[Cite as Freeman v. Todd Deegan Mgt., Inc., 2019-Ohio-1530.]

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA 

LINDA FREEMAN, : 

 Plaintiff-Appellant : 

 No. 107443 

 v. : 

 

TODD DEEGAN MGMT. INC., ET AL., : 

 

 Defendants-Appellees. : 

 

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION 

 JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED 

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: April 25, 2019

 

Civil Appeal from the Euclid Municipal Court 

Case No. CV-18 CVI 01010 

 

Appearances: 

Linda Freeman, pro se, for appellant. 

Rachel E. Cohen and Thomas P. Owen, for appellees. 

MARY EILEEN KILBANE, A.J.: 

Plaintiff-appellant, Linda Freeman (“Freeman”), appeals the decision 

of the Euclid Municipal Court dismissing her complaint. For the reasons set forth 

below, we affirm. 

On March 27, 2018, Freeman filed a complaint against Todd Deegan 

Mgmt., Inc., et al. (“Deegan”), in Euclid Municipal Court seeking $6,000 in money 
damages. In the complaint, Freeman alleged that Deegan, her former landlord, 

wrongfully withheld her security deposit and committed perjury. 

On April 26, 2018, a hearing was held on the matter. In the written 

decision after the hearing, the magistrate found that Deegan filed a forcible entry 

and detainer action, with a second cause for money damages against Freeman, in 

2015.1 The magistrate also found that the parties resolved the second cause for 

money damages by way of a consent entry, whereby Freeman agreed to a judgment 

in Deegan’s favor in the amount of $700, which would be paid in monthly 

installments. 

In addition, the magistrate found that after the consent entry became 

a final judgment on March 2, 2016, Freeman did not appeal. The magistrate further 

found that Freeman’s claim for the return of her security deposit was barred by the 

doctrine of res judicata and her claim that Deegan committed perjury cannot be 

litigated in small claims court. 

On May 17, 2018, Freeman filed objections to the magistrate’s 

decision. On May 24, 2018, the municipal court’s judge upheld the magistrate’s 

decision and entered its judgment of dismissal. 

Freeman now appeals, assigning five errors for review: 

Assignment of Error One 

 1 The trial court found in favor of Deegan in the 2015 case. 
The trial court erred in dismissing the case because while perjury and 

intentional torts are not within the subject matter jurisdiction of small 

claims court, my claim for my security deposit is. 

Assignment 0f Error Two 

The trial court erred in dismissing the case by improperly applying the 

doctrine of res judicata. I signed the judgment entry in the original case 

under duress and fraud, the final ruling is not valid. 

Assignment of Error Three 

The trial court in the original case abused its discretion by failing to 

consider evidence I brought that suggested the ledger Deegan Mgmt. 

used was incorrect and therefore the judgment in the original case is 

not valid. 

Assignment of Error Four 

The trial court erred in dismissing the case by improperly applying the 

doctrine of res judicata. Because Deegan Mgmt. failed to return my 

security deposit in a timely manner after resolution of the original case, 

the claim for my security deposit was not yet ripe at the time of the trial 

and therefore not res judicata. 

Assignment of Error Five 

Because the trial court misapplied a legal standard, res judicata, the 

appellate court should adopt a de novo review to see documentation 

and proof of wrongful eviction. 

We will collectively address Freeman’s assignments of error because 

of their common basis in fact and law. 

In assignments of error two through four, Freeman broadly argues 

that the municipal court should not have dismissed her complaint on the basis that 

it was barred by the doctrine of res judicata. 

In the instant case, the magistrate’s decision, which the municipal 

court adopted states in relevant part: 
[Freeman’s] complaint asserts that Deegan Management “wrongfully 

withheld my security deposit * * *. He also committed perjury * * * at 

Aljer Manor 2016.” [Freeman] was the defendant in 15 CVG 03246, 

wherein Deegan Management filed a forcible entry and detainer action 

with a second cause for money damages. * * * Because 15 CVG 03246 

involved a claim for money damages, [Freeman] was required to file 

any claim against Deegan Management. The return of a security 

deposit is a claim that was required to be litigated in the second cause 

hearing in the earlier case. Having done so, or having failed to so file, 

res judicata applies to the current action. 

Under the doctrine of res judicata, “a valid, final judgment rendered 

upon the merits bars all subsequent actions based upon any claim arising out of the 

same transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of a previous action.” 

Grava v. Parkman Twp., 73 Ohio St. 3d 379, 382, 653 N.E.2d 226 (1995). The Ohio 

Supreme Court has identified four elements necessary to bar a claim under the 

doctrine of res judicata: (1) there is a final, valid decision on the merits by a court of 

competent jurisdiction; (2) the second action involves the same parties or their 

privies as the first; (3) the second action raises claims that were or could have been 

litigated in the first action; and (4) the second action arises out of the transaction or 

occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action. Portage Cty. Bd. of 

Commrs. v. Akron, 109 Ohio St.3d 106, 2006-Ohio-954, 846 N.E.2d 478, ¶ 84. 

