This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn . Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (201 4 ). STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A15 - 1915 State of Minnesota, Respondent,
vs. Daniel Gebreamlak, Appellant. Filed December 12, 2016 Affirmed Ross , Judge Ramsey County District Court File No. 62

- CR

- 13

- 1057 Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and John J. Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Adam E. Petras, Assistant County Attorney, St. Paul , Minnesota (for respondent) Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Michael W. Kunkel, Assistant Appellate Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant) Considered and decided by Smith, Tracy M. , Presiding Judge; Ross , Judge; and Rodenberg , Judge
. U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N R OSS , Judge A jury learned that a police o fficer saw Daniel Gebreamlak spe e d ing , temporarily losing control of his car, fail ing to signal a lane change, and fail ing to promptly stop when2 the officer signaled him to stop. The jury also learned that t he officer noticed that Gebreamlak smel led like an alcoholic beverage, fumbled for his driver’s license, had bloodshot and watery eyes, and slurred his speech. The officer administered both the horizontal

- and vertical

- gaze nystagmus tests, which indicated that Gebreamlak was intoxicated. The j ury found Gebreamlak guilty of driving under the influence of alcohol, and Gebreamlak asks us to reverse his conviction because, he maintains, the evidence was insufficient to prove him guilty. We are unpersuaded by his argument and affirm. FACTS The state charged Daniel Gebreamlak with one count of first

- degree driving while impaired and one count of first

- degree refusal to submit to a chemical test. The district court dismissed the test

- refusal charge and held a jury trial for the impaired

- driving charge
. St. Anthony Police Officer Kiel Rushton testified that he was on overnight patrol in Falcon Heights in February 2013 when he saw a car moving fast on snow - covered Snelling Avenue. T he car turned onto Larpenteur Avenue, temporarily fishtailing out of contr ol. The officer followed the car on Larpenteur
. He watched the car move between lanes without signaling. The officer activated his emergency lights, but the car continued on without immediately stopping. He followed a short distance further, and the car tu rned into a parking lot and stopped. Officer Rushton told the jury that he approached the car and spoke to the driver, Gebreamlak. The officer sm elled the odor of an alcoholic beverage . Gebreamlak’s eyes were watery and bloodshot . Gebreamlak slurred his wo rds when he spoke. After Officer Rushton asked Gebreamlak to produce h is driver’s license , it appeared that Gebreamlak3 was having difficulty dividing his attention and had “a n overall delay in motor skills
. ” The officer perceived that Gebreamlak was intoxicat ed . He directed Gebreamlak to st e p out of the car so he could administer field sobriety tests. Because of the unsafe surface conditions, the officer forewent the balance tests and administered only the nystagmus test s . Officer Rushton described t he horizontal

- gaze nystagmus test, including how he administered each of its three segments . He observed that Gebreamlak exhibited a “lack of smooth pursuit” in the first segment , an “almost immediate[]” nystagmus in the second segment , and a “very prevale nt” nystagmus in the third segment . He said that he decided to also administer the vertical

- gaze nystagmus test. He explained that “the person who is exhibiting vertical nystagmus has a high blood alcohol concentration for what their body is used to.” Agai n the officer observed a “present and pre valent” nystagmus. Based on what the officer saw in Gebreamlak’s driving, his odor and behavior, and his pronounced nystagmus, he concluded that G ebreamlak was intoxicated and arrested him
. Gebreamlak cross - examin e d Officer Rushton . The officer acknowledged that drive r s are sometimes nervous and hav e trouble finding their licenses or handling their wallets. And h e acknowledged that eye redness can result from conditions other than alcohol consumption , that Gebreamla k spoke with an accent , and that nystagmus m ight result from other depressants or natural conditions un related to alcohol intoxication. He also acknowledged that Gebreamlak did not appear to have d ifficult y following directions or maintaining his balance during the nystagmus test . The jury found Gebreamlak guilty of driving under the influence of alcohol. Gebreamlak appeals.4 D E C I S I O N Gebreamlak argues that the state failed to produce evidence sufficient to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. We analyze a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence differently depending on whether the state relied on direct or circumstantial evidence. State v. Silvernail , 831 N.W.2d 594, 598 (Minn. 2013). Generally, w e will not rever se a jury’s guilty verdict if the jury, acting with due regard for the presumption of innocence and the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, could reasonably conclude that the defendant was guilty. State v. Vang , 847 N.W.2d 248, 258 (Minn. 2014)
. But when a conviction rests on circumstantial evidence , we scrutinize more strictly, consider ing whether the proved circumstances and the reasonable inferences drawn from those circumstances are consistent with a defendant’s guilt and inconsistent with a ny other rational hypothesis. State v. Al

