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******************************************************IN RE SYDNEI V.* (AC 38627)
Lavine, Mullins and Harper, Js. Argued April 5—officially released September 15, 2016** (Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of Middlesex, Child Protection Session at Middletown, Hon. Barbara M. Quinn, judge trial referee.)
David J. Reich, for the appellant (respondent). BenjaminM. Wattenmaker, assignedcounsel, forthe appellee (petitioner). GeorgeJepsen, attorneygeneral, Gregory T. D’Auria, solicitor general, and Benjamin Zivyon and Carolyn Signoralli, assistant attorneys general, filed a brief for the Commissioner of Children and Families as amicus curiae.Opinion LAVINE, J. The respondent mother appeals from the judgment of the trial court terminating her parental rights in her daughter (child) pursuant to General Statutes § 45a-717 (g) (2) (A), abandonment, and § 45a-717 (g) (2) (C), no ongoing parent-child relationship.1 On appeal, therespondentclaimsthatthe court (1)violated her right to due process by failing to determine, during the dispositional phase of the termination of parental rights proceeding, that there would be some adverse effect to the child by failing to terminate her parental rights in the child, (2) erred in finding that it was in the child’s best interests to terminate the respondent’s parental rights as to the child, and (3) committed plain
error by failing to canvass her prior to trial as required by In re YasielR., 317 Conn. 773, 120 A.3d 1188 (2015) (Yasiel canvass), and In re Daniel N., 163 Conn. App. 322, 135 A.3d 1260, cert. granted, Conn. , A.3d (2016).2 We disagree and, therefore, affirm thejudgment of the trial court.
In its memorandum ofdecision, the court, Hon. BarbaraM. Quinn, judge trial referee, made the following findings of fact. J.V. and his wife, K.V., are the child’s legal guardians (guardians).3 In December, 2014, in the Court of Probate for the District of Danbury, the petitioner, J.V., filedan applicationto terminatethe respondent’s parental rights, pursuant to General Statutes § 45a-717. The application allegedthatthe respondent’s parental rights should be terminated on the ground of abandonment; General Statutes § 45a-717 (g) (2) (A); and no ongoing parent-child relationship; General Statutes § 45a-717 (g) (2) (C).4 Pursuant to a motion filed by counsel for the child, the matter was transferred to the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters. See General Statutes § 45a-715. The trial was conducted between October 5 and October 8, 2015.
The respondent and the child’s father had dated one anotherwhile they were in high school. They later married and had one child who is the subject ofthe present terminationproceeding. The childwasbornin2005. The couple’s relationship was marked by domesticviolence and alcohol abuse. In 2006, they were living apart from
one another. Despite their differences, the couple tried to ‘‘patch things up.’’ One evening they went out to dinner and were involved in a serious motor vehicle crash. The child’s father was killed at the scene, and the respondent suffered serious injuries. The accident investigation concluded that the respondent and the child’sfatherwereintoxicatedwithbloodalcohollevels in excess of the legal limit.
The respondent subsequently married G.U. with whom she has a son, Z. The respondent’s relationship with G.U. also was characterized by domestic violence, and drug and alcohol abuse. The child and Z wereexposedto agreatdeal ofturbulence. As aconsequence of their domestic violence, the respondent and G.U.
were arrested on numerous occasions. Although the respondent reported that G.U. instigated the violence, the court found that the respondent was the primary aggressor. In January, 2010, the respondent was so angry that she attacked G.U. with a knife and tried to cut his face. The child, who was five years old at the time, was awakened from sleep by the fracas. She still recalled the incident at the time of trial.
OnJanuary 17, 2010, the Department ofChildren and Families (department) obtained an order oftemporary custody and removed both children from the care of respondent and G.U. and placed them with the guardians. The childwas adjudicatedneglected onNovember 22, 2010, and placed in the guardians’ care.5 When the child entered the guardians’ home, she was terrified of knives, including the mere mention of them. She was shy, withdrawn, anxious, and suffered night terrors. When she was traveling in a motor vehicle, the child became nervous and fearful that the respondent was following and would take her away. The guardians placedherintherapy, whichwas ofsomebenefitto her.
At the time of the neglect proceedings, the court, Sommer, J., ordered once-a-week visitation between the respondent and the child and joint counseling for them. The therapist was to work with the respondent and the child to improve their relationship and expand visitation and was authorized to make recommendations regarding the progress, duration, and frequency,
as well as the supervision, of the visits between the respondent and the child. The hoped-for normalization oftheparent-childrelationshipbetweentherespondent and the child did not take place due to the trauma the child had suffered as a result of the constant violence in her parental home. The child did not want to talk about her life with the respondent, even five years later at the time of the termination of parental rights trial.
The respondent and the child had scheduled visitation during the first year and one-half following the transfer of guardianship. The child was anxious, however, and her symptoms increased prior to each visit. It was difficult to schedule the time and location ofthe visits. The guardians asked the respondent to provide adequate notice so that they could prepare the child emotionally to be ready for the visit. The respondent often gave notice at the last minute, after the child had gone to bed for the night, which made it difficult for the guardians to prepare her for the visit, which took place at restaurants, in the community, and in parks. Sometimes Z or the court appointed guardian ad litem attended the visits. On the way to the visits, the child complained of having a stomach ache and that she neededto throwup. The visits lastedfor approximately
one hour, sometimes longer. Often the child wishedthevisits to be shortened. Occasionally, the respondent brought the child a gift. Once, the respondent took the child to a ‘‘Build-a-Bear’’ store, where she purchased a teddy bear for the child. When the child returned to the guardians’ home, she wanted to throw out the bear. By early 2012, the visits between the respondent and the child were sporadic and far between. The two were
no longer were engaged injoint therapy, and the therapist did not recommend increasing the amount oftime the respondent spent with the child.
In March, 2012, the respondent filed a motion for increased visitation. The parties reached an agreement that, afterthree individualtherapysessions, the respondent could have therapeutic visits with the child. The respondent, however, failedto attendthethreerequired therapy sessions, and all visits ceased. The respondent last visited the child on April 9, 2012. The respondent and child have had no contact since then.
The respondent claimed that she failed to continue therapy and engage in therapeutic visits with the child for financial reasons. She had no insurance and inadequate income from her employment. The court found
no evidence that the respondent made any attempt to seek therapy on a sliding pay scale or to ask for help from others, such as the guardian ad litem, to find affordable therapy. She made only a minimal effort to complywiththe court-ordered conditions forincreased
access to the child.
In addition to failing to find means by which she could increase her access to the child, the respondent did not take advantage of other avenues open to her that would demonstrate her commitment to the child. The respondent provided no financial support for the childnordidshesendthe childlettersorgifts. Shefailed to inquire about the child’s school progress, medical appointments, or her life in general. The court found that whatever her level of concern may have been, the respondentfailedto manifest itin aconcrete mannerto inform herself about the child’s daily life and progress. The respondent filed another motion forvisitation in December, 2013. The department investigated and filed
avisitationreportdatedJuly7, 2014. Afterreviewingthe historyandthe child’srelationshipwiththerespondent, the department did not recommend visitation.
