Case 1:22-cv-01542-RCL Document 16 Filed 03/06/23 Page 1 of 5 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 

) 

JOSHUA FREEDMAN, ) 

) 

Plaintiff, ) Civ. No. 22-1542 (RCL) 

)

 v. ) 

) REPLY IN SUPPORT OF 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, ) MOTION TO DISMISS 

)

 Defendant. ) 

) 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION’S REPLY 

IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION TO DISMISS 

Lisa J. Stevenson (D.C. Bar No. 457628) 

Acting General Counsel 

Kevin Deeley 

Associate General Counsel 

Harry J. Summers 

Assistant General Counsel 

Greg J. Mueller (D.C. Bar No. 462840) 

Attorney 

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION 

1050 First Street, NE 

Washington, DC 20463 

(202) 694-1650 

March 6, 2023 
Case 1:22-cv-01542-RCL Document 16 Filed 03/06/23 Page 2 of 5 

The Federal Election Commission’s (“FEC”) Motion to Dismiss (“Mot.”) (Docket Nos. 

11, 11-1) demonstrated that this case should be dismissed on two independent grounds, and 

plaintiff’s opposition does not show otherwise. First, plaintiff has failed to file this action within 

the 60-day jurisdictional period when judicial review may be sought under 52 U.S.C. § 

30109(a)(8). Second, plaintiff’s complaint presents only a generalized interest in law 

enforcement that is insufficiently concrete and particularized to establish Article III standing. In 

his Response to Motion to Dismiss (“Response”) (Docket No. 15), plaintiff does not dispute that 

he filed this case outside the 60-day jurisdictional period. Nor does he attempt to show a 

particularized injury that might give him standing in this case. Instead, plaintiff basically urges 

the Court to proceed to the merits as a discretionary matter because of his pro se status and his 

view of the importance of the case. But plaintiff has failed to show that the Court has the 

discretion to consider a late-filed complaint under 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(8). And he provides no 

basis to disregard his failure to allege an injury sufficient to establish Article III standing, which 

all plaintiffs must have to proceed in federal court. The FEC’s motion to dismiss should be 

granted. 

1. The FEC has shown that plaintiff’s complaint here should be dismissed 

because it was filed outside of the 60-day jurisdictional window provided in 52 U.S.C. § 

30109(a)(8). (Mot. at 6-10.) Plaintiff’s failure to file his complaint in this Court within this 

window means — under this Circuit’s well-established precedent — that the Court lacks 

jurisdiction and the case must be dismissed. See id.; Jordan v. FEC, 68 F.3d 518, 519 (D.C. Cir. 

1995); Nat’l Rifle Assn. of Am. v. FEC, 854 F.2d 1330, 1334 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Spannaus v. FEC, 

990 F.2d. 643, 644 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (per curiam). In his Response, plaintiff concedes that “it is 

true that the complaint may be time-barred,” but argues that he “may not have been aware of the 

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Case 1:22-cv-01542-RCL Document 16 Filed 03/06/23 Page 3 of 5 

applicable deadline,” and that since he is a pro se litigant, the Court should “exercise its 

discretion to consider the merits of the complaint” rather than dismissing it. (Resp. at 1.) It is 

true that a certain amount of consideration for pro se plaintiffs is appropriate in some contexts, 

but because of the well-established precedent confirming that the deadline set by section 

30109(a)(8) is jurisdictional in nature, the Court lacks the authority to exercise discretion here as 

plaintiff urges. Furthermore, the D.C. Circuit has specifically considered whether pro se status 

should afford some extra consideration when a case is filed outside the same 60-day period in 

Section 30109(a)(8), but it determined that pro se status “is not a pertinent factor” because 

dismissal “simply respects the statutorily-fixed deadline.” Spannaus, 990 F.2d at 645. Filing 

within 60 days is a condition of subject matter jurisdiction, and plaintiff’s admitted failure to do 

so here requires dismissal. 

2. The FEC has also shown that plaintiff lacks Article III standing. (Mot. at 10-

15.) In particular, the agency’s determination in the administrative enforcement proceedings at 

issue here did not cause plaintiff any particular injury, nor would proceeding with an 

enforcement action redress any such harm. See Mot. at 13-14; Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in 

Wash. v. FEC, 267 F. Supp. 3d 50, 53 (D.D.C. 2017); Common Cause v. FEC, 108 F.3d 413, 419 

(D.C. Cir. 1997) (per curiam); Wertheimer v. FEC, 268 F.3d 1070, 1075 (D.C. Cir. 2001). In his 

Response, plaintiff emphasizes his view of the importance of his claims on the merits, and he 

appears to argue that he has statutory standing, noting that he was “a party to the original 

[administrative] complaint” under 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(8). But the FEC has not disputed his 

statutory standing. 

Plaintiff does not attempt to establish Article III standing. Instead, his abstract concerns 

about the general importance of the issues he has raised and “ensur[ing] that campaign finance 

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Case 1:22-cv-01542-RCL Document 16 Filed 03/06/23 Page 4 of 5 

laws are upheld” (Response at 2) reflect just the sort of “generic interest in good government that 

is shared equally by all citizens and does not amount to a concrete or particularized Article III 

injury.” Campaign Legal Ctr. v. FEC, 860 F. App’x. 1, *4 (D.C. Cir. 2021). 

Plaintiff asks, “If I don’t have standing, then who does?” (Resp. at 2), but that is 

insufficient. As a factual matter, plaintiff has not shown why his claim to Article III standing is 

as strong as any others would be with regard to the conduct at issue, but more fundamentally, 

whether others may have standing does not establish that plaintiff has it. As the Supreme Court 

has explained, even “the assumption that if respondents have no standing to sue, no one would 

have standing, is not a reason to find standing.” Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 

420 (2013) (quoting Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Am. United for Separation of Church and 

State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 489 (1982)). Thus, even if plaintiff were correct that no one else would 

have Article III standing to challenge the conduct at issue here, that would not give the Court 

jurisdiction to proceed with this case. 

Because plaintiff filed this case outside of the 60-day jurisdictional time period, and 

because he has failed to show Article III standing, the Court should dismiss his complaint.

 Respectfully submitted, 

Lisa J. Stevenson (D.C. Bar No. 457628) /s/ Greg J. Mueller 

Acting General Counsel Greg J. Mueller (D.C. Bar No. 462840) 

lstevenson@fec.gov Attorney 

gmueller@fec.gov 

Kevin Deeley 

Associate General Counsel COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT 

kdeeley@fec.gov FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION 

1050 First Street, NE 

Harry J. Summers Washington, DC 20463 

Assistant General Counsel (202) 694-1650 

hsummers@fec.gov 

March 6, 2023 

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Case 1:22-cv-01542-RCL Document 16 Filed 03/06/23 Page 5 of 5 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I certify that on March 6, 2023, pursuant to Local Civil Rule 5.4(d)(2), I caused to be 

served the foregoing Federal Election Commission’s Reply in Support of its Motion to Dismiss. 

It was sent by the means specified to the addresses listed below. 

Via Regular First-Class Mail 

 Joshua Freedman 

 49 Sample Bridge Rd 

 Mechanicsburg, PA 17050 

Via Email 

Joshua Freedman 

freedman.joshua@gmail.com 

/s/ Greg J. Mueller 

Greg J. Mueller (D.C. Bar No. 462840) 

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