IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 20-0825

Filed October 6, 2021

STATE OF IOWA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

JEFFREY JUERGENS,

Defendant-Appellant.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Dubuque County, Monica Zrinyi 

Wittig, Judge.

Jeffrey Juergens appeals his convictions of lascivious acts with a child by 

solicitation and indecent exposure. AFFIRMED.

Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Shellie L. Knipfer, Assistant 

Appellate Defender, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Darrel Mullins, Assistant Attorney 

General, for appellee.

Considered by Tabor, P.J., Mullins, J., and Gamble, S.J.*

*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 

(2021).
2

GAMBLE, Senior Judge.

Jeffrey Juergens appeals his convictions of lascivious acts with a child by 

solicitation and indecent exposure. We affirm.

I. Background Facts

Juergens is a grandfather figure to, then four-year-old, A.R.G. In March 

2019, A.R.G.’s parents arranged for Juergens to watch A.R.G. when their usual 

babysitters were not available. The next day, A.R.G. watched a movie featuring a 

character with a scar and commented “that grandpa had showed her his scar.” Her 

parents questioned if she meant Juergens’s scar from open-heart surgery. A.R.G. 

told them no and instead said that Juergens had pulled down his pants. When 

questioned further about what she meant, A.R.G. demonstrated what Juergens did 

by pulling her pants down. A.R.G. also told her mother that Juergens “asked her 

to touch it, and she said no.” According to the father, A.R.G. also said that 

Juergens “touched her down there so it hurt, and then she laid down on the floor 

and cried.” 

The father called his mother (the grandmother) and asked about what 

A.R.G. said. Juergens was with the grandmother and denied he did anything, but 

A.R.G. could hear his denials over the phone and kept saying, “Yes, he did. Yes, 

he did, did do that.” 

The mother planned to report the incident the following Monday. That 

weekend, the mother was stressed and “pretty emotional” but “tr[ied] to keep it 

peaceful for [A.R.G.] and not talk about it a whole lot, because [she] wasn’t quite

sure how to deal with it.” A.R.G. did not bring up the incident over the weekend. 
3

The following Monday, the mother gave a statement to the police while 

A.R.G. was present. Then the mother took A.R.G. for a medical examination by a 

pediatrician. A.R.G. was “very quiet and subdued” during the examination. The 

pediatrician talked primarily with the mother, then with A.R.G. A.R.G. responded 

to questions by nodding her head yes or no. The pediatrician asked “whether her 

grandfather did what she said earlier, whether he had showed her his private 

parts,” and A.R.G. responded affirmatively. She asked “if he had her touch his 

private parts with her hand,” and A.R.G. responded affirmatively. She asked 

“whether he put his private parts in her mouth,” and A.R.G. responded in the 

negative. And she asked “if he put his fingers or private parts inside of her private 

parts,” and A.R.G. responded in the negative.

Ten days later, Rachel Haskin completed a recorded child protective center 

(CPC) forensic interview of A.R.G. During the interview, A.R.G. stated Juergens 

showed her his “coochie” and asked her to touch it but she said no. 

Juergens was then charged by trial information with second-degree sexual 

abuse, lascivious acts with a child by fondling or touching, lascivious acts with a 

child by solicitation, and indecent exposure. A jury found Juergens guilty of 

lascivious acts with a child by solicitation and indecent exposure. He was acquitted 

of the other two counts.

Juergens appeals raising evidentiary claims. We will discuss additional 

facts as necessary.

II. Standard of Review

“Although we normally review evidence-admission decisions by the district 

court for an abuse of discretion, we review hearsay claims for correction of errors 
4

at law.” State v. Smith, 876 N.W.2d 180, 184 (Iowa 2016). “A court must exclude 

hearsay unless it is admitted as an exception or exclusion to the hearsay rule.” 

State v. Overstreet, No. 15-1704, 2016 WL 7403728, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. Dec. 21, 

2016) (citing State v. Newell, 710 N.W.2d 6, 18 (Iowa 2006)). “Subject to the 

requirement of relevance, the district court has no discretion to deny the admission 

of hearsay if it falls within an exception, or to admit it in the absence of a provision 

providing for admission.” Id. (quoting Newell, 710 N.W.2d at 18).

