### FI LED U.S. COURT O F APP EALS ELEVENTH CIRCUIT A ugu st 16 , 2 005 THO MAS K. KAH N CL ERK

Honora ble Walter K. Stapleton, United States Circuit J udg e for the Third Circuit, sitting * by desig nation. [PUBLIS H]

IN THE UN ITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FO R T HE EL EV EN TH CIRC UI T

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ N o. 04- 1236 7

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ D. C. Docket N o. 03-00010 -CV -SP M PATRICI A ROBERTSON, ind ivi dua lly

and i n he r ca

pa ci ty as pe rs on al rep res en ta ti ve of t he est at e o f Co rey Ri ce, Pl ai nti ff -Appe llant, ve rs us JI MM Y HECKSEL, in di vi du al ly andas a n a ge nt of t he Cit y of Ga in es vi ll e, CITY OF GAINESVILLE, D ef en dants -Appe lle es .

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ Appeal f rom the United State s District Court fo r the N orthe rnD istri ct

of F lor ida

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ _ (A ug us t 16, 200 5) Be fo re BL A CK , W IL SO N and S T A PL E T O N , Ci rc uit Jud ge s. *2

BL ACK , C ircuit Judg e: Appellant Patric ia Robertson appeals the dist rict court’ s dism issal of her claim s against Appellees Jim m y He cksel and the City

of G ainesville. Core y

Rice, Ro be rt son’ s so n, w as kil le d by O ff ic er H ec kse l duri ng a

tr af fi c sto p. A s ar es ult

of h i s d e a t h , R o b e rt s o n ar g u e s s h e s u f f e r e dad e p r i v a t i o n o f

h e r c o n s t i tu t i o n a l l yprotected liberty

interest in a continued relationsh ip with her adult son. Whether a pare nt h as suc h ar igh t vi s- à- vis he r ad ult c hil d is aque sti on o f fi rs t i m pr es sio n f or thi s C ourt. W e hol d th at

the F ourte en th A m en dm en t’ s su bst an tiv e due pr oc es s pr ote ct ion s do not

e xte nd t o th e re la tio nshi p be tw ee n am oth er and h er a dul t so n an d, the re fo re , a ff

irm the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s di sm iss al of Ro be rt son’ s c la im s. I. BACKGROUND T he dis tr ic t c ourt su cc inc tly sum m ar iz ed the f ac ts: On January

30, 2001, De cedent, C orey Rice ( “ De cedent Rice” ) w as pulled o ver in a tra ffic stop by City of G ainesville pol ice offic er Jim m y H ec kse l ( “ H ec kse l” ). H ec kse l di d no t us e his pol ic e sir en s to pul l ov er D ec ed en t R ic e, nor

did he use any

li ght s to il lum inate De cedent Rice’ s car. When Hec ksel approached Dec edent Rice’ s car, he br an dis he d hi s gun and s tr uc k th e w ind oww ithit . T he n, he m oved in front of Dece dent Rice’ s autom obile and po inted the gu n at D ec ed en t R ic e. D ec ed en t R ic e start ed to dr ive aw ay

in the opp osi te dir ec tio n, and H ec kse l f

ir ed his gunse ve n ti m es , hittin g D ec ed en t Rice w ith four bull ets. D ecedent Rice wa s pronou nced dead a fe w hours later.Vicki Ly nn McDona ld was the pe rsonal re prese ntative of the D ece dent’s estate at the 1 time of the settlement. De cede nt’s mother, Patricia Robe rtson, has since be come the pe rsonal repr esentative. 3 Robertson v. H

ecksel , C ase N o. 1:03CV10-SPM at 1–2 (N. D. Fla. 2003 ). Rice was 30 y ears ol d a t the ti m e o f hi s d eat h. T he pe rs ona l r ep re se ntativ e of Ri ce ’ s e state r ea ch ed

ase ttl em en t w ith Of ficer He cksel and the City

of G ainesville, “ com

pletely relea s[ing] and forever d i s c h a r g [ i n g ] [ t h e ] D e f

e n d a n t [ s ] f

r o m an y a n da l l p a s t , p r e s e n to r f u tu r e c l a i ms

. . . . or any f uture w ro ngf

ul d eath c la im

of P la int if f’ s r ep re se ntativ es or

he ir s, w hic h have r es ult ed

or m ay r es ult f ro m the a lle ge d a ct s or

om iss ion s of

the De fendant[s] .” T he settlem ent also stated: “ [T ] he parties acknowledge and agre e 1 that no thi ng c ont ai ne d inthi s r el ea se is int en de d no r sha ll anythi ng b e co nstru ed to relea se claim s, if any , held by the m other of the decedent, Patric ia Robertson.” On January