- Naseer , 788 N.W.2d 469, 473 (Minn. 2010). Gebreamlak argues that we should apply the circumstantial

- evidence standard of review because the jury had to infer t hat alcohol i mpaired his ability to drive. The state
su ggests that we should apply the direct

- evidence standard. We are convinced that the conviction withstands our review under either standard. Under th e heightened

- scrutiny test, we first identify the circumstances proved, which are those circumstances that are consistent with the guilty verdict. Id
. ; State v. Hawes , 801 N.W.2d 659, 668

– 69 (Minn. 2011). We next independently examine the reasonableness of any inferences that might be drawn from th os e proved circumstances, including inferences consistent with a ny r ational hypotheses other than guilt. Al

- Naseer , 788 N.W.2d at 473

– 74.5 Officer Rushton’s testimony consistent with the guilty verdict informs us that Gebreamlak was speeding , temporarily lost control of his car while turning, failed to signal a lane ch ange, failed to immediately stop when signaled, and had the tell

- tale signs of intoxication

— bloodshot and water y eyes, slurred speech, delayed and fumbling motor skills, divided

- attention difficulties, and the strong odor of an alcoholic beverage. He also failed every segment of both nystagmus test s administered by the officer, and the jury’s verdict informs us that the jury was satisfied that intoxication, and not some other source, caused the nystagmus. Given that the jury accepted the inference that alc ohol impairment caused Gebreamlak’s nystagmus, the second question in the analysis

— whether the circumstances allow for a rational hypothesis other than Gebreamlak’s guilt

— presents a clear answer : n o. Gebreamlak argues that speeding, multi ple lane chang es , failing to signal, and failing to pull over are behaviors that sober drivers might engage in. He points to the poor road conditions as the innocent cause of hi s losing vehicular control , and he has answers for the officer’s observations of his person . He urges, for example, that watery, bloodshot eyes
m ight have resulted from alcohol consumption that fell short of consumption necessary for impairment. He adds that his perceived slurred speech might really have been his foreign accent. And he suggests that his nystagmus might have resulted naturally. His argument fails based on the circumstance , inferred from the verdict, that intoxication and not Gebreamlak’s natural physiology, caused Gebreamlak’s nystagmus. Even putting aside the jury’s conclusions d rawn from the nystagmus tests, however, Gebreamlak’s supposed innocent hypothesis rests on an i mprobable series of coincidences.6 We do not review each circumstance proved in isolation , but as a whole
. State v. Andersen , 784 N.W.2d 320, 332 (Minn. 2010). An d i t is not the s tate ’s burden to remove all doubt, only all reasonable doubt. State v. Hughes , 749 N.W.2d 307, 313 (Minn. 2008). It is certainly possible, but it is not plausible, that every one of the various indicators of Gebreamlak ’s apparent intoxicat ion was caused by something other than intoxication. We would have to accept as reasonable that , although Gebreamlak undisputedly had been drinking, his failing to drive a speed consistent with the weather conditions, failing to signal lane changes, failin g to maintain control, failing to immediately respond to emergency lights, and fumbling for his driver’s license were all caused by something other than excessive alcohol consumption. And we also would have to accept as reasonable that a trained and experi enced police officer cannot distinguish between an accent and slurred speech. The hypothesis that Gebreamlak was not under the influence of alcohol is not reasonable under all the circumstances proved and taken as a whole
. The conviction easily satisfies standard scrutiny in our review for proof beyond a reasonable doubt, as it also easily survives h eightened scrutiny. Affirmed.