III. Discussion

“Hearsay is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while 

testifying at the trial . . . offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter 

asserted.” State v. Veverka, 938 N.W.2d 197, 199 (Iowa 2020) (citation and 

internal quotation marks omitted). “As a general rule hearsay is not admissible.” 

Id. “Hearsay can be admitted when the proffered evidence falls within one of the 

numerous exceptions to the hearsay rule.” Id.

Here, several of A.R.G.’s out-of-court statements were admitted for the truth 

of the matter asserted through various means. So the district court should not 

have admitted them unless they fell within an exception to the rule against hearsay. 

Juergens claims the district court erred in two respects. First, he argues the court 

erred in admitting a video of the CPC interview and testimony of A.R.G.’s parents 

under the residual exception to the hearsay rule. Second, he argues the court 

erred in permitting the pediatrician to testify to A.R.G.’s statements under the 

medical-treatment exception. We address Juergens’s claims in turn.
5

A. Residual Exception 

We first address the district court’s admission of the CPC interview under 

the residual exception to the hearsay rule. Iowa Rule of Evidence 5.807 governs 

the rule and provides:

a. In general. Under the following circumstances, a hearsay 

statement is not excluded by the rule against hearsay even if the 

statement is not specifically covered by a hearsay exception in rule 

5.803 or 5.804:

(1) The statement has equivalent circumstantial guarantees of 

trustworthiness;

(2) It is offered as evidence of a material fact;

(3) It is more probative on the point for which it is offered than 

any other evidence that the proponent can obtain through 

reasonable efforts; and

(4) Admitting it will best serve the purposes of these rules and 

the interests of justice.

b. Notice. The statement is admissible only if, before the trial 

or hearing, the proponent gives an adverse party reasonable notice 

of the intent to offer the statement and its particulars, including the 

declarant’s name and address, so that the party has a fair opportunity 

to meet it.

The residual exception to the hearsay rule is used “very rarely, and only in 

exceptional circumstances.” Id. at 200 (citation omitted). “‘Before hearsay 

evidence can be admitted’ under the residual exception, ‘the district court must 

make five findings concerning the nature of the evidence: (1) trustworthiness; (2) 

materiality; (3) necessity; (4) notice; and (5) service of the interests of justice.’” Id.

at 201 (citation omitted).

1. The CPC video

Juergens attacks the district court’s finding with respect to the first element, 

whether the CPC video is trustworthy. He points to differences between what 

A.R.G. said in the interview and what she told her parents and grandmother, that 
6

A.R.G. had already been questioned by several adults before the CPC interview, 

and the style of questioning used during the interview.

“With respect to trustworthiness, the relevant consideration is whether the 

proffered evidence has ‘circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness.’” Id. at 203 

(citation omitted). We conclude the CPC interview has “circumstantial guarantees 

of trustworthiness” despite Juergens’s concerns for multiple reasons. First, 

hearsay submitted through video evidence “is more reliable than many other forms 

of hearsay because the trier of fact could observe for itself how the questions were 

asked, what the declarant said, and the declarant’s demeanor.” State v. Rojas, 

524 N.W.2d 659, 663 (Iowa 1994). Second, interviewer Haskin has been 

“educated and trained in this type of interview” and has completed over 2000 such 

interviews. See State v. Neitzel, 801 N.W.2d 612, 623 (Iowa Ct. App. 2011). 

Haskin asked age-appropriate questions that were generally open-ended and nonleading. See Rojas, 524 N.W.2d at 663. She did ask A.R.G., “Has a boy ever 

showed you his coochie?” This is a close-ended question. However, it left open 

A.R.G. to identify the person who showed her “his coochie.” A.R.G.’s response 

identified Juergens, her “grandpa,” in response. In doing so, she went beyond the 

close-ended scope of the question and identified Juergens unprompted. So we do 

not view the questioning as leading. Third, our trust in the interview is not 

undermined by the fact that four-year-old A.R.G.’s story varied slightly from when 

she talked to others. It is unexceptional that a child of A.R.G.’s age would not be 

totally consistent each time she discussed her interaction with Juergens. Fourth, 

we do not take issue with the fact that A.R.G. had talked to others (her parents, 

grandma, and pediatrician) beforehand. Children must be able to recount 
7

instances of abuse to adults for investigations to commence. So we will not find a 

child’s out-of-court statement untrustworthy simply because the child had 

previously disclosed abuse to other adults. Cf. State v. Garcia, No. 20-0227, 2021 

WL 210744, at *1, 2 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 21, 2021) (finding A CPC interview 

trustworthy and the child had previously disclosed the abuse to a parent); State v. 

