Case 1:22-cv-02876-CRC Document 6-1 Filed 01/03/23 Page 1 of 17 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 

) 

PALMER, ) 

) 

Plaintiff, ) Civ. No. 22-2876 (CRC) 

) 

v. ) 

) MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, ) MOTION TO DISMISS 

) 

Defendant. ) 

) 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION’S MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND 

AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION TO DISMISS 

Lisa J. Stevenson Jacob Siler (D.C. Bar No. 1003383) 

(D.C. Bar No. 457628) Assistant General Counsel 

Acting General Counsel jsiler@fec.gov 

lstevenson@fec.gov 

Shaina Ward (D.C. Bar No. 1002801) 

Kevin Deeley Attorney 

Associate General Counsel sward@fec.gov 

kdeeley@fec.gov 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION 

January 3, 2023 1050 First Street NE 

Washington, DC 20463 

(202) 694-1650 
 

Case 1:22-cv-02876-CRC Document 6-1 Filed 01/03/23 Page 2 of 17 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Page 

INTRODUCTION .....................................................................................................................1 

BACKGROUND .......................................................................................................................1 

A. The FEC and FECA’s Administrative Enforcement 

Process ...............................................................................................................1 

B. FECA’s Limits on Contributions.......................................................................3 

C. Agency Proceedings Related to Plaintiff’s Administrative 

Complaint...........................................................................................................4 

D. Plaintiff’s Judicial Complaint ............................................................................6 

ARGUMENT.............................................................................................................................7 

I. PALMER LACKS ARTICLE III STANDING TO COMPEL 

THE COMMISSION TO “PROPERLY INVESTIGATE” HER 

ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLAINT.............................................................................7 

A. Standard of Review ............................................................................................7 

B. Palmer Does Not Have Standing Because She Cannot Show a 

Concrete and Particularized Injury Based on Any Alleged 

FECA Violation ...............................................................................................10 

CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................................12 

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 

Page(s) 

Cases 

Am. Legal Found. v. FCC, 808 F.2d 84 (D.C. Cir. 1987)..........................................................9 

Arpaio v. Obama, 797 F.3d 11 (D.C. Cir. 2015) .......................................................................7 

Attias v. Carefirst, Inc., 865 F.3d 620 (D.C. Cir. 2017) ............................................................8 

Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).........................................................................................10 

Campaign Legal Ctr. v. FEC, 860 Fed. App’x 1 (D.C. Cir. May 11, 2021) ..................... 10-11 

Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in Wash. v. FEC, 

267 F. Supp. 3d 50 (D.D.C. 2017)........................................................................................11 

Common Cause v. FEC, 108 F.3d 413 (D.C. Cir. 1997) .........................................9, 10, 11, 12 

Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724 (2008) ...........................................................................................8 

Freedom Republicans, Inc. v. FEC, 13 F.3d 412 (D.C. Cir. 1994) ...........................................9 

Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018).............................................................................. 9-10 

Grand Lodge of the Fraternal Ord. of Police v. Ashcroft, 

185 F. Supp. 2d 9 (D.D.C. 2001)........................................................................................ 7-8 

Haase v. Sessions, 835 F.2d 902 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ....................................................................7 

Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. TSA, 429 F.3d 1130 (D.C. Cir. 2005)........................................... 8-9 

Jerome Stevens Pharms., Inc. v. FDA, 402 F.3d 1249 (D.C. Cir. 2005) ...................................7 

Lance v. Coffman, 549 U.S. 437 (2009) ..................................................................................10 

Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973) .........................................................................9 

Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992).........................................................................8 

M.J. v. District of Columbia, 401 F. Supp. 3d 1 (D.D.C. 2019)................................................7 

Nat’l Ass’n for Latino Cmty. Asset Builders v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 

581 F. Supp. 3d 101 (D.D.C. 2022)........................................................................................8 

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Sargent v. Dixon, 130 F.3d 1067 (D.C. Cir. 1997)..................................................................10 

Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976).........................................................8 

Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330 (2016) .............................................................................9 

Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488 (2009) .................................................................9 

Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975)........................................................................................9 