27, 2003, Robertson, individ ually and in her capacity

as pe rs ona l r ep re se ntativ e, f ile d ac om

pla int in the N orthe rnD istri ct

of F lor ida against Off

icer H ecksel and the City of G ainesville (Def

endants). I n her indiv idual capacity , she a lleged, pursuant to 42 U. S. C. § 198 3, a deprivation of her Fo urte en th A m en dm en t r igh t t o ar el at ion shi p w ithhe r ad ult sonand s ough t dam ages for loss of suppo rt, loss o f com panion ship, and past and futu re m entalThis appea l does not involve Robertson’s claims brought as persona l repre sentative of 2 the dec edent’ s estate. 4 pa in and s uf

fe ri ng. T he D ef

en dants m ove d to dis m iss the c la im pur suant t o F ed . 2 R. Ci v. P . 12( b) (6 ), and the dis tr ic t c ourt gr an te d th ei r m oti on. R obe rt son ap pe al s. II. STANDARD OF REVIEW W e re vie wadis tr ic t c ourt’ s di sm iss al f or f ai lur e to s ta te ac la im

de nov o,

“ ac ce pti ng the a lle ga tio ns i n th e co m pla int a s tr ue and c onstru ing the m

in the li ght
m ost favorable to the plainti ff. ” Swann v. S. H ealth Partners, Inc. , 388 F . 3d 8 34, 836 (11t h Cir. 2004 ) (c itation o m itted). III. DISC USSION A. Co nst itu tio nal

R igh t of Co m pani onsh ip

“ Section 1983 is no so urce of substantive federal r ights . Instead, to state a section 198 3 claim , a

plaintiff m

ust po int to a vio lation of a specific fe deral right.” W hit ing v . T ray lor , 85 F . 3d 5 81, 583 ( 11th C ir . 199 6) ( ci tin g Albright v. O liver , 510 U . S. 266 , 271 , 114 S . Ct . 807 , 811 ( 1994 ) (p lur al ity opi nio n) ). “ [I ] n § 1 983 ca se s gr ound ed

on a lle ge d pare nta l l ibe rty int er es ts, w e ar e ve nturi ng i nto the
m urky are a of unenum erate d constit ution al rights.” M cC urdyv . D odd , 352 F . 3d 820, 825 ( 3d C ir . 200 3) ( ci ta tio n om itt ed ). Whe n th is h ap pe ns, our f ir st t as k is to determ ine “ whether the plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of an ac tual5

constitu tional right at all. ” Id
. at 8 26 (ci ta ti on s an d i nt ern al qu ot at io ns om it te d) . W e shouldtread lightly

because “ [b] y

extending constitu tional protection to an as se rt ed r igh t or li be rty int er es t, w e, to a gr eat e xte nt, pla ce the m atte r out sid e the ar en a of pub lic de ba te and l eg isl at ive a ct ion . W e m ust the re fo re ‘ ex er ci se the utm ost c ar e w he ne ve r w e ar e as ke d to br eak ne wgr ound in thi s f ie ld, ’ le st the liberty protected by

the Due P rocess Clause be subtly transform ed into th e policy prefer ences of the Mem

bers of this Court.” W

ashi ngton v . G luc ks be rg , 521 U. S. 702, 720, 117 S. Ct. 2258 , 2267–68 (1997) (citations om itted). A par ent’ s due process right in the car e, custody , and control o f her c hildren is “pe rh ap s th e old es t of

the f undam en ta l l ibe rty

int er es ts r ec ogni ze d by

[ the Suprem e] Court.” Tr ox el v . G ranv ill e , 530 U . S. 57, 65, 120 S . Ct . 205 4, 206 0 (2 000) ( plura lity

opi nio n) . Whil e thi s r igh t pr ovi de s pare nts w ithboth su bst an tiv e an d pr oc ed

ur al pr ote ct ion s, the S upr em e Co urt c as es “ ex te ndi ng l ibe rty int er es ts of pare nts und er

the D ue P ro ce ss C lause f oc us o n r el at ion shi ps w ith m ino r children.” M

cC urdy , 352 F . 3d at 82 7; se e als o Is aac J .K. Adam s, No te , G row ing Pains: The Scope of Substa ntive Due Process Rights of Parents of Adult Children , 57 V an d. L . Re v. 188 3, 190 2 ( 2004 ) (r ev ie w ing S upr em e Co urt c as el awand fi ndi ng n o e xpl ic it gui danc e on h owto de ci de the que sti on o f w he the r pare nts ha ve a ri gh t t o c om

