IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

CAMPAIGN LEGAL CENTER and 

CATHERINE HINCKLEY KELLEY,

Plaintiffs,

v.

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION,

Defendant,

HILLARY FOR AMERICA and 

CORRECT THE RECORD,

Defendant-Intervenors.

Civil Action No: 1:19-cv-02336-JEB 

PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

The plaintiffs, Campaign Legal Center (“CLC”) and Catherine Hinckley Kelley, by their 

undersigned counsel, and pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56, the Federal Election Campaign Act 

(“FECA”), 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(8)(C), and the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 

§ 706(2)(A), (C), respectfully move this Court for a summary judgment declaring that the failure 

of the Federal Election Commission (“FEC”) to find “reason to believe” that Correct the Record 

and Hillary for America violated FECA and the FEC’s subsequent dismissal of plaintiffs’ 

administrative complaint was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, and otherwise contrary 

to law, and directing the Commission to conform with such declaration within thirty days 

consistent with the Court’s judgment. 

Support for this motion is set forth in the accompanying Memorandum of Points and 

Authorities in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment; the Declaration of Brendan 

Fischer, ECF No. 27-1; the Declaration of Catherine Hinckley Kelley, ECF No. 27-2; and the joint 

appendix containing copies of those portions of the administrative record that are cited or 

Case 1:19-cv-02336-JEB Document 35 Filed 07/24/20 Page 1 of 56
otherwise relied upon, to be filed no later than October 16, 2020. Plaintiffs’ requested relief is set 

forth in the accompanying Proposed Order. Plaintiffs respectfully request oral argument on this 

motion.

Dated: July 24, 2020

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Tara Malloy

Tara Malloy (DC Bar No. 988280)

tmalloy@campaignlegalcenter.org

Megan P. McAllen (DC Bar No. 1020509)

mmcallen@campaignlegalcenter.org

Jeffrey Zalesin (DC Bar No. 1671482)

jzalesin@campaignlegalcenter.org

CAMPAIGN LEGAL CENTER

1101 14th St. NW, Suite 400

Washington, D.C. 20005

(202) 736-2200

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

Case 1:19-cv-02336-JEB Document 35 Filed 07/24/20 Page 2 of 56
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

CAMPAIGN LEGAL CENTER and 

CATHERINE HINCKLEY KELLEY,

Plaintiffs,

v.

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION,

Defendant,

HILLARY FOR AMERICA and 

CORRECT THE RECORD,

Defendant-Intervenors.

Civil Action No: 1:19-cv-02336-JEB 

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES 

IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Tara Malloy (DC Bar No. 988280)

tmalloy@campaignlegalcenter.org

Megan P. McAllen (DC Bar No. 1020509)

mmcallen@campaignlegalcenter.org

Jeffrey Zalesin (DC Bar No. 1671482)

jzalesin@campaignlegalcenter.org

CAMPAIGN LEGAL CENTER

1101 14th St. NW, Suite 400

Washington, D.C. 20005

(202) 736-2200

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

Case 1:19-cv-02336-JEB Document 35 Filed 07/24/20 Page 3 of 56
ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...................................................................................................... iii

INTRODUCTION & SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT................................................................1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.....................................................................................................4

I. Statutory and Regulatory Background.......................................................................................4

A. Coordinated expenditures are in-kind contributions subject to FECA’s contribution 

limits and disclosure requirements.......................................................................................4

B. FEC regulations address coordination through separate rules defining “coordinated 

expenditures” and, more specifically, “coordinated communications.”. .............................6

C. The “internet exemption” carves out only a narrow category of unpaid internet 

communications and uncompensated individual internet activity from regulation.............6

D. The statutory framework for FEC administrative complaints .............................................8

II. Statement of Facts......................................................................................................................9

A. CLC’s administrative complaint..........................................................................................9

B. CTR and HFA’s responses to the administrative complaint..............................................11

C. The FEC’s Office of General Counsel recommends finding reason to believe.................12

D. The Commission deadlocks 2-2 and dismisses the complaint...........................................13

III. Procedural History ..................................................................................................................15

ARGUMENT................................................................................................................................15

I. Jurisdiction...............................................................................................................................15

II. Standard of Review..................................................................................................................16

A. Dismissals “contrary to law” under FECA ........................................................................17

B. APA challenge to regulations ............................................................................................18

III. The Dismissal Was Contrary to Law......................................................................................18

A. The dismissal rested on impermissible interpretations of FECA and FEC regulations.....19

1. FECA unambiguously mandates that coordinated expenditures be regulated as inkind contributions........................................................................................................19

2. The dismissal hinged on a radical expansion of the regulatory “internet 

exemption” that frustrates the Act’s purposes and will lead to gross abuse................21

3. The controlling Commissioners provide no rationale for their exclusion of certain 

“input costs” from regulation as “coordinated expenditures”......................................24

Case 1:19-cv-02336-JEB Document 35 Filed 07/24/20 Page 4 of 56
iii

4. The dismissal was based on an impermissible and unsupported construction of the 

coordination regulations and internet exemption.........................................................26

a. The 2006 Internet Rulemaking did not purport to adopt a categorical 

exception for all “input costs” associated with internet communications............26

b. Commission precedent did not justify radically expanding the internet 

exemption ...............................................................................................................27

B. The dismissal was arbitrary and capricious because it was wholly contrary to the 

administrative record and the legal standard applicable to FEC “reason to believe” 

determinations....................................................................................................................28

1. Abundant record evidence showed that CTR was systematically coordinating with 

HFA while making large, non-exempt expenditures...................................................29

2. The controlling Commissioners have provided no rationale for declining to find 

coordination as to certain activities they concede are not legally exempt...................32

3. The controlling Commissioners committed multiple errors of law in excluding 

key record evidence from consideration......................................................................36

IV. The FEC’s Coordination Rules Are Invalid as Construed......................................................41

A. If the regulatory construction applied to dismiss CLC’s complaint is deemed 

authoritative, it should be invalidated under the APA.......................................................41

B. FECA does not permit a “bright-line” exception to its coordination provisions that 

exempts all activities notionally supporting internet communications..............................43

CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................45

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ..................................................................................................46

Case 1:19-cv-02336-JEB Document 35 Filed 07/24/20 Page 5 of 56
iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

Cases:

Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 296 (2013).................................................................................43

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009)....................................................................................23, 39

Bell Atl. Tel. Cos. v. FCC, 131 F.3d 1044 (D.C. Cir 1997)...........................................................18

Bluman v. FEC, 800 F. Supp. 2d 281 (D.D.C. 2011) (three-judge ct.), aff’d mem., 565 

U.S. 1104 (2012)......................................................................................................................44

Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976)..................................................................................19, 20, 21

Carey v. FEC, 791 F. Supp. 2d 121 (D.D.C. 2011).........................................................................5

Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)..................................18

Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010)................................................................................40

CLC v. FEC, 952 F.3d 352 (D.C. Cir 2020)..................................................................................16

FEC v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee, 533 U.S. 431 (2001) ........17, 18, 23

Common Cause v. FEC, 842 F.2d 436 (D.C. Cir. 1988) ...........................................................9, 18

CREW v. FEC, 243 F. Supp. 3d 91 (D.D.C. 2017)........................................................................43

FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502 (2009).....................................................23, 39

FEC v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee, 454 U.S. 27 (1981)....................................3

In re Carter-Mondale Reelection Committee, Inc., 642 F.2d 538 (D.C. Cir 1980).......................17

In re Federal Election Campaign Act Litigation, 474 F. Supp. 1044 (D.D.C. 1979).............. 37-38

Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400 (2019)...................................................................................18, 43

LaRouche v. FEC, 28 F.3d 137 (D.C. Cir 1994) ...........................................................................42

McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003)...............................................................................4, 20, 28

Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 

(1983)...............................................................................................3, 17, 19, 26, 28, 32, 36, 37

Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644 (2007) ..............................23

Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012).........................................................20

Orloski v. FEC, 795 F.2d 156 (D.C. Cir. 1986)...................................................................2, 17, 22

People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. USDA, 797 F.3d 1087 (D.C. Cir. 

2015) ........................................................................................................................................16

Shays v. FEC, 337 F. Supp. 2d 28 (D.D.C. 2004) (“Shays I”) ..................................................8, 21

Case 1:19-cv-02336-JEB Document 35 Filed 07/24/20 Page 6 of 56
v

Shays v. FEC, 414 F.3d 76 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (“Shays II”)...............................................................3

Shays v. FEC, 528 F.3d 914 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (“Shays III”)......................................................4, 21

SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (en banc) .................................................5

Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016) .............................................................................16

TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19 (2001).....................................................................................23

United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001) ...........................................................17, 18, 23

Statutes:

5 U.S.C. § 551................................................................................................................................15

5 U.S.C. § 706............................................................................................................................2, 15

28 U.S.C. § 1331............................................................................................................................16

52 U.S.C. § 30101..........................................................................................................................15

52 U.S.C. § 30101(8)(A)............................................................................................................4, 19

52 U.S.C. § 30101(8)(A)(i)............................................................................................4, 20, 24, 41

52 U.S.C. § 30101(8)(A)(ii).................................................................................................4, 20, 41

52 U.S.C. § 30101(9)(A)(i)............................................................................................................20

52 U.S.C. § 30101(22).....................................................................................................................6

52 U.S.C. § 30104..........................................................................................................................11

52 U.S.C. § 30104(b)(2)(D).............................................................................................................5

52 U.S.C. § 30104(b)(3)(B).............................................................................................................5

52 U.S.C. § 30104(b)(4)(H)(i).........................................................................................................5

52 U.S.C. § 30104(b)(6)(B)(i) .........................................................................................................5

52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(1)...................................................................................................................8

52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(2).....................................................................................................11, 38, 39

52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(3)...................................................................................................................8

52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(4)(A).......................................................................................................8, 38

52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(6)(A).............................................................................................................9

52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(8)(A).............................................................................................................9

52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(8)(C) .............................................................................................1, 9, 17, 43

52 U.S.C. § 30111(e) .....................................................................................................................42

Case 1:19-cv-02336-JEB Document 35 Filed 07/24/20 Page 7 of 56
vi

52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(1).............................................................................................................5, 11

52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(2)(A).............................................................................................................5

52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(7)(B)(i)..............................................................2, 5, 7, 19, 20, 21, 24, 35, 41

52 U.S.C. § 30118(a) .................................................................................................................5, 11

Regulations:

11 C.F.R. § 100.26...............................................................................................6, 7, 14, 21, 25, 41

11 C.F.R. § 100.52(d)(1)..................................................................................................................4

11 C.F.R. § 100.73...................................................................................................................12, 35

11 C.F.R. § 100.94...........................................................................................................................7

11 C.F.R. § 104.13(a).......................................................................................................................5

11 C.F.R. § 106.4...........................................................................................................................24

11 C.F.R. § 109.20.................................................................................7, 12, 13, 15, 21, 23, 35, 41

11 C.F.R. § 109.20(a).......................................................................................................................6

11 C.F.R. § 109.20(b) ................................................................................................5, 6, 13, 23, 25

11 C.F.R. § 109.21.........................................................................5, 6, 7, 12, 13, 14, 21, 23, 26, 41

11 C.F.R. § 109.21(a)(1)..................................................................................................................6

11 C.F.R. § 109.21(b) ......................................................................................................................5

11 C.F.R. § 109.21(c).......................................................................................................................6

11 C.F.R. § 109.21(d) ......................................................................................................................6

11 C.F.R. § 100.155.........................................................................................................................7

Other Materials: 

Advisory Op. 1982-04 (Apodaca), https://www.fec.gov/data/legal/advisoryopinions/1982-04/ ......................................................................................................................4

Advisory Op. 2006-22 (Jenkens & Gilchrist), 

https://www.fec.gov/data/legal/advisory-opinions/2006-22/.....................................................4

Advisory Op. 2008-10 (VoterVoter.com), https://www.fec.gov/data/legal/advisoryopinions/2008-10 ....................................................................................................................28

Advisory Op. 2010-11 (Commonsense Ten), 

https://www.fec.gov/data/legal/advisory-opinions/2010-11/.....................................................5

Advisory Op. 2011-14 (Utah Bankers Ass’n), https://www.fec.gov/data/legal/

advisory-opinions/2011-14 ......................................................................................................28

