NOT RECOMMENDED F OR F ULL-TEXT PUBLICATION F ile Nam e: 11a0589n.06 No. 09-3720 UNITED STAT ES COURT OF AP P EALS F OR THE S IXTH CIRCUIT

DONALD EDWARD P RYOR, P laintif f-App ellant,

v. ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., Attor ney Ge neral, Defendan t-Appellee. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON AP PEAL F ROM THE UNITED STA T ES DISTRICT COURT F OR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT O F OHIO

Before: G IBBO NS, ST RANCH, and ROTH, Circuit Jud ges. * JULIA SMITH GIBBONS, Circuit Judge. After sending an alleg edly threatening email
to h is e mp lo y ers, plaintiff-a ppellant Donald Edwar d Pry or was char g ed with one misdemeanor count of Telec ommunications Har assment pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2 9 1 7

. 2 1 (B ). He was acquitted of this char g e by a jury and filed suit in fede ra l district court ag ainst numerous parties, alleg ing claims under the United States and Ohio Constit utions for unlawful sear ch and seizure, denial of fre edom of speech , and subst antive due proce ss violations. The parties filed di spositive motions, and t h e d i s t ri ct court dism issed all of P ry or’s claims. Pry or now appea ls a dis trict court order denying his motion to rec onsider a previous order dismiss ing his claims ag ainst defe ndants Dr. Christina Genove se, Mark Charville, and Dr. J eff rey Wagne r. For the rea sons that follow, we aff irm.

The Honora

ble J ane R. Roth, United States Circuit J udg e for the Uni ted States Court of * Appea ls for the Third Circ uit, sit ting by desig nation. -1-No. 09-3720

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older I

. Be fore his resig nation in April 2007, Pry or worke d as a part-time instructor of biology at the Fire lands campus of Bow ling Gre en State University (“B GSU”). I n Fe bruar y 2007, Pry or’s mother beca me serio u s l y ill and was hospitaliz ed, contributing to his persona l stress as he attempted to balanc e his mother’s needs and the demands of teac hing. Around this time, Dr. Genove se, a BG SU biology profe ssor, beca

me critica l of Pry or’s work perf ormanc e; afte r Pryor missed a class on Fe bruary 2 1 d u e t o his mother’s poor health, Dr. Genove se berated him in front of her students, instructed him to email his students in advanc e of canc eling a test, and stated that “we will deal with y our issues afte r y our m o m m y is better.” On Marc h 21, Dr. Genove se revie wed Pry or’s work by

s i t t i n g in on his class and alleg edly “interr upted [ him] numerous ti mes during the class sess i o n . ” Although Pry or was not g iven a copy of his perf ormanc e evaluation, he states that, as of Marc h 23, the BG SU Fire lands fac ulty had decide d not to rene w his teac hing contra ct due to poor perf ormanc e. Pr y o r c la im s that Dr. Wagne r, the BG SU Fire lands Depa rtment Chair of Natura l and Social Science s, “ig nored vital proce dures” and was unrec eptive to hi s complaints about Dr. Genove se, describing her as “har

mless.” He also claims that Dr. Genove se’s “unprof essional behavior

. . . cre ated a hostile work e nvironment” duringan emotionally difficult time. On April 18, 2007, afte r Pry or lear ned that his mother would be place d in a skilled nursing fac ility , Dr. Genove se ag ree d to teac h his class. That evening , she emailed h i m t o d escribe the materia l cover ed during class and the rec ommended lessons for the rema inder of the semester

. She conclude d by noting that Pry or’s “students wer e a delig ht .

. . [a] lthough attendanc e was very light

. . [. .] I wonder why ? ” Distressed by both the tone of Dr. Genove se’s email and his mother’s illness, -2-No. 09-3720

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older Pry or responde d to “ let rig htful discord be hear d” and “to addr ess the [longstanding ] abuses . .

