Filed 9/15/20 P. v. Dusablon CA2/6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion 

has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

THE PEOPLE,

 Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

CAMERON DUSABLON,

 Defendant and Appellant.

2d Crim. No. B302577

(Super. Ct. No. 2018029780)

(Ventura County)

Cameron Dusablon appeals a judgment following conviction 

of providing drugs to a person confined in jail, with a finding that 

he served a prior prison term. (Pen. Code, §§ 4573.9, subd. (a), 

667.5, subd. (b).)1 We strike the prior prison term enhancement, 

reverse and remand for resentencing, but otherwise affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On August 19, 2019, Dusablon pleaded guilty to providing 

drugs to a person confined in jail, and admitted suffering a prior 

serious felony strike conviction and serving two prior prison 

1 All statutory references are to the Penal Code.
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terms. (§§ 4573.9, subd. (a), 667, subds. (c) & (e), 1170.12, subds. 

(a) & (c), 667.5, subd. (b).) The prosecutor agreed that the trial 

court could impose any authorized sentence; the maximum 

sentence that could be imposed was 10 years. On September 17, 

2019, the trial court sentenced Dusablon to a prison term of 28 

months, including 16 months midterm for the crime and 12 

months for the prior prison term enhancement. Pursuant to its 

tentative sentence commitment, the court struck the remaining 

findings.

The trial court also found that Dusablon lacked the 

financial ability to pay the public defender fee and the 

presentence investigation fee. The court then imposed a $300 

restitution fine, a $300 parole revocation restitution fine 

(suspended), a booking fee, and other fees. It stayed the 

restitution fine and booking fee, however, pursuant to People v. 

Dueñas (2019) 30 Cal.App.5th 1157. In staying, the trial judge 

stated that he was referring the restitution fine and booking fee 

to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation and would 

“let them determine whether [Dusablon] has the ability to pay 

from wages and trust accounts placed on his books while he’s a

prisoner at the Department of Corrections on this case . . . .” 

Finally, the court awarded Dusablon 229 days of presentence 

custody credit.

Dusablon appeals and contends that: 1) the prior prison

term enhancement must be struck pursuant to recent 

amendments to section 667.5, subdivision (b), and 2) the trial 

court erred by ordering the Department of Corrections and 

Rehabilitation to determine his financial ability to pay the 

restitution fine and booking fee. The Attorney General concedes.
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DISCUSSION

I.

Dusablon argues that the prior prison term enhancement 

must be struck in view of the recent amendment to section 667.5, 

subdivision (b). 

Effective January 1, 2020, Senate Bill No. 136 amended 

section 667.5, subdivision (b) to provide: “[T]he court shall 

impose a one-year term for each prior separate prison term for a 

sexually violent offense as defined in subdivision (b) of Section 

6600 of the Welfare and Institutions Code . . . .” (Stats. 2019, ch. 

590, § 1.) Dusablon asserts that he may not be punished for his 

one-year prior prison term enhancement because the prison term 

was served for identity theft, not for an enumerated sexually 

violent offense. 

“ ‘When the Legislature amends a statute so as to lessen 

the punishment[,] it has obviously expressly determined that its 

former penalty was too severe and that a lighter punishment is 

proper as punishment for the commission of the prohibited act. It 

is an inevitable inference that the Legislature must have 

intended that the new statute imposing the new lighter penalty 

now deemed to be sufficient should apply to every case to which it 

constitutionally could apply. The amendatory act imposing the 

lighter punishment can be applied constitutionally to acts 

committed before its passage provided the judgment convicting 

the defendant of the act is not final.’ ” (People v. Superior Court 

(Lara) (2018) 4 Cal.5th 299, 307.)

Dusablon’s judgment is not yet final and thus Senate Bill 

No. 136 applies to him. (People v. Jennings (2019) 42 

Cal.App.5th 664, 682.) The Attorney General properly requests a 

remand for resentencing in order that the trial court may 
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reconsider its sentencing options. (People v. Stamps (2020) 9 

Cal.5th 685; People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 893; Jennings,

at p. 682.) Dusablon’s plea was not a negotiated plea with 

specific terms. Accordingly, we strike the one-year prior prison 

term enhancement and reverse and remand for resentencing to 

permit the trial court to exercise its sentencing discretion in light 

of changed circumstances. 

II.

Dusablon asserts, and the Attorney General agrees, that 

the trial court erred by ordering the Department of Corrections 

and Rehabilitation to determine Dusablon’s ability to pay the 

restitution fine and booking fee from his prison wages and trust 

accounts. (See People v. Neal (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 820, 826 [the 

trial court, not a probation officer, makes the final determination 

of a defendant’s ability to pay a fee].) Upon remand, the court 

shall make a final determination of Dusablon’s ability to pay the 

restitution fine and booking fee.

DISPOSITION

We modify the judgment to strike the one-year prison term 

enhancement imposed pursuant to section 667.5, subdivision (b), 

and reverse and remand for resentencing as stated herein. We 

direct the trial court to prepare an amended abstract of judgment 

accordingly and to forward the amended abstract to the 

Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

GILBERT, P. J.

We concur:

YEGAN, J. PERREN, J.
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Bruce A. Young, Judge

Superior Court County of Ventura

______________________________

Jolene Larimore, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief 

Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant 

Attorney General, David E. Madeo and Stacy S. Schwartz, 

Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.