IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

Assigned on Briefs August 1, 2023

NEDRA R. HASTINGS v. LARRY M. HASTINGS

Appeal from the Juvenile Court of Memphis and Shelby County

No. R2487 Terre Fratesi, Magistrate

No. W2022-00433-COA-R3-JV

This case arises from a protracted and contentious child support action, which began in 

2005 with a petition for child support filed on behalf of the mother seeking child support 

assistance from the father for care of the parties’ minor son. Over the years, the parties 

filed numerous petitions to modify the child support amount, petitions for contempt for 

failure to pay medical and other expenses, petitions for changes in visitation with the child, 

objections to the appointment of magistrates by the juvenile court judge, and requests to

rehear many of the motions and petitions. All pending matters were ultimately dismissed 

for failure to prosecute in an order entered December 1, 2020.1 This appeal arises from 

two petitions filed by the mother after the dismissal for failure to prosecute. The first was

a petition for contempt against the father for failure to pay medical and dental expenses for 

the child and failure to pay the full child support amount, and the second was a petition 

seeking payment of extraordinary expenses for the child related to his senior year of high 

school and an extension of the father’s child support obligations until the child reached the 

age of twenty-one. Upon thorough review of the record and consideration of the issues 

raised by the mother on appeal, we affirm the decisions of the trial court.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Juvenile Court

Affirmed; Case Remanded

THOMAS R. FRIERSON, II, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which FRANK G.

CLEMENT, JR., P.J., M.S., and ARNOLD B. GOLDIN, J., joined.

Nedra R. Hastings, Memphis, Tennessee, Pro Se.

OPINION

I. Factual and Procedural Background

 

1 A full recitation of the underlying facts can be found in this Court’s opinion concerning the related appeal,

Nedra R. Hastings v. Larry M. Hastings, No. W2020-01665-COA-R3-JV.

11/09/2023
2

This matter began nearly twenty years ago with a petition for child support filed by 

the State of Tennessee on behalf of the appellant mother, Nedra R. Hastings (“Mother”), 

on April 15, 2005, in the Juvenile Court of Memphis and Shelby County (“trial court”),

seeking support from the appellee father, Larry Maurice Hastings (“Father”), for their son, 

N. H. (the “Child”), who was born in 2004. Mother sought child support enforcement

assistance pursuant to Title IV-D of the Social Security Act, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 651, 

et seq. (“Title IV-D”). On July 29, 2005, the trial court entered an order directing Father 

to pay child support in the amount of $465.00 per month beginning on August 1, 2005, 

with a retroactive child support amount owed totaling $438.00. The trial court further 

ordered Father to provide medical insurance for the Child, with each party responsible for 

50% of medical expenses not covered by insurance. Spanning the next eighteen years, the 

parties filed many motions and petitions related to this matter, and the trial court issued 

numerous respective orders addressing the parties’ filings. Ultimately, the trial court 

dismissed the case for failure to prosecute on December 1, 2020, and denied Mother’s 

motions to alter or amend and for hearing before the judge on May 4, 2021. On appeal, we 

have affirmed the decision of the trial court to dismiss the action. See Nedra R. Hastings

v. Larry M. Hastings, No. W2020-01665-COA-R3-JV. 

In this appeal, Mother raises several issues arising from two orders entered by the 

trial court on March 18, 2022, addressing two petitions Mother filed following the May 4, 

2020 hearing. On May 7, 2021, Mother filed a pro se “Petition for Contempt for Failure 

to Pay Medical/Dental Expenses & Child Support January 1, 2020 – Present.” In this 

petition, Mother sought reimbursement from Father for medical and dental expenses he 

had failed to pay, payment from Father for child support arrearages totaling $660.68, and 

a finding that Father was in “willful contempt” of court for his failure to pay these 

arrearages and medical expenses. On July 1, 2021, Mother filed a pro se “Petition to 

Modify Child Support for Extraordinary Expenses & Deviations; and Petition to Extend 

Child Support to Age 21.” In this second petition, Mother sought reimbursement from 

Father for expenses related to the Child’s senior year of high school and posited that

Father’s child support obligation should be extended until the Child reached age twentyone because the Child had been “determined to be disabled from the age of 5 years old, as 

defined by Americans with Disabilities Act and TN Dept of Education[.]” 

On March 3, 2022, the trial court, with Magistrate Terre Fratesi presiding, 

conducted a hearing concerning both petitions. Father was not present for the hearing. 

After Mother presented proof of Father’s unpaid child support and unpaid medical and 

dental expenses for the Child, the trial court ordered Father to pay child support arrearages 

totaling $550.38 and an unpaid medical and dental expense arrearage of $212.37. The 

court’s ruling was memorialized by a written order entered on March 18, 2022. Also,

during the March 3, 2022 hearing, Mother presented proof of “extraordinary” expenses 

related to the Child’s senior year of high school, as well as records related to the Child’s 

mental and physical health in support of her July 1, 2021 petition to extend child support 
3

until the Child reached the age of twenty-one. The trial court entered a separate order 

addressing that petition, determining that Mother had presented proof of “extraordinary 

expenses related to the child’s senior year of high school” in the amount of $785.00. The 

trial court determined that Father was responsible for half of these expenses and ordered 

Father to pay $392.50 to cover his portion. However, the trial court denied Mother’s 

petition to extend child support until the Child attained the age of twenty-one. In so ruling, 

the trial court found that Mother had not met her “burden of proof required by T.C.A. 36-

5-101[(k)(1)] or T.C.A. 36-5-101[(k)(2)].”

