May 17, 1977

77-27 MEMORANDUM OPINION FOR THE

DIRECTOR OF THE EXECUTIVE OFFICE

FOR UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS

Interchange of Counsel Project—Assistant United

States Attorneys and Assistant Public Defenders

This is in response to your memorandum requesting our opinion on 

the legal and ethical aspects of having one or more Assistant United 

States Attorneys and Assistant Federal Public Defenders temporarily 

exchange duties. We understand that the purpose of the proposed 

exchange is to give the participating attorneys a greater understanding 

of and sympathy for counsel who appear against them, by allowing 

prosecutors to defend a number of criminal cases and vice versa. While 

several types of exchange programs have been conducted, all of the 

proposed programs necessarily contemplate that the participating attorneys will return to their former duties.

It should be noted at the outset that the attorneys employed by a 

Federal Public Defender Office are officers of the judicial branch of the 

Government. They are paid by the Administrative Office of the United 

States Courts from the appropriation for the judiciary, and they are 

ultimately responsible to the Judicial Council of the circuit in which 

they perform their duties. The Department of Justice has no control 

over them.1 Assistant U.S. Attorneys, on the other hand, are employees 

of the Department of Justice.

'S ee 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(h)(2)(A), (j). T he Federal Public Defender Office shares the 

task o f defending indigents accused of Federal crimes w ith the private bar of the district 

in w hich it operates. See 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (a), (b).

T h e statute provides an alternative to the Federal Public Defender Office if the district 

court and the C ircuit Judicial C ouncil prefer the Community D efender Organization. The 

Com m unity D efender Organization is a private, nonprofit organization funded by a block 

grant o f judicial funds. See 18 U .S.C . § 3006A(h)(2)(B). W hile the statute requires the 

Com m unity D efender Organization to report its activities and financial position to the 

Judicial C onference o f the United States, it does not appear to prohibit the organization 

from receiving funds from other sources. Em ployees of a Community Defender Organization are not Federal employees.

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A p p l ic a b i l i t y o f t h e C o n f l i c t o f I n t e r e s t L a w s a n d t h e D e p a r t ­

m e n t ’s S t a n d a r d s o f C o n d u c t

Section 205 of Title 18, U.S. Code, provides, in pertinent part, as 

follows:

Whoever, being an officer or employee of the United States in the 

executive . . . or judicial branch of the Government . . . otherwise 

than in the proper discharge of his official duties— 

*******

(2) acts as agent or attorney for anyone before any department, 

agency, court-martial, officer, or any civil, military, or naval commission in connection with any proceeding . . . controversy, 

charge, accusation, arrest, or other particular matter in which the 

United States is a party or has a direct and substantial interest . . . 

is guilty of a felony.2 The statute expressly allows representation “in the 

proper discharge of . . . official duties.” The House committee that 

drafted the statute stated that its purpose was to protect the “clear 

public interest in preventing Government employees from allying themselves actively with private parties in the multitude of matters and 

proceedings in which . . . the Government has a direct and substantial 

interest.” [Emphasis added.]3 In the light of this intent, this Office has 

regarded § 205 as prohibiting Federal attorneys from serving as volunteer or appointed criminal defense counsel in United States and District 

of Columbia courts. But this limitation does not apply to a Federal 

Public Defender Office, whose statutory function is to defend Federal 

criminal cases.

The proposed exchange program therefore differs significantly from 

other proposals that we have considered. Instead of acting as private 

individuals or affiliates of a nongovernmental organization, participating 

Assistant U.S. Attorneys would be assigned by this Department to the 

Public Defender Office, another Federal Government agency, and 

would perform the official duties of that organization under its supervision. Those duties would include the defense of Federal criminal prosecutions. Thus, we see no problem as far as § 205 is concerned.4

It should also be noted that 18 U.S.C. § 203(a) and 28 CFR 45.735- 

6(a)(3) prohibit Department attorneys from soliciting or receiving any 

compensation other than “as provided by law for the proper discharge 

of official duties” in connection with litigation against the Government. 

The Department’s Standards of Conduct, 28 CFR § 45.735-9(e), permit 

Department attorneys to provide uncompensated legal assistance to 

indigents in off-duty time, but in that connection they forbid “represen2 The D epartm ent’s Standards o f Conduct, 28 C FR § 45.735-6(a)(2), duplicate the 

statute.

3 H.R. Rep. 748, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 9.

4 This conclusion does not apply to the assignment of D epartm ent o f Justice attorneys 

to a private legal services organization, such as a Community Defender Organization.

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tation or assistance in any criminal matter or proceeding, whether 

Federal, State or local.” For the reason stated above, we are of the 

opinion that these provisions do not restrict participation in an exchange program with a Federal Public Defender office.

