J-S02001-21

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

CRAIG GRAY 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1719 EDA 2019

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered May 17, 2019

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-51-CR-0000072-2010

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., KUNSELMAN, J., and NICHOLS, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED: APRIL 5, 2021

Appellant, Craig Gray, appeals pro se from the post-conviction court’s 

May 17, 2019 order, dismissing as meritless his timely petition filed pursuant 

to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546. We 

affirm. 

The PCRA court summarized the background of this case as follows:

On September 12, 2011, before the Honorable Carolyn Engel 

Te[min], [Appellant] entered a negotiated guilty plea [to] thirddegree murder and possession of an instrument of crime.

[Appellant] was sentenced to 20-40 years’ imprisonment for the

murder conviction and 21⁄2-5 years’ imprisonment for the 

possession of an instrument of crime conviction, to run 

concurrently.

[Appellant] filed a timely motion to withdraw his guilty plea on 

September 22, 2011. The trial court denied the motion on 

September 26, 2011. No direct appeal was filed on [Appellant’s] 

behalf at this time.

On September 7, 2012, [Appellant] filed his first pro se PCRA 

petition. PCRA counsel, John P. Cotter, Esquire, was appointed 
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and counsel filed an amended petition on May 6, 2015[,] based 

on ineffective assistance of counsel. In his amended petition, 

[Appellant] requested nunc pro tunc reinstatement of his direct 

appeal rights since trial counsel failed to file a notice of appeal to 

[the] Superior Court despite his request for counsel to do so.

[Appellant’s] rights to file a direct appeal were reinstated nunc pro

tunc on December 22, 2015. The Superior Court affirmed 

[Appellant’s] judgment of sentence on January 12, 2017, holding 

that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied 

[Appellant’s] motion to withdraw his guilty plea because he 

knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered the agreement 

despite his assertion of a mental health issue. [Commonwealth 

v. Gray, 160 A.3d 252 (Pa. Super. 2017).] The Pennsylvania 

Supreme Court denied [Appellant’s] petition for allowance of 

appeal on October 17, 2017. [Commonwealth v. Gray, 172 

A.3d 1116 (Pa. 2017)].[1] 

On October 18, 2018, [Appellant] filed his ... instant, pro se PCRA 

petition, seeking relief based upon ineffective assistance of 

counsel and improper obstruction by a government official. PCRA 

counsel was appointed and counsel filed a Finley1letter on April 

2, 2019. On April 16, 2019, this [c]ourt sent [Appellant] a notice 

pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 907, 

indicating that his petition would be dismissed as meritless.

[Appellant] did not file a response to the [Rule] 907 Notice. On 

May 17, 2019, after conducting a thorough and independent 

review of the record, this [c]ourt dismissed [Appellant’s] petition 

____________________________________________

1 Our review of the record demonstrates that Appellant did not seek review 

with the United States Supreme Court. Therefore, Appellant’s judgment of 

sentence became final on January 15, 2018, when the time for filing a petition 

for writ of certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court expired. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 

9545(b)(3) (stating that a judgment of sentence becomes final at the 

conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking the 

review); U.S.Sup.Ct.R. 13 (providing that “[a] petition for a writ of certiorari

seeking review of a judgment of a lower state court that is subject to 

discretionary review by the state court of last resort is timely when it is filed 

with the Clerk within 90 days after entry of the order denying discretionary 

review”). Thus, Appellant’s second petition, filed on October 18, 2018, was 

timely. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1) (setting forth that “[a]ny petition under 

this subchapter, including a second or subsequent petition, shall be filed within 

one year of the date the judgment becomes final”). 
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without a hearing as meritless.[2] On June 10, 2019, [Appellant] 

filed a [pro se] notice of appeal to the Superior Court.[3]

1 Where PCRA counsel has determined that the issues raised 

in a defendant’s pro se PCRA petition are without merit, she 

[or he] may inform the court and seek to withdraw. 

Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 

1988) (en banc). 

PCRA Court Opinion (PCO), 12/20/19, at 1-3. 

Appellant raises one issue for our review, which we set forth verbatim:

Whether the PCRA Court erred in dismissing the PCRA without a 

hearing for lack of merit. When the Sentencing Court misadvised 

the Appellant of the time requirements to file a post-sentencing 

motion amounts to governmental interference?

Appellant’s Brief at 4. 

At the outset, we note that our standard of review regarding an order 

denying post-conviction relief is whether the findings of the court are 

“supported by the record and free of legal error.” Commonwealth v. 

Albrecht, 994 A.2d 1091, 1093 (Pa. 2010) (citations omitted). 

