Th e Ho no ra ble Th oma s A . Wis e man, Jr., Un ite d St a te s D istri c t Judg e fo r t he Mid dle * District of Tenne ssee, sitting by desig nation. NO T REC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 06a0670n.06 F iled: Septem ber 5, 2006 No. 05-1767 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT
COMPUTER L EASCO, I NC., Pla int if f- Ap pe lla nt,
v. N T P , I N C
. , D O N A L D E
. S T O U T, a nd T H O M A S J. CAMPANA, J R., De fe nd ants -A

pp e lle e s. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) OnAp p e a l f

r o m t h e U n it e d St ates D is tr ic t C o urt f

o r th e E a s te rn District of Michig an

BEFORE: BOGG S, Chief Judge; COLE, Circuit Jud ge; and WISE MAN, D istrict Judge. * BOGG S, Chief

Judge. Computer L easc o, Inc. (CL I ), appe als the judg ment of the district court dismissing, for failure to state a c laim, their suit for re lief fr om a prior judg ment due to fra ud and state- law cla ims of conver sion. CL Ialleg es that newevidenc e re veals that the defe ndants committed fra ud in 1993 to take possession of six patents re lated to email andNo. 05-1767

Computer L easc o v. NTP

“F raud vitiates e very

thing.” See B oyce ’s Ex’rs v. Grundy , 28 U.S. 210, 219–20 (1830). 1 - 2 - messag ing on mobile de vices. We af firm the district cour

t beca use CL I ’s fra

ud claims wer e pr e vio us ly

lit ig ate d a

nd do no t invo lve an o ff

ic e r o f t he c ourt , a

nd be c a us e the state law c la ims
are ba rr e d b y re s ju dic ata

and the a pp lic a ble statut e of

lim itatio ns . I Fraus omnia vitiat
. Although f raud vitiates e very

thing, it must stil l be prove n. And the 1 best place to prove it is at a trial, namely , the first trial. Plaintiff in this case br ings to c ourt alleg ations dismis sed some thirtee n y ear s ag o. The only new e vidence is a witness who swea rs that the alleg ations are true. In 1986, Andre w Andros, Te d Andros, and Rog er A nderson f ormed Te lefind, a c ompany devoted to deve loping wir eless messag ing te chnolog ies for a lphanumeric pag ers. Te lefind hoped to develop text-pag ing pr oducts that it could market to compa nies like Be llSout h and F ranc e T el ec o m . T o th aten d , T el ef i n d ap p ro ac h eden gi n ee r T h o m as C am p an a t o h el p wi thth e d es i gn of the sy ste m. C ampa

na wa s, at th at ti me , o pe ra

tin g his own b us ine ss, ESA Telec ommunications, I nc., manuf actur ing e lectronic switches for pag ing sy stems. Wi thin a y ear , howeve r, Campana ’s role c hang ed fr om contrac tor to Vice Pre sident of eng ineer ing f or Tele find. He be c ame a

Te le fi nd e mpl oye e and

su pp lie r, manu fa c tur ingpr od uc ts f or Te le fi nd thr ou g h h is
ow n b us ine ss. Telef ind entere d into two ag ree ments with Campana to clar ify their re lationship. The fi rs t, t he Ke y Em plo y e e Agre e me nt, wa s c omp le te d o n Augus t 14 , 1 98 7. Am on g oth e r t hin g s,No. 05-1767

Computer L easc o v. NTP

- 3 - the a g re e me nt r e qu ir e d th at Campa na de vo te his “ fu ll- tim e ” to t he po sit ion

and no t c omp e te wi th Telef ind in any “similar business” for

a per iod of five year s after leavingthe company . Campana also ag ree d to stay

with Telefind until their pag ing ne twork wa s functional. Unde r the ag ree ment, all intellectual prope rty develope d by

Campana be came Telef

ind’s proper

ty . One y e ar l a t e r , a C o n f i d e n t i a l i ty

A g r e e m e n tw a s e x e c u t e d b e tw e e nT e l e f

i n d an d C amp an a . It aff irmed that any

inventions made by

Campana, r elatingto the Telef ind sy stem, were Telef

ind’s p r o p e rty. Telef ind leased e quipment and financ ed construc tion of pag ing e quipment throug h CL I , a company heade d by

one F err is Haddad. It is Haddad’s sig nature , as President of CL I , that
a pp e ars up on

the c omp la int
. Telef ind applied for a

nd rec eived numer ous patents duringits employ ment of Campana
. The patented inventions related to pag ing tr ansmission protocols, pag er de sign, a nd pag er operation. Donald Stout was Telefind’s patent attorney and he a ssisted Campana in the
a pp lic a tio ns . St out w a s a lso Campa na ’s pe rs on a l atto rn e y , a

nd so on to b e a fo un de r, wi th Campana, of

NTP, a compa

ny in direct c ompetition with Telefind. By 1990, Telef

ind was experienc ing f

inancial diff

iculty . On J anuar

y 16, 1990, CL Ifiled
su it i n th e Ea ste rn

Di str ic t of

Mic hig an to c oll e c t pa

y me nt p ur su ant t o it s le a se a g re e me nts wi th Telef ind. By April 1991, Campana w as no long er be ing pa id by Telef ind. And on J uly

29, 1991, J udg e L a Plata, now de cea sed, ente red f inal judgme nt ag ainst Telef ind and in favor

of CL Ifor $3.8 milli on owed on the le ase a g ree ments. Computer Leasco, Inc . v. Telefind , No. 90-60007 (E .D . M ic h. ) ( g ra

nti ngfi na l ju dg me nt t o CL I ). CL Ia tte mpt e d to e xec ute the jud g me nt a g a ins tNo. 05-1767

Computer L easc o v. NTP

- 4 - Telef ind in Florida but wa s unable to locate any assets there . Acc ording ly , it requested a n order fr o mth e c o urt as s i gn i n g T el ef i n d ’s i n t el l ec tu al p ro p erty t o i t . W h i l e t h atm o t i o nwa s p en d i n g, Te le fi nd fi le d a pe tit ion fo r b ank ru ptc y in t he Southe rn

Di str ic t of

F lor ida , s tayingte mpo ra ri ly CL I ’s attempts to enfor ce its judg ment. The ba nkruptcy case was dismissed in October 1992 and CL Iwas g rante d an orde r in aid of e x ecution in Fe bruar y 1993. CL Ibroug ht that order be fore the Pate nt a nd Tr a de mark