2 The trial court further determined that the 

“Child was not disabled within the meaning of the Americans with Disabilities Act[, 42 

U.S.C. § 12101, et seq. (“ADA”),] Tennessee statute, or case law.” On the contrary, the

trial court found that the Child’s medical and educational records supported the opposite 

conclusion. 

Mother filed a notice of appeal with this Court on April 4, 2022. On June 24, 2022, 

this Court received an affidavit from the trial court clerk stating that as of that date, Mother 

had not filed either a Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(d) notice or any transcript 

or statement of the evidence after filing the notice of appeal. Upon receiving such affidavit

from the trial court, this Court entered an administrative order reciting that Mother had 

failed to comply with Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(b), (c), or (d).3 The 

administrative order instructed Mother to either file with the trial court clerk a transcript of

the evidence, a statement of the evidence, or a Rule 24(d) notice, or otherwise show cause 

why this appeal should not be dismissed, within fifteen days of the order. 

On July 12, 2022, Mother filed a response to this Court’s administrative order, 

stating, inter alia, that she had “prepared statements of evidence and transcripts of evidence 

based on the substantially verbatim recital of the testimony and evidence submitted [and] 

entered on the record” and had filed those statements with the trial court clerk’s office “by 

depositing in the clerk’s filing box on June 13, 2022.” On August 29, 2022, Mother filed 

a “status update” with this Court explaining that she had “submitted a second delivery of 

the protected transcripts/statements” via “FedEx courier to [Magistrate Fratesi] on [July 

28, 2022],” that the trial court clerk had acknowledged receipt of these materials, and that 

the clerk had informed her that the records she had sent would “not be reviewed by 

Magistrate Fratesi until properly filed.” (Emphasis and additional quotation marks 

omitted.) On September 7, 2022, this Court received a second affidavit from the trial court 

 

2 The trial court referred to “T.C.A. 36-5-101(p)(1) or T.C.A. 36-5-101(p)(2)” in the order. Effective July 

1, 2005, Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-5-101 was amended and rewritten. The relevant subsections, 

which had formerly been designated subsection (p) are now found in subsection (k), but the language of the 

subsection remains the same. See Shaw v. Shaw, No. W2010-02369-COA-R3-CV, 2011 WL 4379052, at 

*3 n.1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 21, 2011).

3 Rule 24(b) and (c) require an appellant to file a transcript or statement of the evidence within sixty days 

after the notice of appeal is filed. If no transcript or statement of the evidence is to be filed, the appellant 

must file a notice that neither will be filed pursuant to Rule 24(d). 
4

clerk stating that the trial court clerk’s office had not received from Mother any Tennessee 

Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(d) notice, transcript, or statement of the evidence.

On September 8, 2022, this Court issued an order relaying the above sequence of 

events and stating that this Court had received “conflicting information from [Mother] and 

the trial court clerk regarding whether [Mother] has filed a statement of the evidence or 

otherwise complied with Rule 24.” In the order, this Court directed the trial court clerk to 

file a response addressing the aforementioned discrepancies. On September 16, 2022, the 

trial court clerk responded, stating that Mother was not in compliance with Tennessee Rule 

of Appellate Procedure 24 because she had not filed either a transcript or a statement of the 

evidence as the rule required. The trial court clerk explained that Mother had delivered a 

package directly to Magistrate Fratesi, who had then forwarded it to the clerk’s office with 

instructions for the trial court clerk to inform Mother that Magistrate Fratesi would not 

review the contents because they had not yet been filed with the trial court. The trial court 

clerk further indicated that the clerk’s office had complied with Magistrate Fratesi’s request 

in contacting Mother but that Mother had failed to retrieve the package or file any 

documents with the trial court clerk. 

On October 5, 2022, no appellate record had yet been filed, and this Court 

accordingly entered an order stating:

It appears to this Court that [Mother’s] position that she has submitted 

a transcript to the trial court clerk is based (at least partially) on her sending 

a “transcript” to the trial court judge’s personal office. The judge 

appropriately directed that the documents be sent to the trial court clerk’s 

office to be returned to [Mother] in order for her to properly file them with 

the trial court clerk. [Mother] appears to assume that the clerk’s office had 

an obligation at that point to file the transcripts for her. The trial court clerk’s 

office had no such obligation or authority to do so. To be clear, [Mother] is 

the party required to file and serve the transcript: “The transcript, certified 

by the appellant . . . shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court within 60 

days after filing the notice of appeal. Upon filing the transcript, the appellant 

shall simultaneously serve notice of the filing on the appellee.” Tenn. R. 

App. P. 24(b).

This Court then ordered Mother to file a “transcript, a statement of the evidence, or a notice 

of no transcript or statement within ten (10) days [of October 5, 2022].” On December 8, 

2022, the trial court clerk’s office filed an amended response to this Court’s request 

concerning the status of the appellate record and reported that Mother had filed a copy of 

the transcript of the relevant proceedings on September 20, 2022. Accordingly, this Court 

directed the trial court clerk to transmit a certified copy of the appellate record to the clerk 

of this Court on or before December 28, 2022, and stated that thereafter, “briefing in this 
5

case shall proceed as set forth in Rule 29 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure.” 

The appellate record was filed with the clerk of this Court on January 24, 2023.