Wertheimer v. FEC, 268 F.3d 1070 (D.C. Cir. 2001)........................................................10, 11 

Statutes 

52 U.S.C. § 30101(8) .................................................................................................................3 

52 U.S.C. § 30101(9) .................................................................................................................3 

52 U.S.C. § 30106......................................................................................................................1 

52 U.S.C. § 30106(b)(1) ............................................................................................................2 

52 U.S.C. § 30106(c) .................................................................................................................2 

52 U.S.C. § 30107..................................................................................................................1, 2 

52 U.S.C. § 30107(a)(8).............................................................................................................2 

52 U.S.C. § 30109......................................................................................................................6 

52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(1).........................................................................................................2, 4 

52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(2).............................................................................................................2 

52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(4)(A)(i) ...................................................................................................2 

52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(6).............................................................................................................2 

52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(6)(A) .......................................................................................................3 

52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(8)(A) ...............................................................................................1, 3, 9 

52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(8)(C) .......................................................................................................3 

52 U.S.C. § 30111(a)(8).............................................................................................................2 

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52 U.S.C. § 30118(a) .................................................................................................................4 

52 U.S.C. § 30119............................................................................................................4, 5, 12 

52 U.S.C. § 30119(a)(1).............................................................................................................4 

52 U.S.C. § 30122............................................................................................................4, 5, 12 

Rules and Regulations 

11 C.F.R. § 100.52(a).................................................................................................................3 

11 C.F.R. § 100.52(d)(1)............................................................................................................3 

11 C.F.R. § 114.2.................................................................................................................5, 12 

11 C.F.R. § 114.2(b) ..................................................................................................................4 

11 C.F.R. § 114.2(d) ..................................................................................................................4 

11 C.F.R. § 111.4.......................................................................................................................2 

11 C.F.R. § 115.2(a)...................................................................................................................4 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1)..........................................................................................................1, 7 

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INTRODUCTION 

The Federal Election Commission (“Commission” or “FEC”) respectfully files this 

motion to dismiss pro se plaintiff Barbara Palmer’s Complaint Seeking Judicial Review of 

Administrative Action (“Compl.”) (Docket No. 1) pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(1). Plaintiff’s complaint rests on the allegation that the FEC improperly dismissed an 

administrative complaint plaintiff previously filed with the Commission that claimed that grants 

distributed during the 2020 election by a non-profit corporation gave rise to multiple violations 

of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (“FECA”). Plaintiff filed her complaint to this 

Court under 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(8)(A), (C) of FECA, which provides a cause of action for a 

“party aggrieved by an order of the Commission dismissing [an administrative] complaint filed 

by such a party,” for a determination that the Commission’s dismissal was “contrary to law.” Id. 

Although the Commission also disputes that it acted contrary to law in its dismissal of 

plaintiff’s administrative complaint, plaintiff’s judicial complaint fails in its entirety for a 

separate preliminary reason. Plaintiff lacks Article III standing to bring this suit because she has 

failed to establish any concrete and particularized injury. Rather, Palmer’s sole claim that the 

Commission failed to “properly investigate” plaintiff’s administrative complaint has asserted 

only a generalized desire to see the FEC apply the law against others. Because a generalized 

interest in seeing federal law enforced is insufficient to establish Article III standing, plaintiff’s 

suit must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The FEC’s Motion should be granted. 

I. BACKGROUND 

A. The FEC and FECA’s Administrative Enforcement Process 

The FEC is a six-member, independent agency of the United States government with 

“exclusive jurisdiction” to administer, interpret, and civilly enforce FECA. See generally 52 

U.S.C. §§ 30106, 30107. Congress authorized the Commission to “formulate policy” with 

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respect to FECA, id. § 30106(b)(1); “to make, amend, and repeal such rules . . . as are necessary 

to carry out the provisions of [FECA],” id. §§ 30107(a)(8), 30111(a)(8); and to investigate 

possible violations of the Act, id. § 30109(a)(1)-(2). The Commission has exclusive jurisdiction 

to initiate civil enforcement actions for violations of the Act in the United States district courts. 

Id. §§ 30106(b)(1), 30109(a)(6). 