Ethical Implications

The contemplated exchange program does, however, raise ethical 

problems. The participating attorney is in a situation where his loyalties 

may be divided between a temporary and a permanent employer. When 

a temporary and permanent employer represent conflicting legal interests, the American Bar Association (ABA) Code of Professional Responsibility severely limits the attorney’s freedom of action. Here the 

interest of the Assistant U.S. Attorneys is to prosecute and to establish 

case precedent conducive to effective prosecution; the interest of the 

Public Defender is to defend and to develop case law favorable to 

defendants. There is a certain inherent conflict in the two roles.

The disciplinary rules implementing Canon 5 of the Code of Professional Responsibility embody the ancient maxim that a person cannot 

serve two masters. Of particular significance is DR 5 -105(A), which 

provides as follows:

A lawyer shall decline proffered employment if the exercise of his 

independent professional judgment in behalf of a client will be or is 

likely to be adversely affected by the acceptance of the proffered 

employment, or if it would be likely to involve him in representing 

differing interests, except to the extent permitted under DR 5- 

105(C).

The rule applies not only to open conflicts but also to “subliminal or 

concealed” influences on the attorney’s loyalty. Goodson v. Payton, 351 

F. 2d 905, 909 (4th Cir. 1965); ABA Formal Opinion 30. For that 

reason it is considered unethical for an active prosecutor to represent 

criminal defendants in his o r her own or another jurisdiction. See ABA 

Formal Opinions 30, 34, 118, 142. Similarly, it is considered unethical 

for an attorney or his associates 5 to attack the result of his professional 

efforts on behalf of a former private or governmental employer. ABA 

Formal Opinions 33, 64, 71. Finally, the rule would prohibit an attorney who is temporarily absent from his employer, with arrangements

5 D R 5 - 105(D) provides:

If a law yer is required to decline em ploym ent or to w ithdraw from employment 

under a D isciplinary Rule, n o partner, or associate, or any other law yer affiliated 

w ith him or his firm, may accept or continue employment.

W hile this rule clearly applies to colleagues with whom the law yer shares a common 

financial interest, it also serves to prevent even the possible appearance o f conflicting 

loyalties o r disclosure o f confidences within a group o f law yers w ho practice together. 

See A B A Form al Opinions 16, 33, 49, 296, 306; Inform al Opinion 1235.

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made for his return, from representing interests adverse to those of the 

permanent employer. ABA Formal Opinion 192.®

In a recent opinion,7 the ABA considered the propriety of a military 

legal office providing both prosecution and defense counsel in the same 

court-martial. It was willing to approve the arrangement only if individual attorneys were assigned, as far as practicable, exclusively to 

prosecution or defense work. It stated that “performance of adverse 

roles in succeeding cases within the same jurisdiction, even though the 

cases themselves may be entirely unrelated, will involve lawyers in 

potentially awkward situations.” The opinion continued:

Depending on whether a lawyer is cast in a defense or prosecutorial role, he may be required to frame and advocate interpretations 

of established rules of law or procedure that are, or seem to be, 

poles apart. He may be required to criticize police actions in one 

case, then turn about to defend the same or similar actions in a 

subsequent case where the facts may be, or seem to be, the same. 

He will deal frequently with the same investigative or police personnel; he may appear before the same [judges]. In the course of 

this, the temptations may be great to mute the force of advocacy, 

or adjust the handling of cases in subtle ways.

The opinion also noted that an appearance of impropriety would be 

created, in violation of Canon 9, when the same attorney represented 

the prosecution and the defense in succeeding cases.

It is certainly open to argument that any temporary exchange of 

attorneys between a U.S. Attorney’s Office and a Federal Public Defender’s Office would create conflicting loyalties in violation of Canon 

5 and DR 5 -105(A). The interests of the respective offices serving in 

the same district are plainly adverse. Even if the participants in an 

exchange program were sent to other districts, they would still be 

involved in creating precedent adverse to the interests served by their 

permanent employers. The possibility that they would maintain a conscious or subliminal loyalty to the permanent employer is enhanced by 

the fact that both the Department of Justice and the Federal Public 

Defender Offices have considerable discretion in the pay and promotion 

of their attorneys.8 It would be difficult to avoid the appearance that a

* In Formal Opinion 192, the question was w hether a law yer tem porarily employed full 

time by the government could remain a member o f his form er law firm if he received no 

compensation from it. T he opinion concluded that he could remain a member o f the firm 

only “so long as the firm refrains from representing interests adverse to the em ployer.”

7 ABA Informal Opinion 1235 (August 24, 1972). Accord: Goodson v. Payton, supra, at 908. 

908.

