* Effective March 31, 1995, the functions of the Secr etary of Health and

Human Services in social security cases were transf erred to the Commissioner of Social Security. P.L. No. 103-296. In the text we continue to refer to the Secretary because she was the appropriate party at the time of the underlying decision.

** This order and judgment is not binding precedent, e xcept under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and col lateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judg ments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and condi tions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.

*** Honorable John W. Lungstrum, District Judge, UnitedStates District Court for the District of Kansas, sitting by designation.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Filed 12/5/96 FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

OTIS W. CRANE,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. SHIRLEY S. CHATER, Commissioner, Social Security Administration, *

Defendant-Appellee. No. 96-5050 (D.C. No. CV-94-651-B) (N.D. Okla.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT **

Before BALDOCK and BRISCOE, Circuit Judges, and LUN GSTRUM, *** District Judge.-2-

After examining the briefs and appellate record, th is panel has determined unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a dec ision on the briefs without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f) and 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. Th e case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. Claimant Otis W. Crane appeals from an order of the district court affirming the final decision of the Secretary of He alth and Human Services denying his applications for social security disabi lity and supplemental security income (SSI) benefits. Claimant contends that he h as been disabled since August 1989 due to the residual effects of arthritis in hi s right foot and ankle, his knee, and his back, that have been exacerbated by obesity . He also claims to have mental problems and limited reading skills. The ad ministrative law judge (ALJ) denied benefits at step five of the five-part seque ntial process for determining disability. See Williams v. Bowen , 844 F.2d 748, 750-52 (10th Cir. 1988)(discussing five-step process). The ALJ determined that claimant had the residual functional capacity to perform the full ra nge of light work limited by his inability to perform complex work and to squat, crawl, climb, or extensively use his right lower extremity. Relying on the testimony of a vocational expert that there were jobs claimant could perform, the ALJ fou nd claimant not disabled.-3-

The Appeals Council affirmed, making the ALJ’s dete rmination the final decision of the Secretary. We review the Secretary’s decision to determine whe ther it is supported by substantial evidence and whether the correct legal standards were applied. Castellano v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs. , 26 F.3d 1027, 1028 (10th Cir. 1994). Substantial evidence is adequate relevant e vidence that a reasonable mind might accept to support a conclusion. Richardson v . Perales , 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). On appeal, claimant contends that the ALJ’s residua l functional capacity determination is not supported by substantial evide nce. Specifically, he contends that the evidence does not support the finding thathe can stand and/or walk for six hours out of an eight-hour workday as required to perform light work. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b); Social Security Ruling 83-10. As the district court noted, however, the ALJ’s finding of nondisability is not premised solely on claimant’s ability to meet the standing and walking requiremen ts of light work. Under § 404.1567(b), a determination that a claiman t can perform light work generally means that he or she can also perfor m sedentary work “unless there are additional limiting factors such as loss of fine dexterity or inability to sit for long periods of time.” In this case, the ALJ s pecifically found that claimant could perform the full range of light work subject to the limitations noted earlier.-4-

In his decision, he also assessed claimant’s ability to perform sedentary work and did not identify any limitations that would preventhim from performing sedentary work. See R. Vol. II at 46-48. At the hearing, the vocation al expert identified in response to hypothetical questions a number of sede ntary jobs that claimant could perform. Id. at 104-05. In concluding that there were a signif icant number of jobs claimant could perform and that claimant was t herefore not disabled, the ALJ relied in part on the vocational expert’s identific ation of these sedentary jobs. Id. at 45, 46, 48. In the district court, claimant challenged the ALJ’ s determination that he could perform light work, but did not raise any iss ues regarding his ability to perform sedentary work. In his report and recommen dation, which the district court adopted, the magistrate judge stated that the record unquestionably supports a finding that P laintiff could perform unskilled sedentary work which the vocation al expert testified existed in the economy. Accordingly, eve n if the finding that plaintiff can perform light work is infirm, th e conclusion that he is not disabled is supported by substantial evidenc e. R. Vol. I at 9. Though claimant did not include hi s objections to the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation in the record on appeal, he apparently concedes that he did not object to this conclusion by the magistrate judge. See Appellant’s Br. at 25-26; see also R. Vol. I at 13 (district court’s list of claimant ’s objections omits any issue involving sedentary workor vocational expert’s-5-

testimony). Generally, we do not consider on appea l issues not presented in objections to a magistrate judge’s report. Soliz v . Chater , 82 F.3d 373, 375-76 (10th Cir. 1996). Claimant’s contention that “he i s within his province” to challenge on appeal the vocational expert’s testimo ny regarding his ability to do sedentary work despite his failure to have raised t his issue previously, Appellant’s Br. at 25, is simply an incorrect statement of law. See Crow v. Shalala , 40 F.3d 323, 324 (10th Cir. 1994). We conclude that claimant’s ability to do sedentary work is an unchallenged alternative basis for denial of benefi ts that forecloses success on appeal regardless of the merits of the challenged i ssue. Murrell v. Shalala , 43 F.3d 1388, 1389-90 & n. 2 (10th Cir. 1994). We the refore need not consider whether claimant could perform the standing and wal king requirements for light work. The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

Entered for the Court

Bobby R. Baldock Circuit Judge