FECA permits any person to file an administrative complaint with the Commission 

alleging a violation of the Act. Id. § 30109(a)(1); see also 11 C.F.R. § 111.4. After reviewing 

the complaint and any response filed by the respondent, the Commission considers whether there 

is “reason to believe” that FECA has been violated. 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(2). If at least four of 

the FEC’s six Commissioners vote to find such reason to believe, the Commission may 

investigate the alleged violation. Id. §§ 30106(c), 30109(a)(2). 

If the Commission votes to proceed with an investigation, it then must determine whether 

there is “probable cause” to believe that FECA has been violated. Id. § 30109(a)(4)(A)(i). Like 

a reason-to-believe determination, a determination to find probable cause to believe that a 

violation of FECA has occurred requires an affirmative vote of at least four Commissioners. Id. 

§§ 30106(c), 30109(a)(4)(A)(i). If the Commission so votes, it is statutorily required to attempt 

to remedy the violation informally and attempt to reach a conciliation agreement with the 

respondent. Id. Entering into a conciliation agreement requires an affirmative vote of at least 

four Commissioners and such an agreement, unless violated, operates as a bar to any further 

action by the Commission related to the violation underlying that agreement. Id. 

§ 30109(a)(4)(A)(i). If the Commission is unable to reach a conciliation agreement, FECA 

authorizes the agency to institute a de novo civil enforcement action in federal district court. Id. 

§ 30109(a)(6)(A). The institution of a civil action under section 30109(a)(6)(A) requires an 

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affirmative vote of at least four Commissioners. Id. 

If, at any point in the administrative process, the Commission determines that no 

violation has occurred, FECA provides the complainant with a narrow cause of action for 

judicial review of the Commission’s dismissal decision. See id. § 30109(a)(8)(A) (detailing the 

procedure for seeking judicial review of an administrative dismissal and the scope of such 

review). That statutory provision also allows a party who has filed an administrative complaint 

with the Commission, after 120 days, to bring a civil action in this District alleging that the 

Commission has “fail[ed] to act” on its complaint. Id. § 30109(a)(8)(A). 

FECA expressly limits the scope of relief available to a plaintiff challenging an FEC 

dismissal decision or alleging that the Commission has failed to act on an administrative 

complaint. The reviewing court may only (a) declare that the Commission’s failure to act or 

dismissal was “contrary to law” and (b) order the Commission to “conform with” the court’s 

declaration within 30 days. 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(8)(C). 

B. FECA’s Limits on Contributions 

FECA defines a “contribution” as any “gift, subscription, loan, advance, or deposit of 

money or anything of value made by any person for the purpose of influencing any election for 

Federal office.” 52 U.S.C. § 30101(8); accord 11 C.F.R. § 100.52(a). The term “anything of 

value” includes in-kind contributions, such as “the provision of any goods or services without 

charge or at a charge that is less than the usual normal charge.” 11 C.F.R. § 100.52(d)(1). The 

Act defines an expenditure as “any purchase, payment, distribution, loan, advance, deposit, or 

gift of money or anything of value, made by any person for the purpose of influencing any 

election for Federal office. 52 U.S.C. § 30101(9). 

FECA prohibits any person from making a contribution in the name of another person or 

knowingly allowing his or her name to be used to make such a contribution. Id. § 30122. 

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FECA and the Commission’s regulations also prohibit contributions during certain time periods 

by any person who enters into a contract with the United States or its departments or agencies for 

“furnishing any material, supplies, or equipment,” if payment on such contract “is to be made in 

whole or in part from funds appropriated by Congress.” Id. § 30119(a)(1); 11 C.F.R. § 115.2(a). 

Finally, FECA prohibits corporations from making contributions to federal candidates, and 

likewise bars candidates, political committees (other than independent expenditure-only political 

committees and committees with hybrid accounts), and other persons, from knowingly accepting 

or receiving corporate contributions. 52 U.S.C. § 30118(a); 11 C.F.R. § 114.2(b), (d). FECA 

also provides that “any officer or any director of any corporation” shall not “consent to any 

[prohibited] contribution or expenditure by the corporation.” 52 U.S.C. § 30118(a). 

