1 (Slip Opin i o n) OCTOBER T ERM, 20 10 Sy llabu s
N O TE : Wh er e it i s feas ibl e , a s y llab u s (h ead n ot e) wil lbe rel e as ed , as is bein g d o n e incon n ecti onwithth is cas e , a tth e ti meth e op in i o n is is s u ed

. Th e s y ll abu s con s titu tes n o p a r t of th e op in i o nof th eC o u r t bu t h a s be en pre p are dbyt h e Re po rte ro f De ci sio n s fo r t h e co nveni e nce of t h e reade r
. Se e United Statesv. Detroit Timbe r& Lumb er Co., 200U. S

. 3 21, 337

. 

# SUPREME CO URT O F THE UNI TED STATES

Sy llabu s 

### CSX T RAN SPORTATION, INC. v
. ALABAMA DEPARTMENT OF REV ENU E ET AL



### . CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVE NTH CIRCUI T
No. 09–5 20. Ar g u ed Nov e mber10, 201 0

—Dec i ded Febr u a r y22, 2011 Petitioner(C S X) is aninter s ta te r a ilc a r r i erthat o p er a t es, and pay s

tax e s, inAlab a ma. Th e S t ate im poses s a les an d u s e t a x e s onr a il

roads when they purchase or cons ume diesel fuel, but e x empts their main c o mpeti t or s—inter s ta te moto r a n d wa t e r ca rriers

. CS X s u ed
r e spondents, the Alaba ma Depar tment o f Rev e nue and its Comm is

sioner(Alaba ma), c l ai mingthatthis t a xsc heme d i sc r i minate s ag ain s t r a ilr o a ds inv i olati o nof the Railr oad Rev i ta l i zation and Reg u latoryReform Act of 197 6 (4–R Ac t orAc t), wh ic hbar s fou r for m s of disc r i min a tor ytax a tion , 49 U. S. C. §1150 1(b). Th r ee of th e delin eated pr oh ibition s de a lwithpr oper tytax e s, §§11 501(b)(1)–( 3 ), and the fourth is a c a tc h-all pr ovisio n that forbid s a S t ate to “[i]mpose ano t hertaxthatdisc r i minate s ag ains t a r a il c a r r i er ,” §115 01(b)( 4). Th e Distr i c t Cou r t dismis s e d CSX ’ s su it as n o t c o g n i

zable under the 4–R Act on the basi s of this Court’s de cision in De

partm ent of Reven u e of O re. v. ACF Industri es, Inc. , 510 U. S. 332, and the Eleventh Circuit aff i rmed. Held: CSXmayc h allen g e Alabam a’ s sale s an d u s e tax e s u n d er

§115 01(b)( 4). Pp. 5–19.

(a) CSXis c h allenging“anothertax” withi nsubsec tion (b )(4)’ s pl ai n meaning

. The Ac t does not define “tax

. ” Thus, this Court looks to th e word’s ordina ry definition, which isexpa nsive. A State seeking to raise revenue may choose among multip le forms of taxation on prop

er ty , inc o me, t r ansac t ions, orac tiv i ties. “[A]nothertax” is thus be s t under stood to enc o mpass an ytaxa State migh t impose, on any asset or transaction, except the proper tytax e s alr e adyaddr e ssed insu b

sections (b)(1)

– (3). There is no re ason to inter p r e t subs ec tion (b)(4)
as apply i ngonlyto the g r oss - r e c e ipts t a x e s thatso me Sta t es impose d2 CSX TRANS P ORTATION, INC. v. ALABAMA DEPT. OF REVE NUE Sy llabu s in lieu of prop erty taxes at the time of the Act’s pass age. Moreove r , CS X’s com p la int , cont ra r yt ot h e Elevent hCircuit ’s a ppa rentview, does protest Alabama’s imposition of taxes onits fuel. Theexemp tion s th e St at e h a s giv e nm a yplaya c e n t r a l r o le inCSX ’ s ar g u men t , but the c o mplaint’ s essenti a l subj ec t r e ma ins the tax e s imposed.

The keyquesti on thus bec o m e s whethera t a xmigh t be sa id to “dis

crimina te” a g a i ns t arailroad under subse c tion (b)(4) wh ere the State has granted exemptions from the tax to o t her entities (h ere, the rail

road’s competi t ors). Because the s t a t ute does not define “dis crimi

nates,” the Co ur t ag ain looks to th e term’ s ordinary meaning, which is to fa il to tr eat al l per s on s equa lly when no reasonable dist inction can be found between those f avored and th ose not f avored. To charge one group of t a xpayers a 2% rate an d anot her gro u p a 4% rate, if the groups are th e same in all releva nt respec ts, is to disc r i minat e ag ainst the l a tter

. Tha t disc r i minationc o ntinues if the fav o r e d group’s rate goes down to 0%, whic h is al l an exemp t io n is. To s a y that suc ha taxdoes not “disc r i minate” is t oadopt a defi nition at odd s with the wor d ’ s natur a l me aning

. This Courtha s repea t edly recog

nized that taxsc hemes with ex emptions maybe disc r i minator y
. See, e.g ., Davi sv. Michi gan Dep a rtm e nt of Tre asury , 489 U. S. 803. An d
even Depar tm ent of Reve nueof Ore. v. ACF Indust r ie s, I n c. , 510 U. S. 332, onwh ic h th e Elev en th Cir c u it h e av ilyr e lied indismiss i n gCSX ’ s suit, made c l e a rthat t a xex emptions “c ould be a v a r i ant of taxdi s c r i mination.” Id., at 343. Inaddition , th e sta t u t e’ s pr oh ibitionof dis

crim i na t i on applies rega rdles s whet her t h e favored ent i t i es a r e int e r sta t e or local. The dist inctions dr awnint h e statu t e ar e n o t between in ter s tate an d loc a l ac tor s , as Al ab ama s u g g e sts, bu t betweenr a il

r o ads an d all o t h e rac tor s , wh eth e rin ter s t a te orloc a l. Pp. 5–10.

(b) ACF Indus trie s does not require a diffe rent result. T h ere, the Cour t held that r a ilr oad s c o uld not c o ntest pr oper tyta xex emptions under subsection (b)(4), reasoning th at it would be illogi cal to permi t such a challenge when subsection s (b)(1)–(3)—the §1 1 5 01 provisions specifically a ddressingpr oper tytax e s—per m itted Sta t es to g r ant pr oper tytaxex emptions. Suc ha r e ading would “subv e r tthe statu

tor yplan” and “c ontr av ene th e ‘ e leme nta r y ca non of con s truction tha t a sta t u t e sh ou ld be in ter p r e ted so as not to rende ronep a rt inopera

tiv e .’ ” 510 U. S., at 340. Con t r a r yto Alaba ma’ s a r g u men t , th is str u c t u r al an a l y s is doe s n o tappl y here. Subsections (b )(1)–(3) spe cifically allow property tax exem ptions , b u t neither th ey nor a n y other provision of the Act speaks to non-property exe m ptions like those at issue here. Because Congr e ss h a s ex pr essed n oin ten tt o “allo[w] the State s to grant” non-propertyexemptions, id., at 343, reading subsection (b)(4) to encompa ss th em poses n odan g erof “n u l

lify[ing]” acongres s i ona lpolicy choice orot herwis e “sub vert ing t h e3 Cite as: 56 2 U

. S. ____ (2011) Sy llabu s statutory plan,” id. , at 340, 343
. Al ab am a’ s oth e refforts to bor r o w from ACF Industri e s ’ analysis s i mil a rly fa il. Al so unavailing is Ala

bam a’ s ar g u men tth at, ev enif ACF Indus tr ies’ reasoning is lim ited to property tax e x emptions, its holding must ex tend to non-pr oper tytax exemptions inorder to prevent inco n s iste n toran omalo u s r e su lts in the tr eatment of pr oper tyand non-pr oper tytax e s. Pp. 1 1–1 8. 350 Fed. Appx . 318, r e v e r s ed an d r e man d ed.

K

AGAN , J., delivered the o p inion of the Court, in w h ich R OBERTS , C. J., and S CALIA , K ENNED Y , B REYER , ALITO , and S O T OMAYOR , JJ., joined. T HOMA S , J., filed a dissenting opi n ion, in which G IN SB U R G , J., join ed._________________

_________________ 1 Cite as: 56 2 U

. S. ____ (2011) Opinion of theCourt

NOTIC E : Th is op i n ionis subjec t to f o rma lrevi si onbef o r e publicat ioninth e p r eli m in ary p rin t of th e U n it edS t at es R e p o rts

. R e ad ers ar e r e qu es ted to n o tif yth e R e p o r t e rof D e c i s i on s , Su p r em e C o u r t of th e U n ited St at es , Wa s h

ington, D. C. 2054 3, of any typ o gra p hical or other f o rmal err o rs , in or der th atc o rr ect i on sm a y b e mad eb e f o r e th ep r e lim in aryp rin t go es t o p r es s
. 