Court-ordered psychological evaluations of both the respondent and the child were performed in October, 2014, byDeborahGruen, aclinicalandforensicpsychologist. Theguardiansalsowereinterviewed. Onthebasis of Gruen’s testimony at trial, the court found that the respondent was an emotionally sensitive person who has a propensity for unstable relationships. She can be irritable, demanding, and charming at the same time, is manipulative in herrelationships, and exercises poor judgment. Although Gruen did not provide a diagnosis,shefoundthattherespondentexhibitsantisocialbehaviorandborderline personalitytraits. She recommended that the respondent receive intensive psychotherapy with a seasoned clinician to deal with the trauma the respondentherselfhas experienced, both as achild and in her adultrelationships.6 Without intensive treatment, Gruen’s prognosis for the respondent is guarded. Because the respondent was pregnant in November, 2014, Gruen recommended that the respondent wait at least six months before entering therapeutic intervention. Thisperiod oftime was neededto give the respondent time to adjust to all ofthe significant changes that
were coming to her life.
The court asked Gruen to answer additional questions, whichshe didinAugust, 2015. Gruensummarized the treatment the respondent had received and results ofthe conversation she had withthe respondent’s clinician. By the end ofJuly, 2015, the respondent had had twenty-two sessions oftherapy and had made substantial strides to address her long-standing trauma-related issues. The respondent has stable employment with considerable management responsibilities and has custody ofheryoungest child. Z is in her care severaltimes
a week, but his father is his primary caretaker. The respondent is beginning the difficult introspection and emotional work that she needs to improve herself for the sake of her children as well as herself. The court found that the respondent’s changes came about after the child had been out ofthe respondent’s primary care for five years. Accordingto Gruen, the childhas onlybad memories of life with the respondent, and she does not wish to
see or interact with her. The child suffers underlying anxiety and needs to strengthen her ability to acknowledge her anxieties and address her fears on a more realistic basis. The therapist did not recommend that the child visit with the respondent until the respondent hadundertakenintensive therapy. Inthe spring of2015, the child was in therapy, having been diagnosed with posttraumatic stress, as a result of the trauma she has witnessed. The child’s therapist echoed Gruen’s concern about the child’s building a relationship with the respondent. Children in her situation are very cautious, hostile, and estranged. The therapist could not predict what would happen if the child and respondent met,
as there could be widely different outcomes. As the child grows, however, the therapist opinedthat she will need some access to the respondent; children who are inthe child’s situation grow-up ‘‘missing apart ofthemselves,’’ which is necessary for their stable, balanced, and mature adult development.7
The court found, according to the guardian ad litem, that in 2011, the child wasvery anxious and uncomfortable whenever the respondent was mentioned. The child wanted to remain with the guardians, and herattitude was unchanged in 2015. She is settled in the guardians’ home where she is a happy and loving ten yearold, whoisenthusiasticaboutschoolandthethings that she does with her family. In the opinion of the guardian ad litem, termination of the respondent’s parental rights is in the best interest of the child.
The court analyzed the facts and the grounds alleged for termination of the respondent’s parental rights in the child in the adjudicatory phase ofthe proceedings. As to the ground of abandonment alleged pursuant to § 45a-717 (g) (2) (A),8 the court notedthat the appellate courts of this state have held that ‘‘[t]he commonly understood general obligations of parenthood entail these minimum attributes: (1) [the expression of] love and affection for the child; (2) [the expression of] personal concern over the health, education and general well-being ofthe child; (3) the dutyto supplythe necessary food, clothing, and medical care; (4) the duty to provide an adequate domicile; and (5) the duty to furnish social and religious guidance.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Kezia M., 33 Conn. App. 12, 18, 632 A.2d 112, cert. denied, 228 Conn. 915, 636 A.2d 847 (1993).
Abandonment has been defined as a parent’s failure to maintain a reasonable degree ofinterest, concern or responsibility as to the welfare of the child, and maintain implies acontinuing, reasonable degree ofinterest, concern, or responsibility and not merely a sporadic showing thereof. See In re Paul M., 148 Conn. App. 654, 664, 85 A.3d 1263, cert. denied, 311 Conn. 938, 88 A.3d 550 (2014).
On the basis of the clear and convincing evidence before the court, it found that the respondent had not demonstrated the minimum attributes of parenthood
astheyareunderstoodinthelaw. Shehasnotexpressed love and affection toward the child in any meaningful way and has failed to inquire about the child’s health, education, and general well-being, and has not made any effort to provide financial support for the child. Although the court did not doubt that in her heart, the respondent loves the child and wishes that she could visit with her, the respondent is aware that the child doesnotwishto have contactwithher. The courtfound that the respondent is wise enough not to force contact with the child.
The court credited the respondent with good intentions, but noted that thoughts and wishes are insufficient to sustain a child. The court found that the respondent had choices to make in the five years since the child left her care. On three separate occasions, in 2010, 2012, and 2014, the respondent was offered visits with the child if she entered therapy. It was not until 2014 that the respondent began the arduous process of making positive changes in her life. Although the respondent has made sufficient progress to enable herto have her two younger children9 in her care on a regular basis, that progress has been too little and too late for the child who is the subject of the present termination of parental rights petition.
The respondent failed to write to the child or to send her gifts. She failed to communicate with the guardians
as to the child’s well-being. Although the respondent believes that the guardians prevented her from doing so, she failed to reach out to take advantage of the
resources available to her, such as the child’s guardian ad litem and attorney. The court concluded that the clear and convincing evidence of respondent’s failures constitutes legal abandonment. Although acourt needfind only one statutoryground to terminate parental rights in achild; seeInreAlexander C., 67 Conn. App. 417, 427, 787 A.2d 608 (2001), aff’d, 262 Conn. 308, 813A.2d87 (2003); the courtadjudicated the second reason alleged by the petitioner. To grant a termination of parental rights petition on the ground that there is no ongoing parent-child relationship pursuant to § 45-717 (g) (2) (C),10 the court must find that no parent-child relationship exists and that looking prospectively, it would be detrimental to the child’sbestinterestto allowtimeforsucharelationship to develop. See In re Christian P., 98 Conn. App. 264, 269, 907A.2d 1261 (2006). In the present case, the court found that there is no remaining parent-child relationship between the respondent and the child; it evaporatedinthe longperiod oftime inwhichthe respondent had no contact with the child. The critical issue, the court found, was whetherit is detrimental to the child’s bestinteresttopermitmoretime forsucharelationship to develop.
The court found that the child is happy and secure in the guardians’ home and her school. The mere mention ofthe respondentupsetsthe child. The childhasno positive memories of the respondent. Permitting more time in the child’s young life for such a relationship to develop is detrimental to the child’s best interest when the childhasbeen out ofthe respondent’s care formore than one half ofher life. The court concluded from the clear and convincing evidence that the petitioner had proven that there was no ongoing parent child relationship and that it was not in the child’s best interest to permit more time for such a relationship to develop.
Thecourtthenmadethestatutoryfindingsrequiredin the dispositionalphase ofthe proceedings. See General Statutes § 45a-717 (h). The courtfoundthatthe dispositional factors all pointed toward a finding that termination of parental rights was in the child’s best interest. The child is in crucial need of safety, stability, and permanency, which the respondent is not in a position to provide. The court concluded on the basis of the clear and convincing evidence that termination of the respondent’s parental rights is in the child’s best inter-est. Additional facts will be set out as necessary. Before addressingthe respondent’s claims on appeal,
we set forth ‘‘the well established legal framework for deciding termination of parental rights petitions. [A] hearing on a petition to terminate parental rights consists of two phases: the adjudicatory phase and the dispositional phase. During the adjudicatory phase, the trial court must determine whether one or more ofthe