Case 1:19-cv-02336-JEB Document 35 Filed 07/24/20 Page 8 of 56
vii

Advisory Op. 2018-13 (OsiaNetwork), https://www.fec.gov/data/legal/advisoryopinions/2018-13/ ....................................................................................................................27

Anna Massoglia, ‘Dark money’ in politics skyrocketed in the wake of Citizens United, 

Ctr. for Responsive Politics (Jan. 27, 2020), https://www.opensecrets.org/news/

2020/01/dark-money-10years-citizens-united .........................................................................44

Factual & Legal Analysis, MUR 5366 (Nov. 17, 2004) (Edwards for President), 

https://www.fec.gov/files/legal/murs/5366/00005473.pdf ........................................................4

FEC, Campaign Guidance: Nonconnected Committees (May 2008), https://www.fec.gov/

resources/cms-content/documents/nongui.pdf.........................................................................24

FEC, Guidebook for Complainants and Respondents on the FEC Enforcement Process

(2012), https://www.fec.gov/resources/cms-content/documents/respondent_guide.pdf.........39

First Gen. Counsel’s Report, MUR 6657 (May 6, 2013) (Akin for Senate), 

https://www.fec.gov/files/legal/murs/6657/13044343282.pdf ................................................27

First Gen. Counsel’s Report, MUR 6729 (Checks and Balances) (Aug. 6, 2014), 

https://www.fec.gov/files/legal/murs/6729/14044363781.pdf ................................................26

Internet Communications, 71 Fed. Reg. 18589 (Apr. 12, 2006) .........................................7, 21, 27

Statement of Policy Regarding Commission Action in Matters at the Initial Stage in 

the Enforcement Process, 72 Fed. Reg. 12545 (Mar. 16, 2007)........................................37, 39

Case 1:19-cv-02336-JEB Document 35 Filed 07/24/20 Page 9 of 56
viii

TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS

APA Administrative Procedure Act

CLC Campaign Legal Center

BCRA Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act

CTR Correct the Record

FEC Federal Election Commission

FECA Federal Election Campaign Act

FGCR First General Counsel’s Report

HFA Hillary for America

MUR Matter Under Review

OGC Office of General Counsel (FEC)

SOR Statement of Reasons

Case 1:19-cv-02336-JEB Document 35 Filed 07/24/20 Page 10 of 56
1

INTRODUCTION & SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Shortly after Hillary Clinton officially announced her candidacy in the 2016 presidential 

election, the super PAC Correct the Record (“CTR”) formed to support her run. By its own 

account, CTR intended to operate as a “surrogate arm” of Clinton’s campaign, Hillary for America 

(“HFA”), that would openly coordinate its activities with HFA while raising and spending millions 

of dollars outside of the contribution restrictions and disclosure requirements in the Federal 

Election Campaign Act (“FECA” or “the Act”). 

The foundation upon which this massive coordination scheme precariously rested was the 

novel claim that all of CTR’s spending qualified for an “internet exemption” promulgated by the 

Federal Election Commission (“FEC” or “Commission”) that carves out certain unpaid internet 

communications from regulation as “coordinated communications.”

But that claim was wrong. 

Plaintiffs Campaign Legal Center and Catherine Hinckley Kelley (collectively, “CLC”) 

filed an administrative complaint in 2016 with the FEC alleging that CTR and HFA, respondents 

in the FEC proceedings and intervenors here, in fact appeared to be coordinating on a host of 

activities, including campaign surrogate training, opposition research and tracking, polling, and 

press outreach, that clearly were not exempt from FECA or FEC coordination rules—under the 

internet exemption or otherwise. The FEC’s Office of General Counsel (“OGC”) agreed and 

recommended finding “reason to believe” CTR and HFA violated the Act. Yet the Commission 

deadlocked, 2-2, on that question, and dismissed CLC’s complaint. 

This action challenges that dismissal on two distinct, although related, grounds: (1) the

dismissal was “contrary to law” under 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(8)(C) because the rationale provided 

for it, as set forth in the two “controlling” Commissioners’ Statement of Reasons (“SOR”), rested

Case 1:19-cv-02336-JEB Document 35 Filed 07/24/20 Page 11 of 56
2

on impermissible interpretations of FECA and Commission regulations, and was arbitrary and

capricious, Orloski v. FEC, 795 F.2d 156 (D.C. Cir. 1986); and alternatively, (2) if the controlling

Commissioners’ construction of the coordination rules and internet exemption is deemed

authoritative, this construction conflicts with FECA and is otherwise arbitrary and capricious in

violation of the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. § 706.

This Court has already recognized that the dismissal rested on impermissible 

interpretations of FECA and FEC regulations, in that it hinged on a construction of the FEC’s 

regulatory internet exemption that “vitiates the plain language of FECA,” ECF No. 33 at 23, 

“unduly compromises the Act’s purposes,” Orloski, 795 F.2d at 164, and is “inconsistent with FEC 

precedent, policy, and regulations.” ECF No. 33 at 21.

According to the controlling Commissioners’ revisionist account of the 2006 internet 

rulemaking, the FEC did not just “exclude[] the vast majority of internet communications from 

regulation as coordinated communications, AR388; it also carved out all “input costs” that may 

support, even if only tangentially or in part, eventual exempt “internet communications (or other 

activities).” AR392. This interpretation of FEC rules runs directly counter to the Act’s clear 

mandate that any expenditure made “in cooperation, consultation, or concert, with, or at the request 

or suggestion of, a candidate . . . shall be considered to be a contribution to such candidate.” 52 

U.S.C. § 30116(a)(7)(B)(i) (emphasis added).

It also turns the internet “exception” into an immense loophole. Indeed, when applied to 

dismiss CLC’s administrative complaint, it sanctioned a presidential candidate’s ability to 

outsource a raft of traditional campaign functions—including expenses for media relations, 

polling, and opposition research—to a super PAC operating “under [the campaign’s] thumb,”

AR091, but unbound by FECA’s limits, on the pretext that these expenditures were mere “input 

Case 1:19-cv-02336-JEB Document 35 Filed 07/24/20 Page 12 of 56
3

costs” for eventual internet communications. AR391-93. Any legal theory that would permit such

blatant evasion of FECA “frustrate[s] the policy that Congress sought to implement” and is

“inconsistent with the statutory mandate.” FEC v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454

U.S. 27, 32 (1981). The controlling Commissioners’ interpretation opens “an immense loophole

that would facilitate the circumvention of the Act’s contribution limits,” and clearly creates “‘the

potential for gross abuse.’” Shays v. FEC, 414 F.3d 76, 98 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (“Shays II”).

Even if the dismissal did not rely on impermissible interpretations of FECA and FEC 

regulations, it would still fail under the second Orloski prong because the controlling group’s 

analysis of CTR’s non-internet activities was arbitrary, capricious, and contrary to the record. To 

find the complaint’s factual allegations insufficient to support a preliminary reason-to-believe 

finding, the controlling Commissioners had to disregard abundant and uncontroverted evidence of

coordinated efforts between CTR and HFA, including CTR’s own public admissions throughout 

the election cycle that it would “work in coordination with the Clinton campaign.” AR005 ¶ 9. 

Moreover, the Commissioners failed to address the clearly erroneous legal defenses for this 

activity advanced by CTR and HFA—such as their claim to the “media exemption,” an argument 

so frivolous the controlling Commissioners just ignored it. For these reasons, too, the dismissal 

falls well short of the reasoned agency decision-making required under Motor Vehicle 

Manufacturers Ass’n of the United States v. State Farm, 463 U.S. 29 (1983).

The controlling Commissioners’ construction of the internet exemption and coordination 

regulations fails APA review for the same reasons it fails under FECA: it is an impermissible 

interpretation of the statutory mandate to regulate coordinated expenditures. Their interpretation

“not only makes it eminently possible” that campaigns will outsource their digital media efforts to

groups operating outside of the Act’s limits, prohibitions, and disclosure requirements, “but also

Case 1:19-cv-02336-JEB Document 35 Filed 07/24/20 Page 13 of 56
4

provides a clear roadmap for doing so.” Shays v. FEC, 528 F.3d 914, 925 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (“Shays

III”) (citing McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 177 n. 69 (2003)). It thus effectively revives “the

exact perception and possibility of corruption Congress sought to stamp out,” id., and ignores

everything that Congress, the Supreme Court, and this Circuit have said about “lax regulation” in

the context of the anti-coordination provisions: “The FEC’s claim that no one will take advantage

of the enormous loophole it has created ignores both history and human nature.” Id. at 927-28.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

I. Statutory and Regulatory Background

A. Coordinated expenditures are in-kind contributions subject to FECA’s contribution 

limits and disclosure requirements.

The Act defines “contribution” as a “gift . . . of money or anything of value made by any 

person for the purpose of influencing any election for Federal office,” 52 U.S.C. § 30101(8)(A)(i), 

including “the payment . . . of compensation for the personal services of another person which are 

rendered to a political committee without charge for any purpose,” id. § 30101(8)(A)(ii). 

The statutory phrase “anything of value” is understood to include “all in-kind 

contributions,” including “the provision of any goods or services without charge or at a charge that 

is less than the usual and normal charge.” 11 C.F.R. § 100.52(d)(1). The Commission has applied 

FECA’s “compensation for personal services” provision to find in-kind contributions where a law 

firm provides free legal services to a candidate to prepare an amicus brief, see Advisory Op. 2006-

22 (Jenkens & Gilchrist), or assists a candidate committee in planning fundraising events and 

collecting contributions, see Factual & Legal Analysis at 2-3, MUR 5366 (Edwards for President)

(Nov. 17, 2004), https://www.fec.gov/files/legal/murs/5366/00005473.pdf, or where an employer 

pays its staff to help renovate a candidate’s campaign headquarters, see Advisory Op. 1982-04 

(Apodaca) at 2-3. 

Case 1:19-cv-02336-JEB Document 35 Filed 07/24/20 Page 14 of 56
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FECA also provides that any expenditure made “in cooperation, consultation, or concert, 

with, or at the request or suggestion of, a candidate, his authorized political committees, or their 

agents” (i.e., coordinated expenditures) “shall be considered to be a contribution to such 

candidate.” 52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(7)(B)(i) (emphasis added). Coordinated expenditures are thus 

subject to FECA’s contribution limits and source restrictions. In the 2015-16 election cycle, a 

candidate could lawfully “accept” $2,700 in coordinated expenditures from an individual, id.

§ 30116(a)(l), or $5,000 from a multicandidate committee, id. § 30116(a)(2)(A), but could not

accept any from corporations or labor unions, id. § 30118(a). See also Contribution limits for 2015-

2016, FEC (Feb. 3, 2015), https://www.fec.gov/updates/contribution-limits-for-2015-2016.

Coordinated expenditures by a committee, as detailed more fully in plaintiffs’ Opposition 

to Intervenors’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 27), are also subject to FECA’s comprehensive 

disclosure requirements. For each reporting period, a candidate-authorized committee must 

disclose and itemize each in-kind contribution in the form of coordinated expenditures it receives, 

52 U.S.C. § 30104(b)(2)(D), and report its date, value, and source, id. § 30104(b)(3)(B). In 

addition, a candidate committee must disclose any coordinated expenditure as both a contribution 

received and an expenditure made by the candidate. 11 C.F.R. §§ 104.13(a), 109.20(b), 109.21(b). 

Likewise, in each reporting period, a non-candidate committee must disclose and itemize each inkind contribution in the form of coordinated expenditures it makes, and report its date, value, and 

the recipient’s name and address. 52 U.S.C. § 30104(b)(6)(B)(i), (b)(4)(H)(i).1

1 CTR is a “hybrid” political committee. Following SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686 (D.C. 

Cir. 2010) (en banc), the FEC created a new class of committees, “super PACs,” unbound by 

FECA contribution limits by virtue of their independence from candidates and parties. Advisory 

Op. 2010-11 (Commonsense Ten). Thereafter, pursuant to the consent judgment in Carey v. FEC, 

791 F. Supp. 2d 121 (D.D.C. 2011), the FEC allowed for “hybrid” committees that make both

unrestricted “soft money” independent expenditures and “hard money” contributions, provided 

they keep these funds in segregated accounts. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 56, 57.

Case 1:19-cv-02336-JEB Document 35 Filed 07/24/20 Page 15 of 56
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B. FEC regulations address coordination through separate rules defining “coordinated 

expenditures” and, more specifically, “coordinated communications.”

