
policies and posture. The Director of SSA reports directly to 
the Secretary of Energy.\37\ The creation of the SSA office 
places added emphasis and focus on security with the ultimate 
goal of providing the highest level of protection for the 
security of nuclear assets held by DOE. According to the 
Director of SSA, the merging of SO and OA will provide for 
better integration and collaboration among the security and 
oversight functions and will generate a synergy that will 
facilitate communication and be more responsive to the security 
needs of DOE.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \37\ The Department of Energy, Press Release, Washington DC, Dec. 
4, 2003, DOE Establishes Office of Security and Safety Performance 
Assurance for Effective Implementation of Safeguards & Security 
Policies.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    SSA develops and promulgates DOE security policy. In 
addition, the office is responsible for developing the Design 
Basis Threat [DBT] to identify and characterize the range of 
potential adversary threats to Department of Energy programs 
and facilities. To carry out this mission, the SSA develops 
strategies and policies governing the protection of critical 
assets entrusted to the Department of Energy.
    Specifically, the Office of Security and Safety Performance 
Assurance is:

          Responsible for managing the DOE Safeguards 
        and Security Technology Development Program;

          Developing policies designed to protect 
        national security and other critical assets entrusted 
        to the Department of Energy;

          Analyzing department-wide safeguards and 
        security policy and standards designed to protect 
        national security and other critical assets;

          Provide an independent assessment of the 
        effectiveness of security policies and programs.

    SSA employs an oversight process that emphasizes 
performance and performance testing for evaluating the 
effectiveness of contractor safeguards and security 
performance. To carry out this function, SSA periodically 
assesses both Federal and contractor operations for 
improvement, including the use of force-on-force exercises. The 
office also performs follow-up reviews to ensure corrective 
actions are implemented and weaknesses in safeguards and 
security are addressed appropriately. SSA also conducts ESE and 
NNSA inspections to determine the effectiveness of safeguards 
and security policies and programs; identifies and analyzes 
safeguards and security policy issues, trends and directions; 
and develops inspection and assessment methods and 
technologies.
    In addition to security oversight provided by SSA, NNSA and 
ESE have the day-to-day oversight responsibility for 
contractors' security programs. The program offices conduct 
annual security surveys or surveillances at sites under their 
jurisdiction.
    The end of the Cold War changed the Department's focus from 
building new weapons to extending the lives of existing 
weapons, disposing of surplus nuclear material, and cleaning up 
no longer needed weapons sites. NNSA is responsible for 
extending the lives of existing weapons in the stockpile and 
for ultimately disposing of surplus nuclear material, while 
ESE, Office of Environmental Management [EM] is responsible for 
cleaning up former nuclear weapons sites. Contractors, who are 
responsible for protecting classified information, nuclear 
materials, nuclear weapons, and nuclear weapons components, 
operate NNSA and EM sites.

                    D. NNSA AND ESE SECURITY OFFICES

    The SSA guides NNSA and ESE safeguards and security 
programs. NNSA and ESE are responsible for ensuring 
contractors' security activities are effective and conform to 
SSA orders and policy requirements. In conducting this 
oversight, NNSA and ESE generally use certain key processes 
intended to identify specific security weaknesses at 
laboratory, production facility and environmental sites and 
ensure weaknesses are corrected. These processes include annual 
comprehensive surveys and ongoing reviews of contractor 
security programs.
    The Office of Defense Nuclear Security is responsible for 
security activities at NNSA laboratories and production 
facilities.\38\ The office develops agency security programs, 
including protection, control, and accountability for nuclear 
material and ensuring physical security for all facilities in 
the complex. Through various contract mechanisms, NNSA provides 
financial incentives for contractor performance. NNSA assesses 
this performance based on the extent contractors meet 
performance standards, which are established in annual 
performance plans.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \38\ Department of Energy, NNSA Organization Chart, Feb. 6, 2005, 
http://www.nnsa.doe.gov/docs/orgcharts/NNSAOrgcharts.pdf (accessed Feb. 
15, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Unlike NNSA, ESE does not have a consolidated headquarters 
security office with direct security budget oversight of 
program offices. In April 2005, the ESE Undersecretary stated 
ESE was composed of ``institutional stovepipes'' and that this 
structure has hampered strategic security management within 
ESE.\39\ As a result, the Undersecretary for ESE appointed a 
director of ESE security in June 2005. Nevertheless, the ESE 
Security Director does not have budget authority or policy 
direction responsibilities nor does he have a dedicated staff 
as found in NNSA. Because of this, each ESE program office is 
organized and staffed differently. For example, the Office of 
Environmental Management's headquarters security office has 
more than 17 professional security personnel on staff. In 
contrast, the headquarters offices of Science and of Nuclear 
Energy, Science and Technology each have only one or two 
security professionals on staff respectively. According to GAO, 
this situation may be problematic because security 
responsibilities are increasing with the consolidation of sites 
and special nuclear materials.\40\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \39\ Nuclear Security: DOE's Office of the Under Secretary for 
Energy, Science and Environment Needs to Take Prompt Action to Meet the 
New Design Basis Threat, p. 29, Government Accountability Office, GAO-
05-611, July 15, 2005.
    \40\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    DOE's overall security policy is contained in DOE Order 
470.1, Safeguards and Security Program, which was originally 
approved in 1995. The key component of the DOE approach to 
security is the Design Basis Threat [DBT], a classified 
document that identifies the characteristics of the potential 
threats to DOE assets.\41\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \41\ Ibid. p. 8.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                         E. DESIGN BASIS THREAT

    The Design Basis Threat identifies and characterizes 
potential attacks against DOE programs and facilities. The DBT 
is based on the Postulated Threat, the official assessment by 
the intelligence community of potential terrorist strategies 
against DOE facilities. DOE, DOD, FBI, CIA and the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission [NRC] participated in the development of 
the postulated threat. The DBT is an integral part of DOE 
efforts to secure and sustain domestic production and control 
of nuclear materials. Detailed elements of the new DBT are 
classified.
    The DBT describes adversaries, such as terrorists, 
criminals, and foreign intelligence agents, in terms of their 
tactics, equipment, level of training, level of motivation, and 
other characteristics. The DBT is used to assist DOE analysts 
in evaluating specific vulnerabilities. The DOE DBT has been 
coordinated historically with the Department of Defense [DOD] 
and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission [NRC] \42\ to ensure that 
similar national security assets are provided equivalent 
protection regardless of what agency has primary custody.\43\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \42\ Nuclear Security: DOE Needs To Resolve Significant Issues 
Before It Fully Meets the New Design Basis Threat, Government 
Accountability Office, GAO-04-623, p. 17, Apr. 27, 2004.
    \43\ According to GAO, after 2003, there was a lack of coordination 
between these agencies. As a result, the subcommittee asked GAO to 
investigate the comparability of the DOE and the NRC DBTs for 
protection of special nuclear material. The GAO report should be 
completed by July 2006.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The DBT is used to:

          Develop overall safeguards and security 
        program requirements;

          provide the basis for site specific 
        safeguards and security program planning, 
        implementation, and facility design; and,

          provide the basis for evaluating the 
        effectiveness of systems that are implemented.

