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IN RE SYDNEI V.*

(AC 38627)

Lavine, Mullins and Harper, Js.

Argued April 5—officially released September 15, 2016**

(Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of

Middlesex, Child Protection Session at Middletown,

Hon. Barbara M. Quinn, judge trial referee.)

David J. Reich, for the appellant (respondent).

Benjamin M. Wattenmaker, assigned counsel, forthe

appellee (petitioner).

George Jepsen, attorney general, Gregory T. D’Auria,

solicitor general, and Benjamin Zivyon and Carolyn

Signoralli, assistant attorneys general, filed a brief for

the Commissioner of Children and Families as amicus curiae.
Opinion

LAVINE, J. The respondent mother appeals from the

judgment of the trial court terminating her parental

rights in her daughter (child) pursuant to General Statutes § 45a-717 (g) (2) (A), abandonment, and § 45a-717

(g) (2) (C), no ongoing parent-child relationship.1 On

appeal, the respondent claims that the court(1) violated

her right to due process by failing to determine, during

the dispositional phase of the termination of parental

rights proceeding, that there would be some adverse

effect to the child by failing to terminate her parental

rights in the child, (2) erred in finding that it was in

the child’s best interests to terminate the respondent’s

parental rights as to the child, and (3) committed plain

error by failing to canvass her prior to trial as required

by In re Yasiel R., 317 Conn. 773, 120 A.3d 1188 (2015)

(Yasiel canvass), and In re Daniel N., 163 Conn. App.

322, 135 A.3d 1260, cert. granted, Conn. , A.3d

(2016).2 We disagree and, therefore, affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In its memorandum of decision, the court, Hon. Barbara M. Quinn, judge trial referee, made the following

findings of fact. J.V. and his wife, K.V., are the child’s

legal guardians (guardians).3

In December, 2014, in the

Court of Probate for the District of Danbury, the petitioner, J.V., filed an application to terminate the respondent’s parental rights, pursuant to General Statutes

§ 45a-717. The application alleged that the respondent’s

parental rights should be terminated on the ground of

abandonment; General Statutes § 45a-717 (g) (2) (A);

and no ongoing parent-child relationship; General Statutes § 45a-717 (g) (2) (C).4 Pursuant to a motion filed

by counsel for the child, the matter was transferred to

the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters. See General

Statutes § 45a-715. The trial was conducted between

October 5 and October 8, 2015.

The respondent and the child’s father had dated one

another while they were in high school. They later married and had one child who is the subject of the present

termination proceeding. The child was born in 2005. The

couple’s relationship was marked by domestic violence

and alcohol abuse. In 2006, they were living apart from

one another. Despite their differences, the couple tried

to ‘‘patch things up.’’ One evening they went out to

dinner and were involved in a serious motor vehicle

crash. The child’s father was killed at the scene, and

the respondent suffered serious injuries. The accident

investigation concluded that the respondent and the

child’s father were intoxicated with blood alcohol levels

in excess of the legal limit.

The respondent subsequently married G.U. with

whom she has a son, Z. The respondent’s relationship

with G.U. also was characterized by domestic violence,

and drug and alcohol abuse. The child and Z were
exposed to a great deal of turbulence. As a consequence

of their domestic violence, the respondent and G.U.

were arrested on numerous occasions. Although the

respondent reported that G.U. instigated the violence,

the court found that the respondent was the primary

aggressor. In January, 2010, the respondent was so

angry that she attacked G.U. with a knife and tried to

cut his face. The child, who was five years old at the

time, was awakened from sleep by the fracas. She still

recalled the incident at the time of trial.

On January 17, 2010, the Department of Children and

Families (department) obtained an order of temporary

custody and removed both children from the care of

respondent and G.U. and placed them with the guardians. The child was adjudicated neglected on November

22, 2010, and placed in the guardians’ care.5 When the

child entered the guardians’ home, she was terrified of

knives, including the mere mention of them. She was

shy, withdrawn, anxious, and suffered night terrors.

When she was traveling in a motor vehicle, the child

became nervous and fearful that the respondent was

following and would take her away. The guardians

placed her in therapy, which was of some benefit to her.

At the time of the neglect proceedings, the court,

Sommer, J., ordered once-a-week visitation between

the respondent and the child and joint counseling for

them. The therapist was to work with the respondent

and the child to improve their relationship and expand

visitation and was authorized to make recommendations regarding the progress, duration, and frequency,

as well as the supervision, of the visits between the

respondent and the child. The hoped-for normalization

of the parent-child relationship between the respondent

and the child did not take place due to the trauma the

child had suffered as a result of the constant violence

in her parental home. The child did not want to talk

about her life with the respondent, even five years later

at the time of the termination of parental rights trial.

The respondent and the child had scheduled visitation during the first year and one-half following the

transfer of guardianship. The child was anxious, however, and her symptoms increased prior to each visit.

It was difficult to schedule the time and location of the

visits. The guardians asked the respondent to provide

adequate notice so that they could prepare the child

emotionally to be ready for the visit. The respondent

often gave notice at the last minute, after the child had

gone to bed for the night, which made it difficult for

the guardians to prepare her for the visit, which took

place at restaurants, in the community, and in parks.

Sometimes Z or the court appointed guardian ad litem

attended the visits. On the way to the visits, the child

complained of having a stomach ache and that she

needed to throw up. The visits lasted for approximately

one hour, sometimes longer. Often the child wished the
visits to be shortened. Occasionally, the respondent

brought the child a gift. Once, the respondent took the

child to a ‘‘Build-a-Bear’’ store, where she purchased a

teddy bear for the child. When the child returned to

the guardians’ home, she wanted to throw out the bear.

By early 2012, the visits between the respondent and

the child were sporadic and far between. The two were

no longer were engaged in joint therapy, and the therapist did not recommend increasing the amount of time

the respondent spent with the child.

In March, 2012, the respondent filed a motion for

increased visitation. The parties reached an agreement

that, after three individual therapy sessions, the respondent could have therapeutic visits with the child. The

respondent, however, failed to attend the three required

therapy sessions, and all visits ceased. The respondent

last visited the child on April 9, 2012. The respondent

and child have had no contact since then.

The respondent claimed that she failed to continue

therapy and engage in therapeutic visits with the child

for financial reasons. She had no insurance and inadequate income from her employment. The court found

no evidence that the respondent made any attempt to

seek therapy on a sliding pay scale or to ask for help

from others, such as the guardian ad litem, to find

affordable therapy. She made only a minimal effort to

comply with the court-ordered conditions for increased

access to the child.