On February 9, 2023, Mother filed a “Motion to Supplement Record; and Stay or 

Extension of Briefing Schedule” requesting that this Court (1) order the trial court to certify 

and transmit a “supplemental record of electronic recording ‘transcript’ of court hearing on 

March 3, 2022”; (2) grant permission for Mother to “submit a supplemental record of 

complete transcript of evidence (99 pages) filed with trial court clerk on September 20, 

2022”; and (3) grant a stay and extension of the briefing schedule while the motion 

remained pending. In the motion, Mother explained that “64 pages of 99 pages” of the 

transcript of evidence from the final hearing held on March 3, 2022 were “missing/omitted” 

from the record. On March 3, 2023, this Court entered an order denying Mother’s motion 

to supplement the appellate record, noting that this Court had adjudicated multiple matters 

regarding the appellate record in this case and that the certified appellate record had been 

received and subsequently filed in this Court on January 24, 2022. Mother filed her 

appellate brief on May 2, 2023. Father has not filed a brief or otherwise appeared in this 

appeal. 

II. Issues Presented

Mother raises several issues on appeal, which we have reordered and restated as 

follows:

1. Whether this Court abused its discretion when it denied Mother’s 

motion to supplement the record with a complete transcript of 

evidence of the final hearing in this matter.

2. Whether the orders signed by the Magistrate comply with Tennessee 

Code Annotated §§ 36-5-405, et seq.

3. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying Mother’s 

petition seeking an extension of child support until the Child reached 

twenty-one years of age.

4. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in declining to modify the 

presumptive child support obligation to cover its awards to Mother for 

extraordinary expenses, out-of-pocket medical and dental expenses, 

child support arrearages, and insurance premiums owed by Father.

5. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it declined to 

impute the noncustodial parent, to modify basic child support, and to 

issue an updated Income Assignment Order to Father’s employer to 
6

ensure collection of judgments in accordance with the Tennessee 

Child Support Guidelines.

6. Whether the trial court erred when it cited Tennessee Code Annotated 

§ 37-1-107(d) for a rehearing of child support actions governed under 

Title 36, Chapter 5 of Tennessee Code Annotated.

III. Standard of Review

We review a non-jury case de novo upon the record with a presumption of 

correctness as to the findings of fact unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. 

See Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d); Bowden v. Ward, 27 S.W.3d 913, 916 (Tenn. 2000). “In order 

for the evidence to preponderate against the trial court’s findings of fact, the evidence must 

support another finding of fact with greater convincing effect.” Wood v. Starko, 197 

S.W.3d 255, 257 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006). We review questions of law de novo with no 

presumption of correctness. Bowden, 27 S.W.3d at 916 (citing Myint v. Allstate Ins. Co., 

970 S.W.2d 920, 924 (Tenn. 1998)); see also In re Estate of Haskins, 224 S.W.3d 675, 678 

(Tenn. Ct. App. 2006). 

We apply the deferential abuse of discretion standard to determinations regarding 

child support. See Mayfield v. Mayfield, 395 S.W.3d 108, 114-15 (Tenn. 2012); 

Richardson v. Spanos, 189 S.W.3d 720, 725 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005). As the Richardson

Court explained:

Because child support decisions retain an element of discretion, we review 

them using the deferential “abuse of discretion” standard. This standard is a 

review-constraining standard of review that calls for less intense appellate 

review and, therefore, less likelihood that the trial court’s decision will be 

reversed. State ex rel. Jones v. Looper, 86 S.W.3d 189, 193 (Tenn. Ct. App. 

2000); White v. Vanderbilt Univ., 21 S.W.3d 215, 222-23 (Tenn. Ct. App. 

1999). Appellate courts do not have the latitude to substitute their discretion 

for that of the trial court. Henry v. Goins, 104 S.W.3d 475, 479 (Tenn. 2003); 

State ex rel. Vaughn v. Kaatrude, 21 S.W.3d 244, 248 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000). 

Thus, a trial court’s discretionary decision will be upheld as long as it is not 

clearly unreasonable. Bogan v. Bogan, 60 S.W.3d 721, 733 (Tenn. 2001).

Id. at 725.

Regarding pro se litigants, this Court has explained:

Parties who decide to represent themselves are entitled to fair and 

equal treatment by the courts. The courts should take into account that many 

pro se litigants have no legal training and little familiarity with the judicial 
7

system. However, the courts must also be mindful of the boundary between 

fairness to a pro se litigant and unfairness to the pro se litigant’s adversary.

Thus, the courts must not excuse pro se litigants from complying with the 

same substantive and procedural rules that represented parties are expected 

to observe.

The courts give pro se litigants who are untrained in the law a certain 

amount of leeway in drafting their pleadings and briefs. Accordingly, we 

measure the papers prepared by pro se litigants using standards that are less 

stringent than those applied to papers prepared by lawyers.

Pro se litigants should not be permitted to shift the burden of the 

litigation to the courts or to their adversaries. They are, however, entitled to 

at least the same liberality of construction of their pleadings that Tenn. R. 

Civ. P. 7, 8.05, and 8.06 provide to other litigants. Even though the courts 

cannot create claims or defenses for pro se litigants where none exist, they 

should give effect to the substance, rather than the form or terminology, of a 

pro se litigant’s papers.

Young v. Barrow, 130 S.W.3d 59, 62-63 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003) (internal citations omitted).