    After the events of September 11, 2001, DOE began to 
reassess and improve the physical security at NNSA and ESE 
sites. In May 2003, the Department of Energy issued an updated 
DBT. Reflecting the post-September 11, 2001 environment, the 
2003 DBT \44\ is substantially different and a somewhat more 
demanding document than the previous DBT which had last been 
updated in 1999.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \44\ Design Basis Threat for the Department of Energy Programs and 
Facilities, (UNCLASSIFIED), Short Title: Unclassified Design Basis 
Threat, U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Safeguards and Security, 
May 2003.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The 2003 DBT represents a departure from earlier DBTs in 
its basic structure. Specifically, as discussed in the GAO 
report, Nuclear Security: DOE Needs To Resolve Significant 
Issues Before It Fully Meets the New Design Basis Threat, key 
differences from the 1999 DBT include the following:

    Increased adversary threat levels. The 2003 DBT increases 
the terrorist threat levels for the theft of the department's 
highest value assets, special nuclear material, although not in 
a uniform way. The 1999 DBT required ESE and NNSA sites to 
protect against a single terrorist threat level. Under the 2003 
DBT however, the theft of a nuclear weapon or test assembly is 
judged to be more attractive to terrorists, and sites that have 
these assets are required to defend against a substantially 
higher number of adversaries than are other ESE and NNSA sites 
that possess other forms of Category I special nuclear 
material. For example, the Pantex Plant, which, among other 
things, assembles and disassembles nuclear weapons, is required 
to defend to a higher level than sites such Los Alamos or Y-12, 
both of which fabricate nuclear weapons components. DOE calls 
this a graded threat approach.

    Specific protection strategies. In line with the graded 
threat approach and depending on the type of materials 
possessed and the likely objective of the terrorist group, 
sites are now required to implement specific protection 
strategies, such as denial of access, denial of task, or 
containment with recapture for their most sensitive facilities 
and assets.

    Wider range of terrorist objectives. The 2003 DBT 
recognizes a wider range of terrorist objectives, particularly 
in the area of radiological, chemical, and biological sabotage. 
The 2003 DBT requires the development of protection strategies 
for a range of facilities, such as some radioactive waste 
storage areas, that were not covered under the previous DBT.

    Complexity. With a graded approach and broader coverage, 
the new DBT is a more complex document than its predecessor. 
The 1999 DBT was 9 pages long, while the 2003 DBT is a far more 
detailed 48 pages.

    Depending on the material, protective systems at DOE 
Category I special nuclear material sites are designed to 
accomplish the following objectives in response to the 
terrorist threat:

    Denial of access. For some potential terrorist objectives, 
such as the creation of an improvised nuclear device, DOE may 
employ a protection strategy that requires the engagement and 
neutralization of adversaries before they can acquire hands-on 
access to the assets.

    Denial of task. For nuclear weapons or nuclear test devices 
that terrorists might seek to steal, DOE requires the 
prevention and/or neutralization of the adversaries before they 
can complete a specific task, such as stealing devices.

    Containment with recapture. Where the theft of nuclear 
material is the likely terrorist objective, DOE requires that 
adversaries not be allowed to escape the facility and that DOE 
protective forces recapture the material as soon as possible. 
This objective requires the use of specially trained and well-
equipped response teams.

    GAO released the report, Nuclear Security: DOE Needs To 
Resolve Significant Issues Before It Fully Meets the New Design 
Basis Threat, (GAO-04-623) at the April 27, 2004 subcommittee 
hearing and testified about how well DOE is positioned to 
protect the nuclear weapons, material, and operations from 
today's threat.\45\ In part, as a result of the subcommittee's 
investigation of DOE facility security, DOE Secretary Spencer 
Abraham announced on May 7, 2004 a series of new facility 
security initiatives. These included enhancing protective 
forces, consolidating nuclear material, protecting sensitive 
information and a re-examination of the 2003 Design Basis 
Threat.\46\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \45\ Prepared testimony of Robin Nazzaro, Director, Government 
Accountability Office, Nuclear Security: Can DOE Meet Facility Security 
Requirements? before the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging 
Threats, and International Relations, House Committee on Government 
Reform, Serial No. 108-237, pps. 10-12, Apr. 27, 2004.
    \46\ Department of Energy Security Initiatives, May 7, 2004 (in 
subcommittee files).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    As a result of Secretary Abraham's May 7th Energy Security 
Initiatives,\47\ DOE issued a revised DBT in October 2004. The 
2004 DBT identified a larger terrorist threat for DOE sites 
than had the previous DBT and merged and simplified threat 
levels [TL] and sabotage threat levels [STL] into 4 threat 
levels. In addition, the 2004 DBT required a reexamination of 
the security posture at each facility, how the threat level 
will be met and incorporating improvised nuclear device [IND], 
radiological sabotage and measures to mitigate airborne threats 
into the highest TL [TL1].\48\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \47\ Ibid. p. 3, Revising Threat Assessments.
    \48\ Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance briefing 
slides, Significant Events Leading to Current DBT Policy, pgs. 8-10, 
March 2005 (in subcommittee files).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    DOE acknowledges that meeting the 2004 DBT requires an 
integrated security approach for the Department of Energy that 
will deploy security-based technical solutions to reduce the 
need for an increased protective force, consolidate special 
nuclear materials by reducing the quantities of materials and 
the number of locations at which the materials are stored, and 
deploy an elite protective force that is trained and equipped 
to meet a more capable attacking force. Because the 2004 DBT 
contains more challenging threat levels than the 2003 DBT, 
achievement of DBT-compliance was changed from October 2007 to 
August 2008.
    In 2005, the DBT was again modified. The Deputy Secretary 
directed the annual review of the DBT be completed on an 
accelerated schedule \49\ and as a result, changes to the 2004 
DBT were announced in November 2005.\50\ According to GAO, the 
2005 DBT reduces the level of threat at most ESE and NNSA 
sites.\51\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \49\ Memorandum for Deputy Secretary Clay Sell, Nov. 28, 2005 from 
Glenn S Podonsky, Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance 
(in subcommittee files).
    \50\ Memorandum for Linton Brooks, Administrator, National Nuclear 
Security Administration, Davis Garman, Under Secretary, Energy, Science 
and Environment and Glenn Podonsky, Director, Office of Security and 
Safety Performance Assurance, Nov. 29, 2005 from Deputy Secretary Clay 
Sell (in subcommittee files).
    \51\ Email correspondence from Jonathan Gill, Senior Analyst, 
Government Accountability Office to subcommittee staff, Mar. 28, 2006 
(in subcommittee files).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                            III. Discussion