. at Fire lands.” His ema il, which was a ddresse d to “[p] rofe ssionals at BGSU,” stated in part: I n light of the obscene problems and hardships that have been, for some odd rea son, fallen my way . I can no long er c ontinue on this semester. I t seems that while working at this fac ility

. . . my family and my very well-be ing & survival have all come under attack for whateve r rea son . . . I have been hit with bad vibe city

. All I wish is for the exact

. . . if not more so problems T O co m e t o p l agu e anyone who has had in their hear

ts opposition to me being here

. Which ag ain points to nutty statements such as below

. . . and the pimping and priming of dirt and the attempt to milk the F students for info[] about what Mr. Pry or is or is not doing r ight . . . . THE L AST THI

NG I WANTED WAS HEL P WI TH MY CL ASS, I CAN HANDL E I T

. . . HOWEVER MY L OVED ONES AND THEI R WEL L BEI NG AN D M Y MENTAL STATE CAN NOT HANDL E AL L THE GARBA GE I HAVE BEEN TOSSED HERE

. . . Fire lands colleg e . . . has a mounted to debt .

. . a los t home t o p ay fo r colleg e and no money and now power . Which power is

. . . I know I shouldn’t say

this . . . but ex actly

. . . what I

seek . . . . MAY GOD PUNI SH MY ENEMI ES SI NCE I CAN’T

. . . . AND T O T HE SHREW D M S

. GE NO VESE, I WI L L GO W I TH MY GUT VI BE AND S AY GO [ex pletive] YOURSEL F . . . I RESI GN . . . . M E , I AM HERE TO WI N, TO GET WHAT I WANT AND TO WI N

. . . NO T STRUGGL E OVER PEANUTS WHI CH I S WHAT I SEEM TO BE FI GHTI NG FOR . . . . THE NUTS, WHI CH I AM NOT ONE OF, ARE THOSE THAT ENSL AVE US, TO ADVOCATE THAT I

WI N . . . YOU MU ST L OSE . . . . Dr. Genove se forwa

rded the email to Charville, the BG SU Direc to r o f Bu d get and Oper ations, claiming that she fel t t h re at ened. Charville then contac ted BG SU L eg al Counsel and the Huron Municipal Court.

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older On April 19, 200 7, Dr. Genove se and Charville repor ted the incident to Deputy Sheriff J eff rey Hippley of the Er ie County

Sheriff’ s Offic e, who r eviewe d a copy of the e mail. Hippley ’s investigative repor

t stated that, in addition to the “veiled threats” contained in Pry or’s email, Dr. Genove se and Charville noted that Pry or had been “ac ting strang ely lately and . . . had to be asked
to leave the buildings on campus late at night on sever al occa sions rec ently , including one night that he was asked to leave at [ 3:30 a.m.] as t he campus’ pol icy is that ev er y o n e should be out at [ 2:30 a.m.] at night.” The repor t also stated that, in light of the campus shootings at Virg inia Poly technic I n s ti tute and State University (“V irg inia Tec h”) ear lier that wee k, “fa culty , particula rly D r . G e n o v e s e

. . . are conce rned.” That afte rno o n , Hippley and Captain Paul Sigsworth met with L ee McDe rmond, L aw Direc tor for the City of Huron, to further discuss the matter and to deter mine whether char g es should be filed. After revie wing the email, McDerm o n d advised that Pry or should be char g ed with one misdemeanor co u n t o f Telec ommunications Har assment pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2917.21(B ). Hippley prepa red and filed a complaint ag ainst Pry or with the Huron Municipal Court,

an arr est war

rant issued, and Pry or was arr ested following a traff ic stop that same day

. Be cause of “the disturbing statements made by Mr. Pry or in the email to Dr. Genove se[] [and] repor ts of his

err atic behavior at the time the email was sent,” McDe rmond reque sted that Pryor rec eive a psy chiatric examination throug h BG SU Fire lands Counseling and Recove ry Service s as a condition

o f b ei n g rele ased on bond. Huron Municipal Court J udg e Wil liam R. Steuk imposed th e examination as a condition of re lease , and it was c ompleted on April 20, 2007.