. . . grounds for termination ofparental rights set forth in [§ 45-717 (g)] existsbyclearandconvincingevidence.

. . . If the trial court determines that a statutory ground for termination exists, then it proceeds to the dispositionalphase. During the dispositional phase, the trial courtmust determinewhetherterminationis inthe best interests of the child.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Elijah G.-R., 167 Conn. App. 1, 18–19, A.3d (2016).
I
The respondent’s first claim is that ‘‘procedural due process requires the court to determine in the dispositional phase that there are adverse effects on the child that outweigh the mother’s constitutionally protected parental rights before those rights canbe terminated.’’11 This claim, which is in derogation of § 45a-717 (h), is made up of whole cloth, and we reject it.
Our legislature has created a constitutionally viable statutory scheme to be followed by our courts when adjudicating petitions to terminate the parental rights of parents in their children. General Statutes §§ 45a717 and 17a-212,12 which are applicable in the Probate Court and Superior Court respectively, consist of ‘‘two phases, adjudication and disposition.

. . . In the adjudicatory phase, the trial court determines whether one of the statutory grounds for termination of parental rights

. . . exists by clear and convincing evidence. If the trial court determines that a statutory ground for termination exists, it proceeds to the dispositional phase. In the dispositional phase, the trial court determines whether termination is in the best interests of the child.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Trevon G., 109 Conn. App. 782, 788, 952 A.2d 1280 (2008). In the present case, the court found that the petitionerhadprovedby clearand convincing evidence the grounds alleged fortermination ofthe respondent’s parental rights in the child. On appeal, the respondent does not challenge the court’s findings and conclusions inthe adjudicatorystage ofthe terminationproceeding. Rather, the respondent claims that her right to procedural due process wasviolatedbecause the courtfailed to perform a balancing test pursuant to Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335, 96 S. Ct. 893, 47 L. Ed. 2d 18 (1976), to determinethe adverse effects ofthe failure to terminate herparental rights on the child against her constitutionally protected right to raise her child. Such
an analysis in this case is unwarranted as the statutoryscheme passes constitutional muster. See In reNevaeh W., 317 Conn. 723, 740, 120A.3d 1177 (2015); InreEden F., 250 Conn. 674, 690–91, 741 A.2d 873 (1999).
Section § 45a-717 (h) sets forth six guidelines that the court must consider and on which it must make written findings, and our Supreme Court has determined that this statutory provision is the guide to determining the best interest ofthe child. The statutory scheme ‘‘carefully sets out

. . . [the] situations that, in the judgment of the legislature, constitute countervailing interests sufficiently powerful tojustify the termination ofparental rights in the absence of consent.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Eden F., supra, 250 Conn. 689. Nothing in § 45a-717 (h), which relates to the best interest of the child in the dispositionalphase ofthe terminationproceeding, requiresthe court to engage in a Mathews balancing analysis or to find a detriment to the child if termination of parental rights is not granted.
The respondent relies on Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 754, 102 S. Ct. 1388, 71 L. Ed. 2d 599 (1982). Santoskydoesnotsupportherposition. ‘‘Afterthe State has establishedparentalunfitness attheintitalproceeding, the court may assume at the dispositional stage that the interests of the child and the natural parents do diverge.’’ (Emphasis omitted.) Id., 760. Inthe dispositional phase ofa termination proceeding, the emphasis shifts ‘‘from the conduct ofthe parent to the best interest of the child.’’ In re Romance M., 229 Conn. 345, 356–57, 641 A.2d 378 (1994). As the commissioner has pointed out in herbrief, the respondent’s claim, in actuality, is not related to procedural due process. Rather, the respondent seeks to add a substantive requirement to the statutory scheme enacted by our legislature. In other words, the respondent’s claim is related to substantive, notprocedural, dueprocess. SeeInreAzareon Y., 309 Conn. 626, 640, 72A.3d 1074 (2013) (ourSupreme Court observed that similar claim was one of substantive, not procedural, due process). For the foregoing reasons, the respondent’s claim fails.
II
The respondent’s second claim is that the trial court erred by finding that there was clear and convincing evidence that it was in the child’s best interestto terminate the respondent’s parental rights in her.13 We do not agree. The substance of the respondent’s claim is that the evidence presented as to the dispositional phase of the terminationproceedingwasmarginal. She correctly notes that the child has been in a safe and stable home since 2010, and that the respondent has done nothing tojeopardizetheplacementandisnotseekingreunification. She argues, therefore, that because the child is in
a stable, permanent placement and the respondent isnotnegativelyaffectingthatplacement, thereisno clear and convincing evidence thatherparentalrights should be terminated because it is in the best interest of the child. To support her claim, the respondent points to Gruen’s testimony that the child, at some time in the future, may benefit from contact with the respondent. The respondent’s argument is unavailing. ‘‘The best interests of the child include the child’s interests in sustained growth, development, well-being, and continuity and stability ofits environment.’’ (Internal quotationmarks omitted.) InreShyinaB., 58 Conn. App. 159, 167, 752A.2d 1139 (2000). ‘‘Inthe dispositional phase of a termination of parental rights hearing, the trial court must determine whether it is established by clear and convincing evidence that the continuation of the respondent’s parental rights is not in the best interest of the child.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Jermaine S., 86 Conn. App. 819, 835, 863 A.2d 720, cert. denied, 273 Conn. 938, 875 A.2d 43 (2005). In making that determination, the court must considerthe factors delineated in § 45a-717 (h).14
The court made the following findings of fact with respect to the dispositional phase of the proceedings. The department was involved with the respondent, the child, and Z atthe time the childrenwere removedfrom her care. The department’s involvement terminated when the child’s guardianship was transferred to the guardians. The department saw no child protection issues following the transfer of guardianship. Thereafter, the department had no obligation to offer the respondent services.
At the time the child’s guardianship was transferred, the court ordered visits between the respondent and the child, but the respondent did not comply with the order. The guardians did complybyofferingthe respondent visits with the child.
At the time ofthe termination hearing, the child was ten years old and had no relationship with the respondent. She is an anxious child and becomes concerned whenever the respondent is mentioned. The child has
no fond memories of the respondent and wishes to remain permanently in the guardians’ home and to be adopted by them.
The respondent failed to make adequate efforts to have the child returned to her home. She abandoned the child and failed to communicate with the guardians in any meaningful way. At the time of the termination of parental rights proceeding, the respondent was engaged in therapy and had made significant strides, but those strides were too late for the child, who had grown deeply attached to others. A child’s sense of time is not the same as an adult’s. Most of the child’s conscious life has been spent with her guardians, not the respondent.The court found that, although the respondent believes that the guardians have prevented her from having reasonable visits with the child, the evidence demonstrates that the respondent failed to take the steps she should have taken to maintain access to the child. Althoughtherespondent’spasteconomic circumstances have made her life more challenging, those circumstances, in and of themselves, did not prevent her from maintaining a reasonable relationship with the child. ‘‘It is axiomatic that a trial court’s factual findings
are accordedgreat deference. Accordingly, anappellate tribunalwillnotdisturb atrial court’sfindingthattermination of parental rights is in a child’s best interest unless that finding is clearly erroneous.