                              A. FINDINGS

1.The Department of Energy lacks an overarching, coordinated security 
        policy to ensure effective safeguards are in place to protect 
        nuclear weapons assemblies, components, designs and special 
        nuclear material

    The Department of Energy lacks a standardized, universally 
applicable security policy, making it extremely difficult for 
NNSA and ESE site offices to effectively oversee security 
activities. GAO reported on security at NNSA sites in May 2003 
and April 2004. GAO found that NNSA needed to improve 
management of safeguards and security programs and that while 
some action had been taken in response to the terrorist attacks 
of September 11, 2001, additional action was needed to ensure 
that DOE sites were adequately prepared to defend themselves. 
NNSA was criticized for not being effective. Ms.
    Robin Nazzaro, Director of Natural Resources and 
Environment of the Government Accountability Office explained 
in her June 24, 2003 testimony that the NNSA had not yet fully 
defined clear roles and responsibilities for headquarters and 
site operations. The management structure is consistently in 
flux, rendering NNSA site offices inconsistent in their 
assessment of contractor safeguards and security activities. 
When problems are identified, NNSA contractors do not 
consistently conduct the analysis DOE policy requires in 
preparing corrective action plans. Ms. Nazzaro also criticized 
NNSA for being understaffed and having shortfalls in the 
expertise needed to effectively oversee contractors.\52\ 
Furthermore, in their testimonies on June 22, 2004, both Ms. 
Nazzaro and Ms. Danielle Brian, executive director of the 
Project on Government Oversight, claimed the lack of 
coordination between the labs and the leadership at 
headquarters within DOE is a major cause for concern and 
therefore, indicates the need for an overarching security 
policy.\53\ Since that time, NNSA has strengthened its security 
organization and clarified roles and responsibilities. However, 
the effectiveness of these reforms has not been fully assessed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \52\ Testimony of Robin Nazzaro, Director, Government 
Accountability Office, Emerging Threats: Assessing Nuclear Weapons 
Complex Facility Security before the Subcommittee on National Security, 
Emerging Threats, and International Relations, House Committee on 
Government Reform, Serial No. 108-62, pps. 6-7, June 24, 2003.
    \53\ Testimony of Robin Nazzaro, Director, Government 
Accountability Office and Ms. Danielle Brian, executive director, 
Project on Government Oversight, Nuclear Security: Can DOE Meet 
Facility Security Requirements? (II) before the Subcommittee on 
National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations, House 
Committee on Government Reform, Serial No. 108-237, p. 38, June 22, 
2004.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    According to GAO, ESE headquarters is also not well suited 
to meet the challenges associated with implementing the 2004 
DBT.\54\ Specifically, there is no centralized ESE security 
organization. The individual who serves as the ESE Security 
Director has no programmatic authority. The lack of authority 
limits the director's ability to facilitate ESE and DOE-wide 
cooperation on such issues as facility security, nuclear 
material down-blending and SNM consolidation at ESE sites.\55\ 
It was only in early July 2005 that DOE finally appointed a 
permanent ESE Director of Security. The reaction of the ESE 
Director of Security to GAO's concern about the lack of 
programmatic authority was tepid at best. According to the ESE 
Director of Security, formalizing the position of ESE Director 
of Security in early July 2005 was responsive to GAO's 
recommendation in this area.\56\ However, GAO believes the ESE 
Director failed to address GAO's underlying concern that the 
position of ESE Security Director does not have direct 
programmatic authority for facility security, nuclear material 
down-blending and SNM consolidation at ESE sites.\57\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \54\ Nuclear Security: DOE's Office of the Under Secretary for 
Energy, Science and Environment Needs to Take Prompt Action to Meet the 
New Design Basis Threat, p. 5, Government Accountability Office, GAO-
05-611, July 15, 2005.
    \55\ Ibid. p. 6.
    \56\ Prepared testimony of Robert Walsh, ESE Director of Security, 
Department of Energy, DOE/ESE Security: How Ready is the Protective 
Force? before the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, 
and International Relations, House Committee on Government Reform, 
Serial No. 109-104, pps. 90-91, July 26, 2005.
    \57\ Prepared testimony of Gene Aloise, Director, Government 
Accountability Office, DOE/ESE Security: How Ready is the Protective 
Force? before the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, 
and International Relations, House Committee on Government Reform, 
Serial No. 109-104, p. 25, July 26, 2005.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. The Design Basis Threat [DBT] is taking too long to implement

