SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-2312-17T2

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

LEONARD K. JOHNSON, a/k/a

LEONARD K. FLAGG, KEITH 

L. FLAGG, KEITH JOHNSON, 

LEONARD JOHNSON, and

MARCUS W. FLAGG,

Defendant-Appellant.

Argued September 19, 2019 – Decided

Before Judges Alvarez, Suter, and DeAlmeida.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Cumberland County, Indictment No. 15-09-

0825.

John Walter Douard, Assistant Deputy Public 

Defender, argued the cause for appellant (Joseph E. 

Krakora, Public Defender, attorney; John Walter

Douard, of counsel and on the briefs).

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

January 13, 2020
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A-2312-17T2

Andre R. Araujo, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the 

cause for respondent (Jennifer Webb-McRae, 

Cumberland County Prosecutor, attorney; Andre R. 

Araujo, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Tried to a jury, defendant Leonard K. Johnson was convicted of the firstdegree armed robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1, of a bank in Vineland. The jury 

acquitted defendant of second-degree attempted robbery at a separate bank 

location. N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1 and 2C:5-1.1 On November 9, 2017, the trial judge 

sentenced defendant to fifteen years subject to the No Early Release Act's 

eighty-five percent parole ineligibility. N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2. Defendant now 

appeals, and we affirm.

Before the trial began, the judge conducted a Miranda2 hearing during 

which he listened to defendant's recorded interview with police and a Federal 

Bureau of Investigations (FBI) agent. Early in the three-to-four-hour interview, 

defendant admitted that on the relevant date and time he rode his mountain bike 

to a bank in Vineland. He gave the teller a note demanding money from the cash 

register, showed her a gun, and she passed him $1000 from her register drawer.

1

 Pre-trial, the State dismissed a second count of first-degree armed robbery and 

second-degree attempt to commit armed robbery. 

2

 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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A-2312-17T2

At trial, the teller testified that the incident occurred on April 24, 2013, at 

approximately 9:20 a.m. The perpetrator, whom she was not able to identify, 

was wearing a knitted hat, black sunglasses, and a "bubble-type" jacket. The 

note instructed she hand over unmarked cash and informed her he had a gun. 

The teller looked up, the perpetrator lifted his jacket, and she saw the handle of 

a black gun protruding from his waistband. She gave him the money from her 

drawer, defendant walked out of the bank, and rode away on his bicycle. 

The bank surveillance footage as well as the redacted portions of 

defendant's videotaped statement were played to the jury. Defendant's identity 

was discovered when police connected him to a green minivan in his girlfriend's 

name, which had been captured on various surveillance cameras. 

In his statement, after admitting his involvement in the Vineland bank 

robbery, and that he had ridden his bike to Millville intending to rob a bank

there, defendant denied involvement in several other bank robberies about which 

his interrogators posed a host of questions. His admission came almost 

immediately after an FBI agent joined the session. Defendant thereafter denied 

any involvement in any other crimes, and denied that anyone had assisted him, 

whether friend or family member. The note defendant handed the teller was 

written on the back of defendant's son's paystub. 
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The judge found the statement admissible despite defendant's argument 

that he tried to stop the questioning and exercise the right to remain silent. The 

judge observed that the argument was colorable when the statement transcript 

was read, but that watching the video made clear that the language defendant

was relying upon was not an attempt to stop the interview. 

The relevant portion of the statement took place before the arrival of the 

FBI agent. Defendant engaged in the following colloquy with a Vineland police 

detective:

[Detective]: All right. So can I ask you 

this, and I want you to be honest with me. Are you 

willing, if I ask you a question today, something as 

simple as your date of birth to something involving the 

investigation, are you willing to be honest with me 

today?

Or -- I'd almost have -- like, I would definitely 

have more respect for you if you say, I'm not going to 

answer you truthfully. You know what I mean? Like, 

some people would just rather lie.

[Defendant]: I'm not lying. I'm just 

(inaudible) anything.

[Detective]: No, no, no. I'm asking you --

[Defendant]: I don't have anything to say 

about it. I don't -- whatever it is. I'm saying, if we've 

got to go to court, that what (inaudible).
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[Detective]: No, I understand but what I'm 

saying, if you say -- you know, I'm asking you, are you 

willing to be truthful today if I ask you a question? If I 

ask you a question?

