NO. 07-03-0302-CR IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TE XAS

AT AMARILLO PANEL D OCTOBER 13, 2004

______________________________ JOSE INE Z CARRIZ

ALES, JR ., Appellant
v. THE STA

TE OF TEX

AS, Appellee

_________________________________ FROM THE 222 ND DISTRICT COURT OF DEAF SMITH COUNTY ; NO. CR-99L-112; HON. H. BRYAN POFF, PRESIDING

_______________________________ Before QUINN, REAVIS, and CAMPBELL, JJ. Jose Inez Carrizales, Jr. (appellant) appeals his conviction for theft of cattle. Vi a a single issue, appellant contends the evidenc e was le gally in sufficie nt to “pro ve the req uisite intentto deprive the owner of his property at the tim e the pro perty was obtaine d.” We affirm. Background Jason Jesko (Jesko) testified that in August of 1999 he w orked for Barrett & Crofoot (Barrett), a feedya rd. Jerry Garcia (Garcia) was a co-employee, and together they decided to steal a steer from their employer. On August 21 st and while using his gran dmo ther’s2

trailer, Jesk o, along wit h Garcia, removed a steer from a pen. The steer taken had markings on its ear identifying it as belongi ng to Barrett. Furthermore, the animal initially
was hauled to the FFA

barn in Hereford, Texas, but later taken to thein-laws of Garcia for butchering. Appellant was present at the latter site when the steer arrived. Accordi ng to Jesko, however, he did not inform appellant that it had been stolen. Thereafter, the ear tag
was removed. Jesko, later, believed that his steer had been butchered and returned for his share of t he meat. The m eat he received, however, was from another steer, not the one he h ad taken. On September 5, 1999, (some two we eks after t he theft) Jesko informed Rodney Barrett (Rodney) (owner of the feedyard) of the theft. Rodney then contacted alocal deputy sheriff aboutthe matter. At that time, Rodney knew that the animal was located at
a house w hereat ap pellant resided with his parents. Both the depu tyand Rod ney went to the house. When they arrive d at the h ome , they asked appellant’s father if they could search his premise s for the stolen steer; he agreed. The steer was then l ocated and returned to Barrett

. The deputy e ventuall y took sta tements fro m both Jesko an d Garcia. So too was one taken from appellant. The latter was read into the record a s follows: Jerry Garcia asked me one day if he ever had a crippled steer from the feed ya rd, could he bring it to my dad’s house and have it butchered. I told him that it was okay. Then one night Je rry calle d me on the phone and said that he had a steer that he got from the feed yard and could he bring [sic] to my dad’s house. I told him to br ing it th e next d ay. Jerry and Jason Je sko came to the house the next day w ith the s te er. When I saw the steer was not crippled, and I looked a t Jerry an d he told me that th ey had stole it fro m a feed yard. I told Jerry that was his deal and that I did not want anything to do with it. The n my dad came over and I told him what was going on. He got mad and sai d, ‘Do w hatever you need to do.’ I told J erry and J ason toput it3

in the pen. A couple of days later they came back and butcher ed one of dad’s steers, and dad just kept the one they brought from the feed yard. Garcia testified thathe told Jesko tha t his bro ther-in-l aw (appe llant) would butcher the steer, that they initially informed appellant that the steer was “broke” butappellant later discovered that it wasn’t “broken,” that nothing was sai d by appellant, and that the steer was placed in a p en. Via a statement previously given to the deputy and admitted into evidence, Garcia testified that he told appellant that the steer was stolen before transporting it to appellant’s residence and appellant directed him to bring it an y way . Garcia recanted this statement at trial, however. Instead, he testified that he simply informed appellant that the steer was “broke,” not stolen. Rodneytestified that Jesko came to him and admitted the theft

. He then went to the location whereat he knew the anima l to be a nd found it. Atthat time it was removed from the pen a nd return ed to him

. Standard of Review A legal sufficiency challenge calls for appellate revi ew of the relevant evidence in the light most favorab le to theprosecut ion. Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S . 307, 31 9, 99 S.C t. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 ( 19 79); Swearin gen v. St ate , 101 S.W.3d 89, 95 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003); Johnson v. State , 23 S.W.3 d 1, 7 (Te x. Crim. App.2000 ). Furt hermore, we are to consider all the evidence that sustains the conviction, whether properly or improperly admitted or wheth er introd uced by t he prosec ution or the defen se. Conner v . State , 67 S.W.3d 192, 197 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). This incl udes the evidence introduced in both the4

guilt/ innocence and punishment stages of the trial. De Garmo v. State , 691 S.W.2d 657, 661 (Tex . Crim. Ap p. 1985). Analysis Appellant urges that the eviden ce is le gally in sufficie nt to supp ort the th eft conviction becausethe Statefailed to prove th at he intended todepriveth e owner of the steer. T EX
. P EN .C ODE A NN . §31.03(a) (Vernon 2003) (a person commits theft if he unlawfully

appropriates property with intent to deprive the owner of i t). Furthermore, deprivation occurs when the property is withheld from the owner p ermanently or for so extended a period of

time thata major portion of the value or enjoyment of the property is lostto the owne r, or when property is restored only upon payment of a rewa rd or compensation, or when property is disposed of in a mann e r that makes recovery of the property to the owne r unlike ly. Id. §31.01(2). So, all that need be proved is that the accused intended to do one of the foregoing acts. Additionally, in assessing whether the accused had that intent, the factfinder may consid er both the accused’s words and acts. Banks v. State, 471 S.W.2 d 811, 81 2 (Tex. C rim. App. 1971). In reviewing the evidence in a lig ht mo st favorable to the verdict and disregarding that which contradic

ts it, we find the followi ng: 1) ap pellant had agre ed to butcher t h e steer, 2) appellant was told that the animal was stolen before it was taken to his residence and he direc

ted th e others to bring it anyway, 3) appellant admitted to knowin g the steer
was stolen o nce it wa s bro ught to his property, 4) appellant’s father became angry when learning that the steer was stolen and told appe llant to do whatever he chose with it, 5) appellant

chose to direc t t he others to placethe steer

in a pen located on the p roperty rather than remove it from the premises or return it to the owner, 6) a smaller animal was5

butchered and parts of it were offered to Jesko as his share of the theft, 7) the stolen animal was kept at the home wherein appellant res ided for approximately two weeks withoutappella nt informi ng its ow ner of its location and while appellant knew it was stolen, and 8) Rodney found the steer at appellant’s reside nce after be ing told by Jesko of the theft. From thi s, a rational jury could conclude, beyond reasonabl e doubt, that appellant int ended to depri ve Rodne y of the s teer and would ha ve done s o excep t fo r the owne r discovering its location and reacquiring the animal. Thus, the evidence of guilt is legally sufficie nt to supp ort the ve rdict. Accordin gly, we o verrule t he issueand affi rm the judg ment of th e trial court.

Per Curiam Do not publish.