Heggebo, No. 17-1194, 2018 WL 6719729, at *1, 2, 4 (Iowa Ct. App. Dec. 19, 

2018) (determining a CPC video was trustworthy where the child had talked to both 

parents and a nurse about the abuse and prior to the CPC interview); State v. Olds, 

No. 14-0825, 2015 WL 6510298, at *1, 8 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 28, 2015) (finding a 

video of a CPC interview admissible and the child had previously disclosed the 

abuse to her parent).

Juergens also challenges the last element, whether the evidence serves the 

interest of justice. See Veverka, 938 N.W.2d at 201. “With respect to the finding 

regarding the interests of justice, evidence serves the interests of justice where 

‘[t]he appropriate showing of reliability and necessity were made, and admitting the 

evidence advances the goal of truth-seeking expressed in Iowa Rule of 

Evidence [5.102].” Veverka, 938 N.W.2d at 204 (alterations in original) (citations 

omitted). Juergens contends there can be no “showing of reliability” as required 

under this element because the evidence is not trustworthy. See id. We disagree. 

On the contrary, and as already discussed, we find this evidence to be trustworthy. 

It is reliable. And it is necessary. Since there were no witnesses to this occurrence 

other than Juergens and the child, the statements of the child are “more 

probative... than any other evidence that the [State] can obtain through reasonable 
8

efforts.” Id. So the last element requiring the CPC video’s admission be in the 

interest of justice is met.

We conclude the court correctly admitted the CPC interview video under the 

residual exception to the hearsay rule.

2. Parents’ testimony

Next, Juergens argues the court erred in permitting the parents to testify to 

A.R.G.’s statements to them under the residual exception to the hearsay rule. The 

State’s brief heading argues the parents’ testimony qualifies under the residual 

exception; however, it does not develop a supporting argument. Instead the State 

argues the parents’ “testimony was merely cumulative and therefore not 

prejudicial.” We agree. “[T]he erroneous admission of hearsay is presumed to be 

prejudicial unless the contrary is established affirmatively.” State v. Hildreth, 582 

N.W.2d 167, 170 (Iowa 1998). “However, we will not find prejudice if the admitted 

hearsay is merely cumulative.” Id. 

The parents’ retelling of A.R.G.’s out-of-court statements included 

statements that were properly admitted through other means, including the CPC 

video. The father’s testimony that A.R.G. told him Juergens touched her 

inappropriately transcends the child’s disclosure in the CPC interview. But this 

statement is cumulative of other evidence as well. For example, in A.R.G.’s 

deposition, which was admitted at trial, she stated that “grandpa” touched her 

private part while they watched television. The pediatrician testified that A.R.G. 

“said that he touched her privates and touched her genitals with his hand, and that 

she touched his private parts.” The pediatrician’s clinical notes were admitted at 

trial and stated that A.R.G. “endorsed that ‘grandpa’ showed her his privates and 
9

had her touch his privates with her hand. She also endorsed that he touched her 

privates (pointed to her genitals) with his hand and with his private parts.” 

Therefore, we conclude the testimony of A.R.G’s parents was merely cumulative 

and not prejudicial, making it unnecessary to determine whether A.R.G.’s 

statements were admissible under the residual exception. See id. 

B. Medical-Treatment Exception

Finally, Juergens claims the pediatrician’s testimony was improperly 

admitted under the medical-treatment exception. Iowa Rule of Evidence 5.803(4) 

governs this exception and provides:

The following are not excluded by the rule against hearsay, 

regardless of whether the declarant is available as a witness:

. . . .

(4) Statement made for medical diagnosis or treatment. A 

statement that:

(A) Is made for—as is reasonably pertinent to—medical 

diagnosis or treatment; and 

(B) Describes medical history, past or present symptoms or 

sensations, or the inception or general cause of symptoms or 

sensations.