The statutory coordination provisions are implemented by an FEC regulation defining 

“coordination” in near-identical terms to mean an expenditure “in cooperation, consultation or 

concert with, or at the request or suggestion of, a candidate, a candidate's authorized committee, 

or a political party committee.” 11 C.F.R. § 109.20(a). Any expenditure “coordinated” within the 

meaning of this regulation is treated as an in-kind contribution to the candidate with whom it was 

coordinated and must be reported as a contribution received and expenditure made by that 

candidate. Id. § 109.20(b).

In addition to this general “coordination” regulation, a separate “coordinated 

communications” rule describes when “public communications” are deemed “coordinated 

expenditures.” Id. § 109.21. To be a “coordinated communication” under this rule, a 

communication must (1) be paid for by a person other than the candidate, id. § 109.21(a)(1); (2) 

satisfy one of the rule’s “content standards,” id. § 109.21(c); and (3) satisfy one of its “conduct 

standards,” id. § 109.21(d).

The “content” standard applies only to “public communications,” which are defined in both 

FECA and Commission regulations as communications made by “broadcast, cable, or satellite

communication, newspaper, magazine, outdoor advertising facility, mass mailing, or telephone 

bank to the general public, or any other form of general public political advertising.” 52 U.S.C. 

§ 30101(22); 11 C.F.R. § 100.26. For all other types of expenditures, the relevant coordination 

regulation remains 11 C.F.R. § 109.20, which by its terms applies unless the expenditure is “made 

for a coordinated communication under 11 C.F.R. § 109.21.” 

C. The “internet exemption” carves out only a narrow category of unpaid internet 

communications and uncompensated individual internet activity from regulation.

In its 2006 internet rulemaking, the FEC carved out a narrow exception from the statutory 

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definition of “public communication”—and by extension, from the coordinated communications

framework in section 109.21—by defining “public communications” to exclude “communications 

over the Internet, except for communications placed for a fee on another person’s Web site.” 

Id. § 100.26. See Internet Communications, 71 Fed. Reg. 18589, 18613 (Apr. 12, 2006) 

(Explanation & Justification). In other words, unpaid internet communications are not “public 

communications” and therefore cannot be regulated as “coordinated communications” under 11 

C.F.R. § 109.21. The Commission also exempted certain internet activities from the definitions of 

“contribution,” 11 C.F.R. § 100.94, and “expenditure,” id. § 100.155, but made clear that it only 

addressed “uncompensated Internet activity” by individuals and groups of individuals. 71 Fed. 

Reg. at 18604 (emphasis added).

In its Explanation and Justification for the rules, the Commission emphasized that a 

political committee’s disbursements to develop communications over the internet can still be

“expenditures,” even if the ultimate internet posts are exempt. For example, “a political 

committee’s purchase of computers for individuals to engage in Internet activities for the purpose 

of influencing a Federal election, remains an ‘expenditure’ by the political committee,” even if the 

internet activities conducted on that computer may have been exempt. 71 Fed. Reg. at 18606. If

this underlying expenditure were coordinated with a candidate campaign, it would still constitute 

a contribution to the campaign. 52 U.S.C. 30116(a)(7)(B)(i); 11 C.F.R. § 109.20. Similarly, the 

Commission noted that “if a political committee pays a blogger to write a message and post it 

within his or her blog entry,” 71 Fed. Reg. at 18604-05, then the underlying payment would be an 

“expenditure”; it follows that if such an “expenditure” is coordinated with a candidate, it would 

constitute an in-kind contribution under 11 C.F.R. § 109.20.

Thus, although the Commission did not address at length whether direct “input costs” 

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connected to exempt internet communications would also qualify for exemption from the 

coordination regulations, it made clear that many payments underlying exempt internet activity 

were still “expenditures,” indicating that the exemption must be read narrowly in this regard.

Indeed, the exemption had to be drawn narrowly, because it was promulgated in the wake 

of a judicial ruling that the FEC’s prior effort to exempt the internet from the coordination rules 

conflicted with FECA’s clear terms, “severely undermine[d]” its purposes, and “create[d] the 

potential for gross abuse.” Shays v. FEC, 337 F. Supp. 2d 28, 69-70 (D.D.C. 2004) (“Shays I”). In

Shays I, this Court struck down an FEC rule providing for the internet “to be excluded wholesale 

from its definition of ‘public communication,’” id. at 68—a new statutory term in the Bipartisan 

Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (“BCRA”). As the Court noted, BCRA was intended “to enlarge

the concept of what constitutes ‘coordination’ under campaign finance law,” id. at 64 (emphasis 

added), and adopting a blanket exemption for “an entire class of political communications . . . 

irrespective of the level of coordination,” id. at 70, conflicted with that purpose. Shays I thus 

recognized that an unduly broad carve-out from the coordination rules for internet activity “would 

permit rampant circumvention of the campaign finance laws and foster corruption.” Id.

D. The statutory framework for FEC administrative complaints

Any person may file a complaint with the FEC alleging a violation of the Act. 52 U.S.C. 

§ 30109(a)(1). After reviewing the complaint and the OGC’s recommendations, the Commission 

votes on whether there is sufficient “reason to believe” the Act was violated to justify an 

investigation. After any investigation, if the Commission finds probable cause to believe a FECA 

violation occurred, id. § 30109(a)(3), it seeks a conciliation agreement with the respondent, which 

may include civil penalties, id. § 30109(a)(4)(A), (a)(5). If the Commission is unable to correct 

the violation and enter a conciliation agreement, it may institute a civil action in federal district 

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court. Id. § 30109(a)(6)(A). All of these decisions require four affirmative votes.

If, at any of these decision-making junctures, fewer than four Commissioners vote to 

proceed, the Commission will dismiss the complaint and the controlling group of Commissioners 

who voted not to proceed must issue a Statement of Reasons to serve as the basis for any judicial 

review. Common Cause v. FEC, 842 F.2d 436, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1988). “Any party aggrieved” by 

the dismissal of its FEC complaint may seek review in this Court to determine whether the 

dismissal was “contrary to law.” 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(8)(A), (B). If the Court finds the FEC’s 

“dismissal of the complaint or the failure to act is contrary to law,” the dismissal should be set 

aside and the matter remanded to the Commission to conform with such declaration within 30 

days, failing which the complainant “may bring, in the name of such complainant, a civil action to 

remedy the violation involved in the original complaint.” Id. § 30109(a)(8)(C).

II. Statement of Facts

A. CLC’s administrative complaint.

On October 6, 2016, plaintiffs filed an administrative complaint (designated Matter Under 

Review (“MUR”) 7146), alleging that CTR made, and HFA accepted, unreported in-kind 

contributions in the form of coordinated expenditures and compensation for personal services, in 

violation of FECA’s reporting requirements and contribution restrictions. AR038-49 ¶¶ 87-111. 

CLC’s administrative complaint, one of five raising similar concerns, documented millions 

of dollars that CTR spent on opposition research, message development, and press outreach, all

for the avowed purpose of promoting Clinton’s candidacy. AR004-31 ¶¶ 7-67. As the complaint 

noted, from CTR’s inception in May 2015, when it relaunched as “a stand-alone ‘super 

PAC,’”AR005 ¶ 9, it was openly “work[ing] in coordination with the Clinton campaign” on the 

theory that all of its spending would qualify for the “internet exemption,” id. Senior CTR staff, 

including its founder and chairman, David Brock, repeatedly and publicly confirmed that this was 

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the committee’s strategy. AR005-07 ¶¶ 9-12; AR011-13 ¶¶ 24, 26-27; AR087-88, 91-92, 96.

But numerous news reports documented that, in fact, CTR and HFA were coordinating on 

a host of activities “not fairly characterized as ‘communications’” exempt from the coordination 

rules, as OGC later found. AR085. Citing published reports and CTR’s own public statements, the

administrative complaint described a range of activities that CTR undertook to achieve its “sole 

mission [of] helping Mrs. Clinton,” AR006 ¶ 11, many of which had no connection to the internet, 

or at most, an extremely marginal one, including: 

• Commissioning an outside polling firm to conduct a poll during a November 2015 

Democratic primary debate. AR015 ¶ 31. 

• Arranging media training for Clinton surrogates with “talking-point tutorials” and 

“on-camera media training,” AR007-08 ¶ 15, and, later, paying the consulting firm 

QRS News Media for “an aggressive surrogate booking program,” AR024 ¶ 51. 

• Sending “trackers” to follow and record Clinton’s Democratic primary opponents. 

AR008-09 ¶¶ 16-17.

• Staffing a “30-person war room” of paid CTR employees who conducted rapid 

response during Clinton’s appearance before the House Select Committee on 

Benghazi; the effort included “flood[ing] the emails of Washington reporters with 

a running, blow-by-blow critique.” AR012-13 ¶¶ 28-29.

• Releasing a “Complete Guide to the Benghazi Select Committee” publication that 

later received a gold “Pollie” award from the American Association of Political 

Consultants—though not in the “Internet/Digital” category. AR018-19 ¶ 38.

• Releasing related opposition research, including a 167-page book, “Committee No. 

10: The True Story of the House Select Committee on Benghazi,” and, as CTR 

described, “more than 46 research-fueled press releases, factchecks, reports, videos 

and other multimedia” during Clinton’s testimony. AR027-28 ¶ 58.

• Placing an op-ed in The Hill by CTR president Brad Woodhouse defending Clinton

and an op-ed in the Detroit Free Press by CTR special adviser Jennifer Granholm 

favorably comparing Clinton’s economic plan to Trump’s. AR027 ¶ 57; AR029-30 

¶ 62.

• Holding a press call to announce the launch of its “Trump Lies” project, which 

involved CTR staff issuing research memos and collecting past Trump statements 

into a searchable database. AR022-23 ¶¶ 46-49.

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• Acquiring leaked text of Trump’s Republican National Convention speech and 

sending it to reporters, which Brock framed as part of CTR’s ongoing efforts to 

“develop relationships with Republicans” and “sleuth out confidential information 

from the Trump campaign.” AR028-29 ¶ 60.

• Professionally producing pro-Clinton video projects, including a “Let’s Talk 

Hillary” project that involved “hundreds of interviews” with Clinton associates and 

aimed to feature “authentic grassroots stories presented in an authentic grassroots 

style.” AR014-15 ¶¶ 30, 32. 

• Maintaining, throughout the 2016 cycle, an “around the clock” “war room” with 

“researchers, communications experts and digital gurus” who produced “point-bypoint fact checks quickly disseminated to the news media.” AR029 ¶ 61.

On the basis of this evidence, the administrative complaint urged the Commission to find 

“reason to believe” that CTR and HFA violated FECA by making or accepting illegal, over-thelimit in-kind contributions, 52 U.S.C. § 30116(a), and contributions from impermissible sources, 

id. § 30118(a), and by failing to report these contributions, id. § 30104; and requested that the 

Commission conduct an immediate investigation under 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(2). AR050 ¶ 112.

B. CTR and HFA’s responses to the administrative complaint.

Administrative respondents CTR and HFA, represented by counsel, responded to CLC’s 

complaint on December 5, 2016 and January 24, 2017, respectively, making similar arguments to 

address the allegations of widespread, undisclosed coordinated activity. Their submissions 

asserted two principal defenses. First, with respect to CTR’s expenditures that had some 

connection to internet communications, such as “research and production related to, and online 

dissemination of web videos, websites (including one featuring poll results), [and] social media 

posts,” respondents argued that “[a]ll of these communications qualify as Internet activities under 

the regulation’s inclusive and non-exhaustive definition and the Commission’s subsequent 

enforcement actions.” AR075; see also AR064-65. Second, with respect to CTR’s activities that 

had little or no connection to the internet—such as reporter outreach, the distribution of books or 

memos, and the placement of op-eds—respondents claimed these activities either were entirely 

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unregulated under FECA and FEC regulations because they were not “public communications,”2

or qualified for the media exemption at 11 C.F.R. § 100.73. AR065-66, 75-76.

Respondents did not deny the nature or scope of CTR’s activities on behalf of HFA as 

alleged in CLC’s complaint, AR090 n.28, or dispute that they were coordinated; their defense was 

based entirely on their own legal interpretations of FEC regulations and guidance. 

HFA did acknowledge making some payments for CTR’s work on “research and tracking,”

claiming to have paid “fair market value” for these services. AR076-77. But the only two reported 

transactions were a May 27, 2015 payment of $275,615 for “research” and a July 17, 2015 payment 

of $6,346 for “research services,” AR089, which together amounted to no more than three percent

of CTR’s overall budget. AR088. Neither mentioned “tracking.”