In addition to failing to find means by which she

could increase her access to the child, the respondent

did not take advantage of other avenues open to her

that would demonstrate her commitment to the child.

The respondent provided no financial support for the

child nor did she send the child letters or gifts. She failed

to inquire about the child’s school progress, medical

appointments, or her life in general. The court found

that whatever her level of concern may have been, the

respondent failed to manifest it in a concrete manner to

inform herself about the child’s daily life and progress.

The respondent filed another motion for visitation in

December, 2013. The department investigated and filed

a visitation report dated July 7, 2014. Afterreviewing the

history and the child’s relationship with the respondent,

the department did not recommend visitation.

Court-ordered psychological evaluations of both the

respondent and the child were performed in October,

2014, by Deborah Gruen, a clinical and forensic psychologist. The guardians also were interviewed. On the basis

of Gruen’s testimony at trial, the court found that the

respondent was an emotionally sensitive person who

has a propensity for unstable relationships. She can be

irritable, demanding, and charming at the same time,

is manipulative in her relationships, and exercises poor

judgment. Although Gruen did not provide a diagnosis,
she found that the respondent exhibits antisocial behavior and borderline personality traits. She recommended

that the respondent receive intensive psychotherapy

with a seasoned clinician to deal with the trauma the

respondent herself has experienced, both as a child and

in her adult relationships.6 Without intensive treatment,

Gruen’s prognosis for the respondent is guarded.

Because the respondent was pregnant in November,

2014, Gruen recommended that the respondent wait at

least six months before entering therapeutic intervention. This period of time was needed to give the respondent time to adjust to all of the significant changes that

were coming to her life.

The court asked Gruen to answer additional questions, which she did in August, 2015. Gruen summarized

the treatment the respondent had received and results

of the conversation she had with the respondent’s clinician. By the end of July, 2015, the respondent had had

twenty-two sessions of therapy and had made substantial strides to address her long-standing trauma-related

issues. The respondent has stable employment with

considerable management responsibilities and has custody of her youngest child. Z is in her care several times

a week, but his father is his primary caretaker. The

respondent is beginning the difficult introspection and

emotional work that she needs to improve herself for

the sake of her children as well as herself. The court

found that the respondent’s changes came about after

the child had been out of the respondent’s primary care

for five years.

According to Gruen, the child has only bad memories

of life with the respondent, and she does not wish to

see or interact with her. The child suffers underlying

anxiety and needs to strengthen her ability to acknowledge her anxieties and address her fears on a more

realistic basis. The therapist did not recommend that

the child visit with the respondent until the respondent

had undertaken intensive therapy. In the spring of 2015,

the child was in therapy, having been diagnosed with

posttraumatic stress, as a result of the trauma she has

witnessed. The child’s therapist echoed Gruen’s concern about the child’s building a relationship with the

respondent. Children in her situation are very cautious,

hostile, and estranged. The therapist could not predict

what would happen if the child and respondent met,

as there could be widely different outcomes. As the

child grows, however, the therapist opined that she will

need some access to the respondent; children who are

in the child’s situation grow-up ‘‘missing a part of themselves,’’ which is necessary for their stable, balanced,

and mature adult development.7

The court found, according to the guardian ad litem,

that in 2011, the child was very anxious and uncomfortable whenever the respondent was mentioned. The

child wanted to remain with the guardians, and her
attitude was unchanged in 2015. She is settled in the

guardians’ home where she is a happy and loving ten

year old, who is enthusiastic about school and the things

that she does with her family. In the opinion of the

guardian ad litem, termination of the respondent’s

parental rights is in the best interest of the child.

The court analyzed the facts and the grounds alleged

for termination of the respondent’s parental rights in

the child in the adjudicatory phase of the proceedings.

As to the ground of abandonment alleged pursuant to

§ 45a-717 (g) (2) (A),8

the court noted that the appellate

courts of this state have held that ‘‘[t]he commonly

understood general obligations of parenthood entail

these minimum attributes: (1) [the expression of] love

and affection for the child; (2) [the expression of] personal concern over the health, education and general

well-being of the child; (3) the duty to supply the necessary food, clothing, and medical care; (4) the duty to

provide an adequate domicile; and (5) the duty to furnish social and religious guidance.’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) In re Kezia M., 33 Conn. App. 12, 18,

632 A.2d 112, cert. denied, 228 Conn. 915, 636 A.2d

847 (1993).

Abandonment has been defined as a parent’s failure

to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or

responsibility as to the welfare of the child, and maintain implies a continuing, reasonable degree of interest,

concern, or responsibility and not merely a sporadic

showing thereof. See In re Paul M., 148 Conn. App.

654, 664, 85 A.3d 1263, cert. denied, 311 Conn. 938, 88

A.3d 550 (2014).

On the basis of the clear and convincing evidence

before the court, it found that the respondent had not

demonstrated the minimum attributes of parenthood

as they are understood in the law. She has not expressed

love and affection toward the child in any meaningful

way and has failed to inquire about the child’s health,

education, and general well-being, and has not made

any effort to provide financial support for the child.

Although the court did not doubt that in her heart, the

respondent loves the child and wishes that she could

visit with her, the respondent is aware that the child

does not wish to have contact with her. The court found

that the respondent is wise enough not to force contact

with the child.

The court credited the respondent with good intentions, but noted that thoughts and wishes are insufficient to sustain a child. The court found that the

respondent had choices to make in the five years since

the child left her care. On three separate occasions, in

2010, 2012, and 2014, the respondent was offered visits

with the child if she entered therapy. It was not until

2014 that the respondent began the arduous process

of making positive changes in her life. Although the

respondent has made sufficient progress to enable her
to have her two younger children9

in her care on a

regular basis, that progress has been too little and too

late for the child who is the subject of the present

termination of parental rights petition.

The respondent failed to write to the child or to send

her gifts. She failed to communicate with the guardians

as to the child’s well-being. Although the respondent

believes that the guardians prevented her from doing

so, she failed to reach out to take advantage of the

resources available to her, such as the child’s guardian

ad litem and attorney. The court concluded that the

clear and convincing evidence of respondent’s failures

constitutes legal abandonment.

Although a court need find only one statutory ground

to terminate parental rights in a child; see In re Alexander C., 67 Conn. App. 417, 427, 787 A.2d 608 (2001),

aff’d, 262 Conn. 308, 813 A.2d 87 (2003); the court adjudicated the second reason alleged by the petitioner. To

grant a termination of parental rights petition on the

ground that there is no ongoing parent-child relationship pursuant to § 45-717 (g) (2) (C),10 the court must

find that no parent-child relationship exists and that

looking prospectively, it would be detrimental to the

child’s best interest to allow time for such a relationship

to develop. See In re Christian P., 98 Conn. App. 264,

269, 907 A.2d 1261 (2006). In the present case, the court

found that there is no remaining parent-child relationship between the respondent and the child; it evaporated in the long period of time in which the respondent

had no contact with the child. The critical issue, the

court found, was whether it is detrimental to the child’s

best interest to permit more time for such a relationship

to develop.

The court found that the child is happy and secure

in the guardians’ home and her school. The mere mention of the respondent upsets the child. The child has no

positive memories of the respondent. Permitting more

time in the child’s young life for such a relationship to

develop is detrimental to the child’s best interest when

the child has been out of the respondent’s care for more

than one half of her life. The court concluded from the

clear and convincing evidence that the petitioner had

proven that there was no ongoing parent child relationship and that it was not in the child’s best interest to

permit more time for such a relationship to develop.

The courtthen made the statutory findings required in

the dispositional phase of the proceedings. See General

Statutes § 45a-717 (h). The court found that the dispositional factors all pointed toward a finding that termination of parental rights was in the child’s best interest.

The child is in crucial need of safety, stability, and

permanency, which the respondent is not in a position

to provide. The court concluded on the basis of the

clear and convincing evidence that termination of the

respondent’s parental rights is in the child’s best inter-
est. Additional facts will be set out as necessary.

Before addressing the respondent’s claims on appeal,

we set forth ‘‘the well established legal framework for

deciding termination of parental rights petitions. [A]

hearing on a petition to terminate parental rights consists of two phases: the adjudicatory phase and the

dispositional phase. During the adjudicatory phase, the

trial court must determine whether one or more of the

. . . grounds for termination of parental rights set forth

in [§ 45-717 (g)] exists by clear and convincing evidence.

. . . If the trial court determines that a statutory

ground for termination exists, then it proceeds to the

dispositional phase. During the dispositional phase, the

trial court must determine whether termination is in the

best interests of the child.’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) In re Elijah G.-R., 167 Conn. App. 1, 18–19,

A.3d (2016).

I

The respondent’s first claim is that ‘‘procedural due

process requires the court to determine in the dispositional phase that there are adverse effects on the child

that outweigh the mother’s constitutionally protected

parental rights before those rights can be terminated.’’11

This claim, which is in derogation of § 45a-717 (h), is

made up of whole cloth, and we reject it.

Our legislature has created a constitutionally viable

statutory scheme to be followed by our courts when

adjudicating petitions to terminate the parental rights

of parents in their children. General Statutes §§ 45a717 and 17a-212,12 which are applicable in the Probate

Court and Superior Court respectively, consist of ‘‘two

phases, adjudication and disposition. . . . In the adjudicatory phase, the trial court determines whether one

of the statutory grounds for termination of parental

rights . . . exists by clear and convincing evidence. If

the trial court determines that a statutory ground for

termination exists, it proceeds to the dispositional

phase. In the dispositional phase, the trial court determines whether termination is in the best interests of

the child.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re

Trevon G., 109 Conn. App. 782, 788, 952 A.2d 1280

(2008). In the present case, the court found that the

petitioner had proved by clear and convincing evidence

the grounds alleged for termination of the respondent’s

parental rights in the child. On appeal, the respondent

does not challenge the court’s findings and conclusions

in the adjudicatory stage of the termination proceeding.

Rather, the respondent claims that her right to procedural due process was violated because the court failed

to perform a balancing test pursuant to Mathews v.

Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335, 96 S. Ct. 893, 47 L. Ed. 2d

18 (1976), to determine the adverse effects of the failure

to terminate her parental rights on the child against her

constitutionally protected right to raise her child. Such

an analysis in this case is unwarranted as the statutory
scheme passes constitutional muster. See In re Nevaeh

W., 317 Conn. 723, 740, 120 A.3d 1177 (2015); In re Eden

F., 250 Conn. 674, 690–91, 741 A.2d 873 (1999).

Section § 45a-717 (h) sets forth six guidelines that

the court must consider and on which it must make

written findings, and our Supreme Court has determined that this statutory provision is the guide to

determining the best interest of the child. The statutory

scheme ‘‘carefully sets out . . . [the] situations that,

in the judgment of the legislature, constitute countervailing interests sufficiently powerful to justify the termination of parental rights in the absence of consent.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Eden F.,

supra, 250 Conn. 689. Nothing in § 45a-717 (h), which

relates to the best interest of the child in the dispositional phase of the termination proceeding, requires the

court to engage in a Mathews balancing analysis or to

find a detriment to the child if termination of parental

rights is not granted.

The respondent relies on Santosky v. Kramer, 455

U.S. 745, 754, 102 S. Ct. 1388, 71 L. Ed. 2d 599 (1982).

Santosky does not support her position. ‘‘Afterthe State

has established parental unfitness at the intital proceeding, the court may assume at the dispositional stage

that the interests of the child and the natural parents

do diverge.’’(Emphasis omitted.)Id., 760. In the dispositional phase of a termination proceeding, the emphasis

shifts ‘‘from the conduct of the parent to the best interest of the child.’’ In re Romance M., 229 Conn. 345,

356–57, 641 A.2d 378 (1994). As the commissioner has

pointed out in her brief, the respondent’s claim, in actuality, is not related to procedural due process. Rather,

the respondent seeks to add a substantive requirement

to the statutory scheme enacted by our legislature. In

other words, the respondent’s claim is related to substantive, not procedural, due process. See In re Azareon

Y., 309 Conn. 626, 640, 72 A.3d 1074 (2013)(our Supreme

Court observed that similar claim was one of substantive, not procedural, due process). For the foregoing

reasons, the respondent’s claim fails.

II

The respondent’s second claim is that the trial court

erred by finding that there was clear and convincing

evidence that it was in the child’s best interest to terminate the respondent’s parental rights in her.13 We do

not agree.

The substance of the respondent’s claim is that the

evidence presented as to the dispositional phase of

the termination proceeding was marginal. She correctly

notes that the child has been in a safe and stable home

since 2010, and that the respondent has done nothing

to jeopardize the placement and is not seeking reunification. She argues, therefore, that because the child is in

a stable, permanent placement and the respondent is
not negatively affecting that placement, there is no clear

and convincing evidence that her parental rights should

be terminated because it is in the best interest of the

child. To support her claim, the respondent points to

Gruen’s testimony that the child, at some time in the

future, may benefit from contact with the respondent.

The respondent’s argument is unavailing.

‘‘The best interests of the child include the child’s

interests in sustained growth, development, well-being,

and continuity and stability of its environment.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Shyina B., 58 Conn.

App. 159, 167, 752 A.2d 1139 (2000). ‘‘In the dispositional

phase of a termination of parental rights hearing, the

trial court must determine whether it is established by

clear and convincing evidence that the continuation of

the respondent’s parental rights is not in the best interest of the child.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

In re Jermaine S., 86 Conn. App. 819, 835, 863 A.2d

720, cert. denied, 273 Conn. 938, 875 A.2d 43 (2005). In

making that determination, the court must consider the

factors delineated in § 45a-717 (h).14

The court made the following findings of fact with

respect to the dispositional phase of the proceedings.

The department was involved with the respondent, the

child, and Z at the time the children were removed from

her care. The department’s involvement terminated

when the child’s guardianship was transferred to the

guardians. The department saw no child protection

issues following the transfer of guardianship. Thereafter, the department had no obligation to offer the

respondent services.

At the time the child’s guardianship was transferred,

the court ordered visits between the respondent and

the child, but the respondent did not comply with the

order. The guardians did comply by offering the respondent visits with the child.

At the time of the termination hearing, the child was

ten years old and had no relationship with the respondent. She is an anxious child and becomes concerned

whenever the respondent is mentioned. The child has

no fond memories of the respondent and wishes to

remain permanently in the guardians’ home and to be

adopted by them.

The respondent failed to make adequate efforts to

have the child returned to her home. She abandoned

the child and failed to communicate with the guardians

in any meaningful way. At the time of the termination

of parental rights proceeding, the respondent was

engaged in therapy and had made significant strides,

but those strides were too late for the child, who had

grown deeply attached to others. A child’s sense of

time is not the same as an adult’s. Most of the child’s

conscious life has been spent with her guardians, not

the respondent.
The court found that, although the respondent

believes that the guardians have prevented her from

having reasonable visits with the child, the evidence

demonstrates that the respondent failed to take the

steps she should have taken to maintain access to the

child. Although the respondent’s past economic circumstances have made her life more challenging, those circumstances, in and of themselves, did not prevent her

from maintaining a reasonable relationship with the

child.

‘‘It is axiomatic that a trial court’s factual findings

are accorded great deference. Accordingly, an appellate

tribunal will not disturb a trial court’s finding that termination of parental rights is in a child’s best interest

unless that finding is clearly erroneous. . . . A finding

is clearly erroneous when either there is no evidence

in the record to support it, or the reviewing court is

left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake

has been made. . . . [E]very reasonable presumption

is made in favor of the trial court’s ruling. . . . Additionally, in reviewing the court’s findings under the dispositional phase of the proceedings, it is appropriate

to read the trial court’s opinion as a whole, including its

findings in the adjudicatory phase.’’ (Citations omitted;

footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In

re Elijah G.-R., supra, 167 Conn. App. 29–30.

We carefully have reviewed the court’s memorandum

of decision, including its factual findings in the adjudicatory phase of the proceedings, and reviewed the record.

We conclude that the court’s finding that termination

of the respondent’s parental rights is in the best interest

of the child is not clearly erroneous. At the time of trial,

the child had resided with her guardians for approximately five years, she is anxious and fearful of the

respondent, and she does not want to visit with her. In

fact, there have been no visits between the respondent

and the child for an extended period of time. The underlying facts support the court’s conclusion that the anxious child who is the subject of the termination petition

is in need of stability and permanency and that termination of the respondent’s parental rights is in her best

interest. The respondent’s claim therefore fails.

III

The respondent’s third claim, which she raised for

the first time during oral argument in this court, is that

the court committed plain error by failing to canvass

her prior to trial as required by In re Yasiel R., supra,

317 Conn. 773. She argues that we should reverse the

judgment of the trial court pursuant to In re Daniel N.,

supra, 163 Conn. App. 322.15 We decline to grant the

reliefrequested because this case is procedurally distinguishable from In re Daniel N.,

16 and on appeal, the

respondent has not demonstrated that failure to reverse

the court’s judgment terminating her parental rights in
the child will result in manifest injustice and erode

the public’s confidence in the integrity of the judicial

system. The record demonstrates that at trial, the

respondent exercised all of the rights of which the

Yasiel canvass was intended to inform her.

We briefly review the history of the pretrial canvass

of respondent parents in termination of parental rights

cases as established in In re Yasiel R., supra, 317 Conn.

773. In that case, the respondent mother waived her

right to a trial and did not contest the allegations of the

petition to terminate her parental rights in her children,

challenge the evidence presented against her, or present

evidence of her own.17 Id., 775–76. After the trial court

terminated the mother’s parental rights in her children,

she appealed to this court, which affirmed the judgments of the trial court. In re Yasiel R., 151 Conn. App.

710, 721, 94 A.3d 1278 (2014), rev’d, 317 Conn. 773,

120 A.3d 1168 (2015). Our Supreme Court granted her

petition for certification to appeal from the judgment

of this court.In re Yasiel R., 314 Conn. 907, 99 A.3d 1169

(2014).18 In resolving the appeal, our Supreme Court

concluded pursuant to its analysis under Mathews v.

Eldridge, supra, 424 U.S. 335, that due process ‘‘does

not require that a trial court canvass a respondent who

is represented by counsel when the respondent does

not testify or present witnesses and the respondent’s

attorney does not object to exhibits or cross-examine

witnesses.’’ In re Yasiel R., supra, 317 Conn. 787–88.

The court, however, considered whether it should

exercise its supervisory authority to require a canvass

prior to a termination of parental rights trial. Id., 788.

The court concluded that ‘‘the lack of a canvass of all

parents in a parental rights termination trial may give

the appearance of unfairness insofar as it may indicate

a lack of concern over a parent’s rights and understanding of the consequences of the proceeding. Therefore,

[it] conclude[d] that public confidence in the integrity

of the judicial system would be enhanced by a rule

requiring a brief canvass of all parents immediately

before a parental rights termination trial so as to ensure

that the parents understand the trial process, their

rights during the trial and the potential consequences.’’

Id., 793–94. The court, therefore, invoked its ‘‘supervisory powers to enunciate a rule that is not constitutionally required but that [it thought] is preferable as a

matter of policy.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

Id., 793.

The court outlined the following canvass of a respondent in a termination of parental rights proceeding to

be undertaken prior to a termination of parental rights

trial. ‘‘In the canvass, the respondent should be advised

of: (1) the nature of the termination of parental rights

proceeding and the legal effect thereof if a judgment

is entered terminating parental rights; (2) the respondent’s right to defend against the accusations; (3) the
respondent’s right to confront and cross-examine witnesses;(4)the respondent’s right to object to the admission of exhibits; (5) the respondent’s right to present

evidence opposing the allegations; (6) the respondent’s

right to representation by counsel; (7) the respondent’s

right to testify on his or her own behalf; and (8) if the

respondent does not intend to testify, he or she should

also be advised that if requested by the petitioner, or

the court is so inclined, the court may take an adverse

inference from his or her failure to testify, and explain

the significance of that inference. Finally, the respondent should be advised that if he or she does not present

any witnesses on his or her behalf, object to exhibits,

or cross-examine witnesses, the court will decide the

matter based upon evidence presented during trial. The

court should then inquire whether the respondent

understands his or her rights and whether there are

any questions.’’ Id., 795.

Our Supreme Court issued its decision in In re Yasiel

R. on August 18, 2015. Trial in the present termination

of parental rights case was held on October 5, 6, and

8, 2015, a bit more than a month after In re Yasiel R.

was decided. The court in the present case, therefore,

should have canvassed the respondent before the commencement of trial, but did not. Neither of the parties

brought the omission to the attention of the court,19

and the respondent did not file a motion for nonsuit or

a motion to open the judgment. The respondent also

did not raise a claim concerning a Yasiel canvass in

her appeal orinitial brief in this court. Rather she waited

until the time of oral argument before this court to

request supplemental briefing on the issue. See footnote

2 of this opinion.

In her supplemental brief, the respondent tacitly

acknowledged that her claim regarding the lack of a

Yasiel canvass was unpreserved by requesting that the

termination judgment be reversed pursuant to the plain

error doctrine and In re Daniel N., supra, 163 Conn.

App. 322. In re Daniel N., however, is distinguishable

in that the trial court in that case terminated the respondent’s parentalrights prior to our Supreme Court’s decision in In re Yasiel R.

20 This court decided the In re

Daniel N. appeal on which the respondent relies after

our Supreme Court issued its decision In re Yasiel R.

The question in the In re Daniel N. appeal in this court

was whether In re Yasiel R. should be applied retroactively to reverse the termination of parental rights of

the respondent in that case.21 That is not the situation

in the present case in which trial took place after In

re Yasiel R. was decided. The question before us is not

whether In re Yasiel R. should be applied retroactively,

but whether the judgment terminating the respondent’s

parental rights should be reversed on the basis of plain

error. This court did no harmful error analysis in In re

Daniel N. See footnote 20 of this opinion. We conclude

that the judgment terminating the respondent’s parental
rights should not be reversed because the respondent

has failed to demonstrate that a failure to do so would

result in manifest injustice.

We begin with the well established legal framework

for claims of plain error. ‘‘[The plain error] doctrine,

codified at Practice Book § 60-5, is an extraordinary

remedy used by appellate courts to rectify errors committed at trial that, although unpreserved, are of such

monumental proportion that they threaten to erode our

system of justice and work a serious and manifest injustice on the aggrieved party. [T]he plain error doctrine

. . . is not . . . a rule of reviewability. It is a rule of

reversibility. That is, it is a doctrine that this court

invokes in order to rectify a trial court ruling that,

although either not properly preserved or never raised

at all in the trial court, nonetheless requires reversal

of the trial court’s judgment, for reasons of policy. . . .

In addition, the plain error doctrine is reserved for truly

extraordinary situation [in which] the existence of the

error is so obvious that it affects the fairness and integrity of and public confidence in the judicial proceedings.

. . . Plain error is a doctrine that should be invoked

sparingly. . . . Implicit in this very demanding standard is the notion . . . that invocation of the plain

error doctrine is reserved for occasions requiring the

reversal of the judgment under review. . . . [Thus, an

appellant] cannot prevail under [the plain error doctrine] . . . unless he demonstrates that the claimed

error is both so clear and so harmful that a failure to

reverse the judgment would result in manifest injustice. . . .

‘‘[Our Supreme Court has] clarified the two step

framework under which we review claims of plain error.

First, we must determine whether the trial court in fact

committed an error and, if it did, whether that error

was indeed plain in the sense that it is patent [or]readily

discernible on the face of a factually adequate record,

[and] also . . . obvious in the sense of not debatable.

. . . [T]his inquiry entails a relatively high standard,

under which it is not enough forthe [respondent] simply

to demonstrate that his position is correct. Rather, [to

prevail] the party [claiming] plain error [reversal] must

demonstrate that the claimed impropriety was so clear,

obvious and indisputable as to warrant the extraordinary remedy of reversal. . . .

‘‘In addition, although a clear and obvious mistake

on the part of the trial court is a prerequisite forreversal

under the plain error doctrine, such a finding is not,

without more, sufficient to warrant the application of

the doctrine. Because [a] party cannot prevail under

plain error unless it has demonstrated that the failure

to grant relief will result in manifest injustice . . .

under the second prong of the analysis we must determine whether the consequences of the error are so

grievous as to be fundamentally unfair or manifestly
unjust. . . . Only if both prongs of the analysis are

satisfied can the appealing party obtain relief.’’(Internal

quotation marks omitted.) Zuberi v. Commissioner of

Correction, 140 Conn. App. 839, 843–44, 60 A.3d 337,

cert. denied, 308 Conn. 931, 64 A.3d 330 (2013).

The substance of the respondent’s claim on appeal

is that because the court failed to canvass her prior

to the termination of parental rights trial, a manifest

injustice occurred; but she has failed to demonstrate

that such an injustice occurred. Although it was error

for the court to fail to conduct a Yasiel canvass of the

respondent prior to trial, the respondent has provided

no analysis as to how that failure deprived her of the

trial rights to which she was entitled. ‘‘[M]erely demonstrating that a trial court has violated a supervisory

mandate is not alone enough to warrant a reversal.’’ In

re Leilah W., 166 Conn. App. 48, 63, A.3d (2016);

see State v. Sanchez, 308 Conn. 64, 77–78, 60 A.3d 271

(2013); see also State v. Smith, 275 Conn. 205, 237, 881

A.2d 160 (2005) (whether trial court’s failure to obey

supervisory authority of Supreme Court results in manifest injustice must be considered on case specific, factbased inquiry).

State v. Smith, supra, 275 Conn. 205, is instructive

‘‘because it demonstrates that a trial court’s failure to

comply with a supervisory rule does not automatically

require reversal and a new trial in all cases. In Smith,

the defendant raised an unpreserved claim that he was

entitled to a new criminal trial because the trial court

utilized language in its instructions to the jury that our

Supreme Court, pursuant to its supervisory powers,

previously had instructed courts to refrain from using.

. . . The Supreme Court determined, consistent with

its decision in [State v. Aponte, 259 Conn. 512, 522,

790 A.2d 457 (2002)], that the trial court’s use of the

prohibited language did not implicate the defendant’s

constitutional rights, and, thus, he was not entitled to

[review under State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239–40,

567 A.2d 823 (1989)]. . . . Further, despite the trial

court having clearly violated a supervisory rule, the

Supreme Court concluded that the defendant was not

entitled to a reversal either under the plain error doctrine . . . or pursuant to the court’s supervisory

authority. . . .

‘‘With respect to whether the trial court’s action

amounted to plain error, the Supreme Court explained

that although it had directed trial courts to discontinue

use of the challenged jury instruction language because

it was concerned about the danger of misleading the

jury, it was unconvinced in the case before it that any

such danger actually existed or that the trial court’s

errorin using the language was so significant as to affect

the fairness and integrity of or the public confidence in

the proceeding. . . . Similarly, the Supreme Court

declined to reverse the judgment on the basis of its
supervisory authority, stating: The trial court’s failure

to heed our direction to discontinue the use of the

challenged jury instruction was not such an extraordinary violation that it threatened the integrity of the trial,

and it certainly did not rise to the level of implicating

the perceived fairness of the judicial system as a whole.

The defendant does not suggest that the trial court

deliberately disregarded this court’s mandate. Nor do

we consider a new trial necessary to emphasize the

importance of our direction in Aponte to the trial courts

of this state. . . . In other words, merely demonstrating that a trial court has violated a supervisory mandate

is not alone enough to warrant a reversal. The party

raising the issue of noncompliance also must demonstrate actual harm.’’ (Citations omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Leilah W.,

supra, 166 Conn. App. 62–63.

The undisputed fact is that the respondent was represented by counsel at the termination of parental rights

trial. Our Supreme Court recognized that, prior to In

re Yasiel R., ‘‘[w]hen the respondent is represented by

counsel, the current procedures in place adequately

protect the respondent from any claimed constitutional

deficiencies.’’ In re Yasiel R., supra, 317 Conn. 785. ‘‘It

has frequently been recognized, albeit in other contexts,

that we strongly presume that counsel’s professional

assistance was reasonable, and the [respondent] has

the burden to overcome the presumption that [her]

attorney was employing sound trial strategy. . . We

evaluate the conduct from trial counsel’s perspective at

the time. . . . [C]ounsel is strongly presumed to have

rendered adequate assistance and made all significant

decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional

judgment.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. In

the present appeal, the respondent does not claim error

on the part of her counsel.

Quite recently, this court has had occasion to address

claims that the judgments terminating the appellants’

parental rights should be reversed because the trial

courts canvassed them after, rather than prior to, the

presentation of evidence but prior to the courts issuing

their decisions. See In re Elijah G.-R., supra, 167 Conn.

App. 1; In re Leilah W., supra, 166 Conn. App. 48. In

both In re Elijah G.-R. and In re Leilah the respondents

were represented by counsel. Although there were

some differences in the way in which the canvasses

were conducted in those cases, this court concluded

that the stated purpose underlying the Yasiel canvass

was met even though the respondents were not canvassed prior to the termination trial. In coming to that

conclusion in each case, this court considered the factors the Yasiel canvass was intended to address and

the actual trials of the subject cases.22 This court found

in both of those cases that on appeal, the respondents

failed to explain how they were harmed by the timing

of the Yasiel canvass, whether they would have moved
for a new trial or asked that the evidence be opened

and what additional evidence they might offer that

would have made a difference in the trial. The respondents in each case argued only that the timing of the

canvass itself was harmful. See In re Elijah G.-R., supra,

167 Conn. App. 18 (noting that claim had been expressly

rejected in In re Leilah W.). Although the trial court in

the present case did not canvass the respondent, she

has failed to explain what she did not know or understand about the termination of her parental rights without the court’s canvass. She has not explained what

she would have done differently if the court had canvassed her and how the outcome of the case would be

different. In other words, the respondent has failed

to explain how the court’s failure to canvass her was

harmful per se.

Moreover, the respondent has failed to meet her burden as to the second prong of the plain error doctrine:

that a failure to reverse the trial court’s judgment will

result in manifest injustice. The record discloses that

the respondent was represented by counsel, who crossexamined the petitioner’s witnesses, and objected to

evidence. She presented her own witnesses and evidence and argued in opposition to the termination of

her parentalrights. The respondent testified on her own

behalf. It appears, as our Supreme Court has said, that

the ‘‘[w]hen the respondent is represented by counsel,

the current procedures in place adequately protect the

respondent from any claimed constitutional deficiencies.’’ In re Yasiel R., supra, 317 Conn. 785. The question

we must therefore address is whether the absence of

a canvass in the present case is likely to cause the

public to lose faith in the integrity of ourjudicial system.

On the basis of our review of the proceedings in the

trial court, we conclude that such an outcome would

surely not occur. Although the court’s failure to give a

Yasiel canvass is clear, obvious and indisputable, the

respondent has failed to demonstrate that the failure

has resulted in a fundamentally unfair termination proceeding that would cause the public to lose faith in the

judicial system.23 She therefore cannot prevail on her

plain error claim that the judgment terminating her

parental rights in the child should be reversed.

In concluding that the judgment terminating the

respondent’s parental rights in the child should not

be reversed, we are mindful that our Supreme Court

repeatedly has addressed the need for permanency in

the life of a child. See, e.g., In re Nevaeh W., supra, 317

Conn. 732 (‘‘[v]irtually all experts, from many different

professional disciplines, agree that children need and

benefit from continuous, stable home environments’’

[internal quotation marks omitted]). The child at issue

here has been living with her guardians since 2010;

she is eleven years old, has no relationship with the

respondent, and wishes to be adopted by her guardians.

It is now 2016. To reverse the judgment at this point
in the child’s life, we believe, would in and of itself

undermine the public’s confidence in the integrity of

our judicial system in that the child would be left in

limbo for an indeterminate period of time until a new

trial can be held. We conclude that the respondent has

not carried her burden to demonstrate that the judgment should be reversed to avoid a manifest injustice.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

* In accordance with the spirit and intent of General Statutes § 46b-142

(b) and Practice Book § 79a-12, the names of the parties involved in this

appeal are not disclosed. The records and papers of this case shall be open

for inspection only to persons having a proper interest therein and upon

order of the Appellate Court.

** September 15, 2016, the date that this decision was released as a slip

opinion, is the operative date for all substantive and procedural purposes.

1 The Commissioner of Children and Families (commissioner) filed a

motion for permission to file a brief as amicus curiae in the present matter.

This court granted the commissioner’s motion.

2

In re Yasiel R., supra, 317 Conn. 773, was decided our Supreme Court

in August, 2015. The respondent filed her initial brief in this court in January,

2016, but did not raise a claim concerning the lack of a Yasiel canvass.

Subsequent to oral argument in this court, however, the respondent filed a

motion requesting permission to file a supplemental brief to address

‘‘Whetherthe termination of [her] parentalrights should be reversed because

[this court] in In re Daniel N., 163 Conn. App. 322, [135 A.3d 1260, cert.

granted, Conn. , A.3d ] (2016), [held] that the canvass requirement

in In re Yasiel R., [supra, 317 Conn. 773], must be applied retroactively,

and the trial court in this case did not canvass [the respondent] as required.’’

We granted the motion permitting supplemental briefing. As we explain in

part III of this opinion, however, In re Daniel N. does not control the

respondent’s claim.

3 The child’s father, J.V.’s brother, is deceased.

4 The petitioner also alleged that the respondent had failed to achieve a

sufficient degree of rehabilitation; General Statutes § 45a-717 (g) (2) (D);

but subsequently withdrew that allegation.

5 Z also was adjudicated neglected and was placed with his father, G.U.

6 Gruen recommended intensive therapy twice a week for at least six

consecutive months and ongoing individual treatment if reunification sessions with the child begin.

7 On January 14, 2015, the court, Randolph, J., ordered the department

to complete a termination of parental rights study. The study, which is dated

April 6, 2015, states in relevant part: ‘‘[The child] stated that she is doing

well with her uncle, aunt and cousins. She stated she wants to be adopted

because this [is] her permanent home and she feels ‘safe here.’ This social

worker explained that in order for her to be adopted her mother’s parental

rights will have to be terminated; explaining what this means. She stated

she is in agreement with her mother’s parental rights being terminated. This

social worker told [the child] that since she knows her mother, when she

gets older she could still visit her if she wanted to. [The child] shook her

head no and said she will not want to visit. This social worker asked her

why and she stated ‘because it brings back bad memories.’ [The child]

became tearful as she talked about this.’’

8 General Statutes § 45a-717 (g) provides in relevant part: ‘‘[T]he court

may approve a petition terminating the parental rights and may appoint a

guardian of the person of the child . . . if it finds, upon clear and convincing

evidence, that (1) termination is in the best interest of the child, and (2)

(A) the child has been abandoned by the parent in the sense that the

parent has failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or

responsibility as to the welfare of the child . . . .’’

9 The respondent has had a third child.

10 General Statutes § 45-717 (g) provides in relevant part: ‘‘[T]he court may

approve a petition terminating the parentalrights and may appoint a guardian

of the person of the child . . . if it finds, upon clear and convincing evidence,

that (1) the termination is in the best interest of the child, and (2) . . .

(C) there is no ongoing parent-child relationship which is defined as the

relationship that ordinarily develops as a result of a parent having met on
a continuing, day-to-day basis the physical, emotional, moral and educational

needs of the child and to allow further time for the establishment or reestablishment of the parent-child relationship would be detrimental to the best

interests of the child . . . .’’

11 The respondent does not dispute the court’s findings made during the

adjudicatory stage of the proceedings that the respondent abandoned the

child and that there is no ongoing parent-child relationship.

12 The best interest factors to be considered in the probate statute; General

Statutes § 45a-717 (h); and the juvenile statute; General Statutes § 17a-112

(k); are substantially similar.

13 The respondent raised this second claim as an alternative argument, if

we determined that her constitutional right to due process was not violated.

See part I of this opinion.

14 General Statutes § 45a-717 (h) provides: ‘‘Except in the case where

termination is based on consent, in determining whether to terminate parental rights under this section, the court shall consider and shall make written

findings regarding: (1) The timeliness, nature and extent of services offered,

provided and made available to the parent and the child by a child-placing

agency to facilitate the reunion of the child with the parent; (2) the terms

of any applicable court order entered into and agreed upon by any individual

or child-placing agency and the parent, and the extent to which all parties

have fulfilled their obligations under such order; (3) the feelings and emotional ties of the child with respect to the child’s parents, any guardian of

the child’s person and any person who has exercised physical care, custody

or control of the child for at least one year and with whom the child has

developed significant emotional ties; (4) the age of the child; (5) the efforts

the parent has made to adjust such parent’s circumstances, conduct or

conditions to make it in the best interest of the child to return the child to

the parent’s home in the foreseeable future, including, but not limited to,

(A) the extent to which the parent has maintained contact with the child

as part of an effort to reunite the child with the parent, provided the court

may give weight to incidental visitations, communications or contributions

and (B) the maintenance of regular contact or communication with the

guardian or other custodian of the child; and (6) the extent to which a

parent has been prevented from maintaining a meaningful relationship with

the child by the unreasonable act or conduct of the other parent of the

child, or the unreasonable act of any other person or by the economic

circumstances of the parent.’’

15 Our Supreme Court certified the following issue in In re Daniel N.,

Conn. , A.3d (2016): ‘‘Did the Appellate Court correctly reverse the

trial court’s judgment ordering termination of parental rights by concluding

that this court’s decision in In re Yasiel R., 317 Conn. 773 (2015), controlled

the result of this case?’’

16 The termination of parental rights trial in In re Daniel N., supra, 163

Conn. App. 322, took place prior to our Supreme Court’s issuing its decision

in In re Yasiel R. The issue in this court, therefore, was whether In re Yasiel

R. applied retroactively. Moreover, on appeal, the respondent in In re Daniel

N. did not seek reversal of the judgment terminating his parental rights

pursuant to the plain error doctrine, as the respondent in the present

case does.

17 The relevant procedural history of In re Yasiel R. follows. ‘‘Due to the

respondent’s various arrests and her mental health and substance abuse

issues, the petitioner [the commissioner] filed petitions to terminate [the

respondent’s] parental rights in November, 2012. According to the petitioner,

the court, on December 11, 2012, advised the respondent of her trial rights,

entered denials to the petitions on her behalf, and appointed her an attorney.

A contested hearing then was scheduled for November 12, 2013. At that

hearing, the respondent’s counsel stated that although [the respondent is]

not in agreement with the [termination of parental rights], she cannot bring

herself to consent today. That being said, she’s in agreement with the court

taking the case on the papers. She’s in agreement to the exhibits that . . .

have been entered. Her counsel then stated that the respondent wants the

court to be aware that things have significantly changed for her over the

last two years and continued to explain those changes. At no time did the

court canvass the respondent personally to question her decisions not to

contest the petitioner’s exhibits and to waive her right to a full trial. It stated

only that I think I understand your position, and I will certainly consider

that [you’ve made great progress] when I’m reviewing all the material . . . .’’