# SUPREME CO URT O F THE UNI TED STATES

No. 09–5 20


### CSX T RANSPORTATION, INC., PETITIONER v. ALABAMA DEPARTM E NT OF R EVE NUE ET AL



### . ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEAL S FOR THE ELEV ENTH CIRC U I T [Febr u ar y22, 201 1] 

### J USTICE 

### K AGAN

### delivered the opini o n of the Co urt. The Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976 restricts the ab ility of state and local governments to levy disc riminatory taxes on ra il carriers. We consider here whether a railroa d may invoke this statute to challenge sales and use taxes that apply to rail carriers (among others), but exempt their competitors in the transportat i on industry. We con c lude that the railroad may do so. I ACongress enacted the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Refo rm Act of 1 976 (Act or 4–R Act) to “restore th e financial stability of the railway system of the Unite d States,” am ong other purposes. §101(a), 90 Stat. 33. To help achieve this goal, Congress targeted sta t e and local taxation schemes thatdiscriminate against rail carriers. Burling t on Northe rn R. Co. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm’n , 48 1 U. S. 454, 457 (1987). The provi s ion of the Act at issu e2 CSX TRANS P ORTATION, INC. v. ALABAMA DEPT. OF REVE NUE Opinion of theCourt 

### here, now codified at 49 U. S. C. §11501, 1 

### bars States and localities fr om engaging in four forms of discriminatory taxation. 90 Stat. 54. Se ctio n 115 01(b ) des c ribes the pro h ibite dpra c ti ces
. I t b e gi nsw i thth r ee p r ovis i o n sa ddr es s e dsp ec if ic a l ly t o p r operty ta xes; it concludes with a catch-all pr ovision concerning other taxes. Accordin g to §11501(b) , States (or their subdivisions) “may not”: “(1) Assess rail transpo rtation prop erty a ta va lue that has a higher ratio to the true mar k et value of the rail transportation property than the ratio that the assessed value of other commercial and industrial property in the same assessment jurisdiction has to the true mark et value of the other commercial and industrial proper ty. “(2) Levy o rcollect a tax on an assessment t hat may not be made under paragraph (1) o f this subsection. “(3) Levy or collect an ad valorem property ta x on rail transportat i on property at a tax rate that exceeds the tax rate applicable to c o mmercial and industrial property in the same asses sment jurisdiction. “(4) Impose another tax that discriminates against a rail carrier. ” The foll owing subsection confers jurisdiction on federal courts to “prevent a violatio n” of §11501(b) n o twithstanding the Tax Injunction Act, 28 U. S. C. §1341, which ordinarily prohibits federal courts from enjoinin g the collection of state taxes wh en a remedy is available in sta t e

——————

1 Th is pr ov isionwas or igin all yc o dified at 4 9 U. S. C. §26 c(1976 ed.). In1978, Con g r e ss r e c o dified it at § 1 1 5 03 (1 976 ed., Su pp. II), with slightly altere d language b u t “witho ut s u b s ta ntive cha n ge,” §3 (a), 92 Sta t . 146 6. In1995, Con g r e ss ag ainr e c o dified th e sec t ionwith out
su bst a n t iv e c h an g e , th is tim eat 49 U. S. C

. §1150 1. Th is opin ionr e fer s to the statute’ s c u rr ent tex t

.3 Cite as: 56 2 U

. S. ____ (2011) Opinion of theCourt 

### court. §11501(c). 2 

### B Petitioner CSX T r ansportation, Inc. (CSX) i s an interstate rail carrier that operates in Alabama and pays taxes there. Alabama impo ses a sales tax of 4% on the gros s receipts of retail businesses, Ala. Code §40–23–2(1) (2010 Cum. Supp.), and a use tax of 4% on the sto r age, use, or consumption of tangib le persona lproperty, §40–23–61( a) (2003). Rai l roads pay these taxes when they purchase o r consume diesel fuel

. But railroads’ main competitors— interstate motor and water ca r r iers—are generally exemp t from paying sales and use taxes on their fuel (although fuel for mot o r carriers is subje ct to a separate excise tax). 3 

### Alleging that Alabama’s tax scheme discriminates against railroads in vi olation of §11501(b)(4) of the 4–R Act, CSX s u ed respondents, the Alabama Department of Revenue a n d its Commissioner(Alabama or State), in Federal Di strict Cour t. In part icular, CSXcomplained that the State could not impose sales and use taxes on railroads’ purchase and consumption of dies el fuel while

——————

2 The first sentence of subsection (c) provid es: “Notwithstanding section134 1 of title 28 .

. . a distr i c tcourt of the United States has jurisdiction .

. . to prevent a violation of subsection (b) of this section.” The next s e ntence co nce r ns the re lief availab l e for violations of §§115 01(b)( 1 ) an d (2): “Reli e f maybe g r an ted u n d erth is su bsec tion only if the ratio of assessed v a lue to true m a rket value of rail transportationproperty exceeds by at le ast 5 percent the ratio of asse ssedvalue t ot r ue ma rketva lue of ot her com m e rci al and industrial property in the
same a sse ssm en t ju r i sdic tion

. ”

3 State law provides that mo tor ca rrie r s need not pay s a les or use taxes on diese lfuel so long as theypa y a di fferentexci s et a x of $0 .1 9 perg a llon

. Ala. Code §40 –17 –2(1) (2 00 3) (pr i mar ytaxof $0.13 per g a llon) ; §40– 1 7–2 20(e) ( 201 0 Cu m. Su pp. ) (addit i on al t a xof $0.0 6pe r gallon). State law wholly e x empts in t e rsta t ewa t e r ca rr iers froms a les
an d u s e tax e s ondiesel fu el

. §40– 23 –4(a) (10); §40

– 2 3

– 62(1 2 ). Nord o t h es e wa t e r ca rriers pa y any ot her t a x on the fuel they purchase or
cons ume. Bri e f for Res p ond e nts 1 6

.4 CSX TRANS P ORTATION, INC. v. ALABAMA DEPT. OF REVE NUE Opinion of theCourt 

### exempting motor and water car r iers from those taxes. App. 22 (Co m plaint ¶26). The District Court dis m issed CSX’s suit as not cogniza

ble under the 4–R Act, and the United States Court o f Appeals forthe Eleventh Circui taffirmed in a brief pe r curiam decision. 350 Fed. Appx. 318 (2009). The Eleventh Circuit rested on its earlier decision in Norfolk Southern R

. Co. v. Ala b ama Dept. of Revenue , 550 F. 3d 1306 (2008), which involved a nearly identica l challenge to the application of Alaba ma’s sales a n d use taxes. In Norfolk Southern , the Eleventh Circuit r ejected the plaintiff railroad’s challenge, principally in reliance on this Court’s decision in Departm e nt of Revenue of Ore. v. ACF Industries, Inc. , 510 U. S. 332 (1994). In that case, we held that a railroad could not invoke §11501(b)(4) to cha l

lenge a gen e rally applicable property ta x on the basis that certain non-railroad pr operty was exempt fr om the tax

. Id. , at 335. The Eleve n th Circuit recognized that the cas e before it involved sales and use taxes—not pr operty taxe s, which the s t atutory scheme separately addre sses. Norfolk Southern , 5 50 F. 3d, at 1314. The court concl u ded, however, that this difference was immaterial, and accordingl y held that arailroad could not object to Ala bama’s sales and use taxes simply becaus e the State provides exemptions from them. Id. , a t1316. CSX petitioned for a writ of certiorari, arguin g that the Eleventh Circuit had misunderstood ACF I ndustriesan d noting a split of authority concerning wheth e r railroads may bring a challenge under §11 501(b)(4) to non-property taxes from which their competitors are exempt. 4

### W e

——————

4 Compare NorfolkSouthe rn R. Co. v. Alab ama Dept. of Revenue , 550 F. 3d 130 6, 13 16 (CA 11 20 0 8), an d A t c h i s o n, T

. & S

. F

. R

. C o
. v. Ar izon a , 78 F. 3d 438, 4 43 (CA 9 19 96) (r ejec t i n ga r a ilr oad’ s c h allen g e to a use tax that e x empted m o t o r ca rriers ) , with Burlington N., S. F. R. Co.
v. Lohman , 193 F. 3d 984, 9 86 (CA 819 99) (en t er tain in g a c h allen g e to a s a les an du s e tax th atex empt ed rail ca r r iers ’ com p et itors ) , Burling­5 Cite as: 56 2 U

. S. ____ (2011) Opinion of theCourt 

### granted certiorari, 560 U. S. ____ ( 2010), and now reverse. II We begin, as in any case of statutory inte rpretation , with the la nguage of the statute. Hardtv. R e liance Standard Life Ins. Co. , 560 U. S. ___, ___ (2010) (s lip op., at 8)

. Section 11501(b)(4) provides that a State may not “[i]mpose a n other tax that discriminates a g ainst a rail carrier.” C S X wishes to bring anaction und er this prov ision because rail carrie r s, but not motor or water car r ier s , must pay Alabama’s sales and use taxes on diesel fuel. To determine whether this suit may go forward, we must therefore answer two questions. Is CSX challenging “another tax” within the meaning of the statu t e? And, if s o , might thattax “discr iminate” against rail carriers b y exempting their competitors? 5

—————— ton No. R. Co. v. Com m i ssi oner of Reve n u e , 606 N. W. 2d 54, 58–5 9 (M in n
. 2000) (same), an d A t c h i s o n, T

. & S

. F

. R

. C o
. v. Bair , 338 N. W

. 2d 338, 3 48 (Io w a 1983) (s am e).