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older McDe rmond also moved the municipal c ourt for an order requiring Pry or t o surre nder a ny firea rms within his control and permitting a sear ch of Pry or’s home and vehicle “to confiscate any such firea rms or deadly wea

pons and hold same until further order .” J udg e Steuk order ed the Erie County Sheriff to perf

orm the sear ch of Pryor’s vehicle and residenc e, to seize any firea rms, and to “hold them until further order of this court.” Captain Sigsworth executed the sear ch on the afte rnoon of April 20, and no f

irea rms wer e re cover ed. On J uly 26, 2007, Pry or was acquitted by jury verdic t of misdemeanor Telec ommunications Har assment. Article s conce rningthe circ umstances of Pry or’s resig nation and the e nsuing c harg e

wer e published in a loca l newspape r, the Sandusky Re gister

. I I

. I n April 2008, Pry or, proce eding pro se and in forma pauperis , filed suit under various fede ral and state st atutes for monetary relief ag ainst the Unit ed S tates Att orney Genera l , a dis trict United States Attorney , sever al employ ees of BG SU, sever al employ ees of the Erie County Sheriff’ s Depa rtm en t and Correc tional Depa rtment, officia ls of Huron City , Huron Municipal Court J udg e Steuk, the di rec tor of Firelands Couns eling & Recover y Service s, and the Sandusky Register

. On J uly 25, 2008, the dist ri ct co u rt dismiss ed sever al parties sua sponte , including the United States Attorney Gene ral, the United States Attorney , BG SU Gene ral Counsel, three other BG SU defe ndants, the sheriff

, the jail direc tor, one Huron City officia l, J udg e Steuk, and th e d irec tor of BG S U Fire lands, noting that Pryor had alleg ed “no fac ts to rea sonably associate

. . . any of thes e defe n d an t s to his claims for relief .” Deputy Hippley and two other employ ees of the Sheriff’ s Depa rtment who had assisted in Pry or’s arr est wer e likewise dismiss ed; the court re asoned that, -5-No. 09-3720

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older althoug h Pry or mentioned these defe ndants in his complaint, he failed to “state the fe d eral constitutional claim . . . upon which [he] intends to base his § 1983 ac tion.” I n the same order , the district court also dismiss ed various cause s of action. Pry or’s Eig hth Amendment claim for crue l and unusual punis h m en t , which was based upon the loss of companionship time with his mot her dur ing his a rre st and the potential adve rse e ffe ct upon future employ ment, failed beca

use he was not a prison inmate. See Barber v. City of Salem , 953 F.2d 232, 235 (1992). His equal protec tion claim for g ender discrimination failed b ec au s e t h ere was no evidenc e of disparate treatment or purposef ul disc rimination. And, Pry or’s claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ag ainst Doug Phares, the newspa per publisher, was dismiss ed beca use Phares was not a state actor and had not eng ag ed in any beh av i o r approximating state action. I n addition, the court dismiss ed Pry or’s claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1985, and 1986; the Hea lth Insuranc e Portability and Acc ountability Act (“H I PAA”); various fed e r a l c r im in a l s tatutes; and inapplicable state statutes. The court, howeve r, permitted Pry or’s suit to p ro ce ed under § 1983 ag ainst Dr. Genove se, Dr. Wagne r, Charville (collec tively , “the state defe ndants”), and McDe rmond for unlawful sear ch and seizure, fre e speec h violations, and the denial of substantive due proce ss. The suit proce eded under state law a g ainst the state def endants, Phare s, and the Sandusky Re gister

. Following th e court’s J uly 25 order , the rema ining defe ndants wer e serve d and filed dispositi ve pleading s. On November 21, 2008, the district court g rante d the motions to dismiss filed by the state defe ndants, Phares, and the Sandusky Register. The court conclude d that, under Ohio 1