IV. Denial of Motion to Supplement the Appellate Record

Mother asserts that this Court abused its discretion when it entered a per curiam

order, dated March 3, 2023, denying her February 9, 2022 motion to supplement the record 

with a complete transcript of evidence of the final hearing in this matter. Mother contends 

that the transcript at issue, designated as Volume 6 of the record on appeal, is missing sixtyfour pages. Mother requested that this Court permit her to submit a supplemental record 

of “complete transcript of evidence (99 pages) filed with the trial court clerk on September 

20, 2022.” In her appellate brief, Mother posits that this Court’s order denying her request 

“appears to admonish [Mother]” for this Court’s having to settle contentions between 

Mother and the trial court clerk. Mother asserts that this Court’s perceived admonishment 

was “misdirected” and appeared to be “an unjust sanction” against her. Mother further 

contends that the order “indicates an indifference or lack of objective consideration to 

[Mother’s] efforts to adhere to the standards and procedures of having the record 

prepared[,]” and “indicates an appearance of . . . partiality, and/or a predetermination of 

the issues to be reviewed by this Court.” Mother further asserts that the “trial judge should 

have noticed the incomplete sentences and/or notations on page thirty-five (35) of the 

clerk’s unnumbered, transmitted transcript of evidence for a final hearing that was almost 

four (4) hours in duration.” 

Concerning the content of the record on appeal, Tennessee Rule of Appellate 

Procedure 24 provides in relevant part:
8

(a) Content of the Record. The record on appeal shall consist of: (1) 

copies, certified by the clerk of the trial court, of all papers filed in the 

trial court except as hereafter provided; (2) the original of any exhibits 

filed in the trial court; (3) the transcript or statement of the evidence 

or proceedings, which shall clearly indicate and identify any exhibits 

offered in evidence and whether received or rejected; (4) any requests 

for instructions submitted to the trial judge for consideration, whether 

expressly acted upon or not; and (5) any other matter designated by a 

party and properly includable in the record as provided in subdivision 

(g) of this rule.

* * *

(b) Transcript of Stenographic or Other Substantially Verbatim 

Recording of Evidence or Proceedings. Except as provided in 

subdivision (c), if a stenographic report or other contemporaneously 

recorded, substantially verbatim recital of the evidence or proceedings 

is available, the appellant shall have prepared a transcript of such part 

of the evidence or proceedings as is necessary to convey a fair, 

accurate and complete account of what transpired with respect to 

those issues that are the bases of appeal . . . . The transcript, certified 

by the appellant, the appellant’s counsel, or the reporter as an accurate 

account of the proceedings, shall be filed with the clerk of the trial 

court within 60 days after filing the notice of appeal[.]

(Emphasis added.) With regard to correction and modification of an appellate record, Rule 

24 provides: 

(e) Correction or Modification of the Record. If any matter properly 

includable is omitted from the record, is improperly included, or is 

misstated therein, the record may be corrected or modified to conform 

to the truth. Any differences regarding whether the record accurately 

discloses what occurred in the trial court shall be submitted to and 

settled by the trial court regardless of whether the record has been 

transmitted to the appellate court. Absent extraordinary 

circumstances, the determination of the trial court is conclusive. If 

necessary, the appellate or trial court may direct that a supplemental 

record be certified and transmitted.

Here, Mother submitted and certified the transcript of the March 3, 2022 hearing to 

the trial court clerk on September 20, 2022, and that certified transcript included thirty-five

pages. Mother wrote by hand and initialed on the front cover of the transcript: “35 pages 
9

total NRH.” On the last page of the transcript, the upper right-hand corner of which bears 

the number, “35,” Mother signed an affidavit certifying that exact copies of the transcript 

had been previously submitted by Mother to the trial court clerk on June 13, 2022 and July 

18, 2022, to Father on June 13, 2022; and to Magistrate Fratesi on July 18, 2022. Nowhere 

on the transcript that Mother signed did she indicate that certain pages of the transcript 

were missing. Instead, Mother noted with her initials on the first page that the transcript 

contained exactly “35 pages total.” The trial court then certified the transcript along with 

the other documents to be included in the record, all of which were filed with this Court on 

January 24, 2022. 

The appellant bears the responsibility to ensure that an accurate and complete 

transcript of relevant proceedings before the trial court is included in the record on appeal. 

See Tenn. R. App. P. 24 (b) (“The appellant shall have prepared a transcript of such part of 

the evidence or proceeding as is necessary to convey a fair, accurate and complete account 

of what transpired with respect to those issues that are the bases of appeal.”); Jennings v. 

Sewell-Allen Piggly Wiggly, 173 S.W.3d 710, 713 (Tenn. 2005) (“An appellant is 

responsible for preparing the record and providing to the appellate court a ‘fair, accurate 

and complete account’ of what transpired at the trial level.” (quoting State v. Ballard, 855 

S.W.3d 557, 560 (Tenn. 1993))). In her brief on appeal, Mother acknowledges this burden. 

This Court afforded Mother ample extensions of time to properly file the transcript of the 

hearing held on March 3, 2022 as well as other documents and exhibits with the trial court, 

even after the deadline for filing the record on appeal had passed. Once Mother filed the 

hearing transcript with the trial court, the trial court duly certified and submitted the 

transcript to this Court. There is nothing in the record to suggest that the trial court 

submitted anything other than the exact transcript Mother filed on September 20, 2022. 

