MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Melinda K. Jackman-Hanlin

Plainfield, Indiana

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE

William O. Harrington

Harrington Law, P.C.

Danville, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

David Heavrin, Jr.,

Appellant-Respondent,

v.

Sarina Kaufman Tearman,

Appellee-Petitioner

September 21, 2016

Court of Appeals Case No.

32A01-1512-DR-2317

Appeal from the Hendricks 

Superior Court

The Honorable Karen M. Love,

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

32D03-1112-DR-891

Crone, Judge.

Case Summary

[1] David Heavrin, Jr. (“Father”), appeals the trial court’s order requiring him to 

pay one-third of his daughter’s (“Daughter’s”) postsecondary education 

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expenses. He contends that the trial court violated his due process rights by 

failing to consider what he would have contributed toward her college

education if he and Sarina Kaufman Tearman (“Mother”) were still married. 

In addition, he argues that the trial court clearly erred in requiring him to pay 

one-third of Daughter’s college expenses by failing to consider his ability to pay 

and by not requiring Daughter to incur student loans to cover some of the costs. 

We conclude that Father’s due process rights were not violated and that the 

trial court did not clearly err in ordering him to pay one-third of Daughter’s 

college expenses. Therefore, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Mother and Father are parents of two children. Their Daughter was born in 

April 1997, and their son was born in August 1998. Mother and Father 

divorced in 1999. Mother was given sole legal and physical custody of the 

children. Father was ordered to pay weekly child support of $180 and given

visitation pursuant to the Morgan County Guidelines. 

[3] In May 2004, the trial court modified Father’s weekly child support to $63. In 

April 2013, the trial court modified Father’s weekly child support to $157.

[4] In April 2015, Mother filed a petition to modify dissolution decree and for 

allocation of postsecondary education expenses. In May 2015, Daughter

graduated from high school and was accepted to Ball State University. She was 

awarded a Presidential Scholarship of $2250 per semester and a Ball State 

Grant of $1000 per semester. In addition, she was offered a Federal Subsidized 

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Stafford Loan for $1750 per semester and a Federal Unsubsidized Stafford 

Loan for $1000 per semester.

[5] Daughter’s 2015 fall semester college expenses totaled $9722.50. After 

Daughter’s scholarship and grant were applied, the remainder was $6472.50, 

which Mother covered with her own funds and by borrowing $1732 through the 

Federal Subsidized Stafford Loan and $990 through the Federal Unsubsidized 

Stafford Loan. Mother also paid $1694.14 toward Daughter’s books and a 

mandatory laptop computer.

[6] In November 2015, the trial court held a hearing on Mother’s petition. Neither 

Mother nor Father submitted a child support worksheet or a postsecondary

education expenses worksheet. However, they both submitted their 2014 

federal income tax returns. Mother’s 2014 tax return shows that she filed 

jointly with her husband and that their combined wages were $92,325. They 

received a refund of $6701. Mother and her husband listed three dependents, 

which included the parties’ son. Mother also submitted her 2014 W-2 Form 

showing that she earned $42,769.02. Mother asked that Father be required to 

pay all Daughter’s spring semester expenses because she had paid all the fall 

expenses. 

[7] Father’s 2014 tax return shows that he filed jointly with his wife and that their 

combined wages were $77,890. They received a refund of $6692. Father and 

his wife listed three dependents, which included the parties’ Daughter. Mother 

testified that Father’s 2014 income was $74,355. At the hearing, Father argued 

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that he and his current spouse do not have enough money to pay $6500 per year 

for a college education, and he offered to pay $1200 per semester toward 

Daughter’s college expenses. He testified that his monthly household net 

income is $5300, his monthly household expenses are $4984, and he has 

$51,000 of personal student loans on which he pays $277 per month. He also 

testified that between them, he and his current spouse have six children. Two 

of Father’s stepchildren are in college, and they are paying their own college 

expenses. Father argued that Daughter should have to take out loans so that 

she would have a financial stake in her education and understand the 

importance of taking her education seriously. 

[8] In December 2015, the trial court issued its order on Mother’s petition (“the 

Order”), which provides as follows: Mother, Father, and Daughter will each 

pay one-third of Daughter’s postsecondary education expenses; Daughter’s 

scholarship and grant will account for her third; Mother and Father will each be 

responsible for half the remaining expenses, which for the 2015-2016 year is 

$3236.25 a semester or $6472.50 a year; Father will reimburse Mother for his 

half of Daughter’s fall 2015 expenses within thirty days; and Father will pay 

one third of the $1694.14 that Mother paid toward the laptop and books. This 

appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

[9] The trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions thereon sua sponte.

