alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
§ 801.8 Public participation. ( a ) The Council encourages maximum public participation in the process established by these regulations. Particularly important, with respect to the UDAG program, is participation by the citizens of neighborhoods directly or indirectly affected by projects, and by groups concerned with historic and cultural preservation.
( b ) The applicant, in preparing and following its citizen participation plan called for by 24 CFR 570.456(c)(11)(i)(A), should ensure that adequate provision is made for participation by citizens and organizations having interests in historic preservation and in the historic and cultural values represented in affected neighborhoods. 24 CFR 570.431(c) sets forth criteria for citizen participation plans. These should be carefully considered with specific reference to ensuring that local concerns relevant to historic preservation are fully identified, and that citizens are provided with full and accurate information about each project and its effects on historic properties. The applicant should ensure that potentially concerned citizens and organizations are fully involved in the identification of properties which may meet the National Register Criteria, and that they are fully informed, in a timely manner, of determinations of No Effect, No Adverse Effect, and Adverse Effect, and of the progress of the consultation process. Applicants are referred to 36 CFR 800.15 for Council guidelines for public participation.
( c ) The Council welcomes the views of the public, especially those groups which may be affected by the proposed project, during its evaluation of the applicant's determination of effect, and will solicit the participation of the public in Council and panel meetings held to consider projects.
EXHIBIT 32.2

                CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Annual Report of Spicy Pickle Franchising, Inc. (the
"Company") on Form 10-KSB for the period ending December 31, 2006, as filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I,
Arnold Tinter, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18
U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, that:

(1)      The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or
         15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2)      The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
         material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of
         the Company.


/s/ ARNOLD TINTER
------------------------------------------
Arnold Tinter
Chief Financial Officer
[Civ. No. 12503.

Second Appellate District, Division Two.

April 19, 1940.]

#### In the Matter of the Estate of MATHILDE G. MAUTNER, Deceased. FEDERATION OF JEWISH WELFARE ORGANIZATIONS OF LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA, Respondent, v. CARRIE LEVI, Appellant.

*522Carrie Levi, *in pro. per.,*for Appellant.

Loeb & Loeb, Walter S. Hilborn and Herman F. Selvin for Respondent.

McCOMB, J.

This appeal transferred from the Supreme Court to this court for decision pursuant to article VI, section 4c, of the Constitution of the State of California, is on the judgment roll alone from an order of the probate court holding that respondent, a charitable organization, is entitled to receive a part of the estate of decedent as a distributee.

This is the sole question to be determined:

> *Was there substantial evidence to sustain the trial court’s finding “that the decedent left her surviving no spouse, brother, sister, nephew, niece, descendant, or ancestor?*

This question must be answered in the affirmative. The law-is established in California that, where the appeal is on the judgment roll alone, the findings will be *conclusively*presumed to be supported by the evidence. *(Estate of Woods,*23 Cal. App. (2d) 187, 191 [72 Pac. (2d) 258].) In the ease just cited Mr. Justice Wood, speaking for this court at page 191, thus accurately states the rule:

> 1 ‘ Since the appeal is on the judgment roll alone the findings are conclusively presumed to be supported by the evidence; they are to receive, if possible, such a construction as will uphold rather than defeat the order of the court; they must be liberally construed and any ambiguity or inconsistency must be resolved in favor of sustaining the order. On such an appeal every presumption and intendment is resolved in favor of the regularity of the proceedings in the trial court. *The order of*the court will not be reversed except for some fatal error appearing on the face of the judgment roll.”

*523Even if we assume for the purpose of argument that the document filed by appellant Carrie Levi entitled “statement of Carrie Levi as a qualifying distributee” is a pleading, we must, since the appeal is on the judgment roll alone, assume that the trial court received evidence contrary to the statements in such document, which evidence would support the trial court’s findings. *(Berri*v. *Rogero,*168 Cal. 736, 741 [145 Pac. 95].)