We recognize that Mother is a pro se litigant who is entitled to fair and equal 

treatment by the courts and to whom we must give a certain amount of leeway in drafting 

her pleadings and briefs. See Young, 130 S.W.3d at 62-63. However, we are also cognizant 

that Mother must comply with the “same substantive and procedural rules that represented 

parties are expected to observe.” See id. at 63. As stated above, Mother was afforded 

numerous opportunities and extensions of deadlines in order to properly file a complete 

and accurate record with the trial court to be transmitted to this Court for our review. The 

trial court submitted to this Court an exact copy of the transcript filed by Mother. Mother, 

as the appellant, was aware of her duty to provide a complete transcript as part of the record

and certified with the trial court that she had done so. She cannot now complain that the 

record is not accurate. Accordingly, we find that this Court did not abuse its discretion 

when it entered the March 3, 2023 order denying Mother’s motion to supplement the 

record.4 We further ascribe no error to the trial court related to the contents of the record 

on appeal. 

 

4 Regarding this Court’s ability to review a per curiam order, Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 22(d) 

provides: 
10

V. Finality of the Magistrate’s Orders

Mother argues that Magistrate Fratesi, who presided over the March 3, 2022 hearing 

at issue, “did not adjudicate the support/contempt petitions as an appointed ‘special judge.’ 

Therefore, the findings and recommendations for dispositive issues in this case should have 

been reviewed and confirmed by the Juvenile Court Judge, pursuant to [Tennessee Code 

Annotated] § 36-5-405(g)(i) and the Child Support Guidelines.” We disagree. 

Mother invokes Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-5-405 (2021), which addresses the 

authority of magistrate judges in child support matters. Regarding the finality of 

magistrates’ decisions, that statute provides:

(g) Upon the conclusion of the hearing in each case, the magistrate shall 

transmit to the judge all papers relating to the case, along with the 

magistrate’s findings and recommendations in writing. A 

magistrate’s decision on a preliminary matter, not dispositive of the 

ultimate issue in the case, shall be final and not reviewable by the 

judge.

* * *

(i) If a hearing before the judge is not requested, the findings and 

recommendations of the magistrate become the final decree of the 

court when confirmed by an order of the judge.

However, because the trial court in this matter is the Juvenile Court for Memphis and 

Shelby County, Tennessee Code Annotated § 37-1-107 (2019) is the relevant statute 

governing the authority and finality Magistrate Fratesi’s decisions in this matter. 

Tennessee Code Annotated § 37-1-107 provides in pertinent part:

(b) The judge may direct that any case or class of cases over which the 

juvenile court has jurisdiction shall be heard in the first instance by 

the magistrate. These cases shall be conducted in the same manner as 

cases heard by the judge. In the conduct of the proceedings, the 

magistrate shall have the powers of a judge and shall have the same 

authority as the judge to issue any and all process.

 

Power of Single Judge to Entertain Motions. A single judge of the appellate court may 

entertain and may grant or deny any request for relief that under these rules may be sought 

by motion, except that a single judge may not dismiss or otherwise finally dispose of an 

appeal or other proceeding. The action of a single judge may be reviewed by the court.
11

(c) Upon conclusion of the hearing, the magistrate shall file an order. The 

magistrate shall also inform each party of the right to a hearing before 

the juvenile court judge, the time limits within which a request for a 

hearing must be perfected, and of the manner in which to perfect the 

request. 

* * *

(e) If no hearing before the judge is requested, or if the right to the 

hearing is expressly waived by all parties within the specified time 

period, the magistrate’s order becomes the order of the court. A party 

may appeal the order pursuant to § 37-1-159.

(Emphasis added.) Thus, according to the applicable statute, unlike a magistrate’s order 

governed by Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-5-405, a juvenile court magistrate’s order 

does not require confirmation of the juvenile court judge. Here, Magistrate Fratesi heard 

Mother’s pending motions on March 3, 2022, and entered two orders on March 18, 2022. 

Neither party requested a hearing before the juvenile court judge. Therefore, Magistrate 

Fratesi’s order became the order of the court pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 37-

1-107(e). 

 

VI. Extension of Child Support to Age Twenty-One

Mother contends that Magistrate Fratesi’s findings related to her petition to extend 

Father’s child support obligations until the Child reaches the age of twenty-one were 

“nothing more than a general summary of denial[]” and therefore did not comport with the 

requirements of Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 52. Regarding Mother’s petition, the 

trial court found:

[Mother] did not meet the burden of proof required by [Tennessee 

Code Annotated §] 36-5-101[(k)(1) and (k)(2)]. The [C]hild is not disabled 

within the meaning of the Americans with Disabilities Act or Tennessee 

statute or case law. In fact, the Court finds the [C]hild’s medical and 

educational records presented by [Mother] support the court’s finding on this 

issue.

Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 52.01 provides:

In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury, the court shall find the facts 

specially and shall state separately its conclusions of law and direct the entry 

of the appropriate judgment.

Regarding the requirements set forth in Rule 52.01, this Court has explained: 
12

Generally, when a trial court fails to explain the factual basis for its 

decision in accordance with Rule 52.01 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil 

Procedure, the appropriate remedy is to “vacate the trial court’s judgment 

and remand the cause to the trial court for written findings of fact and 

conclusions of law.” Manning v. Manning, 474 S.W.3d 252, 260 (Tenn. Ct. 

