GAO-06-754R Export Controls and High Performance Computers 

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

June 30, 2006 

Congressional Committees 

Subject: President’s Justification of the High Performance Computer Control 

Threshold Does Not Fully Address National Defense Authorization Act of 1998 

Requirements

The United States controls the export of high performance computers for national 

security and foreign policy reasons. High performance computers have both civilian 

and military applications and operate at or above a defined performance threshold 

(which was formerly measured in millions of theoretical operations per second 

[MTOPS], but is now measured in Weighted TeraFlops [WT]).1

 The U.S. export 

control policy currently organizes countries into “tiers,” with tier 3 representing a 

higher level of concern related to U.S. national security interests than tiers 1 and 2. A 

license is required to export computers above a specific performance level to 

countries such as China, India, Israel, Pakistan, and Russia. 

Policy objectives of U.S. computer export controls are to (1) limit the acquisition of 

highest-end, high performance computer systems by potential adversaries and 

countries of proliferation concern and (2) ensure that U.S. domestic industries 

supporting important national security computer capabilities can compete in markets 

where there are limited security or proliferation risks. Over the last few years, the 

effectiveness of U.S. export controls in meeting these policy objectives has been 

challenged by market and technological changes in the computer and microprocessor 

industries. 

The National Defense Authorization Act of 19982

 requires that the President provide a 

justification to Congress for changing the control threshold for exports of high 

performance computers to certain sensitive countries.3

 The President’s report must, 

at a minimum, (1) address the extent to which high performance computers with 

capabilities between the established level and the newly proposed level of 

performance are available from foreign countries, (2) address all potential uses of 

military significance to which high performance computers at the newly proposed 

 

1

A TeraFlop is a measure of the mathematical computing power of a machine in floating point 

operations per second. A floating point operation is meant to be an elementary operation, such as a 

sum, subtraction, multiplication, or division. This measure is used to express the speed of a processor. 

2

Public Law 105-85, sec. 1211(d), 111 stat. 1933. 

3

The Departments of Defense, Commerce, State, and Energy prepare the President’s report under the 

coordination of the National Security Council. 
level could be applied, and (3) assess the impact of such uses on U.S. national 

security interests. In February 2006, the President set a new control threshold for 

high performance computers and a new formula for calculating computer 

performance.4

GAO is required by law5 to assess the executive branch’s proposed changes to the 

current control thresholds related to foreign availability and the national security 

risks of exporting high performance computers between the previous and proposed 

thresholds. To comply with the statutory requirement, we reviewed the three 

statutory requirements for the justification, the documentation used by executive 

branch officials to support the conclusions in the President’s February 2006 report, 

and export control regulations pertaining to high performance computers. We also 

interviewed officials from the Departments of Commerce and Defense who were 

responsible for producing the President’s report. We addressed this report to relevant 

congressional committees of jurisdiction for this mandate. We conducted this review 

from February 2006 to May 2006 in accordance with generally accepted government 

auditing standards. 

Background

The United States controls the export of high performance computers and related 

components (e.g., microelectronics) through the Export Administration Act of 1979 

and the implementing Export Administration Regulations.6

 The act authorizes 

Commerce to require firms to obtain licenses for the export of sensitive items that 

may be a national security or foreign policy concern. The Departments of Defense, 

Energy, and State assist Commerce, which administers the act, by reviewing export 

applications and supporting Commerce in its reviews of export control policy. 

Beginning in 1996, the executive branch organized countries into four computer tiers, 

with each tier above tier 1 representing a successively higher level of concern related 

to U.S. national security interests. In 2001, tiers 1 and 2 were merged. Current U.S. 

export control policy places no hardware license requirements on tier-1 or tier-2 

countries, primarily those in Africa, Asia, Central and Eastern Europe, Japan, Latin 

America, and Western Europe. Exports of computers above a specific performance 

level to tier-3 countries, such as China, India, Israel, Pakistan, and Russia, require a 

license. Exports of high performance computers to tier-4 countries, such as Iran, 

North Korea, and Syria, are essentially prohibited. This report refers to tier-3 

countries as ‘‘countries of concern.’’

 4

The White House, Summary of Findings with Respect to Criteria Set Forth in Subsections 1211(d) 

and (e) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 3, 

2006). 

5

Public Law 106-554, app. B, sec. 314, 114 stat. 2763A-123. 