The reasoning for this exception being “statements made by a patient to a doctor 

for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment are likely to be reliable because the 

patient has a selfish motive to be truthful.” State v. Walker, 935 N.W.2d 874, 879 

(Iowa 2019) (citation and internal quotations omitted). “[A] child-declarant’s 

identification of an abuser during treatment with a healthcare professional . . . fall[s] 

within the exception when ‘the declarant’s motive in making the statement [was] 

consistent with the purposes of promoting treatment’ and was of the type 

‘reasonably relied on by a physician in treatment or diagnosis.’” Id. (fourth 

alteration in original) (quoting State v. Tracy, 482 N.W.2d 675, 681 (Iowa 1992)). 
10

“Yet as to both requirements, the statements must also ‘be reasonably pertinent to 

diagnosis or treatment.’” State v. Smith, 876 N.W.2d 180, 185 (Iowa 2016) (citation 

omitted).

Juergens first challenges whether A.R.G.’s motive in making the statements 

to the pediatrician was for the purpose of medical treatment. He argues the mother 

took A.R.G. to the pediatrician at the direction of the Iowa Department of Human 

Services “to document any evidence [and] for determination of whether abuse 

occurred,” as opposed to medical treatment. Juergens focuses on the fact that 

“[t]here were no claims of physical injury prior to the appointment with [the 

pediatrician].” But that does not mean A.R.G. did not need medical attention. The 

pediatrician testified her examination of A.R.G. “was at the recommendation of the 

ER so that she could be examined by a pediatrician, due to concerns for sexual 

abuse.” See id. at 187 (holding the State has the burden to show the statements 

of the child are pertinent to the diagnosis and treatment by a doctor or medical 

provider). “In cases of child sexual abuse, ascertaining the identity of the abuser 

is important for medical purposes because the child’s age prevents her [or him]

from implementing self-care . . . .” Walker, 935 N.W.2d at 879. When a child 

identifies a family member as their abuser, the treating physician “is . . . often 

concerned about the possibility of recurrent abuse.” See Smith, 876 N.W.2d at 

186. And the physician can identify and treat emotional and psychological injuries 

that result from familial abuse. See id. So a family member’s identity as the 

perpetrator is relevant to the physician’s treatment of the child.

Here, the pediatrician asked A.R.G. questions about what, if anything, 

happened to her body so she could determine if A.R.G. required medical 
11

treatment. The pediatrician asked “very standard questions,” which were “specific 

questions, as [the pediatrician] had been trained in residency.” A.R.G. was 

withdrawn and sat on the floor, presumably in effort to not engage in the 

examination. Yet she meaningfully participated in the examination by nodding or 

shaking her head in response to questions, as opposed to responding to all 

questions uniformly. She shook her head in the negative when the pediatrician 

asked “whether he put his private parts in her mouth,” and “if he put his fingers or 

private parts inside of her private parts.” So we conclude she answered questions 

truthfully and in effort to further her medical treatment.

Juergens also argues A.R.G.’s statements1 are not the type a physician 

could reasonably rely on in treatment or diagnosis. See id. Juergens highlights 

A.R.G. “ha[d] been repeatedly questioned” and had heard “the adults’ version of 

events as they repeat[ed] them to each other” and reasons, as a result, her 

statements could not be reliable. We disagree. Simply because A.R.G.’s family 

asked her questions about what happened so they could understand her needs 

does not mean she could not provide reliable information to a physician. Instead,

we find A.R.G.’s statements to be the type a physician could rely on when 

determining if she required any type of treatment. Here, the pediatrician relied on 

A.R.G.’s statements to conclude she required no additional treatment.

Therefore, we conclude the court properly permitted the pediatrician’s 

testimony under the medical-treatment exception.

 

1 A statement can be “[n]onverbal conduct, if intended as an assertion.” Iowa R. 

Evid. 5.801(c). Here, A.R.G.’s nonverbal conduct of shaking or nodding her head 

amount to statements.
12

IV. Conclusion

The court correctly admitted the CPC interview under the residual exception 

to the hearsay rule. The parents’ testimony about what A.R.G. said was 

cumulative so it was not prejudicial. And the pediatrician’s testimony was properly 

admitted under the medical-treatment exception to the hearsay rule.

AFFIRMED.