Therefore, applying the foregoing rules to the facts of the instant case, since the appeal is on the judgment roll alone, the finding above set forth is conclusively presumed to be supported by evidence, and since no error appears on the face of the judgment roll, the judgment must be affirmed.

The order appealed from is affirmed.

Moore, P. J., concurred.

A petition by appellant to have the cause heard in the Supreme Court, after judgment in the District Court of Appeal, was denied by the Supreme Court on June 17, 1940.
#### Bertha D. Thompson, as Administratrix of the Estate of William H. Thompson, Deceased, Appellant, *v.*The Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States, Respondent.

*Thompson*v. *Equitable Life Assur. Society,*119 App. Div. 868, affirmed.

(Argued December 8, 1908;

decided January 5, 1909.)

Appeal from a judgment of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the first judicial department, entered April 20,1907, affirming a judgment in favor of defendant entered upon a dismissal of the complaint by the court at a Trial Term in an action to recover upon certain policies of life insurance.

*Raphael J. Moses*for appellant.

*Charles W. Pierson*for respondent.

Judgment affirmed, with costs; no opinion.

Concur: Cullen, Ch. J., Gray, Willard Bartlett and Hiscook, JJ. Dissenting: Edward T. Bartlett and Vann, JJ. Absent: Werner, J.
Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATION

The undersigned, as the Chief Executive Officer and Chairman of the Board, and as the
Chief Financial Officer, respectively, of CompuCredit Corporation, certify that, to the best of their knowledge and belief, the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the period ended June 30, 2008, which accompanies this certification fully
complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the information contained in the periodic report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of
CompuCredit Corporation at the dates and for the periods indicated. The foregoing certifications are made pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (18 U.S.C. § 1350) and shall not be relied upon for any other purpose.

This 5thday of August, 2008.



/s/ DAVID G. HANNADavid G. HannaChief Executive Officer andChairman of the Board/s/ J. PAUL WHITEHEAD, IIIJ. Paul Whitehead, IIIChief Financial Officer


A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906, or other document
authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that appears in typed form within the electronic version of this written statement required by Section 906, has been provided to CompuCredit Corporation and will be retained by
CompuCredit Corporation and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
§ 1631.3 Prior approval process. ( a ) LSC shall grant prior approval of a cost listed in § 1630.6(b) of this chapter if the recipient has provided sufficient written information to demonstrate that the cost would be consistent with the standards and policies of this part. LSC may request additional information if necessary to make a decision on the recipient's request.
( b ) ( 1 ) For purchases or leases of personal property, contracts for services, and capital improvements, LSC will make a decision to approve or deny a request for prior approval within 30 days of receiving materials LSC deems sufficient to decide. LSC will inform a recipient within 20 days of receiving the initial prior approval request whether LSC needs additional information to make a decision.
( 2 ) For purchases of real estate, LSC will make a decision within 60 days of receiving materials LSC deems sufficient to decide. LSC will inform a recipient within 20 days of receiving the initial prior approval request whether LSC needs additional information to make a decision.
( 3 ) If LSC cannot make a decision whether to approve the request within the allotted time, it will provide the requester with a date by which it expects to make a decision.
( c ) If LSC denies a request for prior approval, LSC shall provide the recipient with a written explanation of the grounds for denying the request.
( d ) *Exigent circumstances.* ( 1 ) A recipient may use more than $25,000 of LSC funds to purchase personal property or award a contract for services without seeking LSC's prior approval if the purchase or contract is necessary; ( i ) To avoid imminent harm to the recipient's personnel, physical facilities, or systems;
( ii ) To remediate or mitigate damage to the recipient's personnel, physical facilities or systems;
( iii ) To avoid disruption to the recipient's client-service delivery system (e.g., an event that causes a recipient's telecommunications system to cease functioning); or
( iv ) To respond to a natural disaster (e.g., a flood washes out roads leading to the recipient's offices such that the recipient must contract for services that will enable it to contact its clients).
( 2 ) The recipient must provide LSC with a description of the exigent circumstances and the information described in § 1631.8(b) within 30 days after the circumstances necessitating the purchase or contract have ended.
[82 FR 37341, Aug. 10, 2017; 82 FR 55053, Nov. 20, 2017]
**Exhibit 32.2**

 

 

 

CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER

PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT

 

 

 

The undersigned, Diane J. Ryan, the Chief Financial Officer of  Implant Sciences Corporation, a Massachusetts corporation (the “Company”), pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, hereby certifies that:

 

     (1)  the Company’s Quarterly Report on Form 10-QSB/A for the fiscal quarter ended March 31, 2004  (the “Report”) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

 

     (2)  the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

 
| Dated: |   | September 1, 2004       |
|--------|--------|-------------------------|
|   |   |                    |
|   |   | /s/ Diane J. Ryan       |
|   |   | Diane J. Ryan           |
|   |   | Chief Financial Officer |
|   |   |                    |

 

 

     This certification is being furnished to the SEC with  this Report on Form 10-QSB pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and shall not, except to the extent required by such Act, be deemed filed by the Company for purposes of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
##### 



Exhibit 32.1 Certification Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 In connection with the quarterly report of MetroCorp Bancshares, Inc. (the
Company) on Form 10-Q for the period ending September 30, 2004 as filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I,
George M. Lee, Chief Executive Officer, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section
1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley act of 2002,
that:  1.
    
    The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and2.
    
    The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and operating results of the
Company. /s/ George M. Lee

George M. LeeChief Executive Officer
 November 15, 2004 31
·...!

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION

WASHINGTON, 0 C. 20463

A8l-3l

REPORT OF THE AUDIT DIVISION

ON THE

CITIZENS' ADVOCATE POLITICAL ACTION COMMITTEE

I. Background

A. Overview

. This report is based on an audit of the Citizens'

Advocate Political Action Committee ("the Committee"), undertaken'

by the Audit Division of the Federal Election Commission in

accordance with the Commission's audit policy to determine

whether there has been compliance with the provisions of the

Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, as amended ("the Act"). The audit was conducted pursuant to Section 438(b) of Title 2 of

the United States Code which states, in part, that the Commission

may conduct audits and field investigations of any political committee required to file a report under Section 434 of this

title. Prior to conducting any audit under this section, the

Commission shall perform an internal review of reports filed by selected committees to determine if the reports filed by a

particular committee meet the threshold requirements for

substantial compliance with the Act.

The Committee registered with the Federal Election

Commission on November 29, 1979. The Committee maintains its

headquarters in Salt Lake City, Utah.

The audit covered the period January 1, 1980, through

December 31, 1980. The Committee reported a cash balance at

January 1, 1980 of $6,64S.00i total receipts for the period of . $108,728.98; total expenditures for the period of $11S,334.8li

and a cash balance on December 31, 1980 of $39.17.

This audit report is based on documents and work papers

which support each of its factual statements. They form part of

the record upon which the Commission based its decisions on the

matters in the report and were available to the Commissioners and

appropriate staff for review.

B. Key Personnel

The Treasurer of the Committee during the period covered by

the audit was Mr. Charles W. Akerlow.
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS 

AUSTIN 

lhroh B7, 19939 
i2r. C. J. Xllde, Xaroh 27, 1939, Yage 2 

and eball slve the time and plaoa for reoelrlne euoh bids. All auoh ooqetltlre bids 

shall be kdpt on file by the oounty auditor 

as a part of the reoorda of his office, and 

shall be subjeot to lnapeotion by any one 

deslrlaF to eee them. Coplee or all bide 

received shall be furnished by the county 

auditor to the oou6ty Judge and to the oom- 

~I~lonora oourt;urdwhen the bids reoe1v.d 

are'not aatisf~otorytotho-uld lwdga or 

. . 

. ..- eaant~oaslaaloaen,thaaudltor aha%lrejaot said bids and re-ednti>aa for new blda. 

Ii oases cf emrg6aoy,, puNI not la ax- - 

086s of one huadrd end fifty doll- mar bo 

made.upoa requlaltlon to bo approved w th0 

o~Ia6Ioner6 eiourt, rlthout d+ertlrIng sor 

ocatpetItIT54 bids.- 

It was kd.6 In tha oaas of kyatt Motel t%oil& 

Fork8 vs. Fannln Coiaity, Ill SR tata) 787 fhat Aktlola 

1659, aupra, manll%6t6 an Intent 'on the part OS the.Le 

latum to deolnre.r pnbllo polloy ruooaaltatlq oaqot: P

tire bidding. It was held In thIa base that a wrlt;t+lr 

oontraot or award uhe~by the Oomlaalonera~ ~,ou?t attempted to ratify pdqahaae of oul~orta~ from ;a aaa*aotu?a 

pursuant to advortlwsnt ior bid6 whioh dewrI+g'.?!+%+ 

by trade name was invalid ~&or the ~I'OVIS~O~~.O~ .4~W*le 

1669, requiring advertIaaaant *aooordIag to apeoItloitIoti 

You state in yeur inqulq that to oatabltah ao~ 

fain 8peoIrIoatlona In the adwrtIamWlt *ll ban tha 

ofiaot of ellnln6tlng oapetltlte bidding In that bat 066 

bid wo6ld be reoeIre& The aomlulon~raf owrt Is glwn 

broad dl6oretlonary ~666~6 WI+ n6peot +o ertabM8hing 

and setting epeolfIoatIon6 for equipsent to be pureh66ed 

by and used by the oarmt7. Haring set Show 6peolfI~atIo~ 

they mat then SuWt them by r&ertI6Iag the name to dll 

those who oare to bid. It 18 aterl6l If but o6e per60 

or firm oaree to bld on the partloular +eohlneq desired 

by the oouuty. 

It la therefore the opInlo6 of thla Department 

and you are eo advised th& oompetlflye bidding order the 
olrounstanoss stated by you is not only legal but 

mandatory upon the Commissioners* Court. 

TrufitlnC, that this 5atlereatorliy answema 

your inquiry, m remeln 

Very truly yours 

.
§ 212.7 Repayment to the United States. ( a ) An individual who has received temporary assistance shall be required to repay, in accordance with his ability, any or all of the cost of such assistance to the United States, except insofar as it is determined that: ( 1 ) The cost is not readily allocable to such individual;
( 2 ) The probable recovery would be uneconomical or otherwise impractical;
( 3 ) He does not have, and is not expected within a reasonable time to have, income and financial resources sufficient for more than ordinary needs; or
( 4 ) Recovery would be against equity and good conscience.
( b ) In determining an individual's resources, any claim which he has against any individual, trust or estate, partnership, corporation, or government shall be considered, and assignment to the United States of such claims shall be taken in appropriate cases.
( c ) A determination that an individual is not required to repay the cost of temporary assistance shall be final and binding, unless such determination was procured by fraud or misrepresentation of the individual or some other person, or the individual voluntarily offers to repay.
( d ) A determination that an individual is required to repay any or all of the cost of temporary assistance may be reconsidered at any time prior to repayment of the required amount. A further determination shall be made with respect to his liability to repay the balance of such amount on the basis of new evidence as to whether ( 1 ) he has, or is expected within a reasonable time to have, income and financial resources sufficient for more than ordinary needs, or
( 2 ) recovery would be against equity and good conscience.
IIA 

118TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION S. J. RES. 113 

Providing for congressional disapproval of the proposed foreign military sale 

to the Government of Israel of certain defense articles and services. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

SEPTEMBER 25, 2024 

Mr. SANDERS (for himself, Mr. WELCH, and Mr. MERKLEY) introduced the 

following joint resolution; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations 

JOINT RESOLUTION 

Providing for congressional disapproval of the proposed foreign military sale to the Government of Israel of certain 

defense articles and services. 

1 Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives

2 of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 That the following proposed foreign military sale to the 

4 Government of Israel is prohibited: 

5 (1) The sale of the following defense articles 

6 and services described in Transmittal No. 24–39, 

7 submitted to Congress pursuant to section 36(b)(1) 

8 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 

9 2776(b)(1)), and published in the Congressional 


ssavage on LAPJG3WLY3PROD with BILLS
2 

•SJ 113 IS 

1 Record on September 10, 2024: Fifty thousand four 

2 hundred (50,400) M933A1 120mm High Explosive 

3 mortar cartridges with M783 fuzes. Also included 

4 are publications; technical documentation; U.S. Gov5 ernment and contractor engineering, technical, and 

6 logistics support services; studies and surveys; and 

7 other related elements of logistics and program sup8 port. 

Æ 


ssavage on LAPJG3WLY3PROD with BILLS
United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 

## FILED

May 16, 2003

Charles R. Fulbruge III Clerk UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

For the Fifth Circuit

No. 02-60840 Summary Calendar

FIRST FAMILY FINANCIAL SERVICES INC,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

VERSUS

FRED SANDERS,

Defendant-Appellant.

--------------------------------------------------------- Cons/W No. 02-60844 FIRST FAMILY FINANCIAL SERVICES INC,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

VERSUS

HAL LEE JENKINS,

Defendant-Appellant.

--------------------------------------------------------- Cons/W No. 02-60864 FIRST FAMILY FINANCIAL SERVICES INC,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

VERSUS

JOANN CALHOUN,

Defendant-Appellant.* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this

opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4.

2 Appeals from the United States District Court For the Southern District of Mississippi, Jackson (4:01-CV-133)

Before BARKSDALE, DeMOSS, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

First Family Financial Services Inc. (hereinafter “First

Family”) filed these three actions in federal court in June, 2001,

to compel Fred Sanders, Joan Calhoun and Hal Lee Jenkins

(collectively “the Borrowers”) to arbitrate claims which Borrowers

had raised in the lawsuit brought by them against First Family in

the Circ uit Court of Noxubee County, Mississippi. The Borrowers

filed motions to dismiss as well as to motions t o stay pending

discovery which the district court denied. First Family moved to

compel arbitration in all three cases in February, 2002. In

September, 2002, the district court entered memorandum opinions and

orders directing the Borrowers to submit their state court claims

to arbitration and staying their state court action pursuant to 28

U.S.C. §2283. The Borrowers timely filed notices of appeal and

this Court consolidated the three appeals.

We have carefully reviewed the briefs and the record excerpts3 G:\opin-sc\02-60840.opn.wpd and relevant portions of the record itself. For the reasons stated

by the district court in each of the three memorandum opinions and

orders entered under date of September 6, 2002, we affirm the

decision of the district court to compel a rbitration in these

cases. AFFIRMED
#### § 1214.101 Purpose.

The purpose of this part is to effectuate section 119 of the Rehabilitation, Comprehensive Services, and Developmental Disabilities Amendments of 1978, which amended section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 to prohibit discrimination on the basis of handicap in programs or activities conducted by Executive agencies or the United States Postal Service.
FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

_____________________________

No. 1D2023-1388

_____________________________

SEAN KRIS PERKINS,

Petitioner,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Respondent.

_____________________________

Petition for Writ of Certiorari—Original Jurisdiction.

May 20, 2024

PER CURIAM.

DISMISSED.

B.L. THOMAS, BILBREY, and WINOKUR, JJ., concur.

_____________________________

Not final until disposition of any timely and 

authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 

9.331.

_____________________________

Sean Kris Perkins, pro se, Petitioner.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.
#### § 1153.151 Program accessibility: New construction and alterations.

Each building or part of a building that is constructed or altered by, on behalf of, or for the use of the agency shall be designed, constructed, or altered so as to be readily accessible to and usable by handicapped persons. The definitions, requirements, and standards of the Architectural Barriers Act (42 U.S.C. 4151 through 4157), as established in 41 CFR 101-19.600 to 101-19.607, apply to buildings covered by this section.