6

50 U.S.C. app. 2401 et seq., and 15 C.F.R., sec. 730. The authorities provided by this legislation expired 

on August 20, 2001. However, acting pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act

(codified at 50 U.S.C. 1702), the President extended application of the act and the implementing 

regulation by Executive Order 13222 (66 Fed. Reg. 44025). 

Page 2 GAO-06-754R Export Controls and High Performance Computers 
The President has periodically changed, on the basis of technological advances, the 

threshold above which export licenses are required. He last raised the threshold in 

2002 to 190,000 MTOPS. In a February 3, 2006, report to Congress, the President 

reported that he was replacing the formula for calculating computer performance 

current at the time with a new formula derived from industry standards that is more 

accurate and easier to calculate than MTOPS. He also set a new threshold for high 

performance computer exports on the basis of the new formula. 

The President’s report stated that the new formula, Adjusted Peak Performance 

(APP),7

 as expressed in weighted TeraFlops, more accurately differentiates between 

high-end, special-order, high performance computers and commercial, readily 

available systems. It also stated that APP places more weight on vector systems than 

nonvector systems.8

 Finally, the report stated that the 0.75 WT control level takes into 

consideration the widespread foreign availability of computing capacity. 

We reviewed prior justifications for changing the export control thresholds on high 

performance computers and found that the changes were not adequately justified. 

For example, previous President reports failed to address all uses of military 

significance to which high performance computers could be applied at the new 

thresholds and the impact of such uses on national security, as required by law. 

We recommended in previous GAO reports that (1) Commerce convene a panel of 

experts to conduct a comprehensive assessment of possible options to safeguard U.S. 

national security interests related to computer exports, such as replacing the MTOPS 

performance metric;9

 (2) Commerce, Defense, and State assess the national security 

threat and proliferation risks of U.S. exports of high performance computers to 

countries of concern;10 and (3) Defense determine what countermeasures are 

necessary, if any, to respond to enhancements of the military or proliferation 

capabilities of countries of concern derived from high performance computing.11 In 

2002, we recommended that Congress should consider requiring the executive branch 

to fully comply with existing statutes before the executive branch alters or eliminates 

the export control threshold for high performance computers.12 This would include 

assessing the national security and military uses of computers at the higher threshold. 

 7

The metric addresses our past recommendation to assess ways to address the shortcomings of high

performance computer export controls based on MTOPS. See our report titled Export Controls: 

System for Controlling Exports of High Performance Computing Is Ineffective, GAO-01-10

(Washington, D.C.: Dec. 18, 2000). However, we did not assess whether APP is the most appropriate 

alternative to MTOPS. 

8

A vector system is a computer with built-in instructions that performs multiple calculations on vectors 

(one-dimensional arrays) simultaneously. 

9

GAO-01-10. 

10GAO, Export Controls: More Thorough Analysis Needed to Justify Changes in High Performance 

Computer Controls, GAO-02-892 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 2, 2002); and Export Controls: Information 

on the Decision to Revise High Performance Computer Controls, GAO/NSIAD-98-196 (Washington,

D.C.: Sept. 16, 1998).

11GAO-01-10. 

12GAO-02-892. 

Page 3 GAO-06-754R Export Controls and High Performance Computers 
In 2004, Commerce implemented the first recommendation to convene a panel of 

experts, which agreed to replace the MTOPS metric with a new APP formula. The 

executive branch has not implemented our other two recommendations. A list of

GAO products related to this review is shown at the end of this report. 

Summary 

The President’s February 2006 report did not fully address the three requirements of 

the National Defense Authorization Act of 1998. Therefore, the report did not present 

the full implications of the threshold change to Congress. 

Worldwide Computer Availability Was Not Adequately Documented

 

Although the President’s report indicated that foreign computing capacity below the 

new control level is currently widely available, agency officials (1) did not adequately 

document how they established the new export control threshold at 0.75 WT on the 

basis of their assessment of worldwide availability and (2) could not document that 

they verified key information used in their decision. Defense said that a High 

Performance Computer Working Group, established by Commerce and comprised of 

U.S. government and industry representatives, evaluated and compared information 

on computer systems and performance levels from government, industry, academia, 

and intelligence sources. Officials said they also held informal meetings and 

discussions with the computer industry on technology developments. We reviewed 

the information the agencies collected but could not determine the basis for selecting 

the new threshold compared with other possible thresholds assessed because the 

agencies did not document the steps leading to their decision. 