pa ni on sh ip wit h t he ir a du ltch il dr en ).6

T he sub stanti ve c om

pone nt o f a pare nt’ s r igh t t o c ar e, c ust ody , and c ontro l of he r m in orch il dr en ha s b een rel ie d upo n t o s tri ke do wn s ev eral st at e st atut es . T he S upr em e Co urt he ld a N eb ra ska

law , w hic h pr ohi bit ed

the te ac hin g of

any fo re ignlangua ge s to stu de nts unt il af te r the e igh th g ra de , de pr ive d pare nts of the ir ri ght to “ es ta bli sh a hom e an d br ing up c hil dr en. . . [ w hic h ha s be en ] lon g recognized at com

m on law as e ssential to th e orderly pursuit o f happiness byfre e m en.” Mey er v. Nebraska , 262 U . S. 390 , 396 –99, 43 S . Ct . 625 , 626 ( 1923 ) (c itatio ns o m itt ed ). S im ilarl y , an O re gon lawr equir ing pare nts to se nd the ir ch ildre n to pub lic sc hool s w as f ound unc onst itu tio na l by

the Co urt be ca

use it

“ unr ea sona

bly int er fe re [d ] w iththe li be rty of pare nts and g uard ians t o di re ct the up br in gi ng an d e du cat io n o f ch il dr en un de r th ei r co nt ro l.” P ie rc e v. Soc ’yof Sis te rs , 268 U . S. 510 , 534 –35, 45 S . Ct . 571 , 573 ( 1925 ); see also W isconsi n v. Yo der , 406 U . S. 205 , 232 , 92 S . Ct . 152 6, 154 1 ( 1972 ) (h old ing appl ic at ionof W isconsi n’ s com

pulso ry education law to A m ish child ren unconstit ution al under the First A m endm ent, in part, because “ [t] he history and culture of W estern ci vil iz at ionr ef

le ct astr ong tr ad iti on o f pare nta l c onc er n f or the nurtur e an d upbr ing ing of

the ir c hil dr en ”) ; Prin cev . M

ass ac huse tts , 321 U. S. 158, 166, 64 S. Ct . 438 , 442 ( 1944 ) (r ec ogni zi ng tha t “ the c ust ody , c ar e an d nurt ur e of the c hil d7

re sid e fi rs t i n th e pare nts , w hose pr im ar y f unc tio n and f

re ed om inc lud e pr ep ar at ion for obligation s the state can neither supply nor hinder”) (c itation o m itted). Apare nt’ s r igh t t o c ar e, c ust ody , and c ontro l of m ino r ch ildre n ha s a lso been the source of added procedural protections. F or exam ple, the S uprem e Court str uc k do w n an I lli noi s st at

ute that m ad e ch ildre n of unw ed f athe rs w ar ds o f the st at e upo n t he de at h o f th ei r m ot he r. Sta nle y v. I lli noi s , 405 U . S. 645 , 658 –59 92 S. Ct . 121 2, 121 6–17 ( 1972 ). T he re , the bio log ic al f athe r’ s in te re st “unde nia

bly warrant[e d] defer ence and, absent a power ful countervailing interest, protection.” Id
. a t 65 1, 92 S . Ct . a t 12 12. I n Sant osky v. Kramer , 455 U . S. 745 , 102 S . Ct . 138 8 (1 982) , the Co urt he ld a

state is re qui re d to sho wby a t l ea st c le ar

and c onvi nc ing ev ide nc e that pare nta l r igh ts s houl d be te rm inate d be ca use , a m ong oth er

r ea sons ,

“ [t ] he f undam en ta l l ibe rty

int er es t of

na tur al pare nts in the c ar e, c ust ody , and
m anagem ent of their child does no t evaporate sim ply because they

have not been
m odel parents . . . .” Id

. a t 75 3, 102 S . Ct . a t 13 94–9 5; see also Lassit er v. De p’t of S oc . Se rv s. , 452 U . S. 18, 27, 101 S . Ct . 215 3, 216 0 ( 1981 ) (a lth oughr ef usi ng t o hol d th e D ue P ro ce ss C lause r equir es the state to ap poi nt c ouns el f or pare nts a t a term ination hearing, noting that “ [a] parent’ s interest in the accurac y and injustice of th e d eci si on to ter m in at e h is or h er p aren ta l s ta tu s i s . . . a co m m an di ng on e”).Th e Te nth Cir c uit ha s r e c ognize d a

pa re nt’ s c on sti tut ion a lly

pr ote c te d li be rt

y int e re st 3 with her a dult son, but di d so under the F irst Amendment’s right of intimate association, which contains “a