Pry or has not appea led the district court’s decision d i smissi ng his claims for intentional 1 infliction of emotional distress and har assment ag ainst the Sandusky Re gister and Phare s. -6-No. 09-3720

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older Rev. Code Ann. § 2743.02(A)( 1), Pry or waived his rig ht to sue the state defe ndants in fede ral court by filing a “substantially duplicative” complaint on April 18, 2008, in the Ohio Court of Claims. See Turker v. Ohio Dep’ t of Rehab. & Corr. , 157 F.3d 453, 457–58 (6th Cir. 1998); L ea ma n v. Ohio Dep’ t of Mental Retardation & Dev

. Di sabilit ies , 825 F.2d 946 (6th Cir. 1987) ( en banc ). I n the alternative, the court deter mined that the state defe ndants wer e entitled to qualified immunit y under fede ral law and under Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 9.86. See Hayne s v. Marshall , 887 F.2d 700, 705 (6th Cir. 1989). On Fe bruar

y 26, 2009, the district court g ranted McDe rmond’s motion for summary judgme nt with respe ct to Pry or’s state law claims for malicious prosec ution and false arr est and his fede ral c laims under § 1983 for unlawful sear ch and seizure under the Four th Amendment, denial of fre e speec h under the First Amendment, an d d ep ri v ati on of substantive due proce ss under the Four teenth Amendment. As to the state law claims, the court found that McDe rmond was entitled
to s u mm a r y ju d gme nt b e c a

u s e Pry or failed to prese nt evidenc e demonstrating that McDe rmond act e d with malice when he rec ommended that Hippley file the complaint and beca use he neither detained Pry or nor was the arr esting office r. As to the fede ral claims, the court held that McDe rmond could
not be held acc ountable “for any constitutional infirmity in the plaintiff’s arr est” beca use he “simply authorized the filing of the complaint” but did not issue or ex ecute the arr est or sear ch war rants; Pr y o r ’ s v a g u e a n d c o nclusory contentions reg arding the violation of his First Amendment rig hts wer e insufficient to show a g enuine issue of materia l fac t ; McDe rmond’s actions did “not rise to an actionable level o f eg reg iousness” to maintain a substantive due proce ss claim; and, in the alternative, McDe rmond was e ntitled to qualified immuni ty

. -7-No. 09-3720

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older On April 15, 2009, Pry or filed a motion for rec onsideration of the district court’s November 21, 2008, ord e r d is mi s s in g h is c la im s a g a in st the state defe ndants, Phares, and the Sandusky Register

. The district court denied this motion on May 27, 2009, stating that Pry or’s motion “[did] not prese nt

new evidenc e or cite any new authority that could not have been called to [t he court’s] attention prior
to [t he court’s] ruling ” and, instead, m ere ly asked the court “to re- do that which [ it] alre ady [had] done.” The court ente red final judgme nt dismiss ing the case and cer tifying under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (3) that a

n appea l from its decision could not be take n in good f aith. On J une 9, 2009, Pryor filed a timely notice of appea l, in which he appea led th e district court’s de nial of his motion for rec onsideration. I I I

. We revie w a d i s t ri ct court’s order g ranting summary judgme nt and its denial of

rec onsideration of that order de novo . Med. Mut. of O hio v

. K. Am alia Ente rs., Inc. , 548 F.3d 383, 3 8 9

– 9 0 (6 t h C ir. 2008). Summary judgme nt is proper if, viewing the evidenc e in the light mo s t 2 favor able to the non-moving party and draw ing all rea sonable infere nces in that party ’s favor , “the movant shows that there is no g enuine dispute as to a ny materia l fac t and the movant is entitled to judgme nt as a matter of law.” Fe d. R. Civ. P. 56(a) ; CMACO Auto. Sys., Inc. v. W anxiang Am.