Furthermore, officials said that they relied on a Top500 Supercomputer List 

maintained by the University of Tennessee and the University of Mannheim in 

Germany to help establish worldwide computer availability. However, the 

information on the Top500 List is not verified by the U.S. government; is self-reported 

by respondents13 to a questionnaire; and may not be error-free despite their efforts to 

verify it, according to the list’s producers. Defense said in its comments that the 

Working Group calculated the APP levels for the Top500 List computers, compared 

these levels with Defense testing data on comparable systems, and found consistent 

results. However, Defense did not disclose and document how many systems from 

the Top500 List it reviewed when it made these comparisons or whether these 

systems were in countries of concern. Accordingly, the U.S. government determined 

the worldwide availability of high performance computers on the basis of information 

that might not be accurate and reliable. 

Although not required by law, Commerce could have conducted a foreign availability 

assessment, which is the principal mechanism identified in the U.S. Export 

Administration Regulations for determining the availability of controlled items. This 

assessment determines whether items of comparable quality and quantity are 

 13Respondents include high performance computer experts, computational scientists, manufacturers,

and the Internet community, according to the Top500 List’s producers. 

Page 4 GAO-06-754R Export Controls and High Performance Computers 
available from non-U.S. sources that would render U.S. export controls on the item 

ineffective.14

 

All Potential Military Uses of Computers Were Not Adequately Assessed

The President's report also did not adequately assess the potential military uses of 

computers with performance capabilities at the new threshold (0.75 WT). First, the 

report could have disclosed, but did not, that U.S. government officials had identified 

15 high performance computing platforms15 that would no longer need to be reviewed 

for a license at the new control threshold.16 Second, the report could have discussed, 

but did not, how the new threshold would impact 29 computers that Commerce 

licensed with extensive conditions for export since the executive branch last raised 

the threshold in 2002 to 190,000 MTOPS. As a result of the decision to move to the 

new level, all but 1 of those 29 computers would now be eligible for export without a 

license and without conditions to countries of concern, such as China, India, and 

Russia.17 Rather than address all potential uses of military significance for these 

computers, as required by law, the report provided selected examples of computer 

applications, such as the design, development, and production of weapon systems; 

military operations; and nuclear weapons design and simulation. The report stated 

that the majority of computers used for these purposes fall below the new and old 

thresholds for tier-3 countries. It also provided some examples of national security 

applications that require computer performance levels above the new threshold. 

Defense officials stated that a strategic assessment of selected applications and 

computing power at a given threshold would be more useful to Congress than the 

assessment in the current reporting requirement, which they said is too narrowly 

focused. However, the report did not provide this assessment, either. 

National Security Impact of Militarily Significant Computer Uses Was Not Assessed

Since the President’s report did not adequately assess the potential military uses of 

computers at the proposed new threshold of 0.75 WT, it did not assess the impact that 

militarily significant uses of those computers would have on U.S. national security. 

Instead, the report discussed how the new threshold would allow the United States to 

maintain a technological lead by controlling the less widely available, most advanced 

computer systems best suited for innovative national security applications above the 

new threshold. In addition, Defense officials stated that assessing the national 

security impact on computers between the old and new thresholds would be very 

time-consuming and resource-intensive. 

 1415 C.F.R. 768. 

15Computing platforms can operate at various performance levels based on the number of processors

available. 

16Licenses will continue to be required for some of these high performance computers operating with a 

larger configuration of processors, according to Commerce. 

17Since December 31, 2005, Commerce stated that it approved licenses to export 2 additional

computers above the new threshold of 0.75 WT to countries of concern, such as China, India, and

Russia. 

Page 5 GAO-06-754R Export Controls and High Performance Computers 
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 

We received written comments on a draft of this report from Commerce and Defense, 

which are reprinted in enclosures I and II. Commerce and Defense disagreed with our 

finding that the executive branch did not have a rigorous process to establish the new 

computer control threshold. The agencies stated that an interagency group compared 

information on computer systems and performance levels from government, industry, 

academia, and intelligence sources, and discussed the new threshold with foreign 

governments. The agencies also said that the U.S. government verified information on 

the Top500 List upon which they relied to evaluate state-of-the-art systems and to 

help calculate the APP levels for high performance computers. Accordingly, 

Commerce stated there is no basis to assert that worldwide availability was 

determined on information that might not be accurate and reliable. 