n intrinsic element of pe rsonal liberty .” Tru jil lo v . B d. of C

ou nty Com m’rs , 768 F.2d 1186, 1188–89 (10th Cir. 1985). Althoug h Truji llo relied pr imarily on Roberts v. United States Jayc ees , 468 U.S. 609, 104 S. C t. 3244 (1984), a F irst Amendment ca se, the Ro be rts Court , in discussing the persona l liberty aspec t of the F irst Amendment, cited to, inte r a lia , Mey er , Pierce , and Y oder . Se eRo be rts , 468 U.S. at 618–19, 104 S. Ct . at 3250. Howe ver, the Truji llo court require d the plaintiffs to show the state a ctor ha d an “intent to interf ere with a par

ticular relationship protected by

the fre edom of intimate assoc iation.” Tru jil lo , 768 F.2d at 1190. 8 It is ag ai nst

thi s ba ck dr op tha t w e an al y ze Ro be rt son’ s c la im . S he w oul d have us hol d that the parental rights already rec ogni zed by

the Suprem e Court inc lud e a ri ght

to co m panio nshi p w ithan a dul t c hil d. R obe rt son’ s c la im c oul d pot en tia lly

inv olv e tw o ve ry

se parate que sti ons: one , w he the r the a sse rt ed r igh t ex ist s; and tw o, if

the a sse rt ed

r igh t do es e xis t, und er

w ha t c ondi tio ns d oe s a de pr ivatio n oc cur, i. e. , are w e loo kin g f or ne gli ge nt b eh av ior , an in te nti ona l a ct , et c. O ne m

ust have ar igh t be fo re it

c anbe de pr ive d; the re fo re , the state -o f- m ind o f th e a c c u s e dp a rt y i s i rr e l e v a n tt o th e i n i t i a l i n qu i ry. T he re appe ar

to be thr ee pos sib le r es olu tio ns o f Ro be rt son’ s c la im : ( 1) she ha s ar igh t and c anr ec ove r fo r inc ide nta l de pr ivatio ns; ( 2) she ha s ar igh t, but can no t re co ve r fo r in ci de nt al de pr iv at io ns ; an d (3 ) sh e d oe s n ot ha ve a ri gh t. The F irst, T hird, Se venth, and District of C olum bia Circuits have rej ected cl ai m s li ke Ro be rt son’ s, w he re the a lle ge d de pr ivatio n w as inc ide nta l t o th e 3 de fen da nt ’s act io ns . R uss v . W att s , – F .3d –, –, 2005 W L 1618831 at *7 (7th Cir.The Ninth Circuit appe ars to have rec og nized the asserte d rig ht where the state a ction 4 had the incide ntal aff

ect of endingthe par ent/adult child relationship. I n Kelson v. City of Sp ringfi e ld, 767 F.2d 651 ( 9th Cir. 1985), the Ninth Circuit held, in the context of a minor child, that “a pa rent ha s a constitutionally protec ted liberty

interest in the compa

nionship and society

of his or her c hild.” Id. at 655. Unlike Kelson , Strandberg v. City of Helena , 791 F.2d 744 ( 9th Cir. 1986), involved the re lationship between a pare nt and an a dult child. Id. at 748 n.1. Yet, it does no t a pp e ar t hat Strandberg actua lly

extended the holding of Kelson t o i n c l u d e a d u l tc h i l dr e n . In Stran db e rg , the cour

t’s action re g ardingthe par ents’ cla im of a due pr ocess violation was limited to corre ctingthe par ents’ incor rec t belief that the district c ourt had dismissed their cla im. Id. at 748 & n.1. T hus, the Strandberg court did not addre ss whether the asser ted rig ht exi sted. Nonethele ss, we re cognize subsequent Ninth Circuit decisions have inter prete d their ca selaw a s allowinga par ent to bringa compa nionship claim in the contextof an a dult child where the deprivation was incidental to the state a ction. See, e .g. , Moreland v. Las Vegas M etro. Police Dep’ t , 1 59 F .3 d 3 65 , 3 71 (9 th C ir . 1 99 8) ; Curnow v. Ridgecrest Police , 9 52 F .2 d 3 21 , 3 25 (9 th Cir . 1 99 1) ; Smith v. City of Fontana , 818 F.2d 1411, 1419 ( 9th Cir. 1987) overruled on othe r grounds by Hodgers-