[Defendant]: You asked me a question and I 

answered and I don't -- I'm like, I (inaudible) to say. 

I'm like, you ask a question. I don't have anything to 

say. You all want to ask a question, I'll answer the 

question. 

[Detective]: Okay. No, well, I'm asking 

you, when I do ask it, if that's going to be a truthful 

answer; okay? So I mean, you're truthful when you're 

answering a question?

[Defendant]: Um-hum.

After the exchange, defendant continued to speak to the officers at some length. 

On occasion, he fell silent and became emotional. 

The judge explained his findings as follows:

That if you look at that sheet of paper and you 

read it, it sounds like he's saying something that might 

be able to be construed as an invocation of his Fifth 

Amendment rights.

I'm going to deal with each of these separately 

and I'm going to start with the quote on page 13. And 

I went back and -- during my lunch break and I rereviewed the tape because, quite honestly, when the 

tape was first played to me, I didn't pick up on any of 

this.

I had a transcript in front of me and it went by, 

and it wasn't until cross-examination by defense 
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counsel, after the tape had been completely played, that 

I started to understand the position with regard to the 

defense's assertion.

What bothered me was, is that I said to myself, 

well, how could I have missed that when I was listening 

to the tape? Because when you read the words on the 

page, it sounds like what defense counsel is [talking] 

about has credence.

Then I went back and I looked at the tape, and the 

printed word is a wonderful thing but it lacks temporal 

relevance and that is where the actual recording 

explains more than the simple translation or the printed 

transcript. 

The judge described the officers' psychological ploy as treating defendant as a 

"stand up guy" who would acknowledge responsibility and tell them the truth. 

During the interrogation, defendant asserted his honesty, claimed he was 

ignorant of the details about what he was being told, and invited the officers to 

present their evidence and take him to court. The judge concluded that the 

language quoted above was not an invocation of defendant's Fifth Amendment 

right because it was made:

in response to a lengthy colloquy being presented to 

him about, don't deny it because we think if you deny it 

you're lying, and he says, I'm not lying.

And then he's asserting his innocence by saying, 

I don't know anything about this, and his reference to 

going to court has to go -- do with, we'll just go to court 

and they can present, you know, what you think I am.
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It is not a disengagement from the questioning. 

So with regard to that initial statement, I do not find 

that as even an ambiguous invocation of his right to 

remain silent because it must be taken in the context of 

this lengthy statement by both of the officers doing that. 

The judge said the issue the detective and defendant were discussing was 

whether defendant was willing to be truthful, not whether defendant wanted to 

stop questioning. The judge summarized the effect of watching the video in his 

interpretation of the words:

That clarified the entire picture. This is not an 

invocation and even if it was an . . . ambiguous 

invocation, the reaction by Mr. Johnson himself 

clarified it that he was not declining to answer 

questions. He was simply wanting them to stop 

inferring that he's lying if he denies it. 

So to the extent that he made a knowing and 

voluntary waiver, he made no clear invocation of his 

right and clarified that he was willing to talk after he 

made an ambiguous invocation or ambiguous statement 

related to his right to not answer questions further, and 

that is borne out throughout the remainder of the 

transcript.

At trial, defendant denied committing the offenses, and denied having 

voluntarily waived his right to remain silent. He testified that he did not want 

to speak with the authorities, but only did so because he was emotionally 

exhausted. Defendant claimed he told the detectives that he did not "really want 
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to talk to them" but that they ignored him and continued. He added that he 

continued talking to them only because they threatened to involve his family.

The judge also conducted a Batson/Gilmore3 hearing during jury selection. 

Defendant alleged that the State's exercise of three out of four peremptory 

challenges of African-American jurors, given that defendant was AfricanAmerican, was unconstitutional. The jury panel was comprised of less than fifty 

percent African-American potential jurors, while seventy-five percent of the 

State's peremptory challenges were of African-Americans. The judge concluded

"the mere statistical imbalance . . . with regard to the percentage of AfricanAmericans challenged by the Prosecutor . . . establish[es] a prima facie showing 

in order to move to the second step of the analysis . . . ." 