C. The FEC’s Office of General Counsel recommends finding reason to believe.

After reviewing CLC’s complaint together with the four others, respondents’ written 

replies, and other available evidence, OGC recommended the Commission find reason to believe 

that CTR and HFA violated FECA by making and accepting excessive and prohibited in-kind 

contributions and failing to report those contributions. AR085, 105. OGC highlighted that 

respondents did not “deny or rebut the description or scope of [CTR’s] activities on behalf of 

[HFA],” AR090 n. 28, and noted that “[f]rom its first week of existence as a ‘separate’ entity . . . 

CTR has consistently stated that the entirety of its work would be made for the purpose of 

benefiting Clinton and in coordination with her campaign.” AR120. 

2 Respondents asserted the novel theory that federal campaign finance law does not regulate the 

coordination of certain activities they characterized as “communications,” such as reporter 

outreach or the offline distribution of research, because this activity does not meet the definition 

of “public communication” and thus is not covered by 11 C.F.R. § 109.21. AR064, 72. Left 

unexplained was why this activity, if coordinated, would escape regulation under FECA or the 

FEC’s default rule, 11 C.F.R. § 109.20. See infra Part III.B.2. The controlling Commissioners did 

not discuss or endorse this argument in the SOR.

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OGC rejected respondents’ characterization of their activities as largely subsumed by the 

internet exemption. Instead, it found that most of the $9 million CTR spent went to a “wide array 

of activities,” and most “cannot fairly be described as ‘communications,’ public or otherwise, 

unless that term covers almost every conceivable political activity,” AR110, 124 (emphasis added), 

including the “costs for staff to ‘develop relationships with Republicans’ or for ‘trackers’ to travel 

across the country,” AR125. OGC also rejected respondents’ legal theory that CTR’s activities 

that were not “public communications” were wholly unregulated, noting that under FEC precedent, 

this spending should be analyzed “under the ‘coordinated expenditure’ provision [§ 109.20], rather 

than the ‘coordinated communication’ provision [§ 109.21].” AR101.

Even as to CTR’s activities that did have some connection to the internet, OGC found that 

respondents had overreached by trying to claim the exemption for expenses that were not properly 

characterized as costs incurred to produce exempt internet communications (or, in the controlling 

Commissioners’ coinage, “input costs”). As OGC explained regarding CTR’s expenditures for 

polling, while “costs for the online placement of [] poll results on its own website would not be a 

cost for a ‘public communication,” the payment for “the underlying polling, made in coordination 

with HFA . . . would be a coordinated expenditure under 11 C.F.R. § 109.20(b) and, thus, an inkind contribution.” AR100.

D. The Commission deadlocks 2-2 and dismisses the complaint.

On June 4, 2019, the FEC’s then-four Commissioners deadlocked 2-2 on whether to find 

reason to believe that CTR and/or HFA had violated any provision of FECA, and dismissed the 

administrative complaint. AR372-75. They also deadlocked, 3-1, on whether to authorize defense 

of any suit by the complainants challenging the dismissal. AR374. On August 21, 2019, eighteen

days after the expiration of the 60-day statutory period for seeking judicial review of the dismissal, 

the two controlling Commissioners issued their SOR. AR380-97; see also Am. Compl. ¶ 85.

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The controlling Commissioners drew the opposite conclusion from OGC, largely because 

they excluded wide swaths of the available record and disregarded the legal authorities cited by 

OGC. With respect to CTR’s expenditures that the controlling Commissioners believed related to 

internet communications—“for example, computer equipment, office space, software, web 

hosting, video equipment, placing a poll online, and salaries for individuals to conduct internet 

activity,” AR391—the Commissioners determined they were exempt internet communications, or 

“inputs” for such communications, under 11 C.F.R. § 109.21. Their theory was that an expenditure 

cannot be deemed “coordinated” if it in any way supports, or can be retrospectively “associated” 

with, an internet communication exempted from the definition of “public communication” in 11 

C.F.R. § 100.26. They also rejected the possibility that overhead expenditures should be allocated 

between the exempt and non-exempt activities they supported, claiming that “exempting only 

those component fees deemed essential for the internet communication’s placement would 

eviscerate the internet exemption . . . and potentially chill political speech online.” AR392.

As for the universe of CTR’s spending that even the controlling Commissioners conceded 

was “unrelated to creating and disseminating online political communications,” AR390, they 

argued that plaintiffs had not alleged facts sufficient to establish coordination conclusively,

“transaction-by-transaction,” and had “fail[ed] to meet their burden.” AR395. In so holding, the 

Commissioners chose to disregard public statements by CTR, as provided in CLC’s complaint and 

otherwise obtained by OGC, see AR005-7 ¶¶ 9-12; AR011-13 ¶¶ 24, 26-27; AR087-88, 91-92, as 

well as corroborating documents posted on Wikileaks that were presented in related complaints, 

but not in CLC’s, AR092-94. They also reached this conclusion without any mention that, as noted 

by OGC, neither respondent had disputed that many of these activities had in fact been coordinated. 

Finally, the controlling Commissioners failed to address the respondents’ legal arguments 

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pertaining to the media exemption and the applicability of 11 C.F.R. § 109.20 to coordinated 

activity that did not constitute “public communications.”

On September 20, 2019, then-Chair Ellen Weintraub issued a dissenting SOR explaining 

why she voted in favor of OGC’s recommendation. AR400-10. Noting the substantial evidence 

even apart from any materials obtained from Wikileaks, such as CTR’s own public statements, 

and emphasizing that “much of CTR’s spending took place—all or at least in part—off the 

internet,” she concluded that the complaints presented the FEC with “ample evidence . . . to 

support a coordination determination at the pre-[reason to believe] stage.” AR404-07.

III. Procedural History

Plaintiffs filed this action on August 2, 2019, challenging the dismissal of their complaint 

as contrary to law. Compl. (ECF No. 1). On August 21, 2019, seventy-eight days after the 

dismissal, the controlling Commissioners issued their SOR, and plaintiffs amended their complaint 

on October 29, 2019 to address its belated issuance. Am. Compl. (ECF No. 15). The FEC has not

appeared to defend this action, but CTR and HFA have intervened to do so in the agency’s place.

On February 4, 2020, Defendant-Intervenors moved to dismiss, arguing that CLC lacked 

standing and had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. On June 4, 2020, this 

Court denied the motion, holding that CLC had “proven its standing” and “present[ed] significant 

and largely uncontroverted evidence that the Commission’s dismissal of its administrative 

complaint was ‘contrary to law.’” ECF No. 33 at 17, 28 (reported at CLC v. FEC, --F. Supp. 3d--

--, 2020 WL 2996592 (D.D.C. June 4, 2020)).

ARGUMENT

I. Jurisdiction

This action arises under federal law—specifically FECA, 52 U.S.C. § 30101 et seq., and 

the APA, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-706—and the Court has federal subject-matter jurisdiction over CLC’s 

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FECA and APA claims pursuant to 52 U.S.C. § 30109 and 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Moreover, as this 

Court has already recognized, “CLC has proven its standing to bring this case.” ECF No. 33 at 17.

Plaintiffs have established Article III standing by showing that they (1) “suffered an injury 

in fact,” (2) “fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant,” and (3) “likely to be 

redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016).

First, “a denial of access to information qualifies as an injury in fact . . . where a statute (on 

the claimants’ reading) requires that the information be publicly disclosed and there is no reason 

to doubt their claim that the information would help them.” CLC v. FEC, 952 F.3d 352, 356 (D.C. 

Cir. 2020). In denying intervenors’ Motion to Dismiss, the Court “d[o]ve into the record” and 

found that plaintiffs’ suit, if successful, would reveal information that is currently unavailable. See

ECF No. 33 at 11-13. And it is “clear” that access to this missing information would help plaintiffs. 

Id. at 11. “CLC depends on accurate and complete reporting of campaign finance information 

under FECA to carry out programmatic activities that are central to its mission,” Decl. of Brendan 

Fischer ¶ 9 (ECF No. 27-2); and Ms. Kelley uses FECA disclosure information “to assess 

candidates for elective office, to evaluate the range of political messages that [she] hear[s] from 

various speakers, and to monitor the influence of campaign money on officeholders and public 

policy.” Decl. of Catherine Hinckley Kelley ¶ 5 (ECF No. 27-1).

CLC has also proven its organizational injury because the dismissal injured CLC’s interest 

and CLC has “used its resources to counteract that harm,” ECF No. 33 at 14 (citing PETA v. USDA, 

797 F.3d 1087, 1094 (D.C. Cir. 2015)). See, e.g., Fischer Decl. ¶¶ 9, 20; ECF No. 33 at 17.

Finally, plaintiffs meet the causation and redressability elements of standing. The FEC 

caused plaintiffs’ injury by dismissing their complaint and thereby depriving them of FECArequired disclosure information from CTR and HFA, and that injury is likely to be redressed if this 

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Court remands the matter to the FEC for a new determination under the proper legal standards. 

II. Standard of Review

A. Dismissals “contrary to law” under FECA

The Commission’s decision to dismiss an administrative complaint will be set aside if it is 

“contrary to law,” 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(8)(C), meaning the dismissal (1) rests on an impermissible 

interpretation of law, or (2) is “arbitrary or capricious, or an abuse of discretion.” Orloski, 795 

F.2d at 161. 

The test for whether the FEC’s dismissal of a complaint was arbitrary, capricious, or an 

abuse of discretion under Orloski is similar to the “arbitrary [or] capricious” standard applied under 

the APA. In re Carter-Mondale Reelection Comm., Inc., 642 F.2d 538, 550-51 & n.6 (D.C. Cir. 

1980); see also Shays II, 414 F.3d at 96 (“[W]hether a statute is unreasonably interpreted is close 

analytically to the issue whether an agency’s actions under a statute are unreasonable.”). Under 

that analysis, a court must set aside agency action “if the agency has relied on factors which 

Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the 

problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence . . . or is so 

implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise.” 

State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43. 

FEC dismissals are subject to judicial review under the contrary-to-law standard regardless 

of whether they spring from a majority vote or a deadlock. However, although the Court’s review 

under FECA is deferential, the controlling Commissioners’ rationale does not receive the added 

boost of Chevron or Auer deference because it does not reflect an exercise of delegated authority 

to make “rules carrying the force of law.” United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 227 (2001). 

To qualify for either form of deference, an FEC interpretation of FECA or Commission regulations 

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“must be one actually made by the agency,” meaning “it must be the agency’s ‘authoritative’ or 

‘official position.’” Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2416 (2019) (citing Mead, 533 U.S. at 257-

59 & n. 6 (Scalia, J., dissenting)). A legal interpretation announced by fewer than four FEC 

Commissioners is neither. Common Cause, 842 F.2d at 449 n.32 & 453 (recognizing that 

Statement of Reasons is “not law” and does not create “binding legal precedent or authority for 

future cases”). 

B. APA challenge to regulations

If the regulatory construction applied to dismiss CLC’s complaint is deemed 

authoritative—i.e., if it reflects a binding Commission interpretation of FECA’s coordination 

provisions promulgated in exercise of its delegated authority to construe the Act, see Mead, 533 

U.S. at 229-30—this Court should apply “the two-step analysis” set forth in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. 

v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), to determine whether the coordination 

regulations and internet exception, as construed, are valid interpretations of FECA. Shays II, 414 

F.3d at 96. At the first step, the Court asks whether the statute is ambiguous. If it is, the Court 

proceeds to the second step and asks “whether the agency’s interpretation is reasonable.” Id. The 

agency’s interpretation can be reasonable only if it is “consistent with the statutory purpose and 

legislative history.” Bell Atl. Tel. Cos. v. FCC, 131 F.3d 1044, 1049 (D.C. Cir. 1997).

III. The Dismissal Was Contrary to Law.

In considering whether to find “reason to believe” that CTR and HFA violated the Act, the 

Commission had before it a record showing that a substantial amount of CTR’s nearly $10 million 

in expenditures was not connected to exempt internet communications, but instead funded 

activities like opposition research, surrogate training, and “rapid response” press outreach—and at 

least some portion of this offline activity, by CTR’s own admission, was conducted in coordination 

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with the Clinton campaign. See, e.g., AR041 ¶ 91. Nevertheless, the controlling Commissioners 

found that not one dollar spent by this massive joint operation constituted an in-kind contribution.