 

Defense also disagreed with our finding that the President’s report did not adequately 

assess the potential military uses of computers with performance capabilities at the 

new threshold or the impact such militarily significant uses would have on U.S. 

national security. It stated that Defense did not provide an exhaustive list of all 

potential military applications because the number and diversity of military 

applications and the rate of change in high performance computing make 

comprehensive analysis of all potential applications, their national security impact, 

and appropriate responses impractical. In addition, Defense stated that we did not 

recognize the pace of technology developments in computing and stated that systems 

have an average lifespan of 3 to 6 years. Thus, according to Defense, many of the 

computers exported during that time are or are becoming obsolete. 

In response, we added some additional information to this report to more fully 

describe the process and sources of information that Commerce used to establish the 

new export control threshold. Although the interagency group collected and analyzed 

a large amount of raw data on computer performance levels, the documentation that 

the agencies provided did not demonstrate how they met the requirements of the law 

or provide a step-by-step approach that an outside reviewer could verify. For 

example, we could not confirm that the U.S. government verified information on the 

Top500 List. Commerce stated that agencies verified the list by comparing the APP 

performance level of computers on the Top500 List with benchmark data on 

comparable U.S. systems. However, Commerce did not provide documentation on 

how many Top500 List computers Defense reviewed or whether the systems assessed 

included those manufactured by countries of concern. Moreover, Defense officials 

said in interviews that they did not adequately document how they established the 

new export control threshold at 0.75 WT on the basis of their assessment of 

worldwide availability.

We do recognize the rapid pace of technological change in the computing industry. 

However, it is important to note that because certain computer systems are no longer 

as useful to the U.S. government as newer systems does not mean that these 

computers would not have some militarily significant use for a country of concern. 

 

Defense’s assertion that it was impractical to provide an exhaustive list of all 

potential military applications to meet the requirements of the law is not noted in the 

Page 6 GAO-06-754R Export Controls and High Performance Computers 
President’s report to Congress nor did the report indicate that the executive branch 

sought legislative relief from this mandated requirement. 

Scope and Methodology 

To address the requirements of the National Defense Authorization Act of 1998, we 

reviewed the statutory requirements for the justification, the documentation that 

executive branch officials said they used to support the conclusions presented in the 

President’s report, and the export control regulations pertaining to high performance 

computers. We also interviewed officials from the Departments of Commerce and 

Defense who were responsible for producing the report. 

__________________________________________________________________________ 

We are sending this report to interested congressional committees and to the 

Secretaries of Commerce and Defense. We will also make copies available to other 

interested parties on request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on 

the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. 

Please contact me at (202) 512-8979 if you or your staff have any questions 

concerning this report. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and 

Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this 

report include Stephen M. Lord, Jeffrey D. Phillips, Ian Ferguson, Lynn Cothern, Hai 

Tran, and Mark Speight. 

Joseph A. Christoff 

Director, International Affairs and Trade 

Page 7 GAO-06-754R Export Controls and High Performance Computers 
List of Congressional Committees 

The Honorable John Warner 

Chairman 

The Honorable Carl Levin 

Ranking Minority Member 

Committee on Armed Services 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Richard C. Shelby

Chairman 

The Honorable Paul S. Sarbanes 

Ranking Minority Member 

Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Duncan L. Hunter

Chairman 

The Honorable Ike Skelton 

Ranking Minority Member 

Committee on Armed Services 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Henry J. Hyde 

Chairman 

The Honorable Tom Lantos 

Ranking Minority Member 

Committee on International Relations 

House of Representatives

Page 8 GAO-06-754R Export Controls and High Performance Computers 
Enclosure I: Comments from the Department of Commerce 

See comment 1. 

See comment 2. 

Page 9 GAO-06-754R Export Controls and High Performance Computers 
See comment 3.

See comment 4.

See comment 5.

Page 10 GAO-06-754R Export Controls and High Performance Computers 
Page 11 GAO-06-754R Export Controls and High Performance Computers 
The following are GAO’s comments on the Department of Commerce letter dated 

June 9, 2006. 

GAO Comments

1. We added additional information to this report to more fully describe the 

administration’s review of U.S. export controls on high performance computers 

and sources of information that Commerce used to establish the new export 

control threshold and the role of the High Performance Computer Working Group. 

2. Commerce stated that a company representative or individual who wants to enter 

his or her machine on the Top500 Supercomputer List must provide the results of 

testing and submit the results to random verification by the list’s organizer. 

