FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION

Washington, DC 20463 

BEFORE THE FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION

In the Matter of ) 

 ) 

Michael R. Bloomberg ) MURs 7722 and 7723 

Mike Bloomberg 2020, Inc. and Hayden ) 

 Horowitz as treasurer ) 

DNC Services Corporation/Democratic ) 

 National Committee and Virginia ) 

 McGregor as treasurer ) 

Unknown State Party Committees ) 

STATEMENT OF REASONS

COMMISSIONER ELLEN L. WEINTRAUB

 Michael Bloomberg permissibly self-funded his 2020 Presidential campaign, spending 

more than $1.1 billion of his own money on this effort.1

 When he suspended his campaign after 

Super Tuesday, millions remained in his campaign account.2

 In March 2020, his campaign 

committee transferred $18 million in excess campaign funds to the DNC. Bloomberg’s 

committee also transferred tens of thousands of dollars in office space and equipment to each of 

nine Democratic state party committees throughout the country, totalling more than $1.1 

million.

3

 

The Federal Election Campaign Act (“FECA” or the “Act”) limits the amount an 

individual can contribute to party committees in a calendar year.4

 In 2020, individual 

contributions were capped at $35,500 to a national party committee such as the DNC and

$10,000 to each committee of a state political party.

5 The Act contains measures to ensure that 

1 First Gen. Counsel’s Rpt. (“FGCR”) at 6 (May 4, 2023) (citing Mike Bloomberg 2020, Inc., FEC Financial 

Summary, FEC.GOV, https://www.fec.gov/data/committee/C00728154/?tab=summary&cycle=2020 (showing 

candidate contributions from Bloomberg to the Committee of $1,089,255,532.11)). The Supreme Court established 

a constitutional right of federal candidates to make “unlimited expenditures from personal funds” in support of their 

own campaigns and the Commission codified that right in its regulations. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 52 (1976); 

11 C.F.R. § 110.10; see also H.R. DOC. NO. 95-44, at 70 (1977) (noting that this regulation was intended to 

“comport[] . . . with the Supreme Court decision in Buckley”). 

2 Mike Bloomberg 2020, Inc., FEC Financial Summary, FEC.GOV, https://www.fec.gov/data/committee/

C00728154/?tab=summary&cycle=2020 (showing $1,102,765,253.53 in operating expenditures).

3 FGCR at 8-9. 

4 52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(1)(B),(D). 

5 Id.; 11 C.F.R. § 110.1(c)(5). 

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Statement of Commissioner Ellen L. Weintraub

Page 2 of 3 

donors do not skirt these contribution limits. Section 30122 of the Act prohibits making 

contributions in the name of another, and section 30116(a)(8) requires specific reporting so that 

any donor who contributes through an intermediary does not exceed the contribution limits.6

 

In contrast, a different provision of the Act allows a candidate’s committee to make 

unlimited transfers to party committees. Section 30114 of the Act states that “[a] contribution 

accepted by a candidate...may be used by the candidate...for transfers, without limitation, to a 

nation, State, or local committee of a political party.”7

These various provisions of the law appear to lead to opposite conclusions. The money in 

Bloomberg’s campaign account came from Bloomberg. Had Bloomberg personally contributed 

the same amount of money directly to the party committees, that would have plainly violated the 

Act’s individual contribution limits. Yet because the funds came from the campaign account of a 

bona fide candidate, the donations appear to be legal under the transfer provision of the Act and 

Commission regulations.

When presented with this conundrum in a case involving a different candidate, the 

District Court of the District of Columbia did not see an obvious answer: 

The Court acknowledges that there appears to be some tension between FECA’s 

provision for unlimited transfers from a campaign committee to a party 

committee on the one hand, and its safeguards against circumvention of 

contribution limits through conduits on the other. In the case of a totally selffunded candidate . . . , it is indeed difficult to distinguish on principle a transfer 

of funds from his now-inactive campaign to a party committee from an 

individual contribution subject to statutory limits imposed to mitigate actual or 

apparent corruption in the campaign finance. In any event, under existing law, it 

is far from clear where the FEC—or a court deciding the question on the 

merits—would come down.8

 

I agree with the court that there is inherent tension in the law. I also agree with my 

colleagues that there is no indication that Bloomberg was intentionally trying to circumvent the 

contribution limits.9

 Bloomberg ran a short but fervent campaign. While $18 million is an eyecatching amount to transfer to the party committees, it was a tiny fraction of the more than 

$1 billion that Bloomberg invested in his campaign. Moreover, in March 2020, when the 

transfers took place, the Commission had been without a quorum and thus unable to issue 

advisory opinions for six months, with no end in sight.10 There was no way for someone in 

6 52 U.S.C. §§ 30116(a)(8), 30122.

7 52 U.S.C. § 30114(a)(4).

8 McCutcheon II v. FEC, 496 F.Supp.3d 318, 335 (2020).

9 See Statement of Reasons of Chair Lindenbaum, Vice Chairman Cooksey, and Commissioners Broussard, 

Dickerson, and Trainor (“Lindenbaum, et al. SOR”) at 4, MURs 7722 & 7733 (Michael R. Bloomberg, et al.).

10 The Commission regained its quorum for a few short weeks in June but otherwise remained without a quorum 

until December 2020.

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Statement of Commissioner Ellen L. Weintraub

Page 3 of 3 

Bloomberg’s unique situation to obtain definitive guidance. While I believe the tension between 

the various statutory provisions discussed above created some ambiguity, under these 

circumstances, Bloomberg’s reliance on the transfer provision of the Act was not unreasonable. 

Thus, I voted to dismiss these allegations as a matter of prosecutorial discretion.11 

I appreciate and agree with my colleagues’ view that a different conclusion would be 

appropriate if a candidate “contributed funds to his campaign for the express purpose of funding 

transfers . . . or if [a] campaign otherwise appeared to be a conduit for transfers” to a party 

committee.12 No one should read this case as a green light for circumventing the contribution 

limits. 

The facts in this matter did not suggest circumvention, but ambiguous situations could 

arise in the future. It is likely that multimillion-dollar transfers from self-funded candidate 

committees were not what Congress envisioned when writing the transfer provision. Fortunately, 

through legislative recommendations and rulemaking, the Commission can advocate for and 

adopt stronger provisions to prevent potential abuses of ambiguities in the Act and its 

implementing regulations. I look forward to working with my colleagues to support such 

provisions. 

 

July 5, 2023 ___________________ 

 Ellen L. Weintraub 

 Commissioner 

11 Certification ¶ 2 (May 31, 2023); Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985).

12 Lindenbaum, et al. SOR at 4.

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