Durgin v. DeLa Vina , 199 F.3d 1037 ( 9th Cir. 1999). 9 2005 ); M cC urdy , 352 F . 3d at 82 2; B ute ra v . D istric t of Co lum bia , 235 F . 3d 6 37, 656 (D . C. Ci r. 200 1) ; V

aldiv ieso O rti

z v . B urgo s , 807 F. 2d 6, 10 (1st Cir. 1986). 4 L es s c le ar

is w he the r tho se c as es r ec ogni ze d ar igh t, a ssum ed ar igh t, or

did not recognize a r ight. If a right has been recognized or assum ed, then the incidental na tur e of the inj ur y m ay be im portant, but

it w ill not be im portant i f the re is no rig ht . O rti

z be gan by

not ing the c ri tic al dif

fe re nc e be tw ee n th e as se rt ed r igh t and the S upr em e Co urt c as es r ec ogni zi ng a pare nt’ s su

bst an tiv e due pr oc es s r igh t t o care , c ust ody , and c ontro l he r ch ild : [T hose ] c as es do n ot h old that f am ily r el at ion shi ps are , in the abstra ct , pr ote ct ed a ga ins t a ll state e nc ro ac hm en ts, dir ec t and i ndi re ct , but onl y that the state m ay

not int er fe re w ithan in div idu al ’ s r igh t t o c hoos e how to conduct hi s or her fam ily aff airs. T he em

phasis in these cases10

on choice sugg ests that the right is one of preem ption ; rather than an ab sol ute r igh t t o ac er

ta in f am ily r el at ion shi p, f

am ily m em be rs have the right, w hen confronted with the state’ s attem pt to m ake choices fo r the m , to ch oose f

or the m se lve s. O rti z , 807 F . 2d at 8. T he F ir st C ir cu it al so d ist ing uis he d th e pr oc ed ur al due pr oc es s c as es , suc h a s Stan ley an d Sant osky , by e xpl ai nin g th at

“ [t ] hose c as es have he ld o nly that whe n th e state se ek s to c hange or a ff ec t the r el at ion shi p of

pare nt an d c hil d inf

urthe ranc e of

ale git im at e state int er es t” is a “ [F ] ourte en th [A ] m en dm en t l ibe rty

int er es t . . . im

pli cate d and the state the re fo re m ust a dhe re to rigorous procedural safeguards.” Id
. T he preceding language seem s to ind icate a fi ndi ng o f no r igh t, but

the c ourt c ont inu ed : “ [W ] e thi nk i t si gni fi cant tha t the Su pr em e Co urt ha s pr ote ct ed the pare nt o nly

w he n th e gove rn m en t di re ct ly a ct s to sever or otherw ise aff

ect his or her legal r elationshi p with a child. The C ourt has ne ve r he ld tha t go ve rn m en ta l a ct ionthat a ff ec ts the pare nta l r el at ion shi p on ly inc ide nta lly

—a s inthi s c as e— is s usc ep tib le to ch al le nge f or avio la tio n of

due process.” Id

. T he T hir d C ir cu it’ s ul tim at e co nc lus ionin M cC urdythat “ the fundam ental guara nte es of the D ue P ro ce ss C lause do n ot e xte nd t o apare nt’ s in te re st i n th e com panion ship o f his independ ent adult child ,” M cC urdy , 352 F . 3d at 83 0, appears to indicate no right exis ts. But the McC urdy co urt a lso dis cu sse d th eAlthough w e hold the asse rted right does not exi st, even if we agree d with Robertson, we 5 still must remember

that the “Due Process Clause is simply not impli cate d by

a neg lige nt act of an off icial ca using unintende d loss of or injury to life, liberty , or prope rty .” Daniels v. W illiams , 474 U.S. 327, 328, 106 S. C t. 662, 663 (1986). Robertson ha s alleg ed that Of fice r He cksel’s a c tio ns we re “ wi llf

ul, ma lic iou s and

e ng a g e d in

wi th c a llo us and

re c kle ss i nd if

fe re nc e to DECEDENT RI CE’s fede rally protec ted rig hts of life, liberty and the pur suit of happiness under the Four th and Four

teenth Amendme nt of the U.S. Constitution” and as a result of his ac tions she 11 inc ide nta l natur e of

the inj ur y : “ It w oul d, the re fo re , str et chthe c onc ep t of due process too far if w e w ere to recognize a constitutio nal violatio n based on o fficial actions that were not directed at the parent-c hild relations hip.” Id
. ; se e als o R uss , – F.3d –, –, 2005 W L 1618831 at *6 (“ Under a ny standard, f

indin g a constitut ional vio la tio n ba se d onof

fi ci al a ct ion s th at

w er e not dir ec te d a t the pare nt- ch ild re la tio nshi p w oul d stre tc h th e co nc ep t of due pr oc es s f

ar be y ond the gui din g pr in ci pl es set for th by the Supr em e Co ur t.”) (ci ta ti on s o m it te d) . In B ute ra , the D istri ct

of Co lum bia Ci rc uit spe ci fi ca lly

not ed that i t ha d no re as on t o c onsi de r howthe inj ur y oc curr ed : Bec au se we ho ldth ata pa ren t-c hi ldrel at io ns hi p b et ween two ind ep en de nt a dul ts d oe s no t i nvok e co nst itu tio na l ‘ co m panio nshi p’ interests, w e do not reach the D istrict of Colum bia’ s contentio n that T er ry Bu te ra ’ s c la im

