COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges McClanahan, Petty and Beales 

Argued at Salem, Virginia 

CARLTON LEE WILEY 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION*

 BY 

v. Record No. 0798-07-3 JUDGE RANDOLPH A. BEALES 

MARCH 4, 2008 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CAMPBELL COUNTY 

Von L. Piersall, Jr., Judge Designate 

 Scott R. Geddes (Scott R. Geddes, PC, on brief), for appellant. 

 (Robert F. McDonnell, Attorney General; Karri B. Atwood, 

Assistant Attorney General; Joanne V. Frye, Assistant Attorney 

General, on brief), for appellee. Appellee submitting on brief. 

Carlton Lee Wiley (appellant) was convicted following a bench trial of two counts of 

distribution of a Schedule I, II, III, or IV drug to a person under the age of 18, in violation of 

Code § 18.2-255, and two counts of contributing to the delinquency of a minor, in violation of 

Code § 18.2-371. This appeal addresses the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain appellant’s 

convictions for violating Code § 18.2-255.1

 For the reasons that follow, we affirm those 

convictions. 

BACKGROUND

“Applying well-established principles of appellate review, we must consider the evidence 

and all reasonable inferences fairly deducible therefrom in the light most favorable to the 

 *

 Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication.

1

 This Court denied the part of appellant’s petition requesting that this Court review the 

convictions for the two counts of contributing to the delinquency of a minor, so they are not now 

before the Court in this appeal. 
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Commonwealth, the prevailing party below.” Walker v. Commonwealth, 272 Va. 511, 513, 636 

S.E.2d 476, 477 (2006). “That principle requires us to discard the evidence of the accused in 

conflict with that of the Commonwealth and to regard as true all the credible evidence favorable 

to the Commonwealth and all fair inferences that may be drawn therefrom.” Guda v. 

Commonwealth, 42 Va. App. 453, 455, 592 S.E.2d 748, 749 (2004). 

 On a Friday evening in September 2005, appellant’s seventeen-year-old daughter (A.W.) 

had two friends over to her home, which she shared with appellant.2

 While the girls were getting 

dressed in A.W.’s bedroom, appellant returned home and entered his daughter’s bedroom. A.W. 

asked him to leave because one of her friends was only partially dressed. Appellant left but 

returned several minutes later. According to A.W. and her friends, appellant appeared drunk. 

 According to C.L., one of A.W.’s friends, appellant gave C.L. a pill that he told her was 

morphine. She testified that appellant told C.L. that she could not leave until she took the pill. 

C.L. swallowed the pill and washed it down with some beer that appellant gave her. C.L. 

described the pill that appellant gave her as small, oval shaped, and with an off-white color 

having a yellowish tint to it. She said the pill made her feel like she was in “a daze” while at a 

party that she and the other two girls attended later that night. C.L. remembered “sitting down 

and . . . [not] really want[ing] to get up, [I] was just all laid back.” Appellant had also informed 

C.L. that she would get sick if she took the pill on an empty stomach; C.L. remembered vomiting 

the morning after taking the morphine pill. 

After giving C.L. the morphine pill, A.W. said that appellant shortly thereafter gave her 

two pills as well. She testified that appellant told her that one pill was a Darvocet and the other 

was a muscle relaxer. A.W. took the pills and washed them down with some beer that appellant 

 2

 In order to protect the identity of the three minor girls associated with this appeal, the 

minor girls’ initials will be used in lieu of their full names. 
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also gave her. A.W. said the Darvocet was long, oval, and pink. A.W. remembered feeling slow 

and a little dizzy while at the party later that night. 

The third girl present, N.H., did not take any pills or consume any alcohol because she 

was pregnant. N.H. confirmed, though, that appellant “gave [C.L.] some pills at first” and then 

gave A.W. one or two pills. N.H. said that, while at the party later that night, C.L. and A.W. 

“were just out of it and not tired but just felt like they didn’t want to move. They said that they 

felt heavy.” 