. . . A finding is clearly erroneous when either there is no evidence in the record to support it, or the reviewing court is left with the definite and firm conviction that amistake has been made.

. . . [E]very reasonable presumption is made in favor of the trial court’s ruling.

. . . Additionally, in reviewing the court’s findings under the dispositional phase of the proceedings, it is appropriate to readthe trial court’s opinion as awhole, including its findings in the adjudicatory phase.’’ (Citations omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In
re Elijah G.-R., supra, 167 Conn. App. 29–30.
We carefullyhave reviewedthe court’smemorandum ofdecision, includingitsfactualfindingsintheadjudicatoryphase oftheproceedings, andreviewedthe record. We conclude that the court’s finding that termination ofthe respondent’sparentalrights is inthe bestinterest ofthe child is not clearly erroneous. Atthe time oftrial, the child had resided with her guardians for approximately five years, she is anxious and fearful of the respondent, and she does not want to visit with her. In fact, there have been no visits between the respondent andthe childforan extendedperiod oftime. The underlying facts support the court’s conclusion that the anxious child who is the subject ofthe terminationpetition is inneed ofstabilityandpermanency andthattermination of the respondent’s parental rights is in her best interest. The respondent’s claim therefore fails.
III
The respondent’s third claim, which she raised for the first time during oral argument in this court, is that the court committed plain error by failing to canvass her prior to trial as required by In re Yasiel R., supra, 317 Conn. 773. She argues that we should reverse the judgment ofthe trial court pursuant to In reDanielN., supra, 163 Conn. App. 322.15 We decline to grant the reliefrequestedbecausethis caseisprocedurallydistinguishable from In re Daniel N.,16 and on appeal, the respondenthasnot demonstratedthatfailureto reverse the court’sjudgment terminating her parental rights inthe child will result in manifest injustice and erode the public’s confidence in the integrity of the judicial system. The record demonstrates that at trial, the respondent exercised all of the rights of which the Yasiel canvass was intended to inform her.
We briefly review the history of the pretrial canvass ofrespondent parents in termination ofparental rights
cases as established inInre YasielR., supra, 317 Conn. 773. In that case, the respondent mother waived her right to a trial and did not contest the allegations ofthe petitionto terminate herparental rights in her children, challengetheevidencepresentedagainsther, orpresent evidence of her own.17 Id., 775–76. After the trial court terminated the mother’s parental rights in her children, she appealed to this court, which affirmed the judgments ofthe trial court. In re YasielR., 151 Conn. App. 710, 721, 94 A.3d 1278 (2014), rev’d, 317 Conn. 773, 120 A.3d 1168 (2015). Our Supreme Court granted her petition for certification to appeal from the judgment ofthis court. Inre YasielR., 314 Conn. 907, 99A.3d 1169 (2014).18 In resolving the appeal, our Supreme Court concluded pursuant to its analysis under Mathews v. Eldridge, supra, 424 U.S. 335, that due process ‘‘does not require that a trial court canvass a respondent who is represented by counsel when the respondent does not testify or present witnesses and the respondent’s attorney does not object to exhibits or cross-examine witnesses.’’ In re Yasiel R., supra, 317 Conn. 787–88.
The court, however, considered whether it should exercise its supervisory authority to require a canvass prior to a termination of parental rights trial. Id., 788. The court concluded that ‘‘the lack of a canvass of all parents in a parental rights termination trial may give the appearance ofunfairness insofar as it may indicate
alack ofconcern overaparent’s rights andunderstanding of the consequences of the proceeding. Therefore, [it] conclude[d] that public confidence in the integrity of the judicial system would be enhanced by a rule requiring a brief canvass of all parents immediately before aparentalrightsterminationtrial so asto ensure that the parents understand the trial process, their rights during the trial and the potential consequences.’’ Id., 793–94. The court, therefore, invoked its ‘‘supervisorypowers to enunciate arule that is not constitutionally required but that [it thought] is preferable as a matter of policy.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 793.
The court outlinedthe following canvass ofarespondent in a termination of parental rights proceeding to be undertaken prior to a termination ofparental rights trial. ‘‘In the canvass, the respondent should be advised of: (1) the nature of the termination of parental rights proceeding and the legal effect thereof if a judgment is entered terminating parental rights; (2) the respondent’s right to defend against the accusations; (3) therespondent’s right to confront and cross-examine witnesses; (4) the respondent’srightto objecttothe admission of exhibits; (5) the respondent’s right to present evidence opposing the allegations; (6) the respondent’s right to representation by counsel; (7) the respondent’s right to testify on his or her own behalf; and (8) if the respondent does not intend to testify, he or she should also be advised that if requested by the petitioner, or the court is so inclined, the court may take an adverse inference from his or her failure to testify, and explain the significance of that inference. Finally, the respondentshouldbe advisedthatifhe orshe doesnotpresent any witnesses on his or her behalf, object to exhibits,
or cross-examine witnesses, the court will decide the matterbasedupon evidence presented duringtrial. The court should then inquire whether the respondent understands his or her rights and whether there are any questions.’’ Id., 795.
Our Supreme Court issued its decision inInre Yasiel R. on August 18, 2015. Trial in the present termination of parental rights case was held on October 5, 6, and 8, 2015, a bit more than a month after In re Yasiel R.
was decided. The court in the present case, therefore, should have canvassed the respondent before the commencement of trial, but did not. Neither of the parties brought the omission to the attention of the court,19 and the respondent did not file a motion for nonsuit or
a motion to open the judgment. The respondent also did not raise a claim concerning a Yasiel canvass in herappealorinitialbriefinthiscourt. Rathershewaited until the time of oral argument before this court to requestsupplementalbriefingontheissue. Seefootnote 2 of this opinion.
In her supplemental brief, the respondent tacitly acknowledged that her claim regarding the lack of a Yasiel canvass was unpreserved by requesting that the terminationjudgmentbe reversed pursuantto the plain
error doctrine and In re Daniel N., supra, 163 Conn. App. 322. In re Daniel N., however, is distinguishable inthatthetrial courtinthat caseterminatedthe respondent’sparentalrightspriorto ourSupreme Court’s decision in In re Yasiel R