App. 2015) (quoting Lake v. Haynes, No. W2010-00294-COA-R3-CV, 2011 

WL 2361563, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 9, 2011)). Nevertheless, “[w]hen 

the trial court fails to explain the factual basis for its decisions, we may 

conduct a de novo review of the record to determine where the preponderance 

of the evidence lies[.]” Gooding v. Gooding, 477 S.W.3d 774, 783 (Tenn. 

Ct. App. 2015) (citing Lovlace v. Copley, 418 S.W.3d 1, 36 (Tenn. 2013); 

Ganzevoort v. Russell, 949 S.W.2d 293, 296 (Tenn. 1997); Nashville Ford 

Tractor, Inc. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 194 S.W.3d 415, 424 (Tenn. Ct. App. 

2005)). Furthermore, “[c]ourts need not make findings on stipulated or 

undisputed facts, unless conflicting inferences can be drawn from undisputed 

facts.” Lovlace, 418 S.W.3d at 35.

Lillard v. Lillard, No. M2019-02305-COA-R3-CV, 2021 WL 861769, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. 

App. Mar. 8, 2021). 

In cases concerning issues arising from Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-5-101(k),

wherein the trial court has not made specific findings of fact, this Court has conducted a de

novo review of the trial court’s determinations. See, e.g., Finn v. Bundy, M2003-01368-

COA-R3-CV, 2005 WL 418793 at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 22, 2005) (“Because the trial 

court did not make specific findings of fact about the son’s [disabled status], we review the 

facts in the record under a purely de novo review.”) (citing In re Valentine, 79 S.W.3d 539, 

546 (Tenn. 2002)). Accordingly, we now conduct a de novo review upon the record of the 

trial court’s denial of Mother’s request to extend child support until the age of twenty-one.

 

Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-5-101(k) (2021), the statutory provision governing 

whether child support may be extended past the age of majority, provides:

(1) Except as provided in subdivision (k)(2), the court may continue child 

support beyond a child’s minority for the benefit of a child who is 

handicapped or disabled, as defined by the [ADA], until such child 

reaches twenty-one (21) years of age.

The ADA defines a disability as follows:

The term “disability” means, with respect to an individual—

(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits 
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one or more major life activities of such individual;

(B) a record of such an impairment; or

(C) being regarded as having such an impairment[.]

42 U.S.C. § 12102 (2009). A “major life activity” is defined by the ADA as follows:

(A) In general

For purposes of [the definition of disability], major life 

activities include, but are not limited to, caring for oneself, 

performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping, 

walking, standing, lifting, bending, speaking, breathing, 

learning, reading, concentrating, thinking, communicating, and 

working.

(B) Major bodily functions

For purposes of [the definition of disability], a major life 

activity also includes the operation of a major bodily function, 

including but not limited to, functions of the immune system, 

normal cell growth, digestive, bowel, bladder, neurological, 

brain, respiratory, circulatory, endocrine, and reproductive 

functions.

Id.

 

Upon our review of the exhibits filed by Mother on appeal, we determine that the 

evidence preponderates in favor of the trial court’s finding that the Child is not a person 

with a disability as defined by the ADA and is therefore not eligible for extended child 

support pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-5-101(k)(1). In support of her petition 

to extend child support until the Child reaches the age of twenty-one, Mother presented to 

the trial court, during the March 3, 2022 hearing, several evaluations of the Child’s 

physical, mental, and psychological health from age ten through seventeen. These were 

conducted and/or considered by the “Exceptional Children and Health Services” of 

Memphis in determining the Child’s eligibility for services pursuant to the Individuals with 

Disabilities in Education Act (“IDEA”). These included an “Initial Evaluation” conducted 

on December 12, 2014; an “Outside Psychological Evaluation” conducted on February 6, 

2020; and a “Reevaluation” and updated “Individual Education Plan” (“IEP”) conducted 

on August 24, 2021. 

The Initial Evaluation was conducted when the Child was in fifth grade to determine 

his eligibility for the Shelby County Schools’ gifted program. The Child was assessed 

using the Reynolds Intellectual Assessment Scale (“RIAS”) and was determined to possess 

an intellectual ability that the evaluators deemed to be “in the Superior range compared to 
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his same age peers.” The Outside Psychological Evaluation, conducted when the Child 

was fifteen years old, showed the Child’s academic performance “indicated generally ageappropriate skills” and abilities in reading, sentence comprehension, and math, with some 

difficulty in concentrating and staying on task at school. Recommendations stemming 

from that evaluation indicated that the Child should be allowed additional time to complete 

any “in-school” reading or writing assignments, should eat healthy foods, get enough sleep,

exercise more, and attempt to make friends. 

The Reevaluation, conducted when the Child was in twelfth grade, contained similar 

findings and also noted that the Child had a “severed tendon” in his left hand, the hand he 

used for writing. The evaluation showed that the Child had proficient language skills, no

visual or hearing impairment, no cognitive processing deficits, no reading or math skill 

deficits, and no communication problems. The IEP associated with the twelfth-grade 

evaluation indicated that the Child was enrolled in and passed several honors courses in his 

senior year and that he had received academic accommodations for these classes that

allowed him to take more time to complete homework and tests and the ability to retake 

tests if needed. The IEP stated that the Child struggled with participating in school 

activities and focusing on school work. Nevertheless, the IEP included plans for the Child 

to seek independent living after graduating from high school, to take his driver’s license 

test, and to attend a four-year university. The record demonstrates that the Child did apply 

for a driver’s license on July 15, 2021, and took the American College Testing (“ACT”) 

exam in October 2021. 