5 We co nsider here only questions rela t i ng t owhet he r CS X ca nb r ing
acla i mfor dis crim i na t i on b a s ed onthe State’s pattern of tax exem pt i o n s
. W ed on o tc o n s i d e ra n yi s s u es conc erningwh ethe r these exemptions ac tual lydisc r i minate a g ainst C S X

. See infra , at 1 8–1 9, an d n

. 8. Alab am a h a s r a ised two su c hissu es int h is Cou r t. F i r s t, Al ab ama cont ends t h a tin deciding CS X’s cla i m , afedera l courtm u stcons ider not onlythe s p ec ifictax e s c h alleng ed, but also the br oa dertaxsc heme. Brief for Resp ondents 58–60. Second , the State argues that the court must c o mpar e the tax a tionof CSXnot mer e lyto dir e c tc o mpetitor s but to othercommer c i al entities a s well. Id. , at 48, n

. 7. M o st of th e dissenting opi n ion is devote d to supporting theState’s argument o n this sec o nd question. But we leav e these and all other issues relating to whetherAl aba ma ac tua l lyhas disc r i minated ag a i nst CSXto t h e tr ial c o ur t on r e mand to ad dr ess a s and when it wishes. No c o ur t i n this case has previously co nsideredthese questions, and the parties’ briefs in this Court have o n ly sket chily a ddressed them. In addition, the parties di spute whether Alabama wai v ed its claim on the second issue by initi a lly agreei ngth at “the c o mp ar ison c l ass c o nsist s of moto r c a r r i er s an d waterc a r r i er s,” App. to Pet. f o rCer t . 12a (i n t er n a l qu otation mar k s o m itted), and p r oceeding withthe litig at io nonth at ba si s.6 CSX TRANS P ORTATION, INC. v. ALABAMA DEPT. OF REVE NUE Opinion of theCourt 

### An excise tax, like Alabama’s sales and use tax, is “another tax” under subsection (b)(4). 6 

### The 4–R Act does not define “tax”; nor does the statute otherwise place an y matters wit h in, or exclude any matters from , the term’s ambit. In these circumstances, we look to the word’s ordinary de finition, As grow Seed Co. v. Winterboer , 513 U. S. 179, 187 (1995), and we note what taxpayers ha ve long since discovered—that th e me aning of “tax” is expansive. A State (or other gove rnmental entit y) seeking to raise revenue may choose among multiple fo rms of taxation on property, income, tr ansactions, or activities. “[A]nother tax,” as used in subsection (b)(4), is best understood to refer to all of these— moreprecisely, to encompas s any form of tax a Sta t e might impose, on any asset or transaction, except the taxes on propertypr eviously ad

dressed in subsections (b)(1)–(3). See Burlington Northern R. Co. v. Superior , 932 F. 2d 118 5, 1186 (CA7 1991) (Sub

section (b)(4) includes “an inco me tax, a gross-receipts tax, a use tax, an occupation tax . . . —w hatever”). The phras e “another ta x” is a catch -all. In particular, we see no reason to interpret subsection (b)(4) as applying only to th e gross-receipts ta xes—known as “in l i eu” taxes—that some Sta t es imposed instead of propertyta xes at the t i me of the Act’s passa ge. See Bri e f for Respondents 53–55; Brief fo r State of Washington et al. as Amici Curiae20–22. The argument in favor of this constr uction relies on the House Report concernin g

—————— We think this question of waiver is al so best considered by the trial court

.

6 As originally enacted, the provision that is now 49 U. S. C. §11501(b)( 4) p r ohibited the i m posi tion of “ a nyothertax” that di sc r i min a tes ag ain s t a r a ilr oad. §2 6c(197 6 ed.). Th e su bstitu t i onof “an o th er t a x” occurredwhen Con g r e s s firs trecodified t h e Act. In line with Con g r e ss’ s sta t emen t th at r e v i sion s ma de at that time should not be
cons trued a s h aving s u b s ta ntive effect, s ee n. 1 , sup r a , we tr eat the two terms a s s y nonymous
.7 Cite as: 56 2 U

. S. ____ (2011) Opinion of theCourt 

### the bill, which descri bed subsection (b)(4) as prohibiting “the imposition of . . . the so-called ‘in lieu tax.’ ” H. R. Rep. No. 94–725, p. 77 (1975). But the Conference Report on the fin a l bill aband oned the H o use Report ’s narrowi n g language a n d describe d the subse ction as it was written

— as prohibiti n g, without limitation, “the impos i tion of any other taxwhich results in the disc riminatory treatment o f any” railroad. S. Conf. Rep. No. 94–595, pp. 165–166 (1976); accord, S. Rep. No. 94–499, p. 65 (1975). And th e statutory la nguage is the real crux of the matter: Subsec

tion (b)(4) s p eaks both clearly and broadly, and a legisla

tive report misdescribing the provision cannot succeed i n altering it. 7 

### Nor do we agree with the Eleventh Circuit’s apparen t view that CSX does not challe nge “another tax” because its complaint relies on th e exemptio ns the State has given. See Norfolk Southern , 550 F. 3d, a t1315 (“Th e language of section (b)(4) prohibits a discriminatory ‘ta x ’ not a di scriminatory tax exemption”); Brief for American Trucking Assns., Inc. as Amicus Curiae9. What the complaint protests is Alabama’s imposition of taxes on the fuel CSX

——————

7 Alaba ma a l so inv o kes the remedial pr ovi s ion of subsec tion (c), n. 2, supra , to u r g eth at we r e ad §115 01 a s effectively limitedto property o r “in lieu” tax e s
. Ac c o r d ingto Alab a m a, th at pr ov ision e n titles feder a l
c o ur ts to g r a n t r e lief only when States overvalue railroad property under subsections (b)(1) an d (b)(2): Fe de ral courts, the State avers, “hav e no powerto enjoin the g r antingof tax exemptions as a viol ation of subsection (b)(4), or , apparently [to remedy] any violation of su bsection (b)(4).” Brief for Re spondent s 37. Butthatint e r p r e tation of
s u b s ection (c)’s remedia lprovis ion ca nno t b eright, b e ca us e it would nullify subsect i on (b)(4) ( a nd, for that m a t t e r, subsection (b)(3) a s well). We understand subsection ( c )’s reme dial provision neither as limit ing the broad grant of jurisdicti on to fede ral c o urts to prevent violations o f subsection (b) nor as otherwi s e restri cting the scope of that subsection

. The remedial provision simply limit s the availab ility o f relief whe n a S t at e dis cri mi na t e s i nas ses s i ng t h e value of railroa d property, as pr osc r ibed bysu bsec tion s (b)(1) and (b)(2). That kind of discrimination is not at is sue here.8 CSX TRANS P ORTATION, INC. v. ALABAMA DEPT. OF REVE NUE Opinion of theCourt 

### uses; what the complaint requests is that Alabama cease to collect those taxes from CSX. Ap p
. 2 3

. T h ee x e m p t i o n s , no doubt, play a central role in CSX ’ s argument: They demonstrate, in CSX’s view, that the State’s sales and us e taxes discri minate against railroads. See id. , at 22, ¶¶24– 26. But the essential subject of the complaintremains the taxes Alabama levies on CSX. The key question thus becomes whether a tax might be said to “discriminate” against a railroad under subsection (b)(4) because the State has granted exemptions from the tax to other entities (he r e, the railroad’s competitors). The statute does not define “discriminates,” and so we again lookto the ordinary meaning of the word. Se e supra, at 5. “Discrimina tion” is the “failure to t r eat all per s ons equally when no reasonable distinction can be found betwee n those favored and tho s e not favored.” Blac k’s Law Di ctionary 534 (9th ed. 2 009); accord, id. , at 4 20 (5th ed. 1979); see also Webst e r’s Third New International Dictionary 648 (1976) (“discriminates” means “to make a difference in treatment or favo r on a class or categorica l basis in disregard of individual merit”). To charge o n e group of taxpayers a 2% rate and another group a 4% rate, if the groups are the same in all relevant respects, is to discri minate against the lat t er. Tha td i scrimination continues (indeed, it increases) if the State takes th e favored g r oup’s rate d o wn to 0%. And that is all an exemption is. See West Lynn Crea mery, Inc. v. Healy , 512 U. S. 186, 2 10–211 (1994) (S CAL IA 