 Appellant’s pharmacist, Roger Akers, testified that he filled a morphine prescription for 

appellant on September 1 and that those pills, which were manufactured by Endeo, were small, 

oblong, and orange. However, Akers also said that the color of the morphine pills changes 

depending on the manufacturer and that he had previously also carried an “off-white yellow” 

color of morphine pills. Akers also filled Darvocet for appellant on August 30th. Akers stated 

that the Darvocet pills that he carried were large and oblong and that all of the manufacturers he 

had bought Darvocet from supplied him with hot pink pills. According to Akers, morphine is a 

Schedule II substance and Darvocet is a Schedule IV substance.3

 Dr. David Burrows, a forensic toxicologist employed by the Virginia Department of 

Forensic Science, testified that the effects of morphine are “nausea, drowsiness, dizziness” along 

with “euphoria” and “feelings of well being.” Burrows confirmed that feelings of heavy limbs 

and dizziness could be experienced after taking morphine. Burrows explained that Darvocet 

could cause “drowsiness, dizziness, disorientation, nausea” and that “feeling like in slow 

motion” would be consistent with the side effects of Darvocet. Burrows confirmed that 

3

 Akers testified, “A muscle relaxer is not a controlled substance.” Appellant was not 

charged, therefore, with distribution of the muscle relaxer to his daughter. 
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morphine is a Schedule II controlled substance and Darvocet is a Schedule IV controlled 

substance. 

 Appellant denied giving any pills to the girls. Nevertheless, the trial court found 

appellant guilty, noting “the evidence clearly shows that you had access to this [sic] sort of 

controlled substances which witnesses, a young girl said that – that you said you were giving 

them and that their reaction or physical reaction to later on was consistent with someone reacting 

to those kinds of drugs.” The trial court sentenced appellant, on all counts, to an active term of 

incarceration of five years and twelve months. 

ANALYSIS

 When considering the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal, “a reviewing court does not 

‘ask itself whether it believes that the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a reasonable 

doubt.’” Crowder v. Commonwealth, 41 Va. App. 658, 663, 588 S.E.2d 384, 387 (2003) 

(quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19 (1979)). “Viewing the evidence in the light 

most favorable to the Commonwealth, as we must since it was the prevailing party in the trial 

court,” Riner v. Commonwealth, 268 Va. 296, 330, 601 S.E.2d 555, 574 (2004), “[w]e must 

instead ask whether ‘any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the 

crime beyond a reasonable doubt,’” Crowder, 41 Va. App. at 663, 588 S.E.2d at 387 (quoting 

Kelly v. Commonwealth, 41 Va. App. 250, 257, 584 S.E.2d 444, 447 (2003)). “This familiar 

standard gives full play to the responsibility of the trier of fact fairly to resolve conflicts in the 

testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate 

facts.” Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319. 

 Code § 18.2-255 states “it shall be unlawful for any person who is at least 18 years of age 

to knowingly or intentionally (i) distribute any drug classified in Schedule I, II, III or IV or 

marijuana to any person under 18 years of age who is at least three years his junior . . . .” 
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Therefore, “The Commonwealth was required to prove that the defendant knowingly or 

intentionally distributed a controlled drug. The purpose of this statute is to provide enhanced 

punishment, where children are involved, to an activity which is illegal no matter what the age of 

the purchaser.” Pannell v. Commonwealth, 9 Va. App. 170, 174, 384 S.E.2d 344, 346 (1989). 

Here, as the trial court appropriately noted, the evidence demonstrates that appellant had 

access to both morphine and Darvocet. Appellant’s pharmacist, Roger Akers, confirmed that he 

had filled appellant’s prescriptions for both drugs prior to September 16, 2005. The only color 

and shape of Darvocet that Akers carried in his pharmacy matched the description given by A.W. 

of the pill appellant gave her. While Akers said that he had filled a prescription of morphine for 

appellant with small orange pills, Akers also confirmed other pharmacists carried (and that he 

had previously also carried) an off-white yellow morphine pill that was consistent with the pill 

that C.L. described appellant gave to her. 

Moreover, as the expert witness, toxicologist Dr. Burrows, explained, the side effects felt 

by C.L. and A.W. (and witnessed by N.H.) were consistent with the side effects of morphine and 

Darvocet. The side effects that the girls experienced, therefore, also substantiate their 

recollection of appellant’s representation, which he made to them at the time he gave them the 

pills, that he was actually giving C.L. morphine and A.W. Darvocet. 