In Ferarra v. Vicchiarelli Funeral Servs., 2016-Ohio-5144, 69 N.E.3d 

171 (8th Dist.), we explained: 

Civ.R. 13(A) governs compulsory counterclaims. Under this rule, all 

existing claims between opposing parties that arise out of the same 

transaction or occurrence must be litigated in a single lawsuit, 

regardless of which party initiates the action. Rettig Ents. v. Koehler, 

68 Ohio St.3d 274, 1994-Ohio-127, 626 N.E.2d 99 (1994), paragraph 

one of the syllabus. In addition to promoting judicial economy, the rule 
is designed to assist courts with the “orderly delineation of res 

judicata.” Lewis v. Harding, 182 Ohio App.3d 588, 2009-Ohio-3071, 

913 N.E.2d 1048, ¶ 12 (8th Dist.). A party who fails to assert a 

compulsory counterclaim at the proper time is barred from litigating 

that claim in a subsequent lawsuit. Id. 

Ohio courts use the “logical relation” test to determine whether a claim 

is a compulsory counterclaim. Rettig Ents. at paragraph two of the 

syllabus. Under this test, a compulsory counterclaim exists if that claim 

“is logically related to the opposing party’s claim” such that “separate 

trials on each of their respective claims would involve a substantial 

duplication of effort and time by the parties and the courts * * *.” Id. 

Accordingly, “multiple claims are compulsory counterclaims where 

they ‘involve many of the same factual issues, or the same factual and 

legal issues, or where they are offshoots of the same basic controversy 

between the parties.’” Id. at 279, quoting Great Lakes Rubber Corp. v. 

Herbert Cooper Co., 286 F.2d 631, 634 (3d Cir.1961). 

In applying the two-part Rettig test to the facts in this case, we find 

that the claims Freeman asserted against Deegan in the present action were 

compulsory counterclaims. Under the first prong, we find that Freeman’s claim, 

regarding the security deposit, existed at the time Deegan filed the forcible entry and 

detainer action and its second cause for money damages in 2015. 

Under the second Rettig prong, we find that Freeman’s claims arose 

out of the transaction or occurrence — the landlord/tenant agreement — that was 

the subject matter of 2015 case. The basis for the causes of action asserted by 

Freeman in the present action arose from the landlord/tenant agreement and bears 

a logical relationship to the claims Deegan asserted against her in their forcible entry 

and detainer and second cause for money damages in 2015. 

Because the claims that Freeman asserted against Deegan in the 

present complaint satisfy both prongs of the Rettig two-part test, they were 
compulsory counterclaims that either were or should have been asserted in the 

previous action. The issue of the security deposit would have been addressed as part 

of Deegan’s second cause of action for money damages in the 2015 case. We have 

held that all claims, including those sounding in tort, arising from complaints 

stemming from the landlord-tenant relationship fall within the compulsory 

counterclaim mandate of Civ.R. 13(A). Maduka v. Parries, 14 Ohio App. 3d 191, 193, 

470 N.E.2d 464 (8th Dist.1984). 

As previously noted, in Deegan’s second cause of action for money 

damages, Freeman signed a consent entry agreeing to judgment in Deegan’s favor 

for $700 to be paid in monthly installments. The consent entry was reduced to a 

final judgment on March 2, 2016. The record indicates that Freeman made an 

installment payment on April 11, 2016 in the amount of $35, which is a clear 

indication that matter had been addressed and resolved. As a result, Freeman is 

barred from asserting or relitigating this claim in the present action. 

Nonetheless, Freeman now asserts for the first time that her 

complaint should not have been dismissed on the basis of res judicata because the 

consent entry was entered into under duress and fraud. 

The record reflects that Freeman did not raise this argument in the 

municipal court, and then waited almost two full years to raise the argument for the 

first time in this appeal. It is well-established that a party is precluded from raising 

an argument on appeal that the party failed to assert in the trial court. See State v. 

Bridges, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 106652, 2018-Ohio-4325, ¶ 7, citing State v. 
Anderson, 151 Ohio St.3d 212, 2017-Ohio-5656, 87 N.E.3d 1203, ¶ 4 (“New issues 

cannot be raised and argued for the first time on appeal.”); State ex rel. Zollner v. 

Indus. Comm. of Ohio, 66 Ohio St.3d 276, 278, 611 N.E.2d 830 (1993) (when a party 

fails to raise an argument in the trial court, he or she waives the right to raise the 

argument on appeal). 

Based on the foregoing analysis, we find that the municipal court 

properly concluded that Freeman was barred from asserting the present claims 

against Deegan in the instant action. 

Finally, in the first assignment of error, Freeman acknowledges that 

perjury and intentional torts are not within the jurisdiction of the small claims court. 

Under R.C. 1925.02, a small claims court has no jurisdiction to hear Freeman’s claim 

of perjury. 

In light of the foregoing, we find the municipal court did not err when 

it dismissed Freeman’s complaint. 

Accordingly, all of Freeman’s assignments of error are overruled. 

Judgment affirmed. 

It is ordered that appellees recover from appellant costs herein taxed. 

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment 

into execution. 

 
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

 

MARY EILEEN KILBANE, ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE 

LARRY A. JONES, SR., J., and 

RAYMOND C. HEADEN, J., CONCUR