C. Agency Proceedings Related to Plaintiff’s Administrative Complaint 

On November 7, 2021, plaintiff filed an administrative complaint with the Commission 

which was designated Matter Under Review (“MUR”) 7946. Plaintiff supplemented her 

complaint on January 3, 2022. (See Compl. ¶ 8; see also Pl.’s Exh. 2 (Doc. No. 1-4), Pl.’s Exh. 3 

(Doc. No. 1-5).) Palmer’s administrative complaint alleged that grants distributed during the 

2020 election by the Center for Tech and Civic Life, (“CTCL”), a 501(c)(3) non-profit 

corporation, which were made to state and local election administrators ostensibly for the 

purpose of assisting with the administration of elections during the COVID-19 pandemic, were, 

in fact, made for the purpose of increasing the turnout of Democratic voters, and therefore 

constituted contributions to various Democratic candidates or committees. (Pl.’s Exh. 3 at 2 ¶ 6 

(alleging that the grants were “designed with the intent to tilt the 2020 federal elections toward” 

Democratic candidates).) The administrative complaint points to the distribution of the grants, 

asserting that they were targeted at “urban cities . . . to turn out the progressive vote.” (Id. at 9 

¶ 46.) In addition to CTCL, Palmer’s administrative complaint requested that the Commission 

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seek action against one CTCL employee, the Election Assistance Commission, (“EAC”), an 

independent federal agency, and two employees of the EAC. (See Pl.’s Exh. 3.). 

The administrative complaint alleged that there was an effort to “funnel funds from a 

wealthy individual and their related and/or controlled entities, through a federal contractor,” 

which plaintiff alleges that CTCL was in the 2020 election. (Id. at 3 ¶ 8.)1 The complaint further 

alleged that the EAC was also a source of the grants and that “taxpayer funds” were effectively 

“funnel[ed] . . . to assist with the 2020 election cycle campaigns of specific candidates and/or 

political parties.” (Id. at 3 ¶ 7.) Based on these allegations, plaintiff claimed that the CTCL, 

EAC, and associated personnel violated a variety of FECA provisions. Plaintiff alleged that the 

CTCL grants were actually in-kind contributions, which CTCL was prohibited from making 

either because it is a corporation or because it was a federal contractor. (Id. at 3 ¶ 9 (citing 52 

U.S. § 30119; 11 C.F.R. § 114.2).) Plaintiff further claimed that CTCL knowingly permitted its 

name to be used to make a contribution in the name of another, and that CTCL’s grants 

constituted contributions in excess of the limit. (Id. at 3 ¶ 10 (citing 52 U.S.C. § 30122).) 

Plaintiff requested that the Commission (1) “investiga[te]” CTCL’s alleged payments to the 

EAC; and (2) investigate all respondents for violations of 52 U.S.C. §§ 30119 and 30122 and 11 

C.F.R. § 114.2. (Id. at 19-20.) 

On July 26, 2022, after considering Palmer’s complaint and responses from persons 

referenced in the complaint, the Commission determined by a vote of 6-0 that there was no 

reason to believe a violation of FECA had occurred and dismissed the administrative complaint. 

See FEC, MUR 7946 Certification, https://www.fec.gov/files/legal/murs/7946/7946_23.pdf. The 

The text of plaintiff’s administrative complaint identified two sources of funding for the 

grants as Mark Zuckerberg, the founder and CEO of Meta (formerly Facebook), and his wife Dr. 

Pricilla Chan. (Exh. 3 at 44 ¶¶ 58-64.) 

5 

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Commission notified plaintiff on August 8, 2022, regarding the dismissal of her complaint and 

provided a Factual and Legal analysis that explained the Commission’s findings. See 

Notification to Barbara W. Palmer, https://www.fec.gov/files/legal/murs/7946/7946_24.pdf. The 

Commission explained that there was no reasonable basis to conclude that the respondents 

funded or awarded grants for the purpose of influencing a federal election or to increase votes for 

Democratic candidates. Further, the Commission found that there was no indication that the 

respondents coordinated with any candidate or committee, and that therefore the grants were 

neither contributions nor expenditures under FECA. The Commission’s findings, responses, and 

certifications are all publicly available on the FEC’s website. See generally Closed Matters 

Under Review, MUR 7946, https://www.fec.gov/data/legal/matter-under-review/7946/. 