    The Design Basis Threat for the Department of Energy was 
revised in 2003, 2004 and 2005. The latest DBT security 
standards are to be implemented by 2008. Because of this 
lengthy implementation period, there is a risk that terrorists 
might seek to exploit lingering vulnerabilities in nuclear 
facility defenses. There are a variety of factors contributing 
to the lengthy implementation process. These include 
development of the 2003 DBT which took almost 2 years because 
of delays in developing the Postulated Threat, the lengthy 
comment and review process at DOE for developing a protection 
policy, the sharp debates within DOE and other government 
organizations over the size and capabilities of terrorist 
threats and the availability of resources to meet those 
threats.\58\ As a result, GAO doubts DOE will be able to fully 
implement the standards set in the DBT before 2008.\59\ 
According to GAO, serious improvements must be made at each 
Category I nuclear site under DOE in order to meet the DBT 
implementation deadline.\60\ Second, it is taking too long to 
implement because there is a lack of coordination among DOE 
offices, sites and contractors, and a lack of focused funding 
needed to implement the DBT.\61\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \58\ Nuclear Security: DOE Needs To Resolve Significant Issues 
Before It Fully Meets the New Design Basis Threat, Government 
Accountability Office, GAO-04-623, Highlights Page, Apr. 27, 2004.
    \59\ Ibid. p. 6.
    \60\ Ibid. p. 7.
    \61\ Nuclear Security: DOE's Office of the Under Secretary for 
Energy, Science and Environment Needs to Take Prompt Action to Meet the 
New Design Basis Threat, pps. 29-30, Government Accountability Office, 
GAO-05-611, July 15, 2005.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Ronald E. Rimm, president of RETA Security Inc., in 
testimony on June 24, 2003, explained that ``the necessary 
implementation schedule for funding security improvements are 
not required to be completed until 2009 with the actual 
implementation to follow some time later.'' \62\ Ms. Nazzaro, 
in April 27, 2004 testimony explained that a faster process to 
reach consensus on policy within DOE is needed since 
adversaries have the ability to move and adapt extremely 
quickly.\63\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \62\ Prepared testimony of Ronald E. Rimm, president, RETA 
Security, Inc., Emerging Threats: Assessing Nuclear Weapons Complex 
Facility Security before the Subcommittee on National Security, 
Emerging Threats, and International Relations, House Committee on 
Government Reform, Serial No. 108-62, p. 169, June 24, 2003.
    \63\ Testimony of Robin Nazzaro, Director, Government 
Accountability Office, Emerging Threats: Assessing Nuclear Weapons 
Complex Facility Security before the Subcommittee on National Security, 
Emerging Threats, and International Relations, House Committee on 
Government Reform, Serial No. 108-62, p. 37, June 24, 2003.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    GAO reported that DOE has been slow to resolve a number of 
significant issues, such as issuing additional DBT 
implementation guidance, developing DBT implementation plans, 
and developing budgets to support these plans, that may affect 
the ability of its sites to fully meet the threat contained in 
the DBT in a timely fashion. Consequently, DOE's deadline to 
meet DBT requirements is probably not realistic and will not be 
met for some sites.\64\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \64\ Nuclear Security: DOE Needs To Resolve Significant Issues 
Before It Fully Meets the New Design Basis Threat, Government 
Accountability Office, GAO-04-623, Highlights Page, Apr. 27, 2004.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    As an example, in March 2006, subcommittee staff met with 
GAO and learned the ESE Savannah River site [SRS] and Oak Ridge 
site (Y-12) are at different stages in complying with the 2003 
DBT. SRS expects to be fully compliant with all aspects of the 
DBT by the end of the fiscal year 2006. Compliance relies on 
the completion of a number of projects and efforts including 
the installation of interlocking vehicle barriers, deployment 
of armored vehicles, and installation of hardened fighting 
positions, all of which appear to be funded and on schedule.
    In contrast, Y-12 has been compliant with portions of the 
2003 DBT since February 2004. This includes strict protection 
requirements for some assets and facilities. However, the 
universal application of stricter protection requirements will 
not be completed until 2008. Both sites have developed broadly 
similar visions for complying with the 2004 and 2005 DBT. 
Implementation of those plans, however, will require adequate 
funding and the completion of key and often interdependent 
activities, especially at Y-12. Accordingly, Y-12 appears at 
greater risk for not meeting its 2005 DBT requirements by the 
end of fiscal year 2008.

3. The Design Basis Threat has not been applied consistently throughout 
        the Department of Energy

    One of the reasons DOE officials have not applied the DBT 
consistently throughout the Department of Energy is because of 
cultural resistance and the belief by some that the Postulated 
Threat applied only to sites containing nuclear weapons and or 
weapon parts. As an example, ESE Hanford sites were required to 
implement the original 2003 DBT denial strategy by fiscal year 
2006 even though the 2004 DBT denial strategy changed the 
implementation date to fiscal year 2008.\65\ However, a June 
22, 2005 a memo from Maurice Daugherty, Director of Safeguards 
and Security Emergency Management, delayed the Hanford denial 
strategy until 2008 even though the sites had not yet begun 
implementation of the 2003 DBT denial strategy.\66\ On July 1, 
2005, in a memorandum to ESE EM, SSA objected to delaying the 
implementation of the denial strategy and ESE rescinded the 
delay.\67\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \65\ Memorandum from Maurice Daugherty, Director of Safeguards and 
Security Emergency Management to Ronald Bartholomew, Director, 
Safeguards and Security Savannah River Operations Office, June 22, 2005 
(in subcommittee files).
    \66\ Ibid.
    \67\ Memorandum from Marshall O. Combs, Director, Office of 
Security, SSA to Maurice Daugherty, Director, Safeguards and Security/ 
ESE Environmental Management, July 1, 2005 (in subcommittee files).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    GAO disagreed with that assessment. According to Ms. 
Nazzaro, ``we felt that the Department did not do an adequate 
job of justifying why they were differentiating between sites 
that had nuclear weapons and those that had nuclear 
materials.'' \68\ Ms. Nazzaro went on to say, ``there was no 
justification for these deviations other than we understand 
there were serious concerns over budget, as to whether they 
would have enough money to be able to implement the new design 
basis threat.'' \69\ Ms. Brian testified that ``the threat of 
an improvised nuclear device should really be the standard of 
whether a site should be reaching the highest levels of 
security, and not whether there is a full-up weapon there.'' 
\70\ The subcommittee notes that the 2004 and 2005 DBT, when 
fully implemented, will have largely addressed this issue.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \68\ Testimony of Robin Nazzaro, Director, Government 
Accountability Office, Emerging Threats: Assessing Nuclear Weapons 
Complex Facility Security before the Subcommittee on National Security, 
Emerging Threats, and International Relations, House Committee on 
Government Reform, Serial No. 108-62, p.43, June 24, 2003.
    \69\ Ibid.
    \70\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    To successfully defend against the larger terrorist threat 
contained in the 2004 DBT, DOE and ESE officials recognized 
they need to take several prompt and coordinated actions. These 
include transformation of the protective force into an elite 
force, development and deployment of new security technologies 
and the consolidation of special nuclear material.\71\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \71\ Nuclear Security: DOE's Office of the Under Secretary for 
Energy, Science and Environment Needs to Take Prompt Action to Meet the 
New Design Basis Threat, p. 4, Government Accountability Office, GAO-
05-611, July 15, 2005.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    GAO is concerned about the use of inconsistent assessments 
of contractor security activities. According to GAO, this lack 
of consistency occurs in part because site offices have assumed 
new oversight responsibilities without clear guidance on how to 
carry out those responsibilities.\72\ DOE policy requires 
contractors to prepare corrective action plans for identified 
problems and to ensure those actions are based on documented 
root cause analysis,\73\ risk assessment, and cost-benefit 
analysis.\74\ GAO found NNSA contractors have not consistently 
prepared effective, formal root cause analyses when developing 
corrective action plans for identified deficiencies. GAO found 
that less than half of the contractors had performed the 
required root cause analysis. In some cases, the root cause 
analysis was poorly prepared.\75\ This resulted in confusion 
and contradictions in correcting site security deficiencies.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \72\ Testimony of Robin Nazzaro, Director, Government 
Accountability Office, Emerging Threats: Assessing Nuclear Weapons 
Complex Facility Security before the Subcommittee on National Security, 
Emerging Threats, and International Relations, House Committee on 
Government Reform, Serial No. 108-62, p. 7, June 24, 2003.
    \73\ Failure analysis reports provide a clear picture of the root 
cause, and include recommendations to avoid future failures from 
security design through implementation.
    \74\ Nuclear Security: NNSA Needs to Better Manage Its Safeguards 
and Security Program, GAO-03-471, pps. 2-3, May 30, 2003.
    \75\ Nuclear Security: NNSA Needs to Better Manage Its Safeguards 
and Security Program, GAO-03-471, p. 5, May 30, 2003.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

