COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

Present: Judges Huff, Athey and Fulton

Argued at Lexington, Virginia

CALEB RASHAAD NOWLIN

MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY

v. Record No. 1691-22-3 JUDGE GLEN A. HUFF

NOVEMBER 8, 2023

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CAMPBELL COUNTY

John T. Cook, Judge

Charles F. Felmlee (Chuck Felmlee Law, P.C., on brief), for 

appellant.

Virginia B. Theisen, Senior Assistant Attorney General (Jason S. 

Miyares, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

Following a bench trial in the Campbell County Circuit Court (the “trial court”), Caleb 

Rashaad Nowlin (“appellant”) was convicted of raping a child under the age of 13, in violation of 

Code § 18.2-61. The trial court sentenced appellant to 40 years’ incarceration with all but 10 years

suspended. On appeal, appellant argues that the trial court erred in finding the evidence sufficient to 

sustain his conviction. For the following reasons, this Court affirms the trial court’s judgment.

* This opinion is not designated for publication. See Code § 17.1-413(A).

UNPUBLISHED
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BACKGROUND1

When S.M. was four years old, her father began dating appellant’s mother.

2

 For several 

years, S.M. lived with her father and appellant’s mother in their North Carolina home, where 

appellant frequently visited. In October 2019, S.M., her father, and appellant’s mother moved to 

Campbell County, Virginia. Appellant followed them to Campbell County in December of that 

year.

S.M.’s relationship with appellant was initially “like brother [and] sister,” but changed when 

she turned 11 years old. At that time, appellant had a conversation with S.M. in which he told her

that she was his “girlfriend.” S.M. did not want to be his girlfriend. Appellant also wrote numerous 

letters to S.M., wherein he proclaimed his love, complimented her, and reminisced about their 

relationship. This inappropriate behavior towards S.M. started in North Carolina and continued 

after the move to Campbell County.

One day during S.M.’s sixth grade school year, she was alone with appellant in her father’s

Campbell County home.

3

 She was playing a board game by herself in appellant’s bedroom when 

appellant suddenly entered the room, pushed S.M. down onto his bed, and began to take her pants 

off. He then flipped S.M. onto her stomach, removed his pants, and put his penis inside her vagina. 

S.M. attempted to get away, but appellant continued to push her onto the bed, telling her to “shut 

1 On appeal, this Court recites the facts “in the ‘light most favorable’ to the 

Commonwealth, the prevailing party in the trial court.” Hammer v. Commonwealth, 74 Va. App. 

225, 231 (2022) (quoting Commonwealth v. Cady, 300 Va. 325, 329 (2021)). In doing so, this 

Court “discard[s] the evidence of the accused in conflict with that of the Commonwealth, and

regard[s] as true all the credible evidence favorable to the Commonwealth and all fair inferences

to be drawn therefrom.” Cady, 300 Va. at 329 (quoting Commonwealth v. Perkins, 295 Va. 323, 

324 (2018)).

2 S.M. was born in March 2007. This Court refers to the child victim here by her initials 

in an attempt to protect her privacy.

3 While S.M. could not remember the exact date of the assault, she was certain it occurred 

while she was in sixth grade and that she turned 12 years old in the spring of that school year.
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up.” S.M. “blacked out” and could not remember the rest of the assault. As S.M. later recounted at 

trial, appellant had sexually assaulted her on both prior and subsequent occasions.

In May 2021, S.M.’s mother found love letters in S.M.’s room written to S.M. from 

appellant. She confronted S.M. about the letters before contacting law enforcement. Campbell 

County Sheriff Investigator Guthrie interviewed appellant, who admitted to writing the letters. He 

told Investigator Guthrie that he wanted to induce S.M. to fall in love with him as revenge for 

perceived mistreatment of his mother by S.M.’s father. When confronted with S.M.’s allegations of 

sexual assault, appellant responded that “whatever the evidence shows, . . . that’s what it is.”

Appellant’s defense at trial rested on the inconsistencies between S.M.’s statements and the 

timeline of offenses presented by the Commonwealth. He moved to strike the Commonwealth’s 

evidence, arguing that it was insufficient to sustain a conviction because S.M. could not remember 

her exact age when the rape occurred. The trial court denied appellant’s motion, but took the matter 

under advisement before making a final ruling in the case. The trial court later determined that the 

evidence was sufficient and that S.M.’s testimony was credible despite its inconsistencies. The 

court then convicted appellant of rape under Code § 18.2-61 and sentenced him to 40 years’

incarceration with all but 10 years suspended. This appeal followed.

ANALYSIS

“When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, ‘[t]he judgment of the trial court is 

presumed correct and will not be disturbed unless it is plainly wrong or without evidence to support 

it.’” McGowan v. Commonwealth, 72 Va. App. 513, 521 (2020) (alteration in original) (quoting 

Smith v. Commonwealth, 296 Va. 450, 460 (2018)). “In such cases, ‘[t]he Court does not ask itself 

whether it believes that the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Id.