f ai ls b ec au se the D istri ct

of Co lum bia ’ s a ct ion s we re not intention ally

directed or a im ed at her r elationshi p with her son. B ute ra , 23 5 F .3dat 6 56 n.2 3 (c it at io n o m it te d) . L ike the D istri ct

of Co lum bia Ci rc uit , w e hol d R obe rt son ha s no t a sse rt ed a cognizable due process interest. Robertson does no t allege the state has interfe red 5was de prived of he r constitutionally protec ted rig hts. Nowhere , howeve r, has Rober tson alleg ed Offic er H eckse l’s actions constituted more tha n neg lige nce c oncer

ning he r rights—mere c a u s at i o ni s n o te n o u g ht o s at i s f y Da nie ls . As the plaintiff ha s not contended the dece dent (who w as 30 year s old at the time of 6 de ath) wa s a

min or , w e do no t ne e d to de c ide wh e n a c hil d c ro sse s th e thr e sh old fr om m ino r t o adult. In Bo nn e r v . Ci ty of Pric ha rd, 6 61 F .2 d 1 20 6, 12 09 (1 1th Cir . 1 98 1) (e n b anc ), thi s 7 Court a do pte d a s b ind ingpr e c e de nt a ll d e c isi on s o f t he fo rm e r F if

th C ir c uit ha nd e d d own p ri or

to the close of

business on September 30, 1981. 12 w ithhowshe r ai se s he r m ino r ch ild , a s w as the c as e in Mey er and Pierc e , nor does she c la im the state a ct iontarg et ed

he r cu sto dy

of he r m ino r ch ild , a s in Sant osky an d Stan ley . T he re fo re , he r cl ai m f ind s no sup port i n S upr em e Co urt pr ec ed en t, an d w e de cl ine to furthe r expand the sub stanti ve pr ote ct ion s of the D ue P ro ce ss Clause. 6 B. Braz ier/Car

ringer Robertson urges us to resolve her claim using a diffe rent analytical f r a mew o rk . S h e ar g u e s h e r c l a i m i s c o n t r o l l e db y B raz ie r v . Ch erry , 293 F . 2d 4 01 (5 th C ir . 196 1) , and Ca rri nge r v . R odge rs , 33 1 F .3d84 4 (1 1t h C ir. 2 00 3) . 7 Be ca use tho se c as es inv olv e the appl ic at ionof 42 U . S. C. § 19 88, it

w ill be he lpf

ul f o r u s t o f i r s tb r i e f l y d i s c u s s h o w§ 1 9 8 8 wo rk s b e f o r e e x p l a i n i n g wh y B raz ie r an d Carring er

are n ot rel ev an t t o R ob ert so n’s cl ai m . T he S upr em e Co urt ha s r ec ogni ze d th at “ ine vit ab ly

e xis tin g f

ed er al laww ill not cover every

issue that m ay

arise in the context of a f ederal c ivil right s action.”13

M oor v. Co unt

y of A lam ed

a , 411 U . S. 693 , 702 , 93 S . Ct . 178 5, 179 2 ( 1973 ) (f ootnot e om itt ed ). T his is w he re 42 U . S. C. § 19 88 c om es int o pl ay . S ec tio n 19 88 pr ovi de s inpart : The j urisdictio n in civil andcrim inal m atters confer red on the district co urts b y [ the Ci vil Ri ght s A ct s] f or the pr ote ct ionof

a ll pe rs ons in the U nit ed

S ta te s inthe ir

c ivi l r igh ts, and f

or the ir vin dic at ion , sha ll be exercised and enforced in conform ity with the law s of the United St at es , so f

ar a s su chlaw s are sui ta

ble to carr

y the sam e int o e ff

ec t; but in all cases where they are not adapted to th e obje ct, or are de fic ie nt in th e p ro vi si on s n eces sa ry to furni sh su it ab le rem ed ie s . . . the c om m on l aw , a s m odi fi ed

and c hange d by

the c onst itu tio n and statut es of

the S ta te w he re in the c ourt havin g j ur isd ic tio n of suc h c ivi l

. . . c au se is he ld, so f

ar a s th e sam e is n ot i nc onsi ste nt w iththe Co nst itu tio n and l aw s of

the U nit ed

S ta te s, sha ll be e xte nde d to and go ve rn th e sa idco ur ts in th e tr ia l an d d is po si ti on of t he cau se . . . . 42 U. S. C. § 198 8(a).