Appellant cites Hinton v. Commonwealth, 15 Va. App. 64, 421 S.E.2d 35 (1992), in 

support of his argument that, since neither girl had sophisticated knowledge of either morphine 

or Darvocet, neither girl could positively identify the pill appellant gave to her absent his 

representation as to what the pills actually were, and, therefore, his convictions should be 

overturned. In Hinton, this Court noted that the witness 

did not identify the “cocaine” by describing its appearance, the 

manner in which it affected her, her previous “familiarity or 

experience” with the drug or provide other foundation for her 

conclusion that it was, in fact, the substance purchased from 
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defendant. Thus, [the witness’] testimony was simply insufficient 

to prove that defendant distributed cocaine to her. 

15 Va. App. at 66, 421 S.E.2d at 37. Here, though, the girls described with particularity the 

appearance of the pills that appellant gave to them, which matched the descriptions given by 

pharmacist Roger Akers, and described the manner in which the pills affected them, which was 

corroborated by both Akers and the toxicologist expert witness, Dr. Burrows. These descriptions 

were entirely consistent with appellant’s representation as to what the pills he gave to them 

actually were. We have previously held that the types of circumstantial evidence recounted 

above may be considered to prove the nature of a particular substance. See Hill v. 

Commonwealth, 8 Va. App. 60, 63, 379 S.E.2d 134, 136 (1989) (listing “the physical appearance 

of the substance involved,” “evidence that the substance produced the expected effects,” and 

“evidence that the substance was called by the name of the [substance] by the defendant” among 

the types of circumstantial evidence that may be considered). Consequently, the foundation not 

present in Hinton is present in the case at bar.4

In addition, the judge specifically stated that he believed the girls’ testimony, thereby 

rejecting appellant’s claim of innocence. “The credibility of the witnesses and the weight 

accorded the evidence are matters solely for the fact finder who has the opportunity to see and 

hear that evidence as it is presented.” Sandoval v. Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 133, 138, 455 

S.E.2d 730, 732 (1995). Finally, “[i]n its role of judging witness credibility, the fact finder is 

entitled to disbelieve the self-serving testimony of the accused and to conclude that the accused 

 4

 Familiarity by the victim with the substance she is being given is not an element of the 

offense prohibited by Code § 18.2-255. While we have previously held that users of a particular 

drug, “if they have gained a familiarity or experience with a drug, may identify it,” Hill, 8 

Va. App. at 63, 379 S.E.2d at 136, we note that testimony from a prior user is not necessary to 

prove the identity of a particular substance. Certainly, as here, there could be many instances 

where a minor child does not have independent or sophisticated knowledge of a controlled 

substance being given to her by an adult. In short, the statute certainly does not require that a 

minor child have such knowledge in order to obtain a conviction under the statute. 
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is lying to conceal his guilt.” Marable v. Commonwealth, 27 Va. App. 505, 509-10, 500 S.E.2d 

233, 235 (1998). 

Here, the evidence demonstrates that appellant had access to both morphine and 

Darvocet, which he also told the girls he was giving to them. While the morphine pill that C.L. 

said she received from appellant did not match the description of the morphine pills that 

pharmacist Roger Akers testified that he dispensed to appellant on September 1, Akers noted that 

other pharmacists carried the type of morphine pill described by C.L. He also confirmed that he 

had previously carried it prior to September 1. The symptoms experienced by C.L. and A.W. are 

consistent with the side effects often experienced after taking those drugs, according to the 

toxicologist expert witness, Dr. David Burrows. The evidence reflects that morphine and 

Darvocet fit into the schedules listed in Code § 18.2-255, and both Dr. Burrows and Akers 

confirmed that morphine is a Schedule II controlled substance and that Darvocet is a Schedule 

IV controlled substance. Therefore, based upon the totality of the evidence contained in this 

record, we hold that a rational trier of fact could certainly conclude that appellant knowingly and 

intentionally gave C.L. morphine, a Schedule II controlled substance, and that appellant 

knowingly and intentionally gave A.W. Darvocet, a Schedule IV controlled substance. 

CONCLUSION

Based upon the foregoing, we affirm appellant’s convictions. 

Affirmed.