(alteration in original) (quoting Secret v. Commonwealth, 296 Va. 204, 228 (2018)). “Rather, the 

relevant question is whether ‘any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the 
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crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Vasquez v. Commonwealth, 291 Va. 232, 248 (2016) (quoting 

Williams v. Commonwealth, 278 Va. 190, 193 (2009)). “If there is evidentiary support for the 

conviction, ‘the reviewing court is not permitted to substitute its own judgment, even if its opinion 

might differ from the conclusions reached by the finder of fact at the trial.’” McGowan, 72 

Va. App. at 521 (quoting Chavez v. Commonwealth, 69 Va. App. 149, 161 (2018)).

Appellant argues that the Commonwealth’s evidence was insufficient to sustain a conviction 

because it did not prove the alleged offense occurred in Virginia. S.M. asserted that the rape 

occurred while she was in sixth grade, at which time appellant contends he still lived in North 

Carolina. He claims that S.M.’s testimony thus demonstrates that the offense could not have 

occurred in Campbell County, Virginia, while she was under the age of 13 because he did not move 

there until the following year. Accordingly, appellant argues that the Commonwealth’s evidence 

established a set of inconsistent facts—that the sexual assault occurred during S.M.’s sixth grade 

year and that appellant did not live at the Campbell County address during that time—which cannot 

support his conviction. This Court disagrees.

A reviewing court “must accept the ‘[fact finder]’s determination of the credibility of 

witness testimony unless, “as a matter of law, the testimony is inherently incredible.”’” Hammer v. 

Commonwealth, 74 Va. App. 225, 239 (2022) (quoting Lambert v. Commonwealth, 70 Va. App. 

740, 759 (2019)); see also Kelley v. Commonwealth, 69 Va. App. 617, 626 (2019) (holding that any 

“‘inconsistencies in testimony are resolved by the fact finder,’ not the appellate court” (quoting 

Towler v. Commonwealth, 59 Va. App. 284, 292 (2011))). Furthermore, a fact finder’s evaluations 

of credibility are not limited to choosing between competing accounts offered by different 

witnesses. See, e.g., Hamilton v. Commonwealth, 279 Va. 94, 105 (2010). Rather, the fact finder is 

often called to resolve conflicts within a single witness’s testimony, as in the case at hand, which 

includes the power to accept the parts of the testimony deemed credible and reject the portions 
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deemed incredible. See Commonwealth v. McNeal, 282 Va. 16, 22 (2011). Here, the trial court—

sitting as trier of fact—determined that S.M.’s testimony was credible and that any perceived

inconsistencies were not fatal to the Commonwealth’s case. This Court finds no basis in the record 

for overturning that ruling.

S.M. consistently testified that the rape occurred in her father’s home in Campbell County, 

Virginia. She was also consistent in her testimony that the rape occurred before she was 13 years 

old.

4

 It was uncontested that between December 2019 and March 2020, appellant lived in Campbell 

County, and that S.M. was 12 years old. The record reflects that S.M. would have been in sixth 

grade for the 2018-2019 school year but would likely have been in seventh grade during the events 

she described. Nevertheless, she remained under the age of 13 until March 2020. The trial court

was free to resolve the conflict in the evidence regarding which grade she was in at the time of the 

offense without having to find S.M.’s testimony incredible. See McNeal, 282 Va. at 21-22. The 

trial court also found that appellant’s love letters and statements to Investigator Guthrie corroborated 

S.M.’s testimony regarding her age at the time of the rape.

In addressing the inconsistency in S.M.’s testimony, the trial court acknowledged that a 

fifteen-year-old witness will “say some things that are a little bit different” on cross-examination, 

but noted that S.M. “clearly said under oath she was under thirteen” and “there was nothing to 

contradict [her].”5 See Kelley, 69 Va. App. at 626 (“Testimony may be contradictory or contain 

inconsistencies without rising to the level of being inherently incredible as a matter of law.”).

4 Appellant asserts that, during cross-examination, S.M. was unable to remember her 

exact age at the time of the offense. That statement, however, is not inherently inconsistent with 

her continuing assertion that she was under the age of 13—that age threshold being the relevant 

factor in the trial court’s consideration of appellant’s guilt pursuant to Code § 18.2-61.

5 The court ruled similarly at a later hearing, indicating that it was “not surprising” that 

the testimony of a 15-year-old girl might have “some inconsistencies.” S.M. was 15 years old 

when she testified at trial.
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Moreover, the trial court found that “there was clearly opportunity for [the offense] to [have 

occurred] in Campbell County” during one of appellant’s frequent visits to S.M.’s Virginia home,

regardless of when appellant officially changed his own address. Considering the totality of the 

evidence and the trial court’s findings, this Court cannot say that no rational fact finder could have 

found appellant guilty under Code § 18.2-61 for raping a child under the age of 13.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Affirmed.