Appellant argues that, during sentencing on September 12, 2011, the 

court advised him that he had 30 days to file a post-sentence motion. See 

Appellant’s Brief at 10-11. Believing that he had 30 days, he says he filed a 

motion asking the court to reconsider his sentence within that timeframe, 

specifically on October 6, 2011. Id. at 11. However, he claims that the 

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2 The PCRA court also permitted counsel to withdraw from further 

representation of Appellant pursuant to his Finley letter. 

3 The PCRA court did not order Appellant to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise 

statement of errors complained of on appeal, and he did not do so. The PCRA 

court subsequently issued a Rule 1925(a) opinion. 
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sentencing court deemed his post-sentence motion untimely. Id.4 He 

complains that the sentencing court’s misadvising him of the time 

requirements to file a post-sentence motion constituted governmental 

interference and caused the untimely filing of his motion. Id. at 7. In his pro 

se petition, he claimed that these circumstances made him eligible for relief 

under Section 9543(a)(2)(iv) of the PCRA. See PCRA Petition, 10/18/18, at 

3. 

Section 9543(a)(2)(iv) states:

(a) General rule.--To be eligible for relief under this subchapter, 

the petitioner must plead and prove by a preponderance of the 

evidence all of the following:

***

(2) That the conviction or sentence resulted from one or 

more of the following:

***

(iv) The improper obstruction by government officials 

of the petitioner’s right of appeal where a meritorious 

appealable issue existed and was properly preserved 

in the trial court.

42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(2)(iv). 

In dismissing Appellant’s petition, the PCRA court explained:

[Appellant] has failed to plead and prove by a preponderance of 

the evidence that his sentence resulted from the alleged improper 

obstruction of the sentencing court, as required by [Section] 

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4 The docket does not reflect these filings. However, Appellant attaches to his 

brief a letter from the sentencing judge, dated October 29, 2011, advising him 

that she received his October 6, 2011 letter, and that it is “too late” for him 

to request reconsideration of his sentence. See Appellant’s Brief at Exhibit B. 

Appellant also attached the sentencing court’s letter to his PCRA petition. 
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9543(a)(2)(iv). More specifically, [Appellant] has failed to 

demonstrate that he did not know of the facts upon which he 

bases his claim. Although the [sentencing] court somewhat 

ambiguously stated “you have 30 days to appeal or asking [sic]

me to reconsider the sentence,” any ambiguity that the statement 

might have caused was resolved by the written guilty plea 

colloquy form, which explicitly states[,] “I have ten (10) days after 

sentencing to file a motion to complain about the sentence or I 

lose the right to do that.” During his colloquy, [Appellant] stated 

that he reviewed that written guilty plea colloquy form with his 

attorney before signing it. [Appellant] was well aware of his 

obligation to file a motion for reconsideration within ten days of 

his sentencing, and the record does not substantiate his 

justification for his believing he had more time. Therefore, 

[Appellant] has failed to plead and prove by a preponderance of 

the evidence that his sentence resulted from the alleged improper 

obstruction of the sentencing court, and his petition was properly 

dismissed for lack of merit. 

PCO at 6-7. While we concur with Appellant that the sentencing court’s verbal 

instruction was incorrect or — at the very least — confusing, we agree with 

the PCRA court that Appellant failed to demonstrate improper obstruction

where the written guilty plea colloquy form set forth the time requirements 

for filing a motion for reconsideration of sentence. See Written Guilty Plea 

Colloquy, 9/12/11, at 3 (“I have ten (10) days after sentencing to file a motion 

to complain about the sentence or I lose the right to do that.”).5 

Moreover, in addition to the instructions in the written guilty plea 

colloquy form, we observe that Appellant has not shown that a meritorious 

appealable issue existed here. Appellant entered a negotiated guilty plea with 

the Commonwealth, and the sentencing court sentenced him in accordance 

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5 We also note that Appellant was represented by counsel at that time, and 

his counsel filed a timely motion to withdraw the plea agreement. 
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with that plea agreement. Appellant does not identify in his brief what 

meritorious issue(s) regarding his sentence he would have raised, had the 

sentencing court not misadvised him of the time constraints for filing a motion 

for reconsideration of sentence. Coulter v. Ramsden, 94 A.3d 1080, 1088-

89 (Pa. Super. 2014) (“The Rules of Appellate Procedure state unequivocally 

that each question an appellant raises is to be supported by discussion and 

analysis of pertinent authority. ... This Court will not act as counsel and will 

not develop arguments on behalf of an appellant.”); see also 

Commonwealth v. Coles, 530 A.2d 453, 457 (Pa. Super. 1987) (“[A] plea 

of guilty usually constitutes a waiver of all defects and defenses except those 

concerning the jurisdiction of the court, legality of sentence, and validity of 

plea.”) (citations and footnote omitted). Accordingly, Appellant’s claim fails 

on this basis as well. Consequently, we affirm the PCRA court’s order 

dismissing his petition as meritless.

Order affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 4/5/21