### , J., concurring in judgment) (noting that an “ ‘exemption’ from .

. . a ‘ n eutral’ tax” for favored persons “is no diffe rent in principle” than “a discriminatory tax . . . imposi ng a higher liability” on disfavored persons). To say that such a tax (with such an exemption) does not “di s criminate”—assuming the groups are similarly situated and ther e is no justification for the difference in treatmen t—is to ad opt a defin i tion of the term at odds with its natural meaning.9 Cite as: 56 2 U

. S. ____ (2011) Opinion of theCourt 

### In line wit hthis understanding, our decisions have repeatedly recognized that ta x sc hemes with exemptions may be dis criminatory. In Davisv. Michigan Dept. of Tre asury , 4 89 U. S. 80 3 (1989), for example, we reviewed a state income tax provision that exempted retirement benefits given by the State, but not those paid by the Federal Government. We held that the tax “discrimi

nate[d]” against federal employees under 4 U. S. C. §111,which serves to protect those employees from discriminatory state taxation. Similarly, our dormant Commerce Clause cases have often held that tax exempti o ns given to local businesses discriminate against interstate actor s
. See, e.g., Bacchus Imp o rts, Ltd. v. Dias , 468 U. S. 263, 268–269 (1984) (holding that a s t ate excise tax on alco hol “discriminate[d]” a g ainst interstat e businesses because of exemptions granted to local producers); Camps Ne wfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of H a rrison , 5 20 U. S. 56 4, 588–589 (1 997) (invalidating as “discriminatory” a state property tax that exempted organizations o p erating for the benefitof res i den t s, but not organizations aim e d at nonresidents). And even our deci sion in AC F Industries , on which the Eleventh Circuit relied in dis m issing CSX’s suit, made clear that tax exempti o ns “could be a variant of tax discrimi nation.” 510 U. S., at 3 43. Nor does the 4–R Act limit the prohibited discrimination to state ta x schemes that unjustifi ably exempt local actors, as opposed to interstate entities. Alabama argues for this result, claiming that §11501(b) is designed “to protect interstate carriers a g ainst discri mination vis-à-vis local businesses. ” Brief for Responden t s 29. Butthe text of §11501(b) tells a differ e nt story. Consistent with the Act’s purpose of restoring the financial st ability of ra ilroads (not of interstat e carriers g e nerally), supra, at 1, each of subsection (b)’s provision s proscribes taxes that specially burden a rail carri er ’s property or otherwise discriminate against a rail carrier. And not a single provision of th e10 CSX TRANS P ORTATION, INC. v. ALABAMA DEPT. OF REVE NUE Opinion of theCourt 

### Act (including the references in subsections (b)(1)–(3) to “commercial and industrial pr operty”) disti n guishes between local and non-local taxpa y ers who rece ive favorable tax treatm e nt. The di stinctions drawn in §11501(b) are not between interstate and local actors, as the State contends, but rather between railroads and other actor s , whether int e rstate or l o cal. Ac cor d ingly, a s t ate excise t a x that applies to railroads but ex empts their interstat e competitors is subject t o challenge under subs ection (b)(4) as a “tax th at discriminates against a rail carrier.” 8

——————

8 Th is c o n c lu siondoes n o t, as Alab am a an d th e dissen tc o n t en d, tu r n r a ilr oads into “mo st-fav o r e d-tax p ay er s,” entitled to any ex emption ( o r oth e rtaxbr eak) th at a S t ate giv e s to another entity. See Brief for Respon den t s 23; post , at 9 (opinion of T HOMAS , J.). Wehold only tha t §115 01(b)( 4) e n ables a r a ilr oad to c h alle n g e anex c i se oroth e rn o npr oper tytaxa s disc r i min a to r yon the basi s of the tax sc heme’s exemption s—a s th e dissen tapp a r e n t lyag r e es, post , at 1. Wh eth e rth e railroad willprevail—that is, whet her it can prove the alleged d i scrimination—depends on w h ether the St a t e offers asuff icient justif ica

tion for declining to provide th e exempt ion a tiss u e t ora il ca rriers

. S ee supra, at 8; Brief for United Sta t es a s Am icusCuriae25–26; Richmond, F. & P. R. Co

. v. Department of Taxation, Commonwealth of Va. , 762 F. 2d 375, 38 0–3 81, an d n

. 4 (CA 41 985 ). So if, to u s e th e dis s en t ’ s example, a railroad challenged a sc heme in which “every person and b u s i nes s in th e S t a t e of Alab a m apa id a$1 a nnua l ta x, a n d one pe rso n was exempt,” post , at 9, forsome r e aso nhav i ng nothingto do wi th railroads, we presume the suit would be p r omptly dismi ssed. Nothing inth is applic a t ionof §1150 1(b)(4) offer s a “win dfall” to r a ilr oads. Ibid

.

The dissent argues in addition th at a St ate sh ou ld pr ev ail ag ain s t anyc l aim of disc r i minationbr ought under subsection (b)(4) if it can demonstr ate t h at a taxdoes not “t ar g e t” o r“singl e out” a r a ilr oad, pos t , at 1; th at sh o w in g , with ou tmor e , would j u s t ify the ta x (a lthough the dissen tdec lin es to say ju s t what it me ans to “ t ar g e t,” po st , at 7, n

. 3). Th is ar g u ment pr imar ilyc o n c ern s th e questionwh eth e rAlabam a’ s t a x s c heme in fa c tdis crimina tes undersubsection (b)(4)— a question we have explained is inappropri ate to address, see n. 5, supra
. We note, howev e r , that the dissent’ s ar g u ment ab out subsec ti on (b)(4) r e sts entirely on the premise that subsec tions (b)(1)–(3) proh ibitonly proper tytax e s tha t“t ar g e t” or“ s ingl e out” r a i l r o ads, see po st , at 4; so, th e dissen tw o u l d say , aS t a t e mayim pose a 4% property tax on railroad s11 Cite as: 56 2 U

. S. ____ (2011) Opinion of theCourt 

### III As against the plain la nguage of subsection (b)(4), Alabama offers two argum e nts based on our decision in ACF Industries

. The first claim, which the Eleventh Circuit accepted, rests on the reasoning w e adopted in ACF Indu strie s:We concluded there that railroads could not ch allenge property tax exemptions under subsection (b)(4), and Alabama asserts that the same analysis applies to excise (and ot her non-property) tax e x emptions. The second contention focuses on alleged problems that would emerge in the application of §11501(b) if the rule of ACF Industrie s did not govern all tax exemptions. On this view, even if ACF Ind u stri es ’ reasoning is irrelevant to cases involving excise t a xes, its holding must extend to those cases to prevent inc o nsistent or anomalous results. We reject each of these ar guments. We stand foursquare behind ou r decision in ACF Industries, but we will n o t extend it inthe way the State wishes. A In ACF In dustries , we considered whether a railroad could sue aState under subsection (b)(4) for taxing ra ilroad proper ty while exempting ce rtain othercommercial property. We he ld that the ra ilroad could not do so. We noted that the language of subs ection (b)(4), when viewe d in isolation, could be read to allowsuch a cha llenge. But we reasoned that the structu re of §11501 required th e opposite result. 510 U. S., at 34 3. The Eleventh Circuit

—————— (a s s u ming s o me uns pecified numb e r of oth e rtax p ay er s also p a yth at rate) while levying only a 2% propertytax on railroad competitors. But we have neve r decided, in ACF Indus trie s or any other case, whether subsections (b)(1)–(3) shou ldbe interpreted in this man n er. An d eve n accepting the dissent’s unexplained premi s e, a serious question would
rema in ab o ut whether to tra n s p la nt this c o nstr uc tion of subsec tions (b)(1)–(3) to subsection (b)( 4) ’s very diffe rentt e rra in, s ee infra, at 16– 18.12 CSX TRANS P ORTATION, INC. v. ALABAMA DEPT. OF REVE NUE Opinion of theCourt 