The proper

standard of

revie w is somewhat uncle ar in this case . “Ge nera lly , the denial of 2 a motion to rec onsider is revie wed for an abuse of discretion,” but “whe n a Rule 59(e) motion seeks rec onsideration of a gra

nt of summary

judgme nt, [ we] conduct[] a de novo revie w us ing the same leg al standard employ ed by the district court.” Gage Prods. Co. v. Henk el Corp. , 393 F.3d 629, 637 (6th Cir. 2004). I n its November 21, 2008, order , the district co u rt gra nted the state defe ndants’ motion to dismiss

. Howeve r, in its May 27, 2009, order denying rec onsideration of the November 21 order , the court char acte rized its ruling as a g rant of summary judgme nt. Be cause neither party has disputed this chara cter ization, we will apply de novo revie w. -8-No. 09-3720

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older Corp. , 589 F.3d 235, 241–42 (6th Cir. 2009). “A ge nuine i ssue fo r trial exis ts only when there is sufficie nt ‘evide nce on which the jury could rea sonably find for the plaintiff.’” Ba ke r v. City of Hamilton , 471 F.3d 601, 605 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986))

. I V. Pry or argues that the district court err ed by g ranting summary judgme nt to the defe ndants and dismiss ing his claims under state law fo r fa lse arr est and malicious prosec ution and under § 1983 for violations of his First, Four th, and Four

teenth Amendment rig hts. He urg es this court to reve rse t h e district court’s decision “as to all the public officia ls involved, including J udg e S t eu k , L aw Direc tor L ee McDe rmond and De puty Hippley and their r espec tive sovere igns, the City of Huron, Ohio and Erie County , Ohio and the Erie County Sheriff’ s office ” on the g round that a g enuine issue of materia l fa ct ex i s t s . The state defe ndants maintain that the district court should be aff irmed b ec au s e P ry o r has not raised claims ag ainst them in his appellate brief, beca use Pry or waived his claims ag ainst them by filing a substantially simil ar complaint in the Ohio Court of Claims , an d beca use they are shielded by

qualified immunity

.

A. Although Pry or has appea led only the district court’s May 27, 2009, ord e r d enying his motion f o r r e c o n s id e r a

ti o n , Pr yo r ’ s a p p e ll a te b r ie f raises arguments ag ainst McDe rmond, Hippley , and J udg e Steuk (collec tively , “the local officia ls”), who are not mentioned in that order

. Be cause “[t] he court must alway s consider its jurisdiction first and may not hear a ca u s e o v er which it has no jurisdiction,” we must first deter mine our jurisdiction over these claims. United States v. Universal

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older Mgmt. Servs., Inc. , 191 F.3d 750, 756 (6th Cir. 1999) (citing Steel Co. v. Citi zens for a Better Env’t , 523 U.S. 83 (1998)). Fe dera l Rule of Appellate Procedur e 3 is a jurisdictional rule g overning the m et h o d for taking appea ls as of rig ht. See Fe d R. App. P. 3; Smith v. Barry , 502 U.S. 244, 248 (1992) (stating that, despite the principle of liberal construction, “Rule 3’s dictates are jurisdictional in nature , and their satisfac tion is a prer equisite to ap pellate revie w”) ; Universal Mgmt. Servs. , 191 F.3d at 756 (instructing that Rule 3 “is jurisdictional and may not be ‘wa ived’ by this c ourt”). “[L ]i tiga nts a re char g ed with the responsibility for complying with the Fe dera l Rules of Appellate Procedur e,” and this court may not excuse non-complianc e. Maerk i v. W ilson , 128 F.3d 1005, 1008 (6th Cir. 1997); Guy v. Lexington-Faye tte Urban Cnty. Gov’ t , 57 F. App’x 217, 223 (6th Cir. 2003); see also Agee

v. Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. , 114 F.3d 395, 400 (2d Cir. 1997) (re marking upon “the importance of Ru l e 3 (c )” and “the harsh and unfortunate conseque nces of overlooking it”). Although liberal construction of the rule’s require ments is permissible, we have emphasized that “strict obedienc e to Rule 3(c) is war

rante d, even though it may have harsh results in cer tain circ umstances.” Uni ted States v. Glover , 242 F.3d 333, 335 (6t h Cir. 2001) (interna l quotation marks omitted); see also Smith , 502 U.S. at 248 (“This principle of liberal construction does not .