However, Commerce did not provide any documentation on how many or which 

systems the list’s organizer randomly verified. Moreover, the list’s producers 

acknowledged that information on the list is self-reported by respondents to a 

questionnaire and may not be error-free. Commerce also stated in its comments 

that agencies compared the Adjusted Peak Performance (APP) level of computers 

on the Top500 List with Department of Defense benchmark data on comparable 

systems and found comparable results. However, Commerce did not state or 

provide documentation on how many or which Top500 List computers Defense 

reviewed that were comparable to U.S. government systems. This would be 

important information to determine how many of the 500 systems the U.S. 

government reviewed and whether they included systems in or manufactured by 

countries of concern. Finally, Commerce stated that the Top500 List was verified 

by the U.S. government. On the basis of the documentation that the agencies 

provided, we cannot confirm that the U.S. government verified information on the 

Top500 List. In our original audit work, Defense and Commerce officials stated 

that they did not perform an independent analysis of computers produced by tier3 countries, but that they relied on other sources of information to estimate the 

performance of such computers. 

3. We disagree that conducting a formal foreign availability assessment would have 

resulted in a similar interagency review process. The President’s report provided 

only anecdotal examples of the availability of high performance computers in 

countries of concern, such as China, India, and Russia, even though the report 

asserted that the new control threshold was based on the widespread foreign 

availability of computing capacity. A foreign availability assessment is the 

principal mechanism identified in the U.S. Export Administration Regulations for 

determining the availability of controlled items. This assessment would determine 

whether items of comparable quality and quantity are available from non-U.S. 

sources, thus rendering U.S. export controls on the item ineffective.

4. We disagree with Commerce’s statement that the President’s report was based on 

a rigorous, well-founded review to set the new control threshold and determine 

worldwide availability of high performance computers. Although the Working 

Group collected a large amount of information and raw data on computer 

performance levels, we found in interviews with Defense officials and our review 

of their data that agencies did not document their methodology or the steps 

leading to the new threshold of 0.75 Weighted TeraFlops (WT). The 

Page 12 GAO-06-754R Export Controls and High Performance Computers 
documentation that the agencies provided did not demonstrate a step-by-step 

approach that an outside reviewer could follow to verify how they reached their 

threshold decision. 

5. We acknowledge these technical comments and modified our report to address 

both points. 

Page 13 GAO-06-754R Export Controls and High Performance Computers 
Enclosure II: Comments from the Department of Defense 

See comment 1.

See comment 2.

Page 14 GAO-06-754R Export Controls and High Performance Computers 
See comment 3.

See comment 4.

See comment 5.

Page 15 GAO-06-754R Export Controls and High Performance Computers 
Page 16 GAO-06-754R Export Controls and High Performance Computers 
The following are GAO’s comments on the Department of Defense letter dated May 

31, 2006. 

GAO Comments 

1. We added additional information to our report to more fully describe the process 

and sources of information that Commerce used to establish the new export 

control threshold, and the role of the High Performance Computer Working 

Group. This group was not cited in the President’s report. Although the Working 

Group collected and analyzed a large amount of information and raw data on 

computer performance levels, Defense officials said in interviews that they did 

not document their methodology or how they set the new threshold at the 0.75 WT 

level. The documentation that the agencies provided did not demonstrate a stepby-step approach that an outside reviewer could follow to verify how they 

reached their threshold decision. 

2. Defense stated in its comments that agencies compared the APP level of 

computers on the Top500 List with Defense benchmark data on comparable 

systems and found consistent results. However, Defense did not state or provide 

documentation on how many or which Top500 List computers agencies reviewed 

that were comparable to U.S. government systems. This would be important 

information to determine how many of the 500 systems the U.S. government 

reviewed and whether they included systems in or manufactured by countries of 

concern. 

3. We recognize the rapid pace of technological change in the computing industry. 

However, because certain computer systems are no longer as useful to the U.S. 

government as newer systems does not mean that these computers would not 

have some militarily significant use for a country of concern. Moreover, the 

President’s report does not identify the estimated numbers of computers available 

at a specific computing level in countries of concern. Thus, the report does not 

adequately assess the potential military uses or impact on U.S. national security 

that availability of these computer systems to countries of concern without a 

license would have. 