### considered ACF Industries “determinative” of the question here, Norfolk Southern , 550 F. 3d, at 1313, a n d Alabama agrees, Brief for Respondents 18. We thinkthey misread that decision. We began our analysis in ACF In dustries b yexplaining that railroads could not challenge property ta x exemptions under subs ections (b)( 1)–(3)—the provisions of §1150 1 specifically addressing property ta xes. As noted earlier, subsections (b)(1)–(3) prohibit a State from imposing higher pro p erty tax rates or assessment ratios on “rail transportat i on propert y” thanon “other co mmercial and industrial property.” The statute defines “commercial and industrial property” as includin g only “propert y .
. . subject to a property tax levy.” §11501(a)(4). We interpreted tha t phrase to mean “property thatis taxed,” rather than property th at is potentially taxable. 510 U. S., at 341–342. As a result , we determined that exempt ( i.e. , non-taxed) property fell outside the catego ry of “other commercial and industrial property” a g ainst which the taxation of railroad property is measured. Ibid. The conclusi on followed : Subsections (b)(1)–(3) permitted States to impose property taxes on railroads while exempting other entities. Ibid. And becaus e that was so, we stated, still another conclusion followed: Subsection (b)(4)’s prohibition on discrimination likewise could not encompass propertyta x exemptions. Id., at 343. We viewed this holding as a matter of simple deduction: “I t would be illogical to conclude that Congress, having allowed the States to gra n t property ta x exemptio ns in subsections (b)(1)–(3), would turn around and nullify its own choice i nsubsection (b)(4).” Ibid. Or stated otherwise: “[R]eading subsection (b)(4) to prohibit what” other parts of the statute wer e “designed to allow,” would “subvert the statutory plan” and “contravene the ‘elementary canon of constructio n that a statute should be inte rpreted so as not to render one part i n operative.’ ” Id. , at 340. The structu re of13 Cite as: 56 2 U

. S. ____ (2011) Opinion of theCourt 

### §11501 thus compelledour conclusion that property ta x exemptions—even if “avariant of tax discrim i nation,” id. , at 343—fell outside sub s ection (b)(4)’s reach. But this structural an alysis—the core of A CF Industrie s—has no bearing on the question here. Subsections (b)(1)–(3) specifically address—a n d allow—property ta x exemptions. But neither those subsections n o r any other provision of the 4–R Act speak s to non- property tax ex emptions li ke those at issue in t h is case. Congress has expressed no intent to “allo[w] the States to g r ant” these exemptions. Ibid

. Reading subsection (b)(4) as written— to encompass non-property ta xexemptions—therefore poses no d anger of “nullify[ing]” a congressional policy choice or otherwise “subvert[ing] the statutory plan.” Id. , at 340, 343. To the contrar y : Giving sub s ection (b)(4) something other than its ordina ry meaning, absent any structu ral reason to do so, would itself contravene t h e expressed will of Congress. Implicitly acknowledging that A C F Industries ’ centra l theory is irrelevant here, Alabama focuses on what tha t decision called “[o]ther considerations reinforc[ing]” it s structu ral analysis. Id. , at 343. Most notably, Alabama underscores the followi ng sentence from ACF Industries: “Given the prevalence of pr operty tax exemptions when Congress enacted the 4–R Act, [§ 11501’s] silence on th e subject—in light of the explicit prohibition of tax rate and assessmentratio discri mination—reflects a determination to permit the States to leave the i r exemptions in place.” Id. , at 344. Alabama asserts that this statement “holds just as tru e” for sales and use taxes. Brief for Respondents 41. That claim rings hollow. To be sure, ACF Industries noted that Congress had declined to spea k “with an y degree of particularity to” the pe rmissibility of property tax exemptions, even though States often granted the m
. 510 U. S., a t343. But we thoughtthat fact r e levant only14 CSX TRANS P ORTATION, INC. v. ALABAMA DEPT. OF REVE NUE Opinion of theCourt 

### because Congress had spoken wi th particularity in proscribing oth e r forms of discriminatory p r opert yta xes. Th e very sente n ce Alabama highlights makes our reasoning clear: Cong ress’s silence as to t h e practice of gran tin g propertyta x exemptions reflected its acquiescence in that practice “ inligh tof the explicit prohibition [in subsections (b)(1)–(3)] of [property] ta x ra te and assessment rati o discrimination.” Id. , at 344 (em p hasis added). If that explicit prohibition h a d not exi s ted—if §11501(b) had consisted only of sub s ection (b)( 4)’s broad ban on ta x discrimination—we could not have gleaned what we did from congre ssional silence. After all, the verypurpose of a catch-all provision like subsection (b)(4) is to avoid the necessity of listing each matter (here, each kind of ta x discrimination) falling within it. And with respect to no nproperty ta xes (like Alabama’s sales and use taxes), subsection (b)( 4) is a ll there is. So h e re again, ou r analysis in ACF Industries does not apply because it rested on subsections (b)(1)–(3)—that i s , on the highly reticul a ted scheme in the 4–R Act relatingsolely to property taxe s. Alabama also emphasizes our statement in ACF Industrie s that “ ‘[p]rinciples of federalis m’ ” supported our holding, Brief for Respondents 41–43 (quoting 510 U. S., at 345), but this final ef fort to borrow from th at decision’s analysis similarly fails. We ind eed recognized in ACF Industriest hat the 4–R Act limit s the tra dit i onal taxing power of the States. Because that is so, we expressed “hesitan[ce] to extend the statute beyond its evident scope.” 51 0 U. S., at 345. But here, for all the reas ons already noted, we are not “extend[ing] the statute”; we a r e merely giving effect to its clear meaning. To r e iterate: The 4–R Act distinguishes between property ta xes and other taxes. Congress expre ssed its intent to insulate propert y tax exemptions from challenge; a g ainst that backgroun d, ACF Industries stated that perm itting suchsuits would intrude on the States’ rightful authority. By contras t ,15 Cite as: 56 2 U

. S. ____ (2011) Opinion of theCourt 

### Congress drafted §11501 to enable railroads to contest all other tax e x emptions; and when Congress speaks in such preemptive terms, its decision m u st govern. Principles of federalism cannot narrow §11501’s clear scope. See, e. g. , CSX Transp., Inc. v. Georgia State Bd. of Equalizatio n , 552 U. S. 9 , 20 (2007) (rejecting the idea that federalism principles preclude challenges to s t ate valuation methodologies wh en §11501 “clearly authorized” such actions). Nothing in ACF Industriessuggested otherwise. B Alabama additionally makes a subtler argum e nt involving ACF Industries

. Given that decision, Alabama contends, a rul i ng in CS X’s favor here would c r eate troubling inconsisten c ies. Alab ama claims that subsection (b)(4)’s singular prohibition on “discriminat[ion]” would then
mean one thing for property ta xes (accord ing to ACF Industries) and another for non-property taxes, even though not h ing in the statute su pports “mor phing defin i

tions.” Brief for Respondents 32. And still worse than t h e difference in meaning would be the difference in resu lt: A ruling for CSX, Alabama argues, would gi ve railroads more protection against non-property taxes than against property taxes, even t h ough no good reason exists for this distinction. Alabama’s one-word-two-meanings argume nt collapses because itagain res t s on a m i sunderstanding of ACF Industries

. That decision did not define “discriminat[e]” or say that a tax exemption could not fall withi nthat term

. Quite to the contrary: As noted earlier, ACF Industries frankly a c knowledged that tax exemptions, including property ta x exemptions, “could be a variant of tax d i scrimination.” 510 U. S., at 343; supra, at 9. We held th at property ta x exemptions were immune from challeng e under subsection (b)(4) for structu ral, rather than linguistic, reasons. Even ass u ming these exemptions “discrim i

­16 CSX TRANS P ORTATION, INC. v. ALABAMA DEPT. OF REVE NUE Opinion of theCourt 

### nate[d],” th ey did so in a way th at the specific provisions of §§11501(b)( 1 )–(3) allow, and accordingly § 11501(b)(4)’s prohibition could not include them. That reasoning, once more, does not apply h e re, because subsections (b)(1)–(3) do not permit—indeed, in no wa y address—non-property tax exemptions. We therefore do not adopt a new definition of “disc r iminate” in this case; in the context of the 4–R Act, tha tword has, and has always had, just one meaning

. What remains is Alabama’s complaint that aruling i n CSX’s fa vor, when combined with our decision in ACF Industries, will result in divergent treatment of property and non-property ta xes. At times, Alabama dresses u p this objection in Latin: It contend s that the c anon of ejusdem generis , which “limits general terms [that] follow specific ones to matters similar to those specified,” Gooch
v. Uni t ed S t ates , 297 U. S. 124, 128 (1936), has a role to play in interpreting § 11501(b). More particularly, Al abama contends that this canon supports reading into §11501(b)(4) every limitation contained in §§11501(b)(1)– (3), including the exclusion of tax exemptio ns from the class of state actions subject to challenge. See Brief for Respondents 26–27. That interpretive move, Alabama rightly notes, would ensure equa l treatment of property tax and non-property ta x exemptions. But we think ejusd e m gene ris is not relevant here. As an initial matter, subsection (b)(4), “[a]lthough something of a catchal l, . . . is not a general or collective term following a list of specific items to which a particul a r statutory command is applicable ( e.g. , ‘fishing rods, nets, hooks , bobbers, sin k ers, and other equipm ent’).” United Sta t esv. Aguilar , 51 5 U. S. 593, 615 (1995) (S CALIA 

### , J. , concurring in part and dissenting in part). Rather, that subsection is “one of . .

. several distinct and independent prohibition s .” Ibid

. Relat e d to this structu ral point is a functional one. We typically use ejusd e m gen eris to ensure that a general word will not render specific words meani ngless. E.g. ,17 Cite as: 56 2 U

. S. ____ (2011) Opinion of theCourt 

### Circui t CityStor es, Inc. v. Ad ams , 532 U. S. 1 05, 114–115 (2001); see 2A N. Si nger, Suth erland on Statutes a n d Statutory Constructio n§47:17(7 th ed. 200 7). But that concern is a b sent here. Reading su bsection (b)(4) to cove r non-property tax exemptions will not deprive subsections(b)(1)–(3) of effect, because those subsections are addressed onl yto property taxes. A canon mea n ing literall y “of the sa me kind” has no application to provisions directed towa rd dissimilar subject m a tter. The better version of Alabama’s claim reads entirely in English; it i s simply that di stinguishing between property tax exemptions and other tax exemptions makes not a whit of se nse. W e are not m u ch incline dto disagree. Neither CSX nor the United States as amic us curiae ha s offered a satisfying re ason for why Cong ress drew this line—why in §§11501(b)(1)–(3) it barred chal lenges based on property tax exemptions, but then turned around in §11501(b)(4) to allow challenges b a sed on, sa y, excise tax exemptions. See Tr. o f Oral Arg. 4–5, 24–2 5. CSX, fo r example, has not presented any evidence that different ta x exemptions posed diff erent level s of threatto railroa ds’ financial st ability. So even if Con gress had agood reason for distinguishing between property and non-property ta x exemptions, we ack n owledge that it eludes us. But this admission d oes not take us far inAlabama’s direction. Even if the 4–R Ac t we re ambiguous, we doubt we would i n terpret su bsection (b)(4) to replic ate each fac e t of subsections (b)(1)–(3). Treating property tax exemptions and other tax exemptions equivalently might ma ke sense, as Alabama argues. Bu t so too might allowing railroads to challenge all taxes (property or non-propert y) that contai n exemptions. After all, as we noted earlier, tax exemptions are an obvious for m of tax di scrimination. See supra, at 8–9. It is hardly self-evident why Congres s would prohibit a State from charging a railroad a 4% ta x and a competitor a 2% tax, but allow the Sta t e to charge18 CSX TRANS P ORTATION, INC. v. ALABAMA DEPT. OF REVE NUE Opinion of theCourt 

### the railroad a 4 % ta x and the competitor nothing. T h e latter situation would frustrate t h e purposes of the Ac t even more than the former. In ACF Industries , we accepted thatanomaly because the terms and structu re of the Act de manded that we do so. But we could say no more in fav o r of the result than that it was “not so bizarre that Con gress could not have intended it.” 510 U. S., at 347 (internal quotation marks omitted). That was not a glowing recommendation, and we see n o rea s on today to view the m a tter differ e ntly. Ac c o rdingly, ev en assuming that statu t ory ambigu ity permit ted us to do so, we would hesitate to extend the distinction between tax exemptions and differential tax r a tes in order to avoid a distinction between property and non-prop ertytaxes. That woul d seem a poortrade of statutory ano malies. In any event, and more importantly, the choice is not ours to make. Congress wrot e the statute it wrote, and that statu t e draws a sharp line between property ta xes and other taxes. Congress drafted §§1150 1(b)(1)–(3) to exclude tax exemptions from the sphere o f prohibited property ta x discrimination. But it drafted §11501(b)(4) more broadly, without any of the prior subsections’ limitations, to proscribe other “ta x[es] that discriminat[e],” including through the use of exemptions. That congressional elect i on settles this case. Al abama’s preference for symmetry cannot trum p an asym metrical statute. And i t s preference for the greatest po ssible latitude to levy taxes cannot tru mp Congre ss’s decisi on to restrict discriminatory ta xation of rail carriers. IV Our decision in this case is lim ited. We holdthat CSX may challenge Alabama’s sales and use ta xes as “ta x[es] that discri minat[e] against .

. . rail carri er[s]” unde r §11501(b)(4). We do not addres s whether CSX should prevail in that challenge—wheth e r, that is, Alabama’s19 Cite as: 56 2 U

. S. ____ (2011) Opinion of theCourt 

### taxes in fact discriminate against railroads by exemptin g interstate motor and water ca rri ers. Alabama argues, in support of barring CSX’s challenge at the outset, that this inquiry into discrimination may pose difficulties. Brief for Respondents 35–37. We cannot deny that assertion, bu t neither can we respond to it by precluding CSX’s claim. Discrimination cases sometimes do raise knotty questions about whether and when dissimilar treatm e nt is adequately justified. In th e context of the 4–R Act, those h a rd calls can arise when States char ge different tax rates to different entities in a practice the statute specifically subjects to challenge. See §11501(b)(3). So too, difficult issues can emerge when, as here , States provide certain entities with tax exemptions. In either case, Congress has directed the federal courts to revie wa railroad’s challenge; and in either case, we would flout the congr e ssional command were we to declare the matter beyond us. For the reasons stated, we reverse the judgm e nt of the Eleventh Ci rcuit andre mand the c a se for furt her proceed

ings consistent with thi s opinion. It is so orde red._________________

_________________ 1 Cite as: 56 2 U

. S. ____ (2011)

T HOMAS , J. , dissen t in g 

# SUPREME CO URT O F THE UNI TED STATES

No. 09–5 20


### CSX T RANSPORTATION, INC., PETITIONER v. ALABAMA DEPARTM E NT OF R EVE NUE ET AL



### . ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEAL S FOR THE ELEV ENTH CIRC U I T [Febr u ar y22, 201 1] 

### J USTICE 

### T HOMA S 

### , withwhom J US TICE 

### G IN S B U R G 

### joins, dissenting. I agree with the Court that Alabama’s sales and use taxes are “another tax” within the meaning of 49 U. S. C. §11501(b)(4) and that ascheme of tax exemptions is capa

ble of making a ta x di scriminatory. An te , a t6–8. As a general matter, therefore, I agree that Alabama’s sales and use ta xes could potentially violate subs ection (b)(4), and would do so if their exemptions “discriminate[d] against a rail carrier.” §11501(b)(4). The majority’s hold

ing stops there, see ant e , at 10, n. 8, but I would go on. I would hold that, to violate §115 01(b)(4), a tax exemp

tion scheme must target or singl e out railroads by com

parison to general commercial and industri al taxpayer s. Although p a rts of the majority’s discussion appear to question th is standard, see ante , at 8–11, the limited holding does not foreclose it

. Bec ause CSX cannot prove facts tha t would satisfy that s t and ard in this case, I would affirm. I In my view, “another tax that discriminates against a rail carrier” in §11501(b)(4) means a tax—or tax e x emp tion schem e—that targets or si ngles out railroads a s2 CSX TRANS P ORTATION, INC. v. ALABAMA DEPT. OF REVE NUE T HOMAS , J. , dissen t in g 

### compared t o other commercial and industri al taxpayer s. That reading settles the ambiguity in the word “discri mi

nates” by r e ference to the restof the statu t e and gives subsection (b)(4) a reach consistent with the problem the statute addressed. A “Discrimina tes,” stand ing alone, is a flex ible word. Compare, e.g. , Cla c k a mas Gas t roente rolog y Associate s , P. C. v. Wel ls , 538 U. S. 440, 446 (2003) (“[T]he statutory purpose of [the Americans with Di sabilities Act of 1990 is] ridding the Nation of the evil of discrimination”), wit h Davisv. Bandemer , 4 78 U. S. 109, 132 (198 6) (plurality opinion) (“[U]nconstitu tionaldiscrimination occurs only when the electoral system is arra nged in a manner that will consist e ntly degrade a voter’s or a group of voters’ influence”); and Uni t e dHaul ers Assn., Inc. v. Oneida

Herkim er So lid Was t e Managem e nt Authori t y , 550 U. S. 330, 338 (2 007) (“In this context, ‘discrimination’ simply means differential trea t ment of in -state and out-of-state economic interests that benefits the former and burdens the latter” ( s ome internal quotation marks omitted)). Even though “discrimi nate” has a general legal meaning relating to differential treatme nt, its precise contours still depend on i t s context. See Guardi ans Assn. v. Civil Serv. Comm’n of New York City , 463 U. S. 582, 592 (1983) (opin

ion of Wh ite, J.) (“The language of Title VI o nits face i s ambiguous; the word ‘discrimination’ is inherently so”); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakk e , 438 U. S. 2 65, 284 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.) ( “ The concept of ‘discri mination’ .

. . is susceptible of varying interp ret a tions”). Here, the word “discriminates” in subsection (b)(4) is ambiguous as to th e appropriate comparison class. Burlington Northe rn R. Co
. v. Commissioner of Revenue , 509 N. W. 2d 551, 553 (Minn. 1993) (“To be discriminatory, a ta x must be discriminatory as compared to someone else”). It is also ambiguous as to3 Cite as: 56 2 U

. S. ____ (2011)

T HOMAS , J. , dissen t in g 

### what type of difference is required to violate the statute— e.g. , any dis t inction, singling out, or something in between

. Therefore, I would use the context to resolve the mean

ing of the w o rd as it is used in sub s ection (b)( 4). See Rob

insonv. Sh ell Oil Co. , 519 U. S. 3 37, 341 (19 97) (statuto ry interpretati on focuses on “the language itself, the specific context in which that language is used, and the broade r context of the statute as a whole”). We did precisely that in Departm e nt of Revenue of Ore. v. ACF Industri es, Inc. , 510 U. S. 332 (1994), where we similarly faced a question about the meaning of subsection(b)(4). In that case, our structu ral analysis of §11501(b) was “centra l to the inter

pretation of subsection (b)(4).” Id., at 340. 1 The structu re of §1150 1(b) is straightforwa r d. Subsec

tions (b)(1) through (3) instruct tha tStates ma y not assess railroad property at “ ahigher ratio to the true market value .

. . t han .

. . oth e r commercial and ind u strial prop

erty,” 49 U. S. C. §11501(b)(1), collect taxes ba sed on thos e inflated as sessments, §11501(b)( 2 ), or set property ta x rates for railroad property higher than that “applicable to commercial and industrial proper ty” in the s a me assess ment jurisdiction, §11501(b)(3). Subsection (b)(4) th en forbids “[i]mpos[ing] another tax that di scriminates against a rail carrier.” I would look to subsection s (b)(1) through (3 ) to deter

mine the meaning of “discriminates” in (b)(4). As many lower court s have corr ectly re cognized, subsection (b)(4) is a residua lclause, na turally appurtenant to subsection s (b)(1) through (3). 1 

### Mor eover, the phrase “another tax that discriminates” in subsection (b)(4) suggests th at the p r evi

-

——————

1 See, e.g
. , Kansas City Southern R. Co. v. McNamara , 817 F. 2d 36 8, 373 –3 74 ( CA5 19 87); Burling t on Northern R. Co. v. Sup erior , 932 F. 2 d 118 5, 118 6 (C A7 19 91); Alab am a Great Southe rn R

. C o
. v. Eagerto n , 663 F. 2d 10 36 , 1041 (CA 11 1 981).4 CSX TRANS P ORTATION, INC. v. ALABAMA DEPT. OF REVE NUE T HOMAS , J. , dissen t in g 

### ous subsections all des cribe taxes that “discri m inate” in a manner similar to tha tforbidden by subsection (b)(4). S ee Washin gtonSta t e De p t . of Socialand Heal th Serv s. v. Guardi anship Estate of Keffeler , 537 U. S. 3 71, 384 (2003) (reading t h e phrase “other legal process” restricti v e ly because “where general words follow specific words in a statutory e numeration, the general words are construed to embrace only objects similar in nature to those objects enumerated by the preceding specific words” (internal quotation marks and brackets o m itted)). Subsections (b)(1) thro ugh (3) eac hprohibit particular types of sta t e taxes tha ttar g etor single out railroad prop

erty for les s favorable tax treatment than oth e r commer cial and industrial property. Firs t, the “disc r iminat[ion]” addressed in subsections (b)(1) through (3) can only be described as taxes that target or single out r a ilroad prop

erty. Those subsections specifically concern taxes th at affect railr oad property different ly from th e way the y affect a larger class of compar ative taxpaye r s’ property. See §§1150 1(b)(1)–(3); cf. ante , a t 9 (“[E]ach o f subsection (b)’s provisions proscribes taxes t hat specially burden a rail carrier’s property or otherwise discriminate against a rail carrier” (emphasis deleted)). Second, each subsection refers to t h e same comparison class—other “commerci al and industrial property.” §§11501(b)(1)–(3). I think it follows that, under subsection (b)(4), a ta x “discriminates against a rail carrie r” if itsimilarly ta rgets railroads for tax treatment less f a vorable than other com

mercial and industria ltaxpa y ers. As we fo und in ACF Industries , the structu re of the statute provi d es a light b y which to navigate the meaning of subsection (b )(4). 2 The background of §11501(b) also supports this under

standing of subsection(b)(4). In previous cases, we hav e identified the problem that made s ubsection (b) necessary.5 Cite as: 56 2 U

. S. ____ (2011)

T HOMAS , J. , dissen t in g 

### At the time the Railr oad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act(4–R Act) was enacted, it was clear that “rail

roads ‘ “are easy prey for State and local tax assessors” in that they are “nonvot i ng, often nonresident, targets fo r local taxati on,” who ca nnot easily remove themselves from the locality.’ ” A C F I ndustries , supra, a t 336 (quoting W

e st er n Air Line s , Inc

. v. Board of Equalization of S. D. , 480 U. S. 123, 131 (19 87) (quotin g , in turn, S. Rep. No. 9 1

– 630, p. 3 ( 1969))). T h e “temptation to excessively tax nonvoting, nonresident business e s
. . . made f e deral legis

lation in this area necessary.” We st e r nAir Line s , su pra, at 131; see als o Burling t on Northe rn R. Co. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm’n , 481 U. S. 454, 457 (1987) (noting that “[a]fter an extended period of congressio nal investigation, Congress concluded that ‘railroads ar e over -taxed by at least $50 millioneac hyear’ ” (q uoting H. R. Rep. No. 94–725, p. 78 (1975))). In other words, §11501(b) responded primarily to wh a t its text describes—pr operty ta xe s that soa k ed the ra il

roads. The obvious rationale supporting subse ctions (b)(1) through (3) is that the “wa yto p r event tax d i scrimination against the railroads is to tie their tax fate to the fate of a large and local group of taxpayers.” Kansas City Southern R. Co. v. McNamara , 8 17 F. 2d 368, 375 (CA5 1987); see also Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Arizona , 78 F. 3d 438, 441 (CA9 1 996). In this way, su bsections (b)(1) through (3) establish a political check o nthe taxa tion of rail

roads. Sta t es cannot impose excessive property ta xes on the nonvoting, nonresident railroads without imposing the same taxes more generally on voting, r e sident loc a l businesses. Absent any indication that subsection (b)(4), as a resid

ual clause, has any different aim, it is reasonable to con

clude that it shares the same one as subs ections (b)(1) through (3). See, e. g., Kansas City Southern R. Co. , sup r a, at 373–374 (Congress included subsection (b)(4) “to ensure6 CSX TRANS P ORTATION, INC. v. ALABAMA DEPT. OF REVE NUE T HOMAS , J. , dissen t in g 

### that states did not shif t to new forms of tax discrimination outside the letter of the first three subsections”); Burlin g
ton North e r nR. Co. v. Superior , 9 32 F. 2d 11 85, 1186 (CA7 1991) (“Subsection (b) ( 4) is .

. . d e signed to prevent th e state from accomplishing the forbi d den end of discriminat

ing against railroads by substituting another type of ta x”). Subsection (b)(4) should be understood to tackle the issue of systemic railroad ov er-tax ation the same w a y that the other subsections do—by link i ng the taxation of railroads to the taxation of bus in esses with l o cal politica linfluence. Thus, a “tax that discriminates ag ainst a rail carrier” is a tax that ta rgets or singles out rail carriers compared to commercial and industrial taxpayers. B Under this test, CSX ’ s complaint was properly dis

missed. CSX has not alleged that Alabama’s sales and us e taxes tar g et railroads comparedto general commercial and industrial taxpayers. See ACF Industries , 510 U. S., at 346–347 (leaving open a case in which “railroads— either alon e or as pa rt of someisolated a n d targete d group—are the only co mmercial entities” subject to atax) ; Norfolk Southern R. Co. v. Alaba m a Dept. of Revenue , 5 50 F. 3d 1306, 1316 (CA11 2008). CSX alleges t hat it paid a tax on its fuel that certain rail competitors did not have to pay. But it concedes, as it must, that the s a les and use taxes are “ g enerally applicable.” Pet. for Cert. i; see Al a. Code §40–23–2(1) (2010 Cum. Supp.) (imposing a four percent sales tax on “every person, firm, or corporation .

. . selling at retail any tangible personal property whatso

ever”); §40–23–61(a) (2003); see also Norfolk Southern R

. Co. , supra, at 1316; Tr. of Oral Arg. 36. Discrete exemptions for certain railroad competitors— namely, fue lexemptions for interstate motor carriers an d interstate ships and barges—do not make a generally applicable tax “discri minat[ory]” under subsection (b)(4).7 Cite as: 56 2 U

. S. ____ (2011)

T HOMAS , J. , dissen t in g 

### Widespread exemptions could theoretically cause a facially general tax to targetra ilroads, but the limited exemptions at issue here do not suggest tha t , and CSX h a s not argu ed it. 2 

### Accordi n gly, CS X h a s not stated a cogniza b le claim for discrimination under §11501(b)(4). II The Court does not settle the ambiguity in the word “discriminates” in subsection (b)(4)—leaving open both the appropriate comparison class and the type of differential treatment required to co nstitute discrimination. 3

### T h e majority “h old[s] only t hat §11501(b)(4) enables a railroad to challenge an excise or other n o n-property tax as dis

criminatory on the basis of the tax scheme’s exemptions.” Ante , at 10 , n. 8. Thus, when the majority says that “a state excise taxthatap plies to railroads but e x empts thei r interstate c o mpetitors is subject to challenge under sub

section (b)(4),” ante , a t10, it must mean on ly that a ta x exemption scheme could potentially violate subsection (b)(4). As I unders t and it, the majority do es not decide whethe r

——————

2 Althoughthe major i tyr i gh tlyobserv es that whethera giv e n taxis disc r i minator ymayoften be a diffic u lt que s tion, see ante , at 19, this i s not a close case. I therefore need not define the exact boundaries of what c o nstitut e s tar g eting or singling o u t. See, e.g
. , No rfolkSouth ern R. Co. v. Alabama Dept. of Revenue , 550 F. 3d 13 06, 13 16, n

. 16 (C A1 1 200 8) (li s tin g ex amples of c o u r ts fi nding railroads targ eted by various sta t e taxsc h e mes).

3 The major i tydec lines to r e ac h the c o mpar ison c l ass is s u e. But the question presented was: “Whether a State’s exemptio ns of rail carrier
com p et it ors , butnotra il carriers , fromg e nera lly a pplicab l e sa les a n d use taxes on fuel subject the taxes to c h a llenge unde r4 9 U. S

. C. §115 01(b)( 4) a s ‘ a n o th ertaxth at disc r i mi n a tes ag ain s t a r a il c a r r i er .’ ” The question presented thus asks whethe r CSX can challenge a “gener

ally ap plicab le ” t a x ba sed onexempt ions granted to ra il competitors— a s t ra ight forwa r d com p a r is on cla s s is s u e. The lowerco urt s have s p lit over the prop er scope of the compar ison c l ass, an d th e issu e w a s pr e s e nted in this cas e
. I wo uld decide it.8 CSX TRANS P ORTATION, INC. v. ALABAMA DEPT. OF REVE NUE T HOMAS , J. , dissen t in g 

### CSX has stated a claim even inthis case but instead leaves that issue for remand. Ac cordingly, S t ates remain free to argue—and lower courts to hold—that complaints like CSX’s should be d i smissed f o r failing to state a “dis

criminat[ion]” claim u n der §11501(b)(4) whe nthey do n o t allege that railroads ar e targeted o rsingled out compare d to commercial and industrial taxp ayers generally. Nonetheless, despite the majority’s assertion that it is “inappropri ate” to address whether Alabama’s tax scheme actually discriminates within the meaning of §11501(b)(4), ante, at 10, n. 8, parts of its opinion suggest an answer to that question that I believe is in correct. Re lying on the second definition in Black’s La w Dictionary, the majority defines “discriminates” as “ ‘failure to treat all persons equally when no reas onable distinction can be found b e tween those favored and those not favored.’ ” Ante , at 8. This definit i on of “discriminate,” combined with the major

ity’s insistence that th e “distinctions drawn in §11501(b )
are .
. . bet w een railroads and other actors, whether inter

state or local,” suggests that the comparison class could be anyone
. 4 

### Ante, at 10. The majority ultimately implies that “another ta x thatdisc riminates against a ra il carrier” i s any tax that dra w s a distinction between a rail carrier and anyone elsewithout sufficient justification. See ante, at 10, n. 8 (“Whether the railroad will prevail .

. . depends on whether th e State offe rs a suffici ent justific ation for d e -

——————

4 A comparison class of “anyone” is br oader than either of the sides in the lower courts’ split on this issu e. Courts usually disagree ove r whet her t ous e com m e rcia l a n d indus t ria lt a xpa y ers orra ilroa d com

petitor s as the c o mpar ison c l ass. Co mpa r e Burlin gton Northe rn, S. F. R. Co. v. Lo hman, 193 F. 3d 98 4, 98 5– 986 (C A8 1 9 9 9 ) (apply i n g a com p a r is on cla s s of ra il com p et it ors ) ; B u r ling t on Nort h e rnR. Co. v. Com m i ssioner of Reven u e , 5 09 N. W. 2d 5 51, 55 3 (M in n
. 1993) ( s ame) , with KansasCity South ern R. Co. , 817 F. 2d, at 37 5 (u sin g c o mmer c i a l
an d in du str i altax p ay er s as th e c o mpar iso nc l ass); Atchi s on, T

. & S. F

. R. Co. v. Arizona , 78 F. 3d 438, 441 (C A9 1 996) (s ame).9 Cite as: 56 2 U

. S. ____ (2011)

T HOMAS , J. , dissen t in g 

### clining to provide the exemption at issue to rail carriers”). I do not read subsection (b )(4) so independently of (b)(1) through (3). Perhaps, as the majority asserts, subsection (b)(4) is not an ideal candidate for ejusdem generis

. An te , at 16–17. But given the ambiguity of subs ection (b)(4), (b)(1) throu gh (3) are the best guides for understanding its proper scope—somethi n g we recognized in ACF Industries

. 510 U. S., at 343. It is more reasonable to discern th e meaning of “discrimin a tes” in subsection (b)(4) using t h e preceding subsections than to pluck from the dictionary a definition for such a context-depend ent term. Detaching subsection (b)(4) from the rest of t h e section would expand its meaning well beyond the scope of the problem that necessitated §11501(b). Instead of simply eliminating the particular vulnerability of railroads by tying theirtax fate t o thatof general commercial and industrial taxpayers, r a ilroads would receive a surprising windfall: most-favored taxpayerstatus. This would con

vert subsection (b)(4) from a shield into a sword. The implication of the majority opinion is that if eve r y person and business in the State of Alabama paid a $1 annual tax, and one personwas exempt, CSX could su e under subsection (b)(4) and require the State to eithe r exempt CSX also or “offe[r] a sufficient justification” for the distinction. See ante , at 10, n. 8. Although the major

ity denies that this wo uld provide railroads most-favored

taxpayer status, see ib i d

. , it acknowledges that States would have to justify any tax di stinction that railroads argue may disfavor them. The only b u lwark aga i nst requiring States to give rail

roads every tax exemption that an yone else gets would b e open-endedjudicial determinations of what i s “sufficient justification” for such distinctions. Ibid. Unsurprisingly, the statute provides no guidanc e f o r what “su fficient just i

fication” m i ght mean, but neith e r does th e majority. There are all sorts of reasons that might lead a State to10 CSX TRANS P ORTATION, INC. v. ALABAMA DEPT. OF REVE NUE T HOMAS , J. , dissen t in g 

### distinguish between railroads and others for tax purposes. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 58. For instance, in this case, Ala

bama point s out that motor car r iers and int e rstate wa t e r carriers pa y a separate—and frequently higher—tax on fuel from which railroads are effectively exempt. Brief fo r Respondents 12–16, 5 9–60. That might be a “sufficient justification” for their exemptions from the tax e s here, but the majority expressly disclaims reaching th at question. Ante , at 5, n. 5. 5

### Of co urse, logically extending the mean

ing of “disc r iminates” from subsections (b)(1) through ( 3 ) would avoid this problem, as there is no need for “justifica

tion” at all: A tax either targets railroads by comparison to commercial and industrial taxpayers or it does not. * * * I disagree with the m e aning of “discriminat[e]” in sub

section (b)(4) that the majority seems to imply. The rest of §11501(b) p r ovides a logical and coherent way to deter

mine what subsection (b)(4) means, and we have used tha t methodology before. See ACF Industries , 510 U. S., at 340. The b e st way to read subsect i on (b)(4) is as prohibit

ing taxes that target or single out r a ilroads as compared t o general commercial and industri al taxpayers. That is the test I would establish, and I do not understan d the major

ity to foreclose the low e r courts from utilizin g it. Under that test, CSX’s chall e nge to Alabama’s sales and us e taxes was properly di smissed. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

——————

5 The major i ty appear s to c o nsider“s ufficient justificat ion” as a poten

tial defense fo r the State, se e ante , at 10, n

. 8, bu t sin c e it der iv e s fr om the meaningof “disc r i mina tes,” a lac kof sufficient jus t ification woul d seem to be a par tof wh at a r a ilr oa d would have to pl ead in order t o sta t e a c l aim f o ra v i olationof §1150 1(b)(4 ).