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Sua sponte findings only control issues that they cover, while a 

general judgment standard applies to issues upon which there are 

no findings. We may affirm a general judgment with findings on 

any legal theory supported by the evidence. As for any findings 

that have been made, they will be set aside only if they are clearly 

erroneous. A finding is clearly erroneous if there are no facts in 

the record to support it, either directly or by inference. 

Eisenhut v. Eisenhut, 994 N.E.2d 274, 276 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (citations 

omitted).

[10] Father challenges the trial court’s allocation of postsecondary education 

expenses. We review the trial court’s apportionment of college expenses under 

a clearly erroneous standard. Carr v. Carr, 600 N.E.2d 943, 945 (Ind. 1992); 

Winslow v. Fifer, 969 N.E.2d 1087, 1092 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied

(2013). Therefore, we will affirm the trial court unless its order “‘is clearly 

against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances which were before’ 

the court.” Marriage of Hensley v. Hensley, 868 N.E.2d 910, 913 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2007) (quoting Carr, 600 N.E.2d at 945). In determining whether the trial 

court’s decision is clearly erroneous, we consider only the evidence and 

reasonable inferences favorable to the judgment without reweighing evidence or 

judging witness credibility. Winslow, 969 N.E.2d at 1092.

[11] “Under Indiana law, there is no absolute legal duty on the part of parents to 

provide a college education for their children.” In re Paternity of Pickett, 44 

N.E.3d 756, 764 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (quoting Hinesley-Petry v. Petry, 894 

N.E.2d 277, 280-81 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied (2009)). However, 

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Indiana Code Section 31-16-6-2(a) authorizes the dissolution court to order 

either or both parents to pay sums toward their child’s college education. 

Section 31-16-6-2(a) provides that a child support order or an educational 

support order may include

(1) amounts for the child’s education in elementary and 

secondary schools and at postsecondary educational institutions, 

taking into account:

(A) the child’s aptitude and ability;

(B) the child’s reasonable ability to contribute to 

educational expenses through:

(i) work;

(ii) obtaining loans; and

(iii) obtaining other sources of financial aid 

reasonably available to the child and each parent; 

and

(C) the ability of each parent to meet these expenses.

[12] In addition, Indiana Child Support Guideline 8 provides,

It is discretionary with the court to award post-secondary 

educational expenses and in what amount. In making such a 

decision, the court should consider post-secondary education to 

be a group effort, and weigh the ability of each parent to 

contribute to payment of the expense, as well as the ability of the 

student to pay a portion of the expense. If the Court determines 

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that an award of post-secondary educational expenses is 

appropriate, it should apportion the expenses between the parents 

and the child, taking into consideration the incomes and overall 

financial condition of the parents and the child, education gifts, 

education trust funds, and any other education savings program.

Section 1 - Father’s due process rights were not violated.

[13] Father asserts that the trial court violated his due process rights because it failed 

to consider and make a finding regarding “whether and to what extent the 

parents, if still married, would have contributed to the child’s expenses.” 

Appellant’s Br. at 8 (citing Neudecker v. Neudecker, 577 N.E.2d 960, 962 (Ind. 

1991)). Father contends that Neudecker stands for the proposition that due 

process requires a trial court to make a specific determination regarding what 

the parents would have contributed toward the child’s postsecondary education 

expenses if they were still married. We disagree. 

[14] In Neudecker, our supreme court addressed equal protection and due process 

challenges to Indiana Code Section 31-1-11.5-12(b), the predecessor to Section

31-16-6-2(a). The court held that even though a married parent could 

unilaterally refuse to pay for college education, the statute authorizing the trial 

court to order either or both parents to pay sums for their child’s college 

education did not violate the noncustodial parent’s equal protection or due 

process rights. In so holding the court explained, 

The statutory authorization in dissolution cases to order either or 

both parents to pay sums for their child’s education expenses 

constitutes a reasonable implementation of the child support 

criteria that the court must consider the standard of living the 

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child would have enjoyed had the marriage not been dissolved. 

.... In this regard, the standard of living the child would have 

enjoyed had the marriage not been dissolved means whether and 

to what extent the parents, if still married, would have 

contributed to the child’s college expenses.

Neudecker, 577 N.E.2d at 962 (citations and quotation marks omitted). 

[15] Thus, the Neudecker court’s discussion regarding “whether and to what extent 

the parents, if still married, would have contributed to the child’s expenses”

merely reflects the concept that children should enjoy the same standard of 

living that they would have enjoyed if their parents had remained married. 