“ [A ] s is pla in o n th e fa ce of the statut e, [ § 19 88] is int en de d to c om ple m en t the vari ous ac ts whic h do c re at e fe de ra l c au se s of a ct ionf or the vio la tio n of federa l civil rights .” M

oor, 411 U . S. a t 70 2, 93 S . Ct . a t 17 92 (fo ot no te om it te d) . If f ed er al lawis “ not

a da pte d to the obj ec t” or

is “ de fi ci en t, ” fe de ra l c ourts m ust loo k to state lawto fi ll the ga ps. T he S upr em e Co urt ha s e xpl ai ne d: The im portation o f the policies and purpo ses of the States on m atters of c ivi l r igh ts i s no t the pr im ar y of fi ce of the bor ro w ing pr ovi sio n in § 19 88; r athe r, the statut e is d es ign ed to as sur e that ne utr al r

ule s of de ci sio n w ill be a va ila

ble to en fo rc e the c ivi l r igh ts a ct ion s, a m ong the m § 19 83. C ongr es s sure ly did not int en d to a ssi gn t o st at e co urts an d le gis la tur es ac onc lus ive r ole in the f orm at ive f

unc tio n ofBr azier’s suit was brought under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985, and 1986. Brazier , 293 8 F.2d at 402–03. She sought damag es for dece dent’s injuries and illeg al ar rest, the de ath of the 14 de fi nin g and c hara ct er iz ing the e sse nti al e le m en ts o f a fe de ra l c au se of a ct ion . W ils on v . G arc ia , 47 1 U.S. 2 61 , 26 9, 1 05 S. Ct. 1 93 8, 1 94 3 (1 98 5) , supe rc ed ed by sta tut e on o the r gr ound

s as re co gni

ze d in J ones v . R
. R
. D onne lle

y & Son s C

o. , 54 1 U.S. 3 69 , 37 7– 81 , 12 4 S . Ct. 1 83 6, 1 84 2– 45 (20 04 ). B raz ie r an d Ca rri nge r w er e both in stanc es w he re state laww as use d to f ill ga ps i n f ed er al lawthr ough§ 19 88’ s bo rr ow ing pr ovi sio n. R obe rt son w oul d have us als o l oo k t o s ta te law t hr ou gh § 1 98 8’s b orro win g p ro vi si on to de ci de he r cas e. H er arg um en t m iss es the dis posi tiv e dif fe re nc e be tw ee n B raz ie r an d Carring er an d our ca se . I n th ose c as es , the pla int if fs w er e se ek ing vin dic at ionof the de ce de nt’ s rights un der § 1983. He re, Robertson alleges a violation of he r rig ht s. R e g a r d l e s s o f

w h o s e r i g h t s ar e b e i n g a s s e rt e d , b e f o r e § 1 9 8 3 an d§ 1 9 8 8 c a n c o me int o pl ay , the pla int if

f m ust sti ll es ta bli sh the e xis te nc e of

af ed er al r igh t. B ec au se Ro be rt son ha s f

ai le d to e sta

bli sh a f ed er al r igh t, w e ne ve r re ac h § 1 983, le t a lon e § 1 98 8 a ndst at e la w. In Brazier , the pla int if

f al le ge d he r husb an d w as be at ento de ath by G eo rg ia pol ic e of fi ce rs , in vio la tio n of

his “ ri ght s and p ri vil eg es of be ing se cure in his pe rs on, of

due pr oc es s and e qua l pr ote ct ionof the law . ” 293 F . 2d at 40 2. T he 8dece dent, and f or ag g ravation, suffering , and mental a nguish caused to the de cede nt. Id. at 402 n.1. 15 que sti on the f

orm er F if th C ir cu it ne ed ed

to an sw er

w as “ w he the r de ath r es ult ing fr om vio la tio n of

the Ci vil Ri ght s S ta tut es giv e[ s] r ise to a fe de ra lly e nf or ce ab le cl ai m f or dam ag es sus ta ine d by

the vic tim

dur ing his li fe tim e, by

his sur viv or s, or both .” Id
. T he c ourt sp en t the bul k of it s op ini on a ddr es sin g th e inc or por at ionof G eo rg ia ’ s surv iva l st at

ute , w hic h a llo w ed

the de ce de nt’ s c la im s to sur viv e his de ath, but it a lso inc or

por at ed G eo rg ia ’ s wro ngf

ul d eath s ta tut e, a“ se parate and dis tin ct c au se [] of

a ct ion ” al low ing c er

ta in s urviv or s to r ec ove r the f ull va lue of th e li fe o f th e d eced en t, id. a t 40 7 n. 15, be ca use “ re gard

