THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PR ECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA In The Supreme Court

Jorge V. Esguerra, Appellant,

v.

Jamie V. Brown, individually and d/b/a Southeastern Services, Robert Baroni, Boyd R. Laughlin and
Associated Construction Cons ultants, Inc., Defendants,

Of whom Robert Baroni, Boyd R. Laughlin and Associated Construction Consultants, Inc. are, Respondents.

Appellate Case No. 2010-174706

Appeal From Beaufort County Marvin H. Dukes, III, Master-in -Equity

Memorandum Opinion No. 2012-MO-047 Heard October 4, 2012 – Filed November 21, 2012

AFFIRMED

Sean Michael Bolchoz, of Ha le & Bolchoz, of Hilton Head Island, for Appellant.James Frederick Berl, of Law Offices of James F. Berl, of Hilton Head Island, and John William Farrell, of Hilton Head Island, for Respondents.

PER CURIAM: Appellant sued defendant Brown and respondents Baroni, Laughlin, and Associated Construction C onsultants, Inc. (ACCI) for damages incurred when Brown renovated appellant 's vacation condominium on Hilton Head Island. After a non-jury trial, the mast er found for appellant on all his claims against Brown and awarded him $ 307,520.73 in damages and attorn ey’s fees. He found for respondents on all issues, a nd appellant appeals. We affirm.

FACTS

Appellant, an Ohio resident, hired Brown d/b/a Southeastern Services to renovate appellant's condo. Brown, who was not properly licensed, approached Baroni, seeking to have Baroni and his company, ACCI, assist him in obtaining a building permit for the project. While Baroni initia lly rebuffed Brown, he met with Brown later and conditionally agreed to help him "pull" a permit from the town of Hilton
Head.

It is uncontested that Brown eventua lly obtained a building permit from Hilton Head for appellant's project using ACCI's information. When Brown's work on the renovations was unsatisfactory, appellant reported Brown to the South Carolina Department of Labor, Licensing, and Re gulation's Contracting Board (LLR). Brown admitted he was not licensed, and eventually was cite d by LLR for several statutory violations arising out of his work on appellant's condo.

In the course of LLR's investigation in to Brown's licensure, LLR's attention was drawn to respondent Baroni and ACCI and their relationship to Brown in connection with appellant's renovations. Following an investigation, Baroni and ACCI entered a Consent Agreement admi tting they unlawfully lent their license 1 to Brown. Under the terms of this Agreem ent, Baroni and ACCI agreed to pay a $1,000 penalty and to be placed on probation for one year.

1 See S.C. Code Ann. § 40-11-110(A)(9) (2011).ISSUES

1. Did the master err in refusi ng to allow appellant to invoke non-mutual collateral estoppel on the issue of license lending?

2. Did the master err in fi nding appellant failed to prove respondents were the proximate cause of his damages?

ANALYSIS

Pursuant to the doctrine of collateral estoppel, a party may be precluded from relitigating an issue decided in a previous action. Non-mutual collateral estoppel may be asserted by a non-party to the firs t action in the second action, unless the party sought to be precluded lacked a full or fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the first action, or there are other circum stances that justify permitting the party to relitigate the issue in the second case. South Carolina Prop. and Cas. Ins. Guar. Ass'n v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. , 304 S.C. 210, 403 S.E.2d 625 (1991). Circumstances which may justify relitigation, and thus deny a party non-mutual offensive collateral estoppel, are found in the Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 28 and § 29. Id

.

Here, the master concluded that two excep tions found in § 28 applied. Assuming without deciding that this was error, appe llant must also demonstrate the master erred in finding Brown's negligent work rather than respondents' license lending and other alleged statutory violations we re the proximate cause of appellant's damages. See

, e.g. , Madison ex rel. Bryant v. Babcock Center, Inc. , 371 S.C. 123, 638 S.E.2d 650 (2006) (proxima te cause requires proof of both causation in fact and legal cause). The question of proximat e cause is ordinarily for the finder of
fact. Id

.

This is an action at law tried to a judge alone. In this t ype of case, the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evid ence is exclusively for the master. Regions
Bank v. Strawn , ____ S.C. ____, ____ S.E.2d ____ (Ct. App. 2012). We find there is evidence in the record supporting the ma ster's finding that respondents' statutory violations were not the proximate cause of appellant's damages. Id .; Madison ex rel. Bryant

, supra

.CONCLUSION

The order of the master is

AFFIRMED.

TOAL, C.J., PLEICONES, BEATTY , KITTREDGE and HEARN, JJ.,

concur.