Additional information about the CTCL grants plaintiff challenges, including the amount and 

recipient information of CTCL’s donations to local election officers, are disclosed in CTCL’s 

IRS Form 990 that plaintiff submitted to the FEC with her administrative complaint. (See Pl.’s 

Exh. 2, pp. 35-172, available at https://www.fec.gov/files/legal/murs/7946/7946_06.pdf.) 

D. Plaintiff’s Judicial Complaint 

On September 21, 2022, plaintiff filed her complaint with this Court in connection with 

the administrative complaint that plaintiff had earlier filed with the agency. (See generally 

Compl.) Plaintiff alleges that the Commission, has “wholly failed to address the issues raised in 

Plaintiff’s Administrative Complaint,” or “make proper referral as required by law.” (Id. ¶ 14.) 

Plaintiff requests that the Court “declare that the [FEC] failed to properly investigate” her 

complaint pursuant to 52 U.S.C. § 30109 and “[o]rder the FEC to conform with such declaration 

within 30 days.” (Compl. Requested Relief.) 

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ARGUMENT 

I. PALMER LACKS ARTICLE III STANDING TO COMPEL THE COMMISSION 

TO “PROPERLY INVESTIGATE” HER ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLAINT 

The Court should dismiss plaintiff’s complaint because she has failed to establish the 

required elements of standing under Article III of the Constitution. Plaintiff has alleged no 

personal injury from the alleged CTCL grants or from any other alleged FECA violation. 

Indeed, plaintiff makes no attempt to explain how the Commission’s decision to dismiss her 

administrative complaint caused her any concrete injury. Rather, Palmer relies on her statements 

that she has standing as a “representative of all United States citizens, regardless of political 

party affiliation, that seek to protect their most basic right to have meaningful participation in 

electing their political leaders.” (Compl. ¶ 5). These generalized grievances fail as a matter of 

law. 

A. Standard of Review 

A plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that she has properly invoked this Court’s 

subject-matter jurisdiction. See Arpaio v. Obama, 797 F.3d 11, 19 (D.C. Cir. 2015). A motion 

to dismiss for lack of standing is properly considered under Rule 12(b)(1), as lack of standing is 

a “defect in subject matter jurisdiction.” Haase v. Sessions, 835 F.2d 902, 906 (D.C. Cir. 1987); 

M.J. v. District of Columbia, 401 F. Supp. 3d 1, 7-8 (D.D.C. 2019). When deciding a motion 

under Rule 12(b)(1), a court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint as 

true. See Jerome Stevens Pharms., Inc. v. FDA, 402 F.3d 1249, 1253 (D.C. Cir. 2005). Because 

the court has “an affirmative obligation to ensure that it is acting within the scope of its 

jurisdictional authority,” however, the factual allegations in the complaint “will bear closer 

scrutiny in resolving a 12(b)(1) motion than in resolving a 12(b)(6) motion for failure to state a 

claim.” Grand Lodge of the Fraternal Ord. of Police v. Ashcroft, 185 F. Supp. 2d 9, 13-14 

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(D.D.C. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Nat’l Ass’n for Latino Cmty. Asset 

Builders v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 581 F. Supp. 3d 101, 104 (D.D.C. 2022) (same). As the 

party bringing suit, Palmer bears the burden of establishing standing. Attias v. Carefirst, Inc., 

865 F.3d 620, 625 (D.C. Cir. 2017). 

To have Article III standing, a plaintiff must establish: (1) she has “suffered an ‘injury in 

fact[,]” which the Supreme Court defines as “an invasion of a legally protected interest which is 

(a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not [merely] conjectural or 

hypothetical,” Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (internal citations and 

quotation marks omitted); (2) that there is a “causal connection between the injury and the 

conduct complained of[,]” which requires the injury to be “fairly traceable to the challenged 

action of the defendant, and not the result of the independent action of some third party not 

before the court,” id. (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted); and (3) that it is “likely, 

as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.” Id. 