4. Defense stated that it did not provide an exhaustive list of all potential military 

applications because the number and diversity of military applications and the 

rate of change in high performance computing make comprehensive analysis of all 

potential applications, national security impacts, and appropriate responses 

impractical. Defense officials said that to generate a list of applications to be used 

on certain levels of computers would require reviewing and analyzing an 

extensive amount of information. However, the President’s report did not state 

the Defense view that the requirement is impractical, nor did the agencies indicate 

that they appealed for legislative relief. 

5. The National Defense Authorization Act of 1998 requires the agencies to assess 

the potential military uses of computers at the new threshold and, therefore, the 

impact that changes in the control threshold will have on U.S. national security. 

Merely stating that Defense conducts national security-related work on computers 

at all performance levels does not respond to the requirement of the act to assess 

Page 17 GAO-06-754R Export Controls and High Performance Computers 
the national security uses that computers at the new performance threshold can 

have. Thus, we believe it would be useful for the executive branch to conduct this 

assessment and provide the results to Congress. 

Page 18 GAO-06-754R Export Controls and High Performance Computers 
Related GAO Products 

Export Controls: More Thorough Analysis Needed to Justify Changes in High

Performance Computer Controls. GAO-02-892. Washington, D.C.: August 2, 2002. 

Export Controls: Inadequate Justification for Relaxation of Computer Controls 

Demonstrates Need for Comprehensive Study. GAO-01-534T. Washington, D.C.: 

March 15, 2001.

Export Controls: System for Controlling Exports of High Performance Computing 

Is Ineffective. GAO-01-10. Washington, D.C.: December 18, 2000. 

Export Controls: Challenges and Changes for Controls on Computer Exports. 

GAO/T-NSIAD-00-187. Washington, D.C.: May 26, 2000. 

Export Controls: National Security Risks and Revisions to Controls on Computers. 

GAO/T-NSIAD-00-104. Washington, D.C.: February 28, 2000. 

Export Controls: Statutory Reporting Requirements for Computers Not Fully 

Addressed. GAO/NSIAD-00-45. Washington, D.C.: November 5, 1999. 

Export Controls: Implementation of the 1998 Legislative Mandate for High 

Performance Computers. GAO/T-NSIAD-00-53. Washington, D.C.: October 28, 1999. 

Export Controls: Information on the Decision to Revise High Performance 

Computer Controls. GAO/NSIAD-98-196. Washington, D.C.: September 16, 1998. 

Export Controls: Changes in Controls Applied to the Export of High Performance 

Computers. GAO/T-NSIAD-98-250. Washington, D.C.: September 16, 1998. 

Export Controls: National Security Issues and Foreign Availability for High 

Performance Computer Exports. GAO/NSIAD-98-200. Washington, D.C.: September 

16, 1998. 

(320413) 

Page 19 GAO-06-754R Export Controls and High Performance Computers 
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the

United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further

permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or

other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to

reproduce this material separately. 
GAO’s Mission The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation and 

investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting its 

constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance and 

accountability of the federal government for the American people. GAO 

examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and policies; 

and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance to help

Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions. GAO’s 

commitment to good government is reflected in its core values of 

accountability, integrity, and reliability. 

The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no cost

is through GAO’s Web site (www.gao.gov). Each weekday, GAO posts 

newly released reports, testimony, and correspondence on its Web site. To

have GAO e-mail you a list of newly posted products every afternoon, go 

to www.gao.gov and select “Subscribe to Updates.” 

The first copy of each printed report is free. Additional copies are $2 each. 

A check or money order should be made out to the Superintendent of 

Documents. GAO also accepts VISA and Mastercard. Orders for 100 or 

more copies mailed to a single address are discounted 25 percent. Orders 

should be sent to: 

U.S. Government Accountability Office 

441 G Street NW, Room LM 

Washington, D.C. 20548 

To order by Phone: Voice: (202) 512-6000 

TDD: (202) 512-2537 

Fax: (202) 512-6061 

Contact: 

Web site: www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm

E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov

Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470 

Gloria Jarmon, Managing Director, JarmonG@gao.gov (202) 512-4400 

U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7125 

Washington, D.C. 20548 

Paul Anderson, Managing Director, AndersonP1@gao.gov (202) 512-4800

U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7149 

Washington, D.C. 20548 

Obtaining Copies of 

GAO Reports and 

Testimony

Order by Mail or Phone 

To Report Fraud,

Waste, and Abuse in 

Federal Programs 

Congressional 

Relations 

Public Affairs 

PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER