NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

ENRIQUE N., Appellant, 

v.

DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, V.F., E.F., Appellees. 

No. 1 CA-JV 20-0043 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. JD23126 

The Honorable Lori Ash, Judge Pro Tempore

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

David W. Bell Attorney at Law, Higley

By David W. Bell

Counsel for Appellant

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By Sandra L. Nahigian

Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety

FILED 3-18-2021
ENRIQUE N. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

2 

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge D. Steven Williams delivered the decision of the Court, in 

which Judge Jennifer B. Campbell and Judge James B. Morse Jr. joined.

W I L L I A M S, Judge:

¶1 Enrique N. (“Father”) appeals the juvenile court’s order 

terminating his parental rights to his children, V.F. and E.F. For the 

following reasons, we affirm. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 In July 2018, Father’s former girlfriend witnessed one of 

Father’s children sexually abusing the other child. The children, apparently, 

spent much time in the former girlfriend’s care even though she was no

longer in a relationship Father and was a heroin addict. Mother’s parental 

rights were previously terminated. The Department of Child Services 

(“DCS”) took temporary custody of the children and filed a dependency 

petition alleging Father was neglecting the children because he failed to 

protect one child from sexual abuse and failed to provide appropriate care 

and supervision to both children.

¶3 When Father failed to appear for a dependency pre-trial 

conference, the juvenile court found the children dependent as to Father.

DCS offered Father a variety of reunification services, including case 

management services, case plan meetings, individual counseling, 

parent-aide services, parenting classes, a psychological evaluation, 

substance-abuse assessment, substance-abuse treatment, transportation, 

urinalysis testing, and visitation. Although the record indicates that Father 

showed some progress in his substance-abuse recovery and engaged in 

some of the services, Father was inconsistent with substance-abuse testing

and counseling, tested positive for cocaine and benzoylecgonine, and 

closed out parent-aid services unsuccessfully. Father was approved for inhome visits, but he refused to participate because he wanted the visits to be 

unsupervised. Father was also arrested in July 2019 for a two-year-old DUI, 

and allegedly faced prison time and deportation. 

¶4 In November 2019, the juvenile court changed the case plan 

from family reunification to severance and adoption. At the initial 
ENRIQUE N. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

3 

severance hearing Father, a Spanish speaker, was provided a notice written 

in Spanish containing the dates and times of future court hearings. Father 

was also informed in Spanish of the consequences of failing to appear for 

any court hearing, including the possibility of the court proceeding in his 

absence. See Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 64(C).

¶5 Father appeared for the initial severance hearing but then

failed to appear at the pre-trial conference in January 2020. When Father’s 

counsel was unable to explain why Father failed to appear for the hearing, 

the juvenile court opted to hold an accelerated severance adjudication 

hearing, ultimately severing Father’s parental rights based upon the 

statutory ground of fifteen-months in out-of-home placement, and found 

termination to be in the children’s best interests. The court also found no 

good cause for Father’s failure to appear. 

¶6 Father timely appealed the order terminating his parental 

rights. Later, Father moved the juvenile court to reconsider and set aside its 

finding that Father had no good cause for failing to appear, and offered an 

explanation, for the first time, as to why he failed to appear. Father 

provided information showing that he was at the DCS office, the morning 

of the pre-trial conference, for a meeting he mistakenly believed to have 

been scheduled. The juvenile court denied Father’s motion. 

¶7 In his opening brief, Father argues he established good cause

for his failure to appear based upon information provided to the court in 

his motion to reconsider. DCS moved this court to dismiss the appeal for 

lack of jurisdiction, arguing Father appealed the termination order, not the 

motion for reconsideration. This court stayed the appeal, remanded the 

matter to the juvenile court, and authorized the court to reissue a ruling on 

Father’s motion after holding an evidentiary hearing. This court also 

indicated that Father could file a second notice of appeal, challenging the 

court’s reissued ruling, if he chose to. 

¶8 In August 2020, the juvenile court held an evidentiary hearing 

on Father’s motion to reconsider, and again, denied Father’s request to set 

aside the termination order. DCS moved this court a second time to dismiss 

Father’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction, which was denied, and the appeal 

was reinstated. We have jurisdiction over Father’s appeal from the 

termination order under Article 6, Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution, 

A.R.S. §§ 8-235(A), 12-120.21(A)(1), -2101(A)(1) and Arizona Rule of 

Procedure for the Juvenile Court 103(A).
ENRIQUE N. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

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DISCUSSION

¶9 We review a severance ruling for an abuse of discretion, 

accepting the court’s factual findings unless clearly erroneous, Mary Lou C. 

v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 207 Ariz. 43, 47, ¶ 8 (App. 2004), and view the 

evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the court’s ruling, Manuel 

M. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 218 Ariz. 205, 207, ¶ 2 (App. 2008). Because the 

juvenile court “is in the best position to weigh the evidence, observe the 

parties, judge the credibility of witnesses, and resolve disputed facts,” we 

will affirm an order terminating parental rights if reasonable evidence

supports the order. Jordan C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 223 Ariz. 86, 93, ¶ 18 

(App. 2009) (quoting Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec. v. Oscar O., 209 Ariz. 332, 334, 

¶ 4 (App. 2004)). 

¶10 “To justify termination of the parent-child relationship, the 

[juvenile] court must find, by clear and convincing evidence, at least one of 

the statutory grounds set out in [A.R.S. §] 8-533,” Michael J. v. Ariz. Dep’t of 

Econ. Sec., 196 Ariz. 246, 249, ¶ 12 (2000), and find, by a preponderance of 

the evidence, that termination is in the best interests of the child, Kent K. v. 

Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 279, 284, ¶ 22 (2005). Fifteen months in an out-of-home 

placement is one statutory ground authorizing termination. A.R.S. 

§ 8-533(B)(8)(c). 

¶11 Father’s opening brief does not challenge the juvenile court’s 

fifteen months in an out-of-home placement finding, nor does it challenge 

the court’s finding that termination is in the children’s best interests. Father, 

likewise, does not challenge the court’s authority to proceed with an

accelerated termination hearing where he failed to appear at the pre-trial 

conference. See A.R.S. § 8-537(C); Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 65(C)(6)(c).

Consequently, we do not address these issues. See ARCAP 13(a)(7)(A);

Crystal E. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 241 Ariz. 576, 578, ¶ 6 (App. 2017) (“[W]e 

adhere to the policy that it is generally not our role to sua sponte address 

issues not raised by the appellant.”); Christina G. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 

227 Ariz. 231, 234, ¶ 14 n.6 (App. 2011) (recognizing that the failure to 

develop an argument on appeal usually results in abandonment and waiver 

of the issue).

¶12 The substance of Father’s opening brief only challenges the 

juvenile court’s order denying his motion for reconsideration, arguing 

specifically that the court abused its discretion in concluding no good cause 

existed for his failure to appear at the pre-trial conference. But Father has 

not appealed that order. Thus, we lack jurisdiction to address the substance 

of Father’s argument raised in his opening brief. See Lindsey v. Dempsey, 153 
ENRIQUE N. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

5 

Ariz. 230, 235 (App. 1987) (“Since the ruling of which [appellant] complains 

occurred after the entry of judgment and the filing of the notice of appeal, 

we do not have jurisdiction to address it.”). 

CONCLUSION

¶13 For the forgoing reasons, we affirm the juvenile court’s 

termination order, but do not address the court’s order denying Father’s 

motion for reconsideration because Father has not appealed that order.