The peremptory challenges made by the prosecutor were as follows:

1) Juror K.H., an African-American, was

challenged because "her son had been in a similar 

situation as this defendant, was charged and convicted 

of an armed robbery. And . . . it did remind her of her 

son" so the prosecutor feared that it was "too close to 

home" because of the nature of the offense. 

2) Juror P.H., an African-American, was 

challenged because he failed to follow instructions 

while answering the jury screening questions. The 

prosecutor was also concerned he would not be able to 

3

 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986); State v. Gilmore, 103 N.J. 508 

(1986).
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follow the instructions given at trial either. However,

the prosecutor went on to state that her "main concern" 

was that P.H. "had multiple brothers in and out of 

prison, one of which [was] charged with the same type 

of charge here, armed robbery." 

3) Juror K.J., an African-American, was 

challenged because he "has three nephews . . . that have 

been very involved [with the prosecutor's] office . . . ." 

The Prosecutor stated the juror could feel animosity 

towards the State for the prosecution of his nephews. 

The prosecutor identified an African-American member of the jury whose

daughter was convicted of a dissimilar crime and was left on the jury. After 

hearing the prosecutor's response, the judge determined that the State's reasons

were legitimate and shifted the burden to defendant to show they were 

pretextual. Defense counsel was unable to demonstrate that a Caucasian juror 

remaining on the jury had friends and relatives who had prior offenses. 

The judge found that despite defendant's prima facie case of 

discrimination, "the State has successfully demonstrated non-discriminatory 

reasons for the challenges exercised on each of the three African-American 

jurors, who were excluded." He determined the reasons were not pretext for a 

discriminatory exclusion but were "based on a [sic] legitimate jury selection 

concerns, referencing similar criminal offenses in the history of family members 

to that of the allegations against the defendant in this case."
10 A-2312-17T2

While testifying before the jury, the FBI agent to whom defendant 

confessed was cross-examined as follows:

Q. Right. Okay. But in the questioning, and 

I'm going to direct your attention to one of the pages 

here, you said to Mr. Johnson, you know, what did you 

say in the note and didn't he say I don't know? I don't 

remember?

A. The inference I got was he couldn't remember.

Q. Okay. So you show him the note and you 

told us that even after the statement that was taken from 

Mr. Johnson you still didn't feel closure, you didn't feel 

comfortable enough. Did you ever instruct Detective 

Burke or suggest to Detective Burke, hey maybe we 

should get a handwriting analysis of this statement to 

make sure it is Mr. Johnson? Did you ever do that?

A. I did not because I didn't feel it was necessary 

because he admitted that that was his note. And you 

keep saying I didn't feel comfortable, I didn't feel 

comfortable about other things. I knew he robbed the 

bank.

Q. No, my question was you said that you 

didn't have closure?

A. I didn't have closure for other reasons.

Q. Okay.

A. I knew he robbed the bank.

Q. Okay. So in your position he robbed the 

bank; right?
11 A-2312-17T2

A. Absolutely.

Q. Okay. So let me ask you this, and I'm going 

to direct your attention to ---

THE COURT: Can I see Counsel at sidebar 

please? 

[(Emphasis added).]

Upon hearing the exchange, the judge advised counsel that he was going 

to give the jury a limiting instruction. He did so:

THE COURT: Listen, his belief is not 

relevant. That is -- so I'm going to give a limiting 

instruction. I'm just letting you know now I'm going to 

do that. Okay. All right. It's not even up for debate. 

Okay.

(Sidebar Concluded)

THE COURT: All right. Ladies and 

Gentlemen, a couple of minutes ago, Special Agent 

Furey told us that he believed that Mr. Johnson did it. 

I'm striking that. Do you understand? You are not to 

consider that statement at all and here's why.

Whether or not the Defendant is guilty of these 

charges is for you and you alone to determine. Do you 

understand that? Whether he believes that or not is 

irrelevant. Okay. And you're not to consider his 

opinion or belief as to what the Defendant did or did 

not do. That is for you to determine, but you can not 

use in that consideration, his opinion. Do you 

understand?
12 A-2312-17T2

So to the extent that he indicated to you what his 

belief was, you can't consider that and you should not 

-- that should not enter into your deliberations in 

anyway. Does everybody understand that?