(internal quotation marks omitted). These three components of the Article III “case or 

controversy” requirement are designed to ensure that the “plaintiff has alleged such a personal 

stake in the outcome of the controversy as to warrant his invocation of federal court jurisdiction 

and to justify [the] exercise of the court’s remedial powers on his behalf.” Simon v. E. Ky. 

Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38 (1976) (internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, 

“standing is not dispensed in gross” and “a plaintiff must demonstrate standing for each claim he 

seeks to press and for each form of relief that is sought.” Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 734 

(2008) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). 

Where a plaintiff asserts a procedural right, she must show that she has suffered a 

personal and particularized injury that impairs one of her concrete interests. Int’l Bhd. of 

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Teamsters v. TSA, 429 F.3d 1130, 1135 (D.C. Cir. 2005). Despite the fact that Congress passed 

section 30109(a)(8)(A)’s judicial review provision, “[i]t makes no difference that the procedural 

right has been accorded by Congress.” Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 497 (2009). 

“[D]eprivation of a procedural right without some concrete interest that is affected by the 

deprivation — a procedural right in vacuo — is insufficient to create Article III standing.” 

Summers, 555 U.S. at 496. Particularized means that “the injury must affect the plaintiff in a 

personal and individual way.” Id. at 560 n.1. And when, as here, “a plaintiff’s asserted injury 

arises from the government’s allegedly unlawful regulation (or lack of regulation) of someone 

else,” standing is “substantially more difficult” to establish. Id. at 562; accord Common Cause v. 

FEC, 108 F.3d 413, 417 (D.C. Cir. 1997); see also Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 

(1973) (“[A] private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or 

nonprosecution of another.”) Standing “focuses on the complaining party to determine ‘whether 

the litigant is entitled to have the court decide the merits of the dispute or of particular issues.’” 

Am. Legal Found. v. FCC, 808 F.2d 84, 88 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 

490, 498 (1975)). Thus, courts “may not entertain suits alleging generalized grievances that 

agencies have failed to adhere to the law.” Freedom Republicans, Inc. v. FEC, 13 F.3d 412, 415 

(D.C. Cir. 1994); see also Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 341 (2016) (“Congress’ role in 

identifying and elevating intangible harms does not mean that a plaintiff automatically satisfies 

the injury-in-fact requirement” because “Article III standing requires a concrete injury even in 

the context of a statutory violation.”). A plaintiff must demonstrate “that he has ‘a personal stake 

in the outcome,’ . . . distinct from a ‘generally available grievance about government.’” Gill v. 

Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1923 (2018) (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962) and 

Lance v. Coffman, 549 U.S. 437, 439 (2009)). 

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B. Palmer Does Not Have Standing Because She Cannot Show a Concrete and 

Particularized Injury Based on Any Alleged FECA Violation 

Plaintiff cannot rely on her abstract desire to see the law enforced against the alleged 

violators in her administrative complaint in her preferred manner to establish Article III standing. 

A plaintiff’s interest in “seeing that the laws are enforced” is not “legally cognizable within the 

framework of Article III.” Sargent v. Dixon, 130 F.3d 1067, 1069 (D.C. Cir. 1997); see Lujan, 

504 U.S. at 573-74. Here, Palmer fails to show that she has suffered any concrete or 

particularized injury from the alleged activities by the administrative respondents that plaintiff 

has identified. Rather, although the Commission unanimously found no reason to believe the 

respondents violated FECA after considering the allegations, plaintiff now simply requests that 

this Court compel the FEC to “properly investigate” the respondents and “make proper referral 

as required by law.” (Compl. ¶ 11; id. ¶ 14.) Such concerns that the Commission should enforce 

the law against alleged violators cannot be the basis for standing because there is no “justiciable 

interest in having the Executive Branch act in a lawful manner.” Common Cause, 108 F.3d at 

419. 

Thus, Palmer has no Article III right to seek “a legal conclusion that carries certain law 

enforcement consequences” for others. Wertheimer v. FEC, 268 F.3d 1070, 1075 (D.C. Cir. 