The dismissal of CLC’s complaint fails under both Orloski prongs: first, because the 

controlling Commissioners grounded their votes to dismiss on impermissible interpretations of 

FECA and FEC regulations that radically narrow the scope of the Act’s coordination provisions

by radically expanding the regulatory internet exemption; and second, because they arbitrarily 

disregarded whole swaths of the factual record and “entirely failed to consider [] important 

aspects” of the matter to reach that result. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43.

A. The dismissal rested on impermissible interpretations of FECA and FEC regulations. 

In applying the internet exemption to dismiss the substantial majority of CLC’s allegations 

against CTR and HFA, the controlling Commissioners committed at least two fundamental errors 

of law: (1) they defied FECA’s unambiguous mandate to regulate all “expenditures” made “in 

cooperation, consultation, or concert with, or at the request or suggestion of,” a candidate as inkind contributions to that candidate, 52 U.S.C. §§ 30101(8)(a); 30116(a)(7)(B)(i); and (2) relied 

on a radically expanded version of the internet exemption that compromises FECA’s purposes and

is unsustainable under the Commission’s own rules and precedent. 

1. FECA unambiguously mandates that coordinated expenditures be regulated as 

in-kind contributions. 

Since Buckley, the Supreme Court has recognized that “the primary interest served by 

[FECA’s contribution] limitations and, indeed, by the Act as a whole, is the prevention of 

corruption and the appearance of corruption.” 424 U.S. at 25. FECA’s candidate contribution limits 

are thus essential to FECA’s core anticorruption purposes. Failing to regulate coordinated 

expenditures, as the Court has likewise made clear, fatally undermines the contribution limits and 

compromises the Act’s purposes, because “expenditures controlled by or coordinated with the 

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candidate . . . might well have virtually the same value to the candidate as a contribution and would 

pose similar dangers of abuse.” Id. at 46. See also McConnell, 540 U.S. at 221-22 (“[E]xpenditures 

made after a ‘wink or nod’ often will be ‘as useful to the candidate as cash.’”). 

Accordingly, “Congress has always treated expenditures made ‘at the request or suggestion 

of’ a candidate as coordinated,” id., and the Supreme Court has consistently affirmed that

“coordinated expenditures are treated as contributions rather than expenditures . . . [to] prevent 

attempts to circumvent the Act through prearranged or coordinated expenditures amounting to 

disguised contributions.” Buckley, 424 U.S. at 46-47. 

To this end, “contributions” and “expenditures” are defined broadly as any “gift” or 

“payment” made “for the purpose of influencing any election for Federal office,” 52 U.S.C. 

§ 30101(8)(A)(i), (9)(A)(i). Further, “expenditures made by any person in cooperation, 

consultation, or concert, with, or at the request or suggestion of, a candidate, his authorized 

political committees, or their agents, shall be considered to be a contribution to such candidate.” 

Id. § 30116(a)(7)(B)(i) (emphasis added).

In statutory interpretation, “the best evidence of Congress’s intent is the statutory text.” 

Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 544 (2012). Here, as FECA’s statutory text 

makes clear and four decades of Supreme Court precedent confirmsd, Congress intended that any

“expenditure” coordinated with a candidate “shall” be considered a contribution to such candidate.

52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(7)(B)(i). That both statutory definitions encompass “anything of value” 

contributed or expended to influence “any election for federal office,” id. § 30101(8)(a)(i), 

(9)(a)(i), and contributions specifically include compensation for personal services “rendered to a 

political committee without charge for any purpose,” id. § 30101(8)(a)(ii) (emphasis added), 

further shows Congress’s intent to regulate broadly. Paired with the mandatory language in section 

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30116(a)(7)(B)(i), the congressional directive is plain on the Act’s face. 

The controlling Commissioners ignored this unambiguous mandate and expanded a 

regulatory exemption to “permit an entire class of political communications”—and noncommunication expenditures “to be completely unregulated irrespective of the level of 

coordination.” Shays I, 337 F. Supp. 2d at 70. An near-identical approach was previously

invalidated by Shays I as contrary Congress’s clear directive to regulate coordinated expenditures, 

id. at 69-70, and this Court should do the same. Even if the relevant statutory terms were

ambiguous, courts “must reject administrative constructions . . . that frustrate the policy that 

Congress sought to implement.” Shays III, 528 F.3d at 919.

2. The dismissal hinged on a radical expansion of the regulatory “internet 

exemption” that frustrates the Act’s purposes and will lead to gross abuse. 

FECA’s text and history make clear that its comprehensive scheme of contribution limits, 

source restrictions, and disclosure requirements demands vigilant regulation of the line between 

expenditures that are “totally independent” from candidates and those coordinated with

candidates. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 47 (emphasis added). 

The FEC has implemented this broad mandate through two regulations relevant here. The 

first, 11 C.F.R. § 109.20, mirrors the statutory language and applies to coordinated expenditures 

generally, except for those “made for a coordinated communication” under 11 C.F.R. § 109.21. 

The more specific regulation, 11 C.F.R. § 109.21, applies only to “coordinated communications,” 

which are expenditures for “public communications” that meet specified content, conduct, and 

payment prongs. Id. § 109.21(a), (c)-(d). As detailed above, see supra at 6-8 (Stmt. of Case I.B),

the FEC’s internet rulemaking carved out only a narrow exception to the “public communication”

definition upon which section 109.21 relies, i.e., for “communications over the Internet” that were 

not “placed for a fee on another person’s Web site.” Id. § 100.26; 71 Fed. Reg. 18589. The

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dismissal here was primarily based on an application of this exemption.

As this Court has recognized, the controlling group’s unbounded interpretation of the 

internet exemption, and the “input costs” to which the exemption supposedly extends, “creates a

loophole that effectively vitiates the plain language of FECA.” ECF No. 33 at 23. According to 

the controlling Commissioners, the internet exemption not only exempts internet communications 

not “placed for a fee” from the coordination rules, but also encompasses without limitation all

“input costs” “incurred by a speaker to produce [exempt] internet communication[s].” AR391. To 

illustrate this concept, the controlling group discusses the input costs that might be associated with 

producing a notice of a candidate endorsement, which, they say, includes, at a minimum, “staff 

time, computer usage, and electricity,” but also possibly “additional overhead and other expenses, 

such as for travel and the services of consultants, graphic designers, videographers, actors, and 

other specialists.” AR392. 

In applying their “input costs” rule, however, the controlling Commissioners stretch the 

internet exemption beyond recognition. Not only do they treat any cost “associated” with an unpaid 

internet communication as an “input” cost, but they include in such “input costs” general overhead 

disbursements only partly attributable (at most) to such exempt internet communications. Id.

Under their approach, one dollar of internet-related spending operates to immunize an otherwise

regulable expense from regulation in its entirety, regardless of whether or to what degree it also 

supports coordinated activities that occur entirely offline. 

A regulatory construction that opens a loophole of this magnitude self-evidently “create[s] 

the potential for gross abuse,” Orloski, 795 F.2d at 165, in that it purports to allow precisely what 

FECA proscribes. The circumvention concern is not illusory. As the Supreme Court recognized 

with respect to party-coordinated expenditures in FEC v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign 

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Committee, if a candidate could “arrange for a [super PAC] to foot his bills” or coordinate 

“spending on virtually identical items as his own campaign funds,” the risk that “contribution 

limits would be eroded” was “beyond serious doubt.” 533 U.S. 431, 457, 460 (2001). So too here. 

“If suddenly every dollar of spending could be coordinated” with federal candidates but escape 

regulation through the simple expedient of posting some product of that spending online, “the 

inducement to circumvent would almost certainly intensify.” Id. at 460. This is why, as the 

Supreme Court has acknowledged, FECA and its regulations must be construed to minimize 

available “channels for circumventing contribution and coordinated spending limits.” Id. at 432, 

455. The controlling Commissioners failed to heed this instruction. 

Moreover, the controlling Commissioners’ fixation on viewing almost all of CTR’s activity 

through the lens of the internet exemption and coordinated communications framework effectively 

turns 11 C.F.R. § 109.20(b)—and the statutory authority upon which it rests—into a superfluity. 

Their SOR provides no basis for refusing to look beyond section 109.21 and the “public 

communication” definition, when section 109.20, by its terms, applies to expenditures that are not 

“made for a coordinated communication under 11 C.F.R. § 109.21.” AR102 (CTR’s non-internet 

activity is “properly analyzed as in-kind contributions to HFA under the coordinated expenditure 

provision of 11 C.F.R. § 109.20(b) rather than the coordinated communication provision of 11 

C.F.R. § 109.21”). The Commission cannot “simply disregard rules that are still on the books.” 

FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515 (2009). Cf. Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders 

v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 668-69 (2007) (rejecting interpretation that would render 

regulation “redundant”); TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001) (noting statutes cannot be 

read to make text “superfluous, void, or insignificant”). 

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3. The controlling Commissioners provide no rationale for their exclusion of 

certain “input costs” from regulation as “coordinated expenditures.”

The controlling Commissioners’ treatment of two specific categories of CTR’s 

expenditures warrants particular attention: (1) CTR’s payments for polling and (2) its general 

overhead expenses supporting multiple organization functions. As to both categories, the rote 

application of the internet exemption exposes the fundamental unlawfulness of their approach. 

First, with respect to CTR’s expenditures to commission a private polling firm to conduct 

polls benefitting the campaign, AR392, it is well established that payments for polling, if 

coordinated with a candidate or her agents, qualify as in-kind contributions to the candidate. Like 

opposition research or a mailing list3, a poll is a “thing of value” and expressly addressed as such 

in FEC regulations, and coordinated expenditures associated with polling are regulated 

accordingly. See 52 U.S.C. §§ 30101(8)(A)(i), 30116(a)(7)(B)(i); 11 C.F.R. § 106.4 (providing 

that “[t]he purchase of opinion poll results by a political committee or other person not authorized 

by a candidate to make expenditures and the subsequent acceptance of the poll results by a 

candidate . . . is a contribution in-kind by the purchaser to the candidate”); see also FEC, 

Campaign Guidance: Nonconnected Committees 25 (2008), https://www.fec.gov/resources/cmscontent/documents/nongui.pdf. Notwithstanding this authority, the controlling Commissioners 

concluded summarily that CTR’s payments for polling were covered by the internet exception. On 

their view, as soon as CTR posted the poll on its website, its expenditures to commission the poll 

transformed into “input expenses” that were “necessary to make” an exempt internet 

communication, “and the inputs would not be in-kind contributions because the resulting internet 

3

Indeed, CTR recognized that at least some of its expenditures in these categories would 

constitute in-kind contributions to HFA; for instance, CTR accepted payment for “research” and 

“research services” from HFA, AR089, even though this research also presumably supported 

exempt online activity. It is unclear why CTR thought polling would be treated differently.

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communication would not be in-kind contributions.” AR392. 

As OGC emphasized, however, even if CTR’s “costs for the online placement of the poll 

results on its own website would not be a cost for a ‘public communication’ under 11 C.F.R. 

§ 100.26,” that cannot end the analysis: 

CTR’s payment for the underlying polling, made in coordination with HFA as it

appears all CTR activity was, would be a coordinated expenditure under 11 C.F.R. 

§ 109.20(b), and, thus, an in-kind contribution. The fact that the polling results were 

subsequently transmitted over the internet does not retroactively render the costs of 

the polling a “communication” cost.

AR100. The controlling Commissioners’ pliable view of “input costs” all but invites political 

committees to convert any coordinated expenditure into an unregulable “input cost” through the 

simple expedient of “posting a message on Facebook that purports to use some advantage 

conferred by the expenditure.” ECF No. 33 at 23-24. 

Second, when paired with their expansive view of the “input costs” that qualify for the 

internet exemption, the controlling group’s refusal to require allocation of multi-purpose 

expenditures only compounds the defects of their approach. As OGC highlighted, most of CTR’s 

nearly $10 million in spending went toward “purposes that [were] not communication-specific, 

including payroll, salary, travel, lodging, meals, rent, fundraising consulting, computers, digital 

software, domain services, email services, equipment, event tickets, hardware, insurance, office 

supplies, parking, and shipping.” AR089. These significant overhead expenses supported the full 

range of CTR’s activities, including both internet communications and offline activities that even 

the controlling Commissioners did not claim were exempt—e.g., strategic press outreach, research, 

tracking, and surrogacy trainings. 