. . excuse noncompliance with the Rule

. ”) ; Torres v. Oakland Scave nger Co. , 487 U.S. 312, 317–18 (1988), supersede d by 1993 amendments to Rule 3(c) (stating that, “althoug h a court may construe the Rules liberally

. . . it may not waive the jur isdictional require ments of Rule[] 3 . . . even f or ‘g ood cause shown’”)

. Rule 3(c) (1) provides that the notice of appea l must “desig nate the judgme nt, order , or part there of being appea led.” Fe d. R. App. P. 3(c) (1)( B)

. T h e re qu i rements of the rule serve “two -10-No. 09-3720

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older essential purposes.” Glover , 242 F.3d at 336. First, Rule 3(c)(1) serves “administrative concerns by ‘avoiding inconsistency , vagueness and an u n n ec essary multipl ication of litigation’ cause d by

uncer tainty over who has appea led and from what judgme nt. ” Is er t v. Ford Motor Co. , 461 F.3d 756, 759 (6th Cir. 2006) (interna l editorial marks omitted) (quoting Minority Emps. v. Tenn. Dep’ t of Emp’t Sec. , 901 F.2d 1327, 1329 (6th Cir. 1990) ( en banc )). Second, it satisfies fairne ss and due proce ss conc erns “by ‘ensur [i ng ] that the filing provides sufficie nt notice to other parties and the courts.’ ” Gl over , 242 F.3d at 336 (quoting Smith , 502 U.S. at 248) (alter ation in orig inal). I n 1993, following the Supreme Court’s decision in To r r es , wh i ch held that the phrase

“ et al. ” was insufficient to satisfy the require ment of Rule 3(c) (1)( A) that the notice of appea l must “s p ec ify the party or parties taking the appea l by naming eac h one,” Rule 3(c) was amended “t o confor m mor e tightly to the se administrative and due pr ocess c oncer ns and to reduc e the potential that an appea l might be dismiss ed wher e such conce rns would not be signific antly implicated.” Glover , 242 F.3d at 336; see also Dillon v. Uni t ed St a t es , 184 F.3d 556, 558 (6th Cir. 1999) ( en b a n c ) (s t at i ng that the amendments to Rule 3(c) “we re aimed at ameliorating the eff ect of Rul e 3(c) (1)( A)” and expanding this rationale to apply to Rule 3(c) (1)( C), which require s parties to “name the court to which the appea l is taken” ). The amendments soug ht “to soften the prac tical eff ect” of Torres ’s holding. Dillon , 184 F.3d at 558. Howeve r, the principle of g ener ous construction “has never reduc ed compliance [wit h Rule 3(c) (1)] to a matter of judicial g rac e.” Isert , 461 F.3d at 760. Thus, in Glover , this court held that it lacke d jurisdiction to decide the would-be appellant’ s case when the appellant failed to desig nate the orde r it wanted to a

ppeal. 242 F .3d at 336–37. We noted:

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older Unlike the decision where to appea l, the decision w h a t to appea l is left almost exclusively to the di scre tion of t he appellant. Fur thermore , it g ener ally is true that numerous potentially appea lable issues have been g ener ated by the district court befor e an appea l is taken. .

