NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
SHALOM M. HARRIS,

Plaintiff

- Appellant,

v. NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting Commissioner Social Security,

Defendant

- Appellee. No. 16

- 35585
D.C. No. 2:15

- cv - 01387

- BAT

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington Brian Tsuchida, Magistrate Judge, Presiding Submitted December 8, 2017 **

Before: THOMAS, Chief Judge, and TROTT and SILVERMAN, Circuit Judges Shalom Harris appeals the district court’s decision affirming the Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of Harris’s application for supplemental security income disability benefits under Title XVI of the Social Security Act. We

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 

# FILED

DEC 12 2017 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLER K U.S. COURT OF APPEAL S2 16

- 35585

have juri sdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Brown

- Hunter v. Colvin , 806 F.3d 487, 492 (9th Cir. 2015), and we affirm

. The ALJ supported his decision to give Dr. Ruddell’s opinion “little weight” with specific and legitimate reasons derived from the evidentiary record. Dr. Ruddell conducted her examination with a materially incomplete understanding of Harris’s mental health and neurological condition. By contrast, Dr. Hendrickson’s detailed opinion took Harris’s Asperger’s condition into considerat ion. The ALJ concluded that Dr. Hendrickson’s opinion was “more reliable and accurate” as well

as consistent with the views of her treating psychiatrist

. The ALJ properly rejected that part of Dr. Hendrickson’s opinion regarding marked limitations in int eracting with supervisors based on evidence in the record showing that Harris engaged appropriately with medical providers and reported no problems interacting with non

- family members. See Batson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin. , 359 F.3d 1190, 1195 (9th Cir. 2004) (concluding that the ALJ may properly reject a medical opinion that is contradicted by other medical evidence). The Residual Functional Capacity (RFC) assessment prope rly accounted for the remaining limitations in Dr. Hendrickson’s thorough opinion. See Stubbs

Danielson v. Astrue , 539 F.3d 1169, 1174 (9th Cir. 2008) (affirming the ALJ’s assessment of specific functional limitations based on substantial evidence in the medical record).3 16

- 35585

Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s interpretation of the medical opinions from Dr. Weir, Dr. Thuline, Dr. Ignacio, Dr. Nelson, and Dr. Fligstein, and the RFC accounts for all relevant limitations in these opinions. See Stubbs

Danielson , 539 F.3d at 1174 (affirming the ALJ’s RFC assessment based on substantial evidence); Batson , 359 F.3d at 1193 (explaining that this court must defer to the ALJ when the evidence supports more than one interpretation). Harris complains that the ALJ erred in failing to acknowledge other evidence supporting her case. However, the ALJ indicated that he had given careful consideration to “all of the evidence.” We find no e rror in not mentioning

some doctors by name. The ALJ provided several clear and convinc ing reasons to discredit Harris’s testimony regarding the intensity of her symptoms. See Vasquez v. Astrue , 572 F.3d 586, 591 (9th Cir. 2009). First, the ALJ properly determined that specific testimony regarding Harris’s physical, social, and cognitive lim itations was inconsistent with specific objective medical evidence. See Brown

- Hunter , 806 F.3d at 494 (requiring the ALJ to link specific m edical evidence to the specific testimony it discredits). Second, the ALJ properly discredited Harris’s testimony bas ed on inconsistencies with her activities. See Orn v. Astrue , 495 F.3d 625, 639 (9th Cir. 2007) (explaining that an ALJ can properly reject claimant testimony based on activities that are inconsistent with the testimony). Third, the ALJ4 16

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properly discredite d Harris’s s tatements regarding her inability to lift her niece or look for work based on inconsistent statements in the record. See Tommasetti v.
Astrue , 533 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2008)

. Fourth, the ALJ properly relied on a lack of objective medical e vidence showing anger and anxiety during social interactions with non

- family members as one factor in discrediting Harris’s testimony regarding her functional limitations from anger and anxiety. See Burch v. Barnhart , 400 F.3d 676, 681 (9th Cir. 2005) (con cluding that the ALJ can properly rely on a lack of supporting objective medical evidence as one factor in discrediting claimant testimony). Even assuming that SSR 16

- 3p applies retroactively, the ALJ properly focused on evaluating Harris’s symptoms and no t her character for truthfulness. See Trevizo v. Berryhill , 871 F.3d 664, 678 n.5 (9th Cir. 2017). The ALJ properly re

jected the lay testimony of Harris ’s mother based on inconsistencies with Harris’s own testimony and the medical evidence. See Lewis v. Ap fel , 236 F.3d 503, 511

- 12 (9th Cir. 2001) (including inconsistencies with claimant testimony and with medical evidence as germane reasons to discredit lay testimony).
AFFIRMED .