Instead of requiring allocation, the controlling group excluded CTR’s general overhead 

expenditures entirely, on the ground that “[r]equiring speakers to further allocate overhead 

expenses across internet communications (or other activities) and then exempting only those 

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component fees deemed essential for the internet communication’s placement would eviscerate 

the internet exemption.” AR392. Here, however, CTR’s operating costs are not direct or indirect 

input expenses for exempt expenditures—or, in many instances, related to exempt activity at all. 

At a minimum, the controlling group did not “articulate a satisfactory explanation,” 

“including a rational connection between the facts found and the choice made,” State Farm, 463 

U.S. at 43, for the conclusion that CTR’s payments for general overhead expenses supporting 

multiple activities were “input costs” for covered internet communications, and thus were entirely 

exempt from treatment as in-kind contributions. AR392-93.

4. The dismissal was based on an impermissible and unsupported construction of 

the coordination regulations and internet exemption.

The controlling Commissioners’ myopic focus on 11 C.F.R. § 109.21 and the “public 

communication” definition—and their extreme expansion of the internet exception to those rules—

also conflicts with the FEC’s own rules and finds no support in agency precedent. 

a. The 2006 Internet Rulemaking did not purport to adopt a categorical exception 

for all “input costs” associated with internet communications.

The controlling Commissioners’ assertion that the internet exemption has always 

comprehensively embraced all conceivable “input costs” ignores what the FEC actually did in its 

2006 internet rulemaking. As OGC has observed, “[n]either the [internet] regulation itself nor the 

Commission’s accompanying explanation and justification expressly address whether the 

regulation also exempts production costs that are incurred unrelated to the advertisement’s 

dissemination over the internet.” First Gen. Counsel’s Rpt. (“FGCR”) at 6, MUR 6729 (Checks 

and Balances) (Aug. 6, 2014), https://www.fec.gov/files/legal/murs/6729/14044363781.pdf. But 

even if the rulemaking record were silent on this point, that would be no justification for an

interpretation that dismantles the entire statutory scheme.

Far from supporting a blanket exemption for input costs, however, the rulemaking record 

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suggests that the exemption was far narrower. See supra at 7-8 (Stmt. of Case I.C). In promulgating 

the rules, for example, the FEC confirmed that computer purchases and payments to bloggers can 

be “expenditures” even if some of the final products, such as the blogs themselves, fall under the 

internet exemption. AR043-45 ¶¶ 94-95 (citing 71 Fed. Reg. at 18604-06). The rulemaking record 

makes clear the exception was addressed primarily to uncompensated activities by individuals and 

non-committees—and not intended to exempt every possible expense incurred by single-candidate 

super PACs like CTR that happen to engage in some internet activity. Cf. Advisory Op. 2018-13 

(OsiaNetwork) at 6 (noting “the Commission did not intend the definition [of internet activities] 

to be so broad as to encompass every activity that might make incidental use of the internet”).

b. Commission precedent did not justify radically expanding the internet exemption.

FEC precedent likewise did not justify dramatically expanding the exemption. The 

controlling SOR relies heavily on MUR 6657 (Akin for Senate), which bears no resemblance to 

this case. First, as OGC explained in justifying its recommendation not to proceed there, “the 

alleged prospective coordinated communications . . . never occurred.” FGCR at 2, MUR 6657 

(May 6, 2013), https://www.fec.gov/files/legal/murs/6657/13044343282.pdf (emphasis added). 

Second, the only question OGC was examining with respect to “input costs” was whether 

expenditures for “‘Email List Rental’ or ‘Online Processing,’” id. at 6, alone were sufficient to 

cause the group’s internet communications to be “placed for a fee,” thereby rendering the internet 

exemption entirely inapplicable. Id. at 6-7. The question was not whether a broader category of 

disbursements not tied to online communications, such as CTR’s overhead expenses here, should 

be exempt as “input costs.”

The other FEC precedents cited in the SOR also do not validate their unbounded approach 

to input costs. None of these authorities involved a remotely comparable coordination scheme, or

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indeed, coordinated activity at all. See, e.g., AR390 (citing Advisory Op. 2011-14 (Utah Bankers 

Ass’n) (approving corporate PAC’s request to operate an email list soliciting contributions to 

particular candidates, where the PAC appended a detailed policy confirming that it was structured 

to operate independently of candidates); Advisory Op. 2008-10 (VoterVoter.com) (permitting 

nonpartisan commercial vendor to operate online marketplace facilitating the purchase and sale 

of political ads, where unpaid ad creators and broadcast buyers were transacting at arm’s length 

and not coordinating with candidates or each other)).

Nor was the interpretation permissible because it avoids “chill[ing] political speech 

online.” AR392. “[S]o would regulating nothing at all, and that would hardly comport with the 

statute.” Shays II, 414 F.3d at 101. Besides, “the rationale for affording special protection to wholly 

independent expenditures” does not extend to coordinated expenditures. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 

221 (emphasis added). Likewise, the First Amendment concerns noted in the rulemaking were 

reserved for individual citizens and bloggers who might incidentally communicate about a 

candidate online; they do not extend to a “full-fledged media machine dedicated to providing HFA 

with services only tangentially related to internet communications.” AR402.

B. The dismissal was arbitrary and capricious because it was wholly contrary to the 

administrative record and the legal standard applicable to FEC reason-to-believe 

determinations.

The agency action at issue here is not a final determination, based on a full evidentiary 

review, of whether CTR and HFA violated FECA. Instead, plaintiffs challenge the controlling 

Commissioners’ failure to find there was even reason to believe a violation occurred. At this stage, 

the Court need not decide whether CTR and HFA actually violated FECA, but must rule for 

plaintiffs if it concludes that the controlling Commissioners’ rationale for finding no reason to 

believe is inconsistent with the administrative record, or otherwise arbitrary or capricious or 

contrary to law. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43.

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That conclusion is inescapable here. Uncontroverted evidence in the record showed that 

(1) CTR systematically coordinated its activities with HFA, and (2) CTR spent millions of dollars 

on types of expenditures that, when coordinated with a candidate, constitute in-kind contributions. 

Together, these facts make it all but impossible that CTR could not have made excessive in-kind 

contributions to HFA. Therefore, “[t]he Commissioners’ conclusion that there was no ‘reason to 

believe’ that ‘Correct the Record’s expenditures for other activities’ than those they claimed under 

the internet exception were ‘in-kind contributions to Hillary for America’ runs contrary to 

uncontested evidence.” ECF No. 33 at 25-26.

1. Abundant record evidence showed that CTR was systematically coordinating 

with HFA while making large, non-exempt expenditures. 

The controlling SOR claims that CLC’s administrative complaint “fail[ed] to provide the 

Commission with information showing . . . that expenditures were made ‘in cooperation, 

consultation, or concert, with, or at the request or suggestion of’ [HFA].” AR393. But the record 

shows that CTR was created specifically to coordinate its activities with HFA and adhered to that 

mission throughout the 2016 election cycle. Even assuming that hacked information published by 

Wikileaks is ignored—and this information was raised only in the four FEC complaints not filed 

by CLC—the record was more than sufficient to provide reason to believe that CTR and HFA 

coordinated systematically. “In fact, the non-Wikileaks information shows that CTR existed solely

to make expenditures in cooperation, consultation or concert with, or at the request or suggestion 

of Clinton and HFA and that it conducted its activities, as Brock phrased it, under HFA’s thumb.” 

AR098. An investigation was warranted to uncover the full extent of that coordination.

Most obviously, CTR and its agents repeatedly and publicly announced their coordination 

with HFA. For example, the press release announcing CTR’s establishment stated that it would 

“be allowed to coordinate with campaigns.” AR359. Similarly, Brock was quoted in a September 

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2015 Time magazine profile as saying he worked on “the ‘coordinated’ side of the Clinton 

campaign.” AR011 ¶ 24. According to the profile, CTR “raises unlimited funds outside the 

regulated campaign finance system. But since it does not pay for advertising advocating her 

election, he says he can continue under current rules to talk to her, and her campaign staff about 

strategy, while deploying the unregulated money he raises to advocating her election online, 

through the press, or through other means of non-paid communications.” Id. As then-Chair 

Weintraub noted, “[t]hese representations by CTR are not the puffery of an entity acting outside 

the orbit of HFA. CTR leadership spoke publicly about communications with senior HFA 

personnel, confirming that CTR and HFA worked closely together to benefit HFA.” AR401.

After the election, in December 2016, Brock sat for a podcast interview and discussed CTR. 

As the controlling Commissioners noted, Brock’s comments in this interview “reinforce what we 

already know from [other] information in the record.” AR386. Brock explained that “the 

coordinated status was, you’re basically under their thumb but you don’t have to run everything 

by them.” AR091. Brock “acknowledged that he would pick up the phone and talk to Clinton 

campaign manager Robbie Mook and occasionally campaign chairman John Podesta.” Id.

The controlling SOR grasps at straws to downplay the significance of Brock’s admissions. 

According to the controlling Commissioners, the fact that Brock made any public statements 

without HFA’s prior authorization suggests that CTR’s activities were not “fully coordinated,” and 

CTR’s compliance with Mook’s request to “chill out” is not by itself an example of coordinated 

spending. AR386. These quibbles miss the point: the examples Brock recounted in the podcast 

interview illustrate that CTR was ultimately “under [HFA’s] thumb” and took HFA’s directions 

on how to allocate its budget. AR091. That HFA did not specifically pre-approve every CTR action 

does not mean that CTR was not making many expenditures in “cooperation, consultation or 

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concert with, or at the request or suggestion of” HFA. And in requesting that CTR not make certain 

expenditures, HFA was “coordinating”—by orchestrating CTR’s overall program and conserving 

CTR resources so that more could be spent on activities that HFA did support. 

Beyond CTR’s own direct admissions, another type of evidence confirming coordination 

was apparent synchronization in the timing and content of CTR and HFA messaging. See, e.g., 

AR009-10 ¶ 20 (noting CTR email to supporters highlighting Clinton’s campaign finance plan); 

AR011-12 ¶ 26 (Fox News noting that a senior Clinton campaign staffer and CTR President Brad 

Woodhouse had tweeted identical messages about Clinton around the same time). CTR had 

advance, inside knowledge of strategic decisions by HFA, and provided comments to journalists 

based on this knowledge. See AR299 (New York Times article quoting Brock on Clinton campaign 

strategy and noting that CTR “coordinates with the campaign”). Not surprisingly, journalists and 

observers widely understood that CTR was an agent or collaborator of HFA. See id.; AR178 

(Washington Post noting in July 2015 that “Clinton’s campaign is working hand-in-glove with 

Correct the Record”); AR215 (Washington Post noting that CTR “works with Clinton’s official 

campaign on communications strategy”); AR302-03 (referring to “[a] constellation of groups in 

[Clinton’s] political orbit,” including CTR).

All this evidence is more than sufficient to show that HFA and CTR systematically 

coordinated. Internal HFA documents published by Wikileaks only corroborate what the rest of 

the record already makes clear. See ECF No. 33 at 26-27. An internal HFA memorandum proposed 

disseminating campaign messages “through work of CTR and other allies,” and stated that HFA 

will “[w]ork with CTR and [the Democratic National Committee] to publicize specific GOP 

candidate vulnerabilities on issues of transparency, ethics, and donor favoritism.” AR092. In 

another internal memorandum, HFA’s Chief Administrative Officer noted that if former Michigan 

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Governor Jennifer Granholm worked at CTR, HFA “could at least make sure her speaking and 

media opportunities met our needs/requests.” AR093. 

In this context of systematic coordination with HFA, CTR spent millions of dollars on the 

types of activities that FECA treats as in-kind contributions when they are coordinated with 

candidates. OGC expressly found, based on CTR’s own FEC disclosures, that “the bulk of” CTR’s 

spending, which totaled $9.61 million, AR088, was “for purposes that are not communicationspecific . . . in addition to payments for explicitly mixed purposes such as ‘video consulting and 

travel’ and ‘communication consulting and travel.’” AR089-90. That CTR made these enormous 

non-communication expenditures while systematically coordinating its operation with HFA all but 

conclusively proves large-scale in-kind contributions. The controlling Commissioners’ refusal to 

even find reason to believe a FECA violation occurred thus “runs counter to the evidence before 

the agency” and “is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the 

product of agency expertise.” State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43. 