4. Maintaining the current far-flung Department of Energy nuclear 
        complex of facilities housing special nuclear materials is not 
        cost effective and increases security risks

    There are many reasons why maintaining Department of Energy 
nuclear materials and components across the country is not cost 
effective and poses higher security risks. Ms. Brian, in her 
June 24, 2003 testimony, explained that ``DOE weapons-quantity 
special nuclear materials are stored at 10 fixed sites even 
though most have virtually no national security mission. DOE 
cannot currently adequately protect this material, and security 
at each site unnecessarily increases redundancies and costs. 
Not only do the unnecessary sites cost the taxpayers billions 
annually, but they also present a significant health and safety 
risk to nearby communities.'' \76\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \76\ Prepared statement of Danielle Brian, executive director, 
Project on Government Oversight, Emerging Threats: Assessing Nuclear 
Weapons Complex Facility Security before the Subcommittee on National 
Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations, House 
Committee on Government Reform, Serial No. 108-62, p. 103, June 24, 
2003.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Those 10 major sites have weapons-grade plutonium [PU] and/
or highly-enriched uranium [HEU] in sufficient quantities for a 
nuclear device. Ms. Brian stated that these sites which house 
nearly 1,000 tons of weapons-grade plutonium and highly 
enriched uranium have at times failed to protect this material 
during force-on-force exercises. Many of these sites are 
located near metropolitan areas, including the San Francisco 
Bay area, Albuquerque and Knoxville.\77\ Furthermore, the 
Office of Secure Transportation [OST] under DOE moves weapons-
grade Special Nuclear Materials [SNM] across the country on 
public, interstate highways, creating even more 
vulnerabilities.\78\ Glenn Podonsky, Director of the Office of 
Independent Oversight and Performance Assurance of the DOE, 
explained that having so many sites makes DOE and the United 
States more vulnerable because more targets are created.\79\ 
With fewer sites, DOE could better coordinate efforts, focus 
and further enhance security measures. The number of DOE sites 
containing nuclear material has remained a security concern. In 
July 2005, Mr. Aloise stated, ``the consolidation of materials 
in fewer places would increase security.'' \80\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \77\ Ibid. p. 149.
    \78\ Ibid. p. 107.
    \79\ Testimony of Glenn Podonsky, Director, Office of Independent 
Oversight and Performance Assurance, Department of Energy, Nuclear 
Security: Can DOE Meet Facility Security Requirements? (II) before the 
Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International 
Relations, House Committee on Government Reform, Serial No. 108-237, p. 
90, June 22, 2004.
    \80\ Testimony of Gene Aloise, Director, Government Accountability 
Office, before the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, 
and International Relations, House Committee on Government Reform, DOE/
ESE Security: How Ready is the Protective Force? Serial No. 109-104, p. 
105, July 26, 2005.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

5. Protective forces are experiencing reduced readiness, retention 
        problems, and fewer force-on-force performance tests

    The subcommittee found weapon specifications, protective 
equipment and training were not consistent at DOE sites 
containing special nuclear material. DOE Inspector General 
Friedman stated, ``Between 2003 and 2005, we identified issues 
regarding protective force overtime and training. In one 
review, which included five Department sites, we found the 
Department faced significant increases in unscheduled 
protective force overtime. Further, we noted protective force 
morale and retention problems due to mandatory overtime and 
reduced training opportunities. In a review with the 
Department's Oak Ridge Reservation, we found that contractor 
protective force personnel spent, on average, about 40 percent 
less time on combat readiness refresher training than that 
specified in the training plan approved by Federal site 
managers, and that the personnel worked in excess of the 
Department's optimum 60-hour per week threshold. In a third 
review we found that 10 of the 12 sites made significant 
modifications to the Department's established protective force 
core curriculum. This raised questions about the effectiveness 
of the training received by the affected protective force 
personnel, as well as the validity of the core curriculum.'' 
\81\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \81\ Testimony of Gregory H. Friedman, DOE Inspector General, DOE/
ESE Security: How Ready is the Protective Force? before the 
Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International 
Relations, House Committee on Government Reform, Serial No. 109-104, 
pps. 27, July 26, 2005.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    While GAO found that protective forces at ESE sites are 
generally meeting current DOE requirements, some weaknesses 
were identified in ESE protective force practices that could 
adversely affect the current readiness to defend ESE sites. 
These include protective force officers' lack of regular 
participation in force-on-force exercises; the frequency and 
quality of training opportunities; the lack of dependable 
communications systems; and insufficient protective gear, 
including protective body armor and chemical protective gear; 
and the lack of armored vehicles.\82\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \82\ Nuclear Security: DOE's Office of the Under Secretary for 
Energy, Science and Environment Needs to Take Prompt Action to Meet the 
New Design Basis Threat, p. 16, Government Accountability Office, GAO-
05-611, July 15, 2005.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Mr. Aloise of GAO stated:

        Regarding readiness, we found that protective forces at 
        the five ESE sites, with weapons-grade nuclear 
        material, generally meet readiness requirements. 
        Specifically, protective forces at the Savannah River 
        site, Hanford site, Idaho, and Argonne West, and Oak 
        Ridge National Lab generally comply with DOE standards 
        for firearms proficiency, physical fitness and 
        equipment, and had the required training programs and 
        facilities. However, we did find weaknesses that could 
        impact the protective forces' ability to defend their 
        sites. For example, most officers we spoke with were 
        concerned about the quality and realism of their 
        training. Further, because DOE neither sets standards 
        for, nor tracks individual participation in force-on-
        force exercises, it was difficult to determine how many 
        officers had this important training.\83\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \83\ Testimony of Gene Aloise, Director, Government Accountability 
Office, DOE/ESE Security: How Ready is the Protective Force? before the 
Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International 
Relations, House Committee on Government Reform, Serial No. 109-104, p. 
8, July 26, 2005.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Mr. Aloise went on to say:

        Another weakness identified by protective force 
        officers at all five sites concerned problems with 
        their radios. Some said that the radios could not be 
        relied on in the event of a terrorist attack. In 
        addition, although most protective forces are required 
        to have access to body armor, at one site we found that 
        body armor had not been issued for most officers. 
        Another site did not have its own special response 
        team. In the event of an attack, one of the jobs of a 
        special response team would be to recover stolen 
        nuclear material. In addition, the capability of some 
        of the protective forces to fight during a chemical or 
        biological attack varied. Specifically, two sites 
        expected and provided equipment for most of their 
        forces to fight in contaminated areas. Another site did 
        not provide any equipment. Indeed, it expected its 
        teams to evacuate the site with other workers. Yet 
        another site expected its forces to fight in a 
        chemically contaminated area, but did not provide 
        protective gear. Another weakness we observed was that 
        only one of the five sites had armored vehicles. In 
        contrast, all six NNSA sites with weapons-grade nuclear 
        material have armored vehicles.\84\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \84\ Ibid.

    Ms. Nazzaro and Mr. Podonsky also described problems 
associated with the Department of Energy's protective force in 
their June 24, 2003 testimonies. Ms. Nazzaro stated ``DOE and 
NNSA took immediate steps to improve security in the aftermath 
of the September 11 terrorist attacks. For example, DOE and 
NNSA moved to a higher level of security that required, among 
other things, more vehicle inspections and security patrols. 
DOE and NNSA also conducted a number of security-related 
reviews, studies and analysis and increased communication with 
Federal, State and local officials. While these steps are 
believed to have improved DOE's and NNSA's security posture, 
they have been expensive. These steps have required extensive 
overtime, which has had a considerable negative effect on DOE's 
and NNSA's protective force through fatigue, reduced readiness, 
retention, and reduced training.'' \85\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \85\ Testimony of Robin Nazzaro, Director, Government 
Accountability Office, Emerging Threats: Assessing Nuclear Weapons 
Complex Facility Security before the Subcommittee on National Security, 
Emerging Threats, and International Relations, House Committee on 
Government Reform, Serial No. 108-62, pps. 7-8, June 24, 2003.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Mr. Podonsky also explained that because of the heightened 
security level, DOE must rely on the use of overtime until new 
hires are cleared and trained to perform their duties. ``As a 
result, protective force personnel testing and training have 
been reduced or deferred because existing manpower is stretched 
to the limit.'' \86\ Mr. Podonsky believes enhancing the 
integration of manpower and technology, creating more effective 
barriers, further consolidating security assets, and initiating 
extensive performance testing to ensure system effectiveness 
are necessary to mitigate the aforementioned problems with the 
security forces.\87\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \86\ Testimony of Glenn Podonsky, Director, Office of Independent 
Oversight and Performance Assurance, Department of Energy before the 
Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International 
Relations, House Committee on Government Reform, Emerging Threats: 
Assessing Nuclear Weapons Complex Facility Security Serial No. 108-62, 
p. 32, June 24, 2003.
    \87\ Prepared statement of Glenn Podonsky, Director, Office of 
Independent Oversight and Performance Assurance, Department of Energy 
before the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and 
International Relations, House Committee on Government Reform, Emerging 
Threats: Assessing Nuclear Weapons Complex Facility Security Serial No. 
108-62, pps. 34-38, June 24, 2003.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                           B. RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The Secretary of Energy should designate an office responsible for 
        Department-wide security policies and should clarify the roles 
        and responsibilities of site offices and headquarters for 
        conducting security oversight

    Many of the problems found in security management, 
consensus on security policy and implementation of the DBT 
would be mitigated with the creation of an overarching security 
office that would delegate the role and responsibilities of all 
security divisions within DOE. This is especially important to 
bridge the gulf between NNSA and ESE security. According to 
GAO, there is no centralized security organization within the 
Office of the Under Secretary, ESE.\88\ The ESE Security 
Director does not have programmatic or budget control of 
security at ESE sites. Mr. Aloise stated, ``DOE needs to 
establish a centralized security office within ESE to help meet 
the challenges of implementing the new design basis threat.'' 
\89\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \88\ Nuclear Security: DOE's Office of the Under Secretary for 
Energy, Science and Environment Needs to Take Prompt Action to Meet the 
New Design Basis Threat, p. 31, Government Accountability Office, GAO-
05-611, July 15, 2005.
    \89\ Testimony of Gene Aloise, Director, Government Accountability 
Office, DOE/ESE Security: How Ready is the Protective Force? before the 
Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International 
Relations, House Committee on Government Reform, Serial No. 109-104, p. 
8, July 26, 2005.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Mr. Podonsky stated, ``we also endorse GAO's recommendation 
to establish an ESE security organization. As it is up to the 
Under Secretary to determine the best way to manage ESE, we 
believe that an appropriate security organization at the 
highest level within ESE and with appropriate authorities 
delegated could facilitate effective and efficient management 
of security resources and implementation of required upgrades. 
Security upgrades will involve substantial effort over the next 
two years, and if ESE is to achieve protection upgrade goals by 
October 2008, this sizeable effort must be well coordinated and 
well managed and fully endorsed by the Under Secretary for 
ESE.'' \90\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \90\ Prepared statement of Glenn Podonsky, Director, Office of 
Independent Oversight and Performance Assurance, Department of Energy 
before the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and 
International Relations, House Committee on Government Reform, Emerging 
Threats: Assessing Nuclear Weapons Complex Facility Security Serial No. 
108-62, p. 48, June 24, 2003.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    If not, some see the need to take the entire security 
enterprise out of DOE hands. In her June 24, 2003 testimony, 
Ms. Brian argued that it would be beneficial to take both 
security management and the Independent Oversight Office out of 
DOE and to set up an independent agency to provide security and 
to oversee nuclear security from outside DOE.\91\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \91\ Testimony of Danielle Brian, executive director, Project on 
Government Oversight before the Subcommittee on National Security, 
Emerging Threats, and International Relations, House Committee on 
Government Reform, Emerging Threats: Assessing Nuclear Weapons Complex 
Facility Security Serial No. 108-62, p. 151, June 24, 2003.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. The Secretary of Energy should develop and implement a coordinated 
        department-wide, multiyear, fully funded implementation plan 
        for meeting the new DBT requirements

    In order to fully meet the new DBT requirements, a coherent 
department-wide, multiyear and fully funded implementation plan 
is needed. In the April 27, 2004 hearing, Ms. Nazzaro claimed 
that DOE had not yet developed official estimates of the 
overall costs of DBT implementation.\92\ Furthermore, current 
DBT implementation cost estimates do not include items such as 
closing unneeded facilities, transporting and consolidating 
materials and completing line-item construction projects.\93\ 
Therefore, Ms. Nazzaro suggested creating a department-wide 
implementation plan including the involvement of Environmental 
Management and the Transportation Security Agency, and the 
estimates for construction.\94\ Ms. Nazzaro explained that, 
``because of the importance of successfully integrating 
multiple program activities with security requirements, we 
continue to believe, as we recommended in April 2004, that DOE 
needs to develop and implement a Department-wide, multi-year, 
fully resourced implementation plan for meeting the DBT 
requirements that includes important programmatic activities 
such as the closure of facilities and the transportation of 
special nuclear materials.'' \95\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \92\ Testimony of Robin Nazzaro, Director, Government 
Accountability Office and Ms. Danielle Brian, executive director, 
Project on Government Oversight, Nuclear Security: Can DOE Meet 
Facility Security Requirements? before the Subcommittee on National 
Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations, House 
Committee on Government Reform, Serial No. 108-237, p. 6, Apr. 27, 
2004.
    \93\ Ibid.
    \94\ Ibid. p. 45.
    \95\ Testimony of Robin Nazzaro, Director, Government 
Accountability Office, Nuclear Security: Can DOE Meet Facility Security 
Requirements? (II) before the Subcommittee on National Security, 
Emerging Threats, and International Relations, House Committee on 
Government Reform, Serial No. 108-237, p. 15, June 22, 2004.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In July 2005, Mr. Aloise stated, ``to protect these sites, 
an effective security program is essential. DOE's security 
program begins with a document known as the design basis 
threat, which identifies the size and capabilities of potential 
adversaries. The 2004 design basis threat identified a much 
larger terrorist threat than before, and it could cost between 
about $400 million and $600 million to develop the force 
necessary to defeat this larger threat.'' \96\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \96\ Testimony of Gene Aloise, Director Government Accountability 
office, DOE/ESE Security: How Ready is the Protective Force? before the 
Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International 
Relations, House Committee on Government Reform, Serial No. 109-104, p. 
7, July 26, 2005.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

3. The Secretary of Energy should report regularly to relevant 
        congressional oversight committees on the status of DBT 
        implementation plans including which sites and facilities are 
        currently considered to be high risk and what steps are being 
        taken to mitigate these risks to acceptable levels

    Regular reports to relevant congressional oversight 
committees will assure a more efficient and expedient DBT 
implementation. It will also allow Congress to hold DOE 
accountable for achieving specific goals and objectives for 
security reform. Both Ms. Nazzaro and Ms. Brian strongly 
supported this recommendation in their testimonies. Ms. Nazzaro 
explained that DOE should regularly report to Congress in order 
to assure that the implementation will be fully funded.\97\ Ms. 
Brian further highlighted this recommendation since consistent 
reporting will force DOE to maintain DBT implementation as a 
top priority.\98\ In the June 24, 2003 testimony, Ms. Brian 
explained that ``there are two things that move any 
bureaucracy: one is sustained press attention to a problem and 
second is congressional oversight . . . without sustained and 
intensive scrutiny and oversight, DOE briefings and testimony 
will not reveal the actual status of security.'' \99\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \97\ Testimony of Robin Nazzaro, Director, Government 
Accountability Office, Nuclear Security: Can DOE Meet Facility Security 
Requirements? before the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging 
Threats, and International Relations, House Committee on Government 
Reform, Serial No. 108-237, p. 39, Apr. 27, 2004.
    \98\ Testimony of Danielle Brian, executive director, Project on 
Government Oversight, Nuclear Security: Can DOE Meet Facility Security 
Requirements? (II) before the Subcommittee on National Security, 
Emerging Threats, and International Relations, House Committee on 
Government Reform, Serial No. 108-237, pps. 45-46, June 22, 2004.
    \99\ Testimony of Danielle Brian, executive director, Project on 
Government Oversight, Emerging Threats: Assessing Nuclear Weapons 
Complex Facility Security before the Subcommittee on National Security, 
Emerging Threats, and International Relations, House Committee on 
Government Reform, Serial No. 108-62, p. 152, June 24, 2003.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

4. The Secretary of Energy should develop a plan and timeline for the 
        consolidation of special nuclear material

    During the course of the DOE nuclear facility security 
investigation, the subcommittee heard from a number of 
witnesses who support the consolidation of special nuclear 
material. Ms. Nazzaro stated, ``as far as the category I 
special nuclear materials, there is a lot of confusion. We have 
sites where the site is managed by one entity within the 
organization and yet there are materials that are owned by 
another entity. One of the strategies that we have proposed in 
the past is to consolidate materials, move materials to other 
sites.'' \100\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \100\ Testimony of Robin Nazzaro, Director, Government 
Accountability Office, Nuclear Security: Can DOE Meet Facility Security 
Requirements? (II) before the Subcommittee on National Security, 
Emerging Threats, and International Relations, House Committee on 
Government Reform, Serial No. 108-237, p. 46, June 22, 2004.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In order to consolidate the special nuclear material, Ms. 
Brian offered several recommendations in her June 24, 2003 
testimony. She explained that unneeded facilities should be 
closed, nuclear materials need to be consolidated and that 
excess materials should be immobilized.\101\ In addition, Ms. 
Brian explained that ``two of the most secure facilities in the 
world would provide enough storage for the entire DOE weapons 
complex--a secure underground weapons storage facility at 
Kirtland Air Force Base in New Mexico and the Device Assembly 
Facility at the Nevada Test Site.'' \102\ Developing a plan and 
timeline for the consolidation of special nuclear material is 
critical. If nuclear materials are consolidated to fewer, more 
easily-protected sites, less money will be spent on unnecessary 
sites and significant health and safety risk to nearby 
communities will be mitigated.\103\ Mr. Podonsky assured that 
DOE had already undertaken measures to address the 
consolidation of special nuclear material. In his June 22, 2004 
testimony, he stated, ``consolidation of special nuclear 
material has perhaps the greatest potential impact on our 
future protection requirements and programs.'' \104\ Mr. 
Podonsky goes on to explain that ``protecting these materials 
is among our most difficult security challenges. We can greatly 
reduce the difficulty, risk, and costs associated with this 
mission by disposing of material we no longer need and 
consolidating the remainder in as few locations as 
operationally feasible.'' \105\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \101\ Prepared statement of Danielle Brian, executive director, 
Project on Government Oversight, Emerging Threats: Assessing Nuclear 
Weapons Complex Facility Security before the Subcommittee on National 
Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations, House 
Committee on Government Reform, Serial No. 108-62, p. 103, June 24, 
2003.
    \102\ Ibid.
    \103\ Ibid. p. 156.
    \104\ Prepared statement of Glenn Podonsky, Director, Office of 
Independent Oversight and Performance Assurance, Department of Energy, 
Nuclear Security: Can DOE Meet Facility Security Requirements? (II) 
before the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and 
International Relations, House Committee on Government Reform, Serial 
No. 108-237, p. 74-75, June 22, 2004.
    \105\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In June 2004, Mr. Podonsky told the subcommittee, ``the 
Department formed a Consolidation of Materials Task Force to 
identify opportunities to relocate and consolidate special 
nuclear materials. They have already compiled and consolidated 
a list of excess material, a difficult and necessary step 
toward a comprehensive consolidation plan. In August, they will 
issue a report identifying short-term, which is 1 year, and 
long-term, beyond 1 year, options for consolidation and 
relocation. We are making progress in this area, but the 
balancing of programmatic cost and risk against security-
related cost and risk is especially difficult. While everyone 
wants to see this effort finalized and implemented, we must 
allow adequate time to prepare a comprehensive plan that is 
prudent and affordable.'' \106\ As of February 2006, the Task 
Force had not yet released recommendations or options for 
consolidating special nuclear material.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \106\ Testimony of Glenn Podonsky, Director, Office of Independent 
Oversight and Performance Assurance, Department of Energy, Nuclear 
Security: Can DOE Meet Facility Security Requirements? (II) before the 
Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International 
Relations, House Committee on Government Reform, Serial No. 108-237, p. 
64, June 22, 2004.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

5. The Secretary of Energy should develop and implement a comprehensive 
        management plan to improve training, qualifications, and 
        increase force strength of the security protective force

    According to GAO, DOE's response to the call to develop a 
comprehensive plan to meet the new design basis threat does not 
go far enough. Without such a plan, DOE may not be successful 
in meeting the requirements of the design basis threat by 
October 2008.\107\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \107\ Testimony of Gene Aloise, Director Government Accountability 
office, DOE/ESE Security: How Ready is the Protective Force? before the 
Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International 
Relations, House Committee on Government Reform, Serial No. 109-104, p. 
8, July 26, 2005.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Measures must be taken in order to improve the training and 
qualifications of an enlarged security protective force. In her 
June 24, 2003 testimony, Ms. Brian explained that DOE must 
increase the size of its protective force and improve weaponry, 
tactics, and command, control and communication.\108\ In both 
his June 24, 2003 and June 22, 2004 testimonies, Mr. Podonsky 
explained that integrating manpower and technology will help 
achieve more effective solutions within the security forces, 
such as the issue of relying on overtime.\109\ He also 
explained that with better training and a higher set of 
standards for security forces and security managers, the 
security protective force and will be stronger. ``We believe 
rigorous force-on-force performance testing against tough, 
skilled aggressor forces is one of the most important elements 
in measuring the effectiveness of our protective forces and in 
carrying us forward to an elite force. We are determined to do 
our part in advancing the Department's ability to conduct 
effective and informative force-on-force performance tests as 
well as improving our ability to analyze the results of those 
tests.'' \110\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \108\ Prepared statement of Danielle Brian, executive director, 
Project on Government Oversight, Emerging Threats: Assessing Nuclear 
Weapons Complex Facility Security before the Subcommittee on National 
Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations, House 
Committee on Government Reform, Serial No. 108-62, p. 103, June 24, 
2003.
    \109\ Testimony of Glenn Podonsky, Director, Office of Independent 
Oversight and Performance Assurance, before the Subcommittee on 
National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations, House 
Committee on Government Reform, Emerging Threats: Assessing Nuclear 
Weapons Complex Facility Security Serial No. 108-62, p. 32, June 24, 
2003.
    \110\ Prepared statement of Glenn Podonsky, Director, Office of 
Independent Oversight and Performance Assurance, Department of Energy, 
Nuclear Security: Can DOE Meet Facility Security Requirements? (II) 
before the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and 
International Relations, House Committee on Government Reform, Serial 
No. 108-237, p. 81, June 22, 2004.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    There are many factors to consider in ameliorating the 
status of the security protective force and all its components. 
A comprehensive management plan is necessary to help achieve 
this level of security. GAO assessed the current readiness of 
protective forces at ESE sites and the steps still needed to 
defend those facilities against the larger, more capable 
attackers postulated in the DBT.\111\ Their findings point to a 
generally proficient guard staff prepared to meet existing 
standards. But the way forward to meet the higher DBT threat 
level is far less clear. Efforts to deploy an elite protective 
force, utilize new security technologies and effectively manage 
ESE security initiatives require coordination and resource 
commitments that GAO is not sure will materialize.\112\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \111\ Nuclear Security: DOE's Office of the Under Secretary for 
Energy, Science and Environment Needs to Take Prompt Action to Meet the 
New Design Basis Threat, Government Accountability Office, GAO-05-611, 
July 15, 2005.
    \112\ Ibid. pps. 30-31.
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
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