 

After a thorough review of the record, we determine that a preponderance of the 

evidence supports the trial court’s finding that the Child is not disabled as defined by the 

ADA. Although the Child received certain diagnoses resulting in accommodations for testtaking and completing school work, nothing in the record demonstrates the existence of 

any condition that would limit the Child’s major life activities. On the contrary, the record 

demonstrates that the Child has been able to function at normal or high cognitive 

functioning levels for his age group and grade levels with minor accommodations. The 

Child received special consideration in school as a “gifted” student due to his high 

intelligence quotient (“IQ”), was enrolled in honors classes as a senior in high school, and 

achieved ACT scores sufficient for him to enroll in a four-year university. Furthermore, 

there are no indications that the Child suffers from any physical disability that would limit 

any major life activity. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s denial of Mother’s petition 

to extend child support to twenty-one years of age pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated 

§ 36-5-101(k)(1).

VI. Modification of Child Support Obligation to Cover Arrearages and Expenses

Mother posits that the trial court’s order concerning her petition for contempt failed 

to comport with Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 52.01 because it did not include “any 

of the subsidiary details, testimony or proof admitted into evidence” and that the rulings 
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“merely stated [Father’s] new arrearages, with interest payments, ‘if not paid by March 30, 

2022.’” Significantly, Mother does not disagree with or appeal the amounts awarded or 

proffer any alternative amounts in her appellate brief. Instead, Mother complains that the 

trial court’s order “does not provide a connection of which proof/evidence was relied upon 

by the Magistrate for the calculations of child support arrears and medical arrears.” 

As stated above, Rule 52.01 provides that “[i]n all actions tried upon the facts 

without a jury, the court shall find the facts specially and shall state separately its 

conclusions of law[.]” In the trial court’s order titled, “Order on Petition for Contempt for 

Failure to Pay Medical/Dental Expenses and Child Support January 1, 2020-Present,” the 

trial court included findings of fact regarding various amounts owed by Father and ordered 

him to pay to Mother these amounts as follows: 

[Mother] presented proof and testimony of Child Support arrears. The 

Court finds that as of February 7, 2022, the Child Support arrears should be 

established at $550.38 which is due and owing as of February 28, 2022 and 

should be paid in full by March 30, 2022 or the amount will incur the 

statutory interest at a rate of 6%. If not paid in full by March 30, 2022, 

arrearage should be paid at the rate of $45.87 per month until the amount is 

paid in full.

[Mother] presented proof and testimony of medical arrears. The 

unpaid medical and dental arrears should be reduced to a judgment of 

$212.37 and should be paid in full by March 30, 2022 or the amount will 

incur the statutory interest at a rate of 6%. If not paid in full by March 30, 

2022, arrearage should be paid at the rate of $65.75 per month until the 

amount is paid in full.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED

That the child support arrearages be established at $550.38 as of 

February 28, 2022. If the amount is not paid by March 30, 2022, [Father] 

shall pay at the rate of $45.87 per month, and incur statutory interest at 6%.

That unpaid medical and dental arrears be established at $212.37 as 

of February 28, 2022. If the amount is not paid by March 30, 2022, [Father]

shall pay at the rate of $65.75 per month, and incur statutory interest at 6%.

(Paragraph numbering omitted.) In the second order entered on March 18, 2022, titled 

“Order on Petition to Modify Child Support for Extraordinary Expenses and Deviations 

and Petition to Extend Child Support to 21 Years of Age,” the trial court included the 

following findings of fact as relevant to this issue on appeal:
16

[Mother] presented proof of extraordinary expenses related to the 

child’s senior year of high school. The amount for senior expenses are 

$785.00. [Father] is responsible for half which is $392.50 to [Mother] by 

May 3, 2022 or shall pay $138.83 per month until the amount is paid in full. 

The Court did not include in this figure the amount requesting reimbursement 

for driving lessons and a class trip to Texas.

* * *

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED

That the arrears for the minor child’s senior expenses be established 

at $392.50 and [Father] shall pay this amount by May 3, 2022. If the amount 

is not paid by May 3, 2022, [Father] shall pay $138.83 per month.

After a careful review of the record, we find that both orders provide sufficient 

findings of fact and conclusions of law to comport with Rule 52.01. In the first order, the 

trial court established a child support arrearage amount and medical and dental arrearages 

based on Mother’s testimony and the “Custodial Parent Payment Summary” documents 

introduced as exhibits at the March 3, 2020 hearing. That order further establishes a start 

date for Father to commence paying each arrearage and the statutory interest that would 

begin to accrue should Father fail to pay as directed. In the second order, the trial court 

determined a specific amount of “extraordinary expenses” related to the Child’s senior year 

of high school predicated on Mother’s testimony and exhibits entered at the March 3, 2022 

hearing. The trial court ordered Father to pay one-half of this amount to Mother. 

Moreover, the trial court expressly indicated that it was intentionally excluding certain 

expense payments sought by Mother, such as the requested reimbursement for driving 

lessons and a class trip. 

Again, in her appellate brief respecting the school expenses award, Mother does not 

object to the amounts awarded; rather, she challenges the manner in which the trial court 

directed that these amounts would be paid by Father. Mother asserts that the trial court 

“erred in not modifying the presumptive child support order and issu[ing] a new incomeassignment order to ensure collection of the judgments/arrearages.” However, we do not 

find that this objection provides a proper basis to overturn the trial court’s discretionary

determination with respect to the continuing amount of child support owed by Father in 

this case. Regarding this Court’s review of a child support award, we reiterate:

Because child support decisions retain an element of discretion, we review 

them using the deferential “abuse of discretion” standard. This standard is a 

review-constraining standard of review that calls for less intense appellate 

review and, therefore, less likelihood that the trial court’s decision will be 

reversed. State ex rel. Jones v. Looper, 86 S.W.3d 189, 193 (Tenn. Ct. App. 
17

2000); White v. Vanderbilt Univ., 21 S.W.3d 215, 222-23 (Tenn. Ct. App. 

1999). Appellate courts do not have the latitude to substitute their discretion 

for that of the trial court. Henry v. Goins, 104 S.W.3d 475, 479 (Tenn. 2003); 

State ex rel. Vaughn v. Kaatrude, 21 S.W.3d 244, 248 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000). 

Thus, a trial court’s discretionary decision will be upheld as long as it is not 

clearly unreasonable, Bogan v. Bogan, 60 S.W.3d 721, 733 (Tenn. 2001), 

and reasonable minds can disagree about its correctness.

Richardson, 189 S.W.3d at 725. 

The trial court’s decision that Father should pay arrearages and extraordinary costs 

directly to Mother in lump sums, rather than through a modified child support award and 

income assignment, was not clearly unreasonable, and we therefore uphold the trial court’s 

decision. For this reason, and because we are able to readily ascertain the trial court’s bases 

for its conclusions, we find no reversible error as to the monetary awards in either of the 

trial court’s March 18, 2022 orders, and we affirm the trial court’s determinations on these 

issues. 

VII. Modification of Basic Child Support

Mother also seeks to modify the “basic child support” award based on an imputation 

of income to Father. However, Mother did not raise this issue in either petition before the 

trial court. As this Court has explained:

Generally, issues may not be raised for the first time on appeal. See, e.g., 

Barnes v. Barnes, 193 S.W.3d 495, 501 (Tenn. 2006) (“Issues not raised in 

the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.”); Main St. Mkt., 

LLC v. Weinberg, 432 S.W.3d 329, 337 n.4 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2013) (“Issues 

not raised at trial will not be considered for the first time on appeal.”). 

Rather, where a party did not first raise an issue in the trial court, “he has 

waived his right to argue this issue for the first time on appeal.” In re M.L.P., 

281 S.W.3d 387, 394 (Tenn. 2009).

Chimneyhill Condo. Ass’n v. Chow, No. W2020-00873-COA-R3-CV, 2021 WL 3047166, 

at *15 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 20, 2021). Accordingly, Mother has waived this issue on appeal 

because she did not raise it before the trial court. 

VIII. Time for Rehearing

Mother contends that the trial court’s reference in its March 18, 2022 orders to

Tennessee Code Annotated § 37-1-107(d), which provides the time during which a party 

may move for a rehearing, was erroneous and confusing because the trial court misstated
18

the rule. Both orders entered on March 18, 2022, include the following paraphrase of the 

language from Tennessee Code Annotated § 37-1-107(d):

[P]ursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated, Section 37-1-107(d): any party 

may, within five (5) days, excluding non-judicial days, file a request with the 

court for a hearing (a rehearing) by the judge by the juvenile court. The 

notice and filing for a rehearing may be prepared and filed in room 133.

Mother is correct that the trial court misstated the time for requesting review by the juvenile 

court judge as provided in the statute. Tennessee Code Annotated § 37-1-107(d) provides:

Any party may, within ten (10) days after entry of the magistrate’s order, file 

a request with the court for a de novo hearing by the judge of the juvenile 

court. The judge shall allow a hearing if a request for hearing is filed.

However, despite the trial court’s erroneous statement of the time for rehearing a 

magistrate’s order in juvenile court, Mother has failed to demonstrate how this error proved 

harmful or that she relied on the statement to her detriment. There is no indication in the 

record that Mother attempted to file a request for rehearing before the juvenile court judge, 

nor does she assert on appeal that she ever asked for a review by the juvenile court judge

of either of Magistrate Fratesi’s orders. We therefore find the error to be harmless. See 

generally Housewright v. McCormack, No. E2016-00272-COA-R3-CV, 2016 WL

6958725, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 29, 2016) (“Our harmless error rule considers whether 

the error ‘more probably than not affected the judgment’ or ‘the substantial rights of the 

party.’” (quoting Tenn. R. App. P. 36(b))); see also Boggs v. Rhea, 459 S.W.3d 539, 547 

(Tenn. Ct. App. 2014).

IX. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s March 18, 2022 orders denying 

Mother’s May 7, 2021 “Petition for Contempt for Failure to Pay Medical/Dental Expenses 

& Child Support January 1, 2020 – Present” and her July 1, 2021 “Petition to Modify Child 

Support for Extraordinary Expenses & Deviations; and Petition to Extend Child Support 

to Age 21.” We remand this matter to the trial court for enforcement of the judgment and 

collection of costs assessed below. Costs on appeal are assessed to the appellant, Nedra R.

Hastings.

s/Thomas R. Frierson, II____________

THOMAS R. FRIERSON, II, JUDGE