2. The controlling Commissioners have provided no rationale for declining to find 

coordination as to certain activities they concede are not legally exempt.

Even if the Court were to accept the controlling Commissioners’ legal arguments for 

exempting some of the non-communication-specific expenses identified by OGC—which it should 

not—the record still contains more than enough evidence to compel a reason to believe finding. 

As the controlling SOR acknowledges, “the record suggests” that CTR engaged in activities that 

“do not relate directly to [its] internet communications,” including CTR’s “surrogacy program, 

research and tracking, and contacts with reporters.” AR393. Spending on these activities would 

therefore count as in-kind contributions, insofar as they were coordinated with HFA. Because of 

CTR’s and HFA’s deficient reporting, it is impossible at this pre-investigation stage to definitively 

calculate CTR’s spending on these activities, but the record indicates that its offline activities 

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together constituted a large part, if not the majority, of CTR’s $9 million program. 

CTR’s surrogate program, for example, was a large and expensive operation that likely

resulted in substantial coordinated expenditures with HFA. The uncontested record shows that, as 

early as the summer of 2015, CTR was carrying out an “unusually ambitious” training program 

for local Clinton surrogates, including “on-camera media training” to prepare surrogates for 

television appearances. AR174-75. CTR openly acknowledged it was “holding sessions with top 

communicators across the country” to train them on talking points and interview techniques. 

AR175 (emphasis added). For the on-camera training aspect of its surrogate program, CTR hired 

the communications firm Franklin Forum, id., and ultimately paid that firm approximately 

$469,145 over 2015 and 2016. See Ex. A attached hereto. Similarly, according to an uncontested

news report in the record, CTR hired QRS News Media in 2016 “to help oversee an aggressive 

surrogate booking program, connecting regional and national surrogates with radio and television 

news outlets across the country in support of Hillary Clinton.” AR024 ¶ 51. CTR paid $106,320 

to QRS News Media in 2016 for “booking consulting.” See Ex. B attached hereto. While the 

controlling Commissioners claimed to see no direct evidence of coordination on CTR’s surrogate 

program in particular, AR394, this ignores the extensive evidence that CTR’s very purpose—and 

consistent practice—was to coordinate its activities with HFA. Nothing in the record suggests that 

CTR departed from its modus operandi in the area of surrogacy.

The record also makes clear that CTR invested heavily in contacting and developing 

relationships with journalists, as well as placing op-eds by Clinton supporters. As described in 

detail above, see supra at 10-11 (Stmt. of Case II.A), these activities included assigning thirty 

employees to a “war room” that conducted extensive rapid response and reporter contacts during 

the Benghazi hearing, AR209, pitching reporters with negative stories about Clinton’s primary 

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opponent, AR225, and providing reporters with voluminous opposition research materials that 

CTR had produced. See AR209 (CNN obtained copy of CTR’s 140-page opposition research 

book); AR189 (CTR provided report to media on Clinton email use); AR303 (Brock wrote memo 

about Trump campaign for distribution to media); AR315-16 (CTR obtained and leaked draft of 

Trump’s convention speech). Similarly, senior CTR officials wrote pro-Clinton op-eds and placed 

them with newspapers. AR319-20. 

Moreover, the record shows that CTR spent vast resources on opposition research and 

tracking, including by sending trackers to monitor Clinton’s primary opponents, producing 

voluminous opposition research books, and obtaining a copy of Trump’s convention speech. E.g.,

AR180 (CTR sent tracker to monitor primary opponent Martin O’Malley); AR194-95 (Brock 

characterized CTR’s attack on Bernie Sanders as “standard opposition research”). The record 

shows that HFA may have partially reimbursed CTR for these services, but it is not plausible that 

these minimal payments, amounting to under three percent of CTR’s total receipts for the election 

cycle, fully covered the value of CTR’s research and tracking activities. CTR’s contemporaneous 

disclosure reports indicate that these payments went to “research,” and make no mention of 

“tracking.” See supra at 12. At the very least, OGC was correct that an investigation is necessary 

“to determine how [the payments] relate to CTR’s overall activity.” AR100 n. 67. 

Remarkably, the record evidence of coordination was largely uncontested in the 

administrative proceedings. Apart from their implausible claim that HFA fully reimbursed CTR’s 

research and tracking expenses, AR067, respondents did not attempt to deny that the “offline” 

activities alleged in CLC’s complaint were coordinated and on CTR’s dime. Instead, they offered 

legal defenses, claiming that some of their coordinated activities, such as calling reporters and 

training local surrogates, were exempt from the coordination rules because they were 

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“communications” but not “public,” AR065-66, 76; and that others, particularly op-eds by CTR 

officials and CTR’s contacts with reporters, were covered by the media exemption under 11 C.F.R. 

§ 100.73, AR065-67, 75-76.

4

While the controlling Commissioners largely embraced respondents’ internet-exemption 

argument—erroneously, see supra Part III.A—they did not bother to engage in any meaningful 

way with respondents’ other legal arguments. If they had done so, they would have had to 

acknowledge the obvious: those arguments were meritless distractions from the undisputed reality 

that CTR and HFA coordinated on activities going far beyond internet communications. As OGC 

noted, CTR’s observation that some of its activities were not “public communications” is 

unavailing; CTR engaged in a “wide array of activities,” and most “cannot fairly be described as 

‘communications,’ public or otherwise, unless that term covers almost every conceivable political 

activity.” AR110, 124 (emphasis added). Such non-communication activities—including, for 

example, CTR’s surrogate trainings—are plainly subject to the FEC’s general coordination rule, 

11 C.F.R. § 109.20. See supra at 6 (Stmt. of Case I.B).

Respondents’ reliance on the media exemption fares no better. As this Court has 

recognized, “the media exemption . . . is for the media,” and any action respondents took in 

reliance on it would be a “seemingly clear . . . violation” of FECA. ECF No. 33 at 26. By deflecting 

with meritless legal arguments while failing to dispute the alleged facts, respondents effectively 

conceded that they coordinated massive expenditures. The failure to find reason to believe on this 

4 As to the training sessions for local Clinton surrogates, CTR claimed it “did not include any 

official Clinton campaign surrogates (as identified by HFA) or HFA staff in the trainings. CTR 

did not solicit or accept any suggestions from HFA regarding which individuals should attend the 

sessions or otherwise permit HFA to direct individuals to the sessions.” AR066. This is not a denial 

of coordination. It is entirely consistent with a conclusion that CTR initiated these training sessions 

at the “request or suggestion” of HFA. 52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(7)(B)(i).

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voluminous, uncontested record of coordinated activity “runs counter to the evidence before the 

agency.” State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43.

3. The controlling Commissioners committed multiple errors of law in excluding 

key record evidence from consideration.

To avoid the obvious conclusion that there was reason to believe respondents violated 

FECA, the controlling Commissioners ignored huge swaths of the record, invented nonsensical 

rules of evidence to exclude facts, and imposed an improperly high standard of proof at the preinvestigation stage. These errors led to a decision that cannot be reconciled with the record. 

First, the controlling Commissioners simply misstated the record. They suggested that the 

evidence supporting the conclusion that CTR “systematically coordinated with” the Clinton 

campaign amounted only to CTR’s “May 2015 press release, information not included in the 

complaints or responses, and information stolen and disseminated by Russian intelligence 

officers.” AR385. This ignores the extensive and unrefuted evidence of coordination in CLC’s 

complaint, which cited numerous reliable public sources other than CTR’s 2015 press release, and 

in no way relied on materials “disseminated” by the Russian government. See, e.g., AR011 ¶ 24

(citing Time profile reporting that Brock worked on what he called “the ‘coordinated’ side of the 

Clinton campaign” and claimed he could “continue under current rules to talk to her, and her 

campaign staff about strategy, while deploying the unregulated money”); AR009-10 ¶ 20 (noting 

CTR email featuring a video produced by HFA); AR011-12 ¶ 26 (noting HFA and CTR officials 

tweeted identical messages about Clinton around the same time); AR007 ¶ 14 (citing report that 

“Clinton’s campaign is working hand-in-glove with Correct the Record”). 

Second, the controlling Commissioners chose to ignore many of CTR’s coordinated 

activities on the erroneous legal premise that those activities were exempt from treatment as inkind contributions under FECA and its implementing regulations. As already discussed, see supra 

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Part III.A, these legal arguments conflict with FECA and its implementing regulations. By 

excluding much of the record from consideration based on legal errors, the controlling 

Commissioners failed to “examine the relevant data and articulate a . . . rational connection 

between the facts found and the choice made.” State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43 (citation omitted). 

Third, the controlling Commissioners further constricted the record by fabricating a rule 

that would limit OGC’s analysis to facts and documents contained within the four corners of the 

administrative complaint, even when other compelling evidence is publicly available and in fact 

was compiled by OGC. On this basis, they refused to consider Brock’s post-election podcast 

interview. AR385-86. This strict four-corners rule flatly contradicts a 2007 FEC statement of 

policy, which provides that the Commission will consider “the available evidence,” including 

information in the complaint and “any publicly available information.” Statement of Policy 

Regarding Commission Action in Matters at the Initial Stage in the Enforcement Process, 72 Fed. 

Reg. 12545, 12545-46 (Mar. 16, 2007).

In any event, categorically excluding all evidence from outside the administrative 

complaint is irrational. As this Court has explained, the controlling Commissioners could not 

reasonably justify the exclusion of important evidence just by deriding OGC’s research as 

“selective Google searches.” ECF No. 33 at 28. Indeed, as then-Chair Weintraub observed, “it is 

gross negligence for an agency charged with enforcing the law to ignore information readily 

available to the general public.” AR409. Courts have therefore recognized that the FEC must not 

ignore publicly available evidence in making a reason-to-believe determination. See In re FECA 

Litig., 474 F. Supp. 1044, 1046 (D.D.C. 1979) (“[The Commission] must take into consideration 

all available information concerning the alleged wrongdoing. In other words, the Commission may 

not rely solely on the facts presented by the sworn complaint when deciding whether to 

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investigate.”). The controlling Commissioners’ failure to do so was arbitrary and capricious.5

Fourth, the controlling Commissioners suggested repeatedly that CLC’s complaint 

“concede[s] the speculative nature of its coordination allegations” because it phrased certain 

clauses in the “conditional tense.” AR393, 395 n.80. This claim is not just wrong, but frivolous. 

As their leading example, the controlling Commissioners quote the complaint out of context: “If 

any of these expenditures were coordinated with the Clinton campaign, they would constitute inkind contributions to the campaign.” AR393 (quoting AR045 ¶ 95). This quotation is from the 

“Causes of Action” section of the complaint—not from any of the sixty numbered paragraphs of 

facts that plaintiffs alleged unconditionally. That the controlling Commissioners must resort to this 

syntactical game-playing shows they had no reasonable arguments to make.

Fifth, and finally, having arbitrarily excluded or discounted most of the record, the 

controlling Commissioners declared that the remaining evidence was insufficient to establish 

reason to believe because it failed to establish coordination conclusively, “transaction-bytransaction.” AR395. That demand sets an unreasonably high bar that contravenes FECA and 

agency policies and precedent regarding the standard at the “reason to believe” stage. 

Section 30109(a) of FECA makes clear that “reason to believe” is a lower standard than 

what is required to find liability or even probable cause—because a reason-to-believe finding is a 

necessary precursor and precondition for a subsequent “probable cause” determination or civil 

enforcement action. See 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(2) (“reason to believe” finding authorizes

investigation); id. § 30109(a)(4)(A) (probable cause finding). Therefore, the Commission has long 

5 The controlling Commissioners suggested that the four-corners rule is necessary to give 

respondents fair notice of the claims they must respond to in administrative proceedings. AR386

n. 30. But CTR could hardly lack notice of its own public admissions, such as the podcast interview 

in which Brock extensively discussed CTR’s coordination with HFA. 

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recognized that “[a] ‘reason to believe’ finding is not a finding that the respondent violated the 

Act, but instead simply means that the Commission believes a violation may have occurred.” FEC

Guidebook for Complainants and Respondents on the FEC Enforcement Process 12 (2012),

https://www.fec.gov/resources/cms-content/documents/respondent_guide.pdf (emphasis added). 

For instance, in its 2007 statement of enforcement policy, the FEC stressed that “reason to believe” 

findings are not “definitive determinations that a respondent violated the Act,” but instead, 

“indicate only that the Commission found sufficient legal justification to open an investigation to 

determine whether a violation of the Act has occurred.” 72 Fed. Reg. at 12545 (emphasis added). 

In contrast, a finding of no reason to believe is appropriate only where “evidence convincingly 

demonstrates that no violation has occurred,” or when a complaint is “not credible,” “so vague that 

an investigation would be effectively impossible,” or “fails to describe a violation of the Act.” Id.

The controlling Commissioners argued, without authority, that the administrative 

complaint must be dismissed because “[f]inding coordination requires . . . a transaction-bytransaction assessment to determine whether specific conduct occurred with respect to particular 

expenditures,” rather than an assessment of “the general relationship between entities.” AR395. 

Precisely because the ultimate adjudication may turn on a “transaction-by-transaction” analysis, 

FECA authorizes investigations to obtain the information needed for such an analysis. 52 U.S.C. 

§ 30109(a)(2) (requiring investigation upon finding “reason to believe”). To demand that all these 

facts be presented within the four corners of the administrative complaint, before any investigation, 

puts the cart before the horse. Cf. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 

Imposing an unduly heightened pleading standard at the pre-investigation stage also creates 

perverse incentives for regulated parties, and “savvy campaign operators will exploit them to the 

hilt.” Shays II, 414 F.3d at 115. If no one can complain to the FEC without conclusive evidence of 

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a violation, then candidates and donors may openly engage in schemes to violate FECA without 

fear of repercussion, so long as they keep the most granular details of their conduct under wraps. 

This risk is not hypothetical. Since the Supreme Court legalized unlimited independent election 

spending by any U.S. entity in Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010), the FEC has never 

acted to enforce the ban on coordinating such spending with a candidate. AR407. The controlling 

Commissioners’ adherence to an impossible pleading standard has contributed to this inaction. See 

AR404 (then-Chair Weintraub noting that her “colleagues continue to block investigations at their 

earliest stages, raising the bar to an unattainable level”). 

The controlling Commissioners’ unwillingness to consider hacked internal documents—

while perhaps not unreasonable on its own—underscores the irrationality of their demand for 

conclusive proof of coordination at the “reason to believe” stage. As a rule, campaigns and super 

PACs do not voluntarily publish their embarrassing internal emails that might reveal illegal 

coordination. And in many cases of potential FECA violations, it is impossible to deduce 

coordination on a transaction-by-transaction basis by combing through committee disclosures, 

precisely because the FECA violations concealed material information from disclosure. That is 

exactly what happened here. See ECF No. 33 at 13 (noting that information “will remain 

unavailable to Plaintiffs” “without a favorable ruling in this case.”). Despite all this, the controlling 

Commissioners demanded that plaintiffs produce a smoking gun. But when presented with the 

only type of information that could possibly meet their standard of proof—internal documents 

corroborating plaintiffs’ allegations—the controlling Commissioners refused to credit it. This 

Catch-22 reasoning cannot justify the controlling Commissioners’ failure to draw the obvious 

conclusion that there was reason to believe CTR and HFA violated FECA.

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IV. The FEC’s Coordination Rules Are Invalid as Construed.

A. If the regulatory construction applied to dismiss CLC’s complaint is deemed 

authoritative, it should be invalidated under the APA. 

In addition to their FECA claim, plaintiffs also assert a claim under the APA challenging 

the coordination rules themselves, 11 C.F.R. §§ 100.26, 109.20, and 109.21, as construed, because 

they conflict with FECA’s mandate to regulate coordinated expenditures. See 52 U.S.C. 

§§ 30101(8)(A)(i)-(ii), 30116(a)(7)(B)(i). In Count One of their Amended Complaint, plaintiffs 

challenge the controlling Commissioners’ application of the coordination rules to find that none 

of the activities described in CLC’s administrative complaint qualified as “coordinated 

expenditures” under FECA, and to dismiss the complaint on that basis. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 106-107. 

Plaintiffs are entitled to summary judgment on the FECA claim for the reasons detailed in Part III. 

But if the controlling Commissioners’ construction of the internet exemption is deemed 

authoritative under “the Commission’s traditional coordination framework,” AR396—as these 

Commissioners insist it was, AR391-93—the Court should proceed to Count Two of plaintiffs’ 

amended complaint and hold that regulatory framework invalid under the APA. Insofar as the 

relevant regulations can be read to encompass all direct and indirect “input costs” for an eventual 

covered internet communication, even general overhead expenses supporting multiple functions, 

that construction conflicts with FECA and should be declared invalid.

In dismissing CLC’s complaint, the controlling Commissioners characterized their 

interpretation of the internet exemption as authoritative and longstanding. As already explained, 

see supra Part III.A, there is scant support for it in the 2006 rulemaking record or subsequent FEC 

precedent, and the regulatory language in no way suggests it. Nevertheless, the controlling 

Commissioners (and intervenors here) maintain that CTR and HFA “properly understood” the 

“plain text” of 11 C.F.R. § 109.21 and FEC precedent with regard to the scope of the internet 

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exemption, AR391-93, because the “Commission has never required speakers” to “allocate 

overhead expenses across internet communications (or other activities).” AR392. 

Plaintiffs disagree with this characterization of relevant FEC precedent. But if it accurately 

describes an authoritative regulatory construction of the exemption, such that any coordinated 

activity with a notional connection to an exempt internet communication has been consistently 

understood as also exempt, CTR and HFA could seek to avoid accountability for their FECA 

violations by invoking the Act’s safe-harbor provision. 52 U.S.C. § 30111(e) (“[A]ny person who 

relies upon any rule or regulation prescribed by the Commission . . . and who acts in good faith in 

accordance with such rule or regulation shall not, as a result of such act, be subject to any sanction 

provided by this Act.”).6Indeed, the controlling SOR all but invites them to do so. See AR393 

n.66 (citing 52 U.S.C. § 30111(e) and suggesting that voting to find “reason to believe” would 

amount to a “retroactive policy reversal[]” depriving respondents of fair notice). As the D.C. 

Circuit observed in Shays II, when an FEC complaint is dismissed based on an invalid regulation, 

the relief available under FECA “hardly appears adequate”—“given that reliance on that regulation 

would afford a defense to ‘any sanction,’ the court might well uphold FEC non-enforcement 

without ever reaching the regulation’s validity.” 414 F.3d at 96 (citing 52 U.S.C. § 30111(e)).

Therefore, if the controlling Commissioners’ alternative narrative is accepted, and this 

construction deemed authoritative, then plaintiffs’ injury extends beyond this matter—as does the 

remedy needed to redress it. The coordination regulations, as construed, will undermine FECA’s 

comprehensive regime for regulating and requiring disclosure of coordinated expenditures in any

6 FECA’s safe-harbor provision does not bar equitable relief; even if it ultimately precluded the 

assessment of civil penalties here, CTR and HFA could still be required to provide disclosure, 

which is not a “sanction” under the Act. Cf. Larouche v. FEC, 28 F.3d 137, 142 (D.C. Cir. 1994) 

(disgorgement of funds was “not a sanction” under FECA, so safe-harbor provision did not bar it).

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coordination case involving internet activity. In this scenario, FECA’s judicial review mechanism 

is not adequate, so the Court should conduct its review under the APA. CREW v. FEC, 243 F. 

Supp. 3d 91, 105 (D.D.C. 2017) (reviewing APA claim alongside FECA claim). 

B. FECA does not permit a “bright-line” exception to its coordination provisions that 

exempts all activities notionally supporting internet communications.

The controlling Commissioners’ construction of the coordination rules and internet 

exemption is impermissible irrespective of whether the analysis proceeds under FECA or the APA. 

If the Court agrees with plaintiffs that neither FECA nor FEC rules support this radical expansion 

of the internet exception, it should find the dismissal of CLC’s complaint contrary to law under 52 

U.S.C. § 30109(a)(8)(C). If, however, the Court agrees with intervenors that the “bright-line” rule 

applied by the controlling Commissioners reflects the FEC’s “traditional approach” to the 

coordination rules, AR392, it should also declare the regulatory construction invalid under the 

APA because the damage it inflicts on the statutory system potentially extends beyond this case.

Either way, the controlling Commissioners’ approach cannot withstand even the most 

deferential review. “Under Auer, as under Chevron, an agency’s reading must fall ‘within the 

bounds of reasonable interpretation’” to be sustained—and “[t]hat is a requirement an agency can 

fail.” Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2416 (2019) (citing Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 296 (2013)).

The internet exception, as construed, fails under the APA for the same reasons it fails under 

section 30109(a)(8): because it directly conflicts with FECA’s unambiguous mandate to regulate 

coordinated expenditures, arbitrarily narrows the scope of regulable coordination under the Act, 

and is manifestly at odds with the statute’s purposes. See supra Part III.A. In other words, the 

regulatory construction applied here would be unsustainable even if it were consistent with “the 

Commission’s traditional coordination framework,” AR396, because it permits exactly what 

FECA forbids: the provision of paid campaign services and other things of value to candidates by 

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groups operating outside of the contribution limits and disclosure requirements of the Act. 

The controlling group defended this construction on the ground that it “operates as a brightline rule and recognizes that a speaker will almost always incur expenses to produce an internet 

communication,” AR392—but as Shays II recognized, “a bright line can be drawn in the wrong 

place.” 414 F.3d at 101. There was no basis to create a per se exception of this magnitude, which 

takes a narrow carve-out originally justified as a way to avoid unduly restraining the speech of 

“bloggers in their pajamas,” AR404 n.27, and turns it into a vehicle for the wholesale “evasion of 

campaign finance restrictions through unregulated collaboration.” Shays II, 414 F.3d at 102.

Indeed, the abuses sanctioned by this construction of the rules go far beyond even the 

massive scheme alleged here. It would also appear to allow similar coordination efforts to occur 

between candidates and nonprofits, such as the 501(c)(4) “dark money” groups increasingly active 

in federal elections but not generally subject to FECA disclosure.

7 Under the controlling 

Commissioners’ construction, if a non-disclosing nonprofit avoided express advocacy 

communications, nothing would prevent it from accepting unlimited contributions from any 

source, including foreign nationals,8and spending these funds in full coordination with a 

candidate—provided some small portion of the effort appeared online. None of this would even 

necessarily be subject to disclosure or public scrutiny. Plaintiffs thus seek an order declaring the 

construction of these rules unlawful and invalid, and ordering the FEC to apply the Act’s 

7 These 501(c)(4) and other “dark money” groups have reported spending nearly $1 billion on 

federal elections since 2010. Anna Massoglia, ‘Dark money’ in politics skyrocketed in the wake of 

Citizens United, Ctr. for Responsive Politics (Jan. 27, 2020), https://www.opensecrets.org/news/

2020/01/dark-money-10years-citizens-united.

8 Bluman v. FEC, 800 F. Supp. 2d 281, 284 (D.D.C. 2011) (three-judge ct.), aff’d mem., 565 

U.S. 1104 (2012) (interpreting 52 U.S.C. § 30121 to permit foreign nationals to make expenditures 

for issue advocacy—i.e., “speech that does not expressly advocate the election or defeat of a 

specific candidate”).

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coordination provisions in the manner that Congress prescribed here and in all future cases. 

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, plaintiffs respectfully urge the Court to grant CLC’s motion for summary 

judgment; declare that the FEC’s dismissal of plaintiffs’ administrative complaint is contrary to 

law, and arbitrary and capricious; and direct the FEC to conform with such declaration within 30 

days consistent with the Court’s judgment.

Dated: July 24, 2020 Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Tara Malloy

Tara Malloy (DC Bar No. 988280)

 tmalloy@campaignlegalcenter.org

Megan P. McAllen (DC Bar No. 1020509)

Jeffrey Zalesin (DC Bar No. 1671482)

CAMPAIGN LEGAL CENTER

1101 14th St. NW, Suite 400

Washington, D.C. 20005

(202) 736-2200

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

Case 1:19-cv-02336-JEB Document 35 Filed 07/24/20 Page 55 of 56
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on July 24, 2020, I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing 

document to be served upon all counsel of record registered with the Court’s ECF system, by 

electronic service via the Court’s ECF transmission facilities.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Tara Malloy

Tara Malloy (DC Bar No. 988280)

tmalloy@campaignlegalcenter.org

CAMPAIGN LEGAL CENTER

1101 14th St. NW, Suite 400

Washington, D.C. 20005

(202) 736-2200

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