2001). “While ‘Congress can create a legal right . . . the interference with which will create an 

Article III injury,’ . . . Congress cannot . . . create standing by conferring ‘upon all persons . . . an 

abstract, self-contained, noninstrumental ‘right’ to have the Executive observe the procedures 

required by law.’” Common Cause, 108 F.3d at 418 (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573) (internal 

citation omitted); see also Campaign Legal Ctr. v. FEC, No. 20-5159, 860 Fed. App’x 1, *4 

(D.C. Cir. May 11, 2021) (“[A]n interest ‘in proper administration of the laws (specifically, in 

agencies’ observance of a particular, statutorily prescribed procedure)’ is a generic interest in 

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good government that is shared equally by all citizens and does not amount to a concrete or 

particularized Article III injury.”). 

Plaintiff’s judicial complaint makes clear that she has suffered no injury-in-fact from the 

CTCL grants. Indeed, she describes herself as a person “eligible to vote in United States federal 

elections and registered as a voter in the State of Texas.” (Compl. ¶ 5.) Plaintiff further alleges 

that she is “representative of all United States citizens, regardless of political party affiliation, 

that seek to protect their most basic right to have meaningful participation in electing their 

political leaders.” (Id.). Plaintiff does not even attempt to explain how the lack of investigation 

of the allegations in the administrative complaint have caused her an injury “in a personal and 

individual way.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 n.1; see also Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in Wash. v. 

FEC, 267 F. Supp. 3d 50, 53 (D.D.C. 2017) (“easily” dismissing claims because plaintiffs “have 

not alleged any injury in fact arising from [the alleged wrongdoing]”). 

Plaintiff claims that the Commission “fail[ed] to make significant inquiry,” or “carefully 

examine” the transactions at issue (Compl. ¶ 13), but her desire to have the FEC pursue the 

administrative respondents is not a legally cognizable injury. These were the precise interests 

held insufficient in Common Cause. See 108 F.3d at 418; see also Wertheimer, 268 F.3d at 

1074-75 (rejecting standing for plaintiffs who “do not really seek additional facts but only the 

legal determination that certain transactions constitute coordinated expenditures”). The prayer 

for relief in the administrative complaint further reveals plaintiff’s lack of injury sufficient for 

Article III purposes. Plaintiff requested that the Commission (1) investigate CTCL’s alleged 

payments to the EAC; and (2) investigate all respondents for violations of FECA’s prohibition on 

contributions by federal contractors, contributions in the name of another, and ban on corporate 

contributions, pursuant to 52 U.S.C. §§ 30119 and 30122 and 11 C.F.R. § 114.2. The first 

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Case 1:22-cv-02876-CRC Document 6-1 Filed 01/03/23 Page 17 of 17 

requested relief does not relate to an alleged campaign finance violation but rather to a question 

of appropriations that is outside the FEC’s jurisdiction. The second does not allege a disclosure 

violation but only that the money came from impermissible sources, or sources already known to 

plaintiff, including Mark Zuckerberg and Pricilla Chan. 

In this case, Palmer may have a general interest in learning whether there was anything 

unlawful about the CTCL grants, but plaintiff’s desire “for the Commission to ‘get the bad 

guys’” is not a legally cognizable interest, Common Cause, 108 F.3d at 418. Plaintiff cannot 

establish a concrete and particularized injury from the dismissal of the allegations in her 

administrative complaint and thus has failed to demonstrate Article III standing. 

CONCLUSION 

For all the foregoing reasons, the Court should dismiss plaintiff’s complaint. 

Respectfully submitted, 

Lisa J. Stevenson (D.C. Bar No. 457628) Jacob Siler (D.C. Bar No. 1003383) 

Acting General Counsel Assistant General Counsel 

lstevenson@fec.gov jsiler@fec.gov 

Kevin Deeley /s/ Shaina Ward 

Associate General Counsel Shaina Ward (D.C. Bar No. 1002801) 

kdeeley@fec.gov Attorney 

sward@fec.gov 

January 3, 2022 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION 

1050 First Street NE 

Washington, DC 20463 

(202) 694-1650 

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