.20 This court decided the In re Daniel N. appeal on which the respondent relies after
our Supreme Court issued its decision In re Yasiel R. The question in the In reDanielN. appeal in this court
was whetherIn re YasielR. should be applied retroactively to reverse the termination of parental rights of the respondent in that case.21 That is not the situation in the present case in which trial took place after In
re YasielR. was decided. The question before us is not whetherInre YasielR. should be applied retroactively, but whetherthejudgmentterminating the respondent’s parental rights should be reversed on the basis ofplain
error. This court did no harmful error analysis in In re DanielN. See footnote 20 ofthis opinion. We conclude thatthejudgmentterminatingtherespondent’sparentalrights should not be reversed because the respondent has failed to demonstrate that a failure to do so would result in manifest injustice.
We begin with the well established legal framework for claims of plain error. ‘‘[The plain error] doctrine, codified at Practice Book § 60-5, is an extraordinary remedy used by appellate courts to rectify errors committed at trial that, although unpreserved, are of such monumentalproportionthattheythreatento erode our system ofjustice andworkaserious andmanifestinjustice on the aggrieved party. [T]he plain error doctrine

. . . is not

. . . a rule of reviewability. It is a rule of reversibility. That is, it is a doctrine that this court invokes in order to rectify a trial court ruling that, although either not properly preserved or never raised at all in the trial court, nonetheless requires reversal ofthe trial court’sjudgment, for reasons ofpolicy.

. . . In addition, the plain error doctrine is reservedfortruly extraordinary situation [in which] the existence of the
error is so obvious that it affects the fairness and integrityofandpublicconfidenceinthejudicialproceedings.

. . . Plain error is a doctrine that should be invoked sparingly.

. . . Implicit in this very demanding standard is the notion

. . . that invocation of the plain
error doctrine is reserved for occasions requiring the reversal of the judgment under review.

. . . [Thus, an appellant] cannot prevail under [the plain error doctrine]

. . . unless he demonstrates that the claimed
error is both so clear and so harmful that a failure to
reverse the judgment would result in manifest injustice.

. . . ‘‘[Our Supreme Court has] clarified the two step frameworkunderwhichwereviewclaimsofplainerror. First, we must determine whether the trial court in fact committed an error and, if it did, whether that error
wasindeedplaininthe sensethatitispatent [or] readily discernible on the face of a factually adequate record, [and] also

. . . obvious in the sense of not debatable.

. . . [T]his inquiry entails a relatively high standard, underwhichitisnotenoughforthe [respondent] simply to demonstrate that his position is correct. Rather, [to prevail] the party [claiming] plain error [reversal] must demonstrate thatthe claimed impropriety was so clear, obvious and indisputable as to warrant the extraordinary remedy of reversal.

. . . ‘‘In addition, although a clear and obvious mistake
onthepartofthetrial courtis aprerequisiteforreversal under the plain error doctrine, such a finding is not, without more, sufficient to warrant the application of the doctrine. Because [a] party cannot prevail under plain error unless it has demonstrated that the failure to grant relief will result in manifest injustice

. . . under the second prong ofthe analysis we must determine whether the consequences of the error are so grievous as to be fundamentally unfair or manifestlyunjust.

. . . Only if both prongs of the analysis are satisfiedcanthe appealingpartyobtainrelief.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Zuberi v. Commissioner of Correction, 140 Conn. App. 839, 843–44, 60 A.3d 337, cert. denied, 308 Conn. 931, 64 A.3d 330 (2013).
The substance of the respondent’s claim on appeal is that because the court failed to canvass her prior to the termination of parental rights trial, a manifest injustice occurred; but she has failed to demonstrate that such an injustice occurred. Although it was error for the court to fail to conduct a Yasiel canvass of the respondent prior to trial, the respondent has provided
no analysis as to how that failure deprived her of the trial rights to which she was entitled. ‘‘[M]erely demonstrating that a trial court has violated a supervisory mandate is not alone enough to warrant a reversal.’’ In
re Leilah W., 166 Conn. App. 48, 63, A.3d (2016);
see State v. Sanchez, 308 Conn. 64, 77–78, 60 A.3d 271 (2013); see also State v. Smith, 275 Conn. 205, 237, 881 A.2d 160 (2005) (whether trial court’s failure to obey supervisoryauthorityofSupreme Courtresultsinmanifest injustice must be considered on case specific, factbased inquiry).
State v. Smith, supra, 275 Conn. 205, is instructive ‘‘because it demonstrates that a trial court’s failure to comply with a supervisory rule does not automatically require reversal and a new trial in all cases. In Smith, the defendant raised an unpreserved claim that he was entitled to a new criminal trial because the trial court utilized language in its instructions to thejury that our Supreme Court, pursuant to its supervisory powers, previously had instructed courts to refrain from using.