(Footnotes omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Yasiel R.,

supra, 317 Conn. 777.
18 Our Supreme Court granted certification as to the following relevant

issue: ‘‘Does the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the

United States constitution require that a trial court canvass a parent personally about his or her decision not to contest the exhibits presented to the

court against him or her in a parental termination proceeding?’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.)In re Yasiel R., supra, 314 Conn. 907. Our Supreme

Court determined that due process does not require a Yasiel canvass. See

In re Yasiel R. supra, 317 Conn. 787–88.

19 The parties are presumed to know the law; Provident Bank v. Lewitt,

84 Conn. App. 204, 209, 852 A.2d 852, cert. denied, 271 Conn. 924, 859 A.2d

580 (2004); and could have brought the matter to the attention of the trial

court. See JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Georgitseas, 149 Conn. App. 796,

798, 89 A.3d 992 (2014) (‘‘[w]e have repeatedly indicated our disfavor with

the failure, whether because of mistake of law, inattention or design, to

object to errors occurring the course of a trial until it is too late for them

to be corrected, and thereafter, if the outcome of the trial proves unsatisfactory, with the assignment of such errors as grounds of appeal’’ [internal

quotation marks omitted]); cf. In re Leilah W., 166 Conn. App. 48, 53,

A.3d (2016) (after close of evidence assistant attorney general informed

court it omitted canvass of respondent; court asked parties to return to

court and canvassed respondent prior to issuing its decision).

20 In re Daniel N., supra, 163 Conn. App. 322, is further distinguishable

from the present case because the issues claimed on appeal are different

and this court decided the cases on different legal theories. In re Daniel

N. was decided on the basis of retroactivity and also our Supreme Court’s

supervisory authority. The respondent in In re Daniel N., did not seek

reversal pursuant to the plain error doctrine and therefore this court performed no analysis of the harm caused by the failure to give the Yasiel

canvass. In the present case, the respondent claims that the judgment terminating her parental rights in the child should be reversed pursuant to the

plain error doctrine, which requires us to perform a harm analysis.

The present case is not the first time this court has considered a claim

of plain error with respect to the Yasiel canvass. See In re Raymond B.,

166 Conn. App. 856, A.3d (2016). In that case, the respondent claimed

that the termination of her parental rights should be reversed because the

trial court failed to conduct the canvass ‘‘at the very start of the termination

trial.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 865. Rather, trial commenced

without the court canvassing the respondent, but on the second day of trial

before the commissioner rested her case, the court, Hon. Francis J. Foley

III, judge trial referee, sua sponte canvassed the respondent. Id., 860. The

respondent acknowledged that she understood her rights, did not object to

the timing of the canvass or file a posttrial motion for a mistrial or to open

the evidence or seek any additional relief. Id., 861. In resolving the claim

of the respondent in In re Raymond B., the court looked to the recent

decision ofIn re Leilah W., 166 Conn.App. 48, A.3d (2016), for guidance.

In In re Leilah W., this court concluded ‘‘that canvassing a respondent

at the conclusion of the termination of parental rights trial was harmless

error. In doing so, this court addressed the contours of what constitutes

compliance with the canvass rule: Although this was not the procedure

envisioned by our Supreme Court, and, accordingly should be avoided, if

any concerns arose regarding the respondent’s understanding of his trial

rights, the trial court could have reopened the evidence to allow for additional proceedings if necessary. . . . This court also stated that the burden

is on the respondent to show the harm of a noncompliant canvass.’’(Citation

omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Raymond

B., supra, 166 Conn. App. 867.

In applying the second prong of the plain error doctrine to the facts of

In re Raymond B., this court concluded that failing to conduct the Yasiel

canvass prior to the commencement of trial was not ‘‘so significant as to

effect the fairness and integrity of the public confidence in the judicial

proceedings’’ to require reversal.(Internal quotation marks omitted.)Id., 868.

In the present circumstance, we have performed a harm analysis pursuant to

the plain error doctrine, and therefore, this case is further distinguishable

from In re Daniel N.

21 We note that the question of whether the supervisory rule announced

in In re Yasiel R. should be applied to other, then pending cases was before

our Supreme Court in In re Egypt E., SC 19643 and SC 19644. The court,

however, declined to answer that question, and thereby declined to provide

guidance for other pending appeals, when it remanded that case to the trial

court. See In re Egypt E., 322 Conn. 231, 233 n.1, A.3d (2016).
22 ‘‘On the basis of our review of the trial court’s canvass, we conclude

that the court reasonably could have concluded that the respondent fully

understood the trial process, the rights he had during the trial, and the

potential consequences of the termination of his parental rights. The stated

purpose underlying our Supreme Court’s supervisory rule appears to have

been effectuated in the present case. The respondent has failed to demonstrate that he was harmed by the trial court’s failure to canvass him prior

to the start of trial, and we do not believe that it is necessary to reverse

the judgment simply to emphasize the importance of compliance with our

Supreme Court’s holding in In re Yasiel R.’’ In re Leilah W., supra, 166

Conn. App. 65–66.

‘‘[T]he respondent argues only that the time of the In re Yasiel R. canvass

after the end of trial, but prior to the court deciding the case, amounts to

structural error, and, thus, if the canvass is not conducted prior to the start

of trial, a new trial always is required. This contention, however, expressly

was rejected by this court in In re Leilah W.’’ In re Elijah G.-R., supra, 167

Conn. App. 18.

23 In the recent case of State v. Gould, 322 Conn. 519, 534–35, A.3d

(2016), our Supreme Court reasoned that the ‘‘defendant’s argument that

the improper exclusion of a prospective juror even without a showing of

prejudice to avoid undermining public confidence in the fairness and integrity of our judicial system, is effectively an argument for structural error.

See Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 309–10, 111 S. Ct. 1246, 113 L.

Ed. 2d 302 (1991). We have observed, however that there is a very limited

class of cases involving error that is structural, that is to say, error that

transcends the criminal process. Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461,

468, 117 S. Ct. 1544, 137 L. Ed. 2d 718 (1997).’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) ‘‘Structural errors have not been recognized outside the realm of

constitutional violations except in extraordinary circumstances. See, e.g.,

Nguyen v. United States, 539 U.S. 69, 79–83, 123 S. Ct. 2130, 156 L. Ed. 2d

64 (2003) (structural error when appeals panel was improperly constituted

in violation of statutory requirement and thus did not have authority to

decide appeal).’’ State v. Gould, supra, 535.