ha s to be take n of

both classes of victim s.” Id

. a t 40 9. T he inc or

por at ionof

G eo rg ia ’ s wro ngf

ul d eath statut e w as not

don e in r es pons e to a

vio la tio n of

the w if e’ s r igh ts: it

w as don e to rem edy the violatio n of the de ce de nt’ s rig ht s. Se e id
. at40 8– 09 . In Carring er , th e p la in ti ff’s s on was s ho t an d k il le d b y th e so n’s wi fe, a pol ic e of fi ce r, w ithhe r se rv ic e re vol ve r. T he de ce de nt’ s m oth er br ough t “ a § 19 83 claim for the wrongful death of the decedent whose constitu tional right s wer e violated.” 331 F.3d at 848. T here, we followed B raz ie r and incorporated G eo rg ia ’ s w ro ngf

ul d eath s ta tut e int o f

ed er al law , hol din g th at

“ Carr ing er , a s aRob e rt so n’ s b e lie f t hat Braz ie r and Car

ringe r we re c ontr oll ingmay have be e n c a

us e d in 9 part by dicta in Carringer . Footnote nine of Car ringe r be g ins by

no tin gthat th e “ ri g ht t o wrong ful death rec overy

under § 1983 ha s g ener ated c onsiderable debate among st our sister

16 pare nt, ha s st an din g to a sse rt a§ 19 83 c la im

f or the w ro ngf

ul d eath o f he r son in violatio n of his constitu tional right s.” Id
. a t 85 0 ( em

pha sis a dde d and f

ootnot e om it te d) . T he pla int if

fs in B raz ie r an d Ca rri nge r pa sse d th e fi rs t hurd le of br ing ing a § 1 98 3 s ui t— id en ti fy in g afed eral rig ht—b y rel y in g o n t he rig ht s o f th e d eced en t. Cf
. Ste ve n H. St ei ng la ss , W rong ful D ea th A ct ion s an d Se ct ion 198 3 , 60 I nd. L . J. 559, 621 ( 1985 ) (“ Wro ngf ul d eath s ta tut es pe rm it sur viv or s to sue w he n akil lin g vio la te d th ei r de ce de nt’ s r igh ts . . . . [ B] othsur viv al and wro ngf

ul d eath a ct ion s as se rt the ide nti ca l l eg al r igh ts o f the de ce de nt. ”) . I n e sse nc e, the y w er e br ing ing wr ongful d eath suits un der fe deral law . Although the survivo rs’ claim s wer e separate f rom the claim s of the decedents’ estates, the B raz ie r an d Carring er plaintiffs’ claim s necessarily required a f

indin g that the decedents’ deaths wer e w ro ngf ul i n so m e w ay . C onve rs el y , w he the r the de ce de nt’ s r igh ts i n our ca se w er e vio la te d ha s no be ar ing on the abil ity of his m oth er

to ar gue alos s of co m panio nshi p, be ca

use he r al le ge d c au se of

a ct ionis ba se d onavio la tio n of rig ht s p ers on al to he r, no t ri gh ts pe rs on al to th e d eced en t. Fo r th atreas on , Brazier an d Ca rri nge r ar e not

c ontro lli ng. 9circ uits” and then c ompare s the Braz ie r analy sis with the analy sis of the circ uits that “allow a

claimant to ar gue that he ha d a re lationship with t he dec ease d that was c onstitut ionally protec ted and that the homicide of

the dec edent de stroy ed that re lationship and, theref ore, violate d the claimant’s own pr otected c onstitut ional rig hts.” Carringer , 331 F.3d at 850 n.9 (citations omi tte d) . T his c omp ari so n in sin uate s th at th e tw o a

pp ro a c he s a

re in r e sp on se to t

he same qu e sti on , b ut, fo r r e a so ns a lr e a dy dis c us se d, the y

are no t. 17 IV. CONCLUSION O ur hol din g th at

apare nt d oe s no t have ac onst itu tio na l r igh t of com panion ship with an adult chil d is in no way m eant to m inim ize the loss of an a du l tc h i l da s c o mp a r e dt o ami n o r c h i l d . Th e l o s s o f

ac h i l da tan y a g e , u n d e r an y ci rc um stanc es , is one of

the m ost dif fi cu lt expe ri en ce s apare nt c ane ndur e. Whil e the pare nt/ ad

ult c hil d r el at ion shi p is an im portant o ne , the Co nst itu tio n do es not pr ot ectag ai ns t al l en cro ach m en ts by the st at e o nt o t he in te res ts of i nd iv idua ls . Instead, it is the province of the Florida legislature to decide when a parent can re co ve r fo r the los s of

an a dul t c hil d. W e w ill not c ir cum ve nt i ts a uth or ity thr ough anuns uppo rt ed

r ea din g of

the F ourte en th A m en dm ent. AFFIR MED.