Of fi c e and a sse rt e d o wn e rs hip of

Te le fi nd ’s pate nts . Duringthis ti me, ac cordingto the key aff idavit in the present c ase, Campa na and Stout
e x e c u t e d a f r a u d u l e n ts c h e m e t o o b t a i np o s s e s s i o no f T e l e f i n d ’ s i n t e l l e c tu a l p r o p e rty . C LI alleg es that this scheme w as re cently exposed to it in the sworn af fidavit of The odore Andros, the pr ior Exe c uti ve Vi c e Pr e sid e nt o f T e le fi nd . A nd ro s h a s a Ma ste rs De g re e in E le c tr on ic En g ine e ri ngand

40 y e ars e xpe ri e nc e in t

he e le c tr on ic s in du str

y . In th e a ff

ida vit , A nd ro s r e c ounts ho w C L I ’s Ha dd a d c ame to F lor ida at th e re qu e st o f T e le fi nd ’s B oa rd of Di re c tor s to a ssi st i n
resc uing the failingcompany . As a major c reditor, Ha ddad wor ked to identify

and re solve problems within the company . This cre ated f riction with Telef

ind’s founder s and they

attempted to d isr up t hi s w or

k. Ac c or din g to T he od or e An dr os : 21
. In 1 99 2 w he n it

be c ame e vid e nt t

hat T e le fi nd

wa s n ot g oin g to b e a

via ble operation and that Hadda d was g oing to f orec lose on Telef

ind’s assets, including its int ellectua l property

and cla im ownership of the intellec tual proper ty , Campana and Stout came up with a pla n to steal awa

y Telef ind’s valuable te chnolog y . Campa na a bs c on de d w iththe te c hn olo g y g e ne rate d f

or Te le fi nd and pr oc e e de d to g e ne rate a

ne w s e t of

pate nts un de r h is o wn

name , v iol a tin g his a g re e me nt t hat a ll technolog y

acc rue to Te lefind. 22. These patent applications included the technolog y that was identica l to the orig inal patent applications but m odified to include a dditional technolog y that was g ener ated in orde r to be a part of the Telef

ind network. The technolog y was develope d while Campana was unde r his work a g ree ments with Telefind a ndNo. 05-1767

Computer L easc o v. NTP

CL Ihas identified one of the United States patents at issue as 5,436,960, the other s are 2 only identified by

their pate nt application seria l numbers. Infring ement of the ‘960 pate nt was an alleg ation in NTP’s patent infring ement cla ims ag ainst Canadian f irm Resear ch in Motion (RI M), culminating in a

$612 milli on settlement paid to NTP in March 2006. NTP Inc. v. Re search I n Motion , N o. 01 -7 67 (E .D . V a . M ar. 3, 20 06 ) ( dis mis sin g c a se purs ua nt t o s e ttl e me nt) . T his patent is said to be wor

th mill ions by

CL I , and y et it was dec lare d invalid by the Patent and Trade mark Of

fice in Febr

uary 2006 beca

use it was pre dated by

prior ar t. In re Campana, J

r., et al Ex Parte Re exam ination Proceeding , No. 90/006,533 (Initiated J an. 30, 2003). See also RI M Provides Updateon Patent Ree xamination Procee ding, All Patents Remaining In Dispute Have Bee n Rejec ted , at http://www.rim.com/news/press/2006/ pr-24_02_2006- 01.shtml (last visi ted Aug . 10, 2006). NT P is a n a c ro ny m f or Ne w T e c hn olo g y

Pr oto c ol. 3 - 5 - beingpaid by

Telef ind. The tec hnology

was g ener ated longbefor e Te lefind cea sed oper ations and wa s to be applied to the Te lefind networ k and wa s to be ame nd e d to the e xistin g pate nt a pp lic a tio ns . Acc ordingto Andros, “the pur pose of f iling the ne w patent a

pplications was to def

raud the rig htful owners,” i.e. , T e l e f i n d , an d e v e n tu a l l y

C LI. As part of the sche me, in May

1991, Campana pe rsonally filed three patent applications descr ibing the inter fac ing of persona l computers and a lphanumeric -pag ers. In Marc h of 1992, three more patents were filed disclosing the use of a high- speed w ireless protoc ol. The par ties ref er to these patents cumulatively as the B Tec hnology
. In J une 1992, Campana and Stout 2 incorpora ted def endant NT P and tra

nsfer red the B Te chnolog y

patents fr om Campana to NTP. 3 In F e br ua ry 19 93 , Ca mpa na ob ta ine d a

de fa ult jud g me nt i n th e Di str ic t of De la wa re a g a ins t Telef ind in the amount of $481,143 for Te lefind’s fa ilure to pay his wag es. Campana v. Telefind Corp. , No. 92-713 (D . Del. F eb. 24, 1993) ( judgme nt). Acc ordingto the complaint in this case, Campana kne w that Tele find would be una ble to defe nd the suit and that the De lawar e judg mentNo. 05-1767

Computer L easc o v. NTP

- 6 - would further

the fra udulent scheme by

providing evidenc e that the B Tec hnology was not develope d for Te lefind. Day s after

CL Iwas g rante d its ex ecution orde r ag ainst the intellectual prope rty in 1993, NTP intervene d, asser

ting that it owned the B Te chnolog y . The district cour t hear d testimony

on April 6, 1993 to determine who owned the pr operty ; property estimated to be wor

th severa l milli on dollars. CL Iacc used Campana of attemptingto transfe r Tele find’s asse ts while the company was in bankr

uptcy and of lying on the stand bec ause he was “ trying to maintain a n
owner ship positi on” in the tec hnology . Campana de nied the cha rg e and te stified that “the
se pa ratio n o f t he ‘ATe c hn olo g y ’ f

ro m th e ‘B Te c hn olo g y ’ [w a s] no t so me thi ng[he ] de signe d in order to avoid havingComputer L easc o ever have a claim to the ‘B Tec hnology .’” Campa na wa s questioned on re direc t as to whether the filing of the B Tec hnology patents wa s part of a

fra ud: Q: The insinuation has ce rtainly been pr esent in the que stions that y ou’re part of some kind of g rand c onspiracy to take Te lefind prope rty awa y from Telef ind. Are you involved in any such conspira cy

with Mr. Stout and Mr. A n dr o s i nan y w ay? A: Absolutely

not. . . . Q: But the se paration of the “A Te chnolog y ” fr om the “B Tec hnology” is not something you desig ned in orde r to avoid havingComputer L easc o ever h av e a c l a i mt o th e “ B T e c h n o l o g y ?” A: No, sir. Roge r Ande rson testified that ther e wa s no “grand c onspiracy” to conve rt the B Te chnolog y

and that, as a

n office r of Te lefind, he w ould have made a cla im to the B Te chnolog y

had he thoug h it owned it. A patent attorne y , Wil liam Wright, testified for NTP that the B Tec hnology

was “ radic ally

differ ent” f

rom the A Te chnolog y . Fe rre l Stremler, aNo. 05-1767

Computer L easc o v. NTP

- 7 - University

of Wisconsin professor a nd author of e lectronic s tex tbooks, testified for CL Ithat the B Te c hn olo g y

wa s c los e ly

re late d to the A T e c hn olo g y and me re ly e mbo die d s ub se qu e nt, pr e dic ta ble , y e t c le ve r, imp ro ve me nts . F ina lly , a fo rm e r Unit e d St a te s Co mmi ssi on e r o f P a te nts , Har ry F. Ma nbeck, Jr., was c alled by

CL I . Manbec k testified that the B Tec hnology was a n
en h an ce m en to f t h e A T ec h n o l o gy , th atC am p an a m u s th av e b egu nth e l en gth y B T ec h n o l o gy pate nt a pp lic atio ns wh ile e mpl oye d b y Te le fi nd , a

nd that Sto ut h a d r e pr e se nte d p art ie s w ith
c on fl ic tin g int e re sts in p ro se c uti on of the A Pa te nts . In May 1993, the district court rule d in favor of NTP. The cour

t’s interpre tation of the Key Employ ee a

nd Confidentiality

contra cts favor ed NTP. The judg ment was pre dicated upon tw o q ue sti on s: 1 ) whe the r t

he B Te c hn olo g y

“ pe rt a ins to t

he Te le fi nd

Ne tw or k a s d e sc ri be d in the B usiness Plan,” and 2) if the B Tec hnology

is “an improveme nt, enhanc ement or modification of the A T echnolog y .” The court found that it would be too ex pensive for Telef ind to i mpl e me nt t

he B Te c hn olo g y . T his we ig he d in fa vo r o f t he B Te c hn olo g y

e mbo dyingse pa

rate innovations, not merely

enhanc ements to the A Te chnolog y . The c ourt also cr edited the t e s t i m o n y o f

A n d e r s o nth atT e l e f

i n d d i dn ’ tth i n k

i th a d an y c l a i mt o th e B T e c h n o l o g y. F i n a l l y, the cour t held: “The te stimony

of witnesses Campa

na, Wrig ht and Ander son convince s this C ourt th atth e B T ec h n o l o gy

i s n o tan i mp ro v em en t , en h an ce m en to r m o d i fi ca t i o no f t h e A T ec h n o l o gy and does not pe rtain to the business of Te lefind.” Soo n a ft e r t

he Mic hig an ju dg me nt, Campa na re tur ne d to the Di str ic t of

De lawa re to modify the def ault judgme nt he had pr eviously obtained. Instead of da

mag es, Campana

asked the cour t to rescind his employ

ment ag ree ments with Telefind. Te lefind wa s defunc t and did notNo. 05-1767

Computer L easc o v. NTP

- 8 - oppose the motion and the c ourt g rante d the cha ng e. Campana v. Telefind Corp. , No. 92-713 (D
. Del. Aug . 20, 1993) (va catingawa rd of damag es and r escindingcontra cts). CL Ifiled the c omplaint in thi s case on Dec ember 30, 2004. I t presents c laims for
conver sion under state la

w and f or fr aud. CL Iprayed for

relief from the 1993 judg ment and damag es. Attac hed to the complaint is the af fidavit of The odore Andros, dated D ece mber 24, 20 04 , ma kin g the a lle g atio ns re c ite d a bo ve . N TP a

nd the ind ivi du a l de fe nd ants mov e d to dismiss the complaint for f ailure to state a

claim on J anuar

y 24, 2005. Fe d. R. Civ. P . 12(b)( 6). Ora l argument was he ard on A pril 20, 2005, and the district cour t gr anted the motion on May 5, 2005. In its written opinion, the dist rict cour t ruled that the suit was be st chara cter ized as an independe nt suit i n equity to obtain relief f

rom the 1993 judg ment. The c ourt consider ed the fra ud upon the cour

t claims independe ntly

and held that CL Idid not state a cla im for fra ud upon the cour t for thre e re asons. Fir st, beca use CL I“re lies almost entirely on its alleg ations of per

jury and fr aud betwe en the pa

rties,” they

could not benef

it from the leadingfra

ud on the cour

t case , Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co. , 322 U.S. 238, 244 (1944) (holdingthat alleg ations of per

jury are insufficient to state a claim for f

raud upon the court). Sec ond, the cour t found CL I ’s evidenc e we ak: “Andr os’ conc lusory aff idavit is thus a far c ry

from the c onclusive proof of fra ud that was pre sent in Hazel-Atlas .” L astly , the cour t held that CL I ’s fra

ud on the court a lleg ations were incomplete bec ause the integ rity of the judicial sy stem was not
c omp ro mis e d b y

Sto ut, an atto rn e y

wh o n e ve r a

pp e are d b e fo re the c ourt .No. 05-1767

Computer L easc o v. NTP

- 9 - In ruling on CL I ’s re quest for r elief f rom the judg ment, the cour t found that its alleg ations d i d n o tm ee tth e “ ‘d em an d i n g s t an d ar d ’” th atp re ce d en tre qu i re s , ci t i n g United States v. Be gge rly , 524 U.S. 38 (1998) (r elief f rom judg ment under F ed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) independent
a c tio ns sh ou ld b e ava ila

ble on ly to p re ve nt a

“ g ra ve mis c arr ia g e of

jus tic e ” ). Th e c ourt

a lso found that the e vidence disclosed in the Andros a ffidavit wa s not “new e vidence ,” and that it had been a vailable in the pr evious ac tion. The court f ound in a footnote that “ it need not addr ess the questions of state law that are raised in the c omplaint” beca use the re s judicata e ffe ct of the previous judg ment prec luded their c onsideration. In support of this positi on it cited Palkow v. CSC T ransp., Inc. , 331 F. Supp. 2d 594, 599 n.2 (N.D . Ohio 2004). This dec ision was subsequently

reve rsed by

this court, 431 F.3d 543 ( 6th Cir. 2005) (re versingdismiss al and order ing a

rema nd to state court be cause the district court lac ked jurisdiction). The c ourt then g ra nte d th e mot ion

to d ism iss
. II We r e vie w a

g ra nt o f a mot ion to d ism iss fo r f

a ilure to s tate a

c la im d e no vo . F e d. R. Civ. P . 12(b)( 6). See J

ackson, Tenn. H

osp. Co., LL C v. W

. Tenn. Healthcare

, Inc. , 414 F.3d 608, 6 1 1 (6 thC i r. 2 0 0 5 ) ( ci t i n g AirTrans, Inc. v. Me ad , 3 89 F .3 d 5 94 , 5 97 (6 th C ir .2 00 4) ). I t is a question of law whe ther the pe tition was properly dismiss ed by

the district court. Ibid. In our evaluation of the claim, we take a ll factua l alleg ations as true a nd make a ll reasona

ble infer ence s in favor of

the petitioner. Ibid. A motion to dis miss is proper ly g rante d if it is bey ond doubt that no set of fa cts would entitle the petitioner to re lief on his claims. Ibid. Se e als o I n r e Com sh ar e Inc. Se c. Litig. , 183 F.3d 542, 547 ( 6th Cir. 1999) (“Dismissal of a c omplaint is not properNo. 05-1767

Computer L easc o v. NTP

- 10 - ‘u nle ss i t a pp e ars be y on d d ou

bt t hat pl a int if

f c an p ro ve no se t of

fa c ts i n s up po rt

of his c la im wh i ch wo u l d

en t i t l e h i mt o re l i ef

. ’” ) ( qu o t i n g Conley v. G ibson , 355 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1957)).

III A Rule 60(b) of the Fe dera l Rules of Civil Procedur e is a litiga nt’s exclusive avenue when seekingrelief

from a judg ment or orde r. Se e Un ite d S tates v . B e

gge rly , 524 U.S. 38, 46 (1998) (noting that the Rule makes c lear that “old forms of obta ining r elief f rom a judg ment, i.e. , coram
no bis , c oram v ob is , au dit a q ue re la , bills of review, a nd bills i n the nature of re view, had be en
a bo lis he d. ” ); GeorgeP. Reintjes Co. v. Riley Stoker Corp. , 71 F.3d 44, 46 ( 1st Cir. 1995) (same)
. Although the Rule allows for r elief f rom “fr aud . . . , misrepr esentation, or other misconduct,” such re lief must be soug ht within one y ear of the orig inal judgme nt. SeeFe d. R. Civ. P . 60(b)( 3), (6). See also J

ordan v. Pacc ar, Inc. , No. 95-3478., 1996 WL528950, at *7 (6th Cir. Sept. 17, 1996) (unpublished) ( setting e videntiary and burde n require ments for F ed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(3)), adopted by , Venture I

ndus. Corp. v. Autoliv ASP, Inc. , ___ F.3d ___, 2006 WL2241043, at *10 (F ed. Cir. 2006). How ever , the Rule contains a sa vings c lause, pre servingthe state of la w bef ore its enactment in 1946, that allows judg ments to be attac ked without reg ard to the pa ssag e of time: This rule does not limit the power of a court to ente rtain an independe nt action to relieve a par

ty from a judg ment, order , or proc eeding , or to g rant re lief to a defe ndant not actua lly

persona lly

notified . . . or to set aside a judgment for fraud up on thec ou rt . [Other writs] are abolished, a nd the proc edure for obtainingany relief from a judg ment shall be by motion as prescr ibed in these rule s or by an independe nt action.No. 05-1767

Computer L easc o v. NTP

- 11 - Fe d. R. Civ. P . 60(b) ( emphasis adde d). Se e als o B e gge rly , 5 24 U. S. at 46 (a ff ir min g the va lid ity of the ind e pe nd e nt a c tio n to se t a sid e a pr ior jud g me nt) ; Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co. , 322 U.S. 238, 244 (1944) (va catinga 1932 judg ment for f raud on the
c ourt ); United States v. Throckm orton , 98 U.S. 61, 65-66 (1878) ( rec og nizi ng that “[w]here the
unsucce ssful party

has bee n preve nted from e x hibiting fully his case, by

fra ud or dec eption . . . a new suit may

be sustained to set a side and a nnul the former

judgme nt or dec ree , and open the
case for a new a nd a fa ir hea

ring .”). “ I f the right to make a motion is lost by the expiration of the time limi ts fix ed in these r ules, the only

other proc edura l remedy is by a new or indepe ndent action to set aside a

judgme nt upon those principles which ha ve her etofore been a

pplied in such
an ac tion.” Notes on 1946 Amdt. to Fe d. R. Civ. P . 60. Rul e 60 (b )’ s sa

vin g s c la us e dr aws fr om Hazel Atlas and Throckmorton two distinct bases for a ctions attackingjudgme nts more than one year old: 1) fra

ud in the procur ement of the judge ment and 2) f

raud upon the court. See R eintjes , 71 F.3d 44, 47–48 ( reve rsing the district court’s inter

pretation that only

fra ud upon the cour

t alleg ations were proper

in an independe nt action). Ea ch has diff

ere nt require d elements. See 2300 E lm Hill Pike, Inc . v. Orlando Residenc e, Ltd. , No. 97-6176, 1998 WL808217, at *2 n.1 (6th Cir. Nov. 16, 1998) ( unpublished) (noting that the two issues are fre quently confuse d). B oth are implicated by CL I ’s complaint and
wer e discussed by

the district court. B elow, we consider a nd reje ct ea ch theor

y of re cover

y based up on a tta c kin g the pr ior

jud g me nt. 1No. 05-1767

Computer L easc o v. NTP

- 12 - “Independe nt actions must, if Rule 60(b) is to be interpre ted as a coher ent whole, be
rese rved f or those ca ses of ‘injustices whic h, in cer tain instances, a

re de e me d s uff

ic ie ntl ygr os s to demand a depar ture’ f rom rig id adher ence to the doctrine of res judicata.” Be

gge rly , 524 U.S. at 4 6 (q u o t i n g Hazel-Atlas , su pra (empha sis added))
. See also Charter Tp. of Muskegon v . City of Muske gon , 303 F.3d 755, 760 ( 6th Cir. 2002) (the g ener al purpose of Rule 60(b) is to strike a ba lanc e be tw e e n th e e qu ita ble pr inc ipl e s o f j us tic e and fi na lity ); Reintjes , 71 F.3d 44, 47 ( noting that independe nt actions for f raud, initiated without any time limi t, must be disti nct from one y ear -limited actions under Rule 60( b)(3) ). In Be gge rly , the plaintiffs soug ht to have the Court set a side a pre vious judgment de nying their cla im of ownership to land include d in a new national park. 524 U.S. at 39–40. The y claimed that the g overnme nt, in the prior ac tion, had “fa iled to ‘thoroug hly sear ch its rec ords and make f ull disclosure to the [dis trict] [ c]ourt’” a bout the true state of

the land’s title. Id. at 47. Justi c e Re hn qu ist , w ri tin g fo r a un anim ou s Co ur

t, h e ld t hat th e pr ior

jud g me nt, ve sti ngtit le in the g overnme nt pursuant to a $208,175.87 pay ment, was “ obviously ” not a grave miscarr iag e of justice and “ perha

ps no miscarria g e of justice at all.” Ibid. Be gge rly clea rly holds “that, under the Rule, an indepe ndent ac tion should be available only to preve nt a g rave miscarr iag e of justice.” Ibid. This standard is more stric t than the standar d for r elief w ithin one y ear by motion under Rule 60( b)(3)
. As an e x ample of a

g rave miscarr iag e of justice, the Court identified the fa cts in Ma rsh all v. Holme s , 141 U.S. 589 (1891). 524 U.S. at 47. In Ma rsh all , the Supreme Court a llowed an independe nt action in fede ral c ourt to enjoin enfor ceme nt of sever al L ouisiana state c ourtNo. 05-1767

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- 13 - jud g me nts . In e a c h o f t

he state -c ourt

tr ia ls, fr a ud ule nt e vid e nc e wa s intr od uc e d, re su lti ngin defa ult judgments ag ainst the petitioner. The Court noted that “it might be that relief c ould be g rante d by

rea son of the fa ct, distinctly alleg ed, that some of the nece ssary proof e stablishing the forg ery of the letter

was discove red a fter the judgme nts . . . and could not have been disc overe d by her soone r.” Ma rsh all , 141 U.S. at 601. See also Mc Daniel v. Traylor , 196 U.S. 415, 425 (1905) ( supporting the theory that the judg ments in Ma rsh all wer e def ault judgme nts); Throckmorton , 9 8 U .S. at 65 -6 6 ( a pp ro vin g ind e pe nd e nt a c tio n w he re “ the un su c c e ssf ul p art y has bee n preve nted from e x hibiting fully his case” ). CL Iha s n ot c ite d a

sin g le c a se wh e re a

fe de ra l c ir c uit

c ourt has fo un d

a gr av e m i s ca rr i age of justice suff

icient to find for the plaintiff in an indepe ndent ac tion case. To the contra ry , many
case s discuss situations t hat do not rise to the g rave miscarr iag e of justice sta ndard. See, e .g., Buell v. Ande rson , 48 F. App’ x 491, 499 (6th Cir. 2002) (fa ilure to raise a known issue at trial); Jacobs e x rel. Carroll v. Invisible Fe nce Co., Inc

. , N o. 98 -4 54 9, 19 99 WL12 04 87 6, a t *5 (6 th Cir . D e c . 3 , 1 99 9) (u

np ub lis he d) (o the r r e me die s e xist at la w) ; Appling v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. , 3 40 F .3 d 7 69 , 7 80 (9 th C ir . 2 00 3) (l a c k o f d ue dil ig e nc e a t th e pr ior

tr ia l) ; Ballew v. U.S. Dept. of Justice , No. 99-11308, 2000 WL1901696, at *3 (5th Cir. Dec . 15, 2000) (unpublished) (misre prese ntations and withheld information duringthe settlement neg otiations). We believe that CL I ’s claims do not rise to this demandingstandard. CL I ’s prior litigation of the fra ud subsequently

claimed pr eclude s this court from finding a g rave miscarr iag e of justice. I n United States v. Throckm orton , su pra , the Court announce d the rule that issues re g ardingthe alleg ed fr aud alr eady litigated should not be r evisited. 98 U.S. atNo. 05-1767

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- 14 - 69. Be cause , if fra

ud can be g rounds to overr ule “the ve ry

matter . . . tried,” the Court rea soned, “the number

of suits would be without lim it and the litigation endle ss.” Ibid. In Throckmorton , the United States alleg ed fr aud in the proc ureme nt of a pre vious judgment ba sed upon a Me x ican land g rant. Id. at 62. [T]he a c ts f

or wh ic h a c ourt of e qu ity wi ll o n a c c ou

nt o f f ra ud se t a sid e or

annul a judgme nt or dec ree , betwee n the same pa rties, re ndere d by

a cour t of compete nt jurisdiction, have re lation to frauds, e x trinsic or collate ral, to the matter tried by the first cour

t, and not to a fra

ud in the matter on whic h the dec ree was re ndere d. * * * The g enuinene ss and validity of the c oncession . . . wa s the single question pendingbefor e the boa

rd of c ommissi oners a

nd the District Court for f our y ear s. I t w a s th e thi ng , a

nd the on ly thi ng , th a t w a s c on tr ov e rt e d, and it w a s e sse nti a l to the dec ree . To overr

ule the demur

rer to this bi ll would be to retry , twenty y ear s afte r the de cision of these tribuna ls, the very matter whic h they

tried, on the g round of f

raud in the doc ument on which the de cre e wa s made. Id. at 68–69. “ Throckmorton stands clea rly for the pr oposition t hat . . . fra udulent evidenc e upon which a judg ment is based, is not g rounds to set aside a judgme nt. I t also makes cle ar that . . . fra ud that was not the subjec t of the litigation, that infects the ac tual judicial proce ss, is grounds to set aside a judg ment as proc ured by fra ud.” Fierro v. J

ohnson , 197 F.3d 147, 155 ( 5th Cir. 1999). I t i s w e ll

- e s ta

b li s h e d th at “ [a ]l le g a ti o n s o f

p e r ju r y , li k e th o s e a dv an c e d

b y [th e p la inti f

f ],
are insufficient to support an inde pendent a ction for r elief f rom judg ment.” Palkow v. CSX Transp., Inc. , 4 3 1 F. 3 d

5 4 3 , 5 4 7 (6 thC i r. 2 0 0 5 ) ( ci t i n g 2300 Elm Hill Pike , su pra ). Se e als o Reintjes , 71 F.3d at 49 (perjur y is insufficient to support an indepe ndent ac tion) (listing ca ses). Thus, to succe ed, CL Imust alleg e some fr aud that wa s not lit iga ted in the prior a ction, a fr aud that preve nted a f

air trial. This they

have not done
.No. 05-1767

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- 15 - The re cord shows that CL Ilitigated its fr aud ac cusations in the forme r ac tion. Specifica lly , issues such as c onspiracy and attempts to frustrate CL I ’s owner ship of the B Te chnolog y

wer e ra ised duringthe pre vious evidentiary hear ing. T hey

are identical to the
a lle g a tio ns ra ise d in

the pr e se nt And

ro s a ff ida vit : The purpose of filing the new patent application wa s to defra ud the rig htful owner s. . . . Campana ha s claimed that he was re lease d from his Telef ind commitment. That claim is completely unfounded. . . . The se re prese ntations we re fa lse , a

nd it i s a bund antl y c le ar t o me that th e Judg e wa s mi sle a d into makin g a c olo ssa l e rr or

in f ind ingfo r N TP. A re view of the rec ord shows that all the c laims in the Andros aff idavit were addre ssed in 1993. Campana w as questioned dire ctly on these points by

his own attorney

in the prior ac tion and he denied a ny “g rand c onspiracy .” F raud w as at issue in the prior action and CL I ’s claims her e
mere ly alleg e that it neg lected to pur sue it thoroug hly , even w ith mil lions of dollars in the ba lanc e . T his fa ilu

re , a de qu ate ly

to p ur su e a

fr a ud pr e vio us ly

de te c te d, inc lud ingthe fa ilure to question Ted Andr os and other of fice rs of Te lefind who mig ht have ha d information re g arding the sche me, was a

failure of due dilig ence . For these re asons, we f

ind that CL I ’s fra

ud claims do not amount to a g rave miscarr iag e of justice a nd that they

wer e prope rly

dismiss ed by

the district court. Be gge rly , 524 U.S. at 47. 2 Rul e 60 (b ) a lso e mbr a c e s “ the inh e re nt p ow e r [that] a llo ws a fe de ra l c ourt

to v a c a te its own judg ment upon proof that a fra ud has bee n perpe trated upon the court.” Chambers v. NASCO, Inc. , 501 U.S. 32, 44 (1991) (c itations omi tted). “[A] wrongag ainst the institut ions set up to protect a

nd safe g uard the public . . . cannot c omplacently be tolerated consistently

with theNo. 05-1767

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- 16 - g ood order

of society . . . . The public we lfare demands that the a g encie s of public justice be not so impotent that they

must alway s be mute and he lpless victims of deception and f raud.” Hazel-Atlas , 322 U.S. at 246. Hazel-Atlas is the leadingcase . I ts facts have bee n summarized by many fede ral c ourts of
a pp e a ls: An atto rn e y fo r H art fo rd

ha d c on tr ive d to have an e nc omi um f or its pate nt c la im published in a trade journal under the by -line of a

disinterested e x pert, whic h was then pre sented in evide nce. H artfor d lost at trial, but its attorney s para ded the article befor e a pa

nel of the c ourt of appe als, which then r ever sed and e ntere d judgme nt in Hartfor d’s favor, supportingits opini on with quotation from the spurious publication. Nine y ear s later Ha zel-Atlas instigate d an ac tion to undo the jud g me nt b a se d o n n e wl y ob ta ine d e vid e nc e of

Ha rt fo rd ’s c a

pe r. Th e Sup re me Court directe d that judgme nt for Ha rtford be set aside a

nd the district court’s orig inal order

denying r elief to Ha

rtford be reinstated. Reintjes , 71 F.3d at 47 (citations omitted). See also Fraige v . Am.-Nat. W atermattress Corp. , 996 F.2d 295, 298–99 ( Fe d. Cir. 1993). The Court held: This is not si mply

a ca se of a

judgme nt obtained with the aid of a witness who, on the basis of a fter- discovere d evidenc e, is believe d possibly to have be en guilty

of perjury . Her e, eve n if we c onsider nothing but Hartfor d’s sworn a dmissions , we find a de liberate ly

planned a

nd car efully

executed sche me to defr aud not only the Pate nt O ff

ic e but th e Cir c uit

Court of Ap pe a ls. Hazel-Atlas , 3 2 2 U. S
. at2 4 5 (c o mp ar i n g Marshall v. Holmes , su pra ). In Demjanjuk v . Petrovsk y , 10 F.3d 338 ( 6th Cir. 1993), this court vacated a district cour t judgme nt issued eig ht y ear s ear lier “pr ocure d as a r esult of prosec utorial misconduct that constituted fra

ud on the cour

t.” Id. at 356. The c ourt noted that “[c]ases dea ling with fr aud on th e c o urto f

t e ntur no nw h e th e r

th e i mp r o p e r

a c t i o n s ar e th o s e o f

p art i e s a l o n e , o r

i f th e a t t o r n e ys in t hec as e are involved.” Ibid. (e mph a sis a dd e d) . T he c ourt a lso qu ote d a

pp ro vin g ly

fr om aNo. 05-1767

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- 17 - leadingtreatise: “[W ]hen [ an attorne y ] departs from that standa rd [integr ity

and honest de aling with the court] in the conduct of a case he per

petrates fra

ud upon a cour

t.” Ibid. (c i t i n g 7 Moore’ s Fe dera l Practice and Proce dure ¶ 60.33). It then noted that the outcome of two leading Supreme Court ca ses could be pr edicted thr oug h this dist inction. Hazel-Atlas involved an attorney ’s misrepre sentations to the court a nd prese nted a pr ima fac ie ca se for fra ud on the cour

t while Throckmorton , in contrast, did not involve any attorney misconduct and wa s dismis sed. Ibid. The Demjanjuk

court c oncluded: Thus , w e ho ld t

hat th e [De pa

rtme nt o f Jus tic e ] attor

ne y s a c te d w ithre c kle ss disreg ard f

or the truth and f

or the g overnme nt’s obligation to take no steps that preve nt an adve rsar

y from pre senting his case f ully and fa irly . This was fr aud on the cour t in the circumstanc es of this ca se whe re, by rec klessly

assuming Demjanjuk’s guilt, they

failed to obser

ve their oblig ation to produce exculpatory materia ls requeste d by

Demjanjuk. Id. at 354. Subsequent pane ls of this circuit have a dopted Demjanjuk ’s re a so nin g int o th e e le me nts of the c la im. Th e y

are “ c on du c t ( 1) on

the pa rt of an o ff ic e r o f t he c ourt , ( 2) tha

t is dir e c te d to the ‘j ud ic ia l ma c hin e ry ’ i tse lf , ( 3) that is int e nti on a lly

fa lse , w ilf

ull y bli nd to t he tr uth , o r i s in
re c kle ss d isr e g ard

fo r t he tr uth , ( 4) Th a t is a

po sit ive ave rm e nt o r i s c on c e a lme nt whe n o ne is under a duty to disclose, and (5) that dece ives the cour t.” W or k ma n v . B e ll , 245 F.3d 849, 852 (6 th C ir . 2 00 1) (d e nyingmot ion to r e op e n d e nia l of

ha be a s c or pu s f or fr a ud on the c ourt ) (f o rm at t i n g an d

p un ctu at i o nal t er ed ) ( ci t i n g Demjanjuk, 10 F.3d at 348). Ac c or d A lle yv . B e ll , 40 5 F .3 d 3 71 , 3 73 (6 th C ir . 2 00 5) ; Tho mp so n v . B e ll , 373 F.3d 688, 730 ( 6th Cir. 2004) (Suhrheinric h, J ., dissenting) , reve rsed on other grounds , 1 25 S. Ct . 2 82 5 ( 20 05 ). We r e a d th e seNo. 05-1767

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- 18 - e le me nts to r e qu ir e that th e ind ivi du a l a c c us e d o f p e rp e tr a tin g the fr a ud mus t ha ve dir e c tly interac ted with the cour

t to “preve nt an adve rsar

y from pre senting his case f ully and fa irly .” Demjanjuk, 10 F.3d at 354. At most, C L Ican ide ntify case s where litigants who a ppear ed bef

ore the cour t perpe trated the fra

ud. Even we re w e to ac cept these case s, they would not sweep widely enoug h to include Stout, an individual who never pa rticipated in the litig ation or took ste ps to p re ve nt t

he pr op e r f

un c tio nin gof

that c ourt . A lawyer is an of

fice r of the c ourt while pre paringher c lient’s case
. See H ickman v

. Taylor , 3 29 U. S. 4 95 , 5 10 (1 94 7) . CL Ia tte mpt s to e xpand the te rm “ of fi c e r o f t he c ourt ” to include the c onduct of a

n attorney , Stout, who never a ppear ed bef

ore the court that e ntere d the judgme nt CL Iseeks r elief f rom. In support of this argument, CL Icites to the def inition of fraud upon the cour

t in Harbold v. Commissioner , 51 F.3d 618 ( 6th Cir. 1995), as “that spe cies of fra ud which does or

attempts to, defile the c ourt itself, or is a fra ud perpe trated by

office rs of the court so that the judicial mac hinery cannot pe rfor

m in the usual manner its impartial task of adjudg ing c ases that a

re pr esente d for a djudication.” Id. at 622 (interna l quotations omi tted). CL Ire lie s o n th e dis

jun c tiv e “ or ” in t

his de fi nit ion

to s up po rt

the ir c a se . T he ir

re a din g wo uld allow a c laim involving any individual not before the court to satisfy the prima fa cie c ase f

or fra ud on the cour

t if the fra ud “def iled the cour

t.” Althoug h this langua g e mig ht support CL I ’s argument, the holding in Ha rb old does not. In Ha rb old, the individual acc used of f raud, the C o m m i s s i o n er ’s co un s el S t ei n er , wa s th e a t t o rn ey wh o ar gu edth e c as e. T h er ef o re , al th o u gh Ha rb old d i c t a m i g h ts u p p o rtane x t e n s i o no f

f r a u d u p o nth e c o urtt o i n c l u d e a c t i o n s b y a t t o r n e ys at-lar g e, its holding doe s not. Further more, none of the a ctions attributed to Stout prevented theNo. 05-1767

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- 19 - parties f rom litigatingthe purporte d fra ud befor e the district cour t in the orig inal action. Stout did no t de fi le the c ourt . CL Ialso offe rs a similar stateme nt of the law f rom the Ninth Circuit that “fr aud upon the court include s both [ 1] attempts t o subvert the integrity of the c ourt and [2] fra

ud by an off icer of the cour t.” In re I ntermagnetics Am ., Inc. , 926 F.2d 912, 916 ( 9th Cir. 1991). In Intermagne tics the CEO of

the de bto r i n b ank

ru ptc y pr e se nte d a

fr a ud ule nt s a le of

fe r f or the ba nk ru ptc y e state to the bankr uptcy court. Althoug h the Ninth Circuit offer ed a two- part de finition of the cause of action, it eventua lly

held that “[o]fficers of

a debtor -in-possession ar e off icer s of the cour

t beca use of their

responsibility

to act in the best intere sts of the estate a s a whole a nd the
acc ompanying f

iduciary duties.” Id. at 917 (c itations omi tted). Intermagne tics is t hu s o f l itt le help to CL Iin proving that Stout, an indivi dual who neve r appe are d befor e the c ourt in the prior litigation was, in fa ct, an of fice r of the c ourt. The pr ior litigation wa s not before a bankr uptcy
c ourt and CL Iha s o ff

e re d n o s ourc e that w ou ld i mpo se a c or re sp on din g fi du c iary

duty on Sto ut. Ne xt, CL Ipr e se nts Gr e at C oa sta l E x pr ess, In c . v . Th e Te am ste rs , 675 F.2d 1349, 1357 (4 th C ir . 1 98 2) , a s su

pp or t f or its argume nt t

hat Sto ut w a s a

n o ff ic e r o f t he c ourt . T his re lia

nc e is also unfounded. T he Great Coastal court did state that “ [o] ther c ircuits have . . . r ecognized that fra ud on the cour

t can oc cur w ithout the involvement of attorney s,” but then we nt on to say that “in view of

our holding that the ty

pe of f raud in this case does not rise to the leve l of fra ud on the court, we need not c onsider the que stion of attorney involvement.” Ibid. The Great Coastal court c ited two case in support of the proposition that fra ud on the cour

t can oc cur w ithout theNo. 05-1767

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- 20 - involvement of an attorney befor e the c ourt, Toscano v. Commissioner , 441 F.2d 930 ( 9th Cir. 1971) and Lim Kwo c k

So on v . B ro wne ll , 369 F.2d 808 ( 5th Cir. 1966). We consider e ach. Lim Kw ock Soon is a ca se whe re a liens committed perjury to obtain United States citizenship. At t he district cour t, the petitioners wer e denie d citizenship because the district court did not credit their testimony . 143 F. Supp. 388 (S.D. Tex. 1956). The F ifth Circuit found the district court’s fa ctual dete rminations to be clea rly err oneous and r ever sed. Lim Kw ock Soon v

. Br own e ll , 2 53 F .2 d 8 09 (5 th C ir . 1 95 8) . In th e c a se c ite d b y CL I , th e F if

th C ir c uit va c a te d it s own prior judg ment and re manded the c ase to the district c ourt “to cor rec t the fra

ud” “pe rpetrated upon the cour

ts herein by

the plaintiffs and a

ppellants, L im Kwock Soon and L im Kwock Min” Lim Kwo c k

So on v . B ro wne ll , 369 F.2d 808, 809 ( 5th Cir. 1966) (per curiam). Thus, this second Lim Kw ock Soon case is more prope rly descr ibed as a

case of af

ter-disc overe d fra

ud, se e su pra Pa rt I I I
. A
. 1 , an‘ in

ju s ti c e [] wh ic h , in

c e rta in in s ta n c e s , [i s ] de e me d s uff

ic ie ntl ygr os s to demand a depar ture’ f rom rig id adher ence to the doctrine of res judica

ta.” Be gge rly , 5 2 4 U
. S. a t 4 6
. We note that the judg ment in Lim Kw ock Soon I I rests upon the va lidity

of evide nce introduc ed at trial. As such, it may

have be en wr ong ly

decide d beca

use “[a]llegations of perjury . . . are insufficient to support an inde pendent a ction for r elief f rom judg ment.” Palkow , 431 F.3d at 547. Howeve r, to the extent the case was c orre ctly decide d, it does nothing to support CL I ’s
argume nt t

hat a pa rt y wh o n e ve r a

pp e are d b e fo re the c ourt

c an b e an o ff

ic e r o f t he c ourt . L astly , we c onsider Toscano v. Commissioner , su pra . In short, Toscano is inapposite for the same re a so ns a s Lim Kw ock Soon I I: th e fr a ud in b oth c a se s w a s p e rp e tr a te d b y ind ivi du a ls who appe are d befor e the c ourt. In Toscano , an innoce nt party named Z elasko wa s char g ed with aNo. 05-1767

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- 21 - de fi c ie nc y

re su lti ngfr om t

he ta x re tur

ns of To sc ano . 4 41 F .2 d at 93 1. To sc ano ha d c la ime d to be mar ried to Z elasko in a pr evious litigation involving his tax returns fr om 1947 to 1950. Ibid. To sc ano sti pu late d to the se de fi c ie nc ie s a nd fo rg e d Z e la sk o’ s si g natur e on do c ume nts fi le d w ith the Tax Court. Ibid. He died in 1962, a nd had neve r paid the tax es due. Ibid. The Servic e tried to collect fr om Z elasko a

nd she moved to vac ate the pr ior judg ment. Ibid. Z elasko de nied the marria g e and “ alleg e[d] that she [had] no recollection of sig ning the petition or any paper that was filed w ith the Tax C ourt, that she did not knowing ly participate in the Tax Court proce eding s, and that, until the Commi ssioner levied on he r asse ts, she had no knowledg e that any defic iencies ha d been a ssessed ag ainst her.” Id. at 931–32. B eca use this fraud w as committed by

Toscano while befor e the Tax Court, Toscano provides no support for CL I ’s theory that Sto ut c ou ld h ave de fi le d th e c ourt in t he pr e vio us a c tio n w ith out pa rt ic ipatin g in i t. We conclude that the district court wa s corr ect to dismiss CL I ’s fra ud on the cour

t alleg ations beca

use Stout’s status as an attorne y does not automatica lly

make him an of

fice r of the c ourt . B Th e dis tr ic t c ourt

dis mis se d CL I ’s state law c onve rs ion c la ims ba se d u

po n r e s ju dic a ta and supported that judgment by citation to a ca se that wa s subsequently reve rsed. In revie w, we note that the judg ment of the district cour t, notwithst andingthe re versa l of its supporting
a uth or ity , mi g ht s til l be c or re c t. H ow e ve r, we be lie ve that th e state law c la ims are mor e c le arl y
an d s u c c i n c t l y b ar

r e d b y l awth ane qu i ty.No. 05-1767

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- 22 - Due to their a g e, CL I ’s conve rsion claims are barr ed by statute. Under

Michig an law, “the pe riod of limitations runs from the time the claim ac crue s,” which is g ener ally “the time the
wr on g up on

wh ic h th e c la im i s b a se d w a s d on e .” Mic h. Com p. L aws § 6 00 .5 82 7. Of

te n in c a se of fr aud, howe ver, a lthough the da mag e is done, the putative plaintiff is unawa re of her c ause of action bec ause the perpe trators subseque ntly conce al the cr ime. In case s where there has bee n fra udulent conce alment, “the a ction may be commenc ed at a

ny time within 2 y ear s after

the person who is e ntitled to bring the a ction discovers, or should have discove red, the exis tence of the claim or the identity

of the pe rson who is liable for the claim.” Mic h. Comp. L aws § 600.5855. Where ther e is no subsequent c oncea lment to hide the fra ud, the limitation period for f raud is six y ear s. Boyle v . Gen. M otors Corp. , 661 N.W.2d 557, 560 (Mich. 2003); Mich. Comp. L aws § 600.5813. The discovery rule, a bsent conc ealment, doe s not apply to the acc rual of ac tions for fra

ud in Michiga

n. Bo y le , 661 N.W.2d at 560. CL I ’s alleg es no ac t on the part of the defe ndants that could constitute fra udulent
conce alment. The f

raud a nd conver sion, acc ordingto CL I , was c ompleted in May 1993, when the district court rule d in favor of NTP. CL Ialleg es no ac t of conc ealment or continuing f

raud afte r the judg ment. I t is obvious t hat ac ts committ ed bef ore the completion of the a lleg ed
conver sion cannot constitute fra udulent conce alment, otherw ise Michig an’s f raudule nt
conce alment statute would be c onverte d into a g ener al discover y rule for fra ud—an outcome that Michig an cour

ts have re jected. Ibid. The c onversion cla ims are ther efor e bar red by the applicable statute of limitations. See B rownell v. Garber , 503 N.W.2d 81, 86 (Mich. Ct. App. 19 93 ) ( fr a ud ule nt c on c e a lme nt m

us t be a lle g e d in

the c omp la int ); Sills v. Oakland Gen. H osp. ,No. 05-1767

Computer L easc o v. NTP

- 23 - 559 N.W.2d 348, 352 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996) (“The plaintiff must prove that the de fenda nt committed affir

mative ac ts or misrepre sentations that wer e desig ned to pre vent subsequent discovery . Mere silence is insuffic ient.”). IV For all these re asons, we AF F IRM the jud g me nt o f t he dis tr ic t c ourt .