. . Thus, unlike the decision in Dillon —loose n ing as it did the require ment “to name the court to which the appea l is taken” — . . . a simil ar loosening of the require ment “to desig nate the judgme nt, order , or part there of being appea led”—would, if approve d, too fre quently require this Court to sort throug h a morass of objective and subjective fac tors to meditate upon and divine the party ’s intended appe llate targ ets. Id. Pry or’s notice of appea l states that he is appea ling from the “[m] otion for rec onsideration

. . . [d] ocument 62, filed 05/27/2009.” I n the May 27 order , the district court denied rec onsideration of its Nove mber 21, 2008, order , in which it g rante d the state defe ndants’ motion to dism iss. But, as the state defe ndants note, Pry or’s appellate brief raises claims exclusively ag ainst the local officia ls, who are not mentioned in the May 27 o r No vember 21 order s. Thus, beca use Pryor has neither 3 desig nated any order s perta ining to the local officia ls in his notice of appea l nor appea led from the final judgme nt, we lack jurisdiction to consider claims ag ainst t h e l o ca l officia ls. See Universal 4 Mgmt. Servs. , 191 F.3d at 756 (noting that “‘[i] f an appellant

. . . chooses to desig nate spec i fi c deter minations in his notice of appea l—rather than simply appea ling from the entire ju d g me nt— o n ly

The district court dismiss ed the claims ag ainst J udg e Steuk and Hippley in its J uly 25, 2008, 3 order ; g rante d summary judgme nt to McDe rmond on Fe bruar y 26, 2009; and enter ed final judgme nt at docke t entry

63 on May

27, 2009. We further note that the district court’s docket entry , g ener ated by the cler k’s office , which 4 states that Pry or has appea led “fr om the 62 Orde r and 63 J udg ment of 5/27/09” is insufficient to prese rve Pry or’s claims ag ainst the local o fficials. As stated above, Pry or’s notice of appea l desig nates only docket entry 62, the district court’s order denying rec onsideration of its November 21 order

. -12-No. 09-3720

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older the specifie d issues may be raised on appea l’” (alter ations in orig inal) (quoting McLaurin v. Fisher , 768 F.2d 98, 102 ( 6th Cir. 1985)). B. Wit h respe ct to the state defe ndants, Pry or has not challeng ed either the district court’s denial of his motion for rec onsideration or the district court’s underly ing order dismi s s in g h is c la ims ag ainst them on the g rounds of waiver under Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2743.02(A)( 1) and qualified immunit y . The state defe ndants contend that Pry or “wa ived his rig ht to challeng e the dispositi on of his claims ag ainst [t hem] by failing to make any arguments in support of those claims” on appea l, and we ag ree . I n this circ uit, it is well-settled that “[ i ] s s u es adver ted to in a perf

unctory manner ,

unacc ompanied by some eff ort at develope d argumentation, are deeme d waived. I t is not sufficie nt for a party to mention a possible argument in the most skeletal way , leaving the court to

. . . put flesh

on its bones.” McPhe rson v. Kelsey , 125 F.3d 989, 995–96 (6th Cir. 1997) (quoting Citi zens Awareness Network, Inc . v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n , 59 F.3d 284, 293–94 ( 1st Cir. 1995) (interna l quotation marks omitted); see also Indec k Energy Servs., Inc. v. Consumers Energy Co. , 250 F.3d 972, 979 (6th Cir. 2000). Her e, aside from the unsupported asse rtion in his
statement of the issue that the district co u rt err ed in dismiss ing his claims ag ainst the state defe ndants, Pry or has not identified case law contra dicting the district court’s conclusions, nor has he cited the Ohio statutes on which the court relied. Moreove r, Pry or’s brief makes no argument as to why he did not forf

ei t h i s claims by filing suit in the Ohio Court of Claims or why the state defe ndants are not entitled to qualified immunit y . I nstead, these issues are omitted altog ether

. We there fore hold that Pryor has waived his claims ag ainst the state defe ndants by failing to develop his -13-No. 09-3720

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older argument with any specific ity

. See, e.g. , Nance v. Goodye ar Tire & Rubber Co. , 527 F.3d 539, 558 (6th Cir. 2008); Indec k, 250 F.3d a t 979. V. For the fore g oing r easons, we aff irm the district court.

-14-