* This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the

doctrines of law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judg ments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and condi tions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

## F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### JUN 10 2003 

### PATRICK FISHER Clerk UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT
ALI SHERKAT, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. JOHNSON COUNTY DISTRICT COURT, Defendant-Appellee. No. 02-3406 (D. Kan.) (D.Ct. No. 02-CV-2487-KHV)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

Before SEYMOUR , MURPHY , and O’BRIEN , Circuit Judges.

After examining the briefs and appellate record, th is panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materiallyassist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). T he case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.1 We liberally construe his pro se pleadings. Ledbetter v. City of Topeka,

318 F.3d 1183, 1187 (10th Cir. 2003).

2 The doctrine’s name is derived from the two United States Supreme Court cases from which it arose: Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co. , 263 U.S. 413 (1923), and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman , 460 U.S. 462 (1983). -2- Mr. Ali Sherkat, acting pro se 1 , appeals the district court’s sua sponte dismissal of his complaint for lack of subject matt er jurisdiction. We affirm. Mr. Sherkat, acting pro se, brought an action again st the Johnson County, Kansas, District Court alleging a violation of his equal protection and due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. He claimed the Johnson County District Court found him guilty of abuse without proof, tookaway his parenting rights, and jeopardized his right to appeal by failing to r ecord the hearing. Mr. Sherkat requested the United States district court dismiss and/or reverse the orders of the Johnson County District Court and sought an award o f damages, including five million dollars in punitive damages. Acting sua sponte, the district court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based upon the Rooker-Feldma n doctrine. 2 Mr. Sherkat now appeals that ruling, and has file d two emergency motions regarding his appeal. “The Rooker-Feldman doctrine ‘bars a party losing in state court from seeking what in substance would be appellate reviewof the state judgment in a United States district court, based on the losing p arty’s claim that the state judgment itself violates the loser’s federal rights .’” Johnson v. Riddle , 305 F.3d-3-

1107, 1116 (10th Cir. 2002) (citing Kiowa Indian Tribe v. Hoover , 150 F.3d 1163, 1169 (10th Cir. 1998)). This doctrine “not only pr ohibit[s] direct review of state judgments by lower federal courts, but it also proh ibit[s] those federal courts from issuing any declaratory relief that is inextricably intertwined with the state court judgment.” Facio v. Jones , 929 F.2d 541, 543 (10th Cir. 1991) (quotation marks and citations omitted). We review a dismissal for lack of subject matter ju risdiction de novo. U.S. West, Inc. v. Tristani , 182 F.3d 1202, 1206 (10th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1106 (2000). Here, Mr. Sherkat essentially se eks a dismissal and/or reversal of the state court proceedings, and the constitutio nal claims raised and relief sought are inextricably intertwined with the substance and procedure of the state court judgment. This is precisely the type of medd ling in state court affairs the Rooker-Feldman doctrine proscribes. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal of Mr. Sherkat’s complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction b ased upon the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Further, Mr. Sherkat’s two emergency mot ions are denied as moot.

Entered by the Court: TERRENCE L. O’BRIEN United States Circuit Judge