. . . The Supreme Court determined, consistent with its decision in [State v. Aponte, 259 Conn. 512, 522, 790 A.2d 457 (2002)], that the trial court’s use of the prohibited language did not implicate the defendant’s constitutional rights, and, thus, he was not entitled to [review under State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239–40, 567 A.2d 823 (1989)].

. . . Further, despite the trial court having clearly violated a supervisory rule, the Supreme Court concluded that the defendant was not entitled to a reversal either under the plain error doctrine

. . . or pursuant to the court’s supervisory authority.

. . . ‘‘With respect to whether the trial court’s action amounted to plain error, the Supreme Court explained that although it had directed trial courts to discontinue
use ofthe challengedjuryinstruction language because it was concerned about the danger of misleading the jury, it was unconvinced in the case before it that any such danger actually existed or that the trial court’s

errorinusingthelanguagewassosignificantastoaffect the fairness and integrity ofor the public confidence in the proceeding.

. . . Similarly, the Supreme Court declined to reverse the judgment on the basis of itssupervisory authority, stating: The trial court’s failure to heed our direction to discontinue the use of the challengedjury instruction was not such an extraordinaryviolationthatitthreatenedthe integrityofthetrial, and it certainly did not rise to the level of implicating the perceivedfairness ofthejudicial system as awhole. The defendant does not suggest that the trial court deliberately disregarded this court’s mandate. Nor do
we consider a new trial necessary to emphasize the importance ofourdirectioninAponteto the trial courts of this state.

. . . In other words, merely demonstratingthatatrialcourthasviolatedasupervisorymandate is not alone enough to warrant a reversal. The party raising the issue of noncompliance also must demonstrate actual harm.’’ (Citations omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In reLeilah W., supra, 166 Conn. App. 62–63.
The undisputedfactisthatthe respondentwas represented by counsel at the termination ofparental rights trial. Our Supreme Court recognized that, prior to In
re Yasiel R., ‘‘[w]hen the respondent is represented by counsel, the current procedures in place adequately protectthe respondentfrom any claimed constitutional deficiencies.’’ In re Yasiel R., supra, 317 Conn. 785. ‘‘It hasfrequentlybeenrecognized, albeitinothercontexts, that we strongly presume that counsel’s professional assistance was reasonable, and the [respondent] has the burden to overcome the presumption that [her] attorney was employing sound trial strategy.

. . We evaluate the conductfrom trial counsel’s perspective at the time.

. . . [C]ounsel is strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. In the present appeal, the respondent does not claim error
on the part of her counsel. Quite recently, this courthashad occasionto address claims that the judgments terminating the appellants’ parental rights should be reversed because the trial courts canvassed them after, rather than prior to, the presentation ofevidence but prior to the courts issuing their decisions. SeeInreElijah G.-R., supra, 167 Conn. App. 1; In re Leilah W., supra, 166 Conn. App. 48. In bothInreElijahG.-R. andInreLeilahtherespondents
were represented by counsel. Although there were
some differences in the way in which the canvasses
were conducted in those cases, this court concluded that the stated purpose underlying the Yasiel canvass
was met even though the respondents were not canvassed prior to the termination trial. In coming to that conclusion in each case, this court considered the factors the Yasiel canvass was intended to address and the actual trials ofthe subject cases.22 This court found in both of those cases that on appeal, the respondents failed to explain how they were harmed by the timing ofthe Yasiel canvass, whether they would have movedfor a new trial or asked that the evidence be opened and what additional evidence they might offer that would have made a difference in the trial. The respondents in each case argued only that the timing of the
canvassitselfwasharmful. SeeInreElijahG.-R., supra, 167 Conn. App. 18 (notingthatclaimhadbeenexpressly rejected in In re Leilah W.). Although the trial court in the present case did not canvass the respondent, she has failed to explain what she did not know or understand about the termination ofherparental rights without the court’s canvass. She has not explained what she would have done differently if the court had canvassed her and how the outcome ofthe case would be different. In other words, the respondent has failed to explain how the court’s failure to canvass her was harmful per se. Moreover, the respondent has failed to meet her burden as to the second prong ofthe plain error doctrine: that a failure to reverse the trial court’s judgment will result in manifest injustice. The record discloses that the respondentwas representedby counsel, who crossexamined the petitioner’s witnesses, and objected to evidence. She presented her own witnesses and evidence and argued in opposition to the termination of herparentalrights. Therespondenttestified onherown behalf. It appears, as our Supreme Court has said, that the ‘‘[w]hen the respondent is represented by counsel, the current procedures in place adequately protect the respondent from any claimed constitutional deficiencies.’’ In re YasielR., supra, 317 Conn. 785. The question
we must therefore address is whether the absence of
a canvass in the present case is likely to cause the publictolosefaithintheintegrityofourjudicialsystem. On the basis of our review of the proceedings in the trial court, we conclude that such an outcome would surely not occur. Although the court’s failure to give a Yasiel canvass is clear, obvious and indisputable, the respondent has failed to demonstrate that the failure has resulted in a fundamentally unfair termination proceeding that would cause the public to lose faith in the judicial system.23 She therefore cannot prevail on her plain error claim that the judgment terminating her parental rights in the child should be reversed.
In concluding that the judgment terminating the respondent’s parental rights in the child should not be reversed, we are mindful that our Supreme Court repeatedly has addressed the need for permanency in the life ofa child. See, e.g., In reNevaeh W., supra, 317 Conn. 732 (‘‘[v]irtually all experts, from many different professional disciplines, agree that children need and benefit from continuous, stable home environments’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]). The child at issue here has been living with her guardians since 2010; she is eleven years old, has no relationship with the respondent, andwishesto be adoptedbyherguardians. It is now 2016. To reverse the judgment at this pointin the child’s life, we believe, would in and of itself undermine the public’s confidence in the integrity of
our judicial system in that the child would be left in limbo for an indeterminate period of time until a new trial can be held. We conclude that the respondent has not carried her burden to demonstrate that the judgment should be reversed to avoid a manifest injustice.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.

* In accordance with the spirit and intent of General Statutes § 46b-142 (b) and Practice Book § 79a-12, the names of the parties involved in this appeal are not disclosed. The records and papers ofthis case shall be open for inspection only to persons having a proper interest therein and upon order of the Appellate Court.

** September 15, 2016, the date that this decision was released as a slip opinion, is the operative date for all substantive and procedural purposes.
1 The Commissioner of Children and Families (commissioner) filed a motion for permission to file a brief as amicus curiae in the present matter. This court granted the commissioner’s motion.