Significantly, the factors in Section 31-16-6-2(a) are directed toward ensuring 

that children enjoy that standard of living. The noncustodial parent’s equal 

protection and due process rights are not violated because the trial court’s 

consideration of the Section 31-16-6-2(a) factors will insure an allocation of 

expenses that reasonably reflects what the parents, if still married, would have 

contributed. As such, we are unpersuaded by Father’s argument that the trial 

court was required to make a specific determination regarding what the parents

would have contributed to Daughter’s postsecondary expenses if they had 

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remained married.1

 Accordingly, we conclude that Father’s due process rights 

were not violated.

Section 2 – The trial court did not clearly err by requiring 

Father to pay one-third of Daughter’s college expenses.

[16] Father contends that the trial court clearly erred in ordering him to pay onethird of Daughter’s college expenses. First, he argues that the trial court failed 

to take into account or make any findings regarding his ability to pay 

approximately $6500 per year toward Daughter’s college expenses. To the 

extent that Father complains that the trial court erred in failing to attach child 

support worksheets to the Order, he has waived that issue by failing to submit a 

worksheet.

2

 See Hedrick v. Gilbert, 17 N.E.3d 321, 327 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) 

(concluding that former husband waived argument that trial court erred by 

issuing order without child support worksheets where he failed to submit 

worksheet and did not object to former wife’s lack of worksheet). Father is 

1

 Furthermore, Father’s argument regarding what he would have contributed if he were still married is not 

supported by the record. At the hearing, Father argued that he was willing to help contribute $1200 a 

semester toward Daughter’s college education but that Daughter should have to take out loans so that she 

would have a financial stake in her education and understand the importance of taking her education 

seriously. On appeal, he argues that he would have felt the same if the parties had remained married. 

However, at the hearing, Father did not provide any evidence as to what his position would have been if he 

and Mother were still married. Tr. at 13-17. 

2 The Indiana Child Support Guidelines require a child support worksheet when the trial court is asked to 

order support, and this Court has also held that a verified child support worksheet must be filed with the 

court when there is one child or more attending a postsecondary educational institution. Butterfield v. 

Constantine, 864 N.E.2d 414, 417 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007); Ind. Child Support Guideline 3(B). Here, neither 

party filed a child support worksheet. We strongly “urge trial courts in the exercise of their discretion to 

require verified child support worksheets in every case. Failure to do so frustrates not only appellate review 

but also the goals of the child support guidelines.” Butterfield, 864 N.E.2d at 417.

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correct that the trial court did not specifically make a finding in its Order 

regarding his ability to pay approximately $6500 per year toward Daughter’s 

college expenses. However, the trial court’s statements at the end of the hearing 

reveal that it did consider Father’s ability to pay and found that he had the 

ability to pay that amount. At the hearing, Mother had requested that Father 

be required to pay all Daughter’s spring semester expenses because Mother had

paid all the fall expenses. The trial court rejected Mother’s suggestion and 

instead ordered Father to reimburse Mother for his half of what she had paid 

for the fall semester, explaining that it wanted to make sure that Daughter was 

“allowed to continue in school” but also that she would not “incur unnecessary 

expenses” because it recognized that Father was “going to have to make some 

adjustments in his budget in order to make these payments.” Tr. at 22. 

Father’s argument that he can afford to pay only $1200 per semester, which is 

the same argument that he presented to the trial court, is merely an invitation to 

reweigh the evidence, which we must decline. See Winslow, 969 N.E.2d at 

1092. Therefore, we conclude that the trial court did not fail to consider 

Father’s ability to pay.

[17] Father also asserts that the trial court erred by not requiring Daughter to incur 

student loans toward the payment of her postsecondary education expenses. 

Father argues that because Daughter was offered Stafford Loans, the trial court 

should have required her to incur these loans, and that remaining expenses,

after the loans, scholarship, and grant are applied, should be divided equally 

between himself and Mother. We observe that Section 31-16-6-2(a) requires the 

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trial court to consider the child’s reasonable ability to contribute to education 

expenses through work, obtaining loans, and obtaining other sources of 

financial aid reasonably available to the child and each parent. However, 

Section 31-16-6-2(a) is not a mandate; it does not require the trial court to order 

a child to incur loans simply because the child was offered a loan. The 

availability of loans is just one of several considerations provided by 31-16-6-

2(a). Here, Daughter received a scholarship and a grant. The trial court found 

that Daughter may need to take out a loan to pay incidental expenses. The trial 

court also found that she may obtain a resident assistant position, which may 

reduce the parental obligation. Father’s argument is an invitation to reweigh 

the evidence, which we must decline. See Winslow, 969 N.E.2d at 1092. We 

conclude that the trial court’s decision to allocate Daughter’s scholarship and 

grant toward her third of postsecondary expenses is not clearly against the logic 

and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court. Therefore, we affirm.

[18] Affirmed.

Kirsch, J., and May, J., concur.

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