Now, I'm not talking about the rest of his 

testimony, I'm only talking about specifically those 

references that he made. Okay. Thank you very much. 

You may continue.

Prior to sentencing defendant, the judge thoroughly reviewed his prior 

criminal history and personal circumstances. He found as a result aggravating 

factors three, six, and nine, and in mitigation factor seven. See N.J.S.A. 

2C:44-1. As the judge said, at age fifty-three, defendant had a history of twelve 

arrests, two twenty-year-old indictable convictions, and two ten-year-old 

disorderly persons offenses. His arrest history "run[s] through 2006." He 

opined that in defendant's case, aggravating factor nine, the need to deter, was 

particularly meaningful because defendant in times of financial stress had turned 

to crime. The judge said, "if things get bad enough, things get hard enough, one 

of the options that he would choose or has chosen is to commit an offense like 

this and it is a first-degree offense." Because of his unusual criminal history, 

the judge gave the aggravating factors "moderate weight," as he did mitigating 

factor seven. As he explained, the factors were "in equipoise," and therefore 

warranted a sentence in the mid-range for a first-degree offense.
13 A-2312-17T2

On appeal, defendant raises the following points:

POINT I

JOHNSON'S PURPORTED WAIVER OF HIS 

MIRANDA RIGHTS, AND HIS SUBSEQUENT 

CUSTODIAL STATEMENTS, WERE NOT 

KNOWINGLY AND VOLUNTARILY GIVEN, AND 

THEREFORE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN 

ADMITTED AT TRIAL. 

A. Miranda Rights Invocation: The Law.

B. Johnson's Invocation of His Rights.

C. Limiting Instructions At Trial.

POINT II

THE PROSECUTION'S PEREMPTORY STRIKES OF 

THREE AFRICAN-AMERICAN JURORS WERE 

NOT FOR CREDIBLY RACE-NEUTRAL REASONS, 

THEREBY VIOLATING DEFENDANT'S STATE 

AND FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS TO 

AN IMPARTIAL JURY. U.S. Const., Amends. VI, 

XIV; N.J. Const. (1947), ART. 1, Pars. 5, 9, 10. 

POINT III

FBI AGENT FUREY, FOR NO REASONS 

WHATSOEVER, IMPROPERLY AND

REPEATEDLY ASSERTED HIS BELIEF THAT 

JOHNSON WAS GUILTY, THEREBY VIOLATING 

JOHNSON'S RIGHTS TO DUE PROCESS AND A 

FAIR TRIAL. U.S. Const., Amends. V, XIV; N.J. 

Const., Art. I, Pars. 1, 9, 10. (Not raised below).

POINT IV

THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF THE TRIAL 

ERRORS DEPRIVED DEFENDANT OF A FAIR 

TRIAL AND WARRANTS REVERSAL OF HIS 
14 A-2312-17T2

CONVICTION. U.S. Const., Amend. VI, XIV; N.J. 

Const., Art. 1, Pars. 1, 10. (Not raised below).

POINT V

THE CASE SHOULD BE REMANDED FOR 

RESENTENCING BECAUSE THE JUDGE 

IMPOSED A MANIFESTLY EXCESSIVE AND 

OVERLY PUNITIVE SENTENCE, IN LIGHT OF 

THE MODERATE WEIGHT GIVEN TO 

AGGRAVATING FACTOR (3), THE IMPROPRIETY 

OF APPLYING AGGRAVATING FACTOR (6), THE 

FAILURE TO WEIGH HEAVILY ENOUGH 

MITIGATING FACTOR (7), AND THE FAILURE TO 

APPLY OTHER APPROPRIATE MITIGATING 

FACTORS. 

I.

We deferentially review a trial court's factual findings regarding a 

defendant's waiver of his right to remain silent. See State v. Tillery, 238 N.J. 

293, 314 (2019). The Court recently reiterated that those findings should be 

disturbed only if "so clearly mistaken that the interests of justice demand 

intervention and correction." Ibid. (quoting State v. A.M., 237 N.J. 384, 395 

(2019)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Legal conclusions, however, are 

reviewed de novo. Ibid.

During custodial interrogation, a suspect must be advised of the following 

panoply of rights: the right to remain silent, that statements may be used against 

him, the right to counsel, the right to counsel even if he cannot afford one, the 
15 A-2312-17T2

right to counsel during questioning, and the right to assert his privilege to remain 

silent at any point during the interrogation. Id. at 315. In New Jersey, we require 

the State to "prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the suspect's waiver was 

knowing, intelligent, and voluntary in light of all the circumstances." State v. 

Presha, 163 N.J. 304, 313 (2000). Such waivers may be found even when not 

explicitly stated. See Tillery, 238 N.J. at 316. In order to determine questions 

of waiver, a trial court considers the totality of the circumstances surrounding 

the custodial interrogation. Ibid. 

According the trial judge appropriate deference, defendant's statements 

were not an assertion of his right to remain silent. His responses were 

occasionally confused and confusing, but at no point did he say the interrogation 

was over. At times he simply did not answer questions, at others denied 

involvement, and vigorously, unequivocally denied the involvement of his 

family after he made his inculpatory statements. Thus, defendant's first point 

lacks merit.

We agree with the judge that as mixed as some of defendant's answers 

were, in the context of the specific portion of the interview he identifies as his 

statement that he no longer wanted to answer questions, defendant was not 

asserting his right to be silent. He was merely reiterating that he had no 
16 A-2312-17T2

information to provide. Otherwise, he said he would answer questions when he 

had information he could give. Defendant's point was not that he was exercising 

his right to remain silent, but that he knew nothing about the robberies.

It is noteworthy that defendant, after he confessed to the Vineland bank

robbery, and the attempt to rob the Millville bank, forcefully insisted that no one 

else was involved in the crimes, and that he did not commit any other bank 

robberies about which he was being asked. Even when confronted with the fact

his minivan had been captured on surveillance cameras at other bank locations

where robberies had occurred, he adamantly denied them. Defendant's 

demeanor on the video demonstrated that just as he had the capacity to deny 

culpability for other offenses after confessing to two crimes, and just as he had 

the ability to deny that anyone else was involved, he had the ability to assert his 

right to remain silent and did not do so. He was not intimidated by the officers

and was not going to answer questions unless and until he was quite ready to do 

so. In fact, defendant acknowledged guilt only when confronted with very 

detailed information. 

Defendant's trial testimony that he only confessed because he felt 

pressured by the officers, and to protect his family, was not convincing. It was 

refuted by the narrative captured on video.
17 A-2312-17T2

Defendant's contention on appeal that his references to court proceedings 

were an invocation of his right to counsel lacks merit. Initially, defendant told 

the officers that he was prepared to go to court because he knew nothing about 

the crime. That is a far cry from any mention of the right to counsel. This 

argument lacks merit to warrant further discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-

3(e)(2).

II.

Turning to defendant's next point, in Batson v. Kentucky, the United 

States Supreme Court held that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 

Amendment "forbids the prosecutor to challenge potential jurors solely on 

account of their race . . . ." 476 U.S. at 89. A defendant asserting the State

wrongfully exercised peremptory challenges under Batson must first "make a 

prima facie showing that a peremptory challenge has been exercised on the basis 

of race . . . ." Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 476 (2008) (citations and 

quotation marks omitted). Once this burden has been met, the prosecutor "must 

offer a race-neutral basis for striking the juror in question . . . ." Id. at 477. 

"Thereafter, the trial court is tasked with determining whether the defendant has 

established intentional discrimination, 'in light of the parties' submissions.'' 

State v. Thompson, 224 N.J. 324, 339 (2016) (quoting Snyder, 552 U.S. at 476). 
18 A-2312-17T2

"It is not until the third step that the persuasiveness of the justification becomes 

relevant -- the step in which the trial court determines whether the opponent of 

the strike has carried his burden of proving purposeful discrimination." Ibid.

(quoting Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768 (1995)). 

The Court in State v. Gilmore, 103 N.J. 508 (1986), "determined that the 

provisions of the New Jersey Constitution, Article I, Paragraphs five, nine, and 

ten, likewise prohibited a prosecutor from exercising peremptory challenges on 

the basis of religious principles, race, color, ancestry, national origin, or sex." 

Thompson, 224 N.J. at 340 (citing Gilmore, 103 N.J. at 524-29). The Court then 

outlined a similar three-step analysis for trial courts to follow when adjudicating 

a claim of unconstitutional discrimination in the use of peremptory challenges. 

Gilmore, 103 N.J. at 533-39.

"That analysis begins with the 'rebuttable presumption that the 

prosecution has exercised its peremptory challenges on' constitutionally 

permissible grounds." Thompson, 224 N.J. at 340 (quoting id. at 535). 

Defendant must make a "prima facie showing that the prosecution exercised its 

peremptory challenges on constitutionally-impermissible grounds." Gilmore, 

103 N.J. at 535. In order to establish a prima facie claim, Gilmore required a 

defendant to show "that the potential jurors wholly or disproportionally 
19 A-2312-17T2

excluded were members of a cognizable group," and that "there is a substantial 

likelihood that the peremptory challenges resulting in the exclusion were based 

on assumptions about group bias rather than any indication of situation-specific 

bias." Id. at 535-36.

We defer to the trial court's findings as to a prosecutor's exercise of 

peremptory challenges. State v. Clark, 316 N.J. Super. 462, 473 (App. Div. 

1998). In this case, the statistical data satisfied defendant's initial burden of 

proof—but the reasons stated by the prosecutor were proper. Id. at 473-74. 

The three excused jurors who were African-American all had family 

members who had either been charged with armed robbery or been prosecuted 

by that county's prosecutor's office. Those factors establish non-discriminatory 

reasons for dismissal. Additionally, the prosecutor did not excuse an AfricanAmerican juror who also had a family member convicted of a crime because the 

crime was dissimilar. 

Defendant's argument on appeal that there are inherent racial biases built 

into the criminal justice system which make the exercise of peremptory 

challenges itself biased does not, on this record, warrant discussion in a written 

opinion. See R. 2:11-3(e)(2).
20 A-2312-17T2

III.

Addressing defendant's next claim of error, it is undisputed that the FBI 

agent's testimony that he "knew" defendant robbed the bank was improper. But

it bears mention that at that juncture the jury had already watched the redacted 

video of defendant's inculpatory statements.

The judge immediately called counsel to sidebar after the FBI agent made 

the comment and immediately explained to the jury that the agent's beliefs were 

"irrelevant," instructing that they were not to take them into account when 

deliberating. The instruction made the necessary point without highlighting the 

statements more than absolutely necessary. We assume that jurors follow 

instructions. State v. Herbert, 457 N.J. Super. 490, 504-05 (App. Div. 2019); 

see also State v. Burns, 192 N.J. 312, 335 (2007) ("One of the foundations of 

our jury system is that the jury is presumed to follow the trial court's 

instructions.") (citing State v. Nelson, 155 N.J. 487, 526 (1998)).

Thus, we do not consider meritorious defendant's argument on appeal that 

the judge should have declared a mistrial because of the agent's statements. In 

the overall context of the trial, and since the jury had seen defendant's 

videotaped admissions, no mistrial was required. 
21 A-2312-17T2

IV.

Defendant also contends that the cumulative effect of trial errors warrants 

a new trial. With the exception of the agent's statements, no error occurred. And 

that mistake was promptly cured by the trial judge with an appropriate 

instruction, making a mistrial unnecessary. The cumulative error argument 

lacks sufficient merit to warrant further discussion in a written opinion. R.

2:11-3(e)(2); see also State v. Orecchio, 16 N.J. 125 (1954).

V.

Finally, defendant argues that the matter should at a minimum be 

remanded for resentencing because of the length of the term of years imposed 

for these offenses. In reviewing excessive sentence claims, we do not substitute 

our judgment for that of the trial court. State v. Fuentes, 217 N.J. 57, 70 (2014). 

A sentence will be affirmed unless the Code's sentencing guidelines have been 

violated, where competent and credible evidence does not support the statutory 

aggravating and mitigating factors, or the sentence shocks the judicial 

conscience. Ibid. 

In this case, the trial court reviewed defendant's criminal history and 

personal circumstances thoroughly before finding aggravating or mitigating 

factors. The record supported his conclusions. The judge's thoughtful 
22 A-2312-17T2

consideration of the factors readily survives appellate review. The sentence 

does not shock the judicial conscience.

Affirmed.