2 In re Yasiel R., supra, 317 Conn. 773, was decided our Supreme Court inAugust, 2015. The respondentfiledherinitialbriefinthis courtinJanuary, 2016, but did not raise a claim concerning the lack of a Yasiel canvass. Subsequent to oral argument in this court, however, the respondent filed a motion requesting permission to file a supplemental brief to address ‘‘Whethertheterminationof[her] parentalrights shouldbereversedbecause [this court] in In re Daniel N., 163 Conn. App. 322, [135 A.3d 1260, cert. granted, Conn. , A.3d ] (2016), [held] that the canvass requirement in In re Yasiel R., [supra, 317 Conn. 773], must be applied retroactively, andthe trial court inthis case didnot canvass [the respondent] as required.’’ We granted the motion permitting supplemental briefing. As we explain in part III of this opinion, however, In re Daniel N. does not control the respondent’s claim.

3 The child’s father, J.V.’s brother, is deceased.

4 The petitioner also alleged that the respondent had failed to achieve a sufficient degree of rehabilitation; General Statutes § 45a-717 (g) (2) (D); but subsequently withdrew that allegation.

5 Z also was adjudicated neglected and was placed with his father, G.U.

6 Gruen recommended intensive therapy twice a week for at least six consecutive months and ongoing individual treatment if reunification sessions with the child begin.

7 On January 14, 2015, the court, Randolph, J., ordered the department to complete atermination ofparental rights study. The study, which is dated April 6, 2015, states in relevant part: ‘‘[The child] stated that she is doing well with her uncle, aunt and cousins. She stated she wants to be adopted because this [is] her permanent home and she feels ‘safe here.’ This social worker explained that in order for her to be adopted her mother’s parental rights will have to be terminated; explaining what this means. She stated she is in agreement with her mother’s parental rights being terminated. This social worker told [the child] that since she knows her mother, when she gets older she could still visit her if she wanted to. [The child] shook her head no and said she will not want to visit. This social worker asked her why and she stated ‘because it brings back bad memories.’ [The child] became tearful as she talked about this.’’

8 General Statutes § 45a-717 (g) provides in relevant part: ‘‘[T]he court may approve a petition terminating the parental rights and may appoint a guardian ofthe person ofthe child

. . . ifit finds, upon clear and convincing evidence, that (1) termination is in the best interest of the child, and (2) (A) the child has been abandoned by the parent in the sense that the parent has failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to the welfare of the child

. . . .’’

9 The respondent has had a third child.

10 General Statutes § 45-717 (g) provides in relevantpart: ‘‘[T]he court may approveapetitionterminatingtheparentalrightsandmayappointaguardian ofthe person ofthe child

. . . ifit finds, upon clear and convincing evidence, that (1) the termination is in the best interest of the child, and (2)

. . . (C) there is no ongoing parent-child relationship which is defined as the relationship that ordinarily develops as a result of a parent having met onacontinuing, day-to-daybasisthephysical, emotional, moralandeducational needs ofthe child andto allow furthertime forthe establishment orreestablishment of the parent-child relationship would be detrimental to the best interests of the child

. . . .’’

11 The respondent does not dispute the court’s findings made during the adjudicatory stage of the proceedings that the respondent abandoned the child and that there is no ongoing parent-child relationship.

12 Thebestinterestfactorstobe consideredintheprobate statute; General Statutes § 45a-717 (h); and the juvenile statute; General Statutes § 17a-112 (k); are substantially similar.

13 The respondent raised this second claim as an alternative argument, if

we determined that her constitutional right to due process was notviolated. See part I of this opinion.

14 General Statutes § 45a-717 (h) provides: ‘‘Except in the case where termination is based on consent, in determining whetherto terminate parental rights under this section, the court shall consider and shall make written findings regarding: (1) The timeliness, nature and extent ofservices offered, provided and made available to the parent and the child by a child-placing agency to facilitate the reunion of the child with the parent; (2) the terms ofanyapplicable court orderenteredinto and agreeduponbyanyindividual

or child-placing agency and the parent, and the extent to which all parties have fulfilled their obligations under such order; (3) the feelings and emotional ties of the child with respect to the child’s parents, any guardian of the child’s person and any person who has exercised physical care, custody

or control of the child for at least one year and with whom the child has developed significant emotional ties; (4) the age ofthe child; (5) the efforts the parent has made to adjust such parent’s circumstances, conduct or conditions to make it in the best interest of the child to return the child to the parent’s home in the foreseeable future, including, but not limited to, (A) the extent to which the parent has maintained contact with the child

as part of an effort to reunite the child with the parent, provided the court may give weight to incidental visitations, communications or contributions and (B) the maintenance of regular contact or communication with the guardian or other custodian of the child; and (6) the extent to which a parent has been prevented from maintaining a meaningful relationship with the child by the unreasonable act or conduct of the other parent of the child, or the unreasonable act of any other person or by the economic circumstances of the parent.’’

15 Our Supreme Court certified the following issue in In re Daniel N., Conn. , A.3d (2016): ‘‘Did the Appellate Court correctly reverse the trial court’sjudgment ordering termination ofparental rights by concluding that this court’s decision inIn re YasielR., 317 Conn. 773 (2015), controlled the result of this case?’’

16 The termination of parental rights trial in In re Daniel N., supra, 163 Conn. App. 322, tookplace priorto our Supreme Court’s issuing its decision inIn re YasielR. The issue in this court, therefore, was whetherIn re Yasiel R. appliedretroactively. Moreover, onappeal, the respondentinInreDaniel N. did not seek reversal of the judgment terminating his parental rights pursuant to the plain error doctrine, as the respondent in the present

case does.

17 The relevant procedural history ofIn re Yasiel R. follows. ‘‘Due to the respondent’s various arrests and her mental health and substance abuse issues, the petitioner [the commissioner] filed petitions to terminate [the respondent’s] parentalrightsinNovember, 2012. Accordingtothepetitioner, the court, on December 11, 2012, advised the respondent of her trial rights, entered denialsto thepetitions onherbehalf, andappointedheran attorney. A contested hearing then was scheduled for November 12, 2013. At that hearing, the respondent’s counsel stated that although [the respondent is] not in agreement with the [termination ofparental rights], she cannot bring herselfto consent today. That being said, she’s in agreement with the court taking the case on the papers. She’s in agreement to the exhibits that

. . . have been entered. Her counsel then stated that the respondent wants the court to be aware that things have significantly changed for her over the last two years and continued to explain those changes. At no time did the court canvass the respondent personally to question her decisions not to contestthe petitioner’s exhibits andto waive herrightto afull trial. It stated only that I think I understand your position, and I will certainly consider that [you’ve made greatprogress] when I’m reviewing all the material

. . . .’’ (Footnotes omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Yasiel R., supra, 317 Conn. 777.18 Our Supreme Court granted certification as to the following relevant issue: ‘‘Does the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution require that atrial court canvass aparentpersonally about his or her decision not to contest the exhibits presented to the court against him or her in a parental termination proceeding?’’ (Internal quotationmarksomitted.)Inre YasielR., supra, 314Conn. 907. OurSupreme Court determined that due process does not require a Yasiel canvass. See In re Yasiel R. supra, 317 Conn. 787–88.