8 See 18 U.S.C. § 3306A(h)(2)(A); 28 U.S.C. § 548; 28 C F R § 0.15(b)(3)(ii).

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public defender, who is on temporary assignment from a prosecutor’s 

office that controls his immediate professional future, might be deliberately or unconsciously devoting less than his best efforts to the defense 

of his clients. The same would, of course, be true of a public defender 

assigned to the Department.9

The exception to DR 5 -105(A) contained in DR 5 -105(C)10 would 

not appear to apply here. Assuming that “multiple clients” within the 

meaning of the rule include successive clients with differing interests, 

the exception applies only when it is “obvious” that the lawyer can 

adequately represent the interest of each client and all clients have 

given their fully informed consent. Given the conflict between the 

interests represented by U.S. Attorneys and the Federal Public Defenders and the control they have over the pay and promotion of their 

subordinates, it is by no means obvious that an attorney temporarily 

attached to the one would not retain some permanent loyalty to the 

other. Moreover, the need to obtain the informed consent of a defendant whenever an Assistant U.S. Attorney is assigned to him could limit 

considerably the number o f cases in which he could participate.

Effective Assistance of Counsel

Finally, the temporary assignment of an Assistant U.S. Attorney as 

defense counsel would also present a problem with respect to a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. It is 

well settled that effective assistance has not been provided “if counsel, 

unknown to the accused, and without his knowledgeable assent, is in a 

duplictous position where his full talents—as a vigorous advocate 

having the single aim of acquittal by all fair and honorable means—are 

hobbled or fettered, or restrained by commitments to others.” 11 The 

Fourth Circuit, moreover, has held that the possibility of “subliminal or 

concealed” influences is so great that the assignment of a prosecutor as 

defense counsel without the consent of the accused is per se a denial of 

the right to counsel.12 It should also be noted that the Third Circuit, in

• T here appear to be no published ethics opinions o f the ABA or other organizations 

concerning the exchange program s that are being conducted in several States.

10 D R 5-105(C) provides:

In the situations covered by D R 5 - 105(A) . . . a law yer may represent multiple 

clients if it is obvious that h e can adequately represent the interest o f each and if 

each consents to the representation after full disclosure o f the possible effect o f such 

representation on the exercise of his independent professional judgm ent on behalf o f 

each.

11 Porter v. United States, 298 F . 2d 461, 463 (5th Cir. 1962). Accord: United States v. 

Jeffers, 520 F. 2d 1256 (7th Cir. 1975); United States el rel Hart v. Davenport, 478 F. 2d 

203 (3d Cir. 1974); Goodson v. Payton, 351 F. 2d 905 (4th Cir. 1965). See, generally. Glosser

v. United States, 315 U.S. 60(1942).

11 Goodson v. Payton, 351 F. 2d 905, 908-09 (4th Cir. 1965) supra. The case arose from 

the Virginia practice, since discontinued, o f assigning the prosecuting attorney o f one 

rural county as defense counsel in other counties if no local attorney was available. Id. at 

906-07; see, also, Yates v. Payton, 378 F. 2d 57 (4th Cir. 1967).

T h e Sixth C ircuit has declined to adopt a per se rule. See, Dawson v. Cowan, 531 F. 2d 

1374, 1376 (6th Cir. 1976); Harris v. Thomas, 311 F. 2d 560, 561 (6th Cir. 1965).

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obiter dictum, has defined “normal competency” of counsel for Sixth 

Amendment purposes to include “such adherence to ethical standards 

with respect to avoiding conflicting interests as is generally expected 

from the bar.” 13

It seems to us that on the basis of these cases an Assistant U.S. 

Attorney serving temporarily as a public defender could not constitutionally be assigned to a defendant without his informed consent. Regardless of the outcome of litigation on this point, the possibility impairs the usefulness of any assistant participating in an exchange program.

In conclusion, it is our opinion that the statutes governing conflicts of 

interest and the Department’s Standards of Conduct do not as such 

prohibit the temporary assignment of Assistant U.S. Attorneys to 

Public Defender Organizations as defense counsel in criminal cases. 

However, under both the Code of Professional Responsiblity and case 

law concerning effective assistance of counsel, any assistant so assigned 

could not represent a defendant without obtaining his informed consent 

after complete disclosure of his apparent conflicting interests. There is 

also precedent from one Federal circuit that would appear to make it a 

per se denial of effective assistance of counsel for an Assistant U.S. 

Attorney to be assigned to a defendant. In our opinion, the requirement 

of disclosure and consent and the risk of direct or collateral attack on 

convictions in which a participating Assistant U.S. Attorney was involved, may seriously impair the usefulness of any exchange program 

involving Assistant U.S. Attorneys.

J o h n M . H a r m o n

Acting Assistant Attorney General

Office o f Legal Counsel

13 United States ex rel. Hart Davenport. 478, F. 2d 203, 210 (3d Cir., 1974).

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