19 The parties are presumed to know the law; Provident Bank v. Lewitt, 84 Conn. App. 204, 209, 852 A.2d 852, cert. denied, 271 Conn. 924, 859 A.2d 580 (2004); and could have brought the matter to the attention of the trial court. See JPMorgan ChaseBank, N.A. v. Georgitseas, 149 Conn. App. 796, 798, 89 A.3d 992 (2014) (‘‘[w]e have repeatedly indicated our disfavor with the failure, whether because of mistake of law, inattention or design, to object to errors occurring the course of a trial until it is too late for them to be corrected, and thereafter, ifthe outcome ofthe trial proves unsatisfactory, with the assignment of such errors as grounds of appeal’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]); cf. In re Leilah W., 166 Conn. App. 48, 53, A.3d (2016) (after close of evidence assistant attorney general informed court it omitted canvass of respondent; court asked parties to return to court and canvassed respondent prior to issuing its decision).

20 In re Daniel N., supra, 163 Conn. App. 322, is further distinguishable from the present case because the issues claimed on appeal are different and this court decided the cases on different legal theories. In re Daniel N. was decided on the basis of retroactivity and also our Supreme Court’s supervisory authority. The respondent in In re Daniel N., did not seek reversal pursuant to the plain error doctrine and therefore this court performed no analysis of the harm caused by the failure to give the Yasiel

canvass. Inthe present case, the respondent claims that thejudgment terminating her parental rights in the child should be reversed pursuant to the plain error doctrine, which requires us to perform a harm analysis. The present case is not the first time this court has considered a claim of plain error with respect to the Yasiel canvass. See In re Raymond B., 166 Conn. App. 856, A.3d (2016). In that case, the respondent claimed that the termination of her parental rights should be reversed because the trial court failed to conduct the canvass ‘‘at the very start ofthe termination trial.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 865. Rather, trial commenced without the court canvassing the respondent, but on the second day oftrial before the commissioner rested her case, the court, Hon. Francis J. Foley III , judge trial referee, sua sponte canvassed the respondent. Id., 860. The respondent acknowledged that she understood her rights, did not object to the timing ofthe canvass or file a posttrial motion for a mistrial or to open the evidence or seek any additional relief. Id., 861. In resolving the claim of the respondent in In re Raymond B., the court looked to the recent decisionofInreLeilahW., 166 Conn.App. 48, A.3d (2016), forguidance. In In re Leilah W., this court concluded ‘‘that canvassing a respondent at the conclusion of the termination of parental rights trial was harmless

error. In doing so, this court addressed the contours of what constitutes compliance with the canvass rule: Although this was not the procedure envisioned by our Supreme Court, and, accordingly should be avoided, if any concerns arose regarding the respondent’s understanding of his trial rights, the trial court could have reopened the evidence to allow for additional proceedings if necessary.

. . . This court also stated that the burden ison therespondenttoshow theharmofanoncompliantcanvass.’’ (Citation omitted; emphasis added; internalquotationmarks omitted.)InreRaymond B., supra, 166 Conn. App. 867. In applying the second prong of the plain error doctrine to the facts of In re Raymond B., this court concluded that failing to conduct the Yasiel

canvass prior to the commencement of trial was not ‘‘so significant as to effect the fairness and integrity of the public confidence in the judicial proceedings’’torequirereversal. (Internalquotationmarksomitted.) Id., 868. Inthepresent circumstance, we haveperformed aharmanalysispursuantto the plain error doctrine, and therefore, this case is further distinguishable from In re Daniel N.

21 We note that the question of whether the supervisory rule announced inIn re YasielR. should be applied to other, then pending cases was before

our Supreme Court in In re Egypt E., SC 19643 and SC 19644. The court, however, declined to answer that question, and thereby declined to provide guidance for other pending appeals, when it remanded that case to the trial court. See In re Egypt E., 322 Conn. 231, 233 n.1, A.3d (2016).22 ‘‘On the basis of our review of the trial court’s canvass, we conclude that the court reasonably could have concluded that the respondent fully understood the trial process, the rights he had during the trial, and the potential consequences ofthe termination ofhis parental rights. The stated purpose underlying our Supreme Court’s supervisory rule appears to have been effectuated in the present case. The respondent has failed to demonstrate that he was harmed by the trial court’s failure to canvass him prior to the start of trial, and we do not believe that it is necessary to reverse the judgment simply to emphasize the importance of compliance with our Supreme Court’s holding in In re Yasiel R.’’ In re Leilah W., supra, 166 Conn. App. 65–66. ‘‘[T]he respondent argues only that the time ofthe In re YasielR. canvass after the end of trial, but prior to the court deciding the case, amounts to structural error, and, thus, ifthe canvass is not conducted prior to the start of trial, a new trial always is required. This contention, however, expressly

was rejected by this court in In re Leilah W.’’ In re Elijah G.-R., supra, 167 Conn. App. 18.

23 In the recent case ofState v. Gould, 322 Conn. 519, 534–35, A.3d (2016), our Supreme Court reasoned that the ‘‘defendant’s argument that the improper exclusion of a prospective juror even without a showing of prejudice to avoid undermining public confidence in the fairness and integrity of our judicial system, is effectively an argument for structural error. See Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 309–10, 111 S. Ct. 1246, 113 L. Ed. 2d 302 (1991). We have observed, however that there is a very limited class of cases involving error that is structural, that is to say, error that transcends the criminal process. Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 468, 117 S. Ct. 1544, 137 L. Ed. 2d 718 (1997).’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) ‘‘Structural errors have not been recognized outside the realm of constitutional violations except in extraordinary circumstances. See, e.g., Nguyen v. United States, 539 U.S. 69, 79–83, 123 S. Ct. 2130, 156 L. Ed. 2d 64 (2003) (structural error when appeals panel was improperly constituted in violation of statutory requirement and thus did not have